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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES BARROW 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1024 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 25, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004038-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES BARROW 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1076 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 25, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004036-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES BARROW 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1077 EDA 2020
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Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 25, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004037-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2021

Appellant, James Barrow, appeals from the judgments of sentence 

entered in the above-captioned matters. Because the issue in each case is 

identical, the crimes charged in each separate bill of information were tried 

together in Appellant’s consolidated nonjury trial, and Appellant has filed a 

single brief with our permission, we address the appeals in a single 

Memorandum. We note that Appellant’s appointed counsel has filed a petition 

to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). 

Appellant has not filed a response to counsel’s petition to withdraw. Following 

our review, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the judgments 

of sentence.

The trial court summarized the procedural history of the cases, as 

follows:

On March 16, 2016, [Appellant] was arrested and charged 

with three separate cases of robbery, conspiracy, possessing the 

instrument of a crime and violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant was bound over for trial on all charges following an April 

25th preliminary hearing. [Appellant] waived his right to a jury 

[trial] and trial began on October 19, 2019. On October 25, 2019, 

[Appellant] was convicted of three counts of robbery and 

conspiracy[1] but acquitted of all other charges. Appellant was 

subsequently sentenced to six to twenty years’ incarceration on

each charge, running concurrently with each other. PostSentencing Motions were filed on November 4, 2019 and denied 

on March 6, 2020. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal as well 

as statement of matters complained of on appeal.

* * *

On February 1, 2016, [Appellant] phoned the Wilmington, 

Delaware office of the F.B.I. seeking to spe[a]k to someone about 

some robberies that took place in Philadelphia. Agent Scott Duffey 

returned [Appellant’s] call and obtained some preliminary 

information about a robbery that took place in February of 2015. 

Two days later, Agent Duffey and Philadelphia Police Detective 

Dan Grassi met [Appellant] at the location [A]ppellant had 

provided them. Upon their arrival, [Appellant] walked over to the 

police vehicle and willingly went with the agents for an interview. 

After [Appellant] was given his Miranda[2] warnings, he discussed 

his involvement in three Philadelphia robberies. (N.T. 10-21-

2019, pp. 10-28). At trial, witnesses from each one of the 

robberies testified and surveillance video of each robbery was 

introduced. (N.T. 10-23-2019, pp. 6-22, 24-36, 42-50). Both 

F.B.I. Agent Duffey, and Philadelphia Police Detective Robert Daly 

testified that they did not have any concerns that [Appellant] had 

any mental health issues, could not understand the questions, or 

was under the influence of drugs or alcohol during either of their 

interviews with him. (N.T. 10-21-2019, pp. 26-27; N.T. 10-23-

2019, pp. 80-104).

Trial Court Opinion, 6/8/20, at 1–3 (footnote omitted).

____________________________________________

1

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii) and 903, respectively.

2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Before we address any question raised on appeal, we must resolve 

appellate counsel’s request to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 

A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). There are procedural and briefing 

requirements imposed upon an attorney who seeks to withdraw on appeal. 

The procedural mandates are that counsel must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy

of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that he 

or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional 

arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court’s 

attention.

Id. at 1032 (citation omitted).

In addition, in Santiago our Supreme Court stated that an Anders brief 

must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Counsel filed the required petition averring that after a conscientious 

review of the record, he found the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Motion 
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Seeking Permission to Withdraw as Counsel, 7/6/20, at ¶ 3. He filed an 

Anders brief discussing the issue that Appellant wanted to pursue and 

concluded further that no other issues could reasonably support the appeal. 

Anders Brief at 13, 15. He provided Appellant with copies of his petition and 

brief and advised Appellant that he could retain new counsel or proceed pro 

se and raise additional arguments. Letter to Appellant, 7/6/20. Thus, counsel 

complied with the technical Anders requirements.

Also, counsel’s brief is sufficiently compliant with Santiago. The brief 

sets forth the history of this case and refers to the notes of testimony, 

pertinent case authority, and sets forth an issue of arguable merit. Anders

Brief at 4–18. Further, the brief advances counsel’s conclusion that the appeal 

is frivolous and the reason for counsel’s conclusion. Id. at 15–17. 

Accordingly, we proceed to examine the issue counsel identified in the Anders

brief, and then we conduct “a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide 

whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 

1190, 1195 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

Counsel identified the following issue in his Anders brief:

1. The Honorable Court committed an abuse of discretion by 

denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial on weight of the 

evidence grounds.

Anders Brief at 15 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
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First, we must determine if Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the 

evidence was properly preserved. A challenge to the weight of the evidence 

must first be raised at the trial level “(1) orally, on the record, at any time 

before sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or 

(3) in a post-sentence motion.” Commonwealth v. Akrie, 159 A.3d 982, 

989 (Pa. Super. 2017). Appellant properly preserved his weight-of-theevidence claim by raising the issue in a timely post-sentence motion on 

November 4, 2019.

We have held that a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the 

verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence “concedes that there is 

sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Rayner, 153 

A.3d 1049, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 

744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000)). Our Supreme Court has described the 

standard applied to a weight-of-the-evidence claim as follows:

The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial based 

upon a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence 

is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, “the function 

of an appellate court on appeal is to review the trial court’s 

exercise of discretion based upon a review of the record, rather 

than to consider de novo the underlying question of the weight of 

the evidence.” An appellate court may not overturn the trial 

court’s decision unless the trial court “palpably abused its 

discretion in ruling on the weight claim.” Further, in reviewing a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence, a verdict will be 

overturned only if it is “so contrary to the evidence as to shock 

one’s sense of justice.”
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Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 312 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1270 (Pa. 2016) (internal citations 

omitted)). A trial court’s determination that a verdict was not against the 

weight of the evidence is “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons” for denying a 

new trial. Commonwealth v. Colon–Plaza, 136 A.3d 521, 529 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013)). A 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence where “certain facts are so clearly 

of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the 

facts is to deny justice.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa. 

Super. 2003) (quoting Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751–752). “[W]e do not reach 

the underlying question of whether the verdict was, in fact, against the weight 

of the evidence . . . . Instead, this Court determines whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in reaching whatever decision it made on the motion.” 

Williams, 176 A.3d at 312.

Appellant suggests the verdicts shock the conscience:

because the testimony of the Commonwealth’s eyewitnesses 

contradicted the contents of [A]ppellant’s statements to 

authorities, [A]ppellant’s statements themselves contradicted 

each other, the evidence demonstrated that [A]ppellant did not 

act voluntarily when he gave his statements to authorities, and 

the statements were unreliable and should not have been 

admitted in evidence or considered by the trial court when 

deliberating on a verdict.

Anders Brief at 15. As pointed out by the Commonwealth, Appellant’s 

potential challenge to the weight of the evidence is asserted by “diminishing 
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the record by attacking the admissibility of [Appellant’s] statements” to police. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. Thus, it appears Appellant is suggesting the 

verdict was shocking because Appellant’s Miranda waiver was allegedly 

invalid. In rejecting Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence challenge, the trial 

court addressed both the weight of the evidence and the voluntariness of 

Appellant’s statements. We rely upon the trial court’s explanation, which 

provided as follows:

F.B.I. Agent Scott Duffey was the first witness presented by 

the Commonwealth, who testified that on February 1, 2016, 

[A]ppellant phoned the Wilmington office of the F.B.I wanting to 

speak with someone about some robberies. (N.T. 10-21-2019, 

pp. 10-15). Agent Duffey returned [Appellant’s] call and obtained 

some preliminary information about the robbery of Elzina Bar in 

Philadelphia in February of 2015. (N.T. 10-21-2019, pp. 13-15). 

On February 3, 2016, Agent Duffey met with [A]ppellant and 

Detective Dan Grassi of the Philadelphia Police Department and

[they] transported him to the Delaware State Police Criminal 

Investigation Squad where a mirandized video-recorded 

statement was taken from [Appellant]. (N.T. 10-21-2019, pp. 14-

21). Appellant confessed to the robbery of Elzina Bar, Vincent’s 

Pizza Shop and Jim’s Steaks, all in Philadelphia in 2015. (N.T. 10-

21-2019, pp. 12-28).

Leon Singleton testified that on February 2, 2015, at 

approximately 11:00 p.m. he was a customer in the Elzina Bar at 

57th and Master Streets in Philadelphia when the bar was robbed. 

Mr. Singleton recalled that two masked men, one with a pistol, 

entered the bar, shouting at everyone to get down on the ground.

One of the crooks jumped over the bar stealing the proceeds from 

the cash register while the other took the valuables from the 

patrons on the floor. (N.T. 10-23-2019, pp. 6-15). The incident 

was captured on the bar’s surveillance system and presented in

court as Commonwealth Exhibit 5. (N.T. 10-23-2019, pp. 9-11, 

19-22).
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Alec Philador testified that he was working at Vincent’s Pizza 

at 6452 Lansdowne Avenue in Philadelphia in the early morning 

hours of March 7, 2015, when two masked individuals, one with a 

handgun, entered the store and robbed the establishment. At 

least eight people were present at the time. (N.T. 10-23-2019, 

pp. 24-29). Once again, surveillance video, inside and outside the 

business, captured the entire incident and was presented in court 

as Commonwealth Exhibit 9. (N.T. 10-23-2019, pp. 3-36).

Rodney Holmes came to court to testify that about 1:00 

a.m. on March 7, 2015, he was working at Jim’s Steaks at 431 

North 62nd Street in Philadelphia when two men entered the store,

both brandishing handguns, shouting for the employees to get on 

the floor. Mr. Holmes was ordered to open the register from which 

one of the robbers took all the money and ran out of the store. 

(N.T. 10-23-2019, pp. 42-48). Again, the incident was recorded 

on video and presented in court as Commonwealth Exhibit 13 

(N.T. 10-23-2019, pp. 46-50).

Philadelphia Police Detective Robert Daly interviewed 

[Appellant] on February 4, 2016, with Detective Conway recording 

[A]ppellant’s mirandized confession. Unbeknownst to the

detectives the interview was being videotaped as well and was 

presented in court as Commonwealth Exhibit 15. (N.T. 10-23-

2019, pp. 76-89). The detective testified that there did not appear

to be any mental health issues, that [Appellant] seemed to 

understand the detectives’ questions, was not under the influence 

of drugs or alcohol, did not ask for a lawyer and no promises or

guarantees were made to him. (N .T. 10-23-2019, pp. 80-104).

Carol Armstrong, a neuropsychologist testifying on behalf of

[Appellant], stated that [Appellant] suffered from an intellectual 

disability and neuropsychiatric illness that would have precluded

him from voluntarily surrendering his Miranda rights, despite 

measuring [A]ppellant’s IQ at 75. (N.T. 10-24-2019, pp. 6-26). 

Dr. Armstrong did not look at the videotape of [Appellant’s]

confession when making the evaluation of whether [Appellant]

had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Additionally, when 

questioned about the fact that it was [Appellant] who initiated the

contact with law enforcement and therefore was not coerced into 

his confession, Dr. Armstrong claimed that she did not know why 
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he had initiated the contact, or his motivations for doing so. (N.T. 

10-24-2019, pp. 41-43).

In rebuttal[,] the prosecution presented the expert 

testimony of Kirk Heilbrun, a psychologist with a forensic 

specialization. Dr. Heilbrun, in addition to interviewing 

[Appellant] and studying the video of [Appellant’s] waiver of his 

rights and subsequent confession, administered two versions of 

the Brief Symptom Inventory tests, the Minnesota Multiphasic 

Personality Inventory as well as the Miranda Rights 

Comprehension Instrument. (N.T. 10-25-2019, pp. 6-41). This 

court found Dr[.] Heilbrun to be substantially more credible than 

Dr. Armstrong and his conclusions, to a reasonable degree of 

scientific certainty much more persuasive.

This court applied the appropriate standards when reviewing 

[Appellant’s] claim that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. Having reviewed the entire record, including a thorough 

reading of the trial transcripts and admitted exhibits, this court 

concludes that the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as 

to shock one’s sense of justice, nor was it so tenuous, vague and 

uncertain that it shocks the conscience of the court. To the 

contrary, the evidence in this case was compelling and substantial, 

and strongly supported the verdict. Accordingly, this claim of 

[Appellant] is without merit.

* * *

[Appellant] claims his statements should not have been 

admitted into evidence as the testimony presented was 

inadequate to show that the statement was voluntary. 

(Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, p. 1; PostSentencing motions, p. 4). To the contrary, the prosecution

presented an abundance of evidence that the statements were 

voluntary, not only the testimony of the detectives who took the 

statements, but the videotapes of the statements by Agent Duffey 

as well as Detective Daly were presented so the factfinder could 

observe [A]ppellant as he confessed to the crimes. It was crystal 

clear that [Appellant] knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily

made his statements to the authorities.
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If [Appellant] is relying upon the findings of Dr. Carol 

Armstrong’s conclusion that [Appellant] was incapable of 

voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights, this court made a 

determination that Dr. Armstrong was less persuasive than Dr. 

Heilbrun, who concluded that [Appellant’s] statements were 

voluntary. Dr. Armstrong administered an I.Q. test, recording 

[Appellant’s] I.Q. as 75, and averred that such a low I.Q. made 

him incapable of understanding what rights he was giving up. Dr. 

Armstrong did not review the videotapes of [Appellant’s]

interviews with either Agent Duffey or Detective Daly, and did not 

conduct a “Grisso” test,[3] which assesses the understanding and 

appreciation of the Miranda rights[,] although [Dr.] Heilbrun did. 

Having heard the testimony of each expert, this court found Dr. 

Heilbrun’s testimony and opinion much more compelling, and 

comprehensive.

The law is clear that it is for the trier of fact to determine 

the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. The 

factfinder may believe all, part or none of the evidence. An 

appellate court may not re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its 

judgment [f]or that of the factfinder. Commonwealth v. Devries, 

112 A.3d 663, 667 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa. Super.2006)).

Further, the fact that a defendant has a low I.Q. does not in 

and of itself render his confession involuntary. Commonwealth v. 

Glover, 488 Pa. 459, 466, 412 A.2d 855, 858-859 (1980);

Commonwealth v. Crosby, 464 Pa. 337, 344-345, 346 A.2d 768, 

772 (1975). As for Dr. Armstrong’s assertion that she did not

know what compelled [Appellant] to initiate contact with law 

enforcement or his motivations to confess, “neither the 

Pennsylvania nor the United States Constitution[s] protect a 

defendant from statements which originate entirely from internal 

compulsion resulting from a mental disease.” Commonwealth v. 

Bracey, 501 Pa. 356, 369, 461 A.2d 775, 782 (1983). This court 

had the opportunity to view the witnesses and to scrutinize their 

testimony. The record clearly discloses ample basis for this court’s 

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3

 The Grisso test refers to Thomas Grisso’s Instruments for Applied 

Assessment of Understanding of Miranda Rights. Commonwealth v. Winter, 

159 A.3d 1017, 835 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. filed December 29, 2016)

(unpublished memorandum at *2).
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determinations and as such[, this court] found [Appellant’s] 

waiver of his Miranda rights to be knowing, intelligent and 

voluntary and as such, [A]ppellant’s claim is without basis.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/8/20, at 5–10 (footnote omitted).

We reiterate that our review is not a reassessment of the weight of the 

evidence; it is for an abuse of discretion. Cash, 137 A.3d at 1270; 

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206, 213 (Pa. Super. 2015). For 

the reasons set forth above, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s denial of a new trial based on the weight of the evidence.

Finally, we have independently reviewed the record in order to 

determine if counsel’s assessment about the frivolous nature of the present 

appeal is correct. Yorgey, 188 A.3d at 1195. After review of the issues raised 

by counsel and our independent review of the record, we conclude that an 

appeal in this matter is frivolous. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s petitions to 

withdraw and affirm the judgments of sentence.

Petitions to withdraw of John Belli, Esquire, granted. Judgments of 

sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/6/2021