[Cite as State v. Ellison, 2018-Ohio-1835.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 17AP-328 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 15CR-4670)

Antonio J. Ellison, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on May 10, 2018 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 

Taylor, for appellee. 

On brief: Yeura Venters, Public Defender, and Timothy E. 

Pierce, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

KLATT, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Antonio J. Ellison, appeals a judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas retaining jurisdiction over Ellison and committing him to 

Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare ("Twin Valley"). For the following reasons, we reverse 

that judgment and remand this matter to the trial court. 

{¶ 2} On September 23, 2015, Ellison was indicted on (1) one count of rape, a 

violation of R.C. 2907.02 and a felony of the first degree; (2) two counts of kidnapping, 

violations of R.C. 2905.01 and felonies of the first degree; and (3) one count of abduction, 

a violation of R.C. 2905.02 and a felony of the third degree. The indictment arose out of 
No. 17AP-328 2 

Ellison's assault of E.R. According to E.R., on the evening of September 14, 2015, Ellison 

held her down and forced his fingers into her vagina. Although Ellison briefly let E.R. go, 

he followed her and beat and kicked her. 

{¶ 3} After Ellison pleaded not guilty to the charges, defense counsel raised the 

question of Ellison's competency to stand trial. Pursuant to R.C. 2945.371(A), the trial court 

ordered an evaluation of Ellison's mental condition. An examiner evaluated Ellison and 

submitted a written report. 

{¶ 4} At a hearing on the issue of Ellison's competency, the prosecutor and defense 

counsel stipulated to the admission of the examiner's written report. Based on the report 

and other evidence, the trial court found that: 

[Ellison] is presently mentally ill and mentally retarded and 

subject to court ordered hospitalization, that [Ellison] does not 

understand the nature and objective of the proceedings against 

[him] and presently cannot assist in [his] defense, and that 

there is a substantial probability that [Ellison] will become 

competent to stand trial within one year if [he] is provided with 

a course of treatment. 

(Jan. 13, 2016 Entry at 1.) The trial court ordered Ellison to undergo inpatient treatment 

at Twin Valley for one year. On February 12, 2016, the trial court issued an order permitting 

Ellison to receive treatment at Summit Behavioral Healthcare rather than Twin Valley. 

{¶ 5} After Ellison had received six months of treatment, his treatment provider 

submitted a written report regarding his mental condition to the trial court. At a 

subsequent hearing, the prosecutor and defense counsel again stipulated to the admission 

of the written report. Based on that report and other evidence, the trial court found "th[at] 

[Ellison] continue[d] to be mentally ill and subject to Court ordered hospitalization." 

(July 11, 2016 Entry at 1.) The trial court required Ellison to continue treatment for 

restoration to competency. 

{¶ 6} At the one-year mark, the prosecutor moved for the trial court to retain 

jurisdiction over Ellison and commit him for mental health treatment. The trial court held 

a hearing on the prosecutor's motion. At that hearing, defense counsel stipulated that 

Ellison was a "mentally ill person subject to hospitalization," but contested whether clear 

and convincing evidence established that Ellison committed the offenses contained in the 

indictment. (Tr. at 6.) To prove Ellison's culpability, the prosecutor presented testimony 
No. 17AP-328 3 

from the police detective who investigated E.R.'s allegations of assault. The prosecutor also 

introduced the written report that a sexual assault nurse examiner had prepared to 

document the incident and E.R.'s injuries. 

{¶ 7} In addition to the evidence presented by the prosecutor, the trial court had 

before it the most recent written report from Ellison's treatment provider. Both the 

prosecutor and the defense counsel stipulated to the findings and recommendations 

contained in the treatment provider's report. 

{¶ 8} Subsequent to the hearing, the trial court issued an entry that stated: 

Based upon the evidence presented and any stipulations of 

counsel, the Court finds that: 

* * * 

2. The defendant remains mentally ill subject to court ordered 

hospitalization. 

* * * 

4. Upon motion of the Prosecutor, the Court finds both of the 

following by clear and convincing evidence: 

a. the defendant committed the offenses charged; 

b. the defendant is mentally ill. 

(Apr. 6, 2017 Entry at 1-2.) The entry also committed Ellison to Twin Valley for mental 

health treatment. 

{¶ 9} Ellison now appeals the trial court's April 6, 2017 judgment, and he assigns 

the following errors: 

[1.] Because the lower court failed to find by clear and 

convincing evidence under R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(a-b) that 

Appellant committed the offenses with which he is charged and

that he is a mentally ill person subject to court order it erred in 

retaining jurisdiction over the Appellant. This violated R.C. 

2945.39(A)(2) and (C) as well as the Due Process Clauses of the 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 16 of the Ohio 

Constitution. 

[2.] The lower court committed plain error when it accepted 

Appellant's stipulation that he was a "mentally ill person 
No. 17AP-328 4 

subject to court order" under R.C. 5122.01(B) in violation of the 

Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 

of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 

16 of the Ohio Constitution. 

[3.] The lower court abused its discretion and committed 

reversible error when it admitted hearsay evidence in deciding 

to retain jurisdiction over Appellant during the April 6, 2017 

hearing in violation of Evid. R. 802, and the Due Process 

Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 

States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 16 of the Ohio 

Constitution. 

[4.] The court's decision retaining jurisdiction is not supported 

by the manifest weight of the evidence. 

(Emphasis sic.) 

{¶ 10} By Ellison's first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court failed to 

make the findings specified in R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, 

Ellison contends, the trial court erred by not dismissing the indictment and discharging 

him. 

{¶ 11} A common pleas court may require a defendant charged with a violent firstor second-degree felony to undergo treatment for up to one year if the court determines 

that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. R.C. 2945.38(B)(1)(a) and (C)(1)(b); 

accord State v. Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 65, 2010-Ohio-2453, ¶ 11. At the conclusion of 

the one-year period of treatment, one of two courses of action must ensue if the defendant 

remains incompetent. R.C. 2945.39(A); Williams at ¶ 12. First, the court or the prosecutor 

may seek the defendant's civil commitment in the probate court under R.C. Chapter 5122 

or 5123. R.C. 2945.39(A)(1). Second, the court or the prosecutor may move for the common 

pleas court to retain jurisdiction over the defendant. R.C. 2945.39(A)(2). 

{¶ 12} To retain jurisdiction, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing 

evidence after a hearing, that (1) the defendant committed the charged offense, and (2) the 

defendant is a mentally ill person subject to court order or a person with an intellectual 

disability subject to institutionalization by court order. R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(a) and (b); 

Williams at ¶ 13. If the trial court does not make both R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) findings, it must 

dismiss the indictment and discharge the defendant unless the court or prosecutor seeks 

the defendant's civil commitment in the probate court under R.C. Chapter 5122 or 5123. 
No. 17AP-328 5 

R.C. 2945.39(C). On the other hand, if the trial court makes both R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) 

findings, it must commit the defendant to an appropriate facility. R.C. 2945.39(D). 

{¶ 13} As used in R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(b), the phrase "mentally ill person subject to 

court order" is a statutorily defined term of art. See R.C. 2945.37(A)(7) (stating that, "[a]s 

used in sections 2945.37 to 2945.402 of the Revised Code," the phrase " 'mentally ill person 

subject to court order' * * * ha[s] the same meaning[ ] as in section 5122.01 of the Revised 

Code"). Under R.C. 5122.01(B), a " '[m]entally ill person subject to court order' " is "a 

mentally ill person who, because of the person's illness[,]" either represents a substantial 

risk of physical harm to himself or others, or would benefit from treatment.1 Given this 

definition, evidence of mental illness alone does not establish a defendant as a "mentally ill 

person subject to court order." 

{¶ 14} Here, the trial court made two findings regarding Ellison's mental condition 

in its April 6, 2017 entry. First, the trial court found that Ellison "remain[ed] mentally ill 

subject to court ordered hospitalization." (Apr. 6, 2017 Entry at ¶ 2.) Second, the trial court 

found "by clear and convincing evidence" that Ellison was "mentally ill." Id. at ¶ 4(b). 

{¶ 15} In substance, the first finding roughly corresponds with the finding required 

by R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(b), i.e., that "[t]he defendant is a mentally ill person subject to court 

order."2 However, the trial court did not explicitly make that finding by clear and 

convincing evidence. The second finding, while expressly reached under the correct 

standard, only states that Ellison is mentally ill, which does not amount to a finding that 

Ellison is a "mentally ill person subject to court order." 

{¶ 16} "A civil commitment for any purpose is a significant deprivation of liberty." 

Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 65, 2010-Ohio-2453, at ¶ 54. Due to the importance of the interest 

at stake, a trial court must articulate its R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) findings with clarity and 

specificity. That clarity and specificity is lacking in the April 6, 2017 entry. Reading the 

 

1 R.C. 5122.01(B) sets forth a lengthy, multi-part definition of the phrase "mentally ill person subject to 

court order." For ease of discussion, we only broadly summarize that definition in this decision. 

2 Previously, R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(b) required a trial court to determine whether a defendant was a "mentally 

ill person subject to hospitalization by court order." (Emphasis added.) However, 2014 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 

43 deleted the words "hospitalization by," thus resulting in the requirement that a trial court determine 

whether a defendant is a "mentally ill person subject to court order." Although this change became effective 

on September 17, 2014, both the trial court and the parties often used the outdated phraseology during the 

proceedings below. 
No. 17AP-328 6 

entry in its entirety, we conclude that it is fundamentally ambiguous on the question of 

whether the trial court reached the finding that Ellison is a mentally ill person subject to 

court order under the clear-and-convincing standard. 

{¶ 17} Both parties want us to ignore that ambiguity and decide this appeal in their 

favor. The state urges us to apply the presumption that the trial court knows the law and 

conclude that the trial court made the first finding under the correct standard of review. 

Ellison urges us to focus on the second finding and conclude that the trial court failed to 

make the necessary R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(b) finding. We decline to follow either of these 

courses of action. 

{¶ 18} When a trial court's language is ambiguous, "it is improper for the court of 

appeals to presume that the lower court reached an incorrect legal conclusion. A remand 

directing the [trial] court to clarify its order is generally permissible" and presents "the 

better approach." Sprint/United Mgt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 386 (2008). Here, 

Ellison's first assignment of error identifies an ambiguity unresolvable by this court. We 

thus remand this matter to the trial court so that it can clarify whether or not it reached the 

disputed finding under the correct standard of review. 

{¶ 19} Our determination of Ellison's first assignment of error moots, at least for 

now, the second, third, and fourth assignments of error. Until the trial court clarifies its 

finding regarding whether Ellison is a mentally ill person subject to court order, we cannot 

decide the remaining assignments of error. 

{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, we find that Ellison's first assignment of error 

raises an issue that the trial court must clarify, and we find the remaining assignments of 

error moot. We reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and 

we remand this matter to that court to state whether it made both of the R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) 

findings using the clear-and-convincing standard of review. 

Judgment reversed; 

cause remanded with instructions.

BRUNNER and HORTON, JJ., concur.