United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-1546

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Kendrick Shawnray Maid

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport

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 Submitted: October 10, 2014

Filed: November 24, 2014

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Before MURPHY, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Kendrick Maid pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon, a violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court sentenced him to 120 months’ 1

imprisonment. Maid appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, Chief Judge, United States District Court

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for the Southern District of Iowa.
calculating his advisory sentencing guidelines range and that his sentence is

unreasonable. We affirm for the reasons explained below. 

In April 2013, Maid argued with Tyrone Hurn at Hurn’s apartment, then left

the residence, promising to return. Shortly thereafter, Maid returned with a gun,

pointed it in Hurn’s direction, fired two shots at the ceiling, and fled. Maid was

indicted for and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At

sentencing, the district court concluded that Maid’s base offense level was twentyfour, pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1, and determined that his total offense level was

twenty-five. This resulted in an advisory sentencing range of 110-137 months’

imprisonment reduced to 110-120 per the statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). 

See USSG § 5G1.1(c). The district court imposed a sentence of 120 months’

imprisonment.

Maid first argues that the district court erred when it determined his base

offense level pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). Section 2K2.1(a)(2) provides for a

base offense level of twenty-four if the defendant has been convicted of two prior

felonies that are crimes of violence as defined in USSG § 4B1.2. Maid concedes that

his Iowa conviction for willful injury is a crime of violence but argues that neither his

conviction for assault while displaying a dangerous weapon, Iowa Code §§ 708.1(3)

(2002) (current version at Iowa Code § 708.1(2)(c)), 708.2(3), nor his conviction for

domestic-abuse assault with intent to injure or with a weapon, Iowa Code §§ 708.1

(2002) (current version at Iowa Code § 708.1), 708.2A(2)(c), qualifies as a crime of

violence. This court reviews de novo a district court’s determination that a conviction

is a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Craig,

630 F.3d 717, 723 (8th Cir. 2011).

“To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence we

apply the ‘categorical approach,’ under which ‘we consider the offense generically,

that is to say, we examine it in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in

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terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular

occasion.’” United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 324, 327 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008)). Under USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1), a

crime of violence includes an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use,

or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Maid was

convicted of the Iowa crime of assault while displaying a dangerous weapon in

violation of Iowa Code §§ 708.1(3) (2002), 708.2(3). A person violates § 708.1(3)

(2002) by “[i]ntentionally point[ing] any firearm toward another, or display[ing] in

a threatening manner any dangerous weapon toward another.” Section 708.2(3)

providesthat any person “who commits assault, as defined in section 708.1, and uses

or displays a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault, is guilty of an

aggravated misdemeanor.” As relevant here, a “dangerous weapon” includes “any

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instrument or device designed primarily for use in inflicting death or injury” and “any

instrument or device . . . which is actually used in such a manner as to indicate that

the defendant intends to inflict death or serious injury.” Iowa Code § 702.7 (1988)

(current version at Iowa Code § 702.7). 

Maid argues that his conviction for assault while displaying a dangerous

weapon is not a crime of violence because it requires no use or threatened use of

physical force. However, both the requirement of “[i]ntentionally point[ing] any

firearmtoward another” and the requirement of “display[ing] in a threatening manner

any dangerous weapon toward another” under Iowa Code § 708.1(3) (2002)

categorically constitute a “threatened use of physical force” under

USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1). In United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2009), we

addressed whether a Missouri conviction for unlawful use of a weapon constituted

An Iowa aggravated misdemeanor carries the possibility of a two-year prison 2

sentence, Iowa Code § 903.1(2), and therefore qualifies as a prior felony conviction

under USSG § 4B1.1. United States v. Malloy, 614 F.3d 852, 860 (8th Cir. 2010).

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a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Id. at 787-88. The defendant in 3

Pulliam was convicted of knowingly “exhibit[ing], in the presence of one or more

persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner.” 

Id. at 788 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4)). We explained that “[i]t goes

without saying that displaying an operational weapon before another in an angry or

threatening manner qualifies as a threatened use of physical force” under

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Id.; see United States v. Forrest, 611 F.3d 908, 910-11

(8th Cir. 2010) (finding that crime of felony menacing, which requires knowingly

placing or attempting to place another in fear ofimminent serious bodily injury by use

of a deadly weapon, “easily satis[fies]” the requirement of a threat of physical force

under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). Thus, we conclude that Maid’s conviction for assault while

displaying a dangerous weapon under Iowa Code §§ 708.1(3) (2002), 708.2(3)

categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1).

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Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining Maid’s base offense level

pursuant to § 2K2.1(a)(2).

Maid next argues that his within-guidelines sentence is substantively

unreasonable. “[W]e review the substantive reasonableness of [Maid’s] sentence

‘under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” See United States v. Robison,

Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1) are textually identical. 

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Although the terms “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2(a) and “violent felony” under

§ 924(e)(2)(B) require independent analysis, see United States v. Ross,

613 F.3d 805, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2010), interpretations of one guide interpretations of

the other, see United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 2009).

Because assault while displaying a dangerous weapon, Iowa Code §§ 708.1(3)

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(2002), 708.2(3), qualifies as a categorical crime of violence, we need not reach the

question of whether Maid’s conviction for domestic-abuse assault with intent to

injure or with a weapon is a crime of violence. See USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). 

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759 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41

(2007)). This “narrow and deferential” review means that only an “unusual case” will

warrant a finding of substantive unreasonableness. United States v. Shuler,

598 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455,

464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). “A district court abuses its discretion and imposes an

unreasonable sentence when itfailsto consider a relevant and significant factor, gives

significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers the appropriate

factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” Robison,

759 F.3d at 950-51 (quoting United States v. Kreitinger, 576 F.3d 500, 503 (8th Cir.

2009)). A sentence imposed within the advisory guidelines range, such as Maid’s,

is presumed to be substantively reasonable. See id. at 950. 

Maid argues that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in

weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Specifically, Maid contends that the

district court did not assign sufficient weight to his history of physical and mental

health problems, his acceptance ofresponsibility, and the victims’ wishes for a lenient

sentence. However, the district court heard extensive argumentsfromMaid’s counsel

concerning each of these factors and determined that Maid’s violent criminal history

and the court’s obligation under § 3553(a) to protect the public “overwhelm[] the

other considerations in this case.” Maid has numerous convictions for violent

conduct. We recognize that a “district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a)

factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than othersin determining

an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.

2009). Accordingly, “giv[ing] due deference to the district court’s decision that the

§ 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justify [Maid’s] sentence,” our review reveals no

clear error of judgment. See id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Gall,

552 U.S. at 51) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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We affirm.

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