alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 23.2

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We  hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in each of the Registration
Statements  on  Form  S-2 (No. 333-55874), Form S-8 (No.'s 333-39766, 333-37310,
333-31104,  333-95655, 333-92239, 333-87541, 333-84457, 333-81033 and 333-80135)
of  Imaging  Technologies  Corporation  of  our  report  dated  November 7, 2002
appearing  in  the  June  30,  2002  Annual  Report  of  this  Form  10-K.


STONEFIELD  JOSEPHSON,  INC.
Irvine,  California

November  18,  2002
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1403 

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a special resource 

study of Point Peter in St. Marys, Georgia, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 6, 2011 

Mr. KINGSTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a 

special resource study of Point Peter in St. Marys, Georgia, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Point Peter Study 

5 Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. SPECIAL RESOURCE STUDY. 

7 (a) STUDY.—The Secretary of the Interior (herein8 after referred to as the ‘‘Secretary’’) shall conduct a spe9 cial resource study of Point Peter in St. Marys, Georgia, 

10 the site of an American fort near Cumberland Island that 


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2 

•HR 1403 IH

1 was attacked by British forces in January 1815 in one 

2 of the last battles of the War of 1812. 

3 (b) CONTENTS.—In conducting the study under sub4 section (a), the Secretary shall— 

5 (1) evaluate the national significance of the 

6 site; 

7 (2) determine the suitability and feasibility of 

8 designating the area as a unit of the National Park 

9 System; 

10 (3) consider other alternatives for preservation, 

11 protection, and interpretation of the site by Federal, 

12 State, or local governmental entities, or private and 

13 nonprofit organizations; 

14 (4) consult with interested Federal, State, and 

15 local governmental entities and private and nonprofit 

16 organizations, and any other interested individuals, 

17 including owners of private property located in the 

18 study area; and 

19 (5) identify cost estimates for any Federal ac20 quisition, development, interpretation, operation, and 

21 maintenance associated with the alternatives. 

22 (c) APPLICABLE LAW.—The study required under 

23 subsection (a) shall be conducted in accordance with sec24 tion 8 of the National Park Service General Authorities 

25 Act (16 U.S.C. 1a–5). 


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3 

•HR 1403 IH

1 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 3 years after the date 

2 on which funds are first made available for the study 

3 under subsection (a), the Secretary shall submit to the 

4 Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Rep5 resentatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural 

6 Resources of the Senate a report containing the results 

7 of the study and any conclusions and recommendations of 

8 the Secretary. 

Æ 


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Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the requirement set forth
in Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act), and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. § 1350), Michael M. Wick, M.D., Ph.D., the Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of Telik, Inc. (the Company), and Cynthia M. Butitta, the Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies that, to the best of his or her knowledge:

1.The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit
32.1 (the Periodic Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and

2.The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

In Witness Whereof, the undersigned have set their hands hereto as of the 13th day of November, 2009.



|                                     |  |  |  |                                                    
|------------------------------------ |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------
|/s/ MICHAEL M. WICK                  |  |  |  | /s/ CYNTHIA M. BUTITTA                             
|Michael M. Wick, M.D., Ph.D.         |  |  |  | Cynthia M. Butitta                                 
|Chairman and Chief Executive Officer |  |  |  | Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer

This certification accompanies the Form 10-Q to which it relates, is not deemed filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of Telik, Inc. under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of
the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I,  John  "JT"  Thatch,  as  CEO/President/acting  CFO of New  Millennium  Media
International, Inc. (the "Company") certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as  adopted  by  Section  906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of  2002,  that  to my
knowledge:

(1) The  accompanying  Form 10-Q report for the period  ending March 31, 2003 as
filed with the U.S.  Securities and Exchange  Commission  (the  "Report")  fully
complies  with the  requirements  of  Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

New Millennium Media International, Inc.


By: /s/________________________________   Dated this ___ day of November 2003
    John "JT" Thatch
    CEO/President/Director/acting CFO
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tariq WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-6890.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 15, 2002.

Decided Aug. 22, 2002.

Tariq Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Lee Keller, Office of the United *671States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM:

Tariq Williams seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. *See United States v. Williams,*Nos. CR-97-39, CA-02-187 (S.D.W.Va. May 10, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### T. C. POSTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28668.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 12, 1956.

Joseph A. Chandler, Stephenville, for appellant.

Leon Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The conviction is for the unlawful sale -of feeding stuff in a bag falsely labeled; the punishment, a fine of $100.

The complaint and information are fatally defective for the reason that the name of the alleged purchaser is not shown. Art. 406, V.A.C.C.P.; King v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 286 S.W.2d 422.

The judgment is reversed and the prose•cution is ordered dismissed.
#### Willie R. MEADOWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-56883.

D.C. No. CV-01-05280-ABC.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*138Submitted July 22, 2002 *.

Decided July 30, 2002.

Before BROWNING, KOZINSKI, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Willie R. Meadows, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that various prison officials violated his civil rights. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim, *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order), and we review for abuse of discretion dismissals without granting leave to amend, *Lopez v. Smith,*203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The district court dismissed Meadows’ complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). The district court correctly concluded that Meadows’ complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim that Correctional Officer J.L. Bernard used excessive force against him or that Dr. Abdollah Alavi was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. However, the district court erred in dismissing Meadows’ complaint with prejudice with respect to Meadows’ claims against Bernard and Alavi without giving Meadows an opportunity to amend his complaint. *See Lopez,*203 F.3d at 1124.

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Meadows’ claims against Steve Cambra, D.K. Butler, and M. Bunts because Meadows has not alleged that these defendants were personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights. *See Taylor v. List,*880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of Meadows’ claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities. *See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,*491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); *Kentucky v. Graham,*473 U.S. 159, 165-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985).

Meadows shall bear his own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### James THACKER, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Nov. 18, 1955.

W. R. Knuckles, Pineville, for appellant.

J. D. Buckman, Jr., Atty. Gen., Zeb A. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

CAMMACK, Judge.

James Thacker is appealing from a judgment convicting him of fraudulently and knowingly removing from this State personal property subject to a statutory lien, with intent to prevent or hinder the enforcement of the lien. The property involved was Thacker’s automobile, which he removed to Tennessee after a purported attachment by a' constable of Bell County. The jury found Thacker guilty and sentenced him to one year imprisonment, but recommended clemency by the court.

Thacker contends that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, since *326the evidence revealed that no valid levy had been made pursuant to the attachment order and therefore, no lien had attached to the automobile.

KRS 434.210, under which Thacker was convicted, requires that the property be subject to a statutory lien when it is removed from the State. Under KRS 425.-270 an attachment binds all the accused’s property which might be seized under an execution from the time of delivery of the attachment order to the sheriff, but the lien on the property is completed only by executing the order upon the property in the manner prescribed by statute. KRS' 425.225(2) provides that an order of attachment be executed upon personal prop--erty capable of manual delivery, as in the instant case, by taking the property into custody and holding it subject to order of the court.

We have held that a lien on a specific piece of property acquired by attachment does not become effective merely by issuance of the writ of attachment or by placing the writ in the hands of an officer, Bolling v. Pikeville National Bank, 213 Ky. 317, 280 S.W. 1090; nor does a lien become effective merely upon delivery of a copy of the attachment to the debtor. Lankford v. Sunshine Mining Co., 287 Ky. 53, 151 S.W.2d 402. There must be an actual levy on the property itself. Glass v. Alcorn, 254 Ky. 16, 70 S.W.2d 964

The evidence in the instant case does not satisfy the foregoing requirements necessary for a valid lien by attachment. The constable who served the order of attachment testified that he did not put the order on the car but merely served a copy of the summons on Thacker. He testified further that he did not at any time take possession of the car. Thacker, testified that he retained possession of his automobile; that he drove it daily to work, in LaFollette, Tennessee, for two or three months; and that the car was destroyed by fire on the last trip. The record contains no evidence showing that the levying officer obtained possession of the car, as required by KRS 425.225(2). Therefore, Thacker’s conviction under KRS 434.210 was unwarranted.

The judgment is reversed, with directions to set it aside and to grant Thacker a peremptory instruction, if upon another trial the evidence be the same.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of uWink, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB for the quarter ending July 3, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Nolan K. Bushnell,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to my knowledge:

(1)      The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


August 17, 2007                                     By: /s/ NOLAN K. BUSHNELL
                                                     -----------------------
                                                     Nolan K. Bushnell
                                                     Chief Executive Officer
**EXHIBIT 23.2**

 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-3 (File Nos. 33-35140,33-77396, 333-43809, 333-83215, 333-34550, 333-33436, 333-72226, 333-100315, 333-106797, 333-109344, 333-110040, 333-120262) and Form S-8 (File Nos. 33-30595, 33-52574, 33-57004, 33-63321, 333-00431, 333-04679, 333-27673, 333-48454, 333-58384,333-59718, 333-75304, 333-109986 and 333-121320) of Cytogen Corporation of our report dated March ****14, 2005 relating to the financial statements of PSMA Development Company LLC, which appears in this Form 10-K. 

 

/s/    PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

 

New York, New York 

March ****14, 2005
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                       1,291,924
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,061,379
<ALLOWANCES>                                    50,000
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</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of uWink, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB/A for the quarter ending September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter F. Wilkniss,
Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1)      The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


December 8, 2006                                   By: /s/ PETER F. WILKNISS
                                                        ------------------------
                                                        Peter F. Wilkniss
                                                        Chief Financial Officer
                                                        Chief Accounting Officer
#### Cecil Absher PYBURN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 38905.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 12, 1966.

No attorney of record on appeal for appellant.

Frank Briscoe, Dist. Atty., Carl E. F. Dally and A. A. Horne, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The offense is drunk driving; the punishment, 3 days in jail and a fine of $50.

The state’s evidence showed that appellant was stopped by a police officer while driving a pickup truck on a public highway at a very slow rate of speed.

The arresting officer testified that the truck “weaved” in the lane of traffic; that appellant staggered and almost fell down after he got out of the pickup truck; that his speech was slurred and he had a smell of alcoholic beverage on his breath. Based upon his observation of appellant and his experience, the officer expressed the opinion that appellant was intoxicated.

A sample of appellant’s urine was taken with his consent and tested. The chemist testified that it contained point forty-four hundredths per cent by weight alcohol and that a person having such amount of alcohol in his urine would have lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties.

Appellant admitted having consumed three beers but denied that he or his companion were intoxicated. His companion admitted having paid a fine for being drunk on the occasion, but denied that either he or his companion were intoxicated.

The jury resolved the fact issue against appellant and the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction.

No brief'has been filed in appellant’s behalf and there are no formal bills of exception.

The informal bills reserved in the statement of facts have been considered and they present no reversible error.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### J. L. PARKER, Appellant, v. B. M. SMITH, Appellee.

No. 3456.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

June 12, 1959.

Rehearing Denied July 10, 1959.

*955Paul Thorp, Dallas, for appellant.

Eades & Eades, Dallas, for appellee.

GRISSOM, Chief Justice.

J. L. Parker, a realtor, sold B. M. Smith’s land and sued him for a commission. Smith filed a motion for summary-judgment wherein he swore he had not executed any instrument in writing listing his land with Parker or agreeing to pay him a commission. He pleaded Section 28 of Article 6573a Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes as a defense. By supplemental petition and affidavits Parker claimed Smith had waived the right to set up said statute as a defense and was estopped to do so. As grounds therefor he swore that he asked Smith for a written contract and Smith told him that he didn’t need it; that they had been friends for years and that would protect him. The court sustained Smith’s motion and rendered judgment accordingly. Parker has appealed.

Parker says the court erred in sustaining Smith’s motion because Smith had waived the right to rely upon said statute as a defense and was estopped to do so because when Parker asked him for a written contract he stated that it wasn’t needed because they had been friends for many years and Smith would protect him and pay him a commission; that he relied thereon and spent time and money in making the sale.

The first paragraph of Section 28 of Article 6573a provides that, “No action shall be brought in any court in this State for the recovery of any commission for the sale * * * of real estate unless the promise or agreement upon which action shall be brought, or some memoradum thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person by him thereunder lawfully authorized.”

We think the reasoning of the following cases required the judgment which was rendered. Breeding v. Anderson, 152 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d 377; Great Western Drilling Co. v. Simmons, Tex., 302 S.W.2d 400, 401; Williams v. Union Producing Co., Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W.2d 572 (RNRE); Landis v. W. H. Fuqua, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 159 S.W.2d 228 (Writ Ref.); Wingo v. Farley, Tex.Civ.App., 318 S.W.2d 955; Furman v. Keith, Tex.Civ.App., 226 S.W.2d 218 (Writ Ref.) and Estes v. Dow, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W.2d 561. The statute declares the policy of the State that a realtor shall not recover a commission for the sale of real estate through the Courts of Texas unless he has a written agreement therefor signed by the owner. We conclude, as a matter of law, that the facts asserted by appellant did not constitute a waiver or estop Smith from asserting the statute as a defense.

The judgment is affirmed.