[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10092

____________________

COREY MCCLENDON, 

on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons, 

REGINALD HOLDEN, 

on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons, 

CHRISTOPHER REED, 

on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

GARY LONG,

in his official capacity and individually, 

JEANETTE RILEY, 

individually, 

SCOTT CRUMLEY, 

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10092

individually, 

Defendants-Appellees,

JOHN AND OR JANE DOES,

1-3, individually,

Defendant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-00385-MTT

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit 

Judges.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

In October 2018, two deputies from the Butts County 

Sheriff’s Office placed signs in the front yards of the residences of 

all 57 registered sex offenders within the County, warning “STOP” 

and “NO TRICK-OR-TREAT AT THIS ADDRESS.” Before 

Halloween 2019, three registered sex offenders living in Butts 

County sued, seeking to enjoin the Sheriff from placing the signs 

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21-10092 Opinion of the Court 3

again. The district court denied a permanent injunction and 

granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff.

After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we 

conclude that the Sheriff’s warning signs are compelled 

government speech, and their placement violates a homeowner’s 

First Amendment rights. Thus, we vacate the district court’s 

judgment in favor of the Sheriff and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. The Plaintiffs 

Plaintiffs Reginald Holden, Corey McClendon, and 

Christopher Reed are residents of Butts County and are required to 

register as sex offenders under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, et seq. The 

Georgia statute not only requires individuals with certain 

convictions to register as sex offenders, but also requires Georgia 

to classify registrants based on whether they pose an increased risk 

of recidivism. Id. § 42-1-14. None of the three plaintiffs have been 

classified as posing an increased risk of recidivism.

In 2004, Holden was convicted of lewd and lascivious 

battery in Pinellas County, Florida. He has been a homeowner in 

Butts County since May 2017. He lives by himself and works as a 

warehouse coordinator. 

In 2001, McClendon was convicted of statutory rape of a 

minor in Butts County. He lives with his daughter and his parents, 

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who own the home where they all reside. He holds a commercial 

driver’s license. 

In 2007, Reed was convicted of sexual assault of a minor in 

Cook County, Illinois. He works as a truck driver and has lived 

with his father, who owns their home, since 2011.

In the 2020 order now on appeal, the district court found 

that all three plaintiffs “have, by all accounts, been rehabilitated 

and are leading productive lives.” The Sheriff does not dispute this, 

nor does the record support a contrary finding.

B. Halloween 2018 

Several days before Halloween in 2018, at the direction of 

Sheriff Gary Long, Deputies Jeanette Riley and Scott Crumley 

placed warning signs in the front yards of the residences of every 

registered sex offender in Butts County, including Holden, 

McClendon, and Reed. At the residences, the deputies also gave 

to, or left for, the registrants a leaflet stating that the signs were the 

property of Sheriff Long and could not be removed by anyone 

other than the Butts County Sheriff’s Office. 

This was the sign, which had the same message on both 

sides:

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According to Deputy Crumley, the signs were placed “in the 

general vicinity within probably 2 feet front or back of the mailbox 

or next to the driveway.” As an example, this picture shows the 

sign placed at Plaintiff McClendon’s residence:

The Sheriff’s Office placed these warning signs in front of 

the listed homes of all registered sex offenders in Butts County, 

without considering whether the State had classified any of them 

as posing an increased risk of recidivism. The deputies collected 

the signs on November 1. 

Plaintiff Holden came home and saw the sign in his front 

yard in 2018. He then called Deputy Riley. At that time, Riley

oversaw Butts County’s compliance with Georgia’s sex-offender 

registry requirements. Holden asked why the sign was placed on 

his lawn without his knowledge or permission. Riley told Holden

that the sign was the property of the Sheriff’s Office and he should 

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not remove it from the right-of-way. Between Riley’s statement 

and the leaflet stating that no one could move the sign except the 

Sheriff’s Office, Holden believed he would be arrested if he moved 

the sign. And Sheriff Long later testified that he would not have 

permitted Holden to cover the sign or place a competing sign. 

After the warning signs were placed, Sheriff Long posted a

message on his official Facebook page, along with a picture of the 

sign. In his post, he explained that the signs had only been placed 

in front of the homes of registered sex offenders. His message also

represented that Georgia law forbids registered sex offenders from 

participating in Halloween:

It is now undisputed, however, that Georgia law does not 

forbid registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween.

At an injunction hearing, Sheriff Long testified that he 

considered the Facebook post to be an effective way to 

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communicate to Butts County residents that the signs marked the 

residences of sex offenders. The goal of his Facebook post was to

associate the signs with the registrants who lived on the properties. 

Sheriff Long explained that he believed the signs were 

“imperative” to warn the public about the residences of registered 

sex offenders. Prior to 2018, the Sheriff’s Office had provided 

registrants with a flier at Halloween and asked them to place it on 

their doors. He believed that placing a yard sign out by the road 

would be more effective because it would prevent children from 

walking to the door. 

Since 2013, Long had been Sheriff in Butts County and in 

that time did not know of any incidents in Butts County involving 

registered sex offenders on Halloween. In fact, during his six-year 

tenure as Sheriff, there were no issues with any registered sex 

offenders in Butts County having unauthorized contact or 

reoffending with minors at any time. 

C. Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit

In September 2019, the plaintiffs sued Sheriff Long in his 

official and individual capacities, Deputy Riley in her individual 

capacity, and three John Doe defendants. The complaint alleged 

that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment 

rights by compelling their speech.

1

 It sought declaratory and 

1 The plaintiffs also alleged a state-law trespass claim and a takings claim under 

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In their appellate brief, however, they 

do not raise any arguments about their trespass or takings claims. They argue 

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injunctive relief, as well as damages. The district court granted a 

preliminary injunction based on the First Amendment claim and 

prohibited the Sheriff from placing the signs in the plaintiffs’ yards 

for Halloween 2019. 

In April 2020, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, adding 

Deputy Crumley as a defendant and dropping the John Doe 

defendants. In September 2020, both parties moved for summary 

judgment. In addition, the plaintiffs moved for a permanent 

injunction against the placement of the signs. 

The defendants attached to their summary judgment 

motion a declaration by Sheriff Long, which emphasized that 

Sheriff Long had never prohibited a sex offender from placing his 

own sign contesting the Sheriff’s warning sign. Long declared:

To my knowledge there was never a situation 

where any sex offender registrant expressed some 

desire to place the offender’s own sign or message 

relating to the Sheriff’s Office sign. The Sheriff’s 

Office has never had a policy about that, and there is 

no Sheriff’s Office prohibition on signage on private 

property that complies with state law and local 

ordinances.

Had any sex offender registrant placed his own 

sign relating to the Sheriff’s Office sign, any response 

by the Sheriff’s Office would have involved review of 

only that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their First 

Amendment claims. Thus, we do not address their trespass or takings claims.

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applicable law and consultation with a competent 

attorney. However, to my knowledge that situation 

never arose.

The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment

and a permanent injunction.

Regarding the plaintiffs’ compelled speech claim, the district 

court found that “[t]he Plaintiffs are free to offer speech competing 

with the Sheriff’s Office’s views and to disassociate themselves 

from those views.” Thus, because (1) the signs were government 

speech and (2) the plaintiffs were free to disagree by posting a 

competing message, no reasonable observer could conclude that 

the residents of the properties where the signs were posted agreed 

with the sign’s message. The court determined that the signs were 

not compelled speech because “[n]o reasonable jury could find that 

there is a risk the Plaintiffs will appear to endorse the signs’ 

message.” 

The district court further found that Sheriff Long was 

immune from any damages claims in his official capacity under the 

Eleventh Amendment, and that all three defendants were entitled 

to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs’ claims for damages in 

their individual capacities, as they had not violated any clearly 

established law. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ First 

Amendment claims for injunctive relief without prejudice and their 

claims for damages with prejudice. 

