### FILED July 12, 2016 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt WA State Court ofAppeals, Division III



### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE In the Matter ofthe Guardianship of P.M.; J.S.; H.S.; C.W.F.S. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

### No. 

### 33532-1-111 (consolidatedwith 

### 33533-0-111, 33534-8-111, 33535-6-111)
UNPUBLISHED OPINION KORSMO, J. -A.M. stipulatedto a guardianship giving custody ofher four minor childrento her adult son, J.K., andhis wife. She now appeals from the guardianship order, challengingthe Guardians' discretion concerninghercontactwiththe children. We reject her arguments and affirm. FACTS A.M. is the mother offour minor children, P.M., J.S., H.S., and C.W.F.S. Sometime in late 

### 2013, she was arrested and chargedwithviolating federal criminal statutes. With no fathers inthepicture, the Department ofSocial and Health Services (DSHS) filed dependencypetitions for all four children andplacedthem in relative care withJ.K. andhis wife, L.K. J.K., who grewup in an adoptive family, is the adult son of A.M. Roughly one year later, A.M. was convicted on federal charges and agreedto transitionthe dependencies into guardianships.No. 33532-1-III (consol w/ 33533-0-III, 33534-8-III, 33535-6-III) In re P.M, JS., H.S., C. WF.S.

At an initial hearing, A.M. stipulatedto the facts necessary to establish guardianships, but requested a greater degree ofcontactthan initially recommendedby DSHS. She asked to be allowed monthly contact with her children, to receive quarterly updates with pictures from the Guardians, and to have the children visit her injail when she returned to Spokane for sentencing. Thetrial court heard testimony from the children's counselor, the dependency case worker, A.M., J.K., and L.K. Afterweighingthe evidence, a superior court commissioner entered guardianship orders for all four children. The orders specifiedthatthe Guardians will sendA.M. two letters peryear, which may include pictures at their discretion. A.M. is allowed to send quarterly letters to each child. The Guardians are also required to facilitate letter writing by the children to A.M. Finally, the commissioner gave the Guardians discretion over any further contactbetweenthe children and A.M., includingpossible phone calls and the June visit. A.M. appealed the order, challenging the discretion given to the guardians. A.M. also filed an emergency motion seekingto visit the children before her federal sentencing. This courtremanded the case for a hearing to determine whetherthejailvisit would happen. However, at the newhearing, A.M. withdrew herrequest.

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### No. 33532-1-III (consol w/ 33533-0-III, 33534-8-III, 33535-6-III) In re P.M, JS., HS., C. WF.S.


### ANALYSIS This court will review a guardianship order for an abuse ofdiscretion. 1 

### Discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 

### 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). A.M. challenges the discretion given to the Guardians over the extent ofcontact with her children. 2 

### She contends that this violates RCW 13.36.050(l)(d), which requires the court to "specify an appropriate frequency and type ofcontact" between the parent and the child. Relying on this court's decision in R. V, 

### she argues that by giving discretion to the Guardians, the trial court unlawfully delegated its statutory obligations. See In re Dependency of R. V, 

### 113 Wn. App. 716, 54 P.3d 716 (2002). In R. V, 

### the trial court determined that the guardian would regulate visits between the mother and her son. Id. 

### at 719. The statute mandated that the guardianship order "specify an appropriate frequency ofvisitation between the parent and the child." Id. 

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### The guardianship statute is relatively new and no court has previously stated the standard ofreview for a guardianship order. However, similartypes oforders, such as dependency orders, are ordinarily reviewed for an abuse ofdiscretion, and we believe that standard is appropriate here. See In re Dependency of JR. U-S., 

### 126 Wn. App. 786, 792 n.1, 110 P.3d 773 (2005); In re Dependency of R.L., 

### 123 Wn. App. 215, 220, 98 P.3d 75 (2004). 2

### A.M.'s opening briefpredates the ruling on the emergency motion, and assigns errorto the portion ofthe order concerning thejail visit. The parties now agree that this issue is moot. 3No. 33532-1-III (consol w/ 33533-0-III, 33534-8-III, 33535-6-III) In re P.M, JS., HS., C. WF.S. 720; RCW 13.34.232(l)(d). This courtreversed the decision because the order failed to do so. R. V, 113 Wn. App. at 720-721, 723. Eventhough

### R. V dealt with a guardianship order established underthe older statutory regime,3 the same rationale applies here. Here, the guardianship order must "specify an appropriate frequency and type ofcontact" between A.M. and her children. RCW 13.36.0SO(l)(d). However, unlike the order in 

### R. V, these guardianship orders adhere to the statutory requirements. Here, the commissionerheld a substantial hearing to learn aboutthe children and their specific situations. She carefully considered this evidence before determining an appropriate scope and frequency ofcontactbetween A.M. and her children.4 The guardianship orders contain these specifications and comply with the statutory requirements.

3 In 2010, the legislature revised the laws governing guardianships and established new procedures to give full custody ofdependent children to permanent guardians and dismiss the underlying dependency. LA

### ws OF 2010, ch. 272. Priorto that, guardianships were established within continuing dependencies and DSHS retained legal custody ofthe child. See former RCW 13.34.230 (2009), .231 (2000), repealedby LA

### ws OF 2010, ch. 272, § 16. 4 As an alternative argument, A.M. contends thatthere is not substantial evidence preponderating in favor ofthe particularterms ordered. She treats this argument as though she is challenging findings offact underlying ajudgment. Certain facts must be established by apreponderance ofthe evidence in orderto create a guardianship. See RCW 13.36.040(2). However, A.M. stipulated to those facts. Rather, the conditions imposed in the guardianship are left to the discretion ofthe court. Since those conditions are well-founded in fact, we cannot find an abuse ofthat discretion. 4No. 33532-1-III (consol w/ 33533-0-III, 33534-8-III, 33535-6-III) In re P.M, JS., H.S., C. WF.S. Then, as a boon to A.M., the trial court gave the Guardians discretion to permit

more substantial contactwith the children. However, there is no legal prohibition against giving Guardians discretion concerning the children in their care. Simply by their nature, guardianships must give caregivers substantial authority and discretion concerning the well-being ofthe children involved. See RCW 13.36.050(1)-(2). Accordingly, since the guardianship orders comply with all ofthe statutory requirements and are well-grounded in fact, the guardianship orders are very tenable. There was no abuse ofthe trial court's discretion. Affirmed. A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will notbeprinted in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public recordpursuantto RCW 2.06.040.

WE CONCUR:

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

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