Present: All the Justices 

CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 

v. Record No. 971746 April 17, 1998 

GIANT SQUARE SHOPPING 

CENTER COMPANY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 

 The main appellate issue in this eminent domain case is whether 

the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike for 

cause a prospective commissioner. An additional issue involves 

refusal of a proposed instruction. 

 Appellant City of Virginia Beach instituted in 1994 eminent 

domain proceedings against two parcels of land owned by appellee 

Giant Square Shopping Center Company, a general partnership. The 

City took the property in connection with the widening of 

Independence Boulevard adjacent to the appellee’s shopping center. 

The two actions were consolidated. 

 During the April 1997 trial, the court denied the City’s motion 

to strike for cause prospective commissioner George R. C. McGuire. 

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court refused to give 

proposed instruction B, tendered by the City. Following 

deliberations, the commissioners filed a report fixing the value of 

the land taken at $129,700 and the damage to the residue at 

$335,000. After overruling the City’s exceptions and denying its 
motion for a new trial, the trial court confirmed the report in a 

May 1997 judgment order, from which we awarded the City this appeal. 

The City assigns error to the seating of McGuire and to the refusal 

of the instruction. 

 The facts are undisputed. The partnership (hereinafter, the 

landowners) consisted of a trust and six individuals, including D. 

L. McKnight. Attorney Grover C. Wright, Jr., represented the 

landowners at trial. 

 During voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective 

commissioners as a group the following two questions in succession: 

“Do any of you have any business associations or are you in any 

joint ventures or business ventures with any of the owners of this 

property? Have any of you worked in any capacity with any of these 

landowners?” McGuire responded, “I’ve used Mr. McKnight as an 

appraiser.” 

 Later, the court asked the group, “Are any of you acquainted 

with any of the lawyers involved in this case?” McGuire responded, 

“Mr. Wright is my attorney, and I know [the City’s attorney], and I 

don’t think there is anything that would affect my decision.” The 

court then stated: “Mr. McGuire I believe said that he has been a 

client of Mr. Wright. Have any of the rest of you ever been a 

client of Mr. Wright?” The court immediately asked eight additional 

questions in succession, the first of which was: “Anybody currently 
a client of Mr. Wright?” McGuire did not respond to any of these 

questions. 

 Next, the court asked: “Have you ever had any of your property 

acquired by the city?” McGuire responded: “We had some 

negotiations with the city and they acquired some land which they 

paid for.” To the court’s question: “Would that experience affect 

your ability to be fair and impartial to both sides in this case,” 

McGuire answered: “No, sir.” 

 At this point during the voir dire, the court granted the 

City’s motion for individual examination of the prospective 

commissioners out of the presence of the others. Then, the City’s 

attorney called McGuire for “follow-up questions.” During 

examination by the City, McGuire said that his earlier reference to 

prior “negotiations” with the City actually entailed “negotiations 

followed by a purchase” and “a condemnation trial” involving land 

owned by “Indian River Associates,” a partnership in which McGuire 

had a one-third interest. According to McGuire, attorney Wright 

represented that partnership at trial, held “[t]wo years, three 

years” prior, and “[m]y appraiser was Mr. McKnight.” McGuire stated 

he sat in the courtroom as the representative of the partnership 

during the “entire” trial of the prior case. At the conclusion of 

his interrogation, McGuire answered affirmatively the court’s 

question whether he “could be fair and impartial to both sides in 

this case.” 
 As noted, the court denied the City’s request to strike McGuire 

for cause. He served as one of the five commissioners. McKnight, 

whose interest in the Giant Square partnership was 12 1⁄2 percent, 

testified as an appraiser for the landowners. 

 On appeal, the City argues “McGuire should have been struck for 

cause from the panel of commissioners because of his previous, 

close, relationship with the landowner and its counsel in nearly 

identical circumstances.” The landowners contend the “trial court 

in the instant matter was correct not to disqualify Dr. McGuire 

automatically. The correct procedure was to conduct a voir dire 

examination and assess from his demeanor and answers to questions 

posed whether he could serve impartially. Having done so, the trial 

court was well within the bounds of its discretion when it concluded 

that Dr. McGuire was unbiased and impartial.” We disagree with the 

landowners. 

 The principles applicable are settled. Code § 25-46.20 

provides that when, as here, the issue of just compensation is to be 

determined by a commission, “disinterested freeholders” shall act as 

commissioners. Discussing the disqualification of condemnation 

commissioners for cause, we have said the maintenance of public 

confidence in the integrity of commission reports is vital. “[S]uch 

reports should be kept free from the suspicion that the 

commissioners may have been improperly influenced.” May v. 

Crockett, 202 Va. 438, 440, 117 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1961). Accord
Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. DuVal, 238 Va. 679, 683, 385 S.E.2d 

605, 607 (1989). The eminent domain statutes, designed to implement 

constitutional mandates, “must be administered in a manner which 

promotes confidence in the integrity of the process.” State Highway 

and Transp. Comm’r v. Dennison, 231 Va. 239, 242, 343 S.E.2d 324, 

326 (1986). 

 However, the trial court is given discretionary authority to 

decide whether a prospective commissioner should be stricken for 

cause, and the court’s judgment on this issue will not be reversed 

on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. Chadwell, 254 Va. 302, 305-06, 491 

S.E.2d 723, 725 (1997). 

 Considering all the circumstances of this case, we hold the 

trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss McGuire 

from the panel for cause. First, the record shows that, at the time 

of trial, McGuire was a client of the landowners’ counsel: “Mr. 

Wright is my attorney.” The trial court obviously misunderstood 

that response as shown by its statement: “Mr. McGuire I believe 

said that he has been a client of Mr. Wright.” 

 We have not overlooked the fact that McGuire subsequently did 

not respond to any of the court’s set of eight questions, the first 

of which was: “Anybody currently a client of Mr. Wright?” 

Nevertheless, McGuire’s positive, affirmative response, “Mr. Wright 
is my attorney,” must be accepted as the truth when measured against 

mere silence that tends to contradict the stated fact. 

 Second, in the present case, landowner McKnight served as the 

landowners’ appraiser with McGuire sitting as a commissioner. In 

the prior condemnation case, McKnight served as the appraiser for 

landowner McGuire, who was the landowners’ designated representative 

sitting at counsel table. In these similar cases tried two or three 

years apart, McGuire has moved from counsel table in the prior case 

to the commissioners’ box in the present case to sit in judgment 

when his former hired appraiser is the present appraiser and one of 

the parties litigant. This scenario was forecast by the City during 

voir dire and called to the trial court’s attention. 

 Under these circumstances, it is extremely unlikely the public 

would have confidence in the integrity of the process when a 

commissioner has the identity of interests demonstrated by this 

prospective commissioner. This is true even though, as the record 

shows, the commissioner is a “respected member of the community” and 

“known to be a man of integrity,” who may be determined to discharge 

his duties in a forthright and unbiased manner. 

 Thus, the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to 

strike McGuire for cause. Because the case will be remanded, we 

shall address the other error assigned should the issue arise upon 

retrial. 
 The landowners presented evidence about the value of a portion 

of the shopping center land as an outparcel to be used for a 

restaurant. They asserted that this portion was suitable for 

separate development before the take, but that the City’s widening 

project had eliminated this development potential by reducing the 

area available for shopping center parking. 

 Refused instruction B, tendered by the City, was based on 

principles relating to compensability of damages attributed to 

frustration of an owner’s plans for development. See State Highway 

and Transp. Comm’r v. Lanier Farm, Inc., 233 Va. 506, 510-11, 357 

S.E.2d 531, 533-34 (1987). We reject the City’s contention the 

trial court erred in refusing the instruction. The subject was 

covered adequately in granted instructions 8 and 11. 

 Accordingly, the judgment below will be affirmed in part and 

reversed in part, and the case will be remanded for a new trial. 

Affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

 and remanded.