alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### **Exhibit 99.1**

 

# **Co-Registrant (Commission File Number000-30761):**

 

**UbiquiTel Inc.**

**One West Elm StreetSuite 400Conshohocken, Pennsylvania 19428**

 

**Co-Registrant (Commission File Number333-39950):**

 

**UbiquiTel Operating Company**

**One West Elm StreetSuite 400Conshohocken, Pennsylvania 19428**

 

 

# **CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

 

In connectionwith the Quarterly Report of UbiquiTel Inc. and UbiquiTel Operating Company onForm 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2002 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, DonaldA. Harris, Chief Executive Officer of UbiquiTel Inc. and UbiquiTel OperatingCompany, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)  The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

(2)  The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of UbiquiTel Inc. and UbiquiTel Operating Company.

 
|   |   | UBIQUITEL  INC.                        |   |
|--------|--------|----------------------------------------|--------|
|   |   |                                   |   |
|   |   |                                   |   |
|   |   | */s/ Donald A. Harris*                 |   |   |
|   |   | Donald A.  Harris                      |   |
|   |   | President  and Chief Executive Officer |   |
|   |   |                                   |   |
|   |   |                                   |   |
|   |   | UBIQUITEL  OPERATING COMPANY           |   |
|   |   |                                   |   |
|   |   |                                   |   |
|   |   | */s/ Donald A. Harris*                 |   |   |
|   |   | Donald A.  Harris                      |   |
|   |   | President  and Chief Executive Officer |   |
|   |   |                                   |   |
|   |   |                                   |   |
|   |   | August 14,  2002                       |   |

 

----
<PAGE>   1

                                   EXHIBIT 23

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

The Board of Directors
Cerprobe Corporation:

     We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements
(No. 33-8348, No. 33-65200 and No. 333-03015) filed on Form S-8 of Cerprobe
Corporation of our report dated February 6, 1998, relating to the consolidated
balance sheets of Cerprobe Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1997
and 1996, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders'
equity and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended
December 31, 1997, which report appears in the December 31, 1997 annual report
on Form 10-K of Cerprobe Corporation.

                                          KPMG PEAT MARWICK L.L.P.

Phoenix, Arizona
March 27, 1998
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered submitted without oral argument.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 4/9/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

DAVID JAMES BIGPOND, Jr., ) ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) vs. ) No. 95-6257 ) (D.C. No. CIV-94-1747-T) RON CHAMPION, ) (W.D. Okla.) ) Respondent-Appellee. )

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. **

Petitioner David James Bigpond, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brought a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus attacking his conviction in Oklahoma state court for robbery with firearms. Petitioner alleged that: (1) state authorities denied him due process by convicting him based upon an unsubscribed, unverified, and unfiled information, and, as a result (2) the state court had no jurisdiction1 We grant Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.

We grant Petitioner’s request for a certificate of probable cause and dispose of this case on the merits. We deny Petitioner’s motion to compel the State of Oklahoma to produce Petitioner’s pre-trial and trial transcripts and information sheet. 2 to entertain his guilty plea. The district court referred the petition to a magistrate judge. After a thorough review, the magistrate recommended Petitioner’s § 2254 petition be denied. The magistrate liberally construed Petitioner’s due process claim as a claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. The magistrate concluded Petitioner was procedurally barred from challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea in this, his third petition for post-conviction relief. The magistrate also rejected Petitioner’s claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his guilty plea. The magistrate took judicial notice of state court records which contained one information that was file stamped, properly endorsed, and verified. The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation and denied Petitioner’s § 2254 petition. We have reviewed Petitioner’s brief, the district court’s order, the magistrate’s recommendation, and the entire record on appeal. Based on our review, we find no reversible error and affirm. 1
AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SATISH SHETTY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

SELENE FINANCE LP, a Delaware 

Limited Partnership; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-55790 

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-03483-BROMAN 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Beverly Reid O’Connell, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 9, 2017**

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Satish Shetty appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing 

his action alleging federal and state law claims relating to a mortgage loan on real 

property transferred to him by the borrower. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 24 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 14-55790 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on an basis supported by the 

record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Shetty’s action was proper because Shetty failed to allege facts 

sufficient to show that he has standing to prosecute claims on behalf of the thirdparty borrower. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 

273-74, 89-90 (2008) (elements of Article III standing; prudential standing requires 

that a party must assert its own legal rights and may not assert the legal rights of 

another).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shetty leave to file 

a Fourth Amended Complaint because amendment would be futile. See Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of 

review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be 

futile); see also Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (a 

district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad when it has 

afforded plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend).

To the extent Shetty is challenging the district court’s order as the 

representative of a trust, the appeal is dismissed because Shetty, as a non-attorney, 

“has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.” C.E. Pope 

Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 
3 14-55790 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as without merit Shetty’s contention regarding ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

AFFIRMED.
#### Fessor Sonie FROST, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 35954.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 19, 1963.

*949Howard B. Law, James Keith Marks, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., Emmett Colvin, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Presiding Judge.

The offense is transporting whisky in a dry area; the punishment, 50 days in jail.

The state confesses error and suggests reversal because of a fundamental defect in the complaint and information.

An examination of the state’s pleadings shows failure to allege publication of the order declaring the result of the local option election, which is fatal. Gallagher v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 133, 151 S.W.2d 819.

The judgment is reversed and the prosecution under the complaint and information is ordered dismissed.
-84 -82 -80 -78 -76 -74 -72

34 36 38 40 

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### ★ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ 500 1000 1500 100 18 12 06 00 06/18 

### NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL 

## Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 18 Jun 06

EDAS Meteorological DataSource★at 38.86 N 77.06 WMeters AGL
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

128 

KA 15-00949 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CURRAN, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAMONI HALL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (DEBORAH K. JESSEY OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

MICHAEL J. FLAHERTY, JR., ACTING DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (MICHAEL

J. HILLERY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (M.

William Boller, A.J.), rendered January 30, 2015. The judgment

convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second

degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law 

§ 125.25 [1]). Contrary to defendant’s contention, the record

establishes that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived

the right to appeal (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256),

and that valid waiver forecloses any challenge by defendant to the

severity of the sentence (see id. at 255; see generally People v

Lococo, 92 NY2d 825, 827; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 737).

Entered: February 3, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. Dollar
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997 
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997 
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1997 
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                          1 
<CASH>                                               2,815 
<SECURITIES>                                             0 
<RECEIVABLES>                                        1,237 
<ALLOWANCES>                                           297 
<INVENTORY>                                            313 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     5,144 
<PP&E>                                               4,669 
<DEPRECIATION>                                       1,912 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      10,405 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                3,938 
<BONDS>                                                  0 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0 
<PREFERRED>                                              0 
<COMMON>                                            31,202 
<OTHER-SE>                                         (24,990)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        10,405 
<SALES>                                             22,029 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    22,029 
<CGS>                                               20,753 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       22,787 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     134 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       (758)
<INCOME-TAX>                                           318 
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (1,076)
<DISCONTINUED>                                         530 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0 
<CHANGES>                                                0 
<NET-INCOME>                                        (1,606)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                         (.65)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         (.65)
                                               

</TABLE>
#### James A. LEGGETT, Appellant, v. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 3857.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

May 11, 1961.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1961.

Otis Scruggs, Jr., Houston, for appellant.

Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates & Jaworski, L. S. Carsey, Houston, for ap-pellee.

WILSON, Justice.

Appellant asks reversal of a judgment in his favor rendered on a jury verdict in a workmen’s compensation case. He contends there is a fatal conflict in answers to special issues.

The jury found the injury alleged by appellant was the producing cause of any total incapacity he sustained, and that he sustained total temporary incapacity which had existed for 47 weeks from date of injury. To the following issue: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that any incapacity to labor which plaintiff may have is not caused solely by a pre-existing condition of arthritis and degenerative disc disease?” the jury answered, “We do not.”

*957There is no irreconcilable conflict. At the time of trial and verdict the 47 weeks which the jury found the temporary total incapacity “has continued”, had elapsed. Such findings were related to the past. The sole cause finding as to arthritis or disc disease was properly subject to the construction that it referred to his condition at time of trial or in the future. It dealt with any incapacity appellant “may have.” Casualty Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97, 99.

It is not necessary for us to apply the rule in Bradford v. Arhelger, Tex.Sup., 340 S.W.2d 772, or the decisions referred to in the majority and dissenting opinions; neither is it necessary for us to decide whether appellant may complain of a judgment based on the maximum duration of incapacity found, where the court disregarded a finding adverse to him. It is our duty to reconcile any apparent conflict if it can reasonably be done. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Snider, 159 Tex. 380, 321 S.W.2d 280, 282.

Other points have been fully considered and are overruled. Affirmed.
#### Woodle Allen LARGENT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28027.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 8, 1956.

No appearance for appellant.

Dan Walton, Dist. Atty., Eugene Brady, Thomas D. White, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

Indecent exposure is the offense; the punishment, one year’s confinement in the penitentiary.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular, and nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned  hereby certifies in his capacity as Chief Executive  Officer of
Belmar Capital Fund LLC (the "Fund"), that:

(a)  the  Quarterly  Report  of the  Fund on Form  10-Q  for the  quarter  ended
     September 30, 2002 (the "Report")  fully complies with the  requirements of
     Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(b)  the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and the results of operations of the Fund
     for such period.


Dated:  November 14, 2002


                                                /s/ Thomas E. Faust Jr.
                                                --------------------------
                                                Thomas E. Faust Jr.
                                                Chief Executive Officer
mpb-ex107_811.htm



EXHIBIT 10.7



MID PENN BANK

 

March 4, 2016

 

 

Michael D. Peduzzi

 

 

Dear Mike:

 

The following is a summary of the compensation package for the position we are offering you today.  We look forward to finalizing the offer and having you join the Mid Penn Bank Team. My summary of the offer is as follows:

 


	
Title
	
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of the Bank and Holding Company




 


	
Salary
	
$205,000 annually




 


	
Restricted Stock
	
1000 Shares will be granted to you on your date of hire




 


	
Signing Incentive
	
$40,000 note to be forgiven over a 4 year period




 


	
Paid Time Off 
	
4 weeks per year (first year to be prorated from date of hire)




 


	
Holidays
	
10 paid days per calendar year




 


	
Personal Day
	
1 day per calendar year




 


	
Medical Coverage 
	
For employees who elect to participate, coverage will begin on the 1st day of the month following date of hire. If medical coverage is waived, you will receive $40.00 per bi­weekly payroll, beginning on the first of the month following the date of hire.




 


	
Vision & Dental Insurance 
	
Employees can elect additional vision and dental coverage paid in part by Mid Penn Bank, which may begin on the 1st day of the month following date of hire.




349 Union Street, Millersburg, PA 17061 • 1-866-642-7736 • midpennbank.com

Member FDIC

 

 




	
Flexible Spending Account
	
You have the option to add to this election up to $2,550 for the year.




 


	
Disability Insurance
	
Coverage will begin on the 1st day of the month following the 90-day introductory period. After 30 days of continuous disability, the disability insurance will pay 60% of normal base wages.




 


	
Group Life Insurance
	
Equal to 500,000 beginning the 1st day of the month following the 90-day introductory period.




 


	
Retirement Plan
	
Employees are eligible to participate in the Mid Penn Bank 401(k) retirement plan beginning on the first of the month after completion of 90 days of service. Matching contributions will also begin on the first day of the month following 90 days of service.




 


	
Country Club Membership
	
Will be provided




 


	
Company Car
	
Will be provided




 

When and if the Bank institutes Change in Control agreements you will be included in this offering. You are also eligible for the Bank Performance Bonus.

 

If you are in agreement with the salary and benefit plans and general terms of employment, please acknowledge receipt and acceptance of employment by signing below and returning this letter to me.

 



 

Accepted the   12TH day of March, 2016 by Michael D. Peduzzi, with employment to begin effective April 11, 2016 or sooner if possible. I understand that my employment is contingent upon acceptable background, credit and reference checks.
# • 2/24/92 SPA 9 RCRA REVISION CHECKLIST 77 HSWA CodificationRule, Double Liners; Correction 55FR 19262-19264 May 9, 1990 (HSWA Cluster II) Note: The final rule addressed bythis checklist corrects 264.221(c) and 264.301(c) as promulgated onJuly 15, 1985 (50 FR 28702; Revision Checklist 17 H). This correction is based on a decision reached in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on June

### 23, 1987 concerning a lawsuit filed against EPA. States not yet authorized for Revision Checklist 17 Hare encouraged to adopt these corrections at the same time the Revision Checklist 17-H provisions are adopted.

FEDERAL REQUIREMENT FEDERAL RCRA CITATION ANALOGOUS STATE CITATION STATE ANALOG IS:- MORE EQUIV- STRINALENT GENT BROADER IN SCOPE PART 264 - STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES WAC 173-303
SUBPART K - SURFACE IMPOUNDMENTS
DESIGN AND OPERATING REQUIREMENTS 1_ insert "forunits where the Part B of the permit application is received bythe RegionalAdninistrator

-after Novenber 8, 

# • 1984" after "permit" 264.221Cc)

DESIGN AND OPERATING REQUIREMENTS addsentence regarding applicabilityof 264.301(c) only where 650(2)CJ) SUBPART N - LANDFILLS 

### x

Part B of the penuit application is received after**~ovember** 8, 1984 264.301(c) 665(2)(h) in this paragraph; X this is a typographical error in the FR for



# •
May 9, 1990 - Page 1 of 1
Ryder Scott Company
Petroleum Consultants

1100 Louisiana                                              Fax (713) 651-0849
Suite 3800
Houston, TX  77002-5218                               Telephone (713) 651-9191






                      CONSENT OF PETROLEUM CONSULTING FIRM




      We consent to the  reference to our name included in this Annual Report on
Form 10-K for  the  year  ended December  31, 2001 for  Dyco Oil and Gas Program
1984-1 Limited Partnership.


                              //s// Ryder Scott Company, L.P.

                              RYDER SCOTT COMPANY, L.P.




Houston, Texas
March 8, 2002
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 40391 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
CARLOS DE LA ROSA

- RODRIGUEZ , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 1:13

- CR

- 1004

- 1

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Carlos De La Rosa

Rodriguez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 7 38 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). De La Rosa

- Rodriguez h a s not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that t he appeal presents no

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED April 2, 2015 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-40391 Document: 00512991335 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/02/2015No. 14

- 40391

nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2.

2 Case: 14-40391 Document: 00512991335 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/02/2015