ALD-009 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 20-1959

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CHRISTOPHER YOUNG,

Appellant

v.

TAMMY FERGUSON; DANIEL MYERS; BOBBI JO SALAMON; JENNIFER 

ROSSMAN; DAVID LINK; STEFAN STESSNEY; TIMOTHY GRAHAM; JOHN 

DANISON; W. MATTHEWS; JOSEPH DUPONT; JOHN WETZEL 

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-cv-00879)

District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

October 8, 2020

Before: MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR. and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed December 2, 2020)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM

Appellant Christopher Young filed a civil rights action against numerous prison 

officials grounded on his temporary administrative placement in a restricted housing unit 

(“RHU”).1 Specifically, Young alleged that he was normally housed with the general 

population at SCI Albion as he was a “custody level 3-4” prisoner. He complained that, 

on five separate occasions when he was temporarily taken to SCI Benner for court 

appearances, he was placed in “administrative custody” and housed in the RHU, which 

limited his access to the phone, law library, and outdoor recreation time, among other 

things. 

Young filed grievances while being held at SCI Benner on at least four occasions. 

The review committee responded each time, noting that it was prison policy to house 

temporary transfers in the RHU and that, on three occasions, lack of bed space prevented 

Young from being housed with the general population. In his complaint, Young alleged 

that his placement in the RHU violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of six defendants 

and granted the remaining defendants’ motion to dismiss. Young appealed. 

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the District 

Court’s orders granting the defendants’ motions de novo. See Tundo v. County of 

1 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we will recite only the facts 

necessary for the discussion. 
Passaic, 923 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2019) (summary judgment); Newark Cab Ass’n v. 

City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018) (motion to dismiss). We may 

summarily affirm on any ground supported by the record if the appeal fails to present a 

substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 

In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim, Young must establish that he was

denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Only “extreme deprivations” are sufficient to make out a 

conditions of confinement claim, Hudson v. McMillen, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992), such as 

when a prisoner has been denied “basic human needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, 

sanitation, medical care and personal safety” from physical assault, Griffin v. Vaughn, 

112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997). Placement in administrative segregation, by itself, is 

insufficient to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 

348, 352 (3d Cir. 1981).

Young has not alleged any deprivation that would be sufficient under the Eighth 

Amendment. In his deposition, Young stated that the cells in the RHU were the same as 

those in the general population. He received food on a daily basis and was able to 

exercise and shower regularly. While Young identified some differences between the 

RHU and the general population, such as longer waiting time for cleaning supplies to be 

delivered and limited access to the phone, Young was provided “life’s necessities.” 
Young’s equal protection claim also fails. He does not allege membership in a 

suspect class or interference with a fundamental right, so he must show that he has been 

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational 

basis for the difference in treatment. See Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr. Facility, 221 

F.3d 410, 423 (3d Cir. 2000). We agree with the District Court that Young was similarly 

situated to inmates who were temporary transfers to SCI Benner. By Young’s own 

admission, all temporary transfers were placed in administrative custody and housed in 

the RHU. Young was not treated differently.2 

Finally, the District Court properly concluded that the claims against certain 

defendants (Wetzel, Danison, Matthews, Dupont, and Graham) failed because they were 

not directly involved in the alleged constitutional violations. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 

845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998). Young alleged simply that he disagreed with the 

way those defendants responded to his grievances, which generally is not the basis for a 

claim. See id.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

2 To the extent that Young alleged a due process violation under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, his temporary administrative confinement in the RHU did not implicate a 

liberty interest. See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that 

administrative segregation for 120 days did not implicate a protected liberty interest); 

Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[C]onfinement in administrative 

or punitive segregation will rarely be sufficient, without more, to establish the kind of 

‘atypical’ deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a liberty interest.”).