### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 4 -00 518 -CV

Rosem arie Satte rfield, as Representative of the Estate of

Je r r old Br ale y, De c e as e d, A ppe lla nt

v. Crown Cork & Seal Com pany, I nc., Ind ividu ally and as Su cce ssor to

Mundet Cork Corporat ion , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN40314 5 , HO NORAB LE P ETER M. LOW RY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
Th e iss ue pr e se nte d is wheth e r a statut e that e xtinguis he s a lit ig ant’ s r ig ht t o pursue a n acc rued a

nd pendingcommon law ca use of a ction—without providing a g rac e period—tra

nscends the le g islature’s power . Wit hin that c ontext , does the pre sumption of a statute’s
c on sti tut ion a lity

surv ive an e xpre ss p ro hib iti on of the Te xas C on sti tut ion ? Appe lla nt R os e mari e Satterfield, r epre sentative of the Estate of Jerrold B rale y , s ee k s damag es for injuries that Br aley sustained by

his ex posure to asbe stos-containing products. In this appeal, we revie w the judg ment of the district cour

t gr anting summary

judgme nt to appellee Crown C o rk & S ea l Company , I nc., pursuant to a ne wly

enac ted statute that limits t he asbe s t o s -re lated liabilities of cer tain succe ssor corpor ations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 149.001-.006 (West 2005) (h er ei n af ter “the Statute”)
.I n r e sp on se to S atte rf ie ld’ s summa

ry jud g me nt m oti on , Cr ow n Co rk did no t c on te st 1 succe ssor liability as to a ctual and compensatory damag es. I t disputed only any claim as to punitive dama g e s. 2

Af te r B ra le y su e d Cr ow n Co rk

and oth e rs fo r d a ma g e s c a

us e d b y hi s expos ur e to asbestos-c ontaining pr oducts, th e trial court g rante d partial summary judgme nt in Bra ley ’s favor. Wit hin day s, the Texas L eg islature ena cted—a nd made immediately

eff ective—the Statute, which eff ectively barr ed any

rec overy from Crown Cork. Crown Cork then filed a motion for summary 1 jud g me nt b a se d o n it s n e w statut or y a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e un de r t

he Statut e , a

rguin g tha

t, b e c a us e it had alr e a dy

p a id s u c c e s s o r

a s b e s to s c la im s in

e xc e s s o f th e li a b il it y li mi t u n d e r th e St a tute , it

h ad no further liability in any asbest o s case , including B rale y ’s. The district c ourt g rante d the motion
and se ve re d B ra le y ’s c la ims again st C ro wn Cor k f ro m th os e a g a ins t th e oth e r d e fe nd ants . T his appea l followed.

I n th re e i s s u es, Satterf

ield contends that Crown Cork w as not entitled to summary judgme nt beca

use: (i) the Statute, whic h imposes cer tain limit s on the liability of cor porations that beca me succ essors to cor

porations that wer e involved in the asbestos-insulation business, violates the Te xas C on sti tut ion ’s pr oh ibi tio n o n r e tr oa c tiv e laws a s a pplie d b e c a

us e it d e pr ive s h e r o f a ll
reme dy for a n acc rued a

nd pendingcause of ac tion, t h er eb y ex t i ng uishing a vested rig ht; (ii) the Statut e , o n it s fa c e , viol a te s the Te xas C on sti tut ion ’s pr oh ibi tio n o n s pe c ia l la ws be c a us e it g ra nts sp e c ia l pr ivi le g e s to a pa

rt ic ula r c la ss fo r the a dv anc e me nt o f p ri vate , r a the r t ha n p ub lic , in te re sts ;
and (i ii) Cr ow n Co rk

fa ile d to con clu si ve ly

e sta bli sha s a matte r o f l aw t

he e le me nts of

its ne wl y
c re a te d a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e un de r t

he Statut e and , th e re fo re , is not enti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt. Be cause the L eg islature may not make a la

w that the Te x as Con s t i t u t i o n p rohi bits and theI n light of our dispositi on of the challeng e to the constitutionalit y of the Statute as a

pplied, 2 we do no t r e a c h Satte rf

ie ld’ s r e ma ini ngiss ue s. 3 Constit ution e x pressly forbids retroa ctive laws that impair vested rig hts, the question prese nted is whether a

n acc rued a

nd pending common law cause of action is a vested rig ht and thus protecte d by the Te xas C on sti tut ion . We c on c lu de that it is a ve ste d r ig ht a

nd tha t th e re fo re the Statut e is
un c on sti tut ion a l a s a

pp lie d to B ra le y ’s c la im b e c a us e , in the a

bs e nc e of a g ra c e pe ri od , the Statut e is a re tr oa c tiv e law i mpa ir inghis ve ste d r ig hts
. 2

Acc ording ly , we sustain Satterf ield’s first issue, an d we re verse the trial cour t’s
summa ry jud g me nt gra

nte d in fa vo r o f C ro wn

Cor k a nd re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.
BACK GR OUND The Parties After

rec eiving an honora

ble dischar g e fr om the United States Army in 1956, J err old Bra ley

returne d to his home in W y oming but then m o v ed h i s famil y to Texas to work as an industrial labore r at a n o i l re fi n ery

near Monahans. Ac quiring skills t o become a pipef itter and we lder’s he lper, ove r the ne x t severa l y ear s Br aley worke d at re finerie s, ch em i ca l p lants, g as plants, and at other

industrial job sit es in Texas, Wy oming, Okla homa, Kansa s, New Me x ico, Florida , and L ouisiana. These jobs involved working with pipes , b oilers, compre ssors, and other
ma c hin e ry

re qu ir ingins ulatio n, wh ic h r outin e ly inv olv ed asb e sto s in su latio n, inc lud inga sb e sto scontaininginsulation p ro d u cts manufa cture d by Crown Cork’s pre dece ssor—Mundet Cork Corporation. B rale y

worke d until he retired in 1996.I n a dd iti on to C ro wn

Cor k, B ra le y su ed A.W
. Ches te rt on

Com pa ny ; B a bc oc k B or sig 3 Power, I nc. ; C o l t ec I n d

u s t ri es , I n c. ; C ra n e C o mp an y ; Da n a C o rp o ra t ion; Durabla Ma nufac turing

Co.; Enpro Industries, I nc.; Exx on Mobil Corp.; Foster Wheeler Energy Corp.; Gar ock Sealing Tec hnologie s, L L C; Genera l Electric Company ; Goodrich Corp.; Gua rd-L ine, In c . ; Jo hn Crane, I nc.; Metropolitan L ife I nsuranc e Company ; N orthern Natura l G as Co.; Rapid Americ an Corp . ; and 3 M C o mp an y. 4

Crown Cork is a manufa cture r and distributor of pa ckag ing pr oducts for c onsumer g oods. I n 1963, Crown Cork, then a N ew York co rp o ra t i on, was the nation’s larg est produce r and seller of metal bottle ca

ps, known in the industry as “cr owns.” Mundet was a lso a larg e produc er and seller of cr owns and c onsisted of two divisions: the “c losure” division, which manuf actur ed
crowns, and the “ thermal insulation” division, which manufa ctured, sold, and installed insulation pr od uc ts, so me of

wh ic h c on ta ine d a sb e sto s. Se e kin g to a c qu ir e the a sse ts of Mund e t, i n November

1963, Crown Cork purc hased the majority of Mundet stock. Appr o x imately three months l a t e r , o nF e b r

u ar y 8 , 1 9 6 4 , M u n d e ts o l d

i t s i n s u l a t i o nd i v i s i o nt o B a l dw i n - E h r e t
- H i l l ( “ B
- E
- H ” )
. It is u n d i sputed in the summary judgme nt proof that B -E-H expressly ag ree d to assume only

the liabiliti es of Mun d et ’s t herma l insulation di vision arising a fter F ebrua ry 8, 1964. Mundet thus reta ined all liability arising from any exposure to its asbestos-c ontaining products bef ore the date of the asset sa le. Crown Cork ac quired the r emainder o f M u n d et s t o ck, and the rema ining a ssets of M u n d et we re t ra nsfer

red to Crown Cork by

merg er in 1966. In 1989, Crown Cork merg ed into a new Pennsylvania cor

poration of the sa

me name.
The La wsui t I n J u l y 2 0 0 2, Br aley

was diag nosed with mesothelioma, a f atal for m of ca ncer associate d wi t h exposure to asbestos. On Oc tober 1, 2002, B rale y sued Crown Cork a

nd others 3I nitially , Crown Cork ag ree d with Satterfield that Texas law does not a pply and that Te x as 4 does not have “an i n t er est in the application of its law to the Plainti ff’ s claim or re cover y of dama g e s. ” Ac c or din g to C ro wn Cor k, “ on ly P enn sy lv ania

ha s a ny int e re st i n th e outc ome of thi s case .” F our day s after

the trial cour

t g rante d partial summ ary judgme nt in favor of S atterf ield on the issue of succ essor liability , the L eg islature cha ng ed the law, including t he choic e-of -law pr ovision. Seizi ng upon the newly

en acte d law, Crown Cork moved f or summary

judgme nt and ar g ued that Texas law applied.

Co n tr ar y to th e d is s e n t’ s a s s e rti o n s , Cr o w n Co r k c o n c e d e d in it s mo tion for 5 summa ry jud g me nt t

hat, i n th e a

bs e nc e of the Statut e , the “ bla c k lette r ru le in Te xas h a s p re vio us ly held a suc cessor

corpor ation liable for the torts of a pre dece ssor corpor ation with which it merg ed.” Thus, Crown Cork di d not challeng e S atterf ield’s claim that Crown C ork was liable for the ne g lige nt acts of Munde t under a

theory of succ essor liability

until after the L eg islature ena cted the Statute. B e c a us e Mund e t sold

its ins ulatio n d ivi sio n a

nd the a c qu ir ingc omp any

a ssume d o nly

tho se 6 lia bil iti e s o f t

he div isi on

ari sin g a ft e r F e br

ua ry 8, 19 64 , M un de t r eta in e d a nd Cr ow n a c qu ir e d a ll liabiliti es not assumed by the acquiring company —i.e., l iabilities arising befor e Februa ry 8, 1964. 5 for da m age s cause d by

his ex posure to asbe stos-containing products. In his live pleading at the time—Plainti ffs’ F ourt h Amended Petition and Jury Demand—B rale y

asser ted common law
c a us e s of ac tio n for ne g lig e nc e and str ic t pro du c ts lia bil ity
. B ra le y ’s pe tit ion

a lso so ug ht t o im

po se liability ag ainst Crown Cork as succ essor to Mundet. In Nove m b er , Br aley moved for pa

rtial
summa ry jud g me nt t o e sta

bli shCr ow n Co rk ’s lia

bil ity fo r Mun de t’ s a sb e sto s- c on ta ini ngpr od uc ts
a s a re su lt o f C ro wn

Cor k’ s a c qu isi tio n a

nd me rg e r. Ar g uin g that Penn sylva nia law co ntr ols be c a

us e it has the most significa

nt relationship to the issue of whe ther Crown Cork sh o u l d b e l i ab le for M u n d e t’ s li a

b il it ie s , Cr o w nCo r

k a s s e rte d th a t T e xa s “ h a s n o th in g b u t a te nu o u s r e lati o n s hip.” 4 Crown Cork did not dispute that it wa s the succe ssor by merg er to Munde t a nd, there fore , liable for M u n d e t’ s to rti o u s c o n d

u c t u n d e r T e xa s la w, n o r d i d i t dispute that it was liable for a ctual and 5
c omp e ns a tor

y dama g e s attr ibuta

ble to B ra le y ’s e xpos ur e to M un de t’ s p ro du c ts. 6That the c auses of action B rale y

asser ted ag ainst Crown Cork ac crue d prior to the Statute’s 7 enac tment is not i n dispute. 6

On May 29, 2003, the trial court enter ed an order g ranting Br aley ’s motion for par tial summary judgme nt on the succe ssor liability issue, finding that Crown “is liable for injuries, actua l
and puni ti ve dam a g e s, a s ma y be pr ov e n at tr ia l, c a

us e d b y the a sb e sto s- c on ta ini ngpr od uc ts manufa cture d, sold or distributed by M u n det[ ] befor e F ebrua ry 8, 1964, as a r esult of Crown Cork’s[ ] acquisition and m erg er of Mundet[ ] into Crown Cork.” The tria l court fur ther found that the jud g me nt “ on ly

de te rm ine s th a t in

the e ve nt the jur

y fi nd s Mund e t Cork wa s neg lig e nt, g ro ssl y neg lige nt, acted w ith malice, or its products we re de fec tive that Crown Cork i s liable and be ars the re sp on sib ili ty

fo r the fi nd ing s a g a ins t Mund e t Cor k. ” I ssu e s o f n e g lig e nc e , p ro du c t de fe c t, g ro ss
n e g l i g e n c e , an d

d am a g e s r e m a i n e d

t o b e d e t e r

m i n e d b y t h e j u r

y. 7
The Sta tute F our d ay s a ft e r t he tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d B ra le y ’s mot ion

fo r p art ia l summa

ry jud g me nt, ruling that Crown C ork was liable as succ essor to Mundet, the L eg islature passe d House B ill 4. Act of June 2, 20 03 , 78t h L e g ., R.S. , c h. 20 4, 20 03 Te x. Ge n. L aws 84 7. Se c tio n 1 7 o f H ou se B ill 4—the Statute—cre ated a n aff irmative defense to succ essor liability for a sbestos claims by

limit ing cumulative succ essor li ability to the fair marke t value of the predece ssor company as of the time of the m erg er or consolidation. Id
. § 17.01, 2003 Tex. Ge n. L aws at 892-95 (codif ied at Te x . Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. §§ 149.001-.006 (West 2005)).

T h e L e g i s l a tu r e a l s o s p e c i f i e d t h a t t h e S t a tu t e w o u l d

b e c o m e “ e f

f e c t i v e i m m e d i a t e l y” in all case s commence d on or af ter June 11, 2003, or in all pending case s in which trial, or a ny newSee Act of June 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 204, § 17.02(2), 2003 Te x . Gen. L aws 847, 8 89 5; see also Te x. Civ . Pra c . & Re m. Cod e Ann. § 149 .0 01 (We st 200 5) (r e fe re nc inghis tor ic a l no te that desig nates June 11, 2003, as Statute’s eff ective date). Simi lar leg i s lation passed in Pennsylvania, see 15 Pa. Cons. St at. Ann. § 1929.1 9 (West 2001), was de clar ed unconsti t u t i o n al by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under the ope ncourts provision of the Pennsylvania Constituti on. See I eropoli v. AC& S Corp. , 842 A.2d 919, 930 (Pa. 2004). “ Suc c e so r a sb e sto s- re late d li a bil iti e s” is d e fi ne d in

the Statut e a s: 10 any liabiliti es, whe ther known or unknown, asser ted or una sserted, a

bsolute or con tin g e nt, a c c ru e d o r u

na c c ru e d, liq

uid a te d o r u

nli qu idate d, or

du e or to b e c ome due, that ar e re lated in any way to asbestos claims that wer e assumed or incurre d by a cor poration as a

res u l t of or in conne ction with a merg er or consolidation, or the pla n o f m e rg e r o r c on so lid a tio n r e late d to the me rg e r o r c on so lid a tio n, wi th or int o another corpor ation or that are related in a ny way to a sbestos claims base d o n the exercise of

control or the owner ship of st ock of the corporation bef ore the merg er or consolidation. The ter

m includes liabiliti es that, af ter the time o f t h e m er g er or consolidation for whic h the fair marke t va lue of total gross assets is deter mined under 7 tri al or retrial af

ter motion, appea l or otherwise , has not begun. The Statute wa s the only section 8 of House Bill 4 to be made immediately eff ective. See id. § 23.02(b), 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws at 898; H. J. of Te x., 7 8th

L e g ., R.S. 60 41 -0 42 (2 00 3) ; S.J. of Te x., 7 8th

L e g ., R.S. 50 08 (2 00 3) . T he Statut e
was a lso the only

section of House Bill 4 made r etroa ctively app licable to all ca ses pendingon i t s effective date. See id. § 1 7
. 0 2 ( 2 ) , 2 0 0 3 T e x. G e n . L aw s a t 8 9 5
. Co d if ie d a t Ch apter

149 of the Texas Civil Practice & Re medies Code, the Statute is entitled “L imitations in Civil Actions of L iabilities Relating to Certain Me rg ers or Consolidations .” See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 149.001-.006. Be cause this suit was pending on J une 11, 2003, and the trial had not starte d, the 9 Statut e a pp lie d to it. The stated pur

pose of the Statute is to limit cumulative “suc cessor asbestos-r elated lia bil iti e s” in Texas. Id. §§ 14 9. 00 1- .0 02 . Asu c c e sso r c or po ra tio n is lia ble fo r a sb e sto s c la ims 10 11Se c tio n 1 49 .0 04 , w e re or are pa id o r o the rw ise dis c ha rg e d, or c omm itt e d to be pa id or otherwise discharg ed, by or on beha lf of the c orporation, or by a succ essor of the c or po ratio n, or

by or on be ha lf of a tr ans fe ro r, in c onne c tio n w ithset tle me nts , judgme nts, or other discha rg es in this state or another jurisdiction. Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 149.001(3). An “ a sb e sto s c la im” is d e fi ne d in the Statut e a s: 11 any claim, wher ever

or whe never

made, f or d am ages, losses, indemnification, c on tr ibutio n, or

oth e r r e lie f a

ri sin g out of

, b a se d on, or

in a ny wa y re late d to a sb e sto s, i n cl u d i n g: (A ) pr op e rt

y dama g e c a

us e d b y the ins ta llatio n, pr e se nc e , o r r e mov a l of a sb e sto s; (B ) the hea lth effe cts of exposure to asbe stos, including any claim for: (i) persona l injury

or death; ( i i ) m e n t a l o r

e m o t i o n a l i n

j u r y; (iii) risk of disease or other injury ; or (iv) the costs of medic al monitoring or surveillance ; and (C) any

claim made by

or on beha lf of any

person ex p o sed to asbestos, or a repr esentative, spouse, par ent, child, or other relative of the pe rson. Id. § 149.001(1). Th e Statut e pr ov ide s that a c or po ratio n ma

y e sta bli shthe fa ir

mark e t va lue of

tot a l g ro ss 12 assets by any method rea sonable unde r the c ircumstance s, including ( 1) by refere nce to the g oing c on c e rn va lue of the a sse ts or to the purc ha se pr ic e a ttr ibuta ble to o r p a id f

or the a sse ts i n a

n a rm ’s

leng th transac tion; or (2) in the abse nce of other re adily

available informa

tion from which fa ir marke t 8 on ly up to t he tot a l g ro ss a sse ts o f t

he tr ans fe ro r c or

po ratio n fro m wh om i t r e c e ive d th e a sb e sto srelated liabilities; t otal g ross assets are determined as of t he ti me of the m erg er or consolidation. See id. § 1 49 .0 03 (a ); see also id. §§ 149.001(4) ( defining“succ essor” as “a corpor ation that assumes or incurs , o r h a s a s s u me d

o r in c u r r e d , s u c c e s s o r

a s b e s to s - r e late d

li a b il it ie s ” ) ; 1 4 9
. 0 0 1 ( 5 ) ( d e f ining “tra nsfer or” a s “a c orporation from which succ essor asbestos-related l iabilities are or wer e assumed or incurr ed”)
. A succ essor c orporation is not responsible for suc cessor asbestos-r elated liabilities 12value can be determined, by ref ere nce to the va lue of the a ssets rec orded on a balanc e shee t. Id. § 149.004(a) (West 2005) . The fa ir marke t value of total g ross assets may not refle ct a de duction for a ny liabiliti es ar ising fr om any asbestos cla im. See id. § 149.004(d). The fair ma rket va lue at the time of the mer g er or consolidation is then adjust ed as provided for inflation. See id. § 149.005 (West 2005). 9 that ex cee d this li mitation. Id . § 149.003(a) . The Statute also provide s that, if a tra nsfer or corpor ation had assumed or incurred succ essor a sbestos-re lated liabilities from a prior merg er or consolidation with a transfe ror, then the fair ma rket va lue of the total assets of the first tra nsfer or shall be used to dete rmine the succ essor c orporation’s liabilit y . Id . § 149.003(b).

Th e Statut e a lso a lte rs the c ho ic e -o f- law ana ly sis in s uc c e sso r- lia bil ity c a se s. Court s
a re re qu ir e d

“ t o t h e f u l l e s te xt e n tp e r

m i s s i b l e ” t o a

p p l y T e xa s l aw t o s u c c e s s o r - r e l a t e d l i a b i l i t i e s. Se e id . § 149.006 (“The courts in t h i s state shall apply , to the fullest extent permissibl e under the United States Constit ution, this state’s substantive law, includingthe limitation under this chapter, to the issue of succe ssor asbestos-r elated liabiliti es.”)
. Thus, even though the parties ha d ag ree d that Texas law did not apply

and that the c laim would be g overne d by another state’s law under c hoiceof-law p ri n ciples, such a s the common law “ most significa nt relationship” test, sec tion 149.006 mandates a

pplication of the Statute. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Safway Stee l Prods. Co. , 74 3 S.W.2 d 6 9 3 , 6 9 7 ( T e x. Ap p . — A u s t i n1 9 8 7 , w r i td e n i e d ) ( n o t i n g t h a tc o u rt s d o n o tr e s o rtto “most signific ant re lationship” analy sis when there is “a l o ca l s tatutory provision controlling the dis po sit ion

of the c ho ic e of

law q ue sti on ” ); Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of Con fl ic t of

L aws § 6 (1 ) & c mts
. a , b (1 97 1) (d ir e c tin g c ourt , su bje c t to c on sti tut ion a l re str ic tio ns , to fo llo w statut or y dir e c tiv e of

its own state on c hoice of

law).10

The Trial Cour t’ s J udg ment The ne x t month—one y ear from his date of

diagno s is—Bra ley

died. The repr esentative of his estate, Rosema rie Satterf ield, was substituted as plaintiff. Crown C ork t hen filed a mot ion for summary judgme nt, see Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c), based on “a newly enac ted Tex as statute,” a rguing that asbestos-re lated liabilities in Tex as imposed an “unf air fina ncial burde n” on Crown Cork a nd that beca

use it had alre ady paid succe ssor asbestos claims in excess of the limit of liabili ty under the new statute, it had no further liability in any asbestos ca se. The tr ial court g rante d the motion and sever ed Satterf ield’s claims agai nst Crown Cork from those a g ainst the other de fenda nts. This appeal followe d.
AN AL YSI S On appe al, Satterfie l d argues that the summary judgme nt gr anted in fa vor of Crown Cork is based on the r et ro ac t i v e appli cation of a n unconstitutional special law. In three issues, she contends tha t t h e t ri al cour t erre d in gr anting Crown Cork’s motion for summary judgme nt beca

use (i) t h e S t atut e violates the Te x as Constitut ion’s prohibition on retroac tive laws b y d ep ri v i n g h er

o f a l l re m ed y

fo r a nac cr

u ed an d p en d i n g cau s e o f ac t i o n , t h er eb y ex t i n gu i s h i n g a
ve ste d ri g h t ; ( i i ) t h e S t a tu t e v i o l a t e s t h e T e xa s C o n s t i tu t i o n ’ s p r o h i b i t i o no ns p e c i a l l aw s b e c a u se it gr ants specia l privileg es to a pa rticular c lass for the a dvance ment of private , rathe r than public, int e re sts ; and

(i ii) Cr ow n Co rk

fa ile d to e sta

bli sh , a s a

matte r o f l aw, the e le me nt s o f i ts n e wl y
c re a te d a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e un de r t

he Statut e and

is t he re fo re no t e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt. Crown Cork re sponds that (i) Satterfie l d has not defe ated the pr esumption that
c ha pte r 1 49 is c on sti tut ion a l; ( ii) Sa tte rf ie ld’ s “ ind ivi du a l r ig hts mus t yie ld to th e S tate ’s va lid11

e xer c ise of

po lic e po we r i n e na c tin g le g isl a tio n de sig ne d to p ro te c t in no c e nt s uc c e sso r c or

po ratio ns ” from bankr

uptcy ; (i i i ) the Statute is not a special law beca use it includes a substantial cla ss of corpor ations to which the Statute would apply and the c lassifications within t h e Statute ar e
re a so na ble ; and (i v) it m e t it s summa

ry jud g me nt b ur de n b y

est abl is hi nge a c h e le me nt o f i ts aff irmative def

ense a ccor ded by

the Statute.
Stan dard of Revie w

Our re view of the district court’s de cision to gr ant summary judgme nt is de novo. J oev . Two Thi rty

Nin e J oin t V e ntu re , 145 S.W .3d 150, 156 (Tex. 2004). Summary judgme nt under rule 166a (c) is proper when a mova nt establishes that there is no ge nuine issue of materi al fa ct
and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r of law. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc .v. Johnson , 891 S.W .2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). A defendant, as movant, can satisfy this burden if the evidence disproves as a matter of l aw at least one e lement of e ach of the plaintiff’s
cause s of ac tion or if the evidenc e conc lusively establishes all elements of an af firmative de fense
. Di v e rsi c ar e Ge n. Pa rtn e r, In c . v . R ub io , 1 85 S.W. 3d 84 2, 84 3 ( Te x. 20 05 ); American Tobacc o Co.

v . G rin ne ll , 951 S
. W
. 2 d 4 2 0 , 4 2 5 (Tex. 1997). In decidingwhether there is a disputed issue of materia l fac t prec luding summary judgme nt, w e take evidenc e favor able to the nonmovant as true, indulge ever

y rea sonable infe renc e in favor of the nonmova n t , and re solve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Sh ah v . M os s , 67 S.W .3d 836, 842 (Tex. 2001). A s th e p arty

s e e k in g s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t b e lo w , Cr o w nCo r k h a d th e b u rden of establishing eac h element of its statutory

aff irmative defense a s a matter of law. Mc

In ty re v. Ramirez , 1 09 S.W. 3d

74 1, 74 8 ( Te x. 20 03 ). Sa tte rf ie ld r e sp on de d to Cr ow n Co rk ’s mot ion bo th12

by seekingto raise issues of material fa ct as to whe ther Crown Cork e stablished all the elements of its sta tut or y a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e and by

c ha lle ng ingthe Statut e on c on sti tut ion a l g ro un ds . B e c a us e Satterfield’ s challeng e to t h e St a tu tea s an unconstitutional retroa ctive law is a n as-a pplied challeng e, she must demonstrate that the Statute is unconstituti onal under article I , section 16 of the Texas Consti tution as applied to Bra ley ’s claims, or that it is an unconstitutional special lawunder article I I I , section 56 of t he constit ution, or t hat s he has raised a fact issue about whethe r Crown Cork has conclusively established it s statutory aff irmative def

ense. See Tex. Const. arts. I , § 16; I I I , § 56;

se e als o Tex as W

or k e rs’ Com p. Com m’n v . G ar c ia , 8 93 S.W. 2d 50 4, 51 8 n . 1 6, 52 0 ( Te x. 19 95 ) ( in

“ a s a pp lie d” c ha lle ng e , p la int if f m us t sh owthat “ statut e , e ve n th ou ghg e ne ra lly c on sti tut ion a l, operates unconstitutionally as to him or her be cause of the plaintiff’ s particular circ umstances” ).
Do es the Sta tute V iol ate the Te xa s Co nsti

tution’ s P ro hib ition o n Re tro ac tiv eLa ws? The L eg islature may

not m ak e a la

w prohibited by

the constitution of the state or that of the United States. See, e .g. , Sh e ph e rd v . S an J ac into J un ior Col l. D ist
. , 363 S.W .2d 742, 743 (T e x. 19 62 ); S

ta te v . Brownson , 61 S.W . 114, 114 (Tex. 1901). And the c ourts may not question the wis dom of a c onstitut ional provision. Cra me r v . S he pp ar d , 167 S.W .2d 147, 154 (Tex. 1942).
1. The Te xa s C ons ti tu ti on e xpr e ssl y pr ohi bit s r e tr oa c ti ve laws . I n her f irst issue, Satterfield conte nds that the Statute violate s article I , section 16 of the Te xas C on sti tut ion

pr oh ibi tin g the e na c tme nt o f r e tr oa c tiv e laws . T hat se c tio n p ro vid e s: No bill of attainder, e x post facto law , retroa ctive law, o r an y law impairingthe obligation of contrac ts, shall be made.Satterfield’ s challeng e to the re troac tive application of the Statute i s an “a s applied” 13 challeng e; she thus claims that the Statute, a l t h o u g h it may be other wise constitutional, operates un c on sti tut ion a lly

a s to the c ir c ums tanc e s o f t his c a se and

B ra le y ’s c omm on

law t or t c la ims
. McCulloch v. M

aryland , 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). 14 13 Tex. Const. art. I , § 16. Satterfield contends that section 16 bars retroa ctive leg isl at i o n that exti ng u i s h es or “impairs vested rig hts acquire d under e x isting law.” See Subaru of Am., I nc.
v. David McD avid Nissan, Inc. , 8 4 S. W.3 d 2 12 , 2 19 (T e x. 20 02 ); Ex pa rteAb e ll , 613 S.W .2d 255, 26 0 (T e x. 19 81 ); Ba ile

yv . Ci ty of A us tin , 972 S.W .2d 180, 191 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied)
. She urg es that an a ccr ued and pe nding c ause of action is a ve sted rig ht that may not retroa ctively

be eliminated. She a sserts that her acc rued co m m o n law cla ims for neg lige nce a nd strict products liability wer e vested befor e the Statute bec ame e ffe ctive and, the ref ore, c ould not be exti ng uished by

subsequently

enac ted leg islation. 13 We beg in our an al y s i s with the presumption that the Statute is constituti onal and that the par

ty challeng ing its constitutionality bear s the burden of

demonstrating that it fails to satisfy constitutional requireme nts. Se e En ro n Co rp . v. Sprin g I nd e p. Sc h. Di

st. , 922 S.W .2d 931, 934 (Tex . 1 99 6); Vi ns on v . B ur ge ss , 7 7 3 S. W. 2 d

2 6 3 , 2 6 6 ( T e x. 1 9 8 9 )
. I t d o e s n o t f o ll o w , h o w e v e r, that what the L eg islature can l eg islate prospec tively , it can leg islate retr oactively
. SeeTe x. Con st. art. I , §§ 16, 29. That the Constituti on has take n cer t ai n l egi slation out of the hands of th e L egi slature due to its retroac tive eff ect is cle ar. Id. The issue, then, is the br eadth of that constitutional prohibiti on.

“In consideringthis question, then, we must never forg et, t hat i t is a constitution we
ar e e x p o u n d i n g” —here , the Texas Constit ution. I n construingthe Texas Constit ution, 1414

[W]e c on sid e r “ the int e nt of the pe op le wh o a do pte d it. ” I n de te rm ini ng that in te nt, “ the his tor

y of the times out o f whic h it g re w a nd to whic h it

may be ratio na lly supposed to have direct relationship, the evils intended to be re medied and the g ood to be ac complished, are proper subjects of the inquiry .” Howe ver, be cause o f t he dif fi c ul ti es in herent

in d e te rm ini ngthe int e nt o f v ote rs ov e r a c e ntu ry a g o, we re ly he avil y on the lit e ra l te xt. Edgewood Inde

p. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby , 777 S.W. 2d 39 1, 39 4 ( Te x. 19 89 ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see als o Ci ty of S he rm an v . H

e nr y , 92 8 S. W.2 d 4 64 , 4 72 (T e x. 19 96 ); Ex parte Tucc i , 859 S.W .2d 1, 18 (T e x. 19 93 ) ( Phi lli ps , C. J., c on c ur ri ng ); Da v e np or t v . G ar c ia , 834 S.W .2d 4, 19 (Tex. 1992). A “ c on sti tut ion ” ha s b e e n d e fi ne d a s a “ c ha rt e r o f g ov e rnmen t deri vin g its wh ole authority from the g overne d.” Re pu bli c an Pa rty

of T e x as v . D ie tz , 940 S.W .2d 86, 91 (Tex. 1997) (quoting Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 311 (6th ed. 1990)). I t is a compac t betwee n the g overnme nt and the people in whic h the people de leg ate powe rs to the g overnme nt and in which the powers of the g overnme nt are presc ribed. Id. (c i t i n g TheOr igi ns of the Am e ric an Con sti tut ion : A D oc um e nta ry Hi sto ry ix (Michae l G. Kammen e d., 1986)). By d esig n, the fra mers of the Texas Consti tution de te rm ine d th e c on sti tut io n was to be a c omp a c t be tw e e n th e g ov e rnme nt a nd its c iti zen s. Te x. Con st. art
. I , § 2 ( “ A l l p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i s i nh e r e n ti nt h e p e o p l e , an d a l l f r e e g o v e r n me nts
are fo un de d o n th e ir

a uth or ity , a

nd ins tit ute d f or the ir be ne fi t.” ); Re

pu bli c an Pa rty , 940 S.W .2d at 91 n.6. Th e g uid ingpr incipl e of c on str uin g a c on sti tut ion

is t o a sc e rt a in a

nd g ive e ff e c t to t h e i ntent of the voter s who adopted it. W illiams v. Cast leman , 2 4 7 S. W. 2 6 3 , 2 6 5 ( T e x. 1922); Cox v. Robison , 150 S.W
. 1149, 1151 (Tex. 1912). The pr ovisions of the Texas Const itution m ean what they meant whe n they

we re p ro m u l gated a

nd adopted, “ and it does not lie within the power15

of the L eg islature to cha

ng e their me aning , o r t o enac t laws in conflict ther ewith.” J on es v . R os s , 17 3 S. W.2 d 1 02 2, 10 24 (T e x. 19 43 ); se e als o Tra v e le rs In s. Co. v . M ar sh all , 76 S.W .2d 1007, 1011- 12 (Tex. 1934) (mea

ning of constituti o n d o es n o t chang e with circ umstances to make a diffe rent rule in a c ase se em desira ble). As the supr eme c ourt stated more rec ently , “In interpre ting the Te xas C on sti tut ion , T e xas c ourt s r e ly he a vil y on the lit e ra l te xt and

are to g ive e ff

e c t to its pla in lang uag e.” Re

pu bli c an Pa rty , 9 40 S.W. 2d a t 89 ; see also City of Beaumont v. B ouillion , 896 S.W .2d 143, 148 (Tex. 1995).

I n a tim e c on te mpo ra

ne ou s wi th t

he dr a ft ingof

our c on sti tut ion , th e Te xas S up re me Court wrote:
I n the construc tion of a Constitut ion, it is to be presumed t hat the languag e in which it is written was ca

ref ully selec ted and made to express the will of the p eo p l e, and that in a do pti ngit the y

int e nd e d to g ive e ff

e c t to e ve ry

on e of its pr ov isi on s. Mellinger v. City of Houston , 3 S.W
. 249, 252 (Tex. 1887). L ike the citizens of other state s, citiz ens of this State adopted state c onstitut ions to restri ct g overnme ntal power and guara

ntee individual rig hts. S e e, e . g. , LeCroy v. Hanlon , 713 S.W .2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986). Ad op te d in a wh oll y differ ent historical and conce ptual fra mework than the fede ral c onstitut ion, the Texas Consti tution exemplifies a

desire to r estrict g overnme ntal power s. See id. ; se e als o Te x. Con st. art . I , § 29 . T his Court has “re g arde d as axiomatic” that “a state constitution is i n no manner a gra nt of power,” but instead, oper ates solely

as a limitation of power
. W atts v. Mann , 187 S.W .2d 917, 923 (Tex. Civ. Ap p. —Aus tin

19 45 , w ri t r e f’ d) ; see al so Sh eph erd , 3 63 S.W. 2d a t 74 3. Al l po we r whic h is16

not limi ted by

the constitution inheres in the people , and a l egi s l at i v e ac t is valid only when the constitution contains no prohibiti on ag ainst it. W att s , 187 S.W .2d at 923. I n r e c e nt y ears, a

str on g re surg e nc e of

state c on sti tut ion a l ana ly sis c omp e ls u s to undertake an a

naly sis of t he Tex as C onstitut ion eac h time a provision of that fundamental docume nt is impl ic a te d. Our hig h co ur ts have inc re a sin g ly loo ke d to the Te xas C on sti tut ion and pa rt ic ula rl y it s b il l o f r igh ts to d e te r

mi n e it s c it iz e n s ’ r igh ts an d li b e rti e s . Wh il e s tate c o n s ti tuti o n s c an n ot subtract f rom the rig hts gua

rante ed by

the United States Constitut ion, state constitution s can, a nd often do, provide additional rig hts for their c itiz ens. See, e .g. , Oregon v . Kennedy , 456 U.S. 667 (1 98 2) ; LeCroy , 713 S.W .2d at 338. We m ay n o t al low a statutory provision not within t he L eg islature’s pr ovince to over ride a state constitutio n al p rovision or allow the c onstitut ional pr ov isi on to b e c ome me anin g le ss surp lu sage. We h a ve lon g re c og nize d th e imp or tanc e of state constitutions in protec ting indivi dual rights. When the L eg islature has done that which the B ill of Rights forbids, then it bec omes the duty of the judiciar

y to declar e such e nactments null and void. See, e .g , Br on so n v . Ki nz ie , 4 2 U .S. 31 1 ( 18 43 ); Stu rges v . Cr own ins hie ld , 17 U.S. 122 (1819). Our duty , then, is to ex amine the wor ds of the constitution to determine whe ther a rea son exi sts to defeat the statute’s pre sumption of validity
. See Cox , 150 S.W . at 1151.

Along with its uni que h i s tory and “inde pendent vitality ,” see LeCroy , 713 S.W .2d
a t 33 9, the Te xas Con sti tut ion c on ta ins sin g ula r pr ov isi on s— se c tio ns 16 and 29 of art ic le I —b oth found in its bill of rig hts. Tex. C onst. art I , §§ 16, 29.17 A. Article I, Section 16 Un lik e the Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit uti on , th e Te xas C on sti tut ion ha s a sp e c if ic prohibition ag ainst retroa ctive laws. Texas W ater Rights Comm’n v. W right , 464 S.W .2d 642, 648 (Tex. 1971). This prohibition is found in the Texas Bill of Rights. SeeTex. Cons t. art. I , § 16. Bills of rig ht are often include d as par t of the compa ct betw ee n go vernme nts and citizens and
are int e nd e d to pr ote c t c iti z ens fro m g ov e rnme nta l tr ans g re ssi on s o f c e rt a in f un dame nta l r ig hts
. Re pu bli c an Pa rty , 940 S.W .2d at 91 (c iting Thomas M. C o o l ey , L L .D., A Treatise on the Con s ti tu ti o n a l Li m it

a ti o n s wh ic h R es t U

p o n th e Le

g is la ti v e P o we r o

f th e S ta te s o f th e Ame rican Union 176 (1868); 1 Ge org e D. B rade n et al., The Constit ution of the St ate of Texas: An Annotated

an d Co mp arati v e An aly

sis 2-3 (1977) ). Signific antly , the Texas Bill of R ights a ppear s in article I of the Te x as Constitut ion. Tex. C onst. art. I . When the au thors of the 1876 Te x as Constitut ion
rec ommended its rati fi ca t i o n , they assure d citizens that each c itiz en’s liber ty would be prote cted by ever y safe g uard known to c onstitut ional law, and that the g overnme nt of the state wa s restore d to its people. Some state constitutions and bill s of rig hts provisions confer gu ar an t ee s more extensive than those in the federa l constitution. Compare U.S. Const. art. I , § 9, cl.3 (prohibiting Congr ess from pa ssing a

bill of attainder or

ex post fac to law) an d

i d. art. I , § 10 (prohibiting the states from e nactingbills of attainder, e x post facto law s, or laws impairing t h e o b l i gat ion of contra cts) with Tex. Const. art. I , § 16 (prohibiting bills of attainder , ex post fac to la w, an y lawThe United St ates Constituti on expresses conc ern w ith retroac tive laws throug h sever al 15 o f it s p r o v is io n s , in c lu d in g th e e x p o s t f a c to an d ta

k in g s c la u s e s . S ee Eastern Enters. v. Apfe l , 52 4 U .S. 49 8, 53 3 ( 19 98 ); Lan dg ra f v . U SI Fi lm Pr od

uc ts , 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994). 18 imp a ir ingthe ob lig a tio n o f c on tr a c ts as we ll as re tro ac tiv e law s ); see also Me llinger , 3 S.W . at 252 15 (artic le I , s e c ti o n1 6 o f

T e xa s Co n s ti tuti o ng iv e s p r o te c ti o nth e U
. S. Co n s ti tuti o nd o e s n o t)
. The Texas Co n s ti tuti o nh a s lo n g b e e nr e c o g n iz e d “ to p o s s e s s in d e p e n d e n t v it a li ty , s e p ar a te an d a part from the guara

ntees provide d by

the United S tates Constitut ion.” City of Sherman , 928 S.W .2d at 47 3; In theIn te re

st o f J .W .T. , 8 72 S.W. 2d

18 9, 19 7 ( Te x. 19 94 ); LeCroy , 7 13 S.W. 2d a t 33 9. Thus , it is no surprise that the Texas Supreme Court conc luded lon g ago that ar ticle I , section 16 of the Texas C o n stitut ion give s additional protection ag ainst retroa ctive lawmaking—in the f orm of an express bar

on the passag e of a

ny “re troac tive law”—not found i n the U.S. Constit ution. See Mellinger , 3 S.W . at 252. In the fa ce of this ex press c onstitut ional p ro h i b i t i o n , littl e if a ny presumption of constitutionalit y rema ins. See U

nited States v. Carolene Prods. Co. , 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ( rec og nizi n g t h at s cope of constitutional presumption is m uch nar rowe r whe n leg islation appear s on its face to fall within ex press c onstitut ional prohibition).

I n s h ie ld in g in d iv id

u a l r igh ts f

r o m th e ar

b it r ar y e n a c tm e n t o f r e tr o a c ti v e laws, the supreme c ourt in Me lli nge r honed in on the literal—a nd “plain”—la

ng uag e of the provision at issue:
I n the construction of a Constit ution, it is t o be pre sumed that the languag e in which it is written was car efully selec ted and made to e x press the will of the peopl e, and that in a do pti ngit the y

int e nd e d to g ive e ff

e c t to e ve ry

on e of its pr ov isi on s; a

nd it can not be presumed that separate and distinct provisions w ere intended to ha ve the same a nd no other e ff

ect than one of them ha s, unless the languag e used, when considere d in connec tion with the whole instrument, shows that this must have be en the intention.19

I t can not be presumed that in adopting a Constit ution which contained a decla ration
“ that no re tr oa c tiv e law sh a ll be ma de ,” that it wa s int e nd e d to pr ote c t the re by on ly such rig hts a s wer e protec ted by other de clar ations of the Constituti on which for bade the makingof ex post facto laws, law s impairing the obligation of contra cts, or laws wh ic h w ou ld d e pr ive a

c iti zen of lif e , li be rt y , p ro pe rt y , pri vi leges or

immun iti e s, otherwise tha

n by due cour se of the la

w of the la

nd. Th e c ha ra c te r o f laws wh ic h, wi thi n the me anin g of the Con sti tut ion , w ou ld o pe rate a s e x pos t f

a c to law s, and

laws imp a ir ingthe ob lig a tio ns of c on tr a c ts, we re we ll understood, not only

from the languag e desc riptive of them used in the Const itution, but from adjudications made by the hig hest courts in the land, pr ior to the time the Con sti tut ion

wa s a do pte d; and there c an b e n o d o u b t that by the clause in the Co n s t i tution w hich forbids the making of retroactive laws it was int ended to give protection to e v e ry citizen against the arbitrary exe rcise of some power not forbidden by theother c lau se

s o f th e Con sti tut ion re

fe rre d to , wh ic h m igh t belaw ful ly exe rcised but for this prohi bition
. 3 S.W . at 252 (e mphasis added)
.

Retroac tive leg islation presents problems of u n fa i rn ess not posed by prospec tive leg islation “beca

use it can de prive c itiz ens of legitimate ex pectations and upset settled transa ctions.” Gen era l Motors Cor

p. v . R om e in , 5 03 U. S. 1 81 , 1 91 (1 99 2) ; see also Owens Corning v. Carter , 997 S.W .2d 560, 572-73 (Te x . 1999) (c onstitut ion al prohibition ag ainst retroa ctive laws de rives from conc epts of fa ir notice a nd well-settled e x pectations). Retroactivity is ge nera lly

disfavor ed in the law, B o wen v. Ge orgetown Univ. Hosp. , 4 88 U. S. 2 04 , 2 08 (1 98 8) , in a c c or da nc e wi th “funda mental notions of justice” that have bee n reco gn i z ed throug hout history , Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno , 4 94 U. S. 8 27 , 8 55 (1 99 0) (S c a lia , J., c on c ur ri ng ). I n h is Commentaries on the Constitut ion , J ustice Story rea soned, “[R] etrospec tive laws ar e, indee d, g ener ally unjust; and, as has be en for cibly

said, neither acc ord with sound leg islation nor with the fundamenta l principles of the socia l compact.” 2 J . Story , Commentaries on the Constituti on § 1398 (5th ed. 1891). Alaw20

that is f undamentally unfair beca

use of its re troac tivity is a law which is ba sically arbitra ry . See, e .g. , Pension Bene

fit Guar. Cor

p. v. R.A. Gray

& Co. , 467 U.S. 717, 728-30 (1984).
B. Article I, Section 29 I n a dd iti on

to s e c tio n 1 6, wh ic h e xpre ssl y ba rs the enact men t of r e tr oa c tiv e laws , article Iof the Tex as C onstitut ion contains a spe cific pr ovision in section 29 “that define s the scope and application of the T exas Bill of Rights.” Re pu bli c an Pa rty , 9 40 S.W. 2d a t 89 . Se c tio n 2 9 is tit led “P rov is ions o f B ill of Rig hts Exc e pte d F ro m Po we rs of Go ve rnme nt; To F or e ve r R e ma in I nviolate.” I t does not have a counterpart in the federa l constitution. Not addre ssed by Crown Cork
and re nd e re d me anin g le ss b y the dis se nt, se c tio n 2 9 p ro vid e s: Sec. 29. To gua

rd aga inst transg ressions of the hig h power s here in deleg ated, we decl ar e t h at eve ry

thing in this “B ill of Rights” is excepted out of the g e ne ra l po we rs of

g ov e rnme nt, and

sh a ll f or e ve r r e ma in i nv iol a te , a nd a ll laws contra

ry there to, or to the following provisions, shall be void.
Tex. Cons t. art. I , § 29. Contained in ever y constitution of the State of Texas, section 29 must be
re a d a s an e xp r e s s l i m i t a t i o n o n s t a t e p o w e r b e y o n d t h a t s e t f o rt h i n e a c h o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l r ig hts g uara nteed in the Te x as B ill of Rights. See Tex. Cons t. of 1869, art. I , § 23; Tex. C onst. of 1866, art. I , § 21; Tex
. C o n s t
. o f 1 8 6 1 , art. I , § 21; Tex. C onst. of 1845, art. I , § 21. The fir st clause of section 29 establishes that the purpose of the Tex as Bill of R ights is t o “guard a g ainst transg ressions of the hig h power s” dele gated to the state g overnme nt by the Texas Constit ution. I ts provisions excepting eac h rig ht in the B ill of Rights “out of the g ener al power s of g overnme nt” and pr oviding that “all laws” contra

ry to the Bill of Rig hts serve a s a shield ag ainst the power s an d l aw s ofSee also He nderson v. Love , 181 S.W .3d 810, 815 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) 16 (f ind ingthat art ic le I , s e c tio n 2 9 “ e xpre ssl y lim its the sta

te ’s po lic e po we r” ); Fa

ze k as v . U niv e rsi ty of Houston , 565 S.W .2d 299, 305 (Tex. Civ. App.—Hou s t o n [ 1 s t Dist.] 1978, writ ref ’d n.r.e .) (stating that, althoug h state has br oad poli ce power, the Texas Constit ution ex cepts fr om this power the a uth or ity to e na c t laws c ontr ary to art ic le I , s e c tio n 1 6) ; Faulk v. Bue na Vista Burial Park Ass’n , 21 g overnme nt. Se e Re

pu bli c an Pa rty , 9 40 S.W. 2d a t 89 -9 0; see also 1 Br aden e t al., The Constit ution
o f t h e S t a t e of Texas , su

pra , 8 5
- 8 6
. I f

i ti s t o h a v e m e an i n g , t h e l an g u a g e o f s e c t i o n2 9 c ano nly be int e nd e d to str e ng the n— no t li mit —th e oth e r p ro vis ion s o f t he B ill of Rights . In th is c on te xt, beca use the Te x as Constitut ion circumscr ibes the limit s of leg itimate leg islative action, it provides Texas citiz ens g reater prote ction than that found in the fe dera l constituti on.

Un de r t he pla in an d lite ra l re a din g of the c on sti tut ion a l te xt, th e n, “ re tr oa c tiv e laws ” shall not be made, a

nd the people of

Texas have e x pressly

withheld, “excepted out,” and not g iven the L eg islature any power to enac t retroa ctive laws. See Te x. Con st. art . I , §§ 16, 29
. Con tr ary to the dissent’s sug g estion that section 29 is without meaning , Texas co u rts have attributed signific ance to this provisi on when a ddresse d. Se e Re pu bli c an Pa rty , 9 4 0 S
. W
. 2 d a t8 9

- 9 0 ( s t a t i n g t h a tart i c l e I, section 29 of the T exas Const itution ex pressly limit s the power

of Texas g overnme nt by

excepting
e ve ry thi ngin t he B ill of

Rig hts out of

the g e ne ra l po we rs of

g ov e rnme nt) ; City of Be a u mo nt , 89 6 S
. W.2d at 148-49 (stating that the g uara ntees found in the B ill of Rights are excepted fr om the g ener al power s of g overnme nt and that the state ha s no power to a ct in a manne r contra ry to the B ill of R ig hts ); Travelers Ins. Co. , 76 S.W .2d at 1010-11 (holdingthat Texas L eg islature has no police powe r to violate ar ticle I , section 16 of the Texas Const itution because se ction 29
e mph a tic a lly

and un ambi g uo us ly

e xce pts thi s pow e r fr om the po we rs of the g ov e rnme nt of the State of Texas). By

its langua g e in Mellinger , the supreme court foc used on the im p ortanc e of the 16152 S.W .2d 891, 893-94 (Tex . Civ. App.—El Paso 1941, no writ) (holding police power is restricted by c on sti tut ion a l bil l of

ri g hts ); Murphy v . Phillips , 63 S.W .2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio, 1933, app. dism’d) (police power and resulting civil mor atorium statute cannot violate c onstitut ional rig hts). 22 prohibition of retroa ctive laws, a s well as g iving mea ning to eac h and every provision of t he Bill of Rights, including the plain languag e of se ction 29. Mellinger , 3 S.W. a t 252. I nd e e d, the su pr e me court ha s consistently

held that cour

ts “should avoid constructions that would re nder a ny const itutional provision m eaning less or nug atory .” See, e .g. , S p r a d li n v . J im W a lte r H o m es , I nc. , 34 S.W. 3d

57 8, 58 0 ( Te x. 20 00 ); Hanson v. J ordan , 198 S.W .2d 262, 263 (Tex. 1946). T h u s , t h e p e o p l e o f

t h e S t a t e o f T e x a s , i n p l a i nl an g u a g e s e tf o rt hi nart i c l e I,
se c tio n 2 9 o f t

he Te xas Con sti tut ion , have e xpre ssl y wi thh e ld f

ro m th e L e g isl a tur e the a

uth or ity to
enac t retroa ctive laws in violation of ar ticle I , section 16. B ut w e a c kn ow le dg e that a statut e op e ra tin g re tr os pe c tiv e ly a lon e is ins uf fi c ie nt t o invalidate a la

w. Texas W

ater Rights Comm’n , 464 S.W .2d at 648. Mere ly beca use a statute allows consideration of events that occ urre d prior to its enac tment does not c ompel its invalidation, so long as the a ffe cted pa

rties wer e g iven a r easona ble opportunity

to protect their interests. Id. I t is a we llsettled principle in Te x as law that retroa ctive laws a re unc ons t itutional only

when they

impair or destro y v ested rig hts. See id. ; see also City of Tyler v. Likes , 962 S.W .2d 489, 502 (Tex. 1997); Mc Cai n v . Yost , 2 84 S.W. 2d 89 8, 90 0 ( Te x. 19 55 ); Me l l i n ger , 3 S.W . at 249. The pa rties do not dispute that the Statute operates re t ro ac tively . There fore , to determine whether the Statute is an
u n c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r e t r o a c t i v e l aw , w e m u s tc o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e S t a tu t e i mp a i r s o r

d e s t r o ys Sa tte rf ie ld’ s v e ste d r ig hts
.23

2 . The Sta t ut e is a n u nc o ns t it ut io na l r e t r o a c t iv e la w be c a us e it im pa irs Sat te r fie ld’ s v e st e d r igh ts and pr ov ide s no gr ac e pe r iod to pr e se r ve th os e r igh ts . Cr ow n Cork argue s th a t Satte rf ie ld f a ile d to de mon str a te that th e Statut e imp a ir s a vested rig ht and that Satterfie ld’s claim is a statutorily cre ated reme dy which may be repe aled a nd i s n o ts u b j ec tt o t h e p ro h i b i t i o naga i n s tre t ro ac t i v e l aw m ak i n g. C i t i n g Ae tna In s. Co. v . R ic ha rd e lle , 528 S.W .2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App—Corpus C hristi 1975 , wr i t re f’d n.r .e.) a nd Di c k so n v . Na v arro County LeveeImprove ment Dist. No. 3 , 139 S.W .2d 257 (Tex. 1940), Crown Cork u rg es that Satterfield did not have a v es t ed right bec ause no f inal judgme nt had bee n rende red pr ior to the passag e of the Statute.

The de finition of a “ve sted rig ht” diffe rs from state to state and varie s widely even within a state ac cordingto its contex t. Thus, we agree with Crown Cork’s g ener al asser tions that litigants have no vested rig hts in new rules of la w, a mer e expec t an cy b ased upon the anticipated
c o n ti nu a ti o n o f an e xis ti n g la w , o r me r e r e me d ies. Se e City of D all as v . Tram me ll , 101 S.W .2d 10 09 , 10 14 (T e x. 19 37 ). Al tho ug h Te xas c ourt s are sp lit on wh e the r an a c c ru e d a nd pe nd ingc a

us e of ac tion is a vested rig ht, all but one of those cour ts that have analy

zed state law, includingrele vant provisions of t he Tex as C onstitut ion, have a nswere d that question in the aff irmative. See, e .g. , Likes , 962 S.W .2d at 502 (findingcommon law ca use of a ction ag ainst municipality for ne g lige nce w as
ve ste d r ig ht) ; Mellinger , 3 S.W
. at 253 (def ining vested rig ht a s “we ll-founded cl ai m ” deserving of c on sti tut ion a l pr ote c tio n) ; Price Pfister, Inc . v. Mo o r e &Kimmey, I nc. , 48 S.W .3d 341, 354 (T ex . Ap p . — Ho u s t o n[ 1 4 t hDi s t
. ] 2 0 0 1 , p et
. d en i ed ) ( qu o t i n g Mellinger , 3 S.W . at 253, and de fining vested rig hts as a state of

fac ts, which in the course of time or unde r g iven circ umstances, be comesB u t s e e R o b in s o n v . Cr o wn Co r k & Seal Co. , 251 S.W .3d 520 (Tex. App.—Houston 17 [14t h D ist .] 20 06 , p e t. f

ile d) . Wh ile we re c og nize tha t ou r s ister co ur

t ha s r e a c he d th e op po sit e conclusion in a c ase involving simil ar fac ts, w e ar e not bound to follow the dec ision of another c ourt of appea ls. Se e De lam ora v . S tate , 128 S.W. 3d 34 4, 35 9 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 04 , pe t. r e f’ d) ; see als o S ho ok v . S tate , 244 S.W .2d 220, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951) (c o u rt n o t b o und to follow a d e c i s i o no f

a c o u rto f e qu a l j u r i s d i c t i o n) ; L a mb ert v. Affiliated Foods, Inc. , 20 S.W .3d 1, 8 (Tex. App.— Am ar illo 1999), aff’d sub nom. Lawrence v. C.D.B. Se rvice s Inc. , 44 S.W .3d 544 (Tex. 2001). 24 fix ed or ve sted by

operation of exi sting law ). Under g ener al principles of tort law, a persona l injury 17
cause of ac tion—like the c auses of action asser ted by Satterfield he re—a ccr

ues whe n conduct that invades the r ights o f an other ha s cause d injury
. SeeRestatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts §§ 899, 910 (1 97 7) . Wh e n th e inj ur

y oc c ur s, the inj ur e d pa

rt y ha s the ri g ht t o b ri ngsu it f or a ll o f t he dama g e s, past, prese nt, and future , cause d by the def endant’ s acts. See id. The fa cts and c i rc u m s tance s surrounding Br aley ’s i njuries and death occurr ed well before the Statute was e nacte d, and B rale y had alre ady filed suit on his c laims by the date on whic h the Statute beca me ef fec tive. Thus, Satterfield’ s
cause of ac tion was ac crue d and pending , or vested, pr ior to the eff ective date of the Statute. Acc epting Crown Cork’s arg ument that a rig ht does not become vested unless a final jud g me nt h a s b e e n r e nd e re d, the dis se nt ignores the s ig nif ic anc e of the se e ve nts . B ut c on tr ary to this arg ument, neither the Texas Consti tution nor the Texas S u p reme Court defines a vested rig ht in te rms of a f

inal judgme nt. I n Mellinger , the supreme court re cog nized accr ued ca uses of a ction
as a ve sted rig ht protecte d by article I , section 16: [Article I , section 16] evidence s an intention to place a further restric tion on the power of the L eg islature, and it must be held to protect eve ry rig ht, even thoug h not s t ri ct l y a ri gh t t o p ro p er t y , wh i ch m ay ac cr u e un d er ex i s t i n g l aw s p ri o r t o t h e p as s age of any act which, if permitted a r etroa ctive ef fec t, would take aw ay

the rig ht. A rig ht25

has bee n well def

ined to be a well founded claim, and a we ll founded cla im means nothing more nor less than a claim re cog nized or secur ed by law. . . . [I ]t must nece ssarily be held that a right, i n a lega l sense, ex ists, when in conse quence of g iven fa cts the law decla res that one person is entitled to enfor ce a g ainst another a cla im, or to resist the enfor ceme nt of a c laim urg ed by another
. * * * Whe n . . . su c h a

state of fa c ts e xists a s t he law decl are s sh a ll e nti tle a pla int if f t o relief in a cour t of justice on a c laim which he make s ag ainst another, or as it decla

res sh a ll o pe rate in f

avo r o f a de fe nd ant as a de fe ns e a g a ins t a cla im m a de a g a ins t hi m, then it must be said that a right ex ists, has become fix ed or vested, and is beyond the re a c h o f r e tr oa c tiv e le g isl a tio n, if the re be a c on sti tut ion a l pr oh ibi tio n o f s uc h la ws . T h i s , s o f ar a s w e h av e b e e n a

b l e t o a s c e rt a i n , h a s b e e n t h e r u l i n g i n e v e r

y S t a t e in this Union which has a c onstitut ional provision in terms forbidding retroa ctive laws in which any

ruling upon the question has bee n made.
3 S. W. at 25 3; see also Likes , 96 2 S.W. 2d a t 50 2; Middleton v. Tex as Power & Light Co. , 1 8 5 S. W. 55 6, 56 0 ( Te x. 19 16 ). Othe r T e xas c ourt s have embra c e d th e de fi nit ion of ve ste d r ig ht a s a

we llfounded c laim as set forth in Mellinger
. See, e .g. , Texas W ater Rights Comm’n , 464 S.W .2d at 648; Middleton , 185 S.W . at 560. To be e ntitled to constitutional protec tion, howeve r, t he supreme cour t has empha siz ed that a c ause of action mus t b e b o th acc rued and pending
. See, e .g. , Likes , 962 S.W .2d at 502 (deny

ing as applied challeng e on retroac tivity g rounds to amende d statute, which sh or te ne d li mit a tio ns pe ri od , w he re su it w a s n ot f ile d unti l a ft e r t

he a me nd e d s tat ute be c a me eff ective) . Thus, the L eg islature may not retroa ctively

exti ng uish or eliminate acc rued a nd pending
cause s of ac tion, either by proce dural c hang es such a s shortening s t at u tes of limitation, or by substantive chang es, such a s cre ating new a ffirmati v e d ef en s es. See, e .g. , DeCordova v . City of Galveston , 4 Tex. 470, 480 (Tex. 1 8 4 9 ) (“ [ I ] f a statute of limit ations applied to exist ing c auses barr ed all reme dy or did not aff ord a rea sonable period for their prosec ution .
. . s u ch l egi slationThe dissent re asons that Crown Cork ra ised the issue in its reply
. But Crown Cork may 18 not use its reply

to assert ne w g rounds for summar y judgme nt. See Te x. R. Civ. P. 1 66 a (c ); se e als o Sa nd e rs v . Cap ito l Ar e a Co un c il , 930 S.W .2d 905, 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ) (holding mov ant m ay

no t r a ise ne w g ro un ds fo r s umm ary jud g me nt i n r e ply

to n on mov ant’ s r e sp on se ); Sams v. N.L. Indus., Inc. , 735 S.W .2d 486, 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1987, no writ) (same).
26 wo uld be re tr os pe c tiv e wi thi n th e int e nt o f t he pr oh ibi tio n, and

wo uld the re fo re be wh oll y ino pe rativ e .” ); Johns-M

anville Sales Corp. v. R. J. R eagan Co. , 577 S.W .2d 341, 345-46 (Te x . Civ. App.—Waco 1979, wr it ref’ d n.r.e.) (holding that defe ndant could not asser t statutory aff irmative defe nse ena cted thre e y ear s after clai m ac cr u ed bec ause suc h would aff ect “ vested rig hts and substantive law”)
.

Th e dis se nt a

rgue s th a t th e Statut e do e s n ot i mpa ir ves ted ri g hts be c a us e it m e re ly chang es the c hoice of law provision re g ardingsucce ssor liability and that Satterf

ield has no vested ri g ht in a re me dy or a statut or y c ho ic e of law p ro vis ion . B ut t

he dis se nt’ s argume nt m iss e s th e po int
. I n it s mo tio n f

or summa ry jud g me nt, Cr ow n Co rk

c on c e de d th a t “ the bla c k le tte r ru le in T e xas” provided for

succe ssor liability . I n its mot ion for summary judgme nt, Crown Cork stated that “the black letter

rule in Texas has pre viously held a suc cessor

corp o ra t i on liable for the torts of a pr e de c e sso r c or

po ratio n w ithwh ic h it

me rg e d” and “ [u]nt il re c e ntl y , it ha s be e n the bla c k le tte r r ule in Texas . . . and elsewhe re . . . that when a p re d ec es s o r corporation merg es with a succ essor corpor ation, the succe ssor can be held liable for the torts of the dissolved prede cessor .” Thus, Crown Cor k d i d n o tr a i s e t h e ar g u m e n t s t h a tt h e S t a tut e d o e s n o ti mp a i r v e s t e d r i g h t s b e c a

u s e i tm e re ly chang es the c hoice of law provision or that Satterfield ha s no vested rig ht in a reme dy or statutory
c ho ic e of law p ro vis ion in i ts m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. Acc ording ly , the trial cour t could not 18Other state s, including F lorida, Ge org ia, Mississi ppi, Ohio, Pennsy lvania and 19 South C arolina have enacte d simil ar leg islation. But, in all of t hese states, courts have struck down the leg islation to the ex tent it applies retroac tively , or such legislation has e x pressly provided that it a pp lie s o nly

pr os pe c tiv e ly

to c a se s f

ile d o n o r a ft e r t

he e ff e c tiv e date of

the le g isl a tio n. Mo st rec ently , a F lorida cour

t of appe als held that the Florida leg islation c ould not be retroa ctively applied to divest plaintiffs of their ac crue d cause s of action, which were vested rig hts under F lorida law. See W illiams v. American Optical Corp. , 985 So.2d 23, 26-28, 33 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). I n 2006, the Ohio cour

t of appe als deter

mined that the Ohio leg islat i o n was unc onstitut ionally retroa ctive when applied to c ases pending befor e the leg islation’s effe ctive date
. See Ackison v. Anchor Pac king Co. , L awr ence No. 05CA46, 2006 Ohio App. L EXI S 7047, at *26-27 (Ohio C t. App. 2006), revie w granted , 864 N. E. 2d

65 2 ( Oh io 2 00 7) ; W

agner v. Anc hor Packing Co. , L aw r e n c e N o . 0 5 CA47, 20 06 Oh io A

pp . L EX I S 70 50 , at *1 1- 12 (O hio Ct. Ap p. 20 06 ) (s a me , but no tin g that le g isl a tio n it se lf is no t un c on sti tut ion a lly re tr oa c tiv e be c a us e it g ive s c ourt s dis c re tio n to de c ide on a ca se -b y -c a se basis whether

application to claims pendingprior to the statute’s effe ctive date would be un c on sti tut ion a lly

re tr oa c tiv e ); cf. W

ilson v. AC& S Corp. , 864 N.E.2d 682, 695 (Ohio Ct
. A p p . 2006) (holding , under f

acts pre sented, that ne w statute could be applied t o plaintiff’s ca se bec ause she was still able to pursue c ause of action for

injury cause d by h u s b an d ’s exposure to asbestos), 27 have g ra nte d— and we c ann ot a ff

ir m—s umm ary jud g me nt o n th e g ro un d n owur g e d b y the dis se nt. See Stiles v . Resolution Trust Corp. , 867 S.W. 2d

24 , 2 6 ( Te x. 19 93 ); se e als o Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c) (“The motion for summary judgme nt shall state the spec ific g rounds there for.” ). Mo re ov e r, the dis se nt i s in c or re c t in its a sse rt ion that Satt e rf

ie ld ha s n o v e ste d r ig ht i n
a re me dy
. Te xas c ourt s h ave lon g re c og nize d th a t la ws a ff e c tin g a re me dy c an b e un c on sti tut ion a lly
r e tr o a c ti v e w h e n th e e n ti r e r e me dy is ta k e n aw ay . S

ee Like s , 9 62 S.W. 2d

a t 50 2; De Cordova , 4 T e x. a t 48 0. L ike a

statut e of

lim itatio ns , th e Statut e a ff e c ts Sa tte rf ie ld’ s r e me dy

be c a us e it
remove s entirely

all reme dy aga i n st Crown Cork. Whi le the L eg islature ca n aff ect a reme dy by providing shorter limitations for an acc rued c ause of action without violating the c onstitut ional pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t r e tr oa c tiv ity if it a ff or ds pla int if

fs a re a so na ble tim e in wh ic h to p re se rv e the ir vested rights or if the amendme nt does not bar a ll remedy , see Like s , 962 S.W .2d at 502, it has not done so her e. Un de r the e xpre ss te rm s of the Statut e , Satte rf ie ld h a s n o ava ila

ble re me dy

a g a ins t 19appeal dism’d , 864 N.E.2d 645 (Ohio 2007) (dismis sed on appe llant’s application). A nd in 2004,

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated the Pennsylvania statute on retroa ctivity g rounds under the open c ourts provision of the Pennsylvania Constituti on. S e e I e r o p o li , 8 4 2 A
. 2 d

a t9 1 9
. In addition, the leg islation e nacte d in G eorg ia, Mississ ippi, a nd South Carolina e x pressly provides that such leg islation applies only prospec tively

to case s filed af

ter the statute’ s eff

ective d at e. See Ga . S. B .1 82 , § 4, 20 07 Ga . A L S 9 (“ [Cha pte r 15] sha ll be c ome e ff

e c tiv e on Ma

y 1, 20 07 , a

nd sh a ll apply to asbestos claims that ac crue d or may acc rue on or

afte r that date” ); S.C. S .B. 1163, § 4, 2006 S.C. Acts 280 (“This act takes e ffe ct upon appr oval by the Gover

nor and a pplies to all civil actions asser ting a n asbestos cla im filed on or after that date.” ); Miss. H.B. 1517, § 10, 2004 Miss. L aws 353 (“ Th is A c t sh a ll t ake effect and be in f or c e fr om a

nd a ft e r i ts p a ssa g e .” ). Thus , T e xas i s th e on ly remai n i n g s t at e i n which this ty pe of le g islation has been a pplied retroa ctively

to bar a ccr

ued and pe nd ingc a

us e s o f a c tio n a

nd ha s n ot b e e n s tr

uc k d ow n a s unc on sti tut ion a l. 28 Crown Cork. SeeTex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 149.001-.006.

Texas courts have rec o gn i z ed that a cur e for retroa ctivity

is to allow statutes to operate prospec tively

or for the L eg islature to provide a g rac e per iod when ena cting statu t es aff ectingvested rig hts. See, e .g. , Likes , 962 S.W .2d at 502 (upholding retroa ctive application of new immunit y defe nse whe n the L eg islature afforde d a reasonable time to file acc rued c auses of action); Texas W ater Rights Comm’n , 464 S.W .2d at 649 (pe rmittee af forde d a re asona b l e time af ter
e na c tme nt o f s tatut e to p re se rv e the ir rights , thus p ro vid inga “ re a so na ble re me dy” a ft e r f

a ir op po rt un ity to p ro te c t r ig hts ); Middleton , 1 85 S.W. a t 56 0 ( re c og nizi ngthat ne w l aw d id n ot a pp ly to claims that acc rued pr ior to enac tment).

I n Middleton , t he Te xas S up re me Court up he ld t he c on sti tut ion a lity

of the fi rs t worke r’s c ompensation l aw . 1 8 5 S.W . at 562. Acknow ledg ing that the L eg islature did not make the ne w law a

pplicable to per sonal injury claims that had a ccr ued bef ore the act’ s passag e, the supreme c ourt explained, “A veste d ri g ht o f a c tio n g ive n b y the pr inc ipl e s of the c omm on law i s a property rig ht, and is protecte d by the Constitut ion as is other prope rty . The Ac t, however , does29

not profess to dea l with r ights of actions ac cruingbefor e its passag e. . . . The laws may be cha ng ed by the L eg islature so long as they do not destroy

or pre vent ade quate e nforc ement of ve sted rig hts.” Id. at 560. L ikewise, in re jecting an a

rgument that an ame ndment providing additional bases fo r i mmunit

y un de r t he To rt Cla ims Ac t unc on sti tut ion a lly de pr ive d a pla int if f o f h e r v e ste d r ig hts , the supreme cour t emphasized that the amendme nt was constitutional beca use the L eg islature aff orded a g r a c e p e r io d : “ T h e L e g is latu r e c an a f f e c t a r e me dy . . . f

o r an a c c r u e d c a u s e of a ction
w it h o u t v io lati n g th e r e tr o a c ti v it y p r o v is io n o f th e Co n s ti tuti o n if it a f f o r d s a r e a s o n a

b le ti me or fair oppor tunity to preser ve a claimant’s rig hts unde r the forme r law, or if the ame ndment does not bar a ll remedy .” Likes , 962 S.W .2d at 502. The Me lli nge r court a lso recog nized that if a provision
re g ulatin g a re me dy sh ou ld be “ so unre a so na ble a s to a mou

nt t o a de nia l of ri g ht, a s f or ins tanc e , if
a statut e of lim itatio ns a

pp lie d to e xistin g c a

us e s b arr e d all re me dy , or did no t af fo rd a re a so na ble period for

their pros ec u t i o n . . . such leg islation would be retrospe ctive within the intent of the prohibition, and would theref ore be wholly

inoperative.” 3 S.W. at 254-55. Her e, the Statute af

fords no gr ac e p er i od. SeeTex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 149.001-.006. I t was ef fec tive immediately , see A c t o f Ju n e 2 , 2 0 0 3, su

pra , § 23.02(b), 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws at 898, and it app l i ed t o al l p ending ca uses of a ction. See id. § 17.02(2), 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws at 895. I n fac t, the S t at u t e was the only provision in House Bill 4, which
c omp le te ly

re -wro te Te xas l aw o n c la ss a c tio ns and me dic a l ma lpr a c tic e c la ims , ma de a pp lic a ble to pendingcause s of ac tion. See id. The majority of House B ill 4 did not apply to pending

case s, butArticles 4, 5, and 8 of H.B. 4 wer e made applicable to an ac tion filed on or af ter July 1, 20 2003. SeeAct of June 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 204, § 23.02(c) , 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws 847, 899. 30 applied only

to those case s filed af

ter its g ener al ef

fec tive date—Septembe r 1, 2003. Id. § 23.02(d), 20 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws at 899.

Even if one acc epts the dissent’s view that the S t at u t e is reme dial in the sense that it merely deprive s Satterfield of a remedy for he r ac crue d and pendingclaims ag ainst Crown Cork, the Statute would still be unconstitutional beca use it applies re t ro ac t i vely and fa ils to provide Satterfield, a

nd other potential c laimants, a re asonable time to bring suit afte r t he enactment of the
new law and pr eser

ve their ve sted rig hts. See Baker Hughes, Inc. v . Keco R. &D., Inc

. , 12 S.W .3d 1, 4 ( Te x. 19 99 ) ( ho ldi ngtha t pr oc e dura l or re me dia l st a tut e s ma y no t be a pp lie d to pe nd ingsu its at the ti m e t h ey

become eff

ective if doing so w ould destroy

or impair rig hts that vested bef ore the statut e ’s e ff

e c tiv e date ); Mellinger , 3 S.W. a t 25 4- 55 (s a me ); see also I n re K.N.P. , 179 S.W .3d 717, 720-21 (Te x . App.—For t Worth 2005, pet. d en i ed ) (f inding statute of

limit ations cannot be retroa ctively

applied bec ause “ the statute did not provide a rea sonable time f or appellants to bring
su it a ft e r e na c tme nt o f t

he ne w l aw” ); Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark v. Lane , 480 S.W .2d 781, 783 (T e x. Civ . App .—Da lla s 1 97 2, wr it re f’ d n. r. e .) (e xpla ini ng that a pr oc e dura l or re me dia l st a tut e is unconstitutional if it “destroy s or i mpairs vested rig hts, or t akes away a li tiga nt’s reme dy

or rig ht of action, or of

defe nse, or so unre asonably encumbe rs or li m i t s i t as to rende r [it] useless or impractica

ble”) . The Te x as Supreme Court has consist ently held that eve n proce dural or r emedial statutes cannot be applied retroac tively wher e doing s o would destroy or i mpair vested r ights. See Bake r Hughes , 1 2 S. W.3 d at 4; Owens Corning , 9 97 S.W. 2d a t 57 2- 73 ; Likes , 962 S.W .2d at 502.31

The L eg islature may regulate or even abolish common law cla ims li ke those a sserted by Satterfield, but it cannot do so without g ranting some protec tion to vested rig hts a nd well-settled e x pectations by aff ording “a r easona

ble time or fa ir opportunity to pr es erve a cla imant’s rig hts under the former law.” See, e .g. , Owens Corning , 9 97 S.W. 2d a t 57 2- 73 ; Likes , 96 2 S.W. 2d a t 50 2; se e als o Va ug hn v . F e dd e rs , No. 05-11329, 2007 U.S. App. L EXI S 12915, at *8-11 (5th Cir. 2007) (a pply ing Te xas l aw a

nd c on c lud ingthat T e xas L e g isl a tur e c ann ot al te r a re me dy and “ e nti re ly de pr ive a pa rt y wi th a n a c c ru e d c a

us e of a c tio n o f t

he ri g ht t o s ue , an d must a ff or d that par

ty a re a so na

ble tim e in wh ic h to br ingsu it” un de r f or me r l aw) ; Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. v . Skinner Tank Co. , 419 F.3d 355, 359-60 (5th Cir. 2005) (sa me). The dissent’s unsupp o rt ed v iew that the Statute may be
c on sti tutio na lly

a pp lie d r e tr oa c tiv e ly

in t his c a se to b ar S a tte rf

ie ld’ s a c c ru e d a

nd pe nd ingc la ims
a g a ins t Cr ow n Co rk

be c a us e the Statut e is m e re ly

re me dia l is wi tho ut m e ri t. B e c a us e Sa tte rf

ie ld’ s c omm on law c la ims of ne g lig e nc e and

str ic t pr od

uc ts l ia bil ity
acc rued an d we re p en d i ng in the trial court whe n the Statute took effe ct, Satterfie ld held vested rig hts in those claims that could not be destroy ed. See Like s , 962 S.W. 2d

a t 50 2; Mellinger , 3 S. W. at 253; Price Pfister, Inc

. , 4 8 S. W. 3 d a t 3 5 4
. B y

e n a c ti n g th is e xp r e s s ly

r e tr o a c ti v e St a tute , the L e g i s l a tu r e c r e a t e d

a n e w s u b s t an t i v e d e f

e n s e t o s u c c e s s o r

l i a b i l i t y an d m a d e i ti m m e dia te ly eff ective in a ll pending c ases, de stroying Satter field’s ve sted rig hts in her accr u ed an d pending common law cla ims ag ainst Crown Cork. Wit hout affor ding a rea sonable g rac e per iod in which Sa tte rf ie ld c ou ld h ave pr e se rv e d h e r r ig hts , w e c on c lud e that th e S tatut e a s a pp lie d in thi s c a se operates as an unc onstitut ional retroa ctive law a nd, there fore , violates ar t i cl e I , section 16 of the Texas Consti tution.32

3. Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp. I n addre ssing the c onstitut ionality of a s i m i l ar Pennsy lvania statute limiting the
su c c e sso r a sb e sto s- re late d li a bil iti es of certai n c omp anie s, the Pe nn sylva nia Sup re me Court

in Ieropoli v. AC& S Corp. , 842 A.2d 919 (Pa. 2004), held the statute unc onstitut ional as applied unde r the Pennsylvani a Constit ution. The Ie ro po li court found that the statute eliminated any reme dy for a n acc rued c ause of

action and that an ac crue d cause of ac tion is a vested rig ht. Id. a t 9 3 0

- 3 2. The c ourt ci t ed l o n gstanding prec edent that a n acc rued c ause of

action is a ve sted rig ht, which leg islation may

not ext inguish:
“The re is a ve sted rig ht in an acc rued c ause of action. . . . A law c an be r epea led by the law g iver; but the rights which have been acquir ed under it, while it was in forc e, do not thereby

cea se. I t would be an absolute injusti ce to a bolish with the law a ll the eff ects it had produc ed. This is a principle of g ener al jurisprudenc e; but a rig ht to be within its protec tion must be a ve sted rig ht.”
Id. at 9 2 7 (q u o t i n g Lewis v. Pennsylvania R. Co. , 6 9 A . 8 21 , 8 23 (P a. 1 90 8) ). F ind ingthe statut e to be a violation of

the state’s c onstitut ion as applied, the Ie ro po licourt c oncluded that the pla intiff’s
ve ste d r ig hts c ou ld not be e xtinguis he d by su bs e qu e nt le g isl a tio n a

nd that, b y do ingso , th e statut e offe nded the state constitution’s open courts provision. Id. at 930-32.

I nsisting that the police pow er ove rri d es the Texas Constit ution’s prohibition of
r e t r o a c t i v e l aw s t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s c a s e fr om Ier op oli , Cr ow n Co rk ur g e s th a t th e Pe nn sylva nia court’s a naly sis is flawed bec ause it “c ontained no ana ly sis reg ardi n g wh et h er a statute that may have imp a ir e d a

ve ste d r ig ht c ou ld n e ve rt

he le ss be c on sti tut ion a l be c a us e it w a s a

le g iti mate e xer c ise of the leg islature’s p o l i ce power.” Although Ie ro po li involved the open c ourts provision of theTh e Te xas C on sti tut ion a lso ha s an o pe n c ourt s p ro vis ion , p ro vid ingthat “ [a]ll c ourt s sh a ll 21 be op e n, and

e ve ry pe rs on fo r a ny inj ur y do ne him , in his la

nd s, g oo ds , p e rs on

or re putatio n, sh a ll have reme dy by due course of law.” Tex. Cons t. art. I , § 13. I t require s that state law “ must afford me anin g fu l le g a l r e me die s to our c iti zen s, so the L e g isl a tur e may no t a br og a te the ri g ht to a sse rt a well-e stablished common law ca use of a ction.” F

e d e r a l Sig n v . Te x a s S. Univ. , 951 S.W .2d 401, 4 1 0 (T ex . 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 448 (Tex. 1993), and Moreno v . Sterling Drug, Inc. , 787 S.W .2d 348, 355-57 (Te x . 1990)).

To the extent the dissent criticiz es our discussion of the Pennsy lvania Supreme Court’s 22 decision in Ie ro

po li , th e dis se nt m iss e s th e mark
. Whil e we re c og nize that Satte rf ie ld d oe s n ot r a ise an o pen cou rt s c ha lle ng e , th e Pe nn sylva nia Sup re me Court ’s ana ly sis of wh e the r a

sim ila r s tatut e passed by

the Pennsylvania L eg islature impaire d vested r i gh t s and destroy ed all re medy for an ac crue d cause of ac tion applies with equal for ce in Te x as g iven that Texas law has c onsidered an ac crue d cause o f ac t i o n t o be a ve sted rig ht subject to constitutional protection for ove r one hundred year s. See City of Tyler v. Like s , 9 62 S .W.2d

48 9, 50 2 ( Te x. 19 97 ); Middleton v. Tex as Power &Light Co. , 1 85 S .W
. 55 6, 56 0 ( Te x. 19 16 ); Mellinger v. City of Houston , 3 S.W . 249, 253 (Tex. 1887). Moreove r, unl ike the Te x as Constitut ion, the Pennsy lvania Constituti on neither mandates nor prohibits the retroa ctive or pr ospective a pplication of a ne w rule of law. See Commonwealth v. Pere

z , 84 5 A. 2d

77 9, 79 0 ( Pa . 2 00 4) ; Blackwell v. State Ethics Comm’n , 589 A.2d 1 0 9 4 , 1 0 9 8 (P a. 1 9 9 1 ) (e x p l ai n i n g t h at , u n d er P en n s yl v an i a co m m o n l aw , a d ec i s i o nan n o u n ci n g a new r ule of lawwas normally considere d to be re troac tive). Althoug h the Pennsylvania Constituti on does prohibit the ena ctment of e x post facto law s, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the prohibition ag ainst ex post fac to laws applies only to criminal or penal statutes, and not to re troac tive laws af fect i n g civil matters. See, e .g. , Swa rtz v . Ca rli sle , 8 5 A . 8 47 , 8 49 (P a . 1 91 2) ; Gr im v . W e iss e nb e rg

Sc h. Di st. , 57 Pa. 433, 435 (Pa. 1868).

33 Pe n n s y lv a n ia Constit ution and

a var iat io n o f t he T ex as as bes to s s tat ut e, i n h ol di ng th e Pe nn sy lva nia 21
s tatute to b e u n c o n s ti tuti o n a l a s a p p li e d , th e c o urt’ s r e a s o n in g is in s tr u c ti v e here
. Reversing

22 the low e r c ourt , th e Pe nn sylva nia Sup re me Court c on c lud e d that the statut e vio late d the op e n c ourt s p ro v ision of the Pennsy lvania Constituti on by destroying a ll remedy

for a n acc rued a ction. Id . at 932. The c ourt furthe r held that a n acc rued c laim is a vested ri ght that cannot be e liminated by subsequent leg islation. Id . at 927. In explaining wh y the statute violated the r emedies c lause of the Pennsylvania Constituti on, the cour t stated:34

B e fo re the Statut e ’s e na c tme nt, e a c h c a us e of a c tio n that App e lla nts br ou g ht a g a ins t Crown Cork was a

reme dy —it was the vehic le by

which Appe llants lawfully pursued redr ess, i n the form of damag es, from Crown Cork for a n alleg ed leg al injury . But under the Statute, Appellants cannot oblig ate Crown Cork to pa y them damag es on tho se c a us e s o f a c tio n. I n th is w ay , e a c h c a us e of a c tio n h a s b e e n s tr ipp e d o f i ts re me dia l si g nif

ic anc e , a s it

c an n o lo ng e r f

un c tio n a s th e me ans by

wh ic h App e lla

nts may secur e redress from Crown C ork. As a re medy , eac h cause of ac tion has been, in e sse nc e , ex ti ng uis he d. Un de r [the op e n c ourt s p ro vis ion of the Pe nn sylva

nia Constit ution] , howeve r, a statute ma y not ext inguish a cause of a ction that has a c c ru e d .
. . . T he re fo re , a s App e lla nts ’ c a us e s o f a c tio n a c c ru e d b e fo re the Statut e wa s e na c te d, we ho ld t

hat th e Statut e ’s a

pp lic a tio n to Ap pe lla

nts ’ c a us e s o f a c tio n is unconstitutional . . . .
Id . at 930 (interna l citation omitt ed). The court re jected the argum en t t h at beca use the plaintiffs could re cover

from other potential defe ndants, it stil l had a r emedy and no ca use of a ction had bee n exti ng uished. Id.

Cr ow n Co rk

a lso a sse rt s th a t th e Statut e pa sse s c on sti tut ion a l mu ste r b e c a us e it does not deprive Satterfield of all reme dy beca use she sue d other de fenda nt s and can satisfy

her
c la ims by ob ta ininga

jud g me nt a g a ins t th os e de fe nd ants . Cr ow n Co rk su g g e sts tha

t th e Statut e
m e r e l y v ar ie

s the re medy

available to Satterfield. B eca use some of t h e o t h er defe ndants who
wer e sued jointly and sever ally are “some of this c ountry ’s larg est and most succ essful businesses,” Crown Cork ar g ues that Satterf ield may obtain a settlement fr om another de fenda nt that w ill satisfy he r jud g me nt and , the re fo re , the Statut e do e s no t e nti re ly take awa y he r r e me dy

or e ve n “ dim ini sh her r emedy

in any way .” I n reje cting the notion that the Pennsy lvania st atute wa s purely reme dial and did not bar all reme dy , the Ie ro

po li court re asoned:
What this rea s o n i n g overlooks is the individual nature of a ca use of a ction. A plaintiff does not asse rt one c ause of act ion ag ainst multi ple def endants. Rather , aTo the extent that the dissent relies o n t h e Fifth Circuit’s de cision in Jones v . Pullman 23 Kellogg Corp. , 7 85 F .2 d 1 27 0 ( 5th Cir
. 19 86 ), to su

pp or t thi s pr op os iti on , the dis se nt’ s re lia nc e is misplaced. Althoug h the cour t in Jones found that a statute that elimi n ated Jones’s medical malp ra ct i ce claims ag ainst one def endant did not violate the ope n courts provision of the Texas Consti tution because J ones’s c laims for dama g es ag ainst other defe ndants rema ined viable, t h e cour t in Jones d id

n o t c o n s id e r

w h e th e r s u c ha la w w o u ld v io late th e T e xa s Co n s ti tution’ s express prohibition aga inst retroac tive laws in article I , section 16. See id. at 1272-73.

Although Crown Cork dismiss es the re levanc e of the Ie ro po li de c isi on

be c a us e it f a ils to 24 addre ss the state’s police power , havingfound the Pennsylvania statute fa t ally flawe d under the open-c ourts provision, the Pennsy lvania cour t declined to addr ess t h e re maining six theories of constitutional invalidi ty
. Se e Ie ro po li , 842 A.2d at 924 n.7.

35 pla int if f a sse rt s o ne c a

us e of a c tio n ( or

tw o o r s e ve ra l c a

us e s of act io n) a g a ins t a sin g le de fe nd ant. Whil e a pla int if f m ay , und e r t

he a pp ro pr iate c ir c ums tanc e s, joi n the ca use of a ction he has a g ainst one def endant with the c aus e o f ac t i o n he has ag ainst another de fenda

nt in one lawsuit, the cause of ac tion he asser ts ag ainst eac h defe ndan t re m ai n s distinct. . . . Thus, the fact that the c auses of action Appe llant broug ht ag ainst Crown Cork’s co- defe ndants ar e procee ding ha s no bear ing on the Statut e ’s un c on sti tut ional effec t on the a c c ru e d c a

us e s o f a c tio n th a t App e lla nts br ou g ht a g a ins t it
. Id. (interna l ci tation omitt ed). Crown Cork cites no authority for the notion that the Texas Consti tution allows a statute to retroa ctively destroy a veste d rig ht in an ac crue d claim if other p art i e s m ay b e l i a

b l e o no t h e r

c l a i m s s e e k i n g d a m a g e s f o r t h e s a m e i n

j u r y. The Ie ro

po li court 23 observe d that the Pennsylvania statute did more tha n simply alter the allocation of da

mag es among multipl e def

endants: The Pennsy

lvan i a s tatute shielded Crown Cork f rom any obligation to pay damag es on asbe stos-relate d cause s of ac tion, and further remove d it as a def

endant. See id. Although the Pennsy lvania Constituti on is differ ent from the T exas Const itution,
and th e Pe nn sylva

nia c ourt re lie d u po n th e op e n c ourt s p ro vis ion to u ph old a c ha lle ng e to the Pennsylvania statute, bo th state s us e the ve ste d- ri g hts ana ly sis and bo th c on sti tut ion s— a lbe it 24
un de r d if fe re nt p ro vis ion s—

pr oh ibi t st a tut e s t hat r e tr oa c tiv e ly e lim inate a c c ru e d c la ims . Wh ile36

the P en n sy lvania Constituti on does not contain a prohibition ag ainst retroa ctive laws, the Texas Constit ution contains an open courts provision as well as an e x press ba r ag ainst retroa ctive laws in a rt ic le I , se c tio n 16 , and an e xpre ss pr oh ibi tio n on le g isl a tin g awa y the ri g hts c on ta ine d in the bill of rig hts in article I , section 29. Ac cording ly , even thoug h the Pennsylvania cour t relied on the open c ourts provision of the Pennsylvania Constituti on, its reasoning and ana ly sis reg ardingthe pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t r e tr oa c tiv e law s is persu a siv e in l ig ht o f t he Te xas C on sti tut ion ’s e xplic it pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t r e tr oa c tiv e laws . Do es the Sta tute Fal

l Wit hin the Sc op e of

the Sta te ’s Po lic ePo we r a nd i s it a Re as ona ble

Exe rc ise of the Sta te ’s Po lic ePo we r? Crown Cork ar g ues that “e ven if the Statute impairs a v es t ed ri gh t or deprive s ap p el l an to f a l l re m ed y , ” th e Legi s l at u re “p o s s es s es t h e p o we r t o re gu l at e c o rp o ra t i o n s an d we i gh the har dship of individuals ag ainst the hardship place d upon all of Texas’ citizens, both i ndividual and cor porate .” C rown Cork urg es t hat S atterf ield “ig nores Tex as law dic tating that her individual ri g hts mus t yie ld t o th e State ’s va lid e xer c ise of

po li ce po wer

in e na c tin g le g isl a tio n d e sig ne d to protec t innocent succ essor c orporations from a b an k ru p tcy that could af

fec t thousands of Texas residents.” We disag ree .

A statute ena cted unde r the guise of police pow er that does not fall within the scope of that po we r a

nd is not re a so na

bly re late d to saf

e g ua rd ing the pu

bli c ’s he a lth , s a fe ty

or we lf are is an invalid exercise of

that power . Be cause the people of Texas in plain lang uag e in theWe observe that any inquiry into whether the L eg islature re as on ab ly exercised its police 25 p o we r t o en ac t a re troac tive law is larg ely aca demic bec ause the Texas L eg islature has no pow er, police or othe rwise, to ena ct such a law at a ll. SeeTex. Cons t. art. I , §§ 16, 29.

37 Texas Consti tution have not deleg ated to the ir g overnme nt the power to enac t a re troac tive law, the L e g isl a tur e ha s n o p oli c e po we r t o o ve rr ide Sa tte rf ie ld’ s v e ste d r ig hts
. 25 As we be g an our a

naly sis with a presumption of constit u t i o nal validity , see Enron Corp. , 922 S.W .2d at 934, and Vinson , 773 S.W .2d at 266, ther e i s also a strongpresumption of re asonable n es s an d recog nition that a “L eg islature under stands and cor rec tly appre ciates the needs of its own people, that its l aw s are direc ted to problems made ma nifest by experience , and that its di s cr i m i n at ions are ba sed upon ade quate g rounds.” Sm ith v . D av is , 426 S.W .2d 827, 831 (Tex. 1968). As a pr actica l m at t er, if this were not the r ule, leg islative bodies would be without power to l egi s l at e in all cases involving police power wher e ther e wa s room for a differ ence of op ini on a s to the wi sd om a

nd ne c e ssi ty the re fo r, e xce pt s ub

je c t to the a

pp ro va l of

a jur y . B ut i t is the duty of the courts to de termine, as a matter of law, whether the L eg islature’s ex er ci s e o f t he police powe r is rea sonable. See M eye r v. Nebraska , 26 2 U.S. 390 , 4 00 (1 92 3) ; Lawton v . S te e le , 15 2 U .S. 13 3, 13 7 ( 18 94 ); Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry . Co. v. Rock wall County Leve e Im

provem ent D is t. No. 3 , 29 7 S.W. 2 06 , 2 12 (T e x. 19 27 ); Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. City of Dallas , 8 4 S
. W
. 6 4 8 , 6 5 3

- 5 4 ( T e x. 1 9 0 5 ) ; C i t y of Coleman v. Rhone , 222 S.W .2d 646, 650 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1949, wr it ref’ d).

Fa cing claims that a statute unconstitutionally abrog ated ve sted rig hts, some Texas courts have resolved the i ssue by addre ssing the L eg islature’s police power . See, e .g , Te x as Sta te Bd

. of B arbe r E

x am ’r s , 454 S.W .2d 729, 731-32 (Te x . 1970); Robinson , 251 S.W. 3d a t 52 6; Texas38

Sta te Te ac he rs A ss’n v . S tate , 711 S .W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.—Austi n 1986, writ ref ’d n.r.e .); Is ma il v . I sm ail , 70 2 S.W. 2d 21 6, 22 2 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Di st. ] 198 5, wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .) ; Sta te Bd. of Registration for

Pro f ’l E n g ’r s v. W ichita Eng’g Co. , 504 S.W .2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 19 73 , wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .) ; City of B re c k e nr idge v . Coza rt , 478 S.W .2d 162, 164 (T e x. Civ . App .— Ea stl and 19 72 , w ri t r e f’ d n .r .e .) ; City of Col eman , 222 S.W
. 2 d at 6 4 8 -49. L ikewise, the Te x as S u p re m e C o urt relied on the police powe r to validate a statute addre ssing historic water

use in Barshop v. Me dina County Underground W ater Conservation District , 925 S.W .2d 618, 633-34 (Te x . 1996).

Even if we we re t o ap p l y the over lay

of a police power

analy sis in the context of limit ing c orporat e l iability , the police powe r re mains subject to the limitations imposed by the Constit ution upon every

power of g overnme nt. Travelers Ins. Co. , 76 S.W .2d at 1011 (re cog nizi ng tha t t h e p o li c e p o w e r

is b r o a d an d c o mp r e h e n s iv e , b ut c o n c lu d in g th a t t h e T e xa s Co n s tituti on

“ fo rb ids its e xer c ise wh e n th e re su lt w ou ld be the de str uc tio n of the ri g hts , gua

ra nte e s, pr ivi le g e s,
an d restraints ex cepte d from the powe rs of g overnme nt by the B ill of Right[s] ”). F or the police power to trump any c o n s t i tu t i o n a l p r o v i s i o ni s s u r e l y t h e m o s tc i r c u l ar o f ar g u m e n t s . “ E m e r g e n c y” do e s n ot c re ateconstitutional power; i t m ay only furnish the oc casion for

the e x e rc iseof powe r. Ho meBl dg . &Loa n A ss’n v . B lai

sd e ll , 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934). Although the police powe r is broad, it is not without li mits. See Travelers Ins. Co. , 76 S.W .2d at 1011. I t r emains subject to the rule that the L eg islature ca nnot exercise anypower

that is e xpre ssl y

or imp lie dly fo rb idd e n b y

the state c on sti tut ion , a

nd the L e g isl a tur e , thro ug h it s e xer c ise of police pow er, ma

y not rende r the c onstitut ion meaning less. See id. a t 10 10 -1 1. Re vie wi ngc ourt s39

cannot sustain “[u]surpations of power, or the exercise of power in disre g ard of the express provision
or pla in i nte nt o f t

he c on sti tut ion

. . . in de fe re nc e to t

he j ud gment of the L e g isl a tur e , o r s ome supposed nec essity .” 12A Te x . J ur. 3d, Constit utional L aw § 5 7 (1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Travelers Ins. Co. , 76 S.W .2d at 1007). The mere asser tion by the L eg islature that a statute relates to the public hea lth, safe ty , or we lfare does not of itself br i n g s uch statute within the police pow er of a state. Mugler v. Kansas , 1 23 U. S. 6 23 , 6 61 (1 88 7) (“ I t doe s not at a ll f oll owthat e ve ry

statut e e na c te d o ste ns ibl y for the pr omotion of these ends, is to be acce pted as a legitimate exertion of the police power s of the State .” ); se e als o 16A Am. J ur. 2d, Constit utional L aw § 335 (1998). The L eg islature, in exercising its poli ce power, “ca

nnot, by its mere fiat,” make r easona ble that which is indisputably unrea sonable, or unconstitutional. 16A Am. J ur. 2d, Constit utional L aw § 3 35 ; se e als o S tate v . S pa rta n’ s I nd us . Inc. , 4 47 S.W. 2d

40 7, 41 7 ( Te x. 19 69 ). Th is a c c ounta bil ity fo r t he c on sti tut ion

may lie in the fi rs t i n s t an c e w i t ht h e L e g i s l a tu r e , b u ti tr u n s i n e x o r a

b l y t o t h e j u d i c i ar

y. For a statute to be a

proper exercise of

police powe r, it must (i) be appr opriate a nd
rea sonably

nece ssary

to acc omplish a purpose within the scope of the police powe r and (i i ) be
rea sonable a

nd not arbitrar

y or unjust in the manner it se eks to a ccomplish the g oal of the statute or
so unduly harsh that it is out of proportion to t he end soug ht to be acc omplished. See, e .g. , Mugler , 12 3 U. S. a t 66 1; Martin v. W holesome D airy, Inc. , 4 37 S.W. 2d 58 6, 59 1 ( Te x. Civ . App .— Au sti n 1969, writ ref

’d n.r.e .); City of Col eman , 222 S.W .2d at 648-49. I n s u p p o rt o f it s c la im th a t t h e St a tute f

a ll s w it h in th e s c o p e o f

th e p o li c e p o w e r, Crown Cork cites c ases that involve exercises of police power for public he alth and saf

ety , including Barshop (u

ph old ing laws re late d to env ir on me nta l pro te c tio n an d wate r c on se rv a tio n) ; Te x as Sta te Teachers Assoc iation , StateBo ar d o f R e gis tra tio n fo r P ro

fe ssi on al E ng ine e rs , and

Te x as Sta teC i t i n g City of Coleman v. Rhone , 222 S.W .2d 646, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1949, 26 writ ref ’d), a nd Ne al v . B oo g- Sc ott , 247 S.W
. 689, 691 (Tex. Civ. App.—B eaumont 1923, no wr it), the dissent maintains that it is not the role of the cour ts to second g uess the L eg islature’s deter mination that an act will serve a public use or purpose “except in instance s where the leg islative deter mination of the question is palpably and manifestly arbitra

ry and incorre ct.” Acc ording to the dissent, then, the L eg islature’s e nactment of a statute under the g uise of exercising its poli ce pow er would be virtually

without lim its. But this is not the re cog nized standard of r eview unde r Texas law. Se e Tra v e le rs In s. Co. v . M ar sh all , 7 6 S. W.2 d 1 00 7, 10 11 -1 2 ( Te x. 19 34 ) ( c ourt s ma y no t su sta in the L e g isl a tur e ’s e xer c ise of po lic e po we r whe re fo rb idd e n b y Te xas C on sti tut ion ); Missouri, Kan. 40 Bo ar d o f B arbe r E

x am iner s (re g ulation of profe ssions); and Car uth e rs (zoning). With a mere
n o d to those case s analy

zing the applica

bility of the police power , the supreme court in B arshop conclude d that “[a] valid ex erc ise of the police power by t h e L egislature to sa feguard the public safe ty

and we lfar e ca n p reva il over a f inding that a

law is unconstitutionally retroa ctive.” 9 2 5 S
. W
. 2 d at 6 3 3

- 3 4 ( c i t i n g Texas State Teache r’s Ass’n , 7 11 S.W. 2d a t 42 4; State Bd. of Re gis tra tio n fo r Pro

f’ l E ng ’r s , 5 04 S.W. 2d

a t 60 8; Te

x as Sta te Bd

. o f B arbe r E

x am ’r s , 454 S.W .2d at 732; and Car uth e rs , 290 S.W .2d at 345). Barshop is simpl y not releva

nt here . The supre me cour t in Barshop c on sid e re d w he the r t he Ed wa rd s A qu if e r Ac t wa s c on sti tut ion a l on its face. 925 S.W .2d at 633 (plaintiffs a

rgued that the Act was an unconstitutional retroa ctive law be cause “the amount of water a landowner

is allowed to withdraw is deter mined from ac tion or inaction taken be fore the passag e, sig ning, or

eff ective date of the Act”)
. Barshop did not involve accr ued and pe nding c auses of ac tion b u t addre ssed whethe r a la ndowner has vested pr operty

rig hts to water be neath his land. Id. a t 63 0. Th e su

pr e me c ourt

did no t ha ve oc c a sio n to a dd

re ss a rt ic le I , s e c tio n 2 9, in p art be c a us e the court “assum[ed] without deciding that Plaintiffs posse ss[ ed] a vested pr operty rig ht.” Id. Whil e
we agr ee wi t hC ro wn C o rkt h at t h es e p ar t i cu l ar ca s es , i n cl u d i n g Barshop , ma y have inv olv e d a

va lid exercise of

police powe r, the que stion whether the Statute in this case is a valid exercise of police po we r re ma ins su

bje c t to re vie w by th is Court
. See Lawton , 1 52 U. S. at 13 7; Missouri, Kan. 26& Tex. Ry. Co. v

. Rock wall County Levee Improve ment Dist. No. 3 , 297 S.W . 206, 212 (Tex. 1927) (leg islative exercise of police power i s subject to judicial revie w); Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. City of Dallas , 8 4 S. W. 6 48 , 6 53 -5 4 ( Te x. 19 05 ) ( le g isl a tiv e e na c tm ent s “ ‘a re su bje c t to investigation in the courts with a v i ew to determining whether the law or

ordinanc e is a law ful ex er ci s e o f t h e p o l i ce p o we r’ ”) (q u o t i n g Dobbins v. Los Angeles , 195 U. S. 2 23 , 2 36 (1 90 4) ); se e als o Mey er v. Nebrask

a , 2 62 U. S. 3 90 , 4 00 (1 92 3) ; Lawton v . S te e le , 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). Eve n th e c o u rt o f a

p p e a ls in City of Col eman rec og nized that the police power , althoug h broad a nd compre hensive, re mains subject t o constitutional limit s. 222 S.W .2d at 649 (“ This [ police] power and the r ight to exerc ise it is li mited by the Constitut ion.”). 41 & Tex. Ry . Co. , 292 S.W . at 212.

I n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r an e xe r c i s e o f p o l i c e p o w e r i s p r o p e r , w e a s k i f t he sta tut e in question bear s a real and substantial relation to the publ ic health, safe ty , morals, or ge nera l welfa re of t hepu bli c . Se e Ba rb ie r v . Co nn oll y , 1 13 U. S. 27, 31 (1 88 5) (l e g isl a tio n must c arr y out a “ pu bli c purp os e ” and pr omo te “ the g e ne ra l g oo d” ); see also Lombardo v. City of Dallas , 73 S.W .2d 475, 478 ( T e x . 1 9 3 4 ) ( o n l y pu bli c ne c e ss ity c an ju sti fy

e xer c ise of

po lic e po we r) ; J

e fc o, In c . v . Le wis , 52 0 S. W.2 d 9 15 , 9 22 (T e x. Civ . App .— Au sti n 1 97 5, wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .) (“ The po li ce po we r i s g rounded upon public ne cessity [,] which alone can justify it s ex er ci s e.”) . Courts have pe rfor med thi s in qu ir

y in a numbe r o f w ay s. Fo r e x am p l e, in M

a r ti n v . W h o le s o m eD a ir y, Inc

. , this Court considered whe ther ther e
was a rea sonable basis for the L eg islature to enac t a statute re g ulating the sale of “ filled milk,” an imitati o n m i l k p roduct known a s “F arme r’s Da ug hter Hig h Protein Drink,” ba sed on its police power . 437 S.W .2d at 591. W holesome Dairy soug ht a declaratory judgme nt that the statute was unconstitutional and witnesses testified in the non-jur y trial. Id. at 587. Var ious doctors testified to t he nutr iti on al con te nt o f t he pr od uc t and wh e the r i ts p a c ka g ingand la be lin g wa s in te nd e d to mislead the g ener al public into be lieving that the produc t contained natural whole c ow’s milk. Id.42

at 592-600. The trial court made f indings of f

act a nd conclusions of law
. Id. at 587-88. In decla ring the statute to be constitutional and within the St ate’ s police powe r to regulate matter s relatingto the health and sa fety

of its citiz ens, the Court re lied upon the qualifications and expertise of the doctors “tog ether with their experience and studi es i n t h ei r re spective f ields, ref lected by the re cord, mak[ing] admissibl e their opinions on the matters a bout which they

testified.” Id . at 60 2; se e als o Jefc o, Inc. , 520 S.W .2d at 922 (co n cluding regulation fell within police power afte r consider ing evidenc e at tria l and administrative hea ring ). I n City of Houston v. Johnny Frank’s Auto Parts Co. , the cour t of appe als addre ssed whether an ordina nce r egulating the operation of automotive wre cking and salvag e y ards within the City was within the scope of the City of Houston’s police power . 480 S.W .2d 774, 775 (Tex. Civ. App.—H o u s ton [ 14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref ’d n.r.e .). Afte r a non-

jury trial in which the trial c ourt filed finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, the c ourt found that the e vidence was leg ally sufficie nt t h at t h e o rdi nance was a proper exercise of

police powe r bec ause the proof showe d that such
wre cking and salvag e y ards we re a “hazar d to the safe ty

of childre n who ar e natur ally attrac ted by such conditions.” Id . at 780.

C o u rt s h av e a l s o re l i edu p o np re ce d en tan d u p o nm at t er s t h at t ra d i t i o n al l y h i n ge “upon the public ne ed fo r s afe ty , health, sec urity , and prote ction of the g ener al welf are .” City of Coleman , 222 S.W .2d at 648. T h us, the L eg islature, in the exerc ise of the police power , may
re gu late occ upations and prof essions. See, e .g. , Te

x as Sta te Bd

. o f B arbe r E

x am ’r s , 4 5 4 S.W .2d at 73 1 ( ba

rb e rs ); Daniel v. Tyrrell &Garth Inv. Co. , 9 3 S. W. 2 d 3 7 2 ( T e x. 1 9 3 6 ) (insura nce
c omp anie s) ; Texas St ate Teache rs Ass’n , 711 S.W .2d at 421 (re g ulation of teac hing profe ssion and43

p u b l i c e d u c a t i o ns y s t e mw a s v a l i d e xe r c i s e o f

s t a t e ’ s p o l i c e p o w e r) ; T exas State Bd. of Pub. Acc ountancy v . Fulcher , 515 S.W .2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.— Corpus C hristi 1974, writ ref’ d n.r.e.) (a c c ounta nts ); Br y an t v . S tate , 457 S.W .2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.— Eastland 1970, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (atto rn e y s) ; Do v ali na v . A lbe rt , 409 S.W .2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App.— Amarillo 1966, writ ref’d n.r .e.) (p oly g ra phop e rator s) ; Fran c isc o v . B oa rd of D e nta l E

x am ’r s , 149 S.W .2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1941, writ ref ’d) ( den tists). I n decla

ring teac hing to be a prof ession, courts have
a lso re c og ni z e d th a t th e L e g isl a tur e ’s duty to e sta bli shand ma int a in a

pu bli c sc ho ol s y ste m in Texas involves the exercise of the s tate’s police power . See, e .g. , Sp rin g B ra nc h I nd e p. Sc h. Di

st. v. Stamos , 6 9 5 S
. W
. 2 d 5 5 6 (T e x. 19 85 ); Mum mev . M arrs , 4 0 S. W.2 d 3 1 ( Te x. 19 31 ); Passel

v . Fo rt W or th In de p. Sch . Dis t. , 4 2 9 S. W. 2 d 9 1 7 , 9 2 5 ( T e x. Ci v . Ap p . — F o rt W o rth

1 9 6 8 ) ( “ We think it well withi n the police powe r of the State to a dopt sta ndards to guide the administration of our public school sy stem. . . .”), rev’d on other grounds , 440 S.W .2d 61 (Tex. 1969). “The power of the State to c omp e l atte nd anc e a t so me sc ho ol a nd to m a ke re a so na

ble re g ulatio ns fo r a ll s c ho ols
. . . is not questioned.” Mey er v. State of Nebraska , 2 62 U. S. 3 90 , 4 02 (1 92 3) . A nd the L e g isl a tur e ’s du ty to maintain the public school sy stem is of constitutional magnitude. SeeTex. Cons t. art. VI I , § 1.

I n Mey er v. Nebrask

a , the Sup re me Court

a dd re sse d th e e xten t of

the va lid e xer c ise of the pol ic e p o w e r . 2 6 2 U
. S. a t 3 9 7
. I n th a t c a s e , th e Su p r e me Co u rt s tr

u c k d o w n a s tate law forbidding instruction in cer tain fore ign lang uag es. Id. a t 40 3. Th e State of Ne br a sk a argue d th a t,
as an attribute of sovere ignty , the police powe r exists without any rese rvation in the Consti tution, and that it is founded on the r ight of the State to pr otect its citiz ens, to provide f or their we lfare and prog ress, and to insure the good of society
. Id. at 397-98. F acingan ar g ument by the State that the44

enac tment of a statute ba

rringthe teac hing of

the Ger man languag e to a c hild who ha d not passed the eig hth grade comes “ rea sonably within the police power

of the state,” the Court conclude d that the statute, eve n though unde r the guise of prote ctingthe public i ntere st, was ar bitrary and “w ithout
rea sonable re lation to some purpose withi n t h e co m p et ency of the State to ef

fec t.” Id. at 400. Holding that “[d] eter

mination by the l eg islature of what constit utes proper exercise of

police powe r is not final or conc lusive but is subjec t to supervision by the cour ts,” the Court rea soned that eve n a desira ble end “ cannot be promoted by prohibited means.” Id . at 400-01. L i k e w i s e , i nt h e 1 8 8 0 ’ s , t h e S t a t e o f K an s a s , i ni t s d e s i r e t o e r a d i c a t e “ m i s e r y, pauper ism, and crime,” passed a law prohibiting the manufa cture of intox icating liquors. Mugler , 123 U.S. at 653. The State a rgued that the police power was a lone compete nt “to the cor rec tion of these g reat evils, and all measur es of r est ra int or prohibition necessar y to effe ct the purpose are within the scope of that authority .” Id. at 6 5 8 -59. In rec og nizi ng that the power to determine the extent of the police powe r, i .e., the extent to which “the peac e and pe ril” of the ma ny is endang ere d by the fe w, is lodge d in the l eg islative branc h of t he gover nment, the Court stated, “It belong s to that [l eg islative] department to exert what ar e known a s the police powe r of the State, and to deter mine, pr ima ri ly , w hat meas ur e s are a pp ro pr iate or

ne e df ul f or the pr ote c tio n o f t

he pu bli c mor a ls, the public hea lth, or the public safe ty .” Id. at 661. The Court explained, however , that the police power is lim ited:
I t does not at al l follow that ever y statute ena cted ostensibly for the pr omotion of these e nds, is to be a cce pted as a le g itimate exertion of the police powe r of the State. Th e re are , of ne c e ssi ty , limit s beyon d whi c h leg isl a tio n cann ot ri g htf ull y g o. Whil e ever y possible presumption is to be indulged in fa vor of the validity of a statute, the courts mu s t o b e y th e Co n s ti tuti o n r a th e r th an th e la w - ma k in g d e p artm e n t of45

g overnme nt, and must, upon th ei r o wn responsibility , deter mine whether , in any particula r ca se, these limits have be en passe d.
Id. C i t i n g Marbury v . Madison , 5 U.S. 137, 176 ( 1803), the Court queried, “ To what purpose are p o w e r s l i m i t e d , an d t o w h a tp u r p o s e i s t h a tl i m i t a t i o nc o m m i t t e d t o w r i t i n g , i f

t h e s e l i m i t s m ay, at any time, be passed by

those intended to be r estraine d? ” Reco gn i z i n g the sing ular role of the courts in de termining if the ena ctment came within the rea sonable police power s of the state, the Court rea soned:
Th e c ourt s are no t bo un d b y me re fo rm s, no r a

re the y to b e mis le d by

me re pr e te nc e s. Th e y ar e a t l ib e rty

— in d e e d , ar e u n d e r

a s o le mn d u ty

—to lo o k a t t h e s u b s ta n c e of things, whe never

they enter upon the inquiry

whether the l eg islature has transce nded the lim its of

its a uth or ity . I f, the re fo re , a sta tut e purp or tin g to have be e n e na c te d to protec t the public health, the public mora ls, or th e public saf ety , has no re al or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable inva sion of rig hts secure d by the fu nd ame nta l la

w, it i s th e duty

of the c ou rt s to so a dju dg e , an d the re by g ive e ff e c t to the Constitut ion.
Id. Under

these princ iples, the S u p re m e Court concluded that the manufa cture and sale of int oxic a tin g liq

uo rs fe ll w ith in t

he po lic e po we rs of

the Sta te a s “ pr ote c tin g the c omm un ity a g a ins t the evils which c onfesse dly result from the excessive use of arde nt spirits,” and that the re g ulations
wer e not under

the mere g uise of police pow er a iming to depr i v e t h e citiz en of his constitutional rig hts. Id . at 662. The diss enting justice cited to the S upreme Court of Kansas, which urge d that the L eg islature of the State “may have g one to the utmost verg e of c onstitut ional authority .” Id. at 678. We may fairly say , then, t hat by stripping a litigant of his rig hts in his pending a nd
ve ste d c omm on

law c la im, fo r t

he purp or te d b e ne fi t of

on e or mor e corp oratio ns su c c e e din g to liability it seeks to shed, and w ithout a t ru e ar t i culation of any “re al or substantial” r elation to the46

o b j ec t s o f p u

b l i c he al t h , p u

b l i c m o ra l s , o r t h e p u

b l i c s af et y , we m u s tex er ci s e o u r du t y t o ad j u d ge that the limita t i o n s o f t h e p olice powe r have been f ar e x cee ded, so as to no long er be in sight of tho se wh o c la im t o r e ly

on it. Sa fe ty , h e a lth , mo ra ls. I t c ann ot b e su pp os e d th a t th e se ob

je c ts
are addre ssed in any

rea l manner by

this legislation. I f this be an a pprop ri ate e x erc ise of police po we r, wh a t is no t?

I f the police power i s to have a ny meaning ful limit ations, public needs must be distinguished fr om the financ ial protec tion of a par ticular private business or business seg ment. At the hear t of the police power is its groundingin the public interest. See J efco, I nc. , 520 S.W .2d at 922. Crown Cork has made no showing and ther e is nothing i n the re cord to de monstrate that t h e Legi s l at u re ’s e n a c t m e n to f t h e S t at u t e f al l s wi t h i nt h e s co p e o f t h e p o l i ce p o we r. Al t h o u gh Crown Cork protests that the L eg islature re asonably exercised its police power “in f avor of secur ing jobs a n d w a g e s f o r th o u s an d s o f

T e xa s c it iz e n s w h o ma

y b e n e f it f r o m t h e c o n ti nu e d

v ia b il it y of the succ es sor cor

porations for whom they

work that a

re a ble to take the be nefit of the limitation of liability

in the Statute,” this utterance alone doe s not bring the S t at u t e wi thin the police power of the State. See Lawton , 1 52 U. S. at 13 7; Travelers Ins. Co. , 76 S.W. 2d a t 10 11 ; Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry . Co. , 297 S.W . at 212. Fo r t h e S t at u t e to be a rea sonable e x erc ise of the State’ s police po we r, the r e m u s t b e a c o n n e c t i o n o r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e S t a tu t e an d it s
avo we d p ur

po se , a nd the Statut e mus t be de sig ne d to a c c omp lis h th e pu bli c g oa l. He re , Cr ow n Cor

k a c kn ow le dg e s— and

e ve n urg e s—

that th e pr of

e sse d p ur po se of the statute is “to re scue c orporations li ke Crown Cork & Seal from the serious proble ms created by asbestos litigation”: “The L eg islature ther efor e ena cted leg islation li miting the liab ility of47

corpor ations sued in asbestos l i t i gat i o n t h at ac quired their liability solely throug h a mer g er.” But there is no showing that the pur pose of the Crown Cork statute—to save companies on the verg e of ba nk ru ptc y —is se rv e d b y

inc lud ingCr ow n Co rk , o r a ny oth e r co mpa

ny wi thi n its sco pe . F or

us to
a sse ss t he re a so na

ble ne ss o f t

he statut e , the L e g isl a tur e ’s int e nt t hr ou g h f ind ing s o r t

he pla in lang uag e of the statute must be clea r. See, e .g. , United St ates v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995) (invalidating law and e x plaining t h at l ack of cong ressional finding s hinders a c ourt’s re view of leg islative intent). Be cause the L eg islature made no finding s, like the Supreme Court in Lopez , we have no e x pression of leg islative intent bey ond the words of the statute to he lp us deter mine whether the ena ctment of the statute w as a r easona ble exercise of

the L eg islature’s police power . W e f i n d i ts i gn i fi ca n t t h at t h e Legi s l at u re d ec l i n edt o i n cl u d e a n y l egi s l at i v e f

i n d i n gs in the Statute. See id. Although H ouse Bill 4 includes l eg islative finding s that addre ss health ca re liability claims, see Act of June 11, 2003, su pra , § 10.11, 2003 T ex . Gen. L aws at 884, there a re
no simil ar leg islative finding s reg ardingthe Statute. Thus, to the extent C rown Cork re lies on “the asbestos litigation crisis” and its own fra g ile financ ial condition, the re are no leg islative findings on these issues. Nor

does the text of the Statute itself c onvey an eme rg ency

or cr isis reg ardingasbestos litigation or the f

rag ile financ ial condition of any corpor ation, fore ign or

domestic
. E v en so, t he Te xas S up re me Court

ha s h e ld t

hat e me rg e nc y

c on dit ion s d o n ot a llo w the Te xas L e g isl a tur e to
enac t a statute that destroy s vested rig hts in violation of the Texas Constitution. Se e Tra v e le rs I ns . Co. , 76 S.W .2d at 1011.

We c on c lud e the a c tiv ity

so ug ht t o be add res se d in the Statut e do e s n ot f

a ll w ith in the s cope of the pol ice power, it is not rea sonable in its ex erc ise of that powe r, and it does not, in anySee Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 267 n.20. 27 48 event, ove rride the constitutional int ere st in preservingthe common law claim. The Statute, a s applied to Satterfie ld, is unconstitut ional beca use it violates the prohibition a g ainst retroa ctive laws
e mbr a c e d b y

the pe op le of

Te xas i n th e ir

B ill of Rig hts
. CO NC LU SION I t is a matte r o f fundamental fairne ss and the ly nchpin of our justice sy stem that the settled ex p ec t at ions of litigants and in pa rticular a ny validly vested rig hts not be defe ated by

subsequently en ac t ed leg islation. That the people of Texas rec og nized the importance of pre dictability and stability

in the ir justice sy stem and the potential for the power ful to o bta in s pe c ia l and

imp ro pe r b e ne fi ts is fully re fl ected in the plain lang uag e of the 27 Te xas C on sti tut ion . T he Te xas Con sti tut ion c on tin ue s to sp e a k p la inl y

and e loq ue ntl y to p ro hib it le g isl a tio n th a t un de rm ine s its so un d no tio ns of fu nd a me nta l f

a ir ne ss a s und e rs too d b y

the pe op le when they

voted on its adoption. Ba sed on the struc ture a

nd plain lang uag e of the Texas Constitution, as well as the weig ht of b in d in g

p r e cede nt, we conc lude the Statute is an unconstitutional retroa ctive law a s applied to S a tte rf ie ld’ s c la ims a g a ins t Cr ow n Co rk
. As a pp lie d to Sa tte rf

ie ld, we c on c lud e that th e Statut e retroa ctively

destroy s her ve sted rig hts in accr ued common law tor

t claims ag ainst Crown Cork and that the Statute violates article I , section 16 of the T exas Const itution.

F or the se re a so ns , w e re ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt ’s summa ry jud g me nt a

nd re mand thi s
c a se to t he tr ia l c ourt

fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.49 __________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and He nson; Dissenting opinion by Chief J ustice L aw Reverse d and Remande d Filed: August 29, 2008