Tyrie Washington v. State of Maryland, No. 15, Sept ember Term, 2022

TERRY STOPS – REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION – UNPROVOKED, HEADLONG FLIGHT – HIGH-CRIME AREA – Supreme Court of Maryland* held that, assessing totality of circu mstances, law enforcement officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant based on defendant’s unprovoked, headlong flight from uniformed officers in marked a nd unmarked cars, with another person, that included jumping over fences and tryin g to hide behind bush, in high-crime area. Supreme Court of Maryland reiterated that re asonable suspicion must be assessed under totality of circumstances, which can include consideration that unprovoked flight may be consistent with innocence, when determining what weight to give unprovoked flight from police, but determined that in this cas e, nature of flight and other circumstances outweighed more innocent inferences from defendant’ s flight. Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that under tota lity of circumstances assessment, in determining whether reasonable suspicion for Terry stop is established, along with evidence that location is high-crime area, court ma y consider whether flight could be reasonably perceived as factor indicating that crim inal activity is afoot or factor consistent with innocence, which may include consideration of circumstance that unprovoked flight may occur for innocent reasons, including those ass ociated with fear of police officers.

*At the time of oral argument in this case, the Sup reme Court of Maryland was named the Court of Appeals of Maryland. At the Nov ember 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional am endment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court o f Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND*

No. 15 September Term, 2022

______________________________________

TYRIE WASHINGTON

v. STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Fader, C.J. Watts Hotten Booth Biran Gould Eaves,

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Watts, J. Hotten, J., dissents.

______________________________________

Filed: December 19, 2022 Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 420234003 Argued: November 3, 2022

*At the November 8, 2022 general election, the vote rs of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the C ourt of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change too k effect on December 14, 2022.In recent years, the Baltimore Police Department ha s experienced a series of

unsettling events, giving rise to what has been des cribed as an increased public awareness of police misconduct and a fear of police officers by some residents of Baltimore City, particularly those who are African American. Due t o disquieting events of late across the country and in our State, this dynamic has not been limited to Baltimore City. Over the last several years, among other events, pr otests occurred in Baltimore City after the death of Freddie Carlos Gray, Jr., a youn g African American man, in police custody, a United States Department of Justice inve stigation found that the Baltimore Police Department “deployed a policing strategy tha t, by its design, led to differential enforcement in African-American communities,” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Balt. City Police Dep’t at 8 ( Aug. 10, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [h ttps://perma.cc/YJU8-6YAW], and “in a shocking and unfortunate scandal, it was disc overed that members of the Department’s Gun Trace Task Force had engaged in wh at has been described as ‘a wideranging, years-long racketeering conspiracy’” that included officer assaults, robberies, and extortion of people in Baltimore City, Balt. City P olice Dep’t v. Potts, 468 Md. 265, 271, 276, 278, 227 A.3d 186, 190, 193-94 (2020). In add ition to media coverage generated by the foregoing events, footage from cell phones and body-worn cameras has displayed graphic images of violence involving police, someti mes deadly, against people, particularly African American people, in encounters with law enforcement officers in various parts of the country. In the instant case, we must address the import of this reality in determining the- 2 -

constitutionality of police stops of people on the street. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a law enforceme nt officer may stop an individual for a brief investigatory detention when the “officer o bserves unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience t hat criminal activity may be afoot[,]” i.e. , a Terry stop must be supported by reasonable suspic ion of criminal activity. Using the standard set forth in Terry, in Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000), the Supreme Court concluded that reasonable suspicion j ustified the stop of a defendant who fled from police officers without provocation in a high-crime area. Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has instructed in its case law that a court must assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding a stop to determine wheth er it was justified by reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 2 66, 273-74 (2002); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). Based on Supr eme Court case law, this Court has adopted the same totality of the circumstances anal ysis. See Collins v. State, 376 Md. 359, 368, 829 A.2d 992, 997 (2003). This case stems from the contention that, due to in creased public awareness of police misconduct, people, particularly young Afric an American men, fear encounters with police officers and that, as such, unprovoked fligh t in a high-crime area should no longer be considered factors that give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion for a Terry stop. The resolution of this contention is necessary to d etermine whether the trial court properly denied a motion to suppress a handgun seized from T yrie Washington, Petitioner. Washington and another person were standing in an a lley in Baltimore City when they saw a marked police vehicle. Both Washington and the other person fled. After seeing- 3 -

a different unmarked police vehicle, Washington ran , jumped over a fence and tried to hide behind a bush in a backyard. Detective Alex Rodrig uez got out of the second vehicle, and Washington ran and jumped over another fence. Ulti mately, Detective Rodriguez stopped Washington, whereupon another detective found a han dgun in Washington’s waistband. Although two of the detectives involved testified a s to observing details that indicated Washington might have a gun, neither of t he detectives had advised Detective Rodriguez of the observations. Detective Rodriguez had not seen any sign of a weapon but had seen Washington fleeing, jumping fences, an d trying to hide. All three of the testifying detectives testified that the block wher e Washington was stopped, and the immediate vicinity, constituted a high-crime area. Washington contends that Detective Rodriguez lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him based solely on his unprovoked flight in a high -crime area. Washington asserts that young African American men like himself have legiti mate fears of mistreatment at the hands of police, providing an innocent reason for h is flight, such that his fleeing in a highcrime area was not sufficient to support reasonable suspicion for a stop. According to Washington, an increased public awareness of police misconduct toward African American men, combined with the specific history of police m isconduct in Baltimore City, renders outdated the conclusion in Wardlow that unprovoked flight is suggestive of wrongdoing. The State, Respondent, contends that the Supreme Co urt considered the essence of Washington’s argument in Wardlow and rejected it, c oncluding that potentially innocent reasons for flight were not enough to overcome a “c ommonsense” presumption that unprovoked flight from police is indicative of wron gdoing. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125- 4 -

(citation omitted). The State argues that Washingt on’s case is factually indistinguishable from Wardlow, supporting a conclusion that the stop of Washington was constitutional. Against this backdrop, we hold that, under the tota lity of the circumstances analysis, a court may consider whether unprovoked flight is a n indication of criminal activity that, coupled with evidence of a high-crime area and any other relevant factors, establishes reasonable suspicion for a stop, or whether unprovo ked flight, under the circumstances of the case, is a factor consistent with innocence tha t adds little or nothing to the reasonable suspicion analysis. In Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, i n concluding that reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop existed, the Supreme Court explain ed that people may flee for a variety of reasons, including innocence, and that “the determi nation of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” (Citation omitted); see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132-35 (Ste vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As such, in Wardlow, the Supr eme Court did not establish a per se rule that unprovoked flight in a high-crime area always gives rise to reasonable articulable suspicion for a Terry stop. In keeping with the Supreme Court’s holding in War dlow, we conclude that unprovoked flight in a high-crime area does not aut omatically equal reasonable articulable suspicion for a Terry stop. Rather, under the tota lity of the circumstances assessment, in determining whether reasonable suspicion for a Terr y stop is established, along with evidence that a location is a high-crime area, a co urt may consider whether unprovoked flight could reasonably be perceived as a factor ju stifying a conclusion that criminal activity is afoot or a factor consistent with innoc ence, including the circumstance that some- 5 -

individuals may fear interactions with police offic ers in Baltimore City and elsewhere. Applying this analysis, we conclude that Detective Rodriguez had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Washington. The spec ific nature and context of Washington’s flight, his other evasive maneuvers, and its occurr ence in a location that was established to be a high-crime area lead us to this conclusion. W ashington fled not only at the sight of uniformed detectives in a marked police car, but al so at the other end of an alley when he spotted different detectives in an unmarked car. W ashington fled, headlong, completely unprovoked, and simultaneously with the other indiv idual standing with him in the alley. He also jumped fences and attempted to conceal hims elf behind a bush while fleeing. Testimony at a suppression hearing supported the tr ial court’s conclusion that the block on which Detective Rodriguez stopped Washingt on was a high-crime area. Detective Lopez testified that he had seized approximately 10 to 15 handguns on the specific block of Oakmont Avenue where Washington was stopped “wit hin a three-month span last year.” Testimony from other detectives concerned drug traf ficking, homicides, shootings, and robberies in the immediate vicinity of Washington’s stop. For all of these reasons, we conclude that Detective Rodriguez had reasonable ar ticulable suspicion to stop Washington and that the stop did not violate Washington’s righ ts under the Fourth Amendment. For the same reasons, we hold that Detective Rodrig uez did not violate Washington’s rights under Article 26 of the Marylan d Declaration of Rights. 1 We decline

1 Article 26 states:- 6 -

to disturb our longstanding practice of interpretin g Article 26 in pari materia with the

Fourth Amendment. In short, reasonable suspicion for Washington’s sto p existed, and we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland (at the time named the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland). 2

BACKGROUND Facing gun charges, Washington filed a motion to su ppress a firearm recovered from him, alleging that he was stopped without reasonabl e suspicion in violation of the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art icle 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. On June 16, 2021, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress. The State called as witnes ses Detectives Darwin Noesi, Israel Lopez, and Alex Rodriguez of the Baltimore Police D epartment. Washington did not call any witnesses.

Detective Noesi testified first. He testified that he was assigned to the Northwest District Action Team, which he described as “a narc otics team” whose “main focus is pretty

That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and o ppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehen d suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the pers on in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted. Although Article 26 does not expressly prohibit unr easonable searches and seizures, we have interpreted it to do so. See Dehn Motor Sales , LLC v. Schultz, 439 Md. 460, 486, 96 A.3d 221, 237 (2014).

2 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voter s of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the C ourt of Special Appeals of Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name chang e took effect on December 14, 2022.- 7 -

much driving around hot areas . . . , high-crime ar eas and enforc[ing] drug distribution and handgun violations.” Detective Noesi testified tha t, on July 9, 2020, at approximately 12:15 p.m., he was in uniform in a marked police ve hicle that Detective Winkey was driving down Cordelia Avenue toward Reisterstown Ro ad. 3 Detective Noesi testified that they were on routine patrol in the area because of homicides and robberies associated with drug dealing. More specifically, Detective Noesi testified that “areas of Reistersto wn [Road] and side streets[,]” including Cordelia and Oakmont Avenues, have “high crime and [a] large amount of individuals selling and dis tributing narcotics.”

Detective Noesi testified that he and Detective Win key were not responding to any

calls for service but rather were there because the area was one that they paid special attention to and needed to show a police presence i n. Detective Noesi testified that they were patrolling with two other members of their tea m, Detectives Lopez and Rodriguez, who they knew were nearby on Oakmont Avenue, the ne xt street over from Cordelia

Avenue. Detective Noesi testified that he observed Washingt on and another person standing in the alley off Cordelia Avenue. According to Det ective Noesi, he was unfamiliar with Washington and did not see him or the other person engage in a hand-to-hand transaction or any apparent drug activity. Detective Noesi ind icated that Washington and the other person were “just standing there in the alley[,]” a nd that he was not sure whether they were conversing. Detective Noesi testified that after W ashington looked directly at the police

3 Detective Noesi testified that he was a passenger i n the car driven by Detective Winkey. Detective Winkey did not testify at the su ppression hearing.- 8 -

car, he and the other person immediately ran away t oward Oakmont Avenue.

Detective Noesi testified that either he or Detecti ve Winkey radioed Detectives Lopez and Rodriguez that two individuals had taken off running. According to Detective Noesi, he and Detective Winkey drove onto Reisterst own Road to reach Oakmont Avenue to follow Washington and the other individual and s ee why they were running. Detective Noesi testified that he saw Washington “kind of man ipulating something at his front as he[ was] running.” Detective Noesi testified that he o bserved Washington jump over a fence and try to hide under some bushes, which he found “ real suspicious.” He testified that Washington then jumped again and ran toward Oakmont Avenue, and Detective Rodriguez

detained him. Detective Noesi testified that he an d Detective Winkey exited their vehicle at this point, in the 3700 block of Oakmont Avenue, and that Detective Lopez patted Washington down and recovered a handgun from his wa istband. During Detective Noesi’s direct examination, the St ate offered into evidence his body-worn camera footage from the time of the stop. The body-worn camera is designed to record approximately 30 seconds of video without audio before being turned on. Washington’s counsel played portions of the body-wo rn camera footage during crossexamination of Detective Noesi. Detective Noesi te stified that from the beginning of his observations to Washington’s arrest took approximat ely 20 seconds. On the stand, Detective Noesi pointed out the alley off Cordelia Avenue, his and Detective Winkey’s progress onto Reisterstown Road and Oakmont Avenue, and the backyard where Washington had jumped the fence and tried to hide b efore running again. Next, Detective Lopez testified that he had been as signed to the Northwest District- 9 -

Action Team for approximately two years and that, o n July 9, 2020, at approximately 12:15 p.m., he was on patrol, wearing a uniform and sitti ng with Detective Rodriguez in an unmarked police vehicle in the 3700 block of Oakmon t Avenue. Detective Lopez testified that the area was “[v]ery violent[,]” and that he h ad “had a couple of homicide shootings and robberies in the area[.]” Detective Lopez test ified that he had seized approximately 10 to 15 handguns on “that one block” within a three-m onth period in the last year. According to Detective Lopez, Detective Winkey said on the ra dio that two people had just taken off running from the 4800 block of Cordelia Avenue down an alley. Detective Lopez testified that, at that moment, he and Detective Rodriguez we re speaking with individuals at the corner of Oakmont Avenue and Litchfield Avenue, nea r the alley in question. He testified that as they drove toward the alley, Washington—wit h whom Detective Lopez was unfamiliar—came running in the direction of the veh icle that Detective Lopez was in, saw it, turned around, jumped over a fence, and tried t o hide behind a bush. According to Detective Lopez, Detective Rodriguez e xited the vehicle, and Washington fled again and jumped over another fence . Detective Lopez testified that as Washington was doing so, Detective Lopez “noticed a large bulge in his pants -- his dip area, waistband.” On cross-examination, Detective Lopez testified that he did not advise any of the other detectives of this observation. D etective Lopez testified that after Detective Rodriguez detained Washington, he (Detect ive Lopez) approached Washington and recovered a gun from his pants. The State offered footage from Detective Lopez’s bo dy-worn camera into evidence. Detective Lopez pointed out where on Oakmont Avenue he and Detective Rodriguez saw- 10 -

Washington and the other individual emerge from the alley that led to Cordelia Avenue and the general area where Washington attempted to hide behind a bush, which was “not normal[.]” Detective Lopez testified that the foot age showed him reversing the car to reposition it after Washington jumped the second fe nce and attempted to evade Detective Rodriguez. This was footage captured automatically by the camera in the seconds before Detective Lopez turned it on. Thereafter, the foot age captured the recovery of the gun from Washington’s waist area. Lastly, Detective Rodriguez testified that, on July 9, 2020, he was assigned to the Northwest District Action Team, and had been for ap proximately five months. Detective Rodriguez testified that members of the District Ac tion Team had been assigned to patrol high-crime areas, which included the 3700 block of Oakmont Avenue. Detective Rodriguez testified that, on July 9, 2020, at appro ximately 12:15 p.m., he was in uniform with Detective Lopez in an unmarked vehicle in the 3700 block of Oakmont Avenue. According to Detective Rodriguez, the area was know n for shootings and robberies. Detective Rodriguez testified that he and Detective Lopez were on patrol, rather than responding to a call for service, and had been talk ing with some individuals on the block. Detective Rodriguez testified that Detective Winkey said on the radio that two unidentified people were running through an alley from Cordelia Avenue to Oakmont Avenue. Detective Rodriguez testified that he saw Washingto n and another person run out from the alley and cross Oakmont Avenue. According to Detective Rodriguez, Washington at first ran toward the detectives, but “when he observed that we were coming down, he immediately turned around” and went into a backyard, where he tried to hide- 11 -

behind a bush. Detective Rodriguez testified that he exited the vehicle to “further investigate,” Washington fled again, and Detective Rodriguez pursued. Detective Rodriguez testified that, when he exited the car, h e was initially about twenty feet behind Washington. Detective Rodriguez testified that, af ter both of them jumped over a fence, he grabbed Washington. 4 Detective Rodriguez testified that after Washington was handcuffed, Detective Lopez found a handgun in Washington’s “front waistb and area.” Per his testimony, Detective Rodriguez had not seen a bulge in Washing ton’s clothing or any other sign of a weapon while chasing him. On cross-examination, Washington’s counsel offered as evidence footage and still photos from Detective Rodriguez’s body-worn camera. Detective Rodriguez testified that the footage showed the officers’ car moving down Oa kmont Avenue toward the alley, his indication to Detective Lopez where Washington was trying to hide behind a bush, and Detective Rodriguez leaving the car, chasing after, and detaining Washington. The still photos showed, per Detective Rodriguez’s testimony, snapshots of his pursuit of Washington, including jumping the fence. While foo tage from his body-worn camera was being played, Detective Rodriguez responded: “Yes, ma’am” to the question: “[T]hat’s the

first fence and then there’s another little fence?”

4 This testimony is consistent with Detective Noesi’s testimony that he observed Washington jump over a fence and try to hide under bushes and Detective Lopez’s testimony that “[o]nce Detective Rodriguez exited t he vehicle and -- to further investigate him while he was running and jumping the fence and concealing his body in the fence, the defendant jumped the fence again[.]”- 12 -

After the detectives testified, the circuit court h eard arguments by the parties. In opposition to Washington’s motion to suppress, the State argued that, in Wardlow, the Supreme Court held “that the defendant’s presence i n an area of heavy narcotics trafficking and his unprovoked flight upon noticing police crea ted reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop.” The State contended that the same fac t pattern existed in Washington’s case, because he fled police, unprovoked, in a high-crime area. The State asserted that, as a result, the detectives had reasonable articulable s uspicion that justified a brief detention to investigate under Terry. The State argued that und er Terry, once Washington was detained, the detectives were also justified in frisking him because Detective Lopez had reasonable articulable suspicion that Washington was armed bec ause of the bulge that had been observed. The State again contended that Wardlow i s directly on point with this case and therefore asked the circuit court to deny the motio n to suppress. Washington’s counsel contended that, under Wardlow, unprovoked flight from a law enforcement officer is merely one factor to con sider in assessing whether there is reasonable articulable suspicion and that, here, su ch flight was the only applicable factor. Washington’s counsel observed that, in the decades since the Supreme Court decided Wardlow in 2000, the Black Lives Matter movement ha d begun, the Baltimore Police Department had entered into a consent decree, and o fficers of the Gun Trace Task Force had been arrested. Washington’s counsel argued tha t, accordingly, “[i]t’s not unusual to distrust the police in Baltimore” and flight from o fficers “should not be considered as a factor supporting reasonable articulable suspicion. ” Washington’s counsel asserted that, even if the detectives did not violate Washington’s rights under the Fourth Amendment,- 13 -

the circuit court could determine that they violate d his rights under Article 26. After hearing arguments, ruling orally, the circuit court denied the motion to suppress. The circuit court found that Washington and the other person ran “for no reason” upon seeing uniformed detectives in a marked police vehicle. This occurred, the circuit court noted, in a high-crime area, Oakmont and Cord elia Avenues, “known for drug dealing, drug robberies, murders, shootings.” The circuit court concluded that reasonable articulable suspicion existed in light of Washingto n running away, jumping over a fence, trying to hide behind a bush, jumping over a fence again, and fleeing from detectives. The circuit court found significance in the fact that t he initial flight was from a marked police car, while in Wardlow the police vehicles had been unmarked. 5 In addition, the circuit court observed that Washington was wearing tight pa nts, such that “the imprint of a firearm was plain and simple[.]” 6 On July 19, 2021, the circuit court conducted a pro ceeding to consider a conditional plea agreement reached between the State and Washin gton. The agreement stipulated that Washington would tender a conditional guilty plea t o possession of a regulated firearm and retain the right to appellate review of the denial of the motion to suppress. The circuit court found that Washington tendered the conditional guil ty plea freely, knowingly, and voluntarily, and determined that the facts that the prosecutor proffered were sufficient to

5 In Wardlow, the police vehicles were described as “ a four car caravan” in the majority opinion, see 528 U.S. at 121, and as “four patrol cars” in the concurring and dissenting opinion, see id. at 137 (Stevens, J., co ncurring in part and dissenting in part).

6 Given our holding concerning the application of War dlow, we need not address whether the circuit court’s observation concerning the imprint of a firearm on Washington contributed to its reasonable suspicion analysis.- 14 -

find Washington guilty. The circuit court accepted the conditional guilty plea and sentenced Washington to ten years of imprisonment, with all but five years suspended, followed by two years of supervised probation. Lat er that day, Washington noted an appeal. Opinion of the Appellate Court of Maryland On March 24, 2022, in an unreported opinion, the Ap pellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. See Tyrie W ashington v. State, No. 739, Sept. Term, 2021, 2022 WL 873315, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar . 24, 2022). The Appellate Court of Maryland explained that “[i]n Illinois v. Wardlo w, the Supreme Court held that it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to stop an individual who fled ‘upon seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcoti cs trafficking.’” Washington, 2022 WL 973315 at *4 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121). T he Court interpreted Wardlow as concluding that “while it is ‘undoubtedly true’ tha t there are innocent reasons to flee from police, and that flight from police is not necessar ily indicative of wrongdoing, both Terry and the Fourth Amendment accept the risk that offic ers may stop or even arrest innocent people.” Washington, 2022 WL 873315 at *5 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125). The Appellate Court of Maryland stated that this Court, citing Wardlow, “has stated that ‘unprovoked flight or presence in a high crime area , or both, are individual factors that may contribute to the reasonable suspicion calculus.’” Washington, 2022 WL 873315 at *5 (quoting Sizer v. State, 456 Md. 350, 367, 174 A.3d 326, 336 (2017)). The Court concluded that, in seeking reversal of the circuit court’s de nial of the motion to suppress, Washington asked the Court to diverge from the Supreme Court’s decision in Wardlow and decisions- 15 -

from this Court “upholding the proposition from Wardlow that unprovoked flight from law enforcement in a high-crime area can be grounds for the requisite reasonable suspicion to

effectuate a Terry stop.” Washington, 2022 WL 873315 at *5. The Cou rt held that, “based on the totality of the circumstances, Detective Rod riguez had reasonable suspicion to stop Washington.” Id. Although the Appellate Court of Maryland concluded that reasonable suspicion for the stop existed, the Court discussed Washington’s contention that African American people generally and young African American men in particular may have innocent reasons for fleeing police officers. See id. at *6. The C ourt acknowledged that there are “problematic implications in relying on ‘unprovoked flight’ due to the legitimate reasons that individuals might be wary of interactions with police in Baltimore City and elsewhere,” that “some courts have highlighted the troubling relation of high-crime areas to areas that are simply majority-minority,” and th at, as a result, “the usefulness of relying on these factors as justifying reasonable suspicion might warrant further review.” Id. at *7. That said, the Court pointed out that it was b ound by our case law, under which “both unprovoked flight and presence in a high-crime area are relevant to a reasonable suspicion analysis, and together can amount to a finding of s uch.” Id. at *8. In sum, addressing the federal constitutional issue, the Appellate Court o f Maryland held that the stop did not violate Washington’s rights under the Fourth Amendm ent because his unprovoked flight from the detectives in a high-crime area gave rise to reasonable articulable suspicion. See

id. at *2. Addressing the State constitutional issue, the Appe llate Court of Maryland held that- 16 -

the stop did not violate Washington’s rights under Article 26 because the article does not afford more protection than the Fourth Amendment. See id. at *8. The Court reaffirmed the principle set forth in Maryland case law “that the protections in Article 26 are coextensive with those afforded by the Fourth Amendme nt.” Id. (cleaned up).

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari On May 11, 2022, Washington petitioned for a writ o f certiorari , raising the following four issues: 1. In light of the legitimate reasons why young Bla ck men may be afraid of interacting with the police, what weight, if any, s hould “unprovoked” flight from the police be given in the reasonable suspicio n analysis? 2. Does flight from the Baltimore police by a young Black man in a highcrime area in Baltimore City give the police reason able suspicion to make a Terry stop? 3. Did the [Appellate Court of Maryland] err by hol ding that the stop of Petitioner did not violate Petitioner’s rights unde r the Fourth Amendment, despite recognizing the “problematic implications” of relying on flight from the police in the reasonable suspicion analysis? 4. Did the [Appellate Court of Maryland] err by hol ding that the stop of Petitioner did not violate Petitioner’s rights unde r Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and, if so, does a violation of Article 26 require the exclusion of the illegally seized evidence? On May 26, 2022, the State filed an answer to the p etition and a conditional cross-petition, raising the following issue: Should Detective Israel Lopez’s observation of a “b ulge” in Washington’s waistband and Detective Darwin Noesi’s observation that Washington was “manipulating something at his front as he’s runnin g” be imputed to the arresting officer and considered in the reasonable suspicion analysis under the collective knowledge doctrine? On July 8, 2022, we granted the petition and condit ional cross-petition. See Washington- 17 -

v. State, 479 Md. 456, 278 A.3d 761 (2022).

DISCUSSION 7

I. Fourth Amendment

The Parties’ Contentions Washington contends that his flight from the detect ives did not give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion under the Fourth A mendment because people, especially young African American men, may flee from law enfor cement officers out of reasonable fear of police violence rather than consciousness o f guilt. Washington argues that the holding in Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, that “unprovok ed flight” from officers may suggest wrongdoing, is outdated. Washington asserts that t he Supreme Court’s holding—which was premised on “commonsense judgments and inferenc es about human behavior[,]” id. (citation omitted)—failed to take into account the divergent experiences with police of people from different segments of society. Washing ton asserts that, today, there is increased public awareness that officers disproport ionately kill African American people, especially young African American men. Accordingly , Washington maintains that “unprovoked flight” from officers deserves little w eight as a factor in determining reasonable suspicion, because running from officers does not indicate wrongdoing any

7 Questions 1, 2, and 3 of the petition for a writ of certiorari raise essentially the same issue and, as such, we will address the questi ons together. In its brief, the State argues that, even if we conclude that Washington’s unprovo ked, headlong flight in a high-crime area did not establish reasonable suspicion, observ ations of a bulge in Washington’s waistband not communicated to Detective Rodriguez s hould be considered in the reasonable suspicion analysis under the “collective knowledge doctrine.” As a result of our holding as to the questions raised by Washingto n, however, we need not address the State’s question concerning the “collective knowled ge doctrine.”- 18 -

more than it does fear for one’s own safety. Washington contends that such fear is especially pr onounced in Baltimore City. Washington draws our attention to the death of Fred die Gray, Jr. in the custody of the Baltimore Police Department, the subsequent consent decree between the Baltimore Police Department and the Department of Justice, and the s candal surrounding the Gun Trace Task Force. Although Washington acknowledges that whether a stop occurs in a highcrime area is a factor to be considered under Wardl ow, he argues that the factor is problematic because the assessment of whether an ar ea is a high-crime area depends on an officer’s subjective belief and can be based on the racial makeup and average income of

the residents of the area. The State responds that, under Wardlow and our late r cases, unprovoked, headlong flight from officers in a high-crime area can estab lish reasonable suspicion. The State describes the term “headlong” as implying “that the defendant was not simply leaving the area in a reasonable manner to passively avoid the police and go about one’s business, but, rather, the defendant was actively evading the police in a rapid, frantic, or suspicious manner.” (Emphasis in original) (citations omitted ). The State contends that such flight constitutes the suspicious act of evading officers, as opposed to the innocent act of merely passively avoiding officers and going about one’s b usiness. The State argues that, in any event, officers are not required to rule out innoce nt explanations for an individual’s

conduct. The State asserts that Wardlow is not out dated because unprovoked, headlong flight from officers has not become common among in nocent people, such that flight still meets the low bar for reasonable suspicion. Furthe r, the State contends that the continued- 19 -

validity of Wardlow is reflected in Justice Stevens ’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Wardlow, which discussed the concerns that Washington raises. The State maintains that Washington’s flight was unprov oked because it was not caused by anything more than the passive presence of officers . The State defends the use of the highcrime area factor in the analysis of reasonable sus picion as consistent with the record, which provides an objective basis for determining t hat the particular block in question had a high volume of drug and gun activity.

Standard of Review When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion t o suppress, we are limited to information in the record of the suppression hearin g and consider the facts found by the trial court in the light most favorable to the prev ailing party, in this case, the State. Trott v. State, 473 Md. 245, 253-54, 249 A.3d 833, 838, c ert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 240 (2021). We accept facts found by the trial cou rt during the suppression hearing unless clearly erroneous. See id. at 254, 249 A.3d at 838 . In contrast, our review of the trial court’s application of law to the facts is de novo . See id. at 254, 249 A.3d at 838. In the event of a constitutional challenge, we conduct an “independent constitutional evaluation by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to th e unique facts and circumstances of the case.” Id. at 254, 249 A.3d at 838 (cleaned up). Analysis Terry Stops and Case Law

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion bars the government from subjecting people to “unreasonable searches and sei zures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “For- 20 -

the Fourth Amendment’s purposes, a ‘seizure’ of a p erson is any nonconsensual detention.” Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373, 386-87, 156 A.3d 940, 948 (2017) (citation omitted). “‘The exclusion of evidence obtained in v iolation of these provisions is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment protections. ’” Trott, 473 Md. at 254, 249 A.3d at 839 (quoting Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 149, 899 A.2d 867, 873 (2006)). “In determining whether a search or seizure is lawful, “[t]he touch stone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the c ircumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal secur ity.” Id. at 254, 249 A.3d at 839 (cleaned up). “Recognizing that the constitutional gauge for purp oses of Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness[,]” id. at 254, 249 A.3 d at 839, Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, permits an officer with reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot” to briefly detain a person after observing “unusual conduct” in order to resolve the suspicion. In Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, the Supreme Court held that to establis h reasonable suspicion, a “police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable f acts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” th e stop. The Supreme Court noted that there is nothing suspicious about standing together on a street corner, strolling up and down a street, or looking into store windows. See id. a t 22-23. However, the particular manner and combination that the individuals in Terry engag ed in these behaviors, coupled with the

reasonable inferences which the officer was entitle d to draw, were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a stop. See id. at 24, 27 . The Court indicated that this is a highly fact-specific inquiry, because “[e]ach case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided- 21 -

on its own facts.” Id. at 30. The meaning of reasonable suspicion is not fixed, but “exists somewhere between unparticularized suspicions and probable cause.” S izer, 456 Md. at 364, 174 A.3d at 334. This fluidity is intentional because the standard “ ‘is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’” Trott, 473 Md. at 257, 249 A.3d at 840 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Instead, we ass ess the existence of reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances, i.e. , the whole picture. See id. at 257, 249 A.3d

at 840. This standard relies on a commonsense unde rstanding of the “factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and pruden t people act.” Id. at 257, 249 A.3d at 840 (quoting Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 286, 7 53 A.2d 519, 527 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The “touchstone” of this analysis is reasonableness, both of the circumstances surrounding a stop and the nature of the stop itself. Id. at 254-55, 249 A.3d at 839 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 , 108-09 (1977)). Because it requires a lower standard than probable cause, reasonable suspicion can be based on “information that is different in quant ity or content” and “less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” In re D.D., 479 Md. 206, 231, 277 A.3d 949, 963- 64 (2022) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is because reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause, as it permits the lesser intrusion of a stop, and perh aps a frisk, rather than an arrest. See Trott, 473 Md. at 255, 249 A.3d at 839. But this does not permit police “to simply assert that innocent conduct was suspicious[.]” Id. at 257, 24 9 A.3d at 840 (quoting Sizer, 456 Md. at 365, 174 A.3d. at 334). Rather, there must exis t a particularized, objective basis for how- 22 -

the observed conduct, in the context “known to the officer, was indicative of criminal activity.” Id. at 257, 249 A.3d at 840 (quoting Si zer, 456 Md. at 365, 174 A.3d at 334) (internal quotation marks omitted). A hunch or gen eral suspicion is not enough, but reasonable suspicion can be supported by circumstan ces and conduct that, viewed alone, appear innocent yet “collectively warrant further i nvestigation.” Id. at 257, 249 A.3d at 840 (quoting Cartnail, 359 Md. at 290, 753 A.2d at 529 (cleaned up)). However, if individual factors appear innocent, when “viewed in their totality” they must be “more indicative of criminal activity than any one factor assessed individually.” Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 511, 970 A.2d 894, 906 (2009) (citing Cartnail, 359 Md. at 293-94, 753 A.2d at 531). In the totality of the circumstances anal ysis, we avoid “a ‘divide and conquer’ approach to addressing factors” that could support or undermine a finding of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 510, 970 A.2d at 905 (quoting Ar vizu, 534 U.S. at 274). In Trott, 473 Md. at 265, 249 A.3d at 845, we held that an anonymous 911 call about a drunk driver formed part of the totality of the c ircumstances establishing that “the police officers had a particularized and objective basis f or suspecting ongoing criminal activity[,]” thereby permitting a stop. We held that the 911 ca ll “provided sufficient indicia of reliability” because it was “contemporaneous to the reported behavior and provided detailed and specific information” about the color of the pertinent vehicle and its license plate and registration numbers. Id. at 265-66, 249 A.3d at 845. We found further indicia of reliability in the caller’s use of the 911 syste m, which can record calls, and the existence of penalties for false reporting. See id. at 267, 249 A.3d at 846. Additional facts supporting our holding included the vehicle being parked outsi de a liquor store at 11:30 p.m., which- 23 -

permitted an inference that the driver may have bee n consuming alcohol. See id. at 267, 249 A.3d at 846. We noted that, in isolation, thes e facts could be innocent, but that a finding of reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Id. at 268, 249 A.3d 846-47 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. a t 277) (internal quotation marks omitted). The relatively unintrusive nature of the stop—a tap on the vehicle window and brief conversation—and the severity of the risk of public harm from drunk driving further supported the existence of reasonable suspicion. S ee id. at 269-70, 249 A.3d at 847-48. Just as the totality of the circumstances can place otherwise innocent conduct in a different light, sometimes the circumstances are in sufficient to justify a Terry stop, as in Cartnail, 359 Md. at 289, 753 A.2d at 528-29. In C artnail, a report of an early morning armed robbery of a business at the interchange of f our highways was accompanied by a description of the assailants as three African Amer ican men who fled in a gold or tan Mazda. See id. at 277, 753 A.2d 522. Based solely on this description, police stopped the petitioner, an African American man, with a passeng er of the same race and gender in a gold Nissan, over an hour later in a nearby part of the same town and arrested him for driving with a revoked license. See id. at 277-78, 753 A.2d at 522. We were “struck by the lack of corroboration between the description o f the robbery suspects and the

c ircumstances surrounding Petitioner at the time of the stop.” Id. at 290, 753 A.2d at 529. We held that even in the sparsely populated streets on an early weekday morning, the tenuous connection between the description of the r obbers and the petitioner’s circumstances could not support reasonable suspicio n, because of the different makes of the vehicles, the lack of any suspicious conduct, a nd the length of time that had passed.- 24 -

See id. at 282, 293-96, 753 A.2d at 524, 530-32. C ritical to our conclusion was that the facts allegedly supporting reasonable suspicion—rac e, gender, and number of the vehicle’s occupants, color and make of the vehicle, and physi cal proximity to the crime—did not “serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innoce nt travelers” such that “the requirement of reasonable suspicion” was satisfied. Id. at 291 , 753 A.2d at 530 (quoting Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 387, 735 A.2d 491, 507 (1999)). In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) , the Supreme Court held that when assessing the constitutionality of a police of ficer’s stop of an individual or vehicle,

the actual motivations of the officers involved are irrelevant. Plainclothes officers in the District of Columbia were patrolling a “high drug a rea” in an unmarked car when they saw a truck make a turn without using a signal and spee d off after sitting at a stop sign for an “unusually long time[.]” Id. at 808. When an offi cer approached the truck at a stoplight to instruct the driver to put the vehicle in park, he saw one of the occupants holding large bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine. See id. at 808-09. The driver and passenger were arrested and convicted on drug charges after t he trial court denied their motion to suppress the drugs seized. See id. at 809. The Su preme Court declined to adopt the defendants’ proposed modification of the objective reasonable officer standard, which was designed to preclude the perceived danger of pretex tual stops based on race, among other things. See id. at 811-14. Characterizing the pro posed standard as requiring the court to ask whether “it is plausible to believe that the of ficer had the proper state of mind[,]” the Supreme Court determined that this was a subjective test and impractical because of the variation of police practices among localities. Id . at 814-15.- 25 - Illinois v. Wardlow In Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121, the Supreme Court held that officers in that case had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, who fle d upon seeing them in an area known for heavy drug trafficking. In Wardlow, id. at 121 -22, the defendant looked in the direction of uniformed officers in a vehicle as they drove by him and fled. The officers followed the defendant, who ran through a gangway and an alley, until they cornered him. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122. In the course of a prote ctive pat-down for weapons, one officer recovered a handgun from the bag the defendant carr ied. See id.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to su ppress the gun as recovered in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. See id. Wardlow was convicted, but an Illinois appellate court reversed, concluding that the gun s hould have been suppressed because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a Te rry stop. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, but on different grounds. See id. The Illinois Supreme C ourt concluded that the defendant was in a high-crime area, but flight in such an area wa s not enough to support reasonable suspicion. See id. The defendant’s flight was of little probative value to the Illinois Supreme Court, which concluded that it fell within a person’s Fourth Amendment right to decline to interact with police and “‘go on one’s w ay.’” See id. at 122-23 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court held, the fli ght in a high-crime area did not create reasonable suspicion, making the stop a violation o f the Fourth Amendment. See id. at

123. The Supreme Court reversed. See id. According to the Supreme Court, the case- 26 -

was governed by the analysis from Terry and its pro geny. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Applying this analysis, the Supreme Court observed that it had previously concluded that, in assessing whether reasonable suspicion justified a stop, a court may consider the circumstances that the stop occurs in a high-crime area and that the defendant engaged in nervous, evasive behavior. See id. at 124. The Su preme Court determined that “[h]eadlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly sugge stive of such.” Id. The Supreme Court pointed out that, “[i]n reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty fr om judges or law enforcement officers where none exists.” Id. at 124-25. The Supreme Co urt explained that, accordingly, “the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Id. at 125 (cita tion omitted). The Supreme Court recognized that it had previously held that, by itself, a refusal to cooperate with officers does not give rise to re asonable suspicion. See id. Reaffirming its precedent that “when an officer, without reason able suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a righ t to ignore the police and go about his business,” the Supreme Court found no conflict betw een this concept and the use of unprovoked flight as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion. Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). The Supreme Court deter mined, however, that “unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not ‘going about one’s business’; in fact, it is just the oppo site.” Id. The Supreme Court explained- 27 -

that “[a]llowing officers confronted with such flig ht to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual’s r ight to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning .” Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and amici “that there are innocent reasons for flight from police and that, therefore, flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity.” Id. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that in Wardlow, such potential innocent reasons were insufficient t o establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See id. The Supreme Court explained th at “ Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people.” Wardlow, 528 U .S. at 126. Normally, this “minimal intrusion” leaves the person free to leave if no fu rther incriminating facts result from the brief investigation; the Supreme Court observed, th ough, that “officers found respondent in possession of a handgun,” resulting in arrest. Id. In Wardlow, the Supreme Court did not relieve trial courts of the obligation to perform the totality of the circumstances analysis. In its opinion, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the various “pertinent factor [s]” and “contextual considerations” that a court must assess in determining whether rea sonable suspicion exists. Id. at 124. In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part that Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority’s decision not to endorse either

of the per se rules that the parties advanced but disagreed with the majority that the officers had reasonable suspicion. See id. at 126-27 (Steve ns, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens noted that the State of Illinois had requested a bright-line rule that officers may stop anyone who flees from them, where as the defendant had asked for a- 28 -

holding that, by itself, unprovoked flight from off icers cannot justify a stop. See id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens opined that neither

per se rule was warranted because the term “‘[u]nprovoked flight[]’ . . . describes a category of activity too broad and varied to permit a per se reasonable inference regarding the motivation for the activity.” Id. at 136 (Stev ens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens pointed out that “there are unquestionably circumstances in which a person’s flight is suspicious, and undeniably ins tances in which a person runs for entirely innocent reasons.” Id. at 129 (Stevens, J., concur ring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). By way of illustration, Justice Stevens observed th at, “[a]mong some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is [] the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, ap art from any criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence.” Id. at 132 (S tevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). Justice St evens stated that, “[f]or such a person, unprovoked flight is neither ‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnorm al.’ Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to the police officers themselves, and ar e validated by law enforcement investigations into their own practices.” Id. at 1 32-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted). Justice S tevens opined that, “[a]ccordingly, the evidence supporting the reasonableness of these bel iefs is too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient.” Id. at 133-34 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent ing in part) (footnote omitted). That- 29 -

said, Justice Stevens stated that, “just as we do n ot require ‘scientific certainty’ for our commonsense conclusion that unprovoked flight can s ometimes indicate suspicious motives, neither do we require scientific certainty to conclude that unprovoked flight can occur for other, innocent reasons.” Id. at 135 (St evens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125) (footno te omitted). Accordingly, Justice Stevens explained, “[t]he prob ative force of the inferences to be drawn from flight is a function of the varied ci rcumstances in which it occurs.” Id. at 135 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated that this case-by-case analysis means that the inference from unprovoked flight will sometimes be “consistent with the presumption of innocence, some times [] justify further investigation, and sometimes [] justify an immediate stop[.]” Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens outlined seve ral factors that could affect the inference to be drawn from unprovoked flight from police: “th e time of day, the number of people in the area, the character of the neighborhood, whethe r the officer was in uniform, the way the runner was dressed, the direction and speed of the flight, and whether the person’s behavior was otherwise unusual[.]” Id. at 129-30 ( Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Applying the totality of the circumstances analysis , Justice Stevens, unlike the majority, found the facts insufficient to support r easonable suspicion. See id. at 137 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For Justice Stevens, the officer testimony was brief and not very informative, leadi ng to a conclusion that the defendant’s flight was not indicative of criminal activity. Se e id. at 137-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in- 30 -

part and dissenting in part). With our holding in this case, we do not overrule o r abrogate Wardlow’s application in Maryland. Supreme Court case law binds us, and we follow it. That said, we apply the Supreme Court’s holding in Wardlow as the language in the majority opinion and Justice Stevens’s opinion indicates it was intended to be a pplied: as a fact-based analysis of the totality of the circumstances, not a per se rule that unprovoked flight in a high-crime area always establishes reasonable suspicion. Indeed, t hat is how we have consistently applied Wardlow over the past two decades. Maryland Case Law after Wardlow In Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 344-45, 958 A.2d 356 , 358 (2008), we held that police

officers in the District of Columbia had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had committed a felony and that, accordingly, the o fficers did not violate the Maryland Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, under which a member of a law enforcement unit of another jurisdiction who enters Maryland in fresh pursuit o f a person believed to have committed a felony in the other jurisdiction may arrest the p erson. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.) § 2-305(a). The officers, identified as police by their jackets, approached a group of people who were drinking alco hol on a sidewalk in a high-crime

area in the District of Columbia near the border wi th Maryland. See Bost, 406 Md. at 346, 958 A.2d at 359. The defendant left the group, wal king briskly and clutching the right side of his waistband. See id. at 346, 958 A.2d at 359. Afterward, the defendant fled, and the officers chased him into Prince George’s County, st opped him, and found a pistol on him. See id. at 346, 958 A.2d at 359. We observed that it is a felony to carry a pistol without a- 31 -

license in the District of Columbia. See id. at 35 9, 958 A.2d at 367. We determined that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe th at the defendant possessed a gun because the defendant appeared to be clutching something at his waistband and engaged in unprovoked flight from officers in a high-crime are a known for drug trafficking. See id. at 359-60, 958 A.2d at 367. In Sizer, 456 Md. at 374-75, 174 A.3d at 340, we he ld that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, who fled after the officers approached a group of people who had been drinking alcohol in a parking lot, one of whom had thrown a bottle on the ground. We held that the trial court had erred in failing to undertake a totality of the circumstances analysis by determining that the defe ndant’s flight alone was not sufficient to establish probable cause. See id. at 361, 370, 174 A.3d at 332, 337. We observed that littering and consuming an alcoholic beverage in a parking lot are misdemeanors under State and local law, which the trial court had fail ed to take into account. See id. at 371-72,

174 A.3d at 338-39. We determined that the defenda nt’s “flight from the group as the officers approached to investigate probable crimes committed in their presence shifted their focus to [the defendant], which could have reasonab ly heightened their suspicion that he was the individual responsible for throwing the bot tle.” Id. at 372, 174 A.3d at 339. In other words, we explained that the defendant’s “fli ght obviously drew the officers’ attention and intensified the officers’ investigati on by shifting their focus from the group to him as an individual.” Id. at 372, 174 A.3d at 339. Although the officers characterized the area as a high-crime area, we did not take that testimony into account, noting that the officers did not “testify that they observed the gr oup demonstrating behavior consistent- 32 -

with the nature of the crimes that led them to conc lude that the” area was a high-crime area. Id. at 358, 371, 174 A.3d at 330, 338. To the extent that any language in the above cases indicates that Wardlow stands for the proposition that unprovoked flight in a hig h-crime area is automatically sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, this is an overreading of our case law and of the Supreme Court’s holding in Wardlow. Our language may have been somewhat imprecise in Bost, 406 Md. at 358, 958 A.2d at 366, when we stated that the Supreme Court “made clear that unprovoked flight is enough to sup port reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed.” (Citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124). Instead, the Supreme Court held in Wardlow that unprovoked flight is one facto r that may support a finding of reasonable suspicion in combination with other circ umstances—the Supreme Court has never held that unprovoked flight standing alone is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Significantly, the broadly worded state ment in Bost was not the basis for our reasonable suspicion conclusion. We concluded that reasonable suspicion existed in Bost based on the combination of the defendant’s flight, the high-crime area, and the officers’ observation that the defendant was clutching what t hey suspected was an illegal firearm. See Bost, 406 Md. at 359-60, 958 A.2d at 367. Similarly, in Sizer, 456 Md. at 370, 174 A.3d at 33 7, our analysis focused on the totality of the circumstances. We were unpersuaded by the trial court’s reliance on the defendant’s flight as a dispositive factor. See id . at 370, 174 A.3d at 337. We described Wardlow as addressing “the weight to be given unpro voked flight in a high crime area as one factor in the totality of the circumstances ana lysis.” Sizer, at 367, 174 A.3d at 336- 33 -

(citation omitted). Indeed, we held that, under a totality of the circumstances analysis, “an individual’s unprovoked flight or presence in a hig h crime area, or both, are individual factors that may contribute to the reasonable suspi cion calculus.” Id. at 367, 174 A.3d at 335-36 (citation omitted). Because these are facto rs that may support reasonable suspicion and are not “hard certainties,” it stands to reason that there can be times when unprovoked flight in a high-crime area does not “contribute to the . . . calculus.” Id. at 367, 174 A.3d at 335-36 (cleaned up). Fear of Law Enforcement Officers In general We have carefully considered the arguments raised b y Washington and amici and decline to establish a hard-and-fast rule that unpr ovoked flight from police officers in a high-crime area is always insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. Washington contends that finding unprovoked flight from the police while in a high-crime

area to be a sufficient basis to establish reasonab le suspicion is outdated and does not reflect the life experience of all people. More specifical ly, he argues that the inference that such flight is suggestive of guilt is inconsistent with legitimate reasons for innocent people, particularly young African American men, to flee fr om police. Washington states that African American people are disproportionately vict ims of police violence and are killed by police more than twice as often as their white p eers. According to Washington, young African American men and boys are especially at ris k. Washington asserts that African American “people are also disproportionately likely to be stopped, searched, and arrested by the police, and are more likely to be the subjec t of use of force.” (Citation omitted).- 34 -

In addition, Washington states that “constant expos ure to images of racialized police violence—usually, graphic videos—amplifies fear of the police.” Washington contends that images and footage from cell phones and body-w orn cameras shared via news outlets and social media make police violence against Afric an American people hyper-visible. Washington maintains that the fear of police is doc umented among African American people and is a natural reaction. Accordingly, Was hington argues that, taking these circumstances into account, flight from police shou ld be accorded less weight in the reasonable suspicion analysis unless accompanied by other facts showing consciousness of guilt. In Baltimore City Washington contends that in Baltimore City it is es pecially reasonable to fear police officers due to the city’s history of police discri mination, excessive force, and other misconduct. Washington links the death of Freddie Gray, Jr. to the history of police misconduct in the city, documented subsequently by the Department of Justice investigation into the Baltimore Police Department in 2015 and 2016. Washington observes that the Department of Justice investigati on concluded that “Baltimore police engaged in a pattern or practice of making unconsti tutional stops, searches, and arrests, discriminating against Black people in their enforc ement activities, and using unreasonable force.” (Citation omitted). Washington cites the investigation’s findings that the Baltimore Police Department routinely “uses overly aggressive tactics that unnecessarily escalate encounters, increase tensions, and lead to unnecess ary force” and “uses unreasonable force against people who present little or no threat to o fficers or others.” (Citation omitted).- 35 -

Washington also notes that the Baltimore Police Dep artment has entered into a consent decree with the Department of Justice to address th e problems documented in the investigation. Washington points to the indictment of members of t he Gun Trace Task Force as an example of the basis for fear that African American people in Baltimore have of police. Washington states that eight officers of the Gun Tr ace Task Force were charged under conspiracy and racketeering laws because the Task F orce for years had been “conducting illegal searches, planting evidence such as guns an d drugs, lying in sworn paperwork, and committing robberies and extortion—and worse.” (Fo otnotes omitted). Washington points out that the Gun Trace Task Force scandal, the Depa rtment of Justice investigation, and Freddie Gray, Jr.’s death received widespread atten tion in Baltimore, which he contends further affirmed fear of the police among some city residents, particularly African

American residents. 8 We have reviewed and considered Washington’s argum ents with care and do not take lightly his contentions. We are aware that th e Supreme Court has recognized that the totality of the circumstances analysis includes “in formation that is accessible to people

8 We received two amici curiae briefs from groups in support of Washington’s position. One group of amici notes that Washington’s brief provides a detailed recounting of incidents concerning the Baltimore Police Depart ment that were covered by the media. Amici contend, among other things, that Washington’s fli ght was “a reasonable effort to avoid contact with members of the same [police depa rtment] reported to have framed, robbed, and assaulted people who look like him.” T he second group of amici argues, among other things, that “Washington’s flight from Baltimore City police officers patrolling his neighborhood must be understood agai nst the backdrop of the Baltimore Police Department’s institutionalized and historica l police corruption and violence toward persons of color.” (Bolding omitted).- 36 -

generally,” whether members of the public or police officers. Kansas v. Glover, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1189-90 (2020). Such informa tion may include the particular history of police misconduct in Baltimore. This reality is part of the “factual and practical aspects of daily life” for all people. Trott, 473 Md. at 2 57, 249 A.3d at 840 (quoting Cartnail, 359 Md. at 286, 753 A.2d at 527). As a result, we reit erate that the circumstance that unprovoked flight may be consistent with innocence is a factor that a court may take into account in determining whether officers had reasona ble suspicion to detain a person, particularly a young African American man, such as Washington. In other words, the circumstance that people, particularly young Africa n American men, may flee police for innocent reasons may be considered in the Fourth Am endment reasonable suspicion

calculus. No Bright-Line Rule With all of the above having been considered, we do not establish a bright-line rule that unprovoked flight from police officers in a hi gh-crime area by any person or a person who is a member of any group is a factor that may n ever give rise to reasonable suspicion.

Nor do we establish a per se rule that unprovoked flight in a high-crime area w ill always equal reasonable suspicion. Rather, unprovoked fli ght is a factor to be considered and the circumstance that flight may have occurred for inno cent reasons, such as fear of police officers, may be considered. Whether unprovoked flight is to be considered a fac tor weighing in favor of reasonable suspicion and what weight to give it as a factor are factual determinations to be made on a case-by-case basis by the trial court. A lthough there is undoubtedly an increased- 37 -

awareness of police misconduct involving race-based violence, which may amplify fear of police officers in the African American community a nd in other communities, it is still as accurate today as it was when the Supreme Court iss ued Wardlow in 2000 that people flee from police officers for reasons associated with in volvement in criminal activity. That has not changed. With this reality, we cannot establis h a bright-line rule that eliminates unprovoked flight as a factor in the reasonable sus picion analysis. Instead, we reaffirm our commitment to the totality of the circumstances ana lysis. 9 Our holding applies not only to Baltimore City but also to all jurisdictions in Maryland. However, a court may give greater or les ser weight to the innocent reasons for flight based on where the incident occurs, because “[i]t is settled that the nature of the area is a factor in assessing reasonable suspicion.” Ho lt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 466, 78 A.3d 415, 428 (2013) (cleaned up). High-Crime Areas The State contends that Washington’s arguments rega rding the high-crime area

9 In reaffirming our commitment to the totality of th e circumstances test and that, as part of the analysis, a court may consider whether unprovoked flight is consistent with innocence, we do not abandon the concept that the s tandard by which reasonable suspicion is determined is an objective one. In the totality of the circumstances assessment, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an obje ctive standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate ?” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (cleaned up). As we stated in Sellman v. State, 449 Md. 526, 542, 144 A.3d 771, 781 (2016), the totality of the circumstances “test is objective: the validi ty of the stop or the frisk is not determined by the subjective or articulated reasons of the off icer; rather, the validity of the stop or frisk is determined by whether the record discloses artic ulable objective facts to support the stop or frisk.” (Cleaned up). As such, the totality of the circumstances assessment to determine the existence of reasonable articulable suspicion i s and remains an objective test.- 38 -

factor of the reasonable suspicion analysis—namely, Washington’s argument that the label “high-crime area” is used by police officers as a “ proxy for race and caste”—are not preserved as the arguments were not raised in the c ircuit court, the Appellate Court o Maryland, or the petition for a writ of certiorari . First, the State oversimplifies Washington’s argument. On brief in this Court, Was hington contends that relying on a person’s presence in a high-crime area as a factor to evaluate reasonable suspicion is problematic because “there is no standard for what constitutes a ‘high-crime area,’ either with respect to the measure of the level of crime r elative to that elsewhere, with respect to what types of crime are significant, or with respec t to limitations on the scope of the geographic area.” Next, the State has the burden to demonstrate that an officer has reasonable articulable suspicion for a stop. See State v. Car ter, 472 Md. 36, 55, 244 A.3d 1041, 1052 (2021). Warrantless searches and seizures are pres umptively per se unreasonable under

the Fourth Amendment and the burden is on the State to provide justification for the departure from the warrant requirement. See id. at 55, 244 A.3d at 1052. To the extent that a location is alleged to be a high-crime area and this is a factor purported to support a Terry stop, the State has the burden to establish t hat this is so. In this case, Washington has preserved a challenge as to whether the State h as done so. In Maryland, we have not had occasion to explore th e intricacies of what constitutes a high-crime area. Of course, we follow the preced ent of Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, that when a stop occurs in a high-crime area, the locati on is “among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Sizer 456 Md. at 368, 174 A.3d at 336. Further, the- 39 -

description of an area as a high-crime area must be based on objective and specific facts, like any factor in the totality of the circumstance s analysis. See id. at 366, 174 A.3d at 335. In Sizer, id. at 356, 358, 374-75, 174 A.3d at 329- 30, 340, we reversed the trial

court’s determination that officers did not have re asonable suspicion to stop the defendant after he fled as officers approached a group of peo ple who had been drinking alcohol in a parking lot near the Owen Brown Village Center, one of whom had thrown a bottle on the ground. The State’s argument for reasonable suspic ion rested, in part, on the contention that the defendant was stopped in a high-crime area . See id. at 358, 174 A.3d at 330. At the suppression hearing, two officers testified tha t the Owen Brown Village Center was a “‘high’ or ‘higher crime area’” due to high rates o f calls for service. Id. at 359, 174 A.3d at 330-31. Officers also testified that recently t here had been a series of robberies at the Owen Brown Village Center and a report, the day bef ore the stop of defendant, of a person wielding a handgun in the area leading up to the Ow en Brown Village Center. See id. at 358-59, 174 A.3d at 331. “ None of the officers testified that they believed t he group was connected to the ‘ongoing robbery series,’ or that they suspected any member of the group was the individual who had displayed a gun on the p revious night.” Id. at 360, 174 A.3d

at 332. We expressed skepticism that the defendant was in a high-crime area, but did not

make a determination on the issue because we saw th e misdemeanors committed in the presence of the officers in combination with the de fendant’s flight as sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion. See id. at 371, 174 A.3d at 338. We noted the lack of evidence at the suppression hearing to establish that the parki ng lot where the defendant and the group- 40 -

stood “was located in the Owen Brown Village Center ” or the parking lot’s proximity “to the Owen Brown Village Center or the area where the handgun violation had occurred.” Id. at 370, 174 A.3d at 337-38. Rather, we stated that one officer had testified that the parking lot was not part of the Owen Brown Village Center and that he had observed a person in the defendant’s group who was banned from the Owen Brown Village Center and watched to see whether the individual attempted to enter the location that he was banned from. See id. at 370, 174 A.3d at 338. We explained that this would support an inference that the parking lot was not in the Owen Brown Village Center, the high-crime area in question. See id. at 370, 174 A.3d at 338. Nor did we see any evidence linking the defendant or his group, specifically or generally, to the Owen Brown Village Center. See id. at 370-71, 174 A.3d at 338. We found significant the fact that the officers did not testify “that they observed the group demonstrating behavior consistent with the na ture of the crimes that led them to conclude that the Village Center was a high crime a rea.” Id. at 371, 174 A.3d at 338. Our skepticism was heightened by the fact that none of the officers testified that they suspected the group or defendant of being connected to the ha ndgun report and that no testimony established the proximity of the location associate d with the handgun report to the group and defendant’s location. See id. at 371, 174 A.3d at 338. In a separate opinion, the Honorable Sally D. Adkin s delved further into our precedent on high-crime areas: Whether an activity occurs in a high crime area can inform a police officer’s analysis about the activity that is taking place. Bailey v. State , 412 Md. 349, 383-84, 987 A.2d 72 (2010). A suspect need not be connected to previous- 41 -

crimes in the area, Holt v. State , 435 Md. 443, 466, 78 A.3d 415 (2013), but the nature of the area is relevant to reasonable su spicion when the suspect’s activities appear to be the kind of criminal activi ty that is likely to be occurring there. A generalized description of an a rea as “high crime,” without a greater connection to the observed activi ties, does not support reasonable suspicion. See Bailey , 412 Md. at 384, 987 A.2d 72. Other Maryland cases addressing Terry stops in high crime areas demonstrate that the nexus between the nature of the area and the ob served activities is significant in determining whether officers had rea sonable suspicion. See Chase v. State , 449 Md. 283, 289, 144 A.3d 630 (2016) (detaining individuals for suspicion of drug trafficking based on behavior in area known for drug trafficking); Cox v. State , 161 Md. App. 654, 671-74, 871 A.2d 647 (2005) (individual suspected o f drug dealing had been warned away from intersection known for heroin traf ficking earlier, when officers saw him again, he fled, committing a traff ic infraction); Wise v. State , 132 Md. App. 127, 134, 751 A.2d 24 (2000) (suspec t’s actions in neighborhood known for drug trafficking coupled wit h flight after seeing officers justified investigatory detention). Sizer, 456 Md. at 380-81, 174 A.3d at 343-44 (Adkin s, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original). Judge Adkins related three factors used by federal appellate courts to assist in assessing whether areas are high-crime and their relation to reasonable suspicion under Wardlow and Terry, as set forth in United Sta tes v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2007). See Sizer, 456 Md. at 381, 174 A.3d at 344 (Adkins, J., concurring and dissenting). A court considers “the nexus between the type of crime most prevalent or common in the area and the type of crime suspected in the instant case”; the “limited geographic boundaries of the area”; and the “tempor al proximity between evidence of heightened criminal activity and the date of the st op or search at issue[.]” Id. at 381, 174 A.3d at 344 (Adkins, J., concurring and dissenting) (cleaned up). Judge Adkins applied these factors to conclude that, in Sizer, the State failed to prove that the Owen Brown Village Center was a high-crime area. See Sizer, 45 6 Md. at 381, 174 A.3d at 345 (Adkins,- 42 -

J., concurring and dissenting). For Judge Adkins, this was a conclusion that the majority “seem[ed] poised to reach, but then abandon[ed].” Id. at 381, 174 A.3d at 344 (Adkins, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted). “In creased calls for service and concerned business owners[,]” as described in officer testimo ny, were insufficient to support a conclusion that the area was a high-crime area. Id . at 381-82, 174 A.3d at 344 (Adkins, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted). Jud ge Adkins concluded that the “series of

robberies at unknown locations and times” and the h andgun report were not specific enough to establish that the defendant was in a hig h-crime area. Id. at 382, 174 A.3d at 344 (Adkins, J., concurring and dissenting). Echoi ng the majority’s observation that the defendant and group were not “demonstrating behavio r consistent with the nature of the crimes that led [police] to conclude that” the Owen Brown Village Center was a high-crime area, id. at 371, 174 A.3d at 338, Judge Adkins con cluded that, even if the area were highcrime, without a nexus between the other crimes and the activity arousing the officers’ suspicion, the high-crime area was not relevant to the reasonable suspicion analysis, see id. at 382, 174 A.3d at 344-45 (Adkins, J., concurring and dissenting). Our cases involving police stops of individuals in high-crime areas have usually been more like Bost, 406 Md. at 359-60, 958 A.2d at 367, 10 in which we held that police

10 For example, in Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 359, 361, 383-84, 987 A.2d 72, 78- 79, 93 (2010), a case in which the trial court “gav e ‘great weight’ to the fact that the petitioner was standing in a high drug crime area, where the police had received ‘a number of complaints from citizens’” based on the testimon y of the apprehending police officer, we acknowledged “the fact that activity is taking p lace in a high drug crime area can inform the police officer’s analysis about the nature of a ctivity taking place[,]” although we reversed the trial court’s judgment because the def endant’s presence in a high-crime area,- 43 -

officers in the District of Columbia had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had committed a felony based on his unprovoked flig ht from police in a high-crime area while clutching what officers suspected was a handg un. The trial court described the area where the incident occurred as “a drug trafficking area known to the police department in the District of Columbia.” Bost, 406 Md. at 347, 9 58 A.2d at 359. Various officers testified that they were patrolling on the block where they e ncountered the defendant “as part of a Focus Mission Unit targeting street level narcotics and firearm recovery in high crime areas.” Id. at 346, 958 A.2d at 359. More critica l to our analysis was that the defendant had fled police, while appearing to try to conceal a weapon in his waistband. See id. at 360, 958 A.2d at 367. The dissent in Bost, id. at 365-66, 958 A.2d at 370-71 (Bell, C.J., dissenting), expressed skepticism about the “buzzwo rd[]” “high crime area,” but focused on the lack of reasonable suspicion that the defend ant was involved in felonious criminal activity, as required under the statute in question , rather than more generalized wrongdoing. Our case law supports the conclusion that testimony from police officers concerning a location being a high-crime area has been suffici ent to allow a trial court to consider the high-crime nature of the location in determining th e existence of reasonable suspicion for a stop. That we have not had occasion to more full y develop the necessary level of specificity of such testimony appears to result fro m lack of contention over a given area’s high-crime status. In Mayo v. United States, 266 A.3d 244, 250 (D.C. 2 022), a case relied upon by

smelling of ether, a legal substance associated wit h PCP, and his failure to respond to an officer did not create probable cause for arrest. (Citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274).- 44 -

Washington, a court in another judication discussed the significance of a police officer’s testimony concerning a high-crime area in conductin g a reasonable suspicion analysis. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that off icers lacked reasonable suspicion for a stop and concluded that an officer’s testimony abou t a high-crime area did not add much value to the analysis. See Mayo, 266 A.3d at 250, 267. The testimony referred to an area by name as a high-crime area, but there was no test imony with respect to the area’s boundaries and no details regarding the nature or q uantity of alleged drug activity and no details about how guns had been detected or recover ed. See id. at 267-68. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s assessment of the officer’s testimony as “conclusory” and “lacking specificity[.]” Id. a t 267. 11 In this case, however, testimony from the detective s, who were familiar with the area, was particularized and specific in a way that the testimony in Mayo was not. The testimony of Detective Lopez was particularly speci fic, given that he described the area as “[v]ery violent” and testified that he had handled “a couple of homicide shootings and

11 On October 27, 2022, a week before oral argument in this case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals granted the government’s petition for rehearing en banc in Mayo and vacated the opinion in the case. See Land on R. Mayo v. United States, No. 18- CF-1132, ___ A.3d ___, 2022 WL 16646150, at *1 (D.C . Oct. 27, 2022). We are unable to discern the specific reasons for which the Distr ict of Columbia Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en banc . However, in dissent, one member of the three-jud ge panel in Mayo, 266 A.3d at 272, 275-79 (McLeese, J., dissenting) d isagreed with the majority’s conclusion that there was not reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, taking issue with the majority’s evaluation of the record, the weight giv en to the defendant’s flight, including the characterization of it as provoked, and the wei ght given to an officer’s testimony about the high-crime area. Because, here, Washington’s f light was clearly unprovoked and the high-crime area testimony was much more specific, a ny outcome of the rehearing would not change our analysis.- 45 -

robberies in the area[.]” Even more specifically, Detective Lopez testified that he had seized approximately 10 to 15 handguns on the speci fic block of Oakmont Avenue where Washington was stopped within a three-month period in the last year. Detective Rodriguez testified that the area was kno wn for shootings and robberies and that he had worked those types of crimes in the area. Detective Rodriguez identified the area in question, the 3700 block of Oakmont Ave nue, as a high-crime area. Similarly,

Detective Noesi testified: “We know that area is on e of the areas that has high crime and [a] large amount of individuals selling and distrib uting narcotics.” Although Detective Noesi initially described the entire neighborhood o f Park Heights as a high-crime area, he later limited his description to a more specific ge ographic location: “areas of Reisterstown [Road] and side streets[,]” including Cordelia and Oakmont Avenues, where the incident in question took place. Detective Noesi testified that the “areas of Reisterstown [Road] and side streets[,]” including Cordelia and Oakmont Avenues, had “high crime and [a] large amount of individuals selling and distributin g narcotics”; as such, this was not the description of a general area, without boundaries, as discussed in Mayo, 266 A.3d at 267-

68. In our view, the reasonable suspicion analysis requ ires support from specific facts such that testimony concerning a location being a h igh-crime area must be particularized as to the location or geographic area at issue, the criminal activity known to occur in the area, and the temporal proximity of the criminal ac tivity known to occur in the area to the time of the stop. Testimony must identify a locati on or geographic area, not an overly broad region, and particular criminal activity occu rring in the not-too-distant past, to- 46 -

support the conclusion that the location is indeed a high-crime area. Additionally, the conduct giving rise to officers’ suspicions must no t be inconsistent with the nature of the crimes alleged to establish the high-crime area. S ee Sizer, 456 Md. at 371, 174 A.3d at

338. 12 Such considerations were satisfied by the testimony in this case. The geographical area was not overly broad, as the detectives’ testi mony was focused on the area of Reisterstown Road, and Cordelia and Oakmont Avenues

. Detective Lopez’s testimony was even more specific, regarding the exact block o n which Washington was stopped. This specificity extended to the nature of the criminal activity as Detective Lopez described seizing approximately 10 to 15 handguns on the bloc k over a three-month period in the prior year. Likewise, Detective Rodriguez testified that the area was known for shootings and robberies and that he was aware of those types of crimes in the area. In addition, Detectives Rodriguez and Lopez were partners and ha d been part of the Northwest District Action Team, Detective Rodriguez for approximately five months prior to Washington’s stop and Detective Lopez for approximately two year s prior to the suppression hearing. Detective Rodriguez testified that members of the A ction Team had been assigned to patrol high-crime areas, which included the 3700 block of Oakmont Avenue. The testimony by the police officers in this case w as particularized enough to establish the existence of a high-crime area as a f actor supporting reasonable suspicion for

12 These considerations are similar but not identical to the factors cited by Judge Adkins in her concurring and dissenting opinion in Sizer, 456 Md. at 381, 174 A.3d at 345 (Adkins, J., concurring and dissenting).- 47 -

Washington’s stop. This is not a case in which the re was conflicting evidence regarding the high-crime nature of an area or that otherwise requires us to resolve the “problematic implications” or “usefulness” of this factor in a r easonable suspicion analysis, as aptly noted by the Appellate Court of Maryland in its dec ision. Washington, 2022 WL 873315,

at *6-7. Additional Case Law from Other Jurisdictions Courts in other jurisdictions have recently address ed flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis. In Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 336 (Mass. 2016), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. In Warren, an off icer in a marked police vehicle saw the defendant and another African American man walking near a park in Boston and believed that they matched the general description provided by the victim of a burglary earlier that night. See id. at 336-37. The officer told the tw o men to “wait a minute[,]” and the men saw the officer, turned, and jogged into the park. Id. at 337. Upon the two men leaving the park, two other officers tried to stop them, bu t the defendant (one of the men) ran back into the park and clutched the side of his pants. See id. Officers eventually detained the defendant and found a gun near him. See id. at 337 -38. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts conclud ed that reasonable suspicion was not generated by the victim’s description of th e burglars, the proximity of the park where the men were walking to the victim’s home, th e lack of other pedestrians in the area, and the defendant’s flight. See id. at 339-43. Ad dressing the latter circumstance, the Court determined that flight as a factor in the reasonabl e suspicion analysis could not be separated- 48 -

from recent findings in a report that the Boston Po lice Department had engaged in a pattern of racial profiling of African American men. See i d. at 342. The Court observed that the study, based on data from the police department, re vealed that in Boston, police were more likely to target African American men for “stops, f risks, searches, observations, and interrogations” as well as “disproportionally targe t[ them] for repeat police encounters.” Id. (footnotes omitted). The Court determined that these findings suggested that “flight is not necessarily probative of a suspect’s state of m ind or consciousness of guilt.” Id. The Court reaffirmed “flight as a factor in the reasona ble suspicion analysis[,]” but concluded that, given this reality, “a judge should, in appro priate cases, consider the report’s findings in weighing flight as a factor in the reasonable su spicion calculus.” Id. In United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that of ficers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. In that case, a 911 caller rep orted an African American man with a gun in a Seattle YWCA and relayed a description of the man. See id. An officer in a patrol vehicle responded to the 911 call and saw the defen dant, who matched the description. See id. The officer activated the emergency lights and drove after the defendant, who fled. See id. Ultimately, officers stopped the defendant and found a gun and drugs on him. See id.

at 1152-53. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “the totality of t he circumstances [did] not add up to enough: no reliable tip, no reasonable inference of criminal behavior, no police initiative to investigate a particular crime in an identified high crime area, and flight without any previous attempt to talk to the suspect.” Id. at 1 157. The Ninth Circuit stated that when- 49 -

“evaluating flight as a basis for reasonable suspic ion, [it could not] totally discount the issue of race” because of how “uneven” policing pra ctices can affect innocent people’s

reaction to law enforcement. Id. at 1156. The Nin th Circuit observed that, since Wardlow, awareness of “racial disparities in policing” had i ncreased, resulting in part from greater “availability of information and data on police pra ctices.” Brown, 925 F.3d at 1156 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit observed tha t the Seattle Police Department was the subject of a report by the Department of Justice co ncerning excessive force and racially discriminatory policing, as well as a consent decre e. See id. at 1156 n.2. The Ninth Circuit determined that such data could not replace Wardlow ’s “commonsense judgments and

inferences about human behavior” standard in the re asonable suspicion analysis, but could

“inform the inferences to be drawn” from an individ ual’s flight from police. Brown, 925 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, and citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit explained that it was “particularly hesitant to all ow flight to carry the day in authorizing a stop” “when every other fact posited by the governm ent weighs so weakly in support of reasonable suspicion[.]” Id. at 1157. Notably, th e Ninth Circuit did not abandon flight as a factor that could weigh in favor of establishing reasonable suspicion and acknowledged that “flight may be suggestive of wrongdoing[.]” Id. (emphasis in original). In People v. Horton, 142 N.E.3d 854, 857-58, as mod ified on denial of reh’g (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 18, 2019), the Appellate Court of Ill inois held that an officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant. In that case, two o fficers in an unmarked police vehicle passed a house in Chicago, where two people were on the porch and the defendant was- 50 -

standing in front of them with a metallic object in his waistband. See id. at 859. The officers exited the vehicle, and the defendant turn ed and rushed inside the house. See id. The officers went inside, found the defendant crouc hing next to a bed, and found a handgun

under the mattress. See id. The Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe that the defendant possessed a gun , let alone that such possession was criminal. See id. at 857-58. Addressing the defen dant’s flight, the Court determined that it could not “ignore the well-documented, reasonabl e, and noncriminal impulse to avoid interactions with police” and that the Court was “m indful of the reluctance of black men interacting with police[.]” Id. at 858. The Court observed that, like the Massachusetts Sup reme Judicial Court in Warren, it had the benefit of a report on policing in the m ost populous city in the state. See Horton, 142 N.E.3d at 868. Specifically, the Appellate Cou rt of Illinois quoted a report by the Department of Justice “finding reasonable cause to believe that the Chicago Police Department had engaged in a ‘pattern or practice’ o f unreasonable force, and that this practice, even when citizens are physically unharme d, leads to ‘fear and distrust’ from citizens.” Id. (citation omitted). The Appellate Court of Illinois noted that this mistreatment was not colorblind, as African America n and Latino residents in particular expressed that Chicago police “assume that they are the perpetrators of crime and unfairly target them.” Id. (cleaned up). According to the report, Chicago police at times “intentionally stop their cars and open the door to see if anyone runs; if they do, the officers give chase.” Id. (citation omitted). The Appellat e Court of Illinois stated that this was- 51 -

evidence of what “the Supreme Court of Massachusett s feared—‘the police could turn a hunch into a reasonable suspicion by inducing the [ flight] justifying the suspicion.’” Id. (quoting Warren, 58 N.E.3d at 341) (alteration in o riginal). The Appellate Court of Illinois clarified that it was not addressing the motives of the officers in Horton, but rather discussed Warren and the Department of Justice repo rt “to highlight that an eminently reasonable and noncriminal reason explains [the def endant]’s actions after seeing the police.” Horton, 142 N.E.3d at 868. The Appellate Court of Illinois reiterated that flight from police can establish reasonable suspicion in c ombination with other factors indicating “suspicious or illegal behavior.” Horton, 142 N.E. 3d at 867 (citations omitted). 13 In this case, although we reach a conclusion simila r to that of courts from other

13 In United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 536, 538-3 9 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit held that the totality of the factors consi dered by the trial court failed to support a conclusion that police had reasonable suspicion to detain a defendant prior to his attempted flight. Police officers approached a group of men in a parking lot at night in a high-crime area, after the police had followed one man there f rom a gas station. See id. at 534-35. The defendant, an African American man, was among t he group and offered his identification card to an officer, who did not retu rn the card as he continued to obtain identification information from the group. See id. at 534-36. When the defendant acted nervously and attempted to walk away, he was told t hat he was not free to leave, and police ultimately chased him and discovered a handgun in h is possession, illegally. See id. at 536. Determining that the defendant was seized at the ti me his identification was retained, the Fourth Circuit concluded that reasona ble suspicion had to exist at that moment, not when the defendant acted nervous and wa s told that he could not leave. See id. at 538-39. The Fourth Circuit concluded that t he factors the trial court outlined—“an individual’s presence at a gas station; prior arres t history of another individual; lawful possession and display of a firearm by another; [th e defendant]’s submission of his ID showing an out-of-district address to [an officer], all of which occurred in a high crime area at night”—failed to establish reasonable suspicion. Id. at 539. The Fourth Circuit stated that, to “conclude that mere presence in a high cri me area at night is sufficient justification for detention by law enforcement is to accept carte blanche the implicit assertion that Fourth Amendment protections are reserved only for a certain race or class of people.” Id. at 542.- 52 -

jurisdictions with respect to flight in the reasona ble suspicion analysis where unprovoked flight occurs in a high-crime area—namely, that unp rovoked flight under the circumstances of the case may be considered as a factor in the an alysis—we arrive at a different outcome

than the courts in the cases above. In other words , we agree that, when undertaking a reasonable suspicion analysis, a trial court may co nsider whether a defendant’s flight was consistent with innocence when unprovoked flight is alleged to be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion for a stop. As detailed below , however, under the circumstances of this case, taking into account the evidence establi shed at the suppression hearing, we conclude that Officer Rodriguez had reasonable susp icion to detain Washington.

Applying the Principles Above to This Case Applying the principles discussed above to the circ umstances of this case leads to the conclusion that Detective Rodriguez had reasona ble suspicion to stop Washington. The nature and circumstances of Washington’s unprovokedflight in a location that was a highcrime area lead us to this conclusion. In this cas e, at the sight of officers who were a distance away from him in a car as he was standing in an alley, Washington fled, headlong, completely unprovoked, simultaneously with the othe r individual standing near him in the alley, fled other officers in a different car , jumped fences, and attempted to conceal himself

behind a bush to elude the officers. Washington not only fled at the mere sight of Detec tives Noesi and Winkey, but also fled when he spotted Detectives Rodriguez and Lopez. Washington first took unprovoked, headlong flight from Detectives Noesi a nd Winkey, when he saw them in a police car on the street as he stood in an alley wi th another person. He then engaged in- 53 -

unprovoked, headlong flight from Detectives Lopez a nd Rodriguez, when he saw them in a vehicle as he was fleeing from Detectives Noesi a nd Winkey. As he fled, Washington took additional evasive maneuvers when he jumped a fence and attempted to hide behind

a bush. He fled a third time when he realized that trying to hide behind a bush was insufficient, and jumped another fence, with Detect ive Rodriguez stopping him thereafter. To be sure, a key tenet of the Fourth Amendment’s p rotections is that a person who is not involved in criminal activity “has a right t o ignore the police and go about his business.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (citation omit ted). Without more, such avoidance cannot be the basis for reasonable suspicion. See id. Unprovoked, headlong flight is a different matter, though, which may allow an infere nce of suspicion. See id. at 124-25. The term “headlong” means “without deliberation[,] recklessly[,]” “without pause or delay[,]” and “lacking in calmness or restraint[.]” Headlong , Merriam-Webster (2022), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/headlong [https://perma.cc/SE5X-BBAU] (capitalization omitted). Thus, headlong flight is reckless, without deliberation or delay, flight lacking in calmness or restraint. In Wardlo w, 528 U.S. at 124, the Supreme Court stated that its cases had “also recognized that ner vous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flig ht—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily in dicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” (Citations omitted). In othe r words, context matters. Just as a bulge in a person’s clothing has different implications f or a reasonable suspicion analysis depending on “where it is, what it looks like, or t he circumstances surrounding its observation[,]” Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 107, 816 A.2d 901, 906 (2003), the nature- 54 -

and circumstances surrounding flight from police ma ke a difference. We agree with the State that “‘headlong’ implies th at the defendant was not simply leaving the area in a reasonable manner to passivel y avoid the police and go about one’s business but, rather, the defendant was actively evading the police in a rapid, frantic, or suspicious manner.” (Emphasis in original) (citati ons omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 323 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2003) (The United States Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendant’s “flight was particularly suspicious because of its nature and its duration” when “[h]e ran away at full speed as soon as he saw

the officers” rather than “turn and start to walk a way” or otherwise “act like he was going about his business” and described such flight as “‘ headlong’ flight[.]”); United States v. Smith, 633 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2011) (The Unite d States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit concluded that an officer’s determination t hat the defendant’s “sudden flight was suggestive of wrongdoing was reasonable” where the defendant “was in a high-crime neighborhood during the events in question, [the of ficer] clearly identified himself as a police officer, and [the defendant] burst into head long flight for no other reason than to evade” the officer.). Compare United States v. Val entine, 232 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2000) (The United States Court of Appeals for the Third C ircuit stated that “[w]alking away from the police hardly amounts to the headlong flight co nsidered in Wardlow [.]”). That avoiding contact with a police officer may offer little to n othing in a reasonable suspicion assessment does not mean that unprovoked, headlong flight is o f equally limited relevance in a reasonable suspicion analysis. Washington’s unprov oked, headlong flight from police officers along with his other maneuvers were acts o f evasion that contributed to a finding- 55 -

of reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. In evaluating whether Washington’s flight supports a finding of reasonable suspicion for a stop, we also cannot overlook that he and a second person fled. Both Washington and the person who had been standing in an alley with him immediately fled at the same time upon noticing a police car. To co nstrue this circumstance as consistent with innocence and not a factor weighing in favor o f supporting reasonable suspicion of criminal activity would require a conclusion that t wo people who saw a marked police car at the same moment, concurrently experienced fear o f the officers in the car at the same time, and simultaneously decided that innocent flig ht was the best alternative. Equally significant is the circumstance that Washin gton fled purely upon seeing Detectives Noesi and Winkey driving by. There is n o indication in the record that the detectives took any action toward Washington, such as attempting to approach him, or that Washington had any particular familiarity with the officers that would have caused him to flee. The same observations can be made with respe ct to Detectives Lopez and Rodriguez when Washington saw them. Even when we consider in the analysis the possibility that Washington may have feared the police due to an inc reased public awareness of officers having mistreated citizens, the facts remain that W ashington engaged in serial unprovoked, headlong flight, took evasive maneuvers, and attemp ted to conceal himself after merely seeing officers drive by. There was no provocation or even a suggestion that the detectives were going to initiate contact with Washington. In both Bost and Sizer, defendants fled after police officers approached them, and we credi ted such unprovoked flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis. See Bost, 40 6 Md. at 359-60, 958 A.2d at 367; Sizer,- 56 -

456 Md. at 371, 174 A.3d at 338. In this case, bec ause the detectives, initially, did not even stop their vehicle, much less approach Washing ton, we conclude that the unprovoked nature of the flight weighs more heavily in favor o f reasonable suspicion in this case than the flight in cases such as Bost and Sizer, in whic h officers initially attempted to approach

a defendant. That the unprovoked, headlong flight took place in a high-crime area supports the existence of reasonable suspicion. The officers’ t estimony at the suppression hearing was not only specific as to the crimes that had occurre d in the particular area where the stop occurred, but also anchored the criminal activity t o a time relatively recent to the stop. The officers’ testimony concerning the nature of the cr imes that had occurred in the area was not vague, nor was the nature of the crimes inconsi stent with Washington’s conduct. This is not a case in which it can be said that the appe llation “high-crime area” was used by a police officer simply to justify a stop. Certainly, as Detective Noesi acknowledged on cross -examination, many people who live in this particular high-crime area are not involved in drug activity. And such residents may have occasion to run down alleys from time to time. But the circumstances surrounding Washington’s stop are not so commonplac e or ordinary as to make them nonprobative of criminal activity, as, for example, th e facts were in Cartnail, 359 Md. at 291, 753 A.2d at 530, a case in which we indicated that the facts offered in support of reasonable suspicion did not tend to “eliminate a substantial portion of innocent” people. (Quoting Ferris, 355 Md. at 387, 735 A.2d at 507). It is we ll established that the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is a low bar. Under the circumstances of this case, Washington’s- 57 -

unprovoked, headlong flight at the sight of police officers, his evasive actions, and his attempt to conceal himself, along with evidence est ablishing that this occurred in a highcrime area, were sufficient to clear it. Applying the factors discussed by Justice Stevens i n his opinion in Wardlow leads us to the same conclusion. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. a t 129-30 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Of course, “[t]he ti me of day,” early afternoon on a Thursday in July, does not enhance the suspiciousness of Was hington’s flight. Id. at 129 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). No r does “the way the [person] was dressed,” as no facts or inferences indicate that Washington’ s clothing was suspicious. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On the other hand, “the number of people in the area” supports an inference that Washington’s f light was suspicious because it eliminates the inference that he was running from s omeone other than police officers, as no one else was around, aside from the other person in the alley, whose simultaneous flight, as discussed above, supports a greater degree of su spicion. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In this case, all of the officers were in uniform, and the initial flight was from a marked police car, which weighs a gainst an innocent inference, particularly given that the officers initially made no attempt to approach Washington. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). “[T]he character of the neighborhood,” “the direction and speed of the flig ht, and whether the person’s behavior

was otherwise unusual” all contribute to make Washi ngton’s unprovoked flight a factor that weighs in favor of establishing reasonable sus picion rather than an innocent occurrence. Id. at 129-30 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).- 58 -

In closing, we caution that our conclusion in this case is a highly fact-specific outcome, as the result of such analyses must always be. On the specific facts of this case— Washington’s unprovoked, headlong flight and his ot her evasive maneuvers in a highcrime area—the totality of the circumstances suppor ted reasonable suspicion for the officers to stop him and investigate further.

II. Article 26

The Parties’ Contentions Washington contends that the stop violated Article 26 and that the violation requires exclusion of the handgun. Washington acknowledges that this Court has never held that Article 26 provides greater protection than the Fou rth Amendment or adopted an independent exclusionary rule for evidence seized i n violation of Article 26. Washington argues that we should take both such actions in lig ht of an increased public awareness of police misconduct across the country in general and in Maryland in particular. The State responds that we should decline to expand our interpretation of Article 26. The State contends that the Fourth Amendment p rovides ample protection against unreasonable seizures. The State argues that expan ding Article 26 for the reasons requested would be bad policy because officers cann ot take a person’s race and subjective lived experience into account when determining whet her they have reasonable suspicion. Finally, the State asserts that this case would be a poor vehicle for an expansion of Article 26 because Washington’s behavior was objectively un usual and suspicious. Analysis As Washington recognizes, we interpret Article 26 in pari materia with the Fourth- 59 -

Amendment, meaning that the protections under Artic le 26 are coextensive with those under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Whittington v. State, 474 Md. 1, 23 n.17, 252 A.3d 529, 542 n.17 (2021); King v. State, 434 Md. 4 72, 482, 76 A.3d 1035, 1041 (2013); Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 506, 864 A.2d 100 6, 1019 (2004). 14 As we stated nearly a decade ago, “[a]lthough we have asserted that Art icle 26 may have a meaning independent of the Fourth Amendment, we have not he ld, to date, that it provides greater protection against state searches than its federal kin. Rather, we rejected uniformly such assertions.” King, 434 Md. at 483, 76 A.3d at 1041 (citations omitted). Additionally, “never have we concluded explicitly and with clarit y that an exclusionary rule, permitting the suppression of [] evidence as a remedy for an a lleged Article 26 violation, exists under our state constitutional law.” Id. at 483, 76 A.3d at 1042 (citations omitted). In King, id. at 484, 76 A.3d at 1042, we pointed out that granti ng the defendant “the relief he [sought] under Article 26 would require both a departure fro m our traditional interpretation of the bounds of Article 26, as well as the adoption of a state law-based exclusionary rule.” We declined to do so and reiterated that, “in construi ng Article 26, decisions of the Supreme Court are entitled to great respect.” Id. at 484, 76 A.3d at 1042 (cleaned up).

14 Our holding in Leidig v. State, 475 Md. 181, 241, 2 56 A.3d 870, 905 (2021), concerning the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, is not instructive here. In Leidig, we departed from our historical stance that the State and federal provis ions were to be read in pari materia because we needed to provide “clarity and predictab ility[,]” as the Supreme Court had reached an unresolved “impasse concerning what make s a scientific report testimonial under the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 236, 241, 256 A .3d at 902, 905. No corresponding impasse or lack of clarity exists with respect to t he Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.- 60 -

We do the same here. We see no necessary reason to engraft onto our State Constitution a deviation from the Supreme Court’s F ourth Amendment precedent regarding the totality of the circumstances analysi s to be used when assessing whether reasonable suspicion exists. Where, as in this cas e, a defendant engages in unprovoked, headlong flight from officers and other evasive con duct in an area established to be a highcrime area, factors exist that, when considered tog ether, can suffice to meet the low bar for justifying a Terry stop. The same result would not necessarily occur if any of the circumstances were lacking— e.g. , where the defendant does not flee but simply walk s away, or where the area is not established to be a high-crime area. As discussed above in Part I, when weighing the imp ort of a defendant’s flight, the totality of the circumstances may include considera tion of the circumstance that unprovoked flight may occur for innocent reasons, i ncluding those associated with fear of police officers. If the other factors surrounding an officer’s stop weigh “weakly in support of reasonable suspicion,” as the Ninth Circuit obse rved in Brown, 925 F.3d at 1157, a trial court may rightly be “hesitant to allow flight to c arry the day in authorizing a stop.” Our Fourth Amendment cases reveal that we do not shy aw ay from tossing out “thin gruel” when the facts relied on by the State to justify a Terry stop “do not constitute ingredients that are sufficiently potent . . . to enrich the po rridge to the constitutionally required consistency of reasonable suspicion.” Crosby, 408 Md. at 513, 970 A.2d at 907. Having affirmed the continued validity of the const ruction of Article 26 in pari

materia with the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that, in th is case, Detective Rodriguez did not violate Washington’s rights under either th e Fourth Amendment or Article 26.- 61 - JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 420234003 Argued: November 3, 2022 IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND*

No. 15 September Term, 2022

TYRIE WASHINGTON

v. STATE OF MARYLAND

Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves,

JJ.

Dissenting Opinion by Hotten, J.

Filed: December 19, 2022

* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the vot ers of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.I respectfully dissent. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v.

Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000), and this Court’s prior decisions have held that unprovoked flight or presence in a high-crime area are merely factors that may contribute to the reasonable suspicion analysis, ra ther than a bright-line rule. In all circumstances, reasonable suspicion must be support ed by an articulable factual basis that “criminal activity is afoot.” Crosby v. State , 408 Md. 490, 505-06, 970 A.2d 894, 903 (2009) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 17, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 (1968)). In the case at bar, despite conceding Petitioner engaged in wholly innocent conduct, the detectives pursued Petitioner solely because he fled in a high -crime area without provocation. In doing so, the detectives abandoned the totality of the circumstances test in favor of a brightline rule based upon unprovoked flight in a high-cr ime area, devoid of any objectively particularized facts amounting to reasonable suspic ion of criminal activity. Accordingly,

I would hold that the detectives did not have reaso nable suspicion to stop Petitioner and would reverse the Appellate Court of Maryland (at t he time named the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland). 1

I. The test for reasonable suspicion is the totality o f the circumstances, rather than a bright-line rule focused on unprovoked fligh t in a high-crime area. The skeletal facts in this case do not support reas onable suspicion because the detectives failed to articulate any facts that init iated their pursuit, other than Petitioner’s unprovoked flight in a high-crime area. The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right

1 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the vot ers of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the C ourt of Special Appeals of Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name chang e took effect on December 14, 2022.2

of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonab le searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend IV. Additionally, Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Maryland’s analogue to the Fourth Amendm ent, provides: That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and o ppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehen d suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the pers on in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.

Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 26. Article 26 of th e Maryland Declaration of Rights is coextensive with the Fourth Amendment of the United S tates Constitution. King v. State , 434 Md. 472, 482–84, 76 A.3d 1035, 1040–42 (2013) ( “[T]his Court has interpreted historically Article 26 in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”) (citations omitted); Whittington v. State , 474 Md. 1, 23 n.17, 252 A.3d 529, 542 n.17 (2021) (noting that “this Court has held t he protections of Article 26 to be coextensive with those afforded by the Fourth Amendme nt”); Padilla v. State , 180 Md. App. 210, 227, 949 A.2d 68, 78 (2008) (noting that this Court “has never held that Article 26 provides greater protection from State interference than its federal counterpart”). A permissible warrantless seizure includes an inves tigatory stop (i.e., “ Terry stop”), where a police officer briefly stops an individual upon “reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot[,]” supported by articulable fact s. Crosby , 408 Md. at 503, 970 A.2d at 901 (quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 17, 88 S. Ct. at 1878). Under this C ourt’s precedent, detectives required a nexus between Petitioner’s un provoked flight in a high-crime area and criminal wrongdoing. Bost v. State , 406 Md. 341, 360, 958 A.2d 356, 367 (2008)3

(“Guns often accompany drugs, and many courts have found an ‘indisputable nexus between drugs and guns.’”) (citation omitted). Ind eed, “the nature of the area is relevant to reasonable suspicion when the suspect’s activiti es appear to be the kind of criminal activity that is likely to be occurring there.” Sizer v. State , 456 Md. 350, 380, 174 A.3d 326, 344 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring and dissent ing in part, joined by Hotten, J.). This “nexus” requirement ensures police officers do not “simply assert that innocent conduct was suspicious to him or her[]” to generate reasona ble suspicion. Crosby , 408 Md. at 508, 970 A.2d at 904. Here, the detectives lacked any f actual nexus between Petitioner’s conduct and criminal wrongdoing. The detectives pr oactively patrolled an area allegedly known for guns and drug trafficking, but they ackno wledged Petitioner did not engage in any conduct suggestive of, or consistent with, such criminal behavior before he fled. Additionally, detectives lacked “reasonable suspici on,” i.e., a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular perso n stopped of criminal activity[.]” Bost v.

State , 406 Md. at 356, 958 A.2d at 365 (internal quotati ons and citations omitted). Police officers can only establish “a particularized suspi cion” when: (1) they base their assessment upon “various objective observations, information f rom police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patter ns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers[,]” which is a process that deals “with probabilities[]” and not “hard certainties,” and (2) the aforementioned assessment “must raise a suspicion that the4

particular individual being stopped is engaged in w rongdoing.” Sizer , 456 Md. at 366, 174 A.3d at 336 (citations and internal quotations omit ted). 2 The State argues “[t]he critical question is whethe r unprovoked, headlong flight from the police is so commonplace and such an ordin ary behavior among innocent persons that it is unreasonable to interpret a person’s flight as suggestive of cr iminal wrongdoing.” Despite “readily conced[ing]” there are ample innoc ent reasons to fear and flee from police,

the State contends that the Fourth Amendment does n ot require officers “rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts .” In re D.D. , 479 Md. 206, 231, 277 A.3d 949, 963 (2022) (citing District of Columbia v. Wesby , ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 577,

2 The State argues detectives seized Petitioner afte r Detective Rodriguez apprehended him, which means any observations befor e that seizure contributed to reasonable suspicion. Neither the Appellate Court nor Petitioner directly addressed this issue, but timing matters when determining what fac tors Detective Rodriguez could consider before he seized Petitioner. Here, detect ives seized Petitioner once they pursued and cornered him on the other side of the alley. P olice officers may seize an individual “by means of physical force, or show of authority a long with submission to the assertion of authority[.]” Ferris v. State , 355 Md. 356, 375, 735 A.2d 491, 501 (1999) (citat ion omitted). Whether an encounter with police officer s constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure depends on “whether a reasonable person wou ld have felt free to leave.” Id. at 375, 735 A.2d at 501 (citation omitted). Factors that i ndicate a seizure occurred include: a threatening presence of several officers, blocking the citizen’s path, the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and w hether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different locati on or isolated him or her from others, and whether the police exhibited threatening behavi or or physical contact that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was n ot free to leave. Swift v. State , 393 Md. 139, 150, 153, 899 A.2d 867, 873, 875 (2006) (citat ion omitted). Here, the stop occurred in an alley where detectives cornered and isolated Petitioner. A reasonable person would not feel free to leave when two uniformed police of ficers pursued him in a marked car and two additional uniformed officers in an unmarked ca r blocked his path of escape. Petitioner likely felt threatened by four officers converging on him in an alley. Therefore, detectives seized Petitioner once they cornered him during his encounter with Detectives Rodriguez and Lopez, which limits indicia of suspicion to obs ervations Detective Rodriguez made at the time he first encountered Petitioner, i.e., unp rovoked flight in a high-crime area.5

588 (2018)). In the case at bar, the detectives ob served innocent and innocuous conduct before their pursuit. Indeed, Detectives Noesi and Rodriguez testified that they did not

observe Petitioner involved in any suspicious behavior before he fled. In other word s, the detectives observed Petitioner’s unprovoked flight in a high-crime area and pursued him, perhaps under the pretense that guilty persons do n ot run. In their haste, the detectives neglected a crucial step in their reasonable suspic ion inquiry. They failed to provide “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting t he particular person stopped of criminal activity [.]” Bost , 406 at 356, 958 A.2d at 365. The bar for reasona ble suspicion may be lower than probable cause, but “an inchoate and unp articularized suspicion or ‘hunch[]’”

does not suffice. Crosby , 408 Md. at 507, 970 A.2d at 904 (citations omitte d).

II. Neither Wardlow nor this Court’s prior decisions have held that un provoked flight in a high-crime area categorically generates reasonable suspicion.

Wardlow and this Court’s precedent never held that unprovo ked flight in a highcrime area per se constitutes reasonable suspicion. Instead, they h eld that police officers

may consider “an individual’s unprovoked flight or pre sence in a high crime area, or both, [as] individual factors that may contribute to the reasonable suspicion calculus.” Sizer v.

State , 456 Md. at 367, 174 A.3d at 335–36 (emphasis adde d). 3

3 The United States Supreme Court’s opinions genera lly invoke the central holding in Wardlow regarding unprovoked flight in cases where police already have other indicia of suspicion or to affirm that unprovoked flight is only a factor in the Terry analysis. See, e.g., Michigan v. Chesternut , 486 U.S. 567, 575, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1980 (1988) ( holding that police officers had reasonable suspicion to st op individuals hosting a loud party at a vacant property, including individuals who hid in a closet or bathroom after seeing officers); Lange v. California , ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2035 (2021) (Rober ts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that police officers have reas onable suspicion to stop a driver who (continued . . .)6

A. Illinois v. Wardlow

. In Wardlow , two uniformed police officers patrolled an area k nown for heavy narcotics trafficking to investigate drug-related c riminal activity. 528 U.S. at 121, 120 S. Ct. at 674. The police officers eventually encount ered Wardlow holding an opaque bag who fled down an alley after seeing the officers. Id. at 121–22, 120 S. Ct. at 674–75. The officers pursued Wardlow, apprehended him, searched for weapons, and recovered a handgun. Id. at 122, 120 S. Ct. at 675. In upholding the Terry stop, the United States Supreme Court held that unprovoked flight or “[h]ea dlong flight” from police officers is a factor under the reasonable suspicion analysis beca use it is “the consummate act of evasion” and “certainly suggestive of [wrongdoing]. ” Id. at 124, 120 S. Ct. at 676. The Court reasoned that, while individuals have a right to ignore police and go about their business, unprovoked flight, “by its very nature, i s ‘not going about one’s business[.]’” Id. at 125, 120 S. Ct. at 676. The Court further reaso ned that “ Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people[,]” even if it is “undoubtedly true[]” that flight does not

(. . . continued) plays loud music, honks his horn on the highway, an d refuses to pull over upon an officer’s show of authority); Kansas v. Glover , ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1185, 1189 (2020) (noting the “unremarkable observation” that “[h]ead long flight” is a factor in the reasonable suspicion determination); Utah v. Strieff , 579 U.S. 232, 252, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (cautioning that police degrade American citizens by using pretextual justifications, such as “how [a n individual] behaved,” to conduct a Terry stop); Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 367–69, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1622–23 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that polic e officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a driver because the driver veered between the shoulder and highway, the odor of air freshener emanated from the vehicle, the passenger refused to make eye contact, and both the driver and passenger appeared extremely nervous ).7

necessarily indicate ongoing criminal activity. Id. at 125–26, 120 S. Ct. at 677. While the Court focused on the factor of unprovoked flight, t he Court noted that police need not “ignore the relevant characteristics of a location” and may consider presence in a “highcrime area” when determining whether to stop an ind ividual. Id. at 124, 120 S. Ct. at 676.

B. Bost v. State

. In Bost , uniformed Washington D.C. police officers approac hed about a dozen individuals, including Bost, who were drinking alco hol in a high-crime area that prohibited loitering. 406 Md. at 346, 958 A.2d at 359. Upon seeing the police, Bost immediately left the area while “clutching his right waistband with his right elbow. Id. , 958 A.2d at 359. Believing Bost concealed a weapon, officers pursued Bost into Prince George’s County, Maryland, apprehended him, and recovered a gun from his jacket and cocaine from his pants pocket. Id. at 345, 958 A.2d at 359. This Court first held th at the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit authorized police officers to pursue Bost into Maryland, and then held that police had reasonable suspicion to stop Bost. Id. at 357–60, 958 A.2d at 365–67. While this Court held that “unprovoked flight is enough t o support reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed[,]” this Court emphasized the “indisputable nexus between drugs and guns[]” as the glue between Bost’s presen ce in a high-crime area and his otherwise innocent behavior, such as clutching his waistband. See id. at 358, 360, 958 A.2d at 366–67 (internal citations and quotations o mitted).

C. Sizer v. State

. In Sizer , five or six uniformed Howard County police office rs observed a group of individuals drinking from a beverage in a brown pap er bag and play fighting in area in8

Columbia, Maryland described as a “high-crime area. ” 456 Md. at 357–59, 174 A.3d at 330–31. The officers suspected the beverage was al cohol because the group’s body language suggested they were inebriated. Id. at 357, 174 A.3d at 330. The officers approached the group after someone threw a bottle t hat hit the ground. Id. , 174 A.3d at

330. Sizer fled from the officers when he first no ticed them about five feet away. Id. , 174 A.3d at 330. The officers quickly apprehended Size r and later recovered a handgun from his backpack and oxycodone from his sock. Id. at 357–58, 174 A.3d at 330. In upholding the officers’ reasonable suspicion, this Court held that “an individual’s unprovoked flight or presence in a high crime area, or both, are individual factors that may contribute to the reasonable suspicion calculus.” Id. at 367, 174 A.3d at 336 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). This Court reasoned that “the officers h ad reasonable suspicion to investigate the group prior to Mr. Sizer’s flight[]” because of ficers observed the group consuming alcohol and discarding the bottle. Id. at 374, 174 A.3d at 340.

D. Application of prior decisions to the case at bar. The Appellate Court incorrectly interpreted Wardlow , Sizer , and Bost to mean that detectives have reasonable suspicion to stop anyone who flees from police in a high-crime area without provocation, absent any articulated fa ctual basis for criminal wrongdoing. First, this interpretation disregards the other ind icia of suspicion present in

Wardlow , Sizer , and Bost . The stop in Wardlow involved: (1) a stop in a high-crime area; (2) unprovoked flight; and (3) an opaque bag. 528 U.S. at 121–22, 120 S. Ct. at 674. The stop in Sizer

involved (1) a stop in a high-crime area; (2) a gr oup of individuals drinking an unknown beverage; (3) inebriated behavior; (4) a thrown bottle; (5) presence in a high-9

crime area; and (6) unprovoked flight. 456 Md. at 357–59, 174 A.3d at 330–31. Notably, officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the suspe ct in Sizer before he fled. See id. , 174 A.3d at 330. Sizer’s flight certainly increased th e suspicion that he threw the bottle, but his unprovoked flight in a high-crime area was not, by itself, dispositive. See id. , 174 A.3d at 330. Similarly, the stop in Bost involved: (1) a group of individuals drinking alco hol; (2) presence in a no-loitering area; (3) presence i n a high-crime area; and (4) unprovoked flight. 406 Md. at 346, 958 A.2d at 359. Contrary to the State’s assertion, this Court’s

decision in Bost

does not support the proposition that unprovoked f light, alone, generates reasonable suspicion, because that case involved in dicia of suspicion beyond unprovoked flight, and, regardless, the officers in Bost had reasonable suspicion to stop the suspect before he fled. Second, unlike in Wardlow , Bost , and Sizer , the detectives in this case did not articulate any particularized objectively factual b asis to stop Petitioner other than his unprovoked flight in a high-crime area. The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from “simply assert[ing] that apparently innocent c onduct was suspicious to him or her; rather, the officer must offer ‘the factual basis u pon which he or she bases the conclusion.’”

Ferris v. State , 355 Md. at 391–92, 735 A.2d at 510 (quoting Derricott v. State , 327 Md. 582, 591, 611 A.2d 592, 597 (1992)). The State can not paradoxically concede that “innocent individuals may flee from the police for [a myriad of] innocent reasons[,]” while characterizing unprovoked flight as so unusual and abnormal that it is categorically suggestive of wrongdoing. Detectives Noesi and Rod riguez confirmed that they did not observe Petitioner engaged in any suspicious behavi or, such as hand-to-hand transactions,10

and they did not receive any complaints about Petit ioner’s conduct. Detective Lopez did not observe a “bulge” on Petitioner’s person until after he jumped over a fence to escape Detective Rodriguez, not at the inception of the pu rsuit. In other words, the only factors in

the Terry analysis in this case were: (1) presence in a high -crime area; and (2) unprovoked flight from law enforcement officers. That falls f ar short of the factors present in Wardlow and its progeny.

III. Reasonable suspicion requires a factual nexus betwe en criminal wrongdoing

and unprovoked flight in a high-crime area. The reasonable suspicion inquiry requires a basis o f articulable facts that connects criminal wrongdoing to otherwise innocent or innocu ous conduct. Overly policed neighborhoods have a myriad of innocent reasons to distrust and evade law enforcement, and that evasion, alone, cannot categorically satis fy the reasonable suspicion test. Police officers may not convert the Fourth Amendmen t into a “rubber stamp” that

authorizes them to label anyone who avoids them as suspicious simply because the o fficer

“believes” it. Ransome v. State , 373 Md. 99, 110–11, 816 A.2d 901, 908 (2003). Wh ile courts defer to an officer’s training, that deferen ce “is not without limits.” Holt v. State , 435 Md. 443, 461, 78 A.3d 415, 425 (2013). The Fou rth Amendment only authorizes a Terry stop when an officer, based upon an objective obser vation, infers and deduces “the particular individual being stopped is engaged in w rongdoing.” Id. at 460–61, 78 A.3d at 425 (citation omitted). “[I]t is impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless the re are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.” Crosby , 408 Md. at 512, 970 A.2d at 907 (cleaned up).11

The State frames the question before the Court as f ollows: [T]he question here is not how common it is for any person to flee from the police. Rather, the critical question is whether innocent flight from the police is so commonplace and ordinary that interpreting fl ight as suggestive of criminal wrongdoing would be unreasonable. According to the State, if unprovoked flight from p olice was so “commonplace and ordinary,” then “[o]ne would expect to see innocent people scatter and flee every time a police officer turned the corner.” There are two f laws in the State’s reasoning. First, the State implies the occurrence of one factor under the reasonable suspicion analysis is categorically indicative of criminal wr ongdoing, simply because “innocent flight” is probably suspicious of something , and “innocent” people do not regularly run from police. That is not the test for reasonable s uspicion. The Fourth Amendment required the detectives to explain why they suspected “criminal activity was afoot[]” bas ed solely on his unprovoked flight in a high-crime area. Crosby , 408 Md. at 503, 970 A.2d at 901 (citation omitted). They failed to do so. Detecti ves observed Petitioner casually standing in an alley. Petitioner ran after seeing the detec tives, and thereafter the detectives immediately pursued Petitioner. 4 It follows that Petitioner is suspicious because . . . ? That question remains unanswered. It fell on detectives to have an answer before their pursuit. See Longshore v. State , 399 Md. 486, 506, 924 A.2d 1129, 1140 (2007) (“Th e

4 The Appellate Court expressly limited its holding to Petitioner’s unprovoked flight in a high-crime area. Washington v. State , No. 0739, Sept. Term, 2021, 2022 WL 873315, at *2 n.2, *5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 24, 2022). I similarly limit my analysis to those factors.12

reasonableness of a Terry stop is determined by considering ‘whether the off icer’s action was justified at its inception[.]’”) (cleaned up). Second, at its core, reasonable suspicion considers “common sense,” “aspects of daily life[,]” and “how reasonable and prudent peop le act.” Id. at 507, 924 A.2d at 1141. The United States Department of Justice released a report in 2016 concluding that the Baltimore City Police Department engaged in a racia lly discriminatory pattern of making stops in violation of the Fourth Amendment. U.S. D ep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Departme nt, at 24–30, 47–54, (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download , archived at : https://perma.cc/YJU8-

6YAW . In the last ten years alone, there were numerous high-profile police killings of Black people, including Tamir Rice on November 22, 2014 5 , Eric Garner on July 17, 2014 6 , Freddie Gray, Jr., on April 19, 2015 7 , Breonna Taylor on March 13, 2020 8 , and George

5 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Closing of Investigation into 2014 Officer Involved in Shootin g in Cleveland, Ohio (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-a nnounces-closing-investigation2014-officer-involved-shooting-cleveland , archived at : https://perma.cc/Z36Z-2DRW

.

6 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement by United States Attorney Richard P. Donoghue (July 16, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/statement-unit edstates-attorney-richard-p-donoghue , archived at : https://perma.cc/AR8M-CWB8

.

7 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Officials Decline Prosecution in the Death of Freddie Gray (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officialsdecline-prosecution-death-freddie-gray , archived at : https://perma.cc/WL9V-HPJB

.

8 Richard A. Oppel, Jr., et al., What to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death , N.Y. T IMES (Aug. 23, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-poli ce.html , archived at : https://perma.cc/F4HT-JJF2

.13

Floyd on May 25, 2020 9 . Since 2015, police killed Black Americans at mor e than twice the rate of White Americans—forty-two Black America n deaths per million compared to seventeen White American deaths per million. 10 Similarly, police kill Hispanic Americans at almost twice the rate of White Americans—thirty Hispanic deaths per million. Id. 11 For many, these deaths illustrate that deadly polic e encounters are commonplace and justice is scarce. As a result, overly policed communities, especially communities of color, grow distrustful of law enforcement. Police , through whatever metric they have, may label those communities as “high-crime areas”—c ommunities that many Maryland

residents call home. 12 Children raised in those communities may learn to avoid police as

9 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Former Minneapolis Police Officers Convicted of Federal Civil Rights Violations for De ath of George Floyd (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-former-minneap olis-police-officers-convictedfederal-civil-rights-violations-death , archived at : https://perma.cc/985X-NA3S

.

10 Julie Tate, et al. , Fatal Force , W ASHINGTON P OST (Updated Nov. 21, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigati ons/police-shootings-database/ , archived at : https://perma.cc/LQ9C-8V6A

.

11 Unfortunately, police killings of Hispanic Americ ans remain underreported, and the precise number of deaths each year remain unkno wn. See Roque Planas, The Fatal Police Shootings You Aren’t Hearing About , H UFFINGTON P OST (Jul. 14, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/latinos-hispanic-kil ledpolice_n_57878af8e4b03fc3ee4f62ae , archived at : https://perma.cc/4YH5-4CLM

.

12 The term “high-crime area” has never been judicial ly defined. Sizer , 456 Md. at 379 n.1, 174 A.3d at 343 n.1 (Adkins, J., concurrin g and dissenting joined by Hotten, J.) (citation omitted). A generalized description of a location as “high crime,” absent any “nexus between the nature of the area and the obser ved activities[,]” cannot support reasonable suspicion. Id. at 380, 174 A.3d at 344. At a minimum, courts sho uld consider three factors “relevant to the ‘high crime’ designa tion, and the designation’s relationship to reasonable suspicion”: (1) “the nexus between th e type of crime most prevalent or common in the area and the type of crime suspected in the instant case”; (2) the “limited (continued . . .)14

a survival tactic

. Wardlow , 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S. Ct. at 676 (noting that “ reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments an d inferences about human behavior”). For those communities, the presence of law enforcement does not necessarily herald hope. In his concurring opinion in Wardlow , Justice Stevens recognized the possibility that “unprovoked flight is neither ‘abe rrant’ nor ‘abnormal’” for individuals living in “high-crime areas.” Id. at 132–33, 120 S. Ct. at 680–81 (Stevens, J., conc urring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens f urther noted that police themselves know of “these concerns and fears[.]” Id. at 133, 120 S. Ct. at 680–81 (Stevens, J., concurr ing in part and dissenting in part). For overpoliced comm unities, fear concerning deadly police encounters limits the extent to which police may re ly merely on unprovoked flight in an alleged “high-crime area.” 13 Nothing in the Fourth Amendment shields police offi cers from public distrust or, in light of that distrust, paints otherwise innocuous behavior as suspicious. See Crosby , 408 Md. at 507, 970 A.2d at 904 (citations omitted) (no ting that “an inchoate and

(. . . continued) geographic boundaries of the area”; and (3) “tempor al proximity between evidence of heightened criminal activity and the date of the st op or search at issue[.]” Id. at 381, 174 A.3d at 344 (citing United States v. Wright , 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007).

13 In Wardlow , Justice Stevens’ opinion cautioned that adopting per se rules is “profoundly unwise,” “[g]iven the diversity and fre quency of possible motivations for flight[.]” Wardlow , 528 U.S. at 129–30, 120 S. Ct. at 679 (Stevens, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He explained that “[u]npr ovoked flight[]” “describes a category of activity too broad and varied to permit per se reasonable inference regarding the motivation for the activity.” Id. at 136, 120 S. Ct. at 682 (Stevens, J., concurring ) (emphasis added).15

unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch[]’” will not s atisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry). The courts cannot simultaneously acknowledge the ex periences of communities in “highcrime areas” and any “commonsense” conduct derived therefrom, while invalidating them as irrelevant for purposes of the reasonable suspic ion analysis. See Glover , ___ U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1189–90 (noting that the reasona ble suspicion analysis accounts for “information that is accessible to people generally ”). At a minimum, the detectives were required to explain a particularized objectively fa ctual basis for believing Petitioner

“ engaged in [ criminal wrongdoing ].” Sizer , 456 Md. at 365, 174 A.3d at 336 (emphasis added). Under these skeletal facts, a decision in the State’s favor risks converting the Fourth Amendment’s protections into a “rubber stamp ” for Terry stops in “high-crime areas,” so long as police officers say, “we found i t suspicious that this otherwise unremarkable person ran away from us in broad dayli ght.” The Fourth Amendment was meant to prohibit such intrusions.

CONCLUSION In the record before us, no particularized objectiv e facts amounting to reasonable suspicion were articulated that would satisfy the c onstitutional standards expressed by

Wardlow . A decision in favor of Petitioner would not igno re Wardlow or this Court’s prior decisions because no precedent held that unprovoked flight in a high-crime area, by itself, is dispositive. Wardlow and its progeny merely affirmed that the reasonabl e suspicion standard requires a totality of the circumstances a nalysis. That precedent does not support police officers stopping anyone who flees from them in a high-crime area, absent an articulable basis that the individual is engaged in criminal activity.16

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland.