1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

N o

. 124,998

A MERICAN W ARRIOR , I NC ., and B RIAN F. P RICE ,

Appell ants ,

v

.
B OARD OF C OUNTY C OMMISSIONERS OF F INNEY C OUNTY , K ANSAS , and H UBER S AND , I NC

. , Appell ees

.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. Mootness occur s when something changes during litigation to render a judicial decision ineffectual to the parties' rights and interests.

2. K.S.A. 12

- 741(a) grants counties the authority to enact zoning regulations without state interference so long as those local enactments do not conflict with the Planning, Zoning
, and Subdivision Regulations in Cities and Counties Act, K.S.A. 12

- 741 et seq

. In keeping with this statutory scheme, K.S.A. 12

- 755 authorizes counties to adopt zoning regulations providing for issuance of conditional use permits.

Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 63 K an. App. 2d 123 , 525 P.3d 789 ( 2023 )

. Appeal from Finney District C ourt; W ENDEL W. W UR ST , judge. Oral argument held November 14, 2023

. Additional briefing completed January 29 , 2024

. Opinion filed July 26, 2024

. Jud gment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed

. Judgment of the d istrict c ourt is affirmed

.2

Patrick A. Edward

s , of Stinson LLP , of Wichita , argued the cause
, and David E. Bengtson , of the same firm, and Benjamin C. Jackson , of Jackson Legal Group, LLC, of Scott City
, were with him on the briefs for appellant s

.

Linda J. Lobmeyer
, of Calihan Law Firm, P.A. , of Garden City
, argued the cause
, and Shane C.
Luedke , of the same firm, was with her on the briefs for appellee s

.

Jay Hall , general counsel
, was on the brief for amicus curi a e Kansas Association of Counties.

Johnathan Goodyear , general counsel , was on the brief for amicus curiae League of Kansas Municipalities.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

B ILES , J.: K.S.A. 12

- 741(a) grants counties the authority to enact zoning regulations without state interference so long as those local enactments do not conflict
with the Planning, Zoning
, and Subdivision Regulations in Cities and Counties Act,
K.S.A. 12

- 741 et seq

. Exercising that authority, Finney County adopted local rules delegat ing the issuance of con ditional use permits to a separate Finney County Board of Zoning Appeals

. A Court of Appeals panel majority held the C ounty could not do that
, while a dissenting ju dge agreed with the district court that it could. See American Warrior, Inc. v. Board of Finney County Comm'rs , 63 Kan. App. 2d 123, 525 P.3d 789 (2023). We granted review to resolve th e dispute

. We hold the County 's regulations do
not conflict with state law . T he Zoning Board validly issued the conditional use permit that sparked this litigation

. We reverse the panel majority and affirm the district court.

F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND

The material facts are un di spute d

. Since 2017, American Warrior , Inc. , owned an oil and gas lease covering about 177 acres southeast of the c ity of Pierceville, between3

Highway 50 to the north and the Arkansas River to the south, and between the t own of Pierceville and South Pierceville Road to the west and the Finney County/Gray County
line to the east. In 2020, Huber Sand , Inc. , bought surface rights to the same t ract, along
with surface rights to an adjoining property to the east across the Finney C ounty line in to Gray County

. The tract was zoned as an agricultural district.

In May 2021, Huber applied to the Finney County Board of Zoning Appeals for a

c onditional u se p ermit to operate a sand and gravel quarry under the Finney County, Kansas, Zoning Regulations, adopted by the Board of Finney County Commissioners

. The Zoning Board published notice of Huber's a pplication
, announcing a public meeting
in June. At that meeting, affected residents commented about authorized uses with in agricultural zoning districts, the location of crushing equipment and the access road, condition of the river pit, road maintenance, Huber's operati ng hours, and traffic on the
Pierceville roads. T he Zoning B oard table d the matter until the next month

.

At the July meeting, the Zoning Board received a report prepared by a Garden City municipal department
, an entity established to guide development and support community livability . It recommend ed the application 's a pproval. The Zoning Board also
received protest petition s from m ore than 100 Pierceville residents

. In the end, i t approved the application on a 2

- 1 vote with conditions

.

In August, Brian F. Price, a Finney County resident who owned land near the tract,
and American Warrior (collectively " American Warrior " ) sued the Finney County Commission and Huber, challenging the permit's legality. They claimed the local procedure for issuing the permit violate d state law , citing K.S.A. 12

- 757 (procedures for amending zoning regulations)

. They argued state statute s require a permit application be
review ed first by the county planning commission before the board of county commission ers consider it

. Both sides submitted competing summary judgment motions

.4

The district court granted judgment for the County and Huber . It held the County properly delegated its power to issue conditional use permit s to the Zoning Board.
American Warri o r appealed to the Court of Appeals , where a panel majority reversed the
district court . The panel majority held the County's local procedure conflicted with
K.S.A. 12

- 757 , relying on Crumbaker v. Hunt Midwest Mining , Inc. , 275 Kan. 872, 69 P.3d 601 (2003) , and Manly v. City of Shawnee , 287 Kan. 63, 194 P.3d 1 (2008)

. American Warrior , 63 Kan. App. 2d at 133. Chief Judge Arnold

- Burger disagreed

. 63 Kan. App. 2d at 134 (Arnold

- Burger, C.J., dissenting).

The County and Huber sought our review, which we granted

. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 20

- 3018(b) (providing for petitions for review of Court of Appeals decisions); K.S.A. 60

- 2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions upon petition for review).

M OOTNESS

T he County's zoning regulations create a threshold question about mootness
b ecause the Zoning Board approved Huber's permit on July 21 , 2021 , and section 28.070

states: "All conditional use permits shall be valid for one (1) year from the date it was approved by the Board of Zoning Appeals ; if project has not been substantially completed within one (1) year of approval, the conditional use permit shall expire ." Section 2.020( 4 ) defines "shall" as "mandatory ."

Mootn ess oc cur s when something changes during litigation that may render a judicial decision ineffectual to the parties' rights and interests. See State v. Roat , 311 Kan. 581, Syl. ¶ 1, 466 P.3d 439 (2020)

. W e asked the parties to discuss this at oral argument5

and later ordered additional briefing. Both sides agree the permit has not expired

. We agree with them.

Standard of review

Courts review mootness question s de novo. Roat , 311 Kan. at 590. To the extent the question involves regulatory interpretation and construction, review is unlimited . W e follow the express language used when it is plain and unambiguous
, giving common words their ordinary meanings, without adding to or subtracting from the text. Courts
resort to textual construction only when the language is ambiguous. Central Kansas
Medical Center v. Hatesohl , 308 Kan. 992, 1002, 425 P.3d 1253 (2018). We apply the same rules to interpreting regulations as we do when interpreting a statute. See Robinson v. City of Wichita Employees' Ret. Bd. of Trustees , 291 Kan. 266, 272, 241 P.3d 15 (2010).

Discussion

American Warrior claims that "when read as a whole, [section 28.070] allows for a conditional use to continue as long as it is maintained if the 'project' is 'substantially completed' within one year of when the [Zoning Board] approved the [conditional use permit]." Similarly, the County and Huber contend "the notion that a conditional use would expire upon a technical failure of not reapplying for a permit yearly, creates an
absurd result." Their point s are well taken.

At a glance, section 28.070 's first clause (" All conditional use permits shall be
valid for one [ 1 ] year from the date it was approved by the Board of Zoning Appeals

. ")
seems clear and implies conditional use permits expir e after that one

- year period. But
read with the second clause ( " [I] f project has not been substantially completed within one6

[ 1 ] year of approval, the conditional use permit shall expire ." ) , the text provides a second meaning

— a permit remains valid for a minimum duration of one year and expires only if the project is not substantially completed within a year.

T his second meaning is the better view and aligns with the second clause's purpose and function to provid e a logical understanding of the regulatory language. See State v. Strong , 317 Kan. 197, 203, 527 P.3d 548 (2023) ("[C]ourts may consult canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity. 'The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that languag e is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.' [Citations omit ted.]"). Reading section 28.070 to invalidate a permit after one year renders the second clause
redundant and nonsensical. See Fisher v. Kansas Crime Victims Comp. Bd. , 280 Kan. 601, 613, 124 P.3d 74 (2005) (stating the Legislature "does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation and the obligation to interpret a statute in such a way that part of it does not become surplusage").

Simply put, section 28.070 means: a permit is valid for at least one year , which

c an extend beyond that year if the project is substantially completed. Here, neither side raises a substantial completion issue

. We hold this litigation is not moot and proceed to
decide the merits.

C OUNTY A UTHORITY TO D ELEGATE Z ONING R EGULATION

I n keeping with the statutory scheme, K.S.A. 12

- 755 authorizes counties to adopt zoning regulations providing for issuance of conditional use permits. Here, the district

court granted judgment to the County and Huber, holding the County properly issued th e conditional use permit through its Zoning Board in accordance with the County's

r egulations

. We agree.7

Standard of review

Appellate courts review de novo a district court's grant of summar y judgment. First Security Bank v. Buehne , 314 Kan. 507, 510, 501 P.3d 362 (2021). Likewise, w e interpret statutes and regulations de novo based on their plain language

. Central Kansas
Medical Center , 308 Kan. at 1002.

Local enact ments

T he Board of Finney County Commissioners first adopted its z oning r egulations in
1995

. T he 2021 version applies here. A rticle 4 governs agricultural district s , list ing permitted uses and structures and specif ying conditional uses , including sand and gravel quarries, " may be permitted only after they have been reviewed and approved as required by Article 29

. " ( E mphasis added.) Regulations, §§ 4.020
, 4.030

. The regulatory definition
of "conditional use" means:

"A use of any building, structure or parcel of land that, by its nature, is perceived to require special care and attention in siting so as to assure compatibility with surrounding properties and uses. Conditional uses are allowed only after public notice, hearing and approval as prescribed in these Regulations and may have special conditions and safeguards attached to assure that the public interest is served." Regulations, § 2.030(36)

.

Meanwhile, a "conditional use permit" i s a "written document of certification issued by the Zoning Administrator permitting the construction, alteration or establishment of a [c]onditional [u]se." Regulations, § 2.030(37). "Conditional use permit" is commonly interchange d with "special use " and "exceptions
, " a practice t he County appears to follow. Compare 2 Am. Law Zoning § 14:1 (5th ed.)
, with Regulations8

§ 2.030(61) ("Exception

- An exception shall always mean the allowance of otherwise prohibited use within a given district, such use and conditions by which it may be permitted being clearly and specifically stated within this Zoning Regulation, and the
al lowance being granted by conditional use permit from the Board of Zoning Appeals.") ; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1685 (11th ed. 2019) ("special

- use permit" is a "zoning board's authorization to use property in a way that is identified as a special exception in a zoning ordinance" and "[a]lso termed conditional

- use permit") ; Black's Law Dictionary
1683 ("special exception" is an "allowance in a zoning ordinance for special uses that are considered essential and are not fundamentally incompatible with the original zoning regulations" and "[a]lso termed . . . conditional use; special use ").

Article 29 governs the Zoning Board's authority over conditional use exceptions

. Under s ection 29.040
, t he Zoning Board may grant conditional use exceptions authorized by the Regulations
, so long as those uses compl y with the relevant provisions and are appropriate ly integrat ed into the community. In pertinent part, it states:

" The Board of Zoning Appeals may authorize, as an exception to the provisions of these zoning regulations, the establishment of those conditional uses that are expressly authorized to be permitted as a conditional use in a particular zoning district

. . . . No conditional use shall be authorized as an exception to these regulations unless the Board is specifically authorized, by these regulations, to grant such conditional use and unless such grant complies with all of the applicable provisions of these reg ulations.

" The purpose of the conditional use permit is to allow proper integration of uses
into the community which may only be suitable in specific locations, and may have potentially detrimental characteristics if not properly designed, located, and conditioned.
A conditional use permit may be granted only for uses listed as conditional uses in respective zones

. . . . " Regulations § 29.040.9

Th is same section outlines the application process for a conditional use permit
, which Huber followed. It applied, detailing information like plots, plans, and drawings, showing how the conditional use will affect adjacent properties
, to the Zoning Board at least 28 days before its meeting. See Regulations § 29.040( A )(1)

- (8). Once submitted, the Zoning Board must consider s ection 29.050 's factors to evaluate the requested use 's impact on County inhabitants' well

- being and zoning district stability. T he Zoning Board

must also impose safeguards as needed to protect neighboring properties.

Article 28 broadly governs the Zoning Board

— dictating its composition, authority, and jurisdiction. T he Zon in g Board is made up of three members. Regulations § 28.010. I t has the authority and jurisdiction:

"To hear and grant exceptions to the provisions of the zoning regulation in those instances where the Board of Zoning Appeals is specifically authorized to grant such exceptions and only under the terms of the zoning regulation. In no event shall exception s to the provisions of the zoning regulation be granted where the use or exception contemplated is not specifically listed as an exception in the zoning regulation. Further, under no conditions shall the Board of Zoning Appeals have the power to grant an

e xception when conditions of this exception, as established in the Zoning regulation by the Governing Body, are not found to be present." Regulations § 28.030(6).

And it may make decisions as follows :

" The Board of Zoning Appeals may affirm or reverse, wholly or partly, or may modify the order, requirement, decision, or determination appealed from, and may make such order, requirement, decision or determination as ought to be made, and to that end shall have all the powers of the zoning administrator and may issue or direct the issuance of a permit. The concurring vote of two (2) members of the Board of Zoning Appeals shall be

necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision, or determination of the Building Inspector or Zoning Administrator, or to decide in favor of the applicant upon any matter10

which it is required to pass under any such ordinance, or to effect any variation in such
ordinance . . . ." (Emphases added.) Regulations § 28.050.

In summary, a rticle 4 permits sand and gravel quarries in agricultural districts as
conditional uses ; a rticle 29 delegates issuing power to the Zoning Board ; and a rticle 28 requires two of three Board members to agree when deciding in an applicant's favor.

Statutory scheme

To resolve whether the County 's action complied with state law, we now dive into
the Planning
, Zoning
, and Subdivision Regulations in Cities and Counties Act. This Act
enables cities and counties to pass planning and zoning regulations "for the protection of the public health, safety and welfare, and is not intended to prevent the enactment or enforcement of additional laws and regulations on the same subject which are not in conflict with the provisions of this act. " K.S.A. 12

- 741 (a)

.

The Act empowers c ounties , through their board s of county commissioners, to enact or amend zoning regulations by adopting resolution s using the applicable statutory procedure. K.S.A. 12

- 753 ; see also K.S.A. 12

- 756 (procedures to establish zones) ; K.S.A.
12

- 757 (procedures to amend the existing zones). The Act also grants t he board of county
commissioners power to regulat e issuing special or conditional use permits. K.S.A. 12

- 755(a)(5)

. And it reflects legislative intent to enable counties' home rule powers on zoning matters

. See K.S.A. 19

- 101 ( " [E] ach organized county . . . shall be empowered . . . to exercise the powers of home rule to determine their local affairs and government authorized under the provisions of K.S.A. 19

- 101a . . . [ and ] to exercise such other and further powers as may be especially conferred by law." ); Dav id v. Board of Norton County Comm'rs , 277 Kan. 753, 755, 89 P.3d 893 (2004) ("Kansas counties derive all of11

their home rule authority from a statutory scheme originally enacted in 1974. See K.S.A.
19

- 101 et seq.").

That said, a county's zoning power may be limited by state law through preemption , which occurs when the " legislative intent to reserve exclusive jurisdiction to
the state [is] clearly manifested by statute

— i.e., by expressly prohibiting cities from enacting any type of ordinance related to the state law. " DWAGFYS Manufacturing, Inc. v. City of Topeka , 309 Kan. 1336, 134 1 , 443 P.3d 1052 (2019)

. But t he Act contains no such express statement of preemption for conditional use permits. Still, K.S.A. 12

- 741 (a)

says state zoning law preempts a ny county regulations " in conflict with the provisions of
this act." Cf. K.S.A. 19

- 101 a (a)(1) ( "Counties shall be subject to all acts of the legislature which apply uniformly to all counties." ); Crumbaker
, 275 Kan. at 886 ( zoning legislation is generally considered as "'the field with a uniformly applicable enactment'" )

.

Here, American Warrior argue s state law preempts what it views as conflicting

c ounty regulations on conditional use permits . It claims the Zoning Board should have
followed K.S.A. 12

- 757's amendment procedures before issuing Huber's permit. The panel majority agreed , citing Crumbaker and Manly
, both of which analyze d whether a
zonin g board properly allowed a conditional use under K.S.A. 12

- 757

. American
Warrior , 63 Kan. App. 2d at 133 ; Crumbaker
, 2 7 5 Kan. at 885

- 87; Manly , 287 Kan. at
67

- 68. On the other hand, Finney County and Huber contend state law does not preempt Finney County's regulations because the permit did not "supplement, change or generally revise the boundaries or regulations contained in zoning regulations." See K.S.A. 12

- 757(a). The panel's dissent concurred with them. American Warrior , 63 Kan. App. 2d at 146

.12

To decide this, we must consider whether the County's zoning procedures conflict
with any of the A ct 's provisions

. We begin with the statute at issue. K.S.A. 12

- 757 (a)
reads:

" The governing body, from time to time, may supplement, change or generally revise the boundaries or regulations contained in zoning regulations by amendment. A proposal for such amendment may be initiated by the governing body or the planning commission. If such proposed amendment is not a general revision of the existing regulations and affects specific property, the amendment may be initiated by application of the owner of property affected. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Put simply, any additions, modifications, corrections, or improvements to "the boundaries or regulations contained in zoning regulations," require counties follow
K.S.A. 12

- 757 's steps

. See Hatesohl , 308 Kan. at 1002 (courts give common words their ordinary meanings) ; Merriam

- Webster Online Dictionary (to " supplement" means "to
add ") (defining to " change" as "to make different in some particular" or "to replace with
another" ) (to " revise " means "to look over again in order to correct or improve" or "to
make a new, amended, improved, or up

- to

- date version of" ); Black's Law D ictionary 102 (11th ed. 2019) ( "amendment" is "[a] formal and usu. m inor revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specif., a change made by addition, deletion, or correction; esp., an alteration in wording" ) ; c f

. K.S.A. 19

- 101c ("The powers granted counties pursuant to this act shall be referred to as county home rule powers and they shall be liberally construed for the purpose of giving
to counties the largest measure of self

- government." [Emphasis added.]).

K .S.A. 12

- 757 appli es only to chang ing zoning regulations by amendment. As t he panel dissent observed:13 "A conditional

- use permit does not change the existing zoning of a tract of land. The Tract here is zoned agricultural and remains zoned agricultural. Under the Finney County, Kansas, Zoning Regulations sand and gravel quarries are allowed on land zoned

as agricultural. So anyone purchasing property around agriculturally zoned property is on notice that sand and gravel quarries are permitted. But the county may place conditions on the use of the land. The placement of these conditions does not constitute an amendment to the zoning regulations or the zoning of the tract. It is and remains agricultural. The zoning regulations of the county remained the same both before and
after the issuance of the conditional

- use permit here. That accords with both the county
definition of a conditional

- use permit and the generally accepted definition of a
conditional use." American Warrior , 63 Kan. App. 2d at 136

.

So d id Huber's application ask the County to supplement, chang e , or revis e the Regulations and t hereby creat e a conflict with K.S.A. 12

- 757 ? In short: no.

Huber 's " Application for Conditional Use or E xception " s ought to use property zoned as agricultural for its sand and gravel quarry operation based on the existing county regulations . See Regulations § 4.030 ( permitting "[s]tate approved . . . sand and gravel quarries" in agricultural zones " after they have been reviewed and approved" by the county ). A s explained
, such a permit is the Zoning Board's authorization to use property
in a way identified as a conditional exception by the Regulations

. This aligns with Huber's proposal and the necessary action to approve it

— no supplement, change, or
revis ion to existing boundaries or regulations needed

.

Next , we turn to K.S.A. 12

- 759 , which specifically contemplates zoning board authority and special uses

. Under subsection (a)
, the Finney County Commission created the Zoning Board with article 28 , dictating the Board's composition, authority, and jurisdiction

. A nd under subsection (e) , it g a ve the Zoning Board broad authority in article
29 to hear, vote upon, and grant conditional use permits through a standard application14

and evaluation process

. See K.S.A. 12

- 75 9 (e) (2) ( " When deemed necessary by the board of zoning appeals, the board may

. . . grant exceptions to the provisions of the zoning regulation in those instances where the board is specifically authorized to grant such exceptions and only under the terms of the zoning regulation. " [ Emphas i s added. ]).

Subsections (a) and (e) govern Huber's permit . T he panel majority mistakenly
believed subsection (d) applied , but it only specifies the process to appeal " a ny decision of the officer administering the provisions of the zoning ordinance " to a specific zoning appellate board

. K.S.A. 12

- 759(d). S ubsection (d) is inapplicable because the Zoning Board granted Huber's permit
, not some individual officer through administrative action.
B y complying with subsections (a) and (e), t he County's zoning regulations in articles 28
and 29 align and do not conflict with K.S.A. 12

- 75 9

.

American Warrior argues for the first time on appeal that K.S.A. 12

- 757a supports its position

. K.S.A. 12

- 757a states : "No city or county may establish procedures regarding the adoption of special use or conditional use permits for mining operations

. . . which require the approval of more than a majority of all members of the governing body." A nd A merican Warrior asserts the timing of K.S.A. 12

- 757a 's passage after
Crumbaker and Manly suggests the Legislature approved of how those cases interpret ed
K.S.A. 12

- 757 . It argues the Legislature " could have and should have amended [K.S.A.
12

- 757] at that time to exclude [conditional use permits]" if it disagreed. There is a lot wrong with this.

First, K.S.A. 12

- 757 never refers to conditional use permits and, in fact, exclude s them from its governance . Further, K.S.A. 12

- 755(a)(5) (allowing counties to adopt their own regulations to issu e conditional use permits) and K.S.A. 12

- 759(e) (allowing a board of zoning appeals to grant exceptions) make no reference to K.S.A. 12

- 757, and vice

versa. Second, American Warrior's interpretation would make K.S.A. 12

- 757a15

duplicative of K.S.A. 12

- 757(g) . In other words, if K.S.A. 12

- 757 uniformly applie d to issu ing conditional use permits
, subsection (g) would already govern such exceptions and
K.S.A. 12

- 757 a would not need to exist

. See Patterson v. Cowley County, Kansas , 307 Kan. 616, 626, 413 P.3d 432 (2018) (courts generally presume the Legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation); Kansas One

- Call Sys tem v. State , 294 Kan. 220, 233, 274 P.3d 625 (2012) ("'[V] arious provisions of an act in pari materia must be construed together in an effort to reconcile the provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious and sensible. '"; "' An appellate court's duty, as far as practicable, is to harmonize different statutory provisions to make them sensible. '").

T he panel majority critical ly fail ed to engage in a straightforward
, textual interpretation of the Act and R egulations

. Instead, it looked first to Crumbaker and Manly
and improperly extended their holdings to the present controversy

. See American
Warrior , 63 Kan. App. 2d at 126

- 32. But n either applies

.

Crumbaker held K.S.A. 12

- 757 governed changing land use in a city whose local zoning regulations requir ed compliance with state law
, which is distinguishable from Finney County 's regulations that ha ve no such requirement . See Crumbaker , 275 Kan. at
885

- 86

. And Manly 's use of K.S.A. 12

- 757 to evaluate a special use permit's validity is similarly inapplicable
, because th at court never had a chance to rule on the legal issue presented here since neither party nor the court question ed K.S.A. 12

- 757's applicability

. T h e Manly decision interpreted the statute without a nswering the foundational inquiry of
whether an appropriate city ordinance governed

. See Manly
, 287 Kan. at 67

- 68. As the
district court here observed, applying Manly would be an unjustified stretch. The panel majority's reliance on Crumbaker and Manly was unwarranted. See American Warrior , 63 Kan. App. 2d at 130

- 31.16

The other cases cited by the panel majority or American Warrior are similarly distinguish able or inapplicable since they misunderstand Crumbaker or Manly . See
Zimmerman v. Board of Wabaunsee County Comm'rs , 289 Kan. 926, 218 P.3d 400 (2009) (distinguishable; amending zoning regulations under K.S.A. 12

- 757); Johnson County Water Dist. No. 1 v. City of Kansas City , 255 Kan. 183, 871 P.2d 1256 (1994 ) (distinguishable; challenging the reasonableness of conditions imposed in granting a special use permit under K.S.A. 12

- 757 [ c ] [judicial review of local government's final decision]); Pretty Prairie Wind v. Reno County , 62 Kan. App. 2d 429, 517 P.3d 135 (2022) (distinguishable; challenging a form of the protest petitions; here, discussing
K.S.A. 12

- 757[f] created no problem since Reno County Zoning Regulations § 20

- 102 [2016] contained sufficiently similar requirements); Kaw Valley Companies v. Board of Leavenworth County Comm'rs , No. 124,525 , 2022 WL 3693619 , at * 8 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion) (misunderstanding Manly ); Ternes v. Board of Sum n er County
Comm'rs , No. 119,073, 2020 WL 3116814 , at * 12 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (misunderstanding Crumbaker and Manly ); Vickers v. Franklin Co. Bd. of
Comm'rs , No. 118,649 , 2019 WL 3242274 , at *4 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion) (misunderstanding Crumbaker and Manly ); R.W.D. No. 2 v. Board of Miami County Comm'rs , No. 105,632 , 2012 WL 309165 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (challenging the validity and reasonableness of decision denying a conditional use permit; like Manly , application of K.S.A. 12

- 757 was uncontested).

W e hold K.S.A. 12

- 757 does not preempt a count y ' s issuance of conditional use permits

. Finney County's zoning procedures for issuing conditional use permits do not
conflict with the governing state law

. T he panel majority erred by holding K.S.A. 12

- 757
controlled Huber Sand's application of a conditional use permit.

Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.