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******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHRISTIAN DERKS (AC 35547)
Gruendel, Lavine and Bear, Js. Argued October 20, 2014—officially released January 20, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Fasano, J. [motion to dismiss]; Clifford, J.

[judgment].)
James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Marc J. Herman, certified legal intern, with whom
were BruceR. Lockwood, senior assistant state’s attor-ney, and, onthebrief,MichaelDearington, state’s attorney, and Maxine V. Wilensky, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion LAVINE, J. The defendant, Christian Derks, appeals fromthejudgmentofconviction, renderedfollowinghis conditionalpleaofnolo contendere, ofsexualassaultin the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a70 (a) (2) and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (2). On appeal, the defendant claims thatthe trial courtimproperly denied his motion to dismiss because his prosecution was time barred by the statutes of limitation set forth in General Statutes §§ 54-193a and 54-193 (b),1 and the delay violated his due process rights. The defendant’s principal assertion is that the state unreasonably delayed the execution of the arrest warrant.2 We disagree, and accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution ofthe defendant’s claim. On September 21, 1997, the twelve year old victim,3 a babysitter, filedacomplaintwiththe Meridenpolice alleging that the thirty-three year old defendant had sexually assaulted her the previous night.4 On February 3, 1998, Meridenpolice obtainedanarrestwarrantforthe defendant. Prior to the issuance of the arrest warrant, the defendant moved from Connecticut to Colorado in the fall of 1997, leaving behind his wife and daughter. Although it is unclear from the record on what date the defendantmovedto Colorado, he obtainedemployment andbeganworking at Soderberg Masonryon December 16, 1997. Fromthetimethe arrestwarrantwas issuedto its ultimate execution, the defendant resided atvarious addressesin Colorado. Followingthe defendant’s arrest
on an unrelated crime in Colorado, he was served with
anextraditionwarrantonOctober3, 2010.Afterwaiving extradition from Colorado and arriving back in Connecticut, the defendant was served with the arrest warrant by Connecticut authorities on October 19, 2010. By motion filed November 30, 2011, the defendant sought to dismiss the information, claiming that the prosecution was time barred by the statute of limitations or, in the alternative, that the continued prosecution ofthe caseviolatedhis dueprocess rightspursuant to the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United Statesconstitution, andarticlefirst, § 8, ofthe Connecticut constitution. On January 4, 2012, following an evidentiary hearing, the court, Fasano, J ., denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. In its memorandum of decision, the court determined that ‘‘the only rational conclusion, absent evidence to the contrary, is that the defendant was on the run, intending to elude the authorities.’’ As such, the court found that ‘‘the years ofdelaywithrespectto his arrest andprosecutionwere occasioned by his very conduct.’’ Ultimately, the court concluded that ‘‘the actions ofthe authorities to apprehend the defendant, though minimal, were adequate under the circumstances of this case where the delaywas occasioned by the defendant’s efforts to elude authorities.’’5
On December 27, 2012, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere, conditioned on his right to appeal from the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. The court, Clifford, J

., accepted the plea, entered a finding of guilty, and imposed a total effective sentence often years of incarceration, execution suspended after two years, and ten years of probation. Thereafter, on July 19, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for rectification, whichwas grantedinpartbyJudge Fasano. This appeal followed. Additionalfactswillbe setforthasnecessary. The defendant claims that Judge Fasano improperly denied the motion to dismiss because the prosecution
wastimebarredby §§ 54-193aand 54-193 (b). He argues that although the warrant for his arrest was issued within the relevant statutes of limitation, it was not executed within areasonable period oftime and, therefore, the statutes of limitation were not tolled. He also claims that the delay in executing the warrant violated his due process rights. The defendant asserts that he neither took evasive action nor was difficult to apprehend after the warrant was issued. We disagree.
At the outset, we set forth the applicable standard of review. ‘‘A motion to dismiss

. . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a
cause of action that should be heard by the court.

. . . [O]ur review of the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [denial] ofthe motion to dismiss will be de novo.

. . . Factual findings underlying the court’s decision, however, will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.

. . . The applicable standard of review for the denial of a motion to dismiss, therefore, generally turns on whether the appellant seeks to challenge the legal conclusions of the trial court orits factual determinations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pittman, 123 Conn. App. 774, 775, 3 A.3d 137, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 914, 10 A.3d 530 (2010). Thus, in orderto determine the appropriate standard of review for the defendant’s claim, we first must ascertain whether the defendant is challenging the trial court’s legal conclusions or factual findings.
In this case, the defendant contests Judge Fasano’s factual finding that he was eluding authorities, which, in turn, led to the court’s allegedly improper legal conclusion that the statutes of limitation were tolled. ‘‘[W]hen the plaintiff asserts that the facts found were insufficienttosupportthecourt’slegalconclusion, th[e] issuepresentsamixedquestionoflawandfacttowhich
we apply plenary review.

. . . We must therefore decide whether the court’s conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valencia, 132Conn. App. 582, 586–87, 33 A.3d 802 (2011).
Section 54-193a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Notwithstanding the provisions of section 54-193, no person may be prosecuted for any offense, except a class A felony, involving sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault of a minor except within thirty years from the date the victim attains the age of majority or within five years from the date the victim notifies any police officer or state’s attorney acting in such police officer’s or state’s attorney’s official capacity of the commission of the offense

. . . .’’
Section 54-193 (b) provides: ‘‘Noperson maybe prosecuted for any offense, other than an offense set forth in subsection (a) of this section, for which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in excess of one year, except within five years next after the offense has been committed.’’
In the present case, the victim notified the police of the alleged sexual assault on September 21, 1997, and
an arrest warrant for the defendant was issued on February 3, 1998. The extradition warrant was served on thedefendantonOctober3, 2010, andthearrestwarrant
was served on October 19, 2010. The question, then, is whetherthe statutes oflimitation under §§ 54-193a and 54-193 (b) were tolled after the warrant was issued on February 3, 1998.
In State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443, 450, 521 A.2d 1034 (1987), our Supreme Court stated that once an arrest warrant is issued and delivered to the proper officer for service, the ‘‘prosecutorial authority has done everythingpossible withintheperiod oflimitation to evidence and effectuate an intentto prosecute, [and] the statute oflimitations is tolled.’’ Our Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘[a]n accused should not be rewarded, absent evidence of a lack of due diligence on the part of the officer charged with executing the warrant, for managing to avoid apprehension to a point in time beyond the period of limitation.

. . . ‘‘[I]n orderto tollthe statute oflimitations, [however]
an arrest warrant, when issued within the time limitations of § 54-193 (b), must be executed without unreasonable delay

. . . . We do not adopt a per se approach
as to what period of time to execute an arrest warrant is reasonable. Areasonable period oftime is a question of fact that will depend on the circumstances of each
case. If the facts indicate that an accused consciously eluded theauthorities, orforotherreasonswasdifficult to apprehend, these factors will be considered in determining what time is reasonable. If, on the other hand, the accused did not relocate or take evasive action to avoid apprehension, failure to execute an arrest warrant for even a short period oftime might be unreasonable and fail to toll the statute oflimitations.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 450–51. Thedefendant has the burden to prove the affirmative defense that the prosecution is barred by the statutes of limitation. Id., 451. ‘‘[O]nce a defendant puts forth evidenceto suggest [however] that [he] wasnotelusive,
was available andwasreadilyapproachable, theburden shifts to the state to prove that the delay in executing the warrant was not unreasonable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Woodtke, 130 Conn. App. 734, 740, 25 A.3d 699 (2011).
In this case, the defendant eluded authorities and
was difficultto apprehend, ashewaslivingin Colorado, which the authorities did not know. The trial court determined thatthe defendant was elusive, ‘‘[g]iven the sequence of events in this particular case: the allegations ofsexual abuse of September 20, 1997; the defendant’s confrontation with his wife over the allegations and his removal from the household; the subsequent complaint ofvaginal, sexual assault [made to the police on] December 11, 1997; the inability of the police to locate the defendant during the investigation; and the abrupt departure fromhis wife and child and relocation in the state of Colorado by December 16, 1997

. . . .’’ Judge Fasano continued: ‘‘[T]he fact that the defendant lived at multiple addresses in Colorado, managed to become incarcerated in a Colorado prison, registered
as a sex offender and placed on a probationary status, filedtaxreturns, etc., hardlyqualifies as making oneself available, approachable and readily discoverable to authorities in Connecticut, though, it certainly qualifies
as evidence of an intent to establish a permanent residence in Colorado, far from the police department investigating the allegations of sexual abuse.’’ The defendant did not prove on appeal that Judge Fasano’s factual findings were clearlyerroneous. Giventhat conclusion, the burden ofproof never shifted to the state, but rather remained with the defendant. Judge Fasano further found that the defendant did notallege actualprejudice in support ofhis dueprocess claim. ‘‘For the defendant to succeed on his claim, a showing of delay will not in and of itself suffice to show prejudice, except in an extreme case, and actual prejudice vel non is the focal point of the inquiry.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pittman, supra, 123 Conn. App. 780. In this case, Judge Fasano found that ‘‘[a]ny prejudice, under the circumstances here, is minimal and speculative.’’ We agree with the court’s finding. ‘‘To evaluate unreasonable delay and due diligence,
we must also consider the police department’s actions in executing the warrant.’’ State v. Woodtke, supra, 130 Conn. App. 744. In the present case, the defendant argues that he was available to police and easily discoverable in Colorado because he paid taxes, held a driver’slicense, maintainedemployment, compliedwith the requirement to register as a sex offender with fivedifferent police departments in Colorado for an unrelated conviction, andreceived service ofdivorcepapers andordersofchildsupportfromhiswife, whoremained in Connecticut. The police enteredthe defendant’s warrant into the FBI’s National Crime Information Center database and conducted computer searches for the defendant in 2006 and 2008. The court found that an
error in the national database system prevented the Meriden police from being alerted to the defendant’s arrests andproceedings in Colorado. Judge Fasano was ‘‘satisfied that, under the circumstances of this case, though the police efforts may be characterized as minimal, they were sufficient.’’ Thus, we cannot conclude that the period of alleged delay in this case was unreasonable or that the state violated the defendant’s right to due process, and, therefore, we conclude that the court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 We note that although §§ 54-193a and 54-193 (b) have been amended since the date of the crimes in 1997, the amendments to those statutes are not relevant to the claims on appeal. Accordingly, we refer to the current revision of those statutes.
2 Approximately twelve years and eight months transpired between the date the arrest warrant was issued and when it was served on the defendant in Colorado.

3 In accordance with our policy ofprotecting the privacy interests of the victims ofsexual abuse and the crime ofrisk ofinjury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

4 On December 11, 1997, the victim gave the police a written statement alleging that forced penile-vaginal intercourse occurred on the night of September 20, 1997.

5 Inhismemorandum ofdecision, Judge Fasano notedthatthe defendant’s wife obtainedadivorcefromthe defendant, who defaultedonhisappearance in December, 1998; thatthe defendantlived atapproximatelyseven different addressesinColorado; wasarrestedandincarceratedinColorado oncharges ofburglary in the second degree and sexual assault in the third degree; and had registered in Colorado as a sex offender.