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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005/1588NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT
No. 04-1537
UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v. EUCLI DES HE RMINI O MOYA, Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DIST RICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY D.C. CivilNo. 01-cv-00283 Distri ct Judge: The Honorable John C. Lif land
Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

November 2, 2004
Bef or e: ALI TO, BARRY, and FU EN TE S, Circuit Judges (Opinion Fi led: J anuary3, 2005)

OPI NION

BA RR Y, Circuit

Judge App ellant Euclides H ermino M oya (“Mo ya”) seeks review of the D istrict Court’s February4, 2004 deni al of hi s Rule 60(b) motion seeki ng reli ef from an order revoking2

an d s ett i ng as i de hi s n at ur al i za t i on an d c an ce l l i ng hi s C ert i fi ca t e o f N at ur al i za t i on . We

rev iew the D istrict Co urt’s refu sal to set a side its or der for abu se o f dis creti on, see Pridgen v. Shannon , 3 80 F. 3d 7 21, 725 (3 d Ci r. 200 4) , a nd wi llaff irm. I. Because we write onl y for the part ies, our disc ussion of t

he facts and circumst ances underl yi ng this appeal i s li mited. Moya signed and fi led an Appli cati on for Naturali zati on on November 6, 1995 and became a naturali zed citizen of the United States on May 14, 1996. Subsequentl y, in it s Complaint to Revoke Natural ization, t he Un ited S tates sou ght to h ave M oya’s natu raliz ation rev oke d, pu rsua nt to 8 U .S.C . § 1451(a), alle ging, i n Count I, t hat it was procured i llega lly

and, i n Count II, that i t was obt aine d as a res ult o f the con cea lme nt o f m ateri al fa cts o r a w illfu l mis rep rese ntati on. The Co mplaint set forth a series of arrests and convictions which M oya fail ed to disclose on his Appli cati on, inc luding an Apri l 8, 1993 New Jerse y convi ction f or recei ving st olen property i n the fourt

h degree, which the Unit ed State s maintai ned quali fied as acrime of moral tur pitude, thereby

renderi ng Moya inel igibl e for naturali zati on. After M oya answe red the C omp laint, the United S tates move d for sum mary judgment. Pursuant to Appendix N to the Local Rules of the U.S. Dist rict Court for t

he Distric t of N ew Jersey, the m otion w as treate d as u nop pose d w hen M oya failed to time ly

serve pape rs in op positio n. U ltimately, the D istrict Co urt gra nted s um mary jud gm ent in favor of theUnited States and ordered Moya’s denat urali zati on. Moya did not appeal, but3

inst ead invoked Rule 60( b)(1) and Rule 60(b)( 6), s eeking re lief from the orde r granting summary j udgment and permis sion t o belat edlyrespond t o the Unite d States ’ motion for

sum mary jud gm ent. It is the denia l of this re lief that is th e sub ject of M oya’s ap peal. II. Rule 60(b)( 1) empowers a dis tri ct court to rel ieve a party from a finaljudgment on th e ba si s of

demo nst ra te d “mi st ake , i nad verta nce , s urpr is e, orexc usabl e ne gl ect .” Fed . R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Moya argues t hat Rule 60( b)(1) s hould apply to rel ieve hi m of the consequences of f

aili ng to fil e a respons e to thesummary j udgment motion of t he United States because he was “under the impre ssion t

hat themotion was being he ld in abe yance until
. . . settlement negotiati ons were exhaust ed.” Appell ant’s Br. at 7. Nothing i n the record before the Dist

rict Court even sugges ts that thi s “impres sion” was re asonable, and ther e is n o ev iden ce th at a s tay w as re que sted fro m o r gra nted by the Dis trict C our t. Moreover, as required by Appendix N, the Unit ed State s made reasonabl e effort s, i n the form of tel ephone call s and a February 19, 2002 facsimi le, to remind Moya ’s attorneyof the impen ding dea dline for filing pa pers in opp osition to its motion. Th ese remind ers were ignored. The Distri ct Court a cted wellwithin i ts di scretion when it refused to fi nd that t he fail ure to oppos e the moti on was the product of mistake , ina dvertanc e, sur prise , or ex cusa ble ne glect. Even if Mo ya could establish that his failure to o ppose m otion for sum mary judg men t was in som e w ay justified or ex cusa ble, he could not o btain re lief un der R ule1 Given our determination tha

t Moy a’s natu

ralization was illegally

procured on the basis of his inability to demonst

rate g ood moral

character, the

re is no need to cons ider the United Sta

tes’ alternative theory

that it was procured through the concea lment of material facts or willful misrepresentation. 4 60(b)(1) because he fai led to r aise a vi able defens e on the meri ts before the Dist rict Co urt, a nd f ails to raise one now . See Lore nzo v . Griff ith , 12 F .3d 2 3, 27 (3d Cir . 199 3). For example, he did not and does not now even sugges t anydefense t o his convi ction f or receiving stolen p roperty, a conviction w hich evide nced to the District Cou rt’s sati sfacti on that he lacked the requis ite good mora l chara cter during the f ive-y ear peri od immediate ly precedi ng his Appli cati on for Natural ization. 1 See 8 U .S.C . § 14 27( a)(3 ). Tha t conv iction, u nder N.J.S .A. § 2 C:20 -7 (req uiring th at the a ccus ed “k now ingly receiv es” the prop erty of an other “ kno win g that it h as be en sto len, or b elievin g that it is pro bab ly stole n”) , clea rly qua lifies as a crim e of mo ral tu rpitu de. Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft , 293 F.3d 633, 636 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Court s have held t hat knowingly

recei ving stole n pr ope rty is a c rime of m ora l turp itud e.”). See also 8 U .S.C . § 11 01( f)(3 ). M oya’s arg um ent f or th e ap plica tion of R ule 6 0(b )(6) i s sim ilarly w itho ut m erit. A partyseeking relie f under § (b) (6) must de monstrate “extr aordinary ci rcumstance s” such that, absent relie f, “an ext reme and unexpect ed hardshi p would occur.” Sawka v. Healtheas t, I nc. , 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993). Whil e we recognize t hat, absent relie f from the orde r of the Dis tri ct Court, Moya will be denatura lize d, thi s resul t is neithe r extrem e nor an un expe cted h ardsh ip un der the circum stance s of th is case ; indee d, he te lls us that he was “willi ng to forgo nat urali zati on so long as hedid not admi t to wil lful5

conduct [and he would t hereaft er] r eapplyfor natur aliz ation. ” Appellant ’s Br. at 13. The Distri ct Court di d not abuse i ts di scretion in conc luding t hat Moya fai led to s atis fy t he req uire me nts o f R ule 6 0(b )(6). III. The February4, 2004 order of the Dist

rict Court refus ing to s et asi de the Jul y 1, 200 2 O rde r ofDe natu raliz ation wil l be a ffir me d.