### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 6, 200 6 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . MELI SSA ANN LAYMAN
App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Anderson County No. A3CR0257 Jam es B. Scott, Jr ., Judge

No. E2004-01471-SC-R11- CD - F iled on Jan uary 29, 2007

AND



### STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JONA THA N R AY TA YLO R
App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Anderson County No. A3CR0014 Jam es B. Scott, Jr ., Judge

________________________ No. E2004-02866-SC-R11- CD - F iled on Jan uary 29, 2007

________________________

We g rante d a ndc on so lid a te d th e appli cat io ns for pe rm iss ionto a

pp e a l f ile d o n b e ha lf

of Me lis sa A n n L a ym a n a n d J o n a t h a n R a y T a yl o r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e s c o p e o f a tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d i s c r e t i o n t o d e n y a motion to nol le prosequi to w hich the defe ndant has consente d. L ayman’s appea l also prese nts the issue o f w h e th e r a v ic ti m’ s f a mi ly h a s a r ig h t to b e h e ar d a t a p r e tria l h e ar in g c o n c e rning a plea ag ree ment or a nolle pr osequi. We conclude that when a n uncontested motion to nolle prosequi or dismiss a criminal char g e is independe nt of a plea ag ree ment, a trial c ourt’s discre tion to deny the motion under Rule 48(a) of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedure is lim ited to ext raor dinary circ umstan c e s in d ic a ti n g b e tr a y a l o f th e p u b li c in te r e s t. B e c au s e ine a c h c a s e th e p r o s e c u tor ’s independe nt, uncontested motion to nolle prosequi the g reater charg e of the indictment was neither fi le d inba d f

a ithno r m oti vate d b y

c on sid e ratio n s c le arl y

c on tr ary to m a nif e st p ub lic int e re st, we ho ld that the trial court abused its discretion in re jecting the nolle prosequi. W e also hold in L ayman’s
case that the victim’s family did not have the right to be he ard at the pre trial hea ring s conce rning the plea a g ree ment and nolle prose qui because such pr etrial he aring s are not critica l stag es of theT he d efend ant spell s her s urnam e “ La y m o n. ” W e ad o p t t he spel l i ng “ La y m an” as us ed i n t he i nd i ct m ent and 1
i n a cc o rd an ce wit h the p o l i cy ad o p t ed b y t he C o urt o f C rimina l A p p ea l s.
-2- criminal justice proc ess as de fined by Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-38- 302(2). Any err or in considering the statements of the family , howeve r, wa s harmless. A cc o rd i n gl y , we r ever se the judgme nts of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appe als in e ach case and rema nd for f urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; Judgme nts of

the Court of Crim inal Ap peals Rever sed; Cases Re m anded

J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which WI LL I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , S P

. J ., joined. G AR Y R. W ADE , J ., concur ring and d i s s en t i n g.
M. Sue Whi te, Sey mour, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Melissa Ann L ayman. Kevin C. Ang el, Clinton, Tennessee, f or the a ppellant, J onathan Ray

Tay lor.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Michael E

. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; John H. B le ds oe , As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ja me s N . Ramse y , D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; a ndJan H ic ks , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound

A. State v. L ayman

Me lis sa An n L a y ma n (“ L a y ma n” ) andGi ng e r R . Po we rs (“ Pow e rs ” ) b e g a n a ro ma nti c 1

r e l a t i o n s h i p i n 1 9 9 9 a n d l i v e d t o g e t h e r i n t e r m i t t e n t l y o v e r

t h e n e x ts e v e r a l ye ar s

. U n f o r t u n a t e l y, their re lationship was marke d by sever al i ncidents of domestic violence . On J uly 7, 2003, L ayman and Power s had a phy sical altercation that resulted in Powers’ de ath. Acc ording to L ayman, Powers was jea lous of L ayman’s ex-husband and be g an an a rg ument. L ayman contends that she attempted to retre at from the a

rg ument but Powe rs pursued he r and ma de re peate d threats to kil l her. Power s then beg an to hit L ayman in the fa ce an d h ead. L ayman re lates the re mainder of the strug g le as fo llo ws :

I told her that I

was g oing to c all the police and she went into a rag e saying she was not going to ja il a g ain. Then she said she was g oing to g et a knife and kill me. She continued to hit me and pull my hair. I started strug g ling with her and we fell off

the bed still fighting

. . . . She kept hitting my head ag ainst the floor

. . . . As we r olled around the floor fig hting my hand touche d a cor d that was laying on the floor. ILay man’ s s t at ement does not provi de an ex pl ana t i on for movi ng t he bo dy

. T he pros ecu t or s t at ed t hat Lay man 2

mo v e d t h e bo dy i n t h e h op e t h a t i t w ou l d b e mo r e e a s i l y di s c ov e r e d i n a n ot h e r r oo m.

N o s i gn i f

i can t chan ges have o ccu r r ed i n t he l ang uag e o f t he pert i nen t provi s i ons of t he s t at ut e s i nce 200 3 when 3

t h e of fen s e wa s a l l eg edl y c ommi t t ed.

“ T h e La t i n ph r as e ‘ n ol l e pr os equ i ’ l i t er al l y me an s ‘ I a m u n wi l l i n g t o pr os ec u t e. ’ ” St at e v

. H ar r i s , 33 S. W

. 3d 4
7 6 7 , 76 9 n. 3 (T enn. 20 0 0 ) (quo t i ng K o rem at su v. U ni t ed S t at es, 5 8 4 F. Sup p

. 14 0 6 , 14 1 0 (N

. D

. C al

. 19 8 4 ))

. T hi s C o urt h as de f i n ed n ol l e pr os equ i as t h e for mal en t r y of re cor d i n wh i ch t h e di s t r i ct at t or n ey ge n er al t er mi n at es t h e pr os ec u t i on of a c as e. I d.

B e c a u se , a s d isc u sse d b e lo w , a p ro se c u to r’s re q u e st to no lle p ro se q u i re q u ire s p e rm issio n o f t h e c o u rt, w e w ill 5

tre a t t h e “n o tice ” a s a m o tio n to no lle p ro se q u i.
-3- g rabbe d the cor d and it went ar ound her ne ck. We continued to strug g le and then she
wa s ju st s til l.

L ayman then lef

t the house and did not tell any one what ha d happene d. On J uly 9, 2003, two day s after Powers’ de ath, L ayman re tur n ed to her home and moved Powers’ body to a diffe rent
room. T h e n ex t d ay , L ayman told her familywhat had ha ppened, and they

contac ted the police. 2 An autopsy reve aled that Powers died of asphy x iation resulting f

rom “blunt traumatic injury to the nasal bone .” The re w as no evidence of strang ulation. The prose cutor late r informe d the doctor perf orming the autopsy

that a cor d had been pl ace d around Powers’ neck. The doctor informed the prosec utor that strang ulation was not inconsistent with h i s findings be cause of the state of d e c o m p o s i t i o n o f

t h e b o d y.
On Au g us t 5, 20 03 , a

g randjury ind ic te d L a y ma n fo r vo lun tary ma ns laug hte r andre c kle ss homicide. L ayman and the State r eac hed a ple a ag ree ment in which it was ag ree d that L ayman would plead g uiltyto rec kless homicide and that proce eding s ag ainst her w ould be diverte d pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annotated s e c ti o n4 0

- 1 5-105 (2006)

. Under the plea a g ree ment, the State ag ree d 3 to nolle prosequi the voluntary manslaug hter c harg e. The nolle prosequi provis i o n was e ssential 4 to the plea a g ree ment beca use L ayman w o uld be inelig ible for pr etrial diver sion if the voluntary manslaug hter char g e re mained. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-15- 105(a) (1)( B) (iii)( j ) (2 00 6)

. At the fi rs t of t wo hearing s reg arding the pl ea ag ree ment, the t rial court expressed reluc tance to allow pretria l diversion of a

case in which violence resulted in the loss of life. A t the second he aring , the trial
c ou rt fo rm a lly re je c te d th e ple a

a g re e me nt. The pa rties then filed an application for pretria l diversion and a supporting memor andum of understanding . The memorandum of understa nding inc luded a “notice” of nol le prosequi r eg arding 5 the voluntary

manslaug hter c harg e. In the “notice” of nolle prosequi, the district attorney stated that the “State c annot prove knowing killing as opposed to rec klessness.” At the re sulting hea ring s, the prosec utor continued to assert that the State could not prove the mental ele ment of the voluntary
ma ns laug hte r c ha

rg e . T he tr ia l c ou rt

ex pres sed it s view of

a jud g e ’s ro le in r e vie wi ng a no lle prosequi stating , “I have to acce pt a nolle prosequi . . . unless I know there is clear

and convinc ing evidenc e that the a ctivity

in the indictment [i s] such t hat . . . t he def endant may

constitute a dang erT enn. C o d e A nn. §§ 40

- 3 8

- 1 0 1 t o - 4 0 6 (20 0 6 ). N o s i gni f i cant changes have occ urr ed i n the l anguage o f t he 6
per t i n en t pr ov i s i on s of t h e s t at u t e s i n ce 2003 w h en t h e of fen s e wa s a l l eg edl y c ommi t t ed.
-4- to the community .” The trial c ourt later stated, “I cannot f ind by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that this woman would ag ain constitute a thre at to the community beca use I do not think that is [t he ca se] here . I t is just the opposite.” How ever , at the final hearing on the matter, the tria l court expressed
a c on c e rnfo r the pr e c e de nt that wou ld be se t by a llo wi ng div e rs iona nda de sir e to a ssu rethe pu bli c that th e c ou rt s ta

ke se ri ou sly

the “ takin g of lif

e .” As a re su lt, the tr ia l cou rt re je c te d the re qu e st t o no lle pr os e qu i, c on c lud ing that it wo uldbe in the “ ma nif

e st b e st i nte re st o f the g e nera l pu bl ic ” to h a v e t h e v o l u n t ar y m a n s l au g h t e r c h ar g e tr i e d b y a

j u r y.
At the Marc h 3, 2004 hearing, t h e t ri al court e ng ag ed in a pr olonge d and wide- rang ing exchang e with seve ra l m em b ers of Powers’ f amily . The familymembers’ statements containe d hear say , wer e not made unde r oath, a nd wer e not subject t o cross-e x amination. Counsel for L ayman moved to have the family

members’ statements stricken f rom the record, and the trial court rejec ted the motion. At a subsequent hea ring , the trial court allowed unidentified people to express opinions reg arding the fa cts of the c ase, the threat L ayman poses to society , and ap p ropriate methods of punishment. None of those w ho offe red state ments were place d under oath or cross- examined. At the fi na l he ari ng on the ma tte r, the tr ia l cou rt dis c us se d at le ng th the stand ard fo r r e je c tin g a no lle pr os e qu i w iththe a tto rn e y fo r P ow e rs ’ f

a mil y , w ho arg ue d v ig or ou sly that th e c ha

rg e s a g a ins t L ayman should not be diverted.

On app e a l, bo th the State a ndL a y ma n a rg ue d th a t th e tria l c ou rt

e rr e d b y re je c tin g the no lle prosequi of the voluntary manslaug hter char g e. The Court of Criminal Appea ls disagr eed w ith the prosec utor’s asse ssment that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to prove voluntary manslaug hter. Furthermore , the Court of C ri m i n al Appea ls found that due to the seriousness of the crime of
vo lun tary ma ns laug hte r, “ the dis mis sa l of the ind ic tme nt is c le arl y c on tr ary to the ma nif

e st p ub lic interest” and, there fore , h eld that the trial c ourt did not err by ref using to dismiss the voluntary manslaug hter c harg e.

I n a dd iti on , L a y ma n a

rg ue d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt de nie d L a y ma n’ s du e pr oc e ss rig ht t o a fair h e ar i n g b y c o n s i d e r i n g t h e o p i n i o n s a n d ar g u m e n t s o f P o w e r s ’ f a m i l y m e m b e r s a n d t h e i r

a t t o r n e y. The Court of Criminal Appeals examined article I , section 35 of t he Tennessee Constit ution, which g uarantees victims of crime “[t] h e ri gh t t o be hea rd, whe n rele vant, at all critical stag es of the criminal justice proc ess as define d by the Gene ral Assembly .” Finding that the hearings in que stion
wer e “c ritical stag es of the criminal justice proce ss,” the Court of Criminal Appeals conc luded that the state me nts of

Pow e rs ’ f

a mil y we re c on sis te nt w ith the pu rp os e s of the Vi c tim s’ B ill of Rig hts

. 6 The Court of Criminal Appe als also found signific ance in the fac t that the trial court did not consider the state me nts of the va

ri ou s famil y me mbe rs a s e vid e nc e or re ly up on the ple a din g s f

ile d b y the ir attorney . The Court of Criminal Appea ls theref ore r eject ed L ay man’s due pr ocess a rg ument and
a ff ir me d th e ru lin g of

the tr ia l c ou rt

in a ll r e sp e c ts.T he p rosecut o r spec ul at ed that the b ul l et m i ght have ri co chet ed af t er ent eri ng t he vi ct i m ’ s arm , but t he reco rd 7

co nt ai ns no de f

i ni t i ve exp l anat i o n of why a gunshot wo und t o t he arm resul t ed i n t he vi ct i m ’ s d eat h.

W e wi l l t r ea t t h e “ n ot i ce ” as a mot i on t o n ol l e pr os equ i

. Se e s u pr a n ot e 5. 8

-5- B. State v. Tay lor

On Dec ember

31, 200 3 , P atricia Ly nn Tay lor (“Mr s. Tay lor”) r eturne d home to find her husband, Jonathan Ray

Tay lor (“T ay lor”), ang ry and brandishing a

g un. Some time later, the g un d i s c h ar g e d a

s i n g l e t i m e , h i t t i n g M r s

. T a yl o r i n t h e ar m

. M r s

. T a yl o r d i e d a s a r e s u l t o f t h e i n j u r y. 7 Tay lor maintains that he did not intentionally fire theg un.
On F e br ua ry 3, 20 04 , a

g randjury in di cte d T a y lor fo r s e c on d d e g re e mur de r andre c kle ss ho mic ide . T he pa

rt ie s late r re a c he d a

ple a a g re e me nt i n whi ch Ta y lor a g re e d to ple a d g uil ty

to
rec kless homicide and the State ag ree d to nolle prosequi the sec ond deg ree murder c harg e. The trial court re jected the plea a g ree ment “bec ause a life [was] taken, and ther e [was] viol ence .”

On July 1, 20 04 , the State fi le d a “ no tic e ” of

no lle pr os e qu i st a tin g that th e failu re to 8 prosec ute Taylor for se cond deg ree murder w as not conditioned on the trial court’s acc eptanc e of the plea a g ree ment. Acc ording to the “notice,” the nolle prosequi wa s b ased on “ an abse nce of proof bey ond a reasonable doubt of the intent re quired for second- deg ree murder.” The “ notice” stated that upon dismiss al of the se cond deg ree murder c harg e the State would proce ed to trial on the re maining char g e of r eckle ss homicide. At t h e re s ulting hea ring , the prosec utor continued to asse rt that the nolle prosequi was not conting ent upon the ac cepta nce of the plea and that the State could not ca rry its burde n of proof on the char g e of se cond deg ree murder. Spec ifically , the prosec utor claimed that Tay lor “did not intentionally point the gun at the upper a rm of the v i ct i m i n order to kill her.” Nonethele ss, the t rial court, ostensibly pursuant to i ts discretion under Rule 48( a) of the Tenne ssee R u l es o f C ri m i n al P ro ce d u re , re j ec t ed t h e n o l l e p ro s eq u i , s t at i n g, [The State] can nolle [prosequi] based upon the fac ts [ as it] know[ s] t hem to be, and I cannot . . . turn that down unl ess [ there ] is clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. As fa r as I am conc erne d , i t is clear and convinc ing w hen somebody . . . point[ s] a gun at
someone and that g un g oes off.

. . . That to me is a dang er to soc iety and should not b e to le r a te d

. T h a t i s th e r e a s o n f o r [r e je c ti n g th e n o ll e p r o s e q u i]

.
I n a later hearing, the trial court ag ain rejected the nolle prosequi, for the first time rea soning that the State “[was] just attempting to do [in] direc tly what [it was] denied to do dire ctly .”
On appe al, both Tay lor and the State c ontend that the trial c ourt err ed by reje cting the State’s
e ff ort to no lle pr os e qu i the seco nd de g re e mur de r c ha rg e . T he Cou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls de te rm ine d that the tr ia l c ou rt ma de a c le ar sh ow ing of its re a so ns fo r r e je c tin g the no lle pr os e qu i. Foc using on the t rial court’s contention t hat t he State “[was] just attempting to do [i n]di rec tly what [i t was] denied to do direc tly ,” the Court of C riminal Appea ls conclude d that the trial court’s ruling
wa s in te nd e d to pr e ve nt the State fr om c ir c umv e nti ng the re je c tio n o f the ple a

a g ree me nt.T he G eneral A ss em b l y ha s am end ed R ul e 4 8 (a), ef fect i ve Jul y 1, 20 0 6 , t o read, “ W i t h t he co urt ’ s p erm i ss i o n, 9
the sta te m a y te rm ina te a p ro se c u tio n b y fi ling a d ism issa l o f an ind ic tm e n t, p re se n tm e n t, info rm a tio n , o r c o m p la int. A d ism issa l m a y no t b e fi le d d u rin g the trial w itho u t t h e d e fen d a n t’s co n se n t.”
-6- Furthermore , the Court of Criminal Appea ls concluded that the trial court’ s ruling f urthere d the
ma nif e st p ub lic int e re st o f p ro te c tin g tria l c ou rt s’ abil ity to a c c e pt o r r e

je c t pl e a a g re e me nts . A s a re su lt, the Cou rt

of Cr imi na l App eal s hel d th a t th e tria l c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n w he n it denied the motion to nolle prosequi the se cond deg ree murder c harg e.

II. Ana lys is
A. Rule 48(a)

After an i n d i ctm ent has be en re turned, Rule 48(a ) of the T ennesse e Rules of Criminal Procedur e g overns the dismissal or nolle prose qui of a c riminal char g e upon mot ion of the State. T h e rule states in pertinent pa rt that “[t] he state may

by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, pr esentment, information or complaint and the prosec ution shall thereupon terminate.” 9 Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 4 8( a ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d). Al th ou gh un de r c omm on la w the de c isi on to n oll e prosequi a c ase w as entire ly within the disc retion of the prosec utor, Rule 48(a) require s the court’ s pe rm iss ion . Se e State v. Ha rris, 33 S.W. 3d 76 7, 77 0 (T e nn . 200 0)

. Th e ru le se ts f orth n o c ri te ri a to g uid e the c ou rt

in the e xer c ise of

its dis c re tio n. We l oo k to jud ic ia l inte rp re ta tio n of the ph ra se “by leave of court” to determine the scope of discre tion affor ded by Rule 48(a) . I nterpre ting the analog ous fede ral rule , the United States Court of Appe als for the Fifth Circuit has state d:
[I ]t seems altog ether

proper to say that the phra se “by leave of court” in Rule 48(a)
was intended to modify and condition the absolute power of t h e E x ecutive, consistently

with the Fr amer ’s conc ept of Sepa ration of Power s, by

ere cting a che ck on the abuse of E x ec u t i v e p re rogatives. B ut this i s not to say that the Rule was int e nd e d to c on fe r o n th e Judic iary the po we r andauth ority

to u su rp or

int e rf e rewi th the g oo d f a ithe xer c ise of

the Exe c uti ve po we r t o tak e c are that the la ws arefaith fu lly executed. The rule wa s not promulgated to shift a bsolute power from the Executive to the J udicial B ranc h. Rather, it was intende d as a pow er to chec k power . The Ex ecutive r emains the a

bsolute judge of wh et h er a prosec ution should be init iated and the f irst and pre sumptivelythe best j udg e of w hether a pending prosec ution should be terminated. T he exerc ise of its discretion with respe ct to the termination of pe nd ing pr os e c uti on s sh ou ld n ot b e jud ic ia lly dis tur be d u nle ss c le arl y

c on tr ary to
ma nif e st p ub lic int e re st.
United States v. Cowan, 524 F .2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975) (e mphasis added)

.La n der s w as a c on s ol i dat ed ca s e i n v ol v i n g t wo def en dan t s i n di ct ed on i dent i cal c h ar g es

. La n der s , 723 10
S. W

. 2d a t 951.

T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n 4 0 -1 5 -1 0 5 (a )( 1 )( B ) (2 0 0 6 ) p ro v id e s in p e rtine n t p a rt: 11

(B )( i ) Fo r purpo ses of t hi s sect i o n, “ q ual i f i ed de fend ant ” m eans a def end ant who m eet s each o f t he fo l l o w i ng req uirem en t s:
( a ) T h e d e fe n d a n t h a s n o t p re v io u sly b e e n gr a n te d p re tria l d ive rs io n un d e r th e p ro v isio n s o f t h is ch apt er or j u di ci al di v er s i on u n der t h e pr ov i s i on s of § 40- 35- 313;
( b ) T he d efend ant do es not ha ve a p ri o r m i sdem eano r co nvi ct i o n for w hi ch a sent ence o f co nf i nem ent i s s er v ed or a pr i or f

el o ny c o nvi ct i on w i t h i n a f i v e- y ea r pe r i od a f

t er c ompl et i n g t h e s en t en ce or p rob at i o nary pro gram fo r t he p ri o r convi ct i o n; and
( c ) T he o f

fense f o r which t he p rosecut i o n i s b ei ng s uspend ed i s no t a C l ass A or C l ass B f el o ny or a C l as s C f el ony as def

i ned i n s ubdi vi s i on ( a) ( 1)( B ) ( i i i ) , a s exu al offens e, dri vi ng un der t he i nf l uen ce of a n i n t ox i ca n t a s pr oh i bi t ed by § 55- 10- 401, or v eh i cu l ar a s s au l t a s pr oh i bi t ed by § 39- 13- 106.
-7- Citi ng Cowan, we adopted the “ manifest public intere st” standard in St ate v. L ander s, 723 S.W .2d 950, 953 (Tenn. 1987)

. I n that case , the g rand jury indicted the def

endants for ve hicular

10 homicide, which c arried a maximum pena lty of five y ear s, and vehicular homicide while under the influence of intox icants, which c ar ri ed a ma x imum penalty of twenty -one year s. Under the thenapplicable law, one of

the pre requisites for pr etrial diver sion was that “the ma x imum punis hment for the of fense char g ed must be ten y ear s or less.” L ander s, 723 S.W .2d at 951 (e mphasis added) (c iti ng Te nn . Co de An n. § 40 -1 5- 10 5( a ))

. I n e a c h c a se , th e tria l c ou rt de nie d th e pr os e c uto r’ s r e qu e st to dismi ss the g reater charg e and g rant pretrial di version on the lesse r cha rg e. We af

firmed, stating that “the de termination of whe ther a def endant is wit hin or without the elig ible class [for pre trial div e rs io n] is ir

re vo c ably de te rm ine d b y

the ind ic tme nt. ” I d. a t 95 2. B e c aus e the de fe nd a nts ’ elig ibilit y had alr eady been conclusively determined by the indictment, w e conclude d that approva l of pre trial diversion in those ca ses would undermine leg islative intent with reg ard to pre trial diversion. I d. We theref ore he ld that the prosec utor’s re quest t o d i s m i s s t h e gre ater char g e wa s clea rly contra ry to manifest public intere st. I d. at 953.

The 1998 a mendment to Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-15-105 c hang ed subsec tions (a) (1)( A) a nd (a) (1)( B)

. Our pronounc ement in L ander s that an indictment irre vocably determines elig ibilit y for pretria l dive rsion is no longe r valid under the amende d statute. S u b s ection 40-15-105( a)( 1)(B ) (2006) sets forth the c riteria f or dete rmining w hich defendants are e ligible f or 11 pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion . T he pe rt ine nt pr ov isi on of the statut e pr ov ide s tha t a de fe nd a nt m a y be e lig ibl e for pr etrial diver sion if “[t] he off ense f or which the p rosec ution is being suspende d” is not one of those listed in subdivi sion (c). Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105( a)( 1)(B )(i)( c) ( emphasis adde d). As we ha ve often noted, “[ w]e determine leg islative intent from the natura l and ordinary meaning of the statutory lang uag e withi n the contex t of the entire statute without any forc ed or subtle c onstruction that would extend or limi t the s tatute’s meaning.” State v. Flemming , 19 S.W .3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000). Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-15-105(a ), as ame nded, foc uses not upon the cha rg es set forth in t he indi ctment but upon the offense for which pre trial diversion is soug ht. We therefor e-8-

hold that a def

endant’ s elig ibilit y

for pr etrial diver sion is determined not by the indictment, but rather by t h e ch ar ges ex isting ag ainst the defe ndant at the time the c ourt rules on the me morandum of understanding seeking pretria l diversion.

Th is c on str

uc tio n of th e st a tut e is c on sis te nt w ithou r m or e re c e nt d e c isi on s, su c h a s State
v. Ha rris, 33 S.W. 3d76 7, 77 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) , d isc us sin g a pr os e c uto r’ s d isc re tio n to dis mis s c ha rg e s. Cf. Ramsey

v. Town of Oliver

Springs, 998 S.W .2d 207, 209 (Tenn. 1999) (“The District Attorney Gene ral a nd only

the District Attorney

Gene ral c an mak e t h e d ec i sion whether to pr ocee d with a pr os e c uti on fo r an of

fe ns e c omm itt e d with in his or he r dis tr ic t.” ). I n Harris, the g randjury orig ina lly indicted the def

endant f or ag g ravated assault. Af ter the de fendant applied for p re t rial diversion, h o w e v e r , th eg r an d

ju r y r e tu rned a supe rseding indictment char g ing a g g ravated assault and attempted first deg ree murder, the latter be ing a “non-dive rsion” cha

rg e. The prosec utor soug ht le ave of court to e nte r a no lle pr os e qu i onthe orig ina l in dic tme nt. I n c on tr a st to L and ers wh e rethe de fe nd a nts consente d to the dismiss al motions, the defendant in Harris opposed the nolle prosequi

. T h e trial court de nied the motion to nolle prosequi the orig inal indictment and, appa rently acting sua sponte, dis mi s s e d t h e s u p e r s e d i n g i n d i c t m e n t

. A g a i n c i t i n g C o w a n , w e r e a f f i r m e d t h e “ m a n i f

e s tp ub lic interest” sta ndard. H arris, 33 S.W .3d at 770. Concluding that the trial court abused its discre tion in deny ing the State’s motion to noll e prose qui the orig inal indictment, we stated:

Given the hig h threshold that the trial court must meet bef ore ove rruling the prosec utor’s dec ision to nol le prosequi a n indictment, t h e broa d discretion g rante d to the tr ia l cou rt in o the r c ir c ums ta nc e s, su c h a s e vid e nti ary ru lin g s, is i na

pp lic able here . I n order

for appellate courts to a ffirm that the trial court’s discretionary power to deny a motion to nolle prosequi is used onl y when the public inter est is at stake, the trial court should provide a clea r showing of its rea sons for denying the motion and should ensure that the reasons are made pa rt of the r ecor d. I n this case, the trial
cou rt p re s erve d no such showing on the re cord. The rec ord does not re flec t any manifes t p u b li c in te r e s t s u f f ic ie n t t o me r it

th e tria l c o u r t’ s r e s tr a in t o f th e St ate’ s discretion; indeed, the trial court seems to ha ve mere ly substitut ed its judgme nt for the State’s r ega rd ing w hich of the two indictments should be pursue d. Such a unilatera l chec k of prose cutorial discr etion, without apparent or a rticulated j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i s b e yo n d t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s au t h o r i t y.

I d. at 770-71.

R e g ar d i n g e l i g i b i l i t y f

o r p r e tr i a l d i v e r s i o n , w e o b s e r v e d : “ [ A ] s a r e s u l to f o u r ru l i n g t o d a y, the on ly ind ic tme nt s til l vi able on re ma ndc on ta ins a c ou nt c ha

rg ing Harris wi th atte mpt e d f ir st deg ree murder, a C lass A felony

. As long a s that char g e re mains, Harris is not eligible for pr etrial div e r s i o n

. ” I d

. a t7 7 2 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d )

. T h u s , w e i m p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d t ha t, contra ry to L ander s, ineligibility

for diver sion may

be cur ed by

dismiss al of t h e “non-diversion” char g e. In light of the amendment to T e n nessee Code Annotated se ction 40-15-105( a), our statement in L a nd e rs that app ro va l of pr e tr ia l div e rs ion in su c h c a se s wo uld un de rm ine le g isl a tiv e int e nt w ith
re g ard to p re tr ia l di ve rs ionis n o lo ng e r a c c ur a te . Wethe re fo reov e rr ule L a nd e rs to the e xten t it holds that a prosec utor’s re quest to dismiss or nol le prosequi a gre ater , “non-dive rsion” cha rg e, thus-9-

makin g the de fe nd a nt e lig ibl e fo r pr e tr ia l dive rs ion ba se d on a les se r ch arg e , is c le arl y c on tr ary to
ma nif e st p ub lic int e re st.

B e c aus e in H arris w e fo un d th a t th e tria l c ou rt abu se d it s d isc re tion bas ed on its failu re to articulate the re ason for

denying themotion to nol le prosequi, we left unanswe red the question of wh a t is me a nt by “ ma nif

e st pub lic int e re st. ” F or g uid a nc e we loo k to f e de ra l c a se s in te rp re tin g thi s phrase

.
I n Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 ( 1977), the United States Supre me Court held that the dis c re tio n a ff

or de d a tr ia l c ou rt

un de r F e de ra l Ru le of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re48 (a ) i s p ri mari ly intended to protec t a def endant fr o m p rosecutorial hara ssment, e.g ., char g ing, dismissing, and
rec harg ing, w hen the g overnme nt moves to dismi ss an ind i ctment over the def endant’ s objection. I d. at 30 n.15. The Supre me Court expli citly declined to de cide whe ther a trial court ha s discretion to deny a dismissal moti on to which a de fendant has consente d beca use, ev en assuming such discretion existed, the result in that case rema i n ed the same. I d. Specifica lly , the Supreme Court conclude d that the prosec utor’s unconte sted motion to dismiss was not filed in bad faith. I d. at 30. B e c aus e the mot ionto d ism iss wa s b a se d o n th e g ov e rn ment’s po lic y a g a ins t ne e dle ss mult ipl e prosec utions, the motion was not motivated by considerations that could “fairly be cha rac terized as ‘cle arly contra ry to ma nifest public interest.’” I d. (citing Cowan, 524 F.2d at 513) (footnote omitted).

T h o s e fede ral c ircuit courts re aching the question of whe ther a trial court may

deny an un c on te ste d d ism iss a l mo tio n ha ve de te rm ine d tha t the tr ia l cou rt ’s dis c re tio n u nd e r R ule 48 (a ) i s limit ed to extraordinary

circ umstances i n d i cating betray al of the public inter est, such as the prosec utor’s acce ptance of a bribe or persona l dislike of t he victim

. See United St ates v. Smith, 55 F .3 d 1 57 , 1 59 (4 th Cir . 1 99 5) ; U nit e d St a te s v . H a mm, 65 9 F .2 d 6 24 , 6 29 -3 0 ( 5thCir . U nit A O c t. 1981). The na

rrow sc ope of the trial court’ s discretion does not extend t o d i s ag ree ment with the prosec utor’s asse ssment of what pe nalty the def endant should fac e. United States v. J acobo- Z avala , 241 F.3d 1009, 1014 ( 8th Cir. 2001).
Although a

fede ral district court is vested with only limit ed dis cre tion to deny an indepe ndent motion to di smiss under Rule 48(a) , when the dismiss al is integ ral to a ple a ag ree ment, the court’s discretion is much broa der unde r the pro v i s ions of Rule 11 of the F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedur e g overning judicial consideration of plea ag ree ments. See United States v. Pimentel, 932 F. 2 d 1 0 2 9 , 1 0 3 3 (2 d C i r. 1 9 9 1 ) ( s t at i n g t h att h e d i s tri ctco u rt ’s d i s cr et i o n t o re j ec ta “ ch ar ge ba rg a in, ” i.e ., a

ple a a g re e me nt t o d ism iss or

a me ndon e or

mor e c ha rges in ex chang e fo r a

g uil ty plea to th e r e d u c e d c h ar g e s , is mo r e ak in to it s d is c r e ti o n o v e r s e n te n c in g matt e r s th a n its more limit ed discre tion to refuse to g rant a Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss an indictment); United States v. Be an, 564 F .2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that althoug h the plea ba rg ain was c ast in the form of a dismissal of a count, the district judg e prope rly exercised r easona

ble discre tion in rejecting the plea barga i n i n o rd er to impose an a ppropriate sentenc e); see g ener ally Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W .3d 1, 22-24 (Ky . 2004) (discussing d i ff er ent degr ees of

discretion af

forde d a fe dera l district court unde r Rules 11 and 4 8 ). Ho we v er, a trial court may not deny an indepe ndent motion under Rule 48(a) to dismi ss one count of a char g ing doc ument on the g round that the re maining c ount does not refle ct the g ravity

of the offense, e ven whe n the trial court has previously reje cted a

plea-10-

a g re e me nt f

or the sa me re a so n. Se e I n re Un ite d State s, 34 5 F .3 d 45 0, 45 3 (7 th Cir

. 20 03 ); se e a lso United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding trial court’s reje ction of plea ag ree ment but noting that the prosec utor could have eff ectuated the same result the plea ag ree ment soug ht by m o v i n g t o d i s miss the other counts with prejudice under Rule 48( a) and having the defe ndant plead g uiltyto the rema ining c ount).
We have pr eviously

rec og nized that a trial court ha s discretion under R u l e 1 1 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Procedur e to reject a ple a ag ree ment on the g round that the propose d sentenc e is too lenient under th e circumstance s. See State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tenn. 1995). I n t h at ca se, the de fendant was convic ted of fe lony murder and sentenc ed to death. On appea l, th e c o n v ic ti o n w a s a f f irme d , b u t th e c a s e w a s r e man d e d f o r r e s e n te n c in g

. During the
rese ntencing hearing, the defe ndant and the State r eac hed a ple a ag ree ment u n d er which the de fe nd a nt w ou ld r e c e ive a lif e se nte nc e to b e se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly to a lif e se nte nc e fo r a

se pa rate of fe ns e to wh ic h the de fe nd a nt wo uld ple a d g uil ty

. Al tho ug h we c on c lud e d tha t th e tria l c ou rt did not abuse its discretion by reje cting the plea ba

rg ain under

Rule 11, we noted that the State was not
re qu ir e d to re c e ive pe rm iss ionfr om the tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld i t w ishto w ith dr a w i ts n oti c e of int e nt t o se e k th e de a th p e na lty . I d. a t 57 8 n .2 . T hu s, we re c og nize d tha t the pr os e c uto r c ou ld d o in dir e c tly what the tria l court had pr evente d him from doing dir ectly under the plea ba

rg ain.

With the se princ ipl e s in mind, we turn to the fa c ts o f the c a se s b e fo reus . T he sa lie nt f a c ts
ar e th e s a me in e a c h c a s e

. T h e tria l c o u r t r e je c te d th e p r o s e c u to r ’ s a tt e mp t to n o ll e p r o sequi the g reater c harg e as pa

rt of a ple a ag ree ment. I ndepende nt of a plea ag ree ment, the prosecu t o r then filed a “ notice” of

, i.e., motion to, noll e prose qui the g reater c harg e. The defe ndant consente d to the nolle prosequi. The prosec utor’s stated r eason fo r t h e n o l l e p rosequi wa s that the State could not
car ry the burde n of proof as to the g reater c harg e. In L ayman’s ca se, the fa ct that the nolle prose qui of the g reater c harg e wa s sought in conjunc tion with pretrial diversion on the lesser char g e is not of le g a l si g nif

ic a nc e in l ig ht o f o ur

ov e rr uli ng L a nd e rs

. The de cision to nolle prosequi the g reater c harg e in each ca se, base d as it was on the State’ s a sse ssm e nt o f the str e ng th o f the e vid e nc e , wa s not moti vate d by c on sid e ratio ns c le arl y c on tr ary to
ma nif e st pub lic int e re st. Th e re c or d doe s not dis c los e ba d f a ithon thepa

rt of theState a t th e tim e it sought lea ve to nolle prosequi the g reater c harg e. None of t he re asons stated by the trial court or the Cou rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls f or re je c tin g the no lle pr os e qu i – c a setoo se ri ou s to a vo id j ury tr ia l, penalty too lenient, S tate mi staken in its assessment of e vidence , and dismissal would circumvent trial court’ s authority

to rejec t plea ag ree ment – sug g est extraordin ar ycirc umstances indicating be tr a y a l of

the pu bli c int e re st. Although the conce rns enumerated by the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appea ls may aff ect the public inter est in a broa d sense, these conce rns do not addre ss the prim ary issue of whe ther the prosec utor’s unconte sted motion to dismiss was filed in ba d faith or motivated by considerations that could be f

airly char acte rized as clea

rly contra ry to manifest public i n t er es t . The discr etion inhere nt to the positi on of prose cutor will alway s have an impact on the public intere st. See Pace v. State, 566 S.W .2d 861, 867 (Tenn. 1978) (He nry , C.J ., concur ring ) (noting t h at t he off ice of District Attorney Gene ral is in a very rea l se nse the most powerf ul office in Tennesse e). Mor eover ,I f a per s on ag ai ns t whom t he cr i me i s com mi t t ed i s deceas ed, t hen a f ami l y mem ber of t hat per s on may meet 12

t he d ef i ni t i o n of “vi ct i m

. ” T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 8

- 3 0 2 (4)(A ) ( 2 0 0 6 ).
-11- it is not the role of

the trial or a

ppellate c ourts to revie w t h e p rosec utor’s re asoned analy sis of the fac ts of a ca se. To do so would be to “mer ely substitut e[] its judgment for the State’s” a s prohibited by Ha rris. 33 S.W. 3da t 77 1. Al tho ug h th e tr ia l c ou rt ma y dis a g re e wi th the de c isi on to t e rm inate the pr os e c uti on , tha t, in an d of itse lf, is an insu ff ic ie nt re a so n to den y a n unc on te ste d moti on to n oll e prosequi. Ac cording ly , we c onclude in eac h case that the trial court abused its discretion in re jecting the no lle pr os e qu i.

B . V ic tim s’ Rig hts

The sec ond issue prese nted in L ayman’s ca se is whether the Victims’ B ill of Rights aff ords
a vic tim ’s famil y the ri g ht to be he ard a t pre tr ia l he ari ng s c on c e rn ing a ple a a g re e me nt anda

no lle prosequi. F or the re asons outlined below, we answe r this question in the neg ative.

Th e Te nn e sse e Con sti tut iong ua rante e s the vic tim s o f c ri me s a ndthe ir famil ie s a

va ri e ty 12 of rig h t s

. Of these rig hts, two are r elevant in the instant case: “[t]he right to conf er w ith the prosec ution” and “[t]he right to be he ard, w hen relevant, at all critical stag es of the c riminal justice p r o c e s s a s d e f

i n e d b y t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y. ” T e n n

. C o n s t

. ar t

. I, § 3 5

. T h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y, pu rs ua nt to its au tho ri ty un de r artic le I , sec tio n 35, e na c te d leg isl atio n to imp le me nt v ic tim s’ ri g hts and def ine their ke y

terms. With reg ard to the right to be h ea rd , crime vic tims m ay be hea rd at “critical stag es of the c riminal justice proce ss,” which the G ener al Assembly has d ef i ned as the fo l l o wi n g: (A) B ond hearings or bond reduc tion he aring s if hearing from the victim is deemed
re le va nt b y

the app ro pria te dis tr ic t a tto rn e y g e ne ra l;
(B ) T h e d ef

en d an t ’s s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g; (C) Any hearing at which the issue of w hether the defendant should pay restitution or the a mount of restitution that should be paid is discussed; and
(D) A ny parole hearing at which the def endant’ s relea se on par ole will bediscussed or dete rmined.

Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 38 -3 02 (2 ) ( 20 06 ). With re g ardto the ri g ht t o c on fe r, the p ro se c uto r i s require d to confe r with the victim be fore the final dispositi on of a c riminal offe nse and be fore the
commence ment of a trial. I d. § 40-38-114( a) to (b) . Howeve r, the failure of a prosec utor to confe r with the vi ctim will not aff ect the validity of pl ea ag ree ments or any other disposition of the case

. I d. § 40-38-114( d). F urthermor e, the right to conf er doe s not include the a u t h o ri t y t o direc t the prosec ution of the ca s e. I d

. § 40-38-114( c). With these consider ations in mind, we turn to the pa rt ic ula r f a c ts o f the c a se be fo re us

.W e e xpr es s no opi ni on wi t h r ega r d t o t he part i es ’ ar gu ment t hat t he ri gh t to b e hea r d do es not i ncl ude a n 13

a b ili ty t o o ff

e r u n sw o rn tes tim o n y, h e a rs a y e v id e n c e , o r te stim o n y n o t sub je c t t o c ro ss-e x a m ina tio n . B e c a u se the re is

no ri gh t t o b e h ea rd i n the inst an t ca se, t he se iss ue s are unn ec essa ry t o t he d eterm i na t i o n o f t he i ssue b efo re u s.
-12- During sever al hea

ring s conce rning the nolle prosequi, the trial court allowe d members of the Pow e rs famil y

to e xpre ss o pin ion s r e g ard ing the fa cts of th e c a se , th e thr e a t L a y ma n p os e s to
s o ci et y , an d ap p ro p ri at e m et h o d s o f pu n i s h m en t

. Al th o u gh t h e tr i al co u rt m ad e n o ex p l i ci tfi n d i n gs wi th re g ard to the pr op ri e ty of the state me nts ma de by

me mbe rs of

Pow e rs ’ f

a mil y , it app e ars the ir statements wer e allowe d out of a be lief t hat the hea ring s were eac h “critical stag es of the c riminal jus tic e pr oc e ss” a t w hic h th e famil y ha d a right to be he ard . T he Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls
c o n c lu d e d th a t th e h e aring s in que s ti o n w e r e “ c r it ic a l s ta g e s o f th e c r im in a l j u s ti c e p r o c e s s

. ” We disag ree . The Ge nera l Assembly has listed the proce eding s that are “cr itical stag es of the criminal jus tic e pr oc e ss. ” Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 38 -3 02 (2 ) ( 20 06 ). He ari ng s c on c e rn ing pl e a a g re e me nts
a ndno lle pr os e qu is a

re no ta bly abs e nt f ro m th e lis t of

pr oc e e din g s a t wh ic h vic tim s h a ve a ri g ht t o be heard. I d. I t is a long-re cog nized rule of statutory construction that “the mention of one subjec t in a statut e me a ns the e xclu sio n o f o the r s ub je c ts that are no t me nti on e d. ” Carv e r v. Citi zenUt ils

. Co., 954 S.W.2 d 3 4 , 3 5 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 7 )

. O n ap p e a l, th e St a te ar g u e s th a t th e p r e tria l h e ar in g s were “critical stag es” unde r Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-38-302(2)( C) beca use the re je c te d plea ag ree ment contained a

clause reg ar d i n g restitution. This arg ument is without m erit. The ple a a g re e me nt i s n ot p art

of the re c or d be fo re us , an d we arethe re fo reun able to f indthat it inc lud e s a provision reg arding restitution. Furthermore, th e re co rd does not re flec t that restitution was considere d at any

of the he aring s or that the Power s family was he ard on that issue. The mer e fa ct that th e ple a

a g re e me nt m a y

ha ve ordered pay me nt o f r e sti tut ionis i ns uf fi c ie nt t o b ri ng the se hearings w ithin the scope of Te nnessee Co d e Annotate d section 40-38- 302(2)( C). We theref ore conclude that Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-38-302( 2) provides victims no rig ht to be hear d at the pre trial hea

ring s in this case. 13

The State a lso arg ues that the trial c ourt impermissiblyallowed the Powe rs fa milyto direct the prosec ution of the case by permitting the ir attorney

to participate in the hearing. We a g ree . The

“ ri g ht t o c on fe r” a s d e fi ne d b y the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y

do e s n ot a llo w v ic tims or th eir a tto rn e y s to appea r bef ore the court a nd offe r leg al ar g uments i n o p p osition t o those of the pr osecutor. T enn. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 38 -1 14 (c ). We c on c lud e that the pa rt ic ipatio n of

the Pow e rs famil y ’s a tto rn e y in the pre trial hea

ring exceede d the rig ht to c onfer g rante d to victims under the Tenne ssee Constitution.

Al t h oug h the victim’s family did not have the right to be he ard at the pretria l hear i n gs conce rning th e plea a g ree ment and nolle prose qui, we conc lude that any err or wa s harmless. The trial court made it clear

that it did not base its rejection of the nolle prosequi and pr etrial diver sion on the re prese ntations or arg uments made by the victim’s family

or their attorney . There is nothing i n t h e r e c o r d e s t a

b l i s h i n g t h a tL a ym a n w a s h ar m e d b y a n y p ar t i c i p a t i o n b y t h e v i c t i m ’ s f a m i l y.-13- III. Conclusi on
We hold that a defe ndant’s elig ibilit y for pr etrial diver sion is dete rmined not by the indictment, but rather by the charg es ex isting against the defendant at the t ime the court rules on the
me mor a nd um o f u nd e rs ta nd ing se e kin g pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion . We fu rthe r h oldthat in e a c hc a s e , b e c a us e the prosec utor’s indepe ndent, unconteste d mot i o n t o nolle prosequi the g reater c harg e of the ind ic tme nt wa s ne ith e r fi le d in ba d faith no r mot ivate d by c on sid e ratio ns c le arl y c on tr ary to m a nif e st pu bli c int e re st, the tr ial c ou rt abu se d it s d isc re tio n inre je c tin g the no lle pr os e qu i. F ina lly , in L ayman’s ca s e, we h old that any err or in allowing the victim’s family to be hea

rd at the pr etrial he ari ng c on c e rn ing the ple a a g re e me nt andno lle pr os e qu i w a s h arm le ss. Ac c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e the judg ments of the trial c ourt an d t h e C o u rt of Criminal Appea ls in each c ase and rema nd for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. Costs of this appea l are taxed to the St ate of Tenne ssee.

___________________________________ JANI CE M . H OLDE R, JUS TI CE