J-S54011- 14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

JESSE MILLER Appellant No. 491 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 14 , 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

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- CR -0002645-2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014 Jesse Miller appeals from the judgment of sentence impo sed by the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, following Mill er’s convictions for two counts of persons not to possess firearms, 1 three counts of possession of a controlled substance, 2 and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. 3 Upon our review, we affirm.

The facts of this matter are as follows: On May 20, 2013, adult Probation Officer, (APO) Car lo DeAngelo received information from a known source indicating [Mi ller] was in possession of a firearm and that he was selling cocaine

. [Miller] had multiple theft charges in Berks County, a retail theft

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).

3 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).J-S54011- 14

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out of Franklin County, and a prior burglary from 2 008 at the time of DeAngelo’s supervision. The known source explained to DeAngelo that [Miller] kept a firearm in a locked saf e that he moved between his apartment and his vehicle. The know n source also told DeAngelo that [Miller] was selling cocai ne between Reading and Franklin County. Due to the spe cifics of the allegations, a pre- approved search for [Miller’s] residence was approved by DeAngelo’s supervisors. On May 21, 2013, APO DeAngelo and APO Michael Futri ck went to 211 West Douglass Street, Apartment 2D, Reading Pennsylvania, to conduct the pre- approved search of [Miller’s] apartment and vehicle. Officer Fleming of the Readin g Police Department was contacted prior to the execution of the search due to the possibility that a firearm may be present. Once at 211 West Douglass Street, [Miller] co nsented to DeAngelo’s entry of the apartment, whereupon he was immediately handcuffed for safety reasons. DeAngelo asked [Miller] if there were any drugs or firearms in the apartment, and [Mil ler] stated that there was not. While handcuffed, [Miller] was searched. DeAngelo found a cellphone in [Miller’s] left front p ocket, a set of car keys, and another key ring in his right front pock et. The officers then searched the apartment. During the search of the apartment, Futrick found a locked safe, which the office rs then opened with the key ring found on [Miller’s] person. Once the safe was opened, two revolvers with ammunition were re moved from inside of the safe. Following the search of the home, officers then searched [Miller’s] vehicle. As a result of the search, officers found several containers of baggies, a digital scale, a sunglass case that contained a white chunky substance, a small amount of powdery substance and two pills. All items discovered i n the search of the residence and vehicles were then turned ove r to Officer [Thomas] Fleming [of the Reading Police depart ment]. Both of the recovered firearms were found to be functi onal by Officer Fleming. The white powdery substance seized . . . tested positive for cocaine. Trial Court Opinion, 4/28/14, at 2- 3.J-S54011- 14

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On May 21, 2013, Officer Fleming filed a criminal com plaint against Miller based on the aforementioned search. Following a preliminary hearing, Miller was formally arraigned on July 3, 2013. Prior to trial, Miller filed an omnibus pretrial mo tion on September 27, 2013, which included a motion to suppress evidence obtain ed during the search of his residence and vehicle. Following a hearing on November 4, 2013, the trial court denied Miller’s motion. A stipulated bench trial followed on February 14, 201 4, after which the

court convicted Miller of the above-referenced offenses. Sentencing occurred on the same day and Miller received an aggrega te sentence of three to six years’ incarceration, followed by eight ye ars of probation. This timely appeal followed. On appeal, Miller argues that APO DeAngelo did not have reasonable suspicion to search his residence and vehicle and, as such, t he court erred in denying his suppression motion. Our standard of review for the denial of a suppression motion is as follows: [W]e are limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusion s drawn from those facts are correct. We may consider the evidence of the witnesses offered by the prosecution, as verdict winner, and only so much of the defense evidence that r emains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record a s a whole. We are bound by facts supported by the record and may reverse only if the legal conclusions reached by the cou rt below we re erroneous. Commonwealth v. McAliley , 919 A.2d 272, 275-76 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).J-S54011- 14

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As an initial matter, we have determined that the su ppression court’s findings of fact are based on evidence in the record. Accordingly, we proceed to examine the legal conclusions drawn from the facts.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitutio n protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person s, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” that ar e not supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. A probatio ner, however, has a diminished expectation of privacy under the Fourth Am endment of the United States Constitution and also under Article 1, S ection 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Williams , 692 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Pa. Super. 1997). Warrantless searches of s upervised persons and their property may occur if: (2) A property search may be conducted by an agent if t here is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in the possession of or under the control of the offende r contains contraband or other evidence of violations of the condi tions of supervision. (3) Prior approval of a supervisor shall be obtained f or a property search absent exigent circumstances.

... (6) The existence of reasonable suspicion to search shall be determined in accordance with constitutional search and seizure provisions as applied by judicial decision. In accordance with such case law, the following factors, where applicable, m ay be taken into account: (i) The observations of agents. (ii) Information provided by others. (iii) The activities of the offender.J-S54011- 14

- 5 - (iv) Information provided by the offender. (v) The experience of agents with the offender. (vi) The experience of agents in similar circumstances. (vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of the offender. (viii) The need to verify compliance with the conditio ns of supervision. 61 Pa.C.S. § 6153(d)(2), (3), (6) (emphasis added). A property search is a “warrantless search of real property, vehicle or personal property which is in the possession or under the control of the offender.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6151. Reasonable suspicion is determined from the totality of the circumstances, which “allows officers to dra w on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences f rom and deductions

about the cumulative information available to them.” See Commonwealth v. Kemp , 961 A.2d 1247, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2008). Reasonable suspicion may arise from information provided by third partie s, including tips from

citizens. See Commonwealth v. Barber , 889 A.2d 587, 593 (Pa. Super. 2005). Instantly, the suppression court concluded that the search i n this matter was reasonable because APO DeAngelo possessed the re quisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Miller and hi s property. The trial court reasoned that although evidence relating to all eight factors enumerated in section 6153(d)(6) was not presented, a n eed existed to verify Miller’s compliance with the conditions of his probation in light of the information provided by the known informant. Mille r contends this wasJ-S54011- 14

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insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because APO D eAngelo relied on a tip from an unverified informant. We disagree. “[I]f an informant . . . identifies him or herself to the police, then there is an indicia of reliability attached to the tip, beca use the informant has placed himself or herself at risk for prosecution for gi ving false information to the police if the tip is untrue.” Commonwealth v. Altadonna , 817 A.2d 1145, 1152 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Hayward , 756 A.2d 23, 34 (Pa. Super. 2000). Here, APO DeA ngelo testified that the informant in question had identifi ed him or herself to him. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 11/4/13, at 4. Miller furt her argues that DeAngelo should have investigated the allegations in o rder to corroborate the anonymous tip. However, it is not necessary for pro bation officers to observe personally an appellant engaging in illegal a ctivity or suspicious conduct in order to form reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Wright , 672 A.2d 826, 830 (Pa. Super. 1996) (officers may r ely upon information from third parties to form reasonable susp icion). Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the suppressio n court correctly determined that APO DeAngelo possessed reasonabl e suspicion to conduct a search of Miller’s person, residence and vehicle. As we find no error with the suppression court’s legal conclusi ons, we affirm the judgment

of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed.J-S54011- 14

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 9/26/2014