alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District

1

Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.

___________

No. 96-2463

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Arkansas.

Carl Richard McCammon, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

__________

 Submitted: October 24, 1996

 Filed: October 31, 1996

__________

Before BOWMAN, MAGILL, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal, Carl Richard McCammon challenges his

30-month sentence of imprisonment imposed by the district court after

1

McCammon pleaded guilty to a drug charge. McCammon argues that he is

entitled to a downward departure based on his substantial assistance. He

also argues that statements he made to an investigating customs officer

should not have been used against him in calculating the amount of drugs

attributable to him.

The district court properly declined to grant McCammon a substantialassistance downward departure absent a motion from the government pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. See United States v.
-2-

Johnigan, 90 F.3d 1332, 1338 (8th Cir. 1996). We conclude the district

court did not clearly err in determining that, at the time McCammon made

the self-incriminating statements to the investigating officer, no

cooperation agreement existed precluding the use of such statements against

McCammon. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8(a), (b)(1); United States v. Sheets, 65

F.3d 752, 753 (8th Cir. 1995) (standard of review); cf. White v. United

States, 998 F.2d 572, 574 (8th Cir. 1993) (no error in using drug

quantities disclosed eighteen months prior to plea agreement absent

cooperation agreement).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### Ambrose Simon DAIGLE, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 30093.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 12, 1958.

H. P. Robichau, Jr., Beaumont, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

*740MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, 3 days in jail and a fine of $50.

Officer Floyd testified that on the night in question, while on patrol and while stopped for a red light at the intersection of 11th Street and the Freeway in the City of Beaumont, a 1957 Ford Fairlane 500 approached his automobile from the rear at a high rate of speed, ran the stop light, and he gave chase. He stated that at one time he was traveling 95 miles per hour, hut the Ford ran away and left him. Some distance further on Floyd stopped the police automobile, received instructions from another motorist, turned around and returned to Lucas Drive, where he turned off the street he had been traveling, and shortly thereafter discovered the Ford, which he had been pursuing, in the ditch. Upon investigation, he learned that the front end of the Ford had been torn out from under it when it hit two culverts, and he saw the appellant seated under the steering wheel making an effort to drive the Ford out of the ditch. He stated that he asked the appellant who owned the Ford and the appellant replied that he did, but the appellant refused to get out until he (Floyd) reached for his night stick, and expressed the opinion from the appellant’s speech, manner of walking and the appearance of his eyes that he was intoxicated.

Auxiliary Officer Nicholas, Floyd’s partner, corroborated his testimony and added that after the appellant was placed in the police automobile he asked to be given a “break.”

The appellant did not testify in his own behalf, but offered two witnesses who testified that, though drinking beer on the night in question, the appellant was not intoxicated.

Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he drove an automobile on the night in question or that he drove the same upon a public highway, and relies Upon Pena v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 637, 224 S.W.2d 258; Brewster v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 177, 226 S.W.2d 124; and Threet v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 497, 250 S.W.2d 200. In none of the cases relied upon by the appellant was the accused upon the scene at the time of the arrival of the officers nor did any witness see them sitting under the steering wheel, and are not here controlling.

The State relies upon Thomas v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 268, 283 S.W.2d 933. In Thomas, as in the case at bar, the accused was found seated under the steering wheel of his automobile. After the collision, Thomas said that he was sorry it had happened, while here the appellant asked the officers to give him a break.

We have concluded that Thomas is here controlling and hold the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.

No reversible error appearing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification of Chief Executive Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of OPNET Technologies, Inc. (the Company), I, Marc A. Cohen, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |     |  |                                     
|----------------------- |  | --- |  | ------------------------------------
|Dated: November 6, 2006 |  | By: |  | /s/ Marc A. Cohen                   
|                        |  |     |  | Marc A. Cohen                       
|                        |  |     |  | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 538 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 538

To reinstate the permit for, and extend the deadline under the Federal 
Power Act applicable to the construction of, a hydroelectric project in 
                    Oregon, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

               March 10 (legislative day, March 6), 1995

 Mr. Hatfield introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To reinstate the permit for, and extend the deadline under the Federal 
Power Act applicable to the construction of, a hydroelectric project in 
                    Oregon, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REINSTATEMENT OF PERMIT AND EXTENSION OF DEADLINE.

    Notwithstanding the expiration of the permit and notwithstanding 
the time period specified in section 13 of the Federal Power Act (16 
U.S.C. 806) that would otherwise apply to the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission project numbered 7829, the Commission shall, at the request 
of the licensee for the project, reinstate the permit effective May 23, 
1993, and extend the time period during which the licensee is required 
to commence the construction of the project to the date that is 4 years 
after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 405

To amend the Defense Economic Adjustment, Diversification, Conversion,

and Stabilization Act of 1990 to give priority in the provision of community economic adjustment assistance to those communities most seriously

affected by reductions in defense spending, the completion, cancellation,

or termination of defense contracts, or the closure or realignment of

military installations.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 14 (legislative day, JANUARY 30), 1995

Ms. SNOWE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To amend the Defense Economic Adjustment, Diversification,

Conversion, and Stabilization Act of 1990 to give priority

in the provision of community economic adjustment assistance to those communities most seriously affected

by reductions in defense spending, the completion, cancellation, or termination of defense contracts, or the closure or realignment of military installations.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•S 405 IS

1 SECTION 1. PRIORITY FOR PROVISION OF COMMUNITY

2 ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE TO

3 MOST SERIOUSLY AFFECTED COMMUNITIES.

4 Section 4103(a) of the Defense Economic Adjust5 ment, Diversification, Conversion, and Stabilization Act of

6 1990 (division D of Public Law 101–510; 104 Stat. 1851;

7 10 U.S.C. 2391 note) is amended by adding at the end

8 the following new sentences: ‘‘In making economic adjust9 ment assistance available under such title, the Economic

10 Development Administration shall ensure that priority is

11 given to those communities identified as the most substan12 tially and seriously affected by the closure or realignment

13 of a military installation or the curtailment, completion,

14 elimination, or realignment of a major defense contract

15 or subcontract. The Administration shall identify such

16 communities through the use of objective evidence, such

17 as increasing unemployment.’’.

Æ
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-50412 Summary Calendar

DON WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. A-99-CV-310-SS

-------------------- January 8, 2001 Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Don Wright appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s decision to deny him disability benefits. He argues that the ALJ erred in determining that his post traumatic stress disorder was not a severe impairment and that he retained the residual functional capacity to work. Wright has not demonstrated any error in the Commissioner’s decision. Substantial evidence supports the determination that alcoholism was not a material contributing factor and that Wright

was not disabled. S ee Brown v. Apfel , 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir.No. 00-50412 -2- 1999); Bowling v. Shalala , 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994); Moore v. Sullivan , 919 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                   5
<CIK>                                                                     725813
<NAME>                                      Chemfab Corp.

<S>                                                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                               year
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                                    Jun-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                                       Jul-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                                         Jun-30-1999
<CASH>                                                                $4,783,000
<SECURITIES>                                                                  $0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                        $25,574,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                                            $462,000
<INVENTORY>                                                          $19,649,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                     $55,016,000
<PP&E>                                                               $59,418,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                                       $29,466,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                      $106,368,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                                $27,461,000
<BONDS>                                                                       $0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                         $0
<PREFERRED>                                                                   $0
<COMMON>                                                                $883,000
<OTHER-SE>                                                           $75,973,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                        $106,368,000
<SALES>                                                             $126,480,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                    $126,480,000
<CGS>                                                                $84,708,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                        $84,708,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                     $28,794,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                              $0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                      $267,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                      $12,711,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                                          $3,775,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                                   $8,936,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                                                $0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                               $0
<CHANGES>                                                                     $0
<NET-INCOME>                                                          $8,936,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                                               1.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                               1.11


</TABLE>
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-40743

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

HILARIO SOTO-HERNANDEZ

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:07-CR-182-1

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Hilario Soto-Hernandez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and was sentenced to 57 months of imprisonment

and three years of supervised release. Soto-Hernandez argues for the first time

on appeal that our opinion in United States v. Rojas-Luna, 522 F.3d 502,504-06

(5th Cir. 2008), compels us to vacate his sentence. In Rojas-Luna, we held that

the district court’s use of the fact of his 2006 removal to increase his sentence

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 30, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-40743

2

beyond the statutory maximum sentence allowed under § 1326(a) was reversible

plain error because the fact of the 2006 removal had not been admitted by RojasLuna or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 522 F.3d at 506-07. We

determined that the only evidence in the record to show when the defendant was

removed was an unsupported statement in the presentence report (PSR) and

that there was no evidence in the record that the defendant had agreed to the

accuracy of this fact in the PSR. Id. at 507.

The facts in Soto-Hernandez’s case are distinguishable. Soto-Hernandez

affirmatively admitted in his statement of facts in support of his plea agreement

and in his objections to the PSR that he was deported on December 15, 2003. He

confirmed this fact at his sentencing hearing. “[R]eliance on a defendant’s

admission of facts that are contained in the PSR is permissible.” United States

v. Ramirez, 557 F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 2009). The district court did not plainly

err in relying on Soto-Hernandez’s admission that he was deported on December

15, 2003 in applying U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.)

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(a)(ii).

Soto-Hernandez argues that his sentence of Texas deferred adjudication

should not be treated as a final conviction for purposes of U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). He notes that the issue is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent

and that he is raising the issue solely to preserve it for possible further review.

This issue is foreclosed by United States v. Valdez-Valdez, 143 F.3d 196, 200-01

(5th Cir. 1998).

AFFIRMED.
|Exhibit 32.2
|------------



|CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The undersigned hereby certifies in his capacity as Chief Financial Officer of Belmar Capital Fund LLC (the Fund), that based on his knowledge:

|(a) | the Quarterly Report of the Fund on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(b) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and the results of operations of the Fund for such period.                                       
|   



|Date: August 9, 2007
|--------------------



| | /s/ Andrew C. Frenette
Andrew C. Frenette
Chief Financial Officer
| | -----------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Fund and will be retained by the Fund and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
**AD Economic Evaluation**



### Docket No. FAA
- 2011
- 0323 Directorate I dentifier 2011
- SW
- 005
- AD Helicopter Model: Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Model 212 Helicopters Number of Helicopters in the US Registry : 84 Reason : The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of a fitting, loss of a main rotor blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter
. Costs :
**Action Labor cost**  **Parts cost Cost per**  **helicopter Cost on U.S.** 

**operators** (a) For any fitting, S/N 9956 through 10005 and a prefix of “A”; or a S/N of 52, 54, 55, 57 through 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 103, 112, 113, 137, 139 with a prefix of “SH”; replace the fitting with an airworthy fitting (assumes action affects 72 fittings) 40 work
- hours X $85 per hour = $3,400 $2,367 $5,767 $415,224

(c) For any fitting affected by this AD with a S/N not identified in paragraph (a) of this table, perform an MPI on each fitting for a crack unless documentation exists of any previous MPI performed during regularly scheduled maintenance (assumes action affects 12 fittings) 40 work
- hours X $85 per hour = $ 3,400 $ 0 $3,400 $ 40,800



### We estimate a total cost of $456,024 to do the actions required by this AD. Executive Order 12866 : Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action?” Yes ( ) No (  ) DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures : Is the AD significant? Yes ( ) Explain Below No (  ) Regulatory Flexibility Act : Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Yes ( ) No (  ) Project Engineer : Michae l Kohner
Fo rm er Pres ide n t G eo rg e W
. B u sh w as n am ed as th e o ri gi n al l ead r esp o n d en t i n this 1 cas e. Pu rsu an t t o Fe d eral R u le of C ivil Pro ced u re 25 (d), the C o u rtau tom aticallysu b stitu tes h is su cce sso r, Pres ide n t B arack H
. O b am a, as th e n ew lead r esp o n d en t. UNI TED S TATES DI S TRI CT COURT FO R T H E D IST R IC T O F C O L U M B IA



### FADI AL MAQALAH, e t al., P e titi one r s, v. Civil Action No. 06-1669 ROBERT GATES, et al., Re spo nde nt s. HAJI WAZIR, et al., P e titi one r s, v. Civil Action No. 06-1697 ROBERT GATES, et al., Re spo nde nt s. AMIN AL BAKRI, e t al., P e titi one r s, v. Civil Action No. 08-1307 BARACK

H. OBAMA, et al., 1 

### Re spo nde nt s. REDHA AL-NAJAR, etal., P e titi one r s, v. Civil Action No. 08-2143 ROBERT GATES, et al., Re spo nde nt s.ORDER

Bef or e t he Courta r e r e s pond e nt s ' mot i ons t o d i s mi s s t he a bove
- c a pt i one d c a s e s . T he Cour tha s r e c e i ve d e xt e ns i ve br i e f i ng f r om t he pa r t i e s a nd he l d a mot i ons he a r i ng on Ja nua ry7, 2009
. T he Courta l s o r e c e i ve d a s uppl e men t a l , c l a s s i f i e d f i l i ng f r om r e s pond e nt s on Ja nua ry16 , 20 09
. On Jan uary22 , 20 09 , t he n ew Pre si den t i al adm i nist r at i on i ssued an Ex ecuti ve O r der i ndi c a t i ng s i g ni f

i c a ntc ha ng e s t o the g ove rnme nt ' s a ppr oa c h t o the de t e nt i on, a nd r e vi e w of detenti on , of

i nd i vidu al s curr entl yheld atG uan t anam o B ay . A d i f f er ent approach cou l d imp act the C o u rt ' s an aly sis o f

certain issu es ce n tr al t o the reso lutio n o f thes e cas es as w ell. Fol l owi ng t he Ja nua r y22 Ex e c ut i ve Or de r , t he Courti s pr ovi di ng t he ne w a dmi ni s t r a t i on wi t h a n o pport uni t yt o p r ovi de i nputr e g a r di ng t he de f i ni t i on of

" e ne myc omba t a nt " f

orus e i n the G u an tan am o B ayd etain ee h ab eas case s. Se e H am li lyv . B u sh , et al
. , C iv.A
. N o . 0 5 -07 6 3 ( D k t. No. 14 0)
. Gi ve n the Ex e c ut i ve Or de ra nd r e s pond e nt s ' c l a s s i f i e d f i l i ng , t he Courtwi l l pr ovi de th e n e w ad m in is tra tio n w ith th e sa m e typ e o f o p p o rtu n ityin th e s e B a gram A irf ie ld h a b e a s ca s e s . H ence, t he C ou r ti nv i t es r espo nd ents t o inf orm t he C ou r t , i n w r i t i ng and byno tl at ert han Feb ruary20 , 20 09 , w hether t heyi ntend t o ref i ne thei rpo si t i on i n the abo ve-capti on ed cases f i l ed by detai nees held atB ag r am A i r f i el d. B ased on t hat subm i ssi on , t he C ou r tw i l l decide w hether f urt her br i ef

i ng or som e othercou r se i s app r op r i at e. S O O R D E R E D . /s/ JOHN D. BATES U n ite d S ta te s D is tric t J u d ge
Dat e : Ja nua r y22 , 20 09
#### Denna MATHIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27993.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 1, 1956.

*421No appearance for appellant.

Dan Walton, Dist. Atty., Eugene Brady and' Thomas D. White, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Leon B. Douglas, .State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The offense is carrying a pistol; the punishment, a fine of $100.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular and nothing is presented for review. The judgment is affirmed.