United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-1081 

SHAUN JENKINS, 

Petitioner, Appellant, 

v. 

KAREN BERGERON, 

Superintendent, Old Colony Correctional Center, 

Respondent, Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges. 

Stewart T. Graham, Jr., with whom Graham & Graham was on 

brief, for appellant. 

Thomas E. Bocian, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal 

Bureau, with whom Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, 

was on brief, for appellee. 

May 27, 2016 
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Shaun Jenkins was convicted in 

Massachusetts state court in 2005 of the first-degree murder of 

his cousin and was sentenced to life in prison. He did not testify, 

and this appeal involves the question of who has the burden of 

showing why under the facts of this case. The state trial court 

denied Jenkins's motion for a new trial, and the Supreme Judicial 

Court ("SJC") affirmed both the conviction and the denial of the 

new trial motion. See Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 941 N.E.2d 56, 62 

(Mass. 2011). 

Jenkins appeals from the Massachusetts federal district 

court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 

Jenkins v. Bergeron, 67 F. Supp. 3d 472 (D. Mass. 2014). The 

district court granted a certificate of appealability only on the 

issue of Jenkins's waiver of his right to testify in his own 

defense. Jenkins v. Bergeron, No. 12-cv-10793, 2015 WL 461911, at 

*2 (D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2015). We address only that claim. 

Jenkins argues that he did not knowingly and 

intelligently waive his right to testify because his attorney 

unilaterally decided that he would not testify. The habeas 

petition is based on the contention that the choice whether to 

testify was his, not his counsel's, and that the record establishes 

that he was denied that choice. 

Since we find that the SJC adjudicated Jenkins's claim 

on the merits, we engage in deferential review under the 
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Because there is no Supreme Court 

precedent clearly establishing the proper standard and burdens for 

assessing whether a criminal defendant has validly waived his right 

to testify on facts like these, Jenkins is not entitled to habeas 

relief. His claim depends on too broad a characterization of 

waiver of federal constitutional rights, not drawn from cases of 

like circumstances. We affirm. 

I. 

In April 2005, Jenkins was convicted by a jury of the 

first-degree murder of his cousin, Stephen Jenkins. The SJC's 

opinion has a full recitation of the underlying facts. See 

Jenkins, 941 N.E.2d at 62–75. Jenkins did not take the stand at 

his trial. Before the end of the trial, the judge engaged in a 

direct colloquy with Jenkins, during which the judge informed 

Jenkins that he had the right to testify in his own defense. 

Jenkins responded affirmatively when asked whether he understood 

his right and stated that he had no questions regarding it. See 

id. at 70. 

While his direct appeal to the SJC was pending, Jenkins 

filed in the state trial court a motion for a new trial. Jenkins 

claimed, inter alia, that he had not knowingly and intelligently 

waived his constitutionally protected right to testify in his own 

defense. See Casiano-Jiménez v. United States, 817 F.3d 816, 820 
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(1st Cir. 2016) ("In any trial, a defendant's right to testify in 

his own defense is a 'fundamental constitutional right' and is 

'essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.'" 

(quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51, 53 n.10 (1987))). He 

submitted two affidavits, one from his defense attorney and one 

from Jenkins himself. His attorney's affidavit stated that he and 

Jenkins discussed whether or not Jenkins should testify, that he 

advised Jenkins not to testify because Jenkins faced potentially 

damaging impeachment and cross-examination, and that based on 

those factors, "I decided not to call him as a witness." 

Jenkins's affidavit stated that he wanted to testify and 

told his attorney as much, and that his attorney "did not explain 

to [him] that the decision to testify was [his] decision to make 

and that [he] had a constitutional right to testify if [he] so 

chose, but that [he] would waive that right by not testifying." 

Jenkins also stated that after explaining the impeachment and 

cross-examination concerns, his attorney said "that he was not 

going to put [him] on the witness stand." 

Jenkins argued in his new trial motion that "[t]here are 

three problems with counsel's actions, all of which serve to render 

invalid any possible waiver of the right to testify": (1) the right 

to testify "cannot be waived by counsel," and "[i]t follows from 

the requirements of waiver that if a defendant does not know of 

his constitutional right to testify, he cannot validly waive it"; 
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(2) "a valid waiver cannot be based on erroneous or substandard 

legal advice," and the reasons his attorney gave him for not taking 

the stand were incorrect; (3) his failure to testify was not 

harmless error, and declining to call him constituted ineffective 

assistance of counsel. The same judge who presided over Jenkins's 

trial denied the new trial motion. An order denying the motion 

stated, "After hearing on 6/30/09, Defendant Shaun Jenkins' Motion 

for New Trial is DENIED." 

Jenkins appealed, and the SJC affirmed. Jenkins, 941 

N.E.2d at 69–70, 75. The SJC characterized Jenkins's argument as 

follows: "The defendant argued in a motion for a new trial that 

his waiver of his right to testify was not valid because he did 

not understand that the decision whether to testify was his alone." 

Id. at 69. The SJC recognized that the right to testify is a 

fundamental right that must be waived knowingly and intelligently. 

Id. Importantly for this case, it also stated that "[i]t is the 

defendant's burden to prove that he did not waive this right 

knowingly and intelligently." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Lucien, 

801 N.E.2d 247, 258 (Mass. 2004)).1 Jenkins calls this a 

fundamental flaw: the prosecution, he says, bears the burden. 

 1 As support for the proposition that the defendant bears 

the burden of proving that his waiver of his right to testify was 

invalid, the SJC cited Lucien, in which it had cited to 

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 564 N.E.2d 11, 14–15 (Mass. App. Ct. 

1990). See Lucien, 801 N.E.2d at 258. In Freeman, the 

Massachusetts Appeals Court reasoned: "Here, the decision not to 
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The court concluded that "[t]he [trial] judge did not 

abuse his discretion in concluding that the defendant's waiver was 

the product of a purposeful and informed judgment on his part." 

Id. at 70. The SJC stated that Jenkins had admitted that he had 

discussed whether to testify with his attorney, that the trial 

judge had engaged in a colloquy with Jenkins in which he explained 

that Jenkins had a right to testify, that Jenkins affirmed that he 

understood his right and that he had no questions regarding that 

right, and that "there was no indication of any dispute or 

disagreement between the defendant and his counsel as to trial 

tactics or 'of any kind.'" Id. at 69, 70 & n.10. Jenkins does 

not dispute that description. 

II. 

On May 3, 2012, Jenkins filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the Massachusetts federal district court. In a 

memorandum of law, he argued, inter alia, that de novo review 

should apply to his right to testify claim because the SJC 

 

testify was made by the defendant in consultation with his counsel. 

The Commonwealth was not a party to the defendant's decisionmaking process. The defendant, not the Commonwealth, has control 

over the relevant facts. He is, thus, better situated to prove 

his claim than is the Commonwealth to disprove it." 564 N.E.2d at 

15. The court distinguished a waiver of the right to testify case 

from "a case of claimed deprivation of a constitutional trial right 

through government coercion." Id. Unlike that type of case, 

"[h]ere, the defendant, who is asserting 'facts which were neither 

agreed upon nor apparent on the face of the [trial] record,' must 

prove those facts." Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Bertrand, 432 N.E.2d 78, 83 (Mass. 1982)). 
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overlooked or misunderstood his subsidiary argument that his 

waiver was invalid because his attorney "unilaterally decided not 

to have him testify." Instead, he argued, the SJC addressed a 

different argument -- which he represented was not raised -- that 

his waiver was not knowing and intelligent because he was not aware 

that the decision to testify was his to make.2 

On December 19, 2014, the district court denied 

Jenkins's petition. See Jenkins, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 480. The court 

noted that "[c]ontrary to petitioner's contention, in addition to 

determining that the petitioner was aware of his right to testify, 

the SJC held that the trial judge 'did not abuse his discretion in 

concluding that the defendant's waiver was the product of a 

purposeful and informed judgment on his part.'" Id. at 476–77 

(quoting Jenkins, 941 N.E.2d at 70). The federal habeas court 

declined to review Jenkins's claim de novo, instead applying 

deferential AEDPA review. Id. at 477; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The court concluded that "[t]here is no standard clearly 

established by the United States Supreme Court addressing the 

circumstances under which a criminal defendant waives the right to 

 2 The argument, in fact, was raised. In his new trial 

motion, Jenkins stated that "counsel never advised him that he had 

an absolute right to testify and that the decision was ultimately 

his alone," and he argued that "[i]t follows from the requirements 

of waiver that if a defendant does not know of his constitutional 

right to testify, he cannot validly waive it." In his opening 

brief to the SJC, Jenkins again asserted that "neither counsel nor 

the court advised him that the decision was ultimately his alone." 
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testify in his own behalf." Id. (citing Thompson v. Battaglia, 

458 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2006)). We agree. 

III. 

"We review de novo a district court's denial of habeas 

relief, including its determination of the appropriate standard of 

review of the state court proceeding." Zuluaga v. Spencer, 585 

F.3d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 2009). 

A. Deferential AEDPA Review Applies 

We review Jenkins's claim under the deferential lens of 

AEDPA. "AEDPA deference is appropriate 'with respect to any claim 

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.'" 

Id. at 30 (quoting Goodrich v. Hall, 448 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 

2006)); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this standard of review, 

a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted unless the state 

court's adjudication of the claim on the merits "resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 

or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding," id. § 2254(d)(2). "By contrast, if 

the state court does not address the merits of a federal claim, we 

owe no such deference and our review is de novo." Zuluaga, 585 

F.3d at 30. 
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Jenkins argues that we should review his claim de novo 

because the SJC did not adjudicate his waiver claim on the merits. 

The SJC, he asserts, did not directly discuss his argument that 

"there was no valid waiver of his right to testify since trial 

counsel unilaterally decided not to call him as a witness, thereby 

preventing him from testifying," but rather erroneously discussed 

the issue of whether "his waiver of his right to testify was not 

valid because he did not understand that the decision whether to 

testify was his alone," Jenkins, 941 N.E.2d at 69. 

We disagree. First, the SJC plainly decided Jenkins's 

right to testify claim when it held that the state trial court 

judge, who had presided over Jenkins's trial and had discussed 

with Jenkins directly his right to testify, "did not abuse his 

discretion in concluding that the defendant's waiver was the 

product of a purposeful and informed judgment on his part." Id. 

at 70. Second, even though the SJC did not explicitly discuss one 

subsidiary argument that Jenkins made in support of his claim, the 

Supreme Court has made clear that even "where there is no explicit 

discussion of the articulated federal constitutional issue amidst 

the discussion of issues in the state court opinion, the federal 

court must presume the federal claim was adjudicated on the 

merits." Hodge v. Mendonsa, 739 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2013) 

(citing Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1095–96 (2013)); see 
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also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). That 

presumption has not been rebutted in this case. 

B. No Clearly Established Law 

Jenkins argues that the SJC's resolution of his right to 

testify claim was incorrect, even under deferential AEDPA review. 

His argument addresses two themes: the appropriate standard for 

determining whether the right to testify has been knowingly and 

intelligently waived, and who bears the burden of proving whether 

a waiver of that right was or was not knowing and intelligent. 

Under AEDPA, we must determine whether the SJC's 

resolution of Jenkins's right to testify claim was "contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As a threshold matter, "[i]f 

the federal law is not clearly established by the United States 

Supreme Court, then per force the state court decision cannot be 

either contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law." Likely v. Ruane, 642 F.3d 99, 102 (1st 

Cir. 2011) (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) 

(per curiam); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)); see also 

Brown v. Ruane, 630 F.3d 62, 68–69 (1st Cir. 2011). 

In determining whether law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court, is clearly established, "we must look for Supreme Court 

precedent that either 'squarely addresses the issue' in the case 
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or that articulates legal principles that 'clearly extend' to the 

new factual context." Brown, 630 F.3d at 69 (quoting Van Patten, 

552 U.S. at 123, 125). The Supreme Court "has cautioned that 

reviewing courts must be careful not to improperly turn the Court's 

context-specific holdings into 'blanket rule[s].'" Id. 

(alteration in original) (quoting Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 

49 (2010) (per curiam)). The state of the law is assessed as of 

the date of the relevant state court decision, here February 4, 

2011. Likely, 642 F.3d at 101–02. 

First, while it is clear that a waiver of the right to 

testify must be knowing and intelligent, nothing in this record 

even suggests that the SJC unreasonably applied that general 

principle. Second, the Supreme Court has never articulated the 

standard for assessing whether a criminal defendant has validly 

waived his right to testify or determined who has the burden of 

production and proof under particular circumstances. Indeed, we 

agree with the analysis used by the Seventh Circuit in denying a 

habeas petition filed by a defendant who claimed his attorney 

prevented him from testifying: "[t]he variety in practice among 

the state courts and the various federal courts shows, 

unfortunately for [petitioner], that there is no standard clearly 

established by the Supreme Court of the United States that is 

binding on all." Thompson, 458 F.3d at 619. That court recognized 

that "some circuits require a defendant to protest a lawyer's 
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refusal to allow her to testify during trial to preserve the 

right." Id. (citing United States v. McMeans, 927 F.2d 162, 163 

(4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); United States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 

445, 446–47 (9th Cir. 1990)). Further, "several state courts 

require judges to inquire of defendants directly whether they want 

to testify." Id. (citing People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514–15 

(Colo. 1984); State v. Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77, 81–82 (W. Va. 1988)). 

The Seventh Circuit itself "'steer[s] a middle course,' requiring 

a defendant who wishes to raise this claim to meet a heightened 

pleading standard before the court must hold an evidentiary hearing 

on the question of waiver." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 

Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1991)). We agree 

with the Seventh Circuit that the law on this point is not clearly 

established by an opinion of the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court cases to which Jenkins points are of 

no help to him. He cites Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), 

Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), and Barker v. Wingo, 407 

U.S. 514 (1972), for the general proposition that a court may not 

presume waiver of a fundamental constitutional right from a 

defendant's silence or inaction. But none of these cases address 

the right to testify. Cf. United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 

11 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that "[t]he right to testify 

qualitatively differs from those constitutional rights which can 

be waived only after the court inquires into the validity of the 
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waiver"). Zerbst and Carnley are both right to counsel cases, and 

Barker is a speedy trial right case. Jenkins's burden of proof 

argument suffers from the same defect.3 Again, there is no clearly 

established law from the Supreme Court on who bears the burden of 

proving that a waiver of the right to testify was invalid. Jenkins 

cites to Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), overruled by 

Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009), and Brewer v. Williams, 

430 U.S. 387 (1977). But both Jackson and Brewer are right to 

counsel cases. 

Jenkins responds that these cases established general 

rules that apply broadly to all fundamental criminal rights 

guaranteed by the Constitution, and that the Supreme Court has 

stated that "rules of law may be sufficiently clear for habeas 

purposes even when they are expressed in terms of a generalized 

standard rather than as a bright-line rule." Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). But Williams and Panetti 

are concerned with constitutional standards applied to different 

sets of facts: rules "which of necessity require[] a case-by-case 

examination of the evidence." Williams, 529 U.S. at 382 (plurality 

 3 Jenkins also failed to raise his burden of proof argument 

to the district court, so it is arguably waived anyway. See Sierra 

Club v. Wagner, 555 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) ("Ordinarily, 

arguments not raised in the district court cannot be raised for 

the first time on appeal."). 
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opinion) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) 

(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). They do not stand for 

the proposition that generalizable standards, which the Court has 

indicated amount to clearly established law in a particular context 

(i.e., the right to counsel), necessarily bind state courts in an 

entirely different context (i.e., the right to testify). In short, 

the general rules Jenkins culls from Supreme Court cases as to 

distinct constitutional rights simply cannot support relief here 

under the strict standards of AEDPA.4

IV. 

The denial of Jenkins's petition is affirmed. 

 4 Jenkins also argues that deferential review of a state 

court's factual findings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) does not 

apply to analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). He is wrong. See 

Cronin v. Comm'r of Prob., 783 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 2015); 

Scoggins v. Hall, 765 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied 

sub nom. Scoggins v. Mitchell, 135 S. Ct. 1007 (2015).