alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1571 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1571

              To ban the sale of certain synthetic drugs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 15, 2011

     Mrs. Adams (for herself, Mr. Smith of Texas, Mr. Conyers, Mr. 
  Sensenbrenner, Mr. Diaz-Balart, Mr. Posey, Ms. Fudge, Ms. Wilson of 
Florida, Mr. Stivers, Ms. Hanabusa, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas, 
  Mrs. Ellmers, Mr. West, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Ross of Florida, Mr. 
Buchanan, Mr. Gowdy, Mr. Mica, Mr. Westmoreland, Mr. Roskam, Mr. Young 
    of Florida, Mrs. Blackburn, Mr. Southerland, Mr. Bilirakis, Mr. 
 McHenry, Ms. Wasserman Schultz, Ms. Brown of Florida, Mr. Nugent, Mr. 
   Rivera, Mr. Barletta, Mr. Quigley, Mr. Miller of Florida, and Mr. 
   Bachus) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
 Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on 
   the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
              To ban the sale of certain synthetic drugs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Combating Dangerous Synthetic 
Stimulants Act of 2011''.

SEC. 2. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT.

    Schedule I of section 202(c) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
U.S.C. 812(c)) is amended in subsection (c) by adding at the end the 
following:
            ``(18) 4-methylmethcathinone (Mephedrone).
            ``(19) 3,4-methylenedioxypyrovalerone (MDPV).''.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1653 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1653

     To amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to increase the dollar amount 
  requirements for articles and merchandise under the administrative 
     exemptions and entry under regulations provisions of that Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 15, 2011

  Mr. Schock (for himself, Mr. Crowley, and Mr. Owens) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to increase the dollar amount 
  requirements for articles and merchandise under the administrative 
     exemptions and entry under regulations provisions of that Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AMENDMENTS TO ADMINISTRATIVE EXEMPTIONS AND ENTRY UNDER 
              REGULATIONS PROVISIONS OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930.

    (a) Administrative Exemptions.--Section 321(a)(2)(C) of the Tariff 
Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C)) is amended by striking ``$200'' 
and inserting ``$1,000''.
    (b) Entry Under Regulations.--Section 498(a)(1)(A) of the Tariff 
Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1498(a)(1)(A)) is amended by striking ``but not 
more than'' and inserting ``but not less than''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section apply with 
respect to the entry of articles or merchandise on or after the 15th 
day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

*CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO*

SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with theannual report of Communication Intelligence Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Kfor the annual period ended December 31, 2007, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Francis V. Dane, Principal Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that to thebest of my knowledge:

 

(1) The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Date:           September 23,2008

 
| By: /s/ Francis V. Dane      |   |
|------------------------------|--------|
| Principal Financial  Officer |

 

----
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-50753

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

WILFREDO REVULTA-ESPINOZA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-02-CR-525-1-DB

--------------------

February 20, 2003

Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Wilfredo Revulta-Espinoza appeals the sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of attempting to illegally

reenter the United States after deportation/removal in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends that the sentence is invalid

because it exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment

prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Revulta-Espinoza complains

that his sentence was improperly enhanced pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b). He argues that the sentencing provision is

unconstitutional. Alternatively, Revulta-Espinoza contends that
No. 02-50753

-2-

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define separate

offenses. He argues that the prior conviction that resulted in

his increased sentence was an element of a separate offense under

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been alleged in his

indictment. 

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Revulta-Espinoza acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed

by Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his arguments for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
#### The State, ex rel. Norris et al., Appellants, *v.*Hodapp, Judge, Appellee.

(No. 27135

Decided January 25, 1939.)

*28
      *Messrs. Swaney & Creager,*for appellants.

*Messrs. Legler & Murray*and *Mr. W. S. Rhotehamel,*for appellee.

Bv the Court.

The writ of prohibition will not lie when the relator has another adequate remedy. *State, ex rel. Brickell,*v. *Roach, Recr.,*122 Ohio St., 117, 170 N. E., 866; *State, ex rel. Nolan,*v. *ClenDening,*93 Ohio St., 264, 112 N. E., 1029.

The writ of prohibition is not available as a substitute for a proceeding on appeal. *Silliman*v. *Court of Common Pleas,*126 Ohio St., 338, 185 N. E., 420; *State, ex rel. Young,*v. *Morrow, Judge,*131 Ohio St., 266, 2 N. E. (2d), 595; *State, ex rel. Nicklaus,*v. *McClelland, Judge,*132 Ohio St., 447, 8 N. E. (2d), 565; *State, ex rel. Frasch,*v. *Miller, Judge,*126 Ohio St., 287, 185 N. E., 193.

The Court of Common Pleas is competent to determine its own jurisdiction and a writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent an anticipated erroneous judgment. *State, ex rel. Industrial Commission,*v. *Holt, Judge,*134 Ohio St., 25, 15 N. E. (2d), 543; *State, ex rel. American Rolling Mill Co.,*v. *Court of Common Pleas,*133 Ohio St., 24, 10 N. E. (2d), 633; *State, ex rel. B. F. Goodrich Co.,*v. *Wanamaker et al., Judges,*128 Ohio St., 421, 191 N. E., 763; *State, ex rel.*
      *29
      *Carmody,*v. *Justice, Judge,*114 Ohio St., 94, 150 N. E., 430.

Furthermore it should be noted that the difficulty here involved is largely an administrative one that could have been avoided if the judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery county had availed themselves' of the salutary provisions of Section 1558, G-eneral Code, relating to the designation of one of their number as chief justice to superintend, classify and distribute the business of the court.

The question whether rule 26 limits the power of the judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery county, the question of the right to trial by jury or whether the cause is' one in equity, and all other questions raised by relators-appellants, can be reviewed upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, and therefore that court was not in error in denying the writ of prohibition.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Wbygandt, C. J., Day, Zimmerman, Williams, Myers, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

UNDER

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT



PACIFIC MERCANTILE BANCORP



Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q

for the Quarter
ended September 30, 2005



The undersigned, who is the
Chief Executive Officer of Pacific Mercantile Bancorp (the Company), hereby certifies that (i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2005, as filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the Quarterly Report), to which this Certification is an Exhibit, fully complies with the applicable requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and (ii) the information contained in this Quarterly
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       |  |  |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
|---------------------- |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                       |  | 
|Date: November 8, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/ RAYMOND E. DELLERBA                                                                                                                                                                                                    
|                       |  |  |  | Raymond E. Dellerba, President and Chief Executive Officer                                                                                                                                                                 
|                       |  | 
|                       |  |  |  | A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ASKIA MUHAMMAD,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 149 EAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 20th day of March, 2024, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.

Justice McCaffery did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1255 

AN ACT 

To prevent a shutdown of the government of the United 

States, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 1255 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Government Shutdown 

3 Prevention Act of 2011’’. 

4 SEC. 2. FUNDING THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE REMAINDER 

5 OF FISCAL YEAR 2011. 

6 (a) DEADLINE FOR CONSIDERATION OF LEGISLA7 TION FUNDING THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE REMAINDER

8 OF FISCAL YEAR 2011.—If the House has not received 

9 a message from the Senate before April 6, 2011, stating 

10 that it has passed a measure providing for the appropria11 tions for the departments and agencies of the Government 

12 for the remainder of fiscal year 2011, the provisions of 

13 H.R. 1, as passed by the House on February 19, 2011, 

14 are hereby enacted into law. 

15 (b) PUBLICATION OF ACT.—In publishing this Act in 

16 slip form and in the United States Statutes at Large pur17 suant to section 112 of title 1, United States Code, the 

18 Archivist of the United States shall include after the date 

19 of approval, if applicable, an appendix setting forth the 

20 text of the bill referred to in subsection (a). 

21 SEC. 3. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PAYMENTS TO MEMBERS 

22 OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT. 

23 (a) TREATMENT OF MEMBERS DURING A GOVERN24 MENT SHUTDOWN.—The Secretary of the Senate and the 

25 Chief Administrative Officer of the House, respectively, 
3 

•HR 1255 EH

1 shall not disburse to each Member or Delegate the amount 

2 of his or her salary for each day that— 

3 (1) there is more than a 24-hour lapse in ap4 propriations for any Federal agency or department 

5 as a result of a failure to enact a regular appropria6 tions bill or continuing resolution; or 

7 (2) the Federal Government is unable to make 

8 payments or meet obligations because the public 

9 debt limit under section 3101 of title 31, United 

10 States Code, has been reached. 

11 (b) TREATMENT OF THE PRESIDENT DURING A GOV12 ERNMENT SHUTDOWN.—The President shall not receive 

13 a disbursement of basic pay for any period in which— 

14 (1) there is more than a 24-hour lapse in ap15 propriations for any Federal agency or department 

16 as a result of a failure to enact a regular appropria17 tions bill or continuing resolution; or 

18 (2) the Federal Government is unable to make 

19 payments or meet obligations because the public 
4 

•HR 1255 EH

1 debt limit under section 3101 of title 31, United 

2 States Code, has been reached. 

Passed the House of Representatives April 1, 2011. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1255 

AN ACT 

To prevent a shutdown of the government of the 

United States, and for other purposes.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 28, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00371

- CV

Jeanine Bell and Sheila PETSCH

,

Appellants

v.

Darrell PETSCH

, Appellee

From the 216th Judicial District Court

, Gillespie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 16468 Honorable Albert D. Pattillo, III , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The clerk’s record was originally due July 25, 2022, but was not filed. On July 26, 2022, the district clerk filed a notification of late record, requesting an extension until September 6,

2022 to file the record. After consideration, we GRANT the request and ORDER the district

clerk to file the record by September 6, 2022

. Further exte nsions of time will be disfavored.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 28th day of July, 2022

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 160 

To amend title II of the Social Security Act to eliminate the five-month 

waiting period in the disability insurance program, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 5, 2011 

Mr. SHULER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend title II of the Social Security Act to eliminate 

the five-month waiting period in the disability insurance 

program, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Social Security Fair5 ness for the Terminally Ill Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF TITLE II WAITING PERIOD FOR 

7 TERMINALLY ILL INDIVIDUALS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 223(a)(1) of the Social 

9 Security Act (42 U.S.C. 423(a)(1)) is amended by adding 

10 at the end the following new sentence: ‘‘In the case of any 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 160 IH

1 application for disability insurance benefits filed by an in2 dividual who is determined to be under a disability and 

3 who has been certified as terminally ill by a physician (as 

4 defined in section 1861(r)(1)), this paragraph shall be ap5 plied without regard to any waiting period. For the pur6 poses of the preceding sentence, an individual is consid7 ered to be terminally ill if the individual has a medical 

8 prognosis that the individual’s life expectancy is 6 months 

9 or less.’’. 

10 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

11 this section shall take effect with respect to applications 

12 filed after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1997
<CASH>                                       4,689,307
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  353,138
<ALLOWANCES>                                   670,697
<INVENTORY>                                    557,182
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,642,172
<PP&E>                                       7,438,432
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,172,741
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              19,513,845
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        5,248,183
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                 12,231,000
<COMMON>                                       464,683
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,569,979
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                19,513,845
<SALES>                                      3,594,899
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,594,899
<CGS>                                        2,475,333
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,475,333
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            14,447,199
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             1,632,552
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              21,822
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (13,349,455)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (13,349,455)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (13,349,455)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.35)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.35)
        

</TABLE>
#### The Jacques Co., Appellee, *v.*Squire, Supt. of Banks, Appellant.

(No. 27002

Decided July 5, 1939.)

*Messrs. Howell, Roberts S Duncan,*for appellee.

*Mr. Herbert S. Duffy,*attorney general, *Mr. Hugh McNamee, Mr. Robert J. Selzer, Mr. Joseph G. Stashower*and *Mr. Edward F. Feighan,*for appellant.

By the Court:

This case came into this court as an appeal from the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county. The error complained of is based upon the action of that court wherein it overruled the application of the appellant for an order amending its notice of appeal from the Common Pleas Court to the Court of Appeals.

*600In the action in the Court of Common Pleas, the plaintiff, The Jacques Company, had sought and secured a decree establishing a preferred claim in its favor against the Superintendent of Banks of Ohio in charge of the liquidation of the Guardian Trust Company, it having been found by the court that the deposit in question was' a special deposit in escrow; whereupon the Superintendent of Banks attempted to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

His' notice of appeal stated that the appeal was on questions of law. The journal entry of the Court of Appeals shows that the matter of permitting an amendment of the notice of appeal so as to read “upon questions of law and fact” instead of “upon questions of law” was heard upon “evidence and the argument of counsel” and was overruled. The record discloses that the Court of Appeals then affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas upon the ground that there was no bill of exceptions. The appellant now seeks a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Concededly there is no transcript of the evidence adduced upon the hearing in the Court of Appeals. The statute, Section 12223-5, General Code, authorizes the Court of Appeals to permit an amendment of the notice of appeal “in the furtherance of justice for good cause shown.” There having been no transcript of the evidence before the Court of Appeals, there is, of course, no bill of exceptions whereby this court may examine the action of the Court of Appeals and determine its validity or invalidity under the statute. Of necessity, therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

"Weygandt,- C. J., Day, Zimmerman, "Williams, Myers, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.
#### The National Sanitary Wipers Co., Appellee, *v.*City of Cleveland, Appellant.

(No. 27643

Decided June 21, 1939.)

*Messrs. Thompson, Mine <& Flory*and *Mr. M. Walter Stewart,*for appellee.

*599*Mr. Henry S. Bramará,*director of law, *Mr. Arthur E. Griffith*and *Mr. Theodore E. Schwartz,*for appellant.

It is ordered and adjudged that said appeal as of right he, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Day, Zimmerman, Williams, Myers, Matthias and Hart, JJ.,. concur.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ADVANCED PHYSICAL MEDICINE & REHAB OF MIAMI, LLC, a/a/o

MARLENE PEREZ ALFONSO,

Appellant,

v.

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-3220

[April 20, 2022]

Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Terri-Ann Miller, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

062021SC047087AXXXCE.

Chad A. Barr of Chad Barr Law, Altamonte Springs, for appellant.

Michael J. Neimand, House Counsel, United Automobile Insurance 

Company, Miami.

CONFESSION OF ERROR

PER CURIAM.

Based on Appellee United Automobile Insurance Company’s confession 

of error, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

Advanced Diagnostic Group v. Ocean Harbor Casualty Insurance Co., 321 

So. 3d 772, 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

FORST, KLINGENSMITH and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.