J-S52003-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEFFREY LITTLE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 105 EDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 13, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011677-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 21, 2020

Jeffrey Little appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County 

Court of Common Pleas on December 13, 2019, dismissing his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546 as untimely. For the reasons discussed below, we find the PCRA court 

properly denied Little relief and affirm. 

On April 9, 2014, Little entered a negotiated guilty plea to third-degree 

murder and robbery.1 The trial court imposed the negotiated aggregate 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court had previously conducted a hearing, on October 7, 2013, on 

Little’s motion to suppress a statement he made to police. On November 4, 

2013, the court issued an order and opinion denying the motion. 
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sentence of thirty to sixty years’ incarceration. Little did not file post-sentence 

motions or a direct appeal. 

On March 13, 2015, Little filed a timely pro se PCRA petition and shortly 

thereafter filed a supplemental petition. PCRA counsel was appointed who 

subsequently filed a petition to withdraw and a Finley2 no-merit letter. After 

issuing notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant 

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. 

On August 28, 2019, Little filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence 

Merger Issues”, contending his sentences for third-degree murder and robbery 

should have merged. While that petition was still before the PCRA court, Little 

filed another petition, on October 28, 2019, framed as a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, in which he claimed his sentence was illegal because the 

sentencing court violated the double jeopardy clause by not merging the 

sentences on both counts. 

The PCRA court, concluding that Little’s claims asserted the illegality of 

his sentence, correctly treated his petitions as PCRA petitions subject to the 

PCRA’s timeliness provisions. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 

1291, 1293 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[T]he PCRA provides the sole means for 

obtaining collateral review, and ... any petition filed after the judgment of 

sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition”); see also 

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2 Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (stating the PCRA 

incorporates the remedy of habeas corpus if it offers the petitioner a remedy 

pursuant to that Act). On that basis, the PCRA court determined that Little’s 

petitions were untimely, and that he had not pled an exception to the time 

bar. As such, the court issued notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its 

intent to dismiss his petitions, and subsequently dismissed the petitions as 

untimely. This timely appeal followed. 

Prior to reaching the merits of Little’s claims on appeal, we must first 

consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition3. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014).

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be 

filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of 

sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the 

three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this 

Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of 

the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not 

address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not 

timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA 

petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised

therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden 

of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three 

exceptions.

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3 Since both of Little’s petitions seek the same relief on essentially the same 

arguments, we conclude that his second petition constitutes a supplement to 

his previous filing. See Commonwealth v. Bauhammers, 92 A.3d 708, 730-

31 (Pa. 2014).
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Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

and footnote omitted). 

Since Little did not file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal, his 

judgment of sentence became final on May 9, 2014, when his time for seeking 

direct review with this Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) 

(judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review ... or 

at the expiration of time for seeking the review”). The instant petition – filed 

over five years later – is patently untimely. Thus, the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to review Little’s petition unless he was able to successfully plead 

and prove one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Exceptions to the time-bar must be pled in 

the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also
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Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). Further, 

Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special 

benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must 

comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania 

Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if 

an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted). 

Even liberally construed, Little has failed to plead and prove that any of 

his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. In fact, Little 

failed to make any attempt to plead an exception in either of his filings. See

Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence Merger Issues, filed 8/28/2019; see also 

Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed 10/28/2019. Even on appeal, he makes no 

attempt to argue that a time bar exception applies; he merely contends that 

his petition should not have been treated as a PCRA petition. See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 21 (unnumbered). As noted above, the court properly classified 

Little’s petition as a PCRA petition. See West. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA 

court’s order denying Little’s petition as untimely.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/21/20