SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3203-17T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

REGGIE T. HUGGINS, 

a/k/a NASHEED HENTON, 

REGGIE HIGGINS, and

JAMAL MUHAMMAD,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted December 18, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Haas and Enright.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 14-08-1998.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Michele A. Adubato, Designated Counsel, 

on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Sarah C. Hunt, Deputy Attorney General, 

of counsel and on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 26, 2019
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PER CURIAM

Defendant Reggie T. Huggins appeals from the October 14, 2016 denial 

of his request for a hearing consistent with Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 

(1978), and the January 12, 2017 denial of his suppression motion. We affirm

both rulings, substantially for the reasons outlined by Judge James M. Blaney in 

his thoughtful and thorough opinions. We add only a few additional comments

to lend context to the instant appeal.

In the fall of 2013, the police requested and obtained a warrant to search 

defendant's vehicle and his home in Toms River. In defendant's home, they

found approximately 1250 wax folds of heroin, 2 bottles containing suspected 

methadone, a digital scale, approximately $12,958 from a safe, a silver Cobra 

Arms .38-caliber handgun with a defaced serial number, a box of Winchester 

.38-caliber automatic ammunition, a women's sweatshirt containing 31 folds of 

heroin, and 11 wax folds.

Prior to resolving his case, defendant argued that the affidavit leading to 

the issuance of the search warrant contained false and misleading statements. 

Accordingly, he claimed he was entitled to a Franks hearing, and that probable 

cause did not exist for the issuance of the search warrant. Judge Blaney rejected 

these arguments. Thereafter, defendant pled guilty to second-degree possession 
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with intent to distribute heroin, and second-degree possession of a firearm by a 

certain person not to have weapons. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2); N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

7(a).

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

POINT I

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO DENY 

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A FRANKS

HEARING CONCERNING THE SEARCH 

WARRANT ISSUED FOR THE PREMISES.

POINT II

BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT SHOWING 

OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE 

ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT, THE 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD 

HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

As to Point I, we review the trial court's decision regarding the need for 

an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. State v. Broom-Smith, 406 

N.J. Super. 228, 239 (App. Div. 2009). We discern none here.

A defendant challenging the veracity of a search warrant affidavit is 

entitled to a Franks hearing only if the defendant makes "a substantial 

preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with 

reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant 
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affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of 

probable cause . . . ." Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.

In making a "substantial preliminary showing," a defendant "must allege 

'deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth,' pointing out with 

specificity the portions of the warrant that are claimed to be untrue." State v. 

Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 567 (1979). These allegations should be supported by 

affidavits or other reliable statements; "[a]llegations of negligence or innocent 

mistake are insufficient." Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. at 240-41 (quoting 

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). A defendant must show that absent the alleged false 

statements, the search warrant lacks sufficient facts to establish probable cause. 

Howery, 80 N.J. at 568. Further, the allegations "must be proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence." Ibid. Finally, if there remains sufficient 

content in the warrant application to support a finding of probable cause when 

the allegedly false material is set aside, a Franks hearing is not required. Franks, 

438 U.S. at 171-72.

Here, defendant alleged the search warrant affiant falsely claimed the 

reliability of a confidential informant (C.I.) who had worked with police was set 

forth in the affidavit. Defendant also insisted the affiant falsely stated money 

given to the C.I. for a controlled buy was "previously recorded." Judge Blaney 
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carefully considered these allegations and directed the State to provide 

additional documents to the court for an in camera review. The documents 

inspected by the judge included: a United States Currency Seizure Report 

showing that $12,958 was recovered during the search, from which one $100

bill was returned to a local police department's confidential funds; a Confidential 

Fund Purchase Report, detailing the funds provided to the police; proof that the 

Toms River and Brick Township police departments provided surveillance over 

a controlled buy between the C.I. and defendant, after defendant became the 

target of an investigation; a photograph of the funds provided during the 

controlled buy; and a photograph of two pages of the Brick Township Police 

Department Drug Ledger, showing the confidential funds being withdrawn for 

use and $100 being placed back into the account after the execution of the search 

warrant.

