### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

MICHAEL DAVID SANDOVAL
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 21

- 2193

[ February 16, 2022 ]

Appeal from the County Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.

Lucie County ; Kathryn Nelson , Judge; L.T. Case No. 562021MM000317A

.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Elijah Giuliano, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pablo Tapia,

Assistant Attorn ey General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

M AY
, J.

The defendant appeals a written probation order entered following his plea to one count of battery. He argues the trial court erred in entering

the order after the record had been transmitted to this co urt in his direct appeal . He also argues the court erred in imposing special conditions, which were not pronounced at sentencing. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Following his plea , the trial court sentenced the d efendant to sixty days in county jail, followed by ten months of probation. The d efendant timely appealed the judgment and sentence. The trial court clerk transmitted the

record to this c ourt on August 2, 2021. Twenty

- nine days later, o n August

3 1 , 2021, the trial court entered the written probation order.

In September, the de fendant filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct errors in his sentence. He raised th e following

issues :2 1. T he trial court lacked jurisdic tion to enter the probation order because the record on appeal had been transferred

to this c ourt.

2. T he written probation order contained five special

conditions that the court did not orally pronounce.

3. T he order enhanced the restriction that prohibit ed him from having any contact with the victim.

4. T he court incorrectly assessed a $25 cost of investigation.

The State responded that the challenged conditions were standard and did not need to be orally pronounced. T he court had jurisdiction to enter the probation order because doing so was ministerial in nature. And the

no

- contact order inherently implied no contact with the victim’s residence, place of employment, etc.

The trial court agreed t he $25 cost of investigation should be stricken

but re jected the other arguments and otherwise denied the motion to correct sentence. The defendant now appeals.

T he d efendant continues to argue the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the written probation order because the record had been transferred

t o this court . The State concedes error on this point. We have explained

a t rial court is not divested of jurisdiction to issue written orders conforming to oral pronouncements once the notice of appeal is filed if the

written order is entered before the record on appeal is transmitted

. Escobar v. State , 189 So. 3d 1029

, 1032 (Fl a. 4th DCA 2016)

.

Here, the written probation order was entered after the record on appeal

had been transferred. T he trial lacked jurisdiction to enter the probation

order at that time. We therefore reverse and remand the case for the trial

court to ree nter the written probation order with the following corrections

. See Witham v. State , 311 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)

.

Next, t he d efendant argues the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $65 for the first month of the probationary period and $55 ea ch month thereafter because these discretionary costs were not pro nounced at sentencing. The State agrees and so do w e.

Section 948.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2020), provides that any person placed on misdemeanor probation by a county court must contr ibute not less than $40 per month. S tatutorily mandated costs may be imposed3 without notice to the defendant. Finkelstein v. State , 944 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) . “However, the trial court is required to give the defendant notice of the impo sition of discretionary costs and to make an oral pronouncement of such costs and their statutory basis. If this does not occur, and discretionary costs are made a condition of probation, they are to be stricken, and cannot be re

- imposed.” Id. (internal citation omitted). We therefore reverse and remand the case to the trial court to reduce the monthly supervision cost to $40 per month. See Bartolone v.

State , 327 So. 3d 331 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)

.

The defendant next argues the court erred in requiring him not to visit places where intoxicants, drugs, or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used without requiring the defendant’s knowledge. While reading this provision with t he standard probation condition would require the defendant’s knowledge, we suggest upon
remand the trial court amend the condition to reflect the d efendant may not “knowingly visit” such prohibited places. See Nelson v. State , 669 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

We have reviewed the remaining challenged conditions

. 1 We find no

error in the court’s imposition of th e standard conditions or with its explicit

clarification of some of them. We therefore affirm o n the remaining issues.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded

.

G ERBER and L EVINE
, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1 (a) Report to the probation officer as directed.

(b) Permit the probation officer to visit him or her at his or her home or

elsewhere.

(c) Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible.

(d) Remain within a specified place.

(e) Live without violating any law. A conviction in a court of law is not necessary for such a violation of law to constitute a violation of probation, community control, or any other form of court

- ordered supervision.