alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tvia, Inc. (the Registrant) on
Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report) I, Eli Porat, Chief
Executive Officer and President of the Registrant, certify, in accordance with
18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that based on my knowledge: (1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Registrant, to which this
certification is attached as an exhibit (the Report), fully complies
with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Registrant. Dated: August 6, 2004
    
    /s/ Eli PoratEli PoratChief Executive Officer and President
Exhibit
10.20


 


Addendum
to the Personal Work Agreement


 


	
  Between:

  	
   

  	
  Advanced Technology Ltd

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  P.O. Box 58180, Tel-Aviv 61581

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (hereafter – ATL)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  And between:

  	
   

  	
  Tuvia Feldman

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  9 Keren Hayesod Street, Givat
  Shmuel

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  (hereafter – the employee)

  



 


Whereas                                         on December 12, 1995, a special personal
work agreement was signed between ATL and the employee (hereafter: “the
Agreement”);


 


And whereas                     the parties have agreed between them to change
the provisions of the agreement, all of which as set out below;


 


Wherefore it
has been hereby agreed between the parties as follows:


 


1.                             The preamble to this
Addendum shall constitute an integral part hereof.


 


2.                             The definition of the
basic salary of the employee for every purpose shall be changed so that the
element of the accompanying supplement in clause A.3 of the Agreement shall be
added to the gross salary element in clause A.1 of the Agreement and shall
constitute a part of the basic salary for every purpose, in the following way:


 


a.                             Starting
from September 1, 1999, the basic salary of the employee shall be composed
of the gross salary in clause A.1 of the Agreement and a half of the
accompanying supplement stated in clause A.3 of the Agreement.


 


b.                            Starting
from March 1, 2000, the basic salary of the employee shall be composed of
the salary in clause 2 a of the Addendum and also of the second half of the
accompanying supplement as defined in clause A.3 of the Agreement.


 


3.                             When what is stated in
clause 2 above is completed, clause A.3 of the Agreement shall be void.


 


4.                             Anywhere where it states
in the Agreement “the basic salary”, this terms shall be interpreted in
accordance with what is stated in this Addendum.


 


In witness
whereof the parties have signed below today, August 23, 1999.


 


	
  /s/ Yehezkel
  Zeira, /s/ Raviv Zoller

  	
   

  	
  /s/ Tuvia
  Feldman

  	
   

  
	
  Advanced
  Technology Ltd.

  	
  The employee
#### A. C. ELEBY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 38939.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 15, 1965.

*895Clayton Malone, Livingston, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DICE, Commissioner.

Appellant was convicted, upon his plea of guilty and waiver of a trial by jury, of the offense of unlawfully hunting wild deer at night with an artificial light and his punishment was assessed at thirty days in jail and a fine of $50.

It is insisted that the judgment is void because it was rendered while the court was in vacation.

The judgment is shown to have been rendered in the cause on October 19, 1964.

The caption found in the transcript recites that the case came on for trial “At a term of the County Court, begun and holden within and for the County of Polk, at Livingston, Texas, on the 1st day of August, A.D. 1964, and which adjourns on the 31st day of October, A.D. 1964 * * ‡ *tt*

Art. 5, Sec. 29, of Vernon’s Ann.St. Constitution of Texas, provides, in part, that the county courts of this state shall “hold at least four terms for both civil and criminal business annually, as may be provided by the Legislature, or by the Commissioners’ Court of the county under authority of law, and such other terms each year as may be fixed by the Commissioners’ Court; * * * Until otherwise provided, the terms of the County Court shall be held on the first Mondays in February, May, August and November, and may remain in session three weeks.”

Under this constitutional provision, the commissioners’ court is authorized to fix the terms of a county court.

The certified copy appearing in the transcript of an order of the commissioners’ court, dated February 11, 1963, fixing two terms of the county court, to run from January 1 to June 30 and from July 1 to December 31, 1963, is not proof that the court did not subsequently enter an order fixing the term of court as set out in the caption of the transcript. After the expiration of one year the commissioners’ court would be authorized to fix new terms of the county court. Art. 5, Sec. 29, supra; Art. 1961, Vernon’s Ann. Civ.St.

Smith v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 585, 183 S.W.2d 175, cited by appellant, is not here controlling, because in that case it was affirmatively shown that the commissioners’ court had not provided for or fixed terms of the county court.

Under the record, the judgment is not shown to be void.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 153 

To prohibit funding for the Environmental Protection Agency to be used 

to implement or enforce a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 5, 2011 

Mr. POE of Texas (for himself, Mr. BRADY of Texas, Mr. BISHOP of Utah, 

Mr. LAMBORN, Mr. HALL, Mr. ROE of Tennessee, Mr. CONAWAY, Mr. 

FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. STUTZMAN, Mr. AKIN, 

Mr. COLE, Ms. FOXX, Mr. GINGREY of Georgia, Mr. GOHMERT, Mr. SAM

JOHNSON of Texas, Mrs. LUMMIS, Mr. MCKEON, Mr. PAUL, and Mr. 

LATTA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To prohibit funding for the Environmental Protection Agency 

to be used to implement or enforce a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ensuring Affordable 

5 Energy Act’’. 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 153 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF FUNDING FOR CAP-AND-TRADE 

2 PROGRAM FOR GREENHOUSE GASES. 

3 (a) PROHIBITION.—Notwithstanding any other provi4 sion of law, no funds appropriated or otherwise available 

5 for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 

6 Agency may be used to implement or enforce— 

7 (1) a cap-and-trade program; or 

8 (2) any statutory or regulatory requirement 

9 pertaining to emissions of one or more greenhouse 

10 gases from stationary sources that is issued or be11 comes applicable or effective after January 1, 2011, 

12 including— 

13 (A) any such requirement under section 

14 111 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7411) or 

15 part C of title I of such Act (42 U.S.C. 7470 

16 et seq.); and 

17 (B) any such permitting requirement 

18 under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et 

19 seq.). 

20 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act: 

21 (1) The term ‘‘cap-and-trade program’’ means 

22 any regulatory program established after the date of 

23 enactment of this Act that provides for the sale, auc24 tion, or other distribution of a limited amount of al25 lowances that permit the emission of one or more 

26 greenhouse gases. 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 153 IH

1 (2) The term ‘‘greenhouse gas’’ includes, with 

2 respect to a cap-and-trade program under subsection 

3 (a)(1) or a requirement under subsection (a)(2), any 

4 of the following: 

5 (A) Carbon dioxide. 

6 (B) Methane. 

7 (C) Nitrous oxide. 

8 (D) Sulfur hexafluoride. 

9 (E) Hydrofluorocarbons. 

10 (F) Perfluorocarbons. 

11 (G) Any other anthropogenic gas des12 ignated as a greenhouse gas for purposes of 

13 such cap-and-trade program or such require14 ment. 

15 (3) The term ‘‘stationary source’’ has the 

16 meaning given such term in section 111(a)(3) of the 

17 Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3)). 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT 

 CHARLES TALBERT,     Petitioner     v.   KAREN BRYANT,     Respondent 

No. 103 EM 2015    

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 13th day of October, 2015, the Application for Leave to File 

Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
#### Henry Lee GORDON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 38723.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 15, 1965.

*881Weldon H. Berry, Houston, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is aggravated assault on a peace officer; the punishment, nine months in jail and a fine of $1,000.

We are met at the outset with the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to show that an assault was made. There is no question that the injured party, a Texas Highway Patrolman, was an officer and was in the performance of the duties of his office of routine patrol. He observed a Pontiac automobile pass another automobile in a no-passing zone. He gave chase and brought it to a halt. A station wagon which he had observed to have one defective tail light passed the spot where he had stopped the Pontiac, and he motioned it to stop. He spoke to the driver of the Pontiac, who it later developed was appellant’s wife, and told her that he would be with her in a minute, and then proceeded to the station wagon where he instructed the driver to step to the rear of the station wagon.

Appellant, who was a passenger in the Pontiac, as well as the other occupants thereof, came to where the officer was writing a ticket for the driver of the station wagon and were instructed by him to go back to their automobile and be seated. With this order they complied except that appellant protested verbally and continued to protest verbally after he had taken his seat.

Appellant’s explanation of this is that he owned the station wagon and wanted to know the nature of the charges against the driver. Be this as it may, the officer became disturbed at appellant’s verbal protests, abandoned his ticket writing, walked past the Pontiac and instructed appellant to get out and come to his patrol car. Appellant complied with this order.

The officer stated that when appellant reached a certain point, he ordered him to stop, but that appellant continued to walk toward him. It was this continued walking plus a “wild look about his eyes” upon which the State must rely for a conviction, because at this juncture, according to the officer, he hit appellant with his left hand and at almost the same moment, also hit appellant across the head with a five cell flashlight which he had in his right hand. All that appellant did after this moment was to grab the officer around the waist to prevent any further assaults upon him.

We have examined this record with care and have concluded that the facts as set forth above do not show an assault. Crow v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 216 S.W.2d 201, supports the conclusion we have reached in this case.

For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
<Page>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.18

       SECOND AMENDMENT TO AMENDED AND RESTATED 1998 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN

     The NeuroMetrix, Inc. Amended and Restated 1998 Equity Incentive Plan, as
amended (the "Plan"), is hereby amended as follows:

     Section 5.1 of the Plan is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with
the following:

          5.1 NUMBER OF SHARES. Awards may be made under the Plan for up to
          5,000,000 Shares, of which up to 5,000,000 Shares may be ISOs. Shares
          issued under the Plan may consist in whole or in part of authorized
          but unissued Shares or treasury Shares.


     This amendment shall be effective as of the date on which it is approved by
the stockholders of NeuroMetrix, Inc.


APPROVED BY BOARD: June 2, 2004


APPROVED BY STOCKHOLDERS: June 18, 2004
#### The Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co., Appellant, *v.*Public Utilities Commission of Ohio et al., Appellees.

(No. 27277

Decided February 23, 1939.)

*Messrs. McMahon $ Hayward, Messrs. Tyler, Wilson*
      *86
      *& Rhinefort*and *Messrs. Eagleson & Laylin,*for appellant.

*Mr. Herbert 8. Duffy*and *Mr. Thomas J. Herbert,*attorneys general, *Mr. Willis W. Metcalf*and *Mr. Kenneth L. Sater,*for appellee, the Public Utilities Commission.

*Mr. Martin 8. Dodd,*director of law, *Mr. John W. RricJcer*and *Mr. Donald G. Power,*for appellee, the City of Toledo.

Weygandt, C. J.

The single question here presented is whether the principle announced by this court in the syllabus in the *Norwalk case, supra,*is decisive of the instant controversy. This pronouncement reads as follows:

> “Under the provisions of Sections 614-44, 3644, 3982 and 3983, General Code, a municipality has the power to enact an ordinance to fix rates for gas even after a public utility has filed an application to increase its rates under the provisions of Section 614-20, General Code.”

The appellant contends that the foregoing rule permits the commission to elect whether it will proceed under the application or under the appeal. With this theory in mind the appellant insists that the facts in the *Norwalk case, supra,*are distinguishable from those in the instant one, and that in the former case this court simply required the commission to proceed under the appeal because of the circumstances peculiar to that situation.

The difficulty with the appellant’s theory is that in the opinion in the *Norwalk case, supra,*the court indicated its rationale in the following language:

> “These powers of the municipality are subject only to review by appeal to the Public Utilities Commission in event the company does not accept the ordinance, and by the right of referendum existing in the people, ’ ’

*87This statement was based upon the statutes and upon Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of Ohio which confer upon municipalities a constitutional grant of broad powers with reference to public utilities. Then too, the court had in mind the fact that the statutes themselves disclose no legislative intent to deny rate-fixing powers to municipalities. Section 614-44, General Code, provides that a municipality may fix rates “at any time” within one year before the expiration of any contract, and also “at any other time authorized by law.” Likewise, Section 3982, General Code, specifically authorizes a municipality to regulate “from time to time” the price which such companies may charge. Therefore the ordinance took precedence, and the commission had no alternative hut to proceed under the appeal rather than under the application.

The order of the Public Utilities Commission dismissing the application of the appellant for want of jurisdiction must be affirmed.

*Order affirmed.*

Day, Zimmerman, Williams, Myers, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AT DECEMBER 31, 1995 AND THE STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1995 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED AS PART OF ITS ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE
PERIOD DECEMBER 31, 1995
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                         525,530
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  277,071
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               802,601
<PP&E>                                       5,425,149
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,410,328
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,817,422
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,817,422
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,817,422
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,055,727
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  334,972
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   720,755
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-8102

JULIETTE MARIA DIXON, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. GENE M. JOHNSON, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District Judge. (2:07-cv-00448-RBS-TEM)

Submitted: September 29, 2009 Decided: October 2, 2009

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Juliette Maria Dixon, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Eldridge Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Juliette Maria Dixon seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on her 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);

Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Dixon has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Certificate of Trust of Bank One Capital VI



  Exhibit 4.2 
   
 AMENDED AND RESTATED 
 CERTIFICATE OF TRUST 
 OF 
 BANK ONE CAPITAL VI 
  
 THIS Amended and Restated
Certificate of Trust of BANK ONE Capital VI (the “Trust”) is being duly executed and filed by the undersigned, as trustee, to amend and restate the original Certificate of Trust of the Trust (the “Certificate of Trust”), which
was filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware on September 27, 2000, under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (12 Del. C. § 3801, et seq.) (the “Act”). 
  
 1. Name. The name of the statutory trust is BANK ONE Capital VI.

  
 2. Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of
the trustee of the Trust in the State of Delaware is The Bank of New York (Delaware), White Clay Center, Route 273, Newark, Delaware 19711. 
  
 3. Effective Date. This Amended and Restated Certificate of Trust shall be effective upon filing. 
  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being a trustee of the Trust, has duly
executed this Amended and Restated Certificate of Trust as of the                  day of
                    , 2004, in accordance with Section 3811(a) of the Act. 
  
 
					
		
	By:	 	 
	 	 	 Name:
	 	 Laurence Goldman

	 	 	 Title:
	 	 Regular Trustee
Exhibit 32

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

The undersigned, Ricky Chiu, President, and Eddie Chou, Secretary and Treasurer, of Eatware Corporation, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)           the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Eatware Corporation for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Eatware Corporation

 

Dated:  November20, 2006

 

 

/s/ Ricky Chiu

Ricky Chiu

President 

(Principal Executive Officer)

 

 

/s/ Eddie Chou

Eddie Chou

Secretary and Treasurer

(Principal Financial Officer and Principal 

Accounting Officer)

 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Eatware Corporation and will be retained by Eatware Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.