J-A20026-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

LITTLE LEAGUE BASEBALL, INC.

v.

JAMES L. BECK AND MARGARET A. 

BECK 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 38 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 30, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County 

Civil Division at No(s): CV-2014-003088-CV

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2018

In this matter, the trial court found Appellants, James and Margaret 

Beck, had failed to establish their right to a prescriptive easement over land 

owned by Appellee, Little League Baseball, Inc. After careful review, we 

conclude the trial court’s opinion and verdict is well supported by evidence of 

record and that it correctly applied the applicable law. We therefore affirm 

on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

The Becks own two properties to the east of Little League’s stadium 

complex located outside of Williamsport. They reside on one property, which 

is surrounded on three sides by lots owned by Little League. The other 

property is undeveloped, lies to the east of, and is separated by two lots 

from, the residential property.
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The Becks purchased the residential property in 1971. The deed to the 

residential property includes the reservation of an access easement over 

property owned by Little League. The easement travels from Route 15, 

through two lots owned by Little League and on to the residential property, 

and is known as Borderline Road. The validity of this express easement was 

not challenged in this matter.

The Becks purchased the undeveloped lot in 1995. The undeveloped

property has an access easement over properties that are not owned by 

Little League.

In 2014, the Becks filed suit against Little League regarding the use of 

Borderline Road, as well as asserting that Little League had blocked access 

from the residential property to the undeveloped property. The Becks 

contended Little League’s erection of security checkpoints along Borderline 

Road for two weeks each summer during the Little League World Series 

constituted a breach of their easement rights. Furthermore, they alleged

they had access rights over the Little League property that is located 

between the residential property and the undeveloped property. Ultimately, 

the Becks discontinued this litigation without prejudice.

Little League subsequently filed this action, seeking a declaratory 

judgment that would determine: a) the legality of its use of security 

checkpoints during the Little League World Series, and b) the location and 

limits of the Becks’ easement over its properties. The Becks filed a 
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counterclaim for a prescriptive easement of areas abutting Borderline Road, 

as well as access to the undeveloped property from the residential property.

The trial court held a bench trial on the matter and entered a verdict in 

favor of Little League. Specifically, the court found Little League’s agent, 

David Houseknecht, was “fully credible,” and the Becks had failed to prove 

their entitlement to a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing 

evidence. The Becks subsequently filed this timely appeal.

On appeal, the Becks raise three issues for our consideration. All three 

issues challenge the trial court’s conclusion they had not established the 

existence of a prescriptive easement. We review non-jury verdicts on two 

grounds. First, whether the court’s findings are supported by competent 

evidence. See Stephan v. Waldron Elec. Heating and Cooling, LLC, 100 

A.3d 660, 664 (Pa. Super. 2014). If they are, we must defer to the trial 

court’s judgment and may not substitute our own. See id. As such, the trial 

court is free to accept or reject the testimony of both expert and lay 

witnesses, and to believe all, part or none of the evidence. See Terwilliger 

v. Kitchen, 781 A.2d 1201, 1210 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Next, if the findings have adequate support in the record, we review 

the court’s legal conclusions. We owe the trial court no deference on issues 

of law. See Stephan, 100 A.3d at 665.
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The trial court, in its November 9, 2016 opinion and verdict, has 

thoroughly reviewed the claims on appeal and disposed of all arguments on 

the merits. We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the relevant law, the 

certified record, and the well-written opinion of the Honorable Richard A. 

Gray. The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law

comprehensively dispose of Appellants’ issues on appeal, with appropriate 

references to the record and without legal error.1 Therefore, we will affirm 

on those bases. See Trial Court Opinion, dated 11/9/16.

Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/13/2018

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1 By way of summary, the court found James Beck’s testimony fell short of 

establishing their use of the contested portions of Little League’s property 

was continuous and adverse for twenty-one years. In particular, the court 

found the Beck’s use of the areas at issue was not sufficiently outside the 

scope of the express easement. The Becks argue Little League did not 

present testimony on the express easement; however, the Becks admitted 

to the existence and terms of the express easement in their answer to Little 

League’s complaint and stipulated that the express easement was accurately 

depicted on a survey map entered as an exhibit at trial. See N.T., Non-Jury 

Trial, 10/25/16, at 4. 
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF L YCOMINO COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

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LITTLE LEAGUE BASEBALL, INC., : 

Plaintiff, 

JAMES L. BECK and MARGARET A. BECK, 

Defendants NON·JURYTRIAL / 

OPINION and VERDICT 

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016 after a non-jury trial held on October 25 

and 26, 2016, and a site view to the property on October 25, 2016, the Court having entered 

verdict in favor of Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, Little League Baseball, Inc., and against 

Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs, James L Beck and Margaret A. Beck on all claims on 

November 2, 2016, the Court provides the following opinion and more specific verdict as 

follows. 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

1. Plaintiff Little League Baseball Inc. ("Little League") owns property essentially surrounding 

Defendants' residential property at 182 Borderline Road, identified as Tax Parcel Number 

02001-103 ("103") on exhibits entered into evidence and marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and 

6. 

2. Specifically, Little League owns real property in South Williamsport and Armstrong 

Township including the following Tax Parcel Numbers: 51-005-522; Sl-005-526; 02-001- 

107; 02-001-106; 02-001-102; 02-001-109. 

3. Borderline Road is situated on land owned by Little League. 
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4. Defendants Mr. and Mrs. Beck (collectively "Becks") have a right of way over Borderline 

Road, by express grant, which is delineated on documents entered into evidence and marked 

as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and 6. 

S. Plaintiff has placed security measures over Borderline Road during the Little League World 

Series for approximately two weeks per year. 

6. Security measures during the Little League World Series have included issuing passes to the 

Becks, their guests, and other permitted users of Borderline Road, and placing security 

checkpoints on Borderline Road where security personnel check the identification and/or 

passes of all vehicles attempted to travel Borderline Road. 

7. The Court finds David B. Houseknecht fully credible. 

8. The security measures implemented so far have allowed the Becks to use Borderline Road to 

access their property by placing passes in their vehicle and being subject to security checks. 

9. No testimony was presented by the Becks that Little League interfered with or even 

inconvenienced them in their use of Borderline Road. 

10. Little League's security measures do not unreasonably infringe upon the Becks' use of their 

easement. 

11. The Becks have parked vehicles on the western boundary appearing on the northwest portion 

of Borderline Road ("parking area") over the years. 

12. The parking area falls within the right of way granted by express grant, which is delineated 

on docwnents entered into evidence and marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and 6. 

13. Since about 1971, the Becks sporadically and non-exclusively accessed property surrounding 

the residential parcel 103, to the west beyond the maple trees, to the north and to the south. 

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14. The Becks use of the areas surrounding their parcels was not proven to be adverse, open, 

continuous, notorious and uninterrupted for twenty-one years. 

15. In 1995, the Becks obtained ownership ofland identified as tax parcel number 02-001-113 

("113") on exhibits entered into evidence and marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. 

16. The Becks have used the area previously covered by stone and gravel roadway on the south 

border of their property to access their parcel 113 which was purchased in 1995. 

17. The Becks accessing 113 from 103 through Little League property was nQ! proven to be 

adverse, open, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted for twenty-one years. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

1. One who claims title by adverse possession must prove actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, 

notorious, distinct and hostile possession of the land for twenty-one years. Johnson v. TeleMedia Co., 2014 PA Super 83, 90 A.3d 736 (Pa. Super. 2014), citing, Baylor v. Soska. 540 

Pa. 435, 658 A.2d 743, 744 (Pa. 1995), cl/Ing Conneaut Lake Park, Inc. v. Klingensmith. 362 

Pa 592, 66 A.2d 82 8 (Pa. 1949). See, also, Boyd v. Teeple, 460 Pa. 91, 331 A.2d 433 (Pa. 

1975), citing, See, Bodman v. Bodman, 456 Pa. 412, 321 A.2d 910 (1974). 

2. Adverse possession must be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. Stevenson v, 

Williams, 188 Pa. Super. 49, 145 A.2d 734 (Pa. Super. 19S8)(To establish "a right or 

easement by prescription, the evidence and proof thereof must be clear and positive.") 

3. "A sporadic use ofland, by one without title to it, will not operate to give him a title, no 

matter how often repeated[.]" Parks v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 301 Pa. 475, 481; 152 A. 682, 

684 (Pa. l 930)(citation omitted). Occasional mowing of a lawn has been considered entirely 

insufficient to establish title by adverse possession. Johnson v. Tele-Media Co., 90 A.3d 

736, 741 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

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4. The Becks use of the areas surrounding their parcels was n21 proven to be adverse, open, 

continuous, notorious and uninterrupted for twenty-one years and therefore they did not 

obtain title to it by adverse possession. 

5. Specifically, the Becks use of land on the western boundary of their property was nQ! proven 

to be adverse, open, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted for twenty-one years. 

6. The Becks use of land on the southern boundary of their property was not proven to be 

adverse, open, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted for twenty-one years. 

7. The Becks' right of way over Borderline Road, by express grant, allows them to use 

Borderline Road without unreasonable interference with the use of Borderline Road. Palmer 

v. Soloe, 601 A.2d 1250, 1253 (Pa. Super. 1992)(Land owner may not unreasonably interfere 

with the use of the easement.) 

8. The owner of the dominant and servient estates must not unreasonably interfere with use of 

an easement. Taylor v. Heffner,359 Pa. 157, 163; 58 A.2d 450, 453 (Pa. 1948) 

9. Little League's security measures over Borderline Road during the Little League World 

Series for approximately two weeks per year, which includes issuing passes and subjecting 

the Becks to security checks, do not unreasonably interfere with the Becks use of the right of 

way. 

10. "A prescriptive easement is created by (1) adverse, (2) open, (3) notorious, (4) continuous 

and uninterrupted use for a period of twenty-one (21) years." Walley v, Iraca, 360 Pa. Super. 

436, 441-442 (Pa. Super. 1987), citing, Dunlap v. Larkin, 342 Pa.Super. 594, 605, 493 A.2d 

750, 756 (1985); Keefer v. Jones. 467 Pa. 544, 547, 359 A.2d 735, 736-737 (1976). 

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11. [T]he party asserting the easement must demonstrate the above elements by proof that is 

clear and positive. Walley, rn 360 Pa. Super at 442, citing, Adshead v. Sprung, 248 

Pa.Super. 253, 256, 375 A.2d 83, 84 (1977). 

12. An easement does not confer any title to physical property. Smith v. Fulkroad. 305 Pa. Super. 

459, 463-464, 451 A.2d 738, 740-741 (Pa. Super. 1982). citing, Cain v. Aspinwall. 289 Pa. 

535, 137 A. 610 (1927). 

13. "A fundamental principle is that an easement for the benefit of a particular piece of ground 

cannot be enlarged and extended .•.. The purpose of this rule is to prevent an increase of the 

burden upon the servient estate, and it applies whether the easement is created by grant, 

reservation, prescription, or implication." Fulkroad, filJ.Pm, 451 A.2d at 741, citing, Percy A. 

Brown Co. v. Raub, 357 Pa. 271, 293, 54 A.2d 35 (1947). 

14. By use of Borderline Road, the Becks did not and could not gain title to it because they had 

an express grant of right of way over it. 

15. The Becks use of the parking area over Borderline Road did not expand the express grant of 

a right of way already existing on Borderline Road. 

16. By parking in the parking area on Borderline Road, the Becks did not and could not enlarge 

their easement over Borderline Road or obtain title to such ground. See, e.g., Fu]kroad. supra. 

17. The Becks use of the pathway on the norther border of the property was not proven to be 

adverse, open, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted for twenty-one years. 

18. Moreover, the Becks the pathway on the northern border of the property was located on an 

express grant of a right of way as to power lines; the Becks use outside of the conditions 

expressly granted neither expanded or enlarged the easement to include such use. See, e.g., 

Fulk.road, supra. 

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19. The Becks use of the gravel roadway to the south of their property to access 113 was not 

proven to be adverse, open, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted for twenty-one years. 

20. Moreover, the Becks use of the gravel roadway, which is situated on an express grant of an 

easement the Becks enjoy over Borderline Road to access their residence, did not and could 

not expand that right of way over Little Leagues' property to 113. 

DISCUSSION 

At issue in this case is (1) whether Little League may continue to secure Borderline Road 

where the Becks have a right of way over Borderline Road to access their property and (2) 

whether the Becks have gained rights to property titled to Little League by means of adverse 

possession or prescriptive easement. 

As to the first issue, the Court concluded that the Little League may continue to secure 

Borderline Road in a reasonable manner and that the methods employed by Little League to date 

have not unreasonably interfered with the Becks' use of Borderline Road and therefore may 

continue. The owner of the dominant and servient estates must not unreasonably interfere with 

use of an easement. Taylor v. Heffner. 359 Pa. 157, 163; 58 A.2d 450, 453 (Pa. 1948). Even a 

swinging gate, which requires one to exit the vehicle to operate and then re-exit the vehicle to 

close, is not a legal obstruction of an easement. See, Haig Com. v. Thomas S. Gassner Co., 163 

Pa. Super. 611, 63 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1949). 

In the instant case, the Becks enjoy an easement over Borderline Road which sits on 

Little League's property. Therefore, Little League may not unreasonably interfere with the 

Becks' use of the easement. By securing Borderline Road with security checkpoints for about 

two weeks out of the year, Little League does not unreasonably interfere with the Becks' use of 

Borderline Road. Such checkpoints are far less intrusive than other permissible burdens on a 

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right of way, such as requiring one to exit and re-exit a vehicle to operate a gate. Haig Cor,p., 

supra. 

As to the second issue, the Becks have not proven by clear and convincing evidence 

actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession of the land for 

twenty-one years as required for title by adverse possession of prescriptive easement Johnson v. 

Tele-Media Co., 2014 PA Super 83, 90 A.3d 736 (Pa. Super. 2014), citing, Baylor v. Soska, 540 

Pa. 435, 658 A.2d 743, 744 (Pa. 1995), citing Conneaut Lake Park, Inc. v. Klingensmith. 362 Pa. 

592, 66 A.2d 828 (Pa. 1949). See, also, Boyd v. Teeple, 460 Pa. 91, 331 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1975), 

citing, See, Bodman v. Bodman. 456 Pa. 412, 321 A.2d 910 (1974). The Becks testified to 

sporadic and temporary uses of the land, including some mowing and planting, which has 

generally been considered insufficient to confer such title in contrast to maintaining a lawn in 

connection with a residence, improvements to land, enclosing land or other conduct that places a 

reasonable person on notice that the land is being claimed by another as one's own. See, e.g., 

Moore v. Duran, 455 Pa. Super. 124, 137 (Pa. Super. 1996)(citation omitted); Johnson v. TeleMedia Co., 90 A.3d 736, 741 (Pa. Super. 2014); Parks v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 301 Pa. 475, 152 

A. 682. 684 (Pa. 1934); Young}:, Herdic, 55 Pa. 172. McArthur v. Kitchen, 77 Pa. 62. Pistner. 

Bros., Inc. v. Agheli, 359 Pa. Super. 177, 518 A.2d 838 (Pa.Super.1986) 

Moreover, the prescriptive easements sought by the Becks (to the North, to the South. 

and the parking spaces) cannot be permitted because they impennissibly attempt to expand 

existing easements the Becks enjoy by express grant. Smithy. Fulkroad, 305 Pa. Super. 459. 

463-464, 451 A.2d 738, 740�741 (Pa. Super. 1982). 

Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order and Verdict. 

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ORDER AND VERDICT 

AND NOW this� day of November 2016, following a non-jury trial in this matter, it is 

ORDERED and DIRECTED that verdict entered in favor of Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 

Little League Baseball, Inc., and against Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs, James L Beck and 

Margaret A. Beck is reaffirmed. It is further ORDERED and DIRECTED as follows. 

1. As stipulated by the parties, the respective boundaries of the properties and the Beck 

residential easement providing ingress and egress to the Beck Residential Property is 

accurately delineated in the Boundary Survey entered into evidence and marked as Plaintiff's 

Exhibit 2. 

2. The Beck residential easement as delineated in the Boundary Survey entered into evidence 

and marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, terminates at the property line and does not cross Little 

League Parcel 02-001·102. 

3. Because the Beck residential easement terminates at the property line, as delineated in the 

Boundary Survey entered into evidence and marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, Little League 

may lock the gate at the boundary of that property at any time for any reason. 

4. As Borderline Road is situated on Little League's land, Little League may place security 

personnel and security measures at any location on Little League property, including, but not 

limited to, the entrance to, along and upon Borderline Road provided the measure do not 

unreasonably burdened the Becks' use of their right of way on Borderline Road 

5. Little League may utilize security methods over Borderline Road in the manner that they 

have implemented them to date; such methods have not unreasonably burdened the Becks' 

use of their right of way on Borderline Road. 

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6. The Becks' claims for title to land or easements by prescription and adverse possession to 

land to the West of the Parcel, to the South of the parcel and to the North of the Parcel are 

denied for insufficient proof. 

7. All personality of the Becks which currently sits on Little League property, including but not 

limited to the list of items in Little League's complaint must be removed within ten (10) 

days. 

8. The Becks' counterclaims (counts 1 and 2) for adverse possession and prescriptive easement 

are dismissed with prejudice. 

9. The Becks' counterclaims (counts 3 and 4) are withdrawn with prejudice by stipulation, 

Plaintiff's exhibit 1. 

November 9, 2016 

Date 

cc: �mas C. Marshall, Esq. 

Xobert A. Hoffa, Esq. 

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