United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted November 8, 2021*

Decided November 10, 2021 

Before 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge 

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge 

No. 21-1182 

JEFFREY ALLEN ROWE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DAWN BUSS and ROBERT E. CARTER, JR., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Indiana, South Bend Division. 

No. 3:20-CV-966-DRL-MGG 

Damon R. Leichty, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Jeffrey Rowe, an Indiana inmate, maintains that the prison’s assistant warden 

violated his constitutional rights when, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, she 

implemented a quarantine policy for inmates who leave and then return to the prison. 

The district court dismissed Rowe’s complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm. 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
No. 21-1182 Page 2 

We take as true the facts alleged in Rowe’s complaint, drawing all inferences in 

his favor. 145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 986 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2021). Indiana State Prison, 

where Rowe is housed, mandated in late 2020 that inmates returning to the prison from 

non-medical appointments quarantine for fourteen days. A limited exception to the 

quarantine requirement was available to inmates returning from a medical appointment 

who returned within twenty-four hours, followed hand-washing protocol, wore a mask, 

practiced social distancing, avoided contacting anyone with COVID-19, and remained 

under constant observation of the prison’s transport officers. Rowe alleged that this 

exception was introduced in response to the refusal of prisoners to attend medical 

appointments because they did not want to be quarantined. 

 

Rowe, who was scheduled to attend a court hearing in connection with a motion 

for a reduced sentence, asked the assistant warden whether he would have to quarantine 

upon his return. The assistant warden confirmed that he would because some courts, 

unlike all off-site hospitals and clinics, did not test for COVID-19. Rowe later attended 

his hearing and quarantined for fourteen days upon his return. 

Rowe sued, alleging that he was quarantined in retaliation for filing his court 

motion, in violation of his First Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also alleged 

that the assistant warden was deliberately indifferent to his safety, in violation of his 

Eighth Amendment rights, because she did not quarantine fellow inmates who returned 

from medical appointments. (The district court understood Rowe also to assert an equal 

protection claim, but Rowe disputed that characterization and says nothing further 

about it on appeal, so we do not either. See White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 

(7th Cir. 2021).) 

The district court screened Rowe’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and 

dismissed it for failure to state a claim. Rowe could not state a retaliation claim, the 

court explained, because he alleged no plausible connection between his court filing 

and the prison’s decision not to extend its quarantine exemption to inmates who attend 

court hearings. Nor could Rowe state an Eighth Amendment claim, the court continued, 

because he faced no substantial risk of harm by a quarantine policy that exempted 

inmates who attended medical appointments and followed all required safety 

protocols. 

The court then denied Rowe’s later request for relief under Rule 59(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Regarding the retaliation claim, the court reiterated 
No. 21-1182 Page 3 

that Rowe had not alleged a plausible link between the motion he filed and the policy 

that resulted in his being quarantined. As for the Eighth Amendment claim, the court 

explained that Rowe alleged “no facts whatsoever” suggesting that the assistant 

warden’s quarantine policy reflected deliberate indifference or that he has been harmed 

by the failure to quarantine individuals returning from medical appointments. 

 

On appeal, Rowe first challenges the dismissal of his retaliation claim on grounds 

that the district court held him to a heightened pleading standard. In Rowe’s view, he 

was not required to plead that his protected activity caused the adverse action; it was 

sufficient that he alleged engaging in protected First Amendment activity (filing a motion 

for a reduced sentence) and suffering an adverse event (forced quarantine). 

The district court did not hold Rowe to a heightened standard. To state a First 

Amendment retaliation claim, Rowe had to allege plausibly that he engaged in a 

protected activity, that he suffered an adverse action, and that his protected conduct 

motivated the adverse action. See 145 Fisk, 986 F.3d at 766 (affirming dismissal where 

litigant had not plausibly alleged all three elements); Santana v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, 

679 F.3d 614, 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (same). Rowe’s complaint did not meet this bar because 

he alleged no plausible retaliatory link between his court motion and the quarantine 

requirement. The assistant warden could not plausibly—or even possibly—have 

intended the quarantine policy to retaliate against Rowe because its enactment 

preceded his informing her that he filed his motion. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 

1722 (2019) (“To prevail on [retaliation] claim, a plaintiff must establish a ‘causal 

connection’ between the government defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff’s 

‘subsequent injury.’”). Nor could she have intended the policy to retaliate generally 

against protected activities because, according to Rowe’s complaint, the policy aimed to 

curb the spread of COVID-19 within the prison, and it applied with equal force to an 

inmate’s non-protected conduct, such as visiting an outside doctor and not complying 

with the requisite safety protocol. Because he has not alleged enough to permit an 

inference that the assistant warden retaliated against him, this claim was properly 

dismissed. 

Rowe next attacks the dismissal of his deliberate-indifference claim. He reprises 

his argument (from his motion for reconsideration) that the assistant warden 

purposefully put him at serious risk of contracting COVID-19 when she lifted the 

quarantine requirement for inmates who return from medical visits and follow safety 

measures. 
No. 21-1182 Page 4 

The district court properly dismissed Rowe’s deliberate indifference claim. To 

plead deliberate indifference, Rowe needed to allege plausibly that the assistant warden 

knew of a significant risk of serious harm and failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate 

or prevent that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Peterson v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 986 F.d 746, 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2021). But by Rowe’s own account, the 

assistant warden introduced measures to mitigate risk when she conditioned the 

quarantine exemption for certain inmates—those returning from short medical visits—

on compliance with specific safety precautions against COVID-19. Rowe’s allegations 

cannot plausibly state an Eighth Amendment claim. 

To the extent Rowe believes that the court should have let him amend his 

complaint with regard to his Eighth Amendment claim, the court appropriately 

concluded that amendment would be futile. See Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 

807 (7th Cir. 2015). A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying leave to 

amend when, as here, the plaintiff does not suggest how the proposed amendment 

would cure the deficiencies identified in the complaint. Id. 

Lastly, with regard to the denial of his Rule 59(e) motion, Rowe asserts that the 

court should not have dismissed his First and Eighth Amendment claims. But because 

the district court properly dismissed those claims (as we have explained), it acted well 

within its discretion also to deny the motion. 

AFFIRMED