JON ROBERT SLAATTE, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 60799 

FILED 

APR 1 8 2013 

Al/ 0)`,4 -',,, 

129 Nev., Advance Opinion 23 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

Appeal from a judgment of conviction. Ninth Judicial District 

Court, Douglas County; David R. Gamble, Judge. 

Dismissed. 

Derrick M. Lopez, Gardnerville, 

for Appellant. 

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Mark B. Jackson, 

District Attorney, and Thomas W. Gregory, Chief Deputy District 

Attorney, Douglas County, 

for Respondent. 

BEFORE PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and SAITTA, JJ. 

OPINION 

PER CURIAM: 

In this appeal, we address a threshold jurisdiction issue: Is a 

judgment of conviction that imposes restitution in an uncertain amount an 

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appealable final judgment? We conclude that it is not, and, as a result, we 

dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Appellant Jon Robert Slaatte pleaded guilty to one count of 

lewdness with a child under 14 years of age. The district court sentenced 

him to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 10 years. The 

district court also determined that restitution should be imposed as part of 

the sentence, but the court did not set an amount of restitution. Instead, 

the judgment entered by the court orders Slaatte to appear at 9 a.m. on a 

Tuesday law-and-motion calendar within 60 days after his release from 

prison "to have this Court determine what restitution for victim 

compensation that will be ordered at that time." Slaatte filed a timely 

notice of appeal. 

Slaatte argues that Nevada law requires that the district 

court set an amount of restitution when it determines that restitution is 

appropriate as part of a sentence. Because the district court failed to 

comply with that requirement, Slaatte urges this court to "set aside or 

reverse the district court's order regarding restitution." For its part, the 

State concedes error and urges the court to remand this matter to the 

district court so that it can specify the amount of restitution imposed as 

part of the sentence. 

We agree with the parties that the district court clearly erred. 

NRS 176.033(1)(c) requires the district court to "set an amount of 

restitution" when it determines that restitution "is appropriate" as part of 

a sentence. When the district court determines that restitution is 

appropriate as part of a sentence, it must include the amount and terms of 

the restitution in the judgment of conviction. NRS 176.105(1)(c) ("the 

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judgment of conviction must set forth. . . any term of imprisonment, the 

amount and terms of any fine, restitution or administrative assessment"). 

Consistent with these statutory requirements, this court has held that a 

district court is not allowed "to award restitution in uncertain terms." 

Botts v. State, 109 Nev. 567, 569, 854 P.2d 856, 857 (1993). In cases where 

a district court has violated this proscription, this court historically has 

remanded for the district court to set an amount of restitution. E.g., 

Washington v. State, 112 Nev. 1067, 1075, 922 P.2d 547, 551-52 (1996); 

Smith v. State, 112 Nev. 871, 873, 920 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1996); Roe v. 

State, 112 Nev. 733, 736, 917 P.2d 959, 960-61 (1996); Botts, 109 Nev. at 

569, 854 P.2d at 857. 

None of our prior decisions addressed whether the judgment 

was final given its failure to comply with NRS 176.105(1). If such a 

judgment is not appealable as a final judgment, see NRS 177.015(3), we 

lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See Castillo v. State, 106 Nev. 349, 352, 

792 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1990) (explaining that court has jurisdiction only 

when statute or court rule provides for appeal). Our recent decision in 

Whitehead v. State, 128 Nev. , 285 P.3d 1053 (2012), is controlling. In 

that case, we considered whether a judgment of conviction that imposed 

restitution but did not specify the amount of restitution was sufficient to 

trigger the one-year period under NRS 34.726 for filing a post-conviction 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at , 285 P.3d at 1055. Based on 

the requirement in NRS 176.105(1)(c) that the amount of restitution be 

included in the judgment of conviction if the court imposes restitution, we 

concluded "that a judgment of conviction that imposes a restitution 

obligation but does not specify its terms is not a final judgment" and 

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therefore it does not trigger the one-year period for filing a habeas 

petition. Id. Given our decision in Whitehead that such a judgment is not 

a final judgment, we necessarily conclude that it also is not appealable. 

In this case, the district court clearly determined that 

restitution should be imposed as part of the sentence. The court, however, 

did not specify the amount of restitution, as required for a final judgment. 

We acknowledge that the district court appears to have been concerned 

with setting an amount of restitution because of the possibility that the 

victim, who had been in counseling, would incur additional counseling 

expenses in the future. 1Any concern about ongoing counseling expenses, 

however, does not override the district court's statutory obligation to 

award restitution in certain terms and to do so in the judgment of 

conviction. See Washington, 112 Nev. at 1074-75, 922 P.2d at 551 

(concluding that district court, which ordered defendant to "pay any future 

counselling costs for victim," erred by failing to set specific dollar amount 

of restitution for such costs (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because 

the judgment of conviction contemplates restitution in an uncertain 

'The record suggests that the parties and the district court had some 

concern that as of the date of sentencing there had not been any expenses 

for counseling that could properly be included as restitution. Because the 

district court has not imposed a specific amount or identified who it must 

be paid to, those concerns are not before us, and we therefore express no 

opinion on those matters. 

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, C.J. 

Pickering 

J. 

Hardesty Saitta 

amount, it is not final and therefore is not appealable. Accordingly, we 

lack jurisdiction over this appeal. The appeal is dismissed on that basis. 2 

2We provided Slaatte with an opportunity to show cause why this 

appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He has not 

responded. 

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