Filed 9/4/20 P. v. McWoodson CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH BYERS McWOODSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

B298925

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. SA099087)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, William L. Sadler, Judge. Affirmed.

Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Blythe J. 

Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

____________________________
2

Appellant Joseph McWoodson pleaded no contest to vehicle 

burglary after the trial court denied his motion to suppress 

evidence. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 1538.5.)1 We conclude that no 

Fourth Amendment violation occurred because (1) the evidence 

appellant seeks to suppress came from a motel room where he

was a casual visitor; (2) when the room rental lapsed, the motel 

took possession of duffel bags abandoned in it and gave them to 

deputies; and (3) appellant disclaims ownership of the duffel 

bags, which contained stolen property. The totality of the 

circumstances show appellant had no proprietary or possessory 

interest in the place searched or the things seized. Appellant

forfeited his challenge to fines and fees by failing to tell the court 

he is unable to pay them. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

At midnight on September 27, 2018, the sheriff conducted a 

vehicle burglary suppression operation in West Hollywood. 

Detective Gaudino, in plain clothes, was alerted that a Black 

male and female Hispanic in a black Hyundai with Oregon 

license plates were looking into cars at Robertson Boulevard and 

Melrose Avenue. When Gaudino and his partner arrived, they

saw appellant and a woman later identified as Desiree 

Hernandez on Melrose Avenue in a car matching the dispatcher’s 

description.

Gaudino saw appellant and Hernandez approach parked 

cars. He lost sight of them but his partner across the street, 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The facts are derived from testimony at the suppression 

hearing. Appellant acted in propria persona at the hearing but 

was represented by counsel when he pleaded no contest.
3

Detective Morton, reported that the Black suspect used a glass 

punch to break into two vehicles, removed property from the 

vehicles, and gave it to his accomplice.

Morton heard glass shatter as he approached the suspects. 

He did not see the window break because trees blocked his view; 

however, he saw appellant punch out the window of a second car, 

then pull out purses and small duffel bags and hand them to 

Hernandez. Morton was about 25 to 50 feet away when he 

witnessed the thefts.

Gaudino radioed field units to move in for an arrest. 

Hernandez ran to her car, drove away and was arrested 400 to 

500 feet from appellant. Stolen property was found in her car. 

Appellant did not leave with Hernandez. He walked past 

Gaudino, ducked between two cars, and removed his beanie, 

sweatshirt, and a glove. He was arrested moments later. A glass 

punch was found on the ground near appellant. Morton 

confirmed that appellant was the person he saw breaking a car 

window.

Gaudino interviewed Hernandez. He learned that she and 

appellant had been at a Motel 6 in Gardena. Deputies went to 

the motel on October 1, 2018. Ms. Vasquez, a manager,

confirmed that room 208 was registered to Desiree Hernandez. 

All of Hernandez’s belongings had been removed from the room

and placed in trash bags because she stopped paying the bill. 

Motel policy requires that items in a room be bagged and stored 

in the lobby when a room bill is unpaid for 24 hours; if unclaimed 

within a month, the abandoned property is discarded. Deputies 

never entered room 208 because Vasquez handed them the trash 

bags in the motel lobby.
4

Deputies took the trash bags to their station, where they 

conducted an inventory. Whenever they take personal property, 

they inventory it to ensure there is no contraband or perishable 

items, and to prove nothing was stolen while in the possession of 

the sheriff’s department. Items in the trash bags were entered 

into a computer database. Within two large zipped duffel bags

were several laptop computers, one of which was reported as 

stolen. Deputies did not have a warrant when they inventoried 

the contents of the bags.

Appellant conceded that the room at Motel 6 was registered 

to Hernandez. He testified that his name was not on the registry.

Hernandez let appellant into her room, where he spent five 

hours. During his visit, two or three other people came to the 

room. He stated that he left in Hernandez’s room “a black 

backpack with a Versace sign and [a] Louis Vuitton wallet with 

my credit card inside” and “a pair of size 13 Jordans, that’s also 

in that backpack.”

Appellant did not tell deputies when he was arrested that 

he left property at Motel 6. He found out later that stolen 

property was recovered at the motel. He testified that he never 

saw the duffel bags or stolen laptops while he was in the room.

Appellant was charged with six counts of second degree 

vehicle burglary and 12 counts of receiving stolen property

exceeding $950 in value; further, he has a prior serious or violent 

felony conviction for robbery, a prison prior, and was on bail 

when he committed the current offenses. (§§ 211, 459, 496, 

subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)–(j), 667.5, 1170.12, 12022.1.)

Appellant moved to suppress evidence taken from Motel 6, 

including 11 computers/laptops and an engagement ring. He 

asserted that his “residence” was illegally searched without a 
5

warrant. The court found appellant cannot contest the search of 

duffel bags stored in the Motel 6 lobby because he had no

expectation of privacy in them. It denied his motion.

Appellant waived his right to trial. He pleaded no contest 

to one count of vehicular burglary and admitted his prior 

conviction for robbery. The court sentenced him to the high term 

of three years, doubled for the strike prior, for a total of six years 

in prison. The court issued a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION

1. Motion to Suppress

The legality of the search is reviewable. (§ 1538.5, 

subd. (m).) We defer to the court’s factual findings if supported 

by substantial evidence, but exercise our independent judgment 

to determine if a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment. (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041; 

People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Federal standards 

govern the suppression of evidence derived from police searches 

and seizures. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 24; Ovieda, at p. 1041.)

The Fourth Amendment forbids “unreasonable searches 

and seizures.” Courts determine “whether the disputed search 

and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the 

Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.” (Rakas v. Illinois 

(1978) 439 U.S. 128, 140.) A defendant without a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the invaded place or the seized thing 

cannot bring a Fourth Amendment challenge. (People v. Roybal 

(1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 507.) The defendant “bears the burden of 

showing a legitimate expectation of privacy.” (Ibid.)

Courts look to the “totality of the circumstances,” such as 

whether the defendant has a property or possessory interest in 

the thing seized or the place searched; had the right to exclude 
6

others from that place; exhibited a subjective expectation that the 

place would remain free from government invasion; took normal 

precautions to maintain his privacy, and was legitimately on the 

premises. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 

Cal.4th 335, 365.)

Appellant admittedly was not the registered guest in room 

208. Nevertheless, he argues that he can object to a search and 

seizure as an overnight guest in Hernandez’s room. No evidence 

supports his claim. He spent five hours in room 208 on 

September 27, 2018; other people visited while he was there. He 

was arrested that night. He did not say he planned to spend the 

night, had a room key, unfettered access, and could exclude 

others from the room. The court could reasonably find that 

appellant was a “casual visitor” who cannot object to a search. 

(People v. Koury (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 687.)

Appellant and Hernandez departed without arranging 

payment of the daily rent, giving rise to an inference they 

abandoned the room and the items left behind. (People v. Parson 

(2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 345–346.) Motel 6 repossessed the room. 

Appellant lost any reasonable expectation of privacy he might 

have when he departed, failed to pay rent, and management took 

property abandoned in the room. (People v. Ingram (1981) 122 

Cal.App.3d 673, 677–681 [no expectation of privacy after hotel 

repossesses a room and takes items abandoned in it].) By the 

time appellant reached Motel 6 on October 2 or 3, the manager 

had already given the duffel bags to deputies.

The court reasonably found objective factors showing

abandonment of personal property. (People v. Parson, supra, 44 

Cal.4th at p. 346 [intent to abandon property in a motel focuses 

on objective factors, not the defendant’s subjective intent.) 
7

Officers did not need exigent circumstances to enter the Motel 6 

lobby to speak to the manager nor did they need to secure a 

warrant to take abandoned property from the motel.

A person aggrieved by damaging evidence obtained in a 

search of another person’s property cannot claim a violation of his 

own Fourth Amendment rights. (Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 

U.S. at p. 134.) Appellant testified that he never saw the duffel 

bags or stolen laptops in the motel room, where he left only a 

backpack containing his wallet and shoes. His disclaimer of a 

proprietary or possessory interest in evidence police collected

negates his claims of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

items. (People v. Stanislawski (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 748, 757; 

People v. Scott (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 405, 410 [house guest who 

denies putting anything under an ottoman and disavows 

ownership of a gun found there has no expectation of privacy].)

2. Imposition of Fines, Fees and Assessments

Before entering his no contest plea, appellant was advised 

that he would be subject to fees and fines. After pleading no 

contest, he was ordered to pay a $400 restitution fine; a stayed 

parole revocation fine; a $40 court operations assessment; and a 

$30 conviction assessment. He did not object to the fines or 

assessments, or the amounts, but now claims inability to pay.

Appellant forfeited this claim. (People v. Avila (2009) 46 

Cal.4th 680, 729; People v. Torres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 849, 860; 

People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153–1155 [“it is 

incumbent on [defendant] to object to the fine and demonstrate 

why it should not be imposed”]; compare People v. Dueñas (2019) 

30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1162 [disabled homeless probationer raised 

her inability to pay fines at sentencing].) Appellant was 
8

sentenced on April 16, 2019, more than three months after 

Dueñas was filed, yet he did not cite the case to the trial court.

The $400 restitution fine imposed exceeded the statutory 

minimum of $300. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) Inability to pay may

be considered when a fine exceeds the minimum, taking into 

account the gravity of the crime, the circumstances of its 

commission, any economic gain to the defendant and loss to the 

victims, and the number of victims. The defendant bears the 

burden of demonstrating inability to pay; no separate hearing is 

required. (§ 1202.4, subds. (c), (d).) This procedure existed when 

appellant was sentenced, but he did not invoke it or demonstrate

his inability to pay, thereby forfeiting it. (People v. Williams 

(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1291.) The statute presumes he can pay 

and left it to him to prove otherwise. (People v. Avila, supra, 46 

Cal.4th at p. 729.)

The fines and fees are not excessive. Appellant damaged 

vehicles and stole property from over a dozen victims. He was 

charged with 18 criminal counts, pleaded guilty to one count, and 

received a six-year sentence. A $400 fine and $70 in assessments 

are not “grossly disproportional to the gravity of [his] offense.” 

(United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334.)

Appellant is in his thirties; he claims no physical or mental 

disability preventing him from earning wages in prison or after 

release. (People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1075–1077

[$10,000 fine not excessive; defendant could pay it and other 

assessments from prison wages].) Appellant’s due process rights

are not implicated because he is not being imprisoned for failure 

to pay a fine. (Williams v. Illinois (1970) 399 U.S. 235, 237–239; 

People v. Torres, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 860, fn. 4.)
9

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.