It is the p o licy o f t h is C o u rt n o t t o id e n tif y vic tim s o f ch ild se x u a l ab u se b y na m e

. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE Fe br ua ry 3, 200 4 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RO Y C HISEN HAL L

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Marion County No. 5829 Jam es Curtis Sm ith, Jud ge

No. M2003- 00956-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jun e 3, 2004

The ap p e ll a n t, Ro y Ch is e n h a ll
, w a s c o n v ic te d b y a ju r y o f a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l b a tt e r y . After a sentenc ing he aring , he wa s sentence d to eig ht y ear s and nine months and, as rec ommended bythe jury , a sse sse d a

$2 5, 00 0 f

ine . T he tr ia l c ou rt

de nie d h is m oti on fo r n e w t ri a l. In th is d ir e c t app e a l, the appe llant challeng es the suff iciency of the ev i d ence, the jury instruction on flight, the jury instruction on ag g ravated sexual battery , and the a bsence of a jury

instruction on corrobor ation of

acc omplice testimony . After a re view of the rec ord and a pplicable authorities, w e af firm the dec ision of the trial c ourt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W ELLES and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

Phi lip A. Con dr a , Jas pe r, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Roy

Chi se nh a ll.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma rk ham, A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; J . Michae l Tay lor, Di s t ri ct Attorney Gene ral; and Colin Campbell, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND

Du ri ng the su mme r o f 2 00 1, eight -y ear- oldD. R. c a me to Ja sp e r, Te nn e sse e , to vis it h is 1
g randmother , Flora

Yahn. D.R. a nd his mother l ived in I llinois . This was the sec ond summer that D. R. h a d s pe nt w ith his g ra nd mothe r. Th e pr e vio us su mme r h e be frie nd e d T .O
., a tw e lve -y e ar- old-2-

bo y that li ve d in his g ra nd mot he r’ s ne ig hb or

ho od a nd T. R., a no the r bo y wh o liv e d in the are a . D .R.

a ndhis frie nd s e njo y e d spe nd ing the su mme r ri din g bik e s in the ne ig hb or ho od , p la y ing ba sk e tba ll, and play ing w ith toytrucks.

Sometimes, the y oung boy s explored the neig hborhood and surrounding are as. During one such venture , the boy s found the appe llant’s cabin. The appellant pr omised the boy s that “if y ou come ba ck her e [to the cabin] in a c ouple of day s,” he would g ive them bottle rocke ts. W hen D.R., T. O. a ndT. R. r e turne d to the c abin on July 3, the a pp e lla nt tol d the m that he ha d h idd e n th e bo ttl e
ro c ke ts. Th e thr e e bo y s w e nt i nto the c abin to loo k fo r the bo ttl e ro c ke ts; T. R. w e nt u ps ta ir s, wh ile T. O. a ndD. R. s ta y e d d ow ns ta ir s. D. R. fo un d a bott le ro c ke t unde r a co uc h an d T.O . fou nda bo ttl e rocke t under a

love sea t. D.R. and the appe llant we re s i t t i ng on the love seat toge ther whe n the

app e lla nt t oldthe bo y s if the y “ je rk e d off wh ile he watc he d” he wo uldg ive the m mo re bo ttl e ro c ke ts. D.R. did not understand wha t the appellant mea nt.

At that po int , th e app e lla nt h a d a sq ue e ze b ott le of

lot ion in h is ha nd th at he calle d h is “jer king of f lotion.” The a

ppellant t old the boy s, “This i s how y ou g et it on.” The a ppellant g ave the bottle of lotion to D.R., who squirted it on the floor. The a ppellant then took the lotion away from D.R., removed hi s own pants, and rubbe d some of the lotion on his own “private parts.” T he appellant then pulled down D.R.’s shorts and under wea r and a pplied lotion to D.R .’s “pr ivate” a nd then rubbe d D.R.’s “priva te.” The appellant told D.R., “This is how y ou jerk off .” T.O. he ard the appellant tell D.R. t h at he could not “quit till it gets har d.” D.R. g rabbe d a lig hter that wa s on a coff ee ta ble, lit the bottle rocket, thre w it at the appe llant and ra n. T.O. ran with D.R. up the stairs and out the ca

bin door to g et away from the appellant. T.R. also ra n awa y . As they left the c abin, T.O. saw the appellant “

jerking off.”

Offic er Linda Mason of t h e J as p er Police D epartment investiga ted the cha rg es ag ainst the appellant. Sh e in te r v ie w e d b o th D

. R. a n d T

. O

. a n d to o k w r it te n n o te s o f

th e in te r v ie w s

. O f

f ic er Mason learned that t h e appellant’ s residenc e wa s located on pr operty that belong ed to his sister, J oanna G riffin. The prope rty adjoined the Danny

Thomas Subdivisi on wher e D.R.’s g randmother lived.

