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Filed 8/7/24 Marriage of Hobson CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of CHRISTINE AND 

JIMMIE DALE HOBSON.

CHRISTINE HOBSON,

Respondent,

v.

JIMMIE DALE HOBSON,

Respondent;

OLIVER LOUER et al.,

Claimants and Appellants.

E080482

(Super. Ct. No. FLRI2000906)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Cheryl C. Murphy, Judge. 

Affirmed.

Decker Law, James D. Decker, and Griffin R. Schindler, for Claimants and 

Appellants.

Benedon & Serlin, Judith E. Posner, and Kian Tamaddoni, for Respondent Jimmie 

Dale Hobson.
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No appearance for Respondent, Christine Hobson.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellants Oliver and Patricia Louer purchased a home (the Property) for their 

daughter, Christine Hobson, and her daughter.

1

 The Louers initially held title to the 

Property and rented it to Christine. Eventually, after Christine married Jimmie Hobson, 

the Louers transferred title to the Property to Christine and Jimmie, as community 

property. When Christine and Jimmie’s marriage was nearing an end, Christine 

unilaterally attempted to transfer title to the Property back to her parents, unbeknownst to 

Jimmie. After Christine filed for dissolution of her marriage, Jimmie discovered 

Christine had quitclaimed the Property back to the Louers. In a bifurcated court trial of 

the Hobsons’ dissolution proceedings, joined by the Louers as interested parties, the trial 

court found that Christine and Jimmie retained their community property interest in the 

Property and that the 2019 quitclaim deed was invalid.

The Louers appeal the trial court’s ruling on the bifurcated issue of ownership of 

the Property. The Louers contend that the trial court erred in finding that the Property 

belongs to Christine and Jimmie as community property. The Louers argue that the 

Hobsons never acquired an interest in the Property because the 2016 quitclaim deed 

transferring title of the Property from the Louers to the Hobsons was invalid. The Louers 

1 When referring individually to parties or witnesses who share the same last 

names, we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion. Our use of first names is 

not intended as a sign of disrespect.
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alternatively argue that, even if title to the Property was transferred to the Hobsons in 

2016, Christine transferred the Property back to the Louers in 2019, by quitclaim deed.

We conclude the Louers’ arguments lack merit, and affirm the trial court’s findings 

and ruling that the Hobsons are the legal owners of the Property.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1995, the Louers purchased the Property, located in Riverside. Christine, her 

daughter, and Christine’s boyfriend, Chris Bragg, moved into the Property right after the 

Louers purchased it. The Louers bought the Property so that Christine and her daughter

would not have to live in an apartment.

Christine paid the Louers rent from the time after she moved into the Property 

until she filed for divorce from Chris. Christine married Chris in 1998, and they divorced 

in 2000. Christine and Chris paid the Louers $600 a month for rent and paid the 

electricity bill. The Louers paid the Property insurance, property taxes, and other 

utilities, such as water and trash.

Christine and her daughter remained at the Property after her divorce from Chris. 

Christine continued to pay the Louers rent, which eventually was reduced to $200 a 

month because she lost her job. In 2003, the Louers paid off the Property mortgage.

Jimmie began living with Christine at the Property in 2003, and they married in 

2004. When Jimmie moved in, he and Christine paid the Louers $675 in monthly rent 

from their joint bank account, and paid for the gas, water, and electricity. The Louers 
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continued to pay the property taxes, insurance, and other household expenses and 

utilities.

On September 12, 2006, the Louers executed the Oliver G. Louer and Patricia A. 

Louer Revocable Living Trust (Louer Trust). The Louers were designated trustees, 

grantors, and beneficiaries of the Louer Trust, and Christine was named successor trustee 

and primary beneficiary upon the death of the Louers. Oliver testified that it was his

intent that Christine would receive sole title to the Property when the Louers died.

On September 18, 2006, the Louers executed a quitclaim deed, which Oliver 

drafted, transferring title to the Property from the Louers individually, to the Louers as 

trustees of the 2006 Trust. Oliver believed that, as trustees, the Louers were in charge of 

managing the Property. Oliver testified that his intent when he drafted the quitclaim deed 

was to prevent the Property from entering probate upon his death.

On April 30, 2016, the Hobsons executed the Christine Marie Hobson and Jimmie 

Dale Hobson Revocable Living Trust (Hobson Trust), which Oliver drafted. Christine 

and Jimmie were named as co-trustees, grantors, and beneficiaries of the Hobson Trust. 

The Hobson Trust states in the declaration of trust instructions that Christine and Jimmie, 

as trustees, “[e]ither alone may act for or represent the trust in any transaction.” The 

Hobson Trust further provides that, upon Christine’s or Jimmie’s death, the survivor must 

distribute the deceased spouse’s share of the property in Schedule A, which consists

solely of the Property. The Hobson Trust’s declaration of trust states in Part 4, entitled 

“Character of Trust Property,” that either Christine or Jimmie, as grantors, “may revoke 
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this trust at any time, without notifying any beneficiary” and “distribute the trust property 

listed on Schedule A” “to the grantors as their community property.” Amending the 

Hobson Trust, however, required both grantors “acting together.”

Under the Hobson Trust section entitled, “Part 8. Trustee’s Management Powers 

and Duties,” the trust states: “A. Powers Under State Law, [¶] The trustee shall have all 

authority and powers allowed or conferred on a trustee under California law, subject to 

the trustee’s fiduciary duty to the grantors and the beneficiaries. [¶] B. Specified Powers, 

[¶] The trustee’s powers include, but are not limited to: [¶] 1. The power to sell trust 

property, and to borrow money and to encumber trust property, including trust real estate, 

by mortgage, deed of trust or other method.” Schedule A of the Hobson Trust only lists 

the Property as “Shared Property Placed in Trust.” Schedule B of the Hobson Trust 

states: “Christine Marie Hobson’s Separate Property Placed in Trust, [¶] No schedule 

property.”

Oliver testified he included in the Hobson Trust the language that either Christine 

or Jimmie could act individually on behalf of the other under the Hobson Trust, in the 

event there was some unforeseen event. Christine testified that she believed she owned 

the Property and she was going to live there forever and raise her children there.

On May 9, 2016, the Louers executed a quitclaim deed, drafted by Oliver (2016 

quitclaim deed), transferring title to the Property from the Louers as trustees of the Louer 

Trust, to Christine and Jimmie, as trustees of the Hobson Trust. The deed was signed by 
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the Louers and recorded a few days later. The Louers did not receive any money in 

exchange for the transfer.

Oliver testified that it was his understanding that he and his wife transferred title to 

the Property into the Hobson Trust, which then became the owner of the Property. Oliver 

further testified that he did not draft a deed transferring title only to Christine because, at 

that time, her “marriage seemed to be pretty strong, and we had no idea that anything like 

a divorce would ever happen.” Oliver did not require compensation for the Property, but 

stated he did not intend it to be a gift. Rather, he intended that at his death it would 

become Christine’s property. Oliver testified he did not intend that the 2016 quitclaim 

deed would give the Hobsons a community property interest in the Property. Instead, he 

intended that the Hobson Trust would own the Property.

After the Louers transferred the Property to the Hobson Trust in 2016, the 

Hobsons stopped paying the Louers rent and began paying the Property costs and 

expenses, including property taxes, homeowners’ insurance, earthquake insurance, and 

utilities. The Hobsons did not pay rent for the Property from April 2016 through March 

2019.

During their marriage, the Hobsons used their tax refund funds in their joint bank 

account to pay for improvements to the Property. Jimmie testified that he and Christine

believed they owned the Property and could do whatever they wanted to it without the 

Louers’ consent. Jimmie believed the Louers gave the Property to both of them by 

transferring title to the Hobson Trust. But Christine testified that during their fights, 
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Jimmie would say that the Property was never going to belong to him, Christine had 

everything, and he had nothing.

On March 25, 2019, Christine, as trustee of the Hobson Trust, executed a 

quitclaim deed (2019 quitclaim deed), transferring title to the Property back to the Louers 

Trust. The 2019 quitclaim deed was recorded. Although Oliver was not an attorney, he

suggested to Christine transferring the Property back to the Louers and prepared the 

quitclaim deed. He wanted the Property returned because Christine told him her marriage 

was ending. Upon reviewing the Hobson Trust, Oliver believed Christine could 

unilaterally transfer title back to the Louers without Jimmie’s consent. Christine also 

executed a claim for reassessment exclusion for transfer between parent and child. 

Jimmie was not mentioned on the form as one of the transferors of the Property. Both 

documents were only signed by Christine.

On November 4, 2019, the Louers executed an amendment to their 2006 Louer 

Trust, deleting Schedule A to the Louer Trust and replacing it with a new Schedule A 

dated November 1, 2019, which listed the Property again as a trust asset. The 

amendment also removed Christine as the Louer Trust successor trustee.

After Christine executed the 2019 quitclaim deed, Oliver drafted a rental 

agreement, which Christine signed, and she began paying the Louers rent. The Louers 

resumed paying the homeowners’ insurance and property taxes. Oliver told Jimmie 

about the transfer and asked him to sign the rental agreement. Jimmie refused to sign it 

or pay rent. On January 8, 2020, Oliver served Jimmie with a three-day notice to quit. 
8

Jimmie moved out in January or February 2020, and Christine continued paying the rent 

to the Louers. Jimmie testified he did not learn of Christine’s purported transfer of the 

Property to the Louers until after Christine filed for divorce in February 2020.

On December 11, 2020, Jimmie filed a joinder complaint to the dissolution 

petition. His joinder complaint included a cause of action to cancel the 2019 quitclaim 

deed and a request for declaratory and injunctive relief.

On February 8, 2021, the Louers filed a cross-complaint on Jimmie’s joinder 

action, which included causes of action for quiet title and cancellation of the 2016 

quitclaim deed.

On September 14th-16th, 2022, the court tried the Property ownership issues. The 

trial court issued a written statement of decision on November 16, 2022, in which the 

court made the following findings regarding the Property: (1) The Property was 

presumptively community property acquired by the Hobsons during their marriage; (2) in 

2016, the Louers transferred title to the Property from the Louer Trust to the Hobson 

Trust; (3) in 2016, the Louers intended to convey all interest in the Property to both 

Christine and Jimmie, as trustees of the Hobson Trust; (4) as trustees, Christine and 

Jimmie jointly held legal title to the Property based upon the 2016 quitclaim deed; and 

(5) after the Louers transferred Property title in 2016 to the Hobson Trust, the Hobsons 

no longer were required to pay the Louers rent, and were responsible for paying for the 

Property taxes, insurance, maintenance, and improvements.
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The trial court further found regarding Christine’s attempt to transfer the Hobsons’ 

interest in the Property back to the Louers: (1) under Family Code section 761, 

subdivision (a),2modification of the rights and interests in the Property held in the 

Hobson Trust required joinder or consent of both spouses; (2) Christine’s attempted 

unilateral transfer of the Property to the Louers by executing the 2019 quitclaim deed was 

tantamount to an amendment of the Hobson Trust; (3) Christine’s attempted return of the 

Property to the Louers was not valid under the terms of the Hobson Trust because it was 

done unilaterally by Christine, and was tantamount to a revocation of the Hobson Trust; 

(4) because Christine’s attempted unilateral transfer of the Property was invalid, the 

Property remained community property under section 761, subdivision (b); (5) because 

the 2019 quitclaim deed was invalid, title to the Property remained in Christine’s and 

Jimmie’s names, as trustees of the Hobson Trust; (6) Christine did not provide any 

evidence rebutting the community property presumption and did not establish that the 

Property was her separate property, not community property; (7) Christine’s and the 

Louers’ concealed efforts to attempt to convey the Property back to the Louers did not 

change the community property character of the Property; and (8) Christine is not liable 

to Jimmie for breach of fiduciary duty by attempting to unilaterally transfer title to the 

Property back to the Louer Trust, because she reasonably relied upon Oliver’s assurances 

and the Hobson Trust language, and held a good faith belief the Louers became the 

owners of the Property.

