Interim Decision #1273 

Mamma or lititnnrso 

. In DEPORTATION Proceedings 

A-11499121 

Decided by Board October Ed, 196$ and February 11, 1963 

Where conspiracy indictment does not contain an allegation that the alien 

procured a visa by fraud his conviction under the indictment will not under 

the doctrine of collateral estoppel establish his deportability under section 

212(a) (19) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

CHARGES : 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(c) [8 U.B.C. 1251(0)17–Failed or refused 

to fulfill marital agreement nialle to piocure entry 

as immigrant. 

Lodged: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (1)3—Excludable 

at entry under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (19)—Visa procured by fraud or misrepresentation. 

Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (1) [8 U S.O. 1251(a) (1)3—Excludable 

at entry under 8 U.S.O. 1182(a) (20)—Immigrant 

visa not valid. 

BEFORE THE BOARD 

This case is before us on appeal from a decision of a special inquiry 

'officer directing the respondent's deportation. 

The respondent is a 30-year-old married male, native and citizen 

of Portugal, who last entered the United States on June 27, 1958 at 

which time he was admitted as a nonquota, immigrant on the basis 

of his marriage on April 14, 1958 to Mary McCabe, a United States 

citizen. He was previously in the United States from September 1956 

to May 1958. The Service takes the position that the respondent's marriage was not a bona fide one and that its only purpose was to secure 

n.onquota status for him. On January .10, 1962 he was convicted e 

conspiracy to violate 8 U.S.C. 1325. The Government abandoned 

. the charge stated in the order to show cause and the second lodged 

charge and relied solely on the first lodged charge (p. 11) . The special 

inquiry officer concluded that this charge was sustained. The only 

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issue to be determined is whether the respondent is deportable on the 

charge mentioned. 

The examining officer stated (p. 17) that the Government would rely 

on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the special inquiry officer 

based his decision on that theory, citing Matter of C—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 

577 (1960), and Matter of T—, Int. Dee. No. 1115 (1960). There the 

courts had made specific findings of fact which precluded relitigation 

of the same facts in the deportation proceedings. The record before 

us does not show that the court made findings of fact in the criminal 

proceeding, and the special inquiry officer has not referred to any 

specific findings as having been made in that proceeding. Accordingly, the two cases upon which the special inquiry officer relied are not 

analogous. 

The two cases mentioned above were cited by the examining officer 

as well as the unreported case of Sifuentes v. Rogers (S.D. Cal., 1960) ; 

United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Cal., 1959) ; 

and Matter of Z—, 5 1. & N. Dec. 708 (1954). We do not believe that 

the Sifuentes case has any applicability. In the Rangel-Perez case, 

the question in the second criminal proceeding was whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel could be invoiced against the defendant 

as to the issue of alienage because of an earlier conviction, and the 

court specifically said (p. 626) that it was beyond dispute that a finding 

of fact that the defendant was then an alien had been made in the first 

criminal proceeding and that this finding had been necessary to a 

judgment of guilt. We have already indicated. that the record in 

the respondent's case does not show what findings of fact were made in 

the criminal proceeding. With respect to Matter of Z—, supra, that 

case is distinguishable because the alien had been convicted under 18 

U.S.C. 1546 which relates inter Oa to receiving an immigrant visa 

knowing that it was procured by means of any false claim or statement, 

whereas the respondent was convicted of conspiracy to violate an 

entirely different statutory provision. 

There is included in Exhibit 3 the court's judgment of January 19, 

1962 showing that the respondent was convicted "of the offense of conspiracy (making false statement to Immigration and Naturalization 

Service)". Count one of the indictment also shows that the respondent was not convicted of violating 8 U.S.C. 1325 but that he and Mary 

McCabe Marinho were charged with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 371 

to violate 8 U.S.C. 1325. There are statements in count one that it 

was part of the plan and purpose of the conspiracy that the two 

defendants would do certain acts but it was not stated that the acts 

were actually done except insofar as concerns the overt acts which were 

set out. One of these is that the respondent entered the United States 

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on June 27, 1958. However, the indictment does not specifically 

charge that he procured an immigrant visa. 

8 U.S.C. 1325, which the defendants conspired to violate, applies 

to obtaining entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact, but it 

does not relate to procurement of a visa. Exhibit 2 shows that the deportation charge on which the Service relies is based on that part of 

8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (19) which refers to an alien who has procured a visa 

by fraud or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact. Under the 

circumstances, we conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is 

not applicable to the respondent's case and that his conviction standing 

alone is insufficient to meet the requirement of 8 U.S.C. 1252(b) (4) 

that a decision of deportability must be based upon reasonable, 

substantial and probative evidence. 

