THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Vanessa Williams, Vanessa Williams as Conservator and 

Guardian of Sandra P. Perkins, and Vanessa Williams as 

Personal Representative of the Estate of Sandra P. 

Perkins, Respondent, 

v. 

Bradford Q. Jeffcoat, Jr. and Blue Heron Builders, LLC, 

Defendants, 

Of whom Bradford Q. Jeffcoat, Jr. is the Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2021-001296 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Charleston County 

Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity 

Opinion No. 28236 

Heard November 14, 2023 – Filed September 18, 2024 

REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

IN PART, AND REMANDED 

Jason Scott Luck, of Luck VI Ltd. Co., of Bennettsville, 

for Petitioner. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Timothy Alan Domin, of Clawson and Staubes, LLC, of 

Charleston, for Respondent. 

JUSTICE JAMES: The Charleston County Master-in-Equity granted summary 

judgment to Respondent Vanessa Williams and ordered the partition by sale of real 

property purportedly held by Williams and Petitioner Bradford Jeffcoat as tenants in 

common. The court of appeals affirmed. Williams v. Jeffcoat, 434 S.C. 461, 863 

S.E.2d 822 (Ct. App. 2021). We reverse in part, affirm as modified in part, and 

remand to the master. 

BACKGROUND 

In the mid-1990's, Jeffcoat and Sandra Perkins (Williams' mother) began a 

roughly two-decade relationship but never married. In April 2000, Jeffcoat 

purchased a house and lot in Charleston (the Property). On July 1, 2000, Jeffcoat 

executed a deed conveying the Property to himself and Perkins "jointly with right of 

survivorship, and not as tenants in common." Jeffcoat and Perkins resided together 

at that location until 2015. 

In 2009, Perkins developed dementia. Jeffcoat served as Perkins' sole 

caregiver until hiring an in-home aide. In the spring of 2015, Perkins' health rapidly 

declined. Jeffcoat asked Williams, Perkins' only child, to come to Charleston from 

her home in Alabama to help care for Perkins. Soon after arriving in Charleston, 

Williams was added to Perkins' checking account. Williams used Perkins' funds to 

pay for Perkins' medical appointments but also allegedly used Perkins' money to pay 

for Williams' own expenses, including the closing costs on a mobile home in 

Alabama, living expenses totaling around $2,200 per month, and Williams' 

daughter's college tuition. 

During her five weeks in South Carolina, Williams helped care for Perkins 

and took Perkins to medical appointments. On June 16, 2015, Williams was 

scheduled to take Perkins to a doctor in Charleston. Instead, without telling Jeffcoat, 

Williams took Perkins to live with her in Alabama. Perkins resided with Williams 

in Alabama until Perkins' death later that year. Jeffcoat swears by affidavit that 

Williams shut Jeffcoat out of Perkins' life and gave him no information regarding 

Perkins' whereabouts or condition despite his repeated attempts to contact them. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In July 2015, without notifying Jeffcoat, Williams filed a petition for general 

guardianship and conservatorship in the Baldwin County, Alabama probate court to 

"protect and manage the person, assets and financial affairs of . . . Perkins." The 

petition did not mention Jeffcoat or Perkins' approximately fifteen years of residence 

with Jeffcoat in South Carolina. The Alabama probate court subsequently granted 

letters of guardianship and conservatorship to Williams, authorizing Williams to 

"discharge all the functions attached to said guardianship/conservatorship." 

On November 16, 2015, Williams, acting as Perkins' guardian and 

conservator, deeded Perkins' interest in the Property to herself, individually, for 

$10.00 "and love and affection," thus allegedly severing the joint tenancy between 

Perkins and Jeffcoat and creating a tenancy in common between Williams and 

Jeffcoat. Perkins died on November 26, 2015. On January 11, 2016, forty-six days 

after Perkins' death, Williams filed a motion in the Alabama probate court to 

retroactively approve the prior transfer of the Property. Perkins' guardian ad litem 

filed a response not opposing Williams' motion. The Alabama probate court issued 

an order approving the prior conveyance. 

On November 24, 2015 (two days before Perkins' death), Williams 

commenced this action, individually and as Perkins' guardian and conservator, 

against Jeffcoat in the Charleston County court of common pleas, asking the court 

to compel partition of the Property by allotment or sale. Jeffcoat answered, asserting 

affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim, unclean hands, and lack of standing, 

and counterclaims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and slander of title. 

Williams later amended her complaint to also appear as the personal 

representative of Perkins' estate. In April 2018, Williams moved for partial summary 

judgment, arguing a joint tenancy can be severed by a cotenant's unilateral 

conveyance to a third party under South Carolina law and that Alabama law permits 

a conservator to collect, hold, and retain a ward's property without prior court 

approval. Jeffcoat also moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) a joint tenancy 

with right of survivorship cannot be unilaterally severed by conveyance to third 

parties under South Carolina law; (2) the conveyance of the Property from Williams, 

as Perkins' guardian and conservator, to herself individually was self-dealing 

contrary to Perkins' intentions and contrary to South Carolina and Alabama law; and 

(3) Alabama law did not permit Williams to convey the Property to herself with or 

without court approval. Jeffcoat asked the court to issue a deed to the Property in 

his name alone. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The case was referred to the Charleston County Master-in-Equity. After a 

hearing, the master granted Williams' motion in a written order, finding (1) in South 

Carolina, "a joint tenant may unilaterally sever or alienate her ownership interest 

during her lifetime with or without the consent of the other joint tenant"; (2) Alabama 

law applied to Williams' actions in conveying her ward's interest in the Property; (3) 

the Alabama probate court, a court "of appropriate jurisdiction," ratified Williams' 

prior conveyance to herself; and (4) the unilateral conveyance was lawful. The 

master ordered the Property to be partitioned by sale. 

The court of appeals affirmed. Williams v. Jeffcoat, 434 S.C. 461, 863 S.E.2d 

822 (Ct. App. 2021). We granted Jeffcoat's petition for a writ of certiorari to review 

the court of appeals' decision. 

ISSUES 

1. Whether there are genuine issues of material fact as to Jeffcoat's defenses and 

counterclaims, thus precluding summary judgment in favor of Williams on 

her partition claim. 

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the Alabama probate court had 

subject matter jurisdiction over Williams' petition for appointment as Perkins' 

guardian and conservator. 

3. Whether the Master-in-Equity erred in holding that South Carolina Code 

section 27-7-40 allows a joint tenancy with right of survivorship to be 

unilaterally severed by conveyance of one cotenant's interest to a third party. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Appellate courts apply the same standard of review applied by the trial court 

to review the grant of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the South 

Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Knight v. Austin, 396 S.C. 518, 521, 722 S.E.2d 

802, 804 (2012). Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, 

affidavits, and discovery on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact such 

that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), SCRCP; 

Knight, 396 S.C. at 521-22, 722 S.E.2d at 804; Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 

440 S.C. 456, 463, 892 S.E.2d 297, 301 (2023) (eliminating the "mere scintilla" 

standard and holding the proper standard is the "genuine issue of material fact" 

standard set forth in the text of Rule 56(c), SCRCP). On appeal from an order 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities, 

conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C. 

643, 653, 661 S.E.2d 791, 796 (2008). Summary judgment is not proper when 

further inquiry into the facts is necessary "to clarify the application of the law." Id. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Whether there are genuine issues of material fact as to Jeffcoat's 

defenses and counterclaims, thus precluding summary judgment in 

favor of Williams on her partition claim. 

Jeffcoat contends the master erred in granting summary judgment to Williams 

on her partition claim because there are genuine issues of material fact with respect 

to his affirmative defenses of unclean hands, lack of standing, and his "affirmative 

defenses and counterclaims" of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and slander of title.1 

The court of appeals declined to address these arguments for two related 

reasons. First, the court of appeals concluded Jeffcoat acknowledged in his own 

motion for summary judgment that there were no issues of material fact; therefore, 

according to the court of appeals, Jeffcoat cannot now argue there are genuine issues 

of material fact barring a grant of summary judgment in Williams' favor. Williams, 

434 S.C. at 470 n.4, 863 S.E.2d at 826 n.4 (citing Miller v. Dillon, 432 S.C. 197, 

207, 851 S.E.2d 462, 468 (Ct. App. 2020) ("A party may not argue one ground at 

trial and an alternate ground on appeal.")). 

We disagree with the court of appeals on that procedural point. Jeffcoat's 

position before the master as to whether there are genuine issues of material fact 

precluding a grant of summary judgment in favor of Williams is consistent with his 

position on appeal. As the court of appeals noted, Jeffcoat wrote in the conclusion 

to his own motion for summary judgment, "[t]here are no disputed facts in this case." 

That statement is correct—the basic facts are not in dispute. For example, there is 

no dispute that Williams, as guardian and conservator, conveyed the Property to 

herself, individually, for $10. However, as our standard of review requires, if there 

are genuine competing inferences to be drawn from this fact, summary judgment 

should not be granted. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Town of Lyman, 370 S.C. 436, 448, 635 

1 In his three counterclaims, Jeffcoat asks for money damages but does not allege 

the deed from Williams to herself should be set aside for reasons based in equity. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

S.E.2d 631, 638 (2006) (holding summary judgment was improper when the 

evidence was susceptible of more than one reasonable inference). Jeffcoat has 

consistently argued Williams' self-dealing in conveying the Property to herself for 

$10 should preclude her from obtaining the equitable relief of partition. Jeffcoat has 

also consistently argued that Williams' conveyance of the Property to herself was 

contrary to Perkins' intent for Jeffcoat to obtain exclusive fee simple title to the 

Property if she predeceased him. 

Second, the court of appeals concluded Jeffcoat is precluded from now 

arguing there are genuine issues of material fact because, "at the motions hearing, 

the master stated no issues of material fact existed and the relevant matter was solely 

one of law" and "Jeffcoat neither objected to the master's assessment nor filed a Rule 

59(e), SCRCP, motion to alter or amend the master's order." Williams, 434 S.C. at 

470 n.4, 863 S.E.2d at 826 n.4. The master stated at the conclusion of the hearing 

that the question of whether a joint tenancy can be unilaterally severed by one joint 

tenant was a pure question of law. However, the master did not state the question of 

unclean hands was a pure question of law, nor did the summary judgment order 

contain such a finding. The master's final written order controls, as "[n]o order is 

final until it is written and entered." First Union Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Hitman, Inc., 

306 S.C. 327, 329, 411 S.E.2d 681, 682 (Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 308 S.C. 421, 418 

S.E.2d 545 (1992); see also Ford v. State Ethics Comm'n, 344 S.C. 642, 646, 545 

S.E.2d 821, 823 (2001). Jeffcoat was not required to make a Rule 59(e) motion 

under these circumstances. 

A. Unclean Hands 

Jeffcoat argues there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his 

defense that Williams' unclean hands should bar her demand for partition of the 

Property. "The doctrine of unclean hands 'precludes a plaintiff from recovering in 

equity if he acted unfairly in a matter that is the subject of the litigation to the 

prejudice of the defendant.'" Wilson v. Gandis, 430 S.C. 282, 308, 844 S.E.2d 631, 

645 (2020) (quoting Ingram v. Kasey's Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 107 n.2, 531 S.E.2d 

287, 292 n.2 (2000)). A partition action is an equitable action. Zimmerman v. 

Marsh, 365 S.C. 383, 386, 618 S.E.2d 898, 900 (2005). The unclean hands doctrine 

recognizes the principle that one who seeks redress in a court of equity must himself 

not be guilty of some wrongdoing. 12 S.C. Jur. Equity § 7 (1992). For a party to 

succeed on an unclean hands defense, the conduct of the person sought to be barred 

from recovery under the doctrine "need not necessarily have been of such a nature 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

as to be punishable as a crime or as to justify legal proceedings of any character." 

27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 21 (2019). "[A]ny willful act concerning the cause of 

action that rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct is 

sufficient" to establish the defense. Id. While mere stupidity, negligence, ignorance, 

or inappropriateness are insufficient to invoke the defense, a litigant's hands are 

rendered unclean by conduct that is "condemned and pronounced wrongful by 

honest and fair-minded people," or by conduct that is inequitable, unfair, dishonest, 

fraudulent, unconscionable, in bad faith, willful, grossly negligent, unrighteous, 

unconscientious, oppressive, or reprehensible. Id. 

The following is a partial summary of the evidence relative to Jeffcoat's 

unclean hands defense, taken in the light most favorable to Jeffcoat. Soon after 

arriving in Charleston, Williams was added to Perkins' checking account and used 

funds from that account to pay thousands of dollars of her own expenses, unrelated 

to the care or wellbeing of Perkins. Williams then, without notifying Jeffcoat, took 

Perkins to Alabama on a day Perkins had a doctor's appointment in Charleston. 

Acting in a fiduciary capacity as Perkins' guardian and conservator, Williams deeded 

Perkins' interest in the Property to herself, individually, for $10.00 and "love and 

affection." According to Jeffcoat, this conveyance was contrary to Perkins' intent 

that whoever survived between Jeffcoat and Perkins would acquire sole title to the 

Property. This conveyance was made free and clear of any encumbrance, trust, or 

other obligation to use the Property for Perkins' benefit. 

The evidence pertinent to Jeffcoat's unclean hands defense is susceptible of 

competing inferences. While Jeffcoat may ultimately be unsuccessful in this 

defense, summary judgment was improper. The master can resolve the unclean 

hands issue on remand. 

B. Lack of Standing 

In his answer and counterclaim, Jeffcoat alleges Williams does not have 

standing to pursue this action against him. Jeffcoat did not raise his standing 

argument to the master with any specificity, the master did not rule on the issue, and 

Jeffcoat did not move for reconsideration and ask the master to rule on standing. 

See, e.g., S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301-02, 

641 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007) (stating that, to be preserved for appellate review, an 

issue "must have been (1) raised to and ruled upon by the trial court, (2) raised by 

the appellant, (3) raised in a timely manner, and (4) raised to the trial court with 

sufficient specificity"). While Jeffcoat raised his standing argument to the court of 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

appeals, the court did not address the issue, and Jeffcoat did not petition for rehearing 

on the issue. See Rule 242(d)(1), SCACR ("Only those questions raised in the Court 

of Appeals and in the petition for rehearing shall be included in the petition for writ 

of certiorari as a question presented to the Supreme Court."); Doe ex rel. Roe v. 

Orangeburg Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 335 S.C. 556, 561 n.8, 518 S.E.2d 259, 261 n.8 

(1999) (finding issue not raised in petition for rehearing to the court of appeals was 

not preserved for review before the Supreme Court). Because this issue is not 

preserved for appellate review, we will not reverse the master's order on this basis. 

C. Fraud 

Jeffcoat argues the master erred in ordering partition of the Property because 

there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to his fraud counterclaim. 

However, Jeffcoat did not raise the issue at the summary judgment stage, and the 

master did not rule on the issue. See S.C. Dep't of Transp., 372 S.C. at 301-02, 641 

S.E.2d at 907. Because this issue is not preserved for appellate review, we will not 

reverse the master's order on this basis. 

D. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 

Jeffcoat argues the master erred in granting summary judgment to Williams 

because there is evidence Jeffcoat was damaged by Williams' breach of her fiduciary 

duty to Perkins. The master did not rule on Jeffcoat's claim for breach of fiduciary 

duty. See id. While Jeffcoat raised the issue to the court of appeals, the court of 

appeals did not rule on the issue, and Jeffcoat did not raise the issue in his petition 

for rehearing. See Rule 242(d)(1), SCACR; Doe ex rel. Roe, 335 S.C. at 561 n.8, 

518 S.E.2d at 261 n.8. Because this issue is not preserved for appellate review, we 

will not reverse the master's order on this basis. 

E. Slander of Title 

Jeffcoat claims there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to his 

slander of title counterclaim. Jeffcoat alleged slander of title in his answer and 

counterclaim, but he did not raise the issue in his summary judgment motion or at 

the summary judgment hearing. The master did not rule on the issue, and Jeffcoat 

did not move for reconsideration. See S.C. Dep't of Transp., 372 S.C. at 301-02, 641 

S.E.2d at 907. Jeffcoat briefed the issue to the court of appeals; however, the court 

of appeals did not rule on the issue, and Jeffcoat did not raise the issue in his petition 

for rehearing. See Rule 242(d)(1), SCACR; Doe ex rel. Roe, 335 S.C. at 561 n.8, 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

518 S.E.2d at 261 n.8. Because this issue is not preserved for appellate review, we 

will not reverse the master's order on this basis. 

II. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the Alabama probate 

court had subject matter jurisdiction over Williams' petition for 

appointment as Perkins' guardian and conservator. 

Jeffcoat argues the Alabama probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

over the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings because (1) Jeffcoat was not 

provided with notice of the proceedings, as required by section 

26-2B-203(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Code of Alabama; and (2) Alabama was not a 

"significant-connection state," as required by section 26-2B-203(a)(2) of the Code 

of Alabama. 

Jeffcoat did not raise these two issues to the master, and the master did not 

rule on them. Jeffcoat did raise the notice issue in his brief to the court of appeals. 

Williams raised the significant-connection-state issue in her brief to the court of 

appeals, obviously to counter Jeffcoat's subject matter jurisdiction argument. The 

court of appeals addressed both issues. Williams, 434 S.C at 466-70, 863 S.E.2d at 

824-26. The court of appeals concluded the Alabama probate court had subject 

matter jurisdiction over the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, holding 

Jeffcoat was not entitled to notice of the Alabama guardianship and conservatorship 

proceedings and holding Alabama was a significant-connection state. Id. at 469-70, 

863 S.E.2d at 826. We agree with the court of appeals that the Alabama probate 

court had subject matter jurisdiction over the guardianship and conservatorship 

proceedings, but we hold the notice issue and the significant-connection-state issue 

are not relevant to the question of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including for 

the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Gantt v. Selph, 423 S.C 333, 338, 814 S.E.2d 523, 

525-26 (2018). However, the question of the Alabama probate court's authority to 

hear and decide Williams' guardianship and conservatorship petition under Alabama 

code section 26-2B-203 is not a question of subject matter jurisdiction. In South 

Carolina, "subject matter jurisdiction" refers to the court's "power to hear and 

determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." 

Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 237-38, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994) (quoting 

Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 472 A.2d 21, 22 (Conn. 1984)). "Numerous cases have 

held that subject matter jurisdiction is not implicated when the court possesses the 

power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

question belong." Gainey v. Gainey, 382 S.C. 414, 424, 675 S.E.2d 792, 797 (Ct. 

App. 2009) (collecting cases). 

Likewise, in Alabama, "[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power 

to decide certain types of cases." Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006). 

"That power is derived from the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code." Id. 

(citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630-31 (2002)). Alabama's 

constitution and code clearly grant to Alabama probate courts the power to hear and 

decide cases in which a party petitions to be appointed as a guardian or conservator 

of an incapacitated person. See Ala. Const. art. VI, § 144 ("There shall be a probate 

court in each county that shall have general jurisdiction of adoptions and the power 

to grant letters testamentary, and of administration, and of guardianships, and shall 

have such further jurisdiction as may be provided by law . . . ."); Ala. Code 

§ 12-13-1(b)(6)-(7) (LexisNexis 2024) ("The probate court shall have original and 

general jurisdiction over . . . [t]he appointment and removal of guardians for minors 

and persons of unsound mind [and] . . . [a]ll controversies as to the right of 

guardianship and the settlement of guardians' accounts."); Ala. Code § 26-2A-31(a) 

& (c) (LexisNexis 2024) (entitled "Subject matter jurisdiction," and providing that 

"[t]he [probate] court has jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to estates of 

protected persons and protection of minors and incapacitated persons" and over 

"protective proceedings and guardianship proceedings"). Williams' guardianship 

and conservatorship petition fell into that class, so the Alabama probate court had 

subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings. 

Section 26-2B-203 merely outlines the circumstances in which Alabama 

probate courts have the "authority" or "power" to act in a given guardianship and/or 

conservatorship proceeding and does not confer the general power, i.e., subject 

matter jurisdiction, to hear guardianship and conservatorship proceedings as a class. 

See Ex parte Casey, 88 So.3d 822, 829 n.7 (Ala. 2012) (citing Alabama code section 

26-2A-31, not section 26-2B-203, for the proposition that "[t]he probate court has 

subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether . . . a person is incapacitated and is 

in need of a guardian or conservator"); Miles v. Helms, 359 So.3d 266, 272 (Ala. 

2022) ("Probate courts have general and original jurisdiction over petitions for the 

appointment of guardians and conservators for incapacitated persons." (citing Ala. 

Code § 12-13-1(b)(6)-(7))); Erskine v. Guin, No. 1200401, 2023 WL 118547, at *14 

(Ala. Jan. 6, 2023) (Bolin, J., dissenting) ("The probate court is a court of general 

and original jurisdiction regarding the administration of guardianships and 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

conservatorships." (first citing Ala. Const. art. VI, § 144; then citing Ala. Code 

§ 12-13-1(b)(6)-(7); and then citing Ala. Code § 26-2A-31(a))). 

Because section 26-2B-203 is not the statute conferring subject matter 

jurisdiction on the Alabama probate court, any nonconformity with that statute 

cannot be attacked for the first time on appeal. The notice issue and the significantconnection-state issue both arise under section 26-2B-203. Because neither issue 

was raised to the master, and because neither issue affects subject matter jurisdiction, 

we affirm the court of appeals as modified on that issue. 

III. Whether the Master-in-Equity erred in holding South Carolina 

Code section 27-7-40 allows a joint tenancy with right of 

survivorship to be unilaterally severed by conveyance of one 

cotenant's interest to a third party. 

Jeffcoat contends the master erred in finding the joint tenancy in the Property 

held between him and Perkins could be unilaterally severed, arguing South Carolina 

Code section 27-7-40 prohibits such severance. 

We need not decide this issue because we hold section 27-7-40 does not apply 

to the joint tenancy created between Jeffcoat and Perkins. The deed creating their 

joint tenancy was executed on July 1, 2000, over one month before section 27-7-40 

became effective on August 17, 2000. See Act No. 398, 2000 S.C. Acts 3424. 

Section 27-7-40 does not apply retroactively. "The retrospective application of a 

statute is not favored, and statutes are presumed to be prospective in effect." State 

v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 186, 747 S.E.2d 677, 681 (2013). "Legislative intent is 

paramount in determining whether a statute will have prospective or retroactive 

application." Id. "A statute is not to be applied retroactively unless that result is so 

clearly compelled as to leave no room for doubt." Id. Nothing in the text of section 

27-7-40 or the act by which it was passed suggests the legislature intended for 

section 27-7-40 to have retroactive effect. See S.C. Code Ann. § 27-7-40; Act No. 

398, 2000 S.C. Acts 3424; but see, e.g., Est. of Sherman ex rel. Maddock v. Est. of 

Sherman ex rel. Snodgrass, 359 S.C. 407, 411, 597 S.E.2d 850, 852 (Ct. App. 2004) 

(finding a statute applied retroactively to deeds created prior to its enactment because 

the legislature specifically provided in the act that "[t]his act . . . applies to joint 

tenancies created either prior to or after the effective date of the act"). 

Under the common law, the joint tenancy between Jeffcoat and Perkins could 

be severed by unilateral conveyance by one cotenant to a third party. Davis v. Davis, 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

223 S.C. 182, 190, 75 S.E.2d 46, 50 (1953) ("The right of survivorship is merely one 

incident of a joint tenancy. Another incident of such tenancy is that any one of the 

tenants can destroy it, with the incidental right of survivorship, by a conveyance to 

a third person . . . ."); 6 S.C. Jur. Cotenancies § 20 (1991) ("Conveyance by a joint 

tenant to a third party severs a joint tenancy. The grantee becomes a tenant in 

common with the remaining joint tenants who nevertheless continue as joint tenants 

with each other still subject to survivorship rights."). 

CONCLUSION 

The court of appeals erred in affirming the master's order granting partition of 

the Property, as there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to Jeffcoat's 

unclean hands defense. We affirm as modified the court of appeals' holding that the 

Alabama probate court had subject matter jurisdiction over Williams' petition for 

appointment as Perkins' guardian and conservator. We hold South Carolina Code 

section 27-7-40 does not apply to Jeffcoat's and Perkins' joint tenancy. Therefore, 

the common law applies, and their joint tenancy could be severed by unilateral 

conveyance by one cotenant to a third party. Consequently, Jeffcoat and Williams 

are tenants in common, and the sole issue to be resolved on remand is whether 

Jeffcoat's unclean hands defense will defeat Williams' demand for partition. We 

hold other issues raised by Jeffcoat are not preserved for review. 

Therefore, we reverse in part and affirm as modified in part the court of 

appeals' decision, and we remand this case to the master for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED. 

KITTREDGE, C.J., FEW, J., and Acting Justice Donald W. 

Beatty, concur. Acting Justice Frank R. Addy, Jr., concurring in a 

separate opinion. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ACTING JUSTICE ADDY: I concur in Justice James's opinion in that summary 

judgment was improper as to Jeffcoat's unclean hands defense, and I also concur 

with the substance of the opinion addressing Alabama's subject matter jurisdiction 

and the applicability of South Carolina Code section 27-7-40. Despite the 

correctness of the above holding and, in an effort to bring attention to issues which 

may well arise with the text of section 27-7-40, I write separately to address in part 

the question which was originally put to this Court. 

This Court correctly concludes that the deed creating the joint tenancy 

between Jeffcoat and Perkins predated section 27-7-40, and, therefore, the statute's 

provisions have no bearing on this deed. As the court of appeals correctly stated, 

the General Assembly's primary purpose in passing section 27-7-40 was to delineate 

specific language which would conclusively create a joint tenancy with right of 

survivorship by will or deed. Williams v. Jeffcoat, 434 S.C. 461, 473, 863 S.E.2d 

822, 828 (Ct. App. 2021). Although the statute accomplishes this purpose, in light 

of the statute's legislative history and today's ruling by this Court, joint tenancies 

with rights of survivorship which were created pursuant to the language of section 

27-7-40 may well remain subject to severance by unilateral conveyance of a joint 

tenant.2 

In response to Jeffcoat's motion for summary judgment, Williams noted that 

the version of subsection 27-7-40(a)(iii) that appeared in the original bill read: "The 

fee interest in real estate held in joint tenancy may not be encumbered or conveyed 

to a third party or parties by a joint tenant acting alone without the joinder of the 

other joint tenant or tenants in the encumbrance or conveyance." Prior to passage, 

however, the General Assembly removed the above underscored language from Act. 

No. 398, 2000 S.C. Acts. 3424. Therefore, because the General Assembly elected 

to remove the language prohibiting unilateral conveyance by a joint tenant, the court 

of appeals' holding that even joint tenancies created pursuant to the language of 

2 The facts of this case present, at best, a cautionary tale and, at worse, a liability trap 

to the real estate practitioner. As the court of appeals noted, had the author of the 

deed in issue created a tenancy in common with right of survivorship pursuant to the 

language used in Smith v. Cutler, 366 S.C. 546, 551, 623 S.E.2d 664, 647 (2005), 

Williams' unilateral conveyance would have been ineffective in severing the 

tenancy. Williams, 434 S.C. at 474, 863 S.E.2d at 828. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

section 27-7-40 remain subject to severance under the common law may well prove 

prescient.3 

Another provision of section 27-7-40 could potentially create problems in 

litigating deeds created post-2000 under this section. Subsection 27-7-40(c) 

provides, "The provisions of this section must be liberally construed to carry out the 

intentions of the parties." (emphasis added). Typically, in passing upon the legal 

effect of a deed, courts are limited to the four corners of the deed, and extrinsic 

evidence is not admissible absent an ambiguity in the text. Proctor v. Steedley, 398 

S.C. 561, 573, 730 S.E.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Windham v. Riddle, 

381 S.C. 192, 201, 672 S.E.2d 578, 582-83 (2009)); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. 

Strandell, 344 S.C. 224, 230-31, 543 S.E.2d 251, 254 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that 

extrinsic evidence showing intent may be admitted if there is a latent ambiguity in 

the text of the instrument). So, to what extent does this provision invite a court to 

look beyond a joint tenancy deed's four corners when otherwise arguably 

inadmissible extrinsic evidence may indicate that unilateral severance was not 

contemplated at the time of the deed's creation? Clearly, vitiating this evidentiary 

rule could not have been the intention of the General Assembly. 

Factually, the manner by which Williams undertook to relocate her ailing 

mother and appropriate her mother's assets for Williams' own benefit is troubling to 

say the least. Regrettably, I agree that many of Jeffcoat's arguments were not 

preserved for review by this Court. Accordingly, I concur in Justice James's opinion. 

3 I am also sympathetic to the common sense of Jeffcoat's argument. It makes little 

logical sense that a unilateral encumbrance by a joint tenant is ineffective and void, 

but a unilateral conveyance acts to destroy a joint tenancy and create a tenancy in 

common. However, under a strict reading of the statute's text and, considering its 

legislative history, this result appears to have been the intention of the General 

Assembly.