*Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________________________

No. 97-20387

(Summary Calendar)

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BARBARA ALANIES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

O’QUINN, KERENSKY, MCANINCH

& LAMINACK; ET AL Defendants

O’QUINN, KERENSKY, MCANINCH 

& LAMINACK, and JOHN M.

O’QUINN, P.C.,

Defendants-Appellees.

_______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

No. 4:95-CV-5802

_______________________________________________

March 19, 1998

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

In this employment discrimination case, Plaintiff-Appellant

Barbara Alanies appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee O’Quinn, Kerensky, McAninch

& Laminack (law firm), holding that Alanies’s claim was precluded
1This court reviews the granting of a summary judgment de novo

under well-established standards. Blakeney v. Lomas Info. Sys.,

Inc., 65 F.3d 482, 484 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.

1042 (1996).

2

by the release provisions of the Separation Agreement she signed at

the termination of her employment with the law firm. Alanies

asserts that the district court erred, as (1) the release was not

supported by adequate consideration, and (2) she promptly returned

the contract consideration and therefore did not ratify the

Separation Agreement. After a de novo review of the record,1 we

find no merit in either of these arguments and, accordingly,

affirm.

Alanies contends first that she received no consideration for

her release of all claims against the law firm, as the Separation

Agreement provides that Alanies’s severance pay was tendered “in

lieu of notice.” She maintains that, inasmuch as the severance pay

was consideration for lack of notice to her prior to termination,

it could not also be sufficient consideration for the release. But

the Separation Agreement expressly provides that 

[b]y acceptance and negotiation of the severance check

and by the signature below, the undersigned . . .

releases and forever discharges Law Firm for any claim of

any kind known or unknown, whether in contract or tort,

property damages and any other damages which have accrued

or may ever accrue to the undersigned arising out of the

employment.

As the district court noted, a single consideration is sufficient
2Birdwell v. Birdwell, 819 S.W.2d 223, 228 (Tex. App. —— Fort

Worth 1991, writ denied); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 80

cmt. a (1981) (“A single performance or return promise may thus

furnish consideration for any number of promises.”).

3Blakeney, 65 F.3d at 485.

3

to support multiple promises bargained for in an agreement.2 After

a review of the plain language of the Separation Agreement, we

reach the same conclusion as did the district court —— that

Alanies’s receipt of severance pay was sufficient consideration to

support all of Alanies’s promises in the Separation Agreement, not

just her waiver of notice.

Alanies also asserts that the Separation Agreement is

unenforceable because (1) she was suffering from an impaired

physical and emotional condition and was coerced into signing it,

and (2) the law firm misrepresented to her that it would continue

her medical benefits for three weeks. The law firm insists that,

even if the agreement was voidable, Alanies ratified it by failing

to return the severance pay within a reasonable time after learning

that the release was voidable.

We have held that to rescind a release agreement, an employee

must (1) restore the status quo ante, and (2) return the

consideration shortly after the discovery of the alleged

deficiency.3 Failure to return the consideration given in exchange

for the covenant not to sue manifests an intention to be bound by
4Wamsley v. Champlin Ref. & Chems., Inc., 11 F.3d 534, 540

(5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1037 (1995); see also

Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930, 937 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1019 (1994)(“Even if a release is tainted by

misrepresentation or duress, it is ratified if the releasor retains

the consideration after learning that the release is voidable.”).

5Blakeney, 65 F.3d at 485 n.3.

6See Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217, 221 (5th

Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Digital Equip. Corp. v.

Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994).

7See Blakeney, 65 F.3d at 485 n.3.

4

the terms of the waiver.4 Although we have not “prescribe[d] a

precise timetable for tender” of consideration,5 we have held that

summary judgment was appropriate when one plaintiff waited two

years6 and when another waited twenty-two months7 to return the

benefits of the release.

By Alanies’s own calculations, her tender of the severance

payment came more than sixteen months after she became free of

those physical impairments and oppressive circumstances that

purportedly compromised her free will and led her to sign the

release. Even under Alanies’s alternate contention, more than nine

months elapsed between her discovery of the law firm’s alleged

misrepresentation about her health insurance and her return of the

money. In the interval between her signing the release and her

tender of the lump sum settlement payment, Alanies (1) wrote

several letters to the law firm, detailing her claim and demanding

settlement; (2) obtained legal counsel; (3) engaged in settlement

negotiations; (4) received a letter from counsel for McAninch, a
5

partner at the law firm, pointing out that she had “never attempted

to revoke her release, much less return the consideration she

received for signing it;” and (5) filed an EEOC charge. Taking

into consideration all these factors, we agree with the district

court that 

as a matter of law . . . her failure to return the cash

consideration within sixteen or seventeen months after

being fully cognizant of most of the claims that she has

now sued on, and within nine months after discovering the

additional claim of misrepresentation that her medical

insurance would be continued for three weeks, is a

passage of time that fails separately and in the

aggregate to meet the Grillet requirement that she return

the consideration “shortly after” or “soon after”

discovering the misrepresentation.

Our de novo review leads us to agree with the conclusion of

the district court that Alanies’s claims are barred by the terms of

her release and that she ratified it. Consequently, the judgment

of the district court should be, and therefore is,

AFFIRMED.