In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-20-00105-CR

No. 02-20-00106-CR

No. 02-20-00107-CR

No. 02-20-00108-CR

No. 02-20-00109-CR

No. 02-20-00110-CR

No. 02-20-00111-CR

No. 02-20-00112-CR

No. 02-20-00113-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 1591031D, 1591138D, 1591644D, 1593646D, 1593648D, 

1594387D, 1595243D, 1596387D, 1615817D

Before Birdwell, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

DEBRA ELISE TURNER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Debra Elise Turner appeals her convictions for theft and her probation for 

falsifying information on a title application. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 31.03(e)(4)(A), 

(D), 31.04(e)(4); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 501.155. Turner entered an open plea of 

guilty to all charges. The trial court deferred adjudication on the falsifying information 

offense, but it sentenced Turner to two years on the unenhanced theft conviction and 

ten years on each of the seven enhanced theft convictions.

On appeal, Turner’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in which 

he argues that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s motion and brief meet the 

requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the record 

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 

S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel provided Turner 

with copies of his brief and motion to withdraw, and he informed Turner of her right 

to file a pro se response, to review the record, and to seek discretionary review pro se 

should this court deny relief. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Turner filed a pro se response in which she questioned the legitimacy of the 

falsifying information charge, the soundness of her trial counsel’s strategy, and the 

thoroughness of the expert who testified on her behalf at sentencing. The State also 

filed a response in which it noted that many of the judgments contain clerical errors 

concerning the levels of the offenses.
3

In the Anders context, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the record 

to determine whether the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Jury v. State, 472 S.W.3d 880, 880 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See 

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

After carefully reviewing the record, we have determined that seven of the theft 

judgments incorrectly state that Turner was convicted of a third-degree felony; theft is 

a state-jail felony when, as here, the value of the property or service stolen is $2,500 or 

more but less than $30,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 31.03(e)(4)(A), 31.04(e)(4). 

While these offenses are punished as third-degree felonies once they are enhanced to 

account for Turner’s prior state-jail-felony convictions, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§ 12.425(a), they remain state-jail felonies for purposes of the judgment, see Oliva v. State, 

548 S.W.3d 518, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). This court has authority to reform a 

judgment and correct typographical errors to make the record speak the truth. French 

v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). We therefore modify these 

judgments to reflect that each of the theft convictions was a state-jail felony.1

 Bledsoe v. 

State, 480 S.W.3d 638, 642 n.11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (modifying 

1

Specifically, we modify the judgments in appellate cause numbers 02-20-00105-

CR, 02-20-00106-CR, 02-20-00107-CR, 02-20-00108-CR, 02-20-00110-CR, 02-20-

00111-CR, and 02-20-00113-CR.
4

judgment to reflect the correct level of an offense with a punishment enhancement in 

an Anders case).

Except for these clerical errors, we agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly 

without merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. 

See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we 

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgments, seven of 

them as modified.

Per Curiam

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: December 30, 2021