REL: January 12, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

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may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

CL-2023-0288

_________________________

Sharon Smith Gartrell

v. 

Edward Conant Gartrell, Jr.

Appeal from Madison Circuit Court

(DR-21-900713)

MOORE, Judge.

Sharon Smith Gartrell ("the wife") appeals from a judgment 

entered by the Madison Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing her

from Edward Conant Gartrell, Jr. ("the husband"). We affirm the 

judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand the case with 

instructions to the trial court.
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Background

The parties married in 1998 and separated in July or August 2021. 

On August 24, 2021, the wife filed a complaint for a divorce. On 

September 24, 2021, the husband answered the complaint and filed a 

counterclaim for a divorce. At the trial on January 3, 2023, the wife

sought, among other things, an award of periodic alimony and an 

equitable division of the marital property, which, she claimed, included 

the property held by the Gartrell Family Express Trust ("the trust"), a 

testamentary trust established for the benefit of the husband by his 

mother when she died in 2014. The parties presented competing evidence 

as to whether the husband had regularly used the corpus and income 

from the trust for the common benefit of the parties during the marriage. 

The parties also disputed whether the proceeds of the trust could be used

by the husband to pay periodic alimony. 

On March 9, 2023, the trial court entered a final judgment that, 

among other things, declared the husband's interest in the trust to be the 

separate property of the husband, divided the marital property without 

including the trust property, and declined to award the wife periodic 
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alimony. In the judgment, the trial court set forth the following reasons 

for denying the wife periodic alimony:

"Neither party in this case is employed and neither has 

significant income. [The wife] contends that [the husband]'s

access to income from [the trust], which was funded by [the 

husband]'s mother and in which [the wife] has no legal 

interest, is a source available to [the husband] for payment of 

her requested alimony. That contention can be justified only 

if [the trust], or income therefrom, was 'used regularly for the 

common benefit of the parties during the marriage.' Ala. Code

[1975, §] 30-2-51 .... The requirement of 'regular use' is not 

established by the evidence herein. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Ratliff, 

5 So. 3d 570 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). Accordingly, [the wife]'s 

request for alimony is DENIED."

(Capitalization in original.) On April 6, 2023, the wife filed a 

postjudgment motion seeking to alter or amend the judgment. The trial 

court denied that motion on April 11, 2023. The wife filed a notice of 

appeal to this court on May 3, 2023.

Issues

The wife argues that the trial court erred in declining to award her 

periodic alimony, in failing to reserve the right to award her periodic 

alimony in the future, in determining that the husband's interest in the

trust was the separate property of the husband, and in failing to 

equitably divide the marital property. However, to properly dispose of 
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the appeal, we need only consider whether the evidence supports the 

determination that the trust property and income were the separate 

property of the husband and whether the trial court erred in declining to 

award the wife periodic alimony. We therefore pretermit discussion of 

the other issues.

Standard of Review

As to the trial court's determination that the trust property and 

income were the separate property of the husband, we review the 

judgment to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. See

Morgan v. Morgan, 322 So. 3d 531, 537 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). In 

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we presume 

the correctness of the findings of fact in the judgment, which were based 

on ore tenus evidence, and we will disturb the judgment only if it is

plainly and palpably wrong. Id. at 537-38.

As to whether the trial court erred in declining to award the wife 

periodic alimony, the wife primarily argues that the trial court erred as 

a matter of law by applying Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-51, to determine that 

the income from the trust could not be considered as a source for paying 

periodic alimony. That argument presents a question of law. We review
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questions of law de novo, without affording any presumption of 

correctness to the trial court's decision. Rose v. Rose, 70 So. 3d 429, 431 

(Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

Property Division

Section 30-2-51(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"If either spouse has no separate estate or if it is insufficient 

for the maintenance of a spouse, the judge, upon granting a 

divorce, at his or her discretion, may order to a spouse an 

allowance out of the estate of the other spouse, taking into 

consideration the value thereof and the condition of the 

spouse's family. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the judge 

may not take into consideration any property acquired prior 

to the marriage of the parties or by inheritance or gift unless 

the judge finds from the evidence that the property, or income 

produced by the property, has been used regularly for the 

common benefit of the parties during their marriage."

In this case, the wife argues that pursuant to § 30-2-51(a), the corpus of 

the trust and the income received by the husband as the beneficiary of 

the trust should be classified as marital property because, she argues,

both were used regularly for the common benefit of the parties during the 

marriage.

In a part of the judgment labeled "Separate Estate," the trial court 

found that "[the husband]'s interest in [the trust] constitutes his separate 

estate, and [the wife] is entitled to no interest therein." In the 
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immediately preceding section, labeled "Alimony," the trial court applied

§ 30-2-51(a) to determine that the trust property and the trust income 

could not be considered a source of income for periodic-alimony purposes. 

Reading those two sections of the judgment together, it is apparent that 

the trial court determined that the husband's interests in the corpus and 

in the income of the trust were his separate property because neither 

were regularly used for the common benefit of the parties during the 

marriage. We do not completely agree with the analysis employed by the 

trial court, but we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the trust 

property and the trust income were not subject to equitable division.

Section 30-2-51(a) applies only to "property acquired" by a spouse. 

We have not been directed to any Alabama caselaw defining that term, 

but, for the purposes of equitable distribution, that term refers to 

property to which a spouse has obtained a right to legal ownership. See

Brett R. Turner, 1 Equitable Distribution of Property § 5:21 (4th ed. 

2023). "Property that is owned by third parties was not acquired by the 

parties ...." Id. at § 5:14. Generally, the assets of an irrevocable trust 

are considered the property of a third party. 2 Equitable Distribution of 

Property at § 6:94. As a beneficiary of a trust, a person does not acquire 
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the assets of the trust. See Ex parte Boykin, 656 So. 2d 821, 826 (Ala. 

Civ. App. 1994). As the husband argues, the corpus of the trust could not 

be classified as marital property so long as it remained within the legal 

ownership of the trust. See 2 Equitable Distribution of Property § 6:94. 

The wife did not argue for dissolution of the trust, and none of the assets 

of the trust were ever distributed to the husband, so the trust assets 

remained the property of a third party and, thus, were not subject to 

equitable division. As a beneficiary, the husband maintained only an 

interest in the corpus of the trust, which, because it was bestowed solely 

upon him by gift or inheritance, was properly considered his separate 

property. Id. at § 6:94. Despite the wife's argument to the contrary, the 

family's use of a truck that was owned by the trust, even if the use was 

regular, would not transform the corpus of the trust into marital 

property.

As opposed to the corpus of a trust, income received by a beneficiary 

from a trust may be treated as marital property once the beneficiary 

obtains a vested interest in the income. See Id. at § 6:94 n.22. At the

point the income becomes payable, the beneficiary has "acquired" the 

income because the beneficiary has a legal right to payment. See Moore 
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v. Moore, 111 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). Assuming, without 

deciding, that income received from a testamentary trust can be 

classified as property acquired by gift or inheritance even though the 

income is realized after the original transaction, that income would be 

divisible as marital property only if it was used regularly for the common 

benefit of the parties during the marriage.

The wife primarily relies on evidence indicating that the husband 

deposited trust income into his personal bank account throughout 2020 

and 2021. The wife maintains that, because the husband used his 

personal bank account to pay the marital living expenses, the deposits 

proved that the husband had regularly used the trust income for the 

common benefit of the parties. The husband testified that, before 2020, 

he had deposited the trust income into a trust account maintained by 

Morgan Stanley. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he lost access to that 

account so, he said, he deposited the trust income into his personal bank 

account. The husband denied that any distributions of trust income had 

ever been used to pay for the marital living expenses, and the wife 

admitted that she had no evidence indicating that any distributions had 

been used to pay for marital debts or to purchase marital assets.
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The wife also references the purchase of a recreational vehicle that 

the husband purchased using trust income. The parties used the 

recreational vehicle to attend football games and to visit Lake 

Guntersville before selling it. Other than the recreational vehicle, the 

husband made no other purchases using trust income during the 

marriage. The husband testified that he had routinely returned any 

distributions into the trust account for reinvestment to build up the 

account. The lone purchase of the recreational vehicle is not sufficient to 

prove a regular use of trust income as required by § 30-2-51(a). See

Ratliff v. Ratliff, 5 So. 3d 570, 582 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (citing Bushnell

v. Bushnell, 713 So. 2d 962, 964 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)) (interpreting the 

word "regularly" as used in § 30-2-51(a), Ala. Code 1975, to mean 

frequent or periodic use of the property to satisfy needs of the family); see

also Hull v. Hull, 887 So. 2d 904, 908 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (holding that 

a one-time use of property for the common benefit of the parties cannot 

be considered "regular"). 

Periodic Alimony

Section 30-2-51(a) formerly governed awards of both property and 

periodic alimony in divorce actions. See Nichols v. Nichols, 824 So. 2d 
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797 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (applying § 30-2-51(a) in a property-division 

case); Shewbart v. Shewbart, 64 So. 3d 1080, 1088 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)

(applying § 30-2-51(a) to explain how to analyze a periodic-alimony 

claim). We have not been referred to any case holding that the corpus of 

a trust or trust income cannot be considered a source from which periodic 

alimony may be paid pursuant to § 30-2-51(a), but we find no need to 

reach that issue.

In 2017, the Alabama legislature enacted a new law, now codified 

at Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57, that governs the determination of claims for 

periodic alimony in divorce actions commenced on or after January 1, 

2018. See Ala. Acts 2017, Act No. 2017-164, § 3; Merrick v. Merrick, 352 

So. 3d 770, 773 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (stating that "[t]he issue of alimony 

in the present case is governed by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57"). 

Section 30-2-57(e) provides, in pertinent part, that,

"in determining whether the other party has the ability to pay 

alimony, the court shall consider any and all evidence, 

including all of the following:

"(1) His or her own individual assets, except 

those assets protected from use for the payment of 

alimony by federal law."
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(Emphasis added.) By its plain language, § 30-2-57(e) indicates that the 

individual assets of the payor spouse shall be considered as a source from 

which periodic alimony can be paid unless the assets are protected by 

federal law. Section 30-2-57 does not provide that assets inherited by a 

payor spouse may be considered a source for the payment of periodic 

alimony only when those assets have been regularly used for the common 

benefit of the parties during the marriage. "When the legislature uses 

language that is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial 

construction; instead, the statute should be applied as written." J.L.M. v.

S.A.K., 18 So. 3d 384, 388 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).

The legislature did not repeal § 30-2-51(a) when it enacted § 30-2-

57, and we find no inconsistency between the two statutes. Section 30-2-

51(a) still governs property division. When dividing marital property, a 

trial court still may not consider property inherited by a spouse unless 

that property "has been used regularly for the common benefit of the 

parties during their marriage." § 30-2-51(a); see, e.g., Burkett v. Burkett, 

367 So. 3d 409, 422 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022). Section 30-2-51(a) remains 

effective, but it does not govern determinations of claims for periodic 

alimony, which are now governed by § 30-2-57, a separate statute. See
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Samayamanthula v. Patchipulusu, 338 So. 3d 787, 796 (Ala Civ. App. 

2021) (noting that § 30-2-51(a) controls property division while § 30-2-57 

controls claims for periodic alimony). 

In the judgment, the trial court specifically expressed that the 

income from the trust would not be considered as a source for periodic 

alimony because the wife did not prove that the husband had regularly 

used his income from the trust for the common benefit of the parties as 

required by § 30-2-51(a). The trial court erred in applying § 30-2-51(a) 

when denying the wife's claim for periodic alimony. That error was not 

a mere scrivener's error, as the husband maintains, but was a 

substantive error that prejudiced the wife and one that only reversal of 

the judgment can cure. The evidence showed that the trust held assets 

worth approximately $1,600,000 and consistently generated income, 

including a gross income of approximately $50,000 in 2021. If the trial 

court had considered that income as a source from which periodic alimony

could be paid, the trial court may have reached a different determination 

regarding the periodic-alimony claim.
CL-2023-0288

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment insofar as it 

determined that the trust property and the trust income were not subject 

to equitable division. We reverse the judgment insofar as it denied the 

wife's request for periodic alimony, and we remand the case with 

instructions for the trial court to vacate the portion of the judgment 

adjudicating the claim for periodic alimony and to reconsider that claim 

without applying § 30-2-51(a). We recognize that the husband asserted 

in the trial court reasons other than the ones discussed in this opinion 

why the trust should not be considered a source from which to pay 

periodic alimony. On remand, the trial court may consider those reasons 

in ruling on the wife's periodic-alimony claim. Because "propertydivision and alimony awards are considered to be interrelated, we often 

reverse both aspects of the trial court's judgment so that it may consider 

the entire award again upon remand." Redden v. Redden, 44 So. 3d 508,

513 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009). Accordingly, we also reverse the judgment 

with respect to the property-division award so that the trial court can 

reconsider it along with the wife's claim for periodic alimony.
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AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED 

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Thompson, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.