Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2016-041

DECEMBER TERM, 2016

State of Vermont } APPEALED FROM:

}

} Superior Court, Lamoille Unit,

 v. } Criminal Division

}

}

Russell G. Goodell } DOCKET NO. 198-4-15 Lecr

Trial Judge: Dennis R. Pearson

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Defendant appeals from a superior court order that he repay a total of $3081 for the care of 

two dogs following his conviction of two counts of cruelty to animals. Defendant contends that

the evidence did not support the award. We affirm.

In April 2015, defendant was charged with six counts of animal cruelty, in violation of 13 

V.S.A. § 352(4), which prohibits “depriv[ing] an animal . . . of adequate food, water, shelter, rest, 

sanitation, or necessary medical attention, or transport[ing] an animal in overcrowded vehicles.” 

In September 2015, pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled nolo contendere to two of the 

charges concerning two dogs named Peanut and Reba, the other charges were dismissed, and 

defendant received an aggregate sentence of three months to two years, all suspended, and was 

placed on probation.

Under 13 V.S.A. § 354(g)(1), a defendant convicted of animal cruelty “shall be required to 

repay all reasonable costs incurred by the custodial caregiver for caring for the animal, including 

veterinary expenses.” As the court here observed, the statutory presumption is that the defendant 

will fully repay all such costs incurred, as Vermont law also provides: “If the Court does not order 

a defendant to pay all the applicable costs incurred or orders only partial payment, it shall state on 

the record the reasons for that action.” 13 V.S.A. § 353(b)(2). As the court here also noted, the 

restitution provisions of the animal-cruelty statute stand apart from the general criminal restitution 

statutes, and do not incorporate the requirement of findings concerning the “material loss” incurred 

by the victim or the offender’s “current ability to pay,” as required under 13 V.S.A. § 7043(d)(2). 

See State v. Eldredge, 2006 VT 80, ¶¶ 6-8, 180 Vt. 278 (noting that animal cruelty statutes “contain 

their own specific provisions regarding repayment of costs” and holding that “[t]he plain meaning 

of statutory language does not require the court to find an ability to pay before ordering defendant 

to pay the reasonable costs of caring for [defendant’s] animals”).

Following defendant’s plea, the court held a restitution hearing. The director of operations 

for the Central Vermont Humane Society (CVHS) testified that CVHS paid $216 for the initial 

veterinary care of Peanut, who also received ongoing shelter and treatment at CVHS for a period 

of twelve days, for a total cost of $300. The director testified that costs incurred by CVHS for the 
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care and treatment of animals include animal-care personnel, a medical technician, medical 

supplies, vaccinations, tick and parasite treatment, food, and general facility expenses, and that 

CVHS charges $25 per day to defray costs. The director testified that boarding facilities in the 

area typically charge $25 to $35 per day.

In addition to the twelve days at CVHS, the director recalled that Peanut was also 

compelled to spend an additional period of time in foster care “because of his medical condition 

and potential of communicable diseases.” He was severely underweight and had skin conditions 

which required “more intensive” foster care for nineteen days before he could be returned to the 

shelter “healthy and adoptable.” The additional period in foster care was also necessary because 

both dogs were very fearful and were not housebroken, and required time for training and slow, 

positive behavioral reinforcement. The director testified that CVHS covers all the costs when a 

dog is in foster care, not just food and basic supplies but also ongoing medical care and specialized 

behavioral training, for which it also charges $25 per day. For Peanut, the additional cost of 

nineteen days in foster care was $475. Together with the veterinary and shelter costs, the total 

costs incurred for Peanut came to $991.

Reba was placed in a shelter run by the North Country Animal League. North Country’s 

manager testified that Reba required initial veterinary care costing $96 plus $140 for specific 

medical supplies, and that she spent thirty days at the shelter before she was ready for foster care. 

The manager explained that the average daily cost for the shelter to cover medical care and staff, 

parasite control, flea treatments, heartworm tests, as well as basic food and supplies, was $70 per 

day. Reba then spent an additional period of time in foster care for the same reasons as Peanut; 

she was “incredibly unsocialized” and also dangerous, and required specialized care and training 

before she could be returned to the shelter. The shelter provides all the necessary food, medical 

treatment, and supplies for a dog while in foster care. The manager estimated that the specialized 

foster care that Reba received would cost about $800 per week in a private facility, and recalled 

that Reba remained in foster care for five or six months, but explained that the shelter was seeking 

reimbursement for only thirty days.

The court noted that North Country had not provided any reason why its per diem costs for 

dogs at the shelter were substantially higher than those of CVHS, and found $35 per day to be 

reasonable as the upper limit of the average boarding costs in the area. The court also awarded 

costs for four weeks of foster care at $200 per week, a daily rate of $28.57 which the court noted 

was comparable to the foster-care costs of Peanut. The total expenses for care and treatment of 

Reba thus totaled $2090.

The court found that the reasonable costs incurred by the custodial caregivers for Peanut 

and Reba totaled $3081 ($991 plus $2090), and ordered defendant to repay that amount. This 

appeal followed.

As we observed in Eldredge, under the restitution provisions of the animal-cruelty statute 

the “only discretion afforded to the trial judge was to determine which costs . . . were reasonable,” 

a decision which we review solely for “abuse of discretion.” 2006 VT 80, ¶ 15. Here, defendant 

maintains that the court abused its discretion in determining the reasonable costs incurred, 

asserting that the “only actual expenditures” supported by the evidence were the veterinary bills 

for Peanut and Reba, totaling $216 and $96 respectively, and the additional medical supplies for 

 



 The court inexplicably awarded $144 for medical supplies rather than $140, which was 

the amount specified by North Country’s manager. The judgment will be modified accordingly.
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Reba of $140. Defendant asserts that the balance of the award was improper because no specific 

evidence was adduced relating the “actual” expenses incurred by Peanut and Reba to the average 

costs for shelter and foster care specified by the shelter managers. We have held, however, that 

an award of restitution does not required “mathematical certainty,” but only “a reasonable basis 

for estimating the loss.” State v. May, 166 Vt. 41, 43-44 (1996). The testimony here by the shelter 

managers outlining the various costs incurred in the care and treatment of dogs at the shelters and 

in foster care, and the comparable fees charged by other facilities in the area, was sufficient to 

provide a reasonable estimate of the costs incurred in providing care for Peanut and Reba in this 

case. See State v. Driscoll, 2008 VT 101, ¶ 14, 184 Vt. 381 (holding that, although it amounted to 

an “approximation,” court’s downward adjustment of fair market value of deer offered by owner 

was sufficient to establish reasonable estimate for restitution award). Accordingly, we find no 

abuse of discretion, and no basis to disturb the judgment.

The judgment is affirmed, but the amount of the restitution award is reduced to $3077.

 

BY THE COURT:

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Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

_______________________________________

Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Beth Robinson, Associate Justice