FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JOSEPH M. CLEARY GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Collignon & Dietrick Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

JODI KATHRYN STEIN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JOSHUA ALFORD, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1109-CR-816

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT 

The Honorable Grant W. Hawkins, Judge

Cause No. 49G05-1004-FC-33630 

April 5, 2012

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Judge
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Case Summary

Joshua Alford appeals the revocation of his probation and the trial court’s order 

that he serve the remaining 309 days of his previously suspended sentence in the Indiana 

Department of Correction. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

finding this his conduct violated the no-contact order that applied to his father, 

specifically that his false review of his father’s cleaning company to Angie’s List did not 

constitute contact. Because we determine that this behavior does constitute contact, we 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On April 29, 2010, the State charged Alford with two counts of Class C felony 

child molesting and later added a charge of Class D felony criminal confinement. The 

trial court also issued a no-contact order on April 29, prohibiting Alford from contacting 

the victim, his daughter, or her mother, his wife, “in person, by telephone or letter, 

through an intermediary, or in any way, directly or indirectly, except through an attorney 

of record . . . . This includes, but is not limited to, acts of harassment . . . .” Appellee’s 

App. p. 1. After a hearing on May 21, 2010, the no-contact order was extended to 

include Alford’s father, Jim, to the list of people that Alford could not contact due to 

Jim’s involvement in the custody dispute that arose out of this incident.

In January 2011, Alford pled guilty under a combined plea agreement to Class D 

felony criminal confinement and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery under another 

cause number. He was sentenced to concurrent suspended sentences of 887 days for each 

conviction, with 268 days of credit time and 365 days of probation. As a special 
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condition of probation, the trial court continued the no-contact order for several 

individuals, including Alford’s father, Jim.

On July 28, 2011, the State filed a notice of probation violation alleging that 

Alford had violated the no-contact order by submitting a false report to Angie’s List 

about his father’s cleaning business that said, “They did a good job cleaning, but they 

stole my wife’s diamond earrings.” Appellant’s App. p. 66. At the probation-revocation 

hearing, Alford admitted to sending the false report but denied that it violated the nocontact order because he did not have direct contact with his father. The trial court 

disagreed, stating that “The acts of the defendant could have no goal other than to bring 

distress to a protected person because of his involvement in the prosecution . . . .” Tr. p. 

5. The trial court ordered Alford to serve the remaining 309 days of his suspended 

sentence. Id. at 9.

Alford now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Alford contends that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to revoke 

his probation, specifically that his actions did not constitute a violation of the no-contact 

order. We disagree. 

Probation revocation is a two-step process. Cox v. State, 850 N.E.2d 485, 488 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006). First, the court must make a factual determination that a violation 

of a condition of probation has occurred. Id. When a probationer admits to the violation, 

the court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the 
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violation warrants revocation. Id. At this step, the probationer must be given an 

opportunity to present evidence that explains and mitigates his violation. Id.

Upon the revocation of probation, a trial court may impose one or more of the 

following sanctions: (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or 

enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the person’s probationary period for not more than 

one year beyond the original probationary period; (3) order execution on all or part of the 

sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). 

We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations for an abuse of 

discretion. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion 

occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances. Id.

We defined “contact” in Wright v. State as 

“establishing of communication with someone” or “to get in 

communication with.” Webster’s Dictionary 249 (10th ed. 1993). 

Communication occurs when a person makes something known or 

transmits information to another. Ajabu v. State, 677 N.E.2d 1035, 1042 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. Further, communication may be either 

direct or indirect and is not limited by the means in which it is made known 

to another person. Id.

688 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). Alford’s contact with Jim 

was indirect and not immediately known by Jim; however, it was contact nonetheless. 

Alford used Angie’s List as an intermediary through which to communicate with Jim in 

an effort to harass him, in direct violation of the no-contact order that was a condition of 

his probation.
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Alford also contends that the no-contact order was not sufficiently clear, arguing 

that he was not informed that contacting a third party about his father would result in a 

violation. Conditions of probation must be sufficiently clear that they “describe with 

clarity and particularity the misconduct that will result in penal consequences . . . .” 

Hunter v. State, 883 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 (Ind. 2008). Alford argues that he was not aware 

that contacting a third party about his father’s business would result in a violation. We 

are not persuaded by this argument. The no-contact order specifically stated that Alford 

was to have no contact with Jim directly, indirectly, or through an intermediary and that 

included acts of harassment. Alford was on notice that his false report to Angie’s List

would be a violation of the no-contact order. We therefore affirm the trial court’s 

revocation of Alford’s probation and the order that he serve the remaining 309 days of his 

previously suspended sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.