[Cite as State v. Bowden, 2014-Ohio-158.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

CASE NO. 2013-A-0040

 - vs - :

SHARRON L. BOWDEN, :

 Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal from the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2012 

CR 742. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecutor and Shelley M. Pratt, Assistant 

Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Courthouse, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 

44047 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

Thomas Rein, Leader Building, #940, 526 Superior Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For 

Defendant-Appellant). 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Sharron L. Bowden, appeals his conviction, following 

a jury trial, for Felonious Assault. The issues before this court are whether it was 

reversible error for police officers to give opinion testimony that Bowden was involved in 

the assault; whether it was reversible error to allow an officer to testify that Bowden was 

originally arrested on an unrelated misdemeanor warrant; whether it was reversible 

error for the court to prohibit the defense from inquiring about possible rape allegations; 
 2

and whether the conviction was supported by the sufficiency and the weight of the 

evidence when based solely on the victim’s testimony. For the following reasons, we 

affirm the decision of the court below. 

{¶2} On January 17, 2013, Bowden was indicted by the Ashtabula County 

Grand Jury on a single count of Felonious Assault, a felony of the second degree in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). As charged in the Indictment, Bowden, “[o]n or about 

[November 17, 2012], in the City of Ashtabula * * * did knowingly cause serious physical 

harm to * * * Erin Lesneski * * *.” 

{¶3} On January 25, 2013, Bowden entered a plea of not guilty. 

{¶4} On May 6 and 7, 2013, a jury trial was held. The following witnesses 

appeared and gave testimony on behalf of the State: 

{¶5} Erin Lesneski testified that, on November 17, 2012, she had planned to 

attend a fish fry with her friend, Akiya Jackson. Instead, Lesneski was driven by a 

friend, named Jack, to Bowden’s residence on West 38th Street, off Station Avenue. 

Lesneski had dated Bowden for “a couple weeks” in October, and did not feel 

comfortable being there. Initially, Lesneski remained in Jack’s car, but went inside after 

Bowden assured her that “you’re okay” and “no problems.” 

{¶6} There were several persons at the residence drinking alcohol. Lesneski 

admitted to being intoxicated. Bowden introduced his “new girlfriend” to Lesneski as 

Amy (later identified as Alexis Lou Newsome). Lesneski had met Amy previously at 

Bowden’s residence and they “didn’t really care for each other.” 

{¶7} At some point in the evening, Lesneski went upstairs to use the bathroom. 

As she was returning downstairs, Jack called Lesneski into an upstairs bedroom and 
 3

“tried to entice [her] into bed.” Lesneski asked that she be driven to the fish fry. 

Bowden entered the bedroom and began yelling at Lesneski because “something 

wasn’t right” with curtains or blinds in the bedroom and Bowden “was very particular 

about his mother’s house.” When he saw Jack in the bedroom, Bowden began to call 

Lesneski “vulgar names,” shoved her, and pulled her pants (blue jeans) completely off. 

Amy entered the bedroom and “everybody * * * started arguing.” 

{¶8} At this point, Lesneski “tried to leave.” Bowden pushed Lesneski down the 

stairs, and he and Amy began “punching and kicking” her. Lesneski crawled out the 

front door while Bowden was “yelling things” at her and threw something. Outside, 

Lesneski stood up and began running and walking toward U.S. Route 20. Lesneski was 

“bleeding * * * severely,” had an eye swollen shut, “could barely breathe,” and was 

“staggering because [she] was beaten so severely.” 

{¶9} Lesneski was able to flag down a police cruiser. She directed the officer 

to Bowden’s house but, initially, only identified Amy as the assailant “because [she] was 

upset, * * * scared, and * * * hysterical.” Lesneski was eventually taken to MetroHealth 

Medical Center in Cleveland, where she was treated for multiple hematomas around her 

head, a broken nose, and cervical sprain. 

{¶10} Akiya Jackson testified that she had planned to meet Lesneski at a fish 

fry, but that Lesneski never arrived. 

{¶11} Patrolman Christopher Defina of the Ashtabula Police Department testified 

that, on the evening of November 17, 2012, he was located at West 43rd Street and 

Route 20 when he noticed a woman “stumbling down the sidewalk,” “her face covered 

in blood,” and wearing “what appeared * * * a black dress.” Lesneski was hysterical and 
 4

advised Defina that she had been assaulted by a girl named Amy at Bowden’s 

residence. After an ambulance arrived for Lesneski, Defina went to Bowden’s 

residence at 623 West 38th Street, accompanied by other police officers. 

{¶12} Outside, Patrolman Defina found a black jacket in the driveway, noticed 

blood on the front storm door, and was advised of a light being turned on and off 

upstairs. Defina knocked on the front door and, after about fifteen to twenty minutes, 

Bowden opened the door. Bowden did not comply with Defina’s order to step outside. 

Another officer arrested Bowden and Defina entered the residence. In the upstairs 

bedroom, Defina noted that the blinds were disrupted, there was a pair of blue jeans 

(inside out) on the floor, and a small refrigerator had blood on its door. Defina also 

noted that a handrail on the stairs was pulled out of the wall. 

{¶13} The following day, Patrolman Defina interviewed Bowden. According to 

Bowden, Lesneski was having sex with Jack Patton upstairs and came downstairs “half 

naked” and “flaunting her stuff.” Lesneski’s conduct made Newsome jealous so she 

“beat up the victim.” Beyond this, Bowden “didn’t really say much about it.” Defina 

found no evidence of a struggle occurring in the downstairs living room, which he 

described as “very orderly.” Defina noted that Bowden had a scratch on the side of his 

neck, which Bowden claimed Newsome had given him prior to Lesneski’s arrival. 

{¶14} Lieutenant Dennis Dibble of the Ashtabula Police Department testified 

that, on the evening of November 17, 2012, he assisted Patrolman Defina’s 

investigation of the assault on Lesneski. Dibble described Bowden’s demeanor on the 

night in question as “very agitated, giving a hard time, * * * “[t]elling [the officers] that 

[they] didn’t have a right to be there.” 
 5

{¶15} Inside Bowden’s residence, Lieutenant Dibble found Newsome hiding 

underneath a bed in the basement. In an upstairs bedroom, he noted “some blood on a 

* * * bedspread,” “curtains ripped down,” “blood * * * on a small refrigerator by the bed,” 

and “Ms. Lesneski’s other shoe in the same bedroom along with her pants, which were 

inside out.” Dibble also observed “a handrail in the hallway which had been ripped from 

the wall.” 

{¶16} Patrolman Jason Erwin of the Ashtabula Police Department testified that 

he assisted Patrolman Defina and Lieutenant Dibble in the investigation of the assault. 

Early on the morning of November 18, 2012, Erwin interviewed Bowden. In this 

interview, Bowden stated that Lesneski had arrived at his residence with Jack Patton 

and that, during the course of the evening, they had gone upstairs to have sex. At 

some point, Bowden went upstairs and noticed that a curtain rod had been knocked off 

the wall in the bedroom. Bowden told Lesneski to fix it and she refused. During this 

exchange, Newsome “came upstairs and the two females started arguing, and that 

escalated into a physical fight.” 

{¶17} Patrolman Erwin noted that “there was a scrape or scratch on [Bowden’s] 

neck that was still fresh,” which Bowden claimed “happened between him and his girl,” 

i.e., Newsome. 

{¶18} Later that morning, Patrolman Erwin interviewed Lesneski upon her 

release from MetroHealth. In this interview, she claimed that both Bowden and 

Newsome had assaulted her. 

{¶19} That evening, Patrolman Erwin interviewed Bowden a second time with 

Patrolman Defina present. On this occasion, Bowden stated that the incident happened 
 6

downstairs and that he watched the fight from the living room couch. When asked 

about the blood in the upstairs bedroom, Bowden stated that Lesneski “must have gone 

upstairs to look for her pants.” 

{¶20} At the close of the State’s case, Bowden moved the trial court for acquittal, 

which the court denied. 

{¶21} The jury returned a guilty verdict for Felonious Assault. 

{¶22} On June 27, 2013, the trial court issued its Judgment Entry of Sentence, 

imposing a prison term of four years, three years of mandatory post-release control, and 

restitution in the amount of $25,331. 

{¶23} On July 23, 2013, Bowden filed his Notice of Appeal. On appeal, Bowden 

raises the following assignments of error: 

{¶24} “[1.] The State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 

against Appellant.” 

{¶25} “[2.] Appellant’s conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” 

{¶26} “[3.] Appellant was denied a fair trial by the witness’ improper comments 

while testifying.” 

{¶27} “[4.] The trial court erred when it admitted other acts testimony in violation 

of R.C. 2945.59, Evid.R. 404(B) and Appellant’s rights under Article I, Section 10 of the 

Ohio Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 

{¶28} “[5.] The trial court erred in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 

Constitution which provide rights to confrontation and cross-examination when it did not 
 7

permit Appellant to inquire about the rape allegations made by the victim to the police in 

this case.” 

{¶29} Bowden’s first assignment of error asserts that there was insufficient 

evidence to support a conviction for Felonious Assault. 

{¶30} “The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the 

evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one 

or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” Crim.R. 29(A). “The 

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 

N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 

{¶31} Bowden raises several arguments: there is no reliable evidence that he 

committed any crime; there is no sustainable evidence that he caused Lesneski serious 

physical harm; and there is no evidence that he had any criminal intent. 

{¶32} In order to convict Bowden of Felonious Assault, the State was required to 

prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he “knowingly * * * [c]ause[d] serious physical 

harm to another.” R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). 

{¶33} Contrary to Bowden’s arguments, Lesneski’s testimony that he shoved, 

punched, and kicked her, thereby causing the injuries amply attested by witness 

testimony and photographic evidence, is sufficient to sustain his conviction. With 

respect to serious physical harm, it is well-established that this element may be 
 8

reasonably inferred “[w]here injuries to the victim are serious enough to cause him or 

her to seek medical treatment.” (Citations omitted). State v. Littlejohn, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 95380, 2011-Ohio-2035, ¶ 21; State v. Higgins, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

26120, 2012-Ohio-5650, ¶ 17 (cases cited). With respect to intent, “[i]t is a fundamental 

principle that a person is presumed to intend the natural, reasonable and probable 

consequences of his voluntary acts.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 39, 381 

N.E.2d 637 (1978). Lesneski’s injuries were the natural, reasonable, and probable 

consequence of being shoved, punched, and kicked. Bowden’s intent to cause them is 

reasonably inferred. 

{¶34} The first assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶35} Under the second assignment of error, Bowden attempts to discredit 

Lesneski’s testimony as that of a “drunken victim,” who only identified him as an 

assailant after the police had been to his house. 

{¶36} “To reverse a judgment of a trial court on the weight of the evidence 

[under Section 3(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution], when the judgment results 

from a trial by jury, a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals 

panel reviewing the case is required.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 

N.E.2d 541 (1997), paragraph four of the syllabus. “Weight of the evidence concerns 

‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support 

one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party 

having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in 

their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue 

which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but 
 9

depends on its effect in inducing belief.’” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 387, quoting Black’s 

Law Dictionary 1594 (6 Ed.1990). 

{¶37} An appellate court determining whether a verdict is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence must consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable 

inferences, the credibility of the witnesses, and whether, “in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice 

that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id., quoting State v. 

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). 

{¶38} In the present case, the jury did not lose its way so as to create a manifest 

miscarriage of justice by crediting Lesneski’s testimony. Lesneski’s intoxication and 

failure to initially identify Bowden as an assailant do not render her testimony wholly 

unbelievable or incredible, although they have some bearing on its weight. Lesneski’s 

account of the assault is consistent with the physical evidence found at Bowden’s 

residence. Bowden’s account of the incident, as related through the police officers’ 

testimony, was self-contradictory and inconsistent with the physical evidence. The 

greater weight of credible evidence supports Bowden’s conviction. 

{¶39} The second assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶40} In the third assignment of error, Bowden contends that he was denied a 

fair trial by the admission of opinion testimony as to his veracity given by the State’s 

witnesses. 

{¶41} “[A] trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the 

admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised 

in line with the rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 
 10

269, 271, 569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). Where defense counsel fails to object at trial, the 

admission of testimony must constitute plain error, defined as error that is obvious and 

outcome-determinative, to justify reversing the judgment or conviction. State v. Land, 

129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 108; Crim.R. 52(B) (“[p]lain 

errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 

brought to the attention of the court”). 

{¶42} Bowden relies upon a line of cases which stand for the proposition that “[a] 

police officer’s opinion that an accused is being untruthful is inadmissible.” State v. 

Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 122. Under this line of 

cases, statements such as the defendant was being deceptive/untruthful or, conversely, 

vouching for the credibility of the State’s witnesses, are improper. Id. at ¶ 123 

(detective testified that defendant “was being very deceptive”); State v. Carpenter, 12th 

Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-06-041, 2013-Ohio-1385, ¶ 23 (detective testified that he 

“was not getting the complete truth” from the defendant and that “there was some 

deception there”); State v. Vanek, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2002-L-130, 2003-Ohio-6957, ¶ 

37 (detective “gave his personal opinion as to the truth of Ziburis’s statements to the 

Mentor Police Department”). This court has recognized the likelihood of the jury being 

influenced by a police officer’s opinion regarding a witness’ credibility. State v. Withrow, 

11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2011-A-0067, 2012-Ohio-4887, ¶ 47. 

{¶43} In a similar line of cases, Ohio appellate courts have held that it is 

reversible error to allow a witness to testify or comment on the credibility of another 

witness. State v. Bajaj, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 03 CO 16, 2005-Ohio-2931, ¶ 72 (“[i]t 

is reversible error to admit testimony from a purported expert or lay witness attesting to 
 11

the believability of another’s statements”); State v. Kovac, 150 Ohio App.3d 676, 2002-

Ohio-6784, 782 N.E.2d 1185, ¶ 32 (2nd Dist.) (“the trial court errs when it permits a lay 

witness to testify concerning another witness’ veracity”); State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 

555, 561, 763 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist.2001) (“[t]he opinion of a witness as to whether 

another witness is being truthful is inadmissible”). 

{¶44} Although opinion testimony regarding the truthfulness of a witness is 

inadmissible, a witness may give “testimony in the form of opinions or inferences * * * 

which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear 

understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” Evid.R. 

701. “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 

objectionable solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 

fact.” Evid.R. 704. Construing Evidence Rules 701 and 704, the Ohio Supreme Court 

has observed that “[t]estimony expressing an opinion on whose version is more likely to 

be true would certainly aid the jury in reaching its conclusion.” State v. Crotts, 104 Ohio 

St.3d 432, 2004-Ohio-6550, 820 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 27. 

{¶45} In the first instance, Lesneski testified that her relationship with Bowden 

had been sexual. The prosecutor asked her, without objection: “So if [Bowden] told the 

police officers that he never had sex with you, that’d be a lie?” Lesneski answered 

affirmatively. Bowden claims this question allowed Lesneski to offer her opinion that he 

is a liar. 

{¶46} The type of question posed to Lesneski, often referred to as a “were they 

lying” question, has been widely condemned in most federal and state jurisdictions. 

United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1268-1269 (11th Cir.2011) (primarily 
 12

addressing whether such questions may properly be asked of a criminal defendant); 

United States v. Dickens, 6th Cir. No. 09-4529, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14800, 12 (July 

19, 2011) (“the general principle that credibility determinations are meant for the jury, 

not witnesses, applies” when “asking a defendant whether other witnesses are lying”); 

State v. Leutschaft, 759 N.W.2d 414, 420-422 (Minn.App.2009) (cases cited); Liggett v. 

Colorado, 135 P.3d 725, 729-732 (Colo.2006) (cases cited). Such questions are 

criticized for eliciting information (whether another witness is lying) beyond the testifying 

witness’ competence and invading the jury’s province with respect to witness credibility. 

Schmitz at 1269; Liggett at 731-732. Even in jurisdictions relatively tolerant of “were 

they lying” questions, such questions are recognized as “hav[ing] no probative value 

and [being] argumentative because they do not assist the jury.” Leutschaft at 421. 

{¶47} We are aware of no Ohio cases directly addressing the propriety of such 

questions. 

{¶48} Although disfavored, such questioning is generally subject to a harmless 

error analysis, or, in the present case, a plain error analysis. Schmitt at 1268; Liggett at 

733. Here, the issue of whether Lesneski and Bowden had sex during their October 

relationship is irrelevant to the issue of Bowden’s guilt. While Lesneski opined that 

Bowden was lying, her opinion on this point was minimally prejudicial. The only material 

discrepancy between Lesneski’s testimony and Bowden’s statements to the police was 

whether Bowden participated in the assault. Since Bowden did not testify at trial, the 

jury’s estimation of Lesneski’s credibility was crucial. Lesneski’s opinion as to whether 

Bowden was lying on a collateral issue does little to either bolster or impinge her own 

credibility. The case law primarily focuses on the situation where police officers proffer 
 13

their opinion of the defendant’s or some other witness’ credibility or the situation where 

the defendant is forced to testify that other witnesses are lying. In these situations, the 

defendant is placed in a “no-win” situation: “If the defendant says the other witness is

lying, then the defendant is put in the position of calling someone a liar, a particularly 

unenviable state when the other witness is a law enforcement officer. * * * If the 

defendant says a contradictory witness is not lying, then a fair inference is that the 

defendant is lying.” State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 872 (Iowa 2003). In the present 

matter, this sort of prejudice is not operative. As a witness, Lesneski did not enjoy the 

natural deference or confidence that is accorded to police officers. Nor does Lesneski’s 

claim to have slept with the man who she identified as her assailant inspire confidence 

in her testimony on the latter point. Lesneski’s opinion that Bowden lied about an 

irrelevant aspect of their former relationship, at most, amounted to a distraction in the 

jury’s consideration of whether Lesneski was lying about Bowden’s participation in the 

assault. 

{¶49} Bowden challenges the following question posed, without objection, by the 

prosecutor to Patrolman Defina, following his testimony that Bowden claimed the 

incident happened downstairs: “Are you aware that [Bowden] had made a previous 

statement to Jason Erwin that was contrary to what he told you?” Defina responded: 

“I’m aware of it. I was not present when that statement [to Erwin] was made.” Defina’s 

testimony that he was aware of a prior inconsistent statement made by Bowden does 

not constitute an impermissible opinion as to the veracity of either statement. State v. 

Adrian, 168 Ohio App.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-4143, 859 N.E.2d 1007, ¶ 55 (2nd Dist.) (a 

sheriff’s “statement that Adrian’s version of events appeared inconsistent with [a prior] 
 14

recorded conversation * * * did not constitute an opinion that Adrian was lying to the 

officers”); State v. Burchett, 12th Dist. Preble Nos. CA2003-09-017 and CA2003-09-

018, 2004-Ohio-4983, ¶ 20 (“Deputy Bratton’s testimony expressed to the jury merely 

that Murray had offered two conflicting statements”). 

{¶50} Bowden challenges the following statement made by Patrolman Defina, 

without objection, explaining why he returned to Bowden’s residence after Bowden 

claimed that the assault occurred downstairs, rather than upstairs: “I simply went back 

to the house to obtain any evidence in [Bowden’s] defense. I was trying to make sure 

that he wasn’t telling me the truth [sic].” The initial search of Bowden’s residence 

focused on the upstairs bedroom, where Bowden initially claimed the incident took place 

and where evidence, such as Lesneski’s blood and pants, were found. When Bowden 

changed the location of the assault to the downstairs living room, the police officers 

conducted another search of the residence, focusing on the living room. Defina’s 

statement was not an opinion regarding Bowden’s truthfulness, but an explanation for 

the second search of the residence. State v. Patterson, 3rd Dist. Hancock No. 5-11-15, 

2012-Ohio-2839, ¶ 89 (detective’s testimony that, “after law enforcement began to 

theorize that Patterson fired the weapon * * *, he re-interviewed Trausch * * * was 

properly admitted for the purpose of showing the investigatory process”); State v. 

Monroe, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94768, 2011-Ohio-3045, ¶ 34 (“an officer is not 

vouching for a witness[’]s credibility by explaining the investigative procedure he 

followed”). 

{¶51} Bowden challenges the following exchange between the prosecutor and 

Patrolman Defina, without objection: 
 15

{¶52} Prosecutor: Is there any doubt in your mind whatsoever that an 

assault occurred? 

{¶53} Ptl. Defina: An assault definitely occurred. 

{¶54} Prosecutor: And that either one or both of them participated in this 

assault? 

{¶55} Ptl. Defina: Someone participated in the assault, yes. 

{¶56} Prosecutor: I’m talking about the two suspects. 

{¶57} Ptl. Defina: Yes. There’s not a doubt in my mind that they 

participated in it. 

{¶58} Bowden raises a similar challenge to testimony elicited, without objection, 

from Lieutenant Dibble: 

{¶59} Prosecutor: And in response to the [defense attorney’s] question 

about [the anticipated] charges, do you decide what charges are 

filed against people that you arrest? 

{¶60} Lt. Dibble: Not that we file, no. * * * All we can do is an initial 

recommendation for charges. 

{¶61} Prosecutor: Alright. And in this case when the Defendant was 

taken into custody, did you believe that he had participated in a 

felonious assault? 

{¶62} Lt. Dibble: Yes. 

{¶63} Bowden characterizes this testimony as impermissible opinion testimony 

as to his guilt. While the police officers testified to their belief that Bowden took part in 

the assault, Lieutenant Dibble and Patrolman Defina both observed Lesneski’s condition 
 16

on the night of the assault, were present when Bowden was taken into custody, and 

participated in the search of Bowden’s residence. Based on their investigation, they 

concluded that Bowden was involved in the assault so as to charge him with that crime. 

Compare State v. Trefney, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0032, 2012-Ohio-869, ¶ 45 

(deputy’s “testimony that she believed she had probable cause to prepare the charge 

for domestic violence and arrest Mr. Trefney is permissible under Evid.R. 701”). 

{¶64} Assuming, arguendo, that Lieutenant Dibble’s and Patrolman Defina’s 

testimony was improper, it was harmless error and, therefore, did not rise to the level of 

plain error. Lesneski’s testimony and Bowden’s vacillating explanation of events 

provided compelling evidence of Bowden’s guilt, rendering the police officers’ testimony 

harmless. 

{¶65} The third assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶66} In the fourth assignment of error, Bowden contends the following 

testimony elicited from Patrolman Erwin constituted “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 

or acts,” impermissible under Evidence Rule 404(B) “to prove the character of a person 

in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.” Erwin testified, without 

objection, as follows: 

{¶67} [Bowden] seemed intoxicated, highly confrontational, agitated. As 

soon as he was removed from the house for safety purposes 

everybody was handcuffed and secured on the front porch. He was 

screaming and yelling obscenities, that we had no right to be there, 

he didn’t do anything wrong, that we couldn’t go in his house. We 

had no right to handcuff him. To the point where we couldn’t even 
 17

speak amongst ourselves to figure out what to do next. We found 

out that he did have a misdemeanor warrant at the time so we just 

decided to place him under arrest and put him in the back seat of a 

patrol car where he couldn’t be any more of a disturbance. 

{¶68} We find no error. The reference to Bowden’s outstanding misdemeanor 

warrant was not proffered as character evidence, but merely to explain his removal from 

the residence during the investigation. Nothing was revealed about the identity of the 

underlying charge and Patrolman Erwin’s testimony was the sole reference to an 

outstanding warrant. Our holding is consistent with that of other appellate courts in 

similar situations. State v. Warren, 4th Dist. Ross No. 12CA3324, 2013-Ohio-3542, ¶ 34 

(Evid.R. 404(B) was not violated where “nothing was revealed about the specific crime 

charged” and “[t]here was also no attempt to show appellant acted in conformity with 

criminal behavior by introducing the evidence of an outstanding warrant”); State v. 

Southam, 3rd Dist. Henry No. 7-12-04, 2012-Ohio-5943, ¶ 20 (the deputy’s “brief and 

inadvertent [reference to ‘a couple of warrants’] in this case was not the type of 

testimony about ‘prior bad acts’ that is usually prohibited in Evid.R. 404”). 

{¶69} The fourth assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶70} Bowden contends, in his fifth and final assignment of error, that the trial 

court erred by not allowing him to cross-examine Lesneski about rape allegations that 

she allegedly made against him. 

{¶71} “Cross-examination shall be permitted on all relevant matters and matters 

affecting credibility.” Evid.R. 611(B). “The limitation of such cross-examination lies 
 18

within the sound discretion of the trial court, viewed in relation to the particular facts of 

the case.” State v. Acre, 6 Ohio St.3d 140, 145, 451 N.E.2d 802 (1983). 

{¶72} In the present case, counsel for Bowden argued before the court that “the 

Defendant on the night of the incident made statements to the Ashtabula Police that 

according to the police reports provided in discovery, indicate that at some point in time 

initially Mr. Bowden was considered a rape suspect.” Counsel wanted to question 

Lesneski regarding the rape allegations to emphasize “the fact that the Defendant told a 

number of different stories.” 

{¶73} The trial judge responded by stating that it was the court’s understanding 

that the possibility of rape was raised by third persons involved in the investigation, not 

by Lesneski herself, and that Lesneski never adopted these statements or otherwise 

claimed to have been raped on the night in question. To allow cross-examination on the 

issue, the court concluded, would not significantly bear on Lesneski’s credibility while 

confusing to the jury. 

{¶74} Counsel for Bowden argued, more specifically, that the rape allegation 

was contained in Lieutenant Dibble’s written police report, and that it “would have 

clearly had to come from [Lesneski], which would show that again her stories are 

inconsistent.” 

{¶75} The trial court again refused Bowden’s counsel: 

{¶76} The only comment the Court might have is what you were reading * 

* * doesn’t give any indication of where or how [Lieutenant Dibble] 

may have come up with that, and certainly it’s not attributed to the 

victim in his report, whatever he was thinking. I mean, there is 
 19

evidence in this case also that her pants were pulled off. We have 

her version of what, how that came to be. But I mean, she’s 

walking around in the street with nothing on except a t-shirt. I 

mean, I think it would be reasonable for somebody to think this 

could be a sex offense, even if she didn’t say a word about it. But 

it’s not a sex offense, and I think again it would just be confusing to 

the jury if we start going into that kind of thing. 

{¶77} We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling. If the allegation of 

rape cannot be fairly attributed to Lesneski and the issue was not raised on direct 

examination, it is within the court’s discretion to prohibit the defense from raising the 

issue on cross-examination. 

{¶78} The fifth and final assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶79} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant. 

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J., 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., 

concur.