### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00049- CV

Do nal d H. Cum m ins, Be tt y A nn Br adfie ld C um m ins, Thom as W. Cum m ins

and Wi lliam Bradfield Cu m m ins, Ap pellants

v. Travis County Water Contr ol and Im provem ent Distr ict No. 17, A ppellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 201ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. GN203636 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
A p p e ll a n ts Do n a ld

H
. Cumm in s , B e tt

y A n n B r a d f

ie ld Cumm in s , T h o ma s W. Cum min s, a nd

Willi a m B ra df

ie ld Cum min s ow n pr op e rt y on a hig h blu ff ov e rl oo kin g L a ke Tr a vis and abutting land owned by appellee , the Travis County Water Control and I mprovement District No. 17. I n 2002, the Cumminses applied to the District for a license to build a boat dock on a par t of the lake subject to the District’s regulation. After the District denied the license, the Cummi nses soug ht a d ec laratory

judgme nt that they

have r ights to use a

nd enjoy their land a s water front proper ty , inclu s i v e of the rig ht to construct a r ecr eational boat dock, bec ause the y are riparia

n or littoral owners of la

nd along the shore of L ake Travis or, in the alternative, bec ause the y possess an
ease ment or quasi-e aseme nt entitling them to such rig hts.The TCEQ wa s fo rm er l y called the Texas Natura l Resource Conservation Commissi on. 1 2 Th e Cum min se s a lso c ha lle ng e d tw o r e g ulati on s th at th e Di str ic t ha d e na c te d to pr ote c t r e str ic te d zo ne s aro un d it s w a te r i nta ke ba rg e ; th e Cum min se s a lle g e d th a t th e fi rs t regulation, which prohibits all activity within a 200-foot radius and mandates that war ning sig ns be place d along the sh o re l i n e, constitutes an inver se conde mnation of their land a nd that the sec ond regulation, which prohibits rec reational boating activity within a 1000-foot radius, is invalid. The District responde d with a motion for summary judgme nt, and the trial c ourt g ranted it. The Cummi nses appe al, asser

ting that the summary

judgme nt should be reve rsed be cause g enuine issues of ma te ri a l f

a c t r e ma in. B ecaus e the Di str ic t satis fi e d it s b ur de n to e sta bli shits e nti tle me nt t o
su mma ry jud g me nt, a nd

no g e nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f a c t r e ma in, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND I n Texas, water is a scarce natura l resour ce that the State is obligate d to conserve and pr ote c t fo r the be ne fi t of the he a lth , sa fe ty , a nd we lf a re of the g e ne ra l pu

bli c . I n a c c or da

nc e wi th t his duty , the State has statutorily cre ated se vera l ty

pes of water districts with authority to r eg ulate the uses of Te x as’s va

rious bodies of water. The Travis County Water Control and I mprovement District No. 17 is one such district, whic h has oper ated since 1958 as a political subdivision of the S t a t e o f T e x a s , u n d e r

t h e s u p e r v i s i n g a u t h o r i t y o f

t h e T e x a s C o m m i s s i o n o n E n v i r o n m e n t a l Q u a l i t y, 1 fo r t he purp os e of

pr ov idi nga n a de qu a te su pp ly of sa fe , p ota

ble wate r a

nd e ns ur ingthe fi sc a lly sound, environmentally

responsib l e development a nd manag ement of w ater resour ces a

nd3

wa ste wate r f

a c ili tie s. To fu

rt he r t he se ob je c tiv e s, in 1 96 0 th e Di str ic t in sta lle d a n “ int a ke ba

rg e ” in L ake Travis, which pumps raw water throug h pipes to the District’s treatment fac ility , wher e the r aw
wa t er i s t re at edan d

m ad e s u i t ab l e f

o r d ri n k i n g. Ne a rl y tw o d e c a de s a ft e r t

he Di str ic t wa s est a

bli sh e d, the Cum min se s a c qu ir e d ti tle to the proper

ty immediately

north of the District’ s l an d , when B etty Ann B radf

ield Cummi ns inh e ri te d the pr op e rt

y fr om he r mot

he r in 19 75
. Th e pr op e rt

y ha d b e e n in

Mr s. Cum min s’ s f

a mil y (the B radf

ields) si n ce 1943. The Cumminses’ proper ty sits atop a steep bluff

; its sout hern bor der
conver g e s w it

h th e D is tr ic t’ s n o rth e r

n b o r d e r a t t h e h e a d o f a s ma ll c o v e , a n d

b o th p r o p erties
ov e rl oo k L a ke Tr a vis to the we st. Th e Di str ic t’ s in take ba rg e is l oc a te d in

the wate rs of

L a ke Tr a vis , approximately

110-120 fe et from the shor eline of the cove. I n 1992, the Commiss ion promulgat ed a s ubstantive rule g overningpublic water
source s. 30 Tex. Admin. C ode § 290.41(e )(2) (2004). The rule sets for th the actions water c ontrol and improveme nt districts a re r equire d to take to ensure an ade quate supply of saf e drinking water : [i ]nt akes sha ll be located and constructed i n a manne r which w ill secure r aw water of the be st quality

available from the sourc e. . . . (B ) Raw water intake s shall not be located w ithin 1,000 fee t of boat launching ramps, mar inas, docks, or f loating f ishing piers which a

re a cce ssible by

the public. (C) A r estrict ed zone of 200 fe et ra dius from the r aw water intake works shall be e stablished and all re cre ational ac tiviti es and tr e sp a ssi ng sh a ll be pr oh ibi te d in this ar e a . Regulatio ns g ov e rn ingthi s zon e sh a ll be in the city

ordinanc es or the r

ules and reg ulations promulg ated by a water district or sim i l ar r eg ulatory

ag ency . The re stricted zone shall be de signated with signs rec ounting these restric tions. The signs sha ll be mai n t ai n ed in plain view of the pu bli c a nd sh a ll be vis ibl e fr om al l par ts of the re str ic te d a

re a . . . . Pr ov isi on s sh a ll be ma de fo r t

he str ic t e nf

or c e me nt o f s uc h o rd ina

nc e s o r r e g ulatio ns .4

Id . Pursuant to this rule, the District enac ted its own regulations in 1 9 9 8 , including Re g ulation 6.5.3.2, which establishes a “cle ar zone” around the District’s ra w wate r intake ba

rg e. Reg . 6.5.3.2, Protection of W

ater Intake

s . The reg ulation prohibits “[a]ll activity not related t o the maintenanc e of the ba rg e or intake ” within 200 fee t. Starting fr om the barg e, the 200- foot radius e ncompasses pa rt s o f t he lak e, as wel l a s th e c ov e wh e re the so uth e rn mos t c or ne r o f t he Cum min se s’ pr op e rt

y abuts the norther

nmost corner

of the District’s land. The regulation also prohibits “[a] ll recr eational boating activity

within 1000 feet.” The 1000-f o o t radius, also ex tending outward f rom the bar g e,
c o v e r s m o r e t h a n h a l f

o f t h e C u m m i n s e s ’ p r o p e rt y an d a l a r g e p o rt i o n o f

t h e D i s t r i c t ’ s l a n d

. F i n a l l y, the District’s re g ulation mandates that “ [s] igns a dvising the g eneral public of this order shall be posted along the shoreline

. . . [and] should r ead ‘ Restricted Z one, Potable Water Intakes Within 200 Fe et, Tre spassing Proh i b i t ed

. ’” Wit hin a fe w months of adopting Reg ulation 6.5.3.2, the District pla c e d a n o rd e r w itha

sig n c omp a ny

fo r s ig ns statin g in larg e , b old le tte rs , “ Re str ic te d Z on e : Po ta ble W at er I ntakes, Tr espassing Prohibited within 200 feet” a nd “Ke ep Clear : Submerg ed Cable a nd Mooring L ines Be low; High V oltag e.”

Following the ena ctment of the D istrict’s regulations, the Cummi nses subdivided their prope rty

into six lots. L ots 1, 4, 5, and 6 are eac h lakef ront proper

ties, while L ots 2 a

nd 3 are landlocked. Be cause of the land’s location atop a steep bluff, all six lots offer lakefr ont views. L ot 6 is the southernmost plot, running a longside the norther n borde r o f t h e District’s land, a nd
conver g in g at the small cove a bout 115 fee t inland from the intake ba rg e. The entire shor eline of L ot 6 falls within the 200-foot “c lear zone.”I n 1938, when Ma nsfield Dam wa s under c onstruction , the L ower Colorado River 2 Authority adopted c ontour lines—as desig nated by the United States Ge o l o gical Survey Be nch Marks—e stablishing the lake’ s aver ag e elevation, measure d by fee t above sea leve l. Capitol Rod & Gu n Cl ub v . Lo we r Co lo. Ri v e r A uth ., 622 S.W .2d 887, 889 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, writ ref’ d n.r.e.)

. 5

I n October

1999, the Cumminse s p re p ared a bounda ry ag ree ment stating that the bo un da ry lin es betwe e n th e ir

pr op e rt y a nd the Di str ic t’ s p ro pe rt

y we re de fi ne d b y

“ the mos t Southerly boundary line of L ot 6,” and “the 670-foot contour li ne as the most Westerly boundary .” 2 A map of the proper

ty was attached to the agr eeme nt; the m ap reinforc es t he terms of the ag ree ment by labeling the 670-foot c ontour l i n e, wh i ch is shown running along the weste rn borde r of the Cummi nses’ prope rty , as the “ ag ree d boundary line.” I n 2002, the Cumminses applied to the District for a license to construct a boat dock
e xten din g fr om t

he ir pr op e rt y ov e r t he wate rs a nd

su bme rg e d la

nd s o f L a ke Tr a vis , w hic h a re he ld by the State in trust f

or the public. When the District ref used to g rant the Cumminses’ application fo r a lic e ns e , th e Cum min se s so ug ht a de c lara tor y jud g me nt. Th e Cum min se s c la ime d th a t, b e c a us e the ir c ha in o f t itl e c on ve y e d w a te rf ro nt p ro pe rt

y , th e y ha d li tto ra l or ri pa

ri a n ri g hts e nti tli ngthe m to construct a

rec reational boat dock on the submer g ed l an d s b elow the 670- foot contour line. Alternatively , they claimed to have a valid ease ment or quasi-e aseme nt to use and enjoy their land as l a k e f r o n t p r o p e rty , w h ic h in c lu d e d th e r ig h t t o c o n s tr

u c t s u c h a

d o c k

. T h e Cumminses ad d i t i o n al l y

ch al l en gedt h e D i s t ri ct ’s re gu l at i o n s , cl ai m i n g t h a t t h e 2 0 0 -f o o tan d wa rn i n g-s i gn regul at i o n s const ituted an inverse condemnation—a taking for whic h the Cumminses should be compensated—and that the 1000- foot regulation was invalid.The following wer e attac hed as e vidence : (1) the a ffidavit of D ebor ah Ge rnes, Ge nera l 3 Manag er f

or the District; (2) a copy of District Reg ulation 6.5.3.2; (3) a copy of the District’s or der fo rm f r o m t h e s i g n

c o mp a n y ; ( 4 ) m i n u t e s o f t h e D i s t r i c t ’ s b o a r d

m e e t i n g s s h o w i n g t h a tD o n a ld Cum min s w a s p re vio us ly a me mbe r o f t

he Di str ic t’ s B oa

rd of Di re c tor s; ( 5) a rt ic le s an d re po rt s about the hazar ds of g as chemica ls f rom boats in water ; (6) a c opy of the 1999 B oundary

Ag ree ment with the map attac hed; and ( 7) th e af fi davit of Claude Hinkle, a n expert survey or, with copies of sever al dee ds from the Cumminses’ cha in of title attache d. 6 The District filed a Rule 166a(c ) motion for summary judgme nt w it h ev i d ence attache d. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c ). The District asser ted t hat the Cumminses are not littoral or 3 ri pa ri an o wn e rs a nd

tha t th e y a re no t e nti tle d to moo r a

bo a t dock on t

he su bme rg e d la

nd be c a us e they do not hold tit le to that land, which is regulated by the Dis trict pursuant to authority deleg ated by the State, and beca

use the Cummi nses do not ha ve any ease ments over that land

. T h e D i s t ri ct
a lso su pp or te d th e va lid ity

of its re g ulatio ns , a sse rt ingtha t th e y do no t c on sti tut e a n in ve rs e condemnation of the Cummins es’ pr operty
.

Th e tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d th e Di str ic t’ s motio n, de nyinge a c h o f t he Cum min se s’ c la ims

. The Cummin s es ap p ea l, urg ing that the summary judgme nt should be reve rsed be cause g enuine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f

a c t r e ma in r e g a rd ingwh e the r ( 1) the Cum min se s hav e ri pa ri a n o r l itt or a l r ig hts appurte nant to their land; (2) the Cumminses have an ease ment or quasi-e aseme nt to use and enjoy their land a s water front prope rty ; (3) their land has been inversely condemne d by

the District’s 200- foot and wa

rning -sig n regulations; and (4) the 1000- foot regulation is invalid.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We r e vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt of su mma ry jud g me nt de novo

. J

oe v . Two Thi rty Nin e J oin t V e ntu re , 145 S.W .3d 150, 156 (Tex. 2004) . When review ing a summary judgme nt, we take a s true all evide nce f

avora ble to the nonmovant, and we i ndulge ever y rea sonable infe renc e andThe Cumminses’ second issue a sserts that they have littoral rig hts in their entire pa rce l of 4 land, while their fourth issue asser ts, in the alternative, that they have littoral r ights in L ots 1- 5, but not in L ot 6. We address these issues toge ther. 7 resolve a ny doubts in the nonmovant’s favor

. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgm t. Co. , 690 S
. W .2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985)

. A defe ndant who moves for summary judgme nt unde r Rule 166a(c ), as her e, is e nti tle d to have its mot ion g ra nte d if it c on c lus ive ly

ne g a te s a t le a st on e of the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the plaintiff’ s cause of ac tion or if it conclusively proves e ach e lement of its aff irmative def

ense, there by showing that it, as the movant, is entitled to judgmen t as a m att er of law and no g enuine issues of mater ial fac t remain. Rhone-P oulenc, Inc. v . Steel , 997 S.W .2d 217, 222-23 (Te x . 1999). Th e de fe nd a nt m

us t su pp or t it s mo tio n w ithpr op e r s umm a ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e. T e x. R. C iv. P. 166a(c ). Only

if the def

endant mee ts its burden does the burden shift to the plaintiff, as the nonmovant, to establish that a g enuine issue of materia l fac t remains. Id . I f the trial c ourt does not specify the g rounds upon which the summary judgme nt was g rante d, as her e, the judg ment can be aff irmed if any

of the theor ies adva

nced a re me ritorious. Carr v. Brasher , 776 S.W .2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989). Be cause the District established that it wa s entitled to a judgme nt as a matter

of law
on eac h of the Cumminses’ claims, and no g enuine iss u es o f m aterial fac t remain, we aff irm the jud g me nt.
AN AL YSI S Riparian an d Li ttor al Rights

Th e Cum min se s ass e rt

in t he ir se c on d a nd fo ur th iss ue s th a t, b e c a

us e the ir pr op e rt y 4 border s a lake , they

have littoral rig hts “to use their property as waterfr ont property .” The District8

asser ts that the Cummi nses’ prope rty is not vested with either ripa rian or littoral rig hts and that, eve n if it were , those rig hts would not entitle the C umminses to moor a private, rec reational boat dock on the District’s land.

I nitially , in their petition for dec laratory judgme nt, the Cummi nses asser ted that they “have riparian or littoral rig hts to construct docks and othe r improvements ne edful to their use of the ir pr op e rt y a s w a te rf ro nt p ro pe rt

y ” a nd that th e “ ri g hts to u se the ir pr op e rt y a s wa te rf ro nt p ro pe rt

y

. . . in c lud e the ri g ht to co ns tr uc t boa t doc ks to se rv e the pr op e rt y .” Th e Cum min se s’ a rgume nt i n their summary

judgme nt response similarly focuse d on thei r rig ht to construct a boat dock; they

a sse rt e d, “ pe rs on s wi th lit tor a l ri g hts have the ri g ht to bu ild do c ks on the ir wate r f ro nt. ” On a pp e a l, ho we ve r, the Cum mi ns es adv anced a mor e g e ne ra l c la im that th e y have lit tor a l r ig hts to u se the ir land “a s water front prope rty ,” without confining the i ssue t o whether or not those rig hts entitle them to construct a boat dock. The D istrict, on the other ha nd, has continuously maintained both that the Cummi nses have no littoral rig hts and that, even if they do, they are not entitled to construct a boat dock on land he ld by

the State and r eg ulated by the District. We will first address the g ener al issue of wh e th e r

th e Cumm in s e s h a v e li tt o r a l r ig h ts an d w il l t h e n a d dr e s s th e s p e c if

ic is s u e o f

w h ether they are entitled to construct a boat dock.

I n raising the littoral rig hts issue, the Cummi nses join centurie s of Texas landowner s wh os e pr ivate rig hts to u se the wate r a dja c e nt t o th e ir land have c la sh e d w iththe Sta te ’s ri g ht t o regulate waters for the gene ral welfar e of the people. See B arshop v. Me dina Underground W ater Con se rv ati on Di

st . , 9 2 5 S
. W
. 2 d

6 1 8 , 6 2 3 ( T e x . 1 9 9 6 )

. In r e c e n tye a r s , t h e “ i n t e r e s ta n d u r g e n c y” in the ong oing battle betwee n private a nd public rig hts t o T ex as water has g rown, ba sed on theTh e C u m minses acknowle dg ed in their summary judgme nt response that a wate rfr ont 5 proper ty owner ’s rights “to use the w ater appea r to be the same whethe r the rig hts are c alled littoral or riparian and the terms are sometimes used intercha ng eably .” More over, in a

n amicus curiae brief, the L CRA discusse d the history and nature of riparia n rig hts a s pertinent author ity for whe ther the Cummi nses have littoral rights. 9 incre a s in g a w a r e n e s s th a t w a te r is “ a s c a r c e n a tu r a l r e s o u r c e v it a l to th e p u b li c , ” w h ich must be
conser ved. City

of A us tin v . H

all , 57 S.W
. 5 6 3 , 5 6 5 (Tex. 1900) (sca rce resour ce) ; Madison Ray burn, 1 Condemnation § 3.16, at 25 (1998) ( g rowing interest) ( here inafter Ra y bu rn ); FrankF. Skill ern, I Texas Water L aw 69 ( 1992) (since 1982, Texas ha s heig htened its focus on conser vation of water resource s and prote ction of water qua lity ) (he reina fter Skillern I ). As her e, many

disputes have cente red on whether a waterfr ont property

owner has ripar ian or littoral rig hts in the land and, if so, what uses those r ights e ntitle the owner to make of the land.

As an initial matter, we must address and de fine the te rms “ripa rian” and “littoral.” Although the Cummi nses re fer primarily to “littoral” rig hts in the i r ap p el l at e brie f, they used the terms “r iparian” and “litt oral” intercha ng eably in their pre vious pleading s, in their reply briefs, a nd

a t or a l argume nt b e fo re thi s Co ur t. T he Di str ic t like wi se re fe re nc e d b oth ri pa ri a n a nd lit tor a l r ig hts

. I n Texas jurisprudence , ri p ar i an and li ttoral rig hts are tr eate d simil arly , and the ter ms are use d intercha ng ably , but “ riparia

n” ref ers to the water s of rivers and streams, while “littoral” ref ers to the 5 water s of lakes, se as, and oc eans. See Blac k ’s Law D ic tio na ry 94 5, 13 28 (7 th e d. 20 01 ). Ev e n s til l, many authorities employ

“ripa rian” as a bla

nket t erm to refer

to a landowne r’s rig hts reg ardingany ty pe of w ater front prope rty , without disting uishing the rig hts a s “littoral” when discussing lakef ront proper ties. Filipos v. Chouke , 40 S.W .2d 38, 40 (Tex. 1931) (ripar ian rig hts discussed in refe renc e to c re e ks , ba

y ou s, lake s, a nd

c ov e s) ; Humphrey

s-Me xia Co. v. Arsene aux , 2 9 7 S. W. 2 2 5 , 2 2 9 ( T e x.10

19 27 ) (r ipa

ri a n rig hts a tta c h to natur a l lake s and po nd s) ; Ri c hte r v . G ra nit e Mf g ., 174 S.W . 284, 286 (Tex. 1915) (d is cus sin g ri pa ri a n r ig hts in t e rm s o f l a ke fr on t pr op e rt y ); W e lde r v . S tat e , 1 9 6 S. W. 86 8, 87 0 ( Te x. Civ . App .— Au sti n 1 91 7, wr it r e f’ d) (s a me ); Gi bs on v . Ca rro ll , 180 S.W . 630, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1915, no writ) ( land border ing Corpus Christi Bay was “ riparia

n”); W. Hutchins, Tex as L aw of Water Rights 332 (1961) (“w ord ‘r iparian’ perta ins to the bank of a river, or lake, or tidewater ”) ( here inafter H u tc h ins ). That sa id, there a re c ases distinctly

using the term “littoral” to de scribe the rig hts attache d to cer tain lands aff

ronting lakes, seas, and other bodies of water. Norrel l v. Aransas County Navigation Dist . No. 1 , 1 S.W .3d 296, 298 n.1 ( T e x. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) (“L ittoral proper ty rig hts a re appurte nant to la

nd which borde rs a lake or sea .”); Natland Corp. v. Bake r’s Port, Inc ., 86 5 S. W.2 d 5 2, 57 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 93 , w ri t de nie d) (l itt or a l r ig hts de fi ne d as “ [s]ho re lin e pr op e rt y ow ne rs ’ r ig hts ” ); City

of P or t Isabel v. M

issouri Pac. R.R. Co. , 729 S.W .2d 939, 942 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref’d
n. r. e .) (l and a dja c e nt to L a g un a Ma dr e wa s “ lit tor a l” ); City of C or pu s Ch ris ti v . D av is , 622 S.W .2d 640, 646 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, writ ref’ d n.r.e.) (“ L i t t o ra l rig hts are a ppurtena nt to the land which borde rs a lake or sea .”); see also Tex. Nat. Re s. Code Ann. § 61.001 (West 2001) (de fining “littoral owner ” as “ owner of land a djace nt to the shore” of beac hes and dune s). Whil e we re c og nize that “ lit tor a l” is t he pr e c ise te rm to de sc ri be wate r r ig hts in relation to lakef

ront proper

ties, the above case s make clea r that the nature of littoral r ights is par allel to that of ripar ian rig hts. Be cause the t erm “riparia n” is fre quently discussed i n relation to all ty pes of waterfr on t p ro p er t i es, i ncluding lakef ront proper

ties, our ana ly sis is guided by the ca ses and authorities discussing the history of riparia n rig hts, spe cify

ing when water front lands are or are not11

vested with ripar ian rig hts, and delineating the r ights c onfer red to ripari an owner s. These c ases provide a nalog ous authority

to establish whether

a par ticular pa rce l of land is v ested with littoral rig hts and, if so, what uses the owner is entitled to make of his land. See Coastal Indus. W ater Auth.

v . York, 532 S.W .2d 949, 952 (Tex. 1976) (discussing rules with equal application to riparian a nd littoral land).
Is t he Cumm inse

s’ lan d v este d wi

th li tto ra l ri ght s? Th e Cum min se s c la im that th e y ha ve lit tor a l r ig hts a

tt a c h e d t o t h e ir land ba se d me re ly
on its proximit y to the water s of L ake Travis. The District conclusively established, howe ver, that the Cumminses’ land is not vested with litt oral rig hts beca use t heir ti tle cannot be trac ed bac k to a g rant fr om the sovere ign betwee n 1823-1895 and beca use their land is not appur tenant to a natural lake with a nor

mal flow of water. For a landowne r to establis h t h at h i s land is riparia n or littoral, the land must have
cer tain char acte ristics. First, the landow ner must be a ble to tr ac e his cha in of title back to a g rant from the sove reig n betwee n 1823 and 1895. Te x . Water Code Ann. § 11.001( b) (West 2000) (“ The code doe s not rec og nize any riparia n rig ht in the owner of any land t he ti tle to which passed out of the S tat e of Tex a s a ft e r Jul y 1, 18 95 .” ); In re Adjudication of W ater Rights in L lano River W atershed, 642 S.W .2d 446, 447-48 (Te x . 1982) (no r iparian rights in portions of land g rante d from State afte r 1895, but owner did have r iparian r ights in other por tions of land g rante d befor e 1895); In re Adjudication of W

ater Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segm ent , 642 S.W .2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982) (l and ve ste d w ith ri pa

ri a n rig hts if g ra

nte d fr om sov e re ig n pri or to Jul y 1, 18 95 ); W

atkins Land Co.

v . Cl e me nts , 8 6 S. W. 7 33 , 7 35 (T e x. 19 05 ). L a nd g ra nte d f ro m th e Me xica

n o r S pa nis h g ov e rn me nts12

betwee n 1823-1840 was vested with civil law ripa rian rig hts. In re Adjudication of W ater Rights of Brazos III Se

gment , 7 46 S.W. 2d

20 7, 20 9 ( Te x. 19 88 ); se e als o No rre ll , 1 S.W .3d at 298 n.1 (land wi th t itl e tr a c e a

ble ba c k to Me xica

n g ra nt h a d li tto ra l ri g hts a tta c he d) ; City of Port Isabel , 729 S.W .2d at 942 (same)

. I n 1840, Texas a dopted the Eng lish common law riparia n sy stem. Motl v. Boyd , 28 6 S .W. 45 8, 46 5- 66 (T e x. 19 26 ); Skillern I , a t2 9
. T h e S t a t e c o n t i n u e d t o r e c o g n iz e common law ripa

rian rig hts in land gr anted f rom the sover eig n until 1913, when Texas pas s ed an amende d vers i o n o f t he Irrig ation Act, which “ cea sed to rec og nize riparian r ights that we re not alre ady vested a nd prohibite d their cr eation by state land patents issued after J uly 1, 1895. That provision of the 1913 act r emains par t of the Texas Water Code today .” Skillern I , at 29 (Irrig ation Act re sulted in dual sy stem beca use i t protecte d prior ripa rian rig hts while enfor cing appropr iation sy stem). Ther efor e, unless a la ndowner can trace his chain of title to a g rant fr om the Mexi can or Spanish gove rnments betwe en 1823-1840, or to a gra nt from the State of

Texas betwee n 1840-1895, he ca nnot establish that his land is vested with riparian or littoral rights. Id . at 62. Fur thermore , in an attempt to alleviate the complications resulting from its dual sy stem, in 1967 Te x as passed the Water Rights Adjudication Ac t, which re quired a Texas landowner claiming a rig ht to use the water to f ile a sworn statement, par ticipate in an e videntiary

hear ing, a

nd obtain a ce rt i fi ca t e of adjudication. Tex. W ater Code Ann. §§ 11.301-.341 ( West 2000 & Supp. 20 04 -0 5) ; Skillern I

, at 48. With narrow exceptions for dome stic and livestock uses, a ny person who failed to timely

file a c laim with the C ommissi on was deemed to have abandone d or wa ived his rig ht to use the water, whe ther the nature of his claim was riparia n or appr opriation. In re Adjudication of W ater Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segme nt , 6 42 S.W. 2d a t 44 2; see also Tex. W ater Code Ann.13

§ 11.307 (West 2000) (cla im must be filed within tim e pre scribed by notice of a djudication). The Water Righ t s Ad

j u d i cation Ac t is now the “exclusive means by which [water] rig hts may be
re c og nize d” a nd , in

a bs e nc e of a c e rt if ic a te of a dju dic a tio n, Te xas c ourt s d o n ot have the po we r t o “g rant in equity cer

tain water rig hts not otherwise rec og nized by law.” In re Adjudication of W ater Rights of Brazos III Segme nt , 7 46 S.W. 2d a t 21 0; see ge nerally Hans W. Ba ade, The Histori cal Back ground of Texas W

ater Law—A T

ribute to Jack

Pope , 18 St. Mary ’s L . J . 1 (1986). A s s u mi n g th e la

n d o w n e r c a n e s ta

b li s h a p r o p e r c h a in o f ti tl e a n d /o r c e rtif icate of adj u d ic a ti o n , th e r e a r e a ls o p h y s ic a l a tt r ib u te s th a t mu s t b e p r e s e n t in o r d e r f o r th e la nd to be
co n s i d er ed riparia

n or littoral. Most clear ly , the land must be adja cent to the wa ter. Richter , 174 S.W . at 286 (“r iparian rig hts de pend upon the owner ship of land which is c ontiguous to and touches up on the wate r” ); W

atkins Land Co. , 86 S.W. a t 73 5; Hutchins , at 330-32 (“loss of c ontact with the stream br ings loss of riparian rights”). Additionally , the adjac ent wate r must be a “ natura l,” not an “a rt i fi cial,” body

. Arseneaux , 2 9 7 S. W. a t 2 2 9 ( w a te r mu s t t r a v e l a lo n g th e n o r

ma l c o u r s e of mig ratio n a

nd c ome to r e st i n a

ba sin ma de by natur e fo r the purp os e of ho ldi ngwate r) ; see also In

re Adjudication of W

ater Rights of

Brazos III Se

gment , 7 46 S.W. 2d

a t 21 0; Harrell v. Vahlsing, Inc ., 248 S.W .2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1961, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (ripar ian rig hts do not attach to artificial bodies of

wate r; one only

has rig hts to use such wate r if by g rant or pr escr iption). F ina lly , r ipa

ri a n o r l itt or a l r ig hts on ly a tta c h to the “ no rm a l f

low” of th e water s, a s o pp os e d to “floodwaters.” Mo tl , 2 86 S.W. a t 47 0; Ro be rso n v . R ed Bl uff W ate r P owe r Co ntr ol D ist ., 142 S.W .2d 248, 254 (Tex. Civ. App.—El P as o 1940, no writ) (w ater s impounded by dam ar eI n its brief, the L CRA contended that, “[b] eca use t he C ummins’ deeds de raig n title from 6 the sovere ign a fter 1895, the common law rig hts they claim in thi s case —whether they are des ig n a te d a s r ip a r ia

n o r li tt o r a l— d o n o t e xis t a s to th e p r o p e rty in qu e s ti o n . T h is h is to r ic a l f act alone should be dispositi ve of any claims they may make to a r iparian r ight, unless they can show a per mit from the State for a

water rig ht in the water s of L ake T ravis.” Neither party

addre ssed what impac t the Water Rights Adjudica tion Act has on the 7 Cummi nses’ c laim and nothing in the r ecor d demonstrates that the Cummi nses or their prede cessor s obtained a cer

tificate of adjudication entitling the m to water r ights. The Texas Supreme Court has clea rly stated that the Ac t is the “ exclusive me ans by which [water] rights may be re cog nized” and, 14 fl oo dw a te rs a nd , h e nc e , d o n ot c on fe r r ipa ri a n r ig hts ); see I ra P. Hildebra nd, Rights of

R i p a r i an Ow ne rs , 6 Tex. L . Rev. 19, 37 (1927) ( discussing la ck of r iparian r ights in flood waters).

I n sum, for a lakefr ont property owner to establish that his land is vested with littoral rig hts, he must (1) be a

ble to trac e his title back to a gra nt from the sovere ign betwee n 1823-1895 and/or pre sent a c ertifica

te of adjudication from the State, and (2) establish that his la nd, as g rante d in the deed, bor ders a

natura l lake with a “ normal flow” of water. The Cumminses do not disput e that their chain of title or iginated with a g rant fr om the State of Te x as in 1904; t h ei r ex pert land sur vey or testified to this in his affidavit. Wit hout addre ssing the fac t that T exas c ease d rec og nizi ng common law riparia n rig hts in gra

nts of water front proper ty from the sove reig n afte r 18 9 5 , t h e C u m minses claim only that, beca

use the 1904 g rant mentions “the mea

nders of the Colorado River” in its property d es cr i p tion, they have r iparian or l i t t o ra l rig hts based on their ow nership of la nd that has “latera l contact with the water.” That the Cum min se s c a nn ot t

ra c e the ir tit le ba c k to a

g ra nt f ro m the so ve re ig n pr ior to 18 95 is su ff ic ie nt t o
e sta bli shthat th e ir

land is n ot v e ste d w ithlit tor a l r ig hts

. S e e W a tk in s La n d Co. , 86 S.W . at 735. 6 I n the alter

native, howe ver, the District established that the Cumminses are not litt oral owne rs beca use their c hain of title did not convey land appur

tenant to a natural lake

. 7in t

he a bs e nc e of a c e rt if ic a te of a dju dic a tio n, Te xas c ourt s do no t ha ve the po we r t o “ g ra

nt i n e qu ity cer tain water rig hts not otherwise rec og nized by law.” In re Adjudication of W ater Rights of Brazos III Segme nt , 746 S.W .2d 207, 210 (Tex. 1988). Nell B radf

ield also g rante d Be tty

Cummi ns a 9.354 ac re tra ct that she ha d acquir ed fr om 8 Charles A. Mc Cormick in 1945. Although the 1975 g rant descr ibes this land as “lying south” of the trac t convey ed fr om the Chericos to the Bradf ield/Bush families, nothing else in the rec ord provides a desc ription of this land. 15

Th e Cum min se s’ c ha in o f ti tl e be g a n w itha 19 04 g ra nt o f l a nd fr om t he State to L eonar d Eck, who the n convey ed the land to Osc ar Collier in 1927. The 1927 de ed used the “bank of Col or a do Riv e r” a nd

“ do wn sa id r ive r w ithits me a nd e rs” to de sc ri be the land ’s bo un da ri e s. Construction of the Marsha ll Ford Da m (now Mansfie ld D am) beg an in 1937; afte r the ere ction of the dam, the r eleva

nt por tion of the Colorado River wa s transfor med into Marshall F ord L ake ( now L a ke Tr a vis ), wh ic h is an ar tif ic ia l lak e sp e c if

ic a lly de sig ne d to con ta in fl oo dw a te rs . B a se d on th e se chang es to the body

of water a ffr onting Collier’s land, w hen he tr ansfe rre d this parce l to the Cherico fa mil y in 1 93 8, the pe ri me te r wa s de sc ri be d a s the “ wate r le ve l lin e of Ma rs ha ll F or d L a ke .” Th is same de scription was used in later deeds from the Chericos to the Br adfie ld/Brush families in 1943

and fr om B ra df

ie lds /B ru sh e s to Ne ll B ra df ie ld i n 1 94 8. Th e land wa s eve ntu a lly c on ve y e d to B e tty Ann B radf

ield Cummi ns in 1975 f

rom Nell B radf

ield, her mother ; the g rant re fer ence d the 1948 dee d for a descr iption of the land. 8

Alth o u gh t h e C u m m i n s es ’ c h ai n o f t i t l e r ef er en ce s th e w at er l i n e as a

boundary , it does not establish that the Cummi nses’ land is vested with littoral rig hts beca use—in addition to the fac t that their title f

ailed to or iginate prior to 1895—the adjac ent water ref ere nced in the deeds is an artificia l lake, rather than a natura l body of water, a nd the wate rs filling that lake ar e not consider ed its “norma l flow,” but are instead floodwaters. See Arseneaux , 297 S.W . at 229 (ripa rian or littoralThe Cummi nses based this a lternative argument on a boundary ag ree ment, ex ecuted 9 betwee n themselves and the District, pe rtaining to the boundary lines of L ot 6. They

asser ted that even if this ag ree ment eliminated their littoral rig hts in L ot 6, the y maintained littoral rig hts in the 16 ri g hts on ly

a tta c h to natur a l bo die s o f w a te r) ; Mo tl , 2 86 S.W. a t 74 0 (no ri pa ri a n r ig hts in floodwate rs); Roberson, 142 S.W .2d at 249, 254 (c onstruction of dam a cross natural river resulted in cre ation of ar

tificial lake, and water s impounded by dam are floodwaters). Even thoug h the 1927 deed from Eck to Colli er used the C olorado Ri ver as a boundar y descr iption, thi s does not mean that the Cumminses’ subsequent dee d g rante d land adjac ent to a natura l body of water. See W atkins Land Co. , 8 6 S. W. a t 7 3 5 ( la

n d mu s t b e “ c o n ti n u o u s ly r ip a r ia n ” s in c e th e ti me it w a s g r a n te d by the
so ve re ig n) ; Hutchins , at 330 (“ loss of contac t with the stream bring s loss of riparia n rig hts”). F oll ow ingthe 19 27 de e d, the wate r wa s tr a ns fo rm e d fr om a natur a l to a n a rt if ic ia l bo dy a s the re su lt of a ma n-made d am . At t h e time of the g rants fr om the Chericos in 1938, fr om the Br adfie lds/Brushes in 1948, a nd from Ne ll Bra dfield to Mrs. Cummins i n 1975, the wate rs abutting the Cummi nses’ proper

ty comprised the Ma

rshall For d L ake/L ake T ravis, not the Colorado River. Given that the Cumminses cannot tra ce the ir title back to a g rant from the sovere ign be tween 1823- 1895, a nd tha t th e Cum min se s’ g ra

nt o nly re fe re nc e s an a

rt if ic ia l bo dy of wate r, the Cum min se s’ land is n ot v e ste d w ithlit tor a l r ig hts

.

Our holding applies t o all six lots of t he C umminses’ land because it i s based on the chain of title, which is the same for the e ntire prope rty , g iven that the Cumminses obtained the land
as one parc el and later subdivided it into six lots. Thus, the Cumm inses’ sec ond issue, claiming that they have littoral rig hts in all six lots, is overr uled, and we do not r eac h their fourth issue, asse rting in the alternative that they have littoral rig hts in L ots 1-5. 9other five lots. Bec ause our analy sis concludes that, re g ardle ss of the bou n d ar y ag ree ment, the Cummi nses have no littoral rights in any of their land ba sed on th e ch ai n o f t i t le, we ne ed not c on sid e r t his a lte rn a tiv e c la im. 17 Are the Cu m m inses entit led to construct a boat dock? Al tho ug h th e Cum min se s g e ne ra lly a sse rt e d o n a

pp e a l tha t the y have lit tor a l r ig hts to “u s e th e ir

la n d a s w a te r f r o n t p r o p e rty , ” th e ir

c la im s a t t

h e d e c la r a to r y ju d g me n t a

n d s ummary judgme nt phases we re more specific . I n response to the Dis trict’s denial of t heir application for a bo a t do c k li c e ns e , th e Cum min se s in iti a lly ur g e d th a t th e y

ha d li tto ra l r ig hts e nti tli ngthe m “ to construct doc ks and other improve ments.” The D istrict, theref ore, soug ht and obtained summary judgme nt on the basis that the Cumminses have no prope rty rig ht entitling them to construct a boat do c k on the su

bme rg e d land s that a re he ld by the State in tr us t fo r the pu

bli c a nd a re val id ly regulated by

the wate r control and improvement di strict, as an ag ent of the S tate, for the purpose of providing safe drinking water to the public. ( 1) Us es li tto ra l ow ne rs a re e nti tle d to ma k e of t he wat e r I t is we ll e sta

bli sh e d th a t r ipa

ri a n a nd lit tor a l own e rs me re ly have a pr ivi le g e to u se and enjoy the water flowing next to their land a nd do not have a

ny possessory

interest in the water. Skillern I , at 29 . T he ri g ht to us e the wate r h a s b e e n “ te rm e d a sim ple us uf ru c t in the wate r a s it passes a long.” Hutchins , at 302; se e als o In re Adjudication of W ater Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segme nt, 642 S.W .2d at 444. The rights to use a nd enjoy the adjac ent wate r ar e primar ily for natural purposes, such as the “right of acc ess” and “for the support of human a

nd animal life a

nd to answer the demands of

other domestic use s”; these a re pr efe rre d over use s of the water for i rrigation and18

manufa cturing

. Ho lla n v . S tat e , 308 S.W .2d 122, 125 (Tex. Civ. App.—F ort Worth 1957, writ ref’ d
n. r. e .) (r ig ht o f a c c e ss) ; W atk ins Lan d Co ., 86 S.W . at 735 (domestic use s pref err ed); se e als o S

tat e v. Valmont Plantations , 346 S.W .2d 858, 855 (Tex

. C i v . App.—San Antonio 1961), aff’d, 355 S.W .2d 5 0 2 ( T e x. 1 9 6 2 ) ( tr a d it io n a l r ig h ts c o n f e r r e d to r ip a r ia

n o r li tt o r a l o w n e r s in c lu d e u s e of water for dr inking, f

ishing, navigation, travel, and dome stic purposes). A lthou g h a li tt oral or r iparian
owner may be able to e stablish r ights to use the water for rec rea tional purposes, the leg islature has d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e s e u s e s a r e n o t p r e f e r r e d w h e n t h e w a t e r i s r e g u l a t e d b y a w a t e r d i s t r ic t. T e x. Wat e r C od e Ann. § 51 .1 84 (We st 2 00 0) (u se s o f d istri c t w a te r l ist e d in or de r o f p re fe re nc e , w ithus e for “ pleasure and re cre ation” appe aringlast).

I t i s al s o well established that r iparian or littoral uses must be “re asonable .” Mo tl , 28 6 S. W. a t 47 0. Rip a ri a n o r l itt or a l ow ne rs mus t no t e xer c is e th eir ri g hts in a mann e r t hat is detrimental to other, c orre lative owner s or to the public g ener ally

. W atkins Land Co. , 86 S.W . at 735. To ensure that water rig hts a re exercised in a rea sonable manne r, ripar ian and littoral owne rs
are su bje c t to the State ’s po lic e po we rs , a nd a ny us e s o f the wate r m

us t be do ne in a c c or da

nc e wi th th e v a li d r e g u lati o n s o f th e g o v e r n in g a u th o rity

. S

ee Ulbricht v. Friedsam , 325 S.W .2d 669, 673 (Tex. 1959). Moreove r, “c ourts have a mple authority

to . . . reg ulate the manner of using the water .” W atk ins Lan d Co ., 86 S.W . at 736. Eve n i f t h e Cummi nses had littoral rig hts in their land, they would not be entitled to construct a private, r ecr eational boat dock bec ause that wo u l d n ot be a

“ re a so na ble us e ” of

wate r r e g ulate d b y

a wate r c on tr ol a

nd imp ro ve me nt d istri c t. The Cumminses cite City of C or pu s Ch ris ti v . D av is for the pr oposition t hat littoral rig hts include the “r ight to build whar ves, docks, a

nd piers.” 622 S.W.2d at 646. I n Da v is the cour tAside from the we ll-established law that water front prope rty owner s only

take title to the 10 water ’s edg e while the State ma intains ownership of the subme rg ed lands and water s as t rustee f or the public, M

a u f r a i s v . S tat e , 1 8 0 S .W.2d 144, 148 (Tex. 1944), the parties fur ther dispute the Cummi nses’ bounda

ry l ine base d on the Cumminses’ chain of title and a boundary

ag ree ment executed betwe en the pa

rties in 1999. The District a rg ues that these doc uments establ i s h t h at the Cummi nses do not own and, hence, ha ve no rig hts to use the land beyond the 670-foot c ontour line. The Cumminses assert that the e x act bounda ry line is imm ater ial; they

claim that (1) they

have lit tor a l r ig hts a nd

(2 ) t he bo un da

ry a g re e me nt d id n ot a lte r t his fa c t.

19 held t hat t he landowners had a right t o cultivate an oy ster bed, and the statement reg arding docks and pie rs wa s dic ta . The majority of ca ses do not include the r ight t o build boat docks as a littoral or riparia n rig ht. See , e.g. , Shively v . Bowlby , 152 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (waterfr ont property owner s have no title in adjacent submer g ed lands a nd no rig ht to build upon those lands). Fur thermore , any

such rig hts an owner

may have c an only

be exerc ised in a reasonable fashion and a re subjec t to the State’s police powe rs. Ulbricht , 325 S.W .2d at 673. Da v is does not support the cla im that an ownerof nonlittoral land adjac ent to a water district is entitled to construct a boat dock i n violation of a water district’s regulations, which protec t the public’s intere st in safe drinking water
. ( 2) Litt oral boundaries and the public trust doctrine Th e D i s t r i c t a l s o e s t a

b l i s h e d t h a t , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e l i t t o r a l r i g h t s i s s u e , i t pr op e rl y denied the Cumminses’ application for a boat dock license on the basis that the Cumminses have no rig hts in the submerg ed lands of L ake T ravis: the Cumminses’ boundary line is the water ’s edg e; the Sta te ho lds tit le to the land a nd wate rs be y on d th a t in

tr us t f or the pu bli c ; and , in

a c c or da nc e wi th its dutie s to c on se rv e a nd ma int a in t

ho se natur a l r e so ur c e s, the State ha s a uth or ize d th e Di str ic t to regulate, tre at, and improve that water for the public. 10We h a ve a lr e a dy a dd re sse d th a t th e Cum min se s’ land is n ot v est e d w ithlit tor a l r ig hts be c a us e the ir c ha in o f t itl e c a nn ot b e tr a c e d to a g ra nt fr om the so ve re ig n b e fo re 18 95 a nd be c a us e their g rant did not conve y land adjac ent to a natur al body of wat er . Gi v en t h i s , and that the law e sta bli shes tha t th e Cum min se s h a ve no ri g hts to b uil d p e rm a ne nt s tr uc tur e s o n s ta te -o wn e d tr us t p ro p erty , we ne ed not deter mine the pre cise bounda

ries of the Cummi nses’ prope rty
. See Ci tyof Port Isabel v. M

issouri Pac. R .R. Co. , 7 29 S.W. 2d 93 9, 94 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 87 , w ri t ref ’d n.r.e.) (boundary betwee n private land and publi c water adjusts over tim e; whereve r shore line i s at any g iven time repr esents boundar y beca use State alwa

y s holds tit le to submerg ed lands a nd public water s). 20

As with all navig able bo d i es o f water within Texas, the State owns the beds a nd water s of L ake T ravis: “The water of t he ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of eve ry flowing river, natura l stream, and la

ke, and of

ever y bay or ar m of the Gulf of Mexi co, and the storm water , floodwate r, and r ainwate r of e very river, natura l stre am, canyon, ravine , depre ssion, a nd water shed in t he state is the pr op e rt

y of the state .” Te x. Wat e r C od e Ann. § 1 1. 02 1( a ) ( Wes t 20 00 ); se e als o Fr ank F

. S k i l l er n , I ITexas Water L aw, at 128 (1991) (he reina fter Skillern II ). Ac cordingto the supreme c ourt, the “r

ule has long been established” in this State that “the St ate is the owner of the
so il und e rl y ingthe navig a ble wate rs , s uc h a s n a vig a ble str e a ms, a s d e fi ne d b y statut e , la

ke s, ba y s, inlets, a nd other are as withing the tide water limit s within its border s.” City of Galveston v. Mann , 14 3 S. W.2 d 1 02 8, 10 33 (T e x. 19 40 ). Gi ve n th a t th e Sta te ho lds tit le to t he be ds and

wate rs of a ll navig able bodies, the boundarie s of adjacent lands nece ssarily end at the water ’s edg e. Maufrais v. Sta te , 18 0 S
. W
. 2d 144, 148 (Tex. 1944) (eve n if adjac ent land is ripar ian, owner ship ends at the ban ks , and State ow ns un de rl y ingso il) ; W elder , 1 9 6 S
. W
. a t8 7 0 , 8 7 2 ( d e e d u s i n g w a t e r l i n e to de sc ri be bo un da

ry on ly g ra nts to w a te r’ s e dg e , n ot t o mi dd le of bo dy , a nd Sta te ma int a ins tit le to lake be ds and

wate rs ); City of Port Isabel , 729 S.W .2d at 942 (as shoreline adjusts over time, so does landowner ’s boundar

y ; where ver loc ation of shore line is at any g iven time repr esents boundar y of21

land). The owner s of land abutting a navig able body of water do “ not [ have] a title in the soil below high w ater

mark, n or a r ight to build there on, but a rig ht of ac cess only , analog ous to that of an abutter upon a

highw ay .” Shively, 152 U.S. at 14. Th e purp os e of

the Sta te ma int a ini ngtit le to t he be ds a nd

wate rs of

a ll n a vig a

ble bodies is to protect the public’s inter est in those scar ce na tural re source s. See Ha ll , 57 S.W . at 565.

“ F ro m it s e a rl ie st h ist or

y thi s State ha s a nn ounc e d its pu bli c po lic y that la

nd s und e rl y ingnavig a

ble water s are held in trust by the State for the use and bene fit of all the people .” Sta te v . B ra dfo rd , 50 S.W. 2d 10 65 , 1 06 9 ( Te x. 19 32 ) ( navig a ble wate rs inc lud e lake wate rs ); see also Tex. W ater Code Ann. § 11.021(a) (State holds title to lake wate rs in trust for public). The importance of the State’s duty to protect its natura l resourc es is demonstrated by article 16, secti o n 5 9 o f t h e Tex as Constit ution, which provides that “[t]he conservation and development of all of the natur al re source s of this State, . . . and the pre servation and conser vation of all such natura l r esourc es of the State a re
e a c h an d all he re by de c lare d pub lic ri g hts a nd du tie s. ” Te x. Con st. a rt . X VI , § 59 ; see also Barshop , 92 5 S. W.2 d at 62 3 ( “ [c]o ns e rv a tio n of wate r ha s a lw a y s be e n a pa ra mou nt c on c e rn

in T e xas” ); In

r e A d j u d i cati on of W

ater Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segm ent, 6 4 2 S. W. 2 d a t 4 4 5 ( St a te has constitutional duty

to conserve water

as a pr ecious re source ). Ba sed on the fac t that the State owns the water a nd submerg ed lands ove r which the Cummi nses soug ht to construct a pr ivate, re cre ational boat dock, the District was a uthorized to deny t h e C u m m i n s e s ’ a

p p l i c a t i o n f

o r a l i c e n s e . InCity of Galveston v. Mann , the supreme court held that the City was not entitled to construct a boat dock in the Gulf

of Mexico beca

use it would encr oach on the submerg ed lands, whic h wer e State prope rty
. 143 S.W .2d at 1034 (The ere ction of the doc kSee , e.g. , Tex. Water Code Ann. §§ 1.003 (West 2000) (public policy of State to conser

ve 11 natura l r esourc es), 26.023 (Commissi on to se t a nd enfor ce water quality standards) (West 2000); 30 Tex. Admin. C ode §§ 307.1-.10 ( 2004) (Te x as Surfa ce Water Quality Standards). 22 “would be a

n encr oachme nt, at the least, upon the prima f acie proper

ty rig hts of the sovere ign. . . . Such a structur e in leg al phra seolog y would const i t u t e a purpesture ,” whe ther it would “obstruc t navig ation or otherw ise.”).

The District’s de nial of the lice nse is fu rt h er j u s t i fied by the fa ct that the State, as trustee, is entitled to regulate those waters and subme rg ed lands t o p ro t ec t i t s citiz ens’ he alth and safe ty and to conse rve its natura l resourc es. Go lds mi th & Po we llv. S ta te , 159 S.W .2d 534, 535 (T e x. Civ . App .—Da lla s 1 94 2, wr it r e f’ d) (S ta te c a n ta ke a c tio n to pr e ven t po ll ut ion of tr us t
r e s o u r c e s )

. E v e n if w a te r f r o n t la n d is p r iv a te ly o w n e d , it is s ti ll s u b je c t to r e g u lati o n u n d e r

the State’s police powe rs. Parker v . El Paso W ater Improv eme nt Dist. No. 1 , 297 S
. W. 737, 740-42 (T e x. 19 27 ). Th e ri g hts of ind ivi du a l la

nd ow ne rs “ mus t yie ld .

. . or be mod if ie d b y . . . w hat is decla red upon the whole to be f or the public be nefit,” especia lly when the regulation affe cting the
owner ’s prope rty

is “essential or material for the prosperity of the c ommunity ,” and is one “in which all of the landow ners have to a c erta in ext ent a c ommon interest,” and that “ca nnot be ac complished without the concur

renc e of a ll or near ly

all of [the adjace nt land] owners by rea son of the pec uliar natura l c ondition of the trac t.” Id. at 742 (owne rs m ust exercise rights in ac corda nce w ith reg ulations of water district).

Th e State ha s e na c te d s e ve ra l pr ov isions o f t he wate r a

nd a dmi nis tr a tiv e c od e s to
acc omplish its duties as trustee f or the public, a nd ha s sta tut or ily e sta bli sh e d v a ri ou s w a te r d istri c ts 11 to act as its ag ents in regulating portions of st ate- owned natural resource s and trust prope rties. The23

wate r c od e g ra

nts dis tr ic ts a ll the “ fu

nc tio ns , p ow e rs , a

uth or ity , r ig hts a nd

du tie s th a t w ill pe rm it

a c c o mp li s h me n t o f th e p u r p o s e s f o r w h ic h it w a s c r e a te d o r th e p u r p o s e s a u th o r ized by

the constitution, t his code, or a ny other law .” Te x . Water Code Ann. § 49.211(a) ( West S upp. 2004-05). This includes the powe r to “a dopt and enforce rea sonable rules and re g ulations to . . . preserve the sanitary condition of all wate r controlled by the district” and to a ccomplish its purposes “by any prac tical means.” Id . §§ 51.121, .122, .127 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004-05). Spec ifically , the Texas Admini s t ra t i v e C o d e m an d at es t h at wa t er co n t ro l an d

i mp ro v em en td i s t ri ct s i n s t al l ra w w ater intakes to secure water

of the “ best quality

available .” 30 Te x . Ad m i n . Code § 290.41(e) (2). The code sp e c if ie s th a t th e “ int a ke s sh a ll no t be loc a te d wi thi n 1, 00 0 fe e t of bo a t la un c hin g ra

mps , ma ri na s, [or ] doc ks

. . . a c c e ssi ble by the pu bli c ” a nd that “a ll re c re a tio na l ac tiv iti e s” sh a ll not oc c ur wi thi n
a 200-foot “re stricted zone” around the intake. Id

. Suc h distri c ts ar e e xpre ssl y g ive n th e a

uth or ity to enac t “[r] eg ulations gove rning this z one” a nd provi sions “for the stric t enforc ement of suc h ordinanc es and reg ulations.” Id

. Pur su a nt t o th e wate r a nd a dmi nis tr ativ e c od e s, the Tr a vis County Wat e r C on tr ol a nd I mpr ov e me nt Di str ic t No
. 17 e na c te d Re g ulatio n 6 .5 .3 .2 to p ro hib it “ [a]ll a c tiv ity not relate d to the maintenanc e of the barg e or int ak e . . . withi n 200 fee t” and “ [a] ll recr eational boating activity

within 1000 feet.” Reg . 6.5.3.2. These r eg ulations ensure a n adequate supply

of saf e drinking water

for the public; a s in Parker , th e y

be ne fi t th e e nti re c omm un ity , in wh ic h th e ind iv idu a l pr op e rt y ow ne r s ha

re s a
c o m m o ni n t e r e s t , a n d

t h e y r e qu i r e c o o p e r a t i o n o f a l l a d j a c e n t o w n e r s i n o r d e r t o f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y. See 29 7 S.W. at 742
. Th e Cum min se s, jus t a s a ll m e mbe rs of the surr ound ingc omm

un ity , b e ne fi t f r o m t h e D i s t r i c t ’ s p r o d

u c t i o n o f s a f

e dr i n k i n g w a t e r , a

n d t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t d i s c l o s e tha t th e seI n their petition for de clar atory judgme nt, the C umminses specifica lly asser ted that they 12 ha d a n e a se me nt c on fe rr ing“ the ri g ht t o b uil d, c on str uc t, an d mai nta in on the ir lake fr on t lan d at a ll times such buildings, structure s and facilities as are useful and appropriate for lake -fr ont property .” Acc ording ly , the District soug ht and obtained summary judgme nt on the basis that the Cumminses “do not have an ease ment or quasi-ea sement which would allow them to build or loc ate a boat dock at or be low the 670-foot c ontour line.” 24 regulations are be ing enfor ced ag ainst the Cummi nses any differ ently than they are ag ainst any other
user of L ake Travis. The re g ulations establishing a 200-foot cle ar zone a

nd preve nting r ecr eational bo a tin g a c tiv ity

wi thi n 1 00 0- fe e t of

the int a ke ba

rg e a pp ly e qu a lly to al l pe rs on s. Th e Cum min se s’
owner ship of water front prope rty is subject to reg ulation under the State’s police powe rs and, he nce, t h e i r r i g h t s m u s tyi e l d t o t h e r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t s e r v e t h e p u b l i c ’ s i n t e r e s ti n p r o t e c t i n g t r u s tp r o p e rt y. See id. Th e Di str ic t, t he re fo re , e sta

bli sh e d th a t it

wa s a uth or ize d to de ny

the Cu mm ins e s’ application for

a boat doc k l i ce n s e on multipl e g rounds. Fir st, based on their c hain of title, the Cum min se s’ pr op e rt

y is no t ve ste d wi th lit tor a l ri g hts a nd , e ve n if it we re , lit tor a l ri g hts do no t e nti tle
an owne r to construc t rec reational boat docks. Second, the Cummi nses have no rig hts to construct

a bo a t do c k in the de sir e d loc a tio n be c a us e tho se wate rs and

su bme rg e d la

nd s are state -o wn e d tr

us t proper ty and are reg ulated by a water c ontrol and improvement district for the purpose of

providing safe drinking water

to the public.
Eas e m e nt and Q uas i- Eas e m e nt

I n their fifth issue, the Cumminses asser t as an alternative argument that, even if they do not have littoral rig hts to make use of the ir land “a s water front p ro p er ty ,” they possess an
ea s em en to r q u as i -e as em en ten t i t l i n g t h em t o d o s o . T h e C u m m i n s es b as e t h i s cl ai m o n l an gu age 1225

in their cha in of title a

nd testimony in their aff

idavits; they

urg e that these documents establish that the g ra nto rs int e nd e d the land to be us e d a s wate rf ro nt p ro pe rt

y and that th e pr op e rt

y ha s h ist or ic a lly been use d for boating, f

ishing, a nd s wi mming. The District contends that the Cumminses’ dee ds failed to reserve an ex press easement and that the C umminses have not de monstrated a c ontinuous and nec essar

y use of the la

nd for r ecr eational boating in orde r to support an implied ea sement. An e xpre ss e a se me nt is a n int e re st in land to w hic h th e sta

tut e of fr a ud s a pp lie s. W est Beac h Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W .3d 248, 264 (Tex. App.—Austin 20 0 2 , no pet.). F or the statute of fra

uds to be satisfied, the intent of the parties, the e ssential terms of the e aseme nt, and an

a de qu a te d e sc ri pti on

of the e a se me nt’ s lo c a tio n mu st b e a pp a re nt f ro m th e fa c e of

the do c ume nt, without refe renc e to extrinsic evidence

. Id . at 26 5. I f t he c ourt c a nn ot de te rm ine the se e le me nts wi th
rea so n ab le ce rtainty , then no express ea sement is convey ed. Id . at 26 4. An e a se me nt’ s e xpre ss terms, which a

re to be given their plain meaning , define the purposes f or which the ease ment holder may use the prope rty
. Marcus Cable Assocs. v . Krohn , 90 S.W .3d 697, 701 (Tex. 2002); Coleman v. Forister , 5 14 S.W. 2d

89 9, 90 3 ( Te x. 19 74 ). Th e e a se me nt h old e r i s o nly e nti tle d to do wh a t is “re asonably

nece ssary ” to fa irly

enjoy the rig hts that were expressly g rante d, and if a purpose wa s not expressly provided for in the g rant, it is not permitted. Krohn, 90 S.W. 3d a t 70 1. Th is i s b e c a us e
an ea sement is a nonpossessory interest, allowing i t s o wner to use the land only for spe cified purposes, rather than a

possessory

interest , wh i ch would allow its owner to make any use of the proper ty
. Id . at 702. As s u p p o rt fo r their c laim of an e x press e aseme nt, the Cummi nses re ly on a dee d date d July

20 , 1 94 0, e xec uted f

ro m th e Col lie r f

a mil y to t he L CRA . T he de e d g ra

nte d th e L CRA26

“a pe rpetua l ease ment and rig ht to inundate, submerg e and overf low all of our cer

tain trac ts of land [l y ing be tween the 670 foot contour e levation and the 715 foot contour elevation]

. . . by virtue of the construc tion, erec tion, maintenance , and oper ation o f a da m. . . .” The de ed also include d an
e xpre ss r e se rv a tio n o f r ig hts fo r t he Col lie rs a nd

the ir a ssi g ne e s b y

statin g that it

wa s executed upon condition t hat t he gra ntors here in, their heirs and assigns, shall have fre e ac cess at all times to the l ake of water formed by the M arsha ll For d dam . . . and the rig ht to use the water from said lake

. . . for domestic purposes a nd shall have the ri g ht t o g o u

po n, pa ss o ve r a

nd a c ro ss a ny a nd a ll p a rt s o f t

he land c on ve y e d h e re in as a me ans of ing ress a

nd eg ress to the water of sa id lake. . . . The languag e of this re servation reser ves only basic rig h t s to acc ess the water, for domestic use, and f

or ing ress a

nd eg ress. Those rig hts, as with all water rig hts, must be exerc ised
re a so na bly —in a mann e r t hat do e s n ot h a rm

oth e r w a te rf

ro nt o wn e rs or the g e ne ra l pu bli c —a nd in
acc ordanc e with the State’s police powe r re g ulations. Ulbricht, 32 5 S. W.2 d at 67 3; W atkins Land Co. , 86 S.W
. at 735. Be y ond those basic rights, this reser vation does not expressly provide a rig ht to use the land submerg ed at or bey ond the 670-foot contour line for rec reational pur poses, nor the rig ht to build and maintain structures on that land. Mooring a boat doc k on the land at issue is not “re asonably

nece ssary ” in orde r to ac hieve the r ights that we re e x pressly g rante d. Reg ardle ss of what rig hts this reservation convey s, the Di s t ri ct contends that the Cummi nses ar e not entitled to any of them b ec au s e t h e C ollier’s re servation was not transfe rre d throug h the C umminses’ chain of title. Prior to executing the 1940 deed, on Fe bruar y 23, 1938, the Colli ers tra

nsfer red pa rt of their la

nd to the Ch er i co s . Although the 1938 transfe r desc ribed the lake’ s “water leve l line” as a b oundary , it did not gra nt the Chericos a

ny express rig hts to use or27

acc ess the water. The Cherico tra ct was later tra nsfer red t o the B radf

ield and B rush families, and then to N ell Br adfie ld, f

rom whom Be tty Ann Br adfie ld Cummins inhe rited the land in 1975. When the Col lie rs e xec ute d th e 19 40 de e d to the L CRA , the y sp e c if ic a lly e xclu de d f

ro m it s te rm s “ c e rt a in
sma ll tra c ts o f l ots wh ic h we re so ld by g ra nto rs . . . p ri or

to M a y 28 , 1 94 0, ” su c h a s th e Che ri c o tr a c t. Be cause the C heric o trac t—which eve ntually beca me the Cumminses’ proper ty —was out of the Colli ers’ possession at the time the Colliers rese rv ed t h eir spec ific water rig hts, and bec ause the Colli ers e x pressly

stated that their r eser

vation of rig hts did not a

pply to previously

sold tracts, the 19 40 de e d d oe s n ot p ro vid e a ny e vid e nc e of

a n expr e ss ea se me nt fo r the Cum min se s to “ us e the ir land as waterfr ont property ,” or to moor a boat dock on the D istrict’s land. Fur thermore , the 1938 Che ri c o d e e d, a s we ll as su bs e qu e nt tr a ns fe rs fr om the Che ri c os to the B ra df ie lds a nd Cum min se s, did no t e xpre ssl y

c on fe r s uc h a

n ease me nt t o th e Cum min se s. Thus , th e Di str ic t c on c lus ive ly
e sta bli sh e d th e la c k o f a

n e xpre ss e a se me nt. I n the abse nce of an express ea sement, the Cumminses alternatively claim that they possess an implied ease ment. To demonstrate the exist ence of an impl ied easement, they must show that the land has been appare ntly , continuously , and necessar ily used for the desire d purpose. Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranc h, Inc., 364 S.W .2d 196, 207 (Tex. 1963). These phr ases c arr y prec ise leg al
me anin g s: “ a

pp a re nt” me a

ns tha t th e us e mu st have e xiste d at th e tim e of the g ra nt, “ c on tin

uo us ” denotes c onspicuousness and perma nency , and “nec essar

y ” ref ers to use s that are essential for the
ease ment owner

to make prope r u s e o f h is land. Id . at 207-08. Ty pically , implied easeme nts are only rec og nized for ec onomic or phy sical nece ssities, a nd not for uses that a

re me rely desirable or
rec reational. Id . at 20 8. F ina lly , n o e a se me nt wi ll be imp lie d if its purp os e wo uld be a g a ins t pu bli c28

p o l i c y. Carrit hers v. Terramar Be ach Cmty. Im provem ent Ass’n , 645 S.W .2d 772, 774 (Tex. 1983) (e a se ment ov er sub me rg e d la nd in G ulf of Me xico no t im

pli e d b e c a

us e it c on fl ic te d w ithpu

bli c policy of State havingsole control over those wate rs and submer g ed lands, held in trust for public). As support for the ir implied easeme nt claim, the Cummi n s e s p o int to the 1940 Col lier
rese rvation of r ights a

nd to Be tty

Ann B radf

ield Cummi ns’s aff

idavit. Be cause the rig hts reser ved by the Colli ers did not transfe r throug h the Cummi nses’ chain of title, the 1940 deed d o es not support the Cummi nses’ claim. Fur ther, the District challeng ed Mrs. Cummins’s affidavit—which stated that her

“fa mily has had boats and boat docks in y ea rs past i n the wate r adja cent to the proper ty and we have fished in the water and used it for swimming” —by urg ing that no boat dock has bee n moored on the submer g ed land dur ing the thirty y ear s in which that are a has been subjec t to the District’s re g ulation and that, g iven the indefinite nature of Mrs. Cummins’s statements, her aff idavit failed to establish a genuine issue of m ater ial fac t. Even in the fa ce of this challeng e, the Cummi nses offe red no pr obative evide nce of their claim that boat docks ha d previously exis ted on the prope rty . The trial c ourt’s duty is to determine if a

ny g enuine issues of material fa ct re main, not to weig h the evidence or deter mine its credibility

. Tris on In v . Co . v . W oo da rd , 838 S.W .2d 790, 792 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, wr it denied). Mrs. Cummi ns’s statements lacke d specific ity and we re not sufficie nt to raise a g enuine issue of materia l f act as to w hether the Cummi nses’ proper ty has bee n appar ently , continuously , and nec essar ily used for the purpose of

a re cre ational boat dock. Se e Fo rd Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 13 5 S.W. 3d 59 8, 60 1 ( Te x. 20 04 ); Ryland Group, Inc. v . Hood , 924 S.W .2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996).29 T h e Cumm in s e s a ls o r e ly on Ul b richt v. Friedsam for the notion that an e aseme nt should be implied on their behalf “for acc ess to and continued use of the wate r.” 325 S.W.2d at 676- 77. I n Ulbricht , the prope rty owner s sought a

n implied e as em en t t o acc ess the waters of L ake B uc ha na n, to a llo w the ir

c a ttl e to g ra ze al on g the sh or e lin e , a nd fo r t he ri g ht t o c on str

uc t st ru c tur e s, which would be moor ed on the submer g ed lands re g ulated by the L CRA b el o w the 1020-f oot contour line, in orde r to fu l l y enjoy their land a s lakefr ont property
. Id . at 675. The c ourt took judicial notice of the nece ssity in allowing live stock to acc ess wate r and note d that neig hboring proper ty owner s had continuously made a ppare nt use of thei r l an d for boat docks and re cre ation, without objection from the L CRA. Id . The c ourt then re cog nized an implied easeme nt for the proper t y o wn er s t o acc ess the water, to g raze their c attle, and to use a nd enjoy the land below the 1020-foot contour

line, limit ed to the extent that the uses wer e re asonable and nec essar y , and subjec t to the rig hts of the L CRA. Id . at 677.

Ulbricht does not support the Cumminses’ position for two rea so n s . F ir s t, in Ulbricht t h er e was an established use of the land f or boat doc ks and re cre ational ac tivity , and the L CRA, which o wn ed t h e subm erg ed land, ha d allowed this use to continue f or an e x tended time per iod. Her e, the District de nied the Cummi nses’ application for a license to build a boat dock and ha s not allowed a r e c r e a ti o n a l b o a t d o c k

to b e mo o r e d

w it h in th e r e g u late d

zo n e s o f it s w a te r tr e a tment fac ility

. Second, the Ulbricht court, even i n imply ing the ease ment, rec og nized that the L CRA had superior r ights to re g ulate the submerg ed land. Ba sed on this and the fa ct that an e aseme nt shall not be implied when its purpose would contravene public policy , there can be no implied easeme nt for the Cumminses to m oor a r ecr eational boat dock in the land, which is o wned by the State and30

regulated by

the District for the purpose of providing safe wa t er t o t he public. At most, Ulbricht supports the C umminses’ claim t hat t hey have ba sic rig hts to use and ac cess the w ater . Howeve r, since a ll uses of wate r must be conduc ted in a re asonable manner and in ac corda

nce w ith police power regulations, t h e C umminses are not e ntitled to act in any manner contra ry to the District’s regulations that would cause ha rm to the public’s supply of saf e drinking water
. See id. at 673; W atkins Land Co. , 86 S.W . at 735.

Be cause the District neg ated that any g enuine issues of mater ial fac t remain a bout the exis tence of either

an express or a

n implied easeme nt, the Cummi nses’ fif th issue is overruled.
Inverse Condem nation

Th e Cum min se s a sse rt

in t he ir fi rs t is su e th a t th e y

have su ff

e re d a n inve rs e condemnation—a taking for whic h they are entitled t o b e compensated—pursuant to either the United States Constit ution or the Texas Constit ution. See U
. S
. C o n s t
. a m e n d V ; T e x . C o n s t
. a rt
. I, § 1 7
. T h e C u m m i n s e s c l a i m t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t ’ s r e g u l a t i o n p r o h i b i t i n g “ [a ]l l a c t i v i t y n o t r e la te d to the maintenanc e of the barg e or intake” within 200 fee t of the intake ba rg e constitutes a per se taking of the portion of their land that falls within the 200-foot radius, which is, essentially , the shoreline of L ot 6 . A lte rn a tiv e ly , the Cum min se s c la im that the 20 0- fo ot r e g ulatio n c on sti tut e s a c a se -s pe c if

ic taking of “the ir land, not [li mited to] any particula r lot.” The Cummi nses additionally claim to have suffe red a per se taking of their pr operty based on the District’s re quirement that wa rning signs be place d along the shoreline; this argument, too, is made in terms of their e ntire par cel of land. The District counter s that no taking has occ urre d and that, aside fr om the denial of the boat dock lice nse, the Cumminses have fa iled to present a ripe taking s claim.31 “ [N]o p e rs on ’s pr op e rt

y sh a ll b e take n, dama g e d o r d e str oy e d f or or a pp lie d to pu

bli c
us e wi tho ut ad e qu a t e c o mp e n s a t i o n b e i n g m a d e . . . . , ” T e x. C o n s t
. a rt
. I , § 1 7 , “ n o r

s h a l l p r i v a te pr op e rt y be take n for

pu bli c us e wi tho ut j us t c omp e ns a tio n. ” U. S. Co ns t. a me nd . V . Apr op e rt

y
ow ne r c an e sta

bli sha takin g wi th e vid e nc e that a g ov e rn me ntal re g ulatio n h a s d e tr ime nta lly i m p ac t ed the use of his land; this is considere d an inver se conde mnation. M a y h e w v . To wn of Su nn y v ale , 964 S.W .2d 922, 933 (Tex. 1998).

Th e ba sic te st is wh e the r the re g ulatio n “ g oe s too fa r” in re str ic tin g the pe rm iss ibl e uses of the pr operty

or in dec rea sing its value. Sh e ffi e ld D e v . v . Ci ty

of G le nn He igh ts , 140 S.W .3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2004)

. I f the regulation de nies the owner “all economica lly benef icial or produc tive use of [the] land,” leaving him with only “a token interest,” or if the re g ulation results in a “phy sical invasion” of private property , then it may be conside red a per se taking

. Id .; se e als o Lu c as v . S ou th Car oli na Coa sta l Co un c il , 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). Otherwise, the c ourt must eng ag e in a c asespecific analy sis of whether a taking has occurre d, as guided by the Pe nn Ce ntral fac tors: (1) “the economic impac t of the re g ulation on the claimant , ” (2 ) “the ext ent to which the r eg ulation has interfe red w ith distinct investment-bac ked ex pectations”; and (3) “the c hara cter of the g overnme ntal action.” Pe nn Ce nt. Tra ns p. Co. v . Ci ty

of N e w York , 4 38 U. S. 1 04 , 1 24 (1 97 8) ; se e als o Pa laz zo lo

v. Rhode Island , 533 U.S. 606, 617, 631 (2001) (“ these fa ctors do not comprise a formulaic te st”). Whether the landow ner c laims a per se or a case -spec ific t aking , our inquiry can be divided into two basic parts: first, whe ther the r eg ulation constit u t es a taking and, if so, what economic impac t results from that taking

. City of Austin v. Travis County Landfill Co. , 73 S.W .3d 234, 241 (Tex. 2002). The c ourt ca nnot analy

ze the economic- impact prongwithout first answer ing32

the ult imate qu e sti on of

wh e the r t he re g ulatio n h a s su

bs tanti a lly

int e rf e re d w iththe land ow ne r’ s u se and enjoy ment of the prope rty
. Id

. To establish this, a landowner must put forth spec ific evide nce of a dir e c t, i mme diate , a

nd su bs tanti a l im

pa c t th a t th e re g ulatio n h a s h a d on th e land , ma kin g it unusable for

its int ended pur

poses. Id. at 2 4 0. The landow ner must “qua ntify the risks and the hazards or spe cifica lly

descr ibe how the [ regulation] interfe red” with the use and e njoy ment of the land; “nonspec ific alleg ations [t hat the re g ulation resulted in incr ease d costs and risks on the land]
are not e noug h to e stablish a taking .” Id

. at 2 4 3
. An “e s s en t i al p re re qu i s i t e” t o a r egu l at o ry t ak i n gs
c la im i s a “ fi na l and

a uth or itativ e de te rm inatio n o f t he ty pe and int e ns ity of de ve lop me nt l e g a lly permitted on the subjec t property
. A court cannot deter mine whether a regulation ha s g one ‘too fa r’ unless it knows how fa

r the re g ulation goe s.” City of El Paso v. Madero Dev . & Constr. Co. , 803 S.W .2d 396, 400 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied). This question “ca nnot be disposed of by g ener al propositions.” Id

.

Not ever y regulation of private land constitutes a compe nsable taking

. Tra v is C ou nty Landfil l Co. , 7 3 S. W.3 d at 24 2. Com pe ns a tio n is no t require d if the pr op e rt

y ow ne r’ s lo ss i s
o c c a s io n e d b y th e p r o p e r e xe r c is e o f p o li c e p o w e r. Lombardo v. City of Dallas , 73 S.W .2d 475, 47 8- 79 (T e x. 19 34 ). Th e “ c on te mpo ra ry un de rs tand ing ” is that th e g ov e rn me nt h a s a “ br oa d r e a lm” in which it “may

regulate without compensation.” Lucas , 505 U.S. at 1024. Although the re is “no br ig ht li ne rul e” f

or e sta bli sh ingwh e n a

n e xer c ise of

po lic e po we r i s p ro pe r— a nd he nc e , n ot a taking—there are two related fa ctors to be c onsidered in a naly zing t h i s q u es t ion of law. City of Col le ge Sta tio n v . Tu rtl e Ro c k

Cor p ., 680 S.W .2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1984). A police pow er r eg ulation do e s n ot c on sti tut e a

takin g if (1 ) it is a do pte d to a c c omp lis h a le g iti ma te g oa l th a t is “ su bs tanti a lly33

r e l a t e d ” t o t h e h e a l t h , s a f

e t y, o r g e n e r a l w e l f

a r e o f t h e p e o p l e , an d

( 2 ) i t i s r e a s o n a

b l e , n o tar b i t r a r y. Id .; see also Skillern II

, at 170 (re g ulation supporting c onservation of natural r esourc es, such a s water held for public tr

ust, “is not a ‘tak i n g’ wit hin the proscr iption of the 5th and 14th amendments”)

. The theor y underlying this rule is that it would not be logic al to c ompensate a private ow ner f or the imp a c t a re g ulatio n ha s on his lan d whe re the ow ne r, a s a memb e r o f t he g e ne ra l pu

bli c , a lso be ne fi ts from the r eg ulation. Ra

y bu rn , § 2. 00 , at 2. F ur

the rm or e , to re qu ir e the State to c omp e ns a te a pr ivate pr op e rt y owner ea c h ti me a

re g ulatio n, wh ic h w a s e na c te d f or the pu bli c g oo d, “ c ur

ta il[e d] so me potential for the use or ec onomic exploi tation of private proper ty . . . would eff

ectively compel the g overnme nt to regulate by purcha se.” Es tat e of S c ott v . V ic tor ia C ou nty , 7 7 8 S. W. 2 d 5 8 5 , 5 9 0 ( T e x. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (emphasis omitted). The 200-foot regulation

Th e Cum min se s fi rs t c ha lle ng e the Di str ic t’ s 2 00 -f oo t r e g ulatio n o n th e ba sis that it constitutes a per se taking of “the portion of [t heir] pr operty within 200 fee t of the intake [barg e].” They claim t hat, because the regulation prohibits “all activity ” within a 200-f oot radius, it deprives the m of a ll o f t he ir pr op e rt y ri g hts in t

hat la nd and pr e ve nts th em f

ro m makin g any

e c on omi c a lly benef icial or produc tive use of it. Alternatively , the Cummi nses claim that the re g ulation has had a detr imental economic impac t on their land and ha s int er fer ed with their investment-ba cked expectations, there fore entitling them to c ompensation under a case -spec ific taking s analy sis. The District conclusively

es t ab l i s hed that its 200-foot re g ulation does not constitute a taking of the Cummi nses’ prope rty

—pursua n t t o either a per se or a c ase- specific analy sis—because it has notThe Cumminses ag ree d at ora l argument that the only activity they have be en prohibited 13 fro m do ingis c on str

uc tin g a bo a t do c k o ve r t

he wate rs a nd

su bme rg e d la

nd s o f L a ke Tr a vis ; th is iss ue is r ipe ba se d o n th e Di str ic t’ s d e nia l of the Cum min se s’ de sir e d boat- do c k li c e ns e . O n a pp e a l, h o we v er , t h e C u m m i n s es fa i l edt o as s er tt h e de n i al o f t h ei r l i ce n s e a s a b as i s t o s u p p o rt t h ei r t ak i n gs claim. I n any

event, the de nial does not constitute a taking of the Cumminses’ land bec ause the activity prohibited would have occur red on pr operty

that is held by

the State in trust for the public, to w hic h th e Cum min se s h ave no rig hts , a nd be c a us e the re g ulatio n, wh ic h e ns ur e s a n a de qu a te supply of safe drinking water for the public, is a

leg itimate exercise of police power . City of College Sta tio n v . Tu rtl e Ro c k

Cor p ., 68 0 S. W.2 d 8 02 , 8 04 (T e x. 19 84 ) ( re gulation n ot a takin g if it i s rea sonable a

nd substantially

related to protec ting he alth, safe ty , or g ener al welf are ). 34 su bs tan ti all y

int e rf e re d w iththe Cum min se s’ us e a nd e njo y me nt o f t he ir land a nd be c a us e it i s a leg itimate exercise of the State’s police powe r.

Reg ardingeither the specific portion of land e ncompassed by the 200-foot r eg ulation
or the ir pa rc e l a s a wh ole , th e Cum min se s hav e no t de mon str a te d a ny pa rt ic ula r a c tiv ity or land us e that has bee n “substantially interfe red” with as a re sult of the Di strict’s 200-foot r eg ulation. See Travis C o u n t

y Landfill Co. , 73 S.W .3d at 241, 243 (spec ific alleg ations of direc t, immediate, and substantial impact require d to establish reg ulatory taking ). The Cumminses o n l y as s ert that the regulation preve nts “all activity ” on the l and, which could “ pr esu ma bly

includ[e] walking on it or using it in any

way .” (Empha sis added.) The Cummi nses have not alleg ed that th e Di s t ri ct has actua lly prohibited them from doing any thing on their

land in its entirety

or wi t h i n the 200-foot
zone. See Madero De v. &Constr. Co. , 803 S.W .2d at 400 (cour t cannot dete rmine if re g ulation 13 g oes “too fa

r” w ithout final and authoritative de termination of re stricted ac tivity ). Th e Cum min se s’ a rgume nt— that a takin g ha s o c c ur

re d b e c a us e “pr e su ma

bly a ll

a c tiv ity” c ou ld be pr e ve nte d by the re g ulatio n— no t on ly e mpl oy s a

hy pe rt e c hn ic a l r e a din g , it

a lso is forwa rd-looking and does not provide sufficient evidence of a ripe c ontroversy
. See B arshop , 925The Di s t ri ct expressed its intent in a letter to the trial judg e, supplementing the hea ring 14 testimony , and included similar state ments in its affidavit testimony , its appellate brief a nd at ora l argume nt. Howeve r, the District a dditionally est abli shed that, eve n if the 200-f oot reg ulation 15 e c on omi c a lly

imp a c te d the Cum min se s’ land , the y wo uld no t be en tit le d to c omp e ns a tio n b e c a us e the reg ulation was validly enac ted pursuant to the State’ s police powe rs. See T e x . C o n s t
. a rt
. X V I, § 5 9; see als o Ba rsh op v . M e din a U nd e rg ro un d W ater Co ns e rv ati on Di

st ., 925 S.W .2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1996) (“ [c]o ns erva tion o f w a te r h a s a lw a y s b e e n a pa ra mou nt c on c e rn

in T e xas” ); In re Adjudication of W

ater Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segm ent, 64 2 S. W.2 d 438 , 4 45 (T e x. 19 82 ) ( State has constitutional duty to c onserve water as a prec ious r esourc e). The leg islature has es t ab l i s hed wate r c on tr ol a

nd imp ro ve me nt dis tr ic ts to a c t a s a g e nts of the State in p ro te c tin g its tr us t pr op e rt

y an d h a s in v e s te d th e m w it h b r o a d a u th o r it y to c a r r y o u t th is d

u ty
. See T ex. W ater

Code Ann. §§ 49.211(a) , 51.121, 5 1
. 1 2 2 , 51.127 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004-05); 30 Te x . Admin. Code § 290.41(e) (2) ( 2004).

35 S.W .2d at 629 (c ourts are to presume co nstitut ionality of re g ulations and avoid over ly literal
c on str uc tio ns ); City

of E l P as o , 80 3 S.W. 2d a t 40 0 (r ipe ne ss)

. F ur the rm or e , the a sse rt ion

that “ a ll

a c tiv ity” on the ir land ha s bee n pro hib ite d is con tr a ry to the Di str ic t’ s r e pe ate d s ta te me nts , ma de in public rec ords, that it “is only prohibiting the Cummins family from mo o ri n g o r b uilding a boat 14 dock on District prope rty below 670 fe et and is only regulating boating a ctivity within a 200 foot radius of the intake bar g e to the extent that the 200 foot radius c overs only District proper

ty .” Thus , th e Di str ic t e sta

blishe d th a t it s 2 00 -f

oo t r e g ulatio n h a s n ot s ub sta nti a lly interfe red w ith the Cummi nses’ use and enjoy ment of t heir land, whether consideringL ot 6 alone or the e ntire par cel. B eca

use no direc t, immediate, or substantial impact has oc curr ed, the 200- foot regulation does not constitute either a per se or a c ase- specific taking and, as suc h, we do not re ach t h e “ e c o n o m i c i mp a c t ” p r o n g o f t h e i n v e r s e c o n d e m n a t i o n i n qu i r y. See Travis County Landfill Co. , 73 S.W .3d at 241 (ultimate question is whether regulation substantially

interfe res with land)

. 15Be cause the purpose of the 200-foot r eg ulation is to ensure an a dequate supply of saf e drinking wa t er t o t he public, it is substantially related to protec ting the he alth, safe ty , or g ener al welfa re of the people. S

e e T u r t l e R o c k

C o rp ., 68 0 S .W .2 d at 8 04 . A lso , th e re g ulatio n is “re asonable ” bec ause it aff ects all users of L ake T ravis equa lly and it encompa sses only

a small are a; it is not being enfor ced a g ainst the Cummins es an y d i ff er ently than it would be ag ainst any other person who a

ttempted to circ umvent the reg ulation’s prohibition of activity not relate d to the intakebarg e withi n 200 fee t. See id. Mo re ov e r, a s me mbe rs of the g e ne ra l pu bli c , th e Cum min se s b e ne fi t from this regulation. There fore , despite any impact the 200-f

oot reg ulatio n m ay

have ha d on the Cummi nses’ land, the y

are not entitled to compensation. See Es tat e of S c ott v . V ic tor ia C ou nty , 778 S.W .2d 585, 590 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ). 36 The war ning -s ign s re qui

re ment The Cum m i nses also cla im that they have suf fer ed a per se taking beca use the regulation’s require ment that war ning sig ns be plac ed alongthe shoreline const itutes a “phy sical invasion” o f th e ir p r o p e rty
. T h e r e c o r d s h o w s th a t th e D is tr ic t o r d e r e d s ig n s , b u t n o th in g in the
rec ord evide nces w hether these sig ns were actua lly completed and place d on the Cumminses’ land or that they

have inter fer ed with the Cummi nses’ use of their land. The Cumminses claim that the sig ns we re pla c e d o n th e ir pr op e rt y or , a lte rn a tiv e ly , th a t a

g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l fac t e xists beca use the re cord doe s not evidence whether the signs wer e place d on their proper ty . The District claimed that the sig ns were put up in A pril 1997, but that the y wer e only place d on the District’s land and we re ne ver pla ced on the Cumm i n s es ’ p roperty , in compliance w ith the require ment that the signs “ be posted a long the shoreline.” This dispute, howeve r, does not r ise to the level of a g enuine issue of mater ial fact beca use, eve n if the District plac ed sig ns on the shoreline bounda ry of the C u m m i nses’ land, the Cummi nses have not demonstrated that this would constitute a p e rm a n ent occupation of their land suff icient to entitle th em t o co mpensation. See Loretto v. Tele prompter Ma nh att an CAT V Co rp ., 45 8 U. S. 41 9, 43 5- 36 (1 98 2) (“ dir e c t ph y sic a l a tta c hme nt of plate s, bo xes,37

wires, bolts , and scr ews to the building , completely occupy ing spa ce immediate ly

above a nd upon the roof and along the building ’s exterior wall” c onstitut ed per manent occ upation and, henc e, wa s a taking ). Be cause the District conc lusively established that its 200-foot re g ulation constitutes neither a p e r

se t ak i n g nor a c ase- specific taking of the Cumminses’ land, and ne g ated that a ny g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t r ema in s as to wh e the r t he wa rn ing -s ig ns re qu ir e me nt c on sti tut e s a sufficie nt phy sical invasion of the Cummi nses’ land to be a per se taking , the Cumminses’ first issue is overrule d. Validity of

1000-F oot Re gulation I n their t hird issue, the C umminses challeng e the validity of t he District’s 1000- foot regulation, specifica lly

asser ting that it is an unauthorized ex pansion of t he authority g rante d by the Commi ssion’s substantive rule, administrative code section 290.41(e )(2)

. See 30 Tex. Admin. C ode § 2 90 .4 1 ( e )( 2) ; Re g . 6 .5 .3 .2 . A g e nc ie s ar e no t pe rm itt e d to “ imp os e a dd iti on a l bu rd e ns , c on dit ion s,
o r r e s tr ic ti o n s in

e xc e s s o f

th e s tatuto r

y p r o v is io n s ” th a t a

u th o r ized the rule. Te

x as Al c oh oli c Bev erage Comm’n v. Sanche z , 96 S.W .3d 483, 487 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). The rule established by

the Commiss ion states that “[r]aw water intakes shall not be located within 1,000 fee t of boat launching ramps, marinas, docks, or f loating f ishing pier s which
are acc essible by

the public,” a

nd the District’s re g ulation provides t h at “a l l recreational boating activity within 1000 feet is prohibited.” 30 Te x . Admin. Code § 290.41(e) (2); Reg

. 6
. 5
. 3.2. The phrase “all re cre ational boating activity ” is simply a shorthand use d by

the District in place of the
enumer ated list of re cre ational boating activities appe aringin the Commi ssion’s rule.38 Even if the phr ase “ all rec reational boating a ctivity ” wa s interpre ted as broa der tha n “all ra mps, marinas, docks, a

nd piers ‘a cce ssible b y t h e p u b l ic,’” this would not i nvalidate the Di str ic t’ s ru le be c a

us e the le g isl a tur e ha s g ra nte d the Di str ic t the a

uth or ity to a c c omp lis h it s statut or ily de fi ne d p ur

po se s b y “ a ny prac ti cal me a ns .” Te x. Wat e r C od e Ann. § 5 1. 12 1. Th is authority expressly includes a water district’s rig ht to “adopt and enfor ce r easona ble re g ulations” for the pur p o s es o f “pre serv[ing] the sanitary condition of all wate r controlled by the district” and “re g ulat[i ng ] privil eg es on any land . . . controlled by

the district.” Id . § 51.122 (West Supp. 2004- 05). Ba sed on the plain meaningof these statutes, the District established a s a matter of law that it s r e g ulatio n im

po se d n o b ur de ns , c on dit ion s, or re str ic tio ns in e xce ss o f t ho se statut or ily authorized. The Cumminses’ third issue is overrule d.
CO NC LU SION The District established that it is entit led to summary judgme nt and that no g enuine issue of mater ial fac t remains on any of the Cummi nses’ claims by conclusively

proving that (1) the Cum min se s are no t li tto ra l ow ne rs be c a us e the ir c ha in of tit le wa s no t g ra nte d p ri or to 1 89 5 a nd it did not convey

land appur

ten an t t o a n at ural lake with a normal flow of water ; (2) eve n if the Cummi nses wer e littoral owner s, that would not entitle them to construct a boat dock over water s and subm er ged lands that a re ow ned by

the State, as trustee for the public, a nd regulated by

the District for the purpose of ensuring an adequate supply of safe drinking water for the public; (3) the Cummi nses’ c hain of title did not convey an express ea sement to use t he water and the Cummins es have no t ma de a

pp a re nt, c on tin

uo us , a nd ne c e ssa ry us e of the wate r to sup po rt

a n im pli e d e a se me nt;39

(4 ) t he Di str ic t’ s 2 00 -f

oo t r e g ulatio n d oe s n ot r e su lt i n a c omp e ns a

ble takin g of

the Cum min se s’ proper ty —whether considering the entire parc el or just L ot 6—be cause it is a leg itimate e x erc ise of the State’s police pow er that has not substantially interfe red w ith the Cumm inses’ use a nd enjoy ment of their land; ( 5) the District’s w arning -sig n regulation does not constitute an inverse condemnation of the Cumminses’ land bec ause it ha s not r esulted in a perma nent, phy sical occ upation of the land;

and (6 ) t he Di str ic t’ s 100 0- fo ot re g ulatio n is val id be c a us e it doe s not exc e e d the a uth or ity e xpre ssl y g rante d to the District by

statute. B e c a u s e th e D is tric t c o n c lu s iv e ly d e mo n s tr a

te d its entitl ement to judg ment as a matter of law, and no g e nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f a c t r e ma in, we a ff

ir m th e su mma

ry jud g me nt.

J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Kidd, Patterson and Pury ear ; J ustice Kidd Not Participating Affir med Filed: June 3, 2005