37958 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 122 / Tuesday, June 25, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 

other matters involving the ongoing 

administration of the loan; and 

(vi) Circumstances and conditions 

under which participants may replace 

the servicer. 

■ 3. Amend § 701.23 by adding 

introductory text to read as follows: 

§ 701.23 Purchase, sale, and pledge of 

eligible obligations. 

This section governs a federal credit 

union’s purchase, sale, or pledge of all 

or part of a loan to one of its own 

members, subject to a limited exception 

for certain well capitalized federal 

credit unions, where no continuing 

contractual obligation between the seller 

and purchaser is contemplated. For 

purchases of eligible obligations, except 

as described in paragraph (b)(2) of this 

section, the borrower must be a member 

of the purchasing federal credit union 

before the purchase is made. A federal 

credit union may not purchase a nonmember loan to hold in its portfolio. 

* * * * * 

PART 741—REQUIREMENTS FOR 

INSURANCE 

■ 4. The authority citation for part 741 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1757, 1766(a), 1781– 

1790, and 1790d; 31 U.S.C. 3717. 

Subpart A—Regulations Applicable to 

Both Federal Credit Unions and 

Federally Insured, State-Chartered 

Credit Unions That Are Not Codified 

Elsewhere in NCUA’s Regulations 

■ 5. Amend § 741.8 by: 

■ a. Removing the word ‘‘or’’ appearing 

at the end of paragraph (b)(2); 

■ b. Adding the word ‘‘or’’ after the 

semicolon appearing at the end of 

paragraph (b)(3); and 

■ c. Adding paragraph (b)(4). 

The addition reads as follows: 

§ 741.8 Purchase of assets and 

assumption of liabilities. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(4) Purchases of loan participations as 

defined in and meeting the 

requirements of § 701.22 of this chapter. 

* * * * * 

■ 6. Add § 741.225 to read as follows: 

§ 741.225 Loan participations. 

Any credit union that is insured 

pursuant to Title II of the Act must 

adhere to the requirements stated in 

§ 701.22 of this chapter, except that 

federally insured, state-chartered credit 

unions are exempt from the requirement 

in § 701.22(b)(4). 

[FR Doc. 2013–15178 Filed 6–24–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7535–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 23 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–0493; Special 

Conditions No. 23–260–SC] 

Special Conditions: Cessna Aircraft 

Company, Model J182T; Electronic 

Engine Control System Installation 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Cessna Aircraft Company 

(Cessna) Model J182T airplane. This 

airplane will have a novel or unusual 

design feature(s) associated with the 

installation of an electronic engine 

control. The applicable airworthiness 

regulations do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for this 

design feature. These special conditions 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is June 25, 2013. 

We must receive your comments by 

July 25, 2013. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number [FAA–2013–0493] 

using any of the following methods: 

D Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

D Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

D Hand Delivery of Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

D Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://www.regulations.gov, including 

any personal information the 

commenter provides. Using the search 

function of the docket Web site, anyone 

can find and read the electronic form of 

all comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov at any time. 

Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to the Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Peter Rouse, Federal Aviation 

Administration, Small Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas 

City, MO 64106; telephone (816) 329– 

4135; facsimile (816) 329–4090. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

has determined that notice and 

opportunity for prior public comment 

hereon are impracticable because these 

procedures would significantly delay 

issuance of the design approval and 

thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In 

addition, the substance of these special 

conditions has been subject to the 

public comment process in several prior 

instances with no substantive comments 

received. The FAA therefore finds that 

good cause exists for making these 

special conditions effective upon 

issuance. 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

Background 

On April 2, 2012, Cessna Aircraft 

Company applied for an amendment to 

Type Certificate No. 3A13 to include the 

new model J182T which will 

incorporate the installation of the 

Societe de Motorisation Aeronautiques 

(SMA) Engines, Inc. SR305–230E–C1 

which is a four-stroke, air cooled, diesel 

cycle engine that uses turbine (jet) fuel. 

The J182T incorporates an engine 

controlled by an electronic engine 


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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 122 / Tuesday, June 25, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 37959 

control (EEC), also known as a Full 

Authority Digital Engine Control 

(FADEC). The EEC system performs 

critical functions throughout the 

operational envelope such as the control 

of the fuel flow and ignition. These 

functions and their impact on the 

engine are required by 14 CFR parts 33 

and 23. Additionally, the EEC systems 

have incorporated functions, that while 

not required in either parts 33 or 23, 

have potential failure(s) and 

malfunction(s) that may be catastrophic 

or unacceptably degrade the airplane 

level of safety. Examples of the 

additional functions include thrust 

management, engine parameter 

indication, engine speed 

synchronization, engine torque 

equalization, etc. Considerations for 

installation of EEC systems were not 

envisaged and are not adequately 

addressed in part 23. Therefore, special 

conditions are required to define the 

additional safety standards the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

the existing airworthiness standards. 

Cessna will use an EEC instead of a 

traditional mechanical control system 

on the J182T airplane. The J182T, which 

is a derivative of the T182T currently 

approved under Type Certificate No. 

3A13, is an aluminum, four place, single 

engine airplane with a cantilever high 

wing, with the SMA SR305–230E–C1 

diesel cycle engine and equipped with 

an electronic engine control. 

The EEC is part 33 certified as part of 

the engine, and the certification 

requirements for engine control systems 

are driven by part 33 requirements. The 

guidance for the part 33 EEC 

certification requirement is contained in 

two advisory circulars: AC 33.28–1 and 

AC 33.28–2. The EEC certification, as 

part of the engine, addresses those 

aspects of the engine specifically 

addressed by part 33 and is not 

intended to address part 23 installation 

requirements. However, the guidance 

does highlight some of the installation 

aspects that the engine applicant should 

consider during engine certification. 

The installation of an engine with an 

EEC system requires evaluation of 

environmental effects and possible 

effects on or by other airplane systems, 

including the part 23 installation 

aspects of the EEC functions. For 

example, the indirect effects of 

lightning, radio interference with other 

airplane electronic systems, and shared 

engine and airplane data and power 

sources. 

The regulatory requirements in part 

23 for evaluating the installation of 

complex electronic systems are 

contained in § 23.1309. However, when 

§ 23.1309 was developed, the 

requirements of the rule excluded 

powerplant systems as part of the 

certificated engine (reference 

§ 23.1309(f)(1), amendment No. 23–49). 

Although the parts of the system that are 

not certificated with the engine could be 

evaluated using the criteria of § 23.1309, 

the analysis would be incomplete 

because it would not include the effects 

of the aircraft supplied power and data 

failures on the engine control system, 

and the resulting effects on engine 

power/thrust. The integral nature of EEC 

installations require review of EEC 

functionality at the airplane level 

because behavior acceptable for part 33 

certification may not be acceptable for 

part 23 certification. 

The Small Airplane Directorate has 

applied a Special Condition for over a 

decade that required all EEC 

installations to comply with the 

requirements of §§ 23.1309(a) through 

(e), amendment No. 23–49. The 

rationale for applying § 23.1309 was that 

it was an existing rule that contained 

the best available requirements to apply 

to the installation of a complex 

electronic system; in this case, an 

electronic engine control with aircraft 

interfaces. Additionally, Special 

Conditions for High Intensity Radiated 

Fields (HIRF) were also applied prior to 

the codification of § 23.1308. 

There are several difficulties for 

propulsion systems directly complying 

with the requirements of § 23.1309. 

There are conflicts between the 

guidance material for § 23.1309 and 

propulsion system capabilities and 

failure susceptibilities. The following 

figure is an excerpt from AC 23.1309– 

1E showing the relationship among 

airplane classes, probabilities, severity 

of failure conditions, and software and 

complex hardware Development 

Assurance Level. 

Classification of failure 

conditions 

No safety effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic 

Allowable qualitative 

probability 

No probability requirement Probable Remote Extremely 

remote 

Extremely 

improbable 

Effect on Airplane ............... No effect on operational 

capabilities or safety.

