alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 24 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]

                                                         Calendar No. 3
104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 24

To make it a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws 
 of the United States to perform an abortion with knowledge that such 
abortion is being performed solely because of the gender of the fetus, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 4, 1995

 Mr. Helms introduced the following bill; which was read the first time

                            January 5, 1995

            Read the second time and placed on the calendar

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To make it a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws 
 of the United States to perform an abortion with knowledge that such 
abortion is being performed solely because of the gender of the fetus, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Civil Rights of Infants Act''.

SEC. 2. DEPRIVING PERSONS OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS BEFORE BIRTH.

    Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1983) is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``(a)'' before ``Every person''; and
            (2) by adding at the end thereof the following new 
        subsection:
    ``(b) For purposes of subsection (a), and for purposes of other 
provisions of law, it shall be a deprivation of a `right' secured by 
the laws of the United States for an individual to perform an abortion 
with the knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion 
solely because of the gender of the fetus. No pregnant woman who seeks 
to obtain an abortion solely on the basis of the gender of the fetus 
shall be liable in any manner under this section.''.
                                     

                                                         Calendar No. 3

104th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                 S. 24

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

To make it a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws 
 of the United States to perform an abortion with knowledge that such 
abortion is being performed solely because of the gender of the fetus, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                            January 5, 1995

            Read the second time and placed on the calendar
```
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

The Honorable Rudi M. Brewster, Senior United States District Judge ***

for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LIVEBYTHEPARK PALM SPRINGS,

LP,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

ARCH SPECIALTY INSURANCE

COMPANY, a Wisconsin Corporation,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 09-56296

D.C. No. 5:09-cv-00467-VAP-OP

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 6, 2010** 

Pasadena, California

Before: TROTT and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and BREWSTER, Senior

District Judge.*** 

FILED

DEC 09 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
The attacker entered a guilty plea to false imprisonment. 1

Because the parties are familiar with the underlying facts, we repeat only

those necessary to our decision.

Appellee had a duty to defend the Thompson action for negligently failing to

provide adequate security. The attacker falsely imprisoned the tenant, however

briefly, in the elevator before and distinct from the assault. The imprisonment

began the moment the attacker stopped the elevator and continued throughout the

entire subsequent assault, battery, and attempted rape, until he pushed the tenant

out of the elevator. A reasonable layperson reading the policy would believe it 1

covered a false imprisonment claim that preceded an assault. Horace Mann Ins.

Co. v. Barbara B., 4 Cal. 4th 1076, 1083-84 (1993); General Ins. Co. v. Am. Safety

Indem. Co., 185 Cal. App. 4th 1515 (2010); see Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old

Cutler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 420 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2005); Ledbetter v.

Concord General Corp., 665 So.2d 1166 (Sup. Ct. La. 1996). Thus, Appellee’s

reliance on the assault and battery exclusion fails. 

The Court rejects Appellee’s conclusory argument that the policy would

cover a false imprisonment only if committed by the insured. Appellee does not

cite any language in the policy to support that view. In any event, the argument

fails because the tenant alleged that all of her injuries arose out of the landlord’s
failure to respond to the complaint that an “unkempt transient” was loitering on the

grounds. See Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 49 Cal. 4th 315, 317 (2010). 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Exhibit 32.2

Statement

Pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. §1350, the
undersigned officer of Paperweight Development Corp. (the Company), hereby certifies that to his knowledge:



| | (1) | the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 2, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |                               |  |                                                                                 
|------------------- |  | ----------------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                    |  | PAPERWEIGHT DEVELOPMENT CORP.
|                    |  |                              
|Dated: May 12, 2006 |  |                               |  | /s/ Mark R. Richards                                                            
|                    |  | Name:                         |  | Mark R. Richards                                                                
|                    |  | Title:                        |  | Chairman, President, Chief Executive Officer and Interim Chief Financial Officer

This certification accompanies this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.



47
IN THE SUPREME COUR T OF THE ST

AT E OF MONT

ANA DA 24
- 0455 IN THE MA

TTER OF UNF

AIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINT 2023DRS00256. MITCHELL

MCBROOM and BARBARA LEWIS
- BACA, PETITIONERS/APPELLANTS,
v. MONT ANA B OARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS and MISSOULA URBAN TRANSPOR

TA TION DISTRICT , RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES. On Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County

Hon. District Court Judge Jason Marks

ORDER Upon consideration of Appellants ’ unopposed m otion for extension of time and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants are granted an extension of tim e through October 7, 2024, inclusive, to file their opening brief on appeal. Electronically signed and dated below
.

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court September 3 2024

09/03/2024

Case Number: DA 24-0455
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 20-0362

MASTERS GROUP INTERNATIONAL, 

INC.,

 Third-Party Plaintiff and 

Appellee,

 V.

COMERICA BANK,

 Third-Party Defendant and 

Appellant.

ORDER OF MEDIATOR APPOINTMENT

This appeal being subject to M.R.App.P. 7, and the parties having failed to jointly 

and timely select a mediator under M.R.App.P., 7(4),(c),

IT IS ORDERED THAT Lawrence E. Henke, whose name appears next on the 

list of attorneys desiring appointment as mediators for Money Judgments appeals which 

is maintained pursuant to M.R.App.P., 7(4)(e), is hereby appointed to conduct the 

mediation process required by M.R.App.P., 7(5), and 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the time periods set forth in M.R.App.P., 

7(5)(d) shall run from the date of this order of appointment.

A true copy of this order is being mailed to counsel of record for the parties, or to 

the parties individually if not represented by counsel, on the date hereof.

DATED this August 5, 2020.

Bowen Greenwood, Clerk of the Supreme Court

c: Jeffrey R. Kuchel, Jane Derse Quasarano, James H. Goetz, David M. Wagner, 

Joseph J. Shannon, Timothy B. Strauch, Ward E. Taleff, Lawrence E. Henke

Viy-.-6Am--f

08/05/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0362
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-10598 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus TOMMY MERREL JACKSON, also known as TJ; DICKEY JOE JACKSON, also known as Joe Jackson; CHARLES ALLEN HOUSE; also known as Chuck House, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:95-CR-148-A

- - - - - - - - - - April 15, 1997 Before GARWOOD, BENAVIDES and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Tommy Merrel Jackson (Tommy) and Charles Allen House (House) were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Dickey Joe Jackson (Dickey) was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of an unregistered firearm.No. 96-10598 - 2 - Dickey, who received a life sentence, argues that the district court erred by attributing 81.6 kilograms of methamphetamine to him and that the district court erred in not departing downward in sentencing him. He is incorrect. United States v. Maseratti , 1 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1129 (1994); United States v. Angulo , 927 F.2d 202, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Burleson , 22 F.3d 93, 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 283 (1994). Tommy contends that the district court erred by attributing 81.6 kilograms of methamphetamine to him, by finding that he used a weapon as defined under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), and by determining that he was a leader or organizer of the methamphetamine conspiracy. His contentions are without merit. United States v. Maseratti , 1 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1129 (1994); United States v. Angulo , 927 F.2d 202, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mitchell , 31 F.3d 271, 277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 455 (1994); United States v. Elwood , 999 F.2d 814, 817 (5th Cir. 1993). House argues that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence and that the court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a severance of the trial. His contentions are also without merit. United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984); United States v. Kelley , 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 113 S. Ct. 2427 (1993); United States v. Kane , 887 F.2d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.No. 96-10598 - 3 - denied493 U.S. 1090 (1990).
AFFIRMED.
#### Daniel L. REAGAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 36000.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 16, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 20,1963.

Dooley & Hoerster, Fredericksburg, for appellant.

Robert R. Barton, County Atty., Kerr-ville, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway while the appellant’s operator’s license was suspended; the punishment, a fine of $200.00.

No statement of facts accompanies the record. Only one question is presented by brief for review. The cause of the suspension of appellant’s operator’s license was his conviction for the offense of driving while intoxicated which occurred in the County Court at Law # 3 of Bexar County on November 8, 1962, at a term of Court which the State concedes did not expire until after December 2, 1962, the date on which the offense in question is alleged to have been committed. Appellant’s contention that the driving while intoxicated conviction was not a final conviction for this reason cannot be sustained. In Woolsey v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 447, 314 S.W.2d 298, we had practically the same situation except that only one day elapsed between the two convictions. There we held that since no notice of appeal appeared to hav.e been given in the first case, such conviction might be utilized for the purpose of enhancement.

The judgment in the Bexar County driving while intoxicated case contains no nota*888tion as to a notice of appeal having been given and Woolsey and the cases there cited are controlling.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
Order entered October 3, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01678-CR

CHARLES RICHARD VANDIVER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F12-56764-M

ORDER

Appellant has informed the Court that he wishes to file a pro se response to the Anders

brief filed by appellate counsel. Accordingly, we ORDER appellate counsel Valencia Bush to 

provide appellant with copies of the clerk’s and reporter’s records. We further ORDER Ms. 

Bush to provide this Court, within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order, with written 

verification that the record has been sent to appellant.

Appellant’s pro se response is due by DECEMBER 9, 2013.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to the 

Honorable Ernest White, Presiding Judge, 194th Judicial District Court; Gary Fitzsimmons, 

Dallas County District Clerk; Dallas County District Clerk’s Office, Criminal Records Division; 
Belinda Baraka, Official Court Reporter, 194th Judicial District Court; Valencia Bush; and the 

Dallas County District Attorney’s Office.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send a copy of this order, by first-class mail, to Charles 

Vandiver, TDCJ No. 1831208, Dalhart Unit, 11950 F.M. 998, Dalhart, Texas 79022.

/s/ DAVID EVANS 

JUSTICE
1The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-2840

___________

Muhammad Farid, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Mega Life & Health Insurance Co., * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: February 1, 1999

 Filed: March 8, 1999

___________

Before McMILLIAN, LOKEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Muhammad Farid appeals from the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary

judgment in his suit claiming bad faith denial of insurance claims by Mega Life &

Health Insurance Co. (MEGA). Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties&

briefs, we conclude the district court&s judgment was correct, and an extended

discussion is not warranted. We also deny Farid&s motion to strike MEGA&s brief.

See Fed. R. App. P. 25(d). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
-2-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### Kenneth Lonzo TATUM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 35030.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 21, 1962.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1963.

Buck C. Miller, Houston, for appellant.

Frank Briscoe, Dist. Atty., Carl E. F. Dally and Theodore P. Busch, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense the possession of marijuana; the punishment, 10 years.

Officer Strickland of the narcotics division of the Houston police testified that on the night in question, in company with other officers and armed with a search warrant, he went to appellant’s home; that a light was shining in the living room and, as he approached the house, he saw appellant and his wife seated on a couch; that he opened the unlocked screen door, knocked on the wooden door, and that a male voice said “Come in.” He testified that as soon as he opened the front door he identified himself to appellant, handed him the search warrant which both appellant and his wife read; that he and the other officers proceeded to search appellant’s home, where they found a quantity of a green plant substance in four different containers which was later identified by a chemist as 432 grams of marijuana and which was a sufficient quantity to make more than 1500 marijuana cigarettes.

Strickland’s testimony was corroborated by Officers Pollock and Stringfellow, who both stated that Strickland entered first, but neither of them heard Strickland’s knock on the door or appellant’s invitation to enter, and Pollock admitted that his pistol was drawn as he followed the other officers into the house.

Appellant did not testify in his own behalf but called Officer Baker, who testified that Strickland identified himself at the time he opened the door; that he did not remember hearing Strickland knock on the door or hear appellant say “Come in,” but explained that Strickland went in first and was already inside when he (the witness) stepped up on the porch.

Appellant’s contention that the search, under the facts stated, was shown to be illegal has been recently decided adversely to him by this Court in McCown v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 338 S.W.2d 732, wherein we stated that we found no expression of the Supreme Court of the United States contrary to our conclusion that Article 319, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., when its terms were complied with, authorized a legal search. The affidavit for the search warrant is in the terms recently approved by this Court in Davis v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 2, 302 S. W.2d 419.

As we construe the evidence set forth above, it did not require the giving of the requested instructions concerning the legality of the execution of the search warrant.

The fact that certain witnesses may not have heard certain things done and said *933does not constitute evidence that the same did not transpire just as Strickland had testified.

Finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and no reversible error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

January 2, 2014 

# Order

Clerk January 2, 2014

146440 ( 126 )

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES

CORPORATION,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

SC: 146440

v COA: 306618

Court of Claims: 11

- 000033

- MT

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,

Defendant

- Appellee.

______________________________ _________ /

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion for the temporary admission of Joe

Huddleston to practice pro hac vice under MCR 8.126 on behalf of amicus curiae

Multistate Tax Commission is GRANTED.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(b) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350.



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of Curis, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Michael P. Gray, Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



(1)  The Report fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



Dated: March 31, 2006



/s/    MICHAEL P. GRAYMichael P. Gray Vice President of Finance
and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting
Officer)
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 514 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 514

     For the relief of the heirs, successors, or assigns of Sadae 
                              Tamabayashi.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                March 7 (legislative day, March 6), 1995

   Mr. Akaka introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     For the relief of the heirs, successors, or assigns of Sadae 
                              Tamabayashi.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PAYMENT REQUIRED.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the 
Treasury shall pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise 
appropriated, the sum of $1,953 to the heirs, successors, and assigns 
of Sadae Tamabayashi, as their interests may appear, in full 
satisfaction of all of their claims against the United States for the 
destruction or loss of property of Sadae Tamabayashi resulting from the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, or from 
the defense of Oahu against such attack. The Comptroller General of the 
United States shall determine and certify to the Secretary of the 
Treasury the status of any person as such an heir, successor, or 
assigneee and the interest of that person in the total amount to be 
paid under the preceding sentence.

SEC. 2. LIMITATION.

    Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, it shall be unlawful 
to pay or deliver to any agent or attorney, and for any agent or 
attorney to receive, on account of services rendered in connection with 
the claims paid pursuant to section 1, any amount exceeding 10 percent 
of the amount so paid. Violation of the provisions of this section is a 
misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed $1,000.
                                 <all>
```