NEY GENERAL 

A-I-IWBRNEZY GENERAI. October 13, 1969 

Honorable J. W. Edgar 

Commissioner of Education 

Texas Education Agency 

201 East 11th Street 

Austin, Texas 78711 

Opinion No. M- 488 

Re: Constitutionality of House 

Bill 1274, Chapter 443, Acts 

of the 61st Legislature, 

Regular Session, 1969 (codified as Article 2775a-2, 

Dear Dr. Edgar: Vernon's Civil Statutes.) 

You have recently requested the opinion of this office 

as to the constitutionality of H.B. 1274, Acts of the 61st Legislature (1969), which reads, in part: 

,f 

. . . The board of trustees of an independent school district in a county having 

a population of more than 8,605 but less than 

8,615, according to the last preceding federal 

census, shall order that each trustee position 

be designated by number and that each candidate 

be designated on the official ballot by the 

number of the position sought. 

Candidates receiving 

the vo{eH cast shall be entitled 

trustees." 

a majority of 

to serve as 

Your request letter points ,out that Article 2775a-1, 

Vernon's Civil Statutes, is a general law providing for a numbered or place system of election of trustees of Independent 

school districts having 500 or more scholastics, and that said 

Article 2775a-1 provides that only a plurality, rather than a 

majority, Is required for election; t;hat the only county In the 

State of Texas with a population of . . . more than 8,605 but 

less than 8,615, according to the last preceding federal census 

. . . is Brooks County; that the Brooks County Independent School 

District Is the only independent school district in Brooks County; 

and, that there are no known or apparent reasons why the Brooks 

County Independent School District should elect its board of 

trustees in any manner different from that method employed by 

other independent school districts. 

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Dr. J. W. Edgar, page 2 (~-488) 

Section 56 of Article III, Texas Constitution, provides: 

"The Legislature shall not, except as 

otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass 

any local or special law, authorizing: 

II 

. . . 

'For the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting; 

1, 

. . . 

"Regulating the management of public schools, 

the building or repairing of school houses, and 

the raising of money for such purposes; 

1, 0 . . 

"And in all other cases where a general law 

can be made applicable, no local or special law 

shall be enacted; . . .' 

In the case of Miller v. El Paso County 136 Tex. 370, 

150 S.W.2d 1000 (1941), the question presented wai very similar 

to that under consideration herein, i.e., whether the population 

classlffcation established by a particular statute was constitutional. Referring to Section 56 of Article III of the Texas 

Constitution, the Supreme Court said: 

"The purpose of this constitutional inhibition against the enactment of local or special 

laws is a wholesome one. It is intended to prevent the granting of special prlvfleges and to 

secure uniformity of law throughout the State as 

far as possible. . . . 

"Notwithstanding the above constitutional 

provision, the courts recognize In the Legislature a rather broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes and to enact laws 

for the regulation thereof, even though such 

legislation may be applicable only to a particular 

class or, in fact, affect only the inhabitants of 

a particular locality; but such legislation>must 

be Intended to apply uniformly to all who may 

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Dr. J. W. Edgar, page 3 (M-488) 

come within the classification designated in the 

Act, and the classification must be broad enough 

to Include a substantial class and must be based 

on characteristics legitimately distinguishing 

such class from others with respect to the public 

purpose sought to be accomplished by the proposed 

legislation. In other words, there must be a 

substantial reason for the classification. It 

must not be a mere arbitrary device resorted to 

for the purpose of giving what is, in fact, a 

local law the appearance of a general law. city 

of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 121 Tex. 14, 36 S.W.2d 

470, 41 S.W.2d 228; Bexar County v. Tynan, 128 

Tex. 223, 97 S,W.2d 467; Clark v. Finley, Comptroller, 93 Tex. 171, 178, 54 S.W. 343, Supreme 

Lodge United Benevolent Ass'n v. Johnson, 98 Tex. 

1, 81 S.W. 18; Smith v. State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 431, 

49 S.W.2d 739; Randolph v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 

80, 36 S.W.2d 484; Fritter v. West, Tex.Civ.App., 

65 S.W.2d 414, writ refused; State v. Hall, Tex. 

Civ.App., 76 S.W.2d 880; Wood v. Marfa Ind. School 

Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 429. As said in 

Leonard v. Road Maintenance District No. 1, 187 

Ark. 599, 61 S.W12d 70, 71: 'The rule is that a 

classification cannot be adopted arbitrarily upon 

a ground which has no foundation in difference of 

situation or circumstances of the municipalities 

placed in the different classes. There must be 

some reasonable relation between the situation 

of municipalities classified and the purposes and 

objects to be attained. There must be something 

* * * which in some reasonable degree accounts 

for the division Into classes.'" 

The Attorney General of Texas has repeatedly followed 

the guidelines set forth in the Miller case when dealing with a 

statute such as the one herein c-red /;jke Attorney General's 

Opinions 0-4206 (1941) and R-2424 (1951 7,and will continue to 

do so in this instance. As it appears h, at the Brooks County 

Independent School District is the only school district in the 

state which would be affected by H.B. 1274, due to the unreasonably narrow population classification set out by the bill ( a 

population range of eight persons) , and there being no known or 

apparent reason why said school district should elect Its school 

board trustees in a manner different from that employed by other 

school districts similarly sftuated, it is the opinion of this 

office that said H.B. 1274 is unconstitutional. 

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Dr. J. W. Edgar, page 4 (M-488) 

SUMMARY 

House Bill 1274, Chapter 443, Acts of the 61st 

Legislature, Regular Session, 1969 (codified as 

Article 2775a-2, Vernon's Civil Statutes) violates 

the terms of Section 56 of Article III, Texas 

Constitution, in that it attempts to establish 

an unreasonable classification based on population, and it is, therefore. unconstitutional. 

Prepared by Bill Corbusier 

Assistant Attorney General 

General of Texas 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Kerns Taylor, Chairman 

George Kelton, Vice-Chairman 

Gordon Cass 

Charles Parrett 

Louis Neumann 

Jim Swearingen 

MEADE F. GRIFFIN 

Staff Legal Assistant 

HAWTHORNE PHILLIPS 

Executive Assistant 

NOLA WHITE 

First Assistant 

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