IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CRAIG T. BOUCHARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) C.A. No. 2020-0097-KSJM

)

BRAIDY INDUSTRIES, INC., )

JOHN PRESTON, CHARLES )

PRICE, MICHAEL PORTER, )

CHRISTOPHER SCHUH, )

COMMONWEALTH SEED )

CAPITAL, LLC, and HANNAH )

MANAGEMENT LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: April 8, 2020

Date Decided: April 28, 2020

Kevin R. Shannon, Christopher N. Kelly, Mathew A. Golden, POTTER 

ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Kahn A. Scolnick, 

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Los Angeles, California; Lindsey S. 

Young, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Palo Alto, California; Counsel for 

Plaintiff Craig T. Bouchard.

Richard P. Rollo, John T. Miraglia, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., 

Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for Defendants Braidy Industries, Inc., John 

Preston, Charles Price, Michael Porter, Christopher Schuh, and Hannah 

Management LLC.

McCORMICK, V.C.
This lawsuit arises from a voting agreement among the stockholders of Braidy 

Industries, Inc. (“Braidy”). In relevant part, the voting agreement: grants the 

plaintiff, the founder of Braidy, the right to designate six “Founder Directors” to the 

Braidy board of directors; requires its signatories, upon the written request of the 

plaintiff, to vote or act by written consent to remove any Founder Director; and 

authorizes the corporate Secretary to serve as proxy for any stockholder who fails to 

act in accordance with the voting agreement. Years before this lawsuit, the plaintiff 

designated as Founder Directors himself and the four individual defendants, who are 

also stockholders and parties to the voting agreement. 

In early 2020, the board removed the plaintiff from his positions as CEO, 

Chairman, and Secretary of Braidy. In response, the plaintiff demanded that the 

parties to the voting agreement, including the individual defendants, act by written 

consent to remove the individual defendants from the board. When they refused to 

comply, the plaintiff demanded that Braidy cause its Secretary to exercise his proxy 

to remove the individual defendants from the board. When Braidy also refused to 

comply, the plaintiff commenced this lawsuit to enforce the voting agreement. The 

plaintiff seeks specific performance and other relief. 

All defendants except Braidy have moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. One individual defendant also has moved to dismiss a claim 

asserted against him as corporate Secretary on the ground that it fails to state a claim
2

against him in that capacity. The plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on his 

claim for breach of the voting agreement and for judgment on the pleadings on

Braidy’s affirmative defense of unclean hands.

While the parties were briefing the motions, the Braidy board of directors took

actions intended to change the board’s composition. The voting agreement grants

investors who acquire a threshold amount of common stock the right to designate 

additional board members, which the agreement defines as “Lead Investor 

Directors.” The individual defendants caused the board to authorize a stock split

intended to increase stock ownership levels to amounts that would entitle some 

stockholders to designate Lead Investor Directors. The board also expanded the 

number of board seats so that the six Founder Director positions constituted a 

minority of the board. The individual defendants then resigned as Founder Directors 

and, along with non-parties to the litigation, rejoined the board as Lead Investor 

Directors. The defendants argue that these actions mooted the plaintiff’s request for 

specific performance of the voting agreement. 

This decision traverses the gauntlet of motions raised by the parties. The

defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are granted. The 

plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Braidy’s unclean hands 

defense is also granted. The plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied in 

its entirety to permit development of the factual record.
3

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The parties’ various motions require the Court to view the facts through 

multiple lenses. In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), the Court 

may “consider the pleadings, affidavits and any discovery of record.”1

 In deciding 

a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint and documents it 

incorporates by reference “generally define[] the universe of facts that the trial court 

may consider.”2

 In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 

Rule 12(c), the Court may consider the pleadings and documents they incorporate 

by reference.3

 In deciding a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, the 

Court may consider “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 

admissions on file,” as well as supporting and opposing affidavits.4

 

A. The Voting Agreement

In 2016, Plaintiff Craig Bouchard founded Braidy (or the “Company”), a 

Delaware corporation with principal places of business in Kentucky and 

Massachusetts whose purpose is to manufacture efficient and eco-friendly aluminum 

alloys. Bouchard served as CEO, Chairman of the board of directors (the “Board”), 

 1 Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 265 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citing Cornerstone Techs., LLC v. 

Conrad, 2003 WL 1787959, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003)). 

2 In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006) (collecting 

cases).

3 OSI Sys., Inc. v. Instrumentarium Corp., 892 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Del. Ch. 2006).

4 Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).
4

and Secretary. At the time this lawsuit was filed, the Board comprised Bouchard 

and Defendants John Preston, Charles Price, Michael Porter, and Christopher Schuh 

(the “Director Defendants”). Bouchard and each of the Director Defendants are also 

Braidy stockholders.

In 2018, the parties to this lawsuit entered into an Amended and Restated 

Voting Agreement (the “Voting Agreement”).5 Bouchard and the Director 

Defendants executed the Voting Agreement in their capacity as stockholders. The 

Board voted on and unanimously approved the Voting Agreement, which is 

governed by Delaware law.

6

 The Voting Agreement is referenced throughout the 

Braidy bylaws, which state that “[o]nly persons who are nominated in accordance 

with” the Voting Agreement “shall be eligible for election as directors.”7

 

Section 1.2 of the Voting Agreement governs Braidy’s “Board 

Composition.”8

 It provides that “[e]ach Stockholder agrees to vote, or cause to be 

voted, all Shares owned by such Stockholder, or over which such Stockholder has 

voting control, . . . in whatever manner as shall be necessary” to elect the director 

 5 C.A. No. 2020-0097-KSJM, Docket (“Dkt.”) 44, Aff. of Craig T. Bouchard in Supp. of 

Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, and Opp’n to Moving Defs.’ Mot. to 

Dismiss (“Bouchard Aff.”) Ex. A. 

6 Id. § 10.7.

7 Dkt. 1, Verified Compl. (“Compl.”) Ex. C § 2.1(f). 

8 Voting Agreement § 1.2
5

designees of certain stockholders to the Board.9 Section 1.2(a) grants Bouchard the 

power to designate six “Founder Directors” for election to the Board,

10 and Section 

1.2(b) grants each additional investor acquiring at least five million shares of 

common stock—defined as a “Lead Investor”—the power to designate a “Lead 

Investor Director.”11 This decision refers to Section 1.2(b)’s requirement that any 

Lead Investor own at least five million shares of common stock as the “Ownership 

Threshold.”

Section 1.3 governs “Removal, Replacement and Vacancies on the Board.”12 

Section 1.3(a) grants Bouchard and any Lead Investor the right to cause the removal 

of any of their directors designated pursuant to Section 1.2. It provides: “No party 

hereto shall vote (or act by written consent) to remove any member of the Board 

nominated in accordance with the aforesaid procedure, without cause, unless the 

person so designating such director as specified above so votes (or acts by written 

consent).”13 Section 1.3(a) also requires that the stockholder signatories vote to 

remove the Founder Directors or the Lead Investor Directors at their designators’ 

 9 Id. 

10 Id. § 1.2(a).

11 Id. § 1.2(b).

12 Id. § 1.3.

13 Id. § 1.3(a).
6

request. It provides: “Each of the parties further covenants and agrees to vote (or 

act by written consent) to remove any director designated as set forth above upon 

the written request of any party or parties collectively entitled to designate such 

director.”14

The Voting Agreement includes backstops to ensure the effectiveness of the 

parties’ removal rights. Under Section 7.1, Braidy agreed, “within the requirements 

of applicable law,” to use its “best efforts to cause the nomination and election of 

directors as provided in [the Voting Agreement].”15 Under Section 7.2, the Secretary 

of the Company is authorized to serve as proxy for, and was granted an irrevocable 

power of attorney by, each stockholder who “(i) fails to vote or (ii) attempts to 

vote . . . in a manner which is inconsistent with the terms of [the Voting 

Agreement].”16 Section 7.2 “authorizes” the Secretary to vote all of such 

stockholder’s shares “in favor of the election of persons as members of the Board 

determined pursuant to and in accordance with the terms and provisions of [the 

Voting Agreement]” or in accordance with several other enumerated provisions of 

 14 Id.

15 Id. § 7.1.

16 Id. § 7.2.
7

the Voting Agreement, but it does not on its face automatically bind the Secretary, 

and no one signed the Voting Agreement in that capacity.

17

When the Voting Agreement was executed, Bouchard designated himself and 

each of the Director Defendants as “Founder Directors” pursuant to Section 1.2(a), 

and they were elected to the Board accordingly. Because no stockholder qualified 

as a Lead Investor at that time, no Lead Investor Directors were designated or elected 

to the Board. 

B. The Board Removes Bouchard as CEO, Chairman, and 

Secretary.

On January 28, 2020, the Board held a special meeting telephonically (the 

“January 2020 Special Meeting”). At the January 2020 Special Meeting, the other 

members of the Board—the Director Defendants and non-party Norton Schwartz—

voted to remove Bouchard as Secretary and appoint Preston to that position. They 

also voted to remove Bouchard from his roles as Chairman and CEO and appoint 

Price and non-party Tom Modrowski to those positions, respectively. The minutes 

of the January 2020 Special Meeting state that the Board “no longer believed that 

Mr. Bouchard would be successful” in raising capital for Braidy18 and believed that 

 17 Id. 

18 Bouchard Aff. Ex. C (“January 2020 Special Meeting Minutes”) § 2. 
8

Bouchard “did not have a viable path for financing of the Company or addressing its 

financial issues.”19 

The minutes of the January 2020 Special Meeting also state that Bouchard

“strongly disagreed” with the Board’s removal decisions.20 He stated that the 

Board’s decisions were “in contravention of the Voting Agreement of the 

stockholders” and that he had “the right under the Voting Agreement to remove 

directors.”21 According to the minutes, Preston stated that Bouchard “could kick all 

of the other members of the Board off of the Board in accordance with the terms of 

the Voting Agreement,” but Preston believed the removal decision was consistent 

with his fiduciary obligations.22 Price also expressed that he was “exercising his 

fiduciary duties” in removing Bouchard.23

Two days after the January 2020 Special Meeting, on January 30, 2020, the 

Company issued a press release thanking Bouchard for his “vision, energy, and 

dedication” and stating that Bouchard “will step down from his current position” but 

 19 Id. § 3.

20 Id. §§ 2, 3.

21 Id. § 3. 

22 Id.

23 Id. 
9

“remain a [director].”24 Bouchard publicly responded that he had never agreed to 

step down.

25

C. Bouchard Seeks to Exercise His Rights Under the Voting 

Agreement and Is Placed on Administrative Leave.

On February 1, 2020, Bouchard sent each of the Board members a letter 

requesting their “immediate resignation” from the Board.26 He stated: “If you do 

not act honorably and do what is right for the company’s shareholders, I will not 

hesitate to exercise my clear rights under the Voting Agreement and other corporate 

documents.”27 

Schwartz agreed to resign, and his resignation became effective on 

February 1, 2020. The Director Defendants, however, refused. On February 2, 

2020, Price wrote a letter to Bouchard (the “February 2 Letter”) in which he stated, 

on behalf of the Director Defendants: “[W]e decline your request to resign on the 

basis that the action you are requesting is not in the best interest of [Braidy] or the 

stockholders of [Braidy].”28 Price continued: “[W]e will remain as Directors absent 

an order from a Delaware Court determining that the provisions in the Agreement 

 24 Compl. ¶ 28. 

25 Id. 

26 Bouchard Aff. Ex. D, at 7.

27 Id.

28 Bouchard Aff. Ex. E.
10

upon which you are relying are, under these circumstances, valid and enforceable 

under the law of the state of Delaware and not a violation of the directors’ fiduciary 

duty to [Braidy] and its stockholders.”29

The next day, on February 3, 2020, Price emailed Bouchard to notify him that 

he had been placed on “administrative leave.”30 The email explained that the 

Company had “identified certain financial and operational irregularities in 

connection with [Bouchard’s] role as Chief Executive Officer that warrant 

investigation” and that the Company would advise Bouchard “of the results of the 

investigation as soon as they are available.”31 Such “financial and operational 

irregularities” were neither mentioned in the minutes of the January 2020 Special 

Meeting nor referenced in the February 2 Letter.32

On February 5, 2020, Bouchard sent a written request to the Director 

Defendants in their capacity as stockholders, as well as Defendants Hannah 

Management, LLC (“Hannah”) and Commonwealth Seed Capital, LLC

(“Commonwealth”) demanding that they execute a Stockholder Action by Written 

 29 Id. 

30 Bouchard Aff. Ex. H.

31 Id.

32 See generally January 2020 Special Meeting Minutes (lacking mention of “financial and 

operational irregularities” or anything of the like in connection with Bouchard’s removal); 

February 2 Letter (same).
11

Consent to remove the Director Defendants in accordance with their obligations 

under Section 1.3(a) of the Voting Agreement.

33 The recipients neither executed the 

Stockholder Action by Written Consent nor otherwise voted to remove the Director 

Defendants. 

On February 11, 2020, Bouchard sent a formal written request to Braidy

asking that the Company “cause the Secretary of Braidy” to execute a written 

consent in order to “effectuate, effective immediately, the removal of the [Director 

Defendants] from the Board, as required by and in accordance with Sections 1.3(a), 

7.1 and 7.2 of the Voting Agreement.”34 The Company did not do so. 

D. Bouchard Files This Lawsuit and the Board Launches an 

Investigation into Bouchard’s Corporate Spending.

Bouchard filed his Verified Complaint (the “Complaint”) on February 14, 

2020.35 The Complaint contains two causes of action claiming breach of the Voting 

Agreement.36 

Count I alleges that the Director Defendants, Hannah, and Commonwealth 

breached Section 1.3(a) of the Voting Agreement. Because Count I is asserted 

 33 Bouchard Aff. Ex. F, at 2.

34 Bouchard Aff. Ex. G, at 1. 

35 Compl.

36 For ease, this decision refers to each cause of action by “Count” number.
12

against these defendants in their capacity as stockholders, this decision refers to them 

collectively for the purpose of discussing Count I as the “Stockholder Defendants.”37 

Count II allegesthat Braidy and Preston, in his capacity as Secretary, breached 

Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of the Voting Agreement. 

