NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0199n.06

No. 22-1178

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ABRAHAM HUGHES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF WAYNE, MICHIGAN; WAYNE, 

MICHIGAN CITY COUNCIL; LISA 

NOCERINI; ALYSE LESLIE; JOHN 

RHAESA,

Defendants-Appellees.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

OPINION

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. After being passed over for a promotion to 

chief of police, Abraham Hughes filed this lawsuit asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

Michigan state law. The district court dismissed Hughes’s federal claims for failure to state a 

claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state claims. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Hughes has worked as a police officer for the City of Wayne, Michigan, since 2002, and 

became a sergeant in 2016. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 9) (Page ID #2). In 2018, Hughes learned that the 

chief of police planned to retire. Id. ¶ 10 (Page ID #2). Hughes began seeking a promotion to the 

position within the year.

In December 2018, Hughes met with City Manager Lisa Nocerini, Director of Personnel 

Alyse Leslie, and Mayor John Rhaesa to discuss the open police-chief position. Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 12
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(Page ID #2–3). Afterwards, Hughes, Nocerini, and Rhaesa met without Leslie. Id. ¶ 13 (Page ID 

#3). During this latter meeting, “Rhaesa and Nocerini expressed their extreme dissatisfaction with 

Former Chief Maciag and Acting Chief Strong[,] who[] Nocerini stated would not become the next 

Chief of Police[.]” Id. (Page ID #3). Nocerini explained that she was upset with Maciag and 

Strong because they had referred investigations of “incidents involving Wayne citizens and Wayne 

City employees” to Michigan state police rather than the City government. Id. ¶ 14 (Page ID #3).

Later that month, a listing for the chief-of-police position was circulated within the police 

department. Id. ¶ 15 (Page ID #3). The listing stated that the next police chief would be selected 

based on a verbal interview and testing conducted by a private organization, Empco, Inc. Id. (Page 

ID #3).1 Initially, Hughes, Strong, and one other candidate applied for the position. Id. ¶ 16 (Page 

ID #3–4). But the other candidate later withdrew, leaving only Hughes and Strong. Id.

In February 2019, City police prepared an arrest warrant for Mark Blackwell, a frequent 

critic of Nocerini’s job performance. Id. ¶ 17–18 (Page ID #4). According to Hughes, “[t]he 

warrant request was the result of personal intervention by Acting Chief Strong on behalf of a 

complaint by Nocerini.” Id. ¶ 18 (Page ID #4). The warrant was issued in March 2019, and 

Blackwell was arraigned on unspecified charges later that month. Id. ¶ 23–24 (Page ID #5).

While police were preparing Blackwell’s warrant, Hughes and Strong met with Empco, 

“where they were informed that the sole qualification for the open Chief of Police position would 

1Hughes refers to Empco as “EMPCO” throughout his complaint. See, e.g., R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 15) (Page ID #3). 

For ease of readability, and because Empco does not appear to capitalize its name in that way, see About Us, Empco 

Incorporated, https://www.empco net/about/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2023), we refer to the organization simply as 

“Empco,” including when quoting Hughes’s complaint.
No. 22-1178, Hughes v. City of Wayne, Mich. et al.

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be the objective results—score and score only—of the Empco testing process.” Id. ¶ 20 (Page ID 

#4). Hughes and Strong completed testing on March 7, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 16, 22 (Page ID #3–4).

On March 13, 2019, Nocerini and Hughes met to discuss the test results. Id. ¶ 25 (Page ID 

#5). Nocerini explained that Hughes had received a score of 87 and Strong had received a score 

of 90, and that she would promote Strong to chief of police. Id. ¶ 26 (Page ID #5). Hughes asked 

why he had not been interviewed, and Nocerini responded that “she had been conducting an 

interview for the last three months.” Id. ¶ 28 (Page ID #5). But “Hughes did not interact with 

Nocerini on any regular basis in that three-month period while Acting Chief Strong did.” Id. ¶ 29 

(Page ID #5).

The following day, an unidentified “third-party” told Hughes “that one of the assessors 

who conducted the Empco testing confirmed that Hughes had received” a higher score than Strong, 

contradicting what Nocerini told Hughes at their meeting the day before. Id. ¶ 30 (Page ID #6). 

This revelation prompted Hughes to speak with someone named Chuck Castle at Empco, who told 

Hughes that during the Empco testing process “Nocerini contacted Empco to change the scoring 

requirements to include the relative strengths and weaknesses of each candidate.” Id. ¶ 31 (Page 

ID #6). When Hughes and Castle spoke again in December 2020, Castle confirmed that Hughes 

had received a higher score than Strong during the Empco testing process, that Empco had reported 

that result to Nocerini within two-to-three days of testing, that the Empco scores were based solely 

on the testing conducted on March 7, 2019, and that Nocerini “had intervened in the normal Empco 

testing process to try to change the criteria used in scoring.” Id. ¶ 33 (Page ID #6).

Hughes brought his concerns with the Empco testing process to Strong’s attention in 

January 2021. Id. ¶ 34 (Page ID #6). “During that meeting,” Strong explained that “he was clear 
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that it was going to be a score-and-score-only evaluation, but that [Empco] did not follow through.” 

Id. ¶ 35 (Page ID #7). Strong also “confirmed . . . that [Empco] [was] only supposed to provide a 

numerical score, but that someone added plusses and minuses[.]” Id. The following month, Strong 

contacted Hughes and informed him that the City “would be conducting an investigation of

improprieties surrounding the Chief selection process.” Id. ¶ 36 (Page ID #7).

In March 2021, City Attorney Anthony Chubb contacted Hughes “to inform him of a 

pending investigation being conducted by [Chubb] and Leslie.” Id. ¶ 37 (Page ID #7). Hughes 

met with Chubb and Leslie, but he objected that they had a conflict of interest in investigating

Nocerini because he believed that the two were employed by and reported to Nocerini. Id. ¶ 39 

(Page ID #7). Hughes was informed that the investigation would proceed “over his objections.” 

Id. ¶ 40 (Page ID #7–8). In April 2021, the City Council was notified of the investigation, and one 

week later Hughes learned that the investigation had been completed and had not revealed any 

“wrongdoing” in the selection process. Id. ¶¶ 41–42 (Page ID #8).

Hughes filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. R. 1 

(Compl. at 1) (Page ID #1). He asserts claims under § 1983 and Michigan state law against the 

City and City Council, as well as Nocerini, Leslie, and Rhaesa in their individual and official

capacities.

2

 Id. ¶¶ 43–86 (Page ID #8–16). The defendants moved to dismiss Hughes’s claims, 

arguing that he failed to state a plausible § 1983 claim and that his claims against Nocerini, Leslie, 

and Rhaesa in their personal capacities were barred by qualified immunity. R. 8 (Defs. Mot. to 

Dismiss at 7–15) (Page ID #57–65). The district court dismissed Hughes’s § 1983 claims, declined 

2Hughes has abandoned his official-capacity claims on appeal. Appellant Br. at 28–29.
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to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state claims, and dismissed the state claims without 

prejudice. Hughes v. City of Wayne, No. 2:21-cv-11443, 2022 WL 433158, at *2–4 (E.D. Mich. 

Feb. 11, 2022). Hughes now appeals. R. 16 (Notice of Appeal at 2) (Page ID #345).

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Jackson v. Ford Motor Co., 842 F.3d 902, 906 

(6th Cir. 2016). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim 

is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A. Federal Claims

Hughes asserts two § 1983 claims. His first claim alleges that the City maintained a 

custom, policy, or practice of allowing Nocerini to abuse her power by making appointment and 

promotion decisions “based upon her personal whims” rather than “objective criteria[.]” R. 1 

(Compl. ¶ 49) (Page ID #9). His second claim alleges that the City, City Council, Nocerini, Leslie, 

and Rhaesa failed to train or supervise the City’s “Management Team”—which, according to 

Hughes, comprises Nocerini, Leslie, and Rhaesa. Id. ¶¶ 59–66 (Page ID #11–12).

Although Hughes’s § 1983 claims rest on different theories of liability and are brought 

against both municipal entities and individual defendants in their personal capacities, both claims 

require Hughes to plead a plausible “violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of 

the United States[.]” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 
No. 22-1178, Hughes v. City of Wayne, Mich. et al.

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839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016) (to overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must plead “that 

the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right”); North v. Cuyahoga County, 754 F. App’x 

380, 386 (6th Cir. 2018) (to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must “demonstrat[e] an 

underlying constitutional violation”). Here, Hughes asserts that his procedural due-process rights 

under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he was not promoted to chief of police. R. 

1 (Compl. ¶¶ 57–58, 66) (Page ID #10, 12). The district court found that Hughes failed to state a 

plausible procedural due-process violation. Hughes, 2022 WL 433158, at *2–4. We agree.

To establish a procedural due-process violation, Hughes must plausibly allege “(1) that [he

has] a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, (2) that [he was] deprived of this protected interest 

within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and (3) that the state did not afford [him] adequate 

procedural rights prior to depriving [him] of [his] protected interest.” Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 

708, 716 (6th Cir. 1999). Because Hughes has not plausibly alleged that he had a property interest 

protected by the Due Process Clause, we do not address the remaining two elements.

Hughes argues that he had a “protected property interest in the promotion to chief of 

police[.]” Appellant Br. at 15. In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the Supreme Court 

explained that “[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an 

abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, 

instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Following Roth, 

we have “recognized that a party cannot possess a property interest in the receipt of a benefit when 

the state’s decision to award or withhold the benefit is wholly discretionary.” Med Corp. v. City 

of Lima, 296 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2002). Taken together, these decisions dictate that a person 
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claiming a protected property interest in a discretionary government benefit “must point to some 

policy, law, or mutually explicit understanding that both confers the benefit and limits the 

discretion of the [the government] to rescind the benefit.” Med Corp., 296 F.3d at 410.

Two of our prior decisions illustrate the proper application of these principles. First, in 

Med Corp., an ambulance provider—Med Corp.—alleged that it had been denied procedural due 

process when a city government stopped sending it 911 calls. 296 F.3d at 407–08. We began our 

evaluation of Med Corp.’s claim by considering whether there was a “written policy or legislative 

enactment establish[ing] a procedure for maintenance of the 911 dispatch list or limit[ing] the 

discretion of [c]ity officials to remove ambulance companies from the list.” Id. at 410. Upon 

finding that no such written enactment existed, we noted that “property interests may be created 

in some situations despite the absence of explicit contractual or legal provisions establishing a 

claim of entitlement” and asked whether there was evidence of “an implicit, but nonetheless legally 

binding, obligation to continue to include Med Corp. in the [c]ity’s allocation of 911 dispatches.” 

Id. at 411 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601–02 (1972)). Because there was no 

evidence of an implicit obligation, we rejected Med Corp’s due-process claim. Id.

Similarly, in Golden v. Town of Collierville, Golden asserted that his procedural dueprocess rights were violated when he was not promoted to a lieutenant position in his city’s fire 

department. 167 F. App’x 474, 477–78 (6th Cir. 2006). Golden based his claim on a conversation 

he had with the fire chief, who told Golden that he would be promoted to lieutenant the following 

month. Id. at 475. After a member of the fire department learned of the chief’s decision and 

complained, the chief reversed course and denied Golden the promotion. Id. at 476–77. We 

observed that “even if we were persuaded that his conversation with [the fire chief] effectively 
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conferred the benefit of the promotion, Golden has not provided any evidence that the terms of 

that conversation limited the defendants’ discretion to rescind the promotion.” Id. at 478. As a 

result, we held that “[t]he defendants’ discretion to rescind a proposed promotion is not limited to 

the extent that Med Corp requires in order for a property interest to be created.” Id. at 478–79.

Although Med Corp. and Golden were decided at the summary-judgment stage, we find 

their reasoning persuasive here. Like the plaintiffs in those cases, Hughes challenges a 

discretionary decision. Indeed, there is no dispute that the City Charter provides that the chief of 

police “shall be appointed by the City Manager for [an] indefinite term[] of office, subject to 

confirmation by the Council.”3 R. 8-5 (Defs. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 4 at § 6.8(b)) (Page ID #105). 

Thus, Nocerini had the discretion to appoint the police chief, subject only to the City Council’s 

confirmation. To plead a plausible due-process violation, therefore, Hughes “must point to some 

policy, law, or mutually explicit understanding that both confers the benefit and limits the 

discretion of [Nocerini] to rescind the benefit.” Med Corp., 296 F.3d at 410.

Hughes does not allege a “written policy or legislative enactment” that entitled him to the 

promotion or that limited Nocerini’s discretion over the appointment process or decision. Id. at 

410. Instead, he argues that Nocerini and the City entered into an implied contract to promote the 

candidate with the highest Empco score to police chief. In Med Corp., we said that Med Corp.

3Hughes did not reference or attach the City Charter in his complaint. “Although typically courts are limited 

to the pleadings when faced with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6),” Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley L. Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 

816 (6th Cir. 2010), “courts . . . can take judicial notice of, for example, administrative rules, regulations, and orders, 

and certain judicial and public records[,]” Davis v. Colerain Township, 51 F.4th 164, 176 (6th Cir. 2022). Hughes 

does not challenge our ability to consider the City Charter, and we therefore conclude that we may properly consider

it here. See Jackson v. City & County of Denver, No. 20-1051, 2022 WL 120986, at *1 n.1 (10th Cir. Jan. 13, 2022)

(taking judicial notice of the Denver City Charter); Demos v. City of Indianapolis, 302 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2002)

(recognizing federal courts’ power to take judicial notice of city charters and other public records).
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“could establish a protected property interest if it could show that the [m]ayor or the [c]ity engaged 

in words or conduct that created an implicit, but nonetheless legally binding, obligation to continue 

to include Med Corp. in the [c]ity’s allocation of 911 dispatches.” Id. at 411 (emphasis added). 

We thus assume that Hughes could similarly demonstrate a protected property interest in being 

promoted to police chief if Nocerini or the City had engaged in words or conduct that created a 

legally binding obligation to promote the candidate with the highest Empco test score.4

Hughes alleges that several third parties stated that the candidate with the highest Empco 

score would be promoted to chief of police, but he does not link any of those statements to Nocerini 

or the City. For instance, he alleges that an unidentified Empco employee told him that “the sole 

qualification for the open Chief of Police position would be the objective results—score and score 

only—of the Empco testing process.” R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 20) (Page ID #4). Although Empco had 

been retained by the City to conduct the testing process, Hughes does not allege that the company 

had any control over Nocerini’s promotion decision or that the employee’s statement was based 

on something Nocerini or the City had said or done. Similarly, Hughes’s allegation that Strong 

stated, after he had already been promoted to chief of police, “that he was clear that it was going 

to be a score-and-score only evaluation” does not source Strong’s belief to Nocerini’s or the City’s 

words or actions, nor does it evidence an agreement to base the promotion decision solely on the 

Empco test scores.

5

 Id. ¶ 35 (Page ID #7). Cf. Golden, 167 F. App’x at 478 (assuming without 

4The defendants argue that only Nocerini could limit her own discretion to appoint the chief of police. See 

Appellees Br. at 21–22. Because Hughes has not plausibly alleged that either Nocerini or the City agreed to limit

Nocerini’s appointment authority, we do not address any issues regarding the City’s power to impose limits on her 

authority.

5

In any event, Strong’s purported statement—which he is alleged to have made after Hughes asked him “if 

he . . . remembered what Empco said they were going to provide to the City of Wayne”—suggests that Strong believed 
No. 22-1178, Hughes v. City of Wayne, Mich. et al.

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deciding that the fire chief’s conversation, which occurred prior to the ultimate promotion decision, 

“effectively conferred the benefit of the promotion” to Golden). Hughes has thus not plausibly 

alleged that Nocerini or the City “engaged in words or conduct” evidencing an implicit but binding 

agreement to circumscribe Nocerini’s discretion to appoint the police chief. Med Corp., 296 F.3d 

at 411.

In fact, the alleged words and conduct that Hughes does source directly to Nocerini and the 

City undermine his claim that there was an agreement to limit Nocerini’s discretion over the 

promotion decision. He alleges, for example, that the listing for the police-chief position that was 

circulated within the police department stated that the qualification process would include both an 

interview and testing conducted by Empco. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 15) (Page ID #3). True, Hughes alleges

that he was never interviewed in connection with his application. Id. ¶¶ 19, 28 (Page ID #4–5). 

But he does not allege that Nocerini or the City agreed to eliminate the interview requirement. To 

the contrary, Hughes alleges that when he inquired about the lack of an interview, Nocerini 

responded “that she had been conducting an interview for the last three months.” Id. ¶ 28 (Page 

ID #5). Hughes does not allege that Nocerini stated that the interview requirement had been 

dispensed with or that she would make her promotion decision based on the Empco scores alone.

In sum, Hughes has not plausibly alleged a “policy, law, or mutually explicit understanding 

that” the candidate with the highest Empco test score would be promoted to chief of police. Med 

Corp., 296 F.3d at 410. Accordingly, Hughes has alleged only a “unilateral expectation” that is 

not entitled to constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.

that Empco would provide the City with “a score-and-score-only evaluation,” not that Nocerini would make her 

decision based on that evaluation alone. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 35) (Page ID #7).
No. 22-1178, Hughes v. City of Wayne, Mich. et al.

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Hughes makes two arguments in response. First, he argues that his case is controlled by 

Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Service Commission, 946 F.2d 1233 (6th Cir. 1991). 

We disagree. In Paskvan, a police officer was denied a promotion despite ranking third on the 

eligibility list. Id. at 1234. The officer alleged “that it was the policy of Cleveland to promote 

from the eligibility list in the order of rank” and that “all the top 18 candidates eligible for 

promotion, except Paskvan, were granted promotion.” Id. We held that the officer had “at least 

arguably and sufficiently alleged defendants’ course of conduct,” despite their discretion over 

promotion decisions, “create[d] an implied contract or mutually explicit understanding for 

promotion based on test scores[.]” Id. at 1237. Here, by contrast, Hughes has not alleged that 

Nocerini or the City previously or consistently made promotion decisions based on only test scores. 

Thus, the crucial fact that allowed Paskvan to survive a motion to dismiss—that the city had acted 

in a way that suggested the existence of an implied contract—is missing here.

Second, Hughes argues that an affidavit from a former member of the City Council

“demonstrates” that Nocerini agreed to limit her discretion to appoint the police chief. Appellant 

Br. at 16; see R. 9-7 (Aff. of Anthony W. Miller at 1–3) (Page ID #242–44). Hughes concedes, 

however, that this affidavit was introduced with his opposition to the defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. Appellant Br. at 16. Because Hughes does not argue that the affidavit or its contents 

were incorporated by reference in or integral to his complaint, and the affidavit is not an 

appropriate subject of judicial notice, we decline to consider it. See Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 

626 (6th Cir. 2016).

Hughes has not plausibly alleged a protected property interest in being promoted to chief 

of police. We therefore affirm the dismissal of his § 1983 claims.
No. 22-1178, Hughes v. City of Wayne, Mich. et al.

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B. State Claims

Hughes also asserts claims under Michigan law. After finding that Hughes had not stated 

a plausible federal claim, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over his state claims

and dismissed the claims without prejudice. Hughes, 2022 WL 433158, at *4. Hughes does not 

challenge this aspect of the district court’s decision, and, in any event, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion. See Widgren v. Maple Grove Township, 429 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2005).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.