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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

KATHY J. MCNEW, 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

September 22, 2016 

v No. 327944 

Tax Tribunal 

TOWNSHIP OF THORNAPPLE, LC No. 14-007756-TT 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and O’BRIEN, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Petitioner, Kathy J. McNew, appeals as of right the Tax Tribunal’s final opinion and 

judgment affirming the uncapping of the taxable value of real property owned by petitioner as 

the successor trustee of the Gerald A. McNew and Joyce A. McNew Revocable Living Trust for 

the 2013, 2014, and 2015 taxable years. We affirm. 

 The Gerald A. McNew and Joyce A. McNew Revocable Living Trust (“the trust”) was 

executed on December 19, 2008. That same day, Gerald and Joyce McNew, petitioner’s parents, 

executed a warranty deed conveying the property at issue to themselves “as tenants-by-theentireties, for their lifetime coupled with an unrestricted power to convey the property during 

their lifetime or the survivor’s lifetime.” According to the deed, if Gerald or Joyce McNew had 

not conveyed the property prior to their deaths, the property was to be conveyed to the trust’s 

successor and administered according to its terms. According to the trust, Gerald and Joyce 

McNew were the settlors and primary trustees, but, upon their deaths, the first successor trust 

would be their youngest daughter, petitioner, and, upon their death, petitioner would receive “all 

right, title, and interest in the front twelve (12) acres” and her three siblings would receive “all 

right, title, and interest in the back twenty-eight (28) acres” of the property at issue. 

 Joyce McNew and Gerald McNew passed away in 2010 and 2012 respectively. On July 

3, 2014, respondent, the Township of Thornapple, sent petitioner a letter that provided as 

follows: 

Part of Proposal A of 1994 requires the taxable value of property in the State of 

Michigan be “uncapped” in the year following a transfer of ownership. Per the 

language of the Gerald A. McNew & Joyce A McNew Trust, as successor trustee, 

the above referenced property is conveyed to you if it had not been conveyed 
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prior to their deaths. Since Gerald A. McNew, the survivor of Joyce A. 

McNew[,] passed away on April 16, 2012, the property was conveyed to you at 

that time. The property should have been uncapped for the 2013 tax roll. 

Attached to the letter were affidavits reflecting the updated taxable values for the 2013 and 2014 

taxable years in light of the uncapping. 

 Petitioner appealed to the Small Claims Division of the Tax Tribunal, arguing that the 

taxable value of the property was improperly uncapped, but the Tribunal disagreed. It concluded 

that, upon Gerald McNew’s death in 2012, the property at issue was conveyed to the trust 

pursuant to the deed. Thus, because a conveyance to a trust is a transfer of ownership pursuant 

to MCL 211.27a(6)(c), the Tribunal concluded, the taxable value of the property was properly 

uncapped. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that respondent had correctly calculated the 

taxable values of the property at issue for the 2013, 2014, and 2015 taxable years. This appeal 

followed. 

 “Where fraud is not claimed, [appellate courts] review[] the tribunal’s decision for 

misapplication of the law or adoption of a wrong principle.” Wexford Med Group v City of 

Cadillac, 474 Mich 192, 201; 713 NW2d 734 (2006). Questions of statutory interpretation and 

application are reviewed de novo. Gardner v Dep’t of Treasury, 498 Mich 1, 5; 869 NW2d 199 

(2015). When interpreting statutory provisions, courts “follow the established rules of statutory 

construction, the foremost of which is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 

Legislature.” Id. at 5-6. First, courts look to the language of the statute itself, and, if clear and 

unambiguous, courts “presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed. 

Accordingly, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is 

permitted.” Id. at 6. 

 In 1994, voters passed Proposal A, amending article 9, § 3 of the Michigan 

Constitution to limit the annual increase in property tax assessments and to 

authorize enabling legislation. The purpose of Proposal A was to limit tax 

increases on property as long as it remains owned by the same party, even though 

the actual market value of the property may have risen at a greater rate. Toll 

Northville Ltd v Northville Twp, 480 Mich 6, 12; 743 NW2d 902 (2008). The 

Michigan Legislature was charged with determining the specifics needed to give 

effect to Proposal A’s mandate. See Const 1963, art 9, § 3 (providing for the 

reassessment of a parcel’s value when ownership has been transferred “as defined 

by law”) (emphasis added). The 1995 amendments of the [General Property Tax 

Act] fixed the cap on assessment increases at the lesser amount of either 5 percent 

of the assessed value of the property for the previous year or the increase in the 

rate of inflation from the previous year. MCL 211.27a(2). After certain 

“transfer[s] of ownership” occur, property becomes uncapped and thus subject to 

reassessment based on actual property value. MCL 211.27a(3). [Klooster v City 

of Charlevoix, 488 Mich 289, 296-297; 795 NW2d 578 (2011) (emphasis in 

original).] 

The term “transfer of ownership” is statutorily defined in MCL 211.27a(6) as follows: 
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 (6) As used in this act, “transfer of ownership” means the conveyance of 

title to or a present interest in property, including the beneficial use of the 

property, the value of which is substantially equal to the value of the fee interest. 

Transfer of ownership of property includes, but is not limited to the following: 

 (a) A conveyance by deed. 

* * * 

 (c) A conveyance to a trust after December 31, 1994, except under any of 

the following conditions: 

 (i) If the settlor or settlor’s spouse, or both, conveys the property to the 

trust and the sole present beneficiary or beneficiaries are the settler or the settler’s 

spouse, or both. 

 (ii) Beginning December 31, 2014, for residential real property, if the 

settlor or the settlor’s spouse, or both, conveys the residential real property to the 

trust and the sole present beneficiary or beneficiaries are the settlor’s or the 

settlor’s spouse’s mother, father, brother, sister, son, daughter, adopted son, 

adopted daughter, grandson, or granddaughter and the residential real property is 

not used for any commercial purpose following the conveyance. 

 This statutory language is clear and unambiguous—a conveyance of real property by 

deed to a trust after December 31, 1994, is a “transfer of ownership” that results in the uncapping 

of the taxable value of the real property pursuant to MCL 211.27a(3) unless a statutory exception 

applies. In this case, according to the December 2008 warranty deed, if neither Gerald McNew 

nor Joyce McNew conveyed the property at issue before their deaths, the property would be 

conveyed to the trust. Thus, when Gerald McNew passed away in April 2012, the property at 

issue was conveyed to the trust (and to petitioner as trustee for the trust) to be administered 

according to the trust’s terms. Thus, pursuant to MCL 211.27a(3), the conveyance of the 

property on April 16, 2012, to the trust constituted a “transfer of ownership” that triggered the 

uncapping of its taxable value. 

 On appeal, petitioner first argues that a transfer of ownership did not occur because “the 

transfer of property at issue . . . fits squarely within” a statutory exception found in MCL 

211.27a(7)(s). We disagree. MCL 211.27a(7)(s) provides as follows: 

 (7) Transfer of ownership does not include the following: 

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 (s) Beginning December 31, 2013 through December 30, 2014, a transfer 

of residential real property if the transferee is related to the transferor by blood or 

affinity to the first degree and the use of the residential real property does not 

change following the transfer. [MCL 211.27a(7)(s).] 
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However, as the Tribunal correctly concluded, the conveyance at issue in this case occurred on 

April 16, 2012, i.e., the date of Gerald McNew’s death. Because MCL 211.27a(7)(s) applies 

only to conveyances made between December 31, 2013, and December 30, 2014, and this 

conveyance obviously was not made between those dates, this statutory exception does not 

apply. Petitioner does not address the date of the conveyance at all on appeal. Instead, she 

merely claims that a conveyance to the trust was basically a conveyance to Gerald and Joyce 

McNew’s children, and we are not convinced that a conveyance to a trust is a conveyance to a 

“transferor by blood or affinity to the first degree” as plaintiff contends. In any event, we need 

not reach a conclusion in that regard because the conveyance did not occur between December 

31, 2013, and December 30, 2014. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien