This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by

the Superintendent of Documents.

Rules and Regulations Federal Register

13975 

Vol. 89, No. 38 

Monday, February 26, 2024 

1 18 CFR pt. 1b (2023). 

2See Enf’t of Statutes, Reguls. and Ords., 123 

FERC ¶ 61,156, at PP 33–34 (2008) (Revised Policy 

Statement on Enforcement). 

FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION 

12 CFR Parts 614 and 620 

RIN 3052–AD54 

Loan Policies and Operations 

AGENCY: Farm Credit Administration. 

ACTION: Notification of effective date. 

SUMMARY: The Farm Credit 

Administration (FCA, we, or our) issued 

a final rule amending our regulations 

governing young, beginning, and small 

farmers and ranchers (YBS). 

DATES: The final rule was published on 

December 27, 2023 (88 FR 89280), and 

is effective as of February 14, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Technical information: Jessica 

Tomlinson-Potter, Senior Policy 

Analyst, Office of Regulatory Policy, 

(703) 819–4667, TTY (703) 883–4056, 

potterj@fca.gov. 

or 

Legal information: Hazem Isawi, 

Senior Attorney, Office of General 

Counsel, (703) 883–4022, TTY (703) 

883–4056, isawih@fca.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

October 12, 2023, FCA issued a final 

rule amending our regulations at 12 CFR 

parts 614 and 620 governing service to 

YBS. The final rule clarifies the 

responsibilities of funding banks in the 

review and approval of direct lender 

association YBS programs, strengthens 

funding bank internal controls, and 

bolsters YBS business planning. 

In accordance with 12 U.S.C. 

2252(c)(1), the effective date of the rule 

is no earlier than 30 days from the date 

of publication in the Federal Register 

during which either or both Houses of 

Congress are in session. Based on the 

records of the sessions of Congress, the 

effective date of the regulations is 

February 14, 2024. 

Dated: February 21, 2024. 

Ashley Waldron, 

Secretary to the Board, Farm Credit 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2024–03870 Filed 2–23–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6705–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

18 CFR Part 1b 

[Docket No. PL24–2–000] 

Enforcement of Statutes, Orders, 

Rules, and Regulations 

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, DOE. 

ACTION: Policy statement. 

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission revises its 

process for resolving by settlement 

investigations pursuant to the 

Commission’s regulations. Pursuant to 

this policy statement, the Commission 

grants the Director of Enforcement the 

discretion to authorize Office of 

Enforcement staff to engage in 

settlement negotiations without first 

seeking settlement authority from the 

Commission. When Office of 

Enforcement staff receives a viable offer 

of settlement from the subject of an 

investigation, it will present that offer to 

the Commission for voting, as is the case 

now. While the new process grants 

Office of Enforcement staff new 

discretion to commence settlement 

negotiations, it does not change the fact 

that it is the Commission that ultimately 

determines whether any proposed 

settlement of an investigation is in the 

public interest. 

DATES: This policy statement is effective 

February 26, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jennifer Gordon, Office of Enforcement, 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, 888 First Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502– 

5908, jennifer.gordon@ferc.gov 

John Hebden, Office of Enforcement, 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, 888 First Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502– 

8821, john.hebden@ferc.gov 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Policy Statement on Process for 

Resolving Investigations by Settlement 

(Issued February 15, 2024) 

1. The Commission issues this policy 

statement to provide updated guidance 

as to our enforcement process and 

policies concerning resolution by 

settlement of investigations that are 

initiated pursuant to part 1b of the 

Commission’s regulations.1 Based on 

our experience over the past 15 years 

operating pursuant to our existing 

settlement process as originally adopted 

in 2008,2 consideration of other Federal 

enforcement program settlement 

processes, and related industry 

feedback, we have determined that the 

Commission’s existing settlement 

process would benefit from certain 

enhancements. Specifically, and in 

recognition of the important role that 

settlements play in enforcement, the 

reforms discussed herein are designed 

to streamline the settlement process, to 

ensure that both the Commission and 

subjects of Commission investigations 

can resolve investigations efficiently. 

2. As discussed in more detail below, 

pursuant to this Policy Statement, we 

replace the Commission’s existing 

process whereby Office of Enforcement 

(Enforcement) staff must seek settlement 

authority from the Commission prior to 

engaging in settlement negotiations with 

the subject of an investigation, with a 

process where the Director of 

Enforcement has the discretion to 

authorize Enforcement staff to engage in 

such negotiations. Under this new 

process, formal settlement authority, 

with settlement terms pre-reviewed by 

the Commission, will not be a necessary 

precondition to the initiation of 

settlement negotiations. Instead, with 

the Director of Enforcement’s 

authorization, Enforcement staff will 

engage in negotiations with the subject 

of an investigation and, if and when 

Enforcement staff receives a viable 

settlement offer from the subject, it will 

negotiate the applicable terms and 

thereafter present the written Offer of 

Settlement to the Commission for formal 

voting. Importantly, while the new 

process grants Enforcement staff new 

discretion to commence and engage in 

settlement negotiations, it does not 


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3 Id. P 33. 

4 Id. 

5 Id. 

6Rather, the Commission determines only 

whether the settlement is a fair and equitable 

resolution of the matters concerned and is in the 

public interest. See, e.g., Todd Meinershagen, 181 

FERC ¶ 61,251, at PP 14–20 (2022); ISO-New 

England, Inc., 180 FERC ¶ 61,223, at PP 88–95 

(2022); Enerwise Glob. Tech., LLC d/b/a CPower, 

180 FERC ¶ 61,126, at PP 17–18 (2022). 

7Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement at P 

1. The Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement 

followed an earlier policy statement on 

Enforcement issued in 2005, following enactment of 

the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law 109–58, 

119 Stat. 594 (2005) (EPAct 2005). See Enf’t of 

Statutes, Ords., Rules, and Reguls, 113 FERC 

¶ 61,068 (2005) (Policy Statement on Enforcement). 

8Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement at P 

5. 

9 Id. PP 20–71. 

10 In adopting and subsequently revising its 

Penalty Guidelines, the Commission formalized this 

financial benefit for settling parties, by providing a 

specific and transparent credit to subjects in the 

penalty calculation for resolving a matter without 

the need for a trial-type hearing. The Commission 

also separately provides credit for cooperating with 

Enforcement staff and for accepting responsibility. 

See FERC Penalty Guidelines Section 1C2.3(c) 

(detailing possible reductions to the culpability 

score, which is used to calculate the civil penalty 

guideline ranges for any particular violation of an 

organization). 

11Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement at P 

33. 

12 Id. 

13 Id. P 34. 

14 Id. (requiring Enforcement staff to provide the 

Commission with the subject’s written response to 

staff’s views, if submitted, so that the Commission 

has both the views of its staff and the subject before 

it determines whether to authorize settlement 

negotiations). 

15 Id. 

16 If at any time Enforcement staff determines that 

no violation has occurred, the evidence is 

insufficient to warrant further investigation, or no 

further action is otherwise called for based on a 

totality of the circumstances, it closes the 

investigation. Id. P 31. Enforcement staff’s annual 

Reports on Enforcement detail examples of cases 

that Enforcement staff closes without taking action. 

See e.g., 2023 Report on Enforcement, Docket No. 

AD07–13–017, at 19 (Nov. 16, 2023). 

17The civil penalty range for organizations is 

informed by the Commission’s Penalty Guidelines. 

Penalties for individuals are determined on a caseby-case basis. See FERC Penalty Guidelines Section 

1A1.1, Application Note 1. 

change the fact that it is the Commission 

that ultimately determines whether a 

settlement of an investigation is in the 

public interest and should be approved. 

3. Given the significant role 

settlements play in the Commission’s 

enforcement program, it is important to 

ensure that the policies and practices 

governing the settlement process are 

efficient and effective. Ensuring that the 

Commission moves expeditiously 

benefits the subjects of Commission 

investigations who want to resolve 

investigations early, as well as any 

market participants, customers, and the 

public who may have been harmed by 

the alleged violations and to whom 

disgorgement and restitution may be 

directed once settlement is achieved. 

The reforms adopted herein to the 

Commission’s settlement process 

enhance both Enforcement staff’s and 

investigative subjects’ ability to 

negotiate settlements and reduce the 

time it takes to reach resolution by 

settlement. As a result, the 

Commission’s settlement practices will 

better align with those of similarly 

situated Federal agencies which do not 

require that Enforcement staff request 

settlement authority prior to engaging in 

settlement negotiations with subjects of 

investigations. 

I. Introduction and Background 

A. Role of Settlements in Part 1b 

Investigations 

4. Settlement is the preferred means 

for the Commission to resolve 

investigations that would otherwise 

result in a recommendation of remedial 

action.3 Settlements allow the 

Commission to devote its limited 

resources to investigating other cases, 

rather than expending significant 

resources in protracted litigation, which 

supports our mission of ensuring the 

jurisdictional markets remain free from 

fraud, manipulation, and anticompetitive conduct.4 The Commission 

has explained that ‘‘the public interest 

is often better served through 

settlements because we are able to 

ensure that compliance problems are 

remedied faster and that disgorged 

profits may be returned to customers 

faster.’’ 5 In addition, while the 

Commission does not make findings as 

to whether a violation occurred in an 

order approving or rejecting a settlement 

offer,6 early and transparent publication 

of settlements permits the Commission 

to expeditiously alert other market 

participants to potential compliance 

pitfalls and helps avoid repetition of 

unlawful conduct. 

B. Revised Policy Statement on 

Enforcement 

5. In 2008, the Commission issued its 

Revised Policy Statement on 

Enforcement to ‘‘provide guidance to 

the regulated community as to [its] 

enforcement policies concerning our 

governing statutes, regulations, and 

orders.’’ 7 The Revised Policy Statement 

on Enforcement was designed to ‘‘give 

the industry a fuller picture of how our 

investigative process works, including 

the considerations Enforcement staff 

takes into account in determining 

whether to open an investigation and, 

once opened, whether to close it 

without further action or to recommend 

sanctions.’’ 8 Consistent with this 

purpose, the Revised Policy Statement 

on Enforcement detailed the procedures 

the Commission, and in particular 

Enforcement staff, follow when 

initiating, conducting, and resolving an 

investigation.9

6. The Revised Policy Statement on 

Enforcement explained that, before 

recommending the Commission 

commence an enforcement proceeding, 

Enforcement staff will attempt to reach 

a settlement with the subject of an 

investigation. The Commission noted 

that this is valuable to the subjects of 

investigations, who benefit from 

potentially lower negotiated penalties 10

and avoiding the costs and risks of 

litigation.11 Further, the Commission 

explained that resolution of 

investigations by settlement benefits the 

public interest, by ensuring the quick 

remediation of compliance problems 

and return to customers of any ill-gotten 

gains.12

7. With regard to process, the Revised 

Policy Statement on Enforcement set 

forth a means by which Enforcement 

staff would request settlement authority 

from the Commission, prior to engaging 

in settlement negotiations.13 It 

explained that Enforcement staff would 

seek ‘‘authority to negotiate within a 

range of potential civil penalties and/or 

disgorgement’’ and that this process 

would ensure that ‘‘the Commission, not 

staff, determines the appropriate range 

of remedies for purposes of 

settlement.’’ 14 If Enforcement staff and 

the subject of an investigation reach a 

settlement in principle, the Revised 

Policy Statement on Enforcement 

provides that staff will submit an 

executed Stipulation and Consent 

Agreement to the Commission for its 

consideration.15

C. Current Policies and Practices 

Regarding Settlement of Part 1b 

Investigations 

8. Since issuance of the Revised 

Policy Statement on Enforcement in 

2008, Enforcement staff has followed 

the process detailed therein whereby it 

seeks settlement authority from the 

Commission prior to entering into 

settlement negotiations with the subject 

of an investigation. Pursuant to this 

process, after commencing an 

investigation under part 1b of the 

Commission’s regulations and engaging 

in initial discovery, but before any 

formal settlement negotiations take 

place, Enforcement staff presents to the 

Commission its views, as developed to 

that date by the investigation,16 and a 

recommended range of potential civil 

penalties 17 and/or disgorgement. The 


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18See Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement 

at P 32 (describing the process by which 

Enforcement staff shares its preliminary findings 

with investigative subjects and provides them the 

opportunity to respond). 

