No. 82-20 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF MONTANA 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

BARBAJPA J. KRAUSE, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

LARRY KRAUSE, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone 

Honorable William Speare, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Stephens & Cole, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Gary L. Beiswanger, Billinqs, Montana 

Submitted on briefs: June 24, 1982 

Decided: September 23, 1982 

Filed: 8EP 23 "1382 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of 

the Thirteenth Judicial District, State of Montana, in and for 

the County of Yellowstone, dividing the marital assets of the 

parties. The wife appeals. 

The parties were married on October 18, 1974, at Billings, 

Montana. It was the second marriage for both parties. There 

were no children born of the marriage, however, each of the parties has children from their previous marriage. Barbara Krause 

was trained to be a registered nurse but has not worked in that 

capacity since 1970. Larry Krause presently works as a petroleum 

engineer. In February of 1977, Barbara petitioned for a divorce. 

A decree of dissolution was signed by the District Judge on 

May 17, 1978. The decree did not make a property disposition, 

rather the District Court expressly reserved jurisdiction to make 

the disposition at a later date. 

During the marriage the parties pooled their assets and made 

investments. Principally, they invested in oil and gas 

properties, three kinds of common stock, and real property 

located on the Boulder River. Only the above-mentioned assets 

were disputed at the trial; the parties having previously agreed 

on a division of the balance of the property. 

By stipulation of the parties the District Court appointed a 

Special Master, a certified public accountant, for purposes of 

reporting to the Court on the following issues : 

1. Ascertaining the net worth of the respective parties including a determination of all 

assets owned or acquired by the respective 

parties ; 

Determining those assets of the parties 

.at were acquired during the course of the 

rriage and tracing the application of the 

premarital assets of the respective parties 

and their application for acquisition of marital assets or post-marital assets; 

3. Providing a written report to the Court 

specifically determining the sources or derivation of the assets of the respective 

parties. 
(2) whether the District Court erred by failing to value assets 

at the time of the dispositional hearing; and (3) whether there 

was a want of candor and disclosure regarding financial information relating to the oil and gas interests? 

In relation to the first issue, the appellant contends that: 

( 1 ) her husband ' s non-mone tary contributions were wrongly considered as monetary contributions, and (2) that her non-monetary 

contributions were not considered. We do not agree with either 

assertion. 

Regarding her first assertion she points to her husband's 

contribution to the oil and gas interests. During the marriage, 

Larry Krause was given the option to take a decrease in earnings 

in return for the opportunity to participate in working oil and 

gas interests. In 1975 he took a cut of $6.25 from his hourly 

consultants fee. Then in 1977 he took another cut of $2.90 per 

hour. These foregone earnings of the husband coupled with a cash 

contribution of the wife resulted in the acquisition of the oil 

and gas interests. The District Court found that the cost of 

acquiring these interests was $36,847; with $29,088 attr ibutable to the husband Is foregone earnings and $7,759 attributable to the wife's cash contribution. 

The appellant/wife contends it is error to "give any monetary 

weight to non-monetary contributions. . . " In other words, she 

argues that the foregone earnings were non-monetary contributions 

and the District Court improperly assigned to them a dollar 

value. 

In all of our previous cases when we spoke of non-monetary 

contributions we were referring to those contributions which are 

difficult to quantify in dollars and cents. For example, in 

Eschenburg v. Eschenburg (1976), 171 Mont. 247, 557 P.2d 1014, 

we noted that a marriage is much more than a business 

relationship, thus contributions to the 32-year marriage included 

raising four children, managing the household, entertaining at 

social activities, and volunteering services to activities 
The Special Master completed his report on January 31, 1981. The 

report set out the original acquisition cost of the various properties and the contribution of each party. Also, the fair 

market value at or near the time of divorce is indicated and 

divided between the parties proportionate to the amount of their 

contribution at the time of acquisition. The pertinent part of 

the report is set out below: 

Larry Barbara 

- Total Krause Krause - - - - - - -- - -- 

2000 Shares Energy 

Resources Stock $ 4,109.85 2,339.81 1,770.04 

Value 5/17/78 18,000.00 10,247.40 7,752.60 

300 Shares Continental 

Group Stock 8,599.68 2,010.89 6,588.79 

Value 5/17/78 9,375.00 2,191.88 7,183.12 

100 Shares Simplicity 

Pattern 1,639.50 383.37 1,251.63 

Value 5/17/78 1,375.00 321.48 1,053.52 

Boulder Property 

Value 5/17/78 

Oil Properties 

Value 1/1/79 

Total Cost Values 66,169.66 41,322.56 24,869.60 

Total Fair Market Value 

@ 5/31/78 $119,164.00 78,924.37 40,239.63 

On March 3, 1981, the property distribution part of their 

case was heard before the District Court. The court made findings of fact and conclusions of law on June 22 and entered its 

j udgment on September 16. 

The court awarded 65 percent of the interest in the oil and 

gas properties to Larry Krause and the balance to Barbara Krause; 

each was awarded 50 percent of the Boulder River property; and 

two of the common stocks, Energy Resources and Continental Group, 

were split 65 percent and 35 percent to Larry and Barbara respectively. The remaining stock, Simplicity Pattern, was awarded to 

Barbara. The petitioner , Barbara Krause , was unsatisfied with 

this distribution and appeals to this Court. 

The appellant raises three issues: (1) whether the District 

Court erred in it's consideration of non-mone tary contributions; 
related to the husband's career. In the case of Biegalke v. 

Biegalke (1977), 172 Mont. 311, 316, 564 P.2d 987, 990, nonmonetary contributions of the wife included "wearing out her 

wedding band chopping wood, turning bales in the field, [and] 

chasing cattle on foot. . ." Again, in In Re Marriage of Kaasa 

(1979), 181 Mont. 18, 23, 591 P.2d 1110, 1113 non-monetary 

contributions were described as follows: " she helped move 

cattle out to pasture, hauled cattle by trucks, helped with 

branding, cooked for the crews, raised chickens and was responsible for the family garden ." 

We believe it is these kinds of contributions that the 

legislature had in mind when they enacted section 40-4-202, MCA, 

which mandates consideration of "contribution[s] of a spouse as a 

homemaker or to the family unit." We do not intend to precisely 

define non-monetary contributions . Such determinations are the 

province of the District Court. We hold that the District Court 

properly considered the respondent's foregone earnings as monetary contributions toward the acquisition of the oil and gas 

interests. Indeed, they are measured accurately in dollars and 

cents and it is difficult to conceive of them as anything but 

monetary. 

The appellant further contends that her non-monetary contr ibutions were not considered. At the trial the appellant 

testified that during the term of the marriage she maintained the 

house, kept it clean, provided meals, did the shopping, cared for 

the children, did ironing, helped with lawn care, and was active 

in social functions related to the husband Is business. Obviously 

these contributions are substantial. However, we find no error. 

This Court has stated innumerable times that the District Court 

had broad discretion in dividing the marital estate. "The test 

for reviewing the District Court's discretion is : Did the 

District Court in the exercise of its discretion act arbitrarily 

without employment of conscientious j udgement , or exceed the 

bounds of reason in view of all the circumstances?" Converse v. 
Converse (1982), - - - . - Mont . I -- -- - - - - .- --- , 645 P.2d 413, 415, 

39 St .Rep, 887, 889; Levandowski v. Levandowski (1981), 

-- Mont . - -. -. --. - , 630 P.2d 239, 38 St.Rep. 1002; In Re Marriage 

of Brown (1978), 179 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361; Ze11 v. Ze11 

(1977), 174 Mont. 216, 570 P.2d 33. We find no error with the 

District Court in its evaluation of the various contributions to 

the marriage. 

The appellant further contends "the court1 s findings did not 

address itself to the effect or the weight that was to be given 

Barbara1 s non-mone tary contributions . " Presumably the appellant 

considers such an omission as reversible error. We do not agree. 

" 'Findings of fact and conclusions of law provide a foundation for the court's judgment. 

Marriage of Barron (1978), 177 Mont. 161, 580 

P.2d 936. This foundation need not consist 

of a multitude of evidentiary facts, but the 

findings of fact must set forth a recordation 

of the essential and determining facts upon 

which the court rested its conclusions of law 

and without which the judgment would lack 

support. Jones v. Jones (1980)f Mon t . - --- , 620 P.2d 850, 37 St.Rep. 197T.-i-"- 

--- 

Converse, supra, 645 P.2d at 416, 39 St.Rep. at 890. 

As the second issue, the appellant alleges error by the 

District Court in failing to consider the oil and gas interests 

properly. Error is alleged through a two-pronged argument, 

first, "for failure to consider the income that was derived from 

the marital oil and gas properties and, second; that the court 

erred in failing to consider any value for additional oil and gas 

assets acquired as a result of income earned from what was an 

agreed marital asset ." This situation is one of first 

impression, consequently a more detailed view of the facts is 

necessary. 

As noted above, when the parties were divorced in May of 1978 

the District Court reserved jurisdiction to apportion the marital 

property. From the divorce to the hearing on property 

distribution, thirty-four months elapsed. During this thirtyfour month period the husband had control over the oil and gas 

properties. The properties consisted of "working interests" in 
twenty-three oil and gas wells, twenty of which were producing. 

The properties generated income and more "working interests" were 

purchased. Larry Krause testified that after the divorce he had 

purchased interests in ten to twenty additional wells. The funds 

to purchase these additional interests came from two sources; his 

income as a consultant, and from income generated from the original twenty producing wells. It was the wife's contention at the 

trial court that she be allowed to share equally in both the 

income realized from the original twenty wells and the additional 

interests purchased with the income of the original twenty. 

Before addressing this contention we find it necessary to evaluate the circumstances which generated this issue. 

This problem arises because there was a time lapse of thirtyfour months between the date of dissolution and the hearing on 

property distribution. The record does not provide any j ustif ication for such a lengthy delay. Even if the time delay had not 

caused complications in the valuation of the property, this 

situation should not occur. Here the parties were divorced for 

nearly three years yet they still owned property as if they were 

husband and wife. 

A District Court may postpone disposition of the marital 

property. The authority is found in section 40-4-104, MCA, 

which reads in part: 

"The District Court shall enter a decree of 

dissolution if: 

". . . the court has considered, approved, or 

made provision for . . . the disposition of 

prope;ty or provided -- - for a separate, --- later 

hearing - tocomplete these matters." (Emphasis 

added. ) 

The comments to this section state: 

"The phrase , cons idered , approved, or provided for' in subsection . . . (l)(d) is 

intended to confer upon the court the 

authority to refuse to make any award, if the 

evidence justifies an outright denial, as well 

as the authority to make such allotment as the 

facts require. To avoid any doubt, the court 

is authorized expressly to provide for a 

later hearing to complete action on these 

matters, - if - necessary." (Emphasis added. ) 

Commissionerls Note, ~hnotations to MCA, Title 

40, Family Law, p. 49. 
Once before we have focused on the language of subsection 

(l)(d). In Miller v. Miller (1980), -- .- Mont . ----I , 616 

P.2d 313, 318, 37 St.Rep. 1523, 1528; the appellant claimed that 

it was error to separate the dissolution aspect of the marriage 

from the property disposition. This Court denied that claim and 

stated: "the interests of justice and judicial economy are best 

served by giving District Courts broad discretion in the conduct 

of their proceedings and the severance of the various elements of 

dissolution decrees." 

Nonetheless we do not view the statute and comments as 

allowing an indefinite postponement of the property disposition. 

The language is straightforward. The court can postpone matters 

only if it has "provided for a separate later hearing." In our 

view, "provide for" means to make arrangements for. Making 

arrangements includes the setting of a date or a time period 

which is agreeable between the parties. To do otherwise is to 

unnecessarily punish the parties. An indefinite postponement 

merely places the parties in limbo and creates appellate 

problems. 

Furthermore, a postponement should not be a routine matter. 

The comments note that postponement is authorized "if necessary." 

Certainly there are cases where postponement of property distribution or other matters is in the best interests of the parties. 

However, it should be clear that delay is "necessary." Present 

Colorado law suggests a balanced approach. Their statute also 

allows District Court discretion in postponement of property 

distribution, yet that discretion is limited. Their comparable 

version of our subsection (l)(d) reads: 

"The district court shall enter a decree of 

dissolution of marriage when: 

"(b) In connection with every decree of dissolution . . . the court shall consider, 

approve, or make provision for . . . the 

disposition of property; but the entry of a 

-- decree with respect to . . . dispositionoF 

property -- may be deferred by the court until a 

time subsequent to the decree of dissolution 

of marriage -- upon - a finding that such deferral - - - - is necessary in the best interests of the -- - - -- - - 
parties." Colo .Rev.Stat. section 14-10-106 

( 1973 ) . This requires the Colorado courts to make specific findings 

of necessity before deferring property distribution. "It is 

clear that the reason for the requirement for a specific finding 

on this issue is to prevent unwarranted delays in dividing property in dissolution of marriage cases." In Re Marriage of Rose 

(1977)r 40 Co10.App. 176, 177, 574 P.2d 112, 113. 

In summary, we encourage District Courts to conclude all matters upon entry of a decree of dissolution. In those unusual 

cases where the trial court is not able to provide for the 

property disposition at the time of dissolution, the District 

Court must make written findings that a postponement of the property disposition is in the best interests of the parties. 

Furthermore, the District Court must "provide for a separate 

later hearing" by either setting a specific hearing date to 

complete matters or by setting a time period within which the 

parties must come before the court for final disposition. 

We do not intend to set precise time limits. Such decisions 

are within the discretion of the District Court. Furthermore, we 

do not hold that an unwarranted delay will result in a faulty 

District Court judgment. However, in this case, the unwarranted 

delay coupled with valuation factors resulted in an abuse of 

discretion. Part of the problem results from the District 

Court's timing of the property valuation. The District Court 

relied on the Special Master's report which valued the oil and 

gas interests effective January 1, 1979, seven months after the 

dissolution. All of the other contested property was valued 

effective May 17, 1978, the date of dissolution. 

As to the time of valuation we have said, " [tlhe time for 

proper valuation cannot be tied to any single event in the 

dissolution process. The filing of a petition, trial of the 

matter, or even the granting of the decree of dissolution do not 

control the proper point of evaluation by the District Court." 

Lippert v. Lippert (1981), - .- Mont . ---I , 627 P.2d 1206, 
1208, 38 St.Rep. 625, 628. Furthermore, we indicated that there 

can be several valuation points rather than one single point for 

all of the property. This is so because some assets may fluctuate in value. Although A Lippert did not involve a postdissolution property distribution the same rule applies and 

extends beyond the dissolution date. Thus, in these facts, the 

time of the dispositional hearing on March 3, 1981, was a 

feasible and allowable point to determine valuation. 

Furthermore, it was the preferable point in view of the often 

stated rule that the partiesg net worth must be determined at or 

near the time of the divorce. See Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), 

Mon t . -- , 607 P.2d 102, 37 St.Rep. 247; Vivian v. Vivian 

(1978), 178 Mont. 341, 583 P.2d 1072; In Re Marriage of Kramer 

(1978), 177 Mont. 61, 580 P.2d 439; Downs v. Downs (1976)I 170 

Mont. 150, 551 P.2d 1025. The crux of the above-cited cases is 

that property valuation should occur at the time of property 

distribution, or in other words, emphasis is on current 

valuations. This reasoning is evident in Herring v. Herring 

(19791 I Mont . , 602 P.2d 1006, 1007, 36 St.Rep. 

2052, 2054, where we remanded since "there was no attempt to 

place a present, fair market value upon these items or to determine the net worth of the parties at the time of their divorce." 

Additionally, in Evert v. Evert (1982)f Mont . - -- -- - - , 645 

P.2d 417, 39 St.Rep. 860, we remanded to the District Court for 

failure to "place current values on the partiesg assets." In 

that case the District Court awarded a house and a 2% acre parcel 

of land based only upon the equity built by the parties rather 

than any valuation figure. 

From the foregoing discussion several principles are evident; 

(1) proper valuation is not tied to a specific event, (2) there 

may be more than one valuation point, depending upon the kind of 

property involved, and (3) preferably, valuation should occur at 

the time of distribution, or, stated another way, present fair 

market values should be used. In given fact situations, these 
principles con£ lict with each other. When one considers the many 

different kinds of marital property and the associated problems 

of valuation it is obvious that a hard and fast rule should not 

be imposed. Thus, we cannot rule that District Courts must 

always value property at the time of distribution. Time and time 

again we have said it is the District Court that has broad 

discretion in property distribution. In Sell v. Sell (1981), -- 

Mont. 630 P.2d 222, 224, 38 St.Rep 956, 958, we 

stated: " [tlhis court has a limited scope of appellate review 

and will not intervene except when the District Court has 

departed substantially from the norms of equity." "The exercise 

of discretion by the District Court is necessary when determining 

the worth of marital assets which fluctuate in value." Lippert, 

627 P.2d at 1208, 38 St.Rep. at 628. In this case we find that 

the District Court abused its discretion in the valuation of the 

contested marital property. The record indicates substantial 

differences in the value of some of the property from the 

District Court's valuation dates to the time of the dispositional 

hearing. For example, the Energy Resources stock was valued at 

$18,000 on May 17, 1978, the date of dissolution. The District 

Court used this value in its determination. Testimony at the 

dispositional hearing showed its present value at $31,000. 

Failure to recognize these kinds of value fluctuations is error. 

On remand the District Court should accept evidence on current 

valuations of all of the contested marital property. 

Specifically, the appellant alleges error for the District 

Court's failure to consider both the oil and gas income and the 

additional acquisitions. In appellant's view, these assets are 

part of the marital estate. We agree. 

The case of Lippert is cited in support of this contention. 

There the husband took $96,000 of the marital property to invest 

in a business. The business went bad and the investment was 

lost. The District Court considered the $96,000 as part of the 

marital estate even though it was not in existence at the time of 
dissolution. The judgment ordered the husband to pay the wife a 

sum of $48,000, one-half of the amount that was lost. We 

reversed stating that "the award ignores fundamental legal principles of marital status; spouses possess mutual powers, obligations and interests which endure until lawfully modified or 

terminated. One of those powers is the power to freely contract 

with others regarding marital property." -- Lippert, 627 P.2d at 

1209, 38 St.Rep. at 629. That reasoning applies to this 

situation. The appellant was never divested of her interest in 

the marital property. She retained a mutual interest even though 

the respondent was in control of the property. It cannot be 

disputed ; the appellant held an interest in income-generating 

property. That income, of which she had an interest, was reinvested to acquire more assets. It follows that she also has an 

interest in those additional assets. In effect, the District 

Court failed to value all of the marital assets, consequently the 

case must be remanded. Tefft v. Tefft (1981), Mont. I 

628 P.2d 1094, 38 St.Rep. 837; Hamiton v. Hamilton (1980), 

Mont . - - - .- , 607 P.2d 10 2, 37 St.Rep. 247. 

The record indicates that the additional interests were 

purchased in part from the respondent's own earnings. Also, it 

may be that the respondent acquired the additional interests 

through careful and prudent management. These contr ibut ions 

deserve careful consideration. 

Finally, the appellant contends that there was a lack of candor and disclosure on the part of the respondent in failing to or 

intentionally refusing to provide in£ ormat ion concerning the 

additional oil and gas interests. The record does not substantiate such a claim. Presumably the appellant hoped to get this 

information on the day of trial through the testimony of Robert 

Nance , the respondent's business associate. It was learned the 

day before trial that Mr. Nance could not attend, thus hurried 

arrangements were made to take his deposition. During the deposition the following exchange occurred: 
"Q. Has Larry Krause acquired oil and gas 

interests in addition to these that are set 

out in these three exhibits that are before 

you since the date of the last acquisition of 

the interests listed there? A. Oh, boy, I 

would say yes, but I don't know that for a 

fact because I don't keep up with Larry's 

endeavors as far as our participation is concerned. I would have to go back and check our 

blow sheets as to who got what in what wells. 

I don't keep that right on the tip of my 

tongue. 

"Q. Who would have access to those records to 

determine the additional interests that Larry 

would have acquired, say since May of 1978? 

A. Well, my bookkeeper would. 

"Q. What is her name? A. Marlene Conrad ." 

Then, the morning of the trial, Mr. Nance's bookkeeper was 

served with a subpoena duces tecum. However, the bookkeeper did 

not appear with the desired documents because she felt she did 

not have the authority to produce the records of Mr. Nance. The 

appellant further sought this information from the respondent 

during trial where the following exchange occurred: 

"8. Have you acquired additional producing 

interests from income that was generated from 

those original 20 wells? A. Income from 

those wells and income that I've made on consulting, yes. I have acquired additional 

wells. 

"Q. Do you know how many additional interests 

you have acquired? A. Not just offhand. I 

would be guessing what it is, because I really 

don' t know for sure. 

"Q. Would it be more than 20? A. No. 

"Q. Would it be less than ten? A. I would 

say between 10 and 20, somewhere in that 

range." 

These facts taken together certainly do not substantiate a 

lack of candor or disclosure. A review of the District Court's 

file certainly shows otherwise. Similar information was sought 

by the appellant early in the action through the use of 

interrogatories. The respondent's answers were very complete in 

those early instances and there is nothing to suggest that at 

trial he would not have been as complete given adequate time to 

prepare the in£ ormat ion. 

The judgment is vacated and remanded for further proceedings . 
We concur: