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DA 22-0639

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2024 MT 19

FORWARD MONTANA; LEO GALLAGHER;

MONTANA ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL

DEFENSE LAWYERS; GARY ZADICK,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

 v.

THE STATE OF MONTANA, by and through

GREG GIANFORTE, Governor,

 Defendant and Appellee.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,

In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. ADV-2021-611

Honorable Mike Menahan, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellants:

Raph Graybill, Graybill Law Firm, PC, Great Falls, Montana

Rylee Sommers-Flanagan, Constance Van Kley, Upper Seven Law, 

Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Brent Mead, Deputy 

Solicitor General, Helena, Montana

Emily Jones, Special Assistant Attorney General, Jones Law Firm, 

PLLC, Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: November 29, 2023

 Decided: January 31, 2024

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

01/31/2024

Case Number: DA 22-0639
2

Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Forward Montana, Leo Gallagher, Montana Association of Criminal Defense 

Lawyers, and Gary Zadick (Appellants) appeal from a September 16, 2022 order of the 

First Judicial District Court denying attorney fees under the private attorney general 

doctrine (“Private AG Doctrine” or “the Doctrine”) and under the Uniform Declaratory 

Judgments Act (UDJA), § 27-8-313, MCA. We reverse and remand to the District Court 

for calculation of attorney fees. 

¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

Was it an abuse of discretion for the District Court to deny Appellants’ attorney fees 

under the private attorney general doctrine?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 The Montana Legislature passed Senate Bill 319 (SB 319) during the 2021 

legislative session. The Bill—originally a regulation of joint political fundraising 

committees—proceeded normally through the legislative process (introduced in Senate, 

passed through the Senate Committee on State Administration, passed on the Senate floor, 

passed as amended through the House Committee on State Administration, passed as 

amended on the House floor). Each of these steps included a public process, and citizen 

testimony was provided in both committees. The House passed and transmitted a slightly 

amended version back to the Senate. The Bill’s sponsor recommended the Senate not 

concur with the amendments so a committee could “review those amendments.” 

¶4 A free conference committee consisting of members of both houses was appointed. 

The committee did not discuss the House amendments at all. Instead, on April 27, 2021—
3

two days before the Legislature adjourned—the free conference committee used the 

opportunity to include four new sections to the Bill during a 17-minute meeting, closed to 

public comment. Several of these last-minute amendments came almost verbatim from a 

Bill that had recently failed to pass in the legislative session. See S.B. 318, § 4(1)(E)(v), 

(F), 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021) (rejected on House floor April 15, 2021); compare

S.B. 319.5, § 22, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021) (adopted during last-minute, 

closed-door session April 27, 2021). The Bill as amended then passed both houses in the 

last 24 hours of the 2021 legislative session. 

¶5 On June 1, 2021, Appellants challenged two of these amendments based on 

Article V, Section 11(6), of the Montana Constitution, which allows a person to challenge 

a statute “on the ground of noncompliance with [Section 11] only within two years after its 

effective date.” Among other allegations of unconstitutionality, Appellants challenged 

Sections 211and 222 of SB 319 as violative of two sections of the Montana Constitution: 

Article V, Sections 11(1) and (3). Article V, Section 11(1), requires that “[a] law shall be 

passed by bill which shall not be so altered or amended on its passage through the 

legislature as to change its original purpose.” (Rule on Amendments.) Article V, 

Section 11(3), requires that “[e]ach bill, except general appropriation bills and bills for the 

codification and general revision of the laws, shall contain only one subject, clearly 

expressed in its title.” (Single Subject Rule.) 

1 Section 13-35-242, MCA (2021 Mont. Laws ch. 494, § 21).

2 Section 3-1-609, MCA (2021 Mont. Laws ch. 494, § 22). 
4

¶6 On June 4, 2021, Appellants filed a Verified Amended Complaint and an 

Application for Preliminary Injunction to preserve the status quo while the merits of the 

case were heard, as the laws were set to go into effect on July 1, 2021. The Attorney 

General responded to Appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction on June 21, arguing 

Appellants did not have legal standing to challenge the law, and that they had not satisfied 

the legal standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction. The District Court held a 

show-cause hearing on June 28 and granted Appellants’ motion on July 1, preliminarily 

enjoining the enforcement of SB 319, Sections 21 and 22. On August 4, the Attorney 

General filed a motion to dismiss, arguing again that Appellants did not have standing to 

challenge the laws and that they had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

¶7 On August 18, Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on their claims 

under Article V, Section 11. Appellants argued there were no genuine disputes of material 

fact, and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The State filed a motion to stay 

the decision on Appellants’ motion for summary judgment until its motion to dismiss was 

resolved and until it could conduct discovery into Appellants’ claims regarding standing.

¶8 The District Court ruled that Appellants had standing to bring the lawsuit and denied 

the State’s motion to dismiss on October 6. The court further found that additional 

discovery was unnecessary on the two constitutional claims in Appellants’ summary 

judgment motion and stayed discovery until resolution of that motion. Thereafter, the State 

responded to Appellants’ motion for summary judgment. The State again argued that 

Appellants lacked standing and that the sections at issue were not unconstitutional. The 
5

court held oral argument on the motion for summary judgment on January 25, 2022, and 

issued its order on February 3. 

¶9 The court found that SB 319 contained two subjects unrelated to campaign finance 

(the original subject of SB 319) because Section 21 banned select campaign activities3and 

had no effect on campaign contributions, spending, or disclosures, and because Section 22 

3 Section 21 reads:

Political activity in public postsecondary institution residence hall, 

dining facility, or athletic facility -- prohibition -- exceptions -- penalty. (1) A 

political committee may not direct, coordinate, manage, or conduct any voter 

identification efforts, voter registration drives, signature collection efforts, ballot 

collection efforts, or voter turnout efforts for a federal, state, local, or school 

election inside a residence hall, dining facility, or athletic facility operated by a 

public postsecondary institution. 

(2) Nothing in this section may be construed as prohibiting any 

communications made through mail, telephone, text messages, or electronic mail 

inside a residence hall, dining facility, or athletic facility or any political advertising 

made through radio, television, satellite, or internet service. Nothing in this section 

may be construed as prohibiting an individual from undertaking or participating in 

any activity for a federal, state, local, or school election if the activity is undertaken 

at the individual’s exclusive initiative. 

(3) A person who resides in a residence hall operated by a public 

postsecondary institution or who regularly uses a dining hall operated by public 

postsecondary institution, a candidate for office in a federal, state, local, or school 

election, or a political committee engaged in a federal, state, local, or school 

election may institute an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to prevent, 

restrain, or enjoin a violation of this section. 

(4) A political committee that violates this section is subject to a civil 

penalty of $1,000 for each violation. Each day of a continuing violation constitutes 

a separate offense. 

(5) For the purposes of this section, “public postsecondary institution”

means: 

(a) a unit of the Montana university system as described in 20-25-201; or 

(b) a Montana community college defined and organized as provided in 

20-15-101.

Section 13-35-242, MCA (2021).
6

regulated judicial recusal4

rather than limiting campaign contributions or reporting 

requirements. It was thus in violation of Article V, Section 11(3), of the Montana 

Constitution. The court further found that Sections 21 and 22 amended SB 319 to the 

extent that its original purpose was changed in violation of Article V, Section 11(1), of the 

Montana Constitution. The court permanently enjoined enforcement of Sections 21 and 

22 as violative of Article V, Sections 11(1) and (3), of the Montana Constitution. It then 

certified its prior judgment as a final judgment subject to immediate appeal. 

¶10 In a tacit acknowledgment that the Bill was unconstitutional, the State filed a notice 

that it was waiving appeal of the District Court’s order.5

 The order thus became law. 

See Jonas v. Jonas, 2013 MT 202, ¶ 21, 371 Mont. 113, 308 P.3d 33 (“[A] legal decision 

made at one stage of litigation which is not appealed when the opportunity to do so exists, 

4 Section 22 reads:

Judicial conflict of interest -- recusal -- definition. (1) A judicial officer 

shall disqualify the judicial officer in a proceeding if: 

(a) the judicial officer has received one or more combined contributions 

totaling at least one-half of the maximum amount allowable amount under 

13-37-216 from a lawyer or party to the proceeding in an election within the 

previous 6 years; or 

(b) a lawyer or party to the proceeding has made one or more contributions 

directly or indirectly to a political committee or other entity that engaged in 

independent expenditures that supported the judicial officer or opposed the judicial 

officer’s opponent in an election within the previous 6 years if the total combined 

amount of the contributions exceed at least one-half of the maximum amount that 

would otherwise be allowed under 13-37-216 if the contributions had been made 

directly to the judicial candidate. 

(2) For the purposes of this section: 

(a) “contribution” has the meaning provided in 13-1-101; and 

(b) “judicial officer” has the meaning provided in 1-1-202.

Section 3-1-609, MCA (2021).

5 By doing so, the fee ultimately awarded in this opinion will be decreased.
7

becomes the law of the case for the future course of that litigation.” (internal quotation 

omitted)). Section 13-35-242, MCA (2021), and § 3-1-609, MCA (2021), repealed 2023 

Mont. Laws ch. 433, § 2, are thus unconstitutional and void. 

¶11 Thereafter, Appellants moved for attorney fees under the Private AG Doctrine; 

§ 25-10-711, MCA; and under the UDJA, § 27-8-313, MCA. The District Court declined 

to award attorney fees. Under the Private AG Doctrine, the court found that Appellants 

had satisfied all three factors required for attorney fees under Montanans for the 

Responsible Use of the School Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 1999 MT 263, 

¶¶ 66–67, 296 Mont. 402, 989 P.2d 800 (Montrust). Nevertheless, the court considered 

equity and immunity principles and found that this case was a “garden-variety” 

constitutional challenge undeserving of attorney fees under the Doctrine. The court also 

denied fees under § 25-10-711, MCA, finding the Attorney General did not act frivolously 

or in bad faith in defending the Bill, and under the UDJA, finding this case did not present 

circumstances making fees equitable. Appellants appealed the court’s decision under the 

Private AG Doctrine and the UDJA but did not appeal the court’s decision regarding 

§ 25-10-711, MCA. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 We review de novo a district court’s conclusion on whether legal authority exists to 

support an award of attorney fees. City of Helena v. Svee, 2014 MT 311, ¶ 7, 377 Mont. 

158, 339 P.3d 32. If legal authority exists, we review for an abuse of discretion the court’s 

order granting or denying fees. Svee, ¶ 7. An abuse of discretion exists if the district court 
8

acted arbitrarily, without the employment of conscientious judgment, or exceeded the 

bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. Montrust, ¶ 68. 

DISCUSSION

¶13 Was it an abuse of discretion for the District Court to deny Appellants’ attorney fees 

under the private attorney general doctrine?

¶14 When it comes to attorney fees, Montana follows the American rule—absent 

specific statutory or contractual provisions, prevailing parties are generally not entitled to 

recovery of their attorney fees in prosecuting or defending an action. W. Tradition P’ship 

v. Att’y Gen., 2012 MT 271, ¶ 9, 367 Mont. 112, 291 P.3d 545. We recognize several 

equitable exceptions to the American rule, but we construe them narrowly so the exceptions 

do not swallow the rule. W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 9. 

¶15 One of these narrow equitable exceptions to the American rule is the Private AG 

Doctrine, which we adopted from Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977). Montrust, 

¶ 67. The party seeking attorney fees must show three basic equitable considerations under 

the Doctrine: “(1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the 

litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant 

burden on the plaintiff, [and] (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the 

decision.” Montrust, ¶ 66 (quoting Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314). The District Court found 

that Appellants met all three factors under Montrust. However, the court concluded the 

case was a “‘garden-variety’ declaratory judgment action,” which was not deserving of 

attorney fees. 
9

¶16 We have limited attorney fees under the first factor of the Doctrine to cases 

vindicating constitutional interests so that courts will not be in the role of assessing public 

policies better left to the Legislature. Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n v. Bitterroot 

Conservation Dist., 2011 MT 51, ¶ 22, 359 Mont. 393, 251 P.3d 131; See also Serrano, 

569 P.2d at 1314. However, this factor does not require a litigant to bring a direct 

constitutional challenge. See Burns v. Cty. of Musselshell, 2019 MT 291, ¶¶ 14–16, 398 

Mont. 140, 454 P.3d 685; see also Clark Fork Coal. v. Tubbs, 2017 MT 184, ¶¶ 17–22, 

388 Mont. 205, 399 P.3d 295 (comparing cases). 

¶17 As discussed below, this factor is satisfied here, where Appellants challenged 

Sections 21 and 22 purely on constitutional grounds and won summary judgment on their 

claims under Article V, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. See Burns, ¶ 21 (“It is 

the vindication of constitutional interests that demonstrates the societal importance of the 

litigation.”). This case falls squarely within the courts’ important role in enforcing 

constitutional checks on the legislative power and implicates other important constitutional 

rights, such as the right to know. Mont. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 9; Mont. Const. art. VII, § 1. 

¶18 The Dissent suggests that even though significant constitutional interests were 

vindicated in Western Tradition Partnership, we held these were not enough under the first 

factor. See Dissent, ¶ 51. However, our holding in Western Tradition Partnership

recognized that “even though ATP vindicated principles of constitutional magnitude, the 

State’s defense also was grounded in constitutional principles and in an effort to enforce 

interests the executive deemed equally significant to its citizens.” W. Tradition P’ship, 

¶ 20 (emphasis added). The important constitutional interests at stake in Western Tradition 
10

Partnership are not in dispute. Our holding shows that both sides had important 

constitutional interests they were trying to vindicate. Here, however, Appellants alone 

were vindicating important constitutional interests. The Legislature disregarded its 

constitutional limitations, and the Attorney General offered no substantive or constitutional 

interests in defense of these actions. 

¶19 Along the same reasoning that underpins our decisions limiting the Doctrine to 

constitutional interests, we have also discussed that the separation of powers cautions us to 

avoid interfering with other branches under the first factor. W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 16. For 

example, in determining if fees under the Doctrine were appropriate in Western Tradition 

Partnership, we held that awarding attorney fees against the Attorney General was 

improper in a “garden variety” constitutional challenge that the Attorney General had 

chosen to defend because his arguments were not frivolous or in bad faith. W. Tradition 

P’ship, ¶¶ 17–18, 20. Indeed, because of our reluctance to invade the province of another 

coequal branch of government, we looked closely at whether the Attorney General 

defended the law in bad faith. We held that the Attorney General’s defense was far from 

frivolous because five members of this Court were convinced of the argument’s merit in a 

prior decision; both the plaintiff’s and the State’s arguments were grounded in equally 

significant constitutional principles; the statute the Attorney General was defending had 

century-old roots in Montana history; the statute had been enacted by initiative of the 

people to combat corruption which had entangled state judges and a U.S. Senator from 

Montana; and the challenge had been brought in a time of shifting legal landscapes given 

recent U.S. Supreme Court cases. W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 20. 
11

¶20 Here, we do not hold attorney fees are proper because of the Attorney General’s 

defense of the law, which included a challenge to Appellants’ standing at different stages 

of the litigation as well as defenses on the merits of the Bill. Rather, we conclude that 

attorney fees are proper in this case because of the process through which the 

unconstitutional sections of this Bill came to be: an obviously unlawful Bill adopted 

through willful disregard of constitutional obligations and legislative rules and norms. 

¶21 Initially, however, we address the State’s argument that statutory immunity requires 

the denial of fees in this case. This argument stems from Finke v. State ex rel. McGrath, 

2003 MT 48, ¶¶ 33–34, 314 Mont. 314, 65 P.3d 576, where we held attorney fees were 

improper against the defendant counties and State:

Defendant Yellowstone County advances several arguments against 

the award of attorneys’ fees in this case, but the one we find most persuasive 

is that it would be unjust to force the Counties to pay for the unconstitutional 

actions of the Legislature. The award of attorneys’ fees, when not statutorily 

mandated, is within the discreet and inherent equitable powers of the 

judiciary. While under the private attorney general doctrine, it may be 

considered equitable to award attorneys’ fees to Finke, we conclude that the 

inequity of imposing those fees against the Defendant Counties who neither 

fashioned nor passed the unconstitutional law is overriding.

The only entity remaining against whom fees could be assessed is the 

State of Montana. The claim against the State in the case at bar is for 

injunctive relief against enforcement of SB 242. The Plaintiffs did not 

specifically seek attorneys’ fees from the State, and the claim for injunctive 

relief simply does not provide a basis for the imposition of attorneys’ fees 

against the State. In fact, the only potential liability of the State for fees 

would lie for the actions of the Legislature in enacting an unconstitutional 

bill, as it is the enactment of SB 242 that prompted the filing of this action. 

However, § 2-9-111, MCA, provides that the Legislature, as a governmental 

entity, is immune from suit for any legislative act or omission by its 

legislative body. There is, therefore, no avenue whereby attorneys’ fees 

could be imposed against the State in this matter.
12

(Internal citations omitted and emphasis added.) The State thus argues that we cannot 

impose attorney fees when our only finding is that the Legislature enacted an 

unconstitutional Bill. This is incorrect for several reasons. First, the holding of Finke as 

it applied to attorney fees against the State was that plaintiffs had not sought fees against 

the State and thus could not recover fees from it—everything else was dicta. 

See In re Marriage of Pfeifer, 1998 MT 228, ¶ 24, 291 Mont. 23, 965 P.2d 895 (“[B]ecause 

we had resolved the issues before us prior to that [relied upon statement], it is clear that the 

statement was not necessary to the decision and was, instead, obiter dictum. Consequently, 

it was not a principle or rule of law necessary to our decision so as to implicate the law of 

the case.”). 

¶22 Second, a reading of the statute (§ 2-9-111, MCA) mentioned in Finke does not lead 

to the conclusion that it prohibits attorney fees against the State. Section 2-9-111(2), MCA, 

provides that governmental entities (including the State) are “immune from suit” for 

legislative acts or omissions. If taken literally, a suit seeking a declaration that a law is 

unconstitutional or to enjoin its enforcement would be prohibited. This clearly is not the 

case. See, e.g., Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(6); § 27-8-202, MCA (allowing suits concerning 

the validity of statutes). 

¶23 Rather, we have held that § 2-9-111, MCA, immunizes governmental entities from 

torts committed by legislative acts or omissions but not for administrative acts. 

See, e.g., Knight v. Missoula, 252 Mont. 232, 245, 827 P.2d 1270, 1278 (1992); Massee v. 

Thompson, 2004 MT 121, ¶¶ 77–78, 321 Mont. 210, 90 P.3d 394 (Nelson, J., specially 

concurring) (collecting cases); Denke v. Shoemaker, 2008 MT 418, ¶ 54, 347 Mont. 322, 
13

198 P.3d 284 (explaining that § 2-9-111, MCA, is a narrow exception to Article II, Section 

18, of the Montana Constitution, which provides that governmental entities have no 

immunity from suit for injury to person or property unless specifically provided by law by 

a two-thirds vote of the Legislature). This reading is consistent with the plain meaning of 

the statute and the rest of Title 2, Chapter 9, part 1, of the Montana Code. See § 2-9-111(5), 

MCA (specifically exempting some torts from immunity); § 2-9-101(1), MCA (defining 

“claim” to include suits for money damages for personal injury or property damage arising 

from “negligent or wrongful act[s] or omission[s]”). Thus, although § 2-9-111, MCA, 

provides immunity to the State for damages arising in tort caused by legislative acts or 

omissions, it does not provide immunity against a declaratory judgment action that a law 

is unconstitutional—or from an equitable grant of attorney fees in that action arising from 

unconstitutional actions of the Legislature that plaintiffs are forced to litigate.

¶24 Finally, Finke cannot stand for the proposition that the State is immune from 

attorney fees because we have awarded attorney fees against the State in prior cases. 