2

Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Family Code.
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In the statement of decision, the trial court ordered that (1) the Property be 

characterized as the Hobsons’ community property and (2) the Louers immediately 

transfer title to the Property back to the Hobsons as tenants in common. The Louers filed 

a notice of appeal of the statement of decision findings and orders entered on November 

16, 2022.

III.

VALIDITY OF THE 2016 QUITCLAIM DEED

The Louers contend the Hobsons never acquired an interest in the Property 

because the 2016 quitclaim deed was invalid. We disagree.

The trial court found that, when the Louers executed the 2016 quitclaim deed, the 

Louers intended to convey the Property to both Christine and Jimmie. The Louers argue 

substantial evidence does not support this finding, and that the evidence establishes that 

the Louers instead intended that Christine would inherit the Property after the Louers

died. The Louers maintain that the 2016 quitclaim deed was therefore invalid because 

the Louers never intended (1) to divest themselves of title to the Property when they 

executed the 2016 quitclaim deed or (2) to transfer any interest in the Property to Jimmie.

“‘A deed delivered with the intent that it shall take effect only on the death of the 

grantor is an attempted testamentary disposition and therefore void. [Citation.]’” (Meyer

v. Wall (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 24, 27, italics added.) “‘“[T]o constitute a valid delivery 

there must exist a mutual intention on the part of the parties, and particularly on the part 

of the grantor, to pass title to the property immediately. In other words, to be a valid 
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delivery, the instrument must be meant by the grantor to be presently operative as a deed, 

that is, there must be the intent on the part of the grantor to divest himself presently of the 

title. Even if the document is manually delivered, but the evidence shows that the parties 

or the grantor intended the document to become operative only upon death, the document 

is testamentary in character and void as a deed.” [Citation.]’” (Ibid., italics added; see 

also Blackburn v. Drake (1963) 211 Cal.App.2d 806, 811-812; Henneberry v.

Henneberry (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 125, 129; Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3rd ed.

2000) § 8:38, p. 74 [“Any attempt to convey property by a deed that is to become 

effective only on the grantor’s death is completely ineffective and void.”].)

The intent to pass title, an essential element of delivery, is a question of fact which 

must be determined by the trier of fact upon consideration of all of the circumstances 

surrounding the transaction. (Meyer v. Wall, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at p. 27.)

Here, there is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the 

Louers intended to divest themselves presently of title to the Property when they 

executed the 2016 quitclaim deed transferring title to the Property to the Hobsons through 

the Hobson Trust. There is evidence establishing that in 2016, Oliver drafted the Hobson 

Trust and the 2016 quitclaim deed transferring title to the Property to the Hobsons, 

through the Hobson Trust. Thereafter, the Hobsons stopped paying the Louers rent for 

the Property, and began paying for all of the Property expenses, including property taxes, 

insurance, utilities, maintenance, and improvements. Before execution of the 2016 

quitclaim deed, most of those expenses were paid by the Louers, and the Hobsons paid 
12

the Louers rent while living at the Property. Oliver told the Hobsons they no longer had

to pay rent after execution of the 2016 quitclaim deed. Christine and Jimmie testified 

they believed that after the Louers quitclaimed the Property to them in 2016, they became 

the sole, joint owners of the Property.

The Louers argue that the absence of any consideration for the transfer of the 

Property to the Hobsons supports a finding that the Louers did not intend to convey the 

Property to the Hobsons when they executed the 2016 quitclaim deed. “Neither 

consideration, nor adequacy of consideration, is essential to the validity of a deed.” 

(Odone v. Marzocchi (1949) 34 Cal.2d 431, 436.) While lack of consideration may be 

relevant when determining whether there was intent, here the lack of consideration is 

insufficient to establish a finding of a lack of intent to transfer the Property to the 

Hobsons, because there is other strong evidence that the Louers intended to voluntarily 

transfer title without requiring the Hobsons to provide anything in return.

For instance, Oliver testified that the Louers decided to quitclaim the Property to 

the Hobsons because the Hobsons’ marriage seemed to be strong and stable, the Louers

wanted the Hobsons to benefit from the homestead property tax deduction, and the

Louers wanted to ensure that Christine and her children could live in a house instead of 

an apartment. It was not until Christine told the Louers that her marriage was ending that 

the Louers realized that they needed to regain title of the Property to avoid Jimmie 

retaining an interest in the Property. Oliver persuaded Christine in 2019 to

surreptitiously, without Jimmie’s knowledge or consent, attempt to transfer title to the 
13

Property back to the Louers. Had the Louers intended, as they argue, to retain title to the 

Property until after they both passed, rather than transferring title in 2016, by quitclaim 

deed to both Christine and Jimmie, the Louers could have simply retained title to the 

Property in their living trust, which provided for transfer of title to the Property to 

Christine upon their death. These facts establish that the parties understood that the 

Louers’ transferred title to the Property to both Christine and Jimmie by executing the 

2016 quitclaim deed.

We conclude based on the totality of the evidence that there was substantial 

evidence that the Louers intended to pass present title to the Property to the Hobsons by 

executing the 2016 quitclaim deed, which was thus valid and immediately transferred

title to Christine and Jimmie in 2016.

IV.

INVALIDITY OF THE 2019 QUITCLAIM DEED

The Louers contend that even assuming they transferred title to the Property in 

2016 to the Hobsons, Christine transferred title to the Property back to the Louers in 

2019, by executing and recording the 2019 quitclaim deed. The Louers argue the trial 

court erred in finding invalid Christine’s unilateral transfer of title to the Louers in 2019. 

Jimmie argues the Louers forfeited this objection by misrepresenting the record on appeal 

and by failing to address the bases for the trial court’s decision. Regardless of whether 

the Louers forfeited their objection, we reject it on the merits.
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The trial court found that, as a result of the 2016 quitclaim deed transferring title 

to the Hobsons, the Hobsons thereafter jointly held title to the Property as community 

property. The trial court further found that Christine’s surreptitious attempt to reconvey 

the Hobsons’ title back to the Louers, without informing Jimmie or obtaining his consent, 

was ineffective and did not eliminate the Hobsons’ community property interest in the 

Property. The trial court therefore ordered the Louers to immediately effectuate record

title of the Property by the Hobsons.

In determining whether the Hobsons’ interest in the Property was lawfully 

quitclaimed to the Louers by the 2019 quitclaim deed, we begin by determining the 

character of the Hobsons’ interest in the Property in 2019, and whether Christine could 

legally unilaterally transfer title to the Property to the Louers.

A. Characterization of the Property as Community Property

“The characterization of property as community or separate can be determined by 

the date of acquisition, the application and operations of presumptions, or by whether the 

spouses have transmuted the property. [Citation.] . . . The party claiming that property 

acquired during the marriage, which is presumed to be community property, is actually 

separate property has the burden of overcoming this presumption by a preponderance of 

the evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Sivyer-Foley & Foley (2010) 189 

Cal.App.4th 521, 526; § 760 [“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real 

or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while 

domiciled in this state is community property.”].) The Hobsons were married when the 
15

Louers transferred title to Christine and Jimmie in 2016. The presumption is thus that the 

Property was community property. The Louers had the burden of proving otherwise, and 

failed to do so, as discussed in the preceding section.

Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the 

Property was the Hobsons’ community property when Christine attempted to transfer title 

to the Louers by executing the 2019 quitclaim deed. The parties’ trial testimony and 

documentary evidence established the character of the Property as community property. 

In 2016, the Louers quitclaimed the Property to both Christine and Jimmie, as trustees of 

the Hobson Trust. Schedule A attached to the 2016 Hobson Trust states that the Property 

is “Shared Property Placed in Trust.” The Hobson Trust’s declaration of trust states in 

Part 4, entitled “Character of Trust Property,” that either Christine or Jimmie, as grantors, 

may revoke the Hobson Trust at any time and “distribute the trust property listed on 

Schedule A” “to the grantors [Christine and Jimmie] as their community property.”

B. Invalidity of Christine’s Unilateral Attempt to Transfer Title in 2019

The Louers argue that, regardless of whether the Property was community 

property, the 2019 quitclaim deed was valid. We disagree.

Christine, as trustee of the Hobson Trust, unilaterally executed the 2019 quitclaim 

deed in an attempt to transfer the Hobsons’ interest in the Property to the Louers. This 

was done without Jimmie’s consent or knowledge and was intended to eliminate the 

Hobsons’ title to the Property. Had the 2019 quitclaim been valid, it would have 

removed the sole asset in the Hobson Trust, which would have had the effect of revoking 
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the Hobson Trust. (Estate of Coleman (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 380, 388 [“Where the 

property of the trust ceases to exist, there is nothing to which the trustee may hold legal 

title, nothing in which the beneficiaries may hold a beneficial interest, and there is no 

longer a trust. [Citation.][] It follows that the complete withdrawal of the trust property 

terminates the entire trust.” (fn. omitted.)].) Under the Hobson Trust, revocation of the 

trust by removing the only property held within it required distribution of the Property to

the trust’s grantors (Christine and Jimmie) as their community property. As community 

property, Christine could not transfer Jimmie’s interest in the Property to the Louers. 

(§ 761, subd. (a).)

The Louers argue that Christine had authority under the Hobson Trust to 

unilaterally transfer the Property to the Louers, without Jimmie’s consent or knowledge, 

because section 761, subdivision (c) and the Hobson Trust provide that, when property is 

held in a trust, a trustee spouse is authorized to unilaterally, without the consent of the 

other trustee spouse, convey and otherwise manage and control trust property in 

accordance with the provisions of the trust, “unless the trust expressly requires the joinder 

or consent of one or both spouses.” (§ 761, subd. (c).)

Under section 761, subdivision (a), “[u]nless the trust instrument or the instrument 

of transfer expressly provides otherwise, community property that is transferred in trust 

remains community property during the marriage, regardless of the identity of the trustee, 

if the trust, originally or as amended before or after the transfer, provides that the trust is 

revocable as to that property during the marriage and the power, if any, to modify the 
17

trust as to the rights and interests in that property during the marriage may be exercised 

only with the joinder or consent of both spouses.”

The Hobson Trust states that either Christine or Jimmie, as trust grantors, can

revoke the Hobson Trust in writing or by any manner allowed by law. The Hobson Trust 

further states that the grantors can amend the trust “only by both of them acting together,” 

and “[a]ll amendments must be in writing and signed by both grantors.” Under these 

provisions, Christine could unilaterally revoke the Hobson Trust, but any amendment to 

the Hobson Trust required both Christine and Jimmie to do so in writing, signed by both 

of them.

The Hobson Trust expressly required the joinder or consent of Jimmie when 

Christine gratuitously transferred title to the only property held in the Hobson Trust. 

Regardless of whether the removal of the Property from the Hobson Trust amended, 

modified, or revoked the Hobson Trust, Christine’s unilateral transfer of title to the 

Property was invalid because she removed the Property from the Hobson Trust without 

Jimmie’s consent and, more significantly, gratuitously transferred both Jimmie’s and her 

community property interest in the Property to the Louers without Jimmie’s consent. 

This removal of the Property from the Hobson Trust and transfer of title to the Louers 

was tantamount to a trust revocation, which in accordance with the declaration of trust, 

Part 4, required distribution of the Property to Christine and Jimmie as their community 

property. The 2019 quitclaim transfer of title to the Louers thus violated the Hobson 
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Trust by transferring title to the Louers, instead of to the Hobsons as community 

property.

Under section 761, subdivision (b), “Unless the trust instrument expressly 

provides otherwise, a power to revoke as to community property may be exercised by 

either spouse acting alone. Community property, including any income or appreciation, 

that is distributed or withdrawn from a trust by revocation, power of withdrawal, or 

otherwise, remains community property unless there is a valid transmutation of the 

property at the time of distribution or withdrawal.”

Although under this provision Christine could unilaterally revoke the trust by 

removing the sole Property from the Hobson Trust, the Hobson Trust declaration of trust 

provides, consistent with section 761, subdivision (b), that “If the trust is revoked, the 

trustee shall distribute the trust property listed on Schedule A to the grantors as their 

community property.” Christine and Jimmie were the trustees and grantors. Upon 

revoking and or amending the Hobson Trust, Christine was required to distribute the 

Property, which was community property, to herself and Jimmie. Christine, however, 

executed the 2019 quitclaim deed in an attempt to transfer title from the Hobson Trust to 

the Louers. The 2019 quitclaim deed was therefore invalid and in violation of the terms 

of the Hobson Trust.

C. The Trial Court Finding that the 2019 Quitclaim Deed Is Invalid

The Louers argue that the trial court did not expressly find or order that the 2019 

quitclaim deed was invalid. Therefore, it must be assumed the 2019 quitclaim deed is
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valid. We disagree. It can be reasonably inferred from the trial court’s statement of 

decision that the trial court found that the 2019 quitclaim deed was invalid. The court 

was not required to make a specific finding in this regard, particularly when the Louers 

did not request it or object to the statement of decision on the ground there was no such

express finding. (Runyan v. Pacific Air Industries, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 304, 309-310

[“‘[W]hile full findings are required upon all material issues a judgment will not be set 

aside on appeal because of a failure to make an express finding upon an issue if a finding 

thereon, consistent with the judgment, results by necessary implication from the express 

findings which are made.’”]; see also St. Julian v. Financial Indemnity Co. (1969) 273 

Cal.App.2d 185, 195; Kuffel v. Seaside Oil Co. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 555, 565; 59 Cal. 

Jur. 3d Trial § 181.)

It can be implied from the following findings in the statement of decision that the 

trial court found that the 2019 quitclaim deed was invalid. The trial court found that 

Christine unilaterally attempted to reconvey the Property to the Louers by executing the 

2019 quitclaim deed. The trial court further found that in 2019, Christine and the Louers 

“concealed efforts to convey” the Hobsons’ interest in the Property to the Louers. The 

trial court found that this surreptitious attempt to unilaterally transfer title to the Louers 

by executing the 2019 quitclaim deed did not change the community property character 

of the Property, and the Hobsons continued to hold title to the Property. Therefore, in 

effect, the 2019 quitclaim deed was invalid, resulting in the trial court ordering that the 

Property remain characterized as the Hobsons’ community property.
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In addition, the trial court found that Christine’s attempted “unilateral transfer of 

the [Property] to [the Louers] is tantamount to an amendment of the Hobson Trust”; 

Christine’s “amendment to the Hobson Trust is not valid, pursuant to the express terms of 

the Hobson Trust”; Christine’s “unilateral transfer of the [Property] to [the Louers] is 

tantamount to a revocation of the Hobson Trust”; and “pursuant to [section] 761

[subdivision] (b) [the Property] remains community property despite [Christine’s] 

unilateral distribution and withdrawal of the [the Property] from the Hobson Trust.”

Even if not expressly stated, the trial court’s findings and orders were wellfounded and more than sufficient in pronouncing the 2019 quitclaim deed invalid.

D. Order that the Louers Transfer Title Back to the Hobsons

The Louers argue that the trial court’s order “to immediately effectuate a transfer 

of title” to the Property to the Hobsons “as tenants in common, forthwith,” demonstrates 

that the trial court found that the 2019 quitclaim deed was a valid conveyance of the 

Property to the Louers. The Louers assert that, if it were not a valid transfer, there would 

be no need for the trial court to order the Louers to transfer title to the Property back to 

the Hobsons. We disagree.

The trial court’s order that the Louers effectuate return of title of the Property to 

the Hobsons was appropriate and not inconsistent with the determination that the 2019 

quitclaim deed was invalid. The trial court reasonably ordered the Louers to effectuate 

transfer of the Property title back to the Hobsons because Christine recorded the 2019 

quitclaim deed, which clouded the Hobsons’ title to the Property. The trial court’s order 
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merely required the Louers to clear title by quitclaiming any interest in the Property,

which the Louers might later on claim under the 2019 quitclaim deed.

The order also required the Louers to convey title to the Hobsons as tenants in 

common, rather than as community property, apparently because the matter was part of 

ongoing dissolution proceedings. (§§ 2550, 2553 [“The court may make any orders the 

court considers necessary to carry out the purposes of this [Family Code, property] 

division”]; In re Marriage of Sivyer-Foley & Foley, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 525 

[“Absent an agreement by the parties, . . . section 2550[] imposes on the trial court in 

marital dissolution proceedings a duty to value and divide equally the parties’ community 

property estate.” (fn. omitted.)].)

Thus, the trial court’s order that the Louers immediately effectuate a transfer of 

title to the Property to the Hobsons is consistent with the trial court’s other findings and 

does not establish, as the Louers argue, that the 2019 quitclaim deed lawfully conveyed 

title to the Property to the Louers.

E. Statute of Limitations

The Louers argue that an unauthorized transfer of community property by one 

spouse, without the consent of the other, is voidable, not void. Such a conveyance 

therefore is valid until the nonconsenting spouse brings a successful action to invalidate 

the unilateral transfer of community property within one year of recording title. (§ 1102, 

subd. (d).)
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Here, the 2019 quitclaim deed was recorded on March 25, 2019. Jimmie did not 

file his joinder complaint to cancel the 2019 quitclaim deed until June 1, 2020. The 

Louers argue that, regardless of whether the 2019 quitclaim deed is valid, the trial court 

erred in ordering the Louers to transfer title back to the Hobsons, because Jimmie’s 

complaint to cancel the 2019 quitclaim deed was barred by the one-year statute of 

limitations under section 1102, subdivision (d). We disagree.

First, section 1102, subdivision (d) provides that an action “to avoid an instrument 

mentioned in this section, affecting any property standing of record in the name of either 

spouse alone, executed by the spouse alone, shall not be commenced after the expiration 

of one year from the filing for record of that instrument in the recorder’s office . . . .” 

(Italics added.) Section 1102, subdivision (d) is inapplicable by its own terms because it 

applies only to recorded instruments affecting title to property standing of record in the 

name of one spouse alone. The evidence is uncontroverted that when Christine executed 

the 2019 quitclaim deed, title to the Property stood in the names of both spouses as 

community property. Thus, the one-year statute of limitations is not a valid defense to 

Jimmie’s action seeking to cancel the 2019 quitclaim deed.

Second, although a deed to community real property transferred to a third party is 

presumed valid if the person receives the deed “in good faith without knowledge of the 

marriage relation” (§ 1102, subd. (c)(2)), here, the Louers did not receive the 2019 

quitclaim deed “in good faith without knowledge of the marriage relation” of the 

Hobsons, given they knew Christine and Jimmie were married at all relevant times and 
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held joint ownership of the Property when Christine attempted to unilaterally transfer 

their title to the Louers. (Ibid.)

We therefore conclude the 2019 quitclaim deed was invalid and the trial court did 

not err in ordering the Louers to immediately effectuate recorded title to the Property by 

the Hobsons as tenants in common.

V.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Jimmie is awarded his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

Acting P. J.

We concur:

RAPHAEL

J.

MENETREZ

J.