### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 500 -CV

Marc os Leal and Laura Leal , Appellan ts

v. McD onald ’s Corporat ion an d McDonald’s Restaurants of Texas, Inc.,

both d /b/a McDonald’s , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN20323 1 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

D I S S E N T I N GO P I N I O N
Irespe ctfully

dissent. Whe n, a s h e r e , w e r e v i e w t h e g r an t o f a s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t , w e ar e o b l ig a te d to examin e the e ntire re cord in the lig ht most favorable to the nonmovant, indulgingever y
rea sonable infe renc e and r esolving any doubts in the nonmova

nt’s favor
. City of Keller v. W ilson , 16 8 S. W.3 d 8 02 , 8 24 (T e x. 20 05 ); se e als o King Ra n ch , Inc. v . Chapman , 118 S.W .3d 742, 751 (T e x. 20 03 ). “ Th e fi na l te st f or le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y mus t a lw ay s b e wh e the r t he ev iden c e . . . w ou ld enable rea sonable and fair- minded people” to differ in their conc lusions. City of Keller , 168 S.W .3d
a t 82 7; se e als o Goodye ar Tire & Ru b b er Co. v. Maye s , 236 S.W .3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). Appellate judg es must be vig ilant to avoid falling into the trap of concludingthat since they are
rea sonable a

nd fair- minded people, their particula r view of t h e circumstantial evidence prese nted
e sta bli sh e s th e ou te r l imi ts o f w hat in fe re nc e s c an r e a so na bly be dr awn the re fr om.2

At the end of

the day , the standar ds of re view ar e mental c onstru ct s t h at discipline the mass of e vidence place d befor e a r eviewingcourt. When a judg e no long er ne eds strictly to separate out evidenc e and inf ere nces in fa

vor of the ve rdict, but may immediately

look throug h the prism of what is “rea sonable,” it c omes much closer t o w e i g h i n g c o n f

l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e an d

i n f e r e n c e s , an d

i n qu i r i n g i n t o c r e d i b i l i t y.
W. W endell Ha ll and Mark Eme ry , The Texas Hold Out: Trends in the R evie w of Ci vil and Criminal J ur yVe rd ic ts , 49 S. Tex . L . Rev. 539, 557 (Spring 2008). Thus, the “more than a scintil la” bar i s nece ssarily a low one: “W hen the e vidence offe red to prove a vit al fact is so wea k as t o do no more than cre ate a mere surmise or suspicion of its ex istence, the evidenc e is no more than a s ci n t i l l a an d, in leg al ef fec t, is no evidence
. . . . Evidence that is so s l i gh t as to make any infere nce a

g uess is in leg al ef

fec t no evidence .” Fo rd Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).
Cir c u m s t an t i a l e v i d e n c e m ay b e u s e d t o e s t a b l i s h an y m a t e r i a l f

a c t , b u t i tmus t transce nd mere suspicion. The mater ial fac t must be reasona bly inferr ed fr om the known circ umstance s . By its very nature , circ umstantial evidence often involves linking what may

be appa rently insignifica

nt and unre lat ed events to establish a pattern. Thus, eac h piece of circ umstantial e vidence must be viewed not in isol ation, bu t in lig ht o f a ll the kn ow n c ir c ums tanc e s.
Lozano v. Lozano , 52 S.W .3d 141, 149 (Tex. 2001) (citatio n s an d i n t erna l quotations omi tted). There fore , as long as the circ umstantial e vidence , viewed as a whole, rises above na ked suspicion or g uesswork, it is more than a scintilla. Wit h this analy

tical framewor

k, what is the patter

n of circ umstantial evidence in the prese nt case ? The re staurant did not open until 6:00 a.m. One of the morning cre w, J ose Pere z, was responsible for

mopping the f

loor of the restaur ant betwee n 5:30 a nd 6:00 e ach day
. His supervisor3

testified, “He had to f

ollow a pretty set schedule .” I n fac t, a book descr ibes all the t as k s t he
ma int e na nc e man h a s to do e ve ry

mor nin g be fo re the sto re op e ns , a nd he is r e qu ir e d to do the m “ in that exact order

ever y day .” Not only

was Pere z responsible for mopping t h e fl o o r every day , the
rec ord conta ins deposition testi mony that he did mop on the morning L eal slipped: Q
. ( B y a t t o r

n e y f o r M c D o n a l d ’ s ) Do y o u k n o w w h o c le a n e d th e lo b b y th at m o rn i n g? A. (B y L a ur a L e a l) Al wa

y s th e ma int e na

nc e pe rs on

c le ans it. Q
. A n d

w h o w a s t h e m a i n t e n an c e p e r s o nt h a td ay? A. Alway s J ose, there is nobody else. Q. Ea c h d ay

tha t y ou ’r e the re wh e n Jose is the ma int e na nc e man, is o ne of

his j o b s t h a th e m o p s t h e l o b b y? A. Ye s . Fi rs tt o cl ea nev ery t h i n g an d t h en m o p at t h e e n d

b ef o re o p en i n g.
L eal f ell at 5:45 a.m., during the re latively small window of t i m e t h at Pere z was require d to mop. Be cause the ac cident occ urre d befor e the r estaura nt had opene d, there wer e no customer s in the store, only the morning cre w of McD onald’s employ ees. L eal slipped e ven thoug h she wa s wea ring slip-resistant shoes. As she w as g etting up, she noticed that the f loor was we t. There was nothing else on the f

loor except the water, a

nd there wer e no known de fec ts in or problems with the floor. The majority

conclude s that the fore g oing e vidence is not sufficient to raise a
rea sonable infe renc e that the we t floor was the result of Perez’s m opping or some other e mploy ee activity . Respectf

ully , Ibelieve that is too narrow a rea ding of

the conc ept of “ rea sonable infe renc e.” I n my opinion, the circ umstantial evidenc e presented here, viewed as a whole, produce s a pattern by4

which a c onclusion that the wet floor probably did result from mopping would not be a g uess and would not be naked suspicion. Ba sed on the standards by which we are require d to eva l u at e t he infere nces that may

rea sonably

be dra wn from suc h evidenc e, that is more than a scintilla. Th e ma jor ity a lso a sse rt s th a t th e me re fa c t th a t th e on ly pe op le in the sto re a t the tim e L eal f ell wer e McD onald’s employ ees “ is no more evidenc e that the y cause d the floor to be w et ( e.g. , by mopping) than it is evidence that the floor wa s wet d u e t o a p l umbing lea k or leaking machine.” Slip opi nion at 6. This appea rs t o be an argument for application of t he so-c alled “e qual infere nce r

ule.” See City of Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 813-14. But there are at least two rea sons why the equal infere nce r

ule is not disposi tive here . First, the e qual infer ence rule doe s not chang e the “more than a sc intill a” le g al ana ly sis, as expl ained by former Chief J ustice Philli ps in Lozano : Properly applied, the e qual infer ence rule is but a species of the no evidenc e ru le , e mph a sizi ngthat w he n th e c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e is s o s lig ht t hat any p l a us ibl e infere nce is pure ly

a g uess, it is in l eg al ef fec t no evidenc e. Bu t circumstantial e vid e nc e is n ot leg a lly

ins uf fi c ie nt m e re ly

be c a us e mor e tha

n o ne re a so na

ble infere nce may

be dra wn from it. If circumstantial e videnc e will support more than on e re as on ab le in

feren c e, it

is f or thejur yto d e c idewhi c h is mo re re as on ab le , subject only

to r eview by the trial court a nd the cour

t of appe als to assure that such e vid e nc e is f

a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt.
52 S.W. 3d

a t 148 (emph a sis a dd e d) . A s se t f or th a bo ve , th e c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e pr e se nte d in thi s case is m or e tha

n s uf fi c ie nt t o ma

ke the inf e re nc e that th e wate r o n w hic h L e a l sl ipp e d c a me fr om m op pin g (o r s ome oth e r e mpl oy e e a c tiv ity ) a re a so na ble on e . Se c on d, the e qu a l in fe re nc e ru le applies only

wher e two rea sonable inferenc es ar e of pr ecise ly equal pr obability . I n the fa ce of the evidenc e set forth above, it stra ins c redulity to a rg ue that it is equally likely that t h e w at er L eal5

slipped on came from a leaking machine or a plumbing le ak, whe n the re cord c ontains no indication whatsoeve r that the re staurant in question had eve r had a le aking machine or a plumbing le ak. For the fore g oing r easons, I

would reve rse the tr ial court’s summar y judgme nt and
re mand the c a us e fo r t ri a l.

__________________________________________

J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Waldrop Filed: August 5, 2009