IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-20-00336-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.W. A/K/A A.R.W., A CHILD

From the County Court at Law

Bosque County, Texas

Trial Court No. CV19362

DISSENTING OPINION

After significant judicial procedures, this child had the assurance of a different 

future. This child now must start over because magic words were not included in an 

extension order. I view the law, and therefore the result somewhat differently. I 

respectfully but vigorously dissent.

I have no quarrel with the Court’s recitation of the procedural facts. The bottom 

line is that if the trial court’s extension order is valid, the trial court had jurisdiction to 

conduct the trial that resulted in the termination of the parental rights of both parents. If 

the extension order was invalid, the mother argues that the proceeding was automatically 

dismissed the day before the trial and that the trial was a nullity. If the mother is correct, 
In the Interest of A.W. a/k/a A.R.W., a Child Page 2

the termination of the father's parental rights as a result of the same trial is also a nullity

even though he did not file a notice of appeal. 

The argument of the mother is that the extension order was defective on its face. 

Specifically, the mother argues that the order was defective because it does not contain 

the findings regarding extraordinary circumstances and the best interest of the child 

which she argues the trial court is required to expressly set forth in the extension order. 

The mother does not complain that the trial court did not timely render an extension 

order, rather, she argues that it does not contain everything that it should, that it does not 

contain the magic words to make it effective. 

The Family Code describes what has to be in an order that grants an extension of 

the one-year deadline to complete a case in which the State seeks to terminate the parental 

rights to a child. Specifically, Section 263.401 of the Family Code provides in relevant 

part:

If the court makes those findings, the court may retain the suit on the court's 

docket for a period not to exceed 180 days after the time described by 

Subsection (a). If the court retains the suit on the court's docket, the court 

shall render an order in which the court:

(1) schedules the new date on which the suit will be 

automatically dismissed if the trial on the merits has not 

commenced, which date must be not later than the 180th day 

after the time described by Subsection (a);

(2) makes further temporary orders for the safety and welfare 

of the child as necessary to avoid further delay in resolving 

the suit; and

(3) sets the trial on the merits on a date not later than the date 

specified under Subdivision (1).
In the Interest of A.W. a/k/a A.R.W., a Child Page 3

 

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401. 

However, the mother is not contending that the order is defective for not 

containing these elements. Rather, the mother is complaining that the order does not 

contain the court’s findings necessary to make the order, and that is the defect in the order 

that the Court holds requires the automatic dismissal pursuant to the statute. But, while 

the statute specifies the findings required to be made by the trial court to render the 

extension order, nowhere does the statute require that the findings have to be made 

within the order. I have found nothing to require that the findings, or for that matter the 

trial court’s extension order, be made in writing, much less that the finding must be made 

within the four corners of a written order granting the extension as argued by the mother, 

conceded by the department, and as now held by this Court.

Family Code Section 263.401(b) does specify that to render an order which extends 

the dismissal date, the trial court must make certain findings. Specifically, the statute 

provides:

[T]he court may not retain the suit on the court's docket after the time 

described by Subsection (a) unless the court finds that extraordinary 

circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing 

conservatorship of the department and that continuing the appointment of 

the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest 

of the child. 

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b).

It is thus undisputed that to render a valid extension order, the trial court must 
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make the following two findings: (1) That extraordinary circumstances necessitate the 

child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department; and (2) 

that continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator 

is in the best interest of the child.

The record before this court does not appear to contain a written expression of 

either of these findings. The statute, however, does not specify how these findings must 

be documented, if at all. While some courts have suggested that the findings are required 

to be in the order and in writing, those opinions do not turn on such a determination. 

Moreover, this Court has held that an oral finding is adequate and relied upon a case that 

held that the statute does not require a written extension order and that an oral rendition 

is sufficient. See In the Interest of C.L.B., No. 10-13-00203-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1924 

at *25, 2014 WL 702798 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 20, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.), see also In the 

Interest of J.G.K., No. 02-10-00188-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4836 at *105, 2011 WL 2518800

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Twelfth Court of Appeals 

in Tyler has expressly held that the extension order need not be in writing, but ultimately 

that discussion was not necessary to support its disposition of that appeal. In the Interest 

of D.D.M., 116 S.W.3d 224 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.). Additionally, in this 

proceeding, although the mother knew of the alleged defect in the extension order for 21 

days after the order was signed extending the dismissal date and before the end of the 

original one-year period which ended the day before the trial was conducted, she never 
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objected to the trial court about the absence of what she contends is a defect in the 

extension order on appeal. 

As further support for the fact that we should not hold that the required findings 

have to be in a written order, we note that the legislature knows how to make such a 

requirement and did not do so here. For example, in Family Code section 154.130(b), the 

legislature has spelled out with precision the findings that are required to be included in 

a child support judgment that deviates from the percentage guidelines under Section 

154.125 or 154.129 of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.130(b).

Similarly, in juvenile proceedings which are civil in nature, until very recently it 

was required to include specific fact findings in an order to transfer the proceeding to 

adult court or the order was void. See Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), 

overruled by Ex parte Thomas, 2021 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 

2021). However, in Ex Parte Thomas, the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that the 

statute that requires the trial court to make specific fact findings does not require those 

findings to be set out in the written order in order for the transfer order to be valid. See 

Ex Parte Thomas, 2021 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 at *14.

One other observation may be important to note here. There is the presumption 

of validity of a trial court’s actions that protects the trial court’s judgments from 

subsequent attacks such as this. As an appellate court, we are to presume the validity of 

an order and that the trial court made any required findings unless and until the appellant 
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shows that the trial court did not, or could not, make the findings required or that the 

trial court made findings contrary to the required findings. See Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. 

v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. 2003) ("When neither party requests findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, it is implied that the trial court made all fact findings necessary to 

support its judgment."); see also BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 

795 (Tex. 2002); Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). In essence the findings 

required are implied until negated by the appellant. This appellant’s attack is limited to 

the argument that the findings are not included in the written extension order. The 

mother does not complain about the nature of the hearing held or the evidence to support 

the implied findings. 

The mother’s entire argument is that the findings have to be included within a 

written extension order. I do not believe that is a requirement of the statute. Therefore, 

I would overrule the mother’s issue and, because that is the only challenge to the 

termination order, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment. Alternatively, I would hold 

that the mother’s complaint was not preserved due to the failure to timely object to the 

extension order that was timely rendered, at a time and in a manner that the trial court 

could have easily cured the argued error by expressly making the findings and including 

those finding within the order as mother contends on appeal is necessary. Finally, to the 
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extent that the mother raises any other error, I would hold that it is inadequately briefed.1

See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). 

Finally, I cannot leave this case without commenting on the Court’s holding that 

the intervenor’s pleadings can support the trial and allow for a modification of the 

judgment that does not terminate the parents’ parental rights,2 but nevertheless appoints 

the department as permanent managing conservator and the grandmother possessory 

conservator. First, because the department did not file a notice of appeal, by following 

the reasoning of a very recent holding of this court, the judgment cannot be modified to 

grant the department any relief by such a modification of the judgment. See Benner v. 

Armstrong, No. 10-19-00279-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2024 at *10 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 

17, 2021, no pet. h.). Neither did the intervenor file a notice of appeal to complain of the 

trial court's failure to grant their only requested relief, which was to be named the 

managing conservator of the child. Second, how strange is it that the trial was conducted 

with the department engaged as the party with the burden of proof in the proceeding, 

presenting and cross-examining witnesses, and making arguments when, based on the 

Court’s holding, they were no longer even a party to the proceeding and did not even 

have the right to be heard. Thus, although I would not reach this issue if the judgment 

1 The mother also posits that the motion for an extension of the dismissal date was inadequate. Such a 

complaint on appeal clearly comes too late as such a complaint must be made by special exception to the 

pleadings and obtain a ruling thereon or the complaint is waived. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90.

2 The petition in intervention did not seek termination of the parents' parental rights but only prayed for 

the appointment of the intervenor as the managing conservator of the child.
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were affirmed as discussed above, I disagree with the Court's holding that modifies the 

trial court’s judgment by affirming only the appointment of the department as the 

managing conservator and the intervenor as the possessory conservator.

Conclusion

This is an important case for a number of reasons, but probably none is more 

important than the whipsawn emotional impact that is the life of this child. But the larger 

legal importance is the existential threat to having every termination order rendered 

during an extension period reexamined and held to be void if the extension order did not 

contain the findings as this court holds today is required even though the statute does 

not expressly require them. The sanctity of judgments requires more. I respectfully 

cannot join the Court’s opinion and dissent to its judgment for the reasons expressed 

herein.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Dissenting Opinion delivered and filed April 14, 2021