NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

NEOLOGY, INC.,

Appellant

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee

KAPSCH TRAFFICCOM USA, INC., KAPSCH 

TRAFFICCOM HOLDING CORP., KAPSCH 

TRAFFICCOM CANADA INC., STAR SYSTEMS 

INTERNATIONAL LTD., STAR RFID CO., LTD.,

Intervenors

______________________

2018-1338

______________________

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-979.

______________________

Decided: April 19, 2019 

______________________

VINAY VIJAY JOSHI, Amin Turocy & Watson LLP, San 

Jose, CA, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

DANIEL W. BEDELL, ANTHONY KIM, ANDREW TIMOTHY 

OLIVER. 
2 NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC

 CATHY CHEN, Office of the General Counsel, United 

States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, 

argued for appellee. Also represented by DOMINIC L.

BIANCHI, WAYNE W. HERRINGTON, SIDNEY A. ROSENZWEIG. 

 NATHAN S. MAMMEN, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, argued for intervenors. Also represented by 

GREGG F. LOCASCIO, BRIAN H. GOLD.

 ______________________

Before TARANTO, SCHALL, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

Neology filed a complaint with the International Trade 

Commission in 2015, alleging, as now relevant, infringement of claims 13, 14, and 25 of its U.S. Patent No. 

8,325,044 and claims 1, 2, and 4 of its U.S. Patent No. 

8,587,436. The patents, which share a specification, describe and claim systems and methods for tracking identifying information, particularly those relying on radio 

frequency identification (RFID). The Commission held the 

claims now at issue invalid because (1) they lack adequate

written description support and (2) they are invalid for anticipation by U.S. Patent No. 5,627,544 (Snodgrass) or for 

obviousness based on the combination of Snodgrass and 

two other pieces of prior art. Neology appeals. We affirm

on the written-description ground and do not reach anticipation or obviousness. 

I

A

Neology filed applications for both the ’044 and ’436 patents in 2012, both applications tracing by the same chain 

of continuation applications to an application filed in 2003 

and a provisional application filed in 2002. The claims that 

appeared in the 2012 applications as filed (the 2012 claims) 

issued with very few changes as the claims in the ’044 and 
NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC 3

’436 patents. Compare J.A. 3549–54, with ’044 patent, col. 

23, line 5, through col. 24, line 63; compare J.A. 3755–59,

with ’436 patent, col. 23, line 13, through col. 25, line 17. 

The patents share a title, “System and Method for Providing Secure Identification Solutions,” as well as a specification. They describe and claim methods and systems “for 

verifying and tracking identification information” in a secure system that, for one embodiment, “includes at least 

one of the following: a radio frequency (RF) identification 

device, an identification mechanism (e.g., a card, sticker), 

and an RF reader/writer.” See, e.g., ’044 patent, col. 1, lines 

39–45. An example is an RF device (corresponding to the 

claims “RFID transponder”) on an automobile, with identifying information embedded in the RFID device readable 

by an RFID reader. The important claim limitation for the 

asserted claims here involves exchanges of a “security key” 

between the RFID reader and transponder.

The claims of the ’044 patent now at issue are claims

13, 14, and 25. Claims 13 and 14 depend on claim 10, which 

reads:

10. A toll system, comprising:

a central database configured to:

store toll accounts,

receive identifiers related to toll accounts, and

compare the received identifiers to identifiers 

associated with the toll accounts to determine 

if a match exists;

an RFID reader comprising a radio and an antenna, the RFID reader configured to:

send a first communication to a RFID transponder that includes a memory the contents of 

which include an identifier,
4 NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC

send a second communication to the RFID 

transponder that includes a security key for 

validation by the RFID transponder,

receive at least the identifier included in the 

memory contents in response to the second 

communication and as a result of validation of 

the security key, and transmit the identifier to 

the central database.

Id., col. 23, lines 39–56. Claim 13 adds the limitation of an 

RFID reader sending a “third communication . . . that includes a second security key for validation by the RFID 

transponder and receive further memory contents in response to the third communication and as a result of validation of the second security key.” Id., col. 23, line 64,

through col. 24, line 4. Claim 14, which depends on claim 

13, further requires that “the second security key is based 

on information received from the RFID transponder.” Id., 

col. 24, lines 5–7. Claim 25 depends on claim 23, which 

recites the same series of communications and transfers of 

security keys but for an RFID transponder, not the “toll 

system” of claim 10. Id., col. 24, lines 37–50, 54–60.

The ’436 patent claims also include the same series of 

communications between the RFID reader and transponder. ’436 patent, col. 23, lines 13–43. Independent 

claim 1 recites:

1. A RFID reader, comprising:

a radio and an antenna; 

a processor coupled with the radio, the processor 

configured to:

send a first communication to a RFID transponder 

via the radio and the antenna that includes a 

memory the contents of which includes an identifier,
NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC 5

send a second communication to the RFID transponder via the radio and the antenna that includes a security key for validation by the RFID 

transponder,

receive at least the identifier included in the 

memory contents via the radio and the antenna in 

response to the second communication and as a result of validation of the security key, and

transmit the identifier to a central database;

wherein the processor is further configured to send 

a third communication to the RFID transponder 

via the radio and the antenna that includes a second security key for validation by the RFID transponder and receive via the radio and the antenna 

further memory contents in response to the third 

communication and as a result of validation of the 

second security key.

Id., col. 23, lines 13–34. Claims 2 and 4 depend directly on 

claim 1. Claim 2 adds the limitation that “the security key 

is based on information received from the RFID transponder.” Id., col. 23, lines 35–36. Claim 4 adds the limitation that “the second security key is based on information 

received from the RFID transponder.” Id., col. 23, lines 41–

43.

B

Neology filed a complaint with the Commission on December 4, 2015. The complaint alleged infringement of various claims of the ’044 and ’436 patents, as well as claims 

of another patent not at issue here. Neology accused Kapsch TrafficCom U.S. Corp., Kapsch TrafficCom IVHS Technologies Holding Corp., Kapsch TrafficCom IVHS Holding 

Corp., Kapsch TrafficCom IVHS, Inc., Kapsch TrafficCom 

Canada Inc., Kapsch TrafficCom Holding Corp., Star Systems International, Ltd., and STAR RFID Co., Ltd. (collectively, Kapsch) of importing infringing products. The 
6 NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC

Commission instituted an investigation on January 11, 

2016. After Neology terminated the investigation with respect to claims 3, 6–12, and 14–18 of the ’436 patent, what 

remained were claims 13, 14, and 25 of the ’044 patent and 

claims 1, 2, and 4 of the ’436 patent.

The administrative law judge concluded on June 22, 

2017, that the ’044 and ’436 patents are not entitled to the 

priority date of U.S. Patent Application No. 10/615,026, 

filed in 2003, because that application “does not provide 

written description support” for some of the key limitations 

of the at-issue claims of the ’044 and ’436 patents. The ALJ 

also found invalidity of the claims on several grounds, including the following: (a) claims 13, 14, and 25 of the ’044 

patent and claims 1, 2, and 4 of the ’446 patent are invalid 

for lack of written description; (b) claim 25 of the ’044 patent and claims 1, 2, and 4 of the ’436 patent are anticipated by Snodgrass; and (c) claims 13 and 14 of the ’044 

patent are invalid for obviousness over a combination of 

Snodgrass, U.S. Patent No. 5,819,234 (Slavin), and an article, “RFID for Road Tolling, Road-Use Pricing and Vehicle 

Access Control,” by Phil Blythe (Blythe).

Neology appealed to the full Commission, which issued 

its final decision on October 30, 2017. The Commission determined that the ALJ was correct that the two patents are 

not entitled to an earlier priority date, that the claims are 

invalid for lack of written description, and that the claims 

are invalid for anticipation by Snodgrass or obviousness

based on a combination of Snodgrass, Slavin, and Blythe. 

The Commission reversed certain other invalidity determinations made by the ALJ.

Neology filed a timely notice of appeal on December 22, 

2017. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6).

II

We review the Commission’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Rivera v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 857 F.3d 
NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC 7

1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Whether a claim is adequately 

supported by the written description is an issue of fact. 

GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Banner Pharmacaps, Inc., 744 

F.3d 725, 729 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We review “procedural and 

evidentiary determinations made by the Commission,” including “waiver” determinations, for abuse of discretion. 

Windbond Elecs. Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 262 F.3d 

1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

A

1

Contrary to Neology’s initial contention, Kapsch did 

not waive the argument that the claims are invalid for lack 

of written description. Both the ALJ and the Commission 

decided whether the claims at issue have adequate writtendescription support both in determining priority and in determining validity. See J.A. 38–45; J.A. 147–74. The Commission specifically held that Kapsch had not waived the 

direct invalidity challenge based on inadequate support in 

the written description. See J.A. 39–40. We see no error 

in that determination. In pre- and post-hearing briefs, 

Kapsch and the Commission’s Office of Unfair Import Investigations timely raised, and they and Neology all discussed, the issue of invalidity due to inadequate written 

description. J.A. 764; J.A. 937; J.A. 977; J.A. 1187; J.A. 

1188; J.A. 4770–71; J.A. 5135. There was no waiver.

2

When the investigation went to the Commission, on review of the ALJ decision, Neology argued that the specification and the 2012 claims themselves each provided 

adequate written description, but the Commission concluded that Neology had waived reliance on the 2012 

claims by not relying on those claims before the ALJ as a 

basis for written-description support. J.A. 42−43. We see 

no error in that conclusion. Neology’s briefing, even after 

the hearing, relied on the argument that the specification 
8 NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC

of the ’026 application (the 2003 application), which did not 

include the 2012 claims, provided the written-description 

support of the claims in the ’044 and ’436 patents, and it 

did not make an argument that the 2012 claims furnished 

the required written-description support. J.A. 4775 (“How 

a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would specifically understand that each challenged claim limitation is disclosed 

in the specification of the ’026 Application is described in 

even more detail below.”) (emphasis added); id. (“As further evidence that the specification of the ’026 Application

provides adequate written description for the asserted 

claims . . . .”) (emphasis added). It was not until after the 

Commission requested additional briefing that Neology 

raised the argument that the 2012 claims contained adequate disclosure to provide written-description support for 

the issued claims. J.A. 5570 (“For validity, the written-description analysis properly relies on the cumulative disclosure of the applications that became the ’044 and ’436 

patents—including the originally-filed claims [(the 2012 

claims)] in the asserted patents along with all prior applications incorporated by reference—to determine whether 

the asserted claims have adequate support.”) (second emphasis added); J.A. 5573 (“Therefore, unlike priority, the 

written-description analysis for invalidity in this case 

. . . also relies on the originally-filed claims of the applications [(the 2012 claims)] that led to the ’044 and ’436 patents . . . .”) (emphasis added).

In response to the Commission’s determination that 

Neology waived the argument that the 2012 claims provide 

written-description support, Neology points to one passage 

in the pre-hearing brief it submitted to the ALJ. There, 

previewing its evidence for written description, Neology 

stated that “[e]xcept for the claims, the as-filed specification of the ’026 Application is nearly identical to the respective applications that issued as the later member patents 

in the same family . . . .” J.A. 765. Neology argues that the 
NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC 9

quoted sentence differentiates between the claims in the 

’026 application and the 2012 claims and thereby preserves

the argument that the 2012 claims alone provide written 

description support for the issued claims. 

We disagree. We have recognized that claims can be 

self-describing. See, e.g., Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVEUSA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Ariad 

Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349–51

(Fed. Cir. 2010). On the other hand, genus claims, especially those that “use functional language to define the 

boundaries of a claimed genus,” are unlikely to provide an 

adequate written description so as to be self-describing. 

Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1349. Determining whether a 

particular claim is self-describing is not a cut-and-dried, 

simple matter, but would require more development—factual and legal—than the passing reference on which Neology now relies. We conclude that the Commission did not 

abuse its discretion in finding that Neology waived its argument that the asserted claims are supported by the 2012 

claims. We therefore affirm the Board’s conclusion that

Neology waived this argument. The written-description 

contention preserved before the ALJ and Commission, 

therefore, was simply whether support for the claims at issue can be found in the body of the written description 

without the 2012 claims—which is substantively the same 

as the 2003 written description.

B

A patent must “contain a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as 

to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use 

the same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1.1 We have long held that, 

 

1 Although the relevant wording has not changed, we 

cite the version of § 112 that pre-dated the amendments to 
10 NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC

for any given claim, “the description must ‘clearly allow 

persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the 

inventor] invented what is claimed.’” Ariad Pharm., 598 

F.3d at 1351 (quoting Vas–Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 

1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). As we have noted, the adequacy of support in the written description is a question 

of fact, and we review the Commission’s answer to that

question for substantial evidence. Rivera, 857 F.3d at 

1319; GlaxoSmithKline, 744 F.3d at 729.

The ALJ identified five limitations of the asserted 

claims that lacked adequate written description, a finding 

affirmed by the Commission. The five limitations are: “a 

second communication . . . that includes a security key”; 

transmission of an “identifier” from transponder memory 

“in response to the second communication” as a result of 

“validation” of the “security key”; a central database and 

toll system; a “third communication . . . that includes a second security key”; and a “security key is based on information received from the RFID transponder.” J.A. 24–25; 

J.A. 70. We find it unnecessary to discuss the third limitation. It suffices to discuss the other four limitations, for 

which the Commission’s findings of inadequate support 

largely rest on a shared basis.

The first limitation claims the transmission of a second 

communication containing a security key and is part of 

claims 13, 14, and 25 of the ’044 patent and claims 1, 2, and 

4 of the ’436 patent. It requires both the existence of a “security key” and the transmission of that same key. The 

specification mentions five types of keys: cryptographic, 

 

that section made by the Leahy-Smith America Invents 

Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). 

Those amendments do not apply to patents, like the ’044 

and ’436 patents, that issued from applications filed before 

September 16, 2012. Id., § 4(e), 125 Stat. 297.
NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC 11

security, credit and debit exchange, encryption, and exchange encrypted. The specification describes cryptographic keys as “check[ed] and validate[d]” by the “security 

management unit” and being “sent to the cryptographic 

block.” ’044 patent, col. 2, lines, 51–53. The “cryptographic 

block” also “stores the security keys.” Id., col. 2, lines 53–

54. Credit and debit exchange keys are disclosed as part of 

the “Optional Security Features” where identifying information is stored in “[h]ighly secure chips with a hardware 

programmable cryptographic block” that has the credit and 

debit exchange key. Id., col. 12, lines 7, 20–23. Encryption 

keys are disclosed in the same optional security features 

section and are needed to “initialize[]” equipment that interacts with the device storing identifying information. Id., 

col. 12, lines 28–31. Finally, the specification discloses a 

“hardware wired cryptographic block 2210 (with 4 exchange encrypted keys . . . ).” Id., col. 22, lines 18–19. 

Based on the disclosures in the specification and testimony from the experts, the Commission had substantial 

evidence to support its finding of insufficient written description. Despite disclosing several types of keys, the 

specification discloses only where they are stored and not 

whether they are exchanged. Experts for both Kapsch and 

Neology agreed that cryptographic and encryption keys, by 

their nature, are not exchanged. J.A. 2908–09; J.A. 3046. 

Dr. Gregory Durgin, Kapsch’s expert, testified that credit 

and debit exchange keys and exchange encrypted keys 

function like cryptographic keys, in that they are stored in 

the same cryptographic block, and are not exchanged, because cryptographic keys are not exchanged. J.A. 2433–34. 

He also testified that the credit and debit exchange and exchange encrypted keys are not exchanged because the specification “doesn’t involve those keys in any sort of RFID 

protocol.” J.A. 2433 The Commission could reasonably rely 

as well on the inventor’s own testimony that the keys disclosed in the specification are encryption keys, J.A. 1704–
12 NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC

07, which, as previously discussed, are not exchanged, even 

though he later clarified his testimony that two of the disclosed keys are the credit and debit exchange keys, id. And 

Jack Goldberg, Neology’s expert, originally testified that he 

simply did not know if the keys were exchanged, J.A. 3060–

61, which allowed the Commission not to credit—against 

other evidence—Mr. Goldberg’s later testimony that the 

credit and debit and exchange encrypted keys must be exchanged because of their names. We conclude that there is 

substantial evidence in the specification and the testimony 

to support the Commission’s finding that the specification 

does not adequately describe a second communication that 

includes a security key.

The Commission’s finding that there is no disclosure of 

a transmission of the security key supports the finding that 

three additional claim limitations are likewise inadequately supported. The second limitation requires the 

transmission of an “identifier” “in response to the second 

communication” as a result of “validation of the security 

key.” ’044 patent, col. 23, lines 53–56; ’436 patent, col. 23, 

lines 23–26. If there is no transmission of a security key,

there cannot be validation of such a key or transmission of 

an identifier in response to the second communication. 

Similarly, the fourth limitation requires a “third communication . . . that includes a second security key,” ’044 patent, 

col. 23, line 64 through col. 24, line 4; ’436 patent, col. 23, 

lines 27–29, so the finding that there is no disclosure of a 

second communication including a key means that there 

can be no third communication that includes a “second” one 

of that key. The fifth limitation, which requires the “security key”/“second security key” from the independent claim 

to be “based on information received from the RFID transponder,” ’044 patent, col. 24, lines 5–7; ’436 patent, col. 23, 

lines 34–35, 40–43, also is reasonably found unsupported 

in the absence of a disclosure of information exchanged between the transponder and the device. Additionally, Dr. 

Durgin testified that “there is no disclosure of an RFID 
NEOLOGY, INC. v. ITC 13

protocol or any specific step that would involve the security 

key, based on information from the RFID transponder.” 

J.A. 2449–53. Thus, the Commission had substantial evidence to find inadequate written-description support for 

limitations two, four, and five.

For those reasons, we affirm the Commission’s finding 

that the asserted claims lack sufficient written-description 

support. In view of that conclusion, we need not reach the 

issues of anticipation or obviousness.

III

The ruling of the Commission that the claims at issue 

are invalid is affirmed.

AFFIRMED