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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

---o0o---

SI UFAGA MOANA, Petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE FRANCES Q. F. WONG, Judge of the 

Family Court of the First Circuit,

State of Hawaii, Respondent Judge,

and

STATE OF HAWAII, Respondent.

(SCPW-17-0000532; CASE NO. 1FFC-17-0000575)

JAYVAN C. CURIOSO, Petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE HILARY BENSON GANGNES, Judge of the

District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division,

State of Hawaii, Respondent Judge,

and

STATE OF HAWAII, Respondent.

(SCPW-17-0000171; CASE NO. 1DCW-17-0000868)

SCPW-17-0000532

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCPW-17-0000532

21-NOV-2017

08:24 AM
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2

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS

NOVEMBER 21, 2017

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.

Petitioner Si Ufaga Moana (Moana) seeks a writ of 

mandamus directing the Honorable Frances Q. F. Wong to order his 

release forthwith from custody in accordance with the 

requirement that a defendant be released upon motion if a 

preliminary hearing has not commenced within two days of the 

defendant’s initial appearance. See Hawaii Rules of Penal 

Procedure (HRPP) Rule 5(c)(3) (2014). Petitioner Jayvan C. 

Curioso (Curioso) also seeks a writ of mandamus directing the 

Honorable Hilary Benson Gangnes to order his release forthwith 

from custody in accordance with the two-day preliminary hearing 

requirement. 

Because the State respectively charged Moana and 

Curioso (petitioners) by information and grand jury indictment 

during the pendency of these petitions, obviating the need for 

preliminary hearings, we ultimately deny the petitions as moot. 

We nonetheless consider the legal issues at the heart of these

cases based on an exception to the mootness doctrine because 

they are capable of repetition but would otherwise evade review.
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Under our rules of court, when a delay in the 

commencement of a preliminary hearing is not caused by a 

defendant’s condition, action, or request and occurs without the 

defendant’s consent, the keeping of a defendant in custody is 

permitted only when compelling circumstances justify an ongoing 

deprivation of liberty. HRPP Rule 5(c)(3). We now provide 

guidance as to when circumstances are compelling for purposes of 

denying a defendant’s motion for release from custody when the 

defendant is held for a period of more than two days after 

initial appearance without commencement of a preliminary 

hearing. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Moana’s Arrest and Preliminary Hearing

On June 20, 2017, police arrested Moana for assault in 

the second degree in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)

§ 707-711 (2014 & Supp. 2016). On June 22, 2017, Moana was 

charged by complaint with abuse of family or household members, 

which was statutorily enhanced to a class C felony due to the 

alleged incident occurring in the presence of a minor household 

member under the age of 14. HRS § 709-906(1), (9) (Supp. 2016). 

The same day, Moana made his initial appearance before the 

Family Court of the First Circuit (family court); the family 
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court confirmed bail at $30,000 and issued an order scheduling a 

preliminary hearing for June 26, 2017.1

On the day of the preliminary hearing, the State 

requested a continuance, informing the family court that the 

complaining witness had “absented herself” from the proceeding.

The prosecutor stated that the complainant had expressed a 

reluctance to come to court when she was served on the preceding 

Friday by the prosecuting attorney’s investigators but did not 

indicate that she did not intend to appear. The prosecutor 

explained that he had since been contacted by the complainant’s

aunt, who informed him that she had taken food to the airport to 

give to the complainant and her child. Based on this 

information, the prosecutor stated that he was not sure whether 

the complaining witness was present on the island. He requested 

additional time to locate and secure the complainant’s 

cooperation, explaining that his office might obtain a material 

witness order if she was found on the mainland and refused to

return voluntarily. The prosecutor advised the court that, 

 

1 HRPP Rule 54(a) (1996) states that the HRPP “apply to all penal 

proceedings in all courts of the State of Hawaii, except as provided in” HRPP 

Rule 54(b). Moana’s case did not fall within any of the exceptions listed in 

HRPP Rule 54(b).

Because Moana’s initial appearance occurred on a Thursday, the 

scheduled hearing would have occurred within the two-day time limit as 

calculated under HRPP Rule 45(a) (2012), which excludes holidays and 

weekends. All references to time limits or elapsed time are computed in 

accordance with this rule. 
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because Moana’s initial appearance was on June 22, 2017, “the 30 

days for preliminary hearing would run on Saturday, July 22nd”

and requested that the hearing be rescheduled before that date.2

Moana moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the 

alternative, for the family court to set aside bail and release 

him on his own recognizance to the supervision of his church 

pastor or mother, who were present in the courtroom. The

prosecutor opposed Moana’s motion, citing the nature of the 

offense. He explained that the complainant was thirty-threeweeks pregnant at the time Moana allegedly bit and punched her, 

causing injury to her ear and a possible concussion. He further 

stated that the argument leading to the incident arose because 

the complaining witness asked for money to buy food for her and 

Moana’s two-year-old child. The prosecutor asserted that the 

child was present during the events and Moana allegedly threw 

Lego-style blocks at the child’s head, causing bruising.

3 He

also pointed to Moana’s 2014 arrest for abuse of the same 

complaining witness, contending that the alleged attack was an 

 

2 HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) requires courts to schedule a preliminary 

hearing within thirty days of a defendant’s initial appearance “if the 

defendant is not in custody.” If a defendant has been “held in custody for a 

period of more than 2 days after initial appearance without commencement of a 

defendant’s preliminary hearing,” the rule mandates the defendant’s release 

upon his or her own motion. This provision is subject to several narrow 

exceptions, discussed infra. 

3 The prosecutor explained that the State intended to pursue 

misdemeanor child abuse charges against Moana in a separate proceeding.
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escalation of violence toward the individual and that Moana 

might be a danger to her. Lastly, the State argued that there 

had been “some obstruction” from Moana’s family during the 

investigation, making release into their custody inappropriate.

Taken together, the State concluded, these factors were

compelling reasons to continue the hearing and to keep Moana in 

custody.

The family court granted the State’s motion for a

continuance and denied Moana’s motion for dismissal of the 

complaint. Seemingly relying on the State’s assertion regarding 

the thirty-day period in which a preliminary hearing must be 

held, the court noted that the “hearing [had been] set very 

expeditiously within the 30-day limit,” which left the court 

free to continue it without legal obstacle.

With respect to bail reduction, the family court noted 

several factors guiding its discretion in setting or modifying 

bail, including Moana’s criminal history, the nature of the 

offense, and the vulnerable nature of the complainant and their 

child.4 The prosecutor asked for clarification regarding whether 

 

4 The family court also expressed general concern regarding 

individuals who threaten or otherwise attempt to persuade a witness not to 

testify, referencing an unrelated recent news story. Because the parties did 

not allege such coercion and the record does not reveal any linkage of the 

news story to the facts of the case, we do not address the court’s general 

concern. 
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these findings relating to bail also constituted compelling 

reasons for the continuance and for keeping Moana in custody, to 

which the court answered affirmatively. 

The family court confirmed bail at $30,000 and 

scheduled the continued preliminary hearing for July 13, 2017, 

which was 15 days after Moana’s initial appearance. The court 

informed the prosecutor that it had intentionally left time

before the presumed 30-day deadline for another continuance if 

necessary, but it went on to warn that “the next time . . . if 

the complaining witness fails to appear . . . [the State]

need[s] a lot more information than what somebody might have 

said.” Prior to the continued hearing date, Moana filed with 

this court a petition for a writ of mandamus.

B. Curioso’s Arrest and Preliminary Hearing

Police arrested Curioso on March 10, 2017, for abuse 

of family or household members, HRS § 709-906 (2014 & Supp. 

2016). On March 13, 2017, Curioso was charged by complaint in 

the District Court of the First Circuit (district court) with 

kidnapping, HRS § 707-720(1)(d) (2014), terroristic threatening 

in the first degree, HRS § 707-716(1)(e) (2014), and abuse of 

family or household members with a statutory enhancement to a 

class C felony based on the charged conduct, HRS § 709-906(1),

(8). Bail was set at $150,000 in the aggregate, and a

preliminary hearing was scheduled for March 15, 2017.
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On the day of the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor

requested a continuance to March 21, 2017, to obtain a Tagalog 

interpreter for the complainant, for whom English was a second 

language. Curioso objected and moved for release on his own 

recognizance or, in the alternative, a reduction in bail. The 

court denied Curioso’s requests and granted the State’s motion 

for a continuance. The court explained that the State’s request 

was “reasonable” given that an interpreter was “necessary for 

the witness to give testimony” and the State was otherwise ready 

with its witnesses. The preliminary hearing was rescheduled by 

the court to March 21, 2017, which was six days after Curioso’s 

initial appearance.

5 On March 16, 2017, Curioso filed a petition 

for a writ of mandamus.

II. THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF MANDAMUS

Moana and Curioso argue that the judges in their 

individual cases violated HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) by denying their 

respective motions for release on their own recognizance. This

rule requires that a court release a defendant upon motion “if 

the defendant is held in custody for a period of more than 2 

days after initial appearance without commencement of a 

defendant’s preliminary hearing.” HRPP Rule 5(c)(3). However, 

 

5 The period also included a weekend, which is not figured into 

this total. See supra, note 2.
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the State may maintain custody of a defendant when the delay is 

caused by the defendant or occurs with the defendant’s consent. 

Id. Release is also not required when the failure to commence a 

timely preliminary hearing is attributable to a “compelling fact 

or circumstance” that would preclude determination of probable 

cause or commencement of the hearing or would render the 

defendant’s “release to be against the interest of justice.” 

Id.

In his petition for a writ of mandamus, Moana argues 

that a preliminary hearing did not commence within two days from 

his initial appearance, obligating the family court to release 

him upon his motion. Moana states that the court appeared to 

base its ruling denying his release on a finding of a compelling 

fact or circumstance. He disputes, however, that compelling 

reasons existed to hold him in custody under any of HRPP Rule 

5(c)(3)’s exceptions. In its response, the State argues that 

the court properly found compelling reasons to keep Moana in 

custody, including Moana’s criminal history, the nature of the 

alleged offense, and the vulnerable nature of the complainant 

and their child.

In his petition, Curioso similarly argues that a

preliminary hearing did not commence within two days of his 

initial appearance and that none of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s 

exceptions justified his continued detention. He asserts that 
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the State’s failure to obtain an interpreter for the complainant

was neither a compelling circumstance precluding the 

commencement of a preliminary hearing within two days of his 

initial appearance nor one rendering his release against the 

interest of justice. He points out that the State had five days 

to speak with the complainant following his arrest to determine 

if an interpreter was needed for the preliminary hearing.

The State responds that it diligently attempted to 

find an interpreter as soon as the complainant requested one. 

In a declaration attached to the State’s response, the 

prosecutor who requested the continuance avers that her review 

of case materials prior to the hearing did not reveal a need for 

an interpreter and that she was not informed of the request 

until the morning of the scheduled preliminary hearing. She 

further avers that the State’s victim witness advocate made 

calls to ten different interpreters but was unable to arrange 

one for the scheduled time. The prosecutor also states that she 

was unable to convince the complainant to proceed without an 

interpreter. The prosecutor does not aver that any of this 

information was placed on the record on the date of the 

scheduled hearing. 

The State asserts that the lack of an interpreter to

aid the complainant in her testimony constituted a compelling 

circumstance that justified the district court’s decision to not 
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release Curioso. In support of its argument, the State points

to this court’s repeated pronouncements regarding the 

fundamental importance of individuals involved in litigation 

understanding the proceedings and being understood in turn.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Mootness

As a threshold matter, we address whether the merits 

of the petitions are properly considered by this court. We have 

long adhered to certain “prudential rules of judicial selfgovernance ‘founded in concern about the proper--and properly 

limited--role of the courts in a democratic society.’” Kona Old 

Hawaiian Trails Grp. v. Lyman, 69 Haw. 81, 87, 734 P.2d 161, 165 

(1987) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); Cty. 

of Haw. v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 123 Hawaii 391, 405, 235 P.3d 

1103, 1117 (2010). Among these is the doctrine of mootness, 

which typically limits our rulings to “live controvers[ies] of 

the kind that must exist if courts are to avoid advisory 

opinions on abstract propositions of law.” Kona, 69 Haw. at 87, 

734 P.2d at 165 (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969)). 

Accordingly, we will generally refrain from deciding cases in 

which we can no longer grant the relief a party seeks. Ala Loop 

Homeowners, 123 Hawaii at 405, 235 P.3d at 1117 (citing 
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Kahoohanohano v. State, 114 Hawaii 302, 332, 162 P.3d 696, 726 

(2007)).

When a defendant is indicted or charged by criminal 

information, a preliminary hearing need not--and, under our 

rules, cannot--be conducted. HRPP Rule (5)(c)(1) (2014).6 This 

is because a complaint and preliminary hearing, indictment, and 

criminal information are separate, parallel methods by which a 

felony prosecution may be initiated. See Haw. Const. art. I, § 

10; HRPP Rule 7(a)–(b) (2012). The “real purpose” of a 

preliminary hearing is to confirm that probable cause exists to 

hold a defendant in custody, “and no purpose remains for” the 

hearing when probable cause is established through another 

mechanism, including indictment. Chung v. Ogata (Ogata I), 53 

Haw. 364, 366, 493 P.2d 1342, 1343 (1972) (citing State v. 

Tominaga, 45 Haw. 604, 372 P.2d 356 (1962)). We have thus held 

that both a defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing and a 

trial court’s jurisdiction to conduct such a hearing are cut off 

by an indictment, even when it is returned after the continuance 

of the preliminary hearing. Chung v. Ogata (Ogata II), 53 Haw. 

395, 395, 495 P.2d 26, 26 (1972); Tominaga, 45 Haw. at 610, 372 

 

6 HRPP Rule (5)(c)(1) states that “the court shall schedule a 

preliminary hearing, provided that such hearing shall not be held if the 

defendant is indicted or charged by information before the date set for such 

hearing.” (Emphasis added.)
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P.2d at 360.7 The same would logically hold true for an 

information, by which probable cause may also be established. 

See HRS § 806-85 (2004).

On July 7, 2017, this court issued an order directing 

the State to respond to Moana’s petition for mandamus. The 

State filed a timely answer on July 10, 2017. The following 

day, prosecutors charged Moana by felony information, cutting 

off his right to the continued preliminary hearing two days 

before it was scheduled to take place.

8 Similarly, this court on 

March 17, 2017, ordered the State to respond to Curioso’s 

petition. The State filed a timely answer on March 20, 2017--

the day before Curioso’s continued preliminary hearing. The 

next day, the State obtained a grand jury indictment of Curioso, 

 

7 Tominaga and the two Ogata cases were decided prior to 1977, when 

preliminary hearings and indictments were governed by the District Court 

Rules of Penal Procedure (DCRPP) and Hawaii Rules of Criminal Procedure 

(HRCrP). The HRPP are substantially modeled after the DCRPP and HRCrP, 

however, and the holdings of Tominaga and the two Ogata cases are not 

undermined by the adoption of the HRPP. See infra (discussing the history 

and adoption of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)).

8 Unlike in Curioso’s case, in which the State filed a notice 

informing this court of the defendant’s indictment, the State did not notify 

this court that it had charged Moana by information. Only research of the 

family court docket by this court revealed the supervening charge. Although 

Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 201 (1980) permits us to take judicial 

notice of such records on our own accord, we remind litigants that their duty 

of candor toward this tribunal includes a responsibility to disclose material 

facts that may affect the outcome of a case, including those facts that would 

render the case moot. See AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 82 Hawaii 453, 460, 

923 P.2d 395, 402 (1996).
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which effectively blocked his preliminary hearing from 

proceeding hours before its scheduled commencement.

The petitioners’ rights to preliminary hearings--and 

release prior to those hearings--were extinguished when probable 

cause to hold them in custody was determined through other 

mechanisms. Indeed, had the judges granted the petitioners’ 

motions for release, the information and indictment would have 

formed independent legal bases for returning the petitioners to 

the State’s custody. We are therefore compelled to deny the 

petitions as moot because we cannot provide the relief the 

petitioners seek.

This is not the end of our inquiry, however. We have 

recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine when its 

application would defeat its own purpose of preserving the 

judiciary’s proper role in a democratic society. See, e.g., 

State v. Tui, 138 Hawaii 462, 468, 382 P.3d 274, 280 (2016)

(applying “capable of repetition but evading review” exception 

to mootness); Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 119 Hawaii 1, 

7, 193 P.3d 839, 845 (2008) (adopting collateral consequences 

exception to mootness); Doe v. Doe, 116 Hawaii 323, 326, 172 

P.3d 1067, 1070 (2007) (applying public interest exception to 

mootness). Notwithstanding our normal reluctance to rule 

outside of the context of a live controversy, this court will 
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resolve the merits of a claim for which it cannot grant relief 

when the alleged injury is capable of repetition but by its 

nature will evade appellate review.9 Tui, 138 Hawaii at 468, 

382 P.3d at 280. This often occurs when a class of injury is 

brief enough that “the passage of time would prevent any single 

plaintiff from remaining subject to the restriction complained 

of for the period necessary to complete the lawsuit.” Id.

(quoting Lethem, 119 Hawaii at 5, 193 P.3d at 843). 

These petitions fall within this exception to the 

mootness doctrine. The two cases demonstrate that the 

continuance of a preliminary hearing beyond the two-day limit 

that HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) sets for defendants in custody is an 

event capable of repetition. Yet the coinciding determination 

by the district or family court of whether to release a 

defendant will nearly always evade appellate review under 

conventional notions of mootness. As discussed, a determination 

of probable cause renders the issue moot by eliminating an 

appellate court’s ability to grant an effective remedy for the 

alleged injury. This determination would occur when a 

 

9 Although the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” 

exception has “merged at times” with the similar public interest exception to 

the mootness doctrine, “they are, in fact, ‘separate and distinct.’” Doe, 

116 Hawaii at 327 n.4, 172 P.3d at 1071 n.4 (quoting Kahoohanohano, 114 

Hawaii at 333 n.23, 162 P.3d at 727 n.23).
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rescheduled preliminary hearing is conducted in full, leaving 

only the brief duration of the continuance to obtain legal 

redress. But even when this court stands ready to expeditiously 

resolve a challenge during this brief period, the State may 

bypass the court’s review by filing an information or obtaining 

a grand jury indictment.10 Because release decisions under HRPP 

Rule 5(c)(3) would otherwise be effectively unreviewable, we 

address the challenge the petitions raise in order to provide 

guidance to the district and family courts--although we are not 

able to grant the petitioners the release from custody they 

seek. 

B. HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s Release Mandate and Its Exceptions

Petitioners argue that HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) required the 

judges in their cases to grant their motions for release from 

custody. We review a trial court’s interpretation of court 

rules de novo. See Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 80 

Hawaii 345, 349, 910 P.2d 116, 120 (1996). 

HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) provides in full as follows:

(3) TIME FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING; RELEASE UPON FAILURE OF TIMELY 

DISPOSITION. The court shall conduct the preliminary hearing 

 

10 Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 21(c) (2006) 

requires that respondents be given an opportunity to answer prior to a court 

granting a petition for a writ of mandamus. This procedure provides 

notification to the State of this court’s pending review of an HRPP Rule 

5(c)(3) determination and affords an opportunity to file an information or 

obtain an indictment before the court may rule.
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within 30 days of initial appearance if the defendant is 

not in custody; however, if the defendant is held in 

custody for a period of more than 2 days after initial 

appearance without commencement of a defendant’s 

preliminary hearing, the court, on motion of the defendant, 

shall release the defendant to appear on the defendant’s 

own recognizance, unless failure of such determination or 

commencement is caused by the request, action or condition 

of the defendant, or occurred with the defendant’s consent, 

or is attributable to such compelling fact or circumstance 

which would preclude such determination or commencement 

within the prescribed period, or unless such compelling 

fact or circumstance would render such release to be 

against the interest of justice. 

HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, if a preliminary 

hearing has not commenced within two days of the initial 

appearance of a defendant held in custody, the rule directs

courts to release the defendant upon his or her own motion. 

This general requirement is subject to three exceptions, 

however. Release is not mandated when the failure to conduct a 

preliminary hearing within the prescribed time frame resulted

from some action or condition of the defendant, upon the 

defendant’s request, or with the defendant’s consent. Release 

is also not required when a “compelling fact or 

circumstance . . . preclude[d]” the hearing from commencing or 

probable cause from being determined. Lastly, HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) 

allows a court to deny a defendant’s motion for release when a 

“compelling fact or circumstance” would make the release 

“against the interest of justice.” 

The State does not argue that either judge relied on 

HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s first exception when denying the petitioners 
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their release.

11 Rather, the State contends that the respective 

courts found “compelling circumstances” that justified the 

continued detention of the petitioners. The State does not 

specify which compelling circumstances exception of HRPP Rule 

5(c)(3) applies, and it is not apparent from the context of the 

courts’ rulings. We therefore consider each of these exceptions 

in turn.

1. HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s Second Exception

HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception permits the 

continued detention of a defendant when “compelling” facts or 

circumstances “preclude” the determination of probable cause or 

the commencement of a preliminary hearing within the prescribed 

two-day period. The HRPP does not define “preclude” or 

“compelling.” See HRPP Rule 2.3 (2012).12 “It is well 

established that the interpretation of rules promulgated by the 

supreme court involves principles of statutory construction.” 

 

11 We note that HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s first exception specifically 

provides that the release rule does not apply when the failure of the 

probable cause determination or commencement of the preliminary hearing is 

caused by the action of the defendant. In other words, if the defendant’s 

conduct, for example, has caused a witness to not appear, release from 

custody is not required, and a compelling circumstance is irrelevant. In 

this case, however, the State did not contend at the hearing or in response 

to the petition that Moana engaged in any actions following the offense to 

cause the witness not to appear. 

12 The HRPP cross-reference Hawaii Electronic Filing and Service 

Rules (HEFSR) Rule 1 (2015) for definitions, but neither “preclude” nor 

“compelling” is defined in HEFSR Rule 1.
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State v. Bohannon, 102 Hawaii 228, 240, 74 P.3d 980, 992 (2003).

The history and structure of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) may therefore 

guide our understanding of these terms. See Morgan v. Planning 

Dept., Cty. of Kauai, 104 Hawaii 173, 185, 86 P.3d 982, 994 

(2004).

a. The History of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)

Prior to 1977, two sets of rules governed Hawaii

courts in criminal cases: the Hawaii Rules of Criminal Procedure 

(HRCrP) and the District Court Rules of Penal Procedure (DCRPP). 

The HRCrP were promulgated in 1960 to “govern the procedure in 

the courts of the State in all criminal proceedings.” HRCrP 

Rule 1 (1960). Although HRCrP Rule 5(d)(1) (1960) provided a 

preliminary hearing to a defendant charged with a felony by 

complaint, the HRCrP neither specified a deadline by which such 

a hearing was to be conducted nor entitled the defendant to 

release when the hearing was not timely held. Rather, the rules 

required only that courts conduct the hearing “within a 

reasonable time.” HRCrP Rule 5(d)(2) (1960). HRCrP Rule 5 did 

not further specify the parameters of what constituted a 

“reasonable time,” and the rule was likewise silent on the 

remedy should the preliminary hearing not be held in a timely 

manner.
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In November 1971, this court adopted and promulgated

the DCRPP, which “govern[ed] the procedure in the district 

courts of the State in all penal proceedings.”

13 DCRPP Rule 2 

(1972). DCRPP Rule 25(b) (1972) functioned much the same as the 

version of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) now in effect. Under DCRPP Rule 

25(b), a defendant charged with a felony in district court who 

was held in custody was entitled to a preliminary hearing within 

forty-eight hours. If more than forty-eight hours passed 

without either a “disposition of the charge” or “commencement of 

a hearing,” the district judge was required to release the 

defendant unless the defendant’s release was prohibited by law

or the delay was due to the defendant’s “request, action or 

condition” or “occurred with [the defendant’s] consent.” DCRPP

Rule 25(b)(1), (2). Release of the defendant was also not 

required if the court “was satisfied that the State ha[d] shown 

good cause why an order of release should not be issued.” Id.

(emphasis added). Additionally, the rule specified that “[s]uch 

good cause must consist of some compelling fact or circumstance

which would preclude disposition of the charge within the 

 

13 The DCRPP superseded the HRCrP in district courts, in which the 

new rules applied when their application was not limited or modified by other 

laws. DCRPP Rule 2 (1972). The HRCrP were left intact in all other courts. 

See Ogata I, 53 Haw. at 368, 493 P.2d at 1345 (“Those rules apply only to 

proceedings in the district courts and before district judges. No provision 

thereunder applies to proceedings in the circuit courts . . . . [T]he 

circuit courts are governed by [the] H.R.Cr.P.”).
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prescribed period or would render such release to be against the 

interest of justice.” Id. (emphasis added).

Thus, under DCRPP Rule 25(b), a defendant in custody 

who was charged with a felony and did not receive a timely 

preliminary hearing was entitled to release unless, inter alia, 

the State could demonstrate the existence of “good cause,”

defined by the rule as a “compelling fact or circumstance” that

either (1) precluded the hearing from being held within the 

forty-eight-hour window, or (2) rendered the defendant’s release 

against the interest of justice. Id.

In 1977, the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) 

were adopted to replace the HRCrP and the DCRPP and to provide a 

comprehensive, unified set of rules governing criminal procedure 

in Hawaii. See Comm. for Penal Rules Revision of the Judicial 

Council of Haw., Proposed Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure at iii (June 1975) (stating that the HRPP were “intended to govern 

penal procedure in all of the courts” and “will supersede both 

the [HRCrP] and the [DCRPP]”). In crafting the HRPP, the 

drafters sought to “retain the present rules [of the HRCrP] 

wherever justified.” Id. at ii. The Penal Rules Revision 

Committee (the Committee) declined to retain the substance of 

HRCrP Rule 5 regarding preliminary hearings, however, in favor 

of a rule modeled after the more-protective DCRPP Rule 25. 
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Under a proposed draft of the HRPP transmitted to the Judiciary,

courts were required to conduct a preliminary hearing for a 

defendant in custody on felony charges, and, “if the defendant 

[was] held in custody for a period of more than 4 days after 

first appearance without either a determination of probable 

cause or commencement of a hearing thereon,” the defendant was 

entitled to release. Id. at 10—11. The proposed rule retained 

two of DCRPP Rule 25’s exceptions, permitting courts to deny 

release if the failure to timely conduct or commence a 

preliminary hearing (1) was caused by “the request, action or 

condition of the defendant or occurred with his consent” or (2) 

was attributable to “some compelling fact or circumstance which 

would preclude [the probable cause] determination or 

commencement within the prescribed period.” Id. at 11. 

HRPP Rule 5 as adopted and promulgated by this court 

did not incorporate the Committee’s proposed departures from 

DCRPP Rule 25, including the extended four-day time limit for 

holding a preliminary hearing when a defendant is held in 

custody. See HRPP Rule 5(c)(2) (1977). The court instead 

retained the forty-eight-hour time limit and the exception 

permitting the continued confinement of a defendant when 

compelling circumstances rendered release against the interest 

of justice. See id. The rule has remained substantially the 

same in the years since.
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The history demonstrates this jurisdiction’s strong

commitment to protecting defendants held in custody by providing 

a prompt preliminary hearing. The Committee first rejected the 

more flexible “reasonable time” standard contained in the HRCrP

when the DCRPP were promulgated, instead establishing a firm

deadline subject to few exceptions. Thus, an approach based on 

“reasonableness” that would have weighed the State’s 

administrative or prosecutorial needs against the hardship of 

the defendant was rejected, and instead the Committee 

recommended a proposed rule under which the rights of the 

defendant were highly protected. This intention was reaffirmed 

when the Committee modeled Rule 5 in the proposed draft of the

HRPP after the more protective DCRPP rule, notwithstanding its

otherwise stated intention to “retain [the HRCrP] wherever 

justified.” Proposed Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure at ii. 

The commitment was again confirmed when this court adopted and 

promulgated the HRPP, strengthening Rule 5’s protections for incustody defendants beyond those contained in the proposed draft 

of the Rule by reducing the prescribed time frame for 

commencement of the preliminary hearing from four days to fortyeight hours.

The implication from the history of HRPP Rule 5 is 

clear: there is a strong presumption that a defendant should be 

released upon motion if a preliminary hearing has not commenced 
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within two days, and holding a defendant for a longer period 

without a preliminary hearing is permissible only in very 

limited situations. Indeed, implicit in this court’s adoption

of a two-day time limit over the proposed four-day limit was a 

statement that a delay of even two additional days was 

presumptively not permissible. This presumption is also evident 

in the framework of the rule itself.

b. The Structure of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)

Our strong commitment to protecting defendants from 

prolonged confinement without a preliminary hearing is reflected 

in HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s structure. Unlike the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure and the rules of many other jurisdictions, 

the two-day time limit contained in HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) is not 

framed as a but-for requirement in order to proceed with the 

preliminary hearing. Compare HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) with Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 5.1(c) (2009) (“The magistrate judge must hold the 

preliminary hearing . . .”); Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 5(d) 

(2016) (“Such examination shall be held . . .”); and Alaska R. 

Crim. P. 5(e)(4) (2017) (same). That is, HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)

provides only for the release of the defendant upon the 

defendant’s motion if a hearing is not conducted within the 

prescribed time period; it does not provide for the dismissal of 

charges without prejudice, as many courts have held to be the 

case under the “mandatory” language of other jurisdictions. See
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State v. Hutcheson, 352 S.E.2d 143, 148 (W. Va. 1986) (citing

United States v. Rogers, 455 F.2d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 1972); 

United States v. Milano, 443 F.2d 1022, 1024, 1025 (10th Cir.

1971); United States v. Assenza, 337 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (M.D. 

Fla. 1972)). Instead, the charges against the released 

defendant remain pending when the defendant is released, and the 

thirty-day time limit for out-of-custody defendants, which is

couched in mandatory terms, becomes applicable. In other words, 

HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) allows the State up to thirty days from a 

defendant’s initial appearance to remedy any complication that 

made conducting a preliminary hearing within the two-day time 

limit inconvenient or otherwise problematic. However, the rule 

requires that the defendant be released from custody upon motion 

until such a hearing takes place unless the State demonstrates 

that one of the rule’s narrow exceptions is applicable.

c. The Language and Operation of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)

With these principles in mind, we turn now to the 

language of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception. The rule does 

not require the release of a defendant from custody upon motion 

if the nonoccurrence of a preliminary hearing “is attributable 

to such compelling fact or circumstance which would preclude 

such determination or commencement within the prescribed 

period.” HRPP Rule 5(c)(3). This phrasing suggests two 

separate requirements: a “compelling fact or circumstance” must 
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exist, and that fact or circumstance must “preclude such

determination [of probable cause] or the commencement [of a 

preliminary hearing]” within two days of the defendant’s initial 

appearance. 

We interpret the meaning of “compelling” in light of 

our historical commitment to providing a defendant held in 

custody with a preliminary hearing within two days of initial 

appearance such that release is strongly presumed to be 

appropriate if a preliminary hearing does not commence within 

this period. Both our history and the structure of HRPP Rule 

5(c)(3) indicate that only in narrow circumstances will the 

presumption be displaced, allowing the defendant to be held 

longer than two days without commencement of the preliminary 

hearing. Thus, a compelling fact or circumstance is an

occurrence or situation that is of such gravity as to overcome 

the strong presumption that the release rule applies.

The absence of a witness from a hearing does not in 

itself present a circumstance of sufficient gravity to displace 

the strong presumption that the release rule applies. Indeed, 

were the voluntary nonattendance of a witness considered 

compelling for purposes of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3), a witness could 

extend a defendant’s captivity at will simply by electing not to 

attend the preliminary hearing. Such a result would be plainly 

contrary to the strong presumption of release embodied in the 
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rule. Rather, when the State has used due diligence to obtain 

the witness’s presence, the court must consider the reasons for 

the witness’s absence, if known.14 Because the release rule is 

designed to have broad application, a situation must present 

serious considerations in order to be compelling. Further, a 

circumstance caused by the State’s failure to exercise due 

diligence will rarely overcome the strong presumption that the 

release rule applies because the rule exists to protect 

defendants against unnecessary delays. 

This interpretation is consistent with our application

of the compelling circumstance phrase in other contexts. In 

Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, for example, we considered 

when preliminary hearings--like the ones here at issue--could be 

closed to the public. 59 Haw. 224, 233, 580 P.2d 49, 56—57

(1978). We determined that a departure from “this 

jurisdiction’s policy of openness in judicial proceedings” was 

justified only when the court concludes that the public’s 

exposure to potentially inadmissible evidence was substantially 

likely to interfere with the defendant’s right to a fair trial 

by an impartial jury. Id. We would later describe this

decision as holding “that except under certain rare and 

 

14 When the reasons for a witness’s absence cannot be ascertained, 

evidence of whether the witness intended to cooperate may be relevant to the 

court’s analysis.
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compelling circumstances, courtroom proceedings shall be open to 

the public.” Oahu Publ’ns Inc. v. Ahn, 133 Hawaii 482, 495, 331 

P.3d 460, 473 (2014) (other emphasis omitted) (quoting Honolulu 

Advertiser, Inc. v. Takao, 59 Haw. 237, 238, 580 P.2d 58, 60

(1978)). Just as in the present cases, we identified a strong 

policy commitment “firmly embedded in our system of 

jurisprudence.” Gannett, 59 Haw. at 228, 580 P.2d at 54. As 

here, we permitted this commitment to be overcome only by a 

showing of circumstances that raised a countervailing concern of 

great enough weight to overcome the strong presumption that the 

standard rule applies. See also Amemiya v. Sapienza, 63 Haw. 

424, 428, 629 P.2d 1126, 1129 (1981) (holding that, 

notwithstanding legislative delegation of prosecutorial 

discretion to city and county public prosecutor, state attorney 

general may “supersede” public prosecutor “in certain compelling 

circumstances,” including “dereliction of duty” and when 

conflict of interest exists).

Even when a compelling fact or circumstance is found 

to be present, however, it must actually result in preclusion of 

“determination [of probable cause] or commencement [of a 

preliminary hearing] within the prescribed period” for HRPP Rule 

5(c)(3)’s second exception to apply. “Preclude” is generally 

defined as “to prevent or make impossible; to rule out 
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beforehand by necessary consequence.” Preclude, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Preclusion will therefore occur 

either when a circumstance prevents the determination of 

probable cause at a preliminary hearing or when a circumstance 

prevents the commencement of the hearing within the two-day time 

frame. The former situation will arise, for example, when there 

is an unavailability of evidence that is crucial to the probable 

cause determination. The latter situation occurs, for example, 

when court personnel required to conduct a hearing, such as 

defense counsel, are unable to be present.15 

An implicit corollary to the rule’s provisions is that 

any continuance granted under HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second 

exception must be no longer than needed to resolve the 

compelling fact or circumstance that precluded the determination 

of probable cause or the commencement of a hearing within the 

two-day time limit. The court must be informed how the State 

intends to expeditiously address the circumstance precluding the 

determination of probable cause or commencement of the hearing,

and any continuance must be circumscribed to the period 

 

15 HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) additionally requires that there be a causal 

link between the compelling fact or circumstance and the nonoccurrence of the 

hearing. The “failure of such determination or commencement” must be 

“attributable to such compelling fact or circumstance.” HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) 

(emphasis added). Even when a hearing is precluded and a compelling fact or 

circumstance is present, HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception will not apply 

when the preclusion resulted from a separate, noncompelling event.
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necessary to resolve that circumstance. The rule’s language, 

structure, and history demonstrate a policy determination that 

an in-custody defendant should be afforded a preliminary hearing 

within the prescribed time frame of the rule. Any deviation 

from this time frame should be measured relative to the two-day 

limit--not the thirty-day limit applicable to out-of-custody 

defendants. Thus, the length of a requested continuance must be 

consistent with the rule’s objective of a prompt probable cause 

determination. 

In summary, two days is the presumptive limit of 

acceptable delay, and holding a defendant without a preliminary 

hearing for a longer period is authorized under HRPP Rule 

5(c)(3)’s second exception only when compelling circumstances 

prevent a timely determination of probable cause or commencement 

of the hearing.

16 The period of any requested continuance must 

be consistent with the prompt-determination purpose of the rule 

and correlated in duration to the specific circumstance that 

caused the preliminary hearing to not commence within the twoday time frame.17

 

16 We note that this corollary also applies to HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s 

other exceptions to the standard release rule. Under the rule’s first 

exception, for example, a hearing continued because of a defendant’s 

condition should occur as soon as the condition is alleviated. 

17 Both petitioners acknowledge a dearth of caselaw regarding when a 

preliminary hearing “commences” for purposes of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3). They 

(continued . . .)
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d. Application to Moana and Curioso’s Cases

The cases at hand provide illustrative examples of the 

operation of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception. In Moana’s 

case, the State argues that the complainant’s nonappearance

despite being properly served was a compelling fact or 

circumstance.

18 Turning initially to the preclusion requirement

of the second exception, the complaining witness’s absence at 

the preliminary hearing likely precluded a determination of 

probable cause, insofar as the witness’s testimony would provide

crucial evidence on this issue. However, the State’s plan for 

 

(. . . continued)

argue that the structure of the rule, which permits a delay in commencement 

without the release of the defendant if the delay occurs by the defendant’s 

request or with the defendant’s consent, necessarily contemplates an 

opportunity for the defendant to move for continuance or consent to the 

State’s motion prior to commencement of the hearing. Commencement must 

therefore occur later, when witnesses are sworn or evidence is presented, 

they conclude. The State does not dispute this point. 

We note that HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s text indicates that the two-day 

time limit for in-custody defendants is satisfied if a preliminary hearing 

commences within the time frame, and that conclusion of the hearing within 

the two-day period is not required. In other words, a hearing commenced 

within the two-day period may extend beyond that time frame without 

necessitating the release of the defendant upon motion. However, any 

continuance granted after the commencement of the hearing must satisfy one of 

HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s exceptions or be based on the court’s inability to 

complete the hearing on the scheduled day due to time restraints. Any 

continuance would presumably be to the next court day. 

18 The State also proffers Moana’s criminal history, the nature of 

the offense with which Moana was charged, and the vulnerable nature of the 

complainant as compelling circumstances on which the court relied. Because 

these circumstances do not prevent the determination of probable cause or the 

commencement of preliminary hearing within the two-day time frame, they 

clearly do not qualify under HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception. We 

consider them further with respect to HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s third exception, 

discussed infra.
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securing the attendance of the complaining witness was of an 

indefinite nature and duration. To hold a defendant during a 

continuance pursuant to HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception, 

the State must set forth the specific steps that it intends to 

take to expeditiously resolve the compelling circumstance, and 

the requested continuance must be limited to that time period. 

Here, the State made only vague statements indicating that it 

would attempt to locate and serve the witness again, possibly 

attempting to obtain a material witness order if necessary. 

Indeed, the State acknowledged that the complainant may no 

longer have been in Hawaii and offered no information suggesting 

it had any knowledge of the witness’s current location. The 

strong presumption of release does not permit the State to hold 

a defendant for a period of time that does not preserve the 

defendant’s right to a prompt probable cause determination.

Because the continuance was clearly not limited to the 

time necessary to expeditiously resolve the circumstance 

precluding the hearing, we do not address whether the 

complaining witness’s absence constituted a compelling 

circumstance in light of the witness’s possible departure from 

the jurisdiction and previously expressed reluctance to testify. 

However, we note that when a compelling circumstance is not 

present or it cannot be ascertained whether a witness’s
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attendance can be promptly obtained, the court following the 

release of the defendant from custody may continue the 

preliminary hearing to any point within the thirty-day time 

limit for an out-of-custody defendant. 

In Curioso’s case, the complainant was present and 

ready to testify at the scheduled preliminary hearing but was 

impeded from doing so by the lack of an interpreter. The State 

avers that it could not have discovered the need for an 

interpreter earlier through ordinary diligence and that it made 

diligent efforts to obtain an interpreter as soon as the 

complainant requested one.19 As we have said, “inherent in [the] 

nature of justice is the notion that those involved in 

litigation should understand and be understood.” In re Doe, 99 

Hawaii 522, 533, 57 P.3d 447, 458 (2002) (quoting Figueroa v. 

Doherty, 303 Ill. App. 3d 46, 50, 707 N.E.2d 654, 658 (1999)).

 

19 Although we assume in this case that the State exercised due 

diligence in attempting to secure an interpreter, we note that there is no 

indication in the record that the State contacted the court for assistance. 

The court is equipped with many resources in this area, including the ability 

to appoint an interpreter of its own selection at a hearing or trial. See

HRPP Rule 28(b) (2012). Further, the Hawaii State Judiciary has committed to 

“reasonably provid[ing], free of charge, and in a timely manner, competent 

court interpreters for parties, witnesses and individuals with a substantial 

interest in a case.” Judiciary’s Language Access Policy, Hawaii Judiciary 

Policy #12 (2014); see also Hawaii State Judiciary, Language Access Plan for 

Persons with Limited English Proficiency, FY 2015-2016, at 9 (“Non-Judiciary 

staff, including a public defender, prosecuting attorney, private attorney, 

or community advocate, may also inform the court of a client’s need for an 

interpreter in a particular case.”)

http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/services/LEP.pdf.
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Given the fundamental importance of an interpreter in courtroom 

proceedings, the inability to obtain one presented a 

circumstance of such gravity as to overcome the strong 

presumption that inheres in the release rule.

The facts of the situation were thus compelling under 

the first prong of HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception. The 

interpreter was also essential court personnel necessary to 

commence the preliminary hearing. With both requirements of 

HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception met, the district court 

would have been justified in relying upon it to deny Curioso’s 

motion for release. 

However, the facts concerning the complaining 

witness’s late request for an interpreter, lack of prior 

indication that an interpreter was needed, and the State’s 

efforts to locate an interpreter were not shown to be part of 

the record of the hearing in this case.

20 The district court 

also continued the hearing without any inquiry into when an 

interpreter could be obtained, and instead of continuing the 

hearing to the next day, which was a Friday, the hearing was 

rescheduled for the following Tuesday--after the weekend. As 

discussed, when a defendant is kept in custody beyond the two-

 

20 The information was contained in an affidavit submitted with the 

State’s response to Moana’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
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day time limit pursuant to HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception,

any postponement of the preliminary hearing is to be limited to 

the time necessary to address the circumstance precluding the 

hearing--here, the minimum time needed to secure an interpreter. 

2. HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s Third Exception

Because the State does not specify which of HRPP Rule 

5(c)(3)’s exceptions the family court relied upon to deny 

Moana’s motion for release and keep him in custody until a 

continued hearing date two weeks hence, we also address the 

proffered facts in relation to the rule’s third exception, which 

allows a court to deny a motion for release if a “compelling 

fact or circumstance would render such release to be against the 

interest of justice.”

Like HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception, the rule’s

third exception requires that a court find that a “compelling 

fact or circumstance” exists in order to keep a defendant in 

custody. As we have concluded above, a fact or circumstance is 

compelling when it is of such gravity as to overcome the strong 

presumption that the standard release rule should apply to the 

situation. 

The record does not indicate that any such compelling 

facts or circumstances were implicated in Moana’s case. In 

addition to the nonappearance of the complainant, discussed 

above, the State argues that the family court relied upon three 
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36

compelling circumstances when it required Moana to remain in 

custody while the complainant’s whereabouts were being 

determined: the nature of Moana’s alleged offense, the 

vulnerable nature of the complainant and their child, and 

Moana’s criminal history, which the State argues collectively 

indicated a potential danger to the absent complainant.

However, simply referencing the nature of an alleged offense 

does not present a fact that justifies departing from the 

standard rule because HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) was formulated and 

adopted to apply to all criminal offenses. The rule does not 

provide for different periods of custody based on the type of

offense. That is, the third exception applies to compelling 

circumstances and not offenses categorized as compelling. 

Additionally, the record does not demonstrate any 

specific factual allegation that Moana posed a risk to the 

absent complainant that was of a sufficient gravity to overcome 

the strong presumption that the standard release rule should 

apply to the situation. Indeed, the State’s argument that Moana 

posed a potential risk to the complainant was undermined by the 

basis of its request for the continuance and the family court’s 

apparent reasoning for granting it. The complainant’s 

whereabouts were unknown to the State, and the requested 

additional time by the prosecutor was to locate and obtain the 

complainant’s cooperation. The prosecutor further explained 
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37

that his office might obtain a material witness order if the 

complainant was found on the mainland and refused to return 

voluntarily. The court itself referred to the insubstantiality 

of the prosecutor’s request in its ruling, warning the 

prosecutor that “the next time . . . if the complaining witness 

fails to appear . . . [the State] need[s] a lot more information 

than what somebody might have said.”21 The lack of a showing of 

compelling circumstances for the continuance request is clearly

evident.

Even had the asserted facts constituted compelling 

circumstances, the State did not present the court with proposed 

measures to expeditiously address the concerns raised. The 

strong presumption of release requires that a defendant in 

custody be afforded a hearing as promptly as feasible, and a 

continuance should in no event be longer than necessary to 

resolve the compelling circumstance that justified holding a 

defendant beyond the two-day time limit. Just as under HRPP 

Rule 5(c)(3)’s second exception, the rule’s third exception does 

not authorize holding a defendant without a probable cause 

determination for a period beyond what is required by the 

 

21 The family court’s comments regarding “what somebody might have 

said” referred to the prosecutor’s statement to the court in his continuance 

request that he had been contacted by the complainant’s aunt, who informed 

him that she had taken food to the airport to give to the complainant and her

child. 
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38

compelling circumstance, and any continuance granted must comply 

with the prompt hearing mandate embodied in the rule.

It is also noted that HRPP Rule 5(c)(3)’s third 

exception contains a second prong that requires a court to 

determine that the defendant’s release would be “against the 

interests of justice.” Because the record does not support a 

finding that compelling circumstances existed to overcome the 

strong presumption that release was required, we do not address 

the possible situations in which the interests of justice

provision may apply.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the petitions are moot, we cannot provide the 

relief the petitioners seek and therefore deny their petitions. 

We nonetheless consider the legal questions they present, which 

are capable of repetition but would otherwise evade review, in 

order to provide guidance to the district and family courts. We 

hold that HRPP Rule 5(c)(3) provides a strong presumption that 

the release upon motion of a defendant held in custody is 

required when a preliminary hearing has not commenced within two 

days of initial appearance. When a delay is not caused by a 

defendant and occurs without the defendant’s consent, courts may 

deny a defendant’s motion for release only in a circumstance

that is of such gravity as to overcome the strong presumption of 

release. If such a compelling circumstance is found, the 
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39

continuance of the preliminary hearing must be consistent with 

the prompt-determination objective of the rule and must be no 

longer than needed to resolve the circumstance making the delay 

necessary.

Jon N. Ikenaga

for petitioners

Rafael K. Renteria

for respondent in

SCPW-17-0000532

Leigh M. Okimoto

for respondent in

SCPW-17-0000171

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Richard W. Pollack

/s/ Michael D. Wilson