21-395-cr

United States v. Cargo

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS 

GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S 

LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH 

THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT 

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 27th day of January, two thousand twenty-two.

PRESENT:

JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

EUNICE C. LEE,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. No. 21-395-cr

LATEEK CARGO, AKA “K”, AKA LEROY,

Defendant-Appellant,

JUSTIN JOHNSON, AKA J, BRYANT MCCRAY,
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AKA TROY, KYLEE RADUECHEL,

Defendants.

_____________________________________

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Barclay T. Johnson, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, for 

Michael L. Desautels, Federal 

Public Defender for the 

District of Vermont.

FOR APPELLEE: John J. Boscia and Gregory L. 

Waples, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, for Nikolas 

Kerest, United States Attorney 

for the District of Vermont.

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of 

Vermont (Reiss, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the district court entered on 

February 3, 2021, is AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Lateek Cargo pleaded guilty on October 19, 2018, to 

arson and a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin. This conduct and

Cargo’s extensive criminal history, which placed him in the highest criminal 
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history category, resulted in a Guidelines sentencing range of 324 to 405 months’

imprisonment. Nonetheless, because Cargo had shown signs of rehabilitation, 

including by obtaining gainful employment in the healthcare industry prior to 

being apprehended, the government and Cargo entered into a plea agreement 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) that capped his 

sentence at 144 months. On March 7, 2019, the district court imposed a sentence 

of 118 months – far below the cap agreed to by the parties – as well as restitution 

for the arson, which had severely damaged an apartment building for low-income 

residents. 

On November 9, 2020, having served approximately thirty-six months of his 

sentence, Cargo moved for compassionate release pursuant to the First Step Act of 

2018. In relevant part, that statute permits a district court to “reduce the 

[defendant’s] term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that[] extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that the reduction is consistent 

with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), (c)(1)(A)(i). 

The district court orally denied the motion without prejudice to Cargo’s renewing 

it at a later date. In doing so, the district court declined to find whether 

extraordinary circumstances justified a sentence reduction, concluding instead 
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that a reduction was not warranted in light of the section 3553(a) factors. See 

United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 69 (2d Cir. 2021) (“[W]hen a district court denies 

a defendant’s motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) in sole reliance on the applicable

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, it need not also determine whether the defendant has 

shown extraordinary and compelling reasons that might (in other circumstances) 

justify a sentence reduction.”). Cargo timely appealed. 

“We review the denial of a motion for compassionate release for abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2021). “A district 

court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the 

law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision 

that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. 

Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (alterations and quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008)). “[O]nce we are sure that 

[a] sentence resulted from the reasoned exercise of discretion, we must defer 

heavily to the expertise of district judges.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 

193 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also United States v. Seshan, 850 F. App’x 800, 801 

(2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (explaining that “[w]e apply the same deference to 

the district court’s denial of a compassionate release motion based on . . . the 
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[section] 3553(a) factors as we do when reviewing a district court’s [original] 

imposition of sentence based on . . . th[ose] factors”).

Here, the district court’s conclusion that the section 3553(a) factors weigh 

against Cargo’s release falls well within its broad discretion. Section 3553(a) 

requires a sentencing court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1), and also to ensure that the sentence “reflect[s] the seriousness of the 

offense, . . . promote[s] respect for the law, . . . provide[s] just punishment for the 

offense,” and “afford[s] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” among other 

sentencing objectives. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(B).

Cargo’s rehabilitative strides, though commendable, do not diminish the 

seriousness of his criminal conduct. The district court correctly observed that it 

was “just by luck” that Cargo’s “arson . . . did not result in killing somebody, 

and . . . some of the tenants lost everything they had.” J. App’x at 104. The 

district court also noted that Cargo’s drug activities “t[ook] place over a long 

period of time with significant quantities” of narcotics and involved the frequent 

use of firearms. J. App’x at 105. It was therefore not an abuse of discretion for 

the district court to conclude that a further reduction in Cargo’s 118-month 
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sentence – which was already well below the 144-month sentence to which the 

parties had stipulated, as well as the Guidelines range of 324 to 405 months – was 

unwarranted. See, e.g., Keitt, 21 F.4th at 72 (citing defendant’s serious criminal 

conduct in affirming denial of compassionate release based on the section 3553(a) 

factors); Seshan, 850 F. App’x at 802 (affirming denial of compassionate released 

when “the district court carefully considered and balanced the [section] 3553(a) 

factors”).

None of Cargo’s remaining objections is meritorious. The array of district 

court decisions granting compassionate release that Cargo identifies are readily 

distinguishable, involving defendants who had already served lengthy, multidecade sentences and never benefited from an initial sentence that was 

substantially below the Guidelines range. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, No. 

00-cr-761-1 (JSR), 2021 WL 797835, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2021); United States v. 

Underwood, No. 88-cr-822 (SHS), 2021 WL 3204834, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2021);

United States v. Rodriguez, 492 F. Supp. 3d 306, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Nor can it be 

said that the district court failed to consider Cargo’s rehabilitation or the 

difficulties facing Cargo’s family while he is in prison. See J. App’x at 102 

(acknowledging that Cargo’s “family is struggling without his presence,” which 
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should not be “minimize[d] . . . in any respect”). The district court simply found 

that those considerations paled in comparison to the seriousness of the crimes that 

Cargo committed. We see no reason to question that conclusion and find that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce Cargo’s sentence 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1).

We have considered Cargo’s remaining arguments and find them to be 

meritless. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court