* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 95-60268

Summary Calendar

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KEVIN DION WILEY, also known as

Edward Jackson; MACK DANCY,

Defendants-Appellants.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

(3:94-CR-078)

_________________________________________________________________

August 7, 1996

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kevin Wiley and Mack Dancy appeal their convictions for

conspiracy to possess and aiding and abetting the possession of,

crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841 and 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. They contend that the evidence,

largely the testimony of a co-conspirator, Williams, was

insufficient to support the verdict against them on both counts.
- 2 -

There is no requirement that testimony by a co-conspirator

fulfilling a plea bargain be corroborated by independent evidence.

The jury is entrusted with the responsibility of evaluating the

credibility of witnesses, and even uncorroborated testimony of a

co-conspirator will sustain a guilty verdict unless, as is not the

case here, the testimony is incredible or otherwise insubstantial

on its face. United States v. Gardea Carrasco, 830 F.2d 41, 44

(5th Cir. 1987). The evidence was sufficient to establish the

requisite elements for a conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. §

846 and for aiding and abetting the possession of crack cocaine

with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and

18 U.S.C. § 2.

Wiley contends that the district court erred by refusing two

proposed jury instructions on accomplice testimony. The existence

of Williams’ plea agreement was fully disclosed to the jury; and,

the district court properly instructed the jury on the caution with

which accomplice testimony is to be received, and that it should

not convict a defendant on the basis of the unsupported testimony

of an alleged accomplice unless it believed that testimony beyond

a reasonable doubt. The charge, as a whole, is a correct statement

of the law and clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of law

applicable to the factual issues confronting them. See United

States v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1338 (5th Cir. 1996).

Wiley and Dancy contend that the disparity between sentences
- 3 -

imposed for powder cocaine-related offenses and crack cocainerelated offenses violates the equal protection component of the due

process clause. This contention is foreclosed under our prevailing

jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 77 F.3d 105,

112 (5th Cir. 1996). Wiley and Dancy seek reconsideration of this

jurisprudence, asserting, for the first time on appeal, that there

is no medical or scientific evidence to support Congress’ continued

imposition of the disparity, and that Congress’ rejection of the

Sentencing Commission’s proposal to equalize penalties for crack

and powder cocaine-related offenses demonstrates discriminatory

intent. Plain error considerations aside, we generally will not

consider new evidence on appeal. See United States v. Flores, 887

F.2d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1989). Moreover, in the absence of an

overriding Supreme Court decision, a change in statutory law, or an

en banc decision by our court, our court’s prior rulings are

binding. E.g., United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 877

(5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

AFFIRMED