alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Drexel
Burnham Lambert Real Estate Associates II 1995 Year-End 10-KSB and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to such 10-KSB.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000725646
<NAME> DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATES II
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                         789,370
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  151,239
<ALLOWANCES>                                     9,500
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                      19,371,137
<DEPRECIATION>                              10,114,760
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,646,699
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                      8,512,981
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     610,912
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,646,699
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,848,339
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,137,378
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             781,721
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (289,039)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (7.68)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>The Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.1**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, Michael V. Shustek, as Chief Executive Officer of Vestin Mortgage, Inc., thesole Manager of Vestin Fund I, LLC, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Vestin Fund I, LLC;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofVestin Fund I, LLC as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. Vestin Fund I, LLC’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for Vestin Fund I,LLC and have:
(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to VestinFund I LLC, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared;
(b) Paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and34-47986;
(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of Vestin Fund I, LLC’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report basedon such evaluations; and
(d) Disclosed in this report any changes in Vestin Fund I, LLC’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred duringVestin Fund I LLC’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect Vestin Fund ILLC’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5. Vestin Fund I, LLC’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to Vestin Fund I, LLC’s auditors and the audit committee ofVestin Fund I, LLC’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent functions):
(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal controls over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect Vestin Fund I, LLC’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and
(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in Vestin Fund I,LLC’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: August 9, 2004
/s/ Michael V. ShustekMichael V. ShustekChief Executive Officer*Vestin Mortgage, Inc., soleManager of Vestin Fund I, LLC* Michael V. Shustek functions as the equivalent of the Chief ExecutiveOfficer of the registrant
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>               5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains a summary of financial information extracted from the
condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet and Condensed Consolidated Statement of
Operations and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       1,175,889
<SECURITIES>                                 1,606,953
<RECEIVABLES>                               14,308,046
<ALLOWANCES>                                   255,000
<INVENTORY>                                 10,943,457
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            30,053,654
<PP&E>                                      55,795,592
<DEPRECIATION>                              23,915,018
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              63,520,611
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,291,946
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       499,115
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                63,520,611
<SALES>                                     66,372,800
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            67,047,283
<CGS>                                       52,784,488
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               62,499,829
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             226,378
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              4,680,824
<INCOME-TAX>                                   964,032
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          3,019,553
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 3,019,553
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .65
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .63


</TABLE>
#### Ex parte Erwin G. ERNST.

No. 38748.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 20, 1965.

Samuel H. Robertson, Jr., Carl E. F. Dally, Houston, for petitioner.

Paul B. Miller, Jr., Houston, for respondent.

MORRISON, Judge.

This is a habeas corpus proceeding. During the Court’s vacation, an application for writ of habeas corpus was presented to the writer alleging that the relator Ernst was held in contempt by the Honorable John Snell, Jr., Judge of the 55th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, and committed to the custody of the sheriff until he purged himself by delivering to the defendant certain documents in his possession.

It has now been made known to this Court that such documents have been delivered to defendant.

Relator’s motion to dismiss his application for writ of habeas corpus is granted.
Deed of Assignment



 Exhibit 4.37 
  
 THIS DEED OF ASSIGNMENT is made the 17th day of Dec., 2003 
  
 BETWEEN 
  

	(1)	ChipMOS Technologies Inc. whose registered office is situate at No. 1, R & D Road 1, Hsinchu Science Park, Hisnchu, Taiwan, ROC (hereinafter called “the
Vendor”); 

  
 And 
  

	(2)	ChipMOS Technologies (Bermuda) Ltd. whose registered office is situate at Canon’s Court, 22 Victoria Street, Hamilton HM 12, BERMUDA(hereinafter called “the
Purchaser”). 

  
 WHEREAS 
  

	(A)	By a promissory note of 4th November 2002 as
varied by a Deed of Variation of 2nd December 2002, MMT is indebted to Jesper Limited, a BVI company, in the
principal sum of USD 37,500,000.00 in such terms and conditions therein contained (“the Note”). 

  

	(B)	The said principal sum of USD 37,500,000.00 together with interest thereon will become due six months after the date of the Note but has been extended for further nine months to
Aug.3, 2004 in due course. 

  

	(C)	When the said principal sum of USD 37,500,000.00 with interest thereon is due and is not repaid by MMT in manner contained under the Note, Jesper Limited may convert all sum
outstanding or any part thereof into ordinary shares of MMT at the conversion rate of USD1.00 for 1 ordinary share of MMT. 

  

	(D)	Jesper Limited and Vendor had entered into a Deed of Assignment on Dec. 17, 2003, where out of the said principal sum of USD 37,500,000.00 under the Note, the sum of USD 16,500,745
and interest thereon to become due were sold to Vendor by Jesper Limited. 

  

	(E)	Purchaser has agreed with the Vendor for the absolute sale to it, the Assigned Rights in manner hereinafter expressed. 

  
 NOW THIS DEED WITNESSETH as follows: 
  

	1.	In consideration of USD 16,594,249.93 (“Purchaser Price”) to be paid by the Purchaser to 









	    	the Vendor, the Vendor as beneficial owner assigns to the Purchaser USD 16,500,745 due under the Note together with interest thereon to become due and all other monies hereafter to
become payable by force or virtue of the Note and the full right, benefit and advantage of the premises TO HOLD the same unto the Purchaser absolutely. 

  

	2.	The Purchase Price shall be paid in full no later than June 30, 2004 to the Vendor through wire transfer to the bank account as designated by the Vendor. 


 

	3.	The receipt of the Purchaser shall be a good discharge to MMT for the said sum of USD 16,500,745 and interest thereon due under the Note hereby assigned. 


 

	4.	This Deed shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the British Virgin Islands. 

  
 IN WITNESS whereof the parties have executed this Deed on the day and year first above written. 
  

			
	 SEALED with the Common Seal
	 	 
	 of the Vendor and signed
	 	 
	 by
	 	 /s/ Shih-Jye Cheng


	 in the presence of :
	 	 
		
	 SEALED with the Common Seal
	 	 
	 Of the Purchaser and signed
	 	 
	 By
	 	 /s/ Hung-Chiu Hu


	 in the presence of :
	 	 

  
 Dated the 17th day of Dec., 2003 
  

 - 2 -
COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS

§
IN RE No. 08

- 1 8

- 00 2 1 4

- C V § DISH NETWORK, LLC AN D ECHOSPHERE, LLC

,

RELATOR S §

§ A N ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

IN MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator s , DISH Network, LLC and Echosphere, LLC (referred to collectively as DISH)

have filed a mandamus petition against the Honorable Selena Solis, Judge of the 243rd District

Court of El Paso County, Texas, to challenge an order compelling pre

- arbitration discove ry and

failing to rule on DISH’s motion to compel arbitration. The petition for writ of mandamus is

denied.

Generally, mandamus relief is appropriate only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or to

compel the performance of a ministerial duty, and where the relator has no adequate remedy by

appeal. In re Reece , 341 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential

Insurance Company of America , 148 S.W.3d 124, 135

- 36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The

burden is on relator to show it is ent itled to mandamus relief. See In re Ford Motor Company , 165

S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex.

1992)(orig. proceeding ). After reviewing the mandamus petition and record, and the response

filed by th e Real Party in Interest, we co nclude that Relator s ha ve f ailed to show that they are- 2

-

entitled to mandamus relief. Acc ordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus

.

August 21, 2019 YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of uWink, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB for the quarter ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Lawrence C. Early,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to my knowledge:

(1)   The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.



August 16, 2004                         By:      /s/ Lawrence C. Early
                                           -------------------------------------
                                                 Lawrence C. Early
                                                 Chief Financial Officer
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

November 2, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice 128288(23) Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. LISA D. WYATT, Personal Stephen J. Markman, Representative of the Estate of Justices William Nolan Wyatt, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 128288 COA: 258237 Wayne CC: 04-402043-NH OAKWOOD HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTERS, a/k/a OAKWOOD HEALTHCARE, INC, and PARVEZ KAHN, M.D., Defendants,

and

THOMAS AUSTIN CHAPEL, M.D., Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of th is Court’s order of June 17, 2005 is considered, and it is DENIED, b ecause it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

C AVANAGH and K ELLY
, JJ., would grant reconsiderati on and, on reconsideration, would grant leave to appeal.

p1026 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 2, 2005

Clerk
#### Marlin INGRAM et al., Appellants, v. Sam B. TURNER et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 15, 1957.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 10, 1957.

Moss Noble, Jackson, for appellants.

H. M. Shumate, Irvine, for appellees.

WADDILL, Commissioner.

Appellees conveyed approximately 31⁄2 acres of land to appellants Marlin Ingram and Haney Ingram, their son-in-law and daughter. The deed recited as consideration, “one dollar and other valuable things.”

In 1953 appellees filed suit seeking cancellation of the deed for failure of consideration. The basis of this action was that the true consideration was maintenance and support of the appellees and the appellants had failed to provide the consideration. This suit was dismissed, but the judgment does not disclose upon what grounds the dismissal was made. The circuit court could have found that no contract was proved or that the charge of nonsupport was not shown.

In 1955 another suit was brought by ap-pellees against appellants to cancel the deed on the same grounds set out in the prior action. Upon trial of this case without a jury, the Chancellor held there was a failure of consideration and entered a judgment granting equitable relief.

Appellants assert two grounds for reversal of the judgment: (1) The plea of res judicata should have been sustained; and (2) the appellees failed to prove that the consideration was a promise to support them.

Since it does not appear from the record, the appellants, in order to rely on the doctrine of res judicata must prove that the issue involved in the second trial *437was present and actually determined in the prior action. The prior judgment could have been based upon one of several issues, none of which appear in the judgment. This being the case, the former judgment does not constitute a conclusive adjudication as to any of the issues involved. Birney v. Ballard County, 190 Ky. 241, 227 S.W. 168; 30 Am.Jur. 283.

The second contention is that there was a failure to show the consideration was maintenance and support. It is true that the deed did not recite this as consideration, but true consideration in a deed may be shown by parol evidence. Allen v. McIntosh, .276 Ky. 751, 125 S.W.2d 234. There was sufficient evidence to support the finding of the Chancellor that the true consideration for the deed was appellants’ agreement to support the appellees . Also, the proof warranted a finding that there was a breach of that covenant on the part of the appellants.

Judgment affirmed.
## U NITED 

## S TATES 

## A IR 

## F ORCE 

## C OURT OF 

## C RIMINAL 

## A PPEALS

_______ _______ __________ No. ACM S 3 22 8 7 ( f rev )

_______ _______ __________ 

### U NITED STATES Appellee
v. 

### Zavian M.T. ADDISON Airman First Class , U.S. Air Force , Appellant

_______ _______ __________ Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary Upon Further Review Decided 9 January 2017

_______ _______ __________ Military Judge : Gregory O. Friedland

. Approved sentence : Bad

- conduct discharge, confinement for 30 days, and reduction to the grade of E

- 1. Sentence adjudged 3 December 2014 by SPCM convened at Joint Base Pearl Harbor

- Hickam, Hawaii

. For Appellant : Major Mark C

. Bruegger

. For Appellee : Colonel Katherine E. Oler

. Before DUBRISKE , B ENNETT , and C. BROWN , Appellate Military Judges

_______ _______ __________ This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent u nder AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4.

_______ _______ __________ P ER CURIAM : This case is before us for further review after our superior court set aside th is c ourt’s previous decision and the original c onvening a uthority ’s action

. United States v. Addison , 75 M.J. 405 ( C.A.A.F. 20 1 6)

. T he record was returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to an appropriate convening authority for a new staff j ud ge advocate ’s r ecommendation (SJAR)United States v. A ddison , No. ACM S32287 (rem)

2 and convening a uthori t y’s action

. Id

. The post

- trial processing has been re

- accomplished with the convening authority approving the same sentence as was originally approved

. We now review the case on its merits. We note the addendum to the SJAR did not specifically advise the convening authority of his mandatory requirement to consider the SJAR and the report of result of trial before taking action

. See Rule for Courts

- Martial 1107(b)( 3)(A); Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51

- 201, Administration of Military Justice , ¶ 9.20.1.2 (6 June 2013)

. Given the convening authority noted he reviewed all matters attached to the addendum, including the SJAR and report of result of trial, and ulti mately approved a sentence in accordance with the pretrial a greement, we find no prejudice

. The consistent use of post

- trial processing templates found in AFI 51

- 201 will eliminate these unnecessary errors and better facilitate accurate post

- trial process ing.The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error prejudicial to the substantial rights of A ppellant occurred

. Articles 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c 2 )

. Accordingly, the findings and sentence are AFFIR MED

. FOR THE COURT

KURT J. BRUBAKER Clerk of Court
#### Charles M. FALLON, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. SALOMON SMITH BARNEY INC., f/k/a Smith Barney Inc., and Citigroup Inc., f/k/a Travelers Group Inc., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 02-7500.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Jan. 30, 2003.

Neil A. Sussman, Sussman & Frankel, LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Brad S. Karp (Daniel J. Toal, Andrew Tauber, on the brief), Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York, NY, for Respondents-Appellees.

PRESENT: OAKES, CALABRESI, and SACK, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Charles M. Fallon, Jr. appeals the district court’s (Casey *J.)*confirmation of a New York Stock Exchange arbitral panel’s ruling, which denied Fallon’s challenge to the forfeiture condition on certain deferred-compensation “bonus” awards paid by his former employer, Salomon Smith Barney. The district court found the awards not to be “wages” within the meaning of New York labor law (which prohibits the forfeiture of earned wages), and accordingly refused to vacate the arbitrators’ decision. We need not reach the question of whether the awards are wages, however, because where, as here, an arbi-tral panel declines to explain its ruling, the courts must confirm the arbitration award “[i]f there is even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached.” *Willem-ijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp.,*103 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Having carefully studied the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that, in light of *Truelove v. Northeast Capital & Advisory, Inc.,*95 N.Y.2d 220, 715 N.Y.S.2d 366, 738 N.E.2d 770 (2000), there is a colorable argument for excluding Fal-lon’s deferred compensation from the category of “wages” under New York labor law.

We have considered the appellant’s remaining arguments and find them without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

Syms CorpSecaucus, New Jersey

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Forms S-8 (Nos. 2-9703, 333-44254 and 333-127399) of Syms Corp of our reports dated April 19, 2007, relating to the consolidated financial
statements and the effectiveness of Syms Corp. and subsidiaries' internal control over financial reporting which appears in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.

/s/ BDO Seidman, LLPBDO Seidman, LLPNew York, New YorkApril 26, 2007

---