FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D18-1822

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ELIZABETH HALVELAND,

individually and as a Personal 

Representative of the ESTATE OF 

MICHAEL HALVELAND, deceased,

Appellant,

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, an Agency of the 

State of Florida, ISAAC 

ANDREWS, both in his individual 

and official capacity as a 

Correctional Officer of Florida 

Department of Corrections,

CARLTON SPOONER, both in his 

individual and official capacity 

as an Officer of Florida 

Department of Corrections, 

JENNIFER REEVES, both in her 

individual and official capacity 

as an Officer of Florida 

Department of Corrections, 

PATRICK JASON WILLIAM, in his 

individual capacity,

Appellees.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County.

Timothy Register, Judge.
2

May 21, 2019

WOLF, J.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing 

her to amend her complaint to add a cruel and unusual 

punishment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 3

correctional officers. We have jurisdiction because appellant

voluntarily dismissed all other counts against the officers; thus,

the effect of the order was to completely dispose of the action as 

to them. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(k).

The trial court refused to allow appellant to amend her 

complaint because it found (1) the statute of limitations had run 

on the federal cause of action, and the amended complaint did not 

relate back to the original complaint; and (2) it lacked the 

authority to permit appellant to amend her complaint because 

doing so would exceed the court’s specific instructions on remand 

of an earlier appeal in this case. We find the trial court erred in 

both determinations and reverse and remand to allow appellant 

to file her third amended complaint.

FACTS

Appellant was the mother and personal representative of the 

estate of an inmate who died while incarcerated. In August 2015, 

she brought a cause of action against several defendants 

including the Department of Corrections, the inmate who was 

responsible for the death, and 3 correctional officers. 

Appellant filed her original complaint in August 2015. 

Pertinent to this appeal, she brought claims for wrongful death

and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the 

officers and the Department, as well a claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress against the officers. The complaint 

included the following general factual allegations: 

20. On or about August 10, 2013, one of the officers 

was conducting showers in G1 Dormitory when inmate 

Williams advised him that [the decedent] needed 
3

assistance. Later, the other 2 officers responded to the 

call for assistance of [the decedent]. 

21. Officers of [the prison], including but not limited 

to [appellees], found [the decedent] down on the floor 

and unresponsive in his prison cell. 

22. On or about 9:00 p.m. on August 10, 2013, [the 

decedent], in critical condition was intubated by EMS 

and taken to Bay Medical Center.

The complaint alleged that the inmate passed away on 

August 12. An autopsy determined he had multiple contusions 

and abrasions on his face, head, and abdominal area, and he died 

of “blunt force head trauma as a result of the assault by another.” 

The doctor “noted that a period of time passed between 

sustaining head trauma and [the decedent’s] subsequent 

presentation for medical care.” The decedent’s cellmate was later 

charged with manslaughter perpetrated by beating the decedent 

“on or about August 8, 2013 through August 10, 2013.” 

Specifically as to the wrongful death count against the 

officers, the complaint alleged that the decedent had “noticeable 

injuries,” yet the officers failed to timely “investigate . . . inspect . 

. . [or] adequately respond to” these injuries, and they failed to 

“provide or ensure that [the decedent] receive[d] proper medical 

care and assistance.” Similarly, as to the count for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, the complaint alleged the officers 

“could have investigated the cause of [the decedent’s] injuries and 

seek [sic] for [the decedent] to be provided with immediate 

medical assistance . . . during the span of at least (2) days,” but 

instead “disregard[ed] the presence of any injuries.” 

The trial court dismissed with prejudice the wrongful death 

claims against the Department and the officers, finding they were 

time-barred by a one-year statute of limitations pursuant to this 

court’s decision in Green v. Cottrell, 172 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2015). The court also dismissed with prejudice the 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the 

officers. Appellant filed an appeal to this court.
4

While the appeal was pending, the supreme court reversed 

this court’s decision in Green, 172 So. 3d 1009, finding a 4-year 

statute of limitations applied to this type of wrongful death 

action. Green v. Cottrell, 204 So. 3d 22, 29 (Fla. 2016). This court 

remanded, stating: “In light of Green, we vacate the order of 

dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

that decision.” Halveland v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 219 So. 3d 

1037, 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).

On remand, there was apparently no dispute that the 

wrongful death actions were timely filed pursuant to the 4-year 

statute of limitations set forth in Green. However, the officers 

moved to dismiss that count as it pertained to them, arguing they 

were protected by sovereign immunity. 

Before the court ruled on that motion, appellant moved to 

file a third amended complaint. This complaint did not include a 

wrongful death claim against the officers, and appellant 

confirmed she intended to abandon that count as to them. The 

third amended complaint sought to add counts against the 

officers and the Department for cruel and unusual punishment 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This federal cause of action 

contained additional allegations against the Department, 

including that they failed to prevent the attack; failed for over a 

week to investigate the cause of the decedent’s injuries and to 

obtain medical care for them; failed to review the decedent’s 

medical records, which would have shown he had pre-existing 

conditions that put him at a greater risk of harm; and 

intentionally failed to provide access to emergency medical care. 

During a hearing, the officers argued that the motion to 

amend should be denied because the statute of limitations period 

to bring the federal action had run, and the amended complaint 

did not relate back to the original complaint. 

The trial court entered a written order denying appellant’s 

motion for leave to amend the complaint to the extent that she 

sought to add a 1983 action against appellees or the Department. 

The court found the amended complaint did not relate back 

because it contained factually distinct allegations that did not 

relate back to the “sparse” allegations in the original complaint. 

Alternatively, the court found it lacked the authority to permit 
5

appellant to amend her complaint with a new cause of action 

because doing so would exceed the specific directions in this 

court’s opinion remanding for “further proceedings consistent 

with [Green].”

THE AMENDED COMPLAINT RELATED BACK 

TO THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

“The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure encourage a policy of 

liberality in allowing litigants to amend their pleadings, 

especially prior to trial; this policy exists so that cases will be 

tried on their merits.” Morgan v. Bank of New York Mellon, 200 

So. 3d 792, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 

1.190(a); Hatcher v. Chandler, 589 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1991)).

However, this policy does not apply where the statute of 

limitations has run. “Although amendments should be permitted 

liberally, one cannot defeat the bar of the statute of limitations by 

filing a new cause of action labelled as an amended complaint. 

The rule of liberality does not authorize a new cause of action.” 

Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty. v. Surette, 394 So. 2d 147, 154 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 1981) (citing Cox v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 360 So. 2d 8 

(Fla. 2nd DCA 1978); Versen v. Versen, 347 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 1977)). 

Here, it is undisputed that the statute of limitations has run 

on the federal claim. The trial court denied the motion to amend 

because the court found the amended complaint did not relate 

back to the original complaint and exceeded the scope of remand.1

We review the determination of whether an amended 

complaint relates back to the filing of the original complaint de 

novo. Kopel v. Kopel, 229 So. 3d 812, 815 (Fla. 2017). 

“An amended complaint raising claims for which the statute 

of limitations has expired can survive a motion to dismiss if the 

claims relate back to the timely filed initial pleading.” Id. An 

 1 Notably, the trial court did not make any findings 

regarding whether the privilege to amend had been abused.
6

amendment relates back “[w]hen the claim or defense asserted in 

the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 

pleading . . . .’” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) (emphasis added).

Even if two complaints allege slightly different facts or 

theories of recovery, a finding of relation back is not 

automatically precluded. Kopel, 229 So. 3d at 818. “[A]s long as 

the initial complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the general 

factual scenario or factual underpinning of the claim, 

amendments stating new legal theories can relate back. . . . This 

is true even where the legal theory of recovery has changed or 

where the original and amended claims require the assertion of 

different elements.” Id. at 816 (approving Fabbiano v. Demings, 

91 So. 3d 893, 895 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Flores v. Riscomp Indus., 

35 So. 3d 146, 148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Kiehl v. Brown, 546 So. 2d 

18, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)). 

The supreme court qualified this general rule by stating, “a 

newly added claim could fail to meet the relation back test if the 

new claim is so factually distinct that it does not arise out of the 

same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original,” even 

though the new claim was “emanating from the same set of 

operative facts.” Id. (quoting Fabbiano, 91 So. 3d at 895). 

In Kopel, the plaintiff filed a complaint demanding 

repayment of $5 million loaned to his brother and nephew, but he

later filed an amended complaint alleging a different theory of 

recovery – that during settlement negotiations, his nephew and 

brother agreed to repay the $5 million in exchange for him giving 

up his interests in companies the parties held together. Id. at 

813-14. The supreme court found the new claim of an oral 

contract related back to the original complaint because both 

alleged that the defendants owed the plaintiff $5 million and 

refused to pay that amount “regardless of the asserted theory of 

recovery”: 

Both the original and fifth amended complaints 

allege that (1) Petitioner and [his brother] borrowed $15 

million, with Petitioner being liable for $5 million and 

[the brother] being liable for $10 million; (2) Petitioner 

loaned such amount to either [his nephew] individually 
7

or Respondents collectively; and (3) regardless of the 

asserted theory of recovery, Respondents, individually 

and collectively, have failed and refused to pay this 

amount. Accordingly, the new claim is not factually 

distinct, but arises out of the same conduct, transaction, 

or occurrence as that established in the original 

pleading. 

Id. at 818. 

“[C]laims for federal law violations can relate back to 

pleadings which previously alleged only violations of the common 

law.” Janie Doe 1 ex rel. Miranda v. Sinrod, 117 So. 3d 786, 789 

n.4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), approved sub nom. Palm Beach Cty.

Sch. Bd. v. Doe, 210 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 2017). In Janie Doe, parents 

filed suit against their child’s teacher and the school board 

alleging sexual abuse by the teacher. Id. at 787-88. The initial 

complaint alleged common law claims, whereas the amended 

complaint raised a federal claim under Title IX, which prohibits 

sex discrimination by recipients of federal education funding. Id.

at 788 n.2. The Fourth District found the Title IX claim related 

back because “[b]oth claims arose from the same conduct and 

resulted in the same injury.” Id. at 790. 

The supreme court agreed, finding the fact that the amended 

complaint alleged the school board “acted with deliberate 

indifference,” whereas the initial complaint alleged negligence, 

did not preclude a finding of relating back. Palm Beach County 

Sch. Bd., 210 So. 3d at 47. “[S]uch differing terms do not indicate 

different facts. Instead, they indicate that the facts are being 

described in legal terms to demonstrate specific elements of each 

cause of action. And claims requiring proof of different elements 

can still relate back.” Id. Thus, although the allegations in the 

Title IX claim were “more specific,” the supreme court concluded 

that the common law claims “were similar enough to the new 

claim to put the School Board on notice that it could be held 

responsible for any harm resulting from the alleged conduct.” Id.

(emphasis added),

In this case, both the original complaint and the proffered 

third amended complaint specifically relate to the attack that

took place in the prison. Both complaints alleged the officers (1) 
8

failed to investigate the cause and extent of appellant’s injuries,

and (2) failed to obtain the proper medical care. As in Kopel, the 

claims in both complaints arose out of the same conduct, 

transaction or occurrence. While several new facts were alleged 

in the amended complaint, appellees were given fair notice of the 

factual underpinnings of the claim. Thus, pursuant to Kopel, we 

are required to reverse the trial court’s determination that the 

third amended complaint did not relate back to the original 

complaint.

THIS COURT’S INSTRUCTION ON REMAND DID NOT PRECLUDE 

APPLICATION OF THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE

Appellant also argues the trial court erred in finding that 

her attempt to amend her complaint exceeded the scope of 

remand from this court, which stated, “In light of Green, we 

vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with that decision.” Halveland, 219 So. 3d at 1038. 

Both parties seem to agree that an opinion remanding with 

specific instructions can limit the scope of remand, whereas a 

broad remand “for further proceedings” does not. See Collins v. 

State, 680 So. 2d 458, 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“When an order or 

judgment is reversed and remanded, the lower tribunal has 

authority to conduct further proceedings in conformity with the 

instruction of the appellate court. A reversal and remand with 

general directions for further proceedings vests the trial court 

with broad discretion in directing the course of the cause. . . . 

Where the remand instruction is specific, it is improper to exceed 

the bounds of that instruction.”). 

However, they dispute how to interpret this court’s 

instruction on remand. Appellant argues that because this court 

used the phrase “remand for further proceedings,” the lower court 

was not limited in the scope of remand. However, the officers 

argue that because this court remanded for further proceedings 

“consistent with that decision,” referring to Green, the only 

consideration on remand should have been whether the wrongful 

death claims were timely pursuant to the 4-year statute of 

limitations set forth in Green. 
9

This court addressed this issue in Fitchner v. Lifesouth 

Community Blood Centers, Inc., 88 So. 3d 269, 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2012), finding that if an appellate court reverses an interlocutory 

order entered at a stage of the trial proceeding during which the 

parties would have been entitled to amend, then amendment on 

remand is permissible. 

Here, as in Fitchner, appellant was entitled to amend. The 

effect of this court’s remand was not to decide the case. It was to 

require consideration of whether the complaint should be 

dismissed under the supreme court’s recent decision in Green. It 

is undisputed that dismissal was not required under Green. Thus, 

as in Fitchner, the effect of this court’s order was to return the 

case to the posture it would have assumed if the trial court had 

correctly denied the officers’ motion to dismiss the second 

amended complaint. Here, that would mean returning the case to 

the pleadings stage, at which point appellant would have had the 

opportunity to amend.2

It would be illogical to state that if the trial court had 

correctly denied the officers’ motion to dismiss the wrongful death 

claim, appellant would have been entitled to seek leave to file an 

amended complaint, but because the trial court erroneously 

dismissed that complaint, she was not entitled to amend on 

remand after successfully obtaining a reversal of that dismissal. 

Thus, the trial court erred in finding the scope of remand did not 

permit appellant to amend her complaint. 

We, therefore, REVERSE the trial court’s determination that 

the third amended complaint did not relate back to the original 

complaint and REMAND for further proceedings.

LEWIS and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.

 2 The statute of limitations of the federal claim did not run 

until after this court’s mandate issued (though appellant waited 

until after the statute of limitations ran to file her third amended 

complaint). 
10

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Megan Cunningham and Ann Finnell of Finnell, McGuinness, 

Nezami & Andux, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Kenneth Steely, General Counsel, Florida Department of 

Corrections, Tallahassee, Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Elizabeth M. van den Berg and Anthony Dean Johnson, Assistant 

Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellees.