alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### S. S. Kresge Co., Appellant, *v.*Butte et al., Appellees. 

(No. 27401

Decided February 23, 1939.)

*Messrs. Galvin é Babin*and *Mr. B. II.*Schwarts, foi appellant.

*Mr. Ralph B. Cohen, Mr. Thomas S. Jones*and *Mr. David M. Spriggs,*for appellees.

It is ordered and adjudged that said appeal as of right be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Day, Zimmerman, Williams, Myers, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50937

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CARLOS SANCHEZ-DOMINGUEZ and

OMAR PRIETO-TREVIZO,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(P-97-CR-232-3)

July 15, 1999

Before POLITZ, JOLLY, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Carlos Sanchez-Dominguez and Omar Prieto-Trevizo appeal their

convictions for importation and possession with intent to distribute marihuana,

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, denials of motions to suppress the

marihuana seized and certain post-arrest statements, and the jury charge on aiding

and abetting. Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of counsel and
pertinent parts of the record, and finding no reversible error, the convictions and

sentences are AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned  hereby certifies in her capacity as Chief Financial  Officer of
Belmar Capital Fund LLC (the "Fund"), that:

     (a)  the  Quarterly  Report of the Fund on Form 10-Q for the quarter  ended
          March 31, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the  requirements of
          Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     (b)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material  respects,   the  financial  condition  and  the  results  of
          operations of the Fund for such period.

A SIGNED  ORIGINAL OF THIS  WRITTEN  STATEMENT  REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 HAS BEEN
PROVIDED  TO THE FUND  AND WILL BE  RETAINED  BY THE FUND AND  FURNISHED  TO THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ITS STAFF UPON REQUEST.

Dated:  May 15, 2003



                                           /s/ Michelle A. Alexander
                                           ----------------------------
                                               Michelle A. Alexander
                                               Chief Financial Officer
#### R. F. TOWNE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 37484

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 6, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1965.

*855No attorney of record on appeal.

Sam Jones, Jr., Dist. Atty., Clifford L. Zarsky and Douglas Tinker, Asst. Dist, Attys., Corpus Christi, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

The conviction is for defrauding with a worthless check, with a prior conviction alleged for enhancement; the punishment, ten years.

The disposition of this case makes a summary of the facts unnecessary.

The indictment, in charging the primary offense, alleged that the appellant by the delivery of the check described in the indictment with the intent to defraud, obtained certain personal property of the ■value of $72.82 from the injured party. It further alleged that appellant fraudulently represented to the injured party that the check was good, which representation he knew was false; and that the injured party at the time of its acceptance believed it was good, and relied upon and was deceived by said pretenses and fraudulent representations, and by virtue thereof, parted with possession and title of said property.

In the charge, the court required the jury to find, as the indictment alleged, that appellant made the representation to the injured party that the check was good, that the injured party believed and relied upon said representations, and that by virtue thereof she parted with the possession and title of said property.

According to the evidence, the appellant made no representations to the injured party concerning the check, and there is no evidence that the injured party relied upon any representations made by the appellant to her at the time the check was delivered and accepted.

■ The evidence fqils t.o show, as alleged in the indictment, that false representations were mq.de by the appellant and relied upon by the injured party. Therefore the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction. Goodwin v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 485, 320 S.W.2d 852. See also Gutierrez v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 493, 352 S.W.2d 124.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

Opinion approved by the Court.
DISMISS and Opinion Filed April 20, 2021 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-20-00755-CV 

SAM C. TAMBORELLO, Appellant 

V. 

TOWN OF HIGHLAND PARK, TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-06613 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Goldstein, and Justice Smith 

Opinion by Chief Justice Burns 

Under Texas law, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment that disposes 

of all parties and claims or an interlocutory order as permitted by statute. See Jack 

B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992). The appeal here 

challenges the trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion to reconsider the 

dismissal of his claims against appellee. As reflected in the record, the underlying 

suit was filed by appellant against appellee and several other parties. The claims 

against appellee were dismissed pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, but 

they were not severed from the remaining claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a 
 –2– 

(authorizing dismissal of baseless causes of action); Aviation Composite Techs., Inc. 

v. CLB Corp., 131 S.W3d 181, 187 n.5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (“[A] 

trial court may sever dismissed claims from remaining claims in order to render an 

otherwise interlocutory judgment final and appealable.”). 

Because the appealed order did not dispose of all parties and claims and no 

statute authorizes an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a rule 91a motion 

to dismiss, we questioned our jurisdiction over the appeal. See In re Farmers Tex. 

Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 604 S.W.3d 421, 429 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, orig. 

proceeding). Although we directed appellant to file a letter brief addressing our 

concern and cautioned that failure to do so by March 5, 2021 could result in dismissal 

of the appeal without further notice, appellant failed to comply. Accordingly, as the 

record before us does not demonstrate our jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). 

200755F.P05 

 

/Robert D. Burns, III/ 

ROBERT D. BURNS, III 

CHIEF JUSTICE 
 –3– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

SAM C. TAMBORELLO, Appellant 

No. 05-20-00755-CV V. 

TOWN OF HIGHLAND PARK, 

TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 160th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-06613. 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice 

Burns, Justices Goldstein and Smith 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal. 

 We ORDER that appellee Town of Highland Park, Texas recover its costs, if 

any, of this appeal from appellant Sam C. Tamborello. 

Judgment entered April 20, 2021.
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

YISSUM RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 

OF THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM,

Appellant

v.

SONY CORPORATION,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1342

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2013-

00219.

--------------------------------------------------------------

YISSUM RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 

OF THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM,

Appellant

v.

SONY CORPORATION,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1343

______________________ 
 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2013-

00218.

______________________ 

JUDGMENT

______________________ 

CRAIG E. COUNTRYMAN, Fish & Richardson, P.C., San 

Diego, CA, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

JOHN A. DRAGSETH, Minneapolis, MN.

WALTER E. HANLEY, JR., Kenyon & Kenyon LLP, New

York, NY, argued for appellee. Also represented by 

MICHELLE CARNIAUX, MARK A. CHAPMAN. 

SCOTT WEIDENFELLER, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, 

argued for intervenor Michelle K. Lee. Also represented 

by NATHAN K. KELLEY, FRANCES M. LYNCH. 

______________________ 

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (PROST, Chief Judge, DYK and TARANTO,

Circuit Judges).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

December 11, 2015 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole

 Date Daniel E. O’Toole 

 Clerk of Court
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6086

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

GLORIA A. MCCUTCHEON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. Cameron McGowan Currie, District

Judge. (CR-97-866)

Submitted: May 16, 2002 Decided: May 23, 2002

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gloria A. McCutcheon, Appellant Pro Se. William Earl Day, II,

Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Gloria A. McCutcheon appeals the district court’s order

denying her request for an extension of time to file a motion under

28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2001). We have reviewed the record

and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States

v. McCutcheon, No. CR-97-866 (D.S.C. Dec. 17, 2001). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-14-00727-CV

Naomi Jefferson, Appellant

v.

Nate the Great Trust, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. C-1-CV-14-009036, HONORABLE J. DAVID PHILLIPS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On January 8, 2015, this Court sent notice to appellant Naomi Jefferson that the

clerk’s record and reporter’s record were due in this Court on December 12, 2014, and that notice

was received from the Travis County clerk’s office that no payment had been received or

arrangements made for payment for the clerk’s record. This Court requested that appellant make

arrangements for the record and submit a status report. Appellant was notified that her appeal would

be dismissed for want of prosecution if she did respond to this Court by January 20, 2015. This

Court received a letter from appellant on February 9, 2015. She provided a new address and

indicated that she would pay for the record.

On February 11, 2015, this Court sent another notice to appellant requesting that

appellant make arrangements for the record and submit a status report. Appellant was notified

that her appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution if she did respond to this Court by
February 23, 2015. To date, appellant has not responded. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for

want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b), (c).

__________________________________________

Melissa Goodwin, Justice

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Field

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: March 17, 2015

2
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

July 23, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 131180 & (17) Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 131180 COA: 269209 Lenawee CC: 97-007240-FH EUGENE KNIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The application for leave to ap peal the March 31, 2006 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that th e questions presented should be reviewed by this C ourt. The denial is without prejudice to the defendant’s right
to file a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 6.500 et seq . that may include the issues whether the 15-yea r maximum sentence represen ts a violation of the plea agreement, which the circuit c ourt in part characterized as the defendant agreeing to plead guilty to “the charge of perj ury with the understanding that the initial sentence would be limited to a maximum of five years in pris on”, and whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object on this ground. See Plea Tr anscript (April 30, 1997), at pp. 2-4, 8-9.

s0716 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

July 23, 2008

Clerk
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.8

[Splinex logo]

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

May 20, 2004

Jerry Herlihy
2850 Farragut Lane
West Palm Beach, FL 33409

Dear Jerry:

On behalf of Splinex, Inc., I am very pleased to offer you the position of CHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER based upon the following terms:

         o  A salary of $110,000 per year, paid semi-monthly.

         o  An annual target bonus up to 50% of annual salary based on
            performance and Board approval.

         o  Options to purchase 100,000 shares of post stock split Splinex, Inc.
            common stock.

         o  You will be required to sign the Company's Nondisclosure Agreement,
            its Confidentiality Agreement and its Business Code of Conduct, as a
            condition of accepting this position.

         o  Medical and dental insurance coverage shall begin on the first of
            the month following 30 days of employment.

         o  A mutually agreeable start date will be established upon your
            acceptance of this offer.

         o  Your employment with Splinex will be on an "at will" basis.

         o  You will be entitled to receive three (3) weeks of paid vacation per
            12 months of employment relative to your anniversary date.

We are excited about the prospect of you joining our team. If the above proposal
meets your approval, please sign below and fax back to 954 556 4031.

 Thank you again for your time and I look forward hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Kevin Fitzgerald
Director
Splinex, Inc.

Print Name   Gerard Herlihy

Signature /s/ Gerard Herlihy                 date:
          -----------------------                  -----------------------------
Order entered February 8, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01290-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.C.T AND L.D.T, CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 256th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-82-17818

ORDER

We GRANT appellant’s February 4, 2013 motion for an extension of time to file a brief. 

Appellant shall file her brief on or before March 6, 2013.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE
#### Faizi Mohammad SYED, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 01-71780.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 22, 2002.*

Decided July 31, 2002.

Before: BROWNING, KOZINSKI, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Faizi Syed, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) order denying his application for asylum, withholding of deportation, and suspension of deportation. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), as amended by section 309(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Because the BIA’s decision incor* porated that of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), we review the IJ’s reasoning. *Gonzalez v. INS,*82 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir.1996). We review the IJ’s factual findings for substantial evidence, *Cordon-Garcia v. INS,*204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir.2000), and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the Immigration Judge’s finding that Syed’s testimony regarding his fear of persecution was not credible because Syed’s testimony contained numerous material inconsistencies. *See Valderrama v. INS,*260 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.2001). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Syed was not eligible for asylum. *See Cuadras v. INS,*910 F.2d 567, 571-72 (9th Cir.1990). Because Syed did not meet the standard for asylum, he cannot satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of deportation, and the IJ did not err in not explicitly addressing this claim. *See Valderrama,*260 F.3d at 1085.

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s conclusion that Syed is not eligible for suspension of deportation because Syed failed to satisfy the continuous physical presence requirement. *See Ram v. INS,*243 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir.2001).

Syed’s due process rights were not violated. The BIA may adopt the IJ’s decision. *Alaelua v. INS,*45 F.3d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.1995). There is no indication in the record that the IJ was biased against Syed.

Because Syed has not raised the issue of his eligibility for relief based on his marriage to a United States citizen before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim. *Ortiz v. INS,*179 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.1999). To present this claim, Syed must file a motion to reopen with the BIA. *Khourassany v. INS,*208 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.2000). We stay the mandate for a period of ninety days to allow Syed the opportunity to file a motion to reopen with the BIA for an adjustment of status based on his marriage to a United States citizen. *See Ortiz,*179 F.3d at 1156; *Oli*
      *143
      *var v. INS,*967 F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir.1992).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. MANDATE STAYED for 90 days.

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
exv10w12xby



 





EXHIBIT 10.12(b)




AMENDMENT TO PARTS SOURCING CONTRACT




     This Amendment to Parts Sourcing Contract (“Amendment”) is made and
entered into to be effective as of the                      day of September, 1999, between
the GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, a New York corporation, acting through its GE
Appliances business component (“GE”) and WIREKRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC., a Delaware
corporation (“Wirekraft”), and amends further that certain Parts Sourcing
Contract effective the 2nd day of December, 1994, between GE and Wirekraft
(“Sourcing Contract”).



     GE and Wirekraft have reached an understanding regarding the pricing terms
set forth in the Sourcing Contract and wish to document their agreement in this
Amendment.



     IN CONSIDERATION OF the mutual covenants herein, and for other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the
parties agree as follows:



     1. Section 2 of Exhibit C of the Contract is hereby amended to add the
following:




	 	 	 	“Payment terms to Controladora Mabe, S.A. de C.V. of [*] days for
Wire Harnesses is an exception to this Section 2.”




     2. All of the other terms of the Sourcing Contract and the Agreement not
modified by this Amendment shall remain in full force and effect.



[SIGNATURES ON FOLLOWING PAGE]




* Omitted pursuant to a request for

confidential treatment and filed

separately with the Securities and

Exchange Commission.




 









 





     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be entered
into as of the date and year first above written.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY	 	WIREKRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC.
	GE Appliances	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	By:

	 	/s/ David Meke	 	By:	 	/s/  Joseph M. Fiamingo
	

	 	
 
	 	 	 	
 
	Title:

	 	Controls LBT Leader	 	Title:	 	President & COO
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD 

JEFFREY L. HOLLISTER 

Pres~dent, 

Vanguard Paints and Finishes, Inc. 

PRESIDENT 

ERIC L. BURKLAND 

July 14,201 1 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Water Docket 

Mail Code: 4203: 4203M 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20460 

Attn: Docket ID No: EPA-HQ-OW-2008-0667 

Dear Administrator Jackson: 

anufacturers 

OCEATION 

I am pleased to provide these comments on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (US 

EPA) proposed cooling water intake structure rule (water rule) that was published in the Federal 

Register on April 20, 2010 at 76 FR 22, 174. The Ohio Manufacturers' Association (OMA) is in 

its 10lSt year representing the manufacturing industry in Ohio. The OMA represents over 1500 

manufacturing employers in Ohio of all sizes and industries. 

If implemented, the proposed one-size fits all water rule could have disastrous effects on Ohio's 

economy through increased electricity rates. Generally, environmental requirements are 

straight "pass through" costs for electric utilities. This means that, no matter what the amount, if 

the environmental improvement is required, an electric utility can simply pass along the increase 

to customers through rates. 

This negative effect can be alleviated without a decrease in environmental protection simply by 

granting states authority to tailor solutions to their specific needs. As others have commented, 

the United States Supreme Court made clear that the Clean Water Act allows for an 

examination of the costs and benefits of effective technologies in individual circumstances. 

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1498 (2009). 

The OMA respectfully urges US EPA to make the following modifications to the water rule: 

Require cost-benefit analysis for impingement as well as entrainment. 

Allow states to determine "best technology availableJ' for impingement according to sitespecific assessments. 

Provide compliance flexibility for impingement national mortality percentage limit or 

intake velocity limit. 

These improvements will allow electric utilities to comply with the environmental objective of the 

proposal without undue cost increases. As Ohio and America struggle to recover from the 

prolonged economic slump, effective environmental policies that provide operational flexibility 

while meeting environmental goals are necessary. 77 

Kevin 

Director, Public POI^ Services 

33 N. HIGH ST, COLUMBUS, OH 43215-3005 614-224-5111 1-800-662-4463 FAX 614-224-1012