UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1036

CRC SCRAP METAL RECYCLING, LLC,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; WATSON INSURANCE 

AGENCY; HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (7:12-cv-00146-HMH)

Submitted: June 13, 2013 Decided: June 27, 2013

Before MOTZ, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John E. Rogers, II, C. Reed Teague, WARD LAW FIRM, PA, 

Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellant. Nosizi Ralephata, 

John S. Wilkerson, III, TURNER, PADGET, GRAHAM & LANEY, P.A., 

Charleston, South Carolina; Hunter S. Freeman, Susan Taylor 

Wall, MCNAIR LAW FIRM, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for 

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

CRC Scrap Metal Recycling, LLC appeals from the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment for Hartford Casualty 

Insurance Company, Hartford Fire Insurance Company, and Watson 

Insurance Agency (collectively the “Insurers”). We affirm.

I.

CRC first appeals the district court’s determination that 

the Insurers did not have a duty to defend or indemnify CRC 

against a suit brought by Action Concrete seeking payment for 

property damage caused by CRC’s receipt and sale of Action’s

stolen aluminum forms. CRC specifically challenges the district 

court’s determination that property damage caused by its alleged 

negligent conversion of the aluminum forms is not covered under 

its commercial general liability policy because negligent 

conversion does not constitute an “occurrence.”

South Carolina courts have yet to address whether negligent 

conversion constitutes an “occurrence.” And we need not now 

decide the issue. For we may affirm on any ground supported by 

the record. Sloas v. CSX Transp. Inc., 616 F.3d 380, 388 n.5 

(4th Cir. 2010). The record in this case demonstrates that even 

assuming negligent conversion constitutes an “occurrence” under 

CRC’s policy, any property damage caused by that occurrence is

excluded under the policy’s “your product” exclusion.
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Under South Carolina law, “[c]ourts interpret insurance 

policy language in accordance with its plain, ordinary, and 

popular meaning, except with technical language or where the 

context requires another meaning.” M & M Corp. of S.C. v. Auto–

Owners Ins. Co., 701 S.E.2d 33, 35 (S.C. 2010). Ambiguities are 

construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. Id.

The policy generally covers “‘property damage’ . . . caused 

by an ‘occurrence.’” J.A. 822. It excludes from coverage, 

however, all “property damage to ‘[CRC’s] product,’” that is, 

property damage to “any goods or products . . . manufactured, 

sold, handled, distributed, or disposed of by” CRC. JA 839. 

The underlying complaint alleged property damage to Action’s 

stolen aluminum forms that CRC purchased, handled, and sold. 

The definition of “your product” unambiguously includes these 

types of actions. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., 

Inc., 674 F.2d 401, 420 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that “handled” 

as used in the “your product” exclusion means “to deal or trade 

in.”). Thus, the aluminum forms, although still owned by 

Action, constitute CRC’s “product” for the purposes of the 

exclusion, and any property damage caused by CRC’s negligent 

conversion of those forms is excluded from coverage.
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II.

CRC also challenges the district court’s determination that 

it failed to offer evidence supporting its claims of negligence 

and negligent misrepresentation by the Insurers. CRC asserts 

that summary judgment was inappropriate because it offered 

evidence that it relied, to its detriment, on the 

recommendations of Watson’s employee as to the “best possible 

coverage,” and accordingly purchased insurance that did not 

provide coverage for the property damage at issue here. Even 

assuming that CRC relied on Watson’s employee, the district 

court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Insurers.

First, there is no evidence in the record that the Insurers 

owed any duty to CRC. “Generally, an insurer and its agents owe 

no duty to advise an insured,” but an insurer that expressly or 

impliedly undertakes to advise its insured must exercise due 

care. Trotter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 377 S.E.2d 

343, 347 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988). “An implied undertaking may be 

shown if . . . the insured made a clear request for advice.” 

Id. However, an insured’s “request for ‘full coverage,’ ‘the 

best policy,’ or similar expressions does not place an [insurer] 

under a duty to determine the insured's full insurance needs, to 

advise the insured about coverage, or to use his discretion and 

expertise to determine what coverage the insured should 

purchase.” Id. In this case, there is no evidence that CRC 
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asked Watson’s employee for any advice beyond suggesting the 

“best and broadest insurance policy.” Thus, the Insurers owed 

no duty to CRC, and CRC’s negligence claim fails.

CRC’s negligent misrepresentation claim similarly fails

because CRC offered no evidence that the Insurers or their 

employees made any factual misrepresentations regarding coverage 

afforded by the policy. See deBondt v. Carlton Motorcars, Inc., 

536 S.E.2d 399, 405 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000). An insurer’s vague 

puffery that a policy provides the “best and broadest” available 

coverage does not constitute a factual misrepresentation. Cf.

Miller v. Premier Corp., 608 F.2d 973, 981 (4th Cir. 1979).

III.

We accordingly affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment for the Insurers. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED