In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-1193 

BROOKS GOPLIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

WECONNECT, INCORPORATED, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 3:17-cv-00773-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 24, 2018 — DECIDED JUNE 21, 2018 

____________________ 

Before MANION and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and 

GETTLEMAN, District Judge.*

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. WeConnect, Inc. asks us to reverse 

the district court for making a factual mistake. The district 

court found that WeConnect was not a party to the arbitra-

 * Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 
2 No. 18-1193 

tion agreement it sought to enforce. WeConnect says that the 

district court misunderstood the nature of its relationship 

with the entity named in the arbitration agreement. Because 

the district court did not clearly err, we affirm its ruling. 

I. 

Brooks Goplin worked for WeConnect, Inc. When he began his employment, he signed an arbitration agreement 

called the “AEI Alternative Entertainment Inc. Open Door 

Policy and Arbitration Program.” The agreement referred to 

an entity named AEI throughout; it never mentioned WeConnect. This error became significant several months later, 

when Goplin sued WeConnect in federal court. 

Goplin brought a collective action under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act and a class action asserting claims under Wisconsin law. Invoking the agreement Goplin had signed, WeConnect filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). It attached an affidavit from its Director of Human Resources stating, among other things, that “I 

am employed by WeConnect, Inc.—formerly known as Alternative Entertainment, Inc. or AEI—as Director of Human 

Resources.” 

Goplin raised several arguments in opposition, but only 

one is relevant here: he claimed that WeConnect was not a 

party to the agreement and therefore could not enforce it.1

 1 Goplin also argued, and the district court agreed, that the “collective action” waiver was invalid under our precedent in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that such waivers violate the Fair Labor Standards Act). The Supreme Court has since reversed Epic Systems, so this argument is no longer relevant. Epic Sys. 

Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285, 2018 WL 2292444 (U.S. May 21, 2018). 
No. 18-1193 3

He directed the district court to language on WeConnect’s 

website, which stated the following: 

WeConnect formed when two privately held companies, Alternative Entertainment, Inc. (AEI) and WeConnect Enterprise Solutions, combined in September 2016... Working together, AEI and 

WeConnect Enterprises could be as nimble as the next great 

technological innovation required. Our founders... saw that we 

were stronger together. And we officially became one company, 

WeConnect. 

Goplin contended that this language supported his position 

that AEI and WeConnect were two distinct legal entities. His 

arbitration agreement was with the now-defunct AEI, and 

WeConnect could not enforce an agreement that he had entered with another company. Under Wisconsin law, which 

applies here, “[t]he general rule is that only a party to a contract may enforce it.” Sussex Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Mainline 

Sewer & Water, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 620, 622–23 (Wis. Ct. App. 

1999). 

In its reply, WeConnect disputed Goplin’s characterization of its relationship with AEI.2 It asserted that WeConnect 

and AEI were not two different legal entities, but rather two 

names for the same legal entity—AEI was the company’s 

original name and WeConnect is its new one. It emphasized 

that the affidavit from the Director of Human Resources referred to WeConnect as a company “formerly known” as 

AEI. Thus, WeConnect argued, a contract with AEI was a 

 2 WeConnect’s reply focused primarily on enforceability of the 

agreement under the National Labor Relations Act and whether the 

agreement is procedurally or substantively unconscionable. Unfortunately, it gave very little attention to the issue now on appeal. 
4 No. 18-1193 

contract with WeConnect. This was a name change, not a 

merger. 

The district court held that WeConnect failed to meet its 

burden of demonstrating that it was a party to the arbitration agreement or otherwise entitled to enforce it. It discounted the affidavit from the Director of Human Resources 

as conclusory and noted that “WeConnect’s own website indicates that AEI ceased to exist in September 2016, when it 

merged with WeConnect Enterprise Solutions to form WeConnect, Inc.” Because the court found that “AEI isn’t just 

another name for WeConnect,” it denied WeConnect’s motion to compel arbitration. 

WeConnect filed a motion for reconsideration. This time, 

it attached more substantial evidence—including some corporate-form documents and affidavits from its lawyer and 

CEO—to support its claim that AEI had undergone a name 

change rather than a merger. But the district court pointed 

out that new evidence cannot be introduced in a motion for 

reconsideration unless the moving party shows “not only 

that [the] evidence was newly discovered or unknown to it 

until after the hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such evidence 

[during the pendency of the motion].” Caisse Nationale de 

Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 

1996) (citations omitted). WeConnect’s evidence was neither 

newly discovered nor unknown; moreover, it could easily 

have produced these documents and affidavits the first time 

around. The district court thus denied the motion. 
No. 18-1193 5

II. 

On appeal, WeConnect challenges the district court’s factual finding that WeConnect and AEI are distinct legal entities. This argument is an uphill battle, because we will only 

reverse a district court’s finding of fact if it is clearly erroneous. And in making that determination, we will consider only the evidence that was properly in the record when the district court ruled. The district court correctly declined to revisit its decision based on the additional materials that WeConnect attached to its motion for reconsideration; thus, we 

will not consider that evidence in our review of the district 

court’s finding. 

WeConnect’s primary complaint is that the district court 

should not have taken its website into account in ruling on 

the Rule 12(b)(3) motion. According to WeConnect, the district court violated the rules of judicial notice by relying on 

information it found in the course of its own internet research. WeConnect emphasizes our warning that “it is especially important for parties to have the opportunity to be 

heard prior to the taking of judicial notice of websites.” 

Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 648 (7th Cir. 

2011). WeConnect suggests that without the website, the district court’s factual finding lacks any basis. 

WeConnect is incorrect. The website was not the determinative factor in the district court’s decision. WeConnect 

bore the burden of establishing its right to enforce the arbitration agreement. It contended that it could enforce a contract entered by AEI, but the only evidence it introduced of 

its relationship to AEI was one sentence in an affidavit from 

its Director of Human Resources. The district court held that 

this affidavit was insufficient proof that WeConnect and AEI 
6 No. 18-1193 

were different names for the same entity. To be sure, it 

viewed the website as confirmation that the entities were 

distinct. But the court’s opinion makes clear that it would 

have reached the same result even without the website. It 

thought that WeConnect simply hadn’t introduced enough 

evidence to show that it had an enforceable agreement with 

Goplin. 

In any event, the district court did not violate the rules of 

judicial notice by reviewing WeConnect’s website. Contrary 

to WeConnect’s assertion, the district court did not engage in 

its own internet research to find the website; Goplin cited 

WeConnect’s website in his briefing. WeConnect protests 

that it did not have the opportunity to put its website language in context for the court. But it could have done so in 

its reply brief; it simply failed to use that opportunity. We 

note too that the statements at issue are WeConnect’s own 

assertions, not potentially unfamiliar information posted on 

third-party websites. Cf. Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 

2015) (taking notice of medical reference websites); Pickett, 

664 F.3d at 648 (addressing a court’s taking notice of the 

Consumer Price Index and Laffey Matrix). 

Had WeConnect introduced the strongest evidence of its 

relationship with AEI from the get-go, it may well have convinced the district court that the two names referred to the 

same entity. But WeConnect miscalculated and relied on a 

conclusory sentence in a human resources affidavit to establish the corporate relationship between WeConnect and AEI. 

Based on the evidence it had before it, the district court’s 

finding was not clearly erroneous. The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED and the case is remanded for further proceedings.