to satisfy the judgment. Appellant filed a motion to stay the sale, which 

a the district court denied because appellant had not posted a bond. 

Nevertheless, the district court temporarily stayed the sale noticed for 

November 3, 2014, until November 18, 2014, at 12 p.m. so that appellant 

could seek a stay from this court This court denied appellant's motion for 

a stay without the posting of a supersedeas bond, but noted that appellant 

may obtain a stay consistent with NRCP 62(d) by providing a supersedeas 

bond in the judgment amount. Appellant did not post the bond, and thus, 

did not receive a stay. Therefore, Rogich purchased appellant's interest in 

things in action at the November 18, 2014, sale. Based on his purchase of 

appellant's rights in this action, Rogich, along with Eldorado Hills, moved 

to dismiss these appeals. 

In Butwiniek v. Hepner, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 65, 291 P.3d 

119, 121-22 (2012), this court recognized that a judgment creditor may 

purchase a party's rights and interests in an action at an execution sale, 

but concluded that a party's defenses to an action may not be purchased 

because only "a right to bring an action to recover a debt, money, or thing" 

may be purchased. (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, this court 

concluded that while a judgment creditor could purchase the debtor's 

thing in action and dismiss an appeal from a judgment as to the debtor's 

claims, the creditor cannot purchase the debtor's defense to an action and 

thereafter dismiss an appeal from a judgment as to the debtor's defenses. 

Id. at 122. 

Having considered the motion, opposition, and reply, we grant 

respondents' motion to dismiss in part. Because the appeal in Docket No. 

65731 arises from a dismissal of the action brought by appellant, Rogich 

could purchase appellant's rights in that action, and by extension, the 

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rights in that appeal.' Id.; see also NRS 21.080(1) (listing property liable 

to execution, including personal property); NRS 10.045 (defining "personal 

property" to include "things in action"). As Rogich purchased appellant's 

rights in the underlying action in Docket No. 65731, he now, for all intents 

and purposes, holds appellant's position in regard to that appeal, and 

thus, appellant is not an aggrieved party and therefore lacks standing to 

maintain the appeal in Docket No. 65731 from the district court's April 

2014 order. See Kenney v. Hickey, 60 Nev. 187, 189, 105 P.2d 192, 192 

(1940) (defining aggrieved party as "one whose personal right is 

injuriously affected by the adjudication, or where the right of property is 

adversely affected or divested thereby"); NRAP 3A(a) (only an aggrieved 

party has standing to appeal). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in 

Docket No. 65731. 2 

'While in opposition to the motion, appellant asserts that Rogich 

failed to provide the statutorily required notices of sale for the continued 

sale date of November 18, 2014, appellant does not assert that he has 

instituted an action to set aside the sale as a result of the alleged notice 

deficiency and we conclude that our consideration of the alleged notice 

deficiency in the first instance would be improper. See generally Swartz v. 

Adams, 93 Nev. 240, 241-42, 563 P.2d 74, 75 (1977) (recognizing that one 

may challenge the notice of an execution sale through an action to set 

aside the execution sale). 

2We note that the appropriate method for respondents to move to 

dismiss the appeal in Docket No. 65731 would have been for Rogich to 

request leave to be substituted in for appellant under NRAP 43 and then 

move for dismissal under NRAP 42. Because denying respondents' motion 

on this ground and requiring the appropriate motion would only serve to 

unnecessarily delay the dismissal of Docket No. 65731, we grant the 

requested relief despite its improper form. 

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Parraguirre 

Cherry 

We, however, deny respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal 

in Docket No. 64763. Because the appeal in Docket No. 64763 arises out 

of an order granting summary judgment on Rogich's counterclaim, and not 

from the action brought by appellant, Rogich cannot purchase appellant's 

defensive rights in the counterclaim action, and by extension, his rights in 

the appeal from the judgment on that counterclaim. Butwi nick, 128 Nev. 

Adv. Op. No. 65, 291 P.3d at 122. Thus, we deny the motion to dismiss the 

appeal in Docket No. 64763 and reinstate the briefing schedule in that 

appeal as follows. 3Respondent shall have 30 days from the date of this 

order to file and serve the answering brief Thereafter, briefing shall 

proceed in accordance with NRAP 31(a)(1). 

It is so ORDERED. 

cc: Hon. Mark R. Denton, District Judge 

Kathleen M. Paustian, Settlement Judge 

McDonald Law Offices, PLLC 

Fennemore Craig Jones Vargas/Las Vegas 

Lionel Sawyer & Collins/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

3To the extent appellant's opening brief addresses the issues raised 

in Docket No. 65731, we will disregard those arguments. 

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