J-A16030-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LAMONT JOHNSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1838 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 23, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0008104-2014

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2023

Lamont Johnson (Appellant) appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment 

of sentence entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following 

his jury convictions of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 

deliver (PWID) and possession of drug paraphernalia.

1

 Appellant advances 

two arguments: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

because the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, and in turn, 

his confession was not voluntary; and (2) the trial court erred in denying his 

request for disclosure of the confidential informant who provided information 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) & (32).
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that was included in the affidavit of probable cause that accompanied the 

search warrant. For the reasons below, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

The relevant facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are as 

follows. Patrolman Timothy Garron (Officer Garron), of the City of Chester 

Police Department, conducted a criminal investigation, which included three 

controlled narcotics buys by a confidential informant (CI), and applied for an 

anticipatory search warrant on December 4, 2014, of Appellant’s residence 

located at 909 West 7th Street, Chester, Pennsylvania, and his vehicle bearing 

a Pennsylvania license plate with the following identification, “JST-8648.” 

Application for Search Warrant and Authorization (Search Warrant), 12/4/14, 

at 2, 4-5, 8.

2

 A magisterial district judge issued the search warrant on 

December 4, 2014. Officer Garron executed the search warrant on December 

5, 2014. After police officers entered the home, they found Appellant in the 

front bedroom on the second floor. N.T., 8/11/15, at 33. They placed him in 

handcuffs and gave him Miranda3 warnings before they conducted a search 

of the home. Id. at 33-34. Police seized a pillowcase, which included (1) a 

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2 Officer Garron averred that at the time of the application, he had been a fulltime police officer with the Chester Police Department for over six years. 

Search Warrant at 2. He stated that for the past 21 months, he was assigned 

to the Narcotics, Vice and Intelligence Unit, and that for the past 20 months, 

he was a sworn member of the Criminal Investigation Division, Drug Task

Force for the Office of the District Attorney of Delaware County. See id. 

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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clear plastic bag with five knotted plastic bags, containing 51.17 grams of 

cocaine; (2) another plastic bag containing 43 heat sealed orange plastic zip 

lock bags contained 10.19 grams of cocaine; (3) two blue plastic bags 

containing 1.02 grams of cocaine; and (4) one knotted clear plastic bag 

containing nine blue plastic zip lock bags which contained five grams of 

cocaine. See N.T., 11/30/16, at 64-66.

4

 

Police Officer Mark Barag of the City of Chester Police Department 

assisted in the execution of the search warrant, and interviewed Appellant at 

police headquarters. Officer Barag provided Appellant with Miranda warnings

prior to questioning him, and gave him a waiver form. N.T., 8/11/15, at 53, 

56. Appellant reviewed the form and signed it. Id. at 53-59. As evidenced 

by the form, Appellant admitted that narcotics in the pillowcase were his, that 

he purchased the drugs in North Philadelphia, that it was his intention to sell 

the drugs and “get high,” and that he took full responsibility for all recovered 

narcotics and drug paraphernalia. N.T., 11/30/16, at 216-18. Appellant also 

indicated that he was not coerced or forced to say anything during the 

interview. Id. at 218. Thereafter, Appellant was arrested and charged with 

numerous violations of the Controlled Substances Act, including PWID. 

____________________________________________

4 Based on the packaging and weight of the cocaine seized, this amounted to 

between $6,000.00 to $7,000.00. See N.T., 11/30/16, at 239-40.
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On May 20, 2015, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion, seeking 

suppression of any statements or physical evidence recovered as a result of 

the search warrant on the basis that the officers lacked probable cause, insofar 

as there were purported defects in the warrant.

5

 The court held a hearing on 

August 11, 2015, regarding the matter. On March 16, 2016, Appellant filed 

an amended omnibus pretrial motion, which concerned a motion for disclosure 

of information regarding the confidential informant. The court held another 

hearing on April 12, 2016. On June 3, 2016, the court denied both motions. 

The matter proceeded to a jury trial, which began on November 29, 

2016. On December 1, 2016, the jury convicted Appellant of PWID and 

possession of drug paraphernalia. On January 23, 2017, the court sentenced 

Appellant a term of 40 to 140 months’ incarceration for the PWID conviction, 

followed by five years of probation, and a concurrent term of six months to 12 

months’ incarceration for the possession of drug paraphernalia offense. 

Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 27, 2017. 

On April 8, 2019, this Court remanded the matter for the trial court to 

hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Appellant timely delivered 

his pro se notice of appeal to prison authorities. See Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 779 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Apr. 8, 2019) (unpub. memo.). On May 

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5 The May 2015 motion was not included in the certified record. The contents 

of the motion were taken from defense counsel’s statements at the 

suppression hearing. See N.T., 8/11/15, at 3-4.
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23, 2019, the court held a hearing, but the matter was continued until July 

22, 2019, “for Appellant to bring a properly executed cash slip or other 

reasonably verifiable evidence of the date he deposited his pro se filing of his 

notice of appeal with the prison authorities.” Trial Ct. Op., 12/16/21, at 3. At 

the time of the July 22nd hearing, Appellant did not produce proof of the 

deposit. On September 10, 2019, this Court quashed Appellant’s appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 779 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Sep. 10, 2019) 

(unpub. memo.).

On April 8, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 

relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).6 Counsel was 

appointed, who then filed an amended PCRA petition on May 28, 2020. On 

August 17, 2021, the trial court entered an order that included a stipulation 

by both parties averring that “trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

when he failed to file a timely notice of appeal when timely requested to do 

so by petitioner, and, as a result, [Appellant]’s direct appeal to the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court was quashed.” Order of the Court, 8/17/21, at 

1 (unpaginated). The court stated that “[t]rial counsel had no reasonable 

basis for failing to file the requested notice of appeal and [Appellant] was 

prejudiced as a result. . . .” Id. Therefore, the court ordered that his direct 

____________________________________________

6 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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appeal rights be reinstated nunc pro tunc. Id. Thereafter, new counsel was 

appointed, who filed a notice of appeal.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred as a matter of law and 

abused its discretion, and denied [Appellant] rights guaranteed by 

the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution and Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, in denying [Appellant]’s pre-trial motion to suppress 

the fruits of the search of his home and the resulting incriminating 

statement, as the warrant issued for the residence fails to set out 

probable cause to believe that contraband would be found within 

the residence and the subsequent incriminating statement of 

[Appellant] was the product of the unlawful search?

2. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred as a matter of law and 

abused its discretion, and denied [Appellant] rights guaranteed by 

the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution and Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, in denying [Appellant]’s pre-trial motion for 

disclosure of the confidential informant who provided information 

included in the Affidavit of Probable Cause accompanying the 

search warrant, where the pre-trial request for disclosure of the 

informant was material to his defense, was reasonable and in the 

interest of justice, and where the Commonwealth failed to 

establish that the safety of the informant would be compromised 

by disclosure?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

Appellant first complains that the trial court erred and abused its 

discretion by denying his motion to suppress because “the search warrant 

resulting in the seizure of illegal drugs, Appellant[’]s arrest and subsequent 

confession was not based on probable cause.” See Appellant’s Brief at 19. 

He asserts the warrant was not based on probable cause due to the CI’s

lack of reliability, stating:
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According to the affidavit, Officer Garron received information

from the informant that a male known as “L” was selling drugs

from the residence at 909 W. 7th Street in Chester. After

performing some internet-based searches, [Officer] Garron

connected Appellant . . . with the residence. The information

supplied by the informant, as corroborated by [Officer] Garron, so

far fails to provide probable cause, as corroboration of readily

obtainable facts does not provide probable cause. . . . The

informant is not shown to be reliable simply because police

verified Appellant’s address as given by the informant. In

addition, although the Affidavit states that the informant provided

information that led to three arrests, information leading to

arrests only does not establish reliability because there is no

showing that the information previously provided, was proven to

be true. The affidavit fails to include any other facts relating to

the case or cases in which the informant provided information; for

instance, the affidavit does not indicate the name of the persons

arrested, the type of information provided by the informant or

whether the case or cases got past the preliminary hearing; the

affidavit does not specify the type of information given in the

previous cases or whether the informant participated in the

criminal activity. . . .

Appellant’s Brief at 21-22 (citations omitted). Furthermore, he argues: “Nor

does the fact that the informant told police he observed cocaine in the

residence . . . amount to a declaration against penal interest[.]” Id. at 23

(citation omitted). Appellant also claims:

[T]he Affidavit does not establish a basis for the informant to state

that “L” is selling drugs from the residence, nor is there a time

frame as to when the informant saw the drugs inside the house or

as to when the person known as “L” was actually selling illegal

drugs from the house[.] The Affidavit states that the informant

made states against his penal interest[, but t]he actual

statements, or even the general nature of the statements, do not

appear in the affidavit. The affidavit does not indicate whether

those statements were made with reference to this case and

cannot be said to have been incriminating for the informant. One

cannot ascertain from the face of the affidavit, whether the

statements were made to curry favor from law enforcement, to
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minimize culpability, to retaliate against another or given for any

other such self-serving reason.

Id. at 23-24 (citation omitted). Appellant maintains that the determination

“that the drugs were purchased from within the residence, therefore, is based

entirely, not on police observation of the informant’s activities, but, instead

on acceptance of the informant’s credibility.” Id. at 25. 

Appellant also suggests that since his arrest was purportedly unlawful,

his statements to police should be suppressed as well. See Appellant’s Brief 

at 25. He states that the “Pennsylvania Supreme Court historically has not

found a confession coming after an illegal arrest to have been freed from the

taint of the illegal arrest simply because the incriminating statement was

preceded by Miranda warnings[.]” Id. at 28 (citations omitted). Appellant

concludes, “Because [he] was arrested without probable cause, and as a result

of [his] confession having not been purged of the illegal arrest, the statements

made by [him] to police should have been suppressed.” Id.

When reviewing suppression decisions, our standard of review is limited.

We review trial court suppression orders to determine whether the 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by 

the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they are 

supported by the record. In reviewing an appeal by the 

Commonwealth of a suppression order, we may consider only the 

evidence from the [defendant’s] witnesses along with the 

Commonwealth’s evidence which remains uncontroverted. Our

scope of review of suppression court factual findings is limited to

the suppression hearing record. We, however, are not bound by

a suppression court’s conclusions of law; rather, when reviewing

questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope

of review is plenary.
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Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 39 (Pa. 2021) (citations & quotations

marks omitted). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as

factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given

their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

As Appellant’s argument pertains to the validity of the search warrant,

we are guided by the following: 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

commands that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 

and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 

persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend IV.

Similarly, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

provides that “[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and 

seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any 

person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as 

may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or 

affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.

A search warrant may issue only upon a demonstration of

probable cause by an affiant. See generally Commonwealth v.

Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 107 (Pa. 2014). The existence of probable

cause is measured by examining the totality of the circumstances. 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). “Probable cause

exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s

knowledge and of which he [or she] has reasonably trustworthy

information are sufficient in and of themselves to warrant a

[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should

be conducted.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017,

1031 (Pa. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

A magisterial district judge, when deciding whether to issue a

search warrant, must “make a practical, common-sense decision

whether, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit .
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. . including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons

supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular

place.” Id. (citation omitted). Conversely, “[a] court reviewing a

search warrant determines only if a substantial basis existed for

the magistrate to find probable cause.” Id. (citation omitted). We

also note that there is a strict particularity requirement in Article

I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that “a warrant must

describe the items as specifically as is reasonably possible.” 

Commonwealth v. Grossman, 555 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1989);

see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 205(2) (requiring all search warrants to

“identify specifically the property to be seized”); id. at 205(3)

(requiring all search warrants to “name or describe with

particularity the person or place to be searched”).

Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1081-82 (Pa. 2017).

Moreover, “a determination of probable cause based upon information 

received from a confidential informant depends upon the informant’s reliability

and basis of knowledge viewed in a common sense, non-technical manner.” 

Commonwealth v. Clark, 28 A.3d 1284, 1288 (Pa. 2011). “[A]n informant’s 

tip may constitute probable cause where police independently corroborate the 

tip, or where the informant has provided accurate information of criminal 

activity in the past, or where the informant himself participated in the criminal 

activity.” Id. (emphasis in original). “[U]nder the totality-of-thecircumstances approach, there is no talismanic recitation of a particular phrase 

with respect to ‘reliability’ or ‘basis of knowledge’ that will either be required 

or will suffice to conclusively establish, or conclusively disaffirm, the existence 

of probable cause.” Id. at 1292. See also Commonwealth v. Luv, 735 

A.2d 87 (Pa. 1999).
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As noted above, Officer Garron was the affiant for the search warrant 

and affidavit of probable cause at issue. The affidavit of probable cause

stated, in relevant part:

During the month of October [Officer Garron] spoke with a 

reliable [CI] regarding narcotics sales from an individual only 

known to [CI] as “L”. During this conversation [CI] stated that 

he/she knows “L” resides at 909 West 7th Street, Chester, 

Delaware County, Pennsylvania 19013 and sells large quantities 

of cocaine from his residence. [CI] went on to describe “L” as a 

black male, approximately 5’4” to 5’7” with a medium build, dark 

complexion, with a beard and black low cropped hair who is 

approximately 40 years old. [CI] has observed “L” numerous 

times inside of 909 West 7th Street . . . with large amounts of 

cocaine as well as large sums of [United States] currency. [CI] 

further stated that he/she is aware that “L” has been arrested in 

the past for previous narcotics convictions.

[CI] advised [Officer Garron] that he/she wishes to remain 

anonymous for fear of bodily harm/death and/or retaliation 

against their property should their identity become known. 

[Officer Garron] also wishes [CI]’s identity to remain anonymous 

out of concern for [CI]’s safety, and also, should his/her identity 

become known he/she could no longer provide law enforcement 

with information regarding illegal drug activity in and around 

Delaware County. [Officer Garron] has corroborated this 

information through independent police investigation and through 

other sources of information (Ex.: investigation/reports/records 

checks). [CI] has provided law enforcement with information 

regarding other narcotics investigations, where during or after 

their completion different quantities of narcotics/firearms have 

been seized and at least three individuals have been arrested as 

a result. [CI] has also made numerous statements against his/her 

penal interest including the fact that [CI] is/was a user/dealer of 

controlled substances. In conversation with [CI, Officer Garron] 

knows [CI] to have a thorough familiarity with the ways in which 

controlled substances, specifically cocaine, is used, sold and 

distributed, and the corresponding prices at which the various 

doses are sold. [Officer Garron] through training and experience 

know[s] this information imparted by [CI] to be accurate.
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During the month of October [Officer Garron] conducted 

multiple searches on the address of 909 West 7th Street . . . and 

was able to locate the name Lamont Johnson . . . as a resident [at 

that address]. With this information in hand, [Officer Garron] 

conducted numerous searches on the name Lamont Johnson using 

JNET,[7] court records and the National Crime Information Center 

(NCIC). Records, including photos for Lamont Johnson were 

found, printed and presented to [CI]. [CI] stated that the photo 

obtained utilizing JNET by your affiant was that of “L” who he/she 

knows has been selling cocaine from the residence located at 909 

West 7th Street[.] Further research on [Appellant] . . . revealed 

that he has five prior convictions for violations of Title 35 for 

manufacturing, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance.

* * *

During the month of October [Officer Garron] conducted 

numerous periods of hidden surveillance during various times of 

the day and nighttime hours on the address of 909 West 7th 

Street[.]. During the course of these various surveillance periods 

[Appellant] aka “L” was observed coming and going from the front 

and rear door of 909 West 7th Street[.]Furthermore, [Officer 

Garron] observed heavy foot and vehicular traffic, often using the 

rear entrance to [the property]. Through training and experience 

[Officer Garron] knows this activity to be consistent with narcotics 

trafficking.

During the month of November [Officer Garron] met with 

[CI] for the purpose of conducting a controlled purchase of cocaine 

from [Appellant] from within the residence located at 909 West 

7th Street[.] [CI] was searched and found to be free of any 

controlled substances and/or United States currency. [Officer 

Garron] gave [CI] a quantity of United States currency with which 

to make the controlled purchase. [Officer Garron] and [CI] 

together went to the vicinity of 909 West 7th Street[.] [CI] left 

[Officer Garron] and went directly inside the rear door of 909 West 

7th Street . . . , by way of a carport/garage making no stops in 

between and meeting with no other individuals. After 

approximately ten minutes [CI] exited the rear door of 909 West 

____________________________________________

7 JNET standards for Pennsylvania Justice Network.
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7th Street, . . . and returned directly to [Officer Garron]. Involved

members of law enforcement had constant observation of [CI] 

prior to entering the residence as well as after the completion of 

the controlled buy. At no time did [CI] stop and or exchange 

anything with any person on the street while [e]n route to or from

the residence located at 909 West 7th Street[.] Upon returning 

to [Officer Garron], [CI] turned over a quantity of cocaine 

consistent with the currency provided, while confirming that the 

subject [CI] purchased the illegal narcotics from was [Appellant] 

from within the residence located at 909 West 7th Street[.] [CI] 

was again searched and found to be free of money and/or a 

controlled substance. The cocaine purchased during the 

controlled buy was returned to Chester Police Headquarters where 

a field test was conducted and a positive reaction was received at 

which time the cocaine was placed into evidence. Again this 

controlled purchase and observation by law enforcement was 

during the second week of November.

During the month of November [Officer Garron] met with 

[CI] for the purpose of conducting a controlled purchase of cocaine 

from [Appellant.] [CI] was searched and found to be free of any 

controlled substances and/or United States currency at which time 

[Officer Garron] gave [CI] a quantity of United States currency 

with which to make the controlled purchase. [Officer Garron] had 

[CI] place a phone call to [Appellant] in order to set up the 

controlled buy; during this conversation, [Appellant] indicated 

that he would bring the controlled substance to [CI] at a 

predetermined location. At this time, [CI] left [Officer Garron] 

and went directly to the predetermined location making no stops 

in between and meeting with no other individuals. After 

approximately [20] minutes, involved members of law 

enforcement observed [Appellant] exit the front door of 909 West 

7th Street . . . and proceed to enter a tan/beige Buick Park Avenue 

parked directly in front of the property[.] At this time involved 

members of law enforcement followed [Appellant] in the tan/beige 

Buick bearing Pennsylvania registration (JST-8648) directly to the 

predetermined meet location while observing that [Appellant] 

made no other stops in between; avoiding any meetings or 

transactions with any other individuals on his way to the 

predetermined meet location. Upon meeting with [CI, Officer 

Garron] observed a quick exchange/transaction between [CI] and 

[Appellant]. After the transaction, [Appellant] left the 

predetermined meet location while [CI] returned directly to 

[Officer Garron]. Involved members of law enforcement had 
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constant observation of [CI] prior to, during the deal and after the 

completion of the controlled buy. At no time did [CI] stop and[/]or 

exchange anything with any other person on the street while [e]n 

route to or from the predetermined meet location. Upon returning 

to [Officer Garron], [CI] turned over a quantity of cocaine 

consistent with the currency provided, while confirming that the 

subject [CI] purchased the illegal narcotics from was [Appellant] 

from within the tan/beige Buick bearing Pennsylvania registration 

(JST-8648). [CI] was again searched and found to free of any 

money and/or controlled substances. The cocaine purchased 

during the controlled buy was returned to Chester Police 

Headquarters where a field test was conducted and a positive 

reaction was received at which time the cocaine was placed into 

evidence. Again this controlled purchase and observation by law 

enforcement was during the second week of November.

During the month of December with 48 hours of application 

for search warrant, [Officer Garron] met with [CI] for the purpose 

of conducting a controlled purchase of cocaine from [Appellant] 

from within the residence located at 909 West 7th Street[.] CI] 

was searched and found to be free of any controlled substances 

and/or United States Currency. [Officer Garron] gave [CI] a 

quantity of United States currency with which to make the 

controlled purchase and had [CI] place a phone call to [Appellant]. 

After placing the phone call setting up the controlled buy [Officer 

Garron] and [CI] together went to the vicinity of 909 West 7th 

Street[.] [CI] left [Officer Garron] and went directly inside the 

rear door of [the property], by way of the carport/garage, making 

no stops in between and meeting with no other individuals. After 

approximately five minutes [CI] exited the rear door of 909 West 

7th Street . . . and returned directly to [Officer Garron]. Involved 

members of law enforcement had constant observation of [CI] 

prior to entering the residence as well as after the completion of 

the controlled buy. At no time did [CI] stop and[/]or exchange 

anything with any person on the street while [e]n route to or from 

the residence located at 909 West 7th Street[.] Upon returning 

to [Officer Garron], [CI] turned over a quantity of cocaine 

consistent with the currency provided, while confirming that the 

subject [CI] purchased the illegal narcotics from was [Appellant] 

from within the residence located at 909 West 7th Street[.] [CI] 

was again searched and found to be free of money and/or any 

controlled substances. The cocaine purchased during the 

controlled buy was returned to Chester Police Headquarters where 

a field test was conducted and a positive reaction was received at 
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which time the cocaine was placed into evidence. Again this 

controlled purchase and observation by law enforcement was 

during the month of December within 48 hours of [the] application 

for [the] search warrant.

Based upon [Officer Garron]’s training and experience as 

well as the facts set forth above, [the officer] knows that persons 

distributing quantities of controlled substances, such as cocaine 

commonly engage in the same process at a residence that is 

within control of the trafficker and hence, the trafficker is secure 

in minimizing detection by police. Further, [Officer Garron] knows 

that it is common for traffickers like [Appellant] to store their 

supply or portions of their supply of cocaine, along with other 

controlled substances, records of sales, monies/assets and other 

related items at their residence since the residence proves some 

measure of security not only from police detection, but from ripoffs by other dealers and/or users of the controlled substance. 

Furthermore, [Officer Garron] knows based upon [his] experience 

that traffickers such as [Appellant] often have weapons within 

their control in order to protect themselves and their stash, 

including cocaine, from rip offs from other drug traffickers and 

from “stick up boys” - people who make a living by robbing drug 

traffickers.

Search Warrant at 2-6.

In finding there was probable cause to support the search warrant, the 

trial court relied on the following: (1) Officer Garron was a trained investigator 

for controlled substances and their uses, distribution, and effects on the 

human body, and was qualified as “Drug Expert” in court proceedings; (2) 

Officer Garron had been involved in numerous drug-related arrests as well as 

the execution of search and arrest warrants for controlled substances 

violations; (3) related to this case, he was in contact with the CI concerning 

sales of controlled substances by Appellant and indicated the CI told him the 

buys were made from Appellant; (4) the CI had provided law enforcement 
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with information concerning prior narcotics investigations and the information 

proved very reliable as it resulted in at least three arrest and the seizure of 

drugs and firearms; (5) Officer Garron corroborated the information regarding 

Appellant through an independent police investigation, verifying that Appellant 

had five prior convictions for PWID; and (6) Officer Garron conducted 

numerous periods of hidden surveillance of Appellant, noting that he drove a 

tan/beige Buick. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7-9. The court further stated: 

For all of these reasons, th[e c]ourt following the 

suppression hearing and review of the information contained in 

the search warrant affidavit and according deference to the issuing 

authority’s probable cause determination in a common-sense, 

nontechnical manner concluded the affiant is a person of 

reasonable caution and the facts and circumstances within his 

knowledge were sufficient to warrant him to believe an offense 

had been committed and was continuing. Th[e c]ourt determined 

the issuing authority had a substantial basis for concluding 

probable cause existed within the four corners of the affidavit for 

the search warrant application and the issuing authority made the 

practical and common-sense decision given all the circumstances 

set forth in the affidavit supporting the search warrant application 

including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying 

hearsay information there was a fair probability contraband or 

evidence of a crime would be found in [Appellant]’s residence 

located at 909 West 7th Street . . . .

Id. at 10.8

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8 The court also noted that was a misstatement that arose in the affidavit —

Officer Garron alleged that in November 2014, Appellant drove a tan/beige 

Buick bearing Pennsylvania license plate, JST-8648. Trial Ct. Op. at 9. At the 

suppression hearing, Appellant called Yamin Ilyaas, an automobile tag agent, 

to testify that he issued a tag with the number “JST-8648” on December 1, 

2014. See N.T., 8/11/15, at 6-9. Appellant argued this information was a 

material misstatement of fact. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Our review of the certified record leads us to agree with the trial court

that the affidavit, as a whole, provided the magistrate district judge with 

sufficient information to conclude there was a reasonable probability evidence 

of criminal activity ─ drug use ─ would be found at Appellant’s home and in 

his car. First, we note that Appellant’s argument amounts to a request for 

this Court to take a “hypertechnical” approach regarding the language of the 

search warrant, including the affidavit of probable cause, based on a purported 

lack of specificity regarding the reliability of the CI. For example, as stated 

above, Appellant contends that while the CI provided information that led to 

three arrests, such information “does not establish reliability because there is 

no showing that the information . . . was proven to be true” and the “affidavit 

fails to include any other facts relating to the case or cases in which the 

____________________________________________

In response, Officer Garron testified that he looked up for the tag for 

the vehicle after December 2, 2014, but before December 4, 2014, the date 

he drafted the search warrant. N.T., 8/11/15, at 29. He stated he “was 

attempting to . . . tidy up the search warrant, at which time [he] got the tag 

for the Buick so [he] could enter it into the search warrant.” Id. at 28-29. 

Officer Garron testified that prior to that date, he had not taken notice of the 

actual license plate on Appellant’s car. Id. at 29. The officer further stated 

that it was his experience that “sometimes drug traffickers keep their stash in 

a car if their house” is searched and they “take steps to avoid police detection 

by using cars that are not registered to them.” Id. at 30. The trial court 

found Officer Garron to be “credible” and “accepted the explanation proffered 

by him concerning this impossibility and misstatement of fact.” Trial Ct. Op. 

at 9-10. 

Appellant did not renew this argument in his appellate brief; therefore, 

we need not address it further.
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informant provided information[, including] the name of the persons arrested, 

the type of information provided by the informant or whether the case or cases 

got past the preliminary hearing[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 22. Further, he 

suggests that affidavit did not contain enough particularity as to the 

statements made by the CI that were against their penal interest. Id. at 23. 

He argues this is problematic because the actual statements did not appear in

the affidavit, and there was no indication whether those statements were

made with reference to this case. Id.

We decline to adopt Appellant’s “hypertechnical approach.” We reiterate 

that the issuance of a search warrant is based on a “practical, common-sense

decision whether, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . .

including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay

information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be found in a particular place.” Jacoby, 170 A.3d at 1082 (citation

omitted). Here, as the evidentiary support was summarized by the trial court,

the issuing judge authorized the search warrant based on (1) substantial

information from the CI, and (2) corroborating research conducted by Officer 

Garron, including three controlled buys that took place either in Appellant’s 

home or his car. It is evident from a “practical” and “common sense” reading 

of these facts there there was a fair probability that contraband or

incriminating evidence would be found at those locations. See id.; see also 

Clark, 28 A.3d at 1288.
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We note that Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Manuel, 194 A.3d

1076 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), for the notion that the CI’s reliability was 

not sufficiently established. We find that case is distinguishable from the 

present matter. In Manuel,

the sole indicia of the CI’s reliability presented in the affidavit of 

probable cause was that he had provided information leading to a 

single felony drug arrest. The affidavit [did] not identify the name

of the defendant or docket number in that case, indicate the type

of information provided by the CI that led to the arrest, or state

whether the defendant was even held over for trial. Moreover,

there [was] no indication that the CI himself participated in the

criminal activity of which he informed the police, thus exposing

himself to legal jeopardy and lending credence to his information. 

In short, the only evidence available to evaluate the reliability of 

[that] CI [was] the fact that he once provided police with some 

unspecified information that, either alone or in conjunction with 

other unidentified evidence, led to a finding of probable cause to 

arrest someone on felony drug charges.

Manuel, 194 A.3d at 1084 (citation omitted).

In reversing the trial court’s denial of the co-defendants’ motion to

suppress, this Court recognized that there was “no ‘magic number’ of arrests

or convictions for which a CI need previously have provided information to be

deemed reliable[,]” and stated “the fact that the CI had previously provided

information leading only to one unadjudicated arrest does not automatically

render the affidavit lacking in probable cause.” Manuel, 194 A.3d at 1084-

85. Nevertheless, the Court found “the lack of any meaningful follow-up 

investigation by the police to secure true corroboration of such inside 

information [led them] to conclude that, under the totality of the 
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circumstances, the affidavit did not establish probable cause.” Id. at 1085. 

The Court further noted:

Police neither arranged for the CI to conduct a controlled buy at 

the premises nor performed any type of photographic or electronic 

surveillance. Nor did they conduct a trash pull. Rather, [the 

officer] merely ran searches through PennDOT that established 

that [the one co-defendant] resided at the Pleasant Grove 

Residence and that [the other co-defendant] registered a car at 

that address. This generally available information was not 

corroborative of the CI’s information.

Id.(footnote omitted). . 

Turing to the present matter, we find that Manuel is distinguishable

from the facts presented herein, and therefore, not controlling. Unlike the

officers in Manuel, Officer Garron did follow up with meaningful investigation

to secure a verified corroboration of the CI’s information — he conducted

surveillance as well as three controlled buys using the CI.

Lastly, Appellant argues that because he was arrested without probable

cause, his confession should be purged because of the illegal arrest, and

therefore, his statements to police should be suppressed. See Appellant’s 

Brief at 25. We conclude that this claim is unavailing based on our abovestated analysis. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, we agree with the trial

court that there was probable cause to support the warrant.

9

 Accordingly,

Appellant’s first claim has no merit.

____________________________________________

9 We note Appellant does not allege that his confession was involuntary or 

unknowing, which would call for a separate analysis.
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In his remaining argument, Appellant alleges the trial court erred and

abused its discretion by denying his pre-trial request for disclosure of the

identity of the CI. See Appellant’s Brief at 28-29. He argues that he “had

every reason to place Officer Garron’s credibility at issue with the jury” and

the CI “would have been able to provide information that would have either

contradicted or corroborated [the officer]’s trial testimony[.]” Id. at 34.10 

Appellant states that “much of the action undertaken, and not undertaken by

the officer, was premised on information provided by” the CI. Id. at 34-35. 

He asserts, “As the information in the hands of the informant would bear

directly on Officer Garron’s trial testimony, it was relevant and not collateral. 

The identity of the informant was therefore material to the defense.” Id. at

35. Appellant also complains that “the Commonwealth did not present any

evidence that disclosure of the identity of the [CI] would jeopardize the

informant’s safety.” Id.

“Our standard of review of claims that a trial court erred in its disposition 

of a request for disclosure of an informant’s identity is confined to abuse of 

____________________________________________

10 For example, he states that the officer never retained the photograph of 

Appellant he showed to the CI. See Appellant’s Brief at 32. The CI described 

the person selling drugs “as a black male, 5’5” to 5’7”, approximate age 

around 40 [years old].” Id. (citation omitted). Appellant points out that there 

was a second black male found in the basement of the house, who was 

“described as 53 years old, medium build, dark complexion.” Id. Appellant 

suggests no further investigation was done by Officer Garron to see if this 

individual was the person the CI had identified. Id. at 33.
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discretion.” Commonwealth v. Jordan, 125 A.3d 55, 62 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(en banc) (citation omitted).

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573, a trial court 

has the discretion to require the Commonwealth to reveal the 

names and addresses of all eyewitnesses, including confidential 

informants, where a defendant makes a showing of material need 

and reasonableness:

(a) In all court cases, except as otherwise provided in Rule 

230 (Disclosure of Testimony Before Investigating Grand 

Jury), if the defendant files a motion for pretrial discovery, 

the court may order the Commonwealth to allow the 

defendant's attorney to inspect and copy or photograph any 

of the following requested items, upon a showing that they 

are material to the preparation of the defense, and that the 

request is reasonable:

(i) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses[.]

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(a)(i).

Commonwealth v. Marsh, 997 A.2d 318, 321 (Pa. 2010).

The Commonwealth has a qualified privilege not to disclose the

identity of a CI. Thus, where a defendant seeks a CI’s identity,

the defendant must first show that [the] request for disclosure is

reasonable and that the information sought to be obtained

through disclosure is material to the defense. Thus, although the 

defendant need not predict absolutely what the CI would say, the 

defendant must demonstrate at least a reasonable possibility the 

informant’s testimony would exonerate him.

It is only after the defendant carries this initial burden does

the trial court then exercise its discretion and determine whether

the information is to be revealed. A defendant fails to carry the

initial burden to show that the CI’s identity would be material to a

defense of mistaken identity where the record contains no

evidentiary basis on which the defendant could assert the defense.

Commonwealth v. Bright, 234 A.3d 744, 747 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations

& quotation marks omitted).
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In addressing this issue, the trial court found the following: 

Th[e c]ourt on June 3, 2016[,] properly denied Appellant’s motion

filed as part of his March 16, 2016[,] Amended Omnibus Pretrial

Motion. In the motion, Appellant claimed he is entitled to have

the confidential informant’s identity revealed. Appellant

contended a significant portion of the affidavit used to support the

search warrant involved alleged controlled buys by the

confidential informant, the controlled buys were not witnessed by

any law enforcement officer and the identity of the confidential

informant is essential in order to establish the veracity of the

information used to support the affidavit of probable cause.

Accordingly on April 12, 2016[, the trial c]ourt held a

hearing on Appellant’s motion for disclosure for Appellant to

present evidence on the issue of whether a misrepresentation was

knowingly and falsely made in the probable cause affidavit and

whether it was material to the establishment of probable cause.

At the hearing on the motion, no testimony was presented;

Appellant reiterated the allegations set forth in his motion. Th[e

c]ourt was not persuaded Appellant demonstrated through his

motion, exhibits, and argument any right to disclosure of the

identity of the confidential informant, and concluded Appellant

failed to meet his burden to show the existence of willful and

material misstatements or falseness in the search warrant

affidavit.3 Additionally, th[e c]ourt found, based on the totality of

the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, the confidential

informant was reliable. Th[e c]ourt also concluded, based on the

information set forth in the affidavit, the safety of the informant

would have been compromised by disclosure of the informant's

identity.

_____________________

3 The only potential misstatement in the affidavit of probable

cause for the search warrant raised by Appellant concerned

the number of the license plate for the Buick and [the trial]

court was satisfied by Officer Garron’s explanation and

concluded this was not a material misstatement of fact.

_____________________

In view of all this, recognizing the Commonwealth enjoys a

privilege to withhold the identity of the confidential informant, and

having determined Appellant did not show any material
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misstatements of fact, or disclosure of the informant’s identity was

material to the preparation of his defense or was reasonable in

the interests of justice, th[e c]ourt was not required to conduct a

balancing test concerning disclosure of the identity of the

confidential informant and properly denied Appellant’s motion.

Assum[ing] arguendo th[e] court was required to conduct

the balancing test, upon consideration of all the facts and

circumstances of record in this case, the scales do not tip in favor

of disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant. Th[e

c]ourt’s denial of Appellant’s motion was proper, and the decision

was not an error nor manifestly unreasonable.

Trial Ct. Op. at 14-16.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s analysis or 

conclusion. Appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing that there was 

a knowing and false misrepresentation in the affidavit of probable cause, and 

it was material to establishment of that standard of proof. Moreover, to 

extent Appellant attempts to argue that Officer Garron’s testimony could have 

been attacked by the information provided by the CI, we point out that the 

Commonwealth’s case was predicated upon the narcotics and paraphernalia

seized from Appellant’s property, which Appellant admitted to possessing in 

his statement to police. Therefore, Appellant “failed to satisfy the threshold 

test necessary to overcome the Commonwealth’s qualified privilege.” See id.

at 143. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Appellant’s request to disclose the CI’s identity, and his second claim 

fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/27/2023