NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ANDRE DENNISON, Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; DAWN NORTHUP, 

Defendants/Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0048 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

LC2013-000421-001 

The Honorable Randall H. Warner, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Andre Dennison, Eloy 

Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Karen J. Hartman-Tellez 

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
DENNISON v. ADOC et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Randall M. Howe joined. 

T H U M M A, Judge: 

¶1 Plaintiff Andre Dennison appeals from the grant of summary 

judgment in favor of defendants Arizona Department of Corrections and 

the Department’s general counsel1 (collectively ADC) on Dennison’s public 

records request. Because Dennison has shown no error, the judgment is 

affirmed. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Dennison, a prison inmate, challenges ADC’s denial of his 

request to inspect his ADC diet order forms. Dennison’s request was not 

part of any ongoing litigation but, rather, a public records request pursuant 

to Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) section 39-121 (2016).2 After exhausting his 

administrative remedies, Dennison filed a timely statutory special action in 

superior court, claiming ADC’s denial violated Arizona’s Public Records 

Laws. See A.R.S. §§ 31-221; 39-121. After discovery and motion practice, the 

superior court granted ADC’s motion for summary judgment, noting A.R.S. 

§ 31-221(E) restricted Dennison’s access to his “own automated summary 

record file,” which did not contain the records requested. From Dennison’s

timely appeal of that decision, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to the 

Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). 

 

1 Originally, Dawn Northup and currently Brad K. Keogh, who is 

automatically substituted as a party on appeal. See ARCAP 27(c)(2) (2016). 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. 
DENNISON v. ADOC et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3

DISCUSSION 

¶3 Dennison claims summary judgment was improper, alleging 

that he was entitled to all records in the possession of ADC relating to his 

inmate file, including ADC diet order forms. Summary judgment is 

appropriate “if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This court reviews the grant of summary 

judgment de novo, viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the 

light most favorable to Dennison. See Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240 

¶ 12 (2003).

¶4 In general, “[p]ublic records and other matters in the custody 

of any officer shall be open to inspection by any person at all times during 

office hours.” A.R.S. § 39-121. As applicable here, however, a prisoner “may 

view the prisoner’s own automated summary record file,” but otherwise 

“shall not have access to any prisoner records.” A.R.S. § 31-221(D), (E). The 

documents contained in Dennison’s “automated summary record file” do 

not include his ADC diet order forms. See A.R.S. § 31-221(G). And to the 

extent A.R.S. §§ 39-121 and 31-221 are in conflict, the “specific statute 

controls over the general.” Berry v. State Dep’t of Corrections, 145 Ariz. 12, 13 

(App. 1985). Accordingly, Dennison’s request was governed by A.R.S. § 31-

221, meaning he was not entitled to his ADC diet order forms. 

¶5 Dennison has not shown that A.R.S. § 31-221(C) compels a 

different result. Subsection C states in relevant part that, “[a]ll records of 

prisoner care and custody are subject to” A.R.S. § 39-121. That directive, 

however, does not address who can inspect such documents. Although in 

most instances documents may be inspected by “any person at all times 

during office hours,” A.R.S. § 39-121, when a prisoner is seeking inspection, 

as noted above, the right is truncated by A.R.S. § 31-221(E). 
DENNISON v. ADOC et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4

¶6 Finally, to the extent Dennison has preserved a due process 

claim, he has failed to show any denial of due process. Dennison appears 

to claim the superior court denied him due process because “the 

unambiguous plain language on the face of the statutes contradicts the 

court’s finding and showed no necessity for statutory/judicial 

interpretation.” But as shown above, the plain language of A.R.S. § 31-221 -

- the more specific statute that modifies the broad directive of A.R.S. § 39-

121 -- is the basis upon which the superior court’s finding rests. Dennison 

has shown no violation of his due process rights. 

CONCLUSION 

¶7 The superior court’s judgment is affirmed.