IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Docket No. 34399 

STATE OF IDAHO, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

ERIC A. REYNOLDS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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2008 Opinion No. 68 

Filed: July 14, 2008 

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Fred M. Gibler, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to suppress evidence, affirmed. 

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Thomas Tharp, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

______________________________________________ 

LANSING, Judge 

Eric A. Reynolds appeals from his judgment of conviction on various drug-related 

charges. He argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found 

during a warrantless search of his home. We affirm. 

I. 

BACKGROUND 

 At approximately 10 p.m., three police officers were dispatched to the home of Eric and 

Melissa Reynolds to investigate a telephoned report from Melissa’s mother that Reynolds was 

holding Melissa against her will. The officers arrived simultaneously and saw Reynolds standing 

just outside of the front door, which was ajar. Two of the officers approached Reynolds and 

began to question him about the reported altercation. In the meantime, a third officer, Officer 

Harmon, entered the home through the partially-opened front door. He did not hear any noises 

coming from the house, nor did he first knock, announce his presence, or call for Melissa. 

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Upon entering, Officer Harmon saw Melissa standing in the living room about ten feet 

from the door. She was visibly upset. She said that Reynolds had pushed her onto the couch and 

also restrained her when she was trying to leave the bedroom. A few minutes after entering, 

Officer Harmon smelled an odor that he believed to be marijuana. He questioned Melissa about 

the scent, and she said that there was marijuana in another room. Officer Harmon then motioned 

the two other officers, Farina and Hicks, into the house. Officer Farina asked Melissa if there 

were any weapons or other people in the home. She said there were no other people in the 

house, and directed Officer Farina down a hallway to an office which contained a handgun as 

well as a large plywood box or closet that was approximately four feet long, four feet wide, and 

six feet tall. Officer Farina then requested and received Melissa’s consent to search the home. 

She told the officer that the large plywood box, which was locked, belonged to Reynolds. 

Melissa told the officer that she did not have the key to unlock the closet and that it was probably 

on Reynolds’ key ring. Nonetheless, the two began to search the office for a key that would 

open the closet. Melissa pointed to a key ring hanging on the wall and instructed Officer Farina 

to try the key. It opened the plywood box, and the officer saw within marijuana plants and grow 

lamps. At some point--whether before or after opening the box is unclear--Officer Farina also 

observed in another room marijuana hanging from the ceiling to dry. 

Reynolds was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-

2732(a); possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, I.C. § 37-2732(e); domestic battery, 

I.C. § 18-918(3)(b); and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A. He filed a motion to 

suppress the evidence found in the house, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were 

violated when the officers entered the home and that Melissa did not have authority to consent to 

a search of his locked plywood box. The district court denied the motion, finding that exigent 

circumstances justified the officers’ entry into the home and that Melissa had at least apparent 

authority to consent to a search of the box. Reynolds conditionally pleaded guilty to possession 

of marijuana in excess of three ounces and domestic battery in exchange for the State’s 

agreement to dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend concurrent sentences. Reynolds 

now appeals the denial of his suppression motion. 

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II. 

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS 

A. Standard of Review 

In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence, this Court defers 

to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 

396, 400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct. App. 1998). The determination whether a search is reasonable, 

and therefore complies with the Fourth Amendment, is a question of law, however, over which 

we exercise free review. State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 912, 136 P.3d 379, 383 (Ct. App. 

2006). 

B. The Entry Was Illegal 

 Reynolds argues that the evidence discovered during the search of his home must be 

suppressed because the police illegally entered the house without a warrant or other lawful 

justification in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth 

Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The “physical entry of the home is the 

chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. 

United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 

573, 589-90 (1980); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 523, 716 P.2d 1288, 1295 (1986); State v. 

Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 498-99, 163 P.3d 1208, 1210-11 (Ct. App. 2007). Such entries and 

other searches conducted without a warrant are presumed to be unreasonable, United States v. 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 960 (1984); State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct. 

App. 1996), but there are a few carefully delineated exceptions to this presumption. Leon, 467 

U.S. at 960-61; State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). The State bears 

the burden to show that a warrantless search fell within one of these well-recognized exceptions 

to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Martinez, 129 

Idaho at 431, 925 P.2d at 1130. 

The State argues here that the officers’ warrantless entry into Reynolds’ home was 

permissible under the exigent circumstances exception, which allows for warrantless searches by 

state agents when there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant. 

Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 

217 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 434, 925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App. 1996). 

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The test for application of this warrant exception is whether the facts known to the agent at the 

time of entry, together with reasonable inferences, would warrant a reasonable belief that an 

exigency justified the intrusion. Barrett, 138 Idaho at 293, 62 P.3d at 217. A law enforcement 

officer’s reasonable belief of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the 

dwelling is one type of exigency that may justify a warrantless entry. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 

U.S. 91, 100 (1990); Bunting, 142 Idaho at 912-13, 136 P.3d at 383-84. Thus, the necessity to 

protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury will legitimize an otherwise illegal intrusion. An 

example of such an exigency is found in Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 925 P.2d 1131, where an officer 

responded to a report of a domestic disturbance. As the officer approached the apartment, she 

could hear yelling and screaming. The officer knocked on the door. The victim, who had blood 

on her nose and hands, answered the door and said that she did not need the assistance of the 

police. The defendant continued shouting at the victim throughout this conversation, and the 

officer could also see a child in the house. The officer then entered the apartment, and the 

defendant later contended that the entry was unlawful. We held that exigent circumstances 

justified the entry because the volatile circumstances suggested that there was a risk of further 

injury to the victim or injury to the child if the police waited to secure a warrant before entering 

the defendant’s apartment. 

Another illustrative case is State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 41 P.3d 275 (Ct. 

App. 2001), which began when a 911 emergency operator received a hang-up call. The operator 

traced the call to the home where Pearson-Anderson resided with her boyfriend. When the 

operator telephoned that residence, someone picked up the telephone and then immediately hung 

up. The 911 operator alerted police who went to the home to investigate. When they arrived, 

they heard yelling and saw Pearson-Anderson and her boyfriend lying on the floor across the 

threshold, struggling with one another. The officers separated the two and questioned them. 

Pearson-Anderson said that she had made the 911 call because the boyfriend was preventing her 

from leaving the home, and he hung up the telephone before she could speak. She said that the 

boyfriend also hung up the telephone when the 911 operator called back. When asked about the 

reason for the fight, Pearson-Anderson said it arose because the boyfriend had given a key to the 

home to another woman who had been in the home earlier but was not currently there. One of 

the officers then went into the home to determine whether there were any third persons in need 

of help. That officer found evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing, for which Pearson4
Anderson was ultimately arrested. We held that the officers’ warrantless entry of the home was 

justified by the 911 hang-up call and rejected Pearson-Anderson’s assertion that any concerns 

arising from that call were laid to rest by her explanation of the events. We noted that PearsonAnderson’s own explanation referred to a third person (the other woman) who had been in the 

home and whose actions were reportedly the cause of the fight, raising the possibility of thirdparty involvement. We also said that where a 911 hang-up call had been received, responding 

officers were not required to simply take the word of a person at the scene who offers a plausible 

explanation and assures the officers that all is well. We explained: 

In our view, 911 hang-up calls are qualitatively different from ordinary 

emergency calls in which the caller communicates with the operator. In the latter 

circumstance, responding officers ordinarily know, at a minimum, the gender of 

the caller and something about the nature of the emergency. With this 

information, officers who have responded can discern whether the reported 

emergency is under control and whether they have communicated with the person 

who was in need of help. The same cannot be said when the 911 call has been 

disconnected before there is any communication with the operator. When 

responding to a 911 hang-up call, officers may reasonably be cautious about 

concluding that the need for help has dissipated based solely upon an explanation 

from whoever greets them upon their arrival. 

Id. at 850, 41 P.3d at 278. 

In this case, the only factor that suggested a possible exigency was the report that 

Reynolds’ wife was being held against her will. By the time the officers arrived, however, 

Reynolds was standing outside the house, and the front door was ajar. With the couple thus 

separated, it was apparent that if there was a woman in the house, she was under no immediate 

risk of harm from Reynolds while he was outside being questioned by an officer. Therefore, 

there was no exigency that would justify entry into the house without first knocking or calling 

out to bring any occupant to the door where she could be interviewed and the situation assessed. 

If Officer Harmon had first knocked or called out to occupants and received no response, the 

telephoned report of a woman being held against her will could have justified a warrantless entry 

to ensure that there was no one in the house who was physically restrained or too frightened to 

respond to the officers, but that did not occur. 

This situation should be contrasted to that in Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 62 P.3d 214, where 

police were dispatched to a home on a report of a medical emergency. They encountered a man 

outside the home, in physical distress, incoherent, and unable to communicate the cause of his 

medical condition. A neighbor informed the police that the man had several family members 

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who lived at the house but had not been seen all day. Officers shouted for any family members, 

but received no response, and so entered the home. We held that this entry was justified by 

exigent circumstances, noting that the unexplained medical emergency, coupled with the 

officers’ inability to contact anyone in the home, suggested a reasonable possibility that other 

occupants in the home were also in distress. 

In the present case, there was no attempt by police officers to contact the alleged victim 

through non-intrusive means such as knocking or calling out for her, and the surrounding 

circumstances did not suggest an immediate danger that would justify dispensing with an effort 

to bring someone to the door to be interviewed. Had the latter action been taken, the officers’ 

interview of Melissa could have either supported or dispelled the report that she was being held 

against her will. If the results of that interview left officers concerned that there could still be an 

individual in danger inside the house, and if permission to search could not be obtained from 

Reynolds or Melissa, perhaps a warrantless entry would have been justified. But in the 

circumstances as they are presented to us, there was no appearance of an immediate risk of harm 

sufficient to excuse the officers from the normal procedure of knocking or calling out to bring 

someone to the doorway for questioning. The circumstances here did not support a reasonable 

belief that immediate entry into the home was necessary. 

C. Melissa’s Consent to a Search Was Valid 

Notwithstanding the illegality of this initial entry, the State argues that evidence found in 

the home should not be suppressed because Melissa’s subsequent consent to the officers’ further 

intrusion into the home and the ultimate opening of the plywood box authorized and legitimized 

the officers’ search and discovery of the marijuana. 

A voluntary consent to a search, given by either the defendant or a third party with 

authority over the place or item to be searched, will exempt a search from the warrant 

requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 

644, 181 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008). The burden of proving that consent has been given, 

and that the person giving the consent had authority to do so, is on the State. Illinois v. 

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708, 963 P.2d 387, 391 

(Ct. App. 1998); Johnson, 110 Idaho at 522, 716 P.2d at 1294; State v. Huskey, 106 Idaho 91, 93, 

675 P.2d 351, 353 (Ct. App. 1984). 

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If the consent was preceded by police conduct that violated the accused’s constitutional 

rights, however, the State must also prove that the consent was not procured by exploitation of 

the previous illegality. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); State v. Tietsort, 

145 Idaho 112, 175 P.3d 801 (Ct. App. 2007). In such a circumstance, the question is “whether, 

granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made 

has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. Whether the 

connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery of evidence is sufficiently 

attenuated to allow use of the evidence against the defendant requires consideration of three 

factors: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the 

occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law 

enforcement action. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 

841, 846-47, 103 P.3d 454, 459-60 (2004). 

Accordingly, to determine whether the evidence found in Reynolds’ home must be 

suppressed, we must determine whether Melissa’s consent to the officers’ further intrusion into 

the home and search of the box was voluntary; whether Melissa possessed authority to authorize 

the officers’ intrusion into all of the areas that were searched; and whether the three Brown

factors indicate that the connection between the officers’ unlawful entry and Melissa’s consent 

was sufficiently attenuated that the consent was untainted. 

1. Voluntariness of consent 

Here, two forms of consent were given, the first being implied. The implied consent 

occurred when, in response to Officer Farina’s question whether there were any weapons in the 

home, Melissa directed the officer down a hallway and into another room to show where a 

handgun was located. The express consent occurred thereafter when Farina requested, and 

Melissa gave, consent to a search of the home. Whether a consent to a search was voluntary is 

an issue of fact, and we therefore defer to the trial court’s findings as to voluntariness. Tietsort, 

145 Idaho at 119, 175 P.3d at 808; State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97-98, 137 P.3d 481, 484-85 

(Ct. App. 2006). Here, the district court found that Melissa’s consents were voluntary, and the 

evidence fully supports that finding. First, we note that although the officers’ unlawful entry 

violated the constitutional rights of Melissa, who was a resident of the home, as well as those of 

Reynolds, nothing in the record suggests that she found their entry objectionable. To the 

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contrary, she acknowledged that she was the victim of the domestic disturbance that the officers 

were there to investigate and, so far as appears from the record, she welcomed the police 

presence and was happy to cooperate. She took the initiative in directing Officer Farina down 

the hallway and into the office where the gun was located, and the police employed no coercive 

tactics either then or thereafter when they requested her express consent for a larger search. 

2. Melissa’s authority to consent 

The next question is whether Melissa possessed authority to consent to the search. As 

noted above, a third party’s consent to a search will relieve government agents of the warrant 

requirement only if the person possessed authority to provide such a consent. Actual authority 

exists if the consenting party shares with the defendant common authority over the place 

searched. Such common authority generally is shared by co-habitants of a residence. The 

United States Supreme Court has explained: 

Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest 

a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party 

consent . . . rests . . . [up]on mutual use of the property by persons generally 

having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to 

recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in 

his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number 

might permit the common area to be searched. 

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). See also State v. Ham, 113 Idaho 405,

744 P.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1987) (mother had access to rent-paying son’s room sufficient to give her 

authority to consent to search). As we noted in Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219, 984 P.2d at 707, 

married couples generally have common authority over the premises they share. 

 In this case, Melissa was married to Reynolds and shared the residence with him. She 

plainly possessed actual authority to consent to Officer Farina’s walk from the living room into 

the office where he saw the handgun and the large box, and to grant his subsequent request to 

search throughout the house. 

 The question of Melissa’s authority to permit the officers to open the big box in the office 

is more problematic. Common authority over shared premises does not necessarily translate into 

authority to search specific containers. That is, “The shared control of ‘host’ property does not 

serve to forfeit the expectation of privacy in containers within that property.” United States v. 

Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds United States v. Kim, 105 

F.3d 1579 (9th Cir. 1997). See also United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2003)

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(housemate did not have authority to consent to search of gym bag under defendant’s bed); 

United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978) (mother did not have authority to consent to 

search of locked trunk when she said it belonged to defendant and she did not have key to open 

it). United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84 (2nd Cir. 1992) (individual had common authority to 

consent to search of his footlocker that he allowed defendant to store items in, even though 

defendant had only genuine key); United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1992) 

(girlfriend lacked authority to consent to search of suitcase left in girlfriend’s apartment by 

defendant, who stayed there several nights a week, where girlfriend expressly denied ownership). 

Even a spouse may not have actual authority to consent to a search of property owned by the 

other if the spouse has no right or ability to control or access the item. Cf. United States v. 

Duran, 957 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992) (wife could consent to search of outbuilding that she did not 

use when nothing prevented her from using it); United States v. Harrison, 679 F.2d 942 (D.C. 

Cir. 1982) (wife had common authority to consent to search of boxes containing husband’s 

personal property in unlocked storage area in basement when boxes were not sealed and did not 

in any way indicate husband’s exclusive ownership or control). 

In the absence of actual authority, a search nevertheless may be valid if, based on the 

information known at the time, the law enforcement officer had an objectively reasonable belief 

that the consenting party possessed authority over the place to be searched. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 

at 188; Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219, 984 P.2d at 707; State v. McCaughey, 127 Idaho 669, 674, 904 

P.2d 939, 944 (1995); State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct. App. 1998). 

For example, in McCaughey, the victim was temporarily living with her husband after a period 

of separation and was in the process of moving her things from the home. After a domestic 

violence incident, she consented to a search of the home. The husband had taken steps to keep 

her out of the shed and basement, but the officer was not aware of these details of the living 

arrangement. Prior to the search, the officer had been told that the victim was married to the 

defendant and lived in the house. Additionally, the victim’s property was at the house, and the 

victim produced the keys to the locked basement and shed. Under these circumstances, where 

nothing suggested to the officer that the victim’s dominion and control over any part of the house 

was limited, the Supreme Court held that the victim had apparent authority to consent to a 

search. Likewise, in United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2005) it was held that the 

occupant of a trailer had apparent authority to consent to the search of a gun case on a shelf in 

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the living room when the occupant answered questions about the case without disclaiming 

control over it. And in White v. United States, 444 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1971) a woman holding 

herself out as the defendant’s wife was deemed to possess authority to consent to the search of a 

cloth bag when she neither objected to the search nor indicated to officers that the bag was 

exclusively the defendant’s property. 

 In this case, Melissa disclaimed ownership of the plywood box and told officers that she 

did not want it in the house. She also told Officer Farina that she seldom went into the room 

with the box, but she did not indicate to the officers that Reynolds had forbidden her to open the 

box or prevented her from accessing its contents. There is no evidence that she lacked the right 

or ability to access or use the box. Although the box was locked and Melissa did not 

immediately know exactly where the key was located, it was quickly found hanging on the wall 

in the same room where the box was situated. The officers knew that the box was located in the 

marital home that Melissa shared with Reynolds and that she could readily access it by simply 

finding the correct key on a ring of keys located nearby. Absent any evidence that the officers 

knew that Reynolds had attempted to forbid or prevent Melissa’s access to the box, the officers 

were justified in a belief that Melissa had authority to consent to their search of the box’s 

interior. The evidence supports the district court’s finding that Melissa had at least apparent 

authority to consent to the search of the box. 

3. Attenuation of taint from the illegal entry 

Lastly, we turn to the attenuation question--whether Melissa’s consent was “fruit of the 

poisonous tree,” i.e., a product of the unlawful entry. The finding that Melissa’s consent was 

voluntary is important, but not decisive, in this inquiry. As noted above, there is a three-part test 

to determine whether there was a sufficient break in the causal chain between the unlawful 

conduct and the discovery of challenged evidence. The first of the three factors to be considered 

is the lapse of time between the police misconduct and Melissa’s consent. In this case, that time 

period was very brief, which militates against a finding of attenuation. 

The other two factors, however, weigh in favor of attenuation. First, the warrantless 

entry into the Reynolds’ home without a warrant or permission was not a particularly egregious 

Fourth Amendment violation. The officer did so in the belief that someone may have been held 

against her will in the house. He entered not for a calculated purpose of trying to discover 

evidence of a crime, but rather to determine the location and well-being of an alleged victim of a 

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domestic disturbance. Having entered, he went only a few feet inside before making contact 

with Melissa, and she consented to any further intrusion. Finally, the unsolicited and entirely 

self-initiated nature of Melissa’s invitation for an officer to walk into the office to see the gun, 

and her personal willingness to cooperate with the officers, is an intervening circumstance that 

separates the consent from the violation of Reynolds’ constitutional rights that occurred when the 

police entered. Apart from the temporal proximity, there is no evidence in the record that 

Melissa’s cooperation and consent were products of the unlawful entry. Nothing indicates that 

she was intimidated by the officers’ unannounced entry. The only information that the officers 

gained by their initial unlawful entry was the scent of marijuana, but that was not the reason that 

Melissa showed Officer Farina around the house. Rather, she led him into the office in response 

to the officer’s question about the presence of weapons, a legitimate inquiry considering that the 

purpose of the visit was to investigate a domestic disturbance. Weighing all of the factors that 

are to be considered in an attenuation analysis, we conclude that Melissa’s consent was not 

acquired by exploitation of the illegality but, instead, “by means sufficiently distinguishable to 

be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. 

Because the consent was given voluntarily by someone with apparent authority and was 

not tainted by the officers’ initial unlawful entry into Reynolds’ home, the district court properly 

refused to suppress the evidence found. 

III. 

CONCLUSION

 Although the officers’ initial entry into Reynolds’ home was unlawful, the district court 

correctly denied his suppression motion. The evidence shows that Melissa voluntarily consented 

to the officers’ search of her home and the large box within it, that she had actual or apparent 

authority to do so, and that her consent was not tainted by the officers’ prior unlawful entry into 

the house. Therefore, the order denying Reynolds’ motion to suppress evidence is affirmed. 

 Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge PERRY CONCUR.