NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A

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CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY PLH

- 00 13397, as subrogee of Laura Lindsey, Plaintiff,

v. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS , Defendant

- Respondent

.

___________ ____________________ ___ HOMESITE INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of Rose D un, Plaintiff,

v. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS, Defendant

- Respondent.

__________________________________ RONALD SLEET and JUANITA SLEET, Plaintiffs

- Appellants, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
June 17 , 2019 APPELLATE DIVISION2 A

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v. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS, Defendant

- Respondent.

_______________________________ LAURA LINDSEY, Plaint i ff

- Appellant,

v. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS, Defendant

- Respondent.

________________________________ LAUREN LINDSEY, Plaint i ff

- Appellant,

v. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS, Defendant

- Respondent.

__ _______________________________ HOMESITE INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of Irwin Author, Plaintiff,

v.3 A

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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS, Defendant/Third

- Party Plaintiff

- Respondent,

v. DAVEY TREE EXPERT COMPANY, Third

- Party Defendant

.

_____________________________

Argued June 4 , 2019

– Decided June 17 , 2019 Before Judges Fisher , Suter, and Enright. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No s . L

- 2040

- 14 , L

- 2041

- 14, L

- 2402

- 14, L

- 2405

- 14, L

- 1918

- 15 and L

0752

- 16. Robert F. Rupinski argued the cause for appellant s . Robert T. Gunning argued the cause for respondent ( Morrison Mahoney LLP, attorneys; Robert T. Gunning , on the brief). The opinion of the court was delivered by FISHER, P.J.A.D. In this appeal, we examine the scope of available damages when a defendant's negligence has caused a homeowner to be displaced ; that is, we consider whether a home owner's damages are limited to the cost of alternate4 A

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shelter or whether the homeowner may also seek additional damages based on a broader concept of inconv enience. In adhering to the legal concepts expressed
in Camaraza v. Bellavia Buick Corp. , 216 N.J. Super. 263, 265 (App. Div. 1987), where we held a motor vehicle owner's damages were not necessarily limited to the rent al cost of a replacement , and in exp anding Camaraza to claims other than those involving the loss of use of a motor vehicle, we reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of the defense and remand for trial. In February 2014, a winter storm caused a high

- voltage powe r line in Willingboro belonging to def endant Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) to fall and ignite fires in plaintiffs' homes ; they were displaced from their homes for ten months

. Plaintiffs filed this action against PSE&G . Their homeowners insurance carriers reimbursed p laintiffs for the repair costs and the incidental expens es generated by their extended stay s in mo tels during their displacement, but their suits also sought damages for the loss of use of their home s , as well as emotional distress, and persona l injuries. 1

1 Plaintiffs consented to a dismissal of all but the loss of use claim on the motion's return date.5 A

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In managing the case, the trial judge bifurcated the issues and first considered PSE&G's liability. In January 2018, a jury fo und PSE&G liable for the occurrence

. A month later , PSE&G moved for summary judgment , arguing plaintiffs were un damaged beyond the compensation provided by their insurers. The motion judge agreed and entered judgment for PSE&G

. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing the judge erred in concluding they were no t entitled to dama ges for the loss of use of their proper ty or their inconvenience

. We agree plaintiffs were entitled to further pursue the se claims and, therefore, reverse

. The error that led to the summary judgment under review arises from the judge's misapprehension of our holding in Camaraza , where the plaintiff's vehicle was stolen while be ing repaired by the d efendant. Ibid. W e recognized that the plaintiff, who chose not to rent a substitute vehicle, could pursue a claim for his inconvenience, which would include damages not only for the loss of the vehicle's use during the reas onable time needed for repairs, s ee also Graves v. Balt

. & N.Y. Ry. Co. , 76 N.J.L. 362, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1908) , but also for the owner's exclusion from "normal recreational pursuits or [diminish ed] enjoyment of those pursuits " proximately caused by the defend ant

. Camaraza , 216 N.J. Super. at 267. P roperty owners , we recognized , may be damaged by more than just repair costs when unable to make use of their property. And , so, w e took a broader6 A

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view than some other jurisdictions, concluding that "t he degree of inconvenience for loss of use of an automobile will vary depending upon the individual circumstances of the plaintiff " ; the trier of fact , we said, " should be permitted to consider the individual circumstances of a plaintiff in determining los s of use damages. " Id. at 268. W hile holding that the rental value of unavailable property is admissible and is a considerable aid in quantifying the loss of use ,

see Jones v. Lahn , 1 N.J. 358, 362 (1949), that evidence is not conclusive; a property owne r may also pursue damages that exceed the mere rental value of the vehicle during its unavailability

. See also MCI WorldCom Network Servs. v. Glendale Excavation Corp. , 224 F. Supp. 2d 875 , 880

- 81 (D.N.J. 2002)

. So , in adhering to Camaraza and extending i ts holding to homeowners, we conclude that t he mere fact that plai ntiffs were provided motel rooms and reimbursed meal and transportation costs by their in surance carriers did not foreclose their right to seek other damages resulting from the loss of the use of their homes or any other reasonable damages caused by the inconvenience.
D amages in such circumstances " are not limited to pecuniary losses which are capable of precise measurement. " Camaraza , 216 N.J. Super. at 266. 2

2 Muise v. GPU, Inc. , 371 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 2004), on which PSE&G greatl y relies, is inapposite and should not be understood as undercutting7 A

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We also reject PSE&G 's argument that pla intiffs' inconvenience claims were not adequately supported. P laintiff s elaborated on the impact of displacement at their depositions. The Lindseys , for example, testified they had
to move on multiple occasions due to insurance issues ; t heir inconvenience included the moving of oxygen tanks for the seventy

- eight

- year - old Laura Lindsey , who suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

. The family

was motel

- bound over the Thanksgiving holiday . A nd Laura Lindsey was without personal items of se ntimental value to her in her last days ; she died prior to trial. Lauren Lindsey , Laura's daughter, had to share a motel room with her fiancé and seven - year - old son, and she prematurely gave birth to another child during the time of displacement, genera ting further inconvenience during the infant 's lengthy hospitalization. The Sleets desc ribed how they were stuck depending on fast

- food chains for most meal s because their motel lacked a full

- service kitchen

. Juanita Sleet attempted to replicate their prior existence and bou ght severa l kitchen

Camar a za . To the contrary, w e there held

– in affirming an order that decertified a class action

– that damages based on class members' loss of us e or inconvenience because of a power outage were "dependent . . . on their individual circumstances ." Id. at 63

- 64. That ruling reinforces the notion

– underlying Camaraza

– that damages based on loss of use or inconvenience are largely unique to the pl aintiff and ultimately turn on the factfinder's view of each plaintiff's circumstances.8 A

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appliances to make som e meals in the motel; she claimed it wasn't the same

. And, because she was displaced, Juanita could not have her mother, then residing in a nursing home, visit her residence ; her mother died before the Sleets were able to return to their home. Ronald Sleet alleged his sleep was affected; he claimed the motel bed was not the same quality as his at h ome, and the sounds of trucks, kids running in hall way s, and motel doors slamm ing at all hours

– compared to his peaceful home on a cul

- de

- sac

– disrupted his normal routine. All p laintiffs claimed the y expended time and incurred additional expenses

un covered by insurance when periodically traveling to check on their homes

. Of cour se, PS&G rem ains free to argue that some or all of these damages
may represent " more than fair indemnity " or may be " so extravagant " as to

" outrun the bounds of reaso n . " Brooklyn E

. Dist. Terminal v. United States , 287
U.S. 170 , 176 (1932). We recognize only the applicability of these principles to the matter at hand ; we express n o view on the compensability of plaintiffs' damage claims. T hat's for a jury to decide. The order o f summary judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for tria l. We do not retain jurisdiction.