alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50373 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. LORENA RIVERA Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:06-CR-596-3
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Lorena Rivera pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C

. §§ 841, 846. The district court sentenced her to 41 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Rivera argues that the district court clearly erred in reducing her base offense level by two levels for her minor participation in the offense, rather than by four or three levels for her minimal or less than minor participation in the United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D June 19, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-50373

2 offense. The advisory Sentencing Guidelines provide for a reduction in the base offense level of a “minor” or a “minimal” participant and a participant who falls between a “minor” and “minimal” participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. To merit a reduction under § 3B1.2, the defendant must have been “substanti ally less culpable” than the average participant. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.3(A)). The role of
a defendant in the offense is a factual determination that we review for clear
error. United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 203 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2005). The factsshowthat Rivera packaged the marijuana, loaded the marijuana, knewthat shewas participating in the transportation ofmarijuana, and assisted in the transportation of a large quantity of marijuana. Rivera has not shown that her participation in the offense was “peripheral to the advancement of the illicit activity” or that it was not “critical to the offense.” Villanueva, 408 F.3d at 203 & n.9; United States v. Becerra, 155 F.3d 740, 757 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Atanda, 60 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1995). The district court did not clearly err in reducing Rivera’s offense level by two levels for her minor participation in the offense, rather than by four or three levels for a minimal or less than minor participation in the offense. Additionally, Rivera’s properly calculated, within guidelines sentence is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.2



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Soyo Group,  Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ended  September 30, 2006 as filed with the  Securities
and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  the  undersigned,
Nancy Chu,  Chief  Financial  Officer of the Company  certifies,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section  13a-14(b) or
15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


 /s/ Nancy Chu
-----------------------
Nancy Chu
Chief Financial Officer
April 20, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0543

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

AVA HICKMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including October 9, 2024, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 4 2024

09/04/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0543
#### Lester William WALLACE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28212.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 28, 1956.

*581No appearance for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The conviction is for the offense of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated; the punishment, three days in jail and a fine of $100.

In the absence of a bond or recognizance on appeal, or a.showing that appellant is in jail, we are without jurisdiction of this misdemeanor appeal.

The appeal is dismissed.
#### Alfred CASTRO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 36930.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 27, 1964.

Rehearing Denied June 27, 1964.

Sam Harrison, San Antonio, for appellant.

James E. Barlow, Dist. Atty., R. Emmett Cater, Asst. Dist. Atty., San Antonio, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DICE, Commissioner.

The conviction is under Art. 1352, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., for knowingly causing cattle to go within the enclosed lands of another; the punishment, thirty days in jail and a fine of $100.

No statement of facts of the evidence adduced upon the trial accompanies the record, in the absence of which we are are unable to pass upon the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Salyer v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 316 S.W.2d 420.

We have examined the formal bill of exception, filed by appellant, which com*907plains of the court’s failure to rule on his motion in arrest of judgment in which he contends that the court was without jurisdiction to determine the issue of title to land, and find no reversible error therein. As qualified by the court, the bill shows a lack of due diligence on the part of appellant and his counsel in securing a ruling by the court on the motion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
EX-10.12(C)



 Exhibit 10.12(c) 

June 1, 2016 
 Secor Capital Advisors L.P. 

One Penn Plaza – Suite 4625 
 New York, New York 10119 

Attention: Mr. Sanjay Malhotra 
 Re:
    Management Agreement Renewal 
 Dear Mr. Malhotra: 

We are writing with respect to your management agreement concerning the commodity pools to which reference is made below (the “Management
Agreement”). We are extending the term of the Management Agreement through June 30, 2017 and all other provisions of the Management Agreement will remain unchanged. 
  


	 	•	 	Secor Master Fund L.P. 


	 	•	 	Emerging CTA Portfolio L.P. 


	 	•	 	MSSB Spectrum Technical L.P. 

 Please acknowledge receipt of this modification by signing one
copy of this letter and returning it to the attention of Mr. Patrick T. Egan at 522 Fifth Avenue – 7th Floor, New York, NY 10036 or fax to 866-428-9026. If you have any questions, I can be reached at 212-296-6808 or contact Jack Yuen
at 212-296-1320. 
 Very truly yours, 
 CERES MANAGED FUTURES
LLC 

			
		
	By:        	 	/s/ Patrick T. Egan
		 	Patrick T. Egan
		 	President and Director

 SECOR CAPITAL ADVISORS L.P. 
  

			
		
	By:	 	/s/ Raymond Iwanowski


			
		
	Print Name:	 	Raymond Iwanowski

 PE/kg
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1383 Engrossed Amendment Senate (EAS)]

                  In the Senate of the United States,

                                                         July 21, 2011.
    Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 
1383) entitled ``An Act to temporarily preserve higher rates for 
tuition and fees for programs of education at non-public institutions 
of higher learning pursued by individuals enrolled in the Post-9/11 
Educational Assistance Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs 
before the enactment of the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance 
Improvements Act of 2010, and for other purposes.'', do pass with the 
following

                              AMENDMENTS:

(1)On page 3, strike lines 10 and 11 and insert the following:
        Code, who, since January 4, 2011, has been enrolled in the same 
        non-public institution of higher learning in a State in

(2)Beginning on page 4, strike line 12 and all that follows through 
page 5, line 3, and insert the following:
    (a) Extension.--Section 3729(b)(2)(B) of title 38, United States 
Code, is amended--
            (1) in clause (i)--
                    (A) by striking ``January 1, 2004'' and inserting 
                ``October 1, 2011''; and
                    (B) by striking ``3.00'' both places it appears and 
                inserting ``3.30'';
            (2) in clause (ii)--
                    (A) by striking ``January 1, 2004, and before 
                October 1, 2011'' and inserting ``October 1, 2011, and 
                before October 1, 2012''; and
                    (B) by striking ``3.30'' both places it appears and 
                inserting ``2.80''; and
            (3) in clause (iii), by striking ``October 1, 2011'' and 
        inserting ``October 1, 2012''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on the later of October 1, 2011, or the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
112th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H.R. 1383

_______________________________________________________________________

                               AMENDMENTS
```
#### Julie DELANEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Victor R. CADE, D.O.; St. Joseph Memorial Hospital; Central Kansas Medical Center, Defendants-Appellees, and L.G. Stephenson & Co., Inc., Defendant.

No. 91-3358.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

June 3, 1994.

Dwight A. Corrin, Corrin & Krysl, Wichita, KS, for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert G. Martin and Alisa M. Arst, McDonald, Tinker, Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, Wichita, KS, for defendant-appellee Victor R. Cade, D.O.

Anne M. Hull, Eldon L. Boisseau, and Brian C. Wright, Turner and Boisseau, Wichita, KS, for defendants-appellees St. Joseph Memorial Hosp. and Central Kansas Medical Center.

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Circuit Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and BURCIAGA, Chief District Judge.*

*

 Honorable Juan G. Burciaga, Chief Judge for the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation.

ORDER

JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge.

This matter is before us following a response by the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas to our certification of the question whether Kansas recognizes the theory of the loss of chance of recovery. *See Delaney v. Cade,*255 Kan. 199, 873 P.2d 175 (1994). The certified question having been answered affirmatively, the portion of the judgment over which we retained jurisdiction in this matter is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

2 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii).

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-41443

Summary Calendar

MITCHELL L. BOREN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

BRADLEY TANNER; JOE L. HAWTHORN,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 96-CV-90

November 10, 1998

Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM: *

Mitchell L. Boren, Texas inmate #463913, filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The suit alleged that defendants Bradley Tanner and Joe Hawthorn, both of the Texas Department

of Criminal Justice, had violated Boren’s rights during a disciplinary hearing against t he plaint iff.

Boren contends that the evidence prod uced at the hearing was insufficient to find him guilty. He

further contends that the procedures used at this hearing were in violation of prison policy. The

district court dismissed the suit as failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 2 We

affirm.

This court reviews a dismissal under §1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo

, applying the same standard3 Black v. Warren , 134 F.3d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1998).

4 McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles , 47 F.3d 158, 160 (5th Cir. 1995).

5 Gibbs v. King

, 779 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1986) quoting Stewart v. Thigpen

, 730 F.2d 1002,

1005-6 (5th Cir. 1984).

6 Myers v. Klevenhagen , 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996).

2 used to review a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6). 3 Viewing the allegations

in the light most favorable to the plaint iff, “the dismissal may be upheld only if it appears that no relief

could be granted under any set of circumstances that could be prove[d] consistent with the

allegations.” 4

Boren’s claim of insufficient evidence is without merit. “Federal courts will not review the

sufficiency of

t he evidence at a disciplinary hearing; a finding of guilt requires only the support of

‘some facts’ or ‘any evidence at all.’” 5 Boren does not deny possessing t

he wire. Boren further

admits that the defendants produced testimonial and photographic evidence against him. These facts

are sufficient to defeat a claim of insufficient evidence at a disciplinary hearing.

Boren’s allegation that the defendants did not follow prison policy is not sufficient to afford

him relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The failure of prison administrators to follow prison rules and

regulations does not, without more, give rise to a constitutional violation. 6

The ruling of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### Hollis LACY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27766.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 2, 1922.

No appearance for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The offense is the unlawful possession of beer for the purpose of sale in a dry area; the punishment, 10 days and a fine of $150.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular and nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### Ward, a Taxpayer, Appellee, *v.*Edy, City Manager, et al., Appellants.

(No. 27561

Decided May 24, 1939.)

*Mr. Júles J. Pilliod*and *Mr. Steven L. MarkowsM,*for appellee.

*Mr. Martrn S. Dodd,*director of law, and *Mr. Jas. Slater Gibson,*for appellants.

*448It is ordered and adjudged that said appeal as of right be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Day, Zimmerman, Myers, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.

Williams, J., not participating.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FE BRUARY 28, 2013

NO. 03

- 12

- 00703

- CV

Mabel Sustaita, Appellant

v.

San Angelo Independent School District and Carol Ann Bonds, Superintendent, Appellee s

APPEAL FROM 51ST DISTRIC T COURT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PE MBERTON AND ROSE

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSE

IT APPEARING to this Court that the appellant has failed to pay or make arrangements to pay

for the clerk’s record; has not submitted a status report regarding this appeal and, accordingly,

has failed to prosecute the appeal: IT IS THEREFORE considered, adjudged and ordered that

the appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution. IT IS FURTHER ordered that the appellant

pay all costs relating to this appeal both in this Court and the court below; and that this decision

be certified below for observance.
Exhibit 32.2

                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                           18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                      OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Jonathan R. Kosheff, Chief Financial Officer of Parlex Corporation (the
"Company"), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to
my knowledge:

      (a)   the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the period
            ending June 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
            Commission (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements
            of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
            1934; and

      (b)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of
            operations of the Company.

Dated: September 28, 2005

/s/ Jonathan R. Kosheff
-----------------------------
Jonathan R. Kosheff
Chief Financial Officer


<PAGE>  68
#### Kenneth Albert HARRIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 38793.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 16, 1965.

Minor Pounds, Lubbock, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The offense is drunk driving; the punishment, 3 days in jail and a fine of $100.

The record affirmatively reflects that the judgment of conviction which recites that the defendant appeared and, after being duly admonished by the court as to the consequences thereof, pleaded guilty to the charge and waived a jury, is incorrect, because in fact the defendant did not appear before the court and plead to the charge.

Art. 580 C.C.P. provides in part that the defendant must be personally present at the trial in all cases of misdemeanor when the punishment or any part thereof is imprisonment in jail.

The judgment having been entered without authority of law, the motion for new trial should have been granted. Cooper v. State, 151 Tex.Cr.R. 174, 206 S.W.2d 835, and cases cited; Deen v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 402, 194 S.W.2d 1007, and cases cited.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Filed 10/20/20 P. v. Stopani CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL C. STOPANI,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B302980

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. VA124204)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court for Los Angeles 

County, John A. Torribio, Judge. Appeal dismissed.

Heather J. Manolakas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Defendant Daniel C. Stopani appeals from the denial of his 

petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. His 

appointed counsel found no arguable issues and filed a brief under 

People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), asking that we 

independently review the record. On July 2, 2020, we sent a letter to 

defendant, informing him that his counsel was unable to find any 

arguable issues and inviting him to submit a supplemental brief or 

letter within 30 days raising any contentions or arguments he would 

like the court to consider. We have not received any supplemental brief 

or letter from defendant.

As recently explained by our colleagues in Division Two of this 

Appellate District, the procedures set forth in Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 

436, are not constitutionally required for appeals other than a criminal 

defendant’s first appeal of right. (People v. Cole (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 

1023, 1034.) Instead, based upon its analysis of the caselaw involving 

no-issue briefs filed by appointed counsel, the Cole court proposed a 

variation of the Wende procedures for appeals from the denial of 

postconviction relief. Under those procedures, if the defendant’s counsel 

files a brief indicating there are no reasonably arguable issues to 

present to the court, and the defendant does not exercise his or her 

right (after notice) to file a supplemental brief, we may dismiss the 

appeal as abandoned. (Id. at pp. 1037-1039.) We agree with the Cole

court’s analysis and adopt those procedures. Accordingly, we will 

dismiss this appeal.
3

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

CURREY, J.
```

                             COGNIGEN NETWORKS, INC.

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                18 U.S.C.ss.1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In  connection  with the Annual  Report of  Cognigen  Networks,  Inc.  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-KSB for the period ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Thomas
S.  Smith,  Chief  Executive  Officer of the  Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.ss.1350,  as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     1.   The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

                                                       /s/ Thomas S. Smith
                                                     -------------------------
                                                     Thomas S. Smith
                                                     Chief Executive Officer

                                                     September 23, 2004
```
#### Lowell McGUIRE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Nos. 28289-28291.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 25, 1956.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., Charles S. Potts, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The offense is felony theft; the punishment, 3 years.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular, and nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
|EXHIBIT 32.2
|------------



|CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The undersigned hereby certifies in his capacity as Chief Financial Officer of Belmar Capital Fund LLC (the Fund), that based on his knowledge:

|(a) | the Quarterly Report of the Fund on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(b) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and the results of operations of the Fund for such period.                                        
|   



|Date: May 9, 2008
|-----------------



| | /s/Andrew C. Frenette
Andrew C. Frenette
Chief Financial Officer
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Fund and will be retained by the Fund and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.