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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs April 3, 2018

SAMUEL SANDERS ET AL. V. MARVIN JACKSON ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for McNairy County 

No. 9091 William C. Cole, Chancellor

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No. W2017-01643-COA-R3-CV

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This matter involves a dispute between record owners of adjacent lots. Plaintiffs claim 

ownership of both lots. Defendant claims ownership of one lot and a shed situated on the 

other lot. Each sought compensation for damages and loss of use of their respective 

personal and real property during the dispute. The trial court held that each side owned 

the lot to which it was the record owner and that the shed was on plaintiffs’ lot. It held 

that both sides failed to meet its burden of proof on the issue of damages. Accordingly, 

the court declined to award damages. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RICHARD H.

DINKINS, and KENNY W. ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

Ross Mitchell, Selmer, Tennessee, for the appellants, Samuel Sanders and Vanessa 

Sanders. 

Joe L. Brown, Savannah, Tennessee, for the appellee, Marvin Jackson.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

 

1

Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10 states:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may 

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion 

when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided 

by memorandum opinion it shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” 

shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any 

unrelated case.

09/18/2018
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I.

This matter involves two parcels of real property – Lot 1 and Lot 2. The parcels 

are located in McNairy County. They abut. The defendant is the record owner of Lot 1, 

according to the Register’s Office of McNairy County; the plaintiffs are the record 

owners of Lot 2 according to the same source. Both plaintiffs and defendant claim 

ownership of a shed located on Lot 2. 

At a bench trial, Mr. Kelvin Sanders, plaintiffs’ father and the former owner of the 

two lots, testified that he purchased both lots in the early 1990s. He testified that he 

obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust on the properties for the purpose of 

constructing a house on Lot 1. The house later burned down. Lot 2 includes the shed. He 

received insurance proceeds and allegedly paid off the obligation secured by the deed of 

trust. However, he states that, due to an error, the deed of trust on Lot 1 was never 

released. A foreclosure took place in 2004. On October 4, 2004, a substitute trustees deed 

was recorded conveying the property to Bank One. Mr. Sanders the senior believes that 

the foreclosure was not legal because he did not receive proper notice. Mr. Sanders the 

senior was the original plaintiff in this action. Plaintiffs were later substituted for him,

because they are the record owners of Lot 2. 

After defendant purchased Lot 1, he stored items, including two vehicles, in the 

shed. He testified that when an issue arose about the ownership of the parcels in question, 

Mr. Sanders the senior padlocked the shed with defendant’s property still inside. Later, at 

the request of Mr. Sanders the senior, the McNairy County Sheriff’s Department placed a

padlock on the shed. Defendant also had placed a padlock on the shed, but was unable to 

access the shed once the sheriff placed its lock. Defendant alleges that for two years and 

six months he was unable to access his property inside the shed. 

Defendant asked the court for compensation for the time his personal items were 

locked inside the shed on Lot 2. He also requested compensation for improvements made 

on the property and for expenses related to the cleanup and improvements of the 

property. Plaintiffs requested compensation for the loss of use of the shed due to 

defendant’s property being stored therein, and compensation for damages to plaintiffs’ 

property. The trial court held in its order that:

[T]he Plaintiffs claim ownership of Lot 1 based on an alleged 

illegal foreclosure of Lot 1 when their father, Kelvin Sanders, 

was the record owner of Lot 1. The Defendant claims 

ownership of a storage building situated on Lot 2 because he 

was told by the seller of Lot 1, [real estate agent], that the 

storage building was included in the purchase. The Court 

finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet the burden of 

proof necessary for the Court to award them possession of 
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Lot 1, and that the Defendant has failed to meet the burden of 

proof necessary for the Court to award him possession of the 

storage building on Lot 2. 

The court held that defendant is the owner of Lot 1, and that plaintiffs are the owner of 

Lot 2, including the shed. The court found that neither party owed the other damages. 

II.

Plaintiffs argue that there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that 

plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages for the loss of use of the shed on Lot 2. 

They argue that the defendant took possession of property belonging to plaintiffs, and 

that defendant did so in violation of the property rights of plaintiffs. Conversion is “the 

appropriation of [property] to the party's own use and benefit, by the exercise of 

dominion over it, in defiance of plaintiff's right.” Barger v. Webb, 216 Tenn. 275, 391 

S.W.2d 664, 665 (1965). 

In a non-jury case, our review of the trial court’s factual findings is de novo upon 

the record, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the 

preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We review a trial 

court’s conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Kaplan v. 

Bugalla, 188 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tenn. 2006). Due to the fact-intensive nature of boundary 

line disputes, the trial court is best suited to assess the credibility of the witnesses and its 

credibility determinations are binding on this Court unless the evidence preponderates 

against them. Conder v. Salyers, 421 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).

The standard of review we employ for damage awards in non-jury cases was set 

forth in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Starkey:

In the appeal of a damages award, the appellate review of 

“[w]hether the trial court has utilized the proper measure 

of damages is a question of law that we review de novo.” The 

amount of damages awarded, however, is a question of fact so 

long as the amount awarded is within the limits set by the 

law. Thus, in a non-jury case such as this, we review the 

amount of damages awarded by the trial court with a 

presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the 

evidence demonstrates otherwise. Great weight is given to 

factual findings that are based on the trial court's assessment 

of witness credibility. This is because the “trial judge as the 

trier of fact had the opportunity to observe the manner and 

demeanor of all of the witnesses as they testified from the 

witness stand.”
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244 S.W.3d 344, 352–53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

III.

The record on appeal is limited to the technical record, trial exhibits, and a 

statement of the evidence prepared by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue in their brief that they 

are “entitled to damages, most notably in the form of rent, from the use of the shed on Lot 

2.” Plaintiffs argue that they “should not have to bear the cost of the loss of use of the 

shed on their property while it was locked.” According to the statement of the evidence, 

the only witness called by plaintiffs was the original plaintiff to this action, Mr. Sanders

the senior. He testified that he believed the foreclosure was improper, and therefore, 

plaintiffs owned both lots. There is no mention of plaintiffs presenting evidence 

regarding damage to any property or of rent owed. As outlined above, defendant testified 

that Mr. Sanders the senior placed a lock on the shed when an ownership dispute arose. 

He also caused the local sheriff to place an additional lock to prevent defendant from 

accessing the shed during the dispute. Defendant had to move the court to obtain 

permission to enter the shed and remove his vehicles, a motion that plaintiffs opposed. 

The record therefore indicates that plaintiffs’ loss of use of the shed occurred in 

conjunction with the defendant’s loss of use of the property locked therein. This course of 

conduct and the facts outlined above do not evince an entitlement to damages. 

Consequently, the court declined to find that either party had carried its burden of proof

and therefore it did not award damages. From the record as a whole, we cannot conclude 

that the evidence preponderates against these findings. We hold that plaintiffs are not

entitled to an award of damages.

IV.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the 

appellants, Samuel Sanders and Vanessa Sanders. This case is remanded to the trial court 

for enforcement of the court’s judgment and for collection of costs assessed by the trial 

court. 

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CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE