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DA 20-0611

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2021 MT 252N

TERRY WALLACE,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

LAW OFFICES OF BRUCE M. SPENCER, PLLC,

LPH, INC., a Montana Corporation, GEISZLER

STEELE, PC, and John Does 1-5,

 Defendants and Appellees.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,

In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. ADV 2020-245

Honorable Mike Menahan, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Terry A. Wallace, Self-represented, Missoula, Montana

For Appellees:

Mikel L. Moore, Moore, Cockrell, Goicoechea & Johnson, P.C., Kalispell, 

Montana (for Law Office of Bruce M. Spencer, PLLC) 

Jon A. Wilson, Brown Law Firm, P.C., Billings, Montana (for LPH, Inc.) 

David J. Steele, II, Timothy D. Geiszler, Geiszler Steele, PC, Missoula, 

Montana (for Geiszler Steele, PC) 

Submitted on Briefs: August 11, 2021

 Decided: September 28, 2021

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

09/28/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0611
2

Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of non-citable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports. 

¶2 Terry Wallace (Wallace) appeals the order entered by the First Judicial District 

Court, granting summary judgment on Wallace’s claims in favor of Law Offices of Bruce

M. Spencer, PLLC, LPH, Inc., and Geiszler Steele, PC (Appellees), and granting 

Appellees’ joint motion to declare Wallace a vexatious litigant. We affirm.

¶3 Discovery Dental Group (DDG) contracted with LPH, Inc., a debt collection 

agency, to collect an unpaid $1,112.13 bill from Karrie Serrania, who had signed a contract 

as responsible party for dental services rendered by DDG to Serrania, her then-husband, 

and her son. Serrania did not pay the debt, and LPH brought action in Justice Court. But 

after Wallace became Serrania’s counsel and filed counterclaims that exceeded the Justice 

Court’s jurisdiction, Serrania initiated suit against DDG and LPH in the District Court. 

Serrania asserted violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the 

Montana Consumer Protection Act and sought damages of approximately $650,000. The 

District Court granted summary judgment to DDG and LPH; and in January 2014, after

concluding Serrania and Wallace had violated M. R. Civ. P. 11 by their vexatious actions,

ultimately imposed sanctions in the amount of $42,113.32 to be paid to LPH and

$32,647.94 to be paid to DDG. The court also sanctioned Wallace an additional $1,000
3

each to counsel for LPH and DDG for failing to appear at a scheduled hearing and $10,000 

for “his blatant lack of candor and his disrespectful conduct toward the Court and the legal 

process and his egregious abuses of the legal rights of the Defendants.” Serrania v. LPH, 

Inc., 2015 MT 113, ¶ 10, 379 Mont. 17, 347 P.3d 1237 (Serrania I). Serrania filed for

bankruptcy and discharged her debts. Serrania I, ¶ 11. On appeal, we affirmed the 

summary judgment and determined that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 

imposing the $1,000 and $10,000 sanctions. Serrania I, ¶¶ 32, 36. After determining 

Serrania’s FDCPA claim “had some grounding in the law—albeit not enough to withstand 

summary judgment”—i.e., it was not entirely frivolous, Serrania I, ¶ 37, we remanded the 

other sanctions to be recalculated without regard to the filing of the FDCPA claim. 

Serrania I, ¶ 38. On remand, the District Court withdrew the $10,000 sanction against 

Wallace and ordered him to pay LPH $30,847.68 for fees unrelated to the FDCPA claim, 

a decision which we affirmed on appeal. Serrania v. LPH, Inc., No. DA 17-0221, 2018 

MT 3N, ¶¶ 4, 6, 2018 Mont. LEXIS 2. (Serrania II).

¶4 On October 30, 2018, following a complaint filed by the Office of Disciplinary 

Counsel and a hearing before the Commission on Practice (COP), this Court issued an 

Order of Discipline, affirming the COP’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 

adopting its Recommendation to suspend Wallace from the practice of law for seven 

months, with readmittance subject to reapplication. See In the Matter of Terry A. Wallace, 

PR 17-0245, Order of Discipline (Mont. Oct. 30, 2018). We noted therein that “[t]he 

records related to this proceeding are replete with incidents of professional misconduct” by

Wallace.
4

¶5 In November 2018, Wallace filed a complaint in the United States District Court for 

the District of Montana, naming as defendants the State of Montana, District Judges Ed 

McLean and Leslie Halligan, who presided over the respective Serrania I and II trial 

proceedings, and the Justices of this Court. See Wallace v. Montana, No. CV-18-103 RJB, 

2019 LEXIS 60606 (D. Mont. Apr. 8, 2019). In April 2019, Wallace’s case was dismissed 

for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wallace, 2019 LEXIS 60606, at *15.1

¶6 Following the entry of judgment against Wallace for the sanctions we affirmed in 

Serrania II, LPH retained attorney Bruce Spencer to collect it. Spencer obtained issuance 

of a writ of execution, but was unable to locate Wallace or his assets, despite searching 

credit records, postal records, and Motor Vehicle Division records. The address given by 

Wallace to the U.S. Post Office belonged to the First Presbyterian Church of Missoula. 

Spencer had a subpoena issued for Wallace, which was returned after the process server 

was unable to locate him. Ultimately, Spencer served two subpoena duces tecum upon

Dr. Sam Wallace, son of Wallace, seeking to depose Dr. Wallace regarding the location of 

his father and his father’s assets. The first deposition was cancelled after Wallace 

communicated to Spencer that the subpoena lacked language required under M. R. Civ. P.

45. Spencer corrected the language and served a second subpoena for a deposition, which 

 

1 During the pendency of this matter, Wallace moved to disqualify this Court en banc, citing this 

federal litigation and many other grounds, including “widespread unethical conduct by this court.”

Appellant’s Consolidated Motions, 2, May 24, 2021, DA 20-0611. We denied the motion in what 

Wallace describes as “a snarky little order.” Appellant’s Reply and Oral Arg. Demand, 2, July 7, 

2021, DA 20-0611. 
5

had to be cancelled by Spencer because of an unrelated emergency. The first deposition 

had been designated to occur at a hotel in Missoula, while the second was scheduled for a 

conference room at the Missoula office of Geiszler Steele, PC.

2

 At this time, Spencer 

advised Wallace and his son that if Wallace would accept service of the writ, the need to 

subpoena Dr. Wallace could be avoided. Wallace declined and, after the deposition 

subpoenas were again served on his son, Wallace filed this lawsuit, alleging claims against 

LPH, Spencer, and Geiszler Steele, PC for abuse of process, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (IIED), and civil conspiracy. 

¶7 Appellees filed motions for summary judgment and also filed a joint motion 

requesting an order declaring Wallace to be a vexatious litigant, requiring anything he 

sought to file be pre-approved by the District Court. In an October 20, 2020 Order, 

discussed further below, the District Court granted Appellees’ motions for summary 

judgment and their joint motion declaring Wallace to be a vexatious litigant. Wallace 

appeals, challenging the entry of summary judgment on his claims and the entry of the 

Order declaring him to be a vexatious litigant. 

¶8 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

M. R. Civ. P. 56 criteria as applied by the lower court. Serrania I, ¶ 12. Summary judgment 

is appropriate if the movant successfully carries the burden to establish that there is no 

 

2 David J. Steele II had previously represented LPH through the completion of the Serrania 

proceedings, but as the District Court noted, “[a]llowing Spencer to use a Geiszler Steele, PC 

conference room for a deposition appears to be the only connection Geiszler Steele, PC has to the 

events of this case.” 
6

genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

as confirmed by a review of “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, 

and any affidavits[.]” M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). If the movant satisfies the burden, the burden 

shifts to the nonmovant, who is tasked with setting forth particularized facts—not merely 

“rely[ing] upon their pleadings, nor upon speculative, fanciful, or conclusory 

statements”—in opposition of summary judgment. Thomas v. Hale, 246 Mont. 64, 67, 802 

P.2d 1255, 1257 (1990) (citation omitted). 

¶9 “Essential to proof of [the claim of] abuse of process is (1) an ulterior purpose and 

(2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the 

proceeding.” Hughes v. Lynch, 2007 MT 177, ¶ 21, 338 Mont. 214, 164 P.3d 913 (quoting 

Brault v. Smith, 209 Mont. 21, 28, 679 P.2d 236, 240 (1984)) (internal quotation omitted). 

“‘Some definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an object not 

legitimate in the use of the process, is required; and there is no liability where the defendant 

has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though 

with bad intentions.’” Hughes, ¶ 21 (quoting Prosser, The Law of Torts § 121, at 857 (4th 

ed., West 1971)). Wallace contends that summary judgment is improper because there 

exist genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Spencer’s efforts to collect the 

judgment were undertaken with an “ulterior motive” and “not in the regular conduct of” 

proceedings in aid of execution of the judgment, arguing “[w]hat we have here is Spencer 

and Steele, who, because of their over the top animosity towards Wallace, are doing 

everything they can to get their ad hominem claims about Wallace before the court, and 
7

who, without a writ of execution, tried to illegally subpoena Wallace’s son in direct 

violations of the law.” 

¶10 From the undisputed facts, the District Court determined that the Appellees “did not 

abuse process” when they “lawfully sought to depose [Wallace’s son] regarding his father’s 

whereabouts and assets,” noting this procedure was authorized under a plain reading of

M. R. Civ. P. 69. The court noted that none of Wallace’s accusations rose “to a level 

beyond mere speculation that Spencer or LPH has done anything beyond carrying out the 

process of collecting a judgment to its authorized conclusion,” or that Appellees “sought a 

‘collateral advantage’ by filing the subpoenas,” or “sought to threaten or coerce Wallace 

into any act by filing the subpoenas.” The District Court reasoned that Spencer’s “simple 

(and accurate) statement that Wallace’s consenting to service would obviate the need to 

depose [his son]” could not be inferred to be coercion. 

¶11 It is clear from Wallace’s briefs that it is not abuse of process to which Wallace 

objects, but simply “the process” legally proscribed for executions of judgments. An 

execution of judgment is a civil proceeding governed both by statute and the Montana 

Rules of Civil Procedure. See § 25-14-101, et seq., MCA. Rule 69 provides that, to aid in 

execution or collection of a judgment, a judgment creditor “may examine any person, 

including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these rules for taking 

depositions.” M. R. Civ. P. 69 (emphasis added). We note, in answer to another of 

Wallace’s arguments, that these provisions do not limit the place of depositions to a 

courtroom or before a judge or referee. Section 25-14-105, MCA; see also M. R. Civ. P. 

30. 
8

¶12 Even if Appellees were operating under a personal vendetta against Wallace or with 

ulterior purposes, there can be no liability absent “[s]ome definite act or threat not 

authorized by the process, or aimed at an object not legitimate in the use of the process[.]”

Hughes, ¶ 21. Appellees’ personal attitudes toward Wallace are of no consequence here

as service of process upon Wallace and his son is not outside of the execution process

provided by statute and the Rules. Nor is it consequential here that Spencer may have 

made the mistake of serving a subpoena after the writ of execution had expired. Such an 

error could have been lawfully repaired, and, regardless of the truth of this allegation, the 

notion that Spencer improperly leveraged or coerced Wallace by deposing his son is 

unsupported speculation. Wallace failed to raise genuine issues of material fact that rose 

beyond fanciful speculation. “Evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact 

‘must be in proper form and conclusions of law will not suffice; the proffered evidence 

must be material and of a substantial nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely 

suspicious.’” Moore v. Goran, LLC, 2017 MT 208, ¶ 24, 388 Mont. 340, 400 P.3d 729

(internal citation omitted). 

¶13 The District Court further reasoned that, “because Wallace’s claims for [IIED], civil 

conspiracy, and punitive damages are premised on the abuse of process claims, those 

claims also fail,” noting “it is axiomatic that civil conspiracy requires an underlying bad 

act.” See, e.g., Hughes v. Pullman, 2001 MT 216, ¶ 26, 306 Mont. 420, 36 P.3d 339. 

Regarding IIED, an “actor is never liable [where] he has done no more than to insist upon 

his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is 

certain to cause emotional distress.” Judd v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 2008 
9

MT 181, ¶ 30, 343 Mont. 416, 186 P.3d 214 (citation and quotation omitted). Spencer was 

exercising his client’s rights as judgment collector and acting within the applicable statutes. 

Therefore, as a matter of law, there can be no cause of action for civil conspiracy or IIED.

¶14 Finally, Wallace argues for reversal on the ground that the District Court denied his 

request for a hearing, which he contends violated his right to due process. Wallace 

correctly cites the general rule that, upon request, a party may have a summary judgment 

hearing. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)(A). However, there are limits to this general rule, as 

applied to these circumstances. See Richards v. County of Missoula, 2009 MT 453, ¶ 17, 

354 Mont. 334, 223 P.3d 878 (“[A] hearing may not be necessary in ‘extraordinary 

circumstances’ before an order granting summary judgment.”) Pursuant to § 3-1-111,

MCA, Montana courts have the inherent power to take necessary measures to maintain the 

integrity of the legal process. As the United States Supreme Court has noted: 

It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, 

order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. 

The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper 

conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges 

confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants 

must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. 

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1970); accord State v. Hartsoe, 

2011 MT 188, ¶ 25, 361 Mont. 305, 258 P.3d 428 (determining that courtroom decorum 

constituted a “compelling circumstance” in satisfaction of the first prong of the test outlined 

in State v. Herrick, 2004 MT 323, ¶¶ 14-15, 324 Mont. 76, 101 P.3d 755). Wallace has a 

recorded history of not showing up to hearings, Serrania I, ¶ 7, and engaging in 

unprofessional and inappropriate actions when he does. See In the Matter of Terry A. 
10

Wallace, PR 17-0245, Order of Discipline (Mont. Oct. 30, 2018) (adopting Commission 

on Practice’s finding that Wallace’s “belief – expressed throughout the hearing – that he 

knows more than other lawyers and judges” was likely to cause Wallace to continue his 

destructive behavior). Given Wallace’s history of disruptive behaviors during litigation, 

the District Court acted within its statutory and constitutional authority and did not abuse 

its discretion when it determined to not hold a summary judgment hearing. Wallace had 

ample opportunities over years of litigation, discussed herein, to present his arguments 

against the sanctions included in the judgment, including the arguments repeated herein, 

and has not been denied due process. The District Court correctly entered summary 

judgment on Wallace’s claims in favor of the Appellees. 

¶15 Turning to the District Court’s vexatious litigant order, our review here will be 

summary, as we are entering a statewide vexatious litigant Order concurrently with this 

Opinion. The District Court, citing McCann v. McCann, 2018 MT 207, ¶ 38, 392 Mont. 

385, 425 P.3d 682, extensively reviewed the record and analyzed the five McCann factors3

 

3 The factors cited in McCann, ¶ 38 (citing Stokes v. First Am. Title Co. of Mont., Inc., 2017 MT 

275, ¶ 4, 389 Mont. 245, 406 P.3d 439 and Motta v. Granite Cty. Comm’rs, 2013 MT 172, ¶ 20, 

370 Mont. 469, 304 P.3d 720), for consideration of a vexatious litigant order are: 

(1) the litigant’s history of litigation and, in particular, whether it has entailed 

vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in pursuing 

the litigation; e.g., whether the litigant has an objective good faith expectation of 

prevailing; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the 

litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary 

burden on the courts and court personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be 

adequate to protect the courts and other parties. 
11

in concluding that Wallace is a vexatious litigant and restricting his access to the courts of 

the First Judicial District. Specifically, the District Court directed that Wallace: 

is prohibited from filing any complaint, petition, or other pleading of his own 

creation that purports to initiate a new cause of []action without the express 

written permission of this Court. In the event Wallace attempts to do so, the 

Clerk of District Court is directed to present the pleading to this Court for 

review. 

¶16 The District Court noted Wallace’s frivolous suits, harassing and abrasive conduct, 

and inability to recognize his wrongdoing. The court delineated “Wallace’s history of

vexatious, harassing lawsuits” in support of satisfaction of factor one, and determined 

factor two was satisfied because Wallace’s claims were not objectively “reasonably 

calculated to succeed.” The court cited McCann, ¶ 42, for the proposition that Wallace’s 

“egregious conduct should be considered even more egregious” given that it was 

“perpetrated by an attorney[.]” The court noted Wallace’s unprofessional and unbecoming 

actions, the culmination of which has “burdened other parties, burdened the courts, and 

have caused needless expense” to the satisfaction of the fourth factor. Finally, noting that 

Wallace’s failure to simply submit to the Serrania sanctions is what led to the current 

litigation, the court determined that lesser sanctions would not adequately protect the courts 

and other parties. 

¶17 We conclude that the District Court properly weighed the relevant factors and did 

not abuse its discretion in determining that Wallace is a vexatious litigant and sanctioning 

him with the imposition of a pre-filing order. Given Wallace’s response to prior, lesser 

sanctions, the District Court’s decision was appropriately tailored to address Wallace’s 

documented penchant for disrespect toward litigants and tribunals. To the extent that 
12

further review is necessary to consider constitutional issues raised by Wallace, this concern

is more fully addressed in the Opinion and Order issued in conjunction herewith. Wallace 

v. Law Offices of Bruce M. Spencer, PLLC, 2021 MT __, __ Mont. __, __ P.3d __, 2021 

Mont. LEXIS __, DA 20-0611.

¶18 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our 

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the 

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of 

applicable standards of review. 

¶19 Affirmed. 

/S/ JIM RICE

We concur: 

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR