*

Honorable Edward S. Smith, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by

designation. 

 1

In Hufford v. Rodgers, 912 F.2d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir.1990), we held that Florida sheriffs are

county, and not state, officials. In Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir.1991), we

held that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect Florida sheriffs from liability for claims

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the funds used to satisfy assessments against sheriffs are

not paid from the state's treasury. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Nos. 96-4647, 96-4649.

Gerald Alan GORDAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Ronald COCHRAN, individually and as Sheriff of Broward County, Defendant-Appellee.

Fred BELLIS and Carol Bellis, Plaintiffs-Appellants.

v.

Ronald COCHRAN, individually and as Sheriff of Broward County, Defendant-Appellee.

July 14, 1997.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 93-6436-

CIV-WDE), Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr., Judge.

Before COX and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and SMITH*

, Senior Circuit Judge..

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

Gerard Gordon, Fred Bellis, and Carol Bellis appeal the district court's order granting

defendant Ronald Cochran's motions for summary judgment in both his individual and official

capacities.1 In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, plaintiffs claim that Cochran dismissed them from their

positions in the Broward County Sheriff's Office because they opposed or were perceived as

opposing Cochran's candidacy for Sheriff. They allege that the politically-motivated dismissals

violated their First Amendment rights as well as a claimed Fourteenth Amendment property interest

in their employment.

Based on McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994), we affirm the district court's grant

of defendant's motion to dismiss the property interest claim.
Insofar as Cochran was sued in his individual capacity, we affirm the grant of summary

judgment based on qualified immunity. See Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088, 1092-93 (11th

Cir.1996)(discussing differing interpretations by circuit courts of the permissibility of patronage

dismissals under Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980)).

With respect to the suit against Cochran in his official capacity, we also affirm the district

court's grant of defendant's summary judgment motions on the First Amendment claims of Gordon

and Fred Bellis. However, with regard to Carol Bellis's First Amendment claim, we vacate the

judgment of the district court because the record does not support its finding that her position was

appropriately susceptible to political patronage.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Ronald Cochran, a Democrat, was elected Sheriff of Broward County in a contest

with a Republican candidate who had defeated incumbent Sheriff Nick Navarro in the Republican

primary. According to the plaintiffs' pleadings, the plaintiffs served as employees or appointees of

the former Sheriff Navarro and all actively supported him in the primary election. Plaintiff Gordon

served as Media Relations Officer in the Sheriff's Office. Plaintiff Fred Bellis held the position of

Project Administrator for the Department of Research and Planning, and Community Involvement.

Plaintiff Carol Bellis was Project Coordinator for the Department of Research and Planning.

Cochran dismissed the plaintiffs upon taking office. This suit followed.

 We review grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard that the

district court used. McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1994). Summary judgment

is appropriate if, after examining the entire record, the court concludes there is no genuine issue of

material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

DISCUSSION

 Based on its review of factually undisputed job descriptions of Frank Bellis and Gerard

Gordon, the district court found that political loyalty was an appropriate job requirement. Mr. Bellis

was responsible for developing and adapting programs to meet the needs of the community,

developing and maintaining contact with the business and academic communities, maintaining good
 2

Mr. Bellis's job functions are described as follows:

1. Conducts research into future needs of Brevard (sic) County Sheriff's Office

(BSO), develops and adapts programs to meet the needs of the community.

2. Maintains liaison with the Office of the Supervisor of Elections and is

responsible for the management of the Poll Deputy Project, in accordance with the

Sheriff's Office constitutional responsibilities.

3. Coordinates special events as directed.

4. Develops and maintains contact with the business and academic community

relative to future trends impacting law enforcement.

5. Meets with experts on local, state, and federal levels and private and public

organizations to gather information for programs and or projects.

6. Establishes rapport with multiple segments of the community including elected

officials and other community leaders.

