AFS-13-560-E

Exemption No. 11023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20591

 

In the matter of the petition of 

 

MENTE, LLC Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2013-0839

 

for an exemption from part 91, SFAR 87 

of Title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations 

 

GRANT OF EXEMPTION

 By letter dated September 20, 2013, Mr. Mark McIntyre, Mente, LLC (Mente), 

6771 Perimeter Road, Seattle, WA 98108, petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) on behalf of Mente for an exemption from 14 CFR part 91, Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation (SFAR) 87 to allow Mente to operate flights within the airspace of Ethiopia north 

of 12 degrees north latitude in support of the philanthropic activities of a U.S. charitable 

foundation. Mr. McIntyre supplemented Mente’s initial petition with additional information 

on November 25, 2013, and Roncevert D. Almond, The Wicks Group, PLLC, 733 10th Street, 

NW, Suite 3002, Washington, DC 20001, counsel for Mente, further supplemented Mente’s 

petition on May 20, 2014.

Petitioner requests relief from the following regulation:

SFAR 87, in pertinent part, prohibits all U.S. air carriers or commercial operators, all 

persons exercising the privileges of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, and all 

operators using aircraft registered in the United States from conducting flight 

operations within the territory and airspace of Ethiopia north of 12 degrees north 

latitude, with certain exceptions not relevant here.

Petitioner provides the following supporting information:
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Mente states that SFAR 87 was promulgated in 2000 in response to the August 1999 

shoot down of a U.S.-registered Learjet by the Ethiopian Air Force. According to 

Mente, the non-commercial flight was proceeding along the published high altitude 

airway and operating on an International Civil Aircraft Organization (ICAO) instrument 

flight rules (IFR) flight plan. At the time of the shoot down, the petitioner states, there 

was an Ethiopian restriction prohibiting flights across the Ethiopian and Eritrean 

border. The petitioner contends that the location of the Learjet wreckage indicates that 

the Learjet had crossed the Ethiopian/Eritrean border, contrary to its originally planned 

route.

Mente states that the reason for the promulgation of SFAR 87 no longer exists and 

infers that flights within the airspace can be conducted safely. In support of this 

contention, the petitioner states that the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments signed a 

peace agreement in 2000 that ended the border war and the conditions that likely led to 

the shoot down of the Learjet.

Mente further states that, when it contacted the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia, Embassy 

personnel indicated that they are currently working through the U.S. Department of 

State to request removal of SFAR 87. Petitioner states that neither the Ethiopian nor 

the Eritrean governments have any prohibitions against cross-border flights. Petitioner 

indicates that a variety of non-U.S.-commercial air carriers make daily flights along 

airways that cross the airspace defined in SFAR 87. In addition, petitioner noted that 

U.S. Embassy personnel routinely travel by air to Axum, Ethiopia, which is within 

SFAR 87, aboard non-U.S. registered aircraft and that a Congressional Delegation 

traveled to Axum in August 2013 aboard U.S. military aircraft without incident. It also 

states there have been no subsequent hostile actions toward civil aircraft since the 1999 

shoot down.

Mente continues by stating its flights will have valid flight plans and Ethiopian 

Airspace and Landing Permits and will operate wholly within Ethiopian airspace, 

without crossing any international borders, and would take place during the day.

Consequently, Mente argues that its proposed operations will not provoke any 

condition that led to the promulgation of SFAR 87.

Mente states this request is in the public interest because its requested flight operations

would transport personnel and supplies for philanthropic missions conducted by a U.S. 

charitable foundation. The petitioner indicates that granting this exemption will allow 

it to facilitate missions to develop new vaccines, hybrid seeds, and other agricultural 

products that will provide significant benefit to Ethiopian citizens and beyond and is 

consistent with U.S. interests in the region. It contends the potential discoveries may 

also have a worldwide impact. It further states that this petition is in the public interest, 

if granted, because it would be able to provide direct flights to areas where the 

charitable foundation provides philanthropic work. If the exemption is not granted, the 

petitioner will be forced to use more costly foreign charter operations, which it states 
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may affect funding for research and development. The petitioner also states that, if it is 

forced to use foreign chartered aircraft, that those aircraft would be less safe than the 

petitioner’s aircraft. 

Mente adds that its flight crews are highly experienced and receive regular simulator 

and international procedures training. Mente further states that charter aircraft flight 

crews have not received the same level of training as its flight crews. The petitioner 

also contends that its flight crews have extensive international experience, including in 

Africa and Ethiopia. According to Mente, their flight crews have made numerous trips 

to Ethiopia, have operated extensively in Africa over the past 10 years, and have been 

recognized by aviation organizations for their expertise in African operations. The 

petitioner contends that passengers face a higher risk when required to travel in foreign 

chartered aircraft in Ethiopia. Additionally, Mente states that its crews safely 

completed flights to several Ethiopian airports in November 2013, including Bahir Dar 

airport, which is just south of the SFAR 87 prohibited airspace.

Mente also conducts extensive pre-trip risk assessments prior to any flight outside of 

North America using its own private security resources and will conduct continuing 

risk assessments for operations within the SFAR 87 area. The petitioner adds that it 

will maintain frequent contact with Department of State personnel in country, 

contributing to its pre-trip and ongoing risk assessments to determine if conditions 

support safe flight operations within the SFAR 87 area. It indicated that, if risk 

assessments deemed areas unsafe, it would not conduct flights to those areas.

Mente stated the degree of operational control exercised by the pilot in command (PIC)

in its supplemental information, to include authority over initiating, conducting, 

terminating or diverting the flight. The petitioner adds that the PIC will ensure that 

only operations authorized by this exemption are conducted, that only crewmembers 

trained and qualified under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, will conduct these 

operations, and that other crew members comply with flight and duty time 

requirements. The PIC will further access all necessary information for the safe 

conduct of the flight, to include threat assessments, specifically during pre-flight. 

Mente has granted the PIC the authority to cancel, delay, re-route, or divert a flight in 

the event conditions specified for flight release cannot be met. While enroute, Mente 

also states the PIC may also divert the aircraft for safety or security events or if there is 

an increase in threat level, to one of the divert airports listed in its supplemental 

information. The divert airports provided by the petitioner are Addis Abeba (HAAB), 

Bahir Dar (HABD), and Djibouti (HDAM).

Mente provided information on how it plans on using a commercial company for 

international trip support, to include aircraft handling and logistics. It outlined its

method for flight monitoring and how it would provide aircraft security while on the 

ground in the SFAR 87 area, primarily by limiting the time that the aircraft would be in 

the SFAR 87 area and by having the flight crew remain on board while the aircraft is on 
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the ground. Of note, the petitioner mentioned that, in the unlikely event that the flight 

crew had to leave the aircraft, its policy is for the aircraft to be disabled, the aircraft 

doors and hatches locked, and the the aircraft’s security system armed.

Mente stated it has plans on how maintenance will be performed on the aircraft if 

circumstances arise requiring maintenance that would ground the aircraft, to include

chartering a flight to bring maintenance support directly to the aircraft, if necessary. To 

avoid the need to refuel at locations within the SFAR 87 area, Mente stated that the 

Global XRS aircraft it plans on using has the capability of carrying enough fuel to fly 

from any location in Ethiopia to any of the five airports (Axum [HAAX], Gondar 

[HAGN], Humera [HAHU], Lalibella [HALL], and Makale [HAMK]) the petitioner 

proposes to operate at within the SFAR 87 area and then continue on to any of the three 

alternate aerodromes listed above. 

Mente also provided supporting information to show that its aircraft are properly 

equipped with navigation and safety equipment for the proposed operations. The 

petitioner states that its aircraft possess U.S. registry and comply with the safety and 

maintenance requirements imposed by the FAA.

A summary of the petition was published in the Federal Register on January 21, 2014 

(79 FR 3455). No comments were received. 

The FAA’s analysis is as follows:

The FAA carefully considered all information presented by Mente and finds that 

granting the petition for exemption would provide a level of safety at least equal to that 

provided by the current regulation and would be in the public interest. 

Mente describes at length why it believes that SFAR 87 is no longer necessary, citing 

the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the lack of prohibitions against 

cross-border flights, and the absence of hostile actions against civil aircraft since the 

1999 incident. The petitioner also claims that unnamed sources at the U.S. Embassy in 

Ethiopia seek to lift SFAR 87. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, Ethiopia has 

closed certain air routes that cross the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and they 

remain closed. 

However, Mente does not seek to cross the Ethiopia-Eritrea border in conducting its 

proposed operations and has demonstrated in its supplemental information that an 

exemption is appropriate to its particular circumstances. The FAA has determined that 

granting this exemption, subject to certain conditions and limitations, would provide a 

level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which it seeks exemption,

as well as, prohibits flights by a U.S. operator in the area north of 12 degrees north 

latitude within Ethiopia. 

At the time SFAR 87 was issued, open hostilities between the armed forces of Ethiopia 

and Eritrea, which included modern surface-to-air missle systems and interceptor 
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aircraft capable of engaging aircraft at cruising altitudes, were ongoing near their 

common border. The FAA also had concerns regarding the heightened state of 

readiness maintained by Ethiopian military forces that posed an imminent threat to civil 

aircraft operations in the area, as demonstrated by the 1999 shootdown of the U.S.-

registered Learjet. The FAA was further concerned about the degree of coordination 

between civil air traffic authorities and military air defense commanders for civil 

aircraft overflight in Ethiopia, to include military rules of engagement, in the event an 

aircraft strayed from its assigned route of flight. There are continuing tensions between 

the two countries which have led to periodic exchanges of military weapons fire across 

the border. However, the FAA has determined there have been no recent air defense 

engagements against aircraft, and the Ethiopian government closed air routes crossing

the border with Eritrea several years ago.

In addition, Mente has proposed certain measures to reduce the risks to its proposed 

operations. The petitioner anticipates that its flights will be conducted during the day,

and originate and conclude strictly within Ethiopian airspace. The petitioner stated in its

supplemental information that flights would be screened with extensive pre-trip risk 

assessments using its own “private security resources,” and that the PIC would access 

threat assessments and confirm prior to each flight if circumstances still support a safe 

operation. As part of its pre-trip and on-going risk assessment, the petitioner will 

maintain frequent contact with the U.S. Embassy and the State Department’s consular 

resources in country. 

The FAA also finds that Mente’s plan for operational control and flight monitoring, 

subject to the additional conditions and limitations required by the FAA, will contribute 

to its safe operation in the SFAR area. It indicated that the PIC will exercise authority 

over initiating, conducting, terminating, or diverting flights as necessary to ensure the 

safety of the aircraft and passengers on board. It also specified that the PIC will 

communicate by satellite telephone with Mente’s management personnel or a home 

base of operations prior to takeoff and after landing, and its threat assessment will be 

monitored during flight. The FAA acknowledges that Mente’s aircraft are equipped 

with appropriate navigation and safety equipment for the proposed operations.

Finally, the FAA finds Mente provides sufficient information supporting how its 

proposed exemption is in the public interest. The petitioner stated the proposed flights 

are humanitarian in nature and would provide needed transportation of personnel and 

supplies for philanthropic missions by a U.S. charitable foundation conducting vaccine 

trials and agricultural studies. This work would facilitate the development of new 

vaccines, hybrid seeds and other agricultural products for the benefit of Ethiopia and 

beyond, and could lead to potential discoveries that may have a worldwide impact. 
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The FAA’s Decision

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of exemption is in the public interest. 

Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113 and 44701, 

delegated to me by the Administrator, Mente, LLC is granted an exemption from 14 CFR 

part 91, SFAR 87 to operate within the SFAR 87 area and land at and take off from the five 

airports named in the petition in support of the foundation’s philanthropic activities described 

in the petition, subject to the conditions and limitations listed below.

Conditions and Limitations

1. Aircrew/aircraft will continuously squawk their Air Traffic Control (ATC) assigned 

transponder codes.

2. Aircrew/aircraft will maintain continuous contact, to the greatest extent possible, with 

Ethiopian ATC.

3. This exemption applies to the following Mente-operated aircraft: Global XRS 

N194WM and N887WM. Mente will coordinate any aircraft swaps in advance with 

its assigned Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) and must receive prior approval 

for swaps from the FSDO manager. 

4. Any “disabling of the aircraft,” as described in the “Aircraft security” portion of 

Mente’s supplemental information dated May 20, 2014, will be conducted by 

appropriately qualified maintenance personnel and in accordance with all applicable 

FAA regulations and applicable flight manuals.

5. Recognizing the importance of operational control measures in the context of the 

proposed operations in the SFAR 87 area, the FAA further requires Mente to have a 

means to exercise enhanced operational control while the aircraft is en-route or during 

flight. (i.e., processes and procedures for communicating time-sensitive information to 

the flight crew via on-board communication equipment of any changes to conditions, 

including threat information, that would negatively affect the safety of the operation). 

Mente must not allow any flight to take place, unless all on-board equipment necessary 

for flight crews to communicate with ATC and Mente management or home base is

operable and readily available for their use.

6. This exemption is contingent upon Mente’s provision of the following information to 

the FAA, to the satisfaction of AFS-200:

a. A description of Mente’s “own private security resources,” including a copy of

a contract or proposed contract with a provider of security and intelligence 

information applicable to operations associated with this exemption;

b. A sample of a pre-trip risk assessment. Future samples must be available to 

the FAA upon request;

c. A description of the enhanced operational control measures to be taken in 

Condition No. 5 above; and 
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d. A copy of the applicable pages of Mente’s flight operations manual outlining 

the procedures submitted to the FAA in its petition containing adjustments, as 

necessary, to address the conditions and limitations contained herein.

7. Prior to conducting any operations within Ethiopia under this exemption, Mente must 

secure all necessary permissions from the appropriate authorities of Ethiopia and, if 

necessary, other countries. Mente must also comply with the Ethiopia Aeronautical 

Information Publication (AIP) in conducting any operations in Ethiopia under this 

exemption.

8. Ensure that all personnel, including pilots, participating in or responsible for 

operations conducted pursuant to this exemption are trained in all aspects of Mente’s 

proposed operations within the SFAR 87 area. This includes all conditions and 

limitations contained in this grant of exemption and any other Mente processes and 

procedures regarding operations in Ethiopia relevant to their job functions. 

9. If a security-related incident occurs, Mente must immediately notify the FAA Current 

Intelligence and Threat Evaluation (CITE) Watch at 202-267-3333. 

10. The flight crew must carry a copy of this grant of exemption on all flights operated 

under this exemption. 

11. The operator, prior to conducting any flights under this exemption, must complete and 

submit to its assigned FSDO the attached document, captioned “Waiver of Claims and 

Agreement to Indemnify and Hold Harmless the United States of America,” containing 

the operator’s agreement to release the U.S. Government from any and all claims and 

liabilities, as well as its agreement to indemnify the U.S. Government with respect to 

any third party claims and liabilities relating to any and all events arising from or 

related to operations authorized under this grant of exemption.

This exemption is also extended to the Mente airmen who will be exercising the privileges of 

airmen certificates issued by the FAA in connection with the operations authorized under this 

exemption, only to the extent necessary to conduct such operations. 

This exemption terminates on July 31, 2016, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Issued in Washington, DC, on July 8, 2014.

/s/

Ricardo Domingo

Acting Deputy Director, Flight Standards Service

Enclosure
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Page 1 of 2

WAIVER OF CLAIMS 

AND AGREEMENT 

TO INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

1. In consideration of the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) issuing operations 

specifications or a letter of authorization to: 

____________________________________ 

[Operator’s corporate name] 

(“Operator”) for one or more aviation operations in the territory of Ethiopia (the 

“SFAR 87 Operations”), pursuant to Special Federal Aviation Regulation (“SFAR”) 

No. 87, Operator enters into this Waiver of Claims and Agreement to Indemnify and 

Hold Harmless the United States of America (“Waiver and Agreement”), and 

hereby—

a. Waives any and all claims and liabilities of whatever type or kind, brought in the 

United States of America or elsewhere, including without limitation those for 

personal injury, death, or property damage, that it may assert against the United 

States of America, or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any 

current or former officer or employee thereof, or any of them (the “Government 

Parties”) arising out of or related to Operator’s SFAR 87 Operations; 

b. Agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Government Parties against any and 

all claims or liabilities of whatever type or kind, brought in the United States of 

America or elsewhere, including without limitation those for death, personal 

injury, or property damage, that arise out of or are related to Operator’s SFAR 87

Operations and that may be asserted against the Government Parties by any third 

person, including without limitation any employee, agent, or supplier or other 

contractor of Operator; and 

c. Agrees to reimburse the United States of America for any and all costs and 

expenses that the United States of America may incur in defending against the 

claims or liabilities referred to in paragraph B, above. 

2. Nothing in this Waiver and Agreement may be interpreted to affect adversely any 

protection provided to Operator—

a. Under Public Law 85-804, as amended (50 U.S.C. § 1431 et seq.); or 

b. Under an effective non-premium insurance policy that the United States of 

America issued under 49 U.S.C. § 44305. 

3. This Waiver and Agreement applies to events occurring during the time period that 

begins when the first aircraft operated by the operator enters into the territory or 
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airspace of Ethiopia to which SFAR 87 applies, and terminates when all aircraft 

operated by the Operator have permanently exited such territory or airspace. 

4. Operator understands that this Waiver and Agreement is required as a condition of, 

and forms part of the proceedings for: 

a. A letter of authorization issued by the Director, Flight Standards Service; 

b. A grant of exemption issued pursuant to part 11 of title 14, Code of Federal 

Regulations; or 

c. A grant of approval issued by the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety or 

the Deputy Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,whichever applies. 

5. Operator agrees to be bound by this Waiver and Agreement, as indicated by the 

signature of Operator’s duly authorized representative, who is an Officer of Operator 

and is authorized to bind Operator. 

For: 

_____________________________ The Federal Aviation Administration 

Operator’s Corporate Name 

By: By:

_____________________________ ___________________________ 

Signature Signature

_____________________________ ___________________________

Name (please print legibly) Name (please print legibly)

_____________________________ ___________________________ 

Title Title

_____________________________ ___________________________ 

Date Date