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18-2466-cv 

William v. City of New York 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 27th day of June, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

RONALD WILLIAM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 18-2466-cv 

v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, POLICE OFFICER CHRISTOPHER FOY 

(SHIELD #5101), POLICE OFFICER MARCUS COLON 

(SHIELD #4439), JOHN DOES 1-5 (ACTUAL NAMES 

UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME), 

Defendants-Appellees. 

 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: David J. Hernandez, David J. Hernandez 

& Associates, Brooklyn, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Deborah A. Brenner, Ellen Ravitch, 

Assistant Corporation Counsel, for

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel 

of the City of New York, New York, NY. 
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Appeal from a July 23, 2018 order of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York (Richard J. Sullivan, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the District Court be and hereby is 

AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald William (“William”) appeals from an order of the District Court 

denying William’s motion to re-open his case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 

60(b)(1). The District Court initially denied William’s motion on September 6, 2017. William 

appealed the denial, and we remanded the case to the District Court “for an appropriate exercise of 

its discretion” in light of the factors set forth in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates 

Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). William v. City of New York, 727 F. App’x 30, 32 (2d Cir. 

2018). On remand, the District Court considered the Pioneer factors and again denied William’s 

motion. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the 

case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review a district court’s grant or denial of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion for “abuse of 

discretion.” Gomez v. City of New York, 805 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam).1

William argues that the District Court abused its discretion in finding that the first three 

Pioneer factors weighed against him. The factors are as follows: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the 

non-moving party, (2) the length of delay and impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the 

delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the moving party, and (4) whether 

the moving party acted in good faith.” Williams v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 391 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 

2004). 

As to the first factor, William argues that the District Court erred in finding a presumption 

of prejudice attached to his ten-month delay. We have explained that “[a] presumption of prejudice 

is particularly appropriate where . . . the plaintiff’s delay was prolonged.” Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 

186 F.3d 186, 195 (2d Cir. 1999). We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District 

Court to apply the presumption here. 

As to the second factor, William argues that the District Court abused its discretion in 

finding that the delay was lengthy and affected judicial proceedings. William argues that the tenmonth delay was not lengthy and that it should not be considered a significant interference in the 

 

1 “Abuse of discretion” is a legal term of art, see, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, 921 F.3d 320, 328 n.37 (2d 

Cir. 2019), which in these circumstances is synonymous with legal error. 
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District Court’s management of its docket. We disagree and conclude that the District Court did not 

err, much less “abuse its discretion,” in finding that the second factor weighed against William. 

As to the third factor, William argues that the District Court abused its discretion in finding 

that the reason for the delay weighed heavily against him. We have explained that “it is the third 

factor—the reason for the delay—that predominates, and the other three are significant only in close 

cases.” Williams, 391 F.3d at 415–16. William argues that he has demonstrated “excusable neglect” 

because (1) email notifications regarding docket entries went to his counsel’s junk mail, and (2) his 

counsel believed that defendants-appellants were in default and was thereby “lulled” into awaiting 

word from them. Appellant Br. 26, 27. William does not contest that his counsel failed to check the 

docket for nearly a year to keep apprised of the litigation. We conclude that the District Court did 

not err or abuse its discretion in finding that this factor weighed heavily against William. 

As to the fourth factor, William argues that the District Court erred by finding that this 

factor weighed “slightly” in his favor rather than fully in his favor. The District Court acted within 

its discretion in finding that there was no evidence of bad faith, but concluding that the fourth factor 

was insufficient to counterbalance the other factors. 

CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by William on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the July 23, 2018 order of the District Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk