COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

JAMES MICHAEL SELLICK 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2702-97-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 DECEMBER 8, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge 

 Amanda E. Shaw (Clinton R. Shaw, Jr.; Office 

of the Public Defender, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 James Michael Sellick (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. 

On appeal he contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress evidence, and (2) the evidence was 

insufficient to convict him of possession of cocaine. Finding no 

error, we affirm. 

 I. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. See Juares v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997). So viewed, the evidence established that 

on December 11, 1996, Officer R.A. Cook (Cook) was on patrol in 

the City of Lynchburg. At approximately 12:30 a.m., Cook 

observed a car stopped in the travel lane of 15th Street. A man 

was leaning into the passenger side of the car. There were no 

other cars on 15th Street at that time; however, there had been 

"heavy traffic" that night. 

 Cook circled the block, which took approximately fifteen to 

twenty seconds. When he returned, the car remained in the same 

position. As Cook approached the car from behind, the pedestrian 

stood up and the car drove down the street. Cook followed the 

car for approximately three blocks at which time he stopped it 

for a violation of Code § 46.2-888.1

 1Code § 46.2-888 provides: 

 No person shall stop a vehicle in such 

manner as to impede or render dangerous the 

use of the highway by others, except in the 

case of an emergency, an accident, or a 

mechanical breakdown. In the event of such 

an emergency, accident, or breakdown, the 

emergency flashing lights of such vehicle 

shall be turned on if the vehicle is equipped 

with such lights and such lights are in 

working order. If the driver is capable of 

doing so and the vehicle is movable, the 

driver may move the vehicle only so far as is 

necessary to prevent obstructing the regular 

flow of traffic; provided, however, that the 

movement of the vehicle to prevent the 

obstruction of traffic shall not relieve the 

law-enforcement officer of his duty pursuant 

to § 46.2-373. A report of the vehicle's 

location shall be made to the nearest 

law-enforcement officer as soon as 

practicable, and the vehicle shall be moved 

from the roadway to the shoulder as soon as 
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 The driver of the car identified himself as "Mr. Tabor" and 

he consented to a search of the car. Tabor, appellant, and a 

third occupant were asked to step out of the vehicle. Officer 

D.M. Bernaldo (Bernaldo), who was assisting Cook, asked appellant 

for permission to search him for weapons. Appellant consented. 

 During the pat-down search, Bernaldo felt a small "device" 

in appellant's pocket. By its size and shape, Bernaldo 

recognized the device as a pipe of the type used to smoke drugs 

and removed it from appellant's pocket. Appellant admitted to 

having smoked marijuana in the pipe two days earlier. An 

analysis of the pipe's contents showed it contained both cocaine 

and marijuana residue. 

 II. 

 Appellant first argues that Cook did not have a reasonable 

articulable suspicion to justify the stop of Tabor's car. He 

contends that there was no violation of Code § 46.2-888 because 

there was no other traffic on the road at the time of the stop. 

 "`[W]hen the police stop a motor vehicle and detain an 

occupant, this constitutes a seizure of the person for Fourth 

Amendment purposes.'" Logan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 

441, 452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994) (quoting Zimmerman v. 

 

possible and removed from the shoulder 

without unnecessary delay. If the vehicle is 

not promptly removed, such removal may be 

ordered by a law-enforcement officer at the 

expense of the owner if the disabled vehicle 

creates a traffic hazard. 
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Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988)). "A 

police officer may conduct an investigatory stop of a vehicle 

when he or she has an `articulable and reasonable suspicion that 

. . . either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to 

seizure for violation of law.'" Commonwealth v. Thomas, 23 Va. 

App. 598, 610, 478 S.E.2d 715, 721 (1996) (quoting Delaware v. 

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). "Reasonable suspicion" is more 

than a "mere hunch" but less than "proof of wrongdoing by a 

preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 610-11, 478 S.E.2d at 721 

(citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 

 In the instant case, the evidence was undisputed that Cook 

observed Tabor's vehicle stopped in the travel lane of a city 

street, a possible violation of Code § 46.2-888 unless one of the 

enumerated statutory exceptions applied. Appellant's argument 

that there must be an actual impediment to existing traffic to 

justify the officer's investigative stop is without merit. The 

statutory language prohibits stopping in a manner that creates a 

dangerous situation.2

 A defendant's stopping in a traffic lane 

need not cause actual harm to another person or property for Code 

 

 2The trial court so found: 

 And the idea is so if traffic comes along you 

don't render the roadway dangerous or impede 

the progress. So when he's stopped in the 

middle of the travel portion of the highway 

for the period of time described, he's 

stopped so as to impede. Now, whether or not 

the officer ticketed him or not, he could 

pull him over and talk to him about that. 
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§ 46.2-888 to apply. See Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 

653, 657, 460 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1995) (noting that the defendant's 

driving behavior is not required to harm another person for the 

habitual offender provisions of the Code to apply). Thus, the 

officer had a reasonable suspicion upon which to make the initial 

stop of the vehicle, and the trial court did not err in denying 

appellant's suppression motion. 

 III. 

 Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth's evidence 

failed to prove that he knew about the presence and character of 

the cocaine residue in the pipe. He contends that his statement 

to Officer Bernaldo that he smoked marijuana two days prior to 

the seizure of the pipe excludes the possibility that he was 

aware of the presence of the cocaine found in the pipe. We 

disagree. 

 "In order to convict a person of illegal possession of an 

illicit drug, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the accused was aware of the presence and character of 

the drug and that the accused consciously possessed it." Walton 

v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 426, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998). 

"Proof of possession of contraband, by itself, gives rise to the 

inference that the defendant knew its character." Hamilton v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 754, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993). 

 In the instant case, appellant had actual possession of the 

pipe containing the cocaine residue. He admitted ownership of 
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the pipe and that he had used it to smoke illegal drugs two days 

earlier. The trial court could conclude from his admission that 

he owned the pipe and had used it to smoke marijuana, that he had 

also used it to smoke cocaine, and that the cocaine residue in 

the pipe was his. The trial court was not required to believe 

appellant's self-serving statement that the only drug he was 

aware of in the pipe was marijuana. See Marable v. Commonwealth, 

27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998) ("In its role 

of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to 

disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to 

conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt."). 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.