As a result of her investig ation, around July7, 2001, Offic er Ma son obtained wa rra nts for the app e lla nt’ s a

rr e st. She a tte mpt e d to se rv e the app e lla nt s e ve ra l ti me s, bu t w a s una ble to l oc a te him for appr ox imately

six months. She spoke wit h Ms. Griffin a nd lear ned that the a ppellant had g on e to A la

ba ma . O ff

ic e r M a so n wa s nev e r ab le to se rv e the app e lla nt w ith the or ig ina l w arr a nts

.

E a s te r Co r b it t, a r e s id e n t o f th e F a c k le r

c o mm u n it y

in n e ar b y St e v e n s o n , A la

b a ma , li v e d n e xt do or to p ro pe rt y

ow ne d b y

the app e lla nt’ s si ste r, Lind a B e a ve rs . F a c kle r i s lo c a te d a bo ut thirty minutes from J asper , Tenne ssee. Mrs. B eave rs and he r husband we re building a cott ag e on the pr op e rt y du ri ng the su mme r o f 2 00 1, a ndthe app e lla nt wa s a ssi sti ng the m in the c on str uc tio n. Mr s. Corbitt rem e mb e r e d s e e in g th e ap p e ll a n t w o rk in g o n th e h o me o n Ju ly 2 a n d 3
, 2 0 0 1

. O n Ju ly

3, 2001, the appe llant and Ms. Be aver s left the are a when it wa s “dusky dark” outside. Ms. Bea vers dropped he r brother

off a t his cabin in J asper

that evening

.T h e re c o rd d o e s n o t re flec t t h e d isp o sitio n o f t h e thr e e c o u n ts o f so licita tio n

. 2

-3- I n A ug us t of

20 01 , th e Ma

ri on Cou nty

Gr a nd Jury re turne d a mul ti- c ou nt i nd ic tme nt a g a ins t the appe llant char g ing him with ag g ravated sexual battery and thre e counts of solicitation of a minor for a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l b a tt e r y

. T h e c a s e p r o c e e d e d to tria l in N o v e mb e r o f 2 0 0 2 o n th e c h arg e of ag g ravated sexual battery

. At the conc lusion of the trial, the j u ry fo und the appe llant guilty of 2
ag g ravated sexual battery and re commende d a $ 2 5
, 0 0 0 fine. Af ter a sentenc ing he aring , the trial court imposed an e ight- y ear , nine month sentence and imposed the $25,000 fine as re commended by the jury

.

Th e app e lla nt f

ile d a mot ion fo r n e w t

ri a l w hic h w a s d enie d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt . O n a

pp e a l, the appe llant arg ues that: (1) the evidenc e wa s not sufficient to support the jury ’s ver dict; (2) the

e vid e nc e wa s n ot s uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jury c harge o n flig ht; (3 ) the tr ia l c ou rt wa s r e qu ir e d to instruct the jury

on corr obo ra t ion of ac complice testimony ; and (4) the trial court’ s char g e on ag g ravated sexual battery amounted to plain er

ror.

Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e

When a defenda nt challeng es t he suff iciency of the e vidence , this Court i s oblige d to review that claim ac cording to certain well-settled pr inciples. A ver dict o f gu i l t y , rende red by a jury and

“ app ro ve d b y

the tr ia l ju dg e , a c c re dit s th e te sti mon y of the” S tat e’s wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s a ll conflicts in the testimony in favor of

the State. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, althoug h the ac cused is orig inally cloake d with a presumption of i nnocenc e, the jury verdic t of g uiltyremove s this presumption “and re place s it with one o f gu i l t .” State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). He nce, on a ppeal, the burden of proof r ests with the defe ndant to demonstrate the insufficienc y of the c onvicting e vidence

. I d. Th e re le va nt q ue sti on the re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t a ns we r i s w he the r a ny ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have f ound the ac cused g uiltyof eve ry element of the offense bey ond a re asonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Ha

rris, 839 S .W.2d at 75. I n making this decision, we are to acc ord the State “ the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence as we ll as all rea sonable and leg itimate infere nces tha t may be dra wn there from.” See Tug g le, 639 S

. W

. 2 d at 914. As such, this Court is preclude d from re

weig hing or rec onsidering the evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morg an, 929 S.W. 2d38 0, 38 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ); Sta te v. Ma tth e ws , 8 05 S.W. 2d77 6, 77 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1990). More over, w e may not substitut e our own “infer ence s for those dr awn by the trier of fac t from circ umstantial evidence .” Matthew s, 805 S.W .2d at 779.

I n the ca se her ein, the appe llant was cha rg ed with ag g rav at ed s exual battery and the jury found hi m guilty . On appe al, the appe llant arg ues that the State fa iled to establish every element of ag g ravated sexual ba ttery

. Specifica lly
, the appellant arg ues that the State failed to pr o v e t h at he touched D.R. for

the purpose of

“sexual arousa l or g ratification,” but rather mere ly “prove d a voy euristic intent” a nd that “the law requires the touching itself to be for se x ual ar ousal or g ratif ic a tio n, no t a lin k in the c ha in. ” Th e Sta te c on te nd s tha t the e vid e nc e su pp orts the jury ve rd ic t.-4-

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-504 def ine s a g g r a v ate d

s e xu a l b att e r

y a s “unlawf

ul sexual contact wit h the vi ctim by the def endant” when “ [t ]he victim i s less than thirteen ( 13) y ear s of ag e.” “Sexual c ontact” is de fined in a separ ate statute as “the intentional touching of the victim’s . . . intimate parts . . . if that intentional to u ching ca n be re asonably construed a s being for the purpose of

sexual arousal or g ratification.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-501(6)

.

Gene rally , when c onstruing a statute, eve ry

word within the statute is presumed to “ have meaning and purpose and shoul d be given full eff ect.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 29-30 (Te nn. 19 96 ) ( qu oti ng Ma

rs h v

. He nd e rs on , 42 4 S.W. 2d 19 3, 19 6 (T e nn

. 19 68 ))

. Th is C ou rt ’s pr ima ry du ty in c on str uin g a statut e is “ to asce rta in a ndg ive e ff e c t to the le g isl a tiv e int e nt w ith ou t un du ly restric ting or

expanding a

stat u t e’ s cover ag e bey ond its int ended sc ope.” O wens v. State, 908 S.W .2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) ; see a lso St ate v. Davis, 940 S.W .2d 558, 561 (Tenn. 1997)

. L eg islative intent should be gle aned f rom the “na tural and ordinary meaning of the lang uag e used, without a forc ed or subtle c onstruction that wo u l d l imit or ex tend the mea ning of the lang uag e.” Cart e r v . St a te , 95 2 S.W. 2d 41 7, 41 9 (T e nn

. 19 97 ). F urthe rm or e , th is C ou rt sh ou ld c on str

ue a statut e so that its component parts ar e consistent and r easona ble, and i n co n s i s t ent parts should be harmonized, wher e possible. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 30.

L oo kin g a t the la ng ua g e of the statut e , the re is no re qu ir e me nt tha t the se xua l c on ta c t it se lf be fo r s e xua l aro us a l or

g ratif ic a tion. Th e statut e a lso do e s n ot r e qu ir e that th e app e lla nt b e c ome sexuallyarouse d or gra tified by the s exual contact. The statute mere ly require s touching that can be “re asonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or g ratification.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501( 6); see State v. Steve n Webster, No. W1999-00293-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1097820, at *1-*2 (T en n

. C ri m . App. Nov. 22, 1999), pe rm. to appea l denied (Te nn. 2000) (r ejec ting the de fe nd a nt’ s “ no ve l” c on te nti on that the re wa s no touc hin g of his int ima te pa rt s whe re he pla c e d h is pe nis in the sle e pin g vic tim ’s ha nd ). Th e app e lla nt a rg ue s th a t he tou c he d the pr ivate pa rt s o f D .R.

no t f or the pu rp os e of

se xua l aro us a l, b ut t o in struct D.R

. how t o ma stu rb a te ou t of a vo y e ur ist ic intent. Furthe r, the a

ppellant see ms to arg ue that the intentional touc hing ha d to be for his own

se xua l aro us a l or

g ratif ic a tio n a nd his ow n g ratif

ic a tio n w a s n ot the pr ima

ry int e nt o f the a c tio ns , h is int e nt w a s to sh ow the bo y s h ow to m a stu rb a te . T his Cou rt ha s h e ld tha t:

. . . it makes no diffe renc e whic h person is intended to be arouse d or g ratified. Although the conduct may vary , the result is the s ame. Simpl y stated, .

. . , unlawful

se xua l c on ta c t wa s comple te up on the de fe nd a nt’ s inte nti on a l touc hin g of the vic tim
, whether for se x ual ar ousal or g ratification of himself, or of the vic tim, or of both.

Sta te v. Sc himpf

, 7 82 S.W. 2d18 6, 18 9 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 89 ), su pe rc e de d b y statut e a s st a te d in Sta te v. Jef

fr e y Ed wa rdPitt s, No

. 01 C01 -9 70 1- CC- 00 00 3 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. Ma r. 18 , 1 99 9) , p e rm

. to appea l denied (Te nn. 1999) (inter nal citations omitted).

Turning to the proof at trial, the t estimony showed that the appellant remove d his pants and applied lotion to hims elf. Then, the appellant remove d the shorts and unde rwe ar of D.R. and rubbe d his “private pa

rt” with lotion, telling D.R. that he c ould not “quit ti l l i t gets hard.” Further, T.O.-5-

observe d the appellant masturbating as t he boy s ran from the cabin. Fr om this testimony , the jury could have rea sonably

conclude d that the appe llant touched D.R. for the purpose of sexual arousal or g ratification. See State v. J ack Warren Emert, J r., No. 03C01-9802-CC-00074, 1999 WL 512029,

a t *2 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. Jul. 2 1, 19 99 ) ( c iti ng Sta te v. Me e ks , 8 76 S.W. 2d12 1, 13 1 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ) ( de te rm in in g t ha t a jury c a n d ra w o n c omm on kn ow le dg e a nde xpe ri e nc e to a sc e rt a in if the def endant touche d the victim for sex u al arousa l or g ratification). Thus, the evidenc e wa s sufficie nt to support the conviction for a g g ravated sexual battery . This issue is without merit.

J u r y In s t ru c t i o n s o n A g g r a v a t e d S e x u a l B a t t e r y

The a ppellan t n ex t ar gues that the trial c ourt failed to pr operly instruct the jury

on the elements of a g g ravated sexual battery . I n so doing, the appellant a cknowledg es that the trial c ourt fo llo we d the Te nn e sse e Pa tte rn Jury I ns truc tio ns , but as se rt s tha t th e ins truc tio n w a s a n “ inc omp le te or conf using state ment of the e lements of the of fense .” The appellant also conc edes tha t he fa iled to object to the jury

instructions and to include this issue in the motion for new trial. How ever , he contends that this Court should re cog nize plain error in this i nstance due to the ef fec t the improper instruction had on his substantive rig hts. Specifically , he submits that the offense of ag g rava ted sexual battery “ca n only be commit ted i f ‘that intentional touching ’ was ‘for the purpose of

sexual

aro us a l or g ratif ic a tio n’ ” a ndthat the tr ia l c ou rt ’s omi ssi on of that po rt ion of

the de fi nit ion is “ pla in

e rr or ” be c a us e it d e nie d h im o f h is “ fu nd a me nta l r ig ht t o a un a nim ous ju ry ve rd ic t.” Th e Sta te counter s that the appe llant has waive d the i ssue for failing to raise it in a motion for new trial and, even unde r a pla in error

analy sis, the instruction was proper

. This Court may
, i n an exerc ise of its discretion, consider an issue which ha s been w aived. Howeve r, in order

for this Court to find plain error , the er ror must aff

ect a substantial rig ht of the

acc used. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Gene rally , the fa ilure to prese nt an issue in a motion for new trial

re su lts in w a ive r. Rul e 3( e ) o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Ap pe lla te Pr oc e du re pr ov ide s th a t f or app e a ls “in all ca ses t ri ed by

a jury , no issue prese nted for r eview sha ll be predic ated upon e rror in the admission or exclusion of evidenc e, jury instructions gr anted or ref used, . . . or other

g round upon wh ic h a new tria l is so ug ht, un le ss the sa me wa s sp e c if ic a lly state d ina

mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l; otherwise suc h issues will be treate d as wa ived.” See also State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that a def endant r elinquishes the rig ht to arg ue on appe al any issues that should have be en pre sented in a motion for ne w trial).

Whether prope rly

assig ned or not, howe ver, this court may consi d er p l ai n err or upon the

rec ord under

Rule 52(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure. State v. Og le, 666 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 19 8 4 )

. I n o r d e r to r e v ie w a n is s u e u n d e r th e p la in e rr o r d o c trin e , f iv e f a c to r s mu s t be prese nt: (1) the re cord must clea rly estab l i s h what occ urre d in the trial court; (2) a cle ar a nd unequivoca l rule of law must have been breac hed; (3) a subst antial right of t he defenda nt must have been a dverse ly

aff ecte d ; (4 ) t h e accuse d did not waive the issue f or tac tical re asons; and (5) consideration of the err or is nece ssary to do substantial just ice. See State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d-6-

626, 641 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ; see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b). An error in j ury instructions on the conduct element of an of fense will be plain when it ca nnot be classifie d as harmless bey ond

a re a so na ble do ub t.

Rule 52(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Crimi nal P roce dure makes i t clea r that the plain e rror rule is not a re medy

to be used in many situations. The int ention of the rule is to serve the e nds of justice. Ther efor e, it is invoked “only in exceptional circumstanc es [where nece ssary ] t o avoid a miscarr iage o f justice.” Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 639 (quoting United States v. Ge rald, 624 F .2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir.1980)). Appe llate courts are a dvised to u s e i t sparing ly in rec og nizi ng err ors that have not be en ra ised by the parties or have been w aived due to a proc edura l default. I d.

“B eca use the Adkisson test provides a clea r an d me an in g f u l sta ndard f

or considering w hether

a tr ia l er ro r ri se s to the le ve l of pla in er ro r in the abs e nc e of

a n o bje c tio n, ” the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court formally

adopted this test when reviewing a re cord f or plain er ror. State v. Smith, 24 S.W .3d 27 4, 28 2- 83 (T e nn

. 20 00 ). I n d oin g so , it re -e mph a size d th a t th e pr e se nc e of a ll f ive fa c tor s mu st be e sta bli sh e d b y

the re c or d b e fo re the e xiste nc e of pla in e rr or

c a n b e re c og nize d a ndthat c omp le te consideration of all the fac tors is not necessa ry when it is c lear

from the r ecor d that at least one of the fa ctors ca nnot be established. I d. The “ ‘plain er ror’ must [ have be en] of such a g reat mag nitude that it probably

chang ed the outcome of the trial.” I d. (citing Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642).

The appellant c ontends that the trial court erre d in its j ury instruction reg arding the mental state nec ess ary

to convict him for the c rime of a g g ravated sexual battery . He a rg ues that the jury instructions stated that, in order to c onvict him, it was onlynece ssary for the jury

to find that De fe nd a nt a c te d e ith e r i nte nti on a lly or kn ow ing ly
, wh e n, in f

a c t, i t w a s impe rativ e fo r the jury to find that the appe llant acte d i ntentionally with respec t to his sex ual contac t with the victim. The appellant submits that this error is plain.

A de fe nd a nt ha s a c on sti tut ion a l ri g ht to tr ia l by jury

. U. S. Co ns t. a me nd . V I ; T e nn . Co ns t. Art. I
, § 6. I n Tenne ssee, the rig ht to trial by jury is the rig ht g uara nteed to e very litigant in jury case s to ha ve the fac ts involved tried and deter mined by twelve juror s. State v. Bobo, 814 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tenn. 1991) (citing Wil lard v. State, 130 S.W. 2 d 9 9 (T en n . 1939)). It follows that the de fe nd a nt h a s a ri g ht to ha ve “ e ve ry iss ue of fa c t ra ise d by the e vid e nc e a nd mate ri a l to his de fe ns e submitt ed to the jury

upon proper instructions by the judge .” State v. Br own, 836 S.W .2d 530, 553 (Tenn. 1992) (citations omitted).

I n th e c a se he re in, the tr ia l c ou rt ’s ins truc tio ns to the jury we re a s f oll ow s:

For y ou to find the defe ndant g uiltyof this offense , the Sta t e m u s t h av e proven be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th e e xiste nc e of the fo llo wi ng e sse nti a l e le me nts : Nu mbe r 1 . T he de fe nd a nt h a d u nla wf ul s e xua l c on ta ct wi th the a lle g e d v ic tim in which the defe ndant intentionally touched the alleg ed victim’s intimate parts, or the clothing c overing the immediate ar ea of the alleg ed victim’s intimate parts. Number 2. That the alleg ed victim was less than 13 y ear s of ag e.-7-

N u m b e r 3

. T h a tt h e d e f

e n d a n ta c t e d k n o w i n g l y. Now the de finitions. S exual contact includes the i ntentionally [si c] touching of

the alleg ed victim’s intimate parts, if that intentionally touching can be rea sonable [sic]

con s tr u e d a s b e in g f

o r th e p u rp o s e o f s e xu a l ar o u s a l o r g r a ti f ic a ti o n

. I n ti mate par t includes the primary g enital are a, g roin, inner thigh, buttock or brea st of a human being

. Knowing ly means with know ledg e, and in a criminal proc eeding means that the def endant kne w what he was a bout to do, and with such knowledg e, proc eede d to d o th e a c t c ha

rg e d. A pe rs on a c ts kn ow ing ly if that pe rs on a c ts w ith a n a wa re ne ss either tha t his or her c onduct is of a pa rt icular nature, or tha t a particular

c ir c ums ta nc e s [si c ] e xists

. Th e re qu ir e me nt o f kno wi ng ly is a lso e sta

bli sh e d if it i s shown that the def

endant a cted intentionally . I ntentionally means doi n g an ac t by desig n or purpose, a determination to act in a certain way or t o do a ce rtain thing . A pe rs on a c ts int e nti on a lly wh e n that pe rs on a c ts wi th a c on sc iou s ob je c tiv e e ith e r t o
c a us e a pa rt ic ula r r e su lt, or

to e ng a g e in a pa

rt ic ula r c on du c t. I f a ft e r c on sid e ri ng a ll the evidenc e and the se instructions, y ou find b ey o n d a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant is g uiltyof this offense , then it shall b e y o u r dut y to find the defe ndant g uilty

. (empha sis added).

The a ppellant ar g ues that these instruc tions co n fu s ed t h e juryas to the ele ments of the offe nse bec ause the trial court did not submit the entire definition of sex ual contac t as the ele ment which must be proven bey ond a re asonable doubt but defined sexual contac t only afte r stating the elements of the offe nse. Specif i ca l l y , the appe llant arg ues that to simplyinstruct the jury that the State must have prove n “unlawf ul sex ual contac t” without “making clea r that the purpose must be for se x ual arousal or g ratification appear s to omit the sig nificant re strictive lang uag e.” F urther, the

app e lla nt a

rg ue s th a t pl a c ing the “ c on dit ion a l c laus e , ‘ if that in te nti on a l to uc hin g c a n b e re a so na bly construed a s being for the pur pose of se x ual ar ousal or g ratificat i o n ’ i n the def inition s ection minimi zes the importance of the condition.”

I n State v. Howar d, a p an el o f this Court determined that the tria l court had pr ovided incorre ct instructions on the eleme nts of ag g ravated sexu al b at tery and sexual battery

and, eve n though the defe ndant did not raise the issue at trial or on appe al, the p an el decide d to addre ss the issue in view of the r emand whic h was ba sed on t h e trial c ourt’s fa ilure to instruct on a lesse rinclud ed o ffe nse. State v. Howa rd, 926 S.W.2d 579, 587 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996), over ruled on other g rounds by

State v. Wil liams, 977 S.W .2d 101 (Tenn. 1998) ).

At the conc lusion of the proof a t the trial in H owar d, the trial court instructed the jury that ag g ravated sexual battery included the f

ollowing e lements: (1) the de fenda nt had unlawf ul sex ual

c on ta c t w ith the a lle g e d vic tim or the a lle g e d vic tim ha d un la wf ul se xua l c on ta c t wi th the de fe nd a nt; (2) the a lleg ed victim was less than t h i rt ee n (13) y ear s of ag e; and ( 3) the de fenda nt acted intentionally , knowing ly

or re cklessly . I d. Prior to Howa rd
, t h i s Court had held that the va rious

e le me nts of agg ra va te d s e xua l batte ry c on ta ine d d if

fe re nt c ulp able me nta l st a te s w ith in the sa meT enn es s ee C od e A nn ot at ed s ect i on 39

- 11

- 30 1(c) provi des : “ i f t he def i ni t i on of an offens e wi t hi n t hi s t i t l e does 3

not pl ai nl y di s pens e wi t h a ment al el ement , i nt ent , kn owl ege , or r eck l es s nes s s uf f i ces t o es t abl i s h t he cul pabl e ment al

s t at e. ”

-8- of fe ns e . Se e id. (c iti ng Sta te v. Park e r, 88 7 S. W.2 d 8 25 , 8 27 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 94 )) . I n f a c t, this Cou rt had noted that our statutes plainly

provided that “ sexual contact” r equire d “intentional touching ” of the victim’s intim ate pa rts or clothing for the pur poses of “ s ex u al ar ousal or g ratification,” but that the definition of agg ravated s exual battery
, howeve r, was silent reg arding the

c ulp able me nta l st a te a s to the vic tim ’s a g e . Se e Te nn . Co de An n. §§ 39 -1 3- 50 1( 6) & -5 04 . T hu s, we de termined that unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301( c), intenti o nal, re ckless, or know ing 3 conduct a pplied to the element r eg arding ag e. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 11- 301(c) (1997); Howa rd, 926 S.W .2d at 587. When an off ense ha s differ ent mens re a for separ ate elements, the trial court has

a duty to se t f

orth the mental state for

eac h element c lear ly

so that the jury

can de termine whe ther the state ha s met its burden of proof . Howar d, 926 S.W .2d at 587.

We m us t de te rm ine wh e the r the e rr or , if a ny , in the jury ins truc tio ns , r os e to the le ve l of pla in

err or. Recog nition of an err or does not result in automatic re versa l of a trial c ourt’s judg ment since the er ror may be harmless. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 626. Afte r ca ref ul review of the re cord, w e find that any err or in the appe llant’s jury instructions did not adversely aff ect a s u b s t antial rig ht of Def endant a nd, there fore , did not rise to the level of pla in error under Te nn. R. Crim. P . 52(b). See S t at e v

. J o ey

L . Salcido, No. M1999-00501-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 227357, at *10-*11 (T enn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Marc h 8, 2001), perm. to a ppeal denied (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2001) (de termining that even w hen jury

expressed conf

usion as to elements of of fense of ag g ravated s exual battery and

acc ompany ing mens rea require d for each element, that the t rial court’s char g e to jury that defe ndant

a c te d e ith e r “ kn ow ing ly , in te nti on a lly , o r r e c kle ssl y ” wi tho ut s pe c if y ing wh ic h me ns re a

app lie d to which ele ment was ha

rmless err or).

Fi rs t , we o b s er v e t h at t h e ju ry i n s t ru ct i o n gi v en i n Ho wa rd i s d i s t i n gu i s h ab l e f ro m t h e c h ar ge g iven in the ca se her ein. The part of the i nstruction conce rning “sexual contac t” i n Howar d omitted any mention of the re quisite mens rea . The trial c ourt in Howar d did not g ive an instruction on the culpable me ntal state until part (3), w hich the jury could have interpre ted to apply to all of the prec eding sections. The instruction g iven here in r eg arding “sexual contac t” re quired the jury to find that “the de fenda nt had unlawf ul sex ual co n t ac t with the alleg ed victim, in which the def endant intentionally

touched the a lleg ed victim’s intimate parts. . . (e m p h asi s added) .” He re, the word

“ int e nti on a l” c le arl y

mod if ie d to the fi nd ing of

“ se xua l c on ta c t.” F urthe r, the tr ia l c ou rt we nt o n to define “sexual contac t.” The re quisite mens rea is contained within the def inition of sex ual contac t itself as sexual cont ac t n ec es s arilyimplies an intentional touching. F urther, e ven thoug h the trial court fa iled to instruct a s to the mens rea require d for the vic tim’s ag e, that ac tion actually favor ed the def ense. See State v. J ones, 889 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

[A] jury instruction that omits an ele ment of the off ense . . . diff

ers mar kedly from the c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns we ha ve fo un d to defy harm le ss- e rr or re vie w. Th os e
case s, we ha ve explained, contain a “def ect aff ecting the fra mework within which the-9-

trial proce eds, ra ther than simply an er ror in t h e trial process itself.” Such e rror s aff ect the e ntire proc ess and ne cessa rily rende r a tri al fundame ntally unfair. Put another way , these e rror s deprive de fenda nts of “basic protec tions” without which “a

c ri min a l tr ia l c a nn ot r e lia

bly se rv e its fu nc tio n a s a

ve hic le fo r de te rm inatio n o f g uil t or innoce nce . . . a nd no criminal punishment may be re g arde d as funda mentally fair. . . .”

State v. Gar

rison, 40 S.W .3d 426, 434 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Nede r v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999))

.
We determine tha t t h e j u ry instruction error , if any , had no impact on the jury verdic t and should be dee med har mless error . The instruct i o n s g iven to the jury included “intentional” in the definition which pertained to the ele ment of sexual contact. The court further instructe d the jury that it h a d to fi ndthe app e lla nt a c te d “ kn ow ing ly .” Th e tr ia l c ou rt fo llo we d the pa tte rn jury

ins truc tio ns

. T h e r e w a s n o t a n o mi s s io n o f o n e of th e e le me n ts o f

th e c r im e a s a ll e g e d b y

th e ap p e ll a n t. We believe tha t the appellant w as n o t d ep rived of “ basic prote ctions” without which “a criminal trial cannot r eliably serve its function as a vehicle for deter mination of guilt or i nnocenc e. . . .” Garrison, 40 S.W .3d at 434. The a

ppellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

J ury I nstruction on Flig ht

Th e app e lla nt a

rg ue s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s ins uf fi c ie nt to su pp ort a

jury ins truc tio n o n f

lig ht. The State re buts that the rec ord supports the instruction. We ag ree

.

I n order for a trial court to cha

rg e the ju ry o n flig ht as an infe renc e of g uilt, there must be

s u ff i ci en tev i d en ce t o s u p p o rt s u ch i n s t ru ct i o n

. T h er e i s s u ff i ci en t ev i d en ce t o s u p p o rt a j u rych ar ge on flig ht where there is proof of “both a lea ving the scene of the diff iculty and a subse quent hiding

ou t, ev a sio n, or c on c e a lme nt in the c omm un ity , or le a vin g the c omm un ity fo r p art s u nk no wn .” Sta te v. Burns, 979 S.W .2d 279, 289-90 (Te nn. 1998) (quo t ing State v. Payton, 782 S.W .2d 490, 498 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)); State v. Fr anks, No. W2003-0003-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL22351024, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., a t J ackson, O ct. 14, 2003), pe rm. to appea l denied (Te nn. J an. 4, 2004).

Th e la w m a ke s n o n ic e or re fi ne d d ist inc tio n a s to the ma nn e r or me tho d of a fl ig ht; it may be open, or

it m aybe a hur

ried or c oncea led depa

rture, or it may be a

conce alment within the jurisdiction.

State v. Whit tenmeir, 725 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (quoting Roge rs v. State, 455 S.W .2d 182, 187 (Te n n

. C ri m

. App. 1970)). It is proper for the trial court to inst ruct the jury on flig ht w hen the issue has been raised by the proof. See State v. Kendr icks, 947 S.W .2d 875, 885-86 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (explaining jury instruction on flight is prope r statement of the law)

.

I n the ca se her ein, the trial c ourt instructed the jury that-10-

[t ]he flight of a

person a ccuse d of a crime in a circ umstance w hich when c onsidered with all the fac ts of the ca se, may justify an inferenc e of g uilt. Flight is the voluntary wi thd ra wa l of

on e se lf fo r the pu rp os e of e va din g arr e st or pr os e c uti on fo r the c ri me char g ed. Whether t he evidence pr esente d proves be y ond a re asonable doubt that the de fe nd a nt f

le d is a qu e sti on fo r y ou r determ in atio n. Th e la w m a ke s n o p re c ise distinction as to the man n er or method of f light, it may

be open, or

it [ may ] be hurried or conce aled departure, or it may be a conce alment wit h i n t h e jurisdi ction. Howeve r, it take[s] both a leaving the scene of t he difficulty and a subsequent hiding out, evasion, or c oncea lment in the community , or a le aving o f t h e community for parts unknown, to constitute flig ht. I f flight is proved, the fac t of flig ht alone does not allow y ou to find that the defe ndant is g uiltyof the c rime alleged . Howeve r, since flig ht by

the def endant may

be ca use[d] by a consc iousness of g uilt, y ou may consider the fac t of fli ght, if flight is so prove n, toge ther with all of the othe r evidenc e when y ou decide the guilty or i nnocent [ sic] of the defe ndant. On the other hand, an e ntirely

innocent per son may

take f light and this flig ht may be explained by proof of fer ed or by

the fac ts a nd circ umstances of the ca se. Whether ther e wa s flight by the def endant, the r easons f

or i t and the weig ht to be given to it, are que stions for y ou to determine.

Offic er Ma son testified that she attempted to se rve the appellant t wi ce shortly afte r the incident occ urre d. She later l ea rned tha t she was una ble to do so beca

use the a ppellant left Te nn e sse e a ndwe nt to Ala ba ma

. Of fi c e r Ma so n wa s una

ble to loc a te the app e lla nt f or six mo nth s. He wa s subsequently

located in Ala

bama a nd extradited back to Te nnessee . The e vidence at t ri al sufficie ntly

raised the issue of flig ht as there was proof of bot h a “le aving the sce ne” a nd a “le aving the c omm un ity

fo r p art s u nk no wn .” B ur ns , 9 79 S .W .2 d at 2 89 -9 0. Th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in instructing the jury

on flig ht.

Corrobora tion of Victim Testimony

L astly , the ap p el l ant ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed by failing to instruct the jury that the testimonyof ac complices ha d to be corrobora ted. Specific ally , he cla ims that the victim was an

acc omplice bec ause the re wer e no threa ts or forc e used and “ the log ical infe renc e is the victim, at the minimum , acquie sced in the c onduct,” ther eby making the victim an ac complice a nd requiring

c or ro bo ratio n o f h is t e sti mon y . The app e lla nt fu rthe r ar g ue s tha t he as se rt e d an a lib i, n ot c on se nt, as a de fense and that Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-17-121 “plainly dispenses with the require ment of cor

robora tion when (1) the victim is under thirteen and (2) the defe nse is consent.” The State c ounters that the law prec ludes the victim from being considere d an ac complice.

We ag ree with the appellant that our law will not support a conviction base d upon the

uncorr obo ra ted testimony of an a ccomplice -witness. See State v. Robinson, 971 S.W .2d 30, 42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . Howeve r, the leg islature has de termin ed t h at v i ct ims of certain crimes

un de r the a g e of

thi rt e e n may

no t be c on sid e re d a c c omp lic e s:-11-

I f the a lleg ed victim of a se x ual pene tration or sexual contac t within the meaning of §§ 39-13-501 is less than thirteen (13) y ear s of ag e, such vic tim shall, reg ardle ss of consent, not be c onsidered to be an accomplice to such sex ual pene tration or sexual

c on ta c t, a ndno c or

ro bo ratio n o f su c h a lle g e d vic tim ’s te sti mon y sh a ll be re qu ir e d to

se c ur e a c on vic tio n if

c or ro bo ratio n is ne c e ssa

ry so le ly be c a us e the a lle g ed v ic tim consente d.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 17-121.

Th e app e lla nt’ s ar g ume nt tha t Ten ne sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 17 -1 21 is i na pp lic able be c a us e he didno t a sse rt

c on se nt a s a

de fe ns e is wi tho ut me ri t. Th e statut e c le arl y pr ov ide s that a vic tim un de r the a g e of thi rt e e n is not an a c c omp lic e . Fu rthe r, e ve n if the te sti mon y

of the vic tim

re qu ir e d c or

ro bo ratio n, in the abs e nc e of a sp e c ia l re qu e st, the tr ia l c ou rt do e s n ot e rr

by fa ili ng to instruct the jury

about ac complice testimony even if the circ umstances of

the ca se wa

rra nt such an instruction. State v. Anderson, 985 S.W.2d 9, 17 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). I n the ca se her ein, the appellant f

ailed to make a

specia l reque st for an a ccomplice instruction reg arding the testimonyof the victim. Accor dingly , even if corr oboration of the vic tim’s testim ony wer e re quired, the a

ppellant has wa ived this issue on appea l. See id.; se e also State v. Shawn Rafa el B oug h, No. E2002-00717- CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL50798, at *11 (Te n n

. C ri m. App. at Knoxvil le, J an. 12, 2004); State v. Michae l Cammon, No. M2001-00592-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31414089, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oc t. 25, 2002). This issue is without m erit.

Conclusion

Af te r a tho ro ug h re vie w of the re c or d, we c on c lud e that no ne of the a pp e lla nt’ s c la ims me ri t relief . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the de cision of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE