Present: All the Justices 

BRANDON WAYNE HEDRICK 

 OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record Nos. 982055 & 982056 February 26, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPOMATTOX COUNTY 

Richard S. Blanton, Judge 

 In these appeals, we review the capital murder 

conviction, sentence of death, and related convictions imposed 

upon Brandon Wayne Hedrick. 

I. PROCEEDINGS 

 The defendant was tried before a jury on indictments for 

the following offenses: capital murder of Lisa Yvonne 

Alexander Crider in the commission of robbery, forcible 

sodomy, and rape in violation of Code § 18.2-31(4) and (5); 

robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58; rape in violation of 

Code § 18.2-61; forcible sodomy in violation of Code § 18.2-

67.1; abduction in violation of Code § 18.2-47; and use of a 

firearm in the commission of murder in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-53.1. The jury found the defendant guilty of these 

crimes and fixed his punishment at life imprisonment on the 

charge of forcible sodomy, life imprisonment on the charge of 

rape, life imprisonment on the charge of robbery, ten years 

imprisonment on the charge of abduction, and three years 
imprisonment on the charge of use of a firearm in the 

commission of a felony. 

 In the penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the 

jury fixed the defendant's punishment at death, finding that 

he represented a continuing serious threat to society and that 

his offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or 

inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or 

aggravated battery to the victim. After considering a report 

prepared by a probation officer pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5, 

the trial court sentenced the defendant in accord with the 

jury verdicts. 

 We consolidated the automatic review of the defendant's 

death sentence with his appeal of the capital murder 

conviction. Code § 17.1-313(F). The defendant's appeal of 

his non-capital convictions was certified from the Court of 

Appeals, Code § 17.1-409, and was consolidated with his 

capital murder appeal and given priority on our docket. 

II. THE EVIDENCE 

 On May 10, 1997, William K. Dodson, Trevor Jones, and the 

defendant were together at Jones' apartment in Lynchburg. The 

defendant and Jones decided to leave the apartment and drive 

to an area in downtown Lynchburg where they could find some 

prostitutes. Dodson remained at the apartment. 

2
 Jones drove his truck to an area near Fifth and Madison 

Streets in Lynchburg where the defendant and Jones met two 

prostitutes. The defendant and Jones gave the prostitutes 

money, asked them to purchase a small quantity of crack 

cocaine, and returned to Jones' apartment with the women. The 

defendant and Jones smoked the crack cocaine that they 

purchased, and the women smoked their own cocaine. Jones, the 

defendant, and Dodson had sexual relations with the 

prostitutes. The defendant and Jones, along with the women, 

returned to the area near Fifth and Madison Streets. The 

defendant and Jones gave the women $50 and asked them to 

purchase some more crack cocaine. The women took the money 

but never returned. 

 The defendant and Jones then rode around in Jones' truck 

for about 45 minutes. They met two different prostitutes and 

returned with them to Jones' apartment. The defendant and 

Jones drank bourbon, smoked marijuana, and had sexual 

relations with the women. Dodson, who was still at Jones' 

apartment, was asleep when these women were present. 

 Around 11:00 p.m., the defendant and Jones, along with 

the prostitutes, left the apartment and returned to the area 

near Fifth and Madison Streets. After the women left Jones' 

truck, Jones observed Crider "walking down the road." Jones, 

who had met Crider previously, told the defendant that 

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Crider's boyfriend was a seller of crack cocaine. The 

defendant and Jones decided to "pick up" Crider, have sexual 

relations with her, and rob her because they thought she may 

have crack cocaine in her possession. 

 Jones approached Crider and "asked if she wanted to have 

sex." Crider got into Jones' truck, and the defendant, Jones, 

and Crider went to Jones' apartment. Once they arrived at the 

apartment, Jones paid Crider $50 and had sexual intercourse 

with her. The defendant did not have sexual relations with 

Crider at the apartment. 

 After Jones had sexual intercourse with Crider, he left 

his bedroom while Crider was "getting dressed." Jones went to 

a living room and spoke with the defendant. The defendant and 

Jones devised a plan in which the defendant would pretend to 

rob both Jones and Crider. Jones did not want Crider to know 

that he was involved in the robbery because Crider knew where 

Jones lived, and Jones was afraid that Crider's boyfriend 

would retaliate against him. 

 Jones told the defendant to leave the apartment, go to 

Jones' truck, and get Jones' shotgun. While the defendant was 

retrieving the shotgun, Jones told Crider that he had lost his 

keys, and she began to help him look for the supposedly lost 

keys. Jones went into the kitchen, got some duct tape, 

returned to the bedroom, and placed the tape there. Jones 

4
also got a set of handcuffs. When the defendant entered the 

house with the shotgun, Jones and Crider were in the kitchen. 

The defendant "racked" the pump on the shotgun to "get 

[Crider's] attention," and the defendant "motioned for" Crider 

and Jones and told them to go into Jones' bedroom. 

 The defendant ordered Jones to empty Crider's pockets, 

and Jones took the $50 bill that he had paid Crider, 

cigarettes, and a cigarette lighter. The defendant told Jones 

to place the handcuffs on Crider. Jones did so. Jones also 

covered Crider's eyes and mouth with duct tape, and he placed 

a shirt over her face. The defendant took Crider out of the 

apartment and placed her in Jones' truck. 

 Dodson, who had been asleep in the living room, woke up 

when he heard the sound caused when the defendant "racked" the 

pump on the shotgun. In response to Dodson's question, "what 

. . . is going on?", Jones responded that, "this is one of the 

girls that ripped us off; we're just going to scare her." 

 The defendant, Jones, and Crider left the apartment about 

1:00 a.m. Jones sat in the driver's seat. The defendant and 

Crider were in the backseat of the truck. The defendant 

removed the shirt and duct tape from Crider. After riding 

around in the truck for some time, the defendant decided that 

he wanted to have sexual intercourse with Crider. The 

defendant told Crider that he "wanted some ass." The 

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defendant warned her, "don't try anything; I got a twentyfive," referring to a .25-caliber pistol. Jones stopped the 

truck and got out. The defendant raped Crider. 

 After the defendant raped Crider, he got out of the truck 

and spoke with Jones. The defendant told Jones that the 

defendant did not want to return Crider to the downtown area 

of Lynchburg because he was "afraid something might happen." 

The defendant, because he had just raped Crider, was afraid 

that "she might come back on him with her boyfriend." The 

defendant and Jones had a brief conversation, "about killing" 

Crider, and decided to do so. 

 The defendant and Jones got back into the truck. Crider 

was crying. She was "upset" and "scared." Jones drove the 

truck as he and the defendant tried to find a good location to 

kill Crider. As the defendant and Jones continued to look for 

a place to kill Crider, Jones drove the truck into Appomattox 

County. Crider, who "kind of figured" that the defendant and 

Jones intended to harm her, pled, "don't kill me; I got two 

kids." She was "sniffling and crying." 

 Crider, continuing to plead for her life, asked: "[I]s 

there anything I can do to make ya'll not do this?" The 

defendant responded, "if you suck my dick, I'll think about 

it." Crider then performed oral sodomy on the defendant. 

6
 Jones continued to drive the truck, and he proceeded on a 

road in Appomattox County and drove onto a "pull-off" space on 

a "back road" near the James River. The defendant got out of 

the passenger side of the truck with the shotgun, and Jones 

took Crider out of the truck. Jones removed the handcuffs 

from Crider because he was afraid that his fingerprints were 

on them. The defendant and Jones put gloves on their hands to 

avoid leaving their fingerprints at the crime scene. 

 The time was now "daybreak." Crider, who was crying, 

continued to beg the defendant and Jones not to kill her, 

saying, "I got two kids." After Jones had removed the 

handcuffs from Crider, he bound her hands together with duct 

tape. He also placed duct tape around her mouth and around 

her eyes. The defendant was standing, watching with the 

shotgun in his hands. 

 The defendant, Jones, and Crider walked toward the river 

bank. Jones led Crider because she was "blindfolded." Jones 

"turned [Crider and] faced her back to the river." Jones 

turned to the defendant, who was armed with the shotgun, and 

said, "do what you got to do." Jones began to walk to the 

truck. When Jones was within 10 feet from the truck, he heard 

a gunshot. 

 The defendant returned to the truck with the shotgun and 

told Jones that Crider "went into the river." Jones took the 

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shell from the shotgun so that it would not be present at the 

scene. The defendant and Jones returned to Lynchburg. They 

disposed of the shotgun shell, duct tape, and other evidence 

en route to Lynchburg. They arrived at Jones' apartment at 

about 6:30 or 7:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, and went to sleep. 

 The defendant and Jones subsequently fled Virginia, and 

they were arrested in Lincoln, Nebraska. The shotgun that the 

defendant used to kill Crider was found in Jones' truck, which 

he had driven to Nebraska. 

 Sherry Kelly Mays and Warren Johns, two friends who had 

gone to the James River to fish, found Crider's body on the 

evening of May 11, 1997. Crider's body had been placed in 

such a manner that the body appeared to be "sitting up with 

[the] feet crossed," and the victim's hands were bound with 

duct tape. 

 Dr. David Oxley, a deputy chief medical examiner for the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, qualified as an expert witness on 

the subject of forensic pathology. He performed an autopsy on 

Crider's body. Dr. Oxley testified that an examination of the 

body revealed that Crider had been shot in the face with a 

shotgun. Several of her teeth were missing and other teeth 

were fractured. The top portion of her head had been bound 

with silver duct tape, which extended to the bridge of her 

nose. Duct tape was also found around her mouth. 

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 The shotgun wound caused massive injury to Crider's 

brain, and shot pellets and wadding were found in the interior 

of her cranial cavity. The location of the shotgun wad, deep 

in the victim's cranial cavity, indicated that she was killed 

within a "range of fire of less than ten feet." The entrance 

wound from the shotgun blast measured an inch and a half in 

greatest diameter. An x-ray of Crider's skull showed the 

presence of shotgun pellets in her skull and brain. A blood 

sample was extracted from Crider's body, and a toxicology 

screen on that sample revealed an absence of any "drugs of 

abuse or prescription drugs" in her blood system. 

 Robert L. Strubel, a forensic scientist, qualified as an 

expert witness on the subject of blood stain pattern analysis. 

He testified that based upon his analysis of certain 

photographs, after Crider had been shot in the face her body 

was moved and placed in the position where Sherry Mays found 

the body. 

 Elizabeth Bush, a forensic scientist, qualified as an 

expert witness on the subject of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) 

and DNA testing. She conducted DNA tests which revealed that 

the possibility of a person other than the defendant providing 

a sperm sample found in the victim's vagina was one out of 

260,000 in the Caucasian population, one out of 1,000,000 in 

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the Hispanic population, and one out of 8,000,000 in the Black 

population. The defendant is Caucasian. 

 Richard V. Roberts qualified as an expert witness on the 

subject of firearms. He examined the shotgun that the 

defendant used to kill Crider, shotgun shells, and waddings. 

He also examined the wadding that was removed from Crider's 

brain. Based upon his tests and examination, which included a 

pattern spray of 12-gauge shotgun shells, he concluded that 

the muzzle of the shotgun was three to seven feet from 

Crider's mouth when she was killed. 

III. EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN PENALTY PHASE 

 During the penalty phase of the capital murder 

proceedings, the Commonwealth adduced the following evidence. 

The defendant had been convicted of three robberies in three 

different jurisdictions. The defendant was armed with a 

"Rambo type" knife when he participated in robberies in 

Campbell County and Bedford County. The defendant was armed 

with a shotgun when he robbed a motel clerk in Farmville. 

During that robbery, the defendant, wearing a hood over his 

head and a bandanna around his face, pointed the shotgun at 

the clerk, who was five or six feet away from him, and 

demanded money. 

 In September 1997, after the defendant had been arrested 

for the murder of Crider, and while being transported from 

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Appomattox to the Campbell County Jail, he tried to take a 

deputy sheriff's revolver. The defendant later had to be 

restrained while being transported. In July 1997, the 

defendant attempted to escape from incarceration by climbing a 

fence. 

 The defendant told a State police officer that he shot 

Crider and that "he was an avid hunter, he liked to hunt . . . 

and how good a shot he was, how he killed deer in the past 

using shotguns and rifles at long range." 

IV. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED 

 The defendant argues that the trial court erred in 

refusing to grant his "motion to dismiss the capital murder 

charges on the grounds that the capital murder statutes are 

unconstitutional." In support of his contention, the 

defendant merely refers this Court to a memorandum of law that 

he filed in the trial court. We hold that the defendant's 

assertions are insufficient and constitute a procedural 

default. "An appellant who asserts that a trial court's 

ruling was erroneous has an obligation to state clearly to the 

appellate court the grounds for that assertion. A crossreference to arguments made at trial is insufficient." 

Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 99, 393 S.E.2d 609, 622, 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); Swisher v. Commonwealth, 

256 Va. 471, 479, 506 S.E.2d 763, 767 (1998); Jenkins v. 

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Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 460-61, 423 S.E.2d 360, 370 (1992), 

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993). 

V. ISSUE PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 

 The defendant argues that the trial court erred in 

refusing his motion for a jury questionnaire. We have 

previously held that a trial court is not required to permit a 

defendant to mail a questionnaire to the potential jurors. 

See Swisher, 256 Va. at 479, 506 S.E.2d at 767; Goins v. 

Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 454, 470 S.E.2d 114, 122, cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996); Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 

Va. 482, 489-90, 404 S.E.2d 227, 232, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 

944 (1991). We will adhere to our previous rulings, and we 

will not discuss the jury questionnaire issue further. 

VI. BILL OF PARTICULARS 

 The defendant argues that the trial court erred in 

refusing his motion for a bill of particulars. We hold that 

the defendant's contention is without merit. The trial 

court's decision whether to require the Commonwealth to file a 

bill of particulars is a matter which rests within the trial 

court's sound discretion. Swisher, 256 Va. at 480, 506 S.E.2d 

at 768; Goins, 251 Va. at 454-55, 470 S.E.2d at 122-23; 

Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 372, 402 S.E.2d at 

218, 223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991). The defendant 

simply does not explain how the trial court abused its 

12
discretion by failing to grant his motion for a bill of 

particulars. The defendant's conclusional argument fails to 

identify any error by the trial court. 

VII. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 

 At trial, the Commonwealth was permitted, over the 

defendant's objection, to introduce in evidence an enlarged 

photograph of the victim's face. The photograph, which was 

approximately two feet by three feet in size, revealed the 

injuries that the victim suffered when the defendant shot her 

in the face with the shotgun. The defendant argues that the 

trial court erred by admitting this photograph in evidence 

because it was duplicative of another photograph of the 

victim's face which had not been enlarged, and the photograph 

was inflammatory and gruesome. 

 We disagree with the defendant's contentions. We have 

held that the admission of photographs in evidence rests 

within the sound discretion of the trial court. Walton v. 

Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 91, 501 S.E.2d 134, 138 (1998); 

Goins, 251 Va. at 459, 470 S.E.2d at 126. Photographs of a 

victim are admissible to show intent, method, malice, motive, 

premeditation, and the atrociousness of the crime. Walton, 

256 Va. at 92, 501 S.E.2d at 138. Photographs which 

accurately depict the crime scene are not rendered 

inadmissible simply because they are gruesome or shocking. 

13
Id.; Goins, 251 Va. at 459, 470 S.E.2d at 126; Gray v. 

Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 343, 356 S.E.2d 157, 173, cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987). We have examined the photograph, 

and we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

VIII. AGGRAVATED BATTERY 

 Code § 19.2-264.2 states: 

 "In assessing the penalty of any person 

convicted of an offense for which the death penalty 

may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be 

imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after 

consideration of the past criminal record of 

convictions of the defendant, find that there is a 

probability that the defendant would commit criminal 

acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 

serious threat to society or that his conduct in 

committing the offense for which he stands charged 

was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 

inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of 

mind or an aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) 

recommend that the penalty of death be imposed." 

The jury, in accordance with this statute, sentenced the 

defendant to death finding that there is a probability that 

the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 

would constitute a continuing serious threat to society and 

that the defendant's conduct was wantonly vile, horrible, or 

inhuman. 

 During the penalty phase of the capital murder 

proceeding, the defendant proffered the following jury 

instruction which the trial court refused: "A single gunshot 

wound causing immediate death does not constitute an 

14
aggravated battery of the victim." The defendant contends 

that he did not commit an aggravated battery upon Crider and, 

citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), asserts that 

"an aggravated battery is not proven where the evidence shows 

that the victim died almost instantaneously from a single 

gunshot wound." The defendant's argument is without merit. 

 We have stated that "[w]ithin the context of [Code 

§ 19.2-264.2], the term 'aggravated battery' means 'a battery 

which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than 

the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder.'" 

Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 392, 464 S.E.2d 131, 

139 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996) (quoting Smith

v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), 

cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979)). 

 Here, there was more than sufficient evidence which would 

have permitted the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

that the defendant committed an aggravated battery upon 

Crider. Before the defendant murdered Crider, he had robbed 

and raped her, forced her to perform an act of oral sodomy 

upon him, bound her hands with duct tape, covered her eyes and 

mouth with duct tape, and held her in captivity for five 

hours. He subsequently removed the duct tape from her hands 

and restrained her with handcuffs. The defendant, an avid 

hunter who considered himself skilled with firearms, shot the 

15
victim in the face with the shotgun, as she stood helplessly 

awaiting her execution at a distance of three to seven feet 

from the barrel of the shotgun. Without question, under the 

facts and circumstances of this case, the manner in which the 

defendant terrorized and killed Crider was qualitatively and 

quantitatively more culpable than the minimum necessary to 

accomplish an act of murder. 

 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Godfrey v. 

Georgia, supra, is not controlling here and is factually 

distinguishable. In Godfrey, a defendant, who had been 

convicted of capital murder, killed two people by shooting 

each victim once with a rifle. There was no other evidence of 

physical injury. The Supreme Court, which reversed judgment 

confirming the sentence of death, stated that 

"[n]o claim was made, and nothing in the record 

before us suggests, that the petitioner committed an 

aggravated battery upon [the victims], or, in fact, 

caused either of them to suffer any physical injury 

preceding their deaths. Moreover, in the trial 

court, the prosecutor repeatedly told the jury — and 

the trial judge wrote in his sentencing report — 

that the murders did not involve 'torture.'" 446 

U.S. at 432. 

Unlike the defendant in Godfrey, Hedrick committed an 

aggravated battery upon Crider and caused her to suffer 

physical injury and torture preceding her death. 

 Moreover, we have held that "a mere inspection of the 

statutory language in [Code § 19.2-264.2] demonstrates clearly 

16
that the term 'vileness' includes three separate and distinct 

factors, with the proof of any one factor being sufficient to 

support a finding of vileness and hence a sentence of death." 

Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 442, 304 S.E.2d 271, 282, 

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). We have also stated that: 

"Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C) define vileness as conduct 

that involves torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated 

battery to the victim; the use of the disjunctive word 'or,' 

rather than the conjunctive 'and,' signifies the availability 

of alternative choices." Id. Here, the evidence was 

overwhelming that the defendant's conduct showed a depravity 

of mind and torture, which the defendant does not challenge on 

appeal. 

 Furthermore, we also observe that the jury found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that there was a probability, based upon the 

evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the 

circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of 

which the defendant was accused, that he would commit criminal 

acts of violence that would constitute a continuing, serious 

threat to society. The defendant does not challenge this 

finding, which is a separate and independent basis for the 

imposition of the death penalty in this case. 

IX. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

17
 The defendant argues that the trial court erred "in 

refusing to set aside the verdicts of the jury finding [him] 

guilty of robbery, rape and forcible sodomy as contrary to the 

law and the evidence." The defendant, in another assignment 

of error, argues that the trial court erred in refusing to set 

aside the verdicts of the jury finding the defendant guilty of 

capital murder in the commission of robbery, capital murder in 

the commission of rape, and capital murder in the commission 

of forcible sodomy. The defendant's contentions are without 

merit. 

 The standard of review for determining the sufficiency of 

evidence on appeal is well established. We must examine the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 

prevailing party at trial, and we will not disturb the trial 

court's judgment unless it is plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it. Goins, 251 Va. at 466, 470 S.E.2d at 

130; Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 281-82, 427 S.E.2d 

411, 421, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993); Code § 8.01-680. 

Here, the evidence of record established, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the defendant robbed Crider, raped her, and forced 

her to commit an act of oral sodomy. The defendant and Jones 

decided before they asked Crider to get into Jones' truck that 

they would rob her of crack cocaine. The defendant admitted 

to deputy sheriffs that he ordered Jones and Crider to a 

18
bedroom where he demanded that she empty her pockets. At 

trial, the defendant admitted that he brought the shotgun into 

the apartment as part of the plan to rob the victim. 

 As we have already stated, Jones testified that the 

defendant told the victim he "wanted some ass," and the 

defendant told Crider, before raping her, "don't try anything; 

I got a twenty-five [caliber pistol]." Jones also testified 

that when the victim begged the defendant and Jones not to 

kill her, the defendant told her that he would consider 

sparing her life if she performed oral sodomy upon him. Thus, 

we hold that the jury's findings are fully supported by the 

evidence. 

X. COMMUTATION 

 The defendant argues that the trial court erred in 

failing to commute the death sentence to a sentence of life 

imprisonment. We disagree. 

 Code § 19.2-264.5 states in relevant part: 

 "When the punishment of any person has been 

fixed at death, the court shall, before imposing 

sentence, direct a probation officer of the court to 

thoroughly investigate the history of the defendant 

and any and all other relevant facts, to the end 

that the court may be fully advised as to whether 

the sentence of death is appropriate and just. 

Reports shall be made, presented and filed . . . 

[and] such reports shall in all cases contain a 

Victim Impact Statement. . . . After consideration 

of the report, and upon good cause shown, the court 

may set aside the sentence of death and impose a 

sentence of imprisonment for life." 

19
 Our review of the record reveals that the trial court 

gave thorough consideration to the evidence and properly 

discharged its statutory duties imposed by Code § 19.2-264.5. 

And, the defendant simply failed to show good cause why the 

sentence of death should not be imposed. 

XI. PASSION AND PREJUDICE 

 Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) requires that we determine 

"[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the 

influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary 

factor." The defendant argues that "the fact that the jury 

. . . imposed the maximum possible sentence in all of the 

predicate cases, when each of the predicate offenses was, 

standing alone, clearly not a maximum penalty offense, 

indicates that the jury gave no consideration whatever to the 

actual offenses involved, but blindly followed the request and 

recommendation of the Attorney for the Commonwealth. It seems 

clear that the rape in this case, and the sodomy, involving a 

victim whose profession was prostitution, and who was in no 

way physically injured in the offense, do not rationally 

support life sentences for each offense." Continuing, the 

defendant says that his robbery of the victim was "so little 

supported by the evidence that, absent the murder later, it 

would not have resulted in any conviction whatever." 

20
 We find no merit in the defendant's assertions. The 

defendant's argument that the victim was not physically 

injured ignores the undisputed fact that he killed her with a 

shotgun blast to her face at close range while she was bound 

and gagged with duct tape. Additionally, the defendant 

abducted the victim for over five hours, and the victim was 

forced "to experience the horror of waiting for [her] 

execution." Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 579, 273 

S.E.2d 57, 67 (1980). Our review of the record indicates that 

the jury and the trial court gave thoughtful and careful 

consideration to all the evidence, and we find nothing in the 

record before us which suggests that the jury or the trial 

court imposed the sentences of death under the influence of 

passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. 

XII. EXCESSIVENESS AND DISPROPORTIONALITY 

 Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) requires this Court to consider and 

determine "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 

disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 

considering both the crime and the defendant." 

 The test of proportionality that we apply is whether 

"juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the supreme 

penalty for comparable or similar crimes." Murphy v. 

Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 145, 431 S.E.2d 48, 54, cert.

21
denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993); Walton, 256 Va. at 96, 501 S.E.2d 

at 140. 

 Our comparison of the record in this case with the 

records in capital cases, including capital cases in which 

life sentences were imposed, fails to indicate that the death 

penalty imposed here is excessive or disproportionate to the 

penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime 

and the defendant. We have examined the records of all 

capital cases reviewed by this Court pursuant to Code § 17.1-

313(E). See Swisher, 256 Va. at 488-89, 506 S.E.2d at 773. 

XIII. CONCLUSION 

 Having reviewed the sentence of death and related 

convictions, finding no reversible error in the record, and 

perceiving no reason to commute the death sentence, we will 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Record No. 982055 —Affirmed. 

Record No. 982056 —Affirmed. 

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