UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

SONYA CONSTANCE DOWDY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; STATE OF

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION, Department of Adult  No. 01-1706

Probation and Parole,

Defendants-Appellees.

and

GEORGE J. MCCLEASE, JR.,

Defendant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City.

Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge.

(CA-96-37-2-BO)

Submitted: October 17, 2001

Decided: November 13, 2001

Before WILKINS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Branch Washington Vincent, III, THE TWIFORD LAW FIRM,

L.L.P., Manteo, North Carolina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, Attorney
General, Neil Dalton, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Sonya Constance Dowdy filed a complaint against her former

employer, the North Carolina Department of Correction ("NCDOC"),

and her supervisor, George J. McClease, alleging, inter alia, violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, based

upon McClease’s improper sexual advances and physical contact.*

The district court denied relief, and, on appeal, we reversed and

remanded for the court to consider Dowdy’s claims in light of the

Supreme Court’s decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.

742 (1998). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment

in NCDOC’s favor, finding that NCDOC established the affirmative

defense to vicarious liability for McClease’s actions. Dowdy appeals,

and we affirm. 

We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir.

1999). Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of

material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once the moving party discharges its burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to

support the nonmoving party’s case, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the nonmoving party must come forward with

*McClease entered into a consent judgment with Dowdy, and he is not

a party to this appeal. 

2 DOWDY v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87

(1986). Summary judgment will be granted unless a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence

presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48

(1986). 

Dowdy argues on appeal that she substantially complied with her

obligation to report the harassment because she told a supervisor,

John Morgan, about it. However, Morgan was a supervisor outside of

Dowdy’s and McClease’s chain of command and, thus, was not one

of the avenues through which the policy provided Dowdy should

report the harassment. Dowdy had a copy of NCDOC’s policy available to her at her office and had attended a six-hour sexual harassment

training course in April 1992, before the incidents with McClease

occurred. "[P]roof that a plaintiff employee failed to follow a complaint procedure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense." Brown v. Perry, 184

F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Although Dowdy asserts that she feared retaliation, "[a]

generalized fear of retaliation does not excuse a failure to report sexual harassment." Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d

262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001). We therefore agree with the district court

that Dowdy unreasonably failed to avail herself of the preventative or

corrective opportunities provided by NCDOC or to otherwise avoid

harm. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 

Next, Dowdy challenges the district court’s finding that NCDOC

used reasonable care to prevent and correct McClease’s behavior.

Because NCDOC did not verify that McClease received training on

the sexual harassment policy, Dowdy assumes that McClease

received no training. Dowdy concludes, therefore, that NCDOC’s

failure to train McClease was unreasonable. We have held, however,

that "[d]istribution of an anti-harassment policy provides compelling

proof that the company exercised reasonable care in preventing and

promptly correcting sexual harassment." Barrett, 240 F.3d at 266

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (rejecting argument

that employer "never did anything more than distribute its antiharassment policy" as "incompatible with the law of this circuit"). 

DOWDY v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 3
Dowdy also asserts that NCDOC’s policy was not proven and

effective because she reported the harassment to Morgan, a Chief Probation Officer like McClease, and Morgan did not inform NCDOC.

Although the district court did not explicitly address this argument in

its opinions, we do not find it persuasive. Morgan had no authority

over McClease to take corrective action, and the record contains no

evidence concerning the specificity of Dowdy’s report to Morgan.

Without more, Dowdy did not forecast evidence sufficient to establish

that NCDOC’s sexual harassment policy was not effective. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (stating that mere existence of "scintilla of

evidence" in support of plaintiff’s position will be insufficient to

defeat summary judgment). 

We therefore agree with the district court that NCDOC’s policy

was proven and effective because the policy provided NCDOC’s

employees with many avenues through which to report harassment

and NCDOC promptly investigated the complaints against McClease.

"[W]here, as here, there is no evidence that [NCDOC] adopted or

administered [its] anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional," Brown, 184 F.3d at

396, we find that NCDOC exercised reasonable care to prevent and

promptly correct any harassing behavior. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807;

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 

Because NCDOC established each element of the affirmative

defense in Faragher and Ellerth, we hold that the district court did

not err in finding that NCDOC was not vicariously liable for

McClease’s actions. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment. Dowdy v. North Carolina, No. CA-96-37-2-BO

(E.D.N.C. Feb. 22 & Apr. 19, 2001). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process. 

AFFIRMED

4 DOWDY v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA