### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00627- CV

G ar r y A c ke r so n, A ppe lla nt

v. Clarendon National In surance Com pany, Ap pellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 201ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. GN003549 , HO NORAB LE JOH N K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt w a s in jur e d o n th e job and

su bmi tt ed a

c la im a g a ins t a

pp e lle e , h is employ er’ s insurance car

rier, to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commissi on (“Commission”). After the Commiss ion gr anted pa rtial relief

, the Commiss ion’s Appea ls Panel denied a ppellant’s reque st fo r re v i ew, holding that the Commiss ion’s decision had be come f inal by operation of law beca use appe llant had filed his reque st one day afte r t he fifteen-da y appea l deadline expi red. The district court af

firmed. Appellant argues t hat t he C ommissi on’s g ener al provisions for c omputing periods of time should extend the five-da y deeme d rec eipt provision a nd delay the start of the fiftee nday appea ls pe riod by one day

. See 28 Te x. Ad min . Code §§ 10 2. 3, 10 2. 5( d) (2 00 5) (T e x. Wor ke rs ’ Comp. Com m’n). We will reve rse the de cision below and r emand.Th is s ta tut e wa s ame nd e d in 20 01 to e xclu de Sa tur da y s, Sun da y s, and ho lid ay s li ste d in 1 s e c ti o n6 6 2
. 0 0 3 o f

th e G o v e r

n me n t C o d e w h e nc o mp u ti n g th e f if te e n - d ay a p p e a l s f il in g p e r io d

. T e x. L ab. Code Ann. § 410.202( d) (West Supp. 2004-05). This cha ng e do es n o t af

fe ct our ana ly sis or ho ldi nghe re re g a

rd ingwh e n th e fi ft e e n- da y pe ri od be g ins

. 2 SUM M AR

Y O F F AC TS Whil e wo rk inga s a c arp e nte r a t a c on str uc tio n sit e in F e br

ua ry 19 99 , a pp e lla nt f e ll
on to s c a ff

old ingand

wa s in jur e d. Ov e r t

he ne xt se ve n mont

hs , h e re c e ive d me dic a l tr e a tme nt, inc lud ingme dic a tio n, surg e ry , a nd ph y sic a l the ra

py and wa s e ith e r un a

ble to w or

k o r r e str ic te d to lig ht l if tin g du tie s. Al tho ug h r e le a se d to fu ll d uty on No vembe r 1, 1 99 9, a

pp e lla nt c on tin ue d to experience knee a

nd b ac k pain, possibly

ag g ravated by

a subseque nt non-work- related fa ll. He soug ht additional treatment e arly the next y ear . Appellant dispu t edt h e w o rk er s ’ c o mp en s at i o nb en ef i t s o ff er edb y ap p el l ee before the Commi ssion. The C o m m i s s i on mailed its written opinion on W ednesda y , Aug ust 30, 2000. Appellant fi l ed a re quest for r eview on Septe mber 20, 2000. The Commi ssion Appeals Panel applied its deeme d-re ceive d provision to deem the date of appe l l an t ’s rec eipt of the de cision as Se pte mbe r 4 , c a lc ulate d th e fi ft e e n- da y tim e pe ri od

fr om that da

te , a nd he ld t hat a pp e lla nt’ s r e qu e st, mailed s ix teen day s afte r S eptember 4, was one day too late. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 410.202(a) (West 2004) (fifte en-da

y limit for filing t imely reque st for review) ; 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 102.5(d) (notice de emed r ece ived five da y s after mailing)

. 1 Appellant then filed suit in district court, claiming that beca use September

4, 2000,
wa s L a bo r Da y , it c ou ld n ot b e de e me d th e re c e ipt date . T he dis tr ic t c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t, b e c a

us e the Commiss ion’s rule provides that a “working day ” is any day , including L abor D ay , the fiftee n-3

day period be g an on September 4, and the r equest wa s untimely filed. The c ourt dismissed for lac k of jurisdiction. This appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N

The only issue on appea l is whether the Commiss ion’s rule e x cluding wee kends and holiday s f

r o m b e in g th e la s t d ay

o f a ti me p e r io d

a p p li e s to th e Co mm is s io n ’ s d e e me d

- r e c eived provision. See 28 Tex. Admin. C ode §§ 102.3 (a )- (b ) (go verningcomputation of time periods), 102.5(d) ( deeme d-re ceipt provision).

Be cause an examination of an Appe als Panel ruling invol v es i n t erpretation of an administrative rule, w e apply principles of statutory

construction and c onduct a de novo rev i ew. Con tin e nta l Ca s. Co. v . R iv e ra , 124 S.W .3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2003, pet. denied) . When construing Commi ssion rules, we f ace two further , competing fac tors. An administrative ag ency ’s int e rp re ta tio n o f i ts own ru le s is e nti tle d to g re a t w e ig ht a nd de fe re nc e ; it

c on tr ols un le ss p la inl y
err oneous or inconsistent with the ag ency ’s ena bling statute. Id . at 7 10 . H ow e ve r, we mus t li be ra lly construe the Workers’ Com pensation Act in favor of t he inj ured worker ; thus, a strained or na rrow construction is improper. Kroger Co. v. Keng , 23 S.W .3d 347, 349 (Tex. 2000).

Th e C o m m i s s i o nh a s a d o p t e d a g e n e r a l r

u l e f o r c o mp u t i n g d

u e d a t e s an d

tim e periods. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 402.061 (West 1996) (Commission has authority to “adopt rule s
as nec essar

y for the implementation and enfor ceme nt of” Ac t ); 28 Tex. Admin. C ode § 102.3 (g ener al rule for computing due date s and time periods). Princ iples of statutory construction re quire that we disce rn the dra fters’ intent from the languag e of the provisi o n , i f p o s s ible. See F leming Foods of Tex., Inc . v. Ry lander , 6 S.W .3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999).4 Th e sc he me tha

t the Com mis sio n u se s to c a lc ulate tim e and re c e ipt is c le ar f ro m it s langua g e : a pa

rt y re qu e sti ng that th e Com mis sio n r e vie w a de c isi on ha s f if te e n d ay s f

ro m th e date of re ceipt of the decision in which to re spond. Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 410.202( a). “ For purposes of dete rmining the date of rec eipt for those w ritten communications sent by the Commi ssion which
re qu ir e the re c ipi e nt t o p e rf or m an ac tio n by a sp e c if

ic date a ft e r re c e ipt , . . . the Com mis sio n s ha ll deem the r ece ived date to be five day s afte r the date mailed . . . .” 28 Tex. Admin. C ode § 102.5(d) (2 00 4) . In c ounti ngthe fi ve da y s, the de e me d- rece ipt

pr ov isi on

re fe rs to c a le nd ar d ay s, be c a us e “[u] se in this tit le of the te rm ‘day ,’ rather than ‘ working d ay ’ s h al l m ean a cale ndar da

y .” Id

. § 102.3(b). How ever , in de termining the last day of the pe riod, “unless other wise spec ified, if the la st d ay of any pe ri od is no t a wo rk ing da y , the pe ri od is e xten de d to inc lud e the ne xt d ay that is a working day .” Id . § 102.3(a) (3). Contrar y to the district court’s c onclusion, “[a] working day is any day , Mon d a y - F r id ay , o th e r th ana n a ti o n a l h o li d ay

a s d e f in e d b y T e xa s G o v e r

n me n t C o d e, § 662.003(a) ” and a

fewother holiday s. Id . § 10 2. 3(b) . U nd e r t he g ov e rnme nt c od e , th e fi rs t Mo nd ay in Se pte mbe r, L a bo r Da y , is a natio na l ho lid ay . Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 6 62 .0 03 (6 ) ( Wes t 20 04 ). Th e re fo re , b e c a

us e the la st d ay

of thi s pe ri od

—Se pte mbe r 4, 20 00 , L a bo r D ay —w a s n ot a
w o r k i n g d ay, t h e p e r i o d

w a s e x t e n d e d

t o i n c l u d e t h e n e x t d a y t h a t w a s a w o r k i n g d ay, T u e s d a y, September 5. 28 Te x . Admin. Code § 102.3(a) (3).

There fore , when a

ppellant mailed his reque st for review on S eptember 20, 2000, he was still within t he statutorily -provided a ppeals period. The Appe als Panel and district c ourt err ed in holding that the or igina l Comm ission decision was final by operatio n o f law and in de ny ing appellant’ s reque st for re view.Our interpr etation of the deeme d-re ceive d provision does not contra dict the hol dings of the 2 three Appea ls Panel decisions appel l ee ci t es . These de cisions assert that the f ive-da y deeme d rec eipt, rathe r than the da t e o f actual rec eipt (unless the g reat weig ht of the evide nce indicates otherwise) , establishes the be g inning of the fifteen-da

y appea ls period. Te x . Work. Comp. C omm’n, Appea l No. 001469, 2000 W L 3 3 1 5 5 9 5 5 , at *1 (Aug . 10, 2000); Tex. W ork. Comp. Comm ’n, Appea l No. 001646, 2000 WL 33159008, at *1 (Aug . 18, 2000); T ex . W o rk

. Comp. Com m’n, Appea l No. 012254, 2001 WL 1510756, at *1 (Nov. 13, 2001)

. T h at p roposition sti ll holds t rue. Be cause the fifth day

did not fall on a we ekend or holiday in any of those dec isions, the method for counting the five- day

period wa s never

addre ssed. Even the Appea ls Panel decision in the instant case looked at the dates without c onsidering whether they wer e working day s. Tex. W ork. Comp. Comm’n, Appeal No. 002208, 2000 WL33124289, at *1 (Nov. 2, 2000)

. 5 Ap pe lle e a rgue s th a t a

pp e lla nt wa ive d his so le po int of e rr or by no t su pp or tin g it w ith argument and authority beca use he offe rs only

statutory interpre tation with no releva nt case s to back it up. W e disag ree . Appellant off ers a rg ument and author ity

supporting a cle ar inter

pretation and ref ers us to all nec essar

y statutes and re g ulations a nd a Texas Supre me Court decision that mandates liberal c onstruction. Appellee further argues seve ral c ounter-inter pretations: (1) that the dee medrec eived pr ovision’s use of “da y s” rather than “ wo rk i n g d ay s” re quires a stric t calenda r-da y counting ; (2) that the Commission i ntended for the de emed- rec eived pr ovision to count calenda r day s, as shown by the Commi ssion’s use of “first wor king da y ” else wher e in the same rule a nd not in the deeme d-re ceive d provision, see 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 102.5(d); (3) that the g ener al rule for counting a per iod of day s does not apply beca use the fif

th day is not the end of a time pe riod but

rathe r t he be g inn ingof

the fi ft e e n da

y a pp e a l pe ri od ; and (4 ) that the fi ft h da y ne e d no t r oll ov e r t o
a wor king da y beca use no ac tion is required be tween the date mailed and the da te re ceive d. Eac h of these inter

pretations force s a strained or narr ow rea ding; thus, w e are unpersua ded in lig ht of the mandate f avoringliberal c onstruction in favor of the injured wor

ker. See Ke ng , 23 S.W .3d at 349. 26 CO NC LU SION Th e Ap pe a ls Pa

ne l and dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in no t pr op e rl y

a pp lyingthe g e ne ra l r

ule for c omputing time per iods to the fiv e- d ay deeme d-re ceive d provision. Appellant’s re quest for
re vie w w a s ti me ly

fi le d. We r e ve rs e and

re mand to the dis tr ic t c ourt fo r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w ith this opini on.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Reverse d and Remande d Filed: June 23, 2005