THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Leslie Davis, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2019-000071 

Appeal From Horry County 

Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5917 

Heard February 17, 2022 – Filed June 15, 2022 

AFFIRMED 

Appellate Defender Adam Sinclair Ruffin, of Columbia, 

for Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of 

Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of 

Conway, all for Respondent. 

WILLIAMS, C.J.: In this criminal appeal, Leslie Davis contends the trial court 

erred in admitting evidence of his prior conviction for rape in the first degree,1

 an 

element of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree (CSCM) under 

section 16-3-655(A)(2) of the South Carolina Code (2015). We affirm. 

1

 Davis's prior conviction occurred in Madison County, New York. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On March 14, 2016, Minor, an eight-year-old female, reported to her live-in 

babysitter that her father, Davis, was sexually assaulting her. The babysitter, 

Brooke Squires, testified that before school on March 14, she found Minor naked 

in her bed vomiting and decided to keep her home for the day. Later that 

afternoon, Minor told Squires about the sexual assault. Squires called 911, and 

two officers and an ambulance responded to Davis's residence. Squires further 

testified that several days prior, she found bloody underwear in Minor's room but 

threw them away when Minor stated the blood was from a cut. 

Upon arrival at the hospital, Janet Moore, a sexual assault nurse, examined Minor 

and concluded Minor's labia majora was reddened; however, she did not show any 

bruising, cuts, or rashes on her body. Moore testified that her records did not 

reflect the presence of blood on Minor. Dr. Carol Rahter, an emergency physician 

and medical director of the Children's Recovery Center in Myrtle Beach, also 

examined Minor at the hospital. Dr. Rahter concluded Minor had a normal exam. 

Minor was also interviewed at the Myrtle Beach Children's Recovery Center. 

Dianne Nordeen, a forensic interviewer, videotaped the interview and testified at 

trial that Minor claimed she was raped from January 2016 until March 2016. 

The Horry County Grand Jury indicted Davis for CSCM pursuant to section 

16-3-655(A)(2). During a pretrial motion, Davis moved to suppress the 

introduction of his prior rape conviction and his obligation to register as a sex 

offender. Davis argued that section 16-3-655(A)(2) was unconstitutional because 

it deprived him of his fundamental right to a fair trial by requiring the introduction 

of exceedingly prejudicial evidence to prove an element of CSCM under the 

statute. He asserted the State could stipulate to his prior conviction, the court 

could rule on the conviction's existence, and the court could hold the evidence for 

sentencing if the jury found him guilty of the underlying sexual battery. The trial 

court denied Davis's motion to suppress, finding that under section 16-3-655(A)(2) 

his prior conviction had to be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. 

At trial, the State called the clerk of court for Madison County, New York, and he 

testified that Davis was convicted for "rape in the first degree" on October 21, 

1986. The State also called a sergeant with the Horry County Sheriff's Office who 

stated Davis was required to register as a sex offender due to this prior conviction. 

After deliberations, the jury found Davis guilty as charged and the trial court 

sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment. This appeal followed. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 

Did the trial court err in admitting Davis's prior conviction for rape in the first 

degree and evidence of his obligation to register as a sex offender? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

An appellate court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings under an abuse of 

discretion standard and gives great deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. 

Cross, 427 S.C. 465, 473, 832 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2019). A trial court abuses its 

discretion when its conclusions either lack evidentiary support or are premised on 

an error of law. Id. "[T]he conduct of a trial is largely within the discretion of the 

presiding judge, to the end that a fair and impartial trial may be had." Id. (quoting 

State v. Heath, 232 S.C. 384, 391, 102 S.E.2d 268, 272 (1958)). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

Davis contends the probative value of his prior rape conviction was substantially 

and unfairly outweighed by its prejudicial effect and argues the trial court could 

have remedied such a prejudicial effect by requiring the State to stipulate to its 

existence. We disagree. 

Davis was indicted for CSCM pursuant to section 16-3-655(A)(2), which provides: 

A person is guilty of [CSCM] if: 

. . . 

(2) the actor engages in sexual battery with a victim who 

is less than sixteen years of age and the actor has 

previously been convicted of, pled guilty or nolo 

contendere to, or adjudicated delinquent for an offense 

listed in [s]ection 23-3-430(C) or has been ordered to be 

included in the sex offender registry pursuant to [s]ection 

23-3-430(D). 

Under subsection (A)(2), a prior conviction for a sex crime or an individual's 

mandated obligation to register as a sex offender is an element of CSCM. See 

§ 16-3-655(A)(2). Our supreme court has noted that when a prosecutor chooses to 

try an individual for CSCM under this section, evidence of a prior conviction, as an 

element of the crime, has "insurmountable probative value." Cross, 427 S.C. at 

474, 832 S.E.2d at 286. But, because of the inherently prejudicial stigma a prior 
 

 

sex crime carries, the prejudicial effect of introducing evidence of such a prior 

crime is exceedingly high. Id. at 474, 478, 832 S.E.2d at 286, 288. The 

admissibility of a prior conviction for a sex crime "remains subject to [the] trial 

court's Rule 403 gatekeeping duty to determine whether and when that evidence 

should be admitted." Id. at 477, 832 S.E.2d at 287. Evidence of the prior crime is 

in no way probative of whether a defendant committed the current underlying 

sexual battery. Id. at 477, 832 S.E.2d at 287–88. 

