Filed 12/10/13 Veronica M. v. Superior Court CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

VERONICA M.,
Petitioner,

v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent;

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY et al.,

Real Parties in Interest. G048848 (Super. Ct. No. DP

- 022456)

O P I N I O N

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Dennis J. Keough, Judge. Petition denied.

Rebecca Captain for Petitioner. Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, K a ren L. Christensen and Ju lie J. Agin, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest , Orange County Social Services Agency.2 Veronica M. (mother) seeks extraordinary relief from an order of the juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting a permanency plannin g hearing for her child, A

. C. After reviewing the petition on the merits, we deny relief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h) .)
FACTS

Mother gave birth to A.C. prematurely, at 34 weeks gestation , i n January 2012. He weighed just five pounds, three ounc es

.

When A.C. was about five weeks old, a social worker visited the home to investigate a report of general neglect of the child by mother . The social worker ’ s resulting report, which was inconclusive on abuse, stated the mother “ has post partum depression, is not all there, and . . . made a statement that she wanted to throw the baby
out the window. ” The report noted the baby ’ s low birth weight and failure to gain weight: A few days before the social worker ’ s visit , A.C. had been weighed at a c linic, registering just six pounds, one ounce

. Mother and the presumed father, Ezequiel C. (father) , with whom mother and baby were then living, signed a Children and Family Services Safety Plan, agreeing to participate in a Postpartum Wellness Program an d Stress Free Families Program, to fill mother ’ s prescription for antidepressant medication,
and to take A.C. to the pediatrician.

I n April 2012, mother and father brought 10

- week

- old A.C. , vomiting and stricken with diarrhea, to the emergency room at th e urging of a neighbor who was concerned the child was seriously underweight. Emergency room personnel found the baby ’ s condition alarming: At 7 pounds, 12 ounces , h e was below the third percentile in weight, had sunken eyes, skinny arms and legs, and a protruding belly. A doctor diagnosed A.C. with “ failure to thrive ” and determined the cause was environmental because, once admitted to the hospital, the infant ate normally and steadily gained weight.3 On April 18, 2012, while A.C. was still at the hosp ital, the social services agency (SSA) placed him in protective custody. On April 20, SSA filed a detention petition for A.C

.

The detention report listed the many warning signs of problems in the home. Along with A.C. ’ s diagnosed failure to thrive, the report noted mother ’ s diagnosed postpartum depression and her complaint of auditory hallucinations

. Father relayed that mother “ does not show any interest in caring for the baby. ” The report also
noted mother ’ s report of having been twice physically abused by father , first during her pregnancy, when father slapped her face for buying the “ wrong ” tortillas, and then again on April 7 or 8, when father grabbed mother by the hair and dragged her while the baby was present

. The detent ion report noted that mother had not complied with the psychiatric medication regime prescribed for her , nor had she followed through on the
referrals given to her as part of the agreed safety plan. She had also neglected to take
A.C. to his pediatrician for scheduled appointments, preventing the doctor from adequately monitoring A.C.’s weight gain.

The report further noted that the maternal grandmother had multiple prior
child abuse referrals and mother had been in foster care and group homes from the a ge of 13 through 18. Mother stated that she had suffered from depression since the age of 12 or 13, and had been prescribed psychotropic medication while in foster care.

At the April 23, 2012, detention hearing the court ordered reunification
services and gave the parents separate, supervised visitation of two hours each, three
times a week. Mother ’ s visitation was conditioned on her keeping her psychiatric appointments and complying with her medication orders. Three days later, A.C. was placed in a f

oster home with a “ non

- relative extended family member , ” a placement that remained constant throughout these dependency proceedings.4 The May 16, 2012, jurisdiction/disposition report and June 1 a ddendum
noted some concerns with mother ’ s visitation. (Because other alone contests the juvenile court orders, this statement of facts focuses on mother

. ) The caretaker, who monitored visitation, reported mother ’ s apparent lack of concern when A.C. was ill (she refused to leave a party to bring a thermometer when A.C. had a fever), mother ’ s disinterest in attending the baby ’ s doctor visits, her admitted dislike for babies in general because they

are “ too small, ” her observed difficulties in changing A.C. , and her impatience in feeding
him.
At the June 4, 20 12 , combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing , mother pleaded no contest to the amended dependency petition alleging neglect through failure to protect (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b))

. 1 The court found that the cause of A.C. ’ s failure to thrive was environmental; that his parents had neglected the infa n t by failing to
ensure he received “ regular, frequent , and consistent feedings ” and the medical care
needed to address his lack of weight gain; that in early March 2012 mother was diagnosed with post partum depression , with symptoms that included “ lack of interest in caring for the child , ” but she “ neglected to take her prescribed medication or seek continued treatment, ” placing A.C. at risk; that A.C. had been exposed to an act of domestic violence ( the hair pulling and dragging incident) and the parents have “ a conflictual relationship ” which has escalated to physical violence, putting A.C. at risk of bodily harm.
The court adopted the recommended case plan objectives and responsibilities for moth er that included completion of a domestic violence program (Personal Empowerment Program or PEP ), general counseling, psychiatric treatment and compl iance with the medication regime prescribed , and parenting education. The court

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.5

continued the existing visitation plan (two

- hour visits, three times per week), and set a
six

- month review for November 27, 2012.

I n July 2012, father was arrested on charges of committing forcible sex offenses again st mother

. He remained incarcerated throughout the rest of these proceedings and he has chose n not to contest the dependency orders.
Six

- month R eview

A series of status review report s prepared for the six

- month review hearing painted a disappointing pict ure of mother ’ s compliance with her visitation and service plan

. During this six

- month review period, mother did not participate in any counseling

. She completed her parenting classes, but did not complete the entire 10

- week PEP domestic violence program. She finished 7 of the 10 PEP classes b y the end of November 2012, but waited until late January 2013 to complete the eighth class, and then
failed to undertake the last two required classes.

Mother attended quarterly medication monitoring appointments (June, September and December of 2012) with a psychiatric nurse practitioner who diagnosed
mother with “ [m]ajor depressive disorder, recurrent episode, ” and noted mother ’ s medication compliance was “ [g]ood, ” with no side effects , and that mother felt the

“ medication is helping me. ” T h e treatment plan was to “ [c]ontinue medication as prescribed

. ” D espite that directive, mother stopped taking her antidepressants in January
2013 on her own initiative , without the approval of her psychiatric nurse practitioner , because she had become pregnant and was worried the drug s would harm her developing
fetus. 2

2 The father of the unborn child was a man mother had begun dating in July 2012

–– the month father was incarcerated. In mid

- January 2013, a pregnant mother began living with t h is new boyfriend, but he was arrested and deported the next month.6 Mother was in consistent with visitation. In June 2012, she attended only 2 of 13 possible visits with A.C. , and stayed for about 30 minutes or less at each visit. During the month of July, mother “ visited an average of once to twice a week, ” rather than the allowable three times per week. In Augus t, mother visited an average of once a week. While visiting A.C. during this three

- month period, mother made minimal attempts to take care of the infant ’ s needs, leaving A.C. ’ s feeding, diaper changes and clothes changes to the caretaker. On one visit in July, mother responded to the
caretaker ’ s description of A.C. having soiled his clothes and baby bouncer from diarrhea
with the comment: “‘ I would have bathed him in cold water so he can learn. ’”

In September 2012, mother made six of eight possible vis its. Unlike the
earlier visits monitored by the caretaker in the caretaker ’ s home , a social worker
monitored these visits at an agency office, and reported mother was “ appropriate, ”

“ affectionate and playful with the child. ” At these visits , mother attended to the baby ’ s needs and “ interacted well ” with him. A social worker made s imilar reports of the
October visits , though noting that mother needed “ prompting ” to attend to the baby ’ s needs for feeding and diaper changes

.

Mother missed two visit s during the first two weeks of November, and
between November 2 7 and January 11, 2013, she missed 6 out of 20 possible visits. The
social worker noted these visits were “ good, ” that mother was appropriate and “ very affectionate, ” and handled all feeding and diaper changes. The social worker noted, however, that mother often ha d to be “ re

- directed when feeding the child; she gives up easily when the child does not want to eat. ” To mother ’ s “ credit, ” the report noted that
she “ continues to demonstrate imp rovement ” and “ accepts suggestions well. ”

Between January 14 and February 6, 2013, mother missed 7 out of 11 visits, and she missed two more visits in the next two weeks. Since the beginning of the dependency case, mother never attended a single one of A.C. ’ s many medical7

appointments, despite being encouraged by the social worker and caretaker to attend
them. In the weeks leading up to the six

- month review hearing set for February 25, 2013 , t he assigned social worker tried repeatedly to contact mother to set up a meeting to discuss her case plan , but was unable to reach mother . The case worker left
messages with the maternal grandmother, w ith whom mother had been living before moving out in mid

- January 2013 . The maternal grandmother promised to pass the messages on to mother , and later reported having done so

. Nevertheless, mother did not
contact the social worker.

Mother did not show up at the six

- month review hearing on February 25,
2013. The court found mother had made “ minimal ” progress toward meeting the goals of her service plan, continued reunification services, and set a 12

- month review for May 28,
2013.
Twelve

- month R eview

The social worker submitted a series of reports for the 12

- month review that once again presented a picture of mother ’ s inconsistent visitation and failure to commit fully to completion of her service plan during the period preceding the evidentiary hearing that began on July 25, 2013.

On February 25, 2013, mother called the social worker to explain that she had missed that day ’ s six

- month review hearing because she had overslept and , upon waking , could not find her clothes for court. Mother said that she was living with “ a friend ” because she could not get along with her mother, but she gave her mot her ’ s address for mailing purposes. Mother made an appointment to meet the social worker two days later, but failed to show up. The social worker tried to reach mother , but the maternal grandmother reported that her daughter had moved to an unidentified h omeless
shelter on March 5. The social worker did not hear from mother again until May 8, w ith
the looming 12

- month review hearing then set for May 28 , 2013

.8 At that point, mother ’ s visitation and service plan compliance since the six

month review was virtually nonexistent. Mother had not visited A.C. since February 25 , 2013

. After resurfacing on May 8, mother waited another two weeks to visit A.C. H er May 24 , 2013 visit was her first contact with the child in three months

. She had yet to
attend a single medical appointment for A.C. , and had not attended any of the therapy
sessions the Regional Center provided to address the child ’ s numerous , substantial developmental delays.

M other had not yet begun any individual counseling. Nor had she yet completed the two PEP classes left unfinished in the last review period. (She did eventually complete the last two classes by the July 25, 2013, hearing.) Mother had unilaterally stopped taking her prescribed psychotropic medication in January 2013 due to her pregnancy

— which she first revealed to her social worker in the May 8 phone call

–– and had neither resumed taking her medication nor met with her psychiatrist since her
last appointment in December 2012.

After mother visited A.C. on May 24, 2013, her visitation continued to be inconsistent. She attended just four of eight possible visits in June , and failed to provide documentation to support her claim of having missed two v isits for medical reasons. Her visits with the child, however, were positive: S he was “ appropriate, ” “ affectionate ” and

“ playful ” with A.C. , and fed and changed him

.

During this review period, mother was expelled from two shelters for homeless pregna nt women before moving into a third shelter just two days before the evidentiary hearing began on July 25 , 2013

. She stayed the longest at the first shelter, from March 5, 2013 to June 17, 2013, when she was asked to leave because she had spent a night aw ay without permission. (Because this was her second unapproved overnight absence, the shelter rejected her excuse of having to babysit her younger sister while her
mother was ill .)9 While at shelter No. 1, mother began individual counseling in June 2013, and completed two counseling sessions before being expelled from the shelter on June
17. Mother was at shelter No. 2 only briefly, from June 29 to July 8, 2013, when she was expelled for lacking identification. Her effort to obtain an identification car d from the
D epartment of M otor V ehicles was unsuccessful when she discovered she was a dollar short of the $8 cost after a three

- hour wait in line.

She was admitted to shelter No. 3 on July 23 , 2013 . At the evidentiary hearing, her new case manager at the shelter , Rebecca Younger, was very positive about
mother ’ s compliance with shelter rules and programs during the two days she had been
there. Younger explained that mother was in the shelter ’ s one

- year program for pregnant women, which included as sistance with parenting, counseling, baby care, education or job planning, child care and housing, among other services. Mother was scheduled to begin individual counseling through the shelter.

When mother testified at the hearing, she had been at shelt er No. 3 for nine days. She explained that she could have A.C. live with her at the shelter and she had all the supplies needed to have him in her care. She had signed a one

- year contract with the shelter and was learning to be a better mother. She was attending the required Narcotics Anonymous meetings (though drug use was not among her problems ) and parenting classes. She was set to begin individual counseling that week. The shelter provided full day preschool onsite.

At the conclusion of the evide ntiary hearing, the court found that mother

“ ha s not regularly and consistently . . . participated in her visitation [ , ] nor ha s she made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the child ’ s

. . . removal. ” The court noted the legal presumption that arises from a parent ’ s failure to participate and progress in the case plan, and found that return of A.C. to mother would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the child ’ s well

- being. The court further concluded that it
could not fin d mother had the capacity to complete the case plan objectives and provide10

for the child ’ s safety, protection, physical and emotional well

- being and special needs.
The court ordered reunification services terminated and set a permanency plan hearing on
De cember 11, 2013.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable L egal S tandards

At the 12

- month review hearing, the court must return the child to the parent ’ s physical custody unless the court finds, “ by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the return of the child

. . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well

- being of the child. ” ( § 366.21, subd. (e).) Though SSA has the burden of pro ving such detriment, the statute provides that the parent ’ s failure “ to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court

- ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. ” ( Ibid .) The court ’ s finding of detriment is reviewed for substantial evidence. ( Angela S. v. Superio r Court (1995) 36 Cal. A pp.4 th 758, 763.)

If the court does not order the child returned to the parent at the 12

- month review hearing , the court may continue reunification services “ only if it finds that there is a substantial probability that the child wi ll be returned to the physical custody ” of the parent within 18 months of the date the child was originally removed from the home. ( § 366.21, subd. (g) (1) .)

The statute limits the court ’ s ability to extend services past the 12

- month
review by requiring the court to make th ree subordinate findings before concluding there is a substantial probability of return. The statute provides, in pertinent part , as follows :

“ [I] n order to find a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent [within the statutory time frame ] . . . , the court shall be required to find all of the following: (A) That the parent or legal guardian has consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child. (B) That the parent or legal guardian has made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child ’ s11

removal from the home. (C) The parent or legal guardian has demonstrat ed the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for
the child ’ s safety, protection, physical and emotional well

- being, and special needs. ” ( § 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)

- (C) , italics added .) Again, the court ’ s findings on each of these three questions is reviewed for substantial evidence. ( In re Shaundra L. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4 th 303, 316.)

In this writ proceeding, mother challenges the court ’ s findings on two issues as lacking sufficient evidentiary support. The two findings are that return of A.C. to her custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to his well

- being, and that there is no substantial probability of returning A.C. to her custody within the requisite 18

- month time frame. As will be explained below, the record provides ample support for both findings

. B

. The R ecord S upports t he F inding of S ubstantial R isk of D etriment

Mother argues substantial evidence does not support the court ’ s finding that returning A.C. to her custod y would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child ’ s physical or emotional well

- being. More specifically, s he contends that SSA “ failed to
demonstrate how A.C. would be at risk in mother ’ s care. ” She point s out that A.C. was removed from the home for three reasons: his diagnosed “ failure to thrive , ” mother ’ s postpartum depression and resulting “ problems , ” and mother ’ s “ domestic violence relationship ” with father

. She contends that all three reasons are now resolved : A. C. is healthy and her positive visits with him demonstrate her ability to care for him in the shelter where she now resides; there is “ no evidence of continued mental health problems ” on her part, and she is no longer in a relationship with her batterer, f ather

. She concludes that, because the initial reasons for detention are now resolved, there is no evidentiary basis for the court ’ s finding of detriment.

Mother ’ s argument is well off the mark. Fundamentally, she ignores the
fact that her demonstrated failure “ to participate regularly and make substantive progress12

in court

- ordered treatment programs ” constituted “ prima facie evidence that return would
be detrimental , ” thereby shifting to mother the burden of proving that return would not be
detrimental. ( § 366.21, subd. (e) ; In re Cory M

. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 935, 949

- 950 , superseded by statute on another point , as stated in In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App

. 4th 1339, 1342

. ) The other defect in her argument is its premise : that her
current circumstan ces p rove that the reasons for removal no longer pertain , and, thus,
there is no risk of detriment in returning A.C. to her custody. The court ’ s finding to the contrary has solid support in the record.

1

. Mother F

ail ed T o P articipate R egularly and M ake S ubstantive P rogress in C ourt

- ordered T

reatment P rograms There were five components of mother ’ s service plan and she failed to participate regularly or make any substantive progress as two of the five requirements. Specifically, though the service pl an required that she obtain counseling, she made no
effort to obtain any counseling until a lmost exactly a year later, in June of 2013, and even then she only attended two counseling sessions. That, clearly, is not “ regular ” participation, nor could it ha ve resulted in “ substantive progress, ” in the court

- ordered counseling program

. Additionally, the service plan required mother to cooperate with her treating psychiatri st and to take the psychiatric medication prescribed for her

. Mother blatantly defied this requirement by unilaterally ceasing to tak e her prescribed antidepressant medication from January 2013 onward due to her pregnancy , and by failing to attend any further psychiatric appointments. SSA aptly contends this noncompliance with two crucial aspects of her service plan created “ gaping holes in the safety net essential to little [ A.C. ’ s ] well [

- ] being. ”

SSA explained the significance of these two unmet requirements of the service plan by pointing to the grave danger A.C. faced as an infant in mother ’ s care. At
10 weeks old , he was abnormally thin, with sunken eyes and protruding belly, because
his mother ’ s postpartum depression and resulting lack of interest in caring for her baby13

left him seriously underfed and bereft o f medical attention. A psychiatrist diagnosed
mother as having “ [m]ajor depressive disorder, recurrent episode ” and prescribed antidepressants for improved functioning. When mother decided in January 2013 to stop taking her medication and to stop obtaini ng psychiatric care, she was subjecting A.C. to the risk of renewed neglect due to her untreated major depression. Additionally, the new
pregnancy posed the risk of a future re currence of the severe postpartum depression that
caused her to neglect A.C. as an infant. At the 12

- month review hearing, t he court expressed concern about th is very risk of “ postpartum issues ” stemming from the new
pregnancy

. It seems beyond debate that, together, the court

- ordered psychiatric treatment and counseling services were measures that could have both enlightened mother as to the nature and scope of her mental health challenges and lessened the dangers her mental illness posed to a small child in her care.

Mother ’ s petition does not dispute that she failed to comply with the psychiatric treatment/medication component of her service plan, but instead implicitly argues that her noncompliance should be excused as unnecessary. She asserts that

“ [t]here were no reported concerns of mother ’ s mental health. There was no evidence presented at trial that mother ’ s discontinuation of her medication to protect her [unborn] baby caused any adverse reactions. ” In effect, mother contends that , because no harm
resulted from her avoidance of psychiatric treatment and medication , her failure to

“ participate regularly ” in this particular court

- ordered treatment program should not constitute prima facie evidence of detriment under section 366.21, subdivision (e).

But mother offers no author ity for th is novel assertion that a parent in a dependency proceeding can blithely ignore a court

- ordered treatment plan and then avoid the consequence of that conduct by asserting the requirement was unreasonable or
unnecessary. (See In re Cory M

. , supra , 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 949

- 950 [ mother ’ s “ failure to follow the prescribed treatment program furnished prima facie evidence of detriment ” notwithstanding mother ’ s assertion that the order to take psychiatric medication was14

unreasonable ].) Mother ’ s failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress
in the court

- ordered psychiatric treatment program furnished prima facie evidence that returning A.C. to her custody would cause detriment to his well

- being. The same consequence flowed from h er failure to participate regularly in counseling.

2

. Mother F

ailed to D isprove the P rima F acie S howing of D etriment
Because mother did not comply with her case plan, the burden shifted to her to prove that returning A.C. to her care would not be detrim ental. ( In re Cory M

. , supra , 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 949

- 950

. ) Mother fail ed to meet that burden.

Mother ’ s showing of lack of detriment consisted, essentially, of the following fact s : She does not currently suffer from postpartum depression or any

“ continued mental health problems ” ; she currently enjoys loving and “ affectionate ” visits
with A.C. ; she currently lives in a shelter that can accommodate A.C. and assist her in caring for him and his newborn sibling ; and she is no longer in a domestic viol ence relationship. All of these facts, taken together, do not dispel the risk of detriment in returning A.C. to mother that arises from her failure to obtain needed psychiatric

treatment and counseling

.

SSA persuasively argues that mother ’ s conduct in stopping medication without consulting her psychiatrist , and then failing to attend any further psychiatric appointments , “ was compelling evidence that she did not appreciate the risk her mental health problems presented and that she could not b e relied upon to address them. ” Moreover, SSA contends that mother ’ s failure to participate in regular counseling significantly increased the chance she would repeat her earlier dangerous behavior of living with an abuse r or neglecting her child when depr ession overwhelm s her

. On the latter point, SSA asserts : “ A bsent significant progress in counseling[,] the court had no evidence that Mother appreciated the gravity of [ A.C. ’ s medical] condition [at removal], her role in its exacerbation, or that she understood how to prevent future neglect and the importance of obtaining medical care. ”15 It also bears noting that from initial detention through the 12

- month review,
mother never demonstrated a str ong commitment to regaining custody of A.C. She delayed completing much of her service plan; for long stretches she failed to remain in contact with the social worker, and , most importantly, she was woefully inconsistent in
visitation. Mother even went t hree months without seeing A.C. in the crucial period just before the original hearing date for the 12

- month review.

Importantly, mother never attended any of A.C. ’ s medical appointments and attended just one of his therapy sessions, and then only for 3 0 minutes of the two

hour session. Given the child ’ s significant developmental delays, mother ’ s complete disinterest in learning how to help her son overcome these challenges is particularly distressing. The court remarked on mother ’ s brief observance of a single therapy session

as “ going to some core aspects of this case

. . . . ”

In light of mother ’s failure to obtain needed psychiatric treatment and counseling, her history of half

- hearted efforts at reunification only underscores the risk of
detriment to the child were he returned t o her custody. T he record provides ample support for the court ’ s finding of detriment.
C

. Substantial E

vidence S upports the F inding of no S ubstantial P robability of R eturn
W ithin 18 M

onths
Mother also argues the court erred in terminating reunification services
because the re was a substantial probability A.C. would be returned to her custody within
the 18

- month statutory timeframe

. She argues the court ’ s finding of no such substantial probability lacks evidentiary support. Mother is wrong.

As explained above, the court may not extend reunification services absent a finding of a substantial probability the child will be returned to the parent ’ s physical custody within 18 months of removal. ( § 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) That finding, in turn, depends on three subordinate findings, none of which the court made here. Specifically, the court must find the parent has maintained consistent and regular contact, has made16

significant progress in resolving the problems that led to removal, and has demonstrated
the “ ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for
the child ’ s safety, protection, physical and emotional well

- being , and special needs. ” ( § 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)

- (C) , )

Our previous analysis of the evidentiary support for the court ’ s detriment finding is equally applicable to the issues raised here. To recap, mother ’ s failure to maintain consistent and regular cont act with A.C. is beyond dispute. Similarly, mother
did not make significant progress in resolving the problems that le d to A.C. ’ s removal, given her rejection of psychiatric treatment and prescribed medication , and her failure to engage in counseling to address her past domestic violence experience s and the persistent
mental illness t hat ha s plagued her since adolescence

. Finally, mother ’ s failure to commit to the hard work of regaining custody of A.C. demonstrated that she is not able to provide for A.C

. ’ s well

- being and special needs.

The trial court did not err in finding no substantial probability of A.C. ’ s timely retu r n . Based on that finding, the trial court properly terminated reunification
services and set the permanency planning hearing

.17 DISPOSITION
The petition is denied

.

THOMPSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

ARONSON, J.