alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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Disposition Comments

Docket No: FAA-2011-0223 These comments are in

Directorate ID: 2010-NM-161 response to an SNPRM

Originating Office Tracking No.: 

Next Step: FRAN SNPRM

 No Comments/Only Supportive Comments Received – If this box is checked, no signatures are 

required.

No Has the referenced service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? If yes, 

list latest revision and attach a copy. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously 

published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance.

Instructions: Summarize all comments by issue (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of 

each issue. All comments relating to the same issue should be discussed together. Do not list all of the issues 

from one commenter together. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and 

describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA-IR-M-8040.1C Chapter 9.

ISSUE 1: Select one of the following: 

If other, explain: 

Commenter(s): 

What change to the AD action is requested? 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? 

Do we agree? 

If YES, we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with because We disagree with because 

Make the following changes to the AD: 

If NO, we don’t agree because 

ISSUE 2: Select one of the following: 

If other, explain: 

Commenter(s): 

What change to the AD action is requested? 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? 

Do we agree? 

If YES, we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with because We disagree with because 

Make the following changes to the AD:
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If NO, we don’t agree because 

For additional issues, double-click here
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Signature Section

Signature indicates concurrence with this action.

Originating Office Tracking No.: 

ASE Printed Name: Date

Branch Manager Date
Exhibit 99.1

                                CERTIFICATION
                     PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                         SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Bancorp Rhode Island, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2003, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned President and Chief Executive Officer hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (a) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (b) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated this 12th day of May, 2003.




                                                     /s/ Merrill W. Sherman
                                                     ----------------------
                                                         Merrill W. Sherman
                                                              President and
                                                    Chief Executive Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to Bancorp Rhode Island, Inc. and will be retained by Bancorp
Rhode Island, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.


<PAGE>
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The Coast Distribution System, Inc.

Annual Report on Form 10-K

for the Year ended December 31, 2013,

as Amended by
Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A

The undersigned hereby certifies that (i) the Annual Report on Form 10-K, of The Coast Distribution System, Inc.
(the Company), for the year ended December 31, 2013, as filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission and as amended by this Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A (the Annual Report), to which this
Certification is an Exhibit, fully complies with the applicable requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and (ii) the information contained in this Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: April 30, 2014

/s/ SANDRA A. KNELLSandra A. Knell
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerA signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to The Coast Distribution System, Inc. and will be retained by The Coast Distribution System, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Julian Bradford CASEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28095.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 22, 1956.

No attorney for appellant of record'on appeal.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, 3 days in jail and a fine of $150.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to bp regular and nothing is presented for review. The judgment is affirmed. . . .
#### Willie COWAN, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 17, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1955.

Willie Cowan, pro se.

J. D. Buckman, Jr., Atty. Gen., George B. Akin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

HOGG, Judge.

Willie Cowan appeals in forma pauperis from an order denying his motion for a writ of error coram nobis. Appellant complains of various errors committed in the trial resulting in his conviction on May 14, 1952, under an indictment charging the carrying of a deadly weapon with two previous convictions of a felony. His punishment was fixed at confinement in the state penitentiary for five years. He is now serving this sentence.

The two previous convictions and punishments were for storehouse breaking, four years and one day, on February 16, 1935, and feloniously taking and operating a motor vehicle without consent of the owner, one year, on February 18, 1949. Neither conviction was vacated, modified, set aside, or appealed from.

At the trial upon which appellant received the third felony conviction, he was represented by counsel. The record showed that a demurrer was overruled to the indictment, appellant entered his plea of not guilty, testimony for the Commonwealth was heard, and appellant declined to introduce any evidence. After hearing the instructions of the court and argument of counsel, the jury retired and brought back a verdict finding him guilty and fixing the punishment.

The appellant urges many alleged errors as the basis for the writ sought. The matters complained of would have been available for consideration on appeal. No appeal was sought on the judgment for the third conviction.

The old common-law writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy re*637tained in our criminal law to be used in correcting a hidden or unseen error. Its function is to rectify a misjustice which could not have been corrected upon appeal because at such time the existence of the error in the proceeding, or-of some new or undiscovered pertinent fact, was unknown and could not have been discovered by the exercise of proper diligence. Anderson v. Buchanan, 292 Ky. 810, 168 S.W. 2d 48; Day v. Commonwealth, *296*Ey. 483, *177*S.W.2d 391; Walsh v. Tuggle, 303 Ey. 200, 197 S.W.2d 253.

 The writ does not issue as a matter of right but its granting is in the sound discretion of the judge who tried the accused upon a showing that there is a strong probability of a miscarriage of justice. Bircham v. Commonwealth, Ky., 245 S.W.2d 932. The trial court found no proper basis for the issuance of such a writ and correctly dismissed the motion.

Judgment affirmed.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, January 31, 2018.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, January 31, 2018

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A18D0267. KENNETH LEMOINE v. ANNAMARIE LEMOINE.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

2000CV28300
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-10014 Summary Calendar

HOWARD R. WATSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF DALLAS TEXAS, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:94 CV 320 T)

August 25, 1995

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The judgment of the district court is affirmed for the

following reasons:

1. Watson has failed to allege facts indicating that any

policy-making official for the City of Dallas implemented an

official policy that resulted in the alleged constitutional injury;

further, he has failed to establish the existence of a persistent,

widespread practice of city officials or employees, which is so1 We do not address Watson's claim that the district court

should have allowed him to amend his complaint because it is raised for the first time on appeal.

-2- common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly

represents city policy.

2. The City of Dallas is immune from Watson's state law

claims of assault, defamation, fa lse arrest, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. 1

AFFIRMED.
#### Mammie Lee NUNEZ, Kathryn Sheppard and Troy Baker, Appellants, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27769.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 9, 1955.

*746No appearance for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DICE, Commissioner.

The appellants were convicted of vagrancy and each assessed a fine of $200.

The record does not show that the appellants, Kathryn Sheppard and Troy Baker, ever entered into a recognizance or executed an appeal bond or that they are confined in jail. Therefore, this court is without jurisdiction to enter any order other than to dismiss their appeals.

The record does show that the appellant, Mammie Lee Nunez, filed an appeal bond which was approved on May 13, 1955, after having given notice of appeal on May 5, 1955. The judgment of conviction is dated May 16, 1955. The caption appearing in the transcript certifies that the term of court began on May 1, 1955, and did terminate by operation of law during May Term, 1955.”

If the appellant’s appeal was perfected during the term in which she gave notice of appeal, she should have entered into a recognizance; if, after the term, an appeal bond would be required. Art. 830, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. The caption not showing when the term ended, we are unable to determine from the record whether an appeal should have been perfected by her entering into a recognizance or by the execution of an appeal bond, and whether this court has jurisdiction of the appeal. Under this state of the record, the appeal must be dismissed.

Therefore, the appeals of all three appellants are dismissed. However, the appeals may be reinstated within fifteen days by correcting the record and the filing of a proper recognizance or appeal bond.

Opinion approved by the Court.
#### LINDA S. OSGOOD *v.*ARTHUR M. OSGOOD, JR.

(14078)

Landau, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.

Argued November 30, 1995

decision released January 9, 1996

*William H. Cashman*filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

*Susan King Shaw,*for the appellee (plaintiff).

PER CURIAM.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### James B. HALL, Appellant, v. UNIVERSAL C. I. T. CREDIT CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 3289.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

Jan. 25, 1957.

Rehearing Denied March 1, 1957.

*859Rex Emerson, Odessa, for appellant.

George T. Thomas, Big Spring, for ap-pellee.

GRISSOM, Chief Justice.

Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation sued James B. Hall for title to an automobile. Plaintiff prayed for an injunction prohibiting Hall from transferring the certificate of title to the automobile and for appointment of a receiver. Upon a hearing a temporary injunction was granted and a receiver appointed. Hall has appealed.

The substance of appellee’s case is that it owned the notes and a mortgage on Hall’s automobile; that Hall was delinquent in his monthly payments; that the automobile and certificate of title thereto was voluntarily placed in appellee’s possession with the understanding that if Hall should pay the delinquent installments within ten days the automobile and certificate of title would be returned to Hall, otherwise they should be owned by ap-pellee ; that the installments were not paid; that appellee had possession of the automobile and certificate after the expiration of said ten day period and that ap-pellee intended to transfer them to the automobile dealer who had sold the automobile to Hall, but that, by mistake, ap-pellee’s employee sent the certificate to Hall instead of said dealer; that appellee had possession oí the automobile for nine months but was unable to dispose of it because the: certificate was in the possession of Hall .and he refused to surrender it and claimed ownership of the car; that the automobile had depreciated in value and would continue to do so; that, in the language of appellee, Hall was “judgment proof” and it had ho adequate remedy at law. Mr. Hall’s testimony was to the effect that about the time appellee changed its offices he went to some woman employed by appellee and paid her more than $2,700 in cash and obtained from her the certificate of title.

Although a question of fact was raised, there was evidence sufficient to sustain findings that Hall did not pay; that ap-pellee owned the automobile; that the certificate was mailed to Hall by mistake; that unless enjoined he would transfer the certificate and cause irreparable damages. The evidence sustained the action of the court. The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



| | I, | Richard L. Feinstein, certify that:
| | -- | -----------------------------------



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 of the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019 of Enzon Pharmaceuticals, Inc.;
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this Amendment No. 1 of the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Amendment No. 1 of the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|April 24, 2020 | /s/ Richard L. Feinstein                            
|-------------- | ----------------------------------------------------
|               | Richard L. Feinstein                                
|               | Vice President - Finance and Chief Financial Officer
|               | (Principal Financial Officer)
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2112

___________________________

Margie Gregor

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Hot Springs

____________

 Submitted: December 30, 2015

Filed: January 13, 2016

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SMITH, BYE, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.
Margie Gregor appeals the district court’s1

 order affirming the Commissioner’s

denial of disability insurance benefits after her hearing before an administrative law

judge (ALJ). Following careful de novo review, and for the reasons explained below,

we conclude that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the denial of

Gregor’s application. See Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091, 1093 (8th Cir. 2012)

(standard of review).

For reversal, Gregor challenges the ALJ’s determination that her fibromyalgia

and musculoskeletal complaints failed to meet or equal a listing, and argues that the

ALJ’s determination is undermined by additional evidence: a post-hearing report

prepared by her treating rheumatologist, James Logan, M.D.2

 Upon careful de novo

review, we conclude that Gregor failed to meet her burden of showing the requisite

major dysfunction of a joint with the necessary clinical evidence and resulting

inability to ambulate effectively, see 20 C.F.R Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.02 (major

dysfunction of a joint); or deformity in one major peripheral weight-bearing joint

resulting in inability to ambulate effectively, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1

§ 14.09 (inflammatory arthritis); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530-31 (1990)

(claimant has burden of establishing impairments meet or equal listing). We further

conclude that Dr. Logan’s report did not undermine the ALJ’s determination, because

it was a conclusory checkbox form that cited no medical evidence; provided little to

no elaboration; and expressed limitations that were not reflected in treatment notes or

medical records. See Anderson v. Astrue, 696 F.3d 790, 793-94 (8th Cir. 2012).

1

The Honorable Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

2

Gregor’s arguments challenging the ALJ’s determination of her residual

functional capacity are not properly before us, as she failed to raise this matter to the

district court. See Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 580 (8th Cir. 2006) (arguments

not articulated before district court are waived).

-2-
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

_____________________________

-3-
#### Eddie Hays JONES, Appellant, v. NEW INDEPENDENT TOBACCO WAREHOUSE CO, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 11, 1957.

Mooney & Turley, Oscar H. Geralds, Jr., Lexington, for appellant.

Buckley & Breckinridge, Lexington, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This suit was brought to recover of the defendant approximately $1,300, the alleged sale price of plaintiff’s tobacco sold at auction by the defendant. The tobacco was sold at that price by defendant, but the sale was rejected by the buyer on the ground that the tobacco was “nested” and defendant then resold the tobacco at a lesser price. The amount in controversy is $234.83.

Many issues were raised during the progress of the case, included among them being matters of procedure. The court overruled defendant’s motion for a directed verdict; submitted the case to the jury; the jury returned a verdict for the plain*919tiff; and on defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it was set aside and a judgment was entered for the defendant.

The trial court handed down two learned opinions on both the substantive and procedural aspects of the case. Plaintiff seeks reversal on what we consider to be a technical procedural question, not meriting further discussion by us.

In our opinion the trial court correctly decided the principal issues.

Defendant cross-appeals on the ground that the judgment improperly allowed interest and costs. In its answer of May 14, 1955, defendant offered to confess judgment and tendered to plaintiff $1,088.82. That was the amount of the final judgment entered. Clearly defendant should not be charged with interest or costs subsequent to May 14, 1955.

The motion for appeal is denied, and the judgment is affirmad with directions to modify it in conformity with this opinion.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    Exhibit 21.1

                       SAFEGUARD HEALTH ENTERPRISES, INC.

                           SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY

The wholly owned subsidiaries of SafeGuard Health Enterprises, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, are as follows:


 1.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., an Arizona corporation

 2.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., a California corporation

 3.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., a Colorado corporation

 4.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., a Florida corporation

 5.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., an Illinois corporation

 6.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., a Kansas corporation

 7.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., a Kentucky corporation

 8.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., a Missouri corporation

 9.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., a Nevada corporation

10.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., an Ohio corporation

11.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation

12.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., an Oregon corporation

13.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., a Texas corporation

14.     SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., a Utah corporation

15.     SafeHealth Life Insurance Company, Inc., a Texas corporation

16.     Advantage Dental HealthPlans, Inc., a Delaware corporation

17.     ADH Marketing, Inc., a Florida Corporation

18.     ADH Plans, Inc., a Delaware corporation

19.     Advantage Dental Plans, Inc., a Delaware corporation

20.     Guards Dental, Inc., a California corporation (A wholly owned subsidiary
        of SafeGuard Health Plans, Inc., a California corporation)

21.     SafeHealth Life Insurance Company, a California corporation

22.     First American Dental Benefits, Inc., a Texas corporation

23.     Imprimis Practice Management Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, February 01, 2022.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, February 01, 2022

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A22D0215. NUBIYN MZEKEWE v. WANDA WALL SPIVEY.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

2019CV325575
#### C. W. HANKINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28572.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 7, *1956.*

No attorney for appellant of record on appeal.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, 1 for the State.'

PER. CURIAM.

The offense is aggravated assault; the punishment, 30 days in jail and a fine of $75. '= ' ;‘

No statement of facts accompanies the record.

The court’s refusal of appellant’s requested special charge cannot be appraised' in the absence of a statement of facts. Conwell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 258 S.W.2d 86.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.