1

 Graham’s employer at the time he filed suit was Cingular Wireless, LLC. Cingular has

been renamed AT&T Mobility LLC, and we refer to the defendant by its current name.

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued May 23, 3007

Decided September 6, 2007

Before

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Nos. 06-3020 & 06-3734

CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AT&T MOBILITY, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 05 C 0994

Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.

O R D E R

Christopher Graham sued his employer, AT&T Mobility, LLC (“AT&T”),1

 for

race discrimination and retaliation. After granting AT&T’s motions to dismiss, in

part, and granting AT&T’s summary judgment motion, the district court dismissed

Graham’s case. Graham appeals, and we affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
Nos. 06-3020 & 06-3734 Page 2

I.

Christopher Graham, who is black, works as a wireless technician for AT&T.

In 2003, Graham filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that AT&T retaliated and discriminated against him

at work because of his race. After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC,

Graham filed suit against AT&T alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title

VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. After the district court dismissed Graham’s

complaint in March 2004, Graham appealed to this court, but filed his appeal over a

year late, and therefore we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See

Graham v. AT&T Wireless, LLC, No. 05-1370 (7th Cir. Sept. 14, 2005). 

In November 2004, Graham filed another EEOC charge alleging that AT&T

retaliated against him for filing his 2003 EEOC charge. Specifically, Graham

stated that AT&T retaliated against him by giving him a negative evaluation,

directing him to send e-mails to his district manager and his work group about his

job progress, denying him the opportunity to have a union representative with him

during a meeting regarding his evaluation, and making defamatory statements to

his personal injury attorney. Other specific acts Graham listed on his charge form

in support of his retaliation claim were that an AT&T manager made a racist

comment in the presence of another employee, and the placement of a sign in his

work area stated “built by Irish crew.” After receiving a right to sue letter, Graham

filed the present case alleging that AT&T violated Title VII through a pattern and

practice of discrimination and by discriminating and retaliating against him for

filing his first lawsuit. AT&T filed a motion seeking dismissal of the retaliation

claim in part and the race discrimination and pattern and practice claims in their

entirety. The district court granted AT&T’s motion, ruling that Graham’s 2004

EEOC charge was only based on retaliation, that there was no suggestion in his

November 2004 EEOC form that “Graham had felt discriminated against because of

his race,” and that the discrimination and pattern and practice claims were outside

the scope of his 2004 EEOC charge. 

On November 1, 2005, Graham then filed an additional EEOC charge

realleging the dismissed discrimination allegations as well as claims of retaliation

and discrimination that took place in 2004 and 2005. Following Graham’s receipt of

another right to sue letter, the district court granted Graham’s motion for leave to

file an amended complaint in which he set forth discrimination, retaliation, and

pattern and practice claims. AT&T moved to dismiss as untimely the race

discrimination claim asserted in the amended complaint and to strike other

allegations as barred by res judicata because Graham presented them in his first

case. Granting the motion in part, the district court ruled that any allegations that
Nos. 06-3020 & 06-3734 Page 3

2

 We address Graham’s claims only to the extent that these arguments have been

presented by his attorney in his briefs and at oral argument. We make particular note of this

because the written submissions presented on Graham’s behalf contain no citations to the record,

are scant on citations to authorities, and contain an inadequate jurisdictional statement and an

inadequate statement of the case in contravention of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

28(a)(9)(A), 28(a)(6), and 28(a)(2). It is not the duty of this court to scour the record to

compensate for inadequate briefing or to make a party’s argument, particularly when the party is

represented by counsel as in this case. See Albrechtsen v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisc.

Sys., 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d

751, 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 

were within the scope of Graham’s first suit were barred by res judicata and that

Graham could only raise acts occurring within 300 days of his second EEOC charge. 

AT&T then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court

granted concluding that Graham had failed to establish that he suffered an adverse

employment action or that there were similarly situated employees outside of his

protected class who were treated more favorably. Graham filed a motion for

reconsideration, which the district court denied, and he now appeals.

II.

Graham asserts five main arguments on appeal: First, he argues that the

district court erred in dismissing his discrimination claims because his failure to

check the “race” box on the 2004 EEOC charge form was a clerical error. Next, he

argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists in relation to his retaliation

claim. Graham also asserts that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding

his pattern and practice claim. Fourth, Graham contends that the district court

misapplied the Supreme Court’s holding in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe

Railway v. White, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). In his fifth and final

argument, Graham asserts that the bill of costs the district court awarded to AT&T

should be stricken because it will have a chilling and deterrent effect upon

individuals who wish to bring discrimination claims. We address each of these

claims in turn.2

Graham contends that the district court improperly dismissed all but his

retaliation claims because he checked only the “retaliation” box and not the

“discrimination” box on his 2004 EEOC charge form. This court reviews de novo a

district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Payton v. County of Carroll, 473 F.3d

845, 847 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A plaintiff generally cannot bring a
Nos. 06-3020 & 06-3734 Page 4

claim in a lawsuit that was not alleged in the EEOC charge, and, while not a

jurisdictional element, it is a prerequisite with which a plaintiff must comply before

filing suit. Cheek v. W. & Suburban Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994)

(citations omitted). This provides the employer with notice about the particular

challenged conduct and provides an opportunity for settlement of the dispute. Id.

(citations omitted). A plaintiff, however, may proceed on a claim not explicitly

mentioned in his EEOC charge “if the claim is like or reasonably related to the

EEOC charges, and the claim in the complaint reasonably could be expected to grow

out of an EEOC investigation of the charge.” Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating

Co., 307 F.3d 535, 551 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

At the very least, these claims must involve the same conduct and implicate the

same individuals. Id. (citations omitted). While the conduct that served as the

basis for Graham’s discrimination claim was the same conduct that served as the

basis for his retaliation claim, Graham checked only the “retaliation” box on his

2004 EEOC charge form and also specifically stated on his form that he was

“discriminated against because of retaliation.” There is no suggestion in the 2004

charge that Graham was asserting that he was discriminated against because of his

race. Therefore, Graham failed to satisfy the prerequisite of alleging a

discrimination claim in his 2004 EEOC charge form. Accordingly, the district court

did not err in dismissing Graham’s discrimination claims based on his 2004 EEOC

charge form.

We next address Graham’s claims on which the district court granted AT&T

summary judgment. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation

omitted). All reasonable inferences from the evidence are drawn in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Id.

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee

because of his race and from punishing an employee for complaining about

discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 and 2000e-3(a). A plaintiff may prove a

retaliation or a discrimination claim through the direct or indirect method. Sun v.

Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 812 (7th Cir. 2007); Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of

Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2005). To prove retaliation, 

[t]he direct method requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) [he] engaged in

statutorily protected activity; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action

taken by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two. Under

the alternative indirect method, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie

case of retaliation by showing that: (1) [he] engaged in a statutorily protected

activity; (2) [he] met the employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) [he] suffered
Nos. 06-3020 & 06-3734 Page 5

an adverse employment action; and (4) [he] was treated less favorably than

similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected

activity.

Moser, 406 F.3d at 903 (citation omitted). A similarly situated employee is one who

is “comparable to plaintiff in all material respects,” Crawford v. Ind. Harbor Belt

R.R. Co., 461 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir. 2006). “Failure to satisfy any one element of

the prima facie case is fatal to an employee’s retaliation claim.” Sublett v. John

Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hudson v. Chicago

Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552, 560 (7th Cir. 2004)). If the plaintiff establishes a

prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to present evidence of a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. If the defendant makes

that showing, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the

defendant’s reason is pretext, i.e., a “lie” or “phony reason” for the action. Perez v.

Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 488 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

Graham asserts that he raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding his

retaliation claim. Specifically, from his 2004 EEOC charge Graham cites his receipt

of derogatory performance reviews and being required to e-mail his supervisors and

work group about his job progress. From his 2005 EEOC charge, Graham cites

being denied training, having a delay in receiving a laptop mount, and being passed

up for promotions. Also as evidence that AT&T retaliated against him, Graham

cites a comment a manager made in the presence of another employee for which

Graham was not present. [id. at 17-18] While Graham does not set forth the

governing standard for a retaliation claim, based on the claims themselves, the only

claim he could possibly make under the direct method was the manager’s comment

to another employee that “they might suspect you [for the vandalism and theft on

AT&T’s property] because you have a tan.” This comment was not made in

Graham’s presence nor did it refer to Graham. Therefore, this comment could not

could not serve as a basis for Graham’s retaliation claim.

As to the remaining facts Graham cites, it appears that he is attempting to

proceed under the indirect method of proof. Graham, as a black person, is a

member of a protected class who engaged in protected activity by filing an EEOC

charge. Even assuming one or more of Graham’s claims amounts to an adverse

employment action, he fails to set forth any similarly situated individuals who were

treated more favorably. While Graham states that “similarly situated (white)

employees” were not required to communicate with supervisors throughout the day,

he does not identify who those employees are and explain why they are similarly

situated. For the remaining claimed retaliatory actions, Graham does not assert

the existence of any similarly situated individuals. Therefore, the district court
Nos. 06-3020 & 06-3734 Page 6

properly awarded summary judgment in favor of AT&T on Graham’s retaliation

claim.

Graham also argues that the district court improperly granted summary

judgment on his pattern and practice claims. We find that Graham has waived his

right to assert his pattern and practice claim by failing to develop these arguments. 

See United States v. Lanzotti, 205 F.3d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing United States

v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991)) (“We repeatedly have made clear

that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported

by pertinent authority, are waived (even where those arguments raise

constitutional issues).”). Specifically, Graham fails to elucidate which alleged

discriminatory acts in his case constitute a pattern and practice of discrimination or

any issues of material fact that would make summary judgment inappropriate. He

also does not provide any argument beyond his conclusory statement that a fact

finder is necessary to resolve this claim. As we have noted, “[t]his court is not

obligated to research and construct legal arguments open to parties, especially

when they are represented by counsel as in this case.” John v. Barron, 897 F.2d

1387, 1393 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to AT&T on the pattern and practice claim.

We now turn to Graham’s contention that the district court misapplied

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct.

2405 (2006). After the district court granted AT&T’s motion for summary

judgment, Graham filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) requesting the district court to reconsider its summary

judgment ruling in light of the United States Supreme Court opinion in White.

White, however, settled a circuit split on retaliation claims, but in doing so agreed

with the approach already employed by the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 2415 (“We agree

with the formulation set forth by the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits. 

In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the

challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might

have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Just as before the

district court, Graham does not demonstrate how the district court improperly

applied White to his case, particularly because the standard adopted by the

Supreme Court in White was already the standard in this circuit. Reconsideration

in light of this case was therefore unnecessary because no change in the legal

standard occurred. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Graham’s motion for reconsideration, and we affirm its denial of Graham’s

motion.
Nos. 06-3020 & 06-3734 Page 7

Graham also cites White in support of his challenge of the district court’s

grant of bill of costs to AT&T. Specifically, Graham argues that the $7,845.23 in

costs awarded to AT&T will “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 2409. We review a district court’s

imposition of costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) for abuse of

discretion. Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1999). 

This “discretion is ‘narrowly confined’ because of the strong presumption created by

[Rule 54] that the prevailing party will recover costs.” Contreras v. City of Chicago,

119 F.3d 1286, 1295 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Other than arguing that the

award of these costs will have a deterrent effect, Graham does not challenge the

reasonableness of the amount of costs or allege that AT&T conducted itself in such

a manner as to ring up unnecessarily the costs incurred. AT&T took only five

depositions, even with Graham’s identification of over 100 witnesses in his Rule 26

disclosures, and Graham took twelve depositions. AT&T further attempted to limit

the scope of litigation by filing two motions to dismiss. Accordingly, based on

Graham’s unpersuasive rationale and the reasonableness with which AT&T

conducted this litigation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding

AT&T costs, and we therefore affirm its grant of costs to AT&T.

III.

Because Graham has failed to establish that the district court improperly

dismissed his discrimination claims based on his 2004 EEOC charge form, the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact on his retaliation and pattern and practice

claims, that the district court improperly applied White, or that the district court

abused its discretion in granting AT&T costs, we AFFIRM.