United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-6066SI

_____________ In re: * * Robert Hatcher, Ruth Ann Hatcher, * * Debtors. * * Robert Hatcher, Ruth Ann Hatcher, * * Debtors - Appellants, * Appeal from the United States * Bankruptcy Court for the v. * Southern District of Iowa * U.S. Trustee, * * Trustee - Appellee, * * Allison Financial Corporation, * * Creditor - Appellee. *

_____________ Submitted: February 12, 1998 Filed: March 6, 1998

_____________ Before WILLIAM A. HILL, SCHERMER, and SCOTT, Bankruptcy Judges.

_____________
WILLIAM A. HILL, Bankruptcy Judge.The Honorable Russell J. Hill, Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Judge for 1 the Southern District of Iowa.
2 The appellants, Robert a nd Ruth Ann Hatcher (“Hatchers”), appeal from the order of the bankruptcy court dismi ssing their 1 Chapter 11 case for cause pursuant to the United State s Bankruptcy Code (“Code”), 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b). For th e followingreasons, we affirm the order of the bankruptcy court

.
I. BACKGROUND

The Hatchers are Iowa farmers. Prior to 1994, they owned farmland which was partly encumbered by a mortgage on whic h th ey fell delinquent. As a result, approximately one-half of their farmland became the subject of a mortgage foreclosur e proceeding. A sheriff’s sale was set for January 6, 1994. Th e Hatchers sought a loan in order to save their property ; how ever, their efforts failed. They then determined to sel l th eir entire property, which consisted of 46 acres of land on wh ich their residence and another building were situated. In pr eparation for its sale, they platted the land into separate parcels with an aggregate list price of $316,000.00.

Several months prior to the sheriff’s sale, the Hatcher s located a buyer for their property. The parties agreed upo n a sale price of $69,300.00, with a n option for the Hatchers to repurchase the property within a specified period of time. Th e sa le collapsed, however, upon the buyer’s inability to obtain financingfor the transaction. Nevertheless, the Hatchers wer e able t o locate yet another buyer, Allison Financia l Corporation(“Allison”), with which they entered into a simila r sale agreement.

OnJanuary 3, 1994, Allison signed a purchase agreemen t with t he Hatchers to purchase their entire property fo rAs the Court of Appeals of Iowa found, “[t]he lower price was due to a variety of 2 factors, including the need to remove an old ethanol plant tower, potential environmental concerns, zoning changes, and the buy-back provision.”
3 $69,300.00. The parties’ agreement provided the Ha tchers with 2 th e option to repurchase the property by March 30, 1994. O n January 6, 1994, the4

Hatchers executed a warranty deed in favor of Allison conveyin g their entire real estate. The Hatchers did not exercise th e repurchase option.
Subsequently, the Hatchers filed suit against Allison i n Iowa s tate district court seeking reformation of the sal e agreemen t by claiming the sale was intended to be a loa n transaction, and also seeking dama ges from Allison and several other defendants for breach of fiduciary duty and fo r fraudulent misrepresentation. The district court entere d judgment against the Hatchers in J anuary 1995. Included among its findings were the following: the Hatchers had attempte d to sell various portions of their farmland since at least 1988 ; Mr
. Hatcher himself negotiated the terms of the sale of hi s proper tywith its first potential buyer, including its sal e price, a repurchase option, and the closing date; Mr

. Hatche r’s real estate agent reduced the sale agreement t o writ ing, explained it to Mr. Hatcher, and also advised hi m against entering into it; and, when the first deal fel l throug h, the Hatchers expressed to their real estate agen t their desire to locate another buyer. Finally, concerning th e Hatchers’ ultimate sale of their property to Allison, the cour t found that:

Th e terms and conditions of the sale . . . [were ] ex plained fully in the written real estate sale s agreements. It was explained orally [as well]. I t is without question that [the Hatchers] freely and of th eir own accord executed a warranty deed in th e presence of a notary public transferring title of the real e state to Allison . . . . [The real estat e brokers] made no material misrepresentations s o as to mislead the Hatchers into selling their land. The court additionally ruled that the Hatchers failed to prove any breach of fiduciary duties or fraudulent misrepresentation by the defendants. The court concluded by stating that:5

[The Hatchers’ ] current status is due to the elusive and unrealistic dream of Robert E. Hatcher. At al l times Robert H atcher maintained a dream or wish that

so meone with unlimited finances would pay a n
ex orbitant price for his farm. Upon receiving thi s
unre asonable sum, Robert E. Hatcher furthe r fa ntasizes of paying all his debts and purchasing a di fferent and better farm. This delusion was th e
rea sonthe [Hatchers] attempted at any cost t o purc hase additional periods of time to allow Rober t E. Hatcher to locate his imaginary buyer

. Ulti mately, the cost of this fantasy was th e [Hatchers’] home.6

Ina subsequent order entered on February 8, 1995, th e distri ct court reaffirmed its earlier findings as to th e Hatchers’ and Allison’s agreement by ruling that, “It is clear that the purchase agreement entere d between [the Hatchers] and Allison was intended as an absolute sale of the subjec t property

for fair and adequate consideration. The relationshi p betw een[the Hatchers] and Allison was as seller and buye r only.”

The Hatchers appealed the orders of the district court. InJuly 1996, the Court of Appeals of Iowa, after undertaking a de novo review of the complete r ecord, affirmed the entirety of the district court’s rulings in pertinent part as follows:

[T]he Hatchers ’ claim [that] they did not understand the consequences of the [real estate] transact ion was no t supported by the record. Robert Hatcher wa s experienced and knowledgeable in real estate m atters. We also give weight to the finding of the tria l court that Hatcher’s expectations were not based on actions or representations of others, but his own fals e hope.

. . . We h ave carefully reviewed the record and agree wit hthe trial court [that] Allison [and othe r defendants] made no false representations to th e Hatchers which would support the claim for fra udulent mis representation. In particular, no evidenc e indicated any of the defendants expressed or implied the real estate transaction was a loan. The r elevant documents clearly indicate the parties entered int o a sa les agreement and any contrary understanding b y the Hatchers was not due to any false represen tations ma de by [Allison]. In fact, the Hatchers ha d attempted to s ell their farm to another person prior to the Allison sale, with terms nearly identical t o the A llison transaction. Their claim they didn’ t understand the transaction was a sale was no t reasonable under the circumstances.7

. . . We agree the evidence is insufficien t to support reformation. Our goal is to ascertain the intent of the parties. The evidence clearly shows the parties intended the transaction to be a sales agreement. [F]rom the inception the Hatchers knew a sale s tr ansactionwas contemplated. The Hatchers an d Al lisonnever maintained a debtor-creditor , mo rtgagor-mortgagee relationship. In fact, it wa s ne cessaryfor Allison to obtain a loan to purchas e the farmland from the Hatchers. Fu rthermore, the purchase price was adequat e co nsidering all the circumstances and risks , associated with the farmland, as well as the b uy-backIn their proposed Chapter 11 plan, Allison is listed as a creditor in the amount of 3 $69,000.00, and is treated as holding a disputed secured claim constituting an impaired class.
8 provision. The Hatchers did retain possessionof the farma fter the agreement was executed, but onl y du ring the option period. We also observe th e langu age of the agreement leaves little doubt th e transaction was a conditional sale. OnOctober 4, 1996, the Supreme Court of Iowa, after an en ban c consideration, denied further review of the matter.
Despite the unfavorable resolution of their appeals in t he Iowa s tate courts, the Hatchers refused to relinquish thei r former real estate. Allison then commenced evictio n pr oceedings against them. However, on October 21, 1996, just two ho urs before a hearing was to be held on the matter, th e Hatchers filed for Chapter 11 protection under the Code. In their Schedules and S tatement of Affairs, the Hatchers cla imed a joint interest in the farmland and buildings whic h they had sold to Allison. They listed the value as bein g $3 00,000.00, “subject to a fraudulent conveyance action,” and ad ditionallyclaimed a homestead exemption of $150,000.00 i n up t o forty acres of the property. The Hatchers schedule d Allisonas a fully secured creditor in the amount of $62,900.0 0 with the “Debtor’s land” serving as collateral. 3
The Hatchers premise the viability of their proposed plan entirely

upon their claim of ownership of the real estate whic h they previously sold to Allison. As they stated in Article VI I of their proposed plan, entitled “Means and Execution of th e Plan,” “The Debtor proposes to continue their [sic] farmin g business and development business and pay creditors from futur e in come from this farming business and from the development of various properties of the Debtors. ” Thus, if their plan is to have anychance of success, the Hatchers must in some way b e found the property’s owners.9

BothAllison and the United States Trustee filed motion s to dismiss the Hatchers’ case. Allison also filed a Motion fo r Relief from Stay. The debtors resisted these motions,10

reurging the fraudulent conveyance and loan-versus-sal e arguments which they had presented in the state courts. Th e ba nkruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing on these motions
onDecember 19, 1996. On July 21, 1997, the court entered an order dismissing the Hatchers’ cas e. In reaching this result, the court stated:

Mr. Hatcher expressed his desire that this Cour t find that the transaction with Allison was a loan rather than a sale of pro perty. This Court cannot do that. The issue of the validity of the warrant y deed executed by [the Hatchers] was litigated i n st ate court. The district court decision wa s appeale d and affirmed by the Court of Appeals o f Iowa. [The Hatchers] were denied further review by the S upreme Court of Iowa. The issue of th e validity of the transacti ons has conclusively been determined; [the Hatchers’] transaction wit h Allis onwas not a loan. This Court finds n o federal statute that provides an exception to th e appl icationof collateral estoppel and therefor e affords full faith and credit to the Iowa stat e court judgments in this case.

The court then based its dismissal order upon its determinatio n th at the Hatchers had filed their Chapter 11 petition without the requisite good faith contempla ted under Section 1112(b) of the Code. In this respect, the court provided the followin g analysis:

In this case, Debtors do not own the real property that is central to their reorganization. Debtors’ plandepends upon them keeping the land. Debtors

were on the brink of being forcibly removed fro m Allis on’s property. Debtors state they file d their c hapter 11 petition to save the house an d farm and to retain posses sion of the property. . .

. Even though ownership of the land has bee n conclusively

decided against them, Debtors continu e to occupy the land and fight efforts to evict them

. The bankruptcy was filed as a litigation tacti c11

after D ebtors lost their fight in the Iowa stat e courts. Debtors continue to pursue their starry

eye d dream that the land is theirs and that the y
candevelop it. A reorganization without Allison’ s land would be futile; th ere can be no development busin ess without the land and Debtors canno t continue their farming operation on this land

. This Court cannot and wil l not rewrite the sale of Debtors’ land to Allison . . . This Court find s that Debtors’ bankruptcy case and plan o f reorg anizationwere filed in bad faith and ar e objectively futile.12

Lastly , because the court determined that the Hatchers’ cas e should b e dismissed, it denied as moot Allison’s motion fo r relief from the automatic stay.

On appeal, the Hatchers argue, inter alia, that under Io wa st ate law the transfer of the farmland to Allison constituted

a “c onstructive fraud” which they may avoid pursuant to 1 1 U. S.C. § 544(b). Specifically, they contend that upon filing their bankruptcy petition, they assumed a new cloak o f identity--that of a trustee succeeding to the rights of a judgment creditor. In this connec tion, they contend that they

ma y bring a fraudulent conveyance action based upon state law byway of Code Section 544(b) and thereby avoid their prio r real estate transaction, independent from and ignorant of thei r actions in the sale transaction and before the Iowa stat e
co urts. Additionally, the Hatchers argue that the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of their Chapter 11 case on the basis of bad faith on their part was erroneous and should be reversed.

Allison argues that the Hatchers are presently assertin g the same claims which they previously litigated, and which wer e de cided, in Iowa state courts. It further contends that this attempt at relitigation is precluded under the doctrines of re s judicata and collateral estoppel, as well as full faith an d credit, and that the bankruptcy co urt’s order must accordingly be affirmed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Onappeal, the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact ar e review ed for clear error and its legal determinations ar e reviewedde novo. O’Neal v. Southwest Mo. Bank of Carthage (I n re Broadview Lumber Co.) , 118 F.3d1246, 1250 (8th Cir. 1997);Rule 8013 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure reads, in pertinent part, 4 as follows:

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.
13 Natkin & Co. v. Myers (In re Rine & Rine Auctioneers, Inc.) , 74 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1996); Hartford Cas. Ins. v. Food BarnStores, Inc. (In re Food Barn Stores, Inc.) , 214 B.R. 197 , 199 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013. 4 “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although14

th ere is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on th e entire e vidence is left with a definite and firm convictio n that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985 ) (qu oting United States v. United States Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S

. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); see Unite d States v. Garrido , 38 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 1994) ; Chamberlainv. Kula (In re Kula) , 213 B.R. 729, 735 (B.A.P. 8t h Cir. 1997). This Court may affirm the bankruptcy court upo n any basis supported by the record. Allstate Fin. Corp. v

. United States , 109 F.3d 1331, 1333 (8th Cir. 1997); Dicken v. Ashcroft , 972 F.2d 231, 233 (8th C ir. 1992); Brown v. Mitchell (In re Arkansas Communities, Inc.) , 827 F.2d 1219, 1222 (8t h Ci r. 1987); Turner v. California Dep’t of Real Estate (In re Turner) , 199 B.R. 694, 696 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION

Fraudulent Conveyance Action The Hatchers contend that, having assumed a new identit y uponthe filing of their bankruptcy case, they may proceed ane w und er Code Section 544(b) with their claim that the transfe r of their property to Allison constituted a fraudulen t
co nveyance under Iowa state law. “A fraudulent conveyance is a ‘transaction by means of which t he owner of real or personal property

has sought to place the land or goods beyond the reac h of his creditors, or which operates to the prejudice of their legal or equitable rights.’” Bens on v. Richardson , 537 N.W.2d 748, 756 (Iowa 1995); see Hartford-Carlisle Sav. Bank v

. Shivers , 552 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). The Supreme Co urt of Iowa summarized the principles controlling a
cr editor’s claim of fraudulent preferential transfer in First State Bank v. Kalkwarf , 495 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1993), as follows :15 1. A debtor may lawfully prefer one credito r over an other by way of sale, mortgage, or th e giving of security to others even if the debtor’s intentions toward the nonpreferred creditor ar e spitef ul and will delay or prevent them fro m obtaining payment. 2. A preferredcreditor’s knowledge that the debtor’s purpose was fraudulent will not defeat hi s claim, so long as he acts in good faith for his own protection. 3. Fraud on the part of the debtor wil l affect the rights of only those preferred creditor s who in some way participate in it. 4. When a preferred creditor knows of th e debtor’s fraudulent intent and accepts a mortgag e of secur ity wholly or in part to aid the fraud , that preferred creditor has participated in th e wrong and the mortgage is fraudulent and will not be honored. 5. F raud must be found under th e circumstances considered as a whole. Some indicia of fraud are: inadequacy of consideration ; insol vencyof the transferor; and pendency o r threat of third-party creditor litigation. 6. A valid preexisting debt is ordinaril y suf ficient consideration for any conveyance o r giv ing of security, so long as the amount of th e antecedent debt is not materially less than th e value of the property conveyed or encumbered. 7. A nonprefer red creditor bringing suit has the burden of showing the preferred creditor’ s int entional participation in the fraudulen t preferential transfer by clear and convincin g evidence.
Id. at 712; see, e.g., Benson , 537 N.W.2d at 756-58; Shivers , 522 N. W.2d at 911-912 ; Textron Fin. Corp. v. Kruger , 54 5 N.W.2d 880, 883-885 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

The elements of this action are identical to many whic h
were previously analyzed by the Iowa state courts in thi s ma tter. Indeed, in their brief to this Court, arguing under the banner of “fraudulent conveyance,” the Hatchers have raise d precis elythose claims which proved unsuccessful for them i n Iowa s tate courts. They argue, inter alia, that thei r trans actionwith Allison was a loan and not a sale; tha t “[u]nr efuted testimony at the trial in the Bankruptcy Cour t16

[sic] . . . established clearly th at these lands were worth in
excess of $268,000"; that “[t]he $63,000 paid [to th e Hatch ers] was not fair consideration for 46 acres of th e [Hatchers’] farm lands.”17

In this connection, the Iowa state courts determined that the Ha tchers initiated the search for a buyer of thei r fa rmland; that Mr. Hatcher was experienced and knowledgeable in real estate matters; that he negotiated the terms of th e sale o f their farmland; that terms of the sale were full y explainedto him both in writing and orally; that the Hatcher s ex ecuted the sale of their farmland freely and of their ow n acco rd; and, that no misrepresentations or fals e rep resentations which would support a claim for fraudulen t misrep resentationoccurred in the course of the sal e tra nsaction. Significantly, the courts found the purchas e price of $63,000.00 to be adequate consideration for the sale.
Thus, these prior decisions speak directly to th e Hatchers’ renamed action in these bankruptcy proceedings, that is , to their fraudulent conveyance claim. While the Hatchers
are co rrect in their arguments that Code Section 544(b ) pro vides them with a new status and identity in bankruptcy-

- th at of a trustee with super-avoidance powers, their reliance on that section is misplaced when they argue, in essence, that it als o provides them with an opportunity to collaterall y attack and disregard prior state court decisions. Sectio n 544(b) d oes not provide the Hatchers with an opportunity t o reliti gate in a federal forum those claims which hav e previou slybeen resolved in state courts. We may not, as a lower federal appellate court, review the orders of thos e courts. Only the United States Supreme Court may review state court decisions.

Rooker-FeldmanDoctrine We note that preclusion, as relied upon by the bankruptcy court, and the Rooker -Feldmandoctrine “are closely relate d le gal concepts.” Goetzman v. Agribank, FCB (In re Goetzman) , 91 F.3d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 11 7 S. Ct. 612, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996) ; see Charchenko v. City of St illwater , 47 F.3d 981, 983 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1995). Th e Ro oker-Feldmandoctrine “derives from the prohibition o n federal appellate review of state court proceedings,” Bechtold
v. City of Rosemount ,104 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997), and18

provides that “lower federal court s do not have subject matter juri sdictionover challenges to state court decisions i n judicial proceedings,” Neal v. Wi lson , 112 F.3d 351, 356 (8th Cir. 1997). The doctrine “commands that the United State s Supreme Court is19

the only federal court which may review state court decisions. ” First Commercial Trust Co. v. Colt’s Mfg. Co., Inc. , 77 F.3 d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1996); Neal , 112 at 356.
“Althoughthe state and federal claims may not b e ide ntical, impermissible appellate review may occur when a fed eral court is asked to entertain a claim that i s ‘inextricably intertwined’ with th e state court judgment.” In
re Goetzman , 91 F.3d at 1177; see Neal , 112 at 356. “In orde r to determine whether a claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ wit h
a state court claim, the federal court must analyze whether th e reli ef requested in the federal action would effectivel y revers e the state court decision or void its ruling. ” Bechtold ,104 F.3d at 1065; Keene Corp. v. Cass , 908 F.2d 293, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Neal , 112 at 356 (“A clai m is inextricably intertwined if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issu e before it.”).

Examination of the Hatch ers’ claims on appeal leads us to conclude that they are inextricably intertwined with the claim s the Ha tchers presented in the prior state court proceeding s previo uslydiscussed herein. Central to the state cour t pro ceedings were determinations by both the state distric t court a nd the Court of Appeals of Iowa that the real estat e transaction to which the Hatchers object as being a fraudulent
con veyance, and which they claimed and continue to claim wa s a loan, was actually a sale. In the state court proceedings, it was adjudged that the Hatchers voluntarily sold thi s proper tyto Allison for fair consideration and under n o mis representations, and that Allison is its present owner

. Ne vertheless, in the instant matter, the Hatchers continue to ch allenge these state court determinations and additionall y premise the viability of their Chapter 11 plan upon thei r purpor ted ownership of this farmland, the ownership of whic h the state courts have determined lies in Allison.
Thus, if the Hatchers are to succeed in these bankruptcy proc eedings, this Court must effectively reverse th e determ inations of the Iowa state courts. Accordingly, th e20

result the Hatchers currently seekis precisely that which the Rooker -Feldmandoctrine is intended to prevent. “‘Wher e fed eral relief can only be predicated upon a conviction tha t the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive th e federa l proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-cou rt judgment.’” Bechtold ,104 F.3d at 1066 (quoting21

Pe nzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. , 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 15 33, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring)). W e conclu de that the Hatchers’ instant appeal is, in substance , a prohibited appeal under the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine.

Dismissal for Cause The ba nkruptcy court has broad discretion in decidin g whether to dismiss or convert a Ch apter 11 case, Lumber Exch. Bldg. Ltd. Partnership v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (In re Lumbe r Exch

. Bldg. Ltd. Partnership) , 968 F.2d 647, 648 (8th Cir

. 1992), and is free to dismiss such a case where the debto r cannot propose a confirmable plan, Windsor on the Rive r As socs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor
onthe River Assocs., Ltd.) , 7 F.3d 127, 133 (8th Cir. 1993). Di smissal is appropriate if “cause” exists, and “if it is ‘in the best interest of creditors and the estate.’” Windsor , 7 F.3d a t 133 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)); In re Schrioc k Const., Inc. , 167 B.R. 569, 574 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1994).
The statutory definitionof “cause” includes, “continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonabl e likelihood of rehabilitation; ina bility to effectuate a plan; [a nd] unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditor s[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1-3). “[T]he statutor y li st is not exhaustive and . . . a court may consider othe r factor s and equitable considerations in order to reach a n appropriate result in the individual case.” Schriock , 167 B.R

. at 575 ; see In re Federal Roofing Co. , 205 B.R. 638, 64 1 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).

Such o ther factors as warrant dismissal under Sectio n 1112 (b) may include filings made in bad faith. See Triden t As socs. Ltd. Partnership v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Trident Assocs. Ltd. Partnership) , 52 F.3d 127, 130 (6th Cir.) , cert. de nied , --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 188, 133 L.Ed.2d 12 5 (1995); First Nat’l Bank of Siou x City v. Kerr (In re Kerr) , 908 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 1990); St. Paul Shelf Storage Ltd

. Partne rship v. Port Auth. of St. Paul (In re St. Paul Sel f St orage Ltd. Partnership) , 185 B.R. 580, 582 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) ; In re Wentworth , 83 B.R. 705, 707 (Bankr. D. N.D

.22

19 88). The following factors are among those which have been recognized as evidence of a bad faith filing:23

(1) the debtor has only one asset, the property, in which it does not hold legal title; (2) the case i s essentially a two-party dispute ca pable of prompt adjudication in state court; (3) there are only a few unsecured creditors; (4) th e debtor’s property has been posted fo r foreclosure, and the debtor has been unsuccessful i n defending against the foreclosure in state court; (5) the f iling of the petition effectively allows th e debtor to evade court orders; (6) the debtor has no ongoing business to reorganize; (7) the debtor has few employees; (8) the timing of the debtor’s filing evidences anintent to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of th e debtor’s secured creditor to enforce their rights.

Se e In re Trident Assocs. Ltd. Partnership , 52 F.3d at 131 ; Y.J. Sons & Co., Inc. v. Anemone, Inc. (In re Y.J. Sons & Co.) , 212 B.R. 793, 802 (D. N.J. 1997); In re St. Paul Self Storage Ltd. Partnership , 185 B.R. at 582-83; In re Wentworth , 83 B.R

. at 707.
In concluding that the H atchers’ case should be dismissed for cause pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), the bankruptcy cour t made the following determinations:

In t his case, [the Hatchers] do not own th e prop ertythat is central to their reorganization

. [T heir] plan depends upon them keeping the land

. [T hey] were on the brink of being forcibly remove d from Allison’s property. [They] state they file d their chapter 11 petition to save the house and farm an d to retain possession of the property. [Th e Ha tchers], operating as the debtor-in-possession , employ no non-insider employees. While the re port of opera tions through November 30, 1996, shows a ne t income, a sign ificant portion of the income was from the s ale of assets (sixteen percent of the hay an d st raw, and ten percent of the cattle scheduled)

. [Th ey] scheduled nine unsecured creditors wit h relatively small claims, with the exception of th e deb t owed [their] former counsel. Even thoug h owne rship of the land has been conclusively decide d24

agai nst them, [the Hatchers] continue to occupy th e land and fight efforts to evict them. The ban kruptcy wa s filed as a litigation tactic after [they] los t th eir fight in the Iowa state courts. [They ] cont inue to pursue their starry-eyed dream that th e land i s theirs and that they can develop it. A reo rganizationwithout Allison’s land would b e futile; there can be no25

deve lopment business without the land and [th e Hatchers] cann ot continue their farming operation on this land. This Court cannot and will not rewrit e th e sale of [their] land to Allison, in essenc e mandating Allison’s assets be placed in involuntar y servitude for the exclusive use of [the Hatchers]

. This Court finds that [the Hatchers] case and plan of reo rganizationwere filed in bad faith and ar e objectively futile.

Th e record and the case law discussed above fully support the
co urt’s conclusion. The Hatchers’ appeal amounts to a renewed eff ort to adjudicate matters which have already been laid t o rest in state courts; the question of ownership of th e propertythey sold to Allison cannot be resurrected here. Thus, it was not error for the ban kruptcy court to dismiss the Hatchers’ Chapter 11 case for cause by finding that thei r petition was filed in bad faith.

IV. CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court did not err in affording full faith and credit to the state court determinations in this matter

. It would be improper for this Cour t to revisit for the purpose of rec onsideration the judgments of the Iowa courts

. Furthermore, the bankruptcy court did not err, under its broad discretion, in dismissing the Hatchers’ case for cause pursuan t to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b). Accordingly, the order of th e bankru ptcycourt dismissing this case for cause, and denyin g as moot Allison Financial’s Motion for Relief from Stay, i s AFFIRMED.
A true copy.

Attest:

CLE RK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL, EIGHT H CIRCUIT.