# United States Court of Appeals

**For the Seventh Circuit**

**Chicago, Illinois 60604**

Argued December 15, 2004

Decided August 2 , 2005

**Before**

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-2826

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v.

JEFFREY SCOTT WALKER,

Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana,

Terre Haute Division.

No. 2:03CR00015-015

John D. Tinder

, Judge

.

**O R D E R**

Jeffrey Scott Walker was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. On

appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his

home under the authority of a federal search warrant. He argues that the affidavit

supporting the search warrant did not es tablish probable cause to believe that

contraband or evidence would be found in his home, and that the information about

him in the affidavit was stale. We conclude that the affidavit was adequate to support

the warrant, and that even if this were questionable, the search satisfied the good-faith

exception to the exclusionary rule. We therefore affirm the judg ment of the district

court. UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53No. 04-2826 Page 2

I

On September 18, 2003, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to search

Walker’s home for drugs and evidence of drug trafficking and money laundering. The

judge ha d before him a 104-page affidavit from an agent of the federal Drug

Enforcement Administration that described conversations intercepted during the

wiretap of a cellular telephone used by Francis Blair, the head of a methamphetamine

conspiracy. Authorities conducted their surveillance of Blair’s telephone from August

5 through

August 31, 2003. During that period, Walker was heard four times talking

with Blair about methamphetamine. Telephone calls between Blair and other

associates also revealed information suggesting to the DEA agent that Walker was

involved in drug trafficking.

Specific affidavit entries relating to Walker began with e vents on August 13,

2003, when Charles Judy called Blair to report that he had set up a meeting with

Walker. Blair replied that he was concerned about Walker’s being drunk and getting

into “it” with “Mike.” Blair told Judy that he wanted Walker to know that he would not

tolerate drinking and “taking care of business.” The DEA agent interpreted this

conversation to mean that Blair did not want Walker dealing in methamphetamine

and collecting

money while he was drunk. Three days later, Blair placed a call to

Michael Covert, informing him that “Scott wants to pay me your money, do you want

me to do it?” Covert replied that he would “mark it off.” The agent thought that this

indicated that Walker was paying Blair money that Walker owed to Covert for drugs.

Ten days later, on August 26, 2003, Judy called Blair and said that he intended

to make a “run” for Walker. The DEA agent interpreted this conversation to mean that

Judy either planned to deliver methamphetamine to Walker or to collect money from

him. Later that same day, Walker telep honed Blair to say that he was waiting for

“Charlie.” Blair then telephoned Judy to report that Walker was waiting. The agent

inferred from this statement t hat Walker was waiting for Judy either to deliver

methamphetamine or to collect money from him.

The last reference in the affidavit to Walker related to August 30 and 31. On the

30th, Walker telephoned Blair looking for Ju dy, and during the conversation Blair

asked Walker if he needed “something.” Walker responded that he needed “two.” Blair

agreed to call Walker around 8:00 that evening. The DEA agent surmised that Blair

had wanted to know whether Walker needed methamphetamine, and that Walker had

repl ied that he needed two ounces. Walker, however, did not wait for Blair’s call.

Instead, shortly before 8:00 p.m., Walker called Blair. Blair assured Walk er that he

would come and get him “hooked up” in approximately 90 minutes. The agent

understood Blair to mean that he would deliver two ounces of methamphetamine to

Walker, as the two had discussed earlier. About 30 minutes later, Blair called JudyNo. 04-2826 Page 3

and said “put Scott Walker d own for two.” The agent thought that this statement

meant that Blair was fronting two ounces of methamphetamine to Walker and that

Blair was informing Judy to record Walker’s debt on a drug ledger. Finally, on August

31 Blair telephoned Walker and asked what Walker had for him. Walker answered

that he had “them two gone.” The DEA agent concluded that Walker had distributed

the two ounces of methamphetamine that he and Blair had been discuss ing the

previous day.

A little more than two weeks later, on September 18, the magistrate judge

issued the warrant Walker is now challenging. The warrant specified documents,

records, firearms, drug paraphernalia, currency, and other evidence associated with

drug trafficking activity; it did not mention controlled substances separately. Law

enforcement officials executed the warrant the next day. They found and seized 4.2

grams of methamphetamine in a shaving bag, 157.6 grams of methamphetamine in the

basement rafters, and various other drug-related items including scales, razor blades,

and zip lock bags and ties.

S ome time later, a grand jury indicted Walker for conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1),

and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). Walker moved to suppress the results of the search, arguing t hat the

aff idavit supporting the warrant did not contain any information indicating that he

had engaged in any unlawful acts outside of his house, or that it was likely that there

was contraband or evidence of unlawful acts inside the house. Thus, he reasoned, the

affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause to search the residence. He also

argued that the information in the affidavit about his activities was stale. The district

court orally denied the motion. It found that the information in the affidavit showed

th at Walker had a “comfort level” in dealing with the others in the drug conspiracy,

which in turn implied that they had an ongoing relationship. Overall, the court found,

the affidavit was adequate to establish probable cause, and even if it fell short, the

good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule justified denying the motion. The court

also found that the intercepted telephone conversations described in the affidavit

reflected an ongoi ng drug-distribution relationship between Walker and Blair and that

the information about Walker was therefore not stale.

II

On appeal, Walker renews his argument that probable cause to search his house

did not exist, because the information in the affidavit was too general, and any belief

that contraband or evidence would be found in his home was speculation or “mere

suspicion.” Walker also co ntinues to claim that the information in the affidavit was

stale, because 18 days had passed between the last event giving rise to probable causeNo. 04-2826 Page 4

and the issuance of the warrant. We review the district court’s decision that probable

cause existed de novo

. Unite d States v. Fleischli, 305 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2002).

Probable cause exists when, considering all the circumstances, the affidavit sets forth

sufficient facts to cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search will

uncover contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 756

(7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). Because

the affidavit provided the only facts on which the magistrate judge relied to issue the

warrant, this court mus t review independently the sufficiency of the affidavit to

determine whether it establishes probable cause. United States v. Spry, 190 F.3d 829,

835 (7th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, the issuing judge’ s view of the facts is entitled to

some deference. United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 866-67 (7th Cir. 2002).

A. Probable Cause

We are satisfied that the affidavit shows that Walker had an ongoing working

relationship with Blair by at least August 13, 2003. Fairly read, it establishes that

Blair was providing Walker with methamphetamine and that Walker was selling the

drugs and delivering the proceeds to Blair. What is missing from the affidavit is any

information indicating that Walker used his home to support this activity. The DEA

agent’s assertion that drugs or evidence of drug dealing was likely to be found in

Walker’s home rest ed solely on what the agent knew from training and experience,

namely, that “drug traffickers generally store their d rug-related paraphernalia in their

residences.”

The question is whether the agent’s general knowledge about the habits of drug

dealers in this respect, co upled with evidence of Walker’s participation in the

methamphetamine conspiracy, was sufficient to create probable cause to search

Walker’s residence. We have found in the past that general participation in a drug

traffick ing scheme may be enough to create probable cause to search a participant’s

home, even witho

ut direct evidence that drug-related activity was occurring there,

because “evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live.” United States v. Lamon,

930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d

1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986)). In Lamon , despite the informant’s statements that the

suspect did not sell drugs out of his primary residence, the court upheld the search of

that residence based on “considerable evidence” that the suspect was dealing drugs out

of his car and another house, along with the detective’s statement that drug dealers

often hide mon ey, drugs, and other incriminating evidence at their permanent

residences. Id. at 1190. Similarly, in United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 1999),

the court overturned the district court’s determination of no probable cause to search

the suspect’s

home, where substantial information had been presented that the suspect

was engaged in illegal drug trafficking and no other drug-dealing headquarters was

id entified in the affidavit. I d. at 87-88. The court reasoned that probable cause toNo. 04-2826 Page 5

search a home in drug cases often will rest not on direct observation, but rather “can

be inferred from the type of crime, th e nature of the items sought, the extent of an

opportunity for concealment and normal inferences as to where a criminal would hide”

evidence of the crime in question. Id. at 88 (quoting United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d

1015, 1017 (1st Cir. 1979)).

We do not read either Lamon or Feliz as holding flatl y that there is always

probable cause to search a drug dealer’s home, merely because there is probable cause

to believe that he or she is engaged in drug trafficking. The facts of a particular case

may indicate, for example, that the dealer uses a “safe house” or another participant’s

property for all of his drug-related business, perhaps to keep information about his

activities from others in the hom e. As usual, the inquiry is highly fact-specific. In

Walker’s case, however, there was no hint of any other location where Walker would

keep materials related to his methamphetamine dealings, and it was logical to infer

that such materials existed. On this record, while we regard the information tending

to show that evidence might be located within the residence as close to the edge, we

think that there was enough to support this warrant.

B. Staleness

We have little to say about Walker’s staleness argument, other than that it has

no merit. The age of inculpatory information is only one relevant factor, Spry

, 190 F.3d

at 836, and this information was not very old. Only 18 days had passed between the

last of the telephone intercepts and the issuance of the warrant, under circumstances

where the conversations suggested that Walker and Blair had an ongoing relationship.

Nothing in the intercepted conversations suggested that this relationship was ending.

This court held that seven-month-old information was n ot stale, in U nited States v.

McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 597 (7th Cir. 1 990), overruled on other grounds by U nited

States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2001). The kinds of items the warrant

specified

– documents, records, firearms, drug paraphernalia, and currency

– are not

so evanescent that they would have vanished over less than three weeks.

C. Good-Faith Exception

Even if we were to conclude that the information in the affidavit just misses

being enough to demonstrate probable cause that evidence would be found in Walker’s

r esidence, suppression would be appropriate only if the good-faith except ion to the

exclusionary rule first recognized in United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 (1984), was inapplicable. The good-faith exception does not apply where the issuing magistrate

abandons her detached and neutral role, or where the officers seeking the warrant

were dishonest or reckless in preparing the affidavit, or where those officers could not

ha ve had an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. U nitedNo. 04-2826 Page 6

States v. Dumes, 313 F.3d 372, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2002). None of those circumstanc e s

obtains here. Moreover, in spite of the fact that the district court specifically mentioned

th e good-faith exception as an alternate ground for its ruling, Walker has not

challenged that ruling on appeal.

We therefore A FFIRM the judgment of the district court.