Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 1 of 18

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

INDIANA EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT

RELATIONS BOARD

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

David Steiner

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Eric M. Hylton

Laura S. Reed

Riley Bennett & Egloff, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Indiana Education Employment 

Relations Board and Nettle 

Creek School Corporation,

Appellants,

v.

Nettle Creek Classroom 

Teachers Association,

Appellee

January 28, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

49A02-1402-PL-78

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Thomas J. Carroll, 

Judge

Cause No. 49D06-1204-PL-16036

Bradford, Judge.

Case Overview
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 2 of 18

[1] In 2011, Appellant Nettle Creek School Corporation (the “School 

Corporation”) and Appellee Nettle Creek Classroom Teachers Association (the 

“Association”) were engaged in collective bargaining for the 2011-2012 school 

year. The School Corporation and the Association (collectively, “the parties”) 

were unable to agree to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and came 

to an impasse. Both sides submitted a last best offer (“LBO”) to Appellant the 

Indiana Education Employment Relations Board (the “Board”) after mediation 

failed. 

[2] The Association initiated judicial review after the Board adopted the School 

Corporation’s LBO. On November 27, 2013, the trial court found that the 

Board erroneously determined that the relevant proffered provisions of the 

parties’ LBOs included an improper attempt to bargain hours rather than 

wages. The trial court also found that the Board erroneously concluded that the 

Association’s LBO contained an improper attempt by the Association to 

bargain for an overtime compensation system that is inconsistent with both 

Federal and Indiana law. 

[3] Upon review, we conclude that while teachers are not entitled to earn overtime 

for the completion of direct teaching functions, the relevant legal authority does 

not exclude the bargaining for and potential receipt of additional wages for the 

completion of required ancillary or voluntary co-curricular duties. Accordingly, 

we remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings that are consistent 

with this opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 3 of 18

Facts and Procedural History

[4] In 2011, the parties were engaged in collective bargaining for the 2011-2012 

school year. The parties, however, were unable to agree to a CBA and came to 

an impasse. In light of the parties’ failure to agree to a CBA, the parties 

participated in mediation. After mediation failed, both sides submitted a LBO 

to the Board. The disputed issues related to the Association’s request for 

additional compensation for required hours worked outside the normal 

workday and certain grievance procedures.1 

[5] On November 29, 2011, the Board appointed a factfinder to hear the parties’ 

case. With respect to the parties’ dispute relating to the Association’s request 

for additional compensation for hours worked outside the normal seven-andone-half-hour workday, the Association’s proffered version of the provision at 

issue reads as follows:

A. (With the understanding that the established contractual 

teacher work day is seven hours and thirty minutes),[2]the [School 

Corporation] shall have the right to require a total of fifteen (15) hours 

 

1

 The parties’ dispute relating to the grievance procedures is not at issue in the instant appeal. 

2

 The parties do not appear to dispute that the School Corporation expects its teachers to work sevenand-one-half hours each day.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 4 of 18

after school activities per semester for each full-time teacher, without 

additional compensation.

B. The compensation for each hour in excess of the fifteen (15) 

hours shall be based on the following rate:

Thirty Four (34) dollars per hour.

Appellant’s App. p. 80. The School Corporation’s proffered version of the 

provision at issue reads as follows:

Teachers are professional employees and are paid on a salary basis 

rather than an hourly basis. The length of the normal work day for 

teachers will be 7.5 hours. This normal teacher work day may be 

extended as necessary to prepare and update lesson plans and other 

instructional materials; conduct parent/teacher conferences; evaluate 

and record student performance; meet with students to counsel them 

and address their academic needs; attend and present information at 

faculty committee meetings, case conferences; participate in 

instructional leadership activities, including the responsibility for 

conducting program and staff evaluation; and participate in cocurricular assignments and extra-curricular assignments listed in the 

ECA Schedule in this Collectively Bargained Agreement.

Appellant’s App. p. 99. Following a hearing, the factfinder issued a 

recommended order in which it adopted the School Corporation’s LBO as the 

parties’ CBA for the 2011-2012 school year. On January 11, 2012, the 

Association appealed the factfinder’s order to the Board. 

[6] The Board held a hearing on January 24, 2012, after which it issued a final 

order. With respect to the parties’ dispute relating to the Association’s request 

for additional compensation for required hours worked outside the normal 

workday, the Board stated the following:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 5 of 18

Under [Indiana Code chapter] 20-29-4 and [Indiana Code section] 20-

29-6-18(b), the [Board’s] decision in this matter is restricted to wages, 

salary, and wage-related fringe benefits. In light of strong statutory 

language and legislative intent toward restricting contracts to these 

limited subjects, we are bound to omit from the imposed contract any 

language referring to other subjects. Compensation for hours worked 

outside the contracted work day and work year is a problematic issue, 

because it suggests a determination of hours to be worked. Hours, 

previously a subject of bargaining, has been legislatively re-categorized 

as an item for the discussion process under [Indiana Code section] 20-

29-6-7, and, as such, may not receive even a mention in the contract. 

In order to comply with these statutory mandates here, the contract 

imposed by the [Board] for the Nettle Creek teachers cannot include 

Article IV of the School Corporation’s LBO or Article III, Section G of 

the Association’s LBO, as both contain daily hours of work.

****

6. [Indiana Code chapter] 20-29-4, [Indiana Code section] 20-29-6-

18(b), and [Indiana Code section] 20-29-6-4.5(a)(5) make abundantly 

clear that all contracts imposed by [the Board] in the factfinding 

process are restricted to wages, salary, and wage-related fringe benefits.

7. In order to reconcile the statutory mandates of [Indiana Code 

section] 20-29-6-15.1 and [Indiana Code section] 20-29-6-18(b) in this 

case, and to assure that the contract we impose contains only 

statutorily-permissible language, the [Board] will strike the 

impermissible portion and adopt the remainder of one party’s LBO.

8. Were we to find that both LBOs contained only permissible 

language in regards to hours, we would, nonetheless, be bound to 

reject the Association’s proposal on compensation. An “overtime” 

system that permits different rates of pay based on the number of hours 

worked is precluded by statutory individual contract requirements. 

Specifically, [Indiana Code section] 20-28-6-2(a)(3)(C) provides that a 

“contract entered into by a teacher and a school corporation must ... 

contain the ... total salary to be paid to the teacher during the school year...” 

[emphasis added]. The individual teacher’s contract could not be 

executed under an “overtime” compensation system because such a 

system would make it impossible to calculate a total salary to be paid 

during the school year in advance because the salary would be 

adjusted throughout the year based on the number of hours the teacher 

works. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 6 of 18

Appellant’s App. pp. 206-07, 209-10 (emphasis and last set of brackets in 

original, footnotes omitted). Consistent with the above-stated language, the 

Board found as follows: “[t]he Association’s appeal is denied and the School 

Corporation’s [LBO] is adopted as the Nettle Creek contract, except insofar as 

any references to the hours of work ... in the School Corporation’s [LBO] shall 

be omitted from the contract.” Appellant’s App. p. 213. 

[7] On April 18, 2012, the Association filed a verified petition for judicial review of 

the Board’s decision in the trial court. On May 9, 2012, the School Corporation 

filed its answer to the Association’s petition. On June 13, 2012, the Board also 

filed an answer to the Association’s petition. The Association subsequently 

filed a motion for judgment on the administrative record and supporting 

memorandum. The Board filed a response in opposition to the Association’s 

motion on September 30, 2013. On October 11, 2013, the School Corporation 

filed a notice of its intention not to file a response to the Association’s motion. 

The Association subsequently filed a reply in favor of its motion.

[8] On November 27, 2013, the trial court issued its findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon. Specifically, the trial court found as follows:

15. The issue in this case is whether [the Board] incorrectly rejected 

the Association’s LBO based on its determination that [Indiana Code 

section] 20-29-6-4 prohibits the Association and the School 

Corporation from bargaining additional compensation for hours 

worked outside a teacher’s contracted work day, and its determination 

that the Association’s LBO would create a compensation system in 

violation of [Indiana Code section] 20-28-6-2. Additionally, what 

remedy should be entered if [the Board] incorrectly rejected the 

Association’s LBO is also at issue.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 7 of 18

 

17. ... [I]t is this Court’s determination that [the Board] incorrectly 

determined that [Indiana Code section] 20-29-6-4 does not permit the 

School Corporation and the Association to bargain pay for additional 

hours worked outside a teacher’s regular teacher’s contract, and 

incorrectly determined that the Association’s LBO would “create a 

compensation system in violation of [Indiana Code section] 20-28-6-

2(a)(3)(c).” (R. 490-91). 

18. As a result, the Court finds that [the Board’s] decision is 

arbitrary, capricious and not in accordance with the law. Ind. Code § 

4-21.5-5-14.

** ***

25. The bargaining of additional wages for additional hours worked 

outside the contracted work day does not bargain hours, but instead bargains 

wages.

26. At no time does the School Corporation lose the power to determine 

how many hours teachers work per day. Instead, the School Corporation 

unilaterally determines the number of hours and if a teacher is required to work 

additional hours outside the contracted work day, [Indiana Code section] 20-

29-6-4(a)(2) allows wages to be bargained to compensate teachers for this 

additional work.

27. Therefore, [the Board] incorrectly held that “Compensation for 

hours worked outside the contracted work day is a problematic issue, 

because it suggests a determination of hours to be worked.”

28. Next, [the Board] incorrectly held that:

An “overtime” system that permits different rates of pay based on the 

number of hours worked is precluded by statutory individual contract 

requirements. Specifically, [Indiana Code section] 20-28-6-2(a)(3)(C) 

provides that a “contract entered into by a teacher and a school 

corporation must ... contain the ... total salary to be paid to the teacher 

during the school year....” [emphasis added]. The individual teacher’s 

contract could not be executed under an “overtime” compensation 

system because such a system would make it impossible to calculate a 

total salary to be paid during the school year in advance because the 

salary would be adjusted throughout the year based on the number of 

hours the teacher works.”

29. [The Board’s] decision does not take into consideration all of 

the language of [Indiana Code section] 20-29-6-4(a) which states:

(a) A school employer shall bargain collectively with the exclusive 

representative on the following:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 8 of 18

(1) Salary.

(2) Wages.

(3) Salary and wage related fringe benefits, including accident, 

sickness, health, dental, vision, life, disability, retirement benefits, and 

paid time off as permitted to be bargained under [Indiana Code 

section] 20-28-9-11.

 

31. The $34/hour that the Association proposed in its LBO is the 

bargaining of “wages” and not “salary.” Therefore, the Association’s 

proposal does not violate [Indiana Code section] 20-29-6-4.

** **

40. Again, if the parties were to agree to the Association’s wage 

proposal, they would not be bargaining the number of hours worked. 

Instead, the School Corporation would control how many hours 

teachers worked above and beyond the hours contained in their regular 

teacher’s contract. The only change is that the parties will be allowed 

to bargain wages for this additional work.

41. This gives a school corporation flexibility if it needs to add 

hours on top of what is in a regular teacher’s contract and provides 

wages to teachers for working the extra hours.

42. [The Board] was concerned that allowing the bargaining of 

additional wages would violate [Indiana Code section] 20-3-28-6-

2(a)(3)(C) because the regular teacher’s contract must contain the total 

“salary” to be paid to a teacher during the school year. This ruling has 

no effect on a teacher’s “salary.” Instead, this ruling allows the 

bargaining of additional “wages” for additional hours worked beyond 

what is contained in a regular teacher’s contract.

43. As previously stated, “salary” and “wages” are two separate 

items that can be bargained under [Indiana Code section] 20-29-6-4 

and therefore have different meanings.

44. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that under [Indiana 

Code section] 20-29-6-4, school corporations and teacher associations 

can bargain additional wages for hours worked over the number of 

hours contained in a regular teacher’s contract.

45. The Court further finds that the wage proposal made by the 

Association at fact-finding in its LBO is permissible and can be 

bargained under [Indiana Code section] 20-29-6-4, and it does not 

violate the regular teacher’s contract statutes at [Indiana Code section] 

20-28-6-2. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 9 of 18

Tr. pp. 374, 375, 377-78, 380 (emphasis added to Paragraphs 25 and 26; 

emphasis, brackets, and ellipses in Paragraph 28 in original). In making these 

findings, the trial court reversed the Board’s decision and ordered that the 

matter be remanded to the Board “to enter an order consistent with [the trial 

court’s order], and to make further findings [as to] whether the School 

Corporation’s or the Association’s LBO should be chosen based on a correct 

interpretation of the law as stated herein.” Appellant’s App. p. 380-81. The 

Board subsequently initiated the instant appeal.3

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[9] While the legislature has granted courts the power to review the action 

of state government agencies taken pursuant to the Administrative 

Orders and Procedures Act [(“AOPA”)], this power of judicial review 

is limited. See State Bd. of Registration for Prof’l Eng’rs v. Eberenz, 723 

N.E.2d 422, 430 (Ind. 2000); Indiana Dep’t of Envtl. Management v. 

Conard, 614 N.E.2d 916, 919 (Ind. 1993); Indiana Dep’t of Natural 

Resources v. United Refuse Co., 615 N.E.2d 100, 103 (Ind. 1993). A court 

may only set aside agency action that is:

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law;

 

3

 We disagree with the Association’s assertion that the Board does not have standing to prosecute 

the instant appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 10 of 18

(2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 

immunity;

(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, 

or short of statutory right;

(4) without observance of procedure required by law; or

(5) unsupported by substantial evidence.

See Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d).

LTV Steel Co. v. Griffin, 730 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Ind. 2000). “The party seeking 

judicial review bears the burden to demonstrate that the agency’s action is 

invalid.” Pendleton v. McCarty, 747 N.E.2d 56, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing 

Ind. Code § 4-21-5-5-14(a)). 

[10] A review of an administrative agency’s decision at the trial court level “is not 

intended to be a trial de novo, but rather the court simply analyzes the record as 

a whole to determine whether the administrative findings are supported by 

substantial evidence.” Whirlpool Corp. v. Vanderburgh Cnty.-City of Evansville 

Human Relations Comm’n, 875 N.E.2d 751, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing 

Amoco Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Labor, 726 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). A 

party may appeal a trial court’s determination of the propriety of the 

administrative agency’s decision pursuant to the rules governing civil appeals. 

See Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-16. “When reviewing an administrative agency’s 

decision, appellate courts stand in the same position as the trial court.” 

Pendleton, 747 N.E.2d at 61 (citing Amoco, 726 N.E.2d at 872). 

[11] An appellate court “may not substitute [its] judgment on factual matters for that 

of the agency and are bound by the agency’s findings of fact if [the findings] are 

supported by substantial evidence.” Whirlpool, 875 N.E.2d at 759 (citing Ind. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 11 of 18

Dep’t of Natural Res., Law Enforcement Div. v. Cobb, 832 N.E.2d 585, 590 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005)).

Furthermore, courts that review administrative determinations, at both 

the trial and appellate level, review the record in the light most 

favorable to the administrative proceedings and are prohibited from 

reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses. 

[Amoco, 726 N.E.2d at 873.] While reviewing courts must accept the 

agency’s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence, no such 

deference need be accorded an agency’s conclusions of law, as the law 

is the province of the judiciary. Id.

Id. However, “[a]n interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency 

charged with the duty of enforcing the statute is entitled to great weight, unless 

this interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself.” LTV Steel, 730 

N.E.2d at 1257; State Emps. Appeals Comm’n v. Barclay, 695 N.E.2d 957, 959-60 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

II. Analysis

A. Relevant Statutory Authority Relating to Collective 

Bargaining Between a School Corporation and the Exclusive 

Representative of Its Teachers

[12] Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4(a) provides that a school corporation shall 

bargain collectively with the exclusive representative of its teachers (the 

“teachers’ representative”) regarding the following: (1) salary; (2) wages; and 

(3) salary and wages related to fringe benefits, including accident, sickness, 

health, dental, vision, life, disability, retirement benefits, and paid time off. 

During collective bargaining, the school corporation and the teachers’ 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 12 of 18

representative must discuss certain items, including: (1) curriculum 

development and revision; (2) selection of curricular materials; (3) teaching 

methods; (4) hiring, evaluation, promotion, demotion, transfer, assignment, 

and retention of certificated employees; (5) student discipline; (6) expulsion or 

supervision of students; (7) pupil/teacher ratio; (8) class size or budget 

appropriations; (9) safety issues for students and employees in the workplace, 

except those items required to be kept confidential by state or federal law; and 

(10) hours. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-7. However, “[t]he obligation to discuss does 

not require either party to enter into a contract, agree to a proposal, or make a 

concession related to the items listed in [Indiana Code section 20-29-6-7].” Ind. 

Code § 20-29-6-8. 

[13] If an impasse is declared at any time after at least sixty days following the 

beginning of formal collective bargaining, the Board shall appoint a mediator 

from the Board’s staff or an ad hoc panel. Indiana Code § 20-29-6-13(a). The 

mediation must consist of not more than three mediation sessions and must 

result in either (1) an agreement between the parties on the items permitted to 

be bargained or (2) each party’s LBO, including fiscal rationale, related to items 

permitted to be bargained. Indiana Code § 20-29-6-13(c). If an agreement has 

not been reached on the items permitted to be bargained within fifteen days of 

the end of mediation, the Board shall initiate fact-finding. Indiana Code § 20-

29-6-15.1(a). 

[14] Fact-finding must culminate in the factfinder imposing contract terms on the 

parties. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-15.1(b).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 13 of 18

The factfinder must select one (1) party’s last best offer as the contract 

terms. The factfinder’s order must be restricted to only those items 

permitted to be bargained and included in the collective bargaining 

agreement ... and must not put the employer in a position of deficit 

financing (as defined in [Indiana Code section] 20-29-2-6). The 

factfinder’s order may not impose terms beyond those proposed by the 

parties in their last, best offers.

Id. Fact-finding must not last longer than fifteen days. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-

15.1(d). Either party may appeal the decision of the factfinder to the Board 

within thirty days after receiving the factfinder’s decision. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-

18(a). The Board’s decision must be restricted to only those items permitted to 

be bargained and included in the collective bargaining agreement and must not 

put the employer in a position of deficit financing. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-18(b). 

The Board’s decision “may not impose terms beyond those proposed by the 

parties in their last, best offers.” Id. The Board’s decision must be issued 

within thirty days after receipt of the notice of appeal. Indiana Code § 20-29-6-

18(c).

B. Salary vs. Wages

[15] A salary is “[a]greed compensation for services—[especially] professional or 

semiprofessional services—[usually] paid at regular intervals on a yearly basis, 

as distinguished from an hourly basis.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (10th

Ed. 2014). A wage is “[p]ayment for labor or services, [usually] based on time 

worked or quantity produced; [specifically], compensation of an employee 

based on time worked or output of production.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

1811 (10th Ed. 2014). “Wages include every form of remuneration payable for a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 14 of 18

given period to an individual for personal services, including salaries, 

commissions, vacation pay, bonuses, and the reasonable value of board, 

lodging, payments in kind, tips, and any similar advantage received from the 

employer.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1811 (10th Ed. 2014). Indiana Code 

section 20-28-6-4(b) specifically provides that “[s]alary and wages include the 

amount of pay increases available to employees under the salary scale adopted 

under [Indiana Code section] 20-28-9-1.5, but do not include the teacher 

evaluation procedures and criteria, or any components of the teacher evaluation 

plan, rubric, or tool.”

[16] Under both Federal and Indiana law, a teacher is not entitled to receive 

overtime. Specifically, Section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“the Act”) 

provides that employees shall receive overtime compensation for hours worked 

in excess of forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207. However, the Act exempts 

certain employees from this requirement, including teachers employed in 

elementary or secondary schools. 29 U.S.C. § 213. “Exemptions from the Act 

are defined by regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor.” Osler 

Inst., Inc. v. Inglert, 558 N.E.2d 901, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Although the 

statutory exemptions are to be narrowly construed, “[t]he regulations are 

entitled to great weight and have been held to carry the full force of law.” Id. 

Further, Indiana Code section 20-29-6-3 provides that “[i]t is unlawful for a 

school employer to enter into any agreement that would place the employer in a 

position of deficit financing due to a reduction in the employer’s actual general
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 15 of 18

fund revenue or an increase in the employer’s expenditures when the 

expenditures exceed the employer’s current year actual general fund revenue.”

[17] While we recognize that teachers are not entitled to receive overtime 

compensation for performing their “normal” teaching duties, i.e., duties that are 

completed as part of one’s direct teaching function, we further recognize that a 

school corporation may require its teachers to undertake, or a teacher may 

agree to undertake, certain duties beyond a teacher’s “normal” teaching duties. 

Specifically, a school corporation may require its teachers to perform certain 

ancillary duties, such as professional development and training or attending 

conferences. In addition, teachers may agree to take on certain co-curricular 

responsibilities, such as coaching athletic teams or sponsoring an academic or 

extracurricular club. It is undisputed that teachers may negotiate for additional 

wages for responsibilities associated with co-curricular duties that are 

voluntarily assumed by a teacher.4 In the same vein, we interpret the abovediscussed law to allow that teachers could potentially receive additional wages 

for ancillary duties. 

 

4

 See Article III of the School Corporation’s LBO which sets forth the pay schedule for certain cocurricular responsibilities.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 16 of 18

[18] Stated differently, we interpret the law to provide that although the law does 

not allow for the receipt of overtime compensation by teachers related to their 

direct teaching functions, teachers are not necessarily excluded from receiving 

additional wages for required or agreed upon ancillary duties. Notably, counsel 

for the Board conceded during oral argument that it is possible under the 

relevant statutory authority for a teacher to earn wages in addition to the 

teacher’s salary and that an agreed-upon salary for direct teaching functions 

does not exclude wages for other functions completed by the individual teacher. 

As such, we conclude that teachers may negotiate with their employers for the 

receipt of additional wages for these ancillary duties. In reaching this 

conclusion, however, we do not mean to say that a school corporation must 

compensate teachers for the ancillary duties, but only that the law allows that 

teachers may negotiate with their employers for additional compensation for 

said ancillary duties.5 

 

5

Further, as our conclusion relates only to those ancillary duties that are required by the school 

corporation, any award of additional wages would not put a school corporation in a position of deficit 

spending as the school corporation controls the number of ancillary duties it requires of its teachers and 

should therefore be able to budget accordingly. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 17 of 18

C. The Instant Matter

[19] Again, here, the Association’s proffered version of the provision at issue reads 

as follows:

A. (With the understanding that the established contractual 

teacher work day is seven hours and thirty minutes), the [School 

Corporation] shall have the right to require a total of fifteen (15) hours 

after school activities per semester for each full-time teacher, without 

additional compensation.

B. The compensation for each hour in excess of the fifteen (15) 

hours shall be based on the following rate:

Thirty Four (34) dollars per hour.

Appellant’s App. p. 80. During oral argument, counsel for the Association 

clarified that the Association’s proffered provision represented an attempt to 

bargain for additional wages for ancillary duties which the School Corporation 

required of its teachers and was not a request for overtime compensation for 

duties relating to teachers’ direct teaching functions. 

[20] On remand, the Board should review the parties’ proffered LBO’s taking into 

consideration our conclusion that the parties may negotiate for additional 

wages for required ancillary duties, i.e., duties that are required by the School 

Corporation but are not considered to be direct teaching functions. We note, 

however, that in issuing this opinion, we do not mean to dictate any particular 

outcome to the Board. Our opinion merely sets forth the legal parameters 

under which the Board should consider the parties’ LBOs. The determination 

of which LBO to adopt as the parties’ contract is within the discretion of the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1402-PL-78 | January 28, 2015 Page 18 of 18

Board so long as the Board’s decision is made in accordance with the legal 

parameters set herein. 

[21] The matter is remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.