In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 17, 2024

S23Y1117, S23Y1119. IN THE MATTER OF DERRIC 

CROWTHER.

PER CURIAM.

These disciplinary matters arose from the conduct of Derric 

Crowther (State Bar No. 198838) in two separate cases. The matters 

are currently before the Court on the report and recommendation of 

the State Disciplinary Review Board (“Review Board”), which 

reviewed the report and recommendation of Special Master Jo Carol 

Nesset-Sale at the request of Crowther pursuant to Bar Rules 4-214 

and 4-216. The Special Master recommended that Crowther be 

disbarred for his violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.8 (e), 1.15 (I), 1.15 

(II), and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct 

(“GRPC”), found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum penalty for a 

single violation of Rules 1.3, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), or 8.4 (a) (4) is 
2

disbarment, and the maximum penalty for a single violation of Rules 

1.4, 1.5, or 1.8 (e) is a public reprimand. The Review Board adopted 

the Special Master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law but 

recommended that Crowther receive a four-year suspension. Both 

the Bar and Crowther filed exceptions in this Court.

The misconduct at issue involves allegations of Crowther’s 

systematic violations of the trust accounting rules, as well as his 

failure to resolve a dispute with one of his clients over settlement 

funds, charging that client an excessive fee, and disbursing all of the 

settlement funds to himself or his law firm despite the ongoing 

dispute with the client. In recommending a four-year suspension, 

the Review Board disagreed with the Special Master only about the 

balance of aggravating and mitigating factors and relied on In the 

Matter of Favors, 283 Ga. 588 (662 SE2d 119) (2008), to support its 

recommendation. However, as explained below, the Board’s 

recommendation is not supported by our precedent, including 

Favors, or by the records in these matters. Accordingly, after 

considering the records and both parties’ exceptions to the Board’s 
3

report and recommendation, we conclude that disbarment is 

appropriate for Crowther’s misconduct in these two cases.

1. Procedural History

The State Bar initially pursued four separate complaints 

against Crowther but dismissed two of the matters. The remaining 

cases were State Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) No. 7134 and 

SDBD No. 7390. In SDBD No. 7134, Crowther was charged with 

violating Rules 1.8 (e); 1.15 (I) (a), (b), (c), and (d); and 1.15 (II) (a) 

and (b). In SDBD No. 7390, he was charged with violating Rules 1.3, 

1.4, 1.5, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a) (4). During litigation of these 

matters, Crowther filed two petitions for voluntary discipline, 

requesting either a public reprimand or a three-month suspension 

to resolve all pending matters. The Special Master rejected both 

petitions. Based on Crowther’s admissions, the Bar filed a motion 

for summary judgment in SDBD No. 7134, which was granted as to 

Rules 1.8 (e); 1.15 (I) (a), (b), and (c); and 1.15 (II) (b). The Special 

Master granted summary judgment to Crowther only on Rule 1.15 
4

(II) (a),

1 concluding that he did not violate that subsection by 

delegating to his office manager the task of administering his trust 

account. As to SDBD No. 7390, the Bar filed a motion for summary 

judgment, which the Special Master granted in its entirety. The 

Special Master held a hearing on aggravation and mitigation on May 

24 and 25, 2022.

In her report and recommendation, the Special Master noted 

that SDBD No. 7390 arose from a 2019 grievance filed by a client 

who had previously filed a grievance against Crowther in 2013 that 

was dismissed in 2014. The instant formal complaint was based on 

Crowther’s actions that occurred between 2014 and 2019. The 

Special Master concluded that the four-year statute of limitation 

and two-year tolling provision in Bar Rule 4-222 (a) “authorize[d] a 

look-back to February 4, 2014, the date of the dismissal [of the 2013 

grievance], or September 4, 2013, the date of the [2013] grievance, 

which would be the farthest reach of the six-year look-back.” The 

1 Rule 1.15 (I) (a) provides, in relevant part, that all funds “held by a 

lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered 

from a trust account.”
5

Special Master observed that she could consider matters outside of 

the statute of limitation, which would provide “essential context” 

and would be relevant to resolving issues involving aggravation and 

mitigation, Crowther’s mental state, restitution, and a pattern of 

misconduct.

2. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation

(a) SDBD No. 7390

In 2006, the client filed a pro se medical malpractice action 

against a Macon hospital on behalf of herself, her siblings, and as 

the administratrix of her mother’s estate (collectively, “plaintiffs”), 

alleging malpractice by the hospital’s nurses in connection with her 

mother’s death. Crowther entered the case in 2007. The attorneyclient relationship was governed by a 2009 Retainer Agreement, 

which contained a handwritten amendment stating that “[t]his 

contract was modified due to client agreeing to pay a portion not to 

exceed $25,000.00 of the legal expenses.” The client paid Crowther 

$25,000 for legal expenses between 2007 and 2009. The Retainer 

Agreement also provided that if the case settled, Crowther’s law firm 
6

would “endorse any check made out to us or to either you or us and 

deposit it in our trust account. If the check requires your signature 

as well, we will advise you immediately so that you can come in and 

endorse the check”; the firm would then schedule a meeting with the 

client to collect her money and review how the funds had been 

disbursed, which would include a statement detailing “exactly 

where the money has gone (your proceeds, attorney[] fees, payments 

to medical providers, other expenses, etc.).” (emphasis supplied).

In 2012, Crowther learned from a new expert that the nurses 

had not actually deviated from the applicable standard of care. He 

pursued settlement with the hospital, and the parties settled in 

August 2012. The hospital issued two checks totaling $187,500, with 

a $7,500 check paid directly to a defense expert and the remaining 

$180,000 paid to the order of the client, individually and as 

administratrix of her mother’s estate; to her siblings; and to 

Crowther and his law firm. At the time Crowther received the check, 

he had not obtained releases of liability from the plaintiffs, which 

were required under the terms of the settlement. The reverse side of 
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the check showed that Crowther deposited it into an account that is 

now closed, and that he had endorsed it for himself and “w/p per k” 

for the plaintiffs. No one else endorsed the check. Crowther claimed 

during the disciplinary proceedings that the Retainer Agreement 

authorized him to endorse and deposit the check and that the client 

had given him permission over the phone to endorse it, but the client 

testified that she never gave Crowther such permission. The Special 

Master found Crowther’s testimony not credible and rejected his 

reading of the Retainer Agreement, noting that the phrase “w/p per 

k” meant “with permission per contract,” but the Retainer 

Agreement did not authorize Crowther to endorse a check made out 

to both his law firm and the plaintiffs without also getting the 

plaintiffs to endorse it. The Special Master observed that the client 

did not even see the settlement check until 2016, when an attorney 

for the hospital gave her a copy.

On September 19, 2012, the parties informed the court of the 

settlement and that Crowther had not yet obtained the requisite 

releases from the plaintiffs. The court dismissed the case without 
8

prejudice, ordering that Crowther “shall not distribute the proceeds 

of any settlement funds until all plaintiffs have executed the 

negotiated releases.” A medical lienholder was entitled to some of 

the settlement funds pursuant to a medical lien, but before making 

any disbursements, Crowther needed to negotiate and reduce the 

amount of the lien. During the disciplinary hearing, Crowther 

asserted that he believed that the order prohibited a distribution to 

the plaintiffs until they signed the releases but did not prohibit a 

distribution to himself and his firm. Thus, Crowther distributed to 

himself $46,875, which he testified was his attorney fee, calculated 

as 25% of the total $187,500 settlement. However, the Special 

Master found that the order was “unequivocal” that Crowther had 

to obtain executed releases from the plaintiffs before he could 

disburse any of the funds. In October 2012, when the releases had 

still not been executed, the hospital filed a motion to enforce the 

settlement agreement, requesting that the court dismiss the case 

with prejudice to prevent any attempt by the client to relitigate the 

claims. The court gave Crowther two weeks to respond, and 
9

dismissed the case with prejudice when he did not. To date, the 

plaintiffs have not signed the releases and have received no money 

from the settlement.

The Special Master found that between the dismissal of the 

first grievance in February 2014 and April 2016, Crowther had 

removed the settlement funds from his now-closed trust account. 

The Special Master stated that in addition to attorney fees, 

Crowther distributed to his law firm reimbursements for costs, fees, 

and expenses totaling $131,476.08. Crowther could not say how the 

funds had been spent because he did not keep individual client 

ledgers, and he testified that he no longer had the bank records and

could not obtain them because the bank did not keep records that 

far back. He testified at his 2020 deposition in the disciplinary 

proceedings that expenses and attorney fees consumed all the funds, 

so his client was entitled to nothing.

The client requested an accounting from Crowther in two 

certified mailings in 2014, to which he did not respond and which he 

later claimed he did not receive. On April 14, 2016, the client made 
10

a written request for her file; Crowther acknowledged that request 

and said she could pick it up in June of that year. In further 

correspondence during the summer of 2016, the client expressed 

frustration about not receiving the file yet. An attorney reached out 

to Crowther on behalf of the client, and in an August 4, 2016 letter, 

Crowther stated that if the attorney represented the client, he would 

no longer communicate with the client directly. He also mentioned 

that the client owed him $5,997.20 for a copy of her file that he had 

made. The Special Master found that the attorney did not become 

the client’s lawyer as a result of this communication, and no lawyer 

except Crowther had ever represented the client in the postsettlement phase of the case. The Special Master observed that the 

client had requested her original file, and she did not agree to pay 

for copies.

By September 2019, the client had received neither proceeds 

from nor an accounting of the $180,000, so she filed a second 

grievance. In his response to the formal complaint, Crowther stated 

under oath that, per the terms of the 2012 court order, he could not 
11

distribute the funds until the plaintiffs had executed releases of 

liability and he had negotiated the medical lien. Crowther also 

stated that the client had incurred additional expenses for the copies 

of her file. However, the medical liens were never negotiated or 

settled, and none of the proceeds were held separately for the 

lienholder or the client until a determination of their interests had 

been made. The Special Master found that Crowther had declared 

unilaterally that there was no fee dispute and that he had spent all 

of the money because the funds were not presently held in any of his 

trust accounts.

In response to the 2013 and 2019 grievances, and at the 2022 

aggravation/mitigation hearing, Crowther submitted three “draft 

closeout statements” reflecting the breakdown of fees, costs, and 

expenses, which he had never previously provided to the client. The 

2013 draft closeout reflected attorney fees of $62,500 (calculated 

based on 33.33% instead of 25% as stated in the Retainer 

Agreement) and expenses of $95,154.34, and the portion owed to the 

client was $34,081.16. The Special Master observed that the
12

Retainer Agreement provided that the firm would “pay up front any 

costs in proceeding with your claim, such as travel, fees for copying 

records, court costs, and the like,” and those expenses would be 

reimbursed from the settlement funds. The Special Master noted 

that some of the itemized fees in the 2013 draft closeout were 

$20,341.12 for photocopies; “standard telephone fee[s]” for 

maintaining a landline and cell phone; meals billed at the per diem 

rate rather than actual cost; and various office supplies. The 2013 

draft closeout also included the cost of providing every student in 

Crowther’s trial advocacy class2 with a complete set of discovery and 

pleadings, and costs associated with a mock trial, focus groups, and 

a psychodramatist. While the attorney fees were correctly calculated 

as 25% of the settlement in the 2019 and 2022 draft closeouts, the 

2022 draft closeout had a line item of “0” for the medical lien, and in 

2 In his November 25, 2013 response to the client’s 2013 grievance (which 

he attached as “Ex. 2” to his 2020 supplemental answer to the notice of 

investigation of the 2019 grievance), Crowther stated that the client allowed 

him to use her case as a case study for his trial advocacy students, that they 

reviewed parts of the case in class each week, that he printed all of the 

discovery and pleadings for his students, and that he had printed more than 

55,000 pages in connection with the client’s case.
13

the 2019 draft closeout, the copying fees included $15,364 in postsettlement copying costs, reflecting in part the cost of the two copies 

of the client’s file made in 2016, billed at $5,997.20 each.

Crowther testified in his 2020 disciplinary deposition that the 

client’s up-front $25,000 payment was an advance of attorney fees 

because he had agreed to reduce his contingency fee to 25%. In 

contrast, the client testified that she had asked Crowther how much 

the case would cost, and he said the total expenses would be $25,000, 

but she also contradictorily testified that she may have been 

obligated to pay expenses beyond that amount. Citing principles of 

statutory construction in construing the fee agreement, the Special 

Master resolved this ambiguity and found that the handwritten 

amendment in the Retainer Agreement limited the client’s 

responsibility for expenses to $25,000. The Special Master found 

neither the 2013 nor the 2019 draft closeout documents had a line 

item for this payment, and Crowther did not give the client an 

accounting of or invoice for the payment.
14

i. Rule 1.33

The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 1.3 

by failing to pursue strategies to close the case other than futilely 

attempting to have the plaintiffs sign releases, opining that 

“[l]eaving the matter in a moribund, unattended state for a decade 

was not the answer.” The Special Master further concluded that 

Crowther violated Rule 1.3 by ceasing all communication with the 

client in 2016, indicating that he had abandoned her, and by failing 

to diligently return her file after she requested it.

ii. Rule 1.44

3 Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence 

and promptness in representing a client,” and defines “reasonable diligence” to 

mean that “a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client 

in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the 

lawyer.”

