NO. 07-10-0489-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL B 

OCTOBER 19, 2011 

____________________________ 

CARLOS LAMONT FISHER, JR., 

 Appellant 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee 

_____________________________ 

FROM THE 223RD DISTRICT COURT OF GRAY COUNTY; 

NO. 7369; HONORABLE LEE WATERS, PRESIDING 

_____________________________ 

Opinion 

_____________________________ 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

 Carlos Lamont Fisher, Jr. challenges his conviction for possessing a controlled 

substance.1

 He claims that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the prosecution as 

purportedly required by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (the Act). We 

overrule the issue and affirm the judgment. 

 1

Appellant was also convicted of assault on a peace officer but has not appealed that conviction. 
2

Background

The dispute before us involves the situation where both a Texas prosecutor and 

appellant sought to have appellant returned to Texas for trial. At the time, appellant was 

incarcerated in a Missouri prison but had pending against him, in Gray County, Texas, 

an indictment accusing him of the crime for which he was ultimately convicted. What 

we are asked to decide is whether the State was obligated to try him within 120 or 180 

days of his return to this jurisdiction. Which applied is critical since it could affect 

whether the trial court was obligated to dismiss the prosecution. 

 The local district attorney desired to have appellant returned to Texas, and on 

November 9, 2009, she requested that prison officials in Missiouri deliver him for trial. 

The request was forwarded via cover letter dated December 3, 2009, to the Eastern 

Reception, Diagnostic & Correctional Center in Bonne Terre, Missouri. That was 

supposed to be the prison at which appellant was held. However, he had been moved 

to another facility in Bowling Green, Missouri. Furthermore, he received, on December 

18, 2009, notice that the State of Texas had lodged a detainer against him. This 

induced him to seek a final dispostion of the Texas charges pending against him. To 

that end, appellant executed his written request manifesting his desire on December 

18th and disclosed therein that the place of his incarceration was the Northeast 

Correctional Center in Bowling Green, Missouri. Officials in Gray County received the 
3

request on or about December 29, 2009. By January 15, 2010, appellant was back in 

Texas.2

 Appellant originally went to trial on June 14, 2010. That proceeding resulted in a 

mistrial per appellant’s request. The court began its second trial of him on October 18, 

2010. That is when appellant first broached the matter of the 120-day deadline, 

contending that the period lapsed before the June 14th trial started. Thus, he believed 

that the proceeding should be dismissed. The trial court disagreed, as do we for 

several reasons to be explained. 

Authority and its Application

 The Act outlines the procedures used by one state to gain temporary custody 

over a defendant imprisoned in another state. State v. Votta, 299 S.W.3d 130, 134-35 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). And, there are two ways in which the transfer of such custody 

may be initiated. It may be done via the request of the accused himself or of the 

“appropriate officer” for the jurisdiction wherein the untried indictment or complaint 

pends. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.14, arts. III(a), IV(a) (West 2006). When the 

“appropriate officer” solicits the transfer, trial “shall be commenced within 120 days of 

the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state . . . .” Id. art. IV(c). However, when the 

prisoner solicits the transfer, statute mandates that he “shall be brought to trial within 

180 days . . . .” Id. art. III(a). At issue here is the question of whether appellant had to 

be tried within 120 or 180 days since both avenues were pursued. And, according to 

appellant, in situations like that, the 120-day time limit takes precedence. The issue is 

overruled for three reasons. 

 2

Missing from the record is the actual detainer (or a copy of it) lodged against appellant and the 

identity of the particular institution with which it was lodged. Nor is there evidence that a detainer was 

ever lodged with the prison in Bowling Green.
4

 First, appellant’s complaint was not preserved for review. As previously 

mentioned, he did not raise the issue until his second trial even though 120 days 

expired before the first proceeding began. That is not the type of contemporaneous 

objection demanded by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The complaint was 

not uttered at the earliest or first opportunity after basis for the complaint arose, which 

would have been before commencement of the June trial. See King v. State, 953 

S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that an objection is contemporaneous 

and satisfies the requirements of Rule 33.1 when it is made at the first opportunity after 

grounds for it arose). Indeed, the timeliness of appellant’s complaint at bar did not even 

satisfy the parameters mentioned in Walker v. State, 201 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. App.–Waco 

2006, pet. ref’d). There, the court acknowledged that complaints arising under art. 

51.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure may be waived if not raised before or 

during trial. Id. at 849. Appellant’s first trial had ended long before he complained 

about the lapse of the 120-day period. 

 Second, nothing in either Article III or IV specifies which controls should both 

avenues be pursued simultaneously. Moreover, we are told to “liberally construe[]” both 

provisos. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.14, art. IX(a). To add restrictions omitted 

from the statute falls short of complying with that directive. This is so because liberally 

construing a statute tends to have the effect of broadening its scope, not restricting it. 

So, to read the provisions of art. 51.14 in a way that nullifies aspects of it (in this case, 

the 180-day period) likens more to a strict than liberal construction of the law. 

 Furthermore, adopting appellant’s suggestion that the time restriction in Article IV 

trumps that in Article III tends to ignore the language of the former. Per Article IV, trial 
5

must be had within 120 days if disposition was “made possible” by the procedures 

outlined in Article IV. Id. art. IV(c). A fair reading of that phrase suggests it 

contemplates a situation wherein the accused’s presence in the forum was garnered 

through the unilateral actions of the requesting state or “appropriate official.” No like 

provision conditions application of the 180-day period in Article III, however. Instead, 

the period is triggered simply by the accused’s request for a final disposition of pending 

charges; the language does not insinuate that his presence in the foreign state must 

have been gained through his own efforts. See id. art. III(a). So, when the accused 

also invokes the procedures made available to him under the statute, it is not 

necessarily true that his presence in the receiving state was “made possible” by the 

prosecutor’s conduct for purposes of Article IV. 

 Third, the evidentiary record before us illustrates that appellant arrived in Texas 

via the provisions of art. 51.14, art. III(a), as discussed in the concurring opinion of 

Justice Campbell. 

 In sum, we hold that upon invocation of the procedures outlined in Article III by a 

defendant, he must be tried within the time period prescribed in Article III. This is 

irrespective of whether or not an “appropriate officer” of a foreign state has also 

attempted to gain transfer of the individual through Article IV. Couple this holding with 

eveyone’s acknowledgement that appellant’s June trial was held within that 180-day 

period, we cannot but affirm the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the proceeding.

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 

 Brian Quinn 

 Chief Justice 

Publish.