7. Represents the BSO on the Development Review Board. 

relationships with community leaders, and representing the Broward Sheriff's Office on the

Developmental Review Board.2

 While Mr. Bellis's position explicitly involved policy development,

Branti teaches that party affiliation is not necessarily an appropriate requirement for the effective

performance of all policy makers. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. at 1294-95. Rather, as we have

previously explained, Branti demands a showing that the position, policy-making or otherwise,

implicates partisan political concerns in its effective functioning. See Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d

1088, 1093 (11th Cir.1996). In addition to his policy development duties, Mr. Bellis was authorized

to speak in the name of the Sheriff to other elected officials and community leaders. He held a

visible leadership position in which the public would likely perceive him as responsive to partisan

political concerns. We are satisfied that this position qualifies as one in which there is a reasonable

connection between job performance and shared political views.

 Gerard Gordon served as a media officer, a job which required him to act as official

spokesperson for the Sheriff's Office, arrange press conferences, write news releases, and meet with

various community groups. In short, Mr. Gordon acted as an alternate for the Sheriff in

communicating with the public. The Supreme Court has explained that "various assistants.. who

help [the elected official] write speeches, explain his views to the press, or communicate with the
 3

The specific job functions are described as follows:

1. Reviews documentation form departments, divisions and units for accuracy and

compliance with CALEA standards.

2. Maintains liaison with departments, divisions, units and external agencies to

ensure ongoing compliance with CALEA standards.

3. Updates CALEA files as needed and ensures that standard folders contain

up-todate proofs of compliance.

4. Edits and critiques work submitted by planners for accuracy and compliance

with CALEA standards assigned to planners.

5. Monitors the Reaccreditation Tracking System to ensure accuracy of reports,

ISSR forms, cross reference and tickler files.

6. Initiates and prepares necessary correspondence, memoranda and other

information relative to specific projects.

legislature" are positions which the elected official might "appropriately assume cannot be

performed effectively unless those persons share his political beliefs and party commitments."

Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. at 1295. Accepting the assertions of Gordon and Fred Bellis that

the defendant fired them because of their political viewpoint as well as the undisputed description

of their employment responsibilities, we conclude that their First Amendment rights have not been

violated. The district court properly granted summary judgment with respect to their claims.

 The district court made a similar finding with respect to Carol Bellis, but the record does

not support that judgment. Defendant bears the burden of establishing that plaintiff's position falls

within the political patronage exception created in Elrod and Branti for certain policymaking or

confidential employees. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. at 2687; Parrish, 86 F.3d at 1093

(11th Cir.1996). Cochran argues that Carol Bellis's job tasks also show that, as a matter of law, she

held a confidential or policy-making position for which political affiliation was a necessary

requirement. We do not agree.

Carol Bellis's responsibilities included organizing and evaluating progress on various

projects and programs of the Sheriff's Office for the purposes of a reaccreditation process.

According to the job description submitted by the defendant, the position appears to involve entirely

administrative and clearly defined functions.3

 Merely being an administrator or supervisor is not
7. Participates in mock assessments to determine adherence to CALEA standards.

8. Identifies deficiencies that may jeopardize CALEA compliance and keeps the

Administration management informed of all obstacles that impede progress. 

 4To avoid summary judgment, plaintiff must also point to evidence in the record which, if

credited, would permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that her political affiliation was a

substantial factor in her dismissal. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Educ. v. Doyle,

429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Because the district court ruled as a matter

of law based only on Carol Bellis's job description, it never reached the question of whether

Bellis had met her burden of demonstrating that political affiliation was a substantial factor in

her dismissal. 

sufficient to show that political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement. See Elrod v. Burns, 427

U.S. at 367-68, 96 S.Ct. at 2686-87.

We find at this point in the litigation4 that if we credit the plaintiff's allegations, as we must

(see McCabe, 12 F.3d at 1560), we cannot say as a matter of law that political affiliation was an

appropriate requirement for the effective performance of her duties. That is, it is not clear as a

matter of law that Bellis's position falls within the political patronage exception created by Elrod

and Branti.

The district court's grant of defendant's summary judgment motion with respect to Carol

Bellis's First Amendment claim was not supported by the record. Accordingly, we vacate that

judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.