alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Drexel
Burnham Lambert Real Estate Associates II 1996 Year-End 10-KSB and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to such 10-KSB filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000725646
<NAME> DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATES II
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         674,942
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   50,210
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                      11,633,065
<DEPRECIATION>                               7,063,237
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,263,693
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                      4,719,671
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     238,966
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,263,693
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,824,269
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,913,307
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             380,049
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (89,038)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.36)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### James Herbert FULTZ, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 4, 1966.

*882James Herbert Fultz, pro se.

Robert Matthews, Atty. Gen., John B. Browning, Asst, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

MILLIKEN, Judge.

From a conviction of armed robbery, defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court erred in refusing to appoint other counsel to represent him after he had requested dismissal of the lawyer originally appointed. He was permitted to appeal forma pauperis and a transcript of the record and testimony was supplied.

On July 7, 1964, the appellant, James Herbert Fultz, forcibly took a pistol from Carl Johnson, a police officer, while detaining him with a sawed-off shotgun. The appellant admitted he took the gun, but said he was in fear of his life because the officer with Johnson, Ed Hall, had beaten him on a previous occasion while arresting him. The appellant had the officer’s pistol the next day when arrested.

The appellant contends that he was denied the right to counsel because the court refused to appoint another attorney after the appellant had requested dismissal' of his originally appointed counsel. The appellant, moved to permit him to discharge his attorney, and further moved the court to appoint another attorney for him, the alleged reasons being that his attorney was not “properly or helpfully representing his case.” The court advised the appellant that in the estimation of the court the appointed counsel was “able and capable,” and that the court would not appoint other counsel, but that the appellant could represent himself if he so elected, which he did.

When counsel has been appointed by the court, the defendant is not entitled to dismiss counsel and have a substitute appointed except for adequate reasons or a clear abuse by counsel. Brown v. United States, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 264 F.2d 363 (1959); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Fay, 2 Cir., 348 F.2d 705 (1965). Of course, the right to counsel can be waived as the appellant chose to do in this case. Davenport v. Commonwealth, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 662 (1965). In the case of Tanner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 694 (1964), it was held that a defendant convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment effectively waived his right to counsel where the court had appointed counsel to represent him, but the defendant elected to represent himself after being informed that he could not have the lawyer he wanted.

RCr 9.04 provides that if the Commonwealth consents to the reading to the jury of affidavits setting forth the testimony of absent witnesses, the trial shall not be postponed on account of their absence. The appellant contends that he was denied *883the evidence of two physicians who would have testified that they treated him after police beatings. The affidavits of the missing witnesses were read to the jury and the trial court instructed the jury to treat the affidavits as the testimony of those witnesses. The jurors returned a verdict of guilty ten minutes after the case was submitted to them, and the trial judge polled the jury to make sure that the verdict was unanimous.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### STATE of Texas, Petitioner, v. Don W. WAIR et al., Respondents.

No. A-8679.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Dec. 13, 1961.

Fisher, McLaughlin & Harrison, Paris, for petitioner.

Moore & Lipscomb, Paris, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The State brought this condemnation suit for a right-of-way east of Paris, Texas. The only question tried was the amount of damages. The landowner sought a new trial on the ground of jury misconduct. He alleged that the jury used a quotient verdict. The court, after hearing testimony from 4 of the 6 jurors, overruled the motion, thus finding that misconduct did not occur. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed on the grounds that it appeared beyond question and as a matter of law that misconduct *did*occur; and in the alternative, if there was some evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding of “no misconduct,” then it held that the finding was against the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence. 349 S.W.2d 637. The question is whether this finding of the trial judge should be tested by (1) the great weight and preponderance of the evidence or by (2) abuse of discretion.

The trial court’s refusal to grant a new trial upon an express or implied finding of no occurrence of jury misconduct is ordinarily binding on the reviewing courts and will be reversed only where a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 169 S.W.2d 462 (1943); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hearks, 144 Tex. 317, 190 S.W.2d 62 (1945); Saladiner v. Polanco, Tex.Civ. App., 160 S.W.2d 531 (1942, error refused) ; Thompson v. Railway Express Agency, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W.2d 134 (1947, n. r. e.) ; Martin v. Shell, Tex.Civ. App., 262 S.W.2d 564 (1953, no writ); Morgan v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 343 S.W.2d 738 (1961, ref., n. r. e.). The occurrence of jury misconduct is not properly reviewed by the great weight and preponderance test which was applied by the *879•Court of Civil Appeals. We hold that the occurrence of jury misconduct was conclusively proved as a matter of law and that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in not granting a new trial. Probable injury of a jury’s misconduct, once misconduct has been found to have occurred, is a question of law for the trial •court and reviewing courts to determine from a review of the entire record, and from such a review we conclude that the respondents probably were injured from the quotient verdict. City of Houston v. Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259 (1944).

The application for writ of error is therefore refused, no reversible error.
#### Edward S. COATES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 29366.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 11, 1957.

Lawrence Arnim, Houston, for appellant.

Dan Walton, Dist. Atty., Thomas D. White, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The appellant was convicted in the Corporation Court of the City of Houston for the offense of speeding, appealed such conviction to the County Court at Law No. 2 of Harris County, where he was again convicted and assessed a fine of $60, from which judgment he gave notice of appeal-to this Court.

Article 53, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., reads as follows:

> “The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of the State in all criminal cases. This article shall not be so construed as to embrace any case which has been appealed from any inferior court to the county court or county court at law, in which the fine imposed by the county court or county court at law shall not exceed one hundred dollars.”

The appeal is dismissed.
#### Guy B. GOODWIN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 30156.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 21, 1959.

Bailey &.Blum, by Ben Blum, Houston, Arthur Mitchell, Austin, for appellant.

Wallace T. Barber, Dist. Atty., San Marcos, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

This is a conviction under Art. 567b Vernon’s Ann.P.C. based upon the giving of a check for $112.50 without sufficient funds, the punishment being three years in the penitentiary and a fine of $1,000.

The indictment alleged that by delivering said check and by the use of false pretenses, appellant secured from Mrs. Bessie Brown fifteen shares of stock of the North Carolina Natural Gas Corporation, and further alleged that appellant represented to *853Mrs. Bessie Brown that the check was good, which representation was false, and that Mrs. Brown relied upon and was deceived by the representation of appellant that the check was good.

It is clear from the court’s charge that the jury was not required to find and from the statement of facts that they could not have found that appellant made any representations that the check was good or that Mrs. Brown relied upon any oral representation made by appellant to her. Appellant simply gave Mrs. Brown a check and stands convicted for violation of Art. 567b V.A.P.C. upon the jury’s finding that he gave the check with intent to defraud and thereby acquired a stock certificate for fifteen shares of stock in a corporation, knowing that he did not have sufficient funds in the bank to pay said check.

Wherever descriptive averments are made in an indictment,' whether necessary or not, the proof must' meet them as well as all necessary allegations, by corresponding evidence. Kahanek v. State, 83 Tex.Cr.R. 19, 201 S.W. 994; Malone, v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 169, 117 S.W.2d 779.

In swindling cases the false pretense must be proved as alleged. If a different pretense from that alleged was the means by which the property was acquired there is a variance. King v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 98, 253 S.W.2d 434; Branch’s Ann. P.C., 2d Ed., Sec. 2827.

The State availed itself of the prima facie evidence of the intent to defraud provision of Art. '567b V.A.P.C. arising from the non-payment of the check within ten days. Appellant paid Mrs. Brown the amount of the check, but not until 'after ten days following notice that it had not been paid by the bank, and after complaint had been filed.

The indictment having alleged that an oral false representation by appellant was made and relied upon, the State was required to prove such descriptive averment in order to convict.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
2 Attachments 

Colleen, 

 

Per your request, please find attached a table that contains a breakdown of the cost of Selective Non-Catalytic 

Reduction (SNCR) for Navajo Generating Station. As can be seen in the table, the cost estimate for SNCR was 

based on a combination of information that SRP obtained from Fuel Tech, the vendor of this technology, and 

information that SRP’s Engineering Department developed. I have also attached a letter from Fuel Tech that 

supports the estimates contained in the table. 

 

If you have any questions, please feel free to call me. 

 

Thanks, 

Grant 

SNCR Cost Breakdown 

Smedley Grant M 

to: 

Colleen McKaughan 

03/16/2012 09:23 AM 

Cc: 

Anita Lee, Eugene Chen, Barr Kelly J, Scott Bohning, Deborah Jordan 

Hide Details 

From: Smedley Grant M <Grant.Smedley@srpnet.com> Sort List... 

To: Colleen McKaughan/R9/USEPA/US@EPA 

Cc: Anita Lee/R9/USEPA/US@EPA, Eugene Chen/R9/USEPA/US@EPA, Barr Kelly J 

<Kelly.Barr@srpnet.com>, Scott Bohning/R9/USEPA/US@EPA, Deborah 

Jordan/R9/USEPA/US@EPA 

History: This message has been forwarded. 

SNCR Cost Estimate.pdf Fuel Tech SNCR Cost Estimates for NGS.pdf

Page 1 of 2

file://C:\Documents and Settings\ALEE07\Local Settings\Temp\notesBAAA25\~web9498.h... 4/3/2012
 

--------------------------------------------------------- 

Grant Smedley 

Manager, Environmental Policy & Innovation 

Salt River Project 

Tel: (602) 236-2928 

Fax: (602) 236-6690 

grant.smedley@srpnet.com 

--------------------------------------------------------- 

 

Page 2 of 2

file://C:\Documents and Settings\ALEE07\Local Settings\Temp\notesBAAA25\~web9498.h... 4/3/2012
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

                  In connection with the Annual Report of Presidential
Associates I Limited Partnership (the "Partnership"), on Form 10-KSB for the
annual period ended December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, in the capacities
and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Partnership.

Date: April 7, 2003                               /s/ Michael L. Ashner
                                                  --------------------------
                                                  Michael L. Ashner
                                                  Chief Executive Officer


Date: April 7, 2003                               /s/ Thomas Staples
                                                  --------------------------
                                                  Thomas Staples
                                                  Chief Financial Officer
#### CITY TAXI SERVICE, Inc., v. John GIPSON, an Infant, etc., et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 24, 1956.

Rehearing Denied May 11, 1956.

Mayer, Cooper & Kiel, Ben T. Cooper, Louisville, for appellant.

Benjamin Mazin, Edwin A. Rausch, Louisville, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This is a motion for an appeal from a judgment for $750 in favor of the ap-pellee, John Gipson, against James Beasley and the appellant, City Taxi Service. It is a companion case to that of City Taxi Service, Inc. v. Gipson, Ky., 289 S.W.2d 723. The same issues are presented in both cases, and our opinion in the companion case, affirming the judgment, sets forth the reasons for our action in overruling this motion for an appeal.

The motion for an appeal is overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.
| (1) | The      quarterly report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or      15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;  and |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The      information contained in the quarterly report fairly presents, in all      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      the Company. |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| By:    | /s/      Daniel N. Ford      |   | Dated      this 6th day of August 2009 |
|--------|------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   | Daniel N. Ford               |   |                                   |
|   | Chief      Financial Officer |   |                                   |

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

DEBBIE HUGHEY,

Petitioner

v.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL 

BOARD (ANDORRA WOODS 

HEALTHCARE CENTER, GALLAGHER 

BASSETT SERVICES, ACE AMERICAN 

INSURANCE COMPANY, UNINSURED 

EMPLOYER'S GUARANTY FUND, AND 

REST HAVEN NURSING CENTER),

Respondents

:

:

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No. 133 EM 2017

DEBBIE HUGHEY,

Petitioner

v.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL 

BOARD (ANDORRA WOODS 

HEALTHCARE CENTER, GALLAGHER 

BASSETT SERVICES, ACE AMERICAN 

INSURANCE COMPANY, UNINSURED 

EMPLOYER'S GUARANTY FUND, AND 

REST HAVEN NURSING CENTER),

Respondents

:

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No. 134 EM 2017

DEBBIE HUGHEY,

Petitioner

v.

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No. 135 EM 2017
[133-138 EM 2017] - 2

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL 

BOARD (REST HAVEN NURSING 

CENTER WHITEMARSH INC., 

GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, 

ANDORRA WOODS HEALTHCARE, ACE 

AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY 

AND UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S 

GUARANTY FUND CENTER),

Respondents

:

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DEBBIE HUGHEY,

Petitioner

v.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL 

BOARD (REST HAVEN NURSING 

CENTER WHITEMARSH INC., 

GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, 

ANDORRA WOODS HEALTHCARE, ACE 

AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY 

AND UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S 

GUARANTY FUND CENTER),

Respondents

:

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:

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:

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:

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No. 136 EM 2017

DEBBIE HUGHEY,

Petitioner

v.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL 

BOARD (ANDORRA WOODS 

HEALTHCARE CENTER, GALLAGHER 

BASSETT SERVICES, ACE AMERICAN 

INSURANCE COMPANY, UNINSURED 

EMPLOYER'S GUARANTY FUND, AND 

:

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No. 137 EM 2017
[133-138 EM 2017] - 3

REST HAVEN NURSING CENTER),

Respondents

:

:

:

DEBBIE HUGHEY,

Petitioner

v.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL 

BOARD (ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE 

COMPANY, ANDORRA WOODS 

HEALTHCARE CENTER, ESIS

NORTHEAST WC CLAIMS, UNINSURED 

EMPLOYER'S GUARANTY FUND),

Respondents

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No. 138 EM 2017

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of January, 2018, the Petition for Review is DENIED.
North Dakota Regional Haze Proposed Rule

Copyright List for Cost Analysis Reference Documents

Number Copyright

1 PNM Responses to Follow

‐ Up Questions from October 14, 2010 Conference Call Regarding

BART Cost Estimate.

2 Cost Economic Indicators; October 2010

– January 2011.

3 Estimating SCR Installation Costs; Murano and Sharp, American Electric Power and the EUGG

Fossil Productivity Committee; February 15, 2006; Power: Business and Technology for the

Global Generation Industry; Tradefair Group, and Access Intelligence LLC company

4 Readers Talk Back; SCR Redux; J. Burkett; August 2004; The McGraw

‐ Hill Companies, Inc.

5 Standing on the shoulders of giants: Retrofitting SCR plant 230 feet above the Gibson power

station in the USA requires a titanic effort physically and logistically, involving the world’s

biggest tower crane at the USA’s second biggest coal fired plant; July 5, 2002; Published by

Progressive Media Markets Ltd.; Modern Power Systems.

6 Readers Talk Back; SCR Redux; J. Burkett; August 2004; The McGraw

‐ Hill Companies, Inc.

7 Operating Experience and Future Challenges with SCR Installations; Technical Publication; G.

Beckmann and C.A. Erickson, Babcock Borsig Power, Inc.; Presented at POWER

‐ GEN

International 2000; Babcock Borsig Power, Inc. 2001.

8 Estimating Total Sulfuric Acid Emissions from Stationary Power Plants; Technical Update, April

2010; Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Inc. 2010.

9 Emissions of Sulfur Trioxide from Coal

‐ Fired Power Plants; Technical Paper; R.K. Srivastava

and C.A. Miller; June 2004; p. 750

‐ 762, Volume: 54; Air & Waste Management Association

10 Deactivation of V 2 O 5 ‐ WO 3 ‐ TiO 2 SCR Catalyst at Biomass Fired Power Plants: Elucidation of

Mechanisms by Lab

‐ and Pilot

‐ Scale Experiments; Y. Zheng, A.D. Jensen; J.E. Johnsson;

J.R.Th Ø gersen; p. 186

‐ 194; Volume 83; Applied Catalysis B: Environmental; 2008 Elsevier B.V.

11 SO2 Conversion Rate of DENOX Catalysts: Measurement and Effects on Downstream Plant

Components; H. Gutberlet, A. Diechmann, A. Merz, and L. Schreiber; Volume 70, Number 11;

VGB Kraftwekstechnik 1990.

12 Nitrogen Oxides Control Technology Fact Book; L.L. Sloss, et al.; 1992; Noyes Data

Corporation.

13 SCR catalyst performance in flue gases derived from subbituminous and lignite coals; S.A.

Benson, et al.; p. 577

‐ 613, volume: 86; Fuel Processing Technology; Elsevier B.V.

14 Steag’s Power Plants Equipped with SCRs; September 2006; Steag LLC

15 Next Generation SCR Choices

– High

‐ Dust, Low

‐ Dust and Tail

‐ End; January 2009; No. 369; FGD

and DeNOx Newsletter

16 Uniqueness of SCR Retrofits Translates into Broad Cost Variations; May 2003; B. Hoskins,

Washington Group International; Power Engineering; PennWell Corporation