[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-16963

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:16-cr-00013-GKS-GJK-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

AIRAMIS J. WILLIAMS, 

a.k.a. Demp, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(September 25, 2017)

Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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On January 20, 2016, a sealed indictment was returned against Airamis J. 

Williams for possession of a firearm, a Davis Industries .22 caliber revolver, by a 

convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was arraigned on April 

11, 2016 following his arrest, and pled guilty to the charge on July 11, 2016. The 

District Court subsequently sentenced Williams to prison for 110 months, a 

sentence below the Guidelines sentence range. He appeals the sentence on the 

grounds (1) that the District Court erred in enhancing his base offense levels under 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) for possession of three firearms and under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) because one of the firearms was stolen; (2) that his sentence is 

procedurally and substantively unreasonable; and (3) that § 922(g) is 

unconstitutional facially and as applied. We affirm.

I.

These are the events that led to Williams’ indictment and sentence. In June 

2015, a confidential informant (“CI”) entered Williams’ residence to purchase 

marijuana and a gun. Williams offered to sell him a .380 caliber revolver and a 

pocket-sized pistol, but the CI wanted a Davis Industries .22 caliber revolver, 

which Williams did not have at the moment. The CI returned a week later and 

observed a bag of marijuana and a .357 caliber revolver on Williams’ kitchen 

counter. The CI bought an ounce of the marijuana and left. The CI went back the 

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next week intending to buy the .357 revolver and marijuana. He observed several 

pounds of marijuana, bought an ounce and left. 

On July 30, 2015, based on the CI’s report of seeing large quantities of 

cocaine, marijuana, other drugs and a number of firearms at Williams’s residence, 

the Orange County Sheriff’s office went there with a search warrant and seized 

drugs and a Springfield Armory .40 caliber pistol. The pistol had been reported 

stolen in 2014.

On March 6, 2016, several weeks following Williams’ indictment but prior 

to his arrest, the Orlando police, acting on a tip that Williams was selling drugs 

from a new residence he was occupying, executed a search warrant and seized 

drugs and a loaded Springfield Armory .45 caliber pistol. 

II.

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) provides for a two-level increase of the base 

offense level if the defendant possessed three to seven firearms. Only firearms

such as those depicted above, that were “unlawfully sought to be obtained,

unlawfully possessed, or unlawfully distributed” are counted under § 2K2.1(b)

(emphasis added). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1), comment., n.5. Under U.S.S.G. §

1B1.3(a), specific offense characteristics are determined based on all acts and 

omissions by the defendant in relation to the subject offense, here a violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g). For firearm-related offenses falling under § 2K2.1, relevant 

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conduct includes all acts and omissions that were part of “the same course of 

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction,” i.e., 18 U.S.C. §

922(g) in this case. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). For multiple events, such as those 

depicted in Part I above, to form a common scheme or plan, they must be 

“substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as . . . 

[a] common purpose, or similar modus operandi.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment.,

n.5(B)(i). In evaluating whether multiple firearm possessions meet this test, a 

sentencing court considers “the degree of similarity of the offenses, the regularity 

(repetitions) of the offenses, and time intervals between the offenses.” United 

States v. Fuentes, 107 F.3d 1515, 1525 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3,

comment., n.9(B)) . 

As for “similarity,” Williams possessed all three firearms as a felon in 

possession in violation of § 922(g). As to regularity, as the presentence 

investigation report (“PSI”) indicates, Williams regularly sold drugs and firearms 

out of his residence. Regarding temporal proximity, less than two months passed 

between the possession of the first firearm on June 9, 2015, and the second firearm 

on July 30, 2015. The nine-month interval between the first and last possession on 

March 6, 2016, is longer, but not so long as to warrant a conclusion that the last 

possession was separate from the first possession. The Court’s finding, albeit 

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implicit, that Williams possessed the three guns in the same course of conduct does 

not amount to clear error.

Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) provides for a two-level enhancement if the firearm 

was stolen. We find no clear error in the Court’s application of the enhancement 

because the PSI established that the Springfield Armory .40 caliber pistol was 

stolen.

II.

Williams argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable. We review a sentence for reasonableness, which “merely asks 

whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 

351 (2007). The first step in reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence is to 

assess whether the sentence is procedurally reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We determine whether “the district court committed no 

significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) 

the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 

§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing 

to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any 

deviation from the Guidelines range.” Id. 

As to the court’s explanation for the sentence, the court “should set forth 

enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments 

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and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” 

United States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). 

In a case such as this one, where the District Court imposes a sentence within the 

Guidelines sentence range, “doing so will not necessarily require lengthy 

explanation.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. Moreover, when a district court considers the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, it need not state on the record that it has explicitly 

considered each of the § 3553(a) factors, or discuss the role that each played in the 

sentencing decision. United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 

2009). “[A]n acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the 

defendant’s arguments and the factors in section 3553(a) is sufficient.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)). 

Substantive reasonableness review seeks to evaluate “whether the sentence 

imposed by the district court fails to achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in 

section 3553(a).” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. The court must impose a sentence 

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in § 

3553(a)(2), including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, deter 

criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal 

conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D). In imposing a particular sentence, 

the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the 

history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the 

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applicable guidelines range, pertinent policy statements, the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. 

Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is 

committed to the “sound discretion” of the district court. United States v. Clay, 

483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). 

While we have not adopted a presumption of reasonableness for sentences 

within the guidelines range, United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th 

Cir. 2007), we have stated that “when the district court imposes a sentence within 

the advisory Guidelines range, we ordinarily will expect that choice to be a 

reasonable one.” Docampo, 573 F.3d at 1101 (quotations omitted). Moreover, a 

sentence imposed “well below” the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of 

reasonableness. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).

Williams has not shown that his sentence, imposed at the low-end of the

Guidelines range, was procedurally unreasonable. First, the record does not show 

that the Court concluded that the Guidelines were presumptively valid. In 

addition, the Court stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors and 

adequately explained the reasons for the sentence, namely Williams’s extensive 

criminal history. Moreover, the record belies Williams’s assertion that the Court 

did not consider mitigating factors. 

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Williams also does not demonstrate that his sentence was substantively 

unreasonable in light of the record and § 3553(a)’s sentencing objectives. The 

sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment falls within the Guidelines sentence range

and below the statutory maximum sentence, which indicates reasonableness. See 

Docampo, 573 F.3d at 1101; Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Furthermore, the 

sentence reasonably meets the sentencing goals of § 3553(a)(2) in light of the 

totality of the circumstances. As the Court noted, Williams had an extensive 

criminal history, with 13 prior arrests and a criminal history category of VI. While 

Williams asserts that he presented mitigating arguments and faults the Court for 

not imposing a lower sentence based on those arguments; the weight to be given a 

particular factor is within the discretion of the court. See Clay, 483 F.3d at 743. It

was also within the court’s discretion to decide that Williams’s mitigating 

arguments were unconvincing. 

Lastly, Williams argues that his conviction should be vacated because 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g) is facially unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s authority 

under the Commerce Clause, and is unconstitutional as applied to his possession of 

firearms. The problem with his argument is that it is foreclosed by precedent. In

United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715–16 (11th Cir. 2010), we held that 

§ 922(g) is not constitutionally invalid under the Commerce Clause. We also 

rejected the defendant’s argument that § 922(g) was unconstitutional as applied to 

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him because mere possession of a firearm does not substantially effect interstate 

commerce. 

AFFIRMED.

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