IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-50662

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JACK CAMERON COPELAND, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:17-CR-45-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In 2007, Jack Cameron Copeland was convicted of criminal sexual 

conduct under Minnesota law and sentenced to three years in prison. Upon 

release, he was required to register as a predatory sex offender until August 

2026. He failed to do so when he moved to Texas in August 2016. Six months 

later, the authorities arrested Copeland for failing to comply with the Sex 

Offender Registration and Notification Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). After he 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 6, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 17-50662

2

pleaded guilty, the district court imposed a 27-month prison sentence, which 

was the low end of the advisory Guidelines range.

Copeland contests his sentence. He argues that the district court erred 

in denying him a three-level reduction to his offense level because he 

voluntarily “attempted to register but was prevented from registering by 

uncontrollable circumstances.” U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(2)(B). Copeland argued he 

was entitled to this reduction because when he first moved to Texas he twice 

went to the Midland Police Department in an effort to register. Copeland says 

he was unable to register the first time because the department’s computer 

system was not working and the officer was “busy.” When he returned, he still 

could not register, but “the officer’s secretary took his name and address and 

everything.” The district court found that, even if it accepted Copeland’s story, 

those facts did not excuse his failure to register. It further explained that 

“[t]here are other means available, and it is not the responsibility of the law 

enforcement agency to chase down the offender.”

Copeland is unable to show that the district court clearly erred in 

rejecting his argument that uncontrollable circumstances prevented him from 

registering. United States v. Cedillo-Narvaez, 761 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 

2014). Copeland had been living in Texas for six months. Nothing prevented 

Copeland from going back to the police station during that time, registering by 

other means, or even calling the police station to see if the registration had

been completed. All of these options were within Copeland’s control. The 

question is not whether uncontrollable circumstances prevented Copeland 

from registering on one particular day; it is whether uncontrollable 

circumstances prevented him from ever registering during the six-month 

period prior to his arrest. 

To breathe life into his argument, Copeland maintains that the district 

court imposed a heightened and incorrect standard by requiring him to have 

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made “all diligent efforts” and to have faced “extraordinary circumstances.” 

According to Copeland, “uncontrollable circumstances” means “circumstances 

not subject to the defendant’s control or direction,” and not “exceptional 

circumstances.” It is not clear to us that “extraordinary circumstances” creates 

a higher threshold than uncontrollable ones. There are extraordinary 

circumstances that remain within the control of the person affected. But we 

need not delve into the metaphysical to decide this case. Copeland is too closely 

parsing the district court’s off-the-cuff explanation at the sentencing hearing.

Each of those words should not be given the significance that we give words in 

the United States Code or the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court did 

what the Guideline required: it assessed whether uncontrollable circumstances 

prevented Copeland from registering. In making the rather obvious conclusion 

that they did not, the district court’s lodestar was the “uncontrollable” 

standard. The verbiage it used in elaborating on its reasons does not give us 

concern that the court failed to properly apply the Guideline. 

* * *

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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