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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 124,998

AMERICAN WARRIOR, INC., and BRIAN F. PRICE,

Appellants,

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FINNEY COUNTY, KANSAS, and

HUBER SAND, INC.,

Appellees.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.

Mootness occurs when something changes during litigation to render a judicial 

decision ineffectual to the parties' rights and interests.

2.

K.S.A. 12-741(a) grants counties the authority to enact zoning regulations without 

state interference so long as those local enactments do not conflict with the Planning, 

Zoning, and Subdivision Regulations in Cities and Counties Act, K.S.A. 12-741 et seq. In 

keeping with this statutory scheme, K.S.A. 12-755 authorizes counties to adopt zoning 

regulations providing for issuance of conditional use permits.

Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 63 Kan. App. 2d 123, 525 P.3d 789 (2023).

Appeal from Finney District Court; WENDEL W. WURST, judge. Oral argument held November 14, 2023. 

Additional briefing completed January 29, 2024. Opinion filed July 26, 2024. Judgment of the Court of 

Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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Patrick A. Edwards, of Stinson LLP, of Wichita, argued the cause, and David E. Bengtson, of the 

same firm, and Benjamin C. Jackson, of Jackson Legal Group, LLC, of Scott City, were with him on the 

briefs for appellants. 

Linda J. Lobmeyer, of Calihan Law Firm, P.A., of Garden City, argued the cause, and Shane C. 

Luedke, of the same firm, was with her on the briefs for appellees.

Jay Hall, general counsel, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Association of Counties.

Johnathan Goodyear, general counsel, was on the brief for amicus curiae League of Kansas 

Municipalities. 

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BILES, J.: K.S.A. 12-741(a) grants counties the authority to enact zoning 

regulations without state interference so long as those local enactments do not conflict 

with the Planning, Zoning, and Subdivision Regulations in Cities and Counties Act, 

K.S.A. 12-741 et seq. Exercising that authority, Finney County adopted local rules

delegating the issuance of conditional use permits to a separate Finney County Board of 

Zoning Appeals. A Court of Appeals panel majority held the County could not do that, 

while a dissenting judge agreed with the district court that it could. See American 

Warrior, Inc. v. Board of Finney County Comm'rs, 63 Kan. App. 2d 123, 525 P.3d 789 

(2023). We granted review to resolve the dispute. We hold the County's regulations do 

not conflict with state law. The Zoning Board validly issued the conditional use permit

that sparked this litigation. We reverse the panel majority and affirm the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The material facts are undisputed. Since 2017, American Warrior, Inc., owned an 

oil and gas lease covering about 177 acres southeast of the city of Pierceville, between 
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Highway 50 to the north and the Arkansas River to the south, and between the town of 

Pierceville and South Pierceville Road to the west and the Finney County/Gray County 

line to the east. In 2020, Huber Sand, Inc., bought surface rights to the same tract, along 

with surface rights to an adjoining property to the east across the Finney County line into

Gray County. The tract was zoned as an agricultural district.

In May 2021, Huber applied to the Finney County Board of Zoning Appeals for a 

conditional use permit to operate a sand and gravel quarry under the Finney County, 

Kansas, Zoning Regulations, adopted by the Board of Finney County Commissioners.

The Zoning Board published notice of Huber's application, announcing a public meeting 

in June. At that meeting, affected residents commented about authorized uses within 

agricultural zoning districts, the location of crushing equipment and the access road, 

condition of the river pit, road maintenance, Huber's operating hours, and traffic on the 

Pierceville roads. The Zoning Board tabled the matter until the next month.

At the July meeting, the Zoning Board received a report prepared by a Garden 

City municipal department, an entity established to guide development and support 

community livability. It recommended the application's approval. The Zoning Board also 

received protest petitions from more than 100 Pierceville residents. In the end, it

approved the application on a 2-1 vote with conditions. 

In August, Brian F. Price, a Finney County resident who owned land near the tract, 

and American Warrior (collectively "American Warrior") sued the Finney County 

Commission and Huber, challenging the permit's legality. They claimed the local 

procedure for issuing the permit violated state law, citing K.S.A. 12-757 (procedures for 

amending zoning regulations). They argued state statutes require a permit application be

reviewed first by the county planning commission before the board of county 

commissioners consider it. Both sides submitted competing summary judgment motions.
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The district court granted judgment for the County and Huber. It held the County 

properly delegated its power to issue conditional use permits to the Zoning Board. 

American Warrior appealed to the Court of Appeals, where a panel majority reversed the 

district court. The panel majority held the County's local procedure conflicted with 

K.S.A. 12-757, relying on Crumbaker v. Hunt Midwest Mining, Inc., 275 Kan. 872, 69 

P.3d 601 (2003), and Manly v. City of Shawnee, 287 Kan. 63, 194 P.3d 1 (2008). 

American Warrior, 63 Kan. App. 2d at 133. Chief Judge Arnold-Burger disagreed. 63 

Kan. App. 2d at 134 (Arnold-Burger, C.J., dissenting).

The County and Huber sought our review, which we granted. Jurisdiction is 

proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for petitions for review of Court of Appeals 

decisions); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of 

Appeals decisions upon petition for review).

MOOTNESS

The County's zoning regulations create a threshold question about mootness

because the Zoning Board approved Huber's permit on July 21, 2021, and section 28.070

states: "All conditional use permits shall be valid for one (1) year from the date it was 

approved by the Board of Zoning Appeals; if project has not been substantially 

completed within one (1) year of approval, the conditional use permit shall expire."

Section 2.020(4) defines "shall" as "mandatory."

Mootness occurs when something changes during litigation that may render a 

judicial decision ineffectual to the parties' rights and interests. See State v. Roat, 311 Kan. 

581, Syl. ¶ 1, 466 P.3d 439 (2020). We asked the parties to discuss this at oral argument
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and later ordered additional briefing. Both sides agree the permit has not expired. We 

agree with them. 

Standard of review

Courts review mootness questions de novo. Roat, 311 Kan. at 590. To the extent 

the question involves regulatory interpretation and construction, review is unlimited. We

follow the express language used when it is plain and unambiguous, giving common 

words their ordinary meanings, without adding to or subtracting from the text. Courts 

resort to textual construction only when the language is ambiguous. Central Kansas 

Medical Center v. Hatesohl, 308 Kan. 992, 1002, 425 P.3d 1253 (2018). We apply the 

same rules to interpreting regulations as we do when interpreting a statute. See Robinson 

v. City of Wichita Employees' Ret. Bd. of Trustees, 291 Kan. 266, 272, 241 P.3d 15 

(2010).

Discussion

American Warrior claims that "when read as a whole, [section 28.070] allows for a 

conditional use to continue as long as it is maintained if the 'project' is 'substantially 

completed' within one year of when the [Zoning Board] approved the [conditional use

permit]." Similarly, the County and Huber contend "the notion that a conditional use 

would expire upon a technical failure of not reapplying for a permit yearly, creates an 

absurd result." Their points are well taken.

At a glance, section 28.070's first clause ("All conditional use permits shall be 

valid for one [1] year from the date it was approved by the Board of Zoning Appeals.")

seems clear and implies conditional use permits expire after that one-year period. But 

read with the second clause ("[I]f project has not been substantially completed within one 
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[1] year of approval, the conditional use permit shall expire."), the text provides a second 

meaning—a permit remains valid for a minimum duration of one year and expires only if 

the project is not substantially completed within a year.

This second meaning is the better view and aligns with the second clause's purpose 

and function to provide a logical understanding of the regulatory language. See State v. 

Strong, 317 Kan. 197, 203, 527 P.3d 548 (2023) ("[C]ourts may consult canons of 

construction to resolve the ambiguity. 'The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language 

is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that 

language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.' [Citations omitted.]").

Reading section 28.070 to invalidate a permit after one year renders the second clause 

redundant and nonsensical. See Fisher v. Kansas Crime Victims Comp. Bd., 280 Kan. 

601, 613, 124 P.3d 74 (2005) (stating the Legislature "does not intend to enact useless or 

meaningless legislation and the obligation to interpret a statute in such a way that part of 

it does not become surplusage").

Simply put, section 28.070 means: a permit is valid for at least one year, which

can extend beyond that year if the project is substantially completed. Here, neither side

raises a substantial completion issue. We hold this litigation is not moot and proceed to 

decide the merits.

COUNTY AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE ZONING REGULATION

In keeping with the statutory scheme, K.S.A. 12-755 authorizes counties to adopt 

zoning regulations providing for issuance of conditional use permits. Here, the district 

court granted judgment to the County and Huber, holding the County properly issued the

conditional use permit through its Zoning Board in accordance with the County's

regulations. We agree.
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Standard of review

Appellate courts review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. 

First Security Bank v. Buehne, 314 Kan. 507, 510, 501 P.3d 362 (2021). Likewise, we 

interpret statutes and regulations de novo based on their plain language. Central Kansas 

Medical Center, 308 Kan. at 1002.

Local enactments

The Board of Finney County Commissioners first adopted its zoning regulations in 

1995. The 2021 version applies here. Article 4 governs agricultural districts, listing 

permitted uses and structures and specifying conditional uses, including sand and gravel 

quarries, "may be permitted only after they have been reviewed and approved as required 

by Article 29." (Emphasis added.) Regulations, §§ 4.020, 4.030. The regulatory definition 

of "conditional use" means:

"A use of any building, structure or parcel of land that, by its nature, is perceived 

to require special care and attention in siting so as to assure compatibility with 

surrounding properties and uses. Conditional uses are allowed only after public notice, 

hearing and approval as prescribed in these Regulations and may have special conditions 

and safeguards attached to assure that the public interest is served." Regulations,

§ 2.030(36).

Meanwhile, a "conditional use permit" is a "written document of certification 

issued by the Zoning Administrator permitting the construction, alteration or 

establishment of a [c]onditional [u]se." Regulations, § 2.030(37). "Conditional use 

permit" is commonly interchanged with "special use" and "exceptions," a practice the

County appears to follow. Compare 2 Am. Law Zoning § 14:1 (5th ed.), with Regulations 
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§ 2.030(61) ("Exception - An exception shall always mean the allowance of otherwise 

prohibited use within a given district, such use and conditions by which it may be 

permitted being clearly and specifically stated within this Zoning Regulation, and the 

allowance being granted by conditional use permit from the Board of Zoning Appeals.");

see also Black's Law Dictionary 1685 (11th ed. 2019) ("special-use permit" is a "zoning 

board's authorization to use property in a way that is identified as a special exception in a 

zoning ordinance" and "[a]lso termed conditional-use permit"); Black's Law Dictionary 

1683 ("special exception" is an "allowance in a zoning ordinance for special uses that are 

considered essential and are not fundamentally incompatible with the original zoning 

regulations" and "[a]lso termed . . . conditional use; special use").

Article 29 governs the Zoning Board's authority over conditional use exceptions.

Under section 29.040, the Zoning Board may grant conditional use exceptions authorized 

by the Regulations, so long as those uses comply with the relevant provisions and are 

appropriately integrated into the community. In pertinent part, it states:

"The Board of Zoning Appeals may authorize, as an exception to the provisions of these 

zoning regulations, the establishment of those conditional uses that are expressly 

authorized to be permitted as a conditional use in a particular zoning district . . . . No 

conditional use shall be authorized as an exception to these regulations unless the Board 

is specifically authorized, by these regulations, to grant such conditional use and unless 

such grant complies with all of the applicable provisions of these regulations.

"The purpose of the conditional use permit is to allow proper integration of uses 

into the community which may only be suitable in specific locations, and may have 

potentially detrimental characteristics if not properly designed, located, and conditioned. 

A conditional use permit may be granted only for uses listed as conditional uses in 

respective zones . . . ." Regulations § 29.040.
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This same section outlines the application process for a conditional use permit, 

which Huber followed. It applied, detailing information like plots, plans, and drawings, 

showing how the conditional use will affect adjacent properties, to the Zoning Board at 

least 28 days before its meeting. See Regulations § 29.040(A)(1)-(8). Once submitted, the 

Zoning Board must consider section 29.050's factors to evaluate the requested use's

impact on County inhabitants' well-being and zoning district stability. The Zoning Board 

must also impose safeguards as needed to protect neighboring properties.

Article 28 broadly governs the Zoning Board—dictating its composition, 

authority, and jurisdiction. The Zoning Board is made up of three members. Regulations 

§ 28.010. It has the authority and jurisdiction:

"To hear and grant exceptions to the provisions of the zoning regulation in those 

instances where the Board of Zoning Appeals is specifically authorized to grant such 

exceptions and only under the terms of the zoning regulation. In no event shall exceptions 

to the provisions of the zoning regulation be granted where the use or exception 

contemplated is not specifically listed as an exception in the zoning regulation. Further, 

under no conditions shall the Board of Zoning Appeals have the power to grant an 

exception when conditions of this exception, as established in the Zoning regulation by 

the Governing Body, are not found to be present." Regulations § 28.030(6).

And it may make decisions as follows:

"The Board of Zoning Appeals may affirm or reverse, wholly or partly, or may modify 

the order, requirement, decision, or determination appealed from, and may make such 

order, requirement, decision or determination as ought to be made, and to that end shall 

have all the powers of the zoning administrator and may issue or direct the issuance of a 

permit. The concurring vote of two (2) members of the Board of Zoning Appeals shall be 

necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision, or determination of the Building

Inspector or Zoning Administrator, or to decide in favor of the applicant upon any matter 
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which it is required to pass under any such ordinance, or to effect any variation in such 

ordinance. . . ." (Emphases added.) Regulations § 28.050.

In summary, article 4 permits sand and gravel quarries in agricultural districts as 

conditional uses; article 29 delegates issuing power to the Zoning Board; and article 28 

requires two of three Board members to agree when deciding in an applicant's favor.

Statutory scheme

To resolve whether the County's action complied with state law, we now dive into 

the Planning, Zoning, and Subdivision Regulations in Cities and Counties Act. This Act 

enables cities and counties to pass planning and zoning regulations "for the protection of 

the public health, safety and welfare, and is not intended to prevent the enactment or 

enforcement of additional laws and regulations on the same subject which are not in 

conflict with the provisions of this act." K.S.A. 12-741(a).

The Act empowers counties, through their boards of county commissioners, to

enact or amend zoning regulations by adopting resolutions using the applicable statutory 

procedure. K.S.A. 12-753; see also K.S.A. 12-756 (procedures to establish zones); K.S.A. 

12-757 (procedures to amend the existing zones). The Act also grants the board of county 

commissioners power to regulate issuing special or conditional use permits. K.S.A. 12-

755(a)(5). And it reflects legislative intent to enable counties' home rule powers on 

zoning matters. See K.S.A. 19-101 ("[E]ach organized county . . . shall be empowered . . 

. to exercise the powers of home rule to determine their local affairs and government 

authorized under the provisions of K.S.A. 19-101a . . . [and] to exercise such other and 

further powers as may be especially conferred by law."); David v. Board of Norton 

County Comm'rs, 277 Kan. 753, 755, 89 P.3d 893 (2004) ("Kansas counties derive all of 
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their home rule authority from a statutory scheme originally enacted in 1974. See K.S.A. 

19-101 et seq.").

That said, a county's zoning power may be limited by state law through 

preemption, which occurs when the "legislative intent to reserve exclusive jurisdiction to 

the state [is] clearly manifested by statute—i.e., by expressly prohibiting cities from 

enacting any type of ordinance related to the state law." DWAGFYS Manufacturing, Inc. 

v. City of Topeka, 309 Kan. 1336, 1341, 443 P.3d 1052 (2019). But the Act contains no 

such express statement of preemption for conditional use permits. Still, K.S.A. 12-741(a)

says state zoning law preempts any county regulations "in conflict with the provisions of 

this act." Cf. K.S.A. 19-101a(a)(1) ("Counties shall be subject to all acts of the legislature 

which apply uniformly to all counties."); Crumbaker, 275 Kan. at 886 (zoning legislation 

is generally considered as "'the field with a uniformly applicable enactment'").

Here, American Warrior argues state law preempts what it views as conflicting

county regulations on conditional use permits. It claims the Zoning Board should have 

followed K.S.A. 12-757's amendment procedures before issuing Huber's permit. The 

panel majority agreed, citing Crumbaker and Manly, both of which analyzed whether a 

zoning board properly allowed a conditional use under K.S.A. 12-757. American 

Warrior, 63 Kan. App. 2d at 133; Crumbaker, 275 Kan. at 885-87; Manly, 287 Kan. at 

67-68. On the other hand, Finney County and Huber contend state law does not preempt 

Finney County's regulations because the permit did not "supplement, change or generally 

revise the boundaries or regulations contained in zoning regulations." See K.S.A. 12-

757(a). The panel's dissent concurred with them. American Warrior, 63 Kan. App. 2d at 

146.
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To decide this, we must consider whether the County's zoning procedures conflict 

with any of the Act's provisions. We begin with the statute at issue. K.S.A. 12-757(a)

reads:

"The governing body, from time to time, may supplement, change or generally 

revise the boundaries or regulations contained in zoning regulations by amendment. A 

proposal for such amendment may be initiated by the governing body or the planning 

commission. If such proposed amendment is not a general revision of the existing 

regulations and affects specific property, the amendment may be initiated by application 

of the owner of property affected. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Put simply, any additions, modifications, corrections, or improvements to "the 

boundaries or regulations contained in zoning regulations," require counties follow

K.S.A. 12-757's steps. See Hatesohl, 308 Kan. at 1002 (courts give common words their 

ordinary meanings); Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (to "supplement" means "to 

add") (defining to "change" as "to make different in some particular" or "to replace with 

another") (to "revise" means "to look over again in order to correct or improve" or "to 

make a new, amended, improved, or up-to-date version of"); Black's Law Dictionary 102

(11th ed. 2019) ("amendment" is "[a] formal and usu. minor revision or addition 

proposed or made to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specif., a 

change made by addition, deletion, or correction; esp., an alteration in wording"); cf. 

K.S.A. 19-101c ("The powers granted counties pursuant to this act shall be referred to as 

county home rule powers and they shall be liberally construed for the purpose of giving 

to counties the largest measure of self-government." [Emphasis added.]).

K.S.A. 12-757 applies only to changing zoning regulations by amendment. As the 

panel dissent observed:
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"A conditional-use permit does not change the existing zoning of a tract of land. 

The Tract here is zoned agricultural and remains zoned agricultural. Under the Finney 

County, Kansas, Zoning Regulations sand and gravel quarries are allowed on land zoned 

as agricultural. So anyone purchasing property around agriculturally zoned property is on 

notice that sand and gravel quarries are permitted. But the county may place conditions 

on the use of the land. The placement of these conditions does not constitute an

amendment to the zoning regulations or the zoning of the tract. It is and remains 

agricultural. The zoning regulations of the county remained the same both before and 

after the issuance of the conditional-use permit here. That accords with both the county

definition of a conditional-use permit and the generally accepted definition of a 

conditional use." American Warrior, 63 Kan. App. 2d at 136.

So did Huber's application ask the County to supplement, change, or revise the 

Regulations and thereby create a conflict with K.S.A. 12-757? In short: no. 

Huber's "Application for Conditional Use or Exception" sought to use property 

zoned as agricultural for its sand and gravel quarry operation based on the existing county 

regulations. See Regulations § 4.030 (permitting "[s]tate approved . . . sand and gravel 

quarries" in agricultural zones "after they have been reviewed and approved" by the 

county). As explained, such a permit is the Zoning Board's authorization to use property 

in a way identified as a conditional exception by the Regulations. This aligns with

Huber's proposal and the necessary action to approve it—no supplement, change, or 

revision to existing boundaries or regulations needed.

Next, we turn to K.S.A. 12-759, which specifically contemplates zoning board 

authority and special uses. Under subsection (a), the Finney County Commission created 

the Zoning Board with article 28, dictating the Board's composition, authority, and 

jurisdiction. And under subsection (e), it gave the Zoning Board broad authority in article 

29 to hear, vote upon, and grant conditional use permits through a standard application 
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and evaluation process. See K.S.A. 12-759(e)(2) ("When deemed necessary by the board 

of zoning appeals, the board may . . . grant exceptions to the provisions of the zoning 

regulation in those instances where the board is specifically authorized to grant such 

exceptions and only under the terms of the zoning regulation." [Emphasis added.]).

Subsections (a) and (e) govern Huber's permit. The panel majority mistakenly 

believed subsection (d) applied, but it only specifies the process to appeal "any decision 

of the officer administering the provisions of the zoning ordinance" to a specific zoning 

appellate board. K.S.A. 12-759(d). Subsection (d) is inapplicable because the Zoning 

Board granted Huber's permit, not some individual officer through administrative action. 

By complying with subsections (a) and (e), the County's zoning regulations in articles 28 

and 29 align and do not conflict with K.S.A. 12-759. 

American Warrior argues for the first time on appeal that K.S.A. 12-757a supports 

its position. K.S.A. 12-757a states: "No city or county may establish procedures 

regarding the adoption of special use or conditional use permits for mining operations

. . . which require the approval of more than a majority of all members of the governing 

body." And American Warrior asserts the timing of K.S.A. 12-757a's passage after 

Crumbaker and Manly suggests the Legislature approved of how those cases interpreted

K.S.A. 12-757. It argues the Legislature "could have and should have amended [K.S.A. 

12-757] at that time to exclude [conditional use permits]" if it disagreed. There is a lot 

wrong with this.

First, K.S.A. 12-757 never refers to conditional use permits and, in fact, excludes

them from its governance. Further, K.S.A. 12-755(a)(5) (allowing counties to adopt their 

own regulations to issue conditional use permits) and K.S.A. 12-759(e) (allowing a board 

of zoning appeals to grant exceptions) make no reference to K.S.A. 12-757, and vice 

versa. Second, American Warrior's interpretation would make K.S.A. 12-757a 
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duplicative of K.S.A. 12-757(g). In other words, if K.S.A. 12-757 uniformly applied to

issuing conditional use permits, subsection (g) would already govern such exceptions and 

K.S.A. 12-757a would not need to exist. See Patterson v. Cowley County, Kansas, 307 

Kan. 616, 626, 413 P.3d 432 (2018) (courts generally presume the Legislature does not 

intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation); Kansas One-Call System v. State, 294 

Kan. 220, 233, 274 P.3d 625 (2012) ("'[V]arious provisions of an act in pari materia 

must be construed together in an effort to reconcile the provisions so as to make them 

consistent, harmonious and sensible.'"; "'An appellate court's duty, as far as practicable, is 

to harmonize different statutory provisions to make them sensible.'").

The panel majority critically failed to engage in a straightforward, textual 

interpretation of the Act and Regulations. Instead, it looked first to Crumbaker and Manly

and improperly extended their holdings to the present controversy. See American 

Warrior, 63 Kan. App. 2d at 126-32. But neither applies.

Crumbaker held K.S.A. 12-757 governed changing land use in a city whose local

zoning regulations required compliance with state law, which is distinguishable from

Finney County's regulations that have no such requirement. See Crumbaker, 275 Kan. at 

885-86. And Manly's use of K.S.A. 12-757 to evaluate a special use permit's validity is 

similarly inapplicable, because that court never had a chance to rule on the legal issue

presented here since neither party nor the court questioned K.S.A. 12-757's applicability. 

The Manly decision interpreted the statute without answering the foundational inquiry of 

whether an appropriate city ordinance governed. See Manly, 287 Kan. at 67-68. As the 

district court here observed, applying Manly would be an unjustified stretch. The panel 

majority's reliance on Crumbaker and Manly was unwarranted. See American Warrior, 

63 Kan. App. 2d at 130-31. 
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The other cases cited by the panel majority or American Warrior are similarly 

distinguishable or inapplicable since they misunderstand Crumbaker or Manly. See 

Zimmerman v. Board of Wabaunsee County Comm'rs, 289 Kan. 926, 218 P.3d 400 

(2009) (distinguishable; amending zoning regulations under K.S.A. 12-757); Johnson 

County Water Dist. No. 1 v. City of Kansas City, 255 Kan. 183, 871 P.2d 1256 (1994) 

(distinguishable; challenging the reasonableness of conditions imposed in granting a 

special use permit under K.S.A. 12-757[c] [judicial review of local government's final 

decision]); Pretty Prairie Wind v. Reno County, 62 Kan. App. 2d 429, 517 P.3d 135 

(2022) (distinguishable; challenging a form of the protest petitions; here, discussing 

K.S.A. 12-757[f] created no problem since Reno County Zoning Regulations § 20-102 

[2016] contained sufficiently similar requirements); Kaw Valley Companies v. Board of 

Leavenworth County Comm'rs, No. 124,525, 2022 WL 3693619, at *8 (Kan. App. 2022)

(unpublished opinion) (misunderstanding Manly); Ternes v. Board of Sumner County 

Comm'rs, No. 119,073, 2020 WL 3116814, at *12 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished 

opinion) (misunderstanding Crumbaker and Manly); Vickers v. Franklin Co. Bd. of 

Comm'rs, No. 118,649, 2019 WL 3242274, at *4 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished 

opinion) (misunderstanding Crumbaker and Manly); R.W.D. No. 2 v. Board of Miami 

County Comm'rs, No. 105,632, 2012 WL 309165 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished 

opinion) (challenging the validity and reasonableness of decision denying a conditional 

use permit; like Manly, application of K.S.A. 12-757 was uncontested).

We hold K.S.A. 12-757 does not preempt a county's issuance of conditional use 

permits. Finney County's zoning procedures for issuing conditional use permits do not 

conflict with the governing state law. The panel majority erred by holding K.S.A. 12-757

controlled Huber Sand's application of a conditional use permit.

Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. 

Judgment of the district court is affirmed.