1 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 10

- 4779

_____________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. ALFRED STEWART,

Appellant

__________________________ On Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the District of Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 1:10

- cr - 00085 ) District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

__________________________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 10 , 201 2
Before: SLO VITER and VANASKIE , Circuit Judges , and POLLAK , District Judge * (Filed : February 23, 2012 )

_____________ OPINION

_____________ VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Alfred Stewart pleaded guilty in the Middle District of Pennsylvania to possession
with intent to distribute cocai ne base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Stewart was a

* Th e Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.2

career offender under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“ U.S.S.G. ”) , resulting in a total
offense level of 29 and a criminal history category VI , producing a n advisory sentencing guideline range of 151 to 188 months. Stewart objected to the career offender designation and mo ved for a downward departure of one criminal history category under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1). The District Court denied the motion for downward departure , but granted a variance based on pertinent 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors , ultimately sentencing Stewart to 110 months ’ imprisonment.
Stewart has appealed his sentence, asserting that the District Court erred by denying the departure motion and that he received a substantively unreasona ble sentence despite the 41

- month variance below the minimum prison term in the applicable guideline range. We reject these arguments and will affirm

. 1
I.
We generally do not review the denial of discretionary departure motions. See
United States v. Jac kson , 467 F.3d 834, 839 (3d Cir. 2006) (“courts of appeals . . . have no authority to review discretionary denials of departure motions in calculating sentencing ranges”). An exception exists if the “ D istrict C ourt refused such a departure
in violation o f law.” United States v. Batista , 483 F.3d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2007). If the District Court properly understood its authority to grant a departure, we lack jurisdiction
to review the denial of a request for downward departure. Id.

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction to decide th is appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C . § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3

The record reveals that the District Court clearly understood its authority to grant
the U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 departure. The District Court adhered to the proper three

- step sentencing proce dure by calculating the advisory sentencing guideline range , ruling on the departure motion , and considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United
States v. Gunter 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). In denying Stewart’s departure motion, the District Court articulated its reasons on the record why Stewart’s criminal history prohibited him from receiving a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. This serves as clear proof that the District Court was aware of its authority to depart.
T herefore, we lack authority to review Stewart’s challenge to the denial of his departure
motion.
II

. A challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under an
abuse

- of

- discretion standard. See Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We will

not reverse a procedurally sound sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the District Court provided.” United States v. Tomko , 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Because a sentence within the guideline range may be presumed r easonable , s ee Rita v.
United States , 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007), it is exceedingly difficult for a defendant to demonstrate that the benefit given by a below guideline range sentence is unreasonable.
See United States v. Cooper , 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (“ [ A ] within

- guidelines range sentence is more likely to be reasonable than one that lies outside the advisory guidelines range.”).4

The District Court properly calculated the guideline range , then proceeded to
consider the U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 downward de parture m otion and § 3553(a) factors when fashioning Stewart’s 41 month below

- guideline range sentence. The District Court
considered Stewart’s role as a street

- level dealer , the dates and weights of the drugs sold, the circumstances of his prior criminal history, and his cooperation with the authorities. Nevertheless, Stewart complains that the District Court gave too much weight t o the career offender guideline . The argument is unavailing . Stewart is a recidivist with a prior criminal record that began at the age of thirteen and continued unabated through the instant offense of conviction. Stewart’s record is comprised of multiple drug convictions, one of which included a firearm, a resisting arrest conviction , and a series of probation and parole violations

. T he District Court did not abuse its discretion by varying 41

mon ths below the guideline range and in no way impose d an unreasonable sentence.
III. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the
District Court.