### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE January 23, 2002 Session
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CLAUD E W. CHEEKS
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County Nos. 222245, 222283, and 223379 Rebecca J. Stern, Judge

No. E2001-00198-CCA-R3-CD July 22, 2002

J OSEPH M. T IPTON , J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent

from the result reached

in the majority opinion. I believe the evidence justifies the co nvictions. That is, the jury had the right under the evidence to discredit the exper t witnesses’ opinions to the extent that the appellant could be found guilty of the offenses char ged.

Because the burden of proving insanity was on the appellant, I believe the state ha d only the duty to prove t

he ele ments of the offenses charged beyond a re asonable doubt. With the jury rejecting insanity as a defense, our standard of review on appeal should be whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any rational trier of fact could have

failed to find that the appe llant’s criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence. This is the standard used under the federal statute that requires the a ppellant to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence. See State v. Barton , 992 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1993). In other words, after viewing the evidence in the light most favora ble to the prosecution, we should determine whether any rational trier of fact could have a serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the

conclusion, i.e., insanity, to be drawn from the evidence. See State v. Holder , 15 S.W.3d 905, 912 (Tenn. Crim. A pp. 1999) (def ining cle ar and c onvincing evidenc e). In th

is respect, we should not r

eweigh th e eviden ce but pr esume that the ju

ry has re solved al l conflic ts in the testimony and drawn all reasonable inferenc es from the evidence in favor of the state. Unquestionably, the appellant’s experts had support for their opinions that the appellant was unable to appre ciate the

nature o r wrongf ulness of his ac ts. However, I believe substantial evidence exists to raise serious doubts about their conclusions.

Relative to the events in question, evidence exists to show that the appellant assaulted Mr. Newman, took his money bag, and ran away. Wh en chased by Mr. Hines, the appellant stopped, turned to Mr. Hines, and said, “Oh, you want some of this?” He then assaulted Mr. H ines. When Officer Chapin co nfronte d him, the a ppellant stopped, o ffering

no resista nce. When Offic er Chapin-2-

asked him why he had committed the crime, the appellant replied, “I was hungry.” Standing alone, these facts justify inferences that the appellant was aware of the nature of

his conduct, had a motive for it, and kne

w that othe

rs would think it was wron g. From his d aring the unarmed Mr. Hineswhile obeying the arme d Office r Chapin, the jury c ould also i nfer tha t the appe

llant had the abilit y t o weigh his options after assaulting Mr. Newman and running away.

As for the 1 998 menta

l evalu atio n, Dr. Brown noted that the appellant initially denied knowing why he as saulted M r. Newma

n and den

ied hear ing voice s. However, the appellant subseque ntly said that he thought Mr. Newman needed money and that the Lord picked the appellant to intervene in Mr. Newman’s life. Dr. Brown said that ea rlier records for the appellant reflect ed that he ha d heard v oices ap

parentl y telling him to assau lt people in the pas t.
As for the 2 000 menta

l evalua tion, Dr. B rown det

ermined that the a

ppellant attempte d to distort tes ting on two psychological tests, thereby reflecting malingering. He also acknowl edged tha t it was possible for intentional distortions to occur without detection. However, although he admitted that it was impossible to say for sure that the appella nt k new right from wrong at the time of the offens es, he st ill believ ed that the appell ant was unable to a pprecia te the wr ongfulne ss of his a

cts at the time of the assaults. Dr. Mudian stated that the appellant said during the 2000 evaluation that he heard voices telling him that the man (Mr. Newman) had his billfold.

Dr. Brown referred to hearing voices in the c ontext of schizophrenia as “command delusions.” To me, this is signific ant in ter ms of what does not co nstitute c riminal in sanityafter the 1995 amendment to the insanity defense statute. Before the am endment, th e insanity standard provided that a person was not responsible if as a result of mental disease or defect he or she

lacked substantial

capacity either

to appre ciate the

wrongfu lness of th

e conduc t or

to conform the conduct to the requirements of law. See Graham v . State , 547 S.W.2d 531, 543 (Tenn. 1977). However, since the amendment, the fact that mental disease or defect prevented a defendant from conforming conduct to requirements of the law no longer proves that a de fendant is crimina

lly insane . Even if
we accept as true the appellant’s having schizophrenia, I believe that the circumstance s surrounding the assaults, the facts shown in the mental evaluations, and t he appellant ’s stated delusions lend themselves more logic ally to the appe llant bein g unable t

o confor m his condu ct to the r

equirem ents of the la w, not bei ng unawa

re of the nature o r wrongf ulness of his acts.

I do not doub t that the a ppellant suffer s from sev ere men tal disor ders. However, the Tennessee legislatu

re has c hosen not t

o excuse his cond uct beca

use of suc

h a disord

er. I would affirm t he convictions.

_____________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE