[J-70-2023] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

CITY OF LANCASTER, BOROUGH OF 

CARLISLE, AND BOROUGH OF 

COLUMBIA,

 Appellees

 v. 

PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY 

COMMISSION,

Appellant

:

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

:

No. 107 MAP 2022

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court at No. 251 

MD 2019 dated October 11, 2022

ARGUED: November 29, 2023

OPINION

JUSTICE BROBSON DECIDED: April 25, 2024

In this direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) challenges 

a decision of the Commonwealth Court concluding that Section 59.18 of the PUC’s 

regulations, 52 Pa. Code § 59.18, violates Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution and is, therefore, unenforceable.

1 Pertinently, the Commonwealth Court 

held that Section 59.18 unlawfully delegates unfettered authority to natural gas 

distribution companies (NGDCs) to determine the location of gas meters in historic 

districts of the Commonwealth. Upon careful review, we conclude that the General 

1 Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[t]he legislative power 

of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a 

Senate and a House of Representatives.”
[J-70-2023] - 2

Assembly never enacted a statute vesting the PUC with any legislative authority under 

Article II, Section 1—i.e., imposing any duty on the PUC—to locate gas meters in historic 

districts that would give rise to any constitutional concerns regarding delegation. 

Accordingly, we reverse. 

I. BACKGROUND

In 2014, the PUC amended Section 59.18 of its regulations, which, in part, 

addresses gas meters in historic districts. Section 59.18 provides, in pertinent part: 

(a) General requirements for meter and regulator location.

(1) Unless otherwise allowed or required in this section, meters and 

regulators must be located outside and aboveground.

(2) Except in the case of an emergency, a utility shall provide written 

notice to a utility customer by first class mail or by personal delivery at 

least 30 days prior to relocating and subsequently installing a meter or 

regulator outside the customer’s building. . . . 

. . . . 

(5) When selecting a meter or service regulator location, a utility shall 

consider potential damage by outside forces.

(6) The meter location must accommodate access for meter reading, 

inspection, repairs, testing, changing and operation of the gas shut-off 

valve.

(7) When feasible and practical to do so, the meter location must 

accommodate the installation of the service line in a straight line 

perpendicular to the main.

(8) Meters and service regulators may not be installed in the following 

locations:

(i) Beneath or in front of windows or other building openings that may 

directly obstruct emergency fire exits.

(ii) Under interior stairways.

(iii) Under exterior stairways, unless an alternate means of egress 

exists and the meter and service regulator are installed in a 

well-vented location under stairs constructed of noncombustible 

material.

(iv) A crawl space.
[J-70-2023] - 3

(v) Near building air intakes under local or State building codes.

(vi) In contact with soil or other potentially corrosive materials.

. . . .

(d) Inside meter locations.

(1) Inside meter locations shall be considered only when:

(i) The service line pressure is less than 10 psig.

(ii) A meter is located in a building that meets one of the following 

criteria:

. . . .

(D) A building is located within a locally designated historic district or 

is eligible for the listing, or a building is individually designated under 

a local ordinance as a historic landmark or is eligible for the listing.

(iii) Protection from ambient temperatures is necessary to avoid meter 

freeze-ups.

(iv) A utility determines that a meter is subject to a high risk of 

vandalism based on the utility's prior experience.

(v) A utility determines that an outside meter location is neither feasible 

nor practical.

(2) Except for low pressure systems with service line pressure less than 

10 psig, regulators must be located outside when a meter is located 

inside.

(3) Installed inside meters must be attached to an operable outside 

shut[-]off valve.

(4) Meters installed within a building must be located in a ventilated 

place not less than 3 feet (914 millimeters) from a source of ignition or 

source of heat which may damage the meter.

52 Pa. Code § 59.18 (emphasis added). 

The City of Lancaster, Borough of Carlisle, and Borough of Columbia 

(Municipalities) have historic districts created pursuant to what is commonly referred to 

as the Municipal Historic Districts Law (MHDL).2 In 2019, the Municipalities filed a petition 

for review (Petition) in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, seeking relief on 

2 Act of June 13, 1961, P.L. 282, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 8001-8006. 
[J-70-2023] - 4

two counts under the Declaratory Judgments Act3 concerning the validity of Section 59.18 

of the PUC’s regulations. Relevant here, in Count II of the Petition, the Municipalities 

averred that Section 59.18 violates Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

because “Section 59.18 cedes the PUC’s statutorily-granted authority to enact rules and 

regulations ‘not inconsistent with law’ [under Section 501(b) of the Pennsylvania Public 

Utility Code (Code),

4 66 Pa. C.S. § 501(b),] to” NGDCs and, therefore, grants NGDCs 

“unfettered discretion to determine whether meters will be located on the interior or 

exterior of homes in historic districts” in the Municipalities. (Petition ¶¶ 47-49, 55, 56

(quoting 66 Pa. C.S. § 501(b)).) Rather, the Municipalities insisted that Article II, 

Section 1 requires the General Assembly to make legislative choices and that the PUC, 

therefore, could not “‘subdelegate’ its regulatory authority to an outside party without clear 

legislative intent permitting it to do so.”5 (Id. ¶ 50, 54.) As to relief, the Municipalities 

asked the Commonwealth Court to declare that Section 59.18 is “unconstitutional, 

improper, and illegal” and to decree “that the placement of [gas] meters shall be subject 

to any ordinance properly adopted by a Pennsylvania municipality” pursuant to the MHDL. 

(Petition, Count II “Wherefore” clause, A-B.)

The PUC filed preliminary objections to the Petition. As to Count II, the PUC 

claimed that the Municipalities failed to exhaust administrative remedies and allege facts 

demonstrating direct and immediate harm to properties within their historic districts as a 

3 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7531-7541. 

4 66 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-3316.

5 “At the heart of the non-delegation doctrine, which we have described as a ‘natural 

corollary’ to the text of Article II, Section 1 [of the Pennsylvania Constitution], is the tenet 

that the General Assembly cannot delegate ‘to any other branch of government or to any 

other body or authority’ the power to make law.” Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Derry Area Sch. Dist.), 161 A.3d 827, 833 (Pa. 2017) (quoting Blackwell v. 

Commonwealth, 567 A.2d 630, 636 (Pa. 1989)). 
[J-70-2023] - 5

result of the amendments to Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations and that the 

Municipalities sought an advisory opinion without the existence of an actual case or 

controversy. A three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court disagreed with the PUC’s 

averments as to Count II, overruled those preliminary objections, and directed the PUC 

to file an answer.6 See City of Lancaster v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 251 M.D. 2019, filed Feb. 21, 2020). The PUC filed an application for reconsideration 

of the Commonwealth Court’s decision, which the Commonwealth Court denied. 

The Municipalities subsequently filed an application (Application) with the

Commonwealth Court, seeking summary relief on their claim that the PUC 

unconstitutionally delegated unfettered legislative authority to NGDCs via Section 59.18 

of the PUC’s regulations as to the location of gas meters in historic districts. More 

specifically, the Municipalities asserted that the PUC delegated legislative authority to 

NGDCs without adequate standards to: (1) guide NGDCs in determining where to place 

a meter at a property located in a historic district; and (2) prevent arbitrary NGDC 

decisions mandating meter relocations. (Application at 9-10; Municipalities’ Br. in Support 

of Application at 24, 27.) The Municipalities reiterated that, in the absence of those 

standards, Section 59.18 “delegates the PUC’s statutorily-granted authority to enact rules 

and regulations to private companies,” and, as a result, violates Article II, Section 1 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution. (Application at 9; Municipalities’ Br. in Support of Application 

at 13, 27.) The Municipalities further averred that the Code failed to provide an adequate 

review process of NGDCs’ meter placement decisions. (Application at 9-10; 

Municipalities’ Br. in Support of Application at 30-32.)

6 The Commonwealth Court sustained the PUC’s preliminary objections to Count I of the 

Petition and dismissed Count I with prejudice. The case proceeded with Count II, the 

only remaining claim. 
[J-70-2023] - 6

The PUC contended, in response to the Application that 

Section 59.18 of the [PUC’s] regulations . . . does not vest absolute 

discretion in NGDCs with respect to the location of natural gas meters. 

Section 59.18 clearly states that a[] NGDC must consider the location of a 

natural gas meter inside a building in a historic district. If the NGDC 

determines that it cannot accommodate a natural gas meter inside the 

building, the aggrieved party can ultimately have the [PUC] review this 

determination pursuant to Section 701 of the [Code], 66 Pa. C.S. § 701,[7]

and Section 5.21 of . . . the [PUC]’s [r]egulations, 52 Pa. Code § 5.21.[8]

(PUC Br. in Opposition to Application at 17-18, 22.) The PUC also generally relied on 

Section 1501 of the Code, 66 Pa. C.S. § 1501, titled “Character of service and facilities,” 

which provides, in relevant part: 

Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and 

reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, changes, 

alterations, substitutions, extensions, and improvements in or to such 

service and facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the 

accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees, and 

the public. 

(Id. at 18.)

7 Section 701 of the Code provides: 

The [PUC], or any person, corporation, or municipal corporation having an 

interest in the subject matter, or any public utility concerned, may complain 

in writing, setting forth any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any 

public utility in violation, or claimed violation, of any law which the [PUC]

has jurisdiction to administer, or of any regulation or order of the [PUC]. Any 

public utility, or other person, or corporation likewise may complain of any 

regulation or order of the [PUC], which the complainant is or has been 

required by the [PUC] to observe or carry into effect. The Commonwealth 

through the Attorney General may be a complainant before the [PUC] in any 

matter solely as an advocate for the Commonwealth as a consumer of 

public utility services. The [PUC] may prescribe the form of complaints filed 

under this section.

8 Section 5.21(a) of the PUC’s regulations provides that “[a] person complaining of an act 

done or omitted to be done by a person subject to the jurisdiction of the [PUC], in violation, 

or claimed violation of a statute which the [PUC] has jurisdiction to administer, or of a 

regulation or order of the [PUC], may file a formal complaint with the [PUC].” 
[J-70-2023] - 7

In a reported opinion, an en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court granted the 

Municipalities’ Application, finding the Municipalities’ claims persuasive that 

Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority 

to NGDCs to determine the location of gas meters in historic districts. City of Lancaster 

v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 284 A.3d 522 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).9 Referencing its February 

2020 opinion, the Commonwealth Court observed: 

[The PUC’s] Final Rulemaking Order [concerning the amendments to 

Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations] states that “the utility will continue 

to retain discretion in applying this regulation,” admits that “the regulation 

does contain provisions that delegate discretion to the utility in making a 

determination with respect to locating an outside meter,” and confirms that 

“due to [a utility’s] public safety obligations,” “it is necessary that . . . the 

utility be allowed to make the final decision.”

Lancaster, 284 A.3d at 527 (internal citations and some alterations omitted) (emphasis 

and one alteration in original) (quoting Lancaster, slip op. at 26). The Commonwealth 

Court further pointed to this Court’s decision in Protz, wherein we emphasized: 

[W]hen the General Assembly empowers some other branch or body to act, 

our jurisprudence requires “that the basic policy choices involved in 

‘legislative power’ actually be made by the [l]egislature as constitutionally 

mandated.” Tosto v. Pa. Nursing Home Loan Agency, . . . 331 A.2d 198, 

202 ([Pa.] 1975). This constraint serves two purposes. First, it ensures that 

duly authorized and politically responsible officials make all of the necessary 

policy decisions, as is their mandate per the electorate. And second, it 

seeks to protect against the arbitrary exercise of unnecessary and 

uncontrolled discretionary power.

. . . .

9 The Commonwealth Court first noted that “[a]n application for summary relief is 

appropriate where a party lodges a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute,” 

where no facts are in dispute, and a party’s right to judgment is clear. Lancaster, 284 A.3d 

at 525 (emphasis omitted) (quoting McLinko v. Dep’t of State, 270 A.3d 1243, 1250 

(Pa. Cmwlth.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 279 A.3d 539 (Pa. 2022), cert. 

denied, 143 S. Ct. 573 (2023), and Jubelirer v. Rendell, 953 A.2d 514, 521 (Pa. 2008)). 

Observing that the Municipalities were raising a legal question concerning the 

constitutional validity of Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations and not a factual question, 

it opined that the Application was appropriate. 
[J-70-2023] - 8

Although [the Pennsylvania] Constitution generally forbids the delegation of 

“legislative power,” it nonetheless permits the General Assembly, in some 

instances, to assign the authority and discretion to execute or administer a 

law. Blackwell, . . . 567 A.2d at 637. When the General Assembly does so, 

the Constitution imposes two fundamental limitations. First, as mentioned, 

the General Assembly must make “the basic policy choices,” and second, 

the legislation must include “adequate standards which will guide and 

restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative functions.” 

Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 

. . . 877 A.2d 383, 418 ([Pa.] 2005); State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs [v. 

Life Fellowship of Pa.], 272 A.2d [478,] 481 ([Pa.1971)] (quoting Chartiers 

Valley Joint Sch. v. C[n]ty. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Allegheny C[n]ty., . . . 211 

A.2d 487, 492-93 ([Pa.] 1965)).

Lancaster, 284 A.3d at 528 (emphasis and some alterations in original) (quoting Protz,

161 A.3d at 833-34). 

Explaining that a reviewing court must look to the letter of the law, the underlying 

purpose of a statute, and its reasonable effect to determine whether adequate delegative 

standards have been established, the Commonwealth Court compared this case to City

of Williamsport Bureau of Codes v. DeRaffele, 170 A.3d 1270 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Id. 

at 528-29 (quoting Gambling Expansion Fund, 877 A.2d at 418). In that case, the 

Commonwealth Court observed that it refused to enforce on constitutional grounds 

Section 11018.13 of the Third Class City Code, 11 Pa. C.S. § 11018.13, because the 

provision granted unfettered authority to the International Code Council, a private entity,

to create maintenance codes for the City of Williamsport. Lancaster, 284 A.3d at 529 

(quoting City of Williamsport, 170 A.3d at 1274-75). 

Based on those cases and principles, the Commonwealth Court rejected the 

PUC’s assertion that Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations somehow imposes an 

affirmative duty on NGDCs to accommodate an indoor meter in a historic district, noting 

that Section 59.18(d)(1) only provides that an inside meter “shall be considered” when 

the building is in a historic district. Id. at 531 (quoting 52 Pa. Code § 59.18(d)(1), and 

PUC’s Br. in Opposition to Application (“Section 59.18 does not guide the NGDC, and it 
[J-70-2023] - 9

certainly does not create a presumption that a meter must remain inside a building unless 

the NGDC ‘cannot accommodate’ it.”)). As a result, the Commonwealth Court concluded 

that Section 59.18 unlawfully grants NGDCs “complete discretion” regarding the 

placement of gas meters in historic districts “with absolutely no guidance . . . [or]

‘safeguards to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc decision making.’” Id. at 532 (alteration 

in original) (quoting 425 Prop. Assoc. of Alpha Chi Rho, Inc. v. State Coll. Borough Zoning 

Hearing Bd., 223 A.3d 300, 313 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022)). 

The Commonwealth Court also found unconvincing the PUC’s assertion that the 

discretion of NGDCs would be curtailed by the right of the PUC review under 

Section 701 of the Code and Section 5.21(a) of the PUC’s regulations, observing, it 

opined in its February 2020 opinion, that, 

[a]lthough . . . it is possible that the owners of the historic buildings may 

discuss the location of the meter with the NGDC as part of the notice 

process, [Section ]59.18(d) does not appear to have a formal, adjudicative 

process. Most notably, contrary to that argued by the PUC, there is no 

formal application procedure embedded within [Section ]59.18. Further, in 

light of the plain language of [Section ]59.18(d), a[] NGDC is not required to 

set forth the basis or reasons for its determination as to whether a meter 

should be located inside or outside a structure.

Id. at 534 (most alterations in original) (quoting Lancaster, slip op. at 25). Accordingly, 

because it reasoned that there were no facts in dispute and the Municipalities were 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their claim that Section 59.18 of the PUC’s 

regulations violates Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the 

Commonwealth Court granted the Municipalities’ Application, thereby rendering 

Section 59.18 unenforceable. See id. at 537.

10 

10 The Commonwealth Court did not grant the Municipalities’ requested relief that the 

Commonwealth decree that the local ordinances created pursuant to the MHDL govern 

over any of the PUC’s regulations. It merely rendered Section 59.18 of the PUC’s 

regulations unenforceable.
[J-70-2023] - 10

Judge McCullough, joined by President Judge Cohn Jubelirer, authored a 

dissenting opinion. Judge McCullough observed that, pursuant to Section 1501 of the 

Code, NGDCs are required to “furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and 

reasonable service and facilities that are necessary and proper for the accommodation, 

convenience, and safety of . . . NGDCs’ patrons, employees, and the public.” Lancaster, 

284 A.3d at 540 (citing 66 Pa. C.S. § 1501). Judge McCullough explained that the PUC 

amended Section 59.18 of its regulations as a safety precaution to protect the public from 

gas leaks and explosions. See id. at 538 (citing and quoting Final Rulemaking Order, 

44 Pa. B. at 5835-36, 5838 (2014)). Thus, “[r]equiring NGDCs to consider, in the first 

instance, whether it is safe, convenient, adequate, efficient, and reasonable to locate a 

meter inside in a historic district,” Judge McCullough reasoned, “is not an unlawful 

delegation of the [PUC’s] authority.” Id. at 540-41. 

