* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JORGE ALFREDO BURGOS-GOMEZ, aka Medardo Villanueva-Castellanos, Petitioner,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney General, Respondent. No. 08-72170 B.I.A. No. A098-182-258

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted August 11, 2010 San Francisco, California Before: GRABER, CALLAHAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Jorge Alfredo Burgos-Gomez, a native and citizen of Honduras, appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ ("BIA") dismissal of the immigration judge’s ("IJ") removal order. The BIA found that Petitioner was deportable as charged, inadmissible because of his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, and ineligible for any waiverthat would permit him to qualify for 

# FILED

AUG 25 2010 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 adjustment of status. The BIA also affi rmed the denial of Petitioner’s application for adjustment of status on the ground that he failed to demonstrate the requisite degree of hardship to his United States c itizen mother and son. We review final decisions of the BIA, Sanchez-Cruz v. INS , 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2001), but we lack jurisdiction to review discre tionary decisions, Murillo-Salmeron v. INS , 327 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2003). We grant the petition in part, dismiss in part, and remand to the BIA. The BIA erred in its analysis regard ing whether Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit battery, in viola tion of sections 199.480 and 200.481 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. The BIA improperly held that Petitioner’s convicti on constituted a crime of moral turpitude without conducting the required analysis under the most recent applicable precedents. Specifically, the BIA’s analysis is incomplete because it failed to take account of the categorical approach set forth by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575 (1990). The BIA did not analyze the specific elements of the Nevada crime. See Uppal v. Holder , 605 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that, in determining whether a conviction under a criminal statute is categorically a crime of moral turpitude, th e BIA first must identify the elements of the criminal statute and then must compar e those elements to the generic definition3 of a crime involving moral turpitude and d ecide whether they meet the definition). And, a fortiori, the BIA did not undertake to decide whether, if the Nevada statute does not qualify categorically, the modified categorical approach applies. See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 187 (2007) (noting that some courts refer to this step of the Taylorinquiry as the "modified categorical approach"). The BIA also failed to use the form of anal ysis set forth in its own opinion in In re Short , 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137-38 (B.I.A. 1989). We are not authorized to conduct any of that analysis for the BIA, INS v. Orlando Ventura , 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam), so we must remand for it to do so in the first instance. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision to deny Petitioner a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mejia v. Gonzales , 499 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2007). GRANTED in part; DISMISSED in part; and REMANDED. Costs on appeal awarded to Petitioner.