IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania :

:

v. :

:

Allegheny County Prison :

Employees Independent Union, : No. 122 C.D. 2020

Appellant : Argued: October 13, 2020

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: November 10, 2020

The Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union (Union) 

appeals the January 23, 20201 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 

County (trial court) that granted the County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania’s (County) 

Petition to Vacate, Modify or Correct Arbitrator’s Award (Petition to Vacate)

regarding an arbitration award entered under the Public Employe Relations Act 

(PERA), Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-

1101.2301, that sustained a grievance filed by the Union seeking reinstatement of a 

1 The trial court originally issued this order on January 10, 2020, but used the wrong docket 

number. See Trial Court Order dated January 10, 2020. Upon learning of the error, the trial court 

reissued the January 10, 2020 order under the proper docket number on January 23, 2020. See

Trial Court Order dated January 23, 2020.
2

terminated corrections officer Union member. Upon review, we reverse the trial 

court’s order and reinstate the arbitrator’s award.

The pertinent facts of this matter, while unique, are not meaningfully 

disputed by either side. Corrections officer Andrew Ruffner began his employment 

as a corrections officer trainee at the Allegheny County Jail in May 2016. See

Decision In Termination Case 2017-0557 dated January 10, 2019 (Arbitration 

Award) at 2. As a corrections officer trainee, Ruffner received training on jail 

policies and procedures, as well as the responsibilities of a corrections officer. See 

Arbitration Award at 2. As part of the corrections officer trainee program, Ruffner 

received mandatory training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and First Aid 

skills. See id. Ruffner became a full-time corrections officer in April 2017. See id. 

As a relatively new employee, Ruffner was a “floater” corrections 

officer, meaning that he did not have a single, assigned cell block to which he was 

stationed, but was stationed instead wherever he was needed in the jail. See

Arbitration Award at 2 & 10. On the morning of September 17, 2017, Ruffner was 

assigned to Housing Unit 4A, a classification area for incoming prison inmates. See 

id. While conducting a guard tour at approximately 9:48 a.m., Ruffner discovered 

an inmate who had hung himself inside his cell. See id. Ruffner immediately 

signaled a medical emergency, cut the inmate down using a cut-down tool, and called 

for medical assistance from the Assistant Director of Nursing (ADON), who was 

present on the cell block at the time. See id. Ruffner waited at the cell door until 

the ADON arrived at 9:51 a.m. See id. Upon arriving, the ADON checked the 

inmate’s vital signs but did not attempt to revive the inmate, instead indicating the 

inmate was deceased. See id. A minute later, at 9:52 a.m., the Allegheny County 

Jail’s Medical Director arrived, administered chest compressions and other 
3

emergency medical attention, and revived the inmate, who was then taken to a 

hospital. See id. The inmate died several days later. See id.

Based on these facts, the County suspended and ultimately terminated 

Ruffner on November 17, 2017. See Arbitration Award at 2-3 & 10; see also Letter 

of Matthew Kohler dated November 17, 2017 (Termination Letter), Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) at 313a-14a. As reasons for Ruffner’s discharge, the County cited in 

the Termination Letter a failure to conduct guard tours pursuant to the Housing Unit 

4A post orders,2 violation of Allegheny County Jail Policy 304, Suicide Behavior 

Detection and Prevention, Section 8,3 violation of two sections of the County’s Code 

2 Housing Unit 4A post order No. 7 requires corrections officers to “[c]onduct[] a guard 

tour every fifteen (15) minutes on an irregular schedule utilizing the key card system and marking 

it in the log book.” Level 4A Post Orders at 2; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 329a. Housing Unit 

4A post order No. 20 further requires that corrections officers “[e]nsure immediate notification is 

made to medical and supervisory staff and life saving measures are taken to save an inmate in a 

medical crisis or when causing self-harm.” Level 4A Post Orders at 3; R.R. at 330a.

3 Allegheny County Jail Policy 304, Suicide Behavior Detection and Prevention, Section 8 

(concerning suicide security inspections for classification pods), provides that “[l]ife saving 

measures will be taken by correctional officer if needed.” Allegheny County Jail Policy 304, 

Section 8(F); R.R. at 350a. Allegheny County Jail Policy 304, Section 15 concerns hanging 

incidents and provides that:

An employee who discovers an inmate hanging shall:

a) Call for help and for medical assistance. Once help arrives, the 

employee shall attempt to reduce tension on the inmate’s neck by 

supporting the inmate by the legs while the inmate is facing the 

employee.

b) Upon arrival of additional staff, the first employee on the scene 

shall continue to support the inmate[’s] body while the second 

officer shall use the rescue tool (wonder knife) to cut the inmate 

down. The employee shall immediately remove the noose from 

around the inmate’s neck.

c) Allegheny County Bureau of Corrections’ employees are trained 

in []CPR[] First Aid. As such, correctional employees shall 

immediately initiate CPR and/or First Aid, as appropriate, until 
4

of Ethics for Allegheny County Jail employees,4 and violation of a directive from 

the former Deputy Warden regarding how to conduct guard tours. See Arbitration 

Award at 2-3 & 10-11; see also Termination Letter at 1, R.R. at 313a. Effectively, 

the violations listed in the Termination Letter comprised two charges against 

Ruffner: (1) failure to properly complete and accurately document required guard 

tours, and (2) failure to provide emergency/lifesaving measures (CPR) to an inmate 

engaged in self-harm. See Arbitration Award at 2-3 & 11; see also Termination 

Letter, R.R. at 313a-14a.

The Union filed a timely grievance that challenged Ruffner’s 

termination as being unsupported by just cause. See Official Grievance Form filed 

September 24, 2017 (Grievance), R.R. at 315a. After the Grievance was denied,5

medical staff relieves the employee. An employee shall 

immediately start CPR/First Aid and never wait for medical staff to 

arrive before starting life saving measures.

d) Upon arrival, the contractor health service providers shall assume 

medical care and decisions and shall continue CPR and other life 

saving measures while instructing that 9-1-1 is called.

e) The contractor’s Physician, Nurse Practitioner or Physician 

Assistant or nurse remains the authorized medical authority as it 

relates to any patient emergency care or decisions until 9-1-1 

arrives.

Allegheny County Jail Policy 304, Section 15; R.R. at 354a-55a.

4 The two sections cited by the County are Code of Ethics Section 2.1, which requires 

employees to be thoroughly familiar with their duties and responsibilities, and Code of Ethics 

Section 2.2, which requires that all employees remain constantly attentive and alert in the 

performance of their duties to promote the safety and welfare of all staff, inmates, visitors, 

property, and jail interests.

5 The Grievance underwent multiple levels of review and, following hearings at all levels, 

was denied at Level 1 on October 3, 2017, at Level 2 on October 16, 2017, and at Level 3 on 

November 9, 2017. See Grievance Hearing Report dated October 3, 2017, R.R. at 316a; Grievance 
5

the Union sought to arbitrate the matter per the collective bargaining agreement in 

force between the County and the Union (CBA). 

An arbitrator conducted a hearing on September 19, 2018, at which both 

Ruffner and the County were represented by counsel and presented evidence. See

Arbitration Award at 1. On January 10, 2019, the arbitrator issued the Arbitration 

Award, which sustained the Grievance in part. See Arbitration Award at 15. The 

arbitrator reviewed the facts of the matter and the testimony presented and, first, 

determined that Ruffner was not at fault for missing the 9:30 a.m. guard tour.6 See 

id. Next, regarding Ruffner’s failure to immediately commence lifesaving measures, 

the arbitrator concluded:

[Ruffner’s] misconduct that day was limited to an error in 

judgment in failing to immediately begin CPR on the 

inmate that he found hanging in his cell. When this error 

is considered in conjunction with the misconduct of the 

ADON, it is concluded that it was not conduct worthy of 

the severe penalty of discharge. Rather, because 

[Ruffner’s] delay was not willful misconduct or neglect of 

duty, it is appropriately addressed with a three-day 

suspension and remedial training[.]

Arbitration Award at 15. Accordingly, the arbitrator sustained the Grievance in part, 

reduced Ruffner’s discharge to a three-day suspension, and ordered Ruffner’s 

immediate reinstatement with back pay and benefits. See id.

Hearing Report dated October 16, 2017, R.R. at 317a; Letter of Steve Pilarski dated November 9, 

2017, R.R. at 318a-19a.

6 This determination does not form part of the appeal of this matter.
6

The County filed a Petition to Vacate, which the trial court granted by 

order dated January 23, 20207(Trial Court Order). See Petition to Vacate, R.R. at 

372a-94a; see also Trial Court Order dated January 23, 2020. The Union appealed 

the Trial Court Order to this Court.

In its opinion on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure (Pa.R.A.P.) 1925(a), the trial court explained that the Arbitration Award 

in this matter satisfied the essence test in that the issue presented – termination for 

just cause – was within the terms of the CBA and also that the arbitrator’s decision 

logically flowed from the terms of the CBA. See Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

Opinion dated March 4, 2020 (Trial Court Opinion) at 11. However, the trial court 

determined that the Arbitration Award violated a public policy against inmate 

suicide. See Trial Court Opinion at 11. The trial court found the three-day 

suspension imposed by the arbitrator to be “virtually no penalty” under the 

circumstances of this case. Id. at 14. The trial court concluded, therefore, that the 

arbitrator’s remedy “poses an unacceptable risk of undermining the well-defined 

public policy against suicide.” Id. at 14. Accordingly, the trial court vacated the 

Arbitration Award. See id. at 1 & 14.

On appeal, the Union claims that the trial court erred by granting the

Petition to Vacate. Specifically, the Union alleges that, given the specific and unique 

circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in determining that Ruffner’s threeday suspension and subsequent reinstatement by the arbitrator violated a welldefined, dominant public policy that seeks to prevent inmate suicide. See Union’s 

Brief at 4, 20-39. We agree.

7 See supra, n.1.
7

Appellate review of a grievance arbitration award is generally 

conducted pursuant to the two-part “essence test.” Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Phila.

Fed’n of Teachers, 164 A.3d 546, 552 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Under the essence test, 

[f]irst, the court shall determine if the issue as properly 

defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining 

agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the 

agreement, and thus, appropriately before the arbitrator, 

the arbitrator’s award will be upheld if the arbitrator’s 

interpretation can rationally be derived from the collective 

bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court will only 

vacate an arbitrator’s award where the award indisputably 

and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically 

flow from, the collective bargaining agreement.

State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Pro. Ass’n (PSEANEA), 743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa. 1999); see also Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 

v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educ. Support Pers. 

Ass’n, PSEA/NEA, 939 A.2d 855, 863 (Pa. 2007) (Westmoreland I). Thus, “[a]n 

arbitrator’s award must be sustained ‘if it is based on anything that can be gleaned 

as the ‘essence’ of the [collective bargaining agreement].’” Pa. State Sys. of Higher 

Educ. v. Ass’n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. Faculties, 98 A.3d 5, 14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014) (quoting Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 84, AFL–

CIO v. City of Beaver Falls, 459 A.2d 863, 865 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)). Further, “[t]he 

essence test does not permit this Court to vacate an arbitrator’s award even if we 

disagree with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the [collective bargaining 

agreement].” Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 87 v. County

of Lackawanna, 102 A.3d 1285, 1290 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citing Cent. Susquehanna 

Intermediate Unit Educ. Ass’n v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit # 16, 459 

A.2d 889, 890 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)). “The essence test is an exceptionally deferential 
8

standard, because binding arbitration is a highly favored method of dispute 

resolution.” Dep’t of Corr., State Corr. Inst. at Forest v. Pa. State Corr. Officers 

Ass’n, 173 A.3d 854, 858 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citing Northumberland Cnty. 

Comm’rs v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL–CIO Local 2016, Council 

86, 71 A.3d 367, 374 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)). The party challenging an arbitration 

award bears the “burden of proving the award does not draw its essence from the 

[collective bargaining agreement].” See Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 98 A.3d at 

14.

However, even where an arbitration award satisfies the essence test, our 

Supreme Court has delineated a discreet exception whereby a reviewing court may 

still vacate the award if it violates public policy. See Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. 

Millcreek Twp. Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 210 A.3d 993, 1007-11 (Pa. 2019); see 

also Westmoreland I, 939 A.2d at 865. The application of this public policy 

exception requires that “[s]uch public policy . . . must be well-defined, dominant, 

and ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general 

considerations of supposed public interests.” Westmoreland I, 939 A.2d at 866. 

Additionally, unlike the deferential standard of review employed to review 

determinations under the essence test, appellate review of the public policy 

exception “lies in the proper application of the public policy exception to the essence 

test. This is a pure question of law; [the] standard of review is de novo, and [the] 

scope of review is plenary.” Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. 

Emps., Dist. Council 33, Local 934, 52 A.3d 1117, 1121 (Pa. 2012). Further, our 

Supreme Court has expressly recognized that

not only is the public policy exception “exceptionally 

narrow” in its own right, but it is also an exception to the 

essence test, which is itself a narrow exception to the 
9

doctrine that arbitration awards are final and binding. A 

baseline recognition that the public policy exception is a 

narrow exception to a narrow exception must guide a 

reviewing court’s analysis.

Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 210 A.3d at 1011 (internal citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has articulated a three-part test to determine the 

appropriate application of the public policy exception to the essence test. See 

Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 210 A.3d at 1011.

First, a reviewing court must identify precisely what 

remedy the arbitrator imposed. Next, the court must 

inquire into whether that remedy implicates a public 

policy that is well-defined, dominant, and ascertained by 

reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from 

general considerations of supposed public interests. 

Finally, the reviewing court must determine if the 

arbitrator’s award compels the employer to violate the 

implicated policy, given the particular circumstances and 

the factual findings of the arbitrator.

Id. (emphasis, internal citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). The 

Supreme Court has further emphasized that “the arbitrator’s interpretation of the 

contract controls during this entire analysis, which is only triggered upon the 

reviewing court’s determination that the award satisfies the essence test, and should 

be upheld absent a clear violation of public policy.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he burden is 

on the party that opposes the award to demonstrate that it violates public policy.” 

Id.

The instant matter involves Article XVIII of the CBA, which states that 

“[t]he Employer has the right to discharge or suspend any employee for just cause.” 

CBA at 34; R.R. at 233a. In reviewing the Arbitration Award, the trial court 
10

determined that the essence test was satisfied because the issue in this case was 

within the terms of the CBA and the Arbitration Award was not without foundation 

in the CBA. See Trial Court Opinion at 11. Neither party disputes the trial court’s 

conclusion that the essence test has been met. Therefore, the only question presently 

before this Court is whether the public policy exception to the essence test applies 

to this case. To make this determination, we review the facts of this case pursuant 

to the three-part Millcreek test.

1. The precise remedy imposed by the arbitrator.

The precise remedy imposed by the arbitrator for consideration in this 

matter was a reduction of Ruffner’s termination to a three-day unpaid suspension 

with back pay. See Arbitration Award at 15.

2. Whether the remedy implicates a well-defined, dominant public policy.

Next, as the party that opposed the Arbitration Award, the County bears 

the burden of demonstrating that the Arbitration Award remedy implicates public 

policy. See Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 210 A.3d at 1011. As stated supra, in order 

for the public policy exception to the essence test to apply, the alleged public policy 

involved “must be well-defined, dominant, and ascertained by reference to the laws 

and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public 

interests.” Westmoreland I, 939 A.2d at 866.

The County alleges that a well-defined public policy against prison 

officials allowing prisoner suicide exists and is applicable to this matter. See

County’s Brief at 16-21. To carry its burden of establishing the existence of this 

policy, the County directs the Court’s attention to Department of Public Welfare, 
11

Farview State Hospital v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), which noted 

Pennsylvania’s strong public policy against the commission of suicide in concluding 

that a prison could force feed an inmate on hunger strike to prevent his death, and 

18 Pa.C.S. § 508(d), which justifies the employment of force by law enforcement to

prevent the commission of a crime or a suicide.8 The trial court also cited Kallinger

to note the existence of a well-defined, dominant policy seeking to prevent prison 

suicide. See Trial Court Opinion at 11-12. While it attempts to distinguish the facts 

of Kallinger from the instant matter, the Union does not argue that a public policy 

seeking the prevention of suicide by inmates does not exist, see Union Brief at 33-

39, and we have little trouble agreeing that such a well-defined, dominant policy 

exists in Pennsylvania.

3. Whether the Arbitration Award compels violation of a well-defined, dominant 

public policy.

The crux of whether the public policy exception to the essence test is 

applicable to the instant matter revolves around the third prong of the Millcreek test: 

whether the remedy fashioned by the arbitrator violated, or would cause the County 

8

18 Pa.C.S. § 508(d) provides, in relevant part:

(d) Use of force to prevent suicide or the commission of crime--

(1) The use of force upon or toward the person of another is 

justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately 

necessary to prevent such other person from committing suicide, 

inflicting serious bodily injury upon himself, committing or 

consummating the commission of a crime involving or threatening 

bodily injury, damage to or loss of property or a breach of the peace 

. . . .

18 Pa.C.S. § 508(d).
12

to violate, the well-defined, dominant public policy seeking to prevent prison 

suicide. We find that it does not.

As this Court has explained:

[C]ourts are to give arbitration awards deference and are 

not to second-guess an arbitrator’s findings of fact or 

interpretations. But these awards are not entitled to a level 

of devotion that makes a mockery of the dominant public 

policy . . . .

Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Neshaminy Fed’n of Tchrs., 171 A.3d 334, 340 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether an 

arbitration award violates a dominant public policy, reviewing courts consider “both 

aggravating and mitigating factors in determining whether an award poses an 

unacceptable risk that a clear public policy will be undermined if the award is 

implemented.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Pa.

State Sys. of Higher Educ., Lock Haven Univ. v. Ass’n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. 

Faculties, 193 A.3d 486, 500 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (same). Courts have found 

arbitration awards properly vacated pursuant to the public policy exception to the 

essence test in cases where, despite proven explicit and continuous conduct 

amounting to sexual harassment in contravention of Pennsylvania’s public policy 

against such harassment, arbitration remedies imposed very little punishment. See 

Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 171 A.3d at 343 (20-day suspension with back pay violated 

public policy against sexual harassment); see also Phila. Hous. Auth., 52 A.3d at 

1128 (award granting immediate reinstatement with back pay in the face of 

“egregious” conduct amounting to sexual harassment makes a mockery of public 

policy against sexual harassment). When considered in the light of the very specific 
13

and unusual facts presented herein, the arbitrator’s award does not make a mockery 

of the dominant policy to prevent prisoner suicide. 

In explaining the Arbitration Award remedy in relation to Ruffner’s 

failure to immediately initiate lifesaving measures on the prospective inmate suicide, 

the arbitrator, as the finder of fact, stated as follows:

After cutting down the inmate, [Ruffner] left the cell to 

call for the ADON and then waited outside of the cell for 

the ADON to arrive. The surveillance evidence 

documents that he did not attempt to start CPR on his own, 

despite policies and training that required him to 

immediately start CPR on an inmate in need. [Ruffner’s] 

explanation was that he believed the inmate to be deceased 

and that he was waiting for the ADON to arrive. With the 

County’s policies and training requiring immediate CPR 

or First Aid, the question is whether [Ruffner’s] 

explanations excuse his failure to immediately act.

The surveillance evidence documents that after cutting 

down the inmate, [Ruffner] began waiting for the ADON 

outside the cell at 9:49:47 a.m. Despite being in the unit 

and aware of the medical emergency, the ADON 

responded casually, taking 1 minute and 23 seconds to 

make his way to the inmate’s cell by 9:51:10 a.m. The 

County determined this delay to be totally unacceptable, 

with the ADON being discharged for his callous conduct 

and neglect of duty. With the ADON being held 

responsible, the County cannot fully blame [Ruffner] for 

the same conduct. As a Corrections Officer, [Ruffner] was 

not medical personnel. He also knew the ADON was in 

the unit. While his training required him to immediately 

begin CPR on his own, the amount of time that he would 

have conducted CPR would have been very brief had the 

ADON acted appropriately. Moreover, he cannot be 

blamed for any failure after the ADON arrived in the cell, 

as he justifiably relied upon the ADON’s handling of the 

medical situation.
14

Upon entering the cell, [Ruffner] saw the inmate and 

believed him to be deceased. [Ruffner] is not medical 

personnel and his testimony as to his belief is accepted as 

credible. As explained by the [Allegheny County] Jail’s 

Medical Director, [] the inmate might have been brain 

dead at that time, as it is difficult to determine exactly 

when that occurred. Nevertheless, [Ruffner’s] training 

required him to immediately begin CPR and he did not do 

so. However, when this conduct is considered in 

conjunction with that of the ADON, it is more 

understandable. The ADON was on the unit and an 

emergency call made. The undersigned is convinced that 

had the ADON acted appropriately, CPR would have been 

initiated in a timely fashion such that [Ruffner] would not 

have been terminated, as his error was more one of 

judgment and not willful misconduct or neglect of duty.

Arbitration Award at 14-15. Based on this assessment of the facts of the matter, the 

arbitrator determined Ruffner should be reinstated with a three-day suspension, 

subject to required training to be determined by the County. See id. at 15.

The trial court found that the arbitrator’s assessment of the evidence 

was “seriously flawed” in relation to the remedy imposed. Trial Court Opinion at 

12. Specifically, the trial court took issue with the arbitrator’s consideration of the 

ADON’s actions during this event, which the trial court viewed as completely 

separate from Ruffner’s actions. See id. at 12-13. On balance, the trial court found 

that “[d]ocking [Ruffner] three days[’] pay [] is virtually no penalty under these 

circumstances[,]” and found that “[s]uch an award poses an unacceptable risk of 

undermining the well-defined public policy against suicide.” Trial Court Opinion at 

13-14. 

We do not agree with the trial court’s assessment of the Arbitration 

Award under the unique circumstances of this case. Events such as these do not 
15

occur in a vacuum. While we appreciate the trial court’s observation that both 

Ruffner and the ADON can be individually blamed for their individual conduct, see

Trial Court Opinion at 12-13, holding both Ruffner and the ADON individually 

responsible for their own conduct does not require, as the trial court seems to 

suggest, that the conduct of each must be viewed in isolation. If we lived in a black 

and white world of absolutes, cases involving proven technical violations of prison 

rules and/or procedures would never require arbitrators to fashion awards other than 

termination or complete reinstatement with back pay. However, the arbitration 

process allows arbitrators to modify disciplinary penalties and fashion appropriate 

awards based on the specific facts of a given case. See Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Com. 

Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, Teamsters Local 502, 160 A.3d 928, 934 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)

(noting that arbitrators maintain authority to modify disciplinary penalties imposed). 

This is what occurred here – the arbitrator reviewed the unique facts and fashioned 

an award to suit those specific facts. 

We agree with the arbitrator that an assessment of the ADON’s 

presence and behavior during the incident was pertinent to consider in determining 

Ruffner’s culpability and, therefore, in fashioning an appropriate remedy. The 

ADON was not far away somewhere else in the prison, but instead was right there 

on the cellblock, a fact that was known to Ruffner. The ADON’s presence helps to 

explain Ruffner’s inaction and represents a significant mitigating factor in 

determining an appropriate remedy. 

Ruffner also testified that he thought the inmate was already dead upon 

cutting him down with the cut-down tool.

9

 The arbitrator credited this testimony. 

9 Ruffner testified:

Once I got the keys I went back into the cell and cut him down. [The 

inmate] landed on his face on the bottom bunk.
16

See Arbitration Award at 14. Notwithstanding the trial court’s sweeping and 

unsupported statement that “[i]t is common knowledge that a person appearing 

lifeless is potentially revivable[,]” Trial Court Opinion at 13, Ruffner’s credited 

belief that the inmate was deceased provides further mitigation for his failure to 

commence CPR and/or First Aid. Allegheny County Jail Policy 304 Section 8 calls 

for corrections officers to initiate lifesaving measures “if needed,” and Section 15 

requires corrections officers to immediately initiate CPR and/or First Aid “as 

appropriate.” See Allegheny County Jail Policy 304, supra note 3. Conducting CPR 

At that point I grabbed [the inmate], flipped him onto his back, and 

placed him onto the ground. 

His eyes were popped out of his head, his chest was expanded, and 

his stomach looked like it didn’t have anything in it. I was under 

the assumption he was dead when I cut him down.

I smacked him in his arm trying to get a response from him, but it 

was eyes open staring at the ceiling, no breathing, nothing.

At that point I exited the cell and stood outside waiting for the 

ADON because I knew he was on the pod. I yelled down to [the 

other officer who was present] and said where’s the ADON, and he 

yelled over to the corner to the ADON and said you need to get 

upstairs.

. . . . 

At that point [upon the discovery of the inmate] I’m under the 

assumption he’s dead, just the lifelessness of him in my opinion, and 

I’m immediately looking for the ADON because I knew he was there 

and knew that somebody with more medical knowledge was on the 

pod, somebody that had more than two hours of training, video 

experience, was on the pod, and I was looking for that person and 

trying to get [the other officer who was present] to get that ADON 

to come upstairs and he was trying, and even [a third officer] yelled 

to [the ADON] to hurry to get upstairs.

Notes of Testimony, September 19, 2018 at 162-64; R.R. at 165a-67a. 
17

on a deceased individual would be futile, and therefore arguably neither “needed” 

nor “appropriate.” Ruffner’s failure to immediately commence CPR on the inmate,

although ultimately incorrect, arguably comported with the mandates of the prison 

policies to the extent it was based on his belief that the inmate was already deceased.

Given the unique facts of the instant matter, the Arbitration Award does 

not make a mockery of the public policy seeking to prevent prisoner suicide. The 

arbitrator considered the testimony and evidence before her and thoughtfully 

explained her decision based on the specific facts of this case. While a well-defined, 

dominant public policy against prisoner suicide exists, in consideration of the unique 

facts as found by the arbitrator, we cannot say that the remedy in this case, although 

not the same as what the trial court would have fashioned in assessing the same facts, 

violates public policy or requires the County to do so. Accordingly, the trial court 

improperly applied the public policy exception to the essence test in this matter.

Additionally, we note that Philadelphia Housing Authority is readily 

distinguishable from the instant matter, as that case involved an employee whose 

“lewd, lascivious and extraordinarily perverse” conduct toward a co-worker without 

question amounted to sexual harassment. See Phila. Hous. Auth., 52 A.3d at 1124-

25. In Philadelphia Housing Authority, the Supreme Court reviewed relevant 

federal sexual harassment case law and recognized the existence of an explicit, welldefined, and dominant public policy against workplace sexual harassment. Id. at 

1123, 1127-28. The Supreme Court then found that the arbitration award that 

reinstated the offending employee with full back pay violated that well-defined, 

dominant public policy against sexual harassment. See id. The Supreme Court 

noted:
18

To allow an arbitration award which finds that an 

employee engaged in “extraordinarily perverse” physical 

sexual harassment of a co-worker, yet then simply 

dismisses the conduct as unworthy of an employer 

response beyond initial “counseling,” and reinstatement 

with back pay, would eviscerate the ability of employers 

to enforce dominant public policy.

Id. at 1125. The majority concluded that, considering the “egregious” nature of the 

employee’s conduct, the arbitrator’s award reinstating him “[made] a mockery of the 

dominant public policy against sexual harassment.” Id. at 1128.

Ruffner’s actions and the remedy fashioned by the arbitrator herein are 

simply not comparable to the actions of the employee or the remedy in Philadelphia 

Housing Authority. Ruffner did not repeatedly and knowingly violate public policy. 

His actions in not commencing CPR, although ultimately incorrect in regard to 

Allegheny County Jail policy, can be easily understood when Ruffner’s credited 

belief that the inmate was deceased is coupled with the presence of a more qualified 

medical professional on scene whose arrival Ruffner thought was imminent. A 

three-day unpaid suspension for a negligent error of judgment under the particular 

circumstances of this case in no way eviscerates the County’s ability to enforce the 

public policy to protect against prisoner suicide. See Phila. Hous. Auth., 52 A.3d at 

1125. The serious nature of the tragic death of the inmate in this matter 

notwithstanding, unlike the reinstatement without other consequences awarded in 

Philadelphia Housing Authority, the Arbitration Award imparts a meaningful 

penalty that is properly calibrated to Ruffner’s level of culpability as determined by 

the arbitrator in this matter.
19

For these reasons, we reverse the Trial Court Order and reinstate the 

award of the arbitrator reducing Ruffner’s termination to a three-day suspension with 

back pay. 

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania :

:

v. :

:

Allegheny County Prison :

Employees Independent Union, : No. 122 C.D. 2020

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 10th day of November, 2020, the January 23, 2020 

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is REVERSED. The 

arbitration award dated January 10, 2019 is REINSTATED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge