Filed 9/4/20 P. v. McWoodson CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH BYERS M c WOODSON,

Defendant and Appellant. B298925

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SA099087 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William L. Sadler , Judge. Affirmed. Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Co urt of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters

, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey

, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Blythe J. Leszkay , Deputy Attorney s General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________2 A ppellant Joseph McWoodson pleaded no contest to vehicle burglary a fter the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 1538.5.) 1 We conclude that no Fourth Amendment violat ion occurred because (1) t he evidence appellant seeks to suppress came from a motel room where he

was a casual visitor ; (2) when the room rental lapsed, the m otel took possession of duffel bags abandoned in it and gave the m to deputi es ; and (3) a ppellant dis claim s ownership of the duffel bags , which contained stolen property

. The totality of the circumstances show appellant had no prop rietar y or possessory interest in the place searched or the thing s seized. Appellant
forfeited his challenge to fines and fees by fail ing to tell the court he is unable to pay them . We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2
At mid night o n September 27, 2018, the sheriff conduct ed a vehicle burglary suppression operation in West Hollywood. Detective Gaudino, in plain clothes, was alerted that a Black male and female Hispanic in a black Hy undai with Oregon license plate s were looking into cars a t Robertson B oulevard and
Melrose Ave nue

. When Gaudino and his part ner arrived, t he y saw appellant and a woman later identified as Desiree
Hernandez on Melrose Ave nue in a car matching the dispatcher’s description

. Gaudino saw appellant and Hernandez approach parked cars. He lost sight of the m but his partner across the street
,

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The facts are derived from testimony at the suppression hearing. Appellant acted in propria persona at the hearing but was represented by counsel when he pleaded no contest

.3

Detective Morton, reported that the Black suspect used a glass punch to br ea k into two vehicles

, remov ed property from the
vehicles

, and g ave it to his accomplice. Morton heard glass shatter as he approached the suspects

. He did not see the window br ea k because tree s blocked his view; however, h e saw appellant punch out the window of a second car, then pull out purses and small duffel bags and hand them to
Hernandez . Morton was about 25 to 50 feet away when he
witnessed the thefts

. Gaudino radioed field units to move in for an arrest.
Hernandez ran to her car, drove away and was arrested 400 to 500 feet from appellant

. Stolen property was found in her car. Appellant did not leave with Her nandez. He walked past
Gaudino , ducked between two cars

, and removed his beanie,
sweatshirt

, and a glove. He was arrested moments later. A glass punch was found on the ground near appellan t

. Morton confirmed that appellant was the person he saw breaking a car window.
Gaudino interviewed Hernandez . He learned that she and appellant had been at a Motel 6 in Gardena. Deputies went to
the m otel on October 1, 2018. Ms. Vasquez

, a manager, confir med that room 208 was registered to Desiree Hernandez. All of Hernandez’s belongings had been removed from the room and placed in trash bags because she stopped paying the bill. Motel policy requires that items in a room be bagged and stored in the lobby when a room bill is unpaid for 24 hours; if unclaimed
within a month , the abandoned property is discarded. D eputies never entered room 208 because Vasquez handed them the trash
b ags in the motel lobby

.4 Deputies took the trash bags to their station, where they conducted an inventory. Whenever they take personal property, they inventory it to ensure there is no contraband or perishable
items , and to prove nothing was stolen while i n the possession of the sheriff’s department

. I tems in the trash bags were entered into a computer database. Within two large zipped duffel bags were several laptop computers, one of which was reported as
stolen. D eputies did not have a warrant when the y inventori ed the contents of the bags. Appellant conceded that the room at Motel 6 wa s registered
to Hernandez. He testified that hi s name was not on the registry.
Hernandez let appellant into her room, where he spent five
hours. During his visit , two or three other people came to the

room. He stat ed that he left in Hernandez’s room “a black backpack with a Versace sign and [a] Louis Vuitton wallet with my credit card inside” and “a pair of size 13 Jordans, that’s also in that backpack.” Appellant did not tell deputies when he was arrested that he left property at M otel 6

. He found out later that stolen property was recovered at the motel. He testified that he never
saw th e duffel bags or stolen laptops whi le he was in the room. Appellant was charged with six counts of second degree vehicle burglary and 12 counts of receiving stolen property exceeding $950 in value ; further

, he has a prior serious or violent felony conviction for robbery , a prison prior, and was on bail
when he committed the current offenses . (§§ 211, 459, 496,
subd. (a)

, 667 , subds. (b)

– (j)

, 667.5, 1170.12, 12022.1 .) Appellant moved to suppress evidence taken from Motel 6, including 11 computers/laptops and an engagement ring. He
asserted that his “ residence ” was illegal ly searched without a5

warrant. The court foun d appellant cannot contest the search of duffel bags stored in the Motel 6 lobby because he had no expectation of privacy in them

. It denied his motion

. Appellant waived his right to trial. He ple a d ed no contest

to one count of vehic ular burglary and admitted his prior conviction for robbery. The court se ntenced him to the high term of three years

, doubled for the strike prior, for a total of six years in prison. The court issued a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
1. Motion to Suppress The legality of the search i s reviewable. (§ 1538.5,
subd. (m).) We defer to the court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence

, but exercise our independent judgment
to determine if a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. ( People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041; People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362. ) Federal standards govern the suppression of evidence derived from police searches and seizures. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 24; Ovieda

, at p. 1041.)
The Fourth Amendment forbids “unreasonable searches
and seizure s. ” C ourts determine “whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.” ( Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 140.) A defendant w ithout a legitimate expectation of p rivacy in the invaded place or the seized thing

cannot bring a Fourth Amendment challenge. ( People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 507.) The defendant “bear s the burden of
show ing a legitimate expectation of privacy. ” ( Ibid .)
Courts look to the “totality of the circumstances

, ” such as whether the defendant has a property or possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched; had the right to exclude6

others from that place; exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would re main free from government invasion; took normal precautions to maintain his privacy

, and was legitimately on the premises. ( People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 365.) Appellant admittedly was not the registered guest in room 208. Nevertheless, he argues that he can object to a search and
seizure as an overnight guest in Hernandez’s room. No evidence

s upports his claim . He spent five hours in room 208 on September 27, 2018 ; other people visit ed while he was there. He
was arrested that night. He did not say he planned to spend the night, had a room key, unfettered access

, and could exclude
others from the room

. The court could reasonably find that appellant w as a “casual visitor” w ho cannot object to a search. ( People v. Koury (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 687.) Appellant and Hernandez departed without arranging payment of the daily rent

, g i v ing rise to an inference they
abandoned the room and the item s left behind

. ( People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 345

– 346 .) M otel 6 repossessed the room. Appellant los t any reasonable expectation of privacy he might
have when he departed, failed to pay rent, and management took property abandoned in the room

. ( People v. In gram (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 673, 677

– 68 1 [no expectation of privacy after hotel

repossesses a room and takes items abandoned in it ].) By the time appellant reached Motel 6 on October 2 or 3, the manager had already given the duffel bags to deputies.
The cou rt reasonably f ou nd objective factors show ing
abandon ment of personal property. ( People v. Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 346 [inte nt to abandon property in a motel focuses on objective factors, not the defendant’s subjective intent.)7

Officers did not need exigent circumstances to enter the Motel 6 lobby to speak to the manager nor did they need to secure a
warrant to take abandoned property from the motel

. A person aggrieved by damaging evidence obtained in a search of another person ’ s property cannot claim a violation of his

own Fourth Amendment rights. ( Rakas v. Illinois

, supra , 439 U.S. at p. 134.) Appellant testified that he ne ver saw the duffel bags or stolen laptops in the motel room, where he left only a backpack containing his wallet and shoes. His disclaimer of a proprietary or possessory interest in evidence police collected negates hi s claims of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the items. ( People v. Stanislawski (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 748, 757 ; People v. Scott (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 405, 410 [house guest who
denie s put ting anything under an ottoman and disavows ownership of a gun f

ound there h as no expectation of privacy ] .)
2. Imposition of Fines, Fees and Assessments Before entering his no contest plea, appellant was advised
that he w ould be subject to fees and fines

. After pleading no contest, he was ordered to pay a $400 restitution fine; a s tayed parole revocation fine; a $40 court operations assessment ; and a $30 conviction assessment. He did not object to the fines or assessments, or the amounts

, but now claims inability to pay. Appellant forfeited th is claim. ( People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 729; People v. Torres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 849, 860; People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App .5th 1126, 1153

– 1155 [“it is incumbent on [defendant] to object to the fine and demonstrate why it should not be imposed”] ; c om pare People v. Due ñ as (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1162 [disabled homeless probationer raised her inability to pay fines at sentencing].) Appellant was8

sentenced on April 16, 2019, more than three months after
Due ñ as was filed

, yet he did not cite th e case to the trial court.
The $400 restitution fine imposed exceeded the statutory minimum of $300. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) Inability to pay may be considered when a fine e xceeds the minimum, taking into account the gravity of the crime, the circumstances o f its commission, any economic gain to the defendant and loss to the
victim s , and the number of victims. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating inability to pay ; no separate hearing is required

. (§ 1202.4, subd s

. (c), ( d ).) This procedure existed when appellant was sentenced, but he did not invoke it or demonstrate his inability to pay , thereby forfeiting it

. ( People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1291.) The statute presumes he can pay and le ft it to him to prove other wise. ( People v. Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 729.)
The fine s and fees are not excessive. Appellant damaged
vehicles and stole property from over a dozen victims . He was charged with 18 criminal counts

, pleaded guilty to one count
, and
received a six

- year sentence. A $400 fine and $70 in assessments

are not “grossly disproportional to the gravity of [his] offense.” ( United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334.) Appellant is in his thirties; he claims no physical or mental disability prevent ing him from earning wages in prison or after release. ( People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 107 5

– 1077 [$10,000 fine not excessive ; defendant could pay it and other assessments from prison wages ].) Appellant’s due process rights are not implicated because he is not being imprisoned for failure to pay a fine. ( Williams v. Illinois (1970) 399 U.S. 235, 237

– 239 ; People v. Torres , supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 860, fn. 4.)9 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.