J-S15001-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.C., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2406 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002718-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.E.L.-C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.C., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2407 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 17, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000352-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.C., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2408 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000108-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.L.-C., A 

MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: R.C., FATHER

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: No. 2409 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 17, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000353-2019

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JULY 19, 2022

Appellant R.C. (Father) appeals from the decrees1 granting the petitions 

filed by the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (DHS) and

involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his minor children, R.E.L.-C. 

(born July 2013) and D.M.L.-C. (born January 2018) (collectively, the 

____________________________________________

1 Father also appealed from the orders changing the Children’s permanency 

goals from reunification to adoption. See Notices of Appeal, 11/22/21. 

However, on appeal, he does not discuss the permanency goal change in his 

statement of questions presented on appeal or in his argument section. 

Accordingly, Father has abandoned this issue for purposes of appeal. See 

Allied Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Roth, 222 A.3d 422, 424 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(stating that “[a]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the 

appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived” (citation omitted)).
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Children).2,3 Father argues that the trial court erred in concluding that DHS 

presented clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination of his 

parental rights. We affirm.

The family came to the attention of DHS on October 9, 2017, when DHS

received a General Protective Services (GPS) report and three Child Protective 

Services (CPS) reports regarding R.E.L.-C. and Sibling. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 

10/1/19, at 16; 9/17/21, at 166-68. The GPS report alleged that Sibling, 

while in an outpatient psychiatric program, had written a note accusing her 

stepfather of rape, and further accused her stepfather and mother of abuse.4 

N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 117; also Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The 

report further alleged that Father had physically abused Sibling and had a 

history of sexual violence against another minor female child. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 

9/17/21, at 166-68; see also Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.

____________________________________________

2 R.E.L.-C. and D.M.L.-C. are the biological children of Father and V.L. 

(Mother), and the Children have an older half-sister, R.L. (Sibling), who is 

Mother’s biological child and Father’s stepchild. See Trial Ct. Op., 1/23/22, at 

1; Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A; N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 11-12, 

9/17/21, at 56-57. Sibling has a separate dependency matter and is not a

subject of the instant appeal. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 11-12, 134. Sibling 

is in the permanent legal custody of another caretaker. Id.

3 Mother’s parental rights to the Children were terminated on the same date. 

Mother filed separate appeals from the goal change orders and the termination

decrees, which we will address in a separate memorandum.

4 Mother later informed Dr. Erica Williams, a forensic evaluator, that “stepdad” 

referred to another former paramour of Mother’s, not Father. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 

10/1/19, at 116-18; 9/17/21, at 62-63.
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The CPS reports alleged that Father was registered as a Tier III sex 

offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)5,6

and that despite being aware of his status, Mother left Sibling unsupervised in 

Father’s care. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 9/17/21, at 166-68; see also Goal Change 

Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Following a DHS investigation, both Mother and Father 

were indicated. Id. 

The second CPS report alleged that Mother permitted a family friend to 

reside in the home and spend time alone with Sibling despite the fact that he 

was a convicted sex offender. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The third 

CPS report alleged that Mother left R.E.L.-C. unsupervised in the care of that 

family friend. Id. Mother admitted to the allegations in both the second and 

third CPS reports, and they were indicated as to Mother. Id.

During the course of their investigation, DHS interviewed both Mother 

and Father. Mother admitted that her former paramour molested her oldest 

adult child and that she left Sibling unsupervised at home with Father while 

she was at work. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Father admitted that 

he was a registered sex offender and agreed to stay at a separate location 

during the DHS investigation. Id. 

____________________________________________

5 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.

6 The record reflects that Father was convicted of indecent assault, indecent 

assault – complainant less than thirteen years of age, unlawful contact with a 

minor, and sexual assault. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(1), 3126(a)(7), 6318, 

and 3124.1, respectively. As a result, he was subject to lifetime registration 

under SORNA.
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DHS met with Sibling and both parents on October 11, 2017. See Goal 

Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Mother admitted that she was aware of Father’s 

prior convictions, but she denied the allegations of domestic violence. Id. 

Sibling stated that she and R.E.L.-C. were left alone with Father. Id. Father 

informed DHS that Mother permitted Sibling to go to the home of her former 

paramour who had molested Mother’s eldest child. Id. Father admitted that 

he failed to inform the Pennsylvania State Police that Sibling lived in the home 

in which Father had registered his residency in accordance with SORNA. See 

Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. He claimed he “did not know” the conditions 

of being a registered sex offender. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. 

That same day, DHS obtained orders of protective custody (OPC) for 

R.E.L.-C. and Sibling and placed them in the care of their maternal 

grandmother. Id. The trial court adjudicated R.E.L.-C. and Sibling dependent 

on October 20, 2017. See Order of Adjudication, 10/20/17, at 1-2; Goal 

Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The trial court found aggravated circumstances

as to Father and ordered that no reasonable efforts were to be made to reunify 

R.E.L.-C. and Father. See Aggravated Circumstances Order, 10/20/17, at 1-

2. The trial court suspended Father’s visitation with both R.E.L.-C. and Sibling 

and issued a stay-away order as to Sibling. See Order of Adjudication, 

10/20/17, at 1-2. The court referred R.E.L.-C. for early intervention services 

and a psychological evaluation. Id. On October 27, 2017, R.E.L.-C. and 

Sibling were placed in kinship care with their maternal aunt, C.L. (Maternal 

Aunt). See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A.
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On November 8, 2017, DHS received a supplemental CPS report alleging 

that another note had been found in Sibling’s diary stating that she had been 

sexually abused. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Sibling’s family stated 

that they believed that Sibling had been sexually abused by Mother’s former 

paramour, that Mother had a history of entering into cohabitating relationships 

with registered sex offenders and perpetrators of sexual abuse, that Mother’s 

eldest child had also been sexually abused, and that Mother had exposed 

Sibling to three or four separate sex offenders. Id.

On November 9, 2017, the Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) held a 

single case plan meeting (SCP) to establish SCP objectives for Mother and 

Father. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. Father was to complete sex 

offender services through the Joseph J. Peters Institute (JJPI) and comply with 

all court orders. Id.

In January 2018, Mother gave birth to D.M.L.-C. See Goal Change Pet., 

5/9/19, Ex. A. On January 12, 2018, the trial court held a permanency review 

hearing and ordered DHS to obtain an OPC and place D.M.L.-C. in care. See

Perm. Rev. Order, 1/12/18, at 1. Father was permitted to have supervised 

visitation with the Children and ordered to complete a parenting capacity 

evaluation (PCE). Id. DHS obtained the OPC on January 15, 2018, and placed 

D.M.L.-C. with R.E.L.-C. and Sibling in the care of their maternal aunt. See 

Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. 

On January 24, 2018, the trial court adjudicated D.M.L.-C. dependent. 

See Adjudication of Dependency, 1/24/18, at 1-2. The trial court ordered a 
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second SCP to address Father’s visitation and to obtain further information 

regarding his sex offender registration. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. 

If appropriate, the trial court indicated that it would allow Father line-of-sight, 

line-of-hearing, supervised visitation at DHS. Id.

On April 6, 2018, the trial court held a permanency review hearing and 

noted that Father had been allowed supervised visitation with the Children. 

See Perm. Rev. Order, 4/6/18, at 1-2. On May 16, 2018, CUA held the SCP 

meeting. See Goal Change Pet., 5/9/19, Ex. A. The Children’s goals were 

identified as reunification with concurrent goals of placement with a relative. 

Id. Both parents’ objectives remained the same. Id. On June 26, 2018, the 

trial court held a permanency review hearing and determined that Father was 

substantially compliant with his permanency plan, but aggravated 

circumstances still existed in D.M.L.-C.’s case. See Perm. Rev. Order, 

6/26/18, at 1-2.

On November 8, 2018, the trial court held a permanency review hearing 

and found that Father was substantially compliant with his permanency plan. 

See Perm. Rev. Order, 11/8/18, at 1-3. Specifically, the court noted that 

Father had completed his PCE and was awaiting the written PCE report with 

recommendations. Id. The trial court ordered Father to sign releases for his

psychiatric records and to provide written confirmation of employment in 

addition to correspondence from the owner of his residence authorizing CUA 

to conduct a home assessment and clearances. Id.
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In November 2018, Erica Williams, Psy.D., and Samantha Peterson, MA, 

completed the PCE report. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 76-104. Dr. Williams 

diagnosed Father with pedophilic disorder and noted that Father admitted to 

having a long-standing attraction to female children. Id. Although Father

reported that he was attending treatment, he did not provide records of his 

treatment. Id. Father was dismissive of safety concerns and his own risk of 

harm to Sibling. Id. The report concluded that Father did not have the ability 

to provide safety and/or permanency to either the Children or to Sibling. Id.

On January 17, 2019, the trial court held a permanency review hearing

and determined that Father was moderately compliant with his permanency 

plan. Perm. Rev. Order, 1/17/19, at 1-2. Father’s visitation was modified to 

weekly supervised visits, and Sibling was not to attend. Id. The trial court 

stated that Father could either provide CUA with all treatment plans and 

mental health records or that the trial court would refer him to Behavioral 

Health Services (BHS) for consultations and evaluations. Id. Additionally, 

the trial court ordered Father to remain up to date with his SORNA registration

requirements and referred him to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for drug 

screens. Id.

On February 14, 2019, CUA revised the SCP. See Goal Change Pet., 

5/9/19, Ex. A. At that time, the Children’s primary goal was identified as 

adoption, with a concurrent goal of reunification. Id. Father’s objectives were 

as follows: comply with his visitation, sign all releases necessary for case 

management, comply with the no-contact order as to Sibling, comply with his 
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drug screens, comply with his PCE and subsequent recommendations, provide 

progress reports from his therapist, attend psychotherapy, provide CUA with 

his address and comply with a home inspection, provide a letter documenting 

his residence and utilities. Id.

On May 8, 2019, DHS filed petitions to change the Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption and seeking involuntary termination of Father’s 

parental rights to the Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), 

(a)(11), and (b). See Pet. for Involuntary Term., 5/9/19, at1-7; Pet. for Goal 

Change, 5/9/19, at 1-7, Ex. A.

The petitions detailed Father’s criminal history, convictions, and status 

as a Tier III sex offender registration. DHS averred that, pursuant to Child 

Protective Services Law B.1 § vii, Father was not permitted to be around 

children under the age of eighteen while unsupervised. DHS also noted that 

at that time, R.E.L.-C. had been in care approximately nineteen months and 

D.M.L.-C. had been in care approximately sixteen months.
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The trial court conducted evidentiary hearings on October 1, 2019, 

September 17, 2021, and November 17, 2021.

7,8

 DHS presented testimony 

from forensic evaluator Dr. Erica Williams, CUA permanency worker Allison 

Serge, CUA case supervisor Andrew Lemon, CUA case manager Tarnjif Kaur, 

and Mother. Father presented testimony from his therapist, Dean Dickson.

At the conclusion of the hearings, the trial court terminated Father’s 

parental rights to the Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), 

(a)(11), and (b),9 and changed the Children’s permanency goals to adoption.

____________________________________________

7 At the first hearing on October 1, 2019, the court heard evidence from two 

witnesses. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 2-174. At the subsequent hearing 

on November 6, 2019, Mother’s first attorney asked the trial court to vacate 

his appointment due to a conflict with Mother. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 11/6/19, at 

3. The trial court granted the request and continued the hearing on counsel’s 

behalf. Id. at 5. Although the evidentiary hearings were postponed multiple 

times during the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court held regular status 

review and permanency hearings. 

8 Meredith Marie Rogers, Esq. served as the Children’s guardian ad litem 

throughout the proceedings. Attorney Rogers argued that terminating 

Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 

11/17/21, at 108-09. Mario D’Adamo III, Esq., served as the Children’s legal 

counsel during the termination proceedings, and appeared at the hearing on 

their behalf. Id.; see also In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 

2020). Attorney Adamo testified that he met with the Children on three 

separate occasions, and that at his latest visit, R.E.L.-C. and D.M.L.-C. 

appeared well-bonded with their caregiver (the Children’s Maternal Aunt) and 

viewed her as a maternal figure. N.T. Term. Hr’g, 11/17/21, at 96.

9 DHS filed the petitions to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), (a)(11), and (b). At the 

conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court explicitly terminated 

Father’s rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8) and (b). The 

following exchange took place:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Father timely appealed and simultaneously filed concise statements of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial 

court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing Father’s claims.

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:

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[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Did the [c]ourt—

THE COURT: Act 10—

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: --[make] a finding as to [F]ather as to 

2511(a)(11). That was the additional ground, because – parent 

is required –

THE COURT: Did you actually—

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: To register as a sex offender.

THE COURT: -- file that in the petition?

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So, that would be (a)(11)?

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And the Act 101 notice is to be provided to the 

parents . . . .

N.T. Term. Hr’g, 11/17/21, at 120-21. Although the decree terminates 

Father’s rights pursuant to Sections (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b), it also 

addresses Father’s SORNA registration requirements and notes that further 

evidentiary findings were placed upon the record. Father, DHS, and the trial 

court discuss their analysis pursuant to Section 2511(a)(11) and Father 

challenged the trial court’s determination concerning Section 2511(a)(11) in 

his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. On this 

record, it is apparent that the trial court included Section 2511(a)(11) in its 

termination of Father’s parental rights and that all parties had notice thereof. 

As noted herein, we may affirm based on any subsection of 2511(a). In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
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1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) where Father presented evidence that he 

has remedied his situation by maintaining housing, working, 

and mental health counseling, and has the present capacity to 

care for [the C]hildren?

2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) where evidence was provided to establish 

that [the Children were] removed from the care of [Father] and 

Father is now capable of caring for [the C]hildren?

3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) where evidence was presented to show 

that Father is now capable of caring for [the C]hildren after he 

completed his parenting capacity evaluation, secured and 

maintained housing and employment, and continues in his 

mental health treatment programs?

4. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(11) where evidence was presented to show 

that Father does not have any restrictions on unsupervised 

contact with his children and continues in his mental health 

treatment program?

5. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) where evidence was presented that 

established the Children had a close bond with their father and 

they had lived with their father for the first part of their lives. 

Additionally, Father maintained that bond by visiting with his 

children.

Father’s Brief at 7 (formatting altered).

We begin by stating our standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 
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or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted and formatting 

altered). “[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

The burden is on the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We 

have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the 

truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 
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concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We note 

that we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 

2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating parental 

rights. B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.

Section 2511(a)(11)

Father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights 

under Section 2511(a)(11) based on the fact that he is a registered sex 

offender. Father’s Brief at 18. Father asserts that “while termination under 

this subsection is discretionary, it is not warranted in this case” because Father 

has “completed his probation and has had no other arrests of any kind.” Id. 

Father also claims that he “is permitted to have unsupervised contact with 

children, including his own children” and that he “is not a risk for re-offense.” 

Id. at 18-19. Father asserts that at the time of his arrest, he had been living 

with his children and was “an appropriate father” to them. Finally, he claims 

that the case arose from “allegations of an older sibling which had nothing to 

do with Father.” Id. at 19. 

Section 2511(a)(11) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *
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(11) The parent is required to register as a sexual offender 

under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to registration of 

sexual offenders) or I (relating to continued registration of 

sexual offenders)[fn1] or to register with a sexual offender 

registry in another jurisdiction or foreign country.

[fn1] 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 et seq., 9799.51 et seq.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(11).

The language of the statute provides that, when the parent is required 

to register as a sexual offender, the court may terminate the parent’s rights. 

See id. Therefore, when that condition is met, the court’s decision on 

termination is discretionary. See Lorino v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 

266 A.3d 487, 493 (Pa. 2021) (noting that the term “may” connote an act that 

is permissive, but not required). Additionally, Section 2511(a)(11) does not 

mandate further inquiry into the parents’ actions. The sole condition is that 

the parent is required to register as a sexual offender under SORNA. 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(11). See, e.g., Interest of Z.F.G., 684 WDA 2021, 2022 

WL 34288, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 4, 2022) (unpublished mem.)10

(concluding that termination was appropriate because the evidence 

established that the father was a registered sex offender and stating that the 

father could not challenge the validity of the underlying convictions and 

registrations in the termination proceeding).

Here, the trial court observed:

____________________________________________

10 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (authorizing citation of non-precedential decisions of 

this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value only).
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It is undisputed that Father is required to register as a sexual 

offender under [SORNA]. Indeed, Father’s own exhibit is his 

[Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)] background check 

information including his criminal record. Father’s Exhibit 1 lists 

convictions for unlawful contact with minors, indecent assault, and 

corruption of minors, resulting from a guilty plea. The Exhibit also 

explains that Father is a lifetime registrant, with the registry 

expiration date listed as “nonexp,” or no expiration. DHS Exhibit 

3 and Child Advocate Exhibit 2 are both Father’s [SORNA] registry. 

DHS Exhibit 9 includes criminal court documentation signed by 

Father acknowledging his reporting requirements under 42 

Pa.C.S. Ch. 97, as well as the criminal complaint initiating his case 

with an affidavit of probable cause describing Father’s confession. 

Father himself reported to Dr. Williams during his PCE his status 

as a [sex] offender. Father has an admitted attraction to 

underage girls, acknowledged by his own therapist. Even Mother 

admitted and acknowledged Father’s attraction to young girls and 

the safety concern it presents for [the] Children. Mother 

specifically stated that “Father is a danger to [her] kids.”

Trial Ct. Op., 1/23/21, at 23 (citations omitted).

Based on our review of the record, we find no error or abuse of discretion 

by the trial court in terminating Father’s parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(11). As noted previously, Father’s status as a sex offender is a 

sufficient basis to warrant termination of his parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(1). See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(11). Further, contrary to Father’s 

claims, the record establishes that he is at risk of re-offense, he is not capable 

of providing safety or permanency to the Children, and he failed to attend 

appropriate psychotherapy to address his diagnosis for pedophilic disorder

because Dr. Dickson’s therapy was not adequate for that purpose. N.T. Term. 

Hr’g, 10/1/19, at 83, 103-04, 110. Dr. Williams, whose testimony the trial 

court found credible, testified that Father’s therapist committed errors, 
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including administering the Static-99R test incorrectly and failing to rely on 

additional sources of information, and that those errors were so serious that 

any data provided by Mr. Dickson was invalid. Id. at 24, 48-52, 96-98, 105-

107.

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children under Section 

2511(a)(11) and no relief is due.

Section 2511(b)

Father also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that 

termination was proper under Section 2511(b). In support, Father argues 

that the Children lived with him for the first part of their lives and that they 

had a bond with Father. Father’s Brief at 19. Father further asserts that he 

consistently attended his supervised visits and that his parental bond with the 

Children continued because of these visits. Id. at 19-20. Therefore, Father 

concludes that the trial court erred in finding that termination was in the 

Children’s best interest. Id.

Section 2511(b) states in relevant part:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. . . . 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
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“[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under 

Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.” In re 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). This Court

has explained:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be 

severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered). “Common sense dictates that courts 

considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a preadoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (citation omitted).

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent 

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond 

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 

case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). The question is whether the bond between the parent and the child 

“is the one worth saving or whether it could be sacrificed without irreparable 

harm to” the child. Id. at 764. “Section 2511(b) does not require a formal 
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bonding evaluation” and caseworkers may offer their opinions and evaluations 

of the bond. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citation omitted).

In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), 

“courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are 

young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their 

healthy development quickly. When courts fail, . . . the result, all too often, 

is catastrophically maladjusted children.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269. Finally, we 

reiterate that the court may emphasize the safety needs of the child. In re 

N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Here, the trial court explained that although Father consistently visited 

with the Children, the interactions during those visits were “very minimal.” 

N.T. Hr’g, 9/17/21, at 221-22. While Father plays with the Children, he cannot 

redirect them, and he spends more time on his phone than he does ensuring 

that the Children are properly supervised. Id. Further, rather than turning 

to Father for comfort when they are scared, hurt, sick or upset, the Children

turn to Maternal Aunt. Id. at 226. The Children do not have any negative 

reaction when their visits with Father end. Id. at 214. In contrast, the 

Children share a positive bond with Maternal Aunt and view her as their 

primary caregiver. Id. at 192-195, 227. D.M.L.-C. in particular has a strong

parent-child bond with Maternal Aunt. Id. Additionally, both DHS

caseworkers testified that the Children could not be safely returned to Father’s 

custody, that it would not cause irreparable harm to either Child to terminate 

Father’s parental rights, and that adoption was in the Children’s best interests. 
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Id. at 223-224. Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded that the 

Children do not have a healthy parental bond with Father and that it was in 

the Children’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. See Trial 

Ct. Op. at 23-26. 

Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. The record supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that there was no beneficial bond between the Children and 

Father, that Maternal Aunt fulfills a parental role for the Children, and that 

there would be no irreparable harm to either Child if Father’s parental rights 

were terminated. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. Likewise, the record supports 

the trial court’s determination that the termination of Father’s parental rights 

served the best interests of the Children. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009-10. 

Therefore, Father is not entitled to relief.

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. See T.S.M., 

71 A.3d at 267. Accordingly, we affirm.

Orders and decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/19/2022