J-S58019-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PAUL ROBERT SIEMINKEWICZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 385 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 26, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001831-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 31, 2020

Appellant, Paul Robert Sieminkewicz, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of six months’ probation, imposed after he was convicted of driving 

under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance (DUI) - general 

impairment, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), and failing to properly use signals on 

turning and starting, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3334(b).1 We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the procedural and factual background of 

this case as follows:

[Appellant] was charged with the following as a result of an 

incident that occurred on January 27, 2014:

____________________________________________

1 Appellant purports to appeal from the trial court’s February 25, 2019 order 

denying his post-sentence motion. See Notice of Appeal, 3/5/2019. However, 

“[a] direct appeal in a criminal proceeding lies from the judgment of 

sentence.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 497 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (citation omitted). We have amended the caption accordingly. 
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Count 1: Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or 

Controlled Substance, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 

3802(a)(1);

Count 2: Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or 

Controlled Substance, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 3802(c);

Count 3: Obscure Plates, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 

1332(b)(3);

Count 4: Stop Signs and Yield Signs, in violation of 75 

Pa.C.S.[] § 3323(a);

Count 5: Turning Movements and Required Signals, in 

violation of 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 3334(b); and,

Count 6: Careless Driving, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 

3714(a).

[Appellant] filed an [o]mnibus [p]re-[t]rial [m]otion to [s]uppress 

[e]vidence on September 30, 2014. The [m]otion was 

subsequently withdrawn by [Appellant] at an [o]mnibus [p]re-

[t]rial [m]otions [h]earing on December 8, 2014. [Appellant] 

thereafter requested that his case be continued several times. His 

case ultimately proceeded to a [n]on-[j]ury [t]rial that was held 

before this [c]ourt an October 9, 2018. At the beginning of 

[Appellant’s] [n]on-[j]ury [t]rial, the Commonwealth presented a 

[m]otion to [w]ithdraw [Appellant’s] charge at Count 2 due to a 

Birchfield[2]issue, which was granted. Upon consideration of the 

testimony presented at the [n]on-[j]ury [t]rial and after a review 

of an MVR[3]that was submitted into evidence by the 

Commonwealth, this [c]ourt found [Appellant] guilty at Counts 1 

and 5, and not guilty at all other [c]ounts.

[Appellant] was sentenced on November 26, 2018. Specifically, 

at Count 1, [Appellant] was sentenced to six (6) months of 

probation and, at Count 5, [Appellant] was ordered to pay a 

$25.00 fine and costs. Additionally, [Appellant] was ordered to 

pay multiple fees, including a lab fee of $134.00 to the 

____________________________________________

2 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016). 

3 MVR stands for mobile video recording, and is also known as a dash-cam 

video. 
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Pennsylvania State Police Crime Lab. [Appellant] subsequently 

filed [p]ost-[s]entence [m]otions on December 6, 2018....

FACTS

On the night of January 27, 2014, Pennsylvania State Police

Troopers Brian Sachs and Joseph Pitsak were patrolling in Ligonier 

Borough, Pennsylvania, in a marked police vehicle. Trooper Sachs 

described the weather conditions that night as wet and icy, with 

snow on the road. While on patrol, the [t]roopers observed 

[Appellant’s] vehicle fail to slow down or stop at a stop sign 

located at the intersection of West Main Street and South Fairfield 

Street. [Appellant’s] vehicle subsequently turned left onto West 

Main Street in front of their patrol vehicle. The [t]roopers 

attempted to run [Appellant’s] vehicle registration, but could not 

do so because it was covered with snow. They continued to follow 

[Appellant’s] vehicle and observed it turn right onto North Walnut 

Street without a signal.

As a result of observing the three (3) aforementioned Motor 

Vehicle Code violations, the [t]roopers initiated a traffic stop of 

[Appellant’s] vehicle by activating the patrol vehicle’s emergency 

lights. [Appellant] continued on the road and pulled his vehicle 

into the driveway at his house. Trooper Sachs believed that 

[Appellant’s] vehicle struck, or came very close to striking, bushes 

that overhung the driveway. He testified that [Appellant] could 

have pulled his vehicle into the driveway “fairly easily” without 

hitting any bushes or hanging over the edge of it. Trooper Sachs 

subsequently exited his patrol vehicle and approached 

[Appellant’s] car. [Appellant] attempted to exit his vehicle, but 

Trooper Sachs instructed [Appellant] to remain inside of the 

vehicle and he complied. Trooper Sachs then asked [Appellant] 

where he was coming from. [Appellant] replied that he was 

driving from a bar in Ligonier Borough known as “Googly’s.”

Trooper Sachs testified that [Appellant] exhibited signs of 

intoxication, including slurred speech, bloodshot glassy eyes, and 

the odor of alcohol on his person. Trooper Sachs did not recall if 

he asked [Appellant] for his driver’s license at that point. He 

asked [Appellant] if he had been drinking and he replied in the 

affirmative. Trooper Sachs then asked [Appellant] how much he 

had to drink and he stated, “probably too much.”

At one point, Trooper Sachs asked [Appellant] to step outside of 

his vehicle. Trooper Sachs testified that [Appellant] stumbled 

towards him and Trooper Sachs placed his hands on [Appellant] 
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to prevent him from falling. Trooper Sachs could not recall if 

[Appellant] stepped on snow and he did not believe that 

[Appellant] slipped on ice or anything else. He believed 

[Appellant’s] stumbling was caused by the amount of alcohol that 

he consumed. Trooper Sachs asked [Appellant] to submit to a 

HGN (horizontal gaze nystagmus) field sobriety test.2 Trooper 

Sachs attempted to perform the test, but [Appellant] was unable 

to follow ... his instructions. Specifically, Trooper Sachs testified 

that he performed the “lack of smooth pursuit” test, which 

requires that an individual follow the tip of the [t]rooper’s pen with 

[his] eyes while it moves left and right. The individual is 

instructed not to move [his] head during the test. Trooper Sachs 

testified that [Appellant] was unable to complete this test. He 

could not recall what [Appellant] specifically did to fail the test, 

but he believed that [Appellant] either followed the pen while

turning his head or he did not follow the pen with his eyes. 

Trooper Sachs did not measure [Appellant’s] pupils.

2 Defense [c]ounsel objected to any testimony regarding the 

HGN test because it is not admissible in trial. His objection 

was overruled. The HGN test was never completed by 

Trooper Sachs. Additionally, the Commonwealth’s purpose 

for presenting Trooper Sachs’[s] testimony regarding the 

HGN test was to show that [Appellant] was unable to follow 

or comprehend Trooper Sachs’[s] instructions. Defense 

[c]ounsel also objected to the MVR that was presented by 

the Commonwealth to the extent that it showed the HGN 

test. This [c]ourt assured [d]efense [c]ounsel that the HGN 

test would not be considered.

Trooper Sachs did not perform any additional field sobriety tests 

on [Appellant] because he did not believe that it was safe due to 

the icy weather conditions and the fact that [Appellant] was 

staggering. [Appellant] was placed under arrest for suspected 

DUI. Trooper Sachs did not believe that [Appellant] was capable 

of safely operating a motor vehicle based on his experience, 

[Appellant’s] statements that he had “too much to drink,”

[Appellant’s] slurred speech, [Appellant’s] demeanor and inability 

to stay balanced, and his observation of [Appellant’s] commission 

of three (3) Motor Vehicle Code violations. Trooper Sachs 

preserved an MVR of the incident, which was admitted into 

evidence as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 and played for the [c]ourt. 

The MVR began once Trooper Sachs activated his emergency 

lights, which occurred around the time that [Appellant’s] vehicle 

turned right onto Walnut Street. Additionally, a picture showing 
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[Appellant’s] driveway that was taken during the daytime was 

submitted into evidence by [d]efense [c]ounsel as Defense Exhibit

A.

[Appellant] testified that he was at the Wicked Googly at about 

1:20 a.m. on January 27, 2014. He noticed that the Chief of Police 

for Ligonier, John Berger (hereinafter “Chief Berger”), was also at 

the Wicked Googly and was drinking at the bar. [Appellant] 

claimed that he had an ongoing issue with Chief Berger since 

2012, when he attempted to have relations with [Appellant’s] now 

ex-wife. He testified that he would generally have “words” that 

were not nice with Chief Berger every time that they were both at 

the Wicked Googly. He did not have “words” with Chief Berger on 

January 27, 2014. [Appellant] also did not leave once he saw 

Chief Berger because he felt that he had a right to be at the 

Wicked Googly. [Appellant] consumed two (2) to three (3) beers 

and then left. About ten (10) minutes prior to [Appellant’s] 

leaving, he observed Chief B[e]rger on his cellular phone. 

[Appellant] testified that he drove on Fairfield Street and came to 

a stop prior to turning on Main Street. He believed that he did not 

have any problem operating his vehicle.

[Appellant] was very involved in Ligonier politics. He testified 

that, once his divorce began with his ex-wife, Chief Berger and 

Ligonier Township fabricated several “things” against him, which 

were dismissed. [Appellant] claimed that Chief Berger wanted to 

have a relationship with his ex-wife and he wanted to prove that 

he could help her. [Appellant] believed that Chief Berger called 

Trooper Sachs on January 27, 2014, and Trooper Sachs was 

waiting for him. He testified, however, that he did not know 

Trooper Sachs prior to January 27, 2014. [Appellant] felt that 

Trooper Sachs may have showed ... a little animosity or ill-will 

towards him during the incident. [Appellant] did not disagree that 

he smelled of alcohol that night. Additionally, he testified that he 

may have a lisp due to dental work, but his speech is “pretty good”

if he tries to control it. [Appellant] also stated that he was wearing 

tennis shoes that night and it was extremely icy outside. 

[Appellant] testified that he had to touch the bushes that night 

with his vehicle because the bushes hung over his driveway. He 

removed the bushes after the incident because they were too 

large. [Appellant] testified that he normally wears glasses and he 

did not have his glasses on that night, so it was hard for him to 

focus when Trooper Sachs instructed him to follow his pen. He 

stated that he was also annoyed knowing “the reason [he] was 

being pulled over.” Additionally, [Appellant] believed that he 
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replied, “you think too much” when Trooper Sachs asked him how 

much he had to drink, rather than “too much.” He testified that 

he wanted to say “you think too much” because he knew he was 

being set up. He also stated that he may have sarcastically said 

“probably too much.”

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 2/25/2019, at 1-5 (internal citations and footnote 

omitted; formatting of list of counts slightly modified). 

The trial court denied Appellant’s timely post-sentence motion, which 

included a weight-of-the-evidence claim, on February 25, 2019. On March 5, 

2019, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court did not order 

Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal, and he did not do so. The trial court subsequently issued its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion, in which it stated that the reasons for its decision appear 

in its February 25, 2019 opinion denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion. 

Presently, Appellant raises three issues for our review:

1. Whether the evidence presented at the non-jury trial was 

insufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty of DUI.

2. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

3. Whether the order of restitution relating to a blood draw and 

analysis was illegal where such blood draw was unconstitutional 

pursuant to Birchfield....

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of DUI-general impairment. Id. at 9. Appellant states that “[t]he 

evidence offered by the Commonwealth belies any assertion that he was not 

able to safely operate a motor vehicle. To the contrary, the MVR — which is 

the best evidence in the case — showed that he most certainly was capable 
J-S58019-19

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of operating a motor vehicle safely, as he did just that.” Id. at 9-10 (emphasis 

in original). He asserts that, “[t]he MVR and the testimony of Trooper Sachs 

showed that while [Appellant] was driving his vehicle down Main Street in 

Ligonier, and then into his driveway on Walnut Street, that he did not weave, 

did not cross the center line, did not strike any other vehicles, nor did he speed 

or drive too slowly.” Id. at 10 (citation omitted). Further, he says that 

Trooper Sachs’s testimony about Appellant’s stumbling after exiting his car 

does not align with the footage actually shown in the video. Id. Thus, he 

claims that the Commonwealth “failed to establish the ‘incapable of safe 

driving’ element” of the offense. Id. 

We apply the following standard of review:

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, 

subject to plenary review. When reviewing a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim, the appellate court must review all of the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner. Evidence 

will be deemed to support the verdict when it establishes each 

element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the 

accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth need 

not preclude every possibility of innocence or establish the 

defendant’s guilt to a mathematical certainty. Finally, the trier of 

fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight 

of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 144-45 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted).

The relevant statute provides:

An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical 

control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient 

amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable 
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of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of 

the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). 

This Court has acknowledged:

Section 3802(a)(1) ... is a general provision and provides no 

specific restraint upon the Commonwealth in the manner in which 

it may prove that an accused operated a vehicle under the 

influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of 

safe driving.... The types of evidence that the Commonwealth may 

proffer in a subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution include but are not 

limited to, the following: the offender’s actions and behavior, 

including manner of driving and ability to pass field sobriety tests; 

demeanor, including toward the investigating officer; physical 

appearance, particularly bloodshot eyes and other physical signs 

of intoxication; odor of alcohol, and slurred speech. Blood alcohol 

level may be added to this list, although it is not necessary and 

the two hour time limit for measuring blood alcohol level does not 

apply. Blood alcohol level is admissible in a subsection 3801(a)(1) 

case only insofar as it is relevant to and probative of the accused’s 

ability to drive safely at the time he or she was driving. The weight 

to be assigned these various types of evidence presents a question 

for the fact-finder, who may rely on his or her experience, 

common sense, and/or expert testimony. Regardless of the type 

of evidence that the Commonwealth proffers to support its case, 

the focus of subsection 3802(a)(1) remains on the inability of the 

individual to drive safely due to consumption of alcohol-not on a 

particular blood alcohol level.

Teems, 74 A.3d at 145 (citation omitted). 

Here, the trial court explained why it deemed the evidence sufficient to 

sustain Appellant’s conviction for DUI-general impairment, as follows:

Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, this [c]ourt finds that 

sufficient evidence was presented at [Appellant’s] [n]on-[j]ury 

[t]rial to find each element of the charge at Count 1 beyond a 

reasonable doubt. It was undisputed that [Appellant] was the 

operator of the motor vehicle that was pulled over by Trooper 

Sachs on January 27, 2014. Additionally, sufficient evidence was 

presented at the [n]on-[j]ury [t]rial to show that [Appellant] was 

under the influence of alcohol to such a degree as to render him 
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incapable of safe driving. This [c]ourt was free to believe all, part, 

or none of the evidence and finds the testimony of Trooper Sachs 

to be credible. Trooper Sachs observed [Appellant] commit three 

(3) Motor Vehicle [C]ode violations on January 27, 2014. 

Specifically, he testified that [Appellant] failed to stop his vehicle 

at a stop sign, his license plate was obstructed by snow, and he 

made a right turn with his vehicle without a proper signal. When 

Trooper Sachs initiated a traffic stop of [Appellant’s] vehicle, he 

saw it pull into a driveway and strike, or come close to striking, 

bushes that overhung the driveway. In his opinion, [Appellant] 

had the ability to pull into his driveway “fairly easily” without 

hitting any bushes. Additionally, Trooper Sachs asked [Appellant] 

where he was coming from and he replied that he was coming 

from a bar in Ligonier known as “Googly’s.” Trooper Sachs 

testified that [Appellant] had slurred speech and bloodshot glassy 

eyes, and he smelled of alcohol. He also asked [Appellant] about 

how much he had to drink and [Appellant] replied, “probably too 

much.” Trooper Sachs asked [Appellant] to exit his vehicle and 

he stumbled forward, so Trooper Sachs placed his hands on 

[Appellant] to prevent him from falling. Trooper Sachs believed 

that [Appellant] stumbled due to the amount of alcohol that he 

consumed and not due to ice or anything else. Trooper Sachs was 

unable to perform field sobriety tests on [Appellant] because 

[Appellant] was unable to follow his instructions. He did not 

perform any additional field sobriety tests on [Appellant] due to 

the icy weather conditions and the fact that [Appellant] was 

staggering. He ultimately did not feel that [Appellant] was 

capable of safely operating a motor vehicle. This [c]ourt reviewed 

the MVR that was submitted into evidence by the Commonwealth 

multiple times and agreed with Trooper Sachs’[s] determination. 

Overall, sufficient evidence was presented for the [c]ourt to find 

[Appellant] guilty at Count I.

TCO at 7-8 (internal citations omitted). 

We agree with the trial court. Although Appellant may not have weaved, 

sped, or struck any other vehicles, he committed three other Motor Vehicle 

Code violations, including failing to stop at a stop sign. Moreover, the other 

circumstantial evidence outlined by the trial court supra, such as Appellant’s 

appearance, failure to follow instructions, admission that he had drank too 
J-S58019-19

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much, and stumbling, supports that Appellant was incapable of safely driving.4 

Accordingly, we reject his sufficiency claim. 

In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that, “[i]n the alternative, even 

if the evidence were legally sufficient to support the DUI conviction, the verdict 

was still against the weight of the evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. He 

incorporates his sufficiency argument and maintains that “the MVR evidence 

was the best evidence of what happened during the traffic stop leading [to] 

the DUI charge. This video evidence flatly contradicted the police officer’s 

testimony relating to what happened.” Id. at 11-12. 

We apply the following standard of review to weight claims:

As a general rule, the weight of the evidence is exclusively for the 

fact finder who is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. We cannot 

substitute our judgment for that of the finder of fact. We may 

only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where the 

trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, our role is not to 

consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to 

whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion.

Commonwealth v. Castelhun, 889 A.2d 1228, 1234 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

____________________________________________

4 We address Appellant’s argument that Trooper Sachs’s testimony contradicts 

the MVR footage, specifically his stumbling, in our analysis of Appellant’s 

weight claim. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281-82 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (explaining that a review of the sufficiency of the evidence does 

not encompass an assessment of the credibility of testimony, as such claims 

implicate the weight of the evidence) (citations omitted). 
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We have 

viewed the video and do not agree with Appellant that it contradicts the 

testimony of Trooper Sachs that Appellant stumbled. Accordingly, we reject 

Appellant’s weight claim. 

In Appellant’s final issue, he contends that “the order of restitution 

relating to a blood draw and analysis was illegal where such blood draw was 

unconstitutional pursuant to Birchfield....” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Specifically, 

he explains that he “was subjected to a warrantless blood draw, and his blood 

was submitted for analysis. Following the filing of the within charges, the 

United States Supreme Court decided Birchfield..., which held that 

warrantless blood draws are unconstitutional.” Id. at 12. Consequently, he 

says that, “[f]ollowing the Birchfield decision, the Commonwealth agreed 

that it could not use the blood draw evidence and withdrew the DUI count 

based upon blood alcohol level.” Id. Nevertheless, Appellant avers that “the 

Commonwealth sought restitution for the blood analysis, and the court below 

erroneously awarded such restitution.” Id. He asserts that “[t]his would be 

analogous to a defendant having two theft charges, then having one 

withdrawn, but still having to pay restitution for the withdrawn count. ... Why 

should restitution be awarded to analyze illegally obtained evidence?” Id. at 

12-13.

In opposition to Appellant’s claim that the $134.00 lab fee was illegal 

due to Birchfield, the Commonwealth “submits that this issue should be 

analyzed by examining the discretionary aspects of sentencing, rather than as 
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a constitutional claim.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 19. It explains that “the 

trial court imposed the lab fees upon [A]ppellant as part of sentencing. ... 

[O]rdering [A]ppellant to pay lab fees was within the trial court’s discretion in 

fashioning an appropriate sentence for [A]ppellant and the Commonwealth.” 

Id. Further, the Commonwealth observes that “[t]he blood draw and 

subsequent analysis were performed two years prior to the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Birchfield. The trial court, in imposing a sentence upon 

[A]ppellant, determined that the police department should not be left to suffer 

financial loss when they otherwise conducted a good faith, lawful investigation 

of [A]ppellant in accordance with existing case[]law and police procedure.” 

Id. at 20; see also TCO at 9 (“At the time of the arrest, the police officers 

were conducting a proper DUI investigation in good faith. The police 

department, therefore, suffered the financial loss associated with said testing. 

Therefore, the restitution awarded in this case was not illegal.”). 

At the outset, we disagree with Appellant’s and the trial court’s 

classification of the lab fees as restitution. Restitution is meant “to provide 

the victim with the fullest compensation for the loss.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 

1106(c)(1)(i). Lab fees, in contrast, constitute a cost related to the 

prosecution of a criminal case. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1725.3.5 Appellant makes

____________________________________________

5 This statute provides, in relevant part, that:

A person who is ... convicted of a crime as defined in ... 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ ... 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or 

controlled substance) ... shall, in addition to any fines, penalties 
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no mention of this statute in his brief, nor does he discuss how it should be 

interpreted in light of the circumstances of his case. Further, Appellant does 

not convince us in his underdeveloped argument that this claim even 

implicates the legality of his sentence, let alone that his sentence is illegal. 

Instead, his argument on this issue constitutes approximately a single page 

of his brief, includes no examination of relevant authority, and lacks 

meaningful legal analysis. We decline to conduct this research and analysis 

for him. Accordingly, no relief is due. See Gibbs, 981 A.2d at 284 (“[The 

a]ppellant’s challenge to the legality of his sentence is underdeveloped. It is 

[the a]ppellant’s obligation to sufficiently develop arguments in his brief by 

applying the relevant law to the facts of the case, persuade this Court that 

there were errors below, and convince us relief is due because of those errors. 

If an appellant does not do so, we may find the argument waived.”). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

____________________________________________

or costs, in every case where laboratory services were required to 

prosecute the crime or violation, be sentenced to pay a criminal 

laboratory or paramedic user fee which shall include, but not be 

limited to, the cost of sending a laboratory technician or 

paramedic to court proceedings.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1725.3(a). 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/31/2020