RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1497-18T2

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.L.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

L.Y.,

Defendant.

_____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF M.Y., 

a Minor.

_____________________________

Submitted October 15, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 7, 2019
2

A-1497-18T2

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket 

No. FG-15-0030-18.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, 

of counsel; Mark Edward Kleiman, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Nicole T. Laferriere, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor (Todd S. Wilson, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant J.L.1appeals from a Family Part judgment of guardianship 

terminating her parental rights of her now three-year-old daughter, M.Y. 

(Maya), following a three-day guardianship trial.2 Maya is currently placed with 

her paternal grandmother, N.G. (Nia).

 

1

 We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the identity of the child. See R.

1:38-3(d)(12).

2

 Defendant L.Y. is Maya's father. He voluntarily surrendered his parental 

rights on October 4, 2018. He has not appealed the trial court's decision or 

participated in this appeal. 
3

A-1497-18T2

Plaintiff New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency's (the 

Division) court-approved plan is for Maya's paternal grandmother to adopt her. 

Maya's Law Guardian supports that plan, and joins the Division in urging that 

we affirm the trial court's decision. 

For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's determination that 

the Division met its burden of proof with respect to the first two prongs of the 

termination of parental rights statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). We remand with 

respect to prongs three and four of the statute, to:

(1) develop the trial record with more clarity as to 

whether [the] resource parent unequivocally, 

unambiguously, and unconditionally wishes to adopt 

the child[] in her care, regardless of the potential 

alternative of Kinship Legal Guardianship ("KLG"); 

and (2) obtain explicit findings by the trial court 

addressing KLG as it relates to the feasibility of 

adoption. 

[N.J. Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency v. M.M., 459 

N.J. Super. 246, 252 (App. Div. 2019).]

In all other respects, we uphold the trial court's fully supported and wellreasoned decision. 

I.

We need not detail the record extensively in this opinion. We summarize 

only the salient facts pertinent to our discussion. 
4

A-1497-18T2

Maya was born prematurely at thirty-one weeks gestation on August 22, 

2016, and remained hospitalized for one month. Three days later, the Division 

received a referral from Monmouth Medical Center expressing concerns that 

J.L. tested positive for marijuana.

On September 1, 2016, J.L. again, along with L.Y., tested positive for 

marijuana. The Division opened a case for services and supervision, and 

required both parents to attend substance abuse evaluations. The Division also 

learned of J.L. and L.Y.'s history of marijuana use, L.Y.'s probation and criminal 

history, and that L.Y. was homeless. Neither parent completed the initial 

recommended substance abuse treatment.

On September 23, 2016, the hospital released Maya to J.L.; they went to 

J.L.'s parents' home where J.L. resided at the time. Approximately four days 

later, Maya returned to the hospital for over a week due to poor feeding, 

lethargy, and a respiratory infection. 

In early November 2016, the Division received two calls from the 

maternal grandparents expressing their concern for Maya's well-being after J.L. 

moved out with Maya. In response to the second call, Division workers visited 

J.L. and L.Y. at a motel they were staying at with Maya. Due to concerns of 

suspected domestic violence and marijuana use in Maya's presence, the Division 
5

A-1497-18T2

workers transported the family to a local Division office. After unsuccessfully 

attempting to implement a safety protection plan, the Division workers 

conducted an emergency removal of Maya on November 9, 2016, and

transported her to a resource home, placing her with Lisa Studer-Haywood. Five 

days later, the Division filed a complaint for custody, which the court granted 

that same day. The court ordered J.L. and L.Y. to submit random urine 

screenings and attend updated substance abuse evaluations. The Division 

arranged visits for both parents. After attending her first visit on December 1, 

2016, J.L. reported she moved to California with L.Y. to "start over." The 

Division was not able to locate either parent for three months. Meanwhile, in

January 2017, Studer-Haywood sought early intervention for Maya due to 

developmental concerns. 

In February 2017, J.L. appeared at a court hearing concerning Maya's 

custody. Thereafter, the Division arranged visitation, which J.L. consistently 

attended. Beginning in April 2017, Nia began supervising visits on weekends 

(at the time, Nia was moving back and forth between New Jersey and Florida). 

During that time, J.L. completed an outpatient substance abuse program and 

produced negative urine screens until July 2017, when she again tested positive 
6

A-1497-18T2

for marijuana. Meanwhile, the Division learned L.Y. was extradited from 

California to New Jersey, where he remained incarcerated until August 2017. 

On May 24, 2017, Lori Lessin, Ph.D., conducted a psychological 

evaluation of J.L. Dr. Lessin noted J.L. "presented as immature and selfabsorbed, and there was no indication that she is currently able to prioritize her 

daughter's needs over her own." Dr. Lessin recommended substance abuse 

treatment, individual counseling, supervised visitation, and development of a 

long-term housing plan. 

In September 2017, J.L. was discharged from treatment and counseling 

for noncompliance. On October 20, 2017, the court accepted the Division's 

permanency plan for Maya—termination of parental rights followed by 

adoption. In November 2017, the Division filed a complaint for guardianship 

of Maya. 

On May 3, 2018, Dr. Lessin re-evaluated J.L. and conducted a bonding 

evaluation between J.L. and Maya. In July 2018, J.L. completed a substance 

abuse program, but subsequently tested positive for marijuana during the months 

leading up to the guardianship trial. 
7

A-1497-18T2

In sum, Maya has been placed with a resource parent since she was 

seventy-nine days old. Of those first seventy-nine days, she was hospitalized 

for forty-one days. The guardianship trial commenced in October 2018. 

On the first day of trial, the court accepted L.Y.'s surrender of his parental 

rights. Division workers Jaime Rimer and Alyson Simak testified for the 

Division. Rimer testified regarding the Division's initial investigation, Maya's 

emergency removal, and the unsuccessful reunification attempts that led up to 

the October 2017 permanency hearing. Rimer also noted J.L. does not 

necessarily understand Maya's special needs, and that J.L. "felt [Maya's] delays 

were the result of being premature and that she would catch up." 

Simak described the Division's unsuccessful efforts to provide J.L. with 

treatment and counseling, noting J.L. tested positive for marijuana right before 

trial. Further, Simak related J.L. consistently visited Maya but expressed 

concern that J.L. did not fully understand Maya's condition, citing J.L.'s remarks 

that she would get Maya to walk and eat solid foods. 

Additionally, Simak described Maya's disabilities. She stated Maya could 

not walk, talk, sit up, or roll over. She further explained Maya's need for 

therapy, special equipment, and services which Maya will likely need for the 

rest of her life. Simak noted J.L. missed some of Maya's doctor appointments 
8

A-1497-18T2

and that J.L. could not describe how she would care for Maya. Finally, Simak 

indicated Nia was a suitable caretaker for Maya based on her experience caring 

for children with special needs. 

Studer-Haywood testified about her time as Maya's resource parent. 

Studer-Haywood noted she sought early intervention for Maya when she was 

about four months old due to developmental concerns. Thereafter, Maya was 

provided with physical, occupational, and speech therapies. Additionally, Maya 

sees multiple specialists including a gastroenterologist, ophthalmologist, 

neurologist, and pediatrician. Studer-Haywood indicated Mia cannot talk other 

than to say "hi" or "ouch." 

Dr. Lessin testified regarding her psychological evaluations of J.L. and 

the bonding evaluation of J.L. and Maya. In concluding J.L. "would not be able 

to independently parent" Maya and that "termination of her rights would be 

appropriate," Dr. Lessin cited J.L.'s failure to establish long-term stability, J.L.'s 

relationship with L.Y., and J.L.'s lack of understanding concerning Maya's 

special needs. Regarding Maya's special needs, Dr. Lessin noted such lack of 

understanding "could be life threatening." Dr. Lessin also testified that the 

significance of the bonding evaluation in this matter is different due to Maya's 

condition. Consequently, Dr. Lessin's bonding evaluation focused more on 
9

A-1497-18T2

J.L.'s ability to care for Maya's special needs. Dr. Lessin noted the importance 

of permanency for Maya who needed assurance her special needs would be met; 

otherwise Maya may suffer negative reactions. Finally, Dr. Lessin testified 

Maya would not suffer irreparable harm from severing her relationship with J.L. 

Maya's nurse at the pediatric daycare program, Lisa Fitzpatrick, testified 

about Maya's special needs. Fitzpatrick described the difficulty of feeding Maya 

because she has "choking and gagging issues." Fitzpatrick noted Maya's need 

for ankle and foot braces. Maya's physical therapist at the daycare program, 

Kelly Ann Cary, also testified, noting Maya will likely need physical therapy 

for the rest of her life. 

Nia testified about her experience caring for medically fragile children for 

over twelve years, and her willingness to adopt Maya. While supervising visits, 

she noted J.L. would get frustrated when caring for Maya and would at times

give up. The paternal grandmother testified J.L. could not appropriately care 

for Maya's special needs, citing conversations where J.L. told her Maya's 

condition was not serious and only temporary. The paternal grandmother said 

she intended to live in North Carolina following adoption. 

Finally, J.L. testified on her own behalf. She acknowledged her relapse 

after completing substance abuse treatment. She indicated she understood 
10 A-1497-18T2

Maya's medical condition but believed Maya would get better. On crossexamination she acknowledged she has never had to care for Maya on a daily 

basis and has no experience meeting Maya's special needs.

The evidence at the three-day trial established Maya is diagnosed with 

spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, agenesis of corpus callosum, failure to 

thrive, strabismus, dysphagia, chronic constipation, gastroesophageal reflux 

disease, and severe developmental delays, rendering her profoundly disabled 

and in need of extraordinary care. 

Maya has an aversion to eating, must eat a special diet, requires skilled 

care, multiple therapies, and will likely never walk or talk. She cannot stand 

without ankle and leg braces and cannot sit up except in a special chair. Her 

vocabulary is limited to two words. She is significantly underweight and may 

need a surgically emplaced feeding tube. She has severe difficulty swallowing 

and is at risk of aspirating food. She is also at risk for scoliosis and hip 

displacement, has no fine motor skills, and cannot pick up or hold anything. Her 

hands are chronically fisted. 

On November 15, 2018, the trial court issued a lengthy oral decision 

recounting the testimony in detail. The court found the Division workers, Dr. 

Lessin, and the daycare workers to be "entirely credible and reliable witnesses." 
11 A-1497-18T2

J.L. produced no expert witnesses. Her testimony did not undermine the 

Division's proofs. The court found the paternal grandmother to be a "very 

impressive" regarding her experience and ability to care for Maya. 

The trial court noted J.L. has struggled to be capable as a parent of a 

severely disabled child. It found the evidence clearly and convincingly 

demonstrated J.L. is unable to meet the child's extraordinary needs. She has 

little knowledge of the multiple therapies her daughter undergoes, does not fully 

understand her daughter's special needs, and is in denial that the limitations are 

permanent. She mistakenly believes her daughter will grow out of it.

Additionally, it found J.L.'s history of drug abuse well documented. She 

relapsed more than once after treatment, concedes she cannot care for Maya 

when she is using marijuana, does not have a driver's license, and has been 

homeless at times. At one point, she moved to California to live with L.Y. and 

abandoned her daughter for three months. 

The trial court determined the Division proved all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 

30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence, terminated the parental rights

of J.L. and L.Y., awarded the Division guardianship of Maya, and directed it to 

file its complaint for adoption "as soon as possible." This appeal followed. 

J.L. raises the following points:
12 A-1497-18T2

Point I 

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE 

INCOMPLETE AND INADEQUATE TO SUSTAIN A 

JUDGMENT TERMINATING [J.L.'S] PARENTAL 

RIGHTS BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 

EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15 

AND 30:4C-15.1.

A. The Trial Court Erred In Finding That [The 

Division] Demonstrated By Clear And 

Convincing Evidence That The Child's Health 

And Development Had Been Or Will Continue 

To Be Endangered By The Parental Relationship 

Under The First Prong.

B. The Trial Court Erred In Finding That [The 

Division] Demonstrated By Clear And 

Convincing Evidence That [J.L.] Was Unwilling 

Or Unable To Eliminate The Harm Facing The 

Child Or Is Unable Or Unwilling To Provide A 

Safe And Stable Home For The Children And 

The Delay Of Permanent Placement Will Add To 

The Harm Under The Second Prong.

C. The Trial Court Erred By Failing To Consider 

Viable Alternatives To Termination Of Parental 

Rights.

D. The Trial Court Erred In Finding That [The 

Division] Demonstrated By Clear And 

Convincing Evidence That Termination Of 

[J.L.'s] Parental Rights Will Not Do More Harm 

Than Good Under The Fourth Prong.
13 A-1497-18T2

Point II 

THE DECISION TO TERMINATE [J.L.'S] 

PARENTAL RIGHTS MUST BE REVERSED 

BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY 

APPLIED A "BETTER" INTEREST OF THE CHILD 

STANDARD RATHER THAN THE "BEST" 

INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD 

GOVERNING TITLE 30 GUARDIANSHIP CASES. 

(Not Raised Below)

II.

"The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is 

limited." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). In general, a trial court's 

findings "are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, 

credible evidence." Id. at 412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. 

of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "Particular deference is afforded to family 

court fact-finding because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise 

in family matters." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency . v. N.C.M., 438 N.J. 

Super. 356, 367 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413). "We will not 

overturn a family court's factfindings unless they are so 'wide of the mark' that 

our intervention is necessary to correct an injustice." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).
14 A-1497-18T2

To terminate parental rights on the grounds of the "best interests of the 

child," the Division must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the following 

four prongs under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a):

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. 

Such harm may include evidence that separating the 

child from his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm 

to the child;

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986)

(reciting the four standards later codified in Title 30).]

The four statutory prongs "are neither discrete nor separate. They overlap 

to provide a composite picture of what may be necessary to advance the best 

interests of the children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 
15 A-1497-18T2

261, 280 (2007) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J. 

Super. 235, 258 (App. Div. 2005)).

Under prong one, the Division must demonstrate harm "that threatens the 

child's health and will likely have continuing deleterious effects on the child." 

In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 352 (1999). The Division need not 

demonstrate actual harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. 

Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 2001). That is, courts consider whether the child's 

safety, health, or development will be endangered in the future. Ibid. Moreover, 

"[c]ourts need not wait to act until a child is actually irreparably impaired by 

parental inattention or neglect." In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 

383 (1999) (citing A.W., 103 N.J. at 616 n.14).

In addition, a parent's failure to provide "a permanent, safe, and stable 

home" engenders significant harm to the child. Ibid. Likewise, a parent's failure 

to provide "solicitude, nurture, and care for an extended period of time is in 

itself a harm that endangers the health and development of the child." Id. at 379. 

"The second prong, in many ways, addresses considerations touched on in 

prong one." F.M., 211 N.J. at 451. The focus is on "parental unfitness." K.H.O., 

161 N.J. at 352. 
16 A-1497-18T2

Under prong three, the Division must prove it "made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the 

child's placement outside the home." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Reasonable 

efforts is defined as "attempts by an agency authorized by the [D]ivision to assist 

the parents in remedying the circumstances and conditions that led to the 

placement of the child and in reinforcing the family structure." N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(c). The record must also establish "the court has considered alternatives to 

termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). 

Under the fourth prong, the Division must demonstrate that "[t]ermination 

of parental rights will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15(a)(4). 

The fourth prong serves as a "'fail safe' inquiry guarding against an inappropriate 

or premature termination of parental rights." F.M., 211 N.J. at 453. 

III.

A.

We affirm the trial court's decision with respect to prongs one and two of 

the statute substantially for the reasons expressed in the trial court's extensive 

oral decision issued on November 15, 2018. We add the following comments.

The trial court's factual findings and conclusions as to prongs one and two 

are fully supported by the record. The record clearly established J.L. is unable 
17 A-1497-18T2

to care for Maya's significant special needs. J.L.'s limitations engender 

significant harm to Maya as J.L. is unable to provide a "permanent, safe, and 

stable home." D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 383.

As to prong one, the trial court emphasized Maya "needs extraordinary, 

unusual, virtually around the clock care." The court found the testimony 

consistently and "strongly indicate[d] that [J.L.] is unable . . . to meet the 

extraordinary needs" of Maya. The court noted J.L. missed doctor appointments 

and cited credible testimony about J.L. not fully comprehending the nature of 

Maya's medical condition. The court also credited Dr. Lessin's opinion that J.L.

could not independently parent Maya and that termination would be appropriate 

in this matter. Additionally, the court considered J.L.'s absence for three 

months, her marijuana use, recent relapse, and her relationship with L.Y. Based 

on these findings, the court determined reunification with Jen would "pose a 

substantial risk" to Maya. 

As to the second prong, the trial court again credited Dr. Lessin's opinion 

concerning J.L.'s inability to prioritize her parental responsibilities and her lack 

of understanding of Maya's special needs. The court gave weight to Dr. Lessin's 

testimony that J.L. had not shown any progress, suggesting an ability to 

independently parent Maya now or in the future. The court noted Dr. Lessin's 
18 A-1497-18T2

testimony regarding the importance of permanency to a child in Maya's position; 

otherwise Maya is subject to fear and anxiety. The court found a delay in 

permanent placement would add to Maya's harm. 

B.

Turning to prong three, we are satisfied the record fully supports the trial 

court's finding that the Division made "reasonable efforts" to provide 

appropriate services to both parents. The Division engaged in such efforts for 

almost two years—assisting J.L. with her substance abuse, providing 

counseling, and arranging visitation—to reunite Maya with J.L. As we have 

noted, the parents participated in many of those services, albeit inconsistently 

and without success. 

The last clause of prong three addresses whether "the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). The 

trial court noted Nia has fostered sixty-four children, including thirty-five

medically fragile children, and has special training in how to do so. It concluded 

that given Nia's "experience, history and capability," "her willingness to adopt"

Maya, and "her willingness to allow contact to continue between" J.L. and Maya,

"there really is no alternative . . . other than termination of parental rights 
19 A-1497-18T2

followed by adoption." The trial court approved the Division's plan to have Nia

adopt Maya. 

That said, our review of the record reveals the Division did not show Nia

was informed about the KLG option. Rimer testified she did not "believe" any 

discussions arose concerning KLG. Nor did the trial court address KLG in its 

decision.

3

 

J.L. argues the trial court erred by "overlook[ing] the viable alternative of 

fashioning a kinship legal guardianship arrangement that would allow [Maya] 

to receive the trained care of her paternal grandmother while allowing her legal 

relationship with her mother to remain intact." Citing M.M., J.L. contends the 

Division should have informed Nia about the KLG option before receiving her 

"unequivocal" decision to adopt Maya. Because the Division failed to do so, 

J.L. argues it did not satisfy prong three. 

The purpose of KLG "is to address the needs of children who cannot reside 

with their parents due to their parents' incapacity or inability to raise them and 

when adoption is neither feasible nor likely." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. S.F., 392 N.J. Super. 201, 209 (2007). KLG is a potential alternative 

 

3

 We recognize that the trial court's decision was issued several months before 

our opinion in M.M. was published. 
20 A-1497-18T2

to termination of parental rights. M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 259. In that regard, 

the Legislature declared, "[i]n considering kinship legal guardianship, the State 

is seeking to add another, alternative, permanent placement option, beyond 

custody, without rising to the level of termination of parental rights, for 

caregivers in relationships where adoption is neither feasible nor likely." 

N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1(c). As we explained in M.M.: 

The Legislature has made it clear that relative 

caretakers who might be candidates for KLG must be 

adequately informed of the nature of such arrangements 

and the financial and other services for which they may 

be eligible. To achieve that objective, the Legislature 

enacted in 2005 the Kinship Legal Guardianship 

Notification Act ("Notification Act"), N.J.S.A. 30:4C89 to -92. In the Act, the Legislature imposed a 

responsibility upon the State "to ensure that individuals 

who may be eligible to become kinship legal guardians 

are aware of the eligibility requirements for, and the 

responsibilities of, kinship legal guardianship and . . . 

[also] the services available to kinship legal guardians 

in the State." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-90(e). 

To implement this notification mandate:

The Department of Children and Families 

shall, in easily understandable language:

(a) inform individuals, of whom the 

department is aware, who may be eligible 

to become kinship legal guardians of:
21 A-1497-18T2

(1) the eligibility requirements for, and the 

responsibilities of, kinship legal 

guardianship; and

(2) the full-range of services for which 

kinship legal guardians may be eligible and 

the eligibility requirements for those 

services; and

b. inform current kinship legal guardians of 

the full-range of services for which kinship 

legal guardians may be eligible and the 

eligibility requirements for those services.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-91.]

[M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 261 (alterations in original)

(footnote omitted).]

In M.M., we discussed the issue of KLG being "appropriate only if 

'adoption of the child is neither feasible nor likely.'" Id. at 262 (quoting N.J.S.A. 

3B:12A-6(d)(3)(b)). We concluded that "[a] logical implication of the 

Notification Act is that the caregiver must be fully informed of the potential 

benefits and burdens of KLG before deciding whether he or she wishes to 

adopt." Id. at 263. We analogized this "paradigm" to the principles of informed 

consent and informed refusal in healthcare. Ibid. "[W]e construe[d] the KLG 

statute and the Notification Act to make a caregiver's preference, if any, of KLG 

over adoption a relevant but not dispositive consideration." Id. at 264. We 
22 A-1497-18T2

concluded that "[t]he caregiver's consent to adopt should be not only be 

informed, but also unconditional, unambiguous, and unqualified." Ibid. 

The record does not demonstrate that KLG was discussed with Nia. As in 

M.M., we cannot determine from the present record, by a level of clear and 

convincing evidence, whether Nia's consent to adopt Maya was informed and if 

she is "committed unambiguously, unequivocally, and unconditionally to 

adoption, regardless of the possible alternative of KLG." Id. at 273. 

We therefore remand this matter "for further proceedings to develop the 

record more definitively" on the KLG and adoption issue and for the trial court 

to render "explicit associated findings of fact and conclusions of law." Id. at 

275. The trial court shall, in its discretion, determine the appropriate forms of 

proof at the remand hearing. 

C.

Finally, we address the fourth prong. The trial court credited Dr. Lessin's 

testimony regarding the bonding evaluation. The court noted it was not known 

if Maya "will ever be able to form typical relationships in the future because of 

her limitations." Dr. Lessen concluded that Maya's profound limitations

precluded conventional application of a bonding evaluation. Nevertheless, the 

court noted Dr. Lessen "was not able to observe any attachment on the part of 
23 A-1497-18T2

[Maya] toward [J.L.]." Dr. Lessen opined that Maya is so dependent on her dayto-day needs, "meetings those needs is paramount with the equivalent to a bond." 

The court agreed with Dr. Lessen's opinion that "termination of parental rights 

in this case would not do more harm than good because of [J.L.'s] inability to 

provide the day-to-day care that [Maya] needs." The court reiterated that the 

paternal grandmother is willing to adopt Maya and qualified to meet her day-today demands. 

Subject to the outcome of the remand hearing, we conclude the trial court 

provided a reasonable basis for its conclusion on prong four that the termination 

of J.L.'s parental rights will not do Maya more harm than good under N.J.S.A. 

30:4C-15.1(a)(4). 

IV.

J.L.'s remaining argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in 

a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed in part and remanded in part for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. The remand shall be completed within ninety days, unless 

that deadline is reasonably extended by the trial court with the consent of 

counsel. We do not retain jurisdiction.