SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0617-17T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GREGORY K. PERRY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted January 14, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Rose.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 07-12-2110.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Cody T. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Dennis Calo, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Ian C. Kennedy, Special 

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 4, 2019
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A-0617-17T3

Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized incident to his 

arrest and pursuant to a search warrant, defendant Gregory K. Perry pled guilty 

to third-degree fraudulent use of a credit card, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-6(h) (count six), 

and third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 (count eight),

charged in a sixteen-count Bergen County indictment. Defendant was sentenced 

to consecutive three-year prison terms on each count.1

 On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his pro se 2suppression 

motion, contending the municipal court exceeded its jurisdictional authority 

when it issued an arrest warrant, which charged an offense that was not 

committed in that municipality. Defendant further contends any evidence seized 

 

1

 Count nine of the indictment, charging defendant with possession of a 

controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), was dismissed 

pursuant to the plea bargain. Defendant previously pled guilty to count ten of 

the indictment, charging him with second-degree escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5, and 

was sentenced to a five-year prison term for that conviction, which is not part 

of this appeal. The extensive procedural history regarding dismissal of the 

remaining counts of the indictment is not relevant to this appeal.

2

 Defendant was represented by counsel when he filed his motion and, against 

the advice of counsel, when defendant presented his argument before the motion 

judge.
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after execution of the arrest warrant should be suppressed pursuant to the "fruit 

of the poisonous tree" doctrine.3 We reject these arguments and affirm.

I.

We derive the salient facts and procedural history from the record before 

the motion judge. On June 20, 2007, C.Y.K.4reported to the Hackensack Police 

Department that her daughter's house was burglarized. Several items, including 

C.Y.K's credit cards were stolen. Soon thereafter, Hackensack detectives 

determined one of the credit cards was used at BJ's Wholesale Club's Paramus 

location on June 20, and another credit card was used at Pathmark's Elmwood 

Park location on June 21. Video surveillance and witness identifications placed 

defendant at both locations.

On June 28, 2007, a Hackensack detective applied for a complaint-warrant 

(CDR-2),5 which states:

By certification or on oath, the complainant says 

that to the best of his/her knowledge, information and 

belief [Gregory K. Perry] on or about 6-20-2007, in 

HACKENSACK CITY, BERGEN COUNTY, NJ, did:

 

3

 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).

4

 We use initials to protect the privacy of the victims.

5

 See R. 3:4-1(a)(1); see also R. 3:2-3(a).
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WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THIS 

COURT, COMMIT THE OFFENSE OF THEFT BY 

KNOWINGLY RECEIVING MOVABLE PROPERTY 

BELONGING TO [C.Y.K.] KNOWING IT WAS 

STOLEN, SPECIFICALLY BY USING HER 

MASTERCARD TO MAKE PURCHASES 

TOTALING $533.87 IN VIOLATION OF [N.J.S.A.]

2C:20-7(A).

PROBABLE CAUSE FOR [THE DETECTIVE'S 

BELIEF WAS] SET FORTH IN THE POLICE 

REPORT ATTACHED [TO THE CDR-2] AS 

EXHIBIT "A."

[6]

A deputy court administrator (DCA)7authorized issuance of the CDR-2. 

Later that day, Hackensack police executed the warrant and arrested defendant 

at his home in Englewood. Conducting a search incident to defendant's arrest, 

police seized, among other things, a receipt for an attempted purchase made at 

BJ's Wholesale Club with C.Y.K's stolen credit card.

A few days later, Hackensack police seized stolen watches and cufflinks 

from defendant's impounded vehicle pursuant to a search warrant. Those items 

were identified by J.K., another victim, as having been stolen from his residence 

in Englewood on May 30, 2007.

 

6

 The police report was not provided on appeal.

7

 See R. 3:2-1(a); R. 3:2-3.
5

A-0617-17T3

Pertinent to this appeal, in count six of the indictment, the grand jury 

charged defendant with fraudulent use of C.Y.K.'s credit card "on or about 

during and between June 20, 2007, and June 21, 2007, in the Boroughs of 

Paramus and/or Elmwood Park, in the County of Bergen, and within the 

jurisdiction of this [c]ourt." Count eight charged defendant with receiving 

stolen property for the items seized from his vehicle that belonged to J.K.

Following oral argument on February 1, 2017, the trial judge denied 

defendant's motion in a cogent oral decision. Relevant here, the judge found no 

"territorial bar or . . . municipal jurisdiction issue regarding the complaint." He 

elaborated:

[T]he allegation is that there was theft or receiving 

stolen property out of Hackensack. The fact that the 

use of those credit cards or devices occurred in other 

municipalities does not in any way void . . . jurisdiction 

or cede jurisdiction from the City of Hackensack where 

the . . . alleged victim, a resident of Hackensack, 

reported the burglary or reported the theft of her 

property.

Thereafter, defendant appealed, but initially only challenged his sentence 

as excessive and, as such, the matter was scheduled on an excessive sentencing 

oral argument calendar. R. 2:9-11. Because defendant sought to appeal the 

denial of his suppression motion, at his request and prior to oral argument, we 

transferred the matter to a plenary calendar.
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On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments for our 

consideration:

POINT I

THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SHOULD 

HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE 

HACKENSACK MUNICIPAL COURT LACKED 

JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ARREST 

WARRANT.

A. The Hackensack Municipal Court Lacked 

Jurisdiction to Issue the Arrest Warrant Because the 

Underlying Offense Was Not Alleged to Have Occurred 

in Hackensack. 

B. The Municipal Court's Lack of Jurisdiction Was a 

Substantive Error Which Requires Suppression of the 

Fruits of the Arrest Warrant.

We reject these arguments and affirm.

II.

Our review of a trial judge's decision on a motion to suppress is "highly 

deferential." State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016); State v. Robinson, 200 

N.J. 1, 15 (2009). "An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence 

in a criminal case must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's 

decision, provided that those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible 

evidence in the record.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017) (quoting 

State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016)). We owe no deference, however, to 
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conclusions of law made by trial courts in suppression decisions, which we 

instead review de novo. State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015).

Conceding probable cause existed for issuance of the CDR-2 here, 

defendant seeks our de novo review of the municipal court's territorial 

jurisdiction to issue the arrest warrant. In doing so, defendant cites Rule 7:2-

2(a)(1) to support his contention that a CDR-2 "may be issued only by a judge" 

or authorized "court administrator or [DCA] of a court with jurisdiction in the 

municipality where the offense is alleged to have been committed."

Defendant's reliance on Rule 7:2-2(a)(1), which governs issuance of a 

CDR-2 for a "[c]itizen [c]omplaint[,]" is misplaced. Where, as here, a law 

enforcement officer applies for a CDR-2, which charges an indictable offense, 

Rule 3:2-3 applies. See also R. 7:1 (defining the scope of municipal court rules 

and specifically indicating "The rules in Part III govern the practice and 

procedure in indictable actions[.]"). Notably, Rule 3:2-3 does not contain the 

same jurisdictional-limiting provision as set forth in Rule 7:2-2(a)(1).

Nonetheless, we view any error in the issuance of the CDR-2 here as a 

technical error that does not vitiate the validity of the warrant, particularly since 

there existed probable cause for its issuance. As we recognized in State v. 

Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. 228, 238-39 (App. Div. 2009), "our courts have
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been reluctant to invalidate search warrants based on confusion over jurisdiction 

or other issues that do not implicate probable cause or the neutrality of the 

issuing judge." See also State v. Hamlett, 449 N.J. Super. 159, 178 (App. Div. 

2017). "In other words, so long as the objectives underlying the warrant 

requirement remain intact, slight departures from strict compliance with the 

rules will not invalidate a search." Id. at 176. That reluctance is particularly 

applicable where the warrant would have been issued exactly as it was, had the 

applicant appeared before the correct judge, and there was no evidence of bad 

faith. Id. at 178; see also State v. Gadsden, 303 N.J. Super. 491, 505 (App. Div. 

1997) (declining to invalidate an arrest warrant where probable cause existed, 

but the warrant was executed outside the arresting officers' jurisdiction, deeming 

any jurisdictional violation was technical and procedural).

Although our decisions in Hamlett and Broom-Smith pertained to the 

issuance of warrants to search premises outside the municipality's geographical

boundaries, our rationale applies with even greater force to the arrest warrant at 

issue here, where the grand jury's indictment superseded the CDR-2. 

Consequently, any technical deficiency in the warrant, if it existed, is irrelevant 

to the charges for which defendant was sentenced. See State v. Boykin, 113 N.J. 

Super. 594, 596 (Law Div. 1971) (noting that even after dismissal of a 
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complaint, a defendant "may still be indicted and convicted for the same 

offense").

Moreover, as the State contends, "Theft under the Code is a single offense. 

. . . [T]heft by actual taking and theft by receiving are both theft." Cannel, N.J. 

Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 2 on N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2 (2018). As stated by the 

New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission in its commentary to the

proposed New Jersey Penal Code:

Consolidation of receiving with other forms of theft 

affords the same advantages as other aspects of the 

unification of the theft concept. It reduces the 

opportunity for technical defenses based upon legal

distinctions between the closely related activities of 

stealing and receiving what is stolen. One who is found 

in possession of recently stolen goods may be either the 

thief or the receiver; but if the prosecution can prove 

the requisite thieving state of mind it makes little 

difference whether the jury infers that the defendant 

took directly from the owner or acquired from the thief.

[2 Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law 

Revision Commission, commentary to § 2C:20-7, at 

232 (1971).]

In the present case, the credit card identified in the CDR-2 was stolen during the 

course of a burglary that occurred in Hackensack. Thus, Hackensack Municipal 

Court had jurisdiction to issue the warrant because "theft by actual taking" 
10 A-0617-17T3

occurred in Hackensack, even though defendant was not charged in the CDR-2 

with that specific offense.

Finally, because any error in the issuance of the arrest warrant was 

technical, and subsumed by the indictment, we discern no reason to exclude the 

evidence seized thereafter. See State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 379-80 (2003). 

Defendant's remaining arguments, to the extent we have not addressed them, 

lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.