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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46837

NATHAN BYERLY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

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Filed: April 29, 2020

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge. 

Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed. 

Nathan Byerly, Boise, pro se appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge 

Nathan Byerly appeals from the judgment summarily dismissing his petition for 

post-conviction relief. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In his underlying criminal case, Byerly was charged with two counts of felony domestic 

violence and one count of petit theft. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Byerly entered an Alford1plea 

to one count of domestic violence. In exchange for Byerly’s plea, the State dismissed the other 

charges. Byerly was sentenced to a unified term of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement 

of two years. 

 

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Subsequently, Byerly filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief naming as respondents 

both the State of Idaho and the judge who presided over the underlying criminal case. The petition 

alleged multiple claims for post-conviction relief2and purported to “sue” the district judge who 

presided over the underlying criminal case for false imprisonment for allegedly awarding too little

credit for time served. The State answered and moved for summary dismissal of the petition. 

Byerly then began a pattern of filing meritless motions and attempted re-litigation of issues. 

Byerly made two unsuccessful attempts to stay the case, one based upon an unsubstantiated medical 

issue and the other based upon a claim that the case was “in default.” Byerly twice attempted to 

amend his petition without first seeking leave of court. When the district court held a hearing to 

determine whether to permit the amendments, Byerly refused to be transported from the prison to 

the courthouse. The district court denied Byerly leave to amend his petition. Byerly also twice 

attempted to appeal from interlocutory orders. When these appeals were dismissed, Byerly moved 

for the certification of certain interlocutory orders as partial judgments under I.R.C.P. 54(b). These 

requests were denied. Byerly then filed motions to disqualify the presiding judge, which were also 

denied. 

Byerly engaged in similar behavior in opposing the State’s motion for summary dismissal. 

When the motion was initially set for hearing, Byerly refused to be transported to the courthouse. 

The State submitted the matter on the briefs, and the district court took the matter under advisement. 

Before the district court issued a decision, Byerly filed a request for discovery, seeking evidence 

and information related to his post-conviction claims from certain governmental entities. The 

district court granted Byerly’s discovery request in relation to his claim for additional credit for time 

served, but denied the request as to any other claim. Then the district court reset the State’s motion 

for summary dismissal for hearing to permit Byerly to present any relevant evidence obtained 

through discovery. 

On the day of the continued hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal, Byerly 

again refused to be transported to the courthouse. However, because a response to one of Byerly’s 

 

2 Specifically, Byerly’s petition alleged that: (1) he did not receive full credit for time served; 

(2) the State failed to notify him of mitigating circumstances, evidence, and lesser-included offenses; 

(3) inadmissible hearsay was used to establish probable cause; (4) his Alford plea was not knowing

and voluntary; (5) an incorrect alias was included in court pleadings; (6) he was falsely imprisoned; 

and (7) judges should be subject to public financial statements. 
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discovery requests had been filed with the district court shortly before the hearing, the district court 

continued the hearing again to allow Byerly to review the response. Ultimately, Byerly submitted 

no additional evidence to support his claim for additional credit for time served. The district court 

granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal, concluding that Byerly’s claims were not 

supported by admissible evidence, were disproven by the record, or could have been raised on direct 

appeal. Byerly appeals. 

II.

ANALYSIS

The district court summarily dismissed Byerly’s post-conviction petition because the claims 

were not supported by admissible evidence, were disproven by the record, or could have been raised 

on direct appeal. Much of Byerly’s pro se appellate brief is dedicated to reciting the facts of both 

the underlying criminal case and the post-conviction proceeding. Byerly has not identified why he

believes the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 

Although Byerly’s brief contains a list of “issues” on appeal, each issue is described only in vague 

terms and many of the issues are unrelated to Byerly’s post-conviction case. For example, Byerly’s 

list of issues contains entries such as “Torts” and “Unreasonable Search and Seizure without Just 

Compensations.” Moreover, Byerly’s brief contains no analysis, argument, or discussion related to 

an alleged error in the district court’s decision to summarily dismiss his petition. 

Byerly asserts that the deficiencies in his briefing are due to the inadequacy of the record on 

appeal. According to Byerly, he could not compose a “full appellant’s brief” because the record 

was “butchered” and he had not been served with transcripts.3 However, Byerly’s “informal brief”

identifies no specific materials that are absent from the record, nor transcripts that he has not 

received. Byerly’s conclusory assertions regarding the inadequacy of the record are unavailing.4

 

3 This was not the first time Byerly alleged that the record on appeal was inadequate. 

Throughout the pendency of this appeal, Byerly made multiple motions to augment the clerk’s 

record and asserted that he had not received copies of certain transcripts. The briefing schedule in 

this appeal was suspended and reset to resolve Byerly’s initial objection to the record. The order 

resolving Byerly’s last objection to the record again extended the deadline for his initial brief.

4 Byerly could have sought an extension of time to file his initial brief under I.A.R. 34(e). 

Byerly did not do so. Even if this Court construed Byerly’s “informal brief” as a motion for an 

extension of time under I.A.R. 34, we would have denied the motion due to the absence of the 
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Pro se litigants, like Byerly, are held to the same standards as those litigants represented by 

counsel. See Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585 (2009). Pro se litigants 

are not excused from abiding by procedural rules simply because they are appearing pro se and may 

not be aware of the applicable rules. Id. A party waives an issue on appeal if either argument or 

authority is lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 (Ct. App. 1997). 

Byerly has failed to present a cogent argument that the district court erred in summarily 

dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Although Byerly presented a list of “issues” raised 

on appeal and a list of general supporting legal authorities,5 Byerly’s brief is bereft of cogent 

arguments that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. Byerly has therefore

waived the issues identified in his brief. See id. Consequently, Byerly has failed to show the district 

court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Byerly failed to present a cogent argument that the district court erred in summarily 

dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Therefore, Byerly has failed to show that the 

summary dismissal of his petition was error. The judgment summarily dismissing Byerly’s petition 

for post-conviction relief is affirmed.

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR. 

 

required supporting affidavit. See I.A.R. 34(e) (requiring motions seeking an extension of time to 

be supported by an affidavit setting forth, among other things, the reasons or grounds why an 

extension is necessary). 

5 Rather than citing legal authority in support of a specific legal proposition, Byerly’s brief 

contains only a list of supporting legal authorities. However, these legal authorities are listed only

in a general way and without connection to Byerly’s list of issues on appeal. For example, the Idaho 

Code is cited without reference to any specific statute, issue on appeal, or legal argument. Moreover, 

Byerly lists several authorities that are irrelevant to his post-conviction case, such as “United 

Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and the Uniform Commercial Code.