NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Emmanuel Quiaoit Anos,

Petitioner,

v. Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. No. 21

- 729 Agency No. A200

- 247

- 335

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 15, 2023 ** Pasadena, California
Before: LEE, BRESS, MENDOZA , Circuit Judges

.

Emmanu el Quiaoit Anos, a native and citizen of the Phi lippines, petitions
for review of a n order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from an I mmigration J udge’s (IJ) denial of a motion to reopen . We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) . W e deny the petit ion.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 24 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 21

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We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and will

reverse the agency ’s decision only if it is “arbitrar [ y ] , irrationa[ l ] , or contrary to
law.” Cano

-

Merida v. INS , 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted)

. Whe n the BIA adopts the reasoning of the IJ and adds some of its own reasoning, we review both decisions. Nehad v. Mukasey , 535 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008).
But for a few limited exceptions, a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was
rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened

. ” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, A nos was granted pr e - conclusi on voluntary departure on November 6,
2018

. A nos did not , however, depart the Un ited States withi n the required 120 days

. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c

. Instead, A nos remained in the United States until he

was apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security in December 2020. On January 12, 2021, A nos filed a motion to reopen with the IJ

. Despite filing his motion to reopen approximately two years too late , A nos argues that the agency erred in denying the motion because : (1) he established equitable tolling was warranted ; ( 2 ) country conditions in the Philippines ha d materially changed such that he was eligible for asylum, withholding or removal ,

an d/or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) ; and (3) he would potentially be eligible for adjustment of status based on his recent engagement to a U.S. legal permanent resident

. 1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding Anos failed to3 21

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establish equitable tolling was warranted

. Equitable tolling of the time in which to file a motion to reopen may be available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error” or when “despite all due diligence,” the petitioner “is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the
existence of the claim

. ” Lona v. Barr , 958 F.3d 1225, 1230 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted)

. A nos argues the IJ failed to provide a

“ reasoned explanation ” for denying his request for equitable tolling. See Movsisian v. Ashcroft , 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005)

. But the record supports the BIA’s conclusion that A nos never presented an equitable tolling argument to the IJ. Moreover, t he record also supports the BIA’s conclusion that
A nos fail ed to allege any facts that could support a claim for equitable tolling.
We thus deny this claim.
2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding A nos failed to
establish changed country conditions warrant ed reopening

. A petitioner may file

a motion to reopen at any time for the purpose of submitting an application for relief based on changed coun try conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Agonafer
v. Sessions , 859 F.3d 1198, 1203

– 04 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting the 90

- day deadline
d oes not apply to motion s to reopen based on changed country conditions ). This changed country conditions exception focuses on two points in time: “the circumstances of the country at the time of the petitioner’s previous hearing, and4 21

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those at the time of the motion to reopen.” Salim v. Lynch , 831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016 ).
The BIA did not act arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law in concluding Anos failed to establish country conditions in the Philippines changed between November 6, 2018

— the date of his last hearing

— and January 12,
2021

— the date he filed his moti on to reopen

— in ways that are material to Anos’s
claims for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under CAT

. A nos state s that
he fears he will be persecuted and/or tortured if removed to the Philippi nes because “as a longtime resident of the United States [he] will be perceived to have wealth” and “[k]idnapping for ransom is very prevalent in the Philippines.” He

states that p eople who are “ known to return from the United States become targets of this type of crime.”
A nos submitted several p ublications that confirm kidnappings “for criminal purposes ” occur in the Philippines , b ut “[g]eneral references to ‘continuing’ or ‘remaining’ problems is not evidence of a change in a country’s
conditions.” Rodriguez v. Garland , 990 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2021). T he
record contains no evidence from which one could conclude longtime residents
of the United States were at greater risk of kidnapping in 2021 than in 2018. Nor do any of the publications Anos presented report a general increase in kidnapping s between 2018 and 202 1

. One publication states that the Philippine
National Police reported “ crime decreased from 2018 to 2019.” Thus , the BIA5 21

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did not abuse its discretion in concluding A nos failed to establish changed country conditions warranted reopening.
3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in d eclining to reopen despite
A nos ’s engagement to a U.S. legal permanent resident

. A nos argues the BIA should have reopened his proceedings because he would be able to establish eligibility for adjustment of status on account of his planned marriage to a U.S. legal permanent resident who intended to file a visa petition on his behalf. But changes in personal circumstances do not provide a basis for an exception to the
90

- day deadline to file a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) ; Rodriguez v. Garland , 990 F.3d 1205, 1209

– 10 (9th Cir. 2021 ) (“Changes in a petitioner’s personal circumstances are only relevant where those changes are related to the changed country conditions that form the basis for the motion to reopen.”). Additionally, to the extent the BIA concluded this change in personal circumstances did not warrant sua sponte reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a ) ,

we lack jurisdiction to review its decision

. See Bonilla v. Lynch , 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting w e may re view a n agency’s decision to d ecline sua
spon t e reopening only for “ legal or constitutional error” ). Petition DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.