NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTINE POTTS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-35519 

D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00274-BR 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 9, 2022

Portland, Oregon

Before: BERZON, TALLMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Christine Potts challenges the administrative law judge (ALJ)’s denial of her 

application for Supplemental Security Income benefits at step five of the sequential 

analysis, arguing that the ALJ failed to reconcile a conflict between the vocational 

expert (VE)’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). This 

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and for the reasons that follow, we 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

MAY 20 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

affirm. 

After determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity at step four of the 

sequential analysis, at step five “an ALJ may consult a series of sources, including a 

VE and the DOT,” to meet the burden of establishing there are a significant number 

of jobs which the claimant could still perform. Lamear v. Berryhill, 865 F.3d 1201, 

1205 (9th Cir. 2017). In cases where a VE is consulted, if “there is an apparent 

conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT—for example, 

expert testimony that a claimant can perform an occupation involving DOT 

requirements that appear more than the claimant can handle—the ALJ is required to 

reconcile the inconsistency.” Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2015). 

This requirement of ALJs to resolve potential conflicts arises under Social Security 

Ruling 00-4P. SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 (Dec. 4, 2000).1

Our precedent defines a conflict as a situation in which the VE’s testimony is 

“at odds with the Dictionary’s listing of job requirements that are essential, integral, 

or expected.” Gutierrez v. Colvin, 844 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2016); see also 

Lamear, 865 F.3d at 1205 (“[T]he conflict must be obvious or apparent to trigger the 

ALJ’s obligation to inquire further.”) (quotation and citation omitted). As a 

1

“Social Security Rulings (SSRs) do not carry the force of law, but they are binding 

on ALJs nonetheless. They reflect the official interpretation of the SSA and are 

entitled to some deference as long as they are consistent with the Social Security Act 

and regulations.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(superseded by regulation on other grounds) (quotations and citations omitted). 
3 

corollary, the duty of an ALJ to ask follow-up questions of the VE “doesn’t extend 

to unlikely situations or circumstances.” Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808. 

On these facts, there was no conflict for the ALJ to reconcile. There is no 

discrepancy between the residual functional capacity that the ALJ assessed for Potts 

and the normal job requirements described in the DOT. The VE testified that a child 

attendant may rarely be presented with a situation in which the attendant must lift 

over twenty pounds because a child needs to be picked up. That situation is, as 

described by the VE, not an “essential, integral, or expected” requirement of the 

position. See id. Such an occurrence does not create an apparent conflict requiring 

further investigation or analysis by the ALJ. 

Therefore, the ALJ’s denial of benefits is AFFIRMED.