IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0753

Filed March 29, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ROY LEE GARNER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County, Shawn R. 

Showers, Judge.

Roy Garner appeals the sentences imposed following his guilty pleas to 

abuse of a corpse, accessory after the fact, and obstruction of prosecution or 

defense. AFFIRMED.

Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023).
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DANILSON, Senior Judge.

Roy Garner appeals the sentences imposed following his guilty pleas to 

abuse of a corpse, accessory after the fact, and obstruction of prosecution or 

defense, contending the district court “abused its discretion by considering 

impermissible factors.” Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Garner lived with his girlfriend, Julia Cox, and her son, Steven Vogel. See 

State v. Vogel, No. 21-1931, 2023 WL 1810032, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023). 

Vogel murdered Michael Williams. See id. at *3–5 (affirming Vogel’s convictions 

for first-degree murder and abuse of a corpse). Following the murder, Williams’ 

body was transported from Cox’s home to a rural area and found “burning in the 

ditch.” See id. at *2. 

In connection with the aftermath of the murder, Garner eventually pled guilty 

to abuse of a corpse, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.14(1)(b) (2020); 

accessory after the fact, in violation of section 703.3; and obstruction of 

prosecution or defense, in violation of section 719.3(1). Garner’s plea admitted his 

involvement in “mutilating, disfiguring, or dismembering a human corpse with the 

intent to conceal a crime”; “harbor[ing] [Vogel] with the intent to prevent the 

apprehension of [Vogel]”; and “destruct[ing] evidence to prevent the prosecution” 

of Vogel. Following a sentencing hearing, the district court imposed consecutive 

prison terms totaling nine years. Garner appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Because the sentence imposed by the court was within the statutory limits, 

we review Garner’s sentencing claim for an abuse of discretion. See State v. 
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Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 592 (Iowa 1983). An abuse of discretion occurs “when 

the court exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent 

clearly unreasonable.” State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003). 

Sentencing decisions enjoy a strong presumption in their favor. State v. Loyd, 530 

N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995).

III. Discussion

On appeal, Garner contends the court “impermissibl[y]” “consider[ed] the 

greater crimes of a co-defendant, [Vogel,] which were not charged against 

[Garner]” “and in doing so imposed the maximum consecutive prison sentences 

on [Garner].” Specifically, Garner claims the court “relied in large part on the 

heinous murder committed by . . . Vogel in ordering that Garner’s sentences be 

served consecutively rather than suspending his sentence as requested or 

ordering the prison terms to be served concurrently.” 

In explaining its reasons for Garner’s sentence, the court stated in relevant 

part:

Mr. Garner, I’ve considered my sentencing options, and those

are provided in Chapters 901 and 907, specifically [section] 907.5 of 

the Iowa Code, which is what I am to consider in sentencing you

based on what would provide you with maximum rehabilitation and

protect the community at the same time from further offenses by you 

and others.

And I have considered your age. You’re an older man. You

do have a small prior criminal history. You’re on, I believe, Social 

Security income for disability, so you’re not employed. Your family 

circumstances obviously have become known throughout this 

hearing. And the nature of the offense committed and the harm to 

the victim, which is obvious to anybody, and your rehabilitation.

I do find that you did play a role—a significant role in

dissolving or disposing of Mr. Michael Williams’s body by driving 

Steven Vogel and then aiding him—Mr. Vogel in setting Michael 

Williams’s body on fire in a ditch, dehumanizing him, transporting 

evidence, and then attempting to dispose of it.
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I do find that your actions—I find them reprehensible, and 

there’s no excuse for them. And I’m sorry for your bad health now, 

but that’s not an excuse for this kind of behavior, and it’s not 

acceptable under the laws of this state or this county.

So the Court is going to impose the prison sentence pursuant

to the provisions of Iowa Code Sections 902.9, 907.5, 708, 703, and 

719.3, and you’re hereby committed to the custody of the Iowa 

Department of Corrections for the maximum term of not to exceed 

five years on Count I, the maximum term of not to exceed two years 

on Count II, and the same for Count III.

. . . .

The sentences just imposed shall be served consecutively to

each other based on the heinous nature of the crime and the

attempted cover-up and obstruction of prosecution.

“In reaching a sentencing decision, the district court must determine which 

legally authorized sentence for the offense ‘will provide maximum opportunity for 

the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from 

further offenses by the defendant and others.’” State v. McCalley, 972 N.W.2d 

672, 677 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Iowa Code § 901.5). This requires the district court 

to weigh multiple factors, “including the nature of the offense, the attending 

circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances 

of reform.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020) (quoting State v. 

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002)). The court also must “consider the 

defendant’s prior record of convictions or deferred judgments, employment status, 

family circumstances, and any other relevant factors.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 

725. There is a presumption in favor of the sentence imposed, and a defendant 

must overcome that presumption by affirmatively demonstrating the court relied on 

an improper factor. Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106. “However, if the defendant 

demonstrates that the district court considered an improper factor, resentencing is 
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required even if the improper factor was merely a secondary consideration.” State 

v. Bowen, No. 22-0278, 2022 WL 16985663, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2022).

Here, at the start of the sentencing hearing, the court clearly stated it was 

sentencing Garner on abuse of a corpse, accessory after the fact, and obstruction 

of prosecution or defense—three offenses related to his activities after the death 

of Williams. We acknowledge some lack of clarity in the court’s statement that it 

had to consider “the nature of the offense committed and the harm to the victim, 

which is obvious to anybody, and your rehabilitation.” At first blush, it could imply 

the court was considering the murder of Williams in addition to Garner’s 

involvement in the crimes after Williams’ death. We note, however, the court never 

specifically referred to the murder of the victim while imposing sentence. 

Considering the court’s statement in context, we conclude the court was 

referencing the crime of abuse of a corpse and did not improperly consider 

Williams’ murder in sentencing Garner. See State v. Johnson, No. 02-0676, 2003 

WL 118531, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2003) (“When we consider the 

statements in context, we conclude they show only a proper consideration of . . . 

other proper factors, rather than an improper consideration of unproven 

offenses.”). Here, Garner has not affirmatively demonstrated that the court relied 

on an improper factor and thus has not overcome the presumption in favor of the 

sentence imposed. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106.

Similarly, with regard to the imposition of consecutive sentences, the court 

explained its decision it was “based on the heinous nature of the crime and the

attempted cover-up and obstruction of prosecution.” Again, the court did not 

specify whether the crime referred to was the murder of Williams or the crime of 
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abuse of a corpse. Notwithstanding, for the same reasons we noted relative to the 

imposition of the sentences, we conclude Garner has not affirmatively

demonstrated the court relied upon an improper factor in imposing consecutive 

sentences. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.