alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellant, v. Warren BOLENDER, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 20, 1956.

J. D. Buckman, Jr., Atty. Gen., Wm. F. Simpson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

J. Howard Hofbert, Elizabethtown, for appellee.

CLAY, Commissioner.

This is a murder case in which a verdict for the defendant was directed at the conclusion of all the evidence. The Commonwealth has asked for a certification of the law as to the correctness of this ruling.

The directed verdict was based upon a unique set of facts peculiar to this particular case. Section 337 of the Criminal Code of Practice authorizes an appeal by the Commonwealth for a certification of the law if the question “is important to the coixect and uniform administration of the criminal law”. In Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 285 Ky. 477, 148 S.W.2d 343, 344, we said:

> “Only a question as to the sufficiency of the evidence is involved, and no useful service would be rendered by a determination of that issue by this court. The defendant has been acquitted, and his rights cannot be affected. It is improbable that similar facts will ever appear in any future case, and any decision rendered would be of no benefit to the parties involved, the trial court or the legal profession generally.”

So here. See also Commonwealth v. Collins, 291 Ky. 685, 165 S.W.2d 357.

We may say in passing that the facts shown by the record justified a directed verdict.

The appeal is dismissed.
**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**






In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Communicate.com Inc. (“Communicate”) on
      Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2005 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, David
      M. Jeffs, President, Chief Executive Officer of Communicate and the sole member
      of the Board of Directors, certify, pursuant to s.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act
      of 2002, that:




(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly represents, the financial condition
      and result of operations of Communicate.








*/s/
      David M. Jeffs*


David
      M.
      Jeffs


Chief
      Executive Officer






November
      10, 2005




















**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**






In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Communicate.com Inc. (“Communicate”) on
      Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2005 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, J.
      Cameron Pan, Secretary, Treasurer, and Chief Financial Officer of Communicate,
      certify, pursuant to s.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly represents, the financial condition
      and result of operations of Communicate.








*/s/
      J. Cameron Pan*


J.
      Cameron Pan


Chief
      Financial Officer




November
      10, 2005
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

 

CERTIFICATIONOF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND FINANCIAL OFFICER

UNDERSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT RULES 13a-14 AND 15d-14

 

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of TBX Resources, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10QSB for theperiod ending August 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchangecommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Tim Burroughs, Chief Executiveand Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

(1)          The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)of the Securities Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.78m or 780(d); and

(2)          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Dated this 14th day of October 2003.

 
| By:  /s/ Tim  Burroughs                        |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                |
| Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 20 23

- 0055

_____________________________
T ONY L EON B ROWN , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County

. Brantley S. Clark, Jr. , Judge

.

March 11, 2024

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
K ELSEY , M.K. T HOMAS , and N ORDBY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Kevin P. Steiger
, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody
, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Curis, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended June 30, 2010 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Daniel R. Passeri, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: August 3, 2010



/S/    DANIEL R.
PASSERIDaniel R. Passeri President
and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 00-2259

___________ Francisco Santana, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern v. * District of Missouri. * United States of America, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: January 9, 2001 Filed: January 19, 2001

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, FAGG, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Ajury convicted Francisco Santana of drug conspiracy and a related charge. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See Unite d States v. OrtizMartinez , 1 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 1993). Santana then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserting several claims. The district court denied relief, but certified two issues for appeal involving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Santana must show both that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance actually prejudiced him. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668,-2-

687-88 (1994). Santana cannot make this showing. Santana first asserts his appellate attorney should have objected to factual misrepresentations in the government's appellate brief. The allegedly misrepresented facts were not material to any issue decided on appeal or relied on in our opinion to support affirmance of Santana's convictions. Thus, Santana cannot show a reasonable probability that his direct appeal wouldhave been successful absent the failure to object to the alleged misrepresentations. For his other ineffective assistance claim, Santana contends his appellate attorney should have challenged the addition of two points to his base offense level for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) because there was no evidence to show he possessed firearms. To have prevailed on the claim, however, the attorney would have had to convince us the district court's factual findings were clearly err oneous, and Santana offers no reasons why they were. Santana cannot show the failure to challenge the § 2D1.1(b)(1) addition prejudiced him. Besides, the increase properly applies to a defendant like Santana. Although Santana did not personally possess weapons, his coconspirators possessed them and the possession was reasonably foreseeable to him. See United States v. Turpin , 920 F.2d 1377, 1386 (8th Cir. 1990). We affirm the district court. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

September 4, 2012

h0827

Order 

September 4, 2012

144984

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 144984

COA: 302738

Wayne CC: 10-002067-01-FH

ADRIEL CHURELL LAWHORN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 29, 2012 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURAL RULES COMMITTEE

FINAL REPORT 1

Amendment of Pa.R.J.C.P. 1601 and 1608

On May 17 , 2018 , the Supreme Court amended Rule s of Juvenile Court Procedur e

1601 and 1608 to require prior notice if a dependent child’s permanency review hearing may result in a goal change away from reunification.

The Juvenile Court Procedural Rules Committee undertook rulemaking to address reported circumstances wherein permanency review hearings resulted in goal change s

that discontinu ed reunification without prior notice that such a goal change w ould be decided at the hearing. This appeared inconsistent with the best practice of provid ing notice of an upcoming goal change hearing. See Pennsylvania Children’s Roundtable

Initiative. Pennsylvania Depen dency Benchbook at p. 119 . Harrisburg, PA: Office of Children and Families in the Courts, 2010.

After considering comments in response to a prior proposal, see 47 Pa.B. 947 (February 18, 2017) , t he Committee revised the proposal to extend Rule 1601(B) t o include all parties ( e.g. , GAL) rather than solely the county agency. Moreover , the previously proposed provision for a discretionary rehearing was eliminated , believing that the effect of a goal change from reunification was so significant that due pro cess required timely notice of the possibility of a goal change from reunification in all instances.

Given the gravity of a permanency review hearing that may result in a goal change from reunification, the Committee proposed to amend Rule 1608(d)(1)(c ) to require that notice in accordance with proposed Rule 1601(B) be given before a court can order a goal change from reunification. As indicated in the revised Comment to Rule 1608, the court should direct the county agency to give notice to all other p arties when the court seeks to change the goal in the absence of such noti ce.

Additionally, post

- publication, the phrase “placement goal” was revised to “permanency goal” to more accurately describe the goal.

The amendments will become effective October 1, 2018.

1 The Committee’s Final Report should not be confused with the official Committee

Comments to the rules. Also note that the Supreme Court does not adopt the

Committee’s Comments or the contents of the Committee’s explanatory Final Reports.
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     In connection  with the annual report of Syms Corp (the  "Company") on Form
10-K for the year  ended  February  25,  2006 as filed with the  Securities  and
Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, Marcy Syms,  Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, to the best of my knowledge, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:

          (1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.




                                        /s/ Marcy Syms
                                        Marcy Syms
                                        Chief Executive Officer
                                        Syms Corp
                                        April 21, 2006


A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
required by Section 906,  has been  provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its
staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                5
<MULTIPLIER>             1,000

<S>                      <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                             2782
<SECURITIES>                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       116
<ALLOWANCES>                                          0
<INVENTORY>                                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   3302
<PP&E>                                               45
<DEPRECIATION>                                        0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     3347
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               935
<BONDS>                                               0
<COMMON>                                             51
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                 0
<PREFERRED>                                           0
<OTHER-SE>                                         2260
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       3347
<SALES>                                            5466
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   5466
<CGS>                                               130
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       551
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   5200
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 (92)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (210)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (493)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (284)
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                       0
<CHANGES>                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (284)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.06)


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 00-1514L.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Aug. 5, 2002.

*419See, also, 2002 WL 1565162.

James Neuman (Richard Jasper, New York, NY, on brief), for Appellant.

Bernadette Miragliotta, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.

Present FEINBERG, OAKES, and F.I. PARKER, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the decision of said district court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART,' AND DECIDED IN PART BY SEPARATE OPINION.

Defendant-appellant appeals from the judgment entered July 10, 2000, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J.), convicting Defendant, following his plea of guilty, of conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, and sentencing him to 262 months imprisonment, which he is serving, five years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.

In this order, we address (1) whether the government acted in bad faith in deciding not to file a Section 5K1.1 motion; and (2) whether Judge Johnson erred in denying Defendant’s downward departure motions. In a separate opinion, we address Defendant’s argument that his sentence was erroneously enhanced on the basis of drug amounts that were not specified in the indictment or in a jury finding beyond reasonable doubt.

We affirm the district court’s ruling that the government was justified in withholding the 5K1.1 letter, based on its honest belief that the Defendant lied while testifying under oath and thereby breached his cooperation agreement. *See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez,*127 F.3d 277, 286 (2d Cir.1997)(where a cooperation agreement required the defendant to be *420truthful, his subsequent lying to the government constitutes a breach of the agreement, allowing the government to refrain from making a § 5K1.1 motion); *United States v. Brechner,*99 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1996) (same); *United States v. Pollack,*91 F.3d 331, 336 (2d Cir.1996) (same); *United States v. Resto,*74 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir.1996) (same).

We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s refusal to depart downwardly in this case because the court did not mistakenly believe it lacked authority to depart downwardly; to the contrary, the court expressly stated on the record *twice*that it understood it had such authority but simply decided not to exercise its discretion to depart. *See, e.g., United States v. Galvez-Falconi,*174 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1999). It is settled that a district court is not required to specify its reasons for refusing to depart downwardly. *See United States v. Lawal,*17 F.3d 560, 563 (2d Cir.1994); *United States v. Hargrett,*156 F.3d 447, 449-50 (2d Cir.1998) (expressly adopting Lawal). We therefore dismiss Defendant’s appeal with respect to the district court’s refusal to depart downwardly.

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART, AND DECIDED IN PART BY SEPARATE OPINION.
**Exhibit 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**
I, Susan M. Atkins, certify that:
1. I have reviewed the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarterended May 31, 2005 of IMPRESO, INC. (the “Report”); 2. Based on my knowledge, the Report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by the Report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in the Report, fairly present inall material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in the Report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to bedesigned under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented inthe Report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by the Report based on suchevaluation; and  c) Disclosed in the Report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in thecase of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting;
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):
 a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknessesin the design or operation of internal controls overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information;and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significantrole in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.
6. Item 4 Controls and Procedures in the registrant’s Form 10-Q is incorporatedherein by reference.        Date: July 15, 2005 /s/ Susan M. Atkins   **Susan M. Atkins**   **Chief Financial Officer**