Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 1 of 16

I N T H E

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Goalsetter Systems, Inc. d/b/a Escalade Sports,

Appellant

v.

Estate of Nolan Gerwels, et al.,

Appellee

February 28, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-CT-1896

Appeal from the St. Joseph Circuit Court

The Honorable John E. Broden, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71C01-1807-CT-340

Opinion by Judge Bailey

Judges Crone and Pyle concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 2 of 16

Bailey, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In a products liability and wrongful death action brought by the Estate of Nolan 

Gerwels (“the Estate”) against Goalsetter Systems, Inc. d/b/a Escalade Sports 

(“Goalsetter”) and other defendants, this Court has accepted a discretionary 

interlocutory appeal challenging the grant of the Estate’s motion to compel

Goalsetter to produce documents, including some exchanged between 

Goalsetter and the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission (“the 

CPSC”). We affirm.

Issues

[2] Goalsetter presents the following issues for review: 

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Goalsetter’s request for a protective order and compelling 

the production of documents that the CPSC had refused to 

produce in response to the Estate’s Freedom of 

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, (“FOIA”) request; and

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

adequately protect Goalsetter’s work product.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Fourteen-year-old Nolan Gerwels was killed on June 22, 2018, when a 

basketball goal detached from the wall of an in-home gymnasium and fell on 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 3 of 16

him. Gerwels’ parents opened an estate, and on July 17, the parents, 

individually, and the Estate filed a complaint against Dick’s Sporting Goods,

the seller, Goalsetter, the manufacturer, and other defendants who had engaged 

in residential construction and equipment installation services.

[4] On November 28, 2018, the parties entered into a Stipulated Protective Order 

to “govern the production and handling of any protected information in this 

action.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, pg. 3.) Pursuant to the order, a party who 

produced protected information could designate it as “confidential” and a nonparty would receive a copy of designated information only after agreeing to be 

bound by specific confidentiality terms. See id. The Estate requested discovery 

materials from Goalsetter and received materials that included communications 

from the CPSC to Goalsetter. Specifically, in response to Goalsetter’s selfreporting to the CPSC of Gerwels’ death, CPSC had stated in writing that it 

was taking no action at that time.

[5] In January of 2022, Goalsetter and the Estate’s attorney each reported to the 

CPSC that there had been an adverse incident in Utah involving a Goalsetter 

basketball goal. Eventually, four separate incidents were reported. On October 

27, 2022, the CPSC announced that Goalsetter had issued a recall of Goalsetter 

wall-mounted basketball goals, identifying the hazard as: “The basketball goal 

can detach from the wall and fall to the ground posing a serious impact injury 

hazard and risk of death.” (Id. at 25.) 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 4 of 16

[6] The Estate’s attorney issued a FOIA request to the CPSC seeking, among other 

things, consumer reports of injuries from Goalsetter wall mount products, all 

records in the CPSC files, and correspondence between the CPSC and Escalade 

Sports after June 22, 2018. (Exhibit A.) The FOIA request was denied on 

February 2, 2023. In part, the denial letter provided that the CPSC Office of 

Compliance “has determined that disclosing these records would cause an 

articulable harm to the current investigation while the recall is still in 

monitoring status.” (Exhibit A.)

[7] The Estate requested supplemental discovery from Goalsetter, who provided 

some responsive materials and objected to the production of others. In 

pertinent part, Goalsetter asserted that materials provided by Goalsetter to the 

CPSC are protected by a privilege of self-critical analysis1 and cannot be 

released to the Estate under the FOIA. Goalsetter also claimed that documents 

exchanged between it and a governmental entity are privileged trade secrets, 

confidential, and not subject to discovery under the Consumer Product Safety 

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2055 (“the CPSA”). 

[8] On February 24, 2023, the Estate filed a motion to compel Goalsetter to 

produce discovery materials in response to the Estate’s first, second, third, and 

1 The Consumer Products Safety Act requires that manufacturers, distributors, and retailers report to the 

CPSC defects in goods that would create a substantial hazard. 15 U.S.C. § 2064. Reports made in 

accordance with that requirement are sometimes referred to as self-critical analysis reports. See Scroggins v. 

Uniden Corp. of America, 506 N.E.2d 83, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 5 of 16

fourth requests for production.

2

 The Estate sought discovery materials inclusive 

of: correspondence between Goalsetter and the CPSC; communications 

between Goalsetter and consumers; and communications between Goalsetter 

and other persons such as independent contractors or inspectors. Other 

requests concerned research and development and test reports related to such 

things as dynamic load, static load, and engineering stress.

[9] Goalsetter filed a response and, regarding post-recall supplementation, 

Goalsetter objected “to any and all requests that seek information that may 

have been exchanged with the CPSC, prepared in anticipation or coordination 

with the CPSC, may otherwise be related to any investigation by the CPSC or 

to any recall, or may have been completed as part of communications and 

negotiations with any governmental entity, including the CPSC.” (Appellant’s 

App. Vol. III, pg. 76.) Goalsetter claimed that such documents are privileged 

trade secrets under the CPSA and the FOIA, attorney work product, and 

“protected by the privilege of self-critical analysis.” Id. Finally, Goalsetter 

asserted that the release of such information would be harmful to the CPSC 

investigation and enforcement. Goalsetter sought a corresponding protective 

order “that discovery related to any CPSC reporting, investigation, research, 

testing, training, or recall, including any internal communication and 

2

Specifically sought were materials in response to items 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, and 40 of the first request for 

production; items 9, 16, and 22 of the second request; item 2 of the third request; and items 1 through 27 of 

the fourth request.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 6 of 16

communications with the CPSC and any documents exchanged, should be 

protected from discovery.”3 (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, pg. 127.)

[10] The trial court conducted a hearing on March 28, 2023, at which argument of 

counsel was heard. Goalsetter advised the trial court that the CPSC had

opened a new investigation in 2022 and had denied the Estate’s FOIA request. 

On that basis, Goalsetter argued that “all from 2022 forward” constituted its 

“work product” and confidential materials “pursuant to CPSC guideline.” (Tr. 

Vol. II, pg. 35.) The parties also presented arguments with regard to Indiana’s 

non-recognition of a self-critical analysis privilege. The Estate argued that 

Scroggins v. Uniden Corp. of America, 506 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), 

trans. denied, is controlling authority while Goalsetter argued that Scroggins was 

wrongly decided. The Estate argued that Goalsetter was at fault for failing to 

maintain a log of claimed work product items while Goalsetter deemed the 

Estate at fault for failure to pursue the administrative remedy of an appeal after 

the FOIA denial.

[11] On April 26, the trial court issued an order granting the motion to compel 

“subject to the limitations and restrictions set out in this Order.” (Appealed 

Order at 6.) The limitations are described in the order as follows:

3

In particular, the requested protective order involved: items 20, 21, 22, 26, and 40 of the first request for 

production; items 9 and 16 of the second request; item 2 of the third request; and items 7, 8, 10, 15, 16, 17, 

and 18 of the fourth request.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 7 of 16

First, any and all discovery that is promulgated from Defendant 

to Plaintiffs as a result of this discovery request shall be properly 

marked and denoted as emanating from this particular discovery 

request; Second, the terms and condition[s] of the Court’s 

November 28, 2018 Protective Order shall apply to discovery 

promulgated as a result of the granting of this Motion to Compel; 

Third, no discovery materials or references to these discovery 

materials may be used in subsequent motions or hearings in this 

cause without the parties having first sought leave of court to use 

such discovery materials and if such leave is granted, the 

materials shall be locked [sic] as confidential; and Fourth, in 

Granting this Motion to Compel, the Court is reserving ruling on 

materials that Defendant asserts are subject to the attorney-client 

privilege.

(Id. at 4.) The order disclosed the trial court’s reasoning in considering the 

denial of the FOIA request non-dispositive:

this Court does want to emphasize that it has no interest in 

jeopardizing or undermining the important work of the 

Consumer Product Safety Commission. However, the Court 

does note that the CPSC’s admonition or warning about the 

threat that the potential disclosure of information related to this 

case could have on the CPSC’s ongoing investigation came in 

response to a FOIA request initiated by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Any 

information disclosed pursuant to a FOIA request is without 

limits and may be published and disseminated to the world. 

However, that is not what is happening as a result of this Court’s 

Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel. The Court believes 

it has placed stringent limitations on the dissemination of 

discovery materials promulgated from Defendant to Plaintiffs to 

ensure that the information is not publicly disclosed.

(Id. at 5.) 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 8 of 16

[12] On May 9, Goalsetter requested that the trial court certify its April 26 order for 

interlocutory appeal4 and issue a stay pending appeal. On June 30, the trial 

court conducted a hearing on Goalsetter’s pending motions. At that hearing, 

the court advised the parties that it had reviewed the CPSC letter denying the 

FOIA request. The trial court characterized the communication as a “form 

letter” responding to a request the granting of which could have resulted in “the 

information [being] disseminated worldwide.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 51.) Goalsetter 

argued that an interlocutory appeal was necessary to permit the Appellate Court

to “address whether [the trial court] can produce that which the federal agency 

has decided cannot be produced.” (Id. at 58.) 

[13] On July 21, the trial court certified its discovery order for interlocutory appeal 

and granted Goalsetter’s motion for a stay. Pursuant to Appellate Rule 

14(B)(2), this Court accepted jurisdiction of the appeal on September 15, 2023.

Discussion and Decision

Motion to Compel Production

[14] Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 26(B), the scope of discovery is, in general:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 

privileged, which is relevant to the subject-matter involved in the 

pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the 

party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other 

4

Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B)(1) provides that “[t]he trial court, in its discretion, upon motion by a party, 

may certify an interlocutory order to allow an immediate appeal.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 9 of 16

party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, 

condition and location of any books, documents, or other 

tangible things and the identity and location of persons having 

knowledge of any discoverable matter.

[15] Although the information available through discovery is broad, it is not allinclusive. Richey v. Chappell, 594 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ind. 1992). Rule 26(B)(1)

requires that the information sought must be relevant, admissible, or reasonably 

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and not privileged. 

Id. Additionally, the Rule permits discovery of documents or tangible items 

prepared “in anticipation of litigation” only upon a showing that the party 

seeking discovery has a substantial need for the materials and is unable, without 

undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means. Id. Even 

with such a showing of hardship, however, the party seeking discovery is not

“entitled to the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of 

an attorney or other representative of the party concerning the litigation.” Id. 

“Our discovery rules are designed ‘to allow liberal discovery with a minimum 

of court involvement in the discovery process.’” Id. (citing Chustak v. No. Ind. 

Pub. Serv. Co. (1972), 259 Ind. 390, 395, 288 N.E.2d 149, 152-3).

[16] “Discovery matters are fact-sensitive, and therefore, the ruling of the trial court 

is cloaked in a strong presumption of correctness on appeal.” Wright v. Mount 

Auburn Daycare/Preschool, 831 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. 

denied. We will review a decision of the trial court regarding discovery matters 

only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 10 of 16

before the court or when the trial court misinterprets or misapplies the law. Id. 

In general, we will not reverse a discovery order unless there has been a 

showing of prejudice. Id. 

[17] Goalsetter has sought protection of documents in its “CPSC file and documents 

and communications exchanged with the CPSC and Goalsetter.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 20. According to Goalsetter:

The production of documents in a case where the CPSC has 

expressly stated doing so subject to FOIA would cause an 

“articulable harm” to its investigation, would, logically by 

extension, cause the same harm to Goalsetter’s recall. Whether 

that is considered a “privilege” created by federal law, or renders 

such documents confidential pursuant to statue and common 

law, the end result should be that such documents are not 

discoverable.

Id. at 21. According to Goalsetter, the trial court has “substituted its judgment” 

for that of the CPSC, and “the Trial Court first should have considered federal 

law on the public availability of certain documents and the tests applied by the 

agency and federal courts in determining if CPSC materials are subject to civil 

discovery requests in related litigation.” Id. at 17, 22. Goalsetter does not

claim that CPSC criteria for public disclosure of information under the FOIA 

directly governs discovery in state court litigation.5 Rather, Goalsetter contends 

5 Goalsetter has conceded that “the CPSA does not automatically apply to civil discovery,” but asserts that 

“there are times and circumstances when the interests of the CPSC and objections to discovery align, and 

credence should be given to both.” Reply Brief at 14.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 11 of 16

that a federal agency action has somehow created a discovery privilege in this 

matter. We disagree.

[18] It is well-settled that: “[a] grant of privilege and the scope of that privilege are 

policy choices of the Legislature.” State v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 964 N.E.2d 

206, 210 (Ind. 2012). Although our legislature could have chosen to enact a 

discovery privilege corresponding to a FOIA determination, it has not done so. 

[19] In Scroggins v. Uniden Corp. of America, 506 N.E.2d 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), 

trans. denied, the Court addressed the issue of whether Indiana courts should 

create a common law discovery privilege, when neither federal nor state statutes 

recognized such a privilege. Scroggins had brought a products liability action 

claiming that Uniden’s cordless telephone caused him to suffer a loss of hearing

when it rang in his ear, and Scroggins sought discovery of communication 

between Uniden and the CPSC. See id. Uniden objected and sought a 

protective order on the basis that any communication between it and the CPSC 

was privileged and not subject to discovery. More specifically, Uniden argued 

that “failure to protect the self-critical analysis will deter open reporting and 

frustrate the strong federal interest.” Id. at 84.

[20] The Uniden Court recognized that privileges are statutory in nature and that it is 

within the power of the legislature to create them, observing that “[m]ost 

privileges were unknown at common law and are particularly disfavored.” Id.

at 86. In directing the trial court to grant discovery of the requested documents, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 12 of 16

accompanied by appropriate protective orders to prevent unnecessary 

publication of matters discovered, the Court stated:

While the cases which apply the privilege denying discovery of a 

self-critical analysis make recitals to the effect that such privilege 

is necessary for open reporting and the success of the program, 

this recital is never explained nor demonstrated. It is a bald 

assumption. It occurs to us that if a manufacturer files a selfcritical analysis which demonstrates that it was marketing a 

hazardous product, the CPSC would instantly order it to cease 

and desist. If the CPSC did not order it to desist, one may

assume either that the hazard was not apparent, or that the CPSC 

was not doing its duty. Additionally, a manufacturer could not, 

with any justice, file a self-critical analysis reflecting the 

dangerous propensity of an article, knowingly continue to market 

the article, and then claim a privilege. We believe that a 

responsible manufacturer who discovered a dangerous article and 

filed a self-critical analysis reflecting the danger, would cease 

distribution of it, or at least be ordered to cease and desist by the 

CPSC. An irresponsible manufacturer would misrepresent the 

hazard in the first place. In essence, we are wholly unpersuaded 

that the privilege would appreciably aid the program. In any 

event it is a legislative matter for either Congress or our 

legislature. Neither body has created such a privilege, though 

they have demonstrated they know how. It is not the prerogative 

of this court to create one.

Uniden argues that any discovery matter is addressed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be 

disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. We agree.

However, here, the trial court denied discovery specifically on the 

basis of a privilege which we have held does not exist.

Id. Goalsetter argues that Scroggins is inapplicable because Goalsetter “is not 

relying on the self-critical analysis doctrine to which Scroggins was limited.” 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 13 of 16

Appellant’s Brief at 27. Goalsetter also suggests, in a cursory manner, that 

Scroggins was wrongly decided. 

[21] Our review of Scroggins reveals that the opinion addressed the statutory nature 

of privileges in general. In relying upon Scroggins, the trial court was not 

required to limit its application to self-critical analysis reports. See also Terre 

Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d 1358, 1360 (Ind. 1992)

(“Indiana generally recognizes that privileges are statutory in nature and that it 

is within the power of the legislature to create them.”) Indeed, this Court has 

held that a trial court erred in relying upon “a rationale for applying a privilege 

in a particular situation” in the absence of a statute. Hulett v. State, 552 N.E.2d 

47, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied. 

[22] The trial court was not empowered to create a common law privilege that 

materials withheld in a FOIA request are non-discoverable due to a federal 

interest. Goalsetter has not shown that the trial court misapplied the law or 

otherwise abused its discretion. 

Work Product

[23] Goalsetter asserts that the trial court’s order “failed to address whether work 

product protection exists for materials prepared as part of Goalsetter’s 

engagement with the CPSC.” Appellant’s Brief at 29. To the contrary, the 

order provides in part:

The Court is reserving ruling on materials that Defendant asserts 

are subject to the attorney-client privilege. This Court is very 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 14 of 16

sensitive to documents and matters that may be protected by the 

attorney-client privilege. Based on the record before the Court at 

present, the Court does not agree with Plaintiffs that Defendant 

has waived the attorney-client privilege. However, “blanket 

claims of discovery privilege are not favored by Indiana courts.” 

Howard v. Dravet, 813 N.E.2d 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Thus, 

documents that Defendant maintains are protected by the 

attorney-client privilege are to be further sequestered by the 

Defendant and Defendant shall articulate sufficient information 

to Plaintiffs’ counsel describing the nature and extend [sic] of the 

attorney-client privilege asserted and further hearing thereon may 

be held.

(Appealed Order at 4.) 

[24] Work product is that which a party or the party’s representative prepares, or 

that which is prepared for the party or party’s representative, in anticipation of 

litigation or for trial. Ind. Trial Rule 26(B)(3). Goalsetter had presented to the 

trial court no log or accounting of specific work product documents, but rather

it argued that everything in the files of independent counsel retained after the 

product recall was privileged work product. The trial court did not reject the 

blanket claim of privilege outright, but instead provided for sequestration of 

documents and permitted Goalsetter to request a hearing in the future to meet 

its burden of showing that some or all of the requested documents are work 

product. See Burr v. United Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 560 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1990) (“The threshold determination in any case involving an 

assertion of the work-product privilege is whether the materials sought to be 

protected from disclosure were in fact prepared in anticipation of litigation.”) It 

is the party asserting the privilege who must establish that the materials were 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 15 of 16

prepared in anticipation of litigation rather than in the normal course of 

business. TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Kesling, 15 N.E.3d 985, 995 (Ind. 2014). The 

trial court’s discovery order, which anticipates further development of

Goalsetter’s factual claims of work product, if necessary, does not amount to an 

abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

[25] Goalsetter possesses no privilege preventing disclosure in a state court discovery 

dispute based upon a federal agency refusal of disclosure in an FOIA context. 

The discovery order at issue is carefully crafted to limit dissemination of 

materials and permit further review of claimed work product materials. 

Goalsetter has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling 

the production of documents and denying Goalsetter’s motion for a protective 

order.

[26] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Renee J. Mortimer

Scott B. Cockrum

Jessica L. Mullen

Corban J. Cavanaugh

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP

Highland, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1896 | February 28, 2024 Page 16 of 16

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ESTATE OF NOLAN GERWELS

Charles P. Rice 

Patrick D. Murphy 

Murphy Rice 

Mishawaka, Indiana 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE DICK’S SPORTING GOODS, INC. 

Jennifer Kalas 

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 

Schererville, Indiana