UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4612

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

MAKUM LAMONT MCCOLLUM,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. 

(4:13-cr-01012-RBH-1)

Submitted: February 12, 2015 Decided: February 25, 2015

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker 

Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Makum Lamont McCollum appeals from his conviction and 

151-month sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to 

distribution of crack cocaine. On appeal, counsel has filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

stating that he had found no meritorious grounds for appeal but 

questioning whether the district court complied with Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 and whether the district court’s sentence was 

reasonable. Although advised of his right to do so, McCollum 

did not file a supplemental pro se brief. The Government also 

declined to file a brief. After a thorough review of the 

record, we affirm.

Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must 

conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, 

and determines that the defendant understands, the nature of the 

charge to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum 

penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various 

rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 

1991). The district court also must ensure that the defendant’s 

plea is voluntary, was supported by a sufficient factual basis, 

and did not result from force, threats, or promises not 

contained in the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), 

(3); DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 119-20. 
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Because McCollum did not move to withdraw his guilty plea 

in the district court or otherwise preserve any allegation of 

Rule 11 error, the plea colloquy is reviewed for plain error. 

United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002). 

Our review of the record reveals that the district court fully 

complied with Rule 11 in accepting McCollum’s guilty plea during 

a thorough hearing. Accordingly, his plea was knowing and 

voluntary, and, consequently, final and binding. See United 

States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

We review McCollum’s sentence for reasonableness, applying 

a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We first ensure that the 

district court committed no “‘significant procedural error,’” 

including improper calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines 

range, insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

(2012) factors, or inadequate explanation of the sentence 

imposed. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). During the district 

court’s explanation of a selected sentence, while it must 

consider the statutory factors and explain the sentence, it need 

not “robotically tick” through every § 3353(a) factor on the 

record, particularly when imposing a sentence within the 

properly calculated Guidelines range. United States v. Johnson, 

445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). At the same time, the 
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district court “must make an individualized assessment based on 

the facts presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. “This 

individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, but 

it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case at 

hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.” 

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the parties agreed that the Guidelines were 

appropriately calculated. Further, the district court provided 

adequate explanation of its sentence. The court noted the 

seriousness of McCollum’s conduct, his past criminal history, 

and the need for deterrence. The court explicitly stated that 

it considered both the statutory factors and McCollum’s 

arguments for a variance and concluded that a sentence at the 

bottom of the Guidelines range was appropriate. We therefore 

conclude that the sentence is procedurally reasonable.

When we find a sentence procedurally reasonable, we then

must examine its substantive reasonableness, considering “the 

totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The 

sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary” to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). A within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable 

on appeal, and the defendant bears the burden to “rebut the 

presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable 
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when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. 

Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Here, McCollum’s sentence was within his Guidelines range. 

While the court did not grant McCollum’s request for a variance, 

the court reasonably explained that McCollum’s conduct was 

serious and that a longer sentence was advisable to deter any 

further criminal conduct. The record does not provide any basis 

to overcome the presumption of reasonableness. Thus, we find 

that the court’s sentence was substantively reasonable.

Our review pursuant to Anders has revealed no meritorious 

issues for review. Accordingly, we affirm McCollum’s conviction 

and sentence. This Court requires that counsel inform McCollum

in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If McCollum requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move this Court for leave 

to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state 

that a copy thereof was served on McCollum. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this Court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED