## IN TH E C OU RT OF C RI MIN A L A PP EA LS O F T E XAS

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. PD - 0798- 08 A N N E E LIZ A BE TH M U R PH Y , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON APP ELLANT’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW

FROM THE FI RST CO URT O F AP PEALS

HA RRI S CO UNTY J OHNS ON , J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C our t i n w hi c h K ELL ER , P .J ., and K EA S LER , H ERVEY , and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . W OMACK , J ., f i l e d a di s s e nt i ng opi ni on i n w hi c h M E YE RS , P RI CE , and H OL C OM B , J J ., jo in e d . O P I N I O N A j u r y c o n v i c t e d a

p p e l l an t o f c a

p i t a l m u r d e r i n t h e c o u r s e o f c o m m i t t i n g o r a t t e mp tin g to commit robbery

. Be cause the state did not seek the death penalty , the trial court assessed a sente nce of life imprisonment without parole. T EX . P ENAL C ODE § 12 .3 1(a ). Th e F ir st C ourt of Ap pe a ls aff irmed the trial cour

t’s judgme nt and sentenc e. Mu rp hy v . S tat e , N o . 0 1

- 0 7

- 0 0 1 7 4

- CR , 2 0 0 8 T e x. App. L EXI S 2568 (Tex. App. – Houston [ 1 Dist.] , delivere d April 10, 2008)(not de signated for st publication). We g rante d appellant’ s petition for discre tionary revie w. Direc t appeal2

On direc t appea l, appellant’s points of erro r i n cluded c laims asserting constitutional and statutor y violations by

the trial cour

t: not informing the pr ospective juror s that she would be sentenc ed to life imprisonment without pa role if found g uilty of capital murde r; and not allowing her to s o in fo rm

or to q ue sti on ve nir e me mbe rs on that subj e c t. Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls h e ld t

hat, b e c a us e appellant f

ailed to s how t hat s he was preve nted from asking a par ticular prope r question, she fa iled to preser ve for revie w her complaints that she had be en denie d her c onstitut ional rig ht to effe ctive assistance of counse l. Mu rp hy v . S tat e , su pra at * 27. The court of appeals also held that the fa ilure of the tr ia l c ourt

to i nf or m th e venir e that a

pp e lla nt w ou ld r e c e ive a

mand a tor

y lif e se nte nc e if convicted of

capital murder was non-constitutional e rror and wa s harmless bec ause “ nothing in the

re c or d in dic a te s th a t su c h f a ilure to inf

or m the ve nir e of thi s inf

or ma tio n de nie d a

pp e lla nt’ s r ig ht t o a fair and impartial jury ,” thus appellant’ s substantial rig hts were not affe cted by the er ror. Id

. at ** 28-33. Appellan t’s G rounds for Review We g ra nte d a pp e lla nt’ s th re e g ro un ds fo r r e vie w. Th os e g ro un ds a sse rt : 1) In this non-death ca

pital murder c ase[,] appellant’s constitutional claim that she was de nied the ef

fec tive assistance of counsel and due proce ss of law wa s prese rved fo r a pp e llate re vie w w he n th e tr ia l c ourt re fu se d to a dv ise the ve nir e that [a pp e lla nt] would be sente nced w ithout parole [sic] i f co n v i cted of capital murde r whe n r e qu e s t e d b y t r i a l c o u n s e l [ , ] a s m a n d a t e d b y T EX . P EN . C ODE ANN . § 12.31(b) a nd the n p ro hib ite d co un se l fr om doi ng so e ve n th ou g h h e fa ile d to pr ov ide the c ourt wi th a par ticularized question on the issue pursuant to Se lls v . S tat e , 1 2 1 S. W. 3 d

7 4 8 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2003). 2) B eca use the trial c ourt dec lined to advise the a ppellant’s venire that she would be s e n t e n c e d t o l i f e w i t h o u tp ar o l e a s m an d a t e d b y T EX . P EN . C ODE ANN . § 12.31(b) a nd then prohibited her

attorney from doing so duringvoir dire, [appellant] was denie d the e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l and

du e pr oc e ss o f l aw o n th is i ssu e duri ngvo ir dire[,] and the ha

rm she suff

ere d should be assesse d under T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(a). 3) Be cause the purpose of T EX . P EN . C ODE ANN . § 12.31(b) is its own clea rly stated3

Secti o n 12

. 3 1

. C ap i t al Felony 1 (a ) . . . (b) .

