No. 82-437 

IN TI-IE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MO?SITAI?A 

1983 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

LOUISE I. PARENTEAU, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

-vsMITCHEL J . PARENTEAU 

Respondent and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable 

William J. Speare, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Jerrold L. Nye, Billings, l4ontana 

For Respondent: 

Robert W. Holmstrom, Rillings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: February 3, 1983 

Decided: May 31, 1983 

Filed: MAY 3 1. 1983 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Mitchel Parenteau (respondent) appeals from the division 

of marital property by the Thirteenth Judicial District 

Court, Yellowstone County, in its order granting Louise 

Parenteau's (petitioner's) petition for dissolution of the 

pa-rties' second marriage to each other. We affirm the 

District Court, but remand for modification of the judgment. 

Respondent raises the following issues for review: 

1. Whether it was an abuse of discretion for the 

District Court to adopt verbatim the findings of fact and 

conclusions of law of petitioner. 

2. Whether the award by the District Court to 

petitioner of the entire equity in the marital home is 

supported by the facts at trial and the applicable law. 

3. Whether the valuation of personal property awarded 

to the respondent is supported by the evidence. 

4. Whether the respondent is entitled to reimbursement 

of his contribution during the second marriage to pay off a 

certain loan taken by petitioner to pay his equity in the 

marital home from the first divorce of the parties. 

5. Failure of the District Court to find and award 

property divided before trial by stipulation of the parties. 

The parties were first married in 1959 and divorced in 

1976; they remarried each other in 1978 and divorced in 1982. 

There were no children of either marriage. The family home 

comprised the bulk of marital assets in 1976 and in 1982. 

In the 1976 dissolution, the court determined that the 

marital assets should be equally divided. Respondent was 

awarded savings and miscellaneous sports equipment, tools, 

vehicles, basement furniture, and an organ, much of which he 

brought into his remarriage to petitioner. Petitioner was 
awarded household goods and furnishings, a vehicle, a stereo 

and records, in addition to the family home. She brought 

many of these assets to her remarriage to respondent. Under 

the provisions of the 1976 decree, petitioner was required to 

pay respondent $9,950 (one-half the difference in value of 

assets awarded) in order to obtain ownership of the home. In 

1976, she mortgaged the home, and took out an $11,000 loan 

from the Yellowstone Bank in Laurel. She then paid 

respondent $9,950, obtaining in return a quitclaim of his 

interest in the home. In 1978, petitioner still owed the 

bank $9,268. 

In 1978, petitioner took out a $20,000 real estate loan 

from the Yellowstone Bank. Of this amount, $9,268 went to 

pay off the 1976 loan, and $10,700 was loaned to respondent 

for payment of a property settlement in his divorce from 

another woman. In October of 1978, $10,936 from respondent's 

sale of certain property in Laurel was applied to the $20,000 

real estate loan in satisfaction of petitioner's $10,700 loan 

to him. 

Shortly after they remarried, the parties legally 

established joint ownership of their checking account, the 

house in Laurel previously in petitioner's name, and a 

two-and-one-half acre parcel with several buildings on it, in 

the Swan Valley, known as "the Condon property, " previously 

in respondent's name. The parties disagree as to their 

purpose in creating joint ownership in the real property. 

According to petitioner, it was a matter of convenience; 

according to respondent, they intended that each should have 

a 50% interest in both properties. During the marriage, 

respondent made some improvements on the Laurel home, 

painting and installing new appliances and carpeting; costs 

for this work came from the parties' joint checking account. 
For a time the Parenteaus planned to sell the Laurel home and 

move to the Condon property. With this in mind, they 

borrowed $22,000 from the bank in May of 1979, paid off the 

$6,989 owing on the $20,000 real estate loan, and applied the 

remaining $15,011 to remodeling buildings on the Condon 

property and upgrading that property. Certain of the costs 

were paid from the joint checking account. 

In October of 1980, after the Parenteaus decided to 

remain in the Laurel home, they sold their Condon property 

for $19,550. Respondent claims that the property, which was 

debt-free, had been appraised at $40,000 a few years earlier. 

(The Parenteaus recognized the loss on their joint tax 

return.) $9,427 from the sale of the Condon property was 

applied to the $22,000 bank loan made in 1979; the remainder 

was spent on a trip to Australia, a vehicle subsequently 

awarded to the husband, and various expenses paid from the 

joint checking account. 

During the marriage, all income and virtually all 

expenditures, including loan payments, passed through the 

Parenteaus' joint checking account. Respondent's monthly 

retirement income of $894.82 (plus $419.25 for petitioner) 

and petitioner's monthly retirement income amounting to 

$969.73 (plus $350.05 for respondent) after petitioner's 

retirement in 1980, were deposited in the joint checking 

account. 

In 1982, the parties were again divorced. Trial was 

held June 1, 1982. At that time, the balance owing on the 

1979 real estate loan for $22,000, was about $5,000. 

Findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered 

September 10, 1982; judgment was entered September 13, 1982. 

The District Court found the marital assets amounted to 

$83,000.00, and divided them as follows: 
"TO THE WIFE: 

Assets: 

"House $57,500.00 

1976 Buick 2,175.00 

Lowrv Organ 2,000.00 

Piano 1,000.00 

Stereo 200.00 

New television 500.00 

Miscellaneous household furniture 

and household goods 1,900.00 

Miscellaneous appliances 500.00 

Record collection 350.00 

[Microwave oven] [150.00] 

Collection of National Geographic 

magazines and antiques received from 

wife's parents No Value 

Total Assets $66,275.00 

Liabilities: 

Yellowstone Bank, mortgage on 

home $ 5,000.00 

Net worth of wife $61,275.00 

TO THE HUSBAND: 

1980 Chevrolet pickup $ 5,650.00 

Colorado pickup camper 1,200.00 

17 Ft. Larson inboard/outboard boat, 

trailer and 120 hp Mercury motor 4,000.00 

14 Ft. Aluminum boat, trailer and 

motor 1,500.00 

Miscellaneous boating equipment 

consisting of depth finder, skis 

life jackets, fishing tackle, et 

cetera 

Camera equipment 

Guns 

Miscellaneous tools, drills, 

grinders, lathes, saws, welders, 

et cetera 
Metal detector 400.00 

Basement furniture consisting of 

couch, chair and stove 100.00 

Net worth of husband $21,725.00" 

The District Court listed the total value of assets 

awarded petitioner as $66,275, but awarded her specific 

assets totaling only $66,125 in value. Because the only 

marital asset not awarded to either party was the microwa-ve 

oven valued at $150, we assume that item was meant to be 

awarded to petitioner. 

Respondent maintains that the District Court's virtually 

verbatim adoption of petitioner's proposed findings of fact 

and conclusions of law amounts to an abuse of discretion. 

Respondent concedes that where the adopted findings and 

conclusions are supported by the evidence, they will not be 

disturbed on appeal. 

This Court has repeatedly stated its position that 

findings and conclusions which are sufficiently comprehensive 

and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision, 

and which are supported by the evidence, i.e., are not 

"clearly erroneous" in light of the evidence, will not be 

overturned simply because the trial court relied upon 

proposed findings and conclusions submitted by counsel. 

Kowis v. Kowis (1983), Mont . , 658 P.2d 1084, 1088, 

40 St.Rep. 149, 154; In re Marriage of Hunter (1982), 

Mont. , 639 P.2d 489, 495, 39 St.Rep. 59, 67; In re 

Marriage of Jensen (19811, Mont . , 631 P.2d 700, 

703-04, 38 St.Rep. 1109, 1113. Because the remaining 

questions raised by petitioner are primarily challenges to 

the sufficiency of evidence to support valuations and awards 

of assets, this first question may be resolved by a 

resolution of the remaining issues. 
Respondent argues that the District Court abused its 

discretion in awarding petitioner the entire equity in the 

family home. He asserts first that Finding of Fact No. VI is 

"not supported by the clear evidence at trial," and the 

District Court's conclusion therein establishes no equitable 

right in petitioner to the entire equity in the Laurel home. 

Finding of fact No. VI states: 

"That during the parties' marriage the title to the 

family home was transferred to their joint names 

and the Condon property was placed in their joint 

names; respondent claims that the title to the 

property was so transferred in connection with an 

oral antenuptial agreement that they were to each 

own a 50 per cent interest in the property, 

however, the petitioner denies that there was any 

such aareement ., and has testified that it was done 

merely to keep peace in the family; the Court finds 

that there -- was no valid antenuptial arrangement 

agreement --- and that the transfer -- was done merely - for 

convenience sake." (Emphasis supplied.) 

In dissolutions of marriage, the award of marital 

property is not controlled by the name on the title or the 

source of the asset. Section 40-4-202, MCA establishes the 

authority of the court to "finally equitably apportion 

between the parties the property and assets belonging to 

either or both, however and wherever acquired and whether the 

title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both." 

See Morse v. Morse (1977), 174 Mont. 541, 571 ~.2d 1147. 

(Property quitclaimed to husband by wife before dissolution 

held to be part of marital estate. Vacated on other 

grounds. 1 

Since the age, income, needs, and opportunities for 

future acquisition of capital by the parties appear to be 

fairly equal, the most important factor of those listed in 

section 40-4-202, MCA, and obviously that weighing most 

heavily in the court's award of assets, is the relative 

contribution of each spouse to the marital estate. In 

Finding of Fact No. X, the District Court stated: 
"The major asset of the parties is the family home 

which was owned by the wife at the time of the 

marriage ; that during the marriage her 

contributions in the form of money to the joint 

living expenses of the parties exceeded that of the 

respondent by an amount in excess of $12,000.00 and 

i.n addition thereto she performed the household 

duties of cooking, cleaning house, washing, et 

cetera; that the respondent's contributions in 

addition to his retirement benefits as herein 

specified consisted of the proceeds from the sale 

of the Condon property; however, said proceeds were 

less than the monies borrowed upon the family home 

used to complete the improvements on the Condon 

property and in addition thereto the respondent 

performed certain minor maintenance upon the family 

home; having in mind the assets that -- each brought 

-- into the marrlage -- and the contributions --- of each to 

the maintenance of those assets -- and the acquisition 

- of additional assets,eCourt - finds the assets of 

the parties should - be divided as follows: [List of 

property awarded, see infra. 1 " (Emphasis - supplied.) 

There is ample evidence on the record to support these 

findings by the trial court. But respondent argues that 

because his substantial contributions to the joint checking 

account helped pay off a series of mortgages against the 

Laurel home, and because his remodeling efforts enhanced the 

value of that home, it was an abuse of discretion for the 

District Court to award the entire equity in the Laurel home 

to petitioner. 

We do not agree. After the contribution of each party 

is weighed, any equity the respondent might have in the 

Laurel home is so insignificant that it does not warrant a 

reversal. The record supports the District Court's finding. 

At the time the parties remarried, the petitioner was sole 

owner of the house, having paid off respondent's equity two 

years earlier. Thus, petitioner contributed the Laurel house 

to the marital estate. She also contributed over $12,000 

more in her work and retirement earnings than did respondent 

over the four years of the second marriage. It is true that 

the $19,550 received for the Condon property was deposited in 

the joint checking account; but much of that money was spent 
on the parties' trip to Australia and the purchase of the 

1980 pickup and camper awarded to respondent. Furthermore, 

$15,000 of the $22,000 borrowed against the Laurel home was 

spent on improving the Condon property. Approximately $5,000 

remained for petitioner to pay after the 1982 dissolution. 

"The standards governing review of a district 

court's property distribution . are 

well-settled in Montana. The District Court has 

far-reaching discretion in making property 

divisions. Torma v. Torma (1982), Mon t . I 

645 P.2d 395, 399, 39 St.Rep. 839, 843; Zell v. 

Zell (1977), 174 Mont. 216, 220, 570 P.2d 33, 35. 

"The reviewing court does not substitute its 

judgment for that of the trial court, and will not 

alter a judgment unless it finds an abuse of 

discretion, i.e., that the trial court acted 

arbitrarily without employment of conscientious 

judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting 

in substantial injustice. Torma, 645 P.2d at 399, 

39 St.Rep. at 843; Zell, 174 Mont. at 220, 570 P.2d 

at 35; Creon v. Creon (1981), Mont. , 635 

P.2d 1308, 1309, 38 St.Rep. 1828,1830." 

"[Wlhile a district court, in its discretion, may 

equally divide the marital assets, section 

40-4-202, MCA, does not mandate equal distribution. 

Martens v. Martens (1981), Mont . , 637 P.2d 

523, 526, 38 St.Rep. 2135, 2138; In re Marriage of 

Aanenson (1979), Mont. , 598 P.2d 1120, 

1123, 36 St.Rep. 1525, 1528- Kowis v. Kowis 

Here, the assets brought to the marriage by petitioner 

were substantially greater than those contributed by the 

respondent, and included in the family home; petitioner's 

contributions during the marriage exceeded respondent's. We 

find no "substantial injustice" in the award of the entire 

equity in the Laurel home to petitioner. 

Respondent next argues that the District Court 

overvalued certain of the assets awarded him, relying on an 

unsupported and biased estimation of values submitted by 

petitioner. He asserts that a pickup camper purchased for 

$700 was valued at $1,200; that a boat and trailer purchased 
for $500-600 was valued at $1,500; that another boat and 

motor valued at $4,000 in 1976 and. only slightly improved was 

again valued at $4,000; and that tools valued in 1976 at 

$2,000 and including, in addition, a $275 table saw and "some 

minor hand tools," were valued in 1982 at $6,100. 

We note that petitioner testified at some length 

concerning how she arrived at the figures she did in 

evaluating the worth of marital assets. The transcript 

contains the following statements by petitioner: 

"(2. Now, you've indicated that the value placed 

for the home is based upon an appraisal, is that 

correct? A. That's right. 

"Q. And are the other values which are shown for 

the vehicles and other items of property your 

estimation of their value? A. Well, they're my 

estimation of the value, but in quite a few of 

them, I did make inquiries; and vehicles, I went to 

Frontier Chevrolet and got their blue book prices, 

what they were worth, and I did the same with the 

boats. I went to Montana Marina and talked to a 

man there and described them as best I could, and 

he gave me prices on those, what he thought they 

would be worth. 

"Q. Would the same thing be true relative to the 

guns and tools and the -- A. Yes. The guns, I 

had a gunsmith look at those, and he had his books 

-- He had three or four books there, and he looked 

each one up. 

"Q. So after having done that, then would I be 

correct in my understanding that you believe the 

values which are shown on Petitioner's proposed 

Exhibit 4, then, is your estimation of the value of 

the various items of personal property? A. Yes, 

it is. [Tr. at 12-13] 

"Q. Did you have somebody else out and and look at 

[the tools] ? A. No. ------- I made a list of them and 

--- took it to someone else -- and talked to -- them, - and 

someone -- that knew about tools. I suppose he would 

have come up if I would have asked him to. [Tr. at 

381 

"Q. Did you use the blue book values when you came 

up with that $4,000? [Valuation of Larson boat] 

A. No, I didn't. I talked to one of the men in 

the shop, and from my description, he gave me -- 

And he asked some questions, and I answered them 
the best I could; and he gave me that, and that 

sounded like a good estimate to me but he didn't 

use a book, no. [Tr. at 441" 

Respondent testified that, although he had not had items 

appraised, he considered them to have certain values because 

of purchase price, deterioration or improvement. 

The standard of review in considering a District Court's 

resolution of disputed facts was stated in Cameron v. Cameron 

(1978), 179 Mont. 219, 227, 587 P.2d 939, 944: 

"Although conflicts may exist in the evidence 

presented, it is the duty of the trial judge to 

resolve such conflicts. His findings will not be 

disturbed on appeal where they are based on 

substantial though conflicting evidence, unless 

there is a clear preponderance of evidence against 

such findings. [Olson v. Westfork Properties, Inc. 

(1976), 171 Mont. 154, 557 P.2d 821, 823, 33 

St.Rep. 11331 : Butte Teachers' Union - v. Board - of 

Education of School District No. 1, Silver Bow 

County (1977), Mont., 567 P.2d 51, 53, 34 St.Rep. 

726; Rule 52 (a) , M.R.Civ.P. " 

We do not find a clear preponderance of evidence against 

those valuations submitted by petitioner. Therefore we will 

not disturb the District Court's adoption of those values. 

Respondent maintains that the District Court erred in 

including in the marital estate certain items of "personal 

property," such as his guns, tools, boats, and petitioner's 

household goods, which were brought into the marriage by each 

party, and whose value was altered little by contributions of 

either during the marriage. Respondent relies upon this 

Court's decision in In Re Marriage of Brown (1978), 179 Mont. 

417, 587 P.2d 361, and In Re Marriage of Herron (1980), 

Mont . , 608 P.2d 97, 37 St.Rep. 387. Brown held that 

where the homemaking contributions of the non-acquiring 

spouse (wife) were substantial, the award to her of $25,000 

of an estate valued at $350,000 or more was inequitable, even 

though the property was inherited solely by the husband. 

Herron held that to the extent that the value of marital 
property acquired by one spouse was not enhanced by 

contributions of the other spouse, the trial court should not 

have equally divided those items. Nothing more. The cases do 

not suggest that the District Court must, on pain of 

reversal, exclude such property from the marital estate. 

Rather, the cases relied upon by respondent stand for the 

proposition stated in Herron that " [ilf none of the value of 

the property is a product of contribution from the marital 

effort, the District Court can justifiably find that the 

non-acquiring spouse has no interest in the property." 608 

P.2d at 101, 37 St. Rep at 392. This finding would affect 

the award of the property, but not its inclusion in the 

marital estate. As section 40-4-202, MCA, indicates, the 

equitable distribution of the parties' property in a 

dissolution proceeding includes "the property and assets 

belonging to either or both, however and whenever acquired." 

Furthermore, the District Court - did award respondent the 

guns, tools and boats, and awarded petitioner the household 

goods, with the exception of certain basement furniture. We 

find no error here. 

Respondent next asserts that he is entitled to 

reimbursement of $4,630 for his contribution, during the 

second marriage, to retiring the 1976 loan permitting 

petitioner to purchase his equity in the Laurel home. He 

argues that effectively he "has been required to pay his own 

1976 divorce settlement." 

We do not agree. In the first place, the parties owed 

no financial obligation to each other when they remarried; 

respondent's equity in the house had been purchased by 

petitioner in 1976 pursuant to the terms of the first divorce 

decree. It is true that respondent contributed his 

retirement income and the proceeds from the sale of the 
Condon property to the joint checking account, and that 

payments made on successive refinancing loans against the 

Laurel home came from that joint account. But what 

respondent urges here is nothing more nor less than 

recognition by this Court of respondent's equity in the 

Laurel home. We have already rejected that argument, finding 

sufficient evidence to support the District Court's findings 

that petitioner's significantly greater contribution to the 

marital estate supports an award to her of full equity in the 

Laurel home. 

Finally, respondent claims that because the District 

Court failed to expressly recognize a stipulation by the 

parties, he is unable to obtain certain property to which he 

is entitled. 

The transcript contains the following statements: 

" [Counsel for Petitioner] : 

[Plrior to this time, we've stipulated that 

[respondent] may have the stove and refrigerator in 

the basement, as well as the refrigerator in the 

shop. That's not in issue that I know of. We are 

prepared to stipulate to it on the record. 

[Counsel for respondent]: 

Fine. " 

The findings and judgment make no reference to this 

stipulation, but do award respondent basement furniture 

consisting of couch, chair and stove. It is clear from the 

transcript that the stipulation included the "refrigerator in 

the basement as well as the refrigerator in the shop." To 

the extent that the record indicates agreement by the parties 

to divide property, the findings and judgment should be 

amended to include that agreement. 

We affirm the District Court, but remand for amendment 

of the findings and judgment as to the final issue onlv. 
We concur: 

/ 

Justice 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea specially concurring: 

I join in the result but adhere to my opinion that 

findings and conclusions adopted verbatim by a judge without 

any supporting indication that the case was independently 

considered and decided, are, among other things, in violation 

of Canon 19 of the Canons of Jud.icia1 Ethics. Beyond this, 

however, a judge owes it to his profession,to the parties, to 

the lawyers, and to the public, to provide the ind.icia that 

he rather than the lawyer, has done the necessary work 

leading to a decision. Verbatim parroting of findings and 

conclusions, with nothing more, hardly fulfills these duties.