J-S40028-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DANIEL B. EDDINGER, 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2736 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 25, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0005414-2015

BEFORE: OTT, DUBOW, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED AUGUST 31, 2017

Appellant, Daniel B. Eddinger, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence 

entered July 25, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

sentencing him to two and a half to five years’ incarceration following his 

open guilty plea to Corruption of Minors and Indecent Assault of a Person 

Less than 16 Years of Age.1 On appeal, Appellant challenges the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.

A detailed recitation of the factual and procedural history is 

unnecessary to our disposition. On April 8, 2016, Appellant entered an open 

guilty plea to Corruption of Minors and Indecent Assault for events that 

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Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8), respectively.
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occurred fifteen years earlier when Appellant, who at the time was a 22-

year-old basketball coach and math tutor, sexually assaulted one of his 13-

year-old students on numerous occasions over a period of approximately 

one year. On July 25, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant to the 

statutory maximum of two and a half to five years’ incarceration on the 

Corruption of Minors charge followed by two years of probation, to run 

consecutively, on the Indecent Assault charge. On July 27, 2016, Appellant 

filed a Post-Sentence Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, which the trial 

court denied. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. [] Appellant has satisfied the technical requirements for 

discretionary review under Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) and presented a 

plausible claim that the sentencing judge abused her 

discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence outside the 

sentencing guideline range. Should the Court review this 

appeal on its merits?

2. Appellant Daniel Eddinger is a first-time non-violent offender 

with a stable job and in a long-term marriage with two young 

children. He adopted a non-adversarial stance toward the 

police investigation, promptly accepted responsibility for his 

misconduct years earlier, and repeatedly expressed his 

genuine remorse. Did the sentencing judge abuse her 

discretion by nevertheless imposing a statutory maximum 

sentence multiple times the guideline range?

3. Should the Court vacate this unreasonable sentence and 

remand this matter to the sentencing judge with instructions 

under § 9781(c)(3)?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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Initially, we note Appellant’s claim that the trial court abused its 

discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence outside of the sentencing 

guideline range represents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 189 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (stating a claim that the court imposed an unreasonable 

sentence beyond the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines 

represented a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing). 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence are not appealable 

as of right. Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 

2015). Rather, an appellant challenging the sentencing court’s discretion 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test: “(1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 

903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) 

whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) 

whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is 

not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).” Id.

(citation omitted).

Here, Appellant complied with the first three requirements above. 

Next, we must determine whether Appellant has presented any substantial 

questions in his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) Statement. An appellant raises a 

“substantial question” when he “sets forth a plausible argument that the 
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sentence violates a provision of the [S]entencing [C]ode or is contrary to the 

fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. 

Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

In his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) Statement, Appellant submits that the trial 

court imposed an unreasonable and excessive sentence that was outside of 

the sentencing guideline range when the trial court concentrated solely on 

the gravity of the offense rather than the record as a whole, including 

Appellant’s remorse, lack of a prior criminal record, and rehabilitation. We 

conclude that Appellant’s claim raises a “substantial question” for our 

review. See Commonwealth v. Guth, 735 A.2d 709, 711 (Pa. Super. 

1999) (finding a claim that the sentence imposed was outside the guidelines 

and unreasonable raised a “substantial question”); Commonwealth v. 

Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2005) (determining that defendant 

raised “substantial question” where defendant claimed that sentencing court 

imposed an excessive and unreasonable sentence after it focused solely on 

the serious nature of the offenses rather than the record as a whole, 

including defendant’s expressions of remorse and lack of prior criminal 

record). 

Accordingly, we will address the merits of Appellant’s sentencing 

claims, mindful of our standard of review. This Court has repeatedly stated: 

“[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing 

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest 
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abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 828 A.2d 1126, 1128 

(Pa. Super. 2003). An abuse of discretion is more than a simple error of 

judgment. Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007). 

Moreover, “[a]n abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an 

appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a 

result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, 

or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (citation and 

quotation omitted).

Appellant concedes that the imposed sentence did not exceed the 

statutory limit on either charge, but claims that the sentence was 

unreasonable and excessive because the trial court deviated above the 

guideline sentencing recommendation of restorative sanctions to nine 

months’ incarceration for the Corruption Charge, and instead imposed “a 

statutory maximum sentence more than 6 times the upper end of the 

standard range on the [C]orruption charge.” Appellant’s Brief at 21; see 

Basic Sentencing Matrix (5th ed.), 204 Pa.Code § 303.16(a). Appellant also 

avers that the trial court deviated from the standard guideline range on the 

Indecent Assault charge by imposing the statutory maximum probation 

sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant further argues that in imposing 

this excessive sentence, the trial court improperly emphasized the gravity of 

the offense while minimizing “the lack of threat posed by [Appellant], and 

his rehabilitative needs.” Id. at 30. 
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Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that that the Sentencing 

Guidelines are purely advisory in nature. Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 923 

A.2d 1111, 1118 (Pa. 2007). “The guidelines are merely one factor among 

many that the court must consider in imposing a sentence.” Id. (citation 

omitted). The trial courts retain broad discretion in sentencing matters, and 

“the only line that a sentence may not cross is the statutory maximum 

sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). 

While a court has discretion to deviate from the guidelines, when the 

court does deviate “it is important that the court reflect a consideration of 

the sentencing guidelines, the background and character of the defendant, 

the circumstances of the crime, and impose a sentence that is consistent 

with the protection of the public and the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant.” Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 519 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

2007); see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 (setting for the general standards 

applicable to sentencing). 

Where the trial court deviates above the guidelines, this Court may 

only vacate and remand a case for resentencing if we first conclude that “the 

sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the 

sentence is unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3). Although the 

Sentencing Code does not define the term “unreasonable,” our Supreme 

Court has made clear that “rejection of a sentencing court’s imposition of 

sentence on unreasonableness grounds [should] occur infrequently, whether 
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the sentence is above or below the guideline ranges, especially when the 

unreasonableness inquiry is conducted using the proper standard of review.” 

Walls, supra at 964; see Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 

1194-95 (Pa. Super. 2004) (affirming a statutory maximum sentence 

imposed after the trial court considered and balanced all of the relevant 

mitigating and aggravating facts). When reviewing the record, this Court 

should have regard for: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and 

the history and characteristics of the Appellant; (2) the opportunity of the 

sentencing court to observe the Appellant, including any presentence 

investigation; (3) the findings upon which the sentence was based; and (4) 

the guidelines promulgated by the commission. 42 Pa.C.S. §9781(d).

Importantly, our Supreme Court “has determined that where the trial 

court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is presumed that the court is 

aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that 

where the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be 

disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (citation omitted).

In the instant case, the trial court reviewed a Presentence 

Investigation Report before imposing the sentence. Thus, we presume that 

the trial court was aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and 

considerations at the time of sentencing. Additionally, the record reflects 

that the trial court did take into consideration the mitigating factors of 
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Appellant’s remorse, cooperation with authorities, lack of a criminal record, 

and progress in therapy. Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/2/16, at 1 n.1; N.T. 

Sentencing, 7/25/16, at 33-34. Nevertheless, the trial court decided to 

deviate above the aggravated sentencing recommendation after relying on 

the following persuasive factors: (1) the serious nature of the crime; (2) 

that the crime involved a course of ongoing conduct for a period of 

approximately one year; (3) that Appellant was in a position of trust with the 

victim and the victim’s family; (4) the age of the victim, who was thirteen 

years old at the time of the offense; (5) the long-term impact on the victim 

who will have “scars forever[;]” and (6) the potential threat to the public. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/2/16, at 1 n.1; Trial Court Opinion, dated 

9/22/16, at 2-3; N.T. Sentencing, 7/25/16, at 33-37. 

After careful review of Appellant’s arguments and the certified record, 

we conclude that the trial court did not ignore or misapply the law, and did 

not exercise its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, 

or arrive at a manifestly unreasonable decision. See Rossetti, supra at

1194-95. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 

Appellant’s aggregate sentence of two and a half to five years’ incarceration 

followed by two years of probation.

Judgment of Sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/31/2017