alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>


                          AMENDMENT TO CERTIFICATE OF
                     DESIGNATION, PREFERENCES AND RIGHTS OF
                           SERIES B PREFERRED STOCK OF

                        APPLIED DATA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
                             A DELAWARE CORPORATION

             (Pursuant to Section 242 of the General Corporation Law
                            of the State of Delaware)

     Applied Data Communications, Inc., a corporation organized and existing
under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the "Corporation"),
hereby certifies that, pursuant to the authority contained in Article 4 of its
Certificate of Incorporation, and in accordance with the provisions of Section
242 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, 15,370 shares of
Series B Preferred Stock have been issued and its Board of Directors and the
sole stockholder of Series B Preferred Stock have adopted the following
resolution amending the Certificate of Designation, Preferences and Rights of
Series B Preferred Stock of the Corporation filed with the Secretary of State of
the State of Delaware on September 16, 1996 (the "Certificate of Designation of
Series B Preferred Stock"):

          RESOLVED, that Sections 5.(b) and 5.(c) of the Certificate of
     Designation of Series B Preferred Stock be amended to read as follows:

          "(b) CONVERSION RATE.  The conversion rate per share of Series B
     Preferred Stock in effect at any time (the "Conversion Rate") shall be
     the quotient obtained by dividing (a) $100.00 by (b) the Conversion
     Price, as provided in Section .

          (c)  CONVERSION PRICE.  The Conversion Price shall be initially
     One Dollar and 00 Cents ($1.00), subject to adjustment as provided
     elsewhere in this Section 5."

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this Amendment to
Certificate of Designation, Preferences, and Rights of Series B Preferred Stock
to be duly executed by its President, Chief Executive Officer and Secretary on
this 27th day of September,  1996.

                              APPLIED DATA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
                              a Delaware corporation


                              By:  /s/ Walter J. Kane
                                   ------------------------------
                                   Walter J. Kane, President,
                                   Chief Executive Officer and Secretary
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

 

2

 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-41443

Summary Calendar

MITCHELL L. BOREN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

BRADLEY TANNER; JOE L. HAWTHORN,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 96-CV-90

November 10, 1998

Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:*

MitchellL. Boren, Texasinmate #463913, filed a civilrightslawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The suit alleged that defendants Bradley Tanner and Joe Hawthorn, both of the Texas Department

of Criminal Justice, had violated Boren’s rights during a disciplinary hearing against the plaintiff.

Boren contends that the evidence produced at the hearing was insufficient to find him guilty. He

further contends that the procedures used at this hearing were in violation of prison policy. The

district court dismissed the suit as failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.2 We

affirm.

This court reviews a dismissal under §1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, applying the same standard
 

3 Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1998).

 

4 McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 160 (5th Cir. 1995).

 

5 Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1986) quoting Stewart v. Thigpen, 730 F.2d 1002,

1005-6 (5th Cir. 1984).

 

6

 Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996).

2

used to review a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6).3 Viewing the allegations

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the dismissal may be upheld only ifit appearsthat no relief

could be granted under any set of circumstances that could be prove[d] consistent with the

allegations.”4

Boren’s claim of insufficient evidence is without merit. “Federal courts will not review the

sufficiency of the evidence at a disciplinary hearing; a finding of guilt requires only the support of

‘some facts’ or ‘any evidence at all.’”5 Boren does not deny possessing the wire. Boren further

admitsthat the defendants produced testimonial and photographic evidence against him. These facts

are sufficient to defeat a claim of insufficient evidence at a disciplinary hearing.

Boren’s allegation that the defendants did not follow prison policy is not sufficient to afford

him relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The failure of prison administrators to follow prison rules and

regulations does not, without more, give rise to a constitutional violation.6

The ruling of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Revisions to Section III of SO2 preamble Lydia Wegman

to: Laity, James A., Mancini, Dominic J.
06/02/2010 02:26 PM
Cc: James Hemby, Richard Wayland, Kevin McLean, Sa ra Schneeberg, Mike Thrift, Scott Jenkins, crabtree.tricia, Charlotte Bert rand, Bridgid Curry, Lydia Wegman
Show Details

Jim and Dom,

A ttached is a redline/strikeout version of section III of th e preamble that includes the language we agreed to this morning: two additions at the end of the document and an added footnote on page 7. We have also incorporated Jim's comments from last week cons istent with our agreement to take public comment on the modeling and implementation guidance. Please let us k now if you have any questions. Thanks. Page 1 of 1

6/2/2010 file://C:\Documents and Settin g s\tcrabtre\Local Settin g s\Tem p \notesFCBCEE\~web4229.htm
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 99.1




      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



G. THOMAS BOWERS, Chief Executive Officer and TERRY L. HAMMOND, Chief Financial
Officer of Savings Bank of the Finger Lakes (the "Company") each certify in his
capacity as an officer of the Company that he has reviewed the quarterly report
on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2002 and that to the best of his
knowledge:

         (1)      the report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      the information contained in the report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.



August 12, 2002                /s/G. Thomas Bowers
---------------                -----------------------------------------------
Date                                    G. Thomas Bowers,
                                        Chief Executive Officer


August 12, 2002                /S/Terry L. Hammond
---------------                -----------------------------------------------
Date                                    Terry L. Hammond,
                                        Chief Financial Officer



                                      -20-
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**@ROAD,INC.**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of @Road, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended March 31, 2006, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Michael Martini, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)     The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)     The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

August 9, 2006

 
| /s/ Michael Martini     |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
|                    |
| Michael Martini         |
| Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1422 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1422

 To amend the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 to extend 
   the suspension of the limitation on the period for which certain 
           borrowers are eligible for guaranteed assistance.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 7, 2011

 Mr. Boswell (for himself, Mr. Butterfield, Mr. Loebsack, Mr. King of 
  Iowa, Mr. Latham, and Mr. Braley of Iowa) introduced the following 
        bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 to extend 
   the suspension of the limitation on the period for which certain 
           borrowers are eligible for guaranteed assistance.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SUSPENSION OF LIMITATION ON PERIOD FOR WHICH BORROWERS ARE 
              ELIGIBLE FOR GUARANTEED ASSISTANCE.

    Section 5102 of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
(7 U.S.C. 1949 note; Public Law 107-171) is amended by striking 
``December 31, 2010'' and inserting ``December 31, 2013''.
                                 <all>
```
# United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 13-1371

___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v. Anthony C. Deloney lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________ Submitted: August 2, 2013 Filed: August 5, 2013 [Unpublished]

____________ Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Anthony Deloney pleaded guilty to possessing stolen firearms, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that at least one was stolen, in violation of 18U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2). The district court 1 sentenced him to 100 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. On appeal, Deloney’ s counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under A nders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the court erred in denying De loney’s motion to suppress evidence and in imposing the 100-month sentence. Counsel’s arguments fail. Deloney’s gu ilty plea foreclosed a challenge to the ruling on his motion to suppress because the plea agreement did not preserve any right to appeal the ruling, see United States v. Limley , 510 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2007), and the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the 100-month sentence, which was at the bottom of the unobjected-to Guidelines range, seeUnited States v. Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). After reviewing the record i ndependently under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

______________________________

1 The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. -2-
Exhibit 23.1







                          Consent of Ernst & Young LLP


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form SB-2 No. 333-59395) pertaining to 2,875,000 shares of common stock, (Form
S-3 No. 333-1149) pertaining to 2,264,006 shares of common stock issuable upon
conversion of preferred stock and exercise of warrants, (Form S-3 No. 33-57116)
pertaining to 1,083,333 shares of common stock and 50,000 shares of common stock
issuable upon exercise of warrants, (Form S-8 No. 33-45536) pertaining to
1,810,000 shares of common stock, (Form S-8 No. 33-63047) pertaining to the 1991
Stock Option Plan, (Form S-8 Nos. 33-45523 and 333-49919) pertaining to the 1991
Stock Plan, (Form S-8 No. 33-36385) pertaining to the 1990 Restricted Stock
Plan, (Form S-8 No. 33-22052) pertaining to the 1988 Employee Incentive Stock
Plan and (Form S-8 No. 2-93693-C) pertaining to the 1983 Employee Stock Option
Plan of GV Medical, Inc., of our report dated February 11, 2000 with respect to
the financial statements of SpectraScience, Inc., included in this Annual Report
(Form 10-KSB) for the year ended December 31, 1999.



Minneapolis, Minnesota                                     /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP
March 24, 2000
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1484 Engrossed in House (EH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1484

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To amend title 38, United States Code, to improve the appeals process 
                 of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Veterans Appeals Improvement Act of 
2011''.

SEC. 2. WAIVER OF REGIONAL OFFICE JURISDICTION OVER INCORPORATION OF 
              SUPPLEMENTAL EVIDENCE INTO PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED CLAIMS.

    (a) Waiver.--Section 7104 of title 38, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(f) If a claimant or the claimant's representative submits new 
evidence in support of a case for which a substantive appeal has been 
filed, such evidence shall be submitted to the Board directly and not 
to the agency of jurisdiction, unless the claimant or the claimant's 
representative requests that the evidence be reviewed by the agency of 
jurisdiction before being submitted to the Board.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--Subsection (f) of section 7104 of title 38, 
United States Code, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall 
apply with respect to evidence submitted on or after the date that is 
90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives May 31, 2011.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
112th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 1484

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To amend title 38, United States Code, to improve the appeals process 
                 of the Department of Veterans Affairs.
```
#### TEMPLE GRAIN & HAY COMPANY, Inc., Appellant, v. THROCKMORTON MILL & ELEVATOR COMPANY, Inc., Appellee.

No. 3437.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

Jan. 30, 1959.

Langford Carlton, Fort Worth, for appellant.

Fred Wright, Throckmorton, for appellee.

WALTER, Justice.

The Transcript and Statement of Facts were filed in this Court on October 24, 1958. Rule 414 provides that the Appellant shall file three copies of his brief in the Court of Civil Appeals within thirty days after the filing therein of the Transcript and Statement of Facts. The appellant has failed to file a brief herein. The Appellee’s attorney appeared in person on the date this case was set for submission and filed a brief on behalf of appellee." Pursuant to Rule 416 of the Rules of Civil Procedure this Court is authorized to regard the Appellee’s brief as a correct presentation of the case. As presented in the Appellee’s brief the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed and it is so ordered.
#### George Lewis GALLEGOS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28510.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 31, 1956.

No attorney for appellant pf record on appeal.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The offense is drunk driving; the punishment, three days in jail and a fine of $50.

The sufficiency of the evidence is not questioned and no brief has been filed in appellant’s behalf. The verdict of the jury is fully sustained by the testimony of several officers who described his appearance and actions and expressed the opinion that he was drunk. Their testimony shows that appellant was arrested in that condition about 11:30 P.M., while driving an automobile upon a public highway,' and that he was taken to jail where he remained over night.

*908It was within the province of the jury to accept this testimony and reject that of appellant and his witness to the effect that appellant was sober on the occasion in question.

The court did not err in sustaining the State’s objection to the question propounded on cross-examination to one of the officers who had expressed the opinion that appellant was intoxicated: “In all of those cases (wherein the witness had previously testified that the party charged with being intoxicated was drunk) has the jury found each and every one of them guilty ?”

In other bills of exception it is claimed that the asking of certain questions by the County Attorney was prejudicial. These bills do not present reversible error, especially in view of the fact that the minimum punishment was assessed.

The judgment is affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATIONS**
I, Carol Rice-Murphy, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of At Road, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:
 (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, tothe registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrols over financial reporting.
Date: May 10, 2004
/s/ Carol Rice-Murphy
Carol Rice-Murphy
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 5, 2015

S15Y1433. IN THE MATTER OF TONY L. AXAM.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of the special master,1 who recommends that we accept the

petition of Tony L. Axam (State Bar No. 029725) for voluntary surrender of his

license to practice law. In that petition, Axam admits that he agreed in 2010 to

act as a “paymaster” for a client, a role for which he was paid $5,000 for each

transaction that he facilitated. On August 5, 2010, another individual — at the

direction of Axam’s client — directed a wire transfer of $100,000 to what he

believed was Axam’s trust account; in fact, the money was wired to Axam’s

operating account. At that time, Axam did not maintain a trust account, and he

generally used his operating account to handle the business of his law practice,

as well as personal funds. A few days after Axam received the funds, he

disbursed them according to the instructions of his client, retaining $5,000 for

1 This Court appointed Daniel J. Quinn as special master in this matter.
himself as his transaction fee. Although the individual who had directed the

transfer to Axam specifically requested that he be notified of the disbursement

of the funds, Axam failed to notify him. That individual later contacted Axam

and repeatedly requested documentation of the disbursement, but Axam failed

to provide an accounting or otherwise to document the disbursement of the

funds until after the individual filed a grievance. Axam has admitted that he did

not read the terms of the trading platform contract in connection with which he

was serving as “paymaster,” that he did not know the nature of the business

dealings between his client and the other individual, and that he asked no

questions about the transaction that he facilitated. Although Axamnoted that the

disbursement instructions from his client came by an e-mail that referred to his

client by a different name than that by which he knew her, he says that he

assumed that the other name was just a trade name for his client. By these acts,

Axam admits that he violated Rules 1.15 (I) and (II) of the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct, violations that subject a lawyer to disbarment.

We grant the petition and accept the voluntary surrender of Axam’s

license to practice law, which is tantamount to disbarment. Accordingly, the

name of Tony L. Axam is hereby removed from the rolls of persons entitled to

2
practice law in Georgia. Axam is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219

(c). 

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur. 

3
Exhibit
32.1











CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the annual report of Communication Intelligence Corporation (the
“Company”) on Form 10-K for the annual period ended December 31, 2008, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),
I, Guido DiGregorio, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002,
that to the best of my knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date;           March
10, 2009





By: /s/ Guido D.
DiGregorio


Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer