[Cite as State v. Bray, 2017-Ohio-118.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v. 

HAUNZ J. BRAY, III 

Defendant-Appellant 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

:

Appellate Case No. 2016-CA-22 

Trial Court Case No. 2015-CR-641 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 13th day of January, 2017. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MEGAN M. FARLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0088515, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark 

County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Fourth Floor, Springfield, Ohio 

45502 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

STEVEN P. BILLING, Atty. Reg. No. 0061063, P.O. Box 1671, Columbus, Ohio 43215 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

WELBAUM, J. 
-2- 

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Haunz Bray, appeals from his conviction and sentence 

on one count of Attempted Murder with a firearm specification. After pleading guilty, Bray 

was sentenced to 11 years in prison on the Attempted Murder charge, three years on the 

firearm specification, and six years on an Aggravated Burglary charge that arose from the 

same incident. The Attempted Murder sentence was ordered to be served consecutive 

to the Aggravated Burglary charge, resulting in a total prison term of 20 years. 

{¶ 2} In support of his appeal, Bray contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by imposing the maximum sentence for the Aggravated Murder charge, and by 

imposing the sentences consecutively. We conclude that the trial court did not commit 

any error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings 

{¶ 3} In October 2015, Bray was indicted for Aggravated Burglary, with a firearm 

specification, in Clark County Common Pleas Court Case No. 2015-CR-527. 

Subsequently, on December 8, 2015, Bray was indicted on one count of Attempted 

Murder with a firearm specification, one count of Felonious Assault, and one count of 

Tampering with Evidence in Clark County Common Pleas Court Case No. 2015-CR-641. 

The cases were consolidated on December 14, 2015, at the State’s request. 

{¶ 4} The charges against Bray arose from events that occurred on October 2, 

2015. On that evening, Bray, together with another individual (Darious Hull), broke into 

a residence located at 136 Southern Avenue, in Springfield, Ohio. Bray and Hull were 

in possession of a firearm. At the time, the residence was occupied, but the residents 
-3- 

fled and called 911. Springfield police officers, Justin Massie and Cassidy Cantrell 

responded to the call. 

{¶ 5} As Massie and Cantrell approached the residence, they saw Bray and Hull 

removing a TV from the address. When Cantrell announced the presence of the police, 

Bray dropped the TV and fired multiple rounds in Cantrell’s direction. Cantrell was 

required to take evasive action in order to avoid being hit. Bray and Hull then fled on 

foot, but were apprehended shortly thereafter. 

{¶ 6} When these crimes occurred, Bray was 18 years old. Bray did not have any 

prior adult felony charges, but he did have several prior juvenile charges, including the 

following charges: two separate Assaults, Falsification, Attempted Breaking and 

Entering, Domestic Violence, Felonious Assault, and a probation violation. When the 

Attempted Murder occurred, Bray also had an outstanding adult warrant from 

Montgomery County, based on a failure to appear in connection with a charge of having 

fictitious license plates. 

{¶ 7} On February 12, 2016, Bray pled guilty to Attempted Murder and Aggravated 

Burglary. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the firearm specification on the 

Aggravated Burglary charge, and to dismiss the charges of Felonious Assault and 

Tampering with Evidence. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report 

(“PSI”) and scheduled sentencing for March 10, 2016. At the sentencing hearing, the 

court heard the victim statement of Officer Cantrell. In addition, Bray and members of 

his family spoke in mitigation. After considering the PSI, which included letters received 

from Cantrell, Massie, and friends and family members of Bray, the trial court sentenced 

Bray as noted above. Bray now appeals from his convictions and sentence. 
-4- 

II. Discussion Related to Notice of Appeal 

{¶ 8} Before addressing Bray’s assignments of error, we note that even though the 

trial court consolidated the cases, Bray’s notice of appeal was filed only with respect to 

Case No. 2015-CR-641, which pertains to the Attempted Murder conviction. Bray did 

not file a notice of appeal in Case No. 2015-CR-527, and the judgments attached to his 

notice of appeal bear the case number only of 2015-CR-641. 

{¶ 9} “A party seeking to appeal must timely file a proper notice of appeal to invest 

the court of appeals with jurisdiction to review a final judgment or order of the trial court.” 

(Citation omitted.) State v. Dixon, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21463, 2004-Ohio-1593, ¶ 6. 

“App.R. 3(D) outlines the content of the notice. Specifically, this Rule states, in relevant 

part, that ‘[t]he notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall 

designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to 

which the appeal is taken.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Id. 

{¶ 10} App.R. 3(F) permits amendment of notices of appeal to include additional 

judgments, but the ability to allow amendment is restricted to situations where “the 

amendment does not seek to appeal from a trial court order beyond the time requirements 

of App.R. 4.” Because App.R. 4(A)(1) provides a 30-day time limit for filing notices of 

appeal, the time for filing a notice of appeal regarding Case. No. 2015-CR-527 has 

elapsed. As a result, we are without jurisdiction to review anything regarding that case. 

Dixon at ¶ 7. We, therefore, will address issues pertaining solely to the plea agreement 

and judgment of conviction and sentence for Bray’s Attempted Murder conviction and 

attendant firearm specification. 
-5- 

II. Appeal of Maximum Term for Attempted Murder 

{¶ 11} Bray’s First Assignment of Error states that: 

The Trial Court Erred in Imposing the Maximum Term of 

Imprisonment for the Conviction of Attempted Murder. 

{¶ 12} Under this assignment of error, Bray contends that the trial court’s decision 

to impose the maximum sentence for Attempted Murder was arbitrary and 

unsubstantiated, and failed to comply with the standards for imposing maximum 

sentences. In particular, Bray points to his lack of a prior adult felony record, the trial 

court’s emphasis on his juvenile record, and the fact that the PSI indicated that he has a 

low rate of recidivism. 

{¶ 13} R.C. 2929.14(A)(1) provides a maximum term of imprisonment of 11 years 

for first-degree felonies. Trial courts have “ ‘full discretion to impose any sentence within 

the authorized statutory range, and * * * [are] not required to make any findings or give * 

* * reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.’ ” State v. Mitchell, 

2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-108, 2016-Ohio-1422, ¶ 6, quoting State v. King, 2013-Ohio2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). Nonetheless, when trial courts exercise their 

discretion, they “must consider the statutory policies that apply to every felony offense, 

including those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.” (Citations omitted.) Id. 

{¶ 14} The overriding principles of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11(A) are 

“to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the 

offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those 

purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government 
-6- 

resources.” In order to accomplish those purposes, courts must “consider the need for 

incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, 

rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, 

or both.” Id. Additionally, R.C. 2929.11(B) provides that felony sentences “shall be 

reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing set 

forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the 

seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with 

sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” 

{¶ 15} Under R.C. 2929.12(A), courts must also consider factors in divisions (B) 

and (C) pertaining to the seriousness of an offender’s conduct; factors in divisions (D) 

and (E) regarding the likelihood of recidivism, any factors in division (F) relating to service 

in the Armed Forces, and any other relevant factors. 

{¶ 16} The standard of review for felony sentences is that “an appellate court may 

vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing 

evidence that the record does not support the trial court's findings under relevant statutes 

or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 

2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1, applying R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 

{¶ 17} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) concerns findings made under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 

R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), and R.C. 2929.20(I). Although other sentences do not 

require the specific findings addressed by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), Marcum stated that “it is 

fully consistent for appellate courts to review those sentences that are imposed solely 

after consideration of the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 under a standard that is 

equally deferential to the sentencing court.” Id. at ¶ 23. 
-7- 

{¶ 18} “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is 

more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty 

as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in 

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established.” Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 

118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶ 19} In the case before us, the trial court indicated that it had considered the 

purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, the seriousness and 

recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, and the sentencing guidelines in R.C. 2929.13. 

The court concluded that Bray’s conduct was more serious than conduct normally 

constituting the offense, pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(B)(2), because the victim, Officer 

Cantrell, had suffered serious psychological harm. The court also found no factors 

making the offense less serious under R.C. 2929.12(C). 

{¶ 20} Regarding the likelihood that Bray would commit future crimes, the court 

found that Bray’s prior adjudication as a juvenile delinquent and the fact that he had not 

been satisfactorily rehabilitated, made it more likely that he would commit future crimes. 

R.C. 2929.12(D)(2) and (3). As to whether Bray demonstrated genuine remorse, the trial 

court expressed doubt that this was the case. R.C. 2929.12(E). Based on Bray’s 

juvenile record, which demonstrated an escalating degree of violence despite 

intervention, the court also concluded that there was a great likelihood of recidivism. 

Furthermore, the court found that the factors in R.C. 2929.13(D), which are to be reviewed 

in felonies of the first-degree, did not overcome the presumption in favor of a prison term. 

{¶ 21} We cannot find that the record clearly and convincingly fails to support the 
-8- 

trial court’s findings. We have reviewed the entirety of the PSI and the record, and they 

support the court’s findings. 

{¶ 22} At the sentencing hearing, Officer Cantrell asked the court to impose the 

maximum term, indicating that Bray fired shots at her to kill her, not to escape or from 

fright. Other statements by Cantrell in the PSI demonstrate the degree of psychological 

harm she suffered, including questions about whether she could even return to work as 

a police officer after this incident. The fact that police work is necessarily dangerous, as 

Bray suggests, does not diminish the harm that he caused. 

{¶ 23} We have previously stressed that “[u]nlike consecutive sentences, the trial 

court [is] not required to make any particular ‘findings’ to justify maximum prison 

sentences.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Dixon, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-67, 2016-

Ohio-2882, ¶ 14. Instead, as was noted above, in order to modify or vacate a trial court’s 

sentence, we must find “ ‘by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not 

support the sentence.’ ” Id., quoting Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 

N.E.3d 1231, at ¶ 23. Again, after reviewing the record, we cannot make such a finding. 

Accordingly, the First Assignment of Error is overruled. 

IV. Appeal of Consecutive Sentence 

{¶ 24} Bray’s Second Assignment of Error states that: 

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Running the Sentence for 

Aggravated Burglary Consecutive With the Sentence for Attempted Murder. 

{¶ 25} Under this assignment of error, Bray concedes that the trial court made all 

the statutorily required findings for ordering Bray’s prison terms to be served 
-9- 

consecutively. However, Bray contends that the court’s findings are contrary to the PSI 

and other factors taken into consideration in ordering consecutive sentences. In this 

regard, Bray focuses on his score in the low to moderate risk level in all categories of the 

risk assessment report and the fact that the report indicated he was amenable to 

community control. 

{¶ 26} Bray further points out that all his prior criminal history occurred when he 

was a juvenile, and that the harm Officer Cantrell faced the day of the shooting was 

nothing unusual or out of the ordinary for a police officer. 

{¶ 27} Before addressing Bray’s arguments, we note that the consecutive term 

was imposed for the matter that is currently on appeal, i.e., the trial court held that the 

sentence imposed for Attempted Murder should run consecutive to the term imposed for 

Aggravated Burglary. March 14, 2016 Judgment Entry of Conviction, Warrant for 

Removal, p. 2. As a result, imposition of the consecutive term is properly before us and 

may be considered, despite Bray’s failure to appeal in Case No. 2015-CR-527. 

{¶ 28} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) allows courts to impose consecutive sentences if they 

find “that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or 

to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the 

seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public 

* * *.” Courts must also find that one of the three additional factors in R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) applies in order to impose consecutive sentences. 

{¶ 29} As pertinent here, the trial court made a finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) 

that “[a]t least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses 

of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed 
-10-

was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as 

part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's 

conduct.” The court made a further finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) that “[t]he 

offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are 

necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.” Judgment Entry of 

Conviction, pp. 3-4. 

{¶ 30} Again, we review this matter under the deferential standard imposed by 

Marcum and R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Dixon, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-67, 2016-Ohio2882, at ¶ 14-15, citing Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, 

at ¶ 23. 

{¶ 31} Although the statute requires only one finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-

(c), the trial court made two findings. With respect to the finding under subsection (b), 

we agree with the trial court as to the unusual seriousness of the harm caused by Bray’s 

conduct. As we said previously, the fact that officers encounter potential danger in their 

work does not discount the harm that Officer Cantrell suffered. Furthermore, prior to the 

time Cantrell arrived, shots were fired into the house where the Burglary occurred, without 

any apparent concern for whether the occupants would be harmed or even killed. 

Transcript of Disposition, p. 9. Luckily, the occupants were able to flee without having 

been injured. Then, after Cantrell arrived and announced the presence of the police, 

Bray shot directly at her, not to escape or from fear, but to kill her. Id. at p. 5. Thus, the 

findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), alone, support imposition of consecutive 

sentences. 

{¶ 32} Regarding the finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) as to Bray’s criminal 
-11-

history, it is true that his history was mostly confined to juvenile offenses. However, after 

detailing Bray’s juvenile offenses, which included violent assaults and the fact that the 

juvenile court spent a great deal of time trying to help Bray, the trial court observed that 

Bray still continued his violent conduct, putting Cantrell’s life in danger. Id. at pp. 25-28 

and 32. 

{¶ 33} The PSI does show a score of moderate (not low) risk on the Ohio Risk 

Assessment Survey. However, the trial court gave this little weight because Bray was 

being sentenced for his first adult offenses. Transcript of Disposition, p. 29. The record 

is also unclear as to whether the PSI made a specific recommendation regarding 

community control. The State contends that the PSI does not recommend community 

control, but the Risk Assessment does state “Overall Impression: Assessment: 

Community Supervision, Final Risk Level: Moderate.” Nonetheless, even if the PSI 

had recommended community control, “[a] trial court is not bound to follow 

recommendations made in a PSI, and does not abuse its discretion when it sentences a 

defendant within the statutory range of confinement.” State v. Gavin, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 20783, 2005-Ohio-4738, ¶ 5. Again, this additional finding about Bray’s 

criminal history was not even required, given the finding from R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). 

{¶ 34} Accordingly, based on the preceding discussion, the Second Assignment of 

Error is overruled. 

 

V. Conclusion 

{¶ 35} All of Bray’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed. 
-12-

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

DONOVAN, P.J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Megan M. Farley 

Steven P. Billing 

Hon. Richard J. O’Neill