alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED September 15, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________ No. 02-51131

____________
SANDRA VASQUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus JOHN SNOW, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Treasury, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Texas USDC No. A-01-CV-508-SS

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
AFFIRMED. See 5 TH

C IR . R. 47.6.
PC GROUP, INC.


419 Park Avenue South


New York, NY 10016








March 21, 2011





Mr. W. Gray Hudkins


President and Chief Executive Officer


PC Group, Inc.


419 Park Avenue South


New York, NY 10016





Re:
Employment Agreement





Dear Gray:





In recognition and confirmation of your agreement to forego $200,000 of the $300,000 base compensation for fiscal year 2011 to which you are entitled under your Employment Agreement, dated as of October 1, 2007 (the “Employment Agreement”), between you and PC Group, Inc. (the “Company”), this letter confirms the Company’s agreement to waive for 2011 the requirement of Section 2(a) of the Employment Agreement that you devote your “full business time and energies to the business and affairs of the Company”.  Instead, during 2011, you agree to devote such business time and energies to the business and affairs of the Company as the Company and you shall agree upon, from time to time, as necessary and
appropriate.  In all other respects, the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.  This letter is made and executed and shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York, without regard to the conflicts of laws principles thereof.









Sincerely,PC GROUP, INC.By:
/s/ Warren B. KandersWarren B. KandersChairman








AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED BY:








By:  /s/ W. Gray Hudkins


W. Gray Hudkins





DATE: March 21, 2011
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, DC

Boston Executive Helicopters Complainant


### v. Town of Norwood, Massachusetts And Norwood Airport Commission Respondents FAA Docket No. 16-15

-05

NOTICE OF EXTENSION OF TIME This matter is before the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) based on the abovereferenced complaint, filed in accordance with FAA Rules of Practice for Federally-Assisted Airport Enforcement Proceedings , 14 CFR Part 16. Pursuant to 14 CFR Part 16, subpart B , the date by which the Director's Determination will be issued in this matter is hereby extended to April 19, 2016. An extension oftime is necessary and appropriate for a fair and complete determination in this case.



# . d:et flffp Acting Director, Airport Compliance

and Management AnalysisCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on

# Februar**Ol6,** I caused to be placed in the United States mail (first class mail, postage paid) a true copy ofthe Notice of Extension ofTime addressed to: Counsel for Complainant: Timothy I. McCulloch Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 2375 East Camelback Road Suite 750 Phoenix, AZ 85016
Counsel for Respondents: Brandon H. Moss , Esq. Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane, LLP Crown Colony Plaza 300 Crown Colony Drive, Suite 410 Quincy, Massachusetts 02169 Town ofNorwood, Massachusetts 566 Washington Street Norwood, Massachusetts 02062 Norwood Airport Commission 125 Access Road Norwood, Massachusetts 02062 Copy to: FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket, AGC-61 0 FAA Airport Compliance and Management

Analysis, AC0-100

laudia Roberts Office ofAirport Compliance

and Management Analysis
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2163 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2163

  To amend title 18, United States Code, to regulate the manufacture, 
  importation, and sale of ammunition capable of piercing police body 
                                 armor.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 30, 1996

 Mr. Moynihan introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title 18, United States Code, to regulate the manufacture, 
  importation, and sale of ammunition capable of piercing police body 
                                 armor.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Law Enforcement Officers Protection 
Amendment Act of 1996''.

SEC. 2. EXPANSION OF THE DEFINITION OF ARMOR PIERCING AMMUNITION.

    Section 921(a)(17)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking ``or'' at the end of clause (i);
            (2) by striking the period at the end of clause (ii) and 
        inserting ``; or''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
                            ``(iii) a projectile that may be used in a 
                        handgun and that the Secretary of the Treasury, 
                        in consultation with the Attorney General 
                        determines, pursuant to section 926(d), to be 
                        capable of penetrating body armor.''.

SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF ARMOR PIERCING CAPABILITY OF PROJECTILES.

    Section 926 of such title is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
    ``(d) Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this 
subsection, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations based on 
standards to be developed by the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, for the uniform testing of 
projectiles to determine whether such projectiles are capable of 
penetrating National Institute of Justice Level II-A body armor.

SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
necessary for the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General 
to--
            (1) develop and implement performance standards for armor 
        piercing ammunition; and
            (2) promulgate regulations for performance standards for 
        armor piercing ammunition.
                                 <all>
```
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 January 2, 2014

Order 

Clerk

January 2, 2014

146440(126)

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES

CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

SC: 146440

v COA: 306618

Court of Claims: 11-000033-MT

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion for the temporary admission of Joe 

Huddleston to practice pro hac vice under MCR 8.126 on behalf of amicus curiae 

Multistate Tax Commission is GRANTED.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 2829

_____________________________ J.D., Father of W.S.D., Minor Child
, Appellant,

v.

D EPARTMENT OF C HILDREN AND F AMILIES , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County

. James P. Nilon , Judge

. November 1, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
B.L. T HOMAS , C.J.
, and B ILBREY and J AY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and auth orized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Audrie H. Hoehn of Audrie M. Harris, P.A., Gainesville
, for Appellant.

Ward L. Metzger, Children’s Legal Services, Department of Children and Families, Jacksonville; Thoma sina F. Moore, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Sara E. Goldfarb, Appellate Counsel, Guardian ad Litem Program, Tallahassee; and Beth Kathryn Roland, Defending Best Interests Project, Florida Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office, Orlando
, for Appellee.
#### Carl JACKSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 36807.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 27, 1964.

Rehearing Denied June 24, 1964.

Leonard Howell, Midland, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is the possession of whiskey, wine and vodka for the purpose of sale in a dry area; the punishment, 90 days in jail.

No statement of facts accompanies the record. From the transcript it appears that appellant plead guilty on January 20, and that motion for new trial was overruled on January 21, “without the Defendant being present thereat, but being represented by his attorney.” It is only in those cases where the defendant desires to be present at the hearing of a motion for new trial and is denied such right that a reversal is called for, as will be seen by our opinion in Johnson v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 101, 289 S.W.2d 249, in which we discuss Henderson v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 18, 127 S.W.2d 902, upon which appellant relies.

We find no factual support in the record of the other contentions advanced in appellant’s brief.

No reversible error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-20092

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE GARCIA, also known as Pedro Garcia

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:07-CR-360-ALL

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jose Garcia appeals his guilty plea conviction for being found unlawfully

in the United States following deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He

requests only that this court exercise its power pursuant to Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 36 to correct an alleged clerical error in the judgment.

Specifically, he alleges that the district court’s judgment misidentifies the nature

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 18, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-20092

2

of his offense as “[i]llegal reentry after deportation” when it should state that he

was found unlawfully in the United States. 

Rule 36 authorizes this court to correct only clerical errors, which exist

when “the court intended one thing but by merely clerical mistake or oversight

did another.” United States v. Steen, 55 F.3d 1022, 1026 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the district court’s

judgment, the “Nature of Offense” description, “[i]llegal reentry after deportation

following conviction for an aggravated felony,” so closely tracks the § 1326 title,

“[r]eentry of removed aliens,” that it bears no indicia of the district court having

made a mistake or oversight. Rather, it appears that the district court intended

the “Nature of Offense” to refer generally to the title of § 1326. Therefore, there

is no clerical error, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. See

United States v. Buendia-Rangel, 553 F.3d 378, 379 (5th Cir. 2008).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

TIYON TONY FORD, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 68658 

# FILED FEB 1 0 2016

laER fre ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE This is a pro se appeal from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson, Judge.

Appellant filed his postconviction petition on May 19, 2014, more than six years after issuance of remittitur on direct appeal on October 2, 2007. Ford u. State, Docket No. 48781 (Order of Affirmance, September 6, 2007). Therefore, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Additionally, his petition was successive as he previously sought postconviction reliel 2 See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2). His petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). 'This appeal has been submitted for decision without oral argument, NRAP 34(0(3), and we conclude that the record is sufficient for our review and briefing is unwarranted. See Thicken v. Warden, 91 Nev. 681, 682, 541 P.2d 910, 911 (1975).
2 Ford v. State, Docket No. 52915 (Order of Affirmance, August 27, 2009).

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA (0) 1947A cep(

## est 

# ;r

1 7 44 Douglas 

# L 1 '4 Cherry J. Appellant failed to demonstrate good cause to overcome the procedural default. Further, his claim that he is actually innocent lacks merit because he failed to present new evidence establishing that he is actually innocent of his crime. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying appellant's petition as procedurally barred. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.



### c , c_5z6

, C.J. Parraguirre

cc: Hon. Eric Johnson, District Judge Tiyon T. Ford Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COUFtT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A es,
Exhibit 31.2  Commodore Applied Technologies, Inc. & Subsidiaries Certification Of Chief Financial Officer PURSUANT TO RULE 13a  14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS AMENDED, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  I, Ted R. Sharp, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K of Commodore Applied Technologies, Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periods presented in this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; c. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.   Date: April 17, 2007 /s/ Ted R. Sharp Ted R. Sharp Chief Financial Officer
#### Donna Scrogum WALLACE et vir, Petitioners, v. L. G. SCROGUM, Respondent.

No. A-9777.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Dec. 11, 1963.

William C. McDonald, San Angelo, for petitioners.

O’Neal Dendy, San Angelo, for respondent.

CALVERT, Chief Justice.

This is a child custody case involving the custody of the three children of respondent, L. G. Scrogum, and his former wife, Donna Scrogum Wallace. The trial court awarded custody of the three children to L. G. Scrogum. The Court of Civil Appeals has affirmed. 369 S.W.2d 531.

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.

Writ of error was granted on petitioners’ second point of error reading as follows: “The Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that the trial court was correct in refusing to give full faith and credit to the prior judgment of the District Court of San Juan County, New Mexico.” The judgment referred to is a judgment of the District Court of San Juan County, New Mexico, entered approximately a year before trial of this case, awarding custody of the oldest child to the mother upon an express finding that she was “a fit and capable mother.” On the trial of this case L. G. Scrogum neither alleged nor sought to prove such changed conditions since the rendition of the New Mexico judgment as would require or authorize a change of custody of the child from its mother to its father.

In granting writ of error it was our tentative opinion that the point of error quoted above should be sustained. It now appears, however, that the question presented by the point of error was not preserved in the motion for rehearing in the Court of Civil Appeals; therefore, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. Rules 458 and 469, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Loftis, 148 Tex. 242, 223 S.W.2d 613.

The application for writ of error contains only one other point of error. In it, petitioner, Mrs. Wallace, asserts an abuse of discretion by the trial court in not awarding custody of the three children to her. From the record before us we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding custody of the three children to their father, respondent here. It follows that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals must be affirmed.

The' judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7648

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JAMES DARREN TAYLOR, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (CR-94-40, CA-98-182-3-V) Submitted: March 21, 2002 Decided: March 27, 2002 Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Darren Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: James Darren Taylor seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 motion (West Supp. 2001). We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on June 26, 2001. Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on September 17, 2001. Because Appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED