Interim Decision #2192 

MATTER OF DUNAR 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-14616295 

Decided by Board April 17, 1973 

(1) The provisions of Article 32 of the United Nations Convention of July 28, 1951, 

which became binding on the United States when it adhered to the 1967 

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, do not preclude the deportation of 

an alien refugee who entered the United States lawfully as a nonimmigrant 

and has remained in this country unlawfully. 

(2) The provisions of Article 33 of the United National Convention of 1951, supra, 

have effected no sufistantial changes in the application of section 243(h) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, either by way of burden of proof, coverage, 

or manner of arriving at decisions. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(aX2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)l—Nonimmigrantremained longer. 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Donald L. Ungar, Esquire Irving A. Appleman 

517 Washington Street Appellate Trial Attorney 

San Francisco, California 94111 (Brief filed) 

(Brief filed) 

This is an appeal from an order of an immigration judge ,finding 

the respondent deportable, denying his request for termination of 

the proceedings, denying his application for withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act, and directing his deportation to Hungary. For the reasons 

stated below, we rema0 for further proceedings. 

Respondent is a 32-year-old male alien, a native and citizen of 

Hungary, who was admitted to the United States on January 18, 

1966 as a nonimmigrant visitor and remained longer than'permitted. At a hearing before the immigration judge, at which he was 

represented by present counsel, respondent admitted the truth of 

1 While this case was pending before us on appeal, the titles of special inquiry 

officers were changed administatively to immigration judges, 8 Cleft 1.1(1), 38 

FR 8590 (April 4, 1973). 

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Interim Decision #2192 

the factual allegations of the order to show cause, conceded 

deportability, designated England as the country of deportation, 

and requested withholding of deportation to Hungary; the alternate country of deportation if England should refuse him, under 

section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. At a 

continued hearing, counsel withdrew the concession of deportability and asked that the proceedings be terminated. He contended 

that, as a refugee who had lawfully entered the United States as a 

nonimmigrant, respondent was immunized from deportation under Article 32 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to 

the Status of Refugees, which became binding on the United 

States when it adhered to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 

of Refugees, TIAS 6577, 19 U.S. Treaties (Part 5, 1968) 6223, which 

entered into force with respect to the United States on November 

1, 1968. 

So far as we are aware, the question is novel. While the 

Convention and Protocol have been mentioned by the courts in a 

few immigration cases, nothing has been stated in the ()Pinions 

which is helpful to us here. See, e.g., INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 

79-80 fn. 22; Muskardin v. INS, 415 F.2d 865, 867 (C.A. 2, 1969). 

The first question confronting us is whether respondent has 

achieved a nondeportable status, as claimed. If he is not deportaMc in the first place, VIP need not reach the other issues raised 

with respect to his application for temporary withholding of 

deportation. A brief analysis of the pertinent statutory and other 

provisions involved will furnish a meaningful backdrop to the 

question. 

Preliminarily, the statute sets up a distinction between aliens 

who are admitted for permanent residence as immigrants and 

those who, like the respondent, come here for a temporary stay as 

nonimmigrants. Aliens seeking admission for permanent residence 

must, unless exempted, meet specific numerical limitations and 

labor certification requirements not normally prescribed for nonimmigrants. The latter (consisting of temporary visitors for business or pleasure, students, crewmen, aliens in transit through the 

United States, and the like) are expected to remain here only 

temporarily. They are not generally subject to the numerical and 

other limitations so carefully prescribed by Congress for intending 

immigrants who, once admitted for permanent residence, are free 

to remain indefinitely and to compete with American labor for 

available jobs. 

Section 241(a) of the Act defines the classes of aliens in the 

United States who are subject to deportation. Sections 241(a)(1), (2) 

and (10) decree deportation based on the alien's inadmissibility at 

the time of entry or because of the manner of entry. Section 

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241(aX2) also calls for the deportation of an alien who "is in the 

United States in violation of this Act;" this has been held to 

encompass aliens who, like respondent, entered lawfully as nonimmigrants and remained here after their period of temporary stay 

had expired. Section 241(a)(9) provides for the deportation of aliens 

who entered lawfully as nonimmigrants and thereafter failed to 

maintain their nonimmigrant status or to comply with the conditions of admission. All the other numerous grounds for deportation 

in section 241(a) are based on the alien's post-entry conduct and 

apply with full force to aliens who had originally been lawfully 

admitted for permanent residence. 

The Act does not, in terms, define "refugees" or provide for their 

"asylum" in the United States. Deportable aliens who, like respondent, claim they would be subject to persecution if sent to a 

given country, are covered by section 243(h) of the Act, as 

amended: 

The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien 

within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien 

would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion 

and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason. 

Article 1 of the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the 

Status of Refugees, to which the United States did not originally 

adhere, in partinent part defined a refugee as a person who, as a 

result of events occurring before January 1, 1951, 

... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 

nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 

outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 

unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having 

a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 

a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return 

to its 

Article 32 of the Convention, relating to "Expulsion," provides as 

follows:8 

1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their 

territory save on grounds of national security or public.order. 

2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision 

reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling 

reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to 

submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the 

purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority. 

3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period 

within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting 

States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as 

they may deem necessary. 

2 S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1, 6, 6. 

s S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 15. 

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Article 33 of the Convention is as follows: 4 

Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ("Refoulement") 

1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any 

manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 

would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 

of a particular Social group or political opinion. 

2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a 

refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the 

security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final 

judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 

The major objective of the Protocol was to Make the Convention 

applicable to all refugees covered by its definition irrespective of 

the January 1, 1951 deadline, and this was accomplished in Article 

I of the Protocol. In acceding to the Protocol, the United States 

undertook to apply Articles 2 to 34, inclusive, of the Convention to 

refugees as defined in the Protoco1. 6 

Since it supplements and incorporates the substantive provisions of the Convention, the Protocol must be regarded as a 

treaty,6which -is part of the supreme law of the land, United 

States Constitution, Article VI, Cl. 2. Such a treaty, being selfexecuting, has the force and effect of an ad of Congress, Valentine 

v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936). Neither the Convention nor 

the Protocol in terms refers to section 241(s), 2430-0 or any other 

pertinent provision of our immigration laws. The precise question 

confronting us is whether those provisions have been affected by 

the later treaty provisions and if so, in what way. 

Certain well-settled principles apply in determining whether a 

treaty has repealed or modified a previously enacted statute. A 

self-executing treaty supersedes a prior Congressional enactment 

if the act is inconsistent with the terms of the treaty, Cook v. 

United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118 (1933). The purpose of a treaty to 

supersede an act of Congress, in whole or in part, may not be 

lightly assumed, however. Such a purpose must appear clearly and 

distinctly from the words used in the treaty, United States v. Lee 

Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221 (1902). When a statute and a treaty 

relate to the same subject, an attempt must be made to give effect 

to both, if that can be done without violating the language of 

either. If the two are inconsistent, the one of later date will control 

the other, provided that the stipulation of the treaty on the 

subject is self-executing, Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 

• S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 15. 

5S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1. 

▪ S. Exec. Kept. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 8-9. 

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Interim Decision #2192 

(1888). Repeals by implication are never favored, and a later treaty 

will not be regarded as repealing an earlier enactment by implication unless the two are absolutely incompatible and the later one 

cannot be enforced without antagonizing the earlier, Johnson v. 

Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907). 

Our examination of the legislative materials satisfies us that the 

United States Senate, in giving its advice and consent to accession 

to the Protocol, did not contemplate that radical changes in 

existing immigration laws would be effected. Quite the contrary, 

the general representations made to induce affirmative Senate 

action indicated that our immigration laws already embodied the 

humane provisions for refugees fostered by the Convention and 

Protocol. Accession by the United States, it was asserted, would 

lend the weight of our moral support to the measure and would 

influence other nations with less liberal refugee legislation to 

adhere to it. 

Thus, in submitting the Protocol to the President, the Secretary 

of State informed him that, "United States accession to the 

Protocol would not impinge adversely upon the laws of this 

country."7The Secretary further stated: 9 

Accession to the Protocol would promote our foreign policy interests 

through reaffirming, in readily understandable terms, our traditional humanitarian concerns and leadership in this field. It would also convey to the world 

our sympathy and firm support in behalf of those fleeing persecution. Actually, most refugees in the United States already enjoy legal and political 

rights which are equivalent to those which states acceding to the Convention 

or the Protocol are committed to extend to refugees within their territories ... 

In his message to the Senate, transmitting the Protocol and 

accompanying State Department report, the President stated: 9 

It is decidedly in the interest of the United States to promote this United 

Nations effort to broaden the extension of asylum and status for those fleeing 

persecution. Given the American heritage of concern for the homeless and 

persecuted, and our traditional role of leadership in promoting assistance for 

refugees, accession by the United States to the Protocol would lend conspicuous support to the effort of the United Nations toward attaining the Protocol's 

objectives everywhere. This impetus would be enhanced by the fact that most 

refugees in this country already enjoy the protection and rights which the 

Protocol seeks to secure for refugees in all countries. Thus, United States 

accession should help advance acceptance of the Protocol and observance of its 

humane standards by States in which, presently, guarantees and practices 

relating to protection and other rights for refugees are less liberal than in our 

own country. 

Similar views were expressed by State Department officials in 

statements and testimony before the Senate Committee on For7 S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at VII. 

S. Exec. K, 90th Culig., 2d Sese. at VIII. 

9S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 

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Interim Decision #2192 

eign Relations. See, e.g., the statement of Laurence A. Dawson, 

Acting Deputy Director, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs: 10 

... [The President] has pointed out that since refugees in this country 

already enjoy the protection and rights which the Protocol seeks to secure 

everywhere, United States accession should help to advance the Protocol and 

acceptance of its humane standards in other states whose treatment of 

refugees is less liberal _ _ Even though the United States already meets the 

standards of the Protocol, formal accession would greatly facilitate our 

continuing diplomatic effort to promote higher standards of treatment for 

refugees and more generous practices on the part of countries whose approach 

to refugees is less liberal than our own, 

Mr. Dawson further testified:" 

Now, it is more important, in this growing spectrum of unrest, the emergence of new nations and proliferation of refugee problems, to project our 

image and use our image and use our influence. We believe that our accession 

would help to support this United Nations efforts to extend throughout the 

world the concept of protection for refugees and the furnishing of rights to 

them such as we have always done within . our national tradition in this 

country. 

Our immigration laws already contain certain provisions 

whereby aliens unlawfully in the United States, whether refugees 

or not, may achieve lawful permanent resident status by administrative action. See, e.g., sections 244(a), 245 and 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 203(a)(7) of the Act sets up 

preferences for certain refugees in obtaining conditional entry 

from abroad and in achieving permanent resident status. If we 

accepted respondent's view, all these, as well as the deportation 

provisions of section 241(a), would be rendered nugatory in the 

case of an alien refugee who entered lawfully as a nonimmigrant 

and remained unlawfully. If such an alien achieves nondeportability under Article 32 of the Convention, he becomes in effect a 

permanent resident. There is nothing in the legislative history of 

this provision to indicate that the Senate had any notion that this 

result would follow accession. Indeed, there is every indication 

that those who framed Article 32 on behalf of the United Nations 

never intended to saddle a host country with any such limitation. 

Thus, in an early report, 12the Ad Hoc Committee stated: 

The expression "lawfully within their territory"• throughout this draft 

Convention would exclude a refugee who while lawfully admitted has overstayed the period for which he was admitted or was authorized to stay or who 

has violated any other condition attached to his admission or stay. 

1° S. Exec. Rept. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7. 

" S. Exec. Rept. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 10. 

12 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, March 2, 1950, at 4? (Ef1618/Corr.1; 

EfAC.32/5/Corr.1). 

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In its report on the revised draft Convention, 13the Ad Hoc 

Committee stated: 

The Committee decided that it was not always necessary to insert in the 

text definitions of expressions used. However, since some question was raised 

as to the phrase "lawfully in the territory", the Committee expressed the view 

that, in any event, a Contracting State may consider that a refugee is no 

longer lawfully in its territory if he is in contravention of terms imposed as a 

condition of his admission or sojourn. 

With commendable candor, counsel for respondent has supplied 

us with a letter dated May 26, 1971, from the Deputy Representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 

quoting directly from advice received from its Geneva headquarters in response to counsel's question concerning the interpretation of Article 32. In pertinent part, it states: 

In determining whether a refugee is "lawfully in the territory" of a 

Contracting State, regard must be had to all the circumstances of his presence 

there, and in this respect the manner in which he originally entered the 

territory, i.e. lawfully or unlawfully, is not the only decisive factor. 

Art. 31 of the 1951 Convention recognizes the possibility that the status of a 

refugee who has entered illegally the territory of a Contracting State may 

subsequently be regularized. Conversely, the stay of a refugee who has 

entered in a regular manner, may subsequently becuule unlawful. This would 

for example be the case if the authorities of the country are not prepared to 

grant him residence beyond the limited period for which he was admitted or if 

they withdraw his residence permission on the ground that he has not 

complied with the conditions under which he was :Admitted, e.g. to pursue his 

studies. As long as his stay is "lawful," even though admitted temporarily, he 

can only be expelled on grounds of "national security and public order." If, 

however, his stay ceases to be "lawful" in the circumstances described above, 

he is no longer "lawfully in the territory of the Contracting State" and may 

therefore not invoke the special protection of Art. 32 of the 1951 Convention. 

(Emphasis in original). 

There is nothing in the representations made to the Senate in 

support of accession which could lead it to conclude that Article 32 

would radically alter the provisions of our deportation laws in the 

manner contended for by counsel. Quite the contrary, the Senate 

was led to believe that the laws relating to the immigration and 

deportation of alien refugees would remain substantially unaffected, that no amendatory legislation would be required to implement the Protocol, and that any minor changes could be handled 

administratively. 

In his letter of submittal to the President, the Secretary of State 

commented with respect to Article 32: 14 

,3United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Second Session, August 25, 1950, at 

11, paragraph 20 (b/1850; E1AC.32/8). 

14S. Exec. K, 90th Gong., 2d Sess. at VIII. 

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... Article 32(1) of the Convention provides that, "The Contracting States shall 

not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national 

security or public order." Many if not most of the grounds for deportation set 

forth in section 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1251, are 

grounds of "national security or public order," including particularly the 

several provisions relating to subversive activities and criminal conduct. As 

refugees by definition are without a homeland, deportation of a refugee is a 

particularly serious measure, and it would not be humanitarian to deport a 

refugee for reasons of health or economic dependence. 

In his statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 

the State Department's representative, Laurence A. Dawson, 

asserted: 16 

[W]hile the concept of guaranteeing safe and humane asylum is the most 

important element of the Protocol, accession does not in any sense commit the 

contracting state to enlarge its immigration measures for refugees. Rather, 

the asylum concept is set forth in the prohibition against the return of a 

refugee in any manner whatsoever to a country where his life or freedom 

would be threatened; and the prohibition under Article 32 against the 

deportation of a refugee lawfully in the territory of a Contracting State to any 

country except in cases involving national security or' public order. The 

deportation provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, with limited 

exceptions, are consistent with this concept. The Attorney General will be able 

to administer such provisions in conformity with the Protocol without amendment of the Act. 

The following colloquy before the Senate Committee with respect to the effect of Article 32 is illuminating: 16 

SENATOR SPARKMAN. Is there anything in here that conflicts with our 

existing immigration laws? 

MR. DAWSON. I would answer that briefly and then ask Mrs. McDowell [of 

the Treaty Section, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State] to give a 

' more authoritative answer. I would say that Article 32 which prohibits the 

expulsion of a refugee who is lawfully in this country to any country except on 

grounds of national security or public order would pose certain questions in 

connection with section 241 of our Immigration and Nationality Act, which 

states the deportation provisions. But I do not believe it would be in conflict. 

We believe most of those grounds in 241 are grounds which can be properly 

construed as having the basis of national security or public order, and we also 

are assured that those relatively limited cases which perhaps could not be so 

construed could be dealt with by the Attorney General without the enactment 

of any further legislation ... 

MRS. McDOWELL. I think Mr. Dawson has covered it very well. We are 

assured by the Justice Department that this is their view. That the existing 

regulations which have to do with deportation would permit the Attorney 

General sufficient flexibility to enforce the provisions of this convention which 

are not presently contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

For example, section 241 of that Act allows the Attorney General to del:6ft an 

alien for certain stated reasons. Most of these are criminal conduct of various 

kinds or subversive activities. 

" S. Exec. Rapt. No. 14, 90th Cong., Zd Sess. at 6. 

16 S. Exec. Rapt. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 8. 

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Interim Decision #2192 

There are two categories, only two, that we think are not covered, and these 

are the deportation of an alien for reasons of mental illness or deficiency, 

where he has become institutionalized for that reason, or deportation on 

grounds that he has become a public charge. These two areas would not be 

enforced against refugees if the protocol were in force. 

We cannot find in these materials any evidence that the Senate 

construed Article 32 as having the broad purpose contended for by 

respondent. That construction would radically alter the carefully 

articulated statutory provisions, devised by Congress through the 

years, for the selection, admission, adjustment of status, and 

deportation of aliens. We may not conclude, in the absence of more 

compelling proof, that the Senate intended that result when it 

acceded to the Protocol. 

We need not now • decide the full sweep of Article 32. The Senate 

was told and presumably concluded that the only refugees who by 

reason of Article 32 would no longer be deportable under section 

241(a) of the Act would be those aliens lawfully in the United 

States who had been institutionalized because of mental illness or 

who had become public charges, under section 241(a)(3) or (8). We 

reject the notion that the Senate intended to preclude deportation 

(and thereby in effect to confer permanent residence) in the ease of 

an alien refugee who entered lawfully as a nonimmigrant and 

remained unlawfully. Such an alien, even if not deportable to his 

country of origin because he would be persecuted there, could still 

conceivably,be accepted by some other country. We sustain the 

immigration judge's conclusion that respondent, even if deemed to 

be a refugee, is deportable under section 241(a)(2) of the Act. 

We must, therefore, confront the questions raised by counsel as 

to the effect of the Protocol and Convention on section 243(h) of the 

Act These questions stern primarily from the definition of "refugee" in Article 1 of the Convention and from the provisions of 

Article 33. It is the position of counsel that these provisions affect 

not only the burden of proof under section 243(h) and the breadth 

of its coverage, but also the nature of the determination the 

Attorney General is permitted to make thereunder. We shall 

discuss each in turn. We note, in passing, that the legislative 

materials concerning Article 33 are as meager and inconclusive as 

those relating to Article 32, which we have already discussed. 

On the burden of proof issue, 8 CFR 242.17(c) provides in 

pertinent part that, "The respondent has the burden of satisfying 

the [immigration judge] that he would be subject to persecution on 

account of race, religion, or political opinion as claimed." That 

statement is consonant with the conclusion of this Board, which 

the emir' 3 have sustained in many cases, that under section 243(h) 

the alien has the burden of presenting evidence showing a "clear 

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Interim Decision #2192 

probability of persecution," Cheng ;ad Fit v. INS, 386 F.2d 750 

(C.A. 2, 1967), cert. den. 390 U.S. 1003; Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100 (1 

Cir., 1971); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536 (C.A. 7, 1967); Hamad v. INS, 

420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir., 1969). It is counsel's contention that under 

Articles 1 and 33, all an alien now need show is that he has a "wellfounded fear of being persecuted" for any of the stated reasons. 

This change in terminology, asserts counsel, relieves the alien of 

the burden of showing a clear probability of persecution. "It is his 

own state of mind that is the primary test." (Respondent's brief on 

appeal, p. 3). 

Clearly, the requirement that the fear be "well-founded" rules 

out an apprehension which is purely subjective. A fear which is 

illusory, neurotic or paranoid, however sincere, does not meet this 

requirement. An early report of the Ad Hoc Committee which 

framed the provision stated: 17 

The expression "well-founded fear of being the victim of persecution for 

reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion" means that a person 

has either been actually a victim of persecution or can show good reason why 

he fears persecution. 

Some sort of a showing must be made and this can ordinarily be 

done only by objective evidence. The claimant's own testimony as 

to the facts will sometimes be all that is available; but the crucial 

question is whether the testimony, if accepted as true, makes out a 

realistic likelihood that he will he persecuted. The burden of 

coming forward with the requisite evidence is obviouSly the claimant's. And if all he can show is that there is a merely conjectural 

possibility of persecution, his fear can hardly be characterized as 

"well-founded." 

Certainly, there is nothing in the Senate proceedings to indicate 

that accession to the Protocol would radically affect section 243(h). 

Quite the contrary, as pointed out above, the general tenor of the 

representations was that the existing immigration laws already 

made provision for the refugee reforms sought by the Convention 

and Protocol. The Secretary of State's letter to the President 

makes one brief reference to section 243(h): 18 

As stated earlier, foremost among the rights which the Protocol would 

guarantee to refugees is the prohibition (under Article 33 of the Convention) 

against their expulsion or return to any country in which their life or freedom 

would be threatened. This article is comparable to Section 243(h) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, S U.S.C. Section 1254 [sic), and it can be 

implemented within the administrative discretion provided by existing regulations ... 

" United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, February 1'1, 1950, at 39 (E/1618; El 

AC.32i5). 

is S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sees. at VIII. , 

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In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign 

Relations, the State Department's witness, Mr. Dawson, stated 

that one former obstacle to our accession was the requirement of 

section 243(h) that persecution be "physical," and that with removal of this requirement in October 1965, the problem no longer 

exists.19The clear implication is that section 243(h) was thereby 

brought into harmony with Article 33. It is noteworthy that, in 

responding to Senator Sparkman's question, "Is there anything in 

here that conflicts with our existing immigration laws?", Mr. 

Dawson made no mention of section 243(h) in relation to Article 33. 

It is clear that when it accepted the Protocol, the Senate had no 

notion that this would work a drastic alteration of section 243(h) 

and the gloss which it had acquired through the years before this 

Board and in the courts. 

Section 243(h) in terms applies to persecution on account of 

"race, religion, or political opinion." It does not define what is 

meant by "persecution." Articles 1 and 33 of the Protocol encompass the three quoted classes and add two more, "nationality" and 

"membership of a particular social group." Article 1 defines a 

refugee in terms of persecution on any of the five grounds, without 

further defining the term. Article 33 makes no mention of persecution but forbids expulsion of a refugee to a place where his "life or 

freedom" would be threatened because of any of the five grounds. 

These seeming differences are clearly reconcilable. 

The two new classes mentioned in Articles 1 and 33 are generically similar to the three which were the concern of Congress in 

section 243(h). In that provision Congress sought generally to 

shield aliens from the actions of their own home governments in 

singling them out for punitive treatment, not because of their 

individual misconduct or demerits, but solely because they are 

members of dissident or unpopular minority groups. The inclusion 

of the two new classes within the ambit of section 243(h), far from 

creating a conflict, is clearly compatible with the beneficent 

purposes underlying that provision. 

Article 33 speaks in terms of threat to life or freedom on account 

of any of the five enumerated reasons. Such threats would also 

constitute subjection to persecution within the purview of section 

243(h). The latter has also been construed to encompass economic 

sanctions sufficiently harsh to constitute a threat to life or freedom, Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3 Cir., 1962); cf. iiovae v. INS, 

407 F.2d 102 (9 Cir., 1969). In our estimation, there is no substantial difference in the coverage of section 243(h) and Article 33. We 

19 S. Exec. Relit. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Seas. at 9. 

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are satisfied that distinctions in terminology can be reconciled on 

a case-by-ease consideration as they arise. 

This leaves only the question whether Article 33 compels a 

change in the nature of the determination which the Attorney 

General may now make under section 243(h). Article 33 speaks in 

mandatory terms: "No Contracting State shall expel or return a 

refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 

where his life or freedom would be threatened. ..." While the 

second paragraph of Article 33 carves out exceptions where the 

alien refugee constitutes a security threat to the host country or 

has been convicted of a particularly serious crime, in cases outside 

the exceptions the provision seems to leave no room for the 

exercise of discretion. Section 243(h), on the other hand, has been 

construed as giving the Attorney General a degree of discretion in 

reaching his decision. Close analysis reveals, however, that there 

is no real conflict between the two provisions. 

As the immigration judge has pointed out at pages 11-14 of his 

excellent opinion, the ancestor of section 243(h) had many seeming 

similarities to Article 33 which section 243(h) was designed to 

eliminate. Section 20(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as 

amended by section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 

Stat. 987, 8 U.S.C. 156(a) (1946 ed., Supp. IV), provided that, "No 

alien shall be deported under any provisions of this Act to any 

country in which the Attorney General shall find that such alien 

would be subjected to physical persecution." The cases held that 

under this provision where an alien raised a persecution claim, the 

Attorney General had to find as fact that he would not be subject 

to physical persecution in the particular country before he could 

be sent there, U.S. ex rel. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 187 F.2d 137, 

142 (CA. 2, 1951), affirmed 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Sang Ryup Park v. 

Barber, 107 F.Supp. 603 and 107 F.Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal., 1952); U.S. 

ex rel. Chen Ping Zee v. Shaughnessy, 107 F.Supp. 607 (S.D. N.Y., 

1952); U.S. ex rel. Watts v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. N.Y., 

1952). It was indicated that the statute contemplated a fact finding 

by the Attorney General based on competent evidence and that 

discretionary power was not conferred. 

Section 243(h), on the other hand, is cast in far different terms. 

Instead of directing that no alien "shall be deported," section 

243(h) merely "authorizes" the Attorney General to withhold 

deportation. Instead of referring to a "finding" by the Attorney 

General, section 243(h) makes reference only to his "opinion." 

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the cases have 

construed section 243(h) as giving the Attorney General a "broad 

discretion" to withhold deportation, Muskardin v. INS, 415 F.2d 

865 (2 Cir., 1969); Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675 (C.A. 9, 1968); 

321 
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Nwmkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 395 (CA. 2, 1955); U.S. ex rel. Dolenz v. 

Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (C.A. 2, 1953). 

It seems clear that the humanitarian values sought to be 

covered by section 243(h) distinguish it from the Act's other 

.provisions for discretionary, relief from deportation in which the 

Attorney General is given power, in his discretion, to grant relief 

to aliens who meet the prescribed eligibility requirements. Those 

provisions involve a two-stage proceeding; (1) the establishment of 

statutory eligibility; (2) the exercise of administrative discretion, 

favorably or unfavorably to the alien, by the Attorney General or 

his delegate. The cases are legion that even where statutory 

eligibility is made out, relief may still be denied in the exercise of 

discretion. See Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957) 

(suspension of deportation); Thomaidis v. INS, 431 F.2d 711 (C.A. 9, 

1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 954 (section 245 adjustment); Lum Wan v. 

Esperdy, 321 F.2d 123 (C.A. 2, 1963) (section 249 registry); Hamad v. 

INS, 420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir., 1969) (voluntary departure). 

While the section 243(h) cases also speak in terms of the 

Attorney General's discretion, we know of none in which a finding 

has been made that the alien has established the clear probability 

that he will be persecuted and in which section 243(h) withholding 

has nevertheless been denied in the exercise of administrative 

discretion. We are fortified in this view by the statement of the 

Service's Appellate Trial Attorney in his brief before us (at page 

14).20It is highly probable that in referring to the Attorney 

General's "broad discretion" under section 243(h), the cases contemplate the manner in which the Attorney General arrives at his 

opinion and the limited scope of judicial review, rather than the 

eligibility-discretion dichotomy. Thus, in an early and much-cited 

case arising under that section, U.S. ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 

206 F.2d 392, 395 (C.A. 2, 1958) the court stated: 

... That section modified the language of the former statute in a manner 

which shows clearly, we think, that the withholding of deportation in cases 

where the alien fears persecution rests wholly in the administrative judgment 

and "opinion" of the Attorney General or his delegate. The courts may not 

substitute their judgment for his. Doubtless a court might intervene to stay 

deportation, if the Attorney General or his delegate should deny the alien any 

opportunity to present evidence on the subject of persecution or should refuse 

to consider the evidence presented by the alien. But we see nothing in the 

statute to suggest that the courts may insist that the Attorney General's 

20 "In actual practice there has been no case under section 243(h) in which it 

has been held that the Attorney General's discretion dictated the deportation of 

an alien to a country where there was a well-founded reason to believe that he 

would be persecuted. If such a contingency were to arise, it is inconceivable that 

it could arise in any thing other than the context permitted under paragraph 2 of 

Article 33, namely, national security or danger to the community." 

322 
Interim Decision #2192 

opinion be based solely on evidence which is disclosed to the alien. In his 

official capacity the Attorney General has access to confidential information 

derived from the State Department or other intelligence services of the 

Government which may be of great assistance to him in making his decision as 

to the likelihood of physical persecution of the alien in the country to which he 

is to be deported. We believe Congress intended the Attorney General to use 

whatever information he has. To preclude his use of confidential information 

unless he is willing to disclose it to the alien would defeat this purpose. 

Moreover, the very nature of the decision he must make concerning what the 

foreign country is likely to do is a political issue into which the courts should 

not intrude ... 

While some of the cases have referred to the separate eligibilitydiscretion elements in a section 243(h) context, this seems to have 

been done largely in relation to the scope of judicial review. 21In 

none was a denial of relief sustained as a valid exercise of 

discretion, in the face of a finding that the alien would probably be 

persecuted 22 One commentator has recently appraised the situation thus:m 

... Some authorities have suggested that there is a distinction between 

determining whether -persecution is probable and in determining whether to 

exercise discretion to withhold deportation, if the probability of persecution is 

established. However, this attempted severance seems untenable since it is 

inconceivable that the Attorney General would direct or that a court would 

uphold deportation to a place where persecution can be anticipated. The 

sounder approach is to regard the entire determination as a discretionary 

assessment of the likelihood of persecution, subject to the normal criteria of 

judicial review. 

In any event, Article 33 can produce no meaningful change in 

the way section 243(h) has been applied. Thus far, relief thereunder has never been denied to an alien who has established that he 

will probably be persecuted. If a ease should arise in which the 

alien refugee is found to be a security risk or a danger to the 

community because convicted of a particularly serious crime, the 

second paragraph of Article 33 specifically permits deportation. 

In summary, we conclude that Article 33 has effected no substantial changes in the application of section 243(h), either by way 

of burden of proof, coverage, or manner of arriving at decisions. 

21 Khalil v. District Director, 457 F.2d 1276, fn. 4 (9.A. 9, 1972); Shinthani v. 

INS, 435 F.2d 1378 (CA. 8, 1971), cert. den., 403 U.S. 920; Hamad v. INS, 420 F.2d 

645 (D.C. Cir., 1969); Hosseinmardi v. INS, 405 P. 2d 25 (C.A. 9,1969); Kasravi v. 

INS, 400 F.2d 675 (CA. 9,1968); cf. U :S. ex rel. Hardie v.Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (CA. 

2, 1967), cert. den., 392 U.S. 935. 

" We regard as dictum our intimation in Matter of Liao, 11 I. & N. Dec. 113, 119 

(BIA, 1965) that section 243(h) withholding could be denied in the exercise of 

discretion on the basis of factors other than those related to the persecution 

claim. After reviewing the record, we rejected the persecution claim as not 

established by the evidence. - 

23 1 Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure 5-124 (1972 Supp.). 

323 
Interim Decision #2192 

Since it appears that England will no longer receive the respondent, the question whether he will be persecuted in Hungary must 

be faced. We turn, then, to appraise the immigration judge's 

decision on the record in this case. 

The evidence has been set forth in detail in the immigration 

judge's painstaking opinion and need not be repeated at length. 

The respondent left Hungary at the age of 15 during the 1956 

uprising. His parents, considered members of the capitalist class, 

had had their lands and their home in Budapest confiscated in the 

post-World War II Communist take -over. His father had to work at 

repairing street cars and his mother, who had never worked 

before, had to work as a locker lady in a bathhouse. Respondent 

was barred from entering college for the ostensible reason that his 

high school record was inadequate, but he suspects the real reason 

is that his parents were considered capitalists. After some time in 

refugee camps in Austria and Germany, respondent had settled in 

England, where he lived continuously until his arrival here in 1966 

as a visitor. After respondent had left Hungary, his father had 

disappeared for five or six months, but he is now living and 

working in Hungary. Regpondent's persecution claim is based on 

his assertion, supported by some evidence, that he will face 

criminal prosecution in Hungary for having departed illegally. He 

also feared that his long sojourn in Western Europe and the 

United States would lead the Communists to consider him a threat 

as one who might spread Western propaganda. The immigration 

judge concluded that there was no reason to believe that the 

penalty imposed for illegal departure would be so severe as to be 

considered persecution. The other fears respondent had expressed 

were dismissed as conjectural. The State Department, in response 

to a -Service report, stated that it had no information concerning 

respondent other than that supplied by the Service and concluded 

that it was "unable to express the opinion" that respondent 

"would be subject to persecution should he return to Hungary." 

On this record, the immigration judge found that respondent 

had failed to establish the likelihood that he would be persecuted 

in Hungary because of his race, religion or political opinion. We 

agree with that conclusion. Even if we apply the nomenclature of 

Articles 1 and 33, we are satisfied that respondent has failed to 

show a well-founded fear that his life or freedom will be threatened in Hungary on account of his race, religion, nationality, 

membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 

The conclusion we have reached would ordinarily lead us to 

diSmiss the appeal. However, during the pendency of this appeal 

the State Department's Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs 

has expressed an interest and has submitted additional materials. 

324 
Interim Decision #2I92 

Since these were not available to either counsel for respondent or 

the Service, we have not considered them in arriving at our 

decision. We shall, however, remand the case to the immigration 

judge in order that they may be made part of the record and to 

permit such further proceedings as may be appropriate in the light 

of the new material. 

ORDER: The record is remanded to the immigration judge for 

further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

325