In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 98-2998

TERRY C. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEBBIE STOVALL,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 C 4340--Milton I. Shadur, Judge.

Argued July 12, 2000--Decided November 30, 2000

 Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

 WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Mr. Terry Johnson, an

Illinois state prisoner, filed this suit pro se

under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 alleging that various

prison employees violated his Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also claimed that

Debbie Stovall, a nurse at the prison where he

was incarcerated, filed false disciplinary

reports and injury reports against him in

retaliation for Johnson’s filing a grievance

against her and for complaining about her to

other medical staff. Before the defendants were

served, the district court dismissed the case as

frivolous pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1997e(c)(1).

Johnson, with the assistance of appointed

counsel, now appeals only the dismissal of his

retaliation claim against Nurse Stovall. We

reverse and remand. 

 In July 1998, Johnson, who was at the time

incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center,

filed this suit against Stovall as well as

Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

Director Odie Washington, Stateville Warden

George DeTella, and various members of IDOC’s

Adjustment Committee. The complaint states that

Johnson received over twenty disciplinary

reports, which resulted in placement in

segregation, a security grade increase, and the

loss of good time credits. Johnson contended that

in administering these disciplinary reports, the

putative defendants, minus Stovall, violated the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Illinois state law, and IDOC regulations. With

regard to Stovall, Johnson alleged that she filed

false disciplinary charges and injury reports

against him in retaliation for his filing a

grievance against her and complaining about her

to other medical staff. Additionally, Johnson

claimed that Stovall denied him his tuberculosis

medication, presumably in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. In support of his complaint, Johnson

attached the disciplinary reports that prison

employees (including Stovall) had filed against

him and the Adjustment Committee’s decisions on

these reports. He also attached the results of a

polygraph examination, in which the examiner

concluded that Johnson was not being truthful

with respect to an assault and battery he

allegedly committed on Stovall.

 Before the defendants were served with process,

the district court sua sponte dismissed as

frivolous pursuant to sec. 1997e(c)(1) the

retaliation claim against Stovall, and dismissed

all of the other claims against Stovall and the

other named defendants (without citing the

specific statutory basis for doing so). In

dismissing the retaliation claim against Stovall,

the district court considered all of the

disciplinary reports that were attached to

Johnson’s complaint--including those reports from

prison employees besides Stovall--and found that

they "portray [Johnson] as a major troublemaker

capable of threats and (even worse) dangerous

actions." Furthermore, the court pointed to one

of Stovall’s disciplinary charges against Johnson

that alleged he had struck her hand and then

burned her hand with a cigarette. The district

court then stated that "that charge was supported

not only by the testimony of another correctional

officer who witnessed the incident but also by a

polygraph examination that found Johnson had

answered deceptively." Finally, the district

court concluded that its "review of the entire

package of disciplinary reports and related

materials that Johnson has himself annexed to his

Complaint leaves it with the firm conviction that

Johnson’s current Complaint of misconduct on

[Stovall’s] part fits [the description of a

frivolous or malicious claim]."

 Johnson timely filed a motion for

reconsideration, requesting that the district

court grant him leave to amend his complaint. The

district court denied leave to amend, reasoning

that "[t]his is not a situation in which a pro se

litigant has submitted an incomplete or

inarticulate (or even incoherent) complaint, so

as to call for giving the litigant a second

opportunity to reframe the allegations before it

would be fair to consider dismissal." Johnson

then filed this appeal, challenging only the

dismissal of his retaliation claim against
Stovall and not his other claims against Stovall

or any of the other prison employees and

officials named in the complaint. This court

granted the named defendants an order of noninvolvement on appeal, and later invited the noninvolved parties to file a brief that would

address "the standard governing dismissals

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1997e(c)(1)." The

Illinois Attorney General submitted a brief that

limits its discussion to the standard of review

but does not address the merits of the dismissal.

 This court has yet to address the standard of

review of dismissals for frivolousness under sec.

1997e(c)(1). See Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d

626, 626 (7th Cir. 1999). We need not decide this

question now, however, because under either a de

novo or an abuse of discretion standard of

review, the district court erred in dismissing

Johnson’s retaliation claim as frivolous. The

Supreme Court in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325 (1989), held that a "frivolous"

complaint is one that "lacks an arguable basis

either in law or in fact." In Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992), the Court

further defined the standard for factual

frivolousness, holding that "a finding of factual

frivolousness is appropriate when the facts

alleged rise to the level of the irrational or

the wholly incredible." The Denton Court

explained that a "complaint may not be dismissed

. . . simply because the court finds the

plaintiff’s allegations unlikely." Id. Moreover,

under the abuse of discretion standard outlined

in Denton, this court may examine "whether the

plaintiff was proceeding pro se; whether the

court inappropriately resolved genuine issues of

disputed fact; whether the court applied

erroneous legal conclusions; whether the court

provided a statement of reasons explaining the

dismissal; and whether the dismissal was with or

without prejudice." Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d

1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Denton, 504

U.S. at 34). 

 We believe that the district court contravened

Denton by erroneously resolving genuine issues of

fact against Johnson and dismissing his

retaliation claim based on the supposed

unlikeliness of the allegations. To state a cause

of action for retaliation, "a complaint need only

allege a chronology of events from which

retaliation may be inferred." Black v. Lane, 22

F.3d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and

internal quotations omitted). Johnson’s complaint

alleged that Stovall filed false disciplinary

charges against him after he filed a grievance

against her and complained about her to other

medical staff. From these pleaded facts, it is

possible to infer that Stovall filed false
charges of injury against Johnson in retaliation

for his grievance and complaints. Yet when the

district court dismissed Johnson’s claim against

Stovall, it concluded that the disciplinary

reports attached to the complaint showed that

Johnson was a "major troublemaker capable of

threats and (even worse) dangerous actions." The

court also stated that Stovall’s disciplinary

charge against Johnson alleging that he struck

and burned her hand with a cigarette was

supported by a witness and by a polygraph test

regarding the incident. Although the district

court’s assessment of the credibility of

Johnson’s claims may prove to be correct, the

district court is resolving a genuine issue of

fact, i.e., whether Johnson did or did not harm

Stovall. Even under the abuse of discretion

standard outlined in Denton, 504 U.S. at 34,

however, the district court may not

"inappropriately resolve[ ] genuine issues of

disputed fact," and the court in this case has

done so. 

 Furthermore, Johnson’s claims of retaliation are

not "clearly baseless" or "fanciful, fantastic,

delusional, irrational, or wholly incredible."

Hutchinson v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir.

1997) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

The district court gave three reasons for not

believing Johnson’s allegations: (1) he was a

"major troublemaker;" (2) another prison employee

allegedly witnessed the alleged battery and

assault against Stovall; and (3) the results of

the polygraph examination. The evidence cited by

the district court may decrease the likelihood

that the disciplinary reports Stovall filed

against Johnson are false, but the documents do

not demonstrate that his retaliation claim is

"wholly incredible." Id. As the Supreme Court

remarked in Denton, "[s]ome improbable

allegations might properly be disposed of on

summary judgment, but to dismiss them as

frivolous without any factual development is to

disregard the age-old insight that many

allegations might be ’strange but true; for truth

is always strange, stranger than fiction.’" 504

U.S. at 33 (quoting Lord Byron, "Don Juan," canto

XIV, stanza 101) (T. Steffan, E. Steffan & W.

Pratt eds. 1977). Johnson’s claim of retaliation

does seem unlikely. Nonetheless, because the

retaliation claim does not meet the definition of

factual frivolousness outlined in Denton, we

reverse the case and remand it for further

proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED