[Cite as Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. Bd. of Edn., 2019-Ohio-1540.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, : 

 Appellant-Appellant, : No. 17AP-767 

 (C.P.C. No. 17CV-5773) 

v. : 

 (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

Ohio State Board of Education et al., : 

 Appellees-Appellees. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on April 25, 2019 

 

Zeiger, Tigges & Little, LLP, Marion H. Little, Jr., John W. 

Zeiger, and Christopher J. Hogan, for appellant. 

Organ Cole, LLP, Douglas R. Cole, Erik J. Clark, and 

Carrie M. Lymanstall, for appellees. 

 

ON APPLICATION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

PER CURIAM. 

{¶ 1} On July 20, 2018, appellees-appellees, Ohio State Board of Education 

("BOE") and Ohio Department of Education ("ODE"), filed an application seeking 

reconsideration, pursuant to App.R. 26(A)(1), or, in the alternative, en banc consideration 

pursuant to App.R. 26(A)(2)(c), of this court's July 10, 2018 decision in Electronic 

Classroom of Tomorrow v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-767, 2018-Ohio2695, which reversed the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Appellant-appellant, Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow ("ECOT"), opposes BOE's and 

ODE's applications. For the following reasons, we grant the application for 

reconsideration. 

 
No. 17AP-767 2 

I. Background 

{¶ 2} This court's opinion fully set forth the background of this case, and we will 

not repeat it here. After BOE issued a decision directing ECOT to repay an overpayment of 

public funds in excess of $60 million, ECOT sought to appeal the administrative action 

directly to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court dismissed ECOT's 

administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal to this court, the majority held the 

trial court erred in granting BOE's and ODE's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

More specifically, the majority concluded that the use of the word "final" in R.C. 

3314.08(K)(2)(d) did not preclude ECOT from pursuing an appeal under R.C. 119.12(B). 

II. Application for Reconsideration 

{¶ 3} The test generally applied to an application for reconsideration is whether the 

application calls to the court's attention an obvious error in its decision or raises an issue 

for our consideration that was either not considered at all or was not fully considered by us 

when it should have been. Matthews v. Matthews, 5 Ohio App.3d 140 (10th Dist.1981). 

However, an application for reconsideration "is not designed for use in instances where a 

party simply disagrees with the logic or conclusions of the court." State v. Burke, 10th Dist. 

No. 04AP-1234, 2006-Ohio-1026, ¶ 2, citing State v. Owens, 112 Ohio App.3d 334, 336 

(11th Dist.1996). Furthermore, an application for reconsideration is not a means to raise 

new arguments or issues. State v. Wellington, 7th Dist. No. 14 MA 115, 2015-Ohio-2095, 

¶ 9. 

{¶ 4} In their application for reconsideration, BOE and ODE ask this court to 

reconsider its decision with regard to whether the use of the word "final" in R.C. 

3314.08(K)(2)(d) precludes an appeal brought under R.C. 119.12. Upon reconsideration, 

we conclude this court's prior decision contains an obvious error in the analysis of R.C. 

3314.08(K)(2)(d). 

{¶ 5} As relevant here, R.C. 3314.08 provides that if ODE determines that a review 

of a community school's enrollment is necessary, it shall complete a review and provide 

written notice of the findings to the governing authority of the community school. R.C. 

3314.08(K)(1). If the review results in a finding that the community school owes money to 

the state, the statute sets forth the procedure the community school may use to appeal 

ODE's determination to BOE. R.C. 3314.08(K)(2). Within that framework, the statute then 
No. 17AP-767 3 

provides "[a]ny decision made by [BOE] under this division is final." R.C. 

3314.08(K)(2)(d). 

{¶ 6} This court has previously construed the legislature's use of the word "final" in 

the context of decisions of administrative bodies to mean the decision is not subject to an 

appeal under R.C. 119.12. Carney v. School Emps. Retirement Sys. Bd., 39 Ohio App.3d 71, 

72 (10th Dist.1987); State ex rel. Shumway v. State Teachers Retirement Bd., 114 Ohio 

App.3d 280, 286 (10th Dist.1996); Heartland Jockey Club v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 

10th Dist. No. 98AP-1465 (Aug. 3, 1999). Upon reconsideration, we find this precedent and 

the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of 

Edn., 127 Ohio St.3d 469, 2010-Ohio-5710, to be controlling. 

{¶ 7} In Brookwood, the Supreme Court considered a statute that provided that 

ODE's decision as to whether an entity was education-oriented was "final." The Supreme 

Court noted that the same statute also expressly provided a right to appeal under R.C. 

119.12. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that the use of the word 

"final" in that statute did not preclude an appeal under R.C. 119.12 where further language, 

within the same statute, specifically contemplated an appeal. In so deciding, the Supreme 

Court reviewed our precedent in Carney, Shumway, and Heartland Jockey Club and 

concluded the statutes in those cases "lacked what is present in [the statute at issue in 

Brookwood] — a specific, statutory grant of jurisdiction to the trial court to review the 

decisions of the administrative body pursuant to R.C. 119.12. Here, that makes all the 

difference." Brookwood at ¶ 15. 

{¶ 8} Unlike the statute at issue in Brookwood, here R.C. 3314.08(K) specifies that 

the decision is "final" and does not provide a specific grant of statutory jurisdiction to the 

trial court to review the decision of the administrative body. Thus, we conclude on 

reconsideration that Brookwood directs that a statute that provides a decision of an 

administrative body is "final" and that does not include a separate specific, statutory grant 

of jurisdiction to the trial court precludes an appeal under R.C. 119.12. Accordingly, we 

follow the Supreme Court's precedent in Brookwood and this court's precedent in Carney, 

Shumway, and Heartland Jockey Club and find the use of the word "final" in R.C. 

3314.08(K)(2)(d) precludes an appeal under R.C. 119.12. 
No. 17AP-767 4 

{¶ 9} Thus, because the majority's conclusion was inconsistent with this court's 

precedent and that of the Supreme Court of Ohio, reconsideration is warranted. 

Accordingly, we grant BOE's and ODE's application for reconsideration and hold that the 

use of the word "final" in R.C. 3314.08(K)(2)(d) precludes an appeal under R.C. 119.12. 

Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting BOE's and ODE's motion to 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

III. Disposition 

{¶ 10} Based on the foregoing reasons, we find BOE and ODE have satisfied the 

grounds for reconsideration under App.R. 26(A)(1). Accordingly, we grant BOE's and 

ODE's application for reconsideration and hold the trial court did not err in granting BOE's 

and ODE's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. This court's July 10, 2018 decision 

and judgment entry are vacated. Appellant's original assignment of error is overruled, and 

the October 6, 2017 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Application for reconsideration granted. 

BROWN and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ. 

BRUNNER, J., dissents. 

BRUNNER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 11} Appellees, Ohio State Board of Education ("BOE") and Ohio Department of 

Education ("ODE"), have requested reconsideration and consideration en banc of our 

decision in Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 

17AP-767, 2018-Ohio-2695. In that decision, we held that appellant Electronic Classroom 

of Tomorrow ("ECOT") could appeal under R.C. 119.12 a decision reached by the BOE. 

Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, 2018-Ohio-2695, ¶ 1, citing Electronic Classroom of 

Tomorrow v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-510, 2018-Ohio-716, ¶ 28. The 

BOE and ODE argue that we should reconsider our decision and also consider it en banc as 

being inconsistent with our decisions in three prior cases decided in 1999, 1996, and 1987, 

respectively. Heartland Jockey Club v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 10th Dist. No. 98AP1465, 1999 WL 566857, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3530, *2 (Aug. 3, 1999), State ex rel. 

Shumway v. State Teachers Retirement Bd., 114 Ohio App.3d 280, 286 (10th Dist.1996), 

and Carney v. School Emps. Retirement System Bd., 39 Ohio App.3d 71, 72 (10th 
No. 17AP-767 5 

Dist.1987). (July 20, 2018 Appellees' Application for Recons. & En Banc at 10-14.) I 

respectfully dissent from the decision of the now new majority and would deny 

reconsideration. 

I. RECONSIDERATION 

{¶ 12} Our standard of review of BOE's and ODE's motion to reconsider is: 

[W]hether the motion calls to the attention of the court an 

obvious error in its decision or raises an issue for consideration 

that was either not considered at all or was not fully considered 

by the court when it should have been. 

Matthews v. Matthews, 5 Ohio App.3d 140 (10th Dist.1981), paragraph two of the syllabus 

(construing App.R. 26). BOE and ODE acknowledge that we analyzed Heartland Jockey,

Shumway, and Carney at length in our decision, Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, 

2018-Ohio-2695, ¶ 17-21. In our decision, we in fact distinguished them. So did the 

Supreme Court of Ohio in Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 127 Ohio 

St.3d 469, 2010-Ohio-5710, ¶ 14-15. ODE's and BOE's argument for reconsideration is that 

we made an obvious error in our analysis and should have adhered to the holdings in these 

three prior decisions. 

{¶ 13} ODE and BOE argue that we obviously erred when we distinguished 

Heartland Jockey, Shumway, and Carney (which concerned statutes governing the Ohio 

State Racing Commission, the State Teachers Retirement Board, and the School Employees 

Retirement System Board). They argue that distinguishing them was erroneous insofar as 

we did so on the basis that each of those decisions found no R.C. 119.12 appeal from a "final" 

agency decision but noted that there was a remedy in mandamus. Pointing out the notation 

in our decision that the Supreme Court already, but without explanation, denied 

mandamus relief to ECOT, ODE and BOE argue that our decision was tantamount to 

holding that "the meaning of a statute may differ based on an aggrieved party's 

litigation choices (i.e., on whether the party has pursued, and been denied, mandamus 

relief)." (Emphasis sic.) (Aug. 6, 2018 Appellees' Reply in Support at 2-3.) There is no basis 

in the record or in the law for this conclusion, in part because the agencies involved in 

Carney, Shumway, and Heartland Jockey were three different agencies, and none of them 

were BOE or ODE. Also, the legislature has the power to decide via its policymaking 

function the interests of the various arms of the state according to their functions. Ohio 
No. 17AP-767 6 

Constitution, Article II, Section 1 ("The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a 

general assembly consisting of a senate and house of representatives."). We have previously 

stated that "policy-making" is a "balancing of social, political, economic, and privacy 

concerns which are legislative in nature." (Citation omitted.) Ohio Licensed Beverage Assn. 

v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-490, 2007-Ohio-7147, ¶ 39. Thus, what may 

be statutorily construed to apply for one agency may not be legally fit for another. 

{¶ 14} In Brookwood, the Supreme Court considered statutes that did involve ODE 

and BOE. The high court analyzed the tension between statutes governing whether appeal 

rights from ODE and BOE decisions existed in the context of determining whether a 

sponsoring organization was "education-oriented," parallel to the situation we examined in 

our decision. The Supreme Court stated: 

The crux of this case is the interplay between R.C. 

3314.015(B)(3) and 3314.015(D). R.C. 3314.015(D) grants a 

right of appeal to entities disapproved for community-school 

sponsorship; the question is whether R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) takes 

it away in certain circumstances. ODE asserts that its 

determination that Brookwood is not education-oriented is 

final and therefore not subject to appeal based upon R.C. 

3314.015(B)(3). 

Brookwood at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 15} The Supreme Court recognized that the question of whether Brookwood was 

"education-oriented" involved four criteria under the education statute, three of which were 

"black and white." Id. at ¶ 16. But the fourth criteria, whether Brookwood was "educationoriented," required a nuanced approach for which the Supreme Court held that the 

subjective and substantive judgment of the board was involved; for this reason appellate 

rights existed so Brookwood would not be consigned to "an administrative abyss." Id. at 

¶ 16, 11. The majority at that time thus relied in part on Brookwood in applying this 

rationale to the subjective and substantive issues before ODE and BOE involving ECOT and 

for the purposes of establishing what the high court in Brookwood called "a check on that 

power." Id. at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 16} Also, in Brookwood, the high court found that it need not analyze 

Brookwood's case in light of the Tenth District Court of Appeals' Carney, Shumway, and 

Heartland Jockey decisions, since specific R.C. 119 appeals language was present. But the 
No. 17AP-767 7 

Supreme Court did not go on to conclude that such express statutory language was needed 

for there to exist an R.C. 119.12 right to appeal. 

{¶ 17} Because the Supreme Court is a higher court than we, as a precedential 

matter we were not constrained to follow Heartland Jockey, Shumway, and Carney (even 

though not overruled in Brookwood) when our then majority distinguished them and 

construed what is meant by the word "final" for litigants' appeals of ODE and BOE 

decisions. Under the various applications of both statutory and case law, I respectfully 

disagree with the new majority of the same panel that our decision is not erroneous, let 

alone obviously so, as the standard for reconsideration requires. 

{¶ 18} Thus, I dissent and would deny appellees' application for reconsideration.