# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed January 9, 2019. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearin g.

________________ No. 3D17-2723 Lower Tribunal No. 12-17609

________________ 

### The Pinnacle Condominium Association, Inc., Appellant,

vs. 

### Richard Haney, et al., Appellees.

An appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Mi ami-Dade County, Rodney Smith, Judge. Cole Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Kathryn L. Ender and Therese A . Savona, for appellant. Baron & Herskowitz, and Jon Herskowitz, for appellees.

Before SCALES, and LINDSEY, JJ., and SUAREZ, Senior Judge. SUAREZ, Senior Judge. Appellant, The Pinnacle Condominium Association, Inc., appeals the trial court’s November 9, 2017 non-final order certifying a class of condominium unit2 owners encumbered by a settlement agreement in a prior cause. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. This Court reviews a trial court’s order on class certification for an abuse of discretion; examines a trial court’s factual findings for compe tent, substantial evidence; and reviews conclusions of law de novo. Sosa v. Saf eway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91, 102-103, 105 (Fla. 2011). To certify a class, a trial court must determine whether the cl ass representative(s) and putative class members meet the requireme nts for class certification enumerated in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.2 20. The proponent of class certification has the burden of pleading and proving t he class certification requirements contained in rule 1.220(a): (1) numerosity, (2) co mmonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy. 1 “A trial court should resolve doubts with regard to certification in favor of certification, especially in the earl y stages of litigation.”

1 Rule 1.220(a) Prerequisites to Class Representation. Before any claim or defense may be maintained on behalf of a cl ass by one party or more suing or being sued as the representative of all members o f a class, the court shall first conclude that (1) the members of the class are so n umerous that separate joinder of each member is impracticable [numerosity], (2) the c laim or defense of the representative party raises questions of law or fact common to the questions of law or fact raised by the claim or defense of each member of th e class [commonality], (3) the claim or defense of the representative p arty is typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class [typicality], and (4) the representative party can fairly and adequately protect and represent the inter ests of each member of the class [adequacy].3 Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 105 (citing Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Porcher, 898 So. 2d 153, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discreti on in certifying the class because Appellees, the putative class representatives , failed to fulfill the numerosity, typicality, and adequacy requirements of rule 1.220 (a). 2 We find Appellant’s arguments to be unfounded. First, numerosity speaks to whether “the members of the class a re so numerous that separate joinder of each member is impracticable. ” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(1). Appellant contends the trial court failed to addr ess the impracticability of joinder and that the Appellees failed to present evidence th at identified the class. Appellant incorrectly suggests the trial court was required to make findings as to the individual ability of each putative class member to bring separ ate actions. The plain language of rule 1.220(a)(1) requires no such thing. Moreover, as the Florida Supreme Court has made clear, no specific number is needed to s ustain the numerosity requirement, and class certification is proper if th e class representative does not base the projected class size on mere speculation. So sa, 73 So. 3d at 114 (citing Toledo v. Hillsborough Cty. Hosp. Auth., 747 So. 2d 958 , 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)).

2 Appellant does not raise commonality as an issue.4 Here, the projected class size of 230 members is based on recor d evidence and not on speculation. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its di scretion in finding Appellees satisfied the numerosity element by determining the p utative class members were so numerous as to make separate joinder of each me mber impracticable. Second, “[t]he key inquiry for a trial court when it determines whether a proposed class satisfies the typicality requirement is whether the class representative possesses the same legal interest and has endured the same lega l injury as the class members.” Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 114. Appellant contends that one of the putative class representatives may not have been encumbered by the subject set tlement agreement underlying the proposed class action. However, as was noted at the relevant hearing on the motion to certify the class, Appellees produced affidavi ts attesting to said putative class member’s encumbrance. Appellant produced no suc h evidence to the contrary. 3 Here, the claims of the putative class representatives are ty pical of the claims of each member of the class. Therefore, the trial court properly concluded the Appellees satisfied the typicality requirement. Third, adequacy rests on whether “the representative party can fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of each member o f the class.” Fla. R.

3 For these same reasons, and based on the record evidence befor e us, we find no merit to Appellant’s argument with regard to standing.5 Civ. P. 1.220(a)(4). 4 Appellant argues the trial court failed to address Appellees’ “unreasonable delay” in moving for class certification, and ins tead only relied on the qualifications of class counsel. On the contrary, the trial co urt’s order specifically finds that class counsel have acted in a diligent and timely ma nner. This finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence. A trial court’s determination as to the qualifications of class counsel to adequately represent a class will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion. Colon ial Penn Ins. Co. v. Magnetic Imaging Sys. I, Ltd., 694 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Absent such a showing here, the trial court’s adequacy determination s tands. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its disc retion in certifying class. We therefore affirm. Affirmed.

4 In examining adequacy, a trial court’s inquiry is two-pronged: (1) whether class counsel has the qualifications, experience, and ability to cond uct the litigation; and (2) whether the class representative’s interests are antagonist ic to the interests of the class members. See Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 115, see also Leibell v. Miami-Dade Cty., 84 So. 3d 1078, 1085 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).