United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 19-1880

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Curtis David Barker

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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Submitted: February 14, 2020

 Filed: May 21, 2020

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM. 

Curtis Barker conditionally pleaded guilty to federal charges after a Missouri 

Highway Patrol officer found a gun, marijuana, and cocaine during a traffic stop. 

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1) (being a felon in possession of a firearm); 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking 

crime); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (possessing a controlled substance with 
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intent to distribute it). On appeal, Barker challenges the district court’s1 denial of 

his motion to suppress these items. His theory is that, before anything was found, 

the officer had unlawfully seized him. We affirm.

The traffic stop itself was for speeding. After an aerial officer determined that 

Barker’s truck was exceeding the speed limit, an officer on the ground stopped him. 

He directed Barker to sit in his patrol car, where he could collect the necessary 

information to issue a speeding ticket. Once they were in the car, the officer smelled 

marijuana. Combined with Barker’s general nervousness and the presence of a 

“mask[ing]” odor, the officer decided that there was probable cause for a search. 

The search uncovered cocaine, a firearm, and nearly 100 pounds of marijuana. 

 

We have long held that an officer may require a driver to sit in his patrol car 

as part of a routine traffic stop. See, e.g., United States v. Richards, 967 F.2d 1189, 

1193 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that such a request is “reasonably related to a stop 

for a traffic violation”). Barker suggests that this rule conflicts with Rodriguez v. 

United States, which held that even a brief extension of a traffic stop for 

investigatory purposes can violate the Fourth Amendment. 575 U.S. 348, 357 

(2015). 

Rodriguez, which limits an officer’s power to extend a traffic stop, has no 

application here. See id. at 355. As we have explained, having Barker sit in the 

patrol car was within “[t]he reasonable scope of the initial traffic stop” itself. United 

States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also United 

States v. Espinoza, 885 F.3d 516, 523 (8th Cir. 2018) (applying the rule from 

Richards and Bloomfield after Rodriguez was decided). The stop was not extended 

1

The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the 

Honorable Matt J. Whitworth, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western 

District of Missouri. 
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until the officer conducted a search, but by then, probable cause existed. See United 

States v. Dunn, 928 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2019) (discussing the automobile 

exception to the warrant requirement). With no illegal seizure, there was no illegal 

search. 

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.

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