IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 14–1596

Filed February 20, 2015

Amended February 26, 2015

IN THE MATTER OF

DOUGLAS A. KRULL,

Judicial Magistrate.

On application of the Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications.

Commission on judicial qualifications filed an application to 

discipline a judicial officer. APPLICATION GRANTED; JUDICIAL 

OFFICER REPRIMANDED.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Grant K. 

Dugdale, Assistant Attorneys General, for complainant.

Mark McCormick of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, for 

respondent.
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

“Déjà vu all over again.”1 We expect lawyers and judges to learn 

from their mistakes. When a judicial officer repeats violations of the 

same ethical rules, sanctions can escalate. In this case, the Iowa 

Commission on Judicial Qualifications (the Commission) recommends we 

publicly reprimand Magistrate Douglas A. Krull for signing a warrant to 

search the home of his client. Krull in his private practice represented 

the mother in a pending action against her ex-husband to modify the 

child-custody provisions of their dissolution decree. A police officer

sought the search warrant in a burglary investigation targeting their son.

Magistrate Krull saw this matter as different from a search warrant he 

signed six years earlier that led to the reversal of a criminal conviction 

because he contemporaneously represented a client bringing a custody

action against the subject of the search. State v. Fremont, 749 N.W.2d 

234, 235, 243–44 (Iowa 2008) (holding Magistrate Krull’s conflict of 

interest invalidated warrant). The Commission issued Magistrate Krull a 

private admonishment for the Fremont transgression. This time, the 

district court judge in the modification action granted the opposing 

party’s motion to disqualify Krull, requiring a continuance and new 

counsel for Krull’s client. 

On our de novo review, we agree with the Commission’s finding 

that Magistrate Krull violated three disciplinary rules governing part-time 

judicial magistrates by signing the search warrant. Because this is the 

second time he has signed a warrant to search the home of a party in a 

civil case he was handling in his private practice—conduct for which he 

1David J. Dreyer, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Turner v. Rogers and the Civil Right to 

Counsel, 61 Drake L. Rev. 639, 640 (2013) (attributing the quote to Yogi Berra and 

calling him “famous for his enigmatic and oftentimes humorous remarks”). 

 
3

was previously admonished—we impose the recommended sanction of a 

public reprimand. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Magistrate Krull, age fifty-four, is a part-time judicial magistrate in 

the Second Judicial District. He has practiced law in Worth County 

since 1985. Krull served as Worth County Attorney from 1986 to 1998 

before opening his own general private practice in Northwood, Iowa. He 

was appointed magistrate in 2005. Krull has maintained his general 

private practice in Northwood while serving as magistrate. Worth County 

has a population of 7500. According to Magistrate Krull, only three 

lawyers regularly practice in Worth County. He is the only resident 

judicial officer.

Krull agreed to represent Mindy Miller in his private practice. On 

March 21, 2012, Krull filed a petition against her former husband, 

Thomas Arndt, to modify their dissolution decree. Under that decree,

Miller and Arndt shared physical care of their children, L.A. and T.A., but 

the children actually lived exclusively with Miller. The petition for 

modification asked the court to grant Miller exclusive physical care. A 

trial-setting conference was held on June 1, during which the court set a 

trial date of September 14. 

On June 23, a Northwood police officer approached Magistrate 

Krull seeking a search warrant to investigate three gas station burglaries. 

The warrant identified T.A., age sixteen, as a suspect and authorized the 

search of Mindy Miller’s residence for specific stolen goods and items 

used in the burglaries. The officer had identified T.A. and another young 

man as the burglars from a security camera video and had information 

that L.A. sent out a text message offering cigarettes for sale matching the 

brands of the stolen cartons of cigarettes. Magistrate Krull immediately 
4

recognized the names and knew that the residence to be searched was 

Miller’s home. He thought that his client may be upset with him for 

signing a warrant to search her house for evidence implicating her son, 

and he “recognized [she] might no longer want [him] to represent her.” 

Nonetheless, Magistrate Krull signed the search warrant. He later 

explained he focused on T.A.’s behavior and did not think about how the 

discovery of stolen cigarettes at Miller’s home might affect the 

modification proceeding. 

At the time he signed the warrant, Magistrate Krull considered 

whether this case was similar to Fremont. In Fremont, Magistrate Krull 

was asked to sign a warrant to search the residence of Destiny Fremont, 

a woman whose name Magistrate Krull recognized from his private 

practice. 749 N.W.2d at 235. Krull had filed a custody action on behalf 

of his client against Fremont, and that civil matter was pending at the 

time the officer presented the warrant for Magistrate Krull’s signature.

Id. He was aware of his client’s pending civil action against Fremont, yet 

he signed the warrant anyway, reasoning “that the evidence [supporting 

the issuance of the warrant] was overwhelming, physical in nature, and 

did not require him to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 235–

36. We held in Fremont that the warrant was constitutionally infirm and 

vacated Fremont’s conviction because Magistrate Krull was not acting as 

a neutral and detached magistrate. Id. at 243–44. Magistrate Krull 

received a private admonition from the Commission for signing the 

warrant in Fremont. When history repeated itself six years later,

Magistrate Krull again signed the search warrant presented to him after 

concluding Fremont was distinguishable because the warrant this time

authorized the search of the home of his own client rather than the

adverse party. 
5

Miller did not ask Krull to withdraw for signing the warrant to 

search her residence, and he continued to represent her in the 

modification action and prepare for trial. Seven days before the 

scheduled trial date, the parties exchanged witness and exhibit lists. On 

September 12, two days before trial, Thomas Arndt’s counsel sent Krull 

an updated witness list naming Magistrate Krull as a witness relating to 

his issuance of the search warrant. Arndt’s counsel filed a motion to 

disqualify Krull from representing Miller. The next day the district court 

judge conducted a telephonic hearing. The judge granted the motion to 

disqualify Krull and continued the trial to allow Miller to retain new 

counsel. His order stated:

A common fact issue in both the search warrant proceedings 

and this modification action is the behavior and conduct of 

[T.A.]. This modification action and the issuance of the 

warrant both impact the legal status of [T.A.]. Given the 

overlap and interconnection of the search warrant 

proceedings and this modification action, it is the opinion of 

the Court that the ethical rules . . . require Mr. Krull to 

withdraw from further representation of [Miller] in this case. 

The order required Krull to file a motion to withdraw on or before 

September 21. Krull was upset with the order, believing T.A.’s conduct 

to be irrelevant to the modification action. He considered the motion to 

disqualify him a ploy by opposing counsel to get a continuance. He 

immediately called Miller and explained his disqualification, then 

dictated his withdrawal to an assistant and asked her to contact Miller to 

sign it. He also contacted another attorney to discuss representing Miller 

going forward, personally delivered Miller’s file to her new counsel, and 

promptly refunded the balance of Miller’s trust account. However, Krull’s 

written withdrawal was mistakenly placed back in Miller’s file and was 

neither signed by Miller nor filed with the court. On October 23, the 

district court judge phoned Krull to inform him that he would be filing a 
6

complaint with the Commission and noted that Krull had not filed his 

withdrawal. Krull was surprised to learn that his withdrawal had not 

been filed and filed it as soon as Miller signed it on October 31. 

Meanwhile, on October 26, the district court judge filed his

complaint against Magistrate Krull with the Commission. The complaint 

recounted the foregoing events and noted Magistrate Krull had previously 

violated ethical rules by signing the search warrant in Fremont. The 

Commission informed Magistrate Krull of the complaint, and he

responded by letter on February 4, 2013. Magistrate Krull admitted the 

facts and explained his thinking in both Fremont and his representation 

of Miller. He described the circumstances of his oversight that delayed 

the filing of his written withdrawal from Miller’s case. He admitted to the 

Commission, “I now understand that I should not have issued the search 

warrant . . . . [M]y review was too narrow. I was too much focused on 

wanting to carry out my official responsibility in the issuance of search 

warrants.” Magistrate Krull also pledged that, “For the future, I will not 

as a magistrate act in that capacity in any matter which has any 

relationship to my representation of a client in my capacity as a lawyer.” 

The Commission charged Magistrate Krull with several violations of 

the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically part III(B) of the 

application section, rule 51:1.2, and rule 51:2.11. The Commission 

conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 19. Magistrate Krull testified 

that he had changed his practices since signing the Arndt warrant and 

now considers it his duty to recuse himself, even as to former clients, if it 

might give rise to any appearance of impropriety. When questioned 

about missing the withdrawal deadline, he explained that when he was 

initially disqualified from representing Miller, he felt blindsided and was 

“kind of hot yet.” When the Commission asked Magistrate Krull whether 
7

T.A.’s criminal behavior was relevant in the modification proceeding, 

Magistrate Krull answered, “I understand where the judge is coming 

from, and I can accept where the judge is coming from, and I’ve adopted 

that into my analysis of matters since.” At the same time, Magistrate 

Krull continued to assert that T.A.’s criminal activity was largely his own 

responsibility as a sixteen-year-old boy and did not impact the custody 

determination. Magistrate Krull asked the Commission to distinguish 

Fremont, arguing that the two incidents were so far apart in time and 

circumstances that they do not constitute a pattern. Magistrate Krull

called several witnesses, including local attorneys who testified he

conducted himself fairly, knowledgeably, and with integrity and high 

moral character on the bench. These witnesses added that Magistrate 

Krull was always well prepared and competent and gave examples of 

Magistrate Krull recusing himself when necessary. 

Magistrate Krull asked the Commission to impose no more than 

another private admonition. The Commission instead filed an 

application with this court to discipline a judicial officer pursuant to 

Iowa Code section 602.2106 (2011). The Commission recommends that 

Magistrate Krull receive a public reprimand. 

II. Standard of Review. 

“The supreme court may retire, discipline, or remove a judicial 

officer from office or may discipline or remove an employee of the judicial 

branch for cause . . . .” Iowa Code § 602.2101. “Our standard of review 

of a recommendation of judicial discipline by the commission on judicial 

qualifications is de novo.” In re McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 

2002). The ethical violation of the judge must be established by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id. We give respectful 

consideration to the Commission’s findings and recommended sanctions, 
8

but are not bound by them. In re Eads, 362 N.W.2d 541, 550 (Iowa 

1985). 

III. Violations. 

We first determine whether Magistrate Krull’s actions violated the 

Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. Magistrate Krull admitted the facts 

charged by the Commission and acknowledged that he was wrong to sign 

the warrant. Even so, “it is our duty to review the findings of the 

Commission de novo and evaluate the facts to determine if a violation 

occurred.” In re Dean, 855 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Iowa 2014). “In order to 

sanction a judge, a violation of the rules must be ‘substantial.’ ” Id. at 

191 (quoting Iowa Code § 602.2106(3)(b)). In determining whether a 

violation occurred and what sanction is appropriate, “we look to both 

attorney and judicial disciplinary cases and note that principles in 

attorney disciplinary matters are generally applicable to judicial 

disciplinary matters.” Id. at 189. But, a judicial officer is “held to a 

higher standard of conduct by virtue of his office.” In re Gerard, 631 

N.W.2d 271, 277 (Iowa 2001). If we find that the Commission’s 

application for discipline should be granted in whole or in part, we are 

authorized by statute to render the decree that we deem appropriate. 

Iowa Code § 602.2106(4). Based on our de novo review, we agree with 

the Commission and conclude that Magistrate Krull violated three

provisions of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. 

The application section of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct states

in relevant part: “A judge who serves repeatedly on a part-time basis or 

under a continuing appointment . . . shall not act as a lawyer in a 

proceeding in which the judge has served as a judge or in any other 

proceeding related thereto.” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Application 

III(B). A violation of this provision may trigger discipline. The issue is 
9

whether the custody modification proceeding is related to the proceeding 

to issue the warrant signed by Magistrate Krull. Magistrates generally

are precluded from signing warrants to search the property of a party to 

a civil case in which the magistrate is counsel of record. Cf. Fremont, 

749 N.W.2d at 243 (holding a magistrate in that circumstance cannot be 

neutral). This is true regardless of whether the warrant was otherwise 

proper in all respects and inevitably would be signed by another judicial 

officer. Cf. id. at 235–36, 243–44 (noting “overwhelming” evidence 

supported warrant). Magistrate Krull signed the warrant authorizing the 

search of his client’s home to seek evidence against her son, the target of 

the criminal investigation, while he simultaneously represented the 

mother in the civil proceeding to modify custody over the son. The 

findings from the search could have influenced the outcome of the 

custody case, as the district court judge noted. We determine the 

pending action to modify custody was a proceeding related to the 

application for a warrant to search the same parties. With the benefit of 

hindsight, Magistrate Krull concedes he should not have signed the 

warrant, and he does not challenge the judge’s ruling compelling his 

withdrawal from the modification action. Magistrate Krull should have 

realized the need to recuse himself at the time based on Fremont. His 

contemporaneous recognition that his client might be upset and 

terminate his representation was a red flag. We conclude Magistrate 

Krull violated part III(B) of the application section by signing the warrant 

to search his client’s home. 

Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct rule 51:2.11(A) provides, “A judge 

shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .” The terminology 

section of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct defines “impartiality” as the 
10

“absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties.” 

Id., Terminology. The “test is not whether the judge self-questions his 

own impartiality, but whether a reasonable person would question it.” 

State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994) (addressing nearly 

identical language in former version of the rule). Recusal was required 

here under that reasonable-person test. Magistrate Krull failed to realize 

acting on the search warrant application put him in a lose–lose position. 

If he rejected the search warrant, his motive for doing so could be 

questioned by Northwood law enforcement. If he granted the search 

warrant, T.A. could argue that he was “bending over backward” not to 

appear to be favoring his client, T.A.’s mother. Either way, his 

independent judgment could be called into question. As it turned out, 

his forced withdrawal the day before the trial prejudiced his client by 

prolonging the custody litigation due to the continuance required to 

enable her to retain new counsel.2 Magistrate Krull’s dual roles as 

private attorney and judicial officer were incompatible, and he could not 

address that inherent conflict through the informed consent of his client 

or a rule of harmless error. See Fremont, 749 N.W.2d at 243–44. We 

2Magistrate Krull argues the opposing party in the custody-modification action 

filed the motion to disqualify him for tactical reasons to postpone the trial. We 

skeptically view motions to disqualify counsel filed by a litigation adversary. See, e.g., 

Engineered Prods. Co. v. Donaldson Co., 290 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Iowa 2003) 

(“Because of the potential for abuse by opposing counsel, disqualification motions 

should be subjected to particularly strict judicial scrutiny.”); Bottoms v. Stapleton, 706 

N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 2005) (“The right of a party to choose his or her own attorney is 

important, . . . [and] a court must also be vigilant to thwart any misuse of a motion to 

disqualify for strategic reasons.”); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Iowa 2014) (“[W]e approach with caution ethics 

complaints initiated by a litigation adversary.”). Regardless of the motive of opposing 

counsel, Magistrate Krull’s ethical violation provided the grounds for his 

disqualification. 

 
11

conclude he violated rule 51:2.11(A) by failing to recuse himself in this

situation in which it would be reasonable to question his impartiality. 

Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct rule 51:1.2 provides: “A judge shall 

act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 

independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid 

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” This rule is found in 

canon 1, which “addresses the need for judges to preserve the crown 

jewels of the judiciary—independence, integrity, and impartiality—and 

directs judges to uphold the fundamental qualities of judging by avoiding 

impropriety.” In re Block, 816 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 2012). We must 

decide whether Magistrate Krull created the appearance of impropriety

by signing the search warrant and thereby eroded the public confidence 

in the judiciary. See Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:1.2 cmt. 1 

(“Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct and 

conduct that creates the appearance of impropriety. This principle 

applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge.”). 

Judges are held to a higher standard of conduct than attorneys because 

of the importance of maintaining an impartial judiciary. See Fremont, 

749 N.W.2d at 242 (“The canons of judicial ethics are designed not to 

protect individual defendants, but to protect the judiciary from charges 

of partiality. The canons of judicial ethics thus often extend further than 

what is constitutionally required.” (Citations omitted.)); In re Gerard, 631

N.W.2d at 277 (Canon 1 “imposes a duty upon a judge that rises above 

the normal responsibilities that he has as an attorney.”); In re Eads, 362 

N.W.2d at 551 (“The canons of conduct recognize that public confidence 

in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper judicial conduct. 

In certain areas judges accept restrictions on their conduct that might be 
12

viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely 

and willingly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 

In his letter to the Commission, Magistrate Krull admitted he 

should have recused himself in both Fremont and this case, but he 

explained, “I was too much focused on wanting to carry out my official 

responsibility in the issuance of search warrants.” Regardless of his 

subjective intent, his decision to issue the warrant raised reasonable 

questions about his impartiality and independence. See In re Worthen, 

926 P.2d 853, 871 (Utah 1996) (“ ‘A judge acting in a judicial capacity 

may be found to have engaged in prejudicial judicial conduct, although 

his conduct was undertaken in subjective good faith . . . .’ ” (quoting In re 

Zoarski, 632 A.2d 1114, 1119 (Conn. 1993))). When a judge who is also 

a lawyer for a party being searched signs a warrant, there is at least an 

appearance of impropriety. Even if Magistrate Krull’s conduct caused no

harm to his client, it was improper because it called into question the 

impartiality of the Iowa judiciary. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 373 (Iowa 2005) (noting that 

“some conflict-of-interest rules protect not only the rights of clients, but 

also ‘the integrity of the legal system’ ” (quoting 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., 

et al., The Law of Lawyering § 10.2, at 10-7 (3d ed. 2004 Supp.))). 

Magistrate Krull was required to recuse himself from acting on the 

search warrant. We conclude that by signing the warrant, he violated 

rule 51:1.2. 

IV. Sanction. 

“The focus of sanctions in judicial disciplinary proceedings is not 

to punish the individual judge, but to restore and maintain the dignity, 

honor, and impartiality of the judicial office, and to protect the public

. . . .” In re McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 16. “Discipline is also imposed to 
13

. . . deter other judges from engaging in unethical conduct.” In re Block, 

816 N.W.2d at 365. The Commission has the authority to recommend 

that a judge be disciplined and to recommend a specific sanction. In re

Carstensen, 316 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Iowa 1982). The Commission 

recommends that we publically reprimand Magistrate Krull. “We give 

respectful consideration to those recommendations, although we are not 

bound by them.” In re Eads, 362 N.W.2d at 550. As in attorney 

discipline cases, we decide the appropriate sanction on a case-by-case 

basis. Cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Plumb, 589 

N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1999). We consider all aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances to tailor the sanction. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 774 N.W.2d 301, 308 (Iowa 2009). 

In judicial discipline cases, we have identified factors to consider, 

including: 

1. whether the misconduct is isolated or a pattern of 

misconduct;

2. the nature, extent, and frequency of the acts of 

misconduct;

3. whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the 

courtroom;

4. whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's 

official capacity or in his or her private life;

5. whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized 

the misconduct;

6. whether the judge has made an effort to change or 

modify his or her conduct;

7. the length of service on the bench;

8. whether there have been any prior complaints;

9. the effect of the misconduct upon the integrity of 

and respect for the judiciary; and

10. the extent to which the judge exploited the judicial 

office to satisfy personal interests. 
14

In re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 365–66. Finally, we will consider sanctions 

imposed in similar situations. See, e.g., id. at 366 (considering the 

sanction given in similar cases both in Iowa and in other jurisdictions). 

We agree with the Commission that it is significant Magistrate 

Krull previously was admonished for issuing the Fremont search warrant.

Magistrate Krull argues that these two cases are so separated by time 

and particular facts that they do not constitute a pattern of misconduct. 

We disagree. In both matters, Magistrate Krull signed a warrant to 

search the property of a party in pending civil litigation in which he was 

counsel of record. Both transgressions carried adverse consequences—in 

Fremont, Magistrate Krull’s conflict required us to vacate a conviction, 

749 N.W.2d at 244, and here, the parties were subjected to delay and 

additional expense resulting from the continuance of the trial and 

retention of new counsel. In both cases, Magistrate Krull’s conflict 

between his public and private roles led to an appearance of impropriety. 

He should have learned from Fremont to recuse himself from any search 

warrant application targeting someone who is a party in a case in which 

he is counsel of record. His prior admonishment for violating the same 

rules is an aggravating factor. 

Magistrate Krull cooperated with the Commission and 

acknowledged his mistakes and corrective measures taken to avoid 

repeating them. His cooperation, contrition, and corrective measures are 

mitigating factors. Id. at 365–66; see also In re Dean, 855 N.W.2d at 193.

Although he explained why he did not realize the need to recuse himself 

at the time he signed the warrants, we do not consider Magistrate Krull’s 

mistaken belief he was acting properly to excuse his misconduct. Cf. In 

re Meldrum, 834 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Iowa 2013) (concluding that it was not 

an excuse that Meldrum was unaware his conduct violated a judicial 
15

canon); Howe, 706 N.W.2d at 378 (explicitly crediting Howe with the

motivation “to resolve city charges in a fashion that was just to the city 

as well as to defendants,” but noting his conduct still “crossed the line”). 

Importantly, however, Magistrate Krull was motivated not by 

personal gain, but by his desire to carry out his judicial duties and serve 

the people of Worth County. He realized if he recused himself, the 

nearest available judicial officer was at least thirty miles away. There is 

no evidence that Magistrate Krull signed the warrant to gain an improper 

advantage for his private client. We weigh the appropriate sanction 

mindful of the “duty to sit”3 to fulfill judicial responsibilities. We 

consider Magistrate Krull’s motivation to honor that duty as a mitigating 

factor.

The duty to sit is set forth in our judicial canons. Rule 51:2.7, 

entitled “Responsibility to Decide” states, “A judge shall hear and decide 

matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is required 

by rule 2.11 or other law.” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.7. 

Rule 51:2.1 states, “The duties of judicial office, as prescribed by law, 

shall take precedence over all of a judge’s personal and extrajudicial 

activities.” Id. r. 51:2.1. 

Although there are times when disqualification is necessary 

to protect the rights of litigants and preserve public 

confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of 

the judiciary, judges must be available to decide matters that 

come before the courts. Unwarranted disqualification may 

bring public disfavor to the court and to the judge 

personally. The dignity of the court, the judge's respect for 

fulfillment of judicial duties, and a proper concern for the 

3The duty to sit was accepted generally in federal practice until 1974, when 

Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 455, consistent with the then-existing version of the 

ABA Model Code. Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of 

Impartiality, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 181, 202 (2011). A significant minority of states still 

expressly recognize the duty to sit. Id. at 202 n.114. 

 
16

burdens that may be imposed upon the judge's colleagues 

require that a judge not use disqualification to avoid cases 

that present difficult, controversial, or unpopular issues. 

Id. r. 51:2.7 cmt. 1. We have said that “ ‘there is as much obligation for 

a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there 

is for him to do so when there is.’ ” State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 

(Iowa 2002) (quoting Mann, 512 N.W.2d at 532). 

As another court observed:

To reiterate, in the absence of a genuine basis for 

recusal or disqualification, an inappropriate recusal or 

disqualification would “simply be shirking” and 

“irresponsible.” Indeed, Delaware’s approach reflects an 

obvious tenet: that there is a duty incumbent on judges “not 

to unreasonably burden fellow judges by recusing in 

response to a weak argument for disqualification.” Upon 

proper motion for disqualification, a judge's decision should 

. . . not [be] guided or influenced by factors such as 

convenience or a desire to remove the allegations of bias 

from the case. 

Taken together, the foregoing case law and Delaware 

Code of Judicial Conduct confirm a judge's important “duty 

to sit” unless and until genuinely convinced of the need for 

recusal or disqualification. 

State v. Desmond, No. 91009844DI, 2011 WL 91984, at *12 (Del. Super. 

Ct. Jan. 5, 2011) aff'd, 29 A.3d 245 (Del. 2011) (footnotes omitted). As a 

commentator explained:

There are at any juncture only a finite number of available 

judges. The recusal of one judge puts greater pressure on 

judges that are not disqualified, particularly in smaller 

districts with fewer sitting judges. To a degree, the duty to 

sit, at least in its benign form, is in large part a duty not to 

unreasonably burden fellow judges by recusing in response 

to a weak argument for disqualification. 

To combat a judge's potential urge to avoid 

demanding, time-consuming, or controversial cases, the legal 

profession has long taken the view that the nature of a 

judgeship implies that the judge has a responsibility to hear 

and decide cases, one that should not be shirked for political 

or personal reasons. To the extent one views the duty to sit 

as a general and rebuttable obligation to preside over a case 

unless disqualified, it is unobjectionable.
17

Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of 

the Duty to Sit, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 813, 820–21 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 

To be clear, a desire to avoid burdening fellow judges does not cure a 

conflict of interest, and judges should recuse themselves when necessary

regardless of the resulting inconvenience to those seeking warrants.

However, we may calibrate our judicial discipline by crediting the judge’s 

subjective motivation to honor the duty to sit. 

Magistrate Krull asks us to impose a public admonition instead of 

a public reprimand. “We employ professional admonitions not so much 

by way of criticism as to instruct the bar. We view admonitions as 

considerably less severe than reprimands, and consider them to be 

something less than actual discipline.”4 Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Liles, 430 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Iowa 1988). He argues his 

position is similar to that of the part-time assistant county attorney in 

Liles who also confronted potential conflicts between his official duties 

and his private practice. See id. at 112. We recognized in Liles that parttime official positions are necessary to serve smaller rural populations, 

yet give rise to potential conflicts of interest:

A certain ambiguity is built into Iowa’s system of part-time 

county attorneys. The overwhelming majority of the state’s 

county attorneys serve part-time and derive their livelihood 

4The Commission may issue a “letter of caution and warning” instead of a 

sanction if the judicial officer’s “conduct has been questionable but does not amount to 

misconduct, or that misconduct of a very minor nature has occurred which does not 

warrant formal discipline.” Iowa Ct. R. 52.26. The Commission issues such 

admonitions privately. A private reprimand is no longer “an available form of discipline 

once we grant an application submitted to us by the Commission.” In re Block, 816 

N.W.2d at 366. We have issued public admonitions in several attorney discipline cases. 

See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Visser, 629 N.W.2d 376, 383 

(Iowa 2001); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Zimmerman, 522 N.W.2d 619, 621 

(Iowa 1994); In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Iowa 1976). We have never given a 

public admonition in an application for judicial discipline, although that option is 

available to us in appropriate circumstances. 

 
18

largely from the private practice of law. Whatever the 

advantages or disadvantages of the system, it exists 

primarily for economic reasons. Many of our counties have 

comparatively sparse populations and it is felt they do not 

require the services of full-time county attorneys. 

The legislature undertook to provide the public with 

county attorney services which are necessary and at the 

same time spare the taxpayers the greater expense of fulltime county attorneys. Accordingly the statute leaves it up 

to the boards of supervisors of each county to determine 

whether the office shall be full or part-time. Iowa Code 

§ 331.752 (1987). 

A result of the plan is that part-time county attorneys, 

who are expected to also engage in private law practice, must 

walk a fine line to avoid conflicts. The two incidents involved 

here are typical of how public legal matters often become 

intertwined with private ones. A conflict of interest or the 

appearance of one is always a danger. 

Id. 

Similar observations apply to part-time judicial magistrates, but 

Liles is distinguishable on its facts. See id. Unlike Magistrate Krull, 

there is no indication Liles had been admonished previously. Liles 

shared office space with Peter Hansen, another part-time assistant 

county attorney. Id. In two instances, Liles continued to represent 

clients in his private practice after Hansen, as a prosecutor, filed 

criminal charges against persons adverse to Liles’s clients. Id. Hansen 

was terminated from his position as prosecutor and later accused Liles of 

misconduct for continuing to represent those clients. Id. We concluded 

there was no proof Liles was involved in any actual conflict of interest 

because, although he shared office space with Hansen, they were neither 

partners nor associates. Id. We nevertheless concluded Liles’s

continued representation was “ill advised” and warranted an admonition 

because the nature of his arrangement with Hansen was unclear to the 

public, and it could appear Liles’s clients gained an “advantage by reason 

of his public office.” Id. at 113. By contrast, Magistrate Krull’s rule 
19

violations are clear. Indeed, Magistrate Krull admits that he should have 

recused himself from acting on the search warrants on both occasions. 

Nevertheless, we are mindful that part-time magistrates who must 

avoid conflicts of interest with their private practices also face the 

challenges we described in Liles. See id. at 112. Many counties in Iowa 

employ part-time judicial magistrates who need to engage in private 

practice to earn a living. Id. Sparsely populated areas of the state such 

as Worth County have fewer lawyers and judges to provide access to 

justice. The nearest available judicial officer may be a long drive away if 

the resident magistrate recuses himself. Part-time magistrates must 

remain vigilant to avoid conflicts of interest while honoring their duty to 

sit. The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct applies statewide. As the 

Washington Supreme Court stated, “Our legal system is based on the 

foundation that an independent, unbiased, and competent judiciary will 

interpret and apply the laws that govern us. This is paramount to the 

American concept of justice and fairness.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding 

Against Michels, 75 P.3d 950, 957 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). Maintaining 

the requisite independence and neutrality of our judiciary inevitably 

requires some measure of personal sacrifice:

The strength of our judicial system is due in large part 

to its independence and neutrality. These twin qualities help 

remove outside influences from judicial decision-making, 

and promote public respect and confidence in our system of 

justice. Yet, judicial independence does not come without 

some personal sacrifice by judges. Judicial independence 

and neutrality require judges to limit or abstain from 

involvement in a variety of activities commonly enjoyed by 

others . . . . 

In re McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 15 (citation omitted). 

The sacrifices may include foregoing representation in a civil case 

on a matter previously addressed as a judge. See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 
20

32:1.12. The consequences can be severe when those wearing multiple 

hats cross ethical lines by signing a search warrant instead of recusing 

themselves. The search warrant prompting today’s public reprimand 

sought evidence of cigarettes purloined by minors. The criminal 

convictions vacated in Fremont were for possession of marijuana with 

intent to deliver and child endangerment. 749 N.W.2d at 236, 244. But,

Fremont’s holding would also apply to vacate a conviction for first-degree 

murder. 

Considering all of the aggravating and mitigating factors together, 

we conclude that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction here. A 

public reprimand is consistent with judicial discipline cases in our sister 

jurisdictions. See Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Fitzgerald, 652 S.W.2d 77, 77 (Ky. 

1983) (imposing public reprimand on judge who entered a custody order 

transferring children from their mother to their uncle, then represented 

the uncle after resigning from his judicial position); Miss. Comm’n on 

Judicial Performance v. Bustin, 71 So. 3d 598, 600, 607 (Miss. 2011) 

(en banc) (issuing a thirty-day suspension and public reprimand for a 

judge who signed an arrest warrant for an opposing party in a childcustody matter based on an affidavit submitted by his own client); Miss.

Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Atkinson, 645 So. 2d 1331, 1337 

(Miss. 1994) (en banc) (holding a public reprimand appropriate when a 

judge set bail for a defendant and then petitioned for a bond reduction as 

a private attorney); Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Vukelic, 811 N.E.2d 1127, 

1127–28 (Ohio 2004) (imposing a public reprimand when a magistrate 

failed to recuse himself when a client in a domestic relations case 

appeared before him on criminal misdemeanor charges); In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ziegler, 750 N.W.2d 710, 713, 736–37 

(Wis. 2008) (imposing a public reprimand when a judge failed to recuse 
21

herself from cases in which her spouse was a director of a party, even 

though the judge gained no personal benefit from the conflict). 

Accordingly, we conclude a public admonishment for Magistrate Krull’s 

second warrant-related transgression is insufficient and a public 

reprimand is required. 

V. Conclusion.

For these reasons, we adopt the Commission’s recommendation 

and publicly reprimand Magistrate Krull for his conduct.

APPLICATION GRANTED; JUDICIAL OFFICER REPRIMANDED.