I N TH E CO UR T OF A PP EALS S T AT E OF AR I Z ONA D I V I S I O N T WO RH ONDA D E NI S E S M I T H, P eti ti o n er,

v . THE H ON
. DO UG LAS P. M I TCH ELL, C om m i s s i onerof the Super i orC our tof t he St at e of A r i zona, i n and fort he Countyof

Pi ma; a nd TH E H O N
. J O H N S. L E O N A R D O , Pr es i di ng J udge of the S u p e rio r C o u rt o f

th e S tate o f

A riz o n a , in and fort he C ount yof Pi m a, R espon den t s,

and HOWARD E DWARD S M I T H, R e sp o n d e n t/R e a l P a rtyin In ter e st. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2 C A
- SA 2006- 0075

DEPA RTM ENT B O P I N I O N

S P E CI AL AC T I ON P RO CE E DI NG Pi m a C ountyC aus e N o. D 2004- 0862 J URI S DI CTI ON A CCE P TE D; REL I EF GRANTED I N PART D EC -7 2 006 

### F I L E D BY CLE RK

C OU RTOF A PP E A LS DI VIS ION TWO2

S c h wa n b e c k & Pr e s e n t , P
. L. L. C. byV i ct orR
. Schw anbec k
E v e rlo v e & C o ss itt B yE rik a L . C o ss itt T ucs on A t t orney s forPet i t i oner

T ucs on A t t orney s forR es pondent/ R eal

P artyi n Int eres t

E S P I N O S A , J udge. ¶1 I n t hi s s peci al act i on, pet i t i onerR honda Sm i t h chal l enges both t he r es pondent j udge’ s and r es pondentcomm i s s i oner ’ s deni al s of her r eques t s fora cha nge of j udge, ar gui ng t hateac h appl i ed an i ncorr ect l egal s t andar d i n rul i ng on her r eques t s . W e ac ceptj ur i s di ct i on of the s peci al act i on and gr antr el i ef. Juri s di ct i on ¶2 I ti s appr opr i at e thatw e ac cept j ur i s di ct i on of t hi s s peci al act i on beca us e the deni al of a pe r em p toryr eques tfora cha nge of j udge i s pr oper l yr evi ew ed onl ybys peci al
a c tio n . T

ali afer ro v. T

ali afer ro , 18 6 A riz
. 22 1, 22 3, 92 1 P
. 2d 21 , 23 (1996 ). Iti s al so
a p p ro p ri a te b e c a u s e th e is s u e h e re is s o le ly a q u e s tio n o f la w . C har t O ne, I

nc. v. B er ni ni , 207 A r i z. 162, ¶ 8, 83 P. 3d 1103, 1106- 07 ( A pp. 2004)
. A n d , beca us e w e conc l ude the
r es pondent comm i s s i oner abus ed hi s di s cr et i on by comm i t t i ng an er r or of l aw i n ent er i ng a d is c re tio n a ry r u lin g , w e g ra n t r e lie f
. See A riz
. R
. P
. S p e c . A c tio n s 3 , 1 7 B A .R .S .; T w in C ity F i r e I ns . C o. v. B urke , 2 0 4 A ri z . 2 5 1 , ¶ 1 0 , 6 3 P .3 d 2 8 2 , 2 8 4 -8 5 (2 0 0 3 ).Rul e 4 2 ( f ) ( 1 ) ( A) p r o v i d e s e a c h s i d e wi t h a c h a n g e o f o n e j u d g e a n d o f

o ne 1 comm i s s i oneras a m at t er of ri ght
. T he rul e furt herpr ovi des thata part y“s hal l fi l e a ‘ N ot i ce o f C h a n g e o f

J u d g e ’ ” t o e x e r c i s e t h e i rr i g h t s . A r i z . R
. C i v . P
. 4 2 ( f ) ( 1 ) ( A )
. A c c o r d i n g l y, alth o u g h R h o n d a so u g h t a ch an g e of the co m m issi o n er a ssign ed to h er c ase , w e u se th e term “ c h a n g e o f

ju d g e ” f o r s im p lic ity. 3 Fac t ualand Pr oc e dur alBackg r ound ¶3 R ho nd a fi l ed a p et i t i on for dis sol uti on of her m arr i age t o real partyi n int eres t H ow a r d Smi t h
. Aft e r a t r i a l , t h e r e s p o n d e n t c o mmi s s i o n e r , who h a d b e e n a s s i gned t o t he
c a s e , s ig n e d a d e c re e d is p o s in g o f , in tera lia , t he part i es ’ ow ner s hi p interest s i n s ever al par cel s of r eal p r oper t y . R honda appe al ed thatdecr ee a nd t hi s cour tvaca t ed the port i on
r el ati n g t o t he mar i t al r es i dence of the part i es beca us e the comm i s s i onerhad appl i ed the
w ro n g le g a l p re s u m p tio n to d e te rm in e th e p a rt ie s ’ r e s p e c tiv e in te re s ts . Sm ith v . Sm ith , 2 CA
C V 2005- 0054 ( m emora ndum deci s i on fi l ed N ov. 30, 2005)
. W e r emanded t he ca s e for
r edet erm i nat i on of the ow ner s hi p i nt er es t s i n t he pr oper t y , w hi ch r equi r ed appl i cat i on of the
corr ect pr es um pt i on, a det erm i nat i on of w hether H ow ar d had r ebut t ed the pr es um pt i on, and
a r edet erm i nat i on of paym ent s nece s s ary t o pr ovi de an equi t abl e di s t r i but i on of t he mar i t al asset s. ¶4 O n re m a n d , R h o n d a f iled a n o ti c e o f

c h a n g e o f

ju d g e p u rsu a n t to R u le 42( f) ( 1) ( E ) , A r i z. R
. C i v. P. , 16 A
. R
. S. , Pt
. 1, cl ai m i ng her r i ght t o a per empt orychange of j udge had r evi ved w hen the cas e w as r emanded. T he r es pondentcomm i s s i onerdeni ed the 1
re q u e st, sta tin g th e c a se h a d n o t b e e n re m a n d e d f o r a n e w trial. R h o n d a th e n so u g h t to4

re m o v e th e re sp o n d e n t co m m iss io n e r th ro u g h a c h a n g e o f ju d g e f o r c a u se u n d e r R u le 42( f) ( 2) , w hi ch the r es pondentj udge deni ed. D i s cus s i on ¶5 R ul e 42( f) , A r i z. R
. C i v. P. , governs change s of j udge i n ci vi l cas es . E ach s i de is e n tit led to o n e c h a n g e o f ju d g e a n d o n e c h a n g e o f c o m m iss io n e r a s a m a tter o f rig h t, pr ovi ded the cha nge i s t i m el yr eques t ed. A r i z. R
. C i v. P. 42( f) (1)(A ). T hi s r i ghtm aybe
w aive d eith er b yag ree m en t or b y fa il ing to exe rcise i t bef o re the ch all en g ed jud g e h as h ea rd any cont es t ed m at t er i n t he cas e. A r i z. R
. C i v. P. 42( f) ( 1) ( C ) , ( D )
. W e r evi ew t he deni al of a cha nge of j udge as of r i ghtforan abus e of di s cr et i on, butr evi ew the court ’ s i nt erpr et at i on
o f R u le 42 (f)(1)(E ) de novo
. A nders on v. C ont es , 212 A r i z. 122, ¶ 5, 128 P. 3d 239, 241 (A p p . 2 0 0 6 ). ¶6 R ul e 42( f) ( 1) ( E ) pr ovi des t hata part y ’ s r i ghtt o a cha nge of j udge i s r enew ed
a f ter a c a se h a s b e e n re m a n d e d to th e trial c o u rt f o r “ a n e w trial o n o n e o r m o re iss u e s.” B u t, i f thi s r i ghtt o a cha nge of j udge w as pr evi ous l yexer ci s ed, i t i s notr enew ed upon r emand. See Brus h W

el lm an, I nc. v. Lee , 1 9 6 A ri z. 34 4 , ¶ 1 4 , 9 9 6 P
. 2 d 1 2 4 8 , 1 2 5 2 -53 (A p p . 2 0 0 0 ). R h o n d a h ad n o t prev iou sly e x erc ised h er righ t t o a c h an g e o f ju d g e in th is case
. In Va l e n z u e l a v . Br o wn , 1 8 6 A ri z . 1 0 5 , 1 0 7 , 9 1 9 P
. 2 d 1 3 7 6 , 1 3 7 8 (A p p . 1 9 9 6 ), this co u rt det erm i ned thata part yw as ent i t l ed t o a per empt orychange of j udge fol l ow i ng t he r ever s al of a gr antof part i al s um m aryj udgm ent , beca us e “the r eas on fort he rule [i s ] avoi di ng t he pos s i bi l it y o f jud ici al bi as aft err ever s al and r emand. ” I d. at108, 919 P. 2d at1379. T he5

V a len zu e la cour texpl ai ned that“[w ] her e, as her e, t he j udge has m ade a deci s i on on the
m er i t s of the ca s e, he has show n unequi vocal l y w hat he bel i eves t he prope r out come of t he
cas e t o be .
. . . T he j udgm entnow havi ng been r ever s ed, t he pol i cyr eas ons forperm i t t i ng a change of j udge as a m at t er of ri ght on r emand ar e al l t he more appar ent . ” Id
. at109, 919 P .2 d a t 1 3 8 0
. ¶7 T hi s r at i onal e fi r s tappea r ed i n K i ng v. Su peri or C ou rt , 108 A r i z. 492, 502 P. 2d 529 ( 1972) , w her e ours upr eme cour texpl ai ned the i m por t ance of the r i ghtt o a cha nge of ju d g e a f te r r e m a n d
. In th e c a se o f

a n a p p e a l, re v e rsa l an d a re m a n d f o r a n e w trial, it i s a lw a y s p o ss ib le th a t th e trial ju d g e m a ysu b c o n sc io u sly r es entt he l aw y er or defe ndant w ho got t he j udgm entr ever s ed. T he mer e pos s i bi l i t yof s uch a thoughti n t he bac k of a tr i al j udge’ s m i nd m eans t hata new j udge s houl d be found. I d. at493, 502 P. 2d at530. ¶8 I n E vans v. E vans , 1 1 7 A ri z. 56 1 , 5 6 1 , 5 7 4 P
. 2 d 4 9 , 4 9 (A p p . 1 9 7 7 ), this co u rt had r emanded a ca s e t o t he t r i al cour t , fi ndi ng i t“err ort o m odi fycus t odyw i t houtaff or di ng bot h par ent s an oppor tuni t yt o pr es entevi dence of al l t he ci r cumst ance s w hi ch mi ghtaff ect th e c o u rt’s d e ter m in a ti o n o f th e p rim a ryq u e stio n .” A lth o u g h th e c a se w a s s p e c if ica lly
re m a n d e d f

o r f u rth e r p ro c e e d in g s in th e c u sto d ym a tter, w e h e ld th a t “ p e ti ti o n e r’s tim e ly
r eques tfora cha nge of j udge s houl d have be en honor ed. ” Id
. at 562, 574 P. 2d at50. T he E vans deci s i on di d s ugges t t he re s ul t m i ght have been di ffe r enti f the j udge as s i gned t o t he
cas e aft err emand had hear d t he ea r l i ercas e, as i n H of s tr a v. Mahoney , 108 A r i z. 498, 5026

P .2 d 1 3 1 7 (1 9 7 2 ). H o w e v e r, H ofs tra a d d re ss e d n e w lyin iti a ted p o st-d e c re e p ro c e e d in g s to enfor ce orm odi fyan exi s t i ng fi nal decr ee, nota r emand fol l ow i ng the appe al of the i ni t i al d e c re e . Id . at 4 9 8 , 5 0 2 P .2 d a t 1 3 1 7 ; see R oss v. Su peri or C ou rt , 109 A r i z. 414, 414, 510 P
. 2 d 3 8 6 , 3 8 6 (19 7 3 ). ¶9 In c o n tr a s t, A nder s on w as a spec i al act i on fol l ow i ng the appe al of pos t - decr ee pr ocee di ngs t hathad appa r ent l ybeen r es ol ved w i t houtan i ndepende nthear i ng. I n t he appeal , D i vi s i on O ne of thi s cour thad r emanded t he ca s e “‘ forfur t herpr ocee di ngs ’ on Fat her ’ s cl ai m s t hatt he tr i al cour t fai l ed t o aw ar d hi m i nt er es t on the B M W debtand thatt he
aw ar d of att or ney s ’ fee s w as i m pr oper . ” A nders on , 2 1 2 Ar i z . 1 2 2 , ¶ 3 , 1 2 8 P
. 3 d a t2 4 0
. On
r emand, Fat herr eques t ed a c hange of j udge, w hi ch t h e tr ial cour tdeni ed by“l i m i t i ng t he
re m a n d e d iss u e s to o ra l ar g u m e n t b a se d ‘ o n th e e v id e n c e p re se n ted a t th e tim e o f trial in 2 003. ’ ” Id
. ¶ 4
. Di v i s i o n One d e t e r mi n e d th a t b e c a u s e t h e “ f u r t h e r p r o c e edi ngs ” i t had
r efe r r ed t o i n t he appe al w er e “a cont i nuat i on of t he proc eedi ngs al r eady hel d r atherthan a de novo r edet erm i nat i on of t he re m anded i s s ues , ” i t w as not a new t r i al as cont empl at ed by R u le 4 2 (f

)( 1 )( E ). Id
. ¶ 9. ¶10 T he i s s ues on r emand i n A nders on w er e l i m i ted— w hythe tr i al cour thad
as s es s ed i nt er es ton unpai d debt s agai ns tone s pous e butnotthe other and forcl ar i fi cat i on of w hi ch of the fa t her ’ s pos i t i ons the tr i al cour thad consi der ed unr eas onabl e t o j us t i fy
aw ard ing the m o ther atto rn e yf e e s . Id
. ¶ 13. T hus , the ca s e had be en r emanded bas ed on

“ th e in s u f

f ic ie n c yo f

th e tr ia l c o u rt ’s e x p la n a tio n s , a n d n o t th e in s u f f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e .”W e n o te th e d e ter m in a tio n o f w h e th e r a p ro c e e d in g is a “ trial” is n o t n e c e ss a rily 2 w hether new evi dence m us tbe r ece i ved. “A tr i al i s ‘ t he j udi ci al exami nat i on of the i s s ues betw een t he par t i es , w hether t heybe i s s ues of l aw orfac t . ’ ” Va l e n z u e l a v . Br o wn , 186 A r i z. 1 0 5 , 1 0 8 , 9 1 9 P .2 d 1 3 7 6 , 1 3 7 9 (A p p . 1 9 9 6 ). O n th e re c o rd b e f o re u s, h o w e v e r, itis lik e ly t h a tn e w ev i d e n c e wou l d b e r e q u i r e d t o c o mpl ywi t h t h i s c o u r t ’ s d i r e c t i v e t o d e t e r m i ne w h e th e r H o w a rd c a n re b u t a p re su m p tio n th a t w a s n o t ap p lied d u rin g th e trial a n d to d e te r m in e a c o r o ll a ryq u e stio n lef t “o p e n ” in o u r p rio r d e c isio n . W e d o n o t su g g e st th a t a re m a n d d ire c tin g a trial c o u rt to m e re lyre v e rse a leg a l co n c lu sio n a n d re c o n sid e r p re v io u sly e s ta b lis h e d f

a c ts w o u ld b e a “ n e w tr ia l” f o r p u rp o s e s o f

R u le 4 2 (f

)( 1 )( E ). 7 Id
. ¶ 14. N o par tof the dec r ee ha d been va cat ed and the tr i al courtw as notr equi r ed t o m ake anynew det erm i nat i ons of w ho w as t o r ece i ve ce r t ai n pr oper t y . In esse n ce, D i vi s i on O ne
as ked t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o e x p l a i n why i t h a d e n t e r e d p a r t i c u l a r o r d e r s , n o t t o e n t e r n ew and po t enti al l ydiffer ent ones. ¶11 T h e lan g u ag e o f R u le 42 (f)(1)(E )— a “ n ew tr ial o n o n e o r m o re i s s ues ”— appea r s t o be concl us i ve of t he i s s ue her e. T he courti n A nders on emphasi zed the d if f e re n c e b e tw e e n a n iss u e r e q u ir in g a “ d e n o v o re d e ter m in a tio n ” a n d o n e re q u irin g o n ly “furt herpr ocee di ngs . ” 212 A r i z. 122, ¶ 9, 128 P. 3d at242. H er e, i n contr as t , w e vac at ed the
u n d erly i ng j udgm entaw ar di ng t he r eal pr oper t yand r emanded t he ca s e fora new d e ter m in a tio n o f

f a c t an d law
. B e c a u se th e ju d g m e n t o n th a t issu e w a s v a c a ted , it

2 “r es t or [ed] t he part i es t o t he s ame posi t i on as i f the [issu e] h ad n everbeen tr i ed. ” Tucs on G as & E l ec. C o. v. Su

peri or C ou rt , 9 A ri z . A p p . 2 1 0 , 2 1 3 , 4 5 0 P .2 d 7 2 2 , 7 2 5 (1 9 6 9 ), quot i ng Markel v. Trans am er i ca Ti t l e I ns . C o. , 1 0 3 A ri z. 35 3 , 3 6 2 , 4 4 2 P .2 d 9 7 , 1 0 6 (19 6 8 ),
over r ul ed on othergr ounds , B ur ch & C r acchi ol o, P
. A
. v. P ugl i ani , 144 A r i z. 281, 283, 697 P .2 d 6 7 4 , 6 7 6 (1 9 8 5 ).8

¶12 O n r emand, t he comm i s s i onerw i l l have t o det erm i ne anew t he ow ner s hi p of th e p ro p e rtya n d th e a m o u n t, i f a n y , o f c o m p e n sa tio n re q u ire d to e f f e c t an e q u itab le di s t r i but i on of the as s et s . T hus , t hi s w oul d appea rt o be “a de novo r edet erm i nat i on of the
re m an d ed issue ” w h ich re v ives R h o n d a’s p rev iou slyu n ex erc ised ri g h t t o a p ere m p tory
c h a n g e o f

ju d g e . See M

uches ko v. Mu ch esko , 191 A r i z. 265, 274, 955 P. 2d 21, 30 ( A pp. 19 97 ) (vacat i ng po rt i on s o f a divorce d ecree an d rem and i ng t o t ri al cou rt w i t h instruct i on s: “[a ] m ong ot heri s s ues t o be r etr i ed , the tr i al cour t s hal l r econs i der t he aw ar d of the Schw ab
a c c o u n t a n d a ttr ib u tio n o f in c o m e to H u s b a n d b a s e d o n th a t a c c o u n t” ) ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ). ¶13 H ow ar d’ s r es pons e, al t hough focus ed on t he change of j udge forcaus e i s s ue,
r el i es heavi l yon cr i m i nal cas es i nt erpr et i ng R ul e 10. 2, A r i z. R
. C r i m . P. , 16A A
. R
. S. T hat
rul e, how ever , has no l anguage corr es pondi ng t o R ul e 42( f) ( 1) ( E ) ors peci fi cal l yappl y i ng t o p os t - r e mand pr oc e e di ng s a pp l i cable to a t ri a l of “ on e ormor e i s s ue s . ” A r i z . R. Ci v. P. 4 2 ( f) ( 1) ( E )
. W e not e, t oo, t hatal t hough H ow ar d as s ert s t he r es pondentcomm i s s i oner’s d e c re e “ sp e c if

ica lly a d d re ss e s [th e c o rre c t] leg a l ‘p re su m p tio n ’ th re e (3 ) d if f e re n t ti m e s in par agr aph s i x, ” andc o n c l u d e s t hi s es t abl i s hed “thatthe pr es um pt i ons and evi dence r egar di ng t he ow ner s hi p of the Si err a N evada pr oper t yi s nota ‘ new i s s ue, ’ ” a r evi ew of the dec r ee show s the co rr ectpresum pti on w as m enti on ed on l yt o sho w i tw as notb eing ap p li ed
. T h ere
w as no i ndi cat i on t hat t he pre s um pt i on had bee n cons i der ed bythe comm i s s i onerorw as even
a n is s u e a t th e tr ia l.9

¶14 Ho wa r d a dd i t i on a l l ya s s e r t s tha t“ [p ] ub l i c p o l i c yc o n c e rn s f o rj u d i c i a l e c o n o my and tr adi t i on” s uppor t t he s ame j udge “r ehea r [i ng] a ca s e thathas been r emanded, r ever s ed
orended i n a mi s t r i al
. ” H e r el i es on K i ng , 10 8 A ri z. 49 2, 50 2 P. 2d 52 9, cl ai m i ng that cas e
se ts id e n ti c a l sta n d a rd s f o r a c a se th a t is m istrie d a n d a c a se th a t is re m a n d e d a f ter a p p e a l. In f a c t, K i ng , as q u o ted a b o v e in ¶ 7 , em p h a siz e d th a t re m a n d s a re d if f e re n t f ro m m istria ls
a n d s h o u ld b e tr e a te d d if f e re n tly. Id
. a t 4 9 3 , 5 0 2 P .2 d a t 5 3 0
. M o re o v e r, th is c o u rt d ire c tly addr es s ed the i s s ue i n V

a len zu e la , sta tin g “

ju d icia l ec o n o m yis n o t a b a sis f o r d e n y in g a p a rty t he r i ghtt o an aut om at i c cha nge of j ud g e.” 1 8 6 A r i z. at109, 919 P. 2d at1380. T he l anguage of R ul e 42( f) ( 1) ( E ) i t s el f, w i t h i t s pr ovi s i on fora new j udge aft er a cas e has been
re v e rs e d a n d re m a n d e d , u n d e rc u ts th is c la im
. ¶15 R h o n d a a lso c h all en g es th e re sp o n d en t j u d g e’s d en ial o f h er req u est fo r a change of j udge forcaus e, butw e s ee n o erro r in t hatrul i ng. A l t hough t he r es pondent
comm i s s i oner err ed by not gr ant i ng t he i ni t i al r eques t for a per empt ory change of j udge, t he
r es pondentj udge’ s rul i ng w as corr ect beca us e a rul i ng i n a cas e, w i t hout m or e, cannot be the b a s is o f a re q u e s t f

o r a c h a n g e o f

th a t ju d g e f

o r c a u s e . S e e Sm ith v . Sm ith , 115 A r i z. 299, 303, 564 P. 2d 1266, 1270 ( A pp. 1977) ( “I t i s gener al l y conce ded t hatthe bi as and pr ej udi ce
nece s s aryt o di s qual i fy a j udge m us t ar i s e fr om an extr a- j udi ci al s our ce a nd notfr om w hat th e ju d g e h a s d o n e in h is p a rt ic ip a tio n in th e c a s e .” ).10 D i s posi t i on ¶16 A ccor di ngl y , w e ac ce p t jur i s di ct i on, gr antr el i ef on the deni al of the per empt or ychange of j udge, and re m an d this mat t ert o the tr i al cour tforpr ocee di ngs
cons i s t entw i t h t hi s deci s i on. I n our di s cr et i on, R honda’ s r eques tforatt orneyfee s pur s uant t o A
. R
. S. § 25- 324, cons i s t entw i t h ourp rev ious det erm i nat i on undert hats t atut e of the
re la tiv e f in a n c ia l p o s itio n s o f

th e p a rt ie s , is d e n ie d
.

PH I L I P G
. E SPIN O SA , J udge CO NC UR RI NG:

PE T E R J
. E C K E R ST R O M , Pr es i di ng J udge

G A R Y E L
. V Á SQ U E Z , J udge