In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-3099 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

CHRISTOPHER R. WILLIAMS, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 1:21-cr-10028-JES-JEH-1 — James E. Shadid, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 21, 2023 — DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2023 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Christopher Williams received a 

360-month term of imprisonment for his role in a large-scale 

methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy, to which he pled 

guilty. Unhappy with that sentence, he appeals, arguing that 

the sentence was unreasonable, and that the judge erred in 

enhancing the sentence in light of aggravating factors. 
2 No. 22-3099 

In his sentencing hearing, the government portrayed Williams as a major supplier to both other dealers and individual 

users, asserting that he was responsible for the distribution of 

more than 48 kilograms (105 pounds) of methamphetamine 

over the course of the conspiracy. As is all too often the tragic 

result with methamphetamine distribution, some of the drugs 

Williams supplied caused fatalities. The government’s investigation linked three such deaths back to methamphetamine 

supplied by Williams. Laboratory testing of different batches 

of drugs supplied by Williams and confiscated by law enforcement indicated that the tested drugs were between 96 to 

100% pure methamphetamine. 

Ten people who purchased significant quantities of methamphetamine from Williams (and were all implicated in the 

distribution of methamphetamine with Williams) testified at 

his sentencing hearing about the quantities of drugs they 

bought from him. Several of them also testified about threats 

he made to them to induce payment for fronted supply, and 

about his possession and use of firearms. The government 

had plenty of other evidence of his drug dealings: a driver and 

passenger arrested for methamphetamine possession disclosed Williams as their source. Another dealer in Peoria informed officers that he and Williams had distributed 276 

grams of methamphetamine as part of their trafficking relationship. And officers orchestrated a controlled buy with audio and visual recording in which, after phone calls arranging 

the transaction with Williams, Williams’ associate provided 

the source with approximately twenty grams of methamphetamine. 

Williams pled guilty to four different counts involving 

distribution and possession of methamphetamine in violation 
No. 22-3099 3

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(B). The district 

court sentenced Williams to a sentence at the bottom of the 

360 month to life range recommended by the United States 

Sentencing Guideline—imposing a 360-month sentence for 

each count, to be served concurrently. 

A. The reasonableness of the sentence 

In this appeal, Williams begins with what some consider 

the Mt. Everest of sentencing arguments. Williams would like 

us to conclude that his within-Guidelines sentence was unreasonable. This goal is elusive both because of the deference appellate courts owe to district courts in sentencing generally, 

and because of the presumption of reasonableness attached to 

sentences recommended by the United States Sentencing 

Commission. 

As for deference, the district court has a front row view to 

the facts of the crime, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the presentation of the pre-sentencing report, and the 

assessment of the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Vallar, 635 

F.3d 271, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We recognize that the sentencing judge is in the best position to apply the § 3553(a) factors to the individual defendant, and that the judge sees 

things we cannot see, assesses in real-time the credibility of 

witnesses and defendants when we cannot, and develops insights from the various bits and pieces of information that he 

comes across in the course of a case that nonetheless are not 

reflected in the record.”); United States v. Daoud, 989 F.3d 610, 

611 (7th Cir. 2021) (Rovner, J., dissenting from the denial of 

rehearing en banc) (describing factors that make it important 

to defer to a district court’s discretion in sentencing). For this 

reason, the Supreme Court instructs appellate courts to limit 

their review only to determinations of whether a sentence is 
4 No. 22-3099 

reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). Consequently, we review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion only. Id.; United States v. Griffith, 

913 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir. 2019). Although we review claims 

of procedural errors in sentencing de novo, these are generally limited to matters such as “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines 

as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 

adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 

U.S. at 51. 

Williams claims that the court committed procedural error 

by failing to explain why he received a harsher sentence than 

any of the witnesses who testified against him and were implicated in the same distribution scheme. But as will become 

clear below, the court did not ignore the requirement of 

§ 3553(a) to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 

of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court considered 

the disparity issue and addressed it, giving several explanations for why Williams’ sentence was higher than that of his 

co-conspirators. In short, there was no procedural error. 

Consequently, all of Williams’ arguments about the sentence and the disparities are really arguments about the reasonableness of his sentence, which, as we noted, we review 

only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Turnipseed, 47 

F.4th 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2022). Moreover, our deference is at its 

peak when the sentence, like the one given to Williams, is 

within the range suggested by the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines. “For even though the Guidelines are advisory 
No. 22-3099 5

rather than mandatory, they are ... the product of careful 

study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the 

review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions.” Gall, 

552 U.S. at 46. The Guidelines themselves are designed to remove disparities, thus within-Guidelines sentences are presumed to be reasonable and are virtually unassailable. Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 201; United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 

271, 279 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that within-Guidelines sentences “will almost never be unreasonable.”) (quoting United 

States v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2008)); United States 

v. Shrake, 515 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Williams’ reasonableness argument also focuses on the 

disparity between his sentence and those of the testifying coconspirators. Six of the other testifying witnesses who were 

charged with federal crimes received between 151 and 300 

months, depending on their criminal history, their role in the 

conspiracy, and the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Two were charged only with state crimes. One cooperated with the government and no charges were ever filed, 

and one was awaiting sentencing at the time of briefing. The 

government pointed out that each of the witnesses who received a lesser sentence than Williams was subject to a lower 

advisory Guidelines range. The district court judge considered Williams’ arguments about the disparity and addressed 

them head on, justifying the higher sentence on the rationale 

that Williams was a large-scale dealer who supplied other 

dealers and distributed methamphetamine to many people. 

The court reasoned that he exerted a high level of control over 

the transactions, and he threatened others to conform to his 

will. The district court judge also noted that Williams was not, 

himself, addicted to methamphetamine and was motived by 
6 No. 22-3099 

financial gain rather than addiction.1 Finally the court noted 

that, although the district court was not sentencing Williams 

for the death of any of the victims who died after ingesting 

the methamphetamine he sold directly or indirectly to them, 

the district court judge nevertheless considered it as an aggravating factor under § 3553 because Williams dabbled in the 

distribution of drugs (much of which was tainted with deadly 

fentanyl) known to be exceptionally dangerous. A district 

court judge who reasonably and adequately explains why a 

disparity is warranted has not abused his discretion. United 

States v. Patel, 921 F.3d 663, 673–74 (7th Cir. 2019). 

1 At oral argument and in the reply brief, Williams’ counsel argued 

that Williams was indeed a drug addict. The Presentence Investigation 

Report indicates that Williams, according to his own self report, used several drugs, including methamphetamine, during the time in which he was 

distributing drugs. The testifying witnesses who were asked during the 

sentencing hearing about Williams’ drug use, however, stated that they 

did not know Williams to be a drug user. See Tr. 49-50, R. 49 at 49–50 (testimony of Ronnie Bodke); Tr. 69, R. 49 at 69 (testimony of Dustin Test); Tr. 

103, R. 49 at 103 (testimony of William Zamaro); Tr. 233, R. 50 at 64 (testimony of Thomas Wright); Tr. 258, R. 50 at 89 (testimony of Mary Lazzari). 

And the prosecuting attorney argued at sentencing that Williams’ statements about his own drug use were contradictory and unreliable, as they 

changed according to what was most beneficial to him at the time. Tr. 381-

384, R. 50 at 212–15. The court was entitled to believe the witness testimony that Williams rarely if ever used methamphetamine, over his own 

report that he was an addict. But in any event, even if the district court 

erred by concluding, based on the evidence, that Williams was not addicted to methamphetamine, this error would not have affected the sentence, as Williams’ interest in financial gain (as opposed to supporting an 

addiction), was only one small part of the district court’s rationale for his 

sentence. 
No. 22-3099 7

B. The enhancements 

Williams’ “Statement of Issues for Review” also asks 

“[w]hether the government met its burden to prove the enhancements without producing a firearm and only one piece 

of evidence?” Williams’ Brief at 2. A district court must find 

facts sufficient to support an enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence—a finding that, once again, we review 

only for clear error. United States v. Griffin, 76 F.4th 724, 751 

(7th Cir. 2023). That means we can reverse “only if a review 

of the evidence leaves us with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Sandidge, 784 

F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 

765 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)). 

Although Williams’ “Statement of Issues for Review” specifically references firearms, but not threats, in the argument 

section he discusses the threatening conduct with just a 

throwaway reference to firearms. The only statement in the 

argument section about firearms is as follows: “Most [witnesses] also stated that they never saw Mr. Williams with a 

weapon.” Williams’ Brief at 8. If this is indeed an argument 

about the firearms enhancement, it is wholly insufficient to 

preserve the issue for appeal. Hakim v. Safariland, LLC, 79 F.4th 

861, 872 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 

674 (7th Cir. 2016) (“perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.”). Williams included additional information in the reply brief in which he argues that the threatening text message used to support the firearm enhancement 

happened outside of the timeframe of the conspiracy, but this 

argument comes too late, and likewise is not fully developed. 

Just as undeveloped arguments are waived, so are arguments 
8 No. 22-3099 

raised for the first time in reply briefs. White v. United States, 

8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[A]rguments raised for the 

first time in [a] reply brief are waived because they leave no 

chance to respond.”) 

As for the enhancement for credible threats of violence under Sentencing Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(2), Williams argues that 

the enhancement for threats was unreasonable because only 

three of the ten witnesses testified that they had been threatened, only one of the threats was supported by physical evidence of the threat (in the form of a text message), and during 

one of the alleged threatening incidents, Williams did not 

have a weapon. The Guideline, however, says nothing about 

a particular number of threats, or the presence of a weapon. It 

merely states, “If the defendant used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use of violence, increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2). 

The evidence of threats was overwhelming. One of Williams’ buyers testified that Williams threatened to “shoot up” 

his home if he did not pay what he owed. A second buyer 

testified that Williams assaulted and threatened to kill him 

when he incurred a debt after Williams fronted him methamphetamine, and then later solicited someone to assault him 

while he was incarcerated. And one of the witnesses at sentencing confirmed that she drove Williams while he looked 

for that same buyer to settle his debt. A third witness testified 

that Williams brandished a handgun just prior to threatening 

another buyer about payment. The government also introduced texts sent from Williams to a fourth co-conspirator in 

which he stated that he would kill for money owed and expected money or blood. That final threat, evidenced both by 

witness testimony and the actual text messages themselves, 
No. 22-3099 9

would have been more than sufficient to support the district 

court’s enhancement for issuing threats. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(2). We do not mean to imply, however, that the evidence of threatening behavior supported by witness testimony alone was insufficient. It is not uncommon for drug 

dealers who threaten their dealers and buyers not to leave behind a written trail of evidence of those threats. Evidence in 

criminal matters commonly comes from witness testimony 

without physical evidence. See Villavicencio-Serna v. Jackson, 

999 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Not every case has the kind 

of physical evidence that definitively resolves doubts, but neither is that type of evidence required.”). The district court has 

far-reaching discretion to listen to testimony and the subsequent cross-examination, assess demeanor, and then decide 

about the credibility of that testimony. United States v. Pennington, 908 F.3d 234, 240 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States 

v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2010)) (“we defer to a district court’s determination of witness credibility, which can 

virtually never be clear error.”). Moreover, the district court 

need only find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

threatening behavior occurred. United States v. Galvan, 44 

F.4th 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 2022). The district court judge 

acknowledged the potential self-interested motivations of 

many of the testifying witnesses, but nevertheless judged the 

testimony about the threats to be credible and thus applied 

the enhancement for threatening conduct. We have no firm 

conviction that an error has been made. 

C. Objections to the base offense level 

Finally, Williams argues that the Guideline range was not 

accurate because the government failed to provide enough information about the purity of the methamphetamine. 
10 No. 22-3099 

Williams, however, after a brief objection to the base offense 

level, withdrew that objection and stipulated to a base offense 

level of 38 under the Sentencing Guidelines, explicitly agreeing that it was accurate and not asserting any objection to the 

purity of the drugs. “When a defendant intentionally relinquishes a known right—for example, stating on the record 

that he has no objection to a specific aspect of the presentence 

report—he waives the right to appeal.” United States v. Robinson, 964 F.3d 632, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Even had Williams not explicitly withdrawn his objection 

to the base offense level, when a court looks at the record and 

can see a strategic decision for forgoing an argument, it is a 

good indication that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver and did not negligently fail to raise the argument. United States v. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 2016). 

In this case, Williams made a successful strategic decision to 

stipulate to the base offense level of 38. That base offense level 

required only that Williams be held accountable for 4.5 kilograms or more of methamphetamine (actual). USSG 

§ 2D1.1(c)(1). The evidence supported the government’s conclusion that Williams was responsible for more than 48 kilograms of methamphetamine–almost ten times the amount the 

government needed to prove. Given these facts, any argument about purity was unlikely to lower the amount below 

4.5 kilograms. Not only was it a losing argument, but to assert 

it, Williams would have to sacrifice any potential reduction 

for acceptance of responsibility. Williams’ lawyer made full 

use of that stipulation to argue for a reduction based on acceptance of responsibility. See Tr. at 329; R. 50 at 160 (“Your 

Honor, I believe that the three-level reduction is warranted 

because my client has accepted responsibility. He admitted to 

the conspiracy. He admitted to selling to various individuals. 
No. 22-3099 11

He even admitted, you know, to the offense level of 38.”). 

That stipulation reduced Williams’ offense level by three. 

Having made full and strategic use of the stipulation, Williams cannot now argue that the base offense level was incorrect. 

Because we see neither error nor abuse of discretion, we 

AFFIRM the sentencing decision of the district court in this 

matter.