NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TONY HINES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

JAMES DZURENDA; BRIAN WILLIAMS, 

Warden, Warden; JENNIFER NASH, 

Associate Warden; JAMES SCALLY; 

JOSEPH LEWIS; DARREN SPENCE; 

DARREN SPIECE; OFFICE OF THE 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF 

NEVADA, 

Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 22-15452, 22-16234

D.C. No. 

2:18-cv-02373-JAD-NJK 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 15, 2024 

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: GRABER, DESAI, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

In these consolidated cases, Nevada state prisoner Tony Hines appeals from 

the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

MAY 23 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

process violations in connection with a prison disciplinary proceeding, Case No. 

22-15452, and a post-judgment order denying his Rule 60(b) motion, Case No. 22-

16234.

1

 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment. Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 

1090 (9th Cir. 2016) (cross-motions for summary judgment). We review for an 

abuse of discretion motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). United 

States v. Asarco, Inc., 430 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm summary 

judgment in Case No. 22-15452 and dismiss Case No. 22-16234.

1. In Case No. 22-15452, the district court properly granted summary

judgment for Lt. Spiece on Hines’s claim alleging inadequate disclosure of the 

evidence against him. Hines did not receive the confidential evidence or a

description of it because disclosing it could (1) reveal the confidential informants’ 

identities, which in turn would affect future cooperation, and (2) compromise the 

safety and security of the facilities. These reasons allow the prison to withhold 

evidence. See Melnik v. Dzurenda, 14 F.4th 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that 

prison officials may limit a prisoner’s right to access evidence for a disciplinary 

hearing if they have a “legitimate penological reason” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)); Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 187–88, 187 n.2

1 We previously consolidated the two appeals and assigned pro bono counsel to 

Hines. 
3 

(9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (noting that information that would reveal a 

confidential informant’s identity and threaten his safety was properly withheld 

from the prisoner).

The district court also properly granted summary judgment for Lt. Spiece on

Hines’s claim alleging improper reliance on confidential informants. The 

confidential information on which the disciplinary committee relied was 

sufficiently reliable because the evidence was corroborated and because the 

investigative report linked Hines to introducing drugs into the prison. See 

Zimmerlee, 831 F.2d at 186–87 (explaining criteria for determining when reliance 

on unidentified inmate informants satisfies due process); Superintendent, Mass.

Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985) (noting that the “some 

evidence” standard does not require courts to independently assess the credibility 

of witnesses or weigh the evidence).

Also, Hines received proper notice to understand the charges against him 

and prepare a defense as required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 

Hines was informed about the conduct at issue, given an approximate date of when 

the violation occurred, and was told that his charge was the result of a formal 

investigation. Although the information provided in the notice was general, it was

sufficient to allow a reasonable person to understand the charges and prepare a 

defense. See id. at 564 (holding that notice given to an inmate must be sufficient to 
4 

“enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense”); see also Ashker v. 

Newsom, 81 F.4th 863, 879 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Notice satisfying due process . . . 

need not painstakingly detail all facts relevant to the date, place, and manner of 

charged inmate misconduct; it must simply permit a reasonable person to 

understand what conduct is at issue so that he may identify relevant evidence and 

present a defense” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Because Hines failed to show that Lt. Spiece violated his due process rights, 

Lt. Spiece is shielded from civil liability by qualified immunity. See Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (explaining that public officials are not shielded by 

qualified immunity if the plaintiff shows “(1) that the official violated a statutory 

or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of 

the challenged conduct” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We need 

not consider the “clearly established constitutional right” prong of qualified 

immunity in this case. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 230–32, 235–36 

(2009) (holding that courts may exercise their discretion in deciding which prong 

to address first). 

2. Hines expressly waived his appeal in case No. 22-16234; we do not 

consider an issue or appeal that is waived. Thus, we dismiss this case. 

Case No. 22-15452 is AFFIRMED. 

Case No. 22-16234 is DISMISSED.