Under 8 CFR 242.18(a), a formal enumeration of findings is 

not required but it is provided that the decision of the special inquiry 

officer shall include findings as to deportability. Such findings were 

not made in the respondent's case, and it is impossible to determine 

from this record whether the special inquiry officer found that the 

respondent procured his visa by both fraud and misrepresentation, by 

fraud only, or by misrepresentation only. If the latter, there should 

be set forth the specific statement in the visa application which constituted a misrepresentation. The immigrant visa was not made 

part of the record. 

In his notice of appeal, counsel contended that the marriage between 

the respondent and Mary McCabe was consummated and that it is 

an existing legal and valid marriage. In his statement of November 

5, 1959 (Ex. 5, pp. 14, 22-23), the respondent stated that he had had 

sexual relations with his wife. On April 3, 1962 (Ex. 4, p. 5), he 

stated that he "never lived with her as a wife". At the hearing on 

June 27, 1962 (p. 26), the respondent answered affirmatively when 

asked whether he ever had sexual intercourse with this woman after 

their marriage. No further questions were asked as to when this 

occurred or whether it occurred on more than one occasion. This may 

or may not have a bearing on the question of whether the visa was 

procured by fraud or misrepresentation, but we believe this matter 

should be developed. 

8 CFR 3.1(d) (2) provides that the Board may return a case to 

the Service for further action without entering a final decision on the 

merits. In view of what we have said above, we consider it appropriate to reopen the hearing and remand the case to the Service for further 

development of the record. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the outstanding order of deportation 

be withdrawn; that the hearing be reopened for further action in 

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Interim Decision #1278 

accordance with the foregoing; and that the case be remanded to the 

Service pursuant to 8 CFR 3.1(d) (2) . 

BEFORE THE BOARD 

On October 22, 1962 we directed that the hearing be reopened and 

that the case be remanded to the Service. The case is now before us 

pursuant to a motion of the Service requesting reconsideration. 

The respondent is a 30-year-old married male, native and citizen of 

Portugal, who last entered the United States on June 27, 1958 at which 

time he was admitted as a. nonquota immigrant on the basis of his 

marriage on April 14, 1958 to Mary McCabe, a United States citizen. 

He was previously in the United States from September 1956 to May 

1958. The special inquiry officer held that the first lodged charge 

was sustained on the basis of the respondent's conviction on January 

19, 1962 and under the doctrine of collateral estoppel by judgment. 

The Service asserted (motion, p. 2) that the respondent was convicted of a violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325. However, it is apparent from 

the court's judgment of January 19, 1962 (part of Ex. 3) that he was 

actually convicted of conspiracy under count one of the indictment. 

Count one shows that the respondent and Mary McCabe Marinho were 

charged with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 371 to violate 8 U.S.C; 1325. 

In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946), it was said 

"It has been long and consistently recognized by the Court that the 

commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it 

are separate and distinct offenses." Under the circumstances, we 

do not believe it can be said that the respondent was convicted of violating 8 U.S.C. 1325. In addition, although fraudulent procurement 

of a visa appears to be within the purview of 18 U.S.C. 1546, it is 

clear that 8 U.S.C. 1325 does not relate to procurement of a visa. 

At the hearing (pp. 11-12), the examining officer stated that the 

Government wished to abandon charges #1 (stated in the order to show 

cause) and #3, and would rely solely on charge #2 (the first lodged 

charge). The special inquiry officer sustained, the latter charge and 

did not discuss the other two charges in his decision. In our previous 

order, we mentioned this but we observe that the Service now asserts 

(motion, pp. 6 and 7) that all the charges are sustained. With the 

exception of this general statement, however, the motion contains no 

specific argument that charges #1 and #3 have been established. Since 

these two charges were not even considered by the special inquiry 

officer, we deem it appropriate to limit our discussion to the first lodged 

charge. If the Service desires to reinstate the two charges which it 

abandoned, such R. request may be made to the special inquiry officer 

during the reopened hearing. 

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Interim Decision #1273 

In our previous decision, we stated that the special inquiry officer 

failed to make findings as to deportability; that it was impossible to 

determine from this record whether the special inquiry officer found 

that the respondent procured his visa by both fraud and misrepresentation, by fraud only, or by misrepresentation only; and that, if it 

was the latter, there should be set forth the specific statement in the 

visa application which constituted a misrepresentation. We indicated 

that the visa, showing the misrepresentation, should have been included in the record. The Service stated that it did not object to a 

remand of the case to the special inquiry officer for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law but suggested that the Board hold 

that the charges are sustained and make its own findings. While this 

Board has authority-to make findingo of fact and oonelusions of law, 

we do not consider that it would be proper to do so in this case since 

8 CFR 242.18(a) contemplates that this shall be clone by the special 

inquiry officer in the first instance, and Bridges v. lirimon, 326 U.S. 

135, 153 (1945), indicates the necessity for officers of the Service to 

comply with its regulations. 

After stating in its motion that it did not object to a. remand of 

the case for the limited purpose stated above, the Service said that it 

was opposed to any full scale reopening of the hearing for exploration 

of issues which it asserts are foreclosed by the pleadings and under 

the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Service does not claim that 

the pleadings alone would be sufficient, and that appears to have been 

the view also of the special inquiry officer who relied on the doctrine 

of collateral estoppel. We shall indicate later herein why the doctrine 

of collateral estoppel cannot be utilized in this case and why there is 

a doubt as to whether the respondent admitted the ninth factual allegation. Accordingly, we shall permit the Service and the respondent to 

present any pertinent evidence at the reopened hearing. We believe 

there should be a clarification at that time concerning exactly what 

the respondent admits and denies and with respect to his conflicting 

testimony on November 5, 1959, April 3, 1962 and June 27, 1962 as to 

-whether he did or did not have sexual intercourse with his wife. The 

Service asserts that the alien's statements (Ex. 4) sustain the charges. 

The special inquiry officer did not discuss nor even mention Exhibit 

4 in his decision but this can be done when he reconsiders the case. 

The factual allegations particularly important in the respondent's 

case are allegations seven and nine which are part of the two charges 

lodged on May 22, 1962. At that time, the special inquiry officer 

stated (p. 7) that, since the respondent denied deportability on these 

charges and the factual allegations, he would not be asked to plead 

to the truth or falsity of the allegations. At the reopened hearing, 

counsel stated that he denied deportability on the first lodged charge 

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and was then asked to examine factual allegations seven through. 

twelve and state which he was prepared to admit or deny. He stated 

(p. 13) that allegations seven and twelve were denied and the other 

allegations were admitted. There is some inconsistency in the denial 

of allegation seven concerning the asserted agreement for a fraudulent 

marriage, and the admission of allegation nine relating to the application for an immigrant visa which also contains an allegation that the 

marriage was fraudulent. 

After counsel had indicated which factual allegations were admitted 

and denied, the special inquiry officer thereafter explained factual 

allegations seven to twelve to the respondent, and we observe that 

the respondent had difficulty understanding the explanation of the 

ninth factual allegation but finally said (p. 10) "I understand that, 

but—" at which point the special inquiry officer interrupted and said 

that he had not asked the respondent to deny it. 

Subsection (d) of 8 CFR 242.16 relates to the lodging of additional 

charges and provides that the special inquiry officer shall read the 

additional factual allegations and charges to the respondent and 

explain them to him in nontechnical language. Thereafter, the provisions of subsection (b) of that regulation apply, and this provides 

that the respondent shall plead to the charges by stating whether he 

admits or denies the factual allegations and his deportability. As we 

have indicated above, the charges were not explained to the respondent 

until after his counsel had been requested to state what factual allegations were admitted or denied. Allegation nine, containing 12 typewritten lines, is long and involved and some of the assertions are not 

controverted by the respondent. Inasmuch as the regulations were 

not strictly complied with and in view of the thwarting of the respondent's attempt to explain his position concerning factual allegation nine, we are not satisfied that there was a valid admission of the 

truth of all assertions contained in this factual allegation. 

In our previous decision, we pointed out certain deficiencies in the 

record and we concluded that, pursuant to 8 CFR 3.1(d) (2), the case 

should be returned to the Service for further action without the entry 

of a. final decision by this Board on the merits. Under the circumstances, we shall not at this time determine whether the first lodged 

charge might be sustained on some basis other than that of collateral 

estoppel, as for example, the pleadings, admissions of the respondent in this proceeding or in the criminal proceeding, or inferences to be 

drawn from the respondent's conviction. We shall, however, dispose 

of the contention of the Service relating to collateral estoppel. 

In connection with this contention, the only cases cited by the Service were: Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; Lutwak v. 

United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) ; United States v. Award°, 113 F. 

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Interim Decision *1273 

Supp. 788 (D.N.J., 1953), aff'd 208 F. 2d 632, cert. den. 347 U.S. 952; 

Matter of B—, Int. Dec. No. 1221 (1962) ; and Matter of C—, 8 I. & N. 

Dee. 577 (1960). Yates, as we shall later indicate, is actually adverse 

to the postion of the Service. 

Lutwak did not involve collateral estoppel. The quotation from 

that decision (motion, p. 7) related to the contention of those petitioners that their marriages were valid. The court declined to pass on 

the validity of the marriages, stating that this was not material. On 

page 5 of the motion, the Service quoted from a sentence in. the Lutwak 

decision which reads, in part, as follows : "There is an abundance of 

evidence in this record of a conspiracy to contract spurious, phony 

marriages * "." We shall not at this time consider the validity 

of the respondent's marriage, but the fact that there was an abundance 

of evidence that the Lutwak marriages were spurious is of no assistance 

in determining whether there is such evidence in the respondent's case. 

The language which the Service quoted from the Amax& decision 

simply means that, after Accardo had been convicted of conspiring to 

operate an unregistered still, he could not deny his guilt of the 

conspiracy in the subsequent denaturalization suit. This respondent 

makes no claim that he was innocent of the offense for which he was 

convicted, and the Aceardo decision is of no value in sustaining the 

argument of the Service. 

Matter of 8— did not involve collateral estoppel. There, we held 

that the alien was excludable because he had been convicted of a crime 

involving moral turpitude—conspiracy to commit, among other 

offenses, the crimes of forgery and uttering a forged instrument. He 

contended that he had actually pleaded guilty only to that portion of 

the conspiracy count relating to gambling. His exclusion was directly 

predicated on the conviction, whereas this respondent is not charged 

with being deportable by reason of the conviction itself. S— was 

attempting to controvert the conviction record; this respondent has 

made no effort to attack the conviction nor does he claim that he intended to plead guilty to only part of the conspiracy count. For the 

reasons mentioned, Matter of B— is not analogous to the respondent's 

case. 

The remaining case cited by the Service is Matter of C—, supra. 

There, we held that the court's finding in a denaturalization suit that 

the naturalized person had been a member of the Communist Party 

was conclusive, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, in a subsequent deportation proceeding against that person based on his Communist Party membership. In the similar case of Matter of 71—, Int. 

Dec. No. 1115 (1060), we reached the same conclusion. In those two 

cases, the records in the denaturalization suits established that the 

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Interim Decision 4fr1273 

courts had made the findings concerning Communist Party membership. As we pointed out in our previous order, the record relating 

to the respondent's conviction does not show what specific findings of 

fact may have been made in that proceeding, and the special inquiry 

officer's decision does not clarify that matter. We do not mean that 

there must have been formal findings of fact in the first action providing that it can be determined definitely what facts or issues were 

actually decided by the court. 

Our decisions in Matter of 0— and Matter of T—, supra, were predicated on the principles stated in Cromwell v. Cownty of Sac, 94 U.S. 

351 (1876) and Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 168 

U.S. 1 (1897). In the former, at page 353, it was said: "* * * where 

the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or 

demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only 

as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered." Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the point or question to be determined in 

the second action must be the same as that litigated in the original 

action and it must have been a fact which was essential to the first 

decision. Tait v. -Western Maryland Rail iway Co., 289 U.S. 620, 623 

(1933). If there is any uncertainty as to the precise question determined in the first suit and the uncertainty is not removed by extrinsic 

evidence, no estoppel is created. De Sollar v. Hanscome, 158 U.S. 216, 

221 (1895) ; .11'084 v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 608, 610 (1877). 

There appears to be no dispute between the parties concerning the 

fact that the respondent last entered the United States on June 27, 

1958 and that he was then admitted as a nonquota, immigrant on presentation of an immigrant visa which had been issued on the basis 

of his marriage to Mary McCabe. As a matter of fact, the third and 

fourth factual allegations are to that effect and these were admitted 

by the respondent. However, the crucial question is whether he procured his immigrant visa by fraud or misrepresentation. 

Although there are allegations in count one of the indictment that 

it was part of the plan and purpose of the conspiracy that the respondent, Mary McCabe Marinho and two other persons would do certain 

acts, including allegations that the respondent would execute an application for immigrant visa and that the State Department would 

issue a nonquota visa to the respondent, the indictment does not specifically state whether these acts were or were not performed except 

insofar as concerns the five overt acts which were set out. None of 

the overt acts relates to the respondent's procurement of his immigrant 

visa, and there is no specific allegation in. the indictment that the respondent procured his immigrant visa by fraud or misrepresentation 

or even that he procured a visa. Hence, if we accepted every allega221 
Interim Decision #1273 

tion of the indictment as having been proved, that would still not establish that an issue actually litigated and determined in the criminal 

case was whether the respondent procured his immigrant visa by fraud 

or misrepresentation, nor that this issue was essential to the judgment 

in that proceeding. In view of the foregoing, those elements which 

are prerequisites to the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel do not exist in the respondent's case. 

The ultimate fact which must be determined in this deportation proceeding is whether the respondent procured his immigrant visa by 

fraud or misrepresentation In Yates v. United States, supra, which 

was cited by the Service, the following statement was made at page 

338: "The normal rule is that a prior judgment need be given no conclusive effect at all unless it establishes one of the ultimate facts in 

issue in the subsequent proceeding. So far as merely evidentiary or 

`mediate' facts are concerned, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is 

.inoperative." We believe this statement of the Supreme Court makes 

it abundantly clear that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inapplicable in this respondent's deportation case. For the reasons indicated above, the motion of the Service will be denied. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the motion of the Service for reconsideration, except as reconsidered herein, be and the same is hereby denied. 

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