After reviewing these documents, Judge Blaney concluded in his ninepage October 14, 2016 written opinion:

[b]ased on a review of the briefs, arguments, the 

[a]ffidavit and search warrant, as well as the additional 

documents submitted by the prosecutor, the [c]ourt 

finds no basis for the defense's claim that the State 

engaged in making any false statements in the 

[a]ffidavit provided to [the search warrant judge.]
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The judge added, the "prosecution in this case felt compelled to not 

provide certain documents [to defendant] for fear . . . [he] would be able to 

determine the identity of the confidential informant. The documents that have 

been provided to the [c]ourt to review in camera explain those alleged 

omissions." The judge's opinion also referenced the affiant's extensive training 

and experience, the affiant's contact with a concerned citizen who advised him 

defendant was distributing illicit drugs from his home, and the steps taken to 

coordinate a controlled buy between defendant and the C.I. Judge Blaney noted 

that the affiant confirmed the C.I. exchanged recorded funds of one hundred 

dollars for a quantity of heroin, and a subsequent field test showed the substance 

tested positive for heroin. After his extensive review of the factual and 

procedural history of this matter, Judge Blaney concluded defendant failed to 

prove the State made false statements in the search warrant affidavit to obtain 

the search warrant.

Based on our deferential standard of review, we are satisfied Judge Blaney 

properly found defendant failed to satisfy the "substantial preliminary showing" 

requirement. Accordingly, a Franks hearing was unnecessary.
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In Point II, defendant argues the trial judge erred in finding probable cause 

existed for the issuance of the search warrant and mistakenly denied his motion 

to suppress. We disagree.

Ordinarily, we "must uphold a trial court's factual findings at a motion-tosuppress hearing when they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the 

record." State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 467 (2015) (citing State v. Elders, 

192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). We owe no such deference, however, to the court's 

interpretation of the law. Ibid. Whether a search warrant was supported by 

adequate probable cause is a question of law, which we review de novo. See 

State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44-45 (2011).

"Probable cause is a flexible, nontechnical concept" requiring the 

balancing of "the governmental need for enforcement of the criminal law against 

the citizens' constitutionally protected right of privacy." State v. Kasabucki, 52 

N.J. 110, 116 (1968). Generally, probable cause is understood to mean "less 

than legal evidence necessary to convict though more than mere naked 

suspicion." State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 210-11 (2001) (citation omitted). 

"When determining whether probable cause exists, courts must consider the 

totality of the circumstances, and they must deal with probabilities." Schneider 
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v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 (2001) (citing

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 238 (1983)).

Information related by informants may constitute a basis for probable 

cause, provided that a substantial basis for crediting that information is 

presented. Sullivan, 169 N.J. at 212; State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 92, cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1998). "When examining an informant's tip . . . the 

issuing court must consider the 'veracity and basis of knowledge' of the 

informant as part of its 'totality' analysis." State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 389 

(2004) (quoting State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 123 (1987)). If there is a 

deficiency in one of those factors, it may be compensated for by a "strong 

showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability." State v. Zutic, 

155 N.J. 103, 111 (1998). Even "if the informant's tip fails to demonstrate 

sufficient veracity or basis of knowledge, a search warrant issued on the basis 

of the tip may still pass muster if other facts included in a supporting [police] 

affidavit justify a finding of probable cause." Jones, 179 N.J. at 390 (alteration 

in original).

"[R]elevant corroborating facts may include a controlled drug buy 

performed on the basis of the tip, positive test results of the drugs obtained . . . 

the suspect's criminal history, and the experience of the officer who submitted 
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the supporting affidavit." Id. at 390-91. While no one corroborating fact

conclusively establishes probable cause, a successful controlled buy "'typically 

will be persuasive evidence in establishing probable cause.'" State v. Keyes, 

184 N.J. 541, 556 (2005) (quoting Jones, 179 N.J. at 390) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, if the police have conducted a successful controlled buy, our Supreme 

Court has found "even one additional circumstance might suffice, in the totality 

of the circumstances, to demonstrate probable cause." Jones, 179 N.J. at 390.

Here, Judge Blaney set forth a number of facts which established probable 

cause, including the C.I. positively identifying defendant as someone who was 

distributing heroin, the use of the C.I. to conduct a controlled buy while under 

police surveillance, and the field test results of the heroin purchased during the 

controlled buy.

"[A] search executed pursuant to a warrant is presumed to be valid and [] 

a defendant challenging its validity has the burden to prove 'that there was no 

probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant or that the search was 

otherwise unreasonable.'" Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004) (quoting State v. 

Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133 (1983)). "[Appellate courts] accord substantial 

deference to the discretionary determination resulting in the issuance of the 

[search] warrant." State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 72 (1991) superseded by statute
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on other grounds, comment 7 on N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 (2007). If there is doubt as 

to the validity of the warrant, such doubt should "ordinarily be resolved by 

sustaining the search." Kasabucki, 52 N.J. at 116.

There is ample support for Judge Blaney finding probable cause existed 

for the issuance of the search warrant and that defendant failed to satisfy his 

burden in proving the search warrant was improvidently issued. Accordingly, 

there is no basis to disturb Judge Blaney's denial of defendant's motion to 

suppress.

Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit for discussion in 

this opinion. Rule 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.