IN THE COURT OFAPPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

CHARLES RODRICK, an individual, No. 76864-6-I Plaintiff, DIVISION ONE BRENT OESTERBLAD, an individual, Appellant,
V. SUSAN K. GALVEZ, NICHOLAS MAIETTA, EDWIN KEITH JOHNSON, GLENN ALEXANDER WYRICK, and UNPUBLISHED OPINION ADAM GALVEZ, Respondents, ABC PARTNERSHIPS I-X, DEF LIMITED LIABILITIES COMPANIES I-X, XYZ CORPORATIONS I-X, and DANIEL and JENNIFERVAN WAES, Defendants. FILED: April 22, 2019 SCHINDLER, J.

— Brent Oesterblad appeals the summaryjudgment dismissal of his claims against Susan and Adam Galvez, Nicholas Maietta, and Edwin Johnson and the CR 12(b)(6) dismissal of his claims against Glenn Wyrick. Because Oesterblad does not provide an adequate record for review orattempts to raise issues forthe first time on appeal, we affirm.No. 76864-6-1/2

The inadequacy ofthe record makes it difficultto ascertain the factual background. Apparently, Susan and Adam Galvez, Nicholas Maietta, Edwin Johnson, and Glenn Wyrickfiled a lawsuit in Arizona against Brent Oesterblad and Charles Rodrick related to theirownership ofwebsites featuring plaintiffs ortheirfamily members. Following the Arizona litigation, Oesterblad and Rodrickfiled a lawsuit in King County Superior Court againstWashington resident Susan Galvez and various “John Doe” defendants, alleging defamation, trade libel, abuse of process, false light invasion of privacy, and negligent and/or intentional infliction ofemotional distress. The complaint also sought injunctive relief and damages, including punitive damages. Oesterblad laterfiled notices naming Maietta, Johnson, Wyrick, Daniel and JenniferVan Waes (collectively, Van Waes), and Adam Galvez as the John Doe defendants. Oesterblad did not amend the complaint.1 Maietta, Johnson, Wyrick, and Van Waes are notWashington residents. Susan and Adam Galvez (collectively, Galvez) filed and noted a motion for summaryjudgment dismissal forApril 7, 2017. Van Waes filed and noted a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss forthe same day. On February 24, Wyrick, acting pro se, sent a letterto the court asking to be dismissed as a defendant. The letterstates, in pertinent part, “I am requesting ‘DISMISSAL FROM THIS CASE BASED ON A LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION’. I have never lived in the state ofWashington. I have neverworked there. I have never conducted business there.”

1 Oesterblad does not designate the complaint as part ofthe record on appeal.
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In response, the court sent an e-mail to Wyrick and all the parties stating, ‘[Ajil requests foraction from the Court must be made by means ofa motion, properlyfiled forthe record and served on all parties and the Court in compliancewith applicable rules.” Butthe e-mail notes: [T]his Court has already scheduled a motion to dismiss on behalfoftwo otherdefendants in this matterfor 10:00 a.m. on Friday, April 7. It is not too.late for me to add your motion to that date, for argumentto the Court atthe same time. Again, however, you will need to follow-up with a motion to the Court, filed and served no fewerthan 28 days in advance of the hearing. On March 15, 2017, Wyrickfiled a “Notice to Join Motions to Dismiss.” Wyrick states, “I join the Motions ofSusan &Adam Galvez and Jennifer & Daniel Van Waes to dismiss this lawsuitforthe same reasons thatthey have identified.” On March 24, Maietta, acting pro se, filed a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(2), stating, “[Tjhis Court does not have personaljurisdiction over me as I am a resident of California, having neverworked or lived in the State ofWashington.” Citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 78 Wn. App. 447, 896 P.2d 1312 (1995), on March 27, Oesterblad and Rodrickfiled a motion to voluntarily dismiss Van Waes under CR 41(a)(1)(B). In Hewitt, we held a court lacks personal jurisdiction overout-of-state defendants in a defamation action by a Washington resident when none ofthe defendants performed any acts related to the case in Washington. Hewitt, 78 Wn. App. at453-55. On March 29, the court struckWyrick’s March 15, 2017 motion tojoin the Galvez and Van Waes motions as untimely. The orderstates, ‘The Courtwill consider only DefendantWyrick’s letter motion requesting dismissal dated February 24, 2017.”

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On March 31 Johnson, acting pro se, filed a motion tojoin the Galvez summary judgment motion and the Van Waes CR 12(b)(6) motion. The motion states:

Defendant Johnson is a legal resident ofthe State ofTennessee, has never had a physical presence in the State ofWashington, nor plans to evervisitthe State ofWashington nor has he everconducted orwill conduct business in the State ofWashington. The court granted the motion to dismiss Van Waes under CR 41(a)(1)(B). The court also dismissed the claims againstWyrick. ‘CR 41 has not been brought as to Mr. Wyrick, butthe Court is going to grant Mr. Wyrick’s request. Again, there is absolutely
no evidence thatthere is any basis for personaljurisdiction as to Mr. Wyrick.” The court granted summaryjudgment dismissal ofthe claims against Galvez, Maietta, and Johnson as barred by resjudicata and compulsory counterclaims under CR 13(a) in the Arizona lawsuit. Oesterblad appeals. We note nearly all the parties are pro se in this appeal. Pro se litigants on appeal
are held to the same standards as attorneys and are bound bythe same rules of procedure and substantive law. In re Marriage ofOlson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). Oesterblad contends the court erred in granting summaryjudgment dismissal of his claims against Galvez as barred by resjudicata. In Washington, resjudicata applies where a priorfinaljudgment is identical to the challenged action “in (1) subject matter, (2) cause ofaction, (3) persons and parties, and (4) the quality ofthe persons for oragainstwhom the claim is made.” Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 763, 887 P.2d 898 (1995). Oesterblad argues there
was no finaljudgment in the Arizona litigation orthe subject matter and parties are not identical.

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We reviewsummaryjudgment de novo. Citizens All, for Prop. Rights Legal Fund
v. San Juan County, 184Wn.2d 428, 435, 359 P.3d 753 (2015). Summaryjudgment is properwhen there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matterof law. CR 56(c); Scrivenerv. Clark CoIl., 181 Wn.2d 439, 444, 334 P.3d 541 (2014). Ifthe nonmoving party ‘‘fails to make a showing sufficientto establish the existence ofan element essential to that party’s case, and on which that partywill bearthe burden of proofattrial,’ “then the court should grant summaryjudgment. Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). In orderto conduct a de novo reviewofthe superiorcourt summaryjudgment decision, we must reviewthe pleadings submitted and considered bythe superiorcourt. See RAP 9.1. The appellant hasthe burden of perfecting the record so thatthe court has before it all the evidence relevantto the issue raised on appeal. In re Marriage of Haugh, 58 Wn. App. 1, 6, 790 P.2d 1266 (1990). An insufficient appellate record precludes review ofthe alleged errors. Bulzomi v. Dept of Labor & Indus., 72 Wn. App. 522, 525, 864 P.2d 996 (1994). Oesterblad did not designate on appeal the summaryjudgment motion orany of the responsive pleadings. The record is inadequate to review oraddress summary judgment dismissal. Oesterblad also asserts the court erred in dismissing his claims against Maietta, Johnson, and Wyrick under CR 12(b)(6). Oesterblad contends the motions to dismiss
were untimelyfiled and violated local court rules that require a calendar note and the

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moving party’s address.2 Oesterblad argues itwas inappropriate forthe courtto considerthe motions because the court had stricken several of his motions on the same grounds. Because Oesterblad did not raise any ofthese procedural arguments below,
we decline to address these arguments on appeal. RAP 2.5(a) (‘The appellate court may refuse to review any claim oferrorwhich was not raised in the trial court.”). We affirm dismissal ofthe claims against Galvez, Maietta, Johnson and Wyrick.3

WE CONCUR: -.----~



# K

2 Qesterblad also contends the courtwas precluded from considering Maietta s moton to dismiss because Maietta had already answered the complaint. Oesterblad cites no authority in support ofthis argument.

~ Oesterblad filed a motion to strikeWyrick’s response brief on the grounds that it is “untimely redundant immaterial impertinent and violates RAP 1 O.3(a)(6) We deny the motion.