NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH LAMONT WILSON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0684 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2013-456607-001 

The Honorable Bruce R. Cohen, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Linley Wilson 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix 

By Carlos Daniel Carrion 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. WILSON 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined. 

G E M M I L L, Judge: 

¶1 Joseph Lamont Wilson (“Wilson”) challenges his convictions 

for one count of aggravated assault and one count of resisting arrest. He 

contends his due process rights were violated because he was required to 

wear constraints without the trial court first conducting a hearing to 

determine the necessity of visible restraints. For the following reasons, we 

affirm his convictions and sentences. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 On the day before jury selection, the trial court and Wilson’s 

counsel both strongly encouraged Wilson to dress out in ordinary clothes 

rather than appear before the jury in jail garb. At jury selection, Wilson’s 

counsel brought clothes for him to change into, but Wilson elected to wear 

jail attire. Wilson was in custody with restraints, including handcuffs, but 

he confirmed that he preferred the jury to see him in jail attire, saying “Yes, 

it is totally my decision.”

¶3 Wilson’s attorney raised the issue of the restraints with the 

trial court, but after speaking with Wilson, stated that Wilson’s main 

concern was his ability to get through paperwork and go through evidence. 

The trial court stated that this would not be an issue during jury selection 

and could be addressed again the next day, when the presentation of 

evidence would commence. Additionally, the court instructed the 

prospective jurors that although “Mr. Wilson is wearing clothing and 

restraints associated with being in custody . . . whether he is in custody or 

out of custody has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not he committed 

the offense.” 

¶4 On the next day of trial, when the presentation of evidence 

began, Wilson again elected to wear jail attire but was not restrained by 

handcuffs. The circumstances were the same on the next day, and the trial 

court again confirmed with Wilson that he preferred to be dressed in jail 

attire. On the final day of trial, Wilson was again in handcuffs. The Defense 
STATE v. WILSON 

Decision of the Court 

3

had rested at that point, and the trial court noted that the jury would not 

“be able to see much . . . anyway.” No specific objections were asserted by 

Wilson or his attorney to the handcuffs restraining him on the first and final 

days of the trial. 

¶5 The jury found Wilson guilty of one count of aggravated 

assault and one count of resisting arrest. The jury found him not guilty of 

threatening or intimidating. The trial court sentenced Wilson to prison 

terms of 2.25 years and 1.75 years, to be served concurrently. Wilson timely 

appeals and we have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona 

Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-

120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and 13-4033. 

ANALYSIS 

¶6 Wilson raises one issue on appeal: whether the trial court 

violated his due process right to a fair trial by allowing him to be placed in 

restraints that were visible to the jury without first conducting a hearing on 

the necessity of such restraints. Wilson did not object to the restraints at 

trial nor did he assert a due process violation. Therefore, he has forfeited 

appellate review except for fundamental error. See State v. Henderson, 210 

Ariz. 561, 567, ¶¶ 19–20 (2005) (failing to object at the trial level limits 

appellate review to fundamental, prejudicial error). Under fundamental 

error review, Wilson must prove the trial court erred, the error was 

fundamental (impacting the foundation of the case), and he was prejudiced 

by the error. See id. 

¶7 In Deck v. Missouri, the United States Supreme Court held that 

“courts cannot routinely place defendants in shackles or other physical 

restraints visible to the jury during the penalty phase of a capital 

proceeding,” but they are permitted to make a “case specific” 

determination that shackling is warranted. 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005). The 

Court observed that shackling the defendant “almost inevitably affects 

adversely the jury’s perception of the character of the defendant.” Id. The 

Arizona Supreme Court reiterated this point in State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, 

503, ¶ 42 (2005). Relying on Deck and Gomez, Wilson argues that he is 

entitled to a new trial because the trial court never made a determination 

that handcuffs were necessary. 

¶8 Even assuming that error occurred in this case, however, 

Wilson cannot prove that the error was fundamental. Fundamental error 

is “error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes from the 

defendant a right essential to his defense, and error of such magnitude that 
STATE v. WILSON 

Decision of the Court 

4

the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.” Henderson, 210 

Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 (internal quotation omitted). 

¶9 This case is distinguishable from both Deck and Gomez, 

because Wilson chose to appear before the jury in jail garb. Despite being 

advised by both the court and counsel to wear street clothes, Wilson 

knowingly elected to wear his jail attire and thereby inform the jury of the 

fact that he was in custody. Additionally, the record reflects that the only 

time the jury had a clear view of Wilson’s restraints was during jury 

selection. At that time, Wilson’s counsel addressed the potential jurors to 

determine whether any of them would be unable to treat Wilson fairly 

because he was in custody: 

Ladies and Gentlemen, I know that the judge went over with 

you the fact that my client is dressed out like this. It’s the 800-

pound gorilla in the room. And so I believe that we should 

attack this square on. 

Look, looking at him, if any of you — you will not hurt our 

feelings — do not believe you can be fair to him as he stands 

before you, raise your card. 

No potential juror raised his or her card, and Wilson’s counsel proceeded 

with voir dire. Accordingly, Wilson has not shown that he was denied a 

fair trial on the basis that the trial court did not prevent the jury from seeing 

his restraints. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 (placing the burden of 

proof of fundamental error on the defendant). 

¶10 In addition to Wilson’s own choice to proceed in jail attire and 

defense counsel’s voir dire, the trial court’s cautionary instruction also 

prevents us from finding the prejudice required for reversal under 

fundamental error review. Our supreme court recognizes the presumption 

that a jury follows the court’s instructions, see State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 

403, ¶ 68 (2006), and here the court told the jurors not to consider Wilson’s 

custody status as substantive evidence of guilt. Moreover, there is no 

indication that the jury did not follow the trial court’s admonition. To the 

contrary, Wilson’s acquittal on the third count (threatening or intimidating) 

supports the conclusion that the jury followed the trial court’s cautionary 

instruction and did not improperly associate guilt with the mere fact that 

he was in custody during trial and wearing handcuffs during jury selection. 

See State v. Anderson, 199 Ariz. 187, 193, ¶ 33 (App. 2000) (reasoning jury’s 

acquittal on some charges “undermined” defendant’s argument of 

prejudice); see also State v. Rushing, 156 Ariz. 1, 3 (1988) (concluding that 
STATE v. WILSON 

Decision of the Court 

5

jury’s acquittal on one charge and conviction of lesser-included offense 

demonstrated the alleged prejudicial evidence “did not so inflame the jury 

as to render it incapable of making critical factual determinations”). 

Therefore, Wilson has failed to demonstrate that a fundamental, prejudicial 

error occurred. 

CONCLUSION 

¶11 For these reasons, we affirm Wilson’s convictions and 

sentences.