alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             NOV-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-2000
<CASH>                                         409,248
<SECURITIES>                                   542,973
<RECEIVABLES>                                  146,375
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    787,794
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,895,695
<PP&E>                                         190,608
<DEPRECIATION>                                 172,568
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,066,539
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          132,178
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  2,082,398
<COMMON>                                       237,946
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,132,164
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,066,539
<SALES>                                      1,180,693
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,234,504
<CGS>                                          467,818
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,178,574
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  89
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 55,841
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             55,841
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    55,841
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.01)


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America v. Joseph PAIGE a/k/a Rick Paige Joseph Paige, Appellant

No. 00-4406.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on March 22, 2002.

Filed Aug. 19, 2002.

Before ROTH, NYGAARD and AMBRO, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge.

Joseph Paige appeals the September 19, 2000, Order of the District Court, which granted the government’s motion *in limine*to preclude Paige from offering a justification defense at trial. Following the barring of the justification defense, Paige entered a guilty plea but reserved the right to appeal the District Court’s ruling on the defense. Paige contends on appeal that the District Court erred in ruling that his offer of proof on the affirmative justification defense was insufficient as a matter of law. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Paige was convicted of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His response to the indictment was that he was legally justified in possessing the firearm because of a threat of danger to his person. In *United States v. Paolello,*951 F.2d 537 (3d Cir.1991), we adopted a four prong test to consider the adequacy of a justification defense. Following the *Paolello*test, the District Court case required Paige in advance of trial to submit evidence to support his justification claim. The District Court found that the proffered facts failed to support a justification defense and granted the government’s motion to bar the defense.

We conclude that Paige did fail to meet the second and third elements of the *Paolello*test. He did not demonstrate that he had not recklessly placed himself in the situation which led to the criminal act, the *486second *Paolello*element. In addition, he did not show that he had no reasonable legal alternative both to the criminal act and to the situation which caused the threat of harm, the third *Paolello*element.

The District Court found that Paige fell “far short” of proving these elements that at a minimum he acted recklessly and that this created the situation which led him to acquire the firearm rather than to choose from a number of alternative courses of action. The District Court did not err as a matter of law in so finding.

For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

           *****RESTATED 1996 FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE*****
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                      18,553,831
<SECURITIES>                                 9,979,776
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            25,982,382
<PP&E>                                       2,164,351
<DEPRECIATION>                               (711,383)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              30,733,191
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,496,849
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    49,821,157
<OTHER-SE>                                   (791,044)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                30,733,191
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               730,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,938,886
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              52,075
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (9,082,161)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (9,082,161)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.49)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.49)
[LEGEND]
 EPS PRIMARY REPRESENTS BASIC NET LOSS PER SHARE
[/LEGEND]
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report of Dalrada Financial Corporation, a
Delaware corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-KSB for the year ending June
30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"),
I, Brian Bonar, Chief Executive Officer of the Company do each hereby certify,
pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss. 1350), that
to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


/s/    Brian Bonar
-----------------------
Brian bonar
Chief Executive Officer
May 13, 2005
#### John L. HALL et al., Appellants, v. Nannie J. FERGUSON et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 23, 1956.

J. J. Tye, H. M. Tye, Barbourville, for appellants.

Lester L. Parrott, Barbourville, for ap-pellees.

PER CURIAM.

The controversy is over the location of a boundary line between the property of the parties. The action is for trespass upon a relatively small parcel of land claimed by both parties.

The appeal is upon notice as one “permitted by law as a matter of right”. KRS 21.060; CR 73.02. However, the judgment does not “fix the value of” the property in controversy as is required by KRS 21.070. Therefore, jurisdiction of this court is not shown and the appeal must be dismissed. Manning v. Mauldin, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 503; Bowling v. Bowling, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 837.

It appears from the briefs that the decision of the trial court rests on contradictory evidence of fact and the judgment cannot be said to be “clearly erroneous.” So> were the jurisdiction of the appeal shown, we would have to affirm the judgment under CR 52.01.

The appeal is dismissed.
| (1) | The      quarterly report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or      15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;  and |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The      information contained in the quarterly report fairly presents, in all      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      the Company |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| By:                                    | /s/ William J. Clough |   | Dated      this 8th day      of May 2009 |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
| William      J. Clough,                |                  |   |
| Chief      Executive Officer/President |                  |   |

----
‘\: 

I c. HAM4 

a..- 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS _ 

AtJSTIN 

Hon. Leo C. Euakier 

Febrtiary 23, 1930 

.- 
Eon. Leo C. Buckley, Pebruvrp 23, 1X39, Page 2 

the ?eace, for occh crirr.lnal aoticn tried aud 

fimlly disPosed r?f kofore bin. .Frovided, 

hosever, that in all couctles hevin2 a populatlon of 23,OOO or less, the Sustioe of the 

. Pecco shell revefve a trial fee of Three Dollars.' _ . 

ioll0ws: 

Itilcle 1074, C. C. P. of T0se5, 1923, Is as 

. . . . 

.._ 

. . 

'In eaoh oase of conviction in a County 

Court, or a County Court at Law, whether by 

L .a jury or by a Court, those shall be taxedacaipst the defendant or aCalmlY all defenbents, when several are hold jointly, e txial 

- fcC of Fire pcllers, the sme to be collectsd 

,ald p&id over i?l the sam nanaer a5 in the 

0ase Of a jury fee, and in the &sticc Court 

the trial fee shall be the sum of I'our Dollars.n 

Tho above &Mole 1052 is one setting aud estsblishine the fee for the justioe of the pecce in orimihal' 

cases acd 58% s'uch fee to be paid hiin et $2.50 In counties of more than twenty thousand population and at $3.00 

in oonntiee of less than twenty thouaand population. 

Article 1074, above rererred to, ou the other 

hand deals not with the question of fees to be paid to 

the justice of the peace but mther tith a matter of 

aosts t.o be charged end asse5sed ai;lelnst a defendant 

'convicted in a ori+mal aotibn. It provides that the 

trial feo in the ju5tloe court shall be Y4.02 acd that 

Vhe ame to be collected and paid over in t.ke saue 

manner es in t&e case of a jury feeen Th:is neaqs that 

such fke of $4.00 511~311 be.?aiC over to t!xi county treasurer acd out of such 5uii tlie jystico 'of the pea00 shall 

reoeive the sum of $3.00 ig counti of lens than t=enty 

thousand ) "9 . . ?rcwj.bed by Article XXX:, 7. C. 7. 

. It is, therefore, the opinion of this Depertmentnnd you are so cdvised thet there is no conflict 

bctxecn ,W.icles 1052 nz:.: 1074, C. C. P., snd that t3e correct cncxu.t,to- betar:?8 as costs by the .)Ustioe of 

the ycace RS hi5 triol'f+=, in 3-;e:!nt c: oa?luict.iun eit?,er 
.._. 

by the court.or jluyf, Is $4.00 snd that out or such oosts 

so essessed and ~ollcalsd, iA4 justiou cf the peso0 ia entitled to tlJe- &Uzl of ;3.00 in conntias Of 1035 thm twenty 

thousand ~o~uldA.oa es MS Cm, the other one dollsr to 

be kept and retnined by the oounty. 

Trusting t!mt this satisfactorily @~swers ya'aur 

ein&iry, wa hre 

I 

‘* 

e. 

:’ Very truly yours 

GZXZ?.tI, 02' TZCS 

X&AS . 

.
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 IMPRESO, INC. CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF SARBANES  OXLEY ACT OF 2002 The undersigned, Susan M. Atkins, Chief Financial Officer of IMPRESO, INC. (the
Company), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY that:  1.
    The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended February 28, 2005 (the Report) fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended; and2.
    Information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operation of the Company.  3.
    Item 4 Controls and Procedures in the Companys Form 10-Q is incorporated herein by
reference. The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 and is
not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document. IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this instrument to be executed this 19th
day of April, 2005. /s/ Susan M. AtkinsSusan M. AtkinsName:
    
    Chief Financial OfficerTitle:
Memorandum

Date:

To: Balaji Vaidyanathan, Permit Section Manager

From: Eric Massey, Air Quality Division Director

Subject: Proposed Final Permits to be Treated as Appealable Agency Actions

The 2012 amendments to our permit rules, which were adopted in order to meet federal new 

source review requirements, provide that an applicant for a Class I permit or Class I permit 

revision may begin actual construction, but not operation, on receipt of a “proposed final 

permit.” R18-2-302(G); R18-2-334(B), R18-2-402(C). A proposed final permit is “the version of 

a Class I permit or Class I permit revision that the Department proposes to issue and forwards to 

the Administrator for review,” as required by § 502 of Title V of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 

7661d.

The purpose of this treatment is to ensure that Arizona’s unitary permit program does not place 

restrictions on Arizona industries that they would not face in jurisdictions with binary programs. 

Under a binary program, separate permits are issued to construct and operate, and only permits to 

operate are subject to EPA review under Title V. Thus a source in a jurisdiction with a binary

program ordinarily would have the authority to proceed with construction under a construction 

permit before EPA review of the Title V permit or permit revision occurred.

Under Arizona administrative law, an “appealable agency action” is defined as “an action that 

determines the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party.” A.R.S. § 41-1092(3). Because a 

proposed final permit or permit revision under the revised rules determines the applicant’s right 

to construct, it must be treated as an appealable agency action separate from the issuance of the 

final permit or permit revision.

1 We must therefore issue a notice of appealable agency action

under 41-1092.03 for both the proposed final permit or permit revision, as well as the final 

permit or permit revision.

Please distribute this memorandum to all of your permit engineers so that they are aware of this 

obligation. In addition, make sure that the subject matter of this memorandum is covered in any 

training for permit engineers hired in the future.

 

1 Duplicative appeals can be avoided by consolidating appeals of proposed final permit and final permits, should 

they occur.
The Honorable Elsijane Trimble Roy, United States District Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable

John F. Forster, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of

Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-1596

___________

Kevin L. DeFries, *

 *

Appellant, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Eastern District of Arkansas

Greene County, Arkansas; James *

Danley, Sheriff of Greene County; * [UNPUBLISHED]

Bob Ward, Jail Administrator, Greene *

County Jail; John Does, Employees of *

Greene County Jail, *

 *

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: December 3, 1997

 Filed: December 30, 1997

___________

Before McMILLIAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Kevin L. DeFries appeals from the final order of the United States District Court1

for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissing his complaint, following a hearing, in
-2-

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. For

the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

DeFries alleged that while he was incarcerated at the Greene County jail,

defendants denied him proper and timely medical treatment in deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs, and inmates passed out prescription drugs in violation of jail

policy. Apparently unaware that DeFries had filed a timely jury demand, the magistrate

judge conducted two evidentiary hearings, and thereafter recommended dismissal of the

complaint. The district court conducted de novo review and adopted the magistrate

judge&s report and recommendation.

Despite the overlooked jury demand, we affirm the judgment of the district court

because, construing the hearings as pre-trial evidentiary hearings, we conclude that

defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hobbs v. Lockhart, 46

F.3d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 1995) (cautious approval of pre-trial evidentiary hearing;

standard to be applied). Even avoiding all credibility determinations and believing

DeFries&s evidence, we conclude that he did not establish that any delay in receiving

medication resulted in objectively serious harm. See Crowley v. Hedgepeth, 109 F.3d

500, 502 (8th Cir. 1997) (objective evidence of harm caused by delay required to

establish deliberate indifference). DeFries&s contention that he was prescribed the wrong

medication and should have seen a psychiatrist constitutes a mere disagreement with

treatment, and is not actionable. See Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir.

1990). In addition, we agree with the district court that any violation of the jail policy

prohibiting distribution of medication by inmates does not amount to a constitutional

violation. See Meis v. Gunter, 906 F.2d 364, 369 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.

1028 (1991).

Finally, DeFries&s other arguments on appeal are without merit.
-3-

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. DeFries&s motion to

amend his brief is denied.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
" It is in the public interest for Gogo to provide satellite - based broadband communications for

public safet y purposes and to increase the productivity of airline passengers on international flights who otherwise are unable to communicate with their workplaces and other locations. A satellite - based broadband sy stem provides a unique communications link for Federal Air Marshals and other public safet y agencies to protect commercial airlines and their passengers. The air - ground s ys tem also enables airlines, including their on - board crew, to better communicate and manage operational information, while also providing important connectivity for passengers, which is of even greater value for longer international flights than on the shorter haul flights th at alread y have service over the continental United States."
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano,

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

J anuary 27 , 2021 

# Order

Clerk January 27 , 2021

162 501 ( 17 )

LINDA MCCORMICK

, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

MSC: 162 501

v COA: 354219

Wayne CC: 19

- 012081

- AV

JOYA GARLAND, SHEILA JAMES, LYNETTE

HARVEY, and JENNIFER PATRICK

, Defendant s

- Appellee s

.

_____________________________________ ____ /

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff

- appellant to waive fees is

GRANTED. Fees are w aived in this case only

.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, March 05, 2021. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, March 05, 2021 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A21I0135. WSE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LLC v. AMANDA ANDERSON et al. . Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 20EV005363
**Exhibit 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, John Alderfer, as the Chief Financial Officer of Vestin Mortgage, Inc., the sole Manager ofVestin Fund I, LLC, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Vestin Fund I, LLC; 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of Vestin Fund I, LLC as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4.  Vestin Fund I, LLC’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for Vestin Fund I, LLC and have:
 (a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to Vestin Fund I, LLC, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  (b)  Paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986;  (c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of Vestin Fund I, LLC’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluations; and  (d)  Disclosed in this report any changes in Vestin Fund I, LLC’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during Vestin Fund I, LLC’s most recent fiscalquarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affectVestin Fund I, LLC’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5.  Vestin Fund I, LLC’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to Vestin Fund I, LLC’s auditors andthe audit committee of Vestin Fund I, LLC’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent functions):
 (a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect Vestin Fund I, LLC’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  (b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in Vestin Fund I, LLC’s internal control over financialreporting.
Date: May 10, 2005     /s/ John Alderfer    John Alderfer    Chief Financial Officer*    Vestin Mortgage, Inc., sole    Manager of Vestin Fund I, LLC         * John Alderfer functions as the equivalent of the Chief Financial Officer of the registrant
29