J-S10009-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RICHARD REESE WORKMAN, JR 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1096 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County

Criminal Division at CP-49-CR-0001190-2020

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 31, 2022

Richard Reese Workman, Jr. (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after he pled guilty to one count each of recklessly 

endangering another person, flight to avoid apprehension, possession of a 

controlled substance, and possession of a small amount of marijuana.1 

Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the above charges on December 

14, 2020. The trial court deferred sentencing for the preparation of a 

presentence investigation (PSI) report. On March 8, 2021, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 11⁄2 - 4 years in prison, with credit for 

203 days of time served (comprised of 1-2 years at Count 5 for recklessly 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2705, 5126(a); 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (a)(31).
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endangering another person; 6 months – 2 years at Count 3 for flight to avoid

prosecution, consecutive to Count 5; 6 – 12 months at Count 7 for possession 

of a controlled substance, concurrent to Count 5; and costs and fines at Count 

6 for possession of a small amount of marijuana). See N.T., 3/8/21, at 3-4.

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the court denied 

by operation of law. See Order, 7/13/21; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720(B)(3)(b). Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court 

have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

Appellant presents two issues for review:

a. [Did the trial court fail] to adequately weigh the standards set 

forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) when imposing an excessive 

aggregate sentence of eighteen (18) to forty-eight (48) 

months’ state imprisonment for a guilty plea to the aforesaid 

charge(s)[?]

b. [Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it] improperly 

failed without explanation to provide reason(s) for not 

considering the least restrictive sentencing alternative(s) 

encompassed within the [PSI] Report prepared by the 

Northumberland County PA Adult Probation Office in 

accordance with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); which recommended 

a standard range sentence of three (3) to fourteen (14) 

months’ imprisonment for a guilty plea to each of one (1) count 

of Recklessly Endangering Another Person under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2705 and one (1) count of Possession of a Controlled 

Substance under 35 P[.S.] § 780-113(a)(16) to be run 

concurrent with each other in combination with a probation 

level (RS-6) sentence for a guilty plea to one (1) count of Flight 

to Avoid Apprehension under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a) and a fine 

for one (1) count of Possession of a Small Amount of Marijuana 

under 35 P[.S.] § 780-113(a)(31), all with [Appellant] 

receiving credit of two-hundred-three (203) days for time 

served with eligibility for immediate parole in this case[?]
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Appellant’s Brief at 8-9 (emphasis omitted).2

Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.3 “The 

right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not 

absolute[.]” Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 

2014). Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence, the appeal should be considered a petition for allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Pertinently:

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part 

test[.] We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question 

that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

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2 The Commonwealth has not filed a reply brief.

3 We have explained:

Generally, upon the entry of a guilty plea, a defendant waives all 

claims and defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction 

of the court, the validity of the plea, and what has been termed 

the “legality” of the sentence imposed. However, where a 

defendant pleads guilty without any agreement as to sentence, 

(i.e. an open plea), the defendant retains the right to petition this 

Court for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary 

aspects of sentencing....

Commonwealth v. Heaster, 171 A.3d 268, 271 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations 

omitted). Because Appellant entered an open plea, his claim challenging the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing is not waived.
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Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006)).

Appellant has timely filed a notice of appeal and preserved his

sentencing claim in a post-sentence motion. See Post-Sentence Motion, 

3/12/21. Also, he included in his brief the requisite concise statement of 

reasons relied upon for appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Appellant’s Brief 

at 13. We therefore examine whether Appellant has raised a substantial 

question.

“We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 

A.2d 884, 886-87 (Pa. Super. 2008). Allowance of appeal will be permitted 

only when the appellate court determines there is a substantial question that 

the sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth 

v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805 (Pa. Super. 2006). “A substantial question 

exists where an appellant sets forth a plausible argument that the sentence 

violates a particular provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the 

fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process.” Id.

In his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, Appellant asserts the trial court 

“improperly failed without explanation to provide reason(s) for not considering 

the least restrictive sentencing alternative(s) encompassed within the [PSI] 

Report,” which recommended that the sentences run concurrently. 

Appellant’s Brief at 13. Further, he argues the court failed to “adequately 
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weigh the standards set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 9721(b) when imposing an 

excessive aggregate sentence” of 11⁄2 - 4 years in prison. Id. at 15. This

Court has held that a defendant raises a “substantial question by alleging that 

the sentencing court did not sufficiently state its reasons for the sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 A.2d 54, 56 (Pa. Super. 2003). We 

therefore review Appellant’s substantive argument.

[T]he proper standard of review when considering whether to 

affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of 

discretion .... [A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error 

of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its 

discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised 

was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court recently 

offered: An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because 

an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but 

requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly 

erroneous.

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly 

deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing 

court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a 

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual 

circumstances before it.

Moury, 992 A.2d at 169–70 (citation omitted).

A sentencing court is statutorily required to disclose in open court the 

reasons for the sentence imposed. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (“In every 

case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, ... 

the court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the 

time of sentencing, a statement of the reasons for the sentence imposed.”). 

However, the court “is not required to parrot the words of the Sentencing 
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Code, stating every factor that must be considered under Section 9712(b)[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 761 (Pa. Super. 2014). The 

sentencing court “can satisfy this disclosure requirement by indicating, on the 

record, that he has been informed by a [PSI].” Commonwealth v. Egan, 

679 A.2d 237, 239 (Pa. Super. 1996).

Here, our review discloses that although the trial court did not “place on 

the record” its reasons for imposing Appellant’s sentence, it referred to the

PSI, stating, “I’m going to sentence [Appellant] according to the 

recommendation through the [PSI] ... .” N.T., 3/8/21, at 3. Because the court 

relied upon the PSI and sentenced Appellant within the guidelines, it did not 

abuse its discretion. Egan, supra at 239; see also Commonwealth v. 

Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 766 (Pa. Super. 2006) (rejecting claim that the court 

abused its discretion by imposing the sentence without stating adequate 

reasons on the record, and holding that “[s]ince the sentencing court had and 

considered a [PSI], this fact alone was adequate to support the sentence[.]”). 

No relief is due.4

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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4 We could also deny relief because Appellant’s conclusory argument is 

undeveloped and fails to cite legal authority to support his sentencing claim. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (the argument section shall include a “discussion and 

citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”). Although we could dismiss 

on this basis, we decline to do so. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/31/2022