alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit








	
	
	EXHIBIT 10.8






AMENDMENT TO CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT 


THIS AMENDMENT TO CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT (the “Amendment”) is made and entered into as of May 14, 2015, by and between the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle, a federally chartered corporation (“FHLBS”), and Glen Simecek (“Executive”).
R E C I T A L S
WHEREAS, FHLBS and the Executive entered into that certain Change in Control Agreement dated March 17, 2014 (the “Agreement”); and
WHEREAS, the Agreement may be amended by a writing signed by FHLBS and the Executive; and
WHEREAS, FHLBS and the Executive desire to amend the Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Agreement is hereby amended as follows:
A G R E E M E N T
Section 1.6 of the Agreement is hereby amended and replaced in its entirety with the following:
1.6.    “Good Reason Termination” shall mean Executive’s voluntary termination of his employment with FHLBS for one of more of the following reasons:
		
	(a)
	the assignment of ongoing duties to Executive that are materially inconsistent with Executive’s position; or


(b)    any material diminution in the Executive’s authority or responsibilities; or
		
	(c)
	a material reduction in the Executive’s base salary, bonus opportunity under applicable incentive compensation plans, or retirement plan benefits, unless such reduction is made as part of a nondiscriminatory cost reduction plan applicable to the Company’s total compensation budget; or


		
	(d)
	a material change by FHLBS in the geographic location at which the Executive is required to perform his services; or


		
	(e)
	a material diminution in the budget over which the Executive retains authority; or


(f)    a material breach of this agreement by the FHLBS.















If  (i) Executive provides written notice to FHLBS of the existence of circumstances that would justify a Good Reason Termination within (A) one hundred eighty (180) days after Executive has knowledge of the circumstances pertaining to any of items (a), (b), or (d), or (B) ninety (90) days after Executive has knowledge of the circumstances pertaining to any of items (c), (e), or (f), which notice shall specifically identify the circumstances that Executive believes justify a Good Reason Termination; (ii) FHLBS fails to correct the circumstances within thirty (30) days after receiving such notice; and (iii) Executive resigns within fifteen (15) days after the FHLBS fails to correct such circumstances; then Executive’s termination shall be considered to have been a Good Reason Termination for purposes of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Amendment as of the date first above written.
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK OF SEATTLE
By:                        
Michael L. Wilson
President and CEO


EXECUTIVE
                        
Glen Simecek
<PAGE>
 
                                  EXHIBIT 21

                        SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT
                        ------------------------------

                                                     JURISDICTION OF
NAME                                                  INCORPORATION
----                                                 ---------------
Merisel Canada, Inc. ............................     Canada
MIFINCO, Inc. ...................................     Delaware
Softsel Foreign Sales Corporation ...............     U.S. Virgin Islands
Merisel Americas, Inc. ..........................     Delaware
Merisel Europe, Inc. ............................     Delaware
Merisel FAB, Inc. ...............................     Delaware
Merisel Asia, Inc. ..............................     Delaware
Merisel Information Services, Inc. ..............     Delaware
Merisel Licensing, Inc. .........................     Delaware
Merisel Properties, Inc. ........................     Delaware
Merisel Capital Funding, Inc. ...................     Delaware
**Exhibit 32**
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**
**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350)**

 

The undersigned certify pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the undersigned’s knowledge:

 

1.                                      The accompanying Annual Report of NVE Corporation (the “Company”)on Form 10-K for the year ended March 31, 2017, fully complies with the requirementsof Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.                                       The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.

 

 

Date:May 3, 2017

 

 

/s/DANIEL A. BAKER

 

Daniel A. Baker

President andChief Executive Officer

 

 

/s/CURT A. REYNDERS

 

Curt A. Reynders

Chief FinancialOfficer

 

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnishedto the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM ADRIEN ARPEL
INC. (FORMERLY ALFIN, INC) AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR ENDED JULY 31, 1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-K.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         433,943
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  171,529
<ALLOWANCES>                                   952,073
<INVENTORY>                                  1,743,684
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,225,404
<PP&E>                                       1,583,677
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,326,813
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,665,865
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,890,315
<BONDS>                                        562,517
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          750,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       161,643
<OTHER-SE>                                     525,550
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,665,865
<SALES>                                      5,908,754
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             5,908,754
<CGS>                                        1,732,805
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                7,665,526
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               252,656
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              24,280
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,742,223)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     6,213
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,748,446)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,748,446)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.32)
        

</TABLE>
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 17

- 00347

- CR

TREVEON DEON WILLIAM S

, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, Appellee

From the 278th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court No. 27685

REINSTATEMENT ORDER

This appeal was abated to the trial court on October 10, 2018 because no brief had

been filed for appellant. Appellant’s brief was received by t he Court on October 30, 2018.

Accordingly, this appeal is reinstated. Appellant’s brief is filed as of the date i t

was received. The State’s brief in this appeal is due 30 days from the date of this Order.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Appeal reinstated

Order issued and filed November 7 , 2018
EXHIBIT 32.1


                                Certification of
                            American River Bankshares
                pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
             of 2002 regarding Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
                           quarter ended June 30, 2008


         Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each
of the undersigned officers of American River Bankshares, a California
corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify that:

         1.       The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter
                  ended June 30, 2008 (the "Form 10-Q") fully complies with the
                  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
                  Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         2.       Information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
                  material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.


         Dated: August 7, 2008         By: /s/ DAVID T. TABER
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           David T. Taber
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer


         Dated: August 7, 2008         By: /s/ MITCHELL A. DERENZO
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Mitchell A. Derenzo
                                           Executive Vice President and
                                           Chief Financial Officer



         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to American River Bankshares and will be retained by American
River Bankshares and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.



                                       87
#### R. E. (Bob) BAILEY, in his capacity as Sheriff, et al., Appellants, v. Habous NACIM, Appellee.

No. 5714.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

Jan. 20, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1965.

Gerald B. Shifrin, Jack Fant, County Atty., El Paso, for appellants.

Mitchell Esper, El Paso, for appellee.

PRESLAR, Justice.

This is an appeal from a temporary inr junction order against the appellants by *823which they are restrained and enjoined from proceeding with an execution sale of certain property of appellee to satisfy a money judgment.

Appellant American Finance and Investment Company placed an $11,829.92 judgment (which it had previously obtained against appellee) in the hands of R. E. (Bob) Bailey, Sheriff of El Paso County, for execution and the Sheriff levied on the property of appellee and advertised such property for sale under execution. Ap-pellee brought suit to enjoin the sale for the alleged reason that the property was exempt from forced sale as her homestead. In granting the temporary injunction, the injunction bond required and given was in the sum of $1,000.00.

Appellants contend that the injunction is to restrain the execution of a money judgment or the collection of a debt within the meaning of Rule 684, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the $1,000.00 bond is insufficient to support the injunction, which is therefore void. The pertinent part of Rule 684 provides:

> *“** * * If the injunction be applied for to restrain the execution of a money judgment or the collection of a debt, the bond shall be fixed in the amount of such judgment or debt, plus a reasonable amount to cover interest and costs.”

This allegation of insufficiency of the injunction bond is the sole point of error asserted by appellants, and we are of the opinion that it should be overruled and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.

We arrive at this conclusion on the basis that the injunction order does not restrain appellants from the execution of their judgment or the collection of their debt, but •only restrains the sale of this particular property. The only relief sought, and the only relief granted by the injunction order, was that the defendants were restrained and enjoined, in the language of the order, “from proceeding with the foreclosure sale under execution of the property known as Lots 27, 28, 29 and 30 of Block 65 of the Morningside Heights Addition to the City of El Paso * * *. ” Thus, the court carefully preserved the status quo pending final determination on the merits, but left appellants free to collect their debt by any means available. Under such circumstances our courts have held that Rule 684, and the statutes which preceded it in our law, and on which it is based, are not applicable. Reese v. Wallace Enterprises, Inc., Tex. Civ.App., 376 S.W.2d 587; Lee v. Howard Broadcasting Corporation, ’ Tex.Civ.App., 305 S.W.2d 629; Pacheco v. Allala, Tex. Civ.App., 261 S.W. 148.

The sole assignment of error is overruled, and the Order Granting Temporary Injunction is in all things sustained.
Order entered June 4, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-00474-CR

RASHAD KEITH WADE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F19-00045-M

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s May 24, 2019 motion to supplement the record on appeal. 

We GRANT appellant’s motion. We ORDER the Dallas County District Clerk to file, within 

FOURTEEN DAYS of the date of this order, a supplemental clerk’s record containing the 

motion for discovery appellant filed in cause no. F18-75205-M on December 13, 2018.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM TBX
RESOURCES, INC'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-2000
<CASH>                                         489,448
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               591,628
<PP&E>                                       2,926,068
<DEPRECIATION>                                 121,427
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,608,954
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          174,180
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       164,234
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,491,442
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,608,954
<SALES>                                          9,061
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                69,677
<CGS>                                          329,299
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (259,622)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (259,622)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (259,622)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.02)


</TABLE>
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-31013

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

LAWRENCE LEE CHATMAN, JR

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 1:04-CR-10014-1

Before KING, BARKSDALE, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lawrence Lee Chatman, Jr., federal prisoner # 12274-035, appeals the

sentence imposed by the district court after granting his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

motion for reduced sentence based on the United States Sentencing

Commission’s retroactive amendment to the base-offense levels for crack-cocaine

offenses. Although the court determined that Chatman was subject to an

amended-guidelines range of 120 to 135 months, the court only reduced his

sentence from 144 to 140 months’ imprisonment. In doing so, the court indicated

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 10, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

Case: 08-31013 Document: 00511047668 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/10/2010
No. 08-31013

2

incorrectly that the reduced sentence was within the amended-guidelines range

and indicated that the amount of the reduction was directly affected by

Chatman’s “poor post-incarceration record”.

A district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion; its interpretation of the Guidelines, de novo. United States

v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir. 2009). Chatman claims the district court

abused its discretion when it reduced his sentence to a term of imprisonment

that constituted an upward deviation from the amended-guidelines range, while

erroneously concluding that the reduced sentence was within the amended

range. He maintains the sentence reduction was based solely on his postincarceration record, without reference to any of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors

and without taking into account his administrative punishment for his

disciplinary infractions. 

District courts are under no obligation to reduce a defendant’s sentence

pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 517 (2009). In exercising its discretion to grant

Chatman’s § 3582(c)(2) motion, however, the district court, as noted, checked a

box on the pre-printed order indicating that the sentence imposed was within the

amended-guidelines range. If the district court intended to depart from the

amended-guidelines range, it should have indicated it was doing so by checking

the box labeled “Other”. See United States v. Franklin, No. 08-30861, 2009 WL

4884963, at *2 (5th Cir. 18 Dec. 2009) (unpublished). Instead, the district court

erroneously indicated that Chatman’s reduced sentence was “within the

amended guideline range”, when it plainly was not. 

VACATED and REMANDED.

Case: 08-31013 Document: 00511047668 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/10/2010
#### Refugio J. FIGUEROA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 36569.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 19, 1964.

Rehearing Denied March 18, 1964.

Wm. H. Hamblen, Edna, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

The conviction is for aggravated assault; the punishment, sixty days in jail and a fine of $300.00.

The evidence reflects that there had been prior difficulties between the appellant and the injured party before they met at a dance; that upon their meeting at the dance, the appellant cut the injured party with a knife in the. body, and after the injured party fell, the appellant leaned over and cut him across the nose and face with the knife.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault with a knife under Sec. 10 of Art. 1147, Vernon’s Ann.P.C.

The sole contention for reversal' is presented by two formal bills of exception. Appellant insists that it was reversible error for Ted Dunham to act as special prosecutor over his objections made before and after the selection of the jury and introduction of the evidence, on the ground that Dunham represented the injured party in a criminal case arising out of the same transaction.

Dunham appeared at the request of the state, without remuneration, and participated along with the County Attorney in the examination of the witnesses during the trial.

No abuse of discretion is shown in the action of the trial court in overruling appellant’s objections, and permitting Dunham to assist in the prosecution. Phillips v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 286, 263 S.W.2d 159; Bingham v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 352, 290 S.W.2d 915.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10 - 22 - 00021 - CR No. 10 - 22 - 00050 - CR EX PARTE EMILY ANN SHEPHERD
Original Proceeding s From the County Court Robertson County, Texas Trial Court No s . 20 - 2 - CR and 20 - 11 - CV MEMORANDUM OPINION In these proceedings , Emily Ann Shepherd , acting pro se , has filed document s that
we have construed as original application s for a writ of habeas corpus
. The courts of appeals, however, have no original habeas

- corpus jurisdiction in criminal matters. Ex parte Braswell , 630 S.W.3d 600, 601 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2021, orig. proceeding). On January 31, 2022, the Clerk of this Court sen t Shepherd a letter in the proceeding assigned Cause No. 10

- 22
- 00021
- CR to notify Shepherd that the Court may dismiss the proceeding unless, within fourteen days of the date of the letter, Shepherd showed grounds for continuing the proceedin g. Shepherd responded, but she has shownEx parte Shepherd Page 2 no grounds for continuin g th ese proceeding s . Accordingly, th e s e proceeding s are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 1 Shepherd’s “Motion for Rehearing,” filed on February 17, 2022 ; her “Motion to Set Amount Required to Supersede Judgment,” filed on March 1, 2022 ; and her “Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant’s Brief,” filed on March 14, 2022, are dismissed as moot. 2

MATT JOHNSON Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Johnson , and Justice Smith Dismissed Opinion delivered and filed March 23, 2022 Do not publish [O T 06]

1 Court of Appeals No. 10

- 22
- 00046
- CR
— Shepherd’s appeal from the trial court’s “Order Dismissing Defendant’s Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” signed on or about February 4, 2022, in Trial Court Case No. 22
- 01
- CV
— and Court of Appeals No. 10

- 22
- 000 68
- CR
— Shepherd’s appeal from the trial court’s “Order Dismissing Defendant’s Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” signed on or about January 26, 2022, in Trial Court Case No. 22

- 11
- CV
— remain pending.

2 Shepherd’s “Motion for Rehearing ” was filed before any opinion had issued. Shepherd apparently filed the motion in response to the Clerk of the Court’s January 31, 2022 letter to Shepherd notifying her of the Court’s intent to dismiss.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7689

GREGORY OLIVER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

THOMAS J. ERVIN, Judge; GEORGE DUCWORTH,

Solicitor; CARL ANDERSON, Magistrate; HARVEY

E. BLACK, Deputy; MICHAEL F. EPPS, Deputy,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge.

(CA-97-2264-2-19AJ)

Submitted: March 12, 1998 Decided: March 26, 1998

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gregory Oliver, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed

the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. Oliver v. Ervin, No. CA-97-2264-2-19AJ (D.S.C. Nov. 5,

1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED