1 John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Re t.), Seventh C ourt of Appeal s, si tt ing by assignment. Tex. Gov’tCode An n. §7 5.00 2(a) (1) (V erno n Su pp. 2 004 ). NO. 07-03-0318-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL E APRIL 16, 2004

______________________________ RODNEY B . ADAMS,

Appellant
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO. ONE OF L UBBOCK CO UNTY; NO. 2002-480,548; HON. L.B . (RUSTY) LADD, PRESIDING

_______________________________ Memorandum Opinion

_______________________________ Before QUINN and CAMPBELL, JJ., and BOYD, S.J. 1 Appellant

Rodney B. Adams appeals his conviction f or driving whileintoxicated. Via two issues, he contends the trial court erre d in denyinghis motion to s uppress w ithout a hearing. Doing sopurportedly constituted 1)

an abuse of discr

etion under article 28.01(6) of t h e T e x a s C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P ro c e d u re a n d 2 ) a v i o l a t i o n o f h i s d u e p ro c e s s r i g h t s . We affirm the judgment.2

It is settl ed that as a prereq uisite to pr

esenting a complaint for app ellate review, the record mustshow that . . . t he compl aint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion . . . stat[ing] the groundsfor the ruling that the complaining party soug ht . . . w ith sufficient specif icity to make the trial court aware of the comp laint . . . [and] the trial court . . . ruled on t he request, objection, or motion . . . or refu sed to rule . . . .” T EX . R. A PP . P

. 33.1(a). This rule has been he ld applicabl e not on ly t o claims inv olving allegations

of denied due proces s, e.g. Henderson v . State , 962 S.W.2d 544 , 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (wherein the appellant con tended that she was denied du e process because her attorney lied to her), but also to those i nvolvi ng the failure by a trial co urt to conduct a hearing. See e.g. Hardeman v . State , 1 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. Cri m. App. 1999) (involving the failure to conduct a punishmen t hearing); Nirschl v. State , 923 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Tex. App. –Amarillo 1996, pet. ref’d) ( involv ing thesame). Indeed, r equiring the appellant

to first broach the matter wi th the trial court seems onl y reasonabl e. This is s o, as described i n Nirschl, because it stands “in the b est p o sition to expeditiously avoid potential or cure act ual error at trial.” Nirschl v. State , 923 S.W.2d at 219. Thus, it should “be accorded a chance to rectif y the situation.” Id. Here, nothing in the record before us il lust rates that appel lant complained, in any way, to the trial court about its failure to hold a heari ng. Nor do es appellant ass ert that he wasdenied opportunity to compla in or assert his due process al legation. Rather, the record simply dep icts that after the motion was denied, appellant

and the State entered i nto a plea bargain resulting in his convicti on and a 180 day s entence. Given the state of the record, the mandate of Rule 33.1 (a), and the r easonable polic

y behind allowi ng trial courts3

first opportuni ty to avoid or corr ect purported error, w

e hold that any

complaint appell ant had abou t the lack o f a h eari ng an d its r amif icat ions was no t pre serve d fo r our r eview. The issue is overruled, and t he judgment isaffirmed.

Brian Quinn Justice Publish.