UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MIKE YELLEN et al . , Plaintiffs,

v. U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al . , Defendants. Case No. 1:16-cv-02467 (TNM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiffs, six individuals proceeding pro se , have filed an Amended Complaint against 13 defendants, which include sevencorporate entities, primaril y banks; “Steve Munchi, Principal Owner of Onewest Bank;” “John/Jan e Does 1-100 Corporation;” “Jo hn/Jane Does 1-100 Partnerships;” “John/Jane Does 1-100 Non-Profit Entities;” and “John/Jane Does 1-100 Government Entities.” Am . Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 33. The Plainti ffs allege misconduct related to mortgage loan servicing, mo rtgage loan origination, and bank ruptcy proceedings. Id. 8-18. All of the bank defendants have fil ed motions to dismiss. Upon consideration of the pleadings, relevant law, and rel ated legal memoranda in opposit ion and in support , I find that the Plaintiffs have failed to adequate ly plead sufficient facts to establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over defendants B ank of America, N.A. and Countryw ide Home Loans, Inc.; and have failed to state a claimupon which relief can be granted w ith respect to defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, U.S . Bank, National Association, O ne West Bank F.S.B., and SecurityNational Mortgage Com pany. Furthermore, I find that th e Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the remaining de fendants—“RCO Hawaii, L.L.L.C. and its agent[s] Glenn Fukuhara and Brett Ryan;” “Steve Munchi, Principal Owner of One west Bank;” and the2 John/Jane Doe entities. Accordi ngly, the Defendants’ motions w ill be granted, and the Amended Complaint will be dismi ssed without prejudice.

I. Background

The Plaintiffs are six indivi duals who appear to have residenti al mortgages serviced by certain of the defendants, some of which may be in foreclosure. See Pls. Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Pls. Opp.”) 5-6, ECF No. 55. The Plaintiffs’ origin al complaint brought claims against numerous financial i nstitutions and 100 John and Jane D oe entities. Compl. 1-3, ECF No. 1. After a half dozen defendant s filed motions to dismiss, the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the compl aint. Order, ECF No. 29. The Plaintiffs’ renewed compl aint dropped nearly two dozen indi viduals as plaintiffs and amended the named defendants in the suit. 1 The Amended Complaint a lleges eight counts of action, which are described as: “unfair and deceptive consumer practices with respect to loan servicing” (Count 1), “unfair a nd deceptive consum er practices with respect to foreclosure processing” (Count 2), “unfair and deceptive consumer practices with respect to loan origination” (Count 3), “violati ons of the False Claims Act” (C ount 4), “declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202” (Count5), “damages under com mon law” (Count 6), failure to follow “procedures under [the ] Fair Debt Collection Practice s Act” (Count 7), and “unfair and deceptive business act practices” (Count 8). Each bank defenda nt has filed a motion to dismiss. Defendants Bank of America, N.A. a nd Countrywide Home Loans, In c. have moved to dismiss the complaint due to l ack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which

1 For any defendants named in the o riginal but not in the Amend ed Complaint, the Court considers those defendants dismissed from the action. See Adams v. Quattlebaum , 219 F.R.D. 195, 198 (D.D.C. 2004) (“The amended c omplaint is now the opera tive complaint due to its superseding nature.”).3 relief can be granted. Mem. o f P. & A. in Supp. of Bank of Ame rica, N.A. and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.’s Mot. to Dismi ss Pls.’ Am. Compl. (“BoA and C ountrywide Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 44. Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company has moved to dis miss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mem. of P. & A . in Supp. of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 45-1. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, as atto rney in fact for U.S. Bank Na tional Association and One West Bank F.S.B., has move d to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC as Attorney in Fact for U.S. Bank, N.A. and One West Bank F.S.B . (“Ocwen Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 46-1. Defendant SecurityNational Mortgage Company has moved to dismis s for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mem. of P. & A. in S upp. of SecurityNational Mortgage Company’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 52-1.

