SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3274-18T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHABBA Z. GREEN,

a/k/a SHABBA K. GREEN,

and ZIARE GREEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted May 28, 2020 – Decided June 15, 2020

Before Judges Whipple and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 16-03-0980.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief). 

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

Defendant Shabba Z. Green appeals from a January 14, 2019 order 

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary 

hearing. We affirm. 

In 2015, defendant was arrested for robbing a juvenile at knife point in 

East Orange. A grand jury indicted defendant for first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 

2C:15-1, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d), 

and possession of a weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). 

In 2016, defendant pled guilty to first-degree robbery, and pursuant to a

plea agreement, was sentenced as a second-degree offender. He received a sixyear prison sentence subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-7.2, and five years of parole supervision. In his PCR petition, defendant 

argued his plea counsel did not advise him he was subject to five years of parole 

supervision, and instead he should have received three years of parole 

supervision consistent with a second-degree robbery conviction. The PCR judge 

rejected defendant's argument, and referencing defendant's plea form, noted the 

following:

Defendant was asked . . . "Do you understand that 

because you pled to these charges the Court must 
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impose a five year term of parole supervision, and that 

term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of 

incarceration?" Below it says, "First degree term for 

parole supervision, five years. Second degree parole 

supervision, three years." This defendant circled yes. 

The judge concluded defendant did not demonstrate a prima facie case of 

ineffective assistance of counsel because his "counsel could not have effectively

argued for three years, because by law statutorily . . . he pled guilty to a first 

degree robbery he must have received and did receive the five years term of 

parole supervision."

Defendant raises the following point on this appeal:

THE PCR COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE 

DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON 

HIS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

BASED UPON HAVING MADE A PRIMA FACIE 

SHOWING OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL WHERE COUNSEL GAVE INCORRECT 

ADVICE THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE THREE 

YEARS OF PAROLE SUPERVISION RATHER 

THAN FIVE YEARS WHEN PLEADING TO A 

FIRST-DEGREE CRIME. 

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 

must meet the two-part test Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) 

established, which our Supreme Court adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 

(1987). Under Strickland, a defendant first must show his or her attorney made 

errors "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed 
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the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Counsel's 

performance is deficient if it falls "below an objective standard of 

reasonableness." Id. at 688.

A defendant also must show counsel's "deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense." Id. at 687. He or she must establish "there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "A reasonable probability 

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of the 

proceeding. Ibid.

We review a PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary 

hearing for abuse of discretion. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 

(App. Div. 2013) (citing State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 157-58 (1997)). A 

defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he or she presents a prima facie 

case supporting PCR, the court determines there are material issues of fact that 

cannot be resolved based on the existing record, and the court finds that an 

evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims presented. R. 3:22-10(b); 

see also State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)). 

Having considered the PCR judge's findings and having reviewed the 

transcript of defendant's testimony at his plea hearing, we are convinced 
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defendant has not established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Before we address the plea proceedings, we note—as the PCR judge 

did—that where a defendant pleads guilty to a first-degree NERA offense, but 

receives a second-degree sentence, the parole supervision period remains five 

years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c). Therefore, defendant could not receive a shorter 

period of parole supervision.

Moreover, the transcript of the plea proceedings resolves any doubt that 

defendant's attorney misled him, as noted in the following colloquy:

THE COURT: Do you understand that because you are 

pleading guilty to a first degree robbery charge that 

there is a period of parole ineligibility of [eighty-five 

percent] of the sentence that applies to that charge?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

. . . . 

THE COURT: Do you understand also that once you 

are released from custody that you will be subject to a 

period of parole supervision for five years following 

your release?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Defendant also testified he was satisfied with his counsel's advice and did not 

need more time to speak with him. 
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Defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he did not 

demonstrate a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. The record 

before us does not demonstrate that plea counsel committed any errors, let alone 

ones which prejudiced the outcome in this case.

Affirmed.