alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit








Exhibit 10.65




August 25, 2016


Didier Cowling
Chief Executive Officer
Kuros Biosciences AG
Wagistrasse 25
8952 Schlieren
Switzerland


Dear Mr. Cowling,


This letter constitutes written notice of termination by Arbutus Biopharma Inc., and its parent company Arbutus Pharma Corp. (collectively “Arbutus”) of the License Agreement by and between Cytos Biotechnology Ltd and Oncore Biopharma, Inc. (predecessor in interest of Arbutus), dated December 30, 2014 (“Agreement”), pursuant to § 12.3 (Termination of the Agreement for Convenience) of said Agreement.


Yours truly,
/s/ Elizabeth Howard
Elizabeth Howard
Executive Vice President & General Counsel


Cc:      VISCHER AG
Aeschenvorstadt 4
4010 Basel
Switzerland
Attn: Dr. Matthias Staehelin
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6868

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

NIGEL CLARKE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior

District Judge. (4:02-cr-00060-5-H; 4:07-cv-00020-H)

Submitted: August 30, 2007 Decided: September 10, 2007

Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Nigel Clarke, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Nigel Clarke seeks to appeal the district court’s orders

dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion and

denying his motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The orders

are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Clarke has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We deny Clarke’s motion to

return the case to district court and dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
2

ENIUM cc: Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge Keith E. Brooks Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 4092** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. XAVIER DIAMOND LUCKEY , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middl e District of North Carolina , at Greensboro
. Thomas D
. Schroeder , District Judge. ( 1:10

- cr - 00226

- TDS

- 1 )

Submitted : October 12, 2011 Decided: November 1, 2011

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opi nion
.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Clifton T. Barrett, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, Nor th Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Xavier Diamond Luckey pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of possession of ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U .S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006). The district court imposed a custodial sentence of 180 months followed by five years of supervised release. Luckey appeals the length of the term of supervised release. We affirm. We review a sentence under a deferenti al abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). First, we inspect for procedural reasonableness by ensuring that the district court committed no significant procedural errors, such as failing to calculate or improperly cal culating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to adequately explain the sentence. United States v. Boulware , 604 F.3d 832, 837

- 38 (4th Cir. 2010). We then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. Gall , 552 U.S. at 51. We presume that a sentence within a properly

- calculated Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Allen , 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007). That p resumption may be rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553 factors.” United States v. Montes

- Pineda , 4453 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court prov ided a cogent and adequate explanation for its imposition of Luckey’s sentence. It explained both the mitigating and the aggravating factors that formed the basis for the sentence. The five

- year term of supervised release was within the advisory Guidelin es range and Luckey has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to such a sentence. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES LINLOR,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

CHASE BANKCARD SERVICES, INC.; CHASE BANK USA, N.A.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 18

- 56200

D.C. No. 3:17

- cv

- 00005

- WQH

KSC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 19, 2019 **

Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges

.

James Linlor appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in

h is action alleging a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Gorman v. Wolpoff

& Abramson, L LP , 584 F.3d 1147 , 1153 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

* This dis position is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 26 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K
U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 56200

Th e district court properly granted summary judgment because Linlor failed

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact to w hether defendants’ investigation of

Linlor’s dispute was unreasonable

. See id. at 1154 (setting forth responsibilities of

furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencie s).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Linlor’s request for

additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56( d ) because Linlor

did not show how additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment.

See Tatum v. City & C

ounty of San Francisco , 441 F.3d 1090, 1100

- 1101 (9th Cir.

2006) (setting forth the stand ard of review and upholding the denial of request for

a continuance where plaintiff “ did not identify the specific facts that further

discovery would have revealed or explain why those facts would have precluded

summary judgment ” )

.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Linlor’s requests for

sanctions because Linlor did not show that defendants failed to comply with their

discovery or Rule 11(b) o bligations

. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (providing that if

a party fails to provide informatio n required by Rules 26(a) or (e) , the party is not

allowed to use that information on a motion or at trial unless the failure was

substantially justified or har mless) ; Christian v. Mattel, Inc ., 286 F.3d 1118, 1126

-

27 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard of review and criteria for the imposition of Rule 11

sanctions); Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp. , 259 F.3d 1101, 110 6 (9th3 18

- 56200

Cir. 2001) ( “[A]lthough we review every discovery sanction for an abuse of

discretion, we give particularly wide latitude to the district court's discretion to

issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1). ” (citation omitted)).

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
               SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Greenfield Online, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2005 to be filed with
Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Dean A. Wiltse, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company as of the dates and for the periods covered by the
            Report.

Date: May 16, 2005                               By: /s/ Dean A. Wiltse
                                                 ---------------------------
                                                 Dean A. Wiltse
                                                 President and
                                                 Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Greenfield Online, Inc. and will be retained by Greenfield Online,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 60 (Wednesday, March 28, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 18798]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-7426]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Efficiency and Renewables Advisory Committee (ERAC); Correction

AGENCY: Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Department of 
Energy.

ACTION: Notice of open meeting; Correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE), on March 15, 2012, published a 
notice of open meeting announcing an open meeting of the Efficiency and 
Renewables Advisory Committee (ERAC). The meeting date has been 
extended to include April 18, 2012. As a result, the language is being 
corrected in this notice.

Corrections

    In the Federal Register of March 15, 2012, in FR DOC. 2012-6270, on 
page 15362, please make the following corrections:
    In the DATES heading, first column, first line, before the existing 
text, please add ``Wednesday, April 18, 2012, 1 p.m.-4:30 p.m. (EDT).
    In the ADDRESSES heading, first column, second line, please remove 
``Room 8E-089'' and add in its place ``Room 1E-245 and Room 8E-089, on 
April 18 and April 19 respectively''.
    In the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION heading, Public Participation, 
second column, first paragraph, fifth line, correct the second sentence 
to read ``The public comment period will take place between 2:30 p.m. 
and 3 p.m. on the second day of the meeting, Thursday, April 19, 
2012.''

    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 22, 2012.
LaTanya R. Butler,
Acting Deputy Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 2012-7426 Filed 3-27-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
```
EXHIBIT 18







                                     February 15, 1999



Colorado Casino Resorts, Inc.
Colorado Springs, Colorado  80905


    We are  providing  this letter to the Company for inclusion as an exhibit to
Form  10-K  for the  year  ended  October  31,  1998,  pursuant  to Item  601 of
Regulation S-K.

    We have read  management's  justification  for the change in accounting from
accelerated  (declining  balance)  methods of depreciation to the  straight-line
method of depreciation for the year ended October 31, 1998. Based on our reading
of the data and  discussions  with Company  officials  about their reasoning and
judgment used in making the change,  we believe  management's  justification for
the  change  is  reasonable.  Accordingly,  we  concur  that the  newly  adopted
accounting   principle   described   above  is   preferable   in  the  Company's
circumstances to the method previously applied.



                                     /s/ Moore Stephens, P.C.
                                     MOORE STEPHENS, P.C.
#### Calvin TATE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27523.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 27, 1955.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Leon Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

Upon a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of fondling a child’s sexual part and was assessed a term of 10 years in the penitentiary.

The record contains no statement of facts and no bills of exception.

The trial court, in pronouncing sentence, failed to apply the indeterminate sentence *140law. The sentence is reformed so as to provide for appellant’s confinement in the penitentiary for a term of not less than one day nor more than ten years.

As reformed, the judgment is affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofVanity Enterprises, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Anthony N. DeMint, President and Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

|   | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

| /s/ Anthony N. DeMint                                  |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Anthony N. DeMint

President and Chief Accounting Officer

November 6, 2006
Exhibit 31.1



CERTIFICATIONS



I, Michael M. Wick, M.D., Ph.D., certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Telik, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                        |  | 
|----------------------- |  | 
|Date: November 12, 2003 |  | 
|                        |  | 
|                        |  | 



35
#### Lucious MANOR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28698.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 12, 1956.

No attorney for appellant of record on appeal.

Leon Douglas, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The conviction, on a plea of guilty before the court, is for the offense of embezzlement of property of the value of $40; the punishment, 10 days in jail.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular and nothing is presented for review. The judgment is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-1309

LAWRENCE VERLINE WILDER, SR., Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. BALTIMORE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; CHIEF JIM JOHNSON; OFFICER ROBERT LONG; OFFICER DOYLE; OFFICER BUTTONS; OFFICER JACKSON; OFFICER DUNNING; OFFICER COVINGTON; OFFICER THOMPSON; OFFICER MAYBIN; OFFICER SEWELL; OFFICER POWERS; OFFICER SMITH; OFFICER FAIM; OFFICER BRUCE; UNKNOWN OFFICERS AND AGENTS, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (1:09- cv-00299))

Submitted: July 30, 2009 Decided: August 4, 2009

Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lawrence Verline Wilder, Sr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Lawrence Verline Wilder, Sr., filed a complaint against the Baltimore County Police Department and several officers, alleging violations of his civil rights. The district court entered an order granting Wilder leave to proceed in forma pauperis, denying without prejudice his motion for appointment of counsel, and placing his case on inactive status pending

resolution of cases Wilder has on the court’s active docket. Wilder seeks to appeal, challenging the denial of his motion for appointment of counsel. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S .C. § 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Because the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel is not immediately appealable, Miller v.

Simmons , 814 F.2d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1987), we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
NO. 07-03-0013-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL D

APRIL 29, 2003

______________________________

OSCAR BALDERAS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee

_________________________________

FROM THE 64TH DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;

NO. A13518-9909; HON. JACK R. MILLER, PRESIDING

_______________________________

ABATEMENT AND REMAND

__________________________________

Before QUINN, REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.

Oscar Balderas (appellant) appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated. The

clerk’s record was filed on January 30, 2003, and the reporter’s record was filed on March

7, 2003. Thus, appellant’s brief was due on April 7, 2003. However, one was not filed on

that date. By letter, this Court notified appellant of the expired deadline and directed him

to respond to our letter by Monday, April 28, 2003, or the appeal would be abated to the
2

trial court pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8. That date has lapsed, and appellant still has

yet to file a brief. 

Consequently, we abate this appeal and remand the cause to the 64th District Court

of Hale County (trial court) for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court shall

immediately cause notice of a hearing to be given and, thereafter, conduct a hearing to

determine the following:

1. whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal;

2. whether appellant is indigent and entitled to appointed counsel; and,

3. whether appellant has been denied the effective assistance of

counsel due to appellate counsel’s failure to timely file an appellate

brief. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 834-35,

83 L.Ed.2d 821, 828 (1985) (holding that an indigent defendant is

entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on the first appeal as of

right and that counsel must be available to assist in preparing and

submitting an appellate brief). 

We further direct the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law

addressing the foregoing subjects. Should the trial court find that appellant desires to

pursue this appeal, is indigent, and has been denied effective assistance of counsel, then

we further direct the court to appoint new counsel to assist in the prosecution of the

appeal. The name, address, phone number, telefax number, and state bar number of the

new counsel who will represent appellant on appeal must also be included in the court’s

findings of fact and conclusions of law. Furthermore, the trial court shall also cause to be

developed 1) a supplemental clerk’s record containing the findings of fact and conclusions

of law and 2) a reporter’s record transcribing the evidence and argument presented at the

aforementioned hearing. Additionally, the trial court shall cause the supplemental clerk’s
3

record to be filed with the clerk of this court on or before May 28, 2003. Should additional

time be needed to perform these tasks, the trial court may request same on or before May

28, 2003.

It is so ordered.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.