II. Legal Standard
A. Failure to Establish Personal Jurisdiction For a defendant to be subject to s uit in a particular forum, th e defendant must “have sufficient minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the main tenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of f air play and subs tantial justic e.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). A defendant w ho lacks the sufficientcontacts with the forum may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ . P. 12(b)(2). The plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of specific facts su fficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Reuber v. United States , 750 F.2d 1039, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In considering a motion brought under Federal Rule o f Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the court is not required to treat4 as true all of the plaintiff’s a llegations; however, the court must resolve any factual discrepancies in establishing personal jurisd iction in favor of the plaintiff

. See Crane v. New York Zoological Soc’y , 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

B. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted A party may move to dismiss a co mplaint on the ground that it “ fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a compla int contain “a short and plain st atement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relie f.” This requires the complain t to contain sufficient factual allegations that, if true, “state a claim to relief that is pla usible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is insufficient if it merely offers “‘labels and conclusions’” or “‘naked asserti on[s]’ devoid of ‘further factu al enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 546). Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plai ntiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misco nduct alleged.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. Plausibility “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id. , and pleading facts that are “mere ly consistent with” a defend ant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibili ty and plausibility.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 545-46. In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), th e Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs and acc ept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well- pled factual allegations. See In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig. , 854 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C. 1994). Further, complaints fil ed by

pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than form al pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, pro se plaintiffs must still5 adequately plead their complaint consistent with the edicts of Iqbaland Twombly

. See Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor , 567 F.3d 672, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2009). This means that the Court does not accept as true legal conclusions or “[t]hreadbare recitals of t he elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. Last, “[i]n determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, [the court] may con sider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the court] may tak e judicial notice.” Hurd v. District of Columbia Gov’t , 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch. , 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).

III. Analysis

A. Bank of America, N.A. and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Bank of America, N.A. (“Bank of America”) and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide”) challenges the A mended Complaint for failing to plead facts to establish that they are properly subject to pers onal jurisdiction in this Dist rict. BoA and Countrywide Mot. to Dismiss 4-7. I agree that th e Plaintiffs have not made a prima facie showing of specific facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See Reuber , 750 F.2d at 1052. To support a showing of personal jurisdiction, the Plaintiffs s imply state in their Amended Complaint that suit is proper because “the Banks have t ransacted business in this District, and because the Banks have committed acts proscribed by the False Claims Act in this District.” Am. Compl. ¶ 5. This si ngle sentence is insufficie nt to establish that Bank of America and Countrywide should be haled into court—either under specifi c or general personal jurisdiction—in this District for the grievances alleged.6 Other than the general allegation that Bank of America and Coun tywide have transacted business in this District, the 26- page complaint fails to alleg e that Bank of America and Countrywide have taken any actions in this District with respec t to the Plaintiffs’ complaints. Indeed, other than listing Ba nk of America and Countrywide in t wo instances in th e introduction, the Amended Complaint fails to mention Bank of America or Countrywide entirely. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4. Though the Amended Complaint generally alleges that “the Banks service[] home mortgage loans secured by res idential properties owned by individual citizens of the Plaintiffs,” the complaint fails to identify whether the reside ntial properties are within this District; and in fact, the compl aint pleads facts to the contrary: the Plaintiffs’ property addresses are all in Hawaii. See id. ¶ 1, 22. This lack of any showi ng that Bank of America and Countrywide have committed conduct in this District that “creat e[s] a substantial connection with [this] forum” fails to est ablish specific pe rsonal jurisdi ction in this District. See Walden v.
Fiore , 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to a djudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’”). Furthermore, the complaint fai ls to make any allegations to est ablish that Bank of America and Countrywide have “co ntinuous and systematic” ties t o this District such that they are “essentially at home” here. Id. Other than the two cursory r eferences to Bank of America and Countrywide in the introduc tion, and the broad assertion th at “the Banks have transacted business in this District,” t he Amended Complaint does not plea d any specific facts to make a showing that this District should be considered Bank of America ’s and Countrywide’s home7 forum. See Am. Compl. ¶ 5. 2 The Amended Complaint provides no basis for establishing general personal ju risdiction over Bank of America and Countryw ide. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint as against Bank of America and Countrywide mu st be dismissed.

B. Deutsche Bank National Trust C ompany, U.S. Bank National Associ ation, One West Bank F.S.B., SecurityNa tional Mortgage Company Although it is not clear that the Amended Complaint alleges suf ficient facts to establish personal jurisdiction over Deutsche Bank National Trust Company , U.S. Bank National Association, One West Bank F.S.B ., or SecurityNa tional Mortgage Company (collectively, the “Bank Defendants”), as these de fendants have no t raised persona l jurisdiction as a defense, I proceed to assess their motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth. , 843 F.3d 958, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ( failure to assert a pe rsonal jurisdiction defense wa ives the objection). The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against any of the Bank Defendants for any of the eight counts allege d. None of the allegations in th e Amended Complaint are particularized to any of the Bank D efendants; instead, the Plai ntiffs group all of the Bank Defendants together and collectiv ely allege that “the Banks[’ c onduct] constitutes unfair and deceptive practices;” Am. Com pl. ¶¶ 55, 58, 61; that “the Banks knowingly presented or caused to be presented false or fraudulen t claims for payment or appro val;” Am. Compl. ¶ 64; “the Banks implemented and relied on ina dequate bankruptcy procedure s;” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 72, 77; that “the Defendants did not have the right to foreclose on the Subject Property;” Am. Compl.

2 Bank of America proffers that itis headquartered in Charlott e, North Carolina; and Countrywide proffers that it is headquartered in California and organized under the laws of New York. BoA and Countrywide Mot. to Dismiss 5 n.1.8 ¶ 82; and that the “Defendants [h ave] violated the Unfair and D eceptive Acts and Practices.” Am. Compl. ¶ 86. These legal c onclusions, which I do not have to accept as true, are supported by non-particularized general asse rtions merely offering “label s and conclusions.” See Am. Compl. 8-18; Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555. For example, the Amended Complaint generally alleges thatthe Bank Defendants “fail[ed] to timely and accurately apply payments made by borrowers and failing to maintain accurate acc ount statements” and “fail[ed] to perform proper loan modificat ion underwriting,” but does notprovide any specific instances where the Bank Defendants allegedly failed to do so. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26(a), 33(a). This does not show that the Plainti ffs are entitled to relief, and f urthermore fails to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud” that is req uired for all claims alleging fraud as the Plaintiffs do so here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 9(b); see also, e.g. , Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 34 (alleging unfair or deceptive practices). Not only do these broad assertions f ail to state a claim agains t the Bank Defendants as a general matter, the Amended Compl aint also fails to allege any nexus between each Bank Defendant and each Plaintiff. T his may be due to the fact that much of the Amended Complaint appears to be copied-and-paste d from a complaint filed by the U nited States, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and a number of state Attorney Gen erals against Suntrust Mortgage,
Inc. See Compl., United States et al. v. Suntrust Mortgage Inc. , No. 14-cv-01028 (D.D.C. June 17, 2014), ECF No. 1 (“Suntrust Complaint”). 3 The Plaintiffs attempt to recycle and reuse the allegations in that wholly unrel ated case, involving government plaintiffs against a single defendant, to bring an action again st the dozen plus defendants named in this case. The end

3 A Consent Judgment resolving t he action was simultaneously fi led with the Suntrust Complaint. See Consent J., United States et al. v. Suntrust Mortgage Inc. , No. 14-cv-01028 (D.D.C. June 17, 2014), ECF No. 1-1.9 result is that the Amended Compl aint fails to sufficiently plea d facts to plausibly allege any of the Bank Defendants has acted un lawfully with respect to each o f the Plaintiffs and with respect to each of the causes of action alleged. In light of the absence of suffi ciently particularized and well -pleaded facts to support any of the claims in the Amended Com plaint, it is repetitive and un necessary to review each claim individually. However, Count F our is an especially poignant ex ample of how the Amended Complaint fails to make suffici ent allegations pertaining to th ese defendants. Count Four of the Amended Complaint alleges violat ions of the False Claims Act. Am. Compl. ¶ 64 (“[T]he Banks knowingly presented or caused to be presented false or fraudule nt claims for payment or approval”). But the False Claims Act requires actions to “be b rought in the name of the Government,” and to be filed under seal. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)( 1)-(b)(2). While this claim may have been properly brought in the S untrust Complaint, where the plaintiffs were the federal and state governments, the Plainti ffs in this matter have utterly f ailed to comply with the procedural requirements of the False Claims Act. See id .; Am. Compl. ¶ 1 (stating that the Plaintiffs bring this action as individuals). Fur thermore, courts in this Distr ict have found that pro se plaintiffs cannot represent the interes ts of the United States. United States ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. , 274 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2003) . The Plaintiffs’ ado ption of a complaint in a separate matter involving wholly different parti es fails to adequately state a claim with respect to their own clai ms and the Bank Defendants. The Plaintiffs’ Opposition to eac h of the Bank Defendants’ moti ons to dismiss does not cure the failure to adequately p lead their claims. The Plainti ffs attach a number of exhibits to their Opposition and ask that the Court take judicial notice of these exhibits. Pls. Opp. 5-6. Assuming without deciding that facts in an opposition brief maybe considered when ruling on a