United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 20-1838

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JEAN PAUL ORTIZ-PÉREZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Howard, Chief Judge,

Selya and Barron, Circuit Judges.

Eric Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, Franco L. PérezRedondo, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals 

Division, and Liza L. Rosado-Rodríguez and Kevin E. Lerman, 

Research & Writing Specialists, on brief for appellant.

W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. BauzáAlmonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate 

Division, and Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney, 

on brief for appellee.

March 31, 2022
- 2 -

SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Jean Paul 

Ortiz-Pérez pleaded guilty to two carjacking counts and one 

firearm-possession count. On appeal, he challenges his aggregate 

150-month prison sentence as procedurally flawed and substantively 

unreasonable. Concluding, as we do, that the defendant's arguments

lack merit, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the 

case. "Where, as here, a sentencing appeal follows a guilty plea, 

we glean the relevant facts from the change-of-plea colloquy, the 

unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report (PSI 

Report), and the record of the disposition hearing." United States

v. Vargas, 560 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2009). 

On April 14, 2019, the defendant (then eighteen years of 

age) pointed a firearm at a man who was retrieving a suitcase from 

the trunk of his car and ordered him to give the defendant the 

keys to the car. The man tossed him the keys, and the defendant

drove the car away.

The next month, the defendant followed the same script: 

he pointed a firearm at a woman who was entering her car, ordered

her out, and demanded the keys. When she complied, the defendant

drove the car away.

Roughly a week later, the defendant was arrested. Both 

victims identified him as the carjacker. In due course, a federal 
- 3 -

grand jury sitting in the District of Puerto Rico returned a fourcount indictment, which charged the defendant with two counts of

carjacking (counts 1 and 3), see 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1), and two 

counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of 

violence (counts 2 and 4), see id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Although 

the defendant initially maintained his innocence, he later entered 

into a plea agreement (the Agreement) with the government. Under 

the terms of the Agreement, count 2 was to be reduced to a charge 

of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 

see id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and count 4 was to be dismissed. The 

defendant would then plead guilty to the two remaining counts and 

the revised version of count 2.

The district court accepted the defendant's change of

plea to the three specified counts and ordered the preparation of 

a PSI Report. When received, the PSI Report recommended a 

guideline sentencing range of seventy to eighty-seven months for 

counts 1 and 3. With respect to count 2, as revised, the PSI 

Report recommended a guideline range of sixty months (the mandatory 

minimum under the statute of conviction, see id.). It also noted 

that the sentence on count 2 had to be imposed consecutively to

any sentences imposed on the other counts. See id.

§ 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
- 4 -

The defendant filed objections to the PSI Report, which 

the district court overruled.1 The defendant also filed a 

sentencing memorandum. As relevant here, he argued that "[h]is 

young age, lack of parental guidance, lack of proper mental health 

treatment and poor background certainly contributed to the 

commission of the offense." He provided extensive research about 

the role of the "developing juvenile brain" in juvenile criminal 

offenses. Arguing that he was "a young man with room to 

rehabilitate," he implored the court to impose sentences "at the 

lower end" of the applicable guideline ranges adumbrated in the 

Agreement.2

At the disposition hearing, defense counsel urged the 

court to impose an aggregate prison sentence of 117 months — a 

sentence which fell below the sum of the applicable guideline 

ranges recommended in the PSI Report. Counsel reiterated the 

arguments made in the sentencing memorandum, focusing on the 

defendant's poor upbringing, mental health problems, youth, and 

potential for rehabilitation. For its part, the government argued 

for an aggregate prison sentence of 131 months. The prosecutor

1 Those objections are not pursued on appeal, and we need not 

discuss them in any detail.

2 The guideline sentencing ranges (as to counts 1 and 3) 

delineated in the Agreement differed from that in the PSI Report. 

The range in the Agreement was fifty-seven to seventy-one months' 

imprisonment.
- 5 -

commented that although the defendant was young, he had "a bit of 

history" and that "[t]his [wa]sn't his first brush with the law." 

After the defendant allocuted, the district court 

adopted the guideline calculations limned in the PSI Report. It 

then reviewed the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

and discussed characteristics of the defendant and of the offenses 

of conviction. It stressed that on two occasions the defendant

had "pointed firearms at the victims to take their vehicles by 

force, violence, and intimidation."

