Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1407-CR-295 | March 30, 2015 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jeffrey D. Stonebraker

Clark County Chief Public Defender

Jeffersonville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Antonio D. Walker,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

March 30, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

10A01-1407-CR-295

Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court

The Honorable Vicki L. Carmichael, 

Judge

Cause No. 10C04-1211-MR-1

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] On November 13, 2012, Appellant-Defendant Antonio D. Walker shot Paris 

Hamilton five times in the torso. Hamilton died as a result of the gunshot 
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wounds inflicted by Walker. Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the 

“State”) subsequently charged Walker with murder. Walker was found guilty 

of the murder of Hamilton following a jury trial. On appeal, Walker contends 

that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at trial. 

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Walker went to Ashley Riley’s apartment in Jeffersonville to pick up his friend 

Amel Scott at approximately 8:00 a.m. on November 13, 2012. Scott was 

arguing with Hamilton, who had come to the apartment to pick up Michelle 

Ragland. After Hamilton removed his jacket and watch, Walker said, “I don’t 

fight with my hands, I fight with this.” Tr. p. 235. Walker then pulled a 

handgun from his jacket and pointed the handgun at Hamilton. Walker 

lowered the handgun and began to put it away before pulling it out again and 

pointing it at Hamilton for a second time. 

[3] Moments later, while Walker and Scott were standing in the doorway to Riley’s 

apartment, Walker turned, pointed the handgun at Hamilton, and shot 

Hamilton five times in the torso. Hamilton died as a result of the gunshot 

wounds inflicted upon him by Walker. 

[4] After Walker shot Hamilton, Walker and Scott fled the apartment. Walker and 

Scott then ran in two different directions. Jeffersonville Police Department 

Officer Mark Doherty subsequently located Walker, walking quickly, 
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approximately one-half mile away from Riley’s apartment. Officer Doherty 

apprehended Walker and transported him to the Jeffersonville Police Station.

[5] While at the Jeffersonville Police Station, Detective Isaac Parker informed 

Walker of his Miranda1rights. Walker agreed to waive his Miranda rights and 

talk to Detective Parker. Walker initially denied ever owning or possessing a 

handgun. Walker, however, eventually confessed to possessing a handgun, 

pulling the handgun from his jacket pocket, and shooting Hamilton five times.

[6] On November 15, 2012, the State charged Walker with murder. Walker was tried 

before a jury in a trial that commenced on April 14, 2014. On April 16, 2014, the 

jury found Walker guilty. The trial court subsequently sentenced Walker to a term 

of fifty-five years, with fifty years executed and five years suspended to probation. 

This appeal follows.

Discussion and Decision

[7] In challenging his conviction on appeal, Walker contends that the trial court 

abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at trial. The admission or 

exclusion of evidence is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. Collins v. 

State, 966 N.E.2d 96, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Farris v. State, 818 N.E.2d 

63, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 

 

1

 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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We will reverse a trial court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion. 

[Farris, 818 N.E.2d at 67]. We will consider the conflicting evidence 

most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and any uncontested evidence 

favorable to the defendant. Taylor v. State, 891 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court or it misinterprets the law. Id. In 

determining whether an error in the introduction of evidence affected 

an appellant’s substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of the 

evidence on the jury. Oldham v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1162, 1170 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2002). Admission of evidence is harmless and is not grounds for 

reversal where the evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence 

admitted. Pavey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 692, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

Id. 

[8] Walker claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence 

that Walker had possessed a handgun prior to shooting Hamilton. Specifically, 

Walker argues that the challenged evidence was not relevant as it was either (1) 

not closely related enough to the events in question or (2) overly prejudicial. 

For its part, the State claims that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the challenged evidence because the evidence was relevant to prove 

that Walker had access to the type of weapon used in the murder of Hamilton. 

The State also claims that because the mere possession of a weapon does not 

amount to misconduct, admission of evidence that Walker had previously 

possessed a handgun did not unfairly prejudice Walker. We agree.

[9] Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the 

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 

action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” 

Ind. Evidence Rule 401. “Generally speaking, relevant evidence is 

admissible, and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.” Sandifur v. State, 
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815 N.E.2d 1042, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied; Ind. 

Evidence Rule 402. Relevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded 

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice. Ind. Evidence Rule 403. These basic tenets of 

evidence are utilized in addressing the specific issue of when evidence 

of other bad acts is admissible.

Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides in pertinent part:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 

show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, 

be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 

of mistake or accident[.]

In determining the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), the 

trial court must: (1) determine whether the evidence of other crimes, 

wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the 

defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) balance the 

probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to 

Indiana Evidence Rule 403. Ware v. State, 816 N.E.2d 1167, 1175 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We employ the same test to determine whether 

the trial court abused its discretion. Id.

Southern v. State, 878 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[10] Evidence that Walker had access to and had previously possessed a handgun 

that was either the same as or similar to the handgun that he used to shoot 

Hamilton was relevant to the question of whether Walker had access to the 

murder weapon. “Evidence that a defendant had access to a weapon of the 

type used in a crime is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s 

propensity to commit the charged act.” Pickens v. State, 764 N.E.2d 295, 299 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Thompson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ind. 2000)). 

Further, although some proffered evidence may be irrelevant because it is too 
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remote, evidence of an event occurring in the past can be critical. Id. In this 

vein, the Indiana Supreme Court has explained:

Some proffered evidence may be irrelevant because it is too remote. 

For example, the fact that an adult defendant threatened the victim 

when both were children does not tell us much about their relationship 

today. On the other hand, an event occurring in the past can be 

critical. If the defendant stole the murder weapon twenty years ago 

and its presence is unaccounted for in the interim, the relevance of the 

gun theft to show access to the weapon is not obviated by the passing 

of time or by the dissimilarity between theft and murder. In short, 

admissibility hinges on relevance, not a litmus test based on an 

isolated factor—remoteness, similarity, or anything else—that may 

bear on relevance.

Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 1997).

[11] Walker challenges the admission of the testimony of two witnesses. One of 

these witnesses testified that she had seen Walker in possession of a handgun a 

month or two before the date in question. The other testified that she had seen 

Walker in possession of a handgun just prior to the shooting on the morning in 

question. With respect to the first witness, we do not believe that possession of 

a handgun by a defendant a month or two before that same defendant uses a 

handgun to commit murder is too remote to be relevant to a question as to 

whether the defendant had access to a handgun. With respect to the testimony 

of the witness who testified that she had seen Walker in possession of a 

handgun on the morning in question, such evidence is clearly not too remote as 

it goes to prove that Walker had access to a handgun on the date that he shot 

Hamilton.
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[12] The probative value of this evidence also outweighs any potential prejudice. 

Walker does not assert that he suffered any specific prejudice, but rather raises 

the generalized concern that possession of a handgun may be viewed 

unfavorably. As the State argued at trial, possession of a handgun is legal if 

certain requirements are met. We do not believe that evidence of mere 

possession is overly prejudicial when balanced against the relevance of the 

evidence that Walker had access to the type of weapon used in the murder. See 

generally, Thompson, 728 N.E.2d at 160 (providing that “[Defendant] points to 

no danger of unfair prejudice, other than a generalized concern that selling a 

weapon may be viewed unfavorably. This possibility is clearly outweighed by 

the probative value of testimony that [the Defendant] had access to a weapon of 

the type used in the murder.”).

[13] Further, in the instant case, the additional consideration that the evidence was 

offered to impeach Walker and cast doubt on his credibility leads us to the 

conclusion that such evidence was not overly prejudicial. Again, Walker 

initially told Detective Parker that, prior to the morning in question, he had 

never possessed a handgun. Although Walker eventually admitted that he had 

previously possessed a handgun, the challenged evidence was relevant to 

impeach Walker’s credibility. Walker’s credibility was at issue because 

although he admitted that he shot Hamilton five times in the torso, he claimed 

that he was justified in doing so. We do not believe that the fact that Walker 

subsequently impeached his own credibility by providing inconsistent and false 

statements to Detective Parker limits the State’s ability to also impeach 
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Walker’s credibility by providing evidence which would tend to prove that 

Walker’s prior statements were false.

[14] Additionally, we further conclude that to the extent that one could possibly 

conclude that it was error to admit the challenged evidence, we agree with the 

State that any potential error was harmless in light of Walker’s admission that 

he shot Hamilton five times.

Errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless 

unless they affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Stewart v. State, 

754 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ind. 2001); Ind. Trial Rule 61; Ind. Evidence 

Rule 103(a). An error will be deemed harmless if its probable impact 

on the jury, in light of all of the evidence in the case, is sufficiently 

minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties. Id. 

Rogers v. State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 961 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[15] Here, in addition to Walker’s confession that he shot Hamilton five times in the 

torso, the State presented the testimony of Ragland and Austin Meltzer who 

each testified that Walker had a gun in his hand in the moments before 

Hamilton was shot. Ragland testified that she had seen Walker point the 

handgun at Hamilton twice a few moments before Walker shot Hamilton. 

Meltzer testified that he saw Walker pointing the gun into Riley’s apartment 

just before he heard five gun shots. Ragland also testified that she heard five 

gun shots. We conclude that in light of the unchallenged evidence, coupled 

with Walker’s confession, the probable impact of the challenged evidence on 

the jury is sufficiently minor so as not to affect Walker’s substantial rights. As 
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such, any potential error in the admission of the challenged evidence was 

harmless.

[16] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.