alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.24


 


Transition
Agreement and Continuity of Rights


 


	
  Between:

  	
   

  	
  Ness Technologies and Ventures
  Ltd - formerly Compro Software Industries (1997) Ltd (hereafter: “former employer”)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  And between:

  	
   

  	
  Ness B.S.G. Ltd -
  formerly Contahal Ltd (hereafter: “the
  company”)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  And between:

  	
   

  	
  Lea Atad (hereafter: “the employee”)

  



 


The parties hereby confirm and undertake as
follows:


 


1.                             The employee
shall be, as of
                    
(“the determining date”) an employee of the company, and on the determining
date the employee-employer relationship between him and the former employer
shall be terminated. The personal work agreement that was signed between the
former employer and the employee, including any additional document and
agreement that exist between the former employer and the employee (which are
attached as appendices to this agreement) shall continue to remain in force for
all intents and purposes between the employee and the company. The rights that
have accumulated for the employee for the period of his employment with the
former employer shall continue to exist between him and the company. The
company undertakes to continue the complete continuity of the employee’s
rights, including for severance pay, as accumulated, starting from the
beginning of the period of his employment with the former employer.


 


2.                            The employee confirms that the undertakings, declaration and details
that he gave to the former employer shall apply also to his relationship with
the company as if they were originally given to it. The employee confirms that
subject to the transfer of the rights by the former employer to the company, as
set out in clause 1 above and subject to the undertakings of the company to him
with regard to the continuity of rights as aforesaid in clause 1 above, he
neither has nor will have any claims or demands vis-à-vis the former employer
for his employment and/or termination of his employment with the former
employer.


 


3.                             This agreement is assignable in the future by the company to any company
in the Ness Technologies Inc. group or to an affiliated company, as these shall
be at the time of the assignment, provided that the rights of the employee as
set out in this agreement are preserved.


 


In witness whereof the parties have signed
below, today July 1,
1999


 


	
  /s/ Michael Zinderman, /s/
  Adiv Baruch

  	
   

  	
  /s/ Andres Richter

  	
   

  	
  /s/ Lea Atad

  
	
  Ness Technologies and Ventures
  Ltd, The former employer

  	
   

  	
  Ness B.S.G. Ltd, The company

  	
   

  	
  The employee
EXHIBIT 99

                                Certification
                                     of
 Take A Ride, Inc. pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
regarding Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2002


     Pursuant  to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a)  and  (b)  of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States  Code),
each  of  the undersigned officers of Take A Ride, Inc., a Nevada corporation
(the "Company"), does hereby certify that:

     1.  The  Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended
         June   30,  2002  (the  "Form  10-QSB")  fully  complies  with   the
         requirements  of  Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange
         Act of 1934, as amended; and

     2.  Information  contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly  presents,  in  all
         material   respects,  the  financial  condition   and   results   of
         operations of the Company.



     Dated:   August 12, 2002          /s/ Anthony N. DeMint
                                        Anthony N. DeMint
                                       President/ Chief Accounting Officer
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Interbank CapitalCorp. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the "Report"), I, Anthony N. DeMint, President and Chief AccountingOfficer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.    The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

2.    The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

/s/ Anthony N.DeMint                    

Anthony N. DeMint

President and

Chief AccountingOfficer

 

May 20, 2005
```

                                                                   Exhibit 10.14

                              **EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

                                    AMENDMENT****THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT**,  entered into on October 5, 1999, that terminates
on  October  15,  2002,  by and  between  **Cognigen  Networks,  Inc.**,  a Colorado
corporation  (the  "Company"),  and **Darrell H. Hughes** (the "Employee") is hereby
amended and modified as follows: (a) the term thereof to extend from October 16,
2002 to and shall  terminate on January 31, 2003;  and (b)  effective  August 1,
2002,  the  compensation  thereof to increase to  Sixty-Eight  Thousand and Four
Hundred Fifty Dollars  ($68,450.00)  for the six-month  term ending  January 31,
2003. All other terms and conditions of the Agreement remain unchanged.

     The parties accept and execute this Agreement, dated July 29, 2002:

**COGNIGEN NETWORKS, INC.                   EMPLOYEE:**

By:  /s/ Jimmy L. Boswell                 /s/ Darrell H. Hughes
   ---------------------------            --------------------------
Jimmy L. Boswell, Chief Operating Officer  Darrell H. Hughes
 and President

Attested to by:

/s/ David L. Jackson
----------------------------------
David L. Jackson, Corporate Secretary
```
#### Mollie N. COMBS et al., Appellants, v. Harriet N. GRIGSBY et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 13, 1955.

*250D. G. Boleyn, E. ■ E. .Wooton, Hazard, for appellants.

T. E. Moore, Jr., S. M. Ward, Craft & Stanfill, Hazard, for appellees.

STANLEY, Commissioner.

This suit was brought by Mollie N. Combs and N. P. Napier and their spouses to reform a deed they executed June 13, 1946, to Harriet' Grigsby of all their undivided interests (which were *%*of the whole) in certain property, subject to a mining lease dated September 24, 1923, now held by the Columbus Mining Company, and to recover past and future rentals and royalties. The reformation sought was to have the deed convey only undivided interests in the surface of the land.

The land was owned by Eliza Grigsby, mother of the parties, when she died intestate in April, 1941. It had déscended to the two grantors and the grantee and four other children' and the descendants of a deceased child. The deed referred to the excepted 1923 mining lease and provided that the grantors “should receive the remuneration set out” in the lease. The petition alleges that there was • another mining lease, of date September 25, 1917, which provided for the payment of minimum ‘royalty of $600 per year, and two other leases of small areas for the purpose of erecting miners’ dwelling houses, for which the lessee agreed to pay $200 annually. They were not excepted from the conveyance. It is sought to. reform the deed to embrace all three of these leases, and to recover the grantors’ share of payments made under them.

The various ramifications of the subsequent ■ transactions respecting these leases and certain assignments, the operation of the mines, and the payment of rentals and royalties cause difficulty of understanding. It appears that royalties from the ,1923 lease were collected ‘by one ,o'f Eliza Grigsby’s daughters, as administratrix of. her estate or as an agreed agent of the heirs, and their distributable shares were paid to the pláintiffs in this suit.’

 The trial court weighed the evidence, and in a written opinion expressed the view that at the time the deed was executed the parties' did’ hot regard' the leases in controversy and not excepted from the conveyance .to be of any value. He found there were no grounds proven to authorize reformation of the deed. The evidence as to fraud or mutual mistake is certainly not of that clear and satisfactory character which is required to reform a deed. It is provided in CR 52.01 that the finding of fact by a trial judge “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous”. We do ‘not regard the finding to ‘be erroneous at all.

Mbreover, since the suit to reform the deed was instituted more than six years after its execution, at which time, or' soon thereafter, the grantors knew of the 1917 mineral lease and others sought now to be excepted, the action is barred by the five year statute of limitations.’ KRS 413.120 (12). Combs v. Grigsby, 200 Ky. 31, 252 S.W. 111.

.The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT32.1

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO

18U.S.C. SECTION1350,

ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Petrol Oil and Gas, Inc. (the"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2005, asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), I, Paul Branagan, President and Chief Executive Officer ofthe Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

/s/PaulBranagan                               

PaulBranagan

Presidentand Chief Executive Officer

 

August15,2005
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7222
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus REGINALD HINES, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CR-89-75-G, CA-95-664-2) Submitted: January 9, 1997 Decided: January 23, 1997 Before HALL and MI CHAEL, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Cheryl Johns Sturm, Westtown, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Benjamin H. White, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994), as amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Hines , Nos. CR-89-75-G; CA-95-664-2 (M.D.N.C. June 6, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit
      32.1




CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED




PURSUANT
      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
      connection with the Annual Report of SpectraScience, Inc. (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned Chief
      Executive Officer of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350,
      as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that based on his
      knowledge: 1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
      or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 2) the information
      contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
      condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods
      covered in the Report.




/s/
                James HitchinJames
                Hitchin,
              Chief
                Executive OfficerDated:
                March 28, 2008
MEMORANDUM


MEMORANDUM




TO:

Byard MacLean




FROM:

Zena Capital Corp.




DATE:

April 7, 2004




SUBJECT:

Operator compensation







Zena is pleased to confirm that to avoid any future confusion regarding the above captioned, as outlined in the Option Agreement (Section 10.1, 10.2, 10.3) we agree with the Management Committee and that prior to the date the Management Committee elects to accept a Production Notice you as Operator will be paid a total of $5000 per month paid semi-monthly plus any company related out of pocket receipted expenses paid monthly. If expenses are to exceed $ 1000.00 per month please have pre approved by the Management Committee.




Also we confirm your discussion with Kevin Hanson that the company has granted you 50,000 options as per 10.6 of the Option Agreement.




Please sign the attached and return a copy for our records.










Kevin Hanson, Director













Accepted  April 7 , 2004













Byard MacLean
#### Odus O. NEWMAN (Plaintiff), Respondent, v. Jerome F. KERN (Defendant), Appellant.

No. 29587.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

Jan. 2, 1957.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Feb. 1, 1957.

*595Frank Mashak, St. Louis, for appellant.

C. J. Pursey, Riley & Riley, St. Louis, for respondent. •

ANDERSON, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County setting aside a judgment of dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The action was brought by Odus O. Newman against Jerome F. Kern for damages for personal injuries, and for damages to plaintiff’s automobile, sustained as a result of a collision between plaintiff’s car and one driven by defendant. Defendant appeared in said cause and filed an answer to the merits. After a number of continuances the case was, on September 27, 1954, dismissed by the court for failure to prosecute. On September 29, 1954, the court set aside the aforesaid dismissal and ordered the cause reinstated on the trial calendar. Thereafter, there were several settings and continuances. On October 10, 1955, the cause came on for hearing. Defendant appeared in person and .by counsel and announced ready for trial. Plaintiff failed to appear, whereupon the court, of its own initiative, again dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, on October 11, 1955, plaintiff filed his motion to set aside said dismissal. This motion was sustained on October 28, 1955. The cause was then set for December 5, 1955, and later reset for January 30, 1956. On January 4, 1956, defendant appeared specially and filed his motion challenging the jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the case, on the theory that the order sustaining plaintiff’s motion to set aside the order of dismissal was void for the reason that defendant had not been given notice of the date of the hearing on said motion and an opportunity to be heard in opposition to same. Defendant’s motion challenging the court’s jurisdiction was overruled on March 12, 1956. Thereafter, defendant appealed from the order of October 28, 1955.

It is our conclusion that this appeal is premature, for the reason that no appeal lies from an order setting aside a judgment of dismissal for failure to prosecute. Mitchell v. Johnston, Mo.Sup., 241 *S.W.24*902; Mandel v. Bethe, Mo.App., 170 S.W.2d 87.

The appeal is dismissed.

MATTHES, J., and JAMES D. CLEM ENS, Special Judge, concur.
Exhibit
      32.2





Certification
      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant


to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In
      connection with the quarterly report of Waytronx, Inc. (the "Company"), on
      Form
      10-Q of the quarter ended September 30, 2008, I hereby certify solely for the
      purpose of complying with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted to Section 906
      of
      the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
      The
      quarterly report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or
      15
      (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the quarterly report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





Waytronx,
                Inc.By:
            /s/
                Daniel N. Ford
            
            Dated
                this 14th day of November 2008Daniel
                N. FordChief
                Financial Officer
##### 



Exhibit 31.1 TVIA, INC. CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 CERTIFICATION I, Eli Porat, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Tvia, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
quarterly report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for
the registrant and we have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrants internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit
committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting. Date: February 14, 2005/s/ Eli PoratEli PoratChief Executive Officer and President
JOHNNY D. HOLLOWAY

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 14

- 2263

_____________________________/

Opinion filed June 3, 2015.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. James H. Daniel , Judge

.

Johnny Holloway, pro se

, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore , Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BENTON

, ROWE

, and OSTERHAUS

, J J

. , CONCUR.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL GORDON WHITMORE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

JEFFERY DORT, Asst. District Attorney,

SD County; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55264

D.C. No. 3:14-cv-02949-DMSBGS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 16, 2016**

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Paul Gordon Whitmore appeals pro se from the 

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due 

process violations arising from his conviction and sentence. We have jurisdiction 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 21 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-55264 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 

(9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). We 

may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 

Polaris Pictures Corp., 159 F.3d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1998), and we affirm. 

To the extent that success on Whitmore’s due process claims would 

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, the district court 

properly concluded that Whitmore’s action is Heck-barred because Whitmore 

failed to allege facts demonstrating that his conviction or sentence has been 

invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

To the extent that success on Whitmore’s due process claims would not 

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, dismissal of 

Whitmore’s due process claims was proper because Whitmore failed to allege facts 

sufficient to show any cognizable injury. See Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 

F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege . . . that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated[.]”); Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth 

elements of a procedural due process claim).

AFFIRMED.