Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 24-0007

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In re Brittanye Morris,

Relator

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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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PER CURIAM 

Justice Devine did not participate in the decision.

Our Court has long held that “a candidate’s access to the ballot is 

an important value to our democracy.” In re Green Party of Tex., 630 

S.W.3d 36, 40 (Tex. 2020) (citing In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 542 (Tex. 

2006)). Ballot access ensures that the people decide who their leaders 

will be, and thus it “lies at the very heart of a constitutional republic.” 

Id. at 37 (quoting Francis, 186 S.W.3d at 542). Accordingly, “any 

statutory provision that restricts the right to hold office must be strictly 

construed against ineligibility.” Id. at 39 (quoting State v. Hodges, 92 

S.W.3d 489, 494-95 (Tex. 2002)). 

In 2023, the Legislature added new disclosure requirements for 

candidates who seek to be elected to judicial office. See TEX. ELEC. CODE

§ 141.0311. These disclosures are directed to informing the electorate 

about a candidate’s experience, including any record of attorney or 
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judicial discipline, the nature of the candidate’s legal practice, and 

judicial or courtroom experience. Id. § 141.0311(b), (c). The statute 

requires disclosure, but it does not disqualify a candidate from holding 

office based on the content of the disclosure. See id.

One of the disclosures required in the new law is the candidate’s 

State Bar of Texas identification number. Id. § 141.0311(b)(1). A state 

bar number can confirm that a candidate is licensed to practice law, and 

it can lead to information about the candidate’s professional experience, 

including any record of discipline or sanction. 

Relator Brittanye Morris applied for a place on the Harris County 

Democratic Party primary ballot for the 333rd Judicial District Court. 

In error, she provided her driver’s license number rather than her state 

bar number on the application form. Because of this error, Respondent 

Michael Patrick Doyle, the Chair of the Harris County Democratic 

Party, rejected Morris’s application as a candidate for judicial office and 

denied her a place on the Democratic Party primary ballot. The question 

presented in this case is whether Morris’s failure to comply with the 

state bar number disclosure requirement results in her exclusion from 

the primary ballot. Because the Election Code does not provide such a 

consequence and we strictly construe election statutes against 

ineligibility, we conditionally grant relief ordering the Chair to certify 

Morris’s name for inclusion on the primary ballot. 

I

Judge Morris seeks re-election as Judge of the 333rd Civil District 

Court of Harris County, Texas. Morris submitted her application form 

on December 8, 2023, for a place on the Democratic Party primary ballot. 
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In accordance with Section 141.0311(b)(1) of the Texas Election Code, 

the application form asks candidates to include their state bar numbers.

Morris instead supplied her Texas driver’s license number. The County 

Chair initially accepted Morris’s application and listed her as a 

candidate on the Texas Secretary of State’s website. 

Opposing candidate and real party in interest Tracy Good alerted

the County Chair to Morris’s error on December 14—three days after 

the deadline to apply for candidacy. Morris responded that she had 

provided her driver’s license number inadvertently, that her state bar 

number is otherwise available as a public record, and that it is not 

disputed that she is a licensed attorney. On December 15, the Chair

withdrew his acceptance of Morris’s application for candidacy and 

ordered her removed from the primary ballot. Morris amended her 

application and resubmitted it the same day. The Chair did not accept

the amended application. Morris sought and was denied mandamus 

relief from the court of appeals. She also sought injunctive relief. That, 

too, was denied. 

Morris now seeks mandamus relief from this Court, asking that 

we order the Chair to certify Morris’s name for inclusion on the 2024 

Democratic Party primary ballot for the office of Judge of the 333rd 

Judicial District Court. In support of her request, she raises three main 

arguments. First, she contends that Chapter 172 controls applications 

to appear on a primary ballot. Chapter 172 does not incorporate the 

newly added Section 141.0311 by reference (as it does for the existing 

Section 141.031). Thus, Chapter 172 does not provide a local party chair 

with authority to remove a candidate from the primary ballot based on 
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a failure to comply with Section 141.0311. Second, Section 141.0311 

does not list exclusion from the primary ballot as a possible consequence

for failure to comply with the statute. Finally, Morris invokes the 

common law right to cure her error that this Court recognized in In re 

Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2006), which established the principle 

that courts must strictly construe election statutes to favor a candidate’s 

inclusion on a ballot. 

The Chair responds that Morris violated the plain language of 

Texas Election Code Section 141.0311(b)(1) and therefore did not comply 

with all “applicable requirements” of an application for judicial office, as 

Chapter 172 requires. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.0222(g). Under Chapter 

172, a party chair “shall reject” a candidate’s application for office when 

the applicable requirements are not met. Id. The Chair further 

determined that the Election Code forecloses any amendments to a 

ballot application after the filing deadline, so Morris is not entitled to an 

opportunity to cure her error. Id. § 172.0222(i). Good filed a brief 

largely echoing the Chair’s arguments.

II

When an Election Code provision does not expressly direct the 

consequence for a candidate’s failure to comply with a ballot application 

requirement, “we apply a presumption against removing parties from 

the ballot.” Green Party, 630 S.W.3d 36 at 39 (citing Francis, 186 S.W.3d

at 542). This presumption arises because “[t]he public interest is best 

served when public offices are decided by fair and vigorous elections, not 

technicalities leading to default.” Francis, 186 S.W.3d at 542. In 

addition, courts should interpret election statutes to avoid any
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“potential constitutional problems that might be implicated if access to 

the ballot [is] unnecessarily restricted.” Id.

Election Code Chapter 172 directs the county chair of the political 

party to review applications to appear on the party’s primary ballot for 

offices, like this one, that are “filled by voters of a single county.” See 

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.022(a)(2). The county chair “shall review the 

application to determine whether it complies with the requirements as 

to form, content, and procedure that it must satisfy for the candidate’s 

name to be placed on the general primary election ballot.” 

Id. § 172.0222(b). “If an application does not comply with the applicable 

requirements, the [county chair] shall reject the application . . . .” 

Id. § 172.0222(g).

The question here is whether a requirement found in Section 

141.0311 is an “applicable requirement[]” justifying the chair’s rejection

of Morris’s application under Chapter 172. We conclude that it is not, 

for two reasons. 

First, Chapter 172, which regulates applications for candidates 

seeking to appear on a party’s primary ballot, does not incorporate or 

reference newly added Section 141.0311 in listing the requirements of 

an application to be “entitled to a place on the general primary election 

ballot.” Id. § 172.021(a). In contrast, Chapter 172 expressly 

incorporates Section 141.031, making that information part of Chapter 

172’s “applicable requirements.” Id. § 172.021(b) (“An application must, 

in addition to complying with Section 141.031, be accompanied by the 

appropriate filing fee . . . .” (emphasis added)). Section 141.031 requires 

prospective candidates to provide identification information and 
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indicate their constitutional and statutory eligibility to hold office, so it 

makes sense that a candidate’s failure to comply with these application 

requirements authorizes the party chair to exclude that candidate from 

the ballot. Section 141.031 is thus among the “applicable requirements” 

the chair “shall review” to determine whether the application “complies 

with the requirements . . . that it must satisfy for the candidate’s name 

to be placed on the general primary election ballot,” or whether to 

“reject” the application because it “does not comply.” Id. § 172.0222(b),

(g). The “Additional Requirements for Application for Judicial Office” 

found in Section 141.0311 are not among Chapter 172’s “applicable 

requirements,” as they are not referenced in Chapter 172’s provisions 

that authorize a party chair to reject an application and exclude a 

candidate from the primary ballot.

The County Chair argues that Chapter 172 need not directly

incorporate Section 141.0311 because Section 141.0311 inherently 

applies to all ballots for judicial office, not just general election ballots. 

That much is correct, but this argument does not answer whether

exclusion from the primary ballot under Chapter 172 is a consequence 

of failure to comply with Section 141.0311. While Section 141.0311’s 

disclosures are not inconsistent with the requirements that Chapter 172

expressly incorporates, the Legislature has not expressly made them 

“applicable” within Chapter 172 as it has for the requirements found in 

Section 141.031.

Second, Section 141.0311 within its text warns of various 

consequences that can result from a candidate’s failure to comply with 

its provisions. Id. § 141.0311(d). Exclusion from the ballot is not listed 
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among them. Nor does Section 141.0311 reference Chapter 172 or a 

party chair’s authority to exclude a prospective candidate from the 

ballot. Rather, Section 141.0311 requires the judicial application form 

to notify candidates “that knowingly providing false information on the 

application, in addition to other penalties prescribed by law, constitutes 

professional misconduct subject to public sanctions or censure by the 

State Commission on Judicial Conduct or the state bar, as applicable.” 

Id. The Legislature may have considered these penalties sufficient 

incentive for applicants to comply with the new judicial disclosure 

requirements in a sworn application. Such an interpretation is 

consistent with Section 141.0311’s effort to educate the voters about a 

candidate’s legal and judicial experience beyond the minimum 

qualifications for office. The statute seeks to inform about the 

candidate’s background, but it does not add to the constitutional and 

statutory qualifications to hold office. Voters certainly may consider 

failures and errors in disclosure in evaluating whether a candidate is 

qualified to hold judicial office. The statute, however, does not impose a 

barrier to a candidate’s access to the ballot based on deficiencies in these 

disclosures. 

In the absence of an express directive to exclude candidates from 

the ballot for a failure to comply with Section 141.0311, we rely on our 

longstanding principle of construing the Election Code against 

ineligibility. Green Party, 630 S.W.3d at 39. A county chair can review 

the application, return it to the applicant for amendment within the 

applicable timeframe, and even publicize to voters any deficiencies in 

compliance with Section 141.0311. A chair also retains the authority to 
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reject any application that fails to comply with the applicable 

requirements of Chapter 172, including by reference the requirements 

of Section 141.031. But a chair has no discretion to exclude a candidate

from the ballot solely for failure to comply with Section 141.0311.

When a candidate has been denied a place on the ballot due to a 

party official’s error of law, we have granted mandamus relief. Francis, 

186 S.W.3d at 543. Therefore, without hearing oral argument, TEX. R.

APP. P. 52.8(c), we conditionally grant relief and direct the County Chair 

to certify Morris’s name for inclusion on the 2024 Democratic Party

primary ballot for the office of Judge of the 333rd Judicial District Court. 

We are confident the Chair will promptly comply, and our writ will issue 

only if he does not.

OPINION DELIVERED: January 10, 2024