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The Honorable Jerry Cavaneau, United States Magistrate

Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, presiding. 

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No. 95-2835

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Judy K. Clark, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Shirley S. Chater, *

Commissioner of Social Security,** Appellee. *

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Eastern

District of Arkansas. 

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Submitted: January 11, 1996

Filed: February 1, 1996 __________

Before WOLLMAN, ROSS, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. __________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Judy K. Clark appeals from a judgment in favor of Shirley S.

Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, denying her claim for

social security disability benefits. Clark filed for disability

benefits on July 15, 1991, claiming that she had been unable to

work after September 6, 1990 due to carpal tunnel syndrome, a cyst

on her left hand, and repetitive stress syndrome. The

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied her claim, and the Appeals

Council denied review. Both sides moved for summary judgment in

the district court,1 and the motion of the Secretary was granted.

 
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At the administrative hearing, Clark, three witnesses, and a

vocational expert testified. Clark was 47 years old at the time

and has a ninth grade education. Her previous jobs were as a

factory packer, tester, sewing machine operator, and assembler.

She testified that she prepares her own meals, washes dishes, shops

for groceries, drives a few times each week, takes care of her 20-

month old son, walks four miles a day, dusts and vacuums, makes the

beds, attends church occasionally, watches television, and does not

need help bathing or dressing. She complained of shoulder and neck

pain, and a loss of strength in her hands, but could cut food and

write letters. She admitted that she has no concentration or

memory problems, and that she can sit, stand, and walk without

difficulty. Two of Clark's friends and her sister provided

corroborating testimony. Dr. Dan Thompson, a vocational expert,

testified that someone of Clark's age, education, work experience,

and physical limitations could perform the jobs of interviewer,

receptionist, information clerk, and order clerk. 

Clark injured her right wrist in August 1990. An EMG and

nerve conduction study in October 1990 indicated carpal tunnel

syndrome. Carpal tunnel releases on both hands gradually improved

Clark's condition; by mid-February 1991, Clark performed range of

motion and strength activities with minimal difficulty and no

reports of pain. In early May 1991, Clark complained of neck and

shoulder pain after having planted tomatoes in her yard. In late

May 1991, Dr. John Ball removed a ganglion cyst from Clark's left

wrist. In September 1991, Dr. Ball stated that Clark was prone to

fibromyositis in her shoulders due to over use and tissue

irritation, that her hands and shoulders constituted a thirteen

percent permanent physical impairment to the person, but that she

was medically stable and could return to work as of October 7,

1991. In April 1992, Clark was placed in a short-leg walking cast

after incurring a fracture. 

Based on this testimony and medical evidence, the ALJ found
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that Clark had a medically determinable impairment of her wrist and

shoulders, but that it failed to meet or equal the disability

criteria required under the Social Security Act. The ALJ noted

that Clark probably suffered from some pain, but that her

complaints of disabling pain were not credible to the extent that

they conflicted with the objective medical evidence and her daily

living activities. He concluded that Clark could not perform her

past work as a sewing machine operator, assembler, tester, or

packer. Since Clark had the residual functional capacity for the

full range of light work reduced by limited pushing and pulling,

however, the ALJ concluded that she could work as an interviewer,

receptionist, or clerk. 

After the Appeals Council denied review, Clark filed this

action. Finding substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding,

the district court affirmed the Secretary's decision to deny

benefits and dismissed Clark's complaint.

Our review is limited to determining whether there is

substantial evidence based on the entire record to support the

ALJ's factual findings, and whether his decision was based on legal

error. Keller v. Shalala, 26 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 1994).

"Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Reed v.

Sullivan, 988 F.2d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted).

The fact that two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn does not

prevent an administrative agency's findings from being supported by

substantial evidence. Baker v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 955 F.2d 552, 554 (8th Cir. 1992). 

Clark concedes that the ALJ could reasonably conclude from the

medical evidence that her physical impairments do not significantly

limit her ability to perform the physical and mental functions set

forth in the regulations. She argues, however, that her pain is

disabling and that the ALJ failed to determine explicitly why her
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complaints of pain were not credible. She also claims that the ALJ

improperly used the Medical-Vocational Guidelines to determine that

she was not disabled. 

Disability is defined in the social security regulations as

"the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . .

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (1995). An ALJ

must weigh the credibility of the claimant's subjective complaints

of pain in terms of the claimant's daily activities, the amount and

frequency of pain, aggravating and precipitating factors,

effectiveness of medication, and functional restrictions. Polaski

v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1984). Complaints

that are inconsistent with the evidence as a whole, including

medical reports and daily activities, may be discredited by the

ALJ. Haynes v. Shalala, 26 F.3d 812, 814-15 (8th Cir. 1994). 

Here, the ALJ found that the objective medical evidence and

Clark's own testimony regarding her daily activities contradicted

her complaints of disabling pain. Clark claimed that she

constantly aches in her hands, arms, and shoulders, that she drops

things due to decreased grip strength, and that she has difficulty

sleeping due to the pain. The ALJ noted in his decision that

Clark's friends and sister provided corroborating accounts.

Although the ALJ agreed that Clark's wrist and shoulders impairment

"could be expected to produce some degree of pain," he recognized

that the real issue is not whether she is experiencing pain, but

how severe that pain is and whether it prevents her from performing

any kind of work. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th

Cir. 1991). 

According to Dr. Ball, Clark's treating orthopedist since May

1991, she is medically stable and has been able to work since

October 1991. See Onstead v. Sullivan, 962 F.2d 803, 805 (8th Cir.
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1992) (according substantial weight to treating physician). Dr.

Ball also reported that the carpal tunnel releases have improved

her grip strength and that she can make a functional grip. He also

stated that she has full cervical spine mobility and that her

shoulders are mobile with some discomfort only at the extremes of

motion. The fact that Dr. Ball did not recommend surgery or other

treatment for her shoulder condition beyond Advil and Ibuprofen, an

over-the-counter drug used for mild to moderate pain, may be used

by the ALJ to discount Clark's complaints of pain. See Haynes, 26

F.3d at 814 (lack of strong pain medication is inconsistent with

complaints of disabling pain). Finally, Clark admitted that these

drugs helped to relieve her pain. See Reed v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d

812, 815 (8th Cir. 1993) (conditions that can be reasonably

regulated cannot constitute a basis for disability).

In addition, the ALJ found that Clark's own description of her

daily activities indicated that she did not suffer disabling pain.

He noted that she could perform tasks involving fine manual

dexterity, such as buttoning clothes, handling eating utensils,

writing, and washing dishes. Clark also testified that she walks

four miles each day, does light housework for two to three hours,

attends church occasionally, drives her car as needed, watches

television, and takes care of her twenty-month old child. The ALJ

could reasonably conclude from these activities that Clark was not

precluded from work at every exertional level. See Loving v. Dept.

of Health and Human Services, 16 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir. 1994) (ALJ

properly discredited claimant's complaints of disabling pain based

on his daily activities of reading, going to church, watching

television, driving, and visiting people.)

Contrary to Clark's suggestion, the ALJ determined that Clark

could work based on the vocational expert's testimony, and he only

used the Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework for

decisionmaking. See Reed, 988 F.2d at 816 (an ALJ may not rely

exclusively on the guidelines and must consider the vocational
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expert's testimony where a claimant's nonexertional impairments

limit her ability to perform the full range of work in a specific

guidelines category). Dr. Thompson, the VE, testified that if all

of Clark's complaints were found to be credible, then she could not

perform any job. He also stated in response to a hypothetical

question, however, that the jobs of interviewer, receptionist,

information clerk, and order clerk were performable by a person of

Clark's age, education, and work experience; who was limited to no

more than light work; who had some limitation on pushing and

pulling; and who could do occasional handling. Given that the ALJ

discounted Clark's complaints of pain to some extent, and that the

medical evidence supported the physical limitations presented in

the hypothetical, the ALJ properly relied on the VE's testimony in

finding that Clark could perform jobs that were considered light

work. See Davis v. Shalala, 31 F.3d 753, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1994)

(an ALJ may rely on the VE's answer to a hypothetical question that

sets forth the impairments which the ALJ accepts as true).

In sum, we find that the ALJ properly considered Clark's

complaints of disabling pain and the vocational expert's testimony

in determining that Clark was not disabled within the meaning of

the Social Security Act. There is substantial evidence to support

this decision and we therefore affirm. 

 A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT