THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Christopher 

Taft, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2013-002246 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Richland County 

Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27543 

Heard April 9, 2015 – Filed July 1, 2015 

REVERSED 

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of Columbia, for 

Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson and Senior Assistant 

Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, of 

Columbia, for Respondent. 

 JUSTICE HEARN: In this civil commitment proceeding, Christopher Taft 

was found to be a sexually violent predator and was committed to the South 

Carolina Department of Mental Health. He now argues the trial court should have 
 

 

 

granted his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to present sufficient 

evidence under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (the SVP Act) that he was 

presently likely to reoffend if not confined. We agree and reverse. 

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The underlying facts of this case are tragic and disturbing. Taft grew up in a 

family rife with intergenerational incest. As a young child, he was sexually abused 

by his aunts, uncles, and a number of older cousins. As Taft went through puberty, 

he became an abuser himself of his younger siblings. 

In June of 2006, at age fifteen, Taft pled guilty to three counts of assault and 

battery of a high and aggravated nature, stemming from the sexual assault of his 

sisters, then five and six, and his nine-year-old brother. Taft was committed to the 

Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for six months, and the family court 

suspended his sentence upon placement in a sex offender treatment facility and 

probation after his release. He was admitted to Generations Group Home, a 

facility for juvenile sex offenders in November 2006. After he was discharged 

from Generations in June 2007, he was remanded to DJJ until his release in July 

2008. Upon his release from DJJ, he was returned home to live with the same 

siblings he had previously assaulted. 

In March of 2010, Taft, then nineteen, pled guilty to two counts of lewd act 

on a minor after being charged with two counts of CSC for fondling and engaging 

in intercourse with his eight and nine-year-old sisters. He received concurrent 

sentences of fifteen years' imprisonment on both charges, suspended to three years' 

incarceration and five years' probation. 

The State brought a civil commitment proceeding pursuant to the SVP Act 

in July 2010. After an initial probable cause hearing, the court appointed Dr. 

Rebecca Jackson to evaluate whether Taft met the criteria for civil commitment. 

After examining Taft, Dr. Jackson issued a report on November 19, 2010, 

concluding he did not. 

The State sought another expert and retained Dr. Gregg Dwyer to evaluate 

Taft. However, Dr. Dwyer was in the process of relocating from the University of 

South Carolina School of Medicine to the Medical University of South Carolina 

and had not yet finished setting up his new lab. Consequently, Dr. Dwyer was 

unable to complete the evaluation within the sixty-day time limit required by 
 

statute. On February 17, 2011, the final day before the time limit expired, the State 

filed a motion for a continuance, requesting more time to allow Dr. Dwyer to 

complete his evaluation. 

Taft objected to the request for a continuance, arguing the SVP Act required 

that a trial be conducted within ninety days of the court-appointed evaluation, and 

the State's claim that its expert did not have time to set up his new lab did not 

constitute good cause. Taft contended the State should have realized earlier that 

Dr. Dwyer could not meet the statutory deadline and obtained another expert. The 

trial court disagreed and granted the motion. The court directed the evaluation be 

completed by May 2, 2011, and set the trial for May 23, 2011. 

Prior to commencement of the trial, Taft moved to exclude the State's 

second evaluation because even though it had been timely submitted pursuant to 

the trial court's latest order, it was authored by both Dr. Dwyer and a Dr. William 

Mulbry. Dr. Mulbry had been retained due to the continued difficulties with Dr. 

Dwyer's schedule. Taft argued the report should be excluded because the trial 

court's order granting the continuance specifically authorized only Dr. Dwyer to 

evaluate him. The court agreed, and excluded the report. The trial court also 

excluded any testimony regarding the second evaluation except from Dr. Dwyer, 

who the State acknowledged was not prepared to testify. 

Taft subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that absent any 

evaluation or testimony from Dr. Dwyer, the State failed to provide any evidence 

that Taft was a sexually violent predator. He argued the only remaining evidence 

was the report and testimony of Dr. Jackson, who had concluded that Taft was not 

a sexually violent predator. In response, the State argued that it still had the reports 

of Drs. Geoffrey McKee and Jack Luadzers who had concluded Taft was a 

sexually violent predator in connection with his prior criminal investigation in 

2009. Taft, however, asserted those two reports were outdated and inadmissible 

because they were not probative of whether he was currently a sexually violent 

predator. The trial court disagreed with Taft, finding the prior evaluations were 

admissible; it therefore denied the motion. 

At trial, the State offered the testimony of Dr. McKee, who had examined 

Taft nearly two years earlier in June 2009. Dr. McKee discussed Taft's ability to 

accept and utilize the treatment he had received, and testified about the previous 

sexual abuse Taft had himself endured beginning at age five. Dr. McKee opined 

that based upon his previous evaluation of Taft, he concluded Taft suffered from 
 

 

 

 

"pedophilia, sexually attracted to females and nonexclusive type,"1 and that based 

on that prior evaluation, Taft met the statutory definition of a sexually violent 

predator. He testified that in reaching these conclusions he had conducted several 

risk assessment tests to measure Taft's likelihood of reoffending; based on Taft's 

score on these tests, McKee determined he had a moderate to high risk of sexual 

recidivism. 

The court-appointed expert, Dr. Rebecca Jackson, also testified. Unlike Dr. 

McKee, Dr. Jackson's opinion was based on her evaluation of Taft in this civil 

commitment proceeding. Dr. Jackson opined Taft suffered from pedophilia, 

limited to incest, based on her finding that there was no evidence he was aroused 

by other females or other children. Dr. Jackson testified that she performed one 

risk assessment test which scored him as having a twenty-five percent chance of 

reoffending in five years and a thirty-three percent chance of reoffending over a 

ten-year period. However, she testified that in her professional opinion, Taft did 

not meet the criteria of the SVP Act, and other measures short of confinement 

could effectively prevent him from victimizing his sisters again. 

At the close of the State's case, Taft moved for directed verdict, arguing the 

State failed to put forth any evidence that Taft presently suffered from a mental 

abnormality that made him likely to reoffend. The court denied the motion, 

concluding it was a jury issue. The jury ultimately found Taft was a sexually 

violent predator. Taft moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, again 

arguing lack of evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. 

On appeal, Taft contended the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in 

his favor based on the lack of expert testimony that he was currently a sexually 

violent predator. The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. In re 

Taft, Op. No. 2013-UP-334 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Aug. 7, 2013). This Court granted 

certiorari. 

ISSUE PRESENTED 

Did the court of appeals err in affirming the trial court's failure to direct a 

verdict in favor of Taft? 

1

 Dr. McKee's diagnosis indicated Taft is attracted to children under the age of 

thirteen, predominately female, and his attraction is nonexclusive so he is 

interested in children and adults. 
 

 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

Taft argues the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of 

his motion for directed verdict. Specifically, Taft argues the State failed to put 

forth evidence he satisfied the definition of a sexually violent predator because 

neither expert testified that he had a present risk of reoffending. We agree. 

On appeal from the denial of a defendant's directed verdict motion, the 

appellate court may only reverse the trial court if there is no evidence to support 

the trial court's ruling. In re Matthews, 345 S.C. 638, 646, 550 S.E.2d 311, 315 

(2001). In considering a directed verdict motion, the trial court is concerned with 

the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight. State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 

588, 593, 606 S.E.2d 475, 477–78 (2004). "A defendant is entitled to a directed 

verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged." State v. 

McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 642, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2003). Thus, a trial judge 

should grant a motion for directed verdict when the evidence presented merely 

raises a suspicion of guilt. State v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 584, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 

(2001). "'Suspicion' implies a belief or opinion as to guilt based upon facts or 

circumstances which do not amount to proof." Id. 

The State bears the burden of proving a person is a sexually violent predator. 

In re Care & Treatment of Corley, 353 S.C. 202, 206, 577 S.E.2d 451, 453 (2003). 

Pursuant to the SVP Act, a sexually violent predator is defined as a person who: 

"(a) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) suffers from a mental 

abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts 

of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, 

and treatment." In re Care & Treatment of Harvey, 355 S.C. 53, 60, 584 S.E.2d 

893, 896 (2003). A person is considered likely to engage in acts of sexual violence 

if "the person's propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as 

to pose a menace to the health and safety of others." S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-

30(9) (2002 and Supp. 2014). 

It is undisputed Taft was convicted of a sexually violent offense and suffers 

from a mental abnormality; the sole question is whether the State produced 

evidence that his mental abnormality is such that he is presently likely to reoffend 

if not confined. The thrust of Taft's argument is that the State's expert testimony 

established only that he had a risk of reoffending in 2009 when he was evaluated in 

conjunction with the underlying criminal charges, and not that he had a risk of 

reoffending in 2011 in the context of this civil commitment proceeding. The State 

contends the issue of present risk goes to the weight—not existence—of the 
 

evidence, and thus the trial court properly submitted the question to the jury. 

We find the State's evidence devoid of proof Taft has a present risk to 

reoffend. Although the State's expert, Dr. McKee, stated that Taft met the 

definition of a sexually violent predator in 2009, he consistently refused to render a 

current diagnosis. Dr. McKee expressly testified that he "[did not] have the 

personal contact and the personal interview that [he] would need to do to form a 

current and active opinion" because "to be able to say whether [Taft] is a sexually 

violent predator now, [he] would have to be able to evaluate [him]." In fact, Dr. 

McKee admitted on cross-examination that "as of [that day] he could not give an 

opinion as to whether or not [Taft] is a sexually violent predator." 

A civil proceeding to commit an individual, perhaps for life, following 

service of his criminal sentence, is an extraordinary remedy. Although this Court 

has repeatedly held the Act constitutional, we decline to construe it in a manner 

which would lessen the State's burden of proof. The General Assembly has 

carefully written our SVP Act to lay out exactly what is required to establish that 

someone is a sexually violent predator; the State must prove, beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the individual is presently a sexually violent predator. See State v. 

Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 551, 564 S.E.2d 87, 90 (2002) (holding, in the context of an 

ex post facto challenge, that the SVP Act "permits involuntary confinement based 

upon the determination the person currently suffers from both a mental 

abnormality or personality disorder and is likely to engage in acts of sexual 

violence" (emphasis added)). Today, we give force to this requirement. 

We decline to accept the State's argument that an expert's evaluation from a 

prior criminal proceeding is sufficient to prove an individual is a sexually violent 

predator. If this were so, it would obviate any possibility of rehabilitation during 

incarceration. Further, it would violate the legislature's statutory scheme, which 

clearly envisions a new civil commitment proceeding based upon current evidence 

that the individual suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that 

makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a 

secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment. In this case, Dr. Jackson 

opined that Taft did not meet the definition of a sexually violent predator under the 

SVP Act and Dr. McKee testified he could not say Taft was presently a sexually 

violent predator because he had not evaluated him since 2009. Accordingly, we 

find the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Taft had a current risk of 

reoffending which would allow a jury to conclude he was a sexually violent 

predator. 
 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court erred in denying Taft's motion 

for directed verdict. We therefore reverse.2 

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur. 

2

 Because our holding on this issue is dispositive, we decline to address Taft's 

additional argument that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's 

grant of a continuance. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 

S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not 

address remaining issues where one issue is dispositive).