NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MARK A. MALL, Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

LEONARD J. MCDONALD, et al., Defendant/Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0193 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CV2022-014883 

The Honorable Katherine Cooper, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Mark Anthony Mall, Phoenix 

Plaintiff/Appellant 

Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., Phoenix 

By Leonard J. McDonald, Michael F. Bosco 

Counsel for Appellees

FILED 01-18-2024
MALL v. MCDONALD, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined. 

F O S T E R, Judge: 

¶1 Plaintiff Mark Mall appeals the superior court’s denial of his 

motion for injunctive relief seeking to stop a trustee’s sale of his 

encumbered real property. For the following reasons, this Court affirms. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In 2007, Mall obtained a loan from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

secured by a Deed of Trust on real property he owned. It listed Wells Fargo 

Bank as the trustee. A month later, Mall transferred the property via a 

Warranty Deed into the Mall Living Trust with himself as trustee. Wells 

Fargo consented to this transaction. Beginning in January 2021, Mall failed 

to make monthly payments on the loan. In October of the following year, 

Mark Bosco, who held a limited power of attorney for Wells Fargo, 

substituted Leonard McDonald as trustee under the Deed of Trust. 

McDonald then recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale to take place in January 

2022. 

¶3 In response, Mall sought an injunction to prevent the trustee’s 

sale. As legal proceedings continued and the date of the sale approached, 

Mall moved for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). The 

court granted the order, cancelled the sale, and ordered a hearing on the 

matter the following week. Following the hearing, the court vacated its 

order, finding that Mall had not established the elements for a TRO. About 

two weeks later, the court held an evidentiary hearing on Mall’s initial 

motion. Following Mall’s presentation of evidence and argument, the court 

denied injunctive relief and dismissed the case, finding that Mall “fail[ed] 

to show any unlawful conduct to support his claim.” Mall filed a motion 

for reconsideration, which the court denied. 

¶4 This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). 
MALL v. MCDONALD, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

DISCUSSION 

¶5 Denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 432, ¶ 15 (2021). Relevant facts are 

viewed “in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling.” 

Mahar v. Acuna, 230 Ariz. 530, 532, ¶ 2 (App. 2012). “Unless the trial judge 

either made a mistake of law...or clearly erred in finding the facts or 

applying them to the legal criteria...we must affirm.” Shoen v. Shoen, 167 

Ariz. 58, 62 (App. 1990). 

¶6 A party requesting an injunction must demonstrate four 

criteria: (1) “a strong likelihood of success on the merits,” (2) “irreparable 

harm if the stay is not granted,” (3) “the harm to the requesting party 

outweighs the harm to the [opposing party],” and (4) “public policy favors 

[] granting the stay.” Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 212 Ariz. 

407, 410, ¶ 10 (2006). 

I. This Court takes judicial notice of documents as requested by 

Mall. 

¶7 As a preliminary matter, Mall requested this Court take 

judicial notice of four documents: (1) Affidavit and Assertory Oath of 

Acceptance of Trusteeship of the Mall Familia GodTrust; (2) Deed of Full 

Reconveyance; (3) Affidavit of Truth, Repudiation and Revocation of 

Citizenship; and (4) Master Form Deed of Trust. A Court may take judicial 

notice of a fact if “the court is supplied with the necessary information” and 

the fact “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Ariz. R. Evid. 201(a), (b)(2), 

(c)(2). The documents in question bear the stamp of the Maricopa County 

Recorder identifying them as official public documents for which this Court 

may take judicial notice. See Ariz. Pub. Integrity Alliance v. Fontes, 250 Ariz. 

58, 65, ¶ 28 n.2 (2020); Wang Elec., Inc. v. Smoke Tree Resort, LLC, 230 Ariz. 

314, 325, ¶ 33 (App. 2012). Mall’s request for judicial notice of the existence 

and recording of these documents is granted. 

II. Mall has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. 

¶8 To show a likelihood of success on the merits, Mall needed to 

show that McDonald, as trustee, did not hold an interest in the property. 

Mall has not done so. 

A. Trustee’s Sales are Governed by Statute. 
MALL v. MCDONALD, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

¶9 Mall argues there is no proof of an underlying debt secured 

by the Deed of Trust, implying that the Deed of Trust and other documents 

are “flawed,” “defective,” or “fraudulent.” He argues that, because the 

“promissory note, revolving line of credit agreement, contract, guaranty or 

other evidence of debt” referenced in the Deed of Trust was not offered into 

evidence, there is no proof that he owes the debt. Such a showing is not 

required. See Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank, N.A., 230 Ariz. 584, 585, ¶¶ 1, 8

(2012) (holding “Arizona’s non-judicial foreclosure statutes do not require 

the beneficiary to prove its authority or ‘show the note’ before the trustee 

may commence a non-judicial foreclosure”). “[T]rustees’ sales[] are 

governed by statute” and no statute mandates showing the underlying debt 

before holding a trustee’s sale. Id. at 585-86, ¶ 5. A.R.S. § 33-808(C)(4), which 

directs the information required in a notice of a trustee’s sale, does require 

that the original amount owed under the Deed of Trust, be included in the 

notice. McDonald’s notice complied with the statute. 

B. The Deed of Trust Remained Effective After Mall 

Executed the Warranty Deed. 

¶10 Mall claims that the Warranty Deed superseded and revoked 

the Deed of Trust. A Deed of Trust “convey[s] trust property to a trustee. . . 

to secure the performance of a contract.” A.R.S. § 33-801(8). The statute 

specifically contemplates a subsequent transfer of the secured property. 

A.R.S. § 33-801(11) (defining the “trustor” as “the person conveying trust 

property . . . or the successor in interest of such person”); see also Successor 

in Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Someone who follows 

another in ownership or control of property.”). The Warranty Deed 

expressly stated that Mall, as grantor, “warrants the title against all persons 

whomsoever.” Mall’s transfer of the property into his living trust did not 

revoke the Deed of Trust; the deed remained effective and still encumbered 

the property. This remains true even with an additional reconveyance from 

the Mall Living Trust back to Mall. 

C. The Interest in the Land Conveyed by the Deed of Trust 

Remains Valid. 

¶11 Mall argues the trustee’s sale is improper because he has 

superior allodial title to the property based on his chain of title going back 

to a federal land patent. A land patent is “[a]n instrument by which the 

government conveys a grant of public land to a private person.” Land 

Patent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). It “is the highest evidence 

of title” and “conclusive as against the Government, and all claiming under 

junior patents or title.” U.S. v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525, 535 (1864); Raestle v. 
MALL v. MCDONALD, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

Whitson, 119 Ariz. 524, 526 (1978). Once “issued, full legal title passe[s] to 

the patentee” who “[can] do with the land that which he [sees] fit,—sell or 

give it away.” Hartman v. Butterfield Lumber Co., 199 U.S. 335, 337 (1905). But 

“if [the patentee] voluntarily conveyed [the land], he could not thereafter 

repudiate the conveyance.” Id. Just as all the previous owners of the land 

were free to convey title to the land or encumber it, so too was Mall. Though 

the land was initially conveyed by a land patent, that is irrelevant to this 

case. When Mall signed the Deed of Trust, he conveyed an interest in the 

property, and he cannot now annul that transfer. 

¶12 Mall’s claim to allodial title of the land is similarly unavailing. 

Allodial title is “ownership without a duty of service to, control by, or 

acknowledgment of any superior landlord.” Allodial Title, BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The term merely signifies a break from the 

“loyalty, obligation, and service” a vassal owed his lord under feudal land 

ownership. Nadav Shaked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 456-57 

(2014). Allodial title grants Mall the same freedom to convey an interest in 

his property as the land patent does, and it offers no protection to avoid the 

consequences of such a conveyance. 

¶13 Because the Deed of Trust was a valid transfer of interest in 

the property, McDonald, as trustee under the Deed of Trust, had authority 

to sell the property when Mall defaulted on the underlying debt contract. 

A.R.S. § 33-807(A)(conferring the power to sell property after a breach or 

default on the trustee of a deed of trust). 

III. Mall has not established that there are serious questions regarding 

the merits. 

¶14 When reviewing for the presence of serious questions the 

inquiry is “whether there are serious questions going to the merits” and 

“depends more on the strength of the legal claim than on the gravity of the 

issue.” Ariz. Assoc. of Providers for Persons with Disabilities v. State, 223 Ariz. 

6, 12, ¶ 13 (App. 2009) (quoting Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F.Supp. 471, 474 (D. 

Ariz. 1995)). 

¶15 As discussed above, the legal claims Mall raises concerning 

title and McDonald’s authority to execute the trustee’s sale do not support 

his arguments. Arizona’s statutory scheme grants a trustee under a Deed of 

Trust the authority to sell conveyed property upon default of the 

underlying debt. A.R.S. § 33-807(A). Mall raises no serious question going 

to the merits of his case. 
MALL v. MCDONALD, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

CONCLUSION 

¶16 Because Mall did not make the required showings for 

injunctive relief, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Mall’s motion. The superior court’s order is affirmed. 

¶17 Appellees seek attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. § 33-

807(E). This Court awards reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the trustee 

upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 21.