alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[No. 35226.

Department One.

December 17, 1959.]

#### George G. Krause *et al., Plaintiffs and Relators,*v. Lloyd Borjessan *et al., Defendants,*The Superior Court for Spokane County, *Ralph E. Foley, Judge, Respondent.**1*

*Paul K. Cooney,*for plaintiffs and relators.

*Herrman, Banta & Johnson,*for defendants and respondents.

1

Reported in 347 P. (2d) 893.

Per Curiam.

By writ of certiorari, plaintiff seeks review of an order of the trial court dismissing plaintiffs’ action without prejudice, but refusing to dismiss defendants’ cross-complaint.

The facts are these:

March 26, 1958, plaintiffs commenced this action for relief by reason of the terms of an alleged contract.

April 1, 1959, plaintiffs moved for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. This motion was served on defendants’ counsel and noted for argument on April 6, 1959. The trial court continued the hearing until April 13, 1959.

April 9, 1959, defendants filed an answer, setoff, and cross-complaint. May 15, 1959, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ action without prejudice, “with exception of defendants’ cross-complaint.”

*285Relators (plaintiffs) contend that the trial court erred when it allowed defendants’ cross-complaint to stand. We agree.

In *McKay v. McKay,*47 Wn. (2d) 301, 304, 287 P. (2d) 330 (1955), this court said:

> “Under this rule [Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 4, RCW, Vol. 0], a plaintiff is entitled to a voluntary nonsuit at any time before he rests at the conclusion of his opening case unless the defendant has interposed a set-off or sought affirmative relief growing out of the same transaction, or set up a counterclaim to the property or thing which was the subject matter of the action. The plaintiff’s right in this respect is absolute and involves no element of discretion on the part of the trial court. *In re Archer’s Estate,*36 Wn. (2d) 505, 219 P. (2d) 112; *Herr v. Schwager,*133 Wash. 568, 234 Pac. 446.

> *U*

> “However, *the right to a voluntary nonsuit is fixed at the moment that it is claimed. A defendant is not thereafter entitled to claim a set-off or seek affirmative relief so as to prevent the granting of the nonsuit, . .*.” (Italics ours.)

When relators moved for a voluntary dismissal on April 1, 1959, their right thereto became fixed and absolute. Defendants had not yet interposed a setoff nor sought affirmative relief.

This case must be remanded to the trial court, with instructions to dismiss defendants’ setoff and cross-complaint.

It is so ordered.
CHIEF JUSTICE

ROGELIO VALDEZ

JUSTICES

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA

GINA M. BENAVIDES

GREGORY T. PERKES

NORA L. LONGORIA

CLERK

DORIAN E. RAMIREZ NUECES COUNTY COURTH OUSE

901 LEOPARD, 10TH FL OOR

CORPUS C HRISTI, TEXAS 78401

361

- 888

- 0416 (TEL)

361

- 888

- 0794 (FAX)

HIDALGO COUNTY

ADMINISTRATION BLDG.

100 E. CANO, 5TH FLO OR

EDINBURG, TEXAS 7853 9

956

- 318

- 2405 (TEL)

956

- 318

- 2403 (FAX)

www.txcourts.gov/13thcoa 

# Court of Appeals

Thirteenth District of Texas

December 18, 2014

Hon. Luis A. Gonzalez

Hidalgo County Courthouse

Assistant District Attorney

100 N. Closner

Edinburg, TX 78539

* DELIVERED VIA E

- MAIL *

Hon. Rene A. Guerra

Criminal District Attorney

Hidalgo County Courthouse

100 N. Closner, Room 303

Edinburg, TX 78539

* DELIVERED VIA E

- MAIL * Hon. Oscar Rene Flores

Attorney at Law

1308 South 10th Ave.

Edinburg, TX 78539

* DELIVERED VIA E

- MAIL *

Re: Cause No. 13

- 12

- 00783

- CR

Tr.Ct.No. CR

- 733

- 12

- D

Style: CARLOS DELGADO REYES v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

Enclosed please find the opinion and judgment issued by the Court on this date

.

Very truly yours,

Dorian E. Ramirez, Clerk

DER: ch

Enc.

cc: 206th District Court (DELIVERED VIA E

- MAIL)

Hon. Laur a Hinojosa , Hidalgo County District Clerk (DELIVERED VIA E

- MAIL)

State Prosecuting Attorney (DELIVERED VIA E

- MAIL)

Hon. J. Rolando Olvera Jr. , Presiding Judge, Fifth Administrative Judicial Region

(DELIVERED VIA E

- MAIL)
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 4.03


                             SUPPLEMENTAL INDENTURE


         This Supplemental Indenture dated as of June 11, 2003 (the "Effective
Date") supplements the terms of that certain Indenture dated as of November 1,
1995 between United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc., a Virginia corporation ("UDR
Virginia") and Wachovia Bank, National Association (formerly First Union
National Bank of Virginia), as Trustee (the "Indenture"). All capitalized terms
used in this Supplemental Indenture and not otherwise defined shall have the
meanings given to such terms in the Indenture.

         WHEREAS, United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc., a Maryland corporation
("UDR Maryland") is the successor by merger to UDR Virginia,

         NOW THEREFORE, as required by Section 801 of the Indenture, UDR
Maryland hereby assumes the due and punctual payment of the principal of (and
premium or Make-Whole Amount, if any) and any interest (including all Additional
Amounts, if any, payable pursuant to Section 1011 of the Indenture) on all
Securities, according to their tenor, and the due and punctual performance and
observance of all the covenants and conditions of the Indenture to be performed
by the Trust.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have caused this Supplemental
Indenture to be executed by their duly authorized representative as of the
Effective Date.

                                    United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc., a
                                    Maryland corporation



                                    By: /s/ RODNEY A. NEUHEARDT
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                    Name:  Rodney A. Neuheardt
                                          --------------------------------------
                                    Title: Senior Vice President, Finance
                                           -------------------------------------



                                    Wachovia Bank, National Association, as
                                    Trustee



                                    By: /s/ JOHN M. TURNER
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                    Name: John M. Turner
                                          --------------------------------------
                                    Title: Vice President
                                           -------------------------------------
Writ of Mandamus is DENIED; Opinion Filed October 18, 2013.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-13-01406-CV

IN RE ARPIN AMERICA MOVING SYSTEMS, LLC, Relator

Original Proceeding from the County Court at Law No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-12-06104-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices O'Neill, Lang-Miers, and Evans 

Opinion by Justice Evans

Relator contends the trial judge erred by overruling its objections to a notice of 

deposition. The facts and issues are well known to the parties, so we need not recount them 

herein. We conclude relator’s petition does not satisfy the requirements of the Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(j); In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Tex. 

App.BDallas 2008, orig. proceeding). Accordingly, we DENY relator’s petition for writ of 

mandamus.

131406F.P05

/David Evans/

DAVID EVANS

JUSTICE
Figure5.BootstrappingResiduals(andDVRecalculations)FYIResidualdistributionfor420290100(SiteA)—240150003(SiteB)pairs:n:454mean:0MAX:26.379035146-22.90388727•Thissteprandomlyappliesrealpct5:—4.030110975pctl0:-2.370615224residualsfromthelinearregressiontopctl5:—2.596139669pct20:-2.230110915theimputedcurrent-periodSiteAvalues.pct25:—1.875234251pct30:•A1000bootstraprunswillprovideapct35:—1.447004697pct4O:—1.036139589pct45:-0.796139669pseudoconfidenceintervalforthepct50:—0.459159591pct55:-0.172529142partiallyimputedcurrent-perioddesignpct60:0.1902790466pctfi5:0.5117917941valuepctl0:0.9986339758pctl5:1.7476110171pct80:2.3842615003pct85:3.2437572511pct90:4.1666685188pct95:5.9549092206•Bootstrapresults(forarunof1000):dvCt•All1000simulationsproducedapassingDV13.8313.9721455914.134414.222Note:Twootherprotocol‘tests’,oneusingsite340070003asthe•Finalresult:SiteB,andtheotherusingsitePASS(cleandatadetermination)100031012astheSiteBalsoproducingPASSIngresults.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur F. JONES, a/k/a Arthur Palmer, a/k/a Junior, a/k/a June, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-7657.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 13, 2003.

Decided Feb. 3, 2003.

Arthur F. Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Sean Kittrell, Office of the United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Ap-pellee.

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Arthur F. Jones seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). We have reviewed the record and conclude that Jones has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. *See Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### Leo W. BLAKE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 37023.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 17, 1964.

*900Thomas D. White, Charles M. Leftwich, Houston, for appellant.

Frank Briscoe, Dist. Atty., Carl E. F. Dally, James C. Brough and Jimmy James, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Presiding Judge.

The offense is embezzlement of $970.00 in money; the punishment, 2 years.

Conviction upon a previous trial was reversed. Blake v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 365 S.W.2d 795.

The oral statement of the appellant to his employer, B. J. Stahlman, was admitted in evidence as was the written confession of the appellant subsequently made to Deputy Sheriff H. C. Carpenter.

As a witness in his own behalf, the appellant testified that while they were alone Mr. Stahlman told him that if he would help find all the shortages in his bookkeeping system he would not file charges against him, otherwise he would "more or less throw the book at me.”

Appellant objected to the court’s charge because it did not clearly instruct the jury not to consider any oral statement made by him after he was placed under arrest and “ * * * does not clearly charge the jury not to consider Defendant’s written or oral statements introduced herein if the— have a reasonable doubt as to whether Defendant made said statements because he was promised anything or threat_

The charge of the court included an instruction relating to the statement or confession signed by the appellant, but none relating to the oral confession shown by the testimony of Mr. Stahlman.

The objection appears to have been sufficient to direct the trial court’s attention to the omission of an instruction to the effect that the oral confession of the appellant to his employer could not be considered if induced by his employer’s promise or threat. Fisher v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 379 S.W.2d 900, and cases cited.

The omission of such an instruction was calculated to injure the rights of the appellant and requires reversal.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
**EXHIBIT
      23.2**


CONSENT
        OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
 
 We
        hereby
        consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on
        Form
        S-3 (File Nos. 333-139264, 033-58277, 333-02015, 333-43809, 333-83215,
        333-34550, 333-33436, 333-72226, 333-100315, 333-106797, 333-109344, 333-110040
        and 333-120262) and Form S-8 (File Nos. Nos. 33-63321, 333-00431, 333-04679,
        333-04677, 333-27673, 333-48454, 333-58384, 333-59718, 333-75304, 333-109986
        and
        333-121320) of Cytogen Corporation of our report dated March 15, 2006 relating
        to the financial statements of PSMA Development Company LLC, which appears
        in
        this form 10-K.
 
 PricewaterhouseCoopers
        LLP
 New
        York,
        New York
 March
        15,
        2007
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CESAR R. RODRIGUEZ,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

J. PUENTE; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 11-17290

D.C. No. 3:10-cv-02585-WHA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 26, 2012** 

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

Cesar R. Rodriguez, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due

process violations in connection with his continued assignment to the security

FILED

JUL 11 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-17290

housing unit (“SHU”) based on his re-validation as a prison gang associate. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Bruce v. Ylst, 351

F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rodriguez’s due

process claim because, even assuming that there was a liberty interest at stake in

avoiding continued confinement in the SHU, Rodriguez failed to raise a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether he was denied due process. See Wilkinson v.

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228-29 (2005) (notice and opportunity to be heard, involving

informal, non-adversarial procedures, are adequate safeguards for placement in

maximum custody); Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287 (prison gang validation decisions

require prison officials to provide an inmate with notice of the charges against him

and an opportunity to present his views, and are reviewed under the “some

evidence” standard). Contrary to Rodriguez’s contentions, it is not appropriate for

this court to “independently assess witness credibility, or reweigh the evidence.”

Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287. 

Rodriguez’s remaining contentions, including those concerning any

misidentification by the district court of Rodriguez as a prison gang “member”

rather than an “associate,” are unpersuasive. 

Issues that are not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the 
3 11-17290

opening brief are deemed waived. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th

Cir. 1999).

AFFIRMED.
REGULATORY EVALUATION

Directorate Identifier: 2010

- NM
- 193

- AD

Executive Order 12866: Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”? YES ( ) explain NO (X) DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures: Is the AD significant? YES ( ) explain NO (X) Regulatory Flexibility Act: Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? YES ( ) explain NO (X) Intrastate Aviation in Alaska: This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. I s it appropriate t o include specific requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of transportation? YES ( ) explain NO (X)
Exhibit 10.39

                              XYNERGY CORPORATION

                                  (Letterhead)

Via Facsimile & U.S. Mail

June 17, 2004

Weinberg & Company, PA
6100 Glades Road, Suite 314
Boca Raton, Florida 33434

Dear Sir or Madam:

We have retained  another  accountancy  firm to conduct our audit for the period
ending  December 31, 2003. As required by SEC rules,  we have filed the attached
Form 8-K for notification.

We are  therefore  requesting  that you  write a letter  to the  Securities  and
Exchange  Commission  stating  whether you agree or disagree with the statements
made in Item 4,  section (b) of the Form 8-K and send it to us so we may file it
in our subsequent 8KA.

Thank you for your anticipated cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

/s/ Raquel Zepeda
-----------------
Raquel Zepeda
President

Enclosures

cc:   Edward A. Rose, Jr., Esq.
      (Outside counsel)
Exhibit 32.1



Statement



Pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. §1350, the undersigned officer of Appleton Papers Inc. (the Company),
hereby certifies that to his knowledge:



| | (1) |  | the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 29, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       |  |  |  | APPLETON PAPERS INC.
|---------------------- |  |  |  | --------------------
|                       |  | 
|Dated: August 11, 2003 |  |  |  |                     
|                       |  |  | 
|                       |  |  |  |                     
|                       |  |  |  |                     
|                       |  |  |  |                     



This certification accompanies this
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
#### HAMILTON COMPANY, Inc., et al., Appellants, v. Paul M. KENDALL, Individually, and T/D/B The Kendall Company, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 4, 1957.

Wilbur Fields, Louisville, for appellants.

S. J. Stallings, Glenn L. Schilling, Louisville, for appellee.

CAMMACK, Judge.

This is an appeal from a second summary judgment awarding the appellee, Paul M. Kendall, the sum of $3,050 plus interest claimed to be due and owing him as a commission on a sale of real estate for the appellants, Hamilton Company, Inc., and others. Reversal is urged upon the grounds that’ (1) the court erred in setting aside the first summary judgment which was for the appellant; and (2) if the first summary judgment was improper, there was an issue of fact which should have been tried and the court erred in entering the second summary judgment.

On March 3, 1953, Hamilton Company, through its agent, R. L. Durning, entered into a duly executed written contract by the terms of which it granted, through Kendall, an option for six months to Sears, Roebuck and Company to purchase a tract of land then owned by the appellants. Due to zoning problems the sale was not completed in the six months’ period and the *762contract was renewed. The tract was finally purchased by Sears, Roebuck and Company on December 29, 1955, after the zoning problems had been settled through litigation.

The appellants claim that Kendall did not establish that he introduced the buyer to the seller and that in any event his rights terminated with the expiration of the option of September 3, 1953.

Kendall claims that the option initiated a continuous chain of activity in which he was involved and which led to the ultimate sale of the property. He contends that the deposition of the appellant, R. L. Durning, and numerous affidavits of record support his claim.

Apparently, there was no pre-trial conference. The contentions presented to us might have been narrowed down by such treatment. We believe that the deposition of R. L. Durning, along with the complaint and Kendall’s deposition, raised issues of fact which should be tried, and therefore we have not considered it necessai'y to discuss other questions.

The judgment is reversed, with directions that it be set aside, and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 600

To require the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations concerning use

of the term ‘‘fresh’’ in the labeling of poultry, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 23, 1995

Mrs. BOXER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

A BILL

To require the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations

concerning use of the term ‘‘fresh’’ in the labeling of

poultry, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Truth in Poultry La5 beling Act of 1995’’.

6 SEC. 2. REGULATIONS ON LABELING OF POULTRY.

7 Not later than thirty days after the date of enactment

8 of this Act, the Secretary of Agriculture shall issue final

9 regulations under the Poultry Product Inspection Act (21

10 U.S.C. 451 et seq.) that prohibit the use of the term
2

S 600 IS

1 ‘‘fresh’’ on labeling of any poultry or poultry part, or of

2 any edible portion of the poultry or part, that has been

3 frozen or previously frozen to below 26 degrees Fahr4 enheit.

Æ
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Postal Service

# AGENCY:

                        Postal ServiceTM.                    

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

# DATES:

*Date of required notice:*                         February 8, 2024.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Sean C. Robinson, 202-268-8405.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The United States Postal Service® hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on January 30, 2024, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a                     *USPS Request to Add Priority Mail Express, Priority Mail & USPS Ground Advantage® Contract 44 to Competitive Product List.*                     Documents are available at                     *www.prc.gov,*                     Docket Nos. MC2024-173, CP2024-179.                

Sean C. Robinson,

Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.

[FR Doc. 2024-02543 Filed 2-7-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7710-12-P