Filed 12/10/13 Veronica M. v. Superior Court CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

VERONICA M.,

 Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE 

COUNTY,

 Respondent;

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES 

AGENCY et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest.

 G048848

 (Super. Ct. No. DP-022456)

 O P I N I O N

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of 

the Superior Court of Orange County, Dennis J. Keough, Judge. Petition denied.

Rebecca Captain for Petitioner.

Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Julie J. 

Agin, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest, Orange County Social Services 

Agency. 
2

Veronica M. (mother) seeks extraordinary relief from an order of the 

juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning 

hearing for her child, A.C. After reviewing the petition on the merits, we deny relief. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h).)

FACTS

Mother gave birth to A.C. prematurely, at 34 weeks gestation, in January 

2012. He weighed just five pounds, three ounces. 

When A.C. was about five weeks old, a social worker visited the home to 

investigate a report of general neglect of the child by mother. The social worker’s 

resulting report, which was inconclusive on abuse, stated the mother “has post partum 

depression, is not all there, and . . . made a statement that she wanted to throw the baby 

out the window.” The report noted the baby’s low birth weight and failure to gain 

weight: A few days before the social worker’s visit, A.C. had been weighed at a clinic, 

registering just six pounds, one ounce. Mother and the presumed father, Ezequiel C.

(father), with whom mother and baby were then living, signed a Children and Family 

Services Safety Plan, agreeing to participate in a Postpartum Wellness Program and 

Stress Free Families Program, to fill mother’s prescription for antidepressant medication, 

and to take A.C. to the pediatrician. 

In April 2012, mother and father brought 10-week-old A.C., vomiting and 

stricken with diarrhea, to the emergency room at the urging of a neighbor who was 

concerned the child was seriously underweight. Emergency room personnel found the 

baby’s condition alarming: At 7 pounds, 12 ounces, he was below the third percentile in 

weight, had sunken eyes, skinny arms and legs, and a protruding belly. A doctor 

diagnosed A.C. with “failure to thrive” and determined the cause was environmental 

because, once admitted to the hospital, the infant ate normally and steadily gained weight. 
3

On April 18, 2012, while A.C. was still at the hospital, the social services 

agency (SSA) placed him in protective custody. On April 20, SSA filed a detention 

petition for A.C. 

The detention report listed the many warning signs of problems in the 

home. Along with A.C.’s diagnosed failure to thrive, the report noted mother’s 

diagnosed postpartum depression and her complaint of auditory hallucinations. Father

relayed that mother “does not show any interest in caring for the baby.” The report also 

noted mother’s report of having been twice physically abused by father, first during her 

pregnancy, when father slapped her face for buying the “wrong” tortillas, and then again 

on April 7 or 8, when father grabbed mother by the hair and dragged her while the baby 

was present. 

The detention report noted that mother had not complied with the 

psychiatric medication regime prescribed for her, nor had she followed through on the 

referrals given to her as part of the agreed safety plan. She had also neglected to take 

A.C. to his pediatrician for scheduled appointments, preventing the doctor from

adequately monitoring A.C.’s weight gain. 

The report further noted that the maternal grandmother had multiple prior 

child abuse referrals and mother had been in foster care and group homes from the age of 

13 through 18. Mother stated that she had suffered from depression since the age of 12 or 

13, and had been prescribed psychotropic medication while in foster care. 

At the April 23, 2012, detention hearing the court ordered reunification 

services and gave the parents separate, supervised visitation of two hours each, three 

times a week. Mother’s visitation was conditioned on her keeping her psychiatric 

appointments and complying with her medication orders. Three days later, A.C. was 

placed in a foster home with a “non-relative extended family member,” a placement that 

remained constant throughout these dependency proceedings.
4

The May 16, 2012, jurisdiction/disposition report and June 1 addendum 

noted some concerns with mother’s visitation. (Because other alone contests the juvenile 

court orders, this statement of facts focuses on mother.) The caretaker, who monitored 

visitation, reported mother’s apparent lack of concern when A.C. was ill (she refused to 

leave a party to bring a thermometer when A.C. had a fever), mother’s disinterest in 

attending the baby’s doctor visits, her admitted dislike for babies in general because they 

are “too small,” her observed difficulties in changing A.C., and her impatience in feeding 

him. 

At the June 4, 2012, combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing, mother

pleaded no contest to the amended dependency petition alleging neglect through failure to 

protect (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)).

1 The court found that the cause of A.C.’s 

failure to thrive was environmental; that his parents had neglected the infant by failing to 

ensure he received “regular, frequent, and consistent feedings” and the medical care 

needed to address his lack of weight gain; that in early March 2012 mother was 

diagnosed with postpartum depression, with symptoms that included “lack of interest in 

caring for the child,” but she “neglected to take her prescribed medication or seek 

continued treatment,” placing A.C. at risk; that A.C. had been exposed to an act of 

domestic violence (the hair pulling and dragging incident) and the parents have “a 

conflictual relationship” which has escalated to physical violence, putting A.C. at risk of 

bodily harm. 

The court adopted the recommended case plan objectives and 

responsibilities for mother that included completion of a domestic violence program 

(Personal Empowerment Program or PEP), general counseling, psychiatric treatment and 

compliance with the medication regime prescribed, and parenting education. The court 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
5

continued the existing visitation plan (two-hour visits, three times per week), and set a 

six-month review for November 27, 2012. 

In July 2012, father was arrested on charges of committing forcible sex 

offenses against mother. He remained incarcerated throughout the rest of these

proceedings and he has chosen not to contest the dependency orders.

Six-month Review

A series of status review reports prepared for the six-month review hearing 

painted a disappointing picture of mother’s compliance with her visitation and service 

plan. 

During this six-month review period, mother did not participate in any 

counseling. She completed her parenting classes, but did not complete the entire 10-

week PEP domestic violence program. She finished 7 of the 10 PEP classes by the end of 

November 2012, but waited until late January 2013 to complete the eighth class, and then 

failed to undertake the last two required classes. 

Mother attended quarterly medication monitoring appointments (June, 

September and December of 2012) with a psychiatric nurse practitioner who diagnosed 

mother with “[m]ajor depressive disorder, recurrent episode,” and noted mother’s 

medication compliance was “[g]ood,” with no side effects, and that mother felt the 

“medication is helping me.” The treatment plan was to “[c]ontinue medication as 

prescribed.” Despite that directive, mother stopped taking her antidepressants in January 

2013 on her own initiative, without the approval of her psychiatric nurse practitioner, 

because she had become pregnant and was worried the drugs would harm her developing

fetus.2

 

2 The father of the unborn child was a man mother had begun dating in July 2012 

–– the month father was incarcerated. In mid-January 2013, a pregnant mother began 

living with this new boyfriend, but he was arrested and deported the next month.
6

Mother was inconsistent with visitation. In June 2012, she attended only 2

of 13 possible visits with A.C., and stayed for about 30 minutes or less at each visit. 

During the month of July, mother “visited an average of once to twice a week,” rather 

than the allowable three times per week. In August, mother visited an average of once a 

week. While visiting A.C. during this three-month period, mother made minimal 

attempts to take care of the infant’s needs, leaving A.C.’s feeding, diaper changes and 

clothes changes to the caretaker. On one visit in July, mother responded to the 

caretaker’s description of A.C. having soiled his clothes and baby bouncer from diarrhea 

with the comment: “‘I would have bathed him in cold water so he can learn.’”

In September 2012, mother made six of eight possible visits. Unlike the 

earlier visits monitored by the caretaker in the caretaker’s home, a social worker 

monitored these visits at an agency office, and reported mother was “appropriate,”

“affectionate and playful with the child.” At these visits, mother attended to the baby’s 

needs and “interacted well” with him. A social worker made similar reports of the 

October visits, though noting that mother needed “prompting” to attend to the baby’s 

needs for feeding and diaper changes. 

Mother missed two visits during the first two weeks of November, and 

between November 27 and January 11, 2013, she missed 6 out of 20 possible visits. The 

social worker noted these visits were “good,” that mother was appropriate and “very 

affectionate,” and handled all feeding and diaper changes. The social worker noted, 

however, that mother often had to be “re-directed when feeding the child; she gives up 

easily when the child does not want to eat.” To mother’s “credit,” the report noted that 

she “continues to demonstrate improvement” and “accepts suggestions well.”

Between January 14 and February 6, 2013, mother missed 7 out of 11 

visits, and she missed two more visits in the next two weeks. Since the beginning of the 

dependency case, mother never attended a single one of A.C.’s many medical 
7

appointments, despite being encouraged by the social worker and caretaker to attend 

them.

In the weeks leading up to the six-month review hearing set for February 

25, 2013, the assigned social worker tried repeatedly to contact mother to set up a 

meeting to discuss her case plan, but was unable to reach mother. The case worker left

messages with the maternal grandmother, with whom mother had been living before 

moving out in mid-January 2013. The maternal grandmother promised to pass the 

messages on to mother, and later reported having done so. Nevertheless, mother did not 

contact the social worker. 

Mother did not show up at the six-month review hearing on February 25, 

2013. The court found mother had made “minimal” progress toward meeting the goals of 

her service plan, continued reunification services, and set a 12-month review for May 28, 

2013. 

Twelve-month Review

The social worker submitted a series of reports for the 12-month review 

that once again presented a picture of mother’s inconsistent visitation and failure to 

commit fully to completion of her service plan during the period preceding the 

evidentiary hearing that began on July 25, 2013.

On February 25, 2013, mother called the social worker to explain that she 

had missed that day’s six-month review hearing because she had overslept and, upon 

waking, could not find her clothes for court. Mother said that she was living with “a 

friend” because she could not get along with her mother, but she gave her mother’s 

address for mailing purposes. Mother made an appointment to meet the social worker 

two days later, but failed to show up. The social worker tried to reach mother, but the 

maternal grandmother reported that her daughter had moved to an unidentified homeless 

shelter on March 5. The social worker did not hear from mother again until May 8, with

the looming 12-month review hearing then set for May 28, 2013. 
8

At that point, mother’s visitation and service plan compliance since the sixmonth review was virtually nonexistent. Mother had not visited A.C. since February 25, 

2013. After resurfacing on May 8, mother waited another two weeks to visit A.C. Her 

May 24, 2013 visit was her first contact with the child in three months. She had yet to 

attend a single medical appointment for A.C., and had not attended any of the therapy 

sessions the Regional Center provided to address the child’s numerous, substantial

developmental delays.

Mother had not yet begun any individual counseling. Nor had she yet 

completed the two PEP classes left unfinished in the last review period. (She did

eventually complete the last two classes by the July 25, 2013, hearing.) Mother had 

unilaterally stopped taking her prescribed psychotropic medication in January 2013 due 

to her pregnancy — which she first revealed to her social worker in the May 8 phone call

–– and had neither resumed taking her medication nor met with her psychiatrist since her 

last appointment in December 2012.

After mother visited A.C. on May 24, 2013, her visitation continued to be 

inconsistent. She attended just four of eight possible visits in June, and failed to provide 

documentation to support her claim of having missed two visits for medical reasons. Her 

visits with the child, however, were positive: She was “appropriate,” “affectionate” and 

“playful” with A.C., and fed and changed him. 

During this review period, mother was expelled from two shelters for 

homeless pregnant women before moving into a third shelter just two days before the 

evidentiary hearing began on July 25, 2013. She stayed the longest at the first shelter, 

from March 5, 2013 to June 17, 2013, when she was asked to leave because she had spent 

a night away without permission. (Because this was her second unapproved overnight 

absence, the shelter rejected her excuse of having to babysit her younger sister while her 

mother was ill.) 
9

While at shelter No.1, mother began individual counseling in June 2013,

and completed two counseling sessions before being expelled from the shelter on June 

17. Mother was at shelter No. 2 only briefly, from June 29 to July 8, 2013, when she was 

expelled for lacking identification. Her effort to obtain an identification card from the 

Department of Motor Vehicles was unsuccessful when she discovered she was a dollar 

short of the $8 cost after a three-hour wait in line. 

She was admitted to shelter No. 3 on July 23, 2013. At the evidentiary 

hearing, her new case manager at the shelter, Rebecca Younger, was very positive about 

mother’s compliance with shelter rules and programs during the two days she had been 

there. Younger explained that mother was in the shelter’s one-year program for pregnant 

women, which included assistance with parenting, counseling, baby care, education or 

job planning, child care and housing, among other services. Mother was scheduled to 

begin individual counseling through the shelter. 

When mother testified at the hearing, she had been at shelter No. 3 for nine 

days. She explained that she could have A.C. live with her at the shelter and she had all 

the supplies needed to have him in her care. She had signed a one-year contract with the 

shelter and was learning to be a better mother. She was attending the required Narcotics 

Anonymous meetings (though drug use was not among her problems) and parenting 

classes. She was set to begin individual counseling that week. The shelter provided full

day preschool onsite. 

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court found that mother

“has not regularly and consistently . . . participated in her visitation[,] nor has she made 

significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the child’s . . . removal.” The 

court noted the legal presumption that arises from a parent’s failure to participate and 

progress in the case plan, and found that return of A.C. to mother would create a 

substantial risk of detriment to the child’s well-being. The court further concluded that it 

could not find mother had the capacity to complete the case plan objectives and provide 
10

for the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being and special needs. 

The court ordered reunification services terminated and set a permanency plan hearing on 

December 11, 2013. 

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Legal Standards

At the 12-month review hearing, the court must return the child to the 

parent’s physical custody unless the court finds, “by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that the return of the child . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, 

protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e).)

Though SSA has the burden of proving such detriment, the statute provides that the 

parent’s failure “to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered 

treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.” 

(Ibid.) The court’s finding of detriment is reviewed for substantial evidence. (Angela S. 

v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.)

If the court does not order the child returned to the parent at the 12-month 

review hearing, the court may continue reunification services “only if it finds that there is 

a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody” of the 

parent within 18 months of the date the child was originally removed from the home. 

(§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) 

The statute limits the court’s ability to extend services past the 12-month

review by requiring the court to make three subordinate findings before concluding there 

is a substantial probability of return. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

“[I]n order to find a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical 

custody of his or her parent [within the statutory timeframe] . . . , the court shall be 

required to find all of the following: (A) That the parent or legal guardian has 

consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child. (B) That the parent or 

legal guardian has made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child’s 
11

removal from the home. (C) The parent or legal guardian has demonstrated the capacity 

and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for 

the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.” 

(§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C), italics added.) Again, the court’s findings on each of 

these three questions is reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re Shaundra L. (1995) 

33 Cal.App.4th 303, 316.) 

In this writ proceeding, mother challenges the court’s findings on two 

issues as lacking sufficient evidentiary support. The two findings are that return of A.C.

to her custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to his well-being, and that 

there is no substantial probability of returning A.C. to her custody within the requisite 18-

month time frame. As will be explained below, the record provides ample support for 

both findings.

B. The Record Supports the Finding of Substantial Risk of Detriment

Mother argues substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that 

returning A.C. to her custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s 

physical or emotional well-being. More specifically, she contends that SSA “failed to 

demonstrate how A.C. would be at risk in mother’s care.” She points out that A.C. was 

removed from the home for three reasons: his diagnosed “failure to thrive,” mother’s 

postpartum depression and resulting “problems,” and mother’s “domestic violence 

relationship” with father. She contends that all three reasons are now resolved: A.C. is 

healthy and her positive visits with him demonstrate her ability to care for him in the 

shelter where she now resides; there is “no evidence of continued mental health 

problems” on her part, and she is no longer in a relationship with her batterer, father. She 

concludes that, because the initial reasons for detention are now resolved, there is no 

evidentiary basis for the court’s finding of detriment.

Mother’s argument is well off the mark. Fundamentally, she ignores the 

fact that her demonstrated failure “to participate regularly and make substantive progress 
12

in court-ordered treatment programs” constituted “prima facie evidence that return would 

be detrimental,” thereby shifting to mother the burden of proving that return would not be 

detrimental. (§ 366.21, subd. (e); In re Cory M. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 935, 949-950, 

superseded by statute on another point, as stated in In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 

Cal.App.4th 1339, 1342.) The other defect in her argument is its premise: that her 

current circumstances prove that the reasons for removal no longer pertain, and, thus, 

there is no risk of detriment in returning A.C. to her custody. The court’s finding to the 

contrary has solid support in the record.

1. Mother Failed To Participate Regularly and Make Substantive Progress

in Court-ordered Treatment Programs

There were five components of mother’s service plan and she failed to 

participate regularly or make any substantive progress as two of the five requirements. 

Specifically, though the service plan required that she obtain counseling, she made no 

effort to obtain any counseling until almost exactly a year later, in June of 2013, and even 

then she only attended two counseling sessions. That, clearly, is not “regular”

participation, nor could it have resulted in “substantive progress,” in the court-ordered 

counseling program. Additionally, the service plan required mother to cooperate with her 

treating psychiatrist and to take the psychiatric medication prescribed for her. Mother

blatantly defied this requirement by unilaterally ceasing to take her prescribed 

antidepressant medication from January 2013 onward due to her pregnancy, and by 

failing to attend any further psychiatric appointments. SSA aptly contends this 

noncompliance with two crucial aspects of her service plan created “gaping holes in the 

safety net essential to little [A.C.’s] well[-]being.” 

SSA explained the significance of these two unmet requirements of the 

service plan by pointing to the grave danger A.C. faced as an infant in mother’s care. At 

10 weeks old, he was abnormally thin, with sunken eyes and protruding belly, because 

his mother’s postpartum depression and resulting lack of interest in caring for her baby
13

left him seriously underfed and bereft of medical attention. A psychiatrist diagnosed 

mother as having “[m]ajor depressive disorder, recurrent episode” and prescribed 

antidepressants for improved functioning. When mother decided in January 2013 to stop 

taking her medication and to stop obtaining psychiatric care, she was subjecting A.C. to 

the risk of renewed neglect due to her untreated major depression. Additionally, the new 

pregnancy posed the risk of a future recurrence of the severe postpartum depression that 

caused her to neglect A.C. as an infant. At the 12-month review hearing, the court 

expressed concern about this very risk of “postpartum issues” stemming from the new 

pregnancy. It seems beyond debate that, together, the court-ordered psychiatric treatment

and counseling services were measures that could have both enlightened mother as to the 

nature and scope of her mental health challenges and lessened the dangers her mental 

illness posed to a small child in her care.

Mother’s petition does not dispute that she failed to comply with the 

psychiatric treatment/medication component of her service plan, but instead implicitly 

argues that her noncompliance should be excused as unnecessary. She asserts that 

“[t]here were no reported concerns of mother’s mental health. There was no evidence 

presented at trial that mother’s discontinuation of her medication to protect her [unborn] 

baby caused any adverse reactions.” In effect, mother contends that, because no harm 

resulted from her avoidance of psychiatric treatment and medication, her failure to 

“participate regularly” in this particular court-ordered treatment program should not 

constitute prima facie evidence of detriment under section 366.21, subdivision (e). 

But mother offers no authority for this novel assertion that a parent in a 

dependency proceeding can blithely ignore a court-ordered treatment plan and then avoid 

the consequence of that conduct by asserting the requirement was unreasonable or 

unnecessary. (See In re Cory M., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 949-950 [mother’s “failure 

to follow the prescribed treatment program furnished prima facie evidence of detriment”

notwithstanding mother’s assertion that the order to take psychiatric medication was
14

unreasonable].) Mother’s failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress 

in the court-ordered psychiatric treatment program furnished prima facie evidence that 

returning A.C. to her custody would cause detriment to his well-being. The same 

consequence flowed from her failure to participate regularly in counseling.

2. Mother Failed to Disprove the Prima Facie Showing of Detriment

Because mother did not comply with her case plan, the burden shifted to 

her to prove that returning A.C. to her care would not be detrimental. (In re Cory M., 

supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 949-950.) Mother failed to meet that burden. 

Mother’s showing of lack of detriment consisted, essentially, of the 

following facts: She does not currently suffer from postpartum depression or any 

“continued mental health problems”; she currently enjoys loving and “affectionate” visits 

with A.C.; she currently lives in a shelter that can accommodate A.C. and assist her in 

caring for him and his newborn sibling; and she is no longer in a domestic violence 

relationship. All of these facts, taken together, do not dispel the risk of detriment in 

returning A.C. to mother that arises from her failure to obtain needed psychiatric 

treatment and counseling.

SSA persuasively argues that mother’s conduct in stopping medication 

without consulting her psychiatrist, and then failing to attend any further psychiatric 

appointments, “was compelling evidence that she did not appreciate the risk her mental 

health problems presented and that she could not be relied upon to address them.”

Moreover, SSA contends that mother’s failure to participate in regular counseling 

significantly increased the chance she would repeat her earlier dangerous behavior of 

living with an abuser or neglecting her child when depression overwhelms her. On the 

latter point, SSA asserts: “Absent significant progress in counseling[,] the court had no 

evidence that Mother appreciated the gravity of [A.C.’s medical] condition [at removal], 

her role in its exacerbation, or that she understood how to prevent future neglect and the 

importance of obtaining medical care.”
15

It also bears noting that from initial detention through the 12-month review, 

mother never demonstrated a strong commitment to regaining custody of A.C. She 

delayed completing much of her service plan; for long stretches she failed to remain in 

contact with the social worker, and, most importantly, she was woefully inconsistent in 

visitation. Mother even went three months without seeing A.C. in the crucial period just 

before the original hearing date for the 12-month review. 

Importantly, mother never attended any of A.C.’s medical appointments 

and attended just one of his therapy sessions, and then only for 30 minutes of the twohour session. Given the child’s significant developmental delays, mother’s complete 

disinterest in learning how to help her son overcome these challenges is particularly 

distressing. The court remarked on mother’s brief observance of a single therapy session 

as “going to some core aspects of this case . . . .”

In light of mother’s failure to obtain needed psychiatric treatment and 

counseling, her history of half-hearted efforts at reunification only underscores the risk of 

detriment to the child were he returned to her custody. The record provides ample 

support for the court’s finding of detriment. 

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding of no Substantial Probability of Return

Within 18 Months

Mother also argues the court erred in terminating reunification services 

because there was a substantial probability A.C. would be returned to her custody within 

the 18-month statutory timeframe. She argues the court’s finding of no such substantial 

probability lacks evidentiary support. Mother is wrong.

As explained above, the court may not extend reunification services absent 

a finding of a substantial probability the child will be returned to the parent’s physical

custody within 18 months of removal. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) That finding, in turn, 

depends on three subordinate findings, none of which the court made here. Specifically, 

the court must find the parent has maintained consistent and regular contact, has made 
16

significant progress in resolving the problems that led to removal, and has demonstrated 

the “ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for 

the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.” 

(§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C),)

Our previous analysis of the evidentiary support for the court’s detriment 

finding is equally applicable to the issues raised here. To recap, mother’s failure to 

maintain consistent and regular contact with A.C. is beyond dispute. Similarly, mother

did not make significant progress in resolving the problems that led to A.C.’s removal, 

given her rejection of psychiatric treatment and prescribed medication, and her failure to 

engage in counseling to address her past domestic violence experiences and the persistent 

mental illness that has plagued her since adolescence. Finally, mother’s failure to 

commit to the hard work of regaining custody of A.C. demonstrated that she is not able to 

provide for A.C.’s well-being and special needs. 

The trial court did not err in finding no substantial probability of A.C.’s 

timely return. Based on that finding, the trial court properly terminated reunification 

services and set the permanency planning hearing.
17

DISPOSITION

The petition is denied.

THOMPSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

ARONSON, J.