Judge McCullough likewise disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that 

Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations “lacks adequate standards and/or procedures to 

guide [NGDCs] in determining where to place a meter located in a historic district.” See 

id. at 537, 540-45. Rather, Judge McCullough insisted that NGDCs must, in the first 

instance, determine whether a gas meter can be placed indoors “on a case-by-case basis 

to ensure the safety of the public and its personnel,” which Judge McCullough reasoned 

NGDCs can do based on the adequate standards set forth in Section 59.18 of the PUC’s 

regulations. Id. at 545. Thereafter, Judge McCullough opined that, if customers are

unsatisfied with the placement of gas meters, customers have a right of appeal to the 

PUC to argue why their particular aesthetic “is feasible while still meeting the overarching 

concern for the safety of . . . NGDCs’ patrons, employees, and the public.” Id. at 545. 

For those reasons, Judge McCullough would have denied the Municipalities’ Application.
[J-70-2023] - 11

II. ISSUES

The PUC appeals from the Commonwealth Court’s en banc decision raising the 

following issues: 

(1) Did the Commonwealth Court err in granting summary relief when it 

failed to recognize the [PUC’s] statutorily prescribed procedure to review 

the placement of utility facilities in the Public Utility Code at Sections 701, 

1501 and 2205, 66 Pa. C.S. §§ 701, 1501 and 2205?

(2) Did the Commonwealth Court err in granting summary relief in accepting 

the Municipalities’ assertion that Section 59.18 [of the PUC’s regulations], 

as amended on May 22, 2014, 52 Pa. Code § 59.18, would cause damage 

to historic facades in historic districts but failed to conduct an analysis of the 

safety issues regarding meter placement versus historic aesthetic?

(3) Did the Commonwealth Court err in granting summary relief when the 

Municipalities failed to demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy 

when there is a material question as to whether Section 59.18 [of the PUC’s 

regulations], as amended on May 22, 2014, 52 Pa. Code § 59.18, actually 

operates to cause harm to historic aesthetic, value, or other attribute[s] of 

properties in the Municipalities’ historic districts?

“An application for summary relief may be granted if a party’s right to judgment is clear 

and no material issues of fact are in dispute.” Jubelirer, 953 A.2d at 521. “This Court’s 

review of questions of law, such as whether summary judgment was appropriate . . . , is 

plenary.” Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. Phila. Gas Works, 782 A.2d 510, 512 (Pa. 2001). 

III. DISCUSSION

Seemingly at the heart of this case is the non-delegation doctrine, which doctrine 

derives from Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. As touched upon

above, the non-delegation doctrine “requires that the basic policy choices involved in 

‘legislative power’ actually be made by the [l]egislature as constitutionally mandated.” 

Chartiers, 211 A.2d at 492. “While the legislature cannot delegate the power to make a 

law, it may, where necessary, confer authority and discretion in connection with the 

execution of the law . . . .” Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277, 284 

(Pa. 1947). The non-delegation doctrine, at its core, serves as a check on the General 
[J-70-2023] - 12

Assembly’s delegative power. “More specifically, the rule demands that, when the 

[l]egislature delegates policymaking discretion to administrative agencies, it must make 

the ‘basic policy choices’ which will serve as standards to guide and restrain the exercise 

of discretion.” Tosto, 331 A.2d at 202-03 (quoting Chartiers, 211 A.2d at 492). 

These principles were exemplified in Protz, where we considered a non-delegation 

challenge to the former Section 306(a.2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act.11 

Section 306(a.2) allowed “employers to demand that a claimant undergo an 

impairment-rating evaluation (IRE), during which a physician must determine the ‘degree 

of impairment’ that is due to the claimant’s compensable injury.” Protz, 161 A.3d at 830

(quoting 77 P.S. § 511.2(1) (repealed 2018)). As part of that process, Section 306(a.2) 

required physicians to apply the “‘most recent edition’ of the American Medical 

Association (AMA) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.” Id. (quoting 

77 P.S. § 511.2 (repealed 2018)). Because Section 306(a.2) failed to “favor any particular 

policies relative to the Guides’ methodology for grading impairments,” “prescribe any 

standards to guide and restrain the AMA’s discretion to create such a methodology,” or 

provide procedural mechanisms to protect against “administrative arbitrariness and 

caprice,” we explained that Section 306(a.2) gave the AMA “unfettered control” over a 

legislative function that is prohibited by the non-delegation doctrine to Article II, 

Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 835-36, 838 (quoting Tosto, 331 A.2d 

at 203). 

The Commonwealth Court reached a similar conclusion in City of Williamsport,

wherein a landowner was charged with and convicted of various offenses under the City 

of Williamsport’s (the City) 2015 Maintenance Code. On appeal before the 

Commonwealth Court, the landowner generally challenged the validity of 

11 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 511.2 (repealed 2018). 
[J-70-2023] - 13

the 2015 Maintenance Code. By way of background, in 2004, the City adopted the 2003 

International Property Maintenance Code, which was created by the International Code 

Council, a private, third party. The City argued that it was permitted to charge the 

landowner under the 2015 Maintenance Code because its adoption of the 2003 

International Property Maintenance Code “encompassed all subsequent changes to the 

[C]ode”—i.e., that the 2003 Code was self-updating. City of Williamsport, 170 A.3d

at 1273. In support, the City referenced Section 11018.13(a) of the Third Class City Code, 

11 Pa. C.S. § 11018.13(a), which provides that a council may enact “by reference” “all or 

a portion of [a] standard or nationally recognized code as an ordinance of the city.” Id. 

(quoting 11 Pa. C.S. § 11018.13(a)). Further, Section 11018.13(b)(2) provides that “[a]n 

ordinance which incorporates standard or nationally recognized code amendments by 

reference shall become effective after the same procedure and in the same manner as is 

specified in this section for original adoption of the code.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting

11 Pa. C.S. § 11018.13(b)(2)). 

The Commonwealth Court disagreed with the City’s suggestion, however, that

Section 11018.13 of the Third Class City Code allows third-class “cities to adopt entirely 

new ordinances, or provisions thereof, sight unseen.” Id. at 1274. “Instead,” the 

Commonwealth Court reasoned that “Section 11018.13 dictates that changes to a 

third[-]class city’s code that are made prior to the adoption of the code are incorporated 

into the ordinance.” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the Commonwealth Court concluded 

that the City “did not have the authority to adopt the 2015 Maintenance Code eleven years 

before it was written.” Id. In so doing, the Commonwealth Court further reasoned that to 

accept the City’s argument “would invariably [cause] a constitutional problem under the 

non-delegation doctrine” pursuant to Protz because it would “effectively grant the 

International Code Council unfettered authority to create a new controlling Maintenance 
[J-70-2023] - 14

Code for the residents of” the City. Id. at 1274-75. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court 

concluded that the landowner could not be charged with and convicted of offenses under 

the 2015 Maintenance Code because it was invalid. 

The parties dispute the applicability of the foregoing principles as they pertain to 

Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations and the NGDCs’ actions relative to gas meter 

placement in historic districts, advancing generally the same contentions they made

before the Commonwealth Court concerning the constitutional validity of Section 59.18 

under the non-delegation doctrine and aligning themselves more or less with the majority 

and dissenting factions of the Commonwealth Court. The parties, however,

mischaracterize the nature of Section 59.18. Principally, Section 59.18 does not involve 

the delegation of any legislative authority—of either the General Assembly or the PUC—

to NGDCs concerning the placement of gas meters in historic districts; rather, 

Section 59.18 is merely a regulatory act under the PUC’s administrative authority limiting 

the placement of gas meters in certain locations for the safety of the public. Stated 

differently, the General Assembly never enacted a statute empowering the PUC to decide 

the location of gas meters in historic districts in Pennsylvania.

12 To the contrary, the 

location of gas meters in historic districts is subject to NGDCs’—not the PUC’s—

discretion in their role as public utilities.

13 

12 The Municipalities fail to reference such a statute, nor have we uncovered one. 

13 Indeed, the prior version of Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations merely provided:

Meters shall be installed in either of the following locations:

1. Inside the building, preferably in a dry, well-ventilated place not subject 

to excessive heat, and as near as possible to the point of entrance of the 

pipe supplying service to the building.

2. Outside the building at a location selected by the utility. A meter cover or 

housing is required if, in the judgment of the utility, conditions require the 

physical protection for the meter installation. 

(continued...)
[J-70-2023] - 15

Undoubtedly, to have an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, there 

must be a legislative delegation in the first instance. Protz concerned Section 306(a.2) 

of the Workers’ Compensation Act, pursuant to which the General Assembly required the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board to rely exclusively and without discretion on the 

third-party AMA guidelines. Similarly, City of Williamsport concerned Section 11018.13 

of the Third Class City Code, which delegated to third-class cities the ability to adopt a 

standard or nationally recognized maintenance code. The only statutes the Municipalities 

reference are Sections 501 and 1501 of the Code, neither of which concern gas meters. 

Pertinently, Section 1501, titled “Character of service and facilities,” sets forth safety 

standards for public utilities in the provision of service: 

Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and 

reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, changes, 

alterations, substitutions, extensions, and improvements in or to such 

service and facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the 

accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees, and 

the public.

66 Pa. C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added). Section 501(b) of the Code, on the other hand, 

concerns the PUC’s administrative authority:

Administrative authority and regulations.—The [PUC] shall have general 

administrative power and authority to supervise and regulate all public 

utilities doing business within this Commonwealth. The [PUC] may make 

such regulations, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary or proper 

in the exercise of its powers or for the performance of its duties. 

66 Pa. C.S. § 501(b). Nowhere in these provisions did the General Assembly direct the 

PUC to choose the location of gas meters in the Commonwealth such that the PUC could 

have unlawfully delegated that authority to NGDCs in Section 59.18 of its regulations, as 

the Municipalities so claim. The absence of such a statute sets this case apart from Protz, 

City of Williamsport, and the non-delegation doctrine entirely, and further demonstrates 

Final Rulemaking Order, 44 Pa. B. at 5835-36.
[J-70-2023] - 16

that NGDCs have the discretion to choose the location of gas meters in the 

Commonwealth. 

Nonetheless, concerned with the safety of the citizens of the Commonwealth, and 

in recognition of the minimal guidance that former Section 59.18 of its regulations 

provided as to the location of gas meters, the PUC amended Section 59.18 to, inter alia,

establish that outdoor gas meter placement is the default location for gas meters in the 

Commonwealth “[u]nless otherwise allowed or required” by the regulation. 52 Pa. Code 

§ 59.18(a)(1), (8). The PUC provided an exception to the default location where a building 

is located in a historic district, in which case an inside meter location “shall be considered” 

in conjunction with a number of attendant circumstances. 52 Pa. Code 

§ 59.18(d)(1)(i)-(ii)(D) (emphasis added). There is no allegation in this case that the PUC 

lacked the administrative authority to amend Section 59.18. Thus, at bottom, the 

Municipalities’ non-delegation argument masks their real complaint—i.e., the PUC did not 

go far enough in Section 59.18 to limit, or direct, NGDCs’ placement of gas meters in 

historic districts. That disagreement, however, does not amount to a non-delegation claim 

under the circumstances presented here. Accordingly, because this case presents a 

circumstance that falls outside the realm of the non-delegation doctrine, the 

Municipalities’ claims must fail.14

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon careful review, we conclude that the General Assembly never enacted a 

statute vesting the PUC with any legislative authority under Article II, Section 1 of the 

14 There is also no merit to the argument the Municipalities advanced before the 

Commonwealth Court that Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations unlawfully delegates 

the PUC’s administrative authority under Section 501(b) of the Code to NGDCs. 

Section 59.18 does not vest NGDCs with the authority to regulate some other entity

concerning the placement of gas meters in historic districts. Section 59.18 merely 

restricts where NGDCs can place gas meters. 
[J-70-2023] - 17

Pennsylvania Constitution relative to the location of gas meters in historic districts that 

would give rise to any constitutional concerns regarding delegation. Accordingly, we 

reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order granting the Municipalities’ Application and 

remand the matter to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings consistent with 

this Opinion.

15 

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht and Mundy join the 

opinion.

15 The PUC did not file a cross-application for summary relief and, therefore, we are 

constrained to remand the matter rather than grant relief in favor of the PUC.