alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 

### Ryan Montgomery

From: Ken Hawk

Sent: Saturday, January 19, 2013 8:17 AM

To: Ryan Montgomery
Subject: FW: Atropine Update

Ryan,

There is a shortage of the Atropine that is part of the EMK’s and there is no delivery date insight. The shortage is also

effecting hospitals and there is a huge quantity on backorder from the manufacturer. We may need to pursue an exception.

From: Steve Gilsdorf [ mailto:steveg@majesticaerotech.com ]

Sent: Friday, January 18, 2013 2:05 PM

To: Ken Hawk Subject: Atropine Update



### Hi Ken,



### I wanted to update you from my end on the Atropine shortage.

The FAA medical people are aware of the shor tage, however as of now no exception is there for all airlines. The FAA is sayi ng each airlines needs to pursue its own exception. Here is an F AA website for this purpose:

http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquar ters_offices/avs/offices/afs/qms/

Also, there is an atropine avail able which is not what is used or required in the kit. We put an atropine which is .1mg/ml in a preloaded syringe (meets FAA requirements). The available atropine is .4mg/ml in a vial. Our Medical Director says this will work but is apprehensive considering it is a multi-dose vial and the epinephrine ( 1:1000 and 1:10000 ) already in the kit may be a mo re acceptable solution in the s hort-term. It is his opinion an exception should still be pursued to cover a time period until the normal atropine is

available for the reasons of:

1) Acceptable short-term alternative accessible 2) No guarantee on long-term availability of .4mg/ml atropine

Steve Gilsdorf Manager

Majestic Aerotech, Inc. FAA Repair Station: MJKR015B EASA Approval: 145.46522 

### 324 West Bay Drive NW – Suite 200 Olympia, WA 98502

T: 360/528-4142

F: 360/528-4144
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

June 2, 2022

No. 04-22-00010-CV

Brian A. JONES,

Appellant

v.

ALLSTATE VEHICLE AND PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CV04875

Honorable J Frank Davis, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

After this court granted Appellant’s first motion for extension of time to file the brief, we 

set Appellant’s brief due on May 31, 2022. Before the once-extended due date, Appellant filed a 

second motion for an extension of time to file the brief.

Appellant’s motion is GRANTED. Appellant’s brief is due on July 1, 2022. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.6(d). 

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 2nd day of June, 2022.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court

FILE COPY
#### John I. HENDERSON, Individually, and John I. Henderson, Administrator of Estate of Minnie Henderson, Deceased, Appellant, v. Elmer SANDERS et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Dec. 2, 1955.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Feb. 3, 1956.

*899Marshall Funk, Bowling Green, for appellant.

Rodes K. Myers, Bowling Green, for ap-pellees.

CAMMACK, Judge.

This is the second appeal of this case. On the first appeal, we held that a constructive trust could and should be imposed upon United States Savings Bonds, Series E, in order to protect a defrauded person whose funds had been used to purchase the bonds. See Henderson’s Adm’r v. Bewley, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 680. Therein we said the chancellor should enter an order directing the named payees to sign the bonds, and further directed that a judgment be entered consistent with our opinion.

Subsequent to the filing of the mandate, the trial court entered an order directing the beneficiaries to sign the bonds and deliver them to John I. Henderson, the defrauded party. After that order was carried out, Henderson presented the bonds for payment to the Treasury Department of the United States. Payment was refused on the grounds that by their terms the bonds were payable only to the named beneficiaries. However, the Treasury Department outlined a method whereby the proceeds of the bonds could be paid to Henderson. The method required the payees to execute certain Departmental forms, including a power of attorney.

After learning of the procedure required by the Treasury Department for payment to one other than the named payee of the bonds, Henderson brought this action seeking to compel the payees, the appellees, under penalty of contempt, to execute the prescribed forms in order to effectuate this Court’s holding. The trial court refused to enter such an order, on the grounds that it was unnecessary in view of the payees’ endorsement on the bonds, and that the terms of the prescribed power of attorney were too broad. The appeal is taken from that judgment.

The first basis upon which the trial court refused to require the appellees to comply with the Treasury Department’s suggested procedure is clearly erroneous, as evidenced by the Department’s refusal to pay solely on the basis of the payees’ endorsements. It may be true that the prescribed power of attorney is broader in its terms than the case before us would require. However, the Department’s letter, which is a part of the record, indicates that the power of attorney need only refer to the bonds affected by our prior opinion. The letter refers specifically to an “appropriate” power of attorney which would conform to the prior holding of this Court.

We see no reason why the procedure required by the Treasury Department should not be followed in this case. The trial court has the inherent power to effectuate the judgment entered in the prior litigation, and may, under penalty of contempt, order the parties to perform all acts necessary to accomplish that end.

The judgment is reversed, with directions that the trial court enter the orders necessary to secure the proceeds of the bonds for Henderson.
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1683 

To restore the longstanding partnership between States and the Federal 

Government in managing the Medicaid program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 3, 2011 

Mr. GINGREY of Georgia (for himself, Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS, Mr. UPTON, 

Mr. PITTS, Mr. HARPER, and Mr. LANCE) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To restore the longstanding partnership between States and 

the Federal Government in managing the Medicaid program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘State Flexibility Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF MEDICAID AND CHIP MAINTENANCE OF 

6 EFFORT REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARRA AND 

7 PPACA. 

8 (a) REPEAL OF ARRA MEDICAID MOE.—Subsection 

9 (f) of section 5001 of the American Recovery and ReinVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:01 May 04, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1683.IH H1683

smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1683 IH

1 vestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–5) is amended by 

2 striking paragraph (1). 

3 (b) REPEAL OF PPACA MEDICAID MOE.—Section 

4 1902 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396a) is 

5 amended by striking subsection (gg). 

6 (c) REPEAL OF PPACA CHIP MOE.—Section 

7 2105(d)(3) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 

8 1397ee(d)(3)) is amended— 

9 (1) by striking subparagraph (A); 

10 (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) and 

11 (C) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and 

12 (3) in the paragraph heading, by striking 

13 ‘‘CONTINUATION OF ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS FOR

14 CHILDREN UNTIL OCTOBER 1, 2019’’ and inserting 

15 ‘‘CONTINUITY OF COVERAGE’’. 

16 (d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 

17 (1) Section 1902(a) of the Social Security Act 

18 (42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)) is amended by striking para19 graph (74). 

20 (2) Effective January 1, 2014, the paragraph 

21 (14) of section 1902(e) added by section 2002(a) of 

22 Public Law 111–148 is amended by striking the 

23 third sentence of subparagraph (A). 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 1683 IH

1 (e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Except as provided in sub2 section (d)(2), the amendments made by this section shall 

3 take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
#### ALLIED BUILDING CREDITS, Inc., a Corporation, Appellant v. Frank WATSON et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 24, 1955.

Eldon L. Webb, Ashland, for appellant.

H. Rupert Wilhoit, Grayson/ for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment on a verdict for the defendants in an action to recover balance of $1,915.84 principal of a promissory note in which the defense was fraud and misrepresentation. A consideration of the record leads to the conclusion that there was no error.

The motion for an appeal is overruled and the judgment is affirmed..
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 36 (Thursday, February 22, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13340-13341]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-03587]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RETIREMENT THRIFT INVESTMENT BOARD


Notice of Board Meeting

DATES: February 27, 2024 at 10 a.m. EST.

ADDRESSES: Telephonic. Dial-in (listen only) information: Number: 1-
202-599-1426, Code: 675 746 624#; or via web: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3ameeting_OTIxOTM4MzAtYTUyOC00NzNkLWFkMTUtZGQ3ODVhZTY0OGQx%40thread.v2/0?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%223f6323b7-e3fd-4f35-b43d-1a7afae5910d%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%2241d6f4d1-9772-4b51-a10d-cf72f842224a%22%7d.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kimberly Weaver, Director, Office of 
External Affairs, (202) 942-1640.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Board Meeting Agenda

Open Session

1. Approval of the January 23, 2024, Board Meeting Minutes

[[Page 13341]]

2. Monthly Reports
    (a) Participant Report
    (b) Investment Report
    (c) Legislative Report
3. Quarterly Reports
    (d) Metrics
4. Enterprise Risk Management
5. ORM Annual Office Update
6. FEVS Update

Closed Session

7. Information covered under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B) and (c)(10).
    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552b(e)(1).

    Dated: February 16, 2024.
Dharmesh Vashee,
General Counsel, Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board.
[FR Doc. 2024-03587 Filed 2-21-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6760-01-P
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 October 5, 2016

a0928

Order 

Clerk

October 5, 2016

153185

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 153185

COA: 315323

Wayne CC: 12-008021-FC

WILLIAM LYLES, JR.,

Defendant-Appellee.

_____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 22, 2015 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral 

argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). 

The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order 

addressing whether the trial court’s failure to correctly instruct the jury regarding 

defendant’s evidence of good character was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. 

The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

May 30, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
130613 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan AMOS WELLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 130613 COA: 257610 Bay CC: 02-004063-CL COUNTY OF BAY, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 19, 2006 judgment of the Court of Appeals is cons idered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented s hould be reviewed by this Court.

s0522 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 30, 2006

Clerk
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 32 (Thursday, February 15, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 11834]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-03139]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

[Docket No. 24-01]


Notice of Filing of Amended Complaint and Assignment; Visual 
Comfort & Co., Complainant V. Cosco Shipping Lines Co., Ltd., 
Respondent

Served: February 9, 2024.
    Notice is given that an amended complaint has been filed with the 
Federal Maritime Commission (the ``Commission'') by Visual Comfort & 
Co. (the ``Complainant'') against COSCO Shipping Lines Co., Ltd. (the 
``Respondent''). Complainant states that the Commission has 
jurisdiction over the amended complaint pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 41301 
through 41309 and personal jurisdiction over Respondent as an ocean 
common carrier as defined in 46 CFR 520.2.
    Complainant is a corporation organized under the laws of Texas with 
its principal place of business located in Houston, Texas, and is a 
shipper as defined in 46 U.S.C. 40102(23).
    Complainant identifies Respondent as a Chinese global ocean carrier 
located in Shanghai, People's Republic of China with an office/general 
agent in the United States located in Secaucus, New Jersey, and as a 
vessel-operating ocean common carrier as defined in 46 U.S.C. 
40102(18).
    Complainant alleges that Respondent violated 46 U.S.C. 41102(c) and 
41104(a)(10) and 46 CFR 545.5. Complainant alleges these violations 
arose from assessment of demurrage, detention, per diem, and yard 
storage charges during periods of time in which the charges were not 
just or reasonable because of circumstances outside the control of the 
Complainant and its agents and service providers, and from the acts or 
omissions of the Respondent that led to the assessment of these 
charges.
    An answer to the amended complaint must be filed with the 
Commission within 14 days after the date of service of the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order Granting Complainant's Motion to Amend 
Complaint and Substitute Respondent, and Granting Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss.
    The full text of the amended complaint can be found in the 
Commission's electronic Reading Room at https://www2.fmc.gov/readingroom/proceeding/24-01/. This proceeding has been assigned to 
Administrative Law Judge Linda S. Harris Crovella. The initial decision 
of the presiding judge shall be issued by January 6, 2025, and the 
final decision of the Commission shall be issued by July 21, 2025.

David Eng,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2024-03139 Filed 2-14-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6730-02-P
### Page 1 of 3 Disposition Comments

Docket No: 

### FAA

- 20 1 6

- 42 31 These comments are in

Directorate ID: 

### 20 1 5

- CE

- 0 4 2

- AD response to an SNPRM

Originating Office Tracking No.:

Next Step: FRAN SNPRM



### N o C omments/Only Supportive Comments Received

– If this box is checked, no signatures are

required.

No 

### Has the reference d service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? If yes,

lis t latest revision and attach a copy. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously

published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance.

Instructions: Summarize all comments by issue (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of

each issue. All comments relating to the same issue should be discussed together. Do not list all of the issues

from one commenter togeth er. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and

describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA

- IR

- M

- 8040.1C Chapter 9.

ISSUE 1: Select one o

f the following :

If other, explain :

Commenter(s):

What change to the AD action is requested?

Why is the change requested or how is it justified?

Do we agree?

If YES, we agree because Make the following changes to the AD:

If PARTIALLY AGREE

, we agree with because We disagree with because

Make the following changes to the AD:

If NO

, we don’t agree because

ISSUE 2 : Select one of the following :

If other, explain :

Commenter(s):

What change to the AD action is requested?

Why is the change requested or how is it justified?

Do we agree?

If YES, we agree because Make the following changes to the AD:

If PARTIALLY AGREE

, we agree w ith because We disagree with because

Make the following changes to the AD:

### Page 2 of 3

If NO

, we don’t agree because

For additional issues, do uble

- click here

### Page 3 of 3 S ignature Section

Signature indicates concurrence with this action.

Originating Office Tracking No.:

ASE Printed Name : Date

Branch M anager Date
? 44- Douglas 660, 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988) (holding that petitioner's claim of organic brain damage, borderline mental retardation, and reliance on assistance of inmate law clerk unschooled in the law did not constitute good cause for the filing of a successive post-conviction petition).

Next, appellant claimed he had good cause due to a lack of access to the prison law library and because the prison law library is inadequate. Appellant failed to demonstrate that inadequate law libraries or lack of access to the library deprived him of meaningful access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), limited by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-56 (1996). Appellant's previous proper person motions filed in the district court indicate that his access to the court was not improperly limited by restrictions on use of the prison law library or due to prison law library policies. Accordingly, he failed to demonstrate that official interference caused him to be unable to comply with the procedural bars. See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003). Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the petition as procedurally barred. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Gibbons

Saitta J.

J.

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 2

II

### cc: Hon. James M. Bixler, District Judge Leo David Hanson Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA (0) I947A 

### 3
#### Tony Buster BAIMBRIDGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 33737.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 15, 1961.

Howard O. Lake, Houston, for appellant.

Frank Briscoe, Dist. Atty., Samuel H. Robertson, Jr., and I. D. McMaster, Jr., Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

McDonald, judge.

The conviction is for driving while intoxicated; the punishment, thirty days in jail and a fine of $50.

It is undisputed that the appellant was driving an automobile upon a public highway at the time and place alleged.

Two officers testified that they saw the appellant immediately after he had stopped his automobile, smelled the odor of alcohol on his breath, heard him talk and saw him walk, and, based upon their observation of appellant’s manner of driving, they expressed the opinion that he was intoxicated.

Testifying in his own behalf, the appellant denied that he was intoxicated but said that he had previously drunk four or five beers. He called two witnesses who corroborated his testimony of nonintoxication.

The jury resolved the issue of intoxication against the appellant, and the evidence sustains their verdict.

The appellant compains of the following testimony of Officer Mahoney:

> “As I got through shaking him down and he was walking in the cell as I closed the door to his cell he said ‘I will kill you for this.’ ”

The only objection to such testimony was as follows:.

> “Objection and ask the Court to declare a mistrial it being prejudicial and highly inflammatory and has no place in the record.”

The objection was overruled and exception thereto reserved.

Officer Mahoney was one of the two arresting officers and he testified that he saw the appellant driving an- automobile while intoxicated.

If we regard the statement of the appellant to Officer Mahoney as an effort on the part of appellant to prevent the officer from testifying against him or an effort to prevent the officer from testifying the truth against appellant, the statement would be admissible in evidence as proof that one charged with *924crime threatened or attempted to intimidate a witness against him. 23 Tex.Jur.2d 195, Sec. 135; Richard v. State, 97 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 261 S.W. 587; Deisher v. State, 80 Tex.Cr.R. 428, 190 S.W. 729. We make the observation that the statement made was not in the nature of an oral confession.

The judgment is affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

 

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

 

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q ofGenaissance Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the “Company”) for the quarter endedSeptember 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on thedate hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Kevin Rakin, Chief ExecutiveOfficer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,that:

 

 (1)  theReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and  

 

(2)  the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.  

 
|                                      |   | /s/  Kevin Rakin         |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------|
| Date:   February  11, 2004 |   | Kevin  Rakin             |
|                                      |   | Chief  Executive Officer |

 

A signedoriginal of this written statement required by Section 906, or other documentauthenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appearsin typed form with the electronic version of this written statement required bySection 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by theCompany and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staffupon request.

 

----
I	would	like	an	exemption	from	FAA	Section	333.		I	would	like	an	exemption	from

section	333	in	order	to	fly	a	quad	copter	and	be	able	to	produce	and	sell	footage.	I would	like	to	be	able	to	do	this	as	a	source	of	income.	I	am	a	student	and	doing	this would be	a	great	way	for	me	to	help	pay	for	schooling.		An	exemption	for	me	would benefit	the	public	by	allowing	me	to	legally	and	safely	fly	an	UAV	and	help businesses	such	as	schools,	realtors,	non

- profits,	teams,	etc	to	get	advertisement that	they	would	othe rwise	not	be	able	to	get.	This	exemption	would	not	adversely affect	safety	because	I	am	skilled	with	UAV’s	and	know	where	no

- fly	zones	are,	and	I can	maintain	full	control	of	my	quad	copter	at	all	times.