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-10092

The plaintiffs timely appealed. On appeal, they do not 

challenge the district court’s rulings as to damages or qualified 

immunity. The only remedies they continue to seek are 

declaratory and injunctive relief against Sheriff Long in his official 

capacity on their First Amendment claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1559–60 (11th 

Cir. 1990). A movant is entitled to summary judgment upon 

showing that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a).

III. SHERIFF’S YARD SIGNS ARE COMPELLED 

GOVERNMENT SPEECH 

First Amendment protection “includes both the right to 

speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Wooley 

v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 1435 (1977). “The 

right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are 

complementary components of the broader concept of individual 

freedom of mind.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The compelled 

speech doctrine applies to ideological speech and purely factual, 

non-commercial speech. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 

781, 797–98, 108 S. Ct. 2667, 2677–78 (1988); Nat’l Inst. of Family 

and Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372–73 (2018).

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In Wooley, the Supreme Court held that it was 

unconstitutional for the State of New Hampshire to prosecute a 

citizen for covering the State motto, “Live Free or Die,” on his 

license plate. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713, 97 S. Ct. at 1434–35. 

Specifically, the Court held that a state could not “constitutionally 

require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an 

ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a 

manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by 

the public.” Id. The Court stated that the New Hampshire statute 

“in effect requires that appellees use their private property as a 

‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message or suffer a 

penalty.” Id. at 715, 97 S. Ct. at 1435. 

This case is materially similar to Wooley. The Sheriff’s 

warning signs, like the State motto on the New Hampshire license 

plate, are government speech. Indeed, the signs expressly bore the 

imprimatur of government, stating that they were “a community 

safety message from Butts County Sheriff Gary Long.” The 

deputies placed the signs despite the homeowners’ and/or 

residents’ objections. The deputies explained, both verbally and 

through the accompanying leaflet, that only the Sheriff’s Office 

could remove the signs. See Mech v. Sch. Bd., 806 F.3d 1070, 1075 

(11th Cir. 2015) (holding that banners on school fences were 

government speech because they “[bore] the imprimatur of the 

school[] and the school[] exercise[d] substantial control over the 

messages that they convey[ed]”). In other words, the Sheriff 

required the use of private property as a stationary billboard for his 

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own ideological message, “for the express purpose that it be 

observed and read by the public.” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713, 97 

S. Ct. at 1434–35. The Sheriff’s warning signs are a classic example 

of compelled government speech.

In concluding otherwise, the district court erred in two 

ways. First, it determined that a compelled government speech 

claim requires a finding that a reasonable third party would view 

the speech as “endorsed” by the plaintiff. Wooley contains no such 

requirement. Wooley held New Hampshire’s law unconstitutional

because the law required the plaintiff to “participate in the 

dissemination of an ideological message” against his will, and it 

used the plaintiff’s private property (his vehicle) to do so. Id. at 713, 

97 S. Ct. at 1434. That the message is intended to be seen by the 

general public is of course necessary to the idea that the State is 

using the plaintiff’s property to disseminate the message. But the 

primary harm in Wooley is just that: the required use of the 

plaintiff’s property as a “billboard” for government speech. There 

is no explicit or implicit requirement that those reading the 

“billboard” believe the plaintiff has endorsed a government 

message that he is being forced to host. Id.; cf. Hunt, 891 F.2d at

1566 (holding that Alabama did not compel its citizens’ speech by 

flying the confederate flag at the capitol building because the State 

did “not compel its citizens to carry or post the flag themselves” or

“to support whatever cause it may represent”).

Second, the district court erred by determining that the 

plaintiffs’ ability to place their own yard signs disagreeing with the 

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warning signs could cure the original violation. This ignores that

the harm here is the forced display of a government message on 

private property in violation of the “right to refrain from speaking 

at all,” see Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714, 97 S. Ct. at 1535, not the “forced 

appearance of endorsement” of that message. Indeed, yard signs at 

“one’s own residence” are a “distinct and traditionally important 

medium of expression.” City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56, 57 

n. 16, 57 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 & n. 16 (1994). Residents, then, 

should be able to decide whether to use that traditional medium 

for speech in the first instance.

No limiting principle exists under the district court’s post-asecond-sign version of the compelled speech doctrine. Cf. W. Va.

State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1184

(1943) (“If validly applied to this problem, the utterance cited 

would resolve every issue of power in favor of those in 

authority. . . .”). If the only constitutional requirement for the 

government to compel citizens to host its speech on their private 

property is that it also permits them to post a second sign 

disagreeing with the first, the Sheriff could place any sign 

identifying himself as the speaker in any county resident’s yard. 

This result is inconsistent with Wooley. The Sheriff’s yard signs 

are compelled government speech, and their placement in a 

homeowner’s yard is unconstitutional unless the signs are a 

narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling government 

interest.

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IV. SHERIFF’S YARD SIGNS DO NOT PASS STRICT 

SCRUTINY 

When the government “compel[s] speakers to utter or 

distribute speech bearing a particular message,” as the Sheriff does 

here, such a policy imposes a content-based burden on speech and 

is subject to strict-scrutiny review. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 

512 U.S. 622, 641–42, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994); see Pacific Gas & 

Elec. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19, 106 S. Ct. 903, 

913 (1986). Thus, to be valid under the First Amendment, the 

placement of the warning signs must be a narrowly tailored means 

of serving a compelling state interest. Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S.

at 19, 106 S. Ct. at 913; see Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 

454, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1671 (2015) (explaining that “narrowly 

tailored” does not mean “perfectly tailored” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)).

All parties agree—as do we—that the Sheriff’s interest in 

protecting children from sexual abuse is compelling. However, the 

yard signs are not narrowly tailored to achieve that goal. 

In 2018, the Sheriff’s deputies placed the signs in the yards of 

all 57 registered sex offenders in Butts County. Prior to placing the 

signs, the Sheriff did not consider whether any of the registrants 

were classified by Georgia as likely to recidivate.2

 He even 

2 In his brief, the Sheriff argues that all convicted sex offenders pose enough of 

a recidivism risk to justify his signs. Because Georgia has a system requiring 

all sex offenders to register and be monitored, the Sheriff argues that he can 

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admitted that, since he took office in 2013, he had never had an 

issue with a registrant having unauthorized contact or reoffending 

with a minor on Halloween or at any other time. The Sheriff has 

not provided any record evidence that the registrants in Butts 

County actually pose a danger to trick-or-treating children or that 

these signs would serve to prevent such danger. And the Sheriff 

bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether his signs are 

narrowly tailored. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 

854, 868 (11th Cir. 2020).

Assuming that yard signs alerting people to the residences of 

registered sex offenders on Halloween would prevent the sexual 

abuse of children (which, we repeat, is not supported by any record 

evidence), the signs are not tailored narrowly enough. Sheriff Long 

testified that the sex-offender registry, which contains each 

registrant’s name, address, and photograph, is available on the 

State of Georgia’s website, on the Butts County website, at Butts 

County administrative buildings, and at the Butts County Superior 

Court Clerk’s Office. The Sheriff has made the sex offender 

treat them all as a dangerous class too, and his warning signs can mitigate that 

danger.

The Sheriff ignores that Georgia’s registration system includes an 

individual determination of recidivism risk performed by a State board. See 

O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14. The statute even requires county sheriffs to maintain a 

list of each resident offender’s risk classification. Id. § 42-1-12(i)(1). Yet the 

Sheriff has not placed any evidence into this record showing that the State has 

classified any of the 57 registrants living within Butts County as having an 

increased risk of recidivism. 

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registry widely available through government sources, diminishing 

the need to require residents to disseminate the same information

in yard signs on their private property. And, while “narrowly 

tailored” does not mean “perfectly tailored,” Williams-Yulee, 575 

U.S. at 454, 135 S. Ct. at 1671 (internal quotation marks omitted), 

the Sheriff has not met his burden to show the yard signs were 

narrowly tailored, see Otto, 981 F.3d at 868, because he has not

offered evidence that any of the yard signs would accomplish the 

compelling purpose of protecting children from sexual abuse.

For these reasons, the Sheriff’s placement of the yard signs 

in a homeowner’s yard is not narrowly tailored to serve the 

compelling government interest of protecting children from sexual 

abuse.

V. SHERIFF’S ARGUMENT ABOUT RIGHTS-OF-WAY 

Even if his signs are compelled government speech that do 

not survive strict scrutiny, the Sheriff argues that his intent was, 

and remains, to place the warning signs in the public rights-of-way 

that abut the private homes where the plaintiff registrants reside. 

The Sheriff argues that the plaintiffs cannot control what a 

government actor, like the Sheriff, might place on public property 

(the right-of-way) in front of their private residences. 

Although a government entity may own a public right-ofway outright in fee, private homeowners may also own the 

property abutting a road in fee and grant an easement to a 

government entity for various public road or transportation 

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purposes. See O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1. Here, though, the Sheriff has not 

shown that a government entity—much less the Sheriff—owns a 

right-of-way in fee across the front yards where the plaintiffs 

reside.3 Further, even if a government entity had a right-of-way 

easement on any of the three properties, the Sheriff’s evidence does 

not address who possesses the easement or for what purpose. 

Even assuming that the record established that the 

government owned the right of way in fee and the signs were 

placed in the right of way, Georgia law makes it “unlawful for any 

person to erect, place, or maintain within the dedicated right of 

way of any public road any sign, signal, or other device” unless 

authorized by a state law or a municipal ordinance. See O.C.G.A. 

§ 32-6-51(a)(1), (2). And the Sheriff conceded at oral argument that 

no Georgia statute or Butts County ordinance authorizes him to 

place his warning signs in the public rights-of-way. 

While Sheriff Long cites no case law applying § 32-6-51, the 

plaintiffs cite Fortner v. Town of Register, a Georgia Supreme 

Court decision holding a municipality’s actions to be unlawful 

3 Before placing the signs in 2018, the deputies did not conduct research to 

assure themselves the signs would be placed in rights-of-way. In 2019, for the 

preliminary injunction hearing, the Sheriff introduced some poorly scanned 

copies of subdivision plats that do not include any keys, legends, or labels; the 

plat maps are not self-explanatory. He also introduced aerial Google Maps 

photos of roads with lines drawn across them. But those maps do not indicate 

who owns the underlying fee where the lines are drawn, or that the lines 

represent right-of-way easements—much less who possesses any easements 

or for what purpose.

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under § 32-6-51(b), which uses language identical to § 32-6-51(a) to 

describe who is covered by the statute. See 604 S.E.2d 175, 278 Ga. 

625 (2004). Section 32-6-51(b) makes it “unlawful for any person to 

erect, place, or maintain” certain unauthorized structures visible 

from public roads. O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51(b) (emphasis added). 

In Fortner, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the 

defendant municipality could be held liable for negligence because 

it erected unauthorized structures that created a traffic hazard, in 

violation of § 32-6-51(b). 604 S.E.2d at 178–79, 278 Ga. at 627–28. 

Because both sections of the Georgia statute contain the same 

coverage language (“any person”) and forbid similar conduct, the 

Fortner decision suggests that the Sheriff, like the municipality in 

Fortner, is subject to the restrictions in § 32-6-51 and is barred by 

§ 32-6-51(a) from placing his warning signs in the alleged public 

rights-of-way without legislative authority to do so.

Another code section in Title 32 also points us in this 

direction. Section 32-6-6 makes it “unlawful for any person” to 

camp on state highways. O.C.G.A. § 32-6-6(b) (emphasis added). 

It continues: “This Code section shall not apply to state or local 

government officials or employees acting in their official capacity 

and while performing activities as part of their official duties.” Id.

§ 32-6-6(d). If the Georgia legislature did not consider 

“government officials or employees acting in their official capacity” 

to be “any person” in Title 32, then arguably there would be no 

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need to carve them out of the highway camping restriction in 

§ 32-6-6.4

At bottom, state law governs the right-of-way issues here,

and we are loath to opine conclusively about them. All we do in 

this case is conclude that, based on this record and the limited 

briefing before us, the Sheriff has failed to show either that he is not 

covered by the sign-posting prohibition in § 32-6-51(a) or that he is 

authorized to place the yard signs.

VI. APPLICATION TO THE THREE APPELLANTS 

We now apply the above First Amendment principles to the 

plaintiffs in this case.

A. Plaintiff Holden Is Entitled to Summary Judgment

Plaintiff Holden owns his home. The Sheriff’s warning sign 

impermissibly burdens his First Amendment right to be free from 

being forced to host a government message on his private 

property. The First Amendment prevents Sheriff Long from 

4 All sections in Title 32 use this broad definition of “person”: “any individual, 

partnership, corporation, association, or private organization of any 

character.” O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(20). The Sheriff’s brief, however, did not cite 

this definitional code section or case law construing it, nor did his brief

expressly argue that he is not a “person” or “individual” under § 32-1-3(20). 

Rather, the Sheriff’s conclusory argument, as best we can tell, is that 

“private citizens” cannot place signs in public rights-of-way and that 

“[g]overnment signs commonly are placed on right-of-way areas in Butts 

County.” Since the Sheriff does not cite or argue about this definitional code 

section, nothing in our opinion should be read as construing § 32-1-3(20).

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20 Opinion of the Court 21-10092

posting his warning sign on Holden’s property. Thus, we reverse 

the district court’s judgment in favor of the Sheriff on Holden’s 

First Amendment claim and remand for the district court (1) to 

grant summary judgment in Holden’s favor on that claim and (2) to

permanently enjoin the Sheriff from requiring Holden to display a 

sign on his front yard relating to his registered sex offender status.

B. Issues Remain as to Plaintiffs McClendon and Reed 

Plaintiffs McClendon and Reed both live with their parents 

on property owned by their parents. McClendon, however, claims 

he has a right to exclude persons from his parents’ property, he 

helps with chores, and he has paid rent in the past. And the record

is not developed as to Reed’s arrangement as a resident or tenant 

on his father’s property. Reed’s father, though, did call the Sheriff’s 

Office to complain that he did not want the sign on his property. 

If Plaintiffs McClendon and Reed have no ownership or 

tenancy interest in the properties where they reside (such as under 

state common law or by lease contract), then threshold issues arise 

as to whether they have any right to complain about a sign 

displaying government speech on another person’s property. We 

need not address these threshold issues because McClendon and 

Reed have now expressed an intent on remand to seek to amend 

their complaint to add their parents as plaintiffs. If the district court 

allows the plaintiffs to so amend, that would resolve the issues. If 

not, the district court will need to address these issues in the first 

instance. 

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At this stage, neither McClendon, Reed, nor the Sheriff have

shown they are entitled to summary judgment. Thus, we vacate 

the entry of judgment for the Sheriff on McClendon’s and Reed’s 

First Amendment claims and remand for further proceedings.

VII. CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we: (1) reverse the district court’s 

judgment in favor of the Sheriff on Plaintiff Holden’s First 

Amendment claim and remand with instructions to enter 

summary judgment and a permanent injunction in Holden’s favor; 

and (2) vacate the judgment in favor of the Sheriff on Plaintiffs 

McClendon’s and Reed’s First Amendment claims and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; AND 

REMANDED. 

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