* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published. 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-30193

Conference Calendar

__________________

JOHN POULLARD,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

LONNIE EDMOND, Lieutenant, and 

DAVID BLANCHARD, Sergeant,

 Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 92-CV-270

- - - - - - - - - -

August 22, 1995

Before KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

IT IS ORDERED that John Poullard's motions for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and for preparation of the trial

transcript at government expense are DENIED, because his appeal

lacks arguable merit and is therefore frivolous. See Howard v.

King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal

is frivolous, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appeal is DISMISSED. 

See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. 
No. 95-30193

-2-

Poullard contends that the district court plainly erred by

submitting the second set of interrogatories to the jury and by

entering judgment for the appellees based on the finding that he

did not sustain a significant injury. The record does not show,

and Poullard does not assert, that he objected to this procedure

in the district court.

The procedure followed by the district court was in

accordance with this court's decisions relative to the qualifiedimmunity defense, in the context of a jury trial. A "bifurcated

analysis" is appropriate for determining the merits of such a

defense. Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 105, 108-09 (5th

Cir. 1993). First there must be a determination whether the

plaintiff proved "the violation of a clearly established

constitutional right." See id. at 105 (quoting Siegert v.

Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991)). This was determined by the

jury's answer to the first interrogatory. 

Consequently, it became appropriate for the jury to

determine whether "the [appellees'] conduct was objectively

reasonable, because [e]ven if an official's conduct violates a

constitutional right, he is entitled to qualified immunity if the

conduct was objectively reasonable." Rankin, id. (citations and

quotation marks omitted). "The objective reasonableness of an

official's conduct must be measured with reference to the law as

it existed at the time of the conduct in question." Mouille v.

City of Live Oak, 918 F.2d 548, 551 (5th Cir. 1990), quoted in

Rankin, 5 F.3d at 108. 
No. 95-30193

-3-

In December 1990, this court's standard for Eighth Amendment

excessive-force claims was as stated in Huguet v. Barnett, 900

F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1990). Under Huguet, the plaintiff had

to prove that he sustained "a significant injury," which resulted

from the use of clearly excessive and objectively unreasonable

force, "constitut[ing] an unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain." Id. 

In its answer to the first interrogatory, the jury found for

Poullard on all of these elements except the first. In its

answer to the second set of interrogatories, the jury found,

however, that he did not sustain "a significant injury." 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in entering judgment

for the defendant-appellees. Poullard's appeal is frivolous as a

matter of law. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d at 219-20.

IFP AND TRANSCRIPT DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.