alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1

                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             WASHINGTON, DC  20549


                                _______________



                                    FORM 8-K



                                 CURRENT REPORT
                     PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE
                        SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934


Date of report (Date of earliest event reported):  April 16, 1997


                         NATIONAL EDUCATION CORPORATION
              ----------------------------------------------------
               (Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in Charter)

                                         
    Delaware                        1-6981                    95-2774428
    --------                        ------                    ----------
(State or Other                  (Commission                 (IRS Employer
Jurisdiction of                  File Number)             Identification No.)
Incorporation)    


2601 Main Street, Suite 700, Irvine, California                        92614
   (Address of Principal Executive Office)                          (Zip Code)


Registrant's telephone number, including area code: (714) 474-9400


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
         (Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last Report)





                                  Page 1 of 3
                        Exhibit Index appears on Page 2
<PAGE>   2
Item 5.  Other Events.

         Attached hereto as Exhibit 99.1 is a copy of a News Release issued on
behalf of the Registrant commenting on Harcourt General, Inc.'s announcement
that it intends to commence a cash tender offer for all of the common stock of
the Registrant at $19.50 per share.

Item 7.  Financial Statements, Pro Forma Financial Information and Exhibits.

         (a)     Not applicable.

         (b)     Not applicable.

         (c)     Exhibits.  The following exhibit is attached to this Current
                 Report on Form 8-K:

                                                                      Sequential
         Exhibit No.              Description                         Page Start
         -----------              -----------                         ----------

         99.1                     News Release                             3




                                   SIGNATURES

         Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned hereunto duly authorized.


                                       NATIONAL EDUCATION CORPORATION
                                       (Registrant)


Date:  April 24, 1997                  By:    /s/ Philip C. Maynard 
                                              ---------------------------------
                                              Philip C. Maynard, Vice President





                                  Page 2 of 3
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 533

AN ACT

To clarify the rules governing removal of cases to Federal

court, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. REMOVAL.

4 The first sentence of section 1447(c) of title 28,

5 United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘any defect

6 in removal procedure’’ and inserting ‘‘any defect other

7 than lack of subject matter jurisdiction’’.

Passed the Senate June 30 (legislative day, June

19), 1995.

Attest:

Secretary.
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 533

AN ACT

To clarify the rules governing removal of cases to

Federal court, and for other purposes.
BRIAN QUINN

Chief Justice

JAMES T. CAMPBELL

Justice

MACKEY K. HANCOCK

Justice

PATRICK A. PIRTLE

Justice

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas

Potter County Courts Building

501 S. Fillmore, Suite 2-A

Amarillo, Texas 79101-2449

www.txcourts.gov/7thcoa.aspx

VIVIAN LONG

Clerk

MAILING ADDRESS:

P. O. Box 9540

79105-9540

(806) 342-2650

May 27, 2015

Kristen Jernigan

Attorney at Law

207 S. Austin Ave.

Georgetown, TX 78626

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

RE: Case Number: 07-15-00016-CR

Trial Court Case Number: 12-05502-CRF-361

Style: Lawrence Pena v. The State of Texas

Dear Counsel:

By Order of the Court, the motion for an extension of time to file Appellant’s brief 

is this day granted. Appellant’s brief is filed as of May 21, 2015.

Very truly yours,

Vivian Long 

VIVIAN LONG, CLERK

xc: Douglas Howell (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)
* After examining the briefs and the records, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeals are submitted on the briefs and the record. See F ED

. R. A PP

.

P. 34(a)(2). 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 21, 2009 *

Decided May 28, 2009

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 08

‐ 2853

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY PHILLIPS,

Defendant

‐ Appellant. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 05 CR 1004

James B. Zagel,

Judge

.

O R D E R

Anthony Phillips suggests several unpersuasive reasons why we should vacate his

conviction for mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1957. He

insists, for instance, that district courts lack subject

‐ matter jurisdiction over all crimes not

committed on federal property. But district courts in fact have exclusive subject

‐ matter

jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231; NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 08

‐ 2853 Page 2

United States v. Turcotte

, 405 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 2005). Phillips also contends that the

district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he is “a natural man, a

Sovereign state born citizen, a private human being.” This argument is frivolous: a district

court has personal jurisdiction over any defendant brought before it on a federal indictment

charging a violation of federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Marks

, 530 F.3d 799, 810 (9th

Cir. 2008); United States v. Rendon

, 354 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003); see also United States

v. Burke

, 425 F.3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that defendant’s presence in the

territory of the United States supplies personal jurisdiction). His remaining claims are too

frivolous to warrant further discussion.

AFFIRMED.
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DECEMBER 31, 1999 FORM 10-K.
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</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT MILTON J. TAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 00-6059 STEVEN DEWALT, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (CA-99-615-AM) Submitted: May 23, 2000 Decided: June 19, 2000 Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________ Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Milton J. Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. Rachel Celia Ballow, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).OPINION PER CURIAM: Milton Joseph Taylor, a former federal inmate, seeks to appeal the district court's order dismissing his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994). Taylor completed his sentence and was released from custody on October 26, 1999, the same day the district court's order was entered on the docket. A copy of the court's order was mailed to Taylor at his new address on November 3, 1999. Taylor's notice of appeal was received in the district court on December 28, 1999, one day late. We note that because Taylor was not incarcerated when he noted his appeal, he does not benefit from Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988). Parties are accorded sixty days if the United States is a party after entry of the district court's final judgment or order to note an appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appealperiod under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). B ecause Taylor failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal.We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED 2
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 50152 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
IGNACIO LUNA GARCIA , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 6:13

- CR

- 155

- 1

Before JOLLY, WIENER , and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Ignacio Luna Garcia, federal prisoner # 53034

- 280, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion seeking modification of his sentence for possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine and illeg al reentry based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. By moving to proceed IFP, Garcia is challenging the district court’s certification decision that his

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 19, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 16-50152 Document: 00513725998 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/19/2016No. 16

- 50152

2 appeal was not taken in good faith because it is frivolous. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). In this court, Garcia argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a reduction of sentence. He contends that he is not a threat to public safety and asserts that a reduction of sentence should h ave been granted. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Evans , 587 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir. 2009). In its order denying relief, the district court recognized that Garcia was eligible for a sentence reduction. See Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817,
826

- 27 (2010). However, the district court denied Garcia’s motion as a matter of discretion, referring specifically to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factor s and Garcia’s extensive criminal history. Garcia has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by denying him a sentence reduction. See United States v. Whitebird , 55 F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1995). This appeal does not present a nonfrivo lous issue. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, Garcia’s motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh , 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. Case: 16-50152 Document: 00513725998 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/19/2016
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 08-1978

SIERRA CLUB, CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,

and THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

THOMAS WAGNER, in his official capacity as Forest Supervisor of the

White Mountain National Forest; ABIGAIL KIMBELL, in her official

capacity as Chief of the United States Forest Service; EDWARD T.

SCHAFER, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States

Department of Agriculture; and the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE,

Defendants, Appellees.

ERRATA

The opinion of this Court, issued on February 6, 2009, should be

amended as follows:

On page 5, paragraph 2, line 2, "will" should not be underlined.

On page 9, paragraph 1, line 4, "the" should be deleted and

"plan." should be changed to "plan[s].".

On page 14, paragraph 1, line 1, change "best evidence" to "best

available science".

On page 21, first full paragraph, line 2, eliminate "that" in

"its EAs that are lengthy".
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DENNIS HENLEY, S/K/A 

 DENNIS HENLEY, A/K/A DENNIS HINTON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0385-99-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 MAY 16, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Robert W. Duling, Judge 

 Matthew P. Geary (Goodwin, Sutton, Duval & 

Geary, on brief), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

The trial court convicted Dennis Henley of possession of 

cocaine upon a conditional plea of guilty. On appeal, he argues 

the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He 

contends the seizure was illegal because the officer did not 

have reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal 

activity or probable cause to search him. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

 "In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, '[t]he burden is upon [the defendant] to show that 

th[e] ruling, when the evidence is considered in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, constituted reversible error.'" 

McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 

(1997) (en banc) (citation omitted). While we review de novo

the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable 

cause, we "review findings of historical fact only for clear 

error and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those 

facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." 

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). 

 Officer James Harrison and several other officers executed 

a search warrant for drugs at a residence. Harrison found the 

defendant in the dining area, searched him, and found cocaine on 

his person. Harrison testified that the warrant was an all 

persons warrant. Neither side introduced the warrant itself. 

 When a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, "the 

defendant must rebut the presumption of validity by proving that 

the warrant is illegal or invalid." Lebedun v. Commonwealth, 27 

Va. App. 697, 711, 501 S.E.2d 427, 434 (1998). This Court has 

upheld the validity of warrants authorizing the search of all 

persons present in the named location. See Morton v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 946, 951, 434 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1993). 

The defendant did not attack the validity of the warrant or 

the information upon which the magistrate found probable cause 

to issue the warrant to search all persons present. The 

uncontradicted evidence established that the search warrant 

authorized a search of all persons present at the residence. 

- 2 -
The defendant was present as the officers entered to execute the 

warrant, so the search of him was proper. The trial court did 

not err in denying the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we 

affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.

- 3 -
1 This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please see

2 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please

3 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other

4 deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the

5 filing date.

6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

7 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel.

8 HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT

9 and DEBRA L. TAJALLE,

10 Petitioners-Appellees,

11 v. NO. 29,912 

12 SLAVIO P. LOVATO,

13 Respondent-Appellant.

14 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY

15 Gerard J. Lavelle, District Judge

16 New Mexico Human Services Dep’t

17 Child Support Enforcement Division 

18 Sharron S. Davidson, Special Assistant Attorney General 

19 Torri A. Jacobus, Special Assistant Attorney General 

20 Albuquerque, NM

21 for Appellee State of New Mexico

22 Debra L. Tajalle

23 Albuquerque, NM

24 Pro Se Appellee

25 Peter Everett IV

26 Albuquerque, NM
2

1 for Appellant
1 MEMORANDUM OPINION

2 BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

3 Summary dismissal was proposed for the reasons stated in the calendar

4 notice. No memorandum opposing summary dismissal has been filed, and the time

5 for doing so has expired.

6 Dismissed.

7 IT IS SO ORDERED.

8 

9 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge

10 WE CONCUR:

11 

12 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 

13 

14 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
#### Ex Parte Moses LERMA.

No. 30336.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 12, 1958.

Merritt F. Hines, Midland, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, .Judge.

Appellant Moses Lerma was arrested on August 27, 1958. He was charged by complaint with possession of marijuana and his bond was set at $10,000, which he was unable to give.

A term of the 142nd Judicial District Court, in Midland County, began on September-2, 1958, and a grand jury was empaneled.' The grand jury recessed the following day with permission of the court *752until December 10, 19S8. The term of court will terminate some time thereafter.

Appellant sought discharge by habeas corpus, contending that by reason of the grand jury having met, deliberated and recessed without indicting him he was entitled to be discharged. This is an appeal from the order of the district judge denying the relief prayed for.

Art. 576, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., relied upon by appellant, provides:

> “When a defendant has been detained in custody or held to bail for his appearance to answer any criminal accusation before the district court, the prosecution, unless otherwise ordered by the court, for good cause shown, supported by affidavit, shall be dismissed and the bail discharged, if indictment or information be not presented against such defendant at the next term of the court which is held after his commitment or admission to bail.”

The statute relates to the dismissal of a prosecution in the event a grand jury has met and been discharged without indicting. Ex parte Oakley, 54 Tex.Cr.R. 608, 114 S.W. 131.

Appellant says that since terms of court are now generally of long duration and continue until another term '■ begins, the provisions of the statute should be applied where, the grand jury has been permitted, to recess to a later day in the term, as for instance, 90 days later as in his case.

We need not pass upon this contention for the record shows that on the day of the hearing of appellant’s application for release and dismissal, the State filed affidavit such as is contemplated in Art. 576, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. showing good cause why the prosecution should not be dismissed, and the district jüdge entered order that it not be dismissed.

The judgment denying appellant’s plea for discharge from custody is affirmed.
J-A15034-17

2017 PA Super 320

C.G., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

J.H. : No. 1733 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order entered September 22, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County,

Civil Division, No(s): 2015-4710

BEFORE: MOULTON, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ.

CONCURRING OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 11, 2017

While the Majority sets forth a comprehensive analysis of the issue of 

standing in this case, I write separately to convey my concerns regarding 

the trial court’s evidentiary hearing in this matter. From the trial court’s 

Opinion, it is apparent that the court applied a custody “best interests” 

standard, rather than considering the factors relevant to a standing 

challenge asserted through preliminary objections. 

I additionally note that, while the Majority properly relied on our 

Supreme Court’s decision in T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. 2001), 

it may be time to re-visit the issue of the appropriate standard and 

presumptions to be applied in determining standing where a child is born 

during a same-sex relationship. I question whether treating C.G. as a “third 

party” is appropriate where, as here, the parties lived together following a 
J-A15034-17

- 2 -

commitment ceremony;1 Child was conceived during the parties’ 

relationship; and the parties subsequently lived together with Child for over 

five years. 

 

1 At that time, same-sex marriage was not recognized under Florida law. If 

C.G. were male, standing would not be an issue because C.G. would have 

been considered to be a “parent.”