Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 37 / Thursday, February 25, 2016 / Proposed Rules 9365 

The applicant must define any 

inspection methods and intervals based 

upon adhesion data from the 

manufacturer of the adhesive, or upon 

actual adhesion-test data, if necessary. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

16, 2016. 

Dionne Palermo, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–03997 Filed 2–24–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–3324; Notice No. 25– 

16–04–SC] 

Special Conditions: L–3 

Communications Integrated Systems; 

Boeing Model 747–8 Series Airplanes, 

Large Non-Structural Glass in the 

Passenger Compartment 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed special 

conditions. 

SUMMARY: This action proposes special 

conditions for the Boeing Model 747–8 

airplane. This airplane, as modified by 

L–3 Communications Integrated 

Systems, will have a novel or unusual 

design feature when compared to the 

state of technology envisioned in the 

airworthiness standards for transportcategory airplanes. This design feature 

is large, non-structural glass panels in 

the passenger compartment. The 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for this design feature. 

These proposed special conditions 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Send your comments on or 

before March 28, 2016. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number FAA–2015–3324 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, 

DC, 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://www.regulations.gov/, 

including any personal information the 

commenter provides. Using the search 

function of the docket Web site, anyone 

can find and read the electronic form of 

all comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at 

http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov/. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. 

Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jayson Claar, FAA, Airframe and Cabin 

Safety, ANM–115, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, Washington, 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–2194; facsimile 

425–227–1320. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We may change these special 

conditions based on the comments we 

receive. 

Background 

On May 10, 2011, L–3 

Communications Integrated Systems 

applied for a supplemental type 

certificate for large, non-structural glass 

panels in the passenger compartment in 

Boeing Model 747–8 airplanes. The 

Model 747–8 airplane is a derivative of 

the Boeing Model 747–400 airplane 

currently approved under type 

certificate no. A20WE. The airplane, as 

modified by L–3 Communications 

Integrated Systems, is a four-engine, jettransport airplane that will have a 

maximum takeoff weight of 970,000 lbs, 

capacity for 24 crewmembers, and taxi, 

takeoff, and landing seating for 143 

passengers. 

Type Certification Basis 

The certification basis for the Boeing 

Model 747–8 airplane, as defined in 

type certificate no. A20WE, is title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 

part 25 as amended by amendments 25– 

1 through 25–120, with exceptions for 

structures and systems that were 

unchanged from the 747–400 design. 

Under the provisions of § 21.101, L– 

3 Communications Integrated Systems 

must show that the Model 747–8 

airplane, as changed, continues to meet 

the applicable provisions of the 

regulations listed in type certificate no. 

A20WE, or the applicable regulations in 

effect on the date of application for the 

change, except for earlier amendments 

as agreed upon by the FAA. 

The regulations listed in the type 

certificate are commonly referred to as 

the ‘‘original type certification basis.’’ 

In addition, the certification basis 

includes certain special conditions, 

exemptions, or later amended sections 

of the applicable part that are not 

relevant to these special conditions. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Boeing Model 747–8 airplane 

because of a novel or unusual design 

feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under the provisions of 

§ 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the applicant apply 

for a supplemental type certificate to 

modify any other model included on the 

same type certificate to incorporate the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

these special conditions would also 

apply to the other model under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Model 747–8 airplane 

must comply with the fuel-vent and 

exhaust-emission requirements of 14 

CFR part 34 and the noise-certification 

requirements of 14 CFR part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type certification basis under 

§ 21.101. 


rmajette on DSK2TPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
9366 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 37 / Thursday, February 25, 2016 / Proposed Rules 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

L–3 Communications Integrated 

Systems is modifying a Boeing Model 

747–8 airplane to install a head-of-state 

interior arrangement. This airplane, as 

modified, will have a novel or unusual 

design feature associated with the 

installation of large, non-structural glass 

panels in the cabin area of an executive 

interior occupied by passengers and 

crew. The installation of these glass 

items in the passenger compartment, 

which can be occupied during taxi, 

takeoff, and landing, is a novel or 

unusual design feature with respect to 

the material being installed. The 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for this design feature. 

The use of glass has resulted in tradeoffs between the one unique 

characteristic of glass—its capability for 

undistorted or controlled light 

transmittance, or transparency—and the 

negative aspects of the material, such as 

extreme notch-sensitivity, low fracture 

resistance, low modulus of elasticity, 

and highly variable properties. While 

reasonably strong, glass is nonetheless 

not a desirable material for traditional 

airplane applications because it is heavy 

(about the same density as aluminum), 

and when it fails, it breaks into 

extremely sharp fragments that have the 

potential for injury and have been 

known to be lethal. Thus the use of glass 

traditionally has been limited to 

windshields, and instrument or display 

transparencies. The regulations only 

address, and thus only recognize, the 

use of glass in windshield or window 

applications. These regulations do 

address the adverse properties of glass, 

but even so, pilots are occasionally 

injured from shattered glass 

windshields. FAA policy allows glass 

on instruments and display 

transparencies. 

Other installations of large, nonstructural glass items have included the 

following: 

• Glass panels integrated onto a 

stairway handrail closeout. 

• Glass panels mounted in doors to 

allow visibility through the door when 

desired. 

• Glass doors on some galley 

compartments containing small 

amounts of service items. 

Discussion 

No specific regulations address the 

design and installation of large glass 

components in airplane passenger 

cabins. Existing requirements, such as 

§§ 25.561, 25.562, 25.601, 25.603, 

25.613, 25.775, and 25.789, in the 

Boeing Model 747–8 airplane 

certification basis applicable to this 

supplemental type certificate project, 

provide some design standards 

appropriate for large glass component 

installations. However, additional 

design standards for non-structural glass 

augmenting the existing design are 

needed to complement the existing 

requirements. The addition of glass 

involved in this installation, and the 

potentially unsafe conditions caused by 

damage to such components from 

external sources, necessitate assuring 

that adequate safety standards are 

applied to the design and installation of 

the feature in Boeing Model 747–8 

airplanes. 

For purposes of these special 

conditions, a large glass component is 

defined as a glass component weighing 

4 kg (9 lbs) or more. Groupings of glass 

items that individually weigh less than 

4 kg, but collectively weigh 4 kg or 

more, also would need to be included. 

The proposed special conditions also 

apply when showing compliance with 

the applicable performance standards in 

the regulations for the installation of 

these components. For example, heatrelease and smoke-density testing must 

not result in fragmentation of the 

component. 

These proposed special conditions 

will reduce the hazards from breakage, 

or from these panels’ potential 

separation from the cabin interior. 

These proposed special conditions 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

existing airworthiness standards. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to Boeing 

Model 747–8 series airplanes. Should 

L–3 Communications Integrated 

Systems apply at a later date for a 

supplemental type certificate to modify 

any other model included on type 

certificate no. A20WE to incorporate the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

these special conditions would apply to 

that model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

series of airplane. It is not a rule of 

general applicability and affects only 

the applicant who applied to the FAA 

for approval of these features on the 

airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Proposed Special Conditions 

For large glass components installed 

in a cabin occupied by passengers or 

crew who are not otherwise protected 

from the injurious effects of failure of 

the glass installations, the L–3 

Communications Integrated Systems 

glass installations on this Boeing 747–8 

airplane must meet the following 

conditions: 

1. Material: The glass used must be 

tempered or otherwise treated to ensure 

that when fractured, it breaks into small 

pieces with relatively dull edges. This 

must be demonstrated by testing to 

failure. 

2. Fragmentation: The glasscomponent installation must control the 

fragmentation of the glass to minimize 

the danger from flying glass shards or 

pieces. This must be demonstrated by 

impact and puncture testing to failure. 

3. Component Strength: The glass 

component must be strong enough to 

meet the load requirements for all flight 

and landing loads, including any of the 

applicable emergency-landing 

conditions in subparts C & D of 14 CFR 

part 25. In addition, glass components 

that are located such that they are not 

protected from contact with cabin 

occupants must not fail due to abusive 

loading, such as impact from occupants 

stumbling into, leaning against, sitting 

on, or performing other intentional or 

unintentional forceful contact with the 

glass component. The effect of design 

details such as geometric discontinuities 

or surface finish, e.g., embossing, 

etching, etc., must be assessed. 

4. Component Retention: The glass 

component, as installed in the airplane, 

must not come free of its restraint or 

mounting system in the event of an 

emergency landing. Both the directional 

loading and rebound conditions must be 

assessed. The effect of design details 

such as geometric discontinuities or 

surface finish, e.g., embossing, etching, 

etc., must be assessed. 

5. Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness: The instructions for 

continued airworthiness must reflect the 

method used to fasten the panel to the 

cabin interior and must ensure the 

reliability of the methods used, e.g., life 

limit of adhesives, or clamp connection. 

The applicant must define any 

inspection methods and intervals based 

upon adhesion data from the 

manufacturer of the adhesive, or upon 

actual adhesion-test data, if necessary. 


rmajette on DSK2TPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 37 / Thursday, February 25, 2016 / Proposed Rules 9367 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

16, 2016. 

Dionne Palermo, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–03996 Filed 2–24–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0254; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–180–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal. 

SUMMARY: The FAA withdraws a notice 

of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that 

proposed a new airworthiness directive 

(AD), which would have applied to 

certain The Boeing Company Model 

737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, and 

–900ER series airplanes. For certain 

airplanes, the NPRM would have 

required a one-time inspection for 

damage of the hydraulic actuator rod 

ends and actuator attach fittings on the 

thrust reversers, and repair or 

replacement if necessary. For all 

airplanes, the NPRM would have 

required repetitive inspections for 

damage of the hydraulic actuator rod 

ends, attach bolts, and nuts; repetitive 

inspections for damage of fitting 

assemblies, wear spacers, and actuator 

attach fittings on the thrust reverser; 

repetitive measurements of the wear 

spacer; and corrective actions if 

necessary. Since the NPRM was issued, 

the manufacturer notified us that an 

assumption regarding a failure mode of 

the rod ends or attachment fittings for 

the thrust reverser actuator used in the 

original safety assessment was incorrect. 

A new safety analysis was conducted 

and we determined that this issue is no 

longer a safety concern. Accordingly, 

the NPRM is withdrawn. 

DATES: As of February 25, 2016, the 

proposed rule, which was published in 

the Federal Register on March 22, 2011 

(76 FR 15864), is withdrawn. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2011– 

0254; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD action, the NPRM (76 

FR 15864, March 22, 2011), the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

address for the Docket Office (telephone 

800–647–5527) is the Docket 

Management Facility, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tak 

Kobayashi, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6499; fax: 

425–917–6590; email: 

Takahisa.Kobayashi@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We proposed to amend part 39 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

part 39) with a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) for a new AD for 

certain The Boeing Company Model 

737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, and 

–900ER series airplanes. The NPRM 

published in the Federal Register on 

March 22, 2011 (76 FR 15864) (‘‘the 

NPRM’’). For certain airplanes, the 

NPRM would have required a one-time 

inspection for damage of the hydraulic 

actuator rod ends and actuator attach 

fittings on the thrust reversers, and 

repair or replacement if necessary. For 

all airplanes, the NPRM would have 

required repetitive inspections for 

damage of the hydraulic actuator rod 

ends, attach bolts, and nuts; repetitive 

inspections for damage of fitting 

assemblies, wear spacers, and actuator 

attach fittings on the thrust reverser; 

repetitive measurements of the wear 

spacer; and corrective actions if 

necessary. 

The NPRM was prompted by reports 

of in-service damage of the attachment 

fittings for the thrust reverser actuator. 

The proposed actions were intended to 

detect and correct such damage, which 

could result in actuator attach fitting 

failure, loss of the thrust reverser auto 

restow function, and consequent loss of 

control of the airplane. 

Actions Since NPRM Was Issued 

Since we issued the NPRM, the 

manufacturer has notified us that an 

assumption regarding a failure mode of 

the attachment fittings for the thrust 

reverser actuator used in the original 

safety assessment was incorrect. It was 

originally assumed that all hydraulic 

actuators attached to the thrust reverser 

have the failure mode (failure of the 

hydraulic actuator rod end or attach 

fitting due to severe wear-out) addressed 

in the NPRM. Based on field reports and 

design review, the manufacturer found 

that certain hydraulic actuators do not 

have this failure mode. Based on this 

new manufacturer finding, a new safety 

analysis was conducted and we 

determined that this issue is no longer 

a safety concern. 

FAA’s Conclusions 

Upon further consideration, we have 

determined that the safety concern 

identified in the NPRM does not affect 

The Boeing Company Model 737–600, 

–700, –700C, –800, –900, and –900ER 

series airplanes identified in the NPRM. 

Accordingly, the NPRM is withdrawn. 

Withdrawal of the NPRM does not 

preclude the FAA from issuing another 

related action or commit the FAA to any 

course of action in the future. 

Regulatory Impact 

Since this action only withdraws an 

NPRM, it is neither a proposed nor a 

final rule and therefore is not covered 

under Executive Order 12866, the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act, or DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 

FR 11034, February 26, 1979). 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Withdrawal 

Accordingly, we withdraw the NPRM, 

Docket No. FAA–2011–0254, Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–180–AD, which 

was published in the Federal Register 

on March 22, 2011 (76 FR 15864). 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

15, 2016. 

Michael Kaszycki, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–03693 Filed 2–24–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2016–3703; Directorate 

Identifier 2015–NM–115–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 


rmajette on DSK2TPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS