[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12089

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BRIAN JONES, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cr-00260-VMC-TGW-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12089

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Brian Jones appeals his 70-month sentence for two counts of 

distribution and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and 

one count of distribution and possession with intent to distribute 

para-fluorofentanyl. On appeal, Jones argues that the district court 

erred by imposing the premises enhancement under the text of 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) and the accompanying commentary because it did not properly weigh his lawful and unlawful uses of the 

relevant premises.1 After careful review of the parties’ arguments, 

we affirm.

“This Court reviews de novo a district court’s interpretation 

of the guidelines and its application of the guidelines to the facts, 

but it reviews the district court’s factual findings under the clearerror standard.” United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197, 1204 n.6 (11th 

Cir. 2017). “Whether a defendant maintained a premises for the 

manufacture or distribution of drugs is a finding of fact that we

review under the clear-error standard.” Id. at 1205. “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, upon review of the evidence, we are

1 In his initial brief, Jones argues that the district court erred by granting deference to the commentary accompanying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) when it imposed a two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises for the purpose of 

manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance based on his residence. 

In his reply brief, however, Jones concedes that this argument is barred by the 

invited-error doctrine. 

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23-12089 Opinion of the Court 3

left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” 

United States v. Dimitrovski, 782 F.3d 622, 628 (11th Cir. 2015).

Under the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of 

Jones’s sentencing, “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for 

the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” his offense level should be increased by two levels. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(12) (2021). The commentary to that subsection explains 

that it “applies to a defendant who knowingly maintains a premises 

(i.e., a building, room, or enclosure) for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, including storage of 

a controlled substance for the purpose of distribution.” Id. § 2D1.1, 

cmt. 17. The commentary continues:

Among the factors the court should consider in determining whether the defendant “maintained” the 

premises are (A) whether the defendant held a possessory interest in (e.g., owned or rented) the premises 

and (B) the extent to which the defendant controlled 

access to, or activities at, the premises.

Manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance 

need not be the sole purpose for which the premises 

was maintained, but must be one of the defendant’s 

primary or principal uses for the premises, rather than 

one of the defendant’s incidental or collateral uses for 

the premises. In making this determination, the 

court should consider how frequently the premises 

was used by the defendant for manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance and how frequently 

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the premises was used by the defendant for lawful 

purposes.

Id. “Courts should ‘view the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant “maintained” a premises for drug distribution or manufacture.’” United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 

1242 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting George, 872 F.3d at 1205).

In George, we affirmed a district court’s application of the 

premises enhancement under the clear-error standard based on 

two alternative premises: (1) a barbershop salon and (2) the defendant’s apartment. 872 F.3d at 1206. We concluded that the salon 

satisfied the premises enhancement because there was evidence 

that the salon contained drugs, “equipment for packaging and distributing drugs,” and employees who worked for the defendant. Id. 

Additionally, there was evidence that the defendant had offered to 

sell drugs to two different individuals at the salon and that he had 

admitted that he made money through the sale of drugs at the salon. Id. We then alternatively concluded that the defendant’s 

apartment supported the enhancement because there was evidence that the defendant had purchased drugs there, and a witness 

stated he saw in the apartment “two other men, packaging equipment, scales, heat-sealing machines, and firearms.” Id. We rejected 

the argument that the enhancement did not apply to the apartment 

on the ground that the defendant lived there because “a premises 

can have more than one primary use, so long as the drug activity is 

more than ‘incidental or collateral.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, 

cmt. 17).

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In Rodriguez, we upheld the application of the premises enhancement based on the defendant’s home. 75 F.4th at 1243. In 

that case, law enforcement discovered in the trash “supplement 

packaging with unknown white powder, discarded pills, ventilator 

masks, and gloves,” and, when they searched the house, they found 

the defendant trying to flush pills down the toilet. Id. Additionally, 

they found in the house “56 grams of methamphetamine, approximately 300 grams of heroin, approximately 10 grams of counterfeit pills containing methamphetamine, $50,000 in cash, a chemical 

mask, and two scales.” Id. Lastly, the defendant admitted that he 

had engaged in drug-related activity at his house, including “sorting the materials, getting the powders, examining them and storing 

pressed drugs and distributing pressed drugs.” Id. We again rejected the argument that the enhancement did not apply because 

the premises was also the defendant’s residence based on the same 

reasoning as in George. Id.

Here, the district court did not clearly err by applying the 

premises enhancement because there was sufficient evidence to 

support its conclusion that Jones “maintained a premises for the 

purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” 

See George, 872 F.3d at 1205; U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) (2021). Record 

evidence shows that Jones conducted two drug transactions with a 

confidential source at his home, that he packaged the drugs in his 

kitchen on one of those occasions, and that law enforcement discovered in his kitchen drugs, “two blenders containing powder residue, a digital scale with powder residue, a plastic container and 

spoon with powder residue, plastic baggies and capsules consistent 

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with narcotics packaging, two-kilogram presses, and a container labeled ‘Super Mannitol,’ a cutting agent,” as well as firearm ammunition. Although Jones also used the apartment as his residence, “a 

premises can have more than one primary use” and the record supports that the drug activity at Jones’s apartment was “more than 

‘incidental or collateral.’” See George, 872 F.3d at 1206; Rodriguez, 75 

F.4th at 1243.

To the extent Jones argues that the district court failed to 

consider how frequently the premises was used for distributing 

drugs versus lawful purposes, we disagree. The record shows that 

the court weighed the lawful and unlawful uses of the apartment 

at Jones’s sentencing hearing when determining to apply the enhancement. 

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by imposing the premises enhancement.

AFFIRMED.

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