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******************************************************WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., TRUSTEE v.

JOSEPH S. TARZIA ET AL. (AC 35791)
Gruendel, Alvord and Norcott, Js. Argued March 17—officially released June 3, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Mintz, J.) Christopher G. Brown, for the appellant (named defendant).
Laura Pascale Zaino, with whom, on the brief, was Brian D. Rich, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion NORCOTT, J. The defendant, Joseph Tarzia, appeals from the entry of a judgment of strict foreclosure for the plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.1 In this appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the plaintiff has not stated a claim for strict foreclosure of the mortgage because it did not plead that it is the owner of the debt, and (2) thejudgment ofstrict foreclosure was procedurally improper because the court’s earlier entry ofsummary judgment as to liability on the note could only apply to his personal liability, and could not be the basis for a judgmentofstrictforeclosure. Wedisagree, andaccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.2
The following facts and procedural history inform
our review. On or about June 22, 2007, the defendant executed a note for a loan of $1,334,000. As security for payment of the note, he concomitantly executed a mortgage on his property at 138 North Lake Drive in Stamford. On or about February 18, 2009, the plaintiff initiated this foreclosure action, bearing a return date of February 24, 2009. In its complaint, the plaintiff allegedthat itwas the holder ofthe note and mortgage; that the defendant defaulted on the note; that it had elected to accelerate the balance due on the note and declare it due immediately; and that it elected to foreclose on the mortgage securing the note.
The defendant filed an answer on March 11, 2009, in which he denied that the plaintiffwas the holder ofthe note and mortgage. The defendant asserted six special defenses and a counterclaim in his answer; only the first special defense is relevant to this appeal.3 In the defendant’s first special defense, he claimed that ‘‘[t]he complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because plaintiffalleges in paragraph [four] that it is merely a ‘holder’ of the Note and a mere ‘holder’ ofthe Note is without the rightto foreclose the Mortgage.’’ On March 19, 2012, the plaintiff moved for summaryjudgment onits claim, the defendant’s special defenses, and the defendant’s counterclaim. In support of its motion, the plaintiff provided the court with a memorandum oflaw and an affidavit that included and incorporated byreference copies ofthe note, mortgage and assignment ofthe mortgage. The defendant did not oppose the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment ‘‘as to liability only.’’ Thereafter, on May 13, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion forjudgment of strict foreclosure to which the defendant objected. The defendant argued that there is no predicate for entry of the foreclosure judgment because ‘‘[t]here is no authority for a court to grant summaryjudgment as to liability only where the relief soughtis foreclosure relief.’’ The defendantalso argued that the plaintiff failed to plead a proper foreclosureclaim by only alleging its ‘‘holder’’ status, rather than pleading that it is the owner ofthe note and mortgage. The trial court heard argument, rejected both claims by the defendant, and renderedjudgment ofstrict foreclosure. As to the defendant’s first claim, the court ruled, ‘‘the [entry of summaryjudgment] as to liability only says there’s no genuine issue of material fact disputed as to any defense on the note or mortgage and thattheycanproceedtojudgmentofforeclosure, which is a separate proceeding after liability has been determined on the note and mortgage.’’ As to the second claim, the court adopted the decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. DiLuca, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-09-5011073- S (April 30, 2013) (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 44),4 which applied
ourSupreme Court’s decisioninRMSResidentialProperties, LLCv. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 32 A.3d 307 (2011). This appeal followed.
I
The defendant first claims that the plaintiff has not stated aproper claim for strict foreclosure ofthe mortgage because the plaintiff failed to plead that it is the
owner of the debt. Specifically, he argues that ‘‘plaintiff’sholderallegationwasinsufficienttostateaforeclosure claim.’’ We disagree.
We review ajudgment of strict foreclosure to determine ‘‘whetherthe trial court abused its discretion.

. . . In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.

. . . Our review ofa trial court’s exercise ofthe legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.)People’s UnitedBankv.Bok, 143 Conn. App. 263, 267, 70 A.3d 1074 (2013).
Our Supreme Court’s decision in RMS Residential Properties, LLC, is dispositive of the plaintiff’s claim
on appeal. There, it was held that ‘‘a holder of a note is presumed to be the owner of the debt, and unless the presumption is rebutted [the holder] may foreclose the mortgage under [General Statutes] § 49-17.

. . . The production of the note establishes his case prima facie against the makers and he may rest there.

. . . It [is] for the defendant to set up and prove the facts which limit or change the plaintiff’s rights.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.)RMSResidentialProperties, LLCv. Miller, supra, 303 Conn. 231–32; see also CountrywideHomeLoansServicing, LPv. Creed, 145 Conn. App. 38, 48, 75 A.3d 38 (same), cert. denied, 310 Conn. 936, 79 A.3d 899 (2013); DeutscheBankNational Trust Co. v. Shivers, 136 Conn. App. 291, 297 n.4, 44 A.3d 879 (same), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 938, 56A.3d 950 (2012).
In the present case, the plaintiffpleaded that it is theholder ofthe note upon which the defendant defaulted and the plaintiff foreclosed, and it submitted to the court an affidavit that included and incorporated by reference copies ofthe note, mortgage and assignment ofthe mortgage. The plaintiff, therefore, established its prima facie case. The defendant did not attempt to rebut the plaintiff’s status as a holder of the note and mortgage; indeed, he did not file any opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for summaryjudgment. Accordingly, the plaintiffwas entitled to avail itselfofthe rebuttable presumption established in RMS Residential Properties, LLC.
The defendantcontendsthatthetrialcourt’s decision must be considered in light of our Supreme Court’s

more recent decision in J.E. Robert Co., Inc. v. SignatureProperties, LLC, 309 Conn. 307, 71 A.3d492 (2013). Specifically, he relies on the following text in that decision: ‘‘Our statement in RMS Residential Properties, LLC

. . . that ‘a holder of a note is presumed to be the owner of the debt, and unless the presumption is rebutted, may foreclose the mortgage under § 49-17,’

was not intendedto suggest that mere proofthat someone other than the party seeking to foreclose is the
owner of the note will require dismissal for lack of standing. Rather, undersuchcircumstances, theburden would shift back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the owner has vested it with the right to receive the money secured by the note. To the extent that our statement inRMSResidentialProperties, LLC, can be read otherwise, it is hereby overruled.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 325 n.18. To the extent that the defendant is correct that this holding alters the decision in RMS ResidentialProperties, LLC, it is inapplicable because in the present case, the defendant never attempted to rebutthe presumptionthatthe plaintiffownedthe debt and had the right to foreclose the mortgage. We therefore reject the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for strict foreclosure by pleading and proving its status as holder of the note and mortgage.
II
The defendantnextarguesthatthejudgmentofstrict foreclosure was improper because the court’s earlier entry of summary judgment as to liability on the note could only pertain to personal liability and could not bethebasisforajudgmentofstrictforeclosure. Specifically he argues that ‘‘there is no authority for a court to grant summary judgment as to liability only where the relief sought is foreclosure’’ and that ‘‘[Practice Book] § 17-50 does not authorize summary judgments
as to liability only for foreclosure relief.’’ We disagree. ‘‘As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard ofreview. The interpretive construction ofthe rules ofpractice is to be governed by the same principles as those regulating statutory interpretation.

. . .Theinterpretationandapplicationofastatute, andthus
a Practice Book provision, involves a question of law
over which our review is plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 99, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010).
Resolution of this claim is controlled by our recent decision in GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn. App. 165, 73 A.3d 742 (2013). There, we said that, ‘‘a courtmayproperlygrantsummaryjudgmentastoliabilityin aforeclosure action ifthe complaint and supporting affidavits establish an undisputed prima facie case and the defendant fails to assert any legally sufficient special defense.’’ Id., 176. Even if we were inclined to agree with the merits of the defendant’s argument, which we are not, ‘‘[o]ur rules ofpractice and our own policy do not permit a panel of this court to overturn decisions ofthis court.’’ Towbinv.BoardofExaminers ofPsychologists, 71 Conn. App. 153, 178, 801 A.2d 851, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 908, 810 A.2d 277 (2002). We therefore must reject the defendant’s second claim of
errorthatthe courtwas withoutauthorityto grant summary judgment as a predicate for ajudgment of strict foreclosure.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

1 The plaintiffis the trustee for the certificateholders of Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II, Inc., Structured Assets Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR4, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-AR-4. Christine Tarzia also was named as a defendant in this case; she was nonappearing before the trial court and is not a party to this appeal. The othernameddefendant, NationalCityBank, isajuniorlienholder. Onappeal, it appears as an appellee, along with the plaintiff.

2 The plaintiff argues that the defendant did not properly preserve his claims of error by appealing from ajudgment ofstrict foreclosure when his claims concern the propriety of the court’s earlier entry of summary judgment as to liability. We reject this argument because, as we have held previously, the entry of summaryjudgment as to liability only is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. See Essex Savings Bank v. Frimberger, 26 Conn. App. 80, 81, 597 A.2d 1289 (1991).

3 The defendant later withdrew the sixth special defense and his counterclaim.

4 This case is presently pending on appeal before this court. Bank of America, N.A. v. DiLuca, Appellate Court, Docket No

. AC 36224.