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### Ql6>GSP&Soaj foal *2 lOi/ElfiJ^TbcAs 7£%£lOpinion issuedApril 28, 2015

In The 

### CourtofAppeals
For The 

### jftrsft3Bi*trtrtof{Eexaa

NO. 01-14-00715-CR
KEITH WAYNE FRANCES, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appealfrom the 178th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1406601

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Keith Wayne Francis pleaded guilty topossession of acontrolled substance and was sentenced to eightmonths' confinement in a State JailFacility. 

### In asingle issue, heargues thathe is entitledto anew trial because the trial courtruled on his motion to set aside the indictment without him being present. We
affirm.

BACKGROUND On January 31, 2014, appellant was indicted for possession ofless than one gram ofcocaine, with enhancements for two prior felony possession convictions. On June 25, 2014, appellant and his counsel attended a pretrial hearing and appellant's counsel filed severalmotions. One of thosefilings was a Motion to Set Aside Indictment, alleging that "the State has provided insufficient evidence to show that Mr. Francis possessed a controlled substance, other than the mere possession ofparaphernalia withresidue." Thefollowing day, on June 26, 2014, the trial court signed an order denying the motion to set aside the indictment. On August 5,2014, appellant entered a guilty plea.
PRESENCEATPRETRIAL HEARING Appellant seeks reversal of hisconviction and a newtrial, arguing that "the trial court erred by failing to secure[his] presence at apretrial hearing based on the legality of the indictment against him." He contends that the right to personal presence atall critical stages oftrial is afundamental right recognized under the U.S. Constitution, Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18, 104 S. Ct. 453, 455 (1983), and codifiedby theTexas Legislature. SeeTEX. CODECrim. Pro. Ann. art 28.01, § 1 (West 2006).The State disagrees, arguing that the appellant cannot show a violation of article 28.01 because "there is no indication that the trial court held any type of proceeding when it ruled on appellant's motion." The State also contends that the "trial court did not violate appellant's constitutional right to be present when the court denied his motion because appellant's presence was not reasonably relatedto his opportunityto defend himself."
ANALYSIS Article28.01 provides that a defendant must be present during "any pretrial proceeding." Tex. Code Crim.Pro. Ann. art28.01. Appellant does notdispute that he waspresentwithcounsel at thepretrial hearing onJune 25, 2014. Rather, he complains that hewas notpresent the next day when the trial courtsigned the order denying themotion to dismiss. The question presented here is whether the trial court's entering an order denying appellant's motion to set aside the indictmentwas apretrialproceeding. Weagree withtheStatethat itwas not. If the trial court holds a hearing on a defendant's pretrial motions, the defendant is entitled, under the plainlanguage of article 28.01, to bepresent. The trial courtmay, however, take matters under advisement and make pretrial rulings in the absence ofa defendant. This distinction was addressed in Watkins v. State, a case inwhichthe appellantarguedthatthetrial court's failure toconductahearing 

### inthe defendant's presence on appellant's pretrial motiontodismiss his appointedcounsel violated article 28.01. 333 S.W.3d 771, 775-76 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. refd). The trial court in that case "entered an order in which it stated that it had considered [the appellant's] motion and denied it." Id. at 775. The Waco Court ofAppeals examined the relevant case law, ultimately concluding this did not amount to a pretrial proceeding at which the appellant was required to be present under article 28.01. In Riggall v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the trial court's actions constituted a "proceeding" under article 28.01, by noting that the written order overruling Riggall's motion to dismiss recited that the cause "came on to be heard" and contained fourparagraphs containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, indicating that some type of evidence or testimony was heard or considered. Riggallv. State, 590 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Since there was some type of "proceeding" in that case, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Riggall or his appointed counsel should have beenpresent. In thepresentcase, there isnothingtoindicatethat there was any kind of "proceeding" with regard to the denial of Watkins's motion. See Jones v. State, No. 14-87-00951-CR, 1989 WL 31803 at *l-2, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 758 at *4 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] April 6, 1989, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (no violation of article 28.01 where there was only a handwritten notation on the motion to dismiss court appointed counsel which read "Denied," together with the date and the signature ofthe trialjudge). WebelievethatRiggall isdistinguishable sincetherecord shows nothing other than the order signed by the trial court that it considered Watkins's motion to indicate that a proceeding was held. There are nofindings in the order or otherindications thatevidence or testimony was heard or considered. We find that a moreanalogous case to the case at bar isMalcom v. State. Malcom v. State, 628 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). In Malcom, there was no formal written order, but there was a notation on a docket sheet that a motion to dismiss counsel was overruled. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court'saction ofoverruling the motion was not a "proceeding" under article 28.01. Malcom, 628 S.W.2d at 792. By application ofthe holdings of Malcom and Riggall, we find that the trial court in this case did not violate article 28.01. Id. at 775-76. We likewise conclude that the facts of this case are more like Malcom than Riggall. There is no record ofahearing or any type ofproceeding on June 26, 2014, the date the trial court signed the complained-oforder. The order itself states only that "[t]he foregoing motion is in all things denied." Because nothing in the record—including the language ofthe June 26 order—indicates that the trial court's signing the denial order was a proceeding under article 28.01, we conclude that appellant has not shown that the trial court violated article 28.01. To the extent that appellant argues that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's ruling on appellant's motion to dismiss outside appellant's presence, we reject thatargument as well. A defendant has constitutional right to be present "whenever [the defendant's] presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Snyderv. Massachusetts,291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332 (1934)). The "presence of a defendant is a condition ofdue process to the extent that a fair andjust hearing would bethwarted by his absence, and to thatextent only." Id. (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08, 54 S. Ct. at 333)). Given that appellant was present at the June 25, 2014 pretrial proceeding, and given thatthere was noproceeding held onJune 26, 2014 when the trial court signed the order denying appellant's motion, appellant has not established that the trial court's ruling on the motion without his being present denied his rightto due process. We overrule appellant's sole issue.
CONCLUSION We affirmthe trial court'sjudgment.

SherryRadack ChiefJustice Panel consists ofChiefJustice Radack and Justices Brown andLloyd. Do not publish. Tex. R. App.P. 47.2(b).