IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

QUINCY VALENTINO HAWKINS,

Appellant.

No. 86176-0-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FELDMAN, J. — Hawkins appeals from his resentencing conducted pursuant 

to State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021), which struck down 

Washington’s statute prohibiting simple drug possession. He argues that we 

should remand for another resentencing because (a) the resentencing court 

mistakenly believed it could not take his post-conviction rehabilitation into account 

in determining his new sentence and (b) his attorney provided ineffective 

assistance at and before the resentencing hearing. Hawkins also contends that 

the trial court erred by imposing discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) as 

part of his sentence. We remand for the trial court to determine whether to impose 

restitution interest under RCW 10.82.090(2) and expressly strike from Hawkins’ 

judgment and sentence several LFOs (as detailed below) that may not be imposed 

on indigent defendants. In all other respects, we affirm. 
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I

Following a jury trial in 2008, Hawkins was convicted of second degree 

murder, second degree assault, and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. 

The sentencing court imposed a sentence on the high end of the standard range,

totaling 391 months. Because Hawkins’ offender score included an offense for 

possession of a controlled substance, Hawkins filed a motion under CrR 7.8(b) to 

correct his judgment and sentence following our Supreme Court’s decision in 

Blake. 

Hawkins’ resentencing memorandum included evidence of his postconviction rehabilitation. Hawkins also argued that the court should impose an 

exceptional sentence below the standard range based on his youthfulness at the 

time he committed the crimes at issue. Lastly, Hawkins requested a mitigated 

sentence under RCW 9.94A.535(1)(a) based on his assertion that the “victim was 

an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident.” 

The trial court scheduled a resentencing hearing and, at the conclusion of 

the hearing, declined to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard 

range. Instead, after considering all of the evidence presented and excising the 

prior convictions subject to Blake, the court imposed a sentence in the middle of 

the standard range, totaling 336 months. Hawkins appeals. 

II

A. Resentencing Error

Hawkins argues that the resentencing court abused its discretion because 

it sentenced him under the “mistaken belief it could not take his rehabilitation into 

account in determining the sentence.” We disagree.
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Hawkins’ argument misconstrues controlling precedent. In State v. Ramos, 

187 Wn.2d 420, 449, 387 P.3d 650 (2017), our Supreme Court held that trial courts 

are not required to consider evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation ”as a basis 

for an exceptional sentence downward.” Instead, where evidence of postconviction rehabilitation exists, such evidence is relevant, if at all, to the trial court’s 

decision regarding the length of a sentence within the standard range. See State 

v. Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d 238, 241, 532 P.3d 652 (2023) (acknowledging that 

Dunbar may seek a sentence at the low end of the standard range based on 

evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation).

The trial court here appropriately considered evidence of Hawkins’ postconviction rehabilitation in determining Hawkins’ sentence within the standard 

range. At the outset of its ruling, the court stated, “I . . . hope that everyone sees 

that I have reviewed everything that’s been supplied to me.” (Emphasis added.)

When it explained its ruling, the court again confirmed that it had reviewed all of 

the submitted evidence:

When I reviewed this case and -- again, what I don’t see a lot 

of direct evidence of is -- while Mr. Hawkins had a difficult upbringing, 

I didn’t see a lot of direct evidence of the impact on this particular 

event. And I say that because I am declining to give a below 

standard-range sentence. 

I don’t think under the facts of this case, after considering all 

of the submissions that have been given, that that’s appropriate. 

However, that does not mean that the Court does not consider some 

of the mitigating factors of youth as to where within the standard 

range to fall. 

The prior [sentencing] court judge, back when this trial 

happened, gave Mr. Hawkins a high end of the standard-range 

sentence on all counts and, for me -- again, taking into account the 

evidence that’s been presented, I don’t think a high end of the 

standard range is appropriate either.
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(Emphasis added.) As can be seen, the court did not state or even suggest that it 

had restricted its review of the evidence; instead, it considered everything that the 

parties had submitted, as required by precedent. See Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 

241 (“unless the reviewing court restricts resentencing to narrow issues, any 

resentencing should be de novo”). 

The record is equally clear that the trial court’s reference to “everything 

that’s been supplied to me” included evidence regarding Hawkins’ post-conviction 

rehabilitation. Hawkins’ resentencing memorandum expressly addressed and 

attached evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation. Additionally, to support 

Hawkins’ request for a sentence at or below the low end of the standard range, 

Hawkins’ family members provided statements describing his post-conviction 

rehabilitation. For example, Hawkins’ sister stated:

He has taken the necessary steps to better himself. In doing 

so, he has completed courses of substance abuse and domestic 

violence; he has also furthered his education so he can be an 

addition to society in a productive manner. He has made the 

necessary changes within to be a better mentor and example for our 

youth. 

Hawkins’ fiancé similarly stated:

He wrote a course called "Am I My Worst Enemy" that I helped

him copyright. He also started a nonprofit organization called Locate 

the Nation to focus on adolescence within the community in which 

he grew up . . . to let them know that they are not forgotten and give 

the support and knowledge that inspires to never give into false 

realities of the street or peer pressure from other’s choices.

Thus, in determining Hawkins’ sentence within the standard range, the record 

shows that the trial court considered everything that the parties had submitted, 

which includes evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation, and exercised its 
No. 86176-0-I

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discretion accordingly. Whereas the sentencing court imposed a sentence on the 

high end of the standard range in 2008, the resentencing court imposed a sentence 

in the middle of the standard range in 2023.

On this record, Hawkins’ reliance on Dunbar is misplaced. The defendant 

there sought relief under Blake to correct his offender score because it included 

two convictions for possession of a controlled substance. Dunbar, Wn. App. 2d at 

239-40. At resentencing, similar to Hawkins here, Dunbar submitted evidence of 

post-conviction rehabilitation. Id. at 241. The resentencing court responded to 

that evidence as follows:

Mr. Dunbar has provided the Court with information about what he 

has done since being incarcerated, and the problem is . . . that it is 

basically a look back, and by that, I have regular resentencings that 

I do where the state’s position is . . . that the Court cannot take that 

into consideration and shouldn’t take that into consideration. 

Id. at 242 (emphasis added). The court then imposed the same high-end sentence 

that the original sentencing court imposed. Id. at 242. 

Dunbar appealed, and this court remanded for a new resentencing. The 

court noted that issuing “the same sentence does not necessarily correlate with 

the second court considering itself precluded from exercising discretion.” Id. at 

243. It nevertheless remanded for a new resentencing because “the resentencing 

court’s comments could be taken as adopting the sentencing court’s judgment 

without reviewing the relevant facts and considerations anew.” Id. at 243. And in 

doing so, we instructed the trial court to “consider new evidence and arguments of 

the parties, including evidence of Daniel Dunbar’s rehabilitation.” Id. at 250. But 

while our holding in Dunbar strongly supports Hawkins’ argument that the 

resentencing court here may consider evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation, 
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the record shows that the court did so—resulting in a shorter sentence at the 

middle rather than the high end of the standard range. Consequently, Dunbar is 

distinguishable and does not require remand for another resentencing.

In short, because the record shows that the resentencing court 

appropriately considered Hawkins’ evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation in 

determining the length of his sentence within the standard range, there was no 

abuse of discretion.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Hawkins next argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his lawyer 

provided ineffective assistance. We disagree.

“Both the United States and Washington Constitutions guarantee a criminal 

defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Vazquez, 198 

Wn.2d 239, 247, 494 P.3d 424 (2021). “To demonstrate ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must make two showings.” Id. at 247. First, the defendant 

must show that “defense counsel’s representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the 

circumstances.” Id. at 247-48. And second, the defendant must show that 

“defense counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is 

a reasonable probability that, except for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 248. “Failure to establish 

either prong of the test is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim.” State v. 

Arumugam, __ Wn. App. 2d __, 545 P.3d 363, 374 (2024).

First, Hawkins argues that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by 

allegedly “conceding rehabilitation was not a legitimate factor for consideration” in 
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resentencing. This argument fails because defense counsel made no such 

concession. At the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked “whether or not

the Court is going to consider post-conviction rehabilitation” because “that does 

change some of the nature of the State’s argument.” Defense counsel responded 

that while post-conviction rehabilitation is not the basis for Hawkins’ request for “an 

exceptional sentence based on youthfulness,” one of Hawkins’ arguments for a 

lesser sentence (but not his only argument), “we think that the post-conviction 

rehabilitation is something that’s still germane for the Court to consider.” Contrary 

to Hawkins’ argument, his lawyer clearly stated that evidence of post-conviction 

rehabilitation was and remained relevant in resentencing.

Nor did Hawkins’ lawyer retreat from that view, as Hawkins also claims. 

Hawkins points to the following colloquy:

[MS. NORTH (prosecutor)]: Just to make it clear, the State is not only 

just asking that post-conviction rehabilitation doesn’t come in but it’s 

not germane to the O’Dell[1] analysis that occurs. 

This is a youthful offender case where we’re looking at -- for 

looking at the defendant’s ability to be rehabilitated.

The State doesn’t believe that’s part of the SRA analysis of 

youthful mitigation; it’s more of whether or not the instant crime 

reflected youthful characteristics enough to mitigate -- to impose a 

mitigated sentence.

THE COURT: And perhaps we’re splitting hairs. I’m not sure 

that I heard Mr. Downs necessarily disagreeing with that --

MS. NORTH: Yeah. 

THE COURT: It’s not a Houston-Sconiers[2] situation, so we 

don’t have that aspect of it, and, again, just for the parties’

 1 State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). 2 State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017)
No. 86176-0-I

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awareness, I guess, not only did I go back and read O’Dell, I’ve tried 

to look up basically almost every case that’s cited to O’Dell, since 

there are several. Some are published; some are unpublished, a lot 

of unpublished cases, a lot of Division II unpublished cases that 

basically, as I read them, all state that, under O’Dell, the court can 

consider youthfulness; it’s not required to consider youthfulness. I 

don’t think any of those talked about rehabilitation issues. 

So I’ll ask you, Mr. Downs, is that your understanding of what 

O’Dell and its progeny stand for? 

MR. DOWNS [Defense attorney]: Yes, that’s correct. 

The trial court then responded, “All right. So with that, Mr. North, you may 

proceed.” 

The foregoing exchange does not support Hawkins’ argument that his 

lawyer wrongly conceded that rehabilitation could not properly be considered in 

resentencing. The cases cited by the trial court—O’Dell and Houston-Sconiers—

address consideration of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing. State 

v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 23-24, 391 P.3d 359 (2015); O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 

at 688-89. Thus, when the statements of Hawkins’ attorney are properly 

considered in context, the record shows that counsel merely conceded that 

evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation was not germane to Hawkins’ separate 

and additional argument that the court should impose an exceptional sentence 

below the standard range based on Hawkins’ youthfulness at the time he 

committed the crimes at issue. Because Hawkins’ lawyer did not concede that 

rehabilitation “was not a legitimate factor for consideration” in resentencing, as 

Hawkins claims, we reject this argument. 

Second, while Hawkins recognizes that Dunbar (discussed above) was 

decided after the resentencing hearing, he argues that the authorities discussed in 
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Dunbar “were not new” and that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by 

failing to cite those authorities, “all of which favor consideration of rehabilitation.” 

Our Supreme Court has held that “[w]here an attorney unreasonably fails to 

research or apply relevant statutes without any tactical purpose, that attorney’s 

performance is constitutionally deficient.” In re Pers. Restraint of Yung-Cheng 

Tsai, 183 Wn.2d 91, 102, 351 P.3d 138 (2015). But here, Hawkins does not, and 

cannot, establish that the result of the proceeding would have been different if his 

attorney had cited these additional authorities because, as noted previously, the 

record shows that the trial court considered Hawkins’ evidence of post-conviction 

rehabilitation as Dunbar and the authorities cited therein require. Accordingly, 

Hawkins’ ineffective assistance of counsel argument necessarily fails based on the 

absence of prejudice (the second prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel 

test).

C. Imposition of Legal Financial Obligations

At the conclusion of the resentencing hearing, the trial court decided to 

waive all discretionary LFOs. Hawkins argues that the judgment and sentence is 

not definite and certain as to which LFOs are discretionary and which are not, as 

required by controlling precedent. See, e.g., Grant v. Smith, 24 Wn.2d 839, 840, 

167 P.2d 123 (1946) (“It is the rule in this state that a sentence for violation of law 

must be definite and certain.”). As a result, Hawkins asks this court to remand for 

the trial court to amend the judgment and sentence. The State concedes this point 

and states, ”On remand, the superior court should expressly waive the attorney 

fees, criminal filing fees, extradition costs, supervision fees, collection costs, 

appellate costs, and nonrestitution interest.” We accept the State’s concession 
No. 86176-0-I

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and remand to the trial court to amend the judgment and sentence accordingly.

Hawkins also requests that we remand to the trial court to strike both the 

$500 Victim Penalty Assessment (VPA) and the $100 DNA collection fee imposed 

at resentencing. Consistent with Hawkins’ argument, RCW 7.68.035 and RCW 

43.43.7541 allow a court, upon motion by the defendant, to waive “any VPA” and 

“any fee for the collection of the offender’s DNA imposed prior to July 1, 2023.” 

The State concedes this point as well. Here too, we accept the State’s concession 

and remand for the trial court to strike the DNA collection fee and VPA.

Finally, Hawkins ask us to remand for the trial court to consider waiving 

interest on restitution. Consistent with Hawkins’ argument, a recent amendment 

to RCW 10.82.090 provides that the superior court “may elect not to impose 

interest on any restitution the court orders” and that this determination shall be 

based on factors such as whether the defendant is indigent. LAWS OF 2022, ch. 

260, § 12. This new law applies here because this case is on direct appeal. See 

State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023). The State does not 

object to remand for the trial court to consider waiving interest on restitution 

pursuant to RCW 10.82.090. We accept that concession as well, and remand to 

the trial court to address whether to waive restitution interest pursuant to the new 

statute.

III

We remand to the trial court to determine whether to impose restitution 

interest after consideration of the relevant factors under RCW 10.82.090(2) and 

expressly strike from Hawkins’ judgment and sentence the VPA, DNA collection 
No. 86176-0-I

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fee, attorney fees, criminal filing fee, extradition costs, appellate costs, supervision 

fees, collection costs, and nonrestitution interest. In all other respects, we affirm.

WE CONCUR: