alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. Section 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
In connection with the Quarterly Report of AMG Oil Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Michael Hart, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)    The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated this 14th day of May, 2004.

BY:
/s/ Michael Hart                        Michael Hart, Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer**
1 The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, sitting by designation.

2 The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 03-2646

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Northern District of Iowa. Lillie B. Epps, also known * as L. L., * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: February 9, 2004 Filed: February 12, 2004

___________ Before RILEY and RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and HOVLAND, 1 District Judge.

___________ PER CURIAM. Lillie Epps (Epps) appeals the district court’s 2 revocation of her supervised release from a drug conspiracy conviction, resulting in the imposition of a six-monthprison term followed by a four-year term of supervised release. On appeal, Epps argues the court’s revocation of her supervised release was unreasonable. When a district court imposes a revocation sentence within the statutory limits of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), we will not reverse the sentence absent an abuse of discretion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (“The [district] court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision, if the court, . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.”); United States v. Carothers , 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003) (“On appeal, the district court’s decision to revoke supervised release based on its finding of a violation is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.”) (citations omitted). After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. Epps’s sentence is within the statutory maximum allowed for revocation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Moreover, Epps’s violations of the terms of her supervised release, which included (1) testing positive for cocaine on one occasion, and (2) missing eight substance abuse counseling sessions, and being out of her residence without the permission of her probation officer, between January and April 2003, provide ample support for the district court’s sentence. Accordingly, we affirm Epps’s sentence. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________
#### Reynaldo C. REYNA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 29003.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 29, 1957.

Peter P. Cheswick, Houston, for appellant.

Dan Walton, Dist. Atty., Thomas D. White, Lee P. Ward, Jr., Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is the possession of heroin; the punishment, 10 years.

Officer Tucker of the Narcotic Division of the Houston Police Department testified, in the absence of the jury on the issue of the validity of the search warrant, that on the day in question, while acting undercover, he purchased two “caps” of heroin from the appellant; that he then made an affidavit for a search warrant to search the appellant’s home.

In the presence of the jury, he testified that he and his fellow officers, armed with a search warrant, went to the house where the appellant resided, met the appellant in front, informed him of the purpose of their visit, handed him the search warrant, and entered the appellant’s bedroom. He stated that the appellant said, “I know you will find it anyway so I might as well go ahead and show it to you,” and then took him to the head of his bed, where he pointed out a matchbox under the mattress and on top of the bed slat. In the matchbox, he found five capsules and one paper of alleged narcotics. At this juncture, the appellant told the officers that there was no use in their looking any further because that was all he had.

Officer Miller corroborated a portion of Tucker’s testimony.

It was shown by the testimony of an expert that four of the capsules and the paper contained heroin.

The appellant did' not testify in his own behalf and offered only one witness on the question of his age.

Appellant in his brief relies upon a number of cases which relate to an insufficient search warrant, but he fails to point out the invalidity of the warrant in the case at bar. We have examined the same and find it sufficient under the holding of this Court in Chapin v. State, 107 Tex.Cr.R. 477, 296 S.W. 1095, and Davis v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 302 S.W.2d 419.

Appellant further contends that the evidence shows that he was under the age of 17 years. Appellant’s own witness testified that he was born on September 14, 1939, which would make him more than 17 years old at the time of the trial.

Finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and no reversible error appearing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
**Exhibit 99.1**

 
| ****       |   | **Deloitte &  Touche LLP**                                                                                                     |
|------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ** ** |   | 250 East 5th Street  Suite 1900  Cincinnati, OH 45202-5109  USA  Tel: +1 513 784 7100

Fax: +1 513 784 7204

www.deloitte.com |

 

**REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTINGFIRM**

 

Tothe Partners of Television Food Network, G.P.:

 

Wehave audited the accompanying balance sheet of Television Food Network, G.P. (“FoodNetwork” – a subsidiary of The E.W. Scripps Company) as of December 31,2007, and the related statements of income and comprehensive income, cash flows,and partners’ equity for the year then ended. These financial statements arethe responsibility of the Food Network’s management. Our responsibility is toexpress an opinion on these financial statements based on our audit.

 

Weconducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public CompanyAccounting Oversight Board (United States). Those standards require that weplan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether thefinancial statements are free of material misstatement. The Food Network is notrequired to have, nor were we engaged to perform, an audit of its internalcontrol over financial reporting. An audit includes consideration of internalcontrol over financial reporting as a basis for designing audit procedures thatare appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing anopinion on the effectiveness of the Food Network’s internal control overfinancial reporting. Accordingly, we express no such opinion. An audit alsoincludes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts anddisclosures in the financial statements, assessing the accounting principlesused and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating theoverall financial statement presentation. We believe that our audit provides areasonable basis for our opinion.

 

Inour opinion, such financial statements present fairly, in all materialrespects, the financial position of the Food Network at December 31, 2007,and the results of its operations and its cash flows for the year then ended inconformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United Statesof America.

 
| ****           |                         |
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| ** **     | ** **                   |
| March 11, 2008 |                         |
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|           |                         |
|           | Member  of                   |
|           | **Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu** |

 

----
Presidential Documents

8989 

Federal Register 

Vol. 89, No. 28 

Friday, February 9, 2024 

Title 3— 

The President 

Notice of February 7, 2024 

Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the 

Situation in and in Relation to Burma 

On February 10, 2021, by Executive Order 14014, I declared a national 

emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 

(50 U.S.C. 1701–1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat 

to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted 

by the situation in and in relation to Burma. 

The situation in and in relation to Burma, and in particular the February 

1, 2021 coup, in which the military overthrew the democratically elected 

civilian government of Burma and unjustly arrested and detained government 

leaders, politicians, human rights defenders, journalists, and religious leaders, 

thereby rejecting the will of the people of Burma as expressed in elections 

held in November 2020 and undermining the country’s democratic transition 

and rule of law, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat 

to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this 

reason, the national emergency declared on February 10, 2021, must continue 

in effect beyond February 10, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 

202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing 

for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14014 with 

respect to the situation in and in relation to Burma. 

This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to 

the Congress. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

February 7, 2024. [FR Doc. 2024–02844 

Filed 2–8–24; 8:45 am] 

Billing code 3395–F4–P 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PRESDOC-O0BIDEN.EPS</GPH>
<PAGE>
                                                                      EXHIBIT 24

    KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that each person whose signature appears
below constitutes and appoints Thomas A. Russo, Joseph Polizzotto and Jeffrey A.
Welikson and each of them, his or her true and lawful attorneys-in-fact and
agents, with full power of substitution and resubstitution, for him or her and
in his or her name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to sign the
Annual Report on Form 10-K of Lehman Brothers Inc., for the fiscal year ended
November 30, 2000, and any and all amendments thereto, and to file the same,
with all exhibits thereto, and other documents in connection therewith, with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, granting unto said attorneys-in-fact and
agents, and each of them, full power and authority to do and perform each and
every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done, as fully to all intents
and purposes as he or she might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and
confirming all that said attorneys-in-fact and agents, or any of them, or their
substitute or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

    Dated: As of February 28, 2001

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                     SIGNATURES                                            TITLE
                     ----------                                            -----
<C>                                                    <S>
              /s/ RICHARD S. FULD, JR.                 Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the
     -------------------------------------------         Board of Directors (principal executive
                Richard S. Fuld, Jr.                     officer)

                 /s/ DAVID GOLDFARB
     -------------------------------------------       Chief Financial Officer (principal financial
                   David Goldfarb                        and accounting officer)

                /s/ ROGER S. BERLIND
     -------------------------------------------       Director
                  Roger S. Berlind

              /s/ HOWARD L. CLARK, JR.
     -------------------------------------------       Director
                Howard L. Clark, Jr.

                 /s/ FREDERICK FRANK
     -------------------------------------------       Director
                   Frederick Frank

                /s/ HARVEY M. KRUEGER
     -------------------------------------------       Director
                  Harvey M. Krueger

              /s/ SHERMAN R. LEWIS, JR.
     -------------------------------------------       Director
                Sherman R. Lewis, Jr.
</TABLE>
Exhibit 31.1

Certification Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a) or 15d-14(a) of the Securities andExchange Act of 1934

 

I, Ann Murtlow, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of IPALCO Enterprises, Inc. (the"registrant");

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) [Paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986]

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter that has materially affected,or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financialreporting; and 

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunction):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant'sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date:	March 23, 2005	
	/s/ Ann D. Murtlow	
Ann D. Murtlow

Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

OF FLORIDA 

SECOND DISTRICT 

VICTOR TIANGA, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D13-1496 

 ) 

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) 

 ) 

 Appellee. ) 

___________________________________ ) 

Opinion filed September 5, 2014. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee 

County; J. Frank Porter, Judge. 

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, 

and Megan Olson, Assistant Public 

Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Jessica Stephans, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, 

for Appellee. 

MORRIS, Judge. 

 Victor Omar Tianga appeals the imposition of his habitual felony offender 

(HFO) sentence for aggravated assault. The State properly concedes error, and we 

reverse and remand for resentencing. 
 The State has the burden of proving that a defendant qualifies as an HFO. 

Edison v. State, 848 So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Among other elements, the 

State must prove that the defendant has at least two prior convictions and that the 

felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced and one of the two prior felony 

convictions are not convictions pursuant to section 893.13, Florida Statutes, relating to 

purchase or possession. § 775.084(1)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2011).

 At Tianga's sentencing hearing, the State entered certified copies of five 

prior convictions for possession of cocaine into evidence and called a fingerprint expert 

to confirm that the prints on the certified convictions matched Tianga's fingerprints. The 

State also introduced a criminal tracking form from the Department of Corrections 

showing three additional prior convictions for Tianga, including one for grand theft. This 

form did not contain Tianga's fingerprints or photograph. Based on this evidence, the 

court found that Tianga qualified for habitual offender status and sentenced him as an 

HFO to five years' incarceration. As the State concedes, this finding was erroneous 

because the criminal tracking form did not sufficiently identify Tianga as the person 

named in the form. See Bodie v. State, 983 So. 2d 1196, 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) 

(reversing when State presented computer printout without the defendant's fingerprints 

or photograph to establish that defendant qualified for enhanced sentencing); Alcantara 

v. State, 39 So. 3d 535, 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (reversing when State presented a 

"rap sheet" as proof of a predicate conviction). 

 Accordingly, we reverse Tianga's sentence and remand for resentencing. 

On remand, the trial court may again impose a habitual offender sentence only if the 
State is able to provide the proper documentation to demonstrate that Tianga qualifies 

for such sentencing. See State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 994 (Fla. 2008). 

 Reversed and remanded for resentencing. 

SILBERMAN and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
#### J. Grady THOMAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28578.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 14, 1956.

*773Byron Chappell, Lubbock, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is the unlawful transportation of wine in a dry area, with a prior conviction of an offense of like character plead for enhancement; the punishment, six months in jail.

Officers Cox and McNeese testified that they observed the appellant’s automobile being driven with only one headlight on the streets of Littlefield on the night in question and brought the same to a halt, that they smelled intoxicants on the appellant’s breath, that they arrested appellant’s passenger for drunkenness in a public place, that they searched the appellant’s automobile and found therein two full pints of wine and one “broken” pint.

On cross-examination, Officer McNeese stated that one Frank Reed had come to the jail later that night and had claimed the wine as his own but stated at the time of the arrest the appellant admitted that the wine was his.

The prior conviction was established.

The appellant called Frank Reed, who testified that he had borrowed the appellant’s automobile on the night in question and had purchased the wine in question and had later informed the officers of such fact.

The appellant, testifying in his own behalf, stated that he did not know the wine was in the automobile on the day in question.

One Cooley also testified that Reed had told him and the officers that the wine belonged to him.

The jury resolved this dispute in the evidence against the appellant, and we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.

Appellant was not represented in the trial court but now asks that we hold reversible error to have been committed by the asking of certain questions, even though no objections were made. Reliance is had upon Randolph v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 265 S.W.2d 114.

In the Randolph case, the trial court overruled a motion for continuance based upon the illness of the appellant’s counsel. This Court held that when he exercised his discretion in this matter adversely to the appellant it became his duty to then see that no inadmissible proof of extraneous offenses was admitted in the absence of such counsel. Such is not the case before us here. In this case, the appellant informed the court that he was no longer represented by counsel and wished to plead his own case.

It is only in unusual circumstances such as existed in the Randolph case that we can hold that evidence to which no objection is made constitutes reversible error. *774Any other holding would encourage the accused to go to trial without counsel and, if unsuccessful in the trial, to then employ counsel on appeal.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
EXHIIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly  report of Island Critical Care. on Form 10-QSB
for the period  ended Dec 31,  2002 as filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission (the "Report"), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the
dates indicated below,  hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1.     the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.     the information  contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of  operation of the
Company.


Dated:  August 10, 2004          /s/ Marc Juliar
                                 ----------------------
                                 Name: Marc Juliar
                                 Title: Chief Executive Officer

Dated:  August 10, 2004          /s/ Marc Juliar
                                 ----------------------
                                 Name: Marc Juliar
                                 Title: Chief Financial Officer
#### Kelly NOBLE, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 22, 1959.

O. J. Cockrell, Jackson, for appellant.

Jo M. Ferguson, Atty. Gen., William F. Simpson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from the Breathitt Circuit Court, Honorable Ervine Turner, Judge. Judgment of conviction, for violation of the local option law, fixing the punishment of appellant at a fine of $100 and 30 days in the county jail.

The facts, questions raised, authorities cited and the applicable law have been carefully considered.

The motion for an appeal is overruled and the judgment stands affirmed.