IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-30378

In the Matter of: Tobin Parker

 Debtor

WAL-MART STORES, INCORPORATED; WAL-MART LOUISIANA, L.L.C.; 

WILLA HOBBY, 

 Appellants - Cross-Appellees

v.

TOBIN PARKER, 

 Appellee - Cross-Appellant

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USBC No. 5:17-AP-1007

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Tobin Parker, a Chapter 13 debtor, filed a personal injury suit against 

Wal-Mart, which Wal-Mart seeks to judicially estop because Parker failed to 

disclose the cause of action to the bankruptcy court or amend his bankruptcy 

schedules to reflect the lawsuit as an asset. The bankruptcy court concluded

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 8, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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that the elements of judicial estoppel were met but declined to apply the 

doctrine for equitable reasons. The bankruptcy court then ruled that Parker 

could continue with his personal injury suit but had to turn over any recovery 

to the trustee to be administered as part of his bankruptcy estate for the benefit 

of his creditors. We AFFIRM.

I.

Tobin Parker filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in February 2009, and the 

bankruptcy court confirmed his bankruptcy plan in July 2009.1 The plan 

required Parker to make monthly payments for the benefit of creditors over 

the next several years. In December 2010, Parker was involved in an on-thejob accident while completing a delivery to a Wal-Mart store, causing injuries 

to his hand and requiring surgeries. Parker filed a personal injury suit against 

Wal-Mart in Louisiana state court in December 2011. Parker did not inform 

the bankruptcy court of his personal injury claim, nor did he amend his 

bankruptcy schedules to disclose the same. Parker completed the payments 

under the terms of his Chapter 13 plan, signed a certificate stating that he had 

completed all his payments, and, in April 2014, received a discharge, at which 

point his undisclosed lawsuit against Wal-Mart was still pending. 

In March 2017, the bankruptcy court granted Wal-Mart’s motion to 

reopen Parker’s bankruptcy case. Wal-Mart filed an adversary proceeding in 

the bankruptcy court,2 arguing that Parker was judicially estopped from 

pursuing his personal injury claim because he had failed to disclose the claim 

in his bankruptcy filings. The bankruptcy court determined that the elements 

 

1 The plan was later modified March 2010 by order after confirmation.

2 “[L]itigated matters that arise during the pendency of a bankruptcy case” are either 

adversary proceedings or contested matters. 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 7000.01 (16th 

ed. 2019). An adversary proceeding is necessary “to obtain an injunction or other equitable 

relief, except when a chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 plan provides for the relief.” FED. R. BANKR. P.

7001(7).

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of judicial estoppel were met but ultimately declined to apply the doctrine for 

equitable reasons. Particularly, the bankruptcy court found that Parker’s 

failure to disclose the personal injury suit did not harm any party in his 

bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court ruled:

Ultimately, this Court’s challenge is to fashion a remedy that is 

equitable and does not punish innocent parties. The Court will 

accomplish this by requiring any potential recovery [from Parker’s]

personal injury claim to be administer [sic] by the Chapter 13 

Trustee, requiring any potential recovery to be used first to pay all 

allowed unsecured claims, including [Parker’s] student loans, and 

paying interest on allowed unsecured claims if the Chapter 13 

estate becomes solvent.

Walmart timely appealed.3

II.

We review a bankruptcy court ruling “as if [it] were an appeal from a 

trial in the district court.” In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 204 (5th 

Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). We review a refusal to apply the doctrine of judicial 

estoppel for abuse of discretion. Id. at 205. We will only reverse where “the 

district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous or incorrect legal 

standards were applied.” Latvian Shipping Co. v. Baltic Shipping Co., 99 F.3d 

690, 692 (5th Cir. 1996).

After declining to apply judicial estoppel and thus allowing Parker to 

proceed with his personal injury suit against Wal-Mart, the bankruptcy court

ordered Parker to turn over any recovery to the Chapter 13 trustee to be 

administered for the benefit of creditors. In cases similar to Wal-Mart’s—when

a potential defendant argues that a debtor is estopped from bringing a lawsuit 

for failure to disclose it to the bankruptcy court—we have held that, while a 

 

3 The bankruptcy court certified its judgment for direct appeal to this court, and this 

court authorized the direct appeal. See 28 U.S.C. §158(d)(2)(A). 

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debtor may be estopped from pursuing the claim on his own behalf, his 

bankruptcy trustee is not similarly estopped and may pursue the claim for the 

benefit of the creditors. See Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 579 (5th 

Cir. 2011) (en banc); In re Flugence, 738 F.3d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 2013). This

approach “protect[s] the integrity of the bankruptcy system by deterring 

debtors from concealing assets” while also being “consistent with the core 

bankruptcy goal of obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for 

creditors.” Reed, 650 F.3d at 577.

Here, the bankruptcy court took an alternate route to the same final 

outcome. Instead of following the path sanctioned by this court in Reed—

applying judicial estoppel to prevent the debtor from pursuing the undisclosed 

claim but allowing the trustee to pursue the claim for the benefit of creditors—

the bankruptcy court declined to apply judicial estoppel to the debtor, allowing 

him to pursue his undisclosed claim himself, but ordered him to turn over any

recovery to the trustee. The ultimate outcome is the same in both situations—

any personal injury recovery winds up in the hands of the trustee. 

Significantly, we have said that “there is no per se rule estopping any 

party who fails to disclose potential claims to a bankruptcy court.” U.S. ex rel. 

Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 798 F.3d 265, 271 (5th Cir. 2015). The doctrine 

of judicial estoppel “is equitable in nature,” and “should be applied flexibly, 

with an intent to achieve substantial justice.” Reed, 650 F.3d at 574. Because 

of the equitable nature of the doctrine, “trial courts are not required to apply it 

in every instance that they determine its elements have been met.” Long, 798 

F.3d at 271; see Flugence, 738 F.3d at 132 (Dennis, J., concurring) (“The 

bankruptcy court, which is closest to the facts, operates in a zone of discretion 

in crafting an appropriate remedy.”). 

Considering the bankruptcy court’s ultimate remedy, we conclude that it 

did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply judicial estoppel to Parker’s 

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personal injury claim but requiring him to turn over any recovery to the 

trustee. See Flugence, 738 F.3d at 132 (Dennis, J., concurring) (explaining that 

“our opinion does not require the same remedy in all cases”). If we concluded

that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion here, the final outcome would 

likely be the same—we would reverse and remand for the bankruptcy court to 

apply judicial estoppel to Parker’s claim, and in so doing, the bankruptcy court 

would allow the trustee to pursue the personal injury claim and administer the 

proceeds for creditors. See Reed, 650 F.3d at 573; Flugence, 738 F.3d at 128. 

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in reaching the same end 

through different, reasonable means. See Flugence, 738 F.3d at 132 (Dennis, 

J., concurring) (“That we affirmed the bankruptcy court’s remedy here—

estopping [the debtor] from pursuing her personal-injury claim while allowing 

the bankruptcy trustee to do so and requiring that any recovery by the trustee 

exceeding [the debtor’s] remaining debt be refunded to the tortfeasors—does 

not imply that the same must be done in all cases in which a debtor fails to 

disclose a claim to the bankruptcy court.”).

Though the bankruptcy court’s decision is certainly odd and not the route 

we would have chosen, we cannot say that it contained clearly erroneous 

factual findings or the application of incorrect legal standards that amount to 

an abuse of discretion. See Latvian Shipping Co., 99 F.3d at 692; Gen. Elec. 

Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997) (“[D]eference . . . is the hallmark of 

abuse-of-discretion review.”). The judgment of the bankruptcy court is 

AFFIRMED.

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