United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-30258

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Christopher Donta Willis, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:19-CR-43-1

______________________________

Before Jones, Clement, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Donta Willis pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to 

distribute methamphetamine. After calculating a sentencing range of 235 to 

293 months under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court 

sentenced Willis to 264 months in prison. Because the district court adhered 

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* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 27, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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to correct sentencing procedure, we AFFIRM the within-Guidelines 

sentence.

I. Background

In January 2019, the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)

enlisted Louisiana State Police Trooper Matthew Titus to tail Willis, whom 

the agency believed to be distributing meth out of Dallas. Officer Titus pulled

Willis over for following too closely behind another vehicle. Willis and his 

passenger bolted on foot as soon as Titus began to conduct a pat down search. 

The two were subdued a quarter-mile away, at which point officers found 

77 grams of meth on Willis and 29 grams on the passenger. While Willis was 

in police custody, the DEA searched his Shreveport, Louisiana residence 

(pursuant to a warrant) and found 447 grams of meth, a stolen pistol, $2,400 

in cash, and some ecstasy pills. The DEA confronted Willis with this 

contraband, and based on his response, searched the residence again and 

found an additional 295 grams of meth.

A federal grand jury returned a five-count indictment. Willis moved 

to suppress the statements he made while in custody, and the DEA agreed 

not to use those statements at trial. In two more motions to suppress, Willis 

sought to exclude the meth found on his person following the traffic stop, 

arguing that both the stop and the pat down violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights. The district court denied both motions.

In September 2021, Willis, represented by counsel, pled guilty to one 

count of possession with intent to distribute meth. The written factual basis 

for the plea, which Willis signed, stated: “The total amount of 

methamphetamine attributable to Willis, as well as any relevant conduct to 

include additional methamphetamine and a firearm recovered from a 

residence, will be determined at sentencing.” The first presentence 

investigation report (“PSR”) calculated his final offense level at 35 based on 

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the amount of drugs involved (853 grams of pure meth), his possession of a 

firearm, his role in the offense, and his acceptance of responsibility. This 

correlated to a recommended sentencing range of 168 to 210 months in 

prison.

Willis objected to the PSR, arguing that he should be held accountable 

only for the drugs found on his person at the traffic stop. The revised PSR 

removed the three-level deduction for acceptance of responsibility because 

Willis disputed relevant conduct. This increased the sentencing range to 235 

to 293 months.

At sentencing, the district court agreed with the removal of the three 

point reduction for acceptance of responsibility and sentenced Willis to 

264 months in prison. The government upheld its end of the plea agreement 

and dropped the remaining four counts. Willis timely appealed.

II. Discussion

A. Preservation of Claim for Appeal

As an initial matter, we hold that Willis failed to preserve the right to 

appeal the denial of his pretrial motions to suppress. Thus, we do not reach 

his Fourth Amendment claim.

By entering a plea of guilty, a defendant waives “any further objection 

to evidence admitted pursuant to a district court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress.” United States v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 2007), 

superseded by rule on other grounds, Fed. R. Crim. P. 12. If a defendant 

desires to “preserve the right to appeal a district court’s adverse ruling on a 

pretrial motion,” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) requires him 

to enter a conditional plea “in writing and consented to by the prosecution 

and the district court.” Id. “Rule 11(h) allows for variance from 

Rule 11(a)(2)’s technical conditional plea requirements when the variance 

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‘does not affect substantial rights.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h)). 

Such “harmless variances” have been excused where “the record clearly 

indicates that the defendant intended to enter a conditional guilty plea, that 

the defendant expressed the intention to appeal a particular pretrial ruling, 

and that neither the government nor the district court opposed such a plea.” 

United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2005).

Willis concedes that the written plea agreement he signed was 

unconditional. He argues, however, that he expressed his intention to appeal 

the suppression rulings in his earlier counter plea agreement. That two-page, 

handwritten document states under the heading “Defendant Obligations” 

that “Defendant shall relinquish his rights to appeal” and under the heading 

“Government Obligations” that the government shall “Sentence Defendant 

based on 116.4 grams (Willis pocket), only.” Willis contends that this 

“overwhelming[ly] indicates” his intention to enter a conditional guilty plea 

if the government rejected his counteroffer.

The record evidence cited by Willis is insufficient to excuse 

compliance with Rule 11(a). In United States v. Santiago, for example, this 

court excused a “harmless variance” where the defendant expressly reserved 

his right to appeal a motion to suppress at his re-arraignment hearing, and 

neither the government nor the court expressed opposition. 410 F.3d 193, 

197–98 (5th Cir. 2005). Also, in United States v. Fernandez, this court allowed 

a variance where the government conceded that the defendant “reserved her 

right to appeal the suppression issue,” although a conditional guilty plea was 

absent from the record. 887 F.2d 564, 566 n.1 (5th Cir. 1989) (summary 

calendar). 

This case is more like United States v. Wise, where the defendant’s 

written plea agreement contained no reservation of any kind, the district 

court orally reviewed the terms of the unconditional plea agreement at the 

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plea hearing, and both the defendant and his lawyer confirmed that there was 

no other agreement between the defendant and the government. 179 F.3d 

184, 186–87 (5th Cir. 1999). On appeal, this court refused to allow a 

“harmless variance” from Rule 11’s requirements. Id.

Here, the written plea agreement signed by Willis and his attorney was 

expressly unconditional. (“No other agreement, understanding, promise, or 

condition exists . . . .”); (“this plea agreement is a complete statement of the 

parties’ plea agreement in this case”). Further, at Willis’s change of plea 

hearing, the district court asked him whether “anyone made a promise to you 

other than what’s contained in this plea agreement that led you to your 

decision to plead guilty?” Willis replied, “No, sir.” The district court then 

asked Willis’s attorney if any additional agreement existed between the 

government and Willis, to which Willis’s attorney replied in the negative. 

This record is void of any clear indication that Willis intended to preserve his 

right to appeal the denials of his motions to suppress. Thus, we refuse to 

reach Willis’s Fourth Amendment claim.

B. Sentencing

Willis also challenges his sentence of 264 months in prison as 

procedurally unreasonable.1

 Specifically, he argues that the district court 

erred by removing the three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 

“Whether a defendant is entitled to a downward adjustment for acceptance 

of responsibility is . . . a factual determination. We will affirm a sentencing 

court’s decision not to award a reduction . . . unless it is ‘without 

foundation,’ a standard of review more deferential than the clearly erroneous 

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1 Willis does not challenge the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

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standard.” United States v. Anderson, 174 F.3d 515, 525 (5th Cir. 1999) 

(citation omitted).

Here, the district court removed the three-level reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility on the ground that Willis “frivolously and falsely 

contested relevant conduct that is clearly attributable to him.” See U.S.S.G. 

§ 3E1.1, cmt. n.1(A) (A defendant who “falsely denies, or frivolously 

contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a 

manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.”). The district court 

cited Willis’s objection to the PSR’s calculation of his offense level, in which 

Willis clearly stated that he was disputing all relevant conduct except “the 

quantity . . . of controlled substances in his actual possession” on the day of 

the traffic stop.

Willis argues that this was error because his objection merely reflected 

his shock that 853 grams of meth were attributed to him instead of only the 

77 found on his person during the traffic stop. In other words, he was not 

refusing to accept responsibility, but was arguing in his PSR objections that 

it was fundamentally unfair to sentence him for possessing 853 grams of 

meth.

The record supports the district court’s assessment that Willis had 

not accepted responsibility for his possession with intent to distribute 

offense. The Written Factual Basis, which Willis and his counsel signed, 

stated that “[t]he total amount of methamphetamine attributable to Willis, 

as well as any relevant conduct to include additional methamphetamine and a 

firearm recovered from a residence, will be determined at sentencing.” 

(emphasis added). In his PSR objection, Willis objected to the additional 

evidence recovered from his residence. Importantly, the police found two 

batches of meth at the Shreveport residence: first, 447 grams along with a 

stolen pistol, ecstasy pills, and cash; second, based on Willis’s statements, an 

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additional 295 grams. The court observed, correctly, that Willis agreed that 

additional meth from his residence would be included at sentencing. Even if 

Willis may have had some basis to contest the second batch of meth, he had 

none whatsoever to challenge the first. By objecting to the first batch of meth, 

he frivolously and falsely contested relevant conduct that is clearly 

attributable to him. That was the basis for the district court’s decision to 

remove the three-point reduction. Thus, we cannot say that the district 

court’s decision was without foundation.2

AFFIRMED.

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2 This court has dismissed similar challenges on appeal by criminal defendants. See 

e.g., United States v. Rascon, 517 F. App’x 283, 283 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he district court’s 

decision to treat his PSR responses as an objection frivolously contesting the probation 

officer’s drug-quantity determination is not without foundation.”); United States v. 

Vazquez, 371 F. App’x 526, 527–28 (5th Cir. 2010) (defendant’s “objections [to the drug 

quantity] constituted attempts to deny or minimize relevant conduct”); United States v. 

Lohmann, 364 F. App’x 167, 168 (5th Cir. 2010) (same).

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