19 Id. P 34. 

20See generally Revised Policy Statement on 

Enforcement. 

21Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement at PP 

10–11 (noting that from the time of EPAct 2005 

going into effect through the issuance of the 2008 

Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement, the 

Commission had only resolved 14 investigations by 

settlement and had only issued two Orders to Show 

Cause, which at that time remained pending 

proceedings). 

22See Enf’t of Statutes, Ords., Rules, and Reguls., 

132 FERC ¶ 61,216 (2010) (Revised Policy 

Statement on Penalty Guidelines) (adopting the 

FERC Penalty Guidelines, which are modeled on 

the United States Sentencing Guidelines). 

23See 2023 Report on Enforcement at 19. During 

this time, Enforcement has also initiated and 

subsequently closed without further action 

hundreds of investigations. 

24See id. at 20–22 (describing the types of 

violations Enforcement staff has resolved by 

settlement, including violations of: the Federal 

Power Act, Natural Gas Act, and Interstate 

Commerce Act; RTO/ISO tariff provisions; the 

Reliability Standards; the Anti-Manipulation Rule 

and the Commission’s market behavior rules; 

Commission orders; amongst others). 

25Revised Policy Statement on Penalty 

Guidelines at P 2. 

26 Id. PP 2, 5 (‘‘[T]he Penalty Guidelines . . . 

provide more clarity and consistency by assessing 

civil penalties based on objective characteristics 

and a uniform set of factors weighted similarly for 

similar violations and similar violators. . . . [T]he 

Penalty Guidelines . . . provide transparency by 

describing the factors we consider in our penalty 

determinations and the weight afforded to each 

factor.’’). 

27The Commission retains the discretion to 

depart from the Penalty Guidelines, based on an 

individualized assessment of the facts presented in 

any case, when appropriate. Id. PP 2, 5, 19. 

However, it is worth noting that departures from the 

Penalty Guidelines are uncommon. In the context 

of settlement negotiations, Enforcement staff will 

inform the subject of the investigation of any 

departures from the Penalty Guidelines it will 

recommend to the Commission. Id. P 32 n.51. 

28See, e.g., Todd Meinershagen, 181 FERC 

¶ 61,251. 

29See, e.g., Vitol Inc., 169 FERC ¶ 61,070 (2019) 

(assessing civil penalty of $1,000,000 against 

Federico Corteggiano, a trader for Vitol Inc.); 

Houlian Chen, 151 FERC ¶ 61,179 (2015) (assessing 

civil penalty of $1,000,000 against Houlian Chen, a 

trader for Powhatan Energy Fund, LLC, HEEP Fund, 

LLC, and CU Fund, Inc.); Coaltrain Energy, L.P., 155 

FERC ¶ 61,204 (2016) (assessing civil penalties of 

$5,000,000 each against Peter Jones and Shawn 

Sheehan, co-owners of Coaltrain Energy, L.P., and 

$1,000,000 against Robert Jones, $500,000 against 

Jeff Miller, and $500,000 against Jack Wells, traders 

for Coaltrain Energy, L.P.). Each of the 

aforementioned cases against individuals 

subsequently settled. See Vitol Inc., 186 FERC 

¶ 61,008 (2024); Coaltrain Energy, L.P., 181 FERC 

¶ 61,031 (2022); Houlian Chen, 177 FERC ¶ 61,076 

(2021). 

30Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement at P 

34. Notably, this statement predates the 

Commission’s adoption of Penalty Guidelines for 

organizations, the existence of which now provides 

Continued 

subject’s response to Enforcement staff’s 

preliminary findings, if available, is also 

provided to the Commission.18 The 

Commissioners then determine whether 

to approve, modify, or deny the 

settlement authority, or provide 

alternative direction on how to proceed 

with the investigation. 

9. Settlement authority is not preapproval of any settlement ultimately 

reached between Enforcement staff and 

an investigative subject consistent with 

the authority granted. Any settlement 

reached after obtaining settlement 

authority must still subsequently be 

approved by the Commission to be 

effective, based on a finding that the 

settlement is in the public interest. 

Thus, while Enforcement staff can 

recommend a settlement to the 

Commission, it cannot guarantee that 

the Commission will approve a 

recommended settlement, including the 

specific terms and conditions of the 

final stipulation and agreement. After 

Enforcement staff reaches a proposed 

settlement with a subject, it submits a 

Stipulation and Consent Agreement— 

executed by both the subject and the 

Director of Enforcement—to the 

Commission for formal voting. The 

Stipulation and Consent Agreement, as 

well as the related order approving the 

settlement, are generally released 

publicly upon approval.19

II. Discussion 

A. Need for Reform 

10. The Commission’s existing 

process for settling cases, which 

requires staff to seek settlement 

authority from the Commission in all 

cases prior to engaging in settlement 

negotiations, would benefit from certain 

improvements in light of both 

Enforcement staff’s increased and broad 

experience investigating violations and 

recommending appropriate sanctions for 

such violations, and inefficiencies that 

the current authorization process can 

present in many cases for the 

Commission, Enforcement and other 

Commission staff, and investigative 

subjects. 

11. The existing settlement authority 

process was adopted in the 2008 

Revised Policy Statement on 

Enforcement, as part of the 

Commission’s efforts to provide 

guidance to the regulated community as 

to our enforcement policies in light of 

the enhanced enforcement tools created 

by EPAct 2005.20 At the time of issuance 

of the 2008 Revised Policy Statement on 

Enforcement, the Commission had little 

experience implementing its new 

enforcement authorities 21 and had not 

yet adopted the Penalty Guidelines.22

12. Over the past 15 years, the 

Commission has gained significant 

experience implementing its enhanced 

enforcement authorities. Since 2007, 

Enforcement staff has negotiated over 

150 settlements, pursuant to which 

investigative subjects have agreed to pay 

almost a billion dollars in civil penalties 

and over a half a billion dollars in 

disgorgement.23 The breadth and 

diversity of matters investigated and 

settled has allowed Enforcement staff to 

gain broad experience, which informs 

settlement negotiations by allowing 

Enforcement staff to compare factual 

circumstances to prior matters when 

considering appropriate remedies in 

those negotiations.24 Similarly, in recent 

years the Federal courts have issued 

opinions interpreting the Commission’s 

enforcement authorities. These Federal 

court cases shed light on legal 

principles, which in turn can help guide 

and inform settlement negotiations by 

giving insight into the strength of 

Enforcement staff’s legal claims, for 

example. 

13. Further, in 2010, after adoption of 

the existing settlement authority 

process, the Commission adopted its 

Penalty Guidelines to ‘‘add greater 

fairness, consistency, and transparency 

to our enforcement program.’’ 25 The 

Penalty Guidelines assign specific and 

transparent weight to each factor taken 

into consideration in calculating a 

proposed penalty, allowing 

organizations to know with more 

certainty and in advance how each 

factor will be applied in any particular 

case, thereby allowing an organization 

to evaluate how much risk it could face 

in light of an investigation of potential 

violations.26 Since their adoption, 

Enforcement staff has used the Penalty 

Guidelines to analyze and calculate an 

appropriate penalty range for any 

alleged violations of organizations being 

investigated, thus ensuring consistency 

and transparency across investigations. 

Given this experience, Enforcement staff 

need not obtain express sign-off from 

the Commission on a particular 

settlement range prior to engaging in 

settlement negotiations.27 Similarly, 

Enforcement staff has also gained 

experience recommending civil 

penalties for individuals and settling 

such matters 28 and the Commission has 

precedent assessing civil penalties 

against individuals.29

14. We note also that one of the only 

stated justifications for adopting the 

existing settlement authority process in 

the 2008 Revised Policy Statement on 

Enforcement was that it would 

‘‘ensure[ ] that the Commission, not 

staff, determines the appropriate range 

of remedies for purposes of 

settlement.’’ 30 Under the revised 


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staff significant guidance in their determination of 

appropriate penalties in a given matter. 

31Sometimes the subject of an investigation may 

not want to engage in settlement negotiations at all. 

Even in situations where Enforcement staff thinks 

settlement is unlikely, under the existing process it 

still requests settlement authority from the 

Commission. In such situations, this process ends 

up being a mere formality. 

32By ‘‘viable’’ we mean a settlement offer that 

Enforcement staff, in its considered discretion, 

believes is sufficient to recommend to the 

Commission for approval based on Commission 

precedent, the facts of the case, and review of the 

Penalty Guidelines. 

33This replaces the existing process whereby 

Enforcement staff typically submits for voting a 

Stipulation and Consent Agreement executed by 

both the subject of the investigation and the 

Director of Enforcement. 

settlement process the Commission will 

continue to determine the appropriate 

remedy for purposes of settlement. The 

Commission must approve any 

settlement Enforcement staff negotiates 

and find that the settlement and its 

terms are in the public interest. Giving 

Enforcement staff the discretion to 

initiate settlement negotiations does not 

affect the Commission’s ability to 

ultimately consider, discuss, and 

approve or reject the proposed 

resolution of any matter. 

15. Further, in addition to 

developments over the past 15 years, the 

Commission has also found that, in its 

experience, requiring pre-authorization 

to engage in settlement negotiations in 

all cases—regardless of the seriousness 

of the alleged violation or the 

complexity of the case—creates 

unnecessary burdens on Commission 

staff and investigative subjects who are 

seeking prompt resolution of 

investigations. 

16. The existing settlement authority 

process can result in an inefficient 

allocation of limited agency resources. 

Under the existing process, in all cases 

Enforcement staff and other 

Commission program offices invest 

significant time in seeking approval to 

commence negotiations, no matter how 

likely the prospects of settlement are. 

However, after all the time and effort 

spent on pre-authorization to engage in 

settlement negotiations, the parties may 

not agree to the terms of a settlement.31

In these cases, the Commission 

resources and time spent preauthorizing settlement authority could 

have instead been expended on other 

Commission priorities. 

17. Investigative subjects have also 

expressed frustration at the time it can 

take to complete the settlement 

authority process in some cases. 

Enforcement staff has found that 

increasingly subjects are inclined to try 

to resolve investigations quickly 

through settlement, particularly in cases 

where there are no factual disputes. 

Moreover, prolonging the settlement 

process by requiring authorization to 

negotiate can result in added burden 

and expense on investigative subjects. 

As a result, investigative subjects are 

often ready to begin negotiations and 

determine whether a settlement is 

attainable, and the existing settlement 

authority process represents a delay— 

sometimes of several months or more— 

in getting to this step. 

18. Finally, the prolonged settlement 

authority process also delays public 

dissemination of information about the 

alleged misconduct. Transparency can 

help prevent further misconduct by 

sending a message of deterrence. 

Moreover, expedient resolution of 

investigations by settlement ensures that 

ill-gotten gains are returned to harmed 

market participants and consumers as 

quickly as possible. 

19. Both the experience Enforcement 

staff has gained investigating and 

settling diverse cases over the past 15 

years and the adoption of, and 

experience applying, the Penalty 

Guidelines have created a strong 

framework for Enforcement staff to 

evaluate whether settlement of an 

investigation, and on what terms, can be 

recommended to the Commission to be 

found to be in the public interest. 

Further, we find that the existing 

settlement authority process is 

inefficient, in that it unnecessarily 

consumes limited agency resources and 

potentially delays resolution of 

investigations by settlement. These 

factors weigh heavily in favor of 

streamlining the settlement process to 

eliminate the unnecessary intermediate 

step of getting settlement authority. 

B. Streamlined Settlement Process 

20. In light of our experience and also 

feedback received from the regulated 

industry and subjects of Commission 

investigations, we hereby revise our 

existing process for settling 

investigations initiated pursuant to part 

1b of the Commission’s regulations. 

Specifically, we will no longer require 

Enforcement staff to obtain settlement 

authority from the Commission prior to 

initiating and negotiating a potential 

settlement of an investigation. Instead, 

we hereby grant the Director of 

Enforcement the authority to authorize 

Enforcement staff to commence 

settlement negotiations and/or respond 

with counteroffers to settlement 

negotiations initiated by a subject. The 

Director of Enforcement retains the 

existing discretion to engage with the 

Commission for feedback prior to 

authorizing staff to engage in such 

settlement negotiations on any 

particular investigation. 

21. After engaging in settlement 

negotiations, should an investigative 

subject submit a viable Offer of 

Settlement,32 Enforcement staff will 

submit the Offer of Settlement to the 

Commission for voting, along with any 

other information that might aid the 

Commission’s determination as to 

whether to accept the Offer of 

Settlement, including for example, 

details about the specifics of the alleged 

violation(s), facts developed by the 

investigation to date, and/or the relevant 

law. Enforcement staff will also submit 

the subject’s response to any 

preliminary findings issued by 

Enforcement staff, when available. The 

Offer of Settlement will be executed by 

the subject of the investigation and will 

remain non-public unless and until it is 

approved by the Commission.33

22. The major benefit of this approach 

to settlement negotiations is that it will 

greatly improve the efficiency of the 

settlement process, thereby allowing 

Enforcement staff to devote time that 

would otherwise be spent seeking 

settlement authority to other 

Commission investigations or 

proceedings. Further, unlike the existing 

settlement authority process, this new 

process ensures that Commission staff 

and the Commissioners are only 

investing time analyzing settlement 

terms that are known to be acceptable to 

the subject of the investigation, as they 

have been presented in an Offer of 

Settlement. We expect that these 

efficiency gains will lead to speedier 

resolutions of investigations, which will 

better serve the subjects of 

investigations, as well as the public who 

will see the benefits of required 

remediation faster. We also note that the 

approach to settlement negotiations set 

forth in this policy statement aligns 

with other similarly situated Federal 

agency enforcement programs, 

including the Securities and Exchange 

Commission and the Commodity 

Futures Trading Commission. 

23. Further, as previously stated, this 

new process does not change the fact 

that it is the Commission, not staff, that 

ultimately determines whether or not 

any settlement of an investigation is in 

the public interest. Consistent with our 

existing process, an Offer of Settlement, 

as well as the related order approving 

the settlement, will generally be 

released publicly upon approval. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 38 / Monday, February 26, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 13979 

34See 18 CFR 385.602 (2023). For example, the 

reforms we announce today will not affect the 

settlement process during an Order to Show Cause 

proceeding stemming from a Part 1b investigation. 

35See generally, N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., 

116 FERC ¶ 61,062 (2006). 

C. Other Considerations and 

Clarifications 

24. The settlement authority process 

and enhancements detailed in this 

policy statement apply only to the 

process by which the Commission 

resolves investigations conducted by 

Enforcement staff pursuant to 18 CFR 

part 1b, including investigations that 

relate to violations of the mandatory 

Reliability Standards. The reforms 

discussed herein do not change the 

process by which parties to a docketed 

proceeding pending before the 

Commission or set for hearing submit 

settlements to the Commission for 

consideration,34 nor do they affect the 

process by which the Commission 

reviews proposed penalties (including 

those agreed to by settlement) imposed 

by NERC and/or the Regional Entities 

for violations of the Reliability 

Standards.35

III. Conclusion 

25. As a Commission, we are always 

striving to responsibly implement our 

enforcement authorities, and to that 

end, to continually improve and 

enhance our enforcement policies and 

procedures to better serve the public. 

Consistent with that goal, we issue this 

policy statement and hereby streamline 

our settlement process by eliminating 

the requirement that Enforcement staff 

seek settlement authority from the 

Commission prior to initiating 

settlement negotiations, and instead 

grant new discretion to the Director of 

Enforcement to authorize the 

commencement of settlement 

negotiations. We believe these reforms 

will result in more effective and 

efficient resolutions of part 1b 

investigations by settlement. 

IV. Document Availability 

26. In addition to publishing the full 

text of this document in the Federal 

Register, the Commission provides all 

interested parties an opportunity to 

view and/or print the contents of this 

document via the internet through the 

Commission’s homepage (https://

www.ferc.gov). 

27. From the Commission’s homepage 

on the internet, this information is 

available on eLibrary. The full text of 

this document is available on eLibrary 

in PDF and Microsoft Word format for 

viewing, printing, and/or downloading. 

To access this document in eLibrary, 

type the docket number excluding the 

last three digits of this document in the 

docket number field. 

28. User assistance is available for 

eLibrary and the Commission’s website 

during normal business hours from the 

Commission’s Online Support at (202) 

502–6652 (toll free at 1–866–208–3676) 

or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, 

or the Public Reference Room at (202) 

502–8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. Email 

the Public Reference Room at public.

referenceroom@ferc.gov. 

V. Effective Date 

29. This policy statement is effective 

February 26, 2024. 

By the Commission. 

Issued: February 15, 2024. 

Debbie-Anne A. Reese, 

Acting Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2024–03609 Filed 2–23–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

Food and Drug Administration 

21 CFR Part 1150 

[Docket No. FDA–2012–N–0920] 

User Fees; Technical Amendment 

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, 

(HHS). 

ACTION: Final rule; technical 

amendment. 

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA or Agency) is 

amending its regulations to update a 

link regarding user fee disputes. This 

technical amendment is nonsubstantive. 

DATES: This rule is effective February 

26, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nate 

Mease and Tamika Hopkins, Center for 

Tobacco Products, Food and Drug 

Administration, Document Control 

Center, 10903 New Hampshire Ave., 

Bldg. 71, Rm. G335, Silver Spring, MD 

20993–0002, 1–877–287–1373, email: 

CTPRegulations@fda.hhs.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FDA is 

amending § 1150.15 (21 CFR 1150.15) to 

update the web address for information 

regarding user fee disputes. FDA’s user 

fee dispute regulations currently link to 

FDA’s general web page on tobacco 

products. FDA is revising § 1150.15 to 

specifically direct firms to FDA’s web 

page on tobacco product user fees by 

replacing ‘‘https://www.fda.gov/ 

tobacco-products’’ with ‘‘https://

www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/ 

manufacturing/tobacco-user-fees’’ in 

two places. 

Publication of this document 

constitutes final action on these changes 

under the Administrative Procedure Act 

(APA) (5 U.S.C. 553). The APA 

generally exempts rules from the 

requirements of notice and comment 

rulemaking when an agency ‘‘for good 

cause finds (and incorporates the 

finding and a brief statement of reasons 

therefor in the rules issued) that notice 

and public procedure thereon are 

impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary 

to the public interest’’ (5 U.S.C. 

553(b)(B)). 

FDA has determined that notice and 

public comment are unnecessary 

because this amendment to the 

regulation provides only technical or 

non-substantive, ministerial changes to 

specify the location of information on 

FDA’s web page regarding tobacco 

product user fee program. Such 

technical, non-substantive changes are 

‘‘routine determination[s], insignificant 

in nature and impact, and 

inconsequential to the industry and to 

the public.’’ (Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 

682 F.3d 87, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2012)) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, FDA for good cause finds 

that notice and public procedure 

thereon are unnecessary for changing 

the cited FDA web page on tobacco user 

fees. 

In addition, FDA finds good cause for 

these amendments to become effective 

on the date of publication of this action. 

The APA allows an effective date of less 

than 30 days after publication as 

‘‘provided by the agency for good cause 

found and published with the rule’’ (5 

U.S.C. 553(d)(3)). A delayed effective 

date is unnecessary in this case because 

the amendments do not impose any new 

regulatory requirements on affected 

parties. As a result, affected parties do 

not need time to prepare before the rule 

takes effect. Therefore, FDA finds good 

cause for this correction to become 

effective on the date of publication of 

this action. 

List of Subjects in 21 CFR Part 1150 

Tobacco products, User fees. 

Therefore, under the Federal Food, 

Drug, and Cosmetic Act and under 

authority delegated to the Commissioner 

of Food and Drugs, 21 CFR part 1150 is 

amended as follows: 

PART 1150—USER FEES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 1150 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 21 U.S.C. 371, 387a, 387b, 387i, 

387s, 21 CFR 1100.1. 


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