J-S11027-17

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

VICTORIO HINTON

Appellant No. 1066 WDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 2, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0011856-1995

BEFORE: OLSON, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2017

Appellant, Victorio Hinton, appeals from the order entered June 2, 

2016, denying as untimely his petition for collateral relief filed under the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, following a 

guilty plea resulting in his conviction for third degree murder.1 We affirm.

In January 1996, after being extradited from Washington state, 

Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to third degree murder. See

Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 1/25/96, at 2. The court immediately sentenced 

Appellant to the negotiated term of incarceration, eight and one-half to 

twenty-one years. Id. at 16.

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c).
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In May 2004, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

arguing that the Commonwealth had breached its contractual agreement by 

incarcerating him past his minimum sentence. See Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, 5/3/04, at 1-2. The PCRA court treated this petition as a 

request for PCRA relief. Appointed counsel submitted a Turner/Finley2 

“no merit” letter, which the court granted. The PCRA court denied 

Appellant’s petition; Appellant did not appeal to this Court.

On October 29, 2015, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, which the court treated as a petition requesting PCRA relief, as it 

challenged the validity of his conviction.3 After sending Appellant notice of 

intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court denied his 

petition as untimely filed.

Appellant timely appealed. The court did not issue an order to file a 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Nevertheless, Appellant filed his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The PCRA 

court did not issue an opinion but instead adopted the reasons given in its 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice.

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2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

3

In the petition, Appellant argued that he was entitled to habeas relief due 

to the Commonwealth’s failure to commence trial within one hundred twenty 

days of his extradition from Washington state, an alleged violation of 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9101. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10/29/15, at 2-5.
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On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue for our review, namely, 

whether the lower court committed reversible error in denying habeas 

corpus relief. See Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant argues that the court 

erred in treating his petition for habeas relief as a PCRA petition. Id. at 5-6. 

Appellant argues that his due process rights were violated because he was 

not brought to trial within one hundred twenty days of his extradition to 

Pennsylvania. Id. at 8-9.

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition 

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported 

by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. 

Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). 

We begin by addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, as the 

PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or 

disregarded in order to address the merits of his claims. See 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the 

PCRA, any petition for relief, including second and subsequent petitions, 

must be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of sentence 

becomes final. Id. There are three exceptions:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke these 

exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have 

been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); see Commonwealth v. 

Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000).

Appellant’s petition is patently untimely.4 Accordingly, in order to 

reach the merits of his issues, he must plead and prove one of the 

exceptions to the time bar. See Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1267. Appellant’s 

brief does not plead any of the time bar exceptions. Nevertheless, Appellant 

argues that the court erred in treating his petition as a PCRA rather than a 

request for habeas relief, as his procedural due process rights were violated. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 7. It is well-settled that 

the PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving postconviction relief. Unless the PCRA could not provide for a 

potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the writ of habeas 

corpus. Issues that are cognizable under the PCRA must be 

raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas 

corpus petition. Phrased differently, a defendant cannot escape 

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4 Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in February 1996, at the 

expiration of his thirty days to file a direct appeal to this Court. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (a judgment of sentence becomes final at the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the 

review). Accordingly, he had until February 1997 to timely file a petition 

seeking collateral relief.
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the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of 

habeas corpus.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465–66 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(internal citations omitted). 

Appellant’s petition appears to argue that his conviction and sentence 

are invalid because they were imposed in violation of the timeliness 

requirements of the Interstate Detainer Act (IAD). See Appellant’s Brief at 

7-8.

The IAD is an agreement between forty-eight states, the District of 

Columbia, and the United States, establishing procedures for the transfer of 

“prisoners incarcerated in one jurisdiction to the temporary custody of 

another jurisdiction which has lodged a detainer against them.” 

Commonwealth v. Destephano, 87 A.3d 361, 364 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Article IV(c) of the IAD further 

provides that in respect to any proceeding made possible by the Article, trial 

shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the 

prisoner in the receiving state. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101, Article IV(c).

This claim is cognizable under the PCRA as Appellant claims that his 

due process rights were violated. Taylor, 65 A.3d at 465–66; see also 

Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 640-41 (Pa. 1998) (finding 

that a defendant’s allegations of constitutional violations were cognizable 

under the PCRA and, accordingly, the statutory writ of habeas corpus was 

not available to him).
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Accordingly, the PCRA court properly treated Appellant’s petition as a 

request seeking collateral relief, and dismissed it as untimely. See 

Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1267. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2017