### REVISED July 1, 2019

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18

- 40127 Summary Calendar

JOHN PRIESTER, JR.; BETTIE PRIESTER,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants

v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; JP MORGAN CHASE & COMPANY; LONG BEACH MORTGAGE COMPANY; ALAMO TITLE COMPANY; CRISTOBAL M. GALINDO, P.C.; GALINDO LAW & TITLE; GALINDO CRISTOBAL TITLE SERVICES; CRISTOBAL M. GALINDO; KRISTEN L. TINSLEY,

Defendants

- Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

Before JOLLY, COSTA, and HO, Circuit Judges

. GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge : Erie guesses are just that

— guesse s. Hopefully we get them right, but
sometimes we get them wrong. When our prediction about what a state

su preme court would do turns out to be wrong years after the federal litigation United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED June 26 , 2019 Lyle W. Cayce ClerkNo. 18

- 40127

2 ends, can the losing litigant reopen the federal case? This appeal poses that question.
John and Bettie Priester were on the losing end of what turned out to be

a n incorrect Erie guess

. Back in 2013, w e affirmed the dismissal of the Priesters’ case, holding that a four

- year statute of limitations barred their attempt to avoid a home

- equity lien under section 50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution. Priester v. JP Morgan Chase Ban k, N.A. , 708 F.3d 667, 671, 674 (5th Cir. 2013). But t hree years later, the Supreme Court of Texas interpreted
Texas law differe ntly

. Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. , 505 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. 2016) (“[N]o statute of limitations applies to an action to quiet title on an
invalid home

- equity lien.”). Wood “made plain that our ‘ Erie guess’ in Priester was wrong.” Alexander v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 867 F.3d 593, 600 (5th Cir. 2017). More than a ye a r after Wood , the Priesters filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the final judgment dismissing their claims. They cited the clarification of Texas law as the justification. The district court denied the motion, a decision we review for abuse of discretion. Hall v. Louisiana , 884 F.3d 546, 549 (5th Ci r. 2018).
There was none . For one thing, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s reasoning that the Priesters unreasonably delayed by wait ing
until fifteen months after Wood to try and vacate the judgment

. See F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 60(c) (“A moti on made under Rule 60(b) must be made within a
reasonable time .

. . .”). We need not belabor the timeliness question, however, because the
district court had another straightforward reason to deny the motion

. Relief
under Rule 60(b)(6)

— the catch

- all prov ision of 60(b), and the one in which the
Priesters seek refuge

— is appropriate only in “extraordinary circumstances .” U.S. ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. , 397 F.3d 334 , 337 (5th Cir.No. 18

- 40127

3 2005). The “general rule” is that a change in decisional l aw “will not normally constitute an extraordinary circumstance, and cannot alone be grounds for relief from a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).” Batts v. Tow

- Motor Forklift Co. , 66 F.3d 743, 748, 750 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting this general rule “has greater force in an Erie case”). Th at principle reflects that the interest in getting the law “right” must sometimes give way to an even stronger interest in finality. See Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi , 635 F.2d 396, 402 ( 5th Cir. 1981) ( emphasizing “the great desirability of preserving the principle of the finality of judgments”). Consider the implications if a “change in law” automatically allowed cases to be reopened. If that were the law, then anytime the Supreme Cour t resolved a circuit split courts that had taken the rejected position would have to restart long

- resolved cases. See Garibaldi , 397 F.3d at 33 8

. That being said, we have recognized that there may be situation s when a change in decisional law combine s w ith other factors to tip the “delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments

. . . and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts. ” Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States , 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970) ; see Batts , 66 F.3d at 748 n.6

. It is not apparent , however, that we have ever found such
a situation. This is not one. Since the dismissal of the Priesters ’ attempt to quiet title, the bank has obtained a foreclosure order. The Priesters ar e fighting it, and they a re worried that the earlier federal judgment against them

may pose a res judicata problem . But res judicata is the ordinary result of a final judgment, not an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief from one.
The Priesters al so argue that our decision ordering Rule 59(e) relief
based on Wood , see Alexander , 867 F.3d at 603

- 04, evinced a newfound openness to postjudgment relief following a change in law. But they confuse
motions to alter a judgment under Rule 59(e) with motion s to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b). Rule 59(e) motions , which must be filed muchNo. 18

- 40127

4 closer in time to the entry of judgment ( within 28 days ), are not “controlled by the same exacting substantive requirements” as Rule 60(b) motions. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc. , 910 F.2d 167, 173

– 74 (5th Cir. 1990). Amending a judgment because of “an intervening change in controlling law” is well within the scope of Rule 59(e). Demahy v. Schwarz Pharm a, Inc. , 702 F.3d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 2012). Vacating a judgment for that reason is a much bigger thing and will not usually be a justified exercise of a court’s limited Rule 60(b) authority.

* * *
The judgment is AFFIRMED.