See generally, e.g., Montrust, Burns. The purpose of the Doctrine is to “provide[] an 

incentive for parties to bring public interest related litigation that might otherwise be too 

costly to bring.” Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, ¶ 91, 338 Mont. 

259, 165 P.3d 1079. If the Doctrine was eliminated where the Legislature has willfully 

disregarded its constitutional duties and purposefully passed unconstitutional laws, 

vindicating important constitutional rights through litigation would not be feasible. 

¶25 Nevertheless, as we noted in Western Tradition Partnership, courts must use caution 

in awarding fees against the State in “garden variety” constitutional challenges so as not to 
14

improperly infringe on the separation of powers. W. Tradition P’ship, ¶¶ 16–17. That case 

discussed attorney fees in relation to the Attorney General’s defense of the law and our 

hesitation to interfere with the executive function of the State. W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 16. 

We thus looked at whether the Attorney General had defended the law frivolously or in 

bad faith as a guidepost. W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 18. Here, legislative acts are at issue, and 

we similarly use caution so as not to interfere with the proper functioning of the legislative 

branch. We therefore also find it a helpful guidepost6to look to the bad faith of the 

Legislature in enacting unconstitutional laws when deciding whether attorney fees are 

proper under the Doctrine. See W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 18. 

¶26 The Legislature must follow certain rules in enacting legislation to ensure 

transparency and public participation. Mont. Const. art. V, § 11. The Single Subject Rule 

is substantially unchanged from Article V, Section 23, of the 1889 Montana Constitution. 

We stated that the purposes of this section:

are to restrict the legislature to the enactment of laws the subjects of which 

are made known to the lawmakers and to the public, to the end that anyone 

interested may follow intelligently the course of pending bills; to prevent the 

legislators and the people generally being misled by false or deceptive titles, 

and to guard against the fraud which might result from incorporating in the 

body of a bill provisions foreign to its general purpose and concerning which 

no information is given by the title.

6 This consideration is only a guidepost rather than a requirement. As Serrano notes, the concept 

of the Private AG Doctrine “seeks to encourage suits effectuating a strong congressional or 

national policy by awarding substantial attorney’s fees, regardless of defendants’ conduct, to those 

who successfully bring such suits and thereby bring about benefits to a broad class of citizens.” 

Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1312 (emphasis added). Thus, fees may be appropriate when a benefit has 

been conferred on the public even though no showing of bad faith has been made. Further, this is 

only a guidepost because if bad faith were a requirement under the equitable Doctrine, it would be 

swallowed up by § 25-10-711, MCA. Cf. Montrust, ¶¶ 60–62. Nevertheless, it can be helpful to 

discuss bad faith in fee requests against the State in order to not unnecessarily interfere with other 

branches’ policy choices. W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 16; Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1313. 
15

State ex rel. Foot v. Burr, 73 Mont. 586, 588, 238 P. 585, 585 (1925). Similar policies lie 

behind the Rule on Amendments, which has remained substantially unchanged from 

Article V, Section 19, of the 1889 Montana Constitution. Undoubtedly the Legislature is 

aware of these constitutional duties and limitations, especially given these provisions’ long 

history and our holding that if “it is apparent that two or more independent and incongruous 

subjects are embraced in its provisions, the Act will be held to transgress [Article V, 

Section 11(3)], and to be void by reason thereof.” Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep’t of Nat. 

Res. & Conservation, 2021 MT 44, ¶ 60, 403 Mont. 225, 481 P.3d 198; Evers v. Hudson, 

36 Mont. 135, 146, 92 P. 462, 466 (1907).7 

¶27 The District Court found, and the State does not dispute, that SB 319 was clearly in 

contravention of the Single Subject Rule. Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(3). Prior to the free 

conference committee, SB 319 contained only one subject—campaign finance. After the 

committee meeting, SB 319 contained two additional subjects within Sections 21 and 22—

campaign activities in university facilities and judicial recusal. 

¶28 In addition, the District Court found that these sections were in violation of the Rule 

on Amendments, which requires Bills to not be so altered or amended during the legislative 

process so as to change their original purpose. Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(1). Prior to the 

free conference committee meeting, the Bill’s entire purpose was to revise campaign 

finance laws regarding the establishment and regulation of joint fundraising committees. 

7

See also Rules of the Montana Legislature, 67th Leg., 40-90 (Mont. April 2021) (available at 

https://perma.cc/74EA-TAQG) [hereinafter Legislature’s Rules] (same as Mont. Const. art. V, 

§ 11(1)). 
16

After the meeting, the original purpose was changed to include regulations on political 

activities on college campuses and judicial recusal, which is manifestly apparent by 

examining SB 319’s title before and after the committee meeting:

AN ACT GENERALLY REVISING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS; 

CREATING JOINT FUNDRAISING COMMITTEES; PROVIDING FOR 

CERTAIN REPORTING; ESTABLISHING THAT IF STUDENT 

ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO REGISTER AS 

POLITICAL COMMITTEES ARE FUNDED THROUGH ADDITIONAL 

OPTIONAL STUDENT FEES, THOSE FEES MUST BE OPT-IN; 

PROHIBITING CERTAIN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN CERTAIN 

PLACES OPERATED BY A PUBLIC POSTSECONDARY 

INSTITUTION; PROVIDING FOR JUDICIAL RECUSALS UNDER 

CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; PROVIDING PENALTIES; AND

AMENDING SECTIONS [enumerated]; AND PROVIDING AN 

EFFECTIVE DATE.

S.B. 319.5, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021) (underlines and strikethrough in original.) 

The nonunderlined portions of the title above show SB 319 prior to the free conference 

committee. SB 319 had 22 sections prior to the committee meeting yet had a relatively 

short title because it was a comprehensive Bill covering a single subject. By adding four 

amendments (only two of which are at issue in this case), the committee more than doubled 

the length of the original title with completely unrelated matters. 

¶29 The Dissent contends that these constitutional rights, implicitly tied together with 

the Montana Constitution’s right to know, do not have the “strength or societal importance” 

of the rights discussed in Western Tradition Partnership—free speech. See Dissent, ¶ 51. 

The Dissent thus argues that certain constitutional rights are more important than others. 

But our caselaw does not require us to assess the strength or societal importance of a 

constitutional interest and decide whether that interest is as important as other 
17

constitutional interests. Rather, we limit evaluation of public policies to those that 

vindicate constitutional interests instead of balancing public policy concerns left to the 

Legislative Branch. Am. Cancer Soc’y v. State, 2004 MT 376, ¶ 21, 325 Mont. 70, 

103 P.3d 1085; Bitterroot, ¶ 22; Montrust, ¶ 66; W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 14. Similarly, 

Serrano, after discussing that it would be inappropriate to make a judicial evaluation of the 

strength or importance of statutorily based public policies, held that those difficulties were 

not present in a case where the public policy was “one grounded in the state Constitution.” 

Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314–15 (emphasis in original). Thus, we have limited the first factor 

to those cases that vindicate constitutional interests. W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 14. The 

Dissent misreads Western Tradition Partnership to mean that a case must present some 

constitutional interests that are more important than others—that are not “garden 

variety”—to justify fees. Instead, as discussed above, Western Tradition Partnership holds 

that fees are not justified against the State when the only basis for them is the Attorney 

General’s good-faith defense of the constitutionality of a statute. W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 17. 

Even if the Attorney General mounts a good-faith defense to a constitutional challenge, 

fees can still be awarded against the State based on other factors, such as those found in 

Montrust and here. W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 19. But even if the Dissent were correct, the 

constitutional policies vindicated here—to restrict legislative enactments to those made 

known to lawmakers and the public, to prevent legislators and the people from being 

misled, and to guard against obfuscation by the Legislature—are sufficiently weighty to 

justify fees. See Foot, 73 Mont. at 588, 238 P. at 585. 
18

¶30 In addition to the constitutional requirements, the Legislature disregarded its own 

internal rules that prohibit the actions it took with respect to SB 319. When the House and 

Senate pass different versions of the same Bill and do not accept the other chamber’s 

amendments, the House and Senate may appoint a conference committee to resolve the 

differences—confined to accepting, rejecting, or amending only the disputed amendments. 

See Legislature’s Rules, 30-30(1)–(2). If the conference committee is unable to reconcile 

the amendments, leaders may appoint a free conference committee which is able to 

“discuss and propose amendments to a bill in its entirety and is not confined to a particular 

amendment. However, a free conference committee is limited to consideration of 

amendments that are within the scope of the title of the introduced bill.” Legislature’s 

Rules, 30-30(3)(a) (emphasis added). 

¶31 Here, the Legislature went directly to a free conference committee without 

appointing a conference committee to discuss the amendments. Incredibly, during the 

17-minute committee meeting, the committee did not discuss the “disputed” amendments. 

Rather, the free conference committee proposed unconstitutional amendments that were 

clearly outside the scope of the title of the introduced Bill. 

¶32 The committee—consisting of legislators with more than 42 years of Montana state 

legislative experience between them—allowed no public participation or testimony, nor 

did they provide any public notice of the intended changes. Significantly, the amendments 

consisted of provisions that had already been defeated in other Bills during the legislative 

session—with one of them having failed mere days before the free conference committee. 

Such practice clearly violates Legislative Rules. See Legislature’s Rules, 40-70(1) (“A bill 
19

may not be introduced or received in a house after that house, during that session, has 

finally rejected a bill designed to accomplish the same purpose . . . .”); 

see also Legislature’s Rules, 40-90 (same as Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(1)); Legislature’s 

Rules, 60-05 (precedent of legislative rules). 

¶33 We are not intruding on the Legislature or enforcing its own internal rules as the 

Dissent suggests. See Dissent, ¶ 54. Rather, we use these examples to amplify the fact that 

the Legislature was well aware that what they were doing was unconstitutional, which 

serves as a strong showing of bad faith, a factor we consider as a guidepost in determining 

that fees are proper here. We thoroughly examine this point to show the proper “caution 

to avoid interference with the [legislative] function.” W. Tradition P’ship, ¶ 16.

¶34 The first factor of Montrust is clearly met. Appellants vindicated important 

constitutional rights, and our typical judicial restraint from interference with the proper 

functioning of other branches of government was overcome by the unconstitutional actions 

and willful disregard of legislative standards in adopting these Sections.

¶35 However, even when important constitutional interests are vindicated by the 

litigation, we still look at the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the 

burden on the plaintiff under the second factor. Montrust, ¶ 66. As such, we consider 

whether invoking the Doctrine provides an incentive for parties to bring public interest 

litigation that might otherwise be too costly to bring. Sunburst, ¶ 91. Thus, when litigants 

are motivated primarily by their own interests and only coincidentally protect the public 

interest, attorney fees are inappropriate—such as where the litigation results in a monetary 

judgment for plaintiffs. Sunburst, ¶ 91. 
20

¶36 The Doctrine is applicable where private litigants must litigate because “the 

government, for some reason, fails to properly enforce interests which are significant to its 

citizens.” Bitterroot, ¶ 27 (internal quotation omitted); Burns, ¶ 13. Thus, we generally 

do not apply the Doctrine when a government agency represents a public interest and 

complies with its duties. In re Dearborn Drainage Area, 240 Mont. 39, 43, 782 P.2d 898, 

900 (1989). However, we awarded attorney fees in Bitterroot where, although a 

government agency was involved in the litigation, the agency did not appeal an adverse 

decision and—against its objection—was joined as an involuntary party to other parts of 

the litigation. Bitterroot, ¶ 32. Because the agency’s involvement “was hardly the usual 

effort” of an agency seeking to enforce the law, private parties were forced to bear the brunt 

of the litigation burden and full relief would not have been granted without their effort. 

Bitterroot, ¶ 32. 

¶37 The State does not dispute that Appellants bore a large burden in litigating the 

constitutionality of Sections 21 and 22.8 Instead, it argues that Lewis and Clark County is 

8 The Dissent quotes this sentence and then compares Western Tradition Partnership, which 

admittedly was a much more difficult and drawn-out case than here, for its argument that 

Appellants have not hit a threshold burden requirement to get fees under the second factor. 

See Dissent, ¶¶ 46–50. The problem with this reasoning is that Appellees did not make any of 

these arguments to the District Court below or in briefing to us. The District Court said “[t]he 

State does not argue Plaintiffs did not bear the financial burden of litigating this constitutional 

issue,” and we reiterate in our holding that the State does not dispute this part of the second factor 

under the Doctrine. Instead, the State argues that private enforcement was not necessary because 

of the participation of a prior public official in the case. “It has long been the rule of this Court 

that on appeal we will not put a District Court in error for a ruling or procedure in which the 

appellant acquiesced, participated, or to which appellant made no objection.” State v. Gardner, 

2003 MT 338, ¶ 44, 318 Mont. 436, 80 P.3d 1262 (internal quotation omitted); see also State v. 

Kearney, 2005 MT 171, ¶ 16, 327 Mont. 485, 115 P.3d 214 (“This Court will not consider 

unsupported arguments, locate authorities or formulate arguments for a party in support of 

positions taken on appeal.” (internal quotation omitted)). Further, we note that Appellants seek 
21

one of the Appellants, and therefore a government agency is litigating this matter. The 

State’s argument is that since Leo Gallagher (one of the Appellants in this case) was Lewis 

and Clark County Attorney, the Court should conclude his participation is on behalf of 

Lewis and Clark County and therefore there was no need for private enforcement. 

¶38 This argument misconstrues Gallagher’s role in the case. Gallagher sued as a 

private citizen who will be negatively affected by the recusal requirements of Section 22 

in both his public and private work (now or in the future). If the State’s argument was 

correct, our caption would read “Lewis and Clark County, by and through its County 

Attorney,” rather than “Leo Gallagher.” See, e.g., Crites v. Lewis & Clark Cty., 2019 MT 

161, 396 Mont. 336, 444 P.3d 1025. Gallagher verified the complaint personally and not 

on behalf of the County. If he had participated on behalf of the County, he would have had 

to state as such. See § 25-4-203, MCA. The verification stated “I, Leo Gallagher, being 

first duly sworn, upon oath depose and say: 1. I am Plaintiff in the action set forth above,” 

and it was signed by him personally, not on behalf of the County or in his role as county 

attorney. (Emphasis added.) Although Section 22 would affect Gallagher in the cases he 

litigates on behalf of the County, it would equally impact him, and other Appellants, in any 

cases they litigate in private practice. Thus, Section 22 will affect Gallagher no matter 

what job he holds, and he personally sued to prevent that. 

compensation for 335.78 hours worked on the case, totaling $105,119. While we make no 

comment on the number of hours or the hourly rate that is appropriate for the District Court to 

award on remand, there can be no doubt that even though this case was resolved on summary 

judgment, the fees sought show that such public interest litigation vindicating important 

constitutional interests is far from feasible, which is a main purpose of the Doctrine. See Serrano, 

569 P.2d at 1313–14. 
22

¶39 Additionally, the complaint shows that Gallagher, in his personal capacity, has 

contributed to judicial races in the past six years “[c]onsistent with his First Amendment 

rights and commitment to civic life in Montana.” (Emphasis added.) Clearly Gallagher 

was suing on behalf of his own constitutional rights. It would be illegal for Lewis and 

Clark County to contribute to a candidate. Section 13-35-227(1), MCA. The District Court 

did not abuse its discretion. 

¶40 Since the only governmental entity involved in this case was defending the statute, 

private enforcement was necessary. See Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1313 (“Although there are 

within the executive branch of the government offices and institutions (exemplified by the 

Attorney General) whose function it is to represent the general public in such matters and 

to ensure proper enforcement, for various reasons the burden of enforcement is not always 

adequately carried by those offices and institutions, rendering some sort of private action 

imperative.”). The second factor of Montrust is met.

¶41 Finally, although we have not set a threshold number of people benefiting from the 

decision to support attorney fees under the Doctrine, clearly issues of statewide importance 

are sufficient to pass muster under the third factor. Bitterroot, ¶ 34; see also Burns, ¶ 23 

(concluding an issue that would benefit all Musselshell County voters was sufficient to 

meet the third factor). The State conceded this factor was met at the District Court because 

the litigation involves a challenge enforcing important constitutional restraints affecting all 

Montanans. 
23

CONCLUSION

¶42 We affirm that all three of the Montrust factors support an award of attorney fees in 

this case under the Private AG Doctrine. However, for the reasons stated herein we 

conclude that the District Court’s finding that this case presented equitable considerations 

which did not warrant attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine was 

unreasonable under these facts and as such an abuse of discretion. Because we conclude 

fees are warranted under the Doctrine, we do not reach the parties’ arguments under the 

UDJA. 

¶43 We decline to award attorney fees on appeal.

¶44 Reversed and remanded to the District Court for consideration of attorney fees.

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

We Concur: 

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

Justice Jim Rice, dissenting. 

¶45 In my view, the Court’s reasoning regarding application of the private attorney 

general doctrine (Doctrine) lacks merit under our precedent. I would conclude the District 

Court did not abuse its discretion by denying fees under the Doctrine, which is to be 

“invoked sparingly,” Western Tradition P’ship v. AG of Mont., 2012 MT 271, ¶ 13, 367 

Mont. 112, 291 P.3d 545 (Western Tradition II), and affirm.
24

¶46 The Court reasons that Appellants “bore a large burden in litigating the 

constitutionality” of SB 319. Opinion, ¶ 37. The burden of litigation borne here versus 

the burden borne by the Plaintiffs in Western Tradition, which challenged § 13-35-227(1), 

MCA, part of the original Corrupt Practices Act (Act), counsels otherwise. Here, the 

Plaintiffs filed suit on June 1, 2021, filed application for a preliminary injunction on June 4, 

and moved for summary judgment by August 18, 2021, six weeks later. The Attorney 

General, acting to defend the bill, limited his defense to the issue of standing. When the 

District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, the Attorney General 

“folded his hand” and gave notice he would not appeal from the judgment, conceding the 

matter. The Attorney General thus acted prudently, in a manner that fulfilled his duty to 

defend the challenged bill but which also did not unreasonably prolong the matter by 

engaging in protracted litigation. The case was over.

¶47 In contrast, in Western Tradition, after likewise receiving an adverse summary 

judgment ruling, in which the District Court, quoting Minnesota Chamber of Commerce v. 

Gaertner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2010), described the governing precedent from 

the U.S. Supreme Court, as “unequivocal,”1the Attorney General rejected this 

“unequivocal” determination and extended the litigation by appealing to this Court. While 

the nature of the interest at issue and the public import are discussed below, Western 

Tradition involved free speech under the First Amendment, an issue which attracted much 

1

See Western Tradition P’ship v. AG, 2011 MT 328, ¶ 8, 363 Mont. 220, 271 P.3d 1 (Western 

Tradition I), quoting the District Court (“Citizens United is unequivocal: the government may 

not prohibit independent and indirect corporate expenditures on political speech.”). 
25

public interest that necessarily complicated advocacy in the case. Leave to file amicus 

briefs was sought and briefs were filed by The ACLU of Montana Foundation, The 

Montana Trial Lawyers Association, Former Montana Supreme Court Justices William 

Hunt, William Leaphart, James Regnier, Terry Trieweiler, and John Warner, Montana 

Public Interest Research Group, The Peoples Power League, Montana Conservation 

Voters, Montanans for Corporate Accountability, Montana League of Rural Voters, Free 

Speech for People, Novak Inc., d/b/a Mike’s Thriftway, The American Independent 

Business Alliance, The American Sustainable Business Council, Domini Social 

Investments, LLC, Trillium Asset Management Corporation, Newground Social 

Investment, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Harrington Investments, Inc., 

Loring, Wolcott & Coolidge Sustainability Group, Calvert Asset Management Company, 

Inc., The Christopher Reynolds Foundation, Inc., Walden Asset Management, and the

Center for Competitive Politics. Pro hac vice and student practice motions were granted. 

In contrast, there was no amici or outside involvement in Forward Montana.

¶48 During the appeal, the Western Tradition Plaintiffs were required to litigate 

appellate procedural issues before this Court, including the Attorney General’s motion to 

strike its reply brief. Following receipt of the party and amicus briefs, this Court set the 

case for oral argument, in which counsel for Plaintiffs appeared and argued. Several 

months later, this Court issued the decision, its collective opinions totaling 80 pages, 

including vigorous dissents to the Court’s divided holding. The Dissenters would be 

proven to be entirely correct that the Court’s decision was clearly and predicably wrong. 

See Western Tradition I, ¶¶ 49, 50 (Baker, J., dissenting) (“Citizens United holds 
26

unequivocally that ‘[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political 

speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.’”); (“In my view, the State of Montana made 

no more compelling a case than that painstakingly presented in the 90-page dissenting 

opinion of Justice Stevens and emphatically rejected by the majority in oCitizens United. 

Though I believe Citizens United requires us to affirm the District Court, we must in any 

event anticipate the consequences should the Court’s holding today be reversed.”); see also 

Western Tradition I, ¶¶ 62, 73 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“The [U.S.] Supreme Court could 

not have been more clear in Citizens United . . . . This Court is simply wrong in its refusal 

to affirm the District Court. Like it or not, Citizens United is the law of the land as regards 

corporate political speech.”). 

¶49 This Court’s erroneous decision in Western Tradition I, in which the undersigned 

concurred, forced the Plaintiffs to continue the litigation yet further by preparing and filing 

a petition for certiorari seeking review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Plaintiffs moved for a 

stay of this Court’s decision pending appeal, and briefed the issue, but this Court denied 

the request. Plaintiffs were then required to seek a stay of this Court’s decision from the 

U.S. Supreme Court, which granted the stay. Regarding the Attorney General’s position 

in defense of the Act, the Supreme Court declared “there can no serious doubt” that Citizens 

United applied and invalidated the Act, reversing this Court’s decision. Am. Tradition 

P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 516, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491.2

2 During the course of the litigation, Western Tradition Partnership changed its name to American 

Tradition Partnership. See Western Tradition I, ¶ 9. 
27

¶50 There is no need to say more—that is a heavy litigation burden. With all due respect 

to the fine lawyering on behalf of the Plaintiffs here in Forward Montana, this case was a 

cakewalk compared to Western Tradition, and the Court’s reliance on the heavy burden 

here provides no shelter from the precedent of Western Tradition’s denial of fees in a much 

more difficult case. This consideration should weigh in favor of the District Court’s denial 

of fees. In retrospect, our inference in Western Tradition II that the case was “garden 

variety” litigation should be considered as suspect as our merits decision in Western 

Tradition I. Regardless, at a minimum, it is irrefutable that Western Tradition’s burden of 

litigation, including before the U.S. Supreme Court, far exceeded Forward Montana’s 

summary judgment litigation here. See Western Tradition II, ¶ 37 (Nelson, J., dissenting) 

(“. . . the undisputed result was that ATP had to incur the burden of litigating its rights—

not only in the District Court, but also in appeals to this Court and the Supreme Court—

against arguments that ‘either were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to 

meaningfully distinguish that case.’ Am. Tradition, 132 S. Ct. at 2491. In my view, given 

these facts, the magnitude of the burden [of litigation] was great.”). 

¶51 Next, the Court engages in a perfunctory analysis of the Doctrine’s constitutional 

vindication factor and concludes in a few sentences that because the Plaintiffs here sought 

relief “purely on constitutional grounds,” the factor is easily satisfied. Opinion, ¶ 17. This 

simplistic assessment will weigh in favor of fees for virtually any constitutionally related 

challenge, and thereby undermine the intended narrowness of the Doctrine’s exception to 

the American Rule. This factor is supposed to assess “the strength or societal importance 

of the public policy vindicated by the litigation.” Montanans for the Responsible Use of 
28

the Sch. Tr. v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm’rs (Montrust), 1999 MT 263, ¶ 66, 296 Mont. 

402, 989 P.2d 800. Thus, the broader nature of the litigation is important and requires 

assessment of societal impact, although courts are to do so without approval or disapproval 

of the public policies advanced by the litigation, to guard against violating separation of 

powers. See Western Tradition II, ¶ 16. The list of amici in Western Tradition, provided 

above, also serves to demonstrate the advanced public interest and importance of the 

constitutional right that was at issue—free speech. As the District Court in Western 

Tradition reasoned on the fee issue, “the issues here are very important and are grounded 

in the United States Constitution.” Although the Citizens United and Western Tradition

cases are often pigeon-holed as “corporate speech” cases, they affected a broader set of 

rights, going back to cases decided long before Citizens United:

Citizens United was not just about the rights of corporations and associations

to speak. More importantly, it was about the rights of citizens to hear and 

obtain information about candidates from diverse sources without 

governmental censorship. Indeed, the Citizens United decision rested on two 

propositions: first, that expenditures (by a person or an organization) on 

political communication are a form of ‘speech’; and second, that ‘citizens 

[have the right] to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach 

consensus.’ Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (emphasis added). These 

propositions were not created in Citizens United. Rather, they can be traced 

to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per 

curiam), and First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 

55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978). 

Western Tradition II, ¶ 42 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). “As a matter of 

federal constitutional law, all Montana citizens—at least, every voter in Montana—

benefitted from the District Court’s decision in favor of ATP under Citizens United.” 

Western Tradition II, ¶ 45 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); see also Western 
29

Tradition II, ¶ 16 (“The constitutional principles underlying this litigation cannot be 

doubted.”). The Court concludes that, despite our determination in Western Tradition II, 

the significant constitutional vindication at work there did not tip the scales in favor of fees, 

the factor is nonetheless “easily met” here. In my view, this conclusion is an incorrect 

application of the factor and irreconcilable with Western Tradition II. The constitutional 

interests vindicated in Western Tradition served a far greater societal purpose than the issue 

here, evidenced both by public interest and an analysis of the constitutional history of the 

rights vindicated in Western Tradition. This factor should also weigh against fees.3

¶52 Perhaps because support here is weak under our precedent, the Court utilizes new 

standards to justify fees: that fees should be awarded because SB 319 is “obviously” 

unconstitutional, and that fees under the Doctrine should be awarded for the punitive 

purpose of punishing the Legislature for “willful disregard” of legislative “rules and 

norms.” Opinion, ¶ 20. Beyond the fact that our precedent provides no support for such 

considerations in application of the Doctrine, I disagree with the use of these standards for 

several other reasons.

¶53 First, the law provides no gradations of unconstitutionality, nor should we create 

them. A law is either constitutional or not. The Court’s holding here encourages future 

parties to argue that the law they challenge is “really” unconstitutional, and for that reason 

alone, such vague considerations should not be employed. However, if it is fair to 

3 The broad societal impact of the Western Tradition litigation thus also provided support for the 

Doctrine’s factor of “the number of people standing to benefit from the decision,” Montrust, ¶ 66, 

but we did not conclude that factor tipped the balance in favor of fees. 
30

colloquially refer to a law as “clearly” or “obviously” unconstitutional, then such could 

clearly be said about the Corrupt Practices Act after Citizens United was decided. 

Although, for our Court, that point was only clear in hindsight, a retrospective demonstrates 

the Act’s unconstitutionality was never in doubt after Citizens United. In striking down 

the statute, the District Court correctly described Citizens United as “unequivocal,” as did 

the Dissenters in Western Tradition I. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld these perspectives 

by summarily reversing this Court’s decision, without even requiring briefing on the merits 

of the issue. See Western Tradition II, ¶ 37 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“. . . despite the clarity 

and breadth of the Citizens United decision, the Attorney General took the position that 

Montana’s ban on independent expenditures is constitutional and enforceable.”). By any 

measure, this turn of events demonstrated “obvious” unconstitutionality of the Act. Yet, 

this Court, despite having the benefit of this hindsight at the time we decided Western 

Tradition II, did not consider this “obvious” unconstitutionality of the Act to weigh in favor 

of fees under the Doctrine, despite the Dissent making that very point. To be consistent, 

nor should we here. 

¶54 Secondly, the Court is using the Doctrine as a sword to punish the Legislature, to 

deter it from “wrongdoing,” based in part on what I view as the Court’s revulsion at 

legislative “sausage-making.” This is an inappropriate judicial consideration. The 

judiciary has no business intruding into the internal operation of another branch of 

government, except as the Constitution expressly permits it. The District Court properly 

stayed within constitutional contours in its summary judgment ruling. See Order on 

Motion for Summary Judgment, ADV-2021-611, p. 9 (“the Court concludes SB 319 
31

contains two subjects not related to campaign finance, in violation of the single subject rule 

embodied in the Montana Constitution, Article V, § 11(3). The Court further concludes 

SB 319 was amended in passage through the legislature to an extent the bill’s original 

purpose was changed, in violation of the Montana Constitution, Article V, § 11(1).”). 

However, in contrast, the Court veers off the constitutional pathway, indicting the 

Legislature’s procedural use of a free conference committee, the timing of legislative 

amendments (“two days before the Legislature adjourned”), the use of prior bills as source 

material for the challenged amendments (“[s]ignicantly, the amendments consisted of 

provisions that had already been defeated in other Bills during the legislative session—

with one of them having failed mere days before the free conference committee”), the 

length of a committee meeting (a “17-minute committee meeting”), a disregard for “[the 

Legislature’s] own internal rules,” a failure to follow “legislative rules and norms,” and 

that such behavior was from “legislators with more than 42 years of Montana state 

legislative experience between them.” While such aspects of the legislative process may 

be mortifying to some, I find nothing unusual here. More to the point, none of these are 

constitutional violations. What violates the Constitution is the Court’s use of these things 

in its reasoning. The Legislature is free to violate its “internal rules” or “legislative norms” 

all day long, blatantly or otherwise, and it is none of this Court’s concern unless a 

constitutional provision has been violated. There are no constitutional prohibitions on 

legislators making decisions at the last minute, and I completely disagree that it is legally 

“significant” that prior bills were used as sources for amendments—even bills that failed 

“mere days” before. There is no prohibition against legislators engaging in behaviors that 
32

they have enough experience to avoid, or against conducting a 17-minute meeting. Indeed, 

it could just as well have been a five-minute meeting. As we have explained, where the 

shoe was on the other foot, and we resisted the Legislature’s effort to control the judiciary’s 

internal operations: 

The totality of the effect of [the challenged statute] is to interfere with the 

internal operations of the judiciary in the same manner as if the judiciary 

would impose limitations on the legislature as to its internal operations, such 

as the number of committees, the time within which a committee must act, 

the time each legislator must attend the sessions, limiting the time of 

discussion, limiting the time one bill must pass from one house to the other 

and the like. All of these legislative functions are internal with the legislature 

and the constitution authorizing the legislature to govern its affairs without 

interference from the other constitutional branches of government. 

Coate v. Omholt, 203 Mont. 488, 498, 662 P.2d 591, 596-597 (1983) (emphasis added). In 

my view, the use of “legislative norm” violations, including the Court’s repeated citation 

to internal legislative rules, Opinion, ¶¶ 28-29, to establish wrongdoing, is an inappropriate 

intrusion into another branch and sets a troubling precedent. It is only the requirements of 

the Constitution we are to be concerned about. More broadly, the Court’s use of the 

Doctrine as a measure to punish the Legislature is a drastic departure from the purpose of 

the Doctrine as established in our precedent.4 

4

In response to this Dissent, the Court has partially backed away from its position that fees are 

here justified by the need to punish legislative wrongdoing for enacting an obviously or blatantly 

unconstitutional bill, and instead reasons that fees are necessary to protect the public’s right to 

know. Opinion, ¶¶ 17, 29. However, SB 319 was not declared to be unconstitutional for violation 

of the right to know, but of containing two subjects not related to campaign finance in violation of 

the single subject rule, a violation of Article V, § 11(3), and for being amended in passage to an 

extent that the bill’s original purpose was changed, a violation of Article V, § 11(1). 
33

¶55 The Court does not fault the Attorney General for defending SB 319. I agree and 

find the Attorney General’s action here to be measured and reasonable, including waiving 

the right to appeal and bringing the litigation to a close after the District Court’s adverse 

ruling. Attorney fees are not warranted under § 25-10-711(1), MCA, which, while not 

dispositive, we have explained “serves as a guidepost in analyzing a claim for fees under 

the private attorney general doctrine.” Western Tradition II, ¶ 18.

¶56 The equitable nature of the Doctrine makes it critical that courts ensure it is not 

applied through a lens of judicial endorsement of the litigation, that is, granting fees where 

a court favors a plaintiff’s constitutional objectives, while rejecting fees where a court 

disfavors a plaintiff’s constitutional objectives. Justice demands that all parties receive 

equal treatment under the Doctrine. In my view, application of the Doctrine’s factors, as

discussed herein, clearly demonstrates that Western Tradition presented a far more 

appropriate case for an award of fees than the case made here, and that this case is the more 

“garden variety” constitutional litigation that does not satisfy our precedent for an award 

of fees. Given that precedent, and the need for fairness, I would conclude the District Court 

did not abuse its discretion by denying them here. 

/S/ JIM RICE

Justice Dirk Sandefur joins in the dissenting Opinion of Justice Rice. 

/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR