alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.4



Statement



Pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. §1350, the undersigned officer of Paperweight Development Corp. (the
Company), hereby certifies that to his knowledge:



| | (1) | the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 4, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |  |  |                               |  |                       |  |                        
|------------------- |  |  |  | ----------------------------- |  | --------------------- |  | -----------------------
|                    |  |  |  | PAPERWEIGHT DEVELOPMENT CORP.
|                    |  |  | 
|Dated: May 17, 2004 |  |  |  |                               |  | /s/    DALE E. PARKER
|                    |  |  |  |                               |  |                       | 
|                    |  |  |  |                               |  | Name:                 |  | Dale E. Parker         
|                    |  |  |  |                               |  | Title:                |  | Chief Financial Officer



This certification accompanies this
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.



4
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with this quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2009 (the Report) of OPNET Technologies, Inc. (the Company), I, Mel F. Wesley, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |     |  |                                           
|----------------------- |  | --- |  | ------------------------------------------
|Dated: February 5, 2010 |  | By: |  | /s/    MEL F.
WESLEY                      
|                        |  |     |  | Mel F. Wesley                             
|                        |  |     |  | Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-6598

DOUGLAS LEE HUSKETH, Petitioner - Appellant, versus GEORGE KENWORTHY, Superintendent, Lumberton Correctional Institution, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. Paul Trevor Sharp, Magistrate Judge. (CA-03-1167) Submitted: July 15, 2004 Decided: July 22, 2004 Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Douglas Lee Husketh, Appellant Pro Se. Roy Asberry Cooper, III, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Douglas Lee Husketh, Junior, seeks to appeal the magistrate judge’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2254 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Husketh has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### John JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28108.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 29, 1956.

No appearance for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

*482PER CURIAM.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, 3 days in jail and a fine of $50.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular, and nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### Gertrudis Saldano SILVA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 29211.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 6, 1957.

Frank W. Steinle, Arnold W. Franklin, Jourdanton, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DICE, Commissioner.

The conviction is for driving while intoxicated; the punishment, 30 days in jail and a fine of $100.

The record is before us without a statement of facts of the evidence adduced upon the trial.

Appellant’s sole contention is that during the selection and-qualification of the jury, the court erred in refusing his challenge for cause to one of the prospective jurors and in refusing to grant him an extra peremptory challenge.

Such contention was urged by appellant as a ground for new trial.

No bills of exception appear in the record.

In the absence of a bill of exception, alleged errors in the selection and qualification of individual jurors will not be considered. Vines v. State, 67 Tex.Cr.R. 355, 148 S.W. 727; Martinez v. State, 69 Tex.Cr.R. 280, 153 S.W. 886; Campbell v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R. 198, 164 S.W. 850; Odom v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 580, 200 S.W. 833 and Lugo v. State, 136 Tex.Cr.R. 226, 124 S.W.2d 344. Nor will a contention that the accused should have been allowed additional peremptory challenges be considered in the absence of a bill of exception. Teague v. State, 67 Tex.Cr.R. 41, 148 S.W. 1063.

The instrument filed in the cause under certificate of the court reporter and styled “Excerpt of Proceedings had on Voir Dire Examination of Jury Panel” which bears neither the approval of the Judge or the attorneys is insufficient to constitute a bill of exception.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**1208 CA 13-00581**  PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ.

CIPRIANA MARTINEZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM T. MURDOCK AND EMILY A. MURDOCK, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. (APPEAL NO. 2.)

LAW OFFICES OF MARC JONAS, UTICA (JASON D. FLEMMA OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
SANTACROSE & FRARY, ALBANY (ELISE CASSAR OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (David A. Murad, J.), entered January 7, 2013. The order, inter alia, granted those parts of the motion of defendants for an order compelling plaintiff to appear for a medical examination and affording defendants an extension of time in which to file any “dispositive motions”.
It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed without costs.

Same Memorandum as in Martinez v Murdock ([appeal No. 1] ___ AD3d ___ [Nov. 15, 2013]).

Entered: November 15, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
#### Ex parte James WILLIAMS, Jr.

No. 36881.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 6, 1964.

Rehearing Denied June 27, 1964.

*912Frank Y. Hill, Jr., San Antonio, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

By writ of habeas corpus filed in the 175th District Court of Bexar County, the appellant sought his final discharge from an accusation of passing a forged instrument, on the ground that he had been deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial.

*From an order*refusing to discharge him after a hearing, the appellant gave notice of appeal.

The evidence at the beginning of the hearing revealed that appellant was held under an indictment returned on August 14, 1963. There was no activity by either side in this cause until January 13, 1964, when it was called for trial, and on motion of the state due to the absence of a witness, it was reset for February 10, and on that day it was again reset for February 12, for the same reason. On February 12, because of the absence of the same witness, the state sought another continuance which was denied. The state immediately filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which was granted, and an order of dismissal was entered February 12. At this time appellant requested the trial court to discharge him but the request was refused.

On application of appellant, a writ of habeas corpus was issued on February 12, returnable at 3 p. m., that day, at which time a hearing began on the writ, but the hearing was recessed from time to time on request of the state until February 21, when the court denied appellant any relief on the writ.

The evidence further shows that, on February 19, before the conclusion of the hearing on the writ, an indictment was returned by the Bexar County grand jury into the 144th District Court, charging the same transaction against appellant as charged in the case dismissed on February 12, and he was taken into custody by a warrant based on the second indictment.

The dismissal of an indictment does not prevent the grand jury from returning a subsequent indictment charging the same transaction. Ex parte Drane, 80 Tex.Cr.R. 543, 191 S.W. 1156; Whitehead v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 507, 286 S.W.2d 947.

It appears that, on February 19, the appellant was taken into custody under an indictment returned by a legal grand jury into a court of competent jurisdiction, charging him with the offense of passing a forged instrument; and that the indictment is regular on its face, and is based upon a valid law under which such an offense could be charged. 27 Tex.Jur.2d 678, Sec. 15; Ex parte Drane, supra; Ex parte McKay, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 221, 199 S.W. 637.

From the record it appears that the appellant is legally restrained by virtue of an arrest warrant based on a valid indictment. The contention presented by the appellant may be raised when he is called upon to answer the new indictment.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 99-4306

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Richard Eugene Eddy, * District of Nebraska. * Appellant. * [UNPUBLISHED]

___________ Submitted: January 4, 2001 Filed: January 12, 2001

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, HANSEN, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Richard Eddy pleaded guilty to causing a videotape of child pornography to be mailed and delivered to him, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, and was sentenced to fifty-two months imprisonment and three years supervised release. For the reasons discussed below, we reject each of the arguments he raises on appeal, and we affirm.1 The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of

Nebraska. -2- First, Eddy argues that the district court 1 erred in setting his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 rather than U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4. We disagree: the proper Guideline was applied because Eddy received through the mail a videotape involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. Next, Eddy argues that his offense level should not have been increased by two under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1) because there was insufficient evidence that the videotape depicted a prepubescent minor or a minor under the age of twelve years. We conclude that the district court--having personally viewed the videotape, and having considered the affidavit of a pediatrician who opined that the girl was prepubescent and younger than eleven--did not clearly err. See UnitedStates v. Marquardt , 949 F.2d 283, 286-87 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (district court did not clearly err in determining that subject was prepubescent where postal inspector so opined, films were furnished to court, and defendant did not present any evidence to contrary). Finally, Eddy argues that the district court erroneously denied his entrapmentbased downward-departure motion. The matter is unreviewable, however, because the court was aware of its authority to depart and discretionarily declined to do so. See UnitedStates v. Turechek , 138 F.3d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1998) (district court’s discretionary decision not to depart downward from Guidelines is unreviewable so long as court was aware of its authority to do so). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.-3-

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Curis, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended September 30,
2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Michael P. Gray, Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: October 28, 2010



/s/    MICHAEL P. GRAYMichael P. GrayChief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)




51
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

ADVANCED PHYSICAL MEDICINE & REHAB OF MIAMI, LLC, a/a/o

MARLENE PEREZ ALFONSO

, Appellant,

v.

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 21

- 3220

[ April 20, 2022 ]

Appeal from the C ounty Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Terri

- Ann Miller , Judge; L.T. Case No.

062021SC047087AXXXCE

.

Chad A. Barr of Chad Barr Law, Altamonte Springs, for appellant.

Michael J. Neimand, House Counsel, United Automobile Insurance Company, Miami.

CONFESSION OF ERROR

P ER C URIAM

.

Based on Appellee United Automobile Insurance Company’s confession of error, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with Advanced Diagnostic Group v. Ocean Harbor Casualty Insurance Co. , 321 So. 3d 772, 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings

.

F ORST

, K LINGENSMITH and K UNTZ

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Ex parte M. J. NATIONS.

No. 29152.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 19, 1957.

No attorney for appellant of record on appeal.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

*796MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

Relator, an inmate of the Texas Prison System, seeks his release by writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the sentence by virtue of which he is confined is void because the indictment upon which he was convicted charged him with the offense of statutory rape while the jury found him guilty of assault with intent to rape.

The offense of assault with intent to commit the crime of rape is a lesser and included offense to the offense of rape. Carr v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 337, 255 S.W.2d 870; Keeton v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 27, 190 S.W.2d 820; and Schroeder v. State, 92 Tex.Cr.R. 7, 241 S.W. 169.

The relief prayed for in the writ of habe-as corpus is denied.
**REGULATORY EVALUATION**

**Directorate Identifier:** 2014

- NM

- 147

- AD

**Executive Order 12866:** Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:** Is the AD significant? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **Regulatory Flexibility Act:** Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:** This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. I s it appropriate t o include specific requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of transportation? YES ( ) explain NO (X)
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


         We  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in the  Registration
Statements (Forms S-8 No. 2-89831, No. 33-61946, No. 333-07139 and No. 333-46985
and Form S-3 No.  33-18264)  pertaining to the 1986 Stock Option Plan,  the 1991
Stock Option Plan and the 1991 Chemfab  Employee  Stock Option Plan, the Amended
and Restated  1991 Stock Option Plan,  the Third Amended and Restated 1991 Stock
Option Plan, and the 1986 Stock Option Plan and the 1983 Incentive  Stock Option
Plan of our  report  dated  July 23,  1999,  with  respect  to the  consolidated
financial statements and schedule of Chemfab Corporation included in this Annual
Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended June 30, 1999.





Boston, Massachusetts
September 10, 1999
EX-10.4(a)



 Exhibit 10.4(a) 

June 1, 2016 
 Rabar Market Research, Inc. 

10 Bank Street, Suite 830 
 White Plains, New York 10606-1933 

Attention: Paul Rabar 
 Re:    Management
Agreement Renewals 
 Dear Mr. Rabar 

We are writing with respect to your management agreements concerning the commodity pools to which reference is made below (the
“Management Agreements”). We are extending the term of the Management Agreements through June 30, 2017 and all other provisions of the Management Agreements will remain unchanged. 

 

	 	•	 	Rabar Master Fund L.P. 

  

	 	•	 	Westport Futures Fund L.P. 

 Please acknowledge receipt of this modification by signing one
copy of this letter and returning it to the attention of Mr. Patrick T. Egan at 522 Fifth Avenue – 7th Floor, New York, NY 10036 or fax to 866-428-9026. If you have any questions, I can be reached at 212-296-6808 or contact Jack Yuen
at 212-296-1320. 
 Very truly yours, 
 CERES MANAGED FUTURES
LLC 

			
		
	By:	 	/s/ Patrick T. Egan

 Patrick T. Egan 
 President and
Director 
 RABAR MARKET RESEARCH, INC. 

			
		
	By:	 	/s/ Paul Rabar


			
	Print Name:	 	Paul Rabar                             
                               
	PE/kg
Exhibit 32.1



Certification of Chief Executive Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of OPNET Technologies, Inc. (the Company), I, Marc A. Cohen, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |     |  |                                     
|----------------------- |  | --- |  | ------------------------------------
|Dated: January 29, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/ Marc A. Cohen                   
|                        |  |     |  | Marc A. Cohen                       
|                        |  |     |  | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer



A signed original of this written
statement required by 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 has been provided to OPNET Technologies, Inc. and will be retained by OPNET Technologies, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 10.45



Public Media Works, Inc.

14759 Oxnard Street

Van Nuys, California 91411



December 21, 2005



Stephen Brown

Chief Executive Officer

Public Media Works, Inc.

14759 Oxnard Street

Van Nuys, California 91411



|Re: | Termination of Employment Agreement and Modification of Option Agreement
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dear Stephen:



This letter confirms the agreement between Public Media Works, Inc. (the Company) and I to terminate my Employment Agreement dated as of October 1, 2005.
Such termination shall be effective as of December 21, 2005. I further acknowledge and agree that the Company has no obligations to pay to me any accrued or future compensation in any manner whatsoever under the employment agreement.



This letter further confirms the agreement between the Company and I to amend
the terms of the Option Agreement dated as of October 1, 2005 to provide that any and all unexercised options under the Option Agreement shall expire if not exercised by me within six (6) months days after I cease to be on the Board of
Directors of the Company.



|                         |  |                     
|------------------------ |  | --------------------
|Sincerely,              
|                        
|/s/    CORBIN
BERNSEN   
|Corbin Bernsen          
|                        
|Acknowledged and Agreed:
|                        
|Public Media Works, Inc.
|                         | 
|By:                      |  | /s/    STEPHEN BROWN
|                         |  | Stephen Brown, CEO
LAW OFFICE OF JOHN MIETUS, LLC 

6701 DEMOCRACY BOULEVARD, SUITE 300 

BETHESDA, MD 20817-7500 

JOHN R. NtIerus, JR. 

(202) 747-52 i 2 

john@mietuslaw.com 

September 22, 2014 

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL 

Mr. Robert Finamore 

Chief, Foreign Carrier Licensing Division 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

Washington D C 20590 

Re: Docket OST-2013-0133; Aerovias de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. 

LAeromexico) Renewal Application 

Dear Mr. Finamore: 

By application dated July 17, 2014, Aeromexico applied for renewal of all 

exemption authority it received in a July 22, 2013 Notice of Action Taken in the 

above-captioned docket. Aeromexico's recitation of the markets involved, though, 

was in error. 

Aeromexico respectfully amends the application to request renewal of 

exemption authority in the New York-San Jose del Cabo and ChicagoIxtapa/Zihuatenejo markets and to delete the reference to Puerto Vallarta. 

Respectfully submitted, 

~ 

John R. Mietus, Jr. 

Counsel for Aeromexico 

cc: Docket