In the end, the court observed that defense counsel's 

sentencing recommendation fell below the sum of the applicable 

guideline ranges. Nor did either party's sentencing 

recommendation "reflect the seriousness of the 

offenses, . . . promote respect for the law, . . . protect the 

public from further crimes by" the defendant, or "address the 

issues of deterrence and punishment." With this in mind, the court 

proceeded to impose an aggregate sentence of 150-months' 

imprisonment — concurrent terms of seventy-eight months on counts 

1 and 3, followed by a consecutive term of seventy-two months on 

count 2.3 Finally, the court dismissed count 4 as called for by 

the Agreement. This timely appeal ensued.

3 At the time of the disposition hearing, the defendant was 

awaiting sentence in a Puerto Rico court for selling a firearm to 

an undercover agent. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 25, § 458. When 

imposing sentence, the district court ordered that the sentence in 
- 6 -

II. ANALYSIS

"Appellate review of a criminal defendant's claims of 

sentencing error involves a two-step pavane." United States v. 

Miranda-Díaz, 942 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2019). We first examine

any claims of procedural error. See id. If the sentence is 

procedurally sound, we then examine any claim of substantive 

unreasonableness. See id.

In the case at hand, the defendant advances both types 

of claims. We address them separately.

A. The Procedural Claims.

The defendant makes four claims of procedural error. As 

we explain below, we find none of them persuasive.

1. We start with the defendant's claim that, in 

explicating its sentence, the district court considered factors 

already accounted for in the guideline range without explaining 

why those factors were worthy of extra weight. We give this claim 

short shrift: because it was raised for the first time in the 

defendant's reply brief, it is waived. See United States v. López, 

957 F.3d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 2020) ("[I]t is settled beyond hope of 

contradiction that arguments not made in an appellant's opening 

brief are deemed abandoned.").

the federal case be served consecutive to any sentence to be 

imposed in the Puerto Rico case.
- 7 -

2. We next consider the defendant's claim that the 

sentencing "court committed procedural error by failing to address 

youth-related mitigation arguments." Because this claim was 

raised below, our review is for abuse of discretion. See United 

States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2020). We discern 

none.

When imposing a sentence, a district court is obliged to 

consider the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In 

explicating its sentencing determination, though, the court "is 

not required to address those factors, one by one, in some sort of 

rote incantation." United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st 

Cir. 2006); see United States v. Pupo, 995 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 

2021). "[I]t is sufficient for the sentencing court simply to 

identify the main factors driving its determination." United 

States v. Sepúlveda-Hernández, 817 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2016).

Here, the defendant does not contend that the sentencing 

court overlooked his youth-related argument. Nor could he: the 

defendant made this argument at considerable length in his

sentencing memorandum and at the disposition hearing, and the 

government directly countered it. In addition, the court mentioned 

the defendant's age as a relevant sentencing factor.

Even so, the defendant complains that, when pronouncing 

sentence, the court failed to "address" the argument. But the 

court was not required to do so. See United States v. Rivera-
- 8 -

Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2020) (noting that "a sentencing 

court is under no obligation [] to address every argument that a 

defendant advances in support of his preferred sentence"). "When 

a defendant has identified potentially mitigating sentencing 

factors and those factors are thoroughly debated at sentencing, 

the fact that the court 'did not explicitly mention them during 

the sentencing hearing suggests they were unconvincing, not 

ignored.'" Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d at 152 (quoting United States v. 

Lozada-Aponte, 689 F.3d 791, 793 (1st Cir. 2012)). We hold, 

therefore, that the sentencing court acted within the ambit of its 

discretion in electing not explicitly to address the defendant's 

youth-related argument when pronouncing sentence.

3. Shifting gears, the defendant posits that the 

sentencing court abused its discretion by "neglect[ing] to 

adequately consider [his] need for mental-health treatment." 

Inasmuch as this claim was raised below, our review is for abuse 

of discretion. See Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d at 151. Once again, we 

discern none.

"Appellate review of federal criminal sentences is 

characterized by a frank recognition of the substantial discretion 

vested in a sentencing court." United States v. Flores-Machicote, 

706 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2013). It is the sentencing court's 

prerogative — indeed, its duty — to "draw upon [its] familiarity 

with a case, weigh the factors enumerated in [section] 3553(a), 
- 9 -

and custom-tailor an appropriate sentence." Id.; see Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007). And "[w]e will not 

disturb a sentencing court's reasoned decision to weigh some 

factors more heavily than others." United States v. Vélez-Andino, 

12 F.4th 105, 117 (1st Cir. 2021).

To be sure, the PSI Report revealed that the defendant 

had received mental health treatment while held in a residential 

program for juvenile offenders. Moreover, defense counsel stated 

at sentencing (albeit in conclusory fashion) that — at the time 

the defendant committed the offenses of conviction — the defendant

"did not have the treatment that he needed in order to cope" with 

his mental health. Thus, the court clearly was aware of the 

defendant's past mental health treatment. It also was aware that 

mental health care was available during incarceration, and it 

specifically decreed that, upon the commencement of supervised 

release, the defendant "shall participate in an approved mental 

health treatment program for evaluation and to . . . determine if 

treatment is necessary. If necessary, the treatment will be 

arranged by the probation officer in consultation with the 

treatment provider."

Viewing the record as a whole, the defendant's 

contention that the sentencing court failed to "adequately 

consider [his] need for mental-health treatment" cannot withstand 

scrutiny. The evidence regarding a specific mental health
- 10 -

diagnosis was sparse and, stripped of rhetorical flourishes,

defense counsel's argument boils down to a contention that the 

court did not weigh that elusive factor as heavily as the defendant 

would have liked. In the circumstances of this case, the fact 

that the court did not attach more weight to that factor does not

require vacation of the sentence it imposed. See id. (explaining

that "a sentencing court's decision 'not to attach to 

certain . . . mitigating factors the significance that [a 

defendant] thinks they deserved does not make [a] sentence 

unreasonable'" (first and third alterations in original) (quoting 

United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 2011))).

The lesson to be learned is basic. There is no 

"requirement that a district court afford each of the section 

3553(a) factors equal prominence. The relative weight of each 

factor will vary with the idiosyncratic circumstances of each 

case . . . ." Dixon, 449 F.3d at 205. And in this area, the 

sentencing court's exercise of its discretion is accorded great 

latitude. See United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 229, 232

(1st Cir. 2014). We hold, therefore, that the sentencing court 

did not abuse its discretion by weighing this factor as it did. 

4. We need not linger long over the defendant's final 

claim of error. He says that the district court failed adequately 

to explicate the sentences imposed. The aggregate sentence is 

upwardly variant, and we have explained before that an adequate 
- 11 -

explanation for an upwardly variant sentence and the "plausible 

rationale" element of the test for substantive reasonableness "are 

almost always two sides of the same coin." United States v. ValleColón, 21 F.4th 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2021); see United States v. 

Merced-García, 24 F.4th 76, 82 n.3 (1st Cir. 2022). This is such 

a case. And because we find the district court's sentencing 

rationale plausible, see infra Part II(B), we find its explanation 

adequate for the same reasons.

B. The Substantive Reasonableness Claim.

This brings us to the defendant's contention that his 

150-month aggregate sentence is substantively unreasonable. Our 

review is for abuse of discretion. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United 

States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020); United States v. Bruno-Campos, 

978 F.3d 801, 808 (1st Cir. 2020). 

We start with first principles. In sentencing, 

"reasonableness is a protean concept." United States v. Martin, 

520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008). As such, "[t]here is no one 

reasonable sentence in any given case but, rather, a universe of 

reasonable sentencing outcomes." Clogston, 662 F.3d at 592. Our 

task, then, is "to determine whether the [challenged] sentence 

falls within this broad universe." Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d at 

21.

In mounting his claim of substantive unreasonableness, 

the defendant's chief complaint is that "the district court did 
- 12 -

not properly balance the § 3553(a) factors." As we already have 

explained, though, the balancing of the sentencing factors is 

largely within the district court's discretion. See supra Part 

II(A)(3). And "we cannot substitute our judgment of the 

appropriate sentence for that of the sentencing court; to the 

contrary, we must accord significant deference to the court's 

informed determination that the section 3553(a) factors justify 

the sentence imposed." Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d at 21. When all 

is said and done, a sentence will be deemed substantively 

reasonable as long as it rests on "a plausible rationale 

and . . . represents a defensible result." Id. 

Where, as here, an aggregate sentence is the product of 

two or more distinct sentences, we sometimes have found it useful 

to analyze the substantive reasonableness of the aggregate 

sentence by analyzing the substantive reasonableness of each of 

its constituent parts. See, e.g., United States v. PadillaGalarza, 990 F.3d 60, 91 (1st Cir. 2021). We follow that praxis 

here.

The aggregate sentence in this case is composed of three 

separate sentences (two of which are to run concurrently). Those 

concurrent sentences — seventy-eight months' imprisonment on 

counts 1 and 3 — are within the guideline ranges for those counts, 

and they are impervious to the defendant's attack. As we 

previously have pointed out, "a defendant who attempts to brand a 
- 13 -

within-the-range sentence as unreasonable must carry a heavy 

burden." United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 204 (1st Cir. 

2006).

The defendant cannot lift that "heavy burden" here. To 

undermine the reasonableness of a sentence that falls within the 

guideline range, "a defendant must 'adduce fairly powerful 

mitigating reasons and persuade us that the district judge was 

unreasonable in balancing pros and cons despite the latitude 

implicit in saying that a sentence must be reasonable.'" United 

States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting 

United States v. Navedo-Concepción, 450 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 

2006)). No such powerful mitigating reasons are apparent here.

At sentencing, the court made pellucid that it reached 

its determination as to the length of these sentences after 

considering the PSI Report, the defendant's objections to the PSI 

Report, the section 3553(a) factors, the parties' arguments, and 

the defendant's allocution. Ultimately, the court deemed 

sentences within the applicable guideline ranges appropriate. It 

noted that the defendant had carjacked two persons at gunpoint, 

and in fashioning the sentences for those counts, it sought to 

impose sentences that reflected the seriousness of the offenses. 

Especially given the defendant's repetition of the offense (twice 

within the span of approximately one month), we cannot say that 
- 14 -

the court's balancing of the relevant factors was unreasonable or 

that its rationale was implausible.

The remaining sentence — the seventy-two-month sentence 

on count 2 — was upwardly variant (twelve months over the guideline 

range). Unlike a within-the-range sentence, an upwardly variant 

sentence requires a "heightened" degree of explanation. PadillaGalarza, 990 F.3d at 91. When — as in this case — "a sentencing 

court imposes a variant sentence, that sentence must be explained, 

either explicitly or by fair inference from the sentencing record." 

United States v. Montero-Montero, 817 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016).

Here, the sentencing court offered an undifferentiated 

explanation for its imposition of the aggregate sentence, and it 

did not explicitly state what factors contributed most directly to 

the imposition of each of the component sentences. Nevertheless, 

we can fairly infer from the record the factor that drove the 

court's decision to impose the upwardly variant sentence. When 

describing the offense of conviction — unlawful possession of a 

firearm — the court noted the defendant's inappropriate use of 

that firearm. It expressed concern that the defendant had "pointed 

firearms at the victims to take their vehicles by force, violence, 

and intimidation." Given the defendant's repeated use of a firearm 

in this dangerous manner and the court's expressed concern, we can 

infer that — as to the firearm-possession charge — the court gave 

particular weight to the brandishing of a firearm on two occasions 
- 15 -

and the consequent threats to life.4 These aggravating factors, 

along with the remainder of the court's explanation for the 

sentences, formed a solid foundation for its sentencing rationale. 

Hence, we find that rationale plausible.

Finally, the aggregate sentence fell comfortably within 

the wide universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes. The 

defendant, who had a prior weapons violation in his criminal 

history, carjacked two persons at gunpoint on two separate 

occasions. For these crimes and for the additional crime of 

unlawfully possessing a firearm, the court sentenced him to an 

aggregate term of immurement of 150 months. In our view, this 

aggregate term of immurement represents a defensible result. Thus, 

the claim of substantive unreasonableness falters. 

III. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, 

the judgment of the district court is 

Affirmed. 

4 Although the defendant was initially charged with two counts 

of "brandish[ing]" a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), he 

ultimately pleaded to a single, lesser count of "possess[ing]" a 

firearm, id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Even so, "[a] sentencing court 

may take into account relevant conduct underlying counts dismissed 

as part of a plea negotiation as long as that conduct was not used 

in constructing the defendant's guideline range." United States

v. Fernández-Garay, 788 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2015).