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No. 14-66C

(Filed: May 12.2014)

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CHRISTOPHERSCOTTBARKSDALE, *

Plaintiff,

THE IINITED STATES,

Defendant.

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Christopher Scott Barksdale, appearing pro se, Cleveland, Ohio.

Benjamin Mark Moss, with whom were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attomey General, Robert E.

Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Kirk T. Manhardt, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation

Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

WHEELER, Judge.

Plaintiff Christopher Barksdale filed a pro se complaint in this Court on January 27,2014.

Mr. Barksdale's claim stems from a decision of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Ohio. In that case, Mr. Barksdale was challenging a foreclosure action, and the

District Court dismissed Mr. Barksdale's case after determining that his suit was frivolous. That

decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, but the appeal

was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Now, Mr. Barksdale asks this Court to award $32,300,000

in damages as well as injunctive relief compelling the Sixth Circuit and the District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio to establish changes in policies, procedures, and training to prevent

such actions, as alleged in the complaint, from occurring in the future.

On March 14,2014, the Government filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Barksdale's complaint

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule l2(b)(l) of the Rules of the U.S. Court of

Federal Claims ("RCFC") and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(bX6). The motion has

been fully briefed. For the reasons stated below the Government's motion is GRANTED.

FILED

lt,|AY 12 2014

U.S.E,OURTff

FEDERALCLAN
Background

In 2010, Mr. Barksdale filed suit in the Northern District of Ohio alleging that the State of

Ohio committed fraud when the State adjudicated a foreclosure action against Mr. Barksdale's

deceased mother. After filing his complaint, Mr. Barksdale petitioned for in forma pauperis

status.r The District Court reviewed his complaint, determined it was frivolous, and dismissed

the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ l9l5(eX2)(B). The Court also denied post-judgment motions

for relief from judgment and recusal. Mr. Barksdale appealed to the Sixth Circuit, but this

appeal was dismissed for want ofprosecution.

Now, Mr. Barksdale has filed a suit in this Court challenging the dismissal of his case

under $ 1915(e). According to Mr. Barksdale $ 1915(e) discriminates against African Americans.

Compl. 13. Furthermore, Mr. Barksdale argues that the judicial system is liable for a breach of

contract ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rishts and a breach of contract ofthe

judicial oath ofoffice.

Analysis

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as

true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintifls favor. Ainslie v. United States, 355 F.3d

1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir.2004) (citing Godwin v. United States,338 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir.

2003)). Though pro se litigants are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers," failures to comply with the Court's jurisdictional requirements are not excused.

Hampel v. United States,97 Fed. Cl.235,237 (201l) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.5.97,

106 (1976). Where subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff must establish the

Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Revnolds v. Army & Air Force Exch.

Serv., 846 F .2d 7 46,748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

This Court's jurisdiction is established by the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. $ 1491 (2006). To

invoke jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must point to a substantive right to money

damages against the United States. Hamlet v. United States, 63 F.3d 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

Such a claim can be founded upon "the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of

an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. $ 1491 (2006). Mr.

Barksdale has failed to meet the burden of establishing jurisdiction for the following four reasons.

I The federal in forma pauperis statute was enacted to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the

federal courts. However, Congress recognized that litigants whose filing fees are assumed by the public lack an

economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous lawsuits. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,324 (1989). As

such, 28 U.S.C. $ 1915(e)(2)(B) requires that United States District Courts dismiss cases which are flivolous or

malicious; which fail to state actionable claims; and which seek monetary reliefagainst a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 

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First, he raises tort claims such as fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation.

However, it is well settled law that this Court lacks jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to hear

claims against the United States "sounding in tort." See. e.g., Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d

621,623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. $ l49l(a); Keene Com. v. United States, 508 U.S.

200,2t4 (1993).

Second, Mr. Barksdale alleges that the Govemment committed criminal acts such as

conspiracy, perjury, and violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. However, this Court lacks

jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under the federal criminal code. Joshua v. United States, l7 F.3d

378,379 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

Third, Mr. Barksdale's constitutional claims fail because he cites constitutional provisions

that are not money-mandating. He raises Constitutional claims under the Preamble to the

Constitution along with the First, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth

Amendments. Cf. Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (the portion of

the Fifth Amendment which prohibits the taking of private property for a public purpose

mandates the payment of money within the meaning of the Tucker Act). He also brings claims

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments sounding in equal protection and due process. These

Constitutional provisions are not money-mandating and therefore fail to raise a fair inference of

jurisdiction.

Fourth, the remainder of Mr. Barksdale's claims arise under various authorities that are

outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. These claims relate to

Ohio's statutory and constitutional provisions; the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights; the Administrative Procedures Act; and the Rules of Decision Act. None of these

authorities establishes a private right of action for money damages against the United States

creating subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

Conclusion

The Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over any of Mr. Barksdale's claims.

Therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(bXl) is GRANTED, and the clerk is

instructed to DISMISS the complaint without prejudice. Because the Court has determined that it

must dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l), it does not need to address Defendant's

altemative ground for dismissal under Rule 12(bX6).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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THOMAS C. WMELER

Judge