## IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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. 11-0425

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### P E T R O L E U M 

### S O L U T IO N S 

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### . , P E T IT IO N E R 

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v . 

### B IL L 

### H E A D D 

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### / A 

### B IL L 

### H E A D 

### E N T E R P R IS E S A N D 

### T IT E F L E X 

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### . , R E S P O N D E N T S

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O N P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W F R O M T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

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Argued Dec em ber 4, 2012

J U S T I C E L E H R M A N N delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which C H I E F J U S T I C E H E C H T , J U S T I C E G R E E N , J U S T I C E J O H N S O N , J U S T I C E W I L L E T T , J U S T I C E G U Z M A N , J U S T I C E D E V I N E , and J U S T I C E B R O W N joined, and in Parts I and I I of which J U S T I C E B O Y D joined.
J U S T I C E B O Y D delivere d an opinion dissenting in par t.

We deny the motions for rehe aring of Bill Hea d d/b/a Bill Hea d Enterpr ises and Petroleum
Soluti ons, I nc. We withdraw our opinion of J uly 11, 2014, and substitut e the following in its place

. Bill Hea d, doing business as Bill Hea d Enterpr ises (He ad), hired Petroleum Soluti ons, I nc.
to manufa cture and ins t all an underg round fuel sy stem. Following a larg e diesel leak, Hea d sued
Petroleum Soluti ons for its resulting damage s , and the trial court render ed judgment on the j ury ’s
verdic t in Hea d’s favor

. The trial court also rende red judgme nt in favor of third -p ar t y d ef en dant Titeflex, I nc., the alleged manufa cture r of a component part incorporated into the fuel sy stem, onTiteflex’s counter claim ag ainst Petroleum Soluti ons for statutory indemnity

. The court of appea ls

affirmed the judgme nt. Petroleum Soluti ons prese nts two principal issues for our revi ew
. Fi rs t , Petroleum Soluti ons challeng es the trial court’s issuance of spoliation sanctions ag ains t i t , wh i ch
included submitt ing a spoliation instruction to the jury and striking Petroleum Soluti ons’ statute-oflimit ations and statutory -indemnity def e n s e s
. Se c o n d , Pe tr o le u

m So lu ti o n s c omplains that Titeflex’s statutory -indemnity

claim fa ils as a matter of law.
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by char g ing the jury wi t h a s p o l i at ion
instruction and st riking Petroleum Soluti ons’ defenses because those sanctions d o not confor m to the standards set forth in our rec ent decision in Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. v. Aldridge , 438 S.W .3d
9 (Tex. 2014). Be cause the trial court’s abuse of discretion was harmful with respe ct to the claims
betwee n Hea d and Petroleum Soluti ons, we reve rse the court of appea ls’ judgme nt as to Hea d’s
claims and rema

nd to the trial court for further proce eding s bet wee n those parties. Howeve r, we
ag ree with the t rial court and the court of appea ls that Titeflex was entitl ed to st atutory indemnity
from Petroleum Soluti ons and hold that any spoliation err or with respe ct to the indemnity claim was harmless. The ref

ore, w e af firm the cour

t of appe als’ judg ment as to Titeflex’s indemnity claim.
I. F actual and Proc edural Backgroun d
Hea d owns and opera tes the Silver Spur Truck Stop in Pharr, Texas. Hea d contra cted with
Petroleum Soluti ons to install a diesel-f uel storag e sy stem that included pipes nece ssary to transport the fuel from the tanks to the station’s fuel pumps. The parties ag ree that flex connec tors—parts of the piping sy stem—were components of the new fuel sy stem. Howeve r, t hey disag ree about who
manufa cture d the conne ctors that Petroleum Solutions used in the sy stem.

2After installing the fuel sy stem, Petroleum Soluti ons rec ommended installing an automatic

tank-g aug ing sy stem to detec t any fuel rele ases. Hea d ag ree d, and Petroleum Soluti ons completed
the sy stem’s installation in October 1999. Shortly af t er b o t h the fuel and g aug ing sy stems wer e installed, Hea d beg an to exp er i en ce problems, mainly with the g aug ing sy stem, and reque sted
maintenanc e and repa ir work from Petroleum Soluti ons on numerous occa sions. I n November 2001,
Hea d contac ted Petroleum Soluti ons about fluctuations in the fuel inventory data from the g aug ing
sy stem. Petroleum Soluti ons invest i gated and discovere d that a major diesel-f uel rele ase had

occur red. The Texas Natura l Resource Conservation Commi ssion (now the Texas Commi ssion on Environmental Quality

) rec orded a rec overy of approximately 20,000 g allons of diesel fuel from the surrounding g round.
Petroleum Soluti ons worke rs immediately n o ti f ie d H e a d a n d Pe tr o le um Soluti ons’ president,
Mark Ba rron, about t h e leak, and Ba rron trave led to the Silver Spur to help deter mine the cause
. After testing, Petroleum Soluti ons conclude d that the leak orig inated in the piping that ran from the
tanks to the fuel dispensers. Ba rron subsequently informe d t h e S ilver Spur’s g ener al manag er, Robert Carpe nter, that the sour ce of the leak w as a faulty flex c onnector located unde r “D ispenser
Number 4.” Ba

rron showed Carpente r the alleg edly faulty connect o r an d asked if Petroleum
Soluti ons could reta in it for safe keeping and possible testing. Carpente r ag ree d to Ba rron’ s reque st. That was the last time Carpente r or Hea d saw the flex connec tor. Petroleum Soluti ons would later
say that Titeflex had manufa cture d the flex connec tor, but photos of the connec tor did not reve al the
manufa cture r, and Petroleum Soluti ons was unable to produce rec ords showing that Titeflex was the
manufa cture r.
3Petroleum Soluti ons repor ted the incident to its liability insurer, which eng ag ed attorney Eliz abeth Nea lly to repr esent Pe tr o leum Soluti ons. I n Fe bruar y 2002, Ba

rron g ave the flex connec tor
to Nea lly , wh o s ent it to metallurg ist David Hendr ix for evalua tion along with instructions not to perf orm destructive testing. Hendr ix perf ormed an u n s p ec ified analy sis on the component, then
proce ssed it into inventory for storag e at WH L abora tories. I n April 2002, Nea lly sent Hendr ix a letter inquiring about his revie w and inspection of the flex connec tor, and Hendr ix responde d with

an invoi ce for his profe ssional eng ineer ing service s, which included photogr aphing the flex

connec tor, four hours of professional time, and one hour of l abora tory time. Petroleum Soluti ons did not contac t Hendr ix ag ain or otherwise inquire about the connec tor until Marc h 2006, shortly
afte r Hea d filed suit. By that time, the storag e fac ility at WH L abora tories had been demolished, and

cer tain contents of the building had been discarde d or destroy ed in conjunction with the building’s
demolition. Howar d He insohn, the lab’s manag er, testified at a deposition that he orally advised
Hendr ix that the building would be torn down and its contents destroy ed, and that Hendr ix retrie ved

some items and told Heinsohn he could throw out the rest. Howeve r, nothing in the rec ord sug g ests Petroleum Soluti ons was informed that WH L abora tories would be torn down or even knew that the

connec tor was be ing store d there

. Be g inning in Dec ember 2001, Hea d withheld pay ments from Petroleum Soluti ons, which it
blamed for causing the leak. I n May 20 0 2 , Hea d’s attorney wrote a letter to Petroleum Soluti ons threa tening suit. W hile the letter reque sted that Petroleum Soluti ons contac t H ead to r esolve their dispute amicably , the letter did not reque st production of the flex connec tor. Hea d eventua lly filed
suit ag ainst Petroleum Soluti ons on Fe bruar y 13, 2006, asser

ting claims for brea ch of the war ranty

4of fitness, brea ch of the implied war ranty of g ood and workmanlike service s, and neg lige nce. 1
Be cause the lawsuit was filed more than four y ear s afte r the leak was discovere d, Hea d also pleade d
the discover

y -rule a nd fra udulent-conc ealment e x ceptions to the statute of limitations. Petroleum
Soluti ons answe red, asser ting limit ations and other aff irmative defe nses. I t also alleg ed that Titeflex
had manuf

actur ed the missing f

lex connector that c aused the leak.
Petroleum Soluti ons then filed a third-par ty peti ti o n ag ainst Titeflex, claiming indemnity and
contribution based on a products-liability theory

. Hea d followed in Petroleum Soluti ons’ footsteps
and amende d its petition to asser t a strict prod u ct s -l i ability claim direc tly ag ainst Titeflex. The
amende d petition attributed the leak and the resulting damag es to sever al defic iencies, including: a failure of the line leak detec tor and g aug ing sy stem; the faulty flex connec tor, which was “par t of the [fuel] sy stem” and which Titeflex alleg edly sold to Petroleum Soluti ons; and Petroleum Soluti ons’
failure to properly

install or repa ir the fue l and g aug ing sy stems. Titeflex moved for summary j u d gm ent on both Petroleum Soluti ons’ and Hea d’s claims,
urg ing that no evidenc e showed that a Titeflex-manufac tured connec tor was used in the Silver Spur’s
fu el s y s t em
. The trial court ultimately denied Titeflex’s motion. Petroleum Soluti ons also twice
moved for summary judgme nt on limit ations g rounds, but the trial court denie d b o t h motions.
Petroleum Soluti ons then desig nated an expert to opine that the damag es resulting from the leak wer e attributable to the fle x connec tor, but the expert failed to a ttend three noticed depositions and wa s de-de signa ted by

Petroleum Soluti ons on the eve of trial.

H e a d ’ s s i x t h a m e n d e d p e t i t i o n i s t h e l i v e p l e a d i n g i n t h i s a c t i o n
. I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h a t p l e a d i n g , t h e c l a i m s 1
s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y i n c l u d e d n e g l i g e n c e , n e g l i g e n t u n d e r t a k i n g , b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t , f

r a u d , b r e a c h o f

i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f g o o d a n d w o r k m a n l i k e s e r v i c e s , a n d b r e a c h o f f i d u c i a r y d u t y . 5I n J anuar y 2008, Titeflex moved for sanctions ag ainst Petroleum Soluti ons. Titeflex claimed
that Petroleum Soluti ons spoliated evidenc e by failing to produce the alleg edly faulty flex connec tor and soug ht a jury instruction to that eff ect. Hea d then nonsuited its claims ag ainst Titeflex and also
moved for sanctions ag ainst Petroleum Soluti ons. Hea d arg ued that P et ro l eum Soluti ons intentionally destroy ed cruc ial evidenc e and reque sted that the trial court consider a broad rang e of sanctions, including striking Petroleum Soluti ons’ pleading s. Petroleum Soluti ons responde d to the
sanctions motions with an aff idavit from Nea lly and the deposition testimony of Hendr ix and
Heinsohn. Petroleum Soluti ons arg ued that it did not delibera tely destroy any ev i d en ce , h ad not
eng ag ed in culpable or neg lige nt conduct with respe ct to the flex connec tor, and did not have a duty to preser ve the f lex connector onc e the limitations period had expired.
Whil e the sanctions motions wer e pending , Titeflex filed a counter claim ag ainst Petroleum
Soluti ons, claiming i t o we d T iteflex a st atutory duty of i ndemnity under Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Co d e ch ap ter 82. Eventually , unable to produce the alleg edly faulty flex connec tor or, afte r t hree failed attempts, an ex pert for deposition to state t hat a faul t y fl ex connec tor cause d the
l ea k, Petroleum Soluti ons nonsuited its third-par ty claims ag ainst Titeflex shortly befor e trial.
Titeflex’s indemnity counter claim rema ined pending

. Hea d’s live petition at the time of trial alleg ed
that Petroleum S o l u t i ons had mi srepr esente d that the flex connec tor cause d Hea d’s damage s, and
that those damag es were caused by defe cts in the s y stems that P et ro l eum S olutions manufa cture d

as we ll as by

Petroleum Soluti ons’ fa ilure to proper ly install, maintain, and repa ir the sy stems.
At a pre t ri al h ear ing on Titeflex’s and Hea d’s motions for sanctions, the trial court struck
Petroleum Soluti o n s ’ af firmative defe nses, including its statute-of- limit ations and statutory

6indemnity defe nses, and ruled that a spoliation instruction would be g iven to the jury

. Hea d’s and

T iteflex’s claims ag ainst Petroleum Soluti ons then proce eded to trial. At trial, Head u rge d t h at Petroleum Soluti ons h ad re p ea tedly misrepre sented the cause of the leak. Hea d offe red expert testimony that Petroleum S o l u t i ons’ i mproper installation of a union at a shear valve, not the flex

connec tor, ca

used the lea

k. The jury

char g e included the following spoliation inst ruction: You, the jury , are instructed that Petroleum Soluti ons, I nc. destroy ed, lost, or failed to produce to this Court materia l evidenc e that by law should have been produce d as evidenc e for y our delibera tions. You are further instructed y ou may , but are not require d to, presume this evidenc e is unfavor able to Petroleum Soluti ons, I nc. The jury found in Hea d’s favor

and aw arde d Hea d near ly $1.2 milli on. As to Titeflex’s statutory

indemnity claim, t he jury found t hat P etroleum S o l u t i o n s wa s a manufacture r, t hat Ti teflex was a seller, and that Titeflex incurre d rea sonable attorney ’s fee s and expenses of $450,853.62. The trial

court re ndere d judgme nt on the jury ’s ver dict, and Petroleum Solutions appealed.
The court of appea ls, with one justice dissenting, aff irmed the trial court’s judgme nt except

as to the amount of prejudg ment interest. ___ S.W .3d ___, ___. The court conclud ed t h at the
sanctions order was not an abuse of discretion beca use Petroleum Soluti ons’ failure to prese rve the
flex connec tor signific antly prejudice d Hea d and T i t efle x , and Petroleum Soluti ons’ repe ated attempts to minimi ze its fault amounted to bad faith deser ving of sever e sanctions. Id. at ___. The

court of appea ls also conclude d that Petroleum Soluti ons’ argum ents reg arding the statute of
limit ations wer e not rele vant, that there was leg ally and fac tually sufficie nt evidenc e supporting the
verdic t on Hea d’s claims, and that Tite flex was entitled to statutory indemnity from Petroleum
Soluti ons. Id. at ___, ___. The dissenting justice took issue with the trial court’s failure to articula te

7any connec tion betwee n Petroleum Soluti ons’ inability to produce the flex connec tor and the str iking

of Petroleum Soluti ons’ statute-of- limit ations defe nse. Id. at ___ (Ve la, J ., dissenting)

. The dissent
would have rema

nded the case for a new trial in which Petroleum Soluti ons could asser t its defe nses. Id. at ___.
II. Th e Trial Court’ s San ctions
Petroleum Soluti ons challeng es the trial court’s imposit ion of spoliation sanctions and, more specific ally , the court’s submissi on of a spoliation jury instruct ion and striking of Petroleum
Soluti ons’ aff

irmative defe nses, including its limit ations defe nse. Petroleum Solutio n s c o n te n d s that the trial court imposed deat h -p enalty sanctions that violate the test set forth in TransAmerican
Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell , 811 S.W .2d 913 (Tex. 199 1). Apply ing the standard for spoliation
sanctions we rec ently adopted in Brookshire Brothers , 438 S.W .3d at 20–26, we hold that the trial

court a bused its discretion and r emand f or a ne w trial. 2
I n Brookshire Brothers , we adopted a fra mework g overning the imposit ion of reme dies for
evidenc e spoliation. We explained that whether a party spoliated evidenc e and whether a particula r

reme dy is appropr iate are questions of law for the trial court. Id. at 20. Be cause the trial court bear s this responsibility , evidenc e of the circ umstances surroundi n g all eg ed spoliation is g ener ally
inadmissible at t rial, as such evidence is larg ely irrele vant to the merits and unf airly prejudicia l to
the spoliating pa

rty

. Id. at 26. We further held in Brookshire Brothers that, to f ind tha t spoliation

P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s c o n t e n d s i t i s e n t i t l e d t o r e n d i t i o n o f j u d g m e n t o n g r o u n d s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s l e g a l l y 2 i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ’ s f i n d i n g s i n H e a d ’ s f

a v o r o n i t s c l a i m s f

o r n e g l i g e n c e , f

r a u d , b r e a c h o f f

i d u c i a r y d u t y , b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t , a n d b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y . B e c a u s e P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s f a i l e d t o c h a l l e n g e t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g t h e j u r y ’ s f i n d i n g i n H e a d ’ s f

a v o r o n i t s n e g l i g e n t u n d e r t a k i n g c l a i m , w h i c h p r o v i d e s a n i n d e p e n d e n t b a s i s t o s u p p o r t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s j u d g m e n t , w e n e e d n o t a d d r e s s t h i s i s s u e
. 8occur

red, the trial court must make aff irmative deter

minations a s to two elements. F irst, the party
who fa iled to produce evidenc e must have had a duty to pr eser ve the evidenc e. Id . at 20. “[S] uch

a duty arises only when a party knows or rea sonably should know that there is a substantial chanc e that a claim will be filed and that evidenc e in its possession or control will be materia l and rele vant
to that claim.” Id

. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the nonproducing party

m u st have brea ched its duty to rea sonably prese rve materia l and rele vant evidenc e. Id

. A p ar t y cannot br eac h its duty

without at least ac ting ne g lige ntly

. Id . at 20–21 & n.8. Upon finding that spoliation occur red, the trial court must exercise its discretion in imposing

a reme dy

. I n deter

mining what reme dy , if any , is appropr iate, the court should weig h the spoliating party ’s culpability and the prejudice to the nonspoliating party

. Id. at 21. Prej u d i ce i s ev al uated
based on the spoliated evidenc e’s r eleva ncy to key issues in the case, whether the evidence would
have been harmful to the spoliating party ’s case (or, conver sely , helpful to the nonspoliating party ’s

case ), and whether the spoliated evidenc e was cumulative of other competent evidenc e that may be
used in its stead. Id

. at 21–22 (citing Trevino v. Ortega , 969 S.W .2d 950, 958 (Tex. 1998) (B aker , J ., concur ring )).
Whil e the trial court’s discretion to r emedy an act of spoliation is broad, it is not limitless.
We revie w a trial court’s imposit ion o f s an cti ons under an abuse of discretion standard. Cire v. Cummings , 134 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004). Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 215.2 allows a trial

court to impose “just” sanctions for discovery abuse. T E X
. R

. C I V
. P. 215.2. As we reaf firmed in
Brookshire Brothers , courts g ene ra l l y fol low a two-par t test in deter

mining whether a particula r sanction for discovery abuse is just. 438 S.W .3d at 21 (citing TransAmerican , 811 S.W .2d at 917).

9First, a direc t rela tionship must exis t betwee n the offe nsive conduct, the offe nder, and the sanction

imposed. See id. ; Spohn Hosp. v. Maye r , 104 S.W .3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003) (per curia m). To meet this require ment, a sanction must be directed a g ainst the wrong ful conduc t and towar d reme dy ing
the prejudice suffe red by the innocent party

. TransAmerican , 811 S.W .2d at 917. Second, a sanction

must not be excessive, which means it should be no more s ev ere than nece ssary to satisfy its leg itimate purpose. Id. This prong require s the trial court to consider t h e av ai l abil ity of lesser sanctions and, “ in all but the most ex ceptional c ases, a ctually test the lesser sa

nctions.” Cire , 134
S.W .3d at 841.
I n Brookshir e B r others , we also articula ted more specific restric tions on a trial court’s
d i s cretion to issue a spoliation instruction to the jury

. We held that a trial court may sub m i t a spoliation instruction only if it finds (1) the spoliating party acte d with intent to conce al discovera ble
evidenc e, or (2) the spoliating party acte d neg lige ntly and caus ed the nonspoliating party to be irrepa rably deprive d of any meaning ful ability to prese nt a claim or defe nse. 438 S.W .3d at 23–26. 3
We noted i n i m p o s ing this strict limit ation that a spoliation instruction “ca n, in some sense, be

tantamount to a death- penalty sanction,” in that such an instruction can remove the focus of the trial
from the merits of the case and redire ct it to the alleg ed conduct that g ave rise to the sanctions. Id

. at 23. I t follows, and we hold today , that in the context of reme dy ing s p o l i ation, the restric tions
articula ted in Brookshire Brothers with reg ard to spoliation instructions also limit a trial court’s

G e n e r a l l y , w e h a v e s t a t e d t h a t , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h d u e p r o c e s s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , d i s c o v e r y s a n c t i o n s t h a t “ a r e s o 3
s e v e r e a s t o p r e c l u d e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e m e r i t s o f [ a c l a i m o r d e f e n s e ] s h o u l d n o t b e a s s e s s e d a b s e n t a p a r t y ’ s f l a g r a n t b a d f a i t h o r c o u n s e l ’ s c a l l o u s d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f d i s c o v e r y . ” T r a n s A m e r i c a n , 8 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d a t 9 1 8 ; S p o h n , 1 0 4 S

. W

. 3 d a t 8 8 3

. S i m i l a r r e a s o n i n g u n d e r l i e s t h e l i m i t a t i o n s w e p l a c e d o n s p o l i a t i o n s a n c t i o n s i n B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s . 1 0discretion to issue other reme dies akin to death- penalty sanctions, such as striking a party ’s claims

or def enses. I n this case , we need not and do not decide whether Petroleum Soluti ons spoliated evidenc e. We hold that, assuming it did, the trial court’s sanctions wer e an abuse o f discretion beca use no proof exis ts that Petroleum Soluti ons intentionally conce aled evidenc e or that Petroleum Soluti ons’ spoliation irrepa

rably deprive d Hea d and Titeflex of any meaning ful ability to prese nt their claims. First, no evidenc e shows that Petroleum Soluti ons acte d with intent to conce al the flex c onnector , 4

as nothing in the rec ord sug g ests that Petroleum Soluti ons was ever informed that the fac ility wher e the connec tor was being stored would be destroy ed. To the contra ry , the rec ord shows the following undisputed fac ts: (1) Ba

rron took a component from the Silver Spur with the express consent of the

m an ager , Carpente r; (2) Ba rron g ave the component to independe nt counsel, Nea lly ; (3) Nea ll y
eng ag ed the service s of a metallurg ist, Hendr ix ; (4) Hendr ix took possession of the component and perf ormed non-destructive testing; (5) Hendrix place d the co m p o n ent in a warehouse for storag e; (6) the war eho u s e wa s t orn down; (7) Petroleum Soluti ons was not told the warehouse was being

torn down; (8) Hea d did not reque st that Petroleum Soluti ons pro d u ce the connec tor befor e the

war ehouse was demoli s hed or at any time befor e filing suit; and (9) Petroleum Soluti ons asked
Hendr ix to r eturn the connec tor when H ead f iled suit, but neither the war ehouse staf f nor He ndrix

cou l d fi nd it. I n sum, no evidenc e demonstrates that Petroleum Soluti ons intentionally lost or destroy ed the c onnector

.

O n l y H e a d m a i n t a i n s t h a t P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s a c t e d i n t e n t i o n a l l y . T i t e f l e x n o t e s i n i t s b r i e f

i n g t h a t i t “ h a s 4
n e v e r c o n t e n d e d t h a t m i s p l a c e m e n t o f t h e f l e x c o n n e c t o r w a s d e l i b e r a t e o r i n t e n t i o n a l

. ”

1 1Fur ther, no evidenc e shows that th e mi s s in g c o nn e c to r ir r e p a r a b ly d eprive d Hea d and Titeflex
of any meaning ful ability to prese nt their claims

. At trial, Hea d’s theory of Petroleum Soluti ons’ liability was unrela ted to the flex connec tor; Hea d s u cc es s ful ly urg ed that Petroleum Soluti ons’ improper installation of a union at a shear valve, not the flex connec tor, cause d the leak. This fac t, in conjunction with the fac t that Hea d never reque sted acc ess to the connec tor befor e filing suit, 5
confirms that the missing flex connec tor did not irrepa rably hinder Hea d’s prese ntation of its claims.
And as discussed further below, the missing flex connec tor did not h i n der Titeflex’s ability to
prese nt its i ndemnity

claim.
I n sum, the trial court abused its discretion in char g ing the jury with a spoliation instruction
and striking Petroleum Soluti ons’ aff irmative defe nses beca

use those sanctions do not comply with

t h e p rocedural and substantive standards set forth in Brookshire Brothers

. The harm of such sanctions, which fore close (or at least sever ely impede) a party from presen t i n g t h e m erits of its
claims or defe nses, is ty

pically patent and is compounded by improper prese ntation of evidenc e and
arg ument to the j ury on the s poliation issue. See Bro o ks h i r e B r o s
. , 438 S.W .3d at 29; W al-Mart 6 Stores, Inc. v. Johnson , 106 S.W .3d 718, 724 (Tex. 200 3). Acc ording ly , we reve rse the court of
appea ls’ judgme nt and rema nd the case to the trial court for further proce eding s betwee n Petroleum

T o t h e e x t e n t H e a d a r g u e s t h a t P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s m i s r e p r e s e n t e d t h e c a u s e o f t h e l e a k s o a s t o p r e v e n t H e a d 5 f r o m f i l i n g s u i t w i t h i n t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d , t h i s a r g u m e n t w i l l b e r e l e v a n t t o t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s ’ s t a t u t e - o f

- l i m i t a t i o n s d e f

e n s e o n r e m a n d

. W e l e a v e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d i s c r e t i o n t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h e v i d e n c e o f t h e m i s s i n g c o n n e c t o r i s r e l e v a n t t o 6
w h e t h e r H e a d ’ s c l a i m s a r e b a r r e d b y l i m i t a t i o n s
. 1 2Soluti ons and Hea d consistent with this opinion. As discussed b el o w, h o we v er, the unique 7
circ umstances of Titeflex’s indemnity claim rende r harmless any spoliation err or as it rela tes to that
claim.
III. Titefl ex’s Statutor y-Indem nity Claim Finally , we addre ss whether Titeflex, a component-pr oduct manufa cture r and s el l er , is
entitled to indemnity from Petroleum Soluti ons, a finished-produc t manufa cture r, under Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code section 82.002, a provision of the Texa s P ro ducts L iability Act. As
descr ibed above, Hea d sued Petroleum Soluti ons and T i teflex under a products-liability theory , Petroleum Soluti ons filed third-par ty claims ag ainst Titeflex for contribution and indem n i ty , and
Titeflex filed a counter claim ag ainst Petroleum Soluti ons for statutory indemnity under section 82.002. Although both H ead and Petroleum Solutions nonsui ted their c laims ag ainst Titeflex, the partie s p roce eded to trial on Titeflex’s indemnity counter claim. The jury awa rded Titeflex approximately

$450,000 in attorney ’s fe es and e x penses, and the t rial court rende red judg ment on that verdic t. The cour

t of appe als aff

irmed. A. Duty to Indem nif

y Between F inis hed-P roduct Manufacturers and Com ponent-P roduct

Manuf acture rs Section 82.002 require s the manufa cture r of an alleg edly defe ctive product to indemnify an innocent seller for any loss arising out of a products-liability action. T E X
. C I V
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E

P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s c o n t e n d s t h a t w e s h o u l d r e n d e r j u d g m e n t o n i t s s t a t u t e - o f

- l i m i t a t i o n s d e f

e n s e
. A s n o t e d 7
a b o v e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t t w i c e d e n i e d P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t o n t h i s d e f e n s e
. B e c a u s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t s t r u c k t h e d e f e n s e b e f o r e t r i a l , e v e n i f t h e c o u r t d i d s o e r r o n e o u s l y , i t w o u l d b e i m p r o p e r t o r e n d e r j u d g m e n t f o r P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s o n l i m i t a t i o n s g r o u n d s o n a p p e a l o f t h e f i n a l j u d g m e n t

. S e e A c k e r m a n n v
. V o r d e n b a u m , 4 0 3 S

. W

. 2 d 3 6 2 , 3 6 5 ( T e x . 1 9 6 6 ) ( r e f

u s i n g t o r e v i e w o r d e r d e n y i n g s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t o n a p p e a l f r o m f i n a l j u d g m e n t )

. 1 3§ 82.002(a) ; see also Fitzgerald v. Advanc ed Spine Fixation Sys., Inc. , 996 S.W .2d 864, 867 (Tex.

1999). The A ct desc ribes a ma nufac turer’ s duty

to indemnify

as follows:
A manufa cture r shall indemnify and hold harmless a seller ag ainst loss arising out of a products liability action, except for any loss cause d by the seller’ s neg lige n ce , intentional misconduct, or other act or omission, such as negli gen t l y modify ing or altering the produc t, for which the seller is indepe ndently liable.
T E X
. C I V
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 82.002(a)

. The term “loss” is define d to include “cour t costs and
other rea sonable expenses, rea sonable attorney fee s, and any rea sonable damag es.” Id. § 82.002(b).
The Ac t broadly

define s “produc ts liabili ty action,” “ seller,” and “ma nufac turer” : “Products liability action” means any action ag ainst a manufa cture r or seller for rec overy o f damag es arising out of persona l injury , death, or proper ty damag e alleg edly cause d by

a def ective pr oduct . . . .
“Seller” means a person who is eng ag ed in the business of distributing or otherwise placing , for any comm er ci al purpose, in the stream of commerc e for use or consumption a product or any component par

t thereof

. “Manuf actur er” means a person who is a desig ner, formulator, constructor , rebuilder , fabr icator, produce r, compounder , proce ssor, or assembler of any p ro duct or any component part there of and wh o p l ac es t he product or any component part there of in the stream of

commerc e. Id

. § 82.001(2)–( 4). Unde r these de finitions, “all manufac turers are also sellers, but not all sellers

are manufa cture rs.” Ge n
. Motors Corp. v. Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc. , 199 S.W .3d 249, 256 (Tex. 2006) ( Hudibu r g ). An d, with one exception not rele vant here , nothing in the Act prec ludes one person f rom being both a manufa cture r and a seller of the same pr oduct or c omponent. See id

. Titeflex contends that Petroleum Soluti ons owes it a duty to indemnify under section 82.002
beca use the fue l sy stem is a product, Petroleum Solutions is t he manuf actur er of that product, a

nd

1 4Titeflex is the innocent seller of a component part alleg edly used in Petroleum Soluti ons’ defe ctive

finished produc t. I n light of our analy sis of the indemnity statute in Hudiburg , we a g ree
. I n Hudiburg , a truck driver was injured and the driver of another vehicle was killed when the truck, which had been assembled by attaching a se rv i ce body to a cab chassis, split apar t during a collision. Id. at 252. A per sonal-injury and wr ong ful-death suit followed ag ainst both the chassis
manufa cture r and Hudiburg , the deale r who had sold the truck and arr ang ed for it to be assembled.
Id. I n that suit, which eventua lly settled, the plaintiffs alleg ed that the vehicle, including its fuel
sy stem, was unrea sonably dan ger o u s. Id. Hudiburg then broug ht a statutory -indemnity action
ag ainst the manufa cture rs o f t h e ca b chassis (GM) and the service body (Rawson-K oenig ), the “compone nt products” of the truck. Id. Clarify ing the fra

mework g overning a manufa cture r’s duty to inde mnify under the Act, we

rea ffirme d that the duty is trig g ere d by the injured claimant’s pleading s. Id. at 256. Specifica lly , the duty is tri ggere d by alleg ations of a defe ct in the manufa cture r–indemnitor’s product and is not depende nt on an adjudication of the indemnitor’s liability

. Id

. By contra st, section 82.002(a) ’s 8 exception to the duty to indemnify for loss cause d by the seller is trig g ere d not by the pleading s, but by an af firmative f

inding that the se ller–indemnitee is indepe ndently liable. Meritor Auto., Inc. v

. Ruan Leasing Co. , 44 S.W .3d 86, 91 (Tex. 2001) (“[I ]t is the manufa cture r’s ‘duty to indemnify ’ that applies reg ardle ss of outcome,

. . . [b] ut for the Manufa cture rs to implicate s ec t i on 82.008(a) ’s exception to that duty , it must be esta blished that seller’s c onduct ‘c aused’ the loss.”).

U n d e r t h e c o m m o n l a w , h o w e v e r , a n i n d e m n i t o r ’ s l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e p r o d u c t d e f

e c t m u s t b e a d

j u d i c a t e d o r 8
a d m i t t e d

. H u d i b u r

g , 1 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 2 5 5

. 1 5Fur ther elabor ating on the statutory -indemnity fra mework in the context of claims involving
both a fini s h ed -produc t manufa cture r and seller as well as the manufa cture r and seller of a component par

t incorpora ted into that finished product, we held:
Under the statute, and disreg arding the exception in s ection 82.002(d), the manufa cture r of a component product alleg ed by a claimant to be defe ctive has a duty to indemnify an innocent seller/manuf actur er of a finished product which incorpora tes the component from loss arising out of a products liability action rela ted to the alleg ed defe ct, but the manufacturer of an allegedly defec tive finished product has a duty to indemnify the innocent seller/manufacturer of a compone nt product for the same loss. I f neither the component-pr oduct manufa cture r nor th e finished-produc t manufa cture r is in n o c e n t, d e p e n d in g not on alleg ations but on proof, both indemnity claims under the statute will fail. I f both are innocent , ag ain depending on proof, the inde mnity claims offse t eac h other.
Hu d i b u r g , 199 S.W .3d at 256–57 (empha sis added)

. I n other words, depending on the alleg ed product defe ct or defe cts, an injured claimant’s pleading s may trig g er a duty to indemnify on the part of the finished-produc t manufa cture r, the component-pr oduct manufa cture r, or both. S ee i d

. I f competing duties to indemnify are trig g ere d, the ultimate succe ss of those claims wil l d ep en d on what the e vidence shows as to the fa ult of the indemnitee seller s. See id.
I n light of the claimant’s alleg ations in Hudiburg that the component product manufa cture d by GM—the chassis—wa s defe ctive, we held that GM owed Hudiburg a duty to indemnify for losses
rela ted to the persona l-injury suit, to the extent Hudiburg was not independe ntly liable. Id. at 262. 9
We also noted that, consistent with the statutory fra mework, “GM would be entitled to statutory

R a w s o n - K o e n i g , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , d i d n o t o w e H u d i b u r g a d u t y t o i n d e m n i f y b e c a u s e t h e c l a i m a n t ’ s 9 p l e a d i n g s , w h i c h a l l e g e d o n l y t h a t t h e v e h i c l e a s a w h o l e a n d t h e f u e l s y s t e m i n p a r t i c u l a r w e r e d e f e c t i v e , c o u l d n o t f

a i r l y b e r e a d t o a l l e g e a d e f e c t i n t h e s e r v i c e b o d y , w h i c h w a s t h e c o m p o n e n t p r o d u c t R a w s o n - K o e n i g m a n u f a c t u r e d

. H u d i b u r g , 1 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 2 5 7

– 5 8 ; s e e a l s o M e r i t o r A u t o
. , I

n c
. , 4 4 S

. W

. 3 d a t 9 1

. 1 6in d e mn it

y f r o m H u d ibur g —althoug h GM has not soug ht indemnity —for losses rela ted to alleg ati o n s of def ects unre lated to the cha ssis, if GM was not independe ntly liable for suc h losses.” Id. Apply ing Hudiburg to the case at hand, we hold that Petroleum Soluti ons owed Titeflex a

s t at u t o ry duty of indemnity

. Hea d initially sued only Petroleum Soluti ons for damag es resultin g from the fuel leak, alleg ing the leak was ca u s ed b y b o t h a defe ctive flex connec tor as well as a “fa ulty ” line leak detec tor and leak- detec tion sy stem. Sho rt ly afte r Petroleum Soluti ons broug ht third-par ty claims ag ainst Titeflex, Hea d amende d its petition to asser t a strict-liability claim direc tly
ag ainst Titeflex and to clar ify the alleg ations that the leak- detec tion sy stem as a whole was defe ctive
and was manufa cture d by Petroleum Soluti ons. After nonsuiting Titeflex, Hea d ag ain amende d its petition to retra ct the alleg ations of a defe ctive flex connec tor and to alleg e only product defe cts that

wer e attributable solely to Petroleum Soluti ons. Ba sed on Hea d’s pleading s, Petroleum Soluti ons, the manufa cture r of an alleg edly defe ctive finished product (the fuel sy stem), owed Titeflex, the alleg ed seller of a component part of t hat product, a duty to indemnify i t under section 82.002 for
losses arising out of this products-liability action, to the extent Titeflex was not independe ntly liable
for those losses. And whil e Tit efle x ’s l osses are limit ed to its attorney ’s fees and costs incurre d 1 0
in the suit, such expenditures qualify as “losses” under the indemnity statute. T E X
. C I V
. P R A C
. &
R E M
. C O D E § 82.002(b).

W e n o t e t h a t , b a s e d o n H e a d ’ s e a r l y p l e a d i n g s , T i t e f l e x a l s o o w e d P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s a c o m p e t i n g d u t y t o 10 i n d e m n i f y i t f o r l o s s e s r e l a t e d t o a l l e g e d d e f e c t s i n t h e f

l e x c o n n e c t o r , t o t h e e x t e n t P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s w a s n o t i n d e p e n d e n t l y l i a b l e
. H u d i b u r g , 1 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 2 6 2

. H o w e v e r , H e a d a m e n d e d i t s p l e a d i n g s t o d e l e t e a n y a l l e g a t i o n s o f a d e f e c t i v e f l e x c o n n e c t o r , a n d P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s n o n s u i t e d i t s i n d e m n i t y a n d c o n t r i b u t i o n c l a i m s a g a i n s t T i t e f l e x b e f o r e t r i a l

. 1 7Citi ng Hudiburg and Owens & Minor, Inc. v. Ansell Healthcare Products, Inc. , 251 S.W .3d

481 (Tex. 2008), the dissent contends that, even if Hea d’s pleading s trig g ere d Petroleum Soluti ons’ duty to indemnify Titeflex for its losses in this action, that duty did not extend to alleg ed defe cts in
the flex connec tor that Petroleum Soluti ons did not manufa cture

. Simi larly , Petroleum Soluti on s
arg ues that Hudiburg ’s rea soning does not apply here beca use Titeflex was sued only for alleg ed
defe cts in the flex connec tor, and “[Petroleum Soluti ons] could not be liable to inde mnify Titeflex
for a product that [P etroleum S olut i o n s ] d i d not manufa cture .” That P etroleum S olutions did not manufa cture the flex connec tor, howeve r, is immaterial. The indemnity statute broadly provides that “[a] manufacture r shall indemnify and hold ha rmless a seller

ag ainst loss arising out of a products liability action,” except to the extent the seller is in d ep en d en t ly liable. T E X
. C I V
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 82.002(a)

. The purpose of section 82.002 is to protec t innocent sellers by assig nin g responsibility for the burden of products-liability litigation to produ c t ma n u f a cture rs. Hudiburg , 199
S.W .3d at 255, 262. When an injured claimant pleads that a manufa cture r’s product is defe ctive, an innocent seller who suffe rs loss is protec ted reg ardle ss of whether it is upstream or downstrea m of
that product’s manufa cture r. Id. at 256. Thus, as the manufa cture r of an alleg edly defe ctive finished product, Petroleum Soluti ons has a duty to indemnify an innocent seller of a component integ rate d into that product, such as Titef lex, for its l oss arising out of Hea d’s produc ts-liability action.
The diss ent’s reliance on Owens & Minor is inapposite. I n that case , we held that a latex

g love manufa cture r did not owe an innocent distributor a duty to defe nd and indemni fy i t against
claims involving g loves that other companies manufa cture d. 251 S.W .3d at 482. Fr om this holding,
the dissent opines that Titeflex cannot rec ov er for its losses beca use Hea d’s pleading s did not

1 8attribute the defe ctive fuel sy stem to Titeflex, only the flex connec tor. This application is improper

in li g h t o f th e c ir c u

ms ta nces prese nted and rende rs the fra mework rec og nized in Hudiburg a nullity

. 11
Owens & Minor involved a one-way duty to indemnify owed by multipl e manufacture rs t o a nonmanufa cturing seller fo r i t s l o sses. By contra st, this case involves the competing duties to 1 2 indemnify owed t o eac h other by a finished-produc t manufa cture r and a component-pr oduct
manufa cture r. As we h el d in Hudiburg , the duty to indemnify when both of these products are alleg ed to be defe ctive runs both way s, as Petroleum Soluti ons and Titeflex are both manufa cture rs and sellers of their respe ctive products vis-a-v is ea ch other. 199 S.W .3d at 256. When these competing claims are pursued, Hudiburg explains that the burden will ultimately fall on t h e party whose product is found to be defe ctive. See id. at 256–57 (re cog nizi ng that such competing claims
will both fail i f t he evidence shows that neither party is innocent, and will o ff s et ea ch o t h er if the
evidenc e shows that both ar e innoce nt).
I n this case , only Titeflex pursued its indemnity claim throug h trial, and, as discussed below,

no evide n ce s u pports a finding that Titeflex was independe ntly liable for its loss. Acc ording ly , Titeflex is entit led to rec over f or its loss arising out of this produc ts-liability action.

W h i l e t h e d i s s e n t c o u c h e s i t s a n a l y s i s i n t e r m s o f t h e s c o p e o f t h e d u t y , t h e r e s u l t o f t h e d i s s e n t ’ s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 11 i s t h a t a c o m p o n e n t

- p r o d u c t m a n u f a c t u r e r c o u l d o n l y b e e n t i t l e d t o i n d e m n i t y i f a n i n j u r e d p l a i n t i f

f a l l e g e d i t w a s d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f

o r u n r e l a t e d d e f

e c t s i n o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s o r t h e f i n i s h e d p r o d u c t

. A s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , t h a t w i l l r a r e l y , i f e v e r , h a p p e n
.

O n l y m a n u f

a c t u r e r s o w e a d u t y t o i n d e m n i f y u n d e r c h a p t e r 8 2

. T E X
. C IV
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 8 2

. 0 0 2 ( a )

. 12
1 9B. Im provem ent to Re al P ropert y May Constitute a P roduct

Petroleum Soluti ons next ar g ues that the fuel sy stem was an improvement to rea l proper ty , not a “product” that it manufa cture s, and that the i ndemnity statute there fore does not apply

. Our
decision in Fresh Coat, Inc. v. K-2, Inc. fore closes this arg ument. 318 S.W .3d 893 (Tex. 2010). The
i s s ue in Fresh Coat was whether a sy nthetic-stucc o sy stem comprised of components t h at we re installed on a house’s exterior walls constituted a product for purposes of the indemnity statute. Id.

at 895. We explained that, pursuant to the statute, “a product is something distributed or otherwise place d, for any commerc ial purpose, into the strea m of commerc e for

use or c onsumption.” Id. at
897. We held that the stucco sy stem was a product under that b ro ad d efinition and reje cted the
manufa cture r’s arg ument that “produc ts place d into the stream of commerc e are not products once they become integ rate d into . . . real prope rty .” Id.
Her e, Petroleum Soluti ons makes the same arg ument we reje cted in Fresh Coat

. Petroleum
Soluti ons cites sever al courts of appea ls’ decisions for the g ener al premise that the law distinguishes
betwee n products and improvements t o real proper ty

. Howeve r, none of the case s Petroleum
Soluti ons cites involved the indemnity statute, and they all preda te our decision in Fresh Coat

. We
therefo re h o ld that the fuel sy stem qualifies as a product under chapte r 82 notwithstanding its integ ration into rea l property

. C. Resolution of

Titeflex’s Ind em nity Claim
For the fore g oing rea sons, we ag ree with the trial court and court of appea ls that Petroleum
Soluti ons owed Titeflex a duty to indemnify under section 82.002. Petroleum Soluti ons arg ues that,
beca use the trial court err oneously struck its indemnity defe nses as a spoliation sanction, Titeflex’s

2 0indemnity claim s h o u ld be rema nded for a new trial along with Hea d’s claims so that Petroleum
Soluti ons may seek a jury finding that Titeflex was independe ntly liable for its loss

. P et ro l eum Soluti ons contends th at t he rec ord contains excluded evidenc e implicating a defe ctive product
manufa cture d by Titeflex that would have supported such a finding

. We disag ree
. Having revie wed
all the record e vidence on which P etroleum S olutions relies, both that admitted and that excluded

at trial, we find that the only evidenc e that Titeflex even manufa cture d the connec tor in question was Ba rron’ s statements (both in testimony and in letters sent by Petroleum Soluti ons in 2001 and 2002)
that Petroleum Soluti ons had identified a Titeflex connec tor as the culprit. Petroleum Soluti ons has

never been able to produce any documentation supporting that statement, and other evidenc e in the

rec ord rebuts it. Moreove r, other than Ba rron’ s conclusory testimony t h at t h e m i ssing connec tor leake d during pressure testing a nd a stateme nt in a one-pa g e wor k repor t ge neric ally

ref ere ncing a “bad flex hose,” Petroleum Soluti ons has never identified any evidenc e that would support a finding
that the connec tor in question was defe ctive or cause d the leak. Petroleum Soluti ons’ expert on the

connec tor failed to attend his deposition and was de-de signa ted on the eve of trial independe ntly of
the trial cour

t’s sanctions. See Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong , 145 S.W .3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2004) (noting that “compe tent expert testimony and objective proof that a defe ct cause d the [i njury ]” a re
g ener ally nece ssary

to support a finding that a third par ty is responsible base d on a desig n defe ct).
I n sum, we see nothing in the rec ord, including the evidenc e that the trial court excluded, that
constitutes more than a scintilla of evidenc e to support a fi n d i n g t h at Titeflex was independe ntly
liable for its loss. See Kindred v. C o n / C h em , In c. , 650 S.W .2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983) (“When the
evidenc e offe red to prove a vital fac t is so wea k as to do no more than creat e a mere surmise or
2 1suspicion of its exis tence , the evidenc e is no more than a s ci n t i l l a and, in leg al eff ect, is no evidenc e.”)

. Acc ording ly , any err or by the t rial court in meting out spoliation sanctions was harmless with respe ct to Titeflex’s indemnity claim. See Brown v. Goldstein , 685 S.W .2d 640, 641 1 3 (Tex. 1985) (holding that a judge may ref use to submit an issue to the jury “if no evidenc e exis ts to

war rant its submissi on”). Remanding that claim for a new trial would serve no purpose other than delay and added expense for all involved. Acc ording ly , our reve rsal of the cou rt o f ap p ea l s’ judgme nt as to the claims betwee n Hea d and Petroleum Soluti ons does not aff ect the validity of the judgme nt in favor of

Titeflex, and we a ffirm that portion of the judgme nt.

* * * *
We hold that the t rial court’s spoliati o n s an ct ions wer e an abuse of discretion and that the

court of appea ls err ed in aff irming the judgme nt i n He ad ’s fa vor. Howeve r, we ag ree with the portion of the court o f ap p ea l s ’ judgme nt in favor of Titeflex. We there fore aff irm the court of
appea ls’ judgme nt in part, reve rse it in part, and rema nd for further proce eding s betwee n Hea d and
Petroleum Soluti ons consistent with this opi nion.

____________________________________ Debr a H. L ehrma

nn J ustice
OP INION DELIVERED: Dec ember 19, 2014

F u r t h e r , t h e o n l y f

i n d i n g s t h e j u r y m a d e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i n d e m n i t y c l a i m , o t h e r t h a n t h e a m o u n t o f 13
a t t o r n e y ’ s f

e e s a n d e x p e n s e s T i t e f l e x i n c u r r e d , w e r e t h a t P e t r o l e u m S o l u t i o n s w a s a m a n u f a c t u r e r a n d T i t e f

l e x w a s a s e l l e r
. T h e t r i a l c o u r t , n o t t h e j u r y , f o u n d t h a t T i t e f

l e x w a s “ a n i n n o c e n t s e l l e r ” a n d w a s e n t i t l e d t o i n d e m n i t y a s a m a t t e r o f l a w . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e i m p r o p e r s p o l i a t i o n i n s t r u c t i o n w a s i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e i n d e m n i t y c l a i m
. 2 2