2015 IL App (2d) 141172 No. 2-14-1172 Opinion filed July 8, 2015

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ PNC BANK, N.A., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Du Page County. Plaintiff

- Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 11-L-913 ) CAMILLE O. HOFFMANN , ) Honorable ) Dorothy French Mallen , Defendant -Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hudson and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion. O PINION ¶ 1 Plaintiff, PNC Bank, N.A. (PNC), brought suit against d efendant, Camille O. Hoffmann , as guarantor of a multimillion -dollar loan . On December 11, 2013, the trial court entered judgment in PNC’s favor for $10,613,320.14. PNC thereafter issued citations to discover assets on several parties, including Raymond James & Associates, Inc., where Hoffmann had an individual retirement account (IRA). Hoffmann sought to declare the retirement account exempt, and PNC initially took the position that she had not met her burden of proof for the exemption

. Several weeks later, PNC agreed that the IRA was exempt. Hoffmann then sought damages under section 12

- 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/12

- 1005 (West 2012)), which allows for damages when a judgment creditor seizes exempt property. The trial2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- court denied damages, ruling that there had been no seizure under the statute, and Hoffmann appeals this ruling. We affirm. ¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND ¶ 3 On April 24, 2014, PNC issued a citation to disc over assets to West Suburban Bankcorp., Inc. (WSB). According to Hoffmann , her Raymond James IRA contained WSB stock, so when PNC issued the citation to WS B , her IRA was frozen. On July 3, 2014, Hoffmann filed a motion to declare the IRA exempt. She all eged that the IRA was established on June 2, 2010, before PNC filed suit, and thus the IRA was exempt from seizure under section 12

- 1006 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/12

- 1006 (West 2012)). She stated that she was also reserving the right to request damages from PNC under section 12-1005. ¶ 4 On July 8, 2014, PNC issued a citation to discover assets to Raymond James. ¶ 5 The trial court held a hearing on Hoffmann’s exemption motion on July 15, 2014. PNC’s counsel stated that the IRA had about 2,158 shares of WSB stock, worth about $800,000, and
additional cash . He stated that the IRA would be exempt if it complied with the Internal Revenue Code but that determining this would require looking at when it was established, how it was funded, and whether there were contributions and distributions. The trial court ask ed if he was saying that he would have no problem with a temporary order declaring the IRA exempt, but with leave for further discovery. PNC ’s counsel said that he was actually going to ask for a temporary order freezing the IRA, pending a final determination as to the exemption status. PNC’s counsel stated that he had requested documents bearing on the good

- faith intent as to both the establishment and the administration of the IRA

. Hoffmann’s counsel replied that the d ocument request was made the previous day, and that he had brought some of the documents with him. The trial court took a break from the matter so that the attorneys could discuss the2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- IRA and another issue. When the matter was called again, Hoffmann ’s counsel stated: “We have basically agreed to briefing schedules on both motions,” with the last reply being due on August 26, 2014. ¶ 6 PNC filed a response to Hoffmann ’s exemption motion on August 19, 2014, arguing that she had not sustained her burden of proof for the exemption. PNC argued, among other things, that the potential for litigation began before 2010; Hoffmann had transferred over $20 million in property in 2009; and the documents Hoffmann provided did not show when and in what amounts contributions and distributions were made to and from the IRA. ¶ 7 Hoffman n filed a reply on August 27, 2014, disputing PNC’s assertions. ¶ 8 On September 4, 2014, t he trial court held a hearing on Hoffmann’s exemption motion. PNC’s counsel st ated that , unless and until he w en t through 40 years of tax records, h e was “satisfied,” from what he ha d seen, that the IRA was exempt. He stated that in her reply Hoffm ann had “ finally” attached the pension plan and some of the operational records. Hoffmann’s attorney argued that damages were appropriate because an exempt asset had been seized. ¶ 9 The trial court granted Hoffmann’s motion to declare the IRA exempt. However, it denied damages under section 12

- 1005 without prejudice , on the basis that Hoffmann did not specifically request such damages in her original motion ; the trial court stated that Hoffmann could raise the issue in a new m otion. The trial court then granted PNC’s request to dismiss the citation against Raymond James. ¶ 10 On September 12, 2014, Hoffmann filed a motion for damages under section 12 -1005. She argued that PNC had wrongly seized the IRA, denying her the benefit of the exempt asset for2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- over two months. Hoffmann mainta ined that under section 12 -1005 she was entitled to double the value of the property seized. ¶ 11 In PNC’s response, it argued that : Hoffmann had failed to produce documents supporting her exemption claim ; there was no seizure under section 12

- 1005; and , even if a seizure had occurred, PNC could not be liable for damages , because its objection to the exemption was filed in good faith. ¶ 12 A hearing on the section 12

- 1005 motion took place on November 6, 2014. Hoffmann’s counsel argued, inter alia , that , at the initial hearing on the exemption motion, although he had documents that he believed clearly showed that the IRA was exempt, PNC asked for a five

- week briefing schedule, file d a response stating that Hoffmann had not met her burden, and then conceded the motion. PNC’s counsel argued, in relevant part, that he asked for the briefing schedule partly so that he could review the documents that Hoffmann had brought. He stated that , because PNC had issued the citation to discover assets to Raymond James, it had received up to a thousand more pages of documents that would take some time to review. He further stated that Hoffmann had attached additional documents to her reply, which finally established a prima facie case for exemption. H e stated that PNC decided that it did not want to review 40 years’ of documents to find out whether the IRA was operationally compliant with the revenue code, so at the final hearing on the exemption motion he had stated that PNC was not going to further c hallenge Hoffmann’s exemption claim. ¶ 13 The trial court denied Hoffmann’s motion for damages

. It stated that Hoffmann’s position was that , once PNC was aware of prima facie evidence that the IRA was exempt but continued to pursue the citation, its actions constituted a seizure. The trial court stated that section 12 -1005 seemed to require a party to file a civil action for damages, but since PNC did2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- not raise an argument as to whether the motion was procedurally appropriate , the trial court would not consider it. The trial court continued that, in considering the statute’s pla in language: “I am finding that in this particular case there was no taking and there was no seizing even though there was an infringement on the righ t of Mrs. Hoffman [ sic ] to dispose of her property as she sees fit. And I do r ecognize there was. But that is our process and that was done legally.” The trial court stated that a part y with a good

- faith basis should have the right to investigate and

res pond to an exemption motion and that PNC ’s request was reasonable under the circumstances. The trial court stated that it allow ed about two months to explore the issue and that the rules were appropriately followed. ¶ 14 Hoffma n n’s counsel asked the trial cour t if it believed that its ruling was final and appealable. PNC’s counsel stated that he did not believe it was, so Hoffmann’s counsel asked for language under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The trial court stated that , if Hoffma nn’s counsel believed that such language was necessary, he could file a motion within 30 days of the order. Hoffmann ultimately did not seek such language. ¶ 15 Hoffmann filed a notice of appeal on November 21, 2014. ¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 17 A. Jurisdiction ¶ 18 PNC contends that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, so w e first address th at issue. Hoffmann argues that we have jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b) (4) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010), which allows the appeal of a “final judgment or order entered in a proceeding under section 2

- 1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” Section 2

- 1402 governs supplementary proceedings in which a judgment creditor can seek to discover and recover assets of the2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment. 735 ILCS 5/ 2-1402 (West 2012); Village of Lake in the Hills v. Niklaus , 2014 IL App (2d) 130654, ¶ 19. Hoffmann sought damages under section 12

- 1005, which states:

“ If any officer by virtue of any judgment or process, or any other person by any right of distress takes or seizes any of the articles of property exempted from levy and sale, as provided in Part 10 of Article XII of this Act, such officer or person shall be liable in a civil action to the party damaged for double the value of the property so illegally taken or seized and costs of the action.” 735 ILCS 5/12-1005 (West 2012). ¶ 19 PNC argues that the supplementary proceeding that gave rise to Hoffmann’s section 12

- 1005 motion was the Raymond James citation proceeding . PNC maintains that the September 4, 2014, order granting Hoffmann’s exemption motion and dismissing the Raymond James citation concluded that supplementary proceeding and had the effect of foreclosing PNC from collecting any of the judgment from Raymond James. PNC cites Shipley v. Hoke , 2014 IL App (4th ) 130810, ¶ 110, where the court stated that , once underlying supplementary proceeding s have automatically terminated, all other collateral proceeding s must terminate as well, except as exempted by supreme court rule. The Shipley court held that , where the creditor allowed the supplementary proceedings to automatically terminate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277(f) (eff. July 1, 1982), the trial court lost authority under section 2

- 1402(f)(1) (735 ILCS 5/2

- 1402(f)(1) (West 2010)) to punish a party who violated a restraining provision of a citation. Shipley , 2014 IL App (4th) 130810, ¶¶ 112 -14. PNC argues that in this case, once the September 4, 2014, order was entered, the trial court lost jurisdiction to hear any proceedings collateral to the citatio n proceeding, including the motion for damages.2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- ¶ 20 PNC argues that any appeal relating to the Raymond James citation had to be brought within 30 days of the September 4, 2014, order. PNC notes that a motion is said to be directed against a judgment (see Il l. S. Ct . R. 303(a)(1) (eff. May 30 , 2008) (includes phrase “directed against the judgment”)) if it attacks the judgment, such as by requesting rehearing, retrial, modification, or vacation of the judgment. See D’Agostino v. Lynch , 382 Ill. App. 3d 639, 643 (2008). It argues that, therefore, after September 4, the only type of motion relating to the citation over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction would have been a postjudgment motion attacking the September 4 order. PNC contends th at Hoffmann’s damages motion did not attack the order and therefore did not toll the deadline for appeal ing any aspect of the citation proceeding, making Hoffmann’s November 21, 2014, notice of appeal untimely. ¶ 21 Hoffmann counters that her motion for damag es stemmed from her exemption motion, which in turn stemmed from PNC’s citation to WSB. Hoffmann notes that PNC did not issue and serve the Raymond James citation until after she had filed the exemption motion. Hoffman n argues that, therefore, it is disingenuous for PNC to argue that the only supplementary proceeding that gave rise to the damages motion was a proceeding on a citation issued after her request to deem the IRA exempt. Hoffmann maintains that the damages issue arose in the context of the cit ation s to both WSB and Raymond James and that the WSB citation is still ongoing. ¶ 22 Hoffmann argues that Rule 304(b)(4) does not state that the final judgment or order that is appealable must dispose of an entire supplementary proceeding. She cites In re Est ate of
Yucis , 382 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 10 6 9 (2008), where this court stated that an order is final if it disposes of the parties’ rights with respect to either the entire controversy or a definite and separate portion of the controversy. Hoffmann argues that the order she appealed from dispose d2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- of the parties’ rights with respect to the IRA and whether PNC improperly seized that exempt
asset. ¶ 23 Finally, Hoffmann argues that Shipley does not bar her appeal , because the court there stated that a time

- bar argument was not a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction but rather an affirmative defense that was subject to forfeiture if not timely raised (s ee Shipley , 2014 IL App (4th) 130810, ¶¶ 82, 109), and here PNC never asserted in th e trial court that her damages motion was time

- barred. ¶ 24 As stated, Rule 304(b) (4) allows the appeal of a final judgment or order entered in a section 2

- 1402 proceeding in which a judgment creditor goes after a judgment debtor’s assets

. “Few cases discuss w hich orders in supplementary proceedings are final orders.” In re Estate of
Yucis , 392 Ill. App. 3d at 1069. Generally, a final order is one that disposes of the parties’ right s with respect to either the entire controversy or some definite and separate portion of the controversy. Id. “ ‘An order in a section 2

- 1402 proceeding is said to be final when the citation petitioner is in a position to collect against the judgment debtor or a third party, or the citation petitioner has been ultimately foreclose d from doing so.’ ” Inland Commercial Property Management, Inc. v. HOB I Holding Corp. , 2015 IL App (1st) 141051, ¶ 26 (quoting D’Agostino , 382 Ill. App. 3d at 642) ; see also Levaccare v. Levaccare , 376 Ill. App. 3d 503, 511 (2007) (citation orders became final and appealable upon their entry)

. In Inland , the appellate court held that an order denying a substitution of judges was not a final judgment under Rule 304(b)(4), because it did not put the plaintiff in a position to collect the judgment amount or direct third parties to turn over funds, nor was there any substantive determination of any of the parties’ rights as to the merits of any claim in the postjudgment action. Id. In contrast, in D’Agostino , the court held that an order was final and appealable under Rule 304(b)(4) where the2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- plaintiffs were foreclosed from collecting funds from two third parties. D’Agostino , 382 Ill. App. 3d at 642. ¶ 25 W hile we agree with PNC that the September 4, 2014, order granting the exemption motion and dismissing the Raymond James citation was a final and appealable order because it ultimately foreclosed PNC from collecting against Raymond James (see Inland , 2015 IL App (1st) 141051, ¶ 26) , we also agree with Hoffmann that she was not attempting to attack that orde r when she filed her motion for damages, nor is she attempting to appeal from that order. We also find unpersuasive PNC’s reliance on Shipley as authority prohibiting the damages motion , as there the defendants asserted the affirmative defense that the co llateral proceedings terminated because the entire supplementary proceedings had automatically terminated under Rule 277 (f) ( Shipley , 2014 IL App (4th) 130810, ¶¶ 110

- 15). In this case , the supplementary proceedings were ongoing even after the damages motion had been ruled upon. ¶ 26 We note that section 12 -1005 states that a party may be liable for damages in “ a civil action ,” which arguably could be interpreted as requiring a separate action. However, as the trial court pointed out, PNC did not object to Hoffmann’s br inging the motion in a section 2-1402 proceeding, so we do not consider whether Hoffmann’s motion was procedurally appropriate. ¶ 27 We conclude that, u nder the circumstances present here , w hen the trial court entered the November 6, 2014 , o rder, it was a final judgment on Hoffmann’s section 12 -1005 claim, as the order conclusively held that Hoffman n was not entitled to damages on her assertion that PNC had wrongfully seized the IRA. That is, the trial court’s ruling was a final judgment tha t was “entered in a proceeding under section 2

- 1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure” (Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(4) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)), so the ruling was immediately appealable under Rule 304(b)(4), and Rule 304(a) language was not necessary. Therefore, we have jurisdiction over this appeal.2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- ¶ 28 B. Section 12-1005 Motion for Damages ¶ 29 We now address Hoffmann’s central argument on appeal, that the trial court erred in ruling that PNC had not unlawfully seized her IRA. As stated, section 12

- 1005 provides that , when a person “ takes or seizes” exempt property, that person is liable to the damage d party for double the value of the property illegally taken or seized, as well as costs of the action. 735 ILCS 5/12-1005 (West 2012). The construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo

. McVey v. M.L.K. Enterprises, L.L.C. , 2015 IL 118143, ¶ 11. Similarly, we review de novo a trial court’s ruling in supplementary proceedings where , as here, the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing or make any factual findings. See Dowling v. Chicago Options Associates, Inc. , 226 Ill. 2d 277, 285 (2007). ¶ 30 Hoffmann notes that no court has defined “seizure” under section 12-1005 . She argues that , because property ri ghts are fundamental rights, de fini ng “seizure” under a fourth

amendment analysis is appropriate. She cites People v. Raibley , 338 Ill. App. 3d 692, 699 (2003 ), where the court stated that , in a fourth

- amendment context, to “seize” property means to infringe, in a meaning ful way, upon a person’s possessory interest in the property. Hoffma n n argues that the trial court’s find ing that PNC had infringed on her use of the IRA should have led to the conclusion that PNC had seized it. Hoffman n argues that , even if there is a good

- faith exception under section 12

- 1005, it does not apply here , because at the initial hearing she gave PNC documents showing that the IRA was exempt. Hoffmann argues that PNC’s bad faith is shown by: its refus al to release the IRA from the WSB and Raymond Jame s citations to discover assets; its refus al of the trial court’s offer to have the IRA deemed temporarily exempt, subject to discovery; t ak ing five weeks to respond to the exemption motion; and then conced ing at the hearing on the motion that the IRA was e xempt. Hoffmann argues that, as a result, she was2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- deprived of her exempt funds for more than two months, which constituted a meaning ful interference with the property. Hoffmann contends that PNC’s actions demonstrate that its true motive was to deprive h er of the use of the IRA for as long as possible and that it should be liable for abusing the legal process , through the damages mandated under section 12 -1005, which would be double the value of the IRA

. ¶ 31 PNC argues that Hoffmann did not comply with section 12

- 1005’s procedural requirement of bringing a separate lawsuit and that this provides an independent basis to affirm the trial court’s denial of the damages motion. As noted, however, PNC forfeited the alleged procedural defect by failing to rais e it in the trial court. S ee supra ¶ 26; Johnson v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital , 402 Ill. App. 3d 830, 842 (2010) (failure to timely object to a procedural deficiency results in forfeiture). ¶ 32 PNC next argues that it did not seize the IRA. PNC notes that almost all of the cases involv ing section 12

- 1005 are from the 1800s and early 1900s and that most involve d the seizure and sale of a judgment debtor’s property by a constable or sheriff. See, e.g. , Heckle v. Grewe , 12 5 Ill. 58 (1888); Ke e nan v. Drew , 144 Ill. App. 388 (1908). PNC maintains that in those cases the seizure was obvious because the property w as physically taken and sold in satisfa ction of the judgment. PNC not es that two comparatively recent cases that mentioned the statute, In re
Marr iage of Schomburg , 269 Ill. App. 3d 13 (1995), and Jakubik v. Jakubik , 208 Ill. App. 3d 119 (1991), involved nonwage garnishment pro ceedings where an order directed the turnover of funds. PNC argues that the circumstances in tho se cases are a far cry from the third

- party citation here , where PNC never took possession of the IRA and did not request or receive a turnover order.2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- ¶ 33 PNC argues that Hoffma n n’s analogy of the citation to a fourth

- amendment seizure is strained, at best, and does not provide constr uctive guidance to this court. PNC argues that a far better analogue is Bank of Aspen v. Fox Cartage, Inc. , 126 Ill. 2d 307 (1989). There, one of the issues presented was whether a citation to discover assets under section 2

- 1402 was a wrongfully issued injunction that deprived the third party of procedural due process. Id. at 309. Our supreme court held that the re s traini ng provision of section 2 -1402 did not impose an injunction, but rather merely informed the citee of penalties if it transferred or disposed of the judgment debtor’s property. Id. at 315

- 16. The court also concluded that the third party was not deprived of due process , because it received a f ai r and timely hearing under the circum stances. Id. at 317. The court contrasted cases involving prejudgment

- seizure statutes by stating that, in the case before it, “the stocks were not seized or impounded” but instead remained in the third

- party’s possession. Id. at 319. It further stated that the “citation did not constitute a seizure of the stock in question” ( id. ) and that “the restraining provision of section 2

- 1402 *** did not serve to seize the stock from” the third party’s possession ( id. at 321). ¶ 34 Hoffmann argues that Bank of Aspen is distinguishable because it did not concern section
12- 1005’s damages provision. She further argues that she has not cl aimed that due process was violat ed or that the re s training provision of section 2

- 1402 results in “seizures” under section 12

- 1005. She maintains that , where a judgment debtor asserts a proper exemption and the judgment creditor promptly releases the exempt property , there would be no meaningful infringement on the judgment debtor’s interest in the property and no entitlement to damage s. She argue s that this situation i s different because PNC persisted in keeping the IRA frozen without justification. ¶ 35 Hoffmann argues that Bank of Aspen is also distinguishable because, in the context of a due- process analysis, it focused on whether the citation deprived a party of physical possession2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- of its asset. Hoffmann maintains that , because section 12

- 1005 provides damages for a “taking” or a “seizure,” we must interpret the word “seizure” as different from a “taking ,” to c onform to the rule that a statu t e should be interpreted such that no term is rendered meaningless or superfluous. See Skaperdas v. Country Casualty Insurance Co. , 2015 IL 117021, ¶ 15. ¶ 36 S ection 12

- 1005 applies only if a party “takes or seizes” exemp t prop erty. 735 ILCS 5/12-1005 (West 2012). In construing a statute, our primar y objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, which is best indicated by the statute’s plain language. McVey , 2015 IL 118143, ¶ 11. We give undefined terms their ordinary and popularly understood meaning. Skaperdas , 2015 IL 117021, ¶ 15. If the sta tutory language is clear , we must apply it as written, without resorting to extrinsic aids of statutory construction. State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises , Inc. , 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56. ¶ 37 Courts look to dictionaries to give words their ordinary and popularly understood meaning. See LeCompte v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 2011 IL App (1st) 100423, ¶ 29. This is appropriate here, as section 12

- 1005 is not directed at fourth amendment rights, in contrast to the cases on which Hoffmann relies. See People v. Meyer , 402 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1092 (2010) (the fourth amendment protects people against unreasonable government searches and seizures). Webster ’ s Dictionary defines “take” as, in relevant part, “to get into one’s hands or into one’s
p ossession, power, or control by force or stratagem.” Webster ’ s Third New International Dictionary 2329 (1986). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “take” as, in relevant part, “[t]o obtain possession or control, whether legally or illegally” and “[t]o seize with authority; to confiscate or apprehend.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1466 (7th ed. 1999)

. As pertinent her e, Webster’s Dictionary defines “seize” as “to take possessi on of.” Webster ’ s Third New International Dictionary 2057 (1986). Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “seize” as, in relevant part,2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- “ [t] o forcibly take possession (of a person or property).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1363 (7 th ed. 1999). ¶ 38 Hoffmann as serts that a seizure took place here. However, under the plain meaning of that term as defined above, P NC cannot be said to have “seized” the IRA , because it did not take possession of the IRA

. Although Hoffmann argues that we must apply a broader definition of a “seizure” because otherwise it would be equivalent to a “taking,” the dictionary definitions above show that the plain meaning of “taking” extends to taking control of property, not just physical possession. In other words, we can apply the plain meaning of “seizure” without rendering that term superfluous in the context of the statute. ¶ 39 Even if, arguendo , the meaning of “seiz ure ” is ambiguous, we agree with PNC that , under Bank of Aspen , the citation proc eeding cannot be said to have resulted in a seizure ; Bank of Aspen clearly held that a citation issued under section 2 -1402’s restraining provision did not result in the seizure of the targeted asset. Bank of Aspen , 126 Ill. 2d at 321. Rather, the citation simp ly inf ormed the third party of potential penalties if it transferred or disposed of the judgment debtor’s property. Id. at 315 -16. ¶ 40 We recognize that Hoffmann asserts that it was not the citation itself that constituted the seizure, but rather PNC’s alleged fa ilure to timely acknowledge the IRA’s exempt status. Assuming that the plain meaning of “seizure” can have a reasonable

- time component , Hoffmann’s argument still fails. First, Hoffmann faults PNC for not accepting the trial court’s “offer” to have the IR A deemed temporarily exempt pending discovery, but it is clear from review ing t he report of proceedings that the trial court was trying to clarify PNC’s position when it presented that scenario. See supra ¶ 6. Indeed, had the trial court believed that a temporary exemption was requir ed under the circumstances, it w ould have ordered such a course of action2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- without relying on PNC to accept its “offer.” Regarding the documents demonstrating the exempt status, although Hoffmann claims that she provided all of the relevant documents at the initial exemption hearing , PNC claims that she provided additional material as attachments to her later

- filed reply. The common

- law record, which is limited in the first place , 1 does not resolve this issue. However, we ag ree with PNC that the record indicates that its decision not to further contest the IRA’s exempt status was based at least partially on its desire not to spend additional time and resources obtaining and going through decades of tax

- related documents. See supra ¶ 9. As for the timing of PNC’s responses to the exemption motion, we note that Hoffmann’s own counsel stated at the initial hearing , “We have basically agreed to briefing schedules on both motions,” with the last reply being due on August 26, 2014

. As Hoffmann agreed to this schedule and did not later seek to expedite the proceedings , she cannot now argue that PNC prolonged the proceedings, as any resulting error would qualify as invited error . See Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District , 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 33 (the rational e for the rule of invited error is that it would be manifestly unfair to grant a party relief based on an

error that he or she introduced into the proceedings). ¶ 41 For these same reasons, even if, arguendo , the IRA could be consider ed as having been seized, the good

- faith exception , articulated in Jakubik , 208 Ill. App. 3d at 126

- 27, would apply.
In Jakubik , the court noted that the purpose of section 12

- 1005 was punitive, as was the purpose

1 The trial court granted Hoffmann’s motion to limit the voluminous record on appeal to documents relevant to the issue on appeal

. We note that Hoffmann, as the appellant, ha d the burden to provide a sufficiently complete record of the trial proceedings to support her claims of error, and we will resolve any doubts that arise from the incompleteness of the record against her. See Foutch v. O Bryant , 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (198 4).2015 IL App (2d) 141172

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- of section 2

- 611 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 100, ¶ 2- 611), which provided sanctions when
attorn eys f ai led to adequately investigate claim s before bringing suit. Jakubik , 208 Ill. App. 3d
at 126. The Jakubik court therefore reason ed that the good

- faith or honest- mistake defense to a section 2 -611 claim should extend to a claim for damages under section 12-1005. Id. at 127. ¶ 42 The debtor has the burden of showing that property is exempt from being applied to satisfy a judgment. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, NA v. Envirobusiness, Inc. , 2014 IL App (1st) 133575 , ¶ 13 . Here, PNC had not seen any documents regarding the IRA when the first section
12- 1005 hearing took place, and at that hearing Hoffmann’s attorney agreed to a briefing schedule that was followed b y the parties. According to PNC, it used that time to review Hoffmann’s documents as well as documents obtained from Raymond James. Further, a lthough PNC ultimately decided not to further challenge the IRA ’s exempt ion , it did so not on the basis that the documents tendered at the initial hearing conclusively proved its exempt status, but rather on the basis that determining whether the IRA was exempt would require reviewing decades of tax

- related documents, which it was unwilling to do. As such, even if the IRA was “seized” under sec tion 2

- 1005, the good

- faith exce ption would apply and Hoffmann would not be entitled to damages. ¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 44 In sum, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Hoffmann’s motion for damages under section 12

- 1005, as we conclude that Hoffmann’s IRA was not “seized” under the statute. Even if it were, the good-faith exception to the statute would apply. ¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Du Page County circuit court. ¶ 46 Affirmed.