J-S37017-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF L.M.H., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.F.-H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 870 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered, February 25, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000921-2018.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 23, 2019

T.F.-H. (Mother) appeals the decree granting the petition filed by the 

Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (DHS) to involuntarily 

terminate her parental rights to her daughter, L.M.H. (Child), pursuant to the 

Adoption Act. See Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b).1 After review, 

we affirm. 

The relevant history is as follows:

Mother was 16 years old when she gave birth to Child in October 2015. 

Mother, evidently the subject of her own dependency proceedings, was 

residing in a DHS placement. In the months prior to Child’s birth, Mother had 

absconded from her placement. Mother and Child were located in December 

2015 at the home of a maternal great-aunt. In December 2015, DHS alleged 

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1 The trial court also terminated the rights of the unknown father.
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that Mother suffered from depression, that she was noncompliant with her 

prescribed medication, and that she was truant from high school. The court 

ordered Mother and Child to be placed together in a home where they could 

stay together. Apparently, DHS had no other concerns for the majority of 

2016.

In January 2017, DHS received a report that Mother faced eviction for 

her noncompliance with the rules of the group placement. Mother continued 

to abscond from the home without permission, both with and without the 

infant Child. In one instance, Child was ill and Mother left her unattended in 

her crib for 4 and a half hours without any adult supervision. DHS obtained 

an emergency order removing Child from Mother’s care. Child was 

adjudicated dependent on January 20, 2017.

The court ordered Mother to submit for a drug screen, a dual diagnosis 

assessment, and monitoring. Mother tested positive for marijuana. The 

Community Umbrella Agency created a single case plan (SCP) for Mother. Her 

SCP objectives were: to comply with her placement’s curfew; to attend Child’s 

medical appointments; to maintain consistent mental health treatment; to 

attend school; to have random drug testing; to have visits with Child; to avoid 

taking Child within one mile of a specific address.2 The dependency case 

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2 The trial court specifically ordered Mother not to take Child within one mile 

of maternal grandmother’s address, due to concerns that alleged drug use and 

prostitution took place there. The parties stipulated that the home was not 

safe for Child.
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lingered for approximately two years. Mother did not make significant 

progress towards achieving any of these goals.

In November 2018, DHS petitioned to involuntarily terminate Mother’s 

parental rights under sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). After a 

hearing, the court denied the petition as to Section 2511(a)(1), but granted 

the petition on the other grounds.3, 4 Mother filed this timely appeal, where 

she presents four issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its 

discretion by terminating the parental rights of 

Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) 

where Mother presented evidence that she has 

remedied her situation by providing negative drug 

screens, attending school and visiting her child and 

has the present capacity to care for Child?

2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its 

discretion by terminating the parental rights of 

Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) 

where evidence was provided to establish that 

Child was removed from the care of her Mother and 

Mother is now capable of caring for Child?

3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its 

discretion by terminating the parental rights of 

Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)

where evidence was presented to show that Mother

is now capable of caring for Child after she 

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3 The court conducted the hearing over two dates, January 14, and February 

25, 2019. The hearing also encompassed DHS’s petition to change the 

dependency goal from reunification to adoption. Mother does not appeal the 

goal change.

4 Child was properly represented by counsel, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2313(a). 
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complied with her placement, attended school and 

provided negative drug screens?

4. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its 

discretion by terminating the parental rights of 

Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) where 

evidence was presented that established Child has 

a close bond with Mother and had lived with Mother 

for part of her life. Additionally, Mother 

consistently visited with Child and maintained a 

strong bond with Child the entire time Child was in 

placement.

Mother’s Brief at 7.

We review these claims mindful of our well-settled standard or review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotations marks 

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section
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2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's 

conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights 

does the court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare 

analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional 

bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to 

the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

We have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so 

“clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to 

a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the court as 

to any one subsection of 2511(a), as well as Section (b), in order to affirm. 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we 

analyze the trial court’s decision to terminate pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) 

and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

...

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 
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causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

...

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving notice of the filing 

of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b)

Instantly, we analyze the trial court's decision to terminate 

under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must

be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,

neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or

refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental

care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations, 

internal quotation marks, and indentation omitted).
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Mother essentially concedes she was unable to care for Child previously, 

but she contends that past incapacity alone is not a sufficient basis for 

involuntary termination. She alleges that she had substantially completed her 

SCP goals and that she should be given a chance to provide a home for herself 

and her child.

Here, we find ample evidence to justify the trial court's termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to Child, pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Mother has 

demonstrated an incapacity to perform parental duties as illustrated by her 

inability to make any real progress on her goals over the last two years. As 

late as September 2018, 21 months after the Child’s removal, Mother still 

tested positive in her drug screens; perhaps relatedly, she had entirely refused 

to address her mental health issues; and she was once again facing removal 

from her placement home for noncompliance with the rules. Mother was 

inconsistent with attending Child’s medical appointments. While Mother had 

graduated to unsupervised visits with Child, those visits had to be scaled back 

because Mother was taking Child to the maternal grandmother’s home, a 

location that Mother agreed was unsafe. Of those supervised visits, Mother 

arrived late or often missed them entirely. While Mother’s progress ebbed 

and flowed throughout the dependency case, Mother was still incapable of 

caring for Child, who had to rely on others for her essential well-being. Mother 

may not have displayed affirmative misconduct, but she has shown an inability 

to remedy the causes of her incapacity.
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We acknowledge that the inherent difficulty that accompanies 

parenthood when it begins during the parent’s own minority. At the time of 

the termination hearing, Mother was enrolled in the 12th grade. Still, a failure 

by a parent to remedy the conditions resulting in the child’s placement is not 

confined to affirmative misconduct by the parent. Rather, it encompasses 

those situations where a parent has attempted to address their incapacity but 

is ultimately unable to remedy it. In time, a parent’s basic constitutional right 

to the custody and rearing of her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill 

her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment 

of the child’s potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment. Matter of 

M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 984 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing In re B., N. M., 856 A.2d 

847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

For over two years, DHS has attempted to buoy Mother with intensive 

services. While she has shown sporadic progress, the dependency case ends 

largely where it began. Meanwhile, Child has been in want of necessary 

parental care and stability. The court did not abuse its discretion when it 

determined that competent, clear, and convincing evidence supported the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), 

thereby satisfying the first prong of the termination analysis.

Next, we consider whether termination was proper under Section 

2511(b). With regard to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as 

follows:
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[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs 

and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to 

include [i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability.... [T]his Court held that the determination of the 

child's “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the 

emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child 

of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (internal case citations omitted). 

Instantly, Mother contends DHS failed to meet these criteria. She points 

to the social worker’s testimony that there was a parental bond between 

Mother and Child. Mother argues no such bond exists with the foster parent. 

Indeed, the caseworker testified that Mother and Child have a positive, if 

inconsistent relationship. When Mother and Child visit, they play games on a 

tablet or phone and sometimes share a meal. We cannot equate a few warm 

visits with a well-adjusted child to a parental bond. Moreover, the question is 

not whether Child and Mother have a bond, but whether that bond is worth 

preserving.

While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect 

of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the trial court when determining what is in 

the best interest of the child. In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citing In re K.K.R.–S., 958 A.2d 529, 535–536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The mere 

existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental 

rights. Id., 93 A.3d at 897-898; see also In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.
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Super. 2008) (trial court's decision to terminate parents' parental rights was 

affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond against parents' inability 

to serve needs of child). Rather, the trial court must examine the status of the 

bond to determine whether its termination “would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. at 898 (citation omitted). 

Here, the basis for the so-called bond was Mother’s visitation with Child. 

While Mother had more expansive visitation in the past, by the end of the 

dependency case Mother could only be trusted with two, two-hour supervised 

visits per week. Even then, she often arrived late or would miss the visit 

completely. Meanwhile, the pre-adoptive foster parent was the one who met 

Child’s daily needs, and who was the parent-figure that Child turned to for 

support and security. Thus, the trial court observed that even if Mother and 

Child had a bond, Child would not suffer irreparable harm if the bond was 

severed. We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision that DHS 

met its burden under the second prong of the termination analysis. Mother’s 

final issue is without merit.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). Accordingly, we affirm the decree of 

the trial court.

Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/23/2019