13276 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 36 / Thursday, February 22, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

§ 165.T05–0136 Safety Zone, Installation 

Area for Offshore Wind Power 

Transmission Export Cables, Atlantic 

Ocean, Virginia Beach, Virginia. 

(a) Location. The following area is a 

safety zone: All waters within 550 yards 

of the center point of the installation 

site at position 36°48′57.6′′ N 

75°57′43.2′′ W to include the shoreline 

within the radius. These coordinates are 

based on WGS 84. 

(b) Definitions. As used in this 

section, designated representative 

means a Coast Guard coxswain, petty 

officer, or other officer operating a Coast 

Guard vessel and a Federal, State, and 

local officer designated by or assisting 

the Captain of the Port Sector Virginia 

(COTP) in the enforcement of the safety 

zones. The term also includes the 

masters of the Lift Boats RAM XII and/ 

or RAM XV, for the sole purpose of 

designating and establishing safe transit 

corridors, to permit passage into or 

through these safety zones, or to notify 

vessels and individuals that they have 

entered a safety zone and are required 

to depart immediately. 

(c) Regulations. (1) Under the general 

safety zone regulations in subpart C of 

this part, no vessels or persons may 

enter the safety zone described in 

paragraph (a) of this section unless 

authorized by the COTP or the COTP’s 

designated representative. 

(2) To seek permission to enter, 

vessels should contact the Lift Boats 

RAM XII and/or RAM XV via VHF–FM 

Channel 16. Those in the safety zone 

must comply with all lawful orders or 

directions given to them by the COTP or 

the COTP’s designated representative 

for the purposes of instructions for safe 

transit. 

(d) Enforcement period. This zone 

will be in effect and subject to 

enforcement during such times as the 

Lift Boats RAM XII and/or RAM XV is 

present within the zone, between March 

1, 2024, and December 31, 2024. 

Dated: February 14, 2024. 

J.A. Stockwell, 

Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the 

Port Sector Virginia. 

[FR Doc. 2024–03590 Filed 2–21–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–04–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Parts 5, 25, and 97 

[IB Docket No. 18–313; FCC 24–6; FR ID 

202994] 

Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New 

Space Age 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Denial of reconsideration. 

SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal 

Communications Commission 

(Commission or FCC) discusses the 

adoption of an Order on 

Reconsideration (Orbital Debris 

Reconsideration Order), which 

addressed three petitions for 

reconsideration challenging the orbital 

debris mitigation rules adopted by the 

Commission in 2020. In the Orbital 

Debris Reconsideration Order, the 

Commission declined to modify, 

withdraw, or otherwise change the 

orbital debris mitigation rules adopted 

in 2020 Orbital Debris Order, published 

August 25, 2020, but also provided 

some clarification and guidance as 

relevant for some of the issues raised in 

the petitions for reconsideration. 

DATES: The denial of reconsideration is 

effective February 22, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Alexandra Horn, Space Bureau, Satellite 

Programs and Policy Division, 202–418– 

1376, alexandra.horn@fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Commission’s Order on 

Reconsideration (Orbital Debris 

Reconsideration Order), FCC 24–6, 

adopted on January 25, 2024, and 

released on January 26, 2024. The full 

text of this document is available at 

https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ 

attachments/FCC-24-6A1.pdf. To 

request materials in accessible formats 

for people with disabilities, send an 

email to FCC504@fcc.gov or call the 

Consumer & Governmental Affairs 

Bureau at 202–418–0530 (voice), 202– 

418–0432 (TTY). 

Paperwork Reduction Act. The Orbital 

Debris Reconsideration Order did not 

contain new or modified information 

collection requirements subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(PRA), Public Law 104–13. Therefore, it 

does not contain any new or modified 

information collection burden for small 

business concerns with fewer than 25 

employees, pursuant to the Small 

Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 

Public Law 107–198,see 44 U.S.C. 

3506(c)(4). 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. The 

Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 

amended (RFA), requires that a 

regulatory flexibility analysis be 

prepared for notice and comment 

rulemaking proceedings. As the Orbital 

Debris Reconsideration Order does not 

adopt or otherwise modify any existing 

rules, no regulatory flexibility analysis 

is necessary. 

Synopsis 

I. Introduction 

1. In the Orbital Debris 

Reconsideration Order, the Commission 

addressed the issues raised in three 

petitions for reconsideration of the 2020 

Orbital Debris Order, 86 FR 52422 

(August 25, 2020): (1) a petition filed by 

the Boeing Company (Boeing), EchoStar 

Satellite Services, LLC (EchoStar), 

Hughes Network Services, LLC 

(Hughes), Planet Labs, Inc. (Planet), 

Spire Global, Inc. (Spire), and Telesat 

Canada (Telesat) (collectively, 

Combined Petition), asking the 

Commission to reconsider information 

disclosure requirements relating to 

satellite maneuverability, large system 

disposal reliability, the use of 

deployment devices, and the use of 

certain types of persistent liquids; (2) a 

petition filed by Space Exploration 

Technologies Corp. (SpaceX) seeking 

reconsideration or clarification of the 

Commission’s orbital debris mitigation 

rules as applied to non-U.S.-licensed 

satellite systems seeking U.S. market 

access; and (3) a petition filed by Kuiper 

Systems LLC (Kuiper) seeking adoption 

of a new rule addressing issues related 

to the orbital separation of large nongeostationary orbit (NGSO) 

constellations. 

2. In responding to these petitions, the 

Commission declined to modify, 

withdraw, or otherwise change the 

information collection requirements 

adopted in the 2020 Orbital Debris 

Order. It also declined to change its 

rules as applicable to non-U.S.-licensed 

systems seeking U.S. market access, or 

to adopt new rules governing the orbital 

separation of large NGSO constellations. 

After reviewing the petitions, the 

Commission found that the petitioners 

failed to show any material errors or 

omissions in the 2020 Orbital Debris 

Order or raise any new or additional 

facts that would warrant reconsideration 

under the Commission’s rules. However, 

the Orbital Debris Reconsideration 

Order provided some clarification or 

guidance as appropriate on some of the 

issues raised in the petitions for 

reconsideration. 

II. Background 

3. On November 19, 2018, the 

Commission released a notice of 


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proposed rulemaking (2018 Orbital 

Debris NPRM), 84 FR 4742 (February 19, 

2019), in IB Docket No. 18–313, 

concerning the mitigation of orbital 

debris in the new space age. It 

represented the first comprehensive 

look at the Commission’s orbital debris 

rules since their adoption in 2004 and 

was intended to improve and clarify 

these rules based on the experiences 

gained in the satellite licensing process 

and various improvements in mitigation 

guidelines, practices, and technologies. 

After reviewing the record and public 

comments filed in response to the 2018 

Orbital Debris NPRM, including 

individual comments filed by some of 

the parties involved in the petitions for 

reconsideration, the Commission 

adopted the 2020 Orbital Debris Order 

on April 23, 2020. At the same time, the 

Commission also adopted a further 

notice of proposed rulemaking, 85 FR 

52455 (August 25, 2020) (2020 Orbital 

Debris FNPRM), which sought further 

comment on adopting rules concerning 

the probability of accidental explosions, 

the total probability of collisions with 

large objects, maneuverability above a 

certain altitude in low-Earth orbit (LEO), 

post-mission orbital lifetime, casualty 

risk, indemnification, and performance 

bonds for successful disposal. On 

September 24, 2020, the petitioners filed 

their timely petitions for 

reconsideration, and by November 24, 

2020, five oppositions and comments to 

the petitions were filed. 

III. Discussion 

A. Combined Petition Issues 

1. Relationship to Other U.S. 

Government Technical and Policy 

Documents 

4. The petitioners raised concerns 

about the consistency of the rules 

adopted with policies and guidelines 

developed by expert Federal agencies, 

noting in particular the U.S. 

Government Orbital Debris Mitigation 

Standard Practices (ODMSP) and Space 

Policy Directive–3 (SPD–3), and allege 

that the disclosure rules ‘‘[diverge] 

substantially from the recommendations 

of other expert federal agencies, 

including, in some cases, disregarding 

the findings of the recently updated 

multi-agency Orbital Debris Mitigation 

Standard Practices.’’ Both Viasat and 

OneWeb challenged this assertion. 

5. The petitioners failed to identify 

any respect in which the Commission’s 

actions in adopting the 2020 Orbital 

Debris Order are fundamentally 

inconsistent with the policies, goals, 

and guidelines identified in SPD–3 and 

the ODMSP. To the extent they are 

relying on the fact that the specific 

technical matters addressed in the 

Commission’s rules are not addressed at 

the same level of specificity in SPD–3 

and the ODMSP, these arguments are 

not well-founded, and do not establish 

a ‘‘divergence.’’ As noted by Viasat and 

OneWeb, both of these documents invite 

further action including through the 

development of additional standards 

and best practices. The ODMSP 

expressly states that it may be 

appropriate to ‘‘consider the benefits of 

going beyond the standard practices and 

tak[ing] additional steps to limit the 

generation of orbital debris.’’ 

Furthermore, the Commission found the 

petitioners have in some instances 

alleged divergence from these 

documents only by ignoring other 

relevant provisions of those documents. 

6. Even if the Commission were to 

accept the petitioners’ unsupported 

allegation of divergence, the 

Commission observed in adopting these 

rules that the ODMSP ‘‘applies, by its 

terms, only to government missions that 

are procured and operated by 

government agencies for governmental 

purposes . . . rather than in the context 

of regulatory review,’’ and for that 

reason ‘‘some tailoring’’ of the ODMSP 

was necessary to fit into the 

Commission’s existing regulatory 

structure. 

2. Burden on Applicants 

7. Throughout the Combined Petition, 

petitioners argued that the regulations 

adopted in the 2020 Orbital Debris 

Order will be overly burdensome on 

applicants. Viasat and Maxar challenged 

this claim. In raising concerns with 

burdens on applicants, the petitioners 

rely on generalized concerns that 

regulation will be ‘‘overly stringent,’’ or 

that applicants will experience 

difficulties because of ‘‘staff conclusions 

that the substance of the disclosed 

information was insufficient or 

inconsistent with what they thought 

should be required.’’ These speculative 

concerns about possible errors in 

Commission decision-making do not 

provide a basis for reconsideration. In 

any event, and in an effort to assist 

applicants in preparing applications, the 

Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order 

offers additional discussion with respect 

to some aspects of the specific 

disclosure requirements adopted. 

3. Maneuverability 

8. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, 

the Commission adopted a rule 

requiring applicants to disclose the 

extent of maneuverability of planned 

space stations, noting that most 

commenters addressing this topic, 

including the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA), agreed 

with the adoption of this disclosure. 

The Commission provided some 

examples of the type of information that 

applicants could include in their 

disclosure statements, as suggested by 

NASA in its comments on the topic. 

9. The Commission also revised a 

separate rule provision on avoiding 

collisions with large objects to require 

applicants to state whether the 

probability that their spacecraft will 

collide with a large object during the 

orbital lifetime of the spacecraft is less 

than 0.001 (1 in 1,000), in line with the 

ODMSP. As part of that rule, the 

Commission adopted a presumption 

that the collision risk with large objects 

could be assumed zero or near zero 

during the period of time when the 

space station is able to conduct 

avoidance maneuvers, absent evidence 

to the contrary. The Commission noted 

that in individual cases where there is 

evidence that a particular system or 

operator is unable to effectively 

maneuver or is only maneuvering at a 

risk threshold that raises reasonable 

questions about its ability to meet the 

0.001 collision risk threshold even with 

some degree of maneuverability, this 

assumption would not be applied and 

further analysis would be necessary. 

The Commission did not adopt a 

definition of ‘‘effective 

maneuverability’’ but sought comment 

in the 2020 Orbital Debris FNPRM on a 

definition, as well as on whether to 

adopt a requirement that spacecraft 

must be maneuverable. 

10. Boeing, Planet, and Spire argued 

that the Commission should withdraw 

its ‘‘requirements’’ regarding effective 

maneuverability until this term is 

adequately defined. These petitioners 

did not distinguish between the two 

distinct portions of the rule, and instead 

argued generally that without a more 

detailed metric for effective 

maneuverability, such as the ability to 

alter the course of a spacecraft by a 

certain distance in a particular time 

period, the FCC rules cannot be 

administered fairly. However, they did 

not take issue with the assumption of 

zero or near zero risk for maneuverable 

spacecraft. Viasat, OneWeb, and Maxar 

opposed this request, noting, in effect, 

that pending development of a 

comprehensive definition, disclosure of 

maneuverability information serves a 

valid public interest objective and 

provides supporting evidence for 

addressing the Commission’s collision 

risk rule. 

11. As observed in the 2020 Orbital 

Debris Order, factual information 

regarding a satellite or system’s 

maneuverability is useful not only to the 


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Commission when it is assessing 

applications, but to other operators as it 

helps interested parties to better 

understand how operators plan to 

handle predicted collision risks. 

Moreover, details about spacecraft 

maneuverability enhance the 

Commission’s grasp of other data 

presented in an applicant’s orbital 

debris mitigation plan and are essential 

information for the administration of 

Commission rules in several key areas. 

For example, the satellite’s expected 

lifespan in orbit can be significantly 

influenced by its maneuverability and 

impact an operator’s ability to comply 

with Commission rules. Additionally, 

the information provided by applicants 

in these disclosures can also be drawn 

upon as the Commission works to 

further refine its rules through 

rulemaking. As noted by opposing 

parties, ‘‘facilitating a thorough 

understanding of other operators’ ability 

to maneuver in-orbit is fundamental to 

responsible orbital stewardship’’ and 

disclosure fosters a ‘‘transparent’’ and 

‘‘predictable’’ operating environment. 

12. Although the petitioners’ request 

appears to focus on any disclosure 

concerning maneuverability, to the 

extent the petition sought only removal 

of the ‘‘not effectively maneuverable’’ 

exception to the zero or near zero 

collision risk assumption in the 

Commission’s large object collision risk 

rule, the Commission found that the 

petitioners provided no valid arguments 

in support of this approach. The 

Commission declined to adopt an 

approach that could maintain an 

assumption of zero or near zero risk 

even in the face of evidence suggesting 

that such an assumption is not 

warranted because collision avoidance 

capabilities are minimal. The 

Commission expects the precedent that 

evolves from a case-by-case approach in 

evaluating factual information regarding 

a satellite or system’s maneuverability 

will guide applicants and will address 

petitioners’ concerns with subjective 

and inconsistent licensing 

determinations. Finding that the 

petitioners have not provided any 

evidence of a material error, omission, 

or reasoning that would warrant 

reconsideration under the Commission’s 

rules, the Commission declined to 

modify its rules pertaining to 

maneuverability. 

13. Additional Resources for 

Applicants. During the pendency of this 

proceeding, NASA developed the 

‘‘NASA Spacecraft Conjunction 

Assessment and Collision Avoidance 

Best Practices Handbook’’ (Handbook) 

and issued a revised version in February 

of 2023. The Handbook is a useful 

resource that applicants may find 

helpful in developing and documenting 

conjunction assessment and collision 

avoidance capabilities, including for 

maneuverable spacecraft. The Handbook 

makes some specific recommendations 

on conjunction assessment and collision 

avoidance, including (i) designing 

spacecraft with capabilities to facilitate 

conjunction assessment and mitigation; 

(ii) providing ephemeris for conjunction 

screening at adequate intervals and 

covering adequate duration; and (iii) 

when the probability of collision (Pc) 

estimated for a conjunction exceeds the 

mitigation threshold (recommended to 

be 1E–4) at the mitigation action 

commitment point, pursuing a 

mitigation action that will reduce Pc by 

at least 1.5 orders of magnitude from the 

remediation threshold, and ensure that 

the mitigation action does not create any 

additional conjunctions with a Pc value 

above the mitigation threshold. 

4. Large System Disposal Reliability 

14. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, 

the Commission adopted a rule 

requiring applicants to provide a 

statement demonstrating that the 

probability of success for their chosen 

disposal method is 0.9 or greater for any 

individual space station. The rule also 

requires that for space station systems 

consisting of multiple space stations, 

the demonstration should include 

additional information regarding efforts 

to achieve a higher probability of 

successful disposal, with a goal, for 

large systems, of a probability of success 

for any individual station of 0.99 or 

better. Drawing on provisions in the 

ODMSP, the Commission also stated in 

the 2020 Orbital Debris Order that 

additional scrutiny will be given to 

larger deployments, including 

consideration of factors such as mass, 

collision probability, and orbital 

location. 

15. Boeing, Planet, Spire, and Telesat 

raised a concern that the rule will result 

in the 0.99 probability goal for satellites 

that are part of large systems becoming 

in effect an enforceable requirement. 

They also objected to providing 

‘‘sensitive’’ commercial considerations, 

such as satellite mass and orbital 

location, as part of the Commission’s 

assessment. 

16. The Commission found that the 

petitioners provided no valid basis for 

reconsideration. With respect to 

concerns that the 0.99 disposal 

reliability goal described in the adopted 

rule is in effect a firm requirement for 

all large deployments, these concerns 

are neither justified nor supported by 

any new information. Since the 

adoption of this rule, the Commission 

has authorized several large system 

deployments, and in doing so has 

addressed reliability together with other 

relevant factual considerations, such as 

collision risk for satellites that are not 

reliably disposed. While it appears to be 

the case based on both authoritative 

studies and the experience gained in 

these decisions that the largest systems 

will require very high disposal 

reliability in order to avoid 

unacceptably high collision risks, the 

approach to disposal reliability 

discussed in the 2020 Orbital Debris 

Order does not foreclose in individual 

cases the authorization of systems of 

satellites with individual satellite 

disposal reliability of less than 0.99. 

With respect to concerns raised about 

examination of ‘‘sensitive’’ information, 

the Commission noted that information 

such as orbital location and satellite 

mass (as a component of the area-tomass ratio of the satellite, necessary for 

calculating residual orbital lifetime and 

related collision risk) are routinely 

provided as part of applications, and 

this information is routinely publicly 

available in the Commission’s files. 

Orbital location is included in all 

licenses. To the extent examination of 

the orbital debris risks presented by a 

large constellation requires examination 

of information for which confidential 

treatment can be justified, the 

Commission’s rules provide for such 

treatment. The Commission therefore 

does not consider these concerns as 

justifying reconsideration. 

5. Deployment Devices 

17. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, 

the Commission modified a rule 

requiring applicants to provide a 

statement that the space station operator 

has assessed and limited the amount of 

debris released in a planned manner 

during normal operations to specifically 

require an orbital debris mitigation 

disclosure for any separate or ‘‘freeflying’’ deployment devices, distinct 

from the space launch vehicle, that may 

become a source of debris. The 

Commission also discussed in the 2020 

Orbital Debris Order the scope of any 

such disclosure, noting that it should 

address facts such as the orbital lifetime 

of the device and collision risks 

associated with the device itself, 

including an evaluation of collision risk 

specifically associated with the 

deployment of multiple satellites from a 

deployment device (e.g., re-contact 

analysis). The Commission stated that 

such disclosures would be largely 

assessed on a case-by-case basis, 

reasoning that this approach provides 

the flexibility necessary to address new 

developments in space station design 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 36 / Thursday, February 22, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 13279 

and addresses the difficulty of designing 

specific disclosure rules for each 

different type of device that may be 

used. 

18. Boeing, Planet, Spire, EchoStar, 

and Hughes argued that this disclosure 

requirement should be replaced with 

the ODMSP standard, which specified 

that ‘‘[f]or all planned released debris 

larger than 5mm in any dimension, the 

total debris object-time product in lowEarth orbit . . . should be less than 100 

object-years . . . per spacecraft.’’ They 

also argued that the Commission should 

not require re-contact risk analyses 

because no consensus exists on what is 

considered an adequate re-contact risk 

analysis, it was not proposed for 

comment in the 2018 Orbital Debris 

NPRM, and there is not enough 

guidance as to how to conduct a recontact analysis or how it would be 

used in the application review process. 

The Commission found that the 

petitioners’ argument concerning the 

ODMSP provisions on operational 

debris relies on a selective reading of 

those provisions and does not justify 

reconsideration of the adopted rule. The 

sentence in the ODMSP immediately 

preceding the sentence that petitioners 

rely on states that ‘‘[e]ach instance of 

planned release of debris larger than 5 

mm in any dimension that remains in 

orbit for more than 25 years should be 

evaluated and justified.’’ This 

additional wording would not be 

necessary if the rationale for this 

guideline is that any release of 

operational debris of less than 100 

object-years should be routinely 

considered acceptable. Instead, as a 

condition precedent to applying the 100 

object-year metric, this guideline 

contemplates a determination that the 

release is evaluated and justified. The 

approach adopted by the Commission is 

in no way inconsistent with this 

approach, which identifies a need, for 

example, to consider whether 

alternative methods for deployment 

might be utilized that do not result in 

the potential for debris generation. 

19. With respect to the concerns 

raised about re-contact analysis, the 

Commission rejected the petitioner’s 

contention that there was insufficient 

notice to require a re-contact analysis, 

stating that the 2018 Orbital Debris 

NPRM sought comment on the issue of 

the use of deployment devices and 

specifically proposed to require 

‘‘information regarding the planned 

orbital debris mitigation measures 

specific to the deployment device, 

including the probability of collision 

associated with the deployment device 

itself.’’ A re-contact analysis addresses 

‘‘the probability of collision associated 

with the deployment device itself.’’ The 

Commission further noted that since 

adopting the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, 

it has authorized multiple deployers on 

a case-by-case basis. Applicants 

provided information detailing the ways 

in which they plan to mitigate recontact 

and Commission assessment of each 

application took into account the 

specific re-contact mitigation measures 

and overall mission facts that were 

unique to each mission in order to 

condition the licenses accordingly. For 

example, one applicant provided a 

report using a high-fidelity approach 

based on a Monte Carlo analysis of 

deployment sequence in its application, 

using the current manifest as the worstcase scenario and incorporating the 

worst possible change in manifest 

subsequent to filing to demonstrate that 

the applicant had taken the relevant recontact risks into account and the 

Commission conditioned their license to 

require the operator to utilize a 

deployment sequence that will reduce 

the probability of re-contact and ensure 

that the risk of re-contact specified in its 

application does not increase based on 

this analysis. Another applicant stated 

in its Orbital Debris Assessment Report 

(ODAR) that it would support at least 

three re-contact mitigation strategies for 

deployments from the spacecraft, 

including ensuring that each 

deployment group will be spaced apart 

by at least 90 minutes, or one full orbit, 

optimize deployment orientation and 

sequence to minimize re-contact, and 

use on-board propulsion as necessary to 

use for maneuvers to minimize the risk 

of re-contact, and the Commission 

conditioned the license to require the 

applicant to optimize customer 

spacecraft deployment orientation and 

sequency to minimize re-contact and 

utilize on-board propulsion as necessary 

for maneuvers to minimize the risk of 

re-contact as a result. Each analysis in 

these examples provides varying levels 

of specificity and detail concerning their 

respective re-contact analyses, but still 

offers important context for mission 

characteristics unique to each 

application. 

20. As these examples demonstrate, 

applicants have been able to address 

these concerns by drawing on available 

information, and in some instances 

involving additional analysis and 

modeling. The Commission anticipates, 

based on this experience, that this caseby-case approach will continue to 

provide a flexible and workable 

framework for applicants. Accordingly, 

the Commission concluded that the 

petitioners’ assertions about potential 

difficulties in the licensing process have 

not been realized and do not justify 

reconsideration of this particular rule. 

6. Persistent Liquids 

21. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, 

the Commission updated its rules to 

require operators to submit a ‘‘statement 

that the space station operator has 

assessed and limited the probability, 

during and after completion of mission 

operations . . . of release of liquids that 

will persist in droplet form.’’ The 

Commission proposed this rule change 

in response to increasing interest in use 

by satellites (including small satellites) 

of alternative propellants and coolants, 

some of which due to their physical 

properties might persist in droplet form. 

The Commission noted specifically 

ionic liquids that would persist if 

released in droplet form by a deployed 

satellite and the substantial debris cloud 

that resulted from release of such 

droplets by Soviet-era satellite 

operation. At orbital speeds, such 

droplets can damage active spacecraft. 

The Commission noted its expectation 

that the orbital debris mitigation plan 

for any system using persistent liquids 

should address the measures taken, 

including design and testing, to 

eliminate the risk of release of liquids 

and to minimize risk from any 

unplanned release of liquids in droplet 

form. 

22. The Combined Petition asserted 

that no evidence exists that the use of 

such liquids is growing in the United 

States’ space industry while at the same 

time raising a concern that the 

Commission did not provide enough 

guidance on how information about 

persistent liquids will be assessed. The 

Commission found that the petitioners 

did not provide a basis for 

reconsideration of the rule adopted or 

demonstrated how the current rule is 

unworkable. Contrary to their 

assertions, there have been license 

requests involving spacecraft that would 

utilize the types of ionic liquids that 

could persist in space if released in 

droplet form. Ionic liquids offer some 

benefits such as ease of on-ground 

handling as compared to the toxic 

volatiles often used for spacecraft 

propulsion, and so it is also possible 

that they may be more frequently 

utilized in the future. With respect to 

criteria to be applied in addressing 

instances in which use of ionic liquids 

is disclosed, the 2020 Orbital Debris 

Order identified some considerations. In 

addition, under a case-by-case 

approach, the Commission may 

consider whether, if released, these 

debris objects would remain in orbit for 

only a short time, perhaps due to 

deployment and operation at low 


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altitudes such as those below 

inhabitable space stations, or whether 

there are other natural processes that 

result in dispersion of the droplets. 

Other potentially relevant 

considerations include whether 

containment of the liquid can be 

expected to be effective, established as 

appropriate by design, testing data, or 

flight heritage, and whether the 

propulsion system is shielded from 

micrometeoroid and debris strikes that 

might result in leakage. These 

considerations provide some examples 

of the types of information that might 

support a favorable public interest 

finding with respect to individual 

applications but are not intended as an 

exhaustive list. 

7. ‘‘Case-by-Case’’ Approach 

23. Petitioners raised concerns about 

a ‘‘case-by-case’’ approach for reviewing 

the information provided in response to 

disclosure requirements, and requested 

that all information disclosure 

requirements be coupled with guidance 

provided by the Commission regarding 

the manner in which the information 

can be used and any minimum 

operation or performance requirements 

that must be demonstrated in the 

disclosed information to warrant the 

grant of a satellite system authorization. 

SpaceX argued a ‘‘case-by-case’’ 

approach sets an inconsistent baseline 

for assessing orbital debris risk, and 

imposes inconsistent rules of the road. 

Viasat and OneWeb, in opposition, 

supported the use of case-by-case 

analysis. Viasat noted that case-by-case 

analysis is an indispensable part of the 

Commission’s licensing process and that 

it would make little sense for the 

Commission to withdraw its existing 

information disclosure requirements 

pending completion of its further work 

on additional orbital debris safety 

standards because doing so would 

deprive the Commission of critical 

information necessary to evaluate the 

orbital safety implications of NGSO 

systems. Viasat argued that the 

Commission is obligated to consider the 

information elicited by these rules in 

order to make a finding that the 

proposed operations are in the public 

interest, and that eliminating the 

information disclosure requirements 

adopted in the 2020 Orbital Debris 

Order would be counter-productive by 

removing from the Commission’s rules 

useful guidance for applicants about 

information that is relevant in seeking a 

license, thereby increasing uncertainty. 

OneWeb supported case-by-case review, 

observing that in circumstances 

involving complex and quickly evolving 

technological debris mitigation 

capabilities, such review is necessary in 

order to facilitate a safe space 

environment, but at the same time 

affords operators flexibility and avoids 

overly prescriptive regulations. 

24. The added disclosure 

requirements provide factual 

information that is relevant in assessing 

an application and supporting a public 

interest determination. The Commission 

found that the petitioners do not allege 

that the factual information elicited by 

the new disclosure requirements would 

never reveal a substantial or 

disqualifying concern related to orbital 

debris, and disagreed with the 

petitioners’ contention that 

incorporating such disclosure 

requirements in the Commission’s rules 

will lead to ‘‘subjective’’ or 

‘‘discretionary’’ decision-making. The 

characteristics of satellites or satellite 

systems can significantly vary across 

applications. These rules serve to ensure 

that the Commission has sufficient 

information to only grant those 

applications that would serve the public 

interest, and while the Commission 

recognizes the potential benefits of 

identifying specific metrics or including 

the same blanket requirements on all 

operators for various aspects of debris 

mitigation plans, such as providing 

certainty to applicants, the development 

of a specific, one-size-fits-all metric on 

a particular point or including blanket 

requirements that do not make sense in 

conjunction with specific satellite or 

satellite system characteristics, may in 

certain cases slow innovation by being 

overly prescriptive or otherwise fail to 

account for innovative aspects of a 

particular system design. 

25. Moreover, for certain metrics, the 

Commission found in the Orbital Debris 

Reconsideration Order that it does not 

have a sufficient record to support a 

‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ metric on this issue. 

But, the absence of a specific metric on 

a particular point does not foreclose the 

need to gather information and evaluate 

mitigation plans in light of the larger 

and well-recognized goals of U.S. 

Government policy in this area— 

ensuring the future of the commercial 

space industry by limiting the release of 

operational debris and avoiding 

fragmentation events, whether caused 

by explosions or collisions. The 

development of metrics and refinement 

of criteria for evaluating orbital debris 

mitigation plans is an active and 

ongoing process. While consideration of 

the development of a metric or 

comprehensive assessment method 

continues, the Commission elects to 

proceed incrementally and make factbased decisions on individual 

applications on a case-by-case basis. As 

noted in connection with several of the 

specific disclosure requirements to 

which petitioners objected, the case-bycase approach has successfully 

permitted the Commission to proceed 

with review and authorization in 

individual cases. Contrary to SpaceX’s 

argument that the case-by-case approach 

threatens space sustainability by 

imposing inconsistent rules of the road, 

experience with these cases, along with 

parallel developments in standards 

development, will inform future 

decision-making. In applying this caseby-case approach, the Commission is 

committed to ensuring consistency in 

application of its rules and to working 

with applicants to gather additional 

information as necessary to ensure that 

applicants are not penalized without a 

prior opportunity to address potential 

concerns. The Commission expects the 

precedent that evolves from a case-bycase approach will provide contours to 

guide applicants regarding the extent to 

which metrics or comprehensive 

methods may aid in facilitating a 

favorable Commission determination on 

pending applications. Finally, as part of 

the Space Bureau’s Transparency 

Initiative, the Commission directs the 

Space Bureau to highlight any 

developments arising from this case-bycase approach, providing additional 

guidance on orbital debris mitigation 

information disclosures. 

B. SpaceX Petition—Market Access and 

Orbital Debris Mitigation Showings 

26. In its petition, SpaceX requested 

that the Commission reconsiders 

allowing non-U.S.-licensed space 

stations to satisfy the orbital debris 

mitigation showing requirement by 

demonstrating that debris mitigation 

plans for the space station(s) for which 

U.S. market access is requested are 

subject to direct and effective regulatory 

oversight by the national licensing 

authority. Alternatively, SpaceX 

requested the Commission to explicitly 

delineate the information an applicant 

must submit with its application in 

support of such a demonstration or 

disclose where that information may be 

easily and publicly found. In particular, 

SpaceX urged the Commission to 

require applicants to include: (i) all 

materials related to orbital debris 

mitigation submitted to the foreign 

regulator in connection with an 

application for a space station 

authorization; and (ii) all authorizations 

that include conditions related to orbital 

debris mitigation. 

27. In support, SpaceX argued that 

allowing non-U.S.-licensed systems to 

rely on the orbital debris mitigation 

requirements of other countries to meet 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 36 / Thursday, February 22, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 13281 

Commission requirements creates a 

‘‘loophole’’ that could undermine the 

Commission’s space safety objectives by 

allowing operators to evade oversight by 

choosing forums with less stringent 

rules and little input from other affected 

satellite operators. In response, Kepler 

Communications Inc., OneWeb, and 

Viasat submitted oppositions and 

comments to the SpaceX petition, 

stating that there is no ‘‘loophole’’ in the 

Commission’s rules and in fact, based 

on their own experience as non-U.S.- 

licensed market access applicants, they 

have been subject to the same level of 

regulatory scrutiny as U.S.-licensed 

systems. The Commission agreed that 

the end result is the same whether a 

market access applicant makes an 

orbital debris mitigation showing under 

47 CFR 25.114(d)(14)(i) through (iv) or 

(d)(14)(v) prior to gaining U.S. market 

access, the applicant will have had its 

orbital debris mitigation plan subject to 

a rigorous review to ensure space safety. 

28. While Commission rules allow 

market access applicants to satisfy the 

requirement to describe the design and 

operational strategies to minimize 

orbital debris risk by demonstrating that 

their debris mitigation plans are subject 

to direct and effective regulatory 

oversight by the national authority that 

licensed their space station operations, 

such a showing requires market access 

applicants to provide supporting 

documentation and respond to inquiries 

from Commission staff in order for the 

staff to compare the non-U.S. regulatory 

regime, including its rules and ongoing 

oversight, and determine whether there 

is an effective regulatory regime in 

place. This information, when filed with 

the Commission, becomes a part of the 

record, and other interested parties are 

able to review it too. If the Commission 

finds additional information is 

necessary to complete its review, that 

information also becomes part of the 

record and available for review. In 

either case, interested parties will have 

access to the same information the 

Commission relies on to determine 

whether a grant of market access is in 

the public interest, the only exception 

being if the applicant is able to 

demonstrate an overriding public 

interest need to keep some of the 

information confidential. 

29. Having a one-size-fits-all 

disclosure requirement as proposed by 

SpaceX can be more burdensome than 

necessary for the Commission to 

determine whether an applicant’s debris 

mitigation plan has been thoroughly 

reviewed and whether the applicant 

will be subject to effective regulatory 

oversight. Using a case-by-case 

approach provides more flexibility and 

can serve the public interest better by 

being less burdensome. For instance, as 

Commission staff become familiar with 

the requirements and review process of 

a particular non-U.S. regulator, they can 

tailor their information request based on 

knowledge of how that regulator 

conducts an orbital debris mitigation 

review, and what regulatory 

requirements it imposes. The staff may 

ask for more information in an area that 

they have found the regulator does not 

require the same level of detail as the 

Commission, or may likewise ask for 

less information in another area where 

the Commission has already found 

sufficient regulatory oversight. In either 

case, if another party believes that 

circumstances have changed with a 

particular non-U.S. regulatory oversight 

process or has reason to believe that an 

applicant is not subject to sufficient 

regulatory oversight, they can raise 

those concerns with the Commission 

and the Commission will factor that in 

as part of its overall review process. 

Ultimately, if the Commission finds 

after its review of either the applicant’s 

mitigation plan or the non-U.S. 

regulatory regime under which it is 

licensed, that additional conditions are 

necessary to ensure space safety, the 

Commission can so condition the grant 

of market access, similar to what it does 

for U.S. licensees in similar situations. 

The Commission also notes that while it 

does accept ‘‘direct and effective’’ 

regulatory oversight showings under 47 

CFR 25.114(d)(14)(v), that rule does not 

preclude applicants from providing the 

same basic orbital debris mitigation 

information provided by U.S. licensees, 

which are detailed in 47 CFR 

25.114(d)(14)(i) through (iv). In fact, the 

provision of such information can 

support a showing of direct and 

effective regulatory oversight, 

particularly in instances where the 

information is provided to but not 

routinely made publicly available by the 

non-U.S. regulator. And, except for a 

few cases, applicants have generally 

found it preferable to just provide the 

Commission with a description of the 

design and operational strategies for 

orbital debris mitigation instead of 

presenting all of the showings necessary 

to demonstrate the effective regulatory 

oversight of another national authority. 

Accordingly, the Commission found 

SpaceX has not demonstrated a need for 

elimination or changes to 47 CFR 

25.114(d)(14)(v). 

C. Kuiper Petition—Orbital Separation 

of Large NGSO Systems 

30. In the 2018 Orbital Debris NPRM 

the Commission sought comment on 

whether it should adopt an upper limit 

for variances in orbit for NGSO systems. 

After reviewing an extensive record on 

the issue, including comments on the 

related topic of whether, and how, the 

Commission should assign orbital 

altitude ranges for large constellations of 

NGSO satellites, in 2020 the 

Commission said it would not adopt a 

maximum orbital variance for NGSO 

systems, nor a required separation 

between orbital locations, and will 

instead continue to address these issues 

on a case-by-case basis. The 

Commission found that there were a 

wide range of considerations in such 

cases, and while it was concerned about 

the risk of collisions between the space 

stations of NGSO systems operating at 

similar orbital altitudes, it found that 

these concerns are best addressed in the 

first instance through inter-operator 

coordination. 

31. Kuiper petitioned the Commission 

to reconsider its decision to not 

establish an orbital separation 

requirement, including for large NGSO 

constellations, and associated limits. 

Kuiper stated that the Commission 

should expressly require a later-filed 

large NGSO constellation to maintain 

sufficient orbital separation from an 

earlier-filed large NGSO constellation. 

In support, Kuiper stated that, since 

adoption of the 2020 Orbital Debris 

Order, the Commission has received a 

number of applications and license 

modifications for large NGSO 

constellations to operate in orbits that 

are already occupied, or proposed to be 

occupied, by other large NGSO 

constellations. Therefore, Kuiper argued 

the Commission’s expectation that 

applicants’ own desire for space safety 

would lead them to voluntarily choose 

non-overlapping orbits has proven false, 

and these new applications constitute 

facts that did not exist at the time the 

Commission adopted its 2020 Orbital 

Debris Order and therefore warrant 

reconsideration. 

32. OneWeb, ARCLab, and Maxar 

filed comments in support of Kuiper’s 

petition. OneWeb argued that the time 

is ripe for the Commission to reconsider 

the potential for orbital separation rules 

to help ensure a safe space environment. 

ARCLab argued that operating large 

constellations with overlapping orbits 

sharply increases systemic risk, and if 

those orbits are not explicitly designed 

for compatibility it would result in 

sharp increases in conjunctions and 

collision avoidance maneuvers. Maxar 

added that since adoption of the 2020 

Orbital Debris Order, the increase of 

large constellations with overlapping 

orbital variances has become an issue of 

broad applicability and therefore ripe 

for Commission consideration. 


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33. Both Viasat and Kepler opposed 

Kuiper’s petition, arguing that Kuiper’s 

proposed rule would undermine the 

incentive for an operator to engage in 

the type of inter-system coordination 

anticipated by the 2020 Orbital Debris 

Order and in essence create a first-come, 

first-serve priority system for orbital 

regions in LEO, which would advantage 

the largest, most established satellite 

operators, and potentially lead to a 

monopolization of certain sections of 

LEO. Viasat also stated that Kuiper has 

not established that an orbital overlap 

rule is necessary to promote space 

safety, and that there are alternative 

approaches the Commission could 

consider. 

34. The Commission continues to take 

space safety issues seriously, and the 

2020 Orbital Debris Order recognized 

that issues may arise with respect to 

large NGSO systems, and the orbits at 

which they operate. Notably, the 2020 

Orbital Debris Order advises that 

applicants for large systems may be 

asked to provide specific information 

about their planned orbital variance as 

well as how their system operations 

would accommodate other spacecraft 

traveling through or operating in the 

same region. While Kuiper supported its 

petition with the ‘‘new’’ fact that 

applications for large NGSO systems 

with competing orbits have been filed 

since adoption of the 2020 Orbital 

Debris Order, the Commission found 

that this circumstance alone is not 

sufficient justification for it to revisit its 

decision to allow in the first instance 

parties to work on an inter-operator 

coordination agreement. At the time the 

Commission adopted its 2020 Orbital 

Debris Order it had already considered 

that parties may want to use similar 

orbits, but it also found that interoperator coordination could resolve any 

space safety concerns, and no party has 

introduced evidence that any such 

concerns remain unresolved. The 

Commission has continued to monitor 

the situation since adoption of the 2020 

Orbital Debris Order and continues to 

believe that the best solution for 

maintaining space safety is for operators 

to have the flexibility to coordinate in 

a manner that works best for their 

situation, rather than have the 

Commission dictate how that 

coordination should proceed. In 

addition, the Commission reviews 

closely applications for new licenses or 

modifications that may raise 

overlapping orbital shell issues and 

works with the applicants and other 

interested parties to ensure that either 

coordination has occurred to minimize 

space safety issues, or changes are made 

to the proposed operating parameters to 

address any remaining concerns. The 

Commission will continue to monitor 

the overall orbital separation 

environment, and to the extent it sees a 

breakdown in the coordination process 

or other space safety issues, it will 

consider at that time whether new 

general rules are needed to either 

improve the coordination process or 

address space safety concerns. 

Accordingly, the Commission declined 

to establish an orbital separation 

requirement, including for large NGSO 

constellations. 

IV. Ordering Clauses 

35. Accordingly, it is ordered, 

pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 

405, and 47 CFR 1.429(b) that the 

petitions for reconsideration filed by 

Boeing, EchoStar, Hughes, Planet, Spire, 

Telesat, SpaceX, and Kuiper in IB 

Docket No. 18–313, are denied. 

36. It is further ordered that the 

Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order 

shall be effective upon publication in 

the Federal Register. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene Dortch, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2024–03506 Filed 2–21–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

GENERAL SERVICES 

ADMINISTRATION 

48 CFR Parts 538 and 552 

[GSAR Case 2020–G511; Docket No. GSA– 

GSAR–2023–0019; Sequence No. 1] 

RIN 3090–AK21 

General Services Administration 

Acquisition Regulation; Updated 

Guidance for Non-Federal Entities 

Access to Federal Supply Schedules 

AGENCY: Office of Acquisition Policy, 

General Services Administration (GSA). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: GSA is issuing this final rule 

amending the General Services 

Administration Acquisition Regulation 

(GSAR) to update and clarify the 

requirements for use of Federal Supply 

Schedule (FSS) contracts by eligible 

non-Federal entities, such as State and 

local governments. 

DATES: Effective March 25, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

clarification of content, contact Mr. 

Thomas O’Linn, Procurement Analyst, 

at gsarpolicy@gsa.gov or 202–445–0390. 

For information pertaining to status or 

publication schedules, contact the 

Regulatory Secretariat Division at 

GSARegSec@gsa.gov or 202–501–4755. 

Please cite GSAR Case 2020–G511. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

This final rule amends the General 

Services Administration Acquisition 

Regulation (GSAR) to update and clarify 

the requirements for use of Federal 

Supply Schedule (FSS) contracts by 

eligible non-Federal entities, such as 

State and local governments. GSA 

published a proposed rule at 88 FR 

63892 on September 18, 2023. 

GSA conducts routine reviews of its 

acquisition regulations. Routine review 

of the GSAR, as well as feedback from 

GSA’s operational offices, prompted this 

change. The review indicated a need to 

update and clarify GSAR subpart 

538.70, Purchasing by Non-Federal 

Entities. 

GSAR subpart 538.70 prescribes the 

policies and procedures that implement 

statutory, regulatory, and other 

provisions that authorize eligible nonFederal entities (e.g., State or local 

governments as defined in 40. U.S.C. 

502(c)(3)) use of Federal Supply 

Schedule (FSS) contracts. 

The GSA Schedule, also known as 

FSS, and Multiple Award Schedule 

(MAS), is a long-term governmentwide 

contract with commercial companies 

that provide access to millions of 

commercial products and services at fair 

and reasonable prices to the Federal 

Government and other authorized 

ordering activities. 

This rule updates and clarifies GSAR 

subpart 538.70, which supports use of 

FSS contracts by eligible non-Federal 

entities. This subpart is being revised to 

make administrative changes due to 

changes in some of the underlying 

authorities supporting use of FSS 

contracts by eligible non-Federal 

entities. This rule also updates and 

clarifies existing requirements 

supporting use of FSS contracts by 

eligible non-Federal entities, adds 

additional key authorities that support 

such use, and makes additional 

technical corrections to enhance clarity 

of existing requirements. 

II. Discussion and Analysis 

A. Analysis of Public Comments 

GSA provided the public a 60-day 

comment period (September 18, 2023, to 

November 17, 2023). There were no 

public comments submitted in response 

to the proposed rule. Minor changes 

were made from the proposed rule to 

the final rule. 


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