REVISED July 1, 2019

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-40127

Summary Calendar

JOHN PRIESTER, JR.; BETTIE PRIESTER, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; JP MORGAN CHASE & COMPANY; 

LONG BEACH MORTGAGE COMPANY; ALAMO TITLE COMPANY; 

CRISTOBAL M. GALINDO, P.C.; GALINDO LAW & TITLE; GALINDO 

CRISTOBAL TITLE SERVICES; CRISTOBAL M. GALINDO; KRISTEN L. 

TINSLEY, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

Before JOLLY, COSTA, and HO, Circuit Judges.

GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:

Erie guesses are just that—guesses. Hopefully we get them right, but 

sometimes we get them wrong. When our prediction about what a state 

supreme court would do turns out to be wrong years after the federal litigation 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 26, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 18-40127

2

ends, can the losing litigant reopen the federal case? This appeal poses that 

question.

John and Bettie Priester were on the losing end of what turned out to be 

an incorrect Erie guess. Back in 2013, we affirmed the dismissal of the 

Priesters’ case, holding that a four-year statute of limitations barred their

attempt to avoid a home-equity lien under section 50(a)(6) of the Texas 

Constitution. Priester v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 708 F.3d 667, 671, 674 

(5th Cir. 2013). But three years later, the Supreme Court of Texas interpreted 

Texas law differently. Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 505 S.W.3d 542, 547 

(Tex. 2016) (“[N]o statute of limitations applies to an action to quiet title on an 

invalid home-equity lien.”). Wood “made plain that our ‘Erie guess’ in Priester 

was wrong.” Alexander v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 867 F.3d 593, 600 (5th Cir. 

2017).

More than a year after Wood, the Priesters filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion 

to vacate the final judgment dismissing their claims. They cited the 

clarification of Texas law as the justification. The district court denied the 

motion, a decision we review for abuse of discretion. Hall v. Louisiana, 884 

F.3d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 2018).

There was none. For one thing, we see no abuse of discretion in the 

district court’s reasoning that the Priesters unreasonably delayed by waiting

until fifteen months after Wood to try and vacate the judgment. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 60(c) (“A motion made under Rule 60(b) must be made within a 

reasonable time . . . .”).

We need not belabor the timeliness question, however, because the 

district court had another straightforward reason to deny the motion. Relief 

under Rule 60(b)(6)—the catch-all provision of 60(b), and the one in which the 

Priesters seek refuge—is appropriate only in “extraordinary circumstances.” 

U.S. ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 397 F.3d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 
No. 18-40127

3

2005). The “general rule” is that a change in decisional law “will not normally 

constitute an extraordinary circumstance, and cannot alone be grounds for 

relief from a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).” Batts v. Tow-Motor 

Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 748, 750 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting this general rule “has 

greater force in an Erie case”). That principle reflects that the interest in 

getting the law “right” must sometimes give way to an even stronger interest 

in finality. See Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981)

(emphasizing “the great desirability of preserving the principle of the finality 

of judgments”). Consider the implications if a “change in law” automatically 

allowed cases to be reopened. If that were the law, then anytime the Supreme 

Court resolved a circuit split courts that had taken the rejected position would 

have to restart long-resolved cases. See Garibaldi, 397 F.3d at 338.

That being said, we have recognized that there may be situations when

a change in decisional law combines with other factors to tip the “delicate 

balance between the sanctity of final judgments . . . and the incessant 

command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” 

Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970); see Batts, 

66 F.3d at 748 n.6. It is not apparent, however, that we have ever found such 

a situation. This is not one. Since the dismissal of the Priesters’ attempt to 

quiet title, the bank has obtained a foreclosure order. The Priesters are 

fighting it, and they are worried that the earlier federal judgment against them 

may pose a res judicata problem. But res judicata is the ordinary result of a 

final judgment, not an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief from one.

The Priesters also argue that our decision ordering Rule 59(e) relief 

based on Wood, see Alexander, 867 F.3d at 603-04, evinced a newfound 

openness to postjudgment relief following a change in law. But they confuse 

motions to alter a judgment under Rule 59(e) with motions to vacate a 

judgment under Rule 60(b). Rule 59(e) motions, which must be filed much 
No. 18-40127

4

closer in time to the entry of judgment (within 28 days), are not “controlled by 

the same exacting substantive requirements” as Rule 60(b) motions. Lavespere 

v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173–74 (5th Cir. 1990). 

Amending a judgment because of “an intervening change in controlling law” is 

well within the scope of Rule 59(e). Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 

177, 182 (5th Cir. 2012). Vacating a judgment for that reason is a much bigger 

thing and will not usually be a justified exercise of a court’s limited Rule 60(b) 

authority. 

* * *

The judgment is AFFIRMED.