UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JUVENCIA DARSHA TOWNSEND, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS; EVERINGHAM, Case 

Manager; ROACH, Case Manager; 

DURAN, Case Manager; JOHN C. 

ROBERTS, Corrections Officer; SGT. 

TONYA GAMBLIN, Housing; SGT. 

TODD CHRIST; Major MARK 

ALHOLTZ, Housing; LT. TRAXLER, 

Head Case Manager; JACKSON, Case 

Manager; DAVID JOHNSON, Warden; 

DEETS, Case Manager,, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 16-1141 

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-02961-RBJ-KMT) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 16, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Juvencia Townsend, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

 Townsend is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department of 

Corrections. She alleges claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and due 

process violations against various corrections department employees. The district 

court denied Townsend’s request for appointment of counsel and subsequently 

dismissed each of her claims. It concluded that Townsend failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies, did not state a claim for discrimination, and that her 

retaliation claim was time-barred. Townsend timely appealed. 

 On appeal, Townsend presents only three narrow bases for relief. First, she 

appears to argue that the district court judge should have recused himself because he 

presided over Townsend’s criminal trial and was biased against her. However, 

“[a]dverse rulings alone are insufficient grounds for disqualification, as is evidence 

that the judge criticized or was angry with a party.” In re Am. Ready Mix, Inc., 14 

F.3d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Townsend does not provide 

any additional facts to support her claim of bias. Thus, the district court judge was 

not required to recuse. 

 Townsend also argues that the district court erred in denying her requests for 

appointed counsel. There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. 

Johnson v. Johnson, 466 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006). However, a district court 

has discretion to request counsel for a litigant who is unable to afford one. Id. (citing 
3 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)). We review the district court’s denial for abuse of 

discretion, considering “the merits of the claims, the nature of the claims, [the 

plaintiff’s] ability to present the claims, and the complexity of the issues.” Rachel v. 

Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 397 (10th Cir. 2016). The district court’s decision was 

reasonable: Townsend’s claims are not novel or complex, and she was able to 

adequately present her case before the district court. 

 Finally, Townsend argues that the district court erroneously denied her motion 

requesting reports and documents, apparently in reference to initial disclosures. But 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B) exempts from initial disclosures “an action brought 

without an attorney by a person in the custody of . . . a state.” Thus, the district court 

did not err. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court. We DENY 

Townsend’s motion to dismiss the appeal without prejudice1

 and GRANT her motion 

to proceed in forma pauperis. She is reminded of her obligation to continue making 

partial payments until the entire filing fee has been paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b). 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

 1

 Townsend mistakenly appears to think that if we dismiss without prejudice, 

she will be allowed to refile her appeal at any time.