alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.1


 


 


March 10, 2017


 


Propanc Health Group Corporation


302/6 Butler Street


Camberwell, VIC, 3124 Australia


Attn: James Nathanielsz


 


 


Re: Maturity Date Extension Agreement


 


Gentlemen:


 


Delafield Investments Limited (“Delafield”)
and Propanc Health Group Corporation (the “Company”) are parties to certain transaction documents (the “Transaction
Documents”), including that certain Securities Purchase Agreement, dated as of October 28, 2015, as amended on March 11,
2016 by an addendum and on July 1, 2016 and August 3, 2016 by separate letter agreements (the “Securities Purchase Agreement”),
and a debenture in the principal amount of $4,400,000 dated October 28, 2015 (as amended, the “Debenture”) and due
on February 28, 2017. Capitalized terms used herein and not defined have the meanings given them in the Securities Purchase Agreement
and the Debenture.


 


By the signature of your authorized representative
below, and for good and valuable consideration, the value and receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:


 


		1.	The Maturity Date shall be extended from February 28, 2017 to September 30, 2017.



		2.	From the period beginning on February 28, 2017 through and including September 30, 2017, the Company shall pay interest to
Delafield on the aggregate unconverted and then outstanding principal amount of the Debenture pursuant to the terms of the Debenture.



		3.	Delafield hereby agrees to waive compliance by the Company with Section 8 of the Debenture regarding payment by the Company
of the outstanding obligations due under the Debenture on February 28, 2017.  This waiver is a one-time waiver only and shall
not be deemed to constitute an agreement by Delafield to waive any other Event of Default which may exist as of the date hereof.



 


Except as expressly set forth herein, all
of the terms and conditions in the Transaction Documents remain unchanged and are in full force and effect.


 


This letter agreement may be executed and
delivered via facsimile or other electronic means with the same force and effect as if an original were executed and may be signed
in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be an original, with the same effect as if the signatures hereto were upon the
same instrument.


 






    
40 Wall Street | New York, NY | 10005
p. 347.491.4240 | f. 646.737.9948



     


    

 


 


 


Please acknowledge your agreement with the
foregoing by executing this letter in the space indicated below and returning the same to the undersigned.


 


	 	Sincerely,
	 	 	 	 
	 	Delafield Investments
    Limited
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/
    James Keyes
	 	  	Name:	James Keyes
	 	 	Title:   	Director
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/
    Michael Abitebol
	 	 	Name:	Michael Abitebol
	 	 	Title:   	Director   
	 	 	 	 


 





Acknowledged,
Confirmed and Agreed To:


 


Propanc
Health Group Corporation


 





	By:	/s/ James
    Nathanielsz	 
	 	Name: James Nathanielsz



	 
	 	Title: President and Chief Executive
        Officer



	 



 


 



    
40 Wall Street | New York, NY | 10005
p. 347.491.4240 | f. 646.737.9948
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 15

- 00270

- CR

RICHARD BRENT REED , Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

From the 66th District Court Hill County, Texas Trial Court No. 37886

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Richard Reed pleaded no t guilty to the offense of injury to an elderly person. The trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed Reed on community supervision for three years. On April 23, 2015, the State filed an Application to Proceed to Final Adjudication. The State then filed an amended Application to Proceed to Final Adjudication on May 7, 2015. Reed pleaded true to four of the eight allegations in the State’s Application to Proceed to Final Adjudication. The trial court found threeReed v. State Page 2

additional allegations to be t rue, convicted Reed of the offense of injury to an elderly person, and assessed punishment at 10 years confinement and a $500 fine. We affirm. Reed’s appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting that she has diligently reviewed the appellate record a nd that, in her opinion, the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel informed Reed of his right to submit a brief on

his own behalf. On November 1 6 , 2015, this Court received a letter from Reed indicating

that he does not wish to pursue his appeal. Counsel's brief evidences a professional evaluation of the record for error, and we conclude that counsel performed the duties required of appointed counsel. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. at 744; High v. State , 573

S. W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); s ee also In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 40 3, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In reviewing an Anders appeal, we must, "after a full examination of all the proceedings, ... decide whether the case is wholly frivolous." See Ande rs v. California , 386 U.S. at; accord Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 509

- 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). An appeal is "wholly frivolous" or "without merit" when it "lacks any basis in law or fact." McCoy v. Court of Appeals , 486 U.S. 429, 439 n. 10 (1988) . After a review of the entire record in this appeal, we determine the appeal to be wholly frivolous. See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 826

- 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we affi rm the trial court's judgment. Counsel's request that she be a llowed to withdraw from representation of Reed is granted. Additionally, counsel must send Reed a copy of our decision, notify Reed of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review, and send this Court a letterReed v. State Page 3

certifying counsel's complianc e with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 48.4. T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 48.4; see also In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.22.

AL SCOGGINS Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed; motion granted Opinion delivered and filed December 3, 2015 Do not publish [CR25]
#### Braulio CRUZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 29113.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 29, 1957.

Pope & Pope, Rio Grande City, for appellant.

Leon Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is aggravated assault committed upon a peace officer; the punishment, a fine of $100.

Deputy Sheriffs Garcia and Ellert testified that, while on patrol on the night in question, they observed a group of approximately fifteen "boys” near a dance hall, that some were yelling, and that a fight between Wicho (the appellant’s son) and another was in progress at the center of the group. They stated that as Garcia, the injured party, approached the group he told them to “break it up, it’s the law,” that the appellant hit Garcia and broke his glasses; Ellert grabbed the appellant; the appellant tried to break away and get to Garcia again as Garcia was subduing appellant’s son Wicho, and that both father and son were finally placed under arrest.

The appellant, testifying in his own behalf, admitted that he had known Garcia to be an officer for a number of years but stated that some one came upon him from the rear, pulled on him, and that he turned and struck the person behind him who he later learned was Garcia.

Trial was before the court without the intervention of a jury, who resolved the conflict in the evidence against the appellant, and we find the evidence sufficient to support his finding that the appellant made an assault upon Garcia, who was in the lawful discharge of the duties of his office.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terrence J. WHITE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-4941.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 15, 2002.

Decided Aug. 21, 2002.

StaMey W. Preston, Jr., Preston Law Firm, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, Umted States Attorney, S. David Schiller, Assistant UMted States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opmion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Terrence J. White appeals Ms jury conviction and sentence on a charge of distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West Supp.1999). He was sentenced to 210 months imprisonment, three years supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. White’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), claiming one error, but *624concluding that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. White was notified of his right to file an additional brief, which he did, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and a claim of a defective indictment. In accordance with the requirements of *Anders,*we have examined the entire record and find no meritorious issues for appeal.

By counsel, White claims that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1, when the government failed to file an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a). This court has previously held that § 851 does not extend to enhancements under the Guidelines, *United States v. Foster,*68 F.3d 86 (4th Cir.1995), and we decline to hold otherwise here.

In his supplemental *pro se*brief, White claims that his attorney was ineffective for failure to timely object to the sufficiency of the indictment, the range of variance and conjecture used by the prosecutor, and for failing to file timely motions and objections at trial. The foundation of each of these claims is in White’s claim that his sentence violates *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), insofar as his indictment failed to charge the amount of drugs involved. White also specifically challenges his indictment as directly violative of *Apprendi.*Because White’s sentence was below the statutory maximum of twenty years, his *Apprendi*claims based upon the indictment and ineffectiveness of counsel must fail.

Accordingly, we affirm White’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
S. 349

One Hundred Fourth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,

the fourth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-five

An Act

To reauthorize appropriations for the Navajo-Hopi Relocation Housing Program.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REAUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE

NAVAJO-HOPI RELOCATION HOUSING PROGRAM.

Section 25(a)(8) of Public Law 93–531 (25 U.S.C. 640d–24(a)(8))

is amended by striking ‘‘1989,’’ and all that follows through ‘‘and

1995.’’ and inserting ‘‘1995, 1996, and 1997.’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
Exhibit 31.4



Rule 13a-14(a) Certification of the Chief
 Financial Officer



I, Michael F. Kanan, certify that:



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to Annual Report on Form 10-K of Flamel Technologies S.A.; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: April 29, 2016



| | /s/ Michael F. Kanan                             
| | -------------------------------------------------
| | Michael F. Kanan                                 
| | Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
| | (principal financial officer)
#### Ex parte Billy Joe SISK.

No. 29815.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 12, 1958.

William P. Buckner, III, Charles H. Winston, Odessa, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

Relator, an inmate of the penitentiary, was charged by indictment with the capital felony of robbery with firearms.

The district attorney’s oral motion to dismiss the capital feature and prosecute for ordinary robbery was granted and relator waived a jury and pleaded guilty and the court assessed his punishment at eight years in the penitentiary.

The order dismissing the capital offense failed to reach the minutes of the court, and the judgment and sentence properly rendered and pronounced were, by clerical error, entered showing the offense to be “armed robbery.”

No appeal was perfected, but relator, after reaching the penitentiary, filed application for writ of habeas corpus in this Court asserting that the conviction was void because of the errors and omissions above set out.

By nunc pro tunc proceedings in the trial court thereafter, the judgment and sentence have been corrected so as to truly reflect the proceedings in said court at the *751time of the original trial, and no appeal has been perfected.

Its jurisdiction not having been divested by appeal, the trial court had the inherent power to correct the minutes so as to truly reflect the judgment, sentence and orders that had been actually rendered, pronounced and made at the time of the trial. Ex parte Brown, Tex.Cr.App., 210 S.W.2d 597; Ex parte Lyon, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 649, 296 S.W.2d 262.

We overrule the contention that failure to enter the order dismissing the capital feature of the case until the nunc pro tunc proceedings rendered the conviction void.

The relief prayed for is denied.
Confidential

100% Active 

Market Value

100% market value is estimated to be XX USD/Lb.
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA , Respondent ,

v.
JON ANTHONY SCHWEDER , Petitioner

.
No. 1 CA

- CR 2 2

- 0054 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Navajo County

No. S0900CR20090633 The Honorable Melinda K. Hardy , Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL
Navajo County Attorney ’ s Office , Holbrook By Michael R. Shumway Counsel for Respondent
Jon Anthony Schweder, Florence Petitioner FILED 5-3-2022STATE v. SCHWEDER Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz , Judge Samuel A. Thumma, and Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court.

PER CURIAM :
¶1 Petitioner Jon Anthony Schweder seeks review of the superior court’s order denying his petition for post

- conviction relief

. This is petitioner’s f irst petition.
¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post

- conviction relief. State v. Gutierrez , 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). It is petitioner’s burden to show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying the petition for post

- conviction relief. See State v. Poblete , 227 Ariz. 537, ¶ 1 (App. 2011) (petitioner has burden of establishing abuse of discretion on review)

. ¶3 We have reviewed the record in this matter, the superior court’s order denying the petition for post

- conviction relief, and the petition for review. We find that petitioner has not established an abuse of discretion.
¶4 We grant review and deny relief.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                              OCT-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                          12,135
<SECURITIES>                                     2,410
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,359
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,587
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                21,001
<PP&E>                                          13,665
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,417
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  34,303
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,830
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           221
<OTHER-SE>                                      16,076
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    34,303
<SALES>                                         24,804
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                24,804
<CGS>                                           25,122
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   25,122
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                36,261
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 172
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (36,034)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,165
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (37,199)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (37,199)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (2.39)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.39)


</TABLE>
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 344

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to make technical corrections to

maps relating to the Coastal Barrier Resources System, and for other

purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 2 (legislative day, JANUARY 30), 1995

Mr. SHELBY (for himself and Mr. HEFLIN) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and

Public Works

A BILL

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to make technical

corrections to maps relating to the Coastal Barrier Resources System, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Coastal Barrier Tech5 nical Corrections Act of 1995’’.

6 SEC. 2. COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES SYSTEM.

7 Section 4(a) of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (16

8 U.S.C. 3503(a)) is amended by inserting before the period
2

•S 344 IS

1 at the end the following: ‘‘and section 3 of the Coastal

2 Barrier Technical Corrections Act of 1995’’.

3 SEC. 3. CORRECTIONS TO MAPS.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than the end of the 30-

5 day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act,

6 the Secretary of the Interior shall make such corrections

7 to the maps described in subsection (b) as are necessary

8 to ensure that—

9 (1) depictions of areas on the maps are consist10 ent with the depictions of areas appearing on the

11 maps entitled lllllll, dated

12 lllllll, and on file with the Secretary;

13 and

14 (2) the Coastal Barrier Resources System es15 tablished by section 4 of the Coastal Barrier Re16 sources Act (16 U.S.C. 3503) does not include any

17 area that, on the day before the date of enactment

18 of this Act, was part of unit Q01 of the System.

19 (b) MAPS DESCRIBED.—The maps described in this

20 subsection are maps that—

21 (1) are included in the set of maps entitled

22 ‘‘Coastal Barrier Resources System’’, dated October

23 24, 1990; and

24 (2) relate to the units of the Coastal Barrier

25 Resources System numbered—
3

•S 344 IS

1 (A) P04A, P05, P05A, P08, P10, P11A,

2 P18, P25, and FL–90; and

3 (B) Q01 (as in effect on the day before the

4 date of enactment of this Act).

Æ
The State of TexasAppellee



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

June 12, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00015

- CR

Robert Alan QUEEMAN

, Appellant

v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 63rd Judicial District Court, Kinne y County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2063

- CR The Honorable Enrique Fernandez, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellant’s brief was originally due to be filed in this appeal on April 15, 2015. On April 20, 2015, this court notified appellant’s attorney that the brief was late. On April 27, 2015, appellant’s attorney filed a motion requesting an extension of time to file the brief. The motion was granted, and the deadline for filing the brief was extended to June 8, 2015. The brief has not

been filed.

Appellant’s attorney is ORDERED to respond to this court in writing within ten days of

the date of this order. The response should state a reasonable explanation for failing to timely file the brief and demonstrate the steps being taken to remedy the deficiency. If appellant’s attorney fails to file an adequate response within ten days, this appeal will be abate d to the trial court for an abandonment hearing, and the trial court will be asked to consider whether sanctions are appropriate. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.8(b)(2).

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 12th day of June, 2015

.

___________________________________ Kei th E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Steven NORI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. POSTMASTER GENERAL (U.S.A.) and United States Postal Service, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-6114.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Jan. 29, 2003.

Steven Nori, Glen Oaks, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant, pro se.

Carolyn L. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York (Roslynn R. Mauskopf, United States Attorney), Brooklyn, New York, for Defendants-Appellees.

PRESENT: NEWMAN, KATZMANN, and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Trager, /.), it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Steven Nori, *pro se,*appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his complaint by order dated March 11, 2002.

The district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs claim is barred by the doctrine of *res judicata. See Allen v. McCur-ry,*449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (final judgment on the merits of an action precludes parties from relitigating issues that were or could have been decided in previous action); *Weston Funding Corp. v. Lafayette Towers, Inc.,*550 F.2d 710, 714-15 (2d Cir.1977) (summary judgment is dismissal on the merits for *res judicata*purposes).

We affirm the judgment of the District Court.