alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KEVIN T. AUBART, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

RYAN D. McCARTHY, Acting Secretary 

of the Army, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-16676 

D.C. No. 1:17-cv-00611-LEK-KJM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 2, 2020**

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Kevin T. Aubart, a civilian military employee, appeals pro se from the 

district court’s summary judgment in his 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) action alleging

entitlement to reimbursement for his commuting costs after the Army changed his 

duty station. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-16676 

Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Aubart failed 

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was entitled to 

reimbursement. See Dep’t of Def., The Joint Travel Regulations, App. A, A1-33 

(defining Permanent Duty Station as a “[b]uilding or other place (base, military 

post, or activity) where an employee regularly reports for duty”); see also FTC v. 

Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A conclusory, 

self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is 

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.”).

We reject as meritless Aubart’s contentions that his First Amendment rights 

were violated by the district court’s order regarding communication with army 

personnel and that the district court improperly disregarded certain declarations.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Sino-Biotics, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), David Lennox, President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operations Officer (Principal Executive Officer) and Sole Director of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Sino-Biotics, Inc., and will be retained by Sino-Biotics, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.







/s/   David Lennox

David Lennox, President, Chief Executive

Officer, Chief Operations Officer (Principal

Executive Officer), Sole Director





Date:  July 14, 2008
No. 99-50737 

-1-

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-50737

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ELIZABETH TINOCO DE CRUZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. DR-99-CR-299-01

--------------------

May 25, 2000

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Elizabeth Tinoco de Cruz (Tinoco) appeals after pleading

guilty to illegal reentry into the United States following

deportation. She argues that her attorney was ineffective at

sentencing (1) for failing to move for a downward departure under

Application Note 5 of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 and (2) for failing to argue

that her prior drug conviction was not an “aggravated felony” which

warranted a 16-level increase under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).

Although we generally do not entertain claims of ineffective

assistance on direct appeal, we feel that the record is
No. 99-50737 

-2-

sufficiently developed to address Tinoco’s claims. See United

States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1987). In

Tinoco’s plea agreement, both parties stipulated (1) that a 16-

level increase was appropriate because Tinoco had previously been

deported subsequent to an aggravated-felony conviction, (2) that a

total offense level of 20 was appropriate, and (3) that Tinoco

should be sentenced at the bottom end of the corresponding

guideline range. 

Given these stipulations, Tinoco has not shown that her

attorney was ineffective at sentencing for failing to argue that

Tinoco’s prior conviction was not an aggravated felony. See United

States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994)(“[An] attorney

cannot be considered deficient for failing to raise claims

knowingly and voluntarily waived in the process of plea

bargaining.”). 

With respect to a downward departure under Application Note 5

of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, we note that Tinoco’s counsel specifically

quoted Application Note 5 in its entirety in his brief supporting

his motion for a downward departure based on the minor nature of

the defendant’s prior felony conviction. At the sentencing

hearing, however, the court specifically ruled that it did not

believe it had the discretion to downwardly depart based on

Application Note 5, and Tinoco’s counsel objected. It therefore

cannot be said that Tinoco received ineffective assistance of

counsel for a failure to raise this issue. 

AFFIRMED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHNNY LEE JONES III,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

BARTH, Sgt.; HOWARD, Officer; COSBY,

Officer; THOMPSON, Officer; WARREN

JOHNSON,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 22

- 15205

D.C. No. 3:21

- cv

- 00028

- MMD

CSD

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 17, 2022 * *

Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Arizona state prisoner Johnny Lee Jones III appeals pro se from the district

court’s order denying his motion for a prelimi nary injunction in his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action alleging First, Eighth, and Fourteenth A mendment violations . We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUN 1 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 22

- 15205

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review for an abuse of

discretion. Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco , 746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th

Cir. 2014). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jones’s motion for

a preliminary injunction because Jones failed to demonstrate that such relief is

warranted. See id . (plaintiff seeking preliminary injunction must establish that he

is likely to succeed on the merits, he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in his favor, and an

injunction is in the public interest).

Jones’s motion to expedite (Docket Entry No . 9 ) is denied as mo o t

.

Jones’s request to certify a constitutional question to the attorney general

(Docket Entry No. 17) is denied.

AFFIRMED

.
Exhibit 10.3

[CSI Letterhead]

October 31, 2006

Mr. William J. McAleer

McAleer Computer Associates, Inc

3213 Executive Park Circle

Mobile, AL 30606

Dear Bill:

Since the Definitive Agreement is still being reviewed, we propose that we extend the time period under our Letter Agreement to
execute the Definitive Agreement until November 30, 2006. We have a Board of Directors meeting scheduled for November 10, 2006 and are planning to vote on the Definitive Agreement at that time. In order to prepare the Board for their vote, I would
like to send the Definitive Agreement to them by November 3, 2006. If we are not able to finalize the agreement by November 3, then we will arrange an additional board meeting to approve the document once the agreement is completed.

Please sign below in order to extend the time period to execute the agreement.



COMPUTER SOFTWARE INNOVATIONS, INC.By:

/s/ Nancy K. HedrickNancy K. HedrickPresident and Chief Executive OfficerMCALEER COMPUTER ASSOCIATES, INC.By:

/s/ William J. McAleerWilliam J. McAleerPresident


900 East Main Street, Suite T | Easley, SC 29640 | toll free:
800-953-6847 | ph: 864-855-3900 | fax: 864-422-0647 | csioutfitters.com
#### Effie Mae McGRAW, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28608.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 21, 1956.

No attorney for appellant of record on appeal.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The offense is the possession of whiskey, vodka, beer and wine for the purpose of sale in a dry area, with prior convictions for an offense of like character alleged for enhancement; the punishment, 30 days in jail and a fine of $300.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular, and nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
ex_138486.htm


 


Exhibit 10.9


 


December 27, 2018


 


Energy Resources 12, L.P

Energy Resources 12 Operating Company (collectively, the "Borrowers")

5815 N. Western Avenue

Oklahoma City, OK 73118


 


Gentlemen.


 


Simmons Bank, as administrative agent for the Lenders signatory below, hereby agrees to amend existing Section 6.28 of the Revolver Loan Agreement between and among Borrowers, the Administrative Agent and the Lenders signatory party thereto dated August 31, 2018 (as amended, restated or otherwise modified from time to time, the "Revolver Agreement") to provide that the minimum hedging requirement is fifty percent (50%) of Borrowers' oil and gas monthly production initially based upon that certain reserve report prepared for Lenders by Schaper International Petroleum Consulting, LLC in connection with the closing of the Loan on a rolling eighteen (18) month basis through the Revolver Final Maturity Date (with engineering report(s) to be updated every six (6) months), and thereby eliminating, effective as of November 1, 2018, the initial eighty percent (80%) minimum hedging requirement and the requirement that Borrower comply with the minimum hedging requirement at eighty percent (80%) until March 31, 2019.


 


Please indicate your acceptance of this letter agreement where indicated below. This letter agreement is a Loan Document as defined in the Revolver Agreement and may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original.


 


All other terms and provisions of the Revolver Agreement remain in full force and effect.


 


	 	
			Simmons Bank


			 


			By:      /s/ Chris Mostek          


			Chris Mostek


			Senior Vice President


			Agent and Lender

			



 


 


 


<Remainder of page intentionally blank>


 


 


 



 




 




 


 


The foregoing letter agreement is accepted and agreed to by each of the undersigned Borrowers, as of the 27th day of December, 2018:


 


Energy Resources 12, L.P.


 


By:      /s/ David S. McKenney               


David S. McKenney


Chief Financial Officer


 


Energy Resources Operating Company, LLC


 


By:      /s/ David S. McKenney               


David S. McKenney


Chief Financial Officer


 


The foregoing letter agreement is accepted and agreed to by each of the undersigned Lenders to the Revolver Agreement, effective as of the 27th day of December, 2018.


 


Arvest Bank


 


By:      /s/ S. Matt Condry               


S. Matt Condry,


Vice President-Commercial Banking


 


West Texas National Bank


 


By:      /s/ Thomas E. Stelmar, Jr.          


Thomas E. Stelmar, Jr.


Senior Vice President
---

EXHIBIT 32.1CERTIFICATION OFPRINCIPAL
EXECUTIVE OFFICERPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Michael Hart, Chief Executive Officer of AMG
Oil Ltd. (the Company), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to
his knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of AMG Oil Ltd. for the
period ended December 31, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
that the information contained in the Report on Form 10-QSB fairly presents in
all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

|Date: | February 14, 2007                           | 
|----- | ------------------------------------------- | 
|      |                                             | 
|      |                                             | 
|      | /s/Michael Hart                             | 
|      | Michael Hart, Chief
      Executive Officer | 

---
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Eli Porat, Chief Executive Officer and President of Tvia, Inc. (the
Company), certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, that based on my
knowledge: (1) the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q of the period ended
September 30, 2004 (the Report), fully complies with the requirements
of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m);
and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Registrant. Dated: November 11, 2004
    /s/   Eli PoratEli PoratChief Executive Officer and President
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00551-CR

BRAD GUINN ALLEN APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. CR12016

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Brad Guinn Allen appeals his conviction for state-jail felony 

delivery of marijuana upon the revocation of his deferred-adjudication community 

supervision. We affirm.

Allen’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as 

counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation 

of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. 386 

U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). Allen had the opportunity to file a pro se brief 

but did not do so; the State has not filed a brief.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this 

court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See 

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 

904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may 

we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–

83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with 

counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in 

the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 

S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 

684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to 

withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: November 6, 2014
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>     5


<CAPTION>

Article 5 Fin. Data Schedule for 1st Qtr 10-Q

<S>                               <C>

<PERIOD-TYPE>                     3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                    JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                      MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                     0
<SECURITIES>                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                              0
<ALLOWANCES>                               0
<INVENTORY>                                0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           0
<PP&E>                                     0
<DEPRECIATION>                             0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                126,200
<BONDS>                                    0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                      0
<PREFERRED>                                0
<COMMON>                                 734
<OTHER-SE>                             2,055
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               0
<SALES>                                    0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           0
<CGS>                                      0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                     126,200
<LOSS-PROVISION>                    (128,989)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                         0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            0
<INCOME-TAX>                               0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        0
<DISCONTINUED>                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                            0
<CHANGES>                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                        (128,989)
<EPS-BASIC>                           (.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                           (.00)



</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




         In connection with the Annual Report of National Home Health Care Corp.
(the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended July 31, 2003, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Robert
P. Heller, Principal Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 that, to the best of my knowledge:

         (1)      The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information  contained in the report fairly  presents,  in
                  all material respects,  the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

Date: October 29, 2003

                                /s/ Robert P. Heller
                                -----------------------------------
                                Robert P. Heller
                                Principal Financial Officer
Exhibit 31.1

Certification Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a) or 15d-14(a) of the Securities andExchange Act of 1934

 

I, Ann D. Murtlow, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of IPALCO Enterprises, Inc. (the"registrant");

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) [Paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8618 and 34-52492]

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter that has materially affected,or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financialreporting; and 

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant'sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date:	June 7, 2007	
	/s/ Ann D. Murtlow	Ann D. MurtlowPresident and Chief Executive Officer