J-S54011-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

JESSE MILLER 

 Appellant No. 491 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 14, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0002645-2013 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014 

 Jesse Miller appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the 

Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, following Miller’s convictions for 

two counts of persons not to possess firearms,1

 three counts of possession 

of a controlled substance,2

 and two counts of possession of drug 

paraphernalia.3

 Upon our review, we affirm. 

 The facts of this matter are as follows: 

On May 20, 2013, adult Probation Officer, (APO) Carlo DeAngelo 

received information from a known source indicating [Miller] was 

in possession of a firearm and that he was selling cocaine. 

[Miller] had multiple theft charges in Berks County, a retail theft 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). 

2

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). 

3

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32). 
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out of Franklin County, and a prior burglary from 2008 at the 

time of DeAngelo’s supervision. The known source explained to 

DeAngelo that [Miller] kept a firearm in a locked safe that he 

moved between his apartment and his vehicle. The known 

source also told DeAngelo that [Miller] was selling cocaine 

between Reading and Franklin County. Due to the specifics of 

the allegations, a pre-approved search for [Miller’s] residence 

was approved by DeAngelo’s supervisors.

On May 21, 2013, APO DeAngelo and APO Michael Futrick went 

to 211 West Douglass Street, Apartment 2D, Reading 

Pennsylvania, to conduct the pre-approved search of [Miller’s] 

apartment and vehicle. Officer Fleming of the Reading Police 

Department was contacted prior to the execution of the search 

due to the possibility that a firearm may be present. Once at 

211 West Douglass Street, [Miller] consented to DeAngelo’s 

entry of the apartment, whereupon he was immediately

handcuffed for safety reasons. DeAngelo asked [Miller] if there 

were any drugs or firearms in the apartment, and [Miller] stated 

that there was not. While handcuffed, [Miller] was searched. 

DeAngelo found a cellphone in [Miller’s] left front pocket, a set of 

car keys, and another key ring in his right front pocket. The 

officers then searched the apartment. During the search of the 

apartment, Futrick found a locked safe, which the officers then 

opened with the key ring found on [Miller’s] person. Once the 

safe was opened, two revolvers with ammunition were removed 

from inside of the safe. 

Following the search of the home, officers then searched 

[Miller’s] vehicle. As a result of the search, officers found 

several containers of baggies, a digital scale, a sunglass case 

that contained a white chunky substance, a small amount of 

powdery substance and two pills. All items discovered in the 

search of the residence and vehicles were then turned over to 

Officer [Thomas] Fleming [of the Reading Police department]. 

Both of the recovered firearms were found to be functional by 

Officer Fleming. The white powdery substance seized . . . tested 

positive for cocaine. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/28/14, at 2-3.
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 On May 21, 2013, Officer Fleming filed a criminal complaint against 

Miller based on the aforementioned search. Following a preliminary hearing, 

Miller was formally arraigned on July 3, 2013. 

 Prior to trial, Miller filed an omnibus pretrial motion on September 27, 

2013, which included a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the 

search of his residence and vehicle. Following a hearing on November 4, 

2013, the trial court denied Miller’s motion.

A stipulated bench trial followed on February 14, 2014, after which the 

court convicted Miller of the above-referenced offenses. Sentencing 

occurred on the same day and Miller received an aggregate sentence of 

three to six years’ incarceration, followed by eight years of probation. This 

timely appeal followed. 

 On appeal, Miller argues that APO DeAngelo did not have reasonable 

suspicion to search his residence and vehicle and, as such, the court erred in 

denying his suppression motion. Our standard of review for the denial of a 

suppression motion is as follows: 

[W]e are limited to determining whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct. We may consider the

evidence of the witnesses offered by the prosecution, as verdict 

winner, and only so much of the defense evidence that remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. We are bound by facts supported by the record and may 

reverse only if the legal conclusions reached by the court below 

were erroneous. 

Commonwealth v. McAliley, 919 A.2d 272, 275-76 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citation omitted). 
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As an initial matter, we have determined that the suppression court’s 

findings of fact are based on evidence in the record. Accordingly, we 

proceed to examine the legal conclusions drawn from the facts. 

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects 

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” that are not supported 

by probable cause. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. A probationer, however, has a 

diminished expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution and also under Article 1, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 

1031, 1039 (Pa. Super. 1997). Warrantless searches of supervised persons 

and their property may occur if: 

(2) A property search may be conducted by an agent if there is 

reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property 

in the possession of or under the control of the offender contains 

contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of 

supervision. 

(3) Prior approval of a supervisor shall be obtained for a 

property search absent exigent circumstances. 

...

(6) The existence of reasonable suspicion to search shall be 

determined in accordance with constitutional search and seizure 

provisions as applied by judicial decision. In accordance with 

such case law, the following factors, where applicable, may be 

taken into account: 

(i) The observations of agents. 

(ii) Information provided by others. 

(iii) The activities of the offender. 
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(iv) Information provided by the offender. 

(v) The experience of agents with the offender. 

(vi) The experience of agents in similar circumstances. 

(vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of the

offender. 

(viii) The need to verify compliance with the conditions of 

supervision. 

61 Pa.C.S. § 6153(d)(2), (3), (6) (emphasis added). 

A property search is a “warrantless search of real property, vehicle or 

personal property which is in the possession or under the control of the 

offender.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6151. Reasonable suspicion is determined from the 

totality of the circumstances, which “allows officers to draw on their own 

experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions 

about the cumulative information available to them.” See Commonwealth 

v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2008). Reasonable suspicion 

may arise from information provided by third parties, including tips from 

citizens. See Commonwealth v. Barber, 889 A.2d 587, 593 (Pa. Super. 

2005). 

Instantly, the suppression court concluded that the search in this 

matter was reasonable because APO DeAngelo possessed the requisite 

reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Miller and his property. The trial 

court reasoned that although evidence relating to all eight factors 

enumerated in section 6153(d)(6) was not presented, a need existed to 

verify Miller’s compliance with the conditions of his probation in light of the 

information provided by the known informant. Miller contends this was 
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insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because APO DeAngelo relied 

on a tip from an unverified informant. We disagree.

“[I]f an informant . . . identifies him or herself to the police, then there 

is an indicia of reliability attached to the tip, because the informant has 

placed himself or herself at risk for prosecution for giving false information 

to the police if the tip is untrue.” Commonwealth v. Altadonna, 817 A.2d 

1145, 1152 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth 

v. Hayward, 756 A.2d 23, 34 (Pa. Super. 2000). Here, APO DeAngelo 

testified that the informant in question had identified him or herself to him. 

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 11/4/13, at 4. Miller further argues that 

DeAngelo should have investigated the allegations in order to corroborate 

the anonymous tip. However, it is not necessary for probation officers to 

observe personally an appellant engaging in illegal activity or suspicious 

conduct in order to form reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. 

Wright, 672 A.2d 826, 830 (Pa. Super. 1996) (officers may rely upon 

information from third parties to form reasonable suspicion).

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the suppression court 

correctly determined that APO DeAngelo possessed reasonable suspicion to 

conduct a search of Miller’s person, residence and vehicle. As we find no 

error with the suppression court’s legal conclusions, we affirm the judgment 

of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/26/2014