J. S53032/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: C.S., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: J.R.B. AND B.J.B. : No. 1401 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree, April 25, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Domestic Relations Division at No. A2014-0002b

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 30, 2018

J.R.B and B.J.B. (“appellants”) appeal from the decree entered 

April 25, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County by the 

Honorable Craig A. Daily, vacating the adoption decree dated March 29, 

2017, denying appellants’ petition for the adoption of C.S. (“the Child”), a 

female born in July of 2009, and granting the adoption petition of A.S., the 

Child’s maternal aunt.1 After careful review, we affirm.

By way of background, the Child is the natural child of R.F. (“Mother”) 

and E.S. (“Father”). Mother struggled with drug addiction, and in 

anticipation of being remanded to prison, Mother placed the Child with 

 

1 A.S. is Mother’s first cousin, and the adoptive mother of C.S.’s full-blooded 

younger twin sisters, O.S. and G.S. (the “Twins”). The Twins were placed 

with A.S. on August 2, 2012, when they were seven weeks old.
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appellants on September 6, 2012.2 Upon Mother’s release from prison, the 

Child returned to Mother’s care but was once again voluntarily placed by 

Mother with appellants on April 30, 2013, in anticipation of entering inpatient 

drug rehabilitation. Mother was released from treatment on or about 

May 30, 2013, and died of a drug overdose on May 31, 2013.

From the time of the Child’s birth through the time of Mother’s entry 

into drug rehabilitation in April of 2013, A.S. had regular and routine contact 

with Mother and the Child. The Child was adjudicated dependent in 2013, 

and Northampton County Children, Youth, and Families Division (“CYF”)

assumed custody of the Child. CYF continued the Child’s placement with 

appellants, and A.S. exercised weekend and holiday visits with the Child 

through December 2014, which limited A.S.’s ability to perform parental 

duties for the Child. In 2013, A.S. and other maternal family members 

regularly had unsupervised weekend visits with the Child.

CYF ceased all contact between the Child and her maternal family, 

including A.S., from the end of December 2014, following a Christmas visit, 

until July 2015, when visits between A.S. and the Child were supervised by 

CYF. Supervised visits continued through May 2016, and they were limited 

to two-hour visits every two weeks. On or about May 20, 2016, maternal 

 

2 Appellants are the adoptive parents of a daughter, G.B., age 9, and house 

their niece, K.C., age 13. 
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family, including A.S., were once again permitted unsupervised weekend 

visits with the Child. 

Father was incarcerated until January of 2015. During his 

incarceration, Father engaged with the Child via Skype, and participated, via 

telephone, with all juvenile court proceedings. Father participated with 

services to the best of his ability, while complying with the terms of his 

probation. On May 26, 2015, Father executed a “Consent for Adoption by 

Father of Child.” On June 24, 2015, CYF filed a petition to confirm consent. 

A hearing on the petition was held on July 28, 2015, at which time Father 

indicated he wished to revoke his consent. On August 17, 2015, the trial 

court entered a final decree, dated August 11, 2015, terminating Father’s 

parental rights to the Child. Father did not appeal the termination of his 

parental rights. 

Appellants filed an adoption petition on December 30, 2016. A.S. filed 

a competing adoption petition on January 5, 2016. On March 29, 2017, the 

trial court entered an adoption decree granting A.S.’s adoption petition, and 

denying appellants’ adoption decree. On April 25, 2017, the trial entered a 

second decree, vacating its March 29, 2017 decree, in order to procedurally 

address the Child’s adoption subsidy payment, and re-entered the adoption 

decree in A.S.’ favor.
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On April 28, 2017, appellants timely filed this notice of appeal, 

together with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), with regards to the decree. 

On appeal, appellants raise three issues, as follow:

I. Did the trial court commit an error of law and 

abuse its discretion in this contested adoption 

matter by failing to consider and finding to be 

relevant and pertinent all pleadings and 

testimony regarding the best interests of the 

Child in question including the placement of 

the Child with the appellants for [three and 

one-half] years prior thereto[?]

II. Did the trial court commit an error of law and 

abuse its discretion in this contested adoption 

matter by failing to consider and apply 

appropriate weight to the persuasive testimony 

of the two (2) expert witnesses who presented 

testimony at time of trial as to the best 

interests of the Child in question[?] 

III. Did the trial court committed an error of law 

and abuse its discretion in this contested 

adoption matter by not placing appropriate 

weight on the findings and reports of the 

guardian ad litem and the caseworkers and 

agents of [CYF] as to the best interests of the 

Child in question[?]

Appellants’ brief at 6 (capitalization omitted).

Once parental rights have been terminated, anyone may become an 

adoptive parent, and the best interest of the child is the controlling factor by 

which a court must be guided. In re Adoption of D.M.H., 682 A.2d 315 

(Pa.Super. 1996). In an adoption proceeding, a trial court must base its 
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conclusions upon all relevant information discerned with the full participation 

of all interested parties. Id.

This court has the broadest discretion in reviewing appeals from 

adoption decrees:

[A]ppellate review of child custody Orders is of the 

broadest type, McMillen v. McMillen, 529 Pa. 198, 

602 A.2d 845 (1992), and we may modify the trial 

court’s custody determination where it is shown by 

evidence of record to be manifestly unreasonable, 

In re: David L.C., 376 Pa.Super. 615, 546 A.2d 694 

(1988); see also Robinson v. Robinson, 538 Pa. 

52, 645 A.2d 836 (1994) (appella[te] interference 

warranted where custody Order is manifestly 

unreasonable). Further, our review is not bound by 

the trial court’s deductions, inferences and 

interpretations of evidence and we will exercise 

independent judgment to consider the merits of the 

case and to enter an Order that is correct and just. 

Bucci v. Bucci, 351 Pa.Super. 457, 506 A.2d 438 

(1986).

In re Adoption of D.M.H., 682 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa.Super. 1996), quoting 

In Interest of G.C., 673 A.2d 932, 943 (Pa.Super. 1996) (en banc).

The proceedings in an adoption hearing are unique and involve parties, 

experts, investigators, and non-parties to a greater extent than in custody 

hearings, but ultimately are subject to the same standard, “that being the 

best interest of the child.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d at 1015, citing In re 

Adoption of A.S.H., 674 A.2d 698 (Pa.Super. 1996).

As all of appellants’ issues arise out of the question of whether the trial 

court considered the best interest of the Child, as defined by the Child

Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328, we will address them together.
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Section 5328(a) of the Act provides as follows:

§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding 

custody

(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the 

court shall determine the best interest of the 

child by considering all relevant factors, giving 

weighted consideration to those factors which 

affect the safety of the child, including the 

following:

(1) Which party is more likely to 

encourage and permit frequent and 

continuing contact between the 

child and another party.

(2) The present and past abuse 

committed by a party or member 

of the party’s household, whether 

there is a continued risk of harm to 

the child or an abused party and 

which party can better provide 

adequate physical safeguards and 

supervision of the child.

(2.1) The information set forth in 

section 5329.1(a)(1) and (2) 

(relating to consideration of 

child abuse and involvement 

with protective services).

(3) The parental duties performed by 

each party on behalf of the child.

(4) The need for stability and 

continuity in the child’s education, 

family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.
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(7) The well-reasoned preference of 

the child, based on the child’s 

maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn 

the child against the other parent, 

except in cases of domestic 

violence where reasonable safety 

measures are necessary to protect 

the child from harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to 

maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent and nurturing 

relationship with the child adequate 

for the child’s emotional needs.

(10) Which party is more likely to 

attend to the daily physical, 

emotional, developmental, 

educational and special needs of 

the child.

(11) The proximity of the residences of 

the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for 

the child or ability to make 

appropriate child-care 

arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the 

parties and the willingness and 

ability of the parties to cooperate 

with one another. A party’s effort 

to protect a child from abuse by 

another party is not evidence of 

unwillingness or inability to 

cooperate with that party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol 

abuse of a party or member of a 

party’s household.
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(15) The mental and physical condition 

of a party or member of a party’s 

household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(1-16).

