Filed 3/6/13 Lobel Financial v. Baltazar CA4/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

LOBEL FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 

 Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and 

Respondent, 

 v. 

LUIS BALTAZAR et al., 

 Defendants, Cross-complainants, and 

Appellants. 

 G046119 

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2008-00225258) 

 O P I N I O N 

 Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, David R. 

Chaffee, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Law Offices of Bruce Adelstein and Bruce Adelstein for Defendants, 

Cross-complainants, and Appellants. 

 Gary Dean Lobel and Ronald J. Green, Jr., for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and 

Respondent. 
2

 Luis Baltazar and his wife, Marisol Chavez, doing business as 

Affordable Auto Wholesales (hereafter collectively referred to in the singular as Affordable 

Auto unless the context indicates otherwise), appeal from an $8,730.73 judgment in favor of 

Lobel Financial Corporation (Lobel). Affordable Auto, a used car dealership, sold a 

customer’s finance contract to Lobel. When the customer defaulted, Affordable Auto 

refused to repurchase the contract. On appeal, Affordable Auto contends the trial court 

erred by enforcing the recourse provision in Affordable Auto’s written agreement with 

Lobel. We find no error and affirm the judgment. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURE 

 Affordable Auto sells used cars, and in turn it sells its customers’ finance 

contracts to independent finance companies, such as Lobel. On May 28, 2003, Baltazar and 

Chavez, on behalf of Affordable Auto, signed a form “Dealer Agreement (with limited 

repurchase obligation)” (hereafter the Dealer Agreement) setting forth terms on which 

Affordable Auto (designated as “Dealer” in the Dealer Agreement) would sell finance 

contracts to Lobel (designated as “Company” in the Dealer Agreement). Paragraph 1 of the 

Dealer Agreement provided in relevant part, “The contracts will be assigned with full 

recourse” and paragraph 10 provided, “The Dealer will repurchase all contracts that default 

in the first three (3) payments of the contract term . . . .” 

 The Dealer Agreement described a reserve account (Reserve Account) that 

Lobel internally maintained for each dealer from which a dealer could additionally profit if 

the dealer’s customers, as a group, honored their payment obligations and paid off their 

loans. Paragraph 4 of the Dealer Agreement provided in full: “The Company will withhold 

a percentage on each contract purchased from the Dealer and credit that amount to the 

Reserve Account. It is the intent of the parties that the funds in the Reserve Account shall 

be accumulated to an amount equal to [30 percent] of the gross aggregate outstanding 

balance due on all contracts purchased by the Company hereinafter referred to as the 
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Minimum Reserve Requirement. When determining whether the Minimum Reserve 

Requirement is satisfied the Company will deduct from the balance of the Reserve Account 

any amounts owing to the Company by the [vehicle purchasers] and the Dealer, including, 

without limitation, amounts owing for contracts which the Dealer is required to repurchase 

under the agreement.” 

 Paragraph 5 of the Dealer Agreement provided “the Company may set off or 

charge against the Reserve Account any and all indebtedness owed for any reason by the 

Dealer to the Company. . . . Refunds from the Reserve Account will be paid to the Dealer 

only to the extent that the amount of said Reserve Account exceeds the Minimum Reserve 

Requirement . . . .” 

 Paragraph 7 of the Dealer Agreement provided: “The Dealer understands and 

agrees that the Dealer has no present proprietary or possessory interest in the 

Reserve Account. The Dealer must claim the reserve within five years from the date that 

the last contract was purchased by the Company. . . . Should the Dealer fail to repurchase 

any contracts [or otherwise breach the Dealer Agreement] the entire Reserve Account will 

become the property of the Company.” 

 Paragraph 10 of the Dealer Agreement provided: “The Dealer will repurchase 

all contracts that default in the first three (3) payments of the contract term, whether or not 

the . . . vehicle was repossessed. Any losses sustained after three (3) payments shall be 

charged against the Reserve Account only. The Dealer’s liability shall be limited to the 

funds in the Reserve Account. . . . If the Dealer fails to repurchase a contract due for 

repurchase the Company may take the proceeds from the Reserve Account. . . . The 

obligations of the Dealer to repurchase contracts from the Company shall not be in any 

manner dependent upon or related to the balance in the Reserve Account.” 

Bad Debt Election Form

 At the same time they executed the Dealer Agreement, Affordable Auto and 

Lobel also executed a document titled “Bad Debt Election Form.” It provided in relevant 
4

part, “California Sales and Use Tax Regulation 1642 allows the retailer [i.e., 

Affordable Auto] or the lender [i.e., Lobel] to claim a deduction or refund for bad debt 

losses from account(s) held by the lender without recourse. The retailer and the lender must 

file an election with the [Franchise Tax] Board designating which of them may claim the 

deduction or refund. This election will assign those rights to the lender as outlined 

below. . . . By signing this election, both parties agree to the following: [¶] 1. The retailer 

relinquishes all rights to the account to the lender. [¶] 2. The lender is entitled to claim any 

(and all) deduction or refunds as a result of any bad debt losses charged off by the lender for 

the accounts covered by this election as of 10-1-99 and forward. The retailer relinquishes 

all rights to claiming such deduction or refunds. [¶] 3. This election is a blanket election 

for all accounts assigned without recourse by the retailer to the lender or all accounts held 

by the lender without recourse pursuant to the lender’s contract directly with the retailer.” 

Parties’ Course of Dealing 

 Over the course of their business relationship, from 2003 through 2008, Lobel 

bought 481 finance contracts from Affordable Auto. During that time, 53 contracts went 

into default during the three-month recourse period and each time Affordable Auto 

repurchased the contract. Also during that time, Lobel sent Affordable Auto monthly 

statements detailing the amounts it had credited to and debited from the Reserve Account. 

On two occasions, Lobel sent Affordable Auto a check for $1,000 from the 

Reserve Account. 

Chaidez Contract 

 In February 2008, Affordable Auto sold a used car to Eduardo Chaidez. The 

amount financed was $9,389.84, payable in monthly installments of $356.46 for 36 months. 

Affordable Auto sold the finance contract to Lobel. The assignment invoice reflected a 

25 percent reserve amount ($2,347) would be deducted from the total financed amount (plus 

a $150 document fee), Affordable Auto was to receive a check for $6,892.39 from Lobel 

(which it received on March 3, 2008), and there would be a three payment repurchase period 
5

(i.e., Affordable Auto had to repurchase the contract if Chaidez defaulted in the first three 

payments). Chaidez defaulted after the second payment. Lobel repossessed the vehicle and 

demanded that Affordable Auto repurchase the contract, but Affordable Auto refused. 

Lobel eventually sold the vehicle at auction for $3,703, leaving a balance due on the 

contract of $6,765.86. 

Complaint & Cross-complaint 

 Lobel filed a complaint against Affordable Auto seeking to recover damages 

of $6,765.68, plus interest, for Affordable Auto’s refusal to repurchase the Chaidez contract. 

Affordable Auto filed a cross-complaint alleging numerous causes of action primarily 

relating to the Reserve Account and requesting an accounting. The cross-complaint also 

contained a cause of action under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 

§ 17200 et seq.). It alleged Lobel engaged in deceptive business practices by entering into 

the Dealer Agreement with Affordable Auto, which provided that customer contracts were 

purchased with recourse against Affordable Auto, but then executing a Bad Debt Election 

Form stating finance contracts were assigned without recourse, which thus might have 

allowed Lobel to collect sales tax refunds on bad debts when Affordable Auto should have 

been entitled to the refund. The matter proceeded to a bench trial. 

Trial Testimony 

 Joseph Hernandez was Lobel’s dealer services manager. Hernandez testified 

that when Lobel buys a finance contract, it is essentially buying the right to receive payment 

from the buyer of the vehicle. He testified the Dealer Agreement and documents relating to 

the Chaidez contract required Affordable Auto to repurchase the contract if Chaidez 

defaulted in the first three payments. Lobel paid Affordable Auto $6,892.39 for the Chaidez 

contract, the total value of the Chaidez contract to Lobel was $12,832.56 (i.e., that was the 

total of the payments—principal and interest—Chaidez should have made to Lobel under 

the contract), Chaidez defaulted after the second payment, the car was repossessed July 7, 

2008, sold at auction for $3,703, and Affordable Auto did not repurchase the contract. 
6

Lobel charged off a $6,765.86 loss against the Reserve Account. Hernandez testified 

Chavez called him about Lobel’s repurchase demand, asking for the repurchase balance due. 

Chavez said she would call him back but never did. The Chaidez contract was the only 

contract Affordable Auto refused to repurchase. 

 Hernandez explained Lobel had two programs under which it bought finance 

contracts from car dealers, including Affordable Auto: a discount program and a reserve 

program. Under the discount program, Lobel would pay a discounted price for the contract 

and no amount of money would go into a reserve. The Dealer Agreement with 

Affordable Auto covered Lobel’s reserve program, not the discount program. Under the 

reserve program, Lobel would withhold a percentage, which varied between 20 and 30 

percent depending on the risk involved with the particular transaction. The reserve 

percentage was credited to the dealer’s Reserve Account. The total in the Reserve Account 

always had to be equal to 30 percent of all of the dealer’s outstanding loans before the 

dealer could get any kind of payout from the Reserve Account. Any bad loans from the 

dealer that were not repurchased by the dealer reduced the value of the dealer’s 

Reserve Account. 

 Hernandez explained the amount Lobel withholds on a particular finance 

contract would be noted on the approval form it sends to the dealer when it agrees to buy 

that contract. In the case of the Chaidez contract, the approval form showed Lobel withheld 

25 percent for the Reserve Account. The amount of the reserve could be negotiated and 

often was. Although a less than 30 percent reserve made it harder for the dealer’s Reserve 

Account to ever get to the minimum 30 percent balance to permit any payout, the dealers 

usually wanted more money upfront for the finance contracts they were selling. Lobel gave 

dealers a monthly accounting of the Reserve Account. By the time of trial in August 2011, 

Affordable Auto’s Reserve Account was “upside down” by $17,000. 

 Hernandez explained the Bad Debt Election Form was a form that could be 

filed with the State Board of Equalization in a nonrecourse assignment to allow Lobel to get 
7

a refund of sales tax if the customer defaulted. To Hernandez’s knowledge, Lobel never 

collected sales tax refund on bad debts from Affordable Auto contracts. The Bad Debt 

Election Form only had relevance if the assignment was held without recourse. Hernandez 

was unsure if Lobel ever took assignments of finance contracts from Affordable Auto 

without recourse—but thought perhaps one or two contracts were funded that way over the 

years. 

 Baltazar and his wife, Chavez, both testified Affordable Auto did not 

repurchase the Chaidez contract because of a dispute over the amount it owed Lobel. 

(However, Chavez also testified she refused to repurchase the Chaidez contract because she 

thought the Bad Debt Election Form made all Affordable Auto finance contracts assigned to 

Lobel nonrecourse assignments.) Baltazar and Chavez testified Affordable Auto regularly 

repurchased financed contracts from Lobel and other finance companies. They both 

understood Affordable Auto was contractually obligated to repurchase a finance contract 

that went into default during the three-month recourse period. The recourse requirement in 

Lobel’s Dealer Agreement was similar to what other finance companies required. This was 

the only time Affordable Auto did not honor its repurchase obligation. 

 Baltazar and Chavez both testified as to their understanding of how the 

Reserve Account was supposed to work. On any contract assigned to Lobel, Lobel was 

suppose to give Affordable Auto 70 percent of the financed amount immediately and put the 

other 30 percent in the Reserve Account. Affordable Auto was supposed to get the 

remaining 30 percent for each finance contract when the customer paid off the car loan. But 

Hernandez agreed from 2003 to 2008 Affordable Auto only ever received two checks for 

$1,000 each from the Reserve Account, the checks did not identify any specific contract 

(car loans) they represented, they just said “Reserve Program” on them, and Affordable 

Auto received monthly statements of the Reserve Account. Baltazar and Chavez both 

understood that Lobel could charge off any bad debts against the Reserve Account. Chavez 
8

testified she understood the Reserve Account was not tracked by each contract sold to 

Lobel, rather it was one big pool. 

 Chavez testified that when a buyer defaulted during the recourse period and 

the car was repossessed, Affordable Auto normally received a notice of intent to dispose of 

collateral and Affordable Auto could get the vehicle back. Affordable Auto did not receive 

such a notice from Lobel with regards to the Chaidez vehicle. 

 In closing argument, Affordable Auto argued the Bad Debt Election Form and 

the Dealer Agreement should be interpreted together as providing that all finance contracts 

assigned to Lobel were without recourse. No statement of decision was requested and none 

was issued by the trial court. In ruling, the trial court orally explained Lobel’s use of a 

three-month recourse period and the Reserve Account were completely reasonable methods 

of securing performance of the finance contracts by Affordable Auto’s customers—“I don’t 

see anything inherently wrong or in violation of some standard of business or law in the 

State of California.” The court observed that Affordable Auto presented no evidence Lobel 

misappropriated or improperly withheld any of the money in the Reserve Account. It would 

have taken a forensic accountant to demonstrate any improprieties and Affordable Auto 

offered no expert testimony or accounting documents. The court entered judgment for 

Lobel on its complaint in the principal amount of $6,765.86, plus $1,964.87 in interest, and 

for Lobel on Affordable Auto’s cross-complaint. The court denied Affordable Auto’s 

motion for new trial. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Judgment on Lobel’s Complaint 

 Affordable Auto contends the judgment awarding Lobel damages on its 

complaint must be reversed because the trial court erroneously interpreted the 

Dealer Agreement as providing the Chaidez contract was assigned to Lobel with recourse. 

Affordable Auto asserts that when the Dealer Agreement and the Bad Debt Election Form 

are read together, there is an obvious conflict between them—with one providing there is 
9

recourse and one providing there is not—and the only way to reconcile that conflict is to 

interpret all assignments as being without recourse. The argument is without merit. 

 “‘The fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the 

mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time they entered into the contract.’ 

[Citation.] ‘When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be 

ascertained from the writing alone, if possible.’ [Citations.] ‘“We consider the contract as a 

whole and construe the language in context, rather than interpret a provision in isolation.”’ 

[Citation.] When the language of the instrument is unambiguous, we determine the parties’ 

intent solely by reference to that language. [Citations.]” (PV Little Italy, LLC v. MetroWork 

Condominium Assn. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 132, 145-146; see also Founding Members of 

the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 

109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955-956.) We review the interpretation of a contract de novo unless 

the interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence. (Morgan v. City of Los 

Angeles Bd. of Pension Comrs. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 836, 843.) 

 Affordable Auto argues the Dealer Agreement and the Bad Debt Election 

Form must be construed as one contract under Civil Code section 1642, which provides that 

“several contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as parts 

of substantially one transaction, are to be taken together[,]” because the two documents 

were executed at the same time and both pertain to Lobel’s purchase of finance contracts 

from Affordable Auto. (See, e.g., Vons Companies v. Lyle Parks, Jr., Inc. (2009) 

177 Cal.App.4th 823, 834.) Lobel agrees the documents should be considered together. 

Although we do not quarrel with that proposition, it does not aid Affordable Auto because 

there is no conflict between the provisions of the two documents. 

 It is a fundamental rule of contract interpretation that “[c]ontradictory or 

inconsistent provisions of a contract are to be reconciled by interpreting the language in 

such a manner that will give effect to the entire contract. (Civ. Code, §§ 1641, 1652; 

Siligo v. Castellucci (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 873, 880-881 . . . .) A contract term should not 
10

be construed to render some of its provisions meaningless or irrelevant. (AIU Ins. Co. v. 

Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 827-828 . . . .)” (Estate of Petersen (1994) 

28 Cal.App.4th 1742, 1753-1754, fn. 4.) Additionally, “A contract must receive such an 

interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being 

carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties.” 

(Civ. Code, § 1643.) 

 The gist of Affordable Auto’s argument is the Dealer Agreement provides for 

the assignment of contracts to Lobel with recourse but the Bad Debt Election Form states 

the assignments are without recourse, thus allowing Lobel to claim sales tax refunds on bad 

debts. Affordable Auto argues the existence of the Reserve Account against which Lobel 

can charge defaulting Affordable Auto loans after the three-month recourse period has 

expired in effect means all contract assignments are recourse assignments. Affordable Auto 

argues that because Lobel can debit bad loans against the Reserve Account, Affordable Auto 

alone bears the risk of defaults on its customers’ finance contracts. Accordingly, 

Affordable Auto reasons, to avoid an interpretation of the Bad Debt Election Form that 

renders it at best meaningless (i.e., if assignments are made with recourse, then Bad Debt 

Election Form serves no purpose), or at worst illegal (i.e., the Bad Debt Election Form 

allows Lobel to fraudulently claim sales tax refunds on bad debts to which it is not entitled 

because the account is held with recourse), we must interpret the two contracts together as 

providing that all assignments of contracts to Lobel are made without recourse. 

 Preliminarily, we do not agree with Affordable Auto’s premise that the 

existence of the Reserve Account means all finance contracts Lobel acquired from 

Affordable Auto are held with recourse to Affordable Auto for payment in the event of 

default. Affordable Auto points out that “recourse” generally means having resort to other 

property of the seller to meet the repayment obligation. (See, e.g., Cook v. Superior Court

(1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 608, 613.) But the Dealer Agreement specifically states, “The Dealer 

understands and agrees that the Dealer has no present proprietary or possessory interest in 
11

the Reserve Account.” (Italics added.) Affordable Auto is only entitled to payment from the 

Reserve Account Reserve when the Reserve Account exceeds 30 percent of the total of all 

of its customers’ outstanding finance contracts after deducting from the Reserve Account 

any amounts Lobel has to write off for bad debts from Affordable Auto’s customers. It is 

correct to say the Reserve Account gives Lobel added security when purchasing 

Affordable Auto’s finance contracts—as the trial court observed, Affordable Auto’s 

potential to eventually receive a payout from the Reserve Account gives it an extra incentive 

to make sure its customer base as a whole has been adequately vetted as to the ability to 

make car payments. But there certainly comes a point at which even the Reserve Account is 

meaningless as added security—indeed, the only evidence in the record is that by the time of 

trial Affordable Auto’s Reserve Account was in the red by $17,000, meaning Lobel now has 

no recourse against Affordable Auto for any remaining outstanding Affordable Auto 

acquired loans that go into default. Thus, Affordable Auto’s claim that it alone bears the 

risk of bad loans is false. 

 Moreover, even if the Reserve Account is a form of recourse, there simply is 

no merit to Affordable Auto’s contention the Dealer Agreement and the Bad Debt Election 

Form conflict. The Bad Debt Election Form is a document required by California Code of 

Regulations, title 18, section 1642, which allows an income tax deduction for or refund of 

sales tax that was paid by a retailer in relation to what eventually has became a bad debt. If 

the account was assigned by the retailer to a lender, and the lender holds the debt without 

recourse, either the retailer or the lender (but not both) can claim the refund or deduction. 

“In order for the retailer or the lender to claim a deduction or refund for bad debt losses from 

an account held by the lender without recourse, the retailer and the lender must file an 

election with the [Franchise Tax] Board designating which of them may claim such 

deduction or refund.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 1642, subd. (i)(3)(A), italics added.) The 

written election must contain specified information and include “[a] list of accounts to 

which the election pertains. If the election is a blanket election for all accounts assigned 
12

without recourse by the retailer to the lender or all accounts held by the lender without 

recourse pursuant to the lender’s contract directly with the retailer, the election must so 

state.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 1642, subd. (i)(3)(A)(4).) 

 Here, the Bad Debt Election Form states it is a blanket election that Lobel is 

entitled to claim the sales tax deduction or refund for “all accounts assigned without 

recourse by the retailer to the lender or all accounts held by the lender without 

recourse . . . .” (Italics added.) It does not state that all contracts assigned to Lobel by 

Affordable Auto are assigned or held without recourse. On its face, the Bad Debt Election 

Form provides only that if an account was assigned without recourse, or is held without 

recourse, then Lobel may claim the sales tax refund. The Bad Debt Election Form only has 

relevance when there no longer is recourse on a debt. It does not constitute an agreement or 

a representation to the Franchise Tax Board that all accounts bought by Lobel from 

Affordable Auto are without recourse, only that when there is no recourse on a bad debt, 

Lobel and not Affordable Auto gets to claim the sales tax deduction or refund. 

 Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting the parties gave the Bad Debt 

Election Form any different interpretation than the one that is plain on its face. Hernandez 

testified that perhaps once or twice over the years Lobel bought a contract from 

Affordable Auto without recourse, but there was no evidence those contracts ever went into 

default. And there was no evidence Lobel construed the Bad Debt Election Form as 

permitting it to claim a sales tax refund on Affordable Auto contracts that were held with 

recourse. Indeed, the only evidence at trial was Hernandez’s testimony that to his 

knowledge Lobel has never sought a sales tax refund on any bad debt from one of 

Affordable Auto’s contracts. Thus, Affordable Auto’s premise, that the Dealer Agreement 

and Bad Debt Election Form are in irreconcilable conflict, is a faulty one. 

 Having concluded there is no conflict between the Dealer Agreement and the 

Bad Debt Election Form, the breach of contract judgment against Affordable Auto must be 

affirmed. The Dealer Agreement provided for a three-month recourse period during which 
13

Affordable Auto was obligated to repurchase the Chaidez contract if it went into default, 

and it is undisputed Chaidez defaulted within that recourse period. Baltazar and Chavez 

both testified they understood the repurchase requirement, and the evidence was 

uncontroverted that on 53 occasions Affordable Auto honored its repurchase obligation. 

Baltazar and Chavez both testified Affordable Auto refused to repurchase the Chaidez 

contract because of disputes over the amount owed. Lobel presented evidence the 

repurchase amount was $6,765.86, and Affordable Auto presented no evidence to the 

contrary. 

B. Judgment on the Cross-Complaint

 We need only briefly address Affordable Auto’s arguments pertaining to its 

cross-complaint. 

 First, Affordable Auto asserts that because the Dealer Agreement and Bad 

Debt Election Form must be interpreted as providing that all contracts Affordable Auto sold 

to Lobel over the years were sold and held by Lobel without recourse, then any bad debts 

Lobel charged against the Reserve Account was done in breach of the Dealer Agreement. 

Affordable Auto acknowledges it presented no evidence as the amounts so charged. 

Inasmuch as we have already determined that Affordable Auto’s premise is wrong—there is 

no conflict between the Dealer Agreement and the Bad Debt Election Form—we reject its 

contention. 

 Affordable Auto also contends it demonstrated as a matter of law that Lobel 

engages in an unfair and deceptive business practice in violation of the UCL by including in 

its Dealer Agreement a provision that contracts are assigned with recourse, but then taking 

the position the Bad Debt Election Form permits it to claim sales tax refunds on contracts it 

holds without recourse. Affordable Auto contends Lobel essentially has positioned itself to 

be able to claim sales tax refunds for bad debt write-offs to which it is not entitled. For 

reasons already discussed, Affordable Auto’s premise is wrong—there is no conflict 

between the documents. Affordable Auto has failed to demonstrate Lobel has engaged in 
14

any an unfair and deceptive business practices. Moreover, even were there any merit to the 

premise of Affordable Auto’s argument, its UCL cause of action fails for a more 

fundamental reason. To prevail on a UCL claim, a plaintiff must prove he or she “has 

suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” 

(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.) Thus, the plaintiff must establish both injury in fact and 

“some form of economic injury” that has a causal connection to the unfair competition. 

(Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 323, 326.) Affordable Auto 

concedes there is absolutely no evidence Lobel has ever sought a sales tax refund based on 

any bad debt write off, let alone one arising from an account it purchased from Affordable 

Auto. Affordable Auto’s failure to demonstrate it suffered any injury in fact from the allege 

unfair business practice is fatal to its UCL claim. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal. 

 

 O’LEARY, P. J. 

WE CONCUR: 

RYLAARSDAM, J. 

THOMPSON, J.