Opinion filed November 7, 2019

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-19-00186-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF N.S., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 326th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 9055-CX

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated the parental

rights of N.S.’s mother and father.

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 The mother filed an appeal. On appeal, she 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in each of her five issues. We affirm.

Termination Findings and Standards

The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2018). To terminate 

parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent 

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We note that the father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights. 
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has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that 

termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. 

In this case, the trial court found that Appellant had committed four of the acts 

listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those found in subsections (D), (E), (O), and (P). 

Specifically, the trial court found that Appellant had knowingly placed or knowingly 

allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s 

physical or emotional well-being; that Appellant had engaged in conduct or 

knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered 

the child’s physical or emotional well-being; that Appellant had failed to comply 

with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary 

for her to obtain the return of the child, who had been in the managing 

conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less 

than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from Appellant for abuse or 

neglect; and that Appellant had used a controlled substance in a manner that 

endangered the child and either failed to complete a substance abuse treatment 

program or abused a controlled substance after completing such a program. The trial 

court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination of Appellant’s

parental rights would be in the best interest of the child.

To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, 

we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine 

whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its 

finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the 

evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine 

whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). 
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With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). 

But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. 

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not 

limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the 

child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now 

and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the 

programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the 

child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking 

custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or 

omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship 

is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. 

Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination 

may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. 

Background

The record shows that N.S. was four years old at the time of removal and five

years old at the time of the final hearing. In January 2018, the Department received 

an intake regarding domestic violence and an intake regarding Appellant’s use of 

methamphetamine. N.S.’s father was incarcerated at that time, and N.S. lived with 

Appellant, Appellant’s boyfriend, and their three-month-old baby. Appellant and her 

boyfriend had engaged in domestic violence while N.S. and the baby were present 

at the home. The police were summoned based on the occurrence of domestic 

violence, and Appellant, her boyfriend, and N.S. confirmed that domestic violence 

had taken place in the home. 

Although Appellant told the Department’s investigator that she had not used 

methamphetamine since 2013, both Appellant and her three-month-old baby tested 
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positive for methamphetamine during the Department’s January 2018 investigation.

The baby’s test results showed methamphetamine at the level of 10,987, a “very high 

level.” Appellant’s level of methamphetamine was 1,619. N.S.’s drug screen was 

negative at that time. The Department removed N.S. and the baby from Appellant’s 

care. We note that Appellant’s parental rights with respect to the baby are not at 

issue in this appeal and that the case involving the baby was severed from the case 

involving N.S. 

Appellant initially did well and fully engaged in her court-ordered services,

and N.S. and the baby were briefly returned to Appellant’s care. Approximately 

three weeks into the monitored return, Appellant tested positive for 

methamphetamine—this time at the level of 3,978. The children were again removed 

from Appellant’s care. Three months later, Appellant tested positive for 

methamphetamine at an even higher level—4,348. Appellant failed to complete 

inpatient or outpatient drug treatment as ordered. We note that, at the time of the 

final hearing, Appellant was again attempting inpatient treatment. 

Appellant ultimately failed to maintain contact with the Department and, as a 

result, did not submit to any drug tests during the six months prior to the final 

hearing. Appellant also failed to abstain from criminal activity while the parental 

termination case was pending in the trial court. During this time period, Appellant 

was arrested for burglary of a habitation, criminal mischief, third-degree felony 

possession of methamphetamine, and class A misdemeanor assault. The Department 

called three police officers to testify about these offenses. An officer with the 

Abilene Police Department testified that Appellant was arrested in December 2018 

for possession of methamphetamine; three small bags of methamphetamine were 

located in Appellant’s bra area. An officer with the Clyde Police Department 

testified that Appellant broke into a house and assaulted a female, whose hand was 

“bleeding profusely” as a result of the assault. An officer with the Abilene Police 
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Department testified that, just a few weeks prior to the termination hearing, 

Appellant assaulted an “older” man. At the time of the assault, Appellant was acting 

aggressively and appeared to be under the influence. Appellant was arrested and 

taken to jail; at the jail, an empty bag with white residue was found inside 

Appellant’s bra. 

The record reflects that, in addition to the offenses that she committed while 

this case was pending, Appellant had other criminal history. She was convicted in 

2013 of the offenses of possession of methamphetamine and endangering a child. 

The child that Appellant was convicted of endangering was her son—N.S.’s older 

brother—who, at the time of the proceedings involving N.S., had been adopted by 

paternal relatives.

The caseworker testified that N.S. had been removed from Appellant three 

times and that N.S. needed a more stable life. The caseworker believed that

termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in N.S.’s best interest. N.S. had 

been placed in a stable and loving home with paternal relatives, and N.S. was doing 

well in their care. N.S. was happy and had adjusted well in the home of her aunt and 

uncle, and the aunt and uncle wanted to adopt N.S. 

Analysis

In her first, second, third, and fourth issues, Appellant challenges the legal and 

factual sufficiency of the evidence to prove grounds (D), (E), (O), and (P), 

respectively. We first address Appellant’s second issue—her challenge to the trial 

court’s finding under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E). See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 

234–35 (Tex. 2019) (addressing due process and due course of law with respect to 

appellate review of grounds (D) and (E) and holding that an appellate court must 

provide a detailed analysis if affirming the termination on either of these grounds). 

Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the 

endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s conduct, 
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including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re D.O., 338 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland 2011, no pet.). Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must 

be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious 

course of conduct by the parent is required. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied); In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.). The offending conduct does not need to be directed 

at the child, nor does the child actually have to suffer an injury. In re J.O.A., 283 

S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). Drug use may constitute evidence of endangerment.

Id. Domestic violence and a propensity for violence may also constitute evidence 

of endangerment. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 265; In re C.E.K., 214 S.W.3d 492, 497 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). If a parent abused or neglected other children, 

that conduct can be used to support a finding of endangerment. C.E.K., 214 S.W.3d 

at 497. 

Based upon the evidence that Appellant and her boyfriend engaged in 

domestic violence in N.S.’s presence, that Appellant had a propensity for violence,

that Appellant used methamphetamine while her children were in her care, and that 

Appellant exposed her baby to a high level of methamphetamine, the trial court could 

have found by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant engaged in a course of 

conduct that endangered N.S. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and 

factually sufficient to uphold the trial court’s finding under subsection (E). We 

overrule Appellant’s second issue. Because only one statutory ground is necessary 

to support termination and because we have upheld the trial court’s finding under 

subsection (E), we need not reach her first, third, or fourth issues. See FAM.

§ 161.001(b)(1); N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 234–35. 

In her fifth issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was 
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in the best interest of N.S. The record reflectsthat Appellant used methamphetamine

while N.S. was in her care and continued to use methamphetamine while this case 

was pending, that Appellant failed to complete treatment for her methamphetamine 

addiction (an addiction, according to Appellant, that she had struggled with since 

she was twelve years old), that Appellant endangered her children by exposing them

to methamphetamine, that Appellant had been convicted of endangering N.S.’s older 

brother, and that Appellant continued to engage in various criminal activity while 

this case was pending. 

The record also reflects that N.S. had been placed with a paternal aunt and 

uncle in an appropriate home and that N.S. had improved and had done very well 

there. The conservatorship caseworker believed that termination of Appellant’s

parental rights would be in N.S.’s best interest. Based upon the evidence presented

in this case, we defer to the trial court’s finding. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. 

We hold that, based on the evidence presented at trial and the Holley factors, 

the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that 

termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in N.S.’s best interest. See 

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Upon considering the record as it relates to N.S.’s 

desires (which were not expressly mentioned at the hearing), the emotional and 

physical needs of N.S. now and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to 

N.S. now and in the future, the parental abilities of those involved, the plans for the 

child by the Department, Appellant’s use of methamphetamine, Appellant’s other 

criminal activity, and the stability of N.S.’s placement with her aunt and uncle, we 

hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding that termination of 

Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of N.S. See id. We cannot hold that 

the finding as to best interest is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We 

overrule Appellant’s fifth issue on appeal. 
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This Court’s Ruling

The order of the trial court is affirmed. 

KEITH STRETCHER

JUSTICE

November 7, 2019

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.2

Willson, J., not participating.

 2

Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, 

sitting by assignment.