Both Counts seek specific performance of the relevant provisions of the 

Voting Agreement. Bouchard also seeks a declaration that “each of the Defendants 

has breached the Voting Agreement” and an order “[e]njoining each of the 

Defendants from taking any actions in contravention of their contractual obligations 

under the Voting Agreement.”38 

Bouchard filed a motion to expedite proceedings contemporaneously with the 

Complaint, seeking a trial and resolution by March 13, 2020.

39

Before the hearing on Bouchard’s motion to expedite, the Stockholder 

Defendants moved to dismiss Count I for lack of personal jurisdiction,

40 and Preston 

 37 On March 26, 2020, the parties stipulated to stay Commonwealth’s obligation to 

participate in this litigation. Dkt. 60, Order Regarding Def. Commonwealth Seed Capital, 

LLC ¶ 1. For purposes of this decision only, therefore, Commonwealth is excluded from 

the definition of Stockholder Defendants.

38 Compl. at 23–24.

39 Dkt. 1, Mot. for Expedited Proceedings ¶ 21.

40 Dkt. 17, Mot. to Dismiss Defs. John Preston, Charles Price, Michael Porter, Christopher 

Schuh and Hannah Management LLC (“Brief No. 1”). 
13

moved to dismiss Count II for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a 

claim.41

During the hearing on the motion to expedite, the Court observed that motion 

practice could potentially winnow the disputes concerning: (1) jurisdiction over the 

Stockholder Defendants as to Count I and Preston as to Count II; (2) Bouchard’s 

entitlement to specific performance of the Voting Agreement; and (3) the availability

of Braidy’s anticipated unclean hands defense as a matter of law. The Court set a 

hearing on these issues for April 8, 2020.

Braidy filed its Answer to Count II of the Complaint on March 4, 2020, 

asserting the affirmative defense of unclean hands.

42 In support of this defense, the 

Answer states that on February 17, 2020, a special committee of the Board (the 

“Special Committee”) comprising the four Director Defendants had launched an 

investigation into “several ‘red flags’ concerning Bouchard’s use of Braidy funds.”43 

 41 Id. The Stockholder Defendants and Preston also moved to dismiss Counts I and II, 

respectively, under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process, but that motion is now 

moot. See Dkt. 44, Pl.’s Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Mot. for J. on the 

Pleadings, and Opp’n to Moving Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Brief No. 2”); Dkt. 39 (affidavits 

of service evidencing that service was effectuated on Schuh, Price, Preston, Porter, and 

Hannah).

42 Dkt. 24, Def. Braidy Industries, Inc.’s Answer to Pl.’s Verified Compl. (“Answer”).

43 Id. at 32–33. The Special Committee was also charged with overseeing this litigation. 

Dkt. 64, Braidy Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss, and Answering Br. in 

Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (“Brief No. 3”) Ex. C, 

at 1. 
14

The Answer states that the Special Committee’s investigation is “likely to prove selfdealing and other wrongful conduct by Bouchard” sufficient to “prevent Bouchard 

from obtaining the equitable relief requested against Braidy relating to the Voting 

Agreement.”44

E. The Director Defendants Take Action on March 18 Designed to 

Moot Plaintiff’s Claims.

Through affidavits and briefs, the parties report that at a special meeting of 

the Board held on March 18, 2020 (the “March 18 Special Meeting”),45 the Board 

adopted a number of resolutions.46 Through these resolutions, the Board approved 

and resolved to submit to the stockholders for approval an amendment to Braidy’s

Certificate of Incorporation (the “Amendment”) that would increase the number of 

authorized shares of Braidy common stock and effect a 1-to-13 forward split of 

Braidy common stock.

47

 44 Answer at 33.

45 Defendants represent that the March 18 Special Meeting was duly noticed and that a 

quorum was present. Brief No. 3 at 18. Plaintiff disputes these assertions. Dkt. 70, Pl.’s 

Reply in Supp. of his Mot. for Summ. J. and Mot for J. on the Pleadings (“Brief No. 4”),

at 45. This decision does not resolve the issue.

46 Dkt. 52, Aff. of Craig T. Bouchard Ex. A (“March 18 Resolutions”). Price, Schuh, and 

Preston voted in favor of the resolutions, and Bouchard voted against the resolutions. 

Porter did not participate in the March 18 Special Meeting. 

47 Id. at 1–2.
15

The Board next took actions that were made contingent on the effectiveness 

of the Amendment. The Board first voted to expand the number of Board seats from 

six to eighteen.

48 The Board then voted to amend the Company’s bylaws “to provide 

that at any meeting of the Board, the greater of (i) a majority of the directors then in 

office and (ii) one-third of the entire Board shall constitute a quorum.”49 

The Board then took actions that were made contingent on the effectiveness 

of the Amendment and the expansion of the Board. The Director Defendants

tendered their resignations as Founder Directors, but such resignations were “not to 

take effect until” the Amendment became effective and the size of the Board 

increased to eighteen.50 The Board resolved to accept the Director Defendants’ 

conditional resignations.

51 The Board then resolved to fill ten of the anticipated 

vacancies created by the board expansion.

52

According to Defendants, on March 18, 2020, Braidy received written 

consents representing more than half of Braidy common stock.53 The consenting 

 48 Id. at 3.

49 Id. at 5. 

50 Id. at 3.

51 Id.

52 Id. at 4. 

53 Brief No. 3 Ex. N; Brief No. 3 at 3, 21 (representing that Braidy received written consents 

representing approximately fifty-four percent of Braidy common stock). 
16

stockholders purported to approve the Amendment,54 ratify the filling of Board 

vacancies, and authorize the officers of Braidy to “take any and all actions” 

necessary to “carry out the purpose and intent of, or consummate the transactions 

contemplated by” those two resolutions.55 

Before the events of March 18, no Braidy stockholder owned five million or 

more shares of Braidy common stock, meaning that there were no Lead Investors or 

Lead Investor Directors and that the Board comprised Bouchard’s designees—the 

Founder Directors—exclusively. If the stock split was effective, then certain 

stockholders arguably met the Ownership Threshold requirement and became Lead 

Investors entitled to designate Lead Investor Directors.56 The Director Defendants, 

purportedly no longer Founder Directors, were identified as four of the ten Lead 

Investor Directors purportedly appointed to the Board on March 18.

57 

According to Defendants, as of March 18, 2020, the Board comprised

Bouchard, the four Director Defendants (now Lead Investor Directors), six non-

 54 Also on March 18, 2020, the Amendment was filed with the Delaware Secretary of State. 

Brief No. 3 Ex. O. 

55 Brief No. 3 Ex. N, at 1–2.

56 Voting Agreement § 1.2(b).

57 Dkt. 52, Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Entry of a TRO and/or Status Quo Order Ex. 1 

(Defendants’ counsel explaining in an email that the Director Defendants “resigned as 

Founder Directors” and were “elected as Lead Investor Directors”); Brief No. 3 at 24.
17

parties, and seven vacancies.58 Defendants represent that the vacancies included five 

Founder Directors, one Lead Investor Director to be designated by Bouchard, and 

one Lead Investor Director to be designated by Commonwealth.59 In an email dated 

March 18, 2020, Defendants expressed their belief that the events of the day 

“moot[ed] Mr. Bouchard’s Delaware litigation, as pled.”60

F. The Status Quo Order

Bouchard does not agree that the events of March 18 mooted his claims. On 

March 19, 2020, Bouchard filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or 

Status Quo Order (the “Status Quo Motion”).61 Through the Status Quo Motion, 

Bouchard sought an order restoring the Board that was in place before March 18 and 

restricting Defendants from effecting the changes they purported to make at the 

March 18 Special Meeting. 

The next day, on March 20, 2020, the Court ruled that a status quo order was 

appropriate and that, pending resolution of this dispute, the Board would continue to 

comprise the individuals who served on the Board at the time Bouchard commenced 

this litigation—Bouchard, the Director Defendants, and one vacant seat for a total 

 58 March 18 Resolutions at 4. 

59 Brief No. 3 at 24. 

60 Dkt. 52, Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Entry of a TRO and/or Status Quo Order Ex. 1.

61 Dkt. 51, Mot. for Entry of a TRO and/or Status Quo Order (“TRO Mot.”).
18

of six seats.62 The Court ordered the parties to meet and confer concerning the scope 

of restrictions to be imposed by the status quo order and requested that the parties 

brief the issue of whether the events of March 18 mooted the relief sought by 

Bouchard in this action. On March 27, 2020, the Court entered the parties’ stipulated 

form of status quo order (the “Status Quo Order”).63 

G. The Special Committee Report

On April 7, 2020, counsel for Defendants filed a letter on the docket attaching 

the Special Committee’s “Report on Investigation Into Non-Financial Conduct for 

the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of Braidy Industries, Inc.” (the 

“Special Committee Report”).64 As its title suggests, the Special Committee Report 

did not address the “financial and operational irregularities” identified in the 

February 2 Letter or the “‘red flags’ concerning Bouchard’s use of Braidy funds” 

that serve as the basis for Braidy’s unclean hands defense.65 Rather, the Special 

Committee Report made several other conclusions, including that there existed “a 

 62 Dkt. 81, Telephonic Oral Arg. and Rulings of the Ct. on Pl.’s Mot. for a TRO or a Status 

Quo Order.

63 Dkt. 63, Stipulated Temporary Restraining and/or Status Quo Order.

64 Dkt. 74, Report on Investigation Into Non-Financial Conduct for the Special Committee 

of the Board of Directors of Braidy Industries, Inc. Ex. 1.

65 The Special Committee Report explains that the “evaluation of financial matters,” 

including “an internal review of Mr. Bouchard’s financial expenses and transactions,” was 

“not the subject of this Report.” Id. at 1.
19

general loss of faith” in Bouchard, that Bouchard furnished inaccurate information 

to the Board or withheld information from the Board, that Bouchard disregarded the 

roles of other Board members, and that Bouchard caused certain emails to be deleted 

from Braidy’s system.66

H. The Pending Motions

As discussed above, on February 24, 2020, the Stockholder Defendants filed 

a motion to dismiss Count I pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal 

jurisdiction, and Preston moved to dismiss Count II against him pursuant to 

Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a 

claim. 

On March 13, 2020, Bouchard moved for summary judgment pursuant to 

Rule 56 on the entirety of his claims—specific performance of the Voting 

Agreement, declaratory judgment that the Voting Agreement has been breached, and 

an order enjoining future breaches—and for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 

Rule 12(c) on Braidy’s unclean hands defense.67 

Defendants raise a mootness defense to Bouchard’s motion for summary 

judgment, arguing that the Board actions of March 18 mooted Bouchard’s requests 

 66 Id. at 3.

67 Dkt. 44, Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and Mot. for J. on the Pleadings.
20

for specific performance. In response to Defendants’ mootness argument, Bouchard 

contends that his claims for breach of the Voting Agreement require that the Board 

actions of March 18 be set aside.68 

Briefing on the three motions and Defendants’ mootness argument proceeded 

on a combined basis and was completed by April 3, 2020.69 The Court heard oral 

arguments on the issues on April 8, 2020.70

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The parties’ motions require the Court to resolve the following four issues: 

whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Stockholder Defendants as to 

Count I; whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over Preston as to Count II; 

whether Bouchard is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Braidy’s unclean 

hands defense; and whether the Board actions of March 18 moot any portion of 

Bouchard’s motion for summary judgment, and if not, whether Bouchard is entitled 

to summary judgment on his claims. 

 68 Brief No. 4 at 26–47.

69 See Brief No. 1; Brief No. 2, Brief No. 3; Brief No. 4; Dkt. 71, Braidy Defs.’ Sur-Reply 

Br. Concerning Mootness (“Brief No. 5”).

70 Dkt. 87, Telephonic Oral Arg. on Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., and 

Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings.
21

A. The Stockholder Defendants Are Dismissed as to Count I for Lack 

of Personal Jurisdiction.

“When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Court of 

Chancery Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a basis for the 

court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant.”71 In ruling on a 12(b)(2) motion, 

this Court may “consider the pleadings, affidavits and any discovery of record.”72 

“If, as here, no evidentiary hearing has been held, plaintiffs need only make a prima 

facie showing of personal jurisdiction and ‘the record is construed in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff.’”73

Generally, Delaware courts resolve questions of jurisdiction using a two-step 

analysis,74 first determining “that service of process is authorized by statute,”75 and 

next determining that the defendant had certain minimum contacts with Delaware 

 71 Ryan, 935 A.2d at 265 (citing Werner v. Miller Tech. Mgmt., L.P., 831 A.2d 318 

(Del. Ch. 2003)). 

72 Id. (citing Cornerstone Techs., LLC v. Conrad, 2003 WL 1787959, at *3 (Del. Ch. 

Mar. 31, 2003)). 

73 Id. (first citing Benerofe v. Cha, 1996 WL 535405, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 12, 1996) and 

then quoting Cornerstone Techs., 2003 WL 1787959, at *3). 

74 Id.

75 Id.
22

such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.”76 

Where the defendant has consented to jurisdiction, however, both aspects of 

the jurisdictional analysis are deemed satisfied.77 “Because the defense of lack of 

personal jurisdiction is a personal right, ‘it may be obviated by consent or otherwise 

waived.’”78 And while it is true that “the personal jurisdiction requirement is a 

waivable right,”79 “[i]ntention forms the foundation of the doctrine of waiver, and it 

must clearly appear from the evidence.”80 “A waiver may be express or implied, but 

either way, it must be unequivocal.”81 “An express waiver exists where it is clear 

from the language used that the party is intentionally renouncing a right that it is 

 76 Matthew v. Fläkt Woods Gp. SA, 56 A.3d 1023, 1027 (Del. 2012) (quoting Int’l Shoe 

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

77 Solae, LLC v. Hershey Can., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456 (D. Del. 2008) (observing 

that “an express consent to jurisdiction, in and of itself, satisfies the requirements of Due 

Process,” thus eliminating the need to undertake a minimum contacts analysis” (citing 

Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1116 (Del. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by 

Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016))); Ruggiero v. FuturaGene, plc., 

948 A.2d 1124, 1132 (Del. Ch. 2008) (observing that “[a] party may expressly consent to 

jurisdiction by contract”). 

78 Sprint Nextel Corp. v. iPCS, Inc., 2008 WL 2737409, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2008) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

79 In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. Deriv. Litig., 2019 WL 1224556, at *10 (Del. Ch. 

Mar. 15, 2019) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985)); 

see id. at *10 n.5, n.6 (collecting authorities). 

80 George v. Frank A. Robino, Inc., 334 A.2d 223, 224 (Del. 1975). 

81 Dirienzo v. Steel P’rs Hldgs., L.P., 2009 WL 4652944, at * 4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2009).
23

aware of.”82 An implied waiver is only possible if there is a “clear, unequivocal, and 

decisive act of the party demonstrating relinquishment of the right.”83

In this case, Plaintiff does not rely on any statute authorizing the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over the Stockholder Defendants.84 Plaintiff instead argues that 

each of the Stockholder Defendants consented to jurisdiction under Section 7.3 of 

the Voting Agreement. Titled “Specific Enforcement,” Section 7.3 provides in its 

entirety: 

Each party acknowledges and agrees that each party hereto 

will be irreparably damaged in the event any of the 

provisions of this Agreement are not performed by the 

parties in accordance with their specific terms or are 

otherwise breached. Accordingly, it is agreed that each of 

the Company and the Stockholders shall be entitled to an 

injunction to prevent breaches of this Agreement, and to

specific enforcement of this Agreement and its terms and 

provisions in any action instituted in any court of the 

United States or any state having subject matter 

jurisdiction.

85 

Focusing on the emphasized language, Plaintiff argues that the parties 

intended to waive jurisdictional defenses to any action brought in “any court of the 

 82 Id.

83 Id. at *5.

84 Plaintiff does not argue that Price, Porter, or Schuh are subject to jurisdiction under 

10 Del. C. § 3114(a). Nor does Plaintiff argue that 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1) provides a basis 

for personal jurisdiction over the Stockholder Defendants.

85 Voting Agreement § 7.3 (emphasis added).
24

United States or any state.”86 Put differently, Plaintiff argues that the Stockholder 

Defendants consented to be sued for breach of the Voting Agreement anywhere in 

the world with subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute.

Delaware courts follow the objective theory of contracts, construing the 

contract the way it “would be understood by an objective, reasonable third party.”87 

In practice, the objective theory of contracts requires that a court “interpret clear and 

unambiguous terms according to their ordinary meaning.”88 “In so doing, the court 

evaluates the relevant provision’s semantics, syntax, and context, aided by 

interpretive canons.”89 As the whole-text canon instructs, context is the primary 

determinant of meaning.90 Thus, the entirety of Section 7.3, rather than the single 

phrase Bouchard emphasizes, informs its intended meaning. 

 86 Brief No. 2 at 57.

87 Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Renewables LLC, 210 A.3d 688, 696 (Del. 2019). 

88 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

89 JJS, LTD. v. Steelpoint CP Hldgs., LLC, 2019 WL 5092896, at *5 (Del. Ch. 

Oct. 11, 2019).

90 See Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 166 A.3d 912, 913–14 (Del. 

2017); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 

1985) (“[T]he meaning which arises from a particular portion of an agreement cannot 

control the meaning of the entire agreement where such inference runs counter to the 

agreement’s overall scheme or plan.”); id. at 1114 (noting that it is a “cardinal rule of 

contract construction that, where possible, a court should give effect to all contract 

provisions”); Charney v. Am. Apparel, Inc., 2015 WL 5313769, at *10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 

2015) (“Delaware courts . . . construe agreements as a whole and give meaning to all 

provisions.”).
25

Read as a whole, Section 7.3 must be construed as a consent to certain 

equitable remedies. The first sentence of Section 7.3 memorializes the parties’ 

agreement that irreparable damage would result from breach of the Voting 

Agreement.91 The second sentence of Section 7.3 memorializes the parties’ 

agreement that, in the event of such breach, the parties shall be entitled to certain 

equitable remedies.

92 A transitional word—“[a]ccordingly,” which means 

“correspondingly” or “consequently, so”93—links the two sentences, indicating that

the latter concept flows from the former. In other words, because the parties agreed 

in the first sentence that irreparable damage would flow from breach, they 

consequently stipulated in the second sentence to certain equitable remedies. 

Reading Section 7.3 as a consent to equitable remedies is consistent with the 

way commentators have interpreted similar provisions.94 This reading is further 

 91 Voting Agreement § 7.3.

92 Id.

93 Accordingly, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/accordingly (last visited April 27, 2020). 

94 In commenting on a similar provision in its annotated model merger agreement, the 

Merger and Acquisitions Committee of the American Bar Association noted that “[t]he 

waiver of the defense of an adequate remedy at law makes an action in equity more likely

to be successful, as the waiver removes a key defense to the request for equitable relief.” 

ABA Mergers and Acquisitions Committee, Model Merger Agreement for the Acquisition 

of a Public Company 314 (2011); see also id. (observing that “expressly providing for 

equitable remedies will not insure that the parties will be successful in obtaining the 

requested relief from a court sitting in equity, but the acknowledgement of their right to 
26

bolstered, albeit to a lesser degree, by the observation that drafters often address the 

remedies to which contracting parties have agreed—such as liquidated damages or 

specific performance—separate and apart from their chosen forum for dispute

resolution.95 

It would be unreasonable to construe Section 7.3 as creating a consent to 

personal jurisdiction. The primary purpose of the provision is to create a consent to 

equitable remedies. To achieve that primary, it is unnecessary for the parties to 

consent to be sued in any forum in the world having subject matter jurisdiction over 

the dispute. It would be unreasonable and absurd to construe the last adverbial 

phrase of Section 7.3 in that manner.96 Read properly, the last adverbial phrase 

modifies the language preceding it such that the parties “shall be entitled” to certain 

equitable remedies only in actions instituted in a court with the power to grant 

 

equitable relief may be persuasive to a court that is considering the matter” (citing Gildor 

v. Optical Sols., Inc., 2006 WL 4782348, at *10, *11 n.34 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2006)). 

95 Compare id. § 8.14 (titled “Enforcement of Agreement” and described as a consent “to 

certain equitable remedies”), with id. § 8.7 (titled “Exclusive Jurisdiction; Venue” and 

setting forth a waiver of jurisdictional defenses); see also Jeff C. Dodd, Raymond T. 

Nimmer, Robert A. Feldman, Drafting Effective Contracts: A Practitioner’s Guide 

§§ 2.07[D], 5.06[3], 2.11[A], 5.10[5] (3d ed. 2019) (addressing contractual risk allocation 

provisions authorizing liquidated damages or specific performance separately from 

boilerplate “forum selection” provisions).

96 Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1160 (Del. 2010) (describing the 

absurdity canon).
27

equitable relief. Section 7.3 does not provide a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction 

over the Stockholder Defendants. 

Plaintiff next argues that the Director Defendants waived their personal 

jurisdiction defense through their pre-litigation conduct. Specifically, Plaintiff 

points to the February 2 Letter in which Price, on behalf of the five directors who 

voted to remove Bouchard, stated that the Director Defendants would “remain as 

Directors absent an order from a Delaware Court determining that the provisions in 

the Agreement upon which you are relying are, under these circumstances, valid and 

enforceable under the law of the state of Delaware.”97

The Director Defendants neither expressly nor impliedly waived their 

jurisdictional defenses in the February 2 Letter. The language upon which Plaintiff 

relies in the February 2 Letter, on its face, falls short of unequivocally relinquishing 

the right to contest a Delaware court’s personal jurisdiction. The February 2 Letter 

lacks any reference to “jurisdiction.” Mere reference to an “order from a Delaware 

Court” cannot be said to evince the sort of intentional renouncement required by the 

doctrine of waiver under Delaware law. 

Plaintiff cites to three decisions in support of a contrary conclusion.

 97 Bouchard Aff. Ex. E (emphasis added).
28

In Salud Natural Entrepreneur, Inc. v. Nutricento Internacional, Inc., the 

court found that one of the defendants waived its personal jurisdiction defense where 

“the sum total of [its] actions in [the] litigation constituted submission by conduct.”98 

The “sum total” of the defendant’s conduct included filing its answer and 

counterclaim “with no mention of jurisdictional deficiencies,” participating in the 

Rule 26(f) discovery conference and jointly submitting the report of that conference, 

and “sitting on the sidelines” while its co-defendants settled the claims against 

them.99 The court observed that in light of this conduct, by the time the defendant 

filed its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff had “built 

up a reasonable expectation” that the defendant would defend the suit in the 

plaintiff’s chosen forum.100 

In MacCauley v. Wahlig, the plaintiff alleged that in a phone call with the 

defendants’ counsel after the lawsuit was filed, the defendants’ counsel “stated that 

there were no pending jurisdictional issues.”101 The court observed that, were it truly 

the case that the defendants represented to the plaintiff “that there were no 

jurisdictional issues,” then the defendants “would have waived objections to 

 98 2011 WL 290271, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011). 

99 Id. 

100 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

101 130 F.R.D. 302, 304 (D. Del. 1990). 
29

personal jurisdiction.”102 The court went on to explain, however, that it was in fact 

unreasonable for the plaintiff to believe that the defendants waived their 

jurisdictional defenses, since the defendants had previously “unequivocally, and in 

writing, stated that they would not waive objections to personal jurisdiction” until 

certain events transpired.103 

In Prince Manufacturing, Inc. v. Bard International Associates, Inc., the 

plaintiff “entered into a settlement negotiation with [the defendant]” prior to filing 

the lawsuit “on the condition that [the defendant] was ‘not to object to jurisdiction 

and venue.’”104 The negotiation failed, the lawsuit was filed, and the defendant filed 

a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.105 The defendant conceded that 

its prior communications with the plaintiff constituted a “waiver of its personal 

jurisdiction defense,” but argued instead that such waiver was conditioned on the 

plaintiff’s unfulfilled promise to negotiate in good faith.106 The court rejected this 

assertion, finding that the defendant’s claim of bad faith was unsupported by the 

record, and holding that the defendant’s waiver remained effective.107 

 102 Id. 

103 Id. at 305 (emphasis added).

104 1988 WL 142407, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 1988) (quoting a letter authored by counsel). 

105 Id. 

106 Id. 

107 Id. 
30

In this case, Plaintiff does not assert that the sum total of the Director 

Defendants’ conduct amounted to waiver by conduct, as the plaintiff did in Salud. 

Nor does Plaintiff assert that the Director Defendants expressly stated that there 

would be “no jurisdictional issues” or something of the like, as the plaintiff did in 

MacCauley. And the Director Defendants do not concede that the February 2 Letter 

was a conditional waiver (or a waiver in any sense) of their personal jurisdiction 

defense, as the defendant did in Prince. The case law to which Plaintiff cites, 

therefore, does not support a finding that the Stockholder Defendants waived their 

personal jurisdiction defenses through the February 2 Letter.

In sum, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Stockholder Defendants 

consented to jurisdiction under Section 7.3 or waived their personal jurisdiction 

defense in the February 2 Letter. And because Plaintiff has identified no statutory 

basis for jurisdiction over the Stockholder Defendants, Plaintiff has not made the 

requisite prima facie jurisdictional showing for Count I as to Preston, Porter, Schuh, 

Price, and Hannah.

B. Preston is Dismissed as to Count II for Lack of Personal 

Jurisdiction.

As to Count II against Preston, Plaintiff relies on Delaware’s director consent 

statute codified at 10 Del. C. § 3114(a). The Delaware Supreme Court has held that 

Section 3114(a) broadly authorizes personal jurisdiction over nonresident fiduciaries 

if the claims “involve conduct by the nonresident fiduciary using his corporate 
31

power.”108 Whether Count II implicates Preston’s corporate powers for personal 

jurisdiction purposes turns on whether Count II states a claim against Preston as 

Secretary. Preston’s Rule 12(b)(2) argument thus collapses into those he advances 

in support of his Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may grant a motion to dismiss if the complaint 

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”109 “[T]he governing 

pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion to dismiss is reasonable 

‘conceivability.’”110 When considering such a motion, the Court must “accept all 

well-pleaded factual allegations in the [c]omplaint as true . . . , draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and deny the motion unless the plaintiff could not 

recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of 

proof.”111 The Court, however, need not “accept conclusory allegations unsupported 

by specific facts or . . . draw unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 

party.”112

 108 Hazout v. Tsang Mun Ting, 134 A.3d 274, 289 (Del. 2016).

109 Ct. Ch. R. 12(b)(6).

110 Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del. 

2011).

111 Id. at 536 (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002)).

112 Price v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011) (citing Clinton 

v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009)).
32

Preston primarily argues that Section 7.2 gives the Secretary the mere 

authority to act without imposing the obligation to do so. Section 7.2 provides as 

follows: 

Irrevocable Proxy and Power of Attorney. Each party to 

this Agreement hereby constitutes and appoints as the 

proxies of the party and hereby grants a power of attorney 

to the then-Secretary of the Company . . . , with respect to 

the matters set forth in this Agreement, and hereby 

authorizes each of them to represent and to vote, if and 

only if the party (i) fails to vote or (ii) attempts to vote 

(whether by proxy, in person or by written consent), in a 

manner which is inconsistent with the terms of this 

Agreement, all of such party’s Shares in favor of the 

election of persons as members of the Board determined 

pursuant to and in accordance with the terms and 

provisions of this Agreement . . . .113

Preston’s interpretation of Section 7.2 is correct. The language of Section 7.2 

appoints an agent of the Company—the Secretary—as the proxy of each stockholder 

signatory to the Voting Agreement. In doing so, Section 7.2 grants the Secretary a 

proxy that “authorizes” the Secretary to vote in a specified manner in the event the 

stockholder signatories fail to vote or attempt to vote in a manner inconsistent with

their obligations under the Voting Agreement. Section 7.2 contains no obligatory 

language that could be read to obligate the person holding the position of Secretary 

to exercise the authority granted by Section 7.2. 

 113 Voting Agreement § 7.2.
33

Best understood and read in tandem,114 the backstops in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 

impose an obligation on Braidy to cause whomever holds the position of Secretary 

to exercise his proxy in accordance with the Voting Agreement. Section 7.1 

provides: “The Company agrees to use its best efforts, within the requirements of 

applicable law, to ensure that the rights granted under this Agreement are effective 

and that the parties enjoy the benefits of this Agreement.”115 The onus is thus on 

Braidy, pursuant to Section 7.1, to “use its best efforts” to cause its Secretary to vote 

the shares over which the Secretary has been granted a power of attorney in 

accordance with “the rights granted under [the Voting Agreement].”116 Bouchard’s 

own written demand on Braidy to “cause the Secretary of Braidy” to act in 

accordance with the Voting Agreement is consistent with this interpretation.117

Because Section 7.2 does not impose an obligation on Preston to act in his 

capacity as Secretary, Count II does not implicate Preston’s corporate powers for 

personal jurisdiction purposes. Count II is thus dismissed as to Preston.

 114 See E.I. du Pont, 498 A.2d at 114 (noting that it is a “cardinal rule of contract 

construction that, where possible, a court should give effect to all contract provisions”).

115 Voting Agreement § 7.1 (emphasis added).

116 Id. 

117 Bouchard Aff. Ex. G, at 1.
34

C. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Judgment on the Pleadings on the 

Affirmative Defense of Unclean Hands.

Under Rule 12(c), a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted

where “no material issue of fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.”118 In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, “a trial court is required to view 

the facts pleaded and the inferences to be drawn from such facts in a light most 

favorable to the non-moving party.”119 However, a “court need not blindly accept 

as true all allegations, nor must it draw all inferences from them in [the non-moving 

party’s] favor unless they are reasonable inferences.”120 

Plaintiff has moved for judgment on the pleadings on Braidy’s affirmative 

defense of unclean hands, arguing that the defense is inapplicable as a matter of law.

“The doctrine of unclean hands is ‘[e]quity’s maxim that a suitor who engaged in 

his own reprehensible conduct in the course of [a] transaction at issue must be denied 

equitable relief . . . .”121 In other words, “the Court refuses to consider requests for 

 118 Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 

1205 (Del. 1993). 

119 Id.

120 In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 727 (Del. Ch. 1999) (internal quotation 

omitted), aff’d sub nom. Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000).

121 RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 875–76 (Del. 2015) (quoting 

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 512 U.S. 352, 360 (1995)).
35

equitable relief in circumstances where the litigant’s own acts offend the very sense 

of equity to which he appeals.”122 

“[T]here are a number of limitations on the application of the [unclean hands] 

maxim.”123 Relevant to this dispute, “in order for the doctrine to apply in the first 

place the improper conduct must relate directly to the underlying litigation.”124 This 

Court’s jurisprudence requires that the improper conduct of which the litigant is 

accused bear an “‘immediate and necessary’ relation to the claims under which relief 

is sought.”125 Delaware courts “do not deny relief in equity to a plaintiff simply 

because the plaintiff may have engaged in inequitable conduct in the past.”126 Also, 

generally, “[t]he Court of Chancery has broad discretion in determining whether to 

apply the doctrine of unclean hands.”127

 122 Nakahara v. NS 1991 Am. Tr., 718 A.2d 518, 522 (Del. Ch. 1998).

123 Id. at 523.

124 Id.

125 Id. (quoting Kousi v. Sugahara, 1991 WL 248408, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1991)); see 

E. States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 8 A.2d 80, 82 (1939) (“[C]ourts of 

equity . . . apply the maxim requiring clean hands only where some unconscionable act of 

one coming for relief has immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he 

seeks . . . .”). 

126 Kousi, 1991 WL 248408, at *2.

127 RBC, 129 A.3d at 876 (quoting SmithKline Beecham Pharms. Co. v. Merck & Co., 

766 A.2d 442, 448 (Del. 2000)). 
36

In this case, Braidy’s unclean hands defense does not bear an immediate and 

necessary relation to Bouchard’s claims for breach of contract. Through the 

Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to vindicate his contractual rights as a stockholder under 

the Voting Agreement and compel Braidy’s compliance with its contractual 

obligations. By contrast, Braidy’s unclean hands defense relates to Bouchard’s 

alleged misuse of company funds, self-dealing, or other wrongful acts.128 Even 

accepting these allegations as true, they relate to Bouchard’s fiduciary duties as a 

director and officer. They do not bear an immediate and necessary relation to 

Bouchard’s rights under the Voting Agreement or to Braidy’s obligations under the 

Voting Agreement. Therefore, there exists “no close nexus between the wrongdoing 

 128 Answer at 32–33 (listing examples of Bouchard’s alleged misconduct including 

“Personal expenses charged by or on behalf of Bouchard to Braidy’s American Express 

credit cards, in violation of Braidy’s travel policies (which prohibit personal charges); At 

least ~$220,000 in unsubstantiated travel charges, and at least ~$113,000 in 

unsubstantiated meal charges to Braidy’s American Express credit cards; Unauthorized 

charges associated with chartered private planes, in violation of Braidy’s travel policies; 

Legal work conducted on behalf of Bouchard but billed to Braidy; Bonuses paid to 

Bouchard, at Bouchard’s own direction, that Braidy believes violate his employment 

agreement; and ‘Related party’ transactions involving businesses associated with 

Bouchard’s son and brother-in-law”); id. at 33 (alleging that the Special Committee 

investigation is “likely to prove self-dealing and other wrongful conduct by Bouchard” 

sufficient to “prevent Bouchard from obtaining the equitable relief requested against 

Braidy relating to the Voting Agreement”).
37

of the plaintiff and the relief he seeks”129 and Braidy’s unclean hands defense fails 

as a matter of law.

This conclusion finds support in In re Farm Industries, Inc.,

130 a decision of 

this Court. In that case, a stockholder owning a majority of the outstanding Class A 

and Class B common stock in a Delaware corporation filed a lawsuit against “certain 

officers and directors” in order to compel an annual meeting and election of 

directors.131 The defendants responded that, through a series of voting agreements 

to which plaintiff was a party, Class B stockholders were entitled to elect a majority 

of the directors at the annual meeting and one of the defendants—the company’s 

president—had the authority to vote the majority of the Class B shares either by 

irrevocable proxy or as voting trustee.132 The defendants sought specific 

performance of the plaintiff’s obligations under the voting agreements.133

The plaintiff replied that the company’s president had engaged in self-dealing 

such that he “misuse[d] . . . the position of dominance and control given him by the 

 129 Claros Diagnostics, Inc. S’holders Representative Comm. v. OPKO Health, Inc., 2020 

WL 829361, at *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2020). 

130 196 A.2d 582 (Del. Ch. 1963). 

131 Id. at 583–84.

132 Id. at 584, 585.

133 Id. at 584.
38

agreements in issue.”134 This, the plaintiff asserted, was sufficient ground for the 

court to deny the equitable relief the defendants sought.135 But the Court disagreed. 

Citing the doctrine of unclean hands, the Court explained that the claim of selfdealing did not bear a sufficient relationship to the claim for specific performance of 

the voting agreements:

Since none of the claims with which we are now 

concerned have any relation to the formation of the 

agreements in issue or to purported breaches thereof, . . . 

that doctrine may not be invoked so as to deny relief. That 

is not to say of course that [the plaintiff] may not otherwise 

assert these claims as the basis of an independent action 

against the defendants, if so desired.136

In this case, like the proponent of the unclean hands doctrine in Farm 

Industries, Braidy asserts that Bouchard may have engaged in “self-dealing and 

other wrongful conduct” in his capacity as fiduciary such that he is not entitled to 

specific performance of the Voting Agreement.137 And just as the Court in Farm 

Industries rejected that argument, so too must this one. Braidy does not assert that 

Bouchard’s alleged “self-dealing and other wrongful conduct” somehow affected 

 134 Id. at 590.

135 Id. 

136 Id.

137 Answer at 32–33.
39

the formation of the Voting Agreement or otherwise relates to Bouchard’s claims 

for breach of the Voting Agreement.138

Braidy urges the Court to permit it to develop a factual record concerning the 

defense of unclean hands, citing to cases where this Court has done so.139 Yet a

defendant cannot avoid judgment on the pleadings by inserting the words “unclean 

hands” into its answer and subsequently demanding a “full record” without 

identifying the immediate and necessary relation between the alleged wrongful acts 

and the underlying claim in the litigation.

140

 138 Further, the alleged wrongdoing that forms the basis for Braidy’s unclean hands defense 

resembles a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and is best evaluated under that legal 

framework. See Farm Indus., 196 A.2d at 590 (rejecting the defense of unclean hands but 

noting that its proponent may still “assert these claims as the basis of an independent 

action”); Gotham P’rs, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty P’rs, L.P., 2000 WL 1521371, at *4 (Del. 

Ch. Sept. 27, 2000) (finding that the unclean hands defense “is not necessary to protect the 

defendants from any harm they have suffered as a result of [plaintiff’s] wrongful conduct”).

139 Brief No. 3 at 59–60 (citing Claros Diagnostics, 2020 WL 829361, at *13; Xu Jong Bin 

v. Heckmann Corp., 2009 WL 3440004, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2009)).

140 In the cases to which Braidy cites, the defendants alleged that the contractual obligations 

the plaintiffs sought to enforce arose by virtue of fraudulent conduct, thereby indicating, at 

the least, that an immediate and necessary relation between the plaintiffs’ misconduct and 

the underlying claims in the litigation may exist. Claros Diagnostics, 2020 WL 829361, 

at *13 (allowing an unclean hands defense to proceed based on “the allegation . . . that the 

contractual obligations the [plaintiff] [sought] to enforce arose via fraud” (emphasis 

added)); Xu Jong Bin, 2009 WL 3440004, at *13 (denying a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings concerning a variety of affirmative defenses asserted in response to a claim for 

specific performance of a contract, including fraudulent inducement, lack of authority to 

enter into the contract, use of a false identity when signing the contract, and unclean 

hands). 
40

In sum, Braidy’s affirmative defense of unclean hands does not bear an 

immediate and necessary relation to Bouchard’s claims for breach of the Voting 

Agreement. Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

D. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Is Denied.

Court of Chancery Rule 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate 

when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”141 A party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law “where there are no material factual disputes.”142 “If, however, there 

are material factual disputes, that is, if the parties are in disagreement concerning the 

factual predicate for the legal principles they advance, summary judgment is not 

warranted.”143 “In discharging this function, the court must view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party.”144

Through Count II, Bouchard seeks an injunction requiring the Company to 

cause the removal of the Director Defendants from the Board. Defendants contend 

that because Bouchard’s contractual right to remove directors was limited to 

Founder Directors, the March 18 resignations of the Director Defendants as Founder 

 141 Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).

142 Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99 (Del. 1992) (citing Moore v. 

Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979)).

143 Id.

144 Id. (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).
41

Directors mooted Bouchard’s request for specific performance of the Voting 

Agreement.

145

Defendants’ interpretation of the Voting Agreement is correct. Although 

Bouchard seeks the “immediate removal of” the Director Defendants from the Board 

without regard to the mechanism by which they were designated,146 the Voting 

Agreement limits Plaintiff’s removal rights to the removal of directors that he is 

“entitled to designate.”147 Because the Voting Agreement limits Bouchard’s 

designation rights to the designation of Founder Directors, his removal rights are 

similarly limited to the removal of Founder Directors.148 Thus, if the Director 

Defendants resigned from their positions as Founder Directors, then Bouchard’s

right to remove them from that position is moot. 

The problem with Defendants’ mootness argument is that the Director 

Defendants’ resignations were “not to take effect” until the Amendment became 

 145 Brief No. 3 at 24. “According to the mootness doctrine, although there may have been 

a justiciable controversy at the time the litigation was commenced, the action will be 

dismissed if that controversy ceases to exist.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. New Castle Cty., 

701 A.2d 819, 823 (Del. 1997). Because this Court “generally does not provide advisory 

opinions,” Glazer v. Pasternak, 693 A.2d 319, 320 (Del. 1997), dismissal under the 

mootness doctrine is appropriate if the Court “can no longer grant relief in the matter.” 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 80 A.3d 628, 632 (Del. 2013).

146 Compl. Prayer for Relief ¶¶ b, c.

147 Voting Agreement § 1.3(a).

148 Id. § 1.2(a).
42

effective.149 Their resignations were also “not to take effect” until the size of the 

Board increased to eighteen—an event that was to occur also “only if, and upon such 

time as, the Amendment bec[ame] effective.”150 Put simply, if the Amendment were 

to be deemed ineffective, so too would the resignations of the Director Defendants. 

And if the resignations of the Director Defendants were ineffective, then Bouchard’s 

contractual right to remove them survived the events of March 18. 

Each side of this litigation has raised a bloody onslaught of arguments 

concerning the effectiveness of the March 18 actions.151 Some arguments raise 

disputed facts. Some raise creative or complicated legal theories warranting further 

development. In no event do these actions easily lend themselves to judicial review 

on summary judgment. 

Under Delaware law, “[t]here is no ‘right’ to a summary judgment.”152 And 

summary judgment will not be granted “if, upon an examination of all the facts, it 

seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into them in order to clarify the application of

the law to the circumstances.”153 In this case, further development of the factual 

 149 March 18 Resolutions at 3.

150 Id.

151 See generally, Dkt. 89, Letter to Counsel.

152 Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. 2002); see Cross v. Hair, 258 A.2d 

277, 278 (Del. 1969) (“Under the rule now well established in this jurisdiction, there is no 

‘right’ to a summary judgment.”).

153 Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del. 1962).
43

record and the parties’ legal arguments would help clarify the application of the law 

to the circumstances of the case. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the claims against Defendants John Preston, 

Charles Price, Michael Porter, Christopher Schuh, and Hannah Management LLC

are DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s motion for judgment 

on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment is DENIED.