UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

AUBREY E. HENRY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING

COMMISSION; SCOTT COYLE,

Commission Member, in his

individual capacity; H. RICHARD

FLAHERTY, Commission Member, in

his individual capacity; PAUL

GRIGER, Commission Member, in

his individual capacity; SAM

DONLEY, Commission Member, in

his individual capacity; JIM KNODE,

No. 99-2122

Commission Member, in his

individual capacity; ERNIE BENNER,

Commission Member, in his

individual capacity; GILBERT PAGE

WRIGHT, Commission Member, in

his individual capacity; LYLE

CAMPBELL TABB, Commission

Member, in his individual capacity;

PAUL J. RACO, Director of Planning

and Zoning, in his individual and

official capacity; JEFFERSON COUNTY;

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARDOF ZONING

APPEALS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg.

W. Craig Broadwater, District Judge.

(CA-96-40-3)
Argued: April 7, 2000

Decided: June 9, 2000

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge,

and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per

curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: John Christian Yoder, Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, for

Appellant. Michael Douglas Lorensen, BOWLES, RICE,

MCDAVID, GRAFF & LOVE, P.L.L.C., Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Aubrey Henry (Henry) sued Jefferson County, West Virginia, the

Jefferson County Planning Commission, its individual members, and

the Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals (collectively the

County), in the United States District Court for the Northern District

of West Virginia, challenging the denial of his application for a conditional use permit to build a townhouse development on property he

owned in Jefferson County. Henry asserted five claims, including a

takings claim, a substantive due process claim, two equal protection

claims, and a procedural due process claim. The district court dis-

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missed all but the procedural due process claim on the ground of Burford abstention. With respect to the remaining claim, the district court

granted the County's motion for summary judgment. For reasons that

follow, we vacate the district court's dismissal of the takings claim,

the substantive due process claim, and the two equal protection claims

and remand those claims for further proceedings. However, we affirm

the district court's grant of the County's motion for summary judgment with respect to the procedural due process claim.

I

On July 7, 1988, Jefferson County adopted the Jefferson County

Zoning and Development Review Ordinance (the Zoning Ordinance)

which, among other things, zoned certain areas of Jefferson County

as a Rural-Agricultural District. The purpose of the RuralAgricultural District "is to provide a location for low density single

family residential development in conjunction with providing continued farming activities." Jefferson County, W. Va., Zoning and Development Review Ordinance § 5.13 (1990) (amending the original

enactment of July 7, 1988). "A primary function of the low density

residential development permitted within [the Rural-Agricultural District] is to preserve the rural character of the County and the agricultural community." Id. The Zoning Ordinance provides a list of sixteen

permitted uses allowed in the Rural-Agricultural District, see id.

§ 5.7(a), and eight prohibited uses, see id. § 4.4. Uses that are not

expressly permitted, but also not expressly prohibited, are allowed if

the property owner can obtain a conditional use permit from the Jefferson County Planning Commission (the Commission) via the Development Review System contained in the Zoning Ordinance. See id.

§ 4.1.

The Development Review System consists of two to four stages:

(1) application for a conditional use permit by the property owner to

the Commission; (2) evaluation by the Commission's staff of the

application, under the point system contained in Article 6 of the Zoning Ordinance, to determine whether the property at issue is better

used for agricultural purposes as opposed to residential, commercial,

or industrial development; (3) if the application receives a numerical

score indicating that the property qualifies for possible residential,

commercial, or industrial development, the Commission's staff holds

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a compatibility assessment meeting (at which the public is allowed to

comment) to determine the compatibility of the proposed development to the "existing areas adjacent to the site" and to the nature of

the zoned district involved; and (4) if any compatibility issues remain

unresolved after the compatibility assessment meeting, the Commission holds public hearings to discuss the unresolved issues. See id. art.

7, §§ 7.3-7.7. After completion of the requisite stages, the Commission formally votes to grant or deny the application for the permit. See

id. § 7.6(g).

Pursuant to section 7.6 of the Zoning Ordinance, the compatibility

of the proposed development at issue to the areas adjacent to the site

and to the nature of the zoned district involved is determined by,

among other things, the following criteria: (1) compatibility with federal, state, and local regulations; (2) similarity of the proposed development type (residential, commercial, or industrial) to existing

development types; (3) the adequacy of roads and highways to

accommodate the traffic to be generated by the development; (4) the

present and future transportation patterns in the area; (5) the consistency with land-use plans and regulations of incorporated municipalities immediately adjacent to the proposed development; (6) any

variance which is known to be required at the time the application is

submitted; and (7) all items submitted with the application. See id.

§ 7.6(b).

Henry is the part-owner of 11.69 acres of real property, known as

the Town Run Property (the Town Run Property), located on U.S.

Highway 480 in Jefferson County, West Virginia. In 1994, Henry

developed a plan to build seventy-six townhouses on 9.8 acres of the

Town Run Property, with the remainder reserved for two singlefamily dwellings. Of relevance to this appeal, townhouses are not

listed as a permitted or prohibited use in the Rural-Agricultural District. Because townhouse development is not a permitted use in the

Rural-Agricultural District, Henry was required to seek a conditional

use permit in order to proceed with his plan.

On January 25, 1994, Henry filed an application with the Commission requesting a conditional use permit for the proposed development of seventy-six townhouses on the Town Run Property (the

Application or Henry's Application). The Application stated that the

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development "in many ways conforms to parts of the comprehensive

plan for Jefferson County." (J.A. 66). The Application further stated

that the development would help to "eliminate sprawl by concentrating 76 units on 9.80 acres of land." Id. The Application indicated that

parts of the Town Run Property were located adjacent to residential

subdivisions.

As required in the Zoning Ordinance, the Commission's staff evaluated the Application under the point system contained in Article 6

of the Zoning Ordinance. As a result, the Commission's staff assigned

the Application a total of 39.04 points, which qualified it for a compatibility assessment meeting. The Commission's staff held such a

meeting on March 23, 1994, during which neighbors raised concerns

about the proposed townhouse development. Opponents to the development expressed concerns about the development's incompatibility

with the surrounding neighborhood and the possible impact on a

nearby stream, wetlands, and an adjacent recreational park.

Taking the neighbors' concerns into consideration, the Commission's staff formulated an assessment of the Application outlining

twenty-one conditions that, if complied with, would alleviate the

neighbors' concerns. For example, the assessment required Henry to

erect an eight-foot fence along one side of the Town Run Property,

to provide lighting that would not glare onto the adjacent recreational

park, and to provide an area for the pets of townhouse residents to

defecate. Of the twenty-one conditions outlined, Henry only agreed

to comply with five. The Commission's staff, therefore, listed the

remaining sixteen as "unresolved" compatibility issues.

The Commission conducted public hearings on the unresolved

compatibility issues on April 26, 1994, and May 24, 1994. At each

hearing, opponents of the Application voiced concern about, among

other things, the density of the townhouse development and its effects

on traffic, the low-density nature of the Rural-Agricultural District,

sewage, schools, and the use of the adjacent recreational park. At the

close of the May 24, 1994 public hearing, the Commission voted to

deny the Application. The Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals

(the Board) affirmed the Commission's decision.

 5
Henry appealed the Application's denial to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, which affirmed. Henry then appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which, on November 21, 1997,

reversed the Circuit Court's affirmance and remanded the case to the

Board for more particular findings of fact. See Henry v. Jefferson

County Planning Comm'n, 496 S.E.2d 239, 242 (W. Va. 1997). On

remand, the Board entered a decision and order on March 19, 1998,

setting forth detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Of note,

the Board concluded that "the proposed townhouse project fails to be

compatible with the housing developments in close proximity as a

result of the vast disparity in the relative density. . . and the character

of the housing."1 (J.A. 84). Further, the Board concluded that "the

proposed townhouse project is a high-density multi-family project and

is not in conformity with the purpose of the Rural-Agricultural District." Id. Therefore, the Board denied the Application.

On April 17, 1998, Henry filed a petition with the Jefferson County

Circuit Court seeking review of the Board's March 19, 1998 decision

and order. On August 31, 1998, the Circuit Court affirmed the Board

again. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals subsequently

denied Henry's petition for certiorari of this affirmance.

During the pendency of Henry's state court litigation, he also pursued the present federal court litigation. Specifically, on May 24,

1996, Henry filed this action.2 On November 22, 1996, the district

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1 The Board made a factual finding that Henry's proposed townhouse

development "is located in close proximity to two other housing developments, Ledge Lowe Estates and Morgana, which consist of single family

homes on lots of 2 acres or more." (J.A. 82).

2 Of relevance to one of Henry's arguments on appeal, on September

19, 1996, over two years after the denial of Henry's Application for a

conditional use permit, the Commission approved a conditional use permit for the Lowe project. The Lowe project proposed to build a conference center with 174 sleeping rooms and amenities on 70.52 acres. The

Lowe project was located approximately 115 yards across U.S. Highway

480 from the Town Run Property but was zoned in the ResidentialGrowth District. "The Residential-Growth District is intended to provide

for a variety of residential uses and densities which can be supported by

central or public water and sewer and adequate roadways and services."

Zoning and Development Review Ordinance § 5.4. Further, the

Residential-Growth District "encourages commercial growth." Id.

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court stayed its proceedings pending a decision by the West Virginia

Supreme Court of Appeals in the state court litigation. After the West

Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued its decision on November

21, 1997, Henry moved to lift the stay and for permission to file an

amended complaint. The district court granted both motions.

Henry's amended complaint alleges the following five claims

based upon the County's denial of the Application: (1) the County

took his property without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

as applied to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the

County violated his right to substantive due process under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) the Commission

lacked a rational basis for its denial, and therefore, violated the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) the Commission

sought to prevent members of a suspect class from obtaining affordable housing, and therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause; and

(5) the County violated his right to procedural due process under the

Due Process Clause. Given that the state court litigation was still

pending at that time, the County moved to dismiss all five claims on

the ground of Burford abstention.3 

On September 24, 1998, based upon the Burford abstention doctrine, the district court dismissed, without prejudice, all of Henry's

claims but the procedural due process claim. The County then moved

for summary judgment on that claim, which the district court granted

on July 21, 1999. Henry timely filed this appeal challenging the district court's disposition of all of his claims. 4

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3 In Burford v. Sun Oil Co. , 319 U.S. 315 (1943), the Court held that

although a federal district court sitting in equity possesses subject matter

jurisdiction over a civil action, it may, in its sound discretion, refuse to

exercise such jurisdiction in certain circumstances if abstention is necessary to show "proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in carrying out their domestic policy." Id. at 317-18 (quotation

marks omitted).

4 After the district court's dismissal of Henry's takings claim, his substantive due process claim, and his two equal protection claims, on

March 23, 1999, Henry filed a new complaint in federal district court

reasserting these same claims. This new lawsuit challenges precisely the

same conduct alleged in the dismissed counts but has been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.

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II

We first address Henry's challenge to the district court's dismissal,

based upon the Burford abstention doctrine, of his takings claim, his

substantive due process claim, and his two equal protection claims.

As stated previously, under the Burford abstention doctrine, although

a federal district court sitting in equity possesses subject matter jurisdiction over a civil action, it may, in its sound discretion, refuse to

exercise such jurisdiction in certain circumstances if abstention is

necessary to show "proper regard for the rightful independence of

state governments in carrying out their domestic policy." 319 U.S. at

317-18 (quotation marks omitted). Significantly, a federal district

court's discretionary authority to dismiss a civil action under the Burford abstention doctrine is limited to civil actions where the relief

sought by the plaintiff is equitable or otherwise discretionary. See

Quackenbush v. AllState Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728-31 (1996); Front

Royal v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 282 (4th Cir. 1998).5 We

do note, however, that "Burford might support a federal court's decision to postpone adjudication of a damages action pending the resolution by the state courts of a disputed question of state law."

Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 730-31.

Because Henry has sought only monetary relief with respect to his

takings claim, his substantive due process claim, and his two equal

protection claims, the district court lacked the authority to dismiss

those claims on the basis of the Burford abstention doctrine. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's September 24, 1998 order dismissing those claims and remand to the district court for further

proceedings.6

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5 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Quackenbush, we held in a

case involving money damages, see Pomponio v. Fauquier County Bd.

of Supervisors, 21 F.3d 1319 (4th Cir. 1994), that "the appropriate course

of action in a Burford abstention case is to dismiss the suit." Id. at 1328.

In dismissing Henry's takings claim, substantive due process claim, and

two equal protection claims, the district court apparently relied upon this

now overruled portion of Pomponio.

6 We note that Henry has refiled these counts in a different case and

that the district court has stayed its proceedings in that case pending the

outcome of this appeal. On remand, the district court maintains the discretion to manage its docket and consolidate these claims if appropriate,

or stay the present action pending final disposition of the state court proceedings.

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III

Henry next argues that the district court erred in granting the County's motion for summary judgment on his procedural due process

claim. We disagree.

In relevant part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State

shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. According to Henry, the

Zoning Ordinance deprives him of his property rights with respect to

the Town Run Property without due process of law, and therefore,

violates the Due Process Clause. Specifically, Henry argues the Zoning Ordinance is so vague that it fails to provide a property owner

with sufficient notice and warning as to what requirements must be

met in order to obtain a conditional use permit, thereby affording the

Commission unbridled and unlimited discretion in determining

whether to grant or deny such a permit. As the precise source of this

alleged unbridled and unlimited discretion, Henry identifies what he

characterizes as the Zoning Ordinance's alleged lack of sufficiently

specific criteria to determine the compatibility of the proposed development at issue with the areas adjacent to it and to the nature of the

zoned district involved.

The doctrine of vagueness in the due process context is based upon

the notion that the Due Process Clause requires an enactment to provide individuals with fair notice and warning as to what it requires.

See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). At

one time, "[t]he idea that excessive vagueness of an enactment violates due process [was] pretty much limited to criminal and other

penal statutes and regulations." Baer v. City of Wauwatosa, 716 F.2d

1117, 1123 (7th Cir. 1983). That idea, however, has since been

extended to licensing ordinances, see Village of Hoffman Estates v.

Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499-500 (1982); Baer,

716 F.2d at 1123-24, and zoning ordinances, see Cornerstone Bible

Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 1991); Williams v. City of Columbia, 906 F.2d 994, 998 (4th Cir. 1990).

Whether a challenged statutory enactment is unconstitutionally vague

is a legal question, which we review de novo. See Roach v. West Virginia Reg'l Jail & Correctional Facility Auth., 74 F.3d 46, 48 (4th

 9
Cir. 1996); see also Mason v. Florida Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 955 (11th

Cir. 2000).

In addressing Henry's vagueness challenge, we must determine

whether the challenged portions of the Zoning Ordinance are sufficiently clear "to `give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable

opportunity to know what is prohibited,' and to`provide explicit standards for those who apply them.'" General Media Communications,

Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 286 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Grayned v.

City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)); see Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498 (same). In making this determination,

we are mindful that we have previously opined that the amount of discretion afforded a zoning board in determining whether a particular

land use is permissible is exceptionally high because zoning is an

inherently discretionary system. See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v.

Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir.

1999); Gardner v. City of Baltimore Mayor & City Council, 969 F.2d

63, 67 (4th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that land-use decisions are a core

function of local government and that subdivision control is an inherently discretionary system). We are also mindful that "[v]agueness

challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment interests are

examined in light of the facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged

on an as-applied basis."7 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361

(1988).

Contrary to Henry's argument, we conclude that the Zoning Ordinance contains sufficiently specific criteria to determine the compatibility of his proposed townhouse development with the areas adjacent

to the Town Run Property and with the nature of the RuralAgricultural District such that Henry is not without sufficient notice

and warning as to the requirements he must meet in order to obtain

the conditional use permit he seeks. Critically, the language and structure of the Zoning Ordinance leaves no doubt that the granting of a

conditional use permit turns upon whether the proposed development

at issue is compatible with the areas adjacent to the property at issue

and to the nature of the zoned district involved. Logically, the word

"compatible," as used in the Zoning Ordinance, has only one mean-

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7 It is undisputed that the Zoning Ordinance does not threaten Henry's

First Amendment rights.

 10
ing: "capable of existing or living together in harmony." The Random

House Dictionary of the English Language 417 (1998); see Webster's

Third New International Dictionary 463 (1986) ("capable of existing

together without discord or disharmony"). Henry has made no argument suggesting otherwise. Thus, under the Zoning Ordinance, Henry

should not be granted a conditional use permit unless his proposed

townhouse development is capable of existing in harmony with the

areas adjacent to the Town Run Property and with the nature of the

Rural-Agricultural District.

Furthermore, the language and structure of the Zoning Ordinance

leaves a reasonable person no doubt as to the criteria that would be

used in determining whether Henry's proposed townhouse development is in harmony with, i.e., compatible with, the areas adjacent to

the Town Run Property and with the nature of the Rural-Agricultural

District. Section 7.6 of the Zoning Ordinance expressly provides that,

in the compatibility assessment meeting, Henry was required to "address the compatibility of his project to the existing areas adjacent to"

the Town Run Property. Zoning and Development Review Ordinance

§ 7.6(a). Section 7.6 further specifies eight criteria, which "those who

participate [in the compatibility assessment meeting] should address,

but are not limited to." Id. § 7.6(b).

Section 7.6(b) of the Zoning Ordinance specifies that the compatibility of the proposed development is determined by the "[s]imilarity

of proposed development type . . . to existing development types," the

compatibility of the proposed development with federal, state, and

local regulations, the adequacy of roads and highways to accommodate the proposed development, the present and future transportation

patterns in the area, the consistency of the proposed development with

land-use plans and regulations of adjacent municipalities, any variances required, and the relationship of the proposed development to

the Zoning Ordinance's plan for the Rural-Agricultural District. Id.

We emphasize that this last specified criteria provides a clear

benchmark for determining whether Henry's proposed development

is compatible with the purpose and function of the Rural-Agricultural

District. The Zoning Ordinance states that the purpose of the RuralAgricultural District "is to provide a location for low density singlefamily residential development in conjunction with providing contin-

 11
ued farming activities." Id. § 5.13 (emphasis added). Accordingly,

"[a] primary function of the low density residential development permitted within a [Rural-Agricultural District] is to preserve the rural

character of the County and the agricultural community." Id. (emphasis added). These statements give a reasonable person notice and

warning that a proposed development such as Henry's, which he does

not dispute is a high-density residential development, would not be in

harmony with, and thus not compatible with, the nature of the RuralAgricultural District.

We also know, pursuant to the Zoning Ordinance, that certain uses

are permitted in the Rural-Agricultural District while others are prohibited. Obviously, the more similar a use in a proposed development

is to a permitted use, the more compatible the use will be with the

nature of the Rural-Agricultural District. Thus, where the Zoning

Ordinance specifies as permitted uses single-family dwellings, home

occupations, riding stables, child or elderly care facilities with four or

less individuals, forestry, and small markets for the sale of farm produce; a reasonable person would have notice and warning that a highdensity multi-family townhouse development is not similar to any

permitted use and would not be in harmony with the nature of the

Rural-Agricultural District.8

Finally, Henry argues that the language in section 7.6, allowing the

Commission to consider other criteria than those specified, provides

"absolutely no guidance or standard as to what other criteria may be

considered." (Appellant's Br. at 40). We disagree. It is clear from the

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8 Henry points to the Commission's grant of a conditional use permit

for the Lowe project, in September 1996, as evidence that the Zoning

Ordinance does not provide sufficient standards for determining compatibility. We disagree. First, the Lowe project was located in the

Residential-Growth District, which "is intended to provide for a variety

of residential uses and densities," and "encourages commercial growth."

Zoning and Development Review Ordinance § 5.4. Second, the Commission considered and approved the application for the Lowe project over

two years after Henry's Application was denied. In sum, the grant of a

conditional use permit to the Lowe project has no relevance to the issue

of whether Henry had fair notice and warning of what requirements he

had to meet to build a townhouse development on the Town Run Property in the Rural-Agricultural District in 1994.

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language of the Zoning Ordinance that the eight specified criteria in

section 7.6(b) are factors to be considered in determining whether

Henry's proposed development is (1) in harmony with the areas adjacent to it, i.e., adjacent developments, adjacent roads and highways,

and adjacent municipalities, or (2) in harmony with the nature of the

Rural-Agricultural District, i.e., federal, state, and local laws governing the Rural-Agricultural District, any variance required by the

Rural-Agricultural District, and the relationship of Henry's proposed

development to the overall Zoning Ordinance. A reasonable person

reading that language would have notice and warning that the Zoning

Ordinance implies that any other criteria the Commission considers

is similar to the specified criteria and addresses whether the proposed

development is in harmony with areas adjacent to it and in harmony

with the nature of the Rural-Agricultural District. See Hughey v.

United States, 495 U.S. 411, 419 (1990) (noting that "the principle of

ejusdem generis [provides] that a general statutory term should be

understood in light of the specific terms that surround it").

In sum, the compatibility criteria specified and clearly implied in

section 7.6 of the Zoning Ordinance, the express purpose and primary

function of the Rural-Agricultural District, and the inherently objective nature of a compatibility determination is more than sufficient to

provide Henry with sufficient notice and warning as to what requirements he must meet in order to obtain a conditional use permit. Thus,

the Zoning Ordinance does not provide the Commission unbridled

and unlimited discretion in determining whether to grant or deny

Henry a conditional use permit as he contends. See Cornerstone, 948

F.2d at 473-74 ("The city council has established the zoning policy

and objectives for each zone and has enumerated a comprehensive list

of permitted uses. . . . The city's statement of objectives, along with

available review procedures, sufficiently constrains the city planner's

discretion."); Williams, 906 F.2d at 998 (holding that a zoning board's

discretion was not unbridled and standardless where the criteria to be

used in deciding whether to grant an exception to the ordinance were

"contained in . . . the City's zoning ordinance and include `adverse

impact of the proposed use on the aesthetic character of the environs'"). Because we discern no violation of the Due Process Clause

in this case, we affirm the district court's grant of the County's

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motion for summary judgment with respect to Henry's procedural due

process claim.9

IV

In sum, we hold the district court erred in dismissing, under the

Burford abstention doctrine, Henry's takings claim, his substantive

due process claim, and his two equal protection claims. Accordingly,

we vacate the district court's September 24, 1998 order dismissing

those claims and remand for further proceedings. However, we reject

Henry's procedural due process challenge to the Zoning Ordinance

premised upon the doctrine of vagueness, and therefore, affirm the

district court's grant of the County's motion for summary judgment.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED 

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9 We note that Henry's procedural due process claim does not directly

attack the Commission's determination that his proposed townhouse

development is incompatible with the existing uses of property adjacent

to the Town Run Property and the purpose and function of the RuralAgricultural District. Rather, such an attack is the subject of his substantive due process claim, which we remand for further proceedings without

addressing its merit.

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