F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

C L A R E N C E E U G E

N E J O N E S , Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

M A X W I L L I A M S , in his official and individual capacity as Corrections Director for the Oreg on Department of Corrections; C O L L E T T E P E T E R S , in her official capacity

and individual capacity as I nspector General of Oreg on Department of Corrections; T I M O’C O N

N O R S , in his official capacity and individual capacity

as Administrator of Relig ious Services; C H A P L A I N H O L B R

O O K , in his official and individual capacity as Chaplain of the Oreg o n

State Penitentiary ; K E I T H D A

V I S , in his official and individual capacity as F o od Service Manag er of the Oreg on State Penitentiary ; D. G I L L I E S , in his official and individual capacity as Assistant F o od Manag e r of the Oreg on State Penitentiary ; R. R I D D E R B U S C H , in his official and individual capacity as Assistant F ood Manag er of the Oreg on State Penitentiary ; L A

R R Y K U T N A R , in his N o. 12-35131

D.C. No. 6:09-cv-00029- TC

OPI NI ONJ O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 2

official and individual capacity as L ieutenant and F ood Service Coordinator; G. M C B R I D E , in his official and individual capacity as F ood Service Coordinator of the Oreg on State Penitentiary ; R. N O P P , in his official and individual capacity as F ood Service Coordinator at the Oreg on State Penitentiary ; A A R O N B A L E S , in his official and individual capacity as Grievance Coordinator of the Oreg on State Penitentiary ; M I C H A E L D O D S O N , in his official and individual capacity as Discrimination Complaint Officer at the Oreg on State Penitentiary ; B R I A N B E L L E Q U E , in his official and individual capacity as Superintendent of the Oreg on State Penitentiary ; L A

U R I E M I N C H E R , in her official and individual capacity as F ood Service Coordinator at the Oreg on State Penitentiary ; K E I T H B A L L E R , in his individual capacity as an inmate assig ned as a cook at the Oreg on State Penitentiary ; M. W H I T N E Y D O D S O N , in his official and individual capacity as supervisor of Grievance Coordinator at the Oreg on State Penitentiary

,

Defendants-Appellees

.J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 3

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oreg on A nn Aiken, Chief District J udg e, Presiding

Submitted October 6, 2014 * Portland, Oreg on

F iled J une 26, 2015

B efore: Alex Koz inski, F erdinand F . F ernandez

, and Andre M. Davis, * * Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e Davis

SUMMARY * * *

P risoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

c ourt’s summary judg ment and remanded in an a ct i o n broug ht under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Relig ious L and Use and I nstitutionaliz e d Persons Act by a Muslim inmate whose

* T he p a n el u n an im o u sly co n clu d es th is case is su itab le f o r d ecisio n

w ith o u t o ral arg u

m en t. S ee Fed . R. A pp . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).

** T h e Ho n o rab le A n d re M. Dav is, Sen io r Circu it J u d g e f o r th e Un ited States Co u rt o f

A p p eals f o r th e Fo u

rth Circu it, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.

*** T h is su

m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f

th e o p in io n

o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 4

relig io u s b e liefs forbid him f rom c o nsuming or handling pork.

Affirming the district c o u

r t’s’ summary judg ment in favor of appellees on the claims broug ht under the Relig ious L a nd Use and I nstitutionaliz ed Persons Act, the panel held that under Sossamon v. Texas , 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658–59 (2011), and W o o d v

. Y ordy

, 753 F .3d 899, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2014), appellant could not obtain the monetary r elief he soug ht. The panel further determined that the claims for injunctive relief were moot because appellant had been released.

Addressing appellant’s three free ex ercise claims broug ht under § 1983, the panel first affirmed the district court ’s
summary judg ment in f

avor o f appellees on the claim a rising from the events of May 31, 2 0 0 7

. The p anel h eld that

a p p e l lant’s e vidence was n ot sufficient to raise an issue o f fact as to whether a tamale pie c o ntained pork or whether the prison’s food service c oordinator o rdered c o oks to add pork
to the d is h

. The p anel reversed the g rant of summary judg ment on a § 1983 claim arising from the events of J uly 8, 2007, and held that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from appellant’s claim that he was ordered to cook pork loins as part of his job duties in the kitchen. The panel affirmed the d istrict court’s sum m a ry j udg ment in favor o f appellees on appellant ’s c laim challeng ing the p rison’s method of cleaning g rills on wh i c h m e a ts served to inmates are cooked.

Addressing appellant’s F irst Amendment retaliation claim, the panel held that t h e r e were g enuine issues as to whether a f

ood services manag er retaliated ag ainst appellant for his complaints of discrimination and his threat to sue.J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 5

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judg ment in favor of p r i s o n officials o n a ppellant’s equal protection claim arising from an altercation. The panel determined that

a p p ellant pointed to no evidence that his placemen t i n disciplinary

seg reg ation a

nd subsequent proceeding s ag ainst him were motivated b y the fact that he is African-American.

COUNSEL

Clarence Eug ene J ones, Portland, Oreg on, pro se.

Denise Gale F

jordbeck, Assistant Attorn ey General, O reg on Department of J u s t i c e, Salem, Oreg on, for DefendantsAppellees.

OP INION

DAVI S, Circuit J udg e:

Clarence J ones, a former i n m at e of the Oreg on State Penitentiary (“the Penitentiary ”), appeals from the district court’s g rant o f s u mmary judg ment in favor of Appellees, fi f t e e n e mploy ees of the Oreg on Department of Corrections (“the Department”), 1 on several civil rig hts claims broug ht under 42 U .S.C. § 1 983 and the Reli gious L and Use a nd I nstitutionaliz ed Persons Act (“RL UI PA”), 4 2 U .S.C.

1 A n i n m a t e , K e i th B aller, is also n am ed as a d ef en d an t- ap pellee. A lth o u g h B aller d id n o t m o v e f o r su m m ary j u d g m en t an d th e d i strict co u rt d id n o t sp ecif

ically ad d ress th is claim

, th e d istrict co u rt en tered j u dg m en t in f av o r o f all d ef en dan ts. J o n es d o es n o t ch allen g e th e d ism issal o f th is claim o n ap p eal, an d th eref

o re an y erro r is w aiv ed

.J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 6

§§ 2000cc–2000cc-5. W e affirm in par t , vacate in part, a nd remand to the district court for further proceeding s.

I

.

A.

J ones is a Muslim and a member of the Nation of I slam,

a relig ious o rg aniz ation. His relig ious beliefs forbid him from consuming or handling pork.

J ones’s claims arise from the following events, which we recount in chronolog ical order. F rom October 2 006 to October 2008, while in custody of the Department, J ones was assig ned to work in the kitchen at the Penitentiary

, initially a s

a server on the food service line. Shortly after his assig nment to the food service line, J ones complained to his supervisors about being required to serve pork food items and requested
to be reassig ned from the serving line to a kitchen-entry position, which would allow him to avoid handli n g pork. According to J ones, he and other black inmates were r equired
to w o rk at least thirty day s on the line before they could work in a kitchen-entry p osition, wherea s c e rtain w hite inmates

were not subject to a thirty -day waiting period. J ones alleg e s that in N ovember 2006, Appellee Keith Davis, F ood Services Manag er at the Penitentiary

, told J o nes that the prison would take di s ciplinary action a g ainst him if he refused orders to

serve or handle pork. On J anuary 7, 2007, J one s f i l e d an administrative discrimination complaint describing Davis’s threats of disciplinary action and citing case law in support o f his asserted rig ht to abstain from handling pork.

On J anuary 8, 2007, J ones approached Appellee Richard Ridderbusch, an Assistant F ood Services Manag er, to discussJ O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 7

his requests for reassig n ment. J o n es told Ridderbusch that he would file a lawsuit in federal court ag ainst Ridderbusch for discrimination. The parties dispute the circumstances of the i n teraction between J ones a n d Ridderbusch. J ones decl a r e s t h a t t h ere were between 30 and 40 inmates working in t h e kitchen a t the time but that none were in the immediate area

or could hear the conversation. Ridderbusch declares that 40
to 50 inmates w e r e working in the immediate area. Ridderbusch a lso declares that J o nes accused him of being a racist and acted in a threatening and inflammato r y manner, which resulted in “a serious r isk that other in mates would become r i l e d creating a security concern.” Ridderbusch subsequently issued a daily performance failure report. 2 The report stated as reasons for the assessment “attitude” and that J ones “ accused [ Ridderbusch] of di s c r iminating in hiring

, threatened to s u e i n fed[ eral] court, [ and] was not reciptive [ sic ] to earning his w ay .” The d ail y performance failure resulted in J ones n ot r eceiving points f o r t hat d a

y toward awards of prog

ram incentives.

J ones was taken off the food service line a nd r e a ssig n ed as a cook on F ebruary 7, 2007.

On March 9
, 2007, Appellee B rian B ellequ e, Superintendent of the Penitentiary

, responded in writing to J ones’s J an u ary 7
, 2007 administrative discrimination complaint. I n the response m e morandum, B e lleque stated

2 T h e D ep artm en t ad m i n isters a P erf o rm an ce Rec o gn i t i o n an d A w ard Sy stem o f m o n etary aw ard s an d o th er in c e n t i v es to reco g n ize an d

en co u rag e g oo d in stitu

tio n al co n d u ct. In m ates w ith w o rk assig n m en ts in th e p ro g ram are eith er g ran t e d o r d en i ed p o in ts b ased o n a d aily

assessm en t o f t

h eir p erf o rm an ce q u ality an d ef f o rt, i n t erp erso n al

co m m u n icatio n s, an d o th er f

acto rs.J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 8

that there was “no current policy ” g o verning the issue raised by J ones but that “there is no need to require Muslim inmates
to handle pork.” The memo randum continued: “As a Muslim, y o u should notify y our supervisor of y our reli gi o n and that y o u are not allowed to handle pork. Every effort will be made to provide a work prog ram that does not require y ou to handle pork.”

W h en serving food items containing pork, the prison h ad

a practice o f d isplay ing a sig n to indicate the items’ pork contents. On May

31, 2007, J ones obtained a tamale pie for lunch. There was no s ig n display ed indicating that the item contained pork. J ones ate a few bites of the tamale pie before Ray mond May es, an o t h e r inmate, told J ones that the item

c ontained pork. May es states in his affidavit that he t o l d J ones “that the tamale p ie contained pork because [ Appellee Richard Nopp, a F ood Service Coo r dinator working in the kitchen that day ,] had pork mix ed in wit h t h e beef for the making o f the tamale pie for lunch

. . . .” J ones declares that,

on J une 2
, 2007, Tom Peacock, a cook, told J ones that Nopp had ordered Peacock to add pork to the meat in the tamale pie and that Peacock added pork as directed while N opp watched. Nopp denies ordering cooks to add pork to t he meat in the tamale pie and declares that no pork was added to the tamale pie.

On J uly 8, 2007, Appellee G

. McB ride, a F ood Service Co o rdinator, ordered J ones to fry pork loins. J ones alleg e s that he told McB ride that he was a Muslim and that cooking pork was ag ainst h i s r e lig ious beliefs, but that McB ride threatened to issue a daily per f ormance failure or possibly a misconduct report if J ones refused the order. J ones declares that he c omplained to A ppellee L arry Kutnar, McB ride’s supervisor, and, a ft er speaking with McB ride a ndJ O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 9

Ridderbusch, Kutnar told J ones that “those up hig h” h ad ordered that J ones prepare the pork loins. J ones prepared the pork loins a s ordered, which required him to dip the loins into

a flour mix ture, cook them on g rills, and then place them in
pans.

On J uly 10, 2 007, wi th D avis present, Ridderbusch told J ones that he had been ordered to prepare pork loins because the l a s t m emorandum Ridderbusch received said it was permissibl e fo r J ones to prepare pork. Ridderbusch stated, however, that he discovered a new memorandum i s s u e d in J a nuary 2007 stating that Muslim inmates should not b e ordered to serve o r prepare pork. 3 Ridderbusch claims that he

was n ot aware of the new memorandum until after J o nes was ordered to cook pork on J u ly 8, 2007. The s a me day

, J ones complained to Davis and Ridderbusch that the g rills in the kitchen were contaminated w ith pork g rease by I slamic standards, and, according to J ones, D avis acknowledg ed the contamination.

On October 2 9, 2008, J ones and Gl e n L eonard, a white inmate, g ot into an arg ument in the presence of A p p e l l e e L aurie Mincher, a F ood Service Coordinator. At some point, L eonard walked up close to J ones, and J ones placed his hand

on L eonard’s chest and pushed him backward. Mincher intervened, took J ones to disciplinary seg reg ation, and issued

a misco n d u c t report describing the incident and charg ing J ones with “Assault 3 ,” a violation o f prison rules. Colleen Clemente, a H earing s Office r a t the Penitentiary

,

3 T h e March 9
, 2 0 0 7 m em o ran d u m r e s p o nd i n g to J o n es’ s J an u ary 7
, 2 0 0 7 ad m in istrativ e d iscrim in atio n co m p lain t s tates th at co p ie s o f th e

m em o ran d u m w ere to b e se n t t o D av i s an d oth ers, b u t th e list do es n o t in clu d e Rid d erb u sch , Ku t n ar, o r McB rid e.J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 10

subsequently convened disciplinary hearing s on November 5, and December 1, 2 008. W itness testimony a nd an investig ation report were presented at the hearing s. Clemente found that J ones commit t e d a unilateral attack on another inmate in violation o f prison rules and recom m e nded disciplinary

action ag ainst J ones.

B

.

J ones filed suit in the United States District Court f or the District of Oreg on a g ainst A p pellees in their individual a nd official capacities. J o nes’s complaint alleg e s that Appellees

v i o l ated free speech and f ree ex ercise rig hts g uaranteed b y the F irst and F ourteenth Amendments, and equal protection rig hts g u aranteed by the F ourteenth Amendment. J ones seeks monetary damag es and injunc t i v e r elief under § 1983 a nd RL UI PA. Appellees moved for summary j u d g ment. J ones opposed the motion in a Response a n d Sur-Resp o nse, to which A ppellees replied. T h e district c o urt adopted the finding s a

nd recommendation o f the mag istrate judg e a nd
g ranted summary judg ment in favor of Appellee s o n all o f J ones’s claims. J ones appeals.

I I

.

W e review the district court’s g rant of summary judg ment de novo. B arnett v. Centoni
, 3 1 F .3d 813, 815 ( 9th Cir. 1 994) (per curiam). “Summary judg ment is only appropriate if the evidence, re a d i n the lig ht most favorable to the nonmoving party , demonstrates that there is no g enuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to j udg ment as a matter of law.” Bruce v. Y lst

, 3 51 F .3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing F ed

. R

. Civ. P. 56(c)). “I n order to carry its burden of production, th e moving party must either produceJ O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 11

evidenc e neg ating an essential element of the nonmoving party ’s claim or defe n s e o r show that the nonmoving party does not have enoug h e vidence of an essential e l e m e n t to carry its u ltimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., I nc. , 2 10 F .3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

A.

J ones cannot obtain the monetary a nd injunctive relief he

se e k s under RL UI PA. The statute provides that a person asserting a violation of the statute “ a s a c laim or defense in a judicial proceeding ” may “obtain appropriate relief ag ainst a g overnment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). I n Sossamon v

. Texas
, the Supreme C o u r t h eld that RL UI PA’s use of the phrase “appropriate relief” is n ot a n unequivocal ex pression of state consent to private suits for mon e tary damag e s a nd therefore does not operate to effect a waiver of the s t a t e s ’

s o v er eig n immunity from such suits. 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658–59 ( 2011); see also Oklevueha Native Am. C h u r c h of Haw. v. H

older

, 676 F .3d 829, 840–41 (9th Cir. 2012). Ad d i t ionally

, as we recog niz ed in W ood v. Y ordy

, RL UI PA does not authoriz e suits for damag es ag a inst state officials in their individual c apacities because individual state officials

are n o t recipients of federal funding and nothing in the statute sug g ests a

ny cong ress i o n a l intent to hold them individually liable. 753 F .3d 899, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2014).

J ones’s RL UI PA c l a i m s for injunctive relief are moot because J ones has been r eleased from custody

. 4 F ederal

4 We tak e j u d icial n o tice o f th e f act th at J o n es w as released du rin g th e p en d en cy o f th is ap p eal. S

ee Ha rris v. Cn ty. of Ora n g e , 6 8 2 F.3 d 1 1 2 6
, 1 1 3 2 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 2 ).J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 12

courts lack juris d i c t i o n over claims that have been rendered
moot because “the iss u e s p r esented are no long er live” o r because the parties no long er p o s s e s s “a leg ally cog niz able interest in the outcome.” Alvarez v

. Hill

, 667 F .3d 1 0 6 1, 1064 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. Parole Com m ’ n v

. G e r aghty

, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980)). “Once an inmate is removed f rom the environment in which he is subjected to the challeng ed policy or practice, a bsent a claim for damag es, he

no long er h as a leg ally cog n i z able interest in a judicial decision o n t h e m e rits of his claim.” A lvarez

, 667 F .3d at 1064 ( quoting I

ncumaa v. Ozmint
, 507 F .3d 281, 2 87 (4th Cir. 2007)). J ones has been removed from the environment in which he was subjecte d to the alleg ed RL UI PA v iolations. The record discloses no evidence o f continuing effects of the alleg ed violations on J ones a n d no r e a s o n a

ble ex pectation that Appellees could violate J ones’s rig hts in the future. S ee Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Davis
, 4 40 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); Lindquist

v. Idaho S tate Bd. o f Corr.
, 776 F .2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1985). I n this situation, any injunctive relief ordered in J ones’ favor “would have no practical impact on [ his] rig hts and would not redress i n any way the injury he orig inally asserted.” Incumaa , 507 F .3d at 287.

According ly

, we affirm the district court’s g r ant o f
summary judg ment in favor of Appellees on all of J ones’s RL UI PA claims.

B

.

W e now turn to J ones’s three § 1983 free e x ercise claims.

A person asserting a free ex ercise claim must show t h at t h e g overnment action in question substantially burdens the person’s practice of her relig ion. Graham v. C.I.R.
, 822 F .2dJ O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 13

844, 851 ( 9th Cir. 1987), aff’d sub nom. H ernandez v. C.I.R.
, 490 U .S. 680, 6 99 (1989). “A substantial burden

. . . place[ s]

more than an inconveni e nce on r elig ious ex ercise; it must have a tendency

to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their relig ious beliefs o r e x ert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his b e liefs.” Ohno v. Y asuma , 723 F .3d 984, 1011 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Y u b a C ity v. Cnty. o

f Sutter
, 456 F .3d 978, 9 8 8 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

“The rig ht to ex ercise relig ious practices and beliefs does
not terminate at the p r i son door[ ,] ” McElyea v. Babbitt

, 833 F .2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz

, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)), but a prisoner’s rig ht to free ex ercise o f relig ion “is necessarily limited by the fact o f incarceration,” W

ard v. W alsh

, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing O’Lone
, 482 U .S. a t 34 8 )

. “To ensure that
courts afford a

ppropriate deference to prison official s , ” the Supreme Court has directed that alleg ed in f ring e ments o f prisoners’ free ex e r c ise rig hts be “judg ed under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restri c t i v e than that ordinarily

a p p l i e d t o a l l e g e d i n f r i n g e m e n t s o f f

u n d a m e n t a l constitutional rig hts.” O’L o n e , 482 U.S. at 349. The challeng ed conduct “is v a lid if it is reasonably related to leg itimate p enolog ical interests

. ” Id. (quoting Turner v

. Safley , 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). 5

5 T h e f acto rs to b e co n si d e r e d i n assessin g th e reaso n ab len ess of
p ractices th at b u rd en p riso n ers’ co n stitu tio n al rig h ts are w ell estab lish ed : (1 ) w h eth er th ere is a “ ‘ v alid , ratio n al co n n ectio n ’ ” b etw een th e co n d u ct

o f p riso n o f

f icials an d “ th e l eg itim ate g o v ern m en ta l in terest p u t f o rw ard
to j u stif y it”; ( 2 ) “ w

h eth er th ere are ‘ altern ativ e m ean s o f ex ercisin g th e rig h t th at rem ain o p en t o p riso n in m ates’ ”; (3 ) “ th e im p act acco m

m o d atio n

o f th e asserted co n stitu

tio n al rig h t w ill h av e o n g u ard s an d o th er in m ates,J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 14

J ones a sserts three § 1983 f ree ex ercise claims, all rooted in his relig ious beliefs ag ainst consuming and handling pork.

1.

The first claim arises from the events of May 31, 2007. J ones alleg e s that h e was served and a te part of a tamale pie withou t h a v ing been n otified of its pork contents. Nopp declares, however, that h e did n ot order cooks to add p ork to the tamale pie and that the tamale pie did not contain pork.

J ones’s evidence is not sufficient to r aise an issue of fact

as to w hether the tamale pie contained p ork a n d o r w h ether Nopp ordered cooks to ad d p ork to the dish. The unsworn statements of the inmate cook who told J ones that Nopp h ad directed the cook to mix p ork in with the m e a t used in the tamale p ie are hearsay

, see F ed. R. Evid. 801(c), and can n o t properly be considered in opposition to a summary judg ment motion. See F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); Block v. City of Los Angeles

, 2 53 F .3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 20 0 1 ) (holding that it

was an abuse of discretion f or the distr i c t c o urt, at the

su m m a ry judg ment stag e, to consider information from an affidav i t based on inadmissible h earsay rather than the affiant’s personal knowledg e ). Ray mond May es, another inmate kitchen worker, states in a n affidavit that he told J ones and A ppellee Michael Dodson that Nopp had pork mix ed in with the tamale pie meat, but May e s’s statemen ts to J ones and Dodson were unsworn. References to such unsworn statements a

re insufficient to g enerate a g enuine dispute o f fact. Therefore

, we affirm summary judg ment in favor o f

an d o n th e allo catio n o f p riso n reso u rces g en erally ”; an d (4 ) w h eth er th ere

are “ read y altern a t i v e s ” to th e p riso n ’ s p ractice. W ard

, 1 F.3 d at 8 7 6 (q u o tin g Tu rn er , 4 8 2 U.S. at 8 9

– 9 0).J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 15

Appellees on the § 1983 c laim arising f rom the events of May 31, 2007.

2.

J ones’s second § 1983 free ex ercise claim arises from the
events of J uly 8
, 2 0 07. J ones alleg es that he was ordered to cook pork loins as part of his job duties in the kitchen a t the Penitentiary

. The district c o u rt held that A ppellees a re entitled to qualified immunity from this claim. W e disag ree.

The doctrine of qualified immunity “ seeks to ensure that defendants reasonably can a nticipate when their conduct may g iv e rise to liability

. . . by attaching liability only if the
contour s of the rig ht v iolated are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that rig ht[ .] ” U

nited States v. Lanier
, 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997) (internal quotation marks, alterations, a nd citations omitted). “Government officials are not entitled to qualified immunity if ( 1) the facts ‘[ t] aken in the li gh t m ost favorable to the party asserting the injury

. . . show [ that] the [ defendants’] conduct violated a con s t i t utional rig ht’ a nd (2) the rig ht was clearly e stablished a t the time of the alleg ed violation.” Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t
, 756 F

. 3d 1 154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2 014) (quoting Saucier v. Katz
, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).

I t was well established in 2007, and remains so today

, that
go v e rnment action places a substantial burden on an individual’s rig ht to free ex ercise of relig ion when it tends to

coerce the individual to foreg o her sincerely h e l d r e lig ious beliefs or to eng ag e in conduct that violates those beliefs. See Sherbert v. Verner
, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 406 (1963); T h o mas

v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div.
, 450 U.S. 707, 717–18J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 16

( 1 981); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y
, 456 F .3d at 9 8 8

. “[ R] equiring a believer to defile himself by doing something that is completely

forbidden by

his relig ion is different from (and more serious than) c urtailing various way s of ex p ressing beliefs for which alterna t i v e s are available.” Ashelman v

. W awrzaszek

, 111 F .3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 19 9 7 ). I n Ashelman

, for ex ample, we held that a J ewish inmate had the rig ht to a kosher diet and disposable utensils. Id. at 678. W e

ex p lained that, in the case of dietary restrictions, the i n mate had no alternative means of ex e r c i sing the rig ht, whereas there were “obvious, easy alternatives” that the prison could implement. Id. (internal quota t i o n marks omitted). “The

ex istence of reas onable a lternatives decisively tip[ p ed] the balance in favor of [ the inmate’s] free ex erci s e r i ght.” Id. ; see also McElyea , 833 F

. 2d at 198.

These constitutional principles apply with “obvious clarity ” here a

nd p rovided a “fair a

nd clear warning ” that J ones had a r ig ht to abstain from conduct directly violative o f his relig ious beliefs. Lanier
, 520 U.S. a t 2 7 1

. O rdering a Muslim prisoner to handle pork r equires h im “to defile himself by doing something that is completely forbidden b y his relig ion.” Ashelman

, 1 1 1 F .3d at 6 77. A nd there a re no alternative means of a l lowing J ones to ex ercise h is rig ht to avoid handling pork b esides n ot o rdering him to h a ndle pork. Acco m m o d a ting J ones’s r ig ht to avoid handling pork isn’t less bu r densome than the r elig ious-based accommodations,

su c h a s p roviding Kosher diets and disposable u tensils, that

we have held for many y ears a r e constitutionally required. I ndeed, several months b efore J ones w as ordered t o handle pork, S u perintendent B elleque informed J ones that “ there is

no need to r equire Muslim inmate s t o handle pork.” B elleque’s memo strong ly indicates that assig ning J ones a task that d id not require him to violate his relig io u s beliefsJ O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 17

was a ready option and would not sig nificantly affect prison personnel, other inmates, or the g eneral allocation o f p rison

resources.

“W e may als o l o ok to the law of other circuits to determine if a princip l e i s clearly established.” Tamas v

. Dep’t of S

oc. & Health Servs.
, 630 F

. 3d 833, 846 (9 t h Cir. 2010). B etween 1974 and 2006, four other circuits h eld that prisoners h a v e the free ex ercise rig ht to avoid handling certain f oods as part of their w o r k d u t i e s. See W illiams v

. Bitner
, 455 F .3d 186, 193–94 ( 3 d Cir. 2006) (finding this rig ht clearly established); Hayes v. Long
, 72 F .3d 70, 7 4 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Kenner v. Phelps

, 6 05 F .2d 850, 851 (5th Cir. 1 979); Chapman v. Kleindienst

, 507 F .2d 1246, 1251–52 (7th Cir. 1974).

Appellees nevertheless arg ue that t h e y are entitled to qualified immunity because ordering J ones to cook pork was “in furtherance of what the o rdering officers u n d erstood the prison’s policy to be at the time.” T o b e sure, in c ertain
cases, the “information possessed by the officer” may be a fa c t or in determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity

. See Inouye v. Kemna
, 504 F .3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2 007) (in t e r n al quotation marks omitted). B ut this is an objective inquiry . “The subjective beliefs of the actual offic er are, of course, irrelevant.” Id. (internal quotation

m a r k s omitted). Here, there is at least an issue of materi al fact as to what a reasonable officer at the Penitentiary should have known on J uly 8, 2007. Several months before McB ride

or dered J ones to cook p ork loins, the Penitentiary implemented a new policy providing that an inmate c ould opt out of handling pork on relig ious g rounds. And J ones alleg e s that he told the officers in charg e that he had the r ig ht to not handle pork. That s o m e officers claim they were notJ O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 18

personally aware of the policy chang e o r B elleque’s memo to J ones is n ot sufficient to show th a t J ones’s rig ht to avoid handling pork was not clearly established.

I n sum, viewing the record in the lig ht most favorable to Jo n e s , A p p ellees’ conduct v iolated J o nes’s clearly estab l i s h e d

r i g ht to avoid handling pork on the basis of his re l i g i o u s beliefs. On this record, Appellees are n ot entitled to qualified immunity

. 6 Therefore, we reverse the g rant of summary judg ment on the § 1983 c laim a rising f rom the events o f J uly 8, 2 007, a nd remand the c laim to the district court for f urther proceeding s.

3.

J ones’s third § 1983 free ex e r c i s e claim challeng es the prison’s method of cleaning g rills on w hich meat s s erved to inmates are cooked. W orkers in the k itchen use veg etable oil and a cinder block to scour the surfaces o f gr i l l s and then

remove the ex cess g rease without use o f chemical cleaners o r g rease removers. D avis declares that the g ri l l s are sanitiz ed by heating b efore use and that the prison’s cleaning practice
meets the industry standard fo r c l e a n ing g rills. J ones a nd Robert Stephens, a lead cook at the Penitentiary

, declare that this method leaves residual amounts of pork gr e ase on the
gr i l ls. Additionally

, J ones arg ues that the prison’s cleaning

6 J o n es alleg es th at McB rid e o r d e r e d h i m to co o k th e p o rk lo in s, b u t b rin g s t h is f ree ex ercise clai m ag ain st McB rid e an d elev en o th er d ef en d an t s in t

h eir in d iv id u al an d of

f icial cap acities. W e ex p ress n o

o p in io n o n th e m e r i t s o f J on es’ s in div id u al o r o f f icial cap acity claim s ag ain st an y

o f th e tw elv e n am ed d ef

en d an ts. W e m erely h o ld th at J o n es h as rais ed a g en

u in e issu e o f f

act as to w

h eth er an y d ef

en d an t is en titled
to q u alif ied im m u n ity f ro m Jo n es’ s claim th at b ein g f o rced to h an dle p ork

v io lated h is f

ree ex ercise rig h ts.J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 19

practices violate Oreg o n Administrative Rule 291-06 1

- 0 1 9 0(7) a nd, under I slamic standards, permit contaminati o n of non-pork meats by

residual pork g r ease.

To the ex tent J ones seeks an injunction ordering a chang e in the Penitentiary ’s gr i l l cleaning procedures, his claim is
moot because he has b e en released f rom custody

. W e therefore consider the merits of this § 1983 claim o nly to the

ex tent that J ones seeks dama ge s ag ainst Appellees for the constitutional violations that he alleg es occurred while he was in custody

.

Even assuming that J ones h as raised an issue of fact as to whether the g rill-cleaning method resulted in the g rills being contaminated by I slamic sta ndards or violations o f Department reg u lations, he h a s failed to show that the prison’s g rill-cleaningmethod imposed a substantial burden

o n his relig ious ex e r cise. There is no g enuine disp u t e t h at inmates were presented alternatives to g rilled meat at every

m eal while J ones was in c ustody

. 7 J ones poin t s t o n o evidence that g rilled meat was such an important b enefit that he was substantially p ressured to eat it and thereby violate his relig ious beliefs. We have long re c o g niz ed the prisoner’s “rig h t to be p rovid e d w i t h food sufficient to sustain them in
g ood health that satisfies the d ietary laws of their relig ion.” McElyea

, 833 F .2d a t 1 98. Here, h o w e ver, J ones h as failed
to show that he ne e d ed g rilled meat to remain healthy or to satisfy the d ietary requirements of his relig io n. I n the absence of such evidence, J ones cannot show that Appellees’
g rill-cleaning method imposed a substantial burden on his

7 T h e m en u s ref

eren ced in J o n es’ s d eclaratio n as Ex h ib its A th ro u g h H d isp ro v e h is claim

th at altern ativ es to g rilled f o od w ere n o t av ailab le f

or

m o rn in g m eals.J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 20

relig ious ex ercise. According ly

, we affirm summary judg ment in favor of Appellees o n the § 1983 claim challeng ing the prison’s g r ill-cleaning practices.

C.

J ones also asserts a F irst Amendment retaliation claim
ag ainst Ridderbu s c h u

n d e r § 1 983 arising from Ridderbusch’s issuance o f a d a i l y performance failure on J anuary 8, 2007. The sanction was issued after J ones c o nfronted Ridderbusch i n t h e P e n i t e n t i a r y ’ s k i t c h e n w i t h c o m p l a i n t s o f discrimination and a threat to sue.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for prison inmates whose constitutionally protected activity has resulted in r etaliatory action by p rison officials. See Rizzo v. Dawson
, 778 F

. 2d 5 27, 532 ( 9th Cir. 1985). “[ A] p rison inmate retains those F irst Amendment rig hts that are not inc o n s i s tent with his status as a prisoner or with the leg it i m ate penolog ical objectives o f the corrections sy stem.” P e l l v. Procunier
, 417 U.S. 817, 822 ( 1974). A viable § 1983 claim o f retaliation for eng ag ing in activity p rotected b y the F irst Amendment in the p ris o n contex t involves the following elements:

(1) An assertion that a state actor took s o me adverse action ag ai n s t an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner' s protected conduct, a nd that such action (4) c h i lled the inmate’s

ex e rcise of his F irst Amendment rig h t s, a nd (5) the action did n ot r easonably a dvance a leg itimate correctional g oal.

Rhodes v. Robinson , 408 F .3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005).J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 21

The F irst Amendment g uarantees a prisoner a rig h t to seek r edress o f g r ievances from prison authorities and as w ell

as a rig ht of meaning f

ul a ccess to the courts. Bradley v. Hall

, 6 4 F .3d 1 276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1 995); see also Hasan v. U

. S

. Dep’t of Labor

, 400 F .3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2 005) (“Prisoners’ g rievances, unless frivolous

. . . , concerning the conditions in whi c h they are being confined are deemed petitions f

o r redress of g rievances and thus are protected b y the F irst Amendment.”); W olfel v. Bates
, 707 F .2d 9 3 2
, 934 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (recogniz ing prison e r’ s F irst Amendment rig h t to complain to pris o n o f ficials about discrimination). According ly

, J ones’s c omplaints o f discrimination to his supervisors and statements of intention to file suit were conduct protected by the F irst Amendment.

J ones h as made a showing in su p p o rt of the remaining elements o f his retaliation claim s u f ficient to overcome summary judg ment. The f ace of the daily fail u re form

c ompleted b y Ridderbusch cites J ones’s discrimination complaints and threat to sue as reasons for its issuance, creating a g enuine issue a s to whether this protected conduct

was “the ‘substantial’ or ‘motiv a t i ng ’ factor” for the daily performance failure. Brodheim v. Cry
, 584 F .3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). That the sanction deprived J o n es of points toward prog r am incentives is adequate to show that it “‘would c h ill or si l e n ce a person of ordinary firmnes s ’ ” f

rom eng a g ing in such protected activities in the future. Id. (q u o t i ng Rhodes

, 408 F .3d at 568–69); see also Rhodes

, 408 F .3d at 567 n .11 (stating that any harm that is “more than minimal w ill almost a lway s have a c h i l ling effect”).

Genuine issues a lso remain as to w hether the daily failure “reason a b l y advance[ d ] a leg itimate correctional g oal.”J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 22

Brodheim

, 584 F .3d at 1271. Appellee s c laim that the daily failure served the penolog ical purpose of maintaining “order and security in a s i tuation where prisoners outnumbered supervisors 20 or 25 t o 1 [ ,] ” but the document bears no indication of any security issues a rising from J ones’ behavior. J ones admits that there were doz ens o f inmates working in the kitchen when he a

pproached Ridderbusch but declares that no inmates were in the immediate area close enoug h to hear the conversation. J ones also declares that he was not acting in a threatenin g m anner. There was no security issue under this version of events. J o nes’s account also casts serious d o ubt on the magi s t r a te judg e ’s conclusion that the sanction was justified by the prison’s interests in “appropriate inmate behavior[ ,] ” “inmate rehabilitation and the d evelopment o f professional attitudes and interpersonal communication.” A prisoner’s “ impolitic choice o f words” does not categ orically justify p u n itive a ction by prison officials that “burdens the prisoner’s rig ht of meaning ful access to the courts.” Bradley

, 64 F .3d at 1 281. O n this record, we ca n n o t d e t ermine as a matter of law that issuance of the daily failure was j u s t i fied by the prison’s leg itimate interests.

F or these reasons, we r everse the g rant of summ a ry judg ment in f

avor o f Ridderbusch on the F irst A mendment retaliation claim and r emand this claim to the district court for further proceeding s. 8

8 T h e d istrict co u rt d id n ot d istin g u ish b etw een J o n es’ s in div id u al an d

o f f icial cap acity claim s ag ain st Rid d erb u sch w h en it g ran ted su

m m ary j u d g m en t to Rid derb u sch

. W h i le J on es arg u es o n ap p eal th at R id d erb u sch

v io lated h is rig h ts b ecau se Rid d erb u sch retaliated ag ain st h im

, J o n es d oes

n o t arg u e th at Rid d erb u s ch h ad p o licy m ak in g au th o rity o r th at h i s claim
ag ain st R id d erb u sch is “a ttrib u t ab le to o f f icial po licy o r cu sto m ,” La rez

v. City o f Lo s An g eles , 9 46 F.2 d 6 30 , 6 4 5 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 1 ). W e th eref

oreJ O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 23

D.

F inally

, J ones asserts a § 1983 equal prote c t i o n claim ba s e d o n alleg ations of racial discrimination in the disciplinary proceeding s fo llowing his altercation with L eonard on October 29, 2008.

The E qual Protection Clause of the F ourtee n th Amendment “commands that no State shall d eny t o a n y person within its jurisdiction the e q ual protection of the laws, which i s essentially a d irection that a ll persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles

, 250 F

. 3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.
, 4 73 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To avoid summary judg ment on a claim of racial d iscrimination, the plaintiff must “produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find by a preponderance of the evidence th at [ the challeng ed action] was r a c i a lly motivated.” Bingham v

. City of Manhattan B e a c h

, 3 41 F .3d 939, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2 003) (internal quotation marks and c itation omitted). I n the prison
contex t, the rig ht to equal protection is “judg ed by a standard of r easonableness—specific a l l y , w h e t h e r the a ctions of prison officials a

re ‘reasonably r elated to leg itimate penolog ical interests.’” W

alker v. Gomez
, 3 7 0 F. 3 d 9 69, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Turner , 482 U.S. at 89).

There is no dispute that J ones a ssaulted L eonard and that L eonard did not touch J ones d u r ing the altercation. J ones points to no evidence that the r esulting placem e n t in disciplinary

seg reg ation a

nd subsequent proceeding s ag ainst

rev erse t h e d istrict co u rt’ s g ran t o f su m m ary j u d g m en t to R id d erb u sch on th e in d iv i d u al cap acity

claim o n ly

.J O N E S V

. W I L L I A M S 24

h i m w e re motivated by the fact that he is African-America n and L eo n a r d is white. According ly

, w e affirm summary judg ment in favor of Appellees on the e q u al p rotection c laim.

I I I

.

F or the foreg oing reasons, the judg me n t o f the district court is

AF F IRMED in p a r t a nd VACATED a nd REMANDED in part.

The parties shall bear their ow n costs on appeal.