United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted April 19, 2022*

Decided April 29, 2022 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge 

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge

No. 21-2822 

CHARLES R. WEINSCHENK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DUSTIN DIXON, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

 Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:20-cv-02133-JPH-MPB 

James Patrick Hanlon, 

Judge. 

No. 21-2823 

CHARLES R. WEINSCHENK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Indianapolis Division. 

*

 We have agreed to decide these appeals without oral argument because they are 

frivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(A). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
Nos. 21-2822 & 21-2823 Page 2 

v. 

VALORIE HAHN,1 et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 1:21-cv-01468-JPH-MJD 

James Patrick Hanlon, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Charles Weinschenk, a resident of Hamilton County, Indiana, sued several state 

and local officials in two lawsuits that alleged a far-reaching conspiracy to harm him. 

The district judge assigned to both cases dismissed each complaint for failure to state a 

claim and warned Weinschenk that failing to coherently plead his allegations would 

lead to dismissal. When subsequent complaints did nothing to clarify the claims, the 

district court dismissed the cases for being too frivolous to engage federal subjectmatter jurisdiction. We affirm. 

We begin by explaining that, although we denied a request to consolidate these 

appeals before briefing, we now consolidate them for disposition. The two cases are 

distinguished mainly by the different sets of defendants. The issues in each appeal are 

substantially similar, as are the decisions under review, and Weinschenk filed the same 

brief in each appeal. 

Weinschenk’s lawsuits assert that various incidents over the last 30 years, 

including murders, election meddling, and terrorist attacks, are part of a targeted 

“genocide” carried out by government officials. In both suits defendants moved to 

dismiss, and the district court dismissed the complaints because Weinschenk did not 

present a cogent narrative of his claims. The court gave Weinschenk one month to 

amend his pleadings, and he timely filed a new complaint in each case. 

The district court found the amended complaints no clearer and sua sponte 

dismissed both suits for lack of jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court 

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss 

the action.”). The court explained that although Weinschenk’s amended complaints 

referred to the Constitution and federal statutes, any possible theory of relief under 

1 The State of Indiana is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989), and sovereign immunity has not 

been abrogated or waived with respect to any other potential claim, see Lapides v. Bd. of 

Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 618 (2002), so we modify the caption 

accordingly. 
Nos. 21-2822 & 21-2823 Page 3 

federal law was a mystery, and his allegations were so frivolous that they failed to 

invoke federal jurisdiction. Weinschenk moved for reconsideration, but the court 

concluded that he identified no errors in the rulings and did not make new allegations. 

On appeal, Weinschenk insists that he pleaded federal claims, invoking Bivens v. 

Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), multiple 

provisions of the Constitution, and 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), which provides a civil remedy 

for victims of international terrorism. But Weinschenk does not explain how these 

defendants could possibly be liable to him under these, or any, theories. His 

assertions—for example, that he was a specific target of both the COVID-19 pandemic 

and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001—are extraordinary. Although we have 

denigrated the fine distinctions we sometimes make in degrees of frivolousness, 

see Carter v. Homeward Residential, Inc., 794 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2015), the term 

“essentially fictitious” appears apt here. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974). 

Fanciful complaints like Weinschenk’s do not engage federal-question 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 because there are no claims arising under federal law. 

Id.; McCormick v. Indep. Life & Annuity Co., 794 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2015). (Weinschenk 

provides no basis for diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.) Therefore, the district 

court correctly decided that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. But it also dismissed 

the cases “with prejudice” and did not say that doing so was a sanction. See Collier v. SP 

Plus Corp., 889 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018). A dismissal for want of jurisdiction, even 

one that finally resolves a lawsuit, is not on the merits and must be without prejudice. 

See MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 935 F.3d 573, 581 

(7th Cir. 2019). We therefore modify the judgment in each case to reflect a dismissal 

without prejudice. See id. at 586. 

We caution, however, that the modified dismissals, though without prejudice, 

are final, and these cases are resolved. See Carter v. Buesgen, 10 F.4th 715, 720 (7th Cir. 

2021); Hill v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 2003); S. Austin Coal. Cmty. Council v. 

SBC Commc'ns Inc., 191 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir. 1999). “Without prejudice” here reflects 

simply that these are not decisions on the merits that would have preclusive effect in 

another forum. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990). But the 

ruling that federal jurisdiction over these claims is lacking has preclusive effect. Hill, 

352 F.3d at 1146 (collecting cases). Weinschenk’s federal cases are over. If he attempts to 

relitigate the same claims in federal court, he does so at the risk of incurring sanctions. 

As modified, both judgments are AFFIRMED.