### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE MA RC H 2, 200 5 S es sio n
SU Z AN DA RV AR MA NES H v. M AHY ARGHA RA CHO LOU

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Davidson County

No. 02D-237 M uriel Robins on, Jud ge

No. M2004- 00262-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Jul y 19, 2005

I n 2002, Wife filed a c omplai n t for divorc e in the cir cuit court. F ollowing a bench trial, the trial court e ntere d a fina l decr ee of divorce and incor

porate d the court’s perma nent parenting plan. The trial cou r t o r d e r e d th e h u s b a n d to p a y th e w if e tr a n s it io n a l a li mo n y f

o r th r e e y e ar s , a w ar d e d the pare nts joint custody

of their minor son, and or dere d both pare nts to pay child s u pport. The wif

e filed an a ppeal to this Court contestin g the trial court’s decision re g arding joint custody . The husband filed a n appea l t o t h i s Court contesting the trial court’s decisions re g arding alimony and
c hil d s up po rt . We re ve rs e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s dec isi on s r e g ard ing a lim on y , c hil d c us tod y , a ndc hil d
su pp ort, andwe re ma ndthi s c a se tot he tr ia l cou rt

fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Thomas F. B loom, Nashville, TN, for A ppellant
Cy nthia J . Bohn, Paul W. Moser, Na shville, TN, for Appe lleeO n Febr uar y 12, 200 2, W i fe f i l ed an amended comp l ai nt t o cha ng e c er t ai n s t at i s t i cal i nf ormat i on cont ai ned 1
in th e o rig ina l co m p la int.
-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

Suz an Da rvarmanesh (“Wife” or “ Appellant”) was born in the U nited States, but she was raised primarily

in Iran. Mahy ar Ghara cholou (“Husband” or “Appe llee”) was born in I ran, and he
came to the United States with his parents at the a g e of twelve. I n 1990, Wife returne d to the United States t o p u rs u e a colleg e educ ation. I n May of 1993, Husband and Wife marrie d in Nashville, Te nn e sse e . T he part ies we re marrie d ina n I slamic marria g e c e re mon y a ndsig ne d a n I slamic marria g e contr act. B oth parties ar e pre sently citizens of the United States. The parties ha ve a minor son of their mar

riag e, Camer on, who was born in 2000.

On J anuary

29, 2002, Wife filed a c omplaint for divorce ag ainst Husband in the Circuit Court of Da vidson Countyalleg ing nume rous g rounds for divor ce. Husband subsequently filed an answ er 1 which conta ined his counter- complaint for divorce. Therein, Husband asked the trial court to aw ard him the majority

of the par enting time for Camer on. The trial c ourt conduc ted a tria l of the matter on October

28, 2003.

Du ri ngth e pro ceedi ng, b ot h p art ies pres ent ed t hei r pr op os ed p aren ti ng pl ans to the tr ial c ou rt

. Wife’s proposed pare nting plan made her the primary residential pare nt of Cameron, with Husba nd having liberal visitation, and it required Husba nd to pay child support. Husband pre sented two proposed pa

renting plans. His first p ro p o sed par enting plan named him the primary residential pare nt of Cameron a nd called f or Mother to pay

chil d support. Husband a lso submit ted an alternative proposed pa

renting plan which na med W ife the primary residential parent of Ca meron, called f or him to pay

child support, and g rante d him additional visi tation.

On Dec ember 23, 2003, the trial court enter ed a Final Dec ree of Divorc e which inc orporated a Pe r man e n t Pa

r e n ti n g Pl a n e n te r e d b y th e tria l c o u r t th a t s a me d a y

. T h e tria l c o u r t’ s decr ee pr ov ide d, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

I t i s OR DERED, ADJUDGED, a nd DECREED that the Husband shall pay to the Wife for a period of three y ear s the sum of $750.00 p erm o n t h tra n s i t i o n al al i m o n y b egi n n i ng November

1, 2003. Said transitional alimony

payments of the Husba nd shall cea se if the Wif e re marrie s o r the thr e e y e ars te rm inate wh ic he ve r o c c ur s f ir st.

. . . . I t is ORDERED, ADJ UDGED , and DECREED t h at the I sla mic marria g e do c ume nt o f the pa rt ie s is no t a

bin din g c on tr a c t.

. . . .-3- I t is ORDERED, ADJ UDGED , and DECREED t h at t he pa rt ie s sh a ll hav e joi nt c us tod y of the min or

c hil d. Th e F a the r w ill have c ustody

of the ch i l d from January 1 until J une 30 . The st th Mothe r wi l l h ave custody of the c hild from J uly

1 until Decembe r st 3 1

. T h e C o u r tm ak e s a f i n d i n g t h a tt h e y

ar e b o t h ap p r o p r i a te st pare nts, they

both have a

ppropriate pare nting skills, and that is [ sic] in the be st i nte re st a ndwe lf are of thi s c hil d th a t c us tod y

be joi nt w ith pa re nti ng tim e e qu a l. I t is ORDERED, ADJ UDGED , and DECREE D that for the purposes of pu b lic school zoning the F ather ’s re sidence shall be desig nated a s the primary residenc e. The Court finds that it is in the best interest and welfa

re of the child that the Father’s r esidenc e be the primary residenc e insofar

as it pertains to the public school zoning. This is no reflec tion on the Mother.

The Perma nent P are nting Pl an also designated which pa rent would ha ve custody

of Camer on fo r s c ho ol v a c a tio ns a nd c e rt a in ho lid a y s. I t a lso or de re d the pa rt ie s to pay c hil d su pp ort a s f oll ow s:
The Mother shall pay child support, in a ccor dance with the Tenne ssee Child Support Guidelines, in the amount of $220.00 per
mon th, be g inn ing Janu ary 1, 20 04 thr ou g h J un e 30 e a c h y e ar f or six
mon ths e a c h y e ar. Plu s a pa y me nt o f $ 75 0. 00 per mon th i n tr a ns iti on a l a lim on y . Sa id am ou nt o f c hil d s up po rt take s in to consideration Mother’s ability to earn $25,000.00 per y ear

. The F ather s h all pay

child support, in acc ordanc e with the Tenne ssee Child Support Guidelines, in the amount of $660.00 per month beg inning Nove mber 1, 2003 through De cembe r 31 ea ch y ear for six m onths eac h y ear . Said amount of child support i s based on Father’s a bilityto earn $50,000.00 per y ear

. Reg arding decision making , the plan provid ed t hat, while Camer on resided w ith one pare nt, that pare nt would make decisions reg arding his day -to-day car e and contr ol. As for major de cisions, the trial court or dere d the par ents to make such de cisions jointl y

. Husband subseque ntly

filed a post-trial motion pursua nt to Rul e 59 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil P roce dure a sking the trial court to r econside r its a war d of alimony and child support. In the int e ri m, Wif

e fi le d a no tic e of app e a l to thi s Cou rt

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ult imate ly

de nie d H us ba nd ’s po st-O r di nar i l y , “ t he not i ce of ap peal requi r ed by R ul e 3 sh al l be f i l ed wi t h a nd r ece i ved by t he cl er k of t he t r i al 2

co urt wi t hi n 30 da y s af t er t he d at e o f

ent ry of t he judgm ent ap p eal ed f rom

. ” T enn. R

. A p p

. P

. 4 (a) (20 0 3 ). H o wever, “[i] n a c ivil a c tio n , i f a tim e ly m o tio n u n d e r t h e T e n n e sse e R u le s o f C ivil P ro c e d u re is f iled in the trial c o u rt b y a n y p a rty

. . . un der r ul e 59

. 04 t o a l t er or amend t he j udgment

. . . t he t i me f or a pp eal for a l l par t i es s hal l r un f r om en t r y of

t he order deny i ng a n ew t r i al or gr ant i ng or deny i ng an y s uch o t her m ot i on. ” T enn

. R

. A pp

. P

. 4 ( b) (2003 )

. “ A pre mat ur el y f i l ed not i ce of appeal s hal l be t r eat ed as f i l ed af t er t he ent r y of t he j udgment f r om whi ch t he appeal i s t ake n and on t he day t hereo f

. ” T enn. R

. A p p

. P

. 4(d ) ( 2 0 0 3 ). A cco rdingl y , bo t h pa rt i es have f i l ed t hei r not i ces of

ap p eal t o t hi s C o urt i n a t i m el y m anner.

W ife c h a n g e d c o u n se l afte r fil ing he r in iti a l b rie f i n th is C o u rt. B y O rd e r o f t h e C o u rt, w e p e rm itt e d W ife’s 3

new coun s el t o f

i l e a r es po ns i ve bri ef

. W i fe r ai s es t hi s ne w ar gu ment i n h er r epl y bri ef , t her efore, we wi l l t r eat i t as an
a lter n a tive a rg u m e n t ra ise d o n a p p e a l.
-4- tr ia l mo tio n, a nd he a lso fi le d a no tic e of app e a l to thi s Cou rt

. On app e a l, Wi fe ha s p re se nte d th is 2 Court with the following issues f or our r eview:

I

. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in awa rding the parties joint custodyof their minor son when the pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e did not support such a f inding; and I I

. Whe the r Wi fe is e nti tle d to he r atto rn e y ’s fe e s o n a pp e a l.

I n turn, Husband ha s prese nted this Court with t he following additional issues for our r eview:

I I I

. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inse tti ng the pa

rt ie s’ c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio ns ; I V. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in awa rding Wife transitional alimony ; and V. Whe the r H us ba ndis e nti tle d to his a tto rn e y ’s fe e s o n a pp e a l.

F or the re a so ns se t fo rth mor e fu lly he re in, we re ve rs e the de c isi on of the tr ia l c ou rt

a ndre ma ndthi s case for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.

II. L AW AND A N A L Y SIS
A. Chi ld Cu stody
On appe al, Wife Arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in awa rding the parties joint custodyof Cameron. She c ontends that the re cord de monstrates that a le vel of a nimosit y exis ts betwee n the pare nts which preve nts joint custody from being an option in this ca se. Furthermore , she conte nds that th e re wa s in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e int

ro du c e d at tria l to e na

ble the tr ia l c ou rt

to c on du c t a compar ative fitness e valuation of e ach pa rent be fore making its custody determination. Al te rn a tiv e ly , Wif

e a sse rt s th a t th e re c or d re ve a ls that a ma jority of the re le va nt s ta tut ory

fa c tor s to be conside red in making a custody determination weig h in her fa vor. Conversely , Husband a rg ues 3 that the re cord c ontains ample proof to support the trial court’s determination of custody in this case.-5-

I n revie wing a trial court’s dec ision reg arding child custody , we e x amine the tria l court’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t “ de novo upon the re cord of the trial court, acc ompanied by a pre sumption of the
corr ectne ss of

the finding , unless the pre ponderance of the evidenc e is otherwise .” Te nn. R. App. P. 1 3( d) (2 00 3) ; Hass v. Knighton , 6 76 S.W. 2d55 4, 55 5 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 4) ; Bah v. Bah , 668 S.W .2d 663, 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

“ No ha rd a nd fa st ru le s e xist fo r de te rm ini ng wh ic h c us tod y a ndvis itatio n a

rr a ng e me nt w ill best serve a child’s ne eds.” Ga sk ill v . G as k ill , 936 S.W .2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) ( citing Ta y lo r v. Taylor , 84 9 S. W.2 d 3 19 , 3 27 (T e nn . 1 99 3) ; Dantzler v. Dantzler , 665 S.W .2d 385, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983))

. Determinations of this nature are fac tually driven a nd require a trial c ourt to consider numer ous fac tors. Nic ho ls v . Ni c ho ls , 792 S. W .2d 713, 716 (Tenn. 1990) . “Where a d i v o rc e case is tried upon ora l testimonyand issues of f act de pend lar g ely

upon the compar ative
cre dibilit y

of the pa rties, the finding s of the Tria l J udg e are e ntitled to gre at weig ht on appea l and
are not to be lightly

overturne d.” Edwards v. Edwards , 501 S.W .2d 283, 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (c it ati on s o mi tted ); see also Nelson v. Nelson , 66 S.W .3d 896, 902-03 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2001); Ga sk ill , 936 S.W .2d at 631. Despite a trial court’s broa d discretionary power s in making a

custody determination, He rre ra v . H e rre ra , 9 44 S.W. 2d3 7 9 , 3 8 5

- 86 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 6) , it s d e c isi on mus t still be base d upon the proof prese nted at trial a nd the applica ble law. Ga sk ill , 936 S.W .2d at 631.

I n rea ching a custody

determination, the courts of this state must evaluate the compar ative fitness of both par ents by

considering numerous re levant fa ctors. Bah , 6 68 S.W. 2da t 66 6; see als o Adelsperge r v. Adelspe rger , 970 S.W .2d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The leg islature has codified ma ny

of the fa ctors a court should consider in making a custody decision. Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 6- 10 6(a) (20 03); Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 6- 40 4( b) (2 00 3) ; see also Shofner v . Shofner , No. M2003-01550-COA- R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 865, at *32 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2004); Cummings v. Cummings , No. M2003-00086-COA- R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. L E XIS 676, at *24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oc t. 15, 2004). Out of all of t he factors which may be re levant in a g iven ca se, the welfa re a nd best in t er es t o f t h e child must be the c ourt’s par amount conce rns. Luke v. Luke , 651 S.W. 2d 21 9, 22 1 ( Te nn . 1 98 3) ; In re Parsons , 914 S.W. 2d88 9, 89 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 5) ; Bah , 668 S.W .2d at 665. I n an i n i t i al custody determination, the trial court’s c onsideration of the rele vant fa c tor s w he n e va luatin g e a c h p are nt’ s c omp arativ e fi tne ss t o p are nt the min or c hild culm inate s in the c re a tio n o f a

pe rm a ne nt p are nti ng pl an. Ten n. Code An n. § 3 6- 6- 40 4( a ) ( 20 03 ); se e als o Cummings , 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 676, at *13-14.

As in many

divorce case s which come befor e this Court, the rec ord in this case c ontains abundant e vidence reg arding property division and v er y l i t t le evidenc e foc using upon the welfa re of the c hild. Se e De Va ult v . D e Va ult , No. 01-A- 01-9601-CV-00012, 1996 T enn. App. LEXI S 536,
a t *1 0 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . A ug . 2 8, 19 96 ); Garner v. Garner , 773 S.W .2d 245, 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Our r eview is further c omplicated by the fa ct that, other than stating that both pare nts were fit and that joint custody

was in Camer on’s best intere sts, the trial court made no specific fac t u al finding s reg arding the proof r elated to c ustody of C amer on. When issuing it s judgme nt, a trial c ourt is not required to list every applicable fac tor along with a discussion o f how that pa rticular f actor impacted the c ourt’s custody determination. See M

ueller v. M

ueller , No. W2004-00482-COA-R3--6-

CV , 2 00 4 T e nn . App . L EX I S 77 0, a t *1 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . N ov . 1 7, 20 04 ); Bu rn e tt v . B ur ne tt , No. E2002-01614-COA- R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 508, at *16. (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 23, 2003). Howeve r, when the trial court fails to make spec ific finding s of fa ct, we must re view the r ecor d de
novo to de termine wher e the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e lies. Kendrick v . Shoemake , 90 S.W .3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002) . As we ha ve pre viouslystated,

I n th i s case , our ability to attach the pr esumption of
corr ectne ss to t h e t ri al court’s decision has be en hampe red by the absenc e of a ny

finding s o f fa ct and conc lusions of law by the trial judge or any

other e x planation of the r ationale use d to achieve the fin al result. Other than a transcript of the pr ocee dings, w e ar e prese nted wit h a memora ndum opinion and order w hich, without elabor ation or explanation, g rants the divorce

. . ., awa rds custodyof the child . .

. , and divi des the jointly held prope rty . I n a re cord containing materia l e vidence adver se to the positions taken by ea ch spouse, we w ill not m ake our decision byattempting to disce rn the
re a so ns fo r the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on . Rathe r w e wi ll p ro c e e d to revie w the re cord de novo . Since the trial c ourt made no f indings of fac t, ther e is n o th in g inth is r e c o r du p o n w h ic h th e p r e s u mp ti o n of
corr ectne ss contained in Te nn.R.App.P. 13(d) ca n attach.

