Affirmed and Opinion filed October 24, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00553-CR

JARED LEVI COLEMAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 23rd District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 66104

O P I N I O N

On appeal from his murder conviction, appellant Jared Levi Coleman 

challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to 

officers about the offense and the trial court’s refusal to admit expert testimony

regarding appellant’s susceptibility to giving a false statement under police 

questioning. We affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment with the first-degree felony offense of 

murder, to which he pleaded ―not guilty.‖ In the course of a murder investigation, 

appellant gave several recorded statements to investigating officers. Before trial, 

appellant filed a motion to suppress three of those statements. The trial court 

denied the motion. In the trial that followed the jury found appellant guilty of the 

charged offense. The trial court assessed punishment at thirty years’ confinement.

DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his first issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress. In the motion appellant challenged the admissibility of two noncustodial statements, one written statement and one video-recorded statement, both 

of which appellant gave to investigating officers on September 27, 2011

(collectively, the ―September Statements‖). In both statements appellant 

implicated himself in the charged offense. According to appellant, police coerced 

or induced the September Statements by an offer to ―help‖ him or a promise of

probation and no jail time in exchange for his confession. 

Appellant also sought to suppress a video recording of a custodial statement 

he gave to investigators on October 7, 2011 (the ―October Statement‖), after he 

was indicted for the offense. In this video statement appellant referred to and 

recanted parts of the September Statements. Appellant does not challenge the 

voluntariness of the October Statement but instead asserts that it was inadmissible 

as the fruit of the allegedly improperly obtained September Statements.

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated 

standard of review. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole finder of fact and is free to 

believe or disbelieve any or all of the evidence presented. Wiede v. State, 214 
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S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to the 

trial court’s determination of historical facts, especially when the trial court’s fact 

findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 

S.W.2d at 89. We afford the same amount of deference to the trial court’s 

application of the law to facts if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on 

an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We review de novo the trial court’s 

application of the law to facts if resolution of those ultimate questions does not 

turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. 

The record of the suppression hearing reflects that appellant’s friend had 

contacted an investigating officer with information indicating that appellant had 

confided in the friend about appellant’s role in the charged offense. The friend

contacted the officer the following day, indicating that appellant wanted to speak 

with the officer. The friend testified at the suppression hearing that in exchange 

for appellant’s statements, the officer promised that appellant would receive only 

probation and not confinement. The officer denied imparting any such information 

to the friend or to appellant. The friend was present when appellant made the 

September Statements. The record indicates that the friend brought appellant to 

the police interview on the day of the September Statements, and in the friend’s 

presence, the officer conducted a recorded, non-custodial interview with appellant. 

During the interview, appellant also made a written statement, which he signed at 

the conclusion of the interview. 

As reflected by the record, the officer initially informed appellant of the 

possibility of being indicted for the offense. Additionally, the officer told 

appellant that by giving the statement, appellant had a chance to help himself and 

that the officer was trying to help appellant, too. The officer explained several 

times to appellant that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave with 
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his friend and end the interview at any point. The officer informed appellant that 

he would not be placed in jail that day; the video reflects that the officer and 

appellant shook hands to confirm that appellant would not be jailed that day. 

Appellant orally confessed his involvement in the charged offense. He also gave a 

written statement about his involvement. Several times in the course of the 

interview, appellant asked whether he would go to jail that day or the following 

day. The officer confirmed that appellant would not go to jail that day or the 

following day. The recorded video of the statement reflects that the friend asked 

the officer whether appellant would be going to jail in the future and inquired 

about the possibility of probation, to which the officer responded, ―no.‖ This 

inquiry occurred one hour into the interview, after appellant had admitted 

involvement in the offense. The officer testified that by his statement, ―no,‖ he 

meant that appellant would neither go to jail nor receive probation in the 

immediate future and that he did not know what was going to happen in the future. 

The video does not reflect any promise regarding probation or any reference to 

such a promise made by the officer. Only the friend made a reference to probation. 

The officer admitted that appellant was hesitant to sign the written statement, but 

testified that the hesitation was not a result of any threat, promise, or coercion on 

the officer’s part. The officer denied promising appellant probation or promising 

that appellant would receive no jail time. The officer testified that he did not 

threaten, coerce, or promise appellant anything in exchange for the September 

Statements. 

After the interview, appellant left with his friend. The following day, 

appellant contacted the officer and informed him that the statements he had made 

in the interview the day before were false. On October 6, 2011, appellant was 

indicted and arrested. On the next day, appellant gave the October Statement to 
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the investigating officer, in which appellant also made reference to and recanted 

the September Statements. This recorded statement does not contain any reference 

to a promise of probation.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress,

finding, in pertinent part, that: (1) no promise or offer of probation or anything else 

of value was made by the investigating officer; (2) appellant never mentioned 

being promised probation from the officer or anyone else during either of his 

recorded interviews; and (3) the oral and written statements given by appellant 

were made freely and voluntarily and without compulsion or persuasion.

Article 38.21 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled 

―Statement,‖ requires a statement to have been ―freely and voluntarily made 

without compulsion or persuasion‖ to be admissible as evidence. Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann art. 38.21 (West 2005). In assessing the voluntariness of a statement, 

we consider the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was made, 

and ultimately whether appellant’s will was overborne. See Creager v. State, 952 

S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Reed v. State, 59 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d). A statement is involuntary if circumstances 

show that the confession was induced by a promise of a benefit. See Ramirez v. 

State, 76 S.W.3d 121, 126–127 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). 

For a promise to render a confession invalid under article 38.21, the promise 

must have been positive, made or sanctioned by someone in authority, and of such 

an influential nature that it would cause a defendant to speak untruthfully. 

Martinez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The truth or 

falsity of the statement is immaterial; the question is whether the promise likely 

would induce a false confession. Id. at 794–95. General, unspecific offers to help 

are not likely to induce one to make an untruthful statement and will not invalidate 
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a confession. Dykes v. State, 657 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). 

Similarly, general statements made to a suspect regarding how a confession can 

sometimes result in leniency do not render a confession involuntary. Muniz v. 

State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 253–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Any prediction about the 

future events is not a promise. Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 261 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (involving an officer’s statements that the 

situation would ―go better‖ for appellant by giving a confession was a prediction 

about a future event that did not amount to a promise).

The only evidence in support of appellant’s contention that the officer 

promised probation in exchange for a confession is the testimony of appellant’s 

friend at the suppression hearing; the friend’s testimony was controverted by that 

of the investigating officer. No other record evidence supports appellant’s 

assertions, and no promises or statements regarding probation appear on the video

recording of appellant’s statement. In the October Statement, appellant made no 

reference to a promise for probation. The trial court chose to believe the officer’s 

testimony that he did not make the alleged promise of probation to appellant or to 

appellant’s friend, and we defer to this assessment of the facts. See Miller v. State, 

312 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (deferring to the trial 

court’s determination of credibility and demeanor and concluding that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by finding appellant’s statement voluntary despite 

an alleged promise by the investigating officer).

Appellant cites Pitts v. State, 614 S.W.2d 142, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1981), as support for his argument that the officer’s statements amounted to 

an improper inducement. But, unlike the promisor in Pitts, the officer interviewing 

appellant did not directly, positively, and unequivocally promise that appellant 

would not go to jail or that appellant would receive only probation. See Ramirez, 
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76 S.W.3d at 126–27. Rather, the record reflects that the officer informed 

appellant that most likely appellant would be indicted. Any indication that 

appellant would not go to jail or would receive probation does not rise to the same 

level of inducement as in Pitts and is not enough, standing alone, to induce a 

statement because the officer did not make a direct, positive offer in his single 

comment, ―no,‖ to the friend’s inquiry as to whether appellant would go to jail or 

receive probation. See Martinez, 127 S.W.3d at 795 (concluding no positive 

promise was made when the officer left the impression that if appellant accepted 

responsibility, the officer would not file charges against others); Humphries v. 

State, 993 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. ref’d) (concluding that 

an officer’s statement that accused would be a witness and not a defendant if he

was not involved in a murder but had information about the murder, did not induce 

a confession because the remarks did not amount to a direct, positive promise of a 

benefit and served as a comment on the status of the case). See also Espinosa v. 

State, 899 S.W.2d 359, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) 

(concluding that an officer’s promise that appellant would receive ―less time‖ if he 

confessed was not of such an influential nature that it caused appellant to confess). 

The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress on these 

grounds. See Martinez, 127 S.W.3d at 795.

As for whether appellant could have been induced by the officer’s comments

that appellant could help himself by confessing or that the officer was attempting 

to help appellant, the officer’s statements were not positive promises of leniency. 

See Herrera v. State, 194 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2006, pet. ref’d) (holding that the statement, ―We can talk to the D.A., get you an 

offer, if you can help us,‖ was not specific enough to influence appellant to speak 

untruthfully); Drake v. State, 123 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
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Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (concluding that an officer’s general, non-specific statement 

that an appellant ―could help herself‖ did not render appellant’s statement 

involuntary). General promises of leniency, such as the officer’s statement that an 

appellant’s cooperation by giving a statement would ―help‖ the accused do not 

reach the required level for improper inducement. See Dykes, 657 S.W.2d at 797. 

Moreover, the officer’s remarks were not of such an influential nature as to amount 

to improper inducement. See Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 654 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2002) (providing that officer’s representation that an accused’s cooperation 

would be conveyed to the trial court was not a promise inducing a confession).

The record does not reflect that appellant’s will was overborne as a result of 

the officer’s comments so as to render appellant’s statements involuntary. See 

Mason, 116 S.W.3d at 261. The September Statements were admissible because

they were given freely and voluntarily and are not invalidated under article 38.21. 

See Tex Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.21; Drake, 123 S.W.3d at 603 (holding that 

appellant’s statements were freely and voluntarily given despite allegations of a 

promise and of improper inducement through an offer to help appellant). Because

the September Statements are admissible, the October Statement, in which 

appellant referred to the September Statements, is not ―fruit of the poisonous tree.‖ 

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion 

to suppress. See Drake, 123 S.W.3d at 603. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

REFUSAL TO ADMIT EXPERT TESTIMONY OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST

In his second issue, appellant asserts that the trial court violated his 

constitutional right to present a meaningful defense when it erroneously ruled that 

Dr. Michael Fuller could not testify as to his expert opinion that appellant fits the 

profile of someone who would be susceptible to giving a false confession.1 The 

 

1 The trial court ruled that Dr. Fuller was qualified as a forensic psychiatrist and could testify 
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erroneous exclusion of evidence offered under the rules of evidence generally 

constitutes non-constitutional error. See Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 219 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). But, constitutional error occurs when the trial court 

erroneously excludes otherwise relevant, reliable evidence which ―forms such a 

vital portion of the case that exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from 

presenting a defense.‖ Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) 

(quoting Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). Appellant 

argues that such constitutional error occurred when the trial court ruled that Dr. 

Fuller would not be allowed to testify before the jury about his expert opinion that 

appellant fits the profile of one who would be susceptible to giving a false 

confession. 

We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. See Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010). Texas Rule of Evidence 702, entitled ―Testimony by Experts,‖ 

governs the admission of expert testimony, and provides:

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the 

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 

a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 

otherwise. 

TEX. R. EVID. 702. In Kelly v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted 

several procedural and substantive limitations upon the admission of expert 

scientific testimony to ensure that unreliable expert opinions would be excluded 

from the jury’s consideration. See Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572–73 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1992). Under Kelly, a trial judge, upon request, must conduct a 

 

generally about circumstances in which false confessions could occur. But, the trial court ruled 

Dr. Fuller could not testify as to his expert opinion that appellant fits the profile of someone who 

would be susceptible to giving a false confession. On appeal, the parties do not dispute Dr. 

Fuller’s qualifications as a forensic psychiatrist.
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―gatekeeping‖ hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether 

scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable and relevant to help the jury in reaching 

an accurate result. See Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 273. Then the judge must decide 

whether, on balance, that expert testimony might nonetheless be unhelpful or 

distracting for other reasons. See id. To be considered reliable, evidence from a 

scientific theory must satisfy three criteria: ―(a) the underlying scientific theory 

must be valid; (b) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (c) the 

technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question.‖2 Id. 

(quoting Kelly, 824 S.W.3d at 573). The trial court’s essential gatekeeping role is 

to ensure that evidence that is unreliable because it lacks a basis in sound scientific 

methodology is not admitted. See id. 

For expert testimony to be admissible under this rule, the party offering

scientific expert testimony must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence,

that this testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to assist the factfinder in 

reaching accurate results. See Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 572. When, as in the case 

under review, we are addressing fields of study such as the social sciences or fields 

that are based primarily upon experience and training as opposed to the scientific 

method, we apply the less rigorous standard set forth in the Nenno case. See 

Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 273–74 (applying Nenno test to testimony of forensic 

psychiatrist regarding future dangerousness); Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 

 

2

In Kelly, the Court of Criminal Appeals set out the following list of nonexclusive factors that a 

trial court can consider in determining scientific reliability: (1) the extent to which the underlying 

theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; (2) the 

qualifications of the testifying expert; (3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the 

underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) the potential error rate; (5) the availability of 

other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with which the underlying 

scientific theory and technique can be explained to the court; and (7) the experience and skill of 

the person who applied the technique in this case. Kelly, 824 S.W.3d at 573. See Coble, 330 

S.W.3d at 273, n.40.
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560–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. 

Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Ruckman v. State, 109 

S.W.3d 524, 5209–31 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. ref’d) (applying Nenno test to 

testimony regarding false confessions). Under this standard, the trial court must 

inquire whether (1) the field of expertise is a legitimate one, (2) the subject matter 

of the expert’s testimony is within the scope of the field, and (3) the expert’s 

testimony properly relies upon or utilizes the principles involved in the field. See

Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 273–74; Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561. This inquiry is 

somewhat more flexible than the application of the Kelly factors. Coble, 330 

S.W.3d at 274. The general principles announced in Kelly apply, but the specific 

factors outlined in those cases may or may not apply depending upon the context. 

See id. Under either Kelly or Nenno, reliability should be evaluated by reference to 

the standards applicable to the particular professional field in question. See id. 

The State objected that appellant had failed to satisfy the Nenno test, and the 

trial court ruled that Dr. Fuller could not testify as to his expert opinion that 

appellant fits the profile of one who would be susceptible to giving a false 

confession. Dr. Fuller testified at a hearing outside the presence of the jury so that 

the trial court could determine the admissibility of his testimony. Dr. Fuller stated

that the area of false confessions was within the scope of his field of practice and 

area of expertise as a forensic psychiatrist. Dr. Fuller outlined three ―sub sets [sic] 

of false confessions that are accepted in the literature and by researchers.‖ He

referred generally to 300 cases in the span of two decades in which the results of 

DNA testing had exonerated individuals convicted of a crime. Dr. Fuller stated 

that about fifteen to twenty-five percent of these individuals were found to have 

falsely confessed. According to Dr. Fuller, ―false confessions frequently occur in 

individuals who are emotionally unstable, who have mental illness, [sic] who have 
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impaired cognitive abilities.‖ Dr. Fuller expressed his belief that there is a 

―legitimate clinical concern‖ as to whether appellant falsely confessed to the 

charged offense. According to Dr. Fuller, this concern is a result of appellant’s 

testimony that he falsely confessed and appellant’s ―psychological profile‖ which 

Dr. Fuller described as ―one that is very much like the psychological profile of an 

individual who would be at relatively or higher risk than, say, the average person 

for making a false confession.‖ According to Dr. Fuller, appellant’s psychological 

profile is consistent with the profile of someone who would falsely confess. 

On cross-examination by the State, Dr. Fuller acknowledged that he had 

never before testified in a court as an expert specifically in the area of false 

confessions. Dr. Fuller testified he had read reviews of articles by a ―Dr. Leo‖ and

reviews of articles by Mr. Saul Kassin. Dr. Fuller also read a 2009 article by Dr. 

Leo on the topic of false confessions as well as excerpts from the work of Mr. 

Kassin. Dr. Fuller indicated he found these articles by searching the internet for 

―false confessions‖ after evaluating appellant several months before trial. Dr. 

Fuller stated he had not read The Psychology of Confessions by Saul Kassin. Dr. 

Fuller acknowledged that he did not teach any courses in false confessions and had

not written any articles or books on the topic. Dr. Fuller stated that this case is the 

first time he has ―focused more directly and thoughtfully‖ on false confessions as a 

primary issue. Dr. Fuller testified that he based his conclusion that appellant had 

the profile of a person who would confess falsely on his general mental-status 

examination of appellant, his clinical interview, and his discussion with appellant 

of the circumstances at or near the time of the alleged crime. According to Dr. 

Fuller, he based this conclusion on his findings that appellant was suffering from a 

major depressive episode with extreme hopelessness about his future, a sense of 

failure in general about the quality and direction of appellant’s life, obsession with 

military themes of honor and chivalry, and preoccupation with ―the notion of 
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laying himself down as part of a tribe or as part of a group. . .‖ Dr. Fuller 

described appellant as a very needy, disturbed young man, who was depressed and 

hopeless but not psychotic, and probably intermittently intoxicated. According to 

Dr. Fuller, there is a possibility appellant made a voluntary, false confession to 

achieve notoriety, attention, and a disturbed sense of fame. 

Dr. Fuller did not administer any formal psychological testing of appellant.

The only examination he used with appellant was an examination for neurological 

function, cognitive function, and memory function. Dr. Fuller has heard of the 

―Johnson Suggestibility Scale,‖ but he has not used that scale and is unfamiliar 

with it. Dr. Fuller did not tie his opinion that appellant had the profile of a person 

who would confess falsely to any specific study or article. Nor did Dr. Fuller 

provide the trial court with a copy of any study or article. Dr. Fuller had not read 

an article by Kassin cited by the State. Dr. Fuller did not explain how his 

testimony properly relies upon or uses principles in this field, nor did he cite any 

article or other source in support of this proposition. There is no objective source 

material in this record to substantiate Dr. Fuller’s methodology as one that is 

appropriate in the practice of forensic psychiatry. 

We presume, without deciding, that the field of Dr. Fuller’s expertise is a 

legitimate one, and that the subject matter of Dr. Fuller’s testimony is within the 

scope of the field. Nonetheless, based upon the lack of evidence showing that Dr. 

Fuller’s testimony properly relies upon or utilizes the principles involved in this 

field, we conclude that appellant did not satisfy his burden of showing by clear and 

convincing evidence during the gatekeeping hearing the reliability of Dr. Fuller’s 

methodology for determining whether appellant fits the profile of someone who 

would be susceptible to giving a false confession. See Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 279–

80 (holding that proponent of expert testimony by forensic psychiatrist did not 
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show by clear and convincing evidence at the gatekeeping hearing that expert’s 

methodology was reliable based upon third Nenno factor); Ruckman, 109 S.W.3d 

at 530 (holding that proponent of expert testimony regarding false confessions did 

not show by clear and convincing evidence at the gatekeeping hearing that expert’s 

testimony was reliable based upon lack of proof regarding third Nenno factor). We 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that Dr. Fuller could 

not testify before the jury as to his expert opinion that appellant fits the profile of 

someone who would be susceptible to giving a false confession. See Coble, 330 

S.W.3d at 277–80; Ruckman, 109 S.W.3d at 530. Because the trial court’s 

exclusion of this evidence was not erroneous, it cannot constitute constitutional 

error as asserted by appellant in his second issue. See Wiley, 74 S.W.3d at 405. 

Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second issue.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Donovan and Brown.3

Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

 

3 Originally, this case was submitted before a panel consisting of Justices Frost, Jeffrey Brown, 

and Donovan. Following the appointment of Justice Jeffrey Brown to the Supreme Court of 

Texas and the appointment of Justice Frost as Chief Justice of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 

this case was resubmitted to the current panel of Chief Justice Frost, Justice Donovan, and 

Justice Marc Brown.