No. 2--07--0833 Filed: 12-10-08

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINO IS, ) of Wi nn eb ag o C ou nt y. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 06--CF--1256 ) RICKY HOOD, ) Honorab le ) Rosemary

Collins, Defend ant-App ellant. ) Judge , Pres idin g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE BOWMAN de livered

the opinion of the c ourt: OnMarch 5, 2007, pursuant to a fully negoti ated plea agreement, def endant, Ricky Hood, pleaded guilty to attempted ag

gravated vehicular hijacking

(720 I LCS 5/8 --4(a) , 18--4( a)(1) ( West 2006)). In excha nge, he was se ntenc ed to 1 0 years' im priso nment and ot her cha rges aga in st him

were dismissed. On June 14, 2007, defendant filed a pro se motion for a reduction of his sentence. The trial court denied

the motion as improper and untimely. On appe al, defendant arguesthat the trial court di d n ot properly dete rmine whether he was mentally fit to enter the guilty

plea, so we should vacate his conviction and allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. He alternatively

argues that

we should all ow him to fi le a motion to withdra

w his gui lty p lea. The

State ar gues tha t we must dismiss the

appeal f or lack o f jurisdiction. We ag ree with the State and dismiss

the appe al. I. BACKGROUNDNo. 2--07--0833

-2-

OnMay 3, 2006, defe

ndant was charged by

indictment with attempted aggravated vehic

ular hijacking ( 720 ILC S 5/8--4( a), 18-- 4(a)(1 ) (West 200 6)), aggrava ted batte ry (720 I LCS 5/12--4(b)(10) (West 2006 )), and u nlawful p ossession

of less tha

n 15 gra ms of coc aine (72 0 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2006 )). At a Ma y 11, 2006, hearing, defense counsel stated tha t the jail had report eda pote ntial issue regarding defenda nt's mental status, and she moved for a psy chological evaluation. The trial court granted the motion. At a June 14, 2006, hearing, the defense stated that the psy chological evaluation sh owed defendant to be unfit to stand trial. According to the report, dated May 22, 2006, Dr. Robert Meye r examined defendant on May

18, 2006. Dr. Meye

r stated that

defens e counsel had told him that defendant had been found adjudicatively incompetent in the pa st. At the time of the evaluation, defendant appeared depressed and re ported aud itory hal lucinations. He was easily confused, had difficul ty communicating, and c ould not re member the circu

mstance s surroun

ding his a

rrest. Defendant

reported that he had been homel ess an d supp orted hims elf th rough disability pay ments for schizophrenia. He was on the medications Ab ilify and Zoloft , and h e repor ted ha ving a significant

drug pr oblem. De fendant's previo us psychologic al testing indicated that he was not mali ngerin g. Dr. Meye

r opined that, altho ugh defendant had some understanding of the judicial process , hi s c ur re nt ps ych ol og ic al co nd it io n m ad e h im un ab le to co mm un ic at e m ea ni ng fu ll y, including communic ating with his attorney for the p urpose of assist i ng in his defense. Dr. Mey er concluded

that defendant was therefore unfit to stand trial. However, Dr. Mey er alsoopined tha

t, with targ eted psy

chotropi c medica

tions, def endant c ould be re stored to fitness w ithin 30 da

ys.No. 2--07--0833

1 According

to defen dant, "A ripiprazo le" is marketed

as Abilify (Phy

sician's Desk Reference 882-83 (61st ed. 2007) ) and"Sertr aline" hyd

rochlor ide is mar

keted as Zoloft ( Phys ician' s Desk Reference 2586-88 (61st ed. 2007)). -3- The partie s stipula

ted to the report on June 29, 2006. Based on the report, the trial court found that def endant w as not cur

rently fit to stand trial but could be restored to fitness within a short time. A 30-day fitness re port from the Elgin Mental Health Center, dated September 12, 2006, showed that defendant was admitted to the center on August 23, 2006. I t listeddefenda

nt's dia gnosis

as schizo-affective disorder, depressed ty pe, and polysubstance

dependence. The report indicated that he c ould be re stored to fitness f or trial i n about thr

ee months

. A 90-day fitness re

port dated September 29, 2006, stated that defendant had shown marked improvement

and that his anxiety, suspiciousness, and auditory hall ucinations had decreased. Defendant

was able to show a substantial understanding of the judicial process, indicate d an intent to coopera

te with his

attorney, and a

ppeared motivated to proceed with trial. Defenda nt was taking the medications "Ariprazole [ sic ]" and "Sertraline" 1 daily. The re port stated

that def endant w as fit to stand trial. The record indicates that the trial court was pr ovided with a co py

of this report on November

22, 2006. The trial court stated, "Based on the information that

I ha ve befor e me, I will find the defendant

fit to stand trial. I will order his custody be transported

then from the Department of Human Services to the Winnebago County Jail." Thereafter, the case was continue d many ti mes. At a Ja

nuary 11, 2007, hearing , defens e counsel stated tha

t defend ant appe ared tobe fit, but she was monitoring him closely bec ause he had told her that he was beginning to hear voic es again.No. 2--07--0833

-4-

The parties held a Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402) conf ere nce with t he trial court on March 5, 2007. Afterwards, defense counsel informe d the court that they had re ached a plea agree ment. Defendant

would plead guilty to a

ttempted aggravat ed veh icula r hija cking i n exc hange for a 10-yea r sentence and

the dismissal of other pending charges, including some that were brought under a different case number. The trial court addressed defendant, asking him if he had

taken any drugs. Defend

ant said, "My

medicine , that's

it," and , when the

trial cou rt asked what spe cific medicine, defenda

nt sa id Zoloft. Th e trial court asked if he was taking any thing else, to which defendant replied, "Something else, Idon't know the name." Defenda nt answered in the affirmative when asked if he had been on "all of that medication" for severa l months, and he stated that the medicine did not af

fect his a bility to communic ate or to

understa nd what was hap penin g at the hearing . The tria

l court a dmonished

defenda nt, and the State then provided a factual basis for the plea. Afterwards, defendant stated that he still wished to enter the plea, and he signed a wr itten plea form. The t rial court accepted the plea and sente nced defendant to 10 y

ears' imprisonment, wi t h credit for time served. It admonished him under Supre me Court Rule 605(c) (210 Ill. 2d R. 605(c)) regar ding the steps to ta

ke if he w ished to a ppeal. OnJune 14, 2007, defendant filed a pro semotion for reduction of sentence. Defendant argued that his sentence should be reduced because he was not taking

his presc ribed an tipsy chotic medicationat the time of the offense, he never g ained possession of the vehicle, and the weapon used

was a ro ck. Inan attac

hed aff idavit, defendant stated that he was filing the motion late beca use he

was denied a

ccessto the law libra

ry after h e was first transf

erred t o the Dep artment o f Correc tions. The trial court

denied the motion as improper and untimely on July

19, 2007. On August 17, 2007, defendant mailed a notice of appeal. De fendant attached an affidavit arg uing that, where thereNo. 2--07--0833

-5-

is a question of a defendant's fitness, he ca nnot be presumed

to understand

Rule 605 a

dmonishme

nts. He conclude d the aff

idavit wi th the statement, "In this instance the pe titionor [ sic ] simply

seeks a reduction in sentence for his unsuccessful criminal attempt." II. AN ALYS IS Before we can address the merits of defenda nt's appeal, wemust

determine whether we have juris di ctionin this cas e. Supre me Court Ru

le 604(d) , which g overns a ppeals f rom guil ty p leas, provides , in rele

vant par t: "No appe a l from a judgment entered upon a plea of g uilty shall be taken unless the defenda nt, within 30 days of the date on w hich sentence is imposed, files in the t ria l court

a motion to reconsider

the sente nce, if only the sentence

is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of gui lty and vaca

te the judgment. No appeal shall be taken upon a negotiated plea of g uilty challenging the sentence as excessive unless the defend ant, with in 30 day s of the imp osition of s entence , files a m otion to withdrawth e p le a o f g ui lt y and vacat e the judgment . For the purposes of this rule, a negoti atedplea o f guilty is one whic h the prosecution has bound itself to recommend a specific sentence, or a specific rang e of sentence , or where the prosecution has made concessions relating to the sentence to be imposed and not merely to the charge or charg es then pending." (Emphasis added.) 210 I ll. 2d R. 604(d). Here, defendant entered

a negotiated guilty

plea on March 5, 2007. Contrary to Rule 604 (d), he d

id not file a motion to withdra w his guilty plea but, ra

ther, filed a motion to reduce his sentence. He also f iled the motion on June 14, 2007, outside of the 30-day limit prescribed by Rule 604(d). Defendant

acknowledges that his motion for reduction of sentence did not comply with theNo. 2--07--0833

-6-

require ments of Rule 604(d). However, he arg ues that the trial court should not have denied the motion on that basis, because the question of his fitness had not been properly

resolved before the entry of the plea, so it cannot

be presumed that

he understood the trial court's Rule 605 admonitions about how

to perfe ct an app eal. De fendant argue s that hisfailure

to file a motion to withdraw the plea, or any

motion within the 30-day period, should theref ore be excused. U nder Rule 604( d), a pro

per motion

is a "condition pr

eceden t" for a reviewi n g cour t t o consider a defendant's appeal from a ple a of guilty. People v. Wilk , 12 4 Ill . 2d 93, 105 (19 88) . In Wilk , our supreme court explained that the rule was create d to allow the tr ial cour t to effic iently correct any errors that may have re sulted in

a guilty plea

( Wilk , 124 I ll. 2d at 10 4) and to e liminate needles s appeals

to the app ellate

court (Wilk , 124 Ill. 2d at 106). The

court sta ted that the appell ate court 's dismissal o f appea ls th at vi ol at e t he ru le do es no t l ea ve su ch de fe nd an ts wi th ou t a re me dy, for they could still take advantage of the Post-Conviction Hearing Ac t (now 725 IL CS 5/122--1 et seq. (West 2006)). Wilk , 124 Ill. 2d at 107. In People v. Foster , 171 Ill. 2d 469 (1996), the supreme c ourt carved out an "admonition exception" to the requirement that appeals that violate Rule 604(d) be dismissed. The court stated that, if the trial court fails to properly admonish the defendant under Rule 605 regardi ng how to appeal fr om his gui lty p lea, to di smiss his ap peal for violating Rule 604( d) would v

iolateth e defend ant's due process rights. Foster , 171 Ill. 2d at 473. I nstead, although the appellate court may have jurisdict

ion over t he appe al ( Foster , 171 Ill. 2d at 471), thecourt ma y not conside

r the mer its of the case but, rather, must remand the case f or strict compliance with Rule 604(d) ( Foster , 171 I ll. 2d at 474). This court subsequently a pplied the admonition exception to a situation where there was

a bona fide question regarding the defe ndant' s mental c ompetenc e and thus his ability to comprehendNo. 2--07--0833

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the Rule 605 a

dmonishme

nts. People v. McKay , 28 2 Ill . Ap p. 3 d 10 8, 1 12 ( 199 6). Indoing so, we held that Rule 6 04(d) re quireme nts were no t jurisdictional in the same manner a s a notice

of appea l, butrather the fail ure to f ollow the rule gave rise to the issue of whether waiver should bar the defendant's appeal. McKay , 282 Ill. App. 3d at 111. Our supreme court re visited the

relation ship betwe en Rule 60 4(d) and jurisdict ion in In re William M. , 206 Ill. 2d 595 (2003), and People v. Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d 291 (2003). I n In re William M

. , the respondent entered an admission pursuant to a plea ag reement. In re

William M. , 2 06 Ill

. 2d at 597. However, contrary to Rule 604(d), the respondent did not file a motion to withdraw the admission or a

motion to reconsider the sentence before filing a timely notice of appeal. In re William M. , 206 Ill. 2d at 597-98. T

he supre me court agree d with McKay

that the written motion requirement

of Rule 60 4(d) is not jurisdi ctional, so the fa ilure tofile such a motion does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal. In re William M. , 206 Ill. 2d at 603. In Flowers , the defendant

pleaded guilty , and she was sentenced in July 1999. Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d at 295. The defendant appealed her sentences without complying with Rule 604(d). Pursua nt to a motion by her appe llate attorney, the a ppellate court dismissed

the defendant's appeals on this basis. Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d at 296. In October 1999, the def endant filed a postconviction petition. Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d at 296. However, her appointed attorney subsequently filed a motion under Rul e 60 4(d) for rec onsideration of her sentences. After the trial c ourt denied that motion, the attorney withdrewthe postconviction petition and filed a Rule 604(d) certificate (see 210 I ll. 2dR. 604(d)). Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d

at 297. Meanwhile, the defendant had filed, pro se , two sets of notices o f appea

l. Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d at 297.No. 2--07--0833

-8-

The appellate court held that the defe ndant' s failure

to comply

with Rule 6 04(d)' s time limits for filing the motion to reconsider her sentencesdid not require dismissal of the appeal. Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d at 299. I

t reasoned that the rule's requireme nts were not jurisdictional and could be excused if consideration

of invalid parts of a sentence would better serve the ends of justice, such

as in the defendant' s case. T he appe llate cou

rt consid ered the merits of the defe ndant' s appeal

. Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d at 299. Thesupreme court reversed. It held that, because more than 30 days had passed since the defendant was sentenced, a nd the trial court had not granted an extension of the 30- day time limit, the trial

court did

not have j urisdicti on to consi der the d efenda nt's motion to reconsider

her sentences under Rule 604(d). Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d at 303. Therefore , the tr ial co urt's order denying the de fendant's motion to recon sider wa s void, and the appe llate cou

rt corre sponding ly did not have the authority to conside r the merits of

the motion. I

nstead, t he appe llate cou

rt should have vacated the trial court's order a nd dismissed the defenda

nt's app eal. Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d at 307. The Stat e ar gues that the aforementioned case s demonstrate that an appellate court has jurisdiction over a judgment on a negotiated g uilty plea, even if a

defendant has not strictly

complied with Rule 604(d)'s requirement to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, if the defendant either (1) files a timely notice of a ppeal within 30 da ys after the entry of the judgment (see In re William M. , 206 Ill. 2d at 597-98 (the respondent was sentenced on November 15, 2000, and f iled a notice of appea l o n November 27, 2000)); or (2) timely files a motion to rec onsider the sentence and appeals withi n 30 days afte r the ruling (see McKay , 282 I ll. App. 3d at 109 (the defen

dant w a s sentenced on March

18, 1994, f

iled a time ly mot ion to rec onsider t he sente nce, and then time ly appealed); see also Flowers , 208 I ll. 2d at 3 04 (di stin guish ing Flowers from People v. Belcher , 199 Ill. 2d 378 (2002), where the defendant had timely filed a motion to reconsider his sentence and thenNo. 2--07--0833

-9-

timely appealed)). Conversely, ar gues the State, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an appea l seekingto excuse a

defenda nt's fa ilure to st rictly comply with Rule

604(d) if the defendant did not file a tim ely notice of a

ppeal under Rule 606(b) (210 I ll. 2d R. 606(b)), within 30 days after the judgment or after the ruling on a timely Rule 604(d) motion. The State ma intains tha

t t hese conclusions are reflected in the supreme c ourt's decision in In re J.T. , 221 Ill. 2d 338 (2006). In In re J.T. , the respondent entered an admission in exchange for a sente nce of probation. Inre J.T. , 221 Ill. 2d at 342. Nearly one year la ter, the trial court revoked the respondent's proba tion and sentenc ed him to prison. O n appea l from the sentenc e of impri sonment, the respondent argued, among other things, that

the trial court did not prope rly admonish h

im when it in

itially sentenc ed him to probat ion and tha

t he should

be allowe d to file a

motion to withdrawhis admission and receive the necessary

admonishments. In re J.T. , 221 Ill. 2d at 344. T he resp onden t argued that, altho ugh he had not fi led a motion to withdr aw his ad missio n or an ap

peal f rom the original sentence, the appella te court sho

uld consid

er his ca se in

the interest of fairness, because as a juvenile he could not seek postconviction relief. In re J.T. , 221 Ill. 2d at 344. The appella

te court held that the trial court had not properly admonished the respondent under Rule 605(c), and it remanded the case so that he c ould be given the admonishments and have the opportunity to withdraw his admission. In re J.T. , 221 I ll. 2d at 344- 45. Howe ver, the supreme court reversed, holding that the appellate cour t lacked jurisdiction to consider the admonishment issue. In re J.T. , 221 Ill. 2d at 346. I t stated: "In noncapital ca ses an

appeal is perfected by

the timely filing of a

notice of appea

l, and it is this step whic

h vests the

appella te court with jurisdiction. 188 Ill. 2d R. 606(a). Except

as provided in Rule 604(d), the notice of appeal must be filed with the cler k of the courtNo. 2--07--0833

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within 30 days after the

entry of the f

inal judgment appealed

from, or, if a motion directed againstthe judgment is timely filed, within 30 day s after the entry

of the order disposing of that motion. 188 Ill. 2d R. [606(b)]. Rule 604(d) requires that in order to appeal from a judgment entered upon a ple a of gu

ilty , a defe

ndant must

first file inthe trial court a written motion to either withdraw his guilty plea or reconsider the sentence. 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). Insuch cases, the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the de nial of that motion. 188 Ill. 2d R. [606(b)]. The appellate court may also allow the filing of a late notice of appeal. 188 Ill. 2d R. 606(c). Inthe pre sent case, J.T. did not file a timely notice of a ppeal from the order sentencinghim

to probation, a written motionto either withdraw

his plea or recon sider his sentence, or a motion

for lea ve to file a late no ti ce of appeal. Conseque ntly , the appe llate court had no jurisdic ti on to consi der any issues ar ising fr om either his guilty

plea or h is sentence." In re J.T. , 221 Ill. 2d at 346-47. Similar to In re J.T. , in

the instan

t case de fendant

did not timely appeal under Rule 606( b) fromthe order

sentencing him to 10 ye ars' imprisonment, nor did he file a motion to either withdraw his guilty plea or r econside r his sente

nce withi n the 30-d

ay time limit imp osed by

Ru le 604(d)

. Defendant

also did not file a motion for leave to file a late notice o f appeal from the sentencing order. Therefore, as in In re J.T. , we lack jurisdiction to consider the issues that he raises on appeal regarding his guilty plea. As the State points out, defenda

nt's ca se and In re J.T. are distingu ishable fromthe cited

cases r esulting in remands. In each

of the latter group of cases, althoug h the defendant may have fa iled to fil e a motion

to withdraw

the guil ty plea, the reviewing court still had jurisdiction because the defendant either had timely appealed within 30 day s of the order imposing the sentenceNo. 2--07--0833

-11-

or h ad timely

fil ed a postplea motion and had timely a ppealed from the trial court's ruling on tha t motion. We pause to no te that he re the tr ial cour t "denie d" defe

ndant' s motion to r

econside r his sentence as "improper and untimely filed." However, the trial court techn ically sh ould have dismissedthe motion because it lacked subject matter jurisdict ion to co ns id er it ; m or e t ha n 3 0 d ays had passed since the t

rial cou rt im posed the sentence and it had not extended the time limitation. See Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d at 303. Still, the trial court correctly did not consider the merits of defend ant's motion, and we do not believe that its inexact terminology c hanges the substanc e of its rulin g. Even if it did, the result would substantively be the same. A trial court ruling that is made withoutsubject matter jurisdiction is void, and the remedy on appeal would be to va c ate the trial court's ruling and dismiss the appeal. Flowers , 208 Ill. App. 3d at 306-07. Defendant

argues that

his appeal is proper under Peoplev. Jones , 349 Ill. App. 3d 255 (2004). There, pursuant

to a fitne ss evalua

tion, the tr

ial cour t found the

defenda nt mentall y f it to stand trial while he was on his current medication. Jones , 349 Ill. App. 3d at 257. The defendant later pleaded guilty inexchange for concessions from the State. Jones , 349 Ill. App. 3d at 258. However, at the time the trial court accepted the defenda nt's guilty ple a, the defendant said that hehad been taken off his medication two to three weeks before. Jones , 349 Ill. App. 3d at 258. About 21⁄2 years a

fter he was sentenced, the defendant moved to rec onsider the sentence, and the trial cou

rt denie d the motion

as u ntimely. J ones , 349 Ill. App. 3d at 258. The appellate c ourt held that, altho ugh defenda

nt failed to comply

with Rule 604(d), he was not sufficiently found fit for the guilty plea hea ring, so he could notbe presumed to have understood the trial court's Rule 605(c ) admonishments concerning Rule 604(d) procedur es. Jones , 349 Ill. App. 3d at 259. The court reliedNo. 2--07--0833

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on McKay

and Foster

in holding

that, unde

r such ci rcumstan ces, it wa s not requ

ired to dismiss the appeal despite the lack of compliance with Rule 604(d). Jones , 349 Ill. App. 3d at 259-60 . T he court reasoned that Flowers did not re quire a d iffere nt result, because

the Flowers court stated that the dismiss al of an appeal for the defenda nt's failure to file the appropriate Rule 604(d) motion i s improper if the defendant was not properly admonished regarding the nee d to file such a motion. Jones , 349 Ill. App . 3d at 260. The appellate court noted that the Flowers court held that the defendant had been properly

admonished before holding that the untimely filing of her Rule 604(d) motion deprived the trial court of jur isdi ction and de prive d the a ppell ate cou rt of t he " 'aut horit y' " to consider the appeal on the merits. Jones , 349 Ill. App. 3d at 260. The appellate c ourt reversed and remanded the case for a dete rmination of the defendant's fitness to plead and for f urther proceedings, if necessary

. Jones , 349 Ill. App. 3d at 262. Justice Schmidt dissented. He noted that the defendant's motion to reduce his sentenc e was untimely under Rule 604(d) because it was filed more than two y ears after the defendant wa s sentenced. Jones , 349 Ill. App. 3d at 263 (Schmidt, J., dissenting). He reasoned that, under Flowers , the trial court

was thus r

equired to dismiss th e motion for lack of jurisdict ion and tha

t the appe llate court, in turn, had no authority to consider the appeal's merits. Jones , 34 9 Il l. App. 3d at 26 3 (Schmidt, J., dissenting). Justice Schmidt concluded that the appeal should be dismissed. Jones , 349 Ill. App. 3d at 263 (Schmidt, J., dissenting). We agree with the dissenting justice in Jones that the majority opinion was wrongly decided. Alth ough the majority

relied on McKay

and Foster

in deter mining th at it was not requir ed to dismis s the appeal, in McKay

the defendant filed a timely motion to reconsider his sentence and in Foster the defendant

appealed after thetrial cou rt denie d his oral

motion for

reconsi deration. Nothing inNo. 2--07--0833

-13-

McKay and Foster

in di cat es t hat th e ap pel lat e co urt s l ack ed j uri sdi cti on o ver th ose cas es. In contras t, the defendant in Jones did not timely appeal within 30 day s of h is se ntence, nor did he timely move to reconsi der his sentence and thereafter timely appeal. Thus, under Flowers , the trial court did nothave jurisdiction to consider the merits of his motion to

reconsi der, and

the appe llate court should have dismissed the appeal. Although the Jones court tried to distinguish Flowers on the b a sis that the Flowers defendant was properly admonished, In re J.T. demonstr ates tha t this distinction is not relevant to jurisdiction. In In re J.T. , the appellate court found that the respondent had not been properly

admonished

under Rul e 605(b) , but the su preme c ourt held

that, because the respondent

had not timely perfe cted an appeal from the se ntencing order he was challeng ing, the appella te court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether t he cause s hould be remanded for proper admonishments
. In re J.T. , 221 Ill. 2d at 353. Accordingly , Jones ' logic is faulty , and it does not provide an alternative basis for jurisdiction here. Fi na ll y, we note that, although a lack of jurisdi ction pre cludes us from con sidering

the merit s of defendant's appeal at this time, he still may potential ly obtain r elief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. III. CONCL USION Becau se defenda

nt did not ( 1) tim ely appe al within 3 0 day s of the f inal judg ment on his guilty plea, (2) timely fi le a motion to either withdraw the plea or reconsider the se ntence and thereafter timely appeal, or ( 3) file a motion for leave to file a late notice of appe al, we lack jurisdiction to addre ss any issues re gardin

g his g uilt y plea and

sentence, including the issue of whether the trial court pr operly found him f

it to enter the plea . We there fore dis miss his app eal. Appeal dismissed.No. 2--07--0833

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HUTCHINSON and GROMETER, JJ., concur.