Filed 4/18/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re L.C. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B322778

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct.

 Nos. 20CCJP02608A–B)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Ashley Price, Judge Pro Tempore. Conditionally 

reversed with directions.

Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

M.C. (mother) appeals from the termination of parental 

rights as to two of her children (the children) under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the juvenile 

court failed to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the 

children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA; Fam. Code,1 § 3400, et seq.). The 

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

(the Department) responds that by failing to raise the issue 

below, mother forfeited her right to raise it on appeal; 

alternatively, the Department argues that substantial evidence 

supports the court’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case.

Mother also contends the juvenile court and the 

Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the 

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et 

seq.) and related California statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et

seq.). The Department does not oppose a conditional remand

with instructions to conduct a limited ICWA inquiry.

We conclude the forfeiture doctrine does not bar mother’s 

challenge to the juvenile court’s compliance with the UCCJEA

and the error requires conditional reversal of the parental rights 

termination orders with directions to the court to undertake the 

process that the UCCJEA requires. This disposition will permit 

mother to raise the unopposed ICWA arguments she makes in 

this appeal.

1 Further statutory references are to the Family Code unless 

otherwise stated.
3

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2020, the Department filed a dependency petition 

under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 subdivisions

(b)(1) and (b)(2) alleging mother was unable to care for the 

children because of her substance abuse, mental and emotional 

problems, and failure to take psychotropic medications as

prescribed. The children were one and five years old.2 The 

whereabouts of their respective fathers remained unknown 

throughout the dependency proceedings. The children initially 

remained in mother’s custody.

In July 2020, the juvenile court denied a request to detain 

the children after an incident during which the younger child 

consumed bleach that mother was using to clean. The court, 

however, placed conditions on the children’s continued placement 

with mother.

In September 2020, the juvenile court granted the 

Department’s request to detain the children without notice to 

mother based on concerns about mother’s continuing lack of 

compliance with court orders and her deteriorating mental 

health. The court placed the children with a caregiver.

At the November 2020 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, 

the juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered monitored 

visits and reunification services for mother. A year later, the 

court terminated mother’s reunification services. At the June 

2022 Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing, the 

2 The Department reports refer to two other children, but 

they are not part of the current dependency case.
4

court terminated parental rights to the children. Mother timely 

filed a notice of appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The UCCJEA

1. Background

Mother and the children first came to the Department’s 

attention in March 2020. During an interview with a 

Department social worker, mother stated that she was born in 

Georgia, moved to Florida in 2013, and then to Texas. The older 

child was born in Texas in 2014 and the younger child was born 

there in 2019. Mother claimed that she continued to live in 

Texas until December 2019, when she fled to Arizona for a few 

months to escape an abusive relationship and then from there 

moved to San Diego and then to Los Angeles. When the social 

worker told mother that her timeline did not make sense, she 

changed her story explaining that she only passed through 

Arizona.

On January 30, 2020, the San Diego County Health and 

Human Services Agency (the San Diego Agency) received a 

referral regarding the family after mother tested positive for 

amphetamine while the children were in her care. Mother told 

hospital staff that she was visiting San Diego from Florida and 

that she intended to return to Florida in a few days. The San 

Diego Agency closed its investigation because mother no longer 

resided in San Diego.
5

Mother denied neglecting or abusing the children and 

advised that the only other child welfare case she had was in 

Texas in April 2019, when the younger child was born prenatally 

exposed to methamphetamine. According to mother, she had 

completed all her required classes and the Texas case was closed.

When the Department filed its dependency petition and 

detention report in May 2020, it did not ask the juvenile court to 

make any findings under the UCCJEA, despite the reported facts 

concerning mother’s recent out-of-state residence and the child 

welfare case in Texas. An addendum report filed the same day, 

however, did include a bullet-point list of items needing further 

investigation, including four entries related to possible child 

welfare proceedings in other states. The first of the four entries 

was “UCCJEA – Texas and Arizona,” and the remaining three 

entries were to investigate “CPS and criminal history in” Texas, 

Arizona, and Florida.

There is no indication in the record that the Department or 

the juvenile court inquired into the existence of child welfare or 

custody proceedings in Texas, Arizona, or Florida. The record 

also reveals no reason to believe the court undertook the 

jurisdictional analysis required by the UCCJEA, which we next 

discuss.

2. The Statutory Scheme

The UCCJEA is a carefully crafted statutory scheme—

enacted not just by California but also by 48 other states
6

(excluding only Massachusetts)3—to determine the appropriate 

forum for child custody proceedings and avoid conflicting state 

child custody orders. (In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 136

[“The UCCJEA is designed to avoid jurisdictional conflicts 

between states and relitigation of custody decisions, promote 

cooperation between states, and facilitate enforcement of another 

state’s custody decrees”]; In re Jaheim B. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 

1343, 1348 [“The purposes of the UCCJEA in the context of 

dependency proceedings include avoiding jurisdictional 

competition and conflict, promoting interstate cooperation, 

litigating custody where child and family have closest 

connections, avoiding relitigation of another state’s custody 

decisions, and promoting exchange of information and other 

mutual assistance between courts of other states”]; see also In re 

Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 497 [“[C]oncurrent 

assertion of jurisdiction by more than one court was one of the 

chief problems that led to the enactment of the UCCJEA. The 

absence of a specific provision for continuing jurisdiction had 

‘caused considerable confusion,’ with conflicting judicial 

interpretations and ‘a loss of uniformity among the States.’ 

[Citations.]”].) The UCCJEA applies to dependency proceedings

(§ 3402, subd. (d); In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, 516),

and is the exclusive method for determining the proper forum in 

child custody proceedings involving other jurisdictions (§ 3421, 

subd. (b); In re Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 516).

3 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 

Laws, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 

(1997) Editors’ Notes.
7

The Family Code provision implementing the UCCJEA

with which we are concerned is section 3421. It provides, in 

relevant part:

“(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424, a court of 

this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody 

determination only if any of the following are true:

“(1) This state is the home state of the child on 

the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or 

was the home state of the child within six months 

before the commencement of the proceeding and the 

child is absent from this state but a parent or person 

acting as a parent continues to live in this state.

“(2) A court of another state does not have 

jurisdiction under paragraph (1), or a court of the 

home state of the child has declined to exercise 

jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more 

appropriate forum under Section 3427 or 3428, and 

both of the following are true:

“(A) The child and the child’s parents, or the 

child and at least one parent or a person acting as a 

parent, have a significant connection with this state 

other than mere physical presence.

“(B) Substantial evidence is available in this 

state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, 

and personal relationships.

“(3) All courts having jurisdiction under 

paragraph (1) or (2) have declined to exercise 

jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is 

the more appropriate forum to determine the custody 

of the child under Section 3427 or 3428.
8

“(4) No court of any other state would have 

jurisdiction under the criteria specified in 

paragraph (1), (2), or (3).”

These four interrelated scenarios that permit a court in 

California (and, reciprocally, in any of the other states that have 

enacted the same scheme) to make a child custody determination 

have been helpfully clarified and summarized by case law:

“California may assume jurisdiction to make an initial child 

custody determination only if any of the following apply: 

California is the child’s ‘home state,’ meaning the state in which 

the child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at 

least six consecutive months immediately before the child custody 

proceeding was commenced (§§ 3421, subd. (a)(1), 3402, subd. 

(g)); a court of another state does not have jurisdiction because it 

is not the child’s home state (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)); a court of the 

child’s home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the 

ground California is the more appropriate forum (ibid.); all courts 

having jurisdiction have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the 

ground California is the more appropriate forum (§ 3421, subd. 

(a)(3)); or no other state has jurisdiction under the foregoing tests 

(§ 3421, subd. (a)(4)).”4 (In re A.M. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 593,

4 A court without jurisdiction under section 3421 subdivision 

(a) may still exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction. (In re

Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097; In re Gino C.

(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 959, 965.) “A court of this state has 

temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this 

state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an 

emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected 

to, or threatened with, mistreatment or abuse . . . .” (§ 3424, 

subd. (a).) The juvenile court, however, “may not address the 
9

598; see also In re Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 518 [“A 

child’s home state has priority over other jurisdictional bases”].)

When it is clear some jurisdiction other than California is 

the home state of the child in question, efforts to consult with the 

court in that jurisdiction are required under the UCCJEA. (In re 

Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 518–519.) Similarly, 

where the information before a juvenile court objectively suffices 

to raise a genuine question about whether another jurisdiction is 

the child’s home state, a juvenile court must obtain additional 

information as necessary to make a home state determination—

and is empowered to contact the court in the other jurisdiction to 

that end. (§ 3410 [“A court of this state may communicate with a 

court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under [the 

UCCJEA]”]; In re Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 523 [“it is 

for the juvenile court in the first instance to hold an evidentiary 

hearing and to evaluate witness credibility, resolve conflicts in 

the evidence and make the factual findings necessary to 

determine whether Arizona was Aiden’s home state in August 

2014 when the dependency petition was filed”]; cf. § 3426, subd. 

(b) [“[A] court of this state, before hearing a child custody 

merits of the dependency petition or otherwise make a final child 

custody determination until it properly asserts jurisdiction under 

the nonemergency jurisdiction provisions of the UCCJEA.” (In re

Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 518; In re Gino C., supra,

224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 965–966.) A court exercising emergency 

jurisdiction under section 3424 is required to contact and provide 

notice to another state’s court to determine whether the other 

state wishes to assert jurisdiction under section 3421. (In re

Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 518–519; In re R.L., supra,

4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–143.)
10

proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other 

information supplied by the parties pursuant to [s]ection 3429. If

the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been 

commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction 

substantially in accordance with this part, the court of this state 

shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the 

other state”].)

3. Forfeiture

The Department suggests that the juvenile court was not 

obligated to pursue any UCCJEA inquiry because mother’s 

attorney did not object to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction on 

that ground. The Department would have us hold that the 

UCCJEA issue is forfeited for that reason, relying on In re J.W. 

(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, in which the Court of Appeal found 

inapplicable the rule that bars forfeiture of “fundamental 

jurisdiction” issues. According to the court in In re J.W., the 

jurisdiction conferred by the UCCJEA is not “fundamental.” (Id.

at p. 355 [“Forfeiture would not apply if the UCCJEA provisions 

governing jurisdiction implicated the courts’ fundamental 

jurisdiction, but, as we explain, they do not.”].)

In our view, In re J.W., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 347 does not 

settle the matter because its analysis is focused only on the

answer to a limited question. Even if it is true that the UCCJEA 

does not concern issues of fundamental jurisdiction that cannot 

be forfeited, In re J.W. says nothing about whether there are

other reasons why the forfeiture doctrine should not apply to the 

UCCJEA issue raised in this appeal. As we next explain, there 

are several such reasons—chief among them the purpose of 
11

forfeiture rules generally, the comity-driven purpose of the 

UCCJEA, and the comprehensive statutory scheme that our 

Legislature enacted when adopting the UCCJEA.

The forfeiture doctrine provides that a reviewing court will 

ordinarily decline to consider a challenge to a ruling if an 

objection to the ruling was not made in the trial court. Our 

Supreme Court has explained the purpose of the doctrine is to 

encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial 

court so that they may be corrected. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 

1287, 1293; accord, In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 881.) 

Our Supreme Court has also cautioned, however, that the 

forfeiture doctrine is “not automatic” (In re S.B., supra, 32 

Cal.4th at p. 1293) and should not apply for a variety of reasons

(see, e.g., In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 [pure 

question of law]; In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293 

[important legal issue]; see also In re Frank R. (2011) 192 

Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [conflict with due process]). In addition to 

these reasons, we identify another: As a doctrine of largely

judicial creation (see People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 

1130 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.)), forfeiture should not apply when 

it would be incompatible with the fundamental purposes of a 

statutory scheme.

Here, the usual benefit from the application of the 

forfeiture doctrine—to encourage parties to bring issues to the 

trial court—would not be conferred under the facts of this case. 

The periods where mother and the children were recently living 

out-of-state were apparent on the face of the Department’s 

reports—indeed, the UCCJEA was expressly identified as a 

matter for “further investigation.” Thus, although the 

Department or mother could have done more to urge the juvenile 
12

court to undertake the UCCJEA process, the objective facts 

supporting the need for such a process were readily apparent 

from the record. Because the UCCJEA process often involves 

direct court-to-court consultations in which the parties do not 

participate, the statute places a greater degree of focus on the 

actions a court itself must undertake, rather than actions 

required of the parties. The independent obligations imposed by 

the UCCJEA on a court making custody decisions support the 

imposition of a corollary duty to be attuned to UCCJEA issues 

even without proactive advocacy by litigants.

Furthermore, the costs of holding the UCCJEA issue here 

forfeited are substantial. As we have explained, the comitydriven purpose of the UCCJEA is to avoid jurisdictional conflict 

between states, promote interstate cooperation, litigate custody 

where the children and family have the closest connections, avoid 

relitigation of another state’s custody decisions, and facilitate 

enforcement of another state’s custody decrees. (In re R.L.,

supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 136.) These are important goals, and

applying a forfeiture rule risks undermining them. If applied 

broadly—including in other states that may also be moved to 

adopt a forfeiture rule (but see, e.g., Nemes v. Tutino (N.Y. App. 

Div. 2019) 173 A.D.3d 16, 23 [UCCJEA issue not waivable]; 

J.M.R. v. J.M. (Pa. Super. Ct., 2010) 1 A.3d 902, 908 [rejecting 

waiver and addressing UCCJEA issue raised for the first time on 

appeal])—the number of jurisdictional conflicts and potentially 

inconsistent judgments among states would rise and, in many 

instances, be left to turn only on whether an attorney had the 

presence of mind to object (or a perceived strategic interest in 

objecting) during a particular hearing. As our Supreme Court 

has observed in another context, where a statute protects the 
13

interests of other sovereigns that are separate and distinct from 

the interests of parents, “‘the parents’ inaction does not constitute 

a waiver or otherwise preclude appellate review.’” (In re Isaiah 

W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 13.)

Moreover, holding the UCCJEA issue forfeited under these 

circumstances would be inconsistent with the “‘“the context of the 

statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme . . . .”’” (In re 

Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 13.) Section 3421 delineates four 

bases for the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction to make an initial 

child custody determination. The statute emphasizes that a 

court may make an initial child custody determination “only” if 

one or more of these four statutorily specified criteria are 

satisfied. We are confident the Legislature did not go to the 

trouble of adopting such a carefully designed and comprehensive 

scheme only to permit courts, under the auspices of forfeiture, 

effectively to add a fifth, unspecified category to the statute, one 

which permits a court to exercise jurisdiction regardless of the 

location of the child’s home state or the preferences of a foreign 

court simply because the parties before it do not object.5

We accordingly decline to hold that the UCCJEA issue in 

this case is forfeited because the parties did not object in the 

juvenile court. Instead, we proceed to analyze the issue on the 

merits, to the extent the record permits.

5 Because UCCJEA issues typically involve out-of-state 

parties and proceedings, we expect there will be cases in which 

all interested parties—and, indeed, the parties with an incentive 

to object—will not be before a juvenile court in this state to 

interpose a UCCJEA objection.
14

4. Conditional Reversal and Remand Is Required

According to mother, because the juvenile court did not 

investigate the possibility that Texas was the children’s home 

state, all of the court’s jurisdictional findings and subsequent 

orders must be reversed. The Department, while conceding that 

California is not the home state, counters that there was 

substantial evidence that no state was a “home state” under the 

UCCJEA because the children had not resided in any one place 

for the six months immediately prior to the commencement of 

dependency proceedings in California in May 2020. We believe 

neither party is correct.

A “home state” under the UCCJEA is “the state in which a 

child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at 

least six consecutive months immediately before the 

commencement of a child custody proceeding . . . . A period of 

temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the 

period.” (§ 3402, subd. (g).) Here, there is evidence in the record 

that both children were born in Texas and resided there until 

December 2019, when the family left Texas and ultimately came 

to the attention of California authorities. Without a finding or 

inquiry about whether mother or either of the children’s absence 

from Texas was temporary, there is no substantial evidence that 

there was “no home state” for the children.

We next consider the Department’s contention that the 

juvenile court’s error was harmless because (1) “Texas did not 

qualify as the children’s home state, thus the juvenile court did 

not need to contact the Texas court;” and (2) “the evidence 

demonstrated there had been no dependency proceedings in 

Texas.” Assuming for argument’s sake that the error here is 
15

amenable to harmlessness review, we do not agree the record 

sufficiently demonstrates that Texas was not the children’s home 

state. Furthermore, mother’s statement that the children had 

been the subject of dependency proceedings in Texas belies the 

Department’s contention that there were no child welfare 

proceedings in Texas. Finally, to the extent the Department 

suggests that mother’s statement concerning the closure of the 

proceedings in Texas is dispositive, the record does not reflect 

whether the courts of that state made any custody orders before 

or at the time the case was closed (if it was indeed closed, which 

we cannot determine on this record). Thus, the court’s failure to 

determine whether it had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA cannot 

be deemed harmless in this case.

We disagree with mother, however, that unconditional 

reversal of all the juvenile court’s prior orders is necessarily 

required. Because we have concluded that the UCCJEA issue is 

not forfeited for reasons independent of a “fundamental 

jurisdiction” analysis, we believe the appropriate course of action 

is to reverse the prior orders conditionally and to remand the 

matter with instructions to comply with UCCJEA procedures. 

(See, e.g., In re A.M., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 599–600.)

B. ICWA

Mother next contends that the juvenile court’s ICWA 

determination was not supported by substantial evidence because

the Department did not ask one of three people identified by 

mother as the children’s maternal grandmother about possible 

Indian ancestry. As we are conditionally reversing the parental 

rights termination orders and remanding the matter to the 
16

juvenile court, mother can pursue the issue on remand informed, 

as appropriate, by the Department’s concessions in this appeal.

IV. DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s June 13, 2022, orders terminating 

parental rights to the children under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 366.26 are conditionally reversed and the matter is 

remanded to permit the court to determine whether it has 

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and for any other proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion. If the court on remand determines 

that it has jurisdiction over the children under the UCCJEA and 

considers and resolves any ICWA-related issues raised by 

mother, the orders terminating parental rights are to be 

reinstated. If the court determines that it does not have 

jurisdiction over the children under the UCCJEA, the court shall 

proceed as required by the UCCJEA, nullify the parental rights 

termination orders, and, as necessary, prior orders.

KIM, J.

I concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J., Concurring.

I agree with the majority’s dispositional order conditionally 

reversing the June 13, 2022, orders terminating parental rights 

and remanding the matter to the juvenile court to address the 

issue of jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA; Fam. Code, 3400 et 

seq.).1

I write separately, however, to emphasize that the doctrine 

of appellate forfeiture is not incompatible with the UCCJEA 

statutory scheme. It is my view that a parent’s failure to object 

in the juvenile court to the lack of compliance with the UCCJEA 

can result in forfeiture of that issue on appeal. (See In re J.W. 

(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, 355, 367.) The UCCJEA does not 

place upon the juvenile court alone the burden to identify the 

appropriate forum for child custody proceedings and avoid 

conflicting state child custody orders. Parties to a child custody 

proceeding are obligated to provide the information necessary to 

determine jurisdictional issues and to bring possible conflicts 

with other state proceedings to the juvenile court’s attention. 

(Fam. Code, § 3429.) Application of the forfeiture rule—and its 

purpose of “encourag[ing] parties to bring errors to the attention 

of the trial court, so that they may be corrected” (In re S.B. (2004) 

32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293)—therefore facilitates compliance with, 

and the making of correct determinations under the UCCJEA.

1 I also agree with the majority’s resolution of the issue

raised under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 

25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).
2

Nevertheless, the record here includes important reasons to 

exercise our discretion to hear the UCCJEA issue on the merits. 

Although the discretion to excuse forfeiture “must be exercised 

with special care” in dependency proceedings, because they 

“involve the well-being of children” and “considerations such as 

permanency and stability are of paramount importance” (In re 

S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293), where a juvenile court may 

have committed legal error on an issue of vital importance 

affecting the placement of a child, it may warrant relaxing the 

rule of forfeiture (In re Alexandria P. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 

1322, 1348). This is not a case where mother remained silent 

about her connections to other states and where the need for 

investigation of other state proceedings went unnoticed by the 

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services. Particularly where the fathers were never located, and 

therefore did not have an opportunity to participate, the 

UCCJEA issue is a significant one: there is at least a potential 

concern that another state has information about the absent 

fathers, or an interest in their relationship with one or both 

minors.

Therefore, I join the majority’s conditional reversal of the 

termination orders and the remand order instructing the juvenile 

court to ensure compliance with the UCCJEA.

MOOR, J.