appellant's petition was an abuse of the writ as he raised claims new and 

different from those raised in his previous petition. 2 See NRS 34.810(2). 

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of 

good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). 

Appellant first claimed that, pursuant to Lafler v. Cooper, 566 

U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. , 132 S. 

Ct. 1399 (2012), counsel was ineffective in advising him to reject a plea 

offer from the State, and because those cases were just decided on March 

21, 2012, they provided good cause to excuse his procedural bars. 

Appellant's good-cause argument was without merit because his case was 

final when Cooper and Frye were decided, and he failed to demonstrate 

that the cases would apply retroactively to him. Even if Cooper and Frye 

announced new rules of constitutional law, he failed to allege facts to 

support that he met either exception to the general principle that such 

rules do not apply retroactively to cases which were already final when the 

new rules were announced. See Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 816-17, 59 

P.3d 463, 469-70 (2002). 

Next, appellant claimed that the decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 

566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), provided good cause because the lack 

of assistance of post-conviction counsel prevented him from complying 

with post-conviction procedures and developing claims of ineffective 

2Rowell v. State, Docket No. 54708 (Order Affirming in Part, 

Reversing in Part and Remanding, April 8, 2010). An amended judgment 

of conviction was entered on June 14, 2010. The amended judgment of 

conviction would not provide good cause in the instant case because the 

petition is late from the amended judgment of conviction and appellant 

does not challenge the amended judgment of conviction. See Sullivan v. 

State, 120 Nev. 537, 541, 96 P.3d 761, 764 (2004). 

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assistance of counsel. We conclude that the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. First, appellant's reliance upon Martinez was 

misplaced as Martinez relates to federal procedural bars and not state 

procedural bars. Thus, the holding in Martinez would not provide good 

cause because it is inapplicable in state court. Second, appellant never 

requested the district court to appoint counsel in the first post-conviction 

proceedings. Third, the factual basis for appellant's claims was readily 

available to appellant at the time he filed his first petition. See Hathaway 

v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003). Finally, appellant's 

ignorance of procedural rules would not provide good cause for the 

procedural defects. See Phelps v. Dir., Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 764 P.2d 

1303 (1988). Therefore, we affirm the order of the district court denying 

the petition as procedurally barred. 

Docket No. 61870 

Appellant filed his petition on June 14, 2012, more than two 

years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on January 15, 

2010. Rowell v. State, Docket No. 51789 (Order of Affirmance, September 

9, 2009). Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 

34.726(1). Moreover, appellant's petition was an abuse of the writ as he 

raised claims new and different from those raised in his previous petition. 3 

See NRS 34.810(2). Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a 

demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); 

NRS 34.810(3). 

3Appellant filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

on January 28, 2010, but withdrew the petition on July 6, 2010. 

Appellant's second petition was denied on June 1, 2012, but appellant did 

not appeal the decision. 

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BEIM 
J. 

Appellant claimed that the decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 

U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), provided good cause because the lack of 

assistance of post-conviction counsel prevented him from complying with 

post-conviction procedures. We conclude that the district court did not err 

in denying this claim. As discussed previously, Martinez relates to federal 

procedural bars and would not provide good cause because it is 

inapplicable in state court. Second, appellant never requested the district 

court to appoint counsel in the first post-conviction proceedings, which he 

subsequently withdrew. Third, the factual basis for appellant's claims 

was readily available to appellant at the time he filed his first petition. 

See Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252, 71 P.3d at 506. Finally, appellant's 

ignorance of procedural rules would not provide good cause for the 

procedural defects. See Phelps, 104 Nev. 656, 764 P.2d 1303. Therefore, 

we affirm the order of the district court denying the petition as 

procedurally barred. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Saitta 

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1513allEMMES 
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Nib 

cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge 

Lamarr Rowell 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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ESEREIMANBIESITUJIKI