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Filed 10/21/21 Region 2 Court Interpreter etc. v. Cal. PERB CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

REGION 2 COURT INTERPRETER 

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 

COMMITTEE et al.,

Petitioner,

v.

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC 

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 

BOARD,

Respondent;

CALIFORNIA FEDERATION OF 

INTERPRETERS, LOCAL 39000 et 

al.,

Real Party in Interest.

 A159985

 (Public Employment Relations

 Board Decision No. 2701-I

 Case No. SF-CE-11-I)

The Trial Court Interpreter Employment and Labor Relations Act 

(Interpreter Act or Act) (Gov. Code, § 71800 et seq.)1 organizes trial courts 

across the state into four regions and generally requires regional bargaining 

of court interpreter labor agreements. In particular, the Act imposes an 

obligation upon the representative of the trial courts in each region and the 

recognized employee organization representing the interpreters to meet and 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to this 

code.
2

confer on “matters within the scope of representation” (§ 71801, subd. (e)), 

which include “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” 

(§ 71816, subd. (a)). The central question in this case is whether regional 

bargaining of the impact of trial court changes to interpreter pension benefits 

is required in light of the Act’s express contemplation that “health and 

welfare and pension benefits” for interpreter employees “may be the same as 

those provided to other employees of the same trial court.” (§ 71808.)

In the proceedings below, the California Public Employment Relations 

Board (PERB) issued a decision concluding, among other things, that the 

Interpreter Act and the parties’ memorandum of understanding required 

regional impact bargaining of pension benefit changes and that the Region 2 

Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee (Committee) acted 

unlawfully by refusing to meet and confer in good faith regarding the impact 

of changes to pension cost sharing by certain trial courts within Region 2. 

The Committee and the California Superior Courts of Region 2 (Region 2 

Courts)2 filed a petition for writ of extraordinary relief from the PERB 

decision, and we granted a writ of review.

Like PERB, we conclude the Committee had a statutory and 

contractual duty to engage in regional bargaining over the impacts of the 

trial court pension changes. We additionally conclude the other challenged 

portions of the PERB decision are correct. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In California, each trial court maintains its own retirement plan for its 

court employees. (See § 71624.) Some of the Region 2 Courts participate in 

2 The Region 2 Courts include the superior courts in the “Counties of the 

First and Sixth Appellate Districts, except for Solano County.” (§ 71807, 

subd. (a)(2).)
3

the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), while others

participate in a statutory retirement system through their respective

counties. The trial court in San Francisco County participates in the City 

and County of San Francisco’s retirement system.

Generally, the various trial court retirement plans operate under 

different pension and contribution formulae, and other requirements. Each 

plan involves an employer contribution and an employee member 

contribution to fund its pension benefits, and during the relevant time herein, 

some courts paid all or a portion of the employee member contribution, 

referred to as the “employer-paid member contribution” (EPMC). Thus,

EPMC and employee contribution amounts varied from court to court because 

of retirement system differences. For example, in 2014, the EPMC was 0 

percent for the Superior Courts of the City and County of San Francisco, 

Alameda County, and Santa Cruz County; 1.8 percent for Napa County 

Superior Court; 2 or 4 percent (based upon hire date) for Santa Clara County 

Superior Court; 7.8 percent for Mendocino County Superior Court; and 50 

percent of the employee’s member contribution for the Superior Courts of

Contra Costa County and San Mateo County. 

A. The Interpreter Act

Prior to 2002, virtually all trial court interpreters were not court 

employees but instead were independent contractors who had no retirement 

or other benefits, no job security, and no right to representation. (Sen. Com. 

on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 371 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended Aug. 28, 2002, p. 2.) That situation changed in 2002, when the 

Legislature declared that court interpreter services “are vital to ensuring 

access and fairness in the trial courts” and passed the Interpreter Act “to 

provide for the fair treatment of court interpreters, to enhance access to the 
4

court system for persons who depend upon the services of interpreters, and to 

promote sound court management.” (Stats. 2002, ch. 1047, § 1, subd. (a)

(Sen. Bill No. 371).) Pursuant to the Act, trial courts were required to 

transition from hiring independent contractors to appointing court employees 

for interpretation services. (Id., § 1, subd. (b).) 

In addition to requiring court appointment of interpreters as 

employees, the Interpreter Act ensures the interpreter employees the right of 

representation in a unique process that calls for collective bargaining at a 

regional level. Specifically, the Act divides the California trial courts into 

four regions and requires the development and bargaining of regional 

employment terms and conditions for interpreter employees. (§ 71807.) 

Pursuant to the Act, the Committee serves as the “regional court interpreter 

employment relations committee” representing the Region 2 Courts

(§§ 71807, subd. (a)(2), 71809), and the California Federation of Interpreters–

The Newspaper Guild-Communication Workers of America, Local 39000

(CFI)3 is the “ ‘[r]ecognized employee organization’ ” representing the 

interpreter employees hired in the Region 2 Courts (§§ 71801, subd. (g), 

71815).

Although the regional bargaining scheme will be addressed at length

post, we note for now the Interpreter Act imposes an obligation to meet and 

confer on “matters within the scope of representation” (§ 71801, subd. (e)), 

which include “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 

(§ 71816, subd. (a).) The Act expressly contemplates that compensation and 

generally all terms and conditions of employment for interpreter employees 

“shall be uniform throughout the region, except that health and welfare and 

3 The organization’s subdivisional number during the operative period 

was originally Local 39521, and subsequently changed to Local 39000.
5

pension benefits may be the same as those provided to other employees of the 

same trial court.” (§ 71808.)

B. The Memorandum of Understanding

Pursuant to the Interpreter Act, the Committee and CFI executed a 

memorandum of understanding that covered all interpreter employees in the 

Region 2 Courts during the period from December 16, 2013 through 

September 30, 2016 (MOU). Consistent with the Act, the MOU expressed the 

agreement of the Committee and CFI that regular full-time and part-time 

interpreter employees would receive the same pension benefits as the 

employees in the largest, non-management-represented bargaining unit at 

their local court (the “linked bargaining unit”). 

By its terms, the MOU represented the “full and entire agreement of 

the parties” and declared their understanding that, “[e]xcept as specifically 

provided [in the MOU],” the parties “reserve the right, upon mutual 

agreement, to meet and confer in good faith with respect to any subject or 

matter covered herein or with respect to any other matter within the scope of 

representation, during the term of this MOU.” 

C. Trial Court Adjustments in EPMCs

After the parties executed the MOU, the California Public Employees’ 

Pension Reform Act of 2013 (PEPRA) (Gov. Code, § 7522 et seq.) was enacted 

into law. As pertinent here, PEPRA prohibited a public agency from paying 

an EPMC for “new members” hired on or after January 1, 2013 and set a 

standard that “employees pay at least 50 percent of normal costs” of their 

pension benefits. (§ 7522.30, subd. (a).) In 2014, Governor Brown apparently 

made statements indicating that reimbursement funding for benefits would 

be allocated less favorably to trial courts that did not eliminate the EPMC. 
6

This prompted many courts to consider eliminating EPMCs from their 

retirement plans.

Among the courts considering EPMC changes was the Contra Costa 

County Superior Court. In 2015, that court notified CFI of its agreement 

with the linked bargaining unit to eliminate the court’s EPMC in two phases. 

Before implementation of the first phase, the court and CFI met and 

conferred regarding the impacts of the first phase and reached agreement for 

additional paid leave time with a cash-out procedure and employer 

contributions to a deferred compensation plan. But CFI declined to meet and 

confer with the court on the impacts of the second phase. Instead, CFI 

announced its intent to request regional bargaining because it wanted a wage

increase to offset the EPMC elimination. The court agreed to postpone a 

meet and confer to allow the Committee to respond to CFI’s bargaining 

request. 

D. CFI’s Regional Bargaining Request and Subsequent Events

In February 2016, CFI representative and Regional Spokesperson Mary

Lou Aranguren sent a letter to the Committee’s Chairperson, Michael Yuen. 

As relevant here, Aranguren requested to meet and confer at the regional 

level regarding proposed PEPRA-related changes in retirement contributions

following court negotiations with linked bargaining units. In making this 

request, Aranguren referenced the Superior Courts of Contra Costa County, 

Marin County, Napa County, San Mateo County, and Santa Clara County. 

On March 9, 2016, after consulting with the Court Executive Officers of the 

Region 2 Courts, Yuen responded to CFI with the position that, based on 

article 23.E of the MOU and the past practice of the Courts and CFI, 

retirement issues must be addressed at each local court and not regionally. 
7

Thereafter, the Contra Costa County Superior Court and CFI returned 

to the bargaining table regarding the impacts of the court’s phase two EPMC 

elimination. But no agreement was reached. 

On April 1, 2016, CFI filed a grievance against the Committee and the 

Superior Courts of Contra Costa County, Marin County, San Mateo County,

and Santa Clara County, alleging these courts planned to implement changes 

to pension cost sharing without a meet and confer at the regional level. Each 

trial court individually denied the grievance, with some claiming they had 

not yet commenced or completed the meet and confer process over pension 

cost sharing with the linked bargaining unit in their courts. The Superior 

Courts of Contra Costa County and Marin County additionally asserted they 

had met with CFI over pension cost sharing changes agreed to by the linked 

bargaining unit and had not made any changes. Each court expressed a 

willingness to meet and confer with CFI regarding the impacts of any pension 

cost sharing changes at the appropriate time. 

On April 13, 2016, Yuen responded to CFI on behalf of the Committee. 

He stated that the Committee had not received the grievance and denied that 

any violation of the MOU had occurred. Yuen also stated his March 9, 2016 

letter advised CFI that any bargaining shall occur at each local court. 

On April 22, 2016, Aranguren sent letters to the Superior Courts of 

Contra Costa County, Marin County, and San Mateo County indicating CFI’s 

grievances were preemptive. 

Ultimately, the Superior Courts of San Mateo County, Mendocino 

County, and Santa Clara County each notified CFI of agreements with the 

linked bargaining units over changes to the EPMC in their respective courts

and invited CFI to bargain the impacts. CFI indicated its desire to meet and 

confer at the regional level and declined to negotiate with the courts. 
8

In May 2016, CFI filed an unfair practice charge against the 

Committee and the Region 2 Courts, alleging the Committee’s refusal to 

bargain regionally over changes to pension contributions and certain trial 

courts’ repudiation of the grievance procedure when they rejected the 

grievances over these changes. PERB’s Office of the General Counsel issued 

a complaint. Thereafter, the PERB administrative law judge (ALJ) granted 

two motions by CFI to amend the complaint to add additional claims. 

Meanwhile, in June 2016, Aranguren sent Yuen a letter requesting to 

meet and confer regarding a successor MOU. CFI and the Committee 

bargained over several months and reached an agreement on September 11, 

2017. The agreement included a 21 percent wage increase over its three-year 

term to address, among other things, the impacts of changes to pension cost 

sharing at some of the trial courts. 

E. The ALJ Proposed Decision and PERB Decision

After presiding over an evidentiary hearing and considering the parties’ 

post-hearing briefs, the ALJ determined that the Committee was not 

required to engage in regional bargaining over the impacts of trial court

changes to employee pension contributions and that the Committee had 

lawfully delegated to the trial courts the duty to negotiate over such impacts. 

The ALJ further concluded the Committee had not refused to bargain over

CFI’s employee contribution proposals during successor contract negotiations

in 2016–2017; the trial courts had not unilaterally changed employee pension 

contribution rates; and the courts had not repudiated the parties’ contractual 

grievance procedures.

PERB affirmed in part and reversed in part the ALJ’s proposed 

decision. Specifically, it affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that the Committee 

did not refuse to bargain over CFI’s pension contribution proposals during 
9

the successor contract negotiations. But PERB disagreed with the ALJ’s 

other conclusions and held “(1) the Committee violated its duty to meet and 

confer in good faith by refusing to engage in impact bargaining in response to 

CFI’s February 11, 2016 request; (2) the Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa 

Clara County Superior Courts violated their duty to meet and confer in good 

faith by unlawfully implementing changes to the interpreters’ pension 

contributions prior to completion of impact bargaining; (3) the Contra Costa, 

Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts violated their 

duty to meet and confer in good faith by repudiating the parties’ contractual 

grievance procedure; and (4) the Santa Cruz County Superior Court violated 

its duty to meet and confer in good faith when it unilaterally eliminated a 

stipend that offset interpreters’ pension contributions.”

Pursuant to section 71825.1, the Committee and the Region 2 Courts 

petitioned for writ of extraordinary relief from PERB’s decision. We 

determined that a summary denial of the petition was not warranted and 

issued a writ of review.

DISCUSSION

The principal issue is whether PERB properly concluded that the 

Committee violated a duty to meet and confer in good faith by refusing to 

engage in regional bargaining over the impacts of the trial court decisions to 

reduce or eliminate the EPMC in their courts.

The California Supreme Court recently summarized the standards 

governing our review of the underlying PERB decision, as follows. “ ‘[C]ourts 

generally defer to PERB’s construction of labor law provisions within its 

jurisdiction. (See [citations].) “. . . PERB is ‘one of those agencies presumably 

equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of 

knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an 
10

expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect.’

[Citation.]” [Citations.]’ ” (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 

5 Cal.5th 898, 911–912 (Boling).) Thus, while courts retain final authority to 

construe a statute, we adhere to PERB’s interpretation unless we determine 

it is clearly erroneous. (Id. at p. 912.) This type of “hybrid approach to 

review in this narrow area maintains the court’s ultimate interpretive 

authority while acknowledging the agency’s administrative expertise.” (Ibid.)

Pursuant to statute, PERB’s factual findings must be upheld if they are

supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. 

(§ 71825.1, subd. (b).) We may not reweigh the evidence, and so long as

PERB’s factual findings have a plausible basis, “ ‘ “we are not concerned that 

contrary findings may seem to us equally reasonable, or even more so. 

[Citations.]” ’ ” (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 912.) Moreover, “when the 

matter falls within PERB’s area of expertise, the deferential standard

outlined above applies to its legal determinations even if based on undisputed 

facts.” (Id. at p. 913.) Finally, because PERB is “ ‘empowered to reweigh the 

evidence [before an ALJ] and draw its own factual conclusions’ ” (City of Palo 

Alto v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1288),

the rule requiring deference to PERB’s findings applies even when it has 

reversed an ALJ’s proposed decision (see ibid.; e.g., McPherson v. Public 

Employment Relations Bd. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 293, 304).

A. The Interpreter Act

The Committee challenges PERB’s conclusion that the Committee 

violated its duty to meet and confer in good faith by refusing to engage in 

regional bargaining over the impacts of the trial court decisions to reduce or 

eliminate the EPMC for interpreter employees. Emphasizing that the 

Interpreter Act does not require uniformity of pension benefits throughout 
11

Region 2, the Committee contends the Act authorizes local trial court 

bargaining over the impacts of local EPMC changes. Whether the Act 

requires regional bargaining over such impacts is a matter of statutory 

construction.

As a general matter, the fundamental task in statutory construction 

“ ‘ “ ‘is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s 

purpose.’ ” ’ ” (Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 

844, 856–857.) Statutory language should be examined “ ‘ “ ‘in the context of 

the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and 

purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment,’ ” ’ ” and the 

plain meaning of the language must be followed “ ‘ “ ‘unless a literal 

interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not 

intend.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 856.) When statutory language is susceptible to more 

than one reasonable interpretation, “ ‘ “ ‘other aids, such as the statute’s 

purpose, legislative history, and public policy’ ” ’ ” may be consulted. (Id. at 

p. 857.)

Applying the deferential standard of review, we must determine

whether it was clearly erroneous for PERB to construe the Interpreter Act as 

requiring regional bargaining over the impacts of EPMC changes. (Boling, 

supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 912.) We turn first to the statutory language.

To effectuate its regional bargaining scheme, the Interpreter Act 

provides that the “regional court interpreter employment relations 

committee” (here, the Committee) “shall set terms and conditions of 

employment for court interpreters within the region” (here, Region 2), which 

“shall be binding on the trial courts within the region” when adopted by the 

Committee. (§ 71808.) The Act specifies that the Committee “shall act as the 

representative of the trial courts within the region in bargaining with a 
12

recognized employee organization” (here, CFI). (§ 71809). The Act expressly 

contemplates that the Committee or its designated representatives “shall 

meet and confer in good faith” with CFI regarding the “terms and conditions 

of employment within the scope of representation” as defined in the Act. 

(§71818, italics added.) The Act defines the “scope of representation” as 

including “all matters relating to employment conditions and employeremployee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other 

terms and conditions of employment.” (§ 71816, subd. (a), italics added.) In 

this regard, the Act states in unambiguous terms that “[c]ompensation shall

be uniform throughout the region” but that “health and welfare and pension 

benefits may be the same as those provided to other employees of the same 

trial court.” (§ 71808.) For purposes of the Act, “ ‘[m]eet and confer in good 

faith’ means that a trial court or [the Committee] or those representatives it 

may designate, and representatives of [CFI], shall have the mutual obligation 

personally to meet and confer promptly upon request by either party and 

continue for a reasonable period of time in order to exchange freely 

information, opinions, and proposals, and to endeavor to reach agreement on 

matters within the scope of representation.” (§ 71801, subd. (e) (§ 71801(e)).)

A plain reading of these particular Interpreter Act provisions leads to 

the conclusion that pension benefits constitute a term or condition of 

employment falling within the scope of representation (§§ 71808, 71816) and 

that, as such, the impact of changes to pension benefits is subject to the 

statutory meet and confer requirement (§ 71801(e).) And because the Act 

expressly requires the Committee to act as the bargaining representative of 

the Region 2 Courts (§ 71809) and to meet and confer in good faith with CFI 

regarding “all matters relating to employment conditions” (§ 71816, 
13

subd. (a)), the impact of changes to pension benefits must be bargained by the 

Committee at the regional level.

In disputing this construction, the Committee highlights the definition 

in section 71801(e) providing: “ ‘Meet and confer in good faith’ means that a 

trial court or regional court interpreter committee or those representatives it 

may designate, and representatives of a recognized employee organization, 

shall have the mutual obligation personally to meet and confer promptly 

upon request by either party . . . .” (Italics added.) In the Committee’s view, 

section 71801(e)’s use of the disjunctive phrase―“a trial court or regional 

court interpreter committee”—reflects the Act’s express provision of a local 

bargaining option allowing individual trial courts to meet and confer 

regarding matters that are determined at the local level, such as pension 

benefits and health and welfare benefits. 

While the Interpreter Act makes clear that interpreter pension benefits 

need not be uniform throughout a region (§ 71808), nowhere does the Act 

exclude the matter of pension benefits or the impact of pension benefit 

changes from the scope of representation. To the contrary, the Act broadly 

and explicitly contemplates the “scope of representation” as including “all 

matters relating to employment conditions . . . including, but not limited to, 

wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” (§ 71816, 

subd. (a), italics added.) Had the Legislature intended to provide for local

trial court bargaining over the impact of pension-related changes, it would 

not have specified that “[t]he regional court interpreter employment relations 

committee . . . shall meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, 

and other terms and conditions of employment within the scope of 

representation, as defined in this chapter.” (§ 71818, italics added.)
14

This construction aligns with other provisions of the Interpreter Act. 

For instance, the Act lists six specific matters—none of which concerns 

pension benefits—that reflect “the unique and special responsibilities of the 

trial courts” and explicitly excludes trial court decisions regarding such 

matters from “the scope of representation.” (§ 71816, subd. (b).)4 

Nonetheless, the Act expressly stipulates that the impact from decisions on 

those six matters “as those matters affect wages, hours, and terms and 

conditions of employment of court interpreters” are “within the scope of 

representation,” such that the Committee “shall be required to meet and 

confer in good faith with respect to that impact.” (§ 71816, subd. (c).) In 

other words, even though trial court decisions on the six listed matters are 

statutorily exempt from the scope of representation, the Act specifically 

contemplates that regional bargaining by the Committee is appropriate for 

addressing their impact on wages, hours, and other employment terms and 

conditions.

Finally, it bears emphasizing that interpreting the Act to require 

regional bargaining over the impacts of pension contribution changes does 

not lead to absurd results. Indeed, as the PERB decision recounts, the

Committee did in fact bargain in good faith with CFI over the impacts of 

4 Section 71816, subdivision (b), states in full: “In view of the unique and 

special responsibilities of the trial courts in the administration of justice, 

decisions regarding any of the following matters may not be included within 

the scope of representation: [¶] (1) The merits and administration of the trial 

court system. [¶] (2) Coordination, consolidation, and merger of trial courts 

and support staff. [¶] (3) Automation, including, but not limited to, fax filing, 

electronic recording, and implementation of information systems. 

[¶] (4) Design, construction, and location of court facilities. [¶] (5) Delivery of 

court services. [¶] (6) Hours of operation of the trial courts and trial court 

system.”
15

EPMC changes during successor MOU negotiations, “repeatedly sweeten[ing] 

its wage proposals in an effort to address all EPMC impacts issues.” 

So what does section 71801(e) contemplate in stating that “a trial court

or regional court interpreter committee” shall have the obligation to meet and 

confer in good faith with the recognized employee organization “on matters 

within the scope of representation”? As PERB observed, apart from section 

71801(e), “[e]very other reference in the Act to the bargaining obligation 

refers to the regional committee alone.” (See §§ 71807, 71808, 71809, 71816, 

subd. (c), 71818, 71819, 71820, 71821.) Thus, PERB concludes the Act 

“appears to contemplate that in some circumstances a trial court will be the 

appropriate entity to meet and confer with CFI,” although the Act “does not 

specify what those circumstances would be.” 

Viewing the statutory scheme as a whole, we cannot say it was “clearly 

erroneous” for PERB to construe the Interpreter Act as effectively allowing a 

meet and confer at the local level if local bargaining is not expressly

prohibited by the Act and if the trial court and the recognized employee 

organization have mutually agreed to it. But the structural design of the Act, 

which focuses on the primacy of the regional court interpreter committee as 

the representative of the trial courts in bargaining with the employee 

organization, leads us to conclude that the regional committee’s consent to

such local bargaining is also required. Moreover, the obligation to meet and 

confer in good faith under section 71801(e) necessarily includes the obligation

of the parties to adhere to the terms of any mutual agreement to meet and 

confer at the local level, including any agreement to forgo regional impact 

bargaining.

In a further effort to undermine PERB’s construction, the Committee 

highlights the portion of section 71801(e) that imposes the obligation to meet 
16

and confer in good faith upon a “regional court interpreter committee or those 

representatives it may designate.” (Italics added.) Relying on this language, 

the Committee contends that a regional court interpreter committee such as 

itself is entitled to designate a trial court as its representative to bargain 

locally over the impacts of changes to pension benefits. In so contending, the 

Committee observes that section 71801(e) places no restriction on whom it 

may designate and that PERB precedent recognizes the right of management 

and unions to appoint their respective negotiators without interference from 

the other side. (See Anaheim Union High School District (2015) PERB Dec. 

No. 2434, p. 16.) We are not persuaded.

We agree section 71801(e) plainly permits the Committee to designate 

a representative for purposes of a meet and confer. But it is axiomatic that 

whomever the Committee designates must act to fulfill the Committee’s 

regional obligation under the Act to meet and confer in good faith “on matters 

within the scope of representation” (§ 71801(e)), including the setting of the 

“terms and conditions of employment” that will bind all Region 2 Courts 

(§§ 71808, 71816, subd. (a), 71818). (See State of California (Department of 

Personnel Administration) (1998) PERB Dec. No. 1305-S, p. 8 [a “specific

delegation of bargaining may be unlawful if it is found to be inconsistent with 

the obligation to bargain in good faith”].) Moreover, while PERB precedent 

supports the Committee’s right to designate its bargaining representative 

without CFI’s interference, that representative remains obligated to 

negotiate on the same regional basis as the Committee where the parties 

have not otherwise agreed. Reasonably understood, section 71801(e) does not

grant the Committee an absolute right to designate a trial court to bargain

locally over the impacts of changes to the terms and conditions of 
17

employment, including changes to the EPMC and employee pension 

contributions.

Additionally, PERB observed that because the Act requires uniformity 

of compensation throughout the region (§71808), “trial courts necessarily lack 

the statutory authority to change interpreters’ wages.” (Fn. omitted.) In

PERB’s view, “allowing the Committee to delegate impact bargaining to a 

trial court under these circumstances would extinguish CFI’s ability to 

negotiate for higher wages to offset increased employee pension 

contributions. Nothing in the Act indicates the Legislature intended this 

result.” (Fn. omitted.) 

In this regard, the Committee has never denied that designating trial 

courts to bargain over the impacts of EPMC and employee contribution 

changes forecloses CFI’s ability to negotiate a wage offset. Indeed, the trial 

courts “consistently declined to negotiate wage increases on the basis that 

compensation is subject to regional control under the Act’s uniformity 

requirement.” The Committee instead emphasizes that trial courts may and 

were prepared to offer “other economic fringe benefits” to address such 

impacts. 

Notably, however, a party may not refuse to discuss a mandatory

subject of bargaining―here, a subject within the scope of representation―once 

the other party has requested bargaining on that subject. (City of San Jose

(2013) PERB Dec. No. 2341-M, p. 27, citing Gov. Code, § 3505 [Meyers-MiliasBrown Act].) As PERB indicated, construing the Interpreter Act in a manner 

that allows the Committee to unilaterally define its meet and confer 

obligation over matters within the scope of representation and to impair 

CFI’s ability to negotiate wage increases to offset increased employee pension 

contributions “is incongruous with the Legislature’s purpose in enacting a 
18

statutory scheme granting court interpreters the right to engage in collective 

bargaining over ‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 

employment.’ ” We will avoid this construction, as it tends to defeat, rather 

than promote, the legislative purpose. (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 918; see 

Santa Clara Valley Water District (2013) PERB Dec. No. 2349-M, p. 17.)

5

Having determined that PERB correctly concluded the Committee was 

obligated under the Interpreter Act to meet and confer with CFI over the 

impacts of the EPMC changes, we next address PERB’s finding the 

Committee violated its statutory obligation.

“A complaint alleging any violation” of the Interpreter Act “shall be 

processed as an unfair practice charge” by the Board. (§ 71825, subd. (c).) 

Moreover, an outright refusal to bargain regarding a mandatory subject is a 

per se violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. (Fresno County In-Home 

Supportive Services Public Authority (2015) PERB Dec. No. 2418-M, p. 15.) 

Here, PERB observed “it is undisputed that, on March 9, 2016 and June 30, 

2017, the Committee refused to meet and confer with CFI over the impacts of 

trial courts’ changes to employee pension contributions.” The record bears 

out that observation, and the Committee does not dispute it. Accordingly, we 

agree with PERB that a statutory violation and unfair practice have been

established. (§ 71825, subd. (c); 8 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32608.)

B. The MOU

Though lacking the authority to enforce contracts between parties

(§ 3541.5, subd. (b)), PERB may interpret an MOU if necessary to resolve an 

5 Having concluded the Interpreter Act did not grant the Committee an 

absolute right to designate an individual trial court to bargain locally over 

the impacts of EPMC changes, we need not and do not decide whether PERB 

erroneously found the Committee did not in fact designate the trial courts to 

bargain regarding such impacts. 
19

unfair practice allegation. (San Francisco County Superior Court & Region 2 

Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee (2018) PERB Dec.

No. 2609-I, p. 7.) Here, PERB found the Committee was contractually

obligated under the MOU to bargain regionally over impacts of EPMC

changes. 

“MOU’s are binding contracts and are interpreted in accordance with 

the general rules of contract interpretation.” (County of Fresno v. Fresno 

Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 282, 292 (County of Fresno).) 

“Where contractual language is clear and unambiguous, it is unnecessary to 

go beyond the plain language of the contract itself to ascertain its meaning. 

[Citations.] ‘The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give 

effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret 

the other.’ (Civ. Code, § 1641.) Thus, ‘the Board must avoid an 

interpretation of contract language which leaves a provision without effect.’ 

[Citation] However, where the contract language is silent or ambiguous, the 

policy may be ascertained by examining past practice or bargaining history. 

[Citations.]’ ” (County of Sonoma (2012) PERB Dec. No. 2242-M, pp. 15–16.) 

We conclude PERB properly adhered to these principles in interpreting the 

MOU.

Articles 22 and 23 of the MOU6 described the wages and benefits 

afforded to court interpreters. Consistent with section 71808 of the 

Interpreter Act, article 22 set forth the agreed wages and compensation for 

interpreter employees on a region-wide basis. In turn, article 23 addressed 

the various benefits. While article 23 provided that holiday benefits for 

interpreters applied uniformly across all trial courts in Region 2, it specified 

that other benefits were available to interpreters at the same level as for 

6 All references to articles are to articles of the MOU.
20

other represented court employees, i.e., benefits regarding vacation; sick 

leave; leaves of absence; health, vision, dental, and other insurance; and 

retirement. Article 23.E, in particular, provided that each interpreter 

employee “shall be eligible to participate in the same retirement plan at the 

same benefit level as those non-management hourly represented employees of 

the local trial court. The level of benefit shall include but not necessarily be 

limited to, eligibility, vesting, employee contribution, regular retirement date, 

benefit formula, etc.”

Article 23.E also explicitly stated that the impact of any changes in 

retirement benefits “will be subject to meet and confer.” Notably, however, 

the article was silent as to whether impact negotiations must occur with the 

Committee at the regional level. But the obligation to meet and confer was 

set forth in article 4, section 1, which provided: “For the purpose of meet and 

confer under this agreement,” the “duly authorized representatives” shall be 

“the Chairperson of the [Committee] or his/her designee” and “the Executive 

Officer or Court Interpreter Unit Chair of [CFI] and his/her designee.” As 

PERB correctly reasoned, articles 4 and 23.E, considered together, make 

reasonably clear that the Committee was contractually obligated to meet and 

confer over the impact of changes to retirement benefits. We further note 

that, had the MOU intended to reflect an agreement for trial courts to meet 

and confer over such impacts, it could have said so just as it did for impacts of 

changes in other benefits.

7

7 Article 25, for example, provided: “Court-provided employee parking 

and reimbursement of parking and transit related expenses shall be 

maintained in accordance with each trial court’s practices. In the event that 

the local practice changes, the Court shall meet and confer regarding the 

impact of the changes in practices.” (Italics added.) 
21

The Committee’s contentions to the contrary are not persuasive. First, 

the Committee argues that article 4, section 1, permits its Chairperson to 

designate a trial court to act as its authorized representative for “the purpose 

of meet and confer” under the MOU. We disagree. As in the statutory 

context, the language of this article necessarily contemplates that the 

Chairperson’s designee could and would exercise the full scope of the 

Committee’s meet and confer authority under the MOU. But individual trial 

courts have no authority to negotiate wage increases to offset increased 

employee pension contributions. Accordingly, PERB properly found the 

Committee violated the MOU by refusing to meet and confer with CFI over 

EPMC change impacts.

The Committee alternatively contends the MOU should have been 

interpreted with reference to substantial evidence in the record that CFI and 

certain trial courts previously bargained at the local level over the impact of 

pension changes. (See County of Sonoma, supra, PERB Dec. No. 2242-M at 

p. 16 [“where the contract language is silent or ambiguous, the policy may be 

ascertained by examining past practice or bargaining history”].) In this 

regard, the Committee cites instances in 2008, 2014, and 2015 in which CFI 

met and conferred with Santa Cruz County Superior Court, Napa County 

Superior Court, and Contra Costa County Superior Court, respectively, over 

the impacts of EPMC reduction or elimination. This contention lacks merit.

To the extent the Committee’s claim is premised on the 2014 and 2015 

events in Napa County and Contra Costa County, which occurred while the 

MOU was in effect, the claim is undermined by the MOU itself. As a 

contractual matter, article 13, section 1 was express in providing: “The 

waiver of any breach, term or condition of this MOU by either party shall not 

constitute a precedent in the future enforcement of all its terms and 
22

provisions.” Thus, any instance of the parties agreeing to local bargaining in 

these instances did not result in a waiver of CFI’s contractual right to meet 

and confer with the Committee over future enforcement of the Committee’s 

obligations to bargain regionally over the impact of EPMC changes.

Nor is a different result compelled by any of the evidence connected to

the 2008 impact bargaining and arbitration decision involving the Santa 

Cruz interpreters. That 2008 bargaining occurred under a previous MOU, 

and CFI apparently assented to local impact bargaining with the Santa Cruz 

County Superior Court. Although that particular MOU is not in the record, 

the parties’ negotiations appear to have been permitted under section 

71801(e) of the Interpreter Act (see ante, at p. 15), since both CFI and the 

court evidently agreed to bargain locally without objection from the 

Committee. And contrary to the Committee’s suggestion, Arbitrator William 

E. Riker did not render an “interpretation” of article 23.E that is binding on 

PERB or the parties here. There is absolutely no indication in Riker’s 

decision that he was purporting to decide whether regional impact bargaining 

over pension changes was either statutorily or contractually required.

C. Unilateral Changes in Violation of the Duty to Bargain

Under PERB standards, to prevail on a complaint of illegal unilateral 

change, the charging party must establish: “ ‘(1) the employer breached or 

altered the parties’ written agreement, or own established past practice; 

(2) such action was taken without giving the exclusive representative notice 

or an opportunity to bargain over the change; (3) the change is not merely an 

isolated breach of the contract, but amounts to a change of policy, i.e., the 

change has a generalized effect or continuing impact on . . . terms and 

conditions of employment; and (4) the change in policy concerns a matter

within the scope of representation.’ ” (County of Fresno, supra, 51 
23

Cal.App.5th at p. 295; e.g., County of Kern (2018) PERB Dec. No. 2615-M, 

pp. 8–9.)

Here, PERB found that certain trial courts committed unfair practices 

under section 71825 by: (1) implementing EPMC changes prior to the 

completion of impact bargaining (Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara); 

(2) unilaterally changing the parties’ negotiated grievance procedure (Contra 

Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara); and (3) unilaterally eliminating 

a pension stipend (Santa Cruz). We address the Committee’s challenges to 

these findings in order.

1. Implementation of EPMC Changes Prior to Completion of 

Impact Bargaining: Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara 

County Superior Courts 

Generally, an employer must refrain from implementing a change 

impacting wages, hours, or terms or conditions of employment until impact 

bargaining has been completed to agreement or impasse. (County of Santa 

Clara (2013) PERB Dec. No. 2321-M, pp. 24-26, 30; see City of El Cajon v. El 

Cajon Police Officers’ Assn. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 64, 71–72.) But an 

employer that has negotiated in good faith may implement a change prior to 

the completion of bargaining if the implementation date was based upon an 

“immutable deadline” or “an important managerial interest, such that a delay 

in implementation beyond the date chosen would effectively undermine the 

employer’s right to make the nonnegotiable decision.” (Compton Community 

College District (1989) PERB Dec. No. 720, pp. 14–15.)

Here, PERB found the Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County 

Superior Courts unlawfully implemented changes to their respective EPMCs 

prior to the completion of regional impact bargaining. In contending this was 

error, the Committee highlights evidence in the record that: (1) the three 

courts each notified CFI of the EPMC changes to which the linked bargaining 
24

units in each court had agreed; (2) the courts made repeated offers to meet 

and confer before implementing the respective EPMC changes; and (3) CFI 

refused to meet and confer or offer any impact mitigation proposal. We are 

not persuaded.

While the record amply demonstrates the courts’ efforts to bargain the 

impacts of EPMC changes at a local level, we have already determined the 

Committee was statutorily and contractually obligated to bargain such 

impacts at the regional level. Thus, the courts should have waited for CFI 

and the Committee to complete regional bargaining over impacts before 

implementing the EPMC changes.

Indeed, CFI and the Committee did in fact engage in impact bargaining 

over the EPMC changes as part of successor MOU negotiations and 

completed the bargaining process in September 2017. But by that time, the 

Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts had already 

implemented their EPMC changes for the court interpreters. As for whether

implementation of the changes could not be delayed, PERB concluded to the 

contrary: “No evidence in the record shows that the Courts could not have 

waited until the completion of regional impact bargaining to implement the 

EPMC changes, or that their decision to make those changes would have 

been undermined by the delay.” 

The Committee’s reliance on Stockton Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of 

Stockton (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 62 and Metropolitan Water District of 

Southern California (2009) PERB Dec. No. 2055-M is misplaced. In those 

cases, the employee organizations failed to timely request to meet and confer 

after they were notified of the employers’ intent to make changes and thus 

waived their bargaining rights. Here, however, there is no question that CFI 

timely demanded to meet and confer regionally with the Committee.
25

In sum, the record supports PERB’s finding that these courts 

committed an unfair practice under the Interpreter Act by unilaterally 

implementing their EPMC changes prior to the completion of regional impact 

bargaining.

2. Unilateral Change of Grievance Procedure: Contra Costa, 

Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts

An employer may not unilaterally repudiate or add terms to an existing 

collective bargaining agreement. (See Stanislaus Consolidated Fire 

Protection District (2012) PERB Dec. No. 2231-M, pp. 13–17.) Grievance 

procedures generally fall within the scope of representation (County of 

Riverside (2003) PERB Dec. No. 1577-M, p. 6), and an employer’s failure or 

refusal to process a grievance in accordance with collectively bargained 

grievance procedures may constitute an unlawful unilateral change (E.g., 

Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2019) PERB Dec. No. 2658-M, pp. 1–2; 

Omnitrans (2010) PERB Dec. No. 2143-M, pp. 6–8).

Pursuant to article 9 of the MOU,

8 on April 1, 2016, CFI filed a 

grievance with the Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County 

Superior Courts alleging the courts had notified CFI they had or were in the 

process of changing EPMCs for the interpreters. Citing articles 13 and 23.E, 

as well as the Committee’s March 9, 2016, written refusal to bargain over 

those changes on a regional basis, CFI claimed it was contractually entitled 

to regional negotiations and offsetting benefits equivalent to those the courts 

had provided to linked bargaining units. Although CFI also named the 

8 Article 9 contained a three-step procedure for resolving grievances 

arising under the MOU that started with a process for possible informal 

resolution and ultimately provided for binding arbitration. As defined in the 

article, a “ ‘grievance’ ” referred to “a dispute of one or more employees, or 

[CFI] involving the interpretation, application or the enforcement of the 

express terms of this MOU.” 
26

Committee in its grievance allegations, it did not file the grievance with the 

Committee based on the belief that article 9 did not allow CFI to file

grievances on a regional basis. (PERB Dec. at pp. 18-19, fn. 14.) 

Each of the four courts individually denied the grievance as premature, 

with some claiming they had neither commenced nor completed the meet and 

confer process over pension cost sharing with the linked bargaining unit in 

their courts. The Contra Costa and Marin County Superior Courts 

additionally asserted they had been meeting with CFI over pension cost 

sharing changes agreed to by the linked bargaining unit and had not made 

any changes. All four courts expressed a willingness to meet and confer with 

CFI regarding the impacts of any pension cost sharing changes at the 

appropriate time. But none of the courts held any meetings with CFI over its 

grievance. (PERB Dec. at p. 21.)

As PERB observed, the Committee clearly stated in writing to CFI that 

its refusal to bargain regionally over the impacts of EPMC changes was not 

grievable “ ‘because Article 23.E clearly establishes the agreement between 

the [parties] that such bargaining shall occur at each [trial] court.’ ” (PERB 

Dec. at p. 54.) In alignment with the Committee’s position, the four courts 

rejected CFI’s grievance on the ground the matter was simply not subject to 

the article 9 grievance procedures. As PERB reasonably concluded, the 

courts’ rejection essentially indicated that future grievances over such 

changes would be rejected outright. Where, as here, the failure to process 

CFI’s grievances has “a generalized effect or continuing impact” on the terms 

and conditions of employment for CFI members across the various courts, an 

unlawful unilateral change of policy may be found. (See Omnitrans, supra,

PERB Dec. No. 2143-M at pp. 7–8.)
27

In this court, the Committee complains PERB failed to consider the 

Committee’s evidence and argument that the trial courts’ rejection of the 

grievance was based on the circumstance that pension cost sharing changes 

had not yet been implemented as to the interpreters or even as to the linked 

bargaining units in some instances. Such circumstance, the Committee 

claims, rendered CFI’s grievance anticipatory and not yet ripe for processing 

through the grievance procedure. Citing Hacienda La Puente Unified School 

District (1997) PERB Dec. No. 1187 (Hacienda), the Committee argues the 

courts’ denial of a premature grievance did not amount to an impermissible 

change or repudiation of grievance procedure.

The Committee’s reliance on Hacienda is misplaced. Hacienda

determined that a school district did not unilaterally change a grievance 

process where the facts established its conformance to a past practice to 

which it had consistently adhered over an extended period of time. 

(Hacienda, supra, PERB Dec. No. 1187, at p. 2, pp. 13–16 of the adopted 

ALJ’s decision in Hacienda.) Here, the record is devoid of evidence indicating 

the courts’ past practice of rejecting a grievance without adhering to

article 9’s grievance procedures. More to the point, the courts were firm in 

their refusal to meet and process CFI’s charge that it was contractually 

entitled to regional negotiations over the impacts of EPMC changes, and the

record contains no indication the courts would consider meeting with CFI and 

processing such grievance at any point in time. Because PERB’s factual 

findings are supported by substantial evidence based on the whole of the 

record, we shall not disturb its determination that the courts unilaterally 

implemented a change in policy by repudiating article 9’s grievance 

procedures without first affording CFI notice and then the opportunity to be 

heard over that change. (See Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 912.) 
28

3. Change of Past Practice Regarding Pension Stipend: Santa 

Cruz County Superior Court

Under PERB precedent, an established policy can take the form of an 

established past practice. (County of Riverside (2013) PERB Dec. No. 2307-

M, p. 20.) An established past practice has been described as a practice that

is “unequivocal, clearly enunciated and acted upon, and readily ascertainable 

over a reasonable period of time as a fixed and established practice accepted 

by both parties,” or a practice that is “ ‘regular and consistent,’ ” or “ ‘historic 

and accepted.’ ” (Id. at p. 20.) When an employee bargaining unit first learns 

of a negotiable change to an established practice in circumstances where the 

employer indicates “it has no intention of entering into negotiations with an 

open mind,” then “by definition, there has been inadequate notice.” (City of 

Sacramento (2013) PERB Dec. No. 2351-M, p. 33.) 

In 2007, CFI filed a grievance against Santa Cruz County Superior 

Court, alleging court interpreters were entitled to the same one-time wage 

increase that employees in the linked bargaining unit received to offset the 

court’s pension contribution changes. The grievance was submitted to 

Arbitrator William E. Riker for final and binding arbitration. In June 2009, 

Arbitrator Riker awarded “a retroactive monetary ‘pension offset leave 

benefit’ ” to continue at least until expiration of the then-operative MOU 

between the trial court and the linked bargaining unit, Service Employees 

International Union, Local 521. Although that MOU expired in October 

2010, “the court continued to pay the stipend to court interpreters through 

2017.” In June 2017, the court decided to end the stipend and informed CFI 

it would stop such payments. 

Here, the evidence that the Santa Cruz Superior Court consistently 

paid the stipend to its interpreters over the course of eight years after the 

operative MOU expired in 2010 substantially supports PERB’s finding that 
29

the stipend payments constituted “a binding past practice.” Thus, we defer to 

that finding. (§ 71825.1, subd. (b); Boling, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 912.) The 

record and relevant PERB authority also support PERB’s findings that “[t]he 

amount employees pay toward their pension benefits is within the scope of 

representation because it has a direct effect on wages” (see Clovis Unified 

School District (2002) PERB Dec. No. 1504, pp. 17–18); the court’s June 2017 

elimination of the stipend was therefore a change that involved a matter 

within the scope of representation; and the decision to stop paying the 

stipend had a generalized effect and continuing impact on the affected 

employees. Because the court made no offer to meet and confer before 

notifying CFI that it would end the stipend payments, we agree with PERB

that the court acted unilaterally and unlawfully in making that change. (City 

of Sacramento, supra, PERB Dec. No. 2351-M, p. 33.)

In challenging PERB’s findings, the Committee first argues that PERB 

lacked jurisdiction to decide that the Santa Cruz Superior Court unlawfully 

changed its past practice of paying a stipend because the ALJ did not make a 

finding on this issue and CFI failed to take exception to the ALJ’s failure to 

do so. While the Committee correctly notes that an exception not specifically

identified generally is waived (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32300, subd. (c), 

32635, subd. (b); County of Ventura (Office of Agricultural Commissioner)

(2011) PERB Dec. No. 2227-M, p. 2), PERB is statutorily authorized to review 

unappealed matters and may consider sua sponte legal issues not raised by 

the parties. (§ 71825, subd. (b); § 3541.3, subd. (i); Cal. Code Regs, tit. 8, 

§ 32320, subd. (a)(2) [PERB may “take such other action as it considers 

proper” in reaching a decision]; State Employees Trades Council United 

(2009) PERB Dec. No. 2069-H, pp. 6–7; Antelope Valley Community College 

District (1981) PERB Dec. No. 168, p. 5, fn. 5.) Here, the Committee makes 
30

no claim that PERB could not properly make a de novo finding on the stipend 

matter based on the administrative record or that its finding was improper 

due to a deficient or undeveloped record. Thus, we reject the Committee’s 

jurisdictional challenge.

Turning to the merits, the Committee next contends the court’s ceasing 

of the stipend payment was not a unilateral change because the court acted 

in compliance with Arbitrator Riker’s 2009 order and explicit 

acknowledgement that he could not order payment of the stipend beyond 

2010, when the MOU at issue expired. While a unilateral change might not 

have been at issue had the court ended the stipend upon expiration of the 

MOU, the very fact that the court regularly and consistently paid the stipend 

to the interpreter employees for another eight years after the MOU’s 

expiration is what elevated the conduct to an enforceable, established past 

practice that the court then unilaterally and unlawfully terminated (County 

of Riverside, supra, PERB Dec. No. 2307-M at p. 20).

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of extraordinary relief is denied. CFI is awarded 

its costs on appeal.
31

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Petrou, J.

_________________________

Chou, J.*

A159985/Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee v. PERB

* Judge of the Superior Court of San Mateo County, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.