J. S58009/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

AARON JAMES BRESSI, : No. 1791 MDA 2016

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, September 29, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County

Criminal Division at Nos. CP-49-CR-0000961-2015,

CP-49-CR-0000962-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 25, 2017

Aaron James Bressi appeals from the September 29, 2016 judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County 

after he pled nolo contendere to one count of simple assault and one count 

of harassment.1 The trial court sentenced appellant to two consecutive 

one-year terms of probation. Amy Stoak, Esq., of the Northumberland 

County Public Defender’s Office has filed a petition to withdraw, alleging that 

the appeal is frivolous, accompanied by an Anders brief.2 We will grant 

counsel’s withdrawal petition and affirm the judgment of sentence.

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§2701(a)(3) and 2709(a)(4), respectively.

2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
J. S58009/17

- 2 -

The trial court set forth the following procedural history:

On September 29, 2016, [appellant] was before the 

court whereby [appellant] entered a plea of no 

contest to the offense of Simple Assault on docket 

CR-2015-961 and the offense of Harassment on 

docket CR-2015-962. Immediately thereafter[, 

appellant] was sentenced within the standard range 

to [one year of] probation on CR-2015-961 and one 

year [of] probation on CR-2015-962, to be served 

consecutive to CR-2015-961. Seven days later, 

[appellant] filed his Motion to Withdraw Plea in which 

he asserted his plea was not entered knowingly, 

intelligently and/or voluntarily. The motion was 

denied without a hearing on October 12th, 2016, as 

there were no allegations therein that could support 

this contention.

Trial court statement in lieu of opinion, 1/19/17 at 1.

The record further reflects that appellant filed a timely notice of appeal 

and timely complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial 

court then filed a statement in lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:3

[1.] Whether the trial court erred in finding that 

[a]ppellant’s pleas were knowing, voluntary, 

and intelligently entered[?]

[2.] Whether the trial court erred in denying 

[a]ppellant’s post-sentence motion to withdraw 

his pleas[?]

Appellant’s brief at 6.

 

3 We note that the Commonwealth elected against filing an appellee’s brief in 

this matter.
J. S58009/17

- 3 -

On July 24, 2017, Attorney Stoak filed in this court a petition to 

withdraw as counsel and an Anders brief, wherein Attorney Stoak states 

that there are no non-frivolous issues preserved for our review.

A request by appointed counsel to withdraw pursuant 

to Anders and Santiago gives rise to certain 

requirements and obligations, for both appointed 

counsel and this Court. Commonwealth v. 

Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1247-1248 (Pa.Super. 

2015).

These requirements and the significant 

protection they provide to an Anders

appellant arise because a criminal 

defendant has a constitutional right to a 

direct appeal and to counsel on that 

appeal. Commonwealth v. Woods, 

939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa.Super. 2007). 

This Court has summarized these 

requirements as follows:

Direct appeal counsel seeking 

to withdraw under Anders

must file a petition averring 

that, after a conscientious 

examination of the record, 

counsel finds the appeal to 

be wholly frivolous. Counsel 

must also file an Anders

brief setting forth issues that 

might arguably support the 

appeal along with any other 

issues necessary for the 

effective appellate 

presentation thereof.

Anders counsel must also 

provide a copy of the Anders

petition and brief to the 

appellant, advising the 

appellant of the right to 

retain new counsel, proceed 
J. S58009/17

- 4 -

pro se or raise additional 

points worthy of the Court’s 

attention.

Woods, 939 A.2d at 898 (citations 

omitted).

There are also requirements as to the 

precise content of an Anders brief:

The Anders brief that 

accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to 

withdraw . . . must: 

(1) provide a summary of the 

procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record; 

(2) refer to anything in the 

record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the 

appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the 

appeal is frivolous; and 

(4) state counsel’s reasons 

for concluding that the 

appeal is frivolous. Counsel 

should articulate the relevant 

facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on 

point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Id. at 1248. If this Court determines that appointed 

counsel has met these obligations, it is then our 

responsibility “to make a full examination of the 

proceedings and make an independent judgment to 

decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” 

Id. at 1248. In so doing, we review not only the 

issues identified by appointed counsel in the Anders

brief, but examine all of the proceedings to “make 

certain that appointed counsel has not overlooked 
J. S58009/17

- 5 -

the existence of potentially non-frivolous issues.” 

Id.

Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 118 A.3d 415, 419-420 (Pa.Super. 2015).

Our review of Attorney Stoak’s petition to withdraw, supporting 

documentation, and Anders brief reveals that she has complied with all of 

the foregoing requirements. We note that counsel also furnished a copy of 

the brief to appellant, advised him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed 

pro se, and/or raise any additional points that he deems worthy of this 

court’s attention,4 and attached to her petition to withdraw a copy of the 

letter she sent to appellant as required under Commonwealth v. Millisock, 

873 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa.Super. 2005). See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 

999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2010) (“While the Supreme Court in 

Santiago set forth the new requirements for an Anders brief, which are 

quoted above, the holding did not abrogate the notice requirements set forth 

in Millisock that remain binding legal precedent.”). As Attorney Stoak has 

complied with all of the requirements set forth above, we conclude that 

counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements of Anders.

 

4 We note that appellant filed a response to Attorney Stoak’s petition to 

withdraw and Anders brief. In that response, appellant again challenges his 

no-contest plea. He also states that Attorney Stoak “has 2015 were [sic] it 

should say 2016 and many more non true [sic] facts and mistakes that need 

to be disscussed [sic] in front of a Judge in the Superior Court[.]” 

(Appellant’s pro se response to Anders brief and petition to withdraw, 

8/4/17.)
J. S58009/17

- 6 -

Once counsel has met her obligations, as Attorney Stoak has done 

here, “it then becomes the responsibility of the reviewing court to make a 

full examination of the proceedings and make an independent judgment to 

decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d 

at 355 n.5. Thus, we now turn to the merits of appellant’s appeal.

At the outset, we note that appellant pled nolo contendere, rather 

than guilty to the charges at issue. “[I]n terms of its effect upon a case, 

[however,] a plea of nolo contendere is treated the same as a guilty plea.” 

Commonwealth v. V.G., 9 A.3d 222, 226 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). As such, we are mindful of the following:

[A]fter the court has imposed a sentence, a 

defendant can withdraw his guilty plea only where 

necessary to correct a manifest injustice. 

[P]ost-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject 

to higher scrutiny since courts strive to discourage 

the entry of guilty pleas as sentencing-testing 

devices. []

To be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly, 

voluntarily and intelligently entered. [A] manifest 

injustice occurs when a plea is not tendered 

knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and 

understandingly. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

Procedure mandate pleas be taken in open court and 

require the court to conduct an on-the-record 

colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware 

of his rights and the consequences of his plea. 

Under Rule 590, the court should confirm, inter alia, 

that a defendant understands: (1) the nature of the 

charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the 

factual basis for the plea; (3) he is giving up his right 

to trial by jury; (4) and the presumption of 

innocence; (5) he is aware of the permissible ranges 

of sentences and fines possible; and (6) the court is 
J. S58009/17

- 7 -

not bound by the terms of the agreement unless the 

court accepts the plea. The reviewing Court will 

evaluate the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the 

voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of 

that plea. Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant 

who entered a guilty plea was aware of what he was 

doing, and the defendant bears the burden of 

proving otherwise.

Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 352 (Pa.Super. 2014) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014).

Additionally, “a defendant is bound by the statements which he makes 

during his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 

1167 (Pa. 1997) (citations omitted). Therefore, a defendant “may not assert 

grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he 

pled guilty,” and he cannot recant the representations he made in court 

when he entered his guilty plea. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, the law 

does not require that a defendant be pleased with the outcome of his 

decision to plead guilty. The law only requires that a defendant’s decision to 

plead guilty be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See 

Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 528-529 (Pa.Super. 2007).

Here, appellant claims that his pleas were not knowing, voluntary, or 

intelligent and, as such, the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

withdraw those pleas. The record, however, belies appellant’s claim. The 

record reflects that appellant read, completed, and signed an extensive 

written nolo contendere plea colloquy, which is part of the certified record. 
J. S58009/17

- 8 -

(Appellant’s guilty plea/nolo contendere plea, 9/30/16.5) On that form, 

appellant affirmed, in writing, among other things, (i) that appellant’s 

decision to plead no contest was appellant’s decision and his alone; (ii) that 

his lawyer explained to him the elements of the offenses to which he pled no 

contest; (iii) that he understood the facts and circumstances of the charges 

against him; (iv) that he understood that he did not need to enter a plea, 

but was able to plead not guilty and go to trial; (v) that he fully discussed 

the plea colloquy with his lawyer and was satisfied with the advice and 

representation that his lawyer gave him; (vi) that no one induced his plea by 

promise, threat, or anything else; and (vii) that he read the entire written 

colloquy, understood its full meaning, and still wanted to enter the plea. 

(Id.) 

The record further reflects that the sentencing court conducted an oral 

colloquy wherein appellant acknowledged that he did not wish to go to trial, 

but wanted to enter his plea. (Notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 3.) During 

that colloquy, appellant acknowledged his signature on the petition for entry 

of nolo contendere plea, which also included the executed plea colloquy. 

(Id. at 4.) Appellant affirmed that after he spoke with his lawyer, appellant 

agreed that the Commonwealth had sufficient evidence to obtain convictions, 

and that appellant, therefore, wished to enter the no-contest pleas. (Id.

 

5 Appellant’s written guilty plea/nolo contendere plea was docketed on 

September 30, 2016.
J. S58009/17

- 9 -

at 6.) He further acknowledged that he was satisfied with his attorney’s 

representation, was aware of the penalties he faced, was not suffering from 

a mental illness, and was not under the influence. (Id. at 6-8.) Appellant 

also affirmed that he understood the rights that he was giving up by 

pleading no contest, including the right to a jury trial and direct-appeal 

rights had a jury found him guilty. (Id. at 7.)

After thoroughly reviewing the record with respect to appellant’s 

challenge to his nolo contendere pleas, we conclude that the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding appellant’s entry of those pleas discloses that 

appellant fully understood the nature and consequences of his pleas and that 

he entered those pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Additionally, our independent review of the entire record has not 

disclosed any potentially non-frivolous issues. Consequently, we grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/25/2017