In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-1497

NATIONAL CASUALTY COMPANY, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

MICHAEL M. MCFATRIDGE, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 2:07-cv-02056-HAB-DCB—Harold A. Baker, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2009—DECIDED APRIL 28, 2010

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and

ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs National Casualty

Company and Scottsdale Indemnity Company provided

commercial general liability (“CGL”) and law enforcement insurance to Edgar County, Illinois, via a series of

policies. In 2005, Gordon “Randy” Steidl sued Edgar

County and its former state’s attorney, Michael
2 No. 09-1497

McFatridge for damages stemming from Steidl’s 1986

conviction for murder, which a federal court overturned

in 2003. The district court held that National Casualty

Company and Scottsdale Indemnity Company have

no obligation to defend or indemnify McFatridge or

the county under four insurance policies issued in

1989, 1997, 1998 and 1999. The county and McFatridge

appeal and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1987, Steidl was convicted in Edgar County of murder.

Eventually, Steidl’s appeals entered the federal system

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In June 2003, the district court

granted a writ of habeas corpus based on ineffectual

counsel at the trial and sentencing in the state court.

Steidl sued, under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law, a

number of officials involved in the prosecution, including

Illinois State Police and Paris police officers who had

investigated the murders, and former Edgar County

State’s Attorney Michael McFatridge, who was involved

in the investigation and prosecution. Steidl also named

the County of Edgar as a defendant and necessary party.

According to the complaint, McFatridge, in cooperation with Paris police, framed and falsely prosecuted

Steidl. The complaint says that McFatridge coerced and

threatened two key witnesses, induced them to testify

falsely, and concealed numerous pieces of exculpatory evidence during the trial. Steidl also claims that

throughout the post-conviction proceedings, even after
No. 09-1497 3

McFatridge left office in 1991, he continued to coerce

witnesses, lied about the evidence, and engaged in

a publicity campaign defending the trial and Steidl’s

conviction.

Steidl’s suit seeks damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The county

tendered the suit to National and Scottsdale, believing

itself entitled to a legal defense and indemnification

under each of four insurance policies the companies

issued. The insurers responded by filing a declaratory

judgment action, asking the court to determine that they

had no duty to defend or indemnify the county under

any of the policies.

There are four separate insurance policies at issue, each

in effect at a different time: A law enforcement liability

policy issued by Scottsdale Insurance Company was

in effect from May 25, 1989, until May 25, 1990. It named

“County of Edgar S.D.” as the insured. In addition, three

CGL policies—two issued by Scottsdale Indemnity Company, and one issued by National Casualty Company—insured Edgar County from July 1, 1997, until

July 1, 2000. Each of the three policies covered a oneyear period.

 Edgar County argued that the policies are at least

ambiguous about whether they provide it or McFatridge

coverage for liability to Steidl, and should be read against

the drafters, in favor of a duty to defend. The district

court granted summary judgment for the insurers.

First, the court found no coverage for McFatridge

under the law enforcement policy in effect from May 1989
4 No. 09-1497

through May 1990 because the state’s attorney was not

a “Class C” employee under that policy. In addition, while

indicating that McFatridge’s conduct during the postconviction proceedings “suggests the possibility of coverage” under the two CGL policies in effect in 1998 and

early 1999, the court pointed out that McFatridge left

office in 1991. It held that the CGL policies did not cover

acts by former officials or employees committed during

the policy periods; therefore, McFatridge was not an

insured under any of the three CGL policies.

Edgar County appealed the district court’s decision

and filed this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION 

In determining whether the insurance companies

must provide former Edgar County State’s Attorney

Michael McFatridge with coverage—a legal defense and/or

indemnity—for liability arising from Steidl’s prosecution

and conviction, we look to Illinois law, which the parties

agree governs this dispute. Conn. Indem. Co. v. DER Travel

Serv., Inc., 328 F.3d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 2003). We review

the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.

Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 500

F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2007).

A. Duty to Defend

An insurer’s duty to defend its insured is broader than

its duty to indemnify. If an insurer has no duty to defend,
No. 09-1497 5

it has no duty to indemnify. We determine whether an

insurer has a duty to defend by examining the underlying

complaint and the language of the insurance policy. Gen.

Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co.,

828 N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Ill. 2005). Any doubts as to

whether particular claims fall within the policy are resolved in favor of coverage. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 500

F.3d at 643. So if the “complaint asserts facts within or

potentially within policy coverage, an insurer is obligated

to defend its insured.” Gen. Agents, 828 N.E.2d at 1098.

On the other hand, an insurer may refuse to defend an

action in which, from the face of the complaint, the allegations are clearly outside the bounds of the policy

coverage. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co.,

578 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Ill. 1991).

Each of the four policies in question provided “occurrence” coverage and name “County of Edgar” or “County

of Edgar S.D.” as named insureds. Coverage depends on

whether the particular policy contemplated coverage

for McFatridge or the state’s attorney’s office, if it does,

we ask whether any of the allegations in Steidl’s complaint “occurred” during the coverage periods.

The county argues that as state’s attorney, McFatridge

was an insured under the law enforcement policy in effect

from May 1989 until May 1990. During that policy

period, the complaint says that McFatridge made false

public statements about Steidl’s guilt, coerced witnesses

to prevent them from recanting false testimony and

provided fabricated evidence to the post-conviction

court. According to the county, Scottsdale has a duty to
6 No. 09-1497

The county’s brief cites to a “public officials liability coverage 1

form,” Appellants’ Brief at 18; App. at A-114-115, as support

for this contention. But this form plainly excludes any duty to

defend against McFatridge’s claims. It says the insurer “will not

be obligated . . . to defend any ‘suit’ in connection with any

‘claim’ made against the insured . . . [f]or false arrest, false

imprisonment, . . . defamation . . . malicious prosecution or

abuse of process.” A nearly identical form in the same policy

entitled, “Law Enforcement Liability Coverage Form”

also lists persons who “were” elected officials as insureds,

App. at A-94-96. We address the county’s argument under

this coverage form.

defend because McFatridge was an insured under the

law enforcement policy and is potentially liable

for conduct within the policy period. And, in addition,

even though he left office in 1991, the county contends

that CGL policies in effect from mid-1997 until mid-2000

require Scottsdale and National to defend it and

McFatridge. It claims that McFatridge is an insured

under the third CGL policy because it contains an endorsement that lists “persons who . . . were . . . your

lawfully elected . . . officials” as covered under that

policy. Alternatively, the county argues that McFatridge 1

participated in a long-running conspiracy to deprive

Steidl of a fair trial, that began when he was a public

official with Edgar County and continued into the

CGL policy periods. Any conduct that occurred after

McFatridge left office was therefore part of a single continuing offense committed under McFatridge’s authority

as state’s attorney. This at least raises an ambiguity,

according to the county, about whether a former official
No. 09-1497 7

is an insured under the CGL policies for wrongful acts

that continued into the policy period, because the course

of conduct began when he was state’s attorney.

Finally, the county suggests that, regardless of the

state’s attorney’s status as an insured, the Illinois Local

Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/9-102 (2006), requires

it to reimburse the state’s attorney for its liability. If it is

liable for acts McFatridge took during the policy periods,

the county argues that the insurers must provide a

defense and indemnity. We address coverage under

each argument in turn.

1. The Law Enforcement Policy—Duty to Defend

Because the law enforcement policy was in effect during

McFatridge’s tenure as state’s attorney and provides

slightly different coverage, we discuss it separately

from the three CGL policies.

Scottsdale issued the law enforcement policy, which

was in effect from May 25, 1989, until May 25, 1990. The

law enforcement policy required Scottsdale to pay all

sums “which the insured shall become legally obligated

to pay . . . because of wrongful acts . . . caused by an

occurrence and arising out of the performance of

the insured’s duties to provide law enforcement.” App. at

A-163 (emphasis added). Under that policy, “insured—

means the named insured and all full or part-time and

all auxiliary or volunteer law enforcement officers of the
8 No. 09-1497

named insured.” App. at A-164. It defines “occurrence” as

“an event, including continuous or repeated exposure

to conditions, which results in personal injury . . . sustained during the policy period.”

We first address whether the law enforcement policy

contemplated coverage for liability for the acts of

McFatridge in his role as state’s attorney. “County of

Edgar S.D.” is the named insured in the policy. The

county defendants argue that whether or not County of

Edgar S.D. refers to the sheriff’s department is ambiguous and so should be read in favor of coverage for

the County of Edgar as a whole. However, an endorsement to the policy names “County of Edgar, IL” as an

additional insured. The endorsement specifies that

County of Edgar is only an insured “with respect[] to

liability arising out of the activities of the named insured,” or County of Edgar S.D. Looking at the “type

of insurance purchased, the nature of the risk involved,

and the overall purpose of the contract,” Nicor, Inc. v.

Assoc. Elec. and Gas Ins. Serv. Ltd., 860 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ill.

2006), (in this case the provision of law enforcement

coverage), we think the policy clearly contemplated

County of Edgar Sheriff’s Department as the named

insured. The sheriff is the county’s main law enforcement official. The county’s contention that “County of

Edgar S.D.” is ambiguous because it could mean something else does not make it so. See Valley Forge Ins. Co. v.

Swiderski Elecs., Inc., 860 N.E.2d 307, 314 (Ill. 2007)

(internal citations omitted) (terms are not ambiguous

“simply if the parties can suggest creative possibilities

for their meaning”). We will not strain to interpret a
No. 09-1497 9

particular provision in a way that would render another

provision meaningless. Shelton v. Andres, 478 N.E.2d 311,

314 (Ill. 1985). Reading “County of Edgar S.D.” as ambiguous and potentially naming the county as a whole would

render the endorsement naming County of Edgar itself

meaningless. But if, as we conclude, the sheriff’s department is the named insured, the endorsement negotiated

by the parties and separately added to the policy has

meaning.

Moreover, the other policies at issue, which no one

disputes insure the county government itself, list “County

of Edgar” as the named insured indicating a distinction

between CGL insurance provided to the county government, and law enforcement coverage purchased for the

sheriff’s department.

Further undercutting the county’s argument on this

point is that the address on the policy for “County of

Edgar S.D.” is different from that of the county government. The named insured on the law enforcement policy

is located at 228 North Central Avenue, the same address

listed publicly by the county for its sheriff’s department.

http://www.edgarcounty-il.gov/Sheriff/default.aspx (last

visited Apr. 8, 2010). The address for the County of

Edgar itself, both according to the CGL policies and the

county’s website, is “Edgar County Courthouse,” which

is actually located at 115 West Court Street in Paris.

http://www.edgarcounty-il.gov/CountyClerk/default.aspx

(last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 

The endorsement does provide coverage for Edgar

County as an additional insured. But it does not cover
10 No. 09-1497

McFatridge or the state’s attorney’s office for the claims in

Steidl’s suit. Edgar County is an additional insured “only

with respect[] to liability arising out of the activities of

the named insured,” the sheriff’s department. However,

the law enforcement policy does not contemplate coverage for all law enforcement activity simply by virtue

of its taking place within Edgar County. McFatridge and

the state’s attorney’s office became involved as the state’s

chief prosecuting official in Edgar County. The state’s

attorney’s duty in this case arises from Illinois law, and

not “out of the activities of the [sheriff’s department].”

Under state law the state’s attorney must “prosecute

all . . . indictments and prosecutions . . . in the circuit court

for his county.” 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-9005(a)(1). When

McFatridge investigated, charged and prosecuted Steidl,

he engaged in activity arising out of his duties as state’s

attorney as defined by Illinois law, not as part of the

activities of the County of Edgar Sheriff’s Department.

A reading of Steidl’s complaint reveals that the sheriff’s

department was not involved in the investigation and

its activities are not the subject of the lawsuit. McFatridge

worked solely with the Paris police and Illinois State

Police. In short, the county is not insured in this

case because any liability it might have to Steidl for

his wrongful prosecution arises only through the activity

of the state’s attorney and not through any activities of

the sheriff’s department.

If coverage for the county in Steidl’s case were not

already foreclosed by the fact that the law enforcement

policy and its endorsement cover sheriff’s department

activities only, the rest of the policy’s terms unambigu-
No. 09-1497 11

ously do the job. The terms of the “Insuring Agreement”

explicitly provide that the policy provides coverage in

the event of an injury or damage caused by an “occurrence.” The policy defines “occurrence” as “an

event, . . . which results in . . . injury . . . and arising out of

the performance of the insured’s law enforcement duties.” App. at A-164 (emphasis added). As mentioned

above, the insureds in this case are the sheriff’s department and the county, but only for “liability arising out

of the activities” of the sheriff’s department. There is

no such liability here. McFatridge’s involvement arose

out of his duty as state’s attorney and the activities of the

Paris police and Illinois State Police. With no law enforcement activity by the sheriff’s department, there

was no covered “occurrence” and no duty for Scottsdale

to defend the county in this case.

Despite this seemingly clear language limiting coverage

to situations where liability arose from sheriff department activities, Edgar County further maintains that

ambiguity in the “Conditions” section of the policy

creates the possibility of coverage for McFatridge. The

section provides as follows:

1. PREMIUM. . . . For the purpose of determining

the actual premium, the following definitions will

apply:

. . . . 

“Class C Employees”—those employees who

do not exercise power of arrest and whose

duties are only administrative in nature.”
12 No. 09-1497

App. at A-164. The policy then lists specific positions that

are part of the Class C category—county commissioner,

mayor, auxiliary police officer and coroner. The district

court held that McFatridge and the Edgar County State’s

Attorney are not Class C employees because under

Illinois law the state’s attorney’s duties are not just

“administrative” in nature, a construction which the

plaintiffs National and Scottsdale urge us to affirm. Edgar

County maintains that the state’s attorney fits within

this definition because he is not specifically excluded,

does not have the power of arrest, and “provides administrative assistance to law enforcement.” But the plain

language of this section indicates that in order to be a

“Class C” employee, one must be an “employee” of the

insured. McFatridge is not an employee of the sheriff’s

department or the county, and cannot be a Class C employee under the law enforcement policy. The best characterization of the state’s attorney is that he is a state constitutional official with jurisdiction in the county in

which he is elected. He can serve as an agent of the

county when representing county officers in suits

brought against them or on their behalf. 55 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 5/3-9005(a)(3), (4). But his primary duty is prosecuting criminal actions—a function he fulfills as a state

employee. 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-9005(a)(1). The government of the county in which the state’s attorney is

elected has neither the power to direct, oversee nor

control these prosecutions; the state’s attorney is not

its employee. Further, Illinois law explicitly holds that

the state’s attorney is a state, and not a county employee.

McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 1995);
No. 09-1497 13

Ingemunson v. Hedges, 549 N.E.2d 1269 (Ill. 1990)

(“[D]rafters of our present constitution agreed . . . that

state’s attorneys should be classified as state, rather

than county officers.”).

That the Illinois Constitution treats state’s attorneys

differently from other county officials adds further

support to this holding. The position of state’s attorney

is created in the judicial article. Ill. Const. art. VI, § 19.

Counties have no power to eliminate the state’s attorney

position and multiple counties may share a single state’s

attorney only if the voters in each county agree. Id. By

contrast, all other county offices are created within the

constitution’s local government article. Id. at art. VII, § 4

(sheriff, clerk, treasurer, coroner, assessor, recorder,

auditor). Unlike its limited power over the state’s attorney, the county can completely eliminate any of these

positions via referendum and can even eliminate

some simply by passing an ordinance. Id.

Acknowledging this authority, the county attempts to

distinguish the Illinois cases and constitutional framework by pointing out that the state’s attorney serves as

the county’s attorney—its agent—in civil actions brought

by, and against the county. The budget for the state’s

attorney’s office and a portion of his salary come from

county coffers, suggesting that the state’s attorney may

be a county employee in some situations. The problem

with this argument is that it also proves the opposite

point: when prosecuting criminal cases, such as the

case against Steidl, the state’s attorney acts in his independent capacity as a representative of the people of
14 No. 09-1497

Illinois in the county in which he works. While

the county does pay a portion of the salary, the state

pays two-thirds, a division that would seem to reflect

the division between the state’s attorney’s duties as a

criminal prosecutor and service to the county in other

circumstances. See 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-2001(a). It is

true, as the county points out that the state’s attorney

can be characterized a county agent at various times.

But when McFatridge investigated, charged and prosecuted Steidl, he acted on behalf of the state and was not

a Class C employee of Edgar County or even an employee at all.

Finally, we note that even if none of the above was

true regarding the state’s attorney’s non-status as a

county employee, it is doubtful that the “Conditions”

section of the law enforcement policy would give rise

to the insurer’s duty to defend. As the insurers point out,

this section purports only to define classes of employees

for purposes of calculating premiums. It says nothing

about changing other definitions in the policy describing

who is an insured. So a duty to defend the insured for

an act of a “Class C” employee arises only if the other

policy requirements and definitions are satisfied. For

example, the “Insuring Agreement” says that the policy

will pay damages caused by the insured’s wrongful acts

“arising out of the performance of the insured’s duties to

provide law enforcement” activity. As discussed above,

the “insured” is the sheriff’s department with the

County of Edgar being additionally covered. So acts

are covered only if they arise out of the performance of

the sheriff’s department’s law enforcement duties, or at
No. 09-1497 15

its very broadest, the county’s law enforcement duties.

McFatridge’s prosecution of Steidl had nothing to do

with duties of either the county or its sheriff’s department to provide law enforcement activities. Based on the

complaint, the county and its sheriff’s department had

nothing to do with the prosecution and any misconduct

by McFatridge was not part of the county’s “duties to

provide law enforcement.” Even if McFatridge fit the

definition of a “Class C” employee, which he does not,

the insurer has no duty to defend him under the law

enforcement policy because the “Insuring Agreement”

limits coverage to liability for those acts of the various

classes of employees undertaken pursuant to the

county’s duty to provide law enforcement. The definition of Class C employees does nothing to change this

and the insurers have no duty to defend under the

law enforcement policy.

2. McFatridge as an Insured—The CGL Policies

 Like the law enforcement policies, the three CGL policies

cover the county on an occurrence basis. To determine

whether the insurers have a duty to defend, we match

the factual allegations in Steidl’s complaint against each

of the policies to determine whether any of the claims

fall within the coverage. BASF AG v. Great Am. Assurance

Co., 522 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 2008). Any ambiguities

in the policy are resolved in the insured’s favor.

The three CGL policies did not take effect until after

McFatridge left the state’s attorney’s office. They

offer nearly identical coverage. Each policy covers
16 No. 09-1497

“ ‘[p]ersonal injury’ caused by an offense arising out

of [County of Edgar’s] business . . . but only if the

offense was committed . . . during the policy period.” App.

at A-27, A-50, A-74. All three policies covered personal

injury arising from offenses such as “false arrest, detention or imprisonment” and “[m]alicious prosecution.”

The first policy, issued by National, covered the period

from July 1, 1997, through July 1, 1998. Scottsdale

issued the second two policies, each in effect for one

year, from July 1, 1998, through July 1, 2000. Each

insured the “County of Edgar,” its “employees,” “elective

officers,” and “duly elected officials.” Thus the three

CGL policies insure the county, its employees and

elected officials in the event one of them becomes

liable because of an offense committed within the

policy period.

The district court held that only two allegations in

Steidl’s complaint describe offenses committed during

the policy periods. In January 1998, McFatridge gave

false testimony at an evidentiary hearing held to determine whether post-conviction relief was warranted.

Then, while Steidl’s post-conviction petition was

pending, McFatridge perpetuated a publicity campaign

to defeat the petition. The court held that neither of

these acts triggers coverage under the CGL policies.

McFatridge left the state’s attorney’s office in 1991 and

was no longer an elected official in the county when

he engaged in these acts. To the extent they constitute

“offenses” within the coverage provided, the district

court determined that McFatridge acted as a private

citizen and not as an insured. It concluded that none of

the three CGL policies contemplates coverage for
No. 09-1497 17

liability arising from offenses committed by a former

official after that official left office.

We agree with the district court. The CGL policies cover

“insureds,” defined as “employees” and “elected . . .

officials.” McFatridge left the state’s attorney’s office in

1991 and was not an elected official during any of the

CGL policy periods. Because he was not an insured, none

of the misconduct Steidl claims McFatridge committed

during the policy periods is a covered occurrence.

The county points to several endorsements to the third

CGL policy stating that “all persons who were . . . your

lawfully elected . . . officials” are insureds. But the

policy covers only insureds for liability arising out of

occurrences during the policy period. Steidl’s complaint

does not claim any misconduct during the third CGL

period. If none of McFatridge’s offenses occurred during

the policy period, there is no duty to defend under

that policy.

The county also claims that coverage is triggered under

the CGL policies because McFatridge’s misconduct was

an ongoing tort that continued from Steidl’s arrest in

1987 until his release in 2003. But this ignores that the

CGL policies provide coverage only if the “offense was

committed . . . in the policy period.” None of the tort

offenses Steidl claims McFatridge committed as state’s

attorney occurred during any of the policy periods.

The complaint says McFatridge’s conduct entitles

Steidl to damages for a variety of offenses under both

state and federal law. The federal law offenses under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 include false imprisonment, deprivation
18 No. 09-1497

of the Steidl’s right to a fair trial, wrongful conviction

and denial of due process. But none of these offenses

occurred during the CGL policy periods. A § 1983 false

imprisonment claim seeks damages for injury caused by

the plaintiff’s detention without probable cause. The

false imprisonment ends, and the claim accrues when he

is held pursuant to a warrant or other judicially issued

process. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390-93 (2007).

McFatridge obtained a warrant to arrest Steidl on

February 19, 1987, and a grand jury indicted Steidl on

March 10, 1987. So to the extent Steidl’s complaint

makes out a § 1983 claim in the nature of false arrest,

that offense was committed at the very latest in 1987,

before Steidl was arrested pursuant to a judicially

issued warrant, and well before any of the policy periods. Steidl’s other federal law claims for unconstitutional

conviction, imprisonment, and denial of due process, on

the other hand, challenge the validity of his conviction.

These claims did not accrue until 2003, because they

require Steidl to prove that his “conviction . . . has been

reversed on direct appeal, . . . or called into question by a

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Johnson v. Dossey,

515 F.3d 778, (7th Cir. 2008). So Steidl did not have a

complete cause of action, and there was no offense of

wrongful conviction or deprivation of due process until

June 17, 2003, when the district court issued the writ of

habeas corpus. This is long after the CGL policies expired

and the insurers have no duty to defend against these

claims.
No. 09-1497 19

Steidl’s state law claims suffer the same fate. He

claims damage for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress and

conspiracy under Illinois law. Like his § 1983 claims,

Steidl’s false arrest ended, and the claim accrued when

authorities got a warrant for his arrest. Mercado v. Vill.

of Addison, 898 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008);

Smith v. Boudreau, 852 N.E.2d 433, 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)

(citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 427, as controlling accrual

of state and federal false arrest claims). Any offenses

relating to Steidl being arrested without probable cause

were accordingly committed, at the very latest, in

February or March 1987, long before any of the policy

periods. On the other hand, the state law malicious prosecution claim depends upon the invalidation of Steidl’s

underlying conviction. Cult Awareness Network v. Church

of Scientology, Inter., 685 N.E.2d 1347, 1351 (Ill. 1997).

That offense did not occur, for insurance purposes, until

June 2003, several years after the CGL policies expired

in 2000. See Sec. Mutual Cas. Ins. Co. v. Harbor Ins., 382

N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), rev’d on other grounds

397 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. 1979).

3. The Local Governmental and Governmental

Employees Tort Immunity Act

The county additionally argues that Illinois law

requires it to indemnify the state’s attorney’s office for

any damages it pays to Steidl on his claims. See 745 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 10/9-102; Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County,

787 N.E.2d 127, 138-39 (Ill. 2003). Indemnifying the
20 No. 09-1497

state’s attorney’s office for its liability, according to the

county, means that it would be “legally obligated to

pay damages because of ‘personal injury,’ ” which it

claims the policies cover. We find, however, that such a

view misreads both the terms of the insurance policies,

and the holding in Carver, 787 N.E.2d at 139.

Carver held that the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 10/9-102, requires a county to pay judgments

rendered against the sheriff’s office, an independently

elected county official reliant on the county for operational funding. Carver, 787 N.E.2d at 138-39. Courts have

subsequently applied this principle to suits involving

other independent officials whose operations the

county funds. See, e.g., Horstman v. County of DuPage, 284

F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131-32 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing Biggerstaff

v. Moran, 671 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Ill. 1996)). But the obligation to pay the judgment does not mean the county itself

is liable to the plaintiff. Rather, the county is only a necessary party to the suit so that, as an insurer or backstop

for the independent official, it may “veto improvident

settlements.” Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324

F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003).

Additionally, as we held above, the policies issued to

Edgar County cover only “insureds,” meaning the

county, its elected officials, and employees. These

insureds are not covered unless the offense occurs

during the policy period. Even though personal injury

liability may be the original source of an official’s

liability, a county’s obligation to indemnify that official
No. 09-1497 21

for that liability arises by operation of law and is not an

occurrence. The county’s obligation to pay judgments

against McFatridge or the state’s attorney’s office under

§ 10/9-102 is not an occurrence or accident as defined

by the policies and the insurers have no duty to defend

or indemnify the county.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the insurers have no duty

to defend or indemnify McFatridge or Edgar County.

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

4-28-10