*This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicataand collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 14 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________________ MICHAEL LEE WIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. STATE OF UTAH; UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION; MURRAY CITY, UTAH; THIRD DISTRICT COURT; FOURTH DISTRICT COURT; MURRAY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; HONORABLE JOHN C. BACKLUND; HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON; HONORABLE FRATTO; UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; CARSTAR & KEARNS TOWING; CITY OF OREM, UTAH, Defendants-Appellees. No. 99-4086 (D. Utah) (D.Ct. No. 98-CV-793)

____________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined-2-

unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Appellant Michael Lee Wight, a litigant appearing pro se , appeals the district court’s decision dismissing his complaint against Appellees for allegedly violating his civil rights in connection with vario us traffic infractions. We exercise our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 an d affirm.

In his complaint, Mr. Wight raised a host of genera l allegations, including claims that Appellees: (1) violated his constituti onal rights; (2) “acted as a [f]oreign [s]tate”; (3) did not “use [g]old and [s] ilver [c]oin”; and (4) committed double jeopardy, conspiracy to defraud, false arres t, kidnaping, libel, breach of contract, abuse of force and unnecessary rigor, andfraud by wire, in connection with state charges brought against him for multiple traffic infractions and the towing and impoundment of his vehicle. Mr. Wight’s traffic and other infractions included driving with an expired registration and s uspended license, failure to maintain insurance, crossing a highway divide, impr oper display of license plates, failure to appear five times for a scheduled hearin g resulting in a bench warrant, and arrest for failure to appear at two other judic ial proceedings. All state-3-

proceedings against Mr. Wight have concluded, excep t for the outstanding state warrant and the state charge concerning his lack of proof of insurance, which are still pending. Mr. Wight did not file direct or po st-conviction actions in state court concerning his traffic or criminal cases.

Following motions to dismiss filed by the State of Utah, Orem City and Murray City, the district court dismissed Mr. Wight ’s complaint against all Appellees. On appeal, Mr. Wight alleges the distri ct court improperly dismissed his complaint by applying principles of comity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. He renews his argument that impoundment of his vehicle constituted double jeopardy, and suspension of his driver’s lic ense violated his due process rights because he “was [d]eprived of a total of [f] ive [d]ays of [l]iberty” without a hearing or counsel, and because “the [j]udge was sw itched without [notice] ... in [violation] of the 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendment s.”

In reviewing Mr. Wight’s appeal, we take instructio n from our decision in Riddle v. Mondragon , 83 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1996), in which we set fo rth the appropriate standard in reviewing a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, we review the dismissal of Mr. Wight’s complaint for failure to state a claim de novo. Id. at 1201. His complaint should not be dismissed un der-4-

Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond doubt he canprove no set of facts supporting his claim for relief. Id. In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, we presume all of Mr. Wight’s factual allegations a re true and construe them in the light most favorable to him. Id. at 1202. Because Mr. Wight is proceeding
pro se , we construe his pleadings liberally and hold his pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted bylawyers. Id. However, a broad reading of his complaint does not relieve himof the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim can be based. Id. Conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments ar e insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based. Id.

With these standards in mind, and after a careful r eview of the record, we determine the district court properly dismissed Mr. Wight’s complaint. The district court correctly applied the well-establish ed doctrines of Eleventh Amendment immunity in dismissing the complaint agai nst the State, comity in dismissing Murray City and Orem City, and absolute immunity in dismissing the state district courts and judges acting in their ju dicial capacity. In addition, the district court properly determined Mr. Wight failedto sufficiently allege violation of his due process or other constitutional rights. In fact, Mr. Wight’s complaint consists of a plethora of incoherent, unsupported c onstitutional and other-5-

allegations arising out of sundry traffic infractio ns and the towing and impoundment of his vehicle. While Mr. Wight is obv iously disgruntled with the traffic infractions for which he was charged, a car eful reading of his complaint and other pleadings establishes he has provided no facts in support of his claim for relief. In sum, his complaint is based solely on conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments sufficient to state a claim or cause of action.

Accordingly, the district court’s decision dismissi ng Mr. Wight’s complaint is AFFIRMED

. Entered by the Court: WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge