### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-14-00344- CV

Blain e Standif

ord, Appellan t

v. CitiMor tgage, Inc. and MERSCORP Holdi ngs, In c., Appellees

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 126 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 2-0 0370 9, H ONO RAB LE GISELA D. TRI ANA, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

I n this appea l conce rning the nonjudicial fore closure of residential proper ty pursuant
to a mo r tg a g e deed of trust, appellant Bla ine Standiford, the mortg ag or, challeng es the district court’ s final j udg ment g ranting the m otion fo r s u m m ary judgme nt of appellees C itiMortgag e, I nc. (CMI ) and MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. F or the following rea sons, we af firm.

BACK GR OUND
I n 1998, Standiford signe d a deed o f tr u s t a n d promissory note pay able to Amerig roup Mortg ag e Corporation a division of Mortg ag e I nvestors Corporation (Ameri group) to purcha se

re s i d en t i al proper

ty

. Amerig roup assig ned the note and deed of trust to Source One Mortg ag e Service s Corporation (Source One) , and Source One assig ned the benef icial interest i n 2 0 00 to Mortg ag e Electronic Reg istrations Sy stems, I nc. (MERS ), a wholly -owne d subsidiary ofMERSC ORP. MERS subsequently assig ned the note and deed of trust to CMI in May 2010. 1 Standiford there afte r beg an making pay ments to CMI

. I n J uly 2012, Standiford was in defa ult afte r failing to make require d pay ments under the note. After notify ing Standiford of its intent to acc eler ate, CMI decla red all sums due and owing , and provide d further

notice, date d J uly

11, 2012, to Standiford of the acc eler ation and for eclosure sale by substitut e trustee schedule d for Aug ust 7, 2012. The substitut e trustee sold the proper ty by fore closure sa le on that date.

Standiford sued ap p el lees asser ting multipl e claims, including void and illega l fore closure, violations of the Financ e Code, violations of section 12.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, violations of the Dec eptive Trade Practice s Act, an d s u i t t o q uiet title. See 2
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 12.002 (addr essing liability rela ted to use of fra udulent court rec ord

or lien or claim ag ainst proper ty ); Tex. Fin. Code §§ 392.301 (prohibiting threa ts or coer cion by debt collector s), .304 (prohibiting fra udulent, deceptive, and misleading repr esenta tions by debt collector s),

. 4 0 4 (a ) (“A violation of t his chapte r i s a deceptive trade practice under Subchapter E, Chapter 17, Business & Commerce Code, and is actionable under that subchapte r.”) ; United States Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. Johnson , No. 01-10-00837- CV, 2011 Tex. App. L EXI S 10253, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec

. 30, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (listing elements of quiet title c ause

“The MERS sy stem is ‘an elec tronic mortg ag e reg istration sy stem and clea ring house that 1 trac ks benef

icial owner ships in, and servicing rig hts to, mortg ag e loans.’” Bierwirth v. BAC Home Loans S er vi ci n g , L.P. , No. 03-11-00644- CV, 2012 Tex. App. L EXI S 7506, at *3 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug . 30, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ( citation omitted). Standiford also sued Vendor Resource Manag ement. I n its final judgme n t, the district court 2 g rante d Vendor ’s motion for traditional summary judgme nt. Standiford filed an a g ree d motion to dismiss Vendor

from this appea l, which we grante d. 2of action to require that plaintiff have interest in proper ty and title to proper

ty aff ecte d by defe ndant’s claim and that de fenda

nt’s claim, althoug h fac ially valid, be invalid or une nforc eable ). Appellee s moved for traditional summary judgme nt on Standiford’s claims ag ainst them on the following g rounds:

1. Standiford’s claims for a void and illega l fore closure, violations of the Texas Financ e C ode, viol ations of S ection 12.002 of t he Tex as C ivil Practice and Remedies Code, violations of the Texas Dec eptive Trade Practice s Act, and a suit to quiet title, all of which rest on the alleg ations that MERS[ CORP] did n o t have authority to assig n the loan to CMI and CMI did not h av e t h e authority to forec lose, fail as a

matter of la

w; 2. J uanita Strickland was proper ly appointed as a substitut e trustee and proper ly completed the f

orec losure sale ; 3. Chapter 51 does not require that a bo rr o we r b e gi ven 21 day s’ notice of a substitut e trustee appointment; 4. Standiford has no sta n d ing to complain about the alleg ed fra udulent assig nments; 5. Neither

MERS[ CORP] nor CMIfiled any fra udulent liens or cour

t rec ords; and 6. Standiford is not a consumer as def ined by the DTPA.
Appellee s’ evidenc e included aff idavits, discovery response s by Standiford, copies of the note and deed of trust, and cer

tified copies of (i) assig nments of the note and deed of trust from Amerig roup
to Source One, from Source One to MERS, and from MERS to CMI , (ii) specia l war ranty deed from the fore closure sale, (iii) notice of the trustee’ s sal e, (i v ) appoint ment of substitut e trustee, and (v) n o t i ce of acc eler ation and the schedule d fore closure sale that was sent cer tified mail to Standiford. I n his discovery response s, Standiford admitted that he defa ulted on the loan by failing

3to pay in acc ordanc e with the loan’s terms and that he rec eived notice of CMI ’s acc eler ation and the

schedule d fore closure sa le.

Standiford filed a response and a competing motion for partial summary judgme nt, challeng ing the fore closure and MERS’s authority to assig n any interest in his loan and contending that cer tain rec orded documents violated section 12.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 3 Standiford’s evidenc e included copies of the challeng ed documents, an aff idavit by his attorney , and
two exhibi ts that the district court struck based on appellee s’ objections and motion to strike. CMI 4 responde d to Standifor d’s motion and filed additional evidenc e including a supplemental aff idavit by a CMIemploy ee w ho testified that CMI was the holde r of the note

.

I n its fina l judg ment, in a ddition to g ranting appellee s’ motion to strike, the district
court g rante d appellee s’ motion for summary judgme nt and denied Standiford’s motion without specify ing the rea sons for its ruling s. Standiford filed a moti o n fo r n ew trial and a motion for j u d gm en t nunc pro tunc, or in the alternative, motion to modify judgme nt. The motions wer e

overr uled by operation of law, and this appe al followed.

The rec orded documents that Standiford contended violated section 12.002 wer e the 3 appointment of substitut e t rust ee, assig nments of the note and deed of trust, notices of substitut e trustee’ s sale, and substitute trustee’ s deed. The district court s t ru ck: (i) a document titled “Remar ks of R.K. Arnold President and 4 CEO of MER SCORP , I nc. B efor e the Senate Commit tee on B anking , Housing and Ur ban Affairs November 16, 2010,” and (ii) a letter d at ed Fe b ruar y 5, 2013, to the members of the Wil liamson County Commi ssioners Court from B ill Bec kman, the President a nd CEO of MERS. 4STANDARD OF REVIEW W e re v i ew a trial court’s decision to g rant summ ary judgme nt de novo. Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Joachim , 315 S. W

. 3 d 8 6 0 , 862 (Tex. 2010). To preva il on a traditional summary judgme nt motion, the movant must demonstrate that there are no g enuine issues of materia l fac t and that it is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c ); Provident Life & Acc ident
Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215–16 (Te x . 2 0 0 3 ). Once the movant produce s evidenc e entitling it to summary judgme nt, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prese nt evidenc e that raises

a fac t issue. See Phan Son Van v. Pena , 990 S.W .2d 751, 7 5 3 (T ex . 1999). When the trial court does not specify the g rounds for g ranting the motion, as is the case here , we m u s t uphold the judgme nt if any of the g rounds asser ted in the motion and prese rved for ap p el l ate revie w are meritorious. Knott , 128 S.W .3d at 216.

DISCUSSIO N

I n five issues, Standiford challeng es the district court’s summary judgme nt in favor of appellee s. He alleg es that the dis t ri ct co u rt er red beca use: (i) there exis t g enuine issues of 5 materia l fac t as to whether MERSC ORP possessed authority to assig n Standiford’s loan t o CMI ; (ii) the substitut e trustee did not have authority to act under the deed of trust and, there fore , did not have authority to conduct the fore closure sale, (iii) Standiford had standi n g to challeng e the assig nment of the deed of trust, (iv) there exis t g enuine issues o f materia l fac t as to whether

Standiford also raised a six th issue as to his claims ag ainst Vendor

. As previously stated, 5 we g rante d Standiford’s ag ree d motion to dismiss his appea l to the extent that it was broug ht ag ainst Vendor . Thus, we do not addr ess Standiford’s sixt h issue. 5documents rec orded by appellee s violated section 12.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

Code, and (v) Standiford is a “c onsumer” a s defined in the D TPA.
Standiford’s Standi ng to Chall enge the Assignment from MERS to CMI

We beg in with Standiford’s third issue beca use it addre sses the distric t c o u r t’ s s u b je ct matter jurisdi ction to consider his cl aims that are premised on MERSC ORP’s lack of authority to

as s i gn t h e deed of trust to CMI

. See Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson , 460 S.W .3d 145, 149 (Tex

. 6 2015) (noting that standing is component of subject matter jurisdiction); Rusk State Hosp. v. Black , 392 S.W .3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012) (noting that opinion of court without jurisdiction is advisory to extent it addre sses issues other than jurisdictional issue beca use “Te x as Constit ution does not aff ord courts jurisdiction to make advisory decisions or issue advisory opinions”); Hec kman v. W illiamson Cnty. , 369 S.W .3d 137, 150–51 (Tex. 2012) (noting that, if plaintiff lacks standing to asser t claim, “the
court lacks jurisdiction ove r that claim and must dismiss i t”). In his third issue, Standiford arg ues that he has standing “to challeng e an alleg edly void or invalid assig nment of a deed of trust that aff ects the c hain of title of prope rty as t o which Standiford c laims a superior ow nership intere st.”

As stated above, one of the g rounds raised by appellee s in their motion for summary judgme nt was that Standiford’s claims that wer e premised on MERS’s lack of authority to assig n the

I n their briefing , appellee s argue that Standiford has no basis for any claims ag ainst 6 MERSC ORP beca

use MERS, and not MERSC ORP, was the assig nor and assig nee of Standiford’s mortg ag e. Appellee s, howeve r, did not raise this g round in their motion for summary judgme nt. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c) (re quiring motion to “state the specific g rounds there for” ); G &H Towing Co. v. Magee , 347 S.W .3d 2 9 3 , 297 (Tex. 2011) (noting t hat s ummary judgme nts g ener ally “may only be g rante d upon g rounds expressly asser ted in the summary judgme nt motion”). Thus, we do not consider it on appe al. 6deed of trust to CMI an d CMI ’s lack of authority to fore close failed as a matter of law beca use Standiford did not have standing to bring these c laims. Appellees r elied on the g ener al rule that a borrowe r lacks standing to challeng e an assig nment when the borrowe r is not a party to the assig nment and ar g ued that the e x ceptions to the gene ral rule did not apply to Standiford’s cla ims that wer e b ased on fra udulent assig nments. See Kramer v. Fede ral Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n , No. A-12-CA- 276-SS, 2 012 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 105878, at *11–13 (W.D. Tex. May 15, 2012) (desc ribing g ener al rule under Texas law that obligor does not have standing to challeng e assig nment of debt when obligor is not party to assig nment and primary exception to g ener al rule “whe re an assig nee of a claim sues the obligor for perf ormanc e” and, u n d er t h at circ umstance, obligor
may d ef en d claim on g round which rende rs assig nment void, but not on g round which would rende r assig nment voidable only (citing Tri-Ci ties Constr., Inc. v. Ame rican Nat’l Ins. Co. , 523 S.W .2d 426, 430 (Tex. Civ. App.—Ho u ston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ))) ; see also Reinagel
v. De utsche Bank

Nat’l Tr ust Co. , 735 F.3d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 2013) (“‘[Tex as] law is settled that the obligor s of a claim

. . . may not defe nd [aga inst an assig nee’ s eff ort to enfor ce the obligation] on any g round which r ender s the assig nment voidable only .’” ( citation omitted)). 7

Under th ese rules, a mortg ag or who is not a party to a deed- of-trust assig nment
must alleg e a g round that would rende r the assig nment void to have standi n g to the challeng e the as s i g nment. See Mele ndez v. Citi mortgage, Inc. , No. 03-14-0029- CV,

“F eder al authority is persua sive here beca use a g reat amount of home-mortg ag e litigation 7 in T exas is tried in its fede ral courts, apply ing Texas f orec losure law.” Bierwirth , 2012 Tex. App. L EXI S 7506, at *3 n.3 (citing Robeson v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys. , No. 02-10-00227- CV, 2012 Tex. App. L EXI S 137, at *12 n.4 (T ex . App.—For t Worth J an. 5, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.))

. 72015 Tex. App. L EXI S 10260, at *15–17 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 2, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(re ly ing upon case s in which non-par ty mortg ag or did not have standing to challeng e assig nment of mortg age beca

use g rounds raised would have rende red assig nment only voidable, not void, and noting that alleg ing g round that woul d re n d er assig nment void is “only circ umstance in which mortg ag ors who are not a party to a deed- o f- t rust assig nment have standing to challeng e that assig nment”).

Standiford’s challeng e to MERS’s assig nment to CM I and CMI ’s status as the mortg ag ee is based on his theory that, beca use MERS is not expressly listed in the deed of trust, Standifo rd did not ag ree to allow MERS to act as “nominee” or “ag ent” for any entity and, thus, MERS was not authorized to assig n his loan t o CMI and C MI did not have a uthority to fore close. This theory , howeve r, t hat i s premised on MERS’s lack of autho ri t y , even if true, would not have made the assig nment from MER S to CMI void, only voidable. See Reinagel , 735 F.3d at 225–26 (noting that “alleg ed lac k of authority , even acc epted as true” did not furnish debtors w ith basis to challeng e assi gn m en t s); see also Nobles v. Marcus , 533 S.W .2d 923, 926 (Tex. 1976) (“D eeds
procur ed by fra

ud are voidable only , not void, at the elec tion of the g rantor.” ). Standiford also was not a par ty to the assig nments of the dee d of trust in the cha in from Amer igr oup to CMI

. Thus, beca

use Standiford’s alleg ations as to MERS’s lack of authority , even if true, would only rende r the deed- of-trust assig nment from MERS to CMI voidable, not void, he does not have standing to challeng e the assig nment as a non-par ty , and his claims depende nt on this challeng e fail as a matt er o f law. See Mele ndez , 2015 Tex. App. L EXI S 10260, at *15–17 n.3; see also
Hec kman , 369 S.W .3d at 150–51 (noti ng that when plaintiff lacks standing to asser t claims, court

8lacks j u ri s d i ct i on and must dismiss claims). We conclude that appellee s’ g round raised in their

summary j u d gment motion that was based on Standiford’s lack of standing to challeng e the assig nment of the deed of trust to CMI and CMI ’s authority to fore close was meritorious and, thus,

we must uphold the summary judgme nt in fav o r o f ap p el l ees as to this g round. See Knott , 128 S.W .3d at 216. On this basis, we overr ule Standiford’s third issue. Fur ther, beca use we have conclude d that Standiford did not have standing to challeng e t h e assi g nments, we do not addre ss Standiford’s first issue that substantively addre sses MERS’s authority to assig n the deed of trust to CMI

. See id. 8

Substitut e Trustee’s Authority to Act Unde r Dee d of Trust

I n his second issue, Standiford argues th a t the substitut e trustee J uanita Strickland did
not have authority to act under the deed of trust beca use “[o] n l y t h e orig inal trustee named in the deed of trust, or someone appointed by the L ender , can act as trustee and conduct a fore closure sale” and Strickland was neither of these. Standiford also arg ues that Strickland was never appointed “by
any entity with the authority to do so” and that the county proper ty rec ords do not ha

ve a rec ord of a lawf ul appointment as requir ed under section 192.007 of the L ocal Gover nment Code. See Tex.
L oc. Gov’t Code § 192.007 (addr essing rec ord i n g o f releases and other actions that rela te to

As support for his position that he has standing , Standiford cites Vazquez v. Deutsche Bank 8 National Trust Company , 441 S.W .3d 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2 014, no pet.). We, howeve r, do not find the analy sis in that case inconsistent with our conclusion here

. I n that case , the court reve rsed a summary judgme nt that was advanc ed on the fac e of the plaintiff’s petition beca use her petition included alleg ations, that if true, would have rende red the challeng ed as s i gnment void—“that the assig nment is void beca use the signature it bear s is forg ed.” Id. at 787. “A forg ed deed is void.” Id. at 787–88 (citation omitted). I n contra st, Stan d i ford’s alleg ations addre ss an assig nor’s lac k of authority

. 9instrument filed with office of county cler k). He further argues that he should have rec eived notice of the substitut e trustee’ s appointment twenty -one day s prior to the fore closure sale and that he did not. Ba sed on these a

rg uments, Strickland arg

ues that the for eclosure sale wa s void. This issue addre sses two of the g rounds that app el l ee s raised in their summary judgme nt motion. I n their summary judgme nt motion, appellee s argu ed that “Juanita Strickland

was proper ly appointed as a substitut e trustee and proper ly compl eted the fore closure sale” and that “Chapter 51 does not require that a borrowe r be g iven 21 day s’ not i ce of a substitut e
trustee a ppointment.” Su p porting their position that Strickland was proper ly ap p o in te d , a p p e ll e e s ’ s u

mm a r y judgme nt evidenc e included a copy of the note and deed of trust and cer tified copies of the chain of assig nments from AmeriGr oup to CMI and Strickland’s appointme n t. T h is e v id e n c e established that CMI was the mortg ag ee afte r May 2010, C M I ap p ointed Strickland as substitut e trustee on J une 6, 2012, the notice of the fore closure s al e was filed in the county proper ty rec ords on J uly 16, 2012, and the notice was sent cer tified mail to Standiford conce rning the acc eler ation of the note and the sc heduled f

orec losure sale . The de ed of trust e x pressly provides:

25. Substi tute Trustee

. L ender , at its option, and with or without cause , may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint, by power of attorney or otherwise, a s ucce ssor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunde r. W ithout convey ance of the Property , the succe ssor trustee shall succe ed to all the title, power and duties conf

err ed upon Truste e her ein and by applicable law.

The deed of trust also provides: “The covena nts and agr eeme nts of t his Security Instrument shall bind and benef

it the succe ssors and assig ns of L ender and Bor rowe r.” This evidenc e est ablished

10Strickland’s authority , as the substitut e trustee, to fore close on the proper ty , and Standiford did not ref ute this evidenc e. See Phan Son Van , 990 S.W .2d at 753; see also Tex. Prop. Code §§ 51.0001(7) ( d e f in in g s u b s ti tute trustee as “per son appointed by the curr ent mortg ag ee or mortg ag e service r und e r the terms of the secur ity instrument to exercise the p ower of sale” ), 51.002 (deta iling sale of rea l
proper ty under contra ct lien). Fur ther, section 192.007 of the L ocal Gover nment Code “is a proce dural direc tive to county cler ks about how t o re co rd subsequent documents” and does not impose a d u t y t o re cord. Harris Cnty. Tex. v. MERSCORP Inc. , 791 F.3d 545, 555–56 (5th Cir. 2015). And the twe nty -one da y s’ notice requireme nt in chapte r 51 of t he Proper ty Code conc erns the notice of the fore closure sal e, n o t n o tice of the appointment of a substitut e trustee. See Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(b).

We conclude that appellee s’ g rounds raised in their summary judgme nt motion wer e meritorious conce rning Standiford’s claim s based on the substitut e trustee and, thus, we must uphold the summary judgme nt in favor of appellee s as to those g rounds. See Knott , 128 S.W .3d at 216. We

overr ule Standiford’s se cond issue.
Violations of

Section 12.002 of the Property Code
I n his fourth issue, Standiford argues that there exis t g enuine issues of materia l fac t
as t o whether cer

tain documents recorde d by appellee s viola t ed s ec t ion 12.002 of t he Tex as C ivil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. C o d e § 12.002. This issue addre sses appellees’ g round in their summary judgme nt that “[n] either MERS[ CORP] nor CMI filed any fra udulent liens or cour

t rec ords.”

11I n order to establish a violation of section 12.002, a plaintiff must e stablish that the

d efendant (1) made, prese nted, or used a document or other rec ord with knowledg e th at i t wa s a fra udulent court rec ord or lien or claim ag ainst propert y , (2) intended that the document be g iven leg al eff ect, and (3) intended to cause the plaintiff injury

. See id. ; Gray v. Entis Mec h. Servs., LLC , 343 S.W .3d 527, 530 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2011, no pet.). “Court rec ord” has the same meaning as assig ned in section 37.01 of the Penal Code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 12.001(1);

see Tex. Penal Code § 37.01(1) (“‘ Court rec ord’ means a decr ee, judgme n t, order , subpoena,

war rant, minutes, or other document issued by a court.” ). “‘L ien’ means a claim in proper ty for the
pay ment of a de bt and includes a secur ity interest.” T ex. C iv. Prac. & Rem. Code § 12.001(3). To su pport his claim that appellee s violated section 12.002, Standiford cites the

rec orded appointment of subs titute trustee dated April 1, 200 4 , t h e assi g nment of m ortg ag e dated
M ay 4 , 2010 (fr om MERS to CMI ), notices of substitut e trustee’ s sale dated J une 14, 2 0 1 0 an d Aug ust 16, 2010, notice of trustee’ s sale dated J uly 1 6 , 2 0 1 2 , and the substitut e trustee’ s deed eff ective August 7, 2012. Even if we wer e to assume that these documents fall within the definition of a “cour t rec ord” or “lien” as those terms are define d in section 12.001, CMI ’s summary judgme nt evidenc e, including aff

idavits as to the fore closure sale, establish that these docume n t s were not fra udulent, and Standiford did not re fute this evidenc e. See P han Son Van , 990 S.W .2d at 753. We conclude that appellee s’ ground raised i n their summary judgme nt motion was meritorious conce rning Standiford’s claims that appell ee s violated section 12.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and, thus, we must uphold the summary judgme nt in favor of appellee s as to that g round. See Knott , 128 S.W .3d at 216. We overr ule Standiford’s f

ourth issue.

12Violations of DTPA
I n his fifth issue, Standiford argues that he is a “consume r” as define d in the DTPA “bec ause Standiford soug ht and acquir ed, by purcha se, the rea l pr operty made the basis of this suit and soug ht financ ing as a means to purcha se the proper ty .” See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.45(4) (def ining “consume r” to include an “individual

. . . who seeks or acquir es by purcha se or lease , any g oods o r s er v i ce s ”); see also id. § 17.45(1) (def ining “g oods” to mean “tang ible chattels or rea l
proper ty purcha sed or lease d for use”) , (2) (defi n i n g “ser vices” to mean “wor

k, labor, or service purcha sed or lease d for use, including service s furnished i n co n n ec t i on with the sale or repa ir of
g oods”). This issue challeng es appellee s’ alternative g round in their summary judgme nt motion that Standiford’s DTPA c laim failed a s a matter of law bec ause he was not a c onsumer. I n their m oti o n fo r summary judgme nt, appellee s asser ted t hat S tandiford’ s DTPA claim failed as a matter of law beca use it was based on the fac tual alleg ations conce rning MERS’s lack of authority to assig n the loan to CMI and CMI ’s lack of authority to fore close. I n his pleading , Standiford desc ribes appe llees’ a lleg ed DTPA violation as follows:

Pursuant to Tex. Financ e Code §§ 392.301 and 392.304 [si c] pursuant to §392.404, Plaintiff say s he is e ntitled to bring a Texas Dec eptive Trade Practice s Act (DTPA) claim ag ainst Def

endants. Plaintiff is a consumer- based u p o n h i s p urcha se of his home as set f

orth in para g raph N umber 9, a bove.

S ee T ex . Fin. Code § 392.404 (making violation under chapte r 392 of Financ e Code also DT P A violation). As pleade d, Standiford’s DTPA claim stems from his claims based on appellee s’ alleg ed Financ e Code violations.

13Turning to Standiford’s alleg ations conce rning the Financ e Code, Standiford alleg ed

that appellees violated section 392.301 of the Financ e Code “by threa tening to take an action prohibited by law in attempts to collect a debt” and section 392.304 “by misrepre senting the status of the de bt in a judicial or g overnme ntal proce eding .” See id

. §§ 392.301, .304. These c laims are based on his fac tual asser tions concern i n g MERS’s lack of authority to assig n the deed of t rust to CMI and CMI ’s lack of authority to fore close. Thus, for the same rea sons that w e have conclude d that the district c ourt did not err in g ranting summary judgme nt a s to Standiford’s claims based on these fac tual alleg ations, we conclude that the district court did not err in g ranting su m m ary judgme nt as to Standiford’s DTPA claim on t h i s b as i s . See Knott , 128 S.W .3d at 216 (re quiring
summary judgme nt motion to be upheld if g rounds raised are meritorious). We there fore do not need
to rea ch whether appellees ’ gro u n d t hat Standiford was not a “consume r” under the DTPA was meritorious. See id. ; see also Tex. R. App. P . 47.1, 47.4. We overrule Standiford’s fifth issue.

CONCLUSION Be cause appellee s asser

ted a meritorious g round in their motion for summary judgme nt as to eac h of Standiford’s claims, we must uphold the district court’s ruling in their favor

. See Knott , 128 S.W .3d at 216. Thus, we a ffirm the district c ourt’s judg ment.

14____________________________________ Melissa Goodwin, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Goodwin a nd Bour land Affir med Filed: Nove mber 3, 2015

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