[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-10196

Non-Argument Calendar

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Agency No. A201-254-591

SVETLANA GRIGORE SUMSCHI, 

 Petitioner,

 versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

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Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(January 26, 2017)

Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Svetlana Grigore Sumschi, a citizen of Moldova, seeks review of the final 

order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration 

Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”). Sumschi contends that 

she was politically persecuted in Moldova when she was assaulted and threatened 

because of her opposition to the Communist Party. She also argues that she has a 

well-founded fear of future political persecution if she is removed to Moldova.

We review the BIA’s decision as the final judgment in an immigration 

appeal. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016). When 

the BIA explicitly agrees with the IJ’s findings, we review both the BIA and the IJ 

as to those findings. Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 799 (11th Cir. 2016). 

The BIA explicitly agreed with certain findings by the IJ in this case, so we review 

those IJ findings in addition to the BIA’s decision. See id.

We review our subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015). Under the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (“INA”), we lack jurisdiction to review a final order in an 

immigration case unless “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies 

available to the alien as of right.” INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). An 

alien who failed to argue “the core issue now on appeal before the BIA” did not 

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exhaust administrative remedies with respect to that issue. Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 

1297 (quotation omitted). Issues that are not raised in an appellate brief are 

abandoned. Ruga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 757 F.3d 1193, 1196 (11th Cir. 2014).

Factual findings are reviewed under the highly deferential substantial 

evidence test. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1026–27 (11th Cir. 2004) (en 

banc). “We must affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by reasonable, 

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. at 

1027 (quotations omitted). We view the record evidence in the light most 

favorable to the BIA’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that 

decision. Id. We reverse a factual finding “only when the record compels a 

reversal; the mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is not 

enough to justify a reversal.” Id.

An applicant for asylum must meet the INA’s definition of “refugee.” INA 

§ 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A “refugee” is

any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . 

and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling 

to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion.

INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The alien must prove 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution with specific and credible 

evidence. Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 596 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010). 

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“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept requiring more than a few isolated 

incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation[, and] mere harassment is not 

persecution.” Rodriguez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(quotation omitted). Determining whether an alien was persecuted involves 

considering the cumulative effect of the allegedly persecutory incidents. Diallo, 

596 F.3d at 1333. We “have not required serious physical injury [to prove 

persecution] where the [alien] demonstrates repeated threats combined with other 

forms of severe mistreatment.” De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 

1009–10 (11th Cir. 2008). For example, we previously concluded that the record 

compelled a finding that an alien was persecuted when she received repeated death 

threats over the course of two years and was dragged from her vehicle by her hair, 

was traumatized by the torture and murder of a family groundskeeper who refused 

to reveal her whereabouts, and was kidnapped and beaten. Id. at 1009–10. We 

concluded that substantial evidence supported a finding that an alien was not 

persecuted when he was arrested while participating in a demonstration, 

interrogated and beaten for five hours, and detained for four days. Kazemzadeh v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Djonda v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the record 

did not compel a finding of persecution when an alien was threatened, detained for 

36 hours, and beaten). 

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“A credible death threat by a person who has the immediate ability to act on 

it constitutes persecution regardless of whether the threat is successfully carried 

out.” Diallo, 596 F.3d at 1333–34 (concluding that an alien was persecuted by the 

soldiers who killed his brother when the alien was beaten, detained for eleven 

hours, and threatened with death before he escaped). Attempted murder constitutes 

persecution even if the alien is not physically injured. Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an alien was 

persecuted when a revolutionary group attempted to murder him by shooting at his 

moving car).

An alien proves a well-founded fear of persecution by establishing “a 

reasonable possibility he or she would be singled out individually for persecution, 

or that he is a member of, or is identified with, a group that is subjected to a pattern 

or practice of persecution.” Djonda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th 

Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). The “alien must establish that the government 

would be her persecutor or that the government would be unwilling or unable to 

protect her from persecution by a private actor.” Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 

1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2014). The alien’s fear of persecution must be both 

subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. De Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 

1007. The “subjective component is generally satisfied by the applicant’s credible 

testimony that he or she genuinely fears persecution.” Id. at 1007 (quotations 

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omitted). An alien who shows past persecution is presumed to have a wellfounded fear of persecution. Shi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 707 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 

2013). 

An alien may not be removed to a country if the alien’s life or freedom 

would be threatened in that country on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). An alien seeking withholding of removal “must show 

that it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted on account of a protected 

ground if he returned to his home country.” Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403. An alien 

unable to meet the well-founded fear standard for asylum generally fails to meet 

this more stringent standard for withholding of removal. Sanchez Jimenez, 492 

F.3d at 1239.

An alien is eligible for CAT relief if the alien establishes it is more likely 

than not that she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 

8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). “Torture” is 

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 

is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 

from him or her or a third person information or a confession, 

punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has 

committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 

coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on 

discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by 

or at the instigation of or with the consent of acquiescence of a public 

official or other person acting in an official capacity.

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8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).

Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we deny 

the petition. As an initial matter, Sumschi adequately exhausted her arguments 

regarding a well-founded fear of future persecution. She raised the core issue of 

future persecution to the BIA by arguing that evidence of human rights problems, 

government corruption, and Community Party activity demonstrates she will be 

persecuted if removed to Moldova. See Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1297. Thus, she 

adequately exhausted the arguments regarding a well-founded fear of future 

persecution that she raises to this Court. See Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1297 (stating 

that exhaustion “is not a stringent requirement” and simply requires an alien to 

have “argued the core issue now on appeal before the BIA” (quotation omitted)). 

As to waiver, Sumschi does not abandon her arguments regarding a well-founded 

fear of future persecution. She essentially challenges the BIA’s entire wellfounded fear finding by arguing that the evidence shows she has an objective, 

reasonable fear of being persecuted and that there is corruption, abuse, and 

Communist infiltration in the Moldovan government. Thus, we reach the merits of 

her future persecution argument.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA’s denial of asylum. First, the 

record does not compel reversal of the IJ and the BIA’s determination that 

Sumschi’s assaults and threats considered cumulatively do not rise to the level of 

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persecution. Sumschi was trampled during an anti-Communist demonstration 

when the police began to disburse the demonstrators. However, her testimony 

reflects that she was not specifically targeted, but was injured because the situation 

became chaotic. Two women confronted her in an elevator after distributing 

political flyers. One of the women held a knife to her throat and threatened to kill 

her and her family if she continued to oppose the Communist Party. However, her 

testimony indicates that the women released her from the elevator and did not 

intend or attempt to kill her. She and her family received threatening telephone 

calls from the women after the incident in the elevator, but she remained in 

Moldova for nearly a year following the incident and was never again directly 

confronted. Sumschi did not face attempted murder or the type of severe 

mistreatment that we have recognized as persecution. See, e.g., De Santamaria, 

525 F.3d at 1009–10; Sanchez Jimenez, 492 F.3d at 1233. In fact, we previously 

held that worse treatment than that suffered by Sumschi did not constitute 

persecution. See, e.g., Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1353; Djonda, 514 F.3d at 1171, 

1174. Substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA’s determination that 

Sumschi’s treatment in Moldova did not reach an extreme level that constitutes 

persecution. See Rodriguez, 735 F.3d at 1308 (referring to persecution as “an 

extreme concept” requiring more than mere harassment or intimidation (quotation 

omitted)).

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Second, the record does not compel reversal of the BIA’s decision that 

Sumschi has not shown an objective, well-founded fear of persecution if removed 

to Moldova. The evidence reflects that the Communist Party lost the majority in 

the Moldovan parliament before Sumschi left the country and that a coalition of 

opposition parties controls the parliament and elected a president. Although 

government corruption and torture of detained people by the police continue to be 

problems in Moldova, the government increased sentences for torture and replaced 

officials in charge of police forces. Individuals can criticize the government 

without reprisal and have the right to change their government peacefully through 

elections. Sumschi did not present evidence showing that Communists continue to 

target political opponents, and she and her family have not been threatened since 

November 2010. Consequently, there is substantial evidence in the record to 

support the BIA’s determination that Sumschi did not demonstrate an objective, 

well-founded fear of future persecution in Moldova.

Because Sumschi has not established asylum eligibility, substantial evidence 

also supports the BIA’s decision that she has not met the higher burden to show 

eligibility for withholding of removal. See Sanchez Jimenez, 492 F.3d at 1238-39. 

Additionally, based on the above analysis, substantial evidence supports the IJ and 

the BIA’s determination that she has not established eligibility for CAT relief by 

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showing that it is more likely than not she will be tortured if removed to Moldova. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).

PETITION DENIED.

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