IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CR-376

Clinton Loehrlein,

Appellant/Defendant,

–v–

State of Indiana,

Appellee/Plaintiff.

Argued: September 3, 2020 | Decided: December 9, 2020

Appeal from the Vanderburgh Circuit Court

No. 82D03-1701-MR-425

The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals

No. 19A-CR-737

Opinion by Justice David

 Chief Justice Rush, and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-376 | December 9, 2020 Page 2 of 10

David, Justice. 

Defendant was charged with the murder and attempted murder of his 

family members. At trial, the issue was not whether he committed the

crimes but whether he was sane at the time. The jury rejected his insanity 

defense and found him guilty. 

At issue today is whether one of the jurors committed gross misconduct 

that probably harmed Defendant, necessitating a new trial. This juror 

wrote “N/A,” meaning not applicable, in response to questions on her jury 

questionnaire when those answers should have been a yes. That is, the 

juror answered not applicable to questions about both her past criminal 

history and whether she had herself been victim of a crime. However, she 

had in fact been charged with a crime and had been the victim of domestic 

abuse. Here we find that the juror did commit gross misconduct but that 

given the facts and circumstances of this case, including the strong 

evidence of Defendant’s sanity, it is not likely he was harmed. As such, 

we affirm the trial court. 

Facts and Procedural History 

Under stress and suffering from insomnia, Loehrlein murdered his wife 

and attempted to murder his two daughters in their home. Among other 

things, the State charged Loehrlein with one count of murder and two 

counts of attempted murder.

Loehrlein’s case was set for trial by jury and his counsel hired jury 

consultant Kaitlin Larimer to assist in jury selection. In preparing for jury 

selection prior to voir dire, counsel and Larimer both noted L.W.’s “N/A” 

responses to several questions on her questionnaire including one asking 

if she had ever been charged with a crime. Larimer thought the answer 

did not make sense, “especially coming from a juror who [was] an 

attorney...” App. Vol. III, p. 156. Nevertheless, Larimer wanted to keep 

L.W. as a juror because L.W. expressed a desire to serve on the jury and 

was familiar with mental-health issues. L.W. was selected as a juror and 

appointed foreperson.
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Loehrlein proceeded to trial, where he asserted an insanity defense. 

Loehrlein hired a clinical psychiatrist to evaluate a prior traumatic brain 

injury he suffered and its potential impact on him relative to the crimes. 

While she found no evidence that a brain injury caused him to commit the 

crimes, she testified that he was suffering from an unspecified depressive 

disorder prior to his crimes and a brief reactive psychosis at the time of 

the crimes. She further testified that she believed he was suffering from a 

mental disease or defect and could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his 

actions at the time of the crimes. She opined that while he appreciated 

that his acts were criminally wrong, he did not appreciate that they were 

morally wrong due to his psychosis. 

The trial court appointed two expert doctors to evaluate him. Both 

court-appointed experts testified that Loehrlein was not suffering from a 

mental disease or defect and that he could appreciate the wrongfulness of 

his actions at the time of the attacks.

Loehrlein was convicted as charged. Thereafter, Loehrlein filed a 

motion to set aside the verdict based on juror misconduct, alleging L.W. 

falsely answered her juror questionnaire, and the trial court denied said 

motion. 

In a post-conviction deposition, L.W. tearfully discussed her past as a 

victim of domestic violence and continued to assert that while she had 

been charged with domestic battery, she still believed not applicable was 

an appropriate answer to the question about whether she had ever been 

charged with a crime under the circumstances. Specifically, she testified 

in her deposition: 

Q. So number 15, "Have you, any of your immediate 

family members, or a close friend been charged with or 

convicted of a crime? If yes, who, when, what & 

where," and you wrote "N/A"?

A. Uh—huh.

Q. Is that the proper answer?
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A. Yes.

Q. It is? Okay. So tell me, it’s not applicable?

A. Right. 

Q. And why is it not applicable?

A. Because I’ve never been charged, never been read 

rights. I’ve never been convicted. 

Q. So you’ve never been charged with a crime? 

A. I mean, there was this little case that was false anyway, 

got dismissed, so it didn’t apply because it was 

dismissed. 

Id. at 99-100.

After much back and forth and being presented with the actual 

charging information against her, L.W. finally stated: “I guess” when 

asked if it appeared she had been charged with domestic battery. Id. at 

105. She further admitted that she was arrested and went to jail for the 

charges, that she had an attorney she knew handle the matter for her and 

that it took months to resolve. 

She also disclosed that while she answered “N/A” to a question about 

her being the victim of a crime, she was in fact the victim of abuse by her 

ex-husband. She got very upset when discussing this matter in her 

deposition. She admitted that she was worried about embarrassment if 

she went to the police about the domestic abuse she suffered.

Nevertheless, L.W. maintained that she was fair and impartial during 

trial. The trial court denied Loehrlein’s motion to set aside the verdict.

Loehrlein appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion to set aside the verdict where L.W. withheld this 

information on her questionnaire.
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Our Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Loehrlein v. State, 142 

N.E.3d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). The majority found that the trial 

court erred in not finding the juror’s false answer to a juror questionnaire 

amounted to gross misconduct that probably harmed Loehrlein. Id. at 975. 

Thus, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. Judge Bailey 

dissented, arguing that Loehrlein failed to show the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion by not proving the juror’s misconduct 

probably harmed him. Id. at 977 (Bailey, J., dissenting).

The State petitioned for transfer which we granted. Ind. Appellate Rule 

58(A). 

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s determination of whether a juror’s misconduct 

entitles a defendant to a new trial for abuse of discretion. Lopez v. State, 

527 N.E.2d 1119, 1130 (Ind. 1988).

Discussion and Decision

"Generally, proof that a juror was biased against the defendant or lied 

during voir dire entitles a defendant to a new trial.” State v. Dye, 784 

N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ind. 2003) (quoting Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 246 

(Ind. 2002)). A defendant seeking a new trial because of juror misconduct 

must show two things: 1) gross misconduct; and 2) that the gross 

misconduct probably harmed the defendant. Id. We will discuss each of 

these required elements in turn. 

I. Juror L.W. committed gross misconduct.

There are two Indiana cases that are somewhat analogous to this case. 

In State v. Dye, 784 N.E.2d 469, 471 (Ind. 2003), a death penalty case, jurors 

were asked if they or a family member had ever appeared in court for any 

reason other than a traffic offense and also whether they had themselves 

been a victim of a crime. One juror responded in the negative to both; 

however, her brother was convicted of two homicides and sentenced to 
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death, two of her siblings had been arrested and she had an OWI charge 

herself. Id. at 472. She was also the victim of rape. Id. 

Jurors were also asked if they believed the death penalty should be 

mandatory for any particular type of crime and this same juror responded 

that she did not feel the death penalty should be mandatory for any type 

of crime, but would vote automatically for the death penalty if a person 

were found guilty of intentional murder. Id. at 471. When all the jurors 

were asked this same question about the death penalty during voir dire, 

the juror remained silent. Id. at 471-72. When asked during voir dire 

about family members in prison, the juror disclosed only that she had a 

brother in prison who was now deceased. Id. at 472.

During a post-conviction hearing, the juror admitted her brother had 

received the death penalty and died while he was in prison. Id. She 

further testified that she believed he deserved the death penalty because 

people who commit murder should receive the death penalty and that she 

had not mentioned her brother because she did not “think it was 

anybody’s business.” Id. With regard to her other siblings’ charges and 

her own, she testified that she didn’t think about these things when 

answering the questionnaire. Id. Finally, she testified that she “tried to 

forget” her rape. Id. 

The post-conviction court concluded that the juror “made omissions 

and false statements on her jury questionnaire and during voir dire, that 

those responses amounted to gross misconduct, and probably harmed the 

defendant by denying him a fair trial.” Id. at 473. Our court affirmed. Id.

at 477. While we were concerned about potential ineffective assistance of 

counsel because defense counsel did not follow-up on the juror’s answer 

on her questionnaire about believing the death penalty should be 

automatic for intentional murder, the post-conviction court did not 

address this issue, instead focusing on the juror misconduct. Id. at 476. 

We found that the post-conviction court was in the best position to assess 

the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses and, given the 

juror’s omissions and false statements as well as her strong beliefs 

regarding the death penalty, the post-conviction court’s decision should 

be upheld. Id.
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In Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ind. 2002), a murder case, one 

juror responded that none of her close family members were victims of a 

crime. However, the juror’s half-sister had been murdered within the last 

2 years. Id. She also did not disclose this fact during voir dire. Id. When 

asked why the juror did not disclose this information during voir dire she 

responded that she “just blanked that out” and as for her juror 

questionnaire, “[t]his was sent to where I used to live and my old 

roommate had it for a while and evidently what I did I just got it and just 

hurried up and filled it out....” Id. She further testified that her halfsister’s murder did not impact her ability to be fair and impartial and that: 

“I mean, there is nothing I can do about it, I can’t change what happened 

to her or let my feelings towards anybody else go towards anything else. I 

don’t do that.” Id. The trial court determined that the juror did not 

deliberately withhold this information, that the juror was not biased and 

that defendant received a fair trial. Id. 

Our Court affirmed the trial court, finding that although the juror 

should not have withheld this information, the omission did not amount 

to gross misconduct. Id. at 246-47. Further, because of the ample evidence 

of the defendant’s guilt, we saw little likelihood that this juror’s omission 

impacted the verdict. Id. at 247. 

Here, L.W. was asked two questions in the juror questionnaire that she 

provided “N/A” responses to. That is, question number fifteen asked:

“HAVE YOU, ANY OF YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS, OR A 

CLOSE FRIEND BEEN CHARGED WITH OR CONVICTED OF A 

CRIME? IF YES, WHO, WHEN, WHAT & WHERE:” App. Vol. III, p. 31. 

L.W. answered “N/A.” Id. 

Similarly, question number sixteen asked: “HAVE YOU, ANY OF 

YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS, OR A CLOSE FRIEND EVER 

BEEN A WITNESS OR A VICTIM IN A CRIMINAL MATTER. IF YES, 

WHO, WHEN, WHAT & WHERE:” Again, L.W. answered “N/A.” Id.

However, L.W. had been charged with domestic battery and she had 

also been the victim of it. Thus, her responses on the jury questionnaire 

should have been two yeses. Her explanation could have been worked 

out during voir dire or even jotted on the questionnaire. Instead, L.W. 
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effectively dodged these questions, noting they did not apply to her when 

they clearly did. 

L.W. compounded her omissions because during her post-trial 

deposition, she became very defensive when asked why she thought 

“N/A” was an appropriate response rather than a straightforward “yes.” 

Like the juror in Dye, it was clear that she did not believe this information 

was anyone’s business. Indeed, she was worried about her professional 

reputation in the legal community should anyone learn that she was 

(wrongfully) charged with domestic battery and was the victim of it. 

While it is understandable that this is a sensitive area for some potential 

jurors, responding “N/A” was not the appropriate way to handle this. 

And unlike the juror in Warner, who just admitted that she answered the 

questionnaire hastily and blanked out during voir dire, L.W. went to great 

lengths to defend her answers on the questionnaire during her deposition. 

We find L.W.’s conduct even more egregious because she is an attorney 

who had previously handled some criminal matters and as such, she 

should have known better. In this regard, her conduct is more egregious 

than the juror in Warner. Perhaps we would be in a different position had 

she not been an attorney or even if she was more open and honest during 

her post-trial deposition. She was not though. Because her answers on 

the jury questionnaire were cryptic1 and her demeanor during her posttrial deposition was defensive and evasive, we find that her misconduct 

was gross. 

1 We would be remiss if we did not note that counsel was in the best position to address 

L.W.’s strange answers on her questionnaire during voir dire. If counsel fails to delve into 

matters such as these or the trial court does not seek additional clarity, this could turn out to 

be a tragic mistake that cannot be rectified on appeal. 
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II. Despite L.W.’s gross misconduct, it is unlikely that 

Loehrlein was harmed. 

While we find that L.W. committed gross misconduct, that does not 

end our analysis of whether Loehrlein is entitled to a new trial. We must 

now determine whether Loehrlein was probably harmed. We find that 

under the circumstances of this case, it is unlikely that he was. 

The issue during trial wasn’t whether Loehrlein committed the 

offenses but rather whether he was sane at the time. Although his expert 

testified that Loehrlein was suffering from a mental disease or defect and 

could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, she based this 

opinion on the fact that she believed there was a difference between legal 

and moral wrong. She conceded he knew what he was doing was legally 

wrong.

Further, both court appointed experts here testified that Loehrlein was 

not suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the crime and 

was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions.2 Finally, although 

L.W. committed gross misconduct, the one thing she was unequivocal 

about during her deposition was that she was impartial. 

We would perhaps be in a different situation if the evidence were 

closer regarding Loehrlein’s sanity or if the issue to be determined at trial

was whether he harmed his family. But as it stands, it is not likely L.W.’s 

misconduct harmed Loehrlein at trial because L.W.’s prior personal 

experience with domestic violence is not directly related to a sanity 

inquiry and further, she testified that she was impartial. 

The standard of review also guides us here. Just as we deferred to the 

trial court’s determinations in Dye and Warner, here too we must rely on 

our trial court to assess the weight of the evidence and credibility of the 

witnesses. The trial court, having heard the evidence in a post-trial 

2 In Indiana, “[a] person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a 

result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the 

conduct at the time of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6.
Page 10 of 10

hearing and after presiding over the trial and voir dire denied Loehrlein’s 

request for a new trial based on juror misconduct. Given the facts and 

circumstances of this case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion because while L.W. committed gross misconduct, Loehrlein has 

not demonstrated that this misconduct probably harmed him. 

Conclusion 

We affirm the trial court. 

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 

ATTORNE Y F O R APP ELLANT 

Stacy R. Uliana 

Bargersville, Indiana 

ATTORNE Y S FOR APPEL L E E

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. MacKenzie 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-376 | December 9, 2020