[Cite as State v. Lewis , 2021-Ohio-530.]

COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

-vsMARCUS LEWIS Defendant-Appellant JUDGES: : Hon, W. Scott Gwin, P.J. : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : : : Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 : : : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Delaware Coun tyCourt of Common Pleas, Case No.19-CR-I02-0135

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 25, 2021

APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant MELISSA SCHIFFEL TODD WORKMAN Delaware County Prosecutor WORKMAN LAW FIRM JACQUELINE J. RAPIER Box 687 Assistant Prosecutor Delaware, OH 43015 145 North Union Street Delaware, OH 43015[Cite as State v. Lewis , 2021-Ohio-530.]
Gwin, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant Marcus Lewis [“Lewis”] appeals from the May 14, 2020 Judgment Entry of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas ove rruling his motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty plea. Facts and Procedural History {¶2} On November 6, 2018, officers were dispatched to a fatal Fentan yl overdose of B.B. in Ashley, Ohio in Delaware County. Prior to t he officers' arrival, B.B.’s girlfriend found him face down in the bathroom. The officers an d coroner found drug paraphernalia around B.B.’s person. B.B.’s blood and urine test ed positive for fentanyl. {¶3} During the course of the investigation, it was revealed that B. B. purchased the drugs from Jamie Rhodes, who purchased the drugs from Saman tha Marks and Jessica Metz, who purchased the drugs from Lewis. {¶4} During this time period Lewis was being investigated by the Del aware County Drug Task Force. The Drug Task Force conducted trash pul ls, surveillance, and ultimately interviews that led to a search warrant of the hotel in late November 2018. After the search warrant, Lewis was arrested and taken to the Delawar e County Jail where he was interviewed by detectives with the Drug Task Force. The sea rch warrant revealed numerous items of drug paraphernalia indicative of drug traffic king; however, no drugs were found. An eye witness at the jail observed Lewis flush dru gs down the toilet that he took out of his rectum area. In his interview with law enforcem ent, Lewis admitted to being a drug trafficker, and to flushing drugs down the toilet at the jail.Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 3
{¶5} Lewis was indicted on February 28, 2019 and charged with Engagi ng in a Pattern of Corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), Involuntary Manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), two counts of Corrupting Another with Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), and Tampering with Evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). On July 3, 2019, Lewis appeared before the court and entered not g uilty pleas to the charges. [Docket Entry No. 11]. {¶6} Subsequently, Samantha Marks accepted an offer from the state f or a reduction of her charges in exchange for her testimony against her co-defendants. Judgment Entry Denying Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, filed May 14, 2020 at 3. [Docket Entry No. 90]. On February 4, 2020, the date schedule d for the trial of Lewis and Metz to begin, Jessica Metz accepted the same offer from th e state. (Id.) Lewis later came before the court on February 4, 2020 and entered negotiate d guilty pleas to Counts One, Two, Five, and Six of the Indictment. On February 4, 2020, a five-day jury trial commenced against the remaining codefendant, Jamie Rhodes. Judgment Entry Denying Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, filed May 14, 2020 at 8. [Docket Entry No. 90]. Jessica Metz and Samantha Marks testified against Rhodes. (Id.) Jamie Rhodes was acquitted of all charges. (Id.) {¶7} On February 25, 2020, Lewis’s trial counsel filed a motion to w ithdraw as counsel indicating that Lewis had expressed his desire to withd raw his negotiated guilty plea. [Docket Entry No. 70]. The court granted counsel’s motion by Judgment Entry filed March 4, 2020. [Docket Entry No. 72]. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Lewis by Judgment Entry filed March 9, 2020. [Docket Entry No. 73].Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 4
{¶8} On March 24, 2020, Lewis filed a motion to withdraw his negotia ted guilty plea. An evidentiary hearing on the motion was begun on April 2 4, 2020. After the defense presented its case, the trial court adjourned the hearing. The hearing on the motion was concluded on May 8, 2020. {¶9} Lewis’s motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty plea was denie d by Judgment Entry filed May 14, 2020. A sentencing hearing took pl ace on May 27, 2020. Lewis was sentenced to seven years on Count 1, seven years on C ount 2, 24 months of Count 5 and 24 months on Count 6. The sentences were ordered t o run concurrently, for an aggregate prison sentence of seven years. Assignment of Errors {¶10} Lewis raises two Assignments of Error, {¶11} “I. THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED UNDER SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, AND SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED BY TRIAL COUNSEL BASED UPON TH E RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT. {¶12} “II. THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.” I. {¶13} In his First Assignment of Error, Lewis maintains that he was d enied the effective assistance of counsel because Lewis did not have suff icient time, prior to the trial, to fully consider the pros and cons of entering a plea, nor to fully discuss the ramifications of entering a plea prior to trial that day. Furt her, Lewis maintains counselDelaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 5 had a duty to communicate with Lewis all the matters that would impact Lewis’s trial. Specifically, Lewis maintains he was not aware of certain text messages that were supplied from the state to Lewis’s attorney as part of the disc overy materials. Standard of Appellate Review. {¶14} When a defendant enters a plea of guilty as a part of a plea ba rgain he waives all appealable errors which may have occurred at trial, unless such errors are shown to have precluded the defendant from entering a knowing a nd voluntary plea. State v. Kelley , 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658(1991). {¶15} In Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S.52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203(1985) the Court noted: The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); see Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Machibroda v. United States , 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 513, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962)...Where, as here, a defendant is repr esented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the ad vice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether couns el's advice “was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in cr iminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson , 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). As we explai ned in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), a defendant who plea ds guiltyDelaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 6 upon the advice of counsel “may only attack the voluntary and i ntelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he rece ived from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann” Id., at 267, 93 S.Ct., at 1608. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57, 106 S.Ct. at 369. {¶16} The Court in Hill , supra , held that the two-part Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S.668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984) test applies to c hallenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 474 U.S. at 58, 10 6 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203. {¶17} The first inquiry under Strickland is whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation involv ing a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to appellant. The second prong is whether the appellant was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. Lockhart v. Fretwell , 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180(1993); Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984); State v. Bradley , 42 Ohio St.3d 136. 538 N.E.2d 373(1989). In other words “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to tri al.” Hill v. Lockhart , supra , 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. However, a different outcome at the plea stage but for counsel's errors is constitutionally insignificant if the ultim ate result that was reached was neither unfair nor unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell , 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct.838, 842(1993).Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 7 Issue for Appellate Review: Whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged failures, Lewis would have not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial; and whether the ultimate result that was reached at the plea stage was unfair or unreliable. {¶18} The entry of a plea of guilty is a grave decision by an accused to dispense with a trial and allow the state to obtain a conviction without following the otherwise difficult process of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Machibroda v. United States , 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473(1962). A plea of gui lty constitutes a complete admission of guilt. Crim. R. 11 (B) (1). “By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discreet acts described in the i ndictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.” United v. Broce , 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 762, 102 L.Ed.2d 927(1989). {¶19} Crim. R. 11 requires guilty pleas to be made knowingly, intelli gently and voluntarily. Although literal compliance with Crim. R. 11 is p referred, the trial court need only "substantially comply" with the rule when dealing with the non-constitutional elements of Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Ballard , 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 475, 423 N.E.2d 115(1981), citing State v. Stewart , 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163(1977). In State v. Griggs , the Ohio Supreme Court noted the following test for determini ng substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11: Though failure to adequately inform a defendant of his constitu tional rights would invalidate a guilty plea under a presumption that it was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, failure to comply with non-const itutional rights will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby sufferedDelaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 8 prejudice.[ State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106,] 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwis e been made.’ Id. Under the substantial-compliance standard, we revi ew the totality of circumstances surrounding [the defendant’s] plea an d determine whether he subjectively understood [the effect of his plea]. See, State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509 at ¶ 19-20. 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶12. {¶20} Further, evidence of a written waiver form signed by the accuse d is strong proof that the waiver was valid. State v. Clark , 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844, 854(1988); see North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369, 374-375, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1758- 1759, 60 L.Ed.2d 286, 293(1979); State v. Dennis , 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 425, 1997-Ohio372, 683 N.E.2d 1096, 1102(1997). A written waiver of constitut ional rights is presumed to have been voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. State v. Turner, 105 Ohio St.3d 331, 2005-Ohio-1938, 826 N.E.2d 266, ¶25. {¶21} With respect to statements made during change o f plea hearings, the United States Supreme Court has stated, “the representation of the def endant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor in such a hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collate ral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity . The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record ar e wholly incredible.” Machibroda v. United States , 368 U.S. 487, 497, 82 S.Ct. 510, 515(1962). {¶22} In the case at bar, Lewis signed a four-page Criminal Rule 11(C ) and (F)Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 9 plea form. [Docket Entry No. 65]. The trial court conducted a l engthy inquiry concerning each of Lewis’s constitutional rights during the change of plea hearing on February 4, 2020. The trial judge gave Lewis several opportunities to ask q uestions or bring any concerns to his attention duri ng the change of plea hearing. Lewis did not. {¶23} At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty plea, Lewis testify that he believed he was going to trial. However, on the morning of trial, his attorney informed him that Metz was planning to testify against him. Lew is claimed he had always believed that both Metz and Marks were going to testify against him, so this information was not news to him. Lewis testified that he discovered that t ext messages provided by the state to his attorney during discovery indicated that Lewis did not communicate by text with either Metz or Meeks on November 5-6, 2018, the dates of the drug transactions leading to B.B.’s death. Lewis testified that his attorney did not provide the text messages to him. According to Lewis this would prove his innocence of th e involuntary manslaughter of B.B. Lewis conceded that his defense was to Count 2 and Coun t 3 only. Transcript Change of Plea Hearing, Apr. 24, 2020 at 71-73. Although Lewis claimed to have additional text messages, Lewis did not submit any evidentiary materials or call any witnesses on his behalf during the motion to withdraw hearings. {¶24} The right to competent counsel does not require that a criminal defendant develop and share a "meaningful relationship" with his attorney

. Morris v. Slappy , 461 U.S. 1, 13, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed.2d 610(1983); State v. Blankenship , 102 Ohio App.3d 534, 657 N.E.2d 559(12 th Dist. 1995); State v. Burroughs , 5th Dist. No. 04CAC03018, 2004-Ohio-4769 at ¶ 11. In the context of a motion to discharge appointedDelaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 10 counsel, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Cowans , 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 1999-Ohio-250, 717 N.E.2d 298(1999) noted: Even if counsel had explored plea options based on a belief th at Cowans might be guilty, counsel's belief in their client's guil t is not good cause for substitution. “‘A lawyer has a duty to give the accu sed an honest appraisal of his case. * * * Counsel has a duty to be candid; he has no duty to be optimistic when the facts do not warrant optimism.'” Brown v. United States , 264 F.2d 363, 369(U.S.App.D.C. 1959)( en banc ), cert. denied 360 U.S. 911, 79 S.Ct. 1299, 3 L.Ed.2d 1262(1959), quoted in McKee v. Harris , 649 F.2d 927, 932(2 nd Cir. 1981). “‘If the rule were otherwise, appointed counsel could be replaced for doing little more than giving the ir clients honest advice.'" McKee , 649 F.2d at 932, quoting McKee v. Harris , 485 F.Supp. 866, 869(S.D.N.Y.1980). Cowans 87 Ohio St.3d at 73, 717 N.E.2d at 304-305. {¶25} In Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), the Supreme Court set forth a new standard to determine prejudi ce in context of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) as it appli es to plea offers and plea negotiations. In Frye, defense counsel allowed a plea offer to expire without communicating the offer to the defendant resulting in t he defendant accepting a later offer that was less favorable. Frye, 466 U.S. at 139. The Court held that “defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the pros ecution to accept a plea....” 466 U.S. at 145, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 674. Gi ven this duty, the Court emphasized that the right to effective assistance of counsel ex tends to the negotiationDelaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 11 and consideration of plea offers that have been rejected or hav e lapsed. 566 U.S. at 145, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379. {¶26} The transcript of the plea hearing reflects that Lewis indicate d in response to the court's questions that his pleas were voluntary, that he understood the nature of the charges and penalties, and the agreement concerning his ple as and sentence. The court further informed Lewis that a guilty plea is a complete a dmission of guilt, and that upon acceptance the court would proceed to judgment and sentenc ing. Finally, the record reflects that the court advised Lewis of each of his con stitutional rights as set forth in Crim.R.11. {¶27} The record affirmatively discloses that: (1) the guilty pleas w ere not the result of coercion, deception or intimidation; (2) Lewis’s att orney was present at the time of the plea; (3) Counsel’s advice was competent in light of the circumstances surrounding the plea (4) the plea was made with the understanding of the na ture of the charges; and, (5) the plea was motivated either by a desire to seek a lesser penalty or a fear of the consequences of a jury trial, or both. See, State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 217 N.E.2d 852(1971), syllabus. {¶28} As previously stated, this case was originally indicted on Febr uary 28, 2019. This was nearly a year prior to the final trial date and the da te of his plea on February 4, 2020. The case was continued three times from the original tria l date at the request of Lewis and once at the request of the state. As noted by the trial cou rt in the Judgment Entry overruling Lewis’s motion, approximately 2 1/2 hours passed aft er Lewis’s trial was scheduled to begin before Lewis changed his pleas to guilty.Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 12
{¶29} Lewis confirmed the state's summary of the plea offer. The fact ual basis was entered on the record by the state for Lewis’s guilty plea. Lewis agreed to these facts, and he confirmed that he wished to enter his pleas of guilty up on his own free will and voluntarily. {¶30} The court next inquired of Lewis whether he felt he had suffici ent opportunity to discuss the plea offer with his counsel, as well as whether Lewis had discussed any defenses available to him if he had decided to proceed to trial . Lewis affirmed that he had sufficient time to consult with counsel and discuss his case. Lewis confirmed that his counsel had answered each of his questions to his satisfaction. Lewis confirmed that he was satisfied with his counsel. Transcript Change of Plea Hearing, Apr. 24, 2020 at 15. Lewis agreed that he read the written plea paperwork provided t o the court, and his signature appeared on the written Rule 11(F) agreement and writ ten guilty plea documentation filed in the case. (Id. at 21). {¶31} In the case at bar, defense counsel negotiated a dismissal of C ounts 3 and 4 of the Indictment. Counsel further negotiated a jointly reco mmended prison sentence of seven years for two felonies of the first degree and two fel onies of the third degree. Lewis’s trial counsel was obligated to communicate the plea off er to Lewis, which she did. Counsel was further obligated to give Lewis an honest appraisal of his case. {¶32} We reviewed the transcript of the hearing at which the trial co urt conducted the plea colloquy required by Crim.R. 11 and determined that th e court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) and strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). The record supports that an extensive colloquy occurred. {¶33} We find Lewis’s suggestions that he did not understand his righ ts, that heDelaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 13 did not have sufficient time to consider a plea, or that his pl ea was involuntary to be unsupported by the record. {¶34} Accordingly, Lewis is unable to demonstrate that he was prejudi ced by defense counsel's performance. There is no evidence that indica tes the result of the plea proceeding was unreliable or the proceeding was fundamentally u nfair as a result of defense counsel's representation of Lewis. {¶35} Lewis’s First Assignment of Error is overruled. II. {¶36} In his Second Assignment of Error, Lewis argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty pleas. Standard of Appellate Review. {¶37} Appellate courts review trial court decisions on motions to wit hdraw pleas for abuse of discretion. State v. Smith , 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph two of the syllabus. “An abuse of discretion exists where the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable, legally inco rrect, or amount to a denial of justice, or where the judgment reaches an end or purpose not ju stified by reason and the evidence. Tennant v. Gallick, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26827, 2014-Ohio-477, ¶35; In re Guardianship of S .H ., 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0066–M, 2013–Ohio–4380, ¶ 9; State v. Firouzmandi, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2006–CA–41, 2006–Ohio–5823, ¶54. {¶38} The good faith, credibility and weight of a defendant’s asserti ons in support of a motion to withdraw guilty plea are matters to be resolved by the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the motivations behind a guilt y plea than is an appellate court in reviewing a record of the hearing. State v. Xie , 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 525, 584Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 14 N.E.2d 715 (1992), citing State v. Smith , 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977). Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial court’s decision to overrule Lewis’s motion to withdrawn his negotiated guilty pleas was clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amounted to a denial of justice, or reaches an end or purpose not justified by reason and the evidence. {¶39} In evaluating whether a trial court has abused its discretion in overruling a presentence motion to withdraw a plea, this Court has adopted t he following approach, In reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to wit hdraw a guilty plea, the court in State v. Fish set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors to be weighed. 104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240, 661 N.E.2d 788 (1st Di st. 1995) [ overruled on other grounds, State v. Sims , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C160856, 2017-Ohio-8379, 99 N.E.3d 1056]: These factors include: (1) whether the prosecution would be prejudiced if the plea was vac ated; (2) whether the accused was represented by highly competent counsel ; (3) whether the accused was given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing; (4) wh ether a full hearing was held on the motion; (5) whether the trial court gav e full and fair consideration to the motion; (6) whether the motion was made wi thin a reasonable time; (7) whether the motion set forth specific reas ons for the withdrawal; (8) whether the accused understood the nature of th e charges and possible penalties; and (9) whether the accused was possibl y not guilty or had a complete defense to the crime. Id. In weighing the nin th factor, “the trial judge must determine whether the claim of innocence is an ything more than the defendant’s change of heart about the plea agreement.” State v.Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 15
Davison, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008–CA–00082, 2008–Ohio–7037, ¶ 45, citing State v. Kramer , 7 th Dist. Mahoning No. 01–CA–107, 2002–Ohio– 4176, ¶ 58. State v. Davis, 5 th Dist. Richland No. 15CA6, 2015-Ohio-5196, ¶19. {¶40} “In considering these factors, the trial court employs a balanc ing test; no single factor is dispositive.” State v. Warrix, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 26556, 2015-Ohio5390, ¶ 30, citing State v. Preston , 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 25393, 2013-Ohio-4404, ¶ 20. However, “[t]he ultimate question for the trial court is wh ether there is a ‘reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.’ ” Id., quoting Xie , 62 Ohio St.3d at 527, 584 N.E.2d 715. {¶41} While “a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and liberally granted [,] * * * a defendant does not have an absolu te right to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing.” State v. X ie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715, 719 (1992). {¶42} In his motion, Lewis only raised the following reasons for with drawing his plea: "that his prior counsel failed to properly inform him of his rights and the ramifications of his plea," and whether or not Lewis was possibly not guilty of the charge or whether Lewis has a complete defense to the charges. Motion to Withdraw Plea, filed Mar. 24, 2020 at 3 [Docket Entry No. 76]. {¶43} In the case at bar, the trial court conducted an extensive evid entiary hearing over two-days, which Lewis presented neither witnesses nor docu mentary evidence in support of his contentions. The state presented the testimony o f Samantha Marks, Jessica Metz and Detective Greg Bates. The state further presen ted the testimony of Marks, Meeks and Detective Bates from Jamie Rhodes’s jury trial . State’s Exhibits 4-7.Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 16
{¶44} Marks testified that in November 2018 she obtained drugs from “ Duke,” aka Lewis. Transcript Continued Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 19- 20. She further testified that it was more than lik ely she obtained drugs from Lewis on November 5, 2018. (Id.). {¶45} Metz testified that she obtained drugs from Lewis on November 5 , 2018. Transcript Continued Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 31-32. In fact, Meeks testified that she got all of her heroin from Lewis. (Id.). Metz further testified that the majority of the time conversations or discus sion would go through Marks as far as any discussions with Lewis. (Id. at 34). {¶46} Detective Bates testified he was investigating Lewis around Nov ember 12, 2018 during Bates’s time with the Drug Task Force. Transcript Continued Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 39. {¶47} Detective Bates testified concerning a drug overdose that occur red on November 16 or 17, 2018 at the motel the Drug Force was watchin g. Detective Bates was able to identify Lewis from a surveillance video as the person who brought the individual to the medic station. (Id. at 41-42). {¶48} Detective Bates testified that Lewis admitted to smuggling 16 g rams of heroin and a small amount of cocaine, or crack cocaine in his r ectal area and attempting to flush the drugs down the toilet at the jail after his arrest

. Transcript Continued Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 44-45. Detective Bates confirmed that an eyewitness had seen Lewis attempting to flush the drugs. Transcript Continued Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 44.Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 17
{¶49} Detective Bates further testified that Lewis admitted that he w as trafficking drugs from the motel room. Transcript Continued Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 46. {¶50} Lewis conceded at the close of the May 8, 2020 evidentiary hear ing that his motion to withdraw his plea failed regarding Counts 1, 5, and 6

. Transcript Change of Plea Hearing, Apr. 24, 2020 at 71-73. {¶51} In our disposition of Lewis’s First Assignment of Error, we fou nd the trial court conducted an adequate Criminal Rule 11(F) hearing on Lewi s’s plea, Lewis executed a written plea of guilty entry, the parties agreed to the terms on the record, the court engaged in a lengthy exchange with Lewis on the record en suring that Lewis understood his rights, he could read and write English, his ple a was voluntary, and he was satisfied with counsel and that Lewis agreed he had suffic ient time to consider the plea. We further found that Lewis is unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's performance. There is no evidence that indica tes the result of the plea proceeding was unreliable or the proceeding was fundamentally u nfair as a result of defense counsel's representation of Lewis. {¶52} Lewis’s claims that he has a defense to the involuntary manslau ghter charge are based upon mere speculation. Nor testimony or eviden ce was presented to support his contention. {¶53} Based on the foregoing discussion, we find that the majority of the factors in Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240, 661 N.E.2d 788, overruled on other grounds, State v. Sims , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160856, 2017-Ohio-8379, 99 N.E.3d 10 56, do not support the withdrawal of Lewis’s guilty pleas. In considering these fa ctors, we further find theDelaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 18 record does not establish that Lewis had a reasonable, legitima te basis to withdraw his plea. The record indicates that the trial court considered Lewi s’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the applicable factors in reaching its decisi on. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Lewis’s presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. {¶54} Lewis’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled. {¶55} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is af firmed.

By Gwin, P.J., Hoffman, J., and Delaney, J., concur