4 Rule 1.4 provides in relevant part that

(a) A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance 

with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined 

in Rule 1.0 (h), is required by these rules;

. . .

(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 

matter; [and]

(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for 

information[.]
15

The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 1.4 

by failing to provide reasonable, necessary, and honest 

communication to the client about his disbursal of the settlement 

funds. In particular, the Special Master noted that in his response 

to the 2013 grievance, Crowther stated that the client was aware 

that the settlement proceeds had not been disbursed because she 

had not signed the release, and in his 2020 supplemental answer to 

the notice of investigation, he stated that he had not made the 

disbursements because the case had not concluded.

iii. Rule 1.5

The Special Master stated that to comply with Rule 1.5 (a)5, a 

lawyer must determine a reasonable basis for costs and fees charged 

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably 

necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 

regarding the representation.

5 A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an 

unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The 

factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee 

include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of 

the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the 

legal service properly;
16

to a client; that fees cannot be used to generate profit; and that only 

“hard costs” like court reporter fees and costs of a deposition 

transcript can be passed to the client if the fee agreement permits. 

But “soft costs” like in-house copying must be calculated to 

determine the appropriate basis for the per-copy charge, and 

imposing administrative fees to cover soft costs or to increase office 

profits to the detriment of the client is prohibited under Rule 1.5. 

See also Comment 1 to Rule 1.5 (providing that lawyer may seek 

reimbursement of services like in-house copying or phone services 

“either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has 

(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular 

employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 

services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 

circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with 

the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or 

lawyers performing the services; and 

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
17

agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects 

the cost incurred by the lawyer”).

The Special Master stated that Crowther knew or should have 

known that the Retainer Agreement did not allow him to charge the 

client over $131,000 in costs and expenses. She examined each of the 

draft closeouts in detail, and concluded that they contained “clearly 

excessive, unreasonable fees and deceptive fees,” in violation of Rule 

1.5 (a). The Special Master further noted that the draft closeouts 

contained charges for administrative costs (such as photocopies and 

phone lines) for the maintenance of Crowther’s law firm, to which 

the client did not consent. The Special Master stated that line items 

that were not actual reimbursements (such as meals, phone lines, 

and copying costs) allowed Crowther to make extra profit from the 

client. The Special Master found that the fees and rates in the draft 

closeouts were not disclosed in the Retainer Agreement and that 

many of the fees were not comparable to the types listed in the 

Agreement.
18

The Special Master further concluded that Crowther violated 

Rule 1.5 (a) by charging the client $5,997.20 for a copy of the file he 

made for himself before giving her the original file. The Special 

Master concluded that this action violated Crowther’s fiduciary 

obligation to the client, and his communications about it were 

deceptive, including his failure to disclose that he did not intend to 

give her the original file and that the charge for the copy would be 

taken out of the settlement funds.

As to Rule 1.5 (c)6, the Special Master observed that Crowther 

acted as though the case was completed, even though he had not 

6 (1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for 

which the service is rendered . . . . A contingent fee agreement 

shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the 

fee is to be determined, including the percentage or 

percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of 

settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be 

deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are 

to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.

(2) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer 

shall provide the client with a written statement stating the 

following:

(i) the outcome of the matter; and,

(ii) if there is a recovery showing:

(A) the remittance to the client;
19

obtained the executed releases from the plaintiffs; negotiated with 

the medical lienholder; assessed his outstanding expenses and fees 

with invoices and receipts; provided a final accounting; or held a 

closeout meeting with the client. The Special Master stated that 

Crowther prematurely paid himself the wrong amount because he 

treated the client’s $25,000 payment as extra attorney fees and 

secretly took the remaining money as costs and fees. The Special 

Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 1.5 (c) (2) (ii) by 

failing to provide the written statement required in contingency fee 

cases to inform the client about her recovery and how the amount 

was determined, which required him to detail the litigation costs, 

expenses, and fees.

(B) the method of its determination;

(C) the amount of the attorney fee; and

(D) if the attorney’s fee is divided with another 

lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the 

lawyer’s firm or law office, the amount of fee 

received by each and the manner in which the 

division is determined.
20

iv. Rule 1.15 (I)7

The Special Master observed that it was not ascertainable from 

any bank records when the settlement funds were disbursed because 

Crowther did not manage, account for, or identify funds with 

7 Rule 1.15 (I) provides in relevant part that

(a) A lawyer shall hold funds . . . of clients or third persons that are 

in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation 

separate from the lawyer’s own funds . . . . Funds shall be kept in 

one or more separate accounts maintained in an approved 

institution . . . . Complete records of such account funds . . . shall 

be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six 

years after termination of the representation.

(b) For the purposes of this rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third 

person’s interest in funds . . . in the lawyer’s possession if: (1) the 

interest is known to the lawyer, and (2) the interest is based upon 

one of the following: (i) a statutory lien . . . . The lawyer may 

disregard the third person’s claimed interest if the lawyer 

reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such lien[.]

(c) Upon receiving funds . . . in which a client or third person has 

an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third 

person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law 

or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to 

the client or third person any funds . . . that the client or third 

person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third 

person, shall render a full accounting regarding such property.

(d) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession 

of funds . . . in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person 

claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer 

until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a 

dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in 

dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is 

resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the 

funds or property as to which the interests are not in dispute.
21

specificity. In fact, he admitted that for years, he systematically 

failed to maintain individual client account ledgers or separate

client funds and that he misused his law firm’s local operating and 

trust accounts by making payments from one account that should 

have been made from the other and not timely moving his own funds 

out of the trust account. The Special Master concluded that

Crowther violated Rule 1.15 (I) (a) by failing to separate the client’s 

settlement funds, to maintain a separate ledger for any client’s 

funds, or to keep his own funds separate from funds belonging to the 

client and the medical lienholder; Rule 1.15 (I) (b) by disregarding 

the lienholder’s interest in the settlement funds; and Rule 1.15 (I) 

(c) by failing to notify the client and the lienholder about the receipt 

of the funds, to promptly disburse the funds due to them, and to 

render a full accounting of the funds upon the client’s written 

request. 

The Special Master further concluded that Crowther violated 

Rule 1.15 (I) (d) by failing to separate the portion of funds subject to 

the third-party claim by the lienholder and contested by the client; 
22

to promptly distribute to the lienholder and the client the funds not 

in dispute; and to hold the funds separate until there was an 

accounting and severance of their interests or until any dispute was 

resolved. The Special Master observed that in his response to the 

2013 grievance, Crowther did not mention whether he had 

distributed any money to himself or his firm, and he had not 

completed an accounting, so he could not have known how much of 

the settlement funds would be owed to the lienholder or how much

would be distributed to the client. Thus, the Special Master 

presumed that Crowther “had kept a substantial amount of the 

money in his trust account to cover those distributions.” The Special 

Master then noted the “missed opportunities” to resolve the 

distribution issue, including Crowther’s failure to file a response to 

the hospital’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement, or to seek 

a judicial remedy such as interpleader.

v. Rule 1.15 (II) (b)8

8 Rule 1.15 (II) (b) provides that “[n]o personal funds shall ever be 

deposited in a lawyer’s trust account, except that unearned attorney’s fees may 
23

In the formal complaint, the Bar alleged that Crowther 

violated Rule 1.15 (II) (b) by failing to keep and maintain trust 

account records showing the exact balance of the funds held for the 

client and the lienholder, and by withdrawing funds for his personal 

use without first debiting the amount against his trust account 

records and recording it. The Special Master summarily concluded 

that Crowther admitted to violating Rule 1.15 (II) (b) in his answer 

to the formal complaint.

vi. Rule 8.4 (a) (4)9

The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 8.4 

(a) (4) because, at some point between February 2014 and April 

2016, he took the entire amount of the settlement proceeds 

“surreptitiously, in a manner to avoid scrutiny or accountability.” 

be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer 

may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service 

charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and 

maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or 

third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the 

personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer’s fees 

debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.”

9 Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides that a lawyer violates the GRPC when he 

“engage[s] in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation.”
24

The Special Master also concluded that Crowther violated Rule 8.4 

(a) (4) by knowingly making false statements about the nature of the 

client’s $25,000 advance payment during the disciplinary 

proceedings because during his 2020 deposition, he claimed that the 

meaning of “legal expenses” was ambiguous, resulting in a 

difference of interpretation between him and the client. The Special 

Master observed that OCGA § 13-2-2 provides rules of contract 

interpretation, including that “[t]he custom of any business or trade 

shall be binding only when it is of such universal practice as to 

justify the conclusion that it became, by implication, a part of the 

contract,” and that “[i]f the construction is doubtful, that which goes 

most strongly against the party executing the instrument or 

undertaking the obligation is generally to be preferred.” OCGA § 13-

2-2 (3), (5). The Special Master noted that attorneys routinely 

differentiate between attorney fees and expenses, so under OCGA § 

13-2-2 (3) and (5), the client’s understanding of the payment as being 

for expenses prevailed. The Special Master then stated that in his 

response to the 2013 grievance, Crowther had only admitted that 
25

the $25,000 was for “initial” expenses, contrary to the Retainer 

Agreement’s characterization of it as the upper limit of the client’s 

responsibility for expenses. Moreover, in his response to the 2013 

grievance, Crowther stated that the client was given an accounting 

showing that the $25,000 had been exhausted during litigation. 

However, the alleged accounting was never produced, and the client 

denied receiving it. 

The Special Master further concluded that Crowther violated 

Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by stating in his 2020 supplemental answer to the 

notice of investigation that he had not made the disbursements 

because the case had not concluded. The Special Master concluded 

that this statement, which was made under oath, was false and 

misleading, and was carefully crafted to give the client hope for a 

disbursement, though Crowther knew all of the money had been 

distributed to him and his firm by 2016.

(b) SDBD No. 7134

In 2016, Crowther settled two personal injury matters on 

behalf of two sets of clients. A financing company had provided 
26

“settlement financing” in both matters in exchange for which the 

clients granted it a lien on any settlement. After Crowther settled 

the matters, money was deposited into his trust account. He paid 

other lienholders, but did not pay the financing company, even 

though its liens were designated on the closeout documents in each 

case. A representative of the financing company filed a grievance in 

2018, claiming that Crowther failed to pay liens of $3,298 and 

$1,220. Crowther paid those amounts to the financing company after 

the grievance was filed with personal funds that he deposited into 

his trust account. He acknowledged that his management of the 

accounts was deficient and admitted to improperly advancing $100 

to one of the clients so that she could buy a medically recommended 

bed. The Special Master found that Crowther failed to protect the 

interests of the financing company at the time the settlement funds 

were disbursed to the clients, and he did not notify the financing 

company of the settlements.

The Special Master observed that the investigation of the 

grievance included an examination of the trust and operating 
27

accounts for Crowther’s law firm, which focuses on personal injury 

cases involving contingency fee agreements. Three years of bank 

statements were produced in discovery, as well as ledgers and other 

accounting documents. The Special Master noted that, contrary to 

the trust accounting rules, Crowther initially deposited all of the 

money he earned into his trust account, even money from flat-fee 

cases and rents he was owed, which mingled with funds owed to 

clients and third parties. Sometimes, his trust account would fall 

below the amount he needed to pay clients, which required him to 

put his own money in the account, pay liens on settlement funds via 

credit card or from his operating account, or transfer money from his 

operating account to his trust account. He also left much of the 

financial administration up to his bookkeeper’s discretion. The 

Special Master opined that Crowther’s careless administration and 

poor recordkeeping of his trust account resulted from inadequate 

protocols and a failure to regularly account for the status of 

individual client funds.
28

i. Rule 1.8 (e)10

The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 1.8 

(e) because he admitted that before the settlement funds were 

received in one of the personal injury cases, he advanced money to 

the client so that she could purchase a medically recommended bed.

The Special Master further observed that Crowther occasionally 

used his credit cards to pay clients’ medical bills and expenses before 

reimbursing himself from client funds transferred from his trust 

account to his operating account.

ii. Rule 1.15 (I)

The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 1.15 

(I) (a) based on his admission that he was responsible for the funds; 

that his trust account lacked proper safeguards, resulting in 

temporary shortfalls; that he sometimes paid client expenses, 

including liens, out of his operating account; and that he failed to 

maintain trust account records showing the exact balances for each 

10 Rule 1.8 (e) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not provide financial 

assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation,” 

subject to exceptions not relevant here.
29

client or to preserve such records for six years. She concluded that 

Crowther violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b) based on his admission that he 

disregarded the financing company’s interest in the funds by failing 

to maintain in his trust account the amount of the liens, even though 

the closeout documents in both personal injury cases referenced the 

liens. The Special Master concluded that Crowther violated Rule 

1.15 (I) (c) by failing to notify the financing company of the 

settlement or to promptly deliver its funds.

iii. Rule 1.15 (II) 

The Special Master concluded that Crowther admitted to 

violating Rule 1.15 (II) (b) by depositing personal funds into the 

trust account and by failing to maintain the required records.11

(c) Application of ABA Standards

The Special Master then turned to the ABA Standards for 

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), to analyze in both 

matters (1) the duties violated; (2) Crowther’s mental state; (3) the 

11 The Special Master reiterated that she had granted summary 

judgment to Crowther on Rule 1.15 (II) (a), and the Bar does not contest this 

conclusion.
30

actual or potential injury caused by his misconduct; and (4) 

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. See In the Matter of 

Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (456 SE2d 52) (1995).

i. Duties Violated

The Special Master noted that, in connection with SDBD No. 

7390, she considered only the duties Crowther violated after the 

2013 grievance was dismissed, which included the duties of 

diligence; communication; transparency and reasonableness in 

matters regarding fees and expenses; candor; and integrity in 

professional practice. As to SDBD No. 7134, the Special Master 

found that Crowther violated his duty to avoid conflicts of interest. 

As to both matters, the Special Master found that he violated his 

duty of safekeeping property and trust accounts.

ii. Mental State

With respect to Rule 1.15 (I) (a), the Special Master found that 

the Bar did not produce evidence that Crowther intentionally set up 

his trust account to be out of compliance with the trust accounting 

rules, and that there was no evidence that he had attended CLEs on 
31

trust accounts or consulted with other attorneys or the Bar’s Law 

Practice Management Program (the “Program”). However, she found 

that Crowther declined an offer from the Program to review the 

firm’s trust account. Moreover, by delegating to his bookkeeper

authority over his accounts without guidance or direction, Crowther 

knowingly ignored trust account rules. The Special Master found 

that Crowther intended that money be deposited into and released 

from his trust account pursuant to the scheme created by the 

bookkeeper; that client funds would not be separated or accounted 

for with accurate ledgers; and that records would not be kept on the 

funds. The Special Master found that Crowther intentionally put 

earned fees or other personal funds into the trust account and 

knowingly paid client expenses using credit cards or the firm’s 

operating account. Additionally, the Special Master stated that 

Crowther intentionally failed to resolve the medical lien in SDBD 

No. 7390 or to hold the settlement funds until the lien was paid, and 

he paid the financing company’s lien in SDBD No. 7134 only after 

the grievance was filed. In SDBD No. 7390, the Special Master found 
32

that Crowther acted intentionally, exhibiting a pattern of behavior 

driven by “unrestrained greed and profiteering,” when he signed the 

settlement check without the client’s permission, disbursed the 

settlement funds to himself in violation of the 2012 court order, and 

continued to misrepresent to the Bar and the client that the 

settlement funds were available until he admitted at his 2020 

deposition that they had all been disbursed. 

ii. Actual or Potential Injury

The Special Master found that the grievants in both matters 

suffered serious injury. In SDBD No. 7134, the financing company 

suffered actual injury when Crowther failed to notify it and pay the 

liens from the settlement funds, but that injury was remediated 

when Crowther paid the liens after the grievance was filed. In SDBD 

No. 7390, the client and her siblings suffered actual injury due to 

the unresolved medical lien and because Crowther paid himself the 

settlement funds that belonged to them. The Special Master noted 

that the 2022 draft closeout reflected that he owed the client 
33

$34,148.92, and Crowther testified that he was prepared to pay that 

amount.

iii. Aggravation and Mitigation

The Special Master then summarized testimony from the 

aggravation/mitigation hearing, with particular focus on SDBD No. 

7390 and the client’s testimony, and testimony from Crowther’s

numerous character witnesses. The Special Master also summarized 

in detail Crowther’s own testimony, in which he referred to the client 

and her sister in SDBD No. 7390 as “elderly ladies” and “like family,” 

and stated that he did not intend for the case to go unresolved for so 

long and that he wished they could reach an agreement about how 

much money the plaintiffs were owed. Nonetheless, he maintained 

that under the Retainer Agreement, he was entitled to all of the fees 

and expenses he had disbursed to his firm.

Crowther also testified that he often adjusts a client’s expenses 

where “real money” was not involved (such as legal research, phone 

lines, and making copies), and in automobile accident cases, he 

waives fees until his attorney fee is less than the amount the client 
34

will receive. Crowther has a new bookkeeper to handle his bank 

accounts, tracks costs and expenses appropriately, and has hired an 

accountant to conduct quarterly audits. Crowther’s experience in 

law firms before starting his own practice did not include education 

about trust accounts, though he acknowledged that he was 

responsible for knowing the trust account rules. Crowther testified 

about being active in his church, supporting programs that help lowincome students improve their college admissions scores and 

increase their chances of getting into good colleges, and allowing law 

students to shadow him.

In aggravation, the Special Master found that Crowther acted 

with a dishonest or selfish motive in connection with SDBD No. 

7390, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and committed multiple 

offenses. See ABA Standard 9.22 (a), (c)-(d). The Special Master 

found that Crowther submitted false evidence or statements or 

engaged in deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, see 

ABA Standard 9.22 (f), because in connection with SDBD No. 7390, 

he made false statements during the investigatory phase of the 2013 
35

grievance; failed to correct those statements until his 2020 

deposition; gave false deposition testimony about the nature of the 

client’s $25,000 payment; and gave false testimony at the 

aggravation/mitigation hearing about receiving verbal permission 

from the client to endorse the settlement check. The Special Master 

found that Crowther refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 

his conduct, see ABA Standard 9.22 (g), because for a long time, he 

maintained a belief that his bookkeeper bore some responsibility for 

his accounting practices not being compliant with the GRPC; that in 

connection with SDBD No. 7390, he did not acknowledge any 

wrongdoing except for his systemic trust accounting issues, and his 

2022 draft closeout still charged the client for fees and expenses that 

were not permitted by the Retainer Agreement; and that when 

asked by Bar counsel whether he believed he had been diligent in 

resolving the client’s case, he gave several non-responsive answers, 

which “typifies the strained efforts [he] made to avoid responsibility 

and accountability.”
36

The Special Master found that Crowther, a member of the 

State Bar of Georgia since 2000, had substantial experience in the 

practice of law; that he was indifferent to making restitution 

because he did not make restitution in SDBD No. 7134 until after 

the grievance was filed, and has never made restitution in SDBD 

No. 7390; and that the plaintiffs in SDBD No. 7390 were vulnerable 

victims due to their advanced ages, among other reasons. See ABA 

Standard 9.22 (h)-(j). Finally, the Special Master found that 

Crowther had committed illegal conduct in SDBD No. 7390, see ABA 

Standard 9.22 (k), noting that in 2014, the client contacted law 

enforcement to have him investigated for fraud, but that 

investigation was closed without charges being filed. Nonetheless, 

the Special Master found that Crowther’s actions, including 

misrepresenting his authority to endorse the settlement check, 

siphoning money from the settlement funds, and misrepresenting 

from 2014 until 2020 that the money was still available for 

distribution, constituted theft under OCGA § 16-8-2 and forgery 

under OCGA § 16-9-1 (d).
37

In mitigation, the Special Master found that Crowther had no 

prior disciplinary record; he had a good reputation as an attorney; 

he presented testimony of his good character; and he served lowincome students through mentoring and scholarships. See ABA 

Standard 9.32 (a), (g).

(d) Recommendation of Discipline

Crowther sought a six-month suspension, while the Bar sought 

disbarment. The Special Master extensively reviewed cases cited by 

Crowther and the Bar. See, e.g., In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206

(857 SE2d 212) (2021) (rejecting recommendations of the special 

master and review board and imposing public reprimand for 

attorney’s violations of Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II) when clients were 

not harmed; substantial mitigating factors were present; and the 

only aggravating factors were substantial experience and pattern of 

misconduct); In the Matter of Berry, 310 Ga. 158, 158-159 (848 SE2d 

71) (2020) (disbarring attorney in default on a notice of discipline for 

violations of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (b) and (c) (2), 1.15 (I), and 8.4 

(a) (4) when numerous aggravating factors were present); In the 
38

Matter of Gorman, 294 Ga. 726, 726-727 (755 SE2d 746) (2014) 

(accepting special master’s recommendation and disbarring 

attorney for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a) 

(4) when no mitigating factors and three aggravating factors were 

present). The Special Master also examined Favors, 283 Ga. at 588-

589, in which an attorney filed a petition for voluntary discipline and 

received a three-year suspension for her violations of Rules 1.15 (I), 

8.1 (a), and 8.4 (a) (4), for spending part of the settlement funds for 

herself instead of paying a third party who was entitled to the 

money, lying about where the funds had gone, and lying to the 

investigative panel during the disciplinary proceeding.

After observing that the aggravating factors significantly 

outweighed the mitigating factors, the Special Master recommended 

that Crowther be disbarred and that he make restitution to the 

client in SDBD No. 7390 in the amount of $140,625, plus interest at 

the statutory rate, calculated starting in August 2012. The Special 

Master noted that the amount of restitution represented the total 

settlement amount of $187,500, less Crowther’s 25% attorney fee 
39

($46,875), and crediting the client with the $25,000 she had already 

paid as expenses pursuant to the Retainer Agreement. Crowther 

filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report and recommendation 

and sought review by the Review Board.

3. Review Board’s Report and Recommendation

The Review Board found that the Special Master’s factual 

findings were not clearly erroneous or manifestly in error and that 

her conclusions of law were correct. See Bar Rule 4-216 (a). The 

Board thus adopted and incorporated by reference the Special 

Master’s findings and conclusions. Turning to the ABA Standards, 

the Board also agreed with the Special Master’s analysis of the 

duties violated, the lawyer’s mental state, and the potential or 

actual injury.

The Board disagreed, however, with the Special Master’s 

balancing of aggravation and mitigation. The Board opined that the 

Special Master erred by finding that Crowther’s experience in the 

practice of law was aggravating instead of mitigating because 

Crowther’s “inexperience, specifically the lack of mentors, 
40

contributed to his conduct.” The Board further opined that the 

length of time one has practiced law does not negate the fact that 

issues may arise if a lawyer does not have proper training or 

mentors, and it believed that Crowther did not receive proper 

training in law firm management, which explained but did not 

excuse his conduct. The Board then stated that the Special Master 

“did not give enough weight” to the mitigating factors, noting that 

Crowther had shown significant evidence of his good reputation and 

character and his lack of prior discipline and opining that the 

Special Master did not fully appreciate his service to 

underprivileged students. Moreover, the Board stated that it was 

apparent during Crowther’s oral argument before the Board that his 

remorse was genuine. Therefore, the Board recommended that 

Crowther be suspended for four years, with reinstatement 

conditioned upon paying restitution to the client in SDBD No. 7390 

in the amount of $140,625, plus statutory interest from August 

2012. The Board stated that it relied on Favors, 283 Ga. at 588, a 

case in which the defendant who sought voluntary discipline 
41

received a three-year suspension, as a similar case that resulted in 

discipline short of disbarment. The Review Board did not cite any 

authority from Georgia or otherwise that supports imposition of a 

four-year suspension instead of disbarment.

Both the Bar and Crowther filed exceptions in this Court as to 

the Board’s report and recommendation.

4. State Bar’s Exceptions and Crowther’s Response

The Bar contends that the Board erred by concluding that 

Crowther’s legal experience was not an aggravating factor, even 

though he had been practicing for 14 years at the start of the 

limitation period for the 2019 grievance. The Bar observes that the 

Special Master found Crowther admitted it was his responsibility to 

know the trust accounting rules, and that he had substantial 

experience as a plaintiff’s lawyer in contingency fee cases. As to 

Crowther’s false deposition testimony during the disciplinary 

proceeding, the Bar asserts that “[n]o Georgia lawyer should require 

a mentor or training or a CLE to know not to lie or misrepresent 

facts during a deposition.” The Bar further contends that the Board 
42

erred by reweighing the aggravating and mitigating factors because 

there is no evidence of Crowther’s remorse in the disciplinary 

records, and the Special Master did credit the voluminous evidence 

of Crowther’s good character, reputation, and service to 

underprivileged students. The Bar argues that although the Special 

Master purported to find four mitigating factors, those factors fall 

under only two categories in the ABA Standards – lack of prior 

discipline and good character or reputation, see ABA Standard 9.32 

(a) and (g) – and that two (or four) mitigating factors do not outweigh 

nine aggravating factors.

Finally, the Bar asserts that the Board erred by recommending 

a four-year suspension instead of disbarment because (1) 

“[g]enerally, suspension should be for a period of time equal to or 

greater than six months, but in no event should the time period prior

to application for reinstatement be more than three years”; (2) this 

Court previously rejected a five-year suspension in a different 

disciplinary case because it was unsupported by precedent, the 

evidence supported a more severe sanction, and the grievances 
43

revealed “a disturbingly extensive pattern of similar misconduct 

extending over a period of several years,” In the Matter of BrileyHolmes, 304 Ga. 199, 208 (815 SE2d 59) (2018); and (3) Favors is 

distinguishable because it was initiated as a petition for voluntary 

discipline and the attorney presented evidence of numerous 

mitigating factors not present in either of Crowther’s matters. The 

Bar maintains that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. See In 

the Matter of Hunt, 304 Ga. 635, 636-637, 641-644 (820 SE2d 716) 

(2018) (accepting special master’s recommendation and disbarring

attorney who stole client funds from his trust account and converted 

them to his own use and the aggravating factors outweighed the 

mitigating factors).

In response, Crowther argues that the Board correctly 

reweighed the aggravating and mitigating factors because when he 

was hired by the client in SDBD No. 7390 in 2007, he had little 

experience with the trust accounting rules; that Hunt is 

distinguishable because that attorney intentionally stole client 

funds but here, Crowther believed he was entitled to a portion of the 
44

settlement funds for his attorney fees and expenses; and that his 

violations of the trust accounting rules were merely negligent 

instead of intentional, but he has remedied those deficiencies and he 

promptly paid the financing company’s liens in SDBD No. 7134 once 

he became aware of them.

5. Crowther’s Exceptions and State Bar’s Response

In Crowther’s exceptions, he first argues that the Board 

erroneously approved the Special Master’s summary judgment 

rulings, which improperly resolved disputed issues of fact in SDBD 

No. 7390 as to his belief about whether he could disburse the 

settlement funds to himself, whether his statements in response to 

the 2013 grievance were untrue, and whether his conduct violated 

Rule 8.4 (a) (4). Second, Crowther contends that the Board 

erroneously approved the Special Master’s consideration of matters 

that occurred before the 2013 grievance was dismissed because the 

Bar stipulated that he was not subject to discipline for that conduct, 

since it fell outside the four-year statute of limitation in Bar Rule 4-

222 (a). Crowther further contends that the Bar was not entitled to 
45

rely on the two-year tolling provision in Bar Rule 4-222 (a) because 

the Bar failed to show that Crowther or his actions were unknown 

during that period. Third, Crowther contends that there was no 

clear and convincing evidence in SDBD No. 7390 that he violated 

Rule 1.5 because the Bar presented no evidence that the rates he 

used to calculate expenses for meals, copies, and travel were 

unreasonable; that there was no clear and convincing evidence that 

he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) because the Special Master did not find 

that he intended to be deceitful, fraudulent, dishonest, or to make 

misrepresentations; and the Special Master erred in SDBD No. 7134

by finding that he was indifferent to making restitution to the 

financing company and that his violations of the GRPC were 

intentional and knowing, rather than negligent. 

Finally, Crowther observes that he came from a low-income 

background, but ultimately went to college, served in the Army, and 

attended law school, and he now mentors and teaches law students 

from his community, who are historically underrepresented in the 

legal profession. He argues that a four-year suspension is excessive 
46

and not supported by case law, and he requests a two-year 

suspension with restitution to be paid to the client in SDBD No. 

7390, though he contends the amount should be adjusted to reflect 

the expenses documented in the 2013 draft closeout.

The Bar responds that the Special Master properly granted 

summary judgment; that her conclusions as to each of the Rules 

Crowther violated were correct; and that her findings as to 

Crowther’s restitution to the financing company and as to his mental 

state were supported by the evidence. The Bar argues that although 

it did not allege that Crowther violated the GRPC before February 

2014, that did not limit inquiry by the Special Master and Board into 

the history of the case and the facts giving rise to his ongoing 

violations of the GRPC. The Bar argues that it was entitled to tolling 

because Crowther’s offenses were unknown at the time it dismissed 

the 2013 grievance because the violations had not yet occurred and 

the client had not yet notified the Bar. See In the Matter of Allison, 

267 Ga. 638, 641-642 (481 SE2d 211) (1997) (in a case where the 

investigative panel initiated a grievance in 1992 for acts occurring 
47

between 1986 and 1988, holding that when a victim does not come 

forward within the statute of limitation, the Bar may take 

advantage of the two-year tolling provision). The Bar also asserts 

that Crowther is estopped from arguing that the Special Master 

erred by considering evidence from before February 2014 because 

Crother himself presented that evidence to support his defense. The 

Bar notes that the Special Master explicitly limited her 

consideration of Crowther’s violations of the GRPC to conduct that 

occurred after February 2014, and she correctly considered all 

relevant evidence in her analysis of the ABA Standards.

5. Analysis and Conclusion

In reviewing the Special Master’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, the Review Board reweighed facts found by the 

Special Master, even though the Review Board did not conclude that 

the Special Master’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. With 

respect to this reweighing, we note the following.12 We disagree with 

12 We note that the Bar Rules do not expressly prohibit the Review Board 

from reweighing the Special Master’s findings as to aggravation and 
48

the Review Board that Crowther’s legal experience was mitigating. 

In 2014, the earliest time of the misconduct for which the Bar seeks 

discipline, Crowther had been practicing law for 14 years in total, 

and he had been a solo practitioner at least since 2007, when the 

elderly client hired him. Under the circumstances presented by this 

case, Crowther’s alleged lack of mentors and experience with 

handling trust accounting matters is immaterial to the question of 

whether he had substantial experience in the practice of law.13

Moreover, we agree with the Bar that the Board placed more 

emphasis on Crowther’s service to his community than was 

appropriate. Additionally, we note that even if the Board was correct 

that the Special Master erred by failing to find that Crowther 

exhibited remorse, the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors 

mitigation. But to the extent that the Review Board made additional findings 

with respect to disputed issues (e.g., findings about Crowther’s community 

service or his level of remorse), we caution the Review Board that these are the 

sort of fact and credibility findings that generally should be left to the Special 

Master in the first instance. See Bar Rule 4-216 (a).

13 The Review Board’s reliance on Crowther’s alleged lack of mentoring 

rings particularly hollow in light of Crowther’s own assertion that he should 

be given the benefit of mitigation for serving as a mentor to underprivileged

students.
49

would still weigh heavily in favor of aggravation. Finally, we agree 

with the Bar that Favors is distinguishable. Although Favors

involved similar violations of the GRPC, it came before the Court on 

a petition for voluntary discipline and numerous mitigating factors 

were present – including the fact that the attorney had made 

restitution, which Crowther has failed to do in SDBD No. 7390 – and 

resulted in a three-year, rather than a four-year, suspension. 

Further, the Board cited no authority from Georgia or otherwise to 

support a four-year suspension, and “a three-year suspension . . . is 

generally the maximum amount of time this Court will consider for 

a suspension.” In the Matter of Van Dyke, 316 Ga. 168, 177 (3) (886 

SE2d 811) (2023).

We reject all of Crowther’s exceptions. As a threshold matter, 

we note that while the Special Master summarized matters that 

occurred outside of the statute of limitation in SDBD No. 7390, she 

did so only to establish the background of the case, to examine the 

aggravating and mitigating evidence, and to determine the 

appropriate amount of restitution. Her conclusions as to Crowther’s 
50

violations of the GRPC only deal with his misconduct during the 

applicable limitation period, 2014 to 2019. Moreover, the Bar was 

entitled to take advantage of the two-year tolling provision in Bar 

Rule 4-222 (a) because when it dismissed the 2013 grievance in 

2014, Crowther’s future violations of the GRPC (i.e., disbursing all 

of the settlement funds at some point between 2014 and 2016; 

attempting to charge the client for two copies of her voluminous file 

even though she had requested the original; and lacking diligence in 

returning the client’s file, providing an accounting, or resolving the 

dispute over the funds) were unknown and in fact, had not yet 

occurred. 

Second, Crowther’s argument that the Special Master erred by 

granting summary judgment as to alleged disputes of material fact 

in SDBD No. 7390 lacks merit. The Special Master properly 

reviewed the record and concluded that, as a matter of law, 

Crowther’s conduct from 2014 to 2019 violated the provisions of the 

GRPC with which he was charged because (1) the superior court’s 

2012 order prohibited Crowther from making any distributions until 
51

the plaintiffs had executed releases of liability, but Crowther 

distributed the settlement funds to himself between 2014 and 2016

even though the plaintiffs had never executed the releases, and (2) 

Crowther’s response to the 2013 grievance stated that the client 

knew the funds had not been distributed because she had not yet 

executed a release of liability, indicating that the funds were still 

available to be distributed at that point. 

As to Crowther’s argument that there was no clear and 

convincing evidence that he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4), we have defined 

“conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” 

under Rule 8.4 (a) (4) to mean “conduct that is intended or likely to 

mislead another.” In the Matter of Woodham, 296 Ga. 618, 625 (769 

SE2d 353) (2015). The Bar charged Crowther with violating Rule 8.4 

(a) (4) by making false statements to “[his client] and others about 

the status of settlement funds” and by converting those funds for his 

own use. While the Special Master granted summary judgment on 

Rule 8.4 (a) (4) based on Crowther’s misleading statements to the 

client that funds were still available to be distributed, the Special 
52

Master also granted summary judgment on Rule 8.4 (a) (4) based on 

conduct that was not charged. To the extent the Special Master 

found Crowther in violation of conduct under Rule 8.4 (a) (4) that 

was not charged, we do not address that conduct and consider it only 

in aggravation. Cf. Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 316 Ga. 855, 873

(892 SE2d 3) (2023).14

Crowther’s argument that the Special Master erroneously 

granted summary judgment on Rule 1.5 similarly lacks merit, as the 

Special Master correctly concluded that it was undisputed that the 

draft closeouts submitted by Crowther reflected expenses of over 

$130,000 and included exorbitant charges for soft costs such as 

copying and telephone lines that were impermissible under the 

Rule. Pretermitting whether his payments to the financing company 

14 As we explained in a recent judicial discipline matter, “[i]mposing 

discipline on a judge solely based on the judge’s response to a JQC inquiry, 

without the JQC first filing formal charges against the judge alleging such 

conduct constituted a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, might raise due 

process concerns.” Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 316 Ga. at 873 n. 19. Similarly, 

in this Bar discipline case, we consider uncharged offenses that arose during 

the disciplinary process only as an aggravating factor in determining the 

proper sanction.
53

after the grievance was filed in SDBD No.7134 preclude a finding of

indifference to making restitution in that matter, the Special Master 

also found that this aggravating factor applied in SDBD No. 7390, 

because Crowther had never made restitution to the client in that 

matter. 

Finally, Crowther’s argument that a two-year suspension is 

warranted in light of his good character and service to his 

community is unpersuasive. While we commend his community 

service, a two-year suspension is not supported by precedent or by 

the records in these two disciplinary matters. We have previously 

disbarred attorneys for violating the trust accounting rules and 

other provisions of the GRPC when numerous aggravating factors 

are present, even if the attorney provides evidence of his good 

character and reputation. See, e.g., Berry, 310 Ga. at 158-159

(disbarring attorney in default on a notice of discipline for violations 

of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (b) and (c) (2), 1.15 (I), and 8.4 (a) (4) 

when numerous aggravating factors were present); Hunt, 304 Ga. at

636-637, 641-644 (disbarring attorney for violations of Rules 1.15 (I), 
54

1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a) (4) when numerous aggravating factors were 

present); In the Matter of Harris, 301 Ga. 378, 379 (801 SE2d 39) 

(2017) (accepting special master’s recommendation and disbarring 

attorney for violating Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II); attorney in default 

on formal complaint); Gorman, 294 Ga. at 726-727 (accepting special 

master’s recommendation and disbarring attorney for violations of 

Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a) (4) when no mitigating 

factors and three aggravating factors were present).

Having carefully reviewed the records, we agree with the 

Special Master that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for 

Crowther’s misconduct in these two disciplinary matters, in which 

he violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.8 (e), 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a) 

(4), with reinstatement conditioned upon the payment of restitution 

to the client in SDBD No. 7390 in the amount of $140,625, plus 

interest at the statutory rate from August 2012. See In the Matter of 

Davis, 316 Ga. 30 (885 SE2d 771) (2023) (disbarring attorney for 

violations of Rules 1.7, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), 3.4, 3.5 (d), 8.1 (b), and 8.4 

(a) (5), with reinstatement conditioned upon the full payment of a 
55

probate judgment that arose from the attorney’s professional 

misconduct); In the Matter of Anderson, 286 Ga. 137 (685 SE2d 711) 

(2009) (disbarring attorney for violations of Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 

(II), with reinstatement conditioned upon repayment of a judgment, 

making restitution, and completing the State Bar’s Law Practice 

Management Program); In the Matter of Oellerich, 278 Ga. 22 (596 

SE2d 156) (2004) (disbarring attorney for using his client’s estate as 

a source of funds for his close corporation, with reinstatement 

conditioned upon his making full restitution to the estate). 

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Derric Crowther 

be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in 

the State of Georgia. Crowther is reminded of his duties pursuant to 

Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.