687B.260. This declaratory relief action was separate from the action 

regarding Mitchell's prior confession of judgment, was assigned to a 

different department, and named many defendants including Mitchell. 

Mitchell failed to appear in the declaratory relief action, and the district 

court entered a default judgment against Mitchell. The district court 

denied Mitchell's subsequent motions to set the judgment aside. Mitchell 

now appeals, challenging the denial of those motions. 

Thefl district court properly exercised its discretion by denying Mitchell's 

motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to NRCP 60(c) 

The district court properly exercised its discretion by denying 

Mitchell's NRCP 60(c) motion to set aside the judgment for lack of 

personal service. We review a district court's order denying a motion to 

set aside a default judgment for an abuse of discretion. Price v. Dunn, 106 

Nev. 100, 103, 787 P.2d 785, 787 (1990), overruled on other grounds by 

NC-DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 125 Nev. 647, 651 n.3, 218 P.3d 853, 857 n.3 

(2009). In doing so, we will not disturb factual findings that are supported 

by substantial evidence. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 

699, 704 (2009). 

NRCP 60(c) provides: 

When a default judgment shall have been taken 

against any party who was not personally served 

with summons and complaint. . . and who has not 

entered a general appearance in the action, the 

court, after notice to the adverse party, upon 

motion made within 6 months after the date of 

service of written notice of entry of such judgment, 

may vacate such judgment. . . . 

Therefore, an NRCP 60(c) movant must demonstrate that (1) the motion 

was filed within six months after service of notice of entry of the default 

judgment, and (2) the movant was not personally served with a summons 

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and complaint. See Basf Corp., Inmont Div. v. Jafbros, Inc., 105 Nev. 142, 

144, 771 P.2d 161, 162 (1989); see also Epstein v. Epstein, 113 Nev. 1401, 

1405, 950 P.2d 771, 773 (1997) (overruling cases that required an NRCP 

60(c) movant to also show that it had a meritorious defense). Once a 

movant makes this showing, "the burden shifts to the opposing party to 

show circumstances which would make granting the motion inequitable." 

Basf, 105 Nev. at 144, 771 P.2d at 162. 

The district court properly concluded—and Powercom and 

Reynolds do not dispute—that Mitchell made the requisite showing to 

shift the burden to Powercom and Reynolds according to Basf. See id. We 

therefore review the district court's conclusion that Powercom and 

Reynolds met their burden to show granting Mitchell's motion would have 

been inequitable under a theory of laches. We hold that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion. 

"Laches is more than mere delay in seeking to enforce one's 

rights, it is delay that works a disadvantage to another." Home Savings 

Ass'n v. Bigelow, 105 Nev. 494, 496, 779 P.2d 85, 86 (1989). "The condition 

of the party asserting laches must become so changed that he cannot be 

restored to his former state." Id. 

Powercom and Reynolds first attempted to serve Mitchell 

through Ms. Gottschalk, Mitchell's attorney at the time. Ms. Gottschalk 

initially promised to ask Mitchell whether she could accept service, but 

later indicated she no longer represented Mitchell. This suggests Mitchell 

was aware of the action and terminated the representation to avoid 

service. Powercom and Reynolds next attempted to serve Mitchell at the 

address of its registered agent, but the person at the front desk turned the 

process server away, indicating Mitchell had not been there for several 

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years. In combination, this evidence supports the district court's finding 

that Mitchell knew of the declaratory relief action but delayed asserting 

its right to appear. See Ogawa, 125 Nev. at 668, 221 P.3d at 704. 

Substantial evidence also supports the district court's finding 

that this delay severely prejudiced Powercom and Reynolds. Powercom 

and Reynolds filed the declaratory action for the express purpose of 

determining what they could and could not do with the insurance 

proceeds. By failing to appear in a timely manner, Mitchell prevented the 

district court from adjudicating the merits of Mitchell's claim to the 

insurance proceeds. As a result, and pursuant to the default judgment, 

Powercom and Reynolds did not reserve any of the insurance proceeds for 

Mitchell. Where, as here, other creditors who appeared in the action 

claimed portions of the insurance proceeds, we cannot conclude the district 

court abused its discretion by finding substantial prejudice would result 

from forcing Powercom and Reynolds to return the insurance proceeds to 

satisfy Mitchell's claim. See Home Savings Ass'n, 105 Nev. at 496, 779 

P.2d at 86. Nor are we persuaded that disbursing the insurance proceeds 

to Reynolds changes this result. Indeed, Reynolds was a party to the 

declaratory relief action in order to have both Powercom's and her own 

rights to the insurance proceeds adjudicated. 

We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by finding that vacating the default judgment would be 

inequitable, and we affirm the district court's denial of Mitchell's NRCP 

60(c) motion to set aside the default judgment. 

The district court properly denied Mitchell's motion to set aside the 

judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction 

Mitchell further argues the district court abused its discretion 

by denying Mitchell's NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment as void 

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for lack of personal jurisdiction. We disagree. When a defendant "by 

concealment seeks to avoid the service of summons," a district court may 

allow service of process by publication. NRCP 4(e)(1)(i). As discussed 

above, substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that 

Mitchell knew of the action. Moreover, the same evidence suggests 

Mitchell concealed itself to avoid service. Accordingly, substantial 

evidence supports the district court's conclusion that service by 

publication was proper and that it had personal jurisdiction over Mitchell, 

see id., and the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by 

denying Mitchell's NRCP 60(b) motion even if Mitchell did not waive this 

argument. See Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 Nev. 592, 

599, 245 P.3d 1198, 1202 (2010) ("This court will affirm a district court's 

order if the district court reached the correct result, even if for the wrong 

re ason."). 2 

2Because Powercom and Reynolds clearly sought an interpretation of 

NRS 687B.260, not Mitchell's judgment, we reject Mitchell's argument 

that declaratory relief was unavailable. See NRS 30.040(1) (stating a 

party may seek an interpretation of a statute in a declaratory relief 

action). We also summarily reject Mitchell's claim that a corporation 

cannot claim an exemption for life insurance proceeds because 

"exemptions are to be liberally construed in favor of the debtor," In re Fox, 

129 Nev., Adv. Op. 39, 302 P.3d 1137, 1140 (2013) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), and beneficiaries are not expressly limited to natural 

persons. See NRS 687B.260(1); see also NRS 0.039. 

Finally, the declaratory relief action did not indirectly challenge the 

legal basis for Mitchell's prior judgment, and thus was not an improper 

collateral attack. See Sheriff, Clark Cnty. v. Hatch, 100 Nev. 664, 666, 691 

P.2d 449, 450 (1984) (defining collateral attack). Similarly, because the 

declaratory relief action involved many parties unrelated to Mitchell's 

judgment, the district court did not err by exercising subject matter 

jurisdiction over the action. See Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Nev. v. Eighth 

continued on next page... 

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For these reasons, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

T cwt. 01- ---c2CJ. 

Parraguirre 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Mark R. Denton, District Judge 

Robert F. Saint-Aubin, Settlement Judge 

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP/Las Vegas 

Aldrich Law Firm, Ltd. 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

...continued 

Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 680, 684, 818 P.2d 396, 399 (1991) (stating 

that a court will not entertain a declaratory judgment action if there is 

another action pending that involves the same parties and the same 

issues). 

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