J-S65026-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION 

OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO A.R., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.Y., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1176 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County 

Orphans' Court at No: 2017-02365

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JANUARY 17, 2019

D.Y. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered July 3, 2018, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, which terminated involuntarily 

his parental rights to his minor daughter, A.R. (“Child”), born in July 2017.1

After careful review, we affirm.

The factual and procedural history of this matter is not entirely clear 

from the certified record. Sometime prior to Child’s birth, Mother contacted 

the private adoption agency, Adoptions from the Heart (“the Agency”), and 

arranged to place Child for adoption. N.T., 3/28/18, at 24. Mother provided 

the Agency with Father’s name, but not with any other information that would 

have enabled the Agency to contact Father. Id. at 29. Eventually, the Agency 

discovered that Father was incarcerated. Id. at 30. The Agency first made 

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1 D.R. (“Mother”) executed a consent to adoption form on July 25, 2017. The 

record does not indicate whether the orphans’ court confirmed Mother’s 

consent and terminated her parental rights. 
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contact with Father in approximately August 2017. Id. at 29-30. Father did 

not consent to Child’s adoption and suggested that the Agency place Child 

with her paternal grandmother.

2 Id. at 30-31. 

Father is incarcerated in New Jersey and is serving a sentence of fortytwo to sixty months of incarceration for convictions of unlawful possession of 

handguns and receiving stolen property. Id. at 48-49; Petitioner’s Exhibit 7.

Father indicates that his maximum sentence will expire in December 2020

assuming that he commits no infractions while in prison. N.T., 3/28/18, at 

49-50. Critically, Father was convicted of statutory rape in Georgia in 2011. 

Id. at 12; Petitioner’s Exhibits 1, 6. Georgia law requires that Father register 

as a sexual offender for the remainder of his life, and he has pled guilty to

violating the requirements of his registration on two occasions. N.T., 3/28/18, 

at 12-13, 50; Petitioner’s Exhibits 2-6.

On October 23, 2017, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Father’s 

parental rights to Child involuntarily. The orphans’ court conducted a hearing 

on March 28, 2018. Father had counsel during the hearing and participated 

from prison via videoconference. Angela Reick, Esquire, represented Child, 

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2 The Agency placed Child in the care of a pre-adoptive family only a few days 

after her birth in July 2017. N.T., 3/28/18, at 16. The pre-adoptive family 

meets Child’s needs and cares for her appropriately. Id. at 16-19. Child 

shares a bond with the family and is “extremely well-adjusted” in their home. 

Id. at 19, 28.
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who was less than a year old at the time, as her guardian ad litem.

3 Following 

the hearing, on July 3, 2018, the court entered a decree terminating Father’s 

parental rights. Father timely filed a notice of appeal on July 18, 2017, along 

with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Father now raises the following claims for our review.

1. Where Father, who was incarcerated, learned that he was the 

possible father of a child placed at birth with an adoption agency, 

and where with the aid of his mother he immediately and diligently 

attempted to comply with the Agency’s request for DNA testing as 

well as advising it of the availability of his mother to care for the

child, did the court err by involuntarily terminating his parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. section 2511[(a)](2)?

2. Did the court err by automatically granting the petition for 

involuntary termination because Father was obligated to register 

as a sexual offender without considering whether, under the 

particular facts of this case[,] it was warranted?

Father’s Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted).

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We consider these claims mindful of our well-settled standard of review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

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3 See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (holding that a very 

young and pre-verbal child’s right to counsel is satisfied when the orphans’ 

court appoints an attorney as the child’s guardian ad litem and the attorney 

represents the child’s best interests).

4 On July 30, 2018, the Agency filed a motion to quash this appeal on the basis 

that Father “failed to claim any actual assertions of judicial error or abuse of 

discretion” with regard to Section 2511(a)(11). Motion to Quash, 7/30/18, at 

3-4 (unnumbered pages). Father included a claim challenging termination 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(11) in his statement of questions involved and 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and developed that claim 

in the argument section of his brief. Therefore, we deny the Agency’s motion. 
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credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of 

parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In the instant matter, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental 

rights involuntarily pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (11), and (b). We need 

only agree with the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) in order 

to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we consider the court’s 
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decision to terminate pursuant to Section 2511(a)(11), which provides as 

follows.5

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

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(11) The parent is required to register as a sexual 

offender under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] Ch. 97 Subch. H 

(relating to registration of sexual offenders) or to 

register with a sexual offender registry in another 

jurisdiction or foreign country.[6]

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(11).

In this case, Father concedes that he is a registered sexual offender in 

Georgia. Father’s Brief at 14. However, he insists that the language of Section 

2511(a) is discretionary, rather than mandatory, such that the orphans’ court 

was not obligated to terminate his parental rights based solely on his sexual 

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5 Father waived any challenge regarding Section 2511(b) by failing to include 

it in his statement of questions involved and concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) (“[I]ssues not included in an appellant’s statement of questions 

involved and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal are 

waived.”). Father also failed to develop any such claim in the argument 

section of his brief. Id. at 465-66 (“[T]his Court will not review a claim unless 

it is developed in the argument section of an appellant's brief, and supported 

by citations to relevant authority.”). Thus, we review only the decision of the 

orphans’ court to terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a).

6 42 Pa.C.S.A. Chapter 97 Subchapter H contains the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10–

9799.41.
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offender status. Id. He directs our attention to the portion of Section 2511(a) 

stating that parental rights “may be terminated” if certain requirements are 

met. Id. (quoting 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)) (emphasis in original). Based on 

this language, he contends that the court committed an error of law by failing 

to engage in a “discretionary analysis which considered factors such as the 

nature of the crime which forms the basis of the registration requirement, 

Father’s age at the time of the crime, [and] the age of conviction” before 

terminating his parental rights. Id. at 15. 

Father’s claim does not entitle him to relief. We agree with Father that 

the Adoption Act leaves the ultimate decision as to whether to terminate

parental rights involuntarily within the sound discretion of the orphans’ court.

However, the language of Section 2511(a)(11) does not require an analysis 

of possible mitigating factors as Father suggests and this Court lacks the 

ability to add such a requirement to the statute. The certified record is clear 

that Father is registered as a sexual offender “in another jurisdiction[.]” 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(11). That by itself is sufficient to support the court’s 

termination decision pursuant to Section 2511(a) and we see no basis upon 

which to conclude that the court committed an error of law or abused its 

discretion.

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In reaching this conclusion, we note that an orphans’ court may still consider 

mitigating factors such as the ones Father suggests as part of its analysis of 

a child’s needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). For example, a court 
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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the court’s July 3, 2018 decree.

Decree affirmed. Motion to quash denied.

Judge McLaughlin joins the memorandum.

Judge Shogan files a concurring and dissenting statement.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/17/2019

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could exercise its discretion and decline to terminate parental rights on the 

basis that a sexual offender parent appears rehabilitated and has a significant 

bond with his or her child, such that severing that bond would cause the child 

to suffer severe emotional harm. See In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 

1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. 

Super. 2011)) (explaining that courts conducting a Section 2511(b) analysis 

should consider the “importance of continuity of relationships and whether any 

existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the 

child.”). Here, as noted above, Father waived any challenge to Section 

2511(b).