alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-10.19.(b)



 Exhibit 10.19(b) 

Second Amendment to Consulting Agreement 

This Second Amendment, effective as of June 2, 2016 (the “Amendment”) is made to the Consulting Agreement dated June 4,
2014, as amended (the “Agreement”) by and between Stereotaxis, Inc., a Delaware corporation (hereinafter “Stereotaxis”) with offices located at 4320 Forest Park Avenue, Suite 100, St. Louis, Missouri 63108, USA and Eric N.
Prystowsky, M.D. (hereinafter “Consultant”). 
 WHEREAS, Consultant and Stereotaxis wish to amend the Agreement to extend the term
of the Agreement for a period of one year; 
 NOW, THEREFORE, Stereotaxis and Consultant hereby agree as follows: 

 

	 	1.	The Term of the Agreement is hereby extended for a period of one year from the effective date of this Amendment, up to and including June 1, 2017. 


Except as specifically modified by this Amendment, all terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 

[Signature Page Follows] 

  
 Page 1 of 2 








 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the date first written above.
This Amendment may be executed in counterparts, by facsimile transmission or by e-mail delivery of a “.pdf” format data file, each of which shall constitute an original and all of which together shall constitute one instrument. 

 

			
	STEREOTAXIS, INC.
		
	By:	 	/s/ Karen W. Duros
	Title:	 	Sr. VP & General Counsel
		 	Compliance Officer
	Date:	 	May 11, 2016

  

			
	CONSULTANT:
		
	By:	 	/s/ Eric N. Prystowsky, M.D.
	Date:	 	May 11, 2016


  
 Page 2 of 2
|   | 1.     | The Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 (the “Form 10-Q”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|   | 2.     | Information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                                                         |

| Dated: May 13, 2010       | By:    | /s/ DAVID T. TABER                    |   |
|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|--------|
|                      |   | David T. Taber                        |   |
|                      |   | President and Chief Executive Officer |   |
|                      |   |                                  |   |
|  Dated: May 13, 2010 | By:    | /s/ MITCHELL A. DERENZO               |   |
|                      |   | Mitchell A. Derenzo                   |   |
|                      |   | Executive Vice President and          |   |
|                      |   | Chief Financial Officer               |   |

----
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON A PPELLEE ’ S

M OTION FOR E N B ANC R ECONSIDERATION

Appellate case name: Jefferson County, Texas v. Ellarene Farris, Individually and as

Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of James Farris

Appellate case number: 01

- 17

- 00493

- CV

Trial court case number: 2005

- 09580

Trial court: 11th District Court of Harris County

Date motion filed: October 12, 2018

Party filing motion: Appellee, Ellarene Farris, Individually and as Personal R epresentative

of the Heirs and Estate of James Farris

T he motion for reconsideration en banc is DENIED.

PER CURIAM

En banc court consists of: Chief Justice Radack, and Justices Keyes, Higley, Lloyd, Goodman,

Landau, Hightower, and Countiss.

Justice Kel ly not participating.

Date: Febr uary 12 , 201 9
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 95-50472

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RENE GARZA,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. SA-94-CV-8825

- - - - - - - - - -

September 3, 1996

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Rene Garza (#568511) moves for leave to appeal in forma

pauperis (IFP), arguing that the district court improperly denied

his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. Garza has

identified no error in the denial. See United States v. Garza,

SA-994-CV-8825 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 1995). His appeal fails to

present a nonfrivolous issue; the motion for IFP is DENIED. 

Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep't, 811 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir.
No. 95-50472

- 2 -

1986). The appeal is DISMISSED. 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

ANTONIO PEARSON, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 713 EAL 2015 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 30th day of March, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                      18,553,831
<SECURITIES>                                 9,979,776
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            25,982,382
<PP&E>                                       2,164,351
<DEPRECIATION>                               (711,383)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              30,733,191
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,496,849
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    49,821,157
<OTHER-SE>                                   (791,044)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                30,733,191
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               730,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,938,886
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              52,075
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (9,082,161)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (9,082,161)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.22)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.23)
        

</TABLE>
#### Earl FAIL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 34929.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 5, 1962.

*863Frank Sparks, Eastland, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Presiding Judge.

Our prior opinion is withdrawn.

The record contains no statement of facts and no bills of exception.

The indictment was in two counts, the first alleging the offense of forgery. The second count alleged that appellant passed the forged instrument, knowing it to be forged, with intent to injure and defraud.

Appellant pleaded not guilty in a trial before a jury. The court in his charge withdrew the first count of the indictment, and submitted only the second count. The jury found appellant guilty as charged in the second count of the indictment and assessed the punishment at 2 years.

The judgment entered upon the verdict adjudged appellant guilty “of the offense of Forgery and Passing a forged instrument, as found by the jury.” The sentence recites that appellant “has been adjudged guilty of Forgery and Passing a forged instrument.”

The judgment and sentence are reformed so as to conform to the jury’s verdict and show that appellant was adjudged guilty and sentenced for the offense of passing as true a forged instrument in writing.

The reformation of the record complies with the prayer of appellant’s motion for rehearing, otherwise nothing is presented for review.

As reformed, the judgment is affirmed.
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-40058 Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. LUIS ARMANDO CRISTALES-HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 1:10-CR-1025-1
Before BENAVIDES, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The attorney appointed to represent Luis Armando Cristales-Hernandez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders
v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Cristales-Hernandez has not filed a response. W e have reviewed counsel’s brief and the r e levant portions of the record reflected therein. We
concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review

. Ac c o r d ingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Octob er 21 , 20 11 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-40058 Document: 00511640237 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/21/2011No. 11-40058

G RANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, a n d t h e APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See5 T H C I R
. R. 42.2.

2 Case: 11-40058 Document: 00511640237 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/21/2011
1

Filed 7/29/21 Laroya v. Laroya CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

AMARJIT LAROYA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HUSSAN LAROYA,

Defenda nt and Appellant. C091576

(Super. Ct. No. 19DV02501)

Hussan Laroya appeals from a domestic violence restraining order issued after

trial to protect Amarjit Laroya. Hussan contends the trial court abused its discretion in

issuing the order. In support of his contention, Hussan argues there was insufficient

evidence he abused Amarjit. He also argues the trial court erred in allowing his adult

sons to testify. As we explain below, despite being represented by counsel, Hussan has

failed to preserve these claims on appeal. The claims are thus forfeited and we will

affirm the trial court’s order.

In order to preserve a claim on appeal, the appellate brief must “[s]upport any

reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the

record where the matter appears” ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)( C)), it must also

support each point by argum ent and, if possible, by citation to authority ( Cal. Rules of2

Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)). In his opening brief, Hussan identifies five separate issues

on appeal; however, his purpo r ted analysis of those issues contain not a single citation to

the record. It is not this court ’ s task to search the record for evidence that supports a

party ’ s factual statements, and we will disregard statements not supported by proper

citation. ( In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal .App.4th 1295, 1310, fn. 3; Regents of

th e University of Cal ifornia v. Sheily (2004) 122 Cal .App.4th 824, 826, fn. 1.)

M oreover, in the argument section of his opening brief, Hussan failed to support

the issues he raised with citation to relevant legal authority or meaningful analysis.

Instead, Hussan rests his claims solely on passing reference to statutes without

explanation. An appellant who does not provide adequate legal authority and analysis to

support a contention forfeits that contention. ( Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC

(2017) 13 Cal .App.5th 947, 948; Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal .App.4th 318, 324.)

Accordingly, Hussan has forfeited his claims for this reason as well.



### D ISPOSITION

The orders of the trial court are affirmed. Appellant shall pay respondent ’ s costs

of this appeal. (See Cal . Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MAURO, J.

DUARTE, J.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS AMENDED AND RESTATED SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION
EXTRACTED FROM THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF APPLIED ANALYTICAL INDUSTRIES, INC.
RESTATED TO REFLECT THE ADOPTION IN 1997 OF STATEMENTS OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS ("SFAS") NO.128, "EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE". THIS RESTATED SCHEDULE
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1996
<CASH>                                           4,035
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,797
<ALLOWANCES>                                        76
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                20,988
<PP&E>                                          22,555
<DEPRECIATION>                                  10,155
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  35,774
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            8,916
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           811
<OTHER-SE>                                      22,599
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    35,774
<SALES>                                         20,774
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                20,774
<CGS>                                            8,815
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    8,815
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 9,350
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     6
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 240
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,363
<INCOME-TAX>                                       967
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,396
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,396
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.11


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-7613

CHARLIE MACK WILLIAMS, SR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

DAVID R. TANIS, Attorney,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District

Judge. (CA-00-783)

Submitted: January 11, 2001 Decided: January 19, 2001

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charlie Mack Williams, Sr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Charlie Mack Williams, Sr., a North Carolina inmate, appeals

the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1994) complaint under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A (West Supp. 1998). We

have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting

the magistrate judge’s recommendation and find that this appeal is

frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of

the district court. Williams v. Tannis, No. CA-00-783 (M.D.N.C.

filed Oct. 19, 2000; entered Oct. 20, 2000). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-10371

Summary Calendar

RILEY RIVERA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

RANDY McLEOD, Warden, Texas Department of

Criminal Justice; DR. REVELL, Clements Unit,

Texas Department of Criminal Justice; CLEMENTS

UNIT MEDICAL STAFF; DENNIS L. SANDERS, Ind.

and in his Official Capacity; REED SMITH, Ind.

and in his Official Capacity; JAMES

RICHARDSON, Ind. and in his Official Capacity;

MR. PHILLIPS, Ind. and in his Official

Capacity; GERALD W. DAVID, Ind. and in his

Official Capacity; MR. BIRDWELL, Ind. and in

his Official Capacity; CAPTAIN LAWSON; MAJOR

LOONEY, Ind. and in his Official Capacity;

MRS. SANDERS, Ind. and in her Official

Capacity; TINA CARMONA, Ind. and in her

Official Capacity; MRS. JACOBS, Ind. and in

her Official Capacity a/k/a Mrs. Jacobson;

DAVIS, Sgt; JANE DOE, Nurse,

Nurse/Receptionist; JANE DOE, Nurse, Rounds

Nurse,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

2:92-CV-319

February 21, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *2

Riley Rivera brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the

theory that prison officials violated hi s Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights through their deliberat e indifference to his

medical needs. The parties consented to trial before a United

States Magistrate Judge, who dismissed al l defendants. Rivera

appeals only the summary judgments granted in favor of Jacobs,

Revell, Richardson, the two “Jane Doe” defendants, and the Clements

Unit Medical Staff in general. We find no error and affirm.

Rivera has failed to present evidence to support his claim

that any of the defendants had actual knowledge of an excessive

risk to his h ealth and disregarded that risk. S ee Farmer v.

Brennan

, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994); Hare v. City of Corinth

, 74

F.3d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1996). The record reflects that if his

physicians and nurses acted improperly, their lapses were nothing

more than negligence.

The lower court similarly did not err when it denied Rivera’s

motions for appointment of counsel. The decision of whether to

ap point counsel in a civil case is within the discretion of the

trial court. J ackson v. Dallas Police Dept. , 811 F.2d 260, 261

(5th Cir. 1986). The court did not abuse its discretion when it

concluded that Rivera was capable of setting forth his own case and

that the case was not sufficiently complex and did not demand the

sort of adversarial skill that comes with a lawyer’s training. S ee

Ulmer v. Chancellor , 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982).

AFFIRMED.
```

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 209 (Tuesday, October 29, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Page 64496]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-25579]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-9902-14-OAR]

Acid Rain Program: Notice of Annual Adjustment Factors for Excess 
Emissions Penalty

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice of annual adjustment factors for excess emissions 
penalty.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Acid Rain Program under title IV of the Clean Air Act 
provides for automatic excess emissions penalties in dollars per ton of 
excess emissions for sources that do not meet their annual Acid Rain 
emissions limitations. This notice states the dollars per ton excess 
emissions penalty amounts, which must be adjusted for each compliance 
year commensurate with changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), for 
compliance years 2013 and 2014.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert L. Miller, Clean Air Markets 
Division (6204J), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 
Pennsylvania Ave. NW., Washington, DC 20460, at (202) 343-9077 or 
miller.robertl@epa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Acid Rain Program under title IV of the 
Clean Air Act limits annual sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions 
of fossil fuel-fired utility units. Under the Acid Rain Program, 
affected sources must hold enough allowances to cover their sulfur 
dioxide emissions, and certain coal-fired sources must meet an emission 
limit for nitrogen oxides. Under 40 CFR 77.6, sources that do not meet 
these requirements must pay a penalty without demand to the 
Administrator based on the number of excess tons emitted times $2,000 
as adjusted by an annual adjustment factor, which must be published in 
the Federal Register.
    The annual adjustment factor for adjusting the penalty for excess 
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides under 40 CFR 77.6(b) 
for compliance year 2013 is 1.8489. This value is derived using the CPI 
for 1990 and 2012 (defined respectively at 40 CFR 72.2 as the CPI for 
August of the year before the specified year for all urban consumers) 
and results in an automatic penalty of $3,698 per excess ton of sulfur 
dioxide or nitrogen oxides emitted for 2013.
    The annual adjustment factor for adjusting the penalty for such 
excess emissions under 40 CFR 77.6(b) for compliance year 2014 is 
1.8770. This value is derived using the CPI for 1990 and 2013 and 
results in an automatic penalty of $3,754 per excess ton of sulfur 
dioxide or nitrogen oxides emitted for 2014.

    Dated: September 30, 2013.
Reid P. Harvey,
Director, Clean Air Markets Division, Office of Atmospheric Programs, 
Office of Air and Radiation.
[FR Doc. 2013-25579 Filed 10-28-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
```