The Honor able Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge f or the Southern District of * New Y ork, sitting by

desig nation. 09-3183-c v Flemingv. Maxm ara

USA, Inc.
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT SUM M AR

Y O RD ER
R U L I N G S B Y S U M M A R Y O R D E R D O N O T H A V E P R E C E D E N T I A L E F F E C T . C I T A T I O N T O A S UM M ARY ORDE R FI L E D ON OR AF T E R J ANUARY 1 , 2 0 0 7 , I S PE RM I T T E D AND I S GOVE RNE D BY FED ERA L RU LE O F AP PELLA TE PRO C EDU R E 32 . 1 A N D TH I S C O U R T’ S LO C A L RU LE 32 . 1. 1. W H EN C I TI N G A S U M M A R Y O R D ER I N A D O C U M ENT FI LED W I TH TH I S C O U R T , A P A R T Y M U ST C I TE E I T HE R T HE F E D E R A L A P P E N DI X OR A N E L E C T R ON I C D A T A B A S E ( W I T H T HE N OT A T I ON “ S UM M ARY ORDE R” ) . A PA RT Y CI T I NG A S UM M ARY O RDE R M US T S E RVE A COP Y OF I T ON ANY PA R TY N O T REPR ESENTED BY CO U N SEL. At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan Courthouse, 500 Pear l Street, in the City of Ne w York, on the 25 day th of Mar ch, two thousand ten. Pr e se nt: RAL PH K. WI NTER ROBERT A. K

ATZ MANN, Circuit Judges , J ED S . RAKO FF,

District Judge
. *

________________________________________________ YVONN E FL EMI

NG, Plaintif f-Appellant ,

v. No. 09-3183-c v MAXMARA USA, I

NC., LUI GI

CAROGGI O, J OHN GL EESON, De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lle es.

________________________________________________ F or Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt: D ENI S E K. B O N N A IG , Bonna ig & Associates, N ew Yor k, NY-2-

F or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts : H O LLI S G ONE R K A B AR T (C ha y a F . We inb e rg -B ro dt, Al y ssa N. Koer ner, on the brief

), Withers Be rg man, L L P, New York, NY Appea l from the United States District Court for the Easter

n District of Ne w York (Sifton, J. ). ON CO NSI DE RA TIO N W HEREOF , i ti s h e r e b y OR DE RE D , AD JU DG ED , and DE CREED that th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED
. Plaintiff-Appellant Yvonne Flemingappea ls from a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Ea stern District of N ew Yor k (Sifton, J. ) gra

nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt t o Def endants-A

ppellees a nd dismiss ing F leming’ s discrimination and reta liation claims. Fleming alleg ed that def

endants discr iminated ag ainst her on the ba sis of her r ace by terminatingher a

nd by cre atinga hostile work e nvironment, and re taliated by terminatingher f

or complainingthat defe ndants treated Amer ican e mploy ees diff ere ntly than Italian employ ees by terminatingher. We assume the par

ties’ familiarity

with the fac ts, procedur al history , and scope of the issues pr e se nte d o n a

pp e a l. Both F leming’ s discrimination and reta liation claims related to he r termination ar e analy zed using the bur den-shiftingpara digm a rticulated in McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Graham v. Long Island R.R. , 23 0 F .3 d 3 4, 38 (2 d Ci r. 20 00 ); Ree d v. A.W . Lawrence &Co. , 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 ( 2d Cir. 1996) (a pp lyingto r e ta liatio n c la ims )

. To establish a prima f

acie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a prote cted c lass; (2) she is qualifie d for the position; (3) she suf fer ed an a dverse employ

ment action; and ( 4) circ umstances surr ounding that action g ive rise to an inf ere nce of discrimination. Colli ns v. N.Y

. City Trans it Auth. , 3 05 F .3 d 1 13 , 1 18 (2 d Ci r. 20 02 ). To e sta bli sha pr ima fa c ie
case of Title VI Ireta liation, a plaintiff must show (1) par ticipation in a protec ted ac tivity known to the defe ndant, (2) a

n employ ment action disadva

ntag ing the plaintiff, and ( 3) a c ausal-3-

connec tion between the protec ted ac tivity and the a dverse employ

ment action. Id
. F le min g ’s dis c ri min ator

y te rm inatio n c la im f

a ils be c a us e sh e c ann ot s ho w the fo ur th
e le me nt o f h e r p ri ma

fa c ie c a se—th at th e c ir c ums tanc e s su rr ound inghe r t e rm inatio n g ive ri se to an infe renc e of discr imination. See Collins , 3 05 F .3 d at 11 8. Whil e a pla int if f m ay us ua lly satisfy this element by

showing that she wa s replac ed by someone not in her pr otected c lass, see Zimmermann v. Assocs. First C apital Corp. , 251 F.3d 376, 381 ( 2d Cir. 2001), Fle ming wa s
re pla c e d b y

ano the r b la c k f

e ma le , L isa

De rr ic k. F le min gargue s th at D e rr ic k w a s h ir e d to dis g uis e de fe nd ants ’ d isc ri min ator y a c t, b ut F le min gfa ils to p oint to any a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e to
su pp or t th is a sse rt ion . F ur

the r, wh ile F le min gpo int s to c a se s c on c lud ingthat w he re a pla int if f i s
re pla c e d w itha

me mbe r o f h e r p ro te c te d c la ss afte r the filing of a discr imination charg e mig ht sug g est a c over- up, see, e .g. , Howard v. Roadway Ex press, Inc. , 7 26 F .2 d 1 52 9, 15 34 -3 5 ( 11 th Cir . 1 98 4) ; Lee v. Cone cuh County Bd. of Educ. , 634 F.2d 959, 964 ( 5th Cir. 1981), here Der rick was hire d at the same time that Flemingwas fir ed, be fore F le min gtoo k a

ny le g a l a c tio n a g a ins t de fe nd ants
. F le min g ’s re ta liator

y te rm inatio n c la im f

a ils be c a us e , e ve n if

sh e c an s ho w a

pr ima fa c ie
case of re taliation, defe ndants have put forth a leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for he r termination, and F leming ha s not responded w ith facts suff icient to war

rant a rea sonable jury finding by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that “the leg itimate rea sons offer ed by the defe ndant[s] wer e not [their] true re asons, but wer e a pr etext for [retaliation] .” Richardson v. Comm’n on Human R ights & Opportunities , 532 F.3d 114, 125 n.11 ( 2d Cir. 2008)

. De fe nd ants state that F leming w as terminate d beca use they perc eived a

need to upgrade her position, and be c a us e of the ir pe rc e pti on

that F le min g ’s “ ina

pp ro pr iate , in se ns iti ve , o r o the rw ise disproportionate c onduct towar ds other employ ees ha d demonstrated . . . that she lacke d the judgme nt neede d for the r ole.” F leming c ontends that these r easons a re pr etextual because they-4-

are false—she disputes that her be havior wa s ever inappropriate and a sserts that by hiring Der rick de fenda

nts did not upgra de her

position. Fleming ’s ar g uments do not demonstrate that MaxMara’ s purported r eason f or terminatingher w as pre text ual. Her disag ree ment with defe ndants over whether her be havior was inappr opriate doe s not show that their stated re asons for te rminating her w ere not their true
rea sons. Fleming ’s email to Haddoc k alone supports de fenda nts’ asser tion that she behave d inappropriately

and unprof

essionally . There fore , even if the fa cts are in dispute about the inappropriateness of othe r incidents, she c annot demonstrate that defe ndants’ prof fer ed re asons for he r termination we re so unf ounded that a r easona

ble jury could conc lude that they “we re not the def endant[s’] true rea sons, but rather a prete x t.” Taitt

v. Chem. Bank

, 849 F.2d 775, 777 ( 2d Cir. 1988). Nor doe s her disagree ment with defe ndants’ asse rtion that they upg rade d her position by hiring Der

rick e stablish pretext. Derrick, unlike F leming, posse ssed a c olleg e degree , and, more importantly , “it is not the function of a f act- finder to se cond-guess business dec isions.” Dister v. Cont’l Group, Inc. , 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 ( 2d Cir. 1988); see also Tex. D ep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (“ The fa ct that a c ourt may think that the employ er
m i s j u d g e d th e qu a l i f

i c at i o n s o f

th e a p p l i c an t s d o e s n o ti ni t s e l f e x p o s e h i mt o T i t l e V II liability .”). O nly

wher e an e mploy er’ s business decision is so impl ausible as to ca ll into questi on its g e nu ine ne ss s ho uld

thi s Co ur t c on c lud e that a

re a so na ble tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld f

ind that it is prete x tual. See D ister , 859 F.2d at 1116. That is not the case here
. F ur the r, wh ile the te mpo ra l pr oximi ty be tw e e n th e me e tin gat w hic h F le min gc la ims to have c omplained of une qual treatment of Americ an and Italian employ ees a nd her te rmination may be suff icient to satisfy

the third eleme nt of her pr ima fac ie ca se, it is insufficient on its own to demonstrate that de fenda nts’ leg itimate, non-discriminatory explanation for her

termination was pre text ual. See Q uinn v. Gree n Tree Credit Corp. , 159 F.3d 759, 770 ( 2d Cir. 1998)-5-

(conc luding that plaintiff’ s fac ts were sufficie nt to warra nt a findingof pre text wher e ther e wa s other c ircumstantial evidenc e of pr etext in additi on to a strongtemporal c onnection). Fleming ’s hostile work envir onment claim fa ils because she ca nnot demonstrate that he r

“ wo rk pla c e [wa s] pe rm e ate d w ith‘d isc ri min ator y int imi datio n, ri dic ule , a

nd ins ult ’ t hat is ‘suffic iently

sever e or pe rvasive to a lter the c onditions of [ her] employ ment and cr eate an abusive wor

king e nvironment.’” See H arris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (i nte rn a l c itatio n o mitte d) . F le min ga lle g e s th at G le e so n ma de a ra c ia lly ha ra ssi ngc omm e nt t o her e arly in her tenur e at Max Mara and followe d it by

numerous incidents of unf air tre atment. “[W ]hether an e nvironment is ‘hostile or abusive’ can be deter mined only

by looking at all the circ umstances.” Id . at 23. “F or ra cist comments, slurs, and jokes to constitute a hostile work environment, ther e [ge nera lly ] m ust be more than a fewisolated incidents of ra cial enmity . . . .” Schwapp v. Town of Avon , 118 F.3d 106, 110 ( 2d Cir. 1997) (interna l citation and quotation
mark s o mitte d) . H ow e ve r, “ e ve n a sin g le e pis od e of

ha ra ssm e nt, if

se ve re e no ug h, c an e sta

bli sh a hostile work e nvironment.” Ri c ha rd so n v . N. Y

. S tate De p’ t of Cor r. Se rv s. , 180 F.3d 426, 437 (2d Cir. 1999), ab roga te d o n o the r g ro un ds by Bu rli ng ton N. S

an ta F e Ry . Co . v . W

hite , 5 48 U. S. 53 (2006). Her e, F leming puts for

th evidence of only

one incident that is plainly motivated by
ra c e —d e fe nd ant G le e so n’ s 2 00 1 c omm e nt. Vi e wi ngthe fa c ts i n th e light m os t f avo ra ble to F le min gand

dr awi nga ll i nf

e re nc e s in he r f avo r, wh ile thi s c omm e nt m ay be se e n a s se ve re , it

is isolated and, standingalone, is not the ty pe of “ intolerable a lteration” of her w orkingconditions that substantially

interfe res with her

ability to do her job. Mathirampuzha v. Potter , 548 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 2008). Instead, we have f ound a hostile work e nvironment only wher e such a
ra c ia lly -h ara ssi ngc omm e nt i s one of ma ny rac ially -motivated comments. See W hidbee v

. Garzarelli Food Specialities, Inc. , 223 F.3d 62, 70 ( 2d Cir. 2000) (conc luding that a simil ar-6-

rac ially hara ssing c omment sufficiently demonstrated a

hostile work environme nt where it was part of a “strea m of rac ially

offe nsive comments” includinga “ve ritable ba rra g e of r acia l epithets”). F leming doe s not alleg e any fac t to connect this comment to her othe r alleg ations of unfair tr eatment, whic h are not fac ially related to her r ace . Moreove r, her other a lleg ations are g e ne ra lly qu ite min or

—s he a lle g e s th at de fe nd ants wr on g ly e xclu de d h e r f

ro m me e tin g s, excessively

criticized her w ork, re fused to answ er w ork-r elated que stions, arbitrarily imposed dutie s o uts ide of

he r r e sp on sib ili tie s, thr e w b oo ks , a nd se nt r ud e e ma ils to h e r. Th e se inc ide nts do not support a findingof a hostile wor k environment that is per

vasive or se vere . Se e Ha rri s , 510 U.S. at 21. Th e fa c t th at F le min gc ann ot c onne c t th e se oth e r i nc ide nts of un fa ir tr e atme nt t o Gl e e so n’ s c omm e nt a lso do oms he r c la im und e r t he Ne w Y or

k Ci ty Human Ri g hts L aw. Whil e that law does not re quire the sa me seve rity

or per vasivene ss that fede ral lawrequire s, see W illiams v. N.Y

. City Housing Auth. , 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 31, 38 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2009) , it does contain a thr ee- y ear

statute of limitations, see N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-502(d). G leeson’s comment was ma de we ll outsi de of this statute of limitations, and Flemingdoes not provide evidenc e of a

ny rac ially -motivated ac ts within t he thre e-year statute of limitations. We have c onsidered the rema inder of F leming’ s arguments and conc lude that they lack
me ri t. A c c or din g ly , f

or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRMED. FOR THE COURT: CA TH ERI

NE O’ HA GA

N WO L F E, CL ERK