NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

TABORSHA W., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, N.W., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0514

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 527612

The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda L. Adams

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety
TABORSHA W. v. DCS, N.W.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Taborsha W. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to daughter, N.W. Mother argues the 

juvenile court erred in finding the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)

made diligent efforts to provide her with appropriate, timely reunification 

services and she would not be able to safely reunify with N.W. in the near 

future.1 Since reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings

2, 

we affirm. See Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 

(App. 2010).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of N.W. DCS initiated a 

dependency action in April 2014, when Mother was sixteen and a ward of 

the State. DCS became involved when staff at Mother’s group home 

reported Mother was engaging in violent altercations with a resident and 

group home staff. They also alleged Mother was neglecting her child. The

juvenile court subsequently found N.W. dependent as to Mother.

¶3 DCS developed a plan for reunification and identified the 

goals Mother must achieve before the return of N.W. To facilitate Mother’s 

efforts, DCS provided Mother case management services, behavioral 

therapy, counseling, a psychological evaluation and mental health 

medication, a parent aide, a case aide for supervised weekly visitation, 

 

1 Because Mother has not challenged the juvenile court’s best interests 

findings, we do not address that requirement. See State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 

167, 175 (1989) (claims not raised in an opening brief are usually waived).

2 We review the record in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

juvenile court’s decision. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 

93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citation omitted).
TABORSHA W. v. DCS, N.W.

Decision of the Court

3

parenting classes, and transportation. DCS offered these services 

throughout the dependency action.

¶4 DCS moved for severance in January 2016, when Mother was 

an adult, on the ground that N.W. had been in out-of-home placement for 

a cumulative period of fifteen months or longer, she had been unable to 

remedy the circumstances causing the out-of-home placement, and a 

substantial likelihood existed that Mother would be unable to exercise 

proper and effective parental control in the near future. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.

(“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The court set a severance trial for November 

2016.

¶5 Evidence presented to the court showed that Mother failed to 

complete the parenting aide program twice because she did not reach her 

parenting goals and resisted the parent aide’s directions. Further, Mother 

failed to attend her one-on-one parenting sessions and only attended half 

of the supervised visits with her child. Additionally, Mother would not take

her prescribed mental health medication and did not fully cooperate in the 

individual counseling services DCS had arranged. 

¶6 The DCS case manager testified about Mother’s inability to 

control her anger. While the dependency was pending, Mother threatened 

group home staff members with violence and argued incessantly. Mother 

continued to engaged in this inappropriate behavior during her supervised 

visits, with the child present. DCS also presented evidence that Mother hit 

a group home staff member in the head and put her hands around the staff

member’s neck; hit a cab driver in the face; kicked a group home resident 

in the face, causing a bloody nose; engaged in an argument with a resident 

and threated her with a knife; and hit a different resident.

¶7 Mother presented evidence that she had enrolled in online 

schooling. She also found her own counseling services, started employment 

as a cashier and at the end of September, 2016, obtained her own housing. 

¶8 While acknowledging Mother’s progress, the DCS case 

manager testified Mother had not made the behavioral changes necessary 

to safely parent her child during the two and one half years of DCS 

involvement. From the time her child was removed until July 2016, the case 

manager did not observe discernable effort by Mother to change the 

circumstances and behaviors that caused the removal. The case manager 

testified Mother was not ready to be discharged from counseling and would 

likely have to participate for an “indeterminate” period of time. Mother’s 
TABORSHA W. v. DCS, N.W.

Decision of the Court

4

current counselor testified that Mother would need to continue counseling 

to address and learn to manage her anger issues. 

¶9 At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court entered an 

order terminating Mother’s parental rights, and Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶10 Mother first argues the juvenile court erred in finding DCS 

made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services. She 

claims that “[a]pproximately nine critical months were lost due to lack of 

diligence on the part of DCS” in receiving counseling services3. See A.R.S.

§ 8-533(B)(8), (D). Termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) requires clear

and convincing evidence that: (1) the child has been in out-of-home 

placement for a cumulative period of fifteen months or longer, (2) the 

parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the out-ofhome placement, and (3) a substantial likelihood exists that the parent will 

not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control 

in the near future. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 

234, ¶ 12 (App. 2011). Additionally, DCS “must provide [reunification] 

services to the parent with the time and opportunity to participate in 

programs designed to help [him or] her to become an effective parent.” Id.

at 235, ¶ 14 (citation omitted). DCS’s obligation to provide reunification 

services requires DCS to “undertake measures with a reasonable prospect 

of success in reuniting the family.” Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 94, ¶ 20 (citation 

omitted).

¶11 Here, DCS continuously provided, in addition to counseling, 

a variety of other services over the two and one half years in which the case 

was pending, aimed at facilitating family reunification. See supra ¶ 3. The 

State does not dispute a delay occurred in Mother’s receiving counseling 

services at one point during the dependency action. However, when 

counseling was stalled, DCS took alternate steps to help Mother by 

 

3 Without identifying any legal basis or supporting authority, 

Mother also argues DCS had an even greater duty to provide her with 

reunification services because she was a minor ward of the State. We reject 

this argument. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 348, 

¶ 11 (App. 2013) (appellate court may reject an argument based on lack of 

proper and meaningful argument alone) (citations omitted); ARCAP 

13(a)(7) (opening brief must set forth an argument that includes citations to 

legal authorities); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 106(A).
TABORSHA W. v. DCS, N.W.

Decision of the Court

5

providing her one-on-one behavioral coaching and a referral for other highneeds case management providers. Mother also conceded that at no time 

when she asked for counseling services did DCS fail to provide the 

requested services. Accordingly, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s finding that DCS made a diligent effort to provide appropriate

reunification services.

¶12 Mother next argues the juvenile court erred in finding her 

unable to exercise proper and effective parental care and control in the near 

future. Mother asserts she has “overcome the barriers that prevented her 

from reuniting with her child” and “has turned the corner in demonstrating 

that she can manage her behavior and emotions.” This change in behavior 

is not supported in the record. While Mother began to make progress in 

July 2016, the progress was minimal. Mother has repeatedly engaged in 

verbal and physical altercations with those around her. See supra ¶ 6. Most 

recently, Mother engaged in a physical altercation with a group home 

resident in August 2016. “[C]hildren should not be forced to wait for their 

parent to grow up.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, 

¶ 17 (App. 2016) (citation omitted) (parental rights terminated where 

mother’s chronic substance abuse rendered her unable to discharge her 

parental responsibilities). 

¶13 Further, the testimony from Mother’s case manager supports

the contention that Mother would need to continue counseling for an 

unknown amount of time before demonstrating that she could be a safe and 

stable parent to N.W. Accordingly, reasonable evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding that Mother would be incapable of exercising 

proper and effective control in the near future. 
TABORSHA W. v. DCS, N.W.

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order terminating 

Mother’s parental rights