Slight reduction in 

functional capabilities or safety 

margins.

Significant reduction in functional 

capabilities or 

safety margins.

Large reduction in 

functional capabilities or safety 

margins.

Normally with hull 

loss. 

Effect on Occupants ........... Inconvenience for passengers.Physical discomfort 

for passengers.

Physical distress to 

passengers, possibly including injuries.

Serious or fatal injury to an occupant.Multiple fatalities. 

Effect on Flight Crew ......... No effect on flight crew .... Slight increase in 

workload or use 

of emergency 

procedures.

Physical discomfort 

or a significant 

increase in workload.

Physical distress or 

excessive workload impairs ability to perform 

tasks.

Fatal Injury or incapacitation. 

Classes of Airplanes Allowable Quantitative Probabilities and Software (SW) and Complex Hardware (HW) Development Assurance 

Levels (Note 2) 

Class I (Typically SRE 

6,000 pounds or less).

No Probability or SW and 

HW Development Assurance Levels Requirement.

<10¥3 Note 1 P=D <10¥4 Notes 1 and 

4 P=C, S=D.

<10¥5 Note 4 P=C, 

S=D.

<10¥6 Note 3 P=C, 

S=C. 

Class II (Typically MRE, 

STE, or MTE 6,000 

pounds or less).

No Probability or SW and 

HW Development Assurance Levels Requirement.

<10¥3 Note 1 P=D <10¥5 Notes 1 and 

4 P=C, S=D.

<10¥6 Note 4 P=C, 

S=C.

<10¥7 Note 3 P=C, 

S=C. 


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37960 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 122 / Tuesday, June 25, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 

Classification of failure 

conditions 

No safety effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic 

Allowable qualitative 

probability 

No probability requirement Probable Remote Extremely 

remote 

Extremely 

improbable 

Class III (Typically SRE, 

STE, MRE, and MTE 

greater than 6,000 

pounds).

No Probability or SW and 

HW Development Assurance Levels Requirement.

<10¥3 Note 1 P=D <10¥5 Notes 1 and 

4 P=C, S=D.

<10¥7 Note 4 P=C, 

S=C.

<10¥8 Note 3 P=B, 

S=C. 

Class IV (Typically Commuter Category).No Probability or SW and 

HW Development Assurance Levels Requirement.

<10¥3 Note 1 P=D <10¥5 Notes 1 and 

4 P=C, S=D.

<10¥7 Note 4 P=B, 

S=C.

<10¥9 Note 3 P=A, 

S=B. 

Note 1: Numerical values indicate an order of probability range and are provided here as a reference. 

Note 2: The letters of the alphabet denote the typical SW and HW Development Assurance Levels for Primary System (P) and Secondary System (S). For example, HW or SW Development Assurance Level A on Primary System is noted by P=A. 

Note 3: At airplane function level, no single failure will result in a Catastrophic Failure Condition. 

Note 4. Secondary System (S) may not be required to meet probability goals. If installed, S should meet stated criteria. 

Difference Between Part 23 and Part 33 

Guidance, Loss of Thrust or Power 

Control 

There is a conflict between the EEC 

system loss-of-thrust-control (LOTC), or 

loss-of-power control (LOPC), 

probability per hour requirements given 

in part 33 guidance material and the 

failure rate requirements associated 

with the hazard created by a total loss 

of power/thrust as given in part 23 AC 

23.1309–1E guidance. The part 33 

requirements for engine control LOTC/ 

LOPC probabilities are shown below: 

Engine type Average LOTC/LOPC 

events per million hours 

Maximum LOTC/LOPC 

events per million hours 

Turbine Engine ......................................................................................... 10 (1 × 10¥05 per hour) ................ 100 (1 × 10¥04 per hour). 

Reciprocating Engine ............................................................................... 45 (4.5 × 10¥05 per hour) ............. 450 (4.5 × 10¥04 per hour). 

Note: See AC 33.28–1, AC 33.28–2 and ANE–1993–33.28TLD–Rl for further guidance. 

The part 23 classification of the 

failure condition for LOTC/LOPC event 

on a single engine airplane ranges from 

Hazardous to Catastrophic. The 

classification of the failure condition for 

a single engine LOTC/LOPC event on a 

multi-engine airplane ranges from Major 

to Catastrophic. The classification of the 

failure condition for a multi-engine 

LOTC/LOPC event on a multi-engine 

airplane is Catastrophic. From the AC 

23.1309-lE failure probability values, it 

is obvious that a single engine airplane 

electronic engine control system will 

not be able to meet the failure 

probabilities as shown in the guidance 

material for § 23.1309. As a result, 

applicants have inappropriately 

declared a reduced hazard severity for a 

failure of the electronic engine control 

system. This is not the intent of 

§ 23.1309. The greater hazard severity 

should be associated with lower 

probabilities of failure, and higher 

probabilities of failure should not 

artificially establish lower hazard 

severities. There is also a conflict 

between the classification of the failure 

condition of an electronic engine 

control system and the required test 

levels for the effects of lightning and 

high intensity radiated frequency 

(HIRF). Testing to a level lower than 

required for a catastrophic failure 

results in a lower level of safety than the 

mechanical system it replaces. This is 

contrary to the intent of certification 

requirements. 

Time Limited Dispatch 

The advent of electronic engine 

controls also created the ability to 

dispatch with certain allowable loss of 

functionality and/or redundancy. This 

is known as Time Limited Dispatch 

(TLD). The TLD allowable 

configurations must meet the specific 

risk LOTC/LOPC failure probabilities. 

FAA Policy Statement, ANE–1993– 

33.28TLD–Rl, defines the full up and 

TLD allowable failure probabilities for 

turbine engines. The ability to use TLD 

is a risk management endeavor that uses 

a limited time between inspection/ 

maintenance intervals to mitigate the 

hazard. As such, the FAA has issued 

specific guidance for part 23 aircraft in 

addition to Policy Statement, ANE– 

1993–33.28TLD–Rl, in order to capture 

the necessary time limits between 

maintenance intervals. 

Additional Functions 

The advent of electronic engine 

controls also led to incorporating 

functions that; while not required by the 

CFRs; also introduce potentially 

catastrophic failure(s) and 

malfunction(s). Consequently, 

incorporation of these additional 

functions must be shown to retain part 

23 safety levels. These additional 

functions have included thrust 

management, portions of engine 

indication otherwise provided as part of 

the engine installation, engine speed 

synchronization, ignition control, autofeather, etc. 

Part 25, unlike part 23, does not apply 

§ 25.1309 via special condition to the 

electronic engine control installation. 

Section 25.1309 is applicable to the 

powerplant installations in general and 

as a whole. The part 25 hazard 

classifications for LOTC/LOPC differ 

from part 23 due to the required multiengine configuration of part 25 aircraft. 

Additional applicable part 25 subpart E 

requirements are those contained within 

§ 25.901(b)(2) and (c): 

Sec. 25.901—Installation. 

a. Rule Text. 

(b) For each powerplant— 

(2) The components of the installation 

must be constructed, arranged, and installed 

so as to ensure their continued safe operation 

between normal inspections or overhauls; 

(c) For each powerplant and auxiliary 

power unit installation, it must be 

established that no single failure or 

malfunction or probable combination of 

failures will jeopardize the safe operation of 

the airplane except that the failure of 

structural elements need not be considered if 

the probability of such failure is extremely 

remote. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 122 / Tuesday, June 25, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 37961 

The following are excerpts from 

guidance provided in FAA Policy 

Statement, PS–ANM100–2002–00073: 

Section 25.901—Installation. 

b. Intent of Rule: 

• § 25.901(b)(2) is intended to require such 

preventative maintenance as is necessary to 

ensure that components of the powerplant 

installation do not cease safe functioning. 

• § 25.901(c) is intended to define, in 

general terms, the foreseeable failures that 

each powerplant and auxiliary power unit 

installation must be shown to safely 

accommodate. 

(7) § 25.901(c): Section 25.901(c) is intended 

to provide an overall safety assessment of the 

powerplant installation. It is intended to 

augment rather than replace other, more 

specific applicable Part 25 design and 

performance standards for transport category 

airplanes. When assessing the potential 

hazards to the aircraft caused by the 

powerplant installation, the effects of an 

engine case rupture, uncontained engine 

rotor failure, engine case burnthrough, and 

propeller debris release are excluded from 

§ 25.901(c). The effects and rates of these 

failures are minimized by compliance with 

Part 33 (‘‘Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft 

Engines’’; Part 35 (‘‘Airworthiness Standards: 

Propellers’’; § 25.903(d)(l) (‘‘Engines’’; 

§ 25.905(d) (‘‘Propellers’’; and § 25.1193 

(‘‘Cowling and nacelle skin’’. Furthermore, 

the effects of encountering environmental 

threats or other operating conditions more 

severe than those for which the aircraft is 

certified (such as volcanic ash or operation 

above placard speeds) need not be 

considered in the § 25.901(c) compliance 

process. However, if a failure or malfunction 

can affect the subsequent environmental 

qualification or other operational capability 

of the installation, this effect should be 

accounted/or in the § 25.901(c) assessment. 

(a) Compliance with § 25.901(c) may be 

shown by a System Safety Assessment (SSA) 

substantiated by appropriate testing and/or 

comparable service experience. Such an 

assessment may range from a simple report 

that offers descriptive details associated with 

a failure condition, interprets test results, 

compares two similar systems, or offers other 

qualitative information; to a detailed failure 

analysis that may include estimated 

numerical probabilities. The depth and scope 

of an acceptable SSA depends on: 

• the complexity and criticality of the 

functions performed by the system(s) under 

consideration, 

• the severity of related failure conditions, 

• the uniqueness of the design and extent 

of relevant service experience, 

• the number and complexity of the 

identified causal failure scenarios, and 

• the detectability of contributing failures. 

(b) Historically, the use of a ‘‘bottom-up 

single failure analysis,’’ such as a Failure 

Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), has 

been a popular safety assessment method 

with many applicants. Wherever the effects 

of a failure are found to be operationally 

‘‘latent,’’ then the effects of the ‘‘next worst’’ 

failure are assessed. In this approach, the 

‘‘probable combinations of failures’’ are 

assumed only to be a single latent failure 

plus ‘‘the next worst’’ failure. When assessing 

the failure effects of a simple mechanical, 

hydro-mechanical, or electrical system, 

where independence from the effects of 

failures elsewhere in the aircraft can be 

assumed, this can be an effective and 

relatively simple means of assuring that the 

design is adequately ‘‘fail-safe.’’ However, as 

the integration and diversity of functions and 

technologies in the subject design increase, 

particularly when digital avionics are 

involved, the resulting increases in 

complexity, interdependence, and parts 

count make this ‘‘latents-plus-one’’ 

assumption about the ‘‘probable 

combinations of failure’’ questionable. 

Consequently, to ensure that the design is 

‘‘fail-safe’’ for a sufficient number of coexisting failures, probability methods are 

typically necessary. 

(d) In carrying out the SSA for the 

powerplant installation for § 25.90I(c), the 

results of the engine (and propeller) failure 

analyses (reference § 33.28 and § 33.75) 

should be used as inputs for those 

powerplant failure effects that can have an 

impact on the aircraft. However, the SSA 

undertaken in response to Part 33 and Part 

35 may not address all the potential effects 

that an engine and propeller as installed may 

have on the aircraft. For those failure 

conditions covered by analysis under Part 33 

and/or Part 35, and for which the installation 

has no effect on the conclusions derived from 

these analyses, no additional analyses will be 

required to demonstrate compliance to 

§ 25.901(c). 

There is language similar to 

§ 25.901(c) contained in § 23.1141(e): 

§ 23.1141—Powerplant controls: General. 

(e) For turbine engine powered airplanes, 

no single failure or malfunction, or probable 

combination thereof, in any powerplant 

control system may cause the failure of any 

powerplant function necessary for safety. 

The requirements contained within 

§ 23.114l(e) were originally intended for 

the mechanical control interfaces on 

turbine engines. The rule was first 

promulgated at amendment 23–7, 

effective on September 14, 1969. The 

preamble justifying the rule change 

states: 

This proposal would, in effect require that 

the need for system redundancy, alternate 

devices, and duplication of functions be 

determined in the design of turbine 

powerplant control systems. 

The overall intent of the above cited 

rules is to provide a robust and fault 

tolerant engine control installation that 

ensures that no single failure or 

malfunction or probable combination of 

failures will jeopardize the safe 

operation of the airplane. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of § 21.101, 

Cessna must show that the model J182T 

meets the applicable provisions of the 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

Type Certificate No. 3A13 or the 

applicable regulations in effect on the 

date of application for the change to the 

model T182T. The regulations 

incorporated by reference in the type 

certificate are commonly referred to as 

the ‘‘original type certification basis.’’ In 

addition, the J182T certification basis 

includes special conditions and 

equivalent levels of safety. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 23) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the J182T because of a novel or 

unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the J182T must comply with 

the fuel vent and exhaust emission 

requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the 

noise certification requirements of 14 

CFR part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38 and 

they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.101. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same novel or unusual 

design feature, or should any other 

model already included on the same 

type certificate be modified to 

incorporate the same novel or unusual 

design feature, the special conditions 

would also apply to the other model. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The J182T will incorporate the 

following novel or unusual design 

features: Electronic engine control 

system. 

Discussion 

These special conditions address the 

certification requirements for the 

installation of Electronic Engine Control 

(EEC) systems on part 23 airplanes. As 

described in the background section, the 

advisory circular and policy guidance 

between part 33 and part 23 contains 

differences that can lead to conflicting 

certification requirements. As such, 

these special conditions are necessary in 

order to provide a reasonable means of 

compliance that removes the conflicts 

between part 33 and part 23. The intent 

of these special conditions is to provide 

a robust and fault tolerant electronic 

engine control installation that ensures 

no single failure or malfunction or 

probable combination of failures will 

jeopardize the safe operation of the 

airplane. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
37962 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 122 / Tuesday, June 25, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the model 

J182T. Should Cessna apply at a later 

date for a change to the type certificate 

to include another model incorporating 

the same novel or unusual design 

feature, the special conditions would 

apply to that model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of airplane. It is not a rule of general 

applicability and affects only the 

applicant who applied to the FAA for 

approval of these features on the 

airplane. 

The substance of these special 

conditions has been subjected to the 

notice and comment period in several 

prior instances and has been derived 

without substantive change from those 

previously issued. It is unlikely that 

prior public comment would result in a 

significant change from the substance 

contained herein. Therefore, because a 

delay would significantly affect the 

certification of the airplane, which is 

imminent, the FAA has determined that 

prior public notice and comment are 

unnecessary and impracticable, and 

good cause exists for adopting these 

special conditions upon issuance. The 

FAA is requesting comments to allow 

interested persons to submit views that 

may not have been submitted in 

response to the prior opportunities for 

comment described above. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and 

symbols. 

Citation 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 

44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR 

11.38 and 11.19. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Cessna Model 

J182T airplanes. 

1. Electronic Engine Control 

a. For electronic engine control 

system installations, it must be 

established that no single failure or 

malfunction or probable combinations 

of failures of Electronic Engine Control 

(EEC) system components will have an 

effect on the system, as installed in the 

airplane, that causes the loss-of-thrustcontrol (LOTC), or loss-of-power-control 

(LOPC) probability of the system to 

exceed those allowed in part 33 

certification. 

b. Electronic engine control system 

installations must be evaluated for 

environmental and atmospheric 

conditions, including lightning. The 

EEC system lightning and High-Intensity 

Radiated Fields (HIRF) effects that result 

in LOTC/LOPC must be shown to 

comply with the HIRF and lightning 

requirements appropriate for 

catastrophic failure conditions. 

c. The components of the installation 

must be constructed, arranged, and 

installed so as to ensure their continued 

safe operation between normal 

inspections or overhauls. 

d. Functions incorporated into any 

electronic engine control that make it 

part of any equipment, systems or 

installation whose functions are beyond 

that of basic engine control, and which 

may also introduce system failures and 

malfunctions, are not exempt from 

§ 23.1309 and must be shown to meet 

part 23 levels of safety as derived from 

§ 23.1309. Part 33 certification data, if 

applicable, may be used to show 

compliance with any part 23 

requirements. If part 33 data is to be 

used to substantiate compliance with 

part 23 requirements, then the part 23 

applicant must be able to provide this 

data for their showing of compliance. 

Note: The term ‘‘probable’’ in the context 

of ‘‘probable combination of failures’’ does 

not have the same meaning as in AC 

23.1309–1E. The term ‘‘probable’’ in 

‘‘probable combination of failures’’ means 

‘‘foreseeable,’’ or (in AC 23.1309–1E terms), 

‘‘not extremely improbable.’’ 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on May 29, 

2013. 

Earl Lawrence, 

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2013–13841 Filed 6–24–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

Food and Drug Administration 

21 CFR Part 73 

[Docket Nos. FDA–2011–C–0344 and FDA– 

2011–C–0463] 

Listing of Color Additives Exempt 

From Certification; Reactive Blue 246 

and Reactive Blue 247 Copolymers; 

Confirmation of Effective Date 

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, 

HHS. 

ACTION: Final rule; confirmation of 

effective date. 

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA or we) is 

confirming the effective date of May 2, 

2013, for the final rule that published in 

the Federal Register of April 1, 2013 (78 

FR 19413), and that amended the color 

additive regulations to provide for the 

safe use of additional copolymers of 1,4- 

bis[4-(2-methacryloxyethyl)

phenylamino]anthraquinone (C.I. 

Reactive Blue 246) and copolymers of 

1,4-bis[(2-hydroxyethyl)amino]-9,10- 

anthracenedione bis(2-methyl-2- 

propenoic)ester (C.I. Reactive Blue 247) 

as color additives in contact lenses. 

DATES: Effective date confirmed: May 2, 

2013. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Regarding CAP 1C0291 (C.I. Reactive 

Blue 246): Judith Kidwell, Center for 

Food Safety and Applied Nutrition 

(HFS–265), Food and Drug 

Administration, 5100 Paint Branch 

Pkwy., College Park, MD 20740–3835, 

240–402–1071. Regarding CAP 1C0292 

(C.I. Reactive Blue 247): Teresa Croce, 

Center for Food Safety and Applied 

Nutrition (HFS–265), Food and Drug 

Administration, 5100 Paint Branch 

Pkwy., College Park, MD 20740–3835, 

240–402–1281. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the 

Federal Register of April 1, 2013, we 

amended the color additive regulations 

in §§ 73.3100 and 73.3106 (21 CFR 

73.3100 and 73.3106), respectively, to 

provide for the safe use of additional 

copolymers of 1,4-bis[(2-hydroxyethyl)

amino]-9,10-anthracenedione bis(2- 

methyl-2-propenoic)ester (C.I. Reactive 

Blue 247) and additional copolymers of 

1,4-bis[4-(2-methacryloxyethyl)

phenylamino] corrected the 

nomenclature for Reactive Blue 247 by 

inserting ‘‘2-methyl’’ before ‘‘2- 

propenoic.’’ 

We gave interested persons until May 

1, 2013, to file objections or requests for 

a hearing. We received no objections or 

requests for a hearing on the final rule. 

Therefore, we find that the effective date 

of the final rule that published in the 

Federal Register of April 1, 2013, 

should be confirmed. 

Therefore, under the Federal Food, 

Drug, and Cosmetic Act and under 

authority delegated to the Commissioner 

of Food and Drugs, and redelegated to 

the Director, Office of Food Additive 

Safety, we are giving notice that no 

objections or requests for a hearing were 

filed in response to the April 1, 2013, 

final rule. Accordingly, the amendments 

issued thereby became effective May 2, 

2013. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES