alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-6917

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JAMES WILLIAMS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CR90-72-K) Submitted: October 7, 1999 Decided: October 14, 1999 Before MURNAGHAN, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Reeves Harding, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court’s denial of Williams’ motion for reconsideration is dated June 3, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on June 7, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the judgment or order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM: James Williams appeals the district court’s orders dismissing his motion for reduction of his term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2) (West Supp. 1999) and denying his motion toreconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Williams , No. CR-90-72-K (D. Md. Apr. 29 & June 7, 1999). * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

September 18, 2020

No. 04

- 20

- 00401

- CV

MESHBESHER & SPENCE, LTD. and Konstandinos Nicklow, Appellants

v. TODD MARQUARDT LAW FIRM,

Appellees

From the 166th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018

- CI

- 24208 Honorable Laura Salinas , Judge Presidi ng



### O R D E R

On September 15, 2020, appellants filed a brief that did not contain a table of contents or an index of authorities, as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(b), (c). On September 17, 2020, appellants filed an amended brief and an unopposed motion for leave to file the amended brief. After consideration, appellants’ motion is GRANTED

.

_________________________________ Beth Watkins , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 18th day of September, 2020

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
**Exhibit18.1**

 

August 12, 2005

 

 

Board of Directors

Whittier Energy Corporation

333 Clay Street, Suite 1000

Houston, Texas  77002

 

 

Dear Board of Directors:

 

As stated in notes 1 and 8 to the consolidated financial statements of WhittierEnergy Corporation and Subsidiaries (the “Company” or “Whittier”) for the interimperiod ended June 30, 2005, the Company changed its accounting policy for oiland gas properties to the full cost method of accounting from the successfulefforts method of accounting.  Managementbelieves the newly adopted accounting principle is preferable in thecircumstances because of the following reasons:

 

•                  Subsequentto the acquisition of RIMCO Production Company, Inc. (“RIMCO”), Whittierwill be much more focused on exploration activities. The full cost method ofaccounting was principally designed to provide a better matching of costs andrevenues for smaller oil and gas companies actively engaged in the explorationand development of oil and gas;

 

•                  Followingthe acquisition of RIMCO, Whittier’s prospect generation and explorationefforts will play a strategic role in how the Company intends to increasestockholder value.

 

•                  Themajority of Whittier’s peer group utilizes the full cost method. Managementbelieves the change will improve the comparability of Whittier’s financialstatements to its peers.

 

At your request, we have reviewed and discussed with management thecircumstances, business judgment, and planning that formed the basis for makingthis change in accounting principle.

 

It should be recognized that professional standards have not beenestablished for selecting among alternative principles that exist in this areaor for evaluating the preferability of alternative accounting principles.  Accordingly, we are furnishing this lettersolely for purposes of the Company’s compliance with the requirements of theSecurities and Exchange Commission, and it should not be used or relied on forany other purpose.

 

Based on our review and discussion, we concur with management’sjudgment that the newly adopted accounting principle is preferable in thecircumstances. In formulating this position, we are relying on management’sbusiness planning and judgment, which we do not find unreasonable.

 

----

 

We have not audited any consolidated financial statements of WhittierEnergy Corporation and Subsidiaries as of any date or for any period subsequentto December 31, 2004.  Accordingly,we are unable to express an opinion on whether the method of accounting for theeffect of the change is in conformity with accounting principles generallyaccepted in the United States of America or if the financial informationincluded in Part I of this Form 10-QSB is fairly presented.

 
| Very truly yours,      |
|------------------------|
|                   |
| /s/ Grant Thornton LLP |   |

 

2

----
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. [CASE NO.]2-03-263-CR

[APPELLANT NAME]BAQUEE ANTAR SABUR	APPELLANT

	V.

[APPELLEE NAME]THE STATE OF TEXAS	[APPELLEE OR STATE]STATE

	------------

	FROM THE [COURT]CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 DISTRICT COURT OF [COUNTY]TARRANT COUNTY

	------------

	OPINION

	------------

SABUR V. STATE

2-03-263-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	Appellant Baquee Antar Sabur pleaded guilty to credit card abuse pursuant to a plea bargain. [cr177,179]  Although the trial court certified that appellant had no right to appeal, he filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2003, appealing from his conviction. [cr181,191]   See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).  We dismiss the appeal.

	On July 16, 2003, we informed appellant that unless he showed grounds for continuing the appeal it would be dismissed.  Appellant responded by claiming he was appealing from the trial court’s rulings on pretrial motions addressing his right to a speedy trial and self-representation.   [see letter brief] Our review of the record does not reveal that appellant ever filed a motion for a speedy trial that was ruled on by the trial court.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(A).  Appellant filed, on the other hand, a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court raising the issue of speedingydy trial.  [cr78] Appellant later appealed to this court the trial court’s ruling on the petition, and we refused to address the claim, stating that a pretrial habeas application was not the proper vehicle to raise a speedy trial claim.  [cr161]  Ex parte Sabur, Nos. 2-02-305-CR, 2-02-306-CR, 2-02-307-CR, 2-02- 308-CR, slip op. at 2 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth Mar. 6, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication).  Appellant did not pursue the issue further in the trial court.  Furthermore, while appellant filed a motion for self-representation after his first attorney had been allowed to withdraw and a second attorney was appointed, no ruling was obtained on that motion. [cr106,108,155]  Thus, appellant cannot appeal from that motion.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(A).  Finally, appellant does not have the trial court’s permission to appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(B).    	

	Because appellant has not shown grounds for continuing the appeal, we dismiss this appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f). 	

							SAM J. DAY

							JUDSTICE

PANEL D:	DYAY, LIVINGSTON, ANDand DAUPHINOT, JJ.

DELIVERED		DO NOT PUBLISH

		Tex. R. App. P.  47.2(b)

DELIVERED:    August 21, 2003
Stephens & Johnson

Operating Co.; Henry W.

Breyer, III, Trust; CAH, Ltd.-

MOPI for Capital Account;

CAH, Ltd.-Stivers Capital

Account; CAH, Ltd.-Wiegand

Resources Capital Account

Wiegand Resources; C.T.

Carden; Myrl W. Deitch

Trust; E.R. Godbout Family

Tru Appellant/s Charles W. Schroeder, Elsie

A. Schroeder Schneider,

Hollis London, Terry



# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 12, 2015

N o. 04-14-00167-CV

STEPHENS & JOHNSON OPERATING CO .; Henry W. Breyer, III, Trust; CAH, Ltd.-MOPI

for Capital Account; CAH, Ltd.-Stivers Capital Account; CAH, Ltd.-Wiegand Resources Capital

Account Wiegand Resources; C.T. Carden; Myrl W. Deitch Trust; E.R. Godbout Family Trust;

Margaret J. Godbout; F.R. Keydel; R.L. Keydel; Pennye K. Maloney; David R. McNitt; RCA

Trust One; Donald B. Scott; Sunset Production Corporation; Genessee Country Museum

Appellants

v.

Charles W. SCHROEDER

, Elsie A. Schroeder Schneider, Hollis London, Terry Mengers Reel,

Ted Mengers, Debbie Mengers Quates, August H. Setinmeyer, Carole Schroeder Miller, James

M. Schroeder, Sally Schroeder Tinanus, James E. Schroeder, Sue Schroeder Stanford, Bill

Schroeder, Wayne Hennecke, Diane Hennecke Rhodes, Jerri James, W. Tom Hailey, and Peggy

Hailey,

Appellees

From the 229th Judicial District Court, Jim Hogg County, Texas

Trial Court No. CC-04-143

Honorable Ana Lisa Garza, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The brief of appellees was due January 5, 2015. Neither a brief nor a motion for

extension of time to file the brief has been filed.

We therefore order appellees, Charles W. Schroeder, Elsie A. Schroeder Schneider,

Hollis London, Terry Mengers Reel, Ted Mengers, Debbie Mengers Quates, August H.

Setinmeyer, Carole Schroeder Miller, James M. Schroeder, Sally Schroeder Tinanus, James E.

Schroeder, Sue Schroeder Stanford, Bill Schroeder, Wayne Hennecke, Diane Hennecke Rhodes,

Jerri James, W. Tom Hailey, and Peggy Hailey, to file their appellees’ brief by January 22,2015. If the brief is not filed by the date ordered, we will order the case submitted without an

appellees’ brief.

sbm

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 12th day of January, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Ralph Edward ADAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28826.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 13, 1957.

No attorney for appellant of record on appeal.

Henry Wade, Criminal Dist. Atty., George P. Blackburn, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, 3 days in jail and a fine of $125.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular and nothing is presented for review. The judgment is affirmed.
REGINALD HOLSTON,

Appellant,

v.

JULIE L. JONES, Secretary, 

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, 

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D15-1551

_____________________________/

Opinion filed June 17, 2016.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County.

David W. Fina, Judge.

Reginald Holston, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Mark S. Urban, Assistant Attorney General, 

Eric Gonzalez, Assistant Attorney General, and Kenneth Steely, General Counsel, 

Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, WINOKUR, and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.
FIRST AMENDMENT TO WARRANT RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT




 EXHIBIT 10.29 
  
 ATX TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
  
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO 
  
 WARRANT RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT 
  
 This FIRST AMENDMENT TO WARRANT RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT (the “Amendment”), is made and entered into as of June 15, 2004, and amends that
certain WARRANT RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT, dated as of March 25, 2004, (the “Warrant Restructuring Agreement”) by and among ATX Technologies, Inc., a Texas corporation, (“ATX”), ATX Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“ATX
Group”), and Sojitz Corporation of America (formerly known as Nichimen American, Inc.), a New York Corporation (“Sojitz”). 
  
 RECITALS: 
  
 WHEREAS, the Warrant Restructuring Agreement contemplates that each share of ATX Common Stock be converted in the “ATX Reorganization”
(as that term is defined in the Warrant Restructuring Agreement) into the right to receive at least 0.3, but no more than 0.5 shares of ATX Group Common Stock, subject to final determination by the Board of Directors, and such rate is defined in the
Warrant Restructuring Agreement as the “Exchange Ratio”; 
  
 WHEREAS, ATX, ATX Group and Sojitz desire to amend the definition of the Exchange Ratio to mean 0.278710150002407 shares of ATX Group Common Stock for each share of ATX Common Stock. 
  
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements contained herein, and in further consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained in the Leininger Note, and intending to be legally bound, the parties hereto do hereby agree as follows: 
  
 1. The definition of the Exchange Ratio set forth in the second whereas
clause of the Warrant Restructuring Agreement is hereby amended by deleting “(which shall not be less than 0.3) (such ratio of the number of shares of ATX Group Common Stock to be received in exchange for each share of ATX Common, as finally
determined by the board of directors of ATX, the ‘Exchange Ratio’)” and replacing that definition with “at a ratio of 0.278710150002407 shares of ATX Group Common Stock for each share of ATX Common Stock (the ‘Exchange
Ratio’).” 
  
 2. Except to the extent expressly
provided herein, the terms of the Warrant Restructuring Agreement remain in full force and effect. 
  
 3. This Amendment may be executed by facsimile signature and in any number of counterparts, each of which when so executed shall constitute an original
hereof, but all of which together shall constitute one amendment. 
  
 [signature page follows] 
  

 AMENDMENT TO WARRANT RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT - Page 1 









 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Amendment as of the day and year first
above written. 
  

			
	 ATX GROUP:
  
 ATX GROUP, INC.

		
	By:	 	 /s/ Steven A. Millstein

	Name:	 	 Steven A. Millstein

	Title:	 	 President and CEO

	
	 ATX:
  
 ATX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

		
	By:	 	 /s/ Steven A. Millstein

	Name:	 	 Steven A. Millstein

	Title:	 	 President and CEO

	
	 SOJITZ:
  
 SOJITZ CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC.

		
	By:	 	/s/ Ryutaro Hirai
	Name:	 	Ryutaro Hirai
	Title:	 	Vice President & Secretary


  

 AMENDMENT TO RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT - S-1
From: Philip Schwartz/DC/USEPA/US 

To: Alexander Cristofaro/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Nicole 

Owens/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Lesley Schaaff/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Eileen 

Pritchard/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Mariana Cubeddu/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Karen 

Thundiyil/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Darryl Adams/DC/USEPA/US@EPA 

Cc: Mary Henigin/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Joseph-J Dougherty/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, 

Ruthw Morgan/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Deborah Banks/DC/USEPA/US@EPA 

Date: 02/19/2011 10:57 AM 

Subject: Submitted to OMB: The Utility Toxics rule was Uploaded to 

ROCIS this Morning
#### Wanda Harper OBARTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 30414.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 11, 1959.

*817No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., Paul W. Leech and Merle Flagg, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The offense is operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway while intoxicated; the punishment, 30 days in jail and a fine of $100. '

The verdict was returned on May 23, 1958, and judgment was entered.

Motion for new trial was filed on the same day. Amended motion for new trial was filed on June 12, 1958.

The amended motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law at the expiration of the twenty days allowed by Art. 755, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. and the judgment became final. See Mahan v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 36, 288 S.W.2d 508; De Hay v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 516, 294 S.W.2d 401; Atkinson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 299 S.W.2d 951; Barton v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 310 S.W.2d 90; Pruitt v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 310 S.W.2d 338; Brinkley v. State, Tex., 320 S.W.2d 855; Torrez v. State, Tex., 316 S.W.2d 417; Brantley v. State, Tex., 320 S.W.2d 825.

No notice of appeal was given at the term of court during which the judgment was rendered and became final, as required by Art. 827, V.A.C.C.P.

On July 7, 1958, the court entered an order overruling appellant’s motion for new trial and pronounced sentence reciting that appellant gave notice of appeal.

In view of the majority holding in Feagin v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 310 S.W.2d 99, holding void the amendment of Art. 768, V.A.C.C.P., providing for sentence in misdemeanor cases as well as felonies, the sentence is a nullity and the notice of appeal therein comes too late.

The appeal is dismissed.
#### William I. TUCKER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 29300.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 27, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 15, 1958.

J. M. Parker, Gorman, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’e Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is burglary; the punishment, two years.

The statement of facts appearing in the record was not filed with the clerk of the trial court as required by Article 759a, Section 4, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. Therefore the statement, of facts cannot be considered. Williams v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 264 S.W. 2d 112.

The complaint and information, as well as all matters of procedure, appear regular; therefore nothing is presented for review.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing

DICE, Commissioner.

Appellant insists that the statement of facts was filed with the clerk of the trial court and therefore should be considered and in support thereof has attached to his motion for rehearing an affidavit of the clerk in which it is certified that the state*880ment of facts was filed in his office immediately after its approval.

While it now appears that the statement of facts was filed with the clerk of the trial court the record reflects that it was not filed within 90 days after notice of appeal was given as required by Art. 759a, sec. 4, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. The statement of facts, not having been filed within the 90 day period provided by Statute, cannot be considered. Hankins v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 294 S.W.2d 850 and Reynolds v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 306 S.W.2d 134.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

Opinion approved by the Court.
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1399 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently extend and 

expand the additional standard deduction for real property taxes for 

nonitemizers. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 6, 2011 

Mr. GRIMM (for himself and Mr. BISHOP of New York) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently 

extend and expand the additional standard deduction 

for real property taxes for nonitemizers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Homeowner Tax Fair5 ness Act of 2011’’. 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1399 IH

1 SEC. 2. PERMANENT EXTENSION AND EXPANSION OF ADDI2 TIONAL STANDARD DEDUCTION FOR REAL 

3 PROPERTY TAXES FOR NONITEMIZERS. 

4 (a) PERMANENT EXTENSION.—Subparagraph (C) of 

5 section 63(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 

6 amended by striking ‘‘in the case of any taxable year be7 ginning in 2008 or 2009,’’. 

8 (b) REMOVAL OF DOLLAR LIMITATION.—Paragraph 

9 (7) of section 63(c) of such Code is amended to read as 

10 follows: 

11 ‘‘(7) REAL PROPERTY TAX DEDUCTION.—For 

12 purposes of paragraph (1), the real property tax de13 duction is equal to the amount allowable as a deduc14 tion under this chapter for State and local taxes de15 scribed in section 164(a)(1). Any taxes taken into 

16 account under section 62(a) shall not be taken into 

17 account under this paragraph.’’. 

18 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

19 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

20 December 31, 2009. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 29 (Monday, February 12, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 9882]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-02932]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meetings

TIME AND DATE: 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, February 15, 2024.

PLACE: The meeting will be held via remote means and/or at the 
Commission's headquarters, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

STATUS: This meeting will be closed to the public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Commissioners, Counsel to the Commissioners, 
the Secretary to the Commission, and recording secretaries will attend 
the closed meeting. Certain staff members who have an interest in the 
matters also may be present.
    In the event that the time, date, or location of this meeting 
changes, an announcement of the change, along with the new time, date, 
and/or place of the meeting will be posted on the Commission's website 
at https://www.sec.gov.
    The General Counsel of the Commission, or her designee, has 
certified that, in her opinion, one or more of the exemptions set forth 
in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(3), (5), (6), (7), (8), 9(B) and (10) and 17 CFR 
200.402(a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(9)(ii) and (a)(10), 
permit consideration of the scheduled matters at the closed meeting.
    The subject matter of the closed meeting will consist of the 
following topics:

    Institution and settlement of injunctive actions;
    Institution and settlement of administrative proceedings;
    Resolution of litigation claims; and
    Other matters relating to examinations and enforcement 
proceedings.

    At times, changes in Commission priorities require alterations in 
the scheduling of meeting agenda items that may consist of 
adjudicatory, examination, litigation, or regulatory matters.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: For further information; please 
contact Vanessa A. Countryman from the Office of the Secretary at (202) 
551-5400.
    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552b.

    Dated: February 8, 2024.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2024-02932 Filed 2-8-24; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P