alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4381

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JOSE MIGUEL MATEO, a/k/a Alec Garcia

Rodriguez, a/k/a Santos Figueroa Santiago,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr.,

District Judge. (1:05-cr-00290-JAB)

Submitted: September 6, 2006 Decided: September 20, 2006

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

C. David Whaley, MORCHOWER, LUXTON & WHALEY, Richmond, Virginia,

for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Jose Miguel Mateo pled guilty to one count of conspiracy

to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2000). His attorney

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), asserting there were no meritorious issues for appeal, but

claiming the sentence was greater than necessary because it was

above the statutory minimum. Mateo declined to file a pro se

supplemental brief. We affirm.

Mateo’s sentence was six months more than the statutory

minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment and near the low end of

the advisory guidelines. In imposing the sentence, the district

court properly calculated the guidelines range of imprisonment and

considered the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).

We find the sentence reasonable. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d

449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006). 

Pursuant to Anders, we have examined the entire record

and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm

Mateo’s conviction and sentence. This court requires counsel to

inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme

Court of the United States for further review. If the client

requests a petition be filed, but counsel believes such a petition

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave

to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
- 3 -

a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Minnie DUQUE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28656.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 23, 1957.

*833Burks & Brown, Lubbock, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This is a conviction for the unlawful possession of beer for the purpose of sale in a dry area, with punishment assessed at sixty days’ confinement in jail and a fine of $300.

The conviction rests upon the validity of the search warrant under and by virtue of which the residence of appellant was searched and the beer found therein.

The complaint upon which the search warrant was based sought, upon its face, a search warrant to search the private dwelling “occupied by, in charge of and under the control of Mrs. Antonio Duque.”

Mrs. Antonio Duque is the appellant in this case.

In a bill of exception complaining of the receipt in evidence of the beer found as a result of the search of appellant’s residence because the search warrant was of no force and effect, the trial court certifies that had appellant been permitted she could have proven “that the search warrant was originally issued to search premises under the control of Antonio Duque, but was altered after its issuance by writing in ‘Mrs.’ before the name Antonio Duque so as to thereby make the affidavit and warrant to refer to ‘Mrs. Antonio Duque’ instead of ‘Antonio Duque’ as originally drawn.”

Under such certificate, then, appellant could have shown a variance between the complaint and the search warrant, in that the complaint sought a search warrant to search the residence of one person while the warrant issued upon that complaint authorized the search of the residence of another.

Such variance is fatal to the validity of the search warrant. The name - of the person stated in the complaint and that in the warrant must correspond. Loven v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 260, 167 S.W.2d 515.

The trial court should have permitted appellant to show the invalidity of the search warrant in the respect mentioned.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
#### Joseph Curley GALLIEN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28885.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 20, 1957.

Russell F. Wolters, Houston, for appellant.

Dan Walton, Dist. Atty., Thomas D. White, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

Appellant, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty before the court to the charge by complaint and information of aggravated assault with an automobile, and his punishment was assessed at a fine of $750.

The evidence, if any, produced at the trial is not before us.

Other counsel were employed after judgment and a motion for a new trial was filed and, with leave of the court, thereafter amended.

The amended motion for new trial, among other things, alleged that appellant was an uneducated man of French descent who was not conversant with the English language and that he did not understand the nature of his plea of guilty; that had a person able to speak the French language been present and able to explain the nature and consequences of his plea of guilty he would not have entered such plea; that he was under the impression that he could not enter any other plea due to his ignorance and unfamiliarity with courts and court procedure.

The claimed error in the overruling of this motion is the sole question raised on this appeal.

There is no bill of exception and the claimed abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in declining to grant a new trial is not a matter which may, under the statute, be preserved and presented to *675this Court as ground for reversal without a bill of exception. Art. 760e Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. relates to motions for new-trial only where the motion is “based on jury misconduct or that the jury received new evidence during deliberations.”

We have nevertheless examined the testimony in connection with the motion and find that appellant testified in English; had attended school where he was taught in English through the third grade; and his counsel at the trial, who spoke French, testified that he acquainted appellant with the nature of the charge against him which, in his opinion, appellant understood, their conversations being in the English language.

No error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In the Interest of R. J., A Child

Appellate case number: 01-18-00729-CV

Trial court case number: CV29910

Trial court: 344th District Court of Chambers County

This Court’s November 9, 2018 Order of Abatement had abated and remanded this 

case to the trial court to determine, among other things, whether to permit appellant E.M.’s 

appointed counsel, R. A. Reba Eichelberger, to remain as counsel, or to allow her to 

withdraw and appoint new counsel in this parental termination appeal. On November 16, 

2018, the supplemental clerk’s record was filed in this Court attaching the August 20, 2018

order granting Ms. Eichelberger’s motion to withdraw and appointing Farrah Harper to

represent appellant E.M. on appeal. The supplemental reporter’s record was also filed on 

November 16, 2018, of the abatement hearing held that day in which both Ms. Eichelberger 

and Ms. Harper appeared, and the district clerk testified that she had inadvertently omitted 

the August 20, 2018 order in the clerk’s record previously filed with this Court that day.

Accordingly, the Court sua sponte directs the Clerk of this Court to REINSTATE

this case on the Court’s active docket, to remove R. A. Reba Eichelberger as appellant

E.M.’s counsel, and to designate Farrah Harper as appellant E.M.’s new lead counsel.

Appellant E.M.’s brief is ORDERED to be filed within 20 days of the date of this 

order, with no extensions to be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 2, 38.6(a)(1).

Appellee’s brief, if any, is ORDERED to be filed within 20 days of the date of the 

filing of appellant E.M.’s brief, with no further extensions to be granted absent 

extraordinary circumstances. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(b).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: __/s/ Laura C. Higley_____

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __November 20, 2018_____
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of Computer Software Innovations, Inc. (the Company), each
certify, pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that to his or her knowledge on the date of this certification:



| | 1. | The quarterly report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Nancy K. HedrickNancy K. HedrickChief Executive OfficerDate: August 16, 2010/s/ David B. DechantDavid B. DechantChief Financial OfficerDate: August 16, 2010




52
#### STATE OF CONNECTICUT *v.*BOBBY GENE SALTER

(14806)

Dupont, C. J., and Schaller and Spear, Js.

Argued December 13, 1995

decision released January 23, 1996

*Michael J. Melly,*for the appellant (defendant).

*SusannE. Gill,*assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were *Donald A. Browne,*state’s attorney, *912and *Gerard P. Eisenman,*assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

PER CURIAM.

The judgment is affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Petrol Oil and Gas, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Paul Branagan, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

|   | /s/ Paul Branagan                                             |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Paul Branagan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|   | President and Chief Executive Officer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|   | August 7, 2006                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1634 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the financing of 

the Superfund. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 15, 2011 

Mr. PALLONE (for himself and Mr. BLUMENAUER) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend 

the financing of the Superfund. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Superfund Polluter 

5 Pays Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF SUPERFUND TAXES. 

7 (a) EXCISE TAXES.—Section 4611(e) of the Internal 

8 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended to read as follows: 

9 ‘‘(e) APPLICATION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE

10 SUPERFUND FINANCING RATE.—The Hazardous SubVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:18 Apr 21, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1634.IH H1634

jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1634 IH

1 stance Superfund financing rate under this section shall 

2 apply after December 31, 1986, and before January 1, 

3 1996, and after the date of the enactment of this sub4 section and before January 1, 2019.’’. 

5 (b) CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL INCOME TAX.— 

6 Section 59A(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 

7 amended to read as follows: 

8 ‘‘(e) APPLICATION OF TAX.—The tax imposed by this 

9 section shall apply to taxable years beginning after De10 cember 31, 1986, and before January 1, 1996, and to tax11 able years beginning after the date of the enactment of 

12 this subsection and before January 1, 2019.’’. 

13 (c) TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.— 

14 (1) Section 4611(b) of the Internal Revenue 

15 Code of 1986 is amended— 

16 (A) by striking ‘‘or exported from’’ in 

17 paragraph (1)(A), 

18 (B) by striking ‘‘or exportation’’ in para19 graph (1)(B), and 

20 (C) by striking ‘‘AND EXPORTATION’’ in 

21 the heading. 

22 (2) Section 4611(d)(3) of such Code is amend23 ed— 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 1634 IH

1 (A) by striking ‘‘or exporting the crude oil, 

2 as the case may be’’ in the text and inserting 

3 ‘‘the crude oil’’, and 

4 (B) by striking ‘‘OR EXPORTS’’ in the 

5 heading. 

6 (d) EFFECTIVE DATES.— 

7 (1) EXCISE TAXES.—The amendments made by 

8 subsections (a) and (c) shall take effect on the date 

9 of the enactment of this Act. 

10 (2) INCOME TAX.—The amendment made by 

11 subsection (b) shall apply to taxable years beginning 

12 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
#### STATE of Missouri ex rel. UNIVERSITY BANK, Appellant, V. Sam C. BLAIR, Judge of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Respondent.

No. 44831.

Supreme Court of Missouri. En Banc.

Jan. 9, 1956.

*679John W. Oliver, Kansas City, Henry Andrae, Jefferson City, for petitioner. Caldwell, Downing, Garrity & Eastin, Kansas City, Hendren & Andrae, Jefferson City, of counsel.

James T. Riley, Jefferson City, Ike Skel-ton, Lexington, for intervenors. Skelton & Bradley, Lexington, of counsel.

STORCKMAN, Judge.

This is an original proceeding for mandamus instituted upon the petition of the relator, University Bank of Kansas City, against the respondent, Sam C. Blair, as judge of the Circuit'Court of Cole County, Missouri, “to the end that said Respondent be directed to hear and determine the cause pending before it on the merits of said cause.”

The cause referred to was a writ for the judicial review of a decision of the board of bank appeals. An appeal was also taken to this court from the action of the court in quashing the writ. The appeal, being cause No. 44,843, entitled, State ex rel. Rouveyrol v. Donnelly, was consolidated for argument with this mandamus proceeding. The decision in the case on appeal decided contemporaneously herewith 285 S.W.2d 669, disposes of the issues in this case. Reference is made to the opinion in the appeal case for the facts arid the grounds of the decision.

This- case is. distinguishable from decisions cited by the relator bank in that a judgment from which an appeal could be taken was rendered by the trial court in this case. .The circuit court did not' limit the issues and appears from the record to •have conducted a full hearing, although the basis of its decision was that neither the relator bank nor the commissioner of finance was lawfully authorized to prosecute the proceedings for judicial review. We have affirmed that judgment and it is decisive of this mandamus action.

The remedy by appeal was adequate to secure the only ruling which could be made. The general rule is that mandamus will not lie if a specific and adequate remedy by appeal exists. State ex rel. Howe v. Hughes, 343 Mo. 827, 123 S.W.2d 105.

The alternative writ issued herein' should be quashed, and the peremptory writ denied. It is so ordered.

All concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 583 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 308
104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                 S. 583

                          [Report No. 104-206]

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate of 
     documentation and coastwise trade endorsement for two vessels.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

               March 21 (legislative day, March 16), 1995

  Mr. Stevens introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
   referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

                            January 26, 1996

              Reported by Mr. Pressler, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate of 
     documentation and coastwise trade endorsement for two vessels.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
That notwithstanding sections 12106, 12107, and 12108 of title 46, 
United States Code, and section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 
App. U.S.C. 883), as applicable on the date of enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Transportation may issue a certificate of 
documentation with a coastwise endorsement for each of the vessels 
RESOLUTION (Serial Number 77NS8701) and PERSERVERANCE (Serial Number 
77NS8901).
                                     

                                                       Calendar No. 308

104th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                 S. 583

                          [Report No. 104-206]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate of 
     documentation and coastwise trade endorsement for two vessels.

_______________________________________________________________________

                            January 26, 1996

                       Reported without amendment
```
EXHIBIT 31.2

                                 CERTIFICATIONS


I,  Leslie  Kent,  Chief  Financial Officer of VerticalBuyer, Inc. certify that:

     1.     I  have  reviewed  this  quarterly  report  for  the  quarter  ended
September  30,  2001  on  Form  10-QSB  of  VerticalBuyer,  Inc.

     2.     Based  on  my  knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue  statement  of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to  make  the  statements  made,  in light of the circumstances under which such
statements  were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
quarterly  report;

     3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information  included  in  this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects  the  financial  condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant  as  of,  and  for,  the  periods presented in this quarterly report;

     4.     The  registrant's  other certifying officers, and I, are responsible
for  establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in  Exchange  Act  Rules  13a-14  and  15d-14)  for  the  registrant  and  have:

     a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is  made  know  to  us  by others within those entities, particularly during the
period  in  which  this  quarterly  report  is  being  prepared;

     b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures  and  presented  in  this  quarterly report our conclusions about the
effectiveness  of  the  disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period  covered  by  this  report  based  on  our  evaluation.

     c)  Disclosed  in this quarterly report any change in the issuer's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by this
quarterly  report  that  has  materially  affected,  or  is reasonably likely to
materially  affect,  the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

     5.     The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers and I have disclosed,
based  on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee  of  registrant's  board  of  directors  (or  persons  performing  the
equivalent  functions):

     a)  All  significant  deficiencies  in  the design or operation of internal
controls  which  are  reasonably  likely  to  adversely  affect the registrant's
ability  to  record,  process,  summarize  and report financial information; and

     b)  Any  fraud,  whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over
financial  reporting.

Date:  July 2, 2004

                                              /s/Leslie  Kent
                                              -------------------------
                                              Leslie  Kent
                                              Chief  Financial  Officer


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