1 The officer stated that “unless you live [in that area], there’s no reason for you to be there.” He testified that he frequently patrolled this area and did not recog nize the appellant as a person who lived in that area. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE
STATE OF TENNESSEE, v. STEVEN D. PITTMAN.

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County No. 97-D-2271 Steve Dozier, Trial Judge

No. M1999-00320-CCA-R3-CD - Decided April 7, 2000

A Davidson County

jury convicted the

appellant, Steven D. Pittman, of one (1) count of possession withthe intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine, one (1) count of felonious possession of a weapon and one (1) count of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced t he appellant as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of eleven (11) y ears for posses sio n with the intent to se ll cocaine, two (2) years for felonious possession of a weapon and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for marijuana pos session. On appea l, the appellant c

ontends that the ev

idence is insufficient

to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we conclude that the stat e pres ented suf ficient e vidence t o support t

he appell ant’s con victions. We therefore aff

irm the judgment o

f the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 as of Right; Judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court is Affirmed

S MITH , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W ELLES , J., and L AFFERTY , S R

. J., joined.

William A. Lane, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Steven D. Pittman.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Rep

orter, Todd R. Kel

ley, Assista

nt Attorney G

eneral, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee

OPINION

I.

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on March 8, 1997, Metro Police Officer Robert Davenport was

on duty patrolling

the “Central Sector” of Nashville. He observed a car backed into a parking spa ce in the area of an a

partment complex, a

nd two (2) people w

ere sitting inside

the vehicle. Be

cause the off ice r bel iev ed t his to b e ou t of the ord ina ry, 1 he called for backup and approached the vehicle.-2-

As Officer Davenport approached the passenger side of the vehicle from behind, he noticed “some movement in the front of the vehicle.” The officer asked that the people inside the car stop moving, but they did not comply with his request. Fearing that the passengers might have a weapon, the officer

drew his gun and

ordered them out o

f the vehicle. Th

e appellant,

who was sitting in the driver’s seat, got out of the vehicle and put his hands on the hood of the car. When the appellant exited the car, the officer saw a small bag of green plant material between the driver and passenger seats. Beside the plant material was a loaded .44 caliber handgun. Officer Davenport arrested the a pp ellant for possession of marijuana, placed him in the backseat of his vehicle

and transported him downtown. When they arrived, the appellant exited the backseat of the officer’s patrol

car. The officer then found a cellophane bag containing white rocklike substance in the floorboard of the backseat. The officer testified that he was certain that the bag

was not in his vehicle prior to transporting the appellant because he always sea rched his vehicle at the beginning of his shift and after anyone exited the backsea t of the vehicle. No drug paraphernalia w as found, but officers recovered approximately $1,000 from the trunk of the appellant’s car and $1,700 from the appellant’s person. When the officer informed the appellant that he would be charged w ith possession with the intent to sell, the appellant told the officer that the drugs were for his personal use. Drug analy

sis indicated that t

he gree n plant material was approximately 0.6 grams of marijuana. The white rock-like substance tested to be 8.0 grams of cocaine base. The jury found the appellant guilty of possession with the intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine, unlawful possession of a weapon, and simple possession of marijuana. The trial cour t sentenced the appellant to concurrent sentences of eleven (11) years on the cocaine offense, two (2) yearsfor the weapons offense and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for possession of marijuana. From

his convictions, the

appellant now bri

ngs this appeal.

II.

In his sole iss ue on ap peal, the appella nt asserts that the

evidence is insuf

ficient to sustain his convic tions. First, he argues that the state failed to prove that he possessed the cocaine, t h e handgun or the marijuana. Secondly, he claims that there is insufficient evidence that he intended to sell or deliver the cocaine. A. When an appellant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is obliged to review that challenge according to certain well-settled principles. Where the sufficiency of the evidence is contested on appeal, the re levant question fo

r the reviewing

court is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the offens e beyond a reasonable doub t. Tenn. R. App. P. 1 3(e); State v. Harris , 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Te nn. 1992). On appe

al, the state is entitled to the strongest l egitimate view o

f the evidence a

s well as all r

e asonable and leg

itimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. Ca bbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). In conducting our evaluation of the convict ing evid ence, this Court is precluded from reweighing or reconsidering the evidence. State v. Morgan , 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State

v. Matthews , 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (T enn. Cr im. App. 1990). Moreover, this Court may not substitute its own inferences “for those drawn by the trier of fa ct from circumstantial evidence.”2 The appellant does not contest that he “ has been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly wea pon.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A).

-3- State v. Matthews , 805 S.W.2d at 779. A verd ict of gu ilt y by th e ju ry, a pproved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the state. State v. Cazes , 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 199 4); State v. Harris
, 839 S.W.2d at 75. Altho ugh an accuse

d is originally cloaked with a presumption of innocenc e, a jury verdic t removes this pres

umption and replac

es it withone of guilt. State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, the burden of proof rests with Appellant to demonstrate the insufficiency of the convicting e vidence. Id. B. To convict the appellant of possession of cocaine with the

intent to sell, the st

ate must prove that the appellant knowingly possessed the cocaine. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4). Sim ila rly, the state was required to prove that the appellan t knowin gly posses sed the marijuana found in his vehicle. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418(a). Finally, for the unlawful possession of a weapon off ense, the state must demonstrate that the appellant possessed a handgun and “has bee n co nvicted of a felony involving the use

or attempted use

of force, violence or a deadly weapon.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 3 9-17-1307(b)(1)(A). 2 Thus, the primary inquiry for this Court becomes whether the appellant possessed the cocaine, the handgun and the marijuana. “Possession” may be actual or constructive. Statev. Bro wn , 823 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “Constructive possession requires that a person knowingly

have the power and the intention at a give n time to e xercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.” State v. Copeland , 677 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 984). In other words, constructive possession is “the ability to re duce an object to

actual possession.” State v. Williams
, 623 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (quo ting United States v. Martinez
, 588 F.2d 495 (5 th Cir. 1979)); see also State v. Cooper , 736 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). In the present case, the marijuana and the handgun were found in the car the appellant was driving. The officer testified that both were within the appellant’sreach, as the officer discovered the contraband next to t

he driver’s sea

t. Whether the appe

llant possessed the

contraband is a question of fact

for the jury to determine. See State v. Copeland , 677 S.W.2d at 476. We believe that the eviden ce is clearly sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the a ppellant constructively

possessed the marijuana and the handgun. See Sta te v . Boyd , 925 S.W.2d 237, 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). With regard to the appellant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, the officer testified that

although he patted down the appellant for weapons after a

rresting him, he

did
notconduct a search of the appellant’s person for drugs. He put the appella nt in his patrol car and transportedhim downtown. When the appellant exited the vehicle, the officer saw the bag ofrocklike s ubstan ce in the floorboa rd of the backse

at. The officer

testified that he a

lways sear

ches his vehicle prior to his shift and after anyone exits the backseat of his vehicle. Furthermore, the of ficer stated that the cocaine was not in his car prior to the appellant entering his vehicle. V iewing this evidence in the light most fa vorable to the sta

te, we conclude t

hat the ju ry could have rationally concluded that the appellant knowingly possessed the crack coc aine. This issue is without m

erit.-4- C. The appellant

also alleges that

the state failed to prove that he possessed the cocaine with the intentto sell or deliver. However, the amount of cocaine possessed by the appellant supports an inferenceof an intent to sell, rather than for personal use. See State v. Bledsoe , 626 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). Moreover, no drug paraphernalia was found, which is also indicative of

an intent to sell. State v. Brown , 915 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Finally, the officers

recover ed approximate

ly $2,700 from the trunk of the appellant’s car and on his person, and the appellant was in possession of a weapon. This Court has held that a weapo n, as well as large
amounts of cash, in the appellant’s possession constitute circumstantial evidence indicating an intent
to sell. State v. Reginald Allan Gillespie , C.C.A. No. 03C01-97 06-CR-00222, 1999 T

enn. Crim. App. LEXIS 600, at *5, Greene County (Tenn. Crim. App. filedJune 16, 1999, at Knoxville); State

v. Jimmy Clyde Jones , C.C.A. No. 02C01-9703-CC-00120, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1289,
at *5, Hardin County

(Tenn. Crim. App. f

il ed Dece mber 18, 1997, at Jac kson); State v. Ronald Mitchell
, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9702-CC-00070, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 8 71, at *5, Laud erdale County (Tenn. Crim. App. filedSeptember 15, 1997, at Jackson), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. April 27, 1998) . Notwithstanding the appellant’s protests that the cocaine was for personal use, the jury could have reas

onably conc

luded that the appe

llant possessed the

cocaine with the

intent to sell. This issue has no mer

it.

III.

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appe llant was guilty of possession of cocain e with the int ent to sell, felonious possession of a weapon and simple possession of marijuana. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is aff irmed.