[Cite as State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-4695.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 98209 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

DEMETRIUS JONES

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

APPLICATION DENIED 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-524453 

Application for Reopening 

Motion No. 465916

RELEASED DATE: October 23, 2013 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Rufus Sims 

75 Public Square 

Suite 1111 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

Robert Tobik 

Cuyahoga County Public Defender 

By: Erica B. Cunliffe 

Assistant Public Defender 

310 Lakeside Avenue 

Suite 200 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Mark J. Mahoney 

Katherine Mullin 

Daniel T. Van 

Assistant County Prosecutors 

8th Floor Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: 

{¶1} Demetrius Jones has filed an application for reopening pursuant to App.R. 

26(B). Jones is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment rendered in State v. Jones, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98209, 2013-Ohio-572, which affirmed his conviction for 

murder. His application is untimely, without establishing good cause for the delay, and 

therefore must be denied. 

{¶2} App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) requires that Jones establish a showing of good cause 

for untimely filing if the application is filed more than 90 days after journalization of the 

appellate judgment that is subject to reopening. The Supreme Court of Ohio, with regard 

to the 90-day deadline provided by App.R. 26(B)(2)(b), has established that 

Consistent enforcement of the rule’s deadline by the appellate courts in Ohio 

protects on the one hand the state’s legitimate interest in the finality of its judgments and 

ensures on the other hand that any claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are 

promptly examined and resolved. 

Ohio and other states “may erect reasonable procedural requirements for 

triggering the right to an adjudication,” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. 

(1982), 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265, and that is what 

Ohio has done by creating a 90-day deadline for the filing of applications to 

reopen. * * * The 90-day requirement in the rule is applicable to all 

appellants, State v. Winstead (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 277, 278, 1996 Ohio 52, 

658 N.E.2d 722, and [the applicant] offers no sound reason why he — 

unlike so many other Ohio criminal defendants — could not comply with 

that fundamental aspect of the rule. 
State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, 2004-Ohio-4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, ¶ 7. See also 

State v. Lamar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-Ohio-3976, 812 N.E.2d 970; State v. Cooey, 73 

Ohio St.3d 411, 1995-Ohio-328, 653 N.E.2d 252; State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 

1995-Ohio-249, 647 N.E.2d 784. 

{¶3} The appellate judgment that Jones seeks to reopen was journalized on 

February 21, 2013. The application for reopening was not filed until June 18, 2013, and 

beyond the 90-day deadline for reopening. 

{¶4} Jones contends that there is good cause for his untimely filing based on the 

fact that his appellate counsel continued to represent him in proceedings before the Ohio 

Supreme Court. Jones maintains that his appellate counsel cannot be expected to raise 

his own ineffectiveness. This argument has been repeatedly raised and rejected, and it 

does not constitute good cause for an untimely application. Gumm at ¶ 3; State v. 

Wilcox, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96079, 2013-Ohio-2895. Likewise, “the excuse that 

[the applicant] and his attorneys were occupied with other appeals or that they simply 

neglected to pay attention to the rule is not ‘good cause’ for missing the filing deadline.” 

Id. Consequently, neither counsel’s mistake in calculating the deadline nor counsel’s 

heavy caseload can establish the requisite good cause that would enable us to consider the 

untimely application for reopening. 

{¶5} Jones has failed to establish “a showing of good cause” for the untimely 

filing of his application for reopening. State v. Klein, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 58389, 
1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1346 (Apr. 8, 1991), reopening disallowed (Mar. 15, 1994), 

Motion No. 49260, aff’d, 69 Ohio St.3d 1481, 634 N.E.2d 1027 (1994); State v. 

Trammell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67834, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2962 (July 24, 1995), 

reopening disallowed (Apr. 22, 1996), Motion No. 70493; State v. Travis, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 56825, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1356 (Apr. 5, 1990), reopening disallowed 

(Nov. 2, 1994), Motion No. 51073, aff’d, 72 Ohio St.3d 317, 1995-Ohio-152, 649 

N.E.2d 1226. See also State v. Gaston, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79626, 2007-Ohio-155; 

State v. Torres, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86530, 2007-Ohio-9. 

{¶6} Accordingly, the application for reopening is denied. 

 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR