alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                           SUBSIDIARIES OF eLOT, INC.

                          JURISDICTION OF         %
NAME                       INCORPORATION      OWNERSHIP       BUSINESS

eLottery, Inc.                Delaware           100%       Lottery retailing
                                                            services and systems

UniStar Entertainment, Inc.    Idaho             100%       Lottery management

All listed subsidiaries do business only under their corporate names listed
above. Certain inactive and immaterial subsidiaries, which if considered in the
aggregate as a single subsidiary would not constitute a "significant subsidiary"
as defined in Rule 1-02(w) of the Commission, as of December 31, 1999, are not
listed.
## State of N ew York Su p reme Cou rt, A p p ellate Division Third J u dicial Dep artment Decided and Entered: December 11, 2014 518609

________________________________ In the Matter of the Claim of LAURA Q. SULLIVAN, Respondent.
BROOKVILLE CENTER FOR MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CHILDREN'S SERVICES, INC., Appellant. COMMISSIONER OF LABOR, Respondent.

________________________________ Calendar Date: October 21, 2014 Before: Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Rose, Lynch and Clark, JJ.

__________ Cooper Sapir & Cohen, PC, Melville (David M. Cohen of counsel), for appellant. Michelle I. Rosien, Philmont, for Laura Q. Sullivan, respondent.

__________ Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed January 3, 2014, which ruled that claimant was entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits. Claimant worked for almost seven years as a senior speech language pathologist for the employer until she was terminated in May 2013. The termination resulted from her running afoul of the employer's written policy prohibiting employees from posting on social media "during work hours, unless for specific and approved business purposes." The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board thereafter determined that claimant was entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits because, in its view, she had not-2- 518609

lost her job due to disqualifying misconduct. The employer now appeals. The question of whether a claimant engaged in actions sufficient to disqualify him or her from receiving unemployment insurance benefits is a factual one for the Board to resolve, "and its determination will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Jaiyesimi [ISS Action Inc.– Commissioner of Labor], 114 AD3d 983, 983 [2014]; see Matter of Morris [Lenox Hill Neighborhood House Inc.–Commissioner of Labor], 110 AD3d 1333, 1334 [2013]). Not every discharge for cause rises to the level of misconduct, which is defined as "a willful and wanton disregard of the employer's interest" (Matter of Rahaman [New York Convention Ctr. Operating Corp.–Commissioner of Labor], 101 AD3d 1206, 1207 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Claimant did not dispute that she was aware of the employer's policy on social media usage and that she nevertheless posted an item during work hours. The record also reflects, however, that it was an isolated incident and that claimant had a clean disciplinary record prior to her termination. Substantial evidence thus supports the determination of the Board that claimant's behavior, while reflective of a momentary lapse in judgment, did not rise to the level of disqualifying misconduct (see Matter of Nangreave [United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc.–Commissioner of Labor], 107 AD3d 1211, 1212 [2013]; Matter of McKoy [LB&B Assoc., Inc.–Commissioner of Labor], 27 AD3d 922, 923 [2006]). Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Rose, Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur.-3- 518609

ORDERED that the decision is affirmed, without costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger Clerk of the Court
The Ho norable Elsijane Trimble Roy, United States District Judge for th e 1 Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendation o f the Honorable John F . Forster, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District o f Arkansas. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-1596

___________ Kevin L. DeFries, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas Greene County, Arkansas; James * Danley, Sheriff of Greene County; * [UNPUBLISHED] Bob Ward, Jail Administrator, Greene * County Jail; John Does, Employees of * Greene County Jail, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: December 3, 1997 Filed: December 30, 1997

___________ Before McMILLIAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Kevin L. DeFries appeals from the final ord er of the United States District Court 1 for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissing his complaint, following a hearing, in-2-

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

De Fries alleged that while he was incarcerated at the Greene County jail , defendants denied him proper and ti mely medical treatment in deliberate indifference to his serious medical need s, and inmates passed out prescription drugs in violation of jail policy. Apparently unaware that DeFries h ad filed a timely jury demand, the magistrate judge conducted two evidentiary hearings, and thereafter recommended dismissal of the complai nt. The district court conducted de novo review and adopted the magistrat e judge & s report and recommendation.
Despite the overlooked jury demand, we affirm the judgment of the district court because, construing the hearings as pre-trial evidentiary hearings, we conclude tha t defendant s were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hobbs v. Lockhart , 4 6 F. 3d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 1995) (cautious approval of pre-trial evidentiary hearing ; sta ndard to be applied). Even avoiding all credibility determinations and believin g DeFries & s e vidence, we conclude that he did not establish that any delay in receivin g medica tion resulted in objectively serious harm. See Crowley v. Hedgepeth , 109 F.3d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1997) (objective evidence of harm caused by delay required t o establish deliberate indifference). DeFries & s contention that he was p rescribed the wrong medication and should have seen a psychiatrist constitutes a mere disagreement with treatment, and is not actionable. See Smith v. Mar cantonio , 910 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1990). In addition, we agree with the district court that any violation of the jail policy proh ibiting distribution of medication by inmates does not amount to a constitutiona l violation. See Meis v. Gunter , 906 F.2d 364, 369 (8th Cir. 1990 ), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
Finally, DeFries & s other arguments on appeal are without merit.-3-

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. DeFries & s motion t o amend his brief is denied.
A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179

P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (citations omitted); seeNRS 34.160. It is within this court's discretion to determine whether a writ petition will be considered. Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). Petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating that this court's extraordinary intervention is warranted. Pan v. 

### Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). Writ relief is generally available, however, only when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. NRS 34.170. Moreover, this court has held that the right to appeal is typically an adequate legal remedy precluding writ relief. Pan, 120 Nev. at 224, 88 P.3d at 841.

Having considered the petition and appendix filed in this matter, we conclude that petitioners have not demonstrated that our intervention by way of extraordinary relief is warranted. NRAP 21(b)(1), Smith, 107 Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at 851. Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.

cc: Hon. Joanna Kishner, District Judge Law Offices of Terry L. Wike Murchison & Cumming, LLC/Las Vegas Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A 2
EXHIBIT 32.1



                                Certification of
                            American River Bankshares
            pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  regarding Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2006


         Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each
of the undersigned officers of American River Bankshares, a California
corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify that:

         1.       The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter
                  ended March 31, 2006 (the "Form 10-Q") fully complies with the
                  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
                  Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         2.       Information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
                  material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.



         Dated: May 9, 2006            By: /s/ DAVID T. TABER
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           David T. Taber
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer


         Dated: May 9, 2006            By: /s/ MITCHELL A. DERENZO
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Mitchell A. Derenzo
                                           Executive Vice President and
                                           Chief Financial Officer




         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to American River Bankshares and will be retained by American
River Bankshares and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.

                                       74
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTIONS 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT HAVE 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Smith Barney Mid-West Futures Fund L.P. II (the ‘‘Partnership’’) on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the ‘‘Report’’), I, Jerry Pascucci, President and Director of Citigroup Managed Futures LLC, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.

/s/ Jerry PascucciJerry PascucciCitigroup Managed Futures LLCPresident and Director


March 31, 2008Date


---
This disposit ion is not appropriate f or publication and is not pre cedent except as * provided by

Ninth Circuit Rul e 36-3. The Honorable Gloria M. Nava rro, United States D istrict Judg e for the District of ** Nevada, sitting by

designation. NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , P la in tif

f - A p p e lle e , v. M A R C O A N T O N I O C H A V E Z , e tc . D e f

e n d a n t - A p p e lla n t. N o. 11- 50258 D . C . N o. 8: 10 -C R -000 33 -A G -1 ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e C e n tr a l D is tr ic t o f C a lif o rn ia A ndr e w J . G ui l f

or d, D i s tr i c tJ udge , P r e s i di ng A r gue d a nd S ubm i tt e d N ove m be r8, 2012

P a s a d e n a , C a lif

o rn ia B e f o r e : R E I NH AR DT a n d T HO MAS , C i r c u i tJ u d g e s , a n d NA VA R R O, ** D i stri ctJudg e. M ar co A nt on i o C havez appeal s the se nt ence i m po se d b y the di stri ctcourt f o llo w in g C h a v e z ’s g u ilty p le ato c o n s p ir a c y to p o s s e s s w ith th e in te n t to d is tr ib u te ap p r o x i ma t e l y 4 9 3 . 3 g r a ms o f p u r e me th a mp h e t a mi n e i n v i o l a t i o n o f 2 1 U . S. C. §§ 84 6 and 84 1(b)(1)(A ). T he di stri ctcourtse nt ence d C havez t o ei gh ty- se ven 

# FI LED DE C 19 2012 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS2

m on ths, t o b e f

ol l ow ed by a f

i ve-y ear t erm of supervi se d rel ea se . T hi s s ent ence i nc l ude d atw o- l e ve l e nha nc e m e ntf orpos s e s s i on of

ada nge r ous w e apon dur i ng the com m i ss i on of the offens e. W e r e vi e w the di s tr i c tc our t ’ s s e nt e nc i ng de c i s i on f orabus e of

di s c r e t i on. U ni te d State s v . A rm s te ad , 552 F . 3d 769, 776 ( 9th C i r . 2008) . W e r e vi e w the d is tr ic t c o u rt’s u n d e r ly in g f a c tu a l f in d in g s f o rc le a re rr o r . Id . B ased o n th e p art i es’ ar gu m ent s and the C ou rt ’ s e xam i nat i on of the re cord, w e c on cl ud e thatC havez shou l d h ave r ea sonabl y f ores ee n thathi s c o-conspi ra t ors w ou l d p osse ss a f i re arm d u r in g th e e x e c u tio n o f

s u c h am a

jo rd ru g tr a n s a c tio n . U

n ite d S ta te s v . G a r c ia , 909 F .2 d 1 3 4 6 , 1 3 5 0 ( 9 th C ir . 1 9 9 0 ) . T h e r e f o r e , th e d is tr ic t c o u r t d idn o t c le a r ly e rrin det erm i ni ng thatthe tw o-l evel se nt enci ng enhancem entfor posse ss i on of a d a n g e r o u s w e ap o n w a s ap p r o p r ia te . Id . AF F I RME D.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3367-17T3

THE BANK OF NEW YORK 

MELLON, f/k/a THE BANK OF

NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR 

THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF

CWABS INC., ASSET-BACKED

CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-7,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SEBASTIAN PACHOLEC, 

Defendant-Appellant,

and

UNIFUND CCR, LLC, 

Defendant.

_______________________________

Submitted September 10, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Ostrer and Susswein. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Ocean County, Docket No. 

F-033592-15.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 2, 2019
2

A-3367-17T3

Sebastian Pacholec, appellant pro se.

Stern Lavinthal & Frankenberg, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent (Mark S. Winter, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Sebastian Pacholec appeals from the judgment entered against 

him in this mortgage foreclosure action. It is not disputed that defendant 

borrowed $207,500 and has not made any payments since 2010. After this 

appeal was filed, the trial judge, Judge Francis R. Hodgson, Jr., issued a tenpage, single-spaced amplification letter pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b). The trial 

court's amplification is thorough, detailed, and well-reasoned. We affirm the 

judgment against defendant substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge 

Hodgson's amplification letter.

Defendant's contentions on appeal do not warrant extensive discussion in 

this written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The record before us establishes 

that defendant obtained a loan for $207,500 that was secured by a mortgage on 

real property. That mortgage was eventually assigned to plaintiff Bank of New 

York Mellon, giving it standing to initiate the foreclosure action. Despite 

defendant's claim to the contrary, we agree with Judge Hodgson that the note 

included a default provision that authorized plaintiff to proceed against the 
3

A-3367-17T3

collateral property. We also are satisfied that the trial judge properly rejected 

the defenses raised by defendant under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and 

Fair Foreclosure Act (FFA). 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1667f; N.J.S.A. 2A:50-53 to 

-68. The trial court properly concluded, for example, that defendant failed to 

meet the burden of proof on the affirmative defense of payment, and that 

plaintiff satisfied all of the pertinent process requirements set forth in TILA and 

FFA, including timely service of a Notice of Intent to foreclose. 

To the extent that Judge Hodgson's amplification letter does not address 

an argument raised by defendant on appeal, the contention lacks sufficient merit 

to warrant discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, D. Gary Fife, President and William Whittle, Vice President and Treasurer of Big Bear Gold Corporation, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)	the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Big Bear Gold Corporation for the three month period ended May 31, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)	the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Big Bear Gold Corporation.

Dated: July 20, 2004

/s/ D. Gary Fife				D. Gary Fife
President (Principal Executive Officer)

/s/ William Whittle			William Whittle
Vice President and Treasurer
(Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Big Bear Gold Corporation and will be retained by Big Bear Gold Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 15, 2011.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

____________

NO. 14-11-00493-CV

____________

HAROLD B. MASON, Appellant

V.

TERRANCE L. SMALLWOOD, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 990084

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal from an order signed May 11, 2011. 

According to information provided to this court, it appeared that the order was 

interlocutory and appellant was attempting to appeal from an order to pay costs in the trial 

court. In addition, appellant filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this court. On 

September 8, 2011, this court ordered a partial record concerning appellant’s claim of 

indigence so that we could ascertain whether this court has jurisdiction over this attempted 
2

appeal. See In re Arroyo, 988 S.W.2d 737, 738-39 (Tex. 1998). That record has now 

been filed. 

The partial clerk’s record contains the order signed May 11, 2011, sustaining the 

County Clerk’s contest to appellant’s affidavit of indigence and requiring him to pay the 

filing fee and other costs of suit. It is apparent from this record that the order is 

interlocutory and no final judgment has been signed. 

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har-Con 

Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Interlocutory orders may be appealed only if 

permitted by statute. Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 

2001); Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. 

proceeding). There is no statutory provision for an interlocutory appeal from an order 

requiring the payment of costs of suit.

On October 10, 2011, notification was transmitted to the parties of this court’s 

intention to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction unless appellant filed a response 

demonstrating grounds for continuing the appeal on or before October 25, 2010. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 42.3(a). In response, appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus, which has 

been docketed under our case number 14-11-00934-CV. Appellant has not established 

that this court has jurisdiction over the appeal.

Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and Christopher.
Order entered November 2 9 , 2018

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05 - 18 - 01138 - CR No. 05 - 18 - 01176 - CR No. 05 - 18 - 01177 - CR No. 05 - 18 - 01178 - CR No. 05 - 18 - 01179 - CR No. 05 - 18 - 011 80 - CR JOSE ANTONIO JUAREZ, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F17 - 72146 - S , F10 - 35577 - S, F13 - 34001 - S, F14 - 33730 - S, F14 - 33734 - S & F14 - 33735 - S



### O RDER Befo re the Court is Official Court Reporter Lisa V. Jackson’s second request for an extension of time to file the reporter’s record. We GRANT the request and ORDER the reporter’s record filed within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. Ms. Jackson is cauti oned that further extensions will be disfavored.

/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE
EXHIBIT 23.1

               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

We have issued our report dated February 9, 2001, accompanying the consolidated
financial statements and schedules incorporated by reference in the Annual
Report of Xybernaut Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the year ended
December 31, 2000. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said
report in the Registration Statements of the Company on Forms S-3 (File No.
333-68859, effective January 25, 1999, File No. 333-33940, effective April 25,
2000, File No. 333-40996, effective August 4, 2000, File No. 333-51974,
effective January 12, 2001, and File No. 333-60556, effective May 23, 2001) and
on Form S-8 (File No. 333-94463, effective January 12, 2000 and File No.
333-56814 , effective March 9, 2001).

/s/ Grant Thornton, LLP

Vienna, Virginia
November 8, 2001