In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2440

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Michael R. Lamarre,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 99-CR-185--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge./1

Argued March 7, 2001--Decided April 20, 2001

 Before Diane P. Wood, Evans, and Williams, Circuit

Judges.

 Evans, Circuit Judge. Over 200 years ago, Edmund

Burke proclaimed "the age of chivalry is

dead."/2 And it hasn’t made much of a comeback.

Certainly our appellant, Michael Lamarre, will

win no awards for chivalry as his defense to an

indictment charging him with five counts of bank

fraud and one of using a phony social security

number to obtain a loan was to try and pin the

rap on his wife. A jury, apparently determining

Mr. and Mrs. Lamarre were in cahoots, found him

guilty, and he appeals. Although we conclude that

the district judge erred in keeping from the jury

a bit of evidence Lamarre wanted to offer to

bolster his defense, we conclude the error was

harmless.

 The events that led to Michael Lamarre’s trial

began in Florida in 1986, where he and Carla, his

wife, were known as Robert and Carla Harrell./3

Together they borrowed $200,000 from Farm Credit

of Southwest Florida to purchase 203 head of

cattle for their dairy farm business, Bristol

Dairy, Inc. In return, the Harrells pledged the

cattle and their farm equipment as security for

the loan. This deal was destined to go sour as

the Harrells provided a wealth of false

information on their loan application, including

false social security numbers, descriptions of

assets they did not own, and grossly inflated
earnings figures. Later, Farm Credit discovered

that the Harrells were not caring for the cattle,

so it obtained a writ of replevin and attempted

to seize the herd. The Harrells filed for

bankruptcy, but the bankruptcy court later

dismissed their petition when they failed to

attend a meeting of creditors. When the bank

eventually seized its collateral, it discovered

that 74 cows and various items of pledged farm

equipment were missing. Thirty cows that were

found did the bank little good as they had to be

destroyed due to illness.

 The Harrells missed the Florida meeting of

creditors because they fled to Wisconsin. In

September 1997 Carla, then using the surname

Lamarre, contacted Mark Binversie, the president

of Investor’s Community Bank in Manitowoc,

Wisconsin. She told him that she and her husband

were planning to relocate their dairy farming

business, which she called "Northern Star Farms,"

to Oconto, Wisconsin, and they were interested in

borrowing money to purchase a herd of dairy

cattle. Carla represented that she and Michael

had substantial dairy experience and that her

husband was still employed on a large farm in

Florida. Binversie was impressed and told her

that their farm experience was an important

factor in the bank’s consideration of the loan

request. Carla and Michael, also then using the

surname Lamarre, applied for the loan and

submitted financial statements, federal income

tax returns, information about their Florida

loans, letters of recommendation, and a business

plan naming Michael as the CEO of the business.

Almost all of this information was false: the

financial reports substantially inflated their

financial status and did not disclose that they

had declared bankruptcy; the social security

numbers on the loan application were not theirs;

the federal tax returns were never submitted to

the IRS; the information about their Florida

banker was false; and one of the letters of

recommendation was from "John Harrell." The bank

did not verify this information prior to

approving a loan for $180,000.

 The Lamarres gave the bank security interests

in their soon-to-be-purchased real estate,

cattle, farm equipment, and proceeds from the

sale of milk. A loan closing was held on December

1, 1997, and that was the first time Binversie

met Michael. Binversie explained the loan

agreement to the Lamarres line-by-line and read

aloud every word of the agreement. He recalled

that Michael appeared to understand both the

agreement and the paperwork he signed. At the

Lamarres’ request, the bank advanced $16,500 on

the day of closing to enable them to purchase 15

cows. The Lamarres asked Binversie to make the
check payable to "John Harrell," who they said

was the seller of the cattle. Later, Michael took

the check to Florida and used it and another

false social security number to open a bank

account in the name of John Harrell. Michael

endorsed the check with the name "Michael

Harrell," and in the teller’s presence he

endorsed it again as "Robert Harrell." He

deposited $100 in the new account and took the

rest in cash, telling the bank that he was a

truck driver and that he needed the cash to

repair his truck. Six days later he closed the

account and returned to Wisconsin. Back in

Wisconsin, the bank paid out the remainder of the

loan, and the Lamarres used the money to purchase

cattle.

 On December 17, 1997, the Lamarres attended the

closing on an Oconto dairy farm they had

contracted to buy. Although they had agreed to

make a $50,000 down payment on the property,

Michael wanted to renegotiate the terms of the

contract at the closing. The seller’s attorney

testified that Michael appeared to fully

understand the transaction and the terms of the

contract and that Michael did most of the

negotiating. After some haggling, the sellers

agreed to sell their farm to the Lamarres for

$350,000 with no down payment.

 The Lamarres also applied for and received

several credit cards from Binversie’s Manitowoc

bank. After the loan closing they took out a

$9,500 cash advance on one of the cards. Michael

took out another $3,000 cash advance on another

card, which he used as a down payment on a hog--

not a farm animal but a $24,500 Harley Davidson

motorcycle. Michael then leased a $25,000 Ford

pickup and a $29,500 Oldsmobile sport utility

vehicle. On all three contracts Michael provided

false social security numbers and false

information about his income, past employment,

bankruptcy history, and education. The finance

managers of the Ford and Oldsmobile dealerships

testified that they completed lease applications

for Michael based on his oral answers to their

questions, and each stated that Michael appeared

to understand the terms of the contracts. The

Harley Davidson dealer testified that Michael

inquired about the specifications of several

cycles, haggled with him over the purchase price,

and negotiated the down payment and interest rate

of his installment contract.

 All the while, the Lamarres attempted to

conduct a dairy business. But by the spring of

1998 Binversie, himself a dairy farmer, became

suspicious of the Lamarres’ ability to run a

dairy farm. Binversie had on several occasions

taken Michael to look at cattle to purchase. Each
time, Michael failed to inspect the "working end"

of the cattle and purchased them without first

inspecting their health records. Additionally,

the terms of the loan required the Lamarres to

deposit the proceeds of their milk sales into a

bank account, and Binversie observed that their

deposits were too small for the amount of milk

the Lamarres were supposed to be selling.

(Unbeknownst to Binversie, the Lamarres diverted

milk proceeds to accounts at other banks.) When

Binversie visited the farm to see what was going

on, he discovered the cows living in unhealthy

conditions. Binversie also noticed that the

encumbered farm equipment was not there. Michael

told him it was in the process of being shipped

from out of state, but on later visits Binversie

never saw it.

 Later, the Lamarres deposited a $23,240 check

from "Bristol Dairies," their defunct Florida

business, in their Manitowoc bank account. Carla

said the money was proceeds from the sale of

cattle in Florida. The check bounced because the

Bristol bank account no longer existed, but not

before the Lamarres wrote several other checks on

the account. Binversie confronted Michael about

the bounced check and Michael expressed surprise,

telling Binversie that Bristol had always been a

reliable customer. Binversie, now concerned about

his security, quickly obtained a writ of replevin

to seize the collateral. On May 4, 1998, the bank

seized 117 unhealthy cows from the Lamarre’s

farm. But 23 cows were missing. The bank seizures

prompted the Lamarres to flee to Florida with the

Ford, Oldsmobile, and Harley Davidson.

 A grand jury indicted both Michael and Carla.

Michael was charged with five counts of

defrauding a federally insured banking

institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 1344

and one count of using a false social security

number to obtain a loan from a bank in violation

of 42 U.S.C. sec. 408(a)(7)(B). The FBI arrested

Michael and seized the vehicles in Florida a year

later. When arrested, Michael had his legitimate

social security card in his wallet.

 The district court severed Michael’s and Carla’s

trials, and Carla later pleaded guilty. Michael’s

defense theory was that he was incapable of

reading or understanding the various loan

documents he signed and therefore could not have

formed the specific intent to defraud the bank.

His defense was that Carla "masterminded" the

fraud and that he blindly signed documents at her

instruction. In support of his theory, he

proffered the opinion of Dr. Christopher Ovide,

a board-certified clinical psychologist. Dr.

Ovide tested Michael after his indictment and

offered to testify that he had an IQ of 70,
placing Michael in the second percentile for

adults his age. Dr. Ovide described Michael as

being in the "borderline intellectual functioning

range of intelligence." Dr. Ovide also determined

that Michael had a second-grade reading ability

and a first-grade spelling and arithmetic

aptitude. The district judge, however, excluded

Dr. Ovide as a witness, believing that his

testimony would invade the province of the jury

and would do nothing more than suggest that

Michael was not intelligent enough to lie and

defraud.

 Michael’s stepchildren, Angel and Alan Lamarre,

testified on his behalf. Angel testified that she

never saw Michael read a book or newspaper--

although she admitted that she had seen him read

classified advertisements--and that she often

assisted her stepfather in filling out the

simplest of forms. Angel also stated that Carla

handled all the household paperwork and financial

matters, and she suggested that Carla had engaged

in suspicious financial activity long before she

married Michael. Alan confirmed Angel’s testimony

and stated that in the 15 years he knew Michael

he had never seen him read a book or newspaper.

Neither Michael nor Carla testified.

 The jury found Michael guilty on all counts. A

presentence investigation report (PSR)

recommended an adjusted offense level of 16 and

9 criminal history points, placing Michael in

criminal history category IV with a sentencing

range of 33 to 41 months. The government,

however, believed that the recommended criminal

history category did not adequately reflect

Michael’s past criminal conduct and recommended

adjusting his criminal history under U.S.S.G.

sec.4A1.3(e) to come up to a total of 15 points.

The judge agreed, and Michael wound up in

criminal history category VI with a sentencing

range of 46 to 57 months. He was sentenced to a

term at the top of the range.

 Michael argues that the district judge abused

his discretion by excluding Dr. Ovide’s testimony

because the judge misunderstood the purpose for

which it was offered. He asserts that Dr. Ovide

would have testified only that Michael lacked the

intellectual capability to understand the nature

of the various financial transactions that gave

rise to his crimes, not that he was not

intelligent enough to commit fraud. And because

he was accused of committing specific intent

crimes, Michael contends that the exclusion of

Dr. Ovide’s testimony denied him the opportunity

to challenge the government’s evidence of his

mental state. We review evidentiary rulings for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Byrd, 208

F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000).
 The parties confined most of their argument in

the district court on this issue to whether

Michael gave the government sufficient notice

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

16(b)(1)(C) of his intent to call Dr. Ovide as an

expert witness and whether Dr. Ovide’s testimony

would be sufficiently reliable under the

principles of Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The

district judge chose not to address these

arguments and rejected the proffer on its merits,

stating:/4

The Court differs with both counsel. It believes

that this type of opinion evidence goes--invades

the common sense inquiry of jurors as to the

circumstances under which a party may have been

acting. And the fact is to indicate that because

he has a second grade level of education that

accordingly that suggests that he cannot be

involved in a fraudulent activity is so far from

what the Court believes to be appropriate in a

matter of this nature that I have no qualms

whatsoever in excluding this type of testimony.

I can imagine that it’s going to be brought

forward in practically 40 percent of all the

cases which this Court ever has the opportunity

to try.

And it would appear that the defense is that

you’ve got a low level of education, you don’t

read very well, you don’t write very well and,

ergo, you certainly can’t commit any fraudulent

conduct and the Court does not believe that that

is appropriate testimony. It believes it is not

relevant to the actions of which the defendant is

charged. And the fact of the matter is, I have to

take some judicial notice, even though I guess I

shouldn’t, but my nine-year-old who’s in the

third grade may have that level also but he sure

knows what it is to tell an untruth.

Now I realize this is an oversimplification and

the Court’s going to be criticized for that, but

from all the documents which this Court has read

in this matter this Court believes that this is

not an area for an expert to testify where the

jury may use its common sense inquiry and they as

untrained layman are able to make those

determinations without the necessity of expert

testimony. I realize that’s not the argument of

the government but it jumps out at the Court when

addressing a matter of this nature, and

accordingly I’m going to exclude the testimony.

 When faced with a proffer of expert testimony

under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), trial

judges must ensure that the expert’s testimony is

reliable and relevant. United States v. Cruz-
Velasco, 224 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2000).

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, and Kumho Tire Co. v.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999), supply the

reliability test. The government and Michael now

both agree that Dr. Ovide’s testimony would have

been scientifically valid and thus reliable under

Daubert and, since the district judge made no

findings on the validity of the doctor’s

scientific methodology, we won’t question it. But

before proceeding to relevance, we wish to

reiterate the importance of applying the Daubert

framework in cases such as this. Not only does

the Daubert framework help judges distinguish

between real and "courtroom" science, see Rosen

v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir.

1996), but we have also stressed its importance

in helping trial judges understand the purpose of

the expert evidence, see United States v. Hall,

93 F.3d 1337, 1345 (7th Cir. 1996). This is

perhaps most important when dealing with experts

in the field of social science. Parties typically

offer experts in human behavior and mental

disorders to testify about everyday subjects.

Certainly laypersons are qualified to evaluate

things within their everyday experience, but

scientifically valid social science can be

offered to show a jury that their commonly held

beliefs are incorrect. See Tyus v. Urban Search

Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996); United

States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1118-19 (7th Cir.

1999) ("Hall II") (Easterbrook, J., concurring);

Hall, 93 F.3d at 1345; Krist v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

897 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1990); Carroll v.

Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir.

1990).

 We think that is precisely the case here. Dr.

Ovide proposed to testify that Michael had a very

low IQ and the reading ability of a second

grader. One of the facts at issue was whether

Michael understood that his conduct was designed

to defraud the banks. He wanted to prop up his

claim that it was Carla’s show, not his. Michael

presented witnesses who testified that he truly

was a dairy farmer, albeit not a very good one.

It is also undisputed that Carla controlled the

books and financial records. On the other hand,

the government presented several witnesses who

testified that Michael appeared to understand the

documents he signed. Dr. Ovide, however, would

have testified that Michael’s low cognitive

skills made him dependent on Carla to conduct

their financial business. He believed that

Michael’s personality suggested that he was

somewhat "interpersonally dependent" and felt a

"need to please others and avoid doing things

that would alienate the person or persons he

depends on." The judge thought that the jury had

the common sense to determine whether Michael

understood that he was defrauding a bank. They
did, but that alone does not justify excluding

Dr. Ovide’s testimony. Trial courts are not

compelled to exclude all expert testimony merely

because it overlaps with matters within the

jury’s experience. Hall, 93 F.3d at 1342, 1344.

 Moreover, the government would have been free

to challenge the weight of his report summarizing

his evaluation of Michael on cross-examination.

In the report, Dr. Ovide noted several possible

inconsistencies with Michael’s purported mental

functioning. For instance, on two tests that

explored Michael’s ability to recognize spacial

relationships, he scored "unusually low" on Block

Design, yet he tested strongly on Object

Assembly. Further, Dr. Ovide noticed that

Michael’s intellectual ability was "far below

what was expected given his history and general

mental status and social interaction." Dr. Ovide,

however, also cautioned that Michael’s

personality pattern suggested that he may have

exaggerated his responses on some of the tests,

although Dr. Ovide thought that the level of

exaggeration was probably consistent with a

person "facing his current situation," i.e., an

indictment charging six felonies. We therefore

conclude that the district court erred in

excluding this testimony for the reason given by

the judge. Whether it should have been excluded

on notice grounds, as the government argued at

trial, is a matter we need not consider for

reasons that will soon become clear.

 Evidentiary errors, of course, are subject to

harmless error review. United States v. Wesela,

223 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2000). We will not

reverse unless the error affected substantial

rights, Byrd, 208 F.3d at 594, or had a

"substantial or injurious effect or influence on

the jury’s verdict," United States v. Jarrett,

133 F.3d 519, 529 (7th Cir. 1998).

 A bank fraud conviction requires proof that a

defendant had the specific intent to defraud the

bank. United States v. Moede, 48 F.3d 238, 241

(7th Cir. 1995). "Specific intent to defraud"

means that a defendant acted willfully and with

specific intent to deceive or cheat, usually for

financial gain for one’s self or the causing of

financial loss to another. Id. Specific intent

may be established by circumstantial evidence and

inferences drawn from the scheme itself. See id.

We have specifically held that actions such as

knowingly depositing an NSF or forged check,

knowingly writing checks on an inadequate account

balance, and providing false information on loan

documents constitute circumstantial evidence of

specific intent to defraud. Id. at 242. Moreover,

the evidence here of uncharged acts (the Florida

matters and the vehicle deals) intricately
related to the acts charged in the indictment

were admissible to establish Michael’s fraudulent

intent. See United States v. Gibson, 170 F.3d

673, 680 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States

v. Ryan, 213 F.3d 347, 351 (7th Cir. 2000)

(evidence casting doubt on credibility of

defendant’s claim that he was ignorant of

fraudulent aspects of transaction is probative of

specific intent to defraud).

 Despite the undisputed evidence that Carla was

the prime mover in this case, the testimony of

witnesses suggesting that Michael appeared to

understand the documents he signed was strong.

Michael also, without Carla’s heeding, endorsed

a bank check intended for the purchase of cattle

(the "John Harrell" check) over to himself, took

it to Florida, assumed a different name, and

cashed it, telling the bank he was a truck

driver. Michael also deposited a $23,000 check

drawn on a closed account from Bristol Dairies,

his Florida business. When confronted, he told

Binversie that he had never had trouble with

Bristol Dairies before as they were always a

reliable customer. He purchased and leased three

vehicles by providing false financial and

personal information. Michael used several false

social security numbers, even though it appears

he kept his legitimate social security card in

his wallet, or at least had it there when he was

arrested. The Lamarres also pledged farm

equipment that never materialized for the loan,

and, when confronted, Michael falsely told

Binversie that the equipment was being shipped

from out of state. Based on this evidence, we

believe that no rational jury would think that

Michael was ignorant of the fraud scheme, and

thus we conclude that the exclusion of Dr.

Ovide’s testimony was no more than harmless

error.

 Finally, Michael challenges his sentence. He

argues that he was entitled to have the facts

upon which the district court enhanced his

criminal history found by the jury beyond a

reasonable doubt under Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000). He does not challenge the

district court’s decision to enhance his criminal

history category. Michael did not raise his

Apprendi argument at sentencing, so we review it

only for plain error. United States v. Jackson,

236 F.3d 886, 887 (7th Cir. 2001); United States

v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820, 824-25 (7th Cir. 2001).

But regardless of the scope of our review, our

cases compel us to reject his argument. Apprendi

holds that any fact (except the existence of a

prior conviction) that increases a sentence

beyond the statutory maximum for the particular

offense must be submitted to the jury and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 236 F.3d at
887. Michael’s sentence does not exceed the

maximum term for bank fraud, see 18 U.S.C. sec.

1344, so Apprendi does not apply, United States

v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2001).

 Accordingly, we AFFIRM Michael Lamarre’s

convictions and sentences.

/1 The Honorable John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge of the

Western District of Wisconsin, presiding.

/2 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in

France (1790).

/3 To avoid confusion, we will refer to the

appellant as "Michael" and his wife as "Carla"

throughout the rest of this opinion. Generally,

Michael was known as "Robert Harrell" in Florida

and "Michael Lamarre" in Wisconsin. He was born

as Robert Edward LeDane, but he legally changed

his name to Robert Harrell in 1995. Michael later

attempted to legally change his surname to

"Lamarre," Carla’s maiden name, but apparently

never completed the process.

/4 We have reprinted the transcript as is, without

inserting any "sics."