[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 36 (Thursday, February 22, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 13276-13282]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-03506]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 5, 25, and 97

[IB Docket No. 18-313; FCC 24-6; FR ID 202994]


Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Denial of reconsideration.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission or FCC) discusses the adoption of an Order on 
Reconsideration (Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order), which addressed 
three petitions for reconsideration challenging the orbital debris 
mitigation rules adopted by the Commission in 2020. In the Orbital 
Debris Reconsideration Order, the Commission declined to modify, 
withdraw, or otherwise change the orbital debris mitigation rules 
adopted in 2020 Orbital Debris Order, published August 25, 2020, but 
also provided some clarification and guidance as relevant for some of 
the issues raised in the petitions for reconsideration.

DATES: The denial of reconsideration is effective February 22, 2024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alexandra Horn, Space Bureau, 
Satellite Programs and Policy Division, 202-418-1376, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c3a2afa6bba2ada7b1a2edabacb1ad83a5a0a0eda4acb5"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="e2838e879a838c869083cc8a8d908ca2848181cc858d94">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Order 
on Reconsideration (Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order), FCC 24-6, 
adopted on January 25, 2024, and released on January 26, 2024. The full 
text of this document is available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-6A1.pdf. To request materials in accessible formats 
for people with disabilities, send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#71373232444145311712125f161e07"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="773134344247433711141459101801">[email protected]</span></a> or call 
the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 
202-418-0432 (TTY).
    Paperwork Reduction Act. The Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order 
did not contain new or modified information collection requirements 
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-
13. Therefore, it does not contain any new or modified information 
collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 
employees, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 
Public Law 107-198,see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4).
    Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 
1980, as amended (RFA), requires that a regulatory flexibility analysis 
be prepared for notice and comment rulemaking proceedings. As the 
Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order does not adopt or otherwise modify 
any existing rules, no regulatory flexibility analysis is necessary.

Synopsis

I. Introduction

    1. In the Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order, the Commission 
addressed the issues raised in three petitions for reconsideration of 
the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, 86 FR 52422 (August 25, 2020): (1) a 
petition filed by the Boeing Company (Boeing), EchoStar Satellite 
Services, LLC (EchoStar), Hughes Network Services, LLC (Hughes), Planet 
Labs, Inc. (Planet), Spire Global, Inc. (Spire), and Telesat Canada 
(Telesat) (collectively, Combined Petition), asking the Commission to 
reconsider information disclosure requirements relating to satellite 
maneuverability, large system disposal reliability, the use of 
deployment devices, and the use of certain types of persistent liquids; 
(2) a petition filed by Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX) 
seeking reconsideration or clarification of the Commission's orbital 
debris mitigation rules as applied to non-U.S.-licensed satellite 
systems seeking U.S. market access; and (3) a petition filed by Kuiper 
Systems LLC (Kuiper) seeking adoption of a new rule addressing issues 
related to the orbital separation of large non-geostationary orbit 
(NGSO) constellations.
    2. In responding to these petitions, the Commission declined to 
modify, withdraw, or otherwise change the information collection 
requirements adopted in the 2020 Orbital Debris Order. It also declined 
to change its rules as applicable to non-U.S.-licensed systems seeking 
U.S. market access, or to adopt new rules governing the orbital 
separation of large NGSO constellations. After reviewing the petitions, 
the Commission found that the petitioners failed to show any material 
errors or omissions in the 2020 Orbital Debris Order or raise any new 
or additional facts that would warrant reconsideration under the 
Commission's rules. However, the Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order 
provided some clarification or guidance as appropriate on some of the 
issues raised in the petitions for reconsideration.

II. Background

    3. On November 19, 2018, the Commission released a notice of

[[Page 13277]]

proposed rulemaking (2018 Orbital Debris NPRM), 84 FR 4742 (February 
19, 2019), in IB Docket No. 18-313, concerning the mitigation of 
orbital debris in the new space age. It represented the first 
comprehensive look at the Commission's orbital debris rules since their 
adoption in 2004 and was intended to improve and clarify these rules 
based on the experiences gained in the satellite licensing process and 
various improvements in mitigation guidelines, practices, and 
technologies. After reviewing the record and public comments filed in 
response to the 2018 Orbital Debris NPRM, including individual comments 
filed by some of the parties involved in the petitions for 
reconsideration, the Commission adopted the 2020 Orbital Debris Order 
on April 23, 2020. At the same time, the Commission also adopted a 
further notice of proposed rulemaking, 85 FR 52455 (August 25, 2020) 
(2020 Orbital Debris FNPRM), which sought further comment on adopting 
rules concerning the probability of accidental explosions, the total 
probability of collisions with large objects, maneuverability above a 
certain altitude in low-Earth orbit (LEO), post-mission orbital 
lifetime, casualty risk, indemnification, and performance bonds for 
successful disposal. On September 24, 2020, the petitioners filed their 
timely petitions for reconsideration, and by November 24, 2020, five 
oppositions and comments to the petitions were filed.

III. Discussion

A. Combined Petition Issues

1. Relationship to Other U.S. Government Technical and Policy Documents
    4. The petitioners raised concerns about the consistency of the 
rules adopted with policies and guidelines developed by expert Federal 
agencies, noting in particular the U.S. Government Orbital Debris 
Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) and Space Policy Directive-3 
(SPD-3), and allege that the disclosure rules ``[diverge] substantially 
from the recommendations of other expert federal agencies, including, 
in some cases, disregarding the findings of the recently updated multi-
agency Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices.'' Both Viasat and 
OneWeb challenged this assertion.
    5. The petitioners failed to identify any respect in which the 
Commission's actions in adopting the 2020 Orbital Debris Order are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the policies, goals, and guidelines 
identified in SPD-3 and the ODMSP. To the extent they are relying on 
the fact that the specific technical matters addressed in the 
Commission's rules are not addressed at the same level of specificity 
in SPD-3 and the ODMSP, these arguments are not well-founded, and do 
not establish a ``divergence.'' As noted by Viasat and OneWeb, both of 
these documents invite further action including through the development 
of additional standards and best practices. The ODMSP expressly states 
that it may be appropriate to ``consider the benefits of going beyond 
the standard practices and tak[ing] additional steps to limit the 
generation of orbital debris.'' Furthermore, the Commission found the 
petitioners have in some instances alleged divergence from these 
documents only by ignoring other relevant provisions of those 
documents.
    6. Even if the Commission were to accept the petitioners' 
unsupported allegation of divergence, the Commission observed in 
adopting these rules that the ODMSP ``applies, by its terms, only to 
government missions that are procured and operated by government 
agencies for governmental purposes . . . rather than in the context of 
regulatory review,'' and for that reason ``some tailoring'' of the 
ODMSP was necessary to fit into the Commission's existing regulatory 
structure.
2. Burden on Applicants
    7. Throughout the Combined Petition, petitioners argued that the 
regulations adopted in the 2020 Orbital Debris Order will be overly 
burdensome on applicants. Viasat and Maxar challenged this claim. In 
raising concerns with burdens on applicants, the petitioners rely on 
generalized concerns that regulation will be ``overly stringent,'' or 
that applicants will experience difficulties because of ``staff 
conclusions that the substance of the disclosed information was 
insufficient or inconsistent with what they thought should be 
required.'' These speculative concerns about possible errors in 
Commission decision-making do not provide a basis for reconsideration. 
In any event, and in an effort to assist applicants in preparing 
applications, the Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order offers 
additional discussion with respect to some aspects of the specific 
disclosure requirements adopted.
3. Maneuverability
    8. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission adopted a rule 
requiring applicants to disclose the extent of maneuverability of 
planned space stations, noting that most commenters addressing this 
topic, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), agreed with the adoption of this disclosure. The Commission 
provided some examples of the type of information that applicants could 
include in their disclosure statements, as suggested by NASA in its 
comments on the topic.
    9. The Commission also revised a separate rule provision on 
avoiding collisions with large objects to require applicants to state 
whether the probability that their spacecraft will collide with a large 
object during the orbital lifetime of the spacecraft is less than 0.001 
(1 in 1,000), in line with the ODMSP. As part of that rule, the 
Commission adopted a presumption that the collision risk with large 
objects could be assumed zero or near zero during the period of time 
when the space station is able to conduct avoidance maneuvers, absent 
evidence to the contrary. The Commission noted that in individual cases 
where there is evidence that a particular system or operator is unable 
to effectively maneuver or is only maneuvering at a risk threshold that 
raises reasonable questions about its ability to meet the 0.001 
collision risk threshold even with some degree of maneuverability, this 
assumption would not be applied and further analysis would be 
necessary. The Commission did not adopt a definition of ``effective 
maneuverability'' but sought comment in the 2020 Orbital Debris FNPRM 
on a definition, as well as on whether to adopt a requirement that 
spacecraft must be maneuverable.
    10. Boeing, Planet, and Spire argued that the Commission should 
withdraw its ``requirements'' regarding effective maneuverability until 
this term is adequately defined. These petitioners did not distinguish 
between the two distinct portions of the rule, and instead argued 
generally that without a more detailed metric for effective 
maneuverability, such as the ability to alter the course of a 
spacecraft by a certain distance in a particular time period, the FCC 
rules cannot be administered fairly. However, they did not take issue 
with the assumption of zero or near zero risk for maneuverable 
spacecraft. Viasat, OneWeb, and Maxar opposed this request, noting, in 
effect, that pending development of a comprehensive definition, 
disclosure of maneuverability information serves a valid public 
interest objective and provides supporting evidence for addressing the 
Commission's collision risk rule.
    11. As observed in the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, factual 
information regarding a satellite or system's maneuverability is useful 
not only to the

[[Page 13278]]

Commission when it is assessing applications, but to other operators as 
it helps interested parties to better understand how operators plan to 
handle predicted collision risks. Moreover, details about spacecraft 
maneuverability enhance the Commission's grasp of other data presented 
in an applicant's orbital debris mitigation plan and are essential 
information for the administration of Commission rules in several key 
areas. For example, the satellite's expected lifespan in orbit can be 
significantly influenced by its maneuverability and impact an 
operator's ability to comply with Commission rules. Additionally, the 
information provided by applicants in these disclosures can also be 
drawn upon as the Commission works to further refine its rules through 
rulemaking. As noted by opposing parties, ``facilitating a thorough 
understanding of other operators' ability to maneuver in-orbit is 
fundamental to responsible orbital stewardship'' and disclosure fosters 
a ``transparent'' and ``predictable'' operating environment.
    12. Although the petitioners' request appears to focus on any 
disclosure concerning maneuverability, to the extent the petition 
sought only removal of the ``not effectively maneuverable'' exception 
to the zero or near zero collision risk assumption in the Commission's 
large object collision risk rule, the Commission found that the 
petitioners provided no valid arguments in support of this approach. 
The Commission declined to adopt an approach that could maintain an 
assumption of zero or near zero risk even in the face of evidence 
suggesting that such an assumption is not warranted because collision 
avoidance capabilities are minimal. The Commission expects the 
precedent that evolves from a case-by-case approach in evaluating 
factual information regarding a satellite or system's maneuverability 
will guide applicants and will address petitioners' concerns with 
subjective and inconsistent licensing determinations. Finding that the 
petitioners have not provided any evidence of a material error, 
omission, or reasoning that would warrant reconsideration under the 
Commission's rules, the Commission declined to modify its rules 
pertaining to maneuverability.
    13. Additional Resources for Applicants. During the pendency of 
this proceeding, NASA developed the ``NASA Spacecraft Conjunction 
Assessment and Collision Avoidance Best Practices Handbook'' (Handbook) 
and issued a revised version in February of 2023. The Handbook is a 
useful resource that applicants may find helpful in developing and 
documenting conjunction assessment and collision avoidance 
capabilities, including for maneuverable spacecraft. The Handbook makes 
some specific recommendations on conjunction assessment and collision 
avoidance, including (i) designing spacecraft with capabilities to 
facilitate conjunction assessment and mitigation; (ii) providing 
ephemeris for conjunction screening at adequate intervals and covering 
adequate duration; and (iii) when the probability of collision (Pc) 
estimated for a conjunction exceeds the mitigation threshold 
(recommended to be 1E-4) at the mitigation action commitment point, 
pursuing a mitigation action that will reduce Pc by at least 1.5 orders 
of magnitude from the remediation threshold, and ensure that the 
mitigation action does not create any additional conjunctions with a Pc 
value above the mitigation threshold.
4. Large System Disposal Reliability
    14. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission adopted a rule 
requiring applicants to provide a statement demonstrating that the 
probability of success for their chosen disposal method is 0.9 or 
greater for any individual space station. The rule also requires that 
for space station systems consisting of multiple space stations, the 
demonstration should include additional information regarding efforts 
to achieve a higher probability of successful disposal, with a goal, 
for large systems, of a probability of success for any individual 
station of 0.99 or better. Drawing on provisions in the ODMSP, the 
Commission also stated in the 2020 Orbital Debris Order that additional 
scrutiny will be given to larger deployments, including consideration 
of factors such as mass, collision probability, and orbital location.
    15. Boeing, Planet, Spire, and Telesat raised a concern that the 
rule will result in the 0.99 probability goal for satellites that are 
part of large systems becoming in effect an enforceable requirement. 
They also objected to providing ``sensitive'' commercial 
considerations, such as satellite mass and orbital location, as part of 
the Commission's assessment.
    16. The Commission found that the petitioners provided no valid 
basis for reconsideration. With respect to concerns that the 0.99 
disposal reliability goal described in the adopted rule is in effect a 
firm requirement for all large deployments, these concerns are neither 
justified nor supported by any new information. Since the adoption of 
this rule, the Commission has authorized several large system 
deployments, and in doing so has addressed reliability together with 
other relevant factual considerations, such as collision risk for 
satellites that are not reliably disposed. While it appears to be the 
case based on both authoritative studies and the experience gained in 
these decisions that the largest systems will require very high 
disposal reliability in order to avoid unacceptably high collision 
risks, the approach to disposal reliability discussed in the 2020 
Orbital Debris Order does not foreclose in individual cases the 
authorization of systems of satellites with individual satellite 
disposal reliability of less than 0.99. With respect to concerns raised 
about examination of ``sensitive'' information, the Commission noted 
that information such as orbital location and satellite mass (as a 
component of the area-to-mass ratio of the satellite, necessary for 
calculating residual orbital lifetime and related collision risk) are 
routinely provided as part of applications, and this information is 
routinely publicly available in the Commission's files. Orbital 
location is included in all licenses. To the extent examination of the 
orbital debris risks presented by a large constellation requires 
examination of information for which confidential treatment can be 
justified, the Commission's rules provide for such treatment. The 
Commission therefore does not consider these concerns as justifying 
reconsideration.
5. Deployment Devices
    17. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission modified a 
rule requiring applicants to provide a statement that the space station 
operator has assessed and limited the amount of debris released in a 
planned manner during normal operations to specifically require an 
orbital debris mitigation disclosure for any separate or ``free-
flying'' deployment devices, distinct from the space launch vehicle, 
that may become a source of debris. The Commission also discussed in 
the 2020 Orbital Debris Order the scope of any such disclosure, noting 
that it should address facts such as the orbital lifetime of the device 
and collision risks associated with the device itself, including an 
evaluation of collision risk specifically associated with the 
deployment of multiple satellites from a deployment device (e.g., re-
contact analysis). The Commission stated that such disclosures would be 
largely assessed on a case-by-case basis, reasoning that this approach 
provides the flexibility necessary to address new developments in space 
station design

[[Page 13279]]

and addresses the difficulty of designing specific disclosure rules for 
each different type of device that may be used.
    18. Boeing, Planet, Spire, EchoStar, and Hughes argued that this 
disclosure requirement should be replaced with the ODMSP standard, 
which specified that ``[f]or all planned released debris larger than 
5mm in any dimension, the total debris object-time product in low-Earth 
orbit . . . should be less than 100 object-years . . . per 
spacecraft.'' They also argued that the Commission should not require 
re-contact risk analyses because no consensus exists on what is 
considered an adequate re-contact risk analysis, it was not proposed 
for comment in the 2018 Orbital Debris NPRM, and there is not enough 
guidance as to how to conduct a re-contact analysis or how it would be 
used in the application review process.
    The Commission found that the petitioners' argument concerning the 
ODMSP provisions on operational debris relies on a selective reading of 
those provisions and does not justify reconsideration of the adopted 
rule. The sentence in the ODMSP immediately preceding the sentence that 
petitioners rely on states that ``[e]ach instance of planned release of 
debris larger than 5 mm in any dimension that remains in orbit for more 
than 25 years should be evaluated and justified.'' This additional 
wording would not be necessary if the rationale for this guideline is 
that any release of operational debris of less than 100 object-years 
should be routinely considered acceptable. Instead, as a condition 
precedent to applying the 100 object-year metric, this guideline 
contemplates a determination that the release is evaluated and 
justified. The approach adopted by the Commission is in no way 
inconsistent with this approach, which identifies a need, for example, 
to consider whether alternative methods for deployment might be 
utilized that do not result in the potential for debris generation.
    19. With respect to the concerns raised about re-contact analysis, 
the Commission rejected the petitioner's contention that there was 
insufficient notice to require a re-contact analysis, stating that the 
2018 Orbital Debris NPRM sought comment on the issue of the use of 
deployment devices and specifically proposed to require ``information 
regarding the planned orbital debris mitigation measures specific to 
the deployment device, including the probability of collision 
associated with the deployment device itself.'' A re-contact analysis 
addresses ``the probability of collision associated with the deployment 
device itself.'' The Commission further noted that since adopting the 
2020 Orbital Debris Order, it has authorized multiple deployers on a 
case-by-case basis. Applicants provided information detailing the ways 
in which they plan to mitigate recontact and Commission assessment of 
each application took into account the specific re-contact mitigation 
measures and overall mission facts that were unique to each mission in 
order to condition the licenses accordingly. For example, one applicant 
provided a report using a high-fidelity approach based on a Monte Carlo 
analysis of deployment sequence in its application, using the current 
manifest as the worst-case scenario and incorporating the worst 
possible change in manifest subsequent to filing to demonstrate that 
the applicant had taken the relevant re-contact risks into account and 
the Commission conditioned their license to require the operator to 
utilize a deployment sequence that will reduce the probability of re-
contact and ensure that the risk of re-contact specified in its 
application does not increase based on this analysis. Another applicant 
stated in its Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR) that it would 
support at least three re-contact mitigation strategies for deployments 
from the spacecraft, including ensuring that each deployment group will 
be spaced apart by at least 90 minutes, or one full orbit, optimize 
deployment orientation and sequence to minimize re-contact, and use on-
board propulsion as necessary to use for maneuvers to minimize the risk 
of re-contact, and the Commission conditioned the license to require 
the applicant to optimize customer spacecraft deployment orientation 
and sequency to minimize re-contact and utilize on-board propulsion as 
necessary for maneuvers to minimize the risk of re-contact as a result. 
Each analysis in these examples provides varying levels of specificity 
and detail concerning their respective re-contact analyses, but still 
offers important context for mission characteristics unique to each 
application.
    20. As these examples demonstrate, applicants have been able to 
address these concerns by drawing on available information, and in some 
instances involving additional analysis and modeling. The Commission 
anticipates, based on this experience, that this case-by-case approach 
will continue to provide a flexible and workable framework for 
applicants. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the petitioners' 
assertions about potential difficulties in the licensing process have 
not been realized and do not justify reconsideration of this particular 
rule.
6. Persistent Liquids
    21. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission updated its 
rules to require operators to submit a ``statement that the space 
station operator has assessed and limited the probability, during and 
after completion of mission operations . . . of release of liquids that 
will persist in droplet form.'' The Commission proposed this rule 
change in response to increasing interest in use by satellites 
(including small satellites) of alternative propellants and coolants, 
some of which due to their physical properties might persist in droplet 
form. The Commission noted specifically ionic liquids that would 
persist if released in droplet form by a deployed satellite and the 
substantial debris cloud that resulted from release of such droplets by 
Soviet-era satellite operation. At orbital speeds, such droplets can 
damage active spacecraft. The Commission noted its expectation that the 
orbital debris mitigation plan for any system using persistent liquids 
should address the measures taken, including design and testing, to 
eliminate the risk of release of liquids and to minimize risk from any 
unplanned release of liquids in droplet form.
    22. The Combined Petition asserted that no evidence exists that the 
use of such liquids is growing in the United States' space industry 
while at the same time raising a concern that the Commission did not 
provide enough guidance on how information about persistent liquids 
will be assessed. The Commission found that the petitioners did not 
provide a basis for reconsideration of the rule adopted or demonstrated 
how the current rule is unworkable. Contrary to their assertions, there 
have been license requests involving spacecraft that would utilize the 
types of ionic liquids that could persist in space if released in 
droplet form. Ionic liquids offer some benefits such as ease of on-
ground handling as compared to the toxic volatiles often used for 
spacecraft propulsion, and so it is also possible that they may be more 
frequently utilized in the future. With respect to criteria to be 
applied in addressing instances in which use of ionic liquids is 
disclosed, the 2020 Orbital Debris Order identified some 
considerations. In addition, under a case-by-case approach, the 
Commission may consider whether, if released, these debris objects 
would remain in orbit for only a short time, perhaps due to deployment 
and operation at low

[[Page 13280]]

altitudes such as those below inhabitable space stations, or whether 
there are other natural processes that result in dispersion of the 
droplets. Other potentially relevant considerations include whether 
containment of the liquid can be expected to be effective, established 
as appropriate by design, testing data, or flight heritage, and whether 
the propulsion system is shielded from micrometeoroid and debris 
strikes that might result in leakage. These considerations provide some 
examples of the types of information that might support a favorable 
public interest finding with respect to individual applications but are 
not intended as an exhaustive list.
7. ``Case-by-Case'' Approach
    23. Petitioners raised concerns about a ``case-by-case'' approach 
for reviewing the information provided in response to disclosure 
requirements, and requested that all information disclosure 
requirements be coupled with guidance provided by the Commission 
regarding the manner in which the information can be used and any 
minimum operation or performance requirements that must be demonstrated 
in the disclosed information to warrant the grant of a satellite system 
authorization. SpaceX argued a ``case-by-case'' approach sets an 
inconsistent baseline for assessing orbital debris risk, and imposes 
inconsistent rules of the road. Viasat and OneWeb, in opposition, 
supported the use of case-by-case analysis. Viasat noted that case-by-
case analysis is an indispensable part of the Commission's licensing 
process and that it would make little sense for the Commission to 
withdraw its existing information disclosure requirements pending 
completion of its further work on additional orbital debris safety 
standards because doing so would deprive the Commission of critical 
information necessary to evaluate the orbital safety implications of 
NGSO systems. Viasat argued that the Commission is obligated to 
consider the information elicited by these rules in order to make a 
finding that the proposed operations are in the public interest, and 
that eliminating the information disclosure requirements adopted in the 
2020 Orbital Debris Order would be counter-productive by removing from 
the Commission's rules useful guidance for applicants about information 
that is relevant in seeking a license, thereby increasing uncertainty. 
OneWeb supported case-by-case review, observing that in circumstances 
involving complex and quickly evolving technological debris mitigation 
capabilities, such review is necessary in order to facilitate a safe 
space environment, but at the same time affords operators flexibility 
and avoids overly prescriptive regulations.
    24. The added disclosure requirements provide factual information 
that is relevant in assessing an application and supporting a public 
interest determination. The Commission found that the petitioners do 
not allege that the factual information elicited by the new disclosure 
requirements would never reveal a substantial or disqualifying concern 
related to orbital debris, and disagreed with the petitioners' 
contention that incorporating such disclosure requirements in the 
Commission's rules will lead to ``subjective'' or ``discretionary'' 
decision-making. The characteristics of satellites or satellite systems 
can significantly vary across applications. These rules serve to ensure 
that the Commission has sufficient information to only grant those 
applications that would serve the public interest, and while the 
Commission recognizes the potential benefits of identifying specific 
metrics or including the same blanket requirements on all operators for 
various aspects of debris mitigation plans, such as providing certainty 
to applicants, the development of a specific, one-size-fits-all metric 
on a particular point or including blanket requirements that do not 
make sense in conjunction with specific satellite or satellite system 
characteristics, may in certain cases slow innovation by being overly 
prescriptive or otherwise fail to account for innovative aspects of a 
particular system design.
    25. Moreover, for certain metrics, the Commission found in the 
Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order that it does not have a sufficient 
record to support a ``one-size-fits-all'' metric on this issue. But, 
the absence of a specific metric on a particular point does not 
foreclose the need to gather information and evaluate mitigation plans 
in light of the larger and well-recognized goals of U.S. Government 
policy in this area--ensuring the future of the commercial space 
industry by limiting the release of operational debris and avoiding 
fragmentation events, whether caused by explosions or collisions. The 
development of metrics and refinement of criteria for evaluating 
orbital debris mitigation plans is an active and ongoing process. While 
consideration of the development of a metric or comprehensive 
assessment method continues, the Commission elects to proceed 
incrementally and make fact-based decisions on individual applications 
on a case-by-case basis. As noted in connection with several of the 
specific disclosure requirements to which petitioners objected, the 
case-by-case approach has successfully permitted the Commission to 
proceed with review and authorization in individual cases. Contrary to 
SpaceX's argument that the case-by-case approach threatens space 
sustainability by imposing inconsistent rules of the road, experience 
with these cases, along with parallel developments in standards 
development, will inform future decision-making. In applying this case-
by-case approach, the Commission is committed to ensuring consistency 
in application of its rules and to working with applicants to gather 
additional information as necessary to ensure that applicants are not 
penalized without a prior opportunity to address potential concerns. 
The Commission expects the precedent that evolves from a case-by-case 
approach will provide contours to guide applicants regarding the extent 
to which metrics or comprehensive methods may aid in facilitating a 
favorable Commission determination on pending applications. Finally, as 
part of the Space Bureau's Transparency Initiative, the Commission 
directs the Space Bureau to highlight any developments arising from 
this case-by-case approach, providing additional guidance on orbital 
debris mitigation information disclosures.

B. SpaceX Petition--Market Access and Orbital Debris Mitigation 
Showings

    26. In its petition, SpaceX requested that the Commission 
reconsiders allowing non-U.S.-licensed space stations to satisfy the 
orbital debris mitigation showing requirement by demonstrating that 
debris mitigation plans for the space station(s) for which U.S. market 
access is requested are subject to direct and effective regulatory 
oversight by the national licensing authority. Alternatively, SpaceX 
requested the Commission to explicitly delineate the information an 
applicant must submit with its application in support of such a 
demonstration or disclose where that information may be easily and 
publicly found. In particular, SpaceX urged the Commission to require 
applicants to include: (i) all materials related to orbital debris 
mitigation submitted to the foreign regulator in connection with an 
application for a space station authorization; and (ii) all 
authorizations that include conditions related to orbital debris 
mitigation.
    27. In support, SpaceX argued that allowing non-U.S.-licensed 
systems to rely on the orbital debris mitigation requirements of other 
countries to meet

[[Page 13281]]

Commission requirements creates a ``loophole'' that could undermine the 
Commission's space safety objectives by allowing operators to evade 
oversight by choosing forums with less stringent rules and little input 
from other affected satellite operators. In response, Kepler 
Communications Inc., OneWeb, and Viasat submitted oppositions and 
comments to the SpaceX petition, stating that there is no ``loophole'' 
in the Commission's rules and in fact, based on their own experience as 
non-U.S.-licensed market access applicants, they have been subject to 
the same level of regulatory scrutiny as U.S.-licensed systems. The 
Commission agreed that the end result is the same whether a market 
access applicant makes an orbital debris mitigation showing under 47 
CFR 25.114(d)(14)(i) through (iv) or (d)(14)(v) prior to gaining U.S. 
market access, the applicant will have had its orbital debris 
mitigation plan subject to a rigorous review to ensure space safety.
    28. While Commission rules allow market access applicants to 
satisfy the requirement to describe the design and operational 
strategies to minimize orbital debris risk by demonstrating that their 
debris mitigation plans are subject to direct and effective regulatory 
oversight by the national authority that licensed their space station 
operations, such a showing requires market access applicants to provide 
supporting documentation and respond to inquiries from Commission staff 
in order for the staff to compare the non-U.S. regulatory regime, 
including its rules and ongoing oversight, and determine whether there 
is an effective regulatory regime in place. This information, when 
filed with the Commission, becomes a part of the record, and other 
interested parties are able to review it too. If the Commission finds 
additional information is necessary to complete its review, that 
information also becomes part of the record and available for review. 
In either case, interested parties will have access to the same 
information the Commission relies on to determine whether a grant of 
market access is in the public interest, the only exception being if 
the applicant is able to demonstrate an overriding public interest need 
to keep some of the information confidential.
    29. Having a one-size-fits-all disclosure requirement as proposed 
by SpaceX can be more burdensome than necessary for the Commission to 
determine whether an applicant's debris mitigation plan has been 
thoroughly reviewed and whether the applicant will be subject to 
effective regulatory oversight. Using a case-by-case approach provides 
more flexibility and can serve the public interest better by being less 
burdensome. For instance, as Commission staff become familiar with the 
requirements and review process of a particular non-U.S. regulator, 
they can tailor their information request based on knowledge of how 
that regulator conducts an orbital debris mitigation review, and what 
regulatory requirements it imposes. The staff may ask for more 
information in an area that they have found the regulator does not 
require the same level of detail as the Commission, or may likewise ask 
for less information in another area where the Commission has already 
found sufficient regulatory oversight. In either case, if another party 
believes that circumstances have changed with a particular non-U.S. 
regulatory oversight process or has reason to believe that an applicant 
is not subject to sufficient regulatory oversight, they can raise those 
concerns with the Commission and the Commission will factor that in as 
part of its overall review process. Ultimately, if the Commission finds 
after its review of either the applicant's mitigation plan or the non-
U.S. regulatory regime under which it is licensed, that additional 
conditions are necessary to ensure space safety, the Commission can so 
condition the grant of market access, similar to what it does for U.S. 
licensees in similar situations. The Commission also notes that while 
it does accept ``direct and effective'' regulatory oversight showings 
under 47 CFR 25.114(d)(14)(v), that rule does not preclude applicants 
from providing the same basic orbital debris mitigation information 
provided by U.S. licensees, which are detailed in 47 CFR 
25.114(d)(14)(i) through (iv). In fact, the provision of such 
information can support a showing of direct and effective regulatory 
oversight, particularly in instances where the information is provided 
to but not routinely made publicly available by the non-U.S. regulator. 
And, except for a few cases, applicants have generally found it 
preferable to just provide the Commission with a description of the 
design and operational strategies for orbital debris mitigation instead 
of presenting all of the showings necessary to demonstrate the 
effective regulatory oversight of another national authority. 
Accordingly, the Commission found SpaceX has not demonstrated a need 
for elimination or changes to 47 CFR 25.114(d)(14)(v).

C. Kuiper Petition--Orbital Separation of Large NGSO Systems

    30. In the 2018 Orbital Debris NPRM the Commission sought comment 
on whether it should adopt an upper limit for variances in orbit for 
NGSO systems. After reviewing an extensive record on the issue, 
including comments on the related topic of whether, and how, the 
Commission should assign orbital altitude ranges for large 
constellations of NGSO satellites, in 2020 the Commission said it would 
not adopt a maximum orbital variance for NGSO systems, nor a required 
separation between orbital locations, and will instead continue to 
address these issues on a case-by-case basis. The Commission found that 
there were a wide range of considerations in such cases, and while it 
was concerned about the risk of collisions between the space stations 
of NGSO systems operating at similar orbital altitudes, it found that 
these concerns are best addressed in the first instance through inter-
operator coordination.
    31. Kuiper petitioned the Commission to reconsider its decision to 
not establish an orbital separation requirement, including for large 
NGSO constellations, and associated limits. Kuiper stated that the 
Commission should expressly require a later-filed large NGSO 
constellation to maintain sufficient orbital separation from an 
earlier-filed large NGSO constellation. In support, Kuiper stated that, 
since adoption of the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission has 
received a number of applications and license modifications for large 
NGSO constellations to operate in orbits that are already occupied, or 
proposed to be occupied, by other large NGSO constellations. Therefore, 
Kuiper argued the Commission's expectation that applicants' own desire 
for space safety would lead them to voluntarily choose non-overlapping 
orbits has proven false, and these new applications constitute facts 
that did not exist at the time the Commission adopted its 2020 Orbital 
Debris Order and therefore warrant reconsideration.
    32. OneWeb, ARCLab, and Maxar filed comments in support of Kuiper's 
petition. OneWeb argued that the time is ripe for the Commission to 
reconsider the potential for orbital separation rules to help ensure a 
safe space environment. ARCLab argued that operating large 
constellations with overlapping orbits sharply increases systemic risk, 
and if those orbits are not explicitly designed for compatibility it 
would result in sharp increases in conjunctions and collision avoidance 
maneuvers. Maxar added that since adoption of the 2020 Orbital Debris 
Order, the increase of large constellations with overlapping orbital 
variances has become an issue of broad applicability and therefore ripe 
for Commission consideration.

[[Page 13282]]

    33. Both Viasat and Kepler opposed Kuiper's petition, arguing that 
Kuiper's proposed rule would undermine the incentive for an operator to 
engage in the type of inter-system coordination anticipated by the 2020 
Orbital Debris Order and in essence create a first-come, first-serve 
priority system for orbital regions in LEO, which would advantage the 
largest, most established satellite operators, and potentially lead to 
a monopolization of certain sections of LEO. Viasat also stated that 
Kuiper has not established that an orbital overlap rule is necessary to 
promote space safety, and that there are alternative approaches the 
Commission could consider.
    34. The Commission continues to take space safety issues seriously, 
and the 2020 Orbital Debris Order recognized that issues may arise with 
respect to large NGSO systems, and the orbits at which they operate. 
Notably, the 2020 Orbital Debris Order advises that applicants for 
large systems may be asked to provide specific information about their 
planned orbital variance as well as how their system operations would 
accommodate other spacecraft traveling through or operating in the same 
region. While Kuiper supported its petition with the ``new'' fact that 
applications for large NGSO systems with competing orbits have been 
filed since adoption of the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission 
found that this circumstance alone is not sufficient justification for 
it to revisit its decision to allow in the first instance parties to 
work on an inter-operator coordination agreement. At the time the 
Commission adopted its 2020 Orbital Debris Order it had already 
considered that parties may want to use similar orbits, but it also 
found that inter-operator coordination could resolve any space safety 
concerns, and no party has introduced evidence that any such concerns 
remain unresolved. The Commission has continued to monitor the 
situation since adoption of the 2020 Orbital Debris Order and continues 
to believe that the best solution for maintaining space safety is for 
operators to have the flexibility to coordinate in a manner that works 
best for their situation, rather than have the Commission dictate how 
that coordination should proceed. In addition, the Commission reviews 
closely applications for new licenses or modifications that may raise 
overlapping orbital shell issues and works with the applicants and 
other interested parties to ensure that either coordination has 
occurred to minimize space safety issues, or changes are made to the 
proposed operating parameters to address any remaining concerns. The 
Commission will continue to monitor the overall orbital separation 
environment, and to the extent it sees a breakdown in the coordination 
process or other space safety issues, it will consider at that time 
whether new general rules are needed to either improve the coordination 
process or address space safety concerns. Accordingly, the Commission 
declined to establish an orbital separation requirement, including for 
large NGSO constellations.

IV. Ordering Clauses

    35. Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 
154(j), 405, and 47 CFR 1.429(b) that the petitions for reconsideration 
filed by Boeing, EchoStar, Hughes, Planet, Spire, Telesat, SpaceX, and 
Kuiper in IB Docket No. 18-313, are denied.
    36. It is further ordered that the Orbital Debris Reconsideration 
Order shall be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2024-03506 Filed 2-21-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P


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