alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
master_ai_idnsr_permit_no owner company_name airs_no sic county municipalitysource_classification

7 Farmers Coop Association Farmers Coop Assoc - Farmers Coop Cotton Gin 0724-Cotton Gin Chaves Minor

46 1669 Farmers Coop Association Farmers Coop Assoc - Cotton Gin No1669 3500500740724-Cotton Gin Chaves Hagerman Synthetic Minor

129 0961 Mesa Farmer's Co-op Mesa Farmers Coop - Cotton Gin No0961 3501300090724-Cotton Gin Dona Ana Vado Synthetic Minor

140 GF Four Points Gin Four Points Gin 3501300200724-Cotton Gin Dona Ana Mesilla No Permit Required

156 BE Harvey Gin Co BEHarvey Gin Co 3501300390724-Cotton Gin Dona Ana Las Cruces No Permit Required
status_descowner_address1 owner_address2 owner_cityowner_stateowner_zip

Closed Drawer R Hagerman NM 88232

Active Drawer R Hagerman NM 88232

Active PO Box 646 Mesquite NM 88048

Active Corner Union Ave & Sr-28Mesilla NM 88046

Active PO Box 1057 Las Cruces NM 88004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21 - 0587 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JOSE MARTINEZ JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

**O RDER**  Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including December 28, 2022, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 10 2022

11/10/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0587
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated balance sheets of TV Filme at December 31, 1997 and the
consolidated statements of operations for the year ended December 31, 1997 and
is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          80,975
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    9,542
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,710
<INVENTORY>                                      5,303
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               114,612
<PP&E>                                          83,448
<DEPRECIATION>                                  20,043
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 186,397
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           16,889
<BONDS>                                        140,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           108
<OTHER-SE>                                      22,222
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   186,397
<SALES>                                         50,547
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                50,547
<CGS>                                           17,631
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   22,977
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                12,162
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 4,988
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (19,167)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (19,256)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (19,256)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (19,256)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.76)<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.76)<F1>
<FN>
<F1>There was no change in primary and diluted EPS for 1995 and 1996 as a result
of the adoption of SFAS 128.
</FN>


</TABLE>
#### Lee Andre DERAMEE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 36400.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 3, 1964.

*909Robert B. Hershey, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., A. D. Jim Bowie, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is driving while license is suspended; the punishment, a fine of $150.-«0.

On a prior day in this term we affirmed appellant’s conviction. Deramee v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 372 S.W.2d 701. Since the rendition of such opinion and at the same term, we realized that we were in error in such affirmance and overruled the case against appellant. Adams v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 376 S.W.2d 832. Appellant now moves this Court to vacate our original judgment of conviction, recall our mandate and order the return of the fine which he has paid under our former judgment of af-firmance. Being a judgment at the present term, we have authority to do so and justice requires that we do no less.

Appellant’s motion for rehearing and to withdraw mandate is granted; the order affirming the conviction is set aside, and the judgment is now reversed and the prosecution under the present complaint and information is ordered dismissed.
#### Mrs. Thais HARRIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 35424.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 27, 1963.

*932Criss Cole, Bliss Daffan, Houston, for appellant.

Frank Briscoe, Dist. Atty., Carl E. F. Dally, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Presiding Judge.

Our disposition of this case makes it unnecessary for us to consider the constitutionality of the ordinances of the City of Houston under which the appellant was prosecuted.

The prosecution arose in the Corporation Court and the appeal is from a conviction upon trial de novo in the County Criminal Court at Law No. 1, with' punishment assessed at a fine of $105.00.

The complaint alleged that the appellant did unlawfully “keep, possess and maintain a dog kennel in the City limits of Houston * * * *without obtaining a kennel license*from the City of Houston. * * * ”

As we understand the ordinances read into the record, Section 3-1 defines a dog kennel; Section 3-50 requires the *payment of a license tax*for the privilege of conducting or maintaining a dog kennel; and Section 3-34 makes it unlawful for any person to keep, possess or maintain in the city limits of the city, a dog kennel *within 100 feet of any actual residence or habitation for human beings*(other than that of the keeper, possessor or owner of the kennel) or *within 100 feet of any church, school or hospital.*

The complaint did not charge that the appellant failed to pay a license tax for the privilege of maintaining a dog kennel, nor was it alleged that she unlawfully kept or maintained a dog kennel within 100 feet of a residence other than her own or within 100 feet of a church, school or hospital. The act alleged in the complaint to be unlawful was that appellant kept, possessed and maintained a dog kennel in the city “without obtaining a kennel license * *

We have found no ordinance in the record which makes it an offense to commit the act for which the appellant was fined $105.00, namely, that she did unlawfully keep, possess, and maintain a dog kennel in the city limits of Houston *without obtaining a kennel license.*

Since no ordinance was introduced which makes the act alleged a violation, the complaint herein does not charge the offense for which appellant stands convicted.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
##### 



Exhibit 10.2
 EFUNDS CORPORATION
NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTORS DEFERRED COMPENSATION PROGRAM
(as amended February 17, 2006)
 Purposes of the Program
 Eligibility
 Plan Periods
 Administration
 Deferral Election
 Manner of Making Deferral Election




---



##### 



Payment Dates
 Credits to Deferred Accounts
 Credits to Deferred Stock Account
 Credits to Deferred Cash Account
 Conversion of Deferred Cash Accounts provided however
 Dividend Equivalent Payments
 2




---



##### 



Fair Market Value ;
 Interest on Cash Units
 Mandatory Account Deferrals
 Payments
 Payment of Deferred Stock Account
 Payment of Deferred Cash Account
 Method and Timing of Distribution
 Installments provided however
 3




---



##### 



Lump Sum
 In-Service provided however st
 Election to Change Method of Distribution
   4




---



##### 



Payment to Beneficiary
 Income Tax Withholding
 5




---



##### 



Limitation on Rights of Eligible Directors and Participants
 Program Amendments, Modifications and Termination
 Effective Date and Duration of the Program
 Participants are General Creditors of eFunds
 Miscellaneous
 Securities Laws and Other Restrictions
 6




---



##### 



Nontransferability
 No Liability
  7
FIRST AMENDMENT TO SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED CONVERTIBLE NOTE




 EXHIBIT 10.28 
  
 ATX TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
  
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO 
  
 SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED CONVERTIBLE NOTE 
  
 This FIRST AMENDMENT TO SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED CONVERTIBLE NOTE (the “Amendment”), is made and entered into as of June 15, 2004, and
amends that certain Second Amended and Restated Convertible Note, dated as of April 24, 2004, (the “Leininger Note”) by and among ATX Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“ATX Group”), ATX Technologies, Inc., a
Texas corporation (“ATX”), and James R. Leininger M.D. (“Leininger”). 
  
 RECITALS: 
  
 WHEREAS, the Leininger Note contemplates that “Exchange Ratio” as defined in the Leininger Note shall be a number at least 0.3 shares, but no more than 0.5 shares; 
  
 WHEREAS, ATX, ATX Group and the Leininger Shareholders desire to amend
the definition of the Exchange Ratio to mean 0.278710150002407 shares of ATX Group Common Stock for each share of ATX Common Stock. 
  
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained herein, and in further consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements contained in the Leininger Restructuring Agreement, and intending to be legally bound, the parties hereto do hereby agree as follows: 
  
 1. The definition of the Exchange Ratio set forth in the Section 1 of the Leininger Note is hereby amended by deleting “such number to be at least
0.3 shares, but no more than 0.5 shares” and replacing that phrase with “such number to be 0.278710150002407 shares.” 
  
 2. Except to the extent expressly provided herein, the terms of the Leininger Note remain in full force and effect. 
  
 3. This Amendment may be executed by facsimile signature and in any number of
counterparts, each of which when so executed shall constitute an original hereof, but all of which together shall constitute one amendment. 
  
 [signature page follows] 
  

 AMENDMENT TO RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT - Page 1 









 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Amendment as of the day and year first
above written. 
  

			
	 ATX GROUP:
  
 ATX GROUP, INC.

		
	By:	  	/s/ Steven A, Millstein
	Name:	  	Steven A. Millstein
	Title:	  	President & CEO
	
	 ATX:
  
 ATX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

		
	By:	  	/s/ Steven A, Millstein
	Name:	  	Steven A. Millstein
	Title:	  	President & CEO
	
	LEININGER:
	
	/s/ James R. Leininger, M.D.
	James R. Leininger, M.D.
		
	Address:	  	 c/o Mission City Management
 8122 Datapoint Dr., No. 900
 San Antonio, TX 78229
 Attn: Thomas W. Lyles

	Facsimile:	  	 (210) 614-5841



  

 AMENDMENT TO SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED CONVERTIBLE NOTE
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7132

DONALD RAY WILLIAMS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

CARLA O’KONEK SMITH,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, Chief

District Judge. (5:06-hc-02194-FL)

Submitted: December 13, 2007 Decided: December 19, 2007

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Donald R. Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Mary Carla Hollis, NORTH

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Donald R. Williams seeks to appeal the district court’s

order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition.

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

(2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Williams has

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate

of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
Hello. My name is Cynthia Linton. I'm a grandmother and I came here from 

Chicago to testify. That is how important I think this carbon rule is. So thank 

you for this opportunity. 

I want to speak in defense of nature and how we must preserve it from the 

destructive activities of men, women and industries, who are on this planet 

for just a nanosecond compared with the forests, mountains and oceans. 

I have always enjoyed being out in nature, from my early days at my 

grandparents' home in the Rhode Island woods, to summer camp in New 

Hampshire, to fishing with my late husband in Wisconsin and the Florida 

Keys. Being out in nature is so restful and helps us put things in perspective. 

We owned a condo in the Florida Keys for 10 years. Sitting on our balcony 

overlooking the ocean. I could smell the salt, feel the warm breezes, and 

contemplate the sparkling blue and green patterns in the water for hours. I 

watched pelicans fold up their wings and dive into a school of fish, and 

long-legged shore birds peck at crabs and other tasty bits along our beach. It 

was paradise. We especially enjoyed a day on the water in a small boat 

hoping to catch fish — perhaps some snapper or grouper for dinner. 

It got to the point where it really didn't matter if we caught anything. It was 

being there that was important. 

The Keys is one of the few places you can watch the sun rise, and then 

simply cross the road later to see a magnificent purple and pink sunset. 

But, alas, about 10 years ago, two hurricanes in back-to-back years took out 

our dock with a storm surge and flooded our property — then the next year a 

third hurricane wiped out homes and businesses just across the street. 

Insurance rates were skyrocketing and we watched with dismay as a 

retaining wall had to erected on our beach to keep the water from lapping 

against the building. We sold our little piece of paradise for fear the 

advancing ocean would damage it beyond repair. 

When I read about global warming and the rising ocean and what it will do 

to islands and lowlands, I fear that my beloved Keys won't be there for 

future generations. My children and grandchildren learned to love the Keys. 
But their children may not have that opportunity. To me the erosion and 

flooding of coastal areas is very personal. And I know that south Florida, 

especially, is at risk. Without serious action to stop climate change, the Keys 

will be under water. 

No place on earth is safe from the ravages of climate change and pollution. 

With Congress unwilling to act, we rely on you, the EPA, to take the 

sensible steps outlined in this carbon rule. Please do not weaken it. In fact, I 

urge you to strengthen it. We who love this land and care about its future are 

looking to you for leadership. Thank you. 

Cynthia Linton 

990 N. Lake Shore Dr., 15E 

Chicago, IL 60611 

Clinton914@aol.com 

(312)944-6516
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WENDY JEANETH TZIQUINGUACHIAC,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

 Respondent.

No. 21-788

Agency No.

A216-442-404

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Immigration Judge

Submitted June 26, 2023**

Before: CANBY, S.R. THOMAS, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Wendy Jeaneth Tziquin-Guachiac, a native and citizen of Guatemala,

petitions pro se for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(g) that she did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or 

torture in Guatemala and is not entitled to relief from her reinstated removal 

order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review an IJ’s negative 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 6 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 21-788

reasonable fear determination for substantial evidence. Andrade-Garcia v. 

Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny the petition for review.

We do not disturb the IJ’s determination that Tziquin-Guachiac failed to 

establish a reasonable possibility that she suffered harm that rises to the level of 

persecution. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(petitioner’s past experiences, including two beatings, even considered 

cumulatively, did not compel a finding of past persecution); see also Flores 

Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 633 n.2 (9th Cir. 2022) (court need not resolve 

whether de novo or substantial evidence review applies, where result would be 

the same under either standard).

Substantial evidence supports the determination that Tziquin-Guachiac 

failed to show a reasonable possibility that the harm she fears would be on 

account of a protected ground. See Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 814 

(9th Cir. 2018) (no basis for withholding of removal where petitioner did not 

show a nexus to a protected ground). We reject as unsupported by the record 

Tziquin-Guachiac’s contention that the IJ ignored issues or otherwise erred in 

analyzing her claim.

Substantial evidence also supports the determination that TziquinGuachiac failed to show a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the 

consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala. See 

Andrade-Garcia, 828 F.3d at 836-37 (petitioner failed to demonstrate 

government acquiescence sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of 
3 21-788

future torture).

The temporary stay of removal remains in effect until the mandate issues.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-41092 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JOSE AYALA-BERMUDES, also known as Jose Alexander Ayala, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. B-02-CR-179-1

-------------------- February 11, 2003 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Jose Ayala-Bermudes, a/k/a Jose Alexander Ayala, was convicted for being present unlawfully in the United States following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and has appealed his sentence. Ayala contends that the district court plainly erred in concluding that his state misdemeanor conviction for Harassment, under T EX . P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 42.07(a)(2) (West 1996), was a “crime of violence” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(E) (2001). Because this issue was not decided atNo. 02-41092 -2- the time Ayala was sentenced, any error on the part of the district court was not clear or obvious and, accordingly, was not plain error. See United States v. Hull , 160 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 1998).
AFFIRMED.
CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION

                  (After Issuance of Stock)

                          Filed by:

                            Charger Ventures Inc.
                             Name of Corporation

We the undersigned      President       and            Secretary        of
                    President or Vice                 Secretary or
                        President                 Assistant Secretary


   Charger Ventures Inc.      do hereby certify:
    Name of Corporation

That the Board of Directors of said corporation at a meeting duly convened,
held on the

27th  day of  March, 2000     adopted  a  resolution  to  amend  the  original
                              articles as

follows:

Article   1  is hereby amended to read as follows:

The name of the corporation is Global Industrial Services Inc.

The number of shares of the corporation outstanding and entitled to vote on an
amendment  to  the  Articles  of Incorporation is  4,020,000;  that  the  said
change(s) and amendment have been consented to and approved by a majority vote
of  the  stockholders  holding at least a majority  of  each  class  of  stock
outstanding and entitled to vote thereon.


                                   /s/ Terry Kirby
                                   President or Vice President

                                   /s/ Terry Kirby
                                   Secretary or Assistant Secretary
Exhibit 32.1
                             CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         Each of the undersigned  hereby certifies in his capacity as an officer
of InMedica Development  Corporation (the Company) that the Annual Report of the
Company on Form 10KSB for the year ended  December 31, 2004 fully  complies with
the  requirements  of Section 13(a) of the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 and
that the information  contained in such report fairly presents,  in all material
respects,  the financial condition of the Company at the end of such periods and
the results of operations of the Company for such periods.


/s/ Ralph Henson
Ralph Henson,
 Chief Executive Officer
DATE:  March 29, 2007



/s/ Richard Bruggeman
Richard Bruggeman,
 Chief Financial Officer
DATE:   March 29, 2007