Ke lly v . Ke lly , 679 S.W .2d 458, 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). Th e re c or d r e ve a ls that bo th pa re nts de mon str a te lov e , a ff e c tio n, a nd a

str on g e mot ion a l ti e to Cameron. Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 106(a) (1) ( 2003); Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-6-404( b)(7) (2003). An oth e r r e le va nt f

a c tor to c on sid e r i s e a ch pare nt’s abil ity to p ro vid e fo r C a me ro n’ s p hy sic a l, medical, a nd ed ucational ne eds, as we ll as the extent to which a pare nt has bee n the primary
car eg iver. Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106( a)( 2) (2003); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-404(b) (2), ( 5) (2003)

. Husband testified that, prior to separ ating from W ife, he was the one primarily responsible for

taking Cameron to the doc tor. Husband a lso te stified that he was capa ble of cooking nutritious meals for Cameron. Conver sely , Wife testified that she has be en Camer on’s prim ary car eg iver since birth, and Husband did little to help. W h i l e she has a cknowledg ed that Husba nd occa sionally chang ed Cameron’ s diapers, Wife testified that Husband neve r bathe d their son and ne ver c ooked. Wife state d th a t, p ri or

to g oin g to w or

k o n th e se c on d s hif

t, s he wo uld pr e -c oo k me a ls fo r Ca me ro n to e a t. Reg arding Cameron’ s educational needs, Husba nd expressed hi s conce rns that Cameron cannot speak English and only speaks F arsi, their native lang uag e. Ac cording to Husband, Wife, who was living with her pa rents at the time of

the trial, only

permits Cameron to speak Eng lish on Tu e s d a y s

. H u s b a n d t e s t i f i e d t h a tW i f

e ’ s m o t h e r

i s t h e o n e w h o i n s i s t s t h atC a m e r o n s p e ak F ars i. Hu sb a nda lso state d th a t, i f a wa rd e d p ri mary cus tod y , h e wo uldpla c e Ca me ro n ina pr e sc ho ol t o better acc limate him to Americ an culture and the Eng lish lang uag e. I n su p p o rt o f Husband’s po sit ion , h is s ist e r te sti fi e d tha t Came ro n doe s not spe ak Eng lis h we ll. Wif e a dmi tte d tha t F ars i is the prima ry lan gu a g e sp ok e n in he r p are nts ’ h ome , a ndsh e pr e vio us ly on ly sp ok e En g lis h to Cameron on T u es d ay s

. S h e also testified that it is not a rule in her pa rents’ home that Cameron-7-

c ou ld o nly

sp e ak Eng lis h one da y a we e k. To the c on tr ary , Wife te sti fi e d tha t she is w or kin g wi th Cameron on lea

rning the Eng lish langua g e. Wife stated t h at, at the time of tria l, she was in the proce ss of enrolling Cameron in pr eschool for three day s per wee k, she takes him to the libra ry , and sh e play s g a me s to fu rthe r de ve lop his la ng ua g e abil iti e s. Wif e a dmi tte d that Ca me ro n is f lue nt i n Fa rsi and spoke little Eng lish at the time of t he hearing , but she ex presse d her desire that Camer on learn both lang uag es. At t rial, Husband introduced a videotape of his sist er pla y ing w ith Cameron in or de r to d e mon str a te Ca me ro n’ s la ng ua g e abil iti e s. Af te r v ie wi ng the vid e ota

pe , w e a g re e wi th the trial court in that the videotape is not very intelligible.

We also co n s i d er Came ron’s e motional needs and de velopmental leve l by noting that Cameron wa s three y ears old at the time of trial. Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 404(b)( 8) (2003)

. Reg arding eac h pare nt’s ability to instruct and par ent Cameron, T enn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-106(a )(10) (2 0 0 3 ); T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 6 -6 -4 0 4 (b )( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 3 ) , w e a l s o n o t e t h at b o t h p ar en t s h av e c o l l ege educations. Eac h pare nt’s employ ment schedule is a lso a fac tor in custody determinations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404( b)(15) (2003). At the time of trial, Mother was wor king pa rt-time on sec ond shift three day s per we ek, and she anticipated subse quently moving to f irst shift. I n turn, Husband is employ ed full time.

We a lso c on sid e r the imp ortan ce of c on tin uity

in C a me ro n’ s li fe , a ndthe le ng th o f t ime he has lived in a

stable, satisfac tory

environment. Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106( a)( 3) (2003) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404(b)(11) (2003). During the pendency of the proc eeding s below, the trial c ourt order ed that Camer on primarily reside w ith W ife a nd g rante d Husband visitation on Wednesday

nights a nd every

other we ekend. R ega rd i n g t h e s t ab i l i t y o f ea ch pare nt’s family

unit, W ife re sid ed with her pare nts at the time of trial while Husba nd was in the pr oc e ss of mov ing int o a n apa rt me nt. Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 36 -6 -1 06 (a )( 4) (2 00 3)

. Th e record al so demonstrates that Cameron intera cts well with the extended fa milyof both pare nts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 106(a) (9) ( 2003); Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 36-6-404( b)(13) (2003). The evidenc e reg arding eac h pare nt’s willingness to enc ourag e a c lose and c ont inuing r elationship betwee n Cameron a nd the other pa rent is in disput e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-106(a )(10) (2003); Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 404(b)( 3) (2003) . Wife testified that she encour ag es Husband to take an ac tive
ro le in C a me ro n’ s li fe . H us ba nddis a g re e d, statin g that Wif e do e s n ot e nc ou ra g e his re la tion sh ip w ith Ca me ro n. Hu sb a ndte sti fi e d th a t sh ortly a ft e r S e pte mbe r 1 1, 20 01 , Wif e too k Came ro n to Iran to visit fa mily and did not communicate with him while they wer e g one. He was only able to r ea ch them af t er h e ca l l ed seve ral number s to locate them. Wife testified that she has no intention of
re turnin g to Iran pe rm a ne ntl y

. Hu sb a nd ’s sis te r t e sti fi e d th a t Wif e do e s n ot e nc ou ra g e a

re la tio ns hip betwee n Husband a nd son.

I n custody

disputes, as this case de monstrates, a r eview of the re cord ty

pically reve als that the evidenc e does not c lear ly preponde rate in favor of one party but contains contra dictory testimony by the witness. Se e Ba rre tt v . B ar re tt , M2000-00380-COA- R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 765, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2001). Unlike appellate courts, the tria l courts ar e able to observe the wi tne sse s a nda sse ss the ir de me a no r a s th e y

te sti fy , t he re fo re , th e y

are in the mor e fa vo ra

ble position t o resolve f

actua l disputes hinging on the cr edibilityof t he witnesses. W ells v. Tenn. Bd. of-8-

Re ge nts , 9 S.W. 3d 77 9, 78 3 (T e nn . 199 9) . Thu s, wh e n the pr oo f is clo se , as it is in this c a se , w e re ly heavily upon the determinations of cr edibilitymade by the trial court. See B eck

v. Be ck , No. 03A01- 96 01 -C V- 00 02 3, 19 96 Ten n. Ap p. LEX I S 13 4, a t *3 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 6) ; Massengale v

. Ma sse ng ale , 91 5 S.W. 2d 81 8, 81 9 ( Te n. Ct. Ap p. 19 95 ); W illiams v. W

illiams , No. 89-63-II , 1989 Te nn . A pp . L

EX I S 76 8, a t *6 -7 (T e nn . Ct . App . Nov . 17, 19 89 ). Ho we ve r, wh e n a tria l c ou rt fails to make finding s of fa ct or de terminations of cr edibility , our task on appe al is complicated.

I n any event, ba sed up o n o u r re v i ew of the re cord and applicable law, we believe the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the trial court’s finding that joint custodyis in the best interest of the child in this case. F irst, the rele vant statutory fac tors weig h in favor of g ranting Wife primary custody of Camer on. I t was undisput ed at trial that she has be en the c hild’s primary car eg iver since birth. Wife is w orking part-time a nd has more time to devote to Cameron’s ne eds, whe rea s Husband is working f

u ll ti me

. A d d it io n a ll y , w h e n s h e is w o rk in g , Wi f e ’ s p ar e n ts ar e ab le to c ar e f or and supervise Came ron. Since the pa rties’ s ep ar at i o n, Cameron ha s lived primarily with Wi fe, and Hu sb a ndha s e xer c ise d visi ta tio n. Du e to C a me ro n’ s y ou ng a g e , h is n e e d f or sta bil ity a ndc on tin uity is of g reat conce rn, and maintaining the arr ang ement which has ex isted since the parties’ se paration promotes this int ere st. See Cumm ings v. Cummings , No. M2003-00086-COA- R3-CV, 2004, Tenn. App. LEXI S 676, at *27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oc t. 15, 2004).

Se c on d, e ve n if

we we re to c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l didno t pr e po nd e rate ag ainst a finding that both pare nts were equally fit, such a f

inding would not invariably lead to the
c o n c lu s io n th a t a

jo in t c u s to d y

arr a n g e me n t i s in th e c h il d ’ s b e s t i n te r est. Se e id

. at *26-27. The leg islature does not for

bid a court of this state from aw arding the parties joint custodyo f a minor child in appropriate circ umstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-101(a )(1) (2003). To thecontra ry , the leg islature simply

provides that “ne ither a pr efe renc e nor a presumpt i o n fo r or ag ainst joint l eg al
c us tod y , joi nt ph y sic a l c us tod y or so le c us tod y is e sta bli sh e d, bu t the c ou rt sh a ll ha ve t he wid e st discretion to orde r a c ustody arr ang ement that is in the best interest of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101( a)( 2)(A) (2003).

J oint custody

arr ang ements ar e appr opriate in c erta in limi ted circ umstances. See Zabaski v. Zabaski , No. M 2001-02013-COA- R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXI S 867, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c . 1 1, 20 02 ); Ma rti n v . M ar tin , No. 03A01-9708- GS-00323, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXI S 218, at *15- 17 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . M ar. 26 , 1 99 8) ; Gray v . Gray , 885 S.W .2d 353, 3 5 5 (T en n

. C t. App. 1994); B a r n h i l lv
. B a r

n h i ll , 826 S.W .2d 443, 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). H oweve r, while authorized by statute, joint custody

arr ang ements ar e g ener ally disfavore d b y t h e courts of this state due to the
rea liz ation that such ra

rely serve s the best intere st of the child. See Shelbourne v . Shelbourne , No. M1999-02557-COA- R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. L EXI S 561, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 22, 2000); Dix v. Carson , No.02A01-9704- CV-00093, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXI S 840, at *29-30 (Te nn. Ct. App. De c . 1 7, 19 98 ); De Va ult v . D e Va ult , No. 01-A- 01-9601-CV-00012, 1996 T enn. App. L EXI S 536,
a t *5 -6 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. Aug. 2 8, 1996 ); Jack son v. Jac kson , No. 01A01-9504- CV-00132, 1995 Te nn . A pp . L

EX I S 76 2, a t *4 -5 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . N ov . 2 9, 19 95 ); M a lo n e v
. M

a lone , 8 4 2 S

. W

. 2d 62 1, 62 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; Le wis v . Le wis , No. 89-287-II , 1990 Tenn. App. LEXI S 103, at *12 (Ten n. Ct. Ap p. F e b. 16 , 1 99 0) ; Garner v. G arner , 7 7 3 S. W. 2 d 2 4 5 , 2 4 5 ( T e n n

. Ct

. A p p

. 1989);-9-

Dodd v. Dodd , 7 37 S.W. 2d28 6, 28 9- 90 (Ten n. Ct. Ap p. 19 87 ); Bloom v. Bloom , N o

. 8 5

- 1 9 8

- II, 19 86 Te nn

. Ap p. LEX I S 28 55 , at *5 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . M ar. 12 , 1 98 6) ; Dunavant v. D unavant , 219 S.W. 2d91 0, 91 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 94 9) ; Logan v . Logan , 176 S.W .2d 601, 603-04 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1943).

The statute doe s not require that joint custodybe aw arde d only when the pa

rents ar e on friendly terms, De Va ult , 1996 Tenn. App. LEXI S 536, at *8, however , in order f or a joint custody
arr ang ement to serve the best i n t er es t of the child, it require s a “ha rmonious and coope rative relatio n s hip betwee n both pare nts.” Dodd , 7 37 S.W. 2da t 29 0; see also Shelbourne , 2000 Tenn. Ap p. LEX I S 56 1, a t *6 ; Di x , 199 8 Te nn . App . L EX I S 84 0, a t *3 0; Jack son , 1 9 9 5 T e n n

. A p p

. LE X IS 76 2, a t *5 . “ Whil e we ha ve sto pp e d s ho rt of re je cting thi s ty

pe of c us tod y arr a ng e me nt o utrig ht, div ide d o r s pli t c us tod y

sh ou ld o nly

be or de re d w he n th e re is specific, direc t proof that the child’s interest will be served best by dividing custody betwee n the par ents.” Garner , 773 S.W .2d at 248 (K oc h, J., d iss e nti ng ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also Zabaski v. Zabaski , No. M2001-02013-COA- R3- CV, 2002 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 867, at * 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 11, 2002) ( finding joint custody appropriate whe re the rec ord re veale d the parents wer e able to communicate e ffe ctively reg arding their son, they share d pare nting and household duties while marrie d, and one of the parties sug g ested
a joi nt c us tod y

arr a ng e me nt) ; M

a r t i n v
. M

a r t in , No. 03A01-9708- GS-00323, 1998 Tenn. App. L EX I S 2 1 8 , a t * 1 5

- 1 7 ( T e n n

. Ct

. A p p

. M ar

. 2 6 , 1 9 9 8 ) ( a f f irmi n g th e tria l c o u r t’ s a w ar d o f jo int
c us tod y du e to the fa c t th a t th e pa re nts ha d p re vio us ly

a g re e d to a

joi nt c us tod y

arr a ng e me nt) ; Gray v. Gray , 885 S.W .2d 353, 354-55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the evidenc e demonstrated that both pare nts were very

active in the c hild’s life and ther e wa s no appar ent animosity b et we en the parties)

. The re cord in this case reve als a he ighte ned leve l of animosity betwee n the parties and an inabilityto communicate r eg ardi n g Cameron, ther eby making a joint custody arr ang ement undesirable . Husband testified conce rning his animositytoward Wife’ s family , expressing his belief that they are too controlling. Wife testified t hat her pare nts traveled w ith her to drop off Cameron at the Husba nd’s re sidence , and, in an appare nt eff ort to avoid confr ontation, she parke d next door and wa lked Cameron ove r to the Husband’ s house. The te stimonyfrom b o t h p ar ents reve als that they have dif ficulty ag ree ing on the best way to e ducate Cameron and assimilate him into American
c ultur e . H us ba ndte sti fi e d th a t, s inc e the ir se pa ratio n, Wif

e ha s n ot c ommunica ted wi th h im
conce rning Cameron’ s medical needs. H e also testified a bout his difficulty

in contacting his W ife when she took Cameron to I ran to visit family . Furthermore , n ei t h er pare nt’s proposed pa renting plans sug g ested a

joint cus t o d y

arr ang ement. To the c ontrary , throug hout the proce eding s below,
eac h pare nt ha s foug ht to rec eive primary custody of Camer on. Cf. Ma rti n v . M ar tin , No. 03A01- 9708-GS-00323, 1998 Te nn. App. LEXI S 218, at *15-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1998) (noting that prior ag ree ments betwe en t he parties reg arding custody may be conside red by

the trial court as evidenc e of the appropriate custody arr ang ement in a g iven ca se).

Ac c or din g ly , a

joi nt c us tod y

arr a ng e me nt i s n ot i n Came ro n’ s be st int e re st, a ndwe re ve rs e the trial court’s awa

rd of joint custody

to the pare nts. As we have previously stated,It i s ent i rel y pe rmis si b l e fo r t he t ri al co urt on rem and t o a llow t he p art i es t o at t em p t ot reach an agreem ent 4

re g a rd ing c u sto d y o f C a m e ro n c o n siste n t with this o p inio n

. Cum m i ngs , 2 0 0 4 T enn. A p p

. L E X IS 6 7 6 , at * 2 9

- 3 0

. I n t he event t hey are unab l e t o do s o , t he t ri al co urt s hal l i m p l em ent a pa rent i ng plan consi st ent wi t h t hi s o p i ni o n.
-10- Th e e xpe ri e nc e of

thi s Co urt h a s b e e n th a t jo int c us tod y ra re ly , if
ever , works — for

the childre n. There needs to be one re sidence , one haven in all the s torms of l ife, including those storms whipped up by the winds of divorc e. The re ne eds to be one p ar en t wi th primary control and r esponsibilityfor the upbringing of the pa rties' children, whene ver possible. Custody , in rea lit y , m eans responsibilityfor the
car e, nurture and development of the mental, emotional and phy sical needs of the chi l d

. T h e custodial parent should expect and re ceive cooper ation and assistanc e fr om the non-custodial parent in eve ry respe ct to serve the best intere sts of their child or c hildren.

Dodd , 7 37 S.W. 2da t 28 9- 90 . T hu s, it i s ne c e ssa ry that we re ma nd thi s c a se to the tr ia l c ou rt wi th instructions on fashioning a new perma nency plan. See First T

enn. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. Hurd Lock & Mfg. Co. , 816 S.W .2d 38, 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ( discussing Te nn. R. App. P. 36(a) a nd noting
ou r d isc retio n in ent e ri ng a jud g me nt w he n a

re ve rs a l is ne c e ssa

ry ); see also Cummings v. Cu m m ings , M 20 03 -0 00 86 -C OA -R 3- CV , 2 00 4 T e nn . A pp . L EX I S 67 6, a t *2 8- 29 n. 6 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. Oct. 15, 2004) . On re mand, the trial court is instructed to cre ate a new pa renting plan naming Wife the primary

residential pa

rent of Ca meron a nd g ranting Father liber al visitation. I n the 4 interim, we re instate the custody arr ang ement orde red by

the t rial court during the pendency of the div or c e pr oc e e din g s.

B. Chil d Sup po rt On appe al, Husband a

rg ues the trial c ourt err ed in setting his child supp o rt obligation by faili ng to c a lc ulate the c hil d s up po rt ob lig a tio n u sin g his c ur

re nt i nc ome . Re g ard ing Wif e ’s c hil d support obligation, Husba nd arg ues the trial court err ed in not calc ulating her ch i l d s u p port obligation based on the potential salary she could ear n by working full-time. I n addition, he contends that th e tr ia l cou rt e rr e d b y no t in c lud ing his a lim on y pay me nts in the a mou nt o f $ 75 0. 00 pe r m on th in the calc ulation of Wife’s child support obligation.

Th e e vid e nc e in the re c or d re g ard ing the iss ue of c hil d su pp ort is min ima l. H us ba ndha s a master’ s deg ree in computer scie nce. A t trial, Husband testified that h e i s cu rre ntly working for N& S, I nc., a N ashville parts distribution company , as a c omputer prog rammer sy stems analy st. At his pr e se nt j ob , H us ba nde arn s $ 60 0. 00 pe r w e e k, or app ro xima te ly $3 1, 00 0. 00 pe r y e ar. Pr ior to h is pr e se nt j ob , H us ba ndwo rk e d f or Se rv ic e Me rc ha nd ise Co mp any (“Se rv ic e Me rc ha nd ise ” ) a s a computer pr og rammer

sy stems analy st making a pproxi mately

$52,000.00 per y ear . He wor ked for Service Merc handise for approximately nine y ear s befor e the c ompany terminated his position and filed for bankruptc y

in 2002. Husband testified that the la st tim e he i n t er v i ew ed for other-11-

employ ment was in the summer of 2002, and he stat ed t h at he ha s not applied for any other employ ment. Shortlyinto Husband’s testimony on direc t examination, t he trial c ourt made the fo llo wi ng state me nt:

THE COURT: M r. Gh ar ac h o l ou, y ou’re capa ble of making $5 0, 00 0, a ndthat’ s w hat th e c hil d s up po rt is g oin g to b e se t on , if y ou are not awar ded custody . So quit M ickey Mous i n g ar o und up here . You’ve g ot the ability to e arn. You’ve g ot to go ba ck to work. Yo u’ ve g ot a

ma ste r’ s d e g re e in C omp ute r Sc ie nc e

. Go g e t a job in y ou r f ie ld. Go t it ?

. . . . THE COURT: Don’t dela y my court time her e. We have established that point. And M s. Bohn knows that he’s g oing to ha ve to g e t a job . I f h e do e sn ’t

g e t a job , if he do e sn ’t

g e t c us tod y

of thi s child, he’s g oing to ha ve to pay the support, any way , so don’t belabor my time here

. At the conc lusion of the trial, the trial court stated orally on the rec ord that it f ound Husband to be undere mploy ed.

Wife obtained her bache lor’s degr ee shortly afte r coming t o the Unit ed S tates. W ife testified that she is a medical technolog ist wor king at the Veter an’s Administration Hospital wher e she ha s be e n e mpl oy e d f

or the pa st six y e ars

. At the tim e of tr ia l, Wif e te sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s w or kin g pa rt

time at the hospital on the second shift, approximately three day s per w eek f or a total of twe nty -four ho ur s, makin g a lmo st $ 20 .0 0 p e r h ou r. She te sti fi ed that sh e wa s g e tti ng re a dy

to m ov e to a

fi rs t shift positi on. Wi fe ad mitted that she could work f ull-time if she wante d to, but onlyon second
s h i f t

. I f s h e w e r e t o w o rk

f u l l

- t i m e , s h e e s t i m a t e d t h a ts h e c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y m ak e ap p r o xima te ly $41,000.00 in income ea ch y ear

. Reg arding Wife, the trial court provided the following statement at the conc lusion of the trial: “When her salary g oes up, then her child support will go up. And y ou can’ t exi st on what y ou are doing now . You’ve g ot to go to wor k full-time.”
Since setting child support is a discre tionary matter, we revie w a trial court’s child support
awa rd to determine whether

the trial court abused its discretion. Tallent v. Cates , 45 S.W .3d 556, 56 0 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; State ex. re l. Vaughn v. Kaatrude , 21 S.W .3d 244, 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2 0 0 0 ). Un d ert h i s s t an d ar d o f r ev i ew , we ar e r eq u i re d t o co n s i d ert h e f o l l o wi n g: (1) whe ther the de cision has a suff icient evidentiary

foundation, (2) whether t h e co urt corr ectly identified and pr operly applied the appropriate leg al principles, and (3) whether the dec ision is wit hin the rang e of a cce ptable alternatives. . . While we will set as ide a discretionary

decision if it rests on an ina dequ at e evidentiaryT he new “ i ncome s har es ” mo del of t he G ui del i nes adop t ed by t he T enn es s ee D epar t ment of H uman Ser vi ces 5
d i d no t t ak e e f

fec t unti l Ja nu ary o f

2 0 0 5

. T he t rial i n thi s ca se w as c o nd uc t ed i n 2 0 0 3

. T hu s, t he ne w “i nc o m e sha res”

mo del of t he G ui del i nes i s i nappl i cabl e t o t he pres ent ca s e.
-12- foundation o r i f i t is contrary to the g overning law, we will not substitut e our judg ment for that of the trial court merely

beca use we might have chosen a nother a lternative.

Kaatrude , 21 S.W .3d at 248 (c itations omi tted). On a ppeal , n either pa

rent take s issue with the leg ality of the trial c ourt’s dec ision to require both par ents to pay child support in this case. Af ter evaluating the r ecor d in this case , howeve r, it is appar ent that the trial cour t’s decision re g arding the parties’ child support obligation is i n contra vention of the g overning law applica ble in this case.

Th e Te nn e sse e Chi ld S up po rt Gu ide lin e s ( “ Gu ide lin e s” ) i n e ff e c t a t th e tim e thi s c a se was de cided by

the trial court provide:

5
These g uidelines are desig ned to ap ply to situations where c hildren
are living primarily

with one par ent but stay

overnig ht with the other p ar e n ta t l e a s t a s o f

t e n a s e v e r y o t h e r

w e e k e n d f

r o mF r i d a y t o S u n d a y, two wee ks in the s ummer and two w eeks during holiday s throug hout the y ea r. These g uidelines are desig ned to consider the ac tual phy sical custody

of the ch ild(ren) , re ga rd le ss o f wh e the r c us tod

y is awarded to one parent and visitation to the other or such an arrangement is ordere d to be joint custod y o r split custody. In situation where ove rnig ht time is divided more equa lly betwee n the pare nts, the courts will have to make a case- by-c ase dete rmination as to the appropriate amount of support. (ref ere nce 1240- 2-4-.04)

. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.02(6) (2003) ( emphasis adde d). The G uidelines furthe r provide that “the pa

rent with whom the c hild(ren) live primarily will be ref

err ed to as the obli gee an d the pare nt with whom the child(ren) do not primarily live will be ref

err ed to as the oblig or.” Te nn . Co mp. R. & Re g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 03 (1 ) ( 20 03 ). Ou r s up re me c ou rt has st a te d th a t “ the Chi ld Support G uidelines contemplate that child support may be aw arde d only to the primary residential parent.” Gray v. Gray , 78 S.W .3d 881, 884 (Tenn. 2002) (empha sis added) . The leg islature def ines the “primary residential pare nt” as “par ent with w hom the child resides more than fift yp er cent (50%) of the time.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 402(4) ( 2003).
Additionally , “the c hild su p p o rt awa rd is based on a

flat per centa g e of the obligor’s net income .” Te nn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.03( 2) (2003) (empha sis added). Thus, an awa rd of child support to an oblige e par ent is to be calc ulated based solely upon the net income of the obligor pare nt, and the oblig ee pa rent’s inc ome should not e nter into the calculation. Gallaher v. Elam , 104 S.W. 3d 45 5, 46 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Gray , 78 S.W .3d at 883-84. The Permane nt Parenting Plan entere d by the trial court in this case mere l y s t at es t hat Husband “ is designated the primary residenc e for-13-

purpose of determining school zoning.” Thus, it is not entirely clea r t hat t he trial court desig nated a primary residential pa

rent, a s that term is used in the Tenne ssee Code and Guidelines, in this case.

At the out set, we note that the t rial i n this matter oc curr ed on Oc tober 23, 2003, a nd the trial court e ntere d a final decr ee on Dec ember 23, 2003. Thus, at the time of a djudicating this case, our
su preme cou rt ha d in str

uc te d th a t on ly

the prima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt w a s e nti tle d to re c e ive c hil d support. Gray , 78 S.W .3d at 884. Thi s Court had also held on two occa sions prior to the hea ring in this case that, should neither parent be desig nated a primary residential pa

rent a nd a par enting plan g rants the pa

rents equa l pare nting time, then neither pare nt is entitl ed to child support. Davis v. Da v is , No. M2003-02312-COA- R3-CV, 2 0 0 4 Tenn. App. L EXI S 664, at *13-14 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oc t

. 1 2 , 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Cox v. Cox , No. E2002-02034- COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 257,
a t *8- 10 (T e nn . Ct. App . Mar . 3 1, 20 03 ); Bailey v . Capps , No. M1999-02300-COA- R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 214, at *11-12 (Te nn. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2001)).

I n Ho p ki ns v. Hopk ins , 1 5 2 S. W. 3 d 4 4 7 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 4 ) , o u r s u p r e me c o u r t d e a lt with a situation where a

trial court a war ded the pa rents equa l pare nting time. Hopkins , 152 S.W .3d at 448. I n interpre ting the G uidelines, the supre me court stated:

We decline to adopt a b ri ght-line rule that no c hild support is owed wh e n a c hil d’ s r e si de nti a l ti me is d ivi de d e qu a lly be tw e e n th e pa

re nts

. The Child Support Guidelines do not e x pressly provide for a n e qu a l di vis ion of res id e nti a l ti me . Ins te a d, the Gu ide lin e s a dd re ss sit uations in which a c hild resides primarily with one par ent. . . . Howeve r, we do not interpret [the definition of primary residential p ar en t ] as p re cl u d i n g a c h i l d ’s re s i d en t i al s ch ed u l e f ro mb ei n g div ide d e qu a lly

be tween the pa

re nts . Wh ile sil e nt o n th is p re c ise issue , t h e Guidelines “a

re de signe d to consider the a ctual phy sical
c us tod y of the c hil d( re n) , re g ard le ss of wh e the r c us tod y is a wa rd e d to
on e pa re nt and vi si tat io n to the oth e r o r s uc h a n a rr a ng e me nt i s or de re d to be joi nt c us tod y or sp lit c us tod y .” Te nn

. Comp. R. & Re g s. 1240-2-4.02( 6). Ha vin g de c ide d th a t a n e qu a l di vis ionof tim e is p e rm iss ibl e un de r the Gu ide lin e s, we mus t a dd re ss the ma nn e r i n w hic h c hil d support is to be calc ulated in suc h a situation. In situations in which
ov e rn ig ht t ime is d ivi de d mo re e qu all y be tw e e n th e pa

re nts , c ou rt s sh ou ld m ake a

c a se -b y -c a se de te rm inatio n a s to theapp ro pria te
a mou nt o f s up po rt

. Id. at 449-50 (c itation omit ted). The supreme c ourt remanded the c ase to the trial court for a desig nation of the primary residential pa

rent a nd a dete rmination of the child support obli g ation owed by the non-primary

residential pa

rent. Id. a t 45 0; se e als o D av is , 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 664, at *13-20 (disc ussing the e ffe ct of the Hopkins decision on joint custody case s).W e a ssum e that t he t rial co urt wa s att em p t i ng to use the G uid eli ne s t o set chil d sup p o rt i n thi s ca se b ec au se 6

t he P erm ane n t P a re n ting P l an p rovides t hat t he p art i es’ chi l d s up p o rt ob l i gat i o ns were set “ i n acco rdanc e wi t h t he T enn es s ee C hi l d Supp ort G ui del i nes

. ” I n a dd i t i on, t he amo un t of ch i l d s uppo r t t he cour t order ed eac h par t y t o pay bas ed

o n the c o urt’ s d eterm i na t i o n o f e ac h p arty’ s n et inc o m e c o rresp o nd s t o t he am o un t s arrived at b y usi ng t he G uid eli ne s.

-14- Although the trial court did not ha ve the be nefit of the supr eme c ourt’s dec ision in Hopkins wh e n it de c ide d thi s c a se , its de c isi on wa s sti ll in c on tr a ve nti onof the n e xistin g la w. Th e su pr e me c o u r t h a d a lr e a d y

s tate d in Gray th at on ly the prima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt m a y be a wa rd e d c hil d support. Gray , 78 S.W .3d at 884. Ther efor e, eve n i t we we re t o assume that the tria l court’s pe rm a ne nt p are nti ng plan na me d Hu sb a nd the prima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt, it wo uldon ly

be pr op e r t o awa rd child support to H usband, not Wife. Conversely , if we assume the trial cou rt ’s p er m anent pare nting plan did not name a primary residential pare nt and awa rded the pare nt’s equal pa renting time, then neither pa

rent would be entitled to c hild support. Da v is , 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 664, at *13-14

. I n addition, assuming the trial court wa s using the G uidelines to rende r its decision
re g ard ing c hil d s up po rt , the c ou rt a lso e rr e d in c on sid e ri ng bo th p are nt’ s in c ome a ndor de ri ng bo th 6 pare nts to pay

child support. See Te nn

. Comp. R. & Re g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 03 (2 ) (2 00 3) (“the ch ild
s u p p o r ta w ar d i s b a s e d o n a f l a tp e r c e n t a g e o f

th e o b l i g o r ’ s n e ti n c o m e ” ); s ee also Gallaher , 104 S.W. 3da t 46 2; Gray , 78 S.W .3d at 883-84.

Furthermore , even if

it wer e permissibl e for a trial c ourt to deviate f rom the Guidelines a nd order both pare nt’s to pay child support in this case, the G uidelines provide a specific proce dure f

or d o i n g s o , s t at i n g:

These g uidelines sh al l be applied a s a re buttable pre sumption i n all child support case s. I f the court finds that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to rebut the pre sumption t hat the application of the g uidelines is the
corr ect a mount to be awar ded, then the court must m ake a writt en or specifi c finding that the application of the child support g uidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case. Finding s that rebut these g uidelines must state the amount th at would have be en require d under the g uidelines and include a justification f or deviation from guidelines which takes into c onsideration the best interest of the child.

Te nn

. Comp. R. & Re g . 1 24 0- 2- 4- .0 2( 7) (2 00 3) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also Gallaher , 104 S.W .3d
a t 46 2; State ex. re l. W

rzesniewski v. Miller , 7 7 S. W.3 d 1 95 , 1 97 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; Rubin v. Kirshner , 948 S.W .2d 742 , 7 4 7 (T en n

. Ct. App. 1997). Thus, in the event that the trial court at t em p t ed t o d ev i at e f

r o m t h e G u i d el i n es , i terre d b y fa i l i n g t o en t ers p ec i fi c o r w ri t t en fi n d i n gs including a

justification for its deviation.
We have pr eviously

determined that Wife should be t h e p ri m ary residential pa

rent for Cameron with Husba nd having liberal visitation. Accor dingly , in cre ating a permanent par enting-15-

plan on re mand, the trial c ourt is instructed t o rec alculate the amount of child support that Husband,
a s th e ob lig or pa

re nt, ow e s to W if

e , as the ob lig e e pa

re nt, c on sis te nt w ith the Gu ide lin e s a ndthi s opinion. Howeve r, we cannot end our analy sis of t his issue at this point. At t he conc lusion of the hearing be low, the trial court sta t ed t h at i t found Husband to be unde remploy ed. Husba nd takes issue with this finding on appe al, ar g uing that the trial court should have ca lculated his child support obligation based on his curr ent income.

The Guidel i n es provide that, “ [i ]f an obligor is willfullyand voluntarily unemploy ed or undere mploy ed, child support shall be calc ulated base d on a dete rmination of potential income, a s evidenc ed by educational level and/or previous work e x perie nce.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg . 1240-2- 4-.03(d) (2003). “ To ca l cu late a c hild support awar d based on e arning capa city rathe r than a ctual
ne t in c ome , th e re mus t be a thr e sh oldfi nd ing th a t th e ob lig or is w ill fu lly

a ndvo lun tari ly undere mploy e d

o r unemploy ed.” Marcus v . Marcus , No. 02A01-9611- CV-00286, 1998 Tenn. A pp. LEX I S 55 , at * 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . Jan . 2 8, 19 98 ). “ Whe the r a pa rt y is w ill fu lly

a ndvo lun tari ly undere mploy ed is a fa ct question, an d th etr ia l c ourt has conside rable discretion in its determination.” W ill is v . W ill is , 6 2 S. W.3 d 7 35 , 7 38 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1). Due to th e fa c tua l natur e of thi s determination, a finding of under employ ment must be sup p o rt ed by the evidenc e in the re cord. Lacey v . Lacey , N o. W20 02 -0 28 13 -COA -R 3- CV , 2 00 3 T e nn . A pp . L EX I S 79 0, a t *8 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. Oc t. 3 1, 20 03 ); Marcus , 1998 Tenn. App. L EXI S 55, at *8.

Th e c ou rt s o f this state are mor e apt to fin d tha t an obl ig or pa re nt is will fu lly a ndvo lun tari ly undere mploy ed whe n he or she voluntarily leave s that employ ment to acc ept employ ment providing signific antl y l ess income. See Lace y , 2 00 3 T e nn . A pp . L

EX I S 79 0, a t *8 ; State ex. re l. Ledbetter v. Godsey , No. M1998-00958-COA- R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. Ap p

. L E X I S 4 0 6 , at *13-15 (Te nn. Ct. App. June 22 , 2 00 0) ; W

ill is , 62 S.W. 3d at 7 38 ; Ralston v. Ralston , No. 01A01-9804- CV-00222, 1999 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 5 2 9 , at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 3, 1999). Husband’ s undisputed testimony establishes that he did not voluntarily leave his job at Service Merc handise, but the co m p any te rm inate d h is p os it io n w he n it fi le d f or ba nk ru ptc y . In s up po rt

of he r a rg ume nt that H us ba ndis wi llf ull y a ndvo lun tari ly un de re mpl oy e d, Wif e po int s to he r t e sti mon y

that H us ba ndthr e a te ne d to quit his j ob and l o we r h i s i n co me. Even a ssuming Husba nd did make this statement, it does not chang e the f

act that his employ ment with Service Me rchandise was involuntarily ended.

“While the initial los s of employ ment may have be en involuntary , an oblig or’s c ourse of action and de cision-maki n g afte r termination can demonstrate w illful and voluntary undere mploy ment.” Godsey , 2000 Tenn. App. L EXI S 406, at *15. Howeve r, there is no proof in the
rec ord indicating that Husband’s a ctions after losing his job rise to the leve l of willful and voluntary undere mploy ment. As we ha ve pre viouslystated, “[a]lthough there is no require ment that a par ent intended to avoid their c hild support obligations by thei r actions, we do think that willful or voluntary unemploy ment or under employ ment must result from an intent on the part of the pa rent to reduc e or te rminate his or he r income.” W ilson v . W ilson , 43 S.W .3d 495, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Since the r ecor d is devoid of any evidenc e showing such an intention, the trial court er red in finding H usband to be willfully and voluntarily

undere mploy ment. See Lace y , 2003 Tenn. App. LEX I S 79 0, a t *9- 10 (a ff

ir min g a tr ia l cou rt ’s fi nd ing that a pa re nt w a s n ot w ill fu lly

a ndvo lun tari ly-16-

undere mploy ed whe re the undisputed evidenc e prese nted at trial showe d the loss of her prior job was inv olu nta ry a ndun fo rs e e n) ; Bee m v. Beem , N o

. 0 2 A 0 1

- 9 5 1 1

- C V

- 0 0 2 5 2 , 1 9 9 6 T e n n

. A p p

. LE X IS 717, at *7-8 (T enn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1996) ( noting that a trial court e rre d in finding that the husband was willfully

and voluntarily

unemploy ed whe n his undisputed testimony showed that he lost his job beca use his positio n was terminated and did eve rything possible to sec ure othe r employ ment). Acc ording ly , we hold that the tria l court er red in de termining Husband to be unde re m p loy ed, and the t rial court is instructed on rema nd to calc ulate Husband’s child support obligation based upon his curre nt income.

C. Alimony

The trial c ourt order ed Husband to pay Wife transitional alimony in the amount of $750.00 per month for

three y ear s. On appe al, Husband a rg ues that the t ri al co u rt hear d no evidenc e re g ard ing Wif

e ’s ne e d, he r e c on omi c dis a dv a nta g e , or his abil ity to pay

. I n a dd iti on , H us ba ndpo int s to the fac t that Wi fe did not re quest alimony in her complaint for divorce. Whil e admitt ing that the trial court did not make spe cific f indings re g arding her e conomic dis advanta g e or need, Wife a rg ues that, b y g ranti ng a n a wa

rdof tr a ns iti on a l a lim on y , th e tr ia l cou rt imp lic itl y ma de bo th f

ind ing s. L ikewise, Wife also arg ues that the trial court made an implicit finding that Wife did no t n eed reha bilitation, which W ife a sserts is corr ect.

“The re a re no hard a nd fast rule s for spousal support de cisions.” Anderton v. Ande rton , 988 S.W .2d 675, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “ Whether an a limonyawa rd is appropriate is depende nt
on the facts and circumstance s of each case.” Sullivan v. Sullivan , 10 7 S.W. 3d 50 7, 51 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 02 ). Du e to the fa c tua lly drive n na tur e of the de c isi on , c ou rt s mu st w e ig h n ume ro us fa c tor s, including those set forth by the leg islature in sec tion 36-5-101(d)( 1)(E) of the Te nnessee Code. Cra nfo rd v . Cr an for d , 772 S.W .2d 48, 5 0 (T en n

. C t . App. 1989). “ The trial c ourt has broa d dis c re tio n in de te rm ini ng the ty pe , amo un t, an d dur a tio n of a lim on y ba se d u po n th e pa

rt ic ula r f a c ts of ea ch ca se.” Sullivan , 1 0 7 S

. W

. 3 d at 5 1 1 (c i t i n g Kin ar d v . Ki na rd , 9 86 S.W. 2d22 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 98 )) ; see also Nelson v. Nelson , 106 S.W .3d 20, 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Re c og nizi ng that t ri al cou rt s h a ve br oa d d isc re tio n inde te rm ini ng wh e the r a lim on y is appropriate in a g iven ca se, Nelson , 1 06 S.W. 3dat 23 ; Anderton , 988 S.W .2d at 682, we e mploy the fo llo wi ng sta nd ardof

re vie w i n e va luatin g su c h d e c isi on s:
We review matters of alimony under an abuse of discretion standa

rd. I f the dis c re tio na

ry de c isi on is w ithin a rang e of a c c e pta ble alternatives, appellate courts will not substitut e their decision for that of the trial c ourt simplybeca use the ap p el l ate court would have chosen a diffe rent a lternative. W hit e v . V an de rb ilt Un iv ., 21 S.W .3d 2 1 5 , 2 2 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). We r eview the trial court’ s discretionary

decisions to d et ermine: (1) whethe r the de cisions are supported by

the fa cts in evidenc e; (2) wh et her the trial courtW e are s o m ewhat p uzzl ed by t he t ri al co urt ’ s o ral f i nd i ngs at t he co ncl usi o n o f t he t ri al i n t hi s case, pro vi d i ng 7

a s fo llo w s: “T a k ing into c o n sid e ra tio n su p p o rt o b liga tio n s, t he pl eadi ngs as ke d f or t empor ar

y al i m ony , but I t hi nk t here shoul d be s o m e t rans i t i o nal al i m o ny he re. ” (em p hasi s ad d ed

. ) A f t er r evi ewing W i fe’ s co m p l ai nt fo r di vo rce, we f i nd

n o s pe c i f

i c r e fe r e n c e s t o a l i mo n y i n a n y for m.
-17- identified and a

pplied the applicable leg al principles; (3) whether the tr ia l c ou rt ' s d e c isi on s a

re wi thi n the rang e of

a c c e pta ble a lte rn a tiv e s. Id

. Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d at 5 1 0

. “A ppellate c ourts are g ener ally disinclined to second-g uess a tria l
c ou rt ’s sp ou sa l su pp ort de c isi on un le ss i t is no t su pp orte d b y the e vid e nc e or is co ntr ary to the pu bli c policies ref

lected in the a

pplicable statutes.” Anderton , 988 S.W .2d at 682.

W e b e g i n w i t h H u s b a n d ’ s a s s e r t i o n t h a t W i f e d i d n o t r e q u e s t a l i m o n y i n h e r c o m p l a i n t

. “ In this S tate a divorce may be g rante d without a limony , and alimony may be g rante d without decre eing a divorc e, ther e being no nece ssary or absolute connection between divorce a nd alimony under the statute.” Qu all s v . Q ua lls , 589 S.W .2d 906, 909 (Tenn. 1979) . When a party files a c omplaint for divorce , “[t] he complaint for divorce shall set forth the g rounds fo r d i v o rce in substantiallythe lang uag e of the [applicable statutes], and pray for a divorce from the defe ndant, or for a divorc e and such other and further relief to which the complainant may think to be e ntitled.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-106( a)( 1) (2003) (empha sis added). In Qu all s , our supre me court held that “a pr ay er f or g e n e r a l r e l i e f

i s n o ts u f f i c i e n tt o s u p p o r ta n a w ar d o f a l i m o n y in a case which the judgme nt is taken

u p o n default of the defendant .” Qu all s , 5 8 9 S. W. 2 d a t 9 0 9 ( e mp h a s is a d d e d )

. T h e subseque nt d ecisions of this Court have inter prete d the dec ision in Qu all s a s b e i n g l i m i t e d t o t h e d e f au lt judgme nt c ontext

. Se e W e st v . W e st , No. M1998-00725-COA- R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. L EXI S 37,
a t *1 1- 12 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . Jan . 2 7, 20 00 ); Bu lla v . B ull a , No. 01-A- 01-9004-CV-00133, 1990 T enn. Ap p. LEX I S 774, at *9 (Ten n. Ct. Ap p. Oc t. 2 4, 19 90 ); Allen v. Allen , No. 89-288-II , 1990 Tenn. Ap p. LEX I S 61 , at *9 (T e nn

. Ct . App . F e b. 2, 19 90 ); Mo ore v . M oo re , No. 87-92-II , 1988 Tenn. App. LEXI S 424, at *5-6 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 24, 1988).

Whil e it i s a dv isa

ble fo r p art ie s to inc lud e a sp e c if ic pr a y e r f

or a lim on y in the ir c omp la int s, Se e Mo ore , 1988 Tenn. App. L EXI S 424, at *5, Wife’s failure to do so in this case is not fata l to the trial court’ s awa

rd o f al i m ony

. When a complaint contains no indication that a party is seeking 7 alimony in a divorce proce eding or the p ar t y ex p re ssly neg ates a

reque st for alimony

during the
course of the proc eeding s, an aw ard of alimony by a trial c ourt m ay v er y we l l be improper

. See Allen , 1990 Tenn. App. L EXI S 61, at *8-9 (noting that the issue of alimony must be tried, and the obligor spouse must be g iven an opportunity to de monstrate that alimony is not needed in a

g iven
case .) Howe ver, Wife’s complaint does conta in a g ener al pra y er f or re lief, there by

placing Husband on notice that she soug ht maintenance and support. Se e Bu lla , 1990 Tenn. App. L EXI S 774, at *9- 10.

We n ow turn to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to a wa rdWif e a lim on y in this c a se . “ Th e pu rp os e of spousal support is to aid the disadvantag ed spouse to bec ome and r emain self- sufficie nt and, whenW i fe argues t hat , pursuant t o s ect i o n 36

- 5

- 1 0 1 (d)(1 )( B ) o f th e T enness ee C o d e, t he co urt s o f t hi s st at e are 8

re q u ire d to a w a rd sp o u sa l su p p o rt to a llo w the e c o n o m ic a lly d isa d v a n ta g e d sp o u se ’s stan d a rd o f l ivin g p o st-d ivo rc e to
r emai n c om para bl e t o t he s t andar d of l i vi ng enj oy ed dur i ng t he marr i age o r t o t he po s t

- di vor ce s t andar d of l i vi ng en j oy ed by t he ot her s po us e. I n s uppo r t of t hi s posi t i on, W i fe poi nt s t o t he di s pari t y i n i ncome i mp ut ed t o t he part i es by t he t r i al

co urt

. I n revers i ng t he t ri al co urt ’ s d eci si o n r e g a rd ing c h ild s up p o rt , we no t ed t hat t he t ri al co urt err ed by i m p ut i ng i ncome t o t he Fat her i ns t ead of cons i deri ng hi s cur r ent i ncome. T hu s , t he gap i n e ar ni ng s bet ween t he part i es i s not as
w i d e a s W i fe sug ge st s.
-18- economic r ehabilitation is not feasible, to mitigate the har sh economic rea l i t i es o f divorce .” Anderton , 9 8 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 6 8 2 (c i t i n g Sh ac k le for d v . Sha c k le

for d , 6 11 S.W. 2d59 8, 60 1 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 80 )) . O ur

le g isl a tur e ha s d e fi ne d tr a ns iti on a l a lim on y a sf oll ow s:

Tr a ns iti on a l a lim on y

me a ns a su m of mon e y pay able by

on e (1 ) p art y to, or on beha lf of, the other party for a determined period of time. . . . Transitional alimony is awar ded when t h e court finds that

re ha bil ita tio n is no t ne c e ssa ry , but the economica lly disadvantag ed
s p o u s e needs assistance to adjust to the economic c onsequenc es of a divorc e, lega l separ ation or other pr ocee ding w here spousal support may be aw arde d, such as a

petition for an or der of

protec tion.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(d) (1)( D) (2003) (empha sis added). The rec ipient spouse’s nee d and the obligor

spouse’s ability

to pay are the primary

considerations in determining whe ther a limony is warr anted in a g iven ca se, Bratton v. Bratton , 136 S.W .3d 59 5 , 6 0 4 (T en n

. 2004), with the
rec ipient spouse ’s need being the “cornerstone f or the a war d of alimony .” Lancaster v. Lancaster , 671 S.W .2d 501, 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

As with the other issues raised by the parties on appea l, our task is complicated somew hat by the fa ct that the trial c ourt made no f indings of f

act r eg arding the alimony awa rd. The r ecor d contains no finding s by

the trial court to the effe ct that Wife was e conomically disadvantag ed or not in need of r ehabilitation. Upon re viewing the re cord, w e find no evidence reg arding Wife’s nee d for a limony

. Although Wife’ s complaint was suff icient to place Husband on notice that alimony 8 would be soug ht in this case , “ther e must be some evide nce in the r ecor d from which alimony may be g rante d.” Allen , 1 99 0 T e nn . A pp . L EX I S 61 , at *9 ; se e als o Cr an for d v . Cr an for d , 772 S.W .2d 48, 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). F inding none , we must conc lud e t h at t he trial c ourt’s aw ard of alimony in this case wa s an abuse of the trial c ourt’s discre tion and reve rse that de cision.

D. Attorn ey’s Fees Both pa r ti e s h a v e r e q u e s te d th a t th is Co u r t a w ar d th e m th e ir r e s p e c ti v e a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s on appea l. This state follows the firmly established American r

ule whi ch p rovides that litiga nts are responsible for their own attorney ’s fe es abse nt a statute or a g ree ment betwee n the parties providing otherwise. State v. Bro w n & W i l l i a ms on Tobacco Corp. , 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d 1 8 6 , 1 9 4 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 )

. In divorce proce eding s, the rec overy of attorne y ’s fe es by

a litiga nt is pro v i d ed for by statute which-19-

provides th a t a s p o u s e s e e k in g e n f o r c e me n t o f a n a li mo n y o r c u s to d y a w ar d in a d e c r e e may be g rante d attorney ’s fee s in the discretion of the court befor e whom the action is pe nding. T enn. Code. Ann. 36-5-103( c) ( 2003).

Th e dis c re tio n to a wa

rda tto rn e y ’s fe e s o n a

pp e a l in a pr oc e e din g of

thi s n a tur e re sts wi thi n the discretion of the Court. Archer v . Archer , 907 S.W .2d 412, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). When
c onsi de ri ng a

re qu e st f or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s o n a

pp e a l, w e a lso c on sid e r the re qu e sti ng pa rt y ’s abil ity to pay such fe es, the re questing party ’s succe ss on appea l, w hether the re questing party

soug ht the appea l in good f

aith, and any

other e quitable fa ctors re levant i n a gi v en case. Du lin v . D uli n , No. W2001-02969-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 628, at *26-27 (Te nn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2003) (c i t i n g Fo lk

v . F olk , 3 57 S.W. 2d82 8, 82 9 ( Te nn . 1 96 2) ); see also Shofner v . Shofner , No. M2003- 01550-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Te nn. App. LEXI S 865, at *41 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 23, 2004).

Re g ard ing Wif

e ’s re qu e st fo r a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, we no te that, on app e a l, Wi fe is n ot s e e kin g to enfor ce the custody

arr angement ordere d by the trial court. Rather, she is see king to ha ve the custody arr ang ement overturned on a ppeal. Thus, since she is not seeking to enforc e the de cre e, the re fo re , we de ny he r re qu e st fo r atto rn e y ’s fe e s. Hu sb a nd ’s re qu e st f or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s is lik e wi se de nie d b e c a us e he is not se e kin g to en fo rc e the fi na l dec re e on app e a l but, ins te a d, se e ks to h a ve it decla red invalid by

this Court. See Parchman v. Parchman , No. W2003-01204-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 768, at *15-16 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2004). Additionally , since both parties have pr evailed r eg arding their respective issues raised on a ppeal, we decline to g rant e ither party ’s reque st for attorney ’s fe es in this case. Se e Ba gg e tt v . B ag ge tt , 512 S.W .2d 292, 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

III
. C ONCL US I ON

F or the re a so ns se t f

orth h e re in, we re ve rse th e dec isi on s o f the tr ia l c ou rt re g ard ing c hil d
cu s t o d y , ch i l d s u p p o rt , an d al i m o n y

. W e re m an d t h i s ca s e t o t h e tri al co u rt fo r f u rt h erp ro ce ed i n gs c on sis te nt w ith thi s o pin ion . Cost s of th is app e a l are to b e ta xede qu a lly be tw e e n th e Ap pe lla nt, Suz an Da rvarmanesh a nd her sur ety , and the Appellee, Mahy ar G hara cholou, for w hich execution
m y i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE