alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Jim VASEK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28451.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 3, 1956.

*811Burks & Brown, Lubbock, for appellant.

Lloyd A. Wicks,. Jr., • County Atty., Crosbyton, Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The conviction -is for driving a motor vehicle upon- a. public highway while intoxicated; the punishment, 15 days in jail and a fine of $100.

Appellant was arrested about 8 P.M. while driving an automobile upon- a public highway. The arresting officer was Texas Highway Patrolman Calvin Harrell.

Patrolman Harrell, as well as Sheriff J. T. Herrington and two of his deputies into whose custody appellant was delivered after his arrest, testified and expressed the opinion that appellant was intoxicated.

Appellant denied that he was intoxicated and gave his explafiation of' his car weaving on the highway, as the patrolman testified that it did. He denied that he had drunk beer from the partially empty quart beer bottle the patrolman found in his automobile, and testified that he did not know.the bottle, was in the car until the officer found it.

The testimony of appellant and his witness was to the effect that a case or more of beer was consumed by appellant and his kinsmen prior to 11:30' -A.M.; appellant having drank' two cans. Also, among thé beer openéd in the automobile during the morning was a quart bottle which appellant testified spewed and spilled on him and'the car when it was opened.

In view of this testimony, we are at a loss to see how appellant could have been prejudiced because the County Attorney was permitted “to argue with the defendant upon his cross-examination as a witness, relative to whether or not the defendant was constitutionally opposed to beer.”

In his argument to the jury the County Attorney, referring to 'Patrolman Harrell, argued: “And, he says that the defendant here was drunk. Now, that is what he says. And, I asked him if he was heavily, intoxicated or lightly intoxicated. ..Now, gentlemen, if there .is any fault to be laid to that testimony it probably should be at my door because of the way I asked that question. Calvin. Harrell is, an honest police officer and he told you, no, he wouldn’t say that he was heavily intoxicated. But he did say that he was drunk.”

Appellant, objected to the argument that Mr. Harrell was an honest man; - as being out óf the record, and sought to have'the statement withdrawn from the- jury’s consideration. ■

We do not understand that the county attorney was attempting to bolster the credibility of the officer as a witness, by matters outside the record, as contended by appellant.

' To the contrary, it appears that the county attorney drew the impression that Mr. Harrell was an honest officer from the answers of the witnesses, before the jury.

The ■ remarks were not such as. to call for reversal. Langley v. State, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 254, 86 S.W.2d 755.

The evidence is sufficient tó sustain the conviction and we find no reversible error. ' ■

The judgment is affirmed.
### Page 1 of 3 **Disposition Comments Docket No:**  

### FAA - 2012 - 0 300 These comments are in **Directorate ID:** 

### 2011 -NM - 276 - AD response to an SNPRM Originating Office Tracking No.: **Next Step:** FRAN SNPRM 

### N o C omments/Only

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– If this box is checked, no signatures are required. 

### Has the reference d service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? I f ye s, lis t latest revision and attach a cop y. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance. Instructions: Summarize all comments **by issue** (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of each issue. **All comments relating to the sam e issue should be discussed together.**  Do not list all of the issues from one commenter togeth er. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA - IR - M - 8040.1C Chapter 9. **ISSUE 1:** Select one o

f the following : If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree with because We disagree with because

Make the following changes to the AD: If **NO** , we don’t agree because **ISSUE 2**  **:** Select one of the following :

If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree w ith because We disagree with because Make the following changes to the AD:

### Page 2 of 3

If **NO** , we don’t agree because **For additional issues, do uble**  **- click**  **here**

### Page 3 of 3 **S ignature Section**  Signature indicates concurrence with this action. Originating Office Tracking No.: **ASE** Printed Name **: Date** 

**Branch Man ager**  **Date**
Kenworth Tracto r Green Single axle Vin : 2XKHMAM7A3BM277905 Miles : 20235 Build Date : 2/3/10 GVWR : 33000 GAWR : 12000 GAWR : 21000 Tires : Front/Rear 11R 22.5 Engine : PX

- 6 280 Cummins # 73073877 Transmission : Model EH

- 8E406A

-T Serial # K0779381 Rear axle : Spicer Serial # U100340280 Model S21

- 170 Ratio 00557 Length overall: 20 feet Height: 9 ft 6 in, not including exhaust tip. 10ft 6 in with tip. Wheelbase: 152” Width: 96”
Exhibit No. 15





Awareness Letter from Independent Accountants





November 8, 2002





Armstrong Holdings, Inc.


Lancaster, Pennsylvania





Re:  Registration Statement No. 333-74501; 33-91890; 33-18996; 33-18997; 33-65768; 333-74633; 333-79093; 333-43872





With respect to the subject registration statements, we acknowledge our awareness of the use therein of our report dated November 8, 2002 related to our review of interim financial information of Armstrong Holdings, Inc.





Pursuant to Rule 436 under the Securities Act of 1933 (the Act), such report is not considered part of a registration
statement prepared or certified by an accountant, or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the Act.





/s/  KPMG LLP








Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
# Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas

July 14, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00398

- CV

Caroline BUSWELL, Appellant

v.

THE GWSPI COMPANY, LLC, as Succe ssor in Interest to Wilmington Trust, NA, Trustee of the Jeffrey P. Blanchard 2013 Family Trust,

Appellees

From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015

- CI

- 06197 Honorable David A. Canales, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court ’ s order denying appellant’s special appearance. The order is date June 8, 2015 . Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal on June 25, 2015

. Accordingly, the reporter ’ s record was due ten days later on July 6, 2015

— July 5, 2015, was a Sunday

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.1(b), 35.1(b). The record has not been filed.

We therefo r e ORDER , the court reporter, Mr. Luis Duran Jr., to file the reporter ’ s record
i n this court on or before July 24, 2015

.

We further order the clerk of this court to serve copies of this order on Mr. Duran, all counsel, and the trial court.

_________________________________ Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 14th day of July, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle
Clerk of Court
#### GARMEADA COAL COMPANY, Appellant, v. Ballard Lee MARTIN, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 28, 1955.

James S. Greene, Jr., Harlan, for appellant.

A. E. Funk, Jr., Middlesboro, for appel-lee.

CLAY, Commissioner.

This is an appeal from a judgment reversing an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Board. The Board had denied the claim of the employee on the ground he failed to sustain the burden of proving that he received an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The question presented is whether or not there was competent evidence of probative value to support the finding of the Board. See The Mengel Co. v. Lehman, Ky.1953, 259 S.W.2d 19.

The alleged accident occurred on December 13, 1951, and it subsequently developed that the employee had a ruptured inter-vertebral disc requiring an operation. Notice to the employer of the alleged accident and injury was not given until January 17, 1952.

The employee worked as a coal loader. He testified that on December 13 while loading slate his foot slipped and “a hurting come in my back”. That evening he went to see a doctor, but returned to work the next day and loaded 15 tons of coal. That was the last day he worked. He returned to the doctor the following week, having been given nd treatment in the meantime, and was subsequently referred to other doctors who finally diagnosed his complaint as a ruptured intervertebral disc.

The employee introduced as a witness the second doctor who had examined him on December 28. He testified that the employee did not complain of any specific injury, although he had told the doctor he worked pretty hard on December 13.

The employer introduced the other two doctors who had examined the employee and both of these denied that the employee had given them a history of any accident or any specific injury on December 13.

While the employee stated that he had an accident and suffered injury while loading coal on December 13, there is nothing else in the record to corroborate his story. On the other hand, the failure to report the accident for over a month after it was supposed to have occurred, and the failure to advise any of the three doctors who treated him of such an accident or of any specific injury occurring on that date constituted substantial circumstantial evidence that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. This created an issue of fact for the Board to resolve.

 We conclude there was sufficient evidence of substance before the Board to justify its finding that the employee, who *60had the burden of establishing a compensable injury, failed to establish an essential element of his claim.

The judgment is reversed, with directions to affirm the order of the Board.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. §1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION  906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.
 February 29, 2008

/s/ Jeffrey H. BuchalterJeffrey H. BuchalterChairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of YFC 355 Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Anthony N. DeMint, President and Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

| 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

 

| /s/ Anthony DeMint                                     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Anthony N. DeMint

President and Chief Accounting Officer

November 1, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>     5


<CAPTION>

Article 5 Fin. Data Schedule for 3rd Qtr 10-Q

<S>                               <C>

<PERIOD-TYPE>                     9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                    JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                      SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                               109,324
<SECURITIES>                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                              0
<ALLOWANCES>                               0
<INVENTORY>                                0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     109,324
<PP&E>                               164,857
<DEPRECIATION>                        (9,718)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       731,781
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                172,900
<BONDS>                              126,260
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                      0
<PREFERRED>                                0
<COMMON>                           1,200,000
<OTHER-SE>                           432,622
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         731,781
<SALES>                                    0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                     438,172
<CGS>                                      0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                         66,764
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                         500
<LOSS-PROVISION>                           0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                    24,647
<INCOME-PRETAX>                      438,172
<INCOME-TAX>                         371,407
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        0
<DISCONTINUED>                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                            0
<CHANGES>                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                         374,664
<EPS-BASIC>                            .25
<EPS-DILUTED>                            .25



</TABLE>
Order entered December 18, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 13

- 01052

- CR

RONALD TERRELL FLOYD , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Tria l Court Cause No. F12

- 11185

- M



### O RDER

The Court GRANTS court reporter Belinda Baraka’s December 15, 2013 request for an extension of time to file the reporter’s record

. We ORDER Ms. Baraka to file the reporter’s
record within THIRTY DAYS of the date of th is order. The clerk’s record is overdue. Accordingly, we ORDER the Dallas County District Clerk to file the clerk’s record by JANUARY 6, 2014

. We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to Belinda Baraka, official court reporter, 194th Judicial District Court; Gary Fitzsimmons, Dallas County District Clerk; the Dallas County District Clerk’s Office, Criminal Records Division; and to counsel for all parties.

/s/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE
104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 561

AN ACT

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a

certificate of documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the coastwise trade for the vessel

ISABELLE, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 561 ES

1 SECTION 1. VESSEL DOCUMENTATION.

2 Notwithstanding section 27 of the Merchant Marine

3 Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 883), section 8 of the Act of

4 June 19, 1886 (24 Stat. 81, chapter 421; 46 App. U.S.C.

5 289), and section 12106 of title 46, United States Code,

6 the Secretary of Transportation may issue a certificate of

7 documentation with appropriate endorsement for employ8 ment in the coastwise trade for the vessel ISABELLE,

9 United States official number 600655.

Passed the Senate July 29, 1996.

Attest:

Secretary.
104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 561

AN ACT

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to

other purposes.wise trade for the vessel ISABELLE, and forpriate endorsement for employment in the coastissue a certificate of documentation with appro-
#### Ex parte M. J. NATIONS.

No. 28953.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 3, 1957.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1957.

No attorney for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

*676MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

Relator, an inmate of the Texas Prison System, acting as his own counsel, seeks his release from confinement by writ of ha-beas corpus filed in the District Court of Brown County, alleging that the sentence by virtue of which he is confined is void because his trial counsel was not present at the time he was sentenced.

The Judge of the District Court of Brown County filed the writ, developed the facts, and certified the same to this Court in accordance with the terms of Article 119, V.A.C.C.P. From this, we learn that relator’s trial counsel advised the court that neither he nor his client desired to appeal the conviction, that he did not desire to be present when the relator was sentenced, and that he was absent at such time of his own volition.

The State submits that Ex parté Oliver, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 235, 240 S;W.2d 316, is authority for denying the writ.

Without passing on such contention at this time, we observe the following:

Relator was sentenced on April 5, 1950, to not less than two nor more than 25 years for the offense of assault with intent to rape.

Relator’s prison record shows that he has credit on such sentence for more than 11 years and 6 months.

If this Court were to grant the writ, we would not order relator discharged, as he prays, but would order him returned to Brown County for re-sentencing and relator would lose the credit which he has earned. Where a prisoner secures his release from confinement under a void sentence, he may not claim credit for the time he has served under such sentence. Ogle v. State, 43 Tex.Cr.R. 219, 63 S.W. 1009, and Marshall v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R. 531, 166 S.W. 722, L.R.A.1915A, 526.

Because of the peculiar circumstances here presented, the writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Relator may file a motion for rehearing if he desires.

On Relator’s Motion for Rehearing

WOODLEY, Judge.

Relator insists that the absence of his counsel at the time sentence was pronounced entitles him to release from the penitentiary. We do not agree.

The facts certified by District Judge Newman show that appellant’s counsel advised the court that neither he nor his client desired to appeal and that he did not desire to be present when the defendant was sentenced. It is further certified that appellant’s counsel was absent of his own will and volition.

The sentence shows on its face that relator was brought into open court for the purpose of having sentence pronounced; that he was asked whether he had anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced and he answered nothing in bar thereof.

The absence of relator’s counsel under the facts certified is not fatal to the conviction.

Relator’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
1

Filed 8/30/13 P. v. Charter CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE P EOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL CHARTER,

Defendant and Appellant. C073364

(Super. Ct. No. 13F01433)

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 ( Wende ).

Having reviewed the record as required by Wende , we affirm the judgment.

We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of

the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)2 BACKGROUND

Because this matte r was resolved by plea the facts are taken from the stated factual

basis.

Between February 28, 2013 and March 1, 2013, defendant willfully and

unlawfully took the victim’s 1990 Honda Accord without the victim’s permission and

with the intent to permanen tly deprive him of title and possession.

A felony complaint charged defendant with vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851,

subd. (a)), receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor

possession of burglary tools (Pen. Code, § 466). D efendant pleaded no contest to the

auto theft charge and the remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court granted

defendant probation for a period of five years conditioned on serving 270 days in county

jail, with credit for time served of six days. The trial court ordered defendant to pay a

$280 restitution fund fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4), a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov.

Code, § 70373), a $40 court security fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $25

urinalysis testing fee. The trial court reserved jurisdiction on the issue of direct victim

restitution. The trial court imposed and the defendant accepted additional terms and

conditions of probation, as stated in the probation report. Defendant appeals. He did not

obtain a certificate of probable cause. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5.)

We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening

brief setting forth the facts of the case and, pursuant to Wende, supra , 25 Cal.3d 436,

requesting the court to review the recor d and determine whether there are any arguable

issues on appeal. Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental

brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have

elapsed, and we have received no communication from defendant. We have undertaken

an examination of the entire record pursuant to Wende , and we find no arguable error that

would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.3 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

MURRAY , J.

We concur:

HULL , Acting P. J.

MAURO , J.