ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

GREG ABBOTT 

May 12,2006 

The Honorable Mark E. Price 

San Jacinto County Criminal District Attorney 

1 State Highway 150, Room 21 

Coldspring, Texas 77331 

Opinion No. GA-0430 

Re: Authority of a county to remove an 

abandoned mobile home from county rightof-way (RQ-0412-GA) 

Dear Mr. Price: 

Two mobile homes’ have been abandoned on the right-of-way of a county road in San Jacinto 

County (the “County”)? You inform us that they present a potential safety hazard unless moved and 

inquire whether a constable or county commissioner has a right or duty to remove them. See Request 

Letter, supra note 2, at 1. You refer us to the Transportation Code and inquire whether section 

545.305 1 authorizes the removal of the manufactured homes, see id., and whether it limits liability 

for personal injury or death.’ See also TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. $545.3051 (Vernon Supp. 2005). 

‘A mobile home is a stmctllre 

(i) constructed before June 15, 1976; 

(ii) built on a permanent chassis; 

(iii) designed for use as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when 

the stmcture is connected to the required utilities; 

(iv) transportable in one or more secdons; and 

(v) [with certain minimum dimensions]. 

TEX. Oct. CODE ANN. 5 1201.003(17) (Vernon 2004). A “HUD-code manufactured home” is a structure with physical 

characteristics identical to those of a mobile home but that was “constructed on or a&r June 15, 1976, according to the 

mlesoftheUnitedStatesDepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopment. Id. ” § 1201.003(9). Bothmobilehomes and 

HUD-code manufactured homes are “manufactured homes.” Id. 5 1201.003(15). In this opinion, we will use the term 

manufactured home. 

‘Letter from Honorable Mark E. Price, San Jacinto County Criminal District Attorney, to Honorable Greg 

Abbott, Attorney General of Texas (Nov. 4,2005) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also available at http:iluww 

.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter]. 

‘Letter from Honorable Mark E. Price, San Jacinto County Criminal District Attorney, to Honorable Greg 

Abbott, Attorney General ofTexas (Dec. 7,2005) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also available at http:llwww 

.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafier Supplemental Request Letter]. 
Honorable Mark E. Price - Page 2 (GA-0430) 

Section 545.3051 was added to the Transportation Code in 2003. See Act of May 21,2003, 

78th Leg., ch. 803, § I,2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 2355. At the time the provision was enacted, only the 

Texas Department of Transportation was expressly authorized to remove personal property from 

roadways and was provided liability protection for damage caused by the removal. See SENATE 

COMM.ONINFRASTRUCTUREDEVELOPMENT&SECURIT(,BILLANALYSIS,T~~. S.B. 165,78thLeg. 

R.S. (2003); see also TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 472.01 l-.015 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2005). 

Section 545.3051 extended the authority to remove personal property from roadways to local law 

enforcement entities. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 3 545.305 1 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Section 

545.305 1 also extended the liability protection enjoyed by the Texas Department of Transportation 

to the local law enforcement entities. See id. 

Section 545.3051 provides that an “authority or a law enforcement agency may remove 

personal property from a roadway or right-of-way if the authority or law enforcement agency 

determines that the personal property blocks the roadway or endangers public safety.” Id. 5 

545.3051(b). The section also provides that 

[n]otwitbstanding any other provision of law, an authority or a law 

enforcement agency is not liable for: 

(1) any damage to personal property removed from a 

roadway or right-of-way under this section, unless the removal is 

carried out recklessly or in a grossly negligent manner; or 

(2) any damage resulting from the failure to exercise the 

authority granted by this section. 

Id. 5 545.3051(e). The term “law enforcement agency” includes [the Texas Department of 

Transportation], see id. $20 1 .OO 1, a municipal police department, a county sheriff, and a constable. 

See also id. 5 545.3051(2). The plain language of section 545.3051 gives removal authority to a 

county constable but not to a commissioners court or an individual county commissioner. See 

Fitzgerald v, Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., 996 S.W.2d X64,865-66 (Tex. 1999) (court construes 

a statute by looking to the plain meaning of the statute’s language). 

Section 545.305 1 authorizes the removal ofpersonal property. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 

5 545.3051(3) (Vernon Supp. 2005). “Personal property” is defined as 

(A) a vehicle described by Section 545.305; 

(B) spilled cargo; 

(C) a hazardous material as defined by 49 U.S.C. Section 5102 and 

its subsequent amendments; or 
Honorable Mark E. Price - Page 3 (GA-0430) 

(D) a hazardous substance as defined by Section 26.263, Water 

Code. 

Id. Section 545.3051 limits the term “vehicle” by reference to section 545.305. See id. 5 

545,3051(a)(3)(A). Section 545.305 does not expressly define “vehicle” but .rather describes the 

circumstances that allow for the removal of an unlawlirlly stopped vehicle. See id. 5 545.305(a) 

(Vernon 1999). The abandonment of the manufactured homes about which you inquire likely falls 

within the circumstances described by section 545.305 if the homes are considered vehicles.4 See 

id. 5 545.305(a)(5) (authorizing vehicle removal if unattended and an officer believes it to have been 

abandoned for longer than 48 hours). Thus, we must determine if the manufactured homes are 

“vehicles” as contemplated by sections 545.305 and 545.3051. 

Nowhere in chapter 545 is the term “vehicle” expressly defined. See generally id. ch. 545 

(Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2005). Chapter 545 is contained in title 7, subtitle C of the Transportation 

Code, however, and chapter 541 defines terms for the whole of subtitle C. See id. 5 541.201(23) 

(Vernon Supp. 2005). Under section 541.201(23), the word “vehicle” is defined as a “device that 

can be used to transport or draw persons on a highway.” Id. 5 541.201(23) (“In this subtitle 

“). Section 541.201(23) expressly excludes from the definition “(A) a device exclusively used 

on stationary rails or tracks; or (B) manufactured housing as that term is defined by Chapter 1201, 

Occupations Code.” Id. Given the clear terms of the applicable statutory definition, we conclude 

that amanufactured homeis not a”vehicle”forpurposes ofsections 545.305 and 545.3051, andthus 

is not “personal property” under section 545.305 1. A county constable, therefore, is not authorized 

by section 545.305 1 to remove abandoned manufactured homes from county roads or right-of-ways. 

Though you inquire specifically only about section 545.3051, it appears your ultimate 

concern is about the potential danger posed by the abandoned manufactured homes. We find other 

authority by which a county may remove the abandoned manufactured homes from the right-of-way 

of a county road. A county commissioners court has “general control over all roads, highways, and 

bridges in the county.” Id. 5 25 1.016. “In the discharge of such duty [a commissioners court is the] 

trustee[] of the public county roads for the whole public.” Hill Farm, Inc. v. Hill County, 425 

S.W.2d 414,417 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968), uff’d, 436 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1969). The “general 

control” language5 of the statutory predecessor of section 251.016 has been construed by the Texas 

Supreme Court as authorizing county actions that are “related to [the county’s] duty to protect the 

public’s interest in transportation.” City of Sun Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 30 

(Tex. 2003) (citing Canales v. Laughlin, 214 S.W.2d 451, 456-57 (Tex. 1948)). Moreover, the 

Transportation Code assigns a county the duty to keep all classes of roads free from obstructions. 

“Whether the manufactured homes have been abandoned is ultimately a fact question for the County. See Tex. 

Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0139 (2004) at 5 (the opinion process does not determine facts). 

% 1999, section 81.028 of the Lo&l Government Code was significantly amended and this language was 

moved to the Transportation Code as section 251.016. See Act ofApril 23, 1999,76tb Leg., RX, ch. 62, 5 13.1 l(b), 

1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 127,351. 
Honorable Mark E. Price - Page 4 (GA-0430) 

See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 5 251.008(l) (V emon 1999). This office has previously opined that 

a county commissioners court has the power to order the removal of an obstruction from a county 

road. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. M-534 (1969) at 4. We believe that a county commissioners 

court could conclude that the abandoned manufactured homes in the right-of-way of a county road 

constitute an obstruction that affects the safety and transportation of the public. See, e.g., Tex. Att’y 

Gen. Op. No. V-177 (1947) at 2 (stating that “[alny narrowing of the road to less than its legal width 

is an obstruction, and any obstruction that interferes with the road in the sense of making it less 

convenient for travel is an offense”). Through its general control over county roads and pursuant 

to its duty to keep all classes of county roads free of obstructions, we believe the County 

Commissioners Court has sufficient authority to remove the manufactured homes from the county 

road right-of-way. 

You inquire whether there is potential civil liability if the abandoned manufactured homes 

are not removed and someone is injured or killed. See Supplemental Request Letter, supra note 3, 

at 1. As a manufactured home is not within the scope of section 545.3051, the liability protection 

afforded a law enforcement agency under section 545.3051 is not applicable. Absent the specific 

liability provisions of section 545.3051, we believe the Texas Tort Claims Act would address any 

potential liability for the County’s failure to remove the abandoned manufactured homes. See TEX. 

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 101 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2005) (Texas Tort Claims Act). 

Because the merits of any particular lawsuit would be determined by the specific facts involved and 

because this office does not resolve fact questions, se2 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0298 (2005) 

at 3 (opinion process cannot resolve fact questions), we do not opine on any potential County 

liability under the Texas Torts Claims Act. 
Honorable Mark E. Price - Page 5 (GA-0430) 

SUMMARY 

Under the ‘clear terms of the applicable statutory definition of 

vehicle, which expressly excludes manufactured housing, amanufactured 

home is not included within the scope of section 545.3051, 

Transportation Code. Thus a county constable is not authorized by 

section 545.3051 to remove abandoned manufactured homes from the 

right-of-way of a county road. A county commissioners court may order 

the removal of manufactured homes pursuant to its general control over 

county roads and its duty to keep county roads free from obstructions. 

Because section 545.3051 is not applicable, all questions of potential 

liability would be addressed by the Texas Tort Claims Act. 

Verv trulv yours. 

Attome&.n&al of Texas 

BARRY R. MCBEE 

First Assistant Attorney General 

ELLEN L. WITT 

Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel 

NANCY S. FULLER 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Charlotte M. Harper 

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee