IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0648

Filed May 2, 2018

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

GREGORY FRANCIS TENNANT,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark R. Lawson (trial), 

Judge, and Mark R. Fowler (pre-trial), District Associate Judge.

Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance, 

marijuana, and operating without registration. AFFIRMED.

Thomas A. Hurd of Glazebrook & Hurd, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.

Gregory Tennant was convicted of possession of marijuana, in violation of 

Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2016), and operating without registration or without 

certificate of title, in violation of Iowa Code section 321.98(1)(a), a simple 

misdemeanor. The defendant filed notices of appeal following the entry of 

judgment for both convictions. The supreme court treated Tennant’s notice of 

appeal from the misdemeanor conviction as an application for discretionary review, 

granted the application, and ordered the cases be consolidated into this appeal. 

On appeal, Tennant maintains the district court violated his right to speedy trial

and erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. In a pro per brief, Tennant 

raises several additional claims. 

This case arose out of what should have been a fairly routine police-citizen 

encounter. Police officers responded to a report that a large group of motorcyclists 

were driving dangerously throughout the city and that one of the motorcyclists may 

have assaulted a motorist. The officers located the motorcyclists, many of whom 

were in costumes, at a local gas station. One officer observed a man, now known 

to be Tennant, dressed in a Super Mario costume, putting gas into a motorcycle. 

The motorcycle did not have a license plate. The officer approached Tennant to 

inquire further. Tennant stated he did not talk to police and ignored the officer. 

Tennant refused to identify himself, refused to answer questions regarding the 

motorcycle, and refused to explain the lack of license plate or registration for the 

motorcycle. The officer arrested Tennant for the registration plate violation and for 

harassment for refusing to provide information regarding his identity. At the police 

station, the officer searched Tennant incident to arrest and discovered a baggie of 
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marijuana in Tennant’s pant pocket. Tennant was ultimately charged and 

convicted for possession of marijuana and operating without registration.

In his first claim of error, Tennant contends the district court erred in 

overruling his motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of Tennant’s right to 

speedy trial. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b) provides, “If a defendant 

indicted for a public offense has not waived the defendant's right to a speedy trial 

the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or 

the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the 

contrary be shown.” Pursuant to the rule and case law, “a criminal charge must 

be dismissed if the trial does not commence within ninety days from the filing of 

the charging instrument unless the State proves (1) defendant's waiver of speedy 

trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) ‘good cause’ for the delay.’” 

State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Iowa 2005). The good-cause inquiry 

focuses on “only one factor: the reason for the delay.” Id. Surrounding 

circumstances, including the length of the delay, whether the defendant asserted 

his or her right to a speedy trial, and whether prejudice resulted from the delay are 

relevant “only to the extent they relate directly to the sufficiency of the reason itself.” 

Id. We review the district court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. See Winters, 

690 N.W.2d at 907. However, the discretion afforded the district court in this 

circumstance is tightly circumscribed. See id. “The discretion to avoid dismissal 

in a criminal case is limited to the exceptional circumstance where the State carries 

its burden of showing good cause for the delay.” Id. at 907–08. 

In this case, Tennant was charged by trial information with possession of 

marijuana on November 16, 2016. Tennant pleaded not guilty and demanded 
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speedy trial. Tennant’s trial was scheduled to commence on December 12, 2016. 

After Tennant filed a pro se motion to suppress evidence, the district court 

rescheduled trial for February 6, 2017. At the pretrial conference held on February 

2, the State requested a continuance because the State’s critical witness, the 

arresting officer, had a prescheduled vacation. The State sought a trial date one 

day after the officer’s return. This requested trial date, February 27, was thirteen 

days beyond the speedy-trial deadline. The district court granted the motion to 

continue over Tennant’s objection. The district court scheduled the trial for March 

due to Tennant’s unavailability. The district court concluded the unavailability of 

the essential witness was sufficient “cause” within the meaning of the rule to grant 

the State’s motion to continue over Tennant’s objection. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tennant’s motion 

to dismiss. Here, the unavailable witness was central to the State’s case. The 

witness was unavailable due to a scheduled vacation and not because of any 

action attributable to the State. There is no evidence the State waited to disclose 

this information until the last minute or to prejudice the defendant. The defendant 

suffered no actual prejudice: the delay was short, only a few weeks beyond the 

speedy-trial deadline; and the defendant was at liberty. In similar circumstances, 

the supreme court has recognized the unavailability of a witness constitutes good 

cause within the meaning of the rule where there is only a short delay in trial. See 

State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 704–05 (Iowa 2017) (finding good cause where 

key expert witness was unavailable); State v. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 

(Iowa 1980) (holding absence of witness can be good cause especially when the 

delay is short and the defendant is not prejudiced). Other states have reached the 
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same conclusion. See, e.g., Otte v. State, 967 N.E.2d 540, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012) (“The absence of a key witness through no fault of the State is good cause 

for extending the time period requirements. Such absence may be due to a longplanned vacation.”); State v. Workman, 2008 WL 2020370, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 

May 13, 2008) (“Normally, the unavailability of a witness constitutes good cause 

for delay.”); Jackson v. State, 924 So.2d 531, 544 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (“In the 

present case, the State has shown good cause for requesting a continuance 

because Love was an essential witness, and because Love's failure to appear was 

not due to any action by the State.”); Commonwealth v. Weaver, 525 A.2d 785, 

788 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (“[W]hen a witness becomes unavailable towards the 

end of the Rule 1100 run date-due to illness, vacation, or other reason not within 

the Commonwealth's control, the Commonwealth is prevented from commencing 

the trial within the requisite period despite due diligence, and an extension of time 

is warranted.”); State v. Kindell, 326 P.3d 876, 882 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) 

(“Scheduling conflicts such as a preplanned vacation and the unavailability of 

witnesses constitute valid grounds to continue a trial date under CrR 3.3(f)(2).”); 

State v. Grilley, 840 P.2d 903, 904–05 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (“The right to a 

speedy trial is a significant right. However, if conflicts with previously scheduled 

vacations of investigating officers could never be considered as a proper basis for 

a relatively brief continuance beyond the speedy trial period, we doubt that some 

officer witnesses would ever be able to take vacations.”). The district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.

In his pro per brief, Tennant argues the district court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress evidence on the ground the arrest that led to the search of 
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Tennant’s person was invalid. Our review of the denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence is de novo. See State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011). 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 

section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect the right to be free from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. The touchstone of any search-and-seizure claim is 

reasonableness under the circumstances presented. See Pennsylvania v. 

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (“The touchstone of our analysis under the 

Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all circumstances of the 

particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.” (citation 

omitted)); State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002) (“The Fourth 

Amendment imposes a general reasonableness standard upon all searches and 

seizures.”). A search incident to arrest is reasonable within the meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. See State v. 

Peterson, 515 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1994) (“[W]e hold that in the case of a lawful 

custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant 

requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that 

Amendment.” (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973))). A 

search incident to arrest “allows a police officer ‘to search a lawfully arrested 

individual's person and the immediately surrounding area without a warrant.’” 

State v. Christopher, 757 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Iowa 2008).

Iowa Code section 804.7(3) authorizes a peace officer to make an arrest for 

a public offense committed in the officer’s presence and allows “a peace officer to 

make an arrest without a warrant [w]here the peace officer has reasonable ground 

for believing that an indictable public offense has been committed and has 
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reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it. 

The ‘reasonable ground for belief’ standard within section 804.7(3) is tantamount 

to probable cause.” See State v. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d 293, 298 (Iowa 2005). 

“Probable cause is present if the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a 

reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that a crime has 

been or is being committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it.” 

Id. 

Tennant was arrested for operation without registration in violation of Iowa 

Code section 321.98 and harassment of a public official in violation of Iowa Code 

section 718.4. Tennant contends his arrest for harassment was unfounded, but 

he does not challenge his arrest for the violation of section 321.98. The 

unchallenged arrest is sufficient grounds authorizing the search incident to arrest. 

Even if Tennant had challenged the arrest for the violation of section 321.98, the 

challenge would have failed. Iowa Code section 321.98 provides that “a person 

shall not operate . . . any vehicle required to be registered and titled under this 

chapter unless . . . a valid registration card and registration plate or plates issued 

for the vehicle for the current registration year are attached to and displayed on 

the vehicle.” Here, the officer observed Tennant filling up the gas tank of a 

motorcycle without a registration plate attached to the vehicle. There were no 

other potential operators near the motorcycle or Tennant. Upon inquiry, Tennant 

refused to provide the vehicle registration or any information regarding the vehicle. 

The officer had probable cause to believe Tennant had and was operating a 

vehicle without a registration plate attached to the vehicle and had probable cause 

to arrest Tennant for the same. Because the arrest was lawful, there was no basis 
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to invalidate the search. The district court did not err in denying the motion to 

suppress evidence. 

Tennant raises several additional arguments in his pro per brief and his pro 

per reply brief. He challenges the personal and subject matter jurisdiction of the 

courts. He contends his right to be indicted by a grand jury was violated. He 

contends there was fraud upon the court because there is no “Corpus Delecti” and 

no evidence of an injured person. He raises a standing claim. Tennant also 

contends there was juror misconduct due to one conspiracy related to the 

criminalization of having a license plate frame that blocks or obscures the county 

name and a second conspiracy related to a chiropractic college’s “appeasement 

policy of silence on the explosive issue revealing the Risks and Failures of 

Vaccinations.” We have reviewed each of the pro per claims, whether or not 

explicitly identified herein, and we conclude none provide an entitlement to any 

relief. 

We affirm Tennant’s convictions.

AFFIRMED.