alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1765 

To amend the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to authorize hunting under certain 

circumstances. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 5, 2011 

Mr. BOUSTANY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To amend the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to authorize 

hunting under certain circumstances. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Migratory Bird Treaty 

5 Amendment Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MIGRATORY BIRDS. 

7 Section 3 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 

8 U.S.C. 704) is amended by adding at the end the fol9 lowing: 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1765 IH

1 ‘‘(c) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding any other provi2 sion of this Act, subsection (b) shall not apply to an agri3 cultural producer, or a hunter with the permission of the 

4 agricultural producer, if— 

5 ‘‘(1) the manipulation occurs on land of the ag6 ricultural producer on which a crop during the cur7 rent or immediately preceding crop year was not 

8 harvestable due to a natural disaster, as determined 

9 by the Secretary of Agriculture; and 

10 ‘‘(2) a local representative of the Secretary of 

11 Agriculture confirms that— 

12 ‘‘(A) the crop has been destroyed; and 

13 ‘‘(B) it would not be economically prac14 ticable to harvest the crop.’’. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1

                      AXA EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December
31, 2010 of AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company (the "Company") as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Mark Pearson, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

                                  /s/  Mark Pearson
                                  ---------------------------
                                  Mark Pearson
                                  Chairman of the Board and
                                  Chief Executive Officer

Date:  March 10, 2011
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 11, 2019

No. 04-18-00870-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.C.M.,

From the 407th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017PA01431

Honorable Karen H. Pozza, Judge Presiding

ORDER

This is an accelerated appeal of an order terminating the appellant’s parental rights, 

which must be disposed of by this Court within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal is filed. 

TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2. Appellant’s brief was originally due December 27, 2018. When 

appellant’s brief was not filed, we issued an order on January 7, 2019 ordering appellant’s 

attorney to file appellant’s brief on or before January 28, 2019. That same day, appellant’s 

attorney filed a motion for extension of time requesting an extension to February 7, 2019. 

Appellant’s motion is GRANTED. Appellant’s brief is due on February 7, 2019.

Given the time constraints governing the disposition of this appeal, no further extensions 

will be granted absent extenuating circumstances. 

_________________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 11th day of January, 2019.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
EXHIBIT 32.1

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
BY PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


      I, Keith Brackpool, herby certify, to my
knowledge, that:

      1. the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of
Cadiz Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2005 (the
"Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

      2. the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of Cadiz Inc.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this
Statement as of the date first written above.

Dated: March 16, 2006


                              /s/ Keith Brackpool
                              ----------------------------------
                              Keith Brackpool
                              Chairman, Chief Executive Officer
#### Elizabeth B. WOOSTER, Appellant, v. Clyde THOMPSON et ux., Appellees.

No. 15673.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

Dec. 30, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1956.

Brewster, Panned, Leeton & Dean, and Wm. C. Panned, Fort Worth, for appellant.

Tilley, Hyder & Law, and Thos. H. Law, Fort Worth, for appellees.

RENFRO, Justice.

■ The appellant, Elizabeth B. Wooster, mother of the minor child Elizabeth Eileen Thompson, has appealed from a judgment awarding custody of said minor child to its paternal grandparents, Clyde and Ossie Thompson.

The appeal is predicated on the theory that the evidence is wholly insufficient to establish a relinquishment of custody to others, or to show a change of condition sufficient to change or modify the custody order previously in effect or that the best interest and welfare of the child would be served thereby.

No useful purpose would be served in setting out the evidence in the statement of facts comprising 500 plus pages. Suffice it to say, the evidence is amply sufficient to support the judgment entered.

The trial judge was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and he had the opportunity to observe the parties and weigh their respective qualifications. He is in a better position to analyze the facts, weigh the virtues of the parties and determine what will be for the best interest of the child than can be ascertained from reading the record. Therefore, the awarding of the custody of a minor child will not be disturbed on appeal unless the award is so contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence as to show an abuse of discretion. Moore v. Moore, Tex.Civ.App., 213 S.W.2d 724; Humphreys v. Humphreys, Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W.2d 453; Prendergast v. Prendergast, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 710; Penn v. Abell, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 483; Epstein v. Epstein, Tex.Civ.App., 84 S.W.2d 894; Lyle v. Lyle, Tex.Civ.App., 141 S.W.2d 960; Turk v. McLure, Tex.Civ.App., 63 S.W.2d 1049; Norris v. Norris, Tex.Civ.App., 194 S.W.2d 813.

Viewing the record as a whole, we cannot say the trial court abused his dis*955cretion in awarding custody of the child to appellees. An appellate court does not have the power to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. Meek, Tex., 276 S.W.2d 787; Kell v. Texas Children’s Home & Aid Society, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 900.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-19-00488-CV

Image Microsystems, Inc., Appellant

v.

MET 4/12, Ltd., Appellee

FROM THE 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. D-1-GN-19-002392, THE HONORABLE DUSTIN M. HOWELL, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Image Microsystems, Inc. has filed an unopposed motion to dismiss 

this appeal, informing the Court that the parties have entered into a settlement agreement. In 

accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement, the parties have agreed to move that the

appeal be dismissed with prejudice, that costs should be paid by the party incurring the same, and 

that the mandate be issued early to effectuate the dismissal of the appeal. We grant appellant’s 

motion and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(2)(A).

__________________________________________

Thomas J. Baker, Justice

Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Kelly

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: November 1, 2019
#### Commonwealth *v.*Donahue, Appellant.

Argued May 9, 1939.

Before Keller, P. J., Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Parker, Bhodes and Hirt, JJ.

*John Duggan, Jr.,*for appellant.

*E. R. Jackson,*Assistant District Attorney, with him *Andrew T. Park,*District Attorney, for appellee.

*307June 28, 1939:

Opinion by

Rhodes, J.,

Appellant’s contention is that the evidence presented at the trial failed to establish the offense charged in the indictment upon which she was tried. She was indicted under section 1 of the Act of July 16, 1917, P. L. 1000, 18 PS §831, as the pathic and not the actor. A police officer was an eyewitness, and testified to the occurrence. He fully described what he saw and found, and the conditions which he observed. He also testified without objection that appellant, when apprehended, admitted what they were doing, stated that this was the first time she had done such a thing, and asked to be let go. Neither principal testified, and no defense was offered.

Counsel for appellant argues that there was no proof of penetration (section 2 of the Act of July 16, 1917, P. L. 1000, 18 PS §832), and that therefore there was not sufficient evidence to convict. With this argument we do not agree. The fact of penetration may be shown by circumstantial evidence where such evidence is sufficient to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The condition, position, and proximity of the parties, as testified to by the eyewitness to the affair, affords sufficient evidence of penetration to warrant the verdict. Appellant and the other party were jointly engaged in the crime, and the only way to prove penetration was by the facts and circumstances. See *State v. Gage et al.*139 Iowa 401, 116 N. W. 596.

The case was for the jury, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

The judgment is affirmed, and the record is remitted to the court below, and it is ordered that defendant appear in the court below at such time as she may there be called, and that she be by that court committed until she has complied with the sentence, or any part thereof which had not been performed at the time the appeal in this case was made a supersedeas.
#### TRATAROS CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL. *v.*ROJAC COMPANY, INC. ROJAC COMPANY, INC. *v.*TRATAROS CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL.

(13941)

(13942)

O’Connell, Heiman and Spear, Js.

Argued December 4, 1995

decision released January 9, 1996

*903
      *Edward J. Dolan,*with whom, on the brief, was *Kent Harvey,*for the appellants (plaintiffs in the first case, defendants in the second case).

*Daniel P. Scapellati,*for the appellee (defendant in the first case, plaintiff in the second case).

PER CURIAM.

The judgments are affirmed.
#### Milton PLEDGER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28775.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 23, 1957.

No attorney for appellant of record on appeal.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DICE, Commissioner.

Upon a trial before the court without a jury, appellant was convicted under a plea of guilty of driving while intoxicated and assessed punishment of a fine of $50 and 3 days’ confinement in jail.

Appellant’s motion for new trial was overruled and notice of appeal given on July 30, 1956, being within the term of the court which terminated on August 31, 1956. On the same day appellant executed an appeal bond.

This Court is without jurisdiction of the appeal where an appeal bond was resorted to by appellant before adjournment of the term at which the notice of appeal was given. Art. 830, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.; Hankins v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 562, 251 S.W.2d 729.

The appeal is dismissed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
Exhibit 31.2

            PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION

I, Linda L. Perry, certify that:

1.    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Wings & Things,
Inc.;

2.    Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small
business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

4.    The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
small business issuer and have:

      (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

      (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,
as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
and

      (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's
fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business
issuer's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.    The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit
committee of small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing
the equivalent function):

      (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

      (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting.


                                /s/ Linda L. Perry
Date: May 10, 2006              ___________________________________________
                                Linda L. Perry, Principal Financial Officer
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### National Science Foundation

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub., L. 92-463, as amended), the National Science Foundation (NSF) announces the following meeting:

*Name and Committee Code:*                         Advisory Committee for Cyberinfrastructure (#25150).                    

*Date and Time:*                         April 11-12, 2024; 8:30 a.m.-5 p.m. (Eastern).                    

*Place:*                         NSF, 2415 Eisenhower Avenue, Rm 3410, Alexandria, VA 22314 (In-Person).                    

                        The final meeting agenda and instructions to register and attend the meeting will be posted on the ACCI website:                         *https://www.nsf.gov/​cise/​oac/​advisory.jsp.*

*Type of Meeting:*                         Open.                    

*Contact Persons:*                         Walton, Amy, National Science Foundation, 2415 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314; Telephone: (703) 292-4538.                    

*Minutes:*                         May be obtained from Christine Christy, National Science Foundation, 2415 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314; Telephone: (703) 292-2221 and will be posted within 90-days after the meeting end date to the ACCI website:                         *https://www.nsf.gov/​cise/​oac/​advisory.jsp*

*Purpose of Meeting:*                         To advise NSF on the impact of its policies, programs, and activities in the OAC community. To provide advice to the Director/NSF on issues related to long-range planning.                    

*Agenda:*                         Updates on NSF wide OAC activities:                         *https://www.nsf.gov/​cise/​oac/​advisory.jsp.*

Dated: February 15, 2024.

Crystal Robinson,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 2024-03519 Filed 2-20-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555-01-P
UN PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22

- 1818

In re: CATHERINE DENISE RANDOLPH , Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. James K. Bredar , Chief District Judge. ( 1:15

- mc - 00369 )

Submitted : December 15, 2022 Decided: December 19, 2022

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge and WILKINSON and DIAZ , Circuit Judges

.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Catherine Denise Randolph, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-1818 Doc: 11 Filed: 12/19/2022 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: Catherine Denise Randolph appeals the district court’s order returning her pleadings because the pleadings did not comply with the prefiling injunc tion and did not state a plausible cause of action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the mater ials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED USCA4 Appeal: 22-1818 Doc: 11 Filed: 12/19/2022 Pg: 2 of 2
#### Flora J. STEPHENS, Appellant, v. Sam STEPHENS, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 17, 1955.

Edward H. Johnstone, Princeton, for appellant.

J. C.' Gannady,' Providence, for appellee.

CAMMACK, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Caldwell Circuit Court denying the appellant, Flora Stephens, a divorce from her husband, Sam Stephens. Mrs. Stephens filed an action for an absolute divorce in April, 1953, in which she relied upon the statutory ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. After all the proof was in the trial court adjudged that she had condoned the cruel and inhuman treatment and entered judgment dismissing her petition. It is contended that the court erred in so doing.

The parties were married in 1941, and lived together as man and wife until their separation in 1953. Mrs. Stephens testified concerning various acts of cruelty on the part of her husband. She said that his excessive drinking, cursing, abuse, neglect and coldness toward her led to their separation in February, 1953. They were separated about two weeks, then lived together again as man and wife for about two weeks. *558Their .efforts at reconciliation -were urn availing and they have not lived together as man and wife since their second separation. Their two-week resumption of cohabitation evidently led the trial court to thé conclu-sión that the cruel and inhuman treatment had been condoned.

We are of the opinion that the con-donation statute, KRS 403.040, has no application where the divorce is sought on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. The statute provides:

> “(1) Cohabitation as man and wife, after knowledge of the adultery or lewd and lascivious behavior complained of, shall take away the right of divorce therefor.”

We have stated specifically that this statute is not applicable where the divorce is sought on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. Robb v. Robb, 281 Ky. 729, 137 S.W.2d 385; Meyer v. Meyer, 226 Ky. 278, 10 S.W.2d 844. In the Robb case we said [281 Ky. 729, 137 S.W.2d 386]:

> «* . * * But where there has been forgiveness and a mutual effort to live together in the future notwithstanding the past, the party, who precipitates or .renews the trouble must, as a matter of fact, be chargeable with the greater blame. * * * ”

. The Robb and Meyer cases show clearly the inapplicability of the case of Buckley v. Buckley, 214 Ky. 566, 283 S.W. 1031, relied upon by the trial court in his opinion. See also York v. York, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 553.

We will not attempt to determine who was responsible for the second separation, or who precipitated or renewed the-trouble in this case. Nor will we consider-the question of alimony, since we think those questions should be passed upon first by the trial court. We are deciding only that KRS 403.040 does not apply to this case, and that there was no condonation on the part of Mrs. Stephens of the alleged acts of cruelty on the part of her husband.

The judgment is reversed, with directions to set it aside, and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.