NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JULIE JEANNIE MASON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR202000167

The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Kevin M. Morrow

Counsel for Appellee

Jill L. Evans Attorney at Law, Flagstaff

By Jill L. Evans

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 12-8-2022
STATE v. MASON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Peter B. Swann1 joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Julie Jeannie Mason appeals the superior court’s order 

denying her motion to suppress, as well as her conviction and sentence for 

one count of possession of dangerous drugs for sale. We affirm in part and 

vacate in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In January 2020, Arizona Department of Public Safety 

Trooper Thomas Callister conducted a traffic stop on Mason’s rental car for 

an obvious window tint violation. After approaching the car, Trooper 

Callister observed numerous duffel bags in the back seat and smelled a 

strong, chemical odor coming from the passenger window. Trooper 

Callister observed Mason’s hand shaking when handing him her driver’s 

license and rental car contract. Trooper Callister then had Mason sit in his 

patrol car while he prepared the warning for the window tint violation.

¶3 While in his patrol car, Mason told Trooper Callister she and 

her husband, Maurius Mason, traveled from Iowa to California to pick up 

Mason’s aunt. Mason also said they returned only with the aunt’s clothing 

in the duffle bags because the aunt decided to fly back instead. While

Trooper Callister printed the warning, he walked back to speak with 

Maurius who confirmed the couple traveled to visit Mason’s aunt in 

California. But Maurius claimed the duffle bags contained his and Mason’s 

1 Judge Peter B. Swann was a sitting member of this court when the 

matter was assigned to this panel of the court. He retired effective 

November 28, 2022. In accordance with the authority granted by Article 6, 

Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution and pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-145, the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme 

Court has designated Judge Swann as a judge pro tempore in the Court of 

Appeals for the purpose of participating in the resolution of cases assigned 

to this panel during his term in office.
STATE v. MASON

Decision of the Court

3

clothing and trip purchases, not the aunt’s clothing. Trooper Callister then 

returned to his patrol car and again asked Mason what the duffle bags 

contained. Mason repeated the luggage contained her aunt’s clothing and 

added she and Maurius each had one small bag.

¶4 Both passengers denied having anything illegal in the car. 

Maurius denied consent to search, and Mason gave consent to search only 

her belongings. Trooper Callister then requested a canine unit, and the dog 

alerted to the presence of drugs. Trooper Callister searched the car and

found numerous shrink-wrapped packages inside the duffle bags later 

confirmed to be 362 pounds of methamphetamine.

¶5 The State charged Mason with both possession and 

transportation of dangerous drugs for sale. Before trial, Mason moved to 

suppress as unconstitutionally precluded all evidence obtained after 

Trooper Callister issued the traffic warning. Mason argued Trooper 

Callister exceeded the scope of the traffic stop and lacked reasonable 

suspicion to search the car. The superior court denied the motion finding 

Trooper Callister had reasonable suspicion to detain Mason after printing 

the warning.

¶6 A jury convicted Mason of both charges, and the superior 

court sentenced her to a twelve-year prison term. Mason timely appealed, 

and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Constitution Article 6, 

Section 9, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Mason’s Motion to Suppress

¶7 Mason argues the superior court erred in denying her motion 

to suppress. We review a denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Cornman, 237 Ariz. 350, 354, ¶ 10 (App. 2015). We view 

the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s ruling, 

and we only consider the facts presented at the suppression hearing. State 

v. Starr, 222 Ariz. 65, 68, ¶ 4 (App. 2009). We review the court’s legal 

conclusions de novo, State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 397, ¶ 27 (2006), and we 

must affirm the superior court if its ruling “was legally correct for any 

reason,” State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 (1984).

¶8 Mason argues Trooper Callister improperly prolonged the 

traffic stop because (1) Mason did not consent and (2) Trooper Callister 
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lacked reasonable suspicion.

2 The Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution prohibits the government from conducting unreasonable 

searches and seizures even in brief investigatory stops of people or vehicles. 

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted). An officer may not extend a traffic stop any longer than

necessary to accomplish the traffic stop’s mission, and the officer’s 

authority for the traffic stop ends when the “tasks tied to the traffic 

infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Rodriguez v. 

United States, 575 U.S. 348, 348-49 (2015).

¶9 After the officer conducting a routine traffic stop receives the 

driver’s valid driver’s license and proof of entitlement to operate the 

vehicle, the officer must let the driver leave without further delay or 

questioning unless (1) the traffic stop becomes consensual or (2) during the 

traffic stop “the officer gains a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the 

driver is engaged in illegal activity.” State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 23, ¶ 22 

(App. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Reasonable suspicion 

is more than a mere hunch, but “the Fourth Amendment only requires that 

police articulate some minimal, objective justification for an investigatory 

detention.” Id. at 23, ¶ 25. In determining whether a law enforcement 

officer had reasonable suspicion, the court may not examine each factor 

individually but must consider all factors collectively. Id. at 24, ¶ 25.

¶10 Mason relies on State v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107 (App. 2010), for 

the proposition that her continued detention after a completed traffic stop 

was not supported by reasonable suspicion. But in Sweeney, we held that 

the continued detention of a driver was unsupported by reasonable 

suspicion because the nine factors upon which the officer relied “did not 

give rise to objective reasonable suspicion of anything” and a “reasonably 

prudent person’s suspicions would not be raised after observing” those 

factors. Id. at 113, ¶ 24. We further held that those factors, which included 

long distance travel to purchase a vehicle, a nervous driver, vague answers, 

a strong smell of deodorizer, a clean car with no personal effects, an atlas 

on the front passenger seat, an out of state plate, and a foreign driver 

driving far back in the seat while sitting in a rigid upright position,

“resemble[d] those employed in drug courier profiles, which are now 

inadmissible at trial as evidence of guilt.” Id. at ¶¶ 23, 25. The facts of 

Mason’s case are distinguishable.

2 The parties do not challenge the constitutionality of the initial stop; 

therefore, we do not address the issue.
STATE v. MASON

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¶11 While Mason did not consent to prolonging the traffic stop, 

consent is not required when law enforcement has reasonable suspicion. 

See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 22. The facts presented at the suppression 

hearing support the conclusion that Trooper Callister had at least 

reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. Trooper Callister testified 

he suspected Mason was involved in criminal activity because (1) Mason 

was driving a rental car with dark window tint, which was highly unusual; 

(2) Mason’s hand shook when handing him her driver’s license and rental 

car contract; (3) the back seats were folded down and covered with 

multiple, large duffle bags; (4) he smelled a strong, chemical odor coming

from the passenger window; (5) Mason was “extremely” and 

“exceptionally” nervous; (6) the passengers’ stories conflicted on the 

purpose of the trip and the contents of the duffle bags; (7) Mason became 

increasingly nervous throughout the stop; (8) he saw Mason’s heartbeat 

“vigorously pulsing on her chest and stomach”; and (9) the passengers were

returning from California, a source state for drugs. Unlike in Sweeney,

Trooper Callister smelling a strong, chemical odor from inside the vehicle, 

together with the other factors observed, gave rise to articulable reasonable 

suspicion that crime may be afoot. The court did not err in denying Mason’s 

motion to suppress all evidence obtained after Trooper Callister printed the 

warning for the window tint violation.

II. Double Jeopardy

¶12 Mason argues the superior court erred in imposing multiple 

sentences for the same offense in violation of constitutional double jeopardy 

protections. In its answering brief, the State concedes possession of 

dangerous drugs for sale is a lesser-included offense of transportation of 

dangerous drugs for sale and requests we vacate Mason’s conviction and 

sentence for possession. We are not bound by the State’s concession of 

error, see State v. Solis, 236 Ariz. 242, 249, ¶ 23 (App. 2014), and we review 

whether one crime is a lesser-included offense of another de novo, In re 

James P., 214 Ariz. 420, 423, ¶ 12 (App. 2007).

¶13 Mason claims her conviction for possession of dangerous 

drugs for sale is a lesser-included offense of transportation of dangerous 

drugs for sale, and thus we should vacate her conviction and sentence for 

possession. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 10, of the Arizona 

Constitution bar multiple punishments for the same offense. A lesserincluded offense contains some but not all elements of the greater offense 

so that it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also 

committing the lesser one. State v. Celaya, 135 Ariz. 248, 251 (1983). A 
STATE v. MASON

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defendant may not be convicted of an offense and a lesser-included offense 

because they are the same under double jeopardy principles. State v. Ortega, 

220 Ariz. 320, 324, ¶ 9 (App. 2008) (citation omitted). “[W]hen the charged 

possession for sale is incidental to the charged transportation for sale, it is 

a lesser-included offense” because a person “cannot possibly be guilty” of 

transportation for sale without also being guilty of possession for sale. State 

v. Chabolla-Hinojosa, 192 Ariz. 360, 363, ¶¶ 12-13 (App. 1998).

¶14 It is settled in Arizona that possession is a lesser-included 

offense of transportation. Id.; State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, 449, ¶ 11 

(2008). The superior court erred in sentencing Mason for both possession 

and transportation in violation of constitutional double jeopardy 

protections. We therefore vacate Mason’s conviction and sentence for 

possession of dangerous drugs for sale.

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm in part and vacate in part.