Opinion issued September 1, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-18-01002-CV

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JERALD A. BROWN, Appellant

V.

WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., Appellee

On Appeal from the 333rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2015-61662-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Jerald A. Brown, has filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s 

November 2, 2018 final judgment in his garnishment suit. Judgment debtors, 

Anthony R. Sueing, Sr., Frontline Recovery and Consulting, Inc., and Frontline 
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Recovery and Consulting North, Inc.,

1 have filed a motion to dismiss Brown’s appeal

for lack of jurisdiction and a motion for sanctions, asserting that the trial court 

vacated its November 2, 2018 final judgment and Brown’s garnishment suit was 

dismissed after the judgment debtors superseded the judgment in the underlying 

case, which is also on appeal in this Court.2

Generally, this Court has civil appellate jurisdiction over final judgments or 

interlocutory orders specifically authorized as appealable by statute. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.012, 51.014(a); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 

S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Although Brown seeks to appeal the trial court’s final 

judgment in Brown’s garnishment suit signed on November 2, 2018, on November 

6, 2018, the trial court vacated its November 2, 2018 final judgment. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 329b(d) (“The trial court, regardless of whether an appeal has been perfected, 

1

“A post-judgment garnishment proceeding is a quasi in rem action brought by a 

judgment creditor (the garnishor) against another party (the garnishee) who holds 

property or funds belonging to the judgment debtor.” Barrow v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., 587 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.); see generally

Tex. R. Civ. P. 661. Because the judgment debtor’s property is at stake in a 

garnishment proceeding, the judgment debtor has standing to participate in the 

proceeding, including by filing a motion to vacate or dissolve a writ of garnishment. 

Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 664a. Here, Brown is the judgment creditor or garnishor 

and appellee, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., is the garnishee.

2 The underlying case is Jerald A. Brown v. Anthony R. Sueing, Sr., Frontline 

Recovery and Consulting, Inc., and Frontline Recovery and Consulting North, Inc., 

Cause No. 2015-61662, previously pending in the 333rd District Court of Harris 

County, Texas. On October 22, 2019, the judgment debtors filed, in this Court, their 

notice of appeal of the trial court’s August 15, 2018 final judgment in the underlying 

case. That appeal is currently pending in appellate cause no. 01-18-00939-CV.
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has plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the 

judgment within thirty days after the judgment is signed.”). After the trial court 

vacated its November 2, 2018 final judgment, there was no appealable final 

judgment or interlocutory order. See Zapata v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 

01-15-00346-CV, 2015 WL 7737626, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 1, 

2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Saenz v. Thorp Petroleum Corp., No.

04-10-00837-CV, 2011 WL 1303802, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 6, 2011, 

no pet.) (mem. op.) (although summary-judgment orders were final and appealable 

when notice of appeal filed, when trial court subsequently vacated severance order 

during its plenary-power period, summary-judgment orders were no longer final and 

appealable).

Brown argues that we have jurisdiction over his appeal because his notice of 

appeal encompasses the trial court’s other November 2, 2018 order, which vacated

and dissolved the writ of garnishment. But if the judgment debtors supersede the 

judgment in the underlying case after a writ of garnishment issues, the trial court 

may dissolve the writ on the judgment debtors’ motion. See Cantu v. Butron, 905 

S.W.2d 718, 719–20 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1995, writ denied); see 

also TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(f); TEX. R. CIV. P. 657. The filing of a supersedeas bond 

“preserves the status quo of the matters in litigation as they existed before the 

issuance of the order or judgment from which an appeal is taken.” Alpert v. Riley, 
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274 S.W.3d 277, 297–98 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) 

(internal quotations omitted)).

Here, the judgment debtors superseded the August 15, 2018 final judgment in 

the underlying case.3 Because the filing of a proper supersedeas bond suspends 

execution of a judgment, an appeal of the dismissal of the enforcement proceeding 

is not justiciable. See TEX.R. APP. P. 24.1(f); cf. Elliott v. West, Nos. 01–09–00747–

CV, 01–09–01084–CV, 2011 WL 1233484, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

Mar. 31, 2011, no pet.) (“The only issue to be tried in a garnishment proceeding is 

who is entitled to the funds involved in the proceeding.”). Thus, even if Brown’s 

notice of appeal encompasses the trial court’s other November 2, 2018 order, which

vacated and dissolved the writ of garnishment, nothing is presented for review.

 Accordingly, we grant the judgment debtors’ motion to dismiss the appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f). 

We deny the judgment debtors’ motion for sanctions. See TEX. R. APP. P. 45; 

Polignone v. Bulldog Chemicals, LLC, No. 01-16-00633-CV, 2018 WL 4128002, at

*7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] August 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The 

3 To the extent necessary, we take judicial notice of the records filed in the judgment 

debtors’ related appeal. See In re Chaumette, 456 S.W.3d 299, 303 n.2 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding); Douglas v. Am. Title Co., 196 

S.W.3d 876, 878 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
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decision to grant appellate sanctions is a matter of discretion that an appellate court 

exercises with prudence and caution and only after careful deliberation.”).

Julie Countiss

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Landau, and Countiss.