FOR PUBLICATION

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

ZURI K. JACKSON ERIC E. SNOUFFER

Fort Wayne, Indiana Snouffer & Snouffer

Fort Wayne, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ZURI K. JACKSON, )

)

Appellant-Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) No. 02A03-1103-RS-99

)

DEMETRIUS HOLINESS, )

)

Appellee-Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Thomas J. Felts, Judge

Cause No. 02C01-0204-RS-41

February 8, 2012

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Zuri Jackson (“Mother”) appeals the trial court‟s grant of Demetrius Holiness‟ 

(“Father”) motion to dismiss her petition for modification of child support. Mother 

presents a single issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court erred 

when it dismissed her petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother and Father were married in 1995 in Indiana, and they divorced in 1996, 

when they were living in Nevada. They have two minor children together. A Nevada 

court issued the final dissolution decree, including an order that Father pay $363 per 

month in child support. Mother and the children then moved back to Indiana in 1996, 

and Father moved to Maryland.

In 2002, Mother completed the necessary paperwork under the Uniform Interstate 

Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) to have the decree registered in Maryland. Appellant‟s 

App. at 6-25, 130.

1

 And in 2004, the Maryland court entered a consent order approving 

the parties agreement to increase child support to $500 per month beginning April 15 of 

that year.2

On April 23, 2009, Mother filed her petition for modification of child support with 

the Allen Circuit Court. Father, who has continued to reside in Maryland during that 

 

1

 In the UIFSA paperwork, Mother also requested enforcement and modification of support. The 

record on appeal does not contain any order showing a modification of support or that the Maryland court 

registered the decree. In light of the procedural history, we assume the decree was ultimately registered 

in Maryland. 

2

 The record does not contain a copy of this order. This information is based on averments in the 

State‟s opposition to Mother‟s motion to correct error in the trial court‟s December 14, 2010 order.
3

time, hired counsel in Indiana, who filed an appearance and various motions with the trial 

court. Ultimately, Father filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under 

Trial Rule 12(B)(2). However, following a hearing, the trial court instead dismissed 

Mother‟s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mother filed a motion to correct 

error, which the trial court denied. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Subject matter jurisdiction is an issue of law to which we apply a de novo standard 

of review. Lombardi v. Van Deusen, 938 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 

Likewise, a trial court‟s interpretation of a statute is an issue of law reviewed de novo. 

Id. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to hear and to determine a 

general class of cases to which the proceedings before it belong. Georgetown Bd. of 

Zoning Appeals v. Keele, 743 N.E.2d 301, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). A tribunal receives 

subject matter jurisdiction over a class of cases only from the constitution or from 

statutes. Id. A party can never waive the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

Indiana Code Section 31-18-6-11 provides in relevant part:

(a) After a child support order issued in another state has been registered in 

Indiana, unless the provisions of section 13 of this chapter apply,[3]the 

responding Indiana tribunal may modify the order only if, after notice and 

hearing, the responding tribunal finds that:

(1) the:

(A) child, individual obligee, and obligor do not reside 

in the issuing state;

(B) petitioner who is a nonresident of Indiana seeks 

modification; and

 

3

 That section does not apply here.
4

(C) respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of 

the Indiana tribunal; or

(2) an individual party or the child is subject to the personal 

jurisdiction of the tribunal and all of the individual parties have filed 

a written consent in the issuing tribunal providing that an Indiana 

tribunal may modify the support order and assume continuing, 

exclusive jurisdiction over the order. However, if the issuing state is 

a foreign jurisdiction that has not enacted the Uniform Interstate 

Family Support Act, the written consent of the individual party 

residing in Indiana is not required for the tribunal to assume 

jurisdiction to modify the child support order.

(Emphasis added). Here, Mother, the petitioner, is a resident of Indiana, but the parties 

have not filed a consent with the court having continuing jurisdiction under UIFSA to 

transfer jurisdiction to the Indiana court. Thus, under the statute, an Indiana court cannot 

have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order here.

In its Order, the trial court concluded that under Indiana Code Section 31-18-6-

11(a)(1), a petitioner seeking modification of a child support order issued by another 

jurisdiction must be a non-resident of Indiana. That is true when the parties have not 

consented to Indiana‟s jurisdiction under subsection (a)(2). Because Mother is a resident 

of Indiana and the parties have not consented to Indiana‟s jurisdiction, the trial court 

concluded that she must seek modification of child support in Maryland, where Father 

lives.

Nonetheless, on appeal Mother contends that the federal Full Faith and Credit for 

Child Support Orders Act (“FFCCSOA” or “Federal Act”) “preempts” subsection (a)(1) 

of Indiana‟s statute because the Federal Act does not impose a non-residency 
5

requirement. Brief of Appellant at 10. In particular, Mother cites to 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, 

which provides in relevant part that:

[i]f there is no individual contestant or child residing in the issuing State

[here, Nevada], the party . . . seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a 

child support order issued in another State shall register that order in a State 

with jurisdiction over the nonmovant for the purpose of modification.[4]

It is true that that statute has no requirement like the one found in Indiana Code Section 

31-18-6-11(a)(1), which requires that the party seeking to modify a child support order 

issued in another State be a nonresident of Indiana. And Mother maintains that, “[u]nder 

the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the FFCCSOA is binding on all 

states and supersedes any inconsistent provisions of state law, including the provisions of 

UIFSA.” Id. 

But the case law Mother cites in support of her argument on this issue is 

unpersuasive. Indeed, while Mother contends that “the UIFSA is preempted by the 

provisions of [the FFCCSOA],” and she cites to case law from a foreign jurisdiction, our 

supreme court has held otherwise. Id. In Basileh v. Alghusain, 912 N.E.2d 814, 820 

(Ind. 2009), our supreme court expressly held that the FFCCSOA does not preempt the 

UIFSA. In Basileh, the court addressed the issue of preemption with respect to Indiana 

Code Section 31-18-2-5 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738B. On direct appeal, this court had 

determined there was a “crucial” distinction between the two statutes, namely, that the 

Uniform Act requires the parties‟ written consent to another state‟s jurisdiction, whereas 

the Federal Act does not. And we held that the federal statute preempted the state statute.

 

4

 Mother contends, and we agree, that Father submitted to the jurisdiction of Indiana when he 

filed his petition to adopt the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines with the Allen Circuit Court on July 17, 

2009. See Allen v. Proksch, 832 N.E.2d 1080, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding a party who seeks

affirmative relief from a court may be estopped from challenging personal jurisdiction).
6

On transfer, our supreme court examined the law on federal preemption and held:

The application of general rules of federal preemption leads us to conclude 

that Congress did not intend the Federal Act to preempt the Uniform Act. 

Rather, it appears that FFCCSOA was intended to follow the contours of 

UIFSA. There is no indication in the text of FFCCSOA or its legislative 

history of any intent to preempt UIFSA. And importantly for our purposes 

the specific provisions here at issue in Indiana‟s version of the Uniform 

Act—the nonresidency requirement and the consent requirement—are 

closely modeled after the federal version of the Uniform Act. “The very 

fact that Congress mandated that all fifty states adopt UIFSA strongly 

mitigates against a construction of FFCCSOA that would impliedly 

preempt UIFSA to any degree.” LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 498 

(Tenn. 2001). We therefore also conclude that the FFCCSOA does not 

preempt the Indiana version of UIFSA.

Id. at 820.

Here, Indiana Code Section 31-18-6-11(a)(1) is likewise closely modeled after 

Section 611 of the Uniform Act, which also requires that the party seeking modification 

be a nonresident. We follow the reasoning in Basileh and hold that Indiana Code Section 

31-18-6-11(a)(1) is not preempted by the FFCCSOA. Basileh, 912 N.E.2d at 820. Still, 

Mother contends that the non-residency element of Indiana Code Section 31-18-6-

11(a)(1) “does not conform to the intent of the FFCCSOA to protect the interest of the 

children.” Brief of Appellant at 11. She maintains that the non-residency element makes 

it “both financially and physically impossible” for her to seek modification of Father‟s 

child support obligation. Id. But given that Section 611 of the UIFSA and Indiana Code

Section 31-18-6-11(a)(1) are almost identical, we find the language of the Comment to

Section 611 to be a strong indication of the legislative intent when it enacted Indiana 

Code Section 31-18-6-11. That commentary states:

Under subsection (a)(1), before a responding tribunal may modify the 

existing controlling order, three specific criteria must be satisfied. First, the 
7

individual parties and the child must no longer reside in the issuing state. 

Second, the party seeking modification, usually the obligee, must register 

the order as a nonresident of the forum. That forum is almost always the 

state of residence of the other party, usually the obligor. A colloquial (but 

easily understood) description is that the nonresident movant for 

modification must “play an away game on the other party‟s home 

field.” . . . 

The underlying policies of this procedure contemplate that the 

issuing tribunal no longer has an interest in exercising its continuing, 

exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order, nor information readily available 

to it to do so. The play-away rule achieves rough justice between the 

parties in the majority of cases by preventing ambush in a local tribunal. 

Moreover, it takes into account the factual realities of the situation. In the 

overwhelming majority of cases the movant is the obligee who is receiving 

legal assistance in the issuing and responding states from Title IV-D 

support enforcement agencies. Further, evidence about the obligor‟s ability 

to pay child support and enforcement of the support order is best 

accomplished in the obligor‟s state of residence.

(Emphasis added). Accordingly, Mother‟s contention that the best interests of the 

children require that Indiana exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the modification of 

child support here is unavailing. 

Although Mother does not prevail in this appeal, we pause to note what we believe 

to be an incongruity in the statutory scheme that leads to the somewhat absurd result in 

this case. Indiana Code chapter 31-18-6 provides a mechanism for registration and 

enforcement of an out-of-state child support order. “Except as otherwise provided in this 

article, an Indiana tribunal shall recognize and enforce but may not modify a registered 

order if the issuing tribunal has jurisdiction.” Ind. Code § 31-18-6-3 (emphasis added). 

Section 31-18-6-11 sets forth the requirements that must be met in order for Indiana to 

modify a registered order. Relevant to this case, Indiana may modify an out-of-state 

child support order only if neither the child nor either parent lives in the issuing state, the 
8

person seeking modification is a non-resident of Indiana, and the person against whom 

modification is sought is subject to personal jurisdiction in Indiana.5 Neither Mother, nor 

Father, nor the children reside in Nevada, the state which issued the original child support 

order, satisfying the first requirement of Section 31-18-6-11(a)(1). Indiana Code Section 

31-18-2-1 provides that “[i]n a proceeding . . . to modify a support order . . . an Indiana 

tribunal may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual . . . if . . . the 

individual resided in Indiana with the child . . . .” Ind. Code § 31-18-2-1(3); see also Ind. 

Trial Rule 4.4(A)(7) (providing that a person submits to the jurisdiction of Indiana courts 

by “living in the marital relationship within the state notwithstanding subsequent 

departure from the state . . . if the other party to the marital relationship continues to 

reside in this state . . . .”). Mother and Father resided in Indiana with the children and 

were married in Indiana prior to their move to and subsequent divorce in Nevada. An 

Indiana court would therefore have personal jurisdiction over Father, despite the fact that 

he now resides in Maryland, satisfying the third requirement of Section 31-18-6-11(a)(1).

But Mother is a resident of Indiana. The second requirement of Section 31-18-6-

11(a)(1) allowing an out-of-state child support order to be modified in Indiana is that the 

petitioner be a non-resident. Although we recognize that because of this requirement, the 

provision allowing an Indiana court to modify an out-of-state child support order is not 

applicable in this case, this case seems to be one in which the sections of the act cannot 

be harmonized. 

 

5

 Indiana may also modify an out-of-state child support order if the parties have filed written 

consent in the issuing state to Indiana modifying the order. No such consent was filed in this case. 
9

The comment to UIFSA § 611, on which Indiana‟s Section 31-18-6-11 is based, 

states that the purpose of the non-residency requirement for the petitioner is to “curb[ ]or 

eliminat[e] the undesirable effect of „ambush or tag‟ jurisdiction, e.g., the likelihood that

the parties would vie to strike first to obtain home-town advantage. . . . [S]uch lawsuits 

would discourage continued contact between the child and the obligor, or between the 

parties for fear of a lawsuit in a distant forum.” Comment to UIFSA § 611 (2008). But 

what is the point of Section 31-18-2-1 conferring jurisdiction over a person who 

previously resided in Indiana if not to allow Indiana to modify a child support order 

under the circumstances presented here? Father would not be discouraged from contact 

with Mother or the children upon their move to Indiana after the dissolution for fear of

being brought into court here because he was already subject to the jurisdiction of Indiana 

courts, even before they moved back. Notably, Indiana‟s Section 31-18-2-1 does not 

include the provision of the UIFSA that the bases of jurisdiction over a nonresident set 

forth therein “may not be used to acquire personal jurisdiction for a tribunal of this state 

to modify a child-support order of another state unless the requirements of Section 611 

are met . . . .” UIFSA § 201(b) (2008) (emphasis added). Thus, Indiana has not unbound 

its personal jurisdiction statute from the out-of-state child support modification statute. 

And because personal jurisdiction is conferred over a non-petitioning parent who 

previously resided with the child in Indiana but does not necessarily presently reside in 

Indiana, but the petitioning parent must be a non-resident, it is possible that Indiana could 

modify a child support order when no party currently lives in Indiana. If, for instance, 

the facts of this case were the same but for Mother living in Illinois rather than Indiana 
10

when she sought modification, the requirements of Section 31-18-6-11 would be met, 

allowing an Indiana court to modify the child support order even though no party was a 

resident of Indiana. And because the obligation of support can continue until a child 

turns twenty-one, it is possible that Indiana would have personal jurisdiction to modify a 

support order for up to twenty years after the relevant parties have left the state.

Moreover, had Mother returned to Indiana prior to seeking dissolution, Indiana 

could have exercised in rem jurisdiction to grant a dissolution due to her current 

residence in Indiana; and because of Father‟s prior residence here, Indiana would also 

have had in personam jurisdiction over both parties to divide the marital property and 

enter a support order as part of the dissolution action. See Harris v. Harris, 922 N.E.2d 

626, 634-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (changing the parties‟ status from married to unmarried 

requires only in rem jurisdiction which is satisfied by the residency of one party; 

adjudicating the incidences of marriage—that is, the marital property and child support—

requires in personam jurisdiction over both parties). And even under the circumstances 

as presented, Mother could have filed an original action for child support in Indiana, 

pursuant to Indiana Code chapter 31-16-2, which authorizes a court to enter a child 

support decree when there is a duty to support that child that has not been fulfilled. Ind. 

Code § 31-16-2-8(a); see also Bagal v. Bagal, 452 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1983) (“child support may be either the subject of a separate „action‟ or an „application‟ 

in an action for dissolution . . . . ”). It seems incongruous that a court that has personal 

jurisdiction over both parties to dissolve a marriage and adjudicate the incidences thereof 

or order support in the first instance could not modify an existing child support order. 
11

Although the requirements of Section 31-18-6-11 are clear, the procedure for 

modifying an out-of-state child support order is less clear when Section 31-18-6-11 is 

considered in conjunction with other relevant statutes. However, because the incongruity 

between the statutory sections is a legislative matter, we must conclude that the trial court 

did not err in dismissing Mother‟s petition to modify because she is not a non-resident

petitioner as required by Section 31-18-6-11. 

In sum, Mother‟s contention that 28 U.S.C. § 1738B preempts Indiana Code 

Section 31-18-6-11(a)(1) must fail given our supreme court‟s holding to the contrary in 

Basileh. And the commentary to Section 611 of the UIFSA, upon which our state statute 

was based, explains the reasoning behind the “rough justice” of the non-residency 

requirement. The trial court did not err when it dismissed Mother‟s petition to modify 

child support for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.