alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.4I, Douglas Boyle, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Diamond Triumph AutoGlass, Inc  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleadingwith respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscalquarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors(or persons performing the equivalent functions): a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and  b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.       Date: August 15, 2005 By: /s/ Douglas Boyle           Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM BALANCE
SHEET AND  STATEMENT OF  OPERATIONS AS OF JUNE 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH 10-Q FOR QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2000.
</LEGEND>

<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                               8,000
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      318,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                       142,000
<INVENTORY>                                      9,783,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                10,467,000
<PP&E>                                          19,231,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                   8,902,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  20,876,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,836,000
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                           205,000
<OTHER-SE>                                      12,835,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    20,876,000
<SALES>                                         10,326,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                10,326,000
<CGS>                                           10,588,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,588,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                10,957,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   100,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (19,219,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (19,219,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (19,219,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          (0.94)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (0.94)



</TABLE>
#### George J. McDONALD, Appellant, v. David M. FINLEY, Jr., et al., Appellees.

No. 3685.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.’

Oct. 29, 1959.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 19, 1959.

*920Red, Kemp & Fahey, Houston, for appellant.

Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Miller & Martin, Dallas, for appellee.

WILSON, Justice.

This is an appeal by defendant from an order sustaining his own plea of privilege. Plaintiff filed suit in Henderson County against defendant, a resident of Smith County, for damages resulting from an automobile collision occurring “near Spring, Texas” in a county not named in the petition. Defendant’s plea of privilege in prescribed form alleged his residence in Smith County. He pleaded the accident occurred in Montgomery County and that since plaintiff had sued where venue did not lie, the latter waived the right to determine the county to which transfer should be made. He prayed that the “cause be transferred to Montgomery County, Texas, or in the alternative, to Smith County, Texas.” No controverting plea having been filed, the court ordered the cause transferred to Smith County, where defendant resided.

Defendant now says the court should have transferred to Montgomery County. His contentions are overruled. Had the trial court done this, he could complain with his present reasoning that transfer should be to the county of his residence. The court properly exercised the option tendered by the pleadings. Judgment affirmed.
EXHIBIT
32.1
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In
connection with the quarterly report of Kodiak Energy, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the
period ended September 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Report"), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the
dates indicated   below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:
 
 1.     the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 2.     the
information  contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the
Company.
 
 
 Dated:  
November 9, 2009
 
 /s/ William S
Tighe
 Name:
William S. Tighe
 Title:
Chief Executive Officer
 
 /s/ William E.
Brimacombe
 Name:
William E. Brimacombe
 Title:
Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Pure Resources, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jack Hightower,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
         and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

Dated:  August 13, 2002                    /s/ Jack Hightower
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Jack Hightower,
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer
#### John D. BEELER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

*No.*27524.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 6, 1955.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Marsene Johnson, Jr.,- County Atty., Jack W. Callahan, Asst. County Atty., Galveston, Leon 'Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

This is a conviction for robbery; the punishment, ten years in the penitentiary.

State’s witness Joseph Slemensky identified appellant as one of two men that accosted him about 1 A.M. on February 26, 1954, and testified that as' he was entering his automobile, one of the men began .striking, him and pushed'him into his automobile as the other pointed a pistol toward him; that they demanded the keys to his automobile and his money-; that after travelling several miles with them in his automobile, during which time they told him that they wanted his *money*and for him to be quiet or they would shoot him, they searched him and took $470 in money; *120that he íet them take the money because he thought they would kill him if he resisted.

Appellant testified in his own behalf and stated that at the time in question he and his companion purchased a quantity of narco.tics from Joseph Slemensky for $300 which they soon found to be of a very low grade; that they immediately returned it and demanded the return of their money; that Slemensky gave then $170 and, on the way to his place of business to obtain the balance, his companion pointed to some money, in Slemensky’s shirt pocket which he gave them; that Slemensky then leaped from the automobile and ran; that the money last given " them was- $300 and because he ran they were unable to return any money to him.

Appellant denied that they had or used a pistol or that they used any force in obtaining the money from Slemensky.

..The jury resolved the issue of fact against appellant and we find the evidence sufficient to support their verdict.

Appellant, complains, in each of two formal bills of exception, of the trial court’s action in sustaining the state’s objections to certain questions propounded by him, and to which action he duly excepted.

These bills are deficient in that they do not show what the answers of the witnesses in each instance would have been, therefore the bills cannot be appraised, and an examination of the record fails to reveal answers to such questions. 4 Tex.Jur. 318, Sec. 219; 1 Tex.Jur.Supp. 393, Sec. 219; McCune v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 207, 240 S.W.2d 305; Cartwright v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 344, 255 S.W.2d 878.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
**EXHIBIT** **31.2**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**







I,
      Francis V. Dane, certify that:






1.
      I have
      reviewed this report
      on
      Form 10-K of Communication Intelligence Corporation;






2.
      Based
      on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
      fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
      in
      light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
      with respect to the period covered by this report;






3.
      Based
      on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
      included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
      condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
      for, the periods presented in this report;






4.
      The
      registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing
      and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange
      Act
      Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:






a)
      Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
      controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
      material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
      subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
      during the period in which this report is being prepared; and






b)
      Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and
      procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
      of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
      by this report based on such evaluation.






Date:
      March 30, 2006






/s/
      Francis V. Dane






**Principal
      Financial Officer**
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofVanity Enterprises, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Anthony N. DeMint, President and Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

|   | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

/s/ Anthony N. DeMint                                    

Anthony N. DeMint

President and Chief Accounting Officer

May 5, 2006
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Capital Gold Corporation (the "Company")
on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended July 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gifford
A. Dieterle, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


                                        /s/ Gifford A. Dieterle
                                        -----------------------
                                        Gifford A. Dieterle
                                        Chief Executive Officer
                                        November 14, 2005
#### AMERICAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Petitioner.

No. MISC. 726.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

DECIDED: Feb. 26, 2003.

Before MICHEL, RADER, and SCHALL, Circuit Judges.

*ORDER*

MICHEL, Circuit Judge.

The United States petitions for permission to appeal the order certified by the Court of Federal Claims as one involving a controlling question of law with respect to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and where an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. American Management Systems, Inc. (AMS) opposes.

AMS filed suit against the United States challenging the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board’s termination of the contract between the Thrift Board and AMS for default. The contract related to AMS’s development of an automated record keeping system for the Thrift Saving Plan (TSP). The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the nonappropriated funds doctrine, 28 U.S.C. § 2517(a), arguing that the TSP contract was not financed from general federal revenues, but rather funded out of private monies placed in the Thrift Savings Fund. AMS opposed the motion, advancing several independent reasons why the nonappropriated funds doctrine did not apply. The Court of Federal Claims denied the motion to dismiss on one ground and did not address AMS’s remaining arguments. The trial court subsequently *471certified its order for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2).

This court has complete discretion to grant or deny a petition for permission to appeal. *In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation,*903 F.2d 822 (Fed.Cir.1990). In this case, we are not convinced that immediate interlocutory review of the trial court’s order is warranted. We are particularly persuaded by AMS’s argument that immediate interlocutory review may not advance the ultimate termination of the litigation because our decision on appeal, either affirming or reversing, would not decide the case. If we affirmed, the case would continue. If we reversed, the trial court would still be required to consider AMS’s remaining arguments regarding jurisdiction.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The United States’ petition for permission to appeal is denied.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

VICTOR TIANGA, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D13-1496 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________ )

Opinion filed September 5, 2014. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County; J. Frank Porter, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jessica Stephans, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

MORRIS, Judge. Victor Omar Tianga appeals the imposition of his habitual felo ny offender (HFO) sentence for aggravated a ssault. The State properly conc edes error, and we reverse and remand for resentencing.The State has the burden of proving that a defendant qualifies as an HFO. Edison v. State, 848 So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Among other elements, the State must prove that the defendant has at least two prior conv ictions and that the felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced and one of th e two prior felony convictions are not convictions pursuant to section 893.13, Flo rida Statutes, relating to purchase or possession. § 775.084(1)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2011). At Tianga's sentencing hearing, the State entered certified co pies of five prior convictions for possession of cocaine into evidence and c alled a fingerprint expert to confirm that the prints on the certified convictions matched Tianga's fingerprints. The State also introduced a criminal tracking form from the Departm ent of Corrections showing three additional prior co nvictions for Tianga, includin g one for grand theft. This form did not contain Tianga's fingerprints or photograph. Base d on this evidence, the court found that Tianga qualified for habitual offender status and sentenced him as an HFO to five years' incarceration. As the State concedes, this finding was erroneous because the criminal tracking form did not sufficiently identif y Tianga as the person named in the form. See Bodie v. State, 983 So. 2d 1196, 1197 ( Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (reversing when State presented computer printout without the d efendant's fingerprints or photograph to establish that defendant qualified for enhance d sentencing); Alcantara v. State, 39 So. 3d 535, 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (reversing whe n State presented a "rap sheet" as proof of a predicate conviction). Accordingly, we reverse Tianga's sentence and remand for resen tencing. On remand, the trial court may again impose a habitual offender sentence only if theState is able to provide the proper documentation to demonstrat e that Tianga qualifies for such sentencing. See State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 994 (Fla. 2008). Reversed and remanded for resentencing.

SILBERMAN and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1442 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1442

 Making appropriations for fiscal year 2011 to ensure that members of 
  the Armed Forces, including reserve components thereof, continue to 
   receive pay and allowances for active service performed during a 
                          Government shutdown.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 8, 2011

  Mr. Amash introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Appropriations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 Making appropriations for fiscal year 2011 to ensure that members of 
  the Armed Forces, including reserve components thereof, continue to 
   receive pay and allowances for active service performed during a 
                          Government shutdown.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EMERGENCY APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS TO PROVIDE PAY AND 
              ALLOWANCES FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES DURING 
              GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN.

    (a) Appropriation of Funds for Military Pay and Allowances.--If a 
funding gap occurs during fiscal year 2011 impacting the Armed Forces, 
amounts are hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not 
otherwise appropriated, at a rate for operations as provided for 
military personnel accounts by division A of H.R. 1, as passed by the 
House of Representatives on February 19, 2011, for the purpose of 
providing pay and allowances (without interruption) to members of the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including reserve 
components thereof, who perform active service during the funding gap.
    (b) Funding Gap Defined.--In this section, the term ``funding gap'' 
means any period of time after the beginning of fiscal year 2011 for 
which interim or full-year appropriations for the military personnel 
accounts of the Armed Forces for that fiscal year have not been enacted 
by a law other than this Act.
                                 <all>
```