NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 23a0211n.06
Case No. 22

- 2049
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.
BLAKE JOSEPH SANDLAIN, Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN OPINION

B efore : SUTTON, Chief Judge; LARSEN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. MURPHY, Circuit Judge. After serving less than half of his 15

- year sentence for federal drug and firearm offenses, Blake Sandlain sought “ compassionate release ” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court denied this relief by relying on the sentencing factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

. The cour t decided that Sandlain should serve his full prison term because he
ha s consistently committ ed new crimes soon after his release fr om custody on old ones. G iven
our deferential standard of review for thi s discretionary decision , we must affirm

. Sandlain ’s many felony convictions and parole violations have led him to spend most of his adult life in prison

. His past crimes have ranged from breaking and entering to assaulting a corrections officer. In 2004, a state court convicted Sandlain of f irearm and drug offenses when officers caught him armed and selling marijuana in Detroit, Michigan

. During his imprisonment
for these offenses , he committed over 40 prison infractions

. These infractions included assaultingNo. 22

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2

staff , fighting with fellow prisoners , and sexual misconduct. He violated the terms of his parole soon after his release from prison in 2010 , and the paro le board returned him to prison. He was released again in 201 3

. On April 28, 2014 , officers undertook a routine parole check of Sandlain’s Detroit apartment. When they knocked, t hey heard a commotion inside . B ut n obody came to the door

. Building staff eventually let the officers in to the apartment

. Sandlain had escaped out of a n open bedroom window. In th e bedroom, the officers found two firearms , 200 individual packages of
heroin , and Sandlain ’s wallet. The kitchen also contained a brick of heroin and other items commonly used in d rug trafficking. After his escape from th e apartment, Sandlain fled the state

. Officers found him a few weeks later hiding in an apartment in Charleston, West Virginia. This time, t he federal government charged Sandlain. He pleaded guilty to possessing a
firearm as a felon , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) , and to possessing heroin with the intent
to distribute i t , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)

. Sandlain’s presentence report treated him as a

career o ffender and calculated his guidelines range as 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. The
district court varied downward from this range by imposing a 180

- month sentence

. About five years into this sentence, Sandlain moved for compassionate release

. See
18 U .S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Th e statute required him to show both that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justified his immediate release and that the release comported with the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). I d. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see United States v. McCall , 56 F.4th 1048, 1054 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc). The district court found neither factor met.
As for “ extraordinary and compelling reasons ,” Sandlain relied on three circumstances : the
COVID

- 19 pandemic, his physical and mental health , and a precedential change show ing that he
would no t qualify as a “ career offender ” under the guidelines if sentenced today. According to theNo. 22

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3

court , these reasons fell short . I t highlighted the broad availability of the COVID vaccine. It found that Sandlain’s medical records did not corroborate his claimed physical and mental ailments. And
it did not view the legal change s concerning the c areer
- offender guideline as “extraordinary,” especially since the court had sentenced Sandlain below his career
- offender range anyway. As for the § 3553(a) factors, the court noted that it had already balanced those factors when sentencing Sandlain to 180 months ’ imprisonment . It decided that this balance remained correct five years later . The court reasoned that Sandlain had shown disrespect for the law through his repeated crime s, parole violations, and pri son infractions. His past behavior demonstrated the need to keep him detained given the likelihood that he would violate the terms of his supervised release if released early

. T he court added that Sandlain had not completed educational courses
recommende d by prison authorities or vocational training that could help him find a job up on his
release . It thus concluded that Sandlain was not yet prepared for his release.
Sandlain now appeal s
. We review the district court’s denial of compassionate release f or

an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ruffin , 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2020)

. Sandlain first argues that the district court committed a legal mistake

. One could read a sentence in the court’s opinion as suggest ing that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 provide d the exclusive list of “extraordinary and compelling reasons ” that could justify a prisoner’s early release

. See i d. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)

– (D). But we have held that § 1B1.13 does not apply to compassionate

release motions filed by prisoner s ( unlike motions filed by prison authorities). See McCall , 56
F.4th at 1054. So the district court would have erred if it had denied relief on the ground that it
must follow § 1B1.13

. See United States v. Sherwood , 986 F.3d 951, 953

– 54 (6th Cir. 2021).
We doubt that t he district court felt bound by § 1B1.13 after reading its opinion as a whole

. But we need not resolve this issue. Even if it committed error in th at regard, the court next heldNo. 22

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4

that it should not release Sandlain under the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). This error

- free ground independently justified the court’s denial of compassionate release. See Ruffin , 978 F.3d at 1008.
A district court has broad discretion over whether to deny relief under the § 3553(a) factors
and over whether to write an exhaustive opinion about the factors. See United States v. Navarro , 986 F.3d 668, 670

– 71 (6th Cir. 2021); Ruffin , 978 F.3d at 1005. The court may deny relief in a
short orde r when it is obvious that its initial balancing of the se factors at sentencing remains correct at the compassionate

- release stage. See Sherwood , 986 F.3d at 954. That is especially true when, as in this case, the same judge both sentence s a defendant and denies compassionate release to the
defendant. See United States v. Keefer , 832 F. App’x 359, 363 (6th Cir. 2020). Applying these deferential standards here , we see no abuse of discretion. Looking to the “nature and circumstances of the offense,” the district court reasonably concluded that Sandlain’s “[a]rmed drug trafficking” was “a serious offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A); Op., R.216, PageID 1441. Turning to Sandlain’s “history and characteristics,” the court also recounted his lengthy cri minal history, his repeated parole violations and prison infractions, and his failure to complete educational programs that might help him on his release. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); Op., R.216, PageID 1441

– 42. Sandlain’s history showed his “lack of respect for the law,” the need “to protect the public” from him, and the need for a sentence t hat provide d “adequate deterrence.”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)

– (C); Op., R.216, PageID 144 1

– 4 2. Th is balancing of the § 3553(a)
factors f e ll well within the court’s discretion. See Ruffin , 978 F.3d at 1008

– 09.
Sandlain responds that the district court did not expressly consider evidence cutting the other way. Sandlain , for example, had completed other educational programs , had held a prison job, and had proposed a “comprehensive release plan” showing that he h ad a job waiting for him upon his release . Ap pellant’s Br. 16

– 17. But a court does not abuse its discretion simply b ecauseNo. 22

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5

it does not expressly address each of a prisoner’s argument s
. See United States v. Rafidi , 842
F. App’x 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 2021). Indeed, we have held that a court may sometimes deny relief
in a form order summarily stat ing that the § 3553(a) factors d o not warrant it. See Navarro , 986
F.3d at 672. The district court did far more in this case. And, given Sandlain’s consistent track record of committing new offenses soon after his release from custody, the court reasonably held that his future dangerousness trumped any mitigating factor s that might support his release.
We affirm.