Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 

Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 

USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 950729 SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 

 January 12, 1996 

MICHAEL STEVEN HENSLEY, et al. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Gerald B. Lee, Judge 

 In this appeal, we decide whether an insured's family 

automobile liability policy provided liability coverage for a 

named operator's use of a non-owned automobile. 

 I. 

 In 1989, Vanessa Magdelena Hoang and her husband, John Paul 

Hoang, moved from California to Jidda, Saudi Arabia where Mr. 

Hoang was employed by Saudi Airlines. While in Jidda, the Hoangs 

lived in a house with their four children. 

 No further education was available to the Hoang children in 

Saudi Arabia after the ninth grade. Accordingly, the parents 

sent their two oldest children, Paul and George, to live with 

Mrs. Hoang's mother, Thaun Tuk Jones, in Centreville, Fairfax 

County, Virginia to continue their education. 

 George, who was 15 at the time, came to Centreville in the 

summer of 1990. In March 1992, Michelle Jones, Mrs. Hoang's 

half-sister, also came to live in the Centreville single family 

house with her mother, Paul, George, and two of her mother's 

other children. 

 George ate, slept, and kept his belongings at his 

grandmother's house, and he spent all but one of his vacations 

there. While living in his grandmother's house, George assisted 
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around the house by running errands, cleaning parts of the house, 

mowing the lawn, and cooking. He worked in the Centreville area 

during the summer of 1992, using his grandmother's address for 

employment and tax purposes. 

 Excluding the 1991-92 school year, when his parents sent him 

to a military academy in Front Royal, and a vacation to various 

cities in the United States with his parents in 1992, George 

lived continuously in his grandmother's house. He never visited 

his parents in Saudi Arabia after he came to Virginia. 

 George talked on the telephone frequently and corresponded 

infrequently with his parents in Saudi Arabia while he was living 

in Virginia. Mrs. Hoang returned from Saudi Arabia to her 

mother's house several times a year for visits of several days 

each to oversee her two sons' activities. She and her husband 

continued to support George and pay his educational expenses 

while he was in Virginia. 

 In July 1992, Mrs. Hoang contacted representatives of USAA 

Casualty Insurance Company (USAA)* seeking automobile liability 

coverage on a Volvo automobile she had recently purchased in 

Virginia, primarily for use by Paul and George. Based on 

information furnished by Mrs. Hoang, USAA listed her on the 

policy as the named insured, and listed her, her husband, Paul, 

 *Although Hensley described USAA as "United States 

Automobile Association" in the caption of his "Complaint for 

Declaratory Judgment," the parties agree that the policy was 

issued by USAA Casualty Insurance Company, a wholly owned 

subsidiary of United Services Automobile Association. 
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and George as the operators of the insured vehicle. 

Additionally, Mrs. Hoang advised USAA that the insured vehicle 

was to be principally garaged at Mrs. Jones's house and that each 

operator had a Virginia driver's license. Shortly after buying 

the Volvo and the USAA insurance, Mrs. Hoang traded the Volvo for 

an Oldsmobile automobile, and USAA transferred coverage to the 

Oldsmobile. 

 In November 1992, Michelle asked George to take her Porsche 

automobile (covered by a separate USAA liability policy issued to 

Michelle) to a filling station to be refueled. While driving the 

Porsche to the filling station, George collided with a car driven 

by Michael Steven Hensley. 

 Hensley was injured in the collision and brought a personal 

injury action against George. Hensley also brought this 

declaratory judgment action against USAA, Mrs. Hoang, Michelle, 

and George to obtain a declaration that the USAA policy on Mrs. 

Hoang's Oldsmobile provided additional liability coverage to 

George in the personal injury action beyond the coverage provided 

by the USAA policy on the Porsche. 

 Upon attaining the age of 18 and after the accident, George 

registered to vote in Virginia and applied for admission to a 

state university, where he was accepted as an in-state student 

and charged the reduced tuition rate for Virginia residents. 

 After hearing evidence ore tenus and considering the 

depositions of additional witnesses, the trial court entered a 
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declaratory judgment in conformity with Hensley's request. USAA 

appeals. 

 II. 

 We resolve the issue in this appeal by considering the 

pertinent language in the USAA policy on the Oldsmobile. 

Liability coverage for the operation of a non-owned automobile is 

provided to the named insured or "any relative" of the named 

insured. And a "relative" is defined in the policy as "a 

relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same 

household." (Emphasis added.) 

 USAA argues that, because George was a resident of his 

grandmother's household in Centreville, he was not a resident of 

the same household as his mother. Thus, USAA argues that George 

was not a relative as defined in the policy. On the other hand, 

the other parties successfully contended in the trial court, and 

contend on this appeal, that George qualified as a relative under 

the policy definition because he was a resident of his mother's 

household in Saudi Arabia. We agree with USAA. 

 III. 

 We have considered similar policy language in a number of 

other cases. In doing so, we said: 

 The meaning of "resident" or "residence", a 

prolific source of litigation, depends upon the context 

in which it is used. . . . Here, we must interpret the 

meaning of "resident", when followed by "of the same 

household". The word "household", . . . connotes a 

settled status; a more settled or permanent status is 

indicated by "resident of the same household" than 

would be indicated by "resident of the same house or 

apartment". 
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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 231 Va. 358, 361, 344 S.E.2d 890, 

892 (1986)(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 206 

Va. 280, 285, 142 S.E.2d 562, 565-66 (1965)). Continuing, we 

also said: 

 Whether the term "household" or "family" is used, 

the term embraces a collection of persons as a single 

group, with one head, living together, a unit of 

permanent and domestic character, under one roof; a 

"collective body of persons living together within one 

curtilage, subsisting in common and directing their 

attention to a common object, the promotion of their 

mutual interests and social happiness". 

Patterson, 231 Va. at 362, 344 S.E.2d at 892 (quoting Smith, 206 

Va. at 285 n.6, 142 S.E.2d at 565-66 n.6). 

 And, as we noted in Patterson, a person's intent is 

important in determining whether he qualifies as a resident of a 

household. 231 Va. at 363, 344 S.E.2d at 893. However, since 

George was an unemancipated minor at the time of the accident, we 

must also consider his parents' intent in this determination. 

See Code § 16.1-334 (unemancipated minor cannot establish his own 

residence); see also Code § 16.1-333 (parent must consent to 

minor's emancipation); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 581-

82, 74 S.E.2d 170, 173-74 (1953) (intent of parent determines 

whether minor is emancipated), overruled on other grounds by

Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971). Here, 

there is no evidence of an intent on the part of George or his 

parents that he would return to Saudi Arabia to rejoin their 

household there. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that 
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his parents intended that George become a part of his 

grandmother's household until they returned from Saudi Arabia. 

There is no evidence that George left any of his belongings in 

Saudi Arabia, that he maintained a room in his former residence 

there, that he ever returned to visit, or that he had anything 

more than telephone and mail contact with his parents while they 

were in Saudi Arabia. 

 After George came to live with his grandmother, his parents 

saw him only in Virginia and on their vacation in the summer of 

1992. His parents supplied George with a car titled in Virginia 

and registered at his grandmother's address, and they permitted 

him to get a Virginia driver's license. Furthermore, George was 

allowed to spend his vacations in Virginia, work there during the 

summer, and apply for admission to a Virginia university as a 

Virginia resident. Additionally, George's parents must have 

known that George was more than a mere boarder at his 

grandmother's house, as evidenced by his activities in 

contributing to the common burdens associated with the operation 

of a household. 

 Even though George testified that his grandmother's house 

was not his "home," the extended period of his residence there 

with no apparent intention on his or his parents' part for him to 

return to his parents' home in Saudi Arabia, as well as his 

activities at his grandmother's house, gainsay this conclusion. 

Instead, we think this evidence indicates that George was living 
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with his relatives in a unit of permanent and domestic character, 

subsisting in common, in which each household member, including 

George, participated in the promotion of their mutual interests 

and social happiness. See Patterson, 231 Va. at 362, 344 S.E.2d 

at 892. Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that 

reasonable persons could not differ in concluding that, at the 

time of the collision, George was a member of his grandmother's 

household in Virginia, and was no longer a member of his mother's 

household in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, we think that the trial 

court erred in concluding that Mrs. Hoang's USAA policy on the 

Oldsmobile provided additional coverage against George's possible 

liability to Hensley. 

 Therefore, we will reverse the trial court's judgment and 

enter final judgment in this Court declaring that George was not 

covered by Mrs. Hoang's USAA policy when he operated his aunt's 

Porsche and collided with Hensley. 

Reversed and final judgment.