COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Be nton, Humphreys, and Senior Judge Overton

ELIZABETH R. McLEAN AND SUSAN POLLACK, AS GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR OF EL IZABETH R. McLEAN MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2908-03-4 PER CURAIM APRIL 6, 2004 JOHN HULL McLEAN, III

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY R. Terrence Ney, Judge (Sandra L. Havrilak; Thomas P. Sotelo; The Havr ilak Law Firm, P.C., on brief), for appellants. (Carol L. Ehlenberger; Paula A. Niederman; Crai g & Hirsch, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Elizabeth R. McLean (wife) an d Susan Pollack, as wi fe’s guardian and conservator, appeal the October 23, 2003 final d ecree awarding John Hull Mc Lean, III (husband) a divorce, incorporating the parties’ spousal support and separation agreements, and requiring each party to be responsible for his or her attorney ’s fees and cost s. Wife contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying her an award of attorney’s fees and costs. She also asks that she be awarded fees and costs in connect ion with this appeal. Husband also seeks attorney’s fees incurred in connection with this appeal . Upon reviewing the record and briefs , we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accord ingly, we summarily af firm the decision of the trial court, see Rule 5A:27, and we deny the requests for a ttorney fees for this appeal.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.Background Husband and wife m a rried on June 17, 1972. One child was born of the m a rriage - - an

em ancipated son. On January 19, 1999, husband pe titioned the circuit co urt to be appointed wife’s guardian and conservator. The cour t d e te r m ined wif e was incapac ita ted, denie d husband’s request to be wife’s guardian, and appointed Poll ack as wife’s guardian and

conservator. On May 6, 2002, husband filed a bill of com p laint seeking a divorce from wife on the ground that the parties had lived separate and apar t. W i fe, through her guardian, filed an answer and cross-bill asking for a divorce. The parties en tered into a separa tion and property settlem e nt
agreem ent disposing of all proper ty is sues betwee n them . They also en tere d into a spo u sal support agreem ent wherein husband agreed to pa y wife $1,810 per m onth in support. Following a Septem ber 16, 2003 hearing, the court found “no ba sis in law to award attorney’s fees.” Analysis
I. “An award of attorney ’s f ees is a m a tter subm itte d to the trial court’ s soun d discre tion and is reviewable on appeal only for an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n
. ” G r a v e s v . G r a v e s , 4 Va. App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). T h e court’s goal is to m a ke a determ ination, which is reasonab l e u nder all the circum s t a n c e s
. S e e McGinnis v. McGinnis , 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 338 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1985). The record d e m onstrates the parties’ a ssets were divided al most equally, husband’s spousal support obligation represents alm o st fort y percent of his take-hom e incom e , and husband agreed to provide wife with half of his pensi on when that becom e s due at his retirem e nt. In support of her argum ent that the trial judge erred, wife cites th e f o l l o w i n g l a n g u a g e i n T h o m as v. Tho m as , 217 Va. 502, 229 S.E.2d 887 (1976): “[W]here . . . the trial court finds [that] the wife

- 2 -needs and is entitled to m a intenance and support a nd the husband has the financial ability to m e et those needs, its failure to aw ard counsel fees to her is, in our opinion, an abuse of [its] d i s c r e t i o n
. ” I d

. at 505, 229 S.E.2d at 890.
W e p r e v i o u s l y h a v e a d d r e s s e d t h e T h o m as holding.
W e d o n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e c o u r t i n T h o m as intended to adopt a rule that whenever a wife is granted support, the trial court must automatically award attorney ’s fees. An award of attorney’s f ees to a par t y in a d i vor ce suit is a m a tter f o r the tr ial cou r t’ s sound discretion after considering the circum stances and equities o f t h e e n t i r e c a s e
. S e e R o wand v. Rowand , 215 Va. 344, 346-47, 210 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1974). Artis v. Artis , 4 Va. App. 132, 138, 354 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987). U p o n o u r r e v i e w o f t h i s r e c o r d , we hold that the tr ial cour t per m i ssi bly consi d ere d , as one of several factors, t h e fact that husband

wa s not at fa ult i n t

h e dis s ol ut ion of t h e ma rria g e. S e e D a v i s v . D a v i s , 8 Va. App. 12, 17, 377 S.E.2d 640, 643 (1989). F u r t h e r m o r e , unlike cases in which attorney’s fees have been awarded, this cas e wa s not a pr olonged c onte s te d a c tion a n d did not i n vol v e exc e ssi ve disc ove ry or numer o us motions

. S e e id. a t 1 8 , 3 7 7 S

. E

. 2 d a t 6 4 3

. S e e als o Via v. Via , 14 Va. App. 868, 872, 419 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1992). Under these circum stances, we cann o t conclud e that the tria l court abus ed its discr e tio n in denying wife’s request. The court considered all the circum stances and m a de a re ason able determ inatio n. II. Both parties request costs and attorney’s fees for m a tters relating to this appeal. The rationale for the appellate court being the proper forum t o determ ine th e propriety o f an award of attorney ’s fees for efforts expended on appeal is clear. The ap pellate cou r t has the opportunity to view the record in its entirety and determ ine whether the appeal is frivolous or w h ether other reasons exist for requir i ng ad dition a l pay m ent.

- 3 -O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin , 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). In this context, and upon consideration of the entire record, we hold that neither party is entitled to costs or

atto rney’s f e es in th e m a tter. A c co rd ing l y, we s u mm arily affirm th e decisi on of t h e tri a l court

. S e e Rule 5A :27. Affirm ed.

- 4 -