United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted January 5, 2021

Decided January 27, 2021 

Before 

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3299 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 

v. 

MARKELL PALMER-TATE, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

Fort Wayne Division. 

No. 1:16CR78-001 

Damon R. Leichty, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Markell Palmer-Tate pleaded guilty to attempted bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2113(a), (d), (e), and was sentenced to 188 months in prison (the bottom of the 

guidelines range) and three years of supervised release. Although his plea agreement 

contained a broad appellate waiver, he filed a notice of appeal. His appointed counsel 

asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738, 746 (1967). Palmer-Tate did not respond to counsel’s motion. See CIR.

R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues for an 

appeal of this kind, and we limit our review to these issues. See United States v. Bey, 748 

F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-3299 Page 2 

Palmer-Tate wishes to withdraw his plea, see United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 

348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012), so counsel asks whether she could raise a nonfrivolous claim 

that it was involuntary. She correctly concludes that she could not. First, she notes that 

the transcript of the plea colloquy does not reflect any sign of coercion, and the judge 

substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11—and, in particular, 

directly confirmed with Palmer-Tate that no one had tried to force him to plead guilty, 

that no one offered him any promises in order to get him to plead guilty, and that he 

was pleading guilty of his own free will. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). No evidence 

undermines Palmer-Tate’s sworn statements during the plea colloquy, which are 

presumed true. See United States v. Graf, 827 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Counsel next points to a minor omission in the Rule 11 colloquy: The judge did 

not warn Palmer-Tate that his statements could be used in a future perjury prosecution. 

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(A). But this omission is harmless because there is no current 

or prospective prosecution against him. See United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 597–98 

(7th Cir. 2016). 

Counsel also considers whether Palmer-Tate could challenge the denial of his 

motion to withdraw his plea based on a claim of innocence—specifically, that he took 

no substantial step toward an attempted bank robbery. Counsel rightly rejects this 

argument because Palmer-Tate admitted at his change-of-plea hearing that he 

committed the essential elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)—that he waited on-scene as the 

getaway driver while his codefendants kidnapped a bank employee at gunpoint in 

order to rob the bank by force. See United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 750 (7th Cir. 

2008) (describing a threat of force to a bank employee as a “typical attempted bank 

robbery”), United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2008) (defining a 

substantial step as an “overt act ... which in the ordinary and likely course of things 

will result in[] the commission of the particular crime”). 

An appeal waiver stands or falls with the validity of the guilty plea, and PalmerTate’s guilty plea is valid. United States v. Perillo, 897 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2018). So the 

appeal waiver must be enforced. An exception exists if the judge considered 

constitutionally impermissible factors at sentencing or imposed a sentence outside the 

statutory range. United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). But the 

judge did not rely on any impermissible factors, and the sentence does not exceed the 

statutory maximum. 
No. 19-3299 Page 3 

One final point: counsel considers whether Palmer-Tate could argue that his 

defense attorney was constitutionally ineffective but properly recognizes that claims of 

ineffective assistance are best raised on collateral review. See Massaro v. United States, 

538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2020). 

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.