alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ex parte Joseph M. CVENGROS.

No. 37158.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 18, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 1965.

*882Holman, Saccomanno, Clegg & Martin, Houston, Norman W. Black, Houston, of Counsel, for petitioner.

Frank Briscoe, Dist. Atty., Carl E. F. Dally and James C. Brough, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Presiding Judge.

Petitioner seeks relief from an order entered in a civil suit (to which he was not a party) adjudging him in contempt of court for violation of a temporary injunction and remanding him to jail for three days and until a fine of $100 and costs were paid.

This Court has general original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus. Art. V, Sec. S, Constitution of Texas, Vernon’s Ann.St.

The Supreme Court of Texas has jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus where any' person is restrained in his liberty by virtue of any order, process or commitment issued by any court or judge on account of the violation of any order, judgment or decree theretofore made, rendered or entered by such court or judge in any civil case. Art. 1737 Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St.; Ex parte Morris, 162 Tex. 530, 349 S.W.2d 99.

As a general practice, where there is reason to believe that the application falls within the area of concurrent jurisdiction, the Court of Criminal Appeals will decline to act until the Supreme Court has decided whether the case comes within its restricted habeas corpus jurisdiction.

If the Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction and issues or refuses to issue the writ, its orders will be treated by the Court of Criminal Appeals as a final disposition of the matter.

Ex parte Mussett, 72 Tex.Cr.R. 487, 162 S.W. 846, points out the reasons for the rule stated. See also Appellate Procedure in Texas, Original Jurisdiction of the Courts, Habeas Corpus, Ch. 1-3.

This petition was first presented to the Supreme Court where it was disposed of without written order. This Court ordered the petition filed and set for hearing on the question of whether the writ should issue, believing that the Supreme Court had declined to assume jurisdiction.

It now appears that the Supreme Court considered the petition and refused to issue the writ, but did not do so because of any question as to its jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court having concurrent jurisdiction under Art. 1737 V.A.C.S., the petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.
|  | (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: April 15, 2009                                                                   |   |   |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
|                                                                                   |   |   |   |
| /s/      Christopher R. Miller                                          |   |   |        |
|                                                                                        |   |   |        |
| Christopher R. MillerChief      Financial OfficerInMedica      Development Corporation |   |   |   |
|                                                                                   |   |   |   |

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET, INCOME STATEMENT AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          51,489
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   82,503
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,202
<INVENTORY>                                     82,946
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               239,611
<PP&E>                                         192,162
<DEPRECIATION>                                  63,335
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 402,971
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           67,851
<BONDS>                                          3,259
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           250
<OTHER-SE>                                     309,845
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   402,971
<SALES>                                        407,199
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               409,609
<CGS>                                          186,667
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  186,667
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  70
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 56,934
<INCOME-TAX>                                    17,583
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             38,277
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    38,277
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.53
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.53


</TABLE>
#### Charles WALKER, Appellant, v. John WINGO, Warden, Kentucky State Penitentiary, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 4, 1966.

Charles Walker, pro se.

Robert Matthews, Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

CULLEN, Commissioner.

Charles Walker, who is serving a life sentence in the penitentiary under an October 1963 conviction of armed robbery, has appealed from an order of the Lyon Circuit Court dismissing a habeas corpus petition filed by him in November 1965 by which he sought to have the judgment of conviction declared void on the ground that he was denied right of counsel at the time he was arrested and made a confession, and upon the trial. The circuit court, relying on Ayers v. Davis, Ky., 377 S.W.2d 154, held that habeas corpus would not lie because there was no showing that the remedy prescribed by RCr 11.42 was not adequate.

Late in 1964 Walker filed two motions under RCr 11.42 to vacate the judgment under which he is confined. Both motions were overruled. He appealed from the order overruling the second of those motions, and the order was affirmed. See Walker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 386 S.W.2d 452. He did not allege denial of counsel in either of those motions, but he reasonably could have, wherefore he is precluded, under the third subsection of RCr 11.42, from raising that issue in another 11.42 proceeding. He contends in the instant case that since he is precluded from raising the issue in an 11.42 motion, that rule does not provide an adequate remedy, so he is entitled to resort to habeas corpus.

The fact that a prisoner has lost his remedy under RCr 11.42 by failing properly to invoke it does not mean that the rule does not provide an adequate remedy within the meaning of Ayers v. Davis, Ky., 377 S.W.2d 154. That case makes clear that a motion under RCr 11.42 is the exclusive post-conviction remedy where it can or could have been resorted to for the purpose of testing the legality of the prisoner’s detention. And the rule itself makes plain the purpose to put a reasonable limit on the number of post-conviction proceedings that may be instituted by a prisoner. See Tipton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 398 S.W.2d 493 (decided January 21, 1966).

*886To accept Walker’s contention here would be to open the door to an endless, alternating succession of post-conviction proceedings. We do not accept it.

In passing we shall say that there appears to be no merit in Walker’s claim of denial of counsel. At the time he was arrested and confessed he did not request counsel. See Scamahorne v. Commonwealth, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 113. And upon the trial he refused to be represented by the counsel theretofore appointed for him and chose to represent himself. See Tanner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 694.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### Pyron William BLACK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28356.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 30, 1956.

*671No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The conviction, on a plea of guilty before the court, is for driving while intoxicated; the punishment, 3 days in jail and a fine of $50.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to he regular and nothing is presented for review. The judgment is affirmed.
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-21-00150-CV

__________________

FARID ALI DATOO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 314649

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Farid Ali Datoo filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. The motion 

appears to be voluntarily made by the appellant and it was filed prior to any decision 

of this Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1). No other party filed notice of appeal. 

We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
2

APPEAL DISMISSED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on June 23, 2021

Opinion Delivered June 24, 2021

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2


                         SECTION 906 CERTFICATION - CFO

In connection with the Annual Report of FirstCity Liquidating Trust (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Stephen J. Barta, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

To the best of my knowledge, after reasonable investigation:

      (1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.

Date:   March 27, 2003

                                              /s/ Stephen J. Barta
                                              ------------------------------
                                              Stephen J. Barta
                                              Principal Financial Officer
#### Jo Ann PEREZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28132.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 7, 1956.

No Attorney on appeal, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The offense is the unlawful sale of heer in a dry area; the punishment, a fine of $250.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or hills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular, and nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
Compagnie Aérienne Interrégionale Express (CAIRE) dba Air Guyane Express / Air Antilles 

Express

Foreign Carrier Permit Application

Dear Sir/Madam,

Under the provisions of the US – EU Reciprocal Recognition Procedures with regards to airline 

fitness and citizenship, CAIRE is hereby applying for foreign air carrier permit and exemption 

under 49 USC 41301 and/or 40109 as applicable as follows:

1. Name and address of applicant:

Compagnie Aérienne Interrégionale Express (CAIRE) dba Air Guyane Express / Air Antilles 

Express

Aeroport de Rochambeau

97351 Matoury

2. Statement of the authority sought:

Scheduled and charter foreign air transportation of passengers, cargo and mail 

to/from Guadeloupe, Martinique and St Martin to/from San Juan, Puerto Rico

3. Evidence of operating authority issued by France’s DGAC:

Per exhibit 1

4. Foreign Air Transport Authority involved:
Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile

50, rue Henry Farman

75720 Paris, Cedex 15

Tel : 33(0) 1 58 09 43 21

5. Applicant’s Insurance Coverage :

Applicant Insurance exceeds the liability limits of 14CFR205

Insurance Carrier: Global Aerospace Underwriting Managers for Lead Insurer 

OAAGC on behalf of the Coinsurers with a share of 74% 

See exhibit 2

6. CAIRE anticipates that grant of the requested authority will not result in additional 

annual aircraft fuel consumption exceeding ten (10) million gallons. Grant of the 

requested foreign air carrier permit would not constitute a major regulatory action 

under the Energy and Conservation Act of 1975, as defined in 14 CFR 313.5 (a).

7. Attached as Exhibit 3 is Form 4523, a partial waiver of the liability limitations of the 

Warsaw Convention.

For additional information please contact:

Mr. Luis Salva

US Representative

CAIRE

787-379-3197 cel

atc@prw.net
Exhibit 1

Operating authority granted by France’s 

Direction Générale de L’Aviation Civile



Exhibit 2

Applicants Insurance Coverage


Exhibit 3

Waiver of the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention.
N OTE : This order is nonprecedential.


# United States **Court of Appeals** 

**for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

RAINEY L. HOOD,

Petitioner,

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
Respondent.

______________________

2013

- 3126

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit System s Protection

Board in No. DA831E120227 -I-1.

______________________

ON MOTION

______________________

O R D E R

Rainey L. Hood moves for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis.

Upon consideration thereof,

I T I S O RDERED T HAT :

The motion is granted. Case: 13-3126 Document: 3 Page: 1 Filed: 06/20/2013HOOD V

. OPM 2

F OR THE C OURT

/s/ Daniel E. O’Toole

Daniel E. O’Toole

Clerk

s23 Case: 13-3126 Document: 3 Page: 2 Filed: 06/20/2013
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

___________________________________

)

DAFNEY CREWS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 12-1362 (RWR)

)

NIANI DIXON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

___________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, plaintiff filed a Complaint which, in 

its entirety, stated:

I dont [sic] want Niani Dixon to come to 1302 Morris Rd[.] SE[.] 

Mr[.] Jerry Crews do not live at this address[.] On 8/10/12 Mr. 

Crews say he live in Maryland with her[.] I . . . asked for a TPO

[sic] and I dont [sic] feel safe[.] I dont [sic] want her to call or 

come by[.]

Compl. Defendant Niani Dixon removed the action to the Court on August 20, 2012, and on 

August 28, 2012, she filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (6) a motion to 

dismiss the complaint. The Court advised the plaintiff of her obligations under the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure and the local rules of this Court to respond to the motion, and specifically 

warned plaintiff that, if she did not respond to the motion by September 27, 2012, the Court may 

treat the motion as conceded. The plaintiff has neither filed an opposition to the motion nor 

requested more time to do so. Accordingly, the Court will grant defendant Dixon’s motion as 

conceded. 
2

In addition, the Court sua sponte will dismiss the complaint as to defendant Jerry 

Crews. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

Because the complaint neither alleges misconduct nor makes any demand for relief as to 

defendant Crews, it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, therefore, it must 

be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SIGNED this 21st day of December, 2012.

/s/

RICHARD W. ROBERTS

United States District Judge
#### Leaton Eugene AKIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 29135.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 30, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1957.

*806No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Dwight Whitwell, County Attorney, McKinney, Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Art. 6687b, Subsection 4 of Sec. 32, Vernon’s R.C.S., makes it unlawful for one to fail or refuse to surrender to the Department of Public Safety, on demand, any operator’s, commercial operator’s, or chauffeur’s license which has been suspended, cancelled, or revoked, as provided by law.

This is an appeal from a conviction for violating that statute, with punishment assessed at fifteen days’ confinement in jail and a fine of $100.

It will be noted that the offense denounced by the statute is complete only when the Department of Public Safety has first made demand that the license be surrendered.

It follows, therefore, that for an information to charge a violation of that statute there must be an allegation that a demand was made for the surrender of the license.

The instant information carries no such allegation, but charges only that the appellant did “ * * * fail to return to the Department of Public Safety his Texas Operator’s License and registration after the same had been duly suspended by said Department.”

Upon its face, the information does not charge a violation of the law and is therefore insufficient to support a conviction.

What we have said here is not to be construed as a determination of the validity of the statute. That question is not reached or decided.

For the reason stated, the conviction is reversed and the prosecution is ordered dismissed.

On State’s Motion for Rehearing

WOODLEY, Judge.

A re-examination of the record convinces us that the State was seeking to obtain a conviction under Art. 6701h, Sec. 31, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St., with a jail term or fine, or both, as provided in Sec. 32 of said Art. 670lh, V.C.S

The complaint and information nowhere disclose whether the license which appellant failed to return had been suspended by the Department of Public Safety after a motor vehicle accident report under authority of Art. 6701h, V.C.S., or had been suspended under authority of Art. 6687b. V.C.S.. Sec. 22 or 24.

If such license had been suspended “as herein provided” (under Art. 6701h, Sec. 5) the punishment assessed against appellant being within the terms of Sec. 32 was authorized.

On the other hand, if appellant’s operator’s license had been duly suspended under authority of Sections 22 or 24 of Art. 6687b, V.C.S., then the punishment for failure to surrender such license is found in Section 44 of said Article, which provides for a fine only, and the jail term assessed against appellant would not be authorized.

Because the complaint and information fail to allege that appellant’s opera*807tor’s license had been suspended as provided in Art. 6701h, Sec. 5, V.C.S., it is fatally defective.

The State’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
#### Jarmon RUTHERFORD, Appellant, v. The STATE *of*Texas, Appellee.

No. 27723.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 25, 1955.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Leon Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State!

PER CURIAM.

The offense is aggravated assault; the punishment, 30 days. .

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular, and nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed, and no motion for rehearing will be entertained in this appeal.
EXHIBIT32.2

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO

18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Hesperia Holding, Inc. (the"Company") on Form 10-QSB/A for the period ended June 30, 2003, asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), I, Steve Chaussy, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

> -  The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; andThe      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company.
 

 

/s/Steve Chaussy                    
SteveChaussy

ChiefFinancial Officer

October16, 2003
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

UNDER

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

PACIFIC MERCANTILE BANCORP

Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q

for the quarter ended September 30, 2006

The undersigned, who is the Chief Financial Officer of Pacific Mercantile Bancorp (the Company), hereby certifies that (i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30,
2006, as filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Quarterly Report), to which this Certification is an Exhibit, fully complies with the applicable requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange
Act; and (ii) the information contained in this Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
|---------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: November 8, 2006 |  | /s/ NANCY A. GRAY                                                                                                                                                                                                          
|                       |  | Nancy A. Gray, Chief Financial Officer                                                                                                                                                                                     
|                       | 
|                       |  | A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission on its staff upon request.