In Cross,

2

 the defendant was charged with CSCM under section 16-3-655(A)(2). 

Id. at 474, 832 S.E.2d at 286. He claimed the State violated Rule 403, SCRE, by 

introducing his prior sex crime conviction before proving he was guilty of the 

sexual battery for which he was charged. Id. at 474, 832 S.E.2d at 286. The 

defendant argued that bifurcation of his trial—requiring the State to prove he was 

guilty of the underlying sexual battery before proving he was guilty of a prior sex 

crime—would sufficiently diminish the risk of excessive prejudice produced by the 

stigma a prior sex crime carries. Id. at 474–75, 832 S.E.2d at 286. The supreme 

court agreed and held that the probative value of the prior conviction, at the time it 

was introduced, was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the 

defendant and bifurcation would have remedied such risks. Id. at 484, 832 S.E.2d 

at 291. However, the court also acknowledged that a defendant's prior conviction 

for a sex crime is admissible to prove the prior-conviction element of CSCM and 

that the state "must" be allowed to introduce it. Id. 

In this case, Davis did not seek to bifurcate his trial into two proceedings like the 

defendant in Cross; Davis sought to force the State to stipulate to his prior 

conviction and thwart the State's ability to present his prior conviction to the jury. 

While Cross does not hold that bifurcation is the only remedy trial courts can 

employ to diminish the risk of unfair prejudice from the admission of a prior sex 

crime, we find forcing the State to stipulate to the prior crime element of section 

16-3-655(A)(2) is incompatible with Cross's holding. Cross states the risk of 

unfair prejudice a prior sex crime poses is exceedingly high during the portion of 

trial the state seeks to prove a defendant sexually assaulted a minor; however, 

evidence of a prior conviction for the sex crime is undeniably probative and 

admissible, and the State must be allowed to introduce it. Id. at 482–84, 832 

S.E.2d at 290–91. 

Moreover, when the existence of a prior conviction constitutes a statutory element 

of a crime, South Carolina appellate courts have refused to require the State to 

2 Cross was decided after Davis's trial. 
accept a defendant's offer to stipulate to the conviction. See State v. Hamilton, 327 

S.C. 440, 443, 486 S.E.2d 512, 513 (Ct. App. 1997) (stating that when the State is 

required to prove a prior conviction as an element of a crime it cannot be forced to 

accept a defendant's offer to stipulate); State v. Anderson, 318 S.C. 395, 399–400 

& n.2, 458 S.E.2d 56, 58–59 & n.2 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding a defendant could not 

force the State to accept an offer to stipulate to prior convictions for driving under 

the influence and noting that a stipulation is an agreement containing mutual assent 

from the parties). Our appellate courts' disinclination to force the State to accept a 

defendant's offer to stipulate falls in line with the well-established principle that the 

State can prosecute an individual with what evidence it chooses. See Old Chief v. 

United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186–89 (1997) (stating the prosecution is entitled to 

prove its case free from a defendant's inclination to stipulate damning evidence 

away); State v. James, 355 S.C. 25, 34, 583 S.E.2d 745, 749 (2003) ("[T]he State 

cannot be forced to accept a defendant's stipulation to prior convictions because 

that would interfere with the State's right to prove its case with 'evidence of its own 

choosing.'" (quoting Hamilton, 327 S.C. at 445, 486 S.E.2d at 514)). 

Finally, even if this court were to force the State to accept Davis's offered 

stipulation, such an agreement would not dampen the prejudicial effect of the prior 

conviction like bifurcation of the trial. The prior sex crime element under section 

16-3-655(A)(2) does not involve generic prior convictions; it requires a specific 

conviction listed under section 23-3-430(C). Even if forced to accept Davis's 

stipulation that he was convicted of a specific sex crime, the State could not have 

proven Davis guilty of CSCM under section 16-3-655(A)(2) using general 

language about his prior offense. The jury would have known Davis was guilty of 

a prior sex crime when the trial court instructed them as to the elements of CSCM. 

See Hamilton, 327 S.C. at 446, 486 S.E.2d at 515 (stating that when a specific prior 

conviction is required to prove a statutory element, generic statements about the 

offense are not possible and the jury would learn about the prior conviction when it 

is instructed on the elements of the crime); Cross, 427 S.C. at 484, 832 S.E.2d at 

291 (holding a defendant's conviction for a specific offense under section 

23-3-430(C) is admissible to prove the prior-conviction element under section 

16-3-655(A)(2) and must be introduced at trial (emphasis added)); cf. Old Chief, 

519 U.S. at 191 (finding that when generic felonies are a statutory element of a 

crime, the probative value of the specific name and nature of an offense is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). 

Because Davis did not seek to bifurcate his trial and a prior sex crime conviction is 

a statutory element of CSCM under section 16-3-655(A)(2), we find the trial court 

did not err in admitting Davis's prior conviction for rape in the first degree or 
evidence that he was required to register as a sex offender. See Cross, 427 S.C. at 

477, 484, 832 S.E.2d at 287, 291 (finding that a prior conviction for a crime listed 

in section 23-3-430(C) has insurmountable probative value in proving the prior 

conviction element of CSCM under section 16-3-655(A)(2) and must be 

introduced at trial). Therefore, we affirm the trial court's evidentiary ruling. 

CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, Davis's conviction is 

AFFIRMED. 

KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.