Filed 12/30/20 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CITY OF FRESNO,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FRESNO BUILDING HEALTHY 

COMMUNITIES,

Defendant and Appellant,

HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYER 

ASSOCIATION,

Intervener and Respondent.

F080264

(Super. Ct. No. 19CECG00422)

MODIFICATION OF OPINION 

ON DENIAL OF REHEARING 

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

FRESNO BUILDING HEALTHY 

COMMUNITIES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO,

Defendant and Respondent,

HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYER 

ASSOCIATION,

Intervener and Respondent.

F080265

(Super. Ct. No. 19CECG00432)

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion herein filed on December 17, 2020, be modified as 

follows:
2.

1. On page 19, delete the entire paragraph that begins with the sentence “First, 

Elections Code section 9217 is not specific to voter initiatives.” and insert the following 

paragraph in its place:

 The trial court places undue significance on California Cannabis’s

reference to Elections Code section 9217 (section 9217). Section 9217 

provides in relevant part: “If a majority of the voters voting on a proposed 

ordinance vote in its favor, the ordinance shall become a valid and binding 

ordinance of the city. ... No ordinance that is either proposed by initiative 

petition and adopted by the vote of the legislative body of the city without 

submission to the voters, or adopted by the voters, shall be repealed or 

amended except by a vote of the people, unless provision is otherwise made 

in the original ordinance.” Section 9217 is found under the chapter of the 

Elections Code governing municipal initiatives and is hence specific to 

initiatives, as the trial court observes. However, we disagree that the 

Supreme Court’s reference in California Cannabis to section 9217 means 

the two-thirds vote requirement applies to voter initiatives. There is no 

indication the Court in that passage was trying to formulate an 

interpretation of the vote requirement for a special tax measure proposed by 

a local governing body. Instead, the Court was explaining that if the voters 

desired to impose a certain procedural requirement on themselves, they 

would have done so expressly. Additionally, in the sentence immediately 

prior to the one referencing section 9217, the Court stated a two-thirds vote 

of the voters was required “before a local government can impose” a 

special tax; there was no reference to special taxes imposed by voter 

initiative. 

 

This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.

Intervener’s petition for rehearing is denied.

SNAUFFER, J.

WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P.J.

PEÑA, J.
Filed 12/17/20 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CITY OF FRESNO,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FRESNO BUILDING HEALTHY 

COMMUNITIES,

Defendant and Appellant;

HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYER 

ASSOCIATION,

Intervener and Respondent.

F080264

(Super. Ct. No. 19CECG00422)

OPINION

FRESNO BUILDING HEALTHY 

COMMUNITIES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO,

Defendant and Respondent;

HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYER 

ASSOCIATION,

Intervener and Respondent.

F080265

(Super. Ct. No. 19CECG00432)
2.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kimberly A. 

Gaab, Judge.

Olson Remcho, Thomas A. Willis, Karen Getman and Benjamin N. Gervercer for 

Defendant and Appellant in F080264 and Plaintiff and Appellant in F080265.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent in F08264 and Defendant and 

Respondent in F080265.

Jonathan M. Coupal, Timothy A. Bittle and Laura E. Dougherty for Intervener and 

Respondent.

Eversheds Sutherland (US), Timothy A. Gustafson, Eric J. Coffill and Alexandra 

Louderback for Council for State Taxation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Intervener and 

Respondent.

-ooOooIn the November 2018 general election, 52.17% of Fresno voters voted for 

Measure P, a voter initiative measure entitled the “Fresno Clean and Safe Neighborhood 

Parks Tax Ordinance.”1 The City of Fresno (the City) filed a complaint for declaratory 

relief to establish whether Measure P has been duly enacted through the voters’ initiative 

power. The City’s complaint named as defendant Fresno Building Healthy Communities 

(FBHC), a nonprofit corporation that supported Measure P, and the Howard Jarvis 

Taxpayers Association (the Association) also intervened as a defendant. The same day 

the City filed its action, FBHC filed its own complaint for declaratory relief and petition 

for writ of mandate, seeking a declaration Measure P had been duly enacted. The City 

was named as the respondent and the Association intervened, and each filed an answer to 

FBHC’s action.

1 California Constitution, Article II, section 1 provides in part: “All political 

power is inherent in the people,” who retain “the right to alter or reform” government by 

voter initiative “when the public good may require.” 
3.

The Association filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the City’s action, 

arguing Measure P is invalid because it imposed a special tax approved by less than twothirds of the voting electorate. The Association relied on provisions placed in the 

California Constitution by Proposition 13 (in 1978) and Proposition 218 (in 1996), 

“which both require a two-thirds vote of the electorate to approve certain taxes adopted 

by local governments.” (City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in 

the Matter of Proposition C (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 703, 708, review denied Sept. 9, 

2020, S263753 (All Persons); see Cal. Const., Art. XIII A, § 4 & Art. XIII C, § 2, 

subd. (d).)2 The trial court granted the Association’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings without leave to amend, agreeing with the Association that the relevant 

provisions of Proposition 13 and Proposition 218 require a two-thirds vote of the 

electorate for passage of a voter initiative that imposes a special tax. Judgment was 

entered in the City’s action, and the parties stipulated and the superior court ordered that 

its ruling in the City’s case be incorporated into a final judgment in FBHC’s case. FBHC 

appeals from both judgments. As both cases involve the same parties, facts, and legal 

issues, we have consolidated the cases. 

After FBHC filed its opening brief, the First District Court of Appeal filed its 

opinion in All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 703. There, the First District was 

presented exactly the same questions presented here, namely, whether Proposition 13 and 

Proposition 218 require a two-thirds vote of the electorate for passage of a voter initiative 

that imposes a special tax. In that case, the City and County of San Francisco filed a 

petition for declaratory relief asking for a determination that a special tax initiative that 

received 61 percent of the vote be declared passed. (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 708.) The trial court granted the City and County of San Francisco’s motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, and the First District affirmed. (Id. at pp. 708-709.) The First 

2 Unspecified references to “Article” are to the California Constitution. 
4.

District ultimately concluded neither Proposition 13 nor Proposition 218 affects the 

voters’ initiative power, and therefore neither imposes a two-thirds voting requirement on 

the passage of voter initiatives that impose special taxes. (Ibid.) We fully agree with and 

endorse the holdings and reasoning of All Persons, and find that case controls the 

outcome here. We reverse, and in doing so we quote liberally from All Persons. 

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

The All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 703 court began by providing an overview 

of the provisions of Proposition 13 and Proposition 218 that were at issue in that case, 

which are the same issues presented in this case. We present that overview here to 

provide a helpful backdrop for reading the facts:3 

I. The Initiative Power

Our state Constitution was amended in 1911 to include the initiative power. 

(California Cannabis [Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 934 (California 

Cannabis)].) “The Constitution ‘speaks of the initiative and referendum, not as a right 

granted the people, but as a power reserved by them.’ ” (Ibid; see Art. IV, § 1.)

Article II describes the initiative as “the power of the electors to propose statutes 

and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them” (Art. II, § 8), and states 

that this power “may be exercised by the electors of each city or county under procedures 

that the Legislature shall provide” (Art. II, § 11). “[A]lthough the procedures for exercise 

of the right of initiative are spelled out in the initiative law, the right itself is guaranteed 

by the Constitution.” (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 

18 Cal.3d 582, 594–595 (Associated Home Builders) [affording greater weight to 

initiative law than zoning law].)

3

In quoting from the All Persons opinion, 51 Cal.App.5th at pages 709-711, the 

brackets enclosing material are used to denote our insertions or additions. 
5.

A defining characteristic of the initiative is the people’s power to adopt laws by 

majority vote. As originally enacted, the 1911 constitutional amendment provided: “Any 

act, law or amendment to the constitution submitted to the people by either initiative or 

referendum petition and approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon at any election 

shall take effect five days after the date of the official declaration of the vote by the 

secretary of state.” (Former Art. IV, § 1.) To similar effect, state legislation providing 

for passage of a local initiative measure upon majority vote was first enacted in 1912. 

(Stats. 1912, 1st Ex. Sess. 1911, ch. 33, p. 131; see Brookside Investments, Ltd. v. City of 

El Monte (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 540, 550.)

Currently, Article II, section 10, subdivision (a) provides that an “initiative 

statute ... approved by a majority of votes cast thereon takes effect on the fifth day after 

the Secretary of State files the statement of the vote for the election at which the measure 

is voted on.” Parallel legislation for local initiatives is found in the Elections Code; 

section 9217 provides that “if a majority of the voters voting on a proposed ordinance 

vote in its favor, the ordinance shall become a valid and binding ordinance of the city.” 

And section 9122 has a parallel provision for “a majority of the voters ... of the county.” 

[fn. omitted.]

The initiative power is “ ‘one of the most precious rights of our democratic 

process’ [citation]. ‘[It] has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction 

to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly 

annulled.” (Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.) Pursuant to our duty 

to “ ‘ “jealously guard” ’ and liberally construe” this right, we must “resolve doubts in 

favor of the exercise of the right whenever possible.” (California Cannabis, supra,

3 Cal.5th at p. 934.) 

II. Restrictions on the Government’s Power to Tax

Over the past four decades, restrictions on the government's taxing power have 

been added to the California Constitution by a series of voter initiatives “designed to limit 
6.

the authority of state and local governments to impose taxes without voter approval.” 

(Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding (2018) 6 Cal.5th 1, 10 (Citizens for Fair 

REU Rates).) Two of those measures added the supermajority vote requirements at issue 

in the present case: Proposition 13 in 1978, and Proposition 218 in 1996.

Proposition 13 “added article XIII A to the state Constitution ‘to assure effective 

real property tax relief by means of an “interlocking ‘package’ ” ’ of four provisions.” 

(Citizens for Fair REU Rates, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 10.) The first two of these four 

provisions are not directly relevant here. They “capped the ad valorem real property tax 

rate at 1 percent (art. XIII A, § 1)” and “limited annual increases in real property 

assessments to 2 percent (art. XIII A, § 2).” (Citizens for Fair REU Rates, at p. 10.) The 

third provision “required that any increase in statewide taxes be approved by two-thirds 

of both houses of the Legislature.” (Ibid., citing Art. XIII A, § 3.) This was the provision 

our Supreme Court construed in Kennedy Wholesale[, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization

(1991) 53 Cal.3d 245 (Kennedy Wholesale)]. The fourth provision, the one at issue in 

this case, requires “that any special tax imposed by a local government entity be 

approved by two-thirds of the qualified electors (Art. XIII A, § 4).” (Citizens for Fair 

REU Rates, at p. 10.)

Eighteen years after Proposition 13, Proposition 218 “added articles XIII C and 

XIII D to the state Constitution.” (Citizens for Fair REU Rates, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 

p. 10.) Article XIII D further limits the authority of local governments to assess real 

property taxes and charges. And “[a]rticle XIII C buttresses article XIII D by limiting the 

other methods by which local governments can exact revenue using fees and taxes not 

based on real property value or ownership.” (Citizens for Fair REU Rates, supra,

6 Cal.5th at p. 10.) Article XIII C categorizes all local taxes as “ ‘either general taxes or 

special taxes’ (Art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (a)),” and provides, “[l]ocal governments may not 

impose, increase, or extend: (1) any general tax, unless approved by a majority vote at a 

general election; or (2) any special tax, unless approved by a two-thirds vote. (Art. XIII 
7.

C, § 2, subds. (b), (d).)” (Citizens for Fair REU Rates, at pp. 10–11.) The Supreme 

Court in California Cannabis construed the general tax restriction in subdivision (b) of 

Article XIII C, section 2 (section 2(b)), while this case concerns the special tax restriction 

in subdivision (d) of the same section (section 2(d)). [We end our quotation from All 

Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pages 709—711.] 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In early 2018, citizens of the City of Fresno circulated an initiative petition 

seeking to place the “Fresno Clean and Safe Neighborhood Parks Tax Ordinance” on a 

future City election ballot. The proposed ordinance sought to impose a 3/8 percent 

transaction and use tax (i.e., sales tax) to improve park safety and accessibility for 

persons with disabilities, update and maintain playgrounds and restrooms, provide youth 

and veteran job training, improve after-school, arts, and recreation programs, beautify 

roadways, and create parks and trails in neighborhoods without current access. 

The proponents submitted the petition to the City and the City Clerk determined it 

contained 27,263 valid signatures of City voters, sufficient to qualify it for placement on 

the election ballot. At the same time, the Fresno City Council considered placing its own 

sales tax measure, the “Parks and Public Safety Transactions and Use Tax,” sponsored by 

the mayor of Fresno, on the ballot. As a local government-proposed tax measure, the 

“Parks and Public Safety Transactions and Use Tax” noted its passage was “subject to 

approval by two-thirds of the electorate under Proposition 218.” However, this proposal 

was removed from the June 28, 2018, city council meeting agenda. 

On August 9, 2018, the city council exercised its mandatory and ministerial duty 

to place the citizens’ proposed measure on the November 6, 2018, general election ballot. 

The initiative was designated as Measure P, and the city council’s resolution submitting it 
8.

to the voters stated that a two-thirds vote of the electorate was required for passage.4 At 

the election, a majority of those voting—52.17 percent—voted to approve Measure P. 

On December 18, 2018, the Fresno City Council determined Measure P failed because 

two-third of the electorate had not approved it. 

On February 1, 2019, the City filed a complaint for declaratory relief in Fresno 

County Superior Court requesting a determination of the voter threshold required for 

passage of a special tax brought by voter initiative.5 The City named as the defendant 

FBHC, which had supported Measure P and had sent a letter to the City requesting the 

City take steps to implement Measure P. FBHC is a California nonprofit corporation, and 

was founded by residents of Fresno to foster and encourage thriving communities where 

all children and families can live healthy, safe, and productive lives. On February 26, 

2019, the Association was granted leave to intervene as a defendant. FBHC and the 

Association each filed answers to the City’s complaint, and FBHC also filed a response 

to the Association’s answer. 

Also on February 1, 2019, FBHC filed its own complaint for declaratory relief and 

verified petition for writ of mandate in Fresno County Superior Court requesting a 

declaration Measure P had been validly enacted and a directive to the City to implement 

it. The City was named as the respondent, Association intervened, and both filed an 

answer. 

Thereafter, the Association moved for judgment on the pleadings in the City’s 

action, arguing that articles XIII A and XIII C of the California Constitution require 

approval of two-thirds of the electorate and that this two-thirds approval requirement 

applies equally to tax measures proposed by voter initiative, including Measure P. The 

4 We take judicial notice on our own motion of Fresno City Council Resolution 

No. 2018-188 dated August 10, 2018. (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a).)

5 The parties do not dispute the tax Measure P seeks to impose is a special tax, as 

opposed to a general tax. 
9.

City submitted a statement of neutrality and indicated it would defer to the court’s 

guidance. FBHC opposed the motion. 

On August 14, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the Association’s motion and 

took the matter under submission. On September 5, 2019, the court granted the motion 

for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. Judgment was entered in the 

City’s action, and the parties stipulated that that judgment be incorporated into a final 

judgment in the case initiated by FBHC. In its written order, the trial court concluded 

Propositions 13 and 218 each impose a supermajority voting requirement on voter 

initiatives. Concerning Proposition 13, the trial court relied on Kennedy Wholesale, 

supra, 53 Cal.3d 245, and Altadena Library Dist. v. Bloodgood (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 

585 (Altadena Library), two cases that the trial court believed stood for the proposition 

that the voters, via article XIII A, section 4, imposed a two-thirds voting requirement on 

themselves for passage of special tax initiatives. We believe the trial court reached the 

wrong conclusion. 

Regarding Proposition 218, FBHC relied on California Cannabis, supra, 

3 Cal.5th 924 to support its contention that the two-thirds voting requirement contained in 

article XIII C, section 2(d) does not apply to voter initiatives. The trial court 

distinguished California Cannabis on the ground that that case was decided within the 

narrow context of a different section of Article XIII C, and therefore is inapposite. The 

trial court in turn concluded, by implication, that the term “local government” as used in 

article XIII C, section 2(d) includes the electorate. Again, the trial court incorrectly 

concluded the electorate is included in the term “local government.” 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

FBHC contends that it, rather than the Association, is entitled to judgment on the 

pleadings. The Association is supported by amicus curiae. “Judgment on the pleadings 

‘ “is equivalent to a demurrer.” ’ [Citation.] We derive the pertinent facts from properly 
10.

pleaded allegations in the challenged pleading and judicially noticeable matters and our 

standard of review is de novo. [Citation.] [⁋] De novo review is proper for the 

additional reason that we are called upon to construe constitutional provisions. 

[Citation.] In undertaking this task, our objective is to give effect to the intended purpose 

of these provisions. We begin with the text, ascribing to words their ordinary meaning 

and considering their context by taking account of related provisions and the broader 

constitutional scheme. If a provision’s intended purpose cannot be gleaned from the text 

in context, then we may consider extrinsic sources. And, as to provisions enacted 

through voter initiative, we presume electors are aware of existing law.” (All Persons, 

supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 713-714, fn. omitted.) 

II. Proposition 13 (Article XIII A, Section 4)

The trial court ruled that under Proposition 13 and the holdings of Kennedy 

Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d 245 and Altadena Library, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d 585, a 

two-thirds vote of the electorate is required for passage of an initiative measure imposing 

a special tax. Specifically, the trial court, relying on a quotation from our Supreme 

Court’s holding in Kennedy Wholesale, ruled that Article XIII A, section 4 imposes a 

two-thirds voting requirement on the electorate for passage of such a measure. The trial 

court also stated in its ruling that the Altadena Library court held that the two-thirds vote 

requirement of Article XIII A, section 4 applies to initiative measures. We believe the 

trial court erred in concluding Article XIII A, section 4 applies to voter initiatives. 

The First District in All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 703 answered the same 

question presented here, namely, whether Article XIII A, section 4 applies to voter 

initiatives. In answering the question in the negative, the First District explained how 

neither Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d 245—including the specific quotation 

therefrom relied on by the trial court in our case—nor Altadena Library, supra, 

192 Cal.App.3d 585 lend support to the proposition that Article XIII A, section 4 applies 

to initiatives. We fully agree with the First District’s holding and reasoning. 
11.

“The text of Article XIII A, section 4 states that ‘Cities, Counties and special 

districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special 

taxes,’ except for taxes relating to the value, possession, or sale of real property.’ ” (All 

Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) The First District recognized a “source of 

potential ambiguity is the phrase ‘Cities, Counties, and special districts.” (Ibid.) 

One interpretation “of section 4’s language is that these elected bodies ‘may 

impose special taxes’ only if two-thirds of the voters also approve.” (All Persons, supra, 

51 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) By this interpretation, the electorate “is distinct from and not

included in the phrase ‘Cities, Counties, and special districts.’ ” (Ibid.) A second 

interpretation—urged by the Association here—is that section 4’s “reference to ‘cities’ 

and ‘counties’ includes the electorate in these jurisdictions.” (Ibid.) “According to this 

interpretation, the people, in exercising their initiative power, are required also to muster 

a two-thirds vote to enact a special tax, even though there is no express mention of the 

initiative power.” (Ibid.) 

The First District recognized both interpretations are plausible “when reading 

section 4 in isolation.” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 715.) “Facing 

ambiguous context, [the First District] turn[ed] to context to interpret section 4, starting 

with other provisions of the California Constitution.” (Ibid.; citing California Cannabis, 

supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 933-934.) The court began by noting that no provision in 

Article III A, including section 4, mentioned the initiative power. (All Persons, supra, at 

p. 715.) The court continued: “When Proposition 13 was approved by California voters 

in 1978, the initiative power had been long ensconced in our Constitution. (California 

Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 934.) ‘Initiatives, whether constitutional or statutory,

require only a simple majority for passage.’ (Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 

p. 250.)” (All Persons, supra, at p. 715.) The court then posed the question: “If the 

voters who approved Proposition 13 (by a majority vote) intended to constrain the 

constitutionally protected power of future voters to approve initiatives by majority vote, 
12.

would they not have manifested that intent by some express reference to the initiative 

power?” (Ibid.) 

Responding to that rather rhetorical question, the First District stated: “[W]e are 

not the first court to grapple with Proposition 13’s silence on the initiative power. Our 

state Supreme Court in Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d 245, first rejected an 

argument that another provision of Proposition 13—section 3 of Article XIII A—

impliedly repealed the people’s power to increase state taxes by voter initiative, and then 

interpreted section 3’s two-thirds vote requirement as inapplicable to statewide initiative 

statutes. The approach to constitutional interpretation and the result reached in Kennedy 

Wholesale compel our conclusion that the two-thirds vote requirement in section 4 does 

not apply to local initiatives.” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 715.)

“Kennedy Wholesale was a constitutional challenge to Proposition 99, a 1988 

initiative statute that increased state taxes on tobacco products. [Citation.] Plaintiff, a 

tobacco product distributor, argued that Proposition 99 violated Article XIII A, section 3, 

which at the time provided, ‘any changes in State taxes enacted for the purpose of 

increasing revenues ... must be imposed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of 

all members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature.’ [Citation.] According 

to the plaintiff, a plain reading of this provision signified that ‘only the Legislature can 

raise taxes.’ [Citation.] The Kennedy Wholesale Court recognized that section 3 was 

susceptible to that interpretation because, read literally, section 3 required that any state 

tax increases ‘ “be imposed by ... the Legislature.” ’ [Citation.] Yet the Court found the 

provision ‘ambiguous when read in the context of the whole Constitution,’ particularly 

those provisions preserving the initiative power. [Citation.] The Kennedy Wholesale 

Court resolved this contextual ambiguity on the basis of three factors that apply in our 

case.” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 715.) 

“First is the general principle that ‘ “the law shuns repeals by implication.” ’ 

[Citation.] To interpret Article XIII A, section 3 as giving the Legislature exclusive 
13.

power to raise taxes would have impliedly repealed the initiative power reserved to the 

people in Article IV, section 1, despite the fact that section 3 did ‘not even mention the 

initiative power, let along purport to restrict it.’ [Citation.] Kennedy Wholesale refused 

to construe section 3 in this manner, reminding courts of our obligation to harmonize, 

whenever possible, potentially conflicting constitutional provisions.” (All Persons, 

supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 715-716.) The All Persons court, abiding by this principle, 

“decline[d] to construe section 4 in a manner that repeals by implication the initiative 

power to pass local laws by majority vote.” (Id. at p. 716.) We agree with All Persons

that Proposition 13 fails to even mention “the constitutionally-backed requirement in the 

Election Code that a local initiative measure take effect when it garners a majority of 

votes cast.” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 716.) 

The All Persons court proceeded: “The second principle of construction applied in 

Kennedy Wholesale is specific to citizen initiatives. Calling the power of initiative, 

‘ “ ‘ “one of the most precious rights of our democratic process,” ’ ” ’ the Supreme Court 

declined to adopt an interpretation of section 3 that would limit the initiative power: ‘we 

must “resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of the exercise of this precious right,” ’

Kennedy Wholesale instructs. (Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 250.) 

Applying that principle here, we will reject a construction of Article XIII A, section 4 

that hobbles the exercise of the initiative power by lashing it to a supermajority vote 

requirement.” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 716.) 

The third relevant factor under Kennedy Wholesale that the First District Court 

recognized “considers evidence bearing on the meaning of the text in question.” (All 

Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 716.) The Kennedy Wholesale court considered the 

official ballot pamphlet as evidence of the intent of the voters who passed Proposition 13. 

(Ibid.) The Kennedy Wholesale court found no evidence in the pamphlet to “ ‘support[] 

the inference that the voters intended to limit their own power to raise taxes in the future 

by statutory initiative.’ ” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 716; quoting Kennedy 
14.

Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 250.) Instead, the Supreme Court noted 

“Proposition 13 was directed against ‘ “spendthrift politicians” ’ and in favor of restoring 

‘ “government of, for and by the people,” ’ ” and this theme is inconsistent with the 

notion that voters enacted Proposition 13 to limit their own power to raise taxes by 

initiative. (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 716; quoting Kennedy Wholesale, 

supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 250-251.) 

The All Persons court correctly recognized that “[n]one of the evidence Kennedy 

Wholesale cites is specific to section 3, as distinct from section 4, of Article XIII A.” (All 

Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 716.) The trial court here therefore erred in 

suggesting Kennedy Wholesale is inapplicable because it was decided in the context of 

section 3. Like the All Persons court, “we find in the official ballot pamphlet nothing to 

support an inference that the voters adopting Proposition 13 intended to limit their own 

ability to raise local taxes by initiative, and to adopt such initiatives by majority vote.” 

(All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 716.) Therefore, we likewise conclude an 

analysis of each of the three foregoing factors compels a conclusion that the two-thirds 

vote requirement codified in Article XIII A, section 4 does not apply to local citizens’ 

initiatives. 

We next address another aspect of Kennedy Wholesale. The trial court, in its order 

granting the Association’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, stated: 

“The California Supreme Court noted, in Kennedy Wholesale, 

Inc. v. State Bd. Of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, that 

article XIII A, section 4’s two-thirds vote requirement 

‘demonstrates, unambiguously, that the voters knew how to 

impose a supermajority vote requirement upon themselves 

when that is what they wanted to do.’ (Id. at p. 252.) 

Article XIII A, section 4 was referenced in contrast to 

article XIII A, section 3: ‘That the voters expressly adopted 

such a requirement in section 4 strongly suggests that they did 

not do so implicitly in section 3.’ (Ibid., emphasis in 

original.)” 
15.

This quotation was also used by the appellants in All Persons—as well as by the 

Association here—“to argue that Article XIII A, section 4 applies to voter-circulated 

initiatives.” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 718.) However, the Association 

has misconstrued what the Kennedy Wholesale court said. “The Court simply 

acknowledged section 4’s two-thirds vote requirement that applies when local 

government entities—‘Cities, Counties, or special districts’—seek to impose special 

taxes. The Court did not say or suggest that the same requirement applies to local 

initiatives.” (All Persons, supra, at p. 718.) 

The trial court and the Association also both rely on Altadena Library, supra, 

192 Cal.App.3d 585. That case “involved a 1983 ballot initiative that would have 

authorized the Altadena Library District to levy a special parcel tax to offset losses 

resulting from the passage of Proposition 13. The measure was approved by 64.8 percent 

of the district’s voters, but the county controller refused to levy the new tax because the 

measure did not satisfy Proposition 13’s supermajority vote requirement, which he took 

to apply. [Citation.] The Library District and its supporters sought mandate relief, which 

was denied. On appeal, they argued that (1) the Library District was not a special district 

within the meaning of Article XIII A, section 4, and (2) applying the supermajority vote 

requirement to a library district that provides constitutionally protected educational 

services violates equal protection. [Citation.] The Court of Appeal rejected both 

contentions and affirmed the judgment.” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 719.)

The Association here, just like the appellants in All Persons, argues the Altadena 

Library court held the two-thirds vote requirement codified in Article XIII A, section 4, 

applies to voter initiatives. The Association is incorrect. The court there did not address 

the question of whether section 4’s supermajority vote requirement applies to voter 

initiatives. Rather, the appellants in that case “limited their appeal to the question 

whether the supermajority vote requirement could be constitutionally applied to a library 

district[, and] never argued that the voters had validly exercised their initiative power 
16.

when they approved the measure by a majority vote, so that issue was not before the 

court.” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 719.) “ ‘Opinions are not authority for 

propositions not considered.’ ” (Ibid.) Indeed, the Altadena Library court stated that its 

“ ‘opinion is confined to the specific constitutional issue the library supporters raised,’ 

not purporting to decide “every other constitutional challenge which might be lodged 

against the supermajority requirement in art. XIII A, section 4.” (All Persons, at p. 719, 

quoting Altadena Library, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 592, fn. 1.) 

Following the sound reasoning of the All Persons court’s resolution of the 

controlling issues, we conclude the trial court here erred in concluding Proposition 13 

imposes a supermajority voting requirement on the electorate for passage of voter 

initiatives. 

III. Proposition 218 (Article XIII C, Section 2)

Separately, the trial court concluded Measure P is invalid under Article XIII C, 

section 2(d), which was added to the state constitution by Proposition 218. That section 

reads in full: “No local government may impose, extend or increase any special tax 

unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a two-thirds vote.” 

The trial court concluded that this provision imposes a two-thirds vote requirement on all 

measures that seek to impose special taxes, regardless if the measure originates from a 

voter initiative or from a governing body. On appeal, the Association defends the trial 

court’s ruling by arguing that the term “local government,” as used in section 2(d), should 

be construed to include the electorate. However, the All Persons court has squarely 

addressed this issue as well, and correctly arrived at the conclusion that the term “local 

government” does not include the electorate, and that section 2(d) does not apply to voter 

initiatives. 

The Association here, as did the appellants in All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 722, “contend[s] that the term ‘local government’ in section 2(d) is broad enough to 

include voters exercising their initiative power, so that initiatives imposing a special tax 
17.

require a two-thirds vote. Article XIII C, section 1 defines ‘ “Local government” ’ to 

mean ‘any county, city, city and county, including a charter city or county, any special 

district, or any other local or regional government entity.’ ” (All Persons, supra, 

51 Cal.App.5th at p. 722.) Obviously, this definition, which is the only definition of 

“local government” applicable to the entirety of Article XIII C, does not reference the 

electorate. “This definition also contains a catch-all for ‘other ... governmental 

entit[ies],’ which only strengthens the City’s argument that ‘local government’ refers to 

constituted governmental entities, not to the electorate exercising its initiative power.” 

(All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 722.) 

More importantly, the California Supreme Court in California Cannabis, supra, 

3 Cal.5th 924 has already determined that “local government”—which, again, has only 

one enumerated definition applicable to the whole of Article XIII C—does not include 

the electorate. (See All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 722.) “California Cannabis 

involved a 2014 voter initiative to repeal a citywide ban on medical marijuana 

dispensaries and impose licensing and inspection fees on dispensaries. [Citation.]

Proponents of the initiative requested that it be placed before voters at a special election, 

but the City determined the initiative had to await the next general election ballot because 

the licensing and inspection fee was a general tax under Article XIII C, section 2. 

[Citation.] The initiative proponents filed a mandate petition, arguing, inter alia, that 

Article XIII C did not apply to voter initiatives. While the case was pending, the medical 

marijuana initiative was defeated in a general election, but the Supreme Court exercised 

discretion to decide the case because of ‘important questions of continuing public interest 

that may evade review.’ ” (All Persons, at p. 722.) 

“The California Cannabis court framed the dispositive issue as whether 

Article XIII C restricts the ability of voters to impose taxes via initiative.” (All Persons, 

supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) The high court ultimately found: “ ‘nothing in the text 

of article XIII C, or its context, supports the conclusion that the term “local government” 
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was meant to encompass the electorate.’ ” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 723; 

quoting California Cannabis, at pp. 936 & 946-947.) The Association contends that 

California Cannabis is inapplicable to our case because, while voters may not be “local 

government” for purposes of determining whether a general tax must be submitted to 

voters at a general election (Article XIII C, section 3), they are “local government” for 

purposes of applying the supermajority vote requirement. Unsurprisingly, the appellants 

in All Persons raised this exact argument, and the All Persons court succinctly and 

accurately disposed of the faulty contention thusly: “Sections 2(b) and 2(d) are found in 

the same article and section of the state Constitution. They were both added by 

Proposition 218. They employ parallel language and incorporate the exact same 

definition of local government set forth in Article XIII C, section 1. The California 

Cannabis Court held that the definition of ‘local government’ in Article XIII C, section 2 

of the Constitution is not ‘broad enough to include the electorate.’ (California Cannabis, 

supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 937.) That holding applies here.” (All Persons, supra, 51 

Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) In short, the California Supreme Court, in California Cannabis, 

has already determined the meaning of “local government” for all purposes of Article 

XIII C, and we are bound by its determination.

Notwithstanding, the Association, like the All Persons appellants, attempts to 

distinguish California Cannabis by seizing on the fact that section 2(b) is materially 

different from section 2(d) because in section 2(d) voters explicitly imposed a two-thirds 

vote requirement on themselves. The trial court also attempted to make the same 

distinction. The trial court relied on the following quotation from California Cannabis: 

“[A]s we observed in Kennedy Wholesale, 53 Cal.3d at page 

252, 279 ..., when an initiative’s intended purpose includes 

imposing requirements on voters, evidence of such a purpose 

is clear. In article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d), for 

example, the enactors adopted a requirement providing that, 

before a local government can impose, extend, or increase 

any special tax, voters must approve the tax by a two-thirds 
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vote. That constitutes a higher vote requirement than would 

otherwise apply. ([Elec. Code,] § 9217 [providing for a 

majority].) That the voters explicitly imposed a procedural 

two-thirds vote requirement on themselves in article XIII C, 

section 2, subdivision (d) is evidence that they did not 

implicitly impose a procedural timing requirement in 

subdivision (b).” ([California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th] at 

p. 943, underlining added by trial court.) 

The trial court continued: 

“In the above-referenced provision, the Court refers to 

Elections Code section 9217, a statute specific to local voter 

initiatives, and which provides that such initiatives pass with 

a simple majority vote. Thus, it appears that the Court was 

referring to initiatives, then, when it stated that, under 

article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d), voters must approve 

special taxes ‘by a two-thirds vote’ and such ‘constitutes a 

higher vote requirement than would otherwise apply’ 

pursuant to Elections Code section 9217. The two-thirds vote 

requirement applies to all special tax proposals, regardless of 

the proponent of the proposal.” 

First, Elections Code section 9217 is not specific to voter initiatives. That section 

provides in relevant part: “If a majority of the voters voting on a proposed ordinance 

vote in its favor, the ordinance shall become a valid and binding ordinance of the city. ... 

No ordinance that is either proposed by initiative petition and adopted by the vote of the 

legislative body of the city without submission to the voters, or adopted by the voters, 

shall be repealed or amended except by a vote of the people, unless provision is otherwise 

made in the original ordinance.” 

More fundamentally, given that the term “local government” in Article XIII C 

does not include the voting electorate and that the California Cannabis court found no 

evidence from the official ballot materials that Proposition 218 was intended to affect the 

voters’ power of initiative, the trial court’s above-quoted provision does not stand for the 

proposition that a supermajority voting requirement applies to voter initiatives. 

(California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 940.)
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“ ‘Proposition 218 simply extends the long standing constitutional protection 

against politicians imposing tax increases without voter approval.’ [Citation.] It does not 

constrain the people’s initiative power.” (All Persons, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.)

IV. Policy argument

Aside from its constitutionally based arguments, the Association also contends 

that our failing to construe Propositions 13 and 218 as imposing a supermajority voting 

requirement on voter initiatives would create a playground for mischief. It contends that 

local politicians who support a tax increase could qualify an initiative as private citizens 

and then, when the initiative comes before the local governing body, they could enact the 

measure without putting it on the ballot, as would be allowed by Elections Code 

section 9215, subdivision (a). Elections Code section 9215 provides that a city must do 

one of the following when it receives a valid initiative petition: “(a) Adopt the ordinance 

as passed, without alteration, at the regular meeting at which the certification of the 

petition is presented, or within 10 days after it is presented[, or] (b) Submit the ordinance, 

without alteration, to the voters pursuant to Section 1405[,] or (c)” order a report from 

appropriate city agencies regarding the impact of the ordinance and then, upon receipt of 

the report, adopt the ordinance or submit it to the electorate for a vote.6 However, since 

this case does not involve any government action taken under Elections Code 

section 9215, subdivision (a), we decline to address the Association’s hypothetical 

scenario. Instead, this is a concern that should be addressed to the Legislature, as our 

limited function as a court is to construe the texts of Propositions 13 and 218 in the 

factual context presented here.

Additionally, although we are not required to do so, we address a related argument 

the Association raised for the first time at oral argument. (Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, 

6 While section 9215 applies only to initiatives in cities, there are comparable 

statutes in the Elections Code for other jurisdictions. 
21.

Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1554, fn. 9 [“We do not 

consider arguments that are raised for the first time at oral argument.”].) The gist of the 

argument as we understand it is that even when, as happened here, an initiative petition is 

submitted to the city council and the city council elects to submit the ordinance to the 

electorate for a vote, the city council would still be “imposing” the ordinance, which 

would implicate the provisions of Articles XIII A, section 4 and XIII C, section 2. 

Implicit in this argument is that all initiative petitions end up as local government 

“impositions” even when all the local government does is perform the ministerial 

function of submitting the measure as written to the electorate. Thus, regardless of 

whether a local government elects to proceed under subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of 

Elections Code section 9215, the local government would still be “imposing” the 

ordinance. We reject the notion that all initiative petitions are transmuted into local 

government “impositions” in this manner. 

DISPOSITION

The judgments are reversed. On the City of Fresno’s action, the trial court is 

ordered to enter a new judgment in favor of Fresno Building Healthy Communities 

declaring Measure P has passed. On Fresno Building Healthy Communities’s action, the 

trial court is directed to enter a new judgment granting Fresno Building Healthy 

Communities’s request for declaratory relief and declaring Measure P has passed. Any 

need for the issuance of a writ of mandate and the terms of that writ shall be decided in 
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the first instance by the trial court on remand. Fresno Building Healthy Communities is 

awarded its costs on appeal. 

SNAUFFER, J.

WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P.J.

PEÑA, J.