[Cite as State v. Lewis, 2021-Ohio-530.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsMARCUS LEWIS 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon, W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 

: 

: 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Delaware County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No.19-CR-I02-0135 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 25, 2021 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

MELISSA SCHIFFEL TODD WORKMAN 

Delaware County Prosecutor WORKMAN LAW FIRM 

JACQUELINE J. RAPIER Box 687 

Assistant Prosecutor Delaware, OH 43015 

145 North Union Street 

Delaware, OH 43015 
[Cite as State v. Lewis, 2021-Ohio-530.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Marcus Lewis [“Lewis”] appeals from the May 14, 2020 

Judgment Entry of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas overruling his motion to 

withdraw his negotiated guilty plea. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} On November 6, 2018, officers were dispatched to a fatal Fentanyl 

overdose of B.B. in Ashley, Ohio in Delaware County. Prior to the officers' arrival, B.B.’s 

girlfriend found him face down in the bathroom. The officers and coroner found drug 

paraphernalia around B.B.’s person. B.B.’s blood and urine tested positive for fentanyl. 

{¶3} During the course of the investigation, it was revealed that B.B. purchased 

the drugs from Jamie Rhodes, who purchased the drugs from Samantha Marks and 

Jessica Metz, who purchased the drugs from Lewis. 

{¶4} During this time period Lewis was being investigated by the Delaware 

County Drug Task Force. The Drug Task Force conducted trash pulls, surveillance, and 

ultimately interviews that led to a search warrant of the hotel in late November 2018. After 

the search warrant, Lewis was arrested and taken to the Delaware County Jail where he 

was interviewed by detectives with the Drug Task Force. The search warrant revealed 

numerous items of drug paraphernalia indicative of drug trafficking; however, no drugs 

were found. An eye witness at the jail observed Lewis flush drugs down the toilet that he 

took out of his rectum area. In his interview with law enforcement, Lewis admitted to being 

a drug trafficker, and to flushing drugs down the toilet at the jail. 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 3 

{¶5} Lewis was indicted on February 28, 2019 and charged with Engaging in a 

Pattern of Corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), Involuntary Manslaughter in 

violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), two counts of Corrupting Another with Drugs in violation of 

R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), and Tampering with Evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). On 

July 3, 2019, Lewis appeared before the court and entered not guilty pleas to the charges. 

[Docket Entry No. 11]. 

{¶6} Subsequently, Samantha Marks accepted an offer from the state for a 

reduction of her charges in exchange for her testimony against her co-defendants.

Judgment Entry Denying Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, filed May 14, 2020 at 3. 

[Docket Entry No. 90]. On February 4, 2020, the date scheduled for the trial of Lewis 

and Metz to begin, Jessica Metz accepted the same offer from the state. (Id.) Lewis later 

came before the court on February 4, 2020 and entered negotiated guilty pleas to Counts 

One, Two, Five, and Six of the Indictment. On February 4, 2020, a five-day jury trial 

commenced against the remaining codefendant, Jamie Rhodes. Judgment Entry Denying 

Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, filed May 14, 2020 at 8. [Docket Entry No. 90]. 

Jessica Metz and Samantha Marks testified against Rhodes. (Id.) Jamie Rhodes was 

acquitted of all charges. (Id.) 

{¶7} On February 25, 2020, Lewis’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw as 

counsel indicating that Lewis had expressed his desire to withdraw his negotiated guilty 

plea. [Docket Entry No. 70]. The court granted counsel’s motion by Judgment Entry filed 

March 4, 2020. [Docket Entry No. 72]. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Lewis 

by Judgment Entry filed March 9, 2020. [Docket Entry No. 73]. 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 4 

{¶8} On March 24, 2020, Lewis filed a motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty 

plea. An evidentiary hearing on the motion was begun on April 24, 2020. After the defense 

presented its case, the trial court adjourned the hearing. The hearing on the motion was 

concluded on May 8, 2020. 

{¶9} Lewis’s motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty plea was denied by 

Judgment Entry filed May 14, 2020. A sentencing hearing took place on May 27, 2020. 

Lewis was sentenced to seven years on Count 1, seven years on Count 2, 24 months of 

Count 5 and 24 months on Count 6. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently, for 

an aggregate prison sentence of seven years. 

Assignment of Errors 

{¶10} Lewis raises two Assignments of Error, 

{¶11} “I. THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL GUARANTEED UNDER SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION, AND SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED BY TRIAL COUNSEL BASED UPON THE 

RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT. 

{¶12} “II. THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA 

WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.” 

I. 

{¶13} In his First Assignment of Error, Lewis maintains that he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because Lewis did not have sufficient time, prior to the 

trial, to fully consider the pros and cons of entering a plea, nor to fully discuss the 

ramifications of entering a plea prior to trial that day. Further, Lewis maintains counsel 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 5 

had a duty to communicate with Lewis all the matters that would impact Lewis’s trial. 

Specifically, Lewis maintains he was not aware of certain text messages that were 

supplied from the state to Lewis’s attorney as part of the discovery materials. 

Standard of Appellate Review. 

{¶14} When a defendant enters a plea of guilty as a part of a plea bargain he 

waives all appealable errors which may have occurred at trial, unless such errors are 

shown to have precluded the defendant from entering a knowing and voluntary plea. 

State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658(1991). 

{¶15} In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203(1985) the 

Court noted: 

The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is 

“whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 

alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. 

Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); see 

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 

274 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 

513, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962)...Where, as here, a defendant is represented by 

counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of 

counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 

“was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 

25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). As we explained in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 

258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), a defendant who pleads guilty 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 6 

upon the advice of counsel “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent 

character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from 

counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann” Id., at 267, 93 

S.Ct., at 1608. 

Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57, 106 S.Ct. at 369. 

{¶16} The Court in Hill, supra, held that the two-part Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S.668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984) test applies to challenges to guilty pleas 

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 

203. 

{¶17} The first inquiry under Strickland is whether counsel's performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonable representation involving a substantial violation 

of any of defense counsel's essential duties to appellant. The second prong is whether 

the appellant was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 

364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180(1993); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 

S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136. 538 N.E.2d 

373(1989). In other words “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant 

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would 

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 

474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. However, a different outcome at the plea stage but for 

counsel's errors is constitutionally insignificant if the ultimate result that was reached was 

neither unfair nor unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct.838, 

842(1993). 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 7 

Issue for Appellate Review: Whether there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s alleged failures, Lewis would have not have pleaded guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial; and whether the ultimate result that was reached at the plea 

stage was unfair or unreliable. 

{¶18} The entry of a plea of guilty is a grave decision by an accused to dispense 

with a trial and allow the state to obtain a conviction without following the otherwise difficult 

process of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Machibroda v. United States, 

368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473(1962). A plea of guilty constitutes a complete 

admission of guilt. Crim. R. 11 (B) (1). “By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not 

simply stating that he did the discreet acts described in the indictment; he is admitting 

guilt of a substantive crime.” United v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 762, 102 

L.Ed.2d 927(1989). 

{¶19} Crim. R. 11 requires guilty pleas to be made knowingly, intelligently and 

voluntarily. Although literal compliance with Crim. R. 11 is preferred, the trial court need 

only "substantially comply" with the rule when dealing with the non-constitutional 

elements of Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 475, 423 N.E.2d 

115(1981), citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163(1977). In State v. 

Griggs, the Ohio Supreme Court noted the following test for determining substantial 

compliance with Crim.R. 11: 

Though failure to adequately inform a defendant of his constitutional 

rights would invalidate a guilty plea under a presumption that it was entered 

involuntarily and unknowingly, failure to comply with non-constitutional 

rights will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby suffered 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 8 

prejudice.[State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106,] 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. 

The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been 

made.’ Id. Under the substantial-compliance standard, we review the 

totality of circumstances surrounding [the defendant’s] plea and determine 

whether he subjectively understood [the effect of his plea]. See, State v. 

Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509 at ¶ 19-20. 

103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶12. 

{¶20} Further, evidence of a written waiver form signed by the accused is strong 

proof that the waiver was valid. State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844, 

854(1988); see North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1758-

1759, 60 L.Ed.2d 286, 293(1979); State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 425, 1997-Ohio372, 683 N.E.2d 1096, 1102(1997). A written waiver of constitutional rights is presumed 

to have been voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. State v. Turner, 105 Ohio St.3d 331, 

2005-Ohio-1938, 826 N.E.2d 266, ¶25. 

{¶21} With respect to statements made during change of plea hearings, the United 

States Supreme Court has stated, “the representation of the defendant, his lawyer, and 

the prosecutor in such a hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the 

plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn 

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent 

presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary 

dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” 

Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 497, 82 S.Ct. 510, 515(1962). 

{¶22} In the case at bar, Lewis signed a four-page Criminal Rule 11(C) and (F) 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 9 

plea form. [Docket Entry No. 65]. The trial court conducted a lengthy inquiry concerning 

each of Lewis’s constitutional rights during the change of plea hearing on February 4, 

2020. The trial judge gave Lewis several opportunities to ask questions or bring any 

concerns to his attention during the change of plea hearing. Lewis did not. 

{¶23} At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty plea, Lewis 

testify that he believed he was going to trial. However, on the morning of trial, his attorney 

informed him that Metz was planning to testify against him. Lewis claimed he had always 

believed that both Metz and Marks were going to testify against him, so this information 

was not news to him. Lewis testified that he discovered that text messages provided by 

the state to his attorney during discovery indicated that Lewis did not communicate by 

text with either Metz or Meeks on November 5-6, 2018, the dates of the drug transactions 

leading to B.B.’s death. Lewis testified that his attorney did not provide the text messages 

to him. According to Lewis this would prove his innocence of the involuntary manslaughter 

of B.B. Lewis conceded that his defense was to Count 2 and Count 3 only. Transcript 

Change of Plea Hearing, Apr. 24, 2020 at 71-73. Although Lewis claimed to have 

additional text messages, Lewis did not submit any evidentiary materials or call any 

witnesses on his behalf during the motion to withdraw hearings.

{¶24} The right to competent counsel does not require that a criminal defendant 

develop and share a "meaningful relationship" with his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 

U.S. 1, 13, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed.2d 610(1983); State v. Blankenship, 102 Ohio 

App.3d 534, 657 N.E.2d 559(12th Dist. 1995); State v. Burroughs, 5th Dist. No. 

04CAC03018, 2004-Ohio-4769 at ¶ 11. In the context of a motion to discharge appointed 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 10 

counsel, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 1999-Ohio-250, 

717 N.E.2d 298(1999) noted: 

 Even if counsel had explored plea options based on a belief that 

Cowans might be guilty, counsel's belief in their client's guilt is not good 

cause for substitution. “‘A lawyer has a duty to give the accused an honest 

appraisal of his case. * * * Counsel has a duty to be candid; he has no duty 

to be optimistic when the facts do not warrant optimism.'” Brown v. United 

States, 264 F.2d 363, 369(U.S.App.D.C. 1959)(en banc),cert. denied 360 

U.S. 911, 79 S.Ct. 1299, 3 L.Ed.2d 1262(1959), quoted in McKee v. Harris, 

649 F.2d 927, 932(2nd Cir. 1981). “‘If the rule were otherwise, appointed 

counsel could be replaced for doing little more than giving their clients 

honest advice.'" McKee, 649 F.2d at 932, quoting McKee v. Harris, 485 

F.Supp. 866, 869(S.D.N.Y.1980). 

Cowans 87 Ohio St.3d at 73, 717 N.E.2d at 304-305. 

{¶25} In Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), 

the Supreme Court set forth a new standard to determine prejudice in context of Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) as it applies to plea 

offers and plea negotiations. In Frye, defense counsel allowed a plea offer to expire 

without communicating the offer to the defendant resulting in the defendant accepting a 

later offer that was less favorable. Frye, 466 U.S. at 139. The Court held that “defense 

counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a 

plea....” 466 U.S. at 145, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 674. Given this duty, the Court 

emphasized that the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the negotiation 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 11 

and consideration of plea offers that have been rejected or have lapsed. 566 U.S. at 145, 

132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379. 

{¶26} The transcript of the plea hearing reflects that Lewis indicated in response 

to the court's questions that his pleas were voluntary, that he understood the nature of 

the charges and penalties, and the agreement concerning his pleas and sentence. The 

court further informed Lewis that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt, and that 

upon acceptance the court would proceed to judgment and sentencing. Finally, the 

record reflects that the court advised Lewis of each of his constitutional rights as set forth 

in Crim.R.11. 

{¶27} The record affirmatively discloses that: (1) the guilty pleas were not the 

result of coercion, deception or intimidation; (2) Lewis’s attorney was present at the time 

of the plea; (3) Counsel’s advice was competent in light of the circumstances surrounding 

the plea (4) the plea was made with the understanding of the nature of the charges; and, 

(5) the plea was motivated either by a desire to seek a lesser penalty or a fear of the 

consequences of a jury trial, or both. See, State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 217 N.E.2d 

852(1971), syllabus. 

{¶28} As previously stated, this case was originally indicted on February 28, 2019. 

This was nearly a year prior to the final trial date and the date of his plea on February 4, 

2020. The case was continued three times from the original trial date at the request of Lewis 

and once at the request of the state. As noted by the trial court in the Judgment Entry 

overruling Lewis’s motion, approximately 2 1/2 hours passed after Lewis’s trial was 

scheduled to begin before Lewis changed his pleas to guilty. 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 12 

{¶29} Lewis confirmed the state's summary of the plea offer. The factual basis 

was entered on the record by the state for Lewis’s guilty plea. Lewis agreed to these facts, 

and he confirmed that he wished to enter his pleas of guilty upon his own free will and 

voluntarily. 

{¶30} The court next inquired of Lewis whether he felt he had sufficient opportunity 

to discuss the plea offer with his counsel, as well as whether Lewis had discussed any 

defenses available to him if he had decided to proceed to trial. Lewis affirmed that he had 

sufficient time to consult with counsel and discuss his case. Lewis confirmed that his 

counsel had answered each of his questions to his satisfaction. Lewis confirmed that he 

was satisfied with his counsel. Transcript Change of Plea Hearing, Apr. 24, 2020 at 15. 

Lewis agreed that he read the written plea paperwork provided to the court, and his 

signature appeared on the written Rule 11(F) agreement and written guilty plea 

documentation filed in the case. (Id. at 21). 

{¶31} In the case at bar, defense counsel negotiated a dismissal of Counts 3 and 

4 of the Indictment. Counsel further negotiated a jointly recommended prison sentence 

of seven years for two felonies of the first degree and two felonies of the third degree. 

Lewis’s trial counsel was obligated to communicate the plea offer to Lewis, which she did. 

Counsel was further obligated to give Lewis an honest appraisal of his case. 

{¶32} We reviewed the transcript of the hearing at which the trial court conducted 

the plea colloquy required by Crim.R. 11 and determined that the court substantially 

complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) and strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). 

The record supports that an extensive colloquy occurred. 

{¶33} We find Lewis’s suggestions that he did not understand his rights, that he 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 13 

did not have sufficient time to consider a plea, or that his plea was involuntary to be 

unsupported by the record. 

{¶34} Accordingly, Lewis is unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by 

defense counsel's performance. There is no evidence that indicates the result of the plea 

proceeding was unreliable or the proceeding was fundamentally unfair as a result of 

defense counsel's representation of Lewis. 

{¶35} Lewis’s First Assignment of Error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶36} In his Second Assignment of Error, Lewis argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty pleas. 

Standard of Appellate Review. 

{¶37} Appellate courts review trial court decisions on motions to withdraw pleas 

for abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. “An abuse of discretion exists where the reasons given 

by the court for its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of 

justice, or where the judgment reaches an end or purpose not justified by reason and the 

evidence. Tennant v. Gallick, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26827, 2014-Ohio-477, ¶35; In re 

Guardianship of S .H., 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0066–M, 2013–Ohio–4380, ¶ 9; State 

v. Firouzmandi, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2006–CA–41, 2006–Ohio–5823, ¶54. 

{¶38} The good faith, credibility and weight of a defendant’s assertions in support 

of a motion to withdraw guilty plea are matters to be resolved by the trial court, which is 

in a better position to evaluate the motivations behind a guilty plea than is an appellate 

court in reviewing a record of the hearing. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 525, 584 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 14 

N.E.2d 715 (1992), citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977). 

Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial court’s decision to overrule 

Lewis’s motion to withdrawn his negotiated guilty pleas was clearly untenable, legally 

incorrect, or amounted to a denial of justice, or reaches an end or purpose not justified 

by reason and the evidence. 

{¶39} In evaluating whether a trial court has abused its discretion in overruling a 

presentence motion to withdraw a plea, this Court has adopted the following approach, 

In reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea, the court in State v. Fish set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors 

to be weighed. 104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240, 661 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist. 1995) 

[overruled on other grounds, State v. Sims, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C160856, 2017-Ohio-8379, 99 N.E.3d 1056]: These factors include: (1) 

whether the prosecution would be prejudiced if the plea was vacated; (2) 

whether the accused was represented by highly competent counsel; (3) 

whether the accused was given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing; (4) whether a full 

hearing was held on the motion; (5) whether the trial court gave full and fair 

consideration to the motion; (6) whether the motion was made within a 

reasonable time; (7) whether the motion set forth specific reasons for the 

withdrawal; (8) whether the accused understood the nature of the charges 

and possible penalties; and (9) whether the accused was possibly not guilty 

or had a complete defense to the crime. Id. In weighing the ninth factor, “the 

trial judge must determine whether the claim of innocence is anything more 

than the defendant’s change of heart about the plea agreement.” State v. 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 15 

Davison, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008–CA–00082, 2008–Ohio–7037, ¶ 45, 

citing State v. Kramer, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 01–CA–107, 2002–Ohio–

4176, ¶ 58. 

State v. Davis, 5th Dist. Richland No. 15CA6, 2015-Ohio-5196, ¶19. 

{¶40} “In considering these factors, the trial court employs a balancing test; no 

single factor is dispositive.” State v. Warrix, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 26556, 2015-Ohio5390, ¶ 30, citing State v. Preston, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 25393, 2013-Ohio-4404, ¶ 

20. However, “[t]he ultimate question for the trial court is whether there is a ‘reasonable 

and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.’ ” Id., quoting Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d at 

527, 584 N.E.2d 715. 

{¶41} While “a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and 

liberally granted [,] * * * a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea 

prior to sentencing.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715, 719 (1992). 

{¶42} In his motion, Lewis only raised the following reasons for withdrawing his 

plea: "that his prior counsel failed to properly inform him of his rights and the ramifications 

of his plea," and whether or not Lewis was possibly not guilty of the charge or whether 

Lewis has a complete defense to the charges. Motion to Withdraw Plea, filed Mar. 24, 

2020 at 3 [Docket Entry No. 76]. 

{¶43} In the case at bar, the trial court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing 

over two-days, which Lewis presented neither witnesses nor documentary evidence in 

support of his contentions. The state presented the testimony of Samantha Marks, 

Jessica Metz and Detective Greg Bates. The state further presented the testimony of 

Marks, Meeks and Detective Bates from Jamie Rhodes’s jury trial. State’s Exhibits 4-7. 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 16 

{¶44} Marks testified that in November 2018 she obtained drugs from “Duke,” aka 

Lewis. Transcript Continued Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 

2020 at 19- 20. She further testified that it was more than likely she obtained drugs from 

Lewis on November 5, 2018. (Id.). 

{¶45} Metz testified that she obtained drugs from Lewis on November 5, 2018. 

Transcript Continued Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 

31-32. In fact, Meeks testified that she got all of her heroin from Lewis. (Id.). Metz further 

testified that the majority of the time conversations or discussion would go through Marks 

as far as any discussions with Lewis. (Id. at 34). 

{¶46} Detective Bates testified he was investigating Lewis around November 12, 

2018 during Bates’s time with the Drug Task Force. Transcript Continued Hearing on 

Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 39. 

{¶47} Detective Bates testified concerning a drug overdose that occurred on 

November 16 or 17, 2018 at the motel the Drug Force was watching. Detective Bates was 

able to identify Lewis from a surveillance video as the person who brought the individual 

to the medic station. (Id. at 41-42). 

{¶48} Detective Bates testified that Lewis admitted to smuggling 16 grams of 

heroin and a small amount of cocaine, or crack cocaine in his rectal area and attempting 

to flush the drugs down the toilet at the jail after his arrest. Transcript Continued Hearing 

on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 44-45. Detective Bates 

confirmed that an eyewitness had seen Lewis attempting to flush the drugs. Transcript 

Continued Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 44. 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 17 

{¶49} Detective Bates further testified that Lewis admitted that he was trafficking 

drugs from the motel room. Transcript Continued Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to 

Withdraw Plea, May 8, 2020 at 46. 

{¶50} Lewis conceded at the close of the May 8, 2020 evidentiary hearing that his 

motion to withdraw his plea failed regarding Counts 1, 5, and 6. Transcript Change of Plea 

Hearing, Apr. 24, 2020 at 71-73. 

{¶51} In our disposition of Lewis’s First Assignment of Error, we found the trial 

court conducted an adequate Criminal Rule 11(F) hearing on Lewis’s plea, Lewis 

executed a written plea of guilty entry, the parties agreed to the terms on the record, the 

court engaged in a lengthy exchange with Lewis on the record ensuring that Lewis 

understood his rights, he could read and write English, his plea was voluntary, and he 

was satisfied with counsel and that Lewis agreed he had sufficient time to consider the 

plea. We further found that Lewis is unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by 

defense counsel's performance. There is no evidence that indicates the result of the plea 

proceeding was unreliable or the proceeding was fundamentally unfair as a result of 

defense counsel's representation of Lewis. 

{¶52} Lewis’s claims that he has a defense to the involuntary manslaughter 

charge are based upon mere speculation. Nor testimony or evidence was presented to 

support his contention. 

{¶53} Based on the foregoing discussion, we find that the majority of the factors 

in Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240, 661 N.E.2d 788, overruled on other grounds, State v. 

Sims, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160856, 2017-Ohio-8379, 99 N.E.3d 1056, do not support 

the withdrawal of Lewis’s guilty pleas. In considering these factors, we further find the 
Delaware County, Case No. 20 CAA 06 0025 18 

record does not establish that Lewis had a reasonable, legitimate basis to withdraw his 

plea. The record indicates that the trial court considered Lewis’s motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea under the applicable factors in reaching its decision. Therefore, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in overruling Lewis’s presentence motion to withdraw guilty 

plea. 

{¶54} Lewis’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled. 

{¶55} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Hoffman, J., and 

Delaney, J., concur