[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 27 (Thursday, February 8, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8652-8666]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-02513]


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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD


Recommendation 2023-01

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a 
Recommendation to the Secretary of Energy concerning the U.S. 
Department of Energy's (DOE) regulatory safety framework related to 
onsite transportation and safety deficiencies in Los Alamos National 
Laboratory's transportation safety document. Pursuant to the 
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is publishing the Recommendation and 
associated correspondence with DOE and requesting comments from 
interested members of the public.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the 
recommendation are due on or by March 11, 2024.

ADDRESSES: Send comments concerning this notice to: Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue NW, Suite 700, Washington, 
DC 20004-2001. Comments may also be submitted by email to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#99faf6f4f4fcf7edd9fdf7ffeafbb7fef6ef"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a8cbc7c5c5cdc6dce8ccc6cedbca86cfc7de">[email protected]</span></a>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tara Tadlock, Associate Director for 
Board Operations, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901, (800) 788-4016.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Recommendation 2023-1 to the Secretary of Energy

Onsite Transportation Safety

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(b)(5)
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended
    Introduction. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) 
has evaluated Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) safety basis for 
onsite transportation, detailed in the laboratory's transportation 
safety document (TSD); the safe harbors \1\ for onsite transportation 
of radioactive materials identified in the U.S. Department of Energy's 
(DOE) Nuclear Safety Management rule, 10 Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) Part 830; and the ability of DOE's safety oversight framework to 
identify and correct safety issues with its safe harbors and the TSDs 
at its defense nuclear facilities.
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    \1\ Table 1 of Appendix A to Subpart B of 10 CFR 830 lists 
acceptable methodologies for developing safety analyses to meet 
requirements in 10 CFR 830. Such methodologies are referred to as 
``safe harbors.'' Throughout this document the phrase ``onsite 
transportation safe harbors'' refers to both DOE Order 460.1D, 
Hazardous Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety, and DOE 
Guide 460.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, 
Packaging and Transportation Safety, as they relate to the 
preparation of an onsite TSD for radioactive materials that are not 
of national security interest.
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    The Board identified safety weaknesses in LANL's onsite TSD, 
stemming in part from weaknesses in the safe harbors that govern TSD 
development, and communicated its safety concerns to the Secretary of 
Energy in a January 6, 2022, letter. The National Nuclear Security 
Administration's (NNSA) management and operating contractor at LANL, 
Triad National Security, LLC, implemented compensatory safety measures 
for onsite transportation of radioactive materials in March 2023, 
following a letter of direction from the NNSA Los Alamos Field Office 
(NA-LA). Triad formally incorporated the compensatory measures into 
revisions of the LANL TSD and technical safety requirements (TSR), 
which NA-LA approved in August 2023, with two conditions of approval 
(COA) [2]. These measures and COAs represent an improvement to the 
safety of onsite transportation of radioactive materials at LANL; 
however, more work is necessary to ensure the LANL TSD appropriately 
identifies all hazards, analyzes all pertinent accident scenarios, and 
evaluates the effectiveness of all credited safety controls.
    NA-LA had approved Triad's deficient TSD on the basis that it met 
the applicable safe harbors for safety analysis identified in 10 CFR 
830. Until DOE revises the safe harbors for onsite transportation of 
radioactive materials to provide clear and effective safety 
requirements, the risk remains that LANL or other defense nuclear sites 
may regress to inadequate TSDs that fail to provide an effective set of 
safety controls. The Board has concluded the following:
    (1) The recently approved compensatory safety measures are 
welcomed; however, the LANL TSD requirements and their implementation 
do not ensure that onsite transportation activities at LANL are 
conducted in a manner that ensures adequate protection of public health 
and safety;
    (2) The requirements of the safe harbors do not ensure that onsite 
transportation activities are conducted in a manner that ensures 
adequate protection of public health and safety; and
    (3) DOE failed to address known safety deficiencies in its safe 
harbors for onsite transportation of radioactive materials and 
neglected to take timely action to correct the safety issues with the 
LANL TSD.
    Background. 10 CFR 830 specifies that onsite transportation of 
radioactive materials at DOE sites may be conducted either in 
accordance with Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations or under 
a specific type of documented safety analysis (DSA) known as a TSD. 
Table 1 in Appendix A to Subpart B of 10 CFR 830 identifies the 
following safe harbor methodology for preparing DSAs/TSDs for onsite 
transportation activities:
    <bullet> Preparing a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging in 
accordance with DOE Order 460.1A, Packaging and Transportation Safety, 
October 2, 1996, or successor document; and
    <bullet> Preparing a Transportation Safety Document in accordance 
with DOE Guide 460.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, 
Packaging and Transportation Safety, June 5, 1997, or successor 
document.
    Following a safety review of the LANL TSD, the Board identified 
safety issues with both the LANL TSD and the onsite transportation safe 
harbors in 10 CFR 830. The Board documented these safety issues in a 
letter to the Secretary of Energy dated January 6, 2022. DOE responded 
on September 13, 2022, stating its agreement with, and plans to 
address, the Board's safety concerns. However, DOE's response only 
partially addressed the safety concerns identified by the Board. 
Furthermore, DOE did not ensure that LANL took timely action to 
implement compensatory measures at LANL that are needed to provide 
adequate protection of workers and the public during onsite 
transportation activities in the absence of an adequate TSD.
    Analysis. Attachment B, Findings, Supporting Data, and Analysis, 
provides additional detail and supporting analysis for this 
recommendation, the conclusions of which are discussed below.
    LANL Transportation Safety Document--10 CFR 830 defines a DSA 
(including TSDs) as ``a documented analysis of the extent to which a 
nuclear facility can be operated safely with respect to workers, the 
public, and the

[[Page 8653]]

environment, including a description of the conditions, safe 
boundaries, and hazard controls that provide the basis for ensuring 
safety'' [3]. The LANL TSD has fundamental flaws in critical safety 
areas and thus does not demonstrate that members of the public and 
workers are adequately protected during onsite transportation 
activities.
    The LANL TSD does not adequately (1) identify all potential 
hazards, (2) analyze accident scenarios, and (3) demonstrate the 
effectiveness of its safety control set. These safety issues are 
particularly concerning given the high material-at-risk (MAR) allowed 
by the TSD, the proximity of LANL's onsite transportation routes to the 
public, and the nature of several credible accident scenarios. These 
factors result in high calculated unmitigated dose consequences to the 
public without an adequate safety control strategy. On January 31, 
2023, Triad informed NA-LA that it would implement compensatory safety 
measures by late March 2023 and would submit a revised TSD with updated 
TSRs by June 1, 2023. Triad implemented the compensatory measures 
procedurally on March 31, 2023, and submitted a revised TSD and TSRs 
that incorporated those measures to NA-LA for approval on June 1, 2023. 
NA-LA approved the revised TSD and TSRs on August 10, 2023, with two 
COAs which require Triad to address additional NA-LA comments in the 
2023 and 2024 annual update of the TSD and TSRs [2]. The compensatory 
measures and COAs improve the safety of LANL onsite transportation 
operations and partially address the LANL-specific safety issues that 
the Board raised in January 2022. Therefore, DOE should ensure that 
Triad continues to implement these compensatory measures until it 
develops a TSD in full compliance with 10 CFR 830 that would resolve 
the safety issues of adequate protection identified in this 
recommendation.
    Onsite Transportation Directives--The Board identified four primary 
safety concerns with the DOE directives related to onsite 
transportation. First, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not 
contain all applicable requirements from 10 CFR 830; therefore, they do 
not ensure that TSDs meet all 10 CFR 830 requirements. In DOE's 
response to the Board's January 6, 2022, letter, DOE asserted that 10 
CFR 830 requirements apply ``regardless of the methodology for DSA 
development that is used,'' and that, consequently, 10 CFR 830 
requirements do not need to flow down into the onsite transportation 
safe harbors [4]. DOE's assertion is inconsistent with the role of safe 
harbors, which is to provide an approved DSA methodology such that if a 
contractor follows the safe harbors, then all the requirements of 10 
CFR 830 will be fulfilled. This concern is illustrated by the LANL TSD: 
although the LANL TSD follows the safe harbor methodology specified in 
10 CFR 830, it fails to properly derive hazard controls necessary to 
ensure adequate protection of workers and the public. Additionally, the 
lack of requirements in the safe harbors has led sites across DOE's 
defense nuclear facilities complex to seek supplementary guidance from 
other documents. Specifically, several sites supplement guidance from 
the onsite transportation safe harbors with methodologies from DOE 
Standard 3009-94 Change Notice 3, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department 
of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, for 
development and analysis of unique, bounding accident scenarios, 
including quantitative analysis [5]. Examples include the 2011 Hanford 
TSD, the 2015 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) TSD, and 
the 2017 Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) TSD. The sites' reliance 
on methods from another safe harbor to adequately evaluate accident 
conditions highlights the weakness of the onsite transportation safe 
harbors in meeting 10 CFR 830 requirements, particularly related to the 
evaluation of accident conditions.
    Second, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not provide 
specific criteria against which to deterministically evaluate the 
effectiveness of the safety control set, leading to an incomplete 
understanding of the risk of onsite transportation operations.\2\ 
Instead, they require that TSDs demonstrate an equivalent level of 
safety to DOT and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations for 
offsite transportation. However, the onsite transportation safe harbors 
do not provide a clear definition of equivalent safety. In DOE's 
response to the Board's January 6, 2022, letter, DOE acknowledged that 
an improved methodology ``to better document analyses of equivalent 
safety'' was warranted and committed to providing better guidance [4]. 
DOE has not provided a timeline for that new guidance in its response, 
nor in any subsequent communication.
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    \2\ By way of comparison, the safe harbor for DOE nonreactor 
nuclear facilities, DOE Standard 3009-2014, Preparation of 
Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Documented Safety Analysis, applies the 
concept of an evaluation guideline (25 rem total effective dose for 
a member of the offsite public), which ``the safety analysis 
evaluates against,'' and ``is established for the purpose of 
identifying the need for and evaluating safety controls'' [16].
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    Third, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not provide 
guidance on methods to control public access during onsite transfers 
conducted under TSDs. Restricting public access is important from both 
regulatory and safety perspectives, because onsite transfers may use 
roads open to the public. If public access is not properly restricted, 
the public could be closer to onsite transportation activities than 
intended. Members of the public could initiate an accident (e.g., 
vehicle crash) and could receive a higher radiation dose by being in 
the vicinity of a transport accident if a release occurred. 
Additionally, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not provide 
detailed guidance on controlling onsite traffic of site personnel. 
Similar to the concern with members of the public, site personnel 
traveling onsite in government or personal vehicles could initiate an 
accident during onsite transfers of radioactive material. At LANL in 
particular, the high operational tempo needed to accomplish its greatly 
expanded pit manufacturing mission will inevitably increase onsite 
traffic. Therefore, it is incumbent upon DOE to develop requirements 
and guidance on the control of site traffic during onsite transfers of 
radioactive material to ensure TSDs adequately address that hazard.
    Finally, DOE Standard 1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear 
Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents, does not 
contain specific guidance for federal review and approval of TSDs. As a 
result, DOE oversight personnel do not have specific criteria to 
evaluate whether a TSD ensures safety and complies with the onsite 
transportation safe harbors, as they would have for a DOE Standard 
3009-compliant DSA. In response to the Board's January 6, 2022, letter, 
DOE stated it would ``review DOE-STD-1104 to determine whether 
improvements are warranted'' [4]. DOE's response did not provide a 
timeline for that evaluation. To ensure adequate and consistent reviews 
by DOE oversight personnel across the defense nuclear complex, DOE 
should add review and approval criteria specific to TSDs to DOE 
Standard 1104-2016.
    DOE Oversight--DOE and NNSA failed to independently identify 
deficiencies in the onsite transportation safe harbors and the LANL 
TSD. Additionally, DOE and NNSA did not ensure that timely corrective 
actions were taken when the Board identified transportation safety 
concerns and have struggled to resolve safety concerns

[[Page 8654]]

when collaboration across program offices is required.
    DOE issued DOE Guide 460.1-1, the 10 CFR 830 safe harbor 
methodology for preparing TSDs, in 1997 and has not updated it since. 
Practitioners at DOE's defense nuclear facilities have at least tacitly 
recognized the deficiencies in the guide for many years. As discussed 
above, several sites use DOE Standard 3009-94 to supplement the onsite 
transportation safe harbors in developing their TSDs.
    Additionally, NNSA did not resolve safety issues with the LANL TSD. 
In 2007, an NNSA safety basis review team identified several of the 
safety issues discussed in this Recommendation. Personnel from the NNSA 
Packaging Certification Division, who were part of the safety basis 
review team, ``concluded that the TSD as submitted did not provide an 
adequate level of analysis to support the conclusions that for non DOT 
compliant packages the overall transport system provided an equivalent 
level of safety'' [6]. To address these issues, NA-LA directed the 
contractor to provide quantitative analysis, which was included in 
subsequent revisions of the TSD. However, in Revision 9, which became 
effective in November 2012, the LANL management and operating 
contractor completely rewrote the safety analysis, removing the 
quantitative analysis. When approving the 2012 revision, and each 
subsequent revision, NA-LA failed to identify the safety issues that 
had previously been corrected. Additionally, NNSA's Office of Packaging 
and Transportation conducted an assessment of LANL's packaging and 
transportation program in July 2015. This assessment provided an 
opportunity for NNSA to identify the weaknesses in the LANL TSD, but it 
did not. Finally, DOE's response to the Board's January 6, 2022, 
letter, stated that ``NNSA uses the Biennial Review process to review 
field office performance in meeting requirements for the review and 
approval of TSDs'' [4]. However, these biennial reviews did not 
identify the weaknesses in NA-LA's review and approval of the LANL TSD.
    The Board brought the safety concerns with the LANL TSD and the 
onsite transportation safe harbors to DOE's attention in its January 6, 
2022, letter; however, DOE did not take timely action to address them. 
It took more than a year for LANL to implement any compensatory 
measures to address the Board's safety concerns. More than ten months 
passed before NA-LA transmitted a letter requesting that Triad consider 
a wide-ranging list of potential compensatory measures. NA-LA 
considered Triad's first response on December 9, 2022, unsatisfactory. 
After additional discussions between Triad and NA-LA personnel, Triad 
sent a new letter to NA-LA on January 31, 2023, in which Triad agreed 
to implement a set of compensatory measures that represented an 
improvement to the safety posture of onsite transportation operations. 
It is noteworthy, however, that Triad's letter did not acknowledge that 
the compensatory measures were needed to address any safety issues.
    Further, given the safety concerns identified with the onsite 
transportation safe harbor and LANL TSD, DOE would greatly benefit from 
conducting a complete extent of condition review of all sites' TSDs. 
While the DOE Office of Environmental Management did conduct an extent 
of condition review for a subset of sites under its purview in 2021, it 
was done before the Board's letter highlighted the specific safety 
issues, and therefore the review's scope and approach were not informed 
by the Board's conclusions. Moreover, the review was not formally 
documented.
    Finally, the Board is concerned with DOE's ability to address 
safety issues that require collaboration across program offices. DOE's 
September 13, 2022, letter that responded to the Board's January 6, 
2022, letter acknowledged that DOE would need to evaluate ``how we 
communicate across offices, engage with the field, and share operating 
experiences across the Department.'' The Board concurs with DOE's 
recognition and need for such an evaluation, and for DOE to take 
corrective actions to ensure effective collaboration in developing 
appropriate requirements in the revised onsite transportation safe 
harbors.
    In summary, DOE's historical management of the safe harbors for 
onsite transportation of radioactive materials and the LANL TSD in 
particular indicates deficiencies in DOE's ability, as the regulatory 
authority, to recognize transportation safety issues and ensure that 
timely action is taken to address them.
    Recommendations. To ensure adequate protection during onsite 
transportation activities at DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities, 
the Board recommends that DOE carry out the following actions, 
organized by topical area below:
1. LANL Transportation Safety Document
    a. Revise the LANL TSD to address the safety concerns identified in 
this Recommendation and to comply with a revised safe harbor 
methodology per sub-Recommendation 2.a.
    b. Ensure compensatory safety measures remain in place until 
implementation of the LANL TSD revised per sub-Recommendation 1.a 
above.
2. Onsite Transportation Directives
    a. Rewrite DOE safe harbors for onsite transportation--DOE Order 
460.1D, Hazardous Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety, and 
DOE Guide 460.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, 
Packaging and Transportation Safety--to:
    i. Provide requirements and guidance to ensure TSDs comply with all 
applicable 10 CFR 830 safety basis requirements including requirements 
related to accident evaluation and hazard controls.
    ii. Include robust evaluation criteria to ensure TSDs demonstrate 
that safety controls are effective at reducing risk.
    iii. Include implementation guidance for restricting public access 
to transportation routes, and controlling onsite traffic, during onsite 
transportation of radioactive materials.
    b. Change DOE Standard 1104, Review and Approval of Nuclear 
Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents, to incorporate 
requirements and guidance for DOE review and approval of TSDs.
    c. Conduct an extent of condition review of TSDs for DOE sites with 
defense nuclear facilities to identify any near-term actions necessary 
to ensure safety until the safe harbors are revised and implemented.
3. DOE Oversight
    a. Perform an independent causal analysis for the safety issues 
identified in this Recommendation, including the effectiveness of DOE 
oversight of contractor TSDs, DOE's management of its onsite 
transportation directives, and DOE's evaluation of and actions in 
response to the safety issues identified in prior Board correspondence 
on onsite transportation safety. Identify and implement corrective 
actions to address appropriate causal analysis results that preclude 
recurrence of the safety issues.

Joyce L. Connery
Chair

Attachment A--Risk Assessment for Draft Recommendation 2023-1

    In making its recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and in 
accordance with 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2286a.(b)(5), the 
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) shall consider, and 
specifically assess risk (whenever sufficient data exists). This 
risk assessment supports Recommendation 2023-1, Onsite 
Transportation Safety. The Board's Policy Statement 5, Policy 
Statement on Assessing Risk, states:


[[Page 8655]]


    Risk assessments performed in accordance with the Board's 
revised enabling statute will aid the Secretary of Energy in the 
development of implementation plans focused on the safety 
improvements that are needed to address the Board's recommendations.

    This recommendation identifies safety issues with (1) the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) transportation safety document 
(TSD), (2) the Department of Energy's (DOE) onsite transportation 
safe harbors that contain the methodology for development of the 
safety basis for onsite transportation of radioactive materials, and 
(3) inadequate oversight from DOE and the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) in identifying and addressing these 
deficiencies and safety issues.
    Development of a safety basis is one of the primary mechanisms 
by which DOE ensures adequate protection of workers and the public. 
To that end, DOE Policy 420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety 
Policy, states that DOE is committed to ``[e]stablishing and 
implementing nuclear safety requirements,'' with the ``[k]ey nuclear 
safety elements to be addressed [to] include hazard identification, 
assessment and control'' [7]. The issues identified in 
Recommendation 2023-1 with regard to the onsite transportation safe 
harbors demonstrate that DOE has not met this commitment for onsite 
transportation of radioactive material.
    Therefore, TSDs that are developed following this methodology 
may not contain sufficient analysis to establish appropriate hazard 
controls. This issue is illustrated by the LANL TSD. The LANL TSD 
does not provide adequate analysis to demonstrate that significant 
public consequences are not credible and does not identify and 
analyze various credible hazards.
    Since the current LANL TSD does not calculate the likelihood and 
consequence of a vehicle accident, the Board used data from 
previously approved LANL TSDs. The July 2007 through March 2012 
revisions of the LANL TSD contained quantitative analysis of the 
risk of LANL onsite transportation activities [8]. Those older 
revisions of the TSD referenced the ``Area G Transuranic [TRU] Waste 
Transportation Accident and Fire'' scenario from the Area G safety 
basis dated April 2003.\3\ In this accident scenario, a vehicle 
crashes or rolls over, causing a fire and spilling the waste 
containers [9]. The postulated material-at-risk (MAR) in this 
scenario was the maximum inventory for a waste transportation truck 
at the time (about 17.7 kg plutonium 239, or Pu-239, equivalent). 
The estimated unmitigated dose consequence to the public was about 
190 rem total effective dose (TED).
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    \3\ The current revision of the Area G safety basis does not 
include a similar transportation accident scenario.
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    From November 2012 through June 2023, the LANL TSD had a MAR 
limit of 20 kg Pu-239 equivalent, the corresponding estimated dose 
consequence to the public is about 217 rem TED. The 2003 Area G 
accident scenario estimated the unmitigated likelihood of the 
accident to be 10<SUP>-</SUP>\3\ instances per year (once per 
thousand years). Additionally, the July 2007 through March 2012 
revisions of the TSD noted that the distance to the site boundary 
for some onsite transportation routes is closer than the distance to 
the site boundary for Area G. As a result, as noted in those TSDs, 
the unmitigated dose consequence for those transportation activities 
could be substantially higher. The current LANL TSD identifies some 
engineered controls (e.g., the package and enclosed cargo 
compartment \4\) that may provide some confinement in an accident. 
However, these safety controls are not designed to withstand the 
hypothetical accident conditions described in the relevant 
Department of Transportation and Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
regulations. Therefore, the reduction in risk they provide is not 
known. Additionally, the current LANL TSD allows for transfers of up 
to 1.9 kg Pu-239 equivalent without either a package or enclosed 
cargo compartment.
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    \4\ An enclosed cargo compartment is ``an enclosure with floor, 
walls on all sides, and a roof in which materials are transferred'' 
[22].
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    The Area G TRU waste transportation and fire accident scenario 
is just one of many potential onsite transportation accidents at 
LANL involving significant MAR quantities. From discussions with 
NNSA Los Alamos Field Office (NA-LA) personnel, the Board 
understands that LANL averages between 30 and 40 shipments of hazard 
category 2 quantities \5\ of material per year.
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    \5\ This term comes from DOE Standard 1027-1992, Hazard 
Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with 
DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. This standard 
determines which of four hazard categories--1, 2, 3, or less than 
3--applies to a facility, based on the amount of nuclear material it 
contains. In this case, a hazard category 2 quantity equates to 
approximately 1 kg or more of plutonium-239, or equivalent.
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    In the TSD and technical safety requirements submitted in June 
2023 and approved in August 2023, NNSA's management and operating 
contractor at LANL, Triad National Security, LLC, established a 
reduced MAR limit of 8.8 kg Pu-239 equivalent for onsite transfers 
at LANL [10] [11]. Using this value for the Area G TRU waste 
transportation accident scenario, the estimated unmitigated dose to 
the public would be about 96 rem TED.
    Given the high dose consequence and likelihood of potential 
accident scenarios for onsite transportation of radioactive 
materials at LANL, together with the lack of analysis in the LANL 
TSD to show the effectiveness of safety controls, the Board has 
determined this recommendation is justified and necessary from a 
risk perspective.

Attachment B--Findings, Supporting Data, and Analysis

    Background. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1D, Hazardous 
Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety, states that DOE has 
``broad authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as 
amended, to regulate activities involving radioactive materials . . 
. including the transportation of radioactive materials'' [12]. In 
most cases, DOE uses commercial carriers that are regulated by the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) and/or the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC). However, in some cases, DOE ``exercises its AEA 
authority to regulate certain Departmental shipments, including . . 
. onsite transfers'' [12].
    The order also states that onsite transfers of hazardous 
materials must be conducted in accordance either with ``49 CFR [Code 
of Federal Regulations] Parts 171-180 and the relevant federal 
regulations governing each mode of transportation,'' or a 
transportation safety document (TSD) [12]. Per DOE Order 460.1D, a 
``TSD must describe the methodology and compliance process to meet 
equivalent safety for any deviation from 49 CFR parts 171-180 and 49 
CFR parts 350-399'' and ``[f]or onsite transfers involving nuclear 
facility Hazard Category 2 or 3 quantities, the TSD must comply with 
the Safety Basis Requirements of 10 CFR part 830, subpart B'' [12].
    Additionally, 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, requires that each DOE 
contractor prepare a documented safety analysis (DSA) for 
transportation activities not covered by DOT regulations. Table 1 in 
Appendix A of 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, provides the acceptable 
methodologies for preparing a DSA; these methodologies are called 
``safe harbors.'' For transportation activities not involving 
materials of national security interest (MNSI),\6\ Table 1 
identifies DOE Order 460.1A and DOE Guide 460.1-1, Implementation 
Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, Packaging and Transportation 
Safety, as the safe harbors [13]. The order contains the methodology 
for preparing a safety analysis report for packaging, and the guide 
contains the methodology for preparing a TSD.
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    \6\ DOE defines MNSI as ``Hazardous materials used in the 
development, testing, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons 
and other materials that have been designated as critical to the 
national security of the United States'' [31].
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    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) conducted a 
safety review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) TSD, and 
identified safety issues with both the LANL TSD and the onsite 
transportation safe harbors.\7\ The Board communicated these safety 
concerns in a letter to the Secretary of Energy dated January 6, 
2022, and requested that DOE provide a written report and briefing 
within 120 calendar days (May 6, 2022). On May 12, 2022, DOE 
responded with a letter stating that it was addressing the Board's 
safety concerns, but the final report was still in process, and DOE 
anticipated transmitting the report by July 6, 2022. On September 
13, 2022, the Board received DOE's written report, and DOE

[[Page 8656]]

briefed the Board on its response on November 4, 2022.
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    \7\ Table 1 of Appendix A of 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, lists 
acceptable methodologies for developing safety analyses to meet 
requirements in 10 CFR 830. Such directives are referred to as 
``safe harbors.'' Throughout this document the phrase ``onsite 
transportation safe harbors'' refers to both DOE Order 460.1D, 
Hazardous Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety, and DOE 
Guide 460.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, 
Packaging and Transportation Safety, as they relate to the 
preparation of an onsite TSD for radioactive materials that are not 
of national security interest.
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    DOE's September 13, 2022, cover letter stated that DOE agreed 
with and planned to address the Board's safety concerns. However, 
the enclosed report only partially addressed the safety concerns 
identified by the Board. For instance, the response asserted that it 
was unnecessary to flow down requirements from 10 CFR 830 to the 
onsite transportation safe harbor, as the requirements apply 
regardless. However this is inconsistent with the role of safe 
harbors in 10 CFR 830, which describes them as acceptable 
methodologies for preparing a DSA (meaning that if a contractor 
follows the safe harbors, then all the requirements of 10 CFR 830 
will be fulfilled). Further, the response acknowledged that DOE's 
safe harbor for development of safety bases for onsite 
transportation of radioactive materials was deficient but then 
incongruously contended that the LANL TSD was acceptable because it 
met the deficient safe harbor.
    During this time, the management and operating contractor 
responsible for the LANL TSD, Triad National Security, LLC (Triad), 
took no compensatory safety actions to ensure the safety of the 
public and workers during onsite transfers of radioactive material. 
On October 11, 2022, the National Nuclear Security Administration's 
(NNSA) Los Alamos Field Office (NA-LA) sent a memorandum to Triad 
requesting that it develop an impact assessment of a list of 
potential compensatory measures, propose revisions to those 
measures, and propose additional measures, as applicable, within 60 
days. Triad responded to the NA-LA memo on December 9, 2022, stating 
that there would be ``minimal impact on cost, scope, and schedule of 
Laboratory operations,'' because ``the recommended compensatory 
measures are already included in the TSD implementation procedures 
as part of normal day-to-day operations'' [14]. Triad further stated 
that it would provide the revised TSD and associated technical 
safety requirements (TSR) to NA-LA by June 1, 2023 [14]. In follow-
up discussions with Board personnel, NA-LA indicated that Triad's 
response was unsatisfactory.
    Following further engagement with NA-LA, Triad sent a new 
response to NA-LA on January 31, 2023 [15]. It discussed what 
quantities of radioactive materials would constitute high material-
at-risk (MAR) transfers and provided detailed compensatory measures 
for high MAR transfers. Triad implemented these compensatory 
measures procedurally on March 31, 2023, and submitted to NA-LA for 
approval a revised TSD and TSRs which incorporated those measures on 
June 1, 2023 [1], which NA-LA approved in August 2023, with two 
conditions of approval (COA) [2].

Findings

1. LANL Transportation Safety Document

    Per 10 CFR 830, the purpose of a DSA (or a TSD, which is a 
specific type of DSA) is to ``provide reasonable assurance that a 
DOE nuclear facility can be operated safely in a manner that 
adequately protects workers, the public, and the environment'' [3]. 
Further, DOE Standard 3009-2014 says ``although all elements of the 
DSA preparation are important, three elements--hazard analysis, 
accident analysis, and hazard control selection--are fundamental, 
because they determine the hazard controls needed to provide 
protection for workers, the public, and the environment'' [16]. The 
LANL TSD has flaws in all three fundamental elements, and thus it 
does not demonstrate that members of the public or workers are 
adequately protected during onsite transportation activities.
    Inadequate Hazard Identification--10 CFR 830, Subpart B, states 
that the safety basis must ``identify and analyze the hazards 
associated with the work'' [3]. The LANL TSD does not contain 
sufficient analysis for a number of transportation-related hazards.
    Cliffs Along Transportation Routes--The LANL TSD acknowledges 
that packages used for onsite transportation may not survive a 30-
foot drop and states additional controls are identified to 
compensate. Many onsite transfers at LANL occur along the Pajarito 
corridor, a specific section of Pajarito Road on the LANL footprint 
near facilities such as Area G, the Plutonium Facility, and the 
Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF). There are steep cliffs along one 
side of the road, with drops of significantly more than 30 feet in 
some locations. However, the LANL TSD makes no mention of the 
specific hazard of the cliffs [17]. During the Board's review of the 
LANL TSD, Triad personnel identified guardrails and run-off 
distances along that route and stated that falling down a cliff was 
not a credible accident scenario. However, neither the guardrails 
nor the run-off distances are identified, credited, or shown to be 
sufficient to prevent drops down the cliffs in the LANL TSD. 
Therefore, the hazard posed by the cliffs along the transfer route 
is neither identified nor adequately controlled with the specific 
controls within the LANL TSD.
    Incompatible Materials--The LANL TSD identifies incompatible 
materials as a potential hazard in Table 7-1, P&T Hazardous 
Materials and Associated Design Basis Conditions. However, Table 7-
4, Design Basis Conditions and Packaging Performance Envelope for 
P&T Activities, asserts that the packages meet Type B equivalent 
level of safety for incompatible materials and thus no additional 
safety controls are needed. The Type B requirement in 10 CFR 71.43 
states there must be assurance that ``there will be no significant 
chemical, galvanic, or other reaction among the packaging 
components, among package contents, or between the packaging 
components and the package contents'' (emphasis added). To meet this 
requirement, the LANL TSD would need to provide assurance that 
incompatible materials will not be present in packages, but it 
currently does not.
    LANL's Packaging Evaluation Program document states ``the 
incompatible materials requirements are satisfied through shipper 
inspection . . . [and] specified in P&T-WI-001'' [18]. However, 
there is no corresponding section of P&T-WI-001 to verify that 
package contents meet the requirements under 10 CFR 71.43 [19]. 
Furthermore, the TWF TSRs state that when a container is found that 
contains oxidizing chemicals or chemical incompatibilities, it is to 
be removed immediately from TWF, per Limiting Condition of Operation 
3.2.3, Condition A, which would rely on onsite transportation to do 
so [20], thus violating the Type B requirements.
    Given that there is no inspection of package contents prior to 
transfer specifically dedicated to ensuring that incompatible 
materials are not present, and that the TWF TSR requires removal of 
containers containing incompatible materials, it can be assumed that 
transfers of incompatible materials may occur. Therefore, the LANL 
TSD assertion that no additional safety controls need to be 
developed to account for this hazard is not supported.
    Pyrophoric Materials--The LANL TSD previously asserted that 
pyrophoric materials were not applicable. In other words, the hazard 
of pyrophoric materials did not need to be further analyzed and 
controlled, because they would never be transported. However, in 
August 2020, LANL transported pyrophoric material that was not 
recognized as pyrophoric at the time of transfer. In early March 
2021, after titanium metal fines caused sparking in the Plutonium 
Facility, additional suspect pyrophoric containers were transported 
from TWF back to the Plutonium Facility (the originator facility). 
After the fact, Triad completed an analysis that concluded the 
transported materials were not pyrophoric.
    The titanium sparking event resulted in a positive unreviewed 
safety question determination, and in July 2021, NA-LA approved an 
addendum to the TSD and a revision to the TSRs. The additional 
packaging control requires ``that either a 12-inch POC [pipe 
overpack container] or a SAVY 4000 container inside a DOT 7A Type A 
drum be used to transport potentially pyrophoric material'' \8\ 
[21]. Triad's analysis concluded the packaging configurations would 
not be ``adversely impacted by the oxidation of limited quantities 
of pyrophoric material'' [21]. These containers are also limited to 
specific quantities of potentially pyrophoric material, per the 
specific administrative control (SAC) [22].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Pipe Overpack Containers (POCs) and SAVY 4000 containers are 
two types of robust packages used routinely at LANL in various 
applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, the analysis which supports the addendum to the TSD, 
and the subsequent revision to the TSRs, uses a limited definition 
of pyrophoric material that only addresses small pieces of special 
nuclear material metal. This definition would not consider other 
potentially pyrophoric payloads such as plutonium oxide dispersed 
within powdered sodium. In this case, since the special nuclear 
material is not metal pieces, the mixture would not be classified as 
potentially pyrophoric per the addendum and revised TSRs. Therefore, 
additional analysis is needed to ensure that all potentially 
pyrophoric materials are analyzed in the TSD.
    Inadequate Accident Analysis--10 CFR 830, Subpart B, requires 
that a DSA must evaluate ``normal, abnormal, and accident

[[Page 8657]]

conditions,'' which will then support the derivation of controls 
[3]. DOE Standard 1104-2016 expands upon what is necessary to 
determine that accident analysis is adequate. Namely, the DSA 
reviewer must be able to reach the conclusion that the ``accident 
analysis methodology is clearly identified and appropriate, 
including identification of initial conditions and assumptions'' and 
the ``accident analysis clearly substantiates the findings of hazard 
analysis for the design/evaluation basis events and demonstrates the 
effectiveness of safety class SSCs [structures, systems, and 
components]'' [23].
    The LANL TSD does not contain any detailed accident analysis. 
Instead, the TSD develops Table 7-5, Derived Controls for P&T Design 
Basis Conditions. Within this table, ``only drops/impacts, crush, 
puncture, and fire conditions were considered'' because these are 
the Type B packaging requirements that are not met by the packages 
used for transfers under this TSD [17]. These are listed in the 
third column of the table in the TSD. The fourth column contains a 
brief event description, and the fifth and sixth columns list the 
preventive and mitigative controls, respectively, for each of these 
events. An example from the table is provided below.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN08FE24.034

    The LANL TSD provides no further description of these accidents; 
there is no discussion of event frequency, estimated unmitigated or 
mitigated dose consequences, either qualitative or quantitative, nor 
any discussion of initial conditions or assumptions. Moreover, the 
TSD does not discuss how each of the controls listed in the fifth 
and sixth columns specifically function in each of the events for 
which they are credited (as discussed in the Inadequate Control Set 
section below). The LANL TSD, with its brief description of events 
and list of controls, does not constitute formal accident analysis 
and therefore does not clearly demonstrate alignment with 
requirements in 10 CFR 830.
    The NNSA safety basis review team for Revision 3 of the LANL TSD 
raised a similar concern. NNSA approved Revision 3 of the LANL TSD 
with various conditions of approval including the condition that 
``LANL shall develop additional analysis . . . that includes 
quantitative estimates of the likelihood of credible scenarios 
leading to the release of nuclear materials both with and without 
TSD controls in place, as well as an estimate of what radiological 
dose a member of the public located at the most likely site boundary 
could receive'' (emphasis added) [6]. The resulting quantitative 
analysis was included until Revision 9 of the LANL TSD, which made 
major changes, including an entire rewrite of the safety assessment 
section.
    Inadequate Control Set--10 CFR 830, Subpart B, requires that 
DSAs ``derive the hazard controls necessary to ensure adequate 
protection of workers, the public, and the environment'' and 
``demonstrate the adequacy of these controls to eliminate, limit, or 
mitigate identified hazards'' [3]. The LANL TSD does not evaluate 
the effectiveness of hazard controls in relation to each specific 
accident scenario for which the controls are credited. Rather, the 
LANL TSD describes generic safety functions for each design feature 
and SAC, instead of specific safety functions in the context of each 
accident scenario. Appendix A to 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, states that 
safety SSCs ``require formal definition of minimum acceptable 
performance in the documented safety analysis'' which ``is 
accomplished by first defining a safety function'' [3]. DOE Standard 
3009-2014 expands on the definition of safety functions: ``Safety 
function descriptions state the objective of the SSC in a given 
accident scenario'' (emphasis added) [16].
    Due to the lack of specific evaluation, the LANL TSD credits 
controls for accident scenarios where the safety function is unclear 
or nonexistent. For example, the LANL TSD credits the straps that 
hold the package to the vehicle (i.e., tie-down system) as a 
preventive control in fire scenarios not initiated by package 
movement, for which the tie-down system appears to provide no 
preventive

[[Page 8658]]

safety function. Further, due to the generic evaluation of controls, 
the LANL TSD fails to compensate for the absence of the enclosed 
cargo compartment \9\ (ECC) design feature and the package design 
feature in some allowed transfers. For instance, the LANL TSD 
permits transfer of large packages which would not fit within an 
ECC. In these cases, the LANL TSD credits a SAC that prohibits all 
traffic as a replacement for the ECC safety function. However, the 
SAC does not address numerous accidents where prohibition of traffic 
would not replace the safety functions of an ECC (e.g., vehicle 
drop-off, vehicle impact from other convoy vehicles, fire events 
from vehicle malfunctions). Additionally, while the TSD limits the 
quantity of MAR for transfers without an ECC to 1.9 kg plutonium 
(Pu) 239 equivalent, it provides no quantitative analysis for this 
lower MAR limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ An enclosed cargo compartment is ``an enclosure with floor, 
walls on all sides, and a roof in which materials are transferred'' 
[22].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The LANL TSD also permits transfers of large objects that ``may 
not fit inside any known package that meets the criteria'' in the 
TSD [24]. In this situation, items such as large pieces of equipment 
or gloveboxes would be sealed with tape, plastic wrap, or other 
means, but this sealing method does not provide the same safety 
function as a package. In some cases these items may also be 
transported without an ECC. The transfer of large objects then can 
involve the loss of at least one, if not two, design features, 
without additional analysis, and therefore the remaining control set 
for these accident scenarios may not be effective.
    Significant Public Consequences--As previously discussed, the 
LANL TSD does not adequately identify all potential hazards, does 
not adequately analyze accident scenarios, and does not demonstrate 
the effectiveness of its safety control set. These safety issues are 
particularly concerning given the high MAR limits, the proximity of 
transportation routes to the offsite public, and the nature of 
several credible accident scenarios (e.g., vehicle fire events). 
These factors result in the possibility of high unmitigated dose 
consequences to the offsite public.
    The July 2007 through March 2012 revisions of the LANL TSD 
contained quantitative analysis of the risk of LANL onsite 
transportation activities. These older revisions of the TSD 
referenced the Area G transuranic (TRU) waste transportation 
accident and fire scenario from the Area G safety basis dated April 
2003. In this accident scenario, a vehicle crashes or rolls over, 
causing a fire and spilling the waste containers. The postulated MAR 
in that scenario was the maximum inventory for a truck at the time, 
which was about 17.7 kg Pu-239 equivalent, and the estimated 
unmitigated dose consequence to the public was about 190 rem. From 
November 2012 to June 2023, the LANL TSD allowed up to 20 kg Pu-239 
equivalent MAR; therefore, the corresponding estimated dose 
consequence to the public would have been about 217 rem. The 2003 
Area G accident scenario had an estimated likelihood of 10\-3\ 
instances per year (once per thousand years). Additionally, the July 
2007 through March 2012 revisions of the LANL TSD noted that the 
distance to the site boundary for some onsite transportation routes 
is closer than the distance to the site boundary for Area G; 
therefore, the July 2007 through March 2012 revisions stated the 
unmitigated dose consequence for those transportation activities 
could be substantially higher.
    The MAR limit within the November 2012 to June 2023 versions of 
the LANL TSD was based on ``an analysis of historical and potential 
future operations,'' with a review of several years of data of 
onsite transfers, and the ``maximum amount of material transferred 
during this time frame was approximately 18 kg Pu-239 equivalent 
material'' [17], thus the ``MAR limit of 20 kg Pu-239 equivalent is 
bounding for historical operations, and is expected to be bounding 
for future operations'' [22]. However, as stated in DOE Standard 
1189-2016, Integration of Safety Into the Design Process, a step in 
an inherently safe design process is to consider the ``removal or 
reduction of hazards before controls need to be developed,'' for 
example, through ``reducing the amount of hazardous material present 
at any one time'' [25]. Rather than basing the MAR limit on 
historical operations, consideration should be given to reducing MAR 
to the lowest practicable amount. Other sites' TSDs contain much 
lower MAR limits than LANL's. For example, LLNL and NNSS both 
specify a MAR limit of 5 kg Pu-239 equivalent.
    Current Compensatory Measures--Given the deficiencies in the 
LANL TSD, it cannot be relied upon to ensure adequate protection of 
the public or workers during onsite transportation activities. 
Therefore, until the LANL TSD is revised to address the above safety 
concerns and/or is revised to comply with an improved safe harbor 
methodology, compensatory measures are warranted to ensure safety.
    As discussed previously, on October 11, 2022, NA-LA transmitted 
a memo to Triad, with an enclosure containing proposed compensatory 
measures, requesting that Triad develop an impact assessment of the 
proposed compensatory measures, propose revisions to those measures, 
and propose additional measures, as applicable, within 60 days. The 
majority of NA-LA's proposed compensatory measures were related to 
improvements to existing SACs that would have minor impact on 
overall safety posture. For instance, NA-LA proposed a compensatory 
measure to revise the language of the road condition restrictions 
SAC to include a requirement to check the weather within two hours. 
While more prescriptive wording in SAC language would be an 
improvement, this action is already in place per implementing 
procedures, and therefore this change would have a minor impact. The 
most impactful proposed compensatory measures from NA-LA were 
related to MAR limits, packaging, and traffic restrictions. Triad's 
second response to the NA-LA letter on January 31, 2023, outlined 
the compensatory measures it planned to implement within 60 days and 
incorporate in the TSD and TSRs by June 1, 2023. Triad implemented 
these compensatory measures procedurally on March 31, 2023, and 
submitted for NA-LA approval a revised TSD and TSRs which 
incorporated those measures, on June 1, 2023 [10] [11].
    NA-LA approved the revised TSD and TSRs on August 10, 2023, with 
two COAs [2]. The first COA directed Triad to resolve NA-LA's 
comments regarding Type A packaging and the use of functionally 
equivalent versions of DOT markings. Triad completed this action and 
submitted the newly revised TSD and TSRs on October 4, 2023 [26]. 
The second COA directed Triad to resolve additional NA-LA comments 
on the TSD and TSRs by the 2024 annual update and provide NA-LA with 
periodic briefings on the status. These additional NA-LA comments 
covered multiple topics, including hazard identification and control 
effectiveness, and addressed some of the Board's safety concerns 
with the LANL TSD.
    In the case of the compensatory measure of reduced MAR limits, 
while any reduction in MAR would be an improvement, given the high 
unmitigated dose consequences, a significant reduction in MAR would 
be preferable. To this end, Triad's January 31, 2023, letter defined 
high MAR TRU waste shipments as TRU waste transfers that exceed 1.9 
kg Pu-239 equivalent and/or 10 g heat source plutonium. It stated 
all TRU waste transfers with greater than this quantity of MAR would 
be conducted using an ECC. Previously, transfers of up to 5 kg Pu-
239 equivalent could be conducted without an ECC; therefore, Triad's 
compensatory measure effectively lowers the MAR limit for non-ECC 
transfers from 5 to 1.9 kg Pu-239 equivalent. Further, Triad stated 
that no TRU waste transfers would exceed 8.8 kg Pu-239 equivalent or 
80 g heat source plutonium. Previously, the LANL TSD had a limit of 
20 kg Pu-239 equivalent for all shipments of radioactive materials. 
Triad's letter did not articulate compensatory measures for high MAR 
transfers other than TRU waste, and rather stated Triad would engage 
with NA-LA to develop transfer-specific controls if there is a need 
to perform such transfers before an updated TSD is implemented. 
However, the MAR limits approved in August 2023 do not distinguish 
between TRU waste and other radioactive materials, apart from the 
special case of heat source plutonium, and limit transfers of all 
radioactive materials other than heat source plutonium to 8.8 kg Pu-
239 equivalent [10] [11].
    Further, NA-LA's list of proposed compensatory measures also 
specified that reductions in MAR be considered in conjunction with 
packaging. Triad's January 31, 2023, letter stated that heat source 
plutonium TRU waste shall be transferred in POCs, a relatively 
robust form of package. While Triad also stated that other plutonium 
(e.g., non-heat source) TRU waste packages would meet Type A 
requirements, this assumption was already part of the TSD package 
performance envelope. The TSD and TSR approved in August 2023only 
require POCs for packages that contain greater than 10 g of heat 
source plutonium [11] [10]. This may allow transfers of up to 80 g 
of heat source plutonium in non-POCs as long as

[[Page 8659]]

each individual package within the shipment contains less than 10 g.
    Finally, NA-LA's list of proposed compensatory measures included 
a traffic restriction for certain (e.g., high MAR) shipments. 
Triad's January 31, 2023, letter stated that public access would be 
restricted on transfer routes and that all traffic would be 
restricted during transfers when an ECC is not used; however, both 
of these safety controls were previously in place.
    Overall, the compensatory measures incorporated in the TSD and 
TSRs approved in August 2023, and the resolution of NA-LA's comments 
covered by the two COAs, represent an improvement in the safety 
posture of onsite transportation operations. However, to demonstrate 
adequate protection of the public and workers at LANL, the hazard 
analysis, accident analysis, selection of controls, and development 
of TSRs for onsite transportation need to be reevaluated in 
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 830.

2. Onsite Transportation Directives

    The onsite transportation safe harbors do not ensure that TSDs 
meet 10 CFR 830 requirements or that TSDs contain sufficient 
analysis and hazard controls for safe operations. Additionally, DOE 
Standard 1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety 
Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents, does not contain specific 
guidance for federal review and approval of TSDs.
    Noncompliance with 10 CFR 830--The onsite transportation safe 
harbors lack requirements or guidance for several 10 CFR 830 
requirements, most significantly those pertaining to accident 
evaluation and hazard controls. The table in Attachment C shows an 
analysis of missing or inadequate requirements and guidance in the 
onsite transportation safe harbors.
    On September 13, 2022, DOE responded to the Board's January 2022 
letter. DOE asserted that 10 CFR 830 requirements apply ``regardless 
of the methodology for DSA development that is used,'' and 
consequently stated that 10 CFR 830 requirements do not need to flow 
down into the onsite transportation safe harbors [4]. However, this 
assertion is inconsistent with the purpose of safe harbors, which is 
to ``provide approved methodologies for meeting the DSA requirements 
of 10 CFR part 830,'' as stated in DOE Standard 1104-2016 [23]. This 
means that if a contractor follows the safe harbors, then the 
contractor is assured that all the requirements of 10 CFR 830 will 
be fulfilled. Given that the onsite transportation safe harbors do 
not clearly address several 10 CFR 830 requirements, TSDs will not 
meet the fundamental 10 CFR 830 requirements by solely following the 
safe harbor methodologies. This is illustrated in the LANL TSD, 
discussed earlier in this report.
    This section will discuss the most important 10 CFR 830 
requirements that are not covered by DOE Guide 460.1-1, and then 
will illustrate how other sites' TSDs have supplemented the guide 
with methodology from DOE Standard 3009-94. Additionally, this 
section includes discussion of several DOE directives in comparison 
to the onsite transportation safe harbors. These include DOE Order 
461.2, Onsite Packaging and Transfer of Materials of National 
Security Interest, and DOE Order 461.1C, Packaging and 
Transportation for Offsite Shipment of Materials of National 
Security Interest.
    Evaluation of Accident Scenarios--10 CFR 830 requires evaluation 
of ``normal, abnormal, and accident conditions, including 
consideration of natural and man-made external events, 
identification of energy sources or processes that might contribute 
to the generation or uncontrolled release of radioactive and other 
hazardous materials'' [3]. Systematic evaluation of accident 
conditions is a necessary component of safety bases to demonstrate 
adequate protection of the public and workers, as the safety bases 
are used to determine the need for safety controls. However, the 
onsite transportation safe harbors do not have requirements or 
detailed guidance related to the development and evaluation of 
specific or detailed accident scenarios.
    DOE Guide 460.1-1 mentions accidents when discussing how TSDs 
should develop safety controls. It states that TSDs should include 
``control requirements appropriate for the level of containment and 
communication provided that take into account the possibility and 
consequences of credible accidents'' [13]. However, the guide does 
not elaborate on how TSDs should determine the credibility of 
accidents or consider their risks.
    Instead of evaluating accidents, there is vague guidance related 
to the development and evaluation of ``design basis conditions'' 
(DBC), which are the conditions that packages should be able to 
withstand for certain insults (e.g., fall, fire, penetration).\10\ 
While determining the conditions that packages can withstand is 
important, this evaluation is not the same as evaluating accident 
scenarios. The guide does not discuss identifying initial 
conditions, assumptions, or specific initiators of various package 
insults. Further, the guide does not advise that TSDs consider 
scenarios where multiple package insults could occur (e.g., a 
vehicle crash with fire that results in a package both falling down 
some distance and being exposed to fire).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ For instance, the guide provides an example of hazardous 
material that is required to be in a package where the DBC for a 
fall is 30 feet (i.e., the package can survive a 30-foot drop). The 
TSD would then evaluate whether the package can survive a 30-foot 
drop; otherwise, ``additional administrative controls would need to 
be imposed on the transport system to ensure an adequate level of 
safety during transport'' [13]. The guide further describes how TSDs 
can include site- and route-specific information in developing and 
evaluating DBCs. Continuing from the previous example, an evaluation 
of onsite transportation activities may determine that the greatest 
fall possible on the transfer route is 10 feet. In this case, if the 
TSD also imposed a control prohibiting lifting the package above 10 
feet during handling, then the DBC would be a fall of 10 feet. From 
there, the guide includes an expectation that either the package 
will be shown to survive a 10-foot drop, or additional 
administrative controls would be needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Evidence of the lack of requirements and guidance for accident 
analysis in the safe harbors can be seen in TSDs across the complex. 
Several sites supplement guidance from the onsite transportation 
safe harbors with methodologies from DOE Standard 3009-94 for 
development and analysis of unique, bounding accident scenarios, 
including quantitative analysis. Examples include the 2011 Hanford 
TSD, the 2015 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) TSD, and 
the 2017 Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) TSD. For instance, the 
Hanford TSD states that ``the accident analysis demonstrates 
consistency with the guidance in DOE-STD-3009-94'' [27]. The LLNL 
TSD states that DOE-STD-3009-94 was used in ``the development of the 
hazard analysis, accident analysis, selection of controls, and 
development of'' TSRs [28]. The NNSS TSD states that the ``analysis 
process used to evaluate NNSS onsite transportation hazards is 
patterned after the approach of DOE-STD-3009'' [29]. The sites' 
reliance on methods from another safe harbor to adequately evaluate 
accident conditions highlights the weakness of the onsite 
transportation safe harbors.
    A comparison of the onsite transportation safe harbors to the 
DOE order for onsite transfers of MNSI further illuminates the 
weaknesses in the safe harbors. For onsite transfers of MNSI, DOE 
Order 461.2 states that the ``safety assessment must document all 
credible onsite accident conditions'' [30]. Additionally, it states, 
``[f]or higher hazard (e.g., hazard category II [sic]) transfers, it 
is recommended that a more quantitative analysis be applied (i.e., 
DOE-STD-3009). For lower hazard transfers the assessment may be 
considerably more qualitative'' [30]. In contrast, DOE Guide 460.1-1 
does not include specific requirements and guidance for accident 
evaluation, such as that in DOE Standard 3009-2014.
    Comparing DOE Guide 460.1-1 to DOE Order 461.1C illustrates this 
issue further. This order establishes the requirements for offsite 
shipments of MNSI that do not comply with DOT and NRC regulations. 
Regarding accident analysis, it states, ``the DSA must include 
analysis of the bounding accidents that could occur (i.e., design 
basis accidents or DBAs), per the requirements of DOE Standard 3009-
2014'' [31].
    Hazard Controls--The onsite transportation safe harbors have no 
guidance related to the 10 CFR 830 requirement to demonstrate the 
adequacy of hazard controls ``to eliminate, limit, or mitigate 
identified hazards'' [3]. While DOE Guide 460.1-1 states that 
controls ``should ensure that the packaging operates within its 
established performance envelope,'' it provides no guidance or 
direction on how to evaluate the effectiveness of a control to do so 
[13]. LLNL and NNSS supplemented their TSDs with guidance from DOE 
Standard 3009-94 and demonstrated the effectiveness of controls to 
reduce risk through mitigated hazard and accident analyses. In these 
analyses, the sites documented the reduction in frequency or 
consequence caused by applying the safety controls. Further, unlike 
the onsite transportation safe harbors, both DOE Order 461.1C and 
DOE Order 461.2 provide additional guidance on the 10 CFR 830 
requirement to demonstrate the adequacy of controls for transport of 
MNSI. DOE Order 461.1C refers to the methodology in DOE

[[Page 8660]]

Standard 3009-2014 to meet this requirement. DOE Order 461.2 is less 
specific but does state that the safety assessment portion of the 
TSD may select controls and ``provide analysis, factoring in the 
control application'' [30].
    Appendix A to 10 CFR 830, Subpart B also states that developing 
functional requirements and applicable performance criteria provides 
assurance that the hazard control will perform its safety function. 
There is no discussion in DOE Guide 460.1-1 on functional 
requirements or performance criteria for controls. However, LLNL and 
NNSS, both of which used DOE Standard 3009-94 to supplement their 
TSDs, documented specific functional requirements for their credited 
controls.
    Finally, 10 CFR 830 requires a safety basis to ``define the 
process for maintaining the hazard controls current at all times and 
controlling their use'' [3]. The onsite transportation safe harbors 
do not contain guidance for implementing this requirement. DOE Guide 
421.1-2A, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Documented 
Safety Analyses to Meet Subpart B of 10 CFR 830, states an 
``expectation associated with any of the safe harbors is that the 
safety classification guidance for safety SSCs (i.e., safety class 
and safety significant SSCs) and specific administrative controls 
(SACs) of DOE-STD-3009 will be used in developing the DSA'' [32].
    Unlike the onsite transportation safe harbors, DOE Order 461.1C 
provides several requirements to meet this expectation for transport 
of MNSI. Due to the proximity to the public for offsite shipments, 
DOE Order 461.1C requires all such controls to be identified as 
safety SSCs and requires the application of ``the requirements 
associated with safety-class controls for these `safety SSCs' '' 
[31]. In comparison, the safe harbors for onsite transportation have 
no discussion of, or requirements related to, the applicability of 
other DOE directives' requirements for TSD controls (e.g., 
applicability of the design criteria for safety SSCs from DOE Order 
420.1C, Facility Safety). Additionally, DOE Order 461.1C requires 
identification of SACs for administrative controls necessary for 
public safety, worker safety, or defense in depth for transport of 
MNSI. In comparison, the safe harbors for onsite transportation do 
not mention SACs, and therefore have no discussion of, or 
requirements related to, the applicability of requirements contained 
in DOE Standard 1186-2016, Specific Administrative Controls.
    Inadequate Evaluation Criteria--An important component of 
evaluating the level of safety documented in a safety basis is 
having an objective metric to assess the effectiveness of safety 
controls at reducing risk. For instance, both the 1994 and 2014 
revisions of DOE Standard 3009 apply the concept of an evaluation 
guideline (25 rem total effective dose for a member of the offsite 
public), which ``the safety analysis evaluates against'' and ``is 
established for the purpose of identifying the need for and 
evaluating safety class controls'' [16]. For non-reactor facilities, 
NRC has criteria similar to DOE Standard 3009, namely for credited 
controls to reduce the frequency of an event to highly unlikely or 
its consequence to less severe than 100 rem for the worker and 25 
rem for the offsite public. For DOT transportation regulations 
pertinent to DOE's offsite shipments of radioactive materials, the 
evaluation criteria apply to the package design itself. For 
instance, for Type B packages,\11\ 10 CFR 71, Subpart E, has a 
requirement to demonstrate ``no loss or dispersal of radioactive 
contents,'' during normal conditions of transport, and to limit 
radioactive material releases to less than specific amounts during 
defined hypothetical accident conditions [33].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ `` `Type A package' means a packaging that, together with 
its radioactive contents limited to A<INF>1</INF> or A<INF>2</INF> 
as appropriate, meets the requirements of Sec. Sec.  173.410 and 
173.412 and is designed to retain the integrity of containment and 
shielding required by this part under normal conditions of transport 
as demonstrated by the tests set forth in Sec.  173.465 or Sec.  
173.466, as appropriate.'' [39]
    `` `Type B package' means a packaging designed to transport 
greater than an A<INF>1</INF> or A<INF>2</INF> quantity of 
radioactive material that, together with its radioactive contents, 
is designed to retain the integrity of containment and shielding 
required by this part when subjected to the normal conditions of 
transport and hypothetical accident test conditions set forth in 10 
CFR part 71.'' [39]
    ``A<INF>1</INF> and A<INF>2</INF> values are given in in Sec.  
173.435 or are determined in accordance with Sec.  173.433.'' [39]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The onsite transportation safe harbors, in contrast, do not 
provide specific quantitative criteria to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the safety control set, and thus to understand the risk of onsite 
transportation operations. Instead, they require that TSDs 
demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to DOT and NRC regulations 
for offsite transportation. Specifically, DOE Order 460.1D states 
that the TSD must ``describe the methodology and compliance process 
to meet equivalent safety for any deviation from 49 CFR parts 171-
180 and 49 CFR parts 350-399'' [12]. As noted above, DOT and NRC 
offsite transportation regulations primarily rely on credited 
packages to provide containment for radioactive materials during 
pre-defined normal transport and hypothetical accident conditions. 
DOE Guide 460.1-1 elaborates on this expectation of containment: 
``For hazardous materials, such as Type B radioactive materials, the 
transport system would be expected to prevent loss of containment 
both for normal handling and for all credible onsite accidents'' 
[13]. However, while the guide allows for options other than the use 
of credited Type B packages (i.e., it does not mandate the use of 
Type B packages), it does not describe specifically how to 
demonstrate an equivalent level of safety for this containment 
expectation for transportation of packages that cannot survive 
normal handling or credible onsite accidents (i.e., non-equivalent 
packages).
    In the absence of clear guidance on what constitutes equivalent 
safety, several sites across the DOE defense nuclear facility 
complex used quantitative accident analysis to demonstrate that 
credited controls sufficiently reduced the risk from credible 
accidents. Sites varied in the thresholds they used; some used 25 
rem, and others used 5 rem for the dose to the public. Sites that 
included a co-located worker analysis used a threshold of either 5 
rem or 100 rem. Notably, one site that used the 5 rem threshold 
stated that this demonstrated equivalent safety to DOT/NRC 
transportation regulations. The 2017 NNSS TSD states that it 
achieves equivalent safety by accomplishing several things, 
including ``no release of contents under `credible accident' 
scenarios,'' and if a ``release is possible, radiological dose 
consequences cannot exceed 5 rem to any person in close proximity to 
the accident within 30 minutes of the incident'' [29].
    Additionally, the DOE order for offsite transportation of MNSI 
instructs analysts to perform quantitative accident analyses, rather 
than demonstrating equivalent safety. DOE Order 461.1C states that 
safety bases ``must include analysis of the bounding accidents that 
could occur (i.e., design basis accidents or DBAs), per the 
requirements of DOE Standard 3009-2014'' [31]. The requirements of 
DOE Standard 3009-2014 include using 25 rem as the evaluation 
guideline for accident analysis. Similarly, the order for onsite 
transportation of MNSI recommends analysts perform quantitative 
accident analyses, rather than demonstrating equivalent safety. DOE 
Order 461.2 states that the TSD ``must substantiate the conclusion 
that a credible accident must not cause individuals to receive a 
total effective dose (TED) greater than the levels referenced in 
DOE-STD-1189, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, public 
protection criteria per Appendix A, section A.2.1'' [30]. The cited 
section defines 25 rem to the public as exceeding the evaluation 
guideline and 5 rem to the public as challenging the evaluation 
guideline.
    The Board communicated the concern with the lack of a clear 
definition of equivalent safety in its January 6, 2022, letter. In 
response, DOE acknowledged that improved methodology ``to better 
document analyses of equivalent safety'' was warranted and committed 
to providing better guidance [4]. While this is one method to 
resolve the concern of inadequate evaluation criteria (i.e., by 
better defining equivalent safety), other options exist for 
providing evaluation criteria, such as using the quantitative 
methodology provided in DOE Order 461.1C, DOE Order 461.2, and DOE 
Standard 3009-2014.
    Methods to Restrict Public Access--The onsite transportation 
safe harbors do not provide clear guidance on methods to control 
public access during onsite transfers conducted under TSDs. Multiple 
correspondences between LANL contractors and DOT have yielded 
different interpretations of how to restrict public access. This 
suggests the need for the DOE onsite transportation safe harbors to 
clearly specify methods for restricting public access.
    DOE Guide 460.1-1, Attachment 2, is a copy of a 1991 letter from 
the DOT chief counsel to the director of the Transportation 
Management Division of DOE. The crux of this letter is defining what 
constitutes a ``public highway'' and when transportation of 
hazardous materials is considered ``in commerce.'' This is important 
because ``government agencies offering hazardous

[[Page 8661]]

materials for transportation in commerce or transporting hazardous 
materials in furtherance of a commercial enterprise are subject to'' 
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, which includes all of 
the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) [13]. In other words, if a 
road is considered in commerce, it would not be permissible to 
conduct onsite transfers of radioactive material in accordance with 
a TSD; instead, all HMRs would need to be met.
    A road on government property may still constitute a road in 
commerce if public access is not controlled. As the 1991 DOT letter 
states, ``[i]f a road is used by members of the general public 
(including dependents of Government employees) without their having 
to gain access through a controlled access point, transportation on 
(across or along) that road is in commerce. On the other hand, if 
access to a road is controlled at all times through the use of gates 
and guards, transportation on that road is not in commerce'' [13]. 
The letter provides several examples and specifically states that 
relying on signs alone to restrict public usage would not be enough 
to consider the road not in commerce.
    During the Board's review of the LANL TSD, it became apparent 
that the guidance contained in the 1991 DOT letter did not provide 
enough clarity for implementation. The issues raised in the 1991 
letter continue to be discussed. For instance, in 2006, a member of 
the LANL Packaging and Transportation group requested DOT to clarify 
whether the 1991 letter was still valid ``[g]iven the vintage of 
this correspondence'' [34], and the chief of standards development 
in the DOT Office of Hazardous Materials Standards responded 
affirmatively [35].
    Additionally, LANL personnel provided the Board with a letter 
that the president of Regulatory Resources (a subcontractor located 
in Los Alamos) sent to DOT in 2018 to request that DOT ``confirm the 
use of signage as a means to achieve public access restriction'' 
[36], and DOT's response [21]. This 2018 letter did not refer to the 
1991 DOT letter. DOT responded that ``[s]hipments that occur on 
private roads whose access is restricted to the public (e.g., 
limited to authorized personnel), whether by signage (as you 
described and presented in your letter) or physical barriers, are 
not subject to the requirements of the HMR'' [37]. This response 
appears to contradict the 1991 letter included in DOE Guide 460.1-1. 
However, LANL personnel stated that they currently use flaggers to 
continuously restrict public access to roads during onsite 
transfers. They further stated that if they decided to apply the 
guidance in the 2018 letter, they would first declare an Unreviewed 
Safety Question and obtain DOE approval prior to relying solely on 
signs to restrict public access.
    These communications between individual entities and DOT suggest 
the need for the DOE onsite transportation safe harbors to be more 
specific regarding the methods necessary to restrict public access. 
Adequately restricting public access is important from both 
regulatory and safety perspectives. If public access is not properly 
restricted, then the public could be closer to onsite transportation 
activities than analyzed. Therefore, a member of the public could 
initiate an accident (e.g., vehicle crash), and could receive a 
higher radiation dose by being in the vicinity of a transport 
accident if a release occurred.
    Additionally, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not 
provide detailed guidance on controlling onsite traffic of site 
personnel. Similar to the concern with members of the public, site 
personnel traveling onsite in government or personal vehicles could 
initiate an accident during onsite transfers of radioactive 
material. At LANL in particular, the high operational tempo needed 
to accomplish its greatly expanded pit manufacturing mission will 
inevitably increase onsite traffic. Therefore, it is incumbent upon 
DOE to develop requirements and guidance on the control of site 
traffic during onsite transfers of radioactive material.
    DOE Review and Approval of TSDs--DOE Standard 1104-2016, Review 
and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design 
Basis Documents, does not contain guidance for the review and 
approval of TSDs. The standard mentions transportation only once as 
an example of other safe harbors allowed by 10 CFR 830 and states 
that the format of the safety evaluation report (SER) should be 
based on the safe harbor methodology used. DOE Standard 1104-2016 is 
divided into topical areas and these ``areas and associated criteria 
established in this Standard form the foundation for reviewing and 
documenting DSA and TSR approval in an SER'' [23]. The lack of 
guidance related to TSDs is problematic, because field office 
personnel do not have a set of specific criteria to evaluate whether 
a TSD ensures safe operations and complies with the onsite 
transportation safe harbors, as they would have for a DOE Standard 
3009-compliant DSA.
    In response to the Board's January 6, 2022, letter, DOE stated 
that it would ``review DOE-STD-1104 to determine whether 
improvements are warranted'' [4]. The Board concludes that adding 
criteria specific to TSDs to DOE Standard 1104-2016 is necessary to 
ensure adequate and consistent reviews by field office personnel 
across the DOE defense nuclear complex.

3. DOE Oversight

    DOE and NNSA failed to identify safety deficiencies in both the 
DOE directives related to onsite transportation and the LANL TSD. 
Additionally, DOE and NNSA neglected to ensure that timely 
corrective actions were taken when the Board identified safety 
concerns and have struggled to resolve safety concerns when 
collaboration across program offices is required.
    DOE Oversight of Directives--DOE issued DOE Guide 460.1-1, the 
10 CFR 830 safe harbor methodology for preparing TSDs for onsite 
transfers of radioactive materials, in 1997 and has not updated it 
since then. DOE initially issued 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, in 2001, 
four years after the guide was written. As noted in previous 
sections, the guide does not contain sufficient guidance to meet 
several 10 CFR 830 safety basis requirements, which is probably due 
to being written before 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, was established. As 
discussed below, DOE did not act on indications of weaknesses with 
the onsite transportation safe harbors that presented themselves 
over many years, and its process for revising directives likewise 
failed to identify these weaknesses.
    Safety basis personnel at DOE's defense nuclear facilities have 
at least tacitly recognized the safety deficiencies in DOE Guide 
460.1-1 for many years, but DOE has not taken action to improve the 
guide. For example, many DOE sites supplemented guidance from the 
onsite transportation safe harbors with methodologies from DOE 
Standard 3009-94 for development and analysis of unique, bounding 
accident scenarios, including quantitative analysis. DOE Guide 
421.1-2A states that DOE Standard 3009 ``is a safe harbor for any of 
the specialized areas covered by the other safe harbors (with the 
exception of Hazard Category 1 nuclear reactors) and can be used in 
lieu of any of them'' [32]. While there is no issue with using DOE 
Standard 3009 methodology when developing TSDs, DOE failed to 
recognize that its widespread use to supplement the onsite 
transportation safe harbors' methodology indicated safety 
deficiencies in the safe harbors. Field offices responsible for 
reviewing and approving these TSDs could have reached out to the 
Office of Primary Interest (OPI) for DOE Guide 460.1-1, alerting 
them to the safety issues with the guide.
    As another example, DOE revised DOE Order 461.1C in 2016. 
Previous to this revision, the methodology for developing TSDs for 
offsite shipments of MNSI was similar to the current DOE Guide 
460.1-1. One key change was the addition of an appendix that states 
that ``DOE Standard 3009-2014 . . . is an approved methodology for 
demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR part 830. DSAs developed by OST 
[Office of Secure Transport] must comply with the requirements of 
DOE Standard 3009-2014, except for deviations that are specifically 
identified in this Appendix'' [31]. DOE failed to recognize the 
corresponding weaknesses in the onsite transportation safe harbors 
and take action to address them.
    Additionally, DOE's process for revising directives failed to 
identify the weaknesses in the onsite transportation safe harbors. 
DOE's directives review process described in DOE Order 251.1, 
Departmental Directives Program, assumes the OPI for each directive 
will review them periodically and propose revisions, as needed, to 
the Directives Review Board; however, DOE does not require these 
reviews to be done with a specific periodicity, and OPIs are not 
required to actively reach out to field elements to solicit 
feedback. In the case of onsite transportation safety directives, 
with the DOE Office of Environmental Management designated as the 
OPI for DOE Guide 460.1-1, this process failed to identify and 
correct the safety deficiencies in the onsite transportation safe 
harbors.
    NNSA Oversight of the LANL TSD--In addition to DOE's failure to 
correct the safety deficiencies in the transportation directives, 
NNSA has not resolved safety issues with the LANL TSD specifically. 
NA-LA and NNSA headquarters packaging and transportation 
organizations have had multiple

[[Page 8662]]

opportunities throughout the years to do so, and yet lasting 
corrective actions were not taken.
    The NNSA safety basis review team tasked with review and 
approval of Revision 3 of the LANL TSD in 2007 consisted of subject 
matter experts from the Los Alamos Site Office (LASO) (the 
predecessor organization to NA-LA), the NNSA Service Center, and an 
independent contractor [6]. Personnel from the NNSA Packaging 
Certification Division, who were part of the safety basis review 
team, ``concluded that the TSD as submitted did not provide an 
adequate level of analysis to support the conclusions that for non 
DOT compliant packages the overall transport system provided an 
equivalent level of safety'' [6]. The associated SER therefore 
contained several conditions of approval, which included requiring 
additional analysis supporting the basis for the MAR limit in 
subsequent TSDs. This additional analysis was to include 
``quantitative estimates of the likelihood of credible scenarios 
leading to the release of nuclear materials both with and without 
TSD controls in place, as well as an estimate of what radiological 
dose a member of the public located at the most likely site boundary 
could receive as a result of these release scenarios with the TSD 
controls in place'' [6]. Subsequent revisions of the TSD included 
such quantitative analysis. However, Revision 9, which became 
effective in November 2012, contained an entire rewrite of the 
safety analysis which removed the quantitative analysis. When 
approving this revision, and each subsequent revision, NA-LA failed 
to identify the same safety issues that had previously been 
corrected.
    Subsequent reviews by NNSA years later failed to detect and 
correct the same safety issues. NNSA's Office of Packaging and 
Transportation conducted an assessment of LANL's packaging and 
transportation program in 2015. While its assessment was primarily 
focused on MNSI, it also reviewed the LANL TSD. During this review, 
the team concluded that ``LANL has an approved 10 CFR 830 compliant 
TSD and TSRs that meet 460.1C requirements'' [38].
    Finally, as discussed in DOE's response to the Board's January 
6, 2022, letter, on the safety deficiencies in DOE's onsite 
transportation safety harbors and the LANL TSD, NNSA stated that it 
``use[s] the Biennial Review process to review field office 
performance in meeting requirements for the review and approval of 
TSDs'' [4]. However, despite these biennial reviews, NNSA did not 
identify the safety deficiencies in the LANL TSD.
    In conclusion, despite multiple instances of NNSA engagement 
with the LANL TSD, both at the field office level and NNSA 
headquarters level, NNSA failed to resolve issues with the LANL TSD.
    DOE Oversight of Identified Safety Issues--Even after the Board 
expressed safety concerns with the LANL TSD and the onsite 
transportation safe harbors in its January 6, 2022, letter to the 
Secretary of Energy, DOE did not take timely action to address these 
safety concerns.
    Regarding the LANL TSD, more than a year elapsed between the 
Board issuing its letter identifying safety deficiencies and Triad 
issuing its letter informing NA-LA that it would institute 
compensatory measures for its onsite transportation activities. NA-
LA did not begin work on developing proposed compensatory measures 
through a baseline assessment of TSDs at other NNSA sites until July 
2022, six months after the Board sent its letter. NA-LA then 
transmitted a letter to Triad on October 12, 2022, over 10 months 
after DOE received the Board's letter, which contained a wide-
ranging list of potential compensatory measures for Triad to 
evaluate. Triad's first response on December 9, 2022, was 
unsatisfactory. After additional discussions with NA-LA personnel, 
Triad sent a new letter to NA-LA on January 31, 2023, that agreed to 
implement a set of compensatory measures that represented an 
improvement to the safety posture of onsite transportation 
operations. Nevertheless, this letter did not acknowledge that the 
compensatory measures were needed to address any safety issues.
    Further, given the safety concerns identified with the onsite 
transportation safe harbor, it would have been prudent for DOE to 
conduct a complete extent of condition review of all sites' TSDs. 
While DOE's Office of Environmental Management had previously 
conducted an extent of condition review for a subset of sites under 
its purview in 2021, it was not formally documented and was done 
prior to receiving the Board's letter highlighting the specific 
safety issues.
    Finally, the Board is concerned with DOE's ability to address 
safety issues that require collaboration across program offices. 
DOE's September 13, 2022, letter that responded to the Board's 
January 6, 2022, letter frankly acknowledged that it would need to 
evaluate ``how we communicate across offices, engage with the field, 
and share operating experiences across the Department.''

Attachment C--Analysis of Gaps in Onsite Transportation Safe Harbors 
Related to 10 CFR 830 Requirements

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 10 CFR 830, subpart B    DOE order 460.1D and/or DOE
         Topical area                 requirement           guide 460.1-1 reference         Analysis of gaps
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazard Identification........  830.204(b)(2)--``Provide  DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section      The order does not
                                a systematic              5.3.1.d. states that the TSD   contain requirements or
                                identification of both    is expected to include ``a     guidance for this
                                natural and man-made      description of the process     requirement. While the
                                hazards associated with   and analysis [that] is used    guide discusses
                                the facility''.           to ensure that equivalent      identifying
                                                          safety requirements are        transportation hazards
                                                          established. This should       on maps and lists
                                                          include a technically          hazard analysis as one
                                                          justified basis for            part of an acceptable
                                                          equivalency. For example,      way to establish
                                                          this could include a hazards   equivalent safety, the
                                                          analysis associated with the   guide does not discuss
                                                          transfer.'' (emphasis          how to systematically
                                                          added).                        identify hazards,
                                                         DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section       including natural and
                                                          5.3.2.c: ``This section        man-made hazards.
                                                          should identify the physical   Further, while the
                                                          location of the site and       guide discusses
                                                          associated facilities on       developing a hierarchy
                                                          legible maps . . . All         of hazardous materials,
                                                          features of the site which     it does not describe
                                                          are mentioned in any part of   how to use this process
                                                          the document, such as . . .    to identify hazards.
                                                          transportation hazards,
                                                          should be clearly identified
                                                          on one or more maps.''.
                                                         DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section
                                                          5.4.1: ``A site seeking to
                                                          establish a graded approach
                                                          to compliance with DOE O
                                                          460.1A should develop a
                                                          hierarchy in which hazardous
                                                          material are grouped into a
                                                          series of hazard levels.''
                                                          The Guide then discusses
                                                          ``low hazards'', ``higher
                                                          hazards'', and ``hazardous
                                                          materials, such as Type B
                                                          radioactive materials.''.

[[Page 8663]]

 
Hazard Categorization........  830.202(b)(3)--``Categor  DOE Order 460.1D 4.b.(3)(b):   By requiring that TSDs
                                ize the facility          ``For onsite transfers         for transfers of Hazard
                                consistent with DOE-STD-  involving nuclear facility     Category 2 and 3
                                1027-92''.                Hazard Category 2 or 3         quantities follow the
                                                          quantities, the TSD must       Safety Basis
                                                          comply with the Safety Basis   Requirements in 10 CFR
                                                          Requirements of 10 CFR 830,    Part 830, Subpart B,
                                                          Subpart B.''.                  the order implicitly
                                                         DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section       requires TSDs to
                                                          5.1.2: ``Such an integrated    categorize the
                                                          approach should include        operations under the
                                                          hazard classification of the   hazard categorization
                                                          material.''.                   scheme of DOE Standard
                                                         DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section       1027-92. However, the
                                                          5.4.1: ``A site seeking to     guide does not discuss
                                                          establish a graded approach    or invoke the hazard
                                                          to compliance with DOE O       categorization scheme
                                                          460.1A should develop a        in DOE Standard 1027-
                                                          hierarchy in which hazardous   92. Instead, the guide
                                                          material are grouped into a    allows sites to develop
                                                          series of hazard levels.''     their own hierarchy of
                                                          The guide then discusses       hazard classification
                                                          ``low hazards'', ``higher      or levels. The guide
                                                          hazards'', and ``hazardous     frames these levels in
                                                          materials, such as Type B      terms of low hazards,
                                                          radioactive materials.''.      higher hazards, and
                                                                                         hazardous materials
                                                                                         such as Type B
                                                                                         radioactive materials,
                                                                                         which is not the same
                                                                                         type of framework as
                                                                                         the DOE Standard 1027-
                                                                                         92 hazard
                                                                                         categorization scheme.
Hazard Controls..............  830.204(b)(4)--``Derive   DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section      While the guide
                                the hazard controls       5.1.2 ``Such an integrated     indicates that hazard
                                necessary to ensure       approach should include        controls should be
                                adequate protection of    hazard classification of the   developed as needed, it
                                workers, the public,      material, hazard               does not present or
                                and the environment,      containment, hazard            require a method to
                                demonstrate the           communication, and control     determine adequacy of
                                adequacy of these         measures commensurate with     these controls to
                                controls to eliminate,    the hazard of the material     eliminate, limit, or
                                limit, or mitigate        being transported, such as .   mitigate hazards.
                                identified hazards, and   . . control requirements      The guide does not
                                define the process for    appropriate for the level of   define a process for
                                maintaining the hazard    containment and                maintaining the hazard
                                controls current at all   communication provided that    controls or controlling
                                times and controlling     take into account the          their use.
                                their use''.              possibility and consequences  The guide states that
                                                          of credible accidents. These   TSDs should establish
                                                          control requirements should    control requirements
                                                          result in minimal acceptance   that will result in
                                                          of risk above the risks        ``minimal acceptance of
                                                          accepted in the context of     risk above those
                                                          existing Hazardous Materials   accepted in the context
                                                          Regulations'' (emphasis        of existing Hazardous
                                                          added).                        Materials
                                                         DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section       Regulations.'' However,
                                                          5.3.1.d. states that the TSD   the guide does not
                                                          is expected to include ``a     include a clear and
                                                          description of the process     consistent definition
                                                          and analysis [that] is used    of what equivalency to
                                                          to ensure that equivalent      these regulations
                                                          safety requirements are        entails.
                                                          established. This should
                                                          include a technically
                                                          justifiable basis for
                                                          equivalency. For example,
                                                          this could include . . . a
                                                          discussion of mitigating
                                                          measures proposed to ensure
                                                          the equivalent safety
                                                          requirements will be
                                                          employed.''.
                                                         DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section
                                                          5.4.2 ``Before non-
                                                          equivalent packaging may be
                                                          used for onsite transport, a
                                                          performance envelope should
                                                          be established for the
                                                          packaging and specific
                                                          control and communication
                                                          requirements should be
                                                          developed which ensure that
                                                          the transport system will
                                                          operate safely within the
                                                          performance envelope.''.
                                                         DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section
                                                          5.4.2.c. ``controls should
                                                          be commensurate with the
                                                          hazard represented by the
                                                          package being transported,
                                                          and should ensure that the
                                                          packaging operates within
                                                          its established performance
                                                          envelope. The hazard levels
                                                          and associated performance
                                                          requirements documented in
                                                          Chapter VII of the TSD will
                                                          greatly facilitate
                                                          development and
                                                          justification of appropriate
                                                          transport controls. Controls
                                                          may include establishment of
                                                          special communication
                                                          requirements (e.g., radio
                                                          contact with emergency
                                                          response personnel) which
                                                          are required to compensate
                                                          for packaging
                                                          inadequacies.''.

[[Page 8664]]

 
Evaluation of Accident         830.204(b)(3)--``Evaluat  DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section      The order does not
 Conditions.                    e normal, abnormal, and   5.1.2 ``Such an integrated     contain requirements or
                                accident conditions,      approach should include        guidance for this
                                including consideration   hazard classification of the   requirement.
                                of natural and man-made   material, hazard              The guide discusses
                                external events,          containment, hazard            including control
                                identification of         communication, and control     requirements that
                                energy sources or         measures commensurate with     consider the frequency
                                processes that might      the hazard of the material     and consequence of
                                contribute to the         being transported, such as .   credible accidents, but
                                generation or             . . control requirements       does not require such
                                uncontrolled release of   appropriate for the level of   evaluation of
                                radioactive and other     containment and                accidents. Further, the
                                hazardous materials,      communication provided that    guide does not describe
                                and consideration of      take into account the          what type of accidents
                                the need for analysis     possibility and consequences   must or should be
                                of accidents which may    of credible accidents''        included.
                                be beyond the design      (emphasis added).             The guide also discusses
                                basis of the facility''. DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section       analyzing transport
                                                          5.4.2.b. ``To establish the    conditions and ensuring
                                                          performance envelope of the    that packages are not
                                                          packaging, evaluation of       exposed to conditions
                                                          design basis conditions        they cannot survive,
                                                          (DBCs) is recommended. DBCs    such as a large drop-
                                                          should be site-specific and    off. While this could
                                                          possibly route-specific        constitute an analysis
                                                          conditions under which the     of transportation
                                                          packaging should be able to    conditions, such
                                                          provide containment during     analysis does not
                                                          onsite transport. DBCs to be   necessarily evaluate
                                                          considered for a particular    the initiators,
                                                          hazardous materials            frequency, or
                                                          transport will depend on the   consequences of
                                                          hazard level of the            accident conditions.
                                                          material.''.
                                                         ``Chapter VII of the TSD
                                                          should include guidance on
                                                          which DBCs should be
                                                          developed for each hazard
                                                          level, and should establish
                                                          minimum performance
                                                          requirements for each hazard
                                                          level. Examples of DBCs
                                                          which may be appropriate for
                                                          some hazard levels are
                                                          shock, vibration, collision,
                                                          fall, fire, penetration, and
                                                          immersion. Others may also
                                                          be appropriate.''.
                                                         ``To illustrate how the
                                                          performance requirements
                                                          established in Chapter VII
                                                          of the TSD can be used to
                                                          develop an appropriate DBC,
                                                          a particular hazardous
                                                          material may be grouped into
                                                          a hazard level that requires
                                                          a packaging to be able to
                                                          survive a 3-ft drop with no
                                                          loss of containment. For
                                                          this hazardous material, a 3-
                                                          ft drop would then become
                                                          the DBC for falls, without
                                                          regard to conditions along
                                                          the transport route or
                                                          during handling which might
                                                          expose the packaging to a
                                                          fall from a higher distance.
                                                          If the packaging could not
                                                          survive a 3-ft drop,
                                                          additional administrative
                                                          controls would need to be
                                                          imposed on the transport
                                                          system to ensure an adequate
                                                          level of safety during
                                                          transport. Guidance
                                                          regarding appropriate
                                                          administrative controls
                                                          should be provided in
                                                          Chapter VII of the TSD.''.
                                                         ``As an example of how
                                                          physical limitations of a
                                                          site may be incorporated
                                                          into a DBC, a particular
                                                          hazardous material may be
                                                          grouped into a hazard level
                                                          that requires a packaging to
                                                          be able to survive a 30-ft
                                                          drop. For this particular
                                                          hazardous material shipment,
                                                          an evaluation of the
                                                          transport route may show
                                                          that, for any accident which
                                                          could occur along the
                                                          transport route, the
                                                          packaging could never fall
                                                          more than 10 ft. If a
                                                          control on the packaging is
                                                          also imposed requiring that
                                                          the packaging never be
                                                          elevated more than 10 ft
                                                          during handling, the DBC
                                                          need only consider a 10-ft
                                                          fall.''
Technical Safety Requirements  830.205(a)(1)--``Develop  No requirement or guidance in  The order and the guide
                                technical safety          the order or guide. Neither    lack requirements and
                                requirements that are     document mentions technical    guidance regarding
                                derived from the          safety requirements.           technical safety
                                documented safety                                        requirements. While DOE
                                analysis''.                                              has other directives
                               830.205(a)(2)--``Prior                                    related to technical
                                to use, obtain DOE                                       safety requirements
                                approval of technical                                    (e.g., DOE Guide 423.1-
                                safety requirements and                                  1B, Implementation
                                any change to technical                                  Guide for Use in
                                safety requirements''.                                   Developing Technical
                                                                                         Safety Requirements),
                                                                                         the safe harbors do not
                                                                                         reference those other
                                                                                         relevant DOE
                                                                                         directives.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

References

[1] Triad National Security, LLC, Submittal of PT-SA-002-R15, P&T 
Transportation Safety Document, and PT-TSR-001-R13, Technical Safety 
Requirements, NSP-23-042, 2023.
[2] Los Alamos Field Office, Approval of Submittal of PT-SA-002-R15 
Packaging and Transportation Safety Document and PT-TSR-001-R13 
Technical Safety Requirements, NNSA-2023-004544, August 10, 2023.
[3] Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Nuclear Safety 
Management.
[4] J. Hruby, Department letter responding to the Board letter of 
January 6, 2022, regarding the adequacy of the LANL onsite 
transportation safety document and the onsite transportation safe 
harbors, September 13, 2022.
[5] Department of Energy, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of 
Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, DOE 
Standard 3009-94 Change Notice 3, 1994.
[6] Los Alamos Site Office, Transmittal of Safety Evaluation Report 
Approving Annual Update of Transportation Safety Document (TSD) and 
Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), March 22, 2007.
[7] Department of Energy, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety 
Policy, DOE P 420.1, 2011.
[8] Los Alamos National Laboratory, Transportation Safety Document, 
P&T-SA-002, R8.1, 2012.
[9] Los Alamos National Laboratory, TA-54 Area G Documented Safety 
Analysis, ABD-WFM-001, R.0, April 2003.
[10] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging and Transportation 
Transportation Safety Document, P&T-SA-002-R15, 2023.
[11] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging and Transportation 
Technical Safety Requirements, PT-TSR-001-R13, 2023.
[12] Department of Energy, Hazardous

[[Page 8665]]

Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety, DOE Order 460.1D Chg 
1, June 2022.
[13] Department of Energy, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 
460.1A, Packaging and Transportation Safety, DOE G 460.1-1, June 
1997.
[14] Triad National Security, LLC, P&T Transportation Safety 
Document Impact Assessment, NSP-22-094, December 9, 2022.
[15] Triad National Security, LLC, P&T Transportation Safety 
Document Compensatory Measures, January 31, 2023.
[16] Department of Energy, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear 
Facility Documented Safety Analysis, DOE-STD-3009-2014, November 
2014.
[17] Triad National Security, LLC, Transportation Safety Document 
(TSD), P&T-SA-002, R12, April 2017.
[18] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging Evaluation Program, 
P&T-PLAN-018, R12, May 7, 2020.
[19] Triad National Security, LLC, Transportation Safety Document 
Authorized Shipper/Transfer Evaluator Instructions, P&T-WI-001, R19, 
July 24, 2020.
[20] Triad National Security, LLC, Technical Safety Requirements for 
Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF), TSR-TWF-002, Rev 2.4, April 2020.
[21] Los Alamos Field Office, Approval of P&T-SA-002-R12 Addendum 3-
R0, Analysis of Transport of Pyrophoric Material, and P&T-TSR-001-
R10-.1, Technical Safety Requirements, NNSA-2021-002752, July 2021.
[22] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging and Transportation 
Technical Safety Requirements, P&T-TSR-001-R10.1, May 17, 2021.
[23] Department of Energy, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility 
Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents, DOE-STD-1104-2016, 
December 2016.
[24] Los Alamos National Laboratory, Packaging Evaluation Program, 
P&T-PLAN-018, R12, May 2020.
[25] Department of Energy, Integration of Safety into the Design 
Process, DOE-STD-1189-2016, December 2016.
[26] Triad National Security, LLC, Submittal of P&T-SA-002-R16, P&T 
Transportation Safety Document and PT-TSR-001-R14, Technical Safety 
Requirements, NSP-23-091, October 4, 2023.
[27] Hanford Site, Hanford Sitewide Transportation Safety Document, 
DOE/RL-2001-36, Revision 1-E, May 2011.
[28] Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory Transportation Safety Document, UCRL-MA-152462-
REV-5, December 2015.
[29] National Security Technologies, LLC, Nuclear Onsite 
Transportation Safety Document for the Nevada National Security 
Site, OTSD-NSAF.100, Rev. 3, June 2017.
[30] Department of Energy, Onsite Packaging and Transfer of 
Materials of National Security Interest, DOE O 461.2, November 2010.
[31] Department of Energy, Packaging and Transportation for Offsite 
Shipment of Materials of National Security Interest, DOE O 461.1C, 
December 2019.
[32] Department of Energy, Implementation Guide for Use in 
Developing Documented Safety Analyses to Meet Subpart B of 10 CFR 
830, DOE G 421.1-2A, December 2011.
[33] Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Subpart E, 
Package Approval Standards.
[34] J. Lowery, Letter to Director of Office of Hazardous Materials 
Standards at U.S. Department of Transportation, Los Alamos: Los 
Alamos National Laboratory Packaging and Transportation, May 17, 
2006.
[35] J. A. Gale, Response Letter to Joseph Lowery, Ref. No. 06-0135, 
Washington: Standards Development, Office of Hazardous Materials 
Standards, U.S. Department of Transportation, July 11, 2006.
[36] W. Winters, Letter to Standards and Rulemaking Division, 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Los Alamos: Regulatory Resources Inc., 
November 29, 2018.
[37] D. Der Kinderen, Response Letter to Letter from Wade Winters 
President of Regulatory Resources Inc., Reference No. 18-0152, 
Washington: Standards Development Branch, Standards and Rulemaking 
Division, U.S. Department of Transportation, April 16, 2019.
[38] NNSA Office of Packaging and Transportation, Assessment Report 
for DOE Orders 461.1B, 461.2 and 460.1C Compliance Review at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, March 2016.
[39] Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 173, Shippers--
General Requirements for Shipments and Packages.

Correspondence With the Secretary of Energy

Department of Energy Request for Extension of Time

September 15, 2023
The Honorable Joyce L. Connery Chair
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Chair Connery:

    The Department of Energy (DOE) received the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) draft Recommendation 2023-1, Onsite 
Transportation Safety, on August 3, 2023. The draft Recommendation 
spans multiple DOE program, staff, and site offices, and DOE is 
currently coordinating our review among the relevant offices.
    In accordance with 42 U.S.C. 2286d(a)(2), the Department 
requests a 60-day extension through November 2, 2023, to provide 
comments. This extension will afford DOE sufficient time to assess 
the findings, supporting data, and analyses of the draft 
Recommendation.
    If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Ahmad M. Al-Daouk, 
National Nuclear Security Administration Associate Administrator for 
Environment, Safety, and Health, at (505) 845-4607.

Sincerely,
Jennifer Granholm

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Response to Extension 
Request

September 19, 2023
The Honorable Jennifer Granholm Secretary of Energy
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585-1000
Dear Secretary Granholm:

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has received 
the Department of Energy's September 15, 2023, letter requesting an 
extension until November 2, 2023, to provide comments regarding the 
Board's draft Recommendation 2023-1, Onsite Transportation Safety. 
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. 2286d(a)(2), the Board grants this 
request.
    Please note that the Atomic Energy Act allows the Board to issue 
a final recommendation after the expiration of a 30-day period for 
the Secretary to provide comments on a draft recommendation. 42 
U.S.C. 2286d(a)(3). In this instance, the 30-day period expired on 
September 2, 2023. The Board respectfully requests that, in the 
future, if the Department wishes to seek an extension of the 30-day 
period, it do so before that period elapses, so that the Board 
receives and can consider extension requests in a timely manner.

Sincerely,
Joyce L. Connery Chair

Department of Energy Comments on Draft Recommendation

November 1, 2023
The Honorable Joyce L. Connery
Chair, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana NW, 
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Chair Connery:

    The Department of Energy (DOE) received the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB/Board) Draft Recommendation 2023-1, 
Onsite Transportation Safety, dated August 3, 2023. This letter 
discusses DOE's recent efforts for improving onsite transportation 
safety at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and provides 
comments on Draft Recommendation 2023-1.
    As captured in DOE's September 2022 response \12\ to the Board's 
January 2022 letter,\13\ the Department has already agreed to take 
actions to address some of the items in Draft Recommendation 2023-1. 
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) previously 
agreed to identify near-term improvements to the LANL Transportation 
Safety Document (TSD) controls, and on

[[Page 8666]]

August 10, 2023, the Los Alamos Field Office approved an update to 
the LANL TSD and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The approved 
LANL TSD and TSRs elevate the compensatory measures to TSRs as 
discussed in Draft Recommendation 2023-1 and directs LANL to 
address, as conditions of approval, NNSA comments that are 
consistent with the concerns raised by the Board in your 
observations and previous letters. NNSA will ensure the Los Alamos 
Field Office and LANL address the remaining conditions of approval 
in the TSD and TSRs by the next annual update in August 2024. 
Correcting these issues will strengthen onsite transportation safety 
at Los Alamos until the regulatory framework is updated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ DOE letter and report to Joyce Connery, Board Chair, 
responding to DNFSB January 6, 2022, letter regarding onsite 
transportation safety at DOE defense nuclear facilities, dated 
September 13, 2022.
    \13\ Letter to Jennifer Granholm, Secretary of Energy, from 
Joyce Connery, Board Chair, dated January 6, 2022, requesting a 
report and briefing regarding onsite transportation safety at DOE 
defense nuclear facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the report attached to DOE's September 2022 letter, DOE 
stated that it ``plans to review the requirements of 10 CFR part 
830, subpart B, and will determine whether an improved methodology 
and/or guidance for performing 10 CFR part 830, subpart B-compliant 
[documented safety analysis] and TSR development for onsite 
transportation at DOE defense nuclear facilities is warranted.'' DOE 
also agreed to ``update the discussion in DOE Standard (STD) 1104-
2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and 
Safety Design Basis Documents, to clarify the expectations for DOE 
to review and approve TSDs.''
    The Department previously agreed to improving interfaces for how 
we communicate, engage, and share expertise with the field after the 
near-term and long-term actions for onsite transportation safety are 
completed, and we intend to share operating experiences across the 
defense nuclear facility complex.
    DOE has the following two comments on Draft Sub-Recommendations 
2.c and Draft Recommendation 3:
    1. In Draft Sub-Recommendation 2.c, the Board recommends DOE 
``[c]onduct an extent of condition review of TSDs for DOE sites with 
defense nuclear facilities to identify any near-term actions 
necessary to ensure safety until the safe harbors are revised and 
implemented.'' As identified in the Draft Recommendation, the DOE 
Office of Environmental Management conducted an extent of condition 
assessment in 2021. Therefore, DOE suggests the Board change Sub-
Recommendation 2.c to limit the extent of condition review to NNSA 
sites. NNSA would commit to complete these reviews in a timely 
manner.
    2. DOE believes that Departmental resources for ensuring safety 
of onsite transportation activities are best used to support the 
actions encompassed in Draft Recommendations 1 and 2. Sub-
Recommendation 3a appears to recommend analysis and review that will 
be an essential part of the approach to developing improved safe 
harbor(s) required as part of Recommendation 2. Sub-Recommendation 
3b appears to require a second parallel process that would replicate 
corrective action activities that will be required for 
Recommendation 1. DOE suggests removing Draft Recommendation 3, or 
at least Sub- Recommendation 3b.
    Thank you for providing Draft Recommendation 2023-1 for our 
review. We appreciate the Board's insights and advice on this 
important topic. DOE remains committed to sharing information with 
the Board and offers to brief the Board or DNFSB staff on the status 
of these issues as we progress. With the consideration of the 
comments above, DOE believes that these actions adequately address 
the Board's concerns. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. 
Ahmad M. Al-Daouk, NNSA Associate Administrator for Environment, 
Safety, and Health, at (505) 845-4607.

Sincerely,
Jennifer Granholm

    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 2286d(b)(2).

    Dated: February 1, 2024.
Joyce Connery,
Chair.
[FR Doc. 2024-02513 Filed 2-7-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3670-01-P


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