In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-2050

CYRIAC ABRAHAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WASHINGTON GROUP INTERNATIONAL, INC. and

URS CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 12-cv-198-bbc — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2013 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

____________________

Before POSNER, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Washington Group, Inc. (“Washington Group”), an engineering, construction and management services company, offered Cyriac Abraham a position 

as a “lead scheduler” for a construction project in Wisconsin. 

After a few rounds of negotiations, Washington Group sent 

Abraham a letter offering him the title of “project control 

manager”—a position higher up the chain of command than 
2 No. 13-2050

that of lead scheduler. In this suit, Abraham claims that 

Washington Group and its parent, URS Energy and Construction (now URS Corporation) not only offered him the 

title, but also promised him that he would perform the duties of a project control manager and then breached that 

promise. 1 Washington Group claims that Abraham understood that it would give him the title of project control manager for purposes of increasing his salary but he would perform the functions of a lead scheduler on a day-to-day basis. 

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

for the Washington Group.

I.

Ordinarily we would begin our opinion with a recitation 

of the facts, and in the case of an appeal from a dismissal on 

summary judgment, we would take those facts in the light 

most favorable to the non-movant, who in this case is the 

appellant, Abraham. Miller v. Gonzalez, Nos. 11-2906, 

12-2950, 2014 WL 3824318, *5 (Aug. 5, 2014). The district 

court, however, found that Abraham had violated the court’s 

summary judgment procedures by failing to respond

properly to the defendants’ proposed findings of fact. In order to enable the court to determine what facts are disputed 

in a summary judgment motion, the district court judge re-

 1 Washington Group International, Inc. no longer exists as a legal entity. 

On March 23, 2012, Defendants filed a corporate disclosure statement 

(R. 2) delineating that URS Energy and Construction, Inc. is the successor 

in interest to Washington Group and establishing that URS Corporation 

is not a proper defendant in this action. We will refer to the defendants 

in this case as “Washington Group.” The defendants point out that “even 

if Plaintiff’s claims could survive summary judgment, unless Abraham 

were allowed to amend the complaint to name the only possible defendant (URS Energy and Construction, Inc.), his complaint should be dismissed.” Because we are upholding the grant of summary judgment to 

the defendants, it is unnecessary to decide this issue. 
No. 13-2050 3

quires through her local rules (as many district court judges 

do), that the movant submit its proposed findings of fact in a 

particular manner. If the party opposing the motion for 

summary judgment wishes to dispute a fact, that opposing 

party must state her version of the fact and refer to evidence 

that supports that version in paragraphs numbered to correspond with the movant’s facts. The court makes clear that if 

a party fails to follow the procedures, it will accept the 

properly proposed fact for purposes of evaluating the propriety of summary judgment. R. 6. 

Abraham submitted only his own affidavit which did not 

respond to the defendant’s proposed findings, contained 

several legal conclusions, and failed to follow the rule in 

other ways (for example, by failing to answer each numbered fact proposed by the moving party in separate paragraphs, using the same number and stat[ing his] version of 

the fact and refer[ing] to evidence that supports it.) See Abraham v. Washington Group, No 3:12-cv-00198-bbc, R. 26, p. 2–4; 

see also Id. R. 32, p. 2. In this appeal, Abraham does not appear to appeal the district court judge’s ruling that he violated the rule or the consequence imposed—that is, that the 

district court accepted all of the defendants’ proposed facts 

as true. And indeed it would be difficult for him to do so, as 

this Circuit has routinely held that a district court may strictly enforce compliance with its local rules regarding summary judgment motions, including the precise local rule at 

issue here. Schmidt v. Eagle Waste and Recycling, Inc., 599 F.3d 

626, 630 (7th Cir. 2010). We review a district court’s application of its own local rules for an abuse of discretion only. 

Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104, 1109 

(7th Cir. 2004). The affidavit Abraham submitted did not 

meet the requirements of the district court’s summary judgment procedures and he made no attempt to correct his mistakes after it was pointed out to him by the opposing party’s 
4 No. 13-2050

brief. At this point in the proceedings, he objects (and only in 

his reply brief) solely to the characterization of his affidavit 

as a “sham affidavit,” a matter we will discuss along with 

the other legal analyses in the case. In the meantime, we will 

continue with the facts as found by the district court. 

II.

Washington Group was in the business of providing engineering, construction, and management services to businesses and government entities. Wisconsin Public Service 

hired Washington Group to manage a construction project 

near Wausau, Wisconsin, called the Weston 4 project. In 

2004, the plaintiff, Cyriac Abraham, was living in California 

and working on a short term project in Colorado. Because 

the job was ending, he began looking for a new position. 

Mark Maier, a third-party recruiter, contacted Abraham 

about a position as a lead project scheduler on the Weston 

project. Abraham applied for the position and shortly thereafter he had a telephone interview with Bob Villa, a project 

control manager with Washington Group. Villa and Abraham discussed the scheduler position and compensation in 

the $90,000 range. After the initial interview, Washington 

Group flew Abraham to Green Bay, Wisconsin, to meet with 

Washington Group employees Chuck Meyer and Lynn 

Rohrbaugh, the latter of whom was the project control manager for the Weston 4 project. During the meeting, the three 

discussed the project in general, but did not discuss Abraham’s specific duties and the Washington Group employees

did not give Abraham any written materials during the 

meeting. 

After that meeting, Abraham also applied to Fru-Con 

Corporation for a job as a project control manager on a project in Sacramento, California at a salary of approximately 

$127,000 a year. Abraham told Maier and Villa that he was 

going to accept the Fru-Con offer as it was a management 
No. 13-2050 5

position with higher pay and it was closer to his family who 

were living in California. In response, Washington Group 

raised its offer to Abraham. Villa called Abraham and told 

him that Washington Group could offer him a salary commensurate with that of a project control manager although 

Abraham would be performing the duties of a scheduler. In 

order to pay him the higher amount, Villa explained, his title 

would be that of project control manager, but he would be 

working under the supervision of another project control 

manager. Around this time, Washington Group also gave 

the title of project control manager to other employees in order to fill positions at higher pay. No one at Washington 

Group discussed performing any project control manager 

duties with Abraham.

Washington Group sent Abraham a letter dated May 21, 

2004, which stated in part:

We are pleased to confirm our offer of employment to you with the Washington Group International, Inc. Your title will be Project Control Manager with a monthly salary of $8,750 and your assignment will be on our Weston Project in Green 

Bay, Wisconsin. Your start date is scheduled for 

June 1, 2004. 

R. 16-2.

The offer packet included other standard employment 

documents, but there was no written job description attached. Abraham accepted the offer on May 24, 2004, and 

began working as scheduled on June 1, 2004. 

Before joining Washington Group, Abraham’s sole discussion with any Washington Group employee about job 

duties was the one he had with Villa over the phone when 

he was told he would perform the duties of a scheduler despite his title as manager. 
6 No. 13-2050

For more than a year, Abraham performed his duties as a 

project scheduler, performing analyses on and managing the 

schedule, developing procedures, and conducting weekly 

meetings. On May 27, 2005, Abraham sent the following 

e-mail to Villa.

Unfortunately, we both missed or overlooked 

some points in our earnest desire to close the hiring process speedily, some time in May 04.

• It is a fact that I would not have come to [defendant] if you had not offered a Manager position. I knew the field title was “Lead Project 

Scheduler.”

• You told me there would be a Project Controls 

Manager. ... I did not think he was going to get 

into scheduling and assumed he would leave that 

to me entirely.

I think, for me to work as a scheduler under the 

instructions of some one, that stage has past [sic]. 

If I try to do that, it will be just a misuse of a valuable resource and I will be doing an injustice to 

the employer and myself. ... I do not have a problem to accept the leadership [the project control 

manager] on this project. This is a large project 

and complex ... . Unfortunately no one has defined what is the scope of my work ... . So I do 

request you to send me a job description and 

what you expect me to do.

You have hired me as Project Control Manager at 

grade 17. But you told me (or did I misunderstand?) this Wednesday that you had no intention 

to place me as a Manager. Why? I would request 

you to look at the corporate HR policy on this position, relevant part of which I have copied and 
No. 13-2050 7

attached for your quick reference. As per this, a 

[project control manager] at grade 17 “Generally 

works under the direction of a business unit director, operations manager, regional office manager or project manager.” My situation is very 

different. Why?”

R. 15-1 at 1.

Villa responded by email, stating,

There is still a misunderstanding or miscommunication between you and I ... . In our initial discussions prior to you accepting [defendant’s] offer, the position I described to you was that of the 

Lead Scheduler on the Weston 4 project ... . When

you accepted our offer, my understanding was 

(and from our conversation this week you confirmed) that you recognized the position you 

were being hired for was Lead Scheduler and you 

would report to the [project control manager]. ...

Because of your experience and capabilities, you 

were offered a salary that was a grade 17 which

has a corporate title of Project Controls Manager. 

You were hired at the corporate title (and salary) 

of Project Controls Manager to fill the position of 

Lead Scheduler. ... We do have an organization 

on the project as you know. Greg is the [project 

control manager] with full responsibility for the 

group. But, Cyriac, you are a very important

member of the project controls team. ... You have 

full responsibility for managing the schedule on 

the project, in itself a major responsibility and one 

you should not take lightly. A major success factor on the project will be meeting this schedule. A 

job description would be helpful for you and you 

should discuss this with Greg. ...
8 No. 13-2050

Id. at 2. 

Abraham, in turn, responded to Villa’s email, stating, 

I really appreciate your reply. There is nothing 

in your reply I could disagree with except for 

the fact that I am not in the loop on many issues where I need to be on this project. I am 

upset because various discussions have [taken] 

place without me where schedule inputs were 

very important. ... Let us leave this discussion 

here. Greg may learn the value of delegation, 

or some day I may be able to move into another project when a suitable opportunity arises. ...

Id. (emphasis ours).

In February 2006, Abraham applied for and then accepted a position with another company which offered him a position in Connecticut with an annual compensation package 

of $150,000. He resigned from Washington Group on February 17, 2006, and worked his last day on March 3, 2006.

On March 1, 2012, Abraham filed suit in Wisconsin state 

court alleging that the Washington Group and its parent, 

URS Corporation breached its contract with him and misrepresented the terms of his employment. Washington 

Group timely removed the case to the federal district court 

where the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Abraham filed a timely Rule 

60 motion for relief from judgment which the district court 

also denied. Abraham appeals only the breach of contract 

claim and, after a de novo review, (see Seiser v. City of Chicago, No. 13-1985, 2014 WL 3907111, *4 (7th Cir., Aug. 12, 

2014)), we affirm.
No. 13-2050 9

III.

Abraham contends that the Washington Group breached 

a contract by hiring him as a project control manager but

failing to give him the corresponding duties. As the district 

court concluded, however, Abraham failed to identify any 

contract, oral or written, in which the Washington Group 

promised to give Abraham specific duties that were different 

than those to which he was assigned. Because of this conclusion, the court held that the case failed to present any genuine disputes of material fact and the movant, Washington 

Group, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); Townsend v. Cooper, No. 12-3620, 2014 WL 

3511731, *5 (July 17, 2014).

On one issue the parties agree: The contract—that is, 

Washington Group’s offer letter—was unambiguous on its 

face. As such, under Wisconsin law, which governs this dispute, the interpretation of an unambiguous contract constitutes a question of law. Betz v. Diamond Jim's Auto Sales, 

849 N.W.2d 292, 299 (Wis. 2014). When the terms of a contract are unambiguous, a court must construe the contract 

according to its literal terms and we presume the parties’ intent is evidenced by the unambiguous words they chose. Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC, 833 N.W.2d 586, 592 (Wis., 

2013). If the terms of a contract are unambiguous, a court is 

barred from considering any extrinsic evidence such as prior 

or contemporaneous understanding or agreements between 

the parties. Id. at 593. Unambiguous contract language is 

given its plain and ordinary meaning, as it is written. Id. at 

592. And under Wisconsin’s parol evidence rule, “When the 

parties to a contract embody their agreement in writing and 

intend the writing to be the final expression of their agreement, the terms of the writing may not be varied or contradicted by evidence of any prior written or oral agreement in 
10 No. 13-2050

the absence of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.” In re Spring 

Valley Meats, Inc. v. Bohen, 288 N.W.2d 852, 855 (1980).

The only contract between the parties was the offer letter 

which straightforwardly stated:

Your title will be Project Control Manager with a 

monthly salary of $8,750 and your assignment 

will be on our Weston Project in Green Bay, Wisconsin.

R. 16-2.

Thus the contract offered the following three things: (1) 

the title of project control manager, (2) a salary of $8,750 per 

month, and (3) an assignment to the Weston Project in Green 

Bay, Wisconsin. Abraham received all three of these promised items. The letter does not contain any description of or 

any promise that Abraham would perform any specific duties. 

In the employment discrimination context, we have recognized that it would not be prudent for a court to micromanage an employer’s need for flexibility in assigning specific job duties, at least where they do not materially and adversely alter an employee’s position for discriminatory reasons. See e.g. Barton v. Zimmer, Inc., 662 F.3d 448, 457 (7th Cir. 

2011); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 790–92 (7th Cir. 

2009); Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744–

46 (7th Cir. 2002). Abraham is before us with a contract 

claim, and not an employment discrimination claim, but the 

policy considerations can be extrapolated. Washington 

Group entered into a contractual agreement to give Abraham a specific salary and job title at the Weston project. 

There are many reasons why an employer might decline to 

elaborate specific job duties in a contract, and the need for 

flexibility in managing the tasks of any particular project 

would be chief among them. It is the court’s job to respect 
No. 13-2050 11

the terms of the contract and not manufacture additional 

terms that are missing. Seitzinger v. Comty Health Network,

676 N.W.2d 426, 41 (Wis., 2004)

Although Abraham argues that the court should not have 

considered extrinsic evidence, in the same breath (or at least 

the same paragraph), he argues that the circumstances surrounding his acceptance of the offer evinced an intent for 

him to become the lead project manager. He explains:

Abraham rejected WGI’s offer of employment as 

a Lead Project Scheduler because he had received 

an offer of employment as a Project Control Manager from another employer. When WGI learned 

of that offer, it sweetened the deal and sent Abraham a letter offering him the Position of Project 

Control Manager.

(Appellant’s Brief at 19). And at the same time as he criticizes the district court judge for relying on parol evidence 

(Reply brief at 8), he urges us to consider his own extrinsic 

evidence included in his affidavit—first, the fact that he rejected the initial lead scheduler offer for a better one (Id. at 

19).

The court correctly determined, as the parties agreed,

that the contract was unambiguous and not in need of extrinsic evidence for clarification. R. 26 at 12. Nevertheless, 

that extrinsic evidence would not have helped Abraham in 

any event. The evidence demonstrated that during the conversations and negotiations prior to Washington Group’s 

official offer letter, it offered Abraham a position as a project 

scheduler but with the salary and title of a project manager. 

If there was any doubt about that agreement, the parties reiterated their understanding in the May 2005 e-mail exchange in which Villa stated, “You were hired at the corporate title (and salary) of Project Controls Manager to fill the 
12 No. 13-2050

position of Lead Scheduler.” R. 15-1 at 1. To which Abraham 

responded that “There is nothing in your reply I could disagree with.” Id. at 2.

The only evidence contrary to this assumption was 

Abraham’s affidavit which stated that he had received a job

description for the project manager position as part of the 

conversations surrounding the offer and attaching that description. Even if the district court judge accepted the parol 

evidence and considered the affidavit, she was ultimately 

correct to dismiss the evidence in the affidavit, as a deponent 

may not use an affidavit sworn to after a deposition to contradict deposition testimony without giving a credible explanation for the discrepancies. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys.

Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999); Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc.,

449 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court was unpersuaded by Abraham’s explanation—which was simply 

that he forgot that he had earlier received the job description 

when he sat for his deposition—as are we. 

Abraham objects to the characterization of his affidavit as 

a “sham affidavit” and indeed the term might imply more of 

a nefarious intent than actually suits the situation. But under 

Wisconsin law, a “sham affidavit” has a specific definition. It 

is a descriptive term used to describe an “affidavit that directly contradicts prior deposition testimony” and therefore 

is considered “generally insufficient to create a genuine issue 

of fact for trial, unless the contradiction is adequately explained.” Yahnke v. Carson, 613 N.W.2d 102, 109 (Wis., 2000). 

Such was the case here. 

Abraham received all of the promises set forth in the unambiguous written contract and for that reason there can be 

no disputed fact of material consequence and the district 

court correctly found that Washington Group was entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. 

AFFIRMED