United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 05-4463

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C. Alan Scott, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

* 

Missouri Valley Physicians, P.C.; *

K. Tom Papreck; Jack Uhrig; Douglas *

Koehn; Mica Newman-Koehn, *

 *

 *

Defendants - Appellees. *

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 Submitted: June 14, 2006

 Filed: August 17, 2006

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Before MURPHY, MELLOY and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

C. Alan Scott brought this action against his employer, Missouri Valley

Physicians, P.C. (MVP) and his medical partners, Tom Papreck, Jack Uhrig, Douglas

Koehn, and Mica Newman-Koehn, regarding the termination of his employment and
1

The Honorable Dean Whipple, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Western District of Missouri. 

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shareholder position. The district court1

 granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants, concluding that Scott did not present evidence of a breach of contract or

demonstrate that his termination was retaliatory in violation of public policy. We

affirm.

Scott was a physician and shareholder of MVP from 1988 until September

2002. Scott and defendants Uhrig, Papreck, Koehn, and Newman-Koehn constituted

the MVP Board of Directors. Under the terms of his employment agreement, Scott

was an at-will employee of MVP. The agreement stated that his employment could

be “voluntarily terminated, with or without cause, by either the Corporation, upon a

two-thirds [vote] of the Directors of the Corporation . . . or [by the] Employee for any

reason, by the terminating party giving sixty (60) days’ written notice to the other,

which written notice shall state the effective date of Employee’s termination of

employment.” 

Scott alleges that beginning in January 2002 and continuing until his discharge

from employment, he complained to the officers and fellow directors of MVP that

MVP’s compensation formula violated federal anti-referral laws (known as Stark

laws). Stark laws prohibit a physician from having his or her own compensation

directly tied to the volume of self-referrals or laboratory or ancillary services

generated by that physician. Scott also states that he complained about various

proposals to circumvent compliance with Stark laws. 

On July 8, 2002, the Board sent a “Notice of Special Meeting of the Board of

Directors of Missouri Valley Physicians, P.C.” to Scott. The notice stated that the

meeting would occur on July 10, 2002, via conference call. The notice listed the

purpose of the meeting as discussing and voting on whether Scott’s employment with
2

Scott did not appeal the district court’s decision regarding his breach of

contract claim.

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MVP should be terminated. At the July 10 meeting, two-thirds of the MVP Board of

Directors voted to terminate Scott’s employment. Scott argues that the July 10

meeting was a sham and that he was actually terminated at a meeting held on June 17,

2002, at Newman-Koehn’s home. Although the defendants contest this assertion, we

consider the facts in the light most favorable to Scott. However, the timing and

procedure surrounding Scott’s termination are not relevant to the issue presented on

appeal as to whether Scott’s termination was retaliatory in violation of public policy.

Following his termination, Scott filed suit against MVP and the other members

of the MVP Board of Directors. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all

claims. Scott resisted the motion on only two claims: breach of contract and wrongful

discharge in violation of the public policy exception to the employment-at-will

doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Scott now brings this timely appeal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment

on his claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.2

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Bradshaw

v. Brown Group, Inc., 258 F.3d 847, 848 (8th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is

appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact is present such that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing

a grant of summary judgment, we examine the facts in the light most favorable to the

adverse party and make all reasonable inferences from those facts to the benefit of the

adverse party. Reed v. ULS Corp., 178 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir. 1999). 

On appeal, Scott alleges that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment because he made disclosures that qualified him as a whistleblower. In

Missouri, an at-will employee may be discharged at any time, with or without cause.
3

Scott does not argue that his actions fall under any of the other three

recognized categories of cases under the public policy exception.

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See Luethans v. Wash. Univ., 894 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Mo. 1995). However, Missouri

courts have recognized a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.

 Faust v. Ryder Commercial Leasing & Servs., 954 S.W.2d 383, 389 (Mo. Ct. App.

1997) (“[W]hen the discharge of an at-will employee violates a clear mandate of

public policy . . . the employee has a wrongful discharge claim.”). The Missouri

courts have recognized four types of cases under this exception: 1) discharge due to

a refusal to perform an illegal act; 2) discharge based on an employee’s act of

reporting violations of law or public policy to superiors or public authorities; 3)

discharge based on an employee’s participation in acts encouraged by public policy,

such as jury duty; and 4) discharge because an employee filed a worker’s

compensation claim. Id. at 390. Scott alleges that his actions fall under the second

exception, commonly referred to as the whistleblowing exception.3

Scott has brought forth no evidence other than his own deposition and affidavits

to substantiate his claims. Even if we assume, arguendo, that Scott can point to

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that MVP’s compensation formula violated federal

Stark laws, his actions do not constitute whistleblowing under Missouri’s public

policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. The public policy exception

exists to encourage employees to report suspected wrongdoing to the proper

authorities to expose the wrongdoing and assist in the prosecution of those committing

the crime. Faust, 954 S.W.2d at 390-91. In this case, Scott complained about the

compensation formula that allegedly violated Stark laws to his fellow members of

MVP’s Board of Directors, the people he alleged were the wrongdoers. The district

court correctly concluded that reporting of possible violations of Stark laws to the

purported wrongdoers does not meet the whistleblowing exception because it does not

further the “clear mandate of public policy.” Id. at 391 (holding that reporting

wrongdoing to the wrongdoer, who is the purported whistleblower’s supervisor, does
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not constitute internal whistleblowing sufficient to support a claim of wrongful,

retaliatory discharge under the public policy exception). 

Scott argues that the case at bar is analogous to Dunn v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car

Co., 170 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). In Dunn, the Missouri Court of Appeals held

that Thomas Dunn made a submissible claim when he asserted that he had been

terminated for internal reporting of conduct he reasonably believed to be a violation

of federal securities laws. Id. at 11. Scott’s reliance on Dunn is misplaced. Although

Dunn and Scott both reported to their respective employers, rather than to an external

authority, Dunn reported the conduct to his immediate supervisor, who was not

involved in the purported wrongdoing. Id. at 4. In contrast, Scott reported his

concerns directly to the purported wrongdoers. Thus, the objectives of the public

policy exception were met in Dunn, but not in Scott’s case. We conclude that Scott

has not demonstrated that his actions constitute whistleblowing under the exception

laid out by the Missouri courts.

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment.

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