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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 34 (Tuesday, February 20, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12831-12836]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-03351]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration

Record of Decision for the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact 
Statement for Continued Operation of the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-
autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is 
issuing this Record of Decision (ROD) for the Final Site-Wide 
Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) for Continued Operation of the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California (Final LLNL 
SWEIS) (DOE/EIS-0547). NNSA prepared the Final LLNL SWEIS to analyze 
the potential environmental impacts associated with reasonable 
alternatives for continuing LLNL operations and foreseeable new and/or 
modified operations and facilities for approximately the next 15 years. 
The SWEIS analyzes two alternatives: No-Action Alternative and Proposed 
Action. In this ROD, NNSA announces its decision to implement the 
Proposed Action.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on this ROD or 
the LLNL SWEIS, contact: Thomas Grim, National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) Document Manager, National Nuclear Security Administration, 
Livermore Field Office, P.O. Box 808, Livermore, CA 94551; via email at 
[email protected], or by phone at (833)778-0508. This ROD, the 
LLNL SWEIS, and related NEPA documents are available at www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-nepa-reading-room.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The NNSA is responsible for meeting the national security 
requirements established by the President and Congress to maintain and 
enhance the safety, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear 
weapons stockpile. The continued operation of LLNL is critical to 
NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, to prevent the 
spread and use of nuclear weapons worldwide, and to many other areas 
that may impact national security and global stability (50 U.S.C. 
2521).
    LLNL is a federally funded research and development center that 
conducts research for the U.S. Government in accordance with 48 CFR 
35.017. LLNL has been in existence since 1952, employs approximately 
8,000 people (employees and contractors), and has a current annual 
budget of approximately $3 billion.
    LLNL consists of two federally owned sites: an 821-acre site in 
Livermore, California (Livermore Site), and a 7,000-acre experimental 
test site (Site 300) southeast of the Livermore Site between Livermore 
and Tracy, California. Most LLNL operations are located at the 
Livermore Site, which is situated about 50 miles east of San Francisco 
in southeastern Alameda County. Site 300 is primarily a test site for 
high explosives and non-nuclear weapons components; it is located about 
15 miles southeast of Livermore in the hills of the Diablo Range. 
LLNL's primary responsibility is ensuring the safety, reliability, and 
performance of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. However, LLNL's 
mission is broader than stockpile stewardship, as dangers ranging from 
nuclear proliferation and terrorism to biosecurity and climate change 
threaten national security and global stability. More than eighteen 
(18) years have passed since the publication of the 2005 Final Site-
wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory and Supplemental Stockpile Stewardship 
and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (2005 LLNL 
SWEIS). Because of proposed plans for new facilities, demolition of 
older facilities, enhanced and modernized site utilities projects, as 
well as needed modifications/upgrades of existing facilities to ensure 
ongoing safe operations, NNSA determined that it was appropriate to 
update the previous 2005 LLNL SWEIS analysis.
    Under the No-Action Alternative, NNSA would continue current 
facility operations throughout LLNL in support of assigned missions. 
The No-Action

[[Page 12832]]

Alternative includes previously approved construction of new 
facilities; modernization, upgrade, and utility projects; and 
decontamination, decommission, and demolition (DD&D) of excess and 
aging facilities.
    The Proposed Action in the 2023 Final LLNL SWEIS includes an 
increase in current facility operations or enhanced operations that 
would require new or modified facilities over the next 15 years. The 
Proposed Action also includes the scope of operations, facility 
construction, and DD&D under the No-Action Alternative through 2022. 
Continued re-investment would allow LLNL to meet mission deliverables 
and sustain science, technology, and engineering excellence to meet 
future mission requirements. In addition to the No-Action Alternative, 
the Proposed Action includes approximately 75 new projects, totaling 
approximately 3.3 million square feet, from 2023-2035. NNSA also 
proposes 20 types of modernization/upgrade/utility projects, most 
involving several facilities. Under the Proposed Action, about 150 
facilities, totaling approximately 1,170,000 square feet would undergo 
DD&D. The Proposed Action also includes operational changes that would 
increase the tritium emissions limits in the National Ignition Facility 
(NIF) (Building 581) and the Tritium Facility (Building 331), and 
decrease the administrative limit for fuels-grade-equivalent plutonium 
in the Superblock (Building 332). In addition, the Proposed Action 
increases the administrative limits for plutonium-239 at Building 235, 
and increases the NIF administrative limits for plutonium-239 and 
tritium. The administrative limit changes for both Building 235 and the 
NIF would maintain the existing facility characterization of ``less 
than Hazard Category-3'' in accordance with DOE Standard (DOE-STD-1027) 
revisions approved for use at LLNL.

NEPA Process for This ROD

    NNSA has prepared this ROD in accordance with Section 102(2)(C) of 
the NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, as amended), regulations promulgated by 
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) for implementing NEPA (40 
CFR parts 1500-1508), and DOE's NEPA implementing regulations (10 CFR 
part 1021). This ROD is based on Federal law and NNSA's mission, and 
information and analysis in the Final LLNL SWEIS including public 
comments received. The Draft LLNL SWEIS was distributed electronically 
for review and comment as part of the public participation process. 
During the comment period, NNSA held two in-person hearings and one 
virtual hearing to receive comments on the Draft LLNL SWEIS. At the in-
person hearings, an open house preceded the formal public comment 
period. During the open house, the public was invited to engage with 
NNSA personnel within their areas of expertise and ask questions about 
the Draft SWEIS. The in-person and virtual hearings were attended by 
approximately 70 persons and 29 speakers provided comments. These 
comments were recorded in formal transcripts. In addition to the 
comments during the public hearings, approximately 84 comment documents 
(including 41 comment documents submitted as an email campaign) were 
received from individuals, interested groups, and Federal, State, and 
local agencies during the comment period on the Draft LLNL SWEIS.
    The majority of the comments received on the Draft SWEIS focused on 
the NEPA process, policy issues, and the scope of the Proposed Action. 
Scans of those comment documents are located in Volume 3 (Comment 
Response Document [CRD]) of the Final LLNL SWEIS. In addition, comments 
from the three public hearings are included in the scanned transcripts, 
which are also located in Volume 3. All comments received were treated 
equally by NNSA. Chapter 2 of Volume 3 contains summaries of all 
comments received on the LLNL Draft SWEIS as well as NNSA's responses 
to those comments. After considering all comments and modifying the 
Draft SWEIS, NNSA completed the Final LLNL SWEIS. NNSA posted the Final 
LLNL SWEIS on the NNSA NEPA Reading Room website (www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-nepa-reading-room) and published a Notice of Availability in the 
Federal Register (88 FR 75566, November 3, 2023). Hard copies of the 
Final LLNL SWEIS were delivered to the City of Livermore and Tracy 
public libraries. During the 30-day period after the Notice of 
Availability, NNSA received 24 comment documents related to the Final 
LLNL SWEIS. This ROD includes NNSA's responses to those comments.

Summary of Impacts

    Brief summaries of impacts are provided below for each resource 
area:
    Land Use: At the Livermore Site total land disturbance would be 
85.5 acres. About 26.5 acres of land would be reclaimed as a result of 
DD&D; 2.5 acres restored for cooling tower pipeline; and 4 acres of 
laydown areas would also be restored. Net change in land disturbance 
would be 52.5 acres. Removal of limited area fencing, expanded bicycle 
network, expanded pedestrian walkways, rebalanced vehicle parking, and 
Lake Haussmann enhancements would create more green space by 2035. At 
Site 300, land disturbance would be 36 acres, and 0.4 acres of land 
would be reclaimed as a result of DD&D, and 1 acre of laydown areas 
would be restored. Net change in land disturbance would be 34.6 acres. 
Operations would be consistent with current land use designations and 
historic uses of LLNL land.
    Aesthetics and Scenic Resources: Construction activities would 
result in temporary changes to the visual appearance of both sites due 
to the presence of cranes, construction equipment, demolition, 
facilities in various stages of construction/DD&D, and possibly 
increased dust. The Livermore Site would remain highly developed with a 
campus-style or business park appearance. Changes at Site 300 would 
occur in the site interior and would be consistent with the existing 
character of the site.
    Geology and Soils: Soil disturbances would be minimal; no prime 
farmland exists. Ongoing remediation efforts would continue to improve 
soil conditions at both sites. Major regional faults exist, but no 
active faults underlie the sites. There is no historical record of 
surface rupturing or faulting, although there is potential for surface 
faulting at Site 300. Any new facility would be designed and 
constructed to meet seismic design criteria commensurate with the risk 
category requirements. Potential impacts from geologic hazards (i.e., 
seismic events) are discussed under ``Accidents.''
    Water Resources: New facilities would increase impervious surfaces, 
which could increase stormwater runoff. LLNL meets stormwater 
compliance monitoring requirements and implementation of a Stormwater 
Pollution Prevention Plan would minimize any pollution that might leave 
the site by stormwater. Ongoing remediation efforts would continue to 
improve groundwater conditions at both sites. In accordance with 10 CFR 
part 1022, the DOE/NNSA prepared an appendix to provide an analysis of 
the potential impacts on floodplains and wetlands from the No-Action 
Alternative and Proposed Action. The New North Entry would be located 
in the north buffer zone and could potentially affect floodplains. The 
roadway for the New North Entry would cross approximately 0.9 acres 
(approximately 2 percent) of the 500-year floodplain (critical action 
floodplain) in the north buffer zone and approximately 0.1 acres 
(approximately 0.4 percent) of the 100-year floodplain

[[Page 12833]]

(base floodplain) along Arroyo Las Positas. The proposed bridge would 
span the Arroyo Las Positas and the roadway would continue through 
previously developed land onto the Livermore Site. The New Fire 
Station, if located near the North Entry, could disturb approximately 
0.7 acres (approximately 1.6 percent) of the 500-year floodplain 
(critical action floodplain) but would not disturb any acres of the 
100-year floodplain (base floodplain). The enhancements in Lake 
Haussmann would not involve wetlands or affect impoundment-waters. Even 
with enhancements, Lake Haussmann would continue to serve as a 
conveyance channel.
    Air Quality: Fugitive dust would be generated during clearing, 
grading, and other earth-moving operations. Construction and 
operational emissions would not: (1) result in a considerable net 
increase (i.e., greater than the de minimis thresholds) of any criteria 
pollutant for which the project region is non-attainment; (2) expose 
sensitive receptors to substantial pollutant concentrations; (3) 
conflict with or obstruct implementation of the applicable air quality 
plan; or (4) violate any air quality standard or contribute 
substantially to an existing or projected air quality violation. 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would increase by approximately 5,239 
metric tons annually compared to the No-Action Alternative. These GHG 
emissions associated with the Proposed Action would represent 0.03 
percent of the State of California GHG emissions. Radiological air 
emissions of tritium at the Livermore Site were estimated to be 3,610 
curies based on emissions limits. There would be minimal radiological 
air emissions at Site 300. Impacts associated with radiological air 
emissions are addressed in ``Human Health and Safety.'' The estimated 
annual dose to the maximally exposed individual (MEI) at the Livermore 
Site and Site 300 would remain well below the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) limit of 10 millirem per year.
    Noise: Although construction and DD&D activities would cause 
temporary noise impacts, most activities would be confined to areas 
more than 500 feet from the site property boundaries. Six projects at 
the Livermore Site and four at Site 300 would be constructed within 500 
feet of a site boundary. However, offsite noise impacts would be 
minimal. Explosive testing noise impacts at Site 300 would be the same 
as for the No-Action Alternative. Explosive testing conducted at the 
Contained Firing Facility and on open firing tables at Site 300 would 
be unchanged when compared to current operations. Additionally, with 
regard to explosive testing, LLNL would maintain its self-imposed 126 
dB impulse noise limits for offsite populated areas.
    Biological Resources: The net land disturbance would be 52.5 acres 
(Livermore Site) and 34.6 acres (Site 300). Construction would have no 
appreciable impact on native vegetation, plant species of concern, 
wetlands or waters of the United States, viability of federally or 
state-listed species, or modification of United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service-designated critical habitat. Construction is not 
expected to result in adverse modification of USFWS-designated critical 
habitat at the Livermore Site or Site 300. Operations would be 
consistent with current activities and would have no appreciable impact 
on biological resources. Potential impacts from projects at the 
Livermore Site, Site 300, and the Arroyo Mocho Pumping Station would be 
minimized by conservation measures, which would be developed and 
implemented in consultation with regulatory agencies.
    Cultural and Paleontological Resources: The probability of 
impacting archaeological resources would be low because any ground 
disturbing activities would be reviewed for the potential for effects 
prior to permit approval. Archaeological and pre-historic sites have 
been identified and recorded and would continue to be avoided. Because 
fossils and/or fossil remains have been discovered at both sites, any 
excavations have the potential to impact similar fossils/fossil 
remains. Both sites have undergone a comprehensive review to identify 
significant historic buildings, structures, and objects, and those that 
were determined eligible for the National Register have already been 
mitigated and are no longer eligible. The 2012 comprehensive review of 
architectural resources included those resources constructed prior to 
1990. Therefore, buildings, structures, and objects that were built 
after 1990 and thus were not part of that comprehensive review may 
become eligible for listing on the National Register. An updated 
comprehensive review is planned consistent with the evaluation approach 
to identify significant (post-1990) historic buildings, structures, and 
objects, that was followed in 2007 and 2012.
    Socioeconomics: Socioeconomic impacts associated with construction 
would be temporary and lower than operational impacts. Once steady-
state operations are reached in 2035, employment at LLNL is projected 
to increase to 10,750 workers (10,344 workers at the Livermore Site and 
406 workers at Site 300). This would represent an increase of 1,410 
workers over the No-Action Alternative workforce, resulting in an 
estimated 860 indirect jobs in the four-county region of influence 
(ROI) workforce. Due to the low potential for impacts on the ROI 
population, operations by 2035 would not affect fire protection, police 
protection services, or medical services. The number of school-age 
children associated with the additional workforce potentially migrating 
into the ROI would be 908 children. The increase in school enrollment 
would represent 0.1 percent of the projected 2034-2035 school 
enrollment for the ROI. This minimal increase in school enrollment 
would have a negligible effect on school services in the ROI.
    Environmental Justice: No high and adverse impacts from 
construction and operation activities at LLNL are expected. 
Consequently, there would be no disproportionate and adverse impacts to 
minority or low-income populations. For routes involving offsite 
shipments, modeling of all 888 potential offsite shipments would yield 
a bounding collective incident-free dose to the general public of 24.7 
person-rem, with an associated increased risk of 0.015 latent cancer 
fatalities (LCF). Impacts to the minority and low-income populations 
along these routes would be a fraction of the LCF risk presented above 
and would not result in disproportionate and adverse impacts to 
minority or low-income populations.
    Traffic and Transportation: By 2035, employment at LLNL is 
projected to increase by 1,410 workers over the No-Action Alternative 
workforce. If all 1,410 workers were to commute to the Livermore Site 
(which is a bounding assumption for the transportation analysis), local 
traffic would increase by an average of approximately 2.3 percent 
(note: traffic on specific roads in the vicinity of the Livermore Site 
would increase by 1.6--3.2 percent). The increase in traffic would not 
affect the level-of-service on roads in the vicinity of LLNL. The New 
North Entry to the Livermore Site is expected to be operational in 
approximately 2025. This site entry would reduce the average daily 
traffic (ADT) volumes on Vasco Road and Greenville Road and increase 
the ADT volume on Patterson Pass Road in the vicinity of the Livermore 
Site. The net effect would be a reduction in traffic backups and delays 
in the mornings on Vasco Road at the West Gate entrance.
    Radiological and Hazardous Material Transportation: As a result of 
increased

[[Page 12834]]

operations and nonroutine shipments of low-level radioactive waste 
(LLW)/mixed LLW (MLLW) associated with DD&D, there could be more total 
shipments of radiological materials for the Proposed Action compared to 
the No-Action Alternative. Modeling all 888 potential offsite shipments 
results in dose to transport-crews of 69.2 person-rem per year (0.042 
LCFs); incident-free dose to the general public of 24.7 person-rem 
(0.015 LCFs); accident risk to public of 2.9 x 10-6 LCFs; 
and 0.038 traffic fatalities from accidents.
    Infrastructure: Electricity use, natural gas use, potable water 
use, and wastewater generation are all projected to increase at both 
sites. The onsite distribution systems and the capacities of utility 
providers are not expected to be adversely impacted, however any 
increase in water use at LLNL would add to overall water demands and 
supply issues in the region. NNSA will continue to evaluate the 
feasibility and implementation of water and energy conservation 
measures at LLNL.
    Waste Management and Materials Management: Operations (including 
construction and DD&D) would generate a variety of wastes (including 
radioactive, hazardous, mixed, and sanitary) and would increase as a 
result of normal operations. NNSA does not expect additional waste 
associated with the Proposed Action to be unique or substantially 
different from the types of waste already managed within LLNL, although 
a larger proportion of DD&D waste and construction debris is expected. 
Although there could be higher quantities of hazardous materials used 
under the Proposed Action, NNSA does not expect additional adverse 
impacts from managing these materials.
    Human Health and Safety: During normal operations, facilities at 
LLNL would release small quantities of radioactive emissions to the 
environment. In addition, skyshine from the NIF would provide a dose to 
a person standing at a public location outside the fence line. The MEI 
dose from the emissions and skyshine would be 4.21 millirem per year, 
resulting in an annual LCF risk of 0.0000025. This is below the USEPA 
limit of 10 millirem per year. As a comparison, background radiation is 
625 millirem per year. With regard to workers, the average annual dose 
to a radiological worker was estimated to be 173.5 millirem per year. 
This would result in an annual LCF risk of 1 x 10-4 (i.e., 
approximately 1 LCF every 9,000 years).
    Site Contamination and Remediation: Remediation of groundwater and 
soil contamination at both the Livermore Site and Site 300 would 
continue. NNSA complies with provisions specified in the two Federal 
Facility Agreements (FFA) entered into by USEPA, DOE, the California 
EPA Department of Health Services (now Department of Toxic Substances 
Control), and the San Francisco Bay and Central Valley Regional Water 
Quality Control Board. Any future remediation actions would be 
conducted in accordance with the FFA, and NNSA did not propose any 
specific changes to future remediation activities in the SWEIS.
    Accidents: NNSA analyzed radiological, chemical, high explosives, 
and biological accidents that could be caused by events such as 
explosions, fires, aircraft crashes, criticalities, and earthquakes. 
None of the accidents evaluated would cause a fatality to a member of 
the public, with the exception of an aircraft crash into Building 625, 
which could cause a population dose of 4,300 person-rem within a 50-
mile radius of the site (2.6 LCFs). Because that accident has an annual 
probability of occurring of approximately 6.3 x 10-7, the 
risks of an LCF from such an accident would be 1.6 x 10-6 
(i.e., 1 LCF every 610,000 years).
    Intentional Destructive Acts (IDA): NNSA prepared a Security Risk 
Assessment (SRA) that analyzed potential impacts of intentional 
destructive acts at LLNL (e.g., sabotage, terrorism). The SRA contains 
sensitive information related to security concerns and is not publicly 
releasable. The IDA impacts and the SWEIS accident impacts have similar 
consequences for radioactive materials dispersal, criticality events, 
chemicals, and biological events.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    Considering the many environmental facets of the two alternatives 
analyzed in the LLNL SWEIS, and with consideration to the long-term 
effects, the No-Action Alternative is the environmentally preferred 
alternative because fewer adverse impacts would result compared to the 
Proposed Action. However, the No-Action Alternative would not meet the 
purpose and need for agency action.

Comments on the Final LLNL SWEIS

    NNSA posted the Final LLNL SWEIS on the NNSA NEPA Reading Room 
website (www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-nepa-reading-room) and published a 
Notice of Availability in the Federal Register (88 FR 75566, November 
3, 2023). Hard copies of the Final LLNL SWEIS were delivered to the 
City of Livermore and Tracy public libraries. During the 30-day period 
after the Notice of Availability, NNSA received 23 comment documents 
related to the Final LLNL SWEIS. Of those 23 documents, 19 were part of 
an email campaign and contained the same comments. Four (4) unique 
documents with comments were received. All of the comment documents 
received are included in the Administrative Record for the LLNL SWEIS 
NEPA process. As indicated below, NNSA considered all of the comments 
contained in these documents during the preparation of this ROD, and 
provides the following comment-responses:
    1. Commenters stated that NNSA inadequately responded to comments 
on the Draft SWEIS requesting additional alternatives and stated that 
the Final SWEIS failed to analyze any of the reasonable alternatives 
proposed by commenters, such as expansion of LLNL's focus on climate 
change adaptation and amelioration technologies, nuclear non-
proliferation, environmental clean-up technologies, alternative fuels, 
clean energy technologies, battery development, energy-grid efficiency, 
green building technologies, and other science areas.
    Response: The reasonable SWEIS alternatives are those that NNSA 
determined would meet the purpose and need presented in Section 1.3 of 
the Final SWEIS. Section 3.5 of the Final SWEIS discusses other 
alternatives that NNSA considered in developing this SWEIS. Other 
alternatives were considered as suggested by commenters during the 
scoping process and/or comment period for the Draft LLNL SWEIS. As 
discussed in Section 3.5, those alternatives, were eliminated from 
detailed analysis because they would not allow LLNL to fulfill its NNSA 
mission requirements. NNSA believes that comment-responses 6-A, 6-C, 
and 6-D in the Comment Response Document (CRD) in Volume 3 of the SWEIS 
adequately address this issue.
    2. Commenters stated that plutonium pit work at LLNL remains opaque 
and requested that NNSA clarify the relationship of plutonium 
operations to expanded plutonium pit production. Commenters cited 
concerns with increasing the administrative limits for plutonium at 
Building 235 and increases in risk and plutonium shipments.
    Response: NNSA believes that Chapter 2 and Appendix A of the Final 
SWEIS provides sufficient descriptions of the LLNL missions, programs, 
and activities for a reader to understand that LLNL conducts activities 
to meet national security requirements to maintain and enhance the 
safety,

[[Page 12835]]

security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. To 
accomplish its missions, LLNL conducts plutonium-related activities. 
That has been true for more than 70 years and is expected to be true 
for the foreseeable future. Plutonium and pit-related activities are 
specifically discussed in Chapter 2 and Appendix A of the Final SWEIS. 
NNSA believes that increased operations at LLNL, as represented by the 
Proposed Action in this SWEIS, are needed for LLNL to meet national 
security requirements to maintain and enhance the safety, security, and 
effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The proposed 
increase in the administrative limits for plutonium at Building 235 
would maintain the existing facility limit of ``less than Hazard 
Category-3'' in accordance with DOE-STD-1027 revisions approved for use 
at LLNL. The potential impacts associated with increasing these 
administrative limits are addressed in Chapter 5 and Appendix C of the 
Final SWEIS. NNSA believes that comment-responses 1-B, 4-E, 9-A, 16-C, 
19-A, and 20-F in the CRD adequately address this issue.
    3. Commenters stated that the USEPA submitted comments on the Draft 
SWEIS with specific recommendations, most of which the NNSA 
disregarded. Commenters specifically cited USEPA recommendations 
related to: (a) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) remedial actions; (b) mitigation and best 
management practices (BMP); (c) additional air quality monitoring along 
site perimeters at Site 300) to provide real time information on 
criteria pollutants and radiological constituents, and (d) analysis of 
impacts to low-income or minority populations that might be 
disproportionately impacted by the transportation of transuranic (TRU) 
waste both along the route and near the disposal sites, the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico.
    Response: Comments from the USEPA were specifically considered and 
addressed by NNSA as evidenced by comment-responses 24-A, 24-B-1, 24-B-
2, 24-C, 24-D, 24-E, 24-F, 24-G, 24-H, 24-I, and 24-J in the CRD. NNSA 
believes those responses adequately address the issues and 
recommendations submitted by the USEPA. NNSA also notes the USEPA 
review comments on the Final SWEIS, stating that, ``[USEPA] appreciates 
the direct responses to our comments and recommendations in the Final 
EIS.''
    (a) Ongoing remedial investigations and cleanup activities for 
legacy contamination of environmental media at LLNL fall under the 
CERCLA (42 U.S.C. 9601). NNSA complies with provisions specified in 
Federal Facility Agreements. As presented in the Final SWEIS, NNSA is 
not proposing any new CERCLA remedial actions and solutions in the 
SWEIS. NNSA has an ongoing Superfund cleanup program for contaminated 
soil and groundwater under the CERCLA process. The CERCLA process 
addresses ongoing remediation actions, prevention of mobilization of 
contaminants, and mitigations and are not repeated in this SWEIS. The 
proposed new facilities and DD&D activities would not change this 
ongoing cleanup program. Additionally, the CERCLA program is a public 
process as well. Any changes to the CERCLA program are negotiated with 
appropriate regulatory agencies before implementation.
    (b) Section 5.19 of the Final SWEIS contains information on 
mitigation measures. Table 5-74 provides examples of design features 
and potential BMPs that could be utilized for new projects at LLNL. 
Sections 5.19.1-5.19.12 discuss these features and BMPs as applicable 
to the environmental resources evaluated in the SWEIS. More specific 
design features and BMPs will be identified and implemented during the 
project planning phase for any new proposed and approved work, and DD&D 
activities. Engineering controls will be employed to reduce potential 
impacts to acceptable levels for protection of human health and the 
environment.
    (c) Air quality monitoring along site perimeters of Site 300 is 
established with concurrence from appropriate regulatory agencies. NNSA 
believes the air monitoring stations at Site 300 are adequate and 
ensure regulatory compliance. Surveillance monitors for radioactive 
particulate, tritium, and at some locations, beryllium, are well 
established at the perimeter of both Livermore Site and Site 300 and at 
off-site locations. While they are not ``real-time,'' a quick 
turnaround in basic radionuclide analysis is achievable by the 
analytical labs performing the analysis. NNSA produces an Annual Site 
Environmental Report that provides details on surveillance monitoring. 
LLNL does not exceed any regulatory limits at surveillance locations.
    (d) As described in comment response 15-B of the CRD, NNSA analyzed 
the potential impacts (including accidents) of transporting radioactive 
materials and TRU waste from LLNL to disposal facilities. As discussed 
in Section 5.11.3.2, under the Proposed Action, modeling of all 888 
potential offsite shipments would yield a bounding collective incident-
free dose to the general public of 24.7 person-rem, with an associated 
increased risk of 0.015 LCF; and a bounding cumulative increased risk 
of 2.9 x 10-6 LCF to the general public from accidents that 
result in a container breach/release. Based on the potential routes to 
the disposal sites, impacts to the minority and low-income populations 
would consist of a fraction of the LCF risk presented above.
    4. The USEPA recommends that NNSA prepare additional NEPA analyses 
where significant changed conditions or new circumstances related to 
site-specific project construction or DD&D activities are found to have 
the potential to violate any federal, state, and local laws or 
regulatory limits, or increase the potential for adverse environmental 
and human health impacts.
    Response: NNSA agrees with the USEPA recommendation and will 
prepare NEPA analyses, as appropriate, for site-specific project 
construction or DD&D activities (that are not addressed in, or exceed, 
the SWEIS analysis) in accordance with the requirements of NEPA, 
regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality, DOE's 
NEPA implementing procedures (10 CFR part 1021), and NNSA Policy (NAP) 
451.1.
    5. The USEPA stated that it is not clear where the Site 300 air 
quality monitor is located and when monitoring takes place. The USEPA 
requests that the next National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants (NESHAP) report, due June 30, 2024, detail this information 
and include a map of Site 300.
    Response: The radiological air effluent sampling systems and 
locations are provided in Chapter 4, Table 4-9. In the next NESHAPs 
report, NNSA will provide additional details on the Site 300 air 
quality monitoring and a map of Site 300 showing the location of air 
monitors. Air monitoring information is also located in Chapter 4 and 
Appendix A of the Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) at https://aser.llnl.gov.
    6. With regard to per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), the 
USEPA recommends continued site characterization and monitoring of 
drinking water wells, groundwater and soil and continued coordination 
with the regional water quality control boards and the State Department 
of Toxic Substances Control to control the mobilization of these 
contaminants and mitigate impacts.
    Response: NNSA agrees to continued site characterization and 
monitoring of drinking water wells, groundwater and soil and continued 
coordination with

[[Page 12836]]

the regional water quality control boards and the State Department of 
Toxic Substances Control to control the mobilization of contaminants 
and mitigate impacts.

Decision

    The continued operation of LLNL is critical to NNSA's Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management Program, to prevent the spread and use of 
nuclear weapons worldwide, and to many other areas that may impact 
national security and global stability. NNSA has decided to implement 
the Proposed Action. The Proposed Action will enable NNSA to fulfill 
its statutory missions and other responsibilities, considering 
economic, environmental, technical, and other factors.

Basis for Decision

    The Final SWEIS provided the NNSA decision-maker with important 
information regarding the potential environmental impacts of 
alternatives and options for satisfying the purpose and need. In 
addition to environmental information, NNSA also considered public 
comments, statutory responsibilities, strategic objectives, technical 
needs, safeguards and security, costs, and schedule in its decision-
making.

Mitigation Measures

    No potential adverse impacts were identified that will require 
additional mitigation measures beyond those required by regulations, 
permits, and agreements or achieved through design features or best 
management practices. However, if mitigation measures above and beyond 
those required by regulations, permits, and agreements are needed to 
reduce impacts during implementation, they will be developed, 
documented, and executed. Because no new potential adverse impacts were 
identified that will require additional mitigation measures beyond 
those required by regulation or achieved through design features or 
best management practices, NNSA does not expect to prepare a Mitigation 
Action Plan.

Signing Authority

    This document of the Department of Energy was signed on February 8, 
2024, by Jill Hruby, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and 
Administrator, NNSA, pursuant to delegated authority from the Secretary 
of Energy. That document with the original signature and date is 
maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance 
with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the 
undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to 
sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as 
an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative 
process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon 
publication in the Federal Register.

    Signed in Washington, DC, on February 14, 2024.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2024-03351 Filed 2-16-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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