UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

ERNESTO MENDOZA-CONTRERAS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 22-5057 

(D.C. No. 4:15-CR-00046-CVE-1) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, KELLY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Ernesto Mendoza-Contreras, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals 

from the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Because Mr. Mendoza-Contreras has not shown that the district court abused its 

discretion, we affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 30, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I. Background 

 Mr. Mendoza-Contreras pleaded guilty to a federal drug-conspiracy offense in 

2015. The district court sentenced him to 156 months’ imprisonment. His projected 

release date is July 16, 2026. 

Mr. Mendoza-Contreras filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) on April 21, 2022, arguing that extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warranted a reduction in his sentence to time served. He relied on the 

following circumstances: prison conditions related to the spread of COVID-19 at 

North Lake CI, his medical conditions that increase his risk of serious illness if he 

becomes infected with COVID-19, and a need to care for family members with 

serious health conditions. The government filed a response opposing the motion on 

May 20, 2022, and the district court denied it on May 27.1

 

The district court reviewed Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s presentence report, 

which states that he had reported that “he is in generally good health and taking 

medication for high cholesterol and hypertension.” R., Vol. 3 at 80. At the time he 

filed his motion, his prison medical records indicated that he took daily medication 

for hypothyroidism and hyperlipidemia and that he was not presently being treated 

for obesity, bradycardia, or hypertension. He was in his late 40s at the time. 

1

 On May 31, 2022, Mr. Mendoza-Contreras moved for an extension of time to 

file a reply. Because the district court had already ruled on his motion for 

compassionate release, it denied his motion for an extension as moot. Unaware of 

the district court’s denial of compassionate release, Mr. Mendoza-Contreras filed a 

reply on June 9. 

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Mr. Mendoza-Contreras was classified as “care level 2 – stable, chronic care, with 

follow up care as needed.” Id. He received a COVID-19 vaccination in May 2021 

and a COVID-19 booster in December 2021, as well as vaccinations against other 

communicable diseases. 

The district court also made findings regarding the conditions at 

Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s prison facility, noting it was “aware that, at North Lake 

CI, . . . there are currently no COVID-19 positive inmates.” Id. at 81. The court 

stated that “[t]his controlled infection rate suggests that the facility is complying with 

the Bureau of Prison[s’] COVID-19 response plan, to include social distancing, 

surface sanitation, and availability of the COVID-19 vaccine.” Id. Acknowledging 

that the risk of infection is greater in an institutional setting, the court said the issue 

was “the likelihood of life-threatening or serious chronic complications should an 

inmate become infected.” Id. It stated it “must balance this risk against its 

responsibility to uphold the reasons for imposition of an imprisonment sentence.” Id.

The district court concluded: 

The record clearly reflects that defendant is not at undue risk. Although 

defendant suffers from ailments that, according to the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention [CDC], may place him at a higher risk of severe 

response to COVID-19, the Court finds that defendant is not in jeopardy of 

serious complications should he contract the virus. 

Id. In making this finding, the court pointed to Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s medical 

history, his “comprehensive medical care,” the prescriptions he takes “to reduce risk 

factors,” his vaccination status for COVID-19 and other communicable diseases, and 

his “imprisonment at a low infection rate institution that is adhering to Bureau of 

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Prisons’ COVID-19 abatement protocols.” Id. The district court therefore decided 

that Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s “medical conditions do not rise to the level of 

extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant a reduction of sentence pursuant 

to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).” Id.

Addressing Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s contention that he is needed at home to 

care for his chronically ill mother and adult daughter, the district court acknowledged 

that the Sentencing Commission’s existing policy statement does not apply to 

compassionate-release motions filed by defendants. It nonetheless noted that 

although the current policy statement provides that certain family circumstances may 

support a reduced sentence, it specifies the incapacitation of a defendant’s “‘spouse 

or registered partner,’” rather than a parent or adult child. Id. at 82 (quoting USSG 

§ 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(C)(ii)). The court found that “disruption of defendant’s life, and 

the concomitant difficulties for those who depend on defendant, are inherent in the 

punishment of incarceration,” stating that “[f]amily concerns resulting from a 

defendant’s imprisonment are not ordinarily a factor to be considered at sentencing.” 

Id. It decided that Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s family concerns were not “a viable 

reason for reduction of sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Id.

The district court ultimately found that the factors Mr. Mendoza-Contreras 

presented did not rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting 

a reduction of his sentence.

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II. Discussion 

A. Legal Background and Standard of Review

 Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended in 2018 by the First Step Act, allows 

defendants to move for compassionate release in the district court after exhausting 

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) administrative remedies. See United States v. Maumau, 

993 F.3d 821, 830 (10th Cir. 2021). The district court may grant a motion when it 

(1) “finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”; 

(2) “finds that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements 

issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (3) “considers the factors set forth in 

[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable.” Id. at 831; see also

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). “[D]istrict courts may deny compassionate-release motions when 

any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking.” Maumau, 

993 F.3d at 831 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court denied 

Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s compassionate-release motion because he did not satisfy 

the first prerequisite: he failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons 

warranting a sentence reduction. 

 A district court has broad discretion to determine what constitutes 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons,” although that discretion is circumscribed by 

the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. at 834 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Currently, there is no policy statement applicable 

to motions filed by defendants. Id. at 837. Rather, the Sentencing Commission’s 

existing policy statement applies only to motions filed by the BOP; it therefore 

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“cannot constrain district courts’ discretion to consider whether any reasons are 

extraordinary and compelling” when the motion is filed by a defendant. Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 We review a district court’s ruling on a compassionate-release motion for 

an abuse of discretion. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 

(10th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect 

conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact[,]” id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted), or “when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, 

whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable,” United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1277 

(10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We liberally construe 

Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s pro se filings but we do not take on the role of being his 

advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).2

B. Medical Conditions and Prison Conditions 

 Mr. Mendoza-Contreras challenges the district court’s conclusion that he 

failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for release based upon his 

medical conditions and the conditions at his prison facility, North Lake CI. He first 

2

 On appeal Mr. Mendoza-Contreras references arguments he made in his 

reply, some of which he maintains the district court “ignored.” But he does not 

expressly challenge the district court’s denial as moot of his motion for an extension 

to file a reply. Local district court criminal rules do not provide for the filing of a 

reply in support of a motion. See N.D.Okla.LCrR47. Moreover, we have reviewed 

Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s reply and we find no abuse of discretion or prejudice 

resulting from the district court’s ruling on his compassionate-release motion before 

the filing of a reply. See Walter v. Morton, 33 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1994). 

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contends the district court reached an “unsupported medical opinion” that he “is 

receiving treatment for his underlying medical conditions and is responding to that 

treatment.” Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 9. But his medical records show that he is taking 

daily medication for hypothyroidism and hyperlipidemia and that his medical 

condition is listed as stable, chronic care. Mr. Mendoza-Contreras argues that no 

evidence or caselaw supports the district court’s “conclusion that as long as a person 

is receiving treatment for any of the underlying medical conditions and risk factors 

identified by the CDC, and is responding to that treatment, he is not in jeopardy of 

serious complications should he contract the virus.” Id. at 10. He asserts that the 

district court lacks authority to reject the CDC’s guidance by concluding that his 

“underlying medical conditions do not place him at an increased risk of serious 

illness or death if he is infected with COVID-19,” id., although he acknowledges that 

“the district court did find that [his] ailments place him at a higher risk of severe 

response to COVID-19,” id. at 11. Mr. Mendoza-Contreras appears to contend that 

district courts lack discretion to deny compassionate release to any inmate who has 

an underlying medical condition that increases his risk of severe illness from 

COVID-19. We reject that proposition as inconsistent with the district court’s broad 

discretion to determine what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See Maumau, 993 F.3d at 834 (“district courts . . . have the 

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authority to determine for themselves what constitutes extraordinary and compelling 

reasons” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Moreover, in finding that Mr. Mendoza-Contreras “is not at undue risk,” 

R., Vol. 3 at 81, the district court did not rely solely on his medical treatment and 

stable condition. It also cited his overall medical history, his vaccination status, and 

the low infection rate at North Lake CI. He contends that COVID-19 vaccinations 

and boosters are not 100% effective. But we have recognized that “access to 

vaccination” may “weigh against a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons.” 

United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 939 n.5 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 

2742 (2022); see id. at 936 n.2 (noting “a growing consensus that either receiving or 

refusing COVID-19 vaccination weighs against a finding of extraordinary and 

compelling circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And according to the 

CDC, vaccination does lessen the potential for severe illness from COVID-19.3

 The 

scientific community has struggled in trying to fully and accurately assess the risks 

from COVID-19. The decision by the district court in this case ultimately may prove 

to be scientifically unsound. But in the present uncertain state of knowledge, we 

cannot say that its assessment of the risk to Mr. Mendoza-Contreras was clearly 

erroneous. 

3

 “COVID-19 vaccines help protect against severe illness, hospitalization, and 

death. People who are up to date on COVID-19 vaccines are much less likely to 

experience severe symptoms than people who are not up to date, if they get infected 

with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19.” 

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/effectiveness/why-measureeffectiveness/breakthrough-cases.html (last visited March 28, 2023). 

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Mr. Mendoza-Contreras argues the district court’s finding regarding the lack 

of positive COVID-19 cases at North Lake CI is clearly erroneous because the BOP 

website the government cited for this fact does not list any statistics for that prison 

facility. See R., Vol. 3 at 51 & n.3. He is correct that the BOP website currently 

does not list that prison facility. See

https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/covid19_statistics.html (last visited March 22, 

2023). But he failed to provide any evidence that the website did not include the 

relevant statistics as of May 17, 2022, when the government cited it. And his 

assertion that “it is highly unlikely that North Lake CI is completely free from 

infection,” Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 16, does not demonstrate that the district court’s 

factual finding is clearly erroneous. Nor did the district court ignore 

Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s arguments that North Lake CI’s design makes it impossible 

to implement CDC guidelines and that the prison facility “completely mishandled the 

COVID-19 pandemic,” id. The court found to the contrary that the “controlled 

infection rate” at North Lake CI “suggests that the facility is complying with the 

Bureau of Prison[s’] COVID-19 response plan.” R., Vol. 3 at 81. 

Finally, Mr. Mendoza-Contreras cites an unpublished district-court decision 

granting compassionate release to a prisoner housed at North Lake CI in 2020 based 

on an underlying medical condition that increased his risk of serious illness from 

COVID-19. We are not persuaded that this ruling demonstrates that the district court 

abused its discretion by denying Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s motion under different 

circumstances in 2022. 

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Mr. Mendoza-Contreras fails to show that the district court abused its 

discretion in concluding that his medical conditions and the conditions at North Lake 

CI do not rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a 

reduction in his sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 

C. Need to Care for Ailing Family Members 

Mr. Mendoza-Contreras also challenges the district court’s conclusion that his 

asserted need to care for his elderly mother and adult daughter, both of whom have 

serious health conditions, does not amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason 

warranting his release. He first argues the district court made a clearly erroneous 

factual finding in stating that he cited the policy statement in USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. 

n.1(C)(ii) in support of his motion for compassionate release. The district court did 

misstate that Mr. Mendoza-Contreras, rather than the government, had cited that 

policy statement. See R., Vol. 3 at 82 (stating “Defendant cites” the policy 

statement); id. at 52 (government’s brief citing the policy statement). But regardless 

of which party cited the policy statement, the question is whether the district court 

abused its discretion by considering it. 

Mr. Mendoza-Contreras correctly notes that the existing policy statement 

regarding compassionate release is not applicable to a motion, like his, filed by the 

defendant. See Maumau, 993 F.3d at 837. He also acknowledges that the district 

court recognized it was not constrained by the existing policy statement. See R., 

Vol. 3 at 82 (district court stating that “the existing policy statements are not 

applicable to motions filed directly by defendants”). Nonetheless, he argues that the 

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district court improperly limited its discretion by denying his motion based upon 

USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(C)(ii). This argument is unfounded. The district court did 

note that the policy statement “specifies a spouse or registered partner, not a 

defendant’s parent or adult child.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But there 

is nothing to suggest that the district court considered itself bound by that policy 

statement. And the court did not abuse its discretion by looking to it for guidance. 

See Hald, 8 F.4th at 938 n.4 (“[I]t would hardly be an abuse of discretion for a 

district court to look to the present policy statement for guidance.”). 

Finally, Mr. Mendoza-Contreras cites a district-court order granting a 

prisoner’s motion for compassionate release based upon his need to care for his 

elderly mother. See Order Granting Compassionate Release, United States v. 

Galaz-Felix, No. 1:03-cr-00062-TC-4 (Apr. 5, 2022), ECF No. 879. But the granting 

of that prisoner’s motion—which, unlike in this case, was not opposed by the 

government, see id. at 1—does not demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in 

denying Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s motion. 

III. Conclusion 

 A district court has “substantial discretion” in determining whether to grant 

compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Hald, 8 F.4th at 938 n.4. 

Mr. Mendoza-Contreras has not demonstrated any clearly erroneous factual finding 

underlying the district court’s decision that affected its ruling. And we do not “have 

a definite and firm conviction that the [district] court made a clear error of judgment 

or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” United States v. 

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Merritt, 961 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2020) (brackets and internal quotation marks 

omitted). We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s 

motion for compassionate release. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge 

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