NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

CLARENCE WILSON, DOC #553181, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D15-4120 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed March 18, 2016. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Kelly P. Butz, Judge. Clarence Wilson, pro se. No appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.
Clarence Wilson appeals the order summarily denying his postco nviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. W e affirm the order without further comment to the extent that it denies grounds on e through four and ground six of his motion; we reverse the order to the extent th at it denies ground five of the motion and remand for further proceedings.-2- In ground five, Mr. Wilson alleged that trial counsel was inef fective for failing to inform him of the nature of the charges against him and the maximum sentence he could receive if convicted at trial. Mr. Wilson cl aimed that as a result of counsel's alleged omission he rejected the State's plea offer o f fifteen years' imprisonment and was sentenced to life imprisonment after a jur y convicted him of sexual battery. 1 Mr. Wilson asserted that if he had understood the sentence he was facing if convicted at trial, he would have accepted the State' s plea offer. The postconviction court found that Mr. Wilson's actions at hi s sentencing hearing refuted the allegations of ground five. Specifically, the postconviction court noted Mr. Wilson's failure to say anything concerning a misunde rstanding about the maximum sentence he faced when counsel announced that they had gone over his scoresheet, as well as his protestation of innocence. But "[i] n the context of ineffective assistance resulting in the rejection of a plea offer, '[p]reju dice . . . is determined based upon a consideration of the circumstances as viewed at the time of the offer and what would have been done with proper and adequate advice

. ' " Armstrong v. State, 148 So. 3d 124, 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (alteration in original) (quotin g Alcorn v. State, 121 So. 3d 419, 432 (Fla. 2013)). Thus, events occurring after Mr. Wil son rejected the plea offer could not cure counsel's alleged failure to provide him with al l of the information necessary to make an informed dec ision concerning the offer. S ee Armstrong, 148 So. 3d at 126.

1 The jury also convicted Mr. Wilson of kidnapping, but this cour t reversed that conviction for which the trial court had imposed a consecu tive term of life imprisonment. Wilson v. State, 159 So. 3d 316, 318 (Fla. 2d DC A 2015).-3- Accordingly, we reverse the order under review to the extent t hat it summarily denies ground five. We note that ground five is faci ally insufficient because Mr. Wilson failed to allege that the State would not have withd rawn the offer and that the trial court would have accepted the offer. See Alcorn, 121 So. 3d at 422 (holding that to establish prejudice from the loss of a favorable plea offer, a defendant must allege and prove a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the offer had counsel advised him correctly, the State would not have withdrawn the o ffer, the court would have accepted the offer, and the conviction or sentence or both under the offer would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence impo sed). Thus we remand this case to the postconvic tion court with directions to enter an order allowing Mr. Wilson sixty days to amend ground five of his motion to sta te a facially sufficient claim under Alcorn. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(3). In all other respects, the postconviction court's order is affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

CASANUEVA, WALLACE, and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.