Filed 6/13/23; Certified for Publication 6/29/23 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BEATRIZ ADRIANA CURIEL,

Defendant and Appellant.

B317814

(Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. PA060094)

ORDER MODIFYING

OPINION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT: 

IT IS ORDERED the opinion in the above-entitled matter 

filed on June 2, 2023, be modified as follows: 

On page 3, the date “July 10, 2018” shall be replaced with 

“July 10, 2008.” 
2

There is no change in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________

STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J. VIRAMONTES, J. 
Filed 6/2/23 (unmodified opinion); Certified for Publication 6/29/23 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BEATRIZ ADRIANA CURIEL,

Defendant and Appellant.

B317814

(Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. PA060094)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. David B. Walgren, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded with directions.

Christopher L. Haberman, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney 

General, Noah P. Hill and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Beatriz Curiel appeals from the order denying her motion 

to withdraw her no contest plea and vacate her convictions under 

Penal Code1 section 1473.7, subdivision (a). Curiel contends the

trial court erred in denying her motion because she demonstrated

she did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration 

consequences of her plea, and it is reasonably probable she would 

have rejected the plea had she understood those consequences. 

We conclude Curiel satisfied her burden of establishing that she 

is entitled to relief under section 1473.7. We accordingly reverse 

the order denying Curiel’s motion and remand to the trial court 

with directions to grant the motion and vacate the convictions. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. The Charges

In a seven-count information filed on February 26, 2008, 

Curiel and her husband, Saul Desantiago, were each charged 

with two counts of identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a); counts 1–2), 

one count of making a false financial statement (§ 532a, subd. (1); 

count 3), two counts of possession of a forged driver’s license 

(§ 470b; counts 4–5), and two counts of grand theft auto (§ 487, 

subd. (d)(1); counts 6–7). On March 5, 2008, Curiel was 

arraigned and pleaded not guilty to all counts. 

According to a preplea probation officer’s report, Curiel and 

Desantiago were accused of using the personal identification 

information and paycheck stub of Luz Salazar to purchase two 

vehicles from a car dealer, Vic’s Motors. Desantiago had been 

Salazar’s real estate agent, and he obtained Salazar’s personal 

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references 

are to the Penal Code.
3

information while representing her in the purchase of her home. 

After the home went into foreclosure due to Desantiago’s poor 

business dealings, he threatened Salazar and her husband that 

“something bad would happen” to them if they went to police. 

Salazar was afraid of Desantiago, and she later obtained a 

restraining order against Desantiago and Curiel. During the 

investigation, the police discovered that Curiel also had a driver’s 

license issued in another person’s name. 

At the time of her arrest, Curiel had no criminal history. 

The report stated that Curiel may have been influenced by 

Desantiago to participate in the criminal plot, and that she had 

shown poor judgment in going along with her husband’s scheme. 

The detective in charge of the investigation told the probation 

officer that Desantiago “needs to be watched,” and that Curiel 

“was just stupid,” indicating that Desantiago, not Curiel, had 

orchestrated the crime. The detective was not opposed to 

probation for Curiel. 

II. The No Contest Plea

At a July 10, 2018 hearing, the prosecutor informed the 

trial court that both Curiel and Desantiago had agreed to a 

negotiated plea. The prosecutor originally offered each of them a 

plea requiring 180 days in county jail, but accepted the

counteroffer made by the defendants’ attorneys. In exchange for 

pleading no contest to counts 1, 3, and 6, Curiel would be 

sentenced to three years of probation and 45 days of Caltrans 

service, and Desantiago would be sentenced to 90 days in county 

jail and 90 days of Caltrans service. Both defendants would be 

joint and severally liable to pay restitution to Vic’s Motors in the 

amount of $11,396 prior to sentencing. If they failed to make full 

restitution, they would each receive a sentence of 90 days in 
4

county jail and 90 days of Caltrans service, or alternatively, 

180 days in county jail. The prosecutor noted that Curiel’s 

sentence of probation was “based on the fact she has no priors 

and is a primary caretaker of the couple’s . . . six children.” 

Prior to entering into the plea, Curiel signed a four-page

plea form, commonly known as a Tahl waiver. (In re Tahl (1969) 

1 Cal.3d 122, overruled on other grounds by Mills v. Municipal 

Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 291.) She also initialed the boxes 

next to paragraphs on the form acknowledging that she 

understood and agreed to the terms of the plea, the advisements 

and waivers of her rights, and the consequences of the plea. 

One of the paragraphs stated: “Immigration Consequences—

I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States, 

I must expect my plea of guilty or no contest will result in my 

deportation, exclusion from admission or reentry to the United 

States, and denial of naturalization and amnesty.” Another 

paragraph provided: “Prior to entering this plea, I have had a 

full opportunity to discuss with my attorney the facts of my case, 

the elements of the charged offense(s) and enhancement(s), any 

defenses that I may have, my constitutional rights and waiver of 

those rights, and the consequences of my plea.” On the last page

of the form, Curiel signed an acknowledgment stating that she 

had “read and initialed each of the paragraphs above and 

discussed them with my attorney,” and that her initials “mean 

that I have read, understand and agree with what is stated in the 

paragraph.” 

Curiel’s privately retained attorney, Arvand Naderi, also 

signed an acknowledgment on the plea form, which stated, 

among other things, that he had “reviewed this form with my 

client” and “discussed . . . the consequences of the plea.” 
5

In addition, a duly sworn Spanish-language interpreter signed an 

acknowledgment indicating that she had translated this form to 

the defendant, and that defendant had “stated that he or she 

understood the contents on the form.” 

At the plea hearing, Curiel was present, represented by 

Naderi, and assisted by a Spanish-language interpreter. Prior to 

taking the plea, the trial court asked Curiel whether she had 

enough time to discuss the case and the plea agreement with her 

counsel, and whether her counsel had explained the nature of the 

charges, any possible defenses, and the consequences of the plea. 

Curiel answered affirmatively. Curiel further confirmed that she

had reviewed the plea form with the assistance of the interpreter, 

and had signed and initialed the form to indicate that she 

understood its contents.

The trial court reiterated the waiver of rights and the 

consequences of the plea set forth in the form, including that “[i]f 

you are not a citizen of the United States you must expect that 

your plea of guilty or no contest will result in your deportation, 

exclusion from admission or reentry into the United States and 

denial of naturalization and amnesty.” When asked if she 

understood this consequence, Curiel answered, “Yes.” The court 

also inquired, “Do you have any questions about the forms, 

anything I’ve said, anything your attorneys have said, the 

charges, anything the prosecutor said, anything whatsoever? 

Now is the time to ask.” Curiel answered, “No.” Both Curiel and 

Desantiago entered a no contest plea to counts 1, 3, and 6, and 

the court accepted the pleas. 

The sentencing hearing was held on February 2, 2009. 

The trial court indicated it had received a signed letter from a 

representative of Vic’s Motors, stating that the defendants had 
6

purchased a car from the dealer, which settled the amount owed 

as restitution. Based on that letter, the court ruled that the 

restitution had been paid in full. In accordance with the plea 

agreement, Curiel was sentenced to three years of probation and

45 days of Caltrans service. Desantiago was sentenced to three 

years of probation, 90 days in the county jail, and 90 days of

Caltrans service. They each received one day of custody credit for 

time served. The court advised both defendants that if they left 

or were deported from the United States, they were not to reenter 

illegally, and they were to report to their probation officer within

72 hours of their reentry.

In 2017, Curiel successfully moved to expunge her 2008 

convictions under section 1203.4. 

III. The Motion to Vacate the Convictions

On September 10, 2021, more than 12 years after her no 

contest plea, Curiel filed a motion to withdraw the plea and to

vacate her convictions under section 1473.7. Curiel argued that 

she did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration 

consequences of her plea because her former attorney, Naderi, 

failed to properly advise her of those consequences. 

Curiel supported her motion with, among other documents, 

her own signed declaration. As set forth in her declaration, 

Curiel was referred to Naderi by her husband’s defense counsel, 

Feliz Martinez. At Curiel’s first meeting with Naderi, he 

inquired about her immigration status. When Curiel informed 

Naderi that she did not have legal status in the United States, he 

told her that “he would do what he could to avoid jail time.” 

Curiel’s husband, Desantiago, who was a lawful permanent 

resident, was advised to assume the majority of the responsibility 

for the crime. As a result, the plea agreements required 
7

Desantiago to serve jail time while Curiel only had to perform 

community service with Caltrans. They also had to pay over 

$10,000 in restitution. Both Curiel and Desantiago were assured 

that “these were good plea bargains,” and that they should accept 

them. Neither of them were told whether there were any 

immigration consequences associated with their pleas. They 

“presumed there were not any and that [they] were only looking 

at the possibility of jail time.”

Desantiago later applied to become a United States citizen 

so that he could petition for Curiel to gain lawful status. In 

anticipation of helping Curiel become a lawful resident, 

Desantiago approached his prior counsel, Martinez, about “the 

possibility of cleaning up his record.” Martinez assured 

Desantiago that he could assist him, and he advised Curiel to 

approach Naderi for the same purpose. In 2017, both Curiel and 

Desantiago paid their former defense attorneys to file paperwork 

to expunge their convictions. Curiel did not realize at the time 

that the expungement had no beneficial effect with respect to her

immigration status.

After her husband applied for citizenship with the federal 

government, Curiel learned that both she and Desantiago had 

pleaded to aggravated felonies. Due to the nature of the 

convictions, the couple’s immigration attorney advised 

Desantiago to withdraw his application. Desantiago later died. 

Following his death, Curiel was advised by the immigration 

attorney that she still might be able to gain lawful status through 

her adult daughter, and that her mother could apply for an 

unlawful presence waiver on her behalf. However, to be eligible 

for a change in status, Curiel would have to address her 

convictions. In her declaration, Curiel stated that if she had been 
8

informed of how the convictions would affect her ability to gain 

lawful status and to defend herself in immigration court, she

never would have agreed to the plea, even if it meant serving jail 

time. 

Curiel also supported her motion with a signed declaration 

from her immigration counsel, Guillermo Carrillo. According to

his declaration, Carrillo was retained to represent Curiel in her 

efforts to legalize her presence in the United States. When 

Carrillo contacted Naderi in 2021 about his prior representation 

of Curiel, Naderi indicated that he no longer had a copy of 

Curiel’s case file because so much time had passed, but he still 

had a good recollection of Curiel and her husband. In a series of 

conversations with Carrillo, Naderi initially was incredulous 

about the fact that Curiel’s convictions constituted an aggravated 

felony and a crime of moral turpitude for immigration purposes. 

While Naderi expressed concern for Curiel, it was evident to 

Carrillo that he “did not understand the technical aspect of how 

Ms. Curiel’s criminal matter interacted with immigration law.” 

Naderi later requested that Carrillo draft a declaration for 

his review. Carrillo sent Naderi a copy of a proposed declaration, 

which stated, among other things, that Naderi did not recognize 

the immigration consequences associated with Curiel’s plea at 

the time of his representation, and that if he had recognized 

those consequences, he would have counseled his client 

differently. After reviewing the draft declaration, Naderi 

informed Carrillo that he had spoken with his attorney and 

“cannot sign that document.” 

The People filed an opposition to the motion to vacate the 

convictions. The People argued that Curiel was fully advised of 

the immigration consequences of her plea because she signed a 
9

Tahl waiver acknowledging that she understood the mandatory 

immigration consequences, and she then confirmed her 

understanding of those consequences in a colloquy with the court. 

The People also asserted that Curiel’s statements in her 

declaration were self-serving and contrary to the written and oral 

advisements that she received at the time of her plea. The People 

supported the opposition with Curiel’s Tahl waiver, transcripts of 

her plea and sentencing hearings, and the probation officer’s 

report. 

IV. The Hearing and Ruling on the Motion

On December 20, 2021, the trial court held an evidentiary 

hearing on Curiel’s motion. Curiel called her former defense 

attorney, Naderi, to testify. According to his testimony, Naderi 

solely practiced criminal defense, and had been doing so since 

2004. He did not remember if he ever discussed Curiel’s 

immigration status with her. He also did not remember if he 

knew whether Curiel was a United States citizen, or if he 

recommended that she speak with an immigration attorney 

before entering into the plea. His normal practice, however, was 

to advise noncitizen clients to consult with immigration counsel. 

He sometimes researched the law on immigration consequences,

and he had attended seminars on the subject, but he could not 

recall if he did so before 2008.

Naderi did not remember how much Curiel had to pay in 

restitution as part of her plea agreement. He currently was 

aware that an aggravated felony under federal immigration law 

includes an offense involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to 

the victim exceeds $10,000. He did not recall if he was aware of 

this definition of an aggravated felony at the time of Curiel’s plea. 
10

He also did not recall if he attempted to negotiate a lesser 

amount of restitution in this case. 

On cross-examination, Naderi agreed that restitution was a

constitutional and statutory right that could not be bargained

away, and that negotiating a lesser amount of restitution than 

the actual loss would have been “illegal.” Naderi also agreed that 

various offenses including auto theft, identity theft, forgery, and 

fraud were crimes of moral turpitude. He was not aware of any 

crime not involving moral turpitude that would cover the facts of 

this case. Naderi confirmed that he signed the attorney 

acknowledgment in Curiel’s Tahl waiver. He further testified

that he would not sign a plea form, or allow an interpreter to sign 

such a form, if the facts stated in the acknowledgments were not 

true. He also would not allow a defendant to initial the box on 

the form pertaining to the immigration consequences of a plea if 

he had not reviewed that paragraph with the defendant. Naderi 

could not recall whether the prosecutor’s original plea offer 

required jail time for Curiel. He agreed, however, that the 

negotiated plea was a fair disposition given that Curiel was the 

primary caregiver for her children. Naderi believed that he had 

no legal defense to the charges, and that Curiel would have faced

the same immigration consequences if she were convicted at a 

trial.

On redirect, Naderi admitted that he did not know if he 

could have negotiated a plea for Curiel in which the amount of 

restitution was divided among the charges to which she was 

pleading so that no single count would require a restitution

payment above $10,000. He also conceded that Curiel could have 

paid a portion of the restitution prior to entering her plea so that 

the amount owed at the time of the plea would not have exceeded
11

$10,000. In other cases, Naderi’s clients sometimes paid

restitution before entering their pleas if the prosecutor agreed to 

those terms. Although Naderi had asked the prosecutor in 

Curiel’s case to agree to a plea that did not include jail time, he 

could not recall if he attempted to negotiate the terms of 

restitution. 

Naderi testified that he did not sign the declaration sent to 

him by Curiel’s immigration attorney because it was inaccurate 

and would have been a fraud on the court for him to sign it. 

When asked if he thought that staying out of jail would shield a 

noncitizen defendant from immigration consequences, Naderi 

answered: “I think it’s different now. But years ago, if someone 

did not have their paperwork in order, [Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE)] would place holds on them, and ICE 

would pick them up from these local facilities and then deport 

them.” Naderi did not know if avoiding jail time could have kept 

Curiel free of immigration consequences, but stated that “if she’s 

not in jail, ICE could not put a hold on her.” Naderi admitted

that it was possible he told Curiel that if she avoided jail, it was 

less likely there would be adverse immigration consequences, 

such as deportation, inadmissibility for entry, and denial of 

amnesty, but he could not recall their exact conversation.

At the hearing, Curiel also testified on her own behalf. 

According to her testimony, she was born in Mexico and had been 

living in the United States for the past 32 years since she was 

about 14 years old. Curiel has six children, all of whom are 

United States citizens and were born prior to her arrest. Curiel’s

mother is a lawful permanent resident and her five siblings 

legally reside in the United States. Curiel’s husband, 
12

Desantiago, was also a lawful permanent resident, and he filed 

an immigration petition on her behalf before he died.

Curiel hired Naderi to represent her in her criminal case. 

She met with him in his office about two times. Because Curiel

spoke little English and Naderi did not speak Spanish, Naderi’s 

secretary served as a translator, but she did not speak Spanish 

well. Before entering her plea, Curiel told Naderi that she was 

not a United States citizen, and that she was concerned about the 

immigration consequences of the plea. In response, Naderi told

Curiel “not to worry about going to jail because that was the only 

way [she] would have contact with immigration.” Naderi never 

informed Curiel that she might not be able to gain lawful status 

in the future regardless of whether she served jail time, nor did 

he advise her to consult with an immigration attorney. Curiel 

believed that if she stayed out of jail, she could avoid any 

immigration consequences. 

Curiel agreed to the no contest plea based on Naderi’s 

recommendation. At the time she entered the plea, she knew she 

would not be serving any jail time under the terms of the 

agreement. In connection with her plea, Curiel initialed and 

signed the Tahl waiver, including placing her initials next to the 

paragraph pertaining to the immigration consequences of the

plea. At that time, Curiel did not think this paragraph applied to 

her “because she was not going to jail,” and Naderi never told her 

otherwise. 

Naderi later advised Curiel that he could arrange for her 

conviction to be expunged, and that she would then be able to 

apply for lawful residence. Curiel hired Naderi to file the 

necessary paperwork. It was not until Curiel consulted with her 

current immigration counsel about applying for lawful 
13

permanent residence that she learned her plea precluded her 

from gaining lawful status. 

At the time of her plea, Curiel wanted to stay out of jail 

because she had six-month-old twins that she could not leave 

alone. However, if Curiel had been able to obtain a plea that 

would allow her to gain lawful status in the future, she would 

have been willing to serve jail time. Curiel did not know at the 

time of her plea that her convictions would make her ineligible to 

become a lawful resident for the rest of her life, and if she had 

such knowledge, she would have done whatever she could to 

preserve her eligibility in the future.

On cross-examination, Curiel confirmed that avoiding jail 

was important to her at the time of her plea because she was the 

primary caregiver for her young children. She stated that she 

hired an attorney so that she could avoid jail time, but she would 

have been willing to go jail “if it was to clean up [her] record.” 

Curiel also admitted that, at the time of her plea, she was “told 

the exact immigration consequences” in the form that she 

initialed and signed, and that the court also “told [her] on the 

record specifically [she] will be deported.” When asked why she

would state in a sworn declaration that she was never told the 

immigration consequences of her plea when the record showed

that she had been given both written and oral advisements, 

Curiel testified, “Because from the very beginning I trusted in

what my attorney had told me, and he never told me that I was 

going to have immigration consequences. He never indicated 

that I should consult an immigration attorney.” Curiel denied 

that she had lied in her declaration. She stated that the fact that 

she went back to Naderi years later “so that he could take care of 

fixing [her] record” substantiated her claim that she did not 
14

understand the immigration consequences of her plea. Curiel 

acknowledged that she had not been deported to date, nor had 

she been notified by any federal agency that she was about to be 

deported. At the conclusion of the testimony, the parties 

stipulated that Curiel had not had any contact from immigration 

authorities concerning deportation. 

After hearing the argument of counsel, the trial court 

denied Curiel’s motion. In issuing its ruling, the court stated: 

“The court is sympathetic to the position she finds herself in. 

However, the fact remains that every single piece of 

contemporaneous evidence shows that she was fully advised, fully 

accepted the consequences, indicated the consequences were 

explained to her, indicated that she understood she would be 

deported. She initialed the box saying she would be deported in 

the Tahl waiver and also signed the form saying ‘My initials 

mean that I have read, understand, and agree with what is 

stated,’ namely, that she is going to be deported. [¶] The court 

advised her in addition to the Tahl waiver. During the plea she 

acknowledged Mr. Naderi had explained the consequences of her 

plea. She said she understood she would be deported. [¶] There 

was no prejudicial error, and I think the statements today are 

self-serving and not credible. And the court is also troubled, in 

evaluating her credibility, that she would so freely submit a 

declaration under penalty of perjury saying she was never 

informed of the immigration consequences and signs that

declaration under penalty of perjury when the record is so

abundantly clear that that is a false statement in her very own 

declaration. [¶] So I do think the case was handled properly. She 

was advised multiple times. She acknowledged she was advised. 

There was no prejudicial error. She fully understood the nature 
15

of the plea as well as the consequences and immigration 

consequences, more specifically. [¶] So I do not believe the 

defense has met their burden, and for that reason the motion is

denied.” 

Curiel filed a timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Curiel contends the trial court erred in denying

her section 1473.7 motion. She argues the motion should have 

been granted because she met her burden of establishing that she 

did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences 

of her plea, and that there is a reasonable probability she would 

not have accepted the plea if she had understood its immigration

consequences. Based on our independent review of the record, we

conclude that Curiel is entitled to relief under section 1473.7.

I. Governing Law

Section 1473.7 allows noncitizens who are no longer in 

criminal custody to move to vacate a conviction if they can 

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conviction 

is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving 

party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or 

knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration 

consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) 

“A finding of legal invalidity may, but need not, include a finding 

of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Ibid.) 

To prevail on a motion under section 1473.7, a defendant 

must satisfy two elements. “The defendant must first show that

he did not meaningfully understand the immigration 

consequences of his plea. Next, the defendant must show that his

misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.” (People v. 

Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza).) “[P]rejudicial 
16

error . . . means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the

defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had

correctly understood its actual or potential immigration 

consequences.” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529

(Vivar).) If the defendant meets his burden of establishing 

prejudicial error, the court must grant the motion and allow the

defendant to withdraw the plea. (Id. at p. 523.)

We apply an independent standard of review to evaluate 

whether a defendant is entitled to relief under section 1473.7. 

(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 527.) Under this standard, “ ‘an appellate court exercises its 

independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the 

rule of law.’ ” (Vivar, at p. 527.) The appellate court must give

deference to the trial court’s factual findings if they are based on 

“ ‘ “the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and 

observed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) However, “courts reviewing such claims 

generally may ‘ “reach a different conclusion [from the trial court] 

on an independent examination of the evidence . . . even where 

the evidence is conflicting.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In cases where the trial 

court’s factual findings “derive entirely from written declarations 

and other documents,” the trial court and the reviewing court 

“ ‘are in the same position,’ ” and no deference is owed. (Id. at 

p. 528.) Accordingly, in determining whether the trial court erred 

in denying a motion to vacate a conviction, “it is for the appellate 

court to decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the 

facts establish prejudice under section 1473.7.” (Ibid.)

II. Immigration Consequences of Curiel’s Plea

Under the terms of her 2008 plea agreement, Curiel 

pleaded no contest to one count of identity theft (§ 530.5, 

subd. (a)), one count of making a false financial statement 
17

(§ 532a, subd. (1)), and one count of grand theft auto (§ 487, 

subd. (d)(1)). Her sentence of three years of probation and 

45 days of community service was contingent upon making full

restitution to Vic’s Motors in the amount of $11,396. The 

restitution amount reflected the value of the two vehicles that 

Curiel and her husband purchased from Vic’s Motors using 

unlawfully obtained personal identifying information.

The parties do not dispute that, under federal immigration 

law, Curiel’s convictions for identity theft and making a false 

financial statement constitute aggravated felonies regardless of 

the length of the sentence because they involve crimes of fraud or 

deceit coupled with a loss to the victim of more than $10,000. 

(8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i); see Kawashima v. Holder (2012) 

565 U.S. 478, 484 [“[a]nyone who is convicted of an offense that 

‘involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims 

exceeds $10,000’ has committed an aggravated felony”].) The 

parties also do not dispute that Curiel’s convictions for making a 

false financial statement and grand theft auto qualify as crimes 

of moral turpitude under federal immigration law. (8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); see Tijani v. Holder (9th Cir. 2010) 628 F.3d 

1071, 1075–1076 [making a false financial statement is a crime of 

moral turpitude]; Rashtabadi v. INS (9th Cir. 1994) 23 F.3d 1562, 

1568 [grand theft is a crime of moral turpitude].) 

When committed by a noncitizen, both types of criminal 

offenses—aggravated felonies and crimes of moral turpitude—

carry adverse immigration consequences. A noncitizen who is 

convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to mandatory 

deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States. 

(8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1228(c); Moncrieffe v. Holder (2013) 

569 U.S. 184, 187–188.) An aggravated felony conviction also 
18

renders a noncitizen ineligible for certain types of discretionary 

relief from deportation, such as asylum and cancellation of 

removal. (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C); Moncrieffe, at p. 187.) 

In addition, a noncitizen without lawful status who is convicted of

a crime of moral turpitude is ineligible for admission to the 

United States as well as cancellation of removal. (8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1229b(b)(1)(C); Pereida v. Wilkinson (2021) 

___U.S.___ [141 S.Ct. 754, 760–761].) Therefore, even though 

Curiel had no contact with immigration authorities when she 

sought relief under section 1473.7, each of the offenses to which 

she pleaded no contest left her subject to potential adverse 

immigration consequences in the future. 

III. Curiel Showed She Did Not Meaningfully Understand 

the Immigration Consequences of Her Plea

In moving to vacate her convictions under section 1473.7, 

Curiel argued that she did not meaningfully understand the 

adverse immigration consequences of her plea because her 

defense counsel, Naderi, failed to properly advise her of those 

consequences. In particular, Naderi never told Curiel that the 

offenses to which she was pleading no contest would subject her 

to deportation regardless of whether she served any jail time. He

also did not explain to Curiel that the convictions would render 

her ineligible to seek relief from deportation or to gain lawful 

status in the future. As evidentiary support for her motion, 

Curiel relied on her written declaration, her oral testimony at the

hearing on her motion, and the oral testimony of Naderi. 

In denying the motion, the trial court found that both the 

written advisements in Curiel’s signed Tahl waiver and the oral 

advisements given by the court at the plea hearing showed that 

Curiel fully understood the immigration consequences of her 
19

plea, “namely, that she is going to be deported.” The court also 

found that Curiel’s “statements today are self-serving and not 

credible.” The court indicated that it was particularly “troubled” 

by the statement in Curiel’s declaration that she was never 

informed of the immigration consequences, and found that 

statement was “false” because it contradicted the advisements 

that Curiel indisputably received at the time of the plea. Because 

the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Curiel’s motion, we 

accord deference to the credibility findings made by the court 

based on the testimony given at that hearing. (Vivar, supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 527.) Nevertheless, we reach a different 

conclusion from the trial court based on our independent 

examination of the evidence. (Ibid.)

It is undisputed that, both in the written Tahl waiver that 

Curiel signed and in her plea colloquy with the court, she was 

advised that if she was not a United States citizen, she “must

expect” that her plea “will result” in her “deportation, exclusion 

from admission or reentry to the United States, and denial of 

naturalization and amnesty.” However, as this court explained

in considering a Tahl waiver with similar mandatory deportation 

language, the fact that the defendant initialed and signed the 

waiver “did not absolve defense counsel of the duty to advise of 

immigration consequences.” (People v. Manzanilla (2022) 

80 Cal.App.5th 891, 906 (Manzanilla).) “Even where the form 

says that the defendant ‘will’ be deported, it does not substitute 

for the advice of counsel, and it is not a categorical bar to relief.” 

(Ibid.; accord, People v. Lopez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 561, 577

[“ ‘Although the Tahl form contains the word “will” and not 

“may,” it . . . “is not designed, nor does it operate, as a substitute 

for such advice” of defense counsel regarding the applicable 
20

immigration consequences in a given case’ ”].) Likewise, a trial

court’s “ ‘generic advisement’ ” to a defendant that deportation 

“ ‘will result’ ” is not a substitute for counsel’s advice. (Lopez, at 

p. 577.) “A proper advisement by the court does not foreclose the 

possibility of relief when counsel provides inaccurate or 

incomplete advice regarding immigration consequences.” (Id. at 

p. 578.) Thus, in evaluating whether the defendant is entitled to 

relief under section 1473.7, “ ‘ “ ‘ “[t]he defendant can be expected 

to rely on counsel’s independent evaluation of the charges” ’ ” ’ 

rather than the generic statements in the Tahl waiver and plea 

colloquy.” (Manzanilla, at p. 906.) 

Here, the fact that the Tahl waiver and the court’s colloquy

advised Curiel that she “must expect” her plea “will result” in 

deportation did not preclude her from demonstrating that she did 

not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of 

her plea. (See Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 899, 910

[rejecting claim that defendant’s signature on Tahl waiver that 

stated “ ‘I must expect my plea . . . will result in my deportation’ ”

showed he subjectively understood he would be deported]; People 

v. Rodriguez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 995, 1003–1004 [defendant 

did not meaningfully understand immigration consequences

despite signing form that stated “ ‘this plea . . . will result in my 

removal/deportation’ ”]; People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 

998, 1011, fn. 8 [even though defendant “was advised that his 

plea ‘will result’ . . . in adverse immigration consequences,” he 

presented sufficient evidence of his lack of understanding to 

warrant section 1473.7 relief].) “Rather, the inquiry under 

section 1473.7 requires consideration of the ‘totality of the 

circumstances,’ which necessarily involves case-by-case 

examination of the record [citation], and no specific kind of 
21

evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th 

at p. 325.) Moreover, in deciding whether the defendant has 

shown error, the focus of our inquiry is on the defendant’s own 

error in misunderstanding the immigration consequences of the

plea. (People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 769 [“the 

‘error’ is that the petitioner subjectively misunderstood the 

immigration consequences of the plea”]; People v. Mejia (2019) 

36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871 [“the focus of the inquiry in a section 

1473.7 motion is on the ‘defendant’s own error in . . . not knowing 

that his plea would subject him to mandatory deportation’ ”].) 

Even deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings at the 

evidentiary hearing and disregarding Curiel’s oral testimony

about whether she was advised of the immigration consequences

of her plea, the remaining evidence was sufficient to show that 

Curiel did not meaningfully understand those consequences at 

the time of the plea. In her written declaration, which we 

independently review, Curiel stated that she told Naderi at their 

first meeting that she did not have legal status in the United 

States, and in response, Naderi said that “he would do what he 

could to avoid jail time.” Curiel also stated that both she and her 

husband were assured by their defense attorneys that “these 

were good plea bargains,” which they should accept. Neither 

Curiel nor her husband “were told what the immigration 

consequences associated with [their] guilty pleas would be,” and 

as a result, they “presumed” there were not any immigration 

consequences and they “were only looking at the possibility of jail 

time.” It was not until her husband applied for citizenship so 

that Curiel could gain lawful status that they learned from 

immigration counsel that they pleaded to aggravated felonies and 

were subject to deportation. 
22

In his testimony at the hearing, Naderi could not recall if 

he knew whether Curiel was a United States citizen, or if he

discussed her immigration status with her. He also could not 

recall if he advised her to consult with an immigration attorney. 

With respect to Curiel’s plea agreement, Naderi could not recall if 

he made any effort to negotiate the terms of restitution as part of 

the plea, or if he even knew at the time that a crime involving 

fraud or deceit where the victim’s loss exceeds $10,000 

constituted an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. 

While Naderi was unable to recall any details of his 

conversations with Curiel, he testified that his understanding of 

the law in 2008 was that, when undocumented immigrants went 

to jail, ICE would place a hold on them and then deport them. 

He further admitted that he may have told Curiel that if she 

avoided jail, she would have fewer chances of facing adverse 

immigration consequences such as deportation, exclusion, and

denial of amnesty. 

Naderi’s testimony thus corroborated the statements in 

Curiel’s declaration that the only advice she received from her

defense attorney about how the criminal charges might impact 

her immigration status related to avoiding jail time. While 

Naderi’s advice may have been technically correct in that Curiel 

was less likely to have contact with immigration authorities if 

she remained out of jail, it was inadequate and incomplete. 

It omitted any explanation of the fact that Curiel’s plea would 

subject her to mandatory removal and exclusion from reentry,

and effectively bar her from gaining lawful status in the future. 

Naderi’s failure to give accurate and complete advice about the 

specific consequences of the plea agreement helps explain why 

Curiel mistakenly believed that, because her plea did not include 
23

a jail sentence, it did not carry a risk of any adverse immigration 

consequences. (See People v. Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1009 [defendant’s “own error in believing that a . . . plea calling 

for no time in custody would avoid making him deportable” was 

supported by attorney’s testimony that “he told defendant only 

that the charge could subject him to deportation and that ‘we’re 

going to get it . . . expunged early and maybe that will help’ ”].) 

Curiel’s subjective misunderstanding of the immigration 

consequences of her plea is further corroborated by the fact that, 

about 10 years after she and her husband entered into the pleas, 

they retained their former defense attorneys to help them get 

their convictions expunged so that Desantiago could apply for 

citizenship and petition for Curiel to become a lawful resident. 

They did not learn that the expungements had no effect on the

immigration consequences of their pleas until sometime after

Desantiago submitted an application for naturalization to the 

federal government, which he then had to withdraw due to the 

disqualifying nature of the convictions. (See Ramirez-Castro v. 

INS (9th Cir. 2002) 287 F.3d 1172, 1175 [a conviction expunged 

under section 1203.4 remains a conviction for purposes of federal 

law].) The couple’s postplea conduct in seeking citizenship for 

Desantiago and lawful residence status for Curiel was not 

consistent with that of individuals who understood that their 

convictions made them presumptively deportable and ineligible 

for reentry into the United States. (See Espinoza, supra,

14 Cal.5th at p. 320 [defendant “took an international commercial

flight to the United States, which predictably required subjecting 

himself to the scrutiny of United States immigration officials,

which is not consistent with the behavior of a person who 

understood that his convictions effectively ended his lawful 
24

resident status”]; People v. Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 770 [“[i]t goes without saying that someone who understood his 

criminal conviction made him automatically deportable would not 

voluntarily contact immigration authorities and advise them of 

his presence”].) 

In sum, based on the totality of the record, Curiel met her 

burden of establishing that she did not meaningfully understand 

the consequences of her plea at the time she entered into it. 

IV. Curiel Showed Her Misunderstanding Constituted 

Prejudicial Error

To establish prejudicial error under section 1473.7, 

“a defendant must demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability that 

[he or she] would have rejected the plea if the defendant had 

correctly understood its actual or potential immigration 

consequences.’ ” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 316.) 

In determining whether there is a reasonably probability the 

defendant would have rejected the plea, courts must “consider the 

totality of the circumstances.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 529.) “Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the 

defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the 

defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s 

priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant 

had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated 

disposition was possible.” (Id. at pp. 529–530.) “These factors 

are not exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is a 

prerequisite to relief.” (Espinoza, at p. 321.)

“Reasonable probability” does not mean more likely than 

not, “ ‘ “but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract 

possibility.” ’ ” (People v. Soto (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 610.) 

It is not enough for the defendant simply to declare that he or she 
25

would not have accepted a plea that would result in deportation. 

(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) Rather, the defendant must 

“corroborate such assertions with ‘objective evidence.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 530.) “Objective evidence includes facts provided by 

declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s 

immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence 

of the charges the defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th 

at p. 321.) 

Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, 

we conclude that Curiel made a showing of prejudice. It is 

undisputed that Curiel has deep and long-standing ties to the 

United States. She immigrated to the country when she was 

14 years old, and at the time of her plea, she had been living here 

for almost 20 years. Prior to his death, her husband was a lawful 

permanent resident. Each of their six children is a United States 

citizen and was born before Curiel entered into the plea. In 

addition, Curiel’s mother and five siblings are all lawful residents 

of the United States. As our Supreme Court explained, “[t]ies to 

the United States are an important factor in evaluating 

prejudicial error under section 1473.7 because they shed light on 

a defendant’s immigration priorities.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 

Cal.5th at p. 321; see, e.g., People v. Villalba (2023) 89 

Cal.App.5th 659, 674 [finding prejudice where defendant came to 

the United States as a child, met and married his wife here, and 

raised six children, all United States citizens]; People v. Soto, 

supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 611 [finding prejudice where 

defendant lived in the United States since he was a teenager in 

the late 1980’s and his children and family lived here]; People v. 

Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 872 [finding prejudice where 

defendant had been living in the United States since he was 
26

14 years old, and his wife and infant son lived here, as well as his 

mother and six siblings].)

The record also reflects that Curiel’s primary consideration 

in seeking a plea bargain was to ensure that she was available to 

care for her six children, including her then six-month-old twins. 

As Curiel testified at the evidentiary hearing on her motion, “My 

children are the most important thing to me.” In opposing the 

motion, the People argued that, because Curiel was the primary 

caregiver for her children, her priority in accepting the plea was 

to avoid jail time rather than any immigration consequences. 

It does not make sense, however, that Curiel would have agreed 

to a plea deal that kept her out of jail so that she could remain 

her children’s caregiver, but placed her at risk of mandatory 

deportation and thus permanent separation from her children, 

who resided in the United States. Rather, it is reasonable to 

infer that Curiel’s paramount concern in seeking a plea was to 

remain in the United States where she could continue raising her

children, including her infant twins. (See People v. Rodriguez

(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 326 [defendant’s prompt acceptance of 

a plea deal that allowed her to return to her family, including her 

two small children, indicated that “she would have done all she

could to avoid pleading no contest to a charge that would lead to 

her mandatory deportation and separation from her family for 

the rest of her life”].) 

The evidence also showed that Curiel had no prior criminal 

record at the time of her plea. As our Supreme Court recognized, 

“[t]his fact is relevant because a defendant without an extensive 

criminal record may persuasively contend that the prosecutor 

might have been willing to offer an alternative plea without 

immigration consequences.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 
27

p. 324.) At the hearing on the motion, Curiel’s immigration 

counsel argued that there were alternative pleas that would not

have carried the same adverse immigration consequences, while 

leaving intact the bargained-for sentence of probation, 

community service, and restitution. Curiel details these 

alternative plea arrangements in her briefing on appeal. 

For instance, with respect to the aggravated felonies, 

Curiel asserts that Naderi could have proposed a plea deal that 

explicitly tied the restitution owed on the two cars to the two 

grand theft auto counts by assigning the value of each car to its 

respective count, and requiring Curiel to enter into a Harvey

waiver so that any dismissed counts could be considered for 

purposes of restitution. (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.) 

Under this scenario, Curiel still would have been liable for full 

restitution, but the amount owed as to any single count would 

have been less than $10,000, the threshold figure for an 

aggravated felony. With respect to the crimes of moral turpitude,

Curiel contends that Naderi could have sought a plea deal that 

required her to plead no contest to the two counts of identity 

theft, which is not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude 

under federal immigration law. (See Linares-Gonzalez v. Lynch

(9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3d 508, 518–519.) Naderi also could have 

tried to negotiate a plea to other factually related, uncharged 

offenses that are not considered crimes of moral turpitude for

purposes of federal immigration law, such as second degree 

commercial burglary (§ 459). (See Lara-Garcia v. Garland

(9th Cir. 2022) 49 F.4th 1271, 1281.)

The People argue that the record fails to demonstrate that

any of these proposed plea deals would have been offered by the 

prosecutor or accepted by the court. The People also assert that
28

there is nothing in the record to show that Curiel had a viable 

defense to the charges, or any reason to believe she could have 

received a better resolution if convicted after a trial. In assessing 

prejudice, however, the focus is on “ ‘what the defendant would 

have done, not whether the defendant’s decision would have led 

to a more favorable result.’ ” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 528–529.) “A decision to reject a plea bargain . . . ‘might be 

based either on the desire to go to trial or on the hope or 

expectation of negotiating a different bargain without 

immigration consequences.’ [Citation.] When a court weighs 

whether a defendant would have taken the latter path, it need 

not decide whether the prosecution would actually ‘have offered a 

different bargain’—rather, the court should consider ‘evidence 

that would have caused the defendant to expect or hope a 

different bargain would or could have been negotiated.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 529.)

On this record, we conclude there is at least a reasonable 

probability that Curiel “could have tried ‘to obtain a better 

bargain that [did] not include immigration consequences.’ ” 

(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p 531.) Curiel’s deep ties to the 

United States, her lack of a criminal record, her undisputed role 

as the primary caregiver for her children, and the possibility of a

plea bargain with less severe immigration consequences provide 

sufficient corroboration for her claim that she would have 

rejected the plea if she had meaningfully understood its adverse 

immigration consequences. Because Curiel met her burden of

demonstrating prejudicial error, she is entitled to relief under 

section 1473.7. 
29

DISPOSITION

The order denying Curiel’s motion to withdraw her plea 

and vacate her convictions under section 1473.7 is reversed. 

The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to grant 

the motion and vacate the convictions.

VIRAMONTES, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J.
Filed 6/29/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BEATRIZ ADRIANA CURIEL,

Defendant and Appellant.

B317814

(Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. PA060094)

ORDER CERTIFYING 

OPINION

FOR PUBLICATION

[No change in judgment]

THE COURT: 

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 2, 

2023, and modified on June 13, 2023, was not certified for 

publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now 

appears that the opinion should be published in the Official 

Reports and it is so ordered.

There is no change in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________

STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J. VIRAMONTES, J.