FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALLISON BASS and THOMAS SCOTT 

PARKS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 04-16705

v.

D.C. Nos.

THE COUNTY OF BUTTE; SCOTT 

CV-02-02443-DFL

MACKENZIE, Sheriff; BUTTE COUNTY CV-02-02444-DFL

SHERIFF’S OFFICE; WILLIAM

ANDERSON, Lieutenant,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

David F. Levi, District Judge, Presiding

JOHN MULDOWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 04-17286

v. D.C. No.

THE COUNTY OF BUTTE; SCOTT  CV-02-02445-

MACKENZIE, Sheriff; BUTTE COUNTY LKK/CMK

SHERIFF’S OFFICE; WILLIAM OPINION ANDERSON, Lieutenant,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence K. Karlton, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 15, 2006—San Francisco, California

9697
Filed August 15, 2006

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, Susan P. Graber,

Circuit Judge, and Kevin Thomas Duffy,*

Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Graber

*The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, Senior United States District

Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

9698 BASS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE
COUNSEL

Lynn Hubbard III and Scottlynn J. Hubbard IV, Law Offices

of Lynn Hubbard, Chico, California, for the plaintiffsappellants. 

Gregory P. Einhorn, Law Office of Gregory P. Einhorn,

Chico, California, for the defendants-appellees.

BASS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE 9699
OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge: 

Plaintiffs Allison Bass, Thomas Parks, and John Muldown

asserted employment discrimination claims against Defendant

County of Butte and others based on Defendant’s alleged failure to accommodate their work-related injuries. All three

Plaintiffs raised their employment claims under California’s

Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51,

and Disabled Persons Act (“DPA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54,

54.1, on the theory that the two state laws incorporate Title I

of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42

U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.1 We disagree. 

This case consolidates the separate actions of three Plaintiffs against the County of Butte. Each of the three Plaintiffs

suffered an on-the-job injury and sought accommodation from

the County for his or her resulting physical impairment. Plaintiffs claim that the County failed to offer them reasonable

accommodations. 

In 2002, Plaintiffs filed separate complaints, each seeking

monetary damages and declaratory relief against Butte

County, Butte County Sheriff Scott Mackenzie, and Lieutenant William Anderson. Plaintiffs raised both federal and state

causes of action including claims under the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796l; the ADA; and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and the Unruh Act, the DPA, and state law theories of

negligence and breach of contract.2 The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims.

Plaintiffs filed timely appeals and this court consolidated the

cases. At issue here is whether the district court properly dis1Plaintiffs raised additional issues, which we have addressed in a separate memorandum disposition, filed this date. 

2Plaintiffs could have, but did not, bring claims under California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act. 

9700 BASS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE
missed Plaintiffs’ employment discrimination claims brought

under the Unruh Act and the DPA. 

Plaintiffs argue that both laws incorporate Title I of the

ADA, thereby making California’s Unruh Act and DPA state

law vehicles for enforcing the ADA’s employment protections. The district court granted summary judgment, holding

that neither state statute provides a cause of action for

employment discrimination. We review de novo this interpretation of state law. Rabkin v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d

967, 971 (9th Cir. 2003). 

[1] Congress enacted the ADA in 1990. The purpose of the

statute is, in part, “to provide a clear and comprehensive

national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against

individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The

statute addresses this goal in three main sections: Title I prohibits public and private employers from discriminating

against qualified individuals with disabilities in employment

practices; Title II requires state and local governments to

ensure that individuals with disabilities have access to public

services, including transportation services; and Title III

requires equal access to public accommodations. 

At the time that the ADA was passed, California had in

place various laws addressing each of these main subject

areas. Three are relevant here. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12900-

12996, makes it an unlawful employment practice to discharge a person from employment, or to discriminate against

a person in the terms, conditions, or privileges, of employment, because of a physical or mental disability. Id.

§ 12940(a). 

[2] The DPA and the Unruh Act both focus on ensuring

that persons with disabilities have equal access to public businesses, facilities, and other accommodations. Section 54(a) of

the DPA provides: 

BASS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE 9701
Individuals with disabilities or medical conditions

have the same right as the general public to the full

and free use of the streets, highways, sidewalks,

walkways, public buildings, medical facilities,

including hospitals, clinics, and physicians’ offices,

public facilities, and other public places. 

Section 54.1 provides in pertinent part: 

(a)(1) Individuals with disabilities shall be entitled

to full and equal access, as other members of the

general public, to accommodations, advantages,

facilities, medical facilities, including hospitals, clinics, and physicians’ offices, and privileges of all

common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad

trains, motorbuses, streetcars, boats, or any other

public conveyances or modes of transportation

(whether private, public, franchised, licensed, contracted, or otherwise provided), telephone facilities,

adoption agencies, private schools, hotels, lodging

places, places of public accommodation, amusement,

or resort, and other places to which the general public is invited, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, or state or federal

regulation, and applicable alike to all persons.[3] 

. . . . 

(b)(1) Individuals with disabilities shall be entitled

to full and equal access, as other members of the

general public, to all housing accommodations

offered for rent, lease, or compensation in this state,

subject to the conditions and limitations established

by law, or state or federal regulation, and applicable

alike to all persons. 

3The DPA defines “full and equal access” as “access that meets the

standards of Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990.” Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a)(3). 

9702 BASS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE
The Unruh Act provides in pertinent part:

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are

free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race,

color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability,

mental condition, marital status, or sexual orientation

are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,

advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all

business establishments of every kind whatsoever. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). 

[3] The California courts have, historically, rejected

attempts by plaintiffs to expand the scope of the Unruh Act

to include employment claims. In Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 229 (Cal. 1970), the California

Supreme Court dismissed a plaintiff’s race-based employment

discrimination claim, holding that “there is no indication that

the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of section 51 to

include discriminations other than those made by a ‘business

establishment’ in the course of furnishing goods, services or

facilities to its clients, patrons or customers.” The California

Supreme Court bolstered its holding that the Unruh Act does

not apply to employment claims by noting: “This conclusion

is substantiated by the fact that at the same session wherein

it adopted the language of section 51, the Legislature also

enacted extensive provisions governing discrimination in

employment.” Id. The California Supreme Court reiterated the

Alcorn holding 20 years later in Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373,

380 (Cal. 1990), stating broadly that “the Unruh Civil Rights

Act has no application to employment discrimination.” 

Plaintiffs argue that amendments to the Unruh Act and the

DPA enacted in 1992 and 1996, respectively, accomplished

the subject matter expansion that the California Supreme

Court had rejected expressly in 1970 and 1990. Plaintiffs’

argument is incompatible with the state’s statutory scheme as

BASS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE 9703
a whole and is unsupported by the legislative history of the

amendments. 

The California governor signed Assembly Bill 1077 into

law in 1992 and signed Senate Bill 1687 in 1996. The stated

purpose of Bill 1077 was to “conform state antidiscrimination laws with the provisions of the Americans with

Disabilities Act.” (Assem. Off. of Research, 3d reading analysis, A.B. 1077 (Cal. 1992 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 29,

1992.) To achieve that end, the bill proposed amendments to

a range of state statutes, including the Unruh Act and FEHA.

Bill 1687 was much more limited in purpose, seeking primarily to clarify the state’s protections for the use of assistance

dogs by disabled persons. (Sen. Off. of Research, 3d reading

analysis, S.B. 1687 (Cal. 1996 Sess.) as amended Apr. 25,

1996.) 

[4] As amended, the Unruh Act incorporated the following

statement: “A violation of the right of any individual under

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 shall also constitute a violation of this section.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f) (citation omitted). Sections 54 and 54.1 of the DPA were amended

to include materially identical provisions.4 Plaintiffs argue

that the plain meaning of the amendments requires the incorporation of the ADA in its entirety into the Unruh Act and the

DPA. Plaintiffs’ reading transforms the subject-matter scope

of these statutes, drastically broadening their reach from public accommodations to employment discrimination. 

[5] In interpreting a state statute, we must determine what

meaning the state’s highest court would give to the law. Goldman v. Standard Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir.

2003). Thus, we must follow the state’s rules of statutory

interpretation. Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden,

376 F.3d 908, 930 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 948

4Section 54.1(d) states additionally that “nothing in this section shall be

construed to limit the access of any person in violation of that act.” 

9704 BASS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE
(2005). “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our

fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as

to effectuate the law’s purpose.” People v. Murphy, 19 P.3d

1129, 1133 (Cal. 2001). We begin by “examining the statute’s

words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.” Id.

However, text is not to be interpreted in isolation. Id. Rather,

we must look to “the entire substance of the statute . . . in

order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the context of the

1992 amendment leads us to conclude that the California legislature intended to incorporate into the Unruh Act and the

DPA only those provisions of the ADA germane to the original scope of those state laws. Beginning, as instructed, with

the common sense meaning of the text, we conclude that the

amendments merely incorporate any otherwise relevant ADA

standards as a “floor” under state law. Plaintiffs’ reading

would, in effect, add to the text that a violation of an individual’s right under any part of the ADA shall constitute a statelaw violation as well, even if the subject matter of the alleged

ADA violation is wholly outside the state-law protection at

issue. The text of the amendments does not sweep so broadly.

Were there any doubt about our conclusion, it would be dispelled by considering two aspects of the context and purpose

of the amendments. 

First, Assembly Bill 1077 was a broad-spectrum enactment

that amended a number of state laws in an attempt to create

conformity between the gamut of California’s discrimination

provisions and those of the ADA. Notably, the bill also

amended FEHA, in an attempt to harmonize the state’s

employment discrimination protections with parallel federal

mandates. A.B. 1077, 1992 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992). If, as

Plaintiffs argue, the legislature intended to transform the

Unruh Act into an all-inclusive anti-discrimination law, then

its simultaneous strengthening of FEHA would have been

unnecessary and anomalous. 

Second, Plaintiffs’ reading of the 1992 and 1996 amendments would create a significant disharmony between the

BASS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE 9705
Unruh Act and the DPA, on the one hand, and FEHA , on the

other. FEHA provides an administrative scheme to process

claims of employment and housing discrimination. The statute

creates two administrative bodies—the Department of Fair

Employment and Housing, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12901, and the

Fair Employment and Housing Commission, id. § 12903—to

investigate, adjudicate, and redress discrimination claims, id.

§§ 12930, 12935. FEHA requires that an aggrieved claimant

exhaust the administrative remedies provided by those bodies

before filing an action in state or federal court. Id. §§ 12960-

12976. By contrast, neither the Unruh Act nor the DPA contains a comparable administrative scheme. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ attempt to expand the subject matter scope of these

statutes to incorporate Title I of the ADA would create an

end-run around the administrative procedures of FEHA solely

for disability discrimination claimants. Nothing in the legislative history of either amendment suggests that the legislature

intended to carve out such an exception by roundabout implication. 

Finally, our decision today is consistent with our own precedent. Although we have not directly addressed the issue in

the context of a disability discrimination claim, we have

applied the rule of Rojo that excludes employment claims

from the reach of the Unruh Act. See Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1996)

(affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff’s claim of

race discrimination arose out of an employment relationship

with the defendant); see also Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the

plaintiff had failed to plead facts sufficient to invoke the protections of the Unruh Act where his claims stemmed from his

employment relationship with the defendant). 

[6] Reading the 1992 and 1996 amendments to the Unruh

Act and the DPA in the context of California’s overall scheme

of statutory protections against discrimination, and in the

absence of any express indication by the state legislature that

9706 BASS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE
it intended the amendments to drastically expand the subject

matter of the two statutes, or to overrule Alcorn and Rojo, we

hold that those amendments incorporate into the Unruh Act

and the DPA only those provisions of the ADA that are germane to the statutes’ original subject matter. 

AFFIRMED. 

BASS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE 9707