NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0535n.06

Case No. 15-6369

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHARLES TYRONE WARREN,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

COLE, Chief Judge. Charles Tyrone Warren pleaded guilty to trafficking in crack 

cocaine and was sentenced to 135 months’ imprisonment. He later sought a sentence 

modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court exercised its discretion to reduce 

Warren’s sentence to 110 months’ imprisonment. Dissatisfied with the extent of that reduction, 

he now appeals. Warren asked us to review the district court’s sentencing decision under a 

“reasonableness” standard, but our precedents say otherwise. See United States v. Bowers, 

615 F.3d 715, 716–17 (6th Cir. 2010). We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2010, Warren pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 

distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. His base offense level of 34, coupled with a 
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criminal history category of IV, produced an advisory guidelines range of 235 to 293 months’ 

imprisonment. Warren was also subject to a 240-month mandatory minimum sentence under 

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). This became the low end of his guidelines range. The government 

moved for, and the court granted, a five-level substantial assistance departure under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(e) and USSG § 5K1.1. Warren’s guidelines range was thus reduced to 135 to 168 

months’ imprisonment, and the district court ultimately sentenced him to 135 months’

imprisonment (a 43.75 percent departure below his guidelines range).

In March 2015, after certain amendments to the guidelines, Warren filed a motion for a 

sentence modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and USSG § 1B1.10. Under the new 

guidelines, his range was 155 to 188 months’ imprisonment, and a similar 43.75 percent

downward departure for the substantial assistance would have resulted in an 85-month term. The 

government did not oppose the reduction in principle but noted that 85 months’ imprisonment 

was a 65 percent reduction from his original mandatory minimum of 240 months. After 

considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court ruled that a reduction was 

appropriate but only reduced Warren’s sentence to 110 months’ imprisonment.

Warren now appeals the district court’s sentencing decision.

II. ANALYSIS

Section 3582(c)(2) “delineates a limited set of circumstances in which a sentence may be 

corrected or reduced.” Dillon, 560 U.S. at 828. That provision is a “congressional act of lenity” 

which allows for a “limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary 

resentencing.” Id. at 826, 828. The statute establishes a “two-step inquiry”: first, a court must 

“determine that a reduction is consistent with [USSG] § 1B1.10” and, second, “it may consider 
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whether the authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part, according to the factors 

set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. at 826.

Warren argues that this court should apply the Ninth Circuit’s standard, and that, under 

that standard, his modified sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. In United 

States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit held that the second step of the 

sentence modification process—application of the § 3553(a) factors—should be reviewed for 

reasonableness as defined in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260–62 (2005), and Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Warren claims that the district court “did not provide 

adequate explanation for the sentence” and “placed an unreasonable amount of weight on a 

particular factor.” Appellant’s Br. 13.

But that is not the law in this circuit. Here, as the government aptly points out, “our 

jurisdiction to consider the appeal of a § 3582(c)(2) determination, like our jurisdiction to 

consider the appeal of a Rule 35(b) determination, . . . come[s] from [18 U.S.C.] §3742.” 

Bowers, 615 F.3d at 722. Section 3742(a) “authorizes us to review the outcome of a sentencingreduction proceeding only where the resulting sentence ‘(1) was imposed in violation of law; 

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; (3) is greater 

than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range; or (4) was imposed for an offense 

for which there is no guideline and is plainly unreasonable.’” Id. at 723 (quoting United States v. 

Moran, 325 F.3d 790, 792 (6th Cir. 2003)).

As we have held, and Warren concedes, “a defendant’s allegation of Booker

unreasonableness in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding does not state a cognizable ‘violation of law’ that 

§ 3742(a)(1) would authorize us to address on appeal.” Id. at 727. We understand that Warren 

may be seeking en banc review with regard to that issue. But “[t]his panel is without authority to 
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overrule binding precedent.” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 319 (6th Cir. 2010); see also 6th 

Cir. R. 32.1(b).

Warren has not alleged or argued that the district court’s decision to reduce Warren’s 

sentence was a cognizable “violation of law” or a “result of an incorrect application of the 

sentencing guidelines.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Nor was Warren’s sentence “greater than the 

sentence specified in the applicable guideline range” or “imposed for an offense for which there 

is no guideline.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We thus lack jurisdiction over the appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.