1

 

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Jamal Darraj ) Docket No. 2015-01-0339

)

v. )

) State File No. 55851-2015

McKee Foods Corporation, et al. ) 

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Audrey A. Headrick, Judge )

Affirmed and Certified as Final – January 17, 2017

The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits arising from a gradual, repetitive 

injury to his hands and arms, a traumatic sprain/strain to his hands and arms, a traumatic 

aggravation of his pre-existing upper extremity arthritis, or some combination thereof. 

The authorized treating physician opined that the employee’s condition was not primarily 

caused by his work activities. The employee presented expert opinions suggesting that 

his condition was primarily caused by his employment. Following a trial, the court 

denied the employee’s claim, concluding that the medical evidence offered by the 

employee did not overcome the presumption of correctness accorded the authorized 

treating physician’s opinion. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the 

determination of the trial court, dismiss the employee’s claim, and certify the 

compensation order as final.

Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding 

Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge David F. Hensley joined.

Jamal Darraj, Ringgold, Georgia, employee -appellant, pro se

J. Bartlett Quinn, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, McKee Foods

Corp.
2

Factual and Procedural Background

Jamal Darraj (“Employee”), a fifty-nine-year-old resident of Ringgold, Georgia, 

alleged an injury to his hands and/or wrists arising primarily out of and in the course and 

scope of his employment with McKee Foods Corporation (“Employer”) in Hamilton 

County, Tennessee. It is unclear from Employee’s statements and filings the precise 

theory of recovery. He sought workers’ compensation benefits for a gradually-occurring 

repetitive trauma to his hands, an acute traumatic sprain/strain to his wrists, an 

aggravation of his pre-existing upper extremity arthritis, or some combination thereof. 

He alleges the injury occurred and/or his condition became symptomatic on July 19, 

2015, when he was feeding cardboard into a machine called a “former,” which shaped the 

cardboard into boxes. Due to defective cardboard or a machine malfunction, he was 

required to repetitively bend the cardboard so it would feed into the machine properly. 

After doing this for some period of time, he suffered pain in both wrists and thumbs, and 

he reported the incident that day.

Employee was provided a panel of physicians from which he chose Dr. Marshall 

Jemison. Because Dr. Jemison was not immediately available, Employer authorized an 

initial visit with Dr. McKinley Lundy so Employee could be seen more quickly. Dr. 

Lundy saw Employee on July 21, 2015 for complaints of bilateral wrist pain. Employee 

acknowledged having had a previous right carpal tunnel release, but he denied any 

symptoms in either wrist for a substantial period of time prior to July 19, 2015. Dr. 

Lundy diagnosed Employee with bilateral wrist sprain and bilateral forearm strain and 

referred him for physical therapy. He allowed Employee to return to work with 

restrictions.

Employee first saw Dr. Jemison on July 30, 2015, at which time Dr. Jemison noted 

his bilateral wrist pain was not the result of a particular injury, but he had been doing 

“more” with his hands and wrists when his symptoms began. Dr. Jemison diagnosed 

Employee with arthritis of the thumbs and wrists and opined he “[did] not believe that 

these conditions [were] primarily related to his work activities as there was no injury and 

his arthritis is very significant.” Upon receipt of this opinion, Employer denied the claim, 

asserting Employee’s condition did not arise primarily out of the employment.

Employee then sought an opinion from Dr. Joseph Burton, a forensic pathologist, 

who provided his assessment in an undated note. Dr. Burton opined, “[Employee] 

actually has an injury and this injury is easily related to events occurring in his job place 

and his work.” He further stated it was “remarkable to [him] that a trained medical 

doctor of any specialty reviewing the history and symptoms of [Employee] would not see 

the obvious connection between his work activity, the event of July 19, 2015, and his 

current exaggerated symptoms of pain in his hand, wrist and forearm.” He observed that 

the July 19, 2015 event “overstressed” Employee’s hands and wrists and “created the 

acute onset of symptoms.” He concluded Employee’s current condition “is associated 
3

with his assembly line work and specifically [with] an event occurring on July 19, 2015 

that precipitated the acute onset of increased pain and symptoms.”

Employee sought treatment on his own with Dr. Edward Holliger, an orthopedic 

surgeon. On September 21, 2015, Dr. Holliger recommended injections and opined that 

Employee’s complaints were work-related. Employee reported no improvement 

following the injections, and Dr. Holliger then referred him for physical therapy. On 

December 14, 2015, Employee returned to Dr. Holliger with persistent complaints of 

wrist and hand pain. Dr. Holliger stated that Employee’s complaints were work-related, 

opining, “[h]e has problems that are greater than 50% attributable to his work and work 

activities over the last many years.” Dr. Holliger did not causally relate Employee’s 

condition to an acute event on July 19, 2015.

Thereafter, Employer sought a medical records review from Dr. John Gracy, also 

an orthopedic surgeon. On February 19, 2016, Dr. Gracy issued a report that noted the 

differing opinions with respect to the cause of Employee’s condition. He summarized 

several medical studies that sought to confirm a causal link between repetitive motion in 

the workplace and the development or aggravation of arthritic conditions, with 

conflicting results. Dr. Gracy explained there are multiple risk factors for arthritis and

ultimately opined, “although [Employee’s] job may have contributed to his arthritis, it is 

not the primary and/or sole cause.”

Employee returned to Dr. Jemison on March 3, 2016, asking Dr. Jemison to 

reconsider his opinion in light of the reports from Dr. Burton and Dr. Holliger. Dr.

Jemison’s record reflects that he told Employee he would provide treatment “outside of 

the Workers’ Compensation System as [he is] obligated to abide by Tennessee State 

Law.” Dr. Jemison further observed that Employee and his wife “do not like [his] 

opinion and [he has] urged them to find a physician who is well versed in Tennessee 

State Workers’ Compensation laws who is a hand surgeon to formulate another opinion.”

The case was tried on September 15, 2016. Employee and his wife were the only 

witnesses to testify, and Employee argued that the opinions of Dr. Burton and Dr. 

Holliger supported his position that his condition was causally related to his 

employment.1 In addition, he asserted that Dr. Jemison’s opinion should be discounted 

because he had initially diagnosed Employee with a sprain/strain-type injury only to 

opine later that no injury had occurred. Employee argued Dr. Jemison’s various 

statements are inconsistent and the opinions of Dr. Holliger and Dr. Burton rebutted the 

presumption of correctness accorded Dr. Jemison’s opinion. Conversely, Employer 

maintained that Employee had not presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption 

 

1 The medical records of Drs. Jemison, Burton, Holliger, and Gracy were admitted into evidence during 

the trial. In addition, Employee offered into evidence partially completed Standard Form Medical 

Reports (Form C-32’s) of Drs. Burton and Holliger.
4

of correctness attached to Dr. Jemison’s opinion, which was further supported by Dr. 

Gracy’s records review.

On October 7, 2016, the trial court issued an order denying Employee’s request for 

workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court observed that Employee had submitted 

Standard Form Medical Reports (Form C-32’s) filled out by Drs. Burton and Holliger to 

be used as evidence in lieu of deposition testimony. However, the reports were 

incomplete in that they failed to include the fourth page of each form, which addresses 

the causation standard applicable for injuries occurring on or after July 1, 2014. The trial 

court found that, because page 4 was missing from each Form C-32, it could not conclude 

Employee had presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness 

accorded Dr. Jemison’s causation opinion.

Employee appealed the trial court’s order, asserting that the physicians had 

completed the missing pages and offered causation opinions supporting his claim, and he 

attached those pages to his notice of appeal. Employer filed a motion to exclude the 

attached pages, arguing the additional pages were submitted too late. Employee

responded that he believed he could present those pages on appeal because the trial court 

informed him during the trial he could submit the missing pages late.

2

 Employer moved 

that the case be remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of determining 

whether the new evidence filed with the notice of appeal should be excluded. Upon 

remand, the trial court determined those pages were not admissible and issued an order 

excluding them. The record on appeal has been supplemented with the trial court’s order.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision is statutorily mandated 

and limited in scope. Specifically, “[t]here shall be a presumption that the findings and 

conclusions of the workers’ compensation judge are correct, unless the preponderance of 

the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2015). The trial court’s 

decision may be reversed or modified if the rights of a party “have been prejudiced 

because findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of a workers’ compensation judge:

(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions;

(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers’ compensation judge;

(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure;

(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or 

clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

 

2 During its discussion with Employee regarding the missing pages from the Form C-32’s, the trial court 

stated, “Regarding your comment about the missing page[s], it’s certainly your choice as to whether or 

not you choose to try and file something late. And, should you do that, you would file it with the clerk; 

and Mr. Quinn would have an opportunity to object to it.”
5

(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material 

in the light of the entire record.” 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015). 

A trial court’s decision concerning the assessment of competing expert medical 

opinions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Sanker v. Nacarato Trucks, 

Inc., No. 2016-06-0101, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 27, at *12 (Tenn. 

Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 6, 2016). An appellate court may “find an abuse of 

discretion only if the [trial] court ‘applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical 

conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or 

employ[ed] reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.’” Wright ex rel. 

Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011) (citations omitted). In reviewing a 

trial court’s exercise of discretion, we presume the trial court is correct and consider the 

evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the decision. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 

S.W.3d 1, 16-17 (Tenn. 2013). “[W]e will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial 

court merely because we might have chosen another alternative.” Johnson v. Walmart

Assocs., Inc., No. 2014-06-0069, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 18, at *17 

(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 2, 2015). That said, such decisions “require a 

conscientious judgment, consistent with the facts, that takes into account the applicable 

law.” White v. Beeks, 469 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tenn. 2015).

Analysis

At trial, an injured employee must prove every essential element of his or her 

claim for workers’ compensation benefits by a preponderance of the evidence. Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2016); Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-01-

0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. 

Aug. 18, 2015). To be compensable under the workers’ compensation statutes, an injury 

must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 50-6-102(14) (2014). This requirement is satisfied “only if it has been shown by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent 

(50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-

102(14)(B). An injury causes “disablement or the need for medical treatment only if it 

has been shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it contributed more than 

fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, 

considering all causes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(C). The phrase “reasonable 

degree of medical certainty” means that, “in the opinion of the physician, it is more likely 

than not considering all causes, as opposed to speculation or possibility.” Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(D). Finally, “[t]he opinion of the treating physician, selected by the 

employee from the employer’s designated panel of physicians . . . shall be presumed 

correct on the issue of causation but this presumption shall be rebuttable by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E).
6

In the present case, the trial court was faced with competing expert medical 

opinions. The authorized treating physician, Dr. Jemison, opined that Employee suffered 

from degenerative arthritis, but that this condition was “not primarily related to his work 

activities as there was no injury and his arthritis is very significant.” This opinion is 

entitled to a presumption of correctness pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 

50-6-102(14)(E). Employer also offered the opinion of Dr. Gracy, who opined that 

“although [Employee’s] job may have contributed to his arthritis, it is not the primary 

and/or sole cause.” 

Conversely, Employee offered the report of Dr. Burton, who opined that “clearly 

[Employee’s] symptomatology was precipitated by the event which he described on July 

19.” He also concluded that “[t]he July 19 event simply overstressed this area and 

created the acute onset of symptoms.” Dr. Burton then stated, “[t]here is absolutely no 

doubt that [Employee’s] current debility is associated with his assembly line work and 

specifically by an event occurring July 19, 2015 that precipitated the acute onset of 

increased pain and symptoms.” Employee also offered the report of Dr. Holliger, who 

concluded that Employee’s arthritic condition “is greater than 50% caused/associated 

with cumulative trauma from rapid, forceful, repetitive work.” However, the Form C32’s of Employee’s experts, which were offered by Employee as expert medical evidence 

in lieu of depositions, were missing page 4, on which each physician had the opportunity 

to express a causation opinion consistent with the requirements of Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 50-6-102(14) (2016). The trial court denied Employee’s postjudgment efforts to append these pages to the evidence.

“In evaluating expert medical opinions, a trial judge may consider, among other 

things, the qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their evaluation, the 

information available to them, and the evaluation of the importance of that information 

by other experts.” Venable v. Superior Essex, Inc., No. 2015-05-0582, 2016 TN Wrk. 

Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 56, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 2, 2016). “A 

trial judge has the discretion to conclude that the opinion of one expert should be 

accepted over that of another expert.” Sanker, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 

27, at *11-12 (citation omitted). As stated by the Tennessee Supreme Court, “[w]hen 

faced . . . with conflicting medical testimony . . ., it is within the discretion of the trial 

judge to conclude that the opinion of certain experts should be accepted over that of other 

experts and that it contains the more probable explanation.” Thomas v. Aetna Life and 

Cas. Co., 812 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tenn. 1991) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, a trial court’s determination regarding the relative weight to be given to

expert medical opinions should be affirmed by a reviewing court unless the reviewing 

court concludes the trial court abused its discretion. In the present case, we are unable to 

conclude that the trial court’s decision constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Employee argues that his status as a self-represented litigant and his limited use of 

the English language presented barriers that “denied [him] essential assistance” in 
7

prosecuting his case. It is well-settled, however, that pro se litigants must comply with 

the same standards to which represented parties must adhere. See, e.g., Bates v. 

Command Ctr., Inc., No. 2014-06-0053, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 10, at *3 

(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Apr. 2, 2015). As one court has observed,

[p]arties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal 

treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro 

se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial 

system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between 

fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary. 

Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the 

same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected 

to observe.

Akard v. Akard, No. E2013-00818-COA-R3-CV, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 766, at *11 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2014). Accordingly, while we acknowledge the legitimate 

challenges faced by a party who proceeds without an attorney, we cannot relax the 

standards of proof or excuse evidentiary deficiencies. In the present case, while 

reasonable minds may differ concerning the relative weight to be given the various expert 

medical opinions offered at trial, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion 

in accrediting the medical opinions presented by Employer or otherwise erred in its

weighing of the evidence. 

Conclusion

The trial court’s decision is affirmed, the case is dismissed, and the trial court’s 

compensation order is certified as final.
 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 

Jamal Darraj ) Docket No. 2015-01-0339

) 

v. ) 

) State File No. 55851-2015

McKee Foods Corporation, et al. ) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the 

referenced case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service 

on this the 17th day of January, 2017. 

Name Certified 

Mail

First Class 

Mail

Via 

Fax

Fax 

Number

Via 

Email

Email Address

Jamal Darraj X Martjamal2000@yahoo.com

J. Bartlett Quinn X bquinn@chamblisslaw.com

Audrey A. Headrick, 

Judge

X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, 

Chief Judge

X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, 

Court of Workers’ 

Compensation Claims

X Penny.Patterson-Shrum@tn.gov

Matthew Salyer

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B 

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606 

Electronic Mail: Matthew.Salyer@tn.gov