. . In a cap i t al f

el o ny t ri al i n whi ch t he st at e d o es not s eek t he d eat h pe nal t y , pro specti ve jur o rs s hal l be i nf

or m ed tha t t h e sta te is no t se e k ing the d e a th p e n a lty and tha t a se n te n c e o f l ife im p riso n m e n t with o u t p a ro le is m a n d a to ry o n c o n v ic tio n o f t h e c a p ital felo n y. (E m p h a sis a d d e d .) mand a te that th e ve nire in a no n- de a th c a

pit a l murd e r c a se sh a ll k no w t he g uil ty defe ndant will rec eive a

sentenc e of life without parole, a n y review of the ha

rm c a us e d b y the tr ia l c ourt ’s mul tip le fa ilure s to so inf or m the a pp e lla nt’ s jur y sh ou ld be conduc ted in light of that stated purpose unde r T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(b). Bac kgr ound T EX . P EN . C ODE ANN . § 12.31(b) include s a provision that “[i] n a ca pital felony

trial in which the state doe s not s eek the death pe nalty , prospec tive jurors shall be infor med that the state is not seekingthe death penalty and that a sentenc e of life imprisonment without par ole is mandatory on conviction of the c apital fe lony .” The recor d ref lects t hat, at the beg inning of voir dire, a

nd outside 1 the pre sence of the ve nire, the tria l court informed t h e p arties of its posit ion on reve aling the automatic sente nce of

life without parole to the ve nire. I ’m g oing to g o on the re co rd o u t s ide the pre sence of the jury . Be fore we beg in jury selec tion, I have disc ussed with eac h side the issue re g ardingpunishment in t his c a se and

dis c us sin g it o n v oir

dir e . Th is i s a

c a pit a l murd e r w he re the State is not seeking the death penalty , so in the event Ms. Murphy is convicted of c apital murder, the sentenc e is automatic life w ithout par o l e an d I would be doing the sentenc ing, so it is my position that I ’m g oing to tell this panel, if they convict her

of ca p i t al m u rder , punishment is not an issue for them, it’s just for me. And I don’t intend to tell the panel and I don’t want either side to te ll the pa nel that it would be life without parole. Iun de rs tand

tha t th e re are – the re wi ll pr ob a bly be le sse rs ra ise d in thi s c a se and , of co ur se , both sid e s hav e to qua lif y the pa ne l on the punis hme nt r ang e on tho se lessers; but as fa

r as the non- death c apital p u n i s h m en t rang e, I would instruct the lawy ers not to g o into what that means, life w ithout parole. On e of a pp e lla nt’ s atto rn e y s so ug ht c lari fi c a tio n o f w he the r t he tr ial co ur

t me ant n ot t o4

mention the punishment for a c onviction for ca pital murder, i.e. “ not to de fine life without parole, but not to say

it at all? ” The trial court r esponded, Rig ht. Th a t’ s w hat I ’m – y es, bec a us e Ido n’ t th ink

it’ s an is su e that th e y

ne e d to know about, or it’s not for them to decide . So if they convict her

of ca pital murder, the n th e y ne e d to kn owthe tr ia l is ov e r fo r the m a t that po int and tha t th e c ourt

wi ll be doing the sentenc ing. I f they convict her of a lesser, then they will be doing the punis hme nt. One of appellant’ s attorney s objected a nd stated, “We think the jury panel should be e ntitled to know

. Since the State is not seeking the death penalty and that it is an automati c p u n i s h ment

a sse sse d b y

the c ourt a t th a t po int

in t ime , w e thi nk the jur

y pa ne l sh ou ld b e e nti tle d to kn owthat it is a n a uto ma tic lif

e se nte nc e .” He fu

rt he r a sse rt e d th a t w he the r i t is de fi ne d a s li fe wi tho ut p a ro le or not, “they

should at least be told that the only punishment that the defe ndant ca n rec eive at that point is l ife, so we would object and make a r equest that we be allowe d to go into that.” The prosecutor arg ued that, because the automatic life sentenc e wa s not a matter f or venire

me mbe rs ’ c on sid e ratio n, the re wa s n o n e e d to qu e sti on the m a bo ut i t, t hu s “ [t]he re is n o ne e d to explore their thoug hts or their fee lings about the automatic se ntence , just li ke any other c ase w hen the cour t is doing the sentenc ing.” After commenting about questioning and qualify ing pr ospective jurors to consider

the fu ll rang e of punishment on lesser -included of fense s, the prosec utor adde d,

“ I t’ s v e ry c le ar t hat any ty pe of po te nti a l punis hme nt sh ou ldn ’t e nte r i nto the ir

de lib e ra tio ns on g uil t or innoce nce. F or that re ason, I think the court’s de cision is the appropriate one.” The trial c ourt stated that it was g oing to stand by its ruling and that it wa s g oing to instruct the jury that the “death pe nalty is not an option in t his case. I f y ou convict her of ca pital, the court will be doing the sentenc ing.” Ap pe lla nt a sse rt s tha t she wa s the re by de nie d he r ri g ht to que sti on the pr os pe c tiv e jur or s so5

that she mig ht intelligently exercise he r per emptory challeng es as guaran t ee d b y the Texas and United S t ates c onstitut ions. She acknowle dg es that trial counse l did not advise the court of a particula r question that she wished to pr opound on that issue, but asser ts that his reque st that he “be allowed to g o into that” was suff icient to prese rve e rror , and the tria l court’s willing ness to “stand by ” its order

confirms this view. Appe llant also ar gu es t hat the er ror wa s prese rved a

nd is of constitutional dim ension: the trial cour t’s ban depr ived her

o f d u e proce ss of law, e ffe ctive assistanc e of counse l, and her

“rig ht to be hear d.” She also sug g ests that, beca use t he trial court’s er

ror is of constitutional dimension, such err or should be examined under T EX . R. A PP . P. 44. 2( a ) an d urg e s th is Court to determine whether such constitutional e rror is of “structur al” or

“sy stemic” propor

tions and t o a s s e s s h ar

m a c c o r d i n g l y. The state note s that appellant’s tria l attorney did not object to the trial court’s ac t i ons on constitutional grounds. The state ar g ues that these c laims, raised for the first time on appea l, have there fore been w aived f

or purpose s of appe al. I t also asserts that ther e is nothing in the la ng uag e of T EX . P EN . C ODE ANN . § 12.31(b) that require s a trial court to pe rmit a trial attorney to q u est ion prospec tive jurors about the f act that a life sentenc e without the possibilit y of par ole would be assessed if

appellant wa s found g uilty of ca pital murder. I t maintains that appellant wa s theref ore not denied her rig ht to ask the prospec tive jurors a proper question. The state argues that any err or on the par t of the trial court in failing to comply with § 12.31(b) constituted statutory err or and w as harmless unde r T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(b). Ana lys is Ap pe lla nt a sse rt s that th e tr ia l c ourt ini tiate d th e e rr or

c omp la ine d o f b y

inf or min g c ouns e l, despit e the clear

mandate of

T EX . P EN . C ODE ANN . § 12.31(b), that it would not advise the ve nire6

that appellant would r ece iv e an au t o m at ic sentenc e of life without parole if c onvicted of c apital murder and also instructed counsel not to do so during voir dire. Gr ound one of a ppellant’s petition

asser ts that appellant’s c onstitut ional claims of lac k of due pr ocess a nd i n ef fe ct ive assistance of counsel we re pr eser

ved for appellate revie w and challeng es the cour t of appe als’s dete rmination that her c onstitut ional complaints were not preser ved. A p p el l ant ac knowledg es that “c ounsel did not specific ally

object that the trial cour

t’s prohibitions viol ated [her] rig ht to effe ctive counse l and rig ht to a s k p r o p e r qu e s ti o n s to th e v e n ir e u n d e r o u r s tate an d f e d e r a l c o n s ti tuti o n s . . . . ” ( A p p e ll a n t’s B ri e f , p . 1 1

. ) H o w e v e r , s h e c o n t e n d s t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s “ i n t e r v e n t i o nan d

o r d e r e xp l i c i t ly prohibited h[er] from doing so” and asse rts t h at h er “gr o u nds for re view we re a ppare nt from the context of the pre- voir dire e x chang e betwe en the c ourt and c ounsel.” (A ppellant’s B rief, p. 11.) After revie wing the re cord, w e do not find any specific objecti o n at t ri al claiming a dueproce ss violation resulting fr om the trial court’ s actions. The r ecor d does re flec t that the trial court expli citly announce d that it would not inform the prospective jur ors pursuant to that provi s i on, despite the mandatory

lang uag e of the statute. As a pre requisit e fo r p re s enti ng a complaint for appellate revie w, T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)

re qu ir e s a tim e ly ob je c tio n with su ff

ic ie nt spe c if

ic ity to ma ke the tr ia l court awa re of the c omp la int , unless the spec ific g rounds wer e appa rent fr om the context. Appellant timely objected to the f ailure of the tr ia l court to co nf

or m to the mand a tor

y langua g e of

§ 1 2. 31 (b ). “ As it d id o n d ir e c t a pp e a l, t h e S t a t e r e c o g n i z e s t h a t , b y i t s w o r d i n g , S e c t i o n 1 2

. 3 1 ( b ) i s m an d a t o r

y r a t h e r t h and i s c r e t i o n a r y. . . . Thus, the trial cour

t erre d by failing to in fo rm t h e p ro s p ective jur ors that a guilty verdic t on capital murder would result in a mandatory sentenc e of life imprisonment without parole.” (State’ s Br ief, p. 19.)7

Th is i s n ot the c omm on c omp la int a bo ut voi r dir e –th a t the de fe nd ant wis he d to in ve sti g a te

a g e ne ra l to pic and

the tr ia l c ourt

re fu se d to a llo w qu e sti on ing on that top ic . In th is c a se , th e statut e require d the trial court to g ive to the jury one specific piece of information–that the sentence upon

c on vic tio n o f ca

pit a l mur de r wo uld be lif

e wi tho ut p aro le –r e g ard le ss o f w he the r t he de fe ns e re qu e sts it. The trial cour

t refuse d to give the mandator y instruction, despite an ex p l i ci t request by the defe ndant. Howe ver, that reque st and subsequent objec tion we re ma de only as to the statutory vio la tio n. Ap pe lla

nt ma de no ob

je c tio n b a se d o n th e c on sti tut ion a l ba se s sh e no w a sse rt s. We h old that the er ror wa s prese rved a s to the s tatutory complaints, but not prese rved as to the constitutional

c la ims . B e c a

us e a pp e lla nt m a de no ob

je c tio n b a se d u

po n th e c on sti tut ion a l ba se s sh e no w a sse rt s in gr ound one, we overr

ule g round one. I n her se cond g round for revie w, appe llant urg es this Court to assess harm under the constitutional standard set out in Rule 44.2(a)

. Be cause we have held that err or wa s not preser ved as to appe llant’s constitutional claims, appell ant’s cla im that the harm fr om the err or should be

a sse sse d und e r R

ule 44 .2 (a )’ s pro vis ion s for c on sti tut ion a l er ro r is moot

. Ac c or din g ly , we dis mis s g round two. Appellant’s third g round for revie w contends that the harm caused by the trial cour

t’s err or should be revie wed unde r the provisions of Rule 44.2(b) and “in light of [t he] stated purpose” of that rule. Pursuant to Rule 44.2(b), we must disre g ard all non-constitutional error s that do not affe ct an appellant’ s substantial rights. Ri c h v . S tat e , 160 S.W .3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “A

su bs tanti a l r ig ht i s a ff

e c te d ‘ wh e n th e e rr or

ha s a su bs tanti a l and in

jur iou s e ff

e c t or inf lue nc e in deter mining the jury ’s ver dict.’” Id ., quoting Ru sse ll v . S tat e , 155 S.W .3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The c ourt of appe als applied those standards to its harm a naly sis pursuant to Rule 44.2(b).8

Mu rp hy v . S tat e , su pra at ** 28-33. Whil e a pp e lla nt’ s th ir d g ro un d f

or re vie w a sse rt s th a t ha

rm fr om t he tr ia l c ourt ’s e rr or

sh ou ld be e va luate d und e r R

ule 44 .2 (b ), he r a

rgume nt a sse rt s t hat th e tr ia l c ourt ’s a c tio ns c on sti tut e “structur al” e rror

that is imm une to harm analy sis or, alternatively , is “sy stemic.” She maintains that it is i mpossible to determine with any cer tainty wh ether she wa s harmed by

the trial cour

t’s err or, and bec ause me aning ful harm a naly sis is not possible, it cannot be said with fa ir assura nce that the tr ia l c ourt ’s e rr or

did no t a ff e c t a su bs tanti a l r ig ht. I n this case, the r ight pr otected by § 1 2

. 3 1 (b ) is the rig ht to have the pr ospective juror s informed that the state is not seeking the death penalty and that a se nt ence of life imprisonment without parole is mandator y upon conviction of the capital offe nse. Although the jury would not be involved in assessing that mandatory sentenc e, the leg islature neve rtheless saw fit to require the trial court to provide that information to the prospec tive jurors. The tr ial court’s er ro r abrog ated that statut or y ri g ht. Pursuant to the lang uag e of Rule 44.2( b), we disreg ard all non-constitutional err or t hat does

no t a ff e c t a pp e lla nt’ s su bs tanti a l ri g hts . “ We h a ve c on str ue d th is t o me an th a t an e rr or is r e ve rs ibl e only when it has a

sub s t an tial and injurious effe ct or influenc e in deter mining the jury ’s ver dict.” Tay lor v . S tat e , 268 S.W .3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), citing Kin g v . S tat e , 953 S.W .2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We ha ve also held that the substantial rig ht at issue in voir dire is the ability to empanel only

those jurors who a

re qualified to serve . I f an a ppellant does not pre sent

rec ord evide nce that demonstrates that the tria l court’s e rror deprive d her of

a jury comprised of leg ally qualified juror s, she suffe red no ha rm. Gray v . S tat e , 233 S.W .3d 295, 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).9

Ap pe ll an t a s s e rt s t h a t t h e o m i t t e d i n s t r u c t i o n w a s a m an d a t o r

y p art o f t h e t r i a l an d t ha t it s absenc e af

fec ted how the venire perce ived t he case a nd the jury

decide d it. She also notes that seven members of the venire indicated that they could not be fa ir and impartial be cause they wer e excluded from the c onsideration of punishment for rea sons that were never

made known to them. Appellant sug g ests that, had § 12.31(b) been fo llowed, all member s of her venire “would have known the

c on se qu e nc e s o f a g uil ty ve rd ic t and be e n a ble to i nf or m th e c ourt

wh e the r t

hat w ou ld a ff

e c t th e ir

a bil ity to b e fa ir

a nd imp art ia l juro rs .” (A

pp e lla nt’ s Brie f, p. 16 .) She a lso su g g e sts that th is information would have “heig htened jurors’ sense of what proof bey ond a rea sonable doubt mea nt beca use of the se verity

of the sente nce that followed a finding of g uilt.” (Appellant’s B rief, p. 16.) The state dir ects our attention to several g ener al fa ctors, set out in Ri c h v . S tat e , 160 S.W .3d at 577-78, a s releva

nt considerations in dete rmining harm from beingbarr ed fr om asking a prope r question of a ve nire. Those fac tors wer e described in a case invol ving the err oneous admission of evidenc e and w ere applied to the er roneous de nial of a proper question in voir dire. Id . Howeve r, in this case, the tria l court er red in not providing to the prospec tive jurors the infor mation mandated by § 12.31(b). Under these circ umstances, in w hich the err or does not involve evidentiary or leg al issues at trial, the Rich fa c tor s d o n ot a pp ly to t he e va luatio n o f h arm . I n the instant case , appellant ha s fail ed t o s h o w t h at she wa s deprived of a jury that was comprised of leg ally qualified jurors. The fa ilure to provide infor mation to which the jury

panel wa s entitled by statute did not aff ect the leg al qualifications of any of the ve nire membe rs. We there fore

c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt ’s e rr or did no t a ff e c t a pp e lla nt’ s su bs tanti a l ri g hts , and purs ua nt t o Ru le 44.2(b), it must be disreg arde d. We overrule appellant’ s third gr ound for r eview. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls.

Deliver ed: Octobe r 21, 2009 Do no t pu bli sh