2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-27-2002

USA v. Myrick

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 01-1766

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Myrick" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 216.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/216
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

 No. 01-1766 

 ___________ 

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 

 v. 

 DARRELL A. MYRICK, 

 Appellant 

 _______________________________________________ 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

 D.C. Criminal No. 99-cr-00119-2 

 (Honorable Donald J. Lee) 

 ___________________ 

 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 January 17, 2002 

Before: SCIRICA and ROSENN, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District Judge* 

 (Filed March 27, 2002 ) 

 

 *The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 

 ______________ 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 ______________ 

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 

 Darrell Myrick appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence in the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. On September 7, 2000, 

Myrick pled guilty under a written plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute in excess of 

one kilogram of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846; conspiracy to distribute in 

excess of fifty grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846; and distribution 

of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). 

 Under the plea agreement, the parties agreed that the relevant quantity of heroin 

was at least one kilogram but less than two kilograms, and the relevant quantity of crack 

cocaine was at least 150 grams but less than 500 grams. On November 11, 2000, Myrick 

filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After a hearing, the District Court found that 
Myrick’s plea of guilty was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and denied the motion. 

The Presentence Report designated Myrick’s offense level at 33, criminal history 

category at IV, and guideline range at 188 to 235 months on each count. The District 

Court sentenced Myrick to 188 months imprisonment on each count, to be served 

concurrently. 

 Myrick makes three arguments on appeal - that his counsel was ineffective; that 

the District Court erred in failing to permit him to withdraw his plea of guilty; and that 

the factual basis for the guideline sentence was inaccurate. 

 I. 

 Myrick contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 

suppress evidence obtained in three searches. While "[i]neffective assistance of counsel 

claims are not generally entertained on direct appeal," there is an exception to this rule 

"[w]here the record is sufficient to allow determination of ineffective assistance of 

counsel . . . ." United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation 

omitted). We hold we may properly address this claim. 

 Myrick’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails because he did not show 

that, but for the alleged ineffectiveness, the result would have been different. Myrick 

contends there was no probable cause for the search warrants authorizing the three 

searches because (1) the information supporting the warrant was stale; (2) there was no 

connection to the place searched and the illegal activity claimed; and (3) there was no 

evidence that he conducted illegal activity or that he stored money in his parents’ home. 

We have held "[a] magistrate judge may find probable cause when, viewing the totality 

of the circumstances, ’there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 

will be found in a particular place.’" United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 

2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). We must "uphold the 

finding if the affidavit on which it was based provided a substantial basis for finding 

probable cause." Id. Furthermore, "[t]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this 

area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants." Id. 

(quotations and citations omitted). 

 Here, all three affidavits set forth facts detailing a continuous long-term course of 

drug dealing. The ongoing nature of Myrick’s narcotics operation refutes his claim of 

staleness. See United States v. Stiver, 9 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Age alone . . . 

does not determine staleness. The determination of probable cause is not merely an 

exercise in counting the days or even months between the facts relied on and the issuance 

of the warrant. Rather, we must also examine the nature of the crime and the type of 

evidence.") (quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, "[d]irect evidence linking 

the place to be searched to the crime is not required for the issuance of a search warrant . 

. . . A court is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be 

kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense." Hodge, 246 F.3d at 

305 (quotations and citations omitted). As a result, it was reasonable to infer Myrick 

would store evidence of drug dealing in his apartment, his business, and at his parents’ 

house, which he listed as his residence on several documents. 

 In light of the information provided in the affidavits, there is a substantial basis 

for finding probable cause. Therefore, Myrick suffered no prejudice and his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 

 II. 

 Myrick argues the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. We have stated that "[o]nce accepted, a guilty plea may not 

automatically be withdrawn at the defendant’s whim. Rather, a defendant must have a 

fair and just reason for withdrawing a plea of guilty." United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 

811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). When evaluating a motion to withdraw we 

look to: (1) whether defendant asserts his innocence; (2) whether the government would 

be prejudiced by his withdrawal; and (3) the strength of defendant’s reason to withdraw 

the plea. Id. We find no fault with the District Court’s analysis. 

 Myrick did not assert his innocence during the withdrawal of plea hearing or the 

written motion to withdraw his plea. Additionally, the District Court correctly concluded 

the government would be prejudiced by Myrick’s withdrawal of his plea as subsequent to 

the entry of the plea, one of the government witnesses received a reduction in sentence. 

Last, the record clearly indicates Myrick was competent and his plea was made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. As a result, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding Myrick failed to demonstrate any fair and just reason for 

withdrawing his plea of guilty. 

 III. 

 Myrick contends the sentence imposed by the District Court was legally invalid 

because the factual basis for the guideline sentence was inaccurate. Contrary to Myrick’s 

contentions, the District Court properly used the stipulated drug quantities under the plea 

agreement. Additionally, its finding that Myrick began this offense in March 1996 was 

based on the record. The District Court’s sentence of 188 months was within the 

guideline range. As a result, the District Court’s sentence is supported by the record and 

its findings are not clearly erroneous. 

 IV. 

 For these reasons, the judgment and sentence of conviction will be affirmed. 

TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing opinion. 

 /s/Anthony J. Scirica 

 

 Circuit Judge 

DATED: