UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BENJAMIN BLUMAN et al., :

: Civil Action No.: 10-1766 (RMU)

Plaintiffs, :

: Re Document No.: 2

v. :

:

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION

FOR A THREE-JUDGE COURT

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiffs applied to have a three-judge court review their constitutional challenge to 

a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) and its implementing 

regulation. The defendant, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), opposes the application, 

arguing that under a three-judge court would lack the authority to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ 

claims. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants in part and denies in part the plaintiffs’

application for a three-judge court. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

Since 1976, the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) has prohibited foreign 

nationals from contributing money or “other thing[s] of value . . . in connection with an election 

to any political office or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to 
2

select candidates for any office.” FECA, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 324, 90 Stat. 493 (1976), 

previously codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a). In 2002, Congress enacted § 303 of the BCRA, which 

repealed the previous foreign national prohibition provision codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a) and 

replaced it with 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1). Like its predecessor, § 441e(a)(1) makes it unlawful for a 

foreign national to make 

 (A) a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make 

an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in 

connection with a Federal, State, or local election

(B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a political party; or

(C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an 

electioneering communication[.]

2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1). 

When an action is commenced challenging the constitutionality of “any [BCRA] 

provision,” “[s]pecial rules” set forth in § 403 of the BCRA must be followed. BCRA, Pub. L. 

No. 107-155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113-14 (2002). More specifically, the BCRA provides that 

such an action must be filed in this district and “shall be heard by a [three]-judge court.” Id. 

Local Civil Rule 9.1 governs the procedure involved with an application for a three-judge court. 

See LCvR 9.1. 

B. Factual & Procedural History

The plaintiffs, two foreign nationals who lawfully reside and work in the United States, 

seek to contribute funds to political candidates and committees of political parties as well as to 

“independently spend[] money to advocate for their preferred candidates.” Compl. ¶ 2. These 

activities, the plaintiffs contend, are prohibited by § 303 of the BCRA, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 

441e(a)(1), and its implementing regulation, 11 C.F.R § 110.20. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Believing that this 

prohibition violates the First Amendment, the plaintiffs have commenced this action against the 
3

FEC, seeking a judgment declaring that § 303 of the BCRA and its implementing regulation are 

unconstitutional insofar as they apply “to foreign nationals lawfully residing and working in the 

United States.” Id. at 7. 

Pursuant to § 403 of the BCRA, the plaintiffs have filed an application to have their case 

heard by a three-judge court, see Pls.’ Application at 1, which the FEC opposes, see generally

Def.’s Opp’n. With the plaintiffs’ application now ripe for adjudication, the court turns to the 

parties’ arguments and the applicable legal standard. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Pre-BCRA Prohibition of the Plaintiffs’ Proposed Activities Does Not Foreclose 

Review By a Three-Judge Court

The defendant maintains that the plaintiffs’ request for a three-judge court under § 403 is 

foreclosed due to the Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 

540 U.S. 93 (2003). Def.’s Opp’n at 4. More specifically, the defendant argues that under

McConnell, a three-judge court lacks “authority” to address the constitutionality of a provision of 

the BCRA where the activities it prohibits were “already unlawful before BCRA’s enactment.” 

Id. at 5-6. The defendant contends that “even if the plaintiffs were to obtain a favorable ruling 

on their challenges to BCRA § 303, the prohibitions on foreign nationals’ activity in pre-BCRA 

§ 441e would remain in place, [the] plaintiffs’ alleged injuries would not be redressed, and [the]
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plaintiffs therefore would lack standing.”1

The plaintiffs counter that McConnell is “easily distinguishable” from the instant case. 

Pls.’ Reply at 3. According to the plaintiffs, the McConnell Court determined that the plaintiffs’ 

alleged injury was caused not only by a provision of the BCRA but also by “other, extant 

provisions” of FECA. Id. at 3. Thus, the plaintiffs contend that the McConnell Court reasoned 

that even if it were to make a decision on the constitutionality of the BCRA provision, it could 

not remedy the specific injury advanced by those plaintiffs. Id. Here, the plaintiffs maintain, § 

303 of the BCRA, is “the only law prohibiting [their] proposed conduct,” and “the only law 

being challenged,” and “[t]here is no other extant provision of law causing or contributing to 

their injury.” Id. at 3. Accordingly, the plaintiffs argue that the pre-BCRA statute does not

“caus[e] or contribut[e] to [their] injury” because it has been “struck by the BCRA in its entirety

and no longer exists.” Id. at 3. 

 Id. at 5.

In McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission, the Court considered the 

constitutionality of the contribution limits imposed by § 307 of the BCRA, together with the 

individual and political action committee contribution limitations of FECA § 315. 540 U.S. at 

228. The Court determined that although § 307 of the BCRA “increased and indexed for 

inflation certain FECA contribution limits,” it was the FECA provisions that actually imposed 

the contested contribution limits. Id. at 229. The Court, however, observed that it “had no 

 1 The defendant also argues that the court should deny the plaintiffs’ application because they 

violated Local Civil Rule 7(m) by failing to confer with the defendant before filing their 

nondispositive motion. Def.’s Opp’n at 10. The plaintiffs respond that they “had no duty to 

confer” with the defendant as this was not a motion but an application under Local Civil Rule 9.1. 

Pls.’ Reply at 5. Local Civil Rule 9.1, as noted by the plaintiffs, requires that the application for 

three-judge court be filed contemporaneously with the complaint, at which point a lawsuit had not 

yet been filed and opposing counsel had not yet been identified. See LCvR 9.1. The court 

therefore agrees with the plaintiffs that the duty for parties to confer regarding nondispositive 

motions is not applicable to the plaintiffs’ for a three-judge court under Local Civil Rule 9.1. 
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power to adjudicate a challenge to the FECA limits” because the plaintiffs were required to 

challenge the constitutionality of the FECA provisions “before an appropriate en banc court of 

appeals, as provided in 2 U.S.C. § 437h,

[2

The plaintiffs here challenge the constitutionality of § 303 of the BCRA and its 

implementing regulation. See generally Compl. Unlike McConnell, if a three-judge court were 

to strike down § 303 as unconstitutional, then no other law (or at least none which the defendant 

has identified) would prohibit the plaintiffs from engaging in their desired conduct. As the 

defendant readily admits, the pre-BCRA provision barring foreign nationals from making 

political contributions is no longer in effect, having been entirely replaced by § 303 of the 

BCRA. See Def.’s Opp’n at 4. Nor does the fact that the plaintiffs’ proposed activities were 

banned before the BCRA’s enactment impact the plaintiffs’ entitlement to a three-judge court. 

See BCRA § 403 (stating that “any action . . . brought for declaratory or injunctive relief to 

challenge the constitutionality of any provision of [the BCRA] . . . shall be heard by a [three]-

judge court”). Because the plaintiffs’ requested relief would remedy their alleged injury in fact, 

] not in the three-judge District Court convened 

pursuant to BCRA § 403(a).” Id. Thus, even if the Court were to exercise its jurisdiction to 

review a constitutional challenge to § 307, “a ruling in the plaintiffs’ favor would not redress 

their alleged injury” because the FECA provisions would remain intact. Id. Accordingly, the 

Court held that because the plaintiffs could not “show the substantial likelihood that the 

requested relief [would] remedy their alleged injury in fact,” they lacked standing to bring their 

claim. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

 2 Under § 437h, issues regarding the constitutionality of a provision in the FECA shall be 

immediately certified to the Circuit, which is required to hear the matter sitting en banc. 2 U.S.C. 

§ 437h. 
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they have the requisite standing and are entitled to a three-judge court to review their 

constitutional challenge to BCRA § 303. 

B. The Plaintiffs’ Challenge to the FEC’s Regulation Is Not Reviewable 

By a Three-Judge Court

The defendant further argues that a three-judge court convened under BCRA § 403 would 

have no authority to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the constitutionality of the FEC’s 

regulation implementing BCRA § 303, because BCRA § 403 “provides jurisdiction to a threejudge court to decide only constitutional challenges to the [BCRA].” Def.’s Opp’n at 9. The 

plaintiffs respond that they have not brought any independent challenge to the regulations, which 

“simply parrot the statutory provision enacted by § 303 of the BCRA,” and which would 

“necessarily fall along with the statute” if the plaintiffs were to succeed in their suit. Pls.’ Reply 

at 1 n.1. 

In McConnell, the Supreme Court noted that “to the extent that the alleged constitutional 

infirmities are found in the implementing regulations rather than the statute itself,” “issues 

concerning the [FEC’s] regulations” are “not appropriately raised in [a] facial challenge to 

BCRA, but must be pursued in a separate proceeding.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223; cf. Shays 

v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004) (reviewing the FEC’s regulations 

under the Administrative Procedure Act in a single-judge court). Here, the plaintiffs specifically 

state in their complaint that they are challenging not only the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441e 

but also of its implementing regulation, 11 C.F.R. § 110.20. Compl. at 1. Moreover, the 

regulation does not simply “parrot” § 303 of the BCRA, but rather prohibits specific types of 

election-related activities for foreign nationals. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (stating, for example, 

that a foreign national shall not participate in the decision-making process of a corporation’s 

election-related activities). Because under McConnell, the FEC’s regulations are not 
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appropriately challenged in a three-judge court, see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223, the plaintiffs’ 

application is denied insofar as it requests that a three-judge court hear its claim that 11 C.F.R. § 

110.20 is unconstitutional.3 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part the plaintiffs’ 

application for a three-judge court. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is 

separately and contemporaneously issued this 7th day of January, 2011.

RICARDO M. URBINA

United States District Judge

 3 The court may, of course, consider the FEC’s regulations when determining the constitutionality 

of the BCRA’s provisions. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 169 n.63 (finding guidance in the FEC’s 

regulation to determine whether a provision of the BCRA was unconstitutionally overbroad 

although the regulation itself was not challenged).