alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-11136

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JONATHAN ESCOBEDO,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:14-CR-33-1

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In 2014, Jonathan Escobedo pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession 

of a firearm, and the district court sentenced him to 46 months in prison and 

three years of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). After 

the district court revoked his supervised release in 2017, Escobedo completed 

the prison term imposed on revocation and began serving another term of 

supervised release. In 2019, the Government once more moved to revoke his 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 5, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-11136 Document: 00515442140 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/05/2020
No. 19-11136

2

supervised release, alleging that Escobedo had violated the mandatory

condition that he not commit another federal, state, or local law violation by 

committing the Texas offense of theft of property valued over $2,500 but less 

than $30,000. Escobedo appeals the district court’s revocation of his 

supervised release and imposition of the statutory maximum term of 24 

months of imprisonment. 

In arguing that the district court plainly erred by finding without a jury 

and by a preponderance of the evidence that Escobedo violated the conditions 

of his release by failing to comply with drug testing conditions, Escobedo does 

not address and has therefore abandoned a challenge to the sole basis for the 

revocation alleged in the Government’s motion to revoke and described by the 

district court at the revocation hearing. See Beasley v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 116, 

118 (5th Cir. 1986). Because the violation of state law to which Escobedo 

pleaded guilty in state court formed an adequate basis for the discretionary 

revocation of Escobedo’s release under § 3583(e), this court “need not decide a 

claim of error as to other grounds that had been advanced as a cause of 

revocation,” such as the petition’s notation of a drug testing condition violation. 

United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 219 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, in light of the revocation 

under § 3583(e), Escobedo’s arguments regarding § 3583(g) are irrelevant. See 

id.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 19-11136 Document: 00515442140 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/05/2020
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
                                         THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL
                                     INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE CONSOLIDATED
                                   FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND ITS QUALIFIED IN ITS
                                         ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
                                                                      STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                                           724904
<NAME>                  ARIZONA INSTRUMENT CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER>                                         1
<CURRENCY>                                U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,381,630
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<DEPRECIATION>                               4,095,177
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,778,955
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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            125,485
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<NET-INCOME>                                   125,485
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .02
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</TABLE>
N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________
PRESERVATION WELLNES S TECHNOLOGIES LLC, Plaintiff

- Appellant

v.

ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCAR E SOLUTIONS INC, EPIC SYSTEMS CORPORA TION, NEXTGEN HEALTHCARE INFORMATI ON SYSTEMS LLC, Defendants

- Appellees

______________________
2016

- 2193, 2016

- 2194, 2016

- 2195

______________________ Appeals from the United States District Cour t for the Eastern District of Texas in No s . 2:15

- cv

- 01559

- WCB, 2:15

- cv

- 01561

- WCB, 2:15

- cv

- 01562

- WCB, Circuit Judge William C. Bryson.

______________________
JUDGMENT

______________________
N ICOLE D OMINIQUE G ALLI , Law Offices of N.D. Galli LLC, Philadelphia, PA, argued for plaintiff

- appellant.

M ICHAEL T IMOTHY R ENAUD , Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Fe rris, Glovsky and Popeo, PC, Boston, MA, argued for all defendants -appellees. Defendant -appellee NextgenHealthcare Informati on Systems LLC also represented by S ANDRA B ADIN , M ICHAEL N EWMAN , J AMES M. W ODARSKI

.
B RIAN D OUGLAS S IFF , Duane Morris LLP, New York, NY
, for defendant

- appellee Allscripts Healthcare Sol utions Inc. Also represented by A SHLEY T AYLOR C ORBIT , H ARNAIK S. K AHLON , Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila, Chicago, IL.

A NTHONY A LLEN T OMASELLI , Quarles & Brady, LLP, Madison, WI, for defendant

- appellee Epic Systems Corp oration. Also represented by C ARLY L EVIN , K RISTIN G RAHAM N OEL , M ARTHA J AHN S NYDER ; L OUIS A. K LAPP , Chicago, I L

______________________
T HIS C AUSE having been heard and considered, it is

O RDERED and A DJUDGED :

P ER C URIAM (D YK , M OORE , and R EYNA , Circuit Judges ).
AFFIRMED

. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

E NTERED BY O RDER OF THE C OURT

April 12, 2017 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner Date Peter R. Marksteiner Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-28-1997
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<CASH>                                       1,125,589
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,431,567
<ALLOWANCES>                                    20,000
<INVENTORY>                                    922,346
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,759,060
<PP&E>                                       2,661,168
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,153,973
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,445,026
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,709,294
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                        51,687
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,239,622
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,445,026
<SALES>                                     10,514,842
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,514,842
<CGS>                                        6,149,872
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,149,872
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,025,122
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,298
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                330,550
<INCOME-TAX>                                    27,503
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            303,047
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.11
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</TABLE>
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-19-00226-CV

__________________

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Appellant

V.

JANET SHERWOOD AND SCOTT STOVER, Appellees

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 1A District Court

Tyler County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 24,277

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Federal National Mortgage Association filed a motion to dismiss 

this appeal. This motion is voluntarily made by the appellant prior to any decision 

of this Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1). No other party filed notice of appeal. 

We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

PER CURIAM
2

Submitted on August 12, 2020

Opinion Delivered August 13, 2020

Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
**Docket No. FAA -**  **2014 -**  **0656**
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 492

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate of

documentation for the vessel INTREPID.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 2 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1995

Mr. CHAFEE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

A BILL

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a

certificate of documentation for the vessel INTREPID.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION OF CERTIFICATE OF DOCU4 MENTATION.

5 Notwithstanding sections 12106, 12107, and 12108

6 of title 46, United States Code, and section 27 of the Mer7 chant Marine Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 883), as applica8 ble on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary

9 of Transportation may issue a certificate of documentation
2

•S 492 IS

1 for the vessel INTREPID, United States official number

2 508185.

Æ
# ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

May 17, 2024 CR-2022-1368 Cameron Jamer Cook v. State of Alabama (Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court: CC-19-393, CC-19-395, CC-19-396, CC-19-397, CC-19-398, CC-19-399, and CC-21- 41) 

## NOTICE You are hereby notified that on May 17, 2024, the following action was taken in the above-reference cause by the Court of Criminal Appeals: Application for Rehearing Overruled.

D. Scott Mitchell, Clerk
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-6696

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WEBSTER DOUGLAS WILLIAMS, III,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, Chief District Judge. (4:12-cr-00969-RBH-1)

Submitted: July 21, 2020 Decided: July 24, 2020

Before AGEE, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Webster Douglas Williams, III, Appellant Pro Se. Lauren L. Hummel, Assistant United 

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Webster Douglas Williams, III, appeals the district court’s order denying his 

motion for disqualification and recusal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(a) (2018). On 

appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the informal brief. See 4th Cir. R. 

34(b). Because Williams’ informal brief does not challenge the basis for the district 

court’s disposition, he has forfeited appellate review of the court’s order. See Jackson v. 

Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important 

document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that 

brief.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.1       Commodore Applied Technologies, Inc. & Subsidiaries Certification Of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant To Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002  In connection with the annual report of Commodore Applied Technologies, Inc. (the Company) on form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006, Dr. Shelby Brewer hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:  (1) The annual report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the annual report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.  Date: April 17, 2007  /s/ Shelby T. Brewer Dr. Shelby T. Brewer Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         491,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,728,000
<PP&E>                                      36,466,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              17,487,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              20,707,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,466,000
<BONDS>                                      6,741,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  12,500,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                20,707,000
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,535,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,894,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             143,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                641,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            641,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   641,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4092

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

XAVIER DIAMOND LUCKEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:10-cr-00226-TDS-1)

Submitted: October 12, 2011 Decided: November 1, 2011

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Clifton T. 

Barrett, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Xavier Diamond Luckey pleaded guilty, pursuant to a 

plea agreement, to one count of possession of ammunition by a 

convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) 

(2006). The district court imposed a custodial sentence of 180 

months followed by five years of supervised release. Luckey 

appeals the length of the term of supervised release. We 

affirm.

We review a sentence under a deferential abuse of 

discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). First, we inspect for procedural reasonableness by 

ensuring that the district court committed no significant 

procedural errors, such as failing to calculate or improperly 

calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to adequately 

explain the sentence. United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 

837-38 (4th Cir. 2010). We then consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the 

totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We 

presume that a sentence within a properly-calculated Guidelines 

range is reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 

(4th Cir. 2007). That presumption may be rebutted by a showing 

“that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the [18 

U.S.C.] § 3553 factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 
3

F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The district court provided a cogent and adequate 

explanation for its imposition of Luckey’s sentence. It 

explained both the mitigating and the aggravating factors that 

formed the basis for the sentence. The five-year term of 

supervised release was within the advisory Guidelines range and 

Luckey has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness 

that attaches to such a sentence.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Charles KAYROUZ et al., Appellants, v. Lawrence W. JOINER et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 13, 1964.

Rehearing Denied May 15, 1964.

*891Henry A. Triplett, Boone & Triplett, Louisville, for appellants.

Sandy Paniello, Louisville, for appellees.

DAVIS, Commissioner.

This appeal must be dismissed for appellants’ failure to comply with the requirements of RCA 1.180 for appeals falling within KRS 21.080.

The litigation before us arose from a real estate transaction in which appellants were the proposed sellers, appellees Joiner, the proposed buyers, and appellee Zettwoch-Fortner Corporation, the real estate broker.

The sellers had refused to carry out the contract, maintaining that it had terminated. The buyers filed suit for specific performance against the sellers. The complaint sought $1,500 in damages and specific performance, or, in the alternative, $14,000 in damages if specific performance was denied.

The sellers brought the broker in as third-party defendant, seeking indemnity for any sum which the buyers might recover. The broker asserted its claim against the sellers for $760 as commission due for the “sale” to the buyers.

The chancellor entered judgment denying any relief to the buyers, but he adjudged the broker entitled to the claimed brokerage commission of $760. The third-party claim of sellers against broker for indemnity was, of course, dismissed.

On its face, the judgment of the trial court is a money judgment in favor of broker against sellers for $760. However, the judgment recites that the amount in controversy is more than $2,500. So it would be had the *buyers*appealed, since they had sought damages in the sum of $14,000. Patently, the only sum involved on this appeal by the *sellers*is the $760 broker’s commission. RCA 1.180 requires that appeals involving sums as much as $200 and less than $2,500 be prosecuted by appropriate motion for appeal. The failure to so prosecute an appeal in which the sum at stake is within the monetary ranges mentioned in KRS 21.080 is fatal. See Pennyrile Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation v. Lyon County, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 430, and cases there cited.

It must be observed that KRS 21.070 provides that the trial court may fix a value in controversy which is conclusive *if*the judgment does not certainly fix the value *when construed in connection with the pleadings.*However, the trial court may not create an absolute right of appeal to this court by reciting a value that has no basis when the judgment is construed in connection with the pleadings. Cf. Roth v. Stauble, Ky., 313 S.W.2d 269. As pointed out, such was not the purpose of the trial judge in the case at bar. Manifestly, the value of the thing in controversy as it relates to this appellant is $760 and no more.

The appeal is dismissed.
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
                       ----------------------------------

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Forms S-3 (File Nos. 333-90431, 333-40142 and 333-60524) and S-8
(File Nos. 333-10043, 333-32143, 333-87995, 333-61798 and 333-64522) of Fusion
Medical Technologies, Inc. of our report dated January 21, 2002, except as to
Note 13, which is as of February 26, 2002, relating to the financial statements,
which appears in this Form 10-K.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

San Jose, California
March 7, 2002
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

Pursuant to Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned, as chief executive officer of SMTC Corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify that to the undersigned’s knowledge: 

1) the Company’s quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 1, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

2) the information contained in the Company’s quarterly report on Form 10-Q forthe quarter ended October 1, 2006 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

 

Date: November 15, 2006 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to SMTC Corporation and will be retained by SMTC Corporation and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.