J-S91045-16

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHN M. DILIBERTO 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2212 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 23, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-SA-0000203-2015

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 27, 2016

Appellant, John M. Diliberto, appeals pro se from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County following 

his conviction on the sole charge of driving without a license, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1501(a). We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the facts underlying this case, in relevant part, 

as follows:

On July 6, 2015, Trooper Konstantin Dyakov, employed by 

the Pennsylvania State Police since July 17, 2014, was working 

patrol. Trooper Dyakov was working on PA 283 westbound and 

was returning to the police station. At the same time, he was 

running the registration plates of cars that he was passing by. 

Trooper Dyakov ran the registration plate of [Appellant’s 

vehicle] and determined that [Appellant’s] driver’s license was 
J-S91045-16

- 2 -

expired.1 Trooper Dyakov further determined that [Appellant’s] 

driver’s license expired on September 23, 2013. Next, the 

trooper identified the picture from PennDOT (on the driver’s 

license) as the same person driving the car. Trooper Dyakov 

proceeded to point out that [Appellant] sitting at the defense 

table was the same person on the day of the incident.

Trooper Dyakov verified that the driver was in fact the 

registered owner of the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. 

Trooper Dyakov informed the driver that he was pulling him over 

for an expired driver’s license and the driver produced the 

driver’s license of John Diliberto which was indeed expired on 

September 23, 2013. 

On cross-examination, Trooper Dyakov testified that his 

selection of vehicles in which to run plates is purely random. 

Trooper Dyakov further testified that he had several 

opportunities to observe the driver. First, when he ran 

[Appellant’s] registration; second, when he received the photo, 

he slowed down and allowed [Appellant] to pass his patrol 

vehicle; and third, [ ] when the Trooper had initially passed 

[Appellant], [he] observed [Appellant] in his rearview mirror. 

Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed 4/21/15, at 2 (footnotes and 

citations to record omitted) (footnote in original). 

Trooper Dyakov issued a citation to Appellant for driving without a 

license, and a magisterial district judge later found him guilty of the offense. 

On September 21, 2015, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the trial court.

On November 16, 2015, Appellant filed a pre-trial motion alleging the 

stop of his vehicle was improper and seeking dismissal of all charges. The 

____________________________________________

1 Trooper Dyakov had a printout from the patrol vehicle computer that told 

him the registered owner of the Honda Accord (the vehicle in question) is 

John Diliberto, his address, his driver’s license information, and that his 

license was expired. 
J-S91045-16

- 3 -

trial court denied the motion, and on November 23, 2015, the trial court

held a summary appeal trial at which Trooper Dyakov testified. The trial 

court found Appellant guilty of the offense, and then imposed a fine and 

costs of $200.00. 

Appellant filed a timely pro se appeal to this Court, and on January 4, 

2016, the trial court directed Appellant to file a Statement pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). The trial court’s order 

provided, inter alia, that the Statement was to be filed “no later than 

twenty-one (21) days from receipt of th[e] [o]rder[;]” the Statement was to 

be filed of record and served upon the trial court judge; Appellant risked 

waiver of his claims if not set forth in a “concise,” “non-redundant,” “readily 

ascertainable” manner; and issues not included in the Statement would be 

deemed waived. Trial Court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Order, filed 1/4/16. The 

record contains a notation that the trial court’s order was mailed to Appellant 

on January 4, 2016. Thereafter, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement was 

filed with the Prothonotary on January 28, 2016.2 On April 21, 2016, the 

trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion. 

Appellant presents the following issues, which we set forth verbatim, 

in his “Statement of Questions Involved:”

____________________________________________

2

Inasmuch as the trial court’s January 4, 2016, order permitted Appellant to 

file his Rule 1925(b) Statement no later than twenty-one days from 

Appellant’s receipt of the order, we are unable to determine whether 

Appellant filed his Statement in a timely manner on January 28, 2016. 
J-S91045-16

- 4 -

1. Did the lower court err in not dismissing the Commonwealth’s 

charge against Appellant on the basis that the random, suspicionless “running” of Appellant’s license plate by Pennsylvania State 

Police (PSP) Trooper Dyakov through his mobile data terminal was

in violation of both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 

and Article I, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as there 

was no probable cause or reasonable, articulable individualized 

suspicion to believe that the Appellant has been engaged in any 

criminal activity prior to the license plate “check”?

2. Did the lower court err in not dismissing the Commonwealth’s 

charge against Appellant on the basis that all interactions with 

Appellant on July 6, 2015, subsequent to the “running” of 

Appellant’s license plate were unlawful?

3. Did the lower court err in not dismissing the Commonwealth’s 

charge against Appellant on the basis that Appellant possesses a 

common law right to travel and that the Commonwealth failed to 

demonstrate that Appellant was “driving” (and not merely 

“traveling”), and so subject to the Commonwealth’s requirements 

for “driver” licensing?

4. Did the lower court err in not dismissing the Commonwealth’s 

charge against Appellant on the basis that the driver’s license 

renewal process entails no assessment of competency in controlling 

an automobile upon the public roadways, one of the chief purported 

aims of license renewal?

5. Did the lower court commit abuses of discretion and violate 

established standards of judicial conduct, thereby denuding its 

adjudication of the Commonwealth’s charge against Appellant of 

any legitimacy in its demeanor and mistreatment of the Appellant 

during the November 23, 2015, Dauphin County Court of Common 

Pleas trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5. 

Preliminarily, we note the trial court indicated in its Rule 1925(a) 

Opinion that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement was vague and did not 

sufficiently identify the issues for appeal. Specifically, the trial court 

indicated the following: 
J-S91045-16

- 5 -

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has concluded that a 

[Rule] 1925(b) “Statement must be ‘concise’ and coherent [so] 

as to permit the trial court to understand the specific issues 

being raised on appeal.” Jiricko v. Geico Insurance Company, 

947 A.2d 206, 211 (Pa.Super. 2008). Where the Statement is 

so incoherent, confusing, or redundant that it impairs appellate 

review, issues in the Statement are deemed waived. Id. at 213. 

In the instant matter, [Appellant] has filed a [four page] 

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal 

(“Statement”) that includes twelve paragraphs of alleged error. 

It is unclear what [Appellant] is alleging. [Appellant] makes 

reference to both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 

and Article I, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

(paragraph 1 [of the Statement]); the “running” of [Appellant’s] 

license plate was unlawful (paragraph 2 [of the Statement]); 

that Trooper Dyakov had no probable cause to search 

[Appellant’s] driving records (paragraph 3 [of the Statement]); 

that [Appellant] was “misled by authority figures in his life at the 

time into believing that he would be driving a motor vehicle and 

not merely traveling in his personal conveyance” (paragraph 5 

[of the Statement]); that the Commonwealth should “share in 

the liability if [a] driver were to damage property or injure a 

person while driving” (paragraph 7 [of the Statement]); that the 

[c]ourt erred in not dismissing the charge against [Appellant] on 

the basis that “no flesh-and-blood injured party could be 

produced by the [c]ourt” (paragraph 9 [of the Statement]); and 

that the [c]ourt “egregiously violated established standards of 

judicial conduct” (paragraph 11 [of the Statement]).[3] 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant additionally alleged in his Statement that he possesses a 

common law right to travel and the Commonwealth failed to prove Appellant 

was “driving” and not “traveling” (paragraph 4 of the Statement); that 

“incorporating into the Pennsylvania Driver’s License document a portrait 

photo of sufficient resolution to permit computerized, biometric analysis and 

identification of an individual” constitutes a significant step in the creation of 

a “Surveillance State” (paragraph 6 of the Statement); that 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1501(a) is “erroneously categorized as a criminal offense” (paragraph 8 of 

the Statement); that the trial court did not engage in a “substantive 

consideration” of Appellant’s pre-trial motion (paragraph 10 of the 

Statement); and that the trial court “violated its oath of office in the 

handling of this case” (paragraph 12 of the Statement). 
J-S91045-16

- 6 -

[Appellant’s] Statement does not sufficiently identify the issues 

being raised on appeal. 

Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed 4/21/16, at 3-4 (emphasis and 

footnotes omitted) (footnote added). We agree.

“The purpose of Rule 1925 is to narrow the focus of an appeal to those 

issues which the appellant wishes to raise on appeal.” Mahonski v. Engel, 

145 A.3d 175, 180 (Pa.Super. 2016). The rule sets forth clear requirements 

to avoid waiver, including:

(i) The Statement shall set forth only those rulings or 

errors that the appellant intends to challenge.

(ii) The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or 

error that the appellant intends to challenge with 

sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the 

judge. . . .

***

(iv) The Statement should not be redundant or provide 

lengthy explanations as to any error. Where nonredundant, non-frivolous issues are set forth in an 

appropriately concise manner, the number of issues 

raised will not alone be grounds for finding waiver. 

***

(vii) Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised 

in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph 

(b)(4) are waived.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(i), (ii), (iv), and (vii). 

In interpreting Rule 1925(b), this Court has held that a Rule 1925(b) 

Statement must be “sufficiently concise and coherent such that the trial 

court judge may be able to identify the issues to be raised on appeal, and 
J-S91045-16

- 7 -

the circumstances must not suggest the existence of bad faith.” Jiricko, 

947 A.2d at 210. Further,

Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and 

focusing upon those issues which the parties plan to raise on 

appeal. Rule 1925 is thus a crucial component of the appellate 

process. When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is 

appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review. When an 

appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner the 

issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded 

in its preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent to those 

issues. 

Commonwealth v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109, 1114 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quotation 

omitted). 

In other words, a Rule 1925(b) Statement which is so voluminous, 

vague, incoherent, or confusing as to prevent the trial court from engaging 

in a meaningful analysis is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement 

at all. See Mahonski, supra (finding waiver of all claims where Statement 

was overly vague, redundant, and contained multiple sub-issues); Ray, 

supra (finding waiver of all claims where the appellant failed to identify his 

claims in an adequate and concise manner).

Here, the trial court indicated that, at trial, Appellant attempted to use 

the proceeding “for the purpose of conducting a sweeping ‘fishing expedition’ 

in order to advocate what eventually became apparent as a political/social 

agenda. The [c]ourt was continually required to re-direct [Appellant’s] 

inquiries [at trial] to relevant and pertinent matters.” Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) Opinion, filed 4/21/15, at 4. The trial court further indicated that, 
J-S91045-16

- 8 -

in a similar manner, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement set forth many 

incoherent issues “irrelevant to the facts of the case.” Id. Accordingly, the 

trial court declined to draft an opinion analyzing individually the issues 

presented in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, noting instead that the 

evidence sufficiently established Appellant’s guilt and “Appellant labors under 

some grossly misdirected view of the government of this Commonwealth[.]” 

Id. at 4. 

In light of the aforementioned, we agree with the trial court that 

Appellant has failed to preserve the issues he may have raised on appeal in 

a properly filed Rule 1925(b) Statement. The record supports the trial 

court’s determination that the four page Rule 1925(b) Statement submitted 

by Appellant in this relatively straightforward case is not sufficiently concise, 

contained numerous vague assertions, and failed to coherently set forth 

non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal. See Mahonski, supra. 

While we acknowledge Appellant is proceeding pro se in this appeal, 

his pro se status does not entitle him to any advantage due to his lack of 

legal training. Ray, supra. Rather, as a pro se litigant, Appellant must still 

abide by the Rules of Appellate Procedure and his decision to represent 

himself requires him to “a reasonable extent assume[ ] the risk that his legal 
J-S91045-16

- 9 -

training will place him at a disadvantage.” Id. at 1114-115 (citation 

omitted).4

____________________________________________

4 We note that Appellant has carried forth in his appellate brief his practice 

of presenting vague and irrelevant assertions suggesting political/social 

reform. For instance, Appellant admits that, pursuant to Commonwealth 

v. Bolton, 831 A.2d 734 (Pa.Super. 2003, Trooper Dyakov was not required 

to have any level of suspicion before checking Appellant’s vehicle’s 

registration plate since such was in plain view; however, Appellant suggests 

that Bolton’s holding has increased the expansion of Pennsylvania into a 

“Surveillance State.” Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. To the extent Appellant 

asks us to overrule Bolton, we decline to do so. See Commonwealth v. 

Pepe, 897 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“A three-judge panel of this 

court may not overrule a decision by another three-judge panel unless our 

supreme court has called the previous panel’s decision into question.”) 

(citation omitted)). Further, Appellant argues that, as a matter of policy, we 

should interpret 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 to apply solely to corporations and not 

to private individuals. See Appellant’s Brief at 19-39. We decline to do so. 

Finally, it is noteworthy that substantial portions of the argument 

section of Appellant’s brief consists of nothing more than large, irrelevant 

block quotes. Further, his final argument, which pertains to alleged 

improper conduct by the trial court judge, consists primarily of a list of 

pages from the trial transcript with notations such as “contempt,” “sarcasm

and ridicule,” “intimidation,” and “overt bias.” Thus, assuming, arguendo, 

Appellant filed a proper Rule 1925(b) Statement, we would decline to 

address the merits of his issues due to the extensive briefing deficiencies. 
J-S91045-16

- 10 -

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/27/2016