Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed June 16, 2021.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D20-463

Lower Tribunal No. 17-21699

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Amanda Lynn DiGiacomo,

Appellant,

vs.

Odel Jorge Mosquera,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marcia B. 

Caballero, Judge.

Scanziani & Associates Law, P.A., and Jessica Ramirez-Garcia, for 

appellant.

Koltun Lazar Laleh, and Jessica T. Laleh, for appellee.

Before EMAS, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and LOGUE, JJ. 

EMAS, C.J.
2

The Wife appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. She 

raises several claims on appeal.1 While we find none of the claims have

merit, and affirm the final judgment, we write to address the Wife’s claim that 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to amend 

to file a counterpetition for alimony. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In September 2017, after a short-term marriage of approximately six

years, the Husband filed a petition for dissolution. The petition was filed 

following an incident in which the Wife cut the neck of their then-fourteenmonth-old child. The Wife was arrested, and her parental rights to the child 

were subsequently terminated. Here is the timeline of relevant proceedings 

and pleadings in the dissolution action: 

• October 24, 2017: The Wife filed her Answer to the Husband’s 

dissolution petition. No counterpetition was filed. 

1 We affirm, without further discussion, the Wife’s claims that the trial court: 

(1) failed to comply with Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.440

(governing when a case may be set for trial); (2) erroneously reduced the 

Wife’s share of the 2018 income tax refund to contribute to child-care costs 

where the Wife’s parental rights had been terminated; and (3) abused its 

discretion in granting the Husband a credit for the carrying costs of the 

marital residence from the date of filing (September 2017) through the date 

of sale.
3

• August 2, 2018: The Wife’s parental rights were terminated.

• January 21, 2019: The Husband filed a motion for leave to amend his 

petition.

• March 14, 2019: The Husband filed a motion to compel sale of marital 

residence and for relief from status quo (i.e., relief from maintaining a joint 

bank account and from paying for the Wife’s personal expenses).

Following a hearing on that motion, the trial court entered an order (on 

May 13, 2019) requiring the Husband to pay the Wife—commencing June 

1, 2019—$900 a month. 

• March 27, 2019: The trial court entered an “agreed order granting 

Husband’s motion for leave to file amended petition for dissolution of 

marriage.” It required the Wife to file a “response to the Amended Petition 

within ten (10) days.” 

• March 29, 2019: The Husband filed an Amended Petition. Ten days 

passed without the Wife filing a response to the Amended Petition.

• May 8, 2019: Five days before the trial court entered its order on the 

Husband’s March 14 motion for relief from the status quo, the Wife filed a 

Motion for Temporary Alimony and Motion to Compel Status Quo. A 

hearing on the Wife’s motion was scheduled for July 29, 2019.
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• May 13, 2019: As noted above, the trial court entered its order on the 

Husband’s motion to compel sale of the marital residence and for relief 

from the status quo, ordering the Husband to pay the Wife $900 a month. 

• May 14, 2019: The trial court entered its Uniform Order setting the case 

for nonjury trial on September 9, 2019. 

• June 27, 2019: Nearly three months past the deadline in the March 27

agreed order, the Wife filed her Answer to the Amended Petition. Her 

pleading did not include a counterpetition for alimony. 

• June 28, 2019: The Husband filed a motion for continuance of the July 

29 hearing (on the Wife’s motion for temporary alimony) because that

“temporary support hearing” was close in time to the September 9 final 

hearing, and because the Wife was already receiving temporary support 

pursuant to the trial court’s May 13 order. The court granted the 

continuance contingent on the September 9 final hearing date remaining 

unchanged. 

• August 23, 2019: The Husband filed his Pretrial Catalogue. 

• September 4, 2019: Five days before trial, the Wife filed her Pretrial 

Catalogue. In this pleading, the Wife requested (for the first time) “bridge 

the gap alimony, rehabilitative alimony, durational alimony or lump sum 

alimony” and “a minimum of $3,000 per month.” 
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• September 5, 2019: The Husband filed a motion to strike the Wife’s 

Pretrial Catalogue as untimely or, in the alternative, a motion to strike 

those portions relating to her request for alimony. 

• September 6, 2019: The Friday before the scheduled trial on Monday, 

September 9, the Wife filed a motion for leave to amend her Answer to 

the Amended Petition to include a counterpetition for alimony. A 

proposed counterpetition was attached. 

• September 9, 2019: On Monday, trial commenced as scheduled, and 

the trial court addressed all pending motions, including the Wife’s 

September 6 motion to amend her Answer to add a counterpetition for 

alimony. Following lengthy discussion and legal argument, the trial court

denied the Wife’s motion, noting inter alia that it could not grant relief that 

was not pled; the Wife had been represented by counsel at all relevant 

times in the proceedings; nothing in the Husband’s pretrial catalogue 

anticipated (or prompted) the Wife’s eleventh-hour request for alimony;

and granting the motion to amend on the first day of trial would result in 

significant prejudice to the Husband. 

The proceedings concluded on October 18, 2019; the parties 

presented closing argument, and the trial court entered final judgment. This 

appeal follows. 
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 

Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.190(a),

2 entitled “Amended 

Pleadings” provides: 

Amendments. A party may amend a pleading once as a matter 

of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, 

if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is 

permitted and the action has not been placed on the trial 

calendar, may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 

served. Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave 

of court or by written consent of the adverse party. If a party files 

a motion to amend a pleading, the party must attach the 

proposed amended pleading to the motion. Leave of court shall 

be given freely when justice so requires. A party must plead in 

response to an amended pleading within 10 days after service of 

the amended pleading unless the court otherwise orders.

2 This rule was adopted, virtually verbatim, from Florida Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1.190(a), which provides: 

Amendments. A party may amend a pleading once as a matter 

of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, 

if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is 

permitted and the action has not been placed on the trial 

calendar, may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 

served. Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave 

of court or by written consent of the adverse party. If a party files 

a motion to amend a pleading, the party shall attach the 

proposed amended pleading to the motion. Leave of court shall 

be given freely when justice so requires. A party shall plead in 

response to an amended pleading within 10 days after service of 

the amended pleading unless the court otherwise orders.
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We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend for an abuse of 

discretion. Santos v. Flores, 116 So. 3d 518, 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Wellestablished law guides a trial court’s exercise of that discretion when 

considering a party’s motion for leave to amend a pleading:

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(a), provides that leave to 

amend ‘shall be given freely when justice so requires.’ Typically, 

refusal to allow amendment of a pleading constitutes an abuse 

of discretion unless allowing the amendment ‘would prejudice 

the opposing party, the privilege to amend has been abused, or 

amendment would be futile.’ JVN Holdings, Inc. v. Am. Constr. 

& Repairs, 185 So. 3d 599, 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (quoting 

Kay's Custom Drapes, Inc. v. Garrote, 920 So. 2d 1168, 1171 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). While the policy in Florida, as articulated 

in Rule 1.190(a), is to allow amendments to pleadings liberally, 

‘a trial judge in the exercise of sound discretion may deny further 

amendments where a case has progressed to a point that 

liberality ordinarily to be indulged has diminished.’ Alvarez v. 

DeAguirre, 395 So. 2d 213, 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (explaining 

that in addition to the desirability of allowing amendments to 

pleadings so that cases may be concluded on their merits, there 

is an equally compelling obligation on the court to see to it that 

the end of all litigation be finally reached).

Pangea Produce Distribs., Inc. v. Franco's Produce, Inc., 275 So. 3d 240, 

242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). 

Although Florida’s liberal policy directs that leave to amend “shall be 

given freely when justice so requires,” see rule 12.190(a), and “generally 

resolving all doubts in favor of granting leave to amend,” see Off Lease Only, 

Inc. v. LeJeune Auto Wholesale, Inc., 187 So. 3d 868, 871 n. 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2016), such liberality is not unbridled. Airlift Intern., Inc. v. Linee Aeree 
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Italiane, S.p.A., 212 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). A court may exercise 

its discretion to deny such leave to amend where “it clearly appears that 

allowing the amendment would prejudice the opposing party.” Dieudonne v. 

Publix Super Markets, Inc., 994 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)

(quotation omitted). Indeed, the trial court’s primary consideration in 

determining whether to grant leave to amend is prejudice to the opposing 

party. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc. v. Key Biscayne Commodore Club 

Condo. I, Inc., 350 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In the instant case, the 

trial court properly determined that granting the Wife leave to amend to file, 

on the day of trial, a counterpetition for alimony would cause substantial 

prejudice to the Husband, who had been litigating the matter with the Wife 

for two years, and did not anticipate and had not prepared to litigate a claim 

for alimony (such preparation might include: retaining a vocational expert to 

address imputation of income for the Wife who was unemployed; deposing 

the Wife and/or Wife’s expert on the issue; conducting pretrial preparation to 

meet and challenge an alimony claim). See, e.g., Minotty v. Baudo, 42 So. 

3d 824, 836 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying 

“the late-filed motion to amend” where the plaintiffs sought to assert a claim 

for punitive damages on their breach of fiduciary duty and fraud claims “on 
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the eve of trial,” and noting that “the plaintiffs could have brought the motion 

as to those claims much earlier”).

Relatedly, and as we have long held: “It is manifest that the further the 

case progresses, the more likely the granting of such amendment is inclined 

to prejudice the opponent.” Airlift Intern., 212 So. 2d at 110. See also Lasar 

Mfg. Co. v. Bachanov, 436 So. 2d 236, 237-38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) 

(recognizing that the “liberality in granting leave to amend diminishes as the 

case progresses to trial”); United States v. State, 179 So. 2d 890, 893 (Fla. 

3d DCA 1965) (observing: “While our courts are generally liberal in permitting 

the amendment of pleadings, this ‘liberality’ gradually diminishes as the case 

progresses”). 

Given the trial court’s determination of clear, substantial prejudice to 

the opposing party, coupled with the eleventh-hour nature of the Wife’s 

motion, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the Wife’s 

motion for leave to amend to add a counterpetition for post-dissolution 

alimony. 

We also find without merit the Wife’s contention that the Wife’s earlier 

motion for temporary alimony somehow put the Husband on notice that the 

Wife was seeking post-dissolution alimony. The Wife’s motion for temporary 
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alimony specifically cited to section 61.071, Florida Statutes (2018),3 and 

expressly sought an award of temporary alimony “[d]uring the pendency of”

the dissolution of marriage proceeding. As the Wife’s motion correctly noted, 

section 61.071 “pertains to alimony in a dissolution proceeding and does not 

address a temporary award post-dissolution.” Reidy v. Reidy, 232 So. 3d 

1053, 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). 

Nor did the postponement of the hearing on the Wife’s motion for 

temporary alimony reasonably suggest that the Husband should have 

anticipated that the final hearing would somehow involve an unpled request 

by the Wife for post-dissolution bridge-the-gap, rehabilitative, durational or 

lump sum alimony. Indeed, the reason the trial court postponed the hearing 

on the Wife’s request for temporary alimony and to maintain the status quo 

was that the final hearing was only ten weeks away, and the Husband was 

already paying the Wife $900 per month during the pendency of the 

3 Section 61.071, Florida Statutes (2018), provides for alimony and suit 

money “pendente lite,” meaning during the pendency of the dissolution 

proceeding. See Florida Bar re Frankel, 581 So. 2d 1294, 1299 n.5 (Fla. 

1991) (noting: “‘Pendente lite’ is defined as ‘[p]ending the lawsuit; during the 

actual progress of a suit; during litigation.’” (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 

1134 (6th ed. 1990))); Holly v. Holly, 89 So. 132, 133 (Fla. 1921) (noting:

“Alimony pendente lite is awarded to furnish the wife, from whom the 

husband has withdrawn his support, with the means of living, and for the 

further reason, in which there is a high public interest, that she may not 

become a charge upon the state, while her rights are being adjudicated. 

Counsel fees are awarded to enable the wife to maintain or defend her suit.”)
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dissolution proceeding. A review of the Wife’s own motion, together with the 

Husband’s motion and the trial court’s order, supports the conclusion that 

the Husband did not anticipate, nor should he reasonably have anticipated,

that the Wife would be seeking post-dissolution alimony at the final hearing. 

Because neither the Wife’s motion for temporary alimony, nor her 

Answer to the amended petition, properly pled a request for post-dissolution 

alimony, the Wife cannot prevail on this unpled claim. McClain v. McClain, 

105 So. 3d 641, 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (holding: “A court is not at liberty to 

award alimony where the benefitting spouse has failed to seek such relief in 

the pleadings.”) (quotation omitted). See also Clark v. Clark, 147 So. 3d 655, 

6xx (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (rejecting the wife’s contention that alimony was at 

issue by virtue of her “pre-trial compliance,” and explaining that the pre-trial 

compliance document “is not a substitute for amending the complaint”). 

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend

to file a counterpetition seeking post-dissolution alimony given the trial 

court’s proper determination of substantial prejudice to the Husband and the 

Wife’s filing of the motion for leave to amend on the Friday before the 

Monday of the final hearing. 

Affirmed.