In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-2225

SARAH WHITEHEAD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LAWRENCE J. BOND, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 09 C 3765—Ruben Castillo, Judge.

ARGUED MARCH 27, 2012—DECIDED MAY 21, 2012

Before FLAUM, WILLIAMS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Sarah Whitehead

brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Chicago

police officers Thomas Stack, Michael Stevens, and Lawrence Bond (and others who are not parties to this appeal) alleging Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest

and excessive force (and other claims not at issue). The

events giving rise to Whitehead’s arrest began when

Officer Bond and his partner Officer Kevin Geyer
2 No. 11-2225

stopped Whitehead’s adult son, Daniel, for a traffic violation. After the officers found crack cocaine in the car,

Daniel attempted to flee, resulting in a physical altercation between him and the officers. Whitehead, who lived

close, was told by a neighbor, “you have to get down

to the corner,” “they’re killing your son.” Whitehead

hurried to the scene; what occurred next is hotly contested.

Whitehead claims she was calmly asking about her son

when she was accosted by Officer Bond and arrested

by Lt. Stevens for no apparent reason. Sgt. Stack and Lt.

Stevens testified that Whitehead was yelling, being aggressive, and leading the crowd that had gathered in

a charge toward Officer Bond, so they arrested her

and placed her in the prisoner wagon for five to ten

minutes before releasing her. Officer Bond testified that

he never saw Whitehead, Sgt. Stack, or Lt. Stevens at the

scene and left almost immediately after placing Daniel

in the squad car. Sgt. Stack testified that he and Officer

Bond spoke briefly after Whitehead was placed in the

prisoner wagon.

Before trial, Whitehead moved to exclude evidence

of events that preceded her arrival and testimony that

the events took place in a “high-crime area.” The

district court denied the motion. After a four-day trial,

the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.

Whitehead moved for judgment as a matter of law on

the false arrest claim, arguing that the officers’ testimony

was inherently incredible and physically impossible.

In the alternative, she sought a new trial on the basis

that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the
No. 11-2225 3

evidence and the district court erroneously admitted

unduly prejudicial evidence in violation of Rule 403 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence. The district court denied

her motions. Because we find that this case boils down

to a credibility contest that was properly reserved

for resolution by the jury and because we do not find

reversible error in the district court’s balancing of the

probative value and prejudicial effect of the challenged

evidence, we affirm.

I. Facts

On June 20, 2008, around 4:25 p.m., Chicago police

officers Bond and Geyer pulled over Daniel, the plaintiff’s

adult son, at the 800 block of South Lavergne Street

near West Polk Street in Chicago because the vehicle

he was driving had no license plates. Daniel didn’t have

a driver’s license or proof of insurance, so the officers

handcuffed him and placed him in the squad car. The

officers also placed his passenger, James Jones, in the

squad car. The officers searched Daniel’s car and found

baggies of crack cocaine. When the officers opened

the door of the squad car, Jones pushed his way out and

ran. Daniel, according to the officers’ testimony, made

a similar attempt to flee and, when the officers tried to

stop him, a struggle ensued, during which Daniel

kicked Officer Bond in the chest, knocking him to the

ground. Jones got away, but the officers were able to

subdue Daniel. Whitehead presented eyewitness testimony from neighbor James Finkley that the officers beat

Daniel until he shook badly and stopped moving. Officers

Geyer and Bond testified otherwise.
4 No. 11-2225

 A crowd had started gathering from both ends of the

block. While Officer Geyer had Daniel on the ground,

Officer Bond informed dispatch of the situation and

requested backup officers. Although the testimony at

trial was conflicting, anywhere from four to twenty

people had gathered. According to the officers, the

crowd, which was rowdy and yelling at them, was led by

Marcus Mynatt. As the crowd drew closer, the officers

ordered them to stay back, but Mynatt didn’t comply.

The dispatcher heard the commotion at the scene

and declared a “10-1,” which means an officer needs

immediate emergency help; it is the highest-level alert

and requests the immediate presence of officers from

inside and outside the district. Within seconds, Officer

Geyer informed the dispatcher that it was not a 10-1

and said “everything was under control.” But even

when a 10-1 is called off officers within the district generally come to investigate. Approximately nine police cars

(sixteen to eighteen police officers) were at the scene

within minutes of the call.

Officers Sweeney and Belcher were the first backup

officers to arrive. Officer Sweeney testified that there were

ten or fewer people in the crowd. At the time, Officers

Bond and Geyer were trying to detain Daniel and they

yelled for Officers Sweeney and Belcher to grab Mynatt;

upon hearing this, Mynatt ran. Officers Sweeney and

Belcher chased him, quickly apprehended him, and

secured him in a squad car. More police cars started

arriving. Officer Bond testified that although people in

the crowd were still yelling, he was less concerned with
No. 11-2225 5

them because the assisting officers could handle the

situation; he turned his attention to Daniel.

Before Officer Bond left with Daniel, a neighbor ran

and told Whitehead, who lived a few blocks down the

street, “You have to get down to the corner,” “they’re

killing your son,” without identifying who “they” were.

Whitehead, followed by her husband Donald, left the

house immediately and headed to the scene. Donald

testified that he saw ten to twenty private citizens out on

the street when they arrived. What happened after their

arrival is disputed and is the centerpiece of the trial

controversy.

Lt. Stevens and Sgt. Stack arrived on the scene shortly

after the 10-1 call. Lt. Stevens testified that when he

arrived it was a “chaotic situation” and that there was

a crowd of ten to fifteen people in an alley on Lavergne

and another crowd on the corner of Polk. Lt. Stevens

heard people in the crowd yell “fuck the police.” Sgt. Stack

testified that he saw a group of ten to twenty people

on Lavergne and that the crowd was yelling and

appeared hostile. Both officers testified that Officer Bond

was still on the scene standing outside his squad car

when they arrived.

According to the officers, Whitehead was at the

front of the crowd, flailing her arms, screaming, yelling,

swearing, and completely out of control. Whitehead was

moving toward Officer Bond’s squad car as people in

the crowd were trying to hold her back. Lt. Stevens was

concerned that Whitehead might try to let the offender

out, attack the officers, or had a psychiatric illness.
6 No. 11-2225

Lt. Stevens ordered the crowd to step back and calm

down, but Whitehead refused to comply. According to

Sgt. Stack, Whitehead was twenty to thirty feet from

Officer Bond. She continued to scream, broke free from

the crowd, and began crossing the street toward

Officer Bond. Lt. Stevens stepped between Whitehead

and Officer Bond’s car and ordered Whitehead and the

crowd to step back, but she kept advancing. It was

around this time (at 4:32 p.m.—only a couple minutes

after the first backup officers arrived), that Officer Marisol

Randonis showed up on the scene with the prisoner

wagon. When she arrived she saw Lt. Stevens standing

on the sidewalk talking to Whitehead; she testified that

they (Lt. Stevens and Whitehead) were about twenty

to thirty feet apart. She heard Whitehead screaming and

yelling loudly in an angry tone, loud enough to be

heard a football-field length away. She testified that

Whitehead was belligerent and was moving her hands

aggressively. Other officers were trying to disperse the

crowds and she saw a crowd of ten to fifteen people

dispersing.

Lt. Stevens testified that he grabbed Whitehead,

handcuffed her (or had someone handcuff her), and, with

the assistance of Sgt. Stack, walked her to the prisoner

wagon. Lt. Stevens and Sgt. Stack testified that Officer

Bond was about ten feet away when Whitehead was

handcuffed; neither officer saw Whitehead interact with

Officer Bond or knew whether Officer Bond saw Whitehead. Lt. Stevens testified that these events happened

within twenty to thirty seconds after his arrival, that “[i]t

all happened very quickly,” and was a “very fluid, quick
No. 11-2225 7

situation.” Whitehead was detained for obstructing a

peace officer, reckless conduct, disorderly conduct, and

mob action.

Officers Bond and Geyer testified that they left almost

immediately after securing Daniel in the squad car. According to Officer Geyer, they were on the scene less

than fifteen minutes. Both officers testified that they did

not see Sgt. Stack, Lt. Stevens, Whitehead, or a prisoner

wagon at the scene. Officer Bond said he couldn’t say

whether he was on the scene when Whitehead was

there. Sgt. Stack, however, testified that after placing

Whitehead in the prisoner wagon, he went over and

spoke to Officer Bond for a minute or minute and a half

about what happened, whether he was hurt, whether

the offender was hurt, and whether anyone needed

medical attention.

Whitehead’s account of what took place that day is

much different. She testified that she encountered a calm

scene and that Lt. Stevens was talking to the crowd and

laughing. She saw Officer Bond standing outside a police

car, approached him, informed him who she was, and

asked about her son. Whitehead, her husband Donald,

and eyewitness Finkley testified that Officer Bond exploded, and said, “He’s a fucking idiot.” According to

Whitehead and Donald, Officer Bond ordered her to

step back on the curb, pushing her, kicking her heels, and

belly-bumping her along the way. Officer Bond was

swearing and acting like he was going to hit Whitehead

even though she was fully cooperating and calm. (Finkley

testified that he didn’t see Officer Bond push, kick, belly-
8 No. 11-2225

bump, or physically touch Whitehead. He was distracted by an officer telling him to get back and the next

time he directed his attention to Whitehead, she was

interacting with Lt. Stevens.)

At that point, according to Whitehead, Lt. Stevens

intervened, trying to hold Officer Bond back, but Bond

kept trying to get around Lt. Stevens to attack Whitehead.

Donald told Whitehead to come toward him and Lt.

Stevens said, “Go ahead, Bitch. Keep walking.” Whitehead

told Lt. Stevens she could expect this language from the

officer, but not from him (a lieutenant). Lt. Stevens

ordered her not to speak and she responded, “I won’t,” and

then Lt. Stevens said “That’s it. You’re under arrest.” Lt.

Stevens grabbed her, had her handcuffed, and requested

Officer Randonis to place her in the prisoner wagon.

(Officer Randonis testified that Whitehead violently

resisted being put in the prisoner wagon, but Lt. Stevens

and Sgt. Stack both testified that Whitehead did not

resist arrest.)

There is conflicting testimony as to how long Whitehead

was in the wagon. The jury heard the following time

estimates from the following witnesses: Lt. Stevens, 2-10

minutes; Sgt. Stack, 2-5 minutes; Randonis, 10 minutes;

Whitehead, 20 minutes; and Finkley, 10 minutes. Lt.

Stevens testified that Donald came up to him and said,

“I’m her husband. She’s acting crazy. Please let her

go. I’ll take care of her.” He informed Lt. Stevens that

Whitehead was the offender’s mother. Lt. Stevens

released Whitehead because she had calmed down. She

was not charged with a crime. Lt. Stevens testified that

he was on the scene for a total of five to ten minutes.
No. 11-2225 9

Numerous other officers testified at trial that when

they arrived the crowd was not acting unruly and that

Officers Bond and Geyer were still on the scene. They

testified that they either didn’t see Whitehead or that

she was already in the prisoner wagon. At least one

officer didn’t recall seeing Lt. Stevens, Sgt. Stack, or the

prisoner wagon at the scene.

II. Analysis 

Whitehead raises three issues on appeal. First she

asserts that the district court erred in failing to grant

her motion for judgment as a matter of law because the

officers’ testimony was exceedingly improbable and

physically impossible. Next she contends that even if

the officers’ testimony is not excluded on those grounds,

the district court should have granted her a new trial

because the verdict was against the manifest weight of

the evidence. She also argues that she is entitled to a

new trial because the district court abused its discretion

in balancing evidence under Rule 403. We address

each argument in turn. 

A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 

We review the district court’s denial of the motion for

judgment as a matter of law de novo, taking “the record

as a whole to determine whether the evidence presented,

combined with all reasonable inferences permissibly

drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict

when viewed in the light most favorable to the party
10 No. 11-2225

against whom the motion is directed.” Clarett v. Roberts,

657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted).

Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

a district court to enter judgment against a party who

has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial but

only if “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that

issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Because the defendants

prevailed at trial, we construe the facts strictly in their

favor. See Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chi. Park Dist., 634 F.3d

372, 376 (7th Cir. 2011). “In cases involving simple

issues but highly disputed facts (an apt description of

this case), greater deference should be afforded the

jury’s verdict.” Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir.

1995) (parenthetical in original).

The trial in this case, simply stated, was a credibility

contest. “Although the court examines the evidence to

determine whether the jury’s verdict was based on that

evidence, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Schandelmeier-Bartels, 634

F.3d at 376. A district court can disregard testimony only

if “reasonable persons could not believe” it because it

“contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws.” Latino,

58 F.3d at 315; see also Mejia v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 650 F.3d

631, 633 (7th Cir. 2011); Burger v. Int’l Union of Elevator

Constructors Local No. 2, 498 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2007)

(the objective evidence must show that it would be unreasonable to believe a critical witness for one side).

Evidence is incredible as a matter of law only when it

would have been “physically impossible for the witness

to observe that which he claims occurred, or impossible
No. 11-2225 11

under the laws of nature for the occurrence to have

taken place at all.” United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 665,

675 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted); see also United

States v. Cervante, 958 F.2d 175, 180 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating

that we will not disturb credibility determinations

unless the testimony is “exceedingly improbable”).

“Discrepancies arising from impeachment, inconsistent

prior statements, or the existence of a motive do not

render witness testimony legally incredible.” United States

v. McEntire, 153 F.3d 424, 435 (7th Cir. 1998).

Whitehead contends that in ruling on her motion for

judgment as a matter of law, the district court should

have disregarded the officers’ testimony as inherently

incredible. She explains that Officers Bond and Geyer

testified that they didn’t see Lt. Stevens, Sgt. Stack, or

Whitehead on the scene and left almost immediately

after placing Daniel in the squad car. According to Lt.

Stevens and Sgt. Stevens, though, Whitehead, standing

ten feet from Officer Bond, was acting aggressively,

yelling, and charging toward him. Sgt. Stack also testified

that he spoke to Officer Bond for about a minute and

a half after placing Whitehead in the prisoner wagon.

There can be no doubt that there were inconsistencies

between Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s testimony and

Officers Bond’s and Geyer’s testimony. Such inconsistencies, however, are not enough to find the testimony

incredible as a matter of law. For instance, the jury was

free to disregard Officer Bond’s testimony and instead

credit Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s version of the events.

See United States v. Colston, 936 F.2d 312, 315 (7th Cir.
12 No. 11-2225

1991) (“Generally, juries may reject parts of a witness’s

testimony while accepting other parties.”); see also

Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1054 (7th Cir. 1995).

Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s testimony was not internally

inconsistent and was corroborated in most respects

by Officer Randonis.

Although other officers testified that they did not

observe Whitehead or an unruly crowd when they

arrived, the record is unclear when each officer arrived

and where they were in relation to the crowd. The

situation with Whitehead was resolved within twenty

to thirty seconds, quite possibly before the other officers

arrived. Also, the officers were testifying to events that

took place two and a half years earlier and there

were numerous distractions at the scene, which spanned

a block. The officers’ perspectives reasonably varied

depending on the exact time of their arrival, where

they were (squad cars were parked all along the block),

and where they focused their attention (there were nine

police cars on the scene, approximately eighteen police

officers, and two crowds—one in an alley on Lavergne

and another on the corner of Polk).

It would have also been reasonable for the jury to

believe Officer Bond’s testimony that he was not

focused on the crowd and was instead preoccupied with

the events that had just transpired and had turned his

attention to Daniel. Minutes before, Daniel had kicked

Officer Bond in the chest and knocked him to the ground.

While Officers Bond and Geyer tried to subdue Daniel,

a crowd started yelling at and approaching them. Officer
No. 11-2225 13

Bond faced a chaotic, tense, and rapidly unfolding situation. When Whitehead arrived, the crowds (located in

two places) were still unruly and loud and there were

police cars and officers all along the block. Officer Bond

testified that he was initially concerned with the crowd,

but when assisting officers showed up, he focused his

attention on Daniel. Although Daniel was secured

in the squad car, Officer Bond was responsible for transporting him to the station and completing his formal

arrest. And James Jones, who had escaped the officers’

grasp, was still on the loose, another potentially disconcerting fact.

Given the other distractions on the scene and that

Officer Bond’s attention was no longer on the crowd, it

would have been reasonable for the jury to conclude

that Officer Bond didn’t notice Whitehead during the

twenty to thirty seconds that she was yelling and

acting aggressively in moving the crowd toward him.

The jury could also reasonably believe that Officer Bond

simply forgot the relatively unremarkable one and a

half minute conversation with Sgt. Stack.

The verdict demonstrates that the jury chose to credit

Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s testimony over Whitehead’s,

Donald’s, and Finkley’s. This was not unreasonable,

particularly considering that the jury could have found

Whitehead’s version of the events unbelievable. Whitehead testified that she approached the scene calmly

even though she was just told by a neighbor that “they’re

killing your son.” Further, she testified that Lt. Stevens

attempted to get between her and Officer Bond to prevent
14 No. 11-2225

an altercation, but then Lt. Stevens, for no apparent

reason, called her a “bitch” and arrested her. There were

also certain inconsistencies and, what the jury may have

reasonably believed were, exaggerations in the

plaintiff’s case (which we don’t need to discuss) that

potentially made her claims less credible. The jury

could have concluded that her version of the story

simply didn’t add up.

 In any event, the inconsistencies between the officers’

testimony do not lead to the conclusion that Lt. Stevens’

and Sgt. Stack’s testimony was incredible as a matter

of law. The objective evidence does not show that it

would be unreasonable to believe Lt. Stevens’ or

Sgt. Stack’s version, nor was their testimony physically

impossible. Whitehead repeatedly pointed out the inconsistencies and weaknesses in the officers’ testimony to

the jurors, and it was within their province to decide

whose testimony to credit. See United States v. Alcantar,

83 F.3d 185, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the inconsistencies in the witness’s testimony were “fully aired

to the jury on cross-examination, but the jury still chose

to credit [the witness’s] story; [t]hat was a judgment

the jury was privileged to make, and [the defendant]

has provided us with no basis for disturbing it.”). “When

a jury has chosen to credit crucial testimony with full

knowledge of the many faults of the witness providing

it, we have no basis to interfere, as the jury is the final

arbiter on such questions.” Id. at 189.

Whitehead hasn’t argued on appeal that if we accept

Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s testimony that the evidence
No. 11-2225 15

is insufficient for the jury to find probable cause for her

arrest. Because we find that the jury could consider their

testimony, we conclude that the district court properly

denied the plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter

of law. 

B. Motion for New Trial

Whitehead raises two grounds in her request for a

new trial: (1) the evidence was against the manifest

weight of the evidence; and (2) certain evidence

admitted by the district court should have been

excluded as unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. We

review a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion.

See Clarett, 657 F.3d at 674. “A new trial may be granted

if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence

or the trial was unfair to the moving party.” Id. (quotations omitted). A new trial should be granted, however,

“only when the record shows that the jury’s verdict

resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict,

on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our

conscience.” Id. (quotations omitted).

1. Against the Manifest Weight of Evidence

When considering whether the verdict was against the

manifest weight of the evidence, “the district court has

the power to get a general sense of the weight of the

evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and

the comparative strength of the facts put forth at trial.”

Mejia, 650 F.3d at 633. “In conducting its own assess-
16 No. 11-2225

ment of the evidence presented, the district court cannot

remove a piece of evidence from the calculus merely

because the court believes it was not credible and then,

with that piece excluded, grant a motion for a new trial

because the verdict is now against the weight.” Id. We

have already found that the district court cannot

disregard the officers’ testimony as physically impossible or inherently incredible, so the district court was

bound by the same evidence the jury considered in

ruling on the motion for new trial. See id. “[A] court will

set aside a verdict as contrary to the manifest weight of

the evidence only if no rational jury could have

rendered the verdict.” Marcus & Millichap Inv. Servs. of

Chi., Inc. v. Sekulovski, 639 F.3d 301, 313-14 (7th Cir.

2011) (quotations omitted); see also Galvan v. Norberg,

2012 WL 1570876, *8 (7th Cir. May 7, 2012).

Whitehead relies heavily on Mejia in arguing that the

district court applied the wrong standard to her motion

for new trial by looking at the case in the light most

favorable to the defendants instead of making an independent, neutral decision based on the credibility of the

witnesses and evidence. Whitehead’s reading of Mejia,

which places the judge in the role of a 13th juror, is misguided. In Mejia, the district court determined that the

weight of the evidence (not necessarily the manifest

weight) was against the defendants, but concluded that

it could not set aside the verdict unless the defendants’

testimony contradicted indisputable physical facts or

laws. 650 F.3d at 633. We held that the “indisputable

facts” analysis comes into play only when considering

whether to remove evidence from the court’s evaluation.
No. 11-2225 17

Id. at 634. This analysis, we explained, “has no application

when the court merely weighs the evidence itself.” Id.

(emphasis in original). The district court in that case

viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the

defendants (rather than neutrally) and concluded that

the verdict could not be set aside unless the evidence

supporting it was impossible. Id. Because the power to

weigh the evidence is not limited by such a standard,

we reversed. Id.

Mejia stands for the proposition that the district court

must properly exercise its discretion in weighing the

evidence to determine if it’s against the manifest weight

of evidence. The district court, however, cannot grant a

new trial just because it believes the jury got it wrong.

See Latino, 58 F.3d at 315. “[S]ince the credibility of witnesses is peculiarly for the jury, it is an invasion of the

jury’s province to grant a new trial merely because

the evidence was sharply in conflict.” Id. “Even when

evidence is contradictory, ‘[i]t’s the jury’s job—not the

district court’s job or the job of a panel of appellate

judges—to figure out who’s telling the truth.’ ”

United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906, 920 (7th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Lowe v. Consol. Freightways of Del., 177 F.3d 640,

642–43 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The fact that [the defendant]

presented evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s

verdict does not mean that the verdict should be reversed. . . . The jury was there; it weighed the witnesses’

credibility, considered the evidence, and reached a supportable conclusion.”)), petition for cert. filed, 80 BNA

U.S.L.W. 3480 (2012). “We will not supplant the jury’s

reasonable and factually supported verdict with our
18 No. 11-2225

own judgment.” Wipf v. Kowalski, 519 F.3d 380, 385 (7th

Cir. 2008).

The district court acknowledged that it was required

to weigh the facts when addressing Whitehead’s motion

for new trial and concluded:

The jurors . . . were presented with two sharply

conflicting portrayals of the events on June 20,

2008, and they were entitled to believe either

side. Whitehead testified that she was harassed

by Bond and Stevens after calmly inquiring about

her son, and then was thrown in the back of a

[prisoner wagon] despite complying with all of

their orders. Bond testified that he never saw

Whitehead at the scene, and Stevens and Stack

testified that Whitehead acted disruptively and

failed to follow the orders they had issued to

control the hostile crowd that had gathered. Given

this conflicting testimony, none of which “contracts

indisputable physical facts or laws,” . . . the jury

had a reasonable basis to find that the individual

Defendants had probable cause to arrest Whitehead and did not use excessive force in doing so.

After weighing all of the evidence presented at

trial, the Court finds that this is not a case in which

“no rational jury could have rendered the verdict.” . . . Because the verdict was not against

the manifest weight of the evidence, the Court

declines to grant Whitehead a new trial.

(emphasis added). The district judge’s discussion of the

evidence and comparative strength of the facts wasn’t
No. 11-2225 19

extensive, but we do not fault him because Whitehead’s

arguments on this issue were brief and merely referred

the court back to her arguments on the inherent incredibility of the officers’ testimony. The judge nevertheless,

citing Mejia, applied the proper standard, understood

his role in weighing the evidence, and relying on all

the evidence, including the officers’ testimony, concluded that the jury had a reasonable basis to find in

favor of the defendants. See Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc.,

635 F.3d 870, 877 (7th Cir. 2011) (“This court will not

overturn a jury verdict if a reasonable basis exists in

the record to support it.”).

“[O]nce the district court applies the correct law, its

discretion is wide and our review deferential.” Mejia,

650 F.3d at 634; see also Galvan, 2012 WL 1570876, *7 (“Our

review of a decision denying a new trial is “extremely

deferential.”). “[T]he district court is in the best position

to evaluate the evidence and determine whether the

verdict was against the manifest weight; it heard the

witnesses testify, saw the evidence presented, and gained

a better appreciation of the nuances of the case than

could be gleaned from a cold, written record. Mejia, 650

F.3d at 634; see also Aldridge, 635 F.3d at 876-77 (“The

district court, having seen the presentation of the

evidence and observed the witnesses, is in a unique

position to rule on a new trial motion.” (quotations omitted)). Based on this record, we cannot find that the

district court, having observed the witnesses testify to

their different versions of events and having assessed

their credibility, abused its discretion in concluding that

the jury verdict was not against the manifest weight of

the evidence.
20 No. 11-2225

2. Evidentiary Rulings 

Whitehead contends that the district court erred in not

granting her Rule 59 motion for new trial because the

evidence admitted at trial was unfairly prejudicial

under Rule 403. We afford significant deference to the

trial court’s decision weighing probative value against

prejudice. Cerabio LLC v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 410 F.3d

981, 994 (7th Cir. 2005). “We review the district court’s

evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion and will

reverse only where no reasonable person could take

the view adopted by the trial court.” Clarett, 657 F.3d at

669 (quotations omitted). And even if the district court

erred, we will not reverse if the error was harmless. Id.

“A new trial is warranted only if the error has a

substantial and injurious effect or influence on the determination of a jury, and the result is inconsistent with

substantial justice.” Cerabio, 410 F.3d at 994 (internal

citation omitted). “Evidentiary errors satisfy this standard

only when a significant chance exists that they affected

the outcome of the trial.” EEOC v. Mgmt. Hospitality of

Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422, 440 (7th Cir. 2012).

a. Evidence of Daniel’s, Jones’s, and Mynatt’s conduct

The district court (over the plaintiff’s objection)

admitted testimony concerning events that took place

before Whitehead’s arrival on the scene, but agreed with

plaintiff that charges or guilty pleas as to Daniel, Jones,

and Mynatt should be excluded. Whitehead alleges that

evidence relating to Daniel’s, Jones’s, and Mynatt’s conduct was irrelevant and highly prejudicial because it
No. 11-2225 21

created a mini-trial-within-a-trial and was used to elicit

sympathy for the police and to impute Daniel’s bad

behavior to her. In allowing the evidence, the district

court explained that the information was relevant to

provide context, assess Officer Bond’s testimony, and

evaluate testimony about the mood of the crowd.

Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make

a fact more or less probable than it would be without the

evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining

the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. In making this determination, “[w]e will not substitute [our] opinion for that of

the trial judge merely because we may be inclined to

rule differently on the question of relevancy.” United

States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). Relevant evidence may be excluded “if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by a

danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Recognizing that “most relevant evidence is, by its very

nature, prejudicial, we have emphasized that evidence

must be unfairly prejudicial to require exclusion.” Boros,

668 F.3d at 909 (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). We employ a sliding scale approach: as the probative

value increases, so does our tolerance of the risk of prejudice. Id. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial in the context

of Rule 403 if it will induce the jury to decide the case on

an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather

than on the evidence presented.” Common v. City of

Chicago, 661 F.3d 940, 947 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations

omitted). “[A] district court, in exercising its discretion

under Rule 403, must carefully analyze and assess the

prejudicial effect of challenged evidence.” United States v.

Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 971 (7th Cir. 2011).
22 No. 11-2225

Evidence of Daniel’s, Jones’s, and Mynatt’s conduct

immediately before Whitehead’s arrival was relevant.

“[O]ne measure of relevance is whether its exclusion

would leave a chronological and conceptual void in the

story.” Boros, 668 F.3d at 908 (quotations omitted). Even

where evidence is not directly related to a disputed fact,

it may be relevant when it provides background information. Id. The testimony explained why Whitehead’s

neighbor said, “They’re killing your son,” why Whitehead hurried to the scene and inquired about her son, why

approximately eighteen police officers were there, and

why a sizeable crowd had gathered. This background

information allowed the jury to put Whitehead’s, the

officers’, and the crowd’s conduct in context. That made

it relevant.

The challenged evidence was also relevant because

it tended to make the defendants’ testimony that the

crowd was hostile more believable. See Common, 661 F.3d

at 945-46. If the jurors hadn’t heard evidence about the

traffic stop, Jones fleeing, Daniel’s attempt to flee and

Officer Bond’s physical altercation with him, or Mynatt’s

refusal to obey police orders and subsequent flight

giving rise to a police chase, they would have had little

basis to understand why people were gathered around

yelling and why the officers had reasonable grounds

to promptly maintain control of the crowd. The evidence

also made Officer Bond’s testimony that he was preoccupied with Daniel even after Daniel was secured in

the squad car more believable.

Accordingly, we find that evidence of Daniels’, Jones’s,

and Mynatt’s conduct (save testimony concerning the
No. 11-2225 23

crack cocaine which we will discuss shortly) relevant

in providing the jurors necessary background information and probative in their assessment of the officers’

credibility. Although the district court only addressed

Whitehead’s concerns of undue prejudice briefly, we find

no reversible error. We give “special deference” to the

district court’s evidentiary findings pursuant to Rule

403, see Common, 661 F.3d at 946, and we have no basis

to second-guess the district court’s judgment here.

Evidence that crack cocaine was found in Daniel’s car

is more problematic. The defendants argue that this

evidence was relevant to Daniel’s and Jones’s incentive to

flee. The district court did not address this evidence

separately and we are troubled by the evidence’s

minimal probative value in relation to the danger of

unfair prejudice. But even if the district court erred in

admitting this evidence, we conclude that it was harmless. See Cerabio, 410 F.3d at 994.

The district court could have given a limiting instruction

to help alleviate any unfair prejudice, but Whitehead

didn’t request such an instruction and so none was

given. See United States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508, 517-18

(7th Cir. 2004) (no error where the district court failed to

give limiting instruction sua sponte). Even without the

instruction, however, the parties told the jury that the

case was not about Daniel or what he did, it was about

Whitehead and her conduct. Whitehead’s counsel explained in closing that it was important for the jury to

know why Whitehead and the officers were at the

scene, but Daniel is an adult and his conduct cannot be
24 No. 11-2225

attributed to his mother. The jury also heard evidence

that Whitehead was a professional with a steady job and

no criminal record. Nothing in the record indicates that

the jury would have attributed Daniel’s bad acts,

including his possession of crack cocaine, to Whitehead.

In light of Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s testimony of Whitehead’s conduct providing probable cause for her arrest,

and the background information of Daniel’s, Jones’s, and

Mynatt’s conduct that was properly admitted, Whitehead

hasn’t shown that there was a significant chance that

the crack cocaine evidence affected the outcome of the trial.

b. Evidence of high-violent-crime area 

Whitehead sought to bar reference to the 800 block of

South Lavergne as a high-crime area, arguing that the

evidence had no foundation, had limited relevance, and

was highly prejudicial. Initially, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that

a proper foundation was laid for Officer Bond, Lt. Stevens,

and Sgt. Stack to testify, based on their experience patrolling the area for several years, that it was a high-violentcrime area. See United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793

(7th Cir. 2005) (stating that “specific data” establishing

that a location is a “high-crime area” is not required).

We also find that the evidence had some relevance.

Contrary to Whitehead’s assertions, an officer’s supported opinion that an area is a high-violent-crime area

can be considered in a probable cause analysis. See

Carmichael v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill. 605 F.3d 451, 457 (7th
No. 11-2225 25

Both parties assume that Whitehead’s seizure amounted to 1

an arrest, but whether her short detention in the prisoner

wagon qualifies as an arrest requiring probable cause is debatable. See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th

Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1228

(7th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is not necessarily improper to detain

suspects in a police car during some kinds of investigatory

stops.”). Some force may be reasonable during an investigatory

stop when the circumstances give rise to a justifiable fear for

personal safety on the part of the officer. Jewett v. Anders,

521 F.3d 818, 824-25 (7th Cir.2008). This issue wasn’t raised

by the defendants, though, and thus, is not an issue we need

to explore.

Cir. 2010) (“[P]robable cause depends not on the facts as

an omniscient observer would perceive them but on the

facts as they would have appeared to a reasonable

person in the position of the arresting officer—seeing what

he saw, hearing what he heard.”) (emphasis in original)

(quotations omitted). When conduct is taking place in a

high-crime area, the characteristics of the location may

be one factor officers consider under the totality of circumstances when detaining someone. See United States 1

v. Jackson, 300 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2002); see also

United States v. Oglesby, 597 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir.

2010); United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 657 (4th

Cir. 2004). For this factor to carry weight, there should

be a reasonable connection between the neighborhood’s

higher crime rate and the facts relied upon to support

probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Tinnie, 629 F.3d

749, 758 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
26 No. 11-2225

Here, there was a connection. Lt. Stevens was concerned not just with Whitehead’s behavior, but also with

that of the other people in the crowd (who he

testified Whitehead was instigating). In part, because it

was a high-violent-crime area, the seemingly agitated

crowd posed a greater threat to the officers safety, who

feared that violence was more likely to ensue if prompt

action wasn’t taken to disperse the crowd. The officers

could reasonably consider the characteristics of the area

in assessing the situation and deciding what action to

take to maintain control.

The evidence was relevant, but it was also prejudicial.

As we have said though, most relevant evidence is prejudicial, so the issue is whether it was unfairly prejudicial.

We cannot find that the district court abused its wide

discretion in admitting the evidence. Neither party suggests that the probable cause instruction to the jury was

an inaccurate statement of the law and thus the jury

was properly guided. Further, Whitehead and Donald

testified that the neighborhood is mostly compromised

of good hardworking homeowners and retired citizens.

Donald described the block as “[m]ostly bungalows,

retired people, elderly people, . . . working class people . . .

It’s a middle class neighborhood.” Defense counsel

didn’t refute this more specific description of the block.

We do not find that the district court abused its

discretion in allowing the jury to hear the parties’

differing perceptions of the area. 
No. 11-2225 27

III. Conclusion

 For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM the district court’s

judgment.

5-21-12