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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 27, 2018

v No. 333720

Jackson Circuit Court

RODNEY JAMAR McKEE, LC No. 15-002788-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 335767

Jackson Circuit Court

CORTEZ ANTONIO BUTLER, LC No. 15-002789-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 336598

Jackson Circuit Court

CLIFFORD DURELL McKEE, LC No. 15-002787-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BECKERING, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants Rodney Jamar McKee (Rodney), Cortez Antonio Butler, and Clifford Durell 

McKee (Clifford), were tried jointly, before a single jury. The jury convicted each defendant of 

first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1), conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, MCL 
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750.157a, and first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). The jury also convicted Rodney 

and Clifford of solicitation of murder, MCL 750.157b(2). The trial court sentenced Rodney to 

life without parole for the first-degree murder and conspiracy convictions, life imprisonment for 

the solicitation of murder conviction, and 12 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the home invasion 

conviction. The court sentenced Butler as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 

life without parole for the first-degree murder and conspiracy convictions, and 50 to 75 years’

imprisonment for the home invasion conviction. Lastly, the court sentenced Clifford as a fourthoffense habitual offender to life without parole for the first-degree murder and conspiracy 

convictions, life imprisonment for the solicitation of murder conviction, and 30 to 60 years’

imprisonment for the home invasion conviction. Rodney appeals as of right in Docket No. 

333720, Butler appeals as of right in Docket No. 335767, and Clifford appeals as of right in 

Docket No. 336598. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we affirm in each appeal.

Defendants’ convictions arise from the stabbing death of Frances Craig, who was killed 

inside her home in Jackson, Michigan. The victim’s body was discovered in her bedroom on the 

morning of August 10, 2014. The victim shared the home with her two young daughters, her 

fiancé Eric Wolfe, and Wolfe’s young daughter. Before the victim and Wolfe moved to the 

home in June 2014, they had been living in an apartment at the Oaks Apartment Complex in 

Jackson. In March 2014, Wolfe’s friend, Ryan Marshall, moved into the apartment with Eric 

and the victim after a fire destroyed the apartment that Ryan and his mother, Donna Marshall, 

were living in. Donna sold drugs for Rodney, who she knew as “Neffue,” but she wanted to stop 

selling. On the day of the fire, Ryan saw Rodney sneaking around outside the house, and 

Rodney was charged with first-degree arson in connection with the fire. Ryan intended to testify 

against Rodney in the arson case. When the victim and Wolfe moved to their new residence, 

Ryan did not move with them.

The evidence presented at trial showed that the victim suffered 20 deep stab wounds, 

including wounds to her neck. Her wrists were confined with zip ties and she was gagged with a 

scarf that had been wrapped around her neck. Wolfe was initially considered the prime suspect 

in the homicide. However, Wolfe claimed that he was at work at the time the victim was killed 

and a review of the cameras at his place of employment provided no indication that he had left 

work during that time frame. 

DNA testing revealed that the zip ties from the victim’s hands contained DNA from a 

male donor. In November 2014, this DNA was matched to Butler’s DNA in the Combined DNA 

Index System (CODIS). A forensic analysis of Butler’s cell phone records revealed that Butler’s 

phone was in the Jackson area on August 6, 8 and 10, and that the Jackson area was outside that 

phone’s “pattern of life.” On those dates, Butler’s phone communicated frequently with several 

phone numbers, including a number that was registered under the name “Dorito Johnson,” a

street name for Clifford. On December 11, 2014, real-time GPS tracking located Clifford’s

phone at a mall in Jackson, where Clifford was arrested and police seized three cell phones from 

him. Clifford admitted knowing Butler and phone mapping data showed that Butler’s phone and 

Clifford’s phone had traveled together on I-94. 

On December 11, 2014, detectives interviewed Butler at the Detroit Detention Center. 

The interview was recorded and Butler denied knowledge of the Jackson homicide. Detectives 

interviewed Butler again on December 16 in Detroit, when they went to obtain a buccal swab to 
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confirm the DNA match. After being assured that his interview was not being recorded, Butler 

confessed to the detectives that “Dorito Johnson” had contacted him to “perform a hit” on a 

person who was going to testify against Rodney1 in an upcoming criminal case. Butler told 

detectives that he had traveled with Dorito Johnson from Detroit to Jackson and that Rodney, 

who was driving a white SUV, paid $5,000 of the agreed $10,000 fee up front. Butler said that 

he entered the victim’s residence and was unable to locate the intended target in the home, so he 

went into the master bedroom where he woke up the victim to interrogate her about the 

individual’s location. He explained that he ultimately killed the victim because he believed she 

saw his face. Butler told detectives that he “damn near cut the Bitch’s head off.” Another 

witness, Dale Morgan, testified that he and Butler had an argument in December 2014 about a 

cell phone and that Butler told him to “shut the f**k up, I know what I’m doing,” “I just chopped 

a Bitch up in Jackson.” At trial, Butler denied killing the victim and denied making statements 

to the police and to Morgan. 

I. BATSON CHALLENGES

Rodney argues that the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges to excuse 

prospective African-American jurors. Butler similarly argues that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for a mistrial due to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to excuse AfricanAmerican jurors. These arguments implicate Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 

L Ed 2d 69 (1986), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection 

Clause prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a jury venire because 

of their race. 

Preliminarily, we note that neither Rodney nor Butler timely raised a Batson challenge. 

A Batson challenge is timely if it is made before the jury is sworn. People v Knight, 473 Mich 

324, 348; 701 NW2d 715 (2005). Rodney and Butler did not make their Batson challenges until 

after the jury was sworn. Therefore, their challenges were untimely and, as such, could be 

considered waived. Id. at 346 n 14, 348. Waiver extinguishes any error. People v Carter, 462 

Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Even if we consider this issue under the plain-error 

standard applicable to unpreserved claims, People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 

(1999), Rodney and Butler would not be entitled to appellate relief. 

Assuming that Rodney and Butler satisfied the first step of Batson by making a prima 

facie case of purposeful discrimination, Batson, 476 US at 93-94, the prosecutor would have had 

the burden of providing race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges. Id. at 97. At 

this step, “the issue is whether the . . . explanation is facially valid as a matter of law. . . . ‘A 

neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation based on something 

other than the race of the juror . . . . Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s 

explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ ” Knight, 473 Mich at 337 (citation 

omitted). After a race-neutral reason is proffered, “the trial court must then determine whether 

 1 Butler used a street name for Rodney and described him as a “very, very large man, 6’6”, 6’7” 

and about 400 pounds.”
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the race-neutral explanation is a pretext” and whether the defendant “has proved purposeful 

discrimination.” Id. at 337-338.

Despite the lack of a timely objection, when the issue was raised, the prosecutor provided 

her reasons for using peremptory challenges to dismiss the jurors in question.2 Those reasons 

were race-neutral and the trial court was satisfied that the reasons were valid. Citing People v 

Tennille, 315 Mich App 51; 888 NW2d 278 (2016), Rodney argues that the trial court erred by 

failing to make findings of fact and rulings addressing the nature of the prosecutor’s reasons. 

However, unlike in Tennille, where the trial court merely stated that the prosecutor had 

articulated a valid, race-neutral reason for the strikes, id. at 62, the trial court in this case

assessed the prosecutor’s proffered reasons and made findings of fact regarding the prosecutor’s 

justification for the strikes under the circumstances. Neither Rodney nor Butler has provided any

basis for concluding that the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons were a pretext for discrimination. 

Accordingly, they have failed to demonstrate plain error in the trial court’s denial of the Batson

challenges or denial of a mistrial with respect to this issue. 

II. MOTION TO SEVER TRIAL

Rodney argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever his trial from that 

of the codefendants. We review a trial court’s decision regarding severance for an abuse of 

discretion. People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 43; 871 NW2d 307 (2015), appeal held in 

abeyance 872 NW2d 492 (2015).

MCR 6.121 governs the joinder and severance of charges for multiple defendants. In 

general, a defendant does not have a right to a separate trial. People v Hurst, 396 Mich 1, 6; 238 

NW2d 6 (1976). A strong policy favors joint trials in the interest of justice, judicial economy, 

and administration. People v Etheridge, 196 Mich App 43, 52; 492 NW2d 490 (1992). 

Severance is mandated under MCR 6.121(C)3 only when a defendant demonstrates that his 

substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is the necessary means of rectifying the 

potential prejudice. People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 345; 524 NW2d 682 (1994), amended 447 

Mich 1203 (1994). “The failure to make this showing in the trial court, absent any significant 

 2 Specifically, one juror was dismissed because he admitted that, when he was a juror in a 

previous criminal case, he believed that the defendant was guilty but agreed to just “go along 

with everybody else” to reach “the wrong verdict” and find the defendant not guilty “because of 

what was going on in the jury room.” The second juror acknowledged that she had a previous 

bad experience with a lawyer and would be “more concerned” about, and “more critical” of, the 

attorneys involved in this case. And, the final juror, who stated that she had previously been the 

victim of a crime when she was shot in the leg during a home invasion, demonstrated a notable 

lack of ability to pay attention to details when she could not recall who committed the crime, 

what charges were brought, if the matter proceeded to trial, whether anyone was convicted, etc. 

3 MCR 6.121(C) states that “[o]n a defendant’s motion, the court must sever the trial of 

defendants on related offenses on a showing that severance is necessary to avoid prejudice to 

substantial rights of defendant.” 
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indication on appeal that the requisite prejudice in fact occurred at trial, will preclude reversal of 

a joinder decision.” Id. at 346-347. Neither the existence of inconsistent defenses nor incidental 

spillover prejudice is sufficient to require severance; “rather, the defenses must be ‘mutually 

exclusive’ or ‘irreconcilable.’” Id. at 349 (citations omitted). 

Rodney argued below that severance was necessary under MCR 6.121(C) because 

Butler’s confession implicated Rodney in the crimes. Rodney submitted with his motion to sever 

an affidavit asserting that he had pleaded not guilty to all charges and he denied Butler’s 

statements as untrue. In other words, the prejudice that Rodney alleged would occur was 

premised on Butler incriminating Rodney in crimes in which Rodney denied participating. 

Rodney maintained that there was “no way for one jury . . . to believe both men.” However, 

Butler testified at trial. He denied having confessed to detectives and he did not attempt to 

incriminate Rodney. There was thus nothing inconsistent, and certainly nothing mutually 

exclusive or irreconcilable, between Butler’s defense and Rodney’s defense. See Hana, 447 

Mich at 349. Consequently, the purported prejudice on which Rodney relied to justify severance

did not occur. 

Nevertheless, Rodney contends that he can make a showing of prejudice based on 

evidence that was introduced against Butler at trial. In this regard, Rodney argues that the 

requisite prejudice occurred at trial when the prosecutor cross-examined Butler about his 

involvement in unrelated homicides.4 Although these other acts did not pertain to Rodney and 

thus would not have been introduced at a separate trial, we reject Rodney’s argument that he is 

 4 In making this argument, Rodney also contends that the prosecutor’s cross-examination 

violated a pretrial ruling that evidence of Butler’s involvement in other, unrelated homicides was 

inadmissible. The matter was raised again during trial, however, when questions arose regarding 

whether the prosecutor would be permitted to cross-examine Butler about statements he made 

relative to other homicides if he chose to testify and accused the detectives or Morgan of lying in 

their testimony concerning Butler’s alleged statements. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor 

would be permitted to cross-examine Butler about other homicides if Butler chose to testify and 

he opened the door to such questioning. During direct examination, Butler denied the statements 

attributed to him by the detectives and Morgan, and he asserted that he told them that “they 

won’t be able to hook this one on me.” The prosecutor, in accordance with the trial court’s 

ruling, then cross-examined Butler about his involvement in other homicides. In particular, the 

prosecutor asked what Butler meant by “hook this one on me,” and Butler asserted that Morgan 

falsely implicated him in another murder. Despite this assertion that Morgan falsely implicated 

him, Butler acknowledged that he pleaded guilty to murder in the other case. Thus, the 

prosecutor’s cross-examination of Butler with respect to other homicides did not violate the trial 

court’s ruling, and we find no error in this questioning given that Butler opened the door by

asserting that the police and Morgan had previously tried to “hook” him. Cf. People v Mullins, 

__ Mich App __, __; __ NW2d __ (2017) (Docket No. 334098) (finding no error when a 

defendant opens the door to otherwise improper questioning), p 7.
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entitled to reversal based on this questioning.

5

 The evidence relating to Butler’s involvement in 

other homicides did not implicate Rodney in those other crimes, and the evidence of other 

homicides was only used against Butler. Cf. People v Moore, 78 Mich App 294, 299; 259 

NW2d 351 (1977). Further, the trial court determined that any potential prejudice resulting from 

admission of the evidence could be alleviated by a limiting instruction. The trial court instructed 

the jury, in relevant part, as follows:

You must judge each defendant on the evidence presented against that 

particular defendant, thus, for example, you – should you find that the evidence 

shows one defendant to be guilty you should not thereby automatically find the 

others guilty as well. Judge each defendant based on the evidence against him. 

Just because some evidence may tend to implicate one defendant does not 

automatically mean that it implicates the other defendants as well.

Certain information has been presented to you showing that Cortez Butler 

may have been involved in certain crimes in the past. Because this evidence has 

nothing to do with either Rodney or Clifford McKee you are not to consider it 

against either of them. 

A limiting instruction will often suffice “to enable the jury to compartmentalize evidence and 

consider it only for its proper purpose.” People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 629; 790 NW2d 607 

(2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. 

People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Rodney has not provided any 

basis for overcoming the presumption that the jurors followed the court’s instructions, and he has 

not shown the prejudice necessary to reverse the trial court’s joinder decision. See Hana, 447 

Mich at 346-347.

Rodney also argues that the requisite prejudice occurred during trial when the prosecutor 

“introduced inadmissible evidence” in front of the jury when responding to an objection by 

Butler’s counsel.6 Rodney has provided no basis for concluding that he was prejudiced by the 

prosecutor’s brief argument regarding the relevance of the evidence. 

In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rodney’s motion for 

severance, and Rodney has failed to show that the requisite prejudice occurred at trial.

III. PROSECUTOR’S CONDUCT

Rodney argues that the prosecutor’s conduct denied him a fair trial. Preserved claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct are evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the 

prosecutor’s conduct denied the defendant a fair and impartial trial. People v Rice (On Remand), 

 5 Clifford also raises this issue in his argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for 

a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Butler. That argument is addressed in 

section VIII, infra.

6 The evidence at issue is further discussed in section III, infra.
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235 Mich App 429, 434-435; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). In this case, however, Rodney failed to 

preserve most of his claims with an appropriate objection at trial. See People v Bennett, 290 

Mich App 465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). Unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct 

are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. Id. “On plain-error review, the burden 

is on the defendant to establish (1) error; (2) that was plain, meaning clear or obvious; and (3) 

that the plain error caused prejudice, meaning that the error affected the outcome of the lower 

court proceedings.” People v Jones, 317 Mich App 416, 420; 894 NW2d 723 (2016) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). This Court will only reverse if a defendant establishes plain error 

and the error resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant or it “seriously affected the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s 

innocence.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]his Court cannot find error 

requiring reversal where a curative instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect.” 

Bennett, 290 Mich App at 476 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Rodney first argues that the prosecutor elicited perjured testimony when Detective 

Andrew Sullivan testified that Butler confessed to his involvement in a “triple” homicide in 

Detroit. The court was later informed that the unrelated offense involved a “double” homicide 

and injury to a third individual, and that a different person had pleaded guilty to that offense. 

A prosecutor may not knowingly use false testimony to obtain a conviction. People v 

Smith, 498 Mich 466, 475-476; 870 NW2d 299 (2015). “[A] conviction obtained through the 

knowing use of perjured testimony offends a defendant’s due process protections guaranteed 

under the Fourteenth Amendment.” People v Aceval, 282 Mich App 379, 389; 764 NW2d 285 

(2009). A conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false 

testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Smith, 498 Mich at 476. The entire 

focus of this Court’s analysis must be on the fairness of the trial, not on the prosecutor’s or the 

court’s culpability. Aceval, 282 Mich App at 390.

Assuming that Detective Sullivan’s testimony regarding the number of homicide victims 

was false, Rodney has not shown how the fact that the other case involved a double homicide, 

rather than a triple homicide, had any effect on Rodney’s trial. The trial court corrected the false 

testimony by complying with Butler’s attorney’s request that the jury be informed that there were 

only two victims and that someone else had pleaded guilty. Rodney has not shown plain error.

Second, Rodney argues that the prosecutor improperly argued facts not in evidence when 

she characterized the victim as a hero during closing arguments, and when she referred to Butler 

as a “hitman” when offering a rebuttal witness for Butler’s testimony. We disagree. A 

prosecutor may argue all the facts in evidence and reasonable inferences as they relate to the 

prosecutor’s theory of the case. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). 

Detective Joseph Merritt testified that Butler stated that he had been hired to perform a hit or a 

homicide on an individual, and this evidence supports the characterization of Butler as a 

“hitman.” Butler also told Detective Merritt that he woke up the victim and interrogated her to 

determine the location of the other individual, and that he killed her because she kept moving in 

a manner that allowed her to see his face. The prosecutor argued as follows:

And the only reason to stay in that room in that house any longer at that 

point is to try to get information about Ryan Marshall. It’s the only reason. He 
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has already been all the way through that house by that time and knows Ryan isn’t 

there. He’s in that room with Frannie and clearly knows she’s not Ryan. He 

could have left. She is bound, she is gagged, she is at least stunned or dazed or 

knocked out, probably has barely had a chance to look at him at that point, could 

have gotten away. Had her phone, she couldn’t even have easily or readily called 

911 or anybody else for help. He could have left.

The only reason to stay is to get information about Ryan Marshall, and 

clearly, she wouldn’t give him what he wanted. Clearly, she wouldn’t tell him, 

clearly she struggled, and as we now know from his statement, she kept trying to 

look at him so he had to take her out.

I told you in opening that Frannie died as collateral damage, but Frannie, 

more importantly, died a hero. Wouldn’t give him what he wanted and fought as 

best she could. 

The prosecutor’s characterization of the victim as a hero was a reasonable inference based on the 

evidence and the conduct that resulted in the victim’s death. The prosecutor was not required to 

state her argument in the blandest possible terms. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 66; 732 

NW2d 546 (2007).

Third, Rodney argues that the prosecutor improperly told the jury during her rebuttal 

argument that Miranda7 is a legal issue and that Butler’s statement would not have been 

admissible if it was obtained in violation of Butler’s Miranda rights. The prosecutor’s argument 

was responsive to Butler’s counsel’s suggestion during his closing argument that Butler’s 

statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. See People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 593; 

629 NW2d 411 (2011) (a prosecutor’s otherwise improper remark may not require reversal when 

given in response to defense counsel’s argument). Contrary to what Rodney asserts, the 

prosecutor’s remark did not vouch for the veracity of the confession or the credibility of the 

detective’s testimony. Indeed, the prosecutor told the jury that they could consider whether the 

statement was voluntary, and the prosecutor did not attempt to prevent the jury from considering 

the credibility of the confession or whether such a confession was made. See People v Gilbert, 

55 Mich App 168, 173; 222 NW2d 305 (1974); see also People v Pierson, __ Mich App __, __; 

__ NW2d __ (2017) (Docket No. 332500), p 2. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that 

the lawyers’ arguments were not evidence, and the trial court instructed the jury regarding their 

ability to weigh and consider Butler’s statement. In these circumstances, reference to there being

nothing legally amiss with regard to Miranda does not require reversal. See People v Kincaid, 

136 Mich App 209, 215-216; 356 NW2d 4 (1984). 

Fourth, Rodney asserts that the prosecutor misled the jury by presenting “unadmitted 

evidence.” It appears that Rodney is referring to a PowerPoint that was made by the prosecutor 

that outlined various text messages, including a communication between Rodney and an 

unidentified third party, referred to as “D.” Butler’s counsel objected to testimony regarding the 

 7 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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phone call, challenging the relevance “of a conversation with a third party who’s yet to be 

identified as having anything [to do] with this case.” The court asked the prosecutor why the 

communication was relevant, and, in front of the jury, the prosecutor replied, “Because this 

whole thing starts with Rodney trying to stay out of jail from the arson” “[s]o D’s telling him 

how to” and Rodney replied, “He’s got it under control.” Rodney’s counsel objected on the 

ground that the prosecutor’s reasoning “called for speculation.” After additional discussion 

outside the presence of the jury, the trial court concluded that the communication was not

relevant and was inadmissible. Rodney now argues it was improper for the jury to see the 

PowerPoint prepared by the prosecutor and for the prosecutor to discuss the text message in front 

of the jury.8 However, Rodney has not provided any basis for concluding that he was prejudiced 

as a result of the jury viewing the PowerPoint and the prosecutor’s brief argument regarding the 

relevance of the evidence. Thus, he has not shown plain error and he is not entitled to relief on 

appeal.

Fifth, Rodney argues that the prosecutor had a duty to correct Morgan’s testimony, which 

Rodney maintains was false. However, Rodney has offered no support, other than his own 

belief, for his assertion that Morgan’s testimony was false or that the prosecutor knew the 

testimony to be false. Cf. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 417; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). 

Further, he has presented no argument explaining how Morgan’s statement pertaining to Butler 

was material in Rodney’s case. See Aceval, 282 Mich App at 389. Consequently, Rodney has 

failed to show that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony. See id. at 389-390.

Lastly, Rodney and Butler both argue that the prosecutor knowingly violated the trial 

court’s evidentiary ruling when she cross-examined Butler with respect to other homicides in 

which he was involved. As discussed in section II, supra, the trial court ruled that the prosecutor 

could cross-examine Butler about other homicides if Butler opened the door on direct 

examination. Because Butler opened the door to the challenged testimony, the prosecutor did not 

elicit “prohibited testimony” by cross-examining Butler regarding other homicides. See People v 

Mullins, __ Mich App __, __; __ NW2d __ (2017) (Docket No. 334098). The premise of this 

argument is factually flawed, and thus does not support the argument that the prosecutor 

improperly cross-examined Butler about other homicides.

In sum, Rodney has failed to show plain error with respect to any of his unpreserved 

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Butler did not 

violate the trial court’s ruling or deprive Rodney and Butler of a fair trial. 

IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

 8 Butler moved for a mistrial on this basis, arguing that Butler was prejudiced when the 

prosecutor began to discuss the “statements that were in Rodney’s phone” in the presence of the 

jury. The prosecutor responded that the argument was not improper and that any prejudice could 

be alleviated by a curative instruction, which the trial court was willing to give. However, none 

of defendants requested a special instruction, and there was no objection to the failure to provide 

an instruction.
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Rodney and Clifford argue that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to reread the 

instructions on transferred intent and conspiracy in response to a jury question seeking 

clarification on the intent required for the murder charge. However, counsel for both Rodney 

and Clifford expressed satisfaction with the jury instructions that were given, thereby 

extinguishing any error and waiving review of this claim. See People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 

504; 803 NW2d 200 (2011). In particular, both Rodney and Clifford expressed satisfaction with 

the trial court’s final instructions, which included instructions on transferred intent and 

conspiracy. Then, in response to the jury’s question regarding the intent for murder, Rodney’s 

counsel suggested that the court instruct the jury to “follow the law,” and then approved the trial 

court’s suggestion that it instruct the jury to reread the instructions on transferred intent and 

conspiracy. Clifford’s counsel also agreed that it would be “correct” for the court to instruct the 

jury to reread the instruction on transferred intent. See id. By approving the trial court’s 

response, Rodney and Clifford waived this claim. Their waivers extinguished any error, leaving 

no error to review. See Carter, 462 Mich at 216.

V. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Rodney argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) not properly preparing to crossexamine the prosecution’s arson expert, (2) not challenging the qualifications of the arson expert, 

(3) failing to consult with an expert to provide data showing the location of Rodney’s phone at 

the time of the fire and that he was texting with his girlfriend at the time of the fire, (4) failing to 

object to the prosecutor’s conduct discussed in section III, (5) failing to object to the jury 

instruction on transferred intent, (6) failing to object to Detective Sullivan’s testimony that none 

of Butler’s four statements were recorded when, in fact, only one statement was not recorded, 

and (7) failing to object to Morgan testifying in prison clothing. Both Rodney and Butler also 

argue that their counsel was ineffective by failing to request an instruction under MCL 763.9 

with respect to the failure to record Butler’s statement. Butler also argues that his counsel failed 

to effectively cross-examine Wolfe with respect to why the police considered him to be a prime 

suspect. 

A Ginther9 hearing was not held in this case, meaning that our review is limited to 

mistakes apparent on the record. People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 139; 659 NW2d 

611 (2003). “To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

both that counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel's deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 140. “[T]he defendant must overcome a strong presumption that 

counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy.” Id. The burden is on the defendant to 

show the factual predicate for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Hoag, 460 

Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). 

The record is devoid of evidence regarding Rodney’s counsel’s preparation for 

questioning the expert and the alleged evidence in support of the defense theory. Rodney has not 

produced any factual support for his claim that his attorney was unprepared or that evidence 

showed that Rodney was not in the area of the fire at the time it was set. Further, regardless of 

 9 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
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whether Rodney actually committed the underlying arson, it was undisputed that Rodney was 

criminally charged with that offense. Thus, Rodney had a motive to kill Ryan because Ryan 

intended to testify that Rodney was involved in that offense. 

Rodney also announces, without argument, that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the prosecutor’s conduct addressed in section III, supra. Given our conclusion that the

prosecutor’s conduct was not improper, counsel was not ineffective by failing to object. Counsel 

is not required to make a meritless argument or raise a futile objection. People v Ericksen, 288 

Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).

Rodney also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to “object to the handling of 

the jury instructions.” Presumably, Rodney is referring to counsel’s agreement with the trial 

court’s response to the jury’s question regarding the requisite intent for murder, in which the 

court instructed the jury to reread the jury instructions on conspiracy and transferred intent. 

Rodney’s argument that the trial court’s response only further confused the jury is not supported 

by the record. Indeed, the court advised the jury that if its response did not resolve the jury’s 

question, the jury should send out another question. The jury did not send out any additional 

questions regarding the instruction. On this record, Rodney has not shown that counsel

performed unreasonably or that counsel’s failure to object to the jury instructions affected the 

outcome of the trial. 

Rodney also complains that counsel failed to object when Detective Sullivan “lied to the 

jury” and told them that none of Butler’s four statements had been recorded. The record does not 

factually support this argument. Detective Sullivan testified that Butler’s December 16 

statement was not recorded, but Sullivan did not testify that all of Butler’s statements were not 

recorded. To the contrary, Detective Sullivan testified that Butler’s December 11 statement was 

recorded. Rodney has not established that Detective Sullivan lied to the jury and, in any event, 

Rodney has not explained how this purported lie affected the outcome of the proceedings. 

Next, Rodney complains that counsel failed to object when Morgan testified while 

wearing prison clothes. Rodney makes no attempt to explain why such an objection would have 

had merit, much less explain how it would have changed the outcome of his trial. Indeed, 

assuming that Morgan did indeed testify while wearing prison clothing, Rodney has not 

overcome the presumption that counsel’s failure to object was reasonable trial strategy 

considering that Morgan was a prosecution witness. 

Rodney and Butler both maintain that their respective attorneys were ineffective for 

failing to request that the trial court instruct the jury that interrogations for major felonies must 

be recorded, MCL 763.8, and that the jury could consider the failure to record Butler’s December 

16 statement when evaluating the evidence in this case, MCL 763.9.

MCL 763.9 provides:

Any failure to record a statement as required under section 8 of this 

chapter or to preserve a recorded statement does not prevent any law enforcement 

official present during the taking of the statement from testifying in court as to the 

circumstances and content of the individual’s statement if the court determines 
-12-

that the statement is otherwise admissible. However, unless the individual 

objected to having the interrogation recorded and that objection was properly 

documented under section 8(3), the jury shall be instructed that it is the law of this 

state to record statements of an individual in custodial detention who is under 

interrogation for a major felony and that the jury may consider the absence of a 

recording in evaluating the evidence relating to the individual’s statement.

Section 8, MCL 763.8, provides, in relevant part:

(1) This section applies if the law enforcement agency has audiovisual 

recording equipment that is operational or accessible as provided in section 11(3) 

or (4) or upon the expiration of the relevant time periods set forth in section 11(3) 

or (4), whichever occurs first.

(2) A law enforcement official interrogating an individual in custodial 

detention regarding the individual’s involvement in the commission of a major 

felony shall make a time-stamped, audiovisual recording of the entire 

interrogation. A major felony recording shall include the law enforcement 

official’s notification to the individual of the individual’s Miranda rights.

(3) An individual who believes the individual's interrogation is being 

recorded may object to having the interrogation recorded. The individual's 

objection shall be documented either by the individual's objection stated on the 

recording or the individual's signature on a document stating the objection. If the 

individual refuses to document the objection either by recording or signature, a 

law enforcement official shall document the objection by a recording or signed 

document. A major felony recording may be made without the consent or 

knowledge of, or despite the objection of, the individual being interrogated.

Rodney’s and Butler’s argument fails because MCL 763.9 provides an exception when 

the individual being interrogated objects to having the interrogation recorded and the objection is 

properly noted. The record discloses that Butler did not want the December 16 statement 

recorded. Rodney does not claim that Butler’s objection was not properly noted. Although 

Butler asserts that the detectives did not properly document his objection, the record is silent on 

this issue. Because the absence of proper documentation is not apparent from the record, this

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot succeed. Moreover, even assuming counsel 

could have succeeded on a request for such an instruction, we are not persuaded that the absence 

of this instruction affected the outcome of the proceedings. 

Lastly, Butler argues that his counsel failed to effectively cross-examine Wolfe about his 

statements and behavior that caused the police to initially consider him a suspect. However, the 

fact that Wolfe was initially a suspect, and the reasons supporting that suspicion, were 

thoroughly explored at trial. Butler fails to explain how additional cross-examination of Wolfe 

would have affected the outcome, especially in light of the other evidence of Butler’s guilt, 

including DNA evidence. Because the jury was clearly apprised of Wolfe’s initial status as a 

primary suspect and the reasons for that suspicion, Butler has failed to demonstrate that counsel 
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performed below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable 

probability that cross-examination on this subject was reasonably likely to change the outcome. 

VI. ADMISSION OF BUTLER’S STATEMENT

Butler argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his December 

16 statement. During this interview, police assured Butler that the interview was not being 

recorded and one of the detectives expressly told Butler: “I’m not intending to use anything you 

say against you.” After receiving these assurances, Butler provided a detailed confession to the 

murder. On appeal, Butler argues that police cannot advise someone of their rights but then offer 

false assurances that what the person says will not be used against him because this type of 

“subterfuge makes a mockery out of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda.” According to Butler, 

his statement was obtained in violation of Miranda and his statement was involuntary because it 

was given based on false assurances that it would not be used against him. 

We review the trial court’s ultimate decision on a motion to suppress de novo. People v 

Roberts, 292 Mich App 492, 502; 808 NW2d 290 (2011). Likewise, voluntariness and whether 

an accused has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights are reviewed de novo. People v 

Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 707; 703 NW2d 204 (2005). However, the trial court’s factual 

findings are reviewed for clear error. People v Elliott, 494 Mich 292, 300; 833 NW2d 284 

(2013). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, an appellate court is 

left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Coomer, 245 

Mich App 206, 219; 627 NW2d 612 (2001). “To the extent we find that constitutional error has 

occurred, we review preserved issues of constitutional error to determine whether they are 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 144; 

854 NW2d 114 (2014) (quotation marks, citation and alteration omitted). “A constitutional error 

is harmless if [it is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 

defendant guilty absent the error.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment's 

prohibition against compelled self-incrimination requires that the accused be given a series of 

warnings before being subjected to custodial interrogation.”10 Elliott, 494 Mich at 301 

(quotation marks omitted). 

The now-familiar Miranda warnings require the police, before a custodial 

interrogation, to inform a suspect (1) that he has the right to remain silent, (2) that 

anything he says can and will be used against him in court, (3) that he has a right 

to the presence of an attorney during any questioning, and (4) that if he cannot 

afford an attorney one will be appointed for him. [People v Daoud, 462 Mich 

621, 625 n 1; 614 NW2d 152, 154 (2000).]

 10 In the trial court, there was debate about whether Butler was “in custody” on December 16 so 

as to require Miranda warnings. See generally Elliott, 494 Mich at 302. However, the trial court 

did not address this question, and the prosecutor makes no argument on appeal that Miranda did 

not apply to the December 16 interrogation. 
-14-

The aim of Miranda “is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech 

remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.” Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 469; 

86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). If the custodial interrogation is not preceded by an 

adequate warning, statements made during the custodial interrogation may not be introduced into 

evidence at the accused's criminal trial.” Elliott, 494 Mich at 301. A defendant may waive his or 

her rights, “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Daoud, 462 

Mich at 633 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it 

was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, 

or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of 

both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision 

to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the 

interrogation” reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 

comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been 

waived. [Id. (citation omitted).]

In this case, on December 16, at the beginning of the interview, police brought out a 

waiver card and were going to inform Butler of his Miranda rights, but Butler said “Bro, I know 

my rights.” The Miranda rights were not read at that time and Butler did not sign the waiver 

card.11 Troublingly, it is undisputed that, during this interview, one of the detectives told Butler 

that “I’m not intending to use anything you say against you.” The detectives also assured Butler 

that the interview was not being recorded, and one of the detectives stated a second time that 

“it’s not my intent to use anything you say against you.” After being given these assurances, 

Butler confessed and described the crime in detail. 

Considering the record as a whole, in our judgment, while Butler had previously been 

informed of his Miranda rights and appeared to understand those warnings, the detective vitiated 

the warnings, and invalidated any waiver of Butler’s rights, by expressly contradicting the advice 

required by Miranda and instead telling Butler that he was not intending to use what Butler said 

against him. 

The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation 

that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This 

warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also 

of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these 

consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent 

exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the 

individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary 

 11 Butler had been read his rights at a previous interview a few days before. In these 

circumstances, given Butler’s insistence that he knew his rights, we see no need for the police to 

have re-read Miranda on December 16. See People v Littlejohn, 197 Mich App 220, 223; 495 

NW2d 171 (1992); People v Godboldo, 158 Mich App 603, 606; 405 NW2d 114 (1986).
-15-

system—that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest. 

[Miranda, 384 US at 469.]

Police are not required to provide warnings “in the exact form” set forth in Miranda; but, they 

are required to provide “a fully effective equivalent.” Duckworth v Eagan, 492 US 195, 202; 

109 S Ct 2875; 106 L Ed 2d 166 (1989). Clearly, this requirement is not satisfied when police 

offer express assurances that vitiate the warnings required by Miranda. In other words, “[a] 

police officer cannot directly contradict, out of one side of his mouth, the Miranda warnings just 

given out of the other.” State v Pillar, 359 NJ Super 249, 268; 820 A2d 1 (2003).

We recognize that police are not categorically prohibited from lying to a suspect by, for 

example, falsely stating that they have evidence he committed the crime. See, e.g., People v 

Hicks, 185 Mich App 107, 113; 460 NW2d 569 (1990). But, there is a grave difference between 

this sort of lying and when police engage in trickery that wholly undermines the validity of a 

waiver by depriving “a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature 

of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.” Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 424; 

106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986). See also 2 LaFave et al, Criminal Procedure, § 6.9(c) n 

65 (4th ed.). For example, with regard to the necessity of informing a suspect that anything he or 

she says can and will be used against the individual, courts have found this advice is vitiated by 

subsequent police statements indicating that the conversation is “off-the-record,” Pillar, 359 NJ 

Super at 268, “confidential,” Spence v State, 281 Ga 697, 698-700; 642 SE2d 856 (2007), 

“between us,” Leger v Com, 400 SW3d 745, 749 (Ky 2013), “between you and me,” Lee v State, 

418 Md 136, 156; 12 A3d 1238, 1250 (2011); State v Stanga, 617 NW2d 486, 489, 491 (SD 

2000), or that giving a statement will not “hurt” the suspect, Hart v Attorney Gen of Florida, 323 

F3d 884, 894 (CA 11 2003); State v Puryear, 441 NJ Super 280, 298; 117 A3d 1255 (2015). In 

contrast to the warnings required by Miranda, an assurance that the suspect’s statements will not 

be used against him “purports to remove the specter of proving one's own guilt by making a 

statement.” Pillar, 359 NJ Super at 273 (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Hart, 

323 F3d at 894; United States v Walton, 10 F3d 1024, 1030 (CA 3 1993). Thus, these types of 

misleading assurances that an individual’s statement will not be used against him undermine the 

suspect’s ability to knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights because this type of trickery 

deprives the defendant of the “knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his 

rights and the consequences of abandoning them.” Hopkins v Cockrell, 325 F3d 579, 584 (CA 5 

2003). 

Here, even more expressly than in other cases, the detective countermanded Miranda and 

assured Butler on December 16 that he was not “intending to use anything you say against you.” 

Such an overt contradiction of Miranda has no place in the interrogation of Butler, and in the 

face of such a statement we cannot conclude that Butler’s subsequent confession following this 

assurance was a product of a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. Cf. Lee, 418 Md at 

157. In reaching this conclusion, we note that at the Walker hearing before trial the detective 

emphasized his use of the word “intending” and he asserted that he was not trying to make any 

“definitive black and white” promises about the future, but was instead talking in “real time, 

right then as we sit there.” This seems to suggest that the detective was not misleading Butler 

because the detective had no immediate intention to use Butler’s statements against him and that

the detective’s statement was therefore permissible because it implicitly acknowledged the 

possibility that Butler’s statements could be used against him in the future. However, the clear-
-16-

cut reality underlying Miranda is that “anything said can and will be used against the 

individual.” Miranda, 384 US at 469 (emphasis added). To affirmatively represent there is no 

intention to use the statements against the individual is a derogation of Miranda which 

undermines a suspect’s ability to understand his rights and the consequences of abandoning 

them. Moreover, regardless of how the detective thought his statement should be interpreted, 

“whether intentional or inadvertent, the state of mind of the police is irrelevant to the question of 

the intelligence and voluntariness of respondent's election to abandon his rights.” Moran, 475 

US at 423. In short, whatever the detective’s motives or internal thought processes, his express 

assurances gave Butler every reason to think that his statements made during the December 16 

interview would not be used against him.12 Such assurances are not in keeping with Miranda, 

and Butler’s waiver of his rights following this statement cannot be considered a knowing and 

intelligent waiver. Cf. Lee, 418 Md at 157. Because Butler’s December 16 statement was 

obtained in violation of Miranda, it was not admissible against him at trial as substantive 

evidence. See Elliott, 494 Mich at 301. 

Although we conclude that Butler’s statement was obtained in violation of Miranda, 

reversal of his convictions is not required because any error in admitting his December 16 

confession as substantive evidence against Butler was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given 

the untainted evidence of Butler’s guilt. See Henry, 305 Mich App at 148. First, Butler’s DNA 

was found on the ties used to restrain the victim. Second, Butler told Dale Morgan that he had 

“just chopped a Bitch up in Jackson.” Third, after the interview on January 6, during which 

Butler was properly mirandized, Butler asked a detective whether the detective thought Butler 

“was gonna admit to killing her on the record.” And, fourth, there were cell phone records 

placing Butler in Jackson on August 10, though he denied being in Jackson and the Jackson 

location was outside the phone’s “pattern of life.” Considered as a whole, this evidence, even 

without Butler’s December 16 confession, was more than enough to allow a rational jury to find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Butler killed the victim. Consequently, Butler is not entitled to 

reversal of his conviction because it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 

have found Butler guilty absent any error in admitting his statement. 

VII. BUTLER’S MOTIONS FOR A MISTRIAL

Butler argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motions for a 

mistrial on four separate occasions. We review a trial court’s decision denying a motion for a 

mistrial for an abuse of discretion. People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 

(1995). To the extent that Butler’s claims may be deemed unpreserved because he failed to 

make a timely request for a mistrial, our review is limited to plain error affecting Butler’s 

substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763. 

 12 Indeed, Butler was told that the police were interested in finding out about the involvement of 

the victim’s fiancé, Eric Wolfe, because Wolfe had a daughter and they were concerned about 

the daughter’s safety. Coupled with the assurances that the detective did not intend to use his 

statements against him, Butler had ample reason to believe that the sole purpose of the interview 

was simply to ensure the safety of Wolfe’s daughter. 
-17-

“A mistrial should be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the 

defendant . . . and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.” Haywood, 209 Mich App at 228 (citation 

omitted). Butler simply asserts that error occurred and provides a citation to the record in each 

instance. He fails to adequately brief his arguments and fails to cite any authority in support of 

his arguments. These arguments are not properly presented for appellate review. People v Kelly, 

231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). Even if we considered his arguments, we 

would conclude that he is not entitled to relief.

First, as explained earlier, the prosecutor provided race-neutral reasons for using 

peremptory challenges to excuse African-American jurors, which the trial court found were 

valid, and Butler has not provided any reason for disturbing the trial court’s findings on this 

issue. Second, Butler has not demonstrated that a mistrial was required because of the 

prosecutor’s brief argument on an objection in the presence of the jury. As explained earlier, the 

prosecutor was responding to the trial court’s request to explain the relevance of evidence 

relating to a phone call between Rodney and a third party, and there is no basis for concluding 

that the prosecutor’s brief argument was prejudicial. Moreover, the trial court offered to provide 

a curative instruction if requested, but there is no indication that any defendant requested an 

instruction. Third, Butler was not entitled to a mistrial based on Morgan’s allegedly “perjured 

testimony.” As discussed earlier, there has been no showing that Morgan’s testimony was false, 

let alone that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony. 

Fourth, with respect to Butler’s preserved argument that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial after an officer, while establishing the chain of 

evidence for a cell phone seized from Butler, described the evidence tag as including the case 

type “HOM,” it is not apparent that the jury would have understood those letters as referring to a 

homicide case, and the prosecutor did not attempt to explore the meaning of “HOM.” People v 

Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 709; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). Moreover, the officer’s brief

mention of “HOM” involved an unresponsive, volunteered remark. Id. at 709-710. We also note 

that the trial court offered to provide a curative instruction if requested, but Butler’s counsel did 

not request an instruction. Under these circumstances, reference to “HOM” did not impair 

Butler’s ability to get a fair trial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Butler’s motion for a mistrial. 

VIII. CLIFFORD’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL

Clifford argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a 

mistrial after the prosecution cross-examined Butler about his involvement in other, unrelated 

homicides that did not involve Clifford. As previously discussed, the risk of prejudice from the 

admission of this evidence was alleviated by a proper cautionary instruction. There is no reason 

to conclude that the jury was not capable of following the trial court’s instruction that this 

evidence could not be considered against Clifford, especially considering that this evidence did 

not implicate Clifford in the other homicides and the trial court specifically advised the jury that 
-18-

the evidence had nothing to do with Clifford. Given these circumstances, the trial court’s denial 

of Clifford’s motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.13 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

 13 In asserting that the trial court erred by denying his request for a mistrial, Clifford challenges, 

in a roundabout way, the trial court’s pre-trial rulings regarding the admissibility of Butler’s 

statement as substantive evidence against Clifford and Rodney. As an evidentiary matter, the 

trial court relied on MRE 804(b)(3), and Clifford does not challenge the trial court’s evidentiary 

decision on appeal. Instead, Clifford argues that the trial court erred by admitting Butler’s 

confession because the detectives failed to provide Butler with an effective Miranda warning. 

Further, Clifford argues that the trial court erred by finding that Butler’s confession was 

nontestimonial and admitting it as evidence against Clifford despite Clifford’s confrontation 

clause objections. Clifford argues that these erroneous pre-trial rulings prompted Butler to take 

the stand and that Butler’s decision to take the stand led to the admission of the evidence of other 

homicides committed by Butler. Thus, Clifford claims that these erroneous rulings should 

somehow be considered when assessing the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial based on the 

evidence relating to Butler’s involvement in other crimes. However, Clifford also expressly 

concedes that these arguments do not entitle him to relief because Butler testified at trial, thereby 

alleviating any confrontation clause concerns, People v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 275; 715 NW2d 

290 (2006), and because Clifford cannot seek to have Butler’s confession suppressed based on a 

violation of Butler’s rights, see People v Wood, 447 Mich 80, 89; 523 NW2d 477 (1994) (“As a 

general rule, criminal defendants do not have standing to assert the rights of third parties.”); 

Paramount Pictures Corp v Miskinis, 418 Mich 708, 715; 344 NW2d 788 (1984) (“The Fifth 

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a personal privilege and cannot be asserted on 

behalf of another.”). Given Clifford’s concession on these issues, we need not consider them 

further and we see no basis for granting relief to Clifford (or Rodney) based on the admission of 

Butler’s confession.