Citing A.S.H., appellants argue the trial court’s paramount concern in 

both custody and adoption matters is the best interest of the child. In re 

Adoption of A.S.H., 674 A.2d 698, 700 (Pa.Super. 1996). (Appellants’

brief at 10.) Appellants argue that, while A.S. is a blood relative to the Child

and the appellants are not, A.S. is not the parent of the Child, and as such, 

the burden of proof should be allocated equally between appellants and A.S. 

(Id. at 12).

We are mindful that, when possible, the preservation of the family is 

the desired outcome in custody matters. However, “[t]he goal of preserving 

the family unit cannot be elevated above all other factors when considering 

the best interests of the children, but must be weighed in conjunction with 

other factors.” In re Adoption of G.R.L., 26 A.3d 1124, 1127 

(Pa.Super.2011) (citation omitted).

Additionally, the Orphans’ Court has the duty to consider the 

statements and opinions of the guardian ad litem when making its 

determination of which family would better serve the bests interests of the 

child. Adoption of D.M.H., 682 A.2d 315, 322 (Pa.Super. 1996).
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Instantly, the trial court issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on May 1, 

2017, and stated that the reasons of the trial court can be found in its 

March 29, 2017 order, in which it considered all of the Section 5328(a) best 

interest factors, and its April 25, 2017 adoption decree. (See trial court 

opinion, 5/1/17.)

A review of the trial court’s March 29, 2017 order reveals that the trial 

court performed a detailed analysis of the Section 5328(a) factors. (Trial 

court order, 3/29/17 at 6-24.) The trial court concluded that it is in the 

Child’s best interest to be adopted by A.S. (Id. at 28.)

When considering Section 5328(a)(1), the trial court concluded:

The [c]ourt is satisfied that both parties are 

cognizant of the importance of the child maintaining 

ties with the other, and with extended family 

members on both sides. Moreover, their ability to 

work together to date to ensure visits in accordance 

with [CYF’s] instructions, coupled with their 

willingness to offer one another Act 101 Agreements, 

demonstrates that the parties are interested in 

ensuring ongoing contact between the child and the 

other party.

Finally, while [appellants] make much of the fact 

that their Act 101 agreement offers [A.S.] more 

contact that the agreement she offers, the [c]ourt is 

not convinced that a greater amount of contact with 

the non-adoptive party is necessarily in the [C]hild’s 

best interests. Specifically, while the [c]ourt 

believes that the adoptive party may need to be 

flexible and willing to adjust visitation schedules to 

meet the needs of the [C]hild, it is ultimately in the 

[C]hild’s best interest to be well established in the 

care and custody of the adoptive party, and that may 

be best accomplished by regular, but not overlyfrequent contact with the non-adoptive party. 
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Moreover, despite [CYF’s] position permitting contact 

between the [C]hild and [Father] under the 

supervision of [appellants], and the endorsement of 

the same by permanency caseworker, Jose “Alex”

Carrillo, who offered no testimony that he has ever 

observed the [C]hild with [Father], the [c]ourt is not 

convinced that it is in the [C]hild’s best interests that 

she visit or be exposed to him, or a number of the 

people with whom [appellants] maintain ties. Nor is 

the [c]ourt convinced that leaving such contact to 

the judgment and supervision of [appellants] is in 

the best interests of the [C]hild. In the [c]ourt’s 

view, the questionable influence of the individuals 

that the [C]hild is exposed to by [appellants]

presents a safety issue, and as such, the [c]ourt 

accords greater weight to this factor, pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). However, in so doing, the 

[c]ourt notes that the record is devoid of testimony 

that the [C]hild has been placed in harms’ [sic] way 

by contact with these individuals, and the weight 

accorded is tempered by that fact.

Id. at 9-10 (internal citations and footnote omitted).

The trial court considered, pursuant to Section 5328(a)(2) and 

(a)(2.1), whether there has been past or present abuse committed by a 

party, or a member of the party’s household, whether there is a continued 

risk of harm to the child or an abused party, and which party can better

provide physical safeguards and supervision of the child. The trial court 

stated: 

In this case, no evidence was presented regarding 

abuse of the [C]hild, or any abuse committed by any 

party or member of their household. However, we 

note that [J.R.B.] has been arrested five times, and 

the two most recent arrests, in 2005 and 2006, 

relate to Simple Assault charges. The 2005 charges 

were withdrawn, and the 2006 charges, which arose 

from an incident with [B.R.B.’s] adult son, who was 
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also charged, resulted in a guilty plea. By contrast, 

[A.S.] has no arrest record, and presents as a calm 

and peaceful individual.

Id. at 11.

Next the trial court examined the performance of parental duties by 

each party on behalf of the child pursuant to Section 5328(a)(3). The trial 

court considered the testimony of A.S., as well as the testimony of B.J.B. in 

concluding:

[T]he [c]ourt is satisfied that to date, [appellants]

have successfully provided for the [C]hild’s daily 

needs, performing all necessary activities of daily 

living with and/or for the [C]hild as necessary, and 

providing her love and support. Likewise, the [c]ourt 

is satisfied that A.S. has done the same for the 

[C]hild during her custodial periods. However, as 

previously noted, the [c]ourt has concerns that 

[appellants] may fail to recognize situations that 

may not be in the best interests of the [C]hild, and 

they may be ill-equipped to protect her from 

exposure to potentially harmful or otherwise 

inappropriate circumstances.

Id. at 12.

Turning to Section 5328(a)(4), the trial court considered the stability 

and continuity of the Child’s education, family, and community life. The trial 

court noted: 

[T]he [C]hild, who is presently seven (7) years old, 

has been residing continually in [appellants’] home 

for the last three and one-half (3 1⁄2) years, and she 

is closely bonded with [appellants], and with her nine 

year-old half-sister, G.B. She is a second grader at 

Washington Elementary School in Bangor, 

Pennsylvania. She is a cheerleader for the Bangor 

Slaters, but is not otherwise engaged in any 
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community activities. [The Child] has had a lifelong 

bond with [A.S.], and she has siblings in both 

homes. The [C]hild’s own testimony indicates that 

she is bonded to all of these siblings and that she 

enjoys the time she spends in both homes. While 

the grant of [A.S.’] adoption petition would require 

that the [C]hild change communities and schools, 

the [c]ourt finds that given the child’s young age, 

her limited involvement in activities, and the promise 

of continuing contact with G.B. and [appellants], the 

challenges that would be presented by such a 

change are not so insurmountable as to weigh 

against [A.S.’] petition.

Id. at 12 (internal citations omitted).

The trial court’s analysis of Section 5328(a)(5), the availability of 

extended family, is as follows:

The [C]hild is deeply loved by family members 

associated with both parties. She has a strong bond 

to [appellants] and . . . G.B., and she has close 

associations to their other family members. She also 

has a close bond to [A.S.], [the Twins], and all of her 

maternal family members, including her two older 

brothers. Through [appellants], the [C]hild also has 

contact with [Father] . . . . While [CYF] does not 

preclude this contact, the [c]ourt does not believe 

that it is in the [C]hild’s best interests.

. . . .

Consequently, the [C]hild has a great number of 

people who are interested in her well-being. 

However, [A.S.’] status as a blood relative and her 

familial connection to a greater number of the 

[C]hild’s blood relatives, which includes her older 

brothers and family interested in and involved with 

her . . . causes the [c]ourt to weigh this factor in 

favor of [A.S.] It should be noted however, that the 

weight of this factor is tempered by each party’s 

willingness to execute Act 101 agreements in favor 

of the other party.
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Id. at 12-13.

Examining the Child’s relationship with her siblings, pursuant to 

Section 5328(a)(5), the trial court found:

The [C]hild has two full-blooded siblings, [the 

Twins], who are the adoptive children of [A.S.,] G.B., 

who is the adoptive daughter of [appellants], is the 

natural child of Father, and [the Child’s] half-sibling. 

[The Child] also has two half-brothers, who are the 

natural children of Mother. . . .

There was considerable testimony offered during trial 

with respect to the fact that [A.S.] has not fostered a 

relationship between her daughters [the Twins], with 

their half-sister, G.B.[,] and the distress this has 

caused [the Child.] If the Court were to grant [A.S.’] 

adoption petition, it would clearly be in the best 

interests of the [C]hild to maintain her relationship 

with G.B., and if the [c]ourt were to grant 

[appellants’] petition, it would be in the best 

interests of the [C]hild to maintain a relationship 

with [the Twins] and the rest of her maternal family. 

In this regard, the [c]ourt is satisfied that the

Act 101 Agreements offered by the parties are 

sufficient to foster the familial bonds between the 

sisters. However, the [c]ourt notes that the grant of 

[A.S.’] adoption petition would also afford the [C]hild 

a full opportunity to rebuild a bond with her 

half-brothers, with whom [appellants] have no 

contact. The [C]hild has a half-brother who is in the 

primary care of his paternal grandmother, and in the 

care of the children’s maternal grandmother every 

other weekend, and the [C]hild has another 

half-brother, who has previously been in the care of 

maternal grandmother, but was in a residential 

placement to address behavioral issues at the time 

of trial, and has remained connected to his maternal 

family since Mother’s passing. In the absence of any 

countervailing concerns, the [c]ourt believes that 

fostering the [C]hild’s consanguineous relationships, 
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or her blood ties, is paramount to her longterm [sic] 

welfare.

Id. at 12-14 (internal citations omitted).

Next, the trial court turned to Section 5328(a)(6), the Child’s 

preference, and concluded:

The [C]hild has been in [appellants’] home for 

approximately half her lifetime to date, she feels 

loved and supported there, and she is comfortable in 

that situation. Notably, however, the [C]hild clearly 

feels loved, comfortable, and safe in the homes of 

both parties, and she is bonded in both homes. 

While the [c]ourt believes that a change in her living 

arrangements attendant with an adoption would be a 

major adjustment, the [c]ourt is satisfied that given 

her young age, her ability to articulate her feelings, 

and the promise of continuing contact with all 

parties, the [C]hild could make the adjustment 

successfully.

Id. at 16.

The trial court examined whether there was any attempt by one party 

to turn the Child against the other, pursuant to Section 5328(a)(7). The 

trial court noted: 

Given that the [c]ourt is ruling on competing 

adoption petitions and not deciding custody as 

between parents, the relationship between the 

parties is not as critical. However, because the 

[c]ourt believes that it is in the [C]hild’s best 

interests to maintain contact with the family that is 

not permitted to adopt, it is important that the 

parties are able to get along sufficiently to honor and 

effectuate an Act 101 agreement, and during the 

testimony of both parties, they indicated that they 

are so prepared. Upon consideration, the [c]ourt 

finds the testimony credible.
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Id. at 17.

Section 5328(a)(9) requires that the trial court consider the Child’s 

emotional needs to determine which party is more likely to maintain a 

loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with the Child, 

adequate for the Child’s emotional needs. The trial court acknowledged that 

the Child has experienced significant trauma in her life, and opined:

While [appellants] are unquestionably loving toward 

the [C]hild, and they do their best to care for her, 

the [c]ourt is concerned that [B.J.B.] in particular, as 

the primary caregiver, is ill-equipped to make 

decisions contrary to what she believes the [C]hild’s 

wishes, when required to assure her best interests. 

Further, the [c]ourt is concerned that [appellants]

may not be equipped to identify and address the 

[C]hild’s emotional needs in a timely and effective 

manner.

Id. at 18.

The trial court then considered the daily needs of the Child, pursuant 

to Section 5328(a)(10) to determine “which party is more likely to attend to 

the daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational, and special needs 

of the Child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5328(a)(10). After considering the evidence 

presented, the trial court concluded:

To date, [appellants] have provided satisfactory care 

for the [C]hild. However, the [c]ourt is concerned 

about their somewhat lackadaisical attitude toward 

addressing the death of the [C]hild’s mother and the 

resulting trauma to her. The [c]ourt also has 

concerns about the ability of [appellants] to put the 

needs of the [C]hild above the wishes of the [C]hild 

when it is necessary to do so.
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It was also noted at trial that [B.J.B.] has some 

learning difficulties and is sometimes unable to help 

the [C]hild with her homework. While this, in and of 

itself is not a concern, the [c]ourt’s concern 

regarding [appellants’] judgment and [B.J.B.’s] own 

expressed tendency to cater to the wishes of the 

children in her home give the [c]ourt pause as to 

whether [appellants] are sufficiently equipped to 

identify the [C]hild’s need for additional supports and 

to initiate and facilitate the [C]hild’s access to the 

same as necessary.

By contrast, [A.S.] appears, by virtue of what 

appears to be a very deliberate and attentive nature, 

more than adequately motivated and capable of 

identifying the [C]hild’s needs and ensuring the 

timely provision of appropriate supports

Trial court order, 3/29/17 at 18-19.

Noting that Section 5328(a)(11) has limited application in this matter, 

the trial court nevertheless considered the proximity of residences of the 

parties. The trial court stated it “has no concerns that the proximity of the 

parties’ residences will impinge in any way on the custodial care of the 

[C]hild in the long run.” (Id. at 19.)

Reviewing Section 5328(a)(12) for each party’s ability to care for the 

Child, or make appropriate child-care arrangements, the trial court again 

stated that it “has no concerns in this regard,” as neither party alleges that 

the other is unable to provide child-care. (Id.)

Next, the trial court gave limited weight to Section 5328(a)(13), which 

directs the trial court to evaluate the level of conflict between the parties 
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because this is an adoption matter, not a custody matter. The trial court 

found:

it is in the best interests of the [C]hild that there be 

an Act 101 agreement in place, it is essential that 

the parties be able to work together to see that 

through. Given their current practice, the [c]ourt is 

satisfied in this regard.

Id. at 20.

Section 5328(a)(14) requires the trial court to consider “the history of 

drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of a party’s household.” 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(14). The trial court noted that there were no 

allegations of drug or alcohol abuse by any party, or member of a party’s 

household, that both parties have family members in recovery, and that 

appellants have a family member in early recovery living next door. The 

trial court stated: 

[w]hile this fact does not bear on the [c]ourt’s 

determination, because both parties will continue to 

have contact with the [C]hild after the [c]ourt’s 

ruling on the adoption petitions, they are reminded 

to be vigilant in protecting the [C]hild from exposure 

to situations where an individual’s substance use 

could put her in harm’s way.

Trial court order, 3/29/17 at 20-21.

Next, the trial court considered the mental and physical conditions of 

the parties and any members of their household pursuant to 

Section 5328(a)(15). The trial court determined that while appellants have 

health issues, it did not “believe that their health issues, which are controlled 
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by physician-prescribed medication, are of any consequence to the [c]ourt’s 

determination in this case.” (Id. at 21.) 

Finally, Section 5328(a)(16) requires the trial court to consider “any 

other factor.” Pa.C.S.A. §5328(a)(16). In its evaluation of the Child’s best 

interest, the trial court considered the opinion of the Child’s guardian 

ad litem (“GAL”). The trial court concluded:

Pursuant to Rule 1154, it is a Guardian Ad Litem’s 

obligation to fully evaluate the factors affecting the 

best interests of the [C]hild, not to simply follow the 

path dictated for the child by the Agency. In this 

case, it is apparent from the record that the GAL did 

not fully exhaust his investigative duties under 

subsections (4) and (5) of the Rule, failing to 

investigate [A.S.] or any other interested party as an 

adoptive resource for the [C]hild, choosing instead to 

limit the scope of his involvement in this matter to 

an endorsement of [appellants] as [CYF’s] chosen 

adoptive resource from early on in this case. With 

this in mind, the [c]ourt accords less weight to the 

GAL’s recommendation that it would had he engaged 

in a complete and thorough undertaking of his 

duties.

While the Court recognizes [appellants’] efforts to 

provide a caring, loving environment for the [C]hild, 

it acknowledges that they are prepared to allow 

[A.S.] more post-adoption contact than she is 

prepared to offer them, and it further acknowledges 

that the grant of [A.S.’] adoption petition would 

signal a large and impactful change in the [C]hild’s 

life, the [c]ourt is confident that the award of [A.S.’] 

adoption petition is soundly in the [C]hild’s best 

interests.

Trial court order, 3/29/17 at 23-24.
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After considering all of the best interest factors pursuant to 

Section 5328(a), the trial court ultimately concluded:

6. Since the inception of the [C]hild’s 

dependency, she has never been placed with 

[A.S.]

7. Accordingly, [A.S.] is unable to satisfy the 

foregoing requirements of the Adoption Act.

8. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2901, and case law interpreting 

the same, establish that the failure to satisfy 

certain requirements of the Adoption Act are 

not fatal to a petition.

9. As set forth supra, § 2901 provides for judicial 

waiver of the requirements of the Adoption Act 

for ‘cause shown.’ 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2901.

10. Case law provides that “there is no reasonable 

construction of the Section 2901 ‘cause shown’

language other than to conclude that it permits 

a petition[er] to demonstrate why, in a 

particular case, he or she cannot meet the 

statutory requirements. Upon a showing of 

cause, the trial court is afforded discretion to 

determine whether the adoption petition 

should, nevertheless, be granted.” In re: 

Adoption of R.B.F., 569 Pa. 269, 280, 803 

A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002).

11. In this case, the [c]ourt is satisfied that [A.S.] 

has shown sufficient cause for her inability to 

satisfy the foregoing requirements of the 

Adoption Act, and she has further 

demonstrated notwithstanding the technical 

deficiencies of her petition, it is in the best 

interests of [the Child] that she be adopted by 

[A.S.]

12. It is in the best interests of the [C]hild that her 

ties to her blood relatives be maintained and 

fostered.
J. S53032/17

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13. It is in the best interests of the [C]hild that her 

connection with [appellants] and with her 

half[-]sister[,] G.B.[,] be maintained and 

fostered.

14. It is in the best interests of the [C]hild that she 

be adopted by [A.S.] and that she maintain 

contact with [appellants] and G.B. pursuant to 

the Act 101 agreement offered by [A.S.] and 

presented to the Court as Exhibit B-2.

15. Weekend visitation with [appellants] twice per 

month in the first three months and once a 

month thereafter will help the [C]hild to 

acclimate to the change in her family structure, 

and allow her to establish firm roots in [A.S.’] 

family.

Trial court order, 3/29/17 at 27-28.

We find that the competent evidence in the record supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that it is in the Child’s best interest that she be adopted 

by A.S. The trial court heard testimony from Richard Small, Ph.D., ABPP, 

who performed a forensic bonding assessment to evaluate bonds between 

the Child, appellants, A.S., as well as G.B., and the Twins. (Id. at 7.) When 

considering Dr. Small’s testimony, the trial court noted that Dr. Small spent 

limited time with the parties, and did not accord great weight to Dr. Small’s 

findings. (Id.) 

The trial court also heard testimony from Rutvi Kapadia, Psy.D., LPC, 

NCC, who performed a trauma assessment to determine the impact of the 

Child’s being removed from appellants’ home. (Id.) Dr. Kapadia did not 

interview the Child or either of the parties together, and the trial court 
J. S53032/17

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surmises that while Dr. Kapadia may not have found it necessary to do so, 

the lack of such interviews goes to the weight to be given to her report. 

(Id. at 8.)

Based on the foregoing, we will not disturb the adoption decree. The 

trial court’s determination that it would be in the Child’s best interest to

grant A.S. the right to adopt her is supported by the record. Accordingly, we 

affirm the decree.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/17