# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 8, 2021 * Decided November 10, 2021

Before

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 21-1182

J EFFREY ALLEN ROWE, Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

DAWN BUSS and ROBERT E. CARTER, JR., Defendants-Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:20-CV-966-DRL-MGG

Damon R. Leichty,
J udge

.

O R D E R

Jeffrey Rowe, an Indiana inmate, maintain s that the prison’s assistant warden violated his constitutional rights when, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, she implemented a quarantine policy for inmates wh o leave and then return to the prison. The district court dismissed Rowe’s complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts an d legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited onl y in accordance with F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 32.1No. 21-1182 Page 2

We take as true the facts alleged in Ro we’s complaint, drawing all inferences in

his favor. 145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas , 986 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2021). Indiana State Prison,
where Rowe is housed, mandated in late 2020 that inmates returning to the prison from non-medical appointments quarantine for fourteen days. A limited exception to the quarantine requirement was available to inma tes returning from a medical appointment who returned within twenty-four hours, followed hand-washing protocol, wore a mask, practiced social distancing, avoided contac ting anyone with COVID-19, and remained under constant observation of the prison’s transport officers. Rowe alleged that this exception was introduced in response to th e refusal of prisoners to attend medical appointments because they did not want to be quarantined.

Rowe, who was scheduled to attend a cour t hearing in connection with a motion
for a reduced sentence, asked the assistant w arden whether he would have to quarantine upon his return. The assistant warden conf irmed that he would because some courts, unlike all off-site hospitals and clinics, di d not test for COVID-19. Rowe later attended his hearing and quarantined for fourteen days upon his return.

Rowe sued, alleging that he was quarantined in retaliation for filing his court motion, in violation of his First Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also alleged that the assistant warden was deliberately indi fferent to his safety, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, because she did not quarantine fellow inmates who returned from medical appointments. (The district cour t understood Rowe also to assert an equal protection claim, but Rowe disputed that characterization and says nothing further about it on appeal, so we do not either. See White v. United States , 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021).)

The district court screened Rowe’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and

dismissed it for failure to state a claim. Ro we could not state a retaliation claim, the court explained, because he alleged no pl ausible connection between his court filing and the prison’s decision not to extend it s quarantine exemption to inmates who attend court hearings. Nor could Rowe state an Eighth Amendment claim, the court continued,

because he faced no substantial risk of harm by a quarantine policy that exempted inmates who attended medical appointments and followed all required safety protocols.

The court then denied Rowe’s later request for relief under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Regarding the retaliation claim, the court reiteratedNo. 21-1182 Page 3

that Rowe had not alleged a plausible link be tween the motion he filed and the policy that resulted in his being quarantined. As for the Eighth Amendment claim, the court explained that Rowe alleged “no facts what soever” suggesting that the assistant warden’s quarantine policy reflected deliberate indifference or that he has been harmed by the failure to quarantine individual s returning from medical appointments.

On appeal, Rowe first challenges the dismi ssal of his retaliation claim on grounds that the district court held him to a height ened pleading standard. In Rowe’s view, he was not required to plead that his protected activity caused the adverse action; it was sufficient that he alleged engaging in protec ted First Amendment activity (filing a motion for a reduced sentence) and suffering an adverse event (forced quarantine).

The district court did not hold Rowe to a heightened standard. To state a First
Amendment retaliation claim, Rowe had to allege plausibly that he engaged in a protected activity, that he suffered an adve rse action, and that his protected conduct

motivated the adverse action. See 145 Fisk

, 986 F.3d at 766 (affirming dismissal where litigant had not plausibly alleged all three elements); Santana v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review

, 679 F.3d 614, 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (same). Rowe’s co mplaint did not meet this bar because he alleged no plausible retaliatory link between his court motion and the quarantine requirement. The assistant warden coul d not plausibly—or even possibly—have intended the quarantine policy to retalia te against Rowe because its enactment preceded his informing her that he filed his motion. See Nieves v. Bartlett , 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (“To prevail on [retaliation] clai m, a plaintiff must establish a ‘causal connection’ between the government defendant’ s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff’s ‘subsequent injury.’”). Nor could she have intended the policy to retaliate generally against protected activities because, according to Rowe’s complaint, the policy aimed to curb the spread of COVID-19 within the prison, and it applied with equal force to an

inmate’s non -protected conduct, such as visiting an outside doctor and not complying with the requisite safety protocol. Because he has not alleged enough to permit an inference that the assistant warden retaliated against him, this claim was properly

dismissed.

Rowe next attacks the dismissal of his de liberate-indifference claim. He reprises his argument (from his motion for recons ideration) that the assistant warden purposefully put him at serious risk of contracting COVID-19 when she lifted the quarantine requirement for inma tes who return from medical visits and follow safety

measures.No. 21-1182 Page 4

The district court properly dismissed Rowe’s deliberate indifference claim. To plead deliberate indifference, Rowe needed to allege plausibly that the assistant warden knew of a significant risk of serious harm and failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate or prevent that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Peterson v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc. , 986 F.d 746, 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2021). But by Rowe’s own account, the

assistant warden introduced measures to mitigate risk when she conditioned the quarantine exemption for certain inmates—th ose returning from short medical visits— on compliance with specific safety precau tions against COVID-19. Rowe’s allegations cannot plausibly state an Ei ghth Amendment claim.

To the extent Rowe believes that the court should have let him amend his complaint with regard to his Eighth Ame ndment claim, the court appropriately

concluded that amendment would be futile. See Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West , 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015). A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend when, as here, the plaintiff does not suggest how the proposed amendment

would cure the deficiencies id entified in the complaint. Id

.

Lastly, with regard to the denial of hi s Rule 59(e) motion, Rowe asserts that the

court should not have dismissed his First and Eighth Amendment claims. But because the district court properly dismissed those cl aims (as we have explained), it acted well within its discretion also to deny the motion.

AFFIRMED