District of Columbia

Court of Appeals

No. 14-CV-819

BRANDI NAVE,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v. CAB-9433-12

HOWARD A. NEWMAN,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

and

No. 15-CV-143

IN RE HOWARD A. NEWMAN, CAB-2582-08

Appellant.

On Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

Civil Division

BEFORE: THOMPSON and EASTERLY, Associate Judges; and FERREN, Senior 

Judge.

J U D G M E N T 

This case was submitted to the court on the transcript of record and the 

briefs filed, and without presentation of oral argument. On consideration whereof, and 

for the reasons set forth in the opinion filed this date, it is now hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgments of the trial court are 

affirmed in both matters.

For the Court:

 

Dated: June 9, 2016.

Opinion by Associate Judge Phyllis D. Thompson.

JUN - 9 2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the 

Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound 

volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 14-CV-819 

BRANDI NAVE, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,

V.

HOWARD A. NEWMAN, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT,

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(CAB-9433-12)

(Hon. Michael L. Rankin, Motions Judge)

and

No. 15-CV-143

IN RE HOWARD A. NEWMAN, APPELLANT.

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(CAB-2582-08)

(Hon. Judith N. Macaluso, Motions Judge)

(Submitted November 12, 2015 Decided June 9, 2016)

Stephen J. Stine was on the brief for appellant/cross appellee.

Howard A. Newman was on the brief for appellee/cross appellant.

Before THOMPSON and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and FERREN, Senior 

Judge.

6/9/16
2

THOMPSON, Associate Judge: Before us are appeals from Superior Court 

orders in two related actions. The first, a breach-of-contract action, proceeded 

before the Honorable Judith N. Macaluso, who, in the appealed-from rulings, 

declined to alter or strike certain language she had used in an order denying a 

motion for sanctions. The other action, raising primarily a claim of abuse of 

process against both an adversary and the adversary‟s attorney, proceeded before 

the Honorable Michael L. Rankin. In the challenged rulings, Judge Rankin 

dismissed the claims against the attorney but declined to otherwise sanction the 

plaintiff. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court‟s judgments in 

both matters.

I. Judge Macaluso’s denial of Mr. Newman’s First and

Second Rule 60 Motions

The matter that was before Judge Macaluso stems from a contract dispute in 

which Keith Britt, represented by Howard A. Newman, Esq., sued Brandi Nave, 

Esq., his former girlfriend, to recover money he had advanced to her. During the 

proceedings in that matter, Mr. Newman, as Mr. Britt‟s counsel, filed a motion for 

sanctions against Ms. Nave. On March 16, 2011, Judge Macaluso denied the 

motion for sanctions in an order (the “Sanctions Order”) that explained that even if 

sanctions against Ms. Nave were otherwise warranted, the court would not impose 
3

the requested sanctions because Mr. Britt did “not come to resolution of the issue 

he presents with clean hands.”1 Mr. Britt appealed the order denying sanctions, 

and this court affirmed the order in a January 2013 Memorandum Opinion and 

Judgment (the “MOJ”). After our affirmance, Mr. Newman, now proceeding on 

his own behalf, filed a July 3, 2014, Motion for Relief (purportedly) pursuant to 

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60 (b) (the “First Rule 60 Motion”) in which he asked Judge 

Macaluso to strike certain passages from the Sanctions Order (passages that this 

court, in the MOJ, termed “non-load bearing” and therefore declined to review). 

Judge Macaluso denied Mr. Newman‟s First Rule 60 Motion on August 13, 2014. 

Thereafter, on August 18, 2014, Mr. Newman filed a Motion to Alter and Amend 

the August 13, 2014, Order, pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59 and R. 60 (the 

“Second Rule 60 Motion”), again asking Judge Macaluso to delete from the 

Sanctions Order language that Mr. Newman argued “unfairly attacked his 

integrity” and was a “black eye” on him. Judge Macaluso denied the Second Rule 

60 Motion on February 3, 2015. This appeal by Mr. Newman (in No.15-CV-143) 

 

1

 On August 12, 2011, Judge Macaluso did issue a subsequent order (the 

“Reconsideration Order”) granting in part Mr. Britt‟s Motion for Reconsideration 

and Clarification, thereby striking certain statements she was persuaded were 

inaccurate.
4

followed. He argues that Judge Macaluso erred in not granting relief under Rules 

60 (a) and (b). We review for abuse of discretion.2

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60 (a) provides in pertinent part that “[c]lerical mistakes 

in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from 

oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own 

initiative or on the motion of any party” (emphasis added). Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60 

(b) provides in pertinent that “the court may relieve a party or a party‟s legal 

representative from a[n] . . . order” (emphasis added). 

Mr. Newman was not a party to the Sanctions Order from which he sought 

relief in his First Rule 60 Motion (and, as Judge Macaluso noted in her order 

denying the motion, Mr. Newman — who referred to himself as the “movant” —

sought relief from the Sanctions Order “on his own behalf[,]” not on behalf of Mr. 

Britt). It appears, therefore, that Mr. Newman lacked standing to apply for Rule 60 

 

2

 As Mr. Newman acknowledges, we review the denial of a Rule 60 motion 

for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., Inc., 640 A.2d 708, 709 

(D.C. 1994) (reviewing the ruling on a Rule 60 (b) motion). It appears that this 

court has not previously stated specifically in a published opinion that abuse of 

discretion is our standard of review with respect to rulings on Rule 60 (a) motions. 

We now join other courts in so stating. See, e.g., Garamendi v. Henin, 683 F.3d 

1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2012) (“„The standard of review for [a] Rule 60(a) claim is 

abuse of discretion.‟”).
5

relief from the Sanctions Order through his First Rule 60 Motion. Cf. Western

Steel Erection Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 737, 738-39 (10th Cir. 1970) 

(declining to relax the standing requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), reasoning 

that “[i]f the threshold bar were not restricted, rule 60(b) could be opened to the 

broadest claims of ancillary jurisdiction and thereby thwart the finality of principal 

judgments and established procedures to correct fundamental legal errors[,]” and 

also holding that “an attorney does not have standing to move under rule 60(b) as a 

„legal representative[]‟”).3 We affirm the denial of the First Rule 60 Motion on 

that basis. See Riverside Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Health, 944 A.2d 

1098, 1103 (D.C. 2008) (“Questions of standing may be raised sua sponte by this 

or any court.”); Outlaw v. United States, 632 A.2d 408, 411 (D.C. 1993) (“A court 

may consider an issue antecedent to . . . and ultimately dispositive of the dispute 

before it, even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief.” (quoting United States 

Nat’l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993) 

(internal quotation marks omitted))); Sheetz v. District of Columbia, 629 A.2d 515, 

519 n.5 (D.C. 1993) (“[T]he judgment of the trial court may be affirmed on a 

ground not raised or considered below.”).

 

3

 This court looks to decisions of the federal courts interpreting the 

counterpart federal rules as persuasive authority in interpreting our local civil rules. 

See Puckrein v. Jenkins, 884 A.2d 46, 56 n.11 (D.C. 2005). 
6

For a related reason, we affirm Judge Macaluso‟s denial of the Second Rule 

60 Motion. Because Mr. Newman lacked standing to pursue the First Rule 60 

Motion, there can be no abuse of discretion in Judge Macaluso‟s refusal to alter her 

ruling that denied that motion.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, we acknowledge that some courts “have 

permitted a non-party to bring a Rule 60(b) motion . . . when its interests are 

strongly affected[.]” In Re Lawrence, 293 F.3d 615, 627 n.11 (2d Cir. 2002) 

(collecting cases). But see Baker v. Gates, No. 14-4371-cv, 2015 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 22870, at *4-5 (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2015) (explaining that this exception is 

“factually cabined” and applies only in “extraordinary circumstances,” and 

declining to extend its reach “more broadly”); Grace v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co., 443 

F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2006) (referring to the “exceedingly narrow exception to the 

well-established rule that litigants, who were neither a party, nor a party‟s legal 

representative to a judgment, lack standing to question a judgment under Rule 

60(b)”). Even if we were to follow the case law recognizing this exception, we 

would agree with Judge Macaluso that Mr. Newman was required to present a 

“strong justification” for being allowed to pursue Rule 60 relief from the Sanctions 

Motion to which he was not a party. He did not do so. The First Rule 60 Motion 
7

discussed at length the claimed errors in the Sanctions Order but did not discuss 

how Mr. Newman had been substantially harmed. In the section of his Second Rule 

60 Motion discussing how his “substantial rights have been harmed,” Mr. Newman 

stated in a conclusory fashion that “[t]here can be no question that [his] reputation 

before [the Superior Court], other judges, and other individuals has been harmed as 

a result of . . . dicta” in the Sanctions Order, but he provided no specific facts 

supporting that assertion. Accordingly, we discern no basis for saying that Judge 

Macaluso erroneously exercised her discretion in concluding that Mr. Newman 

showed no such strong justification or extraordinary circumstance, and that Rule 

60 (b) relief was not warranted because he failed to describe specifically what 

substantial rights of his had been harmed by the Sanctions Order. 

As for Mr. Newman‟s argument that Judge Macaluso erred in denying him 

relief under Rule 60 (a), we similarly can find no abuse of discretion. Mr. 

Newman‟s argument is that Judge Macaluso erred by not changing the language in 

“the decretal paragraph” of the Reconsideration Order, which mistakenly referred 

to striking language from a different March 16, 2011, order (that denied Mr. Britt‟s 

motion for fees and costs) instead of from the Sanctions Order (which is what 
8

Judge Macaluso clearly intended4). We note that although the prayer for relief 

section of the First Rule 60 Motion asked the court to make that change, the 

motion cited only Rule 60 (b)(6) as authority for the requested relief and did not 

direct Judge Macaluso‟s attention to Rule 60 (a); thus, Judge Macaluso reasonably 

understood that Mr. Newman “ask[ed] for this relief [only] under Super. Ct. Civ. 

R. 60 (b)(6).” The Second Rule 60 Motion was no less opaque; in it, Mr. Newman 

stated (quite weakly) that his “request perhaps should have been under Rule 

60 (a).” In any event, because Mr. Newman acknowledges that the 

Reconsideration Order “was clear in what it intended to do — modify the 

Sanctions Order[,]” we discern no harm to Mr. Newman — and thus no abuse of 

discretion — from Judge Macaluso‟s denial of relief. 5 

 

4

 Despite using the name of the other order issued on the same day, Judge 

Macaluso clearly intended to edit the Sanctions Order. In her Reconsideration 

Order, she ordered that language on “page 10” be stricken, but the mistakenly 

referenced order had only two pages whereas the Sanctions Order had twelve.

5

 See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 366, 367 (D.C. 1979) 

(explaining that in reviewing a trial court‟s exercise of discretion, this court “must 

determine, first, whether the exercise of discretion was in error and, if so, whether 

the impact of that error requires reversal” i.e., whether the error “caused [any] 

significant prejudice[,]” and clarifying that it is only “when both these inquiries are 

answered in the affirmative that we hold that the trial court „abused‟ its 

discretion”).
9

II. Judge Rankin’s dismissal of the complaint against Mr. Newman and 

denial of “defendant’s motion” for sanctions against Ms. Nave

The matter that was before Judge Rankin commenced when Ms. Nave 

turned the tables by suing both Mr. Newman and Mr. Britt, alleging abuse of 

process, malicious use of process, defamation, injurious falsehood/disparagement 

of title, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy — claims 

premised on actions Mr. Britt and Mr. Newman took in the prior breach-ofcontract litigation and a related bankruptcy case. Defendant Britt responded by 

filing motions for Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11 sanctions against Ms. Nave. Judge Rankin 

dismissed Ms. Nave‟s claims against Mr. Newman and denied the “Defendant‟s 

motion” for sanctions. Ms. Nave appeals from the order dismissing Mr. Newman, 

and Mr. Newman appeals from the ruling denying Rule 11 sanctions.

A. The dismissal of Ms. Nave’s claims against Mr. Newman

Ms. Nave argues that the dismissal of Mr. Newman was improper because 

the causes of action against Mr. Newman were legally cognizable and because 

Judge Rankin “made no findings whatsoever as to why [he] dismissed” Mr. 

Newman. She seeks a ruling that Judge Rankin “clearly erred in dismissing [Mr.]

Newman[.]” 
10

The following background is pertinent. On March 7, 2013, defendants Britt 

and Newman moved to compel Ms. Nave to respond to their discovery requests, 

which, inter alia, asked Ms. Nave to identify the basis for her including Mr. 

Newman, Mr. Britt‟s counsel, as a party. Judge Rankin granted the defendants‟ 

motion and ordered Ms. Nave to “fully respond” by April 5, 2013. At a June 26, 

2013, hearing, Judge Rankin emphasized that, to establish the viability of her 

claims against Mr. Newman, Ms. Nave would need to persuade the court that Mr. 

Newman‟s actions went beyond doing “the kinds of things that one would think 

that a lawyer can [do] without having to be charged with abusing process and 

misusing the court.” 

Ms. Nave eventually responded to the defense discovery requests, stating 

that her basis for suing Mr. Newman was his conduct in the previous litigation 

before Judge Macaluso and in the bankruptcy court. Ms. Nave stated that Mr. 

Newman “acted with bad faith in making multiple misrepresentations of fact and 

law on behalf of Mr. Britt” in both matters, and that he “harass[ed]” Ms. Nave‟s 

former counsel by calling and emailing them to discuss matters that were 

previously settled and “attempted to re-litigate each and every facet of the 

underlying Superior Court case” instead of “limiting the issues only to those issues 
11

that the bankruptcy court set forth[,]” thus “caus[ing] Ms. Nave‟s legal bills to be 

excessive.” 

At a status hearing on September 20, 2013, Judge Rankin ruled from the 

bench, dismissing Mr. Newman as a party. The same day, the judge memorialized 

those rulings in a short written order.6 Although Judge Rankin‟s oral and written 

rulings stating that Mr. Newman was dismissed as a defendant were not 

accompanied by an explanation for the ruling, the record, including the judge‟s 

comments from the bench, leaves little doubt about why he ruled as he did. As 

described above, Ms. Nave‟s discovery responses make clear that her basis for 

suing Mr. Newman was his conduct in the previous litigation before Judge 

Macaluso and in the bankruptcy court. At the September 20, 2013, status hearing, 

after Ms. Nave‟s counsel asserted that both Judge Macaluso and the bankruptcy 

judge understood that the conduct by Mr. Britt and his counsel involved “bad 

faith” and “harassment,” Judge Rankin told the parties that he was “not sure [he] 

would‟ve used those characterizations[.]”7Judge Rankin‟s remarks signify that he

 

6

 Judge Rankin permitted the suit against Mr. Britt to proceed. However, 

Mr. Britt later settled with Ms. Nave and is no longer a party.

7

 Judge Rankin also asked why Ms. Nave did not seek sanctions from those 

courts rather than filing her lawsuit. 
12

was unpersuaded that Mr. Newman‟s conduct as counsel had gone beyond doing 

“the kinds of things that one would think that a lawyer can [do] without having to 

be charged with abusing process and misusing the court.” 

Ms. Nave argues that Judge Rankin‟s assessment was wrong as a matter of 

law. Actually, the opposite is true. “Only in rare circumstances will a party be 

justified in suing his opponent‟s lawyer.” Goldschmidt v. Paley Rothman 

Goldstein Rosenberg & Cooper, Chartered, 935 A.2d 362, 381 (D.C. 2007). If 

“[a]n attorney . . . pursues in good faith his . . . client‟s interests on a matter fairly 

debatable in the law[,] [he] cannot be held liable to an opposing party.” Id.

(quoting Fischer v. Estate of Flax, 816 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 2003) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Further, “there can be no conspiracy when an attorney acts 

within the scope of his employment . . . [that is,] where an attorney‟s advice or 

advocacy is for the benefit of his client and not for the attorney‟s sole personal 

benefit.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “„[S]o long as the lawyer acts or 

advises with the purpose of promoting the client‟s welfare, it is immaterial that the 

lawyer hopes the action will increase the lawyer‟s fees or reputation as a lawyer or 

takes satisfaction on the consequences to a nonclient.‟” Shenandoah Assocs. v. 

Tirana, 322 F. Supp. 2d 6, 11 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Restatement (Third) of the 

Law Governing Lawyers § 57 cmt. g (2003)). “On the other hand, an attorney may 
13

be liable if he possesses a desire to harm which is independent of the desire to 

protect his client.” Goldschmidt, 935 A.2d at 381 (internal quotation marks and 

brackets omitted). “This would constitute actual malice and therefore substantiate 

a [claim against the attorney].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see 

Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1080 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[A]n 

attorney . . . cannot be held liable to third parties for actions taken in furtherance of 

his role as counsel unless it is shown that he did something either tortious in 

character or beyond the scope of his honorable employment.”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Here, the order dismissing Mr. Newman was warranted because Ms. Nave 

failed to allege facts from which it could legitimately be inferred that Mr. Newman 

acted with malice, i.e., with a desire to harm Ms. Nave that was independent of his 

desire to protect Mr. Britt. With one exception, the entirety of Ms. Nave‟s 

complaint as it pertains to Mr. Newman alleges that the “[d]efendants” committed 

tortious acts (e.g., by filing a “superabundance . . . of motions” against Ms. Nave 

and filing pleadings that alleged “false facts” and “unfounded and unsubstantiated 

allegations”). The only allegation against Mr. Newman alone is that he 

“repeatedly harassed Plaintiff‟s attorneys[] . . . and attempted to rehash matters that 

were previously dismissed or settled in a further[] attempt to excessively increase 
14

costs of litigation for the Plaintiff.” This allegation nevertheless relates to Mr. 

Newman‟s work in service of his client. Ms. Nave‟s brief on appeal likewise 

emphasizes that her claims were brought against both Messrs. Newman and Britt 

because “[Mr.] Newman was at all times [Mr.] Britt‟s attorney in [prior] litigation” 

and acted “on behalf of his client . . . [Mr.] Britt” in the proceedings before Judge 

Macaluso in Superior Court and before the Bankruptcy Court. Ms. Nave‟s 

allegations, that Messrs. Newman and Britt (as attorney and client) together 

committed various torts, fail to satisfy the Goldschmidt requirement that the 

attorney be acting in a different capacity from his client to be liable. See 

Goldschmidt, 935 A.2d at 381. 

Moreover, although Ms. Nave made conclusory allegations about the 

defendants‟ having harassed Ms. Nave‟s colleagues, employers, and friends and 

having made false statements to third parties outside the litigation context about 

Ms. Nave‟s integrity, she alleged no specific facts indicating that her claims 

stemmed from anything other than legal proceedings, and she failed to provide any 

basis for her claim that Mr. Newman “acted with malice” in carrying out the 

alleged torts.8 She failed to do so even though, before dismissing the action against 

 

8

 Existence of malice is ordinarily a factual issue for jury, see Alfred A. 

Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Samperton & Nolan, 374 A.2d 284, 290 (D.C. 1977), 

(continued...)
15

Mr. Newman, Judge Rankin repeatedly admonished her that she must allege facts 

establishing (at least prima facie) the viability of her claims against Mr. Newman. 

B. The denial of “defendant’s motion” for sanctions against Ms. Nave

Mr. Britt filed verified motions for Rule 11 sanctions against Ms. Nave, and 

Mr. Newman subsequently filed motions to “Adopt and Conform” to Mr. Britt‟s

motions. On March 27, 2013, Judge Rankin issued an Omnibus Order in which he 

ruled that the court “will consider defendant Britt‟s motions as having been filed 

by both defendants.” However, during the September 20, 2013, status hearing, 

Judge Rankin first ruled that Mr. Newman would be dismissed from the suit, and 

thereafter denied Mr. Britt‟s — the remaining “defendant‟s” — motions for Rule 

 

(...continued)

but failing to allege any facts supporting a conclusory assertion of actual malice 

requires dismissal of a complaint, Mazur v. Szporer, No. Civ.A. 03-00042, 2004 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13176 (D.D.C. June 1, 2004). Ms. Nave asserts that Judge 

Rankin never explained why her allegations “could not state claims against 

Newman, but could state claims against Britt.” We think it is obvious, however, 

that while the facts alleged in the complaint (e.g., that Nave ended a romantic 

relationship with Britt, that the two had a “a minor disagreement” at a birthday 

party, that Britt filed a Bar grievance against Nave, that Nave allegedly owed Britt 

substantial sums of money, and that Britt “publicized false allegations that [Nave] 

. . . suffered from . . . alcoholism”) make plausible the claim that Britt bore malice 

toward Nave, none of these alleged facts suggests malice on the part of Newman, 

acting as Britt‟s attorney, toward Nave. 
16

11 sanctions (rulings that Judge Rankin memorialized in a brief written order). Mr. 

Britt filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 8, 2013, Judge Rankin 

issued an Omnibus Order again declining to impose Rule 11 sanctions, but 

“provid[ing] a record detailing [the reasons for his] decision to deny sanctions.” 

The Omnibus Order set out nine reasons — all of which, we note, are persuasive 

on their face — why, in Judge Rankins‟s view, “none of the defendant‟s 

allegations constitute sanctionable behavior that would require the Court to impose 

sanctions.” 

Mr. Newman nevertheless argues that because Ms. Nave could not establish 

a prima facie case against her adversary‟s attorney, sanctions were required.9 We 

conclude for the following reason that we need not delve into the particulars of 

whether Nave‟s filing of the lawsuit against Mr. Newman was sanctionable under 

 

9

 “We review the trial court‟s rulings as to [Rule 11] sanctions for abuse of 

discretion.” Wilkins v. Bell, 917 A.2d 1074, 1082 (D.C. 2007).
17

Rule 11.10 It appears to us that Judge Rankin believed that, to the extent that any 

sanction against Ms. Nave was warranted based on her suit against Mr. Newman, 

that sanction had effectively been accomplished through the dismissal order. The 

judge explained in his November 8, 2013, Omnibus Order that, because Mr. 

Newman had been dismissed from the case, the claim that sanctions were 

warranted against Ms. Nave for improperly suing Mr. Newman was “moot.” Main 

Line Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Tri-Kell, Inc., 721 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1983) 

(noting that a matter is moot when there will be “nothing gained by reaching a 

decision”). Just as important for our analysis, in his First Rule 60 Motion (in the 

case that was before Judge Macaluso), Mr. Newman asserted that his dismissal 

from the case brought by Nave was the “relief requested in [his] Rule 11 

motion.”

11

 Mr. Newman‟s brief on appeal similarly acknowledges that Judge 

Rankin “denied the Rule 11 Motions (except for dismissing Newman)” (emphasis 

added). Mr. Newman‟s statements show that he, too, recognizes that his dismissal 

from the case was effectively a sanction against Ms. Nave. We recognize that in 

 

10

 We also observe the fact that a lawsuit is dismissed as not viable does not 

compel a conclusion that sanctions are warranted for filing the suit. Cf. Burtoff v. 

Faris, 935 A.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. 2007) (“[A]lthough we have affirmed the trial 

court‟s dismissal of [Burtoff‟s suit] on the . . . ground . . . of statute of limitations,

it is not obvious to us that an award of Rule 11 sanctions would be compelled, or 

even justified, by Burtoff‟s untimely filing of that suit.”).

11

 Specifically, the Rule 11 motion asserted that Judge Rankin was “free to 

. . . dismiss Nave‟s action”).
18

his motions to “Adopt and Conform,” Mr. Newman also specifically asked Judge 

Rankin to award as sanctions “Defendant‟s attorneys‟ fees . . . arising out of [Ms. 

Nave‟s asserted] multiple Rule 11 violations[.]” However, the record strongly 

suggests that Mr. Newman did not incur any attorneys‟ fees in responding to the 

suit by Ms. Nave;

12 Judge Rankin understood that Mr. Newman would hold off on 

retaining counsel until the court determined whether the suit against him could go 

forward (which it did not after the September 20, 2013, ruling).13 In addition, 

although Mr. Newman asked for “punitive damages” when he joined Mr. Britt‟s 

motions for Rule 11 sanctions, we see no authority in the rule for an award of such 

damages. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11 (c)(2) (stating that a Rule 11 “sanction may 

consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty 

into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an 

order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys‟ 

 

12

 Mr. Britt presumably incurred fees and expenses, but, as already noted, 

he settled with Ms. Nave and has not appealed the denial of Rule 11 sanctions, and 

Mr. Newman lacks standing to challenge the denial of a sanctions award that 

would have benefitted Mr. Britt. See In re C.T., 724 A.2d 590, 595 (D.C. 1999) 

(“[A]n appellant has standing to appeal from an order of the Superior Court only if 

his legal rights have been infringed or denied by that order.”); cf. Garvy v. Seyfarth 

Shaw LLP, 966 N.E.2d 523, 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (holding that law firm 

defendant lacked standing to appeal the denial of its codefendant‟s motion, even if 

it had an interest in the outcome of the motion).

13

 Cf. Peer v. Lewis, 571 F. App‟x 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Circuit 

precedent indicates that a pro se litigant cannot recover attorney‟s fees under Rule 

11.”).
19

fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation”); cf. Bus. 

Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communs. Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 553 (1991) 

(explaining that district courts are not to use Rule 11 sanctions “as substitutes for 

tort damages”).

In light of all the foregoing, we cannot say that Judge Rankin abused his 

discretion in declining to further sanction Ms. Nave. 

***

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments on appeal are 

Affirmed.