1

Filed 1/28/22 In re M.E. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re M.E. et al., Persons Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

E077620

(Super. Ct. Nos. J279266 &

 J283488)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,

Judge. Affirmed.

Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Steven O’Neill, Interim County Counsel, and Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

I.

INTRODUCTION

T.B. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights 

to two of her five children, three-year-old M.E. and two-year-old K.E. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code,1§ 366.26), and an order denying her section 388 petition.

2

 Mother contends the 

juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition without an 

evidentiary hearing. She also argues the court’s order finding the beneficial relationship

exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply should be reversed and 

the matter remanded because the court’s findings did not comply with the principles 

announced in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). We find no error and 

affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The family came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Children and 

Family Services (CFS) on December 31, 2018, after a referral was received alleging 

emotional abuse, caretaker absence/incapacity, and general neglect. Mother had been 

having “‘mood swings’” and threatening people with a knife. Father had taken then twomonth-old M.E., who was dressed only in a onesie, and placed her in the middle of a 

1

 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise stated. 

2

 J.E. (Father) is not a party to this appeal.
3

desert road in 30 degree weather. Father had choked and punched Mother. Mother had 

vandalized a taxi cab belonging to the maternal aunt’s boyfriend, causing $1,500 in 

damages. Both parents were intoxicated and taken into custody.3

M.E. was taken into protective custody, and on January 3, 2019, a petition was 

filed on behalf of M.E. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), 

(b) (failure to protect), and (g) (no provision for support). M.E. was formally detained 

and removed from parental custody the following day at the detention hearing. Mother 

was provided with visitation two times per week for two hours, and CFS was ordered to 

provide the parents with services pending the case plan. Mother had a history with 

mental illness. When she was taken into custody, she informed the officers that she was

schizophrenic and had many different personalities. She also made bizarre and suicidal 

statements, screamed, and inappropriately laughed while in the patrol unit. Mother 

acknowledged that she had a history with mental illness and noted that she was not 

currently seeing a psychiatrist. She also admitted the domestic violence incident 

perpetrated by Father, but noted that it was “‘the first time’” and that she intended to stay 

with Father because he supported her.

Father was not interested in participating in pre-dispositional services. Mother had 

begun participating in services and was attending Alcoholic Anonymous/Narcotics 

3

 Father was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, child endangerment, and 

making criminal threats. Mother was charged with vandalism.
4

Anonymous (AA/NA) and parenting classes. She had three negative drug test results, but 

was a no show for two dates.

The jurisdictional hearing was held on April 17, 2019. Neither Mother nor Father 

were present in court. The juvenile court found true all allegations in the petition except 

for the section 300, subdivision (g) allegations, which the court dismissed.

The contested dispositional hearing was held on June 11, 2019. Both parents were 

present. The juvenile court declared M.E. a dependent of the court, formally removed the 

child from parental custody, and provided the parents with reunification services and 

supervised visitation two times per week for two hours or one time a week for four hours. 

The court also ordered the parents to undergo a psychological evaluation, over the 

parents’ objections.

By the six-month review hearing, CFS recommended that reunification services 

continue for Mother and that services be terminated for Father. Mother had made good 

progress with her case plan, and claimed that she was currently not in a relationship with 

Father. She was employed and resided in a hotel, but was working on obtaining stable 

housing. She had completed a domestic violence program, eight sessions of anger 

management classes, four sessions of general counseling, and eight sessions of parenting 

education. However, Mother had approximately 12 “‘no shows’” for random drug 

testing. She also had not been attending AA/NA meetings, did not appear to be working 

on her 12-steps, and had not completed relapse prevention/aftercare classes. Father did 

not want to participate in services.
5

Mother’s psychological evaluation revealed that she had a history of mental 

illness, inconsistency in taking her prescribed medications, problems with anger 

management, history of substance use, and abuse since adolescence. The psychologist 

diagnosed Mother with “mood regulation difficulties, specifically Bipolar I Disorder,” in 

which she had periods of depressive and manic episodes. She was also diagnosed with 

“Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Alcohol Use Disorder, and AmphetamineType Substance Use Disorder, in sustained remission.” The psychologist concluded that 

Mother’s history of substance abuse and her failure to recognize it as a problem placed 

her at risk for relapse and that her substance abuse exacerbated her mood disorder and 

compromised her ability to manage anger. The psychologist recommended that Mother 

receive psychoeducation regarding her mental illness and to help manage her mood, 

referrals for medication consultation with a psychiatrist, and continued participation in 

individual counseling and substance abuse treatment, anger management, domestic 

violence, and parenting classes.

Mother regularly visited M.E. with no concerns. During visits, Mother engaged 

with M.E. in a loving and positive manner, played with the child, and actively attended to 

the child’s basic needs.

At the six-month review hearing on December 11, 2019, the juvenile court

continued Mother’s reunification services and terminated Father’s services.

Five days later, on December 16, 2019, CFS filed a petition on behalf of K.E. 

pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b), (g) and (j). Four days earlier, CFS had received 
6

a referral alleging general neglect after Mother had accidently revealed to a visitation 

monitor that she had given birth to a baby in November 2019. Mother reluctantly signed 

a declaration authorizing temporary detention of then one-month-old, K.E. She was 

emotional, denied hiding K.E. from CFS, and did not understand why K.E. had to be 

detained since she was doing “‘everything’” asked of her by CFS. Mother also stated that 

since CFS had never asked her about her pregnancy, “she did not feel the need to openly 

discuss it.” The social worker explained that Mother had missed multiple drug tests, 

which was a cause for concern. Mother was a “no show” for random drug testing on 

August 8, 2019, August 16, 2019, November 14, 2019, November 20, 2019, and 

December 9, 2019.

On December 17, 2019, K.E. was formally detained and placed in the same foster 

home with M.E. K.E. appeared safe and well cared for at the time of her removal. 

Mother had unsupervised visits with K.E. at the CFS office and was reported to be 

attentive to the child and properly engaged. While Mother had made progress on her 

reunification plan, she still had not completed a relapse prevention program and failed to 

consistently drug test. She also needed to complete a parenting program tailored to the 

age group of her children. In addition, despite not being in a relationship with Father, 

Mother had relied on Father financially to support her. Father was also present at K.E.’s 

birth. It also appeared that Mother had not been compliant with her psychotropic 

medication and she had not completed her individual counseling. CFS believed that 
7

Mother had not fully benefitted from the services provided to her, but noted that Mother 

was working diligently towards reunifying with both children.

CFS’s review of Mother’s child welfare history revealed that Mother had a son, 

J.W., who was in the care of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services (LA DCFS) from September 2015 through October 2017. Mother was offered 

reunification services through LA DCFS. Her services were eventually terminated and 

J.W. was placed with the maternal grandmother under legal guardianship. When CFS 

inquired about J.W., Mother stated that it was not CFS’s business to know about her son. 

CFS also discovered that Mother had another child in the state of Texas. When CFS 

inquired about this child, Mother reported the child was adopted.4

On December 2, 2020, Mother informed CFS that she was pregnant and due in 

March 2021. She claimed that she was receiving prenatal care and did not know the 

identity of the father.

On February 13, 2020, Mother submitted a waiver of rights form, and the parties 

participated in mediation. At mediation, CFS agreed to provide additional reunification 

services to Mother, and Mother agreed to complete counseling, parenting classes, 

domestic violence classes, and consistently drug test. Mother also agreed to attend 

4

 CFS later discovered that Mother had a prior dependency case in New Mexico 

involving J.W. and another child, Z. J.W. was with the maternal aunt when she was 

arrested for dealing methamphetamines. The children had been abandoned by Mother 

after she had been arrested and incarcerated in Texas and New Mexico. When J.W. was 

detained, he had an injured top lip, burn or scald marks on both his feet and numerous 

bruises or marks on his buttocks and on the back of both thighs. Mother failed to visit 

J.W. or to participate in reunification services.
8

psychiatric appointments and work with CFS in securing a shelter or transitional housing

as soon as possible.

On February 13, 2020, the juvenile court found the allegations in K.E.’s petition 

true except the section 300, subdivision (g) allegations, which were dismissed. The court 

declared K.E. a dependent of the court and provided Mother with reunification services 

and unsupervised visitation a minimum of one time a week for two hours.

Mother regularly participated in her services, but continued to struggle with 

consistently drug testing, remaining employed, and obtaining stable housing. CFS had 

provided Mother assistance with housing at Mama’s House in Palm Desert that provided 

housing, counseling, substance abuse treatment, employment assistance, and assistance in 

educational goals. Mother, however, declined this placement, stating “‘I’ll think on it, 

but look I got me this far, being where I am and I am positive I will continue to do it.’” 

Mother claimed she later called the director and was informed there were no longer any 

openings and to call back in three weeks.

CFS also helped Mother secure financial assistance from the welfare office and 

childcare. Mother wanted the children’s caregivers to provide childcare after 

reunification, but the caregivers were unable to do so. Father had been released from jail 

and was providing some financial support. Mother claimed that she had stabilized and 

was compliant with her psychotropic medication, but the social worker discovered her 

medication was untouched and had expired. Mother stated she did not need the 

medication. Mother was participating in counseling and parenting classes, but had not 
9

yet completed them. In addition, she had seven no-shows for random drug testing. 

Mother’s visits with the children, however, were consistent with no reported concerns 

noted.

By the June 2020 18-month review hearing in M.E.’s case, Mother was staying 

temporarily with the maternal aunt. CFS provided Mother with several housing resources 

however, Mother claimed that she did not receive a letter notifying her of the availability 

of an apartment. She also claimed to not receive a call back from another housing 

resource. She did not want to go to Mama’s House because it was a shelter and she had 

the financial means to find an alternative place. She was working at Stater Brothers and 

Burger King. Mother continued to insist she could obtain housing on her own, even after 

the social worker warned her the 18-month review hearing was approaching and she was 

running out of time. When the social worker followed up with Mother on July 24, 2020 

concerning housing, Mother informed the worker that she was no longer residing with the 

paternal aunt and was staying at different hotels each night. Mother stated that she had 

not pursued the housing resources CFS had provided. The social worker gave Mother 

another local resource that provided mental health services and housing. Mother had

missed three random drug tests during the reporting period; two conflicted with her work 

schedule and one because she forgot a mask. She had completed her parenting and anger 

management classes and was almost done with her counseling requirement. She had also 

been compliant with her psychotropic medication.
10

Mother continued to regularly visit the children. The caregivers had allowed 

Mother to have visits in their home rather than video visits due to the pandemic. During 

the visits, Mother began to ask the caregivers to change the children and to complete 

other tasks for her. In addition, Mother had Father drive her to a visit when the 

caretaker’s address was confidential. CFS thus requested the visits return to supervised 

visits.

On June 30, 2020, the juvenile court ordered the visits to return to supervised and 

continued the 18-month review hearing to October 7, 2020.

On August 13, 2020, the juvenile court continued Mother’s reunification services 

in K.E.’s case. Mother’s visits continued to be supervised one time a week for two hours, 

and she consistently visited the children. During the visits, Mother met the children’s 

needs. The only concern noted was Mother’s failure to bring activities for the children to 

engage in during the visits.

By October 2020, Mother had missed two drug tests in June 2020. She had been

laid off from her jobs and was receiving unemployment. Mother believed she may be 

pregnant again and had applied for pregnancy benefits. Mother’s counselor 

recommended six more counseling sessions to allow Mother to meet her goals. Mother 

was initially hesitant, believing she had met her case plan requirements, eventually 

agreed to participate in additional sessions.

At the October 7, 2020 18-month review hearing in M.E.’s case, the juvenile court 

terminated Mother’s reunification services. The court found that it was not in M.E.’s best 
11

interest to set a section 366.26 hearing at that time and ordered a permanent plan of foster 

care with return home. The court granted Mother reunification services under M.E.’s

permanent plan for a period not to exceed six months and provided Mother with 

supervised visitations once a week for two hours.

In February 2021, Mother gave birth to her fifth child, J.B.

5

 By March 2021, CFS 

recommended Mother’s reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing 

be set for K.E. and M.E. with a specific goal of adoption. Mother had received 14 

months of services for K.E. and 25 months of services for M.E. Nonetheless, Mother 

continued to deny any domestic violence issues with Father, failed to take any 

responsibility for the incidents that led to the children’s removal, and blamed CFS for 

K.E.’s removal. She reported that she was compliant with taking her psychotropic 

medication, even though she had not seen a psychiatrist in five months and complained of 

having days where she could not get out of bed. She would not disclose the prescriber of 

her medication or sign a release to allow CFS to confirm her claim that she was 

compliant with her medication. She also continued to have an unstable living situation. 

She refused to reside temporarily in a shelter or program referred to her by CFS, despite 

the program allowing Mother to reside there with her children, because it interfered with 

her lifestyle. Mother insisted thatshe could find housing on her own, but was alternating 

from living with family and friends to hotel rooms.

5

 Mother’s fifth child J.B. was detained and placed with her half-siblings, M.E. 

and K.E.
12

Mother’s visits had previously been ordered unsupervised, but reverted to 

supervised in June 2020 once the caregivers reported Mother was not overseeing the 

children’s basic needs. During visits, Mother fell asleep while the children played 

unattended and had to be woken up at the end of visits. She also sat on the floor and 

directed then two-year-old M.E. to throw away the diapers and clean up the food and 

toys. Mother, however, made efforts to engage with the children, did their hair, and 

played with them. She reported that she did not know why she had children so close in 

age as she could not manage three babies.

On March 9, 2021, the juvenile court granted the caregivers’ petitions for de facto 

parent status. The caregivers were also designated as the children’s educational rights 

holders. M.E. had been placed with the caregivers since December 12, 2019, and K.E. 

since May 27, 2020. Both children were very bonded and attached to the caregivers and 

looked to them to have their needs met. They also looked to their caregivers for comfort 

and care and were thriving in their caregivers’ home. The caregivers were meeting the 

children’s medical and developmental needs and desired to provide them with stability

and safety in a loving home. The children called their caregivers “dad” or “daddy.” The 

caregivers were willing to have Mother maintain a relationship with the children, if 

appropriate and in the children’s best interests.

On March 9, 2021, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s services under M.E.’s 

plan, ordered a permanent plan of adoption for M.E., and set a 366.26 hearing. The court 

also terminated Mother’s reunification services for K.E. and set a 366.26 hearing in 
13

K.E.’s case. The juvenile court explained it was not terminating Mother’s services 

because of her housing difficulties, but due to her failure to benefit from the services 

provided to her.

On August 5, 2021, the same day as the section 366.26 hearing, Mother filed a 

section 388 petition, seeking a return of the children to her custody, or in the alternative,

reinstatement of reunification services. As a change of circumstances, Mother alleged 

that she had completed parenting classes, a domestic violence program and anger 

management classes, had attended AA/NA meetings, and had obtained stable housing. In 

support, she attached certificates of competition and a copy of a lease. Mother claimed it 

was in the children’s best interest to be raised by their biological mother.

On August 9, 2021, CFS informed the court that Mother continued to be reliant on 

the eldest child M.E. during visits. While she remained seated, Mother had directed M.E. 

to pick up food and water bottles during visits. She had also directed M.E. to assist her 

with the younger children. Although Mother played music for the children and sang with 

them, her interaction with the children was minimal. Mother tended to remain seated in 

one spot during visits. The children had been observed to regress during visits with 

Mother, and when their caregiver arrived, the children eagerly ran to their caregiver to 

leave. Mother had reported to the visitation monitor that she heard voices when off her 

medication, but that when she took her medication, she was sleepy. She had also stated 

that if she had a choice, she would not have had the children and would chose M.E. over 

the other children because M.E. was more bonded to her. In addition, despite not having 
14

a driver’s license, Mother drove to her visits. CFS was concerned whether Mother would 

be able to meet the children’s needs if she reunified with the children. CFS worried that 

Mother still struggled with her mental health and aggression, as well as the children’s 

lack of bond to Mother.

On August 11, 2021, the juvenile court denied Mother’s section 388 petition. The

court found the request did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances and that

it was not in the children’s best interests. The court thereafter proceeded to the contested 

section 366.26 hearing in K.E. and M.E.’s cases.

At the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, citing Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 

614, the juvenile court found that although Mother had consistently visited the children, 

Mother had not developed a significant bond or relationship to the children such that the 

severance of that relationship would be detrimental to the children. The court concluded

that the children were not bonded to Mother, but to their caregivers as their parental 

figures, and that the parental relationship between Mother and the children was incidental 

and not significant. The court also determined that the benefits of maintaining a parentchild relationship were not outweighed by the benefits of adoption. The court thus found 

the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply, terminated 

parental rights, and concluded the children were adoptable. Mother timely appealed.
15

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Denial of Section 388 Petition

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 

388 petition seeking return of the children to her care, or alternatively, reinstatement of 

services and increased visitation without an evidentiary hearing. Mother argues she made 

the requisite prima facie showing entitling her to a hearing. We disagree.

We review the juvenile court’s denial of Mother’s section 388 petition without an 

evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. (In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 

1079.) The denial must be upheld unless we can determine from the record that the 

juvenile court’s decision exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences 

can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we have no authority to substitute our decision 

for that of the juvenile court. (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.)

A petition to modify a juvenile court order under section 388 must allege facts 

showing new evidence or changed circumstances exist and that changing the order will 

serve the child’s best interests. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1)-(2); In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 

1217, 1235.) Courts must liberally construe a section 388 petition in favor of its 

sufficiency. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) However, section 388 

requires a petitioner to make a prima facie showing of both elements to trigger an 

evidentiary hearing. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) If, for instance, 

the parent makes a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, the juvenile court can 
16

still deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing if the parent fails to make a prima 

facie showing that the relief sought would promote the child’s best interests. (In re 

Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-190; see In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 

Cal.App.5th 469, 478; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 322-323.)

“‘A “prima facie” showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable 

decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is 

credited.’” (In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, 418.) Consequently, section 

388 petitions with general, conclusory allegations do not suffice. Otherwise, “the 

decision to grant a hearing on a section 388 petition would be nothing more than a 

pointless formality.” (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) “In 

determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider 

the entire factual and procedural history of the case.” (In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 

Cal.App.4th 247, 258.)

Here, Mother’s section 388 petition stated that she had completed a parenting 

program, a domestic violence program, and anger management classes and that she had 

attended AA/NA meetings and obtained stable housing. She claimed it was in the 

children’s best interest to be raised by their biological mother. The petition failed to 

explain why return of the children to her care or reinstatement of reunification services 

would be in the best interest of the children. This failure was fatal to Mother’s claim 

under section 388. The petition must show how a change of order would be in the best 

interest of the children. Moreover, as multiple Courts of Appeal have recognized, 
17

completion of programs at a late stage in proceedings, while commendable, is not a 

substantial change of circumstances within the meaning of section 388. (In re Ernesto R.

(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223; In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358 

[completion of classes and participation in counseling not enough to show changed 

circumstances where father still unable to “provide the children a stable, safe, permanent 

placement”].) Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying 

Mother’s section 388 petition.

Parent and child share a fundamental interest in reuniting up to the point at which 

reunification efforts cease. (In re R.H. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 678, 697, overruled on 

other grounds in John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 99, fn. 2.) By the time of a 

section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a child’s permanent plan, however, the 

interests of the parent and the child have diverged. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 

5 Cal.4th 242, 254.) Therefore, after reunification efforts have terminated, the court’s 

focus shifts from family reunification toward promoting the child’s needs for permanency 

and stability. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) In fact, there is a rebuttable 

presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. (Id. at p. 310.) 

“A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must 

recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best 

interests of the child.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)

Here, the evidence established that the children had spent most of their young lives 

with their caregivers. M.E. had been placed with the caregivers when she was a year old, 
18

since December 12, 2019, and K.E. when she was six months old, since May 27, 2020. 

Both children were very bonded and attached to the caregivers and looked to them for 

comfort and to have their needs met. They were thriving in their caregivers’ home, and 

the caregivers, who desired to adopt them, were meeting the children’s needs. 

Meanwhile, there was no evidence to suggest the children were bonded to Mother or that 

Mother had benefitted from the services provided. She continued to live an unstable 

lifestyle, questioned why she had the children, minimized her mental health issues, 

acknowledged that she had no bond with the younger children, and was reliant on M.E. 

and the caregivers during visits.

Our role as a reviewing court is to assess whether the court below committed error 

based on the record before it, and we do not reweigh evidence or rely on evidence that 

was not in the court’s record at the time it made its order. (In re James V. (1979) 90 

Cal.App.3d 300, 304.) Based on the record before the juvenile court, we find the court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition without an evidentiary 

hearing.

B. Beneficial Relationship Exception

Mother contends the juvenile court’s order finding the beneficial relationship 

exception to adoption did not apply should be reversed and the matter remanded because 

the court’s findings did not comply with the principles articulated in Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th 614.
19

Section 366.26 governs the proceedings at which the juvenile court must select a 

permanent placement for a dependent child. The express purpose of a section 366.26 

hearing is “to provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, 

subd. (b).) If the court determines it is likely the child will be adopted, the statute 

mandates termination of parental rights unless the parent opposing termination can 

demonstrate that one of the statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & 

(B).) In other words, the court must select adoption as the permanent plan unless “the 

parent shows that termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one 

specifically enumerated reason.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630.) The 

exceptions allow “‘the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option 

other than the norm, which remains adoption.’” (Id. at p. 631, quoting In re Celine R.

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)

Mother contends the exception found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), 

i.e. the beneficial relationship exception, applied in her case. Recently, in Caden C., our 

Supreme Court explained, for this exception to apply, a parent is required to show “(1) 

regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would 

benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to 

the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) “The first element—regular 

visitation and contact—is straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit 

consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’” (Id. at p. 632.) 

“As to the second element, courts assess whether ‘the child would benefit from 
20

continuing the relationship.’ [Citation.] Again here, the focus is the child. And the 

relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the 

portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect 

of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Ibid., quoting 

In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.).) “Concerning the third 

element—whether ‘termination would be detrimental to the child due to’ the 

relationship—the court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the 

relationship and choose adoption.” (Caden C., supra, at p. 633.)

The Supreme Court’s decision in Caden C. focuses primarily on the third element. 

The court rejected reliance on whether the parents have complied with their reunification 

services or case plan and explained, “Because terminating parental rights eliminates any 

legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must assume that 

terminating parental rights terminates the relationship. [Citations.] What courts need to 

determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing the parental 

relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without 

the parent in the child’s life. [Citation.] . . . [T]he effects might include emotional 

instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, 

anxiety, or depression [or] . . . a new, stable home may alleviate the emotional instability 

and preoccupation leading to such problems, providing a new source of stability that 

could make the loss of a parent not, at least on balance, detrimental. [¶] In each case, 

then, the court acts in the child’s best interest in a specific way: it decides whether the 
21

harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a 

new family would confer.’ [Citation.] ‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship 

would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’ even 

considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[]’ the child, 

the court should not terminate parental rights.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633, 

quoting Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)

The parent must show that his or her relationship with the child “promotes the 

well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would 

gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 

Cal.App.4th at p. 575, italics added; accord, Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [When 

“assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial court must decide whether 

the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to 

the child of placement in a new adoptive home.”].) “A showing the child derives some 

benefit from the relationship is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory 

preference for adoption.” (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646, disapproved 

on another ground in Caden C., supra, at pp. 637, fn. 6., 638, fn. 7.) “A parent must 

show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits.” (In re C.F. (2011) 193 

Cal.App.4th 549, 555.)

We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has maintained 

regular visitation and contact with the child and the existence of a beneficial parental 

relationship for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) We 
22

review the third step—whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the 

child due to the child’s relationship with his or her parent—for abuse of discretion. (Id. 

at p. 640.) We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or 

resolve evidentiary conflicts. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)

Here, the juvenile court found that Mother had met the first element of regular or 

consistent contact with the children. Substantial evidence in the record supports that 

Mother maintained regular visitation and contact with the children. The court then 

addressed the second element and impliedly the third element, noting Mother had not met 

these elements.

The court explained as follows: “The first prong by mom is met, not really by 

dad. The second prong hasn’t been met by them. At this issue with the Cayden [sic] C. 

language where it appears that we’re carving out something that is different than 

occupying a parental role, because it’s possible to have a significant relationship, a 

parental bond with the child while not occupying that role. That’s kind of the way I read 

that case anyway. Maybe I’m wrong, but it seems like they’re trying to make a 

distinction, that, hey, wait a second, maybe we don’t necessarily have to prove a parental 

role, but we have to prove a significant relationship or something like that, a significant 

bond. [¶] But in either case, here . . . in this case, we only have – it is a distinguished 

role because I only have evidence of Mother’s perception of the relationship. Clearly all 

of the evidence sort of stands, as you pointed out, that the children are clearly strongly 

bonded to their caregivers as their parental figures as evidenced by reactions and things 
23

like that. Even, I think, as testified to by mom so clearly, I don’t find that there is a 

significant relationship or bond there. There is an incidental bond for sure, and I don’t 

know the specular of qualification between incidental to significant wherein having a 

parent that visits and they know that’s their parent, where does that fit, but that’s where 

this is. [¶] This isn’t significant. It is definitely incidental. There is some benefit. It 

could be beyond incidental. I’m not sure, frankly, but I think this is part of that whole 

sliding scale that we’re just kind of looking at, but it’s not even close to significant to 

raise a point that would satisfy this proposed new prong that we’re talking about. And 

also there is no parental role fulfilled, so . . . I understand that we’re kind of getting away 

from that language of parental role. I understand we’re kind of looking beyond. I’m just 

kind of talking about both things. In any event, neither is satisfied.”

While the juvenile court did not artfully explain its reasoning of the principles 

announced in Caden C., we disagree with Mother that the court did not comply with the 

principles articulated in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614 or that the matter must be 

remanded. Assuming for the sake of argument that the children would benefit from 

continuing their relationship with Mother, the issue is whether the children shared such a 

“substantial, positive attachment” to Mother that the harm in severing the parental 

relationship would “outweigh[ ] ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family 

would confer.’” (Caden C., supra, at pp. 636, 633.) The juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion by determining that any benefits derived from the children’s relationship with 

Mother did not outweigh the benefit of stability through adoption. Under the balancing 
24

test set forth in Autumn H. and approved by in Caden C., we conclude the juvenile court 

acted within its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights.

It was undisputed Mother loved the children and had generally positive visits with 

them. The record also shows that the children enjoyed their visits with Mother. But, as 

previously noted, “[a] parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or 

pleasant visits.” (In re C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 555.) There was no evidence 

that the relationship was so significant as to outweigh the security and stability of an 

adoptive home. (Cf. Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634 [“When the relationship 

with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new home 

wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the 

child’s beneficial relationship with a parent”]; id. at p. 635 [when a child has “‘very 

strong ties’” with a parent and termination of parental rights “‘is likely to be harmful to 

the child, courts should retain parental ties if desired by both the parents and the child’”].) 

Although the children presumably loved Mother and enjoyed their visits with her, there 

was substantial evidence that the children were bonded to their caregivers, whom they 

considered parental figures. This is especially likely considering M.E. had been placed 

with the caregivers since age one, and K.E. since age six months, and had been in their 

caregivers’ home for most of their young lives.

The relationship Mother enjoyed with the children during their visits is not 

sufficient to demonstrate that Mother and the children shared such a substantial, positive 

emotional attachment that terminating Mother’s parental rights would greatly harm the 
25

children. The extent of Mother’s influence over the children was necessarily limited; the 

record supports that the caregivers acted as primary influential parental figures in the 

minds of these young children. They did not look to Mother to attend to their physical, 

developmental, emotional, and other daily needs. (Cf. Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 575 [positive emotional attachment results from an adult’s attention to a child’s 

needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation, typically 

arising from day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences].)

Further, the record supports that the children’s well-being would greatly improve 

when permanently adopted by fully attentive parents. Since being placed with their 

caregivers, the children were thriving due to excellent care by their caregivers. (Cf. 

Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633 [losing the parental relationship might result in 

“emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school, 

insomnia, anxiety, or depression”].) Perhaps most importantly, adoption would bring the 

children stability and permanency.

Mother also did not present any evidence that the children would be greatly 

harmed by severance of the parental relationship, or that the security and stability of a 

new home would not outweigh the loss of that relationship. There was no evidence that 

terminating Mother’s parental rights would be detrimental to the children. Mother did 

not, for example, offer a bonding study or other evidence showing that termination of 

parental rights would have a significant detrimental effect on the children’s lives. In fact, 

the social worker reported that the children digressed during visits with Mother.
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The record fails to show that Mother’s relationship with the children was so 

beneficial to them that it outweighed the benefit they would gain from being adopted. 

(Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 

633-634, 636.) Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in finding that the beneficial 

relationship exception does not apply in this case.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

FIELDS

J.