Filed 3/20/24 P. v. Stephens CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THRIASHAUN STEPHENS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B328643

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NA117871)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Daniel J. Lowenthal, Judge. Affirmed as 

modified. 

Richard Lennon, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Stephanie Santoro, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Defendant and appellant Thriashaun Stephens (defendant) 

was placed on probation after pleading guilty to robbing K.S. 

Later, the trial court found he violated the terms of his probation 

by trying to smother his girlfriend, J.N., with a pillow. For the 

violation, the court ordered probation terminated and sentenced

defendant to three years in prison on the robbery conviction. 

Also before the trial court during the probation violation 

hearing was a separate alleged misdemeanor domestic violence 

charge involving the victim of defendant’s earlier robbery 

conviction, K.S. The prosecution indicated it would agree to 

dismiss the misdemeanor domestic violence charge if defendant 

agreed to a ten-year criminal protective order restraining him 

from having any contact with K.S. Defendant agreed, and the 

trial court dismissed the misdemeanor domestic violence charge. 

Relying on Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1),

1

the trial 

court issued criminal protective orders on January 26, 2023, that 

restrain defendant from having any contact with both J.N. and 

K.S. for ten years.

Defendant noticed an appeal from the judgment entered as 

the result of his probation violation. His appointed attorney, 

Richard Lennon, initially filed a brief pursuant to People v. 

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and declared he could find no 

arguable issues to raise on appeal. This court thereafter 

undertook an independent view of the record and ordered Mr. 

Lennon to file a supplemental opening brief addressing a single 

issue, namely, “whether the January 26, 2023, protective orders 

issued by the trial court are authorized by Penal Code section 

1 Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the 

Penal Code.
3

136.2 (or any other law).” This court also invited the Attorney 

General to file a response.

Defendant’s supplemental opening brief argued the 

protective orders issued without a proper statutory basis because 

a ten-year criminal protective order can issue under section 

136.2, subdivision (i) only when a defendant is convicted of a 

crime involving domestic violence and defendant’s only crime of 

conviction—obtained as a result of a guilty plea to a robbery

charge—does not qualify as a crime involving domestic violence 

under the statute. The Attorney General filed a letter brief in 

response arguing both protective orders properly issued. The 

Attorney General argues K.S. was in a “dating-type relationship”

with defendant when he robbed her of a gold necklace and, 

relying solely on a probation report, contends he struck her in the 

face during the course of the robbery. As to the protective order 

for J.N., the Attorney General argues she was defendant’s 

girlfriend at the time and defendant’s actions placed her in 

reasonable apprehension of imminent death by suffocation. 

Section 136.2, subdivision (i) provides in relevant part that 

“[w]hen a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime 

involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in 

Section 6211 of the Family Code . . . , the court, at the time of 

sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the 

defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. The order 

may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This 

protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether 

the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail, 

whether the defendant is subject to mandatory supervision, or 

whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is 

placed on probation.” As we now explain, the record does not 
4

permit a conclusion that this statute authorizes the criminal 

protective orders entered by the trial court.

Regarding the K.S. protective order, robbery is not a 

domestic violence offense (People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 

887, 901) and neither defendant’s change of plea hearing nor any 

other materials in the record establish the crime otherwise

“involv[ed]” domestic violence. More specifically, we do not 

believe the probation report on which the Attorney General relies

(the facts of which defendant did not admit in entering his plea) 

suffices to establish defendant abused K.S. in robbing her. In 

addition, neither the probation report nor any other record 

materials establish K.S. and defendant were in a dating 

relationship at the time of the robbery.

2

With respect to the J.N. protective order, it is uncontested 

that defendant was in a dating relationship with her at the time 

of the probation violation. The problem, however, is that finding 

defendant violated the terms of his probation by engaging in 

violence against J.N. is not a “conviction” for committing a crime. 

(See People v. Rosbury (1997) 15 Cal.4th 206, 209.) Procedural 

safeguards in probation violation proceedings are less stringent 

than they are in criminal trials (see, e.g., People v. Rodriguez

(1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 446), and the Legislature’s use of the term 

“conviction” evinces an intent to limit use of criminal protective 

orders—which can remain in force, as in this case, as long as ten 

2 The separate misdemeanor domestic violence charge 

discussed earlier in our opinion is irrelevant to our analysis. 

That charge was dismissed, and defendant obviously cannot be 

said to have been convicted on a dismissed charge.
5

years—to situations where the more stringent criminal 

safeguards have led to a finding of guilt.

3

Defendant has raised no other challenges to the judgment 

and our independent review has uncovered no other arguable 

issues. We shall therefore strike the criminal protective orders 

and affirm the judgment as so modified.

3 Of course, if the Legislature wishes to permit use of 

criminal protective orders to circumstances beyond criminal 

convictions, it is free to do so by amending the text of section 

136.2, subdivision (i).
6

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s ten-year criminal protective orders entered 

on January 26, 2023, for victims K.S. and J.N. are vacated. In all 

other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

LEE, J.

*

*

Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.