IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ann L. Craig, :

: No. 1780 C.D. 2015

Petitioner : Submitted: March 18, 2016

:

v. :

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN FILED: May 20, 2016

Ann L. Craig (Claimant) petitions for review of the August 3, 2015, order 

of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (UCBR) affirming the decision 

of a referee to deny Claimant unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. The UCBR 

determined that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits because she was discharged 

from work for willful misconduct under section 402(e) of the Unemployment 

Compensation Law (Law).1 We affirm.

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(e). 

Section 402(e) of the Law provides that “[a]n employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any 

week . . . [i]n which [her] unemployment is due to [her] discharge . . . from work for willful 

misconduct connected with [her] work.” 43 P.S. §802(e).
2

Claimant worked full-time as a staff accountant for the Coalition to End 

Childhood Lead Poisoning (Employer) from November 10, 2008, through March 4, 

2015. (Findings of Fact, No. 1.) Employer’s financial internal controls policy (Controls

Policy) states that all disbursements must be made by check. (Id., No. 2.) Claimant 

signed an acknowledgment of Employer’s Controls Policy. (Id., No. 3; N.T., 5/27/15, at 

7; Employer’s Ex. 5.) 

In January 2015, a check that Employer had mailed to its workers’ 

compensation (WC) insurance carrier was returned to Employer due to an incorrect 

address. (Findings of Fact, No. 4.) Claimant then paid the WC insurance carrier by a

bank transfer over the telephone. (Id., No. 5.) Claimant did not discuss this matter with 

Employer before making the bank transfer. (Id., No. 6.) Employer confronted Claimant 

after Employer received a cancellation notice from its WC insurance carrier, and 

Claimant admitted that she violated Employer’s Controls Policy. (Id., Nos. 7-8.) On 

January 21, 2015, Ruth Ann Norton, Employer’s president and chief executive officer, 

informed Claimant that her disbursement by telephone was a serious infraction to which 

Employer was considering its response. (Id., No. 9.) On March 4, 2015, Employer 

discharged Claimant for making a disbursement by telephone. (Id., No. 10.)

Claimant filed a claim for UC benefits, which the local service center 

granted. Employer appealed to a referee, who held a telephone hearing on May 27, 

2015. Claimant testified that when she received the returned check in January 2015, she 

made the disbursement by telephone. (N.T., 5/27/15, at 41.) Claimant testified that she 

did not believe she was violating Employer’s Controls Policy at the time she made the 

disbursement. (Id. at 44.) Claimant testified that she did not consult anyone before 
3

making the disbursement by telephone but informed Victor Arthur, Employer’s 

comptroller, after the fact. (Id. at 46.) Claimant testified that she did not remember 

why she did not consult anyone before making the disbursement. (Id. at 55.)

Norton testified on behalf of Employer. Norton testified that Employer’s 

Controls Policy requires that disbursements be made by check. (Id. at 20; Employer’s 

Ex. 4.) Norton testified that the purpose of this requirement is to enable Employer to 

track disbursements and prevent unauthorized transactions. (N.T., 5/27/15, at 17.) 

Norton testified that Employer does not permit its employees to make disbursements by 

telephone. (Id. at 24-25.) Norton also testified that Claimant knew that Employer’s 

Controls Policy prohibited disbursements by telephone. (Id. at 23-24.) Norton testified 

that when she met with Claimant to discuss the disbursement, Claimant admitted that 

her conduct violated Employer’s Controls Policy. (Id. at 14-15.) Finally, Norton 

testified that she did not immediately discharge Claimant because she wanted to gather 

information about Claimant’s violation and discuss the matter with Employer’s board of 

directors and financial officers. (Id. at 18-19.) 

Thomas Bellew also testified on Employer’s behalf. Bellew was 

Employer’s chief financial officer from April 2014 through March 2015. (Id. at 30.) 

Bellew testified that Claimant trained him on Employer’s Controls Policy when he was 

first hired. (Id. at 30-31.) Bellew testified that Claimant’s disbursement by telephone

constituted an unauthorized bank transfer. (Id. at 32.) Bellew testified that in order to 

make a bank transfer, the staff accountant must complete a transmittal approval form. 

(Id.) Bellew testified that Employer does not permit bank transfers by telephone. (Id. at 
4

36.) Bellew testified that “having a signed check is not the same as having approval to 

make a bank transfer.” (Id.) 

Arthur also testified on Employer’s behalf. Arthur testified that Employer

first learned of the disbursement at issue when he reviewed a cancellation notice from 

Employer’s WC insurance carrier. (Id. at 49.) Arthur testified that he asked Claimant 

about the disbursement and Claimant acknowledged that she made the disbursement by 

telephone. (Id.) 

The referee resolved all conflicts in the testimony in Employer’s favor. 

(Ref.’s Decision at 2.) The referee determined that Employer’s Controls Policy

prohibited disbursements by telephone, Claimant was aware of the Controls Policy, and 

Claimant breached the Controls Policy by making a disbursement by telephone. (Id.) 

The referee found that Claimant did not inform Employer that she made a disbursement

by telephone until after Employer confronted her. (Id.) Additionally, the referee 

credited Norton’s testimony that the delay in Claimant’s discharge was due to 

Employer’s investigation of Claimant’s disbursement by telephone. (Id.) Claimant 

appealed to the UCBR, which adopted the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of 

law and affirmed. Claimant now petitions this court for review of that decision.2

First, Claimant argues that the UCBR erred in determining that she 

engaged in willful misconduct. We disagree.

 

2 Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an 

error of law was committed, or whether the findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence. 

Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §704.
5

“Willful misconduct” is defined as: (1) a wanton and willful disregard of 

the employer’s interests; (2) a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules or policies; 

(3) a disregard of the standards of behavior that an employer rightfully can expect from 

its employees; or (4) negligence that manifests culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, 

or an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or the employee’s 

duties and obligations. Oliver v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 5 

A.3d 432, 438 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (en banc). When a claimant is discharged for 

violating the employer’s policy, the employer bears the burden of proving the existence 

of the policy, that the policy was reasonable, and that the claimant was aware of and 

violated the policy. Rothstein v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 114 

A.3d 6, 9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). If the employer satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to 

the claimant to establish that she had good cause for violating the employer’s policy. Id. 

“Good cause is demonstrated if the claimant’s conduct was justified or reasonable under 

the circumstances.” Id.

Here, Employer’s Controls Policy states that disbursements must be made

by check. The UCBR credited Norton’s and Bellew’s testimony that disbursements by

telephone are not permitted under the specific language of the Controls Policy. 

Claimant did not contradict Norton’s and Bellew’s testimony that Employer prohibits 

disbursements by telephone because they would jeopardize the security and 

accountability of Employer’s finances. Based on Claimant’s signed acknowledgement 

and Norton’s and Bellew’s credited testimony, the UCBR found that Claimant was 

aware of and had trained other employees in the Controls Policy. Finally, Claimant did 

not contradict the credited testimony of Employer’s witnesses that Claimant admitted
6

that her disbursement by telephone violated the Controls Policy. Therefore, Employer 

met its burden.

The burden then shifted to Claimant to establish good cause for violating 

Employer’s Controls Policy. Claimant testified that she made the disbursement by 

telephone in order to prevent Employer’s WC insurance coverage from being cancelled. 

However, Claimant’s conduct was not reasonable under the circumstances because she

admitted that she failed to consult a supervisor before she made a disbursement that 

violated Employer’s Controls Policy. At the hearing, Claimant could not explain why 

she failed to take these precautions. Therefore, Claimant failed to establish good cause 

for violating Employer’s Controls Policy.

Second, Claimant argues that the remoteness doctrine precludes a finding 

of willful misconduct because of the delay in her discharge from employment. We 

disagree.

The remoteness doctrine provides that “[a]n incident of willful misconduct 

cannot be so temporally remote from the ultimate dismissal and still be the basis for a 

denial of benefits.” Tundel v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 404 A.2d 

434, 436 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979). However, the remoteness doctrine does not apply “where 

the record establishes an explanation for the delay . . . and there is no action on the part 

of the employer indicating that it condoned the claimant’s conduct.” Raimondi v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 863 A.2d 1242, 1247 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2004).
7

Here, Claimant made a disbursement by telephone in January 2015 and was 

discharged for that conduct on March 4, 2015. The UCBR credited Norton’s testimony 

that the delay was due to Employer’s investigation into Claimant’s conduct. Norton 

explained that she needed to gather information about Claimant’s violation and discuss 

the matter with Employer’s board of directors and financial officers. Claimant argues 

that the referee and UCBR erred in crediting Norton’s testimony. However, the UCBR 

is the ultimate factfinder and arbiter of witness credibility. Procito v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 945 A.2d 261, 262 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (en banc). 

Additionally, Claimant does not point to any instance where Employer indicated that it 

condoned Claimant’s conduct. Therefore, the remoteness doctrine is inapplicable and 

did not preclude the UCBR’s finding of willful misconduct.

Accordingly, we affirm.

___________________________________

ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ann L. Craig, :

: No. 1780 C.D. 2015

Petitioner : 

:

v. :

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of May, 2016, we hereby affirm the August 3, 

2015, order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.

___________________________________

ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge