IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-8164 D.C. Docket No. 4:94-CV-12(DF) CAROL L. POOLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus THE COUNTRY CLUB OF COLUMBUS, INC., VAFA GHALAGHIR, individually and as General Manager, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia

(November 17, 1997) Before COX and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and HUNT*, District Judge. HUNT, District Judge: Plaintiff Carol L. Poole appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant The Country Club of Columbus (“CCC”) on plaintiff’s age discrimination claims and dismissing plaintiff’s pendent state law claims . Poole brought suit claiming defendants CCC and

____________________________ *Honorable Willis B. Hunt, Jr., U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.2 Vafa Ghalaghir impermissibly discriminated agains t her because of her age, retaliated against her for engaging in a statutorily protected activity, and committed various state law torts. In support of her age discrimination claim, Poole alleges that she was constructively discharged from CCC. Because we find that a genuine issue of material f act exists as to whether Poole was constructively discharged, we reverse the district court and remand this action for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND After working as Ghalaghir’s executive secretary for almost two years, plaintiff Carol L. Poole, who was fifty-six years old at the time, was told that her duties and responsibilities would be reduced to virtually nothing. Until this, Pool e’s duties to Ghalaghir, the General Manager of CCC, included typing correspondence, taking mi nutes at board meetings, supervising receptionists, and purchasing office supplies. Th e change in the relationship between Ghalaghir and Poole was not an abrupt shift; tensions between the two had been mounting for some time. In early 1992, Ghalaghir’s wife routinely displ aced Poole from her desk and computer, and began performing many of the typing duties previously ha ndled by Poole. In July 1992, Poole gave an unsworn statement in support of six former employees who were suing CCC and Ghalaghir for age discrimination. Four days la ter, Ghalaghir sent a security guard to Poole’s home at night to retrieve her key to Ghalaghir’s office. The secur ity guard stated that Ghalaghir had lost his key, but Poole’s key was never returned to her. About this same time, Poole injured her right eye while at work, but Ghalaghir refused to submit Poole’ s worker’s compensation claim to the insurance carrier, instead waiting almost a year and then forc ing Poole to submit it herself. Plaintiff offers3 evidence that Ghalaghir also made remarks to her and to others regarding Poole’s age. For example, Ghalaghir allegedly said to Poole that “ you’re as old as my mother,” and said to others that he was “too fast paced for an elderly secret ary” and that Poole “w as too old, had too many lines in her face, and too many gray hairs.” Beginning in April 1992, Poole began taking an ti-depressant medication after contacting her regular physician complaining of stress related disorders. This was Poole’s fourth episode of seeking medical advice for stress since 1989. In August 1992, Poole’s physician recommended to CCC that Poole take a five day vacation, a request which CCC granted, and that CCC enact provisions to reduce Poole’s stress. Poole returned to work on a Tuesday, and that day, as well as the two following days, Poole was not allowe d to use her desk or computer, which were occupied by Ghalaghir’s wife. Instead, Poole was sent to the business office, and spent three days stuffing envelopes and correcting two letters that had already been entered into a word processor. On Friday of that week, Ghalaghir told Pool e that she was being relieved of all existing responsibilities and that she was being transferred to the business office, but that her pay and benefits would not decrease. Plaintiff alleges that Ghalaghir instructed other employees not to speak to her, that once in the business office she was given only a chair with no desk, that she was not allowed to pack her belongi ngs herself, and that, because Poole had no place to store her belongings, they were placed next to her chair in boxes. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that no duties or responsibilities attached to her new position. P oole spent only a few days in her new job before resigning.1 Plaintiff has not appealed this portion of the district court’s order. 4 After filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, plaintiff brought suit against defendants in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Plaintiff’s comp laint seeks damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §623(a) and (d) (“ADEA”), and for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and negligent retention under laws of the State of Georgia. The district court dismissed plaintiff’s claims as to defendant Ghalaghir, relying on Eleventh Circuit law that holds that only the em ployer, and not the individual wrongdoer, is liable for ADEA violations. 1 The district court granted defendant CCC’s motion for summary judgment on the ADEA claim and dismissed without prejudi ce the supplemental state law claims. Without reaching the issue of whether defendant CCC was motivated by impermissible discriminatory intent, the district court found that, as a matter of law, plaintiff voluntarily resigned, and thus was not constructively discharged. In light of this fi nding, the district court held that plaintiff could not succeed on her ADEA claim, since plaintiff suffered no adverse employment decision, an element of a successful claim.

DISCUSSION We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the same standard the district court applied. Killinge r v. Sanford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir. 1997); Walls v. Button Gwinnett Bancorp ., Inc., 1 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir. 1993). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions,2 One of the elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA is that plaintiff must show the employer engaged in an adverse employment decision. See 29 U.S.C. §623 (1985); Benson v. Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997). Constructive discharge qualifies as an adverse employment decision. Maddow v. Procter & Gamble, 107 F.3d 846, 852 (11th Cir. 1997); Stamey v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 859 F.2d 855, 859-60 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied , 490 U.S. 1116, 109 S. Ct. 3178, 104 L. Ed.2d 1040 (1989). 5 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, t ogether with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is material if, under applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case. A nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed.2d 202 (1986); Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U.S. 911, 113 S. Ct. 1259, 122 L. Ed.2d 657 (1993). “It is genuine if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Tipton, 965 F.2d at 998 (internal quotation marks omitted). The movant has the burden of showing the absen ce of a genuine issue of material fact, and a court, in deciding whether the burden has b een satisfied, must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L. Ed.2d 142 (1970); Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) . Once the movant has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to pres ent evidence sufficient to make a “showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Allen, 121 F.3d at 646 (citations omitted). Poole claims that she was constructively discharged by CCC in violation of the ADEA. 2 To successfully claim constructive discharge, a plaintiff must demonstrate that working conditions6 were “so intolerable that a reasonable person in her position would have been compelled to resign.” Thomas v. Dillard Dep’t Stor es, Inc., 116 F.3d 1432, 1433-34 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 512 U.S. 1221, 114 S. Ct. 2708, 129 L. Ed.2d 836 (1994); see also Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 1993). Stripped of all res ponsibility, given only a chair and no desk, and isolated from conversations with other workers, Poole has presented evidence suggesting that a reasonable person might find the conditions under which she was working intolerable. Consequently, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we hold that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether plaintiff was constructively discharged from CCC. Of course, because other evidence suggest s that Poole’s job responsibilities were slashed due to her stress related conditions, the question remains open as to whether the plaintiff will ultimately meet her burden of persuasion on the i ssue of constructive discharge. The Court also leaves unresolved the question whether the cons tructive discharge was motivated either by age discrimination or in retaliation for Poole exercisi ng her statutory right to assist former employees in the litigation of their ADEA claims. Because the district court dismissed the fe deral claim against defendant Ghalaghir and granted summary judgment to defendant CCC, it exercised its discretion and dismissed the remaining supplemental state law claims without prejudice. Since the record does not support the district court’s grant of summary judgment, the dismissal of the state law claims must also be reversed.

CONCLUSION7 After considering all the evidence, we conclude that reasonable jurors exercising impartial judgment might reach different conclusions as to whether Poole was constructively discharged. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.