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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 40321

RONALD LEE MACIK,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

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2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 722

Filed: October 24, 2013

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge. 

Order summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, reversed and case 

remanded.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge

Ronald Lee Macik appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his 

petition for post-conviction relief. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand to the 

district court for further proceedings.

In 1972, Macik pled guilty to first degree murder and the district court imposed a life 

sentence. Macik did not appeal, or any appeal that he filed was dismissed, as there is no record 

of an appeal in his case. On March 14, 2011, Macik wrote a letter to the district court that was 

treated as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and counsel was appointed to represent him. The 

district court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Macik’s claim 

and denied the motion. This Court affirmed the district court’s decision in State v. Macik, 

Docket No. 39233 (Ct. App. 2012) (unpublished) and a remittitur was issued on June 28, 2012. 

On July 26, 2012, Macik filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging several claims 

related to the entry of his guilty plea in 1972. Macik also filed a motion for the appointment of 
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counsel, which the district court denied on August 8, 2012. On August 22, 2012, the State filed a 

motion for summary dismissal of Macik’s petition. The district court granted the motion five 

days after its filing and summarily dismissed the petition on August 27, 2012.

On August 29, 2012, Macik filed a motion for leave to amend his petition, requesting 

permission to submit evidence of his claims to the district court. On August 30, 2012, the district 

court denied his motion, finding that he failed to identify any new claims he might have. Macik 

timely appeals. 

Macik argues that the district court erred by not allowing him twenty days in which to 

respond to the State’s motion for summary judgment. When the State files a motion to dismiss, 

the petitioner is entitled to a twenty-day period of time to respond. State v. Christensen, 102 

Idaho 487, 489, 632 P.2d 676, 678 (1981); Isaak v. State, 132 Idaho 369, 370, 972 P.2d 1097, 

1098 (Ct. App. 1999). The purpose of the twenty days’ notice is to ensure that the applicant will 

have an opportunity to challenge an adverse decision before it becomes final. Baruth v. 

Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 158-59, 715 P.2d 369, 371-72 (Ct. App. 1986); Gibbs v. State, 103 

Idaho 758, 760, 653 P.2d 813, 815 (Ct. App. 1982). Ordinarily, the failure to provide a 

petitioner with twenty days’ notice before entering an order of summary dismissal is ground for 

reversal. See Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321-22, 900 P.2d 795, 797-98 (1995); Buss 

v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 518-19, 211 P.3d 123, 127-28 (Ct. App. 2009).

As discussed above, the State filed its motion for summary dismissal of Macik’s petition 

on August 22, 2012. The district court granted the motion and summarily dismissed the petition 

on August 27, 2012. Accordingly, Macik was not allowed the mandatory twenty-day period to 

respond to the State’s motion.1

 Without the requisite time to respond, Macik lost the opportunity 

 

1 The State argues that the error was harmless because Macik was provided with notice that 

his petition was untimely when the district court denied his motion for appointment of counsel 

on August 8, 2012, and he had the opportunity to respond to the untimeliness issue in his motion 

for leave to amend his petition on August 29, 2012. Macik’s motion for leave to amend his 

petition did not explain why he failed to comply with the statute of limitations, but only 

requested to be able to provide proper evidence of his underlying claims. Therefore, the State 

asserts that the district court’s error was harmless because when given the chance to address the 

untimeliness of his petition, Macik instead sought permission to provide the district court with

more information regarding his underlying claims. Although the order denying appointment of 

counsel did articulate that Macik’s petition was untimely, the order did not state that Macik had 

twenty days to reply or his petition would be dismissed. Further, the order did not state that it 

was a notice of the court’s intent to dismiss the petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). 
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to correct the defects in his petition and possibly avoid summary dismissal. The opportunity for 

an applicant to adequately and appropriately respond, in order to avoid summary dismissal and 

have the merits of his or her application considered at an evidentiary hearing, is a substantial 

right. Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 421, 128 P.3d 948, 958 (Ct. App. 2005). When that right is 

affected by a defective notice of proposed dismissal, this Court cannot disregard the error. Id. 

Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred by dismissing Macik’s petition without 

allowing him the prescribed time to respond. Thus, we reverse the district court’s order 

summarily dismissing Macik’s petition for post-conviction relief and remand. Regardless of 

how apparent the appropriateness of summary dismissal may be, the petitioner is entitled to the 

full twenty days to respond.

The district court was required to allow Macik twenty days to respond to the State’s 

motion for summary dismissal. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order summarily 

dismissing Macik’s petition for post-conviction relief and remand this matter to the district court 

for further proceedings.

Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.

 

Therefore, the order denying appointment of counsel did not initiate the twenty-day period. 

Moreover, Macik’s motion for reconsideration did not serve, as the State suggests, to cure the 

premature dismissal.