Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 27 / Thursday, February 8, 2024 / Notices 8739 

the FMCSA study was not 

comprehensive and that more questions 

needed to be asked to determine the full 

nature of the SASH problem. Key areas 

of concern included: 

1. Sample design and categories of

gender, sexual orientation, and 

ethnicity. 

2. Types of questions asked to capture

SASH and not using the latest standards 

in SASH research to design questions. 

3. Development of appropriate and

evaluated recommendations to inform 

actions for SASH prevention. 

While the study framed the SASH 

issues in the industry and provided 

some preliminary data to understand 

magnitude, WOTAB’s discussions on 

the study and other issues for women in 

the CMV industry indicated a need for 

additional research, especially to 

support improved participation of 

women in CMV careers. Additional 

research was suggested to support 

potential policy changes that would 

address improvements to current 

practices and reporting methods for 

drivers related to SASH, and to establish 

improved outreach and safety resources. 

WOTAB noted in particular that it is 

important to understand SASH with 

additional depth and breadth to ensure 

there is an awareness of the magnitude 

of SASH across the industry. 

Therefore, FMCSA seeks to develop a 

comprehensive, expanded study that 

achieves a deeper framing and 

understanding of baseline data and 

issues related to SASH. FMCSA seeks 

input from stakeholders to help in the 

design of a new study. 

III. Request for Information

In developing the SASH study,

FMCSA seeks input on the elements 

that should be included or considered. 

Please include answers to the following 

questions in your response: 

1. What is the optimal study design to

capture SASH information within the 

CMV industry, particularly among 

drivers? FMCSA is considering a survey 

and interview approach, as well as 

potential peer reviews of findings at key 

milestones throughout the study. What 

type of study design will best 

characterize the nature and scope of 

sexual assault and sexual harassment 

within the CMV industry that can be 

used to develop appropriate 

countermeasures? 

2. What are best practices or methods

for capturing gender identity 

information? 

3. What are best practices to consider

when asking demographic questions 

about sexual orientation and ethnicity? 

4. Are there other categories of

participant demographics that would 

improve the study (e.g., education, age, 

income, length of time in position (or in 

the industry), segment of the CMV 

industry, geographic region of 

operation, etc.)? Please be specific and 

provide rationale for including such 

questions, including how they may be 

used in characterizing the SASH 

problem and developing 

countermeasures and recommendations. 

5. Who should be included (i.e.,

targeted stakeholders) in a SASH study 

for the CMV industry? 

6. What options exist to best

incorporate stakeholder input and 

feedback throughout the study (e.g., 

surveys, individual interviews, focus 

groups, or other formats)? 

7. What research is available for

designing and administering questions 

about SASH (e.g., style of questions, 

sequencing, repetition, phrasing, etc.)? 

8. What are the best methods to

capture SASH issues and trends 

throughout the evolution of one’s career 

(trainee, driver, other positions across 

the CMV industry (e.g., manager, 

trainer, scheduler, safety employee, 

retiree, those who have left the 

industry)? 

9. What are the optimum methods to

capture the breadth of SASH? What 

categories of questions should FMCSA 

include that will ensure a 

comprehensive approach to the issue? 

10. What are good practices for

informing stakeholders and the public at 

key milestones during a long study? 

How can FMCSA best disseminate 

information (e.g., literature review, 

preliminary results) to keep 

stakeholders informed without 

compromising the integrity of the study? 

Issued under authority delegated in 49 CFR 

1.87. 

Sue Lawless, 

Acting Deputy Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2024–02539 Filed 2–7–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–EX–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Railroad Administration 

[Emergency Order No. 33, Notice No.1] 

Emergency Order To Prevent 

Operation of Trains and Other OnTrack Rail Equipment on Blackwell 

Northern Gateway Railroad 

SUMMARY: The Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA) of the United 

States Department of Transportation has 

determined that public safety compels 

the issuance of an Emergency Order 

(Order) requiring the Blackwell 

Northern Gateway Railroad (BNGR) of 

Blackwell, Oklahoma, to discontinue 

operation of all trains, locomotives, and 

any other on-track rail vehicles or 

equipment under any circumstances 

over any track BNGR leases or owns, 

including the rail line extending from 

milepost (MP) 0.09 at Wellington, 

Kansas, to MP 35.35 at Blackwell, 

Oklahoma, and from MP 127.0 to MP 

125.0 at Blackwell until BNGR complies 

with all requirements of this Order. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Christian Holt, Staff Director, Operating 

Practices Division, Office of Railroad 

Safety at (202) 366–0978 or Christian.

Holt@dot.gov; Elliott Gillooly, Attorney 

Adviser, Office of the Chief Counsel, at 

(202) 897–8666 or Elliott.Gillooly@

dot.gov; or Veronica Chittim, Attorney

Adviser, Office of the Chief Counsel, at

(202) 480–3410 or Veronica.Chittim@

dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Introduction 

As provided below, FRA has 

determined that public safety compels 

the issuance of this Order requiring 

BNGR to discontinue operations of all 

trains, locomotives, or any other ontrack rail vehicles or equipment under 

any circumstances over any track it 

leases or owns, including the rail line 

extending from MP 0.09 at Wellington, 

Kansas, to MP 35.35 at Blackwell, 

Oklahoma, and from MP 127.0 to MP 

125.0 at Blackwell until BNGR complies 

with all requirements of this Order. 

Authority 

Authority to enforce Federal railroad 

safety laws has been delegated by the 

U.S. Secretary of Transportation 

(Secretary) to the Administrator of FRA. 

49 U.S.C. 103; 49 CFR 1.89(e). Railroads 

are subject to FRA’s safety jurisdiction 

under the Federal railroad safety laws. 

49 U.S.C. 20101, 20103. FRA is 

authorized to issue emergency orders 

where ‘‘an unsafe condition or practice, 

or a combination of unsafe conditions 

and practices, causes an emergency 

situation involving a hazard of death, 

personal injury, or significant harm to 

the environment.’’ 49 U.S.C. 20104. 

Emergency orders may immediately 

impose ‘‘restrictions and prohibitions 

. . . that may be necessary to abate the 

situation.’’ Id. 

Background 

BNGR operates on approximately 37 

miles of rail line owned by the 

Oklahoma Department of Transportation 

(ODOT) and the Blackwell Industrial 

Authority (BIA). The line extends from 

Blackwell, Oklahoma, to Wellington, 

Kansas, where BNGR interchanges with 


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8740 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 27 / Thursday, February 8, 2024 / Notices 

1A hi-rail vehicle is a roadway maintenance 

machine that is manufactured to meet Federal 

Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and is equipped 

with retractable flanged wheels so that the vehicle 

may travel over the highway or on railroad tracks. 

See 49 CFR 214.5. 

BNSF Railway. All track on the BNGR 

line is designated as ‘‘excepted’’ track, 

meaning that trains are limited to 

speeds of 10 miles per hour. BNGR 

operations on all track is further 

designated as ‘‘yard limits,’’ meaning 

that crews must be prepared to stop 

within one half the range of vision at all 

times when moving trains and engines. 

BNGR ownership changed on or about 

October 1, 2023. FRA is aware of several 

serious incidents that have occurred 

following the change in BNGR 

ownership, including two derailments 

and a highly dangerous movement of 

on-track equipment through an 

unprotected highway-rail grade 

crossing, narrowly missing a collision 

with a passenger vehicle. 

FRA recently began investigating 

BNGR’s operations following a 

derailment that occurred on December 

27, 2023. FRA has found that BNGR is 

operating with a complete disregard for 

the safety of the public and has not 

taken corrective action to resolve safety 

issues identified by FRA as posing 

imminent risks of injury or death. BNGR 

has, in its short time under current 

ownership, operated locomotives not 

safe for use under Federal law (49 

U.S.C. 20701, 49 CFR part 229), allowed 

locomotives to be operated by persons 

not properly qualified as engineers in 

accordance with FRA regulations (49 

CFR part 240), and failed to qualify any 

engineers or conductors under any 

qualification program in accordance 

with FRA regulations (49 CFR parts 240 

and 242, respectively). BNGR has 

maintained no records of track safety 

inspections, no records of employees 

designated and qualified to perform 

track inspections, and no records that 

roadway workers have been trained to 

use roadway maintenance machines or 

perform safety-essential functions in 

accordance with FRA regulations (49 

CFR parts 213 and 214). 

Further, in violation of FRA 

regulations (49 CFR part 225), BNGR has 

failed to report, at a minimum, the two 

derailments that FRA has discovered 

through its investigation. In both 

derailments, the individual operating 

the derailed train was not properly 

qualified as an engineer in accordance 

with 49 CFR part 240, including at least 

one instance when the train’s 

locomotive was also several years past 

its required periodic inspection (see 49 

CFR 229.23(a)). Additionally, there is 

evidence that persons not employed by 

the railroad and with no qualification 

under FRA regulations were allowed to 

operate locomotives (see 49 CFR 

240.201(d)). Moreover, there is evidence 

BNGR employees have been directed by 

BNGR ownership to provide FRA false 

information, including a false engineer 

certification card and false hours of 

service (HOS) records. 

BNGR has created a public safety 

emergency through a willful failure to 

undertake basic responsibilities such as 

track inspection and training for safetyrelated railroad employees in 

combination with the deliberate actions 

of one or more individuals in positions 

of authority at this railroad. FRA has 

obtained substantial evidence that the 

most senior person on location at the 

BNGR, a co-owner of the railroad, has 

personally operated locomotives and 

trains on the BNGR line without the 

required training or qualification, 

leading to derailments, and has 

provided false information to FRA. 

Evidence also shows this individual has 

directed employees to act in ways that 

are unsafe and wholly contrary to a 

safety culture railroad employees expect 

and require to do their jobs properly, 

including directions to put locomotives 

into service not fit for use and prepare 

false HOS records. Aggravating all of the 

foregoing concerns, BNGR has not 

provided FRA with documentation that 

the railroad has a written program of 

operational tests and inspections on its 

operating rules in accordance with FRA 

regulations (49 CFR 217.9) or the 

required training program for its safetyrelated employees under 49 CFR part 

243. 

On January 17, 2024, FRA found no 

program for track inspection in 

compliance with FRA safety regulations 

(49 CFR part 213) and no inspection 

records for any month from the time the 

BNGR came under current ownership 

(October through December 2023). 

Following these findings, BNGR’s 

manager represented to FRA that all 

track over which BNGR operates would 

be taken out of service. Under 49 CFR 

part 213, any movements on track that 

is out of service for repairs must be 

authorized by a § 213.7 qualified person 

and be made only to facilitate repairs. 

See § 213.233(d). 

On Sunday, January 28, 2024, 

witnesses reported that at 

approximately 5:15 p.m., C.S.T., an ontrack hi-rail vehicle 1 nearly collided 

with a highway passenger vehicle at a 

highway-rail grade crossing at Doolin 

Avenue over the BNGR line near 

Blackwell, Oklahoma. This incident 

demonstrates a cascade of failures to 

protect life and safety by BNGR, as the 

grade crossing signal system at the 

highway-rail grade crossing was not 

activated, no flag protection of the 

intersection was provided, and the hirail vehicle reportedly made no effort to 

stop and yield the right-of-way to 

vehicular traffic at the crossing, which 

is a customary railroad safety practice 

and often part of a railroad’s operating 

rules under 49 CFR part 217. 

Finding and Order 

The evidence developed in FRA’s 

investigation of the BNGR has led FRA 

to conclude that continued operation of 

any rail equipment by BNGR on any 

part of its line poses an imminent threat 

to safety, including the threat of serious 

harm to persons employed by BNGR 

and the public. Further, the pattern of 

gross negligence and willful failures to 

comply with Federal safety regulations 

in multiple functional areas, including 

track safety, locomotive engineer 

qualification and certification, operating 

practices, and roadway worker safety, 

persuades FRA that reliance alone upon 

the assurances and cooperation of BNGR 

is not possible, consistent with public 

safety. Therefore, as the Administrator 

of FRA, I find that the combination of 

unsafe conditions and practices 

discussed above creates an emergency 

situation involving a hazard of death or 

injury to persons. 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104, delegated 

to me by the Secretary, it is ordered that 

BNGR must discontinue, and may not 

permit under any circumstances, the 

operations of trains, locomotives, or any 

other on-track rail vehicles or 

equipment on any part of the track that 

it owns or leases from ODOT or the BIA, 

including all track between Wellington, 

Kansas, and Blackwell, Oklahoma, 

while this Order remains in effect. I 

direct that a copy of this Order be 

posted in a public location at the 

railroad’s office and a copy of the Order 

be provided to each employee of the 

railroad within 24 hours of the date of 

issuance. 

FRA investigation of this railroad is 

ongoing, and FRA may take further 

steps to assure public safety. These 

steps may include additional notice(s) 

under this Order and/or other 

enforcement action. 

Relief 

BNGR may only resume operations 

and obtain full relief from this Order by 

taking the following actions: 

1. Submit to FRA for approval both a 

current, written program for certifying 

the qualification of engineers under 49 

CFR part 240 and a current, written 

program for certifying the qualification 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 27 / Thursday, February 8, 2024 / Notices 8741 

of conductors under 49 CFR part 242. 

See 49 CFR 240.101; 49 CFR 242.101. 

2. Submit to FRA for approval a list 

of conductors and engineers who have 

been certified under the written 

programs approved by FRA, with 

complete, written certification 

determinations for each individual as 

required under 49 CFR 240.109 for 

engineers, and 49 CFR 242.109 for 

conductors. 

3. Submit to FRA for approval a 

written program of operational tests and 

inspections to be put in effect in 

accordance with 49 CFR 217.9. 

4. Submit to FRA for approval a 

training program in compliance with 49 

CFR part 243 for training, qualification, 

and oversight of safety-related railroad 

employees. 

5. Submit to FRA for approval an ontrack safety program that complies with 

the requirements of 49 CFR part 214, 

subpart C, and complete training and 

qualification records in accordance with 

that program for all employees who will 

engage in any on-track work or use of 

roadway maintenance machines. 

6. Submit to FRA a list of designated, 

qualified persons responsible for 

maintenance and inspection of track in 

accordance with 49 CFR 213.7. 

7. Accompany FRA track inspectors 

on a joint inspection of all BNGR track. 

8. Complete all remedial actions 

noted by FRA for track defects 

identified following the joint inspection 

and submit records of all required track 

inspections after the completion of all 

remedial action. 

9. Certify to FRA that a self-audit of 

HOS records has been completed and 

submit to FRA any records found to be 

incorrect or substantially incomplete 

with corrections to those records, to the 

extent possible. 

10. Certify to FRA that all employees 

have been trained on HOS requirements 

under 49 CFR part 228; 49 U.S.C. ch. 

211. 

11. Certify to FRA that all employees 

have been trained on the requirements 

under 49 CFR part 225 to report 

accidents and incidents to FRA. 

12. Submit to FRA all records of 

inspections required to be maintained 

under § 234.109 (system malfunction at 

highway-rail grade crossings). 

13. Certify that all locomotives are in 

proper condition and fit for service in 

accordance with 49 U.S.C. ch. 207 and 

49 CFR part 229. 

14. Obtain approval from the FRA 

Administrator that all requirements of 

this Order have been met and properly 

performed. 

To obtain relief, BNGR must take the 

actions described above and submit all 

required information and certifications 

to Christian.Holt@dot.gov and 

subsequently inform the FRA 

Administrator in writing that it believes 

all of the requirements of this Order 

have been met. FRA will conduct 

verification inspections and will inform 

BNGR in writing whether it is in 

compliance with this Order so that the 

Order may be lifted. If FRA does not lift 

the Order, FRA’s written response will 

specifically describe what additional 

measures need to be taken to meet all 

of the requirements of this Order. 

Partial Relief 

For FRA to consider granting partial 

relief from this Order, BNGR must 

submit a written plan for approval to 

Christian.Holt@dot.gov that provides a 

detailed explanation of the partial relief 

sought, the specific measures that BNGR 

proposes to ensure the safety of any 

operations to be permitted, and the 

period of time for which such partial 

relief is sought. 

Any partial relief provided will 

remain subject to BNGR’s compliance 

with its approved written plan to 

provide safety measures, limitations on 

operations, and time periods for each 

component part of the partial relief. 

Failure to comply with any material 

provision of the approved plan will 

result in the partial relief being revoked. 

Penalties 

Any violation of this Order or the 

terms of any approved written plan 

pursuant to this Order subjects the 

person (railroad carrier) committing the 

violation to a civil penalty of up to 

$35,516 for ordinary violations and 

$142,063 for aggravated violations for 

each day the violation continues. 49 

U.S.C. 21301; 88 FR 89551 (Dec. 28, 

2023). Any individual (railroad 

personnel) who willfully violates a 

provision stated in this Order is subject 

to civil penalties under 49 U.S.C. 21301. 

In addition, such an individual (railroad 

personnel) whose violation of this Order 

demonstrates the individual’s unfitness 

for safety-sensitive service may be 

removed from safety-sensitive service 

on the railroad under 49 U.S.C. 20111. 

If appropriate, FRA may pursue 

criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C. 

522(a) and 49 U.S.C. 21311(a), as well 

as 18 U.S.C. 1001, for the knowing and 

willful falsification of a report required 

by this Order. FRA may, through the 

Attorney General, also seek injunctive 

relief to enforce this Order. 49 U.S.C. 

20112. 

Effective Date and Notice to Affected 

Persons 

This Order takes effect at 12:01 a.m., 

C.S.T., on February 3, 2024, and applies 

to operations of all trains, locomotives, 

and any other on-track rail vehicles or 

equipment. Notice of this Order will be 

provided by publishing it in the Federal 

Register. Copies of this Order will be 

sent by email prior to publication to 

BNGR, ODOT, and BIA. 

Review 

Opportunity for formal review of this 

Order will be provided in accordance 

with 49 U.S.C. 20104(b) and 5 U.S.C. 

554. Administrative procedures 

governing such review are found at 49 

CFR part 211. See 49 CFR 211.47, 

211.71, 211.73, 211.75, and 211.77. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on February 2, 

2024. 

Amitabha Bose, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2024–02536 Filed 2–7–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Transit Administration 

FY 2024 Competitive Funding 

Opportunity: Low or No Emission 

Grant Program and the Grants for 

Buses and Bus Facilities Competitive 

Program 

AGENCY: Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA), Department of Transportation 

(DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of funding opportunity 

(NOFO). 

SUMMARY: The Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA) announces the 

opportunity to apply for approximately 

$1.10 billion in competitive grants 

under the fiscal year (FY) 2024 Low or 

No Emission Grant Program (Low-No 

Program) (Federal Assistance Listing: 

20.526) and approximately $390 million 

in competitive grants under the FY 2024 

Grants for Buses and Bus Facilities 

Program (Buses and Bus Facilities 

Program) (Federal Assistance Listing 

20.526), subject to availability of 

appropriated funding. 

DATES: Complete proposals must be 

submitted electronically through the 

GRANTS.GOV ‘‘APPLY’’ function by 

11:59 p.m. eastern time on April 25, 

2024. Prospective applicants should 

initiate the process by registering on the 

GRANTS.GOV website promptly to 

ensure completion of the application 

process before the submission deadline. 

ADDRESSES: Instructions for applying 

can be found on FTA’s website at 

https://www.transit.dot.gov/howtoapply 

and in the ‘‘FIND’’ module of 

GRANTS.GOV. The funding 

opportunity ID is FTA–2024–003–TPM– 


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