alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00638-CR

GILBERT GRIMALDO APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1243882D

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Gilbert Grimaldo appeals his conviction and sixty-year sentence 

for aggravated assault.2

 We affirm.

Appellant’s indictment alleged that he had injured a woman by hitting, 

grabbing, and dragging her; that he had also threatened imminent bodily injury to 

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011).
2

her; and that he had used or exhibited a deadly weapon (a knife) during the 

assault. The indictment contained a repeat offender notice, alleging that 

appellant had been previously convicted of murder.

Appellant filed various pretrial documents and pled not guilty. A jury 

convicted him, and after he pled true to the indictment’s repeat offender notice, 

the trial court found the notice to be true and sentenced him to sixty years’ 

confinement. He brought this appeal.

Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as 

counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief and motion, counsel 

avers that he has diligently reviewed the record and opines that this appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. 

California by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and 

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 744–

45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (analyzing the effect of Anders). 

Appellant filed a pro se response to his counsel’s brief, contending that the 

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The State filed a brief, arguing

that the evidence is “amply sufficient.”

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we 

must independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 

511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Roots v. State, 419 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—
3

Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to 

withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988); 

Roots, 419 S.W.3d at 723. We have carefully reviewed the record, appellant’s 

counsel’s brief, appellant’s pro se response, and the State’s brief. We agree with 

appellant’s counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find 

nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. 

State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 

206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant 

counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court's judgment. See Roots, 

419 S.W.3d at 723.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: September 18, 2014
IlVicKenna Long New

tS \Jdride brussels Arney t4w Sacramento

Dermer

1900 Street NW Washington DC 20006-1 108 San Dwgo

Los Angeles Tel 202496.7500 fax 202.496.7756 San Franosco

www.mckennalong.com Washington D.C

MICHAEL 8000HER EMAIL ADDRESS

202 496-7729 rnboucher@rnckennalong corn

January 26 2009

CovrAlis CoNFIDIrI\L

Dv UPS NFxi 1AY AIR BUSINESS JNFORtTION

Thomas Crosetto Chief

Pesticides and Toxics Compliance Section LC-XJ

Chemicals Management Branch

Land and Chemicals Division

U.S Environmental Protection AgencyRegion

77 West Jackson Boulevard

Chicago Illinois 60604-3590

Re Nalco Company

Distribution and Sale of an Unregistered Pesticide

Dear Mr Crosetto

On behalf of our client Buckman Laboratories Inc Buckinan we enclose recent

correspondence with ElAs Antirnicrobials Division AD documenting I3uckmans disco\ery

that competitor Nalco Company Naleo has been making pesticidal claims for an

unregistered ammonia product Nalcon 60620 in contravention of an express written prohibition

from the Agency dated February 2008

We invited the AD to investigate Nalcos apparently knowing violation of FIFRA

in connection with the ADs consideration of opposing petitions from Buck.man

and Nalco regarding the need to register ammonia for water treatment uses Pending the ADs

decisions on these petitions however Naleo was supposed to refrain from distributing or selling

its unregistered ammonia products with any pesticidal claims hut Nalco has ignored EPAs

express prohibition perhaps intentionally as the attached documents illustrate Furthermore the

AD has declined to take any steps to investigate Nalcos wrongdoing despite clear documentary

evidence of Nalcos unlawful behavior

Accordingly we respectfully request that Region review the attached documentation

and investigate Nalcos unlawful and apparently knowing and intentional distribution and sale of

unregistered ammonia with pesticidal claims We will telephone you to conlirm your receipt of

OCSOSDS4h
Thomas Crosetto Chief

January 26 2009

Page

CoNIANs C0NFWENTIAL

BuS1ESs INFORMAFION

this submission and to discuss your proposed handling and disposition of our request In the

meantime we welcome any questions that you may have about this submission and thank you

for your kind attention to this matter

/mb

Attachment 14 pp

\7er truly yours

N4iehael Boucher

Counsel to Buckman Laboicitoejes hc

uc 5O846
EXHIBIT 32
                                                             ----------

          CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                 AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
             PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
            AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                 THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

            In connection with the Quarterly Report on
Form 10-KSB/A of Touchstone Applied Science Associates,
Inc. (the "Company"), for the period ended October 31,
2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Andrew
L. Simon, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Touchstone
Applied Science Associates, Inc., to the best of my
knowledge, that:

            1.	The Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

            2.	The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:  June 13, 2005                   /s/ ANDREW L. SIMON
                                         ---------------------------
                                         Andrew L. Simon, President,
                                         Chief Executive Officer and
                                         Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906 has been provided to Touchstone Applied
Science Associates, Inc. and will be retained by
Touchstone Applied Science Associates, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff
#### Juanita DAILEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27842.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 23, 1955.

Ben -Hagman, V. P. Craven, Weather-ford, for appellant. > .

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

, The offense is felony theft; the punishment, 3 years.,

Our State’s Attorney confesses error. The verdict was returned by a jury consisting of only eleven jurors. A verdict of less than twelve jurors will not support a valid judgment. , Clark v. St,ate, Tex.Cr. App., 276 S.W.2d 819, and cases there cited.

Appellant urges,, however, that we write on the question of former jeopardy which she contends' was raised. Though the record is far from Complete on the question, we do observe that there was no final judgment in the prior case because notice of appeal was given before the court dismissed the case. Only a final judgment will support a plea of former conviction. Ramirez v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 256,-179 S.W. 2d 976.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
### Page 1 of 3 **Disposition Comments Docket No:**  

### FAA - 201 5 - 2714 These comments are in **Directorate ID:** 

### 201 4 - SW - 0 52 - AD response to an SNPRM Originating Office Tracking No.: **Next Step:** FRAN SNPRM 

### N o C omments/Only

Supportive Comments Received

– If this box is checked, no signatures are required. No 

### Has the reference d service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? I f ye s, lis t latest revision and attach a cop y. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance. Instructions: Summarize all comments **by issue** (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of each issue. **All comments relating to the sam e issue should be discussed together.**  Do not list all of the issues from one commenter together. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA - IR- M - 8040.1C Chapter 9. **ISSUE 1:** Select one o

f the following : If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree with because We disagree with because

Make the following changes to the AD: If **NO** , we don’t agree because **ISSUE 2**  **:** Select one of the following :

If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree with because We disagree with because Make the following changes to the AD:

### Page 2 of 3

If **NO** , we don’t agree because **For additional issues, do uble**  **- click**  **here**

### Page 3 of 3 **S ignature Section**  Signature indicates concurrence with this action. Originating Office Tracking No.: **ASE** Printed Name **:** 

### Helene Gandy **Date**

**B ranch Manager**  **Date**
STEAM ELECTRIC

CBI REPLACEMENT PAGE

EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0819

DCN: ________________________________________

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE IT 

CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION 

(CBI) PER 40 CFR PART 2, SUBPART B.

SE04331A041
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-2517

TIGIST HAILU TESFAYE,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A95-221-287)

Submitted: August 20, 2004 Decided: September 8, 2004

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rev. Uduak J. Ubom, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Peter D.

Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, David V. Bernal, Assistant

Director, Margaret K. Taylor, Office of Immigration Litigation,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for

Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Tigist Hailu Tesfaye, a native and citizen of Ethiopia,

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”)

order dismissing the appeal and finding she failed to meet her

burden of proof with respect to her request for asylum,

withholding from removal, or withholding under the Convention

Against Torture. 

On appeal, Tesfaye challenges the Board’s determination

that she failed to establish her eligibility for asylum. To obtain

reversal of a determination denying eligibility for relief, an

alien “must show that the evidence [s]he presented was so

compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the

requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

478, 483-84 (1992). We have reviewed the record and conclude

Tesfaye fails to show the evidence compels a contrary result. 

Additionally, we uphold the Board’s denial of Tesfaye’s

request for withholding of removal. The standard for withholding

of removal is more stringent than that for granting asylum.

Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 205 (4th Cir. 1999). To qualify for

withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate “a clear

probability of persecution.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,

430 (1987). Because Tesfaye fails to show she is eligible for

asylum, she cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of

removal.
- 3 -

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
**Exhibit32.1**

** **

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEFEXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, John R. Cooper, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Avocent Corporation onForm 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 26, 2003 fully complies withthe requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934 and that information contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents in allmaterial respects the financial condition and results of operations of AvocentCorporation.

 
|   | By:/s/ John  R. Cooper                                   |   |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Name: John  R. Cooper                                    |
|   | Title:   President and Chief Executive Officer |

 

I, Douglas E. Pritchett,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of AvocentCorporation on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 26, 2003fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition andresults of operations of Avocent Corporation.

 
|   | By:/s/  Douglas E. Pritchett                                                                                      |   |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Name:  Douglas E. Pritchett                                                                                       |
|   | Title:   Senior Vice President of Finance, Chief  Financial Officer,  Treasurer and Assistant Secretary |

 

 

*Note: The foregoing certifications are being furnishedsolely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, and are not beingfiled for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended, and are not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of theCompany, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of anygeneral incorporation language in such filing. A signed original of each of these written statements required bySection 906 has been provided to Avocent Corporation and will be retained byAvocent Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission orits staff upon request.*

 

1

----
#### Mildred Nadine ARMSTRONG, Personal Representative and Administratrix of the Estate of Eldron (Curley) Armstrong, et al., Appellants, v. Marie McGUIRE, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 17, 1958.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 12, 1958.

O. F. Duval, Olive Hill, for appellants.

H. R. Wilhoit, Grayson, W. H. Counts, Olive Hill, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is a motion for an appeal from a judgment awarding appellee, Marie McGuire, damages in the sum of $2,128 against appellants, Mildred N. Armstrong, as ad-ministratrix of the estate of Eidron Armstrong, Mildred N. Armstrong, as an individual, C. Tackett and Harlan A. Kash.

We conclude the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed all the evidence of decedent, Eidron Armstrong, and appellants, Harlan Kash and C. Tackett, introduced at a former trial of this case, to be read to the jury in the present action. The ruling of the trial court in this respect did not disregard the provisions of KRS 422.150 and CR 80, as contended by appellants. The witnesses whose testimony was read were all along parties to the litigation, and the restrictions in KRS 422.150 upon reading the testimony of “witnesses” do not apply to the testimony of adverse parties.

The lower court properly held that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were jury questions, since the evidence in the present record does not materially differ from that in the record formerly appealed from. See Armstrong v. McGuire, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 366, where these questions were settled and therefore are the law of the case. Also, the facts developed at the trial of this case fully justified the giving of “Instruction 1”.

*903 It is our view the verdict was not excessive. Appellee’s tibia was fractured into the ankle joint and, seven years after the accident, she still suffers from pain and swelling. We believe, too, the X-ray photograph was competent proof. On the issue raised, competent medical evidence fully revealed appellee’s condition to the jury.

Although other alleged errors were urged for reversal, we shall not discuss any of these, because our consideration of the entire record leads us to conclude this case was correctly decided in the lcwer court.

Wherefore, the motion for an appeal is overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
Clarification on Ft . Clarification on Ft .Berthold Information Request Berthold Information Request

Eric Wortman Eric Wortman to: wortman.eric 05/17/2012 12:24 PM

Cc: rothery.deirdre, daly.carl

This email is going to all the recipients of yesterday 's request letter for information regarding oil and gas 

facilities on the Ft. Berthold Indian Reservation. I understand from the call this morning that many of you 

would like clarification on the information EPA is seeking regarding VRU equipment .

Item 2(f) is requesting the total annual average cost for the installation of a VRU at a facility . This includes 

the capital cost of the equipment, O&M related costs, and any annual labor cost. This is the cost incurred 

by the company to install and operate a VRU.

Item 5 is requesting the average annual estimate of revenue obtained from the sale of recoverable product 

due to the VRU. This is a negative cost such as what you would use to calculate the payback period for 

the cost of the VRU. In other words, how much will your average income increase due to the sale of 

recoverable product from the VRU. 

Let me know if you have any further questions,

- Eric

Eric Wortman

Environmental Scientist

Air Permitting, Monitoring and Modeling Unit

Office of Partnerships & Regulatory Assistance

EPA Region 8

1595 Wynkoop Street (8P-AR)

Denver, CO 80202-1129

Phone: (303) 312-6649

Fax: (303) 312-6064

wortman.eric@epa.gov
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. Section 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
In connection with the Quarterly Report of AMG Oil Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Michael Hart, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)    The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated this 13th day of February, 2004.

BY:
/s/ Michael Hart                        Michael Hart, Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer**
#### Leslie WALKER, Appellant, v. R. L. ROSSER et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 31, 1958.

D. Bernard Coughlin, Maysville, for appellant.

M. Hargett, James M. Collins, Maysville, for appellees.

CAMMACK, Judge.

This action was instituted by the appellant, Leslie Walker, against the appellees, Chief of Police R. L. Rosser, and other officials of the City of Maysville, for a determination of priority rights in taking vacations in the Maysville Police Department. *755A city ordinance grants the right to select vacations in accordance with seniority. This appeal is from a judgment declaring Rosser to be senior in length of service in the Department to Walker.

The appellant contends that Rosser was never a regular member of the Police Department prior to his appointment as Chief in January, 1951. Rosser contends that he has been a member of the Police Force since January, 1939. It is not disputed that Walker was commissioned a policeman of the city on July 31, 1939, and was still serving in that capacity when this action was instituted.

On January 3, 1939, the city enacted an ordinance creating the office of Merchant Policeman. The duties of this office were to be those designated by superior city officers and merchants of the city. The salary was set at $1 per year, with an authorization to make collections from merchants for any extraordinary services. The merchants had been asked to vote for the person they desired to fill the position and since Rosser received a majority of the votes cast he was appointed.

It is our opinion that the ordinance creating the office of Merchant Policeman was in derogation of provisions of Carroll’s Kentucky Statutes now embraced in KRS 61.300 and KRS 61.360. These statutes deal with the appointment of special peace officers by the Governor. We believe, therefore, that the judgment of the trial judge holding Rosser senior in length of service to Walker is erroneous.

The appellees argue that the question of whether Rosser should have been removed from employments held prior to 1951 because of repugnant statutory provisions is moot and that the validity of his service at that time cannot be questioned now. Perhaps no action now lies against Rosser for the wrongful holding of a position he no longer occupies; but a judgment as to Ros-ser’s present seniority rights based on an invalid employment cannot be given effect. Here there is an actual controversy involving real and substantial rights of the parties, and the question on appeal is not moot.

The judgment is reversed, with directions that it be set aside, and for the entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.