UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ EDDIE M. KELLY, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. K12 INC.; OKLA HOMA VIRTUAL CHARTER ACADEMY; AUDRA PLUMMER; NICOLE ELLISON, Defendants - Appellees. No. 20-7046 (D.C. No. 6:17- CV-00453-RAW) (E.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before MORITZ , BALDOCK , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Plaintiff Eddie M. Kelly sued he r former employer and others for discrimination, and the district court granted her employer’s motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator granted summa ry judgment against Kelly, and the district

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 10, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 court confirmed the award and dismissed Kelly ’s claims against a ll the defendants. Exercising jurisdiction un der 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 1 we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND Kelly was employed by K12 Inc. as a reading teacher at Oklahoma Virtual Charter Academy (OVCA), 2 a public charter school. K12 provided services to OVCA, including providing te achers like Kelly. Kelly’ s employment with K12 was subject to an arbitration ag reement that required arbitrat ion of all dis putes “arising from or relating to [Kelly’s] employment or the termination of [her] employment.” R. at 42. The agreement further provide d it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Virginia law. K12 terminated Kelly’s employment in March 2016, and she filed a lawsuit alleging civil rights violations against K12, OVCA, and two of Ke lly’s supervisors, Audra Plummer and Nicole Ellison. The district court granted K12’s motion to compel arbitration, and Kelly proceeded to arbitration only against K12. The arbitrator granted summary judgment in K12’s favor and dismis sed Kelly’s claims with prejudice.

1 We issued an order instructing Kelly and Defendant Oklahoma Skynet (d/b/a Oklahoma Virtual Charter Academy) to addr ess whether the district court’s order was final as to all parties and claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (grantin g courts of appeal jurisdiction “of appeals from al l final decisions”). We c onclude that the order was final, and we therefore have juri sdiction to address this appeal.

2 OVCA is a trade name used by Oklaho ma Skynet, which answered Kelly’s claims against OVCA. Because the district c ourt used the trade name to refer to this defendant, we will do the same.3 K12 then moved the district court to confirm the award and dismiss Kelly’s lawsuit. Kelly opposed the motion, and so ught to amend her claims against OVCA, Plummer, and Ellison. Plummer and Ellison moved to dismiss Kelly’s claims against them on the merits and also argued the clai ms against them were foreclosed by the arbitrator’s decision. The district court found no grounds to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitrator’s decision, and therefore confir med the arbitration award. The district court also held the arbitrat ion agreement applied to the claims against the remaining defendants and dismissed them as well. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Arbitration Award “Our review of the [arbitrator’s] deci sion under the FAA is strictly limited; this highly deferential standard has been described as among the narrowest known to the law.” Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co. , 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court may grant a motion to vacate an arbitration award only under very limited circumstances, including violation of public policy. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Union Pac. R.R. , 119 F.3d 847, 84 9 (10th Cir. 1997). Kelly asserts the district court erred in confirming the arbitration award for two reasons. First, she contends the award violated public policy based on her allegation that K12 uses uncertified staff, thus impacting special education students. It is unclear, however, how this allegati on connects to the arbitrator’s grant of summary judgment. The public policy ex ception applies “where the terms of the4 arbitration contract . . . violate public policy or where the award requires parties undertake some action in viol ation of public policy.” Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. , 22 F.3d 1010, 1012 n. 1 (10t h Cir. 1994). Kelly makes no such allegation here and therefore has not shown that the public policy exception applies here. Second, Kelly claims there was no valid contract because after the arbitration she found a second version of the arbitration agreement, suggesting that K12 secretly attempted to alter the agr eement. But this alleged second version was never presented to the district cour t and is not part of the reco rd on appeal. Although Kelly has attempted to supplement th e record pursuant to Fed. App. R. 10(e), that rule “does not grant a license to build a ne w record” by supplementing the record on appeal with documents that were not before the district court. United States v. Kennedy , 225 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10t h Cir. 2000) (internal quotations marks omitted). The district court did not err in finding there was a va lid arbitration agreement. In sum, we hold the district court corre ctly upheld the arb itrator’s grant of summary judgment against Kelly. B. Nonsignatories to Arbitration Agreement A nonsignatory to an arbitration agr eement can enforce an arbitration clause under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration
Ass’n , 64 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1995). Under this theory, a signatory may be required to arbitrate with a nonsignatory when the signatory alleges substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and the signatory5 to the contract. See, e.g., MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin , 177 F.3d 942, 947-48 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, Ke lly’s claims against OVCA, Plummer, and Ellison were not merely interdependent, but based on the exact same operative fa cts as her claims against K12. It was theref ore appropriate to require Ke lly to arbitrate with the non-signatories to the arbitr ation agreement, and we affi rm their dismissal on that ground.
III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We deny Kelly’s motion to supplement the record.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge