COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Annunziata 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

BOBBIE G. MYREE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0383-98-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 MARCH 2, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Walter W. Stout, III, Judge 

 Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication.

 On appeal from his conviction for possession of cocaine with 

intent to distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248, Bobbie G. 

Myree contends that he was unlawfully seized and that the trial 

court erred by receiving into evidence cocaine that was 

discovered pursuant to that seizure. We affirm the judgment of 

the trial court. 

 On July 24, 1997, Richmond Police Officer Cappelli stopped a 

car being driven by Myree, after observing that the car had a 

cracked windshield. Officer Cappelli approached Myree, explained 

his reason for stopping the car, and requested identification. 

Myree responded that he had none and gave the officer a false 

name. When the officer could not find the name, birth date, and 
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Social Security number given by Myree in the computer, he told 

Myree that he would arrest him for giving a false name. Myree 

then gave his correct name. 

 Having determined that Myree was an habitual offender and 

that he was driving with a suspended license, Officer Cappelli 

arrested Myree, and upon searching him incident to arrest, found 

cocaine on his person. 

 Denying Myree's motion to suppress, the trial court received 

the cocaine into evidence. Myree was convicted of possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-248, and was sentenced to six years imprisonment, with 

four years and eight months suspended. 

 Myree contends that Officer Cappelli had no lawful basis to 

stop his car. He argues that because his arrest, search, and the 

discovery of cocaine on his person derived from the stop, the 

seizure of the cocaine was unlawful and the cocaine should have 

been suppressed. We disagree. An investigatory stop is lawful 

if an officer has a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity, 

based upon articulable facts. See McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. 

App. 193, 202, 487 S.E.2d 259, 263 (1997) (en banc). 

 Code § 46.2-1057 requires a motor vehicle to be equipped 

with a windshield. Code § 46.2-1056 requires that safety glass 

be used in motor vehicles. Code § 46.2-1002 requires that safety 

glass in a motor vehicle being operated on a highway be of an 

approved type. Code § 46.2-1003 provides, as follows: 
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 It shall be unlawful for any person to use or 

have as equipment on a motor vehicle operated 

on a highway any device or equipment 

mentioned in [Code] § 46.2-1002 which is 

defective or in an unsafe condition. 

 Before stopping Myree, Officer Cappelli observed that the 

windshield of Myree's car was cracked. This articulable fact 

gave rise reasonably to the suspicion that Myree's windshield 

might be defective or unsafe, in violation of Code § 46.2-1003. 

 Myree argues that Code § 46.2-1003 applies only to 

unapproved equipment. We do not read the statute thus. Code 

§ 46.2-1003 refers to the items of equipment recited in Code 

§ 46.2-1002. It does not refer to the unapproved condition of 

those items. Furthermore, Myree's interpretation would render 

Code § 46.2-1003 redundant, because application of the statute 

would require first that the equipment be shown to be unapproved 

before its defectiveness would become relevant. Under that 

interpretation, the statute would forbid only equipment which is 

both unapproved and defective. 

 Myree argues further that the stop was unlawful because 

Officer Cappelli did not know that the windshield was defective. 

However, the purpose of a Terry stop is to confirm or dispel the 

officer's suspicion of unlawful activity. Cherry v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 135, 141, 415 S.E.2d 242, 245 (1992). 

Cappelli stopped Myree to determine whether the crack rendered 

the windshield defective. 

 Because Cappelli had a reasonable and articulable suspicion 

that a traffic infraction was being committed, his stop of 
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Myree's car was lawful. Having arrested Myree as an habitual 

offender, Cappelli was authorized to search him incident to a 

lawful arrest. See Poindexter v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 730, 

733, 432 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1993). 

 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.