1

Filed 10/28/13 In re L.L. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Placer)

----

In re L.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

PLACER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

C072701

(Super. Ct. No. 53-003215)

This dependency case is the result of an extremely acrimonious divorce and 

custody battle during which both parents’ behavior produced such serious emotional 

distress in the minor, L.L., that it was necessary for the juvenile court to remove the 

minor from their custody. The mother subsequently learned to modify her behavior and 

regained custody of the minor. The father, D.L., remains mired in the past and now 

appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating the dependency and awarding sole 

legal and physical custody to the mother. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4 [further 
2

undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code].) Father 

contends the custody and visitation order is vague; the court gave mother the power to 

deny visits; and the evidence did not support the visit conditions. We affirm.

FACTS

The case was referred to Placer County Department of Health and Human Services 

(Department) by the Placer County Family Law Court (§ 329) in 2011 because the 

minor’s therapist said that six-year-old L.L. was unable to make progress in resolving her 

emotional problems in therapy due to the ongoing parental conflict. The minor’s anxiety 

and stress produced increasingly severe behaviors as the minor tried to control her 

environment. A psychological evaluation ordered by the Family Law Court concluded 

the parents had no coparenting abilities and each believed the other was abusing the 

minor sexually or emotionally. The evaluation recommended that if the parents were 

unwilling or unable to learn to coparent, then the minor should be placed in the primary 

custody of one parent. 

Following an investigation, the Department filed a petition in April 201l alleging 

the minor came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (c), because the minor 

was suffering, or at risk of suffering, serious emotional damage as a result of parental 

conduct. The court ordered the minor detained and permitted each parent to have 

supervised visits with the minor two to three times a week. 

At the time the petition was filed, the parents shared the physical custody of the 

minor equally on an alternating weekly basis. The minor’s therapist described father as 

having an agenda and not listening while mother had no control over the minor’s 

behavior. The therapist reported that father constantly degraded mother in the minor’s 

presence and blamed mother for their problems. The therapist found mother to be 

dramatic but open to learning new skills while questioning whether father could change. 

The therapist stated the minor was aware of the parental conflict and was acting out from 

stress. Mother believed the minor had suffered from the litigation over the last four 
3

years, but that the emotional abuse was not her fault. Father blamed the Department for 

the minor’s removal and insisted that the minor’s emotional abuse stemmed from mental 

abuse and manipulation by mother. The social worker concluded that the parents were 

battling over the minor which caused the minor extreme anxiety. Engaging in their 

mutual dislike appeared to be more important to the parents than the minor’s well-being. 

Each parent was focused on the need to win but what each needed was to change focus to 

the minor’s needs and move on from the past. 

After a lengthy hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition, ordered the 

parents to participate in services and placed the minor in foster care. 

As the six-month review neared, father continued to blame the Department, insist 

that the social worker favored mother and was impatient for the minor to return home. 

Both parents had participated in services but progress was slow. New psychological 

evaluations of the parents found they both tended to have histrionic traits and emotional 

reactivity. The evaluation recommended the parents engage in therapy to improve 

personal responsibility, complete a coparenting counseling program and take a parenting 

class to improve parenting skills. 

The minor was doing very well in foster care and in therapy, although the therapist 

was concerned that father needed to redirect some of the minor’s requests for physical 

interaction with him to something more appropriate and to maintain better boundaries 

with the minor. The separate visits highlighted the parents’ different parenting styles, 

with mother engaging in shared activities and father in movies and horseplay. Mother 

believed she was changing and her relationship with the minor was improving. Father 

said he did not need therapy and had not learned a thing in the classes and counseling. 

Father wanted to know what the Department was doing to shorten the time the minor was 

out of the home. The parents continued to blame each other for their ongoing problems, 

with father also blaming the Department and the court. 
4

Prior to the six-month review hearing, the coparenting therapists reported that, 

although the parents tried to apply coparenting techniques, they were unable to coparent 

because each contended the other presented obstacles to doing so. The therapists agreed 

with this assessment. The father’s therapist reported that father’s distrust of the system 

limited his ability to establish treatment goals. The therapist, noting that therapy only 

works when the client sees a need for change, said he was unable to be of further help to 

father who was not ready to accept intervention. In most of the sessions, father spent 

time and energy arguing his position, criticizing others and claiming he was a victim of 

the system. At the review hearing, the court continued services and set an interim and a 

12-month review hearing. 

The interim Court-Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) report stated the CASA 

had seen an overall change in the minor who was happy and chatty when talking about 

her parents, particularly mother. The social worker’s interim report said mother resided 

in Southern California and traveled to Placer County for visits and therapy. Father was 

referred to a new therapist but was still unwilling or unable to participate in a meaningful 

way because he did not see he had done anything wrong. The minor was stable in foster 

care and had improved both attitude and boundaries. The social worker’s assessment was 

that father remained invested in the fight, misconstrued statements made to him, and 

made assumptions rather than listening to what was being said. Mother made progress, 

acknowledging there was a problem and that she made mistakes and was ready for 

unsupervised visits. At the interim review hearing, the court ordered unsupervised visits 

for mother.

The 12-month review report recommended returning the minor to mother. Mother 

was complying with individual therapy and not speaking negatively about father, she had 

moved to unsupervised visits and completed coparenting classes. The coparenting 

instructor said mother was past her anger and just wanted to do what was best for the 

minor. Father’s individual therapists said they were unable to help him and he was 
5

referred to a third therapist for parent coaching. Father continued to complain about 

mother when he thought the minor could not hear him. In coparenting class, father 

remained focused on the past and believed the information presented did not apply to 

him. Mother had transitioned to overnight visits. Father continued to have supervised 

visits but complained about the social worker, the foster mother, and mother. The report 

concluded mother demonstrated she could stay child focused and had integrated what she 

learned. Father could not. 

At the 12-month review hearing in August 2012, the court placed the minor with 

mother under court supervision. The court ordered unsupervised visitation for father with 

supervised exchanges. The court further ordered communication between the parents to 

be by e-mail with copies to the social worker with no negative comments about the other 

parent. 

Within a month of the hearing, the social worker brought a section 388 petition for 

modification to return to supervised visits for father to prevent him from discussing the 

case with the minor. The petition alleged that the minor reacted negatively toward her 

mother after an overnight visit with father and expressed concern about his finances and 

well-being. At the hearing, the court placed the minor with mother in Orange County, 

reinstated supervised visits for father and continued the matter. Father filed an extensive 

declaration contending the petition for modification was based on false assumptions, that 

the social worker was biased, and that mother had engaged in parental alienation for over 

five years. Father requested the return to a shared custody arrangement and termination 

of the Department’s involvement. 

The CASA report filed in October 2012 contrasted the minor’s demeanor before 

and after the overnight visit with father. After the first two unsupervised visits the minor 

remained positive and loving toward her mother. After the first overnight visit the minor 

ignored mother, physically separated herself from mother, and refused to interact with 

mother until the CASA intervened. The minor continued to try to avoid responding to 
6

mother. The CASA contacted both the social worker and the minor’s therapist with her 

views. 

The 18-month review report recommended termination of the dependency with 

legal and physical custody to mother and supervised visits for father. The minor, who 

was living with mother in Southern California, continued with therapy when she returned 

to Placer County for visits with father. Mother’s counseling had been phased out as 

unnecessary and she appeared to be in compliance with the plan requirement to interact 

positively with father. There was an attempt to mediate the visitation schedule, but father 

ultimately declined to agree to the proposed plan. Father attended therapy with his third 

therapist who described him as “highly defended with rigid thought processes.” Father 

continued to interact negatively with mother and did not demonstrate the ability to be 

child focused or apply what he had been exposed to in services. Father refused to attend 

the first visit after supervision was reinstated. The report explained the basis for the 

Department’s petition for modification, i.e., the change in the minor’s behavior after an 

overnight visit with father, the minor’s concern about his financial condition, the minor’s 

anger at her mother, and her request to the therapist to ask the judge for equal custody 

when she had never made any such request in the past. The report further stated that the 

minor’s behavior toward mother after the overnight visit had regressed to what it had 

been at the outset of the dependency, although the day before the visit the minor had been 

happy and affectionate with mother. The social worker concluded that mother had 

benefitted from services while father had not and continued to be trapped in contention. 

Further, if disputes were not resolved in his favor, father’s reaction was to blame others 

and refuse to participate. Father was unable or unwilling to see how he contributed to the 

problems in the family. This was the pattern throughout the course of the dependency 

proceedings and led to the recommendation to terminate the dependency with full 

custody to mother. 
7

The combined hearing on the petition for modification and the 18-month review 

commenced in October 2012. Father was representing himself and questioned witnesses. 

The court repeatedly cautioned father that the purpose of the hearing was not to relitigate 

jurisdiction issues and that only what had happened since the last review hearing in 

August 2012 was relevant. The court further cautioned father that in trying to elicit 

testimony of prior events, he was showing he was fixed on the past and was not 

progressing. 

The visit supervisor testified about a visit at the mall in July 2012 where the minor 

appeared sad and asked about visiting father after moving to Southern California. After 

father told the minor he and mother would work it out, the minor was fine. The visit 

supervisor stated that mother coordinated a recent visit for father with the minor, who 

was in the hospital for an infected tooth. 

One of the therapists who was to provide coparenting services testified neither 

parent was able to coparent with the other and mechanisms such as e-mail 

communication were necessary to permit contact outside the program. While there were 

areas the parents were able to agree on, they were at an impasse on most issues. 

The foster mother testified the minor expressed a desire to see mother but did not 

talk about calling or seeing father, although the foster mother encouraged her to talk 

about father. She described the minor’s demeanor after the overnight visit with father to 

be similar to that when the minor first arrived in her care, pushing mother away and 

retreating from the openness she had achieved. She said the minor shared a common 

bond with father in that they liked some of the same things and the minor would talk to 

the social worker about that in a positive way. 

Father’s first therapist testified father was receptive to learning ways to control 

being upset but made little progress because he was convinced the system was unjust. At 

each session father would spend time venting about new events which had triggered his 

anger. Eventually the therapist felt further therapy was needed but he could not help. 
8

The social worker testified that she saw father as having difficulty recognizing 

what people intended and misconstruing their statements. She was concerned that father 

had not learned to work cooperatively and be child focused, but mother had and had 

moved on. She questioned some of father’s statements which distorted the past and could 

not tell if he was dishonest or saw things so differently that in his mind it was the truth. 

The minor’s therapist testified that nothing the minor had said led her to believe 

father was discussing the case in their unsupervised visits, however, she had also heard 

nothing which made her think that mother was coercing the minor to express a desire to 

live in Southern California. Her concern about the minor after the unsupervised visit was 

that the minor, who rarely talked about father, came in and wanted equally shared 

custody. This was a change from the minor’s past statements. The minor’s therapist 

opposed unsupervised visits with father based on father’s physical activity in supervised 

visits and lack of any information father had changed or realized the behavior was 

inappropriate. The therapist was concerned about the minor’s regression in behavior 

after the overnight visit. 

Father testified in his own behalf. He denied he was focused on the past; he only 

brought up past events to show a pattern and help people understand what was going on. 

He said he had not spoken negatively about mother in front of the minor and has tried to 

be cordial. He objected to some of the services, finding the group sessions offensive. 

The court, in ruling on the petition for modification and the 18-month review,, 

made it clear that it was aware of all the history from prior trials. On the petition for 

modification the court found there was a dramatic change in the minor’s behavior after 

the unsupervised overnight visit and it was in the minor’s best interests to return to 

supervised visits. 

As to the review hearing, the court found father had demonstrated in testimony, 

examination and his closing remarks that he had completely failed to move past the 

acrimonious divorce and the initial allegations. The court further found father portrayed 
9

himself as a victim and believed he was the subject of a “witch hunt.” In declarations and 

e-mails father made it clear that he believed others were out to get him. The court 

observed that every professional who worked with the family came to the same 

conclusion that father was unwilling to progress and everything turned on how it affected 

him. It was father, not mother who wanted to continue the fight. The court found father 

was essentially unchanged from the time of the jurisdiction hearing and the allegations of 

the petition would still be sustained as to him. The court found that it was clear there was 

not a substantial risk of harm if the minor was returned to mother but there was as to 

father. Observing that termination of jurisdiction was required unless the conditions 

which led to the dependency were likely to return, the court concluded that strong exit 

orders and giving the family law court the ability to review the findings in the 

dependency case would prevent recurrence and ordered the dependency jurisdiction 

terminated. The court terminated father’s services and granted sole legal and physical 

custody to mother. Father’s visits were to be supervised and alternate between Orange 

and Placer Counties as arranged through a third party -- either “an agreed-upon third 

party or a professional agency at father’s expense.” The court further ordered that the 

family law court was to review the dependency file before modifying the custody and 

visitation orders. The court explained that the family law court would require a change of 

circumstances to modify custody or visitation orders and would have to make specific 

factual findings to do so. The court ordered that mother was to transport the minor to 

Placer County once a month for visitation. Formal orders containing the court’s ruling 

were filed January 9, 2013. Father did not object when the orders were pronounced in 

open court or later when the formal orders were prepared. 

DISCUSSION

I

The Department asserts as a preliminary matter that the notice of appeal is 

premature. We agree.
10

As a general rule, the time to appeal an order in a dependency proceeding runs 

from the time the order is pronounced in open court. (In re Markaus V. (1989) 211 

Cal.App.3d 1331, 1337.) The juvenile court orders for custody and visitation on 

termination of the dependency are an exception to this rule because section 362.4 

contemplates that written orders will be prepared and issued. (In re Markaus V., supra, at 

p. 1337.) Accordingly, the time to file a notice of appeal in this case ran, not from the 

pronouncement in open court but from the filing of the written orders. (Ibid.) 

Here, the court gave its ruling on November 14, 2012. The notice of appeal was 

filed December 10, 2012. The written custody and visitation orders were filed January 9, 

2013. The notice of appeal was premature. However, we exercise our discretion to treat 

the notice of appeal as filed immediately after the filing of the orders. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.406(d).)

II

Father argues the juvenile court custody order is too vague to give him notice as to 

what he must show has changed so that he can demonstrate that a modification of 

visitation and/or custody orders is in the minor’s best interest.

“When the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a minor who has been 

adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile court prior to the minor’s attainment of the 

age of 18 years, and proceedings for dissolution of marriage . . . are pending in the 

superior court of any county, or an order has been entered with regard to the custody of 

that minor, the juvenile court . . . may issue . . . an order determining the custody of, or 

visitation with the child. [¶] Any order issued pursuant to this section shall continue 

until modified or terminated by a subsequent order of the superior court. The order of the 

juvenile court shall be filed in the proceeding for . . . dissolution . . . at the time the 

juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over the minor, and shall become a part thereof.” 

(§ 362.4.)
11

“Any custody or visitation order issued by the juvenile court at the time the 

juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction pursuant to Section 362.4 regarding a child who 

has been previously adjudged to be a dependent child of the juvenile court shall be a final 

judgment and shall remain in effect after that jurisdiction is terminated. The order shall 

not be modified in a proceeding or action described in Section 3021 of the Family Code 

unless the court finds that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the 

juvenile court issued the order and modification of the order is in the best interests of the 

child.” (§ 302, subd. (d).)

The juvenile court’s custody and visitation order provided: (1) full physical and 

legal custody of the minor to mother; (2) family law court to review the juvenile 

dependency file prior to making any changes in the current custody order; (3) father to 

have supervised visitation; (4) visits to be supervised by an agreed-upon third party or 

professional agency at father’s expense; (5) one visit per month in Orange County, father 

to make arrangements; (6) one visit per month in Placer County, mother to bring minor 

for visit; and (7) visits to be up to four hours long. As required, the court order clearly 

provides the location, frequency, duration and responsibility for arranging transport and 

supervision for visits. (Fam. Code, §§ 3011, subd. (e)(1), 6323, subds. (c), (d).)

Appellant argues, without citation to authority, that the order was also required to 

include a reason for the order for supervised visitation. Neither the above-quoted statutes 

authorizing the juvenile court to make custody and visitation orders nor the form on 

which such orders are memorialized provide for a statement of reasons. To the extent 

that a statement of reasons for supervision is required, the court based its order granting 

the petition for modification to return to supervised visitation on the regression in the 

minor’s behavior after the unsupervised overnight visit. The court also discussed at 

length the facts relating to father’s intransigence and failure to benefit from services, all 

of which supported not only the custody order but the visitation order. 
12

Generally, the reasons for ordering supervised visitation will be apparent from a 

perusal of the file before the court and are not specified in the visitation order. Because 

the order in this case is transferred from the juvenile dependency court to the family law 

court and, in light of the contentious dissolution and the circumstances of this case, the 

juvenile court specified that the family law court should familiarize itself with the state of 

the record at the time the orders were made by reviewing the dependency file. Such a 

review would provide all the information necessary for the family law court to ascertain 

the baseline from which the required “substantial change” could be measured. Father 

was present and litigated the issues and has actual knowledge of the facts and 

circumstances supporting the order of supervision.

Father is concerned that the minor lives in Orange County and the court in that 

county does not have access to the dependency file in Placer County. If this is a concern, 

in the event the family law case is transferred to Orange County, the parties are free to 

request that a sealed copy of the juvenile dependency file be transmitted with the family 

law case so that it will be available if a modification is requested.

While father believes he has fully complied with the elements of his plan, he 

demonstrated both before and at the hearing that he has not benefitted from his services 

to the point where he can have unsupervised interaction with the minor without placing 

her at risk of harm. In its rulings, the juvenile court made it abundantly clear that, while 

mother had progressed, father had not. There is nothing vague in the order. Father’s 

difficulties with the order stem from his failure to accept that the established facts upon 

which the custody and visitation orders are based are not the facts of past events or facts 

he believes currently exist, but instead, those facts which the court found to be true. 

III

Appellant contends the juvenile court custody and visitation order improperly 

delegated to mother the power to deny visitation altogether because the order requires the 

parties agree on a visit monitor.
13

Father was present in court and litigated the custody and visitation issues. He 

failed to object to the visitation conditions when the court orally pronounced the order in 

open court and has forfeited the challenge on appeal. (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 

Cal.App.4th 551, 558; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502.)

Assuming for purposes of argument that the issue is not forfeited, father cannot 

prevail. 

When a juvenile court enters custody and visitation orders on termination of the 

dependency, it may not delegate the power to determine whether visits will occur at all. 

(In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 213-214 [visits to begin when father’s therapist 

determined father had made progress and minor’s therapist to facilitate did not delegate 

discretion to determine whether visits would occur, noting father was not prejudiced by 

the order since the court could have denied visits altogether]; In re T.H. (2010) 190 

Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123 [order that there would be supervised visitation to be determined 

by the parents made father’s right to visits illusory when the right depended on the 

agreement of the mother who did not want him to visit and was unlikely to agree]; In re 

A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799 [no delegation where the order required parents to 

agree on a monitor and if unable to do so, father would choose the monitor].) 

The visitation order, on its face, does not improperly delegate authority to 

determine whether visits will occur. Unlike the order in T.H., this order grants visitation 

and specifies the number of supervised visits per month, the length of visits and where 

they will occur. The order also provides alternatives in the supervision of the visits, i.e., 

either a third party or a professional agency agreed on by the parents. The parents have 

been ordered to agree. If agreement is unreasonably withheld, it is a matter for the family 

court to enforce the order or modify the condition to avoid the problem. (In re Chantal 

S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 214.) 

Father asserts the acrimony between the parties may make agreement on a visit 

supervisor, whether third party or professional, problematic because mother will not 
14

agree on a visit supervisor. However, the evidence in this case indicates otherwise. 

Mother, as the custodial parent has mitigated her rancor of the past at least insofar as 

visitation is concerned and even facilitated the father’s recent visit with the minor, who 

was in the hospital for an infected tooth. Indeed, based on the evidence, it is father, not 

mother, who may present problems in agreeing on a supervisor. The parties have 

successfully used e-mail communication, which was agreed on in therapy and ordered by 

the court, to avoid the confrontation and animus present in face-to-face communication. 

Such communication also provides a written record of the negotiations over visit 

supervision, providing the family court a simple means of review in the event of 

disagreement. The order is neither illusory nor an improper delegation of the decision of 

whether visits will occur. 

IV

Father argues substantial evidence does not support supervised visits of four hours 

or less. He points to the unsupervised day visits he had with the minor prior to return to 

supervision and argues there were no problems with those visits, so, limiting the time was 

unsupported by the evidence.

When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on 

appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the 

reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is, evidence 

which is reasonable, credible and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier of 

fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 

1206, 1214.) In making this determination we recognize that all conflicts are to be 

resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are 

questions for the trier of fact. (In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1214; In re 

Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the 

evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 

Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
15

Father relies, in part, on section 362.1, which authorizes visitation during the 

reunification period and states: “In order to maintain ties between the parent . . . and the 

child, and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to 

the custody of his or her parent . . . [¶] . . . [v]isitation shall be as frequent as possible 

consistent with the well-being of the child. [¶] No visitation order shall jeopardize the 

safety of the child. . . .” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1).) The visitation order which is the subject 

of the appeal is not for reunification and the purposes set forth in the statute have no 

application here. 

The challenged condition is a part of the juvenile court’s custody and visitation 

orders upon termination of the dependency and is governed by section 362.4 and related 

statutory and rules provisions. The purpose of visitation orders in the family law context 

is to provide ongoing parental contact with the minor in a manner which furthers the best 

interests of the child. (Fam. Code, §§ 3020, 3040, subd. (c).) The court upon termination 

of the dependency has broad discretion in fashioning visitation orders which take into 

account both the safety and the best interests of the child. (In re Emmanuel R. (2001) 94 

Cal.App.4th 452, 465; In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 953.).

At the 12-month review hearing, the court approved a visit schedule for 

unsupervised visits for father. After the first overnight unsupervised visit, the minor 

regressed to the emotional and behavioral condition displayed when the dependency 

began. As a result, the juvenile court decided to circumscribe visitation for father with 

conditions to protect the minor and further her best interests. The resulting order of twice 

monthly supervised visits of four hours satisfied these twin objectives while still 

providing a reasonable visit for father and the minor. By the time of the orders 

terminating the dependency, father had made no progress in understanding his part in the 

initial problems which led to the dependency and caused the return to supervised 

visitation. He continued to take no responsibility and blamed others. The court’s custody 

and visitation order reflected a necessary balance between the need to insure the minor’s 
16

emotional stability and father’s need for contact with the minor. Substantial evidence 

supported the court’s order.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

 NICHOLSON , J.

We concur:

 BLEASE , Acting P. J.

 HULL , J.