No. 90-197 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1990 

IN THE MATTER OF G.P., 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Maurice R. Colberg, Jr., Judge 

presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Terry L. Seiffert, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

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3 Dale Mrkich, Deputy Yellowstone County Attorney, r C> 

0 =cL? Billings, Montana 

"-4 Yyly Marc Racicot, Attorney General; Patti Powell, Asst. 

4 /I .: <-> \< 1 

Atty. General; Helena, Montana 

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- - J,r- N $4 *- Submitted on Briefs: August 16, 1990 

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lilt ...- Decided: September 27, 1990 

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' Clerk 
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The Respondent G. P. appeals the order of the Montana 

Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, committing him 

to the Montana State Hospital for a period of 90 days on the 

grounds that he is seriously mentally ill according to 1 53-21- 

102 (15) , MCA. We affirm. 

G. P. raises a sole issue on appeal: Did the District Court 

err in committing him as being seriously mentally ill under 5 53- 

21-102(15) rather than mentally ill under 1 53-21-102(8) MCA? 

The parents of G. P., age 37, filed a request for G. P.'s 

commitment with the Yellowstone County Attorney's office on 

February 7, 1990. The request described various conduct of G. P. 

that his parents believed indicated the need for commitment: G. 

P. slept most of the time; ate very little; tore at his clothing; 

stood outside and stared into space; doubled up as if in pain; tore 

up his own apartment on one occasion; had not come to his parents 

house to pick up his sole source of income, his SSI check; and he 

refused to take his medication prescribed for him during prior 

hospitalizations. G. P. Is parents alleged that G. P. was unable 

to take care of himself because G.P. was seriously mentally ill. 

A notation was made on the request for commitment by a worker of 

the Billings Mental Health Center, stating that since his recent 

hospitalization G. P. failed to follow any of the recommendations 

of those assigned to his case and that this led the worker to 

believe that G.P.'s illness had become worse. 

The following day the County Attorney initiated a petition for 

2 
commitment. At this time G. P. was not being detained. On the 

date G.P. was to make his initial appearance he allegedly refused 

to enter the courtroom. The court found probable cause to detain 

G. P. for his own safety and ordered G. P. to be detained and 

evaluated by a certified mental health professional. 

On February 14, 1990 G. P. was evaluated by Roshadi Azzam, a 

psychiatrist at Deaconess Hospital. Dr. Azzam testified at the 

commitment hearing the following day. Largely based on Dr. Azzamls 

findings, which were incorporated into the findings of the court, 

the District Court concluded that G. P. l1is beyond a reasonable 

doubt seriously mentally ill as defined in Section 53-21-102 MCAm 

and ordered that G. P. be committed to the Montana State Hospital 

at Warm springs for a period of treatment and evaluation not to 

exceed three months, unless extended as provided for by 5 53-21- 

128, MCA (1983). The courtls order allowed for treatment by 

injection of medication if deemed necessary by the attending 

physician. G. P. now appeals the commitment order. 

The standard of proof for a commitment hearing is set forth 

in 5 53-21-126(2), MCA: 

The standard of proof in any hearing held pursuant to 

this section is proof beyond a reasonable doubt with 

respect to any physical facts or evidence and clear and 

convincing evidence as to all other matters, except that 

mental disorders shall be evidenced to a reasonable 

medical certainty. Imminent threat of self-inflicted 

injury or injury to others shall be evidenced by overt 

acts, sufficiently recent in time as to be material and 

relevant as to the respondent's present condition. 

Thus, the above standard of proof required in involuntary 

commitment proceedings is bifurcated: (1) with respect to physical 
facts or evidence, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 

and (2) as to all other matters, including the existence of a 

mental disorder, there must be clear and convincing evidence. 

Section 53-21-126(2), MCA; In the Matter of R.T. (1983), 204 Mont. 

493, 495, 665 P.2d 789, 790; citing In the Matter of N.B. (1980), 

190 Mont. 319, 323-324, 620 P.2d 1228, 1231, construing Section 53- 

21-126(2), MCA, in light of the constitutional requirements of 

Addington v. Texas (1979), 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 

323. Under this bifurcated standard, proof of mental disorders to 

a reasonable degree of medical certainty is sufficient if, 

considered with all the other evidence in the case, the trier of 

fact is led to the conclusion that the mental disorder exists by 

clear and convincing proof. N. B., 620 P.2d at 1231. 

G. P. contends that the State failed to meet its burden of 

clear and convincing proof that he is seriously mentally ill. The 

definition of "seriously mentally ill1' is found at 553-21-102 (15) , 

MCA : 

"Seriously mentally illw means suffering from a mental 

disorder which has resulted in self-inflicted injury or 

injury to others or the imminent threat thereof or which 

has deprived the person afflicted of the ability to 

protect his life or health. For this purpose, injury 

means physical injury. . . . (Emphasis added.) 

As quoted earlier, the statutes also require that "[i]mminent 

threat of self-inflicted injury or injury to others shall be 

evidenced by overt acts, sufficiently recent in time as to be 

material and relevant as to the respondent's present condition." 

Section 53-21-126(2), MCA. 

G. P. contends that the District Court erred in finding him 
nseriously mentally illw under this definition because of a lack 

of evidence of overt acts. G.P. alleges that in Dr. Azzamfs 

report, the doctor incorrectly restated what he had heard from an 

emergency room physician, that I1[a]pparently, Mr. . . . [G. P.] 

was in a court hearing when he became uncontrollably violent and 

threatening to the members of the court and therefore he was 

restrained. . . ." G. P. points out that this statement is false 

because he never appeared in court. G. P. then argues that because 

this is the only evidence of an overt act, the court erred in 

finding him seriously mentally ill;" and at the very most the 

court could have found him to be "mentally illgn as provided in 5 

53-21-102 (8) , MCA. 

We disagree. Evidence of overt acts is only necessary to 

prove serious mental illness based on tvself-inflicted injury or 

injury to others or the imminent threat thereof.lV Sections 53- 

21-102(15) and 53-21-126(2), MCA. However, it is not necessary to 

present evidence of overt acts to prove serious mental illness 

based on a respondent "suffering from a mental disorder . . . which 

has deprived the person afflicted of the ability to protect his 

life or health." Section 53-21-102(15), MCA; Matter of C. M. 

(1981), 195 Mont. 171, 173-174, 635 P.2d 273, 274-275. 

Here, there is clear and convincing evidence that G. P.Is 

illness deprives him of the ability to protect his own life and 

health. Dr. Azzam diagnosed G. P. as a severe chronic paranoid 

schizophrenic who without medication develops auditory 

hallucinations that direct him to do things he cannot control, thus 
posing a danger to himself and others. Dr. Azzam concluded that 

long term treatment in the state hospital with medication was 

appropriate. G. P. flatly refuses to take his medication, 

insisting, "1 don't need any medicati~n.~~ His roommate also 

testified that G. P. refuses to take and denies that he needs 

medication. The testimony of his parents indicates that prior to 

the hearing he refused to take his medication, slept most of the 

day, ate very little, and often stood outside his trailer staring 

vacantly at nothing. He continually failed to pick up his social 

security check, which was his sole source of income. We recognize 

that I1[i]t is one thing to commit an individual who cannot function 

sufficiently to supply basic survival needs, and another to commit 

an individual who merely 'chooses to live under conditions that 

most of society would conclude to be substandard . . . . *It R. T. 

665 P.2d at 791. But here the evidence indicates that G. P. Is 

illness was interrupting his cognitive processes, was causing 

delusional thinking, and was thereby interfering in a sever way 

with his functioning. C. M., 635 P.2d at 274-275. Under these 

circumstances, the evidence is clear and convincing that G.P.Is 

mental disorder renders him unable to protect his own life or 

health. See C. M., supra. The order of the District Court is 

affirmed.