alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32

                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                           18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,
                           AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with  the amended Quarterly Report of Vanity Enterprises, Inc.
(the "Company")  on  Form 10-QSB/A  for  the period ended March  31, 2003, as
filed  with  the  Securities  and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I,  Anthony N. DeMint,  President  and Chief Accounting Officer of
the  Company,  certify,  pursuant  to  18 U.S.C.  Section  1350,  as  adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in  all
          material   respects,  the  financial  condition  and   results   of
          operations of the Company.



			      /s/ Anthony DeMint
                              Anthony N. DeMint
                              President and Chief Accounting Officer
                              August 29, 2003
**EXHIBIT 24.2**

 

**POWER OF ATTORNEY(Annual Report on Form 10-K)**

 

The undersigned, anofficer and/or director of Electro Scientific Industries, Inc.,constitutes and appoints Nicholas Konidaris and J. Michael Dodson, and each ofthem, his or her true and lawful attorney and agent to do any and all acts andthings and execute in his or her name as an officer or director of the Companythe Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended May 28, 2005 andany and all amendments thereto, and to file the same, with all exhibitsthereto, and other documents in connection therewith, with the Securities andExchange Commission; and the undersigned does hereby ratify and confirm allthat said attorneys and agents and each of them shall do or cause to be done byvirtue hereof. Any one of said attorneys or agents shall have, and mayexercise, all powers conferred.

 
| Dated: July 21,  2005. |                   |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|
|                        |                   |
|                        | /s/ RICHARD J. FAUBERT |   |
|                        | Richard J. Faubert     |

 

----
Exhibit 21


Subsidiaries of the Registrant
------------------------------

     The Registrant, E-Z-EM, Inc., is a Delaware corporation.  The
subsidiaries of the Registrant included in the consolidated financial
statements are as follows:

                                             Incorporated
                                             ------------
     AngioDynamics, Inc.                       Delaware

     AngioDynamics Ltd.                        Ireland

     E-Z-EM Belgium B.V.B.A.                   Belgium

     E-Z-EM Canada Inc.                         Canada

     E-Z-EM Caribe, Inc.                       Delaware

     E-Z-EM International, Inc.                Barbados

     E-Z-EM Ltd.                               England

     E-Z-EM Nederland B.V.                     Holland

     E-Z-SUB, Inc.                             Delaware

     Enteric Products, Inc.                    Delaware

     Leocor, Inc.                              Delaware

     Toho Kagaku Kenkyusho Co., Ltd.            Japan

     All subsidiaries of the Registrant are wholly-owned.






                                  -74-
#### John Lawrence Hardaway MEADOR, Appellant, v. J. S. LEWIS, Appellee.

No. 6904.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.

Sept. 6, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1956.

*792C. S. Farmer, Waco,.C. A. Brian, Marshall, for appellant.

Norman, Rounsaville & Hassell, Lewis & Chandler, Jacksonville, for appellee.

DAVIS, Justice.

Plaintiff-appellant filed suit in the District Court of Cherokee County on June 28, 1954, to cancel certain deeds of conveyance to an undivided interest in and to 320 acres of land in the J. J. Vickery Survey. He alleged in his petition, among other things, that he was non compos mentis at the time of the execution of the instruments sought to be cancelled. On February 9, 1956 (the case having been set for trial on February 20, 1956), the attorneys for plaintiff and defendant reached an agreement to compromise and settle the case, subject to the approval of their respective clients. Oral approval was secured by the attorneys, but before the settlement was consummated, plaintiff-appellant notified his attorney that he repudiated the settlement agreement and refused to go through with it.

On February 14, 1956, the wife of plaintiff-appellant was appointed temporary guardian of the person and estate of appellant by the County Court of Anderson County, Texas, because of his mental condition. On February 15, 1956, she filed her motion as such Guardian to be substituted as party plaintiff in the suit pending in the District Court of Cherokee County. The case in Cherokee County being set for trial for February 20, 1956, the motion for substituting the Guardian, Mrs. Meador, as plaintiff, was set for the same date. Ap-pellee-defendant filed an answer to the motion, and joined in such answer a motion to confirm the settlement agreement and dismiss the case.

On February 20, 1956, a hearing was had on the motion to substitute the Guardian as plaintiff in the case, and in the course of the hearing, the jury was dismissed, the *motion*to substitute the Guardian as plaintiff was overruled, the motion to confirm the settlement agreement was granted, and the case was dismissed. From this judgment, an appeal has been perfected and appellant brings forward four points of error.

By point 4 appellant complains of the action of the trial court in sustaining the motion to confirm the settlement agreement because the parol agreement for the conveyance of land could not be judicially enforced. Without outlining the full history of this case, we hold that the factual and legal principles involved here are analogous to those in the case of Burnaman v. Heaton, 150 Tex. 333, 240 S.W.2d 288. In that opinion, the Honorable Mr. Justice Smith of our Supreme Court ably discusses the issues involved and the holdings of the Supreme Court in that case very positively disposes of this point. The point is sustained.

In view of the fact that the case must be tried upon its merits we will not discuss points 1, 2 and 3 except to say that they are well taken and are sustained.

We suggest a study of “necessary parties” to this suit.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to re-instats the same.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                           5
<LEGEND>
This Schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Company's Form 10-K for the fifty-two weeks ended May 31, 1997 and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to such Financial Statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                                     1,000
       
<S>                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                       YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                          MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                               MAY-31-1997
<CASH>                                                           4,484
<SECURITIES>                                                    10,991
<RECEIVABLES>                                                   17,901
<ALLOWANCES>                                                       930
<INVENTORY>                                                     27,351
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                63,944
<PP&E>                                                          44,711
<DEPRECIATION>                                                  21,293
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                 100,720
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                           20,829
<BONDS>                                                            842
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                0
<PREFERRED>                                                          0
<COMMON>                                                           963
<OTHER-SE>                                                      76,281
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                   100,720
<SALES>                                                         97,324
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                97,324
<CGS>                                                           60,754
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                   60,754
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                41,481
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                   451
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                 517
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                 (4,530)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                    (1,322)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                             (3,208)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                      0
<CHANGES>                                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                                    (3,208)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                     (.33)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                     (.33)
        

</TABLE>
#### Alfredo PRUNEDA, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 31169.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 9, 1959.

*887Pope & Pope, Rio Grande City, for áp-pellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is aggravated assault; the punishment, a fine of $100.

The injured party, Castillo, a 54-year-old man, testified that he went to a certain cantina on Sunday afternoon for the purpose of drinking beer but that the appellant, also a patron of the cantina, hit him in the mouth with a beer bottle, that he fell to the floor at which time the appellant kicked him, that he became unconscious and was later carried to the hospital, where the doctor took ten stitches in his arm and four in his face. He further testified that he was unable to work at the time of the trial because he felt tired and weak.

Dr. Ramirez testified that he treated the injured party for a large laceration in the lip that went “through and through,” for multiple lacerations on his arm and for a •contusion in the chest, that he sutured the lip both inside and out and discharged him from the hospital on the third day. As to the nature of the injury, he said, “In my opinion, when a man suffers wounds of the head which may cause lacerations to the extent that this man sustained, I think he was suffering from serious injury.”

The bartender testified that when appellant hit the injured party with the beer bottle it broke. He also testified to certain facts which indicated that the injured party 'had been the aggressor.

Appellant, aged 38, testifying in his own 'behalf, stated that he acted in self defense.

The injured party was called in rebuttal and denied that he did or said anything to •cause appellant to strike him.

The jury, under appropriate instructions, .rejected the defense of self defense and we find the evidence sufficient 'to support their verdict. Recently in Owens v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 323 S.W.2d 260, we said “We have been cited no authority, nor are we aware of any which holds that self defense is established as a matter of law.”

We hold the doctor’s testimony quoted above to be sufficient to show that serious bodily injury was inflicted upon the person of the injured party.

Art. 1139 Vernon’s Ann.P.C., provided that the intent to injure shall be presumed where violence has been inflicted.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 24.6**

**POWER OF ATTORNEY**

**(Annual Report on Form 10-K)**

The undersigned, an officer and/or director of Electro Scientific Industries, Inc., constitutes and appoints Nicholas Konidaris, Paul Oldham and Kerry Mustoe, and eachof them, his or her true and lawful attorney and agent to do any and all acts and things and execute in his or her name as an officer or director of the Company the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended March 28, 2009 and any andall amendments thereto, and to file the same, with all exhibits thereto, and other documents in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission; and the undersigned does hereby ratify and confirm all that said attorneys and agentsand each of them shall do or cause to be done by virtue hereof. Any one of said attorneys or agents shall have, and may exercise, all powers conferred. 

Dated: May 14, 2009.
______ ________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

May 10, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

126121(66) Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

NATIONAL WINE & SPIRITS, 

INC., NWS MICHIGAN, INC., and

NATIONAL WINE & SPIRITS, L.L.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 SC: 126121 

v CoA: 243524

STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Defendant-Appellee,

and 

 Ingham CC: 02-000013-CZ 

MICHIGAN BEER & WINE 

WHOLESALERS ASSOCIATION, 

Intervening Defendant-Appellee. 

_______________________________________ 

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion by General Wine & Liquor, Inc. and 

Vintage Wine Company for leave to file a brief amicus curiae in this case is considered 

and it is GRANTED. 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

May 10, 2006 

Clerk
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-1891

___________

Sylvester Barbee, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Correctional Medical Services; Jan *

Alexander, Medical Director, * [UNPUBLISHED]

Diagnostic Unit, ADC; Nnamdi *

Ifediora, Dr., Diagnostic Unit, ADC; *

James Blackmon, Dr., Cummins Unit, *

ADC; Does, John, Doctor, or Jane, *

Nurse, Correctional Medical *

Services, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: August 18, 2010

 Filed: August 23, 2010

___________

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated cases filed by Sylvester Barbee, the district court granted

summary judgment to defendants Jan Alexander, Nnamdi Ifediora, and James

Blackmon, and dismissed the claims against them with prejudice; and also dismissed

with prejudice, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a separate amended complaint against the
-2-

remaining defendants for failure to state a claim for relief. Barbee appeals. We affirm

in part, and vacate and remand in part.

We agree with the district court that the separate amended complaint was

properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781

783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (de novo review). However, as to the grant of

summary judgment, see Meuir v. Greene County Jail Employees, 487 F.3d 1115, 1118

(8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review), we conclude that the district court should not

have reached the merits of Barbee’s claims against defendants Alexander, Ifediora,

and Blackmon, who raised as an affirmative defense that Barbee failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (no action may be brought with

respect to prison conditions by prisoner confined in correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted). The district court found, and

we agree, that the record supported this affirmative defense. Once the court

determined that the claims were unexhausted, it was required to dismiss them without

prejudice. See Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003) (if exhaustion was

not completed at time of filing suit, dismissal is mandatory); Lyon v. Vande Krol, 305

F.3d 806, 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (although case went to trial, dismissal of

complaint was required because inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies and

defendants did not waive defense). 

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the amended complaint, see 8th Cir. R.

47B, but we vacate the grant of summary judgment to defendants Alexander, Ifediora,

and Blackmon and remand with instructions to dismiss the claims against these

defendants without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, see

Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000) (remanding with directions to

dismiss complaint without prejudice where record showed failure to exhaust). We

also deny Barbee’s pending motion. 

______________________________
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 19

- 00603

- CR

The State of Texas v. Christopher Tumlinson

On Appeal from the 28th District Court of Nueces County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. 19FC

- 2529

- A

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and rendered . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court REVERSED and RE NDERS judgment in
accordan ce with its opinion

. We further order this decision certified below for observa nce. July 29, 2021
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-8102

JULIETTE MARIA DIXON, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

 v. 

GENE M. JOHNSON, Director of the Virginia Department of 

Corrections, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District 

Judge. (2:07-cv-00448-RBS-TEM) 

Submitted: September 29, 2009 Decided: October 2, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Juliette Maria Dixon, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Eldridge 

Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Juliette Maria Dixon seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate 

judge and denying relief on her 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) 

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice 

or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the 

constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or 

wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district 

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); 

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have 

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Dixon has 

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a 

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
**EXHIBIT 24.7**

**POWER OF ATTORNEY**

**(Annual Report on Form 10-K)**

The undersigned, an officer and/or director of Electro Scientific Industries, Inc., constitutes and appoints Nicholas Konidaris and Kerry Mustoe, and each of them, hisor her true and lawful attorney and agent to do any and all acts and things and execute in his or her name as an officer or director of the Company the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended June 3, 2006 and any and all amendmentsthereto, and to file the same, with all exhibits thereto, and other documents in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission; and the undersigned does hereby ratify and confirm all that said attorneys and agents and each ofthem shall do or cause to be done by virtue hereof. Any one of said attorneys or agents shall have, and may exercise, all powers conferred. 

Dated:July 20, 2006.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

October 22, 2012

h1015

Order 

October 22, 2012

145232

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 145232

COA: 308602

St. Joseph CC: 07-014498-FH

KYLE JOSEPH LONGACRE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 8, 2012 order of 

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to 

meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
EXHIBIT 99

                                Certification
                                     of
Tell-A-Tale Incorporated pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 regarding Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30,
                                    2002


     Pursuant  to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a)  and  (b)  of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States  Code),
each  of  the  undersigned  officers of Tell-A-Tale  Incorporated,  a  Nevada
corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify that:

     1.  The  Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended
         June   30,  2002  (the  "Form  10-QSB")  fully  complies  with   the
         requirements  of  Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange
         Act of 1934, as amended; and

     2.  Information  contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly  presents,  in  all
         material   respects,  the  financial  condition   and   results   of
         operations of the Company.



     Dated:   August 12, 2002          /s/ Anthony N. DeMint
                                        Anthony N. DeMint
                                       President/ Chief Accounting Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 As Adopted Pursuant to Section
                     906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


I, Dr.  David F.  Hostelley,  President  and Chief  Financial  Officer of Auto-Q
International,  Inc. (the  "Company"),  certify,  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1) the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-QSB of the  Company for the quarter  ended
December 31, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: March 14, 2005

/s/ Dr. David F. Hostelley
-------------------------------------
Dr. David F. Hostelley
President and Chief Financial Officer