alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JANET C. HOWELL,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 19

- 16037

D.C. No. 1:17

- cv

- 00514

- ACK

- RLP

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii Alan C. Kay, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 5, 2020 * *

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE , Circuit Judges.

Janet C. Howell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

her action alleging federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review for an abuse of discretion a dismissal for failure to comply with Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8. McHenry v. Renne , 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996)

.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 16037

We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Howell’s action

for failure to comply with Rule 8 (a) . Despite the district court’s warning s and

instructions

, Howell’s amended complaint was vague, confusing, and failed to

contain a short an d plain statement of the grounds for the district court’s

jurisdiction

. See Fed . R. Civ. P. 8(a); McHenry , 84 F.3d at 1177 (affirming

dismissal of complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy,

and largely irrelevant”) ; Nevijel v. N

. Coast Life Ins. Co ., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th

Cir. 1981) (dismissal under Rule 8 was not an abuse of discretion where the

complaint was “verbose, confusing and conclusory”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal.

See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED

.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 434 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

  1st Session
                                 S. 434

      To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the 
deductibility of business meal expenses for individuals who are subject 
              to Federal limitations on hours of service.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

            February 16 (legislative day, January 30), 1995

   Mr. Kohl introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the 
deductibility of business meal expenses for individuals who are subject 
              to Federal limitations on hours of service.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCREASED DEDUCTIBILITY OF BUSINESS MEAL EXPENSES FOR 
              INDIVIDUALS SUBJECT TO FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON HOURS OF 
              SERVICE.

    (a) In General.--Section 274(n) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 (relating to only 50 percent of meal and entertainment expenses 
allowed as deduction) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph:
            ``(3) Special rule for individuals subject to federal 
        limitations on hours of service.--In the case of any expenses 
        for food or beverages consumed by an individual during, or 
        incident to, any period of duty which is subject to the hours 
        of service limitations of the Department of Transportation, 
        paragraph (1) shall be applied by substituting `80 percent' for 
        `50 percent'.''
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1994.
                                 <all>
```
II

Calendar No. 332

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 627

[Report No. 104–231]

To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league

baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 27, 1995

Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. MOYNIHAN, and

Mr. GRAHAM) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

FEBRUARY 6, 1996

Reported by Mr. HATCH without amendment

A BILL

To require the general application of the antitrust laws to

major league baseball, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Major League Baseball

5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995’’.
2

S 627 RS

1 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO2 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

3 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

4 by adding at the end the following new section:

5 ‘‘SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust

6 laws shall apply to the business of professional major

7 league baseball.

8 ‘‘(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af9 fect—

10 ‘‘(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

11 antitrust laws to professional baseball’s amateur

12 draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes13 sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re14 lating to the minor leagues;

15 ‘‘(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

16 antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base17 ball on franchise relocation; or

18 ‘‘(3) the application of Public Law 87–331 (15

19 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the

20 Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).’’.

Calendar No. 332

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 627

[Report No. 104–231]

A BILL

To require the general application of the antitrust

purposes.laws to major league baseball, and for other

FEBRUARY 6, 1996

Reported without amendment
Notice: This opin ion is subject to form al revision before publication in the Atl antic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal

errors so that correc tions m ay be made before the boun d volum es go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF AP P EALS

Nos . 14 -BG -1 14 3 & 1 5- BG- 40 0

IN RE: M ARK A. SGARLATA, Res po nd en t. Ba r Reg is tra tio n No. 4 18 55 7 BDN: 2 47 -1 4 & BDN: 3 3- 15

BEFORE: Tho m

ps on , Ass oc ia te Ju dg e, an d Neb ek er an d F arre ll , Sen io r Ju dg es

.

ORDER (FILED – J ul y

23 , 20 15 )

On co ns id erat io n of th e cert ifi ed or de r r e v o k in g res po nd en t’s li cen se to
pr act i c e l aw in th e st at e of Virg in ia

, th is co ur t’s May 18

, 20 15

, or de r su sp en di ng

res po nd en t pe nd in g fu rth er act io n of th e co ur t an d di rect in g hi m to sh ow cau se why th e fu nc ti on al eq ui va le nt reci pr oc al di sc ip li ne in th e fo rm of di sb arm en t sh ou ld no t be im po se d, an d th e st at em en t o f B a r Co un se l reg ard in g reci pr oc al di sc ip li ne , it
ap pe ari ng th at res po nd en t ha s fai le d to fil e a res po ns e to th is co ur t’s or d e r t o sh ow

cau se or th e affi da vi t req ui red by D.C. Bar R. XI, §1 4 (g ), an d it fu rth er ap pe ari ng th at res po nd en t ha s a se pa rat e pe nd in g ba r di sc ip li na ry m at te r, no

. 14 -BG-1 14 3, th at in vo lv es th e sa m e cri m in al co nv ic ti on , it is

ORDERED th at Mar k A. Sg arl at a is he reb y di sb arre d fro m th e pr act ic e of la w i n t h e Dis tri ct of Co lu m

bi a. Se e In re Si bl ey , 99 0 A.2d 48 3 (D.C. 20 10 ), an d In re Ful le r , 93 0 A. 2d 194, 19 8 (D.C. 20 07 ) (reb ut ta bl e pr es um pt io n of id en ti cal reci pr oc al di sc ip li ne ap pl ie s t o a ll cas es in whi ch th e res po nd en t d oe s n ot pa rti ci pa te ). It i s

FURTHER ORDERED th at ba r di sc ip li na ry cas e no

. 14 -BG-1 14 3 is he reb y di sm is se d a s m oo t. It isNos . 14 -BG 11 43 & 15 -BG -4 00

FURTHER ORDERED th at fo r pu rp os es of rei ns ta te m en t th e pe rio d th at m us t
pa ss be fo re on e is el ig ib le to fil e fo r rei ns ta te m en t w il l no t be gi n to ru n un ti l su ch ti m e as he fil es a D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 14 (g) affi da vi t.

PER CURIAM
104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 656

AN ACT

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a

certificate of documentation with the appropriate endorsement for employment in the coastwise trade for

the vessel QUIETLY.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That notwithstanding sections 12106, 12107, and 12108

4 of title 46, United States Code, and section 27 of the Mer5 chant Marine Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 883), as applica6 ble on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary

7 of Transportation may issue a certificate of documentation

8 with appropriate endorsement for employment in the

9 coastwise trade for the vessel QUIETLY (United States

10 official number 658315).

Passed the Senate July 29, 1996.

Attest:

Secretary.
104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 656

AN ACT

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to

coastwise trade for the vessel QUIETLY.propriate endorsement for employment in theissue a certificate of documentation with the ap-
Docket No: FAA-2015-0498 Dir ID: 2014-NM-152-AD
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Joseph P. Ciavarella, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the
Annual Report of Langer, Inc. on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of
operations of Langer, Inc.

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

|                     |  |  |  |                                                                                        
|-------------------- |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: March 30, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/JOSEPH P. CIAVARELLAJoseph P. Ciavarella, Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer

---



QuickLinks
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                                  AS CREATED BY
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      The undersigned officer of Stratagene Corporation ("Stratagene" or the
"Company") hereby certifies that:

      (i) the accompanying quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the
quarter ended March 31, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"); and

      (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Date: May 12, 2005                By:       /s/ JOSEPH A. SORGE, M.D.
                                      -------------------------------------
                                      Joseph A. Sorge, M.D.
                                      Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and
                                      President

This certification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and
Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K ("Item 601(b)(32)") promulgated under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"), and the Exchange Act.
In accordance with clause (ii) of Item 601(b)(32), this certification (A) shall
not be deemed "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or
otherwise subject to the liability of that section and (B) shall not be deemed
to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act or the
Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it
by reference.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Stratagene and will be retained by Stratagene and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-6227

YO,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

ALISON LAND, Commissioner,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. M. Hannah Lauck, District Judge. (3:20-cv-00453-MHL-MRC)

Submitted: November 28, 2023 Decided: February 21, 2024

Before QUATTLEBAUM and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Yo, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6227 Doc: 7 Filed: 02/21/2024 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

Yo appeals the district court’s order construing his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for 

relief from judgment as an unauthorized, successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition and 

dismissing it on that basis.∗

 Our review of the record confirms that the district court 

properly construed Yo’s Rule 60(b) motion as a successive § 2254 petition over which it 

lacked jurisdiction because he failed to obtain prefiling authorization from this court. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); McRae, 793 F.3d at 397-400. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s order.

Consistent with our decision in United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 208 

(4th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by McRae, 793 F.3d at 400 & n.7, we 

construe Yo’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or 

successive § 2254 petition. Upon review, we conclude that Yo’s claims do not meet the 

relevant standard. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). We therefore deny authorization to file a 

successive § 2254 petition.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

∗ A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the district court’s 

jurisdictional categorization of a Rule 60(b) motion as an unauthorized, successive habeas 

petition. United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2015).

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6227 Doc: 7 Filed: 02/21/2024 Pg: 2 of 2
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**138 KA 11-00413** 
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, LINDLEY, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BRIAN R. BUSSOM, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JANE I. YOON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (DANIEL GROSS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Daniel J. Doyle, J.), rendered November 22, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree and rape in the second degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by vacating the sentence imposed on count three of the indictment and as modified the judgment is affirmed and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Monroe County, for resentencing on that count.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.75 [1] [b]) and rape in the second degree (§ 130.30 [1]), defendant contends that the period of postrelease supervision imposed upon the latter conviction is illegal. It is well settled that “defendant’s challenge to the legality of the sentence survives his waiver of the right to appeal” ( People v McLellan , 82 AD3d 1668, 1669; see People v Seaberg , 74 NY2d 1, 10), and he may raise such a challenge for the first time on appeal ( see People v Gonzalez , 99 NY2d 76, 86). Here, as the People correctly concede, the sentence is illegal insofar as the court imposed a 15-year period of postrelease supervision on the count of rape in the second degree ( see § 70.45 [2-a] [a]). Inasmuch as the record does not establish that the court intended to impose the maximum period of postrelease supervision, we modify the judgment by vacating the sentence on count three of the indictment charging defendant with rape in the second degree, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court for resentencing on that count ( see People v Bowden , 15 AD3d 884, 885, lv denied 4 NY3d 851, reconsideration denied 5 NY3d 786; cf. People v**-2- 138 KA 11-00413** 

Roman , 43 AD3d 1282, 1283, lv denied 9 NY3d 1009).

Entered: February 6, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
#### L. W. LITTLEJOHN, Appellant, v. LONE STAR GAS COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 3885.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

June 22, 1961.

W. Rachel Littlejohn, Beeville, for appellant.

Warren J. Collins, F. Edwin Smith, Dallas, for appellee.

McDONALD, Chief Justice.

This is a condemnation case, before us upon application for writ of error to the judgment of the County Court of Freestone County, confirming and entering as the judgment of such court, an award by Special Commissioners in Condemnation, previously appointed to assess damages in connection with condemnation proceedings instituted by the Lone Star Gas Company against L. W. Littlejohn.

The record before us conclusively shows that no notice of the hearing conducted on 27 December 1960 by the Special Commissioners, (at which hearing the award made the basis of the judgment appealed from was made), was ever served on L. W. Littlejohn.

The judgment appealed from is void, as counsel for respondent now concedes. We therefore reverse same; set aside the award of the Special Commissioners made the basis for such judgment, and remand the cause for further proceedings before the Special Commissioners in Condemnation.

Reversed and remanded.
----

| (1)  | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and  |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)  | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                small                business issuer.  |
|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                    |                                             |                                                |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
|                               |                                        |                                           |
| Date: August              14, 2006 | By:                                    | /s/ Craig              A.              Huffman |
|                                    | Craig              A. Huffman                    |
|                                    | Title: Chief              Executive Officer |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LIQIANG GU, 

Petitioner,

 v.

ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 13-72936

Agency No. A087-957-069

ORDER

Before: WARDLAW, BERZON, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

The panel has voted to grant Gu’s Petition for Panel Rehearing in light of

this Court’s en banc decision in Torres v. Barr, No. 13-70653, 2020 WL 5668478

(9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2020) (en banc) (overruling Minto v. Sessions, 854 F.3d 619 (9th

Cir. 2017)). The prior memorandum disposition (Dkt. 64) in this case is vacated.

Gu’s petition for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals is

remanded to the agency to determine in the first instance whether alternative

grounds for removability exist under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(I).

The Petition for Panel Rehearing is GRANTED and the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order.

FILED

FEB 19 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
The Petition for Rehearing en banc is denied as moot.

2