1

Filed 11/20/20 Estate of Trikha CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Estate of SATISH TRIKHA,

 Deceased. 

AVERY M. COOPER, as Administrator, 

etc.,

 Petitioner and Respondent;

SATISH TRIKHA, JR., et al.,

 Petitioners and Appellants,

v.

SUCHITRA TRIKHA, JR., 

 Objector and Appellant.

 G056841

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2010-00354963)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, David L. 

Belz, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
2

Law Offices of Mohammad A. Fakhreddine, Mohammad A. Fakhreddine 

for Petitioners and Appellants Satish Trikha, Jr., and Sharmila Trikha.

Bidna & Keys, Richard D. Keys and Howard M. Bidna for Objector and 

Appellant Suchitra Trikha.

Avery M. Cooper for Petitioner and Respondent Avery M. Cooper, as 

Administrator of the Estate of Satish Trikha.

* * *

Satish Trikha (Decedent) committed suicide while his marriage to Suchitra 

Trikha was pending dissolution. His death led to a tortured decade-long dispute, with 

multiple lawsuits and appeals, between Decedent’s children and Suchitra1over the 

ownership and proper disposition of various assets. 

In the dispute’s most recent chapter, the administrator of Decedent’s Estate

filed a petition under Probate Code section 850 (§ 850) to recover the Estate’s half 

interest in a house in Laguna Niguel, certain financial accounts, and other assets held by

Suchitra. The trial court granted the petition in part, but otherwise found most of the 

disputed assets belong to Suchitra alone. Two of Decedent’s beneficiaries appeal, and 

Suchitra cross-appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

FACTS

Below we summarize the facts and proceedings relevant to the issues in this 

appeal. Additional facts may be found in our prior decisions, Estate of Trikha (2013) 

219 Cal.App.4th 791 (Trikha I) and Estate of Trikha (Dec. 27, 2018, No. G054909)

[nonpub. opn.] (Trikha II).

1

Because many of the parties involved in these proceedings share the same last 

name, we refer to them by their first name. We mean no disrespect.
3

Suchitra married Decedent in 1985. During their marriage, they had two 

sons, Neel Trikha and Rishi Trikha. 

In 1989, Suchitra and Decedent purchased a house on Kings Road in 

Laguna Niguel (Kings Road). They used community property funds for the down 

payment, mortgage payments, property taxes, insurance, and improvements, and they 

lived there from 1990 onward. 

The couple did not take title to the property in their names, however. 

Instead, title was taken in the names of Decedent’s brother, Sushil Trikha, and

Decedent’s father, Bhim Sain Trikha. According to Suchitra, Decedent told her they 

could not take title in their own names because of certain “issues,” but he promised her 

Sushil and Bhim would transfer title to them after a “short period.”

That transfer never occurred. Instead, Bhim quitclaimed Kings Road to 

Sushil in 1997. Over the next decade, Suchitra repeatedly asked Sushil to transfer the 

title to her and Decedent, but he never did. 

Decedent told Suchitra he would try to convince his brother Sushil to 

transfer title to them, but again, title was never transferred. It is unclear from the record 

whether Decedent tried in good faith to convince Sushil to transfer title and was 

unsuccessful, or whether Decedent did not actually intend or try to recover title. In 

hindsight, Suchitra believes Decedent never attempted to have his brother transfer title to

Kings Road into their names. In her words, Decedent was “conning” her and “pulling the 

wool over [her] eyes.”

In 2008, Suchitra discovered Decedent was secretly communicating with

his two adult children from his prior marriage, Satish Trikha, Jr. (Satish) and Sharmila 

Trikha. She felt betrayed by Decedent’s secretive conduct. The couple separated a few 

months later, Suchitra petitioned for dissolution, and Decedent moved out of the Kings 

Road house.
4

Suchitra told Decedent they could reconcile if he ensured Kings Road was 

put in their or their children’s names. She also told Sushil she would dismiss the 

dissolution proceedings if Decedent put all their assets in a trust for Neel and Rishi and if 

he disinherited Satish and Sharmila in writing. Decedent did not do so.

While the dissolution proceedings were pending, Decedent transferred 

$750,000 to his brother Sushil. The following month, Sushil sent a letter demanding that 

Suchitra vacate the Kings Road property for nonpayment of rent. 

In an attempt to recover title to Kings Road as a community asset, Suchitra 

filed a motion to join Sushil as a party to the dissolution proceedings. Decedent opposed 

her motion, and he submitted two declarations avowing he and Suchitra never had an 

ownership interest in Kings Road, they were not in the chain of title for Kings Road, they 

merely “rent” the property from Sushil, and any payments he and Suchitra made toward 

the Kings Road mortgage or maintenance over the years were in lieu of rent. 

In the dissolution proceedings, Suchitra identified Kings Road as a 

community asset in her Schedule of Assets and Debts. Decedent, by contrast, did not

identify Kings Road as a community asset in his Schedule of Assets of Debts. 

In October 2009, while the dissolution proceedings were still pending, 

Decedent executed a will leaving his estate to all four of his children (i.e., Neel, Rishi, 

Satish, and Sharmila), his two grandchildren, and Charles Arrieta, the son of his exgirlfriend. The will omitted Suchitra. Three weeks later, Decedent committed suicide.2

 

After his death, neither the original nor a duplicate original of his will could be located. 

Suchitra filed a lawsuit (the Civil Case) against Sushil to recover her 

community property interest in Kings Road and the $750,000 Decedent had transferred to 

Sushil, among other assets. Her complaint asserted causes of action for imposition of a 

2

Decedent’s death terminated the dissolution proceedings by operation of law. (See 

In re Marriage of Hilke (1992) 4 Cal.4th 215, 220 (Hilke) [“[t]he death of one of the 

spouses abates a cause of action for dissolution”].)
5

constructive trust, quiet title, conversion, and other claims. Sushil filed a cross-complaint 

against Suchitra for ejectment. Satish and Charles Arrieta, both named as beneficiaries in 

Decedent’s will, were later joined in the Civil Case by stipulation. 

Meanwhile, Satish and Charles filed a petition to probate a copy of 

Decedent’s will. Suchitra opposed the petition and filed a will contest, alleging Decedent 

had revoked the will and his assets should pass by intestate succession, under which

Suchitra would receive all their community property and one-third of Decedent’s separate 

property. 

In 2010, the Civil Case (the lawsuit between Suchitra and Sushil) was tried 

before Judge Michael Brenner. Ruling from the bench, Judge Brenner found Suchitra 

and Decedent were the “true owners” of the Kings Road property, Sushil was holding 

title in trust for them, and Suchitra and the Estate held title to the property as joint 

tenants. Although there was no written title to that effect, the court presumed Suchitra 

and Decedent would have taken title to Kings Road in joint tenancy “because that’s how 

they held [another] property.” The court also imposed a constructive trust on the 

$750,000 Decedent had transferred to Sushil, noting a creditor could perfect a claim 

against those funds in the probate case. 

Shortly after Judge Brenner issued his oral ruling, Suchitra and Sushil 

settled the Civil Case, so the trial court never entered a judgment based on Judge 

Brenner’s findings. As part of their settlement, Sushil agreed to transfer title to the Kings 
6

Road property to Suchitra as her sole and separate property, and to transfer $750,000 in 

cash to the Estate.

3

In 2011, Suchitra filed a creditor’s claim against the Estate (the Creditor’s 

Claim), alleging Decedent had breached his fiduciary duty to her by transferring 

$750,000 to Sushil, and seeking to recover that money, certain real estate properties, and 

other assets. The Creditor’s Claim was stayed pending resolution of the will contest.

Suchitra’s will contest was tried later that year. The trial court sustained 

the will contest and denied admission of the will to probate, finding Decedent had 

destroyed his will with the intent to revoke it. 

Satish appealed the judgment, asserting the court misapplied Probate Code 

section 6124, which creates a presumption the testator destroyed the will with intent to 

revoke it where the will was last in the testator’s possession, the testator was competent 

until death, and neither the will nor a duplicate original of the will can be found after the 

testator’s death. We found there was substantial contrary evidence to negate the 

revocation presumption, and we reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial. (See 

Trikha I, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 791.) The parties later settled the will contest, and 

Suchitra waived any objection to admitting the will into probate.4

3

Several months later, Satish filed a motion to vacate Judge Brenner’s oral holding 

that Kings Road would have been held by Decedent and Suchitra in joint tenancy, 

asserting title should have been taken as community property because Civil Code section 

683 requires an express writing to create a joint tenancy. Judge Brenner denied the 

motion, noting the case had settled, the intervenors had not participated at trial, and their

argument about Civil Code section 683 “never came up before the court” and it was “too 

bad we didn’t hear that during the trial.”

4

The settlement agreement allowed Satish to request reimbursement from the Estate 

for his attorney fees incurred in the will contest. The trial court denied his motion 

without prejudice, finding it was premature. Satish later renewed his motion, which the 

court granted, but the court deferred payment until the time of final distribution. Satish 

appealed the deferral, and we affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion. (See Trikha II, 

supra, No. G056909 [nonpub. opn.].) 
7

The will was admitted to probate in 2015, and Avery M. Cooper was 

appointed as the Estate administrator. Cooper filed a petition under section 850 and 

Family Code section 1101 (§ 1101), asserting the Estate has an interest in Kings Road 

and in about 50 other accounts and assets.

5

 The operative first amended petition sought 

(1) declaratory relief that certain assets, including Kings Road, are community property 

and the Estate is a half owner of those assets; (2) an order transferring a one-half interest 

in Kings Road to the Estate; (3) an order transferring a one-half interest in certain 

financial accounts and personal property to the Estate; (4) a finding of unjust enrichment; 

(5) damages for breach of fiduciary duty; and (6) attorney fees and costs. Satish filed a 

response stating he “join[ed]” in the first amended petition “in whole.” 

While the section 850 petition was pending, Suchitra’s Creditor’s Claim 

against the Estate went to trial. The trial court found Decedent had breached his fiduciary 

duties to Suchitra by transferring $750,000 in community assets to Sushil without 

Suchitra’s consent, and it awarded Suchitra half of the $750,000. Because there was 

insufficient evidence Decedent acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, the court declined 

to award Suchitra Decedent’s share of those assets. 

Cooper’s section 850 petition went to trial in 2018. After taking the matter 

under submission, the trial court issued a 17-page “tentative decision” in which it granted

the petition in part and denied it in part. Cooper filed objections to the tentative decision, 

and Satish filed objections and a request for statement of decision. Meanwhile, Suchitra 

filed a proposed judgment based on the court’s tentative decision, which Cooper opposed

as premature. 

5

Section 850 allows a personal representative to file a petition to recover real or 

personal property held by another where the decedent had a claim to that property at the 

time of death. (§ 850, subd. (a)(2)(D).) Section 1101 allows a court to determine the 

rights of ownership to community property and to classify all property held by the parties

to a marriage. (§ 1101, subd. (b).)
8

The following week, the trial court issued an 18-page “final decision” that 

largely mirrored its tentative ruling, and it overruled Satish’s and Cooper’s objections to 

the tentative ruling. The court simultaneously entered its judgment on the petition, using 

Suchitra’s proposed judgment. 

As we discuss in greater detail below, the trial court determined the Estate 

has a community property interest in certain accounts and awarded the Estate half the 

value of those assets as of the date of the couple’s separation. However, the court found 

the Estate has no right, title, or interest in Kings Road and certain other assets, and further 

found Suchitra did not violate any fiduciary duty owed to the Estate.

Satish and Sharmila appeal from the judgment entered on the section 850 

petition. Suchitra cross-appeals. 

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Satish and Sharmila’s Appeal

1. Procedural Issues

Satish and Sharmila first assert the trial court erred by not ruling on their 

and Cooper’s objections to the tentative decision before issuing its final decision. They 

further contend the court erred by entering judgment less than 10 days after Suchitra filed 

her proposed judgment, and thus violated California Rule of Court, rule 3.1590(j), which 

gives any party “10 days after service of the proposed judgment [to] serve and file 

objections thereto.”

They do not explain, however, how these alleged “errors” were prejudicial. 

We therefore conclude any clerical errors below were harmless. (See F.P. v. Monier

(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108 [“trial court’s error in failing to issue a requested statement 

of decision is not reversible per se, but is subject to harmless error review”].) 
9

2. The Kings Road House

a. The Trial Court’s Ruling

Satish and Sharmila next challenge the trial court’s ruling that the Estate 

has no interest in the Kings Road house. To recap the relevant facts, Decedent and 

Suchitra used community funds to purchase and maintain Kings Road, but title stayed in 

Sushil’s name, despite Suchitra’s requests that he transfer title to her and Decedent. 

During the dissolution proceedings, Suchitra asserted Kings Road is a community asset, 

while Decedent maintained Sushil owned Kings Road and therefore is not a community 

asset. After Decedent’s death, Suchitra filed the Civil Case against Sushil to recover title 

to Kings Road. Suchitra obtained a favorable ruling from Judge Brenner and then settled 

with Sushil, who transferred Kings Road to her as her sole property as part of that 

settlement. Decedent’s Estate then filed the section 850 petition to recover a community 

interest in Kings Road from Suchitra.

The trial court found Decedent had deceived Suchitra by falsely 

representing Sushil would transfer title to them, and Decedent never intended or 

attempted to correct the title. The court further found if title had been transferred to 

Decedent and Suchitra, title “would have been taken” in joint tenancy with right of 

survivorship and Kings Road “should be given status as a joint tenancy property”; it also 

concluded Satish (but not the Estate) was bound by Judge Brenner’s oral finding in the 

Civil Case that title would have been taken in joint tenancy, citing the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel. Finally, the court found Decedent’s fraud and deceit constituted a 

breach of his fiduciary duty to Suchitra. Citing section 1101, subdivision (h), which 

permits a court to award 100 percent of a community asset to a spouse when the other 

spouse has breached his fiduciary duty “within the ambit” of Civil Code section 3294, the 

court concluded Suchitra should have sole title to Kings Road, and Decedent’s Estate has

no right, title, or interest in the house.
10

Before addressing the parties’ arguments, we note the trial court’s analysis 

under section 1101 seems to be superfluous. If title to Kings Road were held in joint 

tenancy with right of survivorship, as the court held, Suchitra automatically would have 

succeeded to the entire property when Decedent died, without probate proceedings,

6

and

Decedent’s Estate would have no community interest in the property to award Suchitra 

under section 1101, subdivision (h).

7

 That said, we must take the court’s ruling as we 

find it, and therefore address the parties’ arguments below.

b. Joint Tenancy 

Satish and Sharmila first assert the trial court erred when it found “the 

Kings Road property should be given status as a joint tenancy property.” In reaching this 

conclusion, the court reasoned: “Suchitra and [Decedent] had used joint tenancy with the 

Right of Survivorship as the form of title on other community property assets . . . [and]

[t]he Kings Road property was their primary residence. . . . [¶] . . . It is entirely 

reasonable, based on the testimony of Suchitra in this case, for the Court to conclude, as 

did Judge Brenner, that had the title to the Kings Road house been transferred back to 

6

“Spouses may hold property as joint tenants . . . or as community property . . . .” 

(Fam. Code, § 750.) When property is held in joint tenancy, if one joint tenant dies, the 

survivor automatically succeeds to the entire property, and probate is avoided. (See 

Walters v. Boosinger (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 421, 434; Dang v. Smith (2010) 

190 Cal.App.4th 646, 660.) When spouses hold property as community property, in 

contrast, “there is no automatic right of survivorship; half of the community property 

belongs to the surviving spouse, and the other half belongs to the decedent” and passes in 

accordance with his will, or in the absence of a will, by intestate succession. (In re Brace

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 903, 917; see Prob. Code, § 100, subd. (a); cf. Civ. Code, § 682.1 

[permitting spouses to hold title as community property with right of survivorship in 

instruments created in or after July 2001].) Although property held in joint tenancy is 

presumed to be community property upon dissolution (Fam. Code, § 2581), that 

presumption does not apply if one joint tenant spouse dies before entry of judgment of 

dissolution. (Hilke, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 220-221.)

7

Section 1101, subdivision (h), applies only to community property. (In re 

Marriage of Simmons (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.)
11

[Decedent] and Suchitra that it would have been taken as a Joint Tenancy asset with right 

of survivorship.”

Although we normally review the factual findings underpinning a trial 

court’s property characterization for substantial evidence, we independently review the 

property characterization to the extent it presents a mixed question of law and fact that is 

predominantly one of law, as is the case here. (In re Marriage of Rossin (2009) 

172 Cal.App.4th 725, 734.)

According to Satish and Sharmila, because Decedent and Suchitra never 

expressly declared in writing that Kings Road was to be held in joint tenancy, the trial 

court erred in finding Kings Road “should be given status as a joint tenancy property.”

We agree. 

By statute, a joint tenancy is created only “when expressly declared in the 

will or transfer to be a joint tenancy.” (Civ. Code, § 683, subd. (a); see Estate of 

MacDonald (1990) 51 Cal.3d 262, 271 [“joint tenancies can be created only by a 

writing”]; Estate of Bibb (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 461, 467 [section 683 “requires that the 

creation of a joint tenancy be ‘expressly declared’”].) Joint tenancies cannot be implied

by conduct, so the fact Decedent and Suchitra held other assets in joint tenancy was 

irrelevant. In the absence of an express writing, the court had no legal basis to find Kings 

Road “should be given status as a joint tenancy property.”

California’s community property presumption bolsters our conclusion that 

Decedent and Suchitra would not have taken title to Kings Road in joint tenancy. 

Although Family Code section 750 permits spouses to hold property as joint tenants or as 

community property, Family Code section 760 provides that “except as otherwise 

provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a 

married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” 

In other words, property acquired during marriage is presumptively held as community 

property, not in joint tenancy.
12

There are several exceptions to the community property presumption. It 

does not apply to property acquired during marriage if that property is: (1) traceable to a 

separate property source; (2) acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent; or (3) earned 

or accumulated while the spouses are living separate and apart. (In re Marriage of Valli

(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1400.) None of those exceptions apply here, however. 

In short, even if we were to assume Sushil held title to Kings Road in trust 

for Suchitra and Decedent, as Judge Brenner held, and further assume title would have 

been transferred back to Suchitra and Decedent, in the absence of an express writing we 

have no grounds to presume Suchitra and Decedent would have taken title in joint 

tenancy. Consequently, the trial court erred in finding “the Kings Road property should 

be given status as a joint tenancy property.”8

c. Section 1101

Satish and Sharmila next challenge the trial court’s application of section 

1101, subdivision (h), and its finding the Estate has no interest in Kings Road because of 

Decedent’s fraud. They contend Suchitra failed to prove Decedent breached his fiduciary 

duty to her, the court erred by shifting the burden to Cooper to disprove Decedent 

breached his fiduciary duty, and the application of section 1101, subdivision (h), unfairly 

penalizes Satish and Sharmila for Decedent’s alleged misconduct. 

Both during marriage and pending dissolution, spouses owe certain 

fiduciary duties to each other in managing community assets, and they may maintain a 

claim against one another for breaching that duty. (Fam. Code, §§ 721, 1100, 1101, subd. 

8

Given our holding here, we need not address Satish’s argument the trial court 

erred in giving Judge Brenner’s oral findings on joint tenancy preclusive effect on Satish 

under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. And in any event, the court found “the Estate is 

not collaterally estopped by the ruling of Judge Brenner in the civil case” and therefore 

reached the merits of the joint tenancy issue. Thus, any error the court may have made in 

applying collateral estoppel did not matter because the court still reached the merits of the 

issue.
13

(a), 2102.) Remedies for a spouse’s breach of fiduciary duty normally include awarding 

the other spouse 50 percent of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the 

fiduciary duty. (§ 1101, subd. (g).) But when a breach of fiduciary duty “falls within the 

ambit of Section 3294 of the Civil Code” — that is, “where it is proven by clear and 

convincing evidence that the [spouse] has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice”

(Civ. Code, § 3294) — the other spouse’s remedies for that breach shall include an award 

of “100 percent” of the undisclosed or transferred asset. (§ 1101, subd. (h); see, e.g., In 

re Marriage of Rossi (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 34, 42 (Rossi) [wife’s intentional 

concealment of lottery winnings constituted fraud under Civil Code section 3294, 

supporting award of all those winnings to husband].) “The § 1101(h) threshold 

evidentiary burden is difficult to meet.” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: 

Family Law (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 8:625.5, p. 8-239.)

In finding Kings Road should go entirely to Suchitra under section 1101, 

subdivision (h), the trial court reasoned Decedent “was deceptive in what he told his wife, 

Suchitra. His reassurances to her that the title to the Kings Road house would be changed 

back to reflect that [Decedent] and Suchitra were the owners was false. There was no 

evidence that [Decedent] ever made an effort to correct the title.” The court also 

observed Decedent committed suicide knowing Kings Road was still not in their names, 

which “forced Suchitra to proceed in a civil case against Sushil and Bhim to recover her 

interest in the Kings Road house.”

The trial court went on: “[T]he evidence is clear and consistent with 

Family Code 1101(h) that [Decedent] intentionally misrepresented, deceived and 

concealed material facts from the time of the purchase of Kings Road up until his death 

with the intent to defraud Suchitra. The actions of [Decedent] support a finding that he 

never intended to have title to Kings Road transferred back to himself and Suchitra as he 

had falsely promised her. [Decedent] caused a community asset to be recorded outside of 

the community estate. His failure to take action to correct the title and to bring the Kings 
14

Road house back into the community estate was evidence of his intent to defraud the 

estate. Suchitra had asked her husband to correct the title but [Decedent] never did so. 

His actions or failure to act to correct the title speaks to [Decedent’s] fraudulent intent.”

The court concluded: “As a result of the acts of fraud, deceit and concealment, the Court 

finds that the principles and provisions of Family Code 1101(h) should apply. The public 

policy principles and equity support that conclusion.”

Although it did not expressly say so, by invoking section 1101, subdivision

(h), the trial court evidently determined Suchitra had proved “by clear and convincing 

evidence” that Decedent was guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice” as defined in Civil 

Code section 3294. In reviewing that finding, we must determine “whether the record as 

a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have 

found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 

9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996 [clarifying how appellate courts are “to review the sufficiency of 

the evidence associated with a finding made by the trier of fact pursuant to the clear and 

convincing standard” and rejecting cases that held “the clear and convincing standard of 

proof has no bearing on appellate review”].) We “view the record in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact 

may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and 

drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at p. 996.) 

Applying those standards here, we conclude the record as a whole contains 

substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly 

probable Decedent breached his fiduciary duty in a way that amounted to “oppression, 

fraud, or malice” within the ambit of Civil Code section 3294. Suchitra testified 

Decedent told her when they purchased the house that title would be transferred to them 

after a “short period,” and over the years, he told her he would try to get the house back 

from his brother. Despite those assurances, title always remained in Sushil’s name, 

although it is unclear from the record whether Decedent tried in good faith to convince 
15

Sushil to transfer title and was unsuccessful, or whether Decedent did not actually try to 

recover title. Whatever his intentions might have been during their marriage, however, 

Decedent’s intentions became clear during the dissolution proceedings. In those 

proceedings, Decedent did not identify Kings Road as a community asset in his Schedule 

of Assets of Debts, he opposed Suchitra’s efforts to join Sushil as a party to the 

dissolution proceedings, and he filed multiple declarations avowing he and Suchitra never 

had an ownership interest in Kings Road, they are not in the chain of title for Kings Road, 

and they merely “rent” the property from Sushil. 

In short, after promising Suchitra the family home purchased with 

community funds would be transferred to their names, and after causing the community 

asset to be recorded outside the community estate, Decedent took affirmative steps during 

the dissolution proceedings to prevent that transfer from ever occurring. This evidence 

supports the trial court’s finding that Decedent acted with oppression, fraud, or malice in 

breaching his fiduciary duty to Suchitra, and thus supports awarding Kings Road to 

Suchitra under section 1101, subdivision (h). 

We reject Satish and Sharmila’s argument that the application of section 

1101, subdivision (h), unfairly penalizes them for Decedent’s alleged misconduct by 

depriving them, as beneficiaries of the Estate, of an interest in Kings Road. Section 

1101’s purpose is to enforce the fiduciary obligations of spouses to one another (see 

Rossi, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 43), and the trial court’s ruling did just that. If the 

divorce had been finalized during his lifetime, Satish and Sharmila would have been 

subject to the same outcome, and the result should not change simply because of 

Decedent’s suicide while the dissolution proceedings were pending. (See also Estate of 

McGuigan (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 639, 653, fn.11 [administrator “‘stands in the shoes of, 

and for the purposes of . . . litigation possesses the same but no greater rights than’” the 

decedent].) 
16

We therefore affirm the court’s denial of Cooper’s section 850 petition as to 

Kings Road.

3. The Bristol Park Investment

Satish and Sharmila next contend the trial court committed reversible error 

when it found the Estate has no interest in Bristol Park Investment Group V, LP (BPIG 

V), a real estate investment made through the medical group Suchitra worked for. 

Suchitra testified she wrote a $10,000 check in November 2001 to fund the 

investment, but she could not locate any written documents showing how title was taken. 

The trial court found BPIG V “was a community property asset,” and Suchitra and 

Decedent “would have” taken title to BPIG V as a joint tenancy with right of 

survivorship; the court made this assumption because Decedent and Suchitra had used 

that form of title for a different Bristol Park investment. Thus, concluded the court, the

couple’s interest in BPIG V passed automatically to Suchitra upon Decedent’s death, and 

the Estate had no interest in BPIG V. 

Satish and Sharmila assert the BPIG V investment cannot be held in joint 

tenancy in the absence of an express writing declaring an asset is held in joint tenancy.

We agree. As noted, a joint tenancy cannot be created by implication; it must be express. 

(Civ. Code, § 683.) In the absence of an express writing, the trial court had no legal basis 

to assume BPIG V was taken in joint tenancy. The portion of the judgment declaring the 

Estate has no right, title, or interest in BPIG V is therefore reversed and remanded.

4. The Bank of America Account

Satish and Sharmila next challenge the trial court’s finding that the Estate 

has no interest to the funds in a Bank of America account ending in 2092. Satish and 

Sharmila contend substantial evidence supports the Estate’s community claim to those 

funds, and Suchitra concedes as much. We therefore reverse and remand that portion of 

the judgment. 
17

5. Fraud by Suchitra

Satish and Sharmila next challenge the trial court’s finding that Suchitra 

was not subject to sanctions under section 1101. The court found, without discussion, 

Suchitra did not breach her fiduciary duty to Decedent or the Estate. We review the 

court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, examining the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party. (Rossi, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 40.)

Satish and Sharmila argue Suchitra breached her fiduciary duties to 

Decedent’s Estate by refusing to account for community funds in the financial accounts 

in her name during the proceedings below, and by taking title to Kings Road in her name 

alone after settling the Civil Case with Sushil. We disagree. 

As Suchitra correctly observes, all of the conduct at issue occurred after 

Decedent died, and thus cannot be used to support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty

under section 1101. Although a spouse’s fiduciary duties to her spouse continue after 

separation in anticipation of dissolution until the date of distribution (Fam. Code,

§ 2102), Satish and Sharmila cite no authority that those fiduciary duties continue after 

the other spouse dies, or that the spouse owes those duties to the deceased spouse’s 

estate. We therefore affirm that portion of the judgment. 

6. Jewelry

In its judgment, the trial court determined the Estate has no right, title, or 

interest in certain “[m]iscellaneous jewelry.” However, it also found “[t]he following 

items, which have not been in the possession, custody or control of Suchitra Trikha since

at least before [Decedent’s] death, were the separate property of [Decedent]: (1) Satish 

Black Diamond Ring [Item 2]; (2) Satish’s Diamond Rings [Item 22]; and (3) Satish 

Diamond Rings [Item 39].” (Italics added.) Satish and Sharmila challenge the italicized 

language stating those three items are not in Suchitra’s possession. They assert that 

language does not appear in the court’s final decision and is contradicted by Suchitra’s 

own testimony. 
18

Substantial evidence supports the language in the judgment that Suchitra 

has not possessed those items “since at least before” Decedent’s death. Suchitra testified 

at trial that Items 2, 22, and 39 were obtained during their marriage, and she returned all 

the jewelry “obtained during the marriage” to Decedent after she petitioned for 

dissolution. At deposition, Suchitra also testified Decedent “has” Item 2, his black 

diamond ring. Because substantial evidence supports the language in question, we affirm 

that portion of the judgment. 

B. Suchitra’s Cross-Appeal 

1. The Statute of Limitations

Turning to Suchitra’s cross-appeal, we next consider the trial court’s ruling 

that the Estate has a community property interest in 11 financial accounts. Suchitra

contends Cooper’s petition on those accounts is time-barred by Probate Code sections 

13561, subdivision (b), and 13562, subdivision (e). The court rejected her statute of 

limitations argument, first in overruling Suchitra’s demurrer, then in denying her motion 

for judgment on the pleadings, and again in its final decision. We review Suchitra’s 

statute of limitations argument de novo. (Sahadi v. Scheaffer (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 

704, 714.)

Probate Code section 13561 makes a surviving spouse liable to a 

decedent’s beneficiary if the decedent’s property is in her possession at the time of the 

decedent’s death, but the action must be brought within three years of the decedent’s 

death. Probate Code section 13562 makes the surviving spouse liable for restitution to 

the decedent’s estate if the surviving spouse still has the decedent’s property, but again, 

the action must be brought within three years of the decedent’s death. According to 

Suchitra, Cooper’s section 850 petition is time-barred under these sections because it was 

brought more than three years after Decedent’s death.

We disagree. The three-year limitations periods in Probate Code sections 

13561 and 13562 do not apply to a section 850 petition. As one leading treatise notes, 
19

actions under section 13561 or 13562 are “forever barred three years after the death of 

the decedent, without tolling for any reason. [Citation.] The statute of limitations for a 

Prob Code § 850 petition, on the other hand, is determined by the underlying right 

asserted in the petition; that is, the same statute of limitations that would apply had an 

ordinary civil action been brought.” (Matthew Bender Practice Guide: California Trust 

Litigation, ¶ 7.08[4] (2020), italics added; see id. ¶ 7.12 [collecting statutes of limitations 

applicable to actions underlying a section 850 petition]; Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice 

Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2020), ¶ 15:588, p. 15-159 [“The claim underlying the 

§ 850 petition is subject to the same statute of limitations that would apply had an 

ordinary (‘non-§ 850’) civil suit been brought”]; see, e.g., Estate of Young (2008) 

160 Cal.App.4th 62, 77 [action by administrator of estate to recover real property was 

governed by limitations period for fraud].) Because Cooper did not elect to administer 

his claims pursuant to Probate Code sections 13561 and 13562, the statutes of limitations 

in those two sections are inapplicable.9

2. The Date of Valuation Used for the Financial Accounts

Suchitra next challenges the trial court’s decision to award the Estate a 

community interest in certain accounts valued at “the date of separation.” She contends 

the court erred in using the date of separation to value the accounts, and the court should 

have instead used the values as of Decedent’s death. 

The date of valuation matters because the collective value of the accounts 

decreased by about $200,000 between the date of separation and date of death. Suchitra 

testified most of that money “was used to pay the attorneys’ fees,” although it is unclear 

from the record whether she was referring to her own attorney fees or Decedent’s.

9

Given our holding here, we need not address Satish and Sharmila’s contention that 

Suchitra waived her statute of limitations defense by failing to raise Probate Code 

sections 13561 and 13562 as an affirmative defense in her response to the petition.
20

In using the couple’s date of separation for valuation, the trial court noted 

“[t]here was little evidence provided” about the accounts, but “[f]rom the date of 

separation each party [was] subject to the standards of F[amily] C[ode section] 721 and is 

responsible to provide a full and accurate disclosure of those assets.” Thus, although it 

did not expressly say so, it appears the trial court used the date of separation at least in 

part because of Suchitra’s failure to account for the decreased balances. We review the 

court’s use of the date of separation for valuation under the abuse of discretion standard. 

(See Estates of Collins & Flowers (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246; In re Marriage of 

Honer (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 687, 693-694.) 

Suchitra contends the trial court should have used the date of death instead. 

She notes Decedent’s death automatically terminated the dissolution proceedings. (In re 

Marriage of Lisi (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1575 [“death of one party before entry of 

an order dissolving the marriage abates the [dissolution] action”].) Because she and 

Decedent were therefore still married when he died, she asserts half their community 

assets belonged to Decedent at his death, and the value of his Estate’s share in those

community assets should be fixed at the time of death. (See Prob. Code, § 100, subd. (a); 

Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1341 [surviving spouse’s 

community interest in increased value of deceased husband’s separate property stock was 

properly valued at date of death].) 

Satish, Sharmila, and Cooper argue any postseparation earnings on the 

accounts are separate property, not community property (Fam. Code, § 771), which 

weighs in favor of using the date of separation. They further argue the accounts 

decreased in value after the date of separation because Suchitra used the accounts to pay 

her separate expenses. 

On balance, in the absence of any published case on point, and given the 

significant decrease in the account values between the date of separation and the date of 

death, Suchitra’s failure to provide an accounting for how that money was spent, and the 
21

overall lack of evidence presented about the accounts, we conclude the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in using the date of separation to value the accounts. We therefore 

affirm that portion of the judgment. 

III.

DISPOSITION 

We reverse and remand those portions of the judgment declaring the Estate 

has no right, title, or interest in BPIG V and in the Bank of America account ending in 

2092. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. In the interests of justice, each party shall 

bear his or her own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

ARONSON, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IKOLA, J.

GOETHALS, J.