NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

OF FLORIDA 

SECOND DISTRICT 

CLARENCE WILSON, DOC #553181, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D15-4120 

 ) 

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) 

 ) 

 Appellee. )

___________________________________) 

Opinion filed March 18, 2016. 

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 

9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for 

Polk County; Kelly P. Butz, Judge. 

Clarence Wilson, pro se. 

No appearance for Appellee. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Clarence Wilson appeals the order summarily denying his postconviction 

motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm the order 

without further comment to the extent that it denies grounds one through four and 

ground six of his motion; we reverse the order to the extent that it denies ground five of 

the motion and remand for further proceedings. 
 -2-

 In ground five, Mr. Wilson alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to inform him of the nature of the charges against him and the maximum 

sentence he could receive if convicted at trial. Mr. Wilson claimed that as a result of 

counsel's alleged omission he rejected the State's plea offer of fifteen years' 

imprisonment and was sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury convicted him of 

sexual battery.1 Mr. Wilson asserted that if he had understood the sentence he was 

facing if convicted at trial, he would have accepted the State's plea offer. 

 The postconviction court found that Mr. Wilson's actions at his sentencing 

hearing refuted the allegations of ground five. Specifically, the postconviction court 

noted Mr. Wilson's failure to say anything concerning a misunderstanding about the 

maximum sentence he faced when counsel announced that they had gone over his 

scoresheet, as well as his protestation of innocence. But "[i]n the context of ineffective 

assistance resulting in the rejection of a plea offer, '[p]rejudice . . . is determined based 

upon a consideration of the circumstances as viewed at the time of the offer and what 

would have been done with proper and adequate advice.' " Armstrong v. State, 148 So. 

3d 124, 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Alcorn v. State, 121 So. 

3d 419, 432 (Fla. 2013)). Thus, events occurring after Mr. Wilson rejected the plea offer 

could not cure counsel's alleged failure to provide him with all of the information 

necessary to make an informed decision concerning the offer. See Armstrong, 148 So. 

3d at 126. 

 1The jury also convicted Mr. Wilson of kidnapping, but this court reversed 

that conviction for which the trial court had imposed a consecutive term of life 

imprisonment. Wilson v. State, 159 So. 3d 316, 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). 
 -3-

 Accordingly, we reverse the order under review to the extent that it 

summarily denies ground five. We note that ground five is facially insufficient because 

Mr. Wilson failed to allege that the State would not have withdrawn the offer and that the 

trial court would have accepted the offer. See Alcorn, 121 So. 3d at 422 (holding that to 

establish prejudice from the loss of a favorable plea offer, a defendant must allege and 

prove a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the offer had counsel 

advised him correctly, the State would not have withdrawn the offer, the court would 

have accepted the offer, and the conviction or sentence or both under the offer would 

have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence imposed). Thus we 

remand this case to the postconviction court with directions to enter an order allowing 

Mr. Wilson sixty days to amend ground five of his motion to state a facially sufficient 

claim under Alcorn. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(3). In all other respects, the 

postconviction court's order is affirmed. 

 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 

CASANUEVA, WALLACE, and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.