NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0055n.06 F iled: Janu ary 15, 2008 No. 07-5793 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
RO SE V AN CE , Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. CO M M ISSI ON ER

OF SOC IA L SEC URITY , Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR THE EA STE RN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: G UY , G ILM AN , M c KEA G UE , C ir c uitJudg e s. McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. Rose Vanc e see ks review of the district court’s decision up ho ldi ngthe Ad

min istrativ e L aw Jud g e ’s (“ AL J’s” ) d e nia l of dis a bil ity ins ur anc e be ne fi ts b e c a

us e the AL J found that Va

nce c ould perfor

m her past specific work. After revie wing the re cord, w e find substantial evidence supports the AL J ’s dec ision to deny Vanc e bene fits and there fore we a ffirm the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt. BACK GR OUND Vanc e filed an application for Social Secur ity Disability

benef its in August 2003, alleg ing disability as of July

31, 2003. After

her a ppl i ca t i on was de nied in initial and rec onsideration deter minations, she reque sted a he aringbefor e an A L J . Afte r holding he aring s on her c laim, on Dec ember

9, 2005, the AL J issued a dec ision that denied Vanc e her claim for be nefits, finding thatVancev. Comm’r of Soc . Sec.

Case No. 07- 5793

2 s h e c o u l d d o l i g h tw o r

k an d t h e r e f o r e c o u l d s t i l l p e r f o r m h e r p a s t w o r

k a s a S o c i a l S e r

v i c e s A i d e II. On J une 14, 2006, the Appe als Council of the Social Secur ity Admini s tration (“SSA”) denied Vanc e’s r eques t fo r re v i ew of the AL J ’s dec ision, “at which point the AL J ’s dec ision became the final dec ision of the Commi ssioner o f Social Security .” W ilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (c itation omit ted). Va nce initiated this civil act i o n i n the United States District Court for the Easter n District of Kentucky for review of the Commiss ioner’s f inal decision purs ua nt t o 4 2 U .S. C. § 40 5( g ) ( 20 06 ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt su bs e qu e ntl y

a do pte d th e ma g istrate jud g e ’s Re po rt

and Re c omm e nd a tio n, a ff

ir min g the A L J’ s d e c i s i o n

t o d e ny V a n c e d i s a bil ity be ne fi ts. Vanc e timely

appea led. AN AL YSI S On appea l, “ this c ourt conducts de novo revie w of the district c ourt’s leg al conc lusion that the AL J ’s dec ision was supported by substantial evidence .” Bass v. Mc Mahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t at i o no m i t t ed ). Ho we v er , we ar e l i m i t edt o “d ec i d i n g u n d er 4 2 U. S
. C
. § 4 0 5 (g) whether substantial evidence supports the AL J ’s decision, we do not try the ca se de novo, r esolve conflicts in e vidence , or decide questions of cre dibilit y .” Id. (c itatio n omitte d)
. Ra the r, we “ mus t
a ff ir m th e Com mis sio ne r’ s c on c lus ion s a bs e nt a de te rm inatio n th a t th e Com mis sio ne r ha s f a ile d to apply the cor rec t le g al standar ds or has made finding s of fa ct unsupported by substantial evidence in the rec ord.” Longwort h v. Comm’r of Soc . Sec. , 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (c itations and qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g ) (“The findings of the C ommissi oner of Social Security as t o any fac t, if supported by substantial evidenc e, shall be conc lusive. . . .”). “ Substantial
e vid e nc e is m or e tha

n a sc int ill a bu t le ss t ha n a pr e po nd e ra

nc e ; it is s uc h r e lev ant evi den ce as aVancev. Comm’r of Soc . Sec.

Case No. 07- 5793

3 rea sonable mind m i gh t ac ce p t as ade quate to support a c onclusion.” Cutli p v. Sec ’y of He alth & Hu ma n S e rv s. , 25 F.3d 284, 286 ( 6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). “The finding s of t he Commi ssioner ar e not subject to re v er s al m er ely beca use there exis ts in the recor d substantial
e vid e nc e to s up po rt

a dif fe re nt co nc lus ion
. . . . Th is is so bec a us e the re is a ‘zon e of

c ho ic e ’ w ith in which the Commiss ioner c an ac t, without the fear of cour t interfer ence .” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 474 F.3d 830, 833 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation mar ks omitt ed). We previously

have e x plained the f

ive-step pr ocess that a

n AL J undertakes whe n he or she
c on sid e rs wh e the r a c la ima nt is e nti tle d to a pe ri od of dis a bil ity and dis a

bil ity in su ranc e ben e fi ts
un de r t he Soc ia l Se c ur ity

Ac t: Th e So c ia l S e c u r it

y A c t r e qu ir e s th e Se c r e ta r y to f o ll o w a “ f iv e - s te p s e qu ential proce ss” for c laims of disability
. Abbott v. Sullivan , 905 F.2d 918, 923 ( 6th Cir. 19 90 ). First , p la int if

f m us t de mon str a te that sh e is n ot c ur re ntl y e ng a g e d in “substantial g ainful activity ” at the time she see ks disability benef its. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) a

nd 416.920(b)( 2000)). Second, plaintiff must show that she suffe rs from a

“seve re impairme nt” in order to warr ant a findingof disability . A
“ se ve re imp a ir

me nt” is o ne wh ic h “ sig nif ic antl y lim its
. . . p hy sic a l or

me nta l a bil ity to do basic work a cti v ities.” Id . (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c ) (2000))
. Third, i f pl aintiff is not perfor ming substantial g ainful ac tivity , has a se vere impairment that is expected to las t for at lea st twelve months, and the impairment meets a listed impairment, plaintiff is pre sumed to be disabled r eg ard l es s of ag e, education or work experienc e. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.15 2 0 (d ) and 416.920( d) (2000)
. Four th, if the pl aintiff’s impairment does not preve nt her from doing he r past re levant work, plaintiff is not d i sabled. F or the fif th and final step, e ven if the pla intiff’s imp a ir me nt d oe s p re ve nt he r fr om doi ng he r pa st re le va nt wo rk , if oth e r wo rk

e xists in the national economy that plaintiff can perf orm, plaintiff is not disabled. Ab bo tt , 905 F.2d at 923. Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001). “The claimant bea rs the burde n of proof duringthe first four

steps, but the burden shifts to the Commiss ioner at step five.” W ilson , 378 F.3d at 548 (citation omitted).Vancev. Comm’r of Soc . Sec.

Case No. 07- 5793

Vanc e ar ticulates these f

irst two arguments as both errone ous decisions by the AL J and the 1 district court. She appe ars to misunderstand t hat t he AL J weig hed the treating phy sicians’ opinions and eva luated her cre dibilit y in the first instance. The district c ourt’s role simply was to re view the decision of the A L J for substantial evide nce, not make tho se de te rm inatio ns a fr e sh . N on e the le ss, such distinctions do not i mpact our de cision here
. 4 Applying the five-ste p proce ss to Vanc e’s claim for bene fits, the AL J first found that Va nce h a d n o t e n g a g e d i n s u

b s t an t i a l g a i n f

u l a c t i v i t y s i n c e t h e a l l e g e d o n s e to f d i s a b i l i t y . S e c o n d , t h e A LJ fo un d th a t V a nce h ad t he fo ll owi ng sev ere i mp air men ts : rheu mat oi d art hri ti s, fi bro my a lg ia , a lle rg ie s,
an d r e a c ti v e a ir

w ay d is e a s e . T h ir d , th e A L J f o u n d th a t V an c e ’ s im

p a ir me n t d id n o t m e e t or
me dic a lly e qu a l an im

pa ir me nt i n th e L ist ing s a

nd the re fo re ste p fo ur wa s re qu ir e d. At the fo ur th ste p , th e A L J d e n ie d

h e r a p p li c a ti o nf

o r b e n e f it s b e c a u s e h e f o u n d th a t, in li g h t o f h e r r e s id ual functional c apac ity , Vanc e wa s able to p er fo rm h er p ast rele vant work. A s such, the AL J never
rea ched the fifth and f

inal step. See M

cCl anahan , 474 F.3d at 830 (“Dur ing the sequential
e va luatio n, if

the c la ima

nt i s f ound to b e c on c lus ive ly

dis a bled o r n ot d isa

ble d, the dis a

bil ity deter mination is m ade, a

nd the inquiry

is ended.” ). O na p p e a l , V an c e ar g u e s t h a tt h e A LJ an d t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtc o m m i t t e d a l i t an y o f e r

r o r s . In pa rt ic ula r, Va nc e dis a g re e s wi th (a ) the we ig ht the AL J ac c or de d h e r t re a tin g ph y sic ians ’ o pin ion s; (b) the A L J ’s eva luation of her pa in, cre dibilit y , and subjective c omplaints; and (c) the district court’s e valuation of the r ecor d as a w hole. 1 A. We igh t o f phys ic ian s’ opi nio ns Va nc e argue s th a t the AL J e rr e d by fa ili ng to d e fe r t o th e op ini on s o f h e r t re a tin g ph y sic ians . “Ge nera lly , the opinions of treating phy sicians are g iven substantial, if not controlling, de fer ence .”Vancev. Comm’r of Soc . Sec.

Case No. 07- 5793

5 W arner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (c iting King v. Hec kler , 742 F.2d 96 8, 97 3 ( 6th

Cir . 198 4) ; 20 C.F .R. § 4 04 .1 52 7( d) (2 )) . Y e t, “ [t]re a tin g ph y sic ians ’ o pin ion s are on ly g iven such defer ence when supporte d by objective medic al evidenc e.” Id. (c i t i n g Jones v . Comm’r

o f Soc. Sec ., 3 3 6 F
. 3 d 4 6 9 , 4 7 7 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 3 ) )
. M o r e o v e r , “ [t ]h e d e t e r m i n at i o n o f

dis a bil ity

is [u lt im a te ly] th e p r e r o g a ti v e o f th e [C o mm is s io n e r ], n o t th e tr e a ti n g p h y s ic ian.” Id. (a lte ra tio n in
o ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Harris v. Hec kler , 756 F.2d 431, 435 ( 6th Cir. 1985)). Dr. Poore is Va

nce’ s treatingprimary ca re phy sician, and D r. Goldfa rb is her tre ating rheumatologist. Dr. Poore broadly opined that Vanc e cannot “hold down any ty pe of job or do a

ny ty pe of pr oductive wor

k .
. . for the rest of her life ” due to “ so much fatigue and musc le pain, joint
sw e lli n g an d t e n d e r

n e s s f r o m t i m e t o t i m e . ” A
. R
. 3 9 3
. H e c o n c l u d e d t h a t V an c e “ i s u n a ble to function in any

ty pe of w ork ca

pacity now or in the for esee able f uture.” Id . Howeve r, such statements by

Dr. Poore a

re pr ecise ly

the ty pe of c onclusory

phy sician statements that amount to a disability deter mination, no t a medical opinion. Such disabili ty deter minations are r eser

ved for the C o m m i ssioner and the ref ore a re not g iven “a

ny specia l significa

nce.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) (1),( 3). Vanc e ar g ues that the AL J did not provide g ood rea sons for discounting her tre ating phy sicians’ c onclusions. We disagr ee. It is true that the SSA’s regulations require it to “give g ood
rea sons” for disc ounting e vidence of di s ab i l i ty submitt ed by

the claimant’ s treatingphy sicians beca use “the se sourc es a re l i kely to be the medica l professionals most able to provide detailed, longit u d i n al p icture of

[t he cla imant’s] m edica l impairment(s).” 20 C.F .R. § 404.1527(d)(2)
. Ho we ve r, un lik e inW

ilson , 378 F.3d at 545, the AL J here did not summ arily dismiss the treatingVancev. Comm’r of Soc . Sec.

Case No. 07- 5793

6 phy sicians’ opinions; rather , the AL J provided a leng thy , acc urate , and thoroug h discussion of Vanc e’s tre ating phy sicians’ re ports and finding s. A.R. 20-22. He re , th e AL J n ote d that Dr
. Poo re lis ts V anc e ’s dia g no se s a s: s e ve re rh e umatoi d a rt hr iti s,
c or on ary art e ry dis e a se , h y

pe rt e ns ion , g a str oe so ph a g e a l r e fl ux dis e a se , f ibr omya lg ia, m

ult ipl e allerg ies, fatigue, hy

pothy roidism, a history

of blee ding ulc ers, a

nd depre ssion . Id. at 21. Yet, the ALJ ex p l ai n ed t h at s ev er al o f Dr
. P o o re ’s d i agn o s es l ac k edt h e s u p p o rto f o b

j ec t i v e c l i n i ca l fi n d i n gs
and ins te a d, Dr . Po or e a

pp e are d to tr e a t V anc e “ mos tly fo r s inu sit is a

nd bro nch it is, rathe r m ild pulmonary

problems.” Id. Moreove r, t he AL J explained that while Dr. Goldfar b stated that Va

nce’ s big g e st p ro ble m w a s f

ibr omy a lg ia , h e te ste d V anc e on ly on c e fo r f

ibr omya lg ia

in 2001 , a

nd his documentation indicate s continuous “improvement ove rall” or, at worst, that the disea se re mains “stable w ith mil d problems.” Id. The AL J also considere d Vanc e’s testimony about her activities of daily living. Se e W

alte rs v. Comm’r of Soc . Sec ., 12 7 F. 3d 52 5, 53 1 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 7) (“ An

AL J may a lso c on sid e r h ou se ho ld and socia l activities eng ag ed in by the clai m an t i n evaluating a claimant’s a ssertions of pain or ailments.”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a) . The AL J explained that Vance eng ag ed in the following activities of daily

living: mopping a

nd swee ping thr ee times pe r month, doing la undry twice a wee k while ca rry ing la undry baskets with clothes, c ooks, clea ns, does dishes, drive up to one hour without brea k, and shops for g roce ries alone some of the time. A.R. at 20-21. The AL J proper ly found that Vanc e’s “ activities of daily living are also inconsistent with the l evel of pain and fatig ue alleg ed.” Id. at 21.Vancev. Comm’r of Soc . Sec.

Case No. 07- 5793

7 I n addition, the AL J considere d a consultative examination conduc ted by Dr. Manusc o. Id
. The re g ulations provide that opinions of no n-treating phy sicians may be conside red. 20 C.F .R. § 404.1527(d)( 1),(f

). Moreove r, while Dr. Manusco is not a “tre ating ” phy sician with a s ex t en s ive past with Vanc e as Drs. P oore and Goldfar b, he did examine Vanc e (a lbeit one time) and the ref ore his opinion m ay

be ac corde d more we ight than a non-examining phy sician. Dr. Manusc o repor ted that V anc e ha d n o jo int

de fo rm iti e s o r s we lli ng ; no no du le s; n o te nd e rn e ss, re dn e ss o r w arm th; a normal ra ng e of motion; normal streng th; normal sensation; and no evide nce of phy sical limitation. Ultimately , the AL J ag ree d with the Residual Func tional Capacity Assessment conduc ted by a state phy sician who re viewed the rec ord, but did not examine Vanc e. A.R. 22. I n light of all the
a fo re me nti on e d e vid e nc e , th e AL J pro vid e d g oo d r e aso ns fo r d isc ounti ngthe tr e a tin g ph y sic ians ’ opinions and substantial evidence supported the AL J ’s deter mination in that reg ard. Vanc e also a

rg ues that fibromy alg ia is an unusual impairment in that its sy mptoms are ofte n not supportable by

objective medic al evidenc e. See R ogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec ., 486 F.3d 234, 24 3 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) ; Preston v. Se c’y of Health a n d Hu man Servs ., 854 F.2d 815, 820 ( 6th Cir. 19 88 ); see also Sarc het v. Charter , 78 F. 3d 30 5, 30 6- 07 (7 th C ir . 1 99 6) . We a g re e . N on e the le ss,
a dia gn os is of fi br omya lg ia do e s not autom a tic a lly e nti tle Va nc e to dis a

bil ity be ne fi ts; pa

rt ic ula rl y so here , wher e ther e is substantial evidenc e to support the AL J ’s determ i n ation that Vanc e’s fibromy alg ia was e ither improving or, at wor st, stable. Cf. Sarchet , 78 F .3 d at 30 7 ( “ Som e pe op le may have a sever e ca se of f

ibromy alg ia as to be totally disabled fr om working
. . . but most do not and the que stion is whether [claimant] i s one of the minority .”) ( citations omitt ed).Vancev. Comm’r of Soc . Sec.

Case No. 07- 5793

8 B. ALJ’s evaluation of

pain , cre dib ility, and sub jec tive c om plain ts Vanc e ar gues that the AL J ’s cr edibility finding is not supporte d in the rec ord. We disag ree . Th e AL J found that Va

nc e ’s “ me dic a lly de te rm ina ble imp a ir

me nts c ou ld re a so na

bly be e xpe c te d to produce the alleg ed sy

mptoms. However, [Vanc e’s] statements conc erningthe intensity , duration, and limiting ef

fec ts of these sy

mptoms are not entire ly

cre dible.” A.R. 20. To eva luate Va

nce’ s complaints of pain, the AL J prope rl y considere d her c redibility
. See W alte rs , 1 2 7 F.3d at 531 (citation omitted). “[A]n AL J ’s finding s based on the c redibility of the
a pp lic ant ar e to be a c c or de d g re a t we ig ht an d de fe re nc e , part ic ula rl y sin c e an AL J is c ha

rg e d w ith the duty of observing a witness’s deme anor a nd cre dibilit y .” Id. (citation omitted). Notwithstanding that defe renc e, “a

n AL J ’s assessment of

a cla imant’s cre dibilit y

must b e supported by

substantial evidenc e.” Id. (citation omitted). “Subjective c omplaints of ‘pain or other sy mptoms shall not alone be conclusive e vidence of disability .’” A rn e tt

v . Co m m ’ r

o f S o c . S e c ., 7 6 F. Ap p ’x 713, 716 (6th Cir. 2003) (c iting 42 U. S.C. § 4 23 (d )( 5) (A )) ; se e als o W alte rs , 127 F.3d at 531 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) ). We have
e xpla ine d th a t: I n evaluating subjec tive complaints of disabling pain, this court must first determine w h e t h e r t h e r e i s o b

j e c t i v e m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e o f anu n d e r l yi n g m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n . If the re is, the e xami natio n f oc us e s o n 1 ) whe the r o bje c tiv e me dic a l e vid e nc e c on fi rm s the seve rity

of the a lleg ed pain a

rising f rom the cond i t ion, or 2) whe ther the ob je c tiv e ly e sta bli sh e d me dic a l c on dit ion is of su c h a se ve ri ty that it c an r e a so na

bly be expected to pr oduce the disabling pa in. Duncan v . Secre tary of Health &Human Servs ., 80 1 F .2 d 8 47 , 8 53 (6 th Cir . 198 6)
. B e c a us e the re are sit

uatio ns wh e re pa in sy mptoms m ay

sug g est a g reater re striction than can be dem o n s t ra t ed by objective evidenc e, re asona b l e co n clusions as to one’s a bility to do work ac tiviti es ca n be derive d from other

information in conjunction with medi ca l evidenc e. Stanley v. Se c ’y of H e alt h & Hu ma n S e rv s. , 39 F.3d 115, 117- 18 (6th Cir. 1994).Vancev. Comm’r of Soc . Sec.

Case No. 07- 5793

9 Id. Whil e it is undisputed that Vance has the ne cessa ry objective medic al conditions to support her c laim, the contested issue is the sever ity of the sy mptoms re sulting from those conditions. Here , the AL J proper ly weig hed the evidenc e to de termine that Vanc e wa s not credible w ith respec t to the
sever ity of her sy

mptoms. Unli ke in Ro ge rs wh e re c la ima nt’ s f ibr omya lg ia

sy mpt oms pr og re ssi ve ly
worsene d, Vanc e’s sy

mptoms have either improve d or r em ai n ed stable. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 245 (P hy sic ians ’ d oc ume ntatio n “ c on sis te ntl y de mon str a te s” that sy

mpt oms “ have pr og re ssi ve ly incre ased in seve rity .”). A s discussed su pra , other e vidence also supported the A L J ’s finding that Vanc e wa s not entirely cre dible with respe ct t o the s ever ity of her pain and limit ations, including he r
a c tiv iti e s o f d a ily

liv ing . T hu s, we fi nd

that su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e su

pp or ts the AL J’s f

ind ingin t

his
re sp e c t. C. Di st r ic t c our t’ s r e vie w of th e r e c or d as a whol e Va nc e ne xt ar g ue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d by fai ling to e va luate the re c or d a s a wh ole
un de r t he su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e sta

nd ard . T his argume nt a lso fa ils . We have e xpla ine d th a t: I t is appare nt that counsel for [claim ant] wishes this court to eng ag e in a de novo revie w of e very

aspec t of eve ry

piece of the favora

ble, and less f

avora ble, evidenc e prese nted to the Commiss ioner throug h the AL J . This court, howe ver, is not cha rg ed with conducting the kind of “supe r re view” r equeste d. Ar ne tt , 76 F. App’ x at 716. Her e, the district cour t properly held that substantial evidenc e supported the AL J ’s denial of Vanc e’s benef its. I n so doing, the district court prope rly acc orded the AL J the defe renc e re quired unde r the substantial evide nce sta ndard. That substantial evidenc e mig ht support
a differ ent conclusion is of no conseque nce beca use it is not g rounds to reve rse a n AL J
. See id. atVancev. Comm’r of Soc . Sec.

Case No. 07- 5793

10 715. Con tr ary

to V anc e ’s su g g e sti on , it sq ua re ly is no t the du ty

of the dis tr ic t c ourt , n or

thi s c ourt , t o r e - w e i g h t h e e v i d e n c e , r e s o l v e m a t e r i a l c o n f l i c t s i n t e s t i m o n y, o r

a s s e s s c r e d i b i l i t y. Se e Ba ss, 499 F.3d at 509. CO NC LU SION Whil e the r ecor d established a dia gn o sis of fibromy alg ia (among othe r conditions), substantial evidence in the rec ord supports a finding t hat Vance’ s phy sical condition was not seve re enoug h to qualify

her f or disability

benef its. I ndeed, ha

ving r eviewe d the re cord a nd the AL J ’s
rea soning, w e ca

nnot say the dec ision here lies ou t s i d e t h e available zone of choice . For all the afor ementioned r easons a nd those discussed in the we ll-rea soned Report a nd Recommendation of the ma g istrate jud g e , w e a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.