NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________ 

No. 15-2575 

_____________ 

MILAD ALLAHAM, 

Appellant 

v.

FADI NADDAF, ELIAS NADAF AND MAJD NADAF 

_______________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. No. 5:13-cv-03564) 

District Judge: Honorable Edward G. Smith 

_______________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

December 8, 2015 

Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 

(Opinion Filed: December 17, 2015) 

______________ 

OPINION*

______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,

does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 

VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant Milad Allaham has brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania against three foreign nationals: Fadi Naddaf, Elias 

Nadaf, and Majd Nadaf. Allaham sought a default judgment, which the District Court 

ultimately denied for lack of personal jurisdiction. Allaham now appeals the denial of his 

Motion for Reconsideration. We will affirm the decision of the District Court. 

I. Factual Background and Procedural History 

A. Factual Background 

At some time shortly before 2007, Raouaeh Nadaf,1 Allaham’s wife, approached 

Allaham while at their home in Allentown, Pennsylvania about entering into a 

partnership to open a jewelry business in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”). (App. 16a–

17a). The partnership was to be with Raouaeh’s brothers, three of whom are Appellees. 

(App. 16a–17a). A fourth brother, Pierre Nadaf, a United States citizen residing in 

Scranton, Pennsylvania, was also involved in the business and traveled between the UAE 

1

 The transcript for the evidentiary hearing before the District Court spells 

Allaham’s wife’s name as “Arawah” followed by a “(ph)” designation. (App. 51a). The 

District Court used the same spelling in its opinion. (App. 16a–17a). Allaham’s brief 

indicates that his wife’s name is spelled “Raouaeh.” This opinion follows the spelling in 

Allaham’s brief since it appears that the District Court’s spelling is phonetic and does not 

reflect the actual spelling. We also note that there is some inconsistency in the spelling of 

Fadi Naddaf’s last name, which in some filings only has one “d,” yet in the majority of 

filings has two “d’s.” For consistency, we follow the spelling used by the District Court 

of “Naddaf.” 
3

and the United States to purchase jewelry.2(App. 17a, 69a–70a). At all times relevant to 

the present action, Allaham was a United States citizen, residing in Pennsylvania. 

(Appellant Br. 4). During the same time period, all three Appellees were foreign nationals 

residing in the UAE. (App. 19a). 

Shortly after Raouaeh introduced the partnership idea, Allaham traveled to the 

UAE to meet with Appellees in person. (App. 17a). After Allaham’s visit, he believed 

that he had entered into an oral agreement with Appellees to be a partner in the business 

and provided investment capital and merchandise to this end. (App. 17a). From October 

2007 through July 2008, Allaham wired approximately $252,000 dollars to Appellees 

from Pennsylvania bank accounts. 3 During his trip to the UAE, Allaham also gave 

Appellees various items of jewelry with a combined value of approximately $25,000. 

(App. 56–57a); (Appellant Br. 6). 

 

2

In order to maintain diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, Allaham did not name 

Pierre as a Defendant in his complaint. (App. 68a–69a). At the December 2014 

evidentiary hearing, Allaham expressed concerns about enforcing a judgment in Abu 

Dhabi, UAE, where Appellees reside. Allaham indicated that he thought a federal 

judgment would be more likely to be enforced. (App. 69a). This type of forum shopping 

does not affect this Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis as this is not a situation where 

the federal court would take the case out of the control of a state court. Telecordia Tech

Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 2006). To prohibit Allaham from 

bringing a claim in federal court solely because of the appearance of forum shopping 

would “ignore[] the maxim that courts generally defer to a plaintiff’s choice of forum.” 

Id. (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 880 (3d Cir. 1995)). 

3 There was some dispute at the evidentiary hearing about the total amount wired. 

Allaham’s Counsel went through each wire, reading the date, amount, and bank. The 

Court tallied these to equal $252,000, while Counsel indicated that Allaham’s 

calculations produced a total of $243,000. (App. 53a–56a). 
4

At an unspecified date in 2009, Appellees, through an unidentified intermediary in 

New York State, told Allaham they did not intend to pursue the partnership. Instead, 

Appellees said they would return Allaham’s money if he travelled to the UAE in two 

weeks.4(App. 58a–59a). Appellees stated that they would return half of the money when 

he arrived, and the other half at a later date. (App. 59a). Allaham travelled to the UAE at 

the agreed upon time, but was unsuccessful in efforts to recover his cash or jewelry 

investment. (App. 59a). 

B. Procedural History 

Allaham filed a complaint for conversion in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

on June 21, 2013.

5

(App. 30a–35a). Allaham filed a proof of service for each defendant, 

which he claims was done by a process server on September 10, 2013.6(App. 36a–38a).

 

4 While unrelated to the conversion claim, it is notable that around this same time 

as the events giving rise to the instant action, Allaham and Raouaeh’s marriage began to 

fall apart. (App. 58a, 62a). Either while Allaham was in the UAE attempting to retrieve 

his investment, or after he returned, Raouaeh took $13,400 out of the couple’s joint bank 

account and violated a custody order by taking their child to Syria. (App. 59a–60a). 

There has been an ongoing custody case in a local court in Damascus. At the evidentiary 

hearing, Allaham stated that the present action was partly motivated by his hope that he 

could use a judgment in the instant action as part of the custody negotiations. (App. 60a, 

82a). 

5 Although the District Court referred to the instant action as a breach of contract 

claim, Allaham’s complaint and civil cover sheet speak in terms of the tort of conversion. 

(App. 9a, 31a–34a). Allaham’s brief uses the term “converted” when describing 

Appellees actions, yet also states “[t]his is a contract claim” and proceeds with his 

argument stating “[i]n a contract claim . . .” (Appellant Br. 3, 13). In accordance with 

Allaham’s complaint, we treat the underlying claim as a conversion action.

6

Judge Edward G. Smith noted that “service probably [was] an issue” but that it 

was not his “primary concern.” (App. 49a). Judge Smith stated that while having the 

process server sign that he personally served Appellees is “not permitted under the 

rule . . . it can be permitted if [the Judge] authorize[s] it to be permitted,” which Judge 
5

On March 20, 2014, Allaham filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(b)(1), along with a request that 

the clerk of court enter a default against each Defendant pursuant to Rule 55(a). (App. 

39a–46a). The District Court (Smith, E.G., J.),

7 denied the motion without prejudice and 

the clerk instructed Allaham to separately file a request for the entry of default, and then 

 

Smith said he was inclined to do. (App. 49a). Although not dispositive for personal 

jurisdiction, it seems likely that Appellees did not receive some of the documents in this 

matter. The notices of reassignment to Judge Smith mailed to the Defendants were 

returned because the addresses were incomplete. (App. 2a). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f), which governs “serving an individual in a 

foreign country,” states that: 

Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an 

incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served 

at a place not within any judicial district of the United States:

(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably 

calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague 

Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 

Documents; 

(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international 

agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is 

reasonably calculated to give notice:

(A) as prescribed by the foreign country’s law for service in that 

country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction; 

(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or 

letter of request; or

(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country’s law, by:

(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to 

the individual personally; or

(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends 

to the individual and that requires a signed receipt; or 

(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court 

orders.

7 This matter, which was originally assigned to Judge Joel H. Slomsky, was 

reassigned to Judge Smith in April 2014. (App. 10a).
6

a Motion for Default Judgment, in the appropriate order. (App. 10a). A week later, 

Allaham made a second request for the entry of default, which the clerk entered against 

each Defendant. (App. 10a). The District Court ordered Allaham to file a Renewed 

Motion for Default Judgment, which he did on August 29, 2014. (App. 10a). A hearing 

was scheduled, prior to which Allaham was invited to provide the District Court with 

briefing supporting personal jurisdiction over Appellees. (App. 27a n.1). Allaham 

submitted a brief arguing that personal jurisdiction existed prior to the hearing. 

(Plaintiff’s Long-Arm Statute Br.). Following the default judgment hearing on December 

12, 2014, which focused almost exclusively on Appellees’ contacts with Pennsylvania, 

the District Court denied Allaham’s motion and dismissed the action for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. (App. 28a–29a). 

Allaham filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e). The District 

Court denied this motion in an order and memorandum opinion issued on May 28, 2015. 

(App. 8a–25a). This timely appeal followed. (App. 6a–7a). As of December 8, 2015, 

Appellees have not responded to any documents served or filed in this matter. 

II. Discussion8

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of 

discretion. Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d 

Cir. 1999). This Court exercises de novo review over a district court’s dismissal for lack 

 

8 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1332(a)(2). We have 

jurisdiction to review final orders of a district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
7

of personal jurisdiction. Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 

F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2010). Factual findings made by a district court in determining 

personal jurisdiction are reviewed for clear error. Control Screening LLC v. Tech.

Application & Prod. Co., 687 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2012).

B. Analysis

As an appeal from a denial of a Motion for Reconsideration, stemming from the 

denial of a Motion for Default Judgment, this Court’s role is to determine whether the 

District Court erred based on the reason Allaham asserts in his Rule 59(e) motion. There 

are limited grounds on which a court will grant a Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration.

To succeed on a Rule 59(e) motion, the moving party must present one, or more, of the 

following: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new 

evidence that was not available when the court granted the [motion]; or (3) the need to 

correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” U.S. ex rel. Schumann 

v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 848–49 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Max’s 

Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc., 176 F.3d at 677). Allaham argues that his Motion for 

Reconsideration should have been granted since the District Court “failed to recognize 

that the defendants engaged in certain activities directed at Pennsylvania that supported

an exercise of such jurisdiction.” (App. 11a). The entry of default judgment is not a 

matter of right, but rather a matter of discretion, which “is not without limits.” Hritz v. 

Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180–81 (3d Cir. 1984). Because the exercise of this 

discretion is contingent on a district court’s determination that it can exercise personal

jurisdiction over each defendant, and as discussed infra, the District Court did not err in 
8

denying Allaham’s Motion for Reconsideration. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 

F.3d 244, 259 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that if a court does not have personal jurisdiction, 

the entry of a default judgment is “not merely erroneous; [but] never should have been 

entered in the first place”); see also Stranahan Gear Co., Inc. v. NL Indus., Inc., 800 F.2d 

53, 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming district court’s striking of default judgment entered 

against party over whom the court did not have personal jurisdiction). 

1. Denial of Motion for Default Judgment 

Before a plaintiff can obtain a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b), a plaintiff 

must secure an entry of default per Rule 55(a). 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 

Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2682, at 13 (3d ed. 1998). 

Once default is entered against a specific defendant, Rule 55(b) allows the plaintiff to 

request that the clerk or the court enter a default judgment against that defendant, 

depending on whether the claim is for a sum certain. Id. While entry of a default 

judgment is largely within a district court’s discretion, three factors control this 

determination: “(1) prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the 

defendant appears to have a litigable defense, and (3) whether defendant’s delay is due to 

culpable conduct.” Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). 

While unlike subject matter jurisdiction, a court generally may not raise personal 

jurisdiction sua sponte, when a default judgment is requested, a court is required to make 

a threshold determination regarding any jurisdictional defects. See Bolden v. Se. 

Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 812 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Mansfield, 

Coldwater & Lake Michigan R.R. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)) (stating that while
9

this Court does not address issues that the parties have ignored, “[w]e are always 

obligated to ensure that we have jurisdiction over the cases that come before us”). If a 

court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court does not have jurisdiction to 

render a default judgment, and any such judgment will deemed void. Budget Blinds, Inc., 

536 F.3d at 258 (citing Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 1978)); see 

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 

(1877)) (“With the adoption of [the Fourteenth] Amendment, any judgment purporting to 

bind the person of a defendant over whom the court had not acquired in personam 

jurisdiction was void within the State as well as without.”). In the absence of an 

evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff’s complaint need only establish a prima facie case of 

personal jurisdiction. Eurofins Pharma US Holdings, 623 F.3d at 155; Metcalfe v. 

Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009). However, at an evidentiary 

hearing before a district court, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court has 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Control 

Screening LLC, 687 F.3d at 167; Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 

n.1 (3d Cir. 1992).

In the instant case, the District Court requested counsel be prepared to discuss the 

basis for personal jurisdiction at the hearing precisely because of the Court’s concern that 

the allegations in the complaint did not satisfy the prima facie standard.9(App. 16a & 

 

9 The District Court’s order scheduling the evidentiary hearing stated that 

“[c]ounsel shall be prepared to address the following: 1) The basis for the court’s 

personal jurisdiction over the defendants.” A footnote appended to this direction stated 

“[t]he plaintiff fails to include any allegations in the complaint relating to where the 
10

n.1, 27a). When determining jurisdiction in a claim for the tort of conversion, this court 

“approache[s] each case individually and take[s] a ‘realistic approach’ to analyzing a 

defendant’s contacts with a forum.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 99–

100 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 

1217, 1224 (3d Cir. 1992)). Until an evidentiary hearing is held, a district court “must 

accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the 

plaintiff.” Carteret Sav. Bank, FA, 954 F.2d at 142 n.1 (citations omitted). At the 

evidentiary hearing Allaham had “the burden of demonstrating the facts that establish[ed] 

personal jurisdiction.” Metcalfe, 566 F.3d at 330 (alteration omitted) (quoting Pinker v. 

Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002)). The evidence Allaham presented 

at the hearing failed to satisfy this burden. 

2. Personal Jurisdiction

We have stated that “[a] district court sitting in diversity may assert personal 

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent allowed under the law of the forum 

state.” Metcalfe, 566 F.3d at 330 (citations omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) 

(authorizing the exercise of “personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is subject to the 

jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is 

located”). In a state such as Pennsylvania, where the long-arm statute 10 allows the 

 

parties’ purported transaction occurred. The plaintiff is invited to provide this information 

to the court in writing prior to the hearing.” (App. 27a). 

10 Subsection (a) of Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute states in relevant part, “A 

tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person . . . who 

acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or other matter arising from such 

person.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5322. Subsection (b) states:
11

exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, the

standard for a federal court sitting in diversity in Pennsylvania is whether a “defendant 

ha[s] ‘minimum contacts,’” such “that the “exercise of jurisdiction comport with 

‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Remick, 238 F.3d at 255

(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

There are two distinct theories under which personal jurisdiction can arise: general 

and specific. Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1559 (3d Cir. 1994). A 

court has general jurisdiction when a defendant has “continuous and systematic” contacts 

with the forum state. O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 

2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court has specific jurisdiction when a

plaintiff’s claim arises from a defendant’s actions within the forum state, such that the 

defendant could “reasonably anticipate being haled into [the state’s] court[s].” Vetrotex 

Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1996)

(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

a. General Jurisdiction 

The District Court correctly determined that Appellees’ contacts with 

Pennsylvania, as alleged by Allaham, are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction. 

 

In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) the jurisdiction of the 

tribunals of this Commonwealth shall extend to all persons who are not 

within the scope of section 5301 (relating to [bases for personal jurisdiction 

over] persons) to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the 

United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this 

Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States.
12

(App. 18a–19a). For general jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s claim need not be related to a

defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 

Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1984). As the District Court noted, the Supreme Court has 

indicated that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 

jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.” (App. 19a) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires 

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Domicile is not the exclusive means by which to establish general jurisdiction. 

However, if as the District Court observed here, a defendant’s contacts “plainly [do] not 

approach” the quantity required for general jurisdiction, this Court need not inquire as to 

the other means by which a defendant can satisfy general jurisdiction. (App. 19a) 

(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

The District Court characterized the Long-Arm Statute Brief Allaham provided 

pre-hearing as having “the thrust of a general jurisdiction argument.” (App. 18a). The 

brief did not attempt to demonstrate a connection between any of Appellees’ contacts 

with Pennsylvania and the present matter. Rather, the brief asserted that Pierre’s trips 

between the United States and UAE were a fundamental part of the partnership and 

provided the quantity of contacts necessary for general jurisdiction. (Appellant Br. 14–

15). Relying solely on an unpublished secondary source,11 Allaham maintained that the

 

11 Paul Dubinsky, The Reach of Doing Business Jurisdiction and Transacting 

Business Jurisdiction Over Non-U.S. Individuals and Entities (Hague Conference Private 

Int’l Law Working Doc. Series No. 67, 1998). In his brief on the reach of Pennsylvania’s 

long-arm statute Allaham argues that it is well established that once a defendant is doing 
13

presence of Pierre, as an agent of Appellees in the forum state permitted the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction. (App. 20a) (citing Plaintiff’s Long-Arm Statute Br. 2–4). As the 

District Court correctly noted, Allaham failed to present facts that established Pierre was 

a bona fide agent, whose “actions would have been imputed to the individual defendants 

as opposed to the partnership, let alone whether Pierre was even in a position where his 

actions could be imputed to others.” (App. 20a). Allaham indicated in his complaint, and 

at the evidentiary hearing, that Appellees are all domiciled in the UAE and provided no 

other evidence indicative of “continuous and systematic contacts” with Pennsylvania.

(App. 30a, 51a).

b. Specific Jurisdiction 

Based on Appellees’ contacts with Pennsylvania, as alleged on the record, 

Allaham has not satisfied his burden of establishing specific jurisdiction. To satisfy the 

federal due process limits adopted by the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, a defendant’s 

minimum contacts are examined in relation to “the nature of the interactions and type of 

jurisdiction asserted.” Telecordia Tech Inc., 458 F.3d at 177. When assessing if due 

process is met, “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” is 

crucial. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). For specific jurisdiction, this Court 

has stated due process necessitates the plaintiff satisfy three requirements. First, the 

 

business in a state, they are subject to suit in that state. (Plaintiff’s Long-Arm Statute 

Br.). Without reaching the merits of this assertion, we note that this argument 

presupposes that Allaham has established facts supporting the assertion that Appellees

were doing business in Pennsylvania. As the District Court stated, Allaham has failed to 

articulate facts demonstrating that Appellees were actually doing business in 

Pennsylvania, undermining Allaham’s argument. (App. 23a).
14

plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “purposefully directed [its] activities at the 

forum.” O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). “Second, 

the litigation must ‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of those activities.” Id. (quoting 

Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414). Third, if the plaintiff satisfies the first two requirements, 

“a court may consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise ‘comport[s] with fair 

play and substantial justice.’”12 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King Corp., 

471 U.S. at 476) (internal quotation marks omitted).

While the defendant need not be physically present in the forum to establish that 

the state has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff must 

establish that the defendant “purposefully directed . . . or otherwise purposefully avail[ed] 

itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” IMO Indus., Inc. v. 

Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)

(quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). This Court has declined to adopt a bright-line test to

determine if a court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant in a tort claim, and instead 

“approach[es] each case individually.” O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 320 (quoting Miller Yacht 

Sales, Inc., 384 F.3d at 99–100) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this inquiry, “mail 

and wire communications can constitute purposeful contacts when sent into the forum.” 

Telecordia Tech Inc., 458 F.3d at 177 (citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476). 

 

12 Since Allaham has failed to establish that Appellees purposefully directed their 

activities at Pennsylvania or that the present claim arises out of the purported activities, it 

is not necessary for this Court address the third step and look at the so-called “fairness” 

or “reasonableness” factors set forth by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen 

Corp., 444 U.S. at 292. 
15

Even viewing the long-arm brief as asserting a specific jurisdiction argument, a 

reading which the District Court noted “would have taken a generous interpretation,” 

Allaham was unsuccessful in articulating facts that establish purposeful availment on the 

part of Appellees. (App. 19a). As the District Court aptly noted, “the factual nature of the 

claim was not fleshed out in any more detail” in Allaham’s long-arm brief than in the 

initial complaint. (App. 16a). In contrast to his earlier general jurisdiction argument, 

Allaham’s Motion for Reconsideration asserted specific jurisdiction based on Appellees’

solicitation and acceptance of money from a Pennsylvania resident. (App. 21a). However, 

at the hearing, the “evidence showed that no defendant had any relevant contact with 

Pennsylvania,” including the solicitation or acceptance of money. (App. 20a). 

Accordingly, Allaham’s claim fails to satisfy due process since “the [Appellees’] conduct 

and connection with the forum State” are not “such that [they] should reasonably 

anticipate being haled into court there.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting 

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The District Court’s finding that the facts adduced at the hearing do not establish 

that Appellees directed their efforts at the forum state satisfies the clear error standard of 

review. Allaham’s brief argues that specific jurisdiction is satisfied because Appellees

purposefully directed their activities at Pennsylvania by approaching Allaham and 

entering into a contract with him while he was in the state. (Appellant Br. 10–11). 

However, as the District Court noted, Allaham testified that none of the Appellees

entered the state during the negotiation or formation stages of their oral partnership 

agreement. (App. 20a). While mail and communications sent by a defendant into a forum 
16

state can count as minimum contacts if part of purposeful availment, Allaham does not 

assert that Appellees ever sent any communications, through any means, into the forum. 

(App. 20a); see O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317. 

The existence of a website that Appellees operate and the presence of 

advertisements on the Internet for Appellees’ jewelry business do not alter our

conclusion. (App. 20a). At the hearing Allaham suggested that one could hypothetically 

order jewelry from Appellees’ website and have the item delivered to Pennsylvania via a 

common carrier. However, Allaham testified in a follow-up question, and states in his 

appellate brief, that Appellees did not at the time of the alleged agreement, nor do they 

presently, sell any jewelry in the United States. (App. 17a; Appellant Br. 6). The 

evidence Allaham now cites from the hearing does not demonstrate that the District Court 

committed clear error in its factual finding that “no defendant had any relevant contact 

with Pennsylvania.” (App. 20a).

Allaham’s reliance on Segal v. Zieleniec, the single case cited to support specific 

jurisdiction in the Motion for Reconsideration, 13 and which Allaham cites again on 

 

13 As the District Court noted in a footnote to its discussion of Segal, there are 

possible procedural issues with Allaham only raising the argument that solicitation and 

acceptance of money from a Pennsylvania resident establishes personal jurisdiction in his 

Motion for Reconsideration. (App. 23a n.3). Allaham did not previously raise a specific 

jurisdiction argument based on Segal, even though it appears this was available to him at 

the time he filed his initial brief. (App. 23a n.3). As this Court has stated, motions for 

reconsideration “are not to be used as an opportunity to relitigate the case.” Blystone v. 

Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011). A trial court does not abuse its discretion in 

denying a motion for reconsideration when the motion is not based on the three proper 

Rule 59 grounds. Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc, 176 F.3d at 678–79. 
17

appeal, is misplaced. (App. 21a) (citing No. 13-cv-7493, 2014 WL 2710989 (E.D. Pa. 

June 16, 2014)). Allaham presents Segal, an unreported district court opinion, as 

“stand[ing] for the proposition that if a person solicits money from a Pennsylvania 

resident and later accepts that money in forming a contract, that person becomes 

amenable to specific jurisdiction in Pennsylvania for a breach-of-contract claim.” (App. 

23a). Unlike the plaintiff in Segal, Allaham has failed to provide “evidence to support the 

notion that the defendants themselves actively solicited money from the plaintiff.” (App. 

23a). In fact, as the District Court suggests, “[i]f anything, the evidence points in the 

opposite direction.” (App. 23a). In Segal, the court’s finding that personal jurisdiction 

was proper over one defendant, but not the other, was dependent on the determination 

that the defendant solicited and accepted money from a Pennsylvania resident. 2014 WL 

2710989, at *4. Allaham has failed to establish that comparable facts exist in the present 

case. Allaham mischaracterizes the rule Segal sets forth, expanding its scope beyond the 

narrower “further purpose[ful] avail[ment]” of the laws of the forum on the basis of

which the Segal court found personal jurisdiction. See id. As the District Court 

articulated, Segal’s use of “further” indicated that the acceptance of money by a 

Pennsylvania resident was preceded by active solicitation. (App. 23a). Without 

establishing active solicitation, the present action is distinguishable from both the facts 

and legal conclusion of Segal. 

 
18

Allaham’s citation to cases which state that a defendant’s initiation of a contact 

establishes personal jurisdiction in a contract claim is inapposite given the absolute dearth 

of facts as to how contact was initiated in the present case. (Appellant Br. 13) (citing 

Vetrotex Certaineed Corp., 75 F.3d at 147); Shanks v. Wexner, No. 02-cv-7671, 2003 WL 

1343018 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2003). At the hearing Allaham did not provide any details as 

to how the agreement was communicated from Appellees to his wife, or his acceptance of

Appellees’ offer back to them. Allaham only stated that his wife served as an 

intermediary. (App. 17a). No specific facts as to his wife’s role in the formation of the 

partnership were provided at the hearing, which further calls into question Allaham’s 

insistence that the “Defendants initiated the contact and then used the Plaintiff’s wife . . . 

to cement the deal.” (Appellant Br. 14). Because he does not allege any facts in support 

of this assertion, we are not required to accept as true Allaham’s conclusion that 

Appellees initiated the agreement. Metcalfe, 566 F.3d at 330; Eurofins Pharma US 

Holdings, 623 F.3d at 156. 

Although Allaham testified at the hearing that two of the brothers traveled to 

Pennsylvania, he failed to establish the connection between these trips and the present 

action. When questioned about Appellees’ presence in Pennsylvania, Allaham told the 

District Court that Elias Nadaf had visited the state more than once. (App. 20a). 

However, Allaham admitted that he did not know why Elias had traveled to 

Pennsylvania, and could not connect any of these trips to the contract at issue. (App. 

20a). Allaham argues that Appellees were “clearly” using Pennsylvania resident Pierre 

“to get substantial monies from [Allaham].” (Appellant Br. 14). In his pre-hearing brief 
19

and appellate brief, Allaham refers to Pierre as an “agent” of the Appellees. (Plaintiff’s 

Long-Arm Statute Br. 2–4; Appellant Br. 15). At no point however, does Allaham 

attempt to demonstrate how Pierre was in fact an agent. Beyond characterizing Pierre as 

the Appellees’ agent, Allaham does not provide evidence as to why Pierre was acting by 

operation of law in a position capable of imputing his actions to others. Allaham merely 

states that Pierre was part of the business along with Appellees. (App. 68a). In light of the 

Supreme Court’s statement that “a defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, 

standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction,” Allaham’s bare legal conclusion 

of agency fails to establish that Pierre was in fact an agent of the Defendants. Walden v. 

Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014). Consequently, Allaham’s assertion that Pierre’s role 

as an agent of the Appellees confers specific jurisdiction over Appellees also fails. 

The District Court properly denied the Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed 

the case for lack of personal jurisdiction since Allaham failed to meet the applicable 

burdens of proof at both the complaint and evidentiary hearing stages.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dated May 

28, 2015.