IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 26, 2022 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RANDY RAY RAMSEY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cocke County

Nos. 2362, 6888, 68901 Carter S. Moore,

2 Judge

No. E2021-00266-CCA-R3-CD

In this delayed appeal, the Defendant, Randy Ray Ramsey, appeals his conviction for 

second degree murder and corresponding twenty-five-year sentence. The Defendant 

contends that his due process rights were violated when the jury venire saw him in shackles 

during jury selection, including one juror who served on the jury panel. After reviewing 

the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the error was harmless and 

affirm the Defendant’s conviction. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD 

WITT, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR.,JJ., joined.

Bryce W. McKenzie, Sevierville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Randy Ray Ramsey.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; T. Austin Watkins, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Jimmy B. Dunn, District Attorney General; and Joann Sheldon (at trial)

and Tonya D. Thornton (at trial and in post-trial pleadings), Assistant District Attorneys

General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

 

1 The Defendant filed a number of post-trial pro se pleadings. Case number 2362 relates to a June 29, 2015 

motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence and a September 21, 2015 petition for writ of 

error coram nobis, both of which raised an issue regarding the coroner that is not relevant to this appeal. 

Case number 6890 relates to a January 26, 2016 petition for writ of habeas corpus based upon jail credits, 

which is similarly not relevant to this appeal. Case number 6888 relates to a January 11, 2016 petition for 

post-conviction relief, which led to this delayed appeal. 

2 Retired Judge Ben W. Hooper, II, presided over the Defendant’s trial and post-trial motions. Judge Moore

took over the Defendant’s case beginning with the October 17, 2017 petition for a delayed appeal. 
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OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Defendant was charged with first degree murder based upon the June 17, 2010 

shooting death of Molly Green Howard (the victim). See State v. Randy Ray Ramsey, No. 

E2013-01951-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 5481327, at *1-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2014). 

Before trial, the parties agreed that the Defendant would appear in street clothing and have 

no physical restraints during the trial, and the trial court issued an order to that effect. 

The Defendant’s trial occurred on February 13-14, 2013. On February 13, after voir 

dire,3the trial court made the following remarks:

THE COURT: The [c]ourt does want to bring up one matter about the 

shackles. I didn’t notice until [the Defendant] . . . got up to leave that there 

was no rattling of the chains, and that may be the reason that I sat in the little 

ante-room outside the courtroom and actually even said something to him, as 

I thought all chains were being taken off of him and I did not notice that there 

were any chains left on him. Now, I don’t think that this is going to be a 

problem, but I think being an [o]fficer of the [c]ourt I guess that I should at 

least put that on the record and, you know, the time will come when this case 

is concluded that you all will have the right to talk to jurors about things, but 

I don’t – I doubt seriously that there was a single juror [who] would have 

noticed that. 

GENERAL SHELDON: Your Honor, if it please the [c]ourt, I had that issue 

in a case in Sevier County, but the difference was . . . that the jury was 

elevated . . . so that there was sight. There was a difference. In this point 

you got people who are sitting and their elevation is different, so I would 

submit that that’s a difference.

THE COURT: I took note of that and the only person that was kind of on 

this front row out here that I recall being called up was Mitch Coakley.

CLERK: Well, plus Tracy Ivy was standing right there most of the time 

which would have blocked some of their view.

 

3 The trial transcript begins with the trial court’s discussion of the shackling issue. From context, it 

appears that the jury panel had been selected and sent to the jury room before the court made its 

comments.
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GENERAL THORNTON: And as an [o]fficer of the [c]ourt, I sat right here 

and watched him and I saw [trial counsel] say hello to him as he walked in 

and I didn’t see it and I was sitting right here as well, so.

THE COURT: Well, our witness coordinator was sitting right here in the 

chair and he walked by her and she did not notice it. So anyway, it wasn’t 

like we heard the chains a rattling and everybody looked to see what that 

was. So we’re back in recess.

At trial, Cocke County Sheriff’s Officer Jason Oury testified that at the crime scene, 

he found the Defendant kneeling beside the victim and holding bloody towels; the 

Defendant stated, “I dropped it, it went off.” Ramsey, 2014 WL 5481327, at *1. Detective 

Robert Caldwell later interviewed the Defendant, who gave a written statement. Id. at *2. 

The statement reflected that the victim had moved in with the Defendant about a month 

before her death and that on the evening of the shooting, the Defendant and the victim spent 

time at a bar before returning home. According to the Defendant, the victim asked the 

Defendant to take his 12-gauge shotgun from the kitchen to an outbuilding. The Defendant 

stated that he owned the gun in order to kill water snakes. The Defendant claimed that 

when he picked up the gun, it went off; that he did not realize the hammer was cocked; and 

that he did not pull the trigger. The Defendant denied that he intended to shoot the victim. 

After the Defendant signed the statement, he asked to add that he habitually took the gun 

outside before he and the victim went to bed. The Defendant also posed for a photograph 

using a baseball bat to demonstrate how he was holding the gun at the time of the shooting. 

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Special Agent Derek Newport helped to 

process the crime scene, including collecting the shotgun. Ramsey, 2014 WL 5481327, at 

*2. Special Agent Newport testified that when he found the gun, the “breech was closed” 

and lying on the floor, and the hammer was “forward.” He noted that a fired shell casing 

was “inside the breech, not the shotgun,” and that he pulled the casing out with his fingers. 

TBI toxicologist Special Agent Adam Gray testified that the victim’s blood and 

vitreous fluid tested negative for alcohol. Ramsey, 2014 WL 5481327, at *2. The victim’s 

toxicology report tested positive for atropine, a drug usually administered by medical 

personnel, diazepam, nordiazepam, and oxycodone. In the report, Special Agent Gray also 

noted that presumptive testing indicated the possibility of additional benzodiazepines as 

well as methylphenidate (Ritalin). Special Agent Gray noted that all of the drugs present 

in the victim’s system were within or below the therapeutic ranges.

TBI Special Agent Robert Royse, an expert in firearm identification, testified that 

the Defendant’s gun was a “Lyon Arms 12[-]gauge top break shotgun” manufactured 

around 1900. Ramsey, 2014 WL 5481327, at *2-3. Agent Royse noted that the gun’s only 
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safety mechanism was a trigger guard. Special Agent Royse performed a series of tests on 

the gun to verify whether it would fire when struck by an object or dropped while the 

hammer was cocked. During the tests, the hammer remained cocked, but the gun did not 

fire. Special Agent Royse determined that ten pounds of pressure was required on the 

trigger for the hammer to “fall.” He stated, though, that when the “hammer [was] lowered 

into the lower position and the hammer spur [was] struck with an object . . . it [would]

discharge the shot shell case.”

Special Agent Royse examined a bikini top that the victim was wearing at the time 

of the shooting and determined that the shot was fired from between two and six feet away. 

Ramsey, 2014 WL 5481327, at *3. On cross-examination, Special Agent Royse clarified

that the shotgun would not fire when the hammer was cocked and it was “banged against 

something.” However, it would fire when the hammer was not cocked if the gun was 

bumped against something from the rear with “fairly substantial” force. 

Dr. Steven Cogswell performed the victim’s autopsy. Ramsey, 2014 WL 5481327, 

at *3. The victim had a gunshot wound to her chest wall just underneath her right breast, 

and Dr. Cogswell noted that the edge of the wound was “associated with the lower edge of 

the bikini top[.]” Dr. Cogswell estimated that the muzzle of the shotgun was between three 

and five feet from the victim when it fired. Dr. Cogswell noted that the path of the wound 

through the victim’s body indicated a downward trajectory. Dr. Cogswell stated that 

because the wound occurred in a female breast, he could examine how the shape of the 

wound changed with repositioning and ascertain the position of the victim’s body when 

she was shot. Id. at *3-4. Dr. Cogswell opined that the victim was lying flat on her back 

when she was shot, and he further opined that the photograph showing the Defendant with 

the baseball bat supported his finding. 

Dr. Gregory James Davis testified for the defense as an expert in pathology.

Ramsey, 2014 WL 5481327, at *5. He stated that although the autopsy and corresponding 

report were generally “excellent,” it was impossible for any pathologist to determine the 

position of the victim’s body when she was shot. Dr. Davis agreed that the autopsy findings 

were consistent with the victim’s lying on her back at the time of the shooting, but he noted

that the findings could have been consistent with a number of scenarios.

The jury convicted the Defendant of second degree murder as a lesser-included 

offense. After the verdict was announced and the jurors were individually polled, the trial 

court held a brief bench conference in which the parties agreed that the court should ask 

the jury about the “little business that happened at the very beginning about the shackles.” 

The following exchange occurred:
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THE COURT: The [c]ourt’s going to make inquiry as to something that 

happened on the morning that this trial began. [The Defendant] has been in 

custody for some time and I don’t know for how long, but when he was 

brought into the courtroom, he had no handcuffs or anything on like that, but 

there were shackles on his ankles. Did any of you all see shackles on his 

ankles when he was brought into the courtroom?

(One juror raised hand) 

THE COURT: You did?

. . . .

THE COURT: Anybody else?

(No response)

THE COURT: Did that play -- well, let me go one step further. Was that 

fact brought to the attention of anybody else? 

JUROR: You mean me telling them?

THE COURT: Yes.

JUROR: No, I didn’t say a word about it.

THE COURT: Did that have any bearing on your decision in this case?

JUROR: None whatsoever.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay, that’s as far as I need to go.

After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered twenty-five years’ incarceration. 

On May 16, 2013, the Defendant filed a motion for new trial in which he argued, in relevant 

part, that he was improperly shackled in front of the jury venire. At the August 22, 2013 

motion for new trial hearing, the trial court made the following comments:

Now, the business about the shackles. I remember I was a little upset and 

concerned when that happened, but . . . I was satisfied that there was no harm 

created by this. I came in myself looking I guess right at him; I didn’t even 

see it. Apparently somebody did and we addressed it. And apparently then
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the courts of this state have recognized that, you know, under certain 

circumstances it’s not a matter to be concerned with. And not that this is a 

ruling of mine in this case, but, you know, quite frankly, I don’t see what 

would be wrong if you brought everybody in in shackles and stripes. You 

know, if they’re in jail, that’s where they are. What do people – where do 

they think they would be, you know. It seems like that we get too carried 

away with things and make too much out of it. Even though, as I said, it kind 

of had my attention[;] . . . I didn’t like it at all, but I was satisfied that it was 

not a matter that caused you any harm or affected the jury’s verdict in this 

case under any circumstances.

The trial court subsequently entered a September 17, 2013 written order denying the 

motion for new trial. In relevant part, the court found that it had questioned the jurors about 

the shackling, that only one juror saw the shackles and affirmed that it had no impact on 

his impartiality, and that no harm resulted to the Defendant. The Defendant’s direct appeal 

of his conviction only raised as issues the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing. 

Ramsey, 2014 WL 5481327, at *5-8. 

On January 11, 2016, the Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition, which 

included the shackling issue as a standalone due process claim and in the context of 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The post-conviction court appointed 

counsel, who filed a May 20, 2016 amended post-conviction petition and subsequently 

withdrew on August 8, 2016. The post-conviction court appointed new counsel, and on 

October 17, 2017, post-conviction counsel filed a “Petition Requesting a Delayed Appeal 

and the Stay of All Other Matters.” The Defendant argued that he was entitled to a delayed 

appeal because trial counsel failed to include the shackling issue in the Defendant’s direct 

appeal in spite of instructions from the Defendant to do such. 

On February 23, 2021, the post-conviction court granted a delayed appeal confined 

to the shackling issue. The court stated that due to difficulties in securing the Defendant 

transportation to court and delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties had 

agreed to stipulate that counsel was deficient for failing to raise the shackling issue at trial 

or on direct appeal. The court noted that granting the delayed appeal resulted in a net 

reduction in judicial resources, but it cautioned that its finding of deficiency did not extend 

to any other post-conviction issue. The court further found that a reasonable probability 

existed that the Defendant would be granted a new trial upon appellate review of the 

shackling issue.
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ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated when a 

juror saw the Defendant in shackles during jury selection. The State concedes that an error 

occurred in this regard but argues that it was harmless.

“It is a well-settled principle of due process that every defendant in a criminal case 

must be afforded the ‘physical indicia of innocence.’” State v. Hall, 461 S.W.3d 469, 497 

(Tenn. 2015) (citing Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973), Mobley

v. State, 397 S.W.3d 70, 100 (Tenn. 2013)). Our supreme court has held that a legal

presumption exists against the use of physical restraints like leg shackles at trial because 

they are “an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings” and that they 

should only be used as “a last resort.” Id. at 498 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 

(1970)); see Mobley, 397 S.W.3d at 101. However, the decision to require physical 

restraints is left to the sound discretion of the trial court after considering a number of 

factors.4 Mobley, 397 S.W.3d at 99 (citing Willocks v. State, 546 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1976)). In the event a defendant appears before a jury in shackles, the trial court must 

issue an instruction that the shackles should not influence the jury’s decision. Id. When a 

violation of due process due to shackling occurs, we must determine whether the error was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thompson, 832 S.W.2d 577, 581-82 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1991).

We agree with the State that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The Defendant wore ankle shackles during voir dire, and they were removed before trial 

began. The trial court, the prosecutors, and a court clerk discussed on the record that the 

prospective jurors had a limited view of the Defendant’s feet, and the court was uncertain 

whether any of the seated jurors saw the shackles.5 The court polled the jurors after the 

return of the verdict and determined that only one juror saw them. The juror affirmed in 

open court that the shackles did not impact his impartiality and that he did not tell any of 

the other jurors about them. The State’s evidence against the Defendant was strong, and 

the main issue at trial was the Defendant’s state of mind when he shot the victim. The jury 

ultimately convicted the Defendant of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, 

 

4 Because the parties agree that the Defendant’s shackling during voir dire occurred in violation of the trial 

court’s order allowing the Defendant to appear without restraints at trial, we need not expound on the 

findings required to impose restraints on a defendant.

5 We acknowledge that the parties and the trial court were placed in a difficult position—if the court had 

inquired with the jury venire or the jury panel about the shackles when the issue arose, it may have placed 

undue attention on them at the beginning of trial. Nonetheless, addressing the issue promptly would have 

allowed the court to excuse any potentially affected jurors or at least issue the mandated curative instruction. 

See Mobley, 397 S.W.3d at 99. 
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implicitly finding that the circumstantial evidence of premeditation was insufficient. See

id. at 582 (noting that where the defendant admitted to escaping from prison, but the jury 

found the defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense relative to his assaulting a prison 

guard, “[t]hese circumstances belie[d] the existence of prejudice resulting from the leg 

irons [worn during trial] or from the failure to instruct relative to them.”). The Defendant 

is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

CONCLUSION

In consideration of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

 

_________________________________ 

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE