_______________________________ 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

Chief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2004 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant, 

v No. 120107 

JOSEPH CARL WEEDER, 

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee. 

PER CURIAM 

This case presents the question whether a driver 

charged with second-degree murder following an auto-related 

death must receive a negligent homicide instruction. 

Following People v McIntosh, 400 Mich 1; 252 NW2d 779 

(1977), the Court of Appeals answered yes. We overrule 

McIntosh and remand to the Court of Appeals for further 

review. 

Defendant seeks to appeal the Court of Appeals 

affirmance of two convictions for operating a vehicle while 
 

under the influence of intoxicating liquor and thereby 

causing death, MCL 257.625(4); two convictions for firstdegree fleeing and eluding, MCL 750.479a(5); and one 

conviction for operating a motor vehicle while license 

suspended, subsequent offense, MCL 257.904(3)(b). Defendant 

was also convicted on two counts of involuntary 

manslaughter, MCL 750.321, which convictions the Court of 

Appeals reversed. The prosecutor seeks to appeal the 

reversal of the involuntary manslaughter convictions. The 

significant question presented is whether defendant was 

entitled to an instruction on negligent homicide, MCL 

750.324, as the Court of Appeals concluded. Because the 

Court of Appeals relied on People v McIntosh, supra, which 

we believe does not properly construe MCL 750.325, we vacate 

the Court of Appeals reversal of defendant's involuntary 

manslaughter convictions and remand the case to that Court 

for further consideration in light of this opinion. We are 

not persuaded that the questions presented by defendant in 

his application merit further review; therefore, except as 

discussed below, defendant's application is denied. 

I 

While intoxicated, defendant fled from a police officer 

who was attempting to effectuate a traffic stop. Defendant 

fled at high speeds, at times through residential areas, 

failed to stop at a stop sign and a traffic signal, almost 

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struck two vehicles, and eventually struck another vehicle, 

killing its two occupants. Defendant was charged with two 

counts of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; two counts of 

operating under the influence and causing death; two counts 

of first-degree fleeing and eluding; and operating a motor 

vehicle with a suspended license, second or subsequent 

offense. 

In connection with the second-degree murder charge, 

defendant requested jury instructions on involuntary 

manslaughter and negligent homicide, MCL 750.324. The trial 

court instructed on involuntary manslaughter as defendant 

requested, but refused to instruct on negligent homicide 

because the court did not view the evidence in the case as 

supporting that instruction. The jury convicted defendant 

of two counts of involuntary manslaughter rather than 

second-degree murder, and otherwise convicted defendant as 

charged. 

The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant's lead issue 

on appeal that he was denied a fair trial because of the 

trial court's refusal to instruct on negligent homicide. 

The Court found McIntosh, to be dispositive.1 The Court 

1 The Court of Appeals quoted the following from People

v McIntosh: 

“[I]f the jurors are or should be permitted

to consider manslaughter committed with a motor

3 
 

 

reversed defendant's manslaughter convictions and ordered 

that they be replaced with negligent homicide convictions, 

while giving the prosecutor the option of retrying defendant 

on the manslaughter charges. The Court rejected the rest of 

defendant's claims on appeal. 

II 

In this appeal we are concerned with the construction 

of MCL 750.325, which reads: 

The crime of negligent homicide shall be

deemed to be included within every crime of 

manslaughter charged to have been committed in

the operation of any vehicle, and in any case

where a defendant is charged with manslaughter

committed in the operation of any vehicle, if the

jury shall find the defendant not guilty of the

crime of manslaughter, it may render a verdict of

guilty of negligent homicide. 

The proper construction of a statute is an issue that 

we review de novo. People v Jones, 467 Mich 301, 304; 651 

NW2d 906 (2002). Our goal in construing a statute is "to 

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 

Legislature." People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d 

275 (2002). If the statute's language is clear and 

unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its 

plain meaning and we enforce the statute as written. 

People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001). In 

vehicle, then, pursuant to MCLA 750.325; MSA 

28.557, they also should be permitted to consider

negligent homicide.” [Unpublished opinion per

curiam, issued July 31, 2001 (Docket No. 217454),

quoting McIntosh, at 7]. 

4 
 

 

other words, when statutory language is unambiguous, 

judicial construction is not required or permitted because 

the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it 

plainly expressed. Id. 

III 

We find MCL 750.325 clear and unambiguous. The statute 

plainly deems the crime of negligent homicide (MCL 750.324) 

to be included within every crime of manslaughter charged to 

have been committed in the operation of any vehicle. 

Further, the statute clearly and unambiguously allows for 

the conviction of negligent homicide in any case in which a 

defendant is charged with manslaughter committed in the 

operation of any vehicle. The Legislature twice uses the 

word "charged." Accordingly, for the statute to apply, a 

defendant must be charged with manslaughter committed in 

connection with the operation of a vehicle. Here, however, 

defendant was not charged with manslaughter. Defendant was 

charged with second-degree murder. It follows that MCL 

750.325 does not apply in this case.2 

To the extent our conclusion is inconsistent with 

McIntosh, we overrule that case. McIntosh concluded that 

because the jury had been given instructions on manslaughter 

2 We recognize that we reach the same result reached in

People v Jordan, 347 Mich 347; 79 NW2d 873 (1956), which

was overruled in McIntosh, supra. 

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as a lesser offense of murder, the jury should also have 

been instructed on negligent homicide under MCL 750.325. 

The McIntosh Court reached this conclusion by concluding 

that the "better view" of MCL 750.325 "is that manslaughter 

committed with a motor vehicle does not have to be formally 

pled in an information charging murder in order for the jury 

to consider negligent homicide as a possible lesser 

offense." 400 Mich 7. In light of the clear and 

unambiguous use of the word “charged” in the statute, it was 

unnecessary for the McIntosh Court to consider what it 

thought was the “better view.” However, we agree with 

McIntosh to the extent that it held that a defendant charged 

with the crime of murder is entitled to an instruction on 

manslaughter if there is the necessary evidentiary support 

for the instruction. Although not based on McIntosh, our 

decision in People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527; 664 NW2d 685 

(2003), arrived at the same result. 

IV 

This is not the end of the analysis, however. The 

result reached in McIntosh will still obtain if negligent 

homicide, MCL 750.324, is an inferior, or necessarily 

included lesser, offense of the charged offense of seconddegree murder, and if there is the necessary evidentiary 

support for an instruction on negligent homicide. People v 

Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002); MCL 768.32(1). 

6
 
 

 

The Court of Appeals did not reach these issues because it 

relied on McIntosh. Accordingly, we vacate the Court of 

Appeals reversal of the manslaughter convictions, and we 

remand this case to that Court for reconsideration of 

defendant's argument in light of this opinion and the 

principles established in Cornell. If, on remand, the Court 

of Appeals concludes that an instruction on negligent 

homicide was warranted in this case, it must additionally 

consider, pursuant to Cornell, whether the trial court 

committed error requiring reversal in failing to give the 

instruction.3 

V 

The foregoing discussion resolves the prosecutor's 

cross-appeal. In addition to that appeal, we have 

considered the issues in defendant's appeal. Except as 

discussed below, we conclude that defendant's arguments lack 

merit for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals. 

If on remand the Court of Appeals affirms defendant's 

convictions for involuntary manslaughter, it must also 

consider defendant's challenge to his sentences of 15 to 221⁄2 

3 The circuit court considered defendant's request for

an instruction on negligent homicide, but determined that

the evidence did not support such an instruction. We note 

that an appellate court must find substantial evidence in

support of a requested instruction that was not given in

order to reverse. See Cornell, supra at 365-366. 

7
 
 

years, which the Court did not consider in light of its 

reversal of the manslaughter convictions. Further, because 

the Court rejected defendant's supplemental argument for a 

new trial (based on new evidence involving a witness's 

testimony in a subsequent civil proceeding), in part because 

it reversed defendant's manslaughter convictions, this issue 

should be reconsidered on remand if the Court of Appeals 

affirms defendant's manslaughter convictions. 

VI 

The Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant's 

manslaughter convictions is vacated, and this matter is 

remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of 

defendant's manslaughter convictions consistent with this 

opinion. Defendant's remaining convictions and sentences 

are affirmed, except as otherwise indicated in this opinion. 

MCR 7.302(G)(1). 

Maura D. Corrigan

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Clifford W. Taylor

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman 

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_______________________________ 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant, 

v No. 120107 

JOSEPH CARL WEEDER, 

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee. 

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 

I would not decide this case by an opinion per curiam. 

Because this case offers the opportunity to address a 

jurisprudentially significant issue, I prefer to grant leave to 

appeal so that we might avail ourselves of full briefing and 

argument by the parties. 

Preferences aside, however, I would limit the Court of 

Appeals reconsideration of defendant’s argument to the issue 

whether there was the necessary evidentiary support for the 

negligent homicide instruction. The majority once again extends 

the obiter dictum from People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 

127 (2002). I remain committed to the view that, when 

requested, a jury may be instructed on offenses inferior to the 

charged offense if such an instruction is supported by the 

evidence. People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 549; 664 NW2d 685 

(2003) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring). Because the trial court 

previously determined that the evidence did not support a 
 

negligent homicide instruction, the only relevant inquiry is 

whether such a determination was erroneous. 

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly