2 1

- 3 95

- cr United States v. Cargo UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NO TATION “ SUMMARY ORDER ” ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 27 th d a y of January , two thousand twenty

- two

. PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., RICHARD J. SULLIVAN , EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges

.

_____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Appellee , v. No. 2 1

- 3 95

- cr LATEEK CARGO , AKA “ K ” , AKA L EROY , Defendant

- Appell ant , JUSTIN J OHNSON, AKA J , BRYANT MCCRAY,2 AKA TROY, KYLEE RADUECHEL, Defendants.

_____________________________________

FOR DEFENDANT
- APPELLANT: Barclay T. Johnson , Assistant Federal Public Defender , for Michael L. Desautels, Federal Public Defender for the District of Vermont

. FOR APPELLEE: John J. Boscia and Gregory L. Waples , Assistant United States Attorneys, for Nikolas Kerest , United States Attorney for the District of Vermont

. Appeal from a n order of the United States District Court for the District of
Vermont ( Reiss , J

. ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the district court entered on February 3 , 202 1 , is AFFIRMED

. Defendant

- A ppellant Lateek Cargo ple a d ed guilty on October 19, 2018 , to arson and a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin . This conduct and Cargo’s extensive criminal history, which placed him in the highest criminal3 history category , resulted in a Guidelines sentencing range of 324 to 405 months ’ imprisonment. Nonetheless, because Cargo had shown signs of rehabilitation , including by obtaining gainful employment in the healthcare industry prior to being apprehended, the government an d Cargo entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) that capped his
sentence at 144 months

. On March 7, 2019, the district court imposed a sentence
of 118 months

– far below the cap agreed to by the parties

– as well as restitution for the arson, which had severely damaged an apartment building for low

- income
residents

. O n November 9, 2020 , having served approximately thirty

- six months of his
sentence, Cargo moved for compassionate release p ursuant to the First Step Act of
2018

. In relevant part, that statute permits a district court to “reduce the [defendant’s] term of imprisonment

. . . if it finds that[] extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that the reduction is con sistent
with the factor s set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) , (c)(1) (A) (i)

. The district court orally denied the motion without prejudice to Cargo’s renewing
it at a later date

. In doing so, the district court d eclin ed to find whether extraordinary circumstances justif ied a sentenc e reduction, concluding instead4 that a reduction was not warranted in light of the section 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Keitt , 21 F. 4th 6 7, 69 (2d Cir. 2021) ( “[W] hen a district court denies
a defendant ’ s motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) in sole reliance on the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors, it need not also determine whether the defendant has shown extraordinary and compelling reasons that might (in other circumsta nces) justify a sentence reduction

. ”)

. Cargo timely appealed. “We review the denial of a motion for compassionate release for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Saladino , 7 F.4th 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2021). “A district
court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United State s v. Borden , 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (alterations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sims v. Blot , 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) ). “[O]nce we are sure that [a] sentence resulted from the reasoned exercise of discretion, we must defer
heavil y to the expertise of district judges.” United States v. Cavera , 550 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) ; see also United States v. Seshan , 850 F. App’x 800, 801 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (explaining that “[w]e apply the same deference to
the dist rict court’s denial of a compassionate release motion based on . . . the5 [section] 3553(a) factors as we do when reviewing a district court’s [original] imposition of sentence based on . . . th[ose] factors”)

. Here, t he district court’s conclusion that the section 3553(a) factors weigh against Cargo’s release falls well within its broad discretion. Section 3553(a) requires a sentencing court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and also to ensure that the sentence “reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense,

. . . promote[s] respect for the law,

. . . provide[s] just punishment for the offense,” and “afford[s] adequate det errence to criminal conduct,” among other sentencing objectives. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)

– (B). Cargo’s rehabilitative strides, though commendable, do not diminish the
seriousness of his criminal conduct . The district court correctly observed that it was “just by luck” that Cargo’s “arson

. . . did not result in killing somebody , and

. . . some of the tenants lost everything they had.” J. App’x at 104. The district court also noted that Cargo’s drug activities “t[ook] place over a long period of time with significant quantities ” of narcotics and involved the frequent
use of firearms. J. App’x at 105. It was therefore not an abuse of discretion for
the district court to conclude that a further reduction in Cargo’s 118

- month6 sentence

– which was already wel l below the 144

- month sentence to which the parties had stipulated, as well as the Guidelines range of 324 to 405 months

– was

un warranted. See, e.g. , Keitt , 21 F.4th at 72 (citing defendant’s serious criminal conduct in affirming denial of compassionate release based on the section 3553(a) factors); Seshan , 850 F. App’x at 802 (affirming denial of compassionate released when “the district court carefully considered and balanced the [section] 3553(a) factors”). None of Cargo’s remaining objections is meritorious. The array of district court decisions granting compassionate release that Cargo identifies are readily distinguishable , involving defendants who had already served lengthy, multi

decade sentences and never benefit ed from an initial sentence t hat was substantially below the Guidelines range. See, e.g. , United States v. Quinones , No.
00

- cr - 761

- 1 (JSR), 2021 WL 797835, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2021); United States v. Underwood , No. 88

- cr - 822 (SHS), 2021 WL 320 4834, at *1

– 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 202 1); United States v. Rodriguez , 492 F. Supp. 3d 306, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Nor can it be said that the district court failed to consider Cargo’s rehabilitation or the difficulties facing Cargo’s family while he is in prison. See J. App’x at 102 (acknowled ging that Cargo’s “family is struggling without his presence,” which7 should not be “minimize[d]

. . . in any respect” ). The district court simply found that those considerations pale d in comparison to the seriousness of the crimes that Cargo committed. W e see no reason to question that conclu sion and find that the
d istrict c ourt did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce Cargo’s sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)( 1 )

. We have considered Cargo’s remaining arguments and find them to be
meritless. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court

. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O ’ Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court