alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001109531
<NAME>                        DIAMOND TRIUMPH AUTO GLASS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                      1,000
<CURRENCY>                                 U.S. Dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                     6-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                              APR-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                    1.00
<CASH>                                               44
<SECURITIES>                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    16,408
<ALLOWANCES>                                        956
<INVENTORY>                                      11,714
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 31,675
<PP&E>                                           18,075
<DEPRECIATION>                                   11,348
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   87,934
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            18,957
<BONDS>                                         101,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            45,667
<PREFERRED>                                           0
<COMMON>                                             10
<OTHER-SE>                                     (78,200)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     87,934
<SALES>                                          93,818
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 93,818
<CGS>                                            29,271
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    83,109
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    290
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                5,483
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   5,270
<INCOME-TAX>                                      2,103
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (3,167)
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   (504)
<CHANGES>                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                      2,663
<EPS-BASIC>                                           0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         0


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, furnished herewith.

Armstrong Holdings, Inc. and

Armstrong World Industries, Inc.

(the Companies)

Written
Statement by Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that the Companies Form 10-Q periodic report containing their respective financial statements for the fiscal
quarter ended March 31, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that information contained in that report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Companies as of that date.



|                                                                                                               
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                                               
|/s/ F. Nicholas Grasberger III                                                                                 
|F. Nicholas Grasberger III                                                                                     
|Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer Armstrong Holdings, Inc. and Armstrong World Industries, Inc.

Dated: April 27, 2006

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Companies and will be retained by the Companies and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-30762

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ZELBONY O. TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:07-CR-109-6

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Zelbony O. Taylor has moved for leave

to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Taylor has filed a response. To the extent that Taylor raises claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel,the record is insufficiently developed to allow consideration

of those claims; such claims generally “cannot be resolved on direct appeal when

the claim[s] [have] not been raised before the district court since no opportunity

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 17, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 11-30762 Document: 00511823986 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/17/2012
No. 11-30762

existed to develop the record on the merits of the allegations.” United States v.

Cantwell, 470 F.3d 1087, 1091 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of

the record reflected therein, as well as Taylor’s response. We concur with

counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate

review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED,

counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS

DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

2

Case: 11-30762 Document: 00511823986 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/17/2012
#### Ex parte George M. DAVIS.

No. 28358.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 30, 1956.

Charles F. Mitchell, Houston, for appellant.

J. L. Smith, Dist. Atty., San Augustine, Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order in a habeas corpus proceeding denying bail to appellant upon a complaint charging him with murder.

It is made to appear that subsequent to the entry of the order appealed from an indictment has been returned charging appellant with said offense, and the question of his right to bail upon the charge by complaint hás therefore become moot. Ex parte Alaniz, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 590, 251 S.W.2d 738; Ex parte Everett, 151 Tex.Cr.R. 22, 204 S.W.2d 980.

The appeal is dismissed.
#### Willis GRIGSBY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28734.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 13, 1957.

John Cutler, Houston, for appellant.

Dan Walton, Dist. Atty., Eugene Brady and Thomas D. White, Asst. Dist. Attys., *596Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is possession of policy paraphernalia . as denounced by Section 2 of Article 642c, V.A.P.C.; punishment, 90 days in jail.

Officers Page and Bell testified that they were in the neighborhood of 5307 Lyons Avenue on the day in question on another mission and saw the appellant seated inside the window of a house at such address writing in a hook, that they presented themselves at the door, secured permission of Mrs. Phillips, who lived at such address, to enter and there observed the appellant lay down a book on the table before him. This table was covered with policy books for the B. & T. and L. & O. games, “hit slips” and money. The appellant was arrested, and the contents of the table were introduced in evidence.

Th appellant did not testify or offer any evidence in his own behalf except a certain document which would indicate that he resided at 2213 Jensen Drive.

Only two questions are presented for review.

It is contended that officer Bell’s qualifications as an expert on policy were not shown so as to authorize him to explain the game to the jury and identify the exhibits as “parahernalia designed and adapted for use in connection with a policy game.”

Bell testified that he had been employed for seven years on the vice squad, that at the time he was so employed his superior officers explained to him how a policy game was played, that during those seven years he had worked on approximately 200 cases involving policy and had talked to a number of persons whom he had arrested in connection with policy about the game.

We have concluded that his qualifications have been amply shown.

It is next contended that the evidence is insufficient to sustain this conviction because it was not shown that the named policy games were actually in operation in Houston at the time the appellant was arrested.

We have been cited no authorities in support of this contention and know of none. It would appear from an examination of the statute in question that the Legislature did not contemplate that such proof was requisite to a conviction in a case such as the one before us here.

Finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and no reversible error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A2 2 A0 60 0 . LARRY TENNYSON, SR. v . THE STATE.

Th i s ap p e a l was d o ck et ed o n No vem er 1 0

, 2 0 2 1

, an d ap pel l an t ’ s b ri ef

co n tai n i n g an en u m erat i o n o f erro rs wa s d ue b y N ov em b er 3 0

, 2 02 1

. An ex t en s i o n

was g ran ted u n t i l Decem er 3 0

, 2 0 2 1

. As ap p el l an t has fai led t o ti m el y fi le a b ri ef an d

en u m erat i o n o f erro rs w i t h t h i s Co u rt

, t he ap p eal i s DISM ISSED fo r fai l u re t o fi le a

b ri ef an d en u m erat i o n o f erro rs wi t h i n t h e p eri o d o rd ered by t h i s Co urt

. See Co u rt

o f Ap peal s Ru le 2 3 (a).

Th e Cl erk i s d irect ed t o s en d a co p y o f t h i s o rd er d i rect l y to Mr. Ten n y s o n.

Pu rs u an t t o Ro wl a n d v. S ta t e , 2 6 4 Ga. 8 7 2

, 8 7 5 (2 ) (4 5 2 SE2 d 75 6 ) (1 9 95 ), an d Rees e

v. St a t e , 2 1 6 G a. Ap p

. 7 7 3

, 7 7 5 (4 5 6 SE2 d 2 7 1 ) (1 9 9 5 ), M r. Ten n y s on i s ad v i s ed as

fo l l o w s :

M r. Ten n y s o n , y ou r a p p e a l h as b een DISM ISSED b ecau s e n o bri ef an d

en u m erat i o n of erro rs were fi l ed

. If y o u h av e d eci d ed y o u do no t wan t t o ap p eal

, y o u

n eed no t d o an y t h in g m o re. Ho wev er, i f y o u d o s t i l l wan t t o ap p eal

, y o u m ay h av e

t h e ri gh t t o an O UT-OF-TIM E APPEAL
-- b u t YOU M UST TAKE ACTION to

ex erci s e t h at ri g h t by m o v i n g fo r an o u t -o f

- t i m e ap p eal i n th e t ri al co u rt

. If y o u r

m o ti o n fo r an o u t -o f-t i m e ap p eal i s g ran t ed

, th e t ri al co u rt s h o u l d ap p oi n t an at t o rn ey

fo r y o u i f y o u wan t o n e an d can n o t p ay f o r o n e

. I f y o u r m o t i o n fo r an o u t -o f t i m e

ap p eal i s d e n i e d

, y o u h av e th e ri g h t t o ap p eal t h at d en i al t o t h i s Co u rt wi t h i n t h i rt y

d ay s o f t h e t ri al co u rt ’ s d eci s i o n

. January 14, 2022C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e
, A t la n t a
,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r t i f y t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a tr u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

.
W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t
h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 01/14/2022
#### Ex parte James R. KELLEY.

No. 27569.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 6, 1955.

*112No attorney on appeal, for appellant.

Leon Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

On October 24, 1951, relator waived the right of trial by jury before the court in each of eight cases pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Harris County, Texas, and numbered upon the docket of that court as 65292 to 65299, inclusive. In five of the cases the offense charged against appellant was that of forgery and in three, that of passing forged instrument.

Upon that plea, the trial' court assessed relator’s punishment at five years’ confinement in the penitentiary in each case. In passing sentence upon that judgment, the punishment in each case succeeding the first was expressly made to run cumulative with the punishment in the next preceding case. The total punishment thus assessed against relator by the eight judgments and sentences was forty years in the penitentiary.

Relator is now serving the sentences thus imposed in the penitentiary of this state.

By writ of habeas corpus to. this ;court he seeks his discharge from custody under each and all of said sentences, insisting that the judgment of conviction in each case was void because he had no attorney representing him in these 'cases and the trial court did not appoint- an attorney to represent him.

• The record before us Sustains relator’s allegations of fact — that is, that he waived trial by jury and, by and'with the consent of state’s counsel, pleaded guilty before the court, with no attorney of his own choosing representing him, nor was an attorney appointed by the 'court to do so.

One of the rights that an accused cannot waive is the right of trial -by jury. Art. 1, Sec. 15, Constitution, Vernon’s Ann. St.; Art. 10, Vernon’s C.C.P.

That right, however, does not apply when the offense charged is an ordinary felony and the accused enters a plea of guilty. In such cases the accused may enter a plea of guilty provided he is represented by counsel of his own choosing or by appointment of the court. Art. 10a, Vernon’s C.C.P.; Kemp v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 261 S.W.2d 573.

It has been the repeated holding of this court that the provision touching representation by counsel is mandatory and that noncompliance therewith renders the conviction void. Wilson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 252 S.W.2d 197; Hernandez v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 4, 133 S.W.2d 584; Ex parte Rawlins, Tex.Cr.App., 255 S.W.2d 877.

*113It is apparent, therefore, that relator is being held in custody under and by void judgments of conviction.

Accordingly, the writ of habeas corpus and the relief prayed for therein are granted and relator is ordered discharged from further custody under each and all of the judgments heretofore described. The relator, however, will be delivered to the sheriff of Harris County to answer the accusations for which the purported convictions were had.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 150 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 150

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the inclusion in 
               gross income of Social Security benefits.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 5, 2011

   Mr. Paul introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the inclusion in 
               gross income of Social Security benefits.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Senior Citizens Tax Elimination 
Act''.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF INCLUSION IN GROSS INCOME OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
              BENEFITS.

    (a) In General.--Section 86 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(relating to social security benefits) is amended by adding at the end 
the following new subsection:
    ``(g) Termination.--This section shall not apply to any taxable 
year beginning after the date of the enactment of this subsection.''.
    (b) Social Security Trust Funds Held Harmless.--
            (1) In general.--There are hereby appropriated (out of any 
        money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated) for each 
        fiscal year to each fund under the Social Security Act or the 
        Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 an amount equal to the 
        reduction in the transfers to such fund for such fiscal year by 
        reason of section 86(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
            (2) No tax increases.--It is the sense of the Congress that 
        tax increases will not be used to provide the revenue necessary 
        to carry out paragraph (1).
                                 <all>
```
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

RYAN KIMURA,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 17

- 10353

D.C. No. 1:10

- cr

- 00537

- SOM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Susan O. Mollway, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 15, 2018 **

Before: SILVERMAN , BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Ryan Kimura appeals from the revocation of supervised release and

aggregate 6

- month sentence imposed upon revocation to be followed by a total of

54 months of supervised release. Pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738

(1967), Kimura’s counsel had filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 18 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 17

- 10353

relief

, al ong with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided

Kimura the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental

brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Oh io , 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

We decline to address on direct appeal Kimura’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel

. See United States v. Rahman , 642 F.3d 1257, 1259

- 60 (9th

Cir. 2011).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 31.2



CERTIFICATIONS



I, Cynthia M. Butitta, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Telik, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



Date: November 8, 2004



| |  |                                                    
| |  | ---------------------------------------------------
| |  | /s/ CYNTHIA M. BUTITTA                             
| |  | Cynthia M. Butitta                                 
| |  | Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer
#### Robert GREGORY, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 22, 1965.

Robert Gregory, pro se.

Robert Matthews, Atty. Gen., George F. Rabe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

CULLEN, Commissioner.

Robert Gregory, in prison under a three-year sentence for knowingly receiving stolen property, filed motion in the trial court, under RCr 11.42, to vacate the sentence. The motion was overruled without a hearing and Gregory has appealed.

*945The motion alleged (1) a defective indictment; (2) insufficient evidence; (3) illegal search and seizure; (4) improper argument by the Commonwealth’s attorney; (5) erroneous instructions; (6) the trial was “rushed through;” and (7) his *paid*counsel was inadequate because counsel did not make objections to improper proceedings on the trial and would not take any steps for a new trial or an appeal.

Under King v. Commonwealth, Ky., 387 S.W.2d 582, the allegations were insufficient to warrant a hearing.

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32

                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                           18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,
                           AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with  the amended Quarterly Report of YFC 355 Corp.
(the "Company")  on  Form 10-QSB/A  for  the period ended March  31, 2003, as
filed  with  the  Securities  and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I,  Anthony N. DeMint,  President  and Chief Accounting Officer of
the  Company,  certify,  pursuant  to  18 U.S.C.  Section  1350,  as  adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in  all
          material   respects,  the  financial  condition  and   results   of
          operations of the Company.



			      /s/ Anthony DeMint
                              Anthony N. DeMint
                              President and Chief Accounting Officer
                              August 29, 2003