DOE/EIA-0484(2005)

International

Energy Outlook

2005

July 2005

Energy Information Administration

Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting

U.S. Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

This report was prepared by the Energy Information Administration, the independent statistical and

analytical agency within the Department of Energy. The information contained herein should be

attributed to the Energy Information Administration and should not be construed as advocating or

reflecting any policy position of the Department of Energy or of any other organization.

This publication is on the WEB at:

www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html.
Contacts

The International Energy Outlook is prepared by the Energy Information Administration (EIA). General questions

concerning the contents of the report should be referred

to John J. Conti (john.conti@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-2222),

Director, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting.

Specific questions about the report should be referred

to Linda E. Doman (202/586-1041) or the following

analysts:

World Energy and Economic Outlook. . . Linda Doman (linda.doman@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-1041)

Macroeconomic Assumptions. . . . . . Nasir Khilji (nasir.khilji@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-1294)

Energy Consumption by End-Use Sector

Residential Energy Use . . . . . . . . . . . John Cymbalsky (john.cymbalsky@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-4815)

Commercial Energy Use. . . . . . . . . . . Erin Boedecker (erin.boedecker@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-4791)

Industrial Energy Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . Linda Doman (linda.doman@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-1041)

Transportation Energy Use . . . . . . . . Eugene Reiser (eugene.reiser@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-5840)

World Oil Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G. Daniel Butler (george.butler@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-9503)

World Oil Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Linda Doman (linda.doman@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-1041)

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Justine Barden (justine.barden@eia.doe.gov 202-586-3508)

Phyllis Martin (phyllis.martin@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-9592)

Gas to Liquids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aloulou Fawzi (aloulou.fawzi@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-7818)

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael Mellish (michael.mellish@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-2136)

Diane Kearney (diane.kearney@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-2415)

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . John Staub (john.staub@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-6344)

Carbon Dioxide Emissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . Perry Lindstrom (perry.lindstrom@eia.doe.gov, 202-586-0934)

ii Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

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Contents

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 iii

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

World Energy and Economic Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Outlook for World Energy Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

World Economic Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Alternative Growth Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Trends in Energy Intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Energy Consumption by End-Use Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Residential Sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Commercial Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Industrial Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Transportation Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

World Oil Markets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

World Oil Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

World Oil Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

The Composition of World Oil Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Worldwide Petroleum Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Reserves and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Regional Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Coal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Reserves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Regional Demand Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Electricity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Net Electricity Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Electricity Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Reference Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Kyoto Protocol Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Appendixes

Tables

Figures

iv Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

1. World Marketed Energy Consumption by Region, 1990-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2. Average Annual Growth in World Gross Domestic Product by Selected Countries and Regions, 1979-2025 . . . . 11

3. Transportation Energy Consumption and Total Oil Consumption by Region, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

4. Estimated World Oil Resources, 1995-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

5. OPEC Oil Production, 1990-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

6. Non-OPEC Oil Production, 1990-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

7. Worldwide Petroleum Trade in the Reference Case, 2002 and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

8. World Natural Gas Reserves by Country as of January 1, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

9. World Coal Flows by Importing and Exporting Regions, Reference Case, 2003, 2015, and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

10. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region, 1990-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

11. Carbon Dioxide Intensity by Region and Country, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

12. Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Fuel in Participating Annex I Countries

in Two Cases, 2010 and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

13. Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Fuel in Canada in Two Cases, 2010 and 2025 . . . . . . . . 84

14. Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Fuel in Western Europe

in Two Cases, 2010 and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

15. Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Fuel in Japan in Two Cases, 2010 and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . 85

A. Reference Case Projections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

B. High Economic Growth Case Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

C. Low Economic Growth Case Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

D. Reference Case Projections by End-Use Sector and Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

E. Projections of Oil Production Capacity and Oil Production in Three Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

F. Projections of Nuclear Generating Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

G. Key Assumptions for the IEO2005 Kyoto Protocol Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

H. Comparisons With Other Forecasts, and Performance of Past IEO Forecasts for 1990, 1995, and 2000 . . . . . . . . . 171

I. System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (SAGE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

J. Regional Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

1. World Marketed Energy Consumption by Region, 1970-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. World Marketed Energy Use by Energy Type, 1970-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

3. World Natural Gas Consumption by End-Use Sector, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

4. Comparison of IEO2004 and IEO2005 Projections for World Nuclear Generating Capacity, 2010-2025 . . . . . . . . 4

5. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Fuel Type, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

6. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Two Cases, 1990, 2010, and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

7. World Marketed Energy Consumption, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

8. World Marketed Energy Use by Region, 1970-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

9. Marketed Energy Use in the Emerging Economies by Region, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

10. World Marketed Energy Use by Fuel Type, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

11. Comparison of IEO2004 and IEO2005 Projections for the U.S. Refiner Acquisition Cost

of Imported Crude Oil, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

12. Comparison of IEO2004 and IEO2005 Projections for World Coal Consumption by Region, 2015 and 2025 . . . . . 9

13. Fuel Shares of World Electricity Generation, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

14. Comparison of IEO2004 and IEO2005 Projections for World Nuclear Generating Capacity, 2010-2025 . . . . . . . . 10

15. World Marketed Energy Consumption in Three Economic Growth Cases, 1970-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

16. Growth in Energy Use and Gross Domestic Product for the Mature Market Economies, 1970-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . 15

17. Growth in Energy Use and Gross Domestic Product for the Emerging Economies, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

18. Growth in Energy Use and Gross Domestic Product for the Transitional Economies, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

19. Energy Intensity by Region, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

20. Residential Sector Energy Consumption by Region, 2002-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

21. Growth in Residential Sector Delivered Energy Consumption by Region and Fuel, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

22. Commercial Sector Energy Consumption by Region, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

23. Growth in Commercial Sector Delivered Energy Consumption by Region and Fuel, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Figures (Continued)

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 v

24. Industrial Sector Energy Consumption by Region, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

25. Growth in Industrial Sector Delivered Energy Consumption by Region and Fuel, 2002-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

26. Average Annual Growth Rates for Industrial Energy Consumption in Emerging Economies, 2002-2025. . . . . . . 21

27. Transportation Sector Energy Consumption by Region, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

28. World Oil Consumption by End-Use Sector, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

29. World Oil Consumption by Region and Country Group, 2002 and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

30. World Oil Prices in Three Cases, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

31. World Oil Production in the Reference Case by Region, 1970, 2002, 2010, and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

32. OPEC, Non-OPEC, and Nonconventional Oil Production in the Reference Case, 2002 and 2010-2025 . . . . . . . . . 30

33. Imports of Persian Gulf Oil by Importing Region, 2002 and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

34. World Natural Gas Consumption, 1980-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

35. Natural Gas Consumption by Region, 1980-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

36. Increases in Natural Gas Consumption by Region and Country Group, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

37. Natural Gas Production by Region, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

38. Natural Gas Consumption in Mature Market Economies by Source, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

39. World Natural Gas Reserves by Region, 1975-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

40. World Natural Gas Reserves by Region as of January 1, 2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

41. World Natural Gas Resources by Region, 2005-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

42. Natural Gas Consumption in North America by Country, 1990-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

43. Natural Gas Supply in North America by Source, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

44. Natural Gas Consumption in Western Europe by Source, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

45. Natural Gas Consumption in Transitional Economies, 1990-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

46. Natural Gas Consumption in Emerging Asia, 1990-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

47. Natural Gas Consumption in the Middle East, 1990-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

48. Natural Gas Consumption in Africa, 1990-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

49. Natural Gas Consumption in Central and South America, 1990-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

50. World Coal Consumption by Region, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

51. Coal Share of World Energy Consumption by Sector, 2002, 2015, and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

52. World Recoverable Coal Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

53. World Coal Consumption by Region, 1980, 2002, 2015, and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

54. Coal Share of Total Energy Consumption by Region, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

55. Coal Consumption in China by Sector, 2002, 2015, and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

56. World Coal Trade, 1985, 2003, 2015, and 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

57. Coal Imports by Major Importing Region, 1995-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

58. World Net Electricity Consumption, 2002-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

59. World Net Electricity Consumption by Region, 2002-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

60. World Electricity Generation Capacity by Region, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

61. Fuel Shares of World Electricity Generation, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

62. World Coal-Fired Generation Capacity by Region, 2002-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

63. World Natural-Gas- and Oil-Fired Generation Capacity by Region, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

64. Nuclear Shares of National Electricity Generation, 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

65. World Nuclear Power Generation Capacity by Region, 2002-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

66. World Hydroelectric and Other Renewable Generation Capacity by Region, 2002-2025. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

67. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region, 1990-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

68. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Fuel Type, 1970-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

69. Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the Mature Market Economies, 1990-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

70. Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the Transitional Economies, 1990-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

71. Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the Emerging Economies, 1990-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Preface

This report presents international energy projections through 2025,

prepared by the Energy Information Administration, including outlooks

for major energy fuels and associated carbon dioxide emissions.

The International Energy Outlook 2005 (IEO2005) presents

an assessment by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the outlook for international energy markets through 2025. U.S. projections appearing in

IEO2005 are consistent with those published in EIA’s

Annual Energy Outlook 2005 (AEO2005), which was prepared using the National Energy Modeling System

(NEMS). Although the IEO typically uses the same reference case as the AEO, IEO2005 has adopted the October

futures case from AEO2005 as its reference case for the

United States. The October futures case, which has an

assumption of higher world oil prices than the AEO2005

reference case, now appears to be a more likely projection. The reference case prices will be reconsidered for

the next AEO. Based on information available as of July

2005, the AEO2006 reference case will likely reflect

world oil prices higher than those in the IEO2005 reference case.

IEO2005 is provided as a service to energy managers and

analysts, both in government and in the private sector.

The projections are used by international agencies, Federal and State governments, trade associations, and

other planners and decisionmakers. They are published

pursuant to the Department of Energy Organization Act

of 1977 (Public Law 95-91), Section 205(c).

The IEO2005 projections are based on U.S. and foreign

government laws in effect on March 1, 2005. The potential impacts of pending or proposed legislation, regulations, and standards are not reflected in the projections,

nor are the impacts of legislation where the mechanisms

for implementing the legislation have not yet been

announced. For example, the IEO2005 reference case

forecast does not include the potential impacts of the

Kyoto Protocol (which entered into force on February

16, 2005), because the treaty does not indicate the methods by which signatories will implement the Protocol.

The Kyoto Protocol also does not address signatory obligations beyond the 2012 time frame, making it impossible in the context of a reference case projection for EIA to

assess the impacts of the Protocol through 2025, the end

of the IEO2005 forecast horizon.

Projections in IEO2005 are displayed according to three

basic country groupings (see Appendix J for complete

regional definitions). The mature market economies

include projections for North America (United States,

Canada, and Mexico); Western Europe; and mature

market Asia (Japan and Australia/New Zealand). The

emerging economies are represented by four separate

regional subgroups: emerging Asia, Africa, Middle East,

and Central and South America. China, India, and South

Korea are represented in emerging Asia, and Brazil is

represented in Central and South America. The transitional economies include projections for Eastern Europe

and the former Soviet Union (EE/FSU). Russia is represented in the FSU.

The report begins with a review of world trends in

energy demand and the major macroeconomic assumptions used in deriving the IEO2005 projections. The time

frame for historical data begins with 1970 and extends to

2002, providing a 32-year historical view of energy

demand, and the projections extend to 2025, providing a

23-year forecast period. High economic growth and low

economic growth cases were developed to depict a set of

alternative growth paths for the energy forecast. The

two cases consider higher and lower growth paths for

regional gross domestic product (GDP) than assumed in

the reference case. The resulting projections—and the

uncertainty associated with international energy projections in general—are discussed in Chapter 1, “World

Energy and Economic Outlook.”

New to this report are regional projections of end-use

energy consumption in the residential, commercial,

industrial, and transportation sectors. Chapter 2 reviews

worldwide forecasts for end-use sector energy consumption. Regional projections for energy consumption

by fuel—petroleum, natural gas, and coal—are presented in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, along with reviews of the

current status of each fuel on a worldwide basis. Chapter

6 discusses the projections for world electricity markets—including nuclear power, hydropower, and other

commercial renewable energy resources—and presents

forecasts of world installed generating capacity, which

are new to this year’s report. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses

the outlook for global carbon dioxide emissions. With

the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol on February 16,

2005, this year’s outlook includes a Kyoto Protocol scenario, which is also presented in Chapter 7.

Appendix A contains summary tables of the IEO2005

reference case projections for world energy consumption, GDP, energy consumption by fuel, carbon dioxide

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 vii
emissions, and regional population growth. The reference case projections of total foreign energy consumption and consumption of oil, natural gas, coal, and

renewable energy were prepared using EIA’s System for

the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (SAGE), as were

projections of net electricity consumption, energy consumed by fuel and region by end-use sector, and carbon

dioxide emissions. In addition, the NEMS Coal Export

Submodule was used to derive flows in international

coal trade, presented in Chapter 5.

Summary tables of projections for the high and low

economic growth cases are provided in Appendixes B

and C, respectively, and reference projections of delivered energy consumption by end-use sector and region

are presented in Appendix D. Appendix E contains

summary tables of projections for world oil production

capacity and oil production in the reference case and in

two alternative cases, the high and low world oil price

cases. The projections in Appendix E were derived from

the International Energy Module of NEMS. Appendix F

contains summary tables of projections for nuclear

capacity in four nuclear growth cases. Appendix G

provides a summary of assumptions underlying the

IEO2005 Kyoto Protocol case. Appendix H includes a

set of comparisons of alternative forecasts with the

IEO2005 projections, as well as comparisons of historical

IEO forecasts with actual historical data. Comparisons

of the IEO2005 and IEO2004 forecasts are also presented

in Appendix H. Appendix I describes the SAGE model,

and Appendix J defines the regional designations included in the report.

viii Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Objectives of the IEO2005 Projections

The projections in IEO2005 are not statements of what will happen, but what might happen given the specific

assumptions and methodologies used. These projections provide an objective, policy-neutral reference case that can

be used to analyze international energy markets. As a policy-neutral data and analysis organization, EIA does not

propose, advocate, or speculate on future legislative and regulatory changes. The projections are based on U.S. and

foreign government laws effective as of March 1, 2005. Assuming fixed laws, even knowing that changes will occur,

will naturally result in projections that differ from the final data.

Models are abstractions of energy production and consumption activities, regulatory activities, and producer and

consumer behavior. The forecasts are highly dependent on the data, analytical methodologies, model structures,

and specific assumptions used in their development. Trends depicted in the analysis are indicative of tendencies in

the real world rather than representations of specific real-world outcomes. Even where trends are stable and well

understood, the projections are subject to uncertainty. Many events that shape energy markets are random and cannot be anticipated, and assumptions concerning future technology characteristics, demographics, and resource

availability cannot be known with certainty.
Highlights

World energy consumption is projected to increase by 57 percent from 2002 to 2025.

Much of the growth in worldwide energy use in the IEO2005 reference case

forecast is expected in the countries with emerging economies.

In the International Energy Outlook 2005 (IEO2005) reference case, world marketed energy consumption is projected to increase on average by 2.0 percent per year over

the 23-year forecast horizon from 2002 to 2025—slightly

lower than the 2.2-percent average annual growth rate

from 1970 to 2002. Worldwide, total energy use is projected to grow from 412 quadrillion British thermal units

(Btu) in 2002 to 553 quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 645 quadrillion Btu in 2025 (Figure 1).

Emerging economies account for much of the projected

growth in marketed energy consumption over the next

two decades, with energy use in the group more than

doubling by 2025. Strong projected economic growth

drives the demand for energy use in the region. Economic activity, as measured by gross domestic product

(GDP) in purchasing power parity terms, is expected to

expand by 5.1 percent per year in the emerging economies, as compared with 2.5 percent per year in the

mature market economies and 4.4 percent per year in the

transitional economies of Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union (EE/FSU).

In contrast to the emerging economies, increases in

energy consumption for the mature market economies

and transitional economies are projected to be more

modest. In the case of the mature market economies,

well-established energy consumption patterns and

infrastructure, along with a shift from energy-intensive

industries to services, lead to a projected growth rate for

energy demand that averages 1.1 percent per year over

the projection period, compared with 3.2 percent per

year in the emerging economies. Although a robust economic growth projection for the transitional economies

should spur energy demand, the outlook for growth in

the region’s energy use is moderated somewhat by projected declines (i.e., improvements) in energy intensity

as the EE/FSU countries continue to replace older, inefficient capital stock.

Trends in end-use sector energy consumption can vary

widely, according to the level and pace of economic

development in a given region. On a worldwide basis,

the industrial and transportation sectors show the fastest growth in the IEO2005 reference case, averaging 2.1

percent per year in both sectors. Slower growth is projected in the residential and commercial sectors, averaging 1.5 percent and 1.9 percent per year, respectively,

from 2002 to 2025 for the world as a whole. In the mature

market economies, where population growth generally

is slow or negative over the forecast, energy use in the

commercial sector grows at a faster pace (1.3 percent per

year) than in any other end-use sector, based on expectations of rapid increases in the use of new telecommunications technologies and office equipment as these

nations continue to shift to service economies.

In the EE/FSU transitional economies, energy demand

in the industrial and transportation sectors is projected

to grow on average by 1.6 percent per year from 2002 to

2025, and slow or negative population growth as well as

improvements in energy efficiency are expected to lead

to lower growth rates for energy demand in the residential and commercial sectors. In the emerging countries,

in contrast, strong growth in demand for energy is projected for every end-use sector, ranging from 3.1 percent

per year in the residential sector to 3.6 percent per

year in the commercial and transportation sectors. The

higher growth rates reflect the relatively rapid economic

and population growth expected for the emerging

economies.

In the IEO2005 reference case, the use of all energy

sources increases over the forecast period (Figure 2).

Fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal) continue to supply

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 1

207 243 285 310 348 366

412

504

553 598

645

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2002

2010

2015

2020

2025

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

Quadrillion Btu

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

History Projections

Figure 1. World Marketed Energy Consumption by

Region, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
much of the energy used worldwide, and oil remains the

dominant energy source, given its importance in the

transportation and industrial end-use sectors. Nonfossil fuel use also grows over the forecast, but not as

rapidly as fossil fuel use. The outlook for non-fossil fuels

could, however, be altered by government policies or

programs, such as environmental laws aimed at limiting

or reducing pollutants from the combustion of fossil fuel

consumption and encouraging the use of non-fossil

fuels.

The IEO2005 reference case has adopted the Annual

Energy Outlook 2005 (AEO2005) October futures case,

which has an assumption of higher prices than the

AEO2005 reference case and now appears to be a more

likely projection for oil prices. World oil prices rose by

more than $9 per barrel (in nominal dollars) over the

course of 2004 and are expected to add an additional $11

per barrel in 2005, brought about by tight oil market conditions that include low inventory levels, surging

demand in emerging Asia, and the situation in Iraq;

however, such developments are not indicative of the

long-term trend in the IEO2005 reference case. From

anticipated high levels throughout 2005, world oil prices

decline gradually through 2010 to $31 per barrel (in 2003

dollars) before beginning to rise to about $35 per barrel

in 2025. Based on information available as of July 2005,

the AEO2006 reference case will likely reflect world oil

prices higher than those in the IEO2005 reference case.

World oil use is expected to grow from 78 million barrels

per day in 2002 to 103 million barrels per day in 2015 and

2 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Regional Definitions in the International Energy Outlook 2005

Regular readers of the International Energy Outlook

(IEO) will notice that, in this edition, the names used to

describe country groupings have been changed.

Although the organization of countries within the

three major groupings has not changed, the nomenclature used in previous editions to describe the groups—

namely, industrialized, EE/FSU, and developing—

had become somewhat dated and did not accurately

reflect the countries within them. Some analysts have

argued that several of the countries in the “developing” group (South Korea and China, for instance) could

fairly be called “industrialized” today.

IEO2005 uses country grouping designations based on

relative levels of economic development. The three

major groupings (or “regions”) used in this report are

the mature market economies, transitional economies,

and emerging economies. The mature market economies include nations whose energy markets are generally well-established, and whose industrial sectors

have trended away from more energy-intensive manufacturing industries toward less energy-intensive service industries. As shown in the map below, the

mature market economies include the countries of

North America (the United States, Canada, and Mexico), Western Europe, and “mature market” Asia

(Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). The grouping of

countries may be subject of some debate. For example,

some may argue that Mexico should not be considered

a mature market economy; however, it is included in

North America because of its importance in energy

trade in the region.

The transitional economies include those nations that

are transitioning away from the centrally planned

economies of the Soviet Union to free market economies. This region is subdivided into Eastern Europe

(EE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU), and within the

FSU separate projections are provided for Russia.

Although several countries in Eastern Europe, notably

the Czech Republic and Poland, may be seen as

approaching the same level of economic development

as their Western European neighbors, the Eastern

Europe aggregation still is useful, particularly given its

importance to analysis of the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol: in most of the EE/FSU countries, carbon dioxide

emissions in 2010 are expected to be well below their

emissions targets for the first commitment period of

the Protocol (2008-2012). Thus, in a modeling sense, the

traditional grouping is useful.

The emerging economies include those countries

whose economies are currently less developed, but

whose energy use patterns, in general, are expected to

begin resembling those of the mature market economies over the next two decades. The nations in this

region, which typically have fairly energy-intensive

industrial sectors, include such rapidly growing economies as China and India. Emerging Asia, the Middle

East, Africa, and Central and South America are

regional subgroups in the emerging economies region.

IEO2005 World Regions
119 million barrels per day in 2025. The projection for oil

demand in 2025 is somewhat lower than the 121 million

barrels per day forecast in last year’s outlook, due in

large part to higher world oil price projections in

IEO2005. Higher sustained world oil prices in this year’s

forecast dampen the mid-term projections in many parts

of the world, particularly in the mature market and transitional economies. The impact of higher oil prices on

demand would be even greater if not for the robust

growth expected in China in the short term. China’s oil

use is projected to grow by an annual average of 7.5 percent from 2002 to 2010, before slowing to 2.9 percent per

year for the remainder of the forecast.

The projected increment in worldwide oil use would

require an increment in world oil production capacity of

42 million barrels per day over 2002 levels. Members of

the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC) are expected to be the major suppliers of the

increased production that will be required to meet

demand, and they account for 60 percent of the projected

increase in world capacity. In addition, non-OPEC suppliers are expected to add nearly 17 million barrels per

day of oil production capacity between 2002 and 2025.

Substantial increments in new non-OPEC oil supply are

expected to come from the Caspian Basin, Western

Africa, and Central and South America.

Natural gas is projected to be the fastest growing component of world primary energy consumption in the

IEO2005 reference case. Consumption of natural gas

worldwide increases in the forecast by an average of 2.3

percent annually from 2002 to 2025, compared with projected annual growth rates of 1.9 percent for oil consumption and 2.0 percent for coal consumption. From

2002 to 2025, consumption of natural gas is projected to

increase by 69 percent, from 92 trillion cubic feet to 156

trillion cubic feet, and its share of total energy consumption is projected to grow from 23 percent to 25 percent.

The electric power sector accounts for 51 percent of the

total incremental growth in worldwide natural gas

demand over the forecast period (Figure 3).

Natural gas is seen as a desirable alternative for electricity generation in many parts of the world, given its relative efficiency in comparison with other energy sources,

as well as the fact that it burns more cleanly than either

coal or oil and thus is an attractive alternative for countries pursuing reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

Natural gas is also an important energy resource in the

industrial sector. The industrial sector accounts for 36

percent of the growth in world natural gas demand over

the 2002-2025 period.

World coal consumption is projected to increase from

5,262 million short tons in 2002 to 7,245 million short

tons in 2015, at an average rate of 2.5 percent per year.

From 2015 to 2025, the projected rate of increase in world

coal consumption slows to 1.3 percent annually, and

total consumption in 2025 is projected at 8,226 million

short tons. Of the coal produced worldwide in 2002, 65

percent was shipped to electric power producers and 31

percent to industrial consumers. In the industrial sector

coal is an important input for the manufacture of steel

and for the production of steam and direct heat for other

industrial applications.

Coal is expected to maintain its importance as an energy

source in both the electric power and industrial sectors,

with the two sectors combined accounting for virtually

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 3

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

50

100

150

200

250

Quadrillion Btu

History Projections

Oil

Natural Gas

Coal

Renewables

Nuclear

Figure 2. World Marketed Energy Use by Energy

Type, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

92

111

128

142

156

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

50

100

150

200

250

Trillion Cubic Feet

Residential

Commercial

Industrial

Transportation

Electric Power

Figure 3. World Natural Gas Consumption

by End-Use Sector, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
all the growth in coal use in the mid-term forecast. To a

large extent, the slight increase in the importance of coal

in the industrial sector results from the substantial

growth projected for industrial energy consumption in

China, which has abundant coal reserves, limited access

to other sources of energy, and a dominant position in

world steel production. Coal is expected to remain the

fuel of choice in China’s rapidly expanding industrial

sector.

World net electricity consumption nearly doubles in the

reference case forecast, from 14,275 billion kilowatthours in 2002 to 21,400 billion kilowatthours in 2015 and

26,018 billion kilowatthours in 2025. More than one-half

(59 percent) of the projected growth in demand occurs in

the emerging economies, where electricity use increases

on average by 4.0 percent per year from 2002 to 2025, as

compared with 2.6 percent per year worldwide. Coal

and natural gas are expected to remain the most important fuels for electricity generation worldwide throughout the forecast, accounting for 62 percent of the energy

used for electricity production in 2025; however,

increases are projected for consumption of all primary

energy sources in electricity generation in the IEO2005

reference case.

Consumption of electricity generated from nuclear

power worldwide is projected to increase from 2,560 billion kilowatthours in 2002 to 3,270 billion kilowatthours

in 2025 in the reference case. Prospects for nuclear power

have improved in recent years, with higher capacity utilization rates reported for many existing nuclear facilities and the expectation that most existing plants in the

mature market and transitional economy nations will be

granted extensions to their operating lives. Further,

higher fossil fuel prices and the entry into force of the

Kyoto Protocol are expected to improve prospects for

new nuclear power capacity over the forecast period.

In past editions of the IEO, declines in nuclear power

were projected in the mid-term forecast as a result of

expectations that few new reactors would be built, and

that older reactors would be shut down when they

reached the end of their operating lives. In IEO2005,

world total installed nuclear capacity is not projected to

decline before 2025, but rises from 361 gigawatts in 2002

to 401 gigawatts in 2015 and 422 gigawatts in 2025

(Figure 4). Between 2002 and 2025, 55 gigawatts of the

world increment in nuclear capacity is projected for the

emerging Asian economies alone, and another 19 gigawatts is projected for the transitional economies of the

EE/FSU countries.

Hydroelectricity and other grid-connected renewable

energy sources are expected to maintain an 8-percent

share of total energy use worldwide throughout the projection period. Although the use of marketed renewable

energy sources expands in the IEO2005 reference case at

an average annual rate of 1.9 percent from 2002 to 2025,

the more rapid growth rates projected for natural gas

and coal cause the renewable share of world energy use

to remain flat.

Much of the projected growth in renewable electricity

generation is expected to result from the completion of

large hydroelectric facilities in emerging economies,

particularly in Asia, where the need to expand electricity

production with associated dams and reservoirs often

outweighs concerns about environmental impacts and

the relocation of populations. China, India, and Laos,

among other emerging Asian economies, already are

constructing or planning new large-scale hydroelectric

facilities.

In the transitional economies, most additions to hydroelectric capacity are expected to come from repair or

expansion of existing plants. Among the mature market

economies, non-hydroelectric marketed renewables,

such as wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass, are

expected to account for most of the growth in renewable

energy use, given government programs and policies to

encourage their expansion. In the mature market and

transitional economies, most hydroelectric resources

either have already been developed or lie far from population centers.

Carbon dioxide is one of the most prevalent greenhouse

gases in the atmosphere. Anthropogenic (humancaused) emissions of carbon dioxide result primarily

from the combustion of fossil fuels for energy, and as a

result world energy use has emerged at the center of the

climate change debate. In the IEO2005 reference case,

4 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

392 407 401 385

361

390 401 411 422

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

100

200

300

400

500 Gigawatts

IEO2004 IEO2005

Figure 4. Comparison of IEO2004 and IEO2005

Projections for World Nuclear Generating

Capacity, 2010-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. IEO2004: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004,

DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004), web site

www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html. IEO2005: EIA, System

for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
world carbon dioxide emissions are projected to rise

from 24.4 billion metric tons in 2002 to 30.2 billion metric

tons in 2010 and 38.8 billion metric tons in 2025 (Figure

5). Much of the projected increase in carbon dioxide

emissions occurs among the emerging nations, accompanying large increases in fossil fuel use. The emerging

economies account for 68 percent of the projected increment in carbon dioxide emissions between 2002 and

2025.

The Kyoto Protocol, which requires participating

“Annex I” countries1 to reduce their carbon dioxide

emissions collectively to an annual average of about 5

percent below their 1990 level over the 2008-2012 period,

became a legally binding treaty on February 16, 2005, 90

days after it was ratified by Russia. The IEO2005 reference case forecast does not include the potential impacts

of the Kyoto Protocol, because the treaty does not indicate the methods by which ratifying parties will implement their obligations either in the first commitment

period or after 2012. To examine the implications of the

treaty for energy use and carbon dioxide emissions, a

Kyoto Protocol case was analyzed.

A number of assumptions were made in developing the

IEO2005 Kyoto Protocol case. First, it was assumed that

energy use would not vary from the reference case forecast for countries that are not undertaking an emissions

reduction commitment. In addition, assumptions were

made about how the affected participating regions

would achieve their reductions. In Western Europe,

stated intentions that “most” of the emissions reductions

will be achieved domestically resulted in an assumption

that 50 percent of the aggregate emissions reduction for

Western Europe will be met by domestic reductions.

With no stated intention about levels of domestic reductions in Japan or in Canada, an assumption was made

that for both countries a 25-percent share of their total

reductions would be met domestically.

In the IEO2005 Kyoto Protocol case, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in the participating nations are

projected to be 593 million metric tons lower than in the

reference case in 2025. Achieving the national commitments under the treaty is projected to require marginal

costs for emission reductions from domestic sources that

range from $36 per metric ton of carbon dioxide in Canada to $64 per metric ton in Western Europe. Continued

heavy reliance on coal and other fossil fuels, as projected

for the emerging economies of the world, ensures that

even when those nations that have ratified the Kyoto

Protocol undertake to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions as required in the treaty, there still will be substantial increases in worldwide carbon dioxide emissions

over the forecast horizon (Figure 6). In the IEO2005

Kyoto Protocol case (assuming that the Kyoto targets

remain constant over the entire forecast period), worldwide carbon dioxide emissions rise to 29.8 billion metric

tons in 2010 and to 38.2 million metric tons in 2025.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 5

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

10

20

30

40

50

Billion Metric Tons

History Projections

Oil

Natural Gas

Coal

Total

Figure 5. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions

by Fuel Type, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1990 2010

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

2025

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

0

10

20

30

40

50

Billion Metric Tons

Participating Annex I

Other

30.2

21.5

29.8

38.8 38.2

Figure 6. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Two

Cases, 1990, 2010, and 2025

Sources: 1990: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. 2010 and 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,

Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Turkey, Belarus, Australia, and the United States are

Annex I nations that will not participate in the Protocol.

World Energy and Economic Outlook

The IEO2005 projections indicate continued growth in world energy use, including

large increases for the emerging economies of Asia. Energy resources are

thought to be adequate to support the growth expected through 2025.

The International Energy Outlook 2005 (IEO2005) projects

strong growth for worldwide energy demand over the

23-year projection period from 2002 to 2025. Total world

consumption of marketed energy is expected to expand

from 412 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) in 2002

to 553 quadrillion Btu in 2015 and then to 645 quadrillion

Btu in 2025, or a 57-percent increase over the 2002 to 2025

time period (Table 1 and Figure 7).

In the IEO2005 mid-term outlook, the emerging economies account for nearly two-thirds of the increase in

world energy use, surpassing energy use in the mature

market economies for the first time in 2020 (Figure 8). In

2025, energy demand in the emerging economies is

expected to exceed that of the mature market economies

by 9 percent.

Much of the growth in energy demand among the

emerging economies is expected to occur in emerging

Asia, which includes China and India; demand in this

region is projected to more than double over the forecast

period (Figure 9). Primary energy consumption in the

emerging economies as a whole is projected to grow at

an average annual rate of 3.2 percent between 2002 and

2025. In contrast, in the mature market economies—

where energy consumption patterns are well established—energy use is expected to grow at a much slower

average rate of 1.1 percent per year over the same

period. In the transitional economies of Eastern Europe

and the former Soviet Union (EE/FSU), growth in

energy demand is projected to average 1.6 percent per

year.

This chapter presents an overview of the IEO2005 outlook for energy consumption by primary energy source

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 7

Table 1. World Marketed Energy Consumption by Region, 1990-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Region 1990 2002 2015 2025

Average Annual Percent Change

1990-2002 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies . . . . 183.6 213.5 247.3 271.8 1.3 1.1

Transitional Economies . . . . . . 76.2 53.6 68.4 77.7 -2.9 1.6

Emerging Economies . . . . . . . . 88.4 144.3 237.8 295.1 4.2 3.2

Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.5 88.4 155.8 196.7 4.6 3.5

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 22.0 32.4 38.9 4.4 2.5

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 12.7 19.3 23.4 2.7 2.7

Central and South America . . . . 14.5 21.2 30.4 36.1 3.2 2.3

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348.2 411.5 553.5 644.6 1.4 2.0

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: 1990 and 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. 2015 and 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).

207 243

285 310

348 366

412

504

553

598

645

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2002

2010

2015

2020

2025

0

200

400

600

800

Quadrillion Btu

History Projections

Figure 7. World Marketed Energy Consumption,

1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
and a look at the major assumptions that form the basis

of the forecasts that appear in the report. The chapter

includes a discussion of the IEO2005 macroeconomic

forecast in the context of recent economic developments

in key mature market, transitional, and emerging

economies.

As with any set of forecasts, there is uncertainty associated with the IEO2005 energy projections. In an effort to

assess issues of uncertainty in the forecast, the following

section considers some of the elements that drive the

IEO2005 projections, which can result in a fair amount of

variation in forecasting. Alternative assumptions about

economic growth and their impacts on the IEO2005 projections are considered, as well as the possible effects of

future trends in energy intensity on the reference case

projections.

Outlook for World Energy

Consumption

The IEO2005 reference case projects increased consumption of primary energy from all sources over the next

two decades. Fossil fuels continue to supply much of the

increment in marketed energy use worldwide throughout the forecast. Oil is expected to remain the dominant

energy source over the projection period, with its share

of total world energy consumption declining only

slightly, from 39 percent in 2002 to 38 percent in 2025

(Figure 10).

Worldwide oil consumption is expected to rise from 78

million barrels per day in 2002 to 103 million barrels per

day in 2015 and then to 119 million barrels per day in

2025. The projection for oil demand in 2025 is slightly

lower than the 121 million barrels per day forecast in the

International Energy Outlook 2004 (IEO2004), and the difference is in large part explained by the change in expectations for world oil prices (Figure 11). In this year’s

outlook, world oil prices are assumed to stay higher for

longer than anticipated in last year’s report, and this

dampens the mid-term projections for oil demand in

many regions of the world—especially in the mature

market economies and the EE/FSU. The impact of

higher prices on world oil demand would be even

8 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Quadrillion Btu

History Projections

Mature Market Economies

Emerging Economies

Transitional Economies (EE/FSU)

Figure 8. World Marketed Energy Use by Region,

1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

32

56

88

144

238

295

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

100

200

300

400

Quadrillion Btu

Emerging Asia

Middle East

Africa

Central & South America

History Projections

Figure 9. Marketed Energy Use in the Emerging

Economies by Region, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

50

100

150

200

250

Quadrillion Btu

History Projections

Oil

Natural Gas

Coal

Renewables

Nuclear

Figure 10. World Marketed Energy Use by Fuel

Type, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
stronger without the robust growth expected for China

in the near-term forecast. China’s oil consumption is

projected to increase at an average annual rate of 5.8 percent between 2002 and 2015, then slow to about half that

rate in the remaining years of the forecast.

Worldwide, transportation and industry are the major

growth sectors for oil demand. On a worldwide basis,

the transportation sector—where there are currently no

alternative fuels that compete widely with oil—

accounts for about 60 percent of the total projected

increase in oil use between 2002 and 2025, with the

industrial sector accounting for virtually all the rest of

the incremental demand.

Natural gas is projected to be the fastest growing primary energy source worldwide, maintaining average

growth of 2.3 percent annually over the 2002 to 2025

period. Total world natural gas consumption is projected to rise from 92 trillion cubic feet in 2002 to 128 trillion cubic feet in 2015 and 156 trillion cubic feet in 2025.

Natural gas is expected to remain an important supply

source for new electric power generation in the forecast.

It is seen as a desirable option for electric power in many

parts of the world, given its efficiency relative to other

energy sources and its low carbon content relative to

other fossil fuels, making it a more attractive choice for

countries interested in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The industrial sector also remains an important

end-use consumer for natural gas worldwide. The electric power sector accounts for nearly 50 percent of the

increase in global natural gas demand over the 2002 to

2025 period, and the industrial sector accounts for

another 36 percent.

Coal use worldwide is projected to increase by 2.0 billion

short tons between 2002 and 2015 and by another 1.0 billion short tons between 2015 and 2025. In this year’s outlook for coal, all regions of the world show some

increase in coal use, except for Western Europe, where

natural gas and, to a lesser extent, renewable energy

sources are increasingly being substituted for coal to fuel

electric power generation. On a regional basis, slightly

lower coal use is anticipated relative to last year’s outlook in the mature market economies. In the transitional

economies of the EE/FSU region, coal use was expected

to decline somewhat in the IEO2004 forecast, but in this

year’s forecast it is expected to increase by 0.5 percent

per year between 2002 and 2025.

The IEO2005 forecast for coal use in the emerging economies is nearly 13 percent higher than in IEO2004 (Figure

12). The largest increases in coal use worldwide are projected for China and India, where coal supplies are plentiful. Together, China and India account for 87 percent of

the projected rise in coal use in the emerging economies

region and 72 percent of the total world increase in coal

demand over the forecast period.

Electricity generation is expected to nearly double

between 2002 and 2025, from 14,275 billion kilowatthours to 26,018 billion kilowatthours. The strongest

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 9

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70 2003 Dollars per Barrel

History Projections

IEO2005

IEO2004

Figure 11. Comparison of IEO2004 and IEO2005

Projections for the U.S. Refiner

Acquisition Cost of Imported Crude Oil,

1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

Annual Energy Review 2003, DOE/EIA-0384(2003) (Washington, DC, September 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/

aer/contents.html. IEO2004: EIA, International Energy Outlook

2004, DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004),

web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html. IEO2005: AEO2005 October Futures Case from EIA, Annual Energy Outlook

2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington, DC, February

2005), web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/index.html.

2002

2015 2025

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Billion Short Tons

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

5.3

7.6

8.2

7.2

6.3

IEO2004 IEO2005 IEO2004 IEO2005

Figure 12. Comparison of IEO2004 and IEO2005

Projections for World Coal

Consumption by Region, 2015 and 2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. IEO2004: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004, DOE/

EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004), web site www.

eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html. IEO2005: EIA, System for the

Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
growth in net electricity consumption is projected for the

emerging economies of the world, averaging 4.0 percent

per year in the IEO2005 reference case, compared with a

projected average increase of 2.6 percent per year worldwide. Robust economic growth in many of the emerging

economies is expected to boost demand for electricity to

run newly purchased home appliances for air conditioning, cooking, space and water heating, and refrigeration.

More modest growth, averaging 1.5 percent per year, is

projected for the mature market economies.

As noted above, natural gas is expected to be a favored

choice for new electricity generation capacity built over

the next two decades (Figure 13). Its relative environmental benefits and efficiency make natural gas an

attractive alternative to coal-fired generation. Moreover,

where fuel diversification is desired (as in China, where

generation is heavily reliant on coal-fired capacity), natural gas is expected to gain share in the electric power

mix over the forecast period. The natural gas share of

total energy used to generate electricity worldwide

increases in the forecast, from 18 percent in 2002 to 24

percent in 2025, with other energy sources showing

small losses in market share.

Worldwide, consumption of electricity generated from

nuclear power is expected to increase from 2,560 billion

kilowatthours in 2002 to 3,032 billion kilowatthours in

2015 and 3,270 billion kilowatthours in 2025. The

IEO2005 world forecast for nuclear electricity generation

is, in general, more optimistic than last year’s forecast;

the projection for nuclear generation in 2025 is 13 percent higher in IEO2005 than it was in IEO2004. Prospects

for nuclear power have improved in recent years, with

higher capacity utilization rates reported for many

existing nuclear facilities and expectations that most

existing plants in the mature market and transitional

economy nations will receive approvals for extensions

of their operating lives.

Higher fossil fuel prices and the entry into force of the

Kyoto Protocol are expected to improve prospects for

new nuclear power capacity over the forecast period,

and the world nuclear generation forecast includes new

construction of nuclear plants in several countries. In

IEO2005, unlike past IEOs, the world’s total installed

nuclear capacity is not projected to decline before 2025

(Figure 14). In the IEO2005 reference case, world nuclear

capacity is projected to rise from 361 gigawatts in 2002 to

401 gigawatts in 2015 and 422 gigawatts in 2025.

In the emerging economies, consumption of electricity

from nuclear power is projected to increase by 4.9 percent per year between 2002 and 2025. Emerging Asia, in

particular, is expected to see the largest increment in

installed nuclear generating capacity over the forecast,

accounting for 96 percent of the total projected increase

in nuclear power capacity for the emerging economies.

Of the 55 gigawatts of additional installed nuclear generating capacity projected for emerging Asia, 24 gigawatts is projected for China, 12 gigawatts for India, and

12 gigawatts for South Korea.

Although the use of hydroelectricity and other gridconnected renewable energy sources is expected to continue to expand over the projection period, increasing by

1.9 percent per year, more rapid growth is projected for

both natural gas and coal demand in the reference case.

10 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

20

40

60

80

100

Percent of Total

Oil

Coal

Renewables

Nuclear

Natural Gas

Figure 13. Fuel Shares of World Electricity

Generation, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

392 407 401 385

361

390 401 411 422

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

100

200

300

400

500 Gigawatts

IEO2004 IEO2005

Figure 14. Comparison of IEO2004 and IEO2005

Projections for World Nuclear

Generating Capacity, 2010-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. IEO2004: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004,

DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004), web site

www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html. IEO2005: EIA, System

for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Still, renewables are expected to retain an 8-percent

share of total world energy consumption throughout the

2002 to 2025 period. Much of the growth in renewable

energy sources is expected to result from large-scale

hydroelectric power projects in the developing world,

particularly among the nations of emerging Asia. China,

India, and Laos, among other emerging Asian economies, are already constructing or have plans to construct

ambitious hydroelectric projects in the coming decades.

World Economic Outlook

Economic growth is among the most important factors

to be considered in projecting changes in the world’s

future energy consumption. In the IEO2005 forecast,

assumptions about regional economic growth—measured in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), in real

2000 U.S. dollars at purchasing power parity rates—

underlie the projections of regional energy demand (see

box on page 13 for discussion of real GDP at purchasing

power parity rates).

Over the 2002 to 2025 period, world economic growth is

projected to average 3.9 percent annually (Table 2). This

growth projection is slightly higher than the IEO2004

projection, because economic performance in most

regions of the world was exceptionally strong in 2003

and 2004. The medium- to long-term outlook for worldwide economic growth depends on the underlying

demographic and productivity trends in each economy,

which will determine the nature and character of

long-term growth, especially in developed, mature market economies that have well-established and stable

political institutions and markets for goods and services,

labor, and financial assets.

In emerging nations that still are in the process of

building human and physical capital infrastructures,

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 11

Table 2. Average Annual Growth in World Gross Domestic Product by Selected Countries and Regions,

1979-2025

(Percent per Year)

Region

History Projections

1979-2002 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005-2015 2015-2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies . . . . . . . 2.6 1.4 2.1 3.4 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.5

United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 1.9 3.0 4.4 3.6 3.1 2.9 3.1

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.4 2.0 3.0 3.3 2.8 2.0 2.4

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 0.7 1.3 4.0 3.7 3.9 4.1 3.9

Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 -0.3 2.5 4.1 2.0 1.7 1.2 1.7

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 1.1 0.9 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 4.0 3.0 3.8 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.6

Transitional Economies . . . . . . . . . -0.5 4.4 6.6 7.0 6.2 4.5 3.7 4.4

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . -1.0 5.2 7.9 7.8 6.7 4.6 3.7 4.6

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 2.7 3.7 5.1 4.9 4.3 3.8 4.1

Emerging Economies . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 4.8 5.9 6.4 5.9 5.3 4.7 5.1

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8 5.9 7.3 6.9 6.4 5.7 4.9 5.5

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 8.0 9.1 8.6 7.2 6.4 5.3 6.2

India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 4.6 8.2 5.7 6.4 5.4 5.2 5.5

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 6.9 3.1 4.3 5.8 4.8 2.8 3.9

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 4.1 4.8 5.8 5.1 4.8 4.3 4.6

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 4.8 3.1 7.4 6.2 4.4 3.9 4.3

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.4 3.9 4.6 5.0 4.2 3.6 4.0

Central and South America . . . . . . . 2.2 -0.5 1.2 4.1 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.9

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 1.9 -0.2 4.3 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.8

Total World

Purchasing Power Parity Rates . . 3.0 2.9 3.9 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.9

Market Exchange Rates . . . . . . . . 2.7 2.0 2.3 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.0

Note: All growth rates presented in this table are expressed as purchasing power parity rates, except for the final line of the table,

which presents world GDP growth rates expressed as market exchange rates.

Sources: Purchasing Power Parity Rates: A. Heston, R. Summers, and B. Aten, “Penn World Table Version 6.1” (Philadelphia,

PA: Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002), web site http://pwt.econ.upenn.

edu/php_site/pwt_index.php. Historical Growth Rates: Global Insight, Inc., World Overview (Lexington, MA, various issues).

Projected GDP Growth Rates: Global Insight, Inc., World Overview, First Quarter 2005 (Lexington, MA, March 2005); and Energy

Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington DC, January 2005). China’s growth

rates were adjusted downward, based on the analyst’s judgment.
establishing credible and effective regulatory mechanisms to govern markets, and ensuring political stability, progress in achieving those goals will play an

equally important role in determining medium- to

long-term growth. The transitional economies face their

own unique sets of problems as they continue moving

from centrally planned to decentralized private markets.

Therefore, in contrast to the mature market economies,

there is a broader range of uncertainty around the reference case projections of economic growth for emerging

and transitional economies.

Mature Market Economies

In the United States, GDP is projected to grow by an

average of 3.1 percent per year between 2005 and 2015,

with somewhat slower growth—2.9 percent per year—

expected between 2015 and 2025 as the baby boom generation retires and labor force growth slows. Compared

with the second half of the 1990s, U.S. GDP growth rates

were lower from 2000 to 2002 but rebounded to 3.0 percent in 2003 and an estimated 4.4 percent in 2004. In the

forecast, the U.S. economy stabilizes at its long-term

growth path between 2005 and 2010.

Canada has the potential to maintain strong growth in

productivity and its standard of living by increasing the

labor force participation rate, focusing on immigration,

strengthening policies on education and innovation, and

reducing structural unemployment. Labor force growth

is projected to slow in the medium to long term, however, and Canada’s overall potential economic growth is

expected to fall from the current 3.0 percent to 2.8 percent per year between 2005 and 2015 and 2.0 percent per

year between 2015 and 2025.

In the IEO2005 reference case, Mexico’s GDP is projected

to grow by an average of 3.9 percent per year from 2002

to 2025. Global financial markets remain friendly to

Mexico in terms of the availability and cost of credit and

the volume of foreign direct investment. In general,

strong trade ties with the United States are expected to

help cushion Mexico from deeper economic troubles. By

the same token, Mexico’s future growth is also more

dependent on U.S. growth.

Western Europe’s GDP is projected to grow by 2.0 percent per year between 2002 and 2025 in the reference

case. Over the medium to long term there are structural

impediments to economic growth in many Western

European countries, related to the region’s labor markets, product markets, and costly social welfare systems.

Reforms to improve the competitiveness of European

labor and product markets could yield significant dividends in terms of increases in regional output [1].

Japan’s GDP growth is projected to average 1.7 percent

per year from 2002 to 2015 and then to slow to 1.2

percent per year from 2015 to 2025. In the short term,

Japan’s highly skilled labor force and strong work ethic

are expected to support the projected growth rate of 1.7

percent per year, provided that more flexible labor policies allowing greater mobility for workers are adopted.

Toward the end of this decade, normal attrition is

expected to eliminate surplus employment levels, especially in the industrial sector, allowing consolidation

and improved efficiencies. More importantly, the bankrupt firms kept afloat by creditors are expected to be

gone and, therefore, no longer a drain on the economy.

In addition, the bad loans that have plagued Japan’s

banks are expected to be reduced to a point at which

lending can resume. In the long term, after 2010, Japan’s

population is expected to decline, and the average age

will continue to rise as a result of low birth rates and

high longevity. As a result, transfer payments by the

government to the elderly could become increasingly

burdensome, leading to slower GDP growth.

Transitional Economies

Over the 2002-2025 period, an average annual growth of

4.6 percent is expected for the FSU as a whole. For the

past several years, the FSU economies have been largely

sheltered from global economic uncertainties, recording

strong growth in each year since 2000. This trend is

largely the result of robust domestic demand, in addition to the impact that rising oil prices have had on the

oil-exporting nations of the region. High world oil prices

have stimulated investment outlays, especially in the

energy sector of the Caspian region. Given the volatility

of energy market prices, however, it is unlikely that

these economies will be able to sustain the growth rates

recently achieved until diversification from energy

becomes more broadly based. The long-term growth

prospects of the FSU economies hinge on their success in

economic diversification, as well as further improvements in domestic product and financial markets.

An average annual expansion of 4.1 percent per year is

projected for Eastern Europe’s GDP over the 2002 to

2025 period. The accession of 10 Eastern European countries to membership in the European Union in May 2004

(Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia,

Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus) is

expected to boost consumer confidence and economic

activity in the medium to long term. Membership in the

European Union is expected to result in more foreign

direct investment, bolstering domestic investment and

growth.

Emerging Economies

Much of the growth in world economic activity between

2002 and 2025 is expected to occur among the nations of

emerging Asia, where regional GDP is projected to grow

by 5.5 percent per year. China, emerging Asia’s largest

economy, is expected to continue playing a major role

on both the supply and demand sides of the global

12 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005
economy. IEO2005 projects an average annual growth

rate of approximately 6.2 percent for China’s economy

over the 2002 to 2025 period. The country’s economic

growth is expected to be the highest in the world. In

2025, based on share of world GDP (converted using

purchase power parity rates), China is expected to be the

world’s largest economy.

In terms of structural issues that have implications for

the medium to long term, China still needs to reform

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 13

GDP Comparisons Based on Purchasing Power Parity Exchange Rates

Regular readers of the International Energy Outlook

(IEO) will notice that, in this edition, the projections of

real gross domestic product (GDP) for different countries and regions have been converted to U.S. dollars by

using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates.

In all previous editions of the IEO, starting from 1985,

market exchange rates were used for the conversion of

real GDP projections.

PPP exchange rates are defined as rates of currency

conversion that equalize the purchasing power of different currencies. For example, if the price of a hamburger in India is 60 rupees and in the United States it is

$2.20, then the PPP exchange rate for hamburgers

between India and the United States is 60 rupees to

$2.20 or 27.3 rupees to the dollar. This concept of PPP

for one good is generalized to a common basket of

goods and services in the different countries to obtain

PPP rates in practice. Market exchange rates on the

other hand are the foreign currency prices of the dollar

(or alternatively the dollar prices of foreign currencies)

as traded in the foreign exchange markets.

In 2004 the average market exchange rate for a dollar in

terms of Indian rupees was 45.3, compared with an

average PPP rate of 7.3. Generally, PPP rates are much

lower than market exchange rates in emerging economies, implying that a dollar buys a lot more in, for

example, India or China than in the United States.

Thus, converting emerging countries’ GDPs into dollars at market exchange rates can understate the true

size of their economies and their living standards.

Real GDP projections for country and regions have

been employed as one of the major determinants in the

world energy forecasts contained in every edition of

IEO. It was stated in the International Energy Outlook

2004 (pp. 17-18) that the energy projections were not

affected by the choice between market exchange and

PPP rates for GDP conversions, because both rates of

conversion would leave unchanged the underlying

rates of growth of real economic activity.a in the various countries/regions. However, some readers have

rightly objected to the presentation of real GDP projections in a common currency based on market exchange

rates,b because they understate the true size of emerging economies. As a result, their growth rates get relatively less weight than they should, and when they are

aggregated to regions and finally to the world, the

regional and world growth rates are underestimated.

Furthermore, the internationally agreed System of

National Accounts 1993, to which the United States is a

signatory, states, “When the objective is to compare

volumes of goods and services produced or consumed

per head, data in national currencies must be converted

into a common currency by means of purchasing

power parities and not exchange rates.”c

The use of PPP rates for converting national GDPs to a

common currency has become widely accepted, and

the Energy Information Administration has also

adopted their use. Nevertheless, care needs to be exercised in interpreting the results.d Market exchange

rates are appropriate when the outcome is closely

linked to the current exchange rate (for example, for

exports and imports, especially of internationally

traded commodities like crude oil, automobiles, etc.).

PPP exchange rates are generally regarded as providing a better measure of the change in global economic

well-being and cost of living. In addition, they are generally thought to provide a more balanced estimate of

the relative importance of rich and poor countries. On

the other hand, while PPP is useful for showing how

much a country’s currency is worth in its home market,

it does not measure effective purchasing power across

borders.

aForIEO2005, GDP projections were first prepared for individual countries in terms of their own currencies and the 2000 prices of goods

and services. The projections were then converted to 2000 U.S. PPP dollars by dividing each country’s real GDP projections by the PPP

exchange rate between the United States and that country in 2000. Had the market exchange rate that existed, on average, in 2000 between

each currency and the dollar been used instead, the growth rate of the resulting series would not differ from the growth rate of the real

GDP series derived by using the 2000 PPP rate.

bIan Castles, Visiting Fellow, Asia Pacific School of Government, the Australian National University (formerly head of Australia’s

National Statistical Office); and David Henderson, Visiting Professor, Westminster School of Business, University of Westminster (formerly Chief Economist at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).

c

SNA 1993, para. 1.38. See web site http://unstats.un.org/unsd/sna1993/toctop.asp.

dThe International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and some private-sector organizations use PPP exchange rates for their world economic growth projections. The World Bank and other groups in the private sector use

market exchange rates.
overstaffed and inefficient state-owned companies and a

banking system that is carrying a significant amount of

nonperforming loans. Membership in the World Trade

Organization is expected to force the government to

pursue these reforms, which are expected to transform

the Chinese economy into one that is more market oriented and, hence, more efficient.

Another Asian country with a rapidly emerging economy is India. The mid-term prospects for India’s economy are positive, as it continues to privatize state

enterprises and increasingly adopts free market policies.

Average annual GDP growth in India over the 2002 to

2025 forecast period is projected at 5.5 percent. Accelerating structural reforms—including ending regulatory

impediments to the consolidation of labor-intensive

industries, labor market and bankruptcy reforms, and

agricultural and trade liberalization—remain essential

to stimulating potential growth and reducing poverty in

the medium to long term [2]. With its vast and cheap

labor force, India is well placed to reap the benefits of

globalization in the long run.

Although the nations of Central and South America are

on favorable economic growth paths, the region’s

growth rate remains well below potential. The weak

international credit environment is a constraint, as are

domestic economic and/or political problems in a number of countries. Growth in the region remains heavily

dependent on the volume of foreign capital flows. In the

long term, beyond macroeconomic stability and commitment to sound fiscal and monetary policies, the

countries of Central and South America will have to

tackle governance issues and attempt to correct severe

economic disparities between the wealthy and the poor

in the region’s societies.

Higher oil prices have helped boost growth in the

oil-exporting countries of the Middle East and Africa,

and strong prices for many other commodities have

helped a number of the region’s commodity-exporting

countries. For Africa as a whole, average annual GDP

growth of 4.0 percent is projected over the 2002 to 2025

period. In the longer run, Africa will continue to face formidable obstacles to growth, such as low savings and

investment rates, limited quantity and quality of infrastructure and human capital, negative perceptions on

the part of international investors, and especially the

impact of HIV/AIDS on population growth.

Alternative Growth Cases

Expectations for the future rates of economic growth are

a major source of uncertainty in the IEO2005 forecast. To

account for the uncertainties associated with economic

growth trends, IEO2005 includes a high economic

growth case and a low economic growth case in addition

to the reference case. The reference case projections are

based on a set of regional assumptions about economic

growth paths—measured by GDP—and energy elasticity (the relationship between changes in energy consumption and changes in GDP). The two alternative

growth cases are based on alternative assumptions

about possible economic growth paths; assumptions

about the elasticity of energy demand are held constant,

at reference case values.

For the high and low economic growth cases, different

assumptions are made about the range of possible economic growth rates among the industrial, transitional

EE/FSU, and emerging economies. For the mature market economies, 0.5 percentage point is added to the reference case GDP growth rates for the high economic

growth case and 0.5 percentage point is subtracted from

the reference case GDP growth rates for the low economic growth case. Outside the industrialized world

(excluding the FSU), reference case GDP growth rates

are increased and decreased by 1.0 percentage point to

provide the high and low economic growth case

estimates.

The FSU suffered a severe economic collapse in the early

part of the 1990s and, until recently, has shown wide

variation in its year-to-year economic growth. Between

1990 and 2002, its annual GDP growth rate has varied

from -14 percent in 1992 to +9 percent in 2000. Given this

wide range, the FSU nations can be characterized as having a considerably more uncertain economic future than

the nations in other regions of the world. As a result, 1.5

percentage points are added and subtracted from the

reference case GDP assumptions to derive the high and

low macroeconomic forecasts for the FSU region.

The IEO2005 reference case shows total world energy

consumption reaching 645 quadrillion Btu in 2025, with

the mature market economies projected to consume 272

quadrillion Btu, the transitional EE/FSU countries 78

quadrillion Btu, and the emerging economies 295 quadrillion Btu. In the high economic growth case, total

world energy use in 2025 is projected to be 708 quadrillion Btu, 64 quadrillion Btu (or 32 million barrels oil

equivalent per day) higher than in the reference case.

Under the assumptions of the low economic growth

case, worldwide energy consumption in 2025 is projected to be 58 quadrillion Btu (29 million barrels oil

equivalent per day) lower than in the reference case, at

586 quadrillion Btu. Thus, there is a range of 122 quadrillion Btu—about one-fifth of the total consumption projected for 2025 in the reference case—between the

projections in the high and low economic growth cases

(Figure 15).

Trends in Energy Intensity

Another major source of uncertainty surrounding

long-term forecasts is the relationship of energy use to

14 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005
GDP—or energy intensity—over time. Economic

growth and energy demand are linked, but the strength

of that link varies among regions over time. In the

mature market economies, history shows the link to be a

relatively weak one, with energy demand lagging

behind economic growth (Figure 16). In the emerging

economies, demand and economic growth have been

closely correlated with energy demand growth for much

of the past three decades (Figure 17). Economic growth

has only recently (that is, within the past decade or so)

begun to outpace growth in energy use among the

emerging economies of the world.

The historical behavior of energy intensity in the FSU is

problematic. Since World War II, the EE/FSU economies

have had higher levels of energy intensity than either the

mature market or emerging economies. In the FSU, however, energy consumption generally grew more quickly

than GDP until 1990 (Figure 18), when the collapse of the

Soviet Union created a situation in which both income

and energy use declined, but GDP fell more quickly and,

as a result, energy intensity increased. Only since the late

1990s, after the 1997 devaluation of the Russian ruble,

have the Russian and Ukrainian industrial sectors begun

to strengthen. As a result, economic growth in the FSU

has begun to outpace growth in energy use significantly,

and energy intensity has begun to decline precipitously.

Over the forecast horizon, energy intensity in the

EE/FSU region is expected to continue to decline but

still remain higher than in any other region of the world

(Figure 19).

The stage of economic development and the standard of

living of individuals in a given region strongly influence

the link between economic growth and energy demand.

Advanced economies with high living standards have a

relatively high level of energy use per capita, but they

also tend to be economies where per capita energy use is

stable or changes very slowly. In mature market economies, there is a high penetration rate of modern

appliances and motorized personal transportation

equipment. To the extent that spending is directed to

energy-consuming goods, it involves more often than

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 15

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

200

400

600

800

Quadrillion Btu

History Projections

Low

Economic

Growth

Reference

High

Economic

Growth

Figure 15. World Marketed Energy Consumption

in Three Economic Growth Cases,

1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

5

10

15

20 Index, 1970 = 1

History Projections

Energy Use

Gross

Domestic

Product

Figure 16. Growth in Energy Use and Gross

Domestic Product for the Mature Market

Economies, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

5

10

15

20 Index, 1970 = 1

History Projections

Energy Use

Gross

Domestic

Product

Figure 17. Growth in Energy Use and Gross

Domestic Product for the Emerging

Economies, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
not purchases of new equipment to replace old capital

stock. The new stock is often more efficient than the

equipment it replaces, resulting in a weaker link

between income and energy demand.

The pace of improvement in energy intensity may

change, given different assumptions of macroeconomic

growth over time. Faster growth in income means a

faster rate of decline in energy intensity. Worldwide

energy intensity in the IEO2005 high economic growth

rate is projected to improve by 2.1 percent per year on

average from 2002 to 2025, compared with 1.9 percent in

the reference case. On the other hand, slower economic

growth would result in a slower rate of decline in energy

intensity. Under the IEO2005 assumptions for GDP

growth in the low macroeconomic growth case, world

energy intensity is projected to decline by an average of

only 1.5 percent per year over the projection period.

References

16 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

1. International Monetary Fund, “Economic Prospects

and Policy Issues,” in World Economic Outlook

(Washington, DC, April 2005), p. 28, web site www.

imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/02/.

2. International Monetary Fund, “Economic Prospects

and Policy Issues,” in World Economic Outlook: Globalization and External Imbalances (Washington, DC,

April 2005), p. 29, web site www.imf.org/external/

pubs/ft/weo/2005/01/.

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

5

10

15

20 Index, 1970 = 1

History Projections

Energy Use

Gross

Domestic

Product

Figure 18. Growth in Energy Use and Gross

Domestic Product for the Transitional

Economies, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

5

10

15

20 Thousand Btu per 2000 Dollar of GDP

History Projections

Mature Market

Economies

Emerging

Economies

Transitional

Economies

Figure 19. Energy Intensity by Region, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
Energy Consumption by End-Use Sector

In the IEO2005 projections, end-use energy consumption in the

residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation sectors

varies widely among regions and from country to country.

One way of looking at the future of world energy markets is to consider trends in energy consumption at the

end-use sector level. With the exception of the transportation sector, which is almost universally dominated by

petroleum products at present, the mix of energy use in

the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors can

vary widely from country to country, depending on a

combination of regional factors, such as the availability

of energy resources, the level of economic development,

and political, social, and demographic factors. This

chapter outlines the International Energy Outlook 2005

(IEO2005) forecast for regional energy consumption by

end-use sector.

Residential Sector

The residential sector is defined by the energy consumed in households, excluding transportation uses.

The physical size of residential structures is the most

important factor in determining the amount of energy

used by their occupants. Larger homes require more

energy to provide heating, air conditioning, and lighting, and they tend to include more energy-using appliances, such as televisions and laundry equipment.

Smaller structures require less energy, because they contain less space to be heated or cooled, produce less heat

transfer with the outdoor environment, and have fewer

occupants.

The type and amount of energy used by households

vary from country to country, depending on income levels, natural resources, and available energy infrastructure. In general, households in the mature market

economies use more energy than those in the transitional or emerging economies, in part because they tend

to include more energy-using appliances. Consequently,

residential sector energy use generally is higher in the

mature market economies (Figure 20). In most of the

world’s countries, residential energy use is expected to

increase as households continue to purchase additional

electricity-using appliances.

Mature Market Economies

Households in mature market economies use energy

more intensively than those in less developed economies, primarily because of higher income levels. In

North America, energy use in Mexico’s residential sector is expected to nearly double by 2015 (relative to

2002), to 1.1 quadrillion Btu; growth in electricity demand is responsible for most of the projected increase.

After 2015, the growth in Mexico’s residential delivered

energy use is expected to slow, reaching 1.3 quadrillion

Btu in 2025. On average, the country’s residential energy

consumption increases in the forecast by 3.4 percent per

year from 2002 to 2025.

In the United States, which is by far the largest residential energy consumer in the region (and in the world),

total residential electricity use is projected to grow on

average by 1.6 percent per year, to 5.4 quadrillion Btu in

2015 and 6.2 quadrillion Btu in 2025, from 4.3 quadrillion

Btu in 2002. Increasing use of electric appliances contributes most to the expected growth in residential electricity demand through 2025.

In Western Europe and mature market Asia, unlike

North America, residential delivered energy consumption combined is not projected to increase through 2025,

because increases in electricity use are expected to be offset by decreases in fossil fuel use, and because population in both regions combined is projected to increase by

less than 1.0 percent from 2002 to 2025. In Western

Europe, residential electricity use is expected to grow by

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 17

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

10

20

30

40

50

Quadrillion Btu

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 20. Residential Sector Energy Consumption

by Region, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
0.4 percent per year through 2025, adding 0.3 quadrillion Btu of consumption, while all other fuel use in the

sector declines by 0.7 quadrillion Btu. A similar pattern

is projected for mature market Asia but with smaller

decreases in fossil fuel use, resulting in essentially no

increase in residential delivered energy consumption

from 2002 to 2025.

Transitional Economies

As households in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet

Union (EE/FSU) transition to market economies, more

energy services and energy-using appliances are

expected to become available over time. Residential

electricity use in the region is projected to nearly double,

from 1.4 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 2.2 quadrillion Btu in

2015 and 2.7 quadrillion Btu in 2025. The transition away

from state-run district heating methods allows for

increases in natural gas and oil consumption as well.

Natural gas consumption in the region’s residential sector is projected to grow by an average of 1.5 percent per

year from 2002 through 2015 and an average of 1.2 percent per year from 2002 through 2025, as energy service

companies increasingly serve homes directly, rather

than through district services.

Emerging Economies

Household energy use is projected to increase most rapidly in the coming decades in the nations with emerging

economies, relative to other nations (Figure 21). In China

and India, population growth and urbanization will create large increases in demand for residential energy services. As a result, the emerging economies in 2025 are

projected to nearly equal the mature market economies

in residential energy use.

The demand for electricity in China is expected to more

than triple by 2025, growing on average by 7.8 percent

per year through 2015 and 5.6 percent per year through

2025. More rapid growth in electricity demand is projected for India’s residential sector, but electricity consumption and total delivered energy consumption are

projected to remain at about one-half those for China

through 2025. China and India together accounted for 37

percent of delivered residential energy consumption in

the emerging economies in 2002 and are projected to

account for more than 43 percent in 2025. The Middle

East, Africa, and Central and South America all are projected to see substantial increases in residential energy

consumption as well, accounting for 42 percent of the

13.6 quadrillion Btu increase in residential sector delivered energy consumption in the emerging economies

through 2025.

Commercial Sector

The commercial sector—often referred to as the services

sector or the services and institutional sector—consists

of businesses, institutions, and organizations that provide services. The sector encompasses many different

types of buildings and a wide range of activities and

energy-related services. Examples of commercial sector

facilities include schools, stores, correctional institutions, restaurants, hotels, hospitals, museums, office

buildings, banks, and even stadiums that hold sporting

events. Most commercial energy use occurs in buildings

or structures, supplying services such as space heating,

water heating, lighting, cooking, and cooling. Energy

consumed for services not associated with buildings,

such as for traffic lights and city water and sewer services, is also categorized as commercial sector energy

use.

Economic and population growth trends drive commercial sector activity and the resulting energy use. The

need for services (health, education, financial, government) increases as populations increase. The degree to

which these additional needs are met depends in large

measure on economic resources—whether from domestic or foreign sources—and economic growth. Economic

growth also determines the degree to which additional

commercial sector activities are offered and utilized.

Higher levels of economic activity and disposable

income lead to increased demand for hotels and restaurants to meet business and leisure requirements; for

office and retail space to house and service new and

expanding businesses; and for cultural and leisure space

such as theaters, galleries, and arenas.

Mature Market Economies

With population growth for the mature market economies as a whole expected to continue slowing, the rate of

increase in the region’s commercial energy demand is

also expected to slow. In addition, further efficiency

18 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Oil Natural

Gas

Coal Electricity Total

Delivered

Energy

0

2

4

6

-2

-4

Average Annual Percent Change

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 21. Growth in Residential Sector Delivered

Energy Consumption by Region and

Fuel, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
improvements are expected to moderate energy

demand growth over time as energy-using equipment is

replaced with newer, more efficient stock. Conversely,

strong economic growth in mature markets is expected

to include continued growth in business activity, with

its associated energy use, in areas such as retail and

wholesale trade and business, financial, and leisure services. The combination of these factors is projected to

cause commercial delivered energy consumption in this

region to increase by 1.3 percent per year from 2002 to

2025 on average, from 16.8 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 20.0

quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 22.6 quadrillion Btu in 2025

(Figure 22).

Commercial electricity demand in mature market economies is projected to grow by 1.9 percent per year from

2002 to 2025, with continued advances in technology

and the introduction of new electronic appliances and

equipment (Figure 23). Electricity delivered to commercial customers in the region, which totaled 7.9 quadrillion Btu in 2002, is projected to reach 10.1 quadrillion Btu

in 2015 and 12.1 quadrillion Btu in 2025. Natural gas is

expected to continue displacing petroleum products and

coal as the preferred heating fuel in the mature market

economies, especially in Western Europe and Japan.

Transitional Economies

Many of the EE/FSU countries—and the region as a

whole—are expected to see their populations decline

over the forecast period. Nevertheless, increasing commercial activity and rising incomes are expected to lead

to 1.1-percent average annual growth in delivered

energy use in the region’s commercial sector between

2002 and 2025 (Figure 23). Commercial sector electricity

consumption is projected to grow by 2.0 percent per

year, to 1.1 quadrillion Btu in 2025, as the transitional

nations approach the requirements of market-based

economies, including increased adoption of electronic

equipment. Commercial sector natural gas use is projected to grow by more than 50 percent, from 0.8 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 1.2 quadrillion Btu in 2025. Most of the

projected increase is attributable to the expectation that

natural gas will be used to meet the heating needs of

transitional countries to a greater extent than it has in the

past, replacing coal and heating oil.

Emerging Economies

Economic growth and commerce are expected to increase rapidly in the emerging economies, fueling additional energy demand in the services sector. Faster

population growth is also expected, relative to the

growth rates for mature and transitional economies,

portending increases in the need for education, health

care, and social services and the energy required to provide them. Under these circumstances, commercial

delivered energy use in the region is projected to nearly

double between 2002 and 2015, to 9.6 quadrillion Btu,

and to continue growing to 11.6 quadrillion Btu in 2025,

at a 3.6-percent average annual growth rate from 2002 to

2025.

Electricity demand for commercial applications is expected to grow rapidly in emerging economies as more

clinics, schools, and businesses gain access to electricity.

Annual growth in commercial delivered electricity use

is expected to average 4.3 percent through 2025 (Figure

23), with projected consumption of 5.4 quadrillion Btu in

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 19

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

10

20

30

40

Quadrillion Btu

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 22. Commercial Sector Energy

Consumption by Region, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

Oil Natural

Gas

Coal Electricity Total

Delivered

Energy

0

2

4

6

-2

Average Annual Percent Change

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 23. Growth in Commercial Sector Delivered

Energy Consumption by Region and

Fuel, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
2015 and 6.9 quadrillion Btu in 2025. The projected

increase in commercial electricity demand is compounded in nations with quickly growing economies,

such as China, as they begin to shift away from heavy

manufacturing toward services.

Increasing commercial activity is expected to lead to

rapid growth in natural gas demand as well. In the forecast, commercial demand for natural gas grows by 5.7

percent per year from 2002 through 2015 and by 4.6 percent per year from 2002 through 2025, as several developing countries focus on expanding the infrastructure

necessary for delivery of this relatively clean fuel. Commercial sector oil consumption is expected to increase

from 1.6 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 2.4 quadrillion Btu in

2015 and 2.6 quadrillion Btu in 2025 in the emerging

economies, increasing more rapidly in areas where natural gas availability is limited. Although consumption of

coal is expected to increase in the forecast, its share of

commercial energy use in the emerging economies is

projected to decline from 8 percent in 2002 to 5 percent in

2025.

Industrial Sector

Energy is consumed in the industrial sector by a diverse

group of industries—including manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and construction—and for a wide range of

activities, such as process and assembly uses, space conditioning, and lighting. Overall energy demand in the

industrial sector varies across regions and countries of

the world, based on the level and mix of economic activity, technological development, and population, among

other factors.

Worldwide, energy consumption in the industrial sector

is projected to grow by 2.1 percent per year from 2002 to

2025. Industrial energy consumption is expected to

increase in all countries and regions; however, industrial

sector energy use in the mature market economies (in

particular, Japan, the United States, and Western

Europe) is expected to grow at a much slower pace—1.0

percent per year—than in the emerging economies

(China and other emerging Asia and the Middle East),

where industrial sector energy demand is projected to

expand by 3.3 percent per year or more (Figure 24).

Mature Market Economies

The mature market economies generally have more

energy-efficient industrial operations and a mix of

industrial output that is more heavily weighted toward

non-energy-intensive sectors than do the other country

groups. For example, in the United States, the manufacturing share of total industrial output has declined

steadily over the past two decades, while the output

share for service industries (included in the commercial

sector) has increased. Additionally, within the U.S. manufacturing sector, a smaller share of output has been

produced by the heavy, energy-intensive industries

(such as steelmaking). These general trends are projected to continue.

Similar developments are expected for the other mature

market economies, as increasing international trade fosters a shift toward a less energy-intensive mix of industrial activity. For example, many of Japan’s heavy

industries are reducing their output as demand for

energy-intensive materials increasingly is met by

imports from China and other Asian countries. In Germany, a decline in industrial energy intensity in the

early 1990s was largely the result of closures of heavy

industries in the former East Germany after reunification. Much of Germany’s inefficient, energy-intensive

eastern capacity has already been shut down, but further

improvements are projected as capital stock is replaced

and modernized.

Transitional Economies

In the EE/FSU countries, industrial sector energy use is

projected to grow by 1.6 percent per year over the forecast period, from 25.3 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 31.4 quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 36.4 quadrillion Btu in 2025

(Figure 24). During the Soviet era, abundant energy

resources in the FSU, along with centralized decisionmaking, led to the construction of energy-inefficient

industrial capacity. As the transition to market economies progresses, and as inefficient capacity is replaced

with modern facilities, the intensity of energy use in the

industrial sector of the transitional EE/FSU economies is

projected to decline more rapidly than in rest of the

world.

20 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Quadrillion Btu

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 24. Industrial Sector Energy Consumption

by Region, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
Russia has the world’s largest natural gas reserves. As a

result, natural gas is projected to supply 40 percent of the

increase in delivered energy use in the industrial sector

of the FSU countries. In the transitional EE/FSU economies, only small changes in industrial fuel mix are projected from 2002 to 2025 (Figure 25)—most notably,

electricity is projected to claim a growing share of delivered energy use in the FSU, and in the countries of Eastern Europe, natural gas is projected to make up a larger

share at the expense of coal.

In 2002, in the aggregate, the transitional economies of

the EE/FSU region had a higher ratio of industrial sector

energy consumption to regional gross domestic product

than did either the mature market or emerging nations.

The relatively high ratio is a result of three factors: the

transition to market-based economies has been slow; a

higher proportion of total output from the region is from

the industrial sector than in the developed countries (the

service sectors are less energy-intensive than the manufacturing sectors); and much of the industrial sector’s

production is from inefficient Soviet-era facilities.

Emerging Economies

The emerging economies are expected to see the most

rapid growth in industrial sector energy use worldwide

over the projection period. Whereas mature market

economies have shifted their industrial sector energy

use from energy-intensive production (like steel and

cement making) to service industries, the emerging

economies still have fairly energy-intensive industrial

sectors. Projections of industrial energy growth (although still relatively high) are lower than the recent

historical rates for rapidly developing Asian countries

like South Korea and China. Energy use for industrial

sector purposes among the emerging economies is projected to grow by 3.9 percent per year from 2002 to 2015,

before slowing to an average of 2.4 percent per year from

2015 to 2025 (Figure 26).

Natural gas and oil accounted for more than one-half of

industrial energy consumption in 2002 in most regions

of the world. China and India were exceptions to that

generalization, and both countries use considerable

amounts of coal (50 percent and 37 percent, respectively), mostly owing to their rich coal resources and

lack of other domestic energy resources available for

development.

Transportation Sector

Energy use in the transportation sector is dominated by

petroleum product fuels. Barring any increase in the

penetration of new technologies, such as hydrogen-fueled vehicles, the use of alternative fuels is

expected to remain relatively modest through 2025.

Thus, the IEO2005 reference case projection of 2.1-

percent average annual growth in the world’s total

energy use for transportation from 2002 to 2025 is paralleled by the forecast for transportation oil use (Table 3

and Figure 27).

Energy use for the transportation sector is poised for its

strongest growth in the Asian emerging economies.

China is the key market that will lead regional consumption growth. India is also on a rapid growth path, and

the region’s mid-sized markets, such as Thailand and

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 21

Oil Natural

Gas

Coal Electricity Total

Delivered

Energy

0

2

4

6 Average Annual Percent Change

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 25. Growth in Industrial Sector Delivered

Energy Consumption by Region

and Fuel, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).

2002-2025 2002-2015 2015-2025

0

2

4

6

8

10 Percent per Year

China India South Korea

Other Emerging Asia Middle East Africa

Central and South America

Figure 26. Average Annual Growth Rates

for Industrial Energy Consumption

in Emerging Economies, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
Indonesia, also are projected to post strong growth. In

China the number of cars has been growing by 20 percent per year, and the potential growth is almost unlimited. If the present patterns persist, China’s car

ownership would exceed the U.S. rate by 2030; however,

large infrastructure barriers will have to be overcome for

this to occur [1].

Mature Market Economies

In general, the transportation sector of the mature market economies is fully established, with extensive infrastructure that includes highways, airport facilities, and

rail systems. Energy demand in the mature market economies is projected to grow at an average annual rate of

1.2 percent, from 53.2 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 63.2 quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 69.9 quadrillion Btu in 2025.

In the United States, the transportation sector accounts

for almost one-fourth of the country’s total energy consumption; and in the IEO2005 reference case, U.S. transportation energy demand is projected to grow from 26.9

quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 34.2 quadrillion Btu in 2015

and 39.4 quadrillion Btu in 2025. The United States is the

largest user of transportation energy among the mature

market economies and is projected to consume 56 percent of the region’s total for the transportation sector in

2025.

Fuel economy for the U.S. light-duty vehicle stock is projected to improve by 5 percent over the forecast period.

Strong macroeconomic and demographic factors are

expected to increase the demand for larger, more powerful vehicles in the United States; however, advanced

technologies and materials are expected to provide

increased performance and size while improving new

vehicle fuel economy. Fuel economy standards for cars

are assumed to stay at current levels of 27.5 miles per

gallon, and light truck standards are expected to

increase from 20.7 miles per gallon in 2004 to 22.2 miles

per gallon by 2007 [2]. For the stock of freight trucks, fuel

economy is projected to increase from 6.0 miles per gallon in 2002 to 6.6 miles per gallon in 2025. A larger gain,

24.1 percent, is expected for aircraft.

In comparison to the United States, transportation

energy demand in Western Europe is projected to

expand more slowly, from 16.3 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to

22 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Table 3. Transportation Energy Consumption and Total Oil Consumption by Region, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Region 2002

Projections

Average Annual

Percent Change

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2015 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

Transportation Energy . . . . . . . . 53.2 59.4 63.2 66.3 69.9 1.3 1.2

Total Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88.8 96.4 101.3 105.5 110.3 1.0 0.9

Transitional Economies

Transportation Energy . . . . . . . . 5.9 7.0 7.6 8.0 8.5 1.9 1.6

Total Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 13.1 13.9 14.8 15.7 1.5 1.4

Emerging Economies

Transportation Energy . . . . . . . . 26.2 39.1 46.1 51.9 58.9 4.4 3.6

Total Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.2 83.6 95.5 106.3 117.4 3.7 3.0

Total World

Transportation Energy . . . . . . . . 85.3 105.5 116.8 126.2 137.2 2.5 2.1

Total Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159.4 193.1 210.6 226.6 243.4 2.2 1.9

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington,

DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

20

40

60

80

100

Quadrillion Btu

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 27. Transportation Sector Energy

Consumption by Region, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
17.3 quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 18.0 quadrillion Btu in

2025. The transportation sector’s share of total energy

use is projected to remain about the same over the forecast period, at 24 percent. Low population growth, high

taxes on transportation fuels, and environmental policies are expected to slow the rate of energy demand

growth in Western Europe to an average rate of 0.4 percent per year over the 2002 to 2025 time period.

Oil is projected to remain Western Europe’s largest

energy source for transportation, with demand increasing by 0.3 percent per year on average from 2002 to 2025.

Transportation accounts for more than one-half of the

increment in total oil use projected for the region, with

the industrial sector accounting for the remainder.

Declines in oil use are projected for the region’s residential and commercial sectors. The fastest rate of growth in

Western Europe’s transportation fuel use is expected to

occur in the aviation sector. Demand for diesel fuel is

expected to increase more rapidly than demand for gasoline, because most countries in Western Europe are

expected to keep taxes on diesel fuel lower than those for

gasoline throughout the forecast period.

Transportation energy use in Japan is projected to grow

at an average rate of 0.2 percent per year from 2002 to

2025, from 4.2 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 4.4 quadrillion

Btu in 2015 and remaining at that level through 2025,

mainly because of Japan’s aging population, projected

low birth rate, and high taxes levied on motorists. Passenger cars in Japan are subject to nine taxes, imposed on

acquisition, ownership, and operation. The taxes, aimed

at reducing oil imports and securing government funds

for infrastructure projects, such as road maintenance

and construction, account for one-tenth of total government revenues.

Transitional Economies

Energy demand in the EE/FSU transportation sector as

a whole is projected to grow at an average annual rate of

1.6 percent, from 5.9 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 7.6 quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 8.5 quadrillion Btu in 2025. The

growth in transportation energy use in this region is

expected to be led by expanding ownership of private

automobiles and an increasing role of trucking in freight

transportation.

Emerging Economies

For the emerging economies as a whole, transportation

sector energy consumption is projected to grow by 3.6

percent per year, from 26.2 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to

46.1 quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 58.9 quadrillion Btu in

2025—the highest rate of growth in transportation

energy use worldwide. In 2002, the emerging economies

accounted for about 31 percent of world energy use for

transportation. In 2025, their share is projected to be

43 percent, as the gap between transportation energy

consumption in the emerging economies and in the

mature market economies narrows substantially over

the forecast (Figure 27).

China’s energy use for transportation is projected to

grow by an average of 6.0 percent per year over the forecast, from 4.1 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 10.4 quadrillion

Btu in 2015 and 15.5 quadrillion Btu in 2025. Virtually all

of the increase in transportation energy consumption is

projected to be in the form of petroleum products. Road

transport is expected to be the primary factor in China’s

growing demand for transportation fuels. There were

7.5 million automobiles and 6.4 million commercial

vehicles in China in 2002 (as compared with 136.0 million automobiles and 89.4 million commercial vehicles

in the United States) [3]. Personal travel in China has

soared in the past two decades, with passenger miles

traveled increasing fivefold [4]. Those trends are expected to continue over the projection period.

In India, energy demand in the transportation sector is

projected to grow at an average rate of 4.7 percent a year,

from 1.4 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 3.1 quadrillion Btu in

2015 and 4.1 quadrillion Btu in 2025. The transportation

sector’s share of total energy use is expected to grow

from 10 percent in 2002 to 14 percent in 2025. In comparison with other countries in the emerging Asia region,

some of India’s transportation infrastructure is well

developed—especially the railways (although many

rural areas still are largely inaccessible by rail). India has

the most extensive railway system in the world, dating

back to colonial times. An estimated 1.6 million people

are employed by the country’s railway system, making

it the world’s largest employer [5].

In South Korea, transportation energy demand is projected to grow by 1.9 percent per year, from 1.7 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 2.3 quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 2.6

quadrillion Btu in 2025. South Korea’s total demand for

oil is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 1.3

percent, from 4.5 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 6.1 quadrillion Btu in 2025—much slower than the average of 8.0

percent per year over the past three decades, reflecting

the relative maturity of the South Korean transportation

sector. Just over one-half of the country’s projected

increase in oil demand is expected in the transportation

sector, with much of the remainder in the industrial

sector.

Energy demand in the transportation sector in the other

emerging nations of Asia (the largest of which are Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and

Hong Kong) is projected to grow from 6.2 quadrillion

Btu in 2002 to 10.1 quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 13.1 quadrillion Btu in 2025. The transportation share of total

energy use in the region is projected to increase from 27

percent in 2002 to 29 percent in 2025, as national economies continue to mature and rising standards of living

result in increased motor transport.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 23
The Middle East region has a relatively small population

and is not a major energy consumer but rather an

exporter; however, rapid population growth is expected

to result in more energy use for transportation in the

future. The region’s energy demand for transportation is

projected to grow from 4.5 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 6.8

quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 8.0 quadrillion Btu in 2025.

Demand for transportation fuels in traditional exporting

countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, the

United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and, most notably, Iran

made the region a net importer of gasoline in 2003; however, that trend is expected to be reversed by 2010, when

planned expansions of refinery capacity come on line.

References

24 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

1. FACTS Inc., Asia-Pacific Databook 1: Supply, Demand

and Prices (Honolulu, HI, Fall 2003), p. 3, web site

www.factsinc.net/products/databooks.shtml.

2. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy

Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington,

DC, January 2004), Table A7, web site www.

eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/.

3. S.C. Davis and S.W. Diegel, Transportation Energy

Data Book: Edition 24, ORNL-6973 (Oak Ridge, TN:

Oak Ridge National Laboratory December 2004),

Tables 3.1 and 3.2, web site http://cta.ornl.gov/

data/Index.shtml.

4. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook

2004 (Paris, France, October 2004), web site www.

worldenergyoutlook.org.

5. World Markets Research Centre, “Automotive Sector Analysis: India and China” (October 18, 2004),

web site www.wmrc.com.
World Oil Markets

IEO2005 projects that world crude oil prices in real 2003 dollars

will decline from their current level by 2010,

then rise gradually through 2025.

In the International Energy Outlook 2005 (IEO2005) reference case, world demand for crude oil grows from 78

million barrels per day in 2002 to 103 million barrels per

day in 2015 and to just over 119 million barrels per day in

2025. Much of the growth in oil consumption is projected for the emerging Asian nations, where strong economic growth results in a robust increase in oil demand.

Emerging Asia (including China and India) accounts for

45 percent of the total world increase in oil use over the

forecast period in the IEO2005 reference case.

The projected increase in world oil demand would

require an increment to world production capability of

more than 42 million barrels per day relative to the 2002

crude oil production capacity of 80.0 million barrels per

day. Producers in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are expected to be the major

source of production increases. In addition, non-OPEC

supply is expected to remain highly competitive, with

major increments to supply coming from offshore

resources, especially in the Caspian Basin, Latin America, and deepwater West Africa. The estimates of incremental production are based on current proved reserves

and a country-by-country assessment of ultimately

recoverable petroleum. In the IEO2005 oil price cases,

the substantial investment capital required to produce

the incremental volumes is assumed to exist, and the

investors are expected to receive at least a 10-percent

return on investment.

In 2004, crude oil prices averaged $36 per barrel (see text

box below), with prices turning upward throughout the

year and well into 2005. Although OPEC production

quotas (excluding Iraq) were raised from 23.5 million

barrels per day in April 2004 to 28.0 million barrels per

day in July 2005, world oil prices generally continued to

rise [1]. In June 2005, crude oil futures prices exceeded

$60 per barrel, a record high price in nominal dollars [2].

Several factors have worked to keep world crude oil

prices high in the near term. First, world petroleum

demand grew at a robust 3.4 percent (2.7 million barrels

per day) in 2004, reflecting dramatic increases in China’s

demand for oil-generated power and oil-based transportation fuels, as well as a rebound in U.S. oil demand. Second, oil prices typically are sensitive to any incremental

tightening of supply during periods of high economic

growth. On the supply side, there was very little spare

upstream capacity, and the spare downstream capacity

was not always properly configured to produce the

required slate of products. World oil inventories, in

terms of “days of supply,” were unusually low. Next,

geopolitical tensions in major oil-producing countries—

including the continuing the war in Iraq and uncertain

prospects for a return to normalcy in Iraq’s oil sector—

and potential unrest in Nigeria and Venezuela contributed to the volatility in world oil markets.

Tempered by high world oil prices, growth in world

petroleum demand in 2005 is expected to remain strong,

while retreating somewhat from its 2004 pace. Any

expectation of incremental supply tightness in nonOPEC supply or downstream refinery capacity could

cause crude oil prices to increase even further. As a

result, the refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil

in 2005 is expected to average more than $47 per barrel.

OPEC producers may find it more challenging to maintain high oil prices over the next few years, however,

given the projected increase in non-OPEC supply.

Despite evidence that OPEC members have achieved

some of their price goals in recent years by using a

price-band strategy, production cutbacks have historically had only limited success. OPEC’s market management strategies have often ended in failure, and its

successes for the most part have been the result of tight

market conditions and disciplined participation by

OPEC members. Currently, spare production capacity

worldwide—with the exception of two or three Persian

Gulf members of OPEC—is negligible, making OPEC’s

consensus building easier. Non-OPEC production is

expected to show significant increases over the next 5

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 25

World Oil Prices in IEO2005

World oil prices in IEO2005 are defined on the basis of

“average refiner acquisition cost” of imported oil to

the United States (IRAC). The IRAC price tends to be a

few dollars less than the widely cited West Texas

Intermediate (WTI) spot price. WTI is a higher quality, lighter, low-sulfur crude than that represented by

IRAC. In recent months, IRAC has been as much as 6

dollars a barrel lower than the WTI. In 2004, WTI

averaged $41.44 per barrel and IRAC averaged $36.00

per barrel (in nominal dollars).
years, and a number of OPEC member countries have

announced plans to expand production capacity in the

short term. In an oil market environment with substantial spare production capacity, it will be more difficult

for OPEC to achieve agreement among its members;

however, obstacles to investment in new production

capacity in some areas with abundant resources may

keep the growth in supply below its expected potential.

Although OPEC’s share of world oil supply is projected

to increase significantly over the next two decades, competitive forces are expected to remain strong enough to

forestall efforts to escalate real oil prices significantly.

Competitive forces operate within OPEC, between

OPEC and non-OPEC sources of supply, and between

conventional oil and other sources of energy (particularly, nonconventional oil, natural gas, and coal).

Non-OPEC producers have been somewhat slow in

reacting to higher oil prices; however, there remains

significant untapped production potential worldwide,

especially in deepwater areas. Deepwater exploration

and development initiatives generally are expected to be

sustained worldwide, with the offshore Atlantic Basin

emerging as a major future source of oil production in

both Latin America and Africa.

Although the lag between higher prices and increases in

drilling activity seems to have increased in the aftermath

of the low price environment of 1998 and 1999, nonOPEC production has increased by more than 3 million

barrels per day over the past 3 years and is expected to

add an additional 0.7 million barrels per day in 2005.

More than one-half of the worldwide increase in nonOPEC production over the next 2 years is expected to

come from the former Soviet Union (FSU), and the

remainder is expected to come mainly from the emerging economies of the Atlantic Basin (Latin America and

West Africa). Technology and resource availability can

sustain large increments in oil production capability at

prices well below the current level.

Incorporating the recent price turbulence into the construction of an intermediate- and long-term oil market

outlook is difficult and raises the following questions:

Will OPEC maintain its cutback strategy in order to keep

prices within a certain price band, or will the anticipated

increase in non-OPEC production exert downward

pressure on prices? Will China and other emerging

economies of Asia be able to sustain the current robust

economic growth and a corresponding increase in their

demand for oil in the long term? Will technology guarantee that oil supply development will move forward

even if a low world oil price environment returns?

The uncertainties associated with the IEO2005 reference

case projections are significant. The war in Iraq, the

international war on terrorism, uncertain economic

recovery in emerging Asia and Japan, the success of

China’s economic reforms and its political situation, the

potential for social unrest in Venezuela and Nigeria,

Brazil’s impact on other Latin American economies, and

uncertain prospects for the pace of economic recovery in

the FSU all increase the risk of near-term political and

policy discontinuities that could lead to oil market

behavior quite different from that portrayed in the

projections.

World Oil Demand

World oil consumption rose by about 2.7 million barrels

per day in 2004, with the mature market economies

accounting for only about one-fourth of the increase.

Demand in the emerging economies rose by almost 1.9

million barrels per day, with China accounting for more

than one-half of that increase. Current growth in the

emerging Asian economies is beginning to show signs of

a return to the rapid economic expansion of the early

and mid-1990s. Latin America’s oil demand continues to

grow at a modest rate. In the FSU, oil demand is

expected to show a modest increase for 2004. In 2005,

global oil demand is expected to grow by about 2.2 million barrels per day [3].

In the IEO2005 reference case forecast, growth in world

oil demand averages 1.9 percent per year over the forecast period. Most of the world’s incremental oil demand

is projected for use in the transportation sector, where

there are currently no competitive alternatives to petroleum; however, several of the technologies associated

with nonconventional liquids (gas to liquids, coal to liquids, and energy crops that can be used to produce ethanol and biodiesel) could reduce the pressure on

conventional oil supply from the transportation sector.

Of the projected increase in oil use in the reference case

over the 2002 to 2025 period, 61 percent occurs in the

transportation sector (Figure 28). The industrial sector

also accounts for a fairly large share of the projected

increase in world oil consumption: 28 percent of the

increase is expected to be for industrial sector uses,

mostly for chemical and petrochemical processes.

On a regional basis, two parts of the world account for

most of the projected growth in world oil demand:

emerging Asia and North America (Figure 29). Outside

North America, oil consumption in the mature market

economy regions grows much more slowly—by 0.3 percent per year—in both Western Europe and mature market Asia, reflecting expectations of slow growth or

declines in population and economic growth over the

next two decades.

In the emerging economies, strong expansion of oil use

is projected, as robust economic growth fuels demand

for oil to fuel burgeoning industrial sectors and rapidly

expanding transportation use. The fastest growth in oil

demand is projected for the emerging Asian economies,

at an average rate of 3.5 percent per year over the

26 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005
forecast period, and the other emerging economy

regions also are expected to experience fast-paced

increases in oil use. From 2002 to 2025, consumption of

petroleum is projected to increase on average by 2.1 percent per year in the Middle East, 2.5 percent per year in

Central and South America, and 2.7 percent per year in

Africa.

Economic development in Asia will be crucial to

long-term growth in oil markets. China, India, and the

other nations of emerging Asia are expected to experience combined economic growth of 5.5 percent per year

between 2002 and 2025, the highest rate of growth in the

world. This robust expansion in gross domestic product

(GDP) translates to a 3.5-percent annual increase in

regional oil use. The projected evolution of Asian oil

demand in the reference case could strengthen economic

ties between the Middle East and Asia, as Asian nations

rely more and more on Middle East oil supplies.

In the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and the

FSU (EE/FSU), oil consumption increases on average by

1.4 percent per year in the reference case forecast, from

5.5 million barrels per day in 2002 to 7.6 million barrels

per day in 2025. Oil use in the EE/FSU region dropped

precipitously after the collapse of the Soviet regime in

the early 1990s, from 10.0 million barrels per day in 1990

to 5.3 million barrels per day in 1997, as the region’s GDP

contracted by almost one-third. Growth in oil demand in

the EE/FSU region has begun to recover in recent years

and by 2002 had reached 5.5 million barrels per day.

Positive economic growth returned to the FSU in 1999,

when high world oil prices and a devalued ruble helped

Russia, the region’s largest economy and a major world

oil exporter, post strong economic gains by boosting performance in its industrial sectors and increasing consumer demand for domestically produced goods. Even

with the robust economic growth (an average of 4.4 percent per year) projected for the region, oil demand in the

EE/FSU is not expected to be as strong in 2025 as it was

in 1990.

World Oil Prices

The world oil price in the International Energy Outlook

2005 (IEO2005) is defined as the annual average U.S.

refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil. Three distinct world oil price scenarios are represented in

IEO2005, reaching $21, $35, and $48 per barrel in 2025,

respectively, in the low world oil price, reference, and

high world oil price cases in 2003 dollars. Although the

IEO typically uses the same reference case as the Annual

Energy Outlook, IEO2005 has adopted the October

futures case from the Annual Energy Outlook 2005

(AEO2005) as its reference case for the United States. The

October futures case, which has an assumption of higher

world oil prices than in the AEO2005 reference case, now

appears to be a more likely projection.2

In October 2004, the New York Mercantile Exchange

(NYMEX) oil futures prices implied that the annual

average oil price in 2005 will exceed its 2004 level before

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 27

North America

Emerging Asia

Western Europe

Mature Market Asia

EE/FSU

Middle East

Central and South America

Africa

0 10 20 30 40

Million Barrels per Day

2002

2025

Figure 29. World Oil Consumption by Region and

Country Group, 2002 and 2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy

Markets (2005).

78

95

103

111

119

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

50

100

150

Million Barrels per Day

Residential

Commercial

Industrial

Transportation

Figure 28. World Oil Consumption by End-Use

Sector, 2002-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

2For detailed descriptions and comparisons of the AEO2005 reference, October oil futures, and other world oil price cases, see Energy

Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington, DC, February 2005), pp. 40-50, web site

www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo. The reference case will be reconsidered for the next AEO. Based on information available as of July 2005, the

AEO2006 reference case will likely incorporate world oil prices higher than those in the IEO2005 reference case.
falling back somewhat. The AEO2005 October oil futures

case is based on an extrapolation of oil prices loosely corresponding to the mid-term profile of prices on the

NYMEX futures market in October 2004.

The low world oil price case reflects a future market

where oil production becomes more competitive and

plentiful. There are several ways in which this could

come about. First, the OPEC countries could become less

cohesive, with each producer attempting to sell as much

of its production capacity as the market will allow.

Another possibility would be a decline in the costs of

non-OPEC oil production or the viable development of

competitive alternatives. To forestall the penetration of

alternatives and other sources of competition, OPEC

would be expected to lower its price band and increase

production. The high price case, in contrast, assumes

that world oil prices will remain close to current levels

for the foreseeable future.

Although oil prices rose by more than $9 per barrel over

the course of 2004 and are expected to add an additional

$7 per barrel in 2005, such developments are not indicative of the long-term trend in the IEO2005 reference case.

From anticipated high levels throughout 2005, oil prices

are expected to decline gradually to $31 per barrel in

2010, then rise by about 0.8 percent per year to $35 in

2025 (all price projections in 2003 dollars unless otherwise noted).

The near-term price trajectory in the IEO2005 reference

case is considerably different from that in the International Energy Outlook 2004 (IEO2004). Last year’s reference case price path did not reflect the upward price

pressure in 2004 brought about by the conditions that

have led to market tightness. In both the IEO2004 and

IEO2005 reference cases, oil prices rise gradually from

about 2010 through 2025. This price path reflects the recognition that OPEC has been able to limit production for

the purpose of firming up prices and that continued

robust projections for oil demand, especially among the

emerging economies, will to some extent maintain pressure on oil markets.

Three alternative long-term price paths are shown in

Figure 30. In the IEO2005 reference case, projected prices

reach $35 per barrel in 2025 in 2003 dollars. In nominal

dollars, the reference case price is expected to approach

$60 per barrel in 2025. In the low price case, prices are

projected to reach $21 per barrel in 2009 and to remain at

about that level out to 2025. In the high price case, prices

are projected to reach $37 per barrel in 2013 and increase

steadily to $48 per barrel in 2025. While the three cases

shown in Figure 30 vary widely, they do not span the full

range of possible scenarios.

In all the IEO2005 oil price cases, oil demand is expected

to rise significantly over the projection period. In the

high and low world oil price cases, the projected

increases in oil consumption from 2002 to 2025 are 35

million barrels per day and 53 million barrels per day,

respectively. Resources are not expected to be a key constraint on world demand to 2025. Rather more important

are the political, economic, and environmental circumstances that could shape developments in oil supply and

demand.

Oil prices have been highly volatile over the past 25

years, and periods of price volatility can be expected in

the future principally because of unforeseen political

and economic circumstances. It is well recognized that

tensions in the Middle East, for example, could give rise

to serious disruptions of normal oil production and trading patterns. On the other hand, market forces can play a

significant role in restoring balance over an extended

period. High real prices deter consumption and encourage the emergence of significant competition from large

marginal sources of oil, which currently are uneconomical to produce, and other energy supplies. Persistently

low prices have the opposite effects.

Limits to long-term oil price escalation include substitution of other fuels (such as natural gas) for oil, marginal

sources of conventional oil that become reserves (i.e.,

economically viable) when prices rise, and nonconventional sources of oil that become reserves at still higher

prices. Advances in exploration and production technologies are likely to bring prices down when such additional oil resources become part of the reserve base.

There are some oil market analysts, however, who find

this viewpoint overly optimistic, based on what they

consider to be a significant overestimation of both

proven reserves and ultimately recoverable resources.

28 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

1970 1980 1995 2004 2015 2025

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70 2003 Dollars per Barrel

Projections

High Oil Price

Low Oil Price

Reference

History

Figure 30. World Oil Prices in Three Cases,

1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

Annual Energy Review 2003, DOE/EIA-0384(2003) (Washington, DC, September 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/

aer/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/

EIA-0383(2005) (Washington, DC, February 2005). Note:

IEO2005 uses the AEO2005 October oil futures case as its reference case.
The Composition of World Oil

Supply

A three-step approach was used to determine the composition of world oil supply in the three IEO2005 oil

price cases. The first step determined whether the oil

resource base would be sufficiently robust to meet

worldwide demand. The second step determined how

much non-OPEC oil (both conventional and nonconventional) could be produced at the assumed price path. An

important criterion in the second step was whether producers would receive an adequate rate of return on their

investment (usually 10 percent). With total non-OPEC

supply having been established, the third step assumed

that the remainder of the worldwide demand would be

met by OPEC producers and determined an appropriate

production capacity for each OPEC producer.

It is important to note what this simple three-step

approach did and did not assume. A business-as-usual

oil market environment was assumed. Disruptions in oil

supply for any reason (war, terror, weather, geopolitics)

were not assumed. It was assumed that all non-OPEC oil

projects that show a favorable rate of return on investment would be funded, and that OPEC would act as the

residual supplier of oil to the world. For the forecast

period out to 2025, there is sufficient oil to meet worldwide demand. Peaking of world oil production is not

anticipated until after 2030.

In the IEO2005 reference case, world oil supply in 2025 is

projected to exceed the 2002 level by almost 41 million

barrels per day. Increases in production are expected for

both OPEC and non-OPEC producers; however, only

about 41 percent of the total increase is expected to come

from non-OPEC areas. Over the past two decades, the

growth in non-OPEC oil supply has resulted in an OPEC

market share substantially under its historic high of

52 percent in 1973. New exploration and production

technologies, aggressive cost-reduction programs by

industry, and attractive fiscal terms to producers by

governments all contribute to the outlook for continued

growth in non-OPEC oil production.

The reference case projects that about 59 percent of the

increase in petroleum demand over the next two

decades will be met by an increase in production by

members of OPEC rather than by non-OPEC suppliers.

OPEC production in 2025 is projected to be more than 24

million barrels per day higher than it was in 2002 (Figure

31). The IEO2005 estimates of OPEC production capacity

in 2010 are slightly less than those projected in IEO2004,

reflecting a shift toward non-OPEC supply projects in

scenarios with higher prices. Some analysts suggest

that OPEC members might pursue significant price escalation through conservative capacity expansion decisions rather than undertake major production expansion

programs. Such behavior would tend to raise world oil

prices.

Reserves and Resources

Table 4 shows estimates of the conventional oil resource

base by region out to the year 2025. Proved reserves are

from the annual assessment of worldwide reserves published by Oil & Gas Journal [4]. Reserve growth and

undiscovered estimates are based on the World Petroleum Assessment 2000 by the U.S. Geological Survey

(USGS). The oil resource base is defined by three categories: remaining reserves (oil that has been discovered

but not produced); reserve growth (increases in reserves

resulting mainly from technological factors that enhance

a field’s recovery rate); and undiscovered (oil that

remains to be found through exploration). The information in Table 4 is derived from the USGS mean estimate,

which is an average assessment over a wide range of

uncertainty for reserve growth and undiscovered

resources. The IEO2005 oil production forecast is based

on the USGS mean estimate.

Expansion of OPEC Production Capacity

It is generally acknowledged that OPEC members with

large reserves and relatively low costs for expanding

production capacity can accommodate sizable increases

in petroleum demand. In the IEO2005 reference case,

the production call on OPEC suppliers is projected to

grow at a robust annual rate of 2.7 percent through 2025

(Table 5 and Figure 32). OPEC capacity utilization is

expected to increase slightly after 2002, reaching almost

95 percent by 2015 and remaining at about that level for

the duration of the projection period.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 29

1970 2002 2010 2025

0

25

50

75 Million Barrels per Day

Mature Market Economies OPEC

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 31. World Oil Production in the Reference

Case by Region, 1970, 2002, 2010, and

2025

Sources: 1970 and 2002: Energy Information Administration

(EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219

(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.

gov/iea/. 2010 and 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of

Global Energy Markets (2005).
Amidst enormous uncertainty, Iraq’s role in OPEC in

the next several years will be of particular interest. In

1999, Iraq expanded its production capacity to 2.8 million barrels per day in order to reach the slightly more

than $5.2 billion in oil exports allowed by United

Nations Security Council resolutions. The expansion

was required because of the low price environment of

early 1999. In the IEO2005 reference case, Iraq is

30 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Table 4. Estimated World Oil Resources, 1995-2025

(Billion Barrels)

Region Proved Reserves Reserve Growth Undiscovered Total

Mature Market Economies

United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.9 76.0 83.0 180.9

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178.8 12.5 32.6 223.9

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.6 25.6 45.8 86.0

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.8 19.3 34.6 69.7

Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.7 5.9 10.1

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 77.8 137.7 170.8 386.3

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.5 1.4 4.4

Emerging Economies

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.3 19.6 14.6 52.5

India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 3.8 6.8 16.0

Other Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.0 14.6 23.9 49.5

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729.6 252.5 269.2 1,251.3

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.8 73.5 124.7 299.0

Central and South America . . . . . . . 100.6 90.8 125.3 316.7

Total World. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,277.7 730.2 938.9 2,946.8

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885.2 395.6 400.5 1,681.3

Non-OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392.5 334.6 538.4 1,265.5

Note: Reserves include crude oil (including lease condensates) and natural gas plant liquids.

Sources: Proved Reserves as of January 1, 2005: Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 102, No. 47 (December 20, 2004), pp. 22-23. Reserve

Growth (Total) and Undiscovered: U.S. Geological Survey, World Petroleum Assessment 2000, web site http://greenwood.cr.

usgs.gov/energy/WorldEnergy/DDS-60. Estimates of Regional Reserve Growth: Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2002, DOE/EIA-0484(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2002), p. 32.

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

25

50

75

Million Barrels per Day

OPEC (Conventional)

Non-OPEC (Conventional)

Nonconventional

Figure 32. OPEC, Non-OPEC, and Nonconventional

Oil Production in the Reference Case,

2002 and 2010-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219 (2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.

gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

Table 5. OPEC Oil Production, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Year

Reference

Case

High

Oil Price

Low

Oil Price

History

1990 . . . . . . . . . . . 24.6 — —

2002 . . . . . . . . . . . 28.7 — —

Projections

2010 . . . . . . . . . . . 37.7 33.3 42.8

2015 . . . . . . . . . . . 41.3 33.0 49.3

2020 . . . . . . . . . . . 46.8 35.4 57.3

2025 . . . . . . . . . . . 52.7 37.9 65.2

Note: Includes the production of crude oil, natural gas plant

liquids, refinery gain, and other liquid fuels.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219 (2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.

gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005). Note: IEO2005 uses the AEO2005

October oil futures case as its reference case.
assumed to maintain its current oil production capacity

of about 2.0 million barrels per day into 2005. Iraq has

indicated a desire to expand its production capacity

aggressively, to more than 6 million barrels per day,

once the oil sector is deemed safe from terrorist activities. Preliminary discussions of exploration projects

have already been held with potential outside investors,

including France, Russia, and China. Such a significant

increase in Iraqi oil exports would ease market tightness.

Given the requirements for OPEC production capacity

expansion implied by the IEO2005 estimates, much

attention has been focused on the oil development, production, and operating costs of individual OPEC producers. With Persian Gulf producers enjoying a

reserve-to-production ratio that exceeds 108 years, substantial capacity expansion clearly is feasible.

Production costs in Persian Gulf OPEC nations are less

than $3 per barrel, and the capital investment required

to increase production capacity by 1 barrel per day is less

than $5,940 [5]. Assuming the IEO2005 low price trajectory, total development and operating costs over the

entire projection period would be about 24 percent of

gross oil revenues. Thus, Persian Gulf OPEC producers

can expand capacity at a cost that is a relatively small

percentage of projected gross revenues.

For OPEC producers outside the Persian Gulf, the cost to

expand production capacity by 1 barrel per day is considerably greater, exceeding $13,270 in some member

nations; yet those producers can expect cost-to-revenue

ratios of about 41 percent on investments to expand production capacity over the long term, even in the low

price case [5]. Venezuela has the greatest potential for

capacity expansion and could aggressively increase its

production capacity by more than 1.0 million barrels per

day, to between 4 and 5 million barrels per day in the

mid-term. It is unclear, however, whether the current

political climate will support the outside investment

required for any substantial expansion of Venezuela’s

production capacity. Tables E1-E6 in Appendix E show

the ranges of production potential for both OPEC and

non-OPEC producers.

The reference case projection implies aggressive efforts

by OPEC member nations to apply or attract investment

capital to implement a wide range of production capacity expansion projects. The combination of potential

profitability and the threat of competition from nonOPEC suppliers provides a rationale for the assumption

of a relatively aggressive expansion strategy.

In the IEO2005 reference case, OPEC members outside

the Persian Gulf are expected to increase their production potential substantially, despite their higher capacity

expansion costs. There is much optimism regarding

Nigeria’s offshore production potential, although it is

unlikely to be developed until the middle to late part of

this decade. In addition, increased optimism about the

production potential of Algeria, Libya, and Venezuela

supports the possibility of reducing the world’s dependence on Persian Gulf oil.

Non-OPEC Supply

The growth in non-OPEC oil supplies played a significant role in the erosion of OPEC’s market share over the

past three decades, as non-OPEC supply became

increasingly diverse. North America dominated nonOPEC supply in the early 1970s, the North Sea and Mexico evolved as major producers in the 1980s, and much

of the new production in the 1990s came from the emerging economies of Latin America, West Africa, the

non-OPEC Middle East, and China. In the IEO2005 reference case, non-OPEC supply from proven reserves is

expected to increase steadily, from 49.4 million barrels

per day in 2002 to 66.2 million barrels per day in 2025

(Table 6).

There are several important differences between the

IEO2005 production profiles and those published in

IEO2004:

•The U.S. production decline was somewhat more

severe in the IEO2004 projections than in this year’s

forecast, with IEO2005 projecting lower exploration

and production costs coupled with more optimistic

finding rates in the National Petroleum ReserveAlaska.

•The outlook for growth in Russia’s oil production is

slightly more optimistic in IEO2005 as Russian companies in alliance with Western service companies

continue to surprise industry experts with productivity increases in West Siberia.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 31

Table 6. Non-OPEC Oil Production, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Year

Reference

Case

High

Oil Price

Low

Oil Price

History

1990 . . . . . . . . . . . 42.1 — —

2002 . . . . . . . . . . . 49.4 — —

Projections

2010 . . . . . . . . . . . 56.6 59.6 55.0

2015 . . . . . . . . . . . 61.7 66.7 59.0

2020 . . . . . . . . . . . 63.9 70.7 60.5

2025 . . . . . . . . . . . 66.2 75.1 62.4

Note: Includes the production of crude oil, natural gas plant

liquids, refinery gain, and other liquid fuels.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219 (2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.

gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005). Note: IEO2005 uses the AEO2005

October oil futures case as its reference case.
•The outlook for production of nonconventional liquids (especially from oil sands and ultra-heavy oils)

is somewhat more optimistic in IEO2005 as production costs decline and markets evolve.

•In the IEO2005 projections, Caspian output is

expected to exceed 3.3 million barrels per day in 2010

and to increase steadily thereafter. There still

remains a great deal of uncertainty about export

routes from the Caspian Basin region.

In IEO2005, the decline in North Sea production is

slowed slightly, based on the implementation of strategies for redeveloping mature fields. Production from

Norway, Western Europe’s largest producer, is expected

to peak at about 3.6 million barrels per day in 2006 and

then decline gradually to about 2.5 million barrels per

day by the end of the forecast period with the maturing

of some of its larger and older fields. The United Kingdom sector is expected to produce about 2.2 million barrels per day in 2010, followed by a decline to 1.4 million

barrels per day in 2025.

Two non-OPEC Persian Gulf producers are expected to

increase output gradually through 2010. Enhanced

recovery techniques are expected to increase current

output in Oman by more than 190,000 barrels per day,

with only a gradual production decline anticipated after

2010. Current oil production in Yemen is expected to

increase by at least 50,000 barrels per day within the next

5 years, and those levels could show a slight increase

throughout the projection period. Syria is expected to

hold its production flat out to 2015, but little in the way

of new resource potential will allow anything except

declining production volumes from 2015 to 2025.

Oil producers in the Pacific Rim are expected to increase

their production volumes significantly as a result of

enhanced exploration and extraction technologies.

India’s deepwater prospects are expected to show some

encouraging production increases in this decade, with

the potential for significant increases near the end of the

forecast period. Deepwater fields offshore from the Philippines have resulted in an improved reserve picture,

with production expected to exceed 75,000 barrels per

day by the end of the forecast period. Vietnam’s

long-term production potential still is viewed with considerable optimism, although exploration activity has

been slower than originally hoped. Output from Vietnamese fields is projected to exceed 375,000 barrels per

day in 2015.

Australia has continued to make additions to its proved

reserves, and it is possible that its oil production could

exceed 800,000 barrels per day by the end of this decade.

Malaysia shows little potential for any significant new

finds, and its output is expected to peak at around

750,000 barrels per day in this decade and then decline

gradually to less than 700,000 barrels per day in 2025.

Papua New Guinea continues to add to its reserve posture and is expected to achieve production volumes

approaching 110,000 barrels per day by the end of this

decade, followed by only a modest decline over the

remainder of the forecast period. Exploration and

test-well activity have pointed to some production

potential for Bangladesh and Myanmar, but significant

output is not expected until after 2010.

Oil producers in Central and South America have significant potential for increasing output over the next

decade. Brazil became a million barrel per day producer

in 1999, with considerable production potential waiting

to be tapped. Brazil’s production is expected to rise

throughout the forecast period and to top 3.5 million

barrels per day in 2025. Colombia’s current economic

downturn and civil unrest have delayed development of

its upstream sector, but its output is expected to top

610,000 barrels per day within the decade and continue

to show modest increases for the remainder of the forecast period. In both Brazil and Colombia, the oil sector

would benefit significantly from the creation of favorable climates for foreign investment. Argentina is

expected to increase its production volumes by at least

65,000 barrels per day over the next 3 years, and by the

end of the decade it could possibly to become a million

barrel per day producer. Although the current political

situation in Ecuador is in transition, there is still optimism that Ecuador will double production volumes

over the forecast period.

Several West African producers—Angola, Cameroon,

Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,

Mauritania, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, and Ivory

Coast—are expected to reap the benefits of substantial

exploration activity, especially if the current high prices

persist. Angola is expected to become a million barrel

per day producer by the end of this decade. Given the

excellent deepwater exploration results, Angola could

produce volumes of up to 3.4 million barrels per day in

the later years of the forecast. The other West African

producers with offshore tracts are expected to increase

output by up to 1.1 million barrels per day for the duration of the forecast.

North African producers Egypt and Tunisia produce

mainly from mature fields and show little promise of

adding to their reserve posture. As a result, their production volumes are expected to decline gradually over

the forecast period. In East Africa, Sudan is expected to

produce significant volumes by the end of this decade

and could exceed 500,000 barrels per day by the end of

the forecast period. Eritrea, Somalia, and South Africa

also have some resource potential, but they are not

expected to produce significant volumes until late in the

forecast.

32 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005
In North America, moderately declining U.S. output is

expected to be supplemented by significant production

increases in Canada and Mexico. Canada’s conventional

oil output is expected to contract steadily, by about

600,000 barrels per day over the next 20 years, but an

additional 3.5 million barrels per day of nonconventional output from oil sands projects is expected to be

added. Expected production volumes in Mexico exceed

4.2 million barrels per day by the end of the decade and

continue to increase out to the end of the forecast period,

by another 500,000 barrels per day.

With higher oil prices assumed to continue, oil production in the FSU is expected to exceed 15.0 million barrels

per day in 2015, based in large part on a more optimistic

outlook for investment in Russia. The long-term production potential for the FSU still is regarded with considerable optimism, especially for the resource-rich Caspian

Basin region. The IEO2005 reference case shows FSU

output exceeding 17.5 million barrels per day in 2025,

implying export volumes of more than 12 million barrels

per day. In China, oil production is expected to decline

slightly to about 3.5 million barrels per day in 2025.

China has voiced an interest in expanding its domestic

oil resource base and perhaps developing coal-toliquids technologies.

The estimates for non-OPEC production potential presented in this outlook are based on such parameters as

numbers of exploration wells, finding rates, reserve-toproduction ratios, advances in both exploration and

extraction technologies, and sensitivity to changes in the

world oil price. A critical component of the forecasting

methodology is the constraint placed on the exploration

and development of non-OPEC undiscovered resources.

For the purpose of the three IEO2005 price cases, no

more than 15, 30, and 45 percent of the mean USGS estimate of non-OPEC undiscovered oil is developed over

the forecast period in the low, reference, and high price

cases, respectively. In all price cases, OPEC producers

are assumed to be the source of the required residual

supply.

The expectation in the late 1980s and early 1990s was

that non-OPEC production in the longer term would

stagnate or decline gradually in response to resource

constraints. The relatively insignificant cost of developing oil resources within OPEC countries (especially

those in the Persian Gulf region) was considered such an

overwhelming advantage that non-OPEC production

potential was viewed with considerable pessimism. In

actuality, however, despite several periods of relatively

low prices, non-OPEC production has risen every year

since 1993, adding more than 6.9 million barrels per day

between 1993 and 2002.

It is expected that non-OPEC producers will continue

to increase output, producing an additional 7.2 million

barrels per day in 2010. Three factors generally are given

credit for the impressive resiliency of non-OPEC production: development of new exploration and production technologies, efforts by the oil industry to reduce

costs, and efforts by producer governments to promote

exploration and development by encouraging outside

investors with attractive fiscal terms.

Worldwide Petroleum Trade

In 2002, the mature market economies imported 16.6

million barrels of oil per day from OPEC producers.

Of that total, 10.1 million barrels per day came from the

Persian Gulf region. Oil movements to mature market

economies represented 67 percent of the total petroleum

exported by OPEC member nations and 60 percent of all

Persian Gulf exports (Table 7). By the end of the forecast

period, OPEC exports to mature market economies in

the reference case are estimated to be about 10.3 million

barrels per day higher than their 2002 level, and more

than one-half of the increase is expected to come from

the Persian Gulf region.

Despite such a substantial increase, the share of total

petroleum exports that goes to the mature market economy nations in 2025 is projected to be almost 11 percentage points below their 2002 share, and the share of

Persian Gulf exports going to the mature market economies is projected to fall by about 17 percent. The significant shift expected in the balance of OPEC export shares

between the mature market economies and emerging

economies is a direct result of the economic growth

anticipated for the economically developing nations of

the world, especially those of Asia. OPEC petroleum

exports to emerging economies are expected to increase

by 17 million barrels per day over the forecast period,

with more than 70 percent of the increase going to the

emerging economies of Asia. China, alone, is likely to

import about 7.3 million barrels per day from OPEC in

2025, virtually all of which is expected to come from Persian Gulf producers.

North America’s petroleum imports from the Persian

Gulf in the reference case are expected to more than double over the forecast period (Figure 33). At the same

time, over 46 percent of total North American imports in

2025 are expected to be from Atlantic Basin producers

and refiners, with significant increases anticipated in

crude oil imports from Latin American producers,

including Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.

West African producers, including Nigeria and Angola,

are also expected to increase their export volumes to

North America. Caribbean Basin refiners are expected to

account for most of the increase in North America’s

imports of refined products.

With a moderate decline in North Sea production, Western Europe is expected to import increasing amounts

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 33
from Persian Gulf producers and from OPEC member

nations in both northern and western Africa. Substantial

imports from the Caspian Basin are also expected.

Mature market Asian nations are expected to increase

their already heavy dependence on Persian Gulf oil. The

emerging economies of the Pacific Rim are expected to

more than double their total petroleum imports between

2002 and 2025.

Worldwide crude oil distillation capacity was about 82

million barrels per day at the beginning of 2003. To meet

the projected growth in international oil demand in the

reference case, worldwide refining capacity would have

to increase by more than 45 million barrels per day by

2025. Substantial growth in distillation capacity is

expected in the Middle East, Central and South America,

and especially in the Asia Pacific region. Refiners in

North America and Europe, while making only modest

additions to their distillation capacity, are expected to

continue improving product quality and enhancing the

usefulness of the heavier portion of the barrel through

investment in downstream capacity. Likewise, future

investments by emerging economies are expected to

include more advanced configurations designed to meet

the anticipated increase in demand for lighter products,

especially transportation fuels.

34 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Table 7. Worldwide Petroleum Trade in the Reference Case, 2002 and 2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Exporting Region

Importing Region

Total

Exports

Mature Market Economies Emerging Market Economies

North

America

Western

Europe Asia Total

Pacific

Rim China

Rest of

World Total

2002

OPEC

Persian Gulf. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 2.9 4.4 10.1 3.2 0.9 2.5 6.6 16.7

North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 2.1 0.0 2.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.8

West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 0.5 0.1 1.7 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.6 2.3

South America . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 0.1 0.1 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 2.3

Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6

Total OPEC. . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 5.6 4.8 16.6 4.3 0.9 2.9 8.1 24.7

Non-OPEC

North Sea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 4.5 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1

Caribbean Basin . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.9

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . 0.3 3.6 0.3 4.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 4.5

Other Non-OPEC. . . . . . . . . 5.5 3.6 1.2 10.3 3.0 1.3 5.7 10.0 20.3

Total Non-OPEC. . . . . . . . 7.0 11.8 1.5 20.3 3.3 1.3 5.9 10.5 30.8

Total Petroleum Imports . . . 13.2 17.4 6.3 36.9 7.6 2.2 8.8 18.6 55.5

2025

OPEC

Persian Gulf. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 4.5 5.1 15.4 8.7 6.4 4.9 20.0 35.4

North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 3.1 0.1 3.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 1.6 5.3

West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.1 0.3 3.0 1.8 0.5 0.2 2.5 5.5

South America . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 0.1 0.4 4.4 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.5 4.9

Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.9 1.3

Total OPEC. . . . . . . . . . . . 11.9 8.8 6.2 26.9 12.0 7.3 6.2 25.5 52.4

Non-OPEC

North Sea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 3.4 0.0 3.9 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.5 4.4

Caribbean Basin . . . . . . . . . 1.4 0.5 0.2 2.1 0.6 0.0 0.8 1.4 3.5

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . 0.5 3.3 0.6 4.4 0.7 3.1 1.5 5.3 9.7

Other Non-OPEC. . . . . . . . . 6.8 2.9 0.4 10.1 3.1 0.3 2.5 5.9 16.0

Total Non-OPEC. . . . . . . . 9.2 10.1 1.2 20.5 4.7 3.4 5.0 13.1 33.6

Total Petroleum Imports . . . 21.1 18.9 7.4 47.4 16.7 10.7 11.2 38.6 86.0

Notes: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Energy Markets and Contingency Information Division. 2025: EIA, Office

of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, IEO2005 WORLD Model run IEO2005.B25 (2005).
References

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 35

1. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries,

various press releases, web site www.opec.org.

2. M. Piotrowski, “Nymex Crude Closes Above

$60/bbl on Iranian Concerns,” Oil Daily, Vol. 55,

No. 23 (June 28, 2005), p. 3.

3. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term

Energy Outlook, July 2005 on-line version, web site

www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/contents.html.

4. “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” Oil

& Gas Journal, Vol. 102, No. 47 (December 20, 2004),

pp. 22-23.

5. DRI/McGraw-Hill, Oil Market Outlook (Lexington,

MA, July 1995), Table 1, p. 10.

2002 2025 2002 2025

0

10

20

30

40 Million Barrels per Day

Mature Market

Economies

Emerging

Economies

North America

Other

Emerging Asia

Other

Figure 33. Imports of Persian Gulf Oil by Importing

Region, 2002 and 2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219 (2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

Natural Gas

Natural gas is the fastest growing primary energy source in the IEO2005 forecast.

Consumption of natural gas is projected to increase by nearly 70 percent between 2002

and 2025, with the most robust growth in demand expected among the emerging economies.

Natural gas is projected to be the fastest growing component of world primary energy consumption in the International Energy Outlook 2005 (IEO2005) reference case.

Consumption of natural gas worldwide increases in the

forecast by an average of 2.3 percent annually from 2002

to 2025, compared with projected annual growth rates of

1.9 percent for oil consumption and 2.0 percent for coal

consumption. From 2002 to 2025, consumption of natural gas is projected to increase by almost 70 percent, from

92 trillion cubic feet to 156 trillion cubic feet (Figure 34),

and its share of total energy consumption on a Btu basis

is projected to grow from 23 percent to 25 percent. The

electric power sector accounts for almost one-half of the

total incremental growth in worldwide natural gas

demand over the forecast period.

On a regional basis, the largest increases in natural gas

consumption worldwide are projected for the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union (EE/FSU) and for emerging Asia (Figures

35 and 36). Natural gas use in the EE/FSU expands by 63

percent over the projection period; and in emerging

Asia, gas use is expected to nearly triple from 2002 to

2025. In the mature market economies, where natural

gas markets are more established, consumption of

natural gas is projected to increase by a more modest

annual average of 1.6 percent from 2002 to 2025, with the

largest incremental growth in the mature market

economies projected for North America, at 11 trillion

cubic feet.

The emerging economies are also expected to show the

strongest growth in natural gas production, with a projected average increase of 4.1 percent per year from 2002

to 2025 in the reference case (Figure 37). In contrast, natural gas production in the transitional economies is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 2.3 percent,

and production in the mature market economies is

expected to increase by an average of only 0.6 percent

per year from 2002 to 2025.

The disparity between the increase projected for natural

gas consumption in the mature market economies and

the much smaller increase projected for their gas production points to an increasing dependence on the transitional and emerging market economies for gas

supplies (Figure 38). In 2002, the mature market economies accounted for 42 percent of the world’s total natural gas production and 50 percent of the world’s natural

gas consumption; in 2025, they are projected to account

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 37

53

73

92

111

128

142

156

1980 1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

50

100

150

200

Trillion Cubic Feet

History Projections

Figure 34. World Natural Gas Consumption,

1980-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1980 1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

20

40

60

80

100

Trillion Cubic Feet

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

History Projections

Figure 35. Natural Gas Consumption by Region,

1980-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
for only 29 percent of production and 43 percent of consumption. As a result, the mature market economies are

expected to rely on imports of natural gas from other

parts of the world to meet almost one-third of their natural gas consumption in 2025, up from 15 percent in 2002.

Reserves and Resources

As of January 1, 2005, proved world natural gas

reserves, as reported by Oil & Gas Journal,

3 were estimated at 6,040 trillion cubic feet—36 trillion cubic feet

(less than 1 percent) lower than the estimate for 2004 [1].

In general, world natural gas reserves have trended

upward since the mid-1970s (Figure 39).

The largest revision to natural gas reserve estimates was

made in Australia. The Australian government reported

a two-thirds cut in its estimate of natural gas reserves

between 2004 and 2005, from 90 trillion cubic feet to 29

trillion cubic feet. Higher reserve estimates were

recorded for the emerging economies, mostly in Africa

and the Middle East. Nigeria alone accounted for most

of the increment in Africa, with a gain of 17 trillion cubic

feet (11 percent), and Libya reported a smaller increase

of 6 trillion cubic feet (12 percent). In the Middle East,

Saudi Arabia increased its estimate of reserves by 4 trillion cubic feet (2 percent), accounting for all of the

region’s addition to reserves. Elsewhere, national estimates of natural gas reserves changed little over the

1-year period.

Almost three-quarters of the world’s natural gas

reserves are located in the Middle East and in the transitional economies of the EE/FSU (Figure 40). Russia,

Iran, and Qatar combined account for about 58 percent

of the world’s natural gas reserves (Table 8). Reserves in

38 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

EE/FSU

Emerging Asia

North America

Middle East

Western Europe

Central and South America

Africa

Mature Market Asia

0 5 10 15 20

Trillion Cubic Feet

Figure 36. Increases in Natural Gas Consumption

by Region and Country Group,

2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

20

40

60

80

Trillion Cubic Feet

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Market Economies

Figure 37. Natural Gas Production by Region,

2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

20

40

60

80

100

Trillion Cubic Feet

Domestic Production

EE/FSU Imports

Emerging Economies Imports

Figure 38. Natural Gas Consumption in Mature

Market Economies by Source,

2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

3Proved Reserves, as reported by the Oil & Gas Journal, are estimated quantities that can be recovered under present technology and

prices. Figures reported for Canada and the former Soviet Union, however, include reserves in the probable category. Natural gas reserves

reported by the Oil & Gas Journal are compiled from voluntary survey responses and do not always reflect the most recent changes. Significant natural gas discoveries made during 2004 are not likely to be reflected in the reported reserves.
the rest of the world are fairly evenly distributed on a

regional basis.

Despite high rates of increase in natural gas consumption, particularly over the past decade, most regional

reserves-to-production ratios have remained high.

Worldwide, the reserves-to-production ratio is estimated at 66.7 years [2]. Central and South America has a

reserves-to-production ratio of 55.0 years, the FSU

77.4 years, and Africa 96.9 years. The Middle East’s

reserves-to-production ratio exceeds 100 years.

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) periodically assesses

the long-term production potential of worldwide petroleum resources (oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids).

According to the most recent USGS estimates, released

in the World Petroleum Assessment 2000, a significant volume of natural gas remains to be discovered. The mean

estimate for worldwide undiscovered natural gas is

4,301 trillion cubic feet (Figure 41), which is approximately double the worldwide cumulative consumption

forecast from 2002 to 2025 in IEO2005. Of the total natural gas resource base, an estimated 3,000 trillion cubic

feet is in “stranded” reserves, usually located too far

away from pipeline infrastructure or population centers

to make transportation of the natural gas economical. Of

the new natural gas resources expected to be added over

the next 25 years, reserve growth accounts for 2,347 trillion cubic feet. More than one-half of the mean undiscovered natural gas estimate is expected to come from

the FSU, the Middle East, and North Africa; and about

one-fourth (1,065 trillion cubic feet) is expected to come

from a combination of North, Central, and South

America.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 39

Table 8. World Natural Gas Reserves by Country

as of January 1, 2005

Country

Reserves

(Trillion

Cubic Feet)

Percent of

World

Total

World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,040 100.0

Top 20 Countries. . . . . . . . 5,391 89.3

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,680 27.8

Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 15.6

Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 15.1

Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . 235 3.9

United Arab Emirates . . . . 212 3.5

United States. . . . . . . . . . . 189 3.1

Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 2.9

Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 2.7

Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 2.5

Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 1.8

Indonesia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 1.5

Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 0.5

Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 1.2

Turkmenistan . . . . . . . . . . 74 1.2

Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 1.2

Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 1.1

Netherlands. . . . . . . . . . . . 65 1.1

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 1.0

Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 0.9

Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 0.7

Rest of World. . . . . . . . . . . 649 10.7

Source: “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” Oil &

Gas Journal, Vol. 102, No. 47 (December 20, 2004), pp. 22-23.

Middle East

EE/FSU

Africa

Emerging Asia

North America

Central and South America

Western Europe

Mature Market Asia

0 1,000 2,000 3,000

Trillion Cubic Feet

World Total:

6,040 Trillion Cubic Feet

Figure 40. World Natural Gas Reserves by Region

as of January 1, 2005

Source: “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” Oil &

Gas Journal, Vol. 102, No. 47 (December 20, 2004), pp. 22-23.

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000 Trillion Cubic Feet

Mature Market Economies

Total

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 39. World Natural Gas Reserves by Region,

1975-2005

Sources: 1975-1993: “Worldwide Oil and Gas at a Glance,”

International Petroleum Encyclopedia (Tulsa, OK: PennWell

Publishing, various issues). 1994-2004: Oil & Gas Journal

(various issues).
Regional Forecasts

North America

North America’s natural gas production4 is expected to

grow at an average annual rate of 0.5 percent between

2002 and 2025 in the IEO2005 forecast, whereas its gas

consumption (Figure 42) is expected to grow by 1.5

percent per year. In 2002, most of the natural gas consumed in North America was produced within the

region (Figure 43). In 2015, however, North America is

projected to consume 5.7 trillion cubic feet more than it

produces, and in 2025 the gap between North America’s

natural gas production and consumption is projected to

be 8.0 trillion cubic feet, illustrating the region’s growing

dependence on imports.

Currently, Canada supplies the bulk of U.S. imports of

natural gas, the United States supplies most of Mexico’s

import needs, and less than 1 percent of North America’s natural gas demand in 2002 was met by imports

from outside the region (Figure 43). Imports from other

regions are all in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG)

into the United States through one of five existing LNG

regasification facilities. Four are onshore terminals that

were built more than 20 years ago, located in Everett,

Massachusetts, Cove Point, Maryland, Elba Island,

Georgia, and Lake Charles, Louisiana. The fifth is the

Gulf Gateway Energy Bridge, located in the offshore

Gulf of Mexico. It is the first new U.S. LNG terminal to be

constructed in more than 20 years, and it received its

first cargo on March 17, 2005.

LNG imports are expected to increase substantially and

play a prominent role in the future, with LNG imports

into the United States surpassing pipeline imports from

Canada by 2015. Although Mexico is expected to remain

a net importer from the United States, LNG imports are

expected to begin reducing Mexico’s dependence on the

United States in 2007.

40 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

000

2,347

6,040

4,301

Proven

Reserves

Undiscovered

Natural Gas

Reserve

Growth

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

Trillion Cubic Feet

Former Soviet Union

Middle East

North America

Africa

Asia

Central/South America

Other

Figure 41. World Natural Gas Resources

by Region, 2005-2025

Source: U.S. Geological Survey, World Petroleum Assessment 2000, web site http://greenwood.cr.usgs.gov/energy/

WorldEnergy/DDS-60; “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 102, No. 47 (December 20,

2004), pp. 22-23; and Energy Information Administration estimates.

1990 1995 2000 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Trillion Cubic Feet

United States

Canada

Mexico

History Projections

Figure 42. Natural Gas Consumption in

North America by Country, 1990-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Trillion Cubic Feet

Production

Imports

Figure 43. Natural Gas Supply in North America by

Source, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

4U.S. domestic production does not include production from any areas that currently are off limits for oil and gas drilling or production

from methane hydrates.
New LNG regasification facilities are expected to begin

operating in Mexico, the United States, and Canada

between 2005 and 2010. After 2010, the region’s import

capacity continues to expand throughout the remainder

of the forecast period. More than 50 proposals to build

new regasification facilities in North America have been

put forth, and projects in all three countries have already

received at least some of the needed regulatory approvals. If all the proposed facilities were constructed, they

would add more than 20 trillion cubic feet to the region’s

import capacity, equivalent to almost 75 percent of the

natural gas consumed in North America in 2002; however, the IEO2005 reference case does not assume that all

the proposed facilities will be built. Still, the level of

activity is a clear indication that LNG is poised to play a

much greater role in North American gas markets in the

future.

According to EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2005 (AEO2005), the share of total U.S. natural gas consumption

met by net imports of LNG is expected to grow from

about 1 percent in 2002 to 15 percent (4.3 trillion cubic

feet) in 2015 and 21 percent (6.4 trillion cubic feet) in

2025. LNG terminals are expected to be built relatively

early in the forecast, with new terminals receiving supplies on the Gulf Coast and in the Bahamas by 2010. A

new terminal in Baja California, Mexico, is projected to

begin operation in 2007 to serve Northern Mexico and

Southern California, with additional capacity in Baja

California added after 2020. Although new U.S. terminals are projected to be constructed along the East Coast

after 2015, the Gulf Coast is expected to be the primary

location for new LNG import capacity.

Most of the projected new U.S. LNG capacity is located

in the Gulf of Mexico because of the locale’s many

advantages. There is spare capacity in the existing pipeline infrastructure to move natural gas to market, and

deepwater ports are available to serve onshore facilities.

In addition, offshore pipeline systems are in place to

move natural gas to shore from offshore facilities. The

extensive pipeline grid provides a ready ability to blend

gases of varying heat content and thus, handle high-Btu

LNG. Finally, the local environment appears to be favorable for the permitting of new facilities. Imports into

new Gulf Coast terminals are expected to account for

more than 70 percent of imports into new U.S. LNG terminals in 2025.

Canada is the only North American country that currently produces more natural gas than it consumes, and

its domestic production is projected to continue to

exceed its consumption through 2025. Most of Canada’s

natural gas production currently comes from the Western Sedimentary Basin. Although conventional production in the basin is in steady decline, the decreases are

expected to be more than offset by increases in

unconventional production in western Canada, conventional production in the MacKenzie Delta and Eastern

Canada, and LNG imports. Supply is also expected to be

supplemented by natural gas from the MacKenzie Delta.

A pipeline to bring natural gas from the MacKenzie

Delta to market is expected to open in 2010. In spite of

these supply additions, pipeline imports from Canada

are expected to decline toward the end of the forecast

because of strong growth in Canada’s internal need for

natural gas.

In the IEO2005 reference case, Canada’s natural gas production is projected to grow at an average annual rate of

0.1 percent. Whereas in 2002, production exceeded consumption in Canada by 3.6 trillion cubic feet, excess production available for export to the United States is

expected to drop to 2.5 trillion cubic feet in 2015 and to

2.1 trillion cubic feet in 2025.

In Mexico, natural gas consumption is expected to far

outstrip production. Mexico’s demand for natural gas is

projected to grow at an average annual rate of 3.0 percent between 2002 and 2025, while production grows at

a rate of only 1.7 percent annually. Most of the growth in

consumption is expected to fuel electricity generation.

Although consumption in the residential and commercial sectors combined accounted for less than 3 percent

of the country’s total natural gas use in 2002, pipeline

infrastructure to serve residential and commercial users

is expected to continue growing, allowing their natural

gas consumption to increase tenfold from 2002 to 2025.

Mexico’s dependence on natural gas imports, like that of

the United States, is projected to increase. In the IEO2005

reference case, imports are expected to grow from 13

percent of Mexico’s total natural gas consumption in

2002 to 37 percent in 2025. The Mexican government is

attempting to attract foreign capital to help in developing the country’s own abundant resources and supporting production increases, but to date little increase has

been seen, and it appears that LNG will be the biggest

contributor to additional supply in the near term. In

addition to import facilities in Baja California, Mexico,

that will serve both Mexican and U.S. markets, an LNG

facility is under construction at Altamira on Mexico’s

Gulf Coast, and two facilities currently are under consideration on the Pacific Coast, primarily to serve the

Mexican market.

Western Europe

Natural gas is expected to be the fastest growing fuel

source in Western Europe, with demand projected to

grow at an annual average rate of 1.8 percent, from 15.0

trillion cubic feet in 2002 to 22.4 trillion cubic feet in 2025.

More than 60 percent of incremental gas consumption in

Western Europe between 2002 and 2025 is expected to be

used for electric power generation. Natural gas is the

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 41
fuel of choice for new electricity generation capacity in

Western Europe, where many nations are looking to

replace oil- and coal-fired plants that are more carbon

intensive than natural gas. In addition, natural gas is

expected to remain more cost competitive than renewable energy sources, and countries such as Germany and

Belgium have government policies that discourage the

expansion of nuclear power capacity and may result in

the retirement of existing nuclear power plants over the

forecast period.

Natural gas consumption for electricity generation in

Western Europe is projected to increase on average by

3.6 percent per year from 2002 to 2025, surpassing the

use of coal and renewables for electricity generation (on

a Btu basis) by 2015 and the use of nuclear power by

2025. The share of total electricity sector energy demand

met by natural gas is projected to increase from 14 percent in 2002 to 23 percent in 2015 and 28 percent in 2025.

With the notable exception of Norway, natural gas production is in decline in most areas of Western Europe.

In the mid-term future, production from Norway is

expected to stave off a decline in the region’s overall production; however, total natural gas production in Western Europe is still far from keeping pace with demand

(Figure 44). Western Europe received net imports of 4.9

trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 2002, accounting for

one-third of total gas consumption. The region’s reliance

on imported gas is projected to grow to more than 40

percent of demand in 2015 and more than 50 percent in

2025. Currently there are 10 LNG regasification terminals operating in Western Europe, and LNG receiving

capacity is being expanded aggressively. More than 20

new facilities have been proposed, including 4 that are

under construction. Egypt, a new addition to the list of

LNG suppliers to the world as well as to Europe, sent its

first-ever LNG cargo to Spain in March 2005.

Mature Market Asia

In Japan, natural gas shows the largest incremental

growth in demand among primary energy sources over

the forecast period. Japan’s natural gas consumption is

projected to increase at an average annual rate of 1.5 percent, from 2.7 trillion cubic feet in 2002 to 3.8 trillion

cubic feet in 2025. Natural gas use in the industrial sector

is projected to grow by 3.4 percent per year on average

from 2002 to 2025, and to claim an increasing share of the

country’s total gas consumption. Electricity generation

remains by far the largest use for natural gas in Japan,

however, despite an expected decline in its share of the

total, from 71 percent in 2002 to 67 percent in 2025.

In Australia and New Zealand, the industrial sector currently is the predominant user of natural gas, and it is

projected to account for more than one-half of all gas

consumption in Australia and New Zealand throughout

the forecast period. Natural gas is also the fastest growing fuel in the region’s electricity sector. Natural gas consumption as a percentage of total energy use in the

electric power sector is projected to grow from 11 percent in 2002 to nearly 13 percent in 2025, but this will

have only a modest impact on the electric power sector

fuel mix, which is dominated by coal. Even in 2025, coal

is expected to account for almost 73 percent of energy

consumption in Australia and New Zealand’s electric

power sector on a Btu basis.

Transitional Economies

In the EE/FSU countries, natural gas consumption in the

electric power sector is expected to surpass consumption in the industrial sector by 2010, and to account for 44

percent and 43 percent of total gas consumption in 2025

in the FSU and Eastern Europe, respectively. Total natural gas demand in the EE/FSU region is projected to

grow at an average annual rate of 2.2 percent from 2002

to 2025 (Figure 45). In both Eastern Europe and the FSU,

the electric power sector is expected to account for

nearly 60 percent of the total increment in natural gas

use over the forecast period.

The FSU, which holds around 30 percent of the world’s

natural gas reserves, is much more dependent on natural gas for its energy supply than is Eastern Europe (51

percent of total energy consumption in the FSU was supplied by natural gas in 2002, compared with 23 percent

in Eastern Europe). Natural gas production in the FSU is

projected to grow at an average annual rate of just over

2 percent from 2002 to 2025, and exports are projected

to increase to around one-quarter of total gas production

in 2025 from 19 percent in 2002. Despite the Russian

42 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

5

10

15

20

25

Trillion Cubic Feet

Production

Imports

Figure 44. Natural Gas Consumption in

Western Europe by Source, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
government’s recent dismantling of the oil giant Yukos,

foreign companies—especially Western European companies—have increasingly been pursuing investments

in Russia’s upstream gas sector. Gazprom, the majority

state-owned Russian gas company, currently has a spate

of suitors from which to choose its partners in the development of the giant Shtokmanovskoye field [3].

Emerging Asia

In China, natural gas is currently a minor fuel in the

overall energy mix, representing only 3 percent of total

primary energy consumption in 2002; however, China is

rapidly expanding infrastructure to facilitate the consumption of gas throughout the country as well as

imports of gas into the country. Overall natural gas consumption in China is projected to grow at an average

annual rate of 7.8 percent, from 1.2 trillion cubic feet in

2002 to 6.5 trillion cubic feet in 2025 (Figure 46). Only

nuclear power generation is projected to grow more rapidly, at a 9.9-percent average annual rate over the forecast period.

Natural gas consumption in China’s residential sector,

projected to more than double from 2002 to 2010,

received a boost with the start of commercial operation

of the West-East pipeline in December 2004. Most of the

early natural gas coming off the pipeline has been going

to residential consumers and the remainder to industrial

consumers [4]. The pipeline is far from full utilization,

because several natural-gas-fired electric power plants,

which ultimately are to be the main consumers of

West-East gas, are not yet complete and operational.

In the long term, the electric power sector is the main

source of projected growth in China’s natural gas

demand, accounting for fully two-thirds of the total

increment in China’s natural gas consumption from

2002 to 2025. In 2002, natural gas consumption in the

electric power sector was 0.2 trillion cubic feet, accounting for only 1 percent of the country’s total electricity

generation. In 2010, natural gas consumption in the electricity sector is projected to surpass consumption in the

industrial and residential sectors, and in 2025 it is projected to surpass their combined consumption, accounting for more than one-half of China’s total natural gas

use.

In India, as in China, natural gas is currently a minor fuel

in the overall energy mix, representing only 6.5 percent

of total primary energy consumption. Also like China,

India is rapidly expanding infrastructure to facilitate

consumption and imports of gas. Overall, India’s gas

consumption is projected to grow at an average annual

rate of 5.1 percent, from 0.9 trillion cubic feet in 2002 to

2.8 trillion cubic feet in 2025. The electric power sector is

projected to account for 71 percent of the total incremental growth in India’s natural gas demand from 2002 to

2025.

Total natural gas consumption in South Korea is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 3.7 percent

from 2002 to 2025. In 2002, the residential sector was the

country’s predominant consumer of natural gas,

accounting for 37 percent of the total, and the electric

power sector was a close second, accounting for 34 percent of total gas use. In the forecast, natural gas use in

South Korea’s industrial sector increases on average by

7.0 percent per year from 2002 to 2025, compared with

average annual growth of 1.7 percent in both the residential and electric power sectors. In 2015, more natural

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 43

1990 1995 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

10

20

30

40

50

Trillion Cubic Feet

Former Soviet Union

Eastern Europe

History Projections

Figure 45. Natural Gas Consumption in

Transitional Economies, 1990-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1990 1995 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

5

10

15

20

25

Trillion Cubic Feet

China

India

South Korea

Other Asia

History Projections

Figure 46. Natural Gas Consumption in

Emerging Asia, 1990-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
gas consumption is expected in the country’s industrial

sector than in its residential or electric power sector. In

2025, industrial natural gas use is projected to account

for more than 40 percent of all the natural gas consumed

in South Korea.

High world oil prices, beginning in 1999, provided the

impetus for the strong growth in gas use in South

Korea’s industrial sector, and it is partially at the

expense of oil consumption that natural gas is expected

to grow in this sector. On a Btu basis, the share of total

industrial consumption attributable to natural gas is

projected to grow from just 5 percent in 2002 to almost 16

percent in 2025, and the share attributable to oil is

expected to shrink from 58 percent in 2002 to just under

50 percent in 2025.

In the other countries of emerging Asia, total natural gas

consumption is projected to grow at an average annual

rate of 2.9 percent from 2002 to 2025. Natural gas consumption in 2002 and throughout the forecast period is

fairly evenly split between the industrial and electricity

sectors, with each accounting for more than 40 percent of

total gas consumption. Penetration of gas into the residential, commercial, and transportation sectors is projected to remain low with the three sectors combined

continuing to account for less than 10 percent of total gas

consumption in the other countries of emerging Asia

throughout the forecast period. Natural gas infrastructure across the region is fragmented, with limited infrastructure outside producing areas, and extensive

advances will be needed to meet growing demand in the

long term.

Middle East

Natural gas consumption in the Middle East is projected

to double between 2002 and 2025 (Figure 47). The overall

share of natural gas in the Middle East’s fuel consumption mix increases over the forecast period at the expense

of oil, although oil will remain the region’s predominant

fuel source. The share of total Middle East energy

demand met by natural gas is projected to increase from

39 percent in 2002 to 45 percent in 2025, while the share

of total energy demand met by oil is projected to decline

from 53 percent to 48 percent.

Natural gas is projected to retain its dominant position

in the Middle East’s power sector, with 1.9-percent average annual growth over the forecast period. In the industrial sector, however, natural gas use is projected to

grow by 4.0 percent per year, accounting for more than

two-thirds of the overall incremental growth in gas

demand in the region from 2002 to 2025. The natural gas

share of total energy consumed in the region’s industrial

sector is projected to grow from 46 percent in 2002 to 59

percent in 2025, and oil is expected to lose share in the

sector (from 41 percent of industrial energy consumption in 2002 to just under 30 percent in 2025).

Oil-exporting countries in the region have deliberately

sought to expand domestic gas use in order to make

more oil available for export. Many gas-rich countries in

the region are also developing projects to monetize their

natural gas resources, in particular through LNG and,

more recently, gas to liquids (GTL) projects (see box on

page 46). Qatar has secured several high-profile deals

that, when realized, will eventually boost its total LNG

exports to 77 million metric tons per year. One such deal

is for the construction of what will be the two largest liquefaction trains in the world, at 7.8 million metric tons

per year each.

Africa

Natural gas consumption in Africa is projected to grow

at an average annual rate of 4.0 percent from 2002 to 2025

(Figure 48), compared with average yearly growth rates

of 2.7 percent for oil and 1.6 percent for coal. Gas consumption is expected to surpass coal consumption by

2025, with oil remaining the dominant fuel throughout

the projection period. Incremental growth in Africa’s

gas demand from 2002 to 2025 is projected to be fairly

even across sectors, with the industrial, residential, and

electric sectors each accounting for around one-third of

total growth. Significant flaring of associated gas is still

common in Africa because of the remoteness of much of

the production and a lack of infrastructure to use all the

associated gas produced. Despite continuing instability

in some countries of the region, the investment climate

in Africa appears to be welcoming to foreigners, with

massive investments planned for Egypt, Libya, Algeria,

Nigeria, and other parts of West Africa.

44 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

1990 1995 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

5

10

15

20

Trillion Cubic Feet

History Projections

Figure 47. Natural Gas Consumption in the

Middle East, 1990-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
Central and South America

Natural gas is expected to be the fastest growing fuel

source in Central and South America, with demand projected to increase on average by 3.3 percent per year,

from 3.6 trillion cubic feet in 2002 to 7.5 trillion cubic feet

in 2025 (Figure 49). By 2010, natural gas is expected to

overtake oil as the second most prevalent fuel for electricity generation in the region, with renewables—particularly, hydropower—retaining their dominant share

in the sector throughout the forecast period.

The investment climate for natural gas production projects in Central and South America has been less than

ideal. Although Venezuela appears to be more welcoming to foreign investment in its natural gas sector than its

oil sector, negotiations, especially on the Mariscal Sucre

project, continue with no final decisions taken [5]. In

Bolivia, two successive presidents were forced to resign

by street protests over the handling of the nation’s natural gas resources. (Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozado resigned

in October 2003, and Carlos Mesa resigned in June 2005.)

Protestors have called for increased government

involvement in the natural gas sector, including possible

nationalization of the industry. On the other hand,

Brazil is proceeding with natural gas exploration and

hopes to become self-reliant in the gas sector in the

future. Major investments in the natural gas sector are

underway in Trinidad and Tobago and in Peru.

References

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 45

1990 1995 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

5

10

15

20

Trillion Cubic Feet

History Projections

Figure 48. Natural Gas Consumption in Africa,

1990-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1990 1995 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

5

10

15

20

Trillion Cubic Feet

History Projections

Figure 49. Natural Gas Consumption in Central

and South America, 1990-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1. “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” Oil

& Gas Journal, Vol. 102, No. 47 (December 20, 2004),

pp. 22-23.

2. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005 (London,

UK, June 2005), p. 20.

3. “Russia,” Cedigaz News Report, Vol. 44, No. 9 (March

4, 2005), p. 5.

4. FACTS Inc., “Natural Gas Pipelines and LNG Terminals in China: An Update,” Gas Insights, No. 46

(March 2005), p. 4.

5. World Markets Research Centre, “Venezuela:

Chevron Announces ‘Significant’ Gas Discovery

in Deltana Platform,” web site www.

worldmarketsanalysis.com (June 21, 2005).
46 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Gas to Liquids: A New Frontier for Natural Gas

The relatively high world crude oil prices of the past 3

years have drawn attention to the potential for developing previously uneconomical natural gas reserves,

such as associated gas (gas found jointly with oil in an

oil field) or stranded gas (gas that lies far from markets,

thus requiring major investments to commercialize).

Converting these resources to liquids—either to liquefied natural gas (LNG) or to petroleum liquid substitutes, such as diesel, naphtha, motor gasoline, or other

products (such as lubricants and waxes) by employing

“gas to liquids” (GTL) technology—could provide a

way to bring these gas resources to market. GTL has

recently become attractive as an option for monetizing

stranded gas and complementing traditional commercialization opportunities such as LNG or pipeline

transportation.

The economics of GTL continue to improve with

advances in technology and scale. Capital costs have

dropped significantly, from more than $100,000 per

barrel of total installed capacity for the original plants

to a range of $25,000 to $30,000 per barrel of capacity

today.a Moreover, Royal/Dutch Shell has commented

that it expects to be able to reduce the costs to below

$20,000 per barrel. By comparison, the costs associated

with conventional petroleum refining are around

$15,000 per barrel per stream day after several decades

of technology improvements. The high oil prices of

recent years, moreover, have made transportation

fuels produced through GTL technology more commercially viable. Few companies release the detailed

costs of their GTL conversion technologies, but according to ConocoPhillips, assuming that the cost of

natural gas is $1.00 per million Btu, GTL fuel is cost

competitive with diesel fuel at world oil prices above

$20 per barrel (see table below).

Among the different GTL products, the diesel fraction,

in particular, is highly valued in the downstream market because of its unique properties that meet environmental regulations aimed at tightening emissions

standards for light- and heavy-duty diesel vehicles.

The GTL fuel reduces emissions relative to conventional diesel, as it contains near-zero sulfur and

aromatics. GTL fuel also exhibits a high cetane number

that enhances engine combustion performance.b

Because they are compatible with existing vehicle

engines and fuel distribution infrastructures, GTL

fuels are the most cost-effective in reducing emissions

among the nonconventional fuels.

At present, worldwide there are at least 9 commercial

GTL projects at various stages of planning and development for the period 2009 to 2012 that could bring to

market an additional capacity of 580 thousand barrels

per day (see figure). More than 19 additional proposed

projects could double that capacity beyond 2012.c

(continued on page 47)

aPersonal correspondence with Sylvia Williams, Business Development Manager, Global GTL Development, Shell International Gas

Limited (May 3, 2005).

bACTED Consultants, “Gas to Liquids,” Chemicals Australia Web Site, http://www.chemlink.com.au/gtl.htm (1999).

c

FACTS Inc., Gas Databook I: Asia-Pacific Natural Gas & LNG (Honolulu, HI, 2005), p. 87.

Cost to Produce a Barrel of Diesel Fuel:

Grass Roots Gas to Liquids Plant vs. Refinery

(2002 Dollars per Barrel)

Cost Component GTL Refinery

Natural Gas

(at $1.00 per Million Btu). . . . $10.00

Crude Oil

(at $20 per Barrel) $20.00

Operating Costs . . . . . . . . . $ 4.00 $ 2.50

Capital Recovery, Taxes. . . $14.00 $ 6.50

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $28.00 $29.00

Source: M. Culligan, ConocoPhillips, Director of Business

Development-Qatar GTL Project, “GTL: New Technology for

a New Industry,” presentation at the Fifth Doha Gas Conference (March 1, 2005).

394

120

34 33 15

Qatar Iran Nigeria Algeria Malaysia

0

100

200

300

400

500 Thousand Barrels per Day

Current

Potential

Current and Potential Gas to Liquids Capacity,

2005-2012

Note: In addition, a 45,000-barrel-per-day GTL plant in

South Africa’s Mossel Bay has been switched temporarily

from processing coal to liquids to processing gas to liquids.

Sources: Interview with Abdullah Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah,

Qatar Minister of Energy and Industry, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC (May 9,

2005). Data from FACTS Inc., Gas Databook I (Honolulu, HI,

2005), p. 87; and “Algeria—Internatrional Tender for First

Gas-to-Liquids Project,” Cedigaz News Report, Vol. 44, No.

15 (April 15, 2005), p. 4.
Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 47

Gas to Liquids: A New Frontier for Natural Gas (Continued)

These projects are being initiated by companies operating in gas-rich countries such as Qatar, Iran, Russia,

Nigeria, Australia, and Algeria, where natural gas can

be developed at a cost of less than $1.00 per million

Btu.d Qatar’s North Field, with an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, and the adjoining South Pars field in Iran with an estimated 500

trillion cubic feet of reserves, are the cheapest natural

gas resources in the world.e For other countries, such as

Nigeria and Algeria, GTL complements their LNG

industries. GTL offers promise for use in Nigeria to

convert natural gas that would otherwise be flared.

Huge capital investments are required for GTL, however, and project financing and the availability of qualified contractors and operators may limit the growth of

GTL projects on a year-to-year basis.f

Six of the nine confirmed GTL projects are located in

the state of Qatar as joint ventures based on an integrated development and production sharing agreement (DPSA) with major international oil companies.

Foreign companies have favored this approach,

because it gives them an opportunity to book part of

the gas reserves on their balance sheet and support

their upstream and downstream activities.g By 2011,

Qatar is set to produce about 394,000 barrels of GTL

products per day, the equivalent of 68 percent of the

total confirmed new capacity.h A list of Qatar’s GTL

ventures is shown in the table below.

Unlike many other gas-producing countries, Qatar has

established a favorable climate in terms of transparent

business and investment policies. Foreign investors

have also been encouraged to invest in Qatar’s energy

sector because of its stable tax regulations, enforcement

of formal agreements, and the government’s willingness to protect foreign investors through its legislature.

In addition to the stable political climate, Qatar has

invested substantially to develop infrastructure and

services to support development of its natural gas

resources. The country also provides guarantees for

the safety of foreign employees and the potential for

future development through expansion of existing

facilities.i In the second quarter of 2005, Moody’s Investor Service upgraded Qatar’s rating for long-term foreign currency bonds and bank bonds from A3 to A1.j

Qatar has been able to reach agreements with a group

of financial institutions to fund their gas-related projects (which exceed $60 billion) and has developed a

master plan to expand its port and double the size of

Ras Laffan Industrial city from 39 square miles to 77

square miles, in order to accommodate 7 GTL projects,

16 LNG trains, 5 gas processing plants, 6 to 7 ethylene

plants, and a variety of other gas-related industries. By

2012, Qatar must produce nearly 25 billion cubic feet of

natural gas per day to support its commitments. Some

10.3 billion cubic feet per day will be needed to produce 77 millions metric tons of LNG per year; 4 billion

cubic feet per day for the 394,000 barrels per day of

GTL; about 5 billion cubic feet per day for petrochemical, local power, and industrial projects; and about

(continued on page 48)

dEnergy Information Administration, Model Documentation: Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Module, DOE/EIA-M062 (Washington, DC, May 2005), Appendix F-27.

e

FACTS Inc., “Iran’s Gas Industry and Export Projects,” Gas Insights, No. 45 (March 2005). f

M. Culligan, ConocoPhillips, Director of Business Development-Qatar GTL Project, “GTL: New Technology for a New Industry,” presentation at the Fifth Doha Gas Conference (March 1, 2005).

gWorld Markets Research Centre, “Shell Holds Back on FID for Qatar GTL,” web site www.worldmarketsanalysis.com (January 20,

2005).

hFACTS Inc., Gas Databook I (Honolulu, HI, 2005), p. 87. i

Keynote speech by Abdulla bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, Qatar Minister of Energy and Industry, at the Fifth Doha Gas Conference (February 28, 2005).

j

“Third Annual Finance, Investment in Qatar Set To Open in London,” Gulf Times (Qatar) (May 24, 2005).

GTL Joint Venture Projects in Qatar

(2002 Dollars per Barrel)

Project

Initial Capacity

(Barrels per Day) Start Date

Final Capacity

(Barrels per Day)

Oryx (QP/Sasol Chevron) . . . 34,000 2005 100,000

Pearl (Shell) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70,000 2009 140,000

ExxonMobil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154,000 2011 154,000

QP/Sasol Chevron . . . . . . . . 130,000 Delayed 130,000

Marathon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60,000 Delayed 120,000

ConocoPhillips . . . . . . . . . . . 80,000 Delayed 160,000

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528,000 804,000

Source: Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), March 2005.
48 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Gas to Liquids: A New Frontier for Natural Gas (Continued)

2 billion cubic feet per day for exports through the Dolphin pipeline. Over a 25-year period (the duration of a

long-term LNG or GTL contract), Qatar would need to

produce 225 trillion cubic feet, or one-fourth of its

North Field reserve.k Although the 900 trillion cubic

feet of natural gas reserves from the North Field should

be sufficient to support these projects on a sustainable

basis, the quality of the gas and cost of development

will vary from project to project. As a result, there

could be delays in some of the plans.

In the IEO2005 reference case, world demand for oil in

the transportation sector is projected to grow by 2.1

percent per year, from 41.7 million barrels per day in

2002 to 67.3 million barrels per day in 2025. Even if all

the proposed GTL projects worldwide materialized by

2025, assuming a 70-percent yield for diesel fuel from

the natural gas stock, the expected GTL diesel supply

of 1.2 million barrels per day in 2025 would represent

only a fraction of total world transportation sector

demand. Nevertheless, GTL diesel projects do provide

gas-producing companies with an opportunity to add

new value-added activities to their portfolios, as well

as providing governments with an effective approach

to meeting policy and environmental objectives.

k“Qatar Seeks New Math From North Field,” World Gas Intelligence (June 1, 2005), pp. 2-3.
Coal

Although coal use is expected to be displaced by natural gas in some parts of the world,

only a slight drop in its share of total energy consumption is projected by 2025.

Coal continues to dominate electricity and industrial sector fuel markets in emerging Asia.

In the International Energy Outlook 2005 (IEO2005) reference case, world coal consumption is projected to

increase from 5,262 million short tons5 in 2002 to 7,245

million tons in 2015, at an average rate of 2.5 percent per

year. From 2015 to 2025, the projected rate of increase in

world coal consumption slows to 1.3 percent annually,

and total consumption in 2025 is projected at 8,226 million tons (Figure 50). World GDP and primary energy

consumption also are projected to grow at a more rapid

pace during the first half than during the second half of

the forecast period, reflecting a gradual slowdown in

growth of the economies of emerging Asia, which currently are expanding at a rapid pace.

Coal consumption in 2002—primarily in the electric

power and industrial sectors—accounted for 24 percent

of total world energy consumption (Figure 51). Of the

coal produced worldwide, 65 percent was shipped to

electricity producers, 31 percent to industrial consumers, and most of the remaining 4 percent to coal consumers in the residential and commercial sectors. In the

industrial sector coal is an important input for the manufacture of steel and for the production of steam and

direct heat for other industrial applications. Coal plays a

limited role in the residential and commercial sectors,

and although it was once an important fuel for transportation, its use for transportation is now virtually

nonexistent.

Coal’s share of world energy consumption in the electricity and industrial sectors is projected to remain relatively stable in the IEO2005 forecast. As a consequence,

its share of total world energy consumption remains

near its 2002 share of 24 percent. In the electricity sector,

coal’s share of energy consumption is projected to

decline slightly, from 39 percent in 2002 to 38 percent in

2025. In the industrial sector, its share is projected to rise

from 20 percent in 2002 to 22 percent in 2015 and to

remain at that level through 2025.

To a large extent, the slight increase in the importance of

coal in the industrial sector results from the substantial

growth projected for industrial energy consumption in

China, which has abundant coal reserves, limited

reserves of oil and natural gas, and a dominant position

in world steel production. Coal is expected to remain the

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 49

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

2

4

6

8

10

Billion Short Tons

History Projections

Mature Market

Economies

Emerging

Economies Total

Transitional Economies

Figure 50. World Coal Consumption by Region,

1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

39

20

4

24

39

22

3

25

38

22

3

24

Electricity Industrial Other Sectors Total

0

20

40

60

80

100

Percent

2002 2015 2025

Figure 51. Coal Share of World Energy

Consumption by Sector,

2002, 2015, and 2025

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site

www.eia.doe.gov/ iea/. 2015 and 2025: EIA, System for the

Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).

5Throughout this chapter, tons refers to short tons (2,000 pounds).
fuel of choice in China’s rapidly expanding industrial

sector. In the IEO2005 reference case forecast, the coal

share of China’s industrial energy consumption

increases from 50 percent in 2002 to 55 percent in 2025. In

the rest of the world, coal’s share of industrial energy

consumption is projected to decline from 15 percent in

2002 to 13 percent in 2025.

International coal trade is projected to increase from 714

million tons in 2003 to 969 million tons in 2025, accounting for approximately 12 to 13 percent of total world coal

consumption over the period. Steam coal (including coal

for pulverized coal injection at blast furnaces) accounts

for most of the projected increase in world coal trade.

Details of recent changes in international coal markets

and an assessment of the long-term outlook for world

coal trade are provided at the end of this chapter.

Reserves

Total recoverable reserves of coal6 around the world are

estimated at 1,001 billion tons—enough to last approximately 190 years7 at current consumption levels (Figure

52). Historically, estimates of world recoverable coal

reserves, although relatively stable, have declined gradually from 1,167 billion tons at the beginning of 1990 to

1,083 billion tons in 2000 and 1,001 billion tons in 2003

[1]. The most recent assessment of world coal reserves

includes a substantial downward adjustment for Germany, from 73 billion tons of recoverable coal reserves to

7 billion tons. The reassessment primarily reflects more

restrictive criteria for the depth and thickness parameters associated with both underground and surface

minable seams of coal [2].

Although coal deposits are widely distributed, 57 percent of the world’s recoverable reserves are located in

three countries: the United States (27 percent), Russia (17

percent), and China (13 percent). Another six countries—India, Australia, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Yugoslavia—account for an additional 33

percent. In 2002, these nine countries, taken together,

accounted for 90 percent of the world’s estimated recoverable coal reserves and 78 percent of total world coal

production [3]. By rank, bituminous and anthracite coal

account for 53 percent of the world’s estimated recoverable coal reserves (on a tonnage basis), subbituminous

coal accounts for 30 percent, and lignite accounts for 17

percent.

Quality and geological characteristics of coal deposits

are important parameters for coal reserves. Coal is a heterogeneous source of energy, with quality (e.g.,

characteristics such as heat, sulfur, and ash content)

varying significantly from one region to the next and

even within an individual coal seam. At the top end of

the quality spectrum are premium-grade bituminous

coals that are used to manufacture coke for the

steelmaking process. Coking coals produced in the

United States have an estimated heat content of 27.4 million Btu per ton and a relatively low sulfur content of

approximately 0.8 percent by weight [4]. At the other

end of the spectrum are reserves of low-Btu lignite or

“brown coal.” On a Btu basis, lignite reserves show considerable variation. Estimates published by the International Energy Agency indicate that the average heat

content of lignite for major producing countries varies

from a low of 4.6 million Btu per ton in Greece to a high

of 12.3 million Btu per ton in Canada in 2002 [5].

A potential new entrant as a producer of lignite is Pakistan, where interest has been sparked by the identification of a huge lignite resource in the Tharparkar (Thar)

Desert in the 1990s. The Thar coalfield covers an area of

approximately 3,500 square miles and is estimated to

contain 193 billion tons of lignite resources [6]. Four

tracks of the Thar coalfield currently undergoing more

detailed assessment, comprising an area of about 138

square miles, are estimated to contain 3 billion tons of

recoverable coal reserves. This represents 89 percent of

Pakistan’s total recoverable reserves, as published by

the World Energy Council [7]. Analyses of Thar lignite

indicate a relatively high heat content, between 9.4 and

12.7 million Btu per ton [8]. The Pakistan government

currently is working with two international companies,

50 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

United States

Russia

China

India

Australia

South Africa

Ukraine

Kazakhstan

Yugoslavia

Other Countries

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Billion Short Tons

Bituminous

and Anthracite

Subbituminous

Lignite

World Total:

1,001 Billion Short Tons

Figure 52. World Recoverable Coal Reserves

Note: Data for the United States represent recoverable coal

estimates as of January 1, 2004. Data for other countries are

as of January 1, 2003.

Source: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2003, DOE/EIA-0219(2003) (Washington, DC,

June 2005), Table 8.2, web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/.

6Recoverable reserves are those quantities of coal which geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable certainty can

be extracted in the future under existing economic and operating conditions. 7Assuming that world coal consumption continues to increase at the same rate as is projected for the years 2015 through 2025 (1.3 percent

per year), current estimated world coal reserves would last for only about 90 years.
the Shenhua Group and AES Corporation, toward the

development of several minemouth power plants in the

Thar coalfield [9].

Regional Demand Forecasts

Mature Market Economies

Coal consumption in the mature market economies is

projected to rise at a relatively even pace over the forecast horizon, from 2,067 million tons in 2002 to 2,261 million tons in 2015 and 2,474 million tons in 2025 (Figure

53). Much of the 407-million-ton increase in coal consumption projected for the mature market economies

over the forecast period is the result of expected strong

growth in U.S. coal demand. While modest increases in

coal consumption are projected for Canada and Australia/New Zealand, coal consumption in Western Europe

is projected to decline by 114 million tons between 2002

and 2025. In Western Europe, natural gas and renewable

energy are projected to capture an increasing share of

the region’s total energy consumption, displacing both

coal and nuclear energy.

North America

Coal use in North America is dominated by U.S. consumption. In 2002, the United States consumed 1,066

million tons, accounting for 93 percent of the regional

total. U.S. consumption is projected to rise to 1,505 million tons in 2025. The United States has substantial coal

reserves and has come to rely heavily on coal for electricity generation, a trend that continues in the forecast.

Coal’s share of total U.S. electricity generation is projected to decline slightly from 52 percent in 2002 to 51

percent in 2015 and then return to 53 percent in 2025 [10].

To a large extent, the projections of increasing prices for

natural gas after 2010, combined with projections of relatively stable minemouth coal prices and slightly declining rates for domestic transportation of coal, are the key

factors helping coal compete as a fuel for U.S. power

generation. Increases in coal-fired generation are projected to result from both greater utilization of existing

U.S. coal-fired generating capacity and an additional

89,500 megawatts of new coal-fired capacity by 2025

(3,600 megawatts of older coal-fired capacity is projected to be retired). The average utilization rate of

coal-fired generating capacity is projected to rise from 70

percent in 2002 to 83 percent in 2025.

In Canada, coal’s share of total energy consumption is

projected to decline slightly over the forecast period,

from 13 percent in 2002 to 12 percent in 2025. In the near

term, the restart of four of Canada’s nuclear generating

units after 2002 is expected to restrain the need for coal

in eastern Canada. Between September 2003 and January 2004, three of the four units, representing 2,000

megawatts of generating capacity, were returned to service—Unit 4 at the Ontario Power Generation (OPG)

Pickering A plant and Units 3 and 4 at Bruce Power’s

Bruce A plant [11]. OPG’s 500-megawatt Unit 1 at the

Pickering A plant is scheduled to come back on line in

late 2005.

In 2004, coal-fired generation accounted for 17 percent of

Ontario’s electricity supply, down from 23 percent in

2003, and its share could decline further in the future

[12]. The Ontario government currently plans to shut

down all of the Province’s 7,560 megawatts of coal-fired

generating capacity by early 2009, although the government has indicated that the shutdowns will not occur

unless generation from alternative sources can be

secured [13]. The decision is based primarily on the

premise that the adverse health and environmental

impacts of the plants’ operation are unacceptable. In

western Canada, increasing demand for electricity is

expected to result in the need for additional coal-fired

generating capacity, primarily in Alberta.

Mexico consumed 14 million tons of coal in 2002. In 2025

it is projected to consume 25 million tons. Two coal-fired

generating plants, Rio Escondido (1,200 megawatts) and

Carbon II (1,400 megawatts), operated by the stateowned utility Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE),

consume approximately 10 million tons of coal annually,

most of which comes from domestic mines [14]. In addition, CFE has recently switched its six-unit, 2,100-

megawatt Petacalco plant, located on the Pacific coast,

from oil to coal. Petacalco’s estimated annual coal consumption is 6 million tons of imported coal, although

CFE has maintained the option to generate with fuel oil.

The utility plans to add an additional 700 megawatts of

coal-fired capacity at the Petacalco plant late in the

decade [15].

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 51

Mature Market

Economies

Transitional

Economies

China and

India

Other

Emerging

Economies

0

1

2

3

4

5

Billion Short Tons

1980 2002 2015 2025

Figure 53. World Coal Consumption by Region,

1980, 2002, 2015, and 2025

Sources: 1980 and 2002: Energy Information Administration

(EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219

(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.

gov/iea/. 2015 and 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of

Global Energy Markets (2005).
Western Europe

In Western Europe, environmental concerns play an

important role in the competition among coal, natural

gas, and nuclear power. Recently, other fuels—particularly, natural gas—have been gaining relative to coal in

the generation market. Coal consumption in Western

Europe has fallen by 36 percent since 1990, from 894 million tons to 573 million tons in 2002. The decline was

smaller on a Btu basis, at 30 percent, reflecting the fact

that much of it resulted from reduced consumption of

low-Btu lignite in Germany.

Over the forecast period, coal consumption in Western

Europe is projected to fall by an additional 20 percent

(on a tonnage basis), reflecting a slower rate of decline

than during the previous decade. Factors contributing to

further cutbacks in coal consumption include continued

penetration of natural gas for electricity generation,

growing use of renewable fuels in the region, continuing

pressure on member countries of the European Union to

reduce subsidies that support domestic production of

hard coal,8 and relatively slow growth in overall energy

consumption (0.5 percent per year). Despite a considerable drop in lignite consumption since 1990, this

low-rank fuel continues to be an important component

of the Western European coal market. In 2002, lignite

accounted for 50 percent of the region’s total coal consumption on a tonnage basis and 29 percent on a Btu

basis [16].

Coal consumption in Western Europe’s electric power

sector is projected to decline from 6.4 quadrillion Btu in

2002 to 5.4 quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 4.8 quadrillion

Btu in 2025. Germany is currently the leading coalconsuming country in Western Europe, a position it is

expected to maintain over the forecast period. Much of

the planned and recently completed work on coal-fired

generating capacity in Western Europe is related to

either the replacement or refurbishment of existing

capacity. Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and Greece all

are planning major projects to upgrade existing coalfired generating facilities over the next two decades.

Mature Market Asia

Mature market Asia consists of Australia, New Zealand,

and Japan. Australia is the world’s leading coal exporter,

and Japan is the world’s leading coal importer. In 2002,

Australian coal producers shipped 225 million tons of

coal to international consumers and consumed another

160 million tons (both hard coal and lignite) domestically, primarily for electricity generation. Coal-fired

power plants accounted for 78 percent of Australia’s

total electricity generation in 2002, a level that is projected to be maintained over the forecast horizon [17].

Overall coal use for Australia and New Zealand, taken

together, is projected to increase by 47 million tons (29

percent), from 162 million tons in 2002 to 209 million

tons in 2025. The most recent energy forecast released by

the Australian government (August 2004) indicates that

coal consumption in Australia will increase by 1.5 percent per year on a Btu basis from 2002 to 2020, which is

slightly higher than the projected rate of 1.4 percent for

Australia/New Zealand over the same period in the

IEO2005 reference case [18].

Japan, which is the seventh largest coal user globally

(following China, India, the United States, Russia, Germany, and South Africa), imports nearly all the coal it

consumes, much of it originating from Australia [19].

Currently, about 44 percent of the coal consumed in

Japan is used by the country’s steel industry (Japan is the

world’s second largest producer of both crude steel and

pig iron, behind China) [20]. Coal is also used heavily in

the Japanese power sector, and coal-fired plants generated 27 percent of the country’s electricity supply in 2002

[21]. During the years 2001 through 2004, 8,700 megawatts of new coal-fired generating capacity was brought

on line in Japan [22]. Additional coal-fired generating

capacity originally scheduled to come on line between

the end of 2004 and the end of 2008 has been postponed

to later dates [23]. In the IEO2005 forecast, increased use

of other fuels for electricity generation (including

natural gas, renewables, and nuclear), coupled with an

outlook for slow economic growth and a decline in population, results in a relatively flat outlook for Japanese

coal consumption.

Transitional Economies

Coal consumption in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EE/FSU) is

projected to rise over the forecast horizon from 771 million tons in 2002 to 850 million tons in 2015 and 874 million tons in 2025. In the EE/FSU countries, the process of

economic reform and the transition to market-oriented

economies from centrally planned economic systems

continue to advance. The dislocations associated with

institutional changes in the region have contributed substantially to declines in both production and consumption of coal. In 2002, coal consumption in the EE/FSU

region was 44 percent lower (on a tonnage basis) than in

1990. In the IEO2005 reference case, coal’s share of total

EE/FSU energy consumption is projected to decline

from 22 percent in 2002 to 17 percent in 2025 (Figure 54).

During this same period, natural gas’ share of total

energy consumption is projected to increase from 45 percent to 51 percent.

Substantial declines in economic output and energy

demand following the breakup of the Soviet Union in

1991 led to considerable declines in both overall energy

52 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

8Internationally, the term “hard coal” is used to describe anthracite and bituminous coal. In data published by the International Energy

Agency, coal of subbituminous rank is classified as hard coal for some countries and as brown coal (with lignite) for others.
consumption and coal consumption in the FSU. In 2002,

total energy consumption in the FSU was 18.5 quadrillion Btu, or 30 percent, below the level in 1990, and coal

consumption was down by 6.0 quadrillion Btu, or 45

percent. Reversing recent historical trends, coal consumption in Russia and the other FSU countries is projected to increase over the forecast period. Russia’s coal

consumption is projected to increase by 59 million tons

(26 percent) from 2002 to 2025, and consumption in other

FSU countries is projected to rise by 24 million tons (15

percent).

Of the 15 FSU countries, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan together account for virtually all the coal consumption and production in the region, and this is expected to

remain the case in the future [24]. The IEO2005 outlook

for Russia’s coal consumption is generally consistent

with the long-term energy policy set forth in the August

2003 document, Russia’s Energy Strategy for the Period up

to 2020 [25]. Although Russia’s long-term energy strategy favors a considerable amount of new nuclear generating capacity, fossil-fuel-fired plants are expected to

continue in their role as the primary source for electric

power generation through 2020. For new fossil-fired

generating capacity, Russia’s energy strategy promotes

the construction of advanced coal-fired generating

capacity in the coal-rich Siberian region (central Russia)

and recommends a focus on efficient natural-gas-fired

capacity for the western and far eastern areas of the

country. Coal consumption in other FSU countries is

projected to increase slightly, primarily as the result of

increased utilization of existing coal-fired generating

capacity in Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

In Eastern Europe, coal consumption is projected to

increase slightly over the forecast period, from 374 million tons in 2002 to 394 million tons in 2025. Poland is the

region’s largest producer and consumer of coal and the

second largest coal producer and consumer in all of

Europe, outranked only by Germany [26]. In 2002, coal

consumption in Poland totaled 149 million tons—40 percent of Eastern Europe’s total coal consumption for the

year. The most recent (January 2005) long-term energy

policy put forth by the Polish government indicates that

coal-fired generation should remain relatively constant,

with new natural-gas-fired capacity used to meet future

demand in the electricity sector [27]. Additional plans

for both new coal-fired capacity and the refurbishment

of existing capacity in other Eastern European countries,

including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech

Republic, Macedonia, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia, is a

strong indicator that coal will continue to be an important source of energy in the region [28].

Emerging Asia

Coal consumption in the emerging economies of Asia is

projected to more than double in the IEO2005 reference

case forecast, increasing from 2,118 million tons in 2002

to 3,715 million tons in 2015 and 4,435 million tons in

2025. The projected increase of 2,317 million tons from

2002 to 2025 represents 78 percent of the increase in

worldwide coal consumption over the period. With substantial growth in coal consumption in China (1,819 million tons) and India (315 million tons) over the forecast

period, emerging Asia’s share of total world coal consumption is projected to rise from 40 percent in 2002 to

51 percent in 2015 and 54 percent in 2025.

Despite the tremendous increases in coal consumption

projected for emerging Asia, coal’s share of total energy

consumption in the region is still projected to decline

slightly, from 47 percent in 2002 to 44 percent in 2025.

Much of the decline in coal’s share is attributed to

fast-paced growth projected for natural gas use in the

region.

As very large countries (in terms of both population and

landmass) with large domestic coal resources, China

and India account for 71 percent of the total increase in

coal use worldwide (on a Btu basis) over the forecast

period; however, coal’s share of energy use in China and

India, and in emerging Asia as a whole, still is projected

to decline. The large increases in coal consumption projected for China and India are based on an outlook for

strong economic growth (averaging 6.2 percent per year

in China and 5.5 percent per year in India from 2002 to

2025) and the expectation that much of the increased

demand for energy will be met by coal, particularly in

the industrial and electricity sectors.

In China’s electricity sector, coal use is projected to grow

by 3.3 percent a year, from 14.8 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 53

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

20

40

60

80

100

Percent

History Projections

Mature Market

Economies

Other Emerging Economies

Transitional

Economies

China

and India

Figure 54. Coal Share of Total Energy

Consumption by Region, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
31.2 quadrillion Btu in 2025 (Figure 55). In comparison,

coal consumption by electricity generators in the United

States is projected to rise by 1.6 percent annually, from

19.8 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 28.6 quadrillion Btu in

2025. One of the key implications of the substantial rise

in coal use for electricity generation in China is that large

financial investments in new coal-fired power plants

and in the associated transmission and distribution systems will be needed. The projected growth in electricity

sector coal demand for China would result in the need

for 229,000 megawatts of additional coal-fired capacity

(net of retirements) by 2025 [29]. At the end of 2002,

China had an estimated 204,000 megawatts of coal-fired

generating capacity.

In 2002, 47 percent of China’s coal use was in the nonelectricity sectors, primarily in the industrial sector.

Over the forecast period, coal demand in China’s

non-electricity sectors is expected to increase by 19.4

quadrillion Btu (148 percent), raising the non-electricity

share of total coal demand to 51 percent in 2025. Coal

remains the primary source of energy in China’s industrial sector, primarily because China has limited

reserves of oil and natural gas. In 2002, China was the

world’s leading producer of both steel and pig iron [30].

With a substantial portion of the increase in China’s

demand for both oil and natural gas projected to be met

by imports, the Chinese government is actively promoting the development of a large coal-to-liquids industry.

Initial production of coal-based synthetic liquids in

China is scheduled to commence in mid-2007 with the

completion of the country’s first coal-to-liquids plant.

The plant, located in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous

Region, is being built by the Shenhua Coal Liquefaction

Corporation. Following the completion of a second production phase at the same site in 2010, the facility will be

capable of converting approximately 17 million tons of

coal to 37 million barrels of petroleum products annually (approximately 100,000 barrels per day) [31]. The

Shenhua Coal Liquefaction Corporation plans to expand

production of coal-based synthetic liquids to about 220

million barrels per year (approximately 600,000 barrels

per day) in 2020, requiring an estimated 80 to100 million

tons of coal per year as an input [32].

In India, slightly less than 60 percent of the projected

growth in coal consumption is attributable to increased

demand for coal in the electricity sector, and the industrial sector accounts for most of the remaining increase.

In 2002, electricity generation accounted for 67 percent

of India’s total coal use. The use of coal for electricity

generation in India is projected to rise by 2.2 percent per

year, from 5.1 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 8.5 quadrillion

Btu in 2025, requiring an additional 59,000 megawatts of

coal-fired capacity (net of retirements) [33]. At the end of

2002, India had an estimated 66,000 megawatts of coalfired generating capacity. Currently, the government is

targeting the construction of approximately 40,000

megawatts of new coal-fired generating capacity for the

country over the 10-year period ending March 2012 [34].

In the other areas of emerging Asia, a considerably

smaller rise in coal consumption is projected over the

forecast period, based on expectations for growth in

coal-fired electricity generation in South Korea, Taiwan,

and the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (primarily Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam). In the electricity

sector, coal use in the other emerging countries of Asia

(including South Korea) is projected to increase by 2.6

percent per year, from 2.9 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 5.2

quadrillion Btu in 2025.

The key motivation for increasing use of coal in

other emerging Asia is to maintain a diversity of fuel

supply for electricity generation. This objective is shared

even in countries that have abundant reserves of natural

gas, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the IEO2005 forecast, coal’s share of fuel consumption for electricity generation in the region

(including South Korea) is projected to increase from 27

percent in 2002 to 30 percent in 2015, then decline to 26

percent in 2025 as consumption of natural gas for electricity generation increases.

Middle East

In 2002, Middle Eastern countries consumed 84 million

tons of coal, with Turkey accounting for more than 86

percent of the total. Most of the coal consumed in Turkey

is locally produced, low-Btu lignite [35]. Israel accounts

for most of the region’s remaining coal consumption.

54 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

15

11

2

27 28

24

2

53

31 31

2

64

Electricity Industrial Other Sectors Total

0

20

40

60

80

Quadrillion Btu

2002 2015 2025

Figure 55. Coal Consumption in China by Sector,

2002, 2015, and 2025

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.

doe.gov/iea/. 2015 and 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of

Global Energy Markets (2005).
Over the forecast period, coal consumption in the Middle East is projected to increase by 32 million tons.

Much of the increased use of coal projected for the Middle East is for electricity generation. In Turkey, the completion of two new coal-fired power plants in 2003 and

2005 is projected to add an additional 23 million tons to

the country’s annual coal consumption. The projects

consist of a 1,300-megawatt hard-coal-fired plant being

built on the southern coast of Turkey near Iskenderun, to

be fueled by imported coal, and a 1,440-megawatt lignite-fired plant (Afsin-Elbistan B plant) being built in the

lignite-rich Afsin-Elbistan region in southern Turkey

[36]. Because of the extremely low heat content of the

indigenous lignite feedstock for the Afsin-Elbistan B

plant—approximately 4.0 million Btu per ton—annual

fuel requirements are estimated to be 19 million tons

[37]. In Israel, state-owned Israel Electric Corporation

plans to bring an additional 1,100 megawatts of coalfired generating capacity on line at Ashkelon in 2012,

near the site of its 2,250-megawatt Rutenberg coal plant

[38].

Africa

Africa’s coal consumption is projected to increase by 81

million tons between 2002 and 2025, primarily to meet

demand for electricity, which is projected to increase at a

rate of 3.7 percent per year. South Africa currently

accounts for 92 percent of the coal consumed in the continent and is expected to continue to account for much of

the increase in Africa’s total coal consumption over the

forecast period. Additional growth in coal consumption

is likely to occur in some of the other countries of southern Africa that also are well endowed with indigenous

coal resources.

In South Africa, increasing demand for electricity in

recent years has led to the decision by Eskom, the country’s state-owned electricity supplier, to restart three

large coal-fired plants (Camden, Grootvlei, and Komati)

that have been closed for more than a decade [39]. The

first of the three plants is to scheduled to come back on

line in 2005, and the remaining plants are scheduled for

restart in 2008. The plants have a combined generating

capacity of 3,800 megawatts [40]. Projections of power

shortages for southern Africa in the latter half of this

decade have led to increased interest in new coal-fired

power projects not only in South Africa but also in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Swaziland, and Botswana [41].

Central and South America

Historically, coal has not been a major source of energy

in Central and South America. In 2002, coal accounted

for about 4 percent of the region’s total energy consumption, and in past years its share has never exceeded 5 percent. In the electricity sector, hydroelectric power has

met much of the region’s electricity demand, and new

power plants are now being built to use natural gas

produced in the region. Over the forecast period, a combination of fuels—natural gas, oil, and renewable energy

(including hydropower and other renewables)—is

expected to fuel most of the region’s projected increase

in electricity generation. In the IEO2005 reference case,

coal is projected to maintain a 4-percent share of Central

and South America’s total primary energy consumption.

Brazil, with the world’s eighth largest steel industry in

2002, accounted for more than 62 percent of the region’s

coal demand (on a tonnage basis); Colombia, Chile,

Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela accounted for much of

the remainder [42]. In the forecast, Brazil accounts for

most of the growth in coal consumption projected for the

region, with increased use of coal expected for both

steelmaking and electricity production. Brazil’s steel

companies currently plan to expand production capacity by a substantial amount over the next few years to

meet increasing domestic and international demand for

steel [43]. Brazil’s three southernmost States, Rio Grande

do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Parana, which contain most

of the country’s coal reserves, are actively promoting the

construction of several new coal-fired power plants [44].

The new coal projects being promoted by the government of Rio Grande do Sul represent a key component of

its plan to become self-sufficient in electricity supply.

Trade

Overview

Compared with world coal consumption, the amount of

coal traded in international markets is relatively small.

In 2003, world imports of coal amounted to 714 million

tons (Figure 56 and Table 9), representing 13 percent of

total world consumption. In 2025, coal imports worldwide are projected to total 969 million tons, or 12 percent

of world coal consumption.

The world coal market consists of essentially two distinct markets—a steam coal market and a coking coal

market. The international steam coal market consists

largely of (1) demand for coal for electricity generation,

(2) demand for coal to produce steam and direct heat for

industrial applications, and (3) demand for coal to be

used in blast furnaces for steelmaking. The international

market for coking coal consists solely of demand for coal

coke as a fuel and reducing agent for smelting iron ore in

blast furnaces.

Growth in international coal trade in recent years has

resulted primarily from increased demand for steam

coal for electricity generation, particularly in Asia. In

contrast, the world market for coking coal has been relatively stable, as Asian steel producers have increased

their imports and Europe and the Americas have

decreased imports. Most recently, increased imports of

coking coal by China in 2003 and 2004 have contributed

to the upward trend for coking coal imports to Asia.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 55
Two factors that have contributed to the relatively flat

trend in world coking coal imports are continuing

increases in steel production from electric arc furnaces

(which do not use coal coke as an input), primarily in

Europe and North America; and technological improvements at blast furnaces, including greater use of pulverized coal injection and higher average injection rates per

ton of hot metal produced [45].

In the IEO2005 forecast, world steam coal trade is projected to increase by 1.5 percent per year, from 504 million tons in 2003 to 693 million tons in 2025. Increased

exports to Asia, primarily to fuel new coal-fired generating capacity, account for most of the projected expansion

in the world steam coal market. World coking coal trade

is projected to increase by 1.3 percent per year, from 210

million tons in 2003 to 276 million tons in 2025. Increased

imports of coking coal are projected for China, South

Korea, Taiwan, India, and Brazil, where expansions in

blast-furnace-based steel production are expected.

Asia

Based primarily on strong growth in electricity demand,

Asia’s demand for imported coal remains poised for

additional increases over the forecast period (Figure 57).

In the IEO2005 forecast, South Korea, Taiwan, India,

China, and Malaysia are projected to account for most of

the projected growth in coal imports to Asia.

Although Japan’s share of total world coal trade has

been declining, it continues to be the world’s leading

importer of coal and is projected to account for 19 percent of total world imports in 2025, less than its 2003

share of 25 percent [46]. In 2003, Japan relied almost

entirely on imported coal for domestic consumption,

purchasing 182 million tons of coal from foreign suppliers. In IEO2005, expectations of slow economic growth

(1.7 percent per year from 2002 to 2025) and a shift to a

less energy-intensive economy lead to relatively small

changes in Japan’s total energy consumption (average

annual growth of 0.5 percent) and virtually no change in

coal consumption. As a result, Japan’s coal imports are

projected to remain near the 2003 level throughout the

forecast. Japan’s share of total Asian coal imports, which

declined from 85 percent in 1980 to 46 percent in 2003

primarily as a result of increases in coal imports by

South Korea, Taiwan, and India, is projected to continue

falling to 29 percent in 2025.

South Korea, currently the second leading importer of

coal worldwide, is expected to maintain that position

over the forecast period. Coal imports to South Korea

are projected to increase from 77 million tons in 2003 to

143 million tons in 2025. As a result, South Korea’s share

of Asian coal imports is projected to rise from 19 percent

in 2003 to 22 percent in 2025. From 2004 through 2010,

South Korean electricity generators plan to add more

than 8,000 megawatts of new coal-fired generating

capacity [47].

China and India, which import relatively small quantities of coal at present, are expected to account for much

of the remaining increase in coal imports projected for

Asia. From 2003 to 2025, coal imports by China and

India, taken together, are projected to increase by 109

million tons. Increased imports of coking coal account

for approximately half of the overall increase in coal

imports projected for China and India, which is unlike

the outlook for other Asian countries, where fuel

requirements for new coal-fired power plants are the

key source of coal demand. Imports by China and India

have the potential to be even higher than projected, but

it is assumed in the forecast that domestic coal will be

given first priority in meeting the large projected

increase (2.1 billion tons) in coal consumption in the two

countries.

Elsewhere in Asia, recent and planned additions of

coal-fired capacity have increased and will continue to

add to coal import demand in the region. In both Malaysia and Taiwan, coal imports are projected to rise substantially over the forecast period to fuel new coal-fired

power plants. Diversification of fuel supply for electricity generation is the key factor underlying Malaysia’s

plans for additional coal-fired generating capacity [48].

Taiwan Power cites cost advantages over natural-gasand oil-fired plants as the key factor underlying its plans

for new coal plants [49]. In Thailand, the 1,434-megawatt

56 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Coking Steam Total

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

Million Short Tons

1985 2003 2015 2025

Figure 56. World Coal Trade, 1985, 2003, 2015,

and 2025

Sources: 1985: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

Annual Prospects for World Coal Trade 1987, DOE/EIA0363(87) (Washington, DC, May 1987). 2003: SSY Consultancy and Research, Ltd., SSY's Coal Trade Forecast, Vol. 14,

No. 2 (London, UK, May 2005); and Energy Information Administration, Quarterly Coal Report, October-December 2003,

DOE/EIA-0121(2003/4Q) (Washington, DC, March 2004).

2015 and 2025: Energy Information Administration, National

Energy Modeling System run IEO2005.D060605B.
Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 57

Table 9. World Coal Flows by Importing and Exporting Regions, Reference Case, 2003, 2015, and 2025

(Million Short Tons)

Exporters

Importers

Steam Coking Total

Europea Asia Americas Totalb Europea Asiac Americas Totalb Europea Asia Americas Totalb

2003

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5 96.1 6.8 115.8 29.0 85.1 8.1 122.3 41.5 181.3 14.9 238.1

United States. . . . . . . . 3.0 0.2 18.5 21.8 14.0 0.0 7.2 21.2 17.0 0.3 25.7 43.0

South Africa. . . . . . . . . 70.2 5.5 0.4 77.2 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.6 71.2 5.5 1.0 78.7

Former Soviet Union . . 24.2 9.5 0.0 33.8 2.7 4.5 0.0 7.2 26.9 14.0 0.0 41.0

Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.1 0.0 0.0 15.1 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 16.4 0.0 0.0 16.4

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.9 0.7 1.5 8.1 13.9 4.1 26.2 8.1 14.7 4.7 27.7

China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 81.2 1.1 89.0 0.1 12.6 1.8 14.4 6.3 93.8 2.8 103.4

South Americad . . . . . . 32.5 0.0 25.2 57.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.5 0.0 25.2 57.8

Indonesiae . . . . . . . . . . 16.9 70.6 2.9 91.8 0.1 15.8 0.1 16.0 17.0 86.4 3.0 107.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180.7 263.9 55.6 503.7 56.3 131.9 21.8 210.1 237.0 395.9 77.4 713.9

2015

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 137.3 0.8 140.7 28.6 121.9 11.9 162.4 31.1 259.2 12.7 303.1

United States. . . . . . . . 5.9 1.1 4.0 11.0 8.9 0.8 6.5 16.2 14.7 1.8 10.5 27.1

South Africa. . . . . . . . . 56.0 28.8 4.0 88.7 0.9 0.0 0.8 1.7 56.8 28.8 4.8 90.4

Former Soviet Union . . 41.5 23.6 0.0 65.1 3.1 9.4 0.0 12.5 44.6 33.0 0.0 77.5

Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 0.0 0.5 6.7 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 7.3 0.0 0.5 7.8

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 8.6 15.3 12.7 36.6 10.2 15.3 12.7 38.1

China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 90.4 0.0 90.4 0.0 6.8 0.0 6.8 0.0 97.2 0.0 97.2

South Americad . . . . . . 53.8 0.0 47.4 101.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 53.8 0.0 47.4 101.2

Indonesiae . . . . . . . . . . 13.3 108.3 4.5 126.1 0.0 14.3 0.0 14.3 13.3 122.7 4.5 140.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180.7 389.5 61.3 631.5 51.1 168.4 31.9 251.5 231.8 558.0 93.2 883.0

2025

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 164.7 0.8 165.5 29.4 141.1 15.1 185.6 29.4 305.8 15.9 351.2

United States. . . . . . . . 0.0 1.0 4.1 5.1 6.9 0.0 7.7 14.6 6.9 1.0 11.8 19.7

South Africa. . . . . . . . . 48.0 40.1 4.2 92.3 0.2 0.0 0.9 1.1 48.2 40.1 5.1 93.4

Former Soviet Union . . 42.0 26.5 0.0 68.5 4.2 9.9 0.0 14.1 46.2 36.4 0.0 82.6

Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 18.5 10.8 38.8 9.5 18.5 10.8 38.8

China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 93.7 0.0 93.7 0.0 7.4 0.0 7.4 0.0 101.1 0.0 101.1

South Americad . . . . . . 69.4 0.0 56.6 126.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 69.4 0.0 56.6 126.0

Indonesiae . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 124.8 6.3 137.3 0.0 14.3 0.0 14.3 6.3 139.1 6.3 151.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170.1 450.7 72.0 692.8 50.8 191.2 34.4 276.5 220.9 641.9 106.5 969.2

aCoal flows to Europe include shipments to the Middle East and Africa. In 2003, coal imports to the Middle East and Africa totaled 40.2 million tons.

bIn 2003, total world coal flows include a balancing item used to reconcile discrepancies between reported exports and imports. The 2003

balancing items by coal type were 3.5 million tons (steam coal), 0.1 million tons (coking coal), and 3.6 million tons (total). cIncludes 14.3 million tons of coal for pulverized coal injection at blast furnaces shipped to Japanese steelmakers in 2003.

dCoal exports from South America are projected to originate from mines in Colombia and Venezuela.

eIn 2003, coal exports from Indonesia include shipments from other countries not modeled for the forecast period. The 2003

non-Indonesian exports by coal type were 8.4 million tons (steam coal), 1.7 million tons (coking coal), and 10.0 million tons (total).

Notes: Data exclude non-seaborne shipments of coal to Europe and Asia. Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent

rounding. The sum of the columns may not equal the total, because the total includes a balancing item between importers’ and exporters’

data.

Sources: 2003: SSY Consultancy and Research, Ltd., SSY's Coal Trade Forecast, Vol. 14, No. 2 (London, UK, May 2005); and Energy

Information Administration, Quarterly Coal Report, October-December 2003, DOE/EIA-0121(2003/4Q) (Washington, DC, March 2004).

2015 and 2025: Energy Information Administration, National Energy Modeling System run IEO2005.D060605B.
Map Ta Phut plant is scheduled to be fully operational in

early 2007 [50].

During the 1980s, Australia became the leading coal

exporter in the world, primarily by meeting increased

demand for steam coal in Asia. Exports of Australian

coking coal also increased, as countries such as Japan

began using some of Australia’s semi-soft or weak coking coals9 in their coke oven blends. As a result, imports

of hard coking coals from other countries, including the

United States, were displaced. Australia’s share of total

world coal trade, which increased from 17 percent in

1980 [51] to 33 percent in 2003, is projected to remain relatively steady over the forecast period, accounting for 36

percent of total trade in 2025. Australia is expected to

continue as the major exporter to Asia, with its share of

the region’s total coal import demand projected to

increase from 46 percent in 2003 to 48 percent in 2025

(Table 9).

Two other major suppliers of coal to Asian markets are

China and Indonesia. In 2003, China exported 94 million

tons of coal to other Asian countries, representing 24

percent of total Asian coal imports, and Indonesian producers exported 78 million tons to Asia, or 20 percent of

the region’s total imports for the year. Over the forecast

period, increasing domestic demand for coal in both

China and Indonesia is projected to limit growth in their

coal exports.

The United States, once a major supplier of coal to Asia,

is currently only a minor participant in the Asian market. The U.S. share of Asia’s coal imports declined from

28 percent in 1980 to less than 0.1 percent in 2003 [52]. In

2004, however, limited supplies of coking coal in the

international market and a weaker U.S. dollar led to

renewed interest in Appalachian coking coal. U.S. coking coal exports to Asia, which declined from a peak of

more than 24 million tons in 1982 to virtually nothing in

2002 and 2003, were more than 5 million tons in 2004

[53]. U.S. steam coal exports to Asia increased from 0.2

million tons in 2003 to 2.3 million tons in 2004.

Europe, Middle East, and Africa

Coal imports to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa,

taken as a whole, are projected to increase from 237 million tons in 2003 to 239 million tons in 2010 and then

decline to 221 million tons in 2025 (Figure 57 and Table

9). In the IEO2005 forecast, projected declines in overall

imports to the countries of Western Europe are partly

offset by increases projected for Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Israel.

In Western Europe, environmental pressures and competition from natural gas are expected gradually to

reduce the reliance on steam coal for electricity

generation, and further improvements in the

steelmaking process are expected to continue to reduce

the amount of coal required for steel production. Strict

environmental standards are expected to result in the

closure of some of Western Europe’s older coke plants

and to make it difficult to get approvals for plants, thus

increasing import requirements for coal coke but reducing imports of coking coal. Projected reductions in

domestic coal production in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and France are not expected to be replaced

by equivalent volumes of coal imports. Rather,

increased use of natural gas and renewable energy is

expected to replace much of the reduction in domestic

energy supply projected to result from continuing

declines in the region’s indigenous coal production.

In 2003, the leading suppliers of imported coal to the

countries of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa were

South Africa (30 percent), Australia (18 percent), South

America (14 percent), and the former Soviet Union (11

percent). Over the forecast period, low-cost coal from

South America (primarily from Colombia and Venezuela) is projected to meet an increasing share of European coal import demand, displacing some coal from

such higher cost suppliers as the United States and

Poland.

58 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

1995 2003 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

Million Short Tons

History Projections

Europe, Middle East, and Africa

Asia

Total

Americas

Figure 57. Coal Imports by Major Importing

Region, 1995-2025

Sources: History: SSY Consultancy and Research, Ltd.,

SSY's Coal Trade Forecast, Vol. 14, No. 2 (London, UK, May

2005); International Energy Agency, Coal Information 2001

(Paris, France, September 2001), and previous issues; and

Energy Information Administration, Quarterly Coal Report,

October-December 2003, DOE/EIA-0121(2003/4Q) (Washington, DC, March 2004), and previous issues. Projections:

Energy Information Administration, National Energy Modeling

System run IEO2005.D060605B.

9Semi-soft or weak coking coal is blended with hard coking coal before being charged into the coke oven to produce coke. Semi-soft coal

needs to be blended because, used alone, it does not produce coke with sufficient strength. Coal coke is used primarily to smelt iron ore in

blast furnaces, acting as a source of heat and as a chemical reducing agent for the production of pig iron.
Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 59

Recent Developments in World Coal Trade

The years 2003 and 2004 saw two solid back-to-back

increases in international coal shipments. In 2003,

world coal trade rose to 714 million tons, an increase of

9 percent from 2002. Preliminary data for 2004 indicate

that world coal trade reached approximately 760 million tons, for an additional increase of 6 percent over

2003.a Gains in coal shipments to each of the three

major coal import demand regions discussed in

this chapter contributed to the 100-million-ton-plus

increase in world coal trade for the 2-year period.

In addition to the substantial increases in international

coal trade in 2003 and 2004, other notable developments for the period were sharp upward movements in

both ocean freight rates and coal export prices. During

2003, ocean freight rates for coal rose to near all-time

record highs. Much of the increase was attributable to

substantial growth in imports of iron ore by Chinese

steel producers, which in turn created a shortage of

ocean vessels for transporting other dry bulk products,

including coal.b China imported 163 million tons of

iron ore in 2003, an increase of 33 percent from 2002.c

According to Global Insight, Inc., substantial amounts

of new shipping capacity projected to come on line by

the end of 2007 should help to alleviate the current

capacity shortage, which in turn should lead to some

reductions in freight rates.d Global Insight estimates

that between the beginning of 2004 and the end of 2007

annual dry-bulk-shipping capacity will expand by

approximately 550 million tons, while demand for

annual dry-bulk-shipping will increase by only 309

million tons.

While freight rates for coal retreated some from the historic highs reached in early 2004, coal export prices

(both steam and coking) began increasing in late 2003

and continued to rise throughout 2004. Limited supply

of export coal is the primary explanation given for the

substantial rise in coal export prices. Some of the factors that restrained export supply during the year

included (1) substantial shipping delays at Australian

coal ports, as expansions in port infrastructure have

not kept pace with the recent surge in China’s demand

for iron ore and coking coal; (2) reduced exports of

steam coal out of South Africa, mostly due to

rail-related shipping delays; and (3) reduced exports

and increased imports of coking coal by China. Relative to 2003, China imported an additional 4 million

tons of coking coal in 2004 and exported 8 million tons

less. Other factors affecting coal export prices in 2003

and 2004 were the effects of higher freight rates on

international coal markets, increasing concentration in

the ownership of coal export supply, and increasing

importance of coal-on-gas competition in international

power supply.e

Taken together, higher freight rates and coal export

prices led to considerably higher prices for imports of

steam and coking coal. Quarterly data on average

steam coal prices, published by the International

Energy Agency, indicate that the average price of coal

imported to the European Union in the fourth quarter

of 2004 (nominal dollars per ton) was up by 92 percent

from the fourth quarter of 2002,f and the average price

of steam coal imported to Japan was up by 67 percent.

For coking coal, the prices of imported coal to the European Union and Japan in the fourth quarter of 2004

were 60 and 54 percent higher, respectively, than in the

fourth quarter of 2002. In late 2004, annual negotiations

between Japanese steel mills and Australian coking

coal producers established a new benchmark price for

Japan’s current fiscal year (ending on March 31, 2006)

at $113.40 per ton free-on-board (f.o.b.) port of exit,

which was more than double the benchmark price of

$51.70 per ton for the previous year.g

To date, higher coal prices do not appear to have had a

significant effect on the demand for coal in international markets. In the electric power sector, the price of

natural gas, coal’s key competitor in this sector, has

also been high. In the industrial sector, steel producers

have seen increasing profits despite higher prices for

coking coal and iron ore, as strong worldwide demand

for steel has led to considerably higher prices for their

products. As indicated, coal freight rates are expected

to retreat some from recent high levels as new shipping

capacity comes on line over the next few years. In turn,

(continued on page 60)

aSSY Consultancy and Research Ltd., SSY’s Coal Trade Forecast, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 2005); and Energy Information Administration,

Quarterly Coal Report, October-December 2004, DOE/EIA-0121(2004/4Q) (Washington, DC, March 2005), Tables 10, 12, and 14. b“Ocean Freight Rates Continue To Soar, Little Relief in Sight,” Coal Americas, Energy Publishing LLC, No. 29 (November 3, 2003), p. 1. c

“Steel/Iron Ore: Iron Ore Exports, Iron Ore Imports and Steel Production,” Monthly Shipping Review SSY (April 21, 2005), p. 7. dGlobal Insight, Inc., Global Coal Trade and Price Report (2004) (Lexington, MA, December 2004), pp. xviii-xxii. e

“Worsening Australian Coal Port Congestion,” Monthly Shipping Review SSY (April 21, 2005), p. 4; and “Supply Dynamics on the

Move,” Petroleum Economist (October 6, 2004). f

International Energy Agency, Databases for Energy Prices and Taxes, 2nd Quarter 2005, web site http://data.iea.org.

gT. Grant-Taylor, “Coal Prices Steaming Ahead,” The Courier Mail (February 7, 2005), p. 18; and S. Wyatt, “Coup for Coking Coal

Exports,” Australian Financial Review (December 13, 2004), p. 17.
Despite South America’s current foothold and expected

gains in Europe, South Africa is projected to maintain its

position as the leading supplier of coal to Europe

throughout much of the forecast period. Currently,

plans call for a 15-million-ton expansion of South

Africa’s Richards Bay Coal Terminal by the end of 2007,

increasing the facility’s annual throughput capacity to

95 million tons [54].

The Americas

Compared with European and Asian coal markets,

imports of coal to North and South America are relatively small, totaling 77 million tons in 2003 (Table 9).

Coal imports to the United States accounted for 32 percent of the 2003 regional total, followed by Canada at 30

percent and Brazil at 20 percent [55]. Most of the imports

to Brazil were coking coal, and a majority of the remaining import tonnage was steam coal used for pulverized

coal injection at steel mills [56].

Over the IEO2005 forecast period, coal imports to the

Americas are projected to increase by 29 million tons,

with most of the additional tonnage going to the United

States and Brazil. Coal imports to the United States are

projected to increase from 25 million tons in 2003 to 46

million tons in 2025 [57]. This outlook is based on the

capability and plans of existing coal-fired generating

plants to import coal (primarily plants located on the

eastern seaboard and in the southeastern part of the

country) and announced plans to expand coal import

infrastructure [58]. In Brazil, the country’s expanding

steel industry is projected to require increasing quantities of imported coal.

Partially offsetting the projected growth in coal imports

elsewhere in the Americas, Canadian imports are

expected to decline substantially over the next few years

as the Ontario government moves ahead with the shutdown of the Province’s five coal-fired generating plants.

Ontario imported 20 million tons of coal in 2003, primarily from U.S. coal mines in Central Appalachia and the

Powder River Basin [59]. After Ontario, Nova Scotia and

New Brunswick account for most of Canada’s remaining

import tonnage. In 2003, Nova Scotia imported 2.0 million tons of coal and New Brunswick imported 1.4 million tons. U.S. coal exports to Canada are projected to fall

from 21 million tons in 2003 to 7 million tons in 2025 [60].

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60 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Recent Developments in World Coal Trade (Continued)

this should lead to some downward pressure on the

non-transportation component of the delivered price

of coal in markets such as Europe, where Australian

coal should again be able to compete with coal originating from South Africa and South America.

Along with strong growth in world coal trade in recent

years, the geographical composition of coal supply for

international markets has changed. While emerging

coal exporting countries such as China, Colombia, and

Indonesia have increased their output substantially

over the past few years, several of the more established

coal-exporting countries such as the United States,

South Africa, Canada, and Poland have seen their

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1998 and 2003, coal exports from China expanded by a

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Appendix 9.1A, web site www.cea.nic.in/nep/nep.

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Energy Annual 2002, web site www.eia.doe.gov

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France, August 2004), p. II.16.

36. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy,

Energy Overview of Turkey, web site www.fe.doe.

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CoalPower5 Database (2005); “Steag Markets New

Coal Station Design,” McCloskey’s Coal Report, No 73

(November 14, 2003), pp. 16-17; and BabcockHitachi Europe, “Project Site—Afsin Elbistan B,

Successful Pressure Test and First Firing” (February

23, 2004), web site www.babcockborsigpower.de.

37. M. Ersoy, Turkish Coal Enterprises, “Current Status

of Turkish Lignite Sector,” presentation at the

United Nation’s Economic Commission for Europe

(UNECE) Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts on Coal in

Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland

(November 17-18, 2003), web site www.unece.org;

“EUAS Modifies Afsin-Elbistan B Lignite Project,”

IBS Research & Consultancy Energy Line(December 2,

2002), web site www.ibsresearch.com.

38. “Israel’s 5th Coal Plant Off Schedule,” Platts International Coal Report, No. 689 (November 8, 2004), p. 10;

and “Asia Beat—Israel,” Power in Asia, No. 415

(November 11, 2004), p. 24.

39. S. Samayende, “Eskom’s Power Stations To Create

26,000 New Jobs,” All Africa (February 16, 2005),

web site www.allafrica.com; and World Markets

Research Centre, “Country Report: Canada” (May

10, 2005), web site www.worldmarketsanalysis.

com.

40. IEA Coal Research, CoalPower5 Database (2005).

41. P. Nyakazeya, “Rio Tinto Seeks Partners for

Sengwa Coal Project,” The Herald (Harare) (April 5,

2005), web site www.allafrica.com; “Tanzania Now

To Pay $2.5m Monthly to Songas,” LiquidAfrica

Holding Limited (June 11, 2004); C. Baputaki,

“Makwinja Takes Over as MCL Board Chair,”

Mmegi/The Reporter (Gaborone) (April 29, 2005),

web site www.allafrica.com; and “Swaziland: Plans

To Expand Power Production,” UN Integrated

Regional Information Networks (May 4, 2005), web

site www.allafrica.com.

42. Web site www.worldsteel.org; and Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual

2002, web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea (March-June

2004), Table 1.4.

43. “Brazilian Mills Plan To Raise Capacity by 30%,”

Steel Business Briefing (September 21, 2004), web site

www.steelbb.com; and “Brazil Steel Sector To

Invest $8.0 Bln in Capacity Expansion by 2009,” Portuguese News Digest (August 21, 2003).

44. “Aneel Approves Transfer of Coal-Fired Project to

Eleja,” Business News Americas (April 29, 2005);

“Czech Republic Eyes Brazil Rio Grande do Sul

Energy Sector,” Latin America News Digest (March

22, 2005); “Rio Grande do Sul To Hold Referendum

on 650MW Coal Project,” Business News Americas

(December 7, 2004); and “Rio Grande do Sul:

US$5bn To Double Capacity by 2010,” Business

News Americas (May 24, 2004).

45. International Energy Agency, Coal Information 2003

(Paris, France, November 2003), pp. I.101-I.102 and

Table 3.10.

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Trade Forecast, Vol. 14, No. 2 (London, United Kingdom, May 2005); Energy Information Administration, National Energy Modeling System, run

IEO2005.D060605B.

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Korea,“ Platts (February 10, 2005), web site

www.platts.com; “South Korea’s Power Industry

Has Been Restructured,” Power Engineering International, Vol. 13, No. 3 (March 1, 2005); Korea Midland

Power Company, Ltd., “Nationwide Construction

Status (As of the End of May 2005),” web site

www.komipo.co.kr; “S Korea Posco To Liquidate

Posenergy Unit,” Dow Jones International News (May

27, 2001); and “Korea: 5th Long-Term Power Development Plan,” International Market Insight Reports

(February 10, 2001).

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and Thailand Show the Way Forward,” Coaltrans,

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(June 12, 2003), p. 4.

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2004).
Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 63

50. P. Vichakul and V. Sivavong, “Thailand Coal

Demand for Power Generation in 2004-2015,” presentation at 12th APEC Clean Fossil Energy Technical and 11th APEC Coal Flow (Policy) Seminar,

Cebu, Philippines (January 26-29, 2005), web site

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Power Plant From BLCP Power of Thailand,” News

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(Washington, DC, June 1991), Table 1.

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53. Energy Information Administration, Quarterly Coal

Report, October-December 2004, DOE/EIA-0121

(2004/4Q) (Washington, DC, March 2005), Table 12.

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International Coal Report, No. 663 (May 10, 2004),

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Bay Coal Terminal’s R1.75bn Expansion,” Business

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March 2004).

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(Paris, France, August 2004), pp. I.22-I.26 and III.13.

57. Energy Information Administration, National

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58. Hill & Associates, Inc., U.S. Coal Imports: Issues and

Near Term Outlook (Annapolis, MD, June 2003).

59. K. Stone (Natural Resources Canada) and D.

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60. Energy Information Administration, National

Energy Modeling System, run IEO2005.D060605B.

Electricity

Electricity consumption nearly doubles in the IEO2005 projection period.

The emerging economies of Asia are expected to lead

the increase in world electricity use.

The International Energy Outlook 2005 (IEO2005) reference case projects that world net electricity consumption

will nearly double over the next two decades.10 Over the

forecast period, world electricity demand is projected to

grow at an average rate of 2.6 percent per year, from

14,275 billion kilowatthours in 2002 to 21,400 billion

kilowatthours in 2015 and 26,018 billion kilowatthours

in 2025 (Figure 58). More than one-half (59 percent) of

the projected growth in demand occurs in the emerging

economies, with the mature market and transitional

economies accounting for 28 percent and 14 percent,

respectively.

This chapter examines the future of electricity supply

and demand, beginning with a discussion of regional

demand projections and the trends in expansion anticipated over the next two decades. The remainder of the

chapter discusses the projections for electricity generating capacity, with particular attention to how the

regional fuel mix might change over the forecast period.

Regional differences in fuel diversity, operating efficiencies, and ability to meet growing demand for electric

power are reviewed.

Net Electricity Consumption

Growth in net electricity consumption is expected to be

most rapid among the emerging economies of the world,

with annual average growth of 4.0 percent from 2002 to

2025 (Figure 59). In contrast, electricity demand is projected to increase by an average of 1.5 percent per year in

the mature market economies and an average of 3.1 percent per year in the transitional economies of Eastern

Europe and the former Soviet Union (EE/FSU). On an

absolute quantity basis, China and the United States

lead the projected growth in net electricity consumption,

adding 2,803 and 1,819 billion kilowatthours over the

23-year forecast to their respective annual net consumption levels.

Mature Market Economies

Electricity use in the mature market economies is

expected to increase more slowly than in the emerging

and transitional economies, averaging 1.5 percent per

year in the IEO2005 reference case over the projection

period. In the mature market economies, the electricity

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 65

14,275

18,875

21,400

23,677

26,018

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

Billion Kilowatthours

History Projections

Figure 58. World Net Electricity Consumption,

2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

4,000

8,000

12,000

16,000

Billion Kilowatthours

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

History Projections

Figure 59. World Net Electricity Consumption

by Region, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

10In IEO2005, “net electricity consumption” includes both electricity and heat produced for sale to the grid. It does not include electricity

generated on site at industrial facilities.
sector is well established, and equipment efficiency

gains are expected to temper the growth in electricity

demand.

Although parts of the United States still have excess natural-gas-fired electricity capacity that was installed during the boom in construction between 2000 and 2004,

strong economic growth throughout the country will

require the development of additional generation capacity. Electricity demand in the United States is projected

to increase from 3,651 billion kilowatthours in 2002 to

5,470 billion kilowatthours in 2025. Demand growth is

expected to be particularly strong in the commercial sector, averaging 2.4 percent per year. Rapid additions to

commercial floorspace, the continuing penetration of

new telecommunications technologies and medical

imaging equipment, and increased use of office equipment are projected to offset efficiency gains for electric

equipment in the sector. In the industrial and residential

sectors electricity consumption is expected to grow at

more moderate rates, averaging 1.3 percent per year and

1.6 percent per year, respectively.

Net electricity consumption in Western Europe is projected to increase in the IEO2005 reference case from

2,556 billion kilowatthours in 2002 to 3,072 billion

kilowatthours in 2025. Electricity demand growth in the

region will, in part, be influenced by the progress it

makes in liberalizing its electric power markets. Western

Europe’s drive to reduce cross-border barriers throughout the regional economy is expected to increase competition in its electricity and natural gas markets, offsetting

some of the increased costs that will result from reduced

reliance on coal-fired and nuclear power plants and

increased reliance on natural gas and renewables for

electricity production.

All electricity customers in the European Union (EU)

will have the right to choose their suppliers by July 2007.

Furthermore, in 2004 new EU directives entered into

force, requiring energy companies to unbundle formerly

vertically integrated supply chains and mandating the

establishment of uniform, well-defined regulatory bodies to increase information transparency, helping to

increase competition in the electricity sector and, as a

result, restrain price increases [1].

In addition, populations in Western Europe and Japan

are expected either to remain at current levels or to

decline slightly toward the end of the forecast period,

and as a result it is unlikely that demand for electricity in

the residential sector will increase substantially. Western Europe and Japan are expected to have the slowest

growth in residential electricity consumption, averaging

0.4 and 0.6 percent per year, respectively, and in commercial electricity consumption, averaging 0.8 and 0.9

percent per year, respectively.

Transitional Economies

Electricity demand among the EE/FSU transitional

economies is projected to increase at an average annual

rate of 3.1 percent over the 2002-2025 period. This is

higher than the 1.5-percent average annual increase over

the past 30 years, mostly as a result of the precipitous

drop in electricity use that followed the fall of the Soviet

regime in the early 1990s. Net electricity consumption in

the EE/FSU region is projected to climb from 1,544 billion kilowatthours in 2002 to 3,145 billion kilowatthours

in 2025.

Many of the FSU countries are attempting to reform or

liberalize their electricity sectors—for the most part, to

attract much needed private and foreign investment to

repair and expand aging and neglected infrastructure.

In Russia, for instance, little investment was made in the

1990s to upgrade the country’s electricity system, and

especially its transmission and distribution infrastructure, which includes some operational transformers that

date back to the 1930s [2]. A recent major electricity

blackout in Moscow underscores the infrastructure

problem. On May 25, 2005, between 2 and 4 million people were left without electricity for several hours following an explosion at a Moscow substation that had been

operating for more than 40 years.

Russia’s thermal generating capacity is scheduled for

privatization as part of the country’s electric power sector restructuring plan, with nuclear power plants

remaining under state control and hydroelectric facilities placed under the control of a single state-owned

company [3]. The state-owned Unified Energy Systems

utility has created 6 wholesale power generating companies and 14 territorial generating companies to be privatized in 2005; however, the government has delayed the

privatization until early 2006.

Outside Russia, the progress toward electricity sector

reform has been mixed. Kazakhstan appears to be in the

most advanced stage of restructuring in the region.

Restructuring of the power sector in Kazakhstan began

in 1995 with the unbundling of distribution, transmission, and generation functions [4], and by 1998, the government had privatized most of the country’s generating

capacity, as well as a number of distribution companies,

and was allowing direct electricity sales to large end

users.

Ukraine’s privatization effort began in 1997, and each of

the country’s regional electricity distributors has been

partially privatized [5]. Progress has been slow for a

number of reasons, however. Only minor percentages

have been offered to investors, and investors are

required to commit to substantial, long-term investments in the electricity infrastructure. In addition,

Lithuania, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan have started

66 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005
power sector liberalization, although their progress also

has been slow.

In Eastern Europe, efforts to restructure and liberalize

national electricity sectors have been driven by the

accession of several countries11 to the EU. EU membership has compelled many nations of the region to reform

electricity markets in order to meet EU standards. The

Czech Republic plans to begin selling its 67.8-percent

stake in the Ceske Energeticke Zavody generator sometime in 2006 to comply with EU rules on electricity sector

liberalization [6], and 10 of the 12 power producers in

Hungary are owned by foreign companies.

Emerging Economies

Emerging economies are projected to more than double

their net electricity consumption, from 4,645 billion

kilowatthours in 2002 to 11,554 billion kilowatthours in

2025. The projected growth in net electricity consumption for the emerging market economies is driven in

large part by gross domestic product (GDP) and population growth assumptions (see box on page 69). GDP

growth is in turn dependent on access to reliable electricity supplies.

Because of the links between reliable electricity supply,

GDP growth, and living standards, many of the nations

with emerging economies are attempting to increase

access to reliable electricity supply. The need to increase

their citizens’ access to electricity has led many governments of the emerging economies to implement a variety of strategies, such as privatization to increase

investment in the electricity sector, enacting government policies to encourage investment from potential

foreign participants, and introducing rural electrification schemes aimed at bringing electricity to rural communities, both to improve standards of living and to

increase the productivity of rural societies. The International Energy Agency has estimated that 1.6 billion people lacked access to electricity in 2002 and that, despite

projected gains in electrification rates, the number of

people without access to electricity will fall only slightly

(to 1.4 billion in 2030), mostly as a result of continued

population growth in developing countries [7].

As an example of the efforts being made to improve electrification, India announced plans in March 2005 to continue subsidizing electricity consumption for rural and

poor households that use less than 30 kilowatthours per

month. Currently, 45 percent of households in India do

not have access to electricity. The new legislation has set

a target of electrifying all households by 2010. As in the

past, the ongoing challenge in providing electricity to

the poor is paying for the electricity. Some progress has

been made in reducing cross-sector subsidy burdens;

however, even with commercial and industrial consumers subsidizing poor consumers, regional electricity

companies still are expected to pay for some of the subsidies [8]. The burden of subsidies is amplified by inadequate revenue collection systems and outright theft of

electricity. For example, in 2002 India’s regional electricity companies lost $5.3 billion [9].

India’s new electricity policy also places considerable

emphasis on reliability. The policy “requires that within

six months the Central Electricity Authority must

launch its first National Electricity Plan, covering the

period to 2017. Central to the plans is the provision of

adequate generation capacity by 2012 based on 85 percent availability and including reserves of at least 5 percent” [10].

In China, news reports over the past few years have

highlighted electricity generation shortfalls during periods of peak demand. To close the annual supply shortages and meet further growth in demand, China’s 11th

five-year plan includes plans for expanding electricity

generation capacity to 570 gigawatts by 2010. In order to

meet this rapid rate of expansion, roughly 8 percent

annually, investments of $20 to $30 billion per year will

be needed [11]. It appears, however, that building more

power plants may not provide a complete solution to

China’s electric power limitations. Equally important is

supplying primary fuel to the power plants and constructing transmission lines to reach electricity consumers. The Chinese State Grid Corporation estimates that

investments of $10 billion per year will be needed for

upgrading electricity transmission infrastructure alone

[12].

The potential impacts of lack of electric power infrastructure on China’s economy are illustrated by recent

developments in the country’s industrial sector.

Three-quarters of the electricity consumed in China is

used for manufacturing and heavy industry [13]. When

electricity shortages occurred in the summer of 2004,

some industrial production had to be cut. In 2004 Beijing

shut down approximately 6,400 industrial facilities for

one week and then staggered their operations for the

duration of the summer to avoid consumption peaks

[14]. It is clear that, unless the Chinese electricity infrastructure can keep pace with demand for electric power,

the negative impact of electricity shortages on the industrial sector could have significant detrimental impacts

on the country’s economy.

Electricity Supply

To meet the world’s projected electricity demand over

the 2002 to 2025 forecast period, an extensive expansion

of installed generating capacity will be required.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 67

11The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia acceded to the European Union in May 2004. Bulgaria and Romania are

scheduled to join in 2007.
Worldwide installed electricity generating capacity is

expected to grow from 3,315 gigawatts in 2002 to 5,495

gigawatts in 2025 in the IEO2005 reference case, at a

2.2-percent average annual growth rate (Figure 60).

In IEO2005, “generating capacity” is defined as the

hourly level of production when a power plant is operating at full capacity. Baseload generation typically operates as close to full capacity as possible. Peaking

systems, such as natural gas turbines, typically operate

at times of peak demand—that is, those times of the day

when electricity use is at its highest. In contrast, most

renewable electricity generation systems12 cannot be

relied upon to meet peak demand. Instead, renewable

systems are operated whenever resources are available.

Wind turbines do not operate when wind speeds are

either too low or too high; hydroelectric power is vulnerable to drought; and solar systems do not operate at

night. That said, even fossil fuel and nuclear power

plants cannot operate at 100 percent capacity all year

long. Outages for annual maintenance, as well as seasonal and daily fluctuations in demand, reduce their

“operating capacity” relative to their “nameplate

capacity.”

The mix of primary fuels used to generate electricity has

changed a great deal over the past three decades on a

worldwide basis. Coal has remained the dominant fuel,

although electricity generation from nuclear power

increased rapidly from the 1970s through the mid-1980s,

and natural-gas-fired generation has grown rapidly in

the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, in conjunction with the

high world oil prices brought on by the oil price shocks

after the oil embargo by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)13 in 1973-1974 and

the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the use of oil for electricity generation has been slowing since the mid-1970s.

High world oil prices encouraged switching from

oil-fired generation to natural gas and nuclear power

and reinforced coal’s important role in world electric

power generation.

In the IEO2005 reference case, continued increases in the

use of natural gas for electricity generation are expected

worldwide (Figure 61). Coal is projected to continue to

retain the largest market share for electricity generation,

but its importance is expected to be moderated somewhat by a rise in natural gas use. The role of nuclear

power in the world’s electricity markets is projected to

lessen, although some new reactors are expected to be

added over the forecast horizon, mostly in the emerging

and transitional economies. Generation from hydropower and other renewable energy sources is projected

to grow by 54 percent over the next 23 years, but their

share of total electricity generation is projected to remain

near the current level of 18 percent.

68 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000 Gigawatts

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

History Projections

Figure 60. World Electricity Generation Capacity

by Region, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

2002

2010

2015

2020

2025

0 20 40 60 80 100

Percent of Total

Oil

Natural Gas

Coal

Nuclear

Renewables

History

Projections

Figure 61. Fuel Shares of World Electricity

Generation, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.

doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of

Global Energy Markets (2005).

12The generation capacity data presented in this chapter as “renewables” include hydropower, wind, geothermal, solar, and other. The

data for hydropower include conventional hydro impoundment, run-of-river, and pumped storage because of the difficulty in distinguishing among the various technologies on a worldwide basis. A further challenge is accounting for distributed small-scale hydroelectricity production. Therefore, the renewable generation capacity figures may underrepresent total installed capacity. Biomass-fired capacity is not

included (except for cases where biomass is added to the coal stream in coal-fired power plants and in the U.S. data) because of limited data

availability. 13OAPEC includes Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar.
Coal

In the IEO2005 reference case, coal continues to be the

dominant fuel for generation of electricity and combined

heat and power (district heat).14 In 2025, coal is projected

to fuel 38 percent of the world’s electricity generation,

compared with a 24-percent share for natural gas. Coalfired capacity is expected to grow by 1.5 percent per

year, from 987 gigawatts in 2002 to 1,403 gigawatts in

2025 (Figure 62). Installed coal-fired capacity, as a share

of total world capacity, declines from 30 percent to 26

percent over the forecast.

By country, the United States and China currently are

the leaders in terms of installed coal-fired capacity, at

311 and 204 gigawatts, respectively. In China, strong

growth in natural-gas-fired capacity is projected to push

coal’s share down from 65 percent to 52 percent of total

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 69

Electricity Consumption per Capita

Net electricity consumption in the world’s emerging

economies is projected to grow by 149 percent from

2002 to 2025. By that measure, the emerging economies

would surpass the mature market economies in terms

of total annual electricity consumption; in terms of per

capita consumption, however, the emerging economies are expected to continue trailing the mature market economies (see figure below). With the emerging

economies expected to account for 82 percent of the

world’s population in 2025, the projected increase in

demand forecast for the region translates to an increase

in per capita net electricity consumption from 950

kilowatthours per person in 2002 to 1,807 kilowatthours per person in 2025. Even with this strong

growth, per capita consumption for the emerging economies as a whole would remain much lower than that

for the mature market economies. Net electricity use

per capita in the mature market economies is projected

to increase from 8,371 kilowatthours per person in 2002

to 10,632 kilowatthours per person in 2025.

The differences in per capita electricity consumption

among the emerging, transitional, and mature market

economies are especially stark in the residential sector,

which can serve as a proxy for living standards. For

example, in the residential sector on a per person basis,

Canada and the United States consumed over 24 times

more electricity than China in 2002, 29 times more than

Africa, and 47 times more than India. Although the differences are expected to narrow over the forecast

period, they still would be substantial in 2025, with per

capita electricity use in the United States remaining 9

times higher than in China, 14 times higher than in

Africa, and 17 times higher than in India (see figure

below).

Emerging

Economies

Transitional

Economies

Mature Market

Economies

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000 Kilowatthours per Capita per Year

2002 2025

Electricity Consumption per Capita by Region,

2002 and 2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy

Markets (2005).

India

Africa

China

Other Emerging Asia

Mexico

Central and South America

South Korea

Middle East

Former Soviet Union

Eastern Europe

Western Europe

Japan

Australia/New Zealand

United States

Canada

0 2,000 4,000 6,000

Kilowatthours per Capita per Year

2002

2025

Residential Sector Electricity Consumption

per Capita by Country Group, 2002 and 2025

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site

www.eia.doe.gov/ iea/. 2025: EIA, System for the Analysis of

Global Energy Markets (2005).

14Only in the EE/FSU region is heat a significant portion of the output from central power stations.
generating capacity. In the United States, coal-fired

power plants are expected to continue supplying most

of the country’s electricity through 2025 [15]. In 2002,

coal-fired plants in the United States (including utilities,

independent power producers, and end-use combined

heat and power) accounted for 51 percent of all electricity generation. While the output from U.S. coal-fired

power plants increases in the forecast, from 1,881 billion

kilowatthours in 2002 to 2,890 billion kilowatthours in

2025, their share of total generation decreases slightly, to

50 percent, as a result of a rapid increase in natural-gas-fired generation.

Coal consumption in the United States as a share of fuels

used for electricity generation is expected to rise from 52

to 53 percent over the forecast. In terms of installed

capacity, coal’s share of the total will hold steady at 35

percent. Coal is used for baseload generation, which

explains why it accounts for only 35 percent of U.S.

capacity but generates more than one-half of the country’s electricity.

Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the FSU all are

projected to see declines in coal-fired generating capacity over the forecast period. Not surprisingly, the three

regions are also expected to see large increases in

installed natural-gas-fired capacity.

Natural Gas

Additions to natural gas capacity are projected to

increase the world’s gas-fired generating capacity by

approximately 3.9 percent per year from 2002 to 2025

(Figure 63), at a faster rate than projected for any other

energy source. Natural-gas-fired capacity is an attractive

choice for new power plants because of its fuel efficiency, operating flexibility, rapid deployment, and

lower installation costs compared to other technologies.

This development represents a major change in the fleet

of electricity generation plants. Because of the shorter

installation time and lower investment costs for

gas-fired combined-cycle generation in comparison to

coal, total installed natural gas capacity (combined with

oil capacity) is expected to surpass coal-fired installed

generation capacity by 2010—1,207 gigawatts versus

1,151 gigawatts. The combined share of natural gas and

oil in world installed generating capacity is projected to

rise from 36 percent in 2002 to 47 percent in 2025.

In the United States, the electric power sector is projected to account for an ever-larger share of total natural

gas demand. About 23 percent of total U.S. natural gas

consumption in 2002 was in the electric power sector,

and in 2025 its share is projected to be to 31 percent [16].

Natural-gas-fired generation capacity is expected to

grow more rapidly than capacity using any other energy

source from 2002 to 2020. From 2020 to 2025, however,

natural gas prices are projected to increase substantially,

and as a result coal-fired capacity is expected to lead

new additions [17].

Western Europe, Japan, and Canada are similarly

expected to favor natural gas capacity over other fuels

for new generating capacity because of lower investment costs and shorter construction times, as well as the

fact that gas is an advantageous economic alternative to

other fossil fuels. Moreover, these regions have instituted energy policies to limit the use of coal in the

70 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

250

500

750

1,000

1,250

1,500 Gigawatts

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 62. World Coal-Fired Generation Capacity

by Region, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.

doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of

Global Energy Markets (2005).

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

250

500

750

1,000

1,250

1,500 Gigawatts

Mature Market Economies

Transitional

Emerging

Figure 63. World Natural-Gas- and Oil-Fired

Generation Capacity by Region,

2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.

doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of

Global Energy Markets (2005).
electricity generation sector. With the Kyoto Protocol

now in effect, further efforts to reduce greenhouse gas

emissions will likely encourage more reliance on natural

gas [18].

The FSU region, with its access to rich natural gas

resources, also increases its reliance on natural gas for

electricity generation in the IEO2005 reference case forecast. Natural gas already provides about 45 percent of

the total energy used for electricity generation in the

FSU, and the region’s reliance on gas-fired generation is

projected to increase even further over the next decades,

to 55 percent in 2025.

Natural gas consumption in China’s electric power sector is projected to increase rapidly from a relatively low

total of 0.2 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 4.3 quadrillion Btu

in 2025, at an impressive 14.7-percent average annual

growth rate. In comparison, India, South Korea, and the

rest of emerging Asia combined are expected to see an

increase of 3.7 quadrillion Btu over the period, and natural gas use for electricity generation in the United States

is projected to grow by 3.9 quadrillion Btu.

Oil

Relatively little change is expected in oil-fired generation capacity. Oil’s share of the world’s installed capacity declines over the projection period, from an 8-percent

market share in 2002 to 7 percent in 2025. Oil has more

value in the transportation sector and in limited applications for distributed diesel-fired generators than in central power plant applications. The only region expected

to see a sizable increase in oil-fired electric power capacity is the Middle East, where some new oil-fired capacity

is expected to be built. Oil use for electricity generation

in the Middle East is expected to increase from 2.1 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 4.1 quadrillion Btu in 2025.

In recent years, China has shown fairly strong growth in

oil-fired electricity generation, because peak electricity

demand continues to outpace on-grid electricity generation, and Chinese industry has had to rely on diesel generators to cope with annual summer power shortages.

That situation is expected to continue in the short term,

but as planned capacity fueled by natural gas, coal,

nuclear, and hydropower comes on line and the country’s national electricity grid matures, the demand for oil

used to generate electricity is expected to moderate.

Nuclear Power

In the IEO2005 reference case, electricity generation

from nuclear power plants around the world is projected to increase from 2,560 billion kilowatthours in

2002 to 3,032 billion kilowatthours in 2015 and 3,270 billion kilowatthours in 2025, and the world’s nuclearpowered generating capacity is projected to increase

from 361 gigawatts in 2002 to 422 gigawatts in 2025. In

past editions of the IEO, in contrast, declines in nuclear

power were projected in the mid-term forecast as a

result of expectations that few new reactors would be

built and that older reactors would be shut down when

they reached the end of their operating lives.

Prospects for nuclear power have improved in recent

years, with higher capacity utilization rates reported for

many existing nuclear facilities and the expectation that

most existing plants in the mature market and transitional economy nations will be granted extensions to

their operating lives. Further, higher fossil fuel prices

and the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol are

expected to improve prospects for new nuclear power

capacity over the forecast period. Nevertheless, nuclear

power trends can be difficult to anticipate for a variety of

political and social reasons, and considerable uncertainty is associated with nuclear power forecasts (see

box on page 72).

Nuclear power is an important source of electricity in

many countries of the world. In 2003, 19 countries

depended on nuclear power for at least 20 percent of

their electricity generation (Figure 64). As of March 2005,

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 71

France

Lithuania

Slovakia

Belgium

Sweden

Ukraine

Bulgaria

Slovenia

South Korea

Switzerland

Armenia

Hungary

Germany

Czech Republic

Japan

Finland

Spain

United States

United Kingdom

Russia

Canada

Romania

Argentina

South Africa

Mexico

Netherlands

Brazil

India

Pakistan

China

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Percent

Figure 64. Nuclear Shares of National Electricity

Generation, 2004

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, Reference

Data Series 2, “Power Reactor Information System,” web site

www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/ (June 2005).
72 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

How Nuclear Power Could Shape World Electricity Markets: Two Nuclear Power Development Scenarios

Two opposing scenarios of nuclear power development can be used to assess the potential of nuclear

power in the electricity markets of the future. In a

“strong nuclear power revival” case developed for

IEO2005, few nuclear plants are retired, and new

builds increase the world’s total nuclear generating

capacity to 570 gigawatts in 2025. In contrast, a “weak

nuclear power” case assumes that nuclear power programs, especially in Western Europe and the EE/FSU,

are dismantled, few new nuclear power plants are constructed, and installed nuclear power capacity falls to

297 gigawatts in 2025. The IEO2005 reference case projects an increase in world nuclear capacity, from 361

gigawatts in 2002 to 422 gigawatts in 2025.

In very few instances is the decision to build nuclear

power capacity left entirely to corporations or utilities

that would base their decisions solely on economics. In

general, government policy (with an eye to public

opinion) guides the development of nuclear power.

The OAPEC oil embargo of 1973-74 led some nations to

pursue nuclear power programs aggressively in the

1970s, mostly with strong public support; but subsequent accidents at the Three Mile Island nuclear power

plant in the United States in 1979 and Chernobyl in the

Soviet Union in 1986 pushed public opinion and

national energy policies away from nuclear power. In

the United States, rapidly increasing capital costs and

repeated construction delays virtually ended construction of nuclear power plants; and in Europe, both

before and after the Chernobyl disaster, several European governments, including Italy, Austria, Belgium,

Germany, and Sweden announced their intentions to

withdraw from the nuclear power arena.

For many years analysts expected social, economic,

and political pressures to cause a substantial slowdown of nuclear power expansion in the short term

and a decline in nuclear generating capacity in the long

term. More recently, however, there has been talk of a

“renaissance” in the nuclear power programs of the

United States and some European countries, as fossil

fuel prices have remained relatively high, and energy

security issues, concerns about air pollution and global

warming, and the high performance levels of existing

nuclear power plants have come to the forefront.a On

the other hand, a future adverse event involving

nuclear power, such as another Chernobyl-sized

nuclear power plant accident or a terrorist event

involving an attack on a nuclear plant or using processed nuclear materials to commit an act of terrorism,

could strengthen negative perceptions of nuclear

power.

The table on the opposite page summarizes the projected fuel mix for the world’s installed electric power

capacity in three cases: the IEO2005 reference case,

strong nuclear power revival case, and weak nuclear

power case. With the same macroeconomic assumptions in each of the three cases, it is not surprising that

they all project the same total (about 5,500 gigawatts)

for world installed electricity capacity in 2025.

Much of the expansion in nuclear generating capacity

projected in the strong nuclear power revival case—a

total of 148 gigawatts—is in regions with older, more

mature nuclear power markets. Many Western European and EE/FSU countries have established nuclear

power industries, and they would be capable of staving off the decline in nuclear power capacity projected

in the reference case by reversing planned phaseouts of

existing nuclear power plants, lengthening operating

lives, and constructing new nuclear capacity in response to, for example, concerns about climate change.

In the strong nuclear case, Western Europe’s projected

nuclear generating capacity in 2025 is 52 gigawatts

higher than in the reference, the EE/FSU’s is 36

gigawatts higher, and Japan’s is 15 gigawatts higher.

The IEO2005 strong nuclear case assumes that emerging economies with nuclear power expansion plans,

including China, India, and South Korea, expand the

development of nuclear power to the greatest extent

possible. Therefore, in the strong nuclear revival case

the emerging nations are able to increase their nuclear

capacity by adding a combined 37 gigawatts of additional capacity by 2025 relative to the reference case

values.

Construction and operation of 148 gigawatts of additional nuclear capacity in 2025 in the strong nuclear

revival case would have the greatest impact on the fuel

shares of natural gas, oil, and renewables in the fuel

mix for world electricity generation (see table). Because

Western Europe, the EE/FSU, and Japan all are projected to see declines or minimal growth in coal-fired

capacity in the reference case, there is little or no opportunity for new nuclear capacity to displace coal. As a

result, the strong nuclear revival case shows declines of

96 gigawatts in natural gas and oil capacity and 32

gigawatts in renewable electricity capacity in 2025 relative to the reference case projections.

In the weak nuclear power case, almost every region

loses some nuclear capacity by 2025 relative to the reference case. Only for the Middle East and Mexico, with

(continued on page 73)

aS. Taub and J.-L. Wang, The U.S. Nuclear Power Business: Poised for Expansion? (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Energy Research Associates, May 2005), p. 1 (private report).
there were 441 nuclear power reactors in operation

around the world, and another 25 were under construction. Five new nuclear power plants began operation in

2004óone each in China, Japan, and Russia and two in

Ukraineóand Canadaís Bruce 3 reactor was reconnected to the grid. Five nuclear power plants were permanently shut down in 2004óone in Lithuania and four

in the United Kingdom.

For the mature market economies, the reference case

assumes that, in the long term, retirements of existing

plants as they reach the end of their operating lives will

not be balanced by the construction of new nuclear

power capacity, and there will be a slight decline in

installed nuclear capacity toward the end of the forecast.

Few new builds are expected in the mature market

economies outside of Japan, France, and Finland.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 73

How Nuclear Power Could Shape World Electricity Markets: Two Nuclear Power Development Scenarios

(Continued)

their relatively small nuclear power industries, are the

2025 projections unchanged from those in the reference

case.b Total world installed nuclear capacity in 2025 is

125 gigawatts lower in the weak nuclear case than in

the reference case. Western Europe sheds the largest

amount of nuclear capacity in 2025 in the weak nuclear

case (50 gigawatts), followed by the EE/FSU (27 gigawatts), emerging Asia (24 gigawatts), and Japan (14

gigawatts).

In emerging Asia, coal-fired capacity makes up for

most of the loss of nuclear capacity in the weak nuclear

case, with 20 gigawatts of additional coal capacity constructed in China, India, and South Korea compared to

the reference case in 2025. The other emerging Asian

countries construct an additional 7 gigawatts of natural-gas-fired and oil-fired capacity in the weak nuclear

case. In Western Europe, the EE/FSU, and Japan, natural gas, oil, and renewables are used to make up for the

loss of nuclear capacity, with 63 gigawatts of additional

natural-gas- and oil-fired capacity and 10 gigawatts of

additional renewable capacity constructed relative to

the reference case projections in 2025.

bFor the purposes of this analysis, U.S. nuclear capacities were not varied across the nuclear cases. While EIA recognizes that there is

potential for increases or decreases in U.S. nuclear power capacity in the future, no analysis has been done to quantify that potential. As a

result, U.S. numbers are held constant to levels reported in the Annual Energy Outlook 2005.

World Installed Electricity Generation Capacity by Fuel in Three Nuclear Capacity Cases, 2002-2025

(Gigawatts)

Analysis Case and Fuel Type 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

IEO2005 Reference Case

Natural Gas and Oil . . . . . . . . . . . 1,207 1,851 2,071 2,304 2,560 3.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 1,151 1,232 1,322 1,403 1.5

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 390 401 411 422 0.7

Renewable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763 927 980 1,036 1,110 1.6

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,318 4,319 4,684 5,073 5,495 2.2

Strong Nuclear Power Revival Case

Natural Gas and Oil . . . . . . . . . . . 1,207 1,849 2,041 2,254 2,464 3.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 1,153 1,232 1,320 1,397 1.5

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 395 449 498 570 2.0

Renewable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763 928 970 1,020 1,078 1.5

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,318 4,326 4,692 5,092 5,509 2.2

Weak Nuclear Power Case

Natural Gas and Oil . . . . . . . . . . . 1,207 1,865 2,087 2,342 2,626 3.4

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 1,160 1,245 1,339 1,426 1.6

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 360 357 340 297 -0.8

Renewable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763 934 987 1,050 1,127 1.7

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,318 4,318 4,677 5,071 5,476 2.2

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
Western Europe’s nuclear capacity is projected to drop

from 127 gigawatts in 2002 to 115 gigawatts in 2015 and

95 gigawatts in 2025. In Japan, however, nuclear capacity is projected to expand by 9 gigawatts between 2002

and 2025. U.S. nuclear capacity is projected to increase

from 99 gigawatts in 2002 to 103 gigawatts in 2025, in

part because of the return of the Browns Ferry reactor,

scheduled for 2007. Life extensions and higher capacity

factors are expected to play a major role in sustaining the

U.S. nuclear industry. Thus, despite a declining share of

global electricity production, nuclear power is projected

to continue in its role as an important source of electric

power.

In contrast to the mature market economies, rapid

growth in nuclear power capacity is projected for Russia

and for the world’s emerging economies (Figure 65). The

EE/FSU and emerging economies combined are projected to add 42 gigawatts of nuclear capacity between

2002 and 2015 and another 35 gigawatts between 2015

and 2025. Over the forecast period, the largest additions

of nuclear capacity are expected in emerging Asia

(China, India, and South Korea) and in Russia. China is

projected to add 24 gigawatts of nuclear capacity in the

IEO2005 reference case, India 12 gigawatts, South Korea

12 gigawatts, and Russia 14 gigawatts. Among the

mature market economies, only Japan is expected to add

a sizable amount of nuclear capacity, a total of 9 gigawatts between 2002 and 2025.

Hydroelectricity and Other Renewables

In the IEO2005 reference case, moderate growth in the

world’s consumption of hydroelectricity and other

renewable energy resources is projected over the forecast period. Most renewable energy sources are not

expected to compete economically with fossil fuels in the

mid-term forecast. In the absence of significant government policies, such as those aimed at reducing the

impacts of carbon-emitting energy sources on the environment, it will be difficult to extend the use of

renewables on a large scale. Worldwide, the use of

hydroelectricity and other renewable energy is projected to increase by an average of 1.9 percent per year,

from 32.1 quadrillion Btu in 2002 to 42.4 quadrillion Btu

in 2015 and 48.9 quadrillion Btu in 2025.

The IEO2005 projections for hydroelectricity and other

renewable energy resources include only on-grid

renewables. Non-marketed (noncommercial) biofuels

from plant and animal sources are an important source

of energy, particularly in the developing world, and the

International Energy Agency has estimated that some

2.4 billion people in developing countries depend on

traditional biomass for heating and cooking [19]. However, because comprehensive data on the use of nonmarketed fuels and dispersed renewables (renewable

energy consumed on the site of its production, such as

solar panels used to heat water) are not available, they

are not included in the projections. Both non-marketed

fuels and dispersed renewables are considered in formulating end-use energy demands.

Much of the projected growth in renewable generation is

expected to result from the completion of large hydroelectric facilities in the countries with emerging economies (Figure 66), particularly in Asia, where the need to

expand electricity production with associated dams and

reservoirs often outweighs concerns about environmental impacts and the relocation of populations. China,

74 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

100

200

300

400

500 Gigawatts

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 65. World Nuclear Power Generation

Capacity by Region, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

200

400

600 Gigawatts

Mature Market Economies

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 66. World Hydroelectric and Other

Renewable Generation Capacity

by Region, 2002-2025

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
India, and Laos, among other emerging Asian economies, already are constructing or planning new

large-scale hydroelectric facilities. In 2004, India’s

1,500-megawatt Nathpa Jhakri project on the Sutlej

River in Himachal Pradesh became fully operational

[20]. In 2005, the World Bank approved financing for the

$1.2 billion Nam Theun project in Laos [21]. The 1,070-

megawatt hydroelectric project in Laos has been the subject of much debate and delay over the past several

years, but with financial support from the World Bank

and Asia Development Bank the project might come on

line as early as 2009 [22].China’s 11th five-year plan

expects 42 gigawatts of additional hydroelectric generating capacity by 2010 [23].

Many nations of Central and South America have plans

to expand their already well-established hydroelectric

resources. Brazil, Peru, and even oil-rich Venezuela

have plans to increase hydroelectric capacity over the

next decade. Brazil is the largest energy market in Central and South America, and more than 80 percent of its

electricity generation comes from hydroelectric sources.

As a result, Brazil is especially vulnerable to droughtinduced shortages in electricity supply. In general, the

nations of Central and South America are not expected

to expand hydroelectric resources dramatically but

instead are expected to invest in other sources of electricity—particularly natural-gas-fired capacity—that will

allow them to diversify electricity supplies and reduce

their reliance on hydropower. Brazil had planned to

increase the natural gas share of its generation to 12 percent by 2012, but regulatory and price risks have slowed

the construction timetables for its planned new gas-fired

power plants [24].

Hydroelectric capacity outside the emerging economies

is not expected to grow substantially. Among the mature

market nations, only Canada is expected to construct

any sizable hydroelectric projects over the forecast

period. An estimated 34,371 megawatts of new hydroelectric capacity currently is under consideration for

future development in Canada [25]. In the EE/FSU

countries, most additions to hydroelectric capacity are

expected to come from repair or expansion of existing

plants. In the mature market and transitional economies,

most hydroelectric resources either have already been

developed or lie far from population centers.

Wind power has shown the fastest growth among

renewable energy sources in recent years. In many

emerging economies, small wind and wind-hybrid

installations are effective in bringing electric power to

rural areas that cannot be connected to national grids;

and among the mature market economies, the growth in

wind power has been particularly robust. Western

Europe and the United States accounted for nearly 90

percent of all new wind installations in 2003—adding a

combined 5,952 megawatts of new wind capacity [26].

Germany, Spain, and Denmark all were among the top

five wind installers in 2003. Germany added the most

wind capacity in 2003, 2,645 megawatts, bringing the

country’s total installed wind capacity to 14,609 megawatts. In the United States, because the Federal production tax credit for wind plants was not extended until

late in 2004, only a little more than 200 megawatts of new

wind capacity was added in 2004 [27]. In 2005, however,

more than 1,000 megawatts of new U.S. wind capacity is

expected to enter service.

References

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 75

1. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook

2004 (Paris, France, October 2004), p. 250.

2. P. Vorobyov, “CERA Insight: Russian Electricity

Reform After the Moscow Blackout” (Cambridge,

MA: Cambridge Energy Research Associates, June

20, 2005), p. 5.

3. A. Neff, “Country Report—Russia (Energy):

Utilities: Electricity” (World Market Research Centre, June 7, 2005) web site www.

worldmarketsanalysis.com.

4. A. Neff, “Country Report—Kazakhstan (Energy):

Utilities: Electricity and Gas” (World Market

Research Centre, June 1, 2005), web site www.

worldmarketsanalysis.com.

5. A. Neff, “Country Report—Ukraine (Energy): Utilities: Electricity and Gas” (World Market Research

Centre, June 1, 2005), web site www.

worldmarketsanalysis.com.

6. S. Berger, “Country Report—Czech Republic

(Energy): Utilities: Electricity” (World Market

Research Centre, June 1, 2005), web site www.

worldmarketsanalysis.com.

7. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook

2004 (Paris, France, October 2004), p. 348.

8. Platts Global Power Report, “Indian Gov’t. Hopes

New Electricity Policy Will Secure $205 Bil. Sector

Investment” (March 3, 2005), ISSN 1095-6441, web

site www.platts.com.

9. World Markets Research Centre, “Energy Sector

Analysis—India: New Indian Electricity Bill

Offers Hope of Greater Transparency and Competition” (May 6, 2003), web site www.

worldmarketsanalysis.com.

10. Platts Global Power Report, “Indian Gov’t. Hopes

New Electricity Policy Will Secure $205 Bil. Sector

Investment” (March 3, 2005), ISSN 1095-6441, web

site www.platts.com.

11. World Markets Research Centre, “Country

Report—China (Energy) Utilities: Government

Policy” (January 18, 2005), web site www.

worldmarketsanalysis.com.
76 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

12.World Markets Research Centre, “Energy Sector

Analysis—China: Navigating the Minefield of Chinese Power Investment” (March 23, 2005), web site

www.worldmarketsanalysis.com.

13.World Markets Research Centre, “Energy Sector

Analysis—China: Playing Catch Up: Chinese Power

Generation” (August 04, 2004), web site www.

worldmarketsanalysis.com.

14.World Markets Research Centre, “Energy Sector

Analysis—China: Urban Centres in China To

Face Fresh Power Crunch During Summer

Months” (April 07, 2005), web site www.

worldmarketsanalysis.com.

15.Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy

Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington,

DC, February 2005), p. 88.

16. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy

Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington,

DC, February 2005), p. 95.

17. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy

Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington,

DC, February 2005), p. 87.

18. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook

2004 (Paris, France, October 2004), p. 197.

19.International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook

2004 (Paris, France, October 2004), p. 36.

20.International Rivers Network, “The World Bank’s

Legacy of Funding Hydropower Projects in India:

Nathpa Jhakri” (October 2004), web site

www.irn.org.

21.World Markets Research Centre, “World Bank

Approves Loan for Laotian Dam” (April 4, 2005),

web site www.worldmarketsanalysis.com.

22.World Markets Research Centre, “EDF Backtracks

on Laos Pull-Out” (October 2, 2003), web site

www.worldmarketsanalysis.com.

23.World Markets Research Centre, “Country

Report—China (Energy) Utilities: Government

Policy” (January 18, 2005), web site www.

worldmarketsanalysis.com.

24.World Markets Research Centre, “Country

Report—Brazil (Energy) Electricity” (March 29,

2005), web site www.worldmarketsanalysis.com.

25.World Markets Research Centre, “Country Report:

Canada (Energy),” (January 30, 2004) web site

www.worldmarketsanalysis.com.

26.American Wind Energy Association, “Wind Energy

Industry Grows at Steady Pace, Adds Over 8,000

MW in 2003,” Global Wind Energy Market Report

(March 10, 2004), web site www.awea.org.

27.Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy

Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington,

DC, February 2005), p. 92.
Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions

In the coming decades, responses to environmental issues could affect patterns

of energy use around the world. Actions to limit greenhouse gas emissions could alter

the level and composition of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by energy source.

Carbon dioxide is one of the most prevalent greenhouse

gases in the atmosphere. Anthropogenic (humancaused) emissions of carbon dioxide result primarily

from the combustion of fossil fuels for energy, and as a

result world energy use has emerged at the center of the

climate change debate. In the International Energy Outlook 2005 (IEO2005) reference case, world carbon dioxide

emissions are projected to rise from 24,409 million metric tons in 2002 to 33,284 million metric tons in 2015 and

38,790 million metric tons in 2025 (Figure 67).15

The Kyoto Protocol, which requires participating

“Annex I” countries to reduce their greenhouse gas

emissions collectively to an annual average of about 5

percent below their 1990 level over the 2008-2012 period,

became a legally binding treaty on February 16, 2005, 90

days after it was ratified by Russia. Russia’s ratification

brought the total number of signatories to more than 55

countries, including Annex I signatories that accounted

for more than 55 percent of Annex I carbon dioxide emissions in 1990. The Annex I countries include the 24 original members of the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (including the United

States), the European Union, and 14 countries with economies in transition (Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, and Eastern Europe).16

The IEO2005 reference case projections are based on U.S.

and foreign government laws in effect on March 1, 2005.

The potential impacts of pending or proposed legislation, regulations, and standards are not reflected in the

projections, nor are the impacts of legislation for which

implementing mechanisms have not been announced.

The IEO2005 reference case forecast does not include the

potential impacts of the Kyoto Protocol, because the

treaty does not indicate the methods by which ratifying

parties will implement their obligations. Moreover, the

Protocol does not address signatory obligations beyond

2012, making it impossible to assess its impacts on

energy markets and carbon dioxide emissions through

2025 in the context of a reference case projection.

Another difficulty in projecting energy-related carbon

dioxide emissions in the context of the Kyoto Protocol is

that, in the 5-year increments of the System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (SAGE) model, upon

which this forecast is based, 2010 is the only projection

year that is part of the Protocol’s first commitment

period. Further, the specific energy-consuming sectors

that will be affected in each country and region have not

been identified.

Despite the challenges, it is important to address the

possible impacts of the Kyoto Protocol, because they

could strongly influence future energy trends. Accordingly, this chapter begins with a presentation of the

IEO2005 reference case forecast for regional carbon dioxide emissions, which can serve as an estimate against

which future emissions reductions can be measured.

The IEO2005 Kyoto Protocol case assumes that the emissions goals of the Protocol will be met by the countries

that have ratified the treaty and have obligations to limit

or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, using a combination of domestic actions and purchases of international emissions permits. Results from the Kyoto

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 77

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

10

20

30

40

50

Billion Metric Tons

Mature Market Economies Total

Transitional Economies

Emerging Economies

Figure 67. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions

by Region, 1990-2025

Sources: 1990 and 2002: Energy Information Administration

(EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219

(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.

gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

15In keeping with current international practice, IEO2005 presents data on greenhouse gas emissions in million metric tons carbon dioxide equivalent. The figures can be converted to carbon equivalent units by multiplying by 12/44. 16As of May 27, 2005, 149 countries and the European Community had ratified, accepted, acceded to, or approved the Kyoto Protocol. A

list of the 149 countries is provided in Appendix J.
Protocol case are analyzed in the second part of the

chapter.

Reference Case

Carbon Dioxide Emissions

In the IEO2005 reference case, world carbon dioxide

emissions from the consumption of fossil fuels are

expected to grow at an average rate of 2.0 percent per

year from 2002 to 2025. Emissions in 2025 are projected

to total 38,790 million metric tons, exceeding 1990 levels

by 81 percent. Combustion of petroleum products

contributes 5,454 million metric tons to the projected

increase from 2002, coal 5,353 million metric tons,

and natural gas 3,540 million metric tons (Figure 68).

Although coal use is projected to grow at a slower rate

than natural gas use over the projection period, coal is a

more carbon-intensive fuel than natural gas. As a result,

the increment in carbon dioxide emissions from coal

combustion is larger than the increment in emissions

from natural gas.

The mature market economies, for the most part, are

growing more slowly than the emerging economies, and

their growth tends to be in less energy-intensive sectors.

As a result, carbon dioxide emissions from the mature

market economies are projected to grow by 1.1 percent

per year from 2002 to 2025, absent binding constraints

(Figure 69 and Table 10). Emissions from North America

are projected to grow the most rapidly among the

mature market regions, by 1.5 percent per year. North

America’s average annual increase in gross domestic

product (GDP) is 3.1 percent over the forecast horizon,

and that strong economic growth, combined with

projected increases in population, drives the demand for

fossil fuels and thus the projected increase in carbon

dioxide emissions.

In contrast to North America, Western Europe and

mature market Asia are projected to have fairly modest

growth in GDP (2.0 and 1.8 percent per year, respectively) and either flat or declining population numbers

over the forecast. Thus, only limited growth in demand

for energy is projected for those regions, leading to

slower growth in emissions. For Western Europe, carbon dioxide emissions are projected to grow by 0.5 percent per year on average from 2002 to 2025, and for

mature market Asia the projected average annual

increase in emissions is 0.6 percent.

The economic collapse of the transitional economies of

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EE/FSU)

dampened the growth of carbon dioxide emissions

worldwide between 1990 and 2002. In the IEO2005 reference case, carbon dioxide emissions in the EE/FSU

region are projected to increase on average by 1.5 percent per year, to 3,937 million metric tons in 2015 and

4,386 million metric tons in 2025 (Figure 70). The transitional economies are dominated by Russia, the region’s

largest economy, which accounts for 51 percent of its

energy consumption and 45 percent of related carbon

dioxide emissions.

Although GDP growth in the EE/FSU region is projected to average 4.4 percent per year from 2002 to 2025,

improvements in energy infrastructure are expected to

keep the growth in energy demand at an annual average

of 1.6 percent. In addition, an increase in natural gas as a

share of total energy production and a drop in coal’s

78 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

1970 1980 1990 2002 2015 2025

0

10

20

30

40

50

Billion Metric Tons

History Projections

Oil

Natural Gas

Coal

Total

Figure 68. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by

Fuel Type, 1970-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

5

10

15

20

Billion Metric Tons

North America

Western Europe

Mature Market Asia

Figure 69. Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the Mature

Market Economies, 1990-2025

Sources: 1990 and 2002: Energy Information Administration

(EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219

(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.

gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
share are expected to lower the carbon intensity of

energy supply in the region and keep carbon dioxide

emissions in the transitional economies well below their

1990 level of 4,894 million metric tons.

For the world’s emerging economies, the reference case

projects strong economic growth driven largely by the

energy-intensive industrial and transportation sectors.

Accordingly, carbon dioxide emissions in the emerging

economies are projected to grow at twice the rate projected for the transitional economies and almost three

times the rate for the mature market economies, averaging 3.2 percent per year from 2002 to 2025. The most

rapid increases in carbon dioxide emissions are projected for the nations of emerging Asia (Figure 71).

Carbon Dioxide Intensity

World carbon dioxide intensity has improved (decreased) substantially over the past three decades, falling from 853 metric tons per million 2000 U.S. dollars of

GDP in 1970 to 517 metric tons per million dollars in

2002. Although the pace of improvement in emissions

intensity is expected to be slower over the 2002 to 2025

period than over the past three decades, a continuing

decline in intensity is projected in the reference case, to

422 metric tons per million dollars in 2015 and 344 metric

tons per million dollars in 2025.

On a regional basis, the most rapid rates of improvement

in carbon dioxide intensity are projected for the transitional economies of the EE/FSU and for the emerging

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 79

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

2

4

6

8

Billion Metric Tons

Former Soviet Union

Eastern Europe

History Projections

Figure 70. Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the

Transitional Economies, 1990-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219 (2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

5

10

15

20

25

Billion Metric Tons

Emerging Asia

Middle East

Africa

Central and South America

History Projections

Figure 71. Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the

Emerging Economies, 1990-2025

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),

International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219 (2002)

(Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/

iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).

Table 10. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region, 1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons)

Region

History Projections Average Annual Percent Change

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 1990-2002 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies . . . . 10,465 11,877 13,080 13,745 14,392 15,183 1.1 1.1

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,769 6,701 7,674 8,204 8,759 9,379 1.3 1.5

Western Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,413 3,549 3,674 3,761 3,812 3,952 0.3 0.5

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . 1,284 1,627 1,731 1,780 1,822 1,852 2.0 0.6

Transitional Economies . . . . . . 4,894 3,124 3,643 3,937 4,151 4,386 -3.7 1.5

Emerging Economies . . . . . . . . 6,101 9,408 13,478 15,602 17,480 19,222 3.7 3.2

Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,890 6,205 9,306 10,863 12,263 13,540 4.0 3.5

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 1,361 1,761 1,975 2,163 2,352 4.1 2.4

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655 854 1,122 1,283 1,415 1,524 2.2 2.5

Central and South America . . . . 711 988 1,289 1,480 1,639 1,806 2.8 2.7

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,460 24,409 30,201 33,284 36,023 38,790 1.1 2.0

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
economies of China and India. In the FSU, economic

recovery from the upheaval of the 1990s is expected to

continue throughout the forecast. The FSU nations are

also expected to replace old, inefficient capital stock as

economic recovery progresses.

The Eastern European nations began their economic

recovery much earlier than the nations of the FSU. As a

result of strong investment in improving the efficiency

of energy use among Eastern European countries and a

push to increase the use of natural gas, carbon dioxide

intensity fell by more than 43 percent in Eastern Europe

between 1990 and 2002, as compared with an increase of

almost 4 percent in Russia and a decrease of 27 percent in

the other FSU nations. Improvement in carbon dioxide

intensity in Eastern Europe is projected to continue over

the projection period, at an average rate of 2.6 percent

per year (Table 11).

Emerging Asia is expected to see fairly rapid improvement in carbon dioxide intensity over the 2002-2025

period, primarily as a result of rapid economic growth

rather than a switch to less carbon-intensive fuels. China

and India, in particular, are expected to remain heavily

reliant on fossil fuels, especially coal, in the IEO2005 reference case, but their combined annual GDP growth is

projected to average 5.9 percent, compared with an

expected 3.9-percent annual rate of increase in fossil fuel

use over the projection period. China’s carbon dioxide

intensity is expected to decrease by 2.1 percent per year

on average between 2002 and 2025 and India’s by 2.4

percent per year.

Rates of improvement in carbon dioxide intensity could

vary considerably in the future, based on technological

advances, government policy initiatives, and economic

growth rates. In the IEO2005 reference case, world carbon dioxide intensity is projected to fall from 517 metric

tons per million 2000 dollars of GDP in 2002 to 344 metric tons per million dollars in 2025; however, if world

economic growth expands to the levels projected in the

IEO2005 high economic growth case, carbon dioxide

intensity could fall more quickly, to 325 metric tons per

million dollars in 2025. In contrast, if the world economy

expands more slowly, as in the low economic growth

case, carbon dioxide intensity could decline to a projected 383 metric tons per million dollars in 2025.

80 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Table 11. Carbon Dioxide Intensity by Region and Country, 1970-2025

(Metric Tons per Million 2000 U.S. Dollars of Gross Domestic Product)

Region

History Projections

Average Annual

Percent Change

1970 1980 1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

1990-

2002

2002-

2025

Mature Market Economies

North America

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,117 917 701 571 501 459 423 393 -2.1 -1.6

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,046 883 691 612 562 527 495 481 -1.7 -1.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 405 452 377 340 317 286 255 0.2 -1.7

Western Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . 695 624 471 377 333 307 281 264 -1.9 -1.5

Mature Market Asia

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 627 497 348 359 310 291 274 259 -1.7 -1.4

Australia/New Zealand. . . . . . . 1,094 715 702 721 667 621 583 544 -1.3 -1.2

Transitional Economies

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 897 820 850 635 568 504 445 0.0 -2.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,211 1,210 1,843 1,346 926 801 682 602 0.3 -3.4

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,454 1,445 1,198 679 549 482 422 372 -2.3 -2.6

Emerging Economies

Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 766 637 470 434 389 343 300 -2.0 -1.9

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,560 1,943 1,252 605 570 500 436 375 -4.4 -2.1

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 312 346 324 272 242 212 185 0.4 -2.4

South Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 791 868 698 680 555 515 484 454 -0.5 -1.7

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506 566 894 951 833 761 687 621 2.0 -1.8

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522 542 609 595 549 518 477 431 0.4 -1.4

Central and South America . . . . 481 409 408 414 407 383 347 314 -0.5 -1.2

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 753 649 517 461 422 381 344 -1.6 -1.8

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Kyoto Protocol Case

Modeling Approach

Under the Kyoto Protocol, participating Annex I nations

are required to reduce or limit emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases over the first commitment period (January 2008 to December 2012) to a level

that was determined as part of the negotiation process.

The year 1990 was used as the base year for most countries, although some were allowed to use other years.17

To fulfill their obligations under the treaty, the Annex I

countries must limit their emissions over the 5-year

commitment period to an annual average that is at or

below their commitment goals. Because the SAGE

model used to generate IEO2005 forecasts projects in

5-year increments, 2010 is used as the basis year for

achieving commitments in the first period.18

The SAGE model comprises 15 regions. In the Kyoto

Protocol case, the model regions affected by the treaty

are Canada, Japan, Western Europe, Eastern Europe,

and the FSU. Although New Zealand has ratified the

Protocol and intends to honor the terms of the treaty,

Australia has not. In SAGE, New Zealand and Australia

are treated as a single entity; and Australia’s energy use

far exceeds New Zealand’s. Therefore, projections for

Australia/New Zealand are not included in the results

of the Kyoto Protocol case.

In the formulation of the Kyoto Protocol case, assumptions were made about how the affected regions would

achieve their reductions, based whenever possible on

official government statements. For instance, the European Union (EU) has stated that “most” of its greenhouse gas emissions reductions must be achieved

domestically. The Kyoto Protocol case therefore

assumes that 50 percent of the aggregate emission

reduction for Western Europe will be met by domestic

reductions, as opposed to using the international market

mechanisms allowed under the Protocol (see box on

page 83).

Both Japan and Canada have higher domestic reduction

costs than Western Europe, and neither country has

announced its intentions on the specific share of reductions that must be reached through domestic actions. In

the Kyoto Protocol case, both countries are assumed to

achieve 25 percent of their total reductions domestically.

In the IEO2005 Kyoto Protocol case, a country or region

is first required to achieve its domestic reduction goal.

After the domestic requirement has been met, the country or region is free to seek other means of meeting its

overall reduction goal—for example, by trading carbon

permits internationally. In SAGE, the “shadow price” of

reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 1 metric ton in a

given country or region is used to determine the price

that the country or region would be willing to pay for the

next additional reduction of 1 metric ton. If the price of a

carbon permit traded internationally exceeds the

shadow price of the domestic reduction, then the country or region would be better off achieving that reduction domestically. If the price of a purchased permit is

less than the shadow price, then the country or region

would be expected to choose the trading option.

Unlike the mature market economies that have ratified

the Kyoto Protocol, the EE/FSU transitional economies

have reported estimated emissions that are below their

Kyoto goal levels. Over the forecast period the credits

they provide would be enough to satisfy all the other

Annex I countries’ demand for reductions once their

domestic goals are met. The credits available from the

EE/FSU countries have no direct costs, because they do

not require any actions to be taken. Under the model

structure of perfect competition, price equals cost; however, a transaction cost of $10 per ton was imposed in the

SAGE model in order to derive a price greater than zero.

Summary

The Kyoto Protocol case assumes that energy use will

not vary from the reference case forecast for Annex I

countries that are not expected to participate in the

treaty (the United States and Australia, for example) or

for countries that are not required to make reductions

according to the terms of the treaty (China and India, for

example). As a result, only the projections for energy use

in the Annex I nations committed to participating in the

Kyoto Protocol are changed in the Kyoto Protocol case.

For the participating Annex I group, total energy

demand in the Kyoto Protocol case is projected to be 3

quadrillion Btu lower than in the reference case in 2010,

and almost 4 quadrillion Btu lower in 2025, assuming

that the Kyoto targets remain constant over the entire

forecast period (Table 12).

In the Kyoto Protocol case, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in the participating nations are projected

to be 402 million metric tons lower than in the reference

case in 2010 and 593 million metric tons lower in 2025.

Total coal use among the participating Annex I nations

in 2025 is projected to be about 18 percent lower than in

the reference case in 2025, and the carbon dioxide emissions associated with their coal use are projected to be

nearly 21 percent lower than in the reference case, primarily because of the expected penetration of carbon

sequestration technologies in Western Europe. These

technologies sequester 90 percent of the emissions from

coal-fired generation. The penetration of the sequestration technology also limits the potential for renewables

development.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 81

17The countries using a base year other than 1990 are Bulgaria (1988), Hungary (1985-87), Poland (1988), and Romania (1989). 18For detailed assumptions in the Kyoto Protocol case, see Appendix G.
Total oil consumption for the participating nations is

almost 2 quadrillion Btu lower in the Kyoto Protocol

case in 2025, and the emissions associated with their oil

use are 143 million metric tons lower. In the short term,

natural gas is expected to displace coal use among the

participating Annex I nations, because natural gas is

cleaner than coal and has an economic advantage over

nuclear and renewable energy sources that produce no

net carbon dioxide emissions. In the longer term, as the

marginal costs of carbon dioxide reductions increase,

natural gas becomes less attractive than the non-fossil

fuels, especially nuclear power, which is projected to

begin to displace natural gas by 2025. The projection for

natural gas consumption in the Kyoto Protocol case is 2.8

quadrillion Btu higher than the reference case projection

in 2010 and 1.7 quadrillion Btu in 2025, when non-fossil

fuel use is projected to be 1.4 quadrillion Btu higher in

the Kyoto Protocol case than in the reference case.

The projected penetration of renewable fuels in the

energy markets of participating Annex I countries is

lower in the Kyoto Protocol case than in the reference

case, for a number of reasons. Electricity generation

from nuclear power is 1.9 percent higher in the Kyoto

Protocol case than in the reference case in 2010 and 12.5

percent higher in 2025; and total energy use is 1.8 percent lower in 2010 and 1.7 percent lower in 2025. As a

result, even though generation from non-fossil fuels

makes up a larger share of total energy consumption in

the Kyoto Protocol case than in the reference case,

renewable generation is lower.

Regional Projections

Canada

Canada is the only Annex I country in North America

that has ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Its goal is to reduce

carbon dioxide emissions to 6 percent below 1990 levels,

to a total of about 444 million metric tons in 2010, or

35 percent below the IEO2005 reference case projection

of 681 million metric tons. As indicated above, it is

assumed that 59.3 million metric tons (25 percent) of the

carbon dioxide emission reductions in Canada will be

met through domestic actions, and 177.8 million metric

tons (75 percent) will be met through the Protocol’s market mechanisms.

In April 2005, Canada unveiled its plan for compliance,

based on multiple approaches. The plan includes binding constraints on the country’s electric power sector

and large-scale industrial emitters, subsidies for wind

power, a “partnership fund” between government and

industry, soil management goals, and programs in consumer awareness and voluntary reductions by

automakers. The Canadian government also has budgeted $3.2 billion to $4.0 billion for purchases of carbon

credits, depending on the permit price [1].

The Kyoto Protocol case projects that, at the 25-percent

domestic level, the marginal cost for emission reductions from domestic sources in Canada will be around

$26 per metric ton of carbon dioxide in 2010 and, assuming that constraints are held constant after 2012, about

$36 per metric ton in 2025. Canada’s energy demand in

2010 is projected to be 0.3 quadrillion Btu (1.8 percent)

lower in the Kyoto Protocol case than in the IEO2005 reference case, and its energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in 2010 are projected to be 59 million metric tons

(8.7 percent) lower (Table 13). In 2025, its projected

energy demand is 0.5 quadrillion Btu below the reference case level (assuming that the Kyoto goals for Canada will not change over the forecast period), and its

energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are 91 million

metric tons lower than in the reference case.

Canada’s coal consumption and associated carbon dioxide emissions are projected to be about 41 percent lower

in 2010 and 55 percent lower in 2025 in the Kyoto Protocol case than in the reference case. Emissions associated

with oil consumption are projected to be about the same

in the two cases in 2025, and emissions from natural gas

use are projected to be 5.2 percent higher in 2010 and

11.6 percent higher in 2025. Canada’s consumption of

non-fossil energy in 2025 is projected to be 0.9 percent

82 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Table 12. Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Fuel in Participating Annex I Countries

in Two Cases, 2010 and 2025

Fuel

Energy Consumption (Quadrillion Btu) Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million Metric Tons)

2010 2025 2010 2025

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Oil . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 56.8 63.2 61.4 3,803 3,719 4,142 3,998

Natural Gas . . . 54.9 57.6 71.3 73.1 2,896 3,046 3,765 3,863

Coal . . . . . . . . . 27.0 22.1 26.7 21.9 2,504 2,036 2,472 1,943

Nuclear . . . . . . 17.3 17.7 18.3 20.6 ————

Renewables . . . 14.4 14.4 17.8 16.9 ————

Total . . . . . . . 171.7 168.6 197.3 193.8 9,203 8,801 10,386 9,793

Source: Energy Information Administration, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
higher in the Kyoto Protocol case than in the reference

case.

Western Europe

The countries of Western Europe have ratified the Kyoto

Protocol individually, and the EU has adopted a goal of

reducing its member countries’ aggregate carbon dioxide emissions to 8 percent below their 1990 level, or to an

average of 3,123 million metric tons per year during the

first commitment period. That goal, which is about 15

percent below the 2010 projection in the IEO2005 reference case, would require a reduction of 545 million

metric tons from the reference case level, 50 percent of

which (273 million metric tons) is assumed to be met

through domestic programs.

The EU has developed its own plan for emissions trading in the 2005 to 2007 period, in preparation for the first

Kyoto commitment period in 2008. The EU Greenhouse

Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) allocates emissions to more than 12,000 specific installations across 25

member countries and requires reductions or permits to

meet those allocated goals; however, there have been

some mixed messages coming out of the EU in the

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 83

Market Mechanisms Under the Kyoto Protocol

In order to help participating countries meet their

goals, the Kyoto Protocol includes market mechanisms

that are designed to allow some flexibility in reaching

reduction targets. The three primary market mechanisms are described below.

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): The CDM is

designed to promote participation by emerging economies in projects that lead to certified and verifiable

emissions reductions. It allows Annex I countries to

invest in emissions reduction projects in non-Annex I

countries and apply credits received for those projects

toward meeting their commitment goals. Currently,

CDM reductions achieved between 2000 and 2012 may

be used to meet requirements in the first commitment

period, 2008 to 2012.

Several recent studies have estimated that the average

annual demand for CDM Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) will be between 50 and 500 million metric

tons, and that the cost of a CER will be between $5 and

$15 per metric ton.a Emission reductions in 2010 of 400

million metric tons carbon dioxide equivalent would

require annual investments of $10 billion. For reference, annual foreign direct investment in emerging

economies between 1997 and 2002 averaged $140 billion,b and it is estimated that the emerging economies

will need a total of $192 billion annually in energy

investments between 2001 and 2010.

Finally, CDM projects generally require a leadtime of 4

to 5 years to begin receiving credits. Because of risks to

both the buyers and sellers of CERs derived from CDM

projects and the abundance of excess emissions credits—so-called “hot air”—that could be sold internationally over the forecast period, the IEO2005 Kyoto

Protocol case does not explicitly include CDM projects.

However, CDM projects serve as a mitigating factor to

prevent the countries in possession of hot air credits

from exercising monopoly power, since in many cases

CDM projects would offer the best alternative to emissions trading after participating countries have met

their domestic goals.

Emissions Trading: This market mechanism allows

emitters who are in an advantageous position with

regard to emissions reductions (as most of the EE/FSU

countries currently are) to make further reductions

below their target levels and sell the difference to emitters whose domestic reduction costs are relatively

high. In theory, such trading would allow the necessary emission reduction to be achieved in the aggregate

at the lowest possible cost, regardless of where they

take place. Indeed, Russia and Ukraine could in theory

meet all the required reductions of Annex B countries.c

After domestic emissions reduction goals are achieved,

the IEO2005 Kyoto Protocol case assumes that additional reductions will be achieved by emissions

trading.

Joint Implementation (JI): This market mechanism is

similar to the CDM, except that JI projects would

involve only the Annex B countries, and only reductions achieved during the 2008-2012 commitment

period may be used. Because the SAGE model aggregates all the Western European countries into one

region, JI is implicit in the projections for Western

Europe. In contrast, because Canada and Japan are represented as single regions in SAGE, each must achieve

its domestic goals (in the modeling process) independently of JI projects. As with CDM projects, the IEO2005

Kyoto Protocol case assumes that emissions trading

will be the least-cost alternative to reductions once

domestic goals are achieved.

aE. Haites, Estimating the Market Potential for the Clean Development Mechanism: Review of Models and Lessons Learned. Prepared for the

World Bank Carbon Finance Business PCFplus Research Program, the International Energy Agency, and the International Emissions

Trading Association (Washington DC: PCFplus Report 19, June 2004), p. v, web site www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2004/cdm.pdf. bE. Haites, Estimating the Market Potential for the Clean Development Mechanism: Review of Models and Lessons Learned, p. iv. c

Annex B countries are the mature market economies that are part of Annex I, excluding the transitional economies.
months since the EU ETS was implemented. Earlier indications were that the EU wanted to meet its Kyoto goals

with a “significant element of their [reduction] efforts”

coming from domestic cuts [2], but recent analysis has

indicated that the cost of achieving domestic reductions

in countries such as the United Kingdom may have been

underestimated [3].

The IEO2005 Kyoto Protocol case assumes that 50 percent of the emission reductions in Western Europe will

be based on domestic actions, and the cost projections

are highly sensitive to that assumption. At the 50-

percent domestic reduction level, the cost of reducing

carbon dioxide emissions in the region is projected to be

$48 per metric ton in 2010, rising to $64 per metric ton in

2025. Western Europe’s total projected energy demand

is 2.2 quadrillion Btu lower in the Kyoto Protocol case

than in the reference case in 2010 and 2.8 quadrillion Btu

lower in 2025 (Table 14). Energy-related carbon dioxide

emissions are projected to be 273 million metric tons

lower than in the reference case in 2010 and 415 million

metric tons lower in 2025.

Western Europe’s coal consumption is projected to be 46

percent lower in 2010 in the Kyoto Protocol case than in

the reference case, and the carbon dioxide emissions

associated with its coal use are projected to be 45 percent

lower. In 2025, however, when coal use in Western

Europe is projected to be 47 percent lower than in the reference case, coal-related emissions are projected to be 58

percent lower, because technologies become available in

Western Europe by 2025 that will allow 90 percent of the

carbon dioxide emissions associated with coal combustion to be captured and sequestered. Oil consumption

and related emissions are projected to be about 5 percent

lower in the Kyoto Protocol case in 2025; natural gas consumption and associated emissions are projected to be

almost 7 percent higher in 2025; and consumption of

non-fossil fuels is projected to be 2.4 percent higher than

in the reference case in 2025.

Japan

Japan’s goal for reducing carbon dioxide emissions

under the Kyoto Protocol is estimated at 930 million

metric tons, or 6 percent below its 1990 emissions level.

That target represents a reduction of about 280 million

metric tons or 23 percent from the IEO2005 reference

case projection for 2010. If 25 percent of the goal is to be

met domestically, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions will have to be cut by 70.1 million metric tons from

the reference case projection in 2010, with the remaining

84 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Table 13. Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Fuel in Canada in Two Cases,

2010 and 2025

Fuel

Energy Consumption (Quadrillion Btu) Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million Metric Tons)

2010 2025 2010 2025

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Oil . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 4.9 5.5 5.5 306 305 344 341

Natural Gas . . . 4.0 4.2 4.8 5.4 210 220 253 282

Coal . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.1 2.3 1.0 166 97 210 93

Nuclear . . . . . . 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 ————

Renewables . . . 3.8 3.9 5.1 5.1 ————

Total . . . . . . . 15.6 15.3 18.8 18.3 681 622 807 716

Source: Energy Information Administration, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).

Table 14. Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Fuel in Western Europe in Two Cases,

2010 and 2025

Fuel

Energy Consumption (Quadrillion Btu) Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million Metric Tons)

2010 2025 2010 2025

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Oil . . . . . . . . . . 29.2 28.3 31.0 29.5 1,951 1,901 2,074 1,967

Natural Gas . . . 17.7 20.1 22.9 24.5 934 1,066 1,210 1,290

Coal . . . . . . . . . 8.2 4.5 6.9 3.6 783 428 661 281

Nuclear . . . . . . 9.0 9.3 7.8 9.0 ————

Renewables . . . 6.1 5.9 7.4 6.6 ————

Total . . . . . . . 70.2 68.0 76.1 73.3 3,668 3,395 3,952 3,537

Source: Energy Information Administration, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
reduction of 210.4 million metric tons accomplished

through purchases of emissions permits. In the IEO2005

Kyoto Protocol case, Japan’s domestic effort is projected

to yield marginal costs of $49 per metric ton of carbon

dioxide in 2010 and $43 per metric ton in 2025.

Japan’s energy demand in 2010 is projected to be 0.8

quadrillion Btu lower in the Kyoto Protocol case than in

the reference case (Table 15). Assuming that the country’s goals for the first commitment period remain in

place at the same level through 2025, its total energy

demand in 2025 is projected to be 0.5 quadrillion Btu

lower than in the reference case, and its energy-related

carbon dioxide emissions are projected to be 70 million

metric tons lower than the reference case projection in

2010 and 78 million metric tons lower in 2025.

Japan’s coal consumption is projected to be 7.5 percent

lower in 2025 in the Kyoto Protocol case than in the reference case, with a smaller reduction (3.6 percent) projected for oil consumption relative to the reference case

projection in 2025. Because natural gas is expected to be

used as a substitute for coal in the short run to help Japan

reach its Kyoto goal, emissions associated with natural

gas consumption are projected to be 4.1 percent higher

in the Kyoto Protocol case than in the reference case in

2010.

In March 2005, a proposed fossil fuel tax was stopped by

a government panel chaired by Prime Minister Junichiro

Koizumi [4]. Currently, the Japanese plan calls for voluntary industry efforts as the cornerstone of the plan to

meet its goals in the first commitment period. A shrinking population is expected to help Japan meet its goals in

later years.

References

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 85

Table 15. Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Fuel in Japan in Two Cases,

2010 and 2025

Fuel

Energy Consumption (Quadrillion Btu) Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million Metric Tons)

2010 2025 2010 2025

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Reference

Case

Kyoto

Protocol

Case

Oil . . . . . . . . . . 10.9 10.4 11.0 10.6 657 623 662 628

Natural Gas . . . 3.2 3.3 3.9 3.8 167 174 208 198

Coal . . . . . . . . . 4.3 3.8 4.1 3.8 386 343 372 338

Nuclear . . . . . . 3.3 3.3 4.0 4.4 ————

Renewables . . . 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.6 ————

Total . . . . . . . 22.9 22.1 24.7 24.2 1,211 1,141 1,242 1,164

Source: Energy Information Administration, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).

1. C. Holly, “Canada Unveils Kyoto Compliance

Plan,” The Energy Daily, Vol. 33, No. 74 (April 20,

2005), pp. 1 and 4; and Government of Canada, Project Green: Moving Forward on Climate Change

(Ottawa, Canada, April 2005), web site www.

climatechange.gc.ca/kyoto_commitments/

report_e.pdf.

2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change, “Parties to the Convention,” web site

http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/

items/2352.php.

3. World Markets Research Centre, “UK Energy Prices

To Rise More Than Europe” (September 16, 2004),

web site www.worldmarketsanalysis.com.

4. A. Mollet, “Policy Update: Japan,” World Fuels

Today (March 31, 2005), p. 2.

Appendix A

Reference Case Projections:

• World Energy Consumption

• Gross Domestic Product

• Carbon Dioxide Emissions

• World Population

Table A1. World Total Primary Energy Consumption by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 89

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.9 115.2 117.7 134.2 143.6 152.9 162.1 1.4

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84.6 96.3 98.0 110.6 117.6 125.1 132.4 1.3

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 12.8 13.1 15.6 16.9 17.8 18.8 1.6

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 6.1 6.6 8.0 9.1 10.0 10.9 2.2

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.9 68.0 67.4 70.2 72.2 73.4 76.1 0.5

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 22.7 28.0 28.4 30.4 31.5 32.5 33.6 0.7

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.3 21.9 22.0 22.9 23.6 24.1 24.7 0.5

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.1 6.5 7.5 7.9 8.4 8.8 1.4

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 183.6 211.2 213.5 234.7 247.3 258.7 271.8 1.1

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 60.9 42.0 42.4 49.7 53.9 57.2 61.0 1.6

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.1 27.7 27.5 31.3 33.5 35.7 37.9 1.4

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.8 14.3 14.9 18.4 20.4 21.5 23.1 1.9

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3 11.4 11.2 13.3 14.5 15.6 16.7 1.7

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.2 53.4 53.6 63.0 68.4 72.8 77.7 1.6

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.5 84.7 88.4 133.6 155.8 176.3 196.7 3.5

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.0 40.9 43.2 73.1 86.1 97.7 109.2 4.1

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 13.8 14.0 19.6 22.7 26.0 29.3 3.3

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 8.0 8.4 10.6 11.8 12.7 13.5 2.1

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.7 21.9 22.9 30.3 35.1 39.9 44.6 2.9

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 20.9 22.0 28.7 32.4 35.6 38.9 2.5

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 12.5 12.7 16.7 19.3 21.4 23.4 2.7

Central and South America . . . . . 14.5 21.2 21.2 26.8 30.4 33.2 36.1 2.3

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 8.4 8.6 10.2 11.6 13.2 15.1 2.5

Other Central/South America . . . . 8.8 12.7 12.6 16.6 18.8 20.0 21.1 2.3

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88.4 139.2 144.3 205.8 237.8 266.6 295.1 3.2

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348.2 403.9 411.5 503.5 553.5 598.1 644.6 2.0

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Notes: Energy totals include net imports of coal coke and electricity generated from biomass in the United States. Totals may not

equal sum of components due to independent rounding. The electricity portion of the national fuel consumption values consists of

generation for domestic use plus an adjustment for electricity trade based on a fuel’s share of total generation in the exporting country.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A2. World Total Energy Consumption by Region and Fuel, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Appendix A

90 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40.6 46.2 47.1 53.8 57.8 61.6 65.2 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.2 27.3 28.2 32.2 35.8 38.7 39.6 1.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.7 23.8 23.9 27.1 27.9 29.6 33.2 1.4

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9 8.9 9.0 9.8 9.9 10.0 9.9 0.4

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 9.0 9.5 11.3 12.1 13.0 14.1 1.7

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.9 115.2 117.7 134.2 143.6 152.9 162.1 1.4

Western Europe

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.9 28.9 28.6 29.2 29.7 30.0 31.0 0.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 15.2 15.4 17.7 19.5 20.9 22.9 1.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 8.7 8.6 8.2 7.8 7.3 6.9 -1.0

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 9.1 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.4 7.8 -0.7

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.0 5.5 6.1 6.4 6.8 7.4 1.3

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.9 68.0 67.4 70.2 72.2 73.4 76.1 0.5

Mature Market Asia

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 13.0 13.1 13.4 13.8 13.9 14.1 0.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.4 5.1 5.3 5.7 1.6

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 6.5 6.8 7.4 7.4 7.6 7.6 0.4

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.0 1.2

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.6

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.7 28.0 28.4 30.4 31.5 32.5 33.6 0.7

Total Mature Market

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79.0 88.0 88.8 96.4 101.3 105.5 110.3 0.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.4 46.5 47.5 54.3 60.3 64.9 68.2 1.6

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.3 39.0 39.4 42.7 43.1 44.5 47.7 0.8

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 21.1 21.2 22.1 22.3 22.0 21.7 0.1

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.6 16.5 16.6 19.1 20.3 21.8 23.8 1.6

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183.6 211.2 213.5 234.7 247.3 258.7 271.8 1.1

Transitional Economies

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.0 11.9 11.4 13.1 13.9 14.8 15.7 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.8 23.8 24.3 30.0 34.1 36.7 39.6 2.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.7 11.7 11.6 12.7 12.9 13.1 13.4 0.6

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.8 3.9 4.6 5.3 2.1

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.6 0.7

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.2 53.4 53.6 63.0 68.4 72.8 77.7 1.6

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.1 30.4 31.4 47.0 54.4 61.8 69.5 3.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 7.6 8.2 11.4 14.3 17.5 22.3 4.4

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.1 39.9 41.5 62.6 72.8 81.1 86.8 3.3

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.8 2.0 3.8 4.8 5.7 6.5 5.3

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 4.9 5.4 8.8 9.5 10.2 11.6 3.4

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.5 84.7 88.4 133.6 155.8 176.3 196.7 3.5

See notes at end of table.
Table A2. World Total Energy Consumption by Region and Fuel, Reference Case, 1990-2025 (Continued)

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 91

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Emerging Economies (Continued)

Middle East

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 11.3 11.7 15.1 16.6 17.7 18.8 2.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 8.0 8.6 11.1 13.2 15.2 17.4 3.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 —

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 3.3

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 20.9 22.0 28.7 32.4 35.6 38.9 2.5

Africa

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 5.4 5.5 7.6 8.7 9.5 10.1 2.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.5 2.6 3.4 4.4 5.2 6.4 4.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.7 3.7 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.3 1.6

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.2

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 12.5 12.8 16.7 19.3 21.4 23.4 2.7

Central and South America

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 11.0 10.7 13.9 15.8 17.4 18.9 2.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 3.8 3.8 5.0 6.1 7.0 8.1 3.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 2.2

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.4

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 5.4 5.7 6.6 7.0 7.2 7.4 1.2

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5 21.2 21.2 26.8 30.4 33.2 36.1 2.3

Total Emerging

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.1 58.1 59.2 83.6 95.5 106.3 117.4 3.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.8 21.9 23.3 30.9 37.9 45.0 54.2 3.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.4 45.6 47.1 69.8 80.4 89.1 95.0 3.1

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 2.2 2.3 4.3 5.5 6.3 7.1 5.0

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 11.5 12.4 17.3 18.6 19.8 21.5 2.4

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88.4 139.2 144.3 205.8 237.8 266.6 295.1 3.2

Total World

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136.0 158.0 159.4 193.1 210.6 226.6 243.4 1.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.0 92.2 95.2 115.2 132.4 146.6 162.1 2.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90.5 96.3 98.1 125.2 136.4 146.8 156.1 2.0

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.3 26.4 26.9 30.2 31.7 32.9 34.1 1.0

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.4 31.1 32.1 39.8 42.4 45.2 48.9 1.9

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348.2 403.9 411.5 503.5 553.5 598.1 644.6 2.0

Notes: Energy totals include net imports of coal coke and electricity generated from biomass in the United States. Totals may not

equal sum of components due to independent rounding. The electricity portion of the national fuel consumption values consists of

generation for domestic use plus an adjustment for electricity trade based on a fuel’s share of total generation in the exporting country.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A3. World Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Billion 2000 Dollars)

Appendix A

92 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,478 11,774 11,997 15,567 18,142 21,055 24,285 3.1

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,113 9,891 10,075 13,084 15,216 17,634 20,292 3.1

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684 929 961 1,211 1,378 1,527 1,675 2.4

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 955 962 1,272 1,548 1,893 2,318 3.9

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,246 9,314 9,416 11,044 12,255 13,563 14,958 2.0

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . 3,258 3,891 3,904 4,691 5,123 5,530 5,914 1.8

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,840 3,294 3,284 3,911 4,240 4,533 4,792 1.7

Australia/New Zealand. . . . . . . . 419 597 621 780 883 997 1,122 2.6

Total Mature Market. . . . . . . . 18,982 24,980 25,317 31,302 35,519 40,148 45,157 2.5

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . 3,306 2,274 2,392 3,827 4,672 5,627 6,707 4.6

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,241 1,583 1,657 2,543 3,019 3,571 4,192 4.1

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,065 691 735 1,283 1,653 2,056 2,516 5.5

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 1,040 1,068 1,527 1,863 2,253 2,702 4.1

Total Transitional. . . . . . . . . . . 4,220 3,314 3,460 5,354 6,535 7,880 9,409 4.4

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,108 12,456 13,196 21,467 27,953 35,723 45,110 5.5

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,807 5,087 5,494 9,716 13,003 16,919 21,699 6.2

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,684 3,021 3,160 5,031 6,524 8,430 10,807 5.5

South Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 619 662 988 1,209 1,399 1,592 3.9

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,282 3,728 3,880 5,732 7,216 8,975 11,012 4.6

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 1,365 1,431 2,113 2,594 3,147 3,789 4.3

Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,075 1,387 1,434 2,044 2,476 2,968 3,533 4.0

Central and South America. . . . 1,744 2,400 2,388 3,168 3,870 4,717 5,753 3.9

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,022 1,344 1,370 1,783 2,170 2,638 3,209 3.8

Other Central/South America. . . 722 1,056 1,018 1,385 1,699 2,080 2,544 4.1

Total Emerging. . . . . . . . . . . . 9,871 17,608 18,449 28,793 36,892 46,555 58,185 5.1

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,073 45,901 47,227 65,449 78,947 94,582 112,752 3.9

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: A. Heston, R. Summers, and B. Aten, “Penn World Table Version 6.1” (Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania, October 2002), web site http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php; Global Insight, Inc., World

Overview, First Quarter 2005 (Lexington, MA, March 2005); and Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2005,

DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington DC, January 2005), Table A19.
Table A4. World Oil Consumption by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Reference Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 93

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.5 23.7 23.8 27.2 29.2 31.1 32.9 1.4

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.0 19.6 19.7 22.5 24.2 25.8 27.3 1.4

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.6 1.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.0 1.8

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5 14.0 13.8 14.1 14.3 14.4 14.9 0.3

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 6.4 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 0.3

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.3 0.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 39.1 44.1 43.9 47.7 50.1 52.2 54.6 1.0

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 4.3 4.1 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.5 1.3

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 2.7 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.4 1.3

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.3

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.7

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.0 5.7 5.5 6.3 6.7 7.2 7.6 1.4

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 14.7 15.1 22.7 26.3 29.8 33.6 3.5

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 4.9 5.2 9.2 10.7 12.3 14.2 4.5

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 2.2 2.2 3.1 3.7 4.2 4.9 3.5

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.9 1.3

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 5.5 5.6 7.9 9.2 10.4 11.6 3.2

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 5.5 5.7 7.3 8.0 8.6 9.2 2.1

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.7 4.3 4.6 4.9 2.7

Central and South America . . . . . 3.8 5.4 5.2 6.8 7.8 8.5 9.3 2.5

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.7 2.3

Other Central/South America . . . . 2.3 3.2 3.1 4.3 5.0 5.3 5.6 2.6

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3 28.2 28.7 40.6 46.3 51.6 57.0 3.0

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66.5 78.0 78.2 94.6 103.2 111.0 119.2 1.9

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A5. World Natural Gas Consumption by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Trillion Cubic Feet)

Appendix A

94 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.5 26.6 27.4 31.3 34.8 37.6 38.6 1.5

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.2 22.2 23.0 25.6 28.3 30.4 30.9 1.3

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.7 2.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.0

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 14.9 15.0 17.3 19.0 20.4 22.4 1.8

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.8 5.1 5.4 1.6

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.8 1.5

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 35.2 45.2 46.2 52.8 58.7 63.1 66.4 1.6

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 25.0 20.8 21.3 25.6 29.0 31.0 33.3 2.0

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3 14.4 14.6 16.2 17.9 19.5 20.7 1.5

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 6.4 6.8 9.4 11.1 11.6 12.6 2.7

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 2.7 2.6 4.0 4.6 5.2 5.8 3.5

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.1 23.5 23.9 29.6 33.6 36.2 39.1 2.2

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 7.2 7.8 10.6 13.3 16.3 20.7 4.3

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 1.1 1.2 2.6 3.4 4.2 6.5 7.8

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.8 5.1

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.9 3.7

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 4.6 4.9 5.4 6.8 8.2 9.5 2.9

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 7.6 8.3 10.6 12.6 14.5 16.6 3.1

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 2.3 2.4 3.1 4.1 4.9 6.0 4.0

Central and South America . . . . . 2.0 3.5 3.6 4.6 5.6 6.5 7.5 3.3

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.1 6.8

Other Central/South America . . . . 1.9 3.1 3.1 3.8 4.3 4.8 5.4 2.4

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 20.6 22.0 29.0 35.6 42.2 50.7 3.7

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73.4 89.3 92.2 111.4 127.9 141.6 156.2 2.3

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A6. World Coal Consumption by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Million Short Tons)

Reference Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 95

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 1,144 1,152 1,326 1,375 1,457 1,629 1.5

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 1,060 1,066 1,227 1,271 1,351 1,505 1.5

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 70 72 78 80 81 99 1.4

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 15 14 21 24 25 25 2.6

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 572 573 544 514 486 459 -1.0

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 233 326 341 374 373 386 386 0.5

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 173 179 184 181 179 177 0.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 106 153 162 190 191 207 209 1.1

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 2,099 2,042 2,067 2,245 2,261 2,328 2,474 0.8

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 848 396 397 450 462 471 480 0.8

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462 242 229 283 293 292 288 1.0

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386 154 168 167 169 179 192 0.6

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524 384 374 384 388 390 394 0.2

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,372 779 771 834 850 860 874 0.5

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,555 2,033 2,118 3,196 3,715 4,138 4,435 3.3

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,124 1,357 1,422 2,302 2,704 3,037 3,242 3.6

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 414 421 544 614 674 736 2.5

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 75 80 97 116 130 142 2.5

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 188 196 253 281 298 316 2.1

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 98 84 116 117 118 116 1.4

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 188 186 231 249 267 267 1.6

Central and South America . . . . . 27 34 36 48 52 56 59 2.2

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 22 22 30 33 36 41 2.7

Other Central/South America . . . . 10 12 14 18 20 20 18 1.2

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,799 2,353 2,424 3,592 4,134 4,579 4,878 3.1

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,270 5,174 5,262 6,670 7,245 7,767 8,226 2.0

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Notes: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding. To convert short tons to metric tons, divide each

number in the table by 1.102.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A7. World Nuclear Energy Consumption by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Billion Kilowatthours)

Appendix A

96 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649 850 860 937 953 957 952 0.4

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577 769 780 813 826 830 830 0.3

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 73 71 114 117 117 112 2.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 9 10 10 10 10 0.2

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703 870 876 864 854 802 752 -0.7

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 192 303 295 319 330 351 380 1.1

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 303 295 319 330 351 380 1.1

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0000000 —

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 1,544 2,024 2,032 2,120 2,136 2,110 2,083 0.1

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 201 210 224 275 279 332 399 2.5

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 125 134 151 153 173 218 2.1

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 85 90 124 125 160 181 3.1

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 72 79 89 98 105 113 1.6

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 282 302 364 376 437 512 2.3

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 178 194 367 464 551 620 5.2

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 17 23 72 137 162 200 9.8

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 18 18 67 89 123 132 9.1

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 107 113 169 179 185 196 2.4

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 36 40 60 59 81 93 3.8

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0006666 —

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11 12 13 14 15 15 0.9

Central and South America . . . . . 9 21 19 20 35 33 34 2.5

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 14 14 14 23 23 24 2.3

Other Central/South America . . . . 7 7 5 6 11 10 10 2.9

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 209 225 406 519 605 675 4.9

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,905 2,515 2,560 2,890 3,032 3,152 3,270 1.1

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A8. World Consumption of Hydroelectricity and Other Renewable Energy by Region, Reference Case,

1990-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 97

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 9.0 9.5 11.3 12.1 13.0 14.1 1.7

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.0 5.2 5.9 6.9 7.2 7.7 8.3 1.5

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.8 4.2 4.6 5.1 1.9

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 3.0

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.0 5.5 6.1 6.4 6.8 7.4 1.3

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.6

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 15.6 16.5 16.6 19.1 20.3 21.8 23.8 1.6

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.4

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 0.7

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 -0.6

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.6

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.6 0.7

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 4.9 5.4 8.8 9.5 10.2 11.6 3.4

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 2.6 3.1 5.2 5.7 6.2 6.7 3.4

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.7 3.8

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 4.6

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.4 1.5 2.2 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.1

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 3.3

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.2

Central and South America . . . . . 3.9 5.4 5.7 6.6 7.0 7.2 7.4 1.2

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.0 1.2

Other Central/South America . . . . 1.7 2.6 2.7 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.2

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 11.5 12.4 17.3 18.6 19.8 21.5 2.4

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.4 31.1 32.1 39.8 42.4 45.2 48.9 1.9

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Notes: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding. U.S. totals include net electricity imports, methanol,

and liquid hydrogen.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A9. World Net Electricity Consumption by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Billion Kilowatthours)

Appendix A

98 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,369 4,247 4,328 5,193 5,693 6,208 6,741 1.9

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,827 3,554 3,651 4,272 4,643 5,043 5,470 1.8

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435 508 487 644 713 774 828 2.3

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 185 190 277 337 390 443 3.8

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,069 2,551 2,556 2,613 2,786 2,872 3,072 0.8

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 930 1,136 1,202 1,273 1,358 1,434 1,506 1.0

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 765 910 971 1,000 1,060 1,110 1,154 0.8

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 166 226 231 273 299 324 352 1.8

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 6,368 7,934 8,086 9,079 9,837 10,514 11,319 1.5

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,488 1,131 1,154 1,794 2,048 2,254 2,421 3.3

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 769 780 1,043 1,188 1,323 1,469 2.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533 363 374 750 860 932 951 4.1

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 389 390 540 606 663 724 2.7

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,906 1,520 1,544 2,334 2,654 2,917 3,145 3.1

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,259 2,711 2,914 4,909 5,843 6,723 7,552 4.2

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551 1,302 1,457 2,801 3,327 3,816 4,260 4.8

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 509 510 773 961 1,150 1,340 4.3

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 247 267 381 436 480 520 2.9

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358 653 680 955 1,119 1,278 1,433 3.3

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 547 574 861 997 1,106 1,203 3.3

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 410 422 622 755 867 980 3.7

Central and South America . . . . . 463 715 735 1,070 1,314 1,550 1,818 4.0

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 338 352 457 563 697 864 4.0

Other Central/South America . . . . 234 377 383 613 751 853 955 4.0

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,272 4,383 4,645 7,462 8,909 10,246 11,554 4.0

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,546 13,836 14,275 18,875 21,400 23,677 26,018 2.6

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A10. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

Reference Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 99

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,769 6,624 6,701 7,674 8,204 8,759 9,379 1.5

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,989 5,692 5,751 6,561 6,988 7,461 7,981 1.4

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473 573 588 681 726 757 807 1.4

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 359 363 432 490 541 591 2.1

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,413 3,585 3,549 3,674 3,761 3,812 3,952 0.5

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 1,284 1,610 1,627 1,731 1,780 1,822 1,852 0.6

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 1,182 1,179 1,211 1,232 1,240 1,242 0.2

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 294 429 448 520 548 582 610 1.4

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 10,465 11,819 11,877 13,080 13,745 14,392 15,183 1.1

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 3,798 2,393 2,399 2,804 3,040 3,201 3,379 1.5

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,347 1,553 1,522 1,732 1,857 1,971 2,063 1.3

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,452 840 877 1,072 1,183 1,230 1,317 1.8

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,095 744 726 839 898 951 1,006 1.4

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,894 3,137 3,124 3,643 3,937 4,151 4,386 1.5

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,890 5,967 6,205 9,306 10,863 12,263 13,540 3.5

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,262 3,176 3,322 5,536 6,506 7,373 8,133 4.0

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583 1,009 1,025 1,369 1,581 1,786 1,994 2.9

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 431 451 549 623 676 723 2.1

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 1,351 1,407 1,853 2,154 2,428 2,689 2.9

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 1,311 1,361 1,761 1,975 2,163 2,352 2.4

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655 840 854 1,122 1,283 1,415 1,524 2.5

Central and South America . . . . . 711 998 988 1,289 1,480 1,639 1,806 2.7

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 343 342 433 502 583 679 3.0

Other Central/South America . . . . 461 655 646 856 979 1,056 1,128 2.5

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,101 9,116 9,408 13,478 15,602 17,480 19,222 3.2

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,460 24,072 24,409 30,201 33,284 36,023 38,790 2.0

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: The U.S. numbers include carbon dioxide emissions attributable to renewable energy sources.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A11. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Oil Use by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

Appendix A

100 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,639 2,983 2,987 3,426 3,688 3,931 4,164 1.5

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,178 2,458 2,457 2,826 3,037 3,239 3,436 1.5

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 268 274 306 323 334 344 1.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 258 256 295 328 358 385 1.8

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,739 1,933 1,911 1,951 1,985 2,003 2,074 0.4

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 768 808 796 821 841 852 862 0.3

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655 668 657 657 665 664 662 0.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 113 140 139 164 177 188 201 1.6

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 5,145 5,724 5,695 6,199 6,515 6,786 7,100 1.0

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,224 607 581 667 698 736 776 1.3

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 783 378 356 412 429 464 493 1.4

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 229 225 255 269 273 283 1.0

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 197 192 222 245 265 286 1.7

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,468 803 773 889 943 1,002 1,062 1.4

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,116 1,886 1,940 2,922 3,386 3,850 4,340 3.6

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 638 669 1,193 1,385 1,599 1,845 4.5

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 278 279 390 466 542 621 3.5

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 236 241 284 306 318 326 1.3

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 733 751 1,055 1,229 1,392 1,548 3.2

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568 781 804 1,037 1,140 1,220 1,297 2.1

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 369 377 523 599 653 697 2.7

Central and South America . . . . . 541 729 712 926 1,053 1,155 1,259 2.5

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 281 275 322 356 407 465 2.3

Other Central/South America . . . . 330 448 437 604 697 748 794 2.6

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,529 3,764 3,834 5,408 6,178 6,878 7,594 3.0

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,142 10,292 10,302 12,496 13,635 14,665 15,756 1.9

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A12. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Natural Gas Use by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

Reference Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 101

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,207 1,423 1,470 1,691 1,880 2,033 2,083 1.5

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,026 1,189 1,227 1,380 1,523 1,639 1,665 1.3

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 157 160 210 234 251 253 2.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 77 83 102 123 142 165 3.0

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514 803 812 934 1,029 1,104 1,210 1.8

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 133 209 209 234 268 280 300 1.6

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 150 147 167 187 200 208 1.5

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 44 59 62 67 81 80 92 1.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 1,854 2,436 2,491 2,859 3,177 3,416 3,594 1.6

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,352 1,119 1,147 1,376 1,561 1,668 1,791 2.0

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 768 776 865 954 1,036 1,105 1.5

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424 351 371 512 607 632 686 2.7

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 139 136 209 241 271 301 3.5

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,519 1,258 1,283 1,585 1,802 1,940 2,093 2.2

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 402 434 601 754 924 1,176 4.4

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 66 71 163 209 259 401 7.8

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 46 48 75 96 125 152 5.1

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 44 48 69 82 96 111 3.7

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 246 267 294 366 444 512 2.9

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 421 457 586 696 803 916 3.1

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 130 139 178 230 277 340 4.0

Central and South America . . . . . 116 202 203 265 321 370 428 3.3

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 22 26 57 87 111 140 7.6

Other Central/South America . . . . 110 181 177 208 234 260 288 2.1

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569 1,156 1,232 1,630 2,001 2,375 2,860 3.7

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,942 4,849 5,006 6,074 6,980 7,731 8,547 2.4

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A13. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal Use by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

Appendix A

102 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,923 2,214 2,247 2,537 2,616 2,774 3,110 1.4

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,784 2,042 2,070 2,335 2,407 2,561 2,858 1.4

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 148 154 166 169 172 210 1.4

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 24 23 36 39 41 42 2.6

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,160 849 825 783 740 699 661 -1.0

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 383 593 622 675 671 690 689 0.4

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 364 375 386 380 376 372 0.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 138 229 247 289 291 314 317 1.1

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 3,465 3,656 3,694 3,995 4,026 4,162 4,459 0.8

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,222 667 671 761 781 796 812 0.8

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635 408 390 456 473 471 465 0.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587 260 281 304 308 325 347 0.9

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685 409 397 408 412 414 419 0.2

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,907 1,076 1,068 1,169 1,193 1,210 1,231 0.6

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,607 3,679 3,831 5,784 6,724 7,488 8,024 3.3

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,886 2,472 2,582 4,181 4,911 5,514 5,887 3.6

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394 684 698 903 1,019 1,119 1,222 2.5

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 152 161 196 235 263 286 2.5

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 371 389 504 559 592 629 2.1

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 110 100 138 140 140 139 1.4

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 340 338 421 453 485 486 1.6

Central and South America . . . . . 54 66 73 98 106 114 120 2.2

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 40 41 54 59 66 74 2.6

Other Central/South America . . . . 20 26 32 44 47 48 46 1.6

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,003 4,196 4,342 6,441 7,423 8,227 8,768 3.1

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,375 8,928 9,105 11,604 12,642 13,600 14,458 2.0

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web

site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table A14. World Population by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Millions)

Reference Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 103

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 417 423 457 477 497 517 0.9

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 286 289 310 324 337 351 0.9

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 31 31 33 34 35 36 0.6

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 100 103 113 120 125 130 1.0

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376 391 392 396 397 397 397 0.1

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 144 150 151 153 153 152 151 0.0

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 127 127 128 127 126 123 -0.1

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 20 23 24 25 26 27 28 0.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 884 959 966 1,006 1,028 1,047 1,065 0.4

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 290 289 288 283 280 277 272 -0.2

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 145 144 138 133 129 124 -0.6

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 144 144 145 147 148 148 0.1

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 121 121 119 118 117 115 -0.2

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 412 410 408 402 398 393 387 -0.2

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,791 3,288 3,355 3,658 3,850 4,022 4,168 0.9

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,155 1,285 1,300 1,365 1,402 1,429 1,445 0.5

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 1,033 1,059 1,174 1,246 1,312 1,369 1.1

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 47 48 49 50 50 50 0.2

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 746 923 949 1,071 1,152 1,230 1,304 1.4

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 247 255 294 322 349 375 1.7

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 622 814 844 984 1,085 1,188 1,292 1.9

Central and South America . . . . . 358 428 437 481 509 534 557 1.1

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 174 178 193 202 210 216 0.9

Other Central/South America . . . . 210 254 260 288 307 324 341 1.2

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,965 4,777 4,891 5,418 5,765 6,092 6,392 1.2

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,261 6,145 6,266 6,825 7,191 7,533 7,844 1.0

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Sources: United States: Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington,

DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web site

www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/. Other Countries: United Nations, Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs

of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: 2002 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects (New York, NY,

July 11, 2003).

Appendix B

High Economic Growth Case Projections:

• World Energy Consumption

• Gross Domestic Product

• Carbon Dioxide Emissions

Table B1. World Total Primary Energy Consumption by Region, High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

High Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 107

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.9 115.2 117.7 138.4 150.0 160.8 173.0 1.7

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84.6 96.3 98.0 114.2 123.1 131.5 141.4 1.6

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 12.8 13.1 16.0 17.6 18.7 20.0 1.9

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 6.1 6.6 8.2 9.4 10.5 11.7 2.5

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.9 68.0 67.4 71.5 74.3 76.9 80.7 0.8

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 22.7 28.0 28.4 31.0 32.6 34.0 35.6 1.0

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.3 21.9 22.0 23.4 24.4 25.2 26.1 0.8

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.1 6.5 7.6 8.2 8.8 9.5 1.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 183.6 211.2 213.5 241.0 256.9 271.7 289.3 1.3

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 60.9 42.0 42.4 51.7 57.5 62.1 67.3 2.0

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.1 27.7 27.5 32.7 35.9 38.9 41.8 1.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.8 14.3 14.9 19.0 21.5 23.2 25.5 2.4

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3 11.4 11.2 13.8 15.4 16.9 18.5 2.2

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.2 53.4 53.6 65.5 72.8 79.0 85.8 2.1

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.5 84.7 88.4 139.8 167.4 194.7 223.2 4.1

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.0 40.9 43.2 76.3 92.2 107.6 123.5 4.7

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 13.8 14.0 20.3 24.1 28.2 32.5 3.7

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 8.0 8.4 11.2 12.8 14.2 15.5 2.7

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.7 21.9 22.9 31.9 38.3 44.8 51.5 3.6

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 20.9 22.0 30.1 34.9 39.3 44.1 3.1

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 12.5 12.7 17.4 20.6 23.4 26.1 3.2

Central and South America . . . . . 14.5 21.2 21.2 28.1 32.4 35.7 39.6 2.8

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 8.4 8.6 10.6 12.2 14.0 16.2 2.8

Other Central/South America . . . . 8.8 12.7 12.6 17.5 20.2 21.7 23.5 2.7

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88.4 139.2 144.3 215.3 255.2 293.0 333.0 3.7

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348.2 403.9 411.5 521.7 585.0 643.7 708.1 2.4

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Notes: Energy totals include net imports of coal coke and electricity generated from biomass in the United States. Totals may not

equal sum of components due to independent rounding. The electricity portion of the national fuel consumption values consists of

generation for domestic use plus an adjustment for electricity trade based on a fuel’s share of total generation in the exporting country.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B2. World Total Energy Consumption by Region and Fuel, High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Appendix B

108 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40.6 46.2 47.1 56.6 61.5 66.3 71.2 1.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.2 27.3 28.2 33.0 37.6 39.7 41.0 1.6

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.7 23.8 23.9 27.5 28.5 31.1 35.9 1.8

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9 8.9 9.0 9.8 9.9 10.0 9.9 0.4

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 9.0 9.5 11.5 12.4 13.6 15.0 2.0

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.9 115.2 117.7 138.4 150.0 160.8 173.0 1.7

Western Europe

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.9 28.9 28.6 29.8 30.8 31.5 32.9 0.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 15.2 15.4 18.3 20.2 22.4 25.1 2.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 8.7 8.6 8.2 7.8 7.4 7.1 -0.9

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 9.1 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.4 7.8 -0.7

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.0 5.5 6.3 6.6 7.2 7.9 1.6

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.9 68.0 67.4 71.5 74.3 76.9 80.7 0.8

Mature Market Asia

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 13.0 13.1 13.7 14.2 14.5 14.8 0.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.6 5.4 5.7 6.1 1.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 6.5 6.8 7.5 7.5 7.9 8.3 0.8

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.0 1.2

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.0

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.7 28.0 28.4 31.0 32.6 34.0 35.6 1.0

Total Mature Market

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79.0 88.0 88.8 100.1 106.5 112.4 118.9 1.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.4 46.5 47.5 55.9 63.3 67.8 72.2 1.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.3 39.0 39.4 43.3 43.8 46.4 51.2 1.1

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 21.1 21.2 22.1 22.3 22.0 21.7 0.1

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.6 16.5 16.6 19.6 21.0 23.1 25.4 1.9

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183.6 211.2 213.5 241.0 256.9 271.7 289.3 1.3

Transitional Economies

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.0 11.9 11.4 13.7 14.9 16.3 17.7 1.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.8 23.8 24.3 31.6 37.1 40.8 44.9 2.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.7 11.7 11.6 12.9 13.4 13.7 14.2 0.9

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.8 3.9 4.6 5.3 2.1

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 0.7

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.2 53.4 53.6 65.5 72.8 79.0 85.8 2.1

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.1 30.4 31.4 49.2 58.8 68.4 79.2 4.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 7.6 8.2 12.5 16.8 21.2 27.6 5.4

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.1 39.9 41.5 65.4 77.5 88.6 97.5 3.8

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.8 2.0 3.8 4.8 5.7 6.5 5.3

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 4.9 5.4 8.8 9.5 10.7 12.4 3.7

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.5 84.7 88.4 139.8 167.4 194.7 223.2 4.1

See notes at end of table.
Table B2. World Total Energy Consumption by Region and Fuel, High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Continued)

(Quadrillion Btu)

High Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 109

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Emerging Economies (Continued)

Middle East

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 11.3 11.7 15.7 17.9 19.7 21.6 2.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 8.0 8.6 11.8 14.3 16.8 19.7 3.6

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 —

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 3.3

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 20.9 22.0 30.1 34.9 39.3 44.1 3.1

Africa

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 5.4 5.5 7.9 9.3 10.4 11.3 3.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.5 2.6 3.6 4.8 5.8 7.4 4.6

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.7 3.7 4.7 5.2 5.8 5.8 2.0

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.4

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 12.5 12.8 17.4 20.6 23.4 26.1 3.2

Central and South America

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 11.0 10.7 14.6 17.1 19.0 21.3 3.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 3.8 3.8 5.0 6.3 7.0 8.4 3.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 4.1

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.4

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 5.4 5.7 6.8 7.1 7.4 7.6 1.3

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5 21.2 21.2 28.1 32.4 35.7 39.6 2.8

Total Emerging

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.1 58.1 59.2 87.5 103.1 117.6 133.4 3.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.8 21.9 23.3 32.9 42.1 50.9 63.1 4.4

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.4 45.6 47.1 73.0 85.8 97.8 106.9 3.6

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 2.2 2.3 4.2 5.4 6.3 7.0 5.0

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 11.5 12.4 17.5 18.8 20.5 22.5 2.6

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88.4 139.2 144.3 215.3 255.2 293.0 333.0 3.7

Total World

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136.0 158.0 159.4 201.3 224.5 246.2 270.0 2.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.0 92.2 95.2 120.5 142.5 159.5 180.2 2.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90.5 96.3 98.1 129.3 143.0 157.9 172.3 2.5

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.3 26.4 26.9 30.1 31.6 32.9 34.1 1.0

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.4 31.1 32.1 40.5 43.3 47.2 51.6 2.1

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348.2 403.9 411.5 521.7 585.0 643.7 708.1 2.4

Notes: Energy totals include net imports of coal coke and electricity generated from biomass in the United States. Totals may not

equal sum of components due to independent rounding. The electricity portion of the national fuel consumption values consists of

generation for domestic use plus an adjustment for electricity trade based on a fuel’s share of total generation in the exporting country.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B3. World Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Region, High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Billion 2000 Dollars)

Appendix B

110 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,478 11,774 11,997 16,311 19,353 22,784 26,977 3.6

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,113 9,891 10,075 13,740 16,260 19,089 22,570 3.6

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684 929 961 1,255 1,459 1,654 1,856 2.9

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 955 962 1,316 1,635 2,041 2,550 4.3

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,246 9,314 9,416 11,456 13,001 14,717 16,602 2.5

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . 3,258 3,891 3,904 4,865 5,436 6,005 6,573 2.3

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,840 3,294 3,284 4,057 4,500 4,925 5,331 2.1

Australia/New Zealand. . . . . . . . 419 597 621 808 935 1,080 1,242 3.1

Total Mature Market. . . . . . . . 18,982 24,980 25,317 32,632 37,790 43,507 50,152 3.0

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . 3,306 2,274 2,392 4,205 5,459 6,997 8,881 5.9

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,241 1,583 1,657 2,712 3,357 4,143 5,074 5.0

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,065 691 735 1,493 2,102 2,854 3,807 7.4

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 1,040 1,068 1,632 2,074 2,613 3,268 5.0

Total Transitional. . . . . . . . . . . 4,220 3,314 3,460 5,837 7,533 9,610 12,149 5.6

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,108 12,456 13,196 22,841 30,905 41,069 53,951 6.3

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,807 5,087 5,494 10,313 14,327 19,372 25,834 7.0

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,684 3,021 3,160 5,357 7,221 9,698 12,928 6.3

South Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 619 662 1,054 1,344 1,623 1,929 4.8

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,282 3,728 3,880 6,118 8,014 10,375 13,260 5.5

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 1,365 1,431 2,256 2,884 3,646 4,575 5.2

Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,075 1,387 1,434 2,184 2,757 3,445 4,277 4.9

Central and South America. . . . 1,744 2,400 2,388 3,393 4,317 5,483 6,966 4.8

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,022 1,344 1,370 1,911 2,423 3,069 3,889 4.6

Other Central/South America. . . 722 1,056 1,018 1,482 1,894 2,414 3,077 4.9

Total Emerging. . . . . . . . . . . . 9,871 17,608 18,449 30,674 40,863 53,643 69,770 6.0

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,073 45,901 47,227 69,144 86,186 106,760 132,071 4.6

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: A. Heston, R. Summers, and B. Aten, “Penn World Table Version 6.1” (Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania, October 2002), web site http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php; Global Insight, Inc., World

Overview, First Quarter 2005 (Lexington, MA, March 2005); and Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2005,

DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System,

run HM2005.D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/.
Table B4. World Oil Consumption by Region, High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

High Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 111

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.5 23.7 23.8 28.5 31.1 33.5 36.0 1.8

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.0 19.6 19.7 23.8 25.8 27.9 30.0 1.8

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 1.2

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 2.1

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5 14.0 13.8 14.4 14.8 15.2 15.9 0.6

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 6.4 6.3 6.6 6.9 7.0 7.1 0.5

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 0.2

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.9

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 39.1 44.1 43.9 49.5 52.8 55.7 59.0 1.3

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 4.3 4.1 4.9 5.3 5.7 6.2 1.8

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 2.7 2.6 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.9 1.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 1.8

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.3

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.0 5.7 5.5 6.6 7.2 7.9 8.6 1.9

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 14.7 15.1 23.8 28.4 33.1 38.3 4.1

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 4.9 5.2 9.6 11.4 13.5 16.1 5.1

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 2.2 2.2 3.2 3.9 4.6 5.4 4.0

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 2.1 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.4 1.9

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 5.5 5.6 8.4 10.1 11.7 13.4 3.9

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 5.5 5.7 7.6 8.7 9.6 10.5 2.7

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.9 4.6 5.1 5.5 3.2

Central and South America . . . . . 3.8 5.4 5.2 7.2 8.4 9.3 10.4 3.0

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.2 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.5 4.1 2.8

Other Central/South America . . . . 2.3 3.2 3.1 4.5 5.4 5.8 6.3 3.2

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3 28.2 28.7 42.5 50.0 57.0 64.7 3.6

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66.5 78.0 78.2 98.6 110.0 120.6 132.3 2.3

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B5. World Natural Gas Consumption by Region, High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Trillion Cubic Feet)

Appendix B

112 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.5 26.6 27.4 32.1 36.6 38.6 39.9 1.6

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.2 22.2 23.0 26.3 29.8 31.2 31.7 1.4

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.9 3.0 4.0 4.5 4.7 4.9 2.2

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.4

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 14.9 15.0 17.8 19.8 21.9 24.5 2.2

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 3.8 3.8 4.4 5.2 5.5 5.9 1.9

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.2 2.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 35.2 45.2 46.2 54.4 61.5 66.0 70.2 1.8

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 25.0 20.8 21.3 26.9 31.5 34.4 37.6 2.5

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3 14.4 14.6 17.1 19.4 21.6 23.4 2.1

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 6.4 6.8 9.9 12.1 12.8 14.2 3.3

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 2.7 2.6 4.2 5.1 5.8 6.7 4.2

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.1 23.5 23.9 31.2 36.6 40.2 44.2 2.7

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 7.2 7.8 11.7 15.7 19.8 25.5 5.3

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 1.1 1.2 3.1 4.5 5.8 9.0 9.3

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.8 3.3 5.9

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 4.2

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 4.6 4.9 5.9 7.7 9.5 11.1 3.6

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 7.6 8.3 11.2 13.6 16.0 18.8 3.6

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 2.3 2.4 3.4 4.4 5.4 6.9 4.6

Central and South America . . . . . 2.0 3.5 3.6 4.6 5.8 6.5 7.8 3.5

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.2 7.0

Other Central/South America . . . . 1.9 3.1 3.1 3.8 4.4 4.8 5.6 2.6

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 20.6 22.0 30.9 39.5 47.7 59.0 4.4

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73.4 89.3 92.2 116.5 137.6 153.9 173.4 2.8

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B6. World Coal Consumption by Region, High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Million Short Tons)

High Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 113

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 1,144 1,152 1,347 1,403 1,524 1,756 1.8

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 1,060 1,066 1,246 1,297 1,405 1,617 1.8

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 70 72 79 81 94 113 2.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 15 14 22 24 25 26 2.7

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 572 573 546 518 491 468 -0.9

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 233 326 341 380 378 404 424 1.0

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 173 179 186 184 183 188 0.2

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 106 153 162 194 195 220 236 1.6

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 2,099 2,042 2,067 2,273 2,299 2,418 2,648 1.1

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 848 396 397 460 479 493 510 1.1

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462 242 229 289 304 306 306 1.3

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386 154 168 171 175 188 204 0.9

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524 384 374 389 397 405 417 0.5

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,372 779 771 850 876 898 928 0.8

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,555 2,033 2,118 3,339 3,954 4,519 4,974 3.8

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,124 1,357 1,422 2,402 2,876 3,325 3,636 4.2

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 414 421 566 647 714 805 2.9

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 75 80 110 136 160 183 3.7

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 188 196 261 295 321 350 2.6

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 98 84 119 123 125 126 1.8

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 188 186 234 260 288 291 2.0

Central and South America . . . . . 27 34 36 65 71 84 90 4.1

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 22 22 40 43 53 61 4.5

Other Central/South America . . . . 10 12 14 26 28 30 29 3.3

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,799 2,353 2,424 3,757 4,407 5,017 5,481 3.6

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,270 5,174 5,262 6,880 7,582 8,333 9,057 2.4

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Notes: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding. To convert short tons to metric tons, divide each

number in the table by 1.102.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B7. World Nuclear Energy Consumption by Region, High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Billion Kilowatthours)

Appendix B

114 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649 850 860 937 953 957 952 0.4

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577 769 780 813 826 830 830 0.3

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 73 71 114 117 117 112 2.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 9 10 10 10 10 0.2

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703 870 876 864 854 802 752 -0.7

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 192 303 295 319 330 351 380 1.1

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 303 295 319 330 351 380 1.1

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0000000 —

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 1,544 2,024 2,032 2,120 2,136 2,110 2,083 0.1

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 201 210 224 275 279 332 399 2.5

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 125 134 151 153 173 218 2.1

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 85 90 124 125 160 181 3.1

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 72 79 89 98 105 113 1.6

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 282 302 364 376 437 512 2.3

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 178 194 367 464 551 620 5.2

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 17 23 72 137 162 200 9.8

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 18 18 67 89 123 132 9.1

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 107 113 169 179 185 196 2.4

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 36 40 60 59 81 93 3.8

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0006666 —

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11 12 13 14 15 15 0.9

Central and South America . . . . . 9 21 19 20 35 33 34 2.5

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 14 14 14 23 23 24 2.3

Other Central/South America . . . . 7 7 5 6 11 10 10 2.9

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 209 225 406 519 605 675 4.9

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,905 2,515 2,560 2,890 3,032 3,152 3,270 1.1

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B8. World Consumption of Hydroelectricity and Other Renewable Energy by Region,

High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

High Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 115

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 9.0 9.5 11.5 12.4 13.6 15.0 2.0

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.0 5.2 5.9 7.0 7.5 8.1 8.9 1.8

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.9 4.3 4.9 5.4 2.2

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 3.2

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.0 5.5 6.3 6.6 7.2 7.9 1.6

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.0

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.4

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 15.6 16.5 16.6 19.6 21.0 23.1 25.4 1.9

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.4

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 0.7

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 -0.6

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.9

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 0.7

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 4.9 5.4 8.8 9.5 10.7 12.4 3.7

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 2.6 3.1 5.2 5.7 6.2 6.7 3.4

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.0 4.4

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 4.6

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.4 1.5 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.6 3.9

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 3.3

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.4

Central and South America . . . . . 3.9 5.4 5.7 6.8 7.1 7.4 7.6 1.3

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.1 1.3

Other Central/South America . . . . 1.7 2.6 2.7 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.5 1.3

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 11.5 12.4 17.5 18.8 20.5 22.5 2.6

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.4 31.1 32.1 40.5 43.3 47.2 51.6 2.1

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Notes: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding. U.S. totals include net electricity imports, methanol,

and liquid hydrogen.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B9. World Net Electricity Consumption by Region, High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Billion Kilowatthours)

Appendix B

116 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,369 4,247 4,328 5,314 5,906 6,500 7,172 2.2

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,827 3,554 3,651 4,364 4,803 5,254 5,785 2.0

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435 508 487 666 750 831 907 2.7

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 185 190 285 353 416 479 4.1

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,069 2,551 2,556 2,676 2,858 3,076 3,366 1.2

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 930 1,136 1,202 1,307 1,417 1,518 1,622 1.3

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 765 910 971 1,026 1,103 1,171 1,237 1.1

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 166 226 231 281 314 347 385 2.2

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 6,368 7,934 8,086 9,297 10,181 11,095 12,159 1.8

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,488 1,131 1,154 1,904 2,246 2,542 2,788 3.9

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 769 780 1,043 1,188 1,323 1,469 2.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533 363 374 861 1,058 1,219 1,319 5.6

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 389 390 566 652 733 820 3.3

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,906 1,520 1,544 2,469 2,899 3,275 3,609 3.8

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,259 2,711 2,914 5,152 6,304 7,443 8,588 4.8

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551 1,302 1,457 2,938 3,589 4,222 4,833 5.4

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 509 510 807 1,028 1,259 1,504 4.8

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 247 267 400 473 539 605 3.6

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358 653 680 1,006 1,213 1,423 1,646 3.9

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 547 574 907 1,080 1,231 1,375 3.9

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 410 422 661 829 983 1,143 4.4

Central and South America . . . . . 463 715 735 1,134 1,456 1,704 1,997 4.4

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 338 352 457 563 697 864 4.0

Other Central/South America . . . . 234 377 383 677 893 1,007 1,133 4.8

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,272 4,383 4,645 7,852 9,669 11,361 13,102 4.6

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,546 13,836 14,275 19,619 22,749 25,731 28,870 3.1

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B10. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region, High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

High Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,769 6,624 6,701 7,925 8,579 9,236 10,062 1.8

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,989 5,692 5,751 6,783 7,308 7,856 8,561 1.7

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473 573 588 700 761 809 866 1.7

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 359 363 442 510 572 635 2.5

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,413 3,585 3,549 3,862 3,952 4,007 4,152 0.7

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 1,284 1,610 1,627 1,768 1,836 1,910 1,983 0.9

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 1,182 1,179 1,236 1,270 1,294 1,319 0.5

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 294 429 448 532 566 616 663 1.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 10,465 11,819 11,877 13,555 14,367 15,153 16,197 1.4

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 3,798 2,393 2,399 2,924 3,253 3,494 3,758 2.0

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,347 1,553 1,522 1,830 2,012 2,166 2,304 1.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,452 840 877 1,094 1,241 1,328 1,454 2.2

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,095 744 726 868 950 1,029 1,119 1.9

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,894 3,137 3,124 3,793 4,203 4,523 4,876 2.0

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,890 5,967 6,205 9,754 11,689 13,554 15,389 4.0

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,262 3,176 3,322 5,796 6,982 8,145 9,238 4.5

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583 1,009 1,025 1,424 1,679 1,927 2,209 3.4

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 431 451 576 675 761 846 2.8

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 1,351 1,407 1,958 2,353 2,721 3,095 3.5

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 1,311 1,361 1,846 2,132 2,392 2,674 3.0

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655 840 854 1,163 1,368 1,548 1,701 3.0

Central and South America . . . . . 711 998 988 1,370 1,610 1,806 2,042 3.2

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 343 342 459 539 637 758 3.5

Other Central/South America . . . . 461 655 646 910 1,071 1,168 1,284 3.0

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,101 9,116 9,408 14,132 16,799 19,299 21,806 3.7

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,460 24,072 24,409 31,480 35,369 38,976 42,879 2.5

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: The U.S. numbers include carbon dioxide emissions attributable to renewable energy sources.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B11. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Oil Use by Region, High Economic Growth Case,

1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

Appendix B

118 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,639 2,983 2,987 3,594 3,912 4,221 4,530 1.8

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,178 2,458 2,457 2,975 3,225 3,490 3,755 1.9

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 268 274 317 345 353 363 1.2

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 258 256 302 342 379 412 2.1

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,739 1,933 1,911 1,987 2,055 2,106 2,195 0.6

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 768 808 796 838 867 888 905 0.6

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655 668 657 670 684 691 692 0.2

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 113 140 139 168 183 197 213 1.9

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 5,145 5,724 5,695 6,420 6,835 7,215 7,630 1.3

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,224 607 581 698 749 811 876 1.8

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 783 378 356 428 459 497 537 1.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 229 225 270 290 314 339 1.8

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 197 192 232 263 293 325 2.3

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,468 803 773 931 1,012 1,104 1,200 1.9

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,116 1,886 1,940 3,062 3,659 4,266 4,947 4.2

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 638 669 1,242 1,485 1,754 2,086 5.1

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 278 279 406 496 591 692 4.0

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 236 241 296 328 351 371 1.9

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 733 751 1,118 1,349 1,571 1,798 3.9

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568 781 804 1,083 1,232 1,357 1,484 2.7

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 369 377 547 644 716 781 3.2

Central and South America . . . . . 541 729 712 972 1,136 1,266 1,414 3.0

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 281 275 338 384 446 522 2.8

Other Central/South America . . . . 330 448 437 634 752 820 892 3.2

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,529 3,764 3,834 5,664 6,670 7,605 8,626 3.6

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,142 10,292 10,302 13,015 14,517 15,924 17,457 2.3

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B12. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Natural Gas Use by Region, High Economic Growth Case,

1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

High Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 119

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,207 1,423 1,446 1,735 1,976 2,087 2,153 1.7

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,026 1,189 1,203 1,415 1,604 1,680 1,709 1.5

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 157 160 215 243 255 264 2.2

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 77 83 104 128 151 180 3.4

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514 803 812 964 1,068 1,183 1,325 2.2

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 133 209 209 245 287 303 324 1.9

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 150 147 176 201 219 232 2.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 44 59 62 70 87 84 92 1.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 1,854 2,436 2,467 2,944 3,331 3,572 3,801 1.9

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,352 1,119 1,147 1,447 1,694 1,849 2,018 2.5

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 768 776 909 1,036 1,149 1,245 2.1

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424 351 371 538 658 700 773 3.2

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 139 136 222 265 306 351 4.2

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,519 1,258 1,283 1,670 1,959 2,155 2,369 2.7

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 402 434 648 871 1,103 1,437 5.3

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 66 71 193 275 353 549 9.3

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 46 48 78 109 150 182 5.9

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 44 48 58 72 88 106 3.5

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 246 267 320 416 512 600 3.6

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 421 457 621 754 886 1,040 3.6

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 130 139 191 252 308 390 4.6

Central and South America . . . . . 116 202 203 265 331 370 445 3.5

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 22 26 48 75 93 122 7.0

Other Central/South America . . . . 110 181 177 217 255 277 323 2.6

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569 1,156 1,232 1,725 2,208 2,667 3,312 4.4

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,942 4,849 4,982 6,338 7,499 8,395 9,483 2.8

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table B13. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal Use by Region, High Economic Growth Case,

1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

Appendix B

120 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,923 2,214 2,247 2,576 2,670 2,907 3,357 1.8

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,784 2,042 2,070 2,372 2,458 2,664 3,075 1.7

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 148 154 168 173 201 240 2.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 24 23 36 40 42 43 2.7

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,160 849 825 786 745 706 673 -0.9

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 383 593 622 685 681 719 754 0.8

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 364 375 391 385 384 395 0.2

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 138 229 247 294 296 335 359 1.6

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 3,465 3,656 3,694 4,047 4,096 4,332 4,784 1.1

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,222 667 671 779 810 834 863 1.1

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635 408 390 492 517 521 521 1.3

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587 260 281 286 292 314 342 0.9

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685 409 397 414 422 430 443 0.5

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,907 1,076 1,068 1,192 1,232 1,264 1,306 0.9

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,607 3,679 3,831 6,044 7,159 8,184 9,005 3.8

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,886 2,472 2,582 4,362 5,222 6,038 6,604 4.2

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394 684 698 939 1,073 1,186 1,335 2.9

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 152 161 222 275 323 369 3.7

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 371 389 519 588 638 697 2.6

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 110 100 142 146 149 150 1.8

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 340 338 425 472 525 530 2.0

Central and South America . . . . . 54 66 73 133 143 170 183 4.1

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 40 41 73 80 98 113 4.5

Other Central/South America . . . . 20 26 32 60 64 71 70 3.4

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,003 4,196 4,342 6,743 7,921 9,028 9,868 3.6

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,375 8,928 9,105 11,983 13,248 14,624 15,958 2.5

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), high economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run HM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Appendix C

Low Economic Growth Case Projections:

• World Energy Consumption

• Gross Domestic Product

• Carbon Dioxide Emissions

Table C1. World Total Primary Energy Consumption by Region, Low Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Low Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 123

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.9 115.2 117.7 131.7 139.1 146.3 152.8 1.1

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84.6 96.3 98.0 108.6 114.0 119.7 124.9 1.1

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 12.8 13.1 15.3 16.4 17.1 17.6 1.3

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 6.1 6.6 7.8 8.7 9.5 10.3 1.9

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.9 68.0 67.4 69.0 70.2 70.6 72.2 0.3

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 22.7 28.0 28.4 29.8 30.5 31.0 31.5 0.5

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.3 21.9 22.0 22.5 22.8 23.0 23.2 0.2

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.1 6.5 7.3 7.7 8.0 8.3 1.1

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 183.6 211.2 213.5 230.5 239.8 247.9 256.5 0.8

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 60.9 42.0 42.4 47.8 50.7 52.8 55.6 1.2

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.1 27.7 27.5 30.3 31.8 33.1 34.6 1.0

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.8 14.3 14.9 17.5 18.9 19.7 21.0 1.5

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3 11.4 11.2 12.8 13.6 14.3 15.0 1.3

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.2 53.4 53.6 60.7 64.4 67.1 70.6 1.2

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.5 84.7 88.4 127.8 144.2 158.4 172.8 3.0

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.0 40.9 43.2 69.7 79.6 87.7 96.2 3.5

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 13.8 14.0 18.9 21.5 24.0 26.4 2.8

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 8.0 8.4 10.3 11.1 11.5 11.9 1.5

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.7 21.9 22.9 28.9 32.0 35.2 38.3 2.3

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 20.9 22.0 27.2 29.7 31.9 34.0 1.9

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 12.5 12.7 16.1 18.1 19.6 21.1 2.2

Central and South America . . . . . 14.5 21.2 21.2 25.3 27.8 29.3 31.1 1.7

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 8.4 8.6 9.5 10.4 11.4 12.7 1.7

Other Central/South America . . . . 8.8 12.7 12.6 15.8 17.3 17.8 18.4 1.7

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88.4 139.2 144.3 196.3 219.8 239.3 259.0 2.6

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348.2 403.9 411.5 487.5 523.9 554.2 586.1 1.5

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Notes: Energy totals include net imports of coal coke and electricity generated from biomass in the United States. Totals may not

equal sum of components due to independent rounding. The electricity portion of the national fuel consumption values consists of

generation for domestic use plus an adjustment for electricity trade based on a fuel’s share of total generation in the exporting country.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C2. World Total Energy Consumption by Region and Fuel, Low Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Appendix C

124 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40.6 46.2 47.1 53.0 56.3 59.2 61.7 1.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.2 27.3 28.2 31.1 33.8 36.2 37.5 1.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.7 23.8 23.9 26.8 27.5 28.5 30.6 1.1

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9 8.9 9.0 9.8 9.9 10.0 9.9 0.4

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 9.0 9.5 11.0 11.5 12.3 13.1 1.4

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.9 115.2 117.7 131.7 139.1 146.3 152.8 1.1

Western Europe

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.9 28.9 28.6 28.4 28.7 28.6 29.2 0.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 15.2 15.4 17.4 18.9 20.0 21.6 1.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 8.7 8.6 8.2 7.7 7.3 6.9 -1.0

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 9.1 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.4 7.8 -0.7

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.0 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.4 6.7 0.8

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.9 68.0 67.4 69.0 70.2 70.6 72.2 0.3

Mature Market Asia

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 13.0 13.1 13.1 13.3 13.2 13.2 0.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.7 5.0 5.2 1.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 6.5 6.8 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.2 0.2

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.0 1.2

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.0

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.7 28.0 28.4 29.8 30.5 31.0 31.5 0.5

Total Mature Market

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79.0 88.0 88.8 94.6 98.2 101.1 104.2 0.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.4 46.5 47.5 52.7 57.5 61.2 64.2 1.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.3 39.0 39.4 42.3 42.5 43.1 44.7 0.5

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 21.1 21.2 22.1 22.3 22.0 21.7 0.1

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.6 16.5 16.6 18.7 19.3 20.5 21.7 1.2

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183.6 211.2 213.5 230.5 239.8 247.9 256.5 0.8

Transitional Economies

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.0 11.9 11.4 12.5 12.9 13.4 13.9 0.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.8 23.8 24.3 28.5 31.5 33.0 35.1 1.6

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.7 11.7 11.6 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 0.4

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.8 3.9 4.6 5.3 2.1

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 0.5

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.2 53.4 53.6 60.7 64.4 67.1 70.6 1.2

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.1 30.4 31.4 44.6 50.2 55.2 60.6 2.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 7.6 8.2 10.5 12.2 14.2 17.1 3.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.1 39.9 41.5 60.7 68.4 74.3 78.9 2.8

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.8 2.0 3.8 4.8 5.7 6.5 5.3

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 4.9 5.4 8.1 8.6 9.0 9.6 2.6

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.5 84.7 88.4 127.8 144.2 158.4 172.8 3.0

See notes at end of table.
Table C2. World Total Energy Consumption by Region and Fuel, Low Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Continued)

(Quadrillion Btu)

Low Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 125

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Emerging Economies (Continued)

Middle East

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 11.3 11.7 14.1 15.0 15.6 16.2 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 8.0 8.6 10.6 12.2 13.8 15.3 2.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.1

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 —

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 3.2

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 20.9 22.0 27.2 29.7 31.9 34.0 1.9

Africa

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 5.4 5.5 7.3 8.1 8.6 9.0 2.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.5 2.6 3.1 4.0 4.8 5.7 3.4

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.7 3.7 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.9 1.2

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 12.5 12.8 16.1 18.1 19.6 21.1 2.2

Central and South America

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 11.0 10.7 12.8 14.0 14.9 15.9 1.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 3.8 3.8 4.8 5.6 6.3 7.1 2.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.5

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.4

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 5.4 5.7 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.7 0.7

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5 21.2 21.2 25.3 27.8 29.3 31.1 1.7

Total Emerging

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.1 58.1 59.2 78.8 87.3 94.3 101.7 2.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.8 21.9 23.3 29.1 34.0 39.0 45.1 2.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.4 45.6 47.1 67.6 75.7 81.6 86.3 2.7

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 2.2 2.3 4.2 5.4 6.3 7.0 5.0

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 11.5 12.4 16.6 17.4 18.0 18.7 1.8

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88.4 139.2 144.3 196.3 219.8 239.3 259.0 2.6

Total World

Oil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136.0 158.0 159.4 185.9 198.4 208.8 219.8 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.0 92.2 95.2 110.4 123.0 133.2 144.5 1.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90.5 96.3 98.1 122.4 130.8 137.4 143.8 1.7

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.3 26.4 26.9 30.1 31.6 32.9 34.1 1.0

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.4 31.1 32.1 38.7 40.1 41.9 43.9 1.4

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348.2 403.9 411.5 487.5 523.9 554.2 586.1 1.5

Notes: Energy totals include net imports of coal coke and electricity generated from biomass in the United States. Totals may not

equal sum of components due to independent rounding. The electricity portion of the national fuel consumption values consists of

generation for domestic use plus an adjustment for electricity trade based on a fuel’s share of total generation in the exporting country.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C3. World Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Region, Low Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Billion 2000 Dollars)

Appendix C

126 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,478 11,774 11,997 15,036 17,099 19,324 21,567 2.6

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,113 9,891 10,075 12,640 14,336 16,163 17,957 2.5

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684 929 961 1,169 1,300 1,408 1,509 2.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 955 962 1,228 1,463 1,753 2,102 3.5

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,246 9,314 9,416 10,639 11,537 12,478 13,446 1.6

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . 3,258 3,891 3,904 4,520 4,822 5,084 5,309 1.3

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,840 3,294 3,284 3,768 3,990 4,165 4,298 1.2

Australia/New Zealand. . . . . . . . 419 597 621 752 832 920 1,011 2.1

Total Mature Market. . . . . . . . 18,982 24,980 25,317 30,196 33,458 36,885 40,322 2.0

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . 3,306 2,274 2,392 3,465 3,963 4,466 4,978 3.2

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,241 1,583 1,657 2,298 2,550 2,819 3,091 2.7

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,065 691 735 1,167 1,413 1,647 1,887 4.2

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 1,040 1,068 1,426 1,667 1,930 2,217 3.2

Total Transitional. . . . . . . . . . . 4,220 3,314 3,460 4,891 5,630 6,397 7,196 3.2

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,108 12,456 13,196 20,134 25,191 30,911 37,462 4.6

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,807 5,087 5,494 9,137 11,762 14,704 18,108 5.3

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,684 3,021 3,160 4,714 5,873 7,289 8,973 4.6

South Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 619 662 924 1,084 1,199 1,303 3.0

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,282 3,728 3,880 5,358 6,472 7,719 9,078 3.8

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 1,365 1,431 1,975 2,324 2,701 3,114 3.4

Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,075 1,387 1,434 1,909 2,214 2,541 2,896 3.1

Central and South America. . . . 1,744 2,400 2,388 2,951 3,454 4,034 4,714 3.0

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,022 1,344 1,370 1,660 1,936 2,254 2,626 2.9

Other Central/South America. . . 722 1,056 1,018 1,291 1,518 1,781 2,088 3.2

Total Emerging. . . . . . . . . . . . 9,871 17,608 18,449 26,969 33,183 40,188 48,186 4.3

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,073 45,901 47,227 62,056 72,271 83,469 95,703 3.1

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: A. Heston, R. Summers, and B. Aten, “Penn World Table Version 6.1” (Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania, October 2002), web site http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php; Global Insight, Inc., World

Overview, First Quarter 2005 (Lexington, MA, March 2005); and Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2005,

DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System,

run LM2005.D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/.
Table C4. World Oil Consumption by Region, Low Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Low Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 127

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.5 23.7 23.8 26.7 28.4 29.8 31.1 1.2

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.0 19.6 19.7 22.2 23.5 24.8 25.9 1.2

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 0.7

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 1.5

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5 14.0 13.8 13.7 13.8 13.8 14.1 0.1

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 0.1

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.0 -0.2

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 39.1 44.1 43.9 46.8 48.6 50.1 51.6 0.7

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 4.3 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.9 0.7

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 0.7

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 0.7

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.2

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.0 5.7 5.5 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.7 0.9

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 14.7 15.1 21.5 24.2 26.7 29.3 2.9

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 4.9 5.2 8.8 9.9 11.1 12.5 3.9

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 2.2 2.2 2.9 3.4 3.9 4.3 3.0

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.7

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 5.5 5.6 7.4 8.3 9.1 9.8 2.5

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 5.5 5.7 6.9 7.3 7.6 7.9 1.4

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.4 2.2

Central and South America . . . . . 3.8 5.4 5.2 6.3 6.9 7.3 7.8 1.7

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.7 3.1 1.5

Other Central/South America . . . . 2.3 3.2 3.1 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.7 1.9

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3 28.2 28.7 38.2 42.3 45.8 49.4 2.4

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66.5 78.0 78.2 91.1 97.2 102.3 107.7 1.4

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C5. World Natural Gas Consumption by Region, Low Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Trillion Cubic Feet)

Appendix C

128 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.5 26.6 27.4 30.3 32.9 35.2 36.5 1.2

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.2 22.2 23.0 24.7 26.7 28.4 29.3 1.1

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.4 1.8

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.8 2.7

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 14.9 15.0 17.0 18.4 19.5 21.0 1.5

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 3.8 3.8 4.1 4.5 4.8 4.9 1.2

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.4 1.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 35.2 45.2 46.2 51.3 55.9 59.5 62.5 1.3

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 25.0 20.8 21.3 24.4 26.9 28.0 29.7 1.5

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3 14.4 14.6 15.4 16.6 17.6 18.5 1.0

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 6.4 6.8 8.9 10.3 10.5 11.2 2.2

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 2.7 2.6 3.7 4.1 4.5 4.9 2.8

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.1 23.5 23.9 28.1 31.0 32.5 34.6 1.6

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 7.2 7.8 9.9 11.4 13.3 16.0 3.2

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 1.1 1.2 2.0 2.6 3.0 4.0 5.6

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.3 4.3

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 3.1

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.9 6.8 8.0 2.1

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 7.6 8.3 10.1 11.6 13.1 14.6 2.5

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 2.3 2.4 2.9 3.7 4.4 5.3 3.4

Central and South America . . . . . 2.0 3.5 3.6 4.5 5.2 5.8 6.5 2.7

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.9 6.2

Other Central/South America . . . . 1.9 3.1 3.1 3.6 4.0 4.3 4.7 1.8

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 20.6 22.0 27.4 32.0 36.7 42.4 2.9

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73.4 89.3 92.2 106.8 118.9 128.7 139.5 1.8

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C6. World Coal Consumption by Region, Low Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Million Short Tons)

Low Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 129

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 1,144 1,152 1,307 1,354 1,406 1,508 1.2

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 1,060 1,066 1,208 1,252 1,303 1,393 1.2

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 70 72 77 78 79 91 1.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 15 14 21 24 25 25 2.6

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 572 573 543 513 484 457 -1.0

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 233 326 341 371 368 368 364 0.3

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 173 179 184 180 176 174 -0.1

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 106 153 162 187 188 192 190 0.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 2,099 2,042 2,067 2,221 2,235 2,258 2,330 0.5

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 848 396 397 442 448 453 457 0.6

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462 242 229 278 284 280 274 0.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386 154 168 164 164 172 183 0.4

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524 384 374 379 381 379 382 0.1

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,372 779 771 821 829 832 839 0.4

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,555 2,033 2,118 3,096 3,493 3,793 4,033 2.8

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,124 1,357 1,422 2,234 2,543 2,782 2,959 3.2

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 414 421 523 574 621 672 2.1

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 75 80 94 109 113 114 1.6

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 188 196 246 268 277 287 1.7

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 98 84 110 113 111 109 1.1

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 188 186 229 239 245 244 1.2

Central and South America . . . . . 27 34 36 43 46 48 51 1.5

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 22 22 26 28 31 35 2.0

Other Central/South America . . . . 10 12 14 17 18 18 16 0.7

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,799 2,353 2,424 3,479 3,891 4,197 4,437 2.7

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,270 5,174 5,262 6,521 6,955 7,287 7,606 1.6

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Notes: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding. To convert short tons to metric tons, divide each

number in the table by 1.102.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C7. World Nuclear Energy Consumption by Region, Low Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Billion Kilowatthours)

Appendix C

130 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649 850 860 937 953 957 952 0.4

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577 769 780 813 826 830 830 0.3

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 73 71 114 117 117 112 2.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 9 10 10 10 10 0.2

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703 870 876 864 854 802 752 -0.7

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 192 303 295 319 330 351 380 1.1

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 303 295 319 330 351 380 1.1

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0000000 —

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 1,544 2,024 2,032 2,120 2,136 2,110 2,083 0.1

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 201 210 224 275 279 332 399 2.5

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 125 134 151 153 173 218 2.1

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 85 90 124 125 160 181 3.1

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 72 79 89 98 105 113 1.6

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 282 302 364 376 437 512 2.3

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 178 194 367 464 551 620 5.2

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 17 23 72 137 162 200 9.8

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 18 18 67 89 123 132 9.1

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 107 113 169 179 185 196 2.4

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 36 40 60 59 81 93 3.8

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0006666 —

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11 12 13 14 15 15 0.9

Central and South America . . . . . 9 21 19 20 35 33 34 2.5

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 14 14 14 23 23 24 2.3

Other Central/South America . . . . 7 7 5 6 11 10 10 2.9

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 209 225 406 519 605 675 4.9

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,905 2,515 2,560 2,890 3,032 3,152 3,270 1.1

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C8. World Consumption of Hydroelectricity and Other Renewable Energy by Region,

High Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Low Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 131

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 9.0 9.5 11.0 11.5 12.3 13.1 1.4

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.0 5.2 5.9 6.8 6.9 7.3 7.7 1.2

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.6 1.5

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 3.0

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.0 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.4 6.7 0.8

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.0

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 15.6 16.5 16.6 18.7 19.3 20.5 21.7 1.2

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.4

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 0.7

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 -0.6

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 0.5

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 4.9 5.4 8.1 8.6 9.0 9.6 2.6

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 2.6 3.1 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.7 2.6

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 3.2

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 4.6

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.4 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.1

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 3.2

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1

Central and South America . . . . . 3.9 5.4 5.7 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.7 0.7

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.6 0.7

Other Central/South America . . . . 1.7 2.6 2.7 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.1 0.7

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 11.5 12.4 16.6 17.4 18.0 18.7 1.8

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.4 31.1 32.1 38.7 40.1 41.9 43.9 1.4

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Notes: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding. U.S. totals include net electricity imports, methanol,

and liquid hydrogen.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C9. World Net Electricity Consumption by Region, Low Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Billion Kilowatthours)

Appendix C

132 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,369 4,247 4,328 5,086 5,501 5,910 6,314 1.7

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,827 3,554 3,651 4,193 4,502 4,821 5,147 1.5

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435 508 487 624 677 723 757 1.9

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 185 190 270 322 366 409 3.4

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,069 2,551 2,556 2,592 2,712 2,775 2,916 0.6

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 930 1,136 1,202 1,241 1,304 1,356 1,403 0.7

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 765 910 971 976 1,020 1,053 1,081 0.5

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 166 226 231 265 284 302 322 1.5

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 6,368 7,934 8,086 8,919 9,517 10,041 10,633 1.2

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,488 1,131 1,154 1,688 1,864 1,996 2,101 2.6

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 769 780 1,037 1,132 1,226 1,335 2.4

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533 363 374 650 732 769 765 3.2

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 389 390 514 561 600 640 2.2

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,906 1,520 1,544 2,201 2,425 2,595 2,741 2.5

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,259 2,711 2,914 4,674 5,408 6,057 6,638 3.6

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551 1,302 1,457 2,667 3,081 3,440 3,747 4.2

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 509 510 739 897 1,048 1,194 3.8

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 247 267 362 401 426 446 2.2

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358 653 680 907 1,028 1,144 1,251 2.7

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 547 574 816 918 992 1,051 2.7

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 410 422 583 686 764 841 3.0

Central and South America . . . . . 463 715 735 1,012 1,192 1,366 1,540 3.3

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 338 352 442 529 631 761 3.4

Other Central/South America . . . . 234 377 383 570 663 735 779 3.1

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,272 4,383 4,645 7,085 8,204 9,179 10,070 3.4

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,546 13,836 14,275 18,205 20,146 21,815 23,444 2.2

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C10. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region, Low Economic Growth Case, 1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

Low Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 133

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,769 6,624 6,701 7,562 8,001 8,413 8,840 1.2

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,989 5,692 5,751 6,472 6,818 7,171 7,530 1.2

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473 573 588 667 711 729 755 1.1

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 359 363 422 471 513 555 1.9

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,413 3,585 3,549 3,590 3,641 3,658 3,741 0.2

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 1,284 1,610 1,627 1,698 1,725 1,735 1,740 0.3

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 1,182 1,179 1,189 1,195 1,185 1,173 0.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 294 429 448 508 531 550 566 1.0

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 10,465 11,819 11,877 12,849 13,367 13,806 14,321 0.8

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 3,798 2,393 2,399 2,695 2,852 2,939 3,061 1.1

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,347 1,553 1,522 1,687 1,766 1,823 1,876 0.9

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,452 840 877 1,008 1,086 1,116 1,184 1.3

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,095 744 726 808 848 879 913 1.0

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,894 3,137 3,124 3,503 3,701 3,817 3,974 1.1

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,890 5,967 6,205 8,922 10,082 11,042 11,968 2.9

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,262 3,176 3,322 5,321 6,064 6,679 7,247 3.4

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583 1,009 1,025 1,315 1,480 1,635 1,798 2.5

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 431 451 517 572 588 602 1.3

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 1,351 1,407 1,770 1,967 2,140 2,321 2.2

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 1,311 1,361 1,664 1,810 1,932 2,051 1.8

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655 840 854 1,083 1,203 1,291 1,367 2.1

Central and South America . . . . . 711 998 988 1,193 1,323 1,420 1,532 1.9

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 343 342 390 435 489 556 2.1

Other Central/South America . . . . 461 655 646 803 888 931 975 1.8

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,101 9,116 9,408 12,862 14,419 15,685 16,917 2.6

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,460 24,072 24,409 29,214 31,486 33,308 35,212 1.6

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Note: The U.S. numbers include carbon dioxide emissions attributable to renewable energy sources.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C11. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Oil Use by Region, Low Economic Growth Case,

1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

Appendix C

134 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,639 2,983 2,987 3,403 3,627 3,816 3,983 1.3

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,178 2,458 2,457 2,816 2991 3,154 3,229 1.3

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 268 274 300 321 325 325 0.7

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 258 256 287 314 338 360 1.5

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,739 1,933 1,911 1,898 1,912 1,911 1,950 0.1

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 768 808 796 803 811 810 812 0.1

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655 668 657 642 641 632 623 -0.2

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 113 140 139 161 170 178 189 1.3

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 5,145 5,724 5,695 6,105 6,350 6,538 6,746 0.7

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,224 607 581 638 649 668 689 0.7

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 783 378 356 392 399 410 423 0.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 229 225 246 251 258 266 0.7

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 197 192 212 227 239 251 1.2

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,468 803 773 850 876 907 940 0.9

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,116 1,886 1,940 2,773 3,122 3,441 3,785 2.9

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 638 669 1,138 1,287 1,441 1,626 3.9

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 278 279 374 435 495 555 3.0

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 236 241 271 284 286 285 0.7

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 733 751 990 1,115 1,219 1,318 2.5

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568 781 804 973 1,033 1,074 1,113 1.4

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 369 377 501 557 594 623 2.2

Central and South America . . . . . 541 729 712 849 932 991 1,055 1.7

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 281 275 295 315 349 390 1.5

Other Central/South America . . . . 330 448 437 553 617 542 666 1.8

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,529 3,764 3,834 5,095 5,644 6,100 6,577 2.4

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,142 10,292 10,302 12,050 12,870 13,545 14,262 1.4

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C12. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Natural Gas Use by Region, Low Economic Growth Case,

1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

Low Economic Growth Case Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 135

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,207 1,423 1,446 1,635 1,779 1,904 1,971 1.4

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,026 1,189 1,203 1,333 1,437 1,532 1,579 1.2

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 157 160 203 224 238 238 1.8

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 77 83 99 118 134 154 2.7

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514 803 812 939 1,035 1,109 1,216 1.8

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 133 209 209 225 250 263 273 1.2

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 150 147 161 175 183 185 1.0

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 44 59 62 64 75 80 88 1.5

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 1,854 2,436 2,467 2,777 3,026 3,223 3,383 1.4

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,352 1,119 1,147 1,310 1,445 1,506 1,599 1.5

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 768 776 823 883 936 986 1.0

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424 351 371 487 562 570 612 2.2

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 139 136 194 218 236 256 2.8

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,519 1,258 1,283 1,503 1,662 1,742 1,855 1.6

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 402 434 545 638 739 891 3.2

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 66 71 126 159 187 246 5.6

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 46 48 73 92 109 127 4.3

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 44 48 56 67 74 87 2.6

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 246 267 291 319 369 431 2.1

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 421 457 561 644 726 808 2.5

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 130 139 165 211 251 299 3.4

Central and South America . . . . . 116 202 203 256 297 330 373 2.7

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 22 26 46 68 83 102 6.2

Other Central/South America . . . . 110 181 177 210 229 247 270 1.9

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569 1,156 1,232 1,526 1,789 2,047 2,371 2.9

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,942 4,849 4,982 5,806 6,478 7,012 7,608 1.9

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table C13. World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal Use by Region, Low Economic Growth Case,

1990-2025

(Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide)

Appendix C

136 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

1990 2001 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,923 2,214 2,247 2,504 2,575 2,672 2,864 1.1

United Statesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,784 2,042 2,070 2,304 2,370 2,464 2,630 1.0

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 148 154 164 166 167 193 1.0

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 24 23 36 39 41 41 2.6

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,160 849 825 774 731 691 653 -1.0

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . 383 593 622 670 664 661 654 0.2

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 364 375 387 378 370 365 -0.1

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 138 229 247 284 285 291 289 0.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . 3,465 3,656 3,694 3,948 3,970 4,024 4,172 0.5

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . 1,222 667 671 748 758 765 773 0.6

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635 408 390 473 484 477 467 0.8

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587 260 281 275 274 288 306 0.1

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685 409 397 402 404 403 406 0.1

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,907 1,076 1,068 1,150 1,162 1,168 1,179 0.4

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,607 3,679 3,831 5,604 6,322 6,862 7,292 2.8

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,886 2,472 2,582 4,057 4,617 5,052 5,374 3.2

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394 684 698 867 952 1,031 1,116 2.1

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 152 161 190 220 228 231 1.6

Other Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 371 389 489 533 552 572 1.7

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 110 100 131 134 132 129 1.1

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 340 338 417 435 446 444 1.2

Central and South America . . . . . 54 66 73 88 94 98 104 1.5

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 40 41 49 52 57 64 2.0

Other Central/South America . . . . 20 26 32 40 42 41 39 0.9

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,003 4,196 4,342 6,240 6,986 7,538 7,970 2.7

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,375 8,928 9,105 11,338 12,118 12,731 13,320 1.7

a

Includes the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005)

(Washington, DC, February 2005), low economic growth case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run LM2005.

D102004A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Appendix D

Reference Case Projections

by End-Use Sector and Region

Table D1. Delivered Energy Consumption in the United States by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections by End-Use Sector and Region

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 139

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 -0.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 5.6 5.9 6.1 6.2 0.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 5.0 5.4 5.8 6.2 1.6

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 -0.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 12.5 13.1 13.7 14.1 1.0

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.2 1.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 5.0 5.6 6.3 7.1 2.4

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 9.5 10.4 11.3 12.4 1.8

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 10.1 10.4 10.9 11.3 0.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.9 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.7 0.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 -0.6

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 1.3

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 1.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.2 27.4 28.4 29.8 30.8 0.9

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.1 30.5 33.3 35.8 38.3 1.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.4

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.9 31.4 34.2 36.8 39.4 1.7

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.5 42.8 45.9 49.0 51.9 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.8 19.3 20.3 21.4 22.1 0.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 -0.5

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.8 13.9 15.1 16.4 17.8 1.8

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.0 1.2

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71.6 80.7 86.1 91.7 96.8 1.3

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 26.4 29.9 31.5 33.4 35.6 1.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.0 110.6 117.6 125.1 132.4 1.3

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 7.0 8.7 9.8 9.6 2.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.8 22.8 23.6 25.3 28.6 1.6

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 0.3

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 4.3 4.6 4.8 5.3 1.7

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38.2 43.7 46.7 49.8 53.5 1.5

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38.4 44.0 47.1 50.2 53.2 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.6 26.3 29.0 31.2 31.7 1.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.0 24.9 25.7 27.3 30.5 1.4

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 0.3

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 6.9 7.2 7.7 8.3 1.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.0 110.6 117.6 125.1 132.4 1.3

Sources: 2002: Based on Energy Information Administration (EIA), Annual Energy Review 2003, DOE/EIA-0384(2003) (Washington, DC,

September 2004). Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case,

AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global

Energy Markets (2005).
Table D2. Delivered Energy Consumption in Canada by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Appendix D

140 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.4

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.7

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 2.2

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.3

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.6 1.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.9

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 2.9

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.8

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 5.2 5.8 6.2 6.6 1.7

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 0.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 0.8

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.2 1.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.7 1.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.9

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.3

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.8

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 10.6 11.5 12.1 12.6 1.3

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 5.0 5.4 5.7 6.2 2.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 15.6 16.9 17.8 18.8 1.6

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.1 9.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.1

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.7 4.2 4.6 5.0 2.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 7.2 7.8 8.4 9.0 2.2

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.5 1.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 4.0 4.4 4.8 4.8 2.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.3 1.4

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 3.8 4.2 4.6 5.1 1.9

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 15.6 16.9 17.8 18.8 1.6

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D3. Delivered Energy Consumption in Mexico by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections by End-Use Sector and Region

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 141

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 10.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 5.8

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 3.4

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 2.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 9.6

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.3

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 4.4

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.4

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 2.7

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.2 1.4

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.3 2.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.3 2.5

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.9 4.3 4.7 5.1 2.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.4

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 4.0

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 13.7

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 6.1 6.9 7.6 8.3 2.2

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 8.0 9.1 10.0 10.9 2.2

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.6 5.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.3

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 2.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.8 3.3 3.7 4.1 2.7

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 5.0 5.6 6.1 6.5 1.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 2.6

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 3.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 8.0 9.1 10.0 10.9 2.2

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D4. Delivered Energy Consumption in Western Europe by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Appendix D

142 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 -1.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.6 0.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -3.3

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 0.4

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.5

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3 10.1 10.0 9.8 9.9 -0.2

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 -0.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 0.8

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.0 0.6

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 7.8 8.0 8.3 8.7 0.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 6.8 7.3 8.0 8.7 1.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 0.0

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.8 4.3 4.4 4.9 1.6

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 7.8 8.0 8.3 8.7 0.9

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 2.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.2 28.7 30.0 31.3 33.3 1.1

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.0 16.6 17.1 17.2 17.8 0.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 16.9 17.3 17.5 18.0 0.4

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.9 27.8 28.2 28.4 29.3 0.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.8 12.4 13.1 13.8 14.7 1.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.1 -0.2

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 8.9 9.5 9.8 10.5 1.0

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 -0.9

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.8

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.3 52.7 54.3 55.3 57.7 0.6

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 17.2 17.4 17.9 18.0 18.4 0.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67.4 70.2 72.2 73.4 76.1 0.5

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 0.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 5.3 6.4 7.1 8.2 3.6

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.8 -1.3

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.4 7.8 -0.7

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 5.8 6.1 6.5 7.1 1.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.3 27.2 28.3 28.6 29.7 0.5

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.6 29.2 29.7 30.0 31.0 0.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.4 17.7 19.5 20.9 22.9 1.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 8.2 7.8 7.3 6.9 -1.0

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.4 7.8 -0.7

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 6.1 6.4 6.8 7.4 1.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67.4 70.2 72.2 73.4 76.1 0.5

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D5. Delivered Energy Consumption in Japan by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections by End-Use Sector and Region

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 143

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 -1.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.4

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 -0.1

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 -1.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 3.4

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 0.2

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.5 0.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 3.4

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 -0.2

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.3

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 63.8

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -5.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 8.1 8.4 8.7 8.9 0.7

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.2

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.3 10.3 0.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 -0.2

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.9 1.3

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -2.3

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 16.9 17.3 17.5 17.8 0.4

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.6 7.0 0.9

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.0 22.9 23.6 24.1 24.7 0.5

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 -0.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.6 1.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 0.1

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.0 1.2

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 2.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 9.5 9.9 10.4 10.9 1.0

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.9 10.9 11.1 11.0 11.0 0.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.8 3.9 1.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 0.0

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.0 1.2

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.0 22.9 23.6 24.1 24.7 0.5

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D6. Delivered Energy Consumption in Australia/New Zealand by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Appendix D

144 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.2

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.8

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.5

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 3.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.0

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 2.1

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -9.0

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 2.5

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 0.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 0.8

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.0 1.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.9

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.8

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -9.0

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 4.7 5.1 5.5 5.9 1.7

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 0.7

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 7.5 7.9 8.4 8.8 1.3

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0 1.0

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.1 1.1

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 1.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.4 1.1

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 7.5 7.9 8.4 8.8 1.4

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D7. Delivered Energy Consumption in the Former Soviet Union by End-Use Sector and Fuel,

2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections by End-Use Sector and Region

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 145

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 3.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.3 1.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 3.2

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.1 0.1

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -34.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.8 9.4 9.8 9.9 10.2 1.2

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 2.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.9

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -2.4

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.0

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.8 0.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 10.0 11.5 12.3 13.8 1.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 1.0

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 4.1 4.7 5.2 5.5 3.7

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 1.6

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.0 23.7 26.1 27.7 30.0 1.6

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 5.0 5.4 5.7 6.0 1.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 5.3 5.6 5.9 6.3 1.5

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 8.9 9.3 9.8 10.4 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1 14.6 16.4 17.3 19.0 1.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6 0.9

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 6.1 7.0 7.7 8.3 3.2

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 6.5 6.4 6.2 6.1 0.6

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.8 40.1 43.3 45.4 48.4 1.4

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 9.6 10.6 11.8 12.6 2.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.4 49.7 53.9 57.2 61.0 1.6

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 11.5 13.2 14.3 14.9 2.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 0.8

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.9 2.9 3.5 4.2 2.3

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.4

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.0 22.2 24.0 25.6 27.0 2.0

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 9.8 10.2 10.8 11.4 1.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.7 26.1 29.6 31.6 33.9 2.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 8.3 8.5 8.6 8.8 0.8

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.9 2.9 3.5 4.2 2.3

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.4

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.4 49.7 53.9 57.2 61.0 1.6

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D8. Delivered Energy Consumption in Eastern Europe by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Appendix D

146 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -1.0

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 2.7

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 -0.7

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 22.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 1.1

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 2.1

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.6

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 3.0

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 4.7 5.3 5.9 6.4 1.8

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.9

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 3.1 3.5 3.8 4.1 1.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.3 2.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 -0.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 -0.2

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 9.2

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 9.5 10.4 11.2 12.1 1.6

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.7 2.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 13.3 14.5 15.6 16.7 1.7

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.4 6.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.4

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 6.3 6.8 7.3 7.7 1.9

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.3 1.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 4.0 4.6 5.1 5.7 3.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 0.2

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 13.3 14.5 15.6 16.7 1.7

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D9. Delivered Energy Consumption in China by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections by End-Use Sector and Region

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 147

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.6 5.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.3 6.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 -0.2

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.8 5.6

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 3.0

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 5.5 6.3 6.9 7.7 3.5

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 2.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 7.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 5.1

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.4

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 7.1 8.4 9.7 10.9 3.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 3.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.0 20.0 24.1 27.6 30.6 4.6

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 6.9 8.1 9.3 10.3 4.0

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.3 3.1

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.9 36.6 43.7 50.1 55.7 4.2

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 8.0 10.1 12.1 15.2 6.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 19.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -100.0

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 8.2 10.4 12.3 15.5 6.0

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9 17.0 20.7 24.3 29.0 4.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.3 4.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.0 22.3 26.3 29.5 32.4 4.0

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 9.6 11.4 13.0 14.5 4.4

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.6 3.1

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 —

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.8 52.6 63.0 72.1 82.0 4.3

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 20.4 23.1 25.6 27.2 3.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.2 73.1 86.1 97.7 109.2 4.1

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 1.9 1.3 1.0 0.2 -5.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 1.2 1.5 2.1 4.3 14.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.8 22.9 26.7 30.1 31.2 3.3

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.7 1.4 1.7 2.1 9.9

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 5.2 5.7 6.1 6.6 3.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.1 31.9 36.6 41.0 44.4 3.7

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 18.9 21.9 25.3 29.2 4.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 3.1 4.0 4.9 7.6 7.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.9 45.1 53.0 59.6 63.6 3.6

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.7 1.4 1.7 2.1 9.9

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 5.2 5.7 6.2 6.7 3.4

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.2 73.1 86.1 97.7 109.2 4.1

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D10. Delivered Energy Consumption in India by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Billion Kilowatthours)

Appendix D

148 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.0 3.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.3

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.4 6.5

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.9 4.3

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 —

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 3.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 6.1

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 5.7

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 2.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 2.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.8 3.3 3.7 4.2 3.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.9 3.3

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 7.0 8.0 9.1 10.4 2.7

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 2.4 3.0 3.5 3.9 4.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 —

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 2.5 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.7

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 6.0 7.1 8.2 9.3 3.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 3.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.8 2.9

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 2.6 3.3 3.9 4.6 4.7

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 23.1

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.0 12.8 15.1 17.5 19.9 3.5

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 6.8 7.7 8.6 9.5 2.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.0 19.6 22.7 26.0 29.3 3.3

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 6.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.7 7.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 6.4 7.2 7.9 8.5 2.2

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.4 8.4

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.7 3.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 9.5 10.9 12.5 14.0 3.3

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.3 7.5 8.7 10.0 3.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.9 5.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 9.9 11.1 12.2 13.4 2.5

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.4 8.4

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.7 3.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.0 19.6 22.7 26.0 29.3 3.3

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D11. Delivered Energy Consumption in South Korea by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections by End-Use Sector and Region

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 149

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -3.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.5

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 3.5

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.6

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.6

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.1

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 7.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.6

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 3.4

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.1

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 4.2 4.8 5.2 5.6 2.0

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 1.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 1.9

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.7 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.6 4.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.5

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 3.2

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 8.1 9.0 9.6 10.2 1.9

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.4 2.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 10.6 11.8 12.7 13.5 2.1

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.2 3.8

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.6

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 4.4

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.9 4.5 4.9 5.2 2.8

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 5.3 5.8 6.0 6.1 1.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.1 3.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.1 2.6 2.9 3.1 2.5

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.6

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 4.6

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 10.6 11.8 12.7 13.5 2.1

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D12. Delivered Energy Consumption in Other Emerging Asia by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Appendix D

150 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 3.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 3.4

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.2

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 3.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 2.9

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 3.0

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 4.5 5.3 6.1 6.8 3.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.8 3.2 3.7 4.1 2.7

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.7 2.3

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.6 4.0

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 11.5 13.4 15.3 17.3 3.1

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 8.6 10.1 11.5 13.0 3.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 15.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 8.6 10.1 11.6 13.1 3.3

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 14.4 16.7 18.9 21.0 3.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 3.3 3.8 4.4 5.0 3.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.8 2.3

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 3.3 3.8 4.4 4.9 3.6

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.7

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.2 23.6 27.4 31.0 34.8 3.1

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 6.7 7.8 8.9 9.9 2.4

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.9 30.3 35.1 39.9 44.6 2.9

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.2 3.1 4.0 4.7 2.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.9

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 4.0

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.9 10.0 11.6 13.3 14.8 2.8

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 16.5 19.2 21.8 24.2 3.2

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 5.6 6.9 8.4 9.7 2.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 5.4 6.0 6.4 6.8 2.1

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 4.0

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.2 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.9 30.3 35.1 39.9 44.6 3.0

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D13. Delivered Energy Consumption in the Middle East by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections by End-Use Sector and Region

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 151

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 3.6

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.7

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.7 4.0 4.2 4.4 1.9

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 3.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 2.5

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 3.1

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 3.1

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.3 1.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 6.1 7.4 9.0 10.7 4.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.2

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 2.8

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 12.4 14.2 16.1 18.1 2.9

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 5.9 6.7 7.3 7.9 2.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 —

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 6.0 6.8 7.4 8.0 2.5

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 12.0 13.1 13.9 14.7 1.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 7.6 9.1 10.7 12.5 3.6

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.9 3.4 3.8 4.1 3.2

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 4.3

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.6 23.3 26.3 29.2 32.1 2.6

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 5.4 6.0 6.4 6.8 1.9

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.0 28.7 32.4 35.6 38.9 2.5

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 3.0 3.5 3.8 4.1 2.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.9 1.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.6

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 3.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 8.3 9.4 10.2 10.9 2.4

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 15.1 16.6 17.7 18.8 2.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 11.1 13.2 15.2 17.4 3.1

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 3.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.0 28.7 32.4 35.6 38.9 2.5

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D14. Delivered Energy Consumption in Africa by End-Use Sector and Fuel, 2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Appendix D

152 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 -0.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5 6.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -2.3

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.7 6.0

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.3

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 14.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 4.6

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 4.3

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.3

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.1 3.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.6

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.8

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 5.9 6.5 7.1 7.7 2.1

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 4.2 4.9 5.4 5.7 3.1

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -6.4

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 4.2 5.0 5.4 5.8 3.1

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 6.7 7.6 8.3 8.8 2.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 2.0 2.5 3.1 3.7 4.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.4

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.8

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.7

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 12.7 14.7 16.3 17.8 2.8

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 4.0 4.6 5.2 5.6 2.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.7 16.7 19.3 21.4 23.4 2.7

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 3.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.7 2.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.4 2.5

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 6.1 7.1 8.1 8.9 2.7

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 7.6 8.7 9.5 10.1 2.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 3.4 4.4 5.2 6.4 4.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.3 1.6

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.7 16.7 19.3 21.4 23.4 2.7

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table D15. Delivered Energy Consumption in Central and South America by End-Use Sector and Fuel,

2002-2025

(Quadrillion Btu)

Reference Case Projections by End-Use Sector and Region

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 153

Sector/Fuel 2002

Projections Average Annual

Percent Change,

2010 2015 2020 2025 2002-2025

Residential

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 3.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.8 4.2

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.3

Commercial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 3.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 2.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.6 4.8

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.1 4.4

Industrial

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 4.2 4.7 5.2 5.6 1.9

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.7 3.3 3.7 4.3 2.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 2.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.7 4.1

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.8

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 9.3 10.7 12.0 13.7 2.6

Transportation

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 7.3 8.3 9.0 9.8 2.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 7.4 8.4 9.1 9.9 2.7

All End-Use Sectors

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6 12.4 14.0 15.2 16.5 2.4

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.4 4.1 4.7 5.4 2.8

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 2.1

Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 3.7 4.5 5.3 6.2 4.3

Heat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5

Delivered Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.5 20.3 23.5 26.1 29.1 2.8

Electricity-Related Losses . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 6.6 6.9 7.1 7.0 0.9

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 26.8 30.4 33.2 36.1 2.3

Electric Power

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.5 3.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.7 4.6

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.5

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.4

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 6.6 6.9 7.2 7.4 1.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 10.2 11.4 12.4 13.3 2.2

Total Energy Consumption

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.7 13.9 15.8 17.4 18.9 2.5

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 5.0 6.1 7.0 8.1 3.3

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 2.2

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.4

Renewables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 6.6 7.0 7.2 7.4 1.2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 26.8 30.4 33.2 36.1 2.3

Sources: 2002: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).

Appendix E

Projections of Oil Production Capacity

and Oil Production in Three Cases:

• Reference

• High World Oil Price

• Low World Oil Price

Table E1. World Oil Production Capacity by Region and Country, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Oil Production and Capacity Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 157

Region/Country

History (Estimates) Projections

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

OPEC

Persian Gulf

Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.7 5.0

Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.0 3.5 4.2 5.3 6.6

Kuwait. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.1 2.9 3.5 4.5 5.2

Qatar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8

Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 9.2 14.0 14.5 15.4 16.3

United Arab Emitates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.9 3.3 3.6 4.5 5.4

Total Persian Gulf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.7 20.7 28.3 30.8 35.2 39.3

Other OPEC

Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.8

Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5

Libya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.9

Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.9

Venezuela. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.7 5.6

Total Other OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 9.9 11.6 12.9 14.5 16.7

Total OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.2 30.6 39.9 43.7 49.7 56.0

Non-OPEC

Mature Market Economies

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 9.3 9.9 9.7 9.5 9.3

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.9 3.5 4.8 4.9 5.1

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.6 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.9

North Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 6.3 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.5

Australia and New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.1 23.7 25.2 26.1 25.8 25.4

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 11.2 13.6 15.3 16.5 17.6

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 11.4 13.9 15.7 16.9 18.1

Emerging Economies

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5

Other Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.8

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.8

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 3.1 4.0 5.1 5.8 6.8

Central and South America . . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.9 4.8 5.9 6.4 6.9

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 14.3 17.5 19.9 21.2 22.7

Total Non-OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.2 49.4 56.6 61.7 63.9 66.2

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69.4 80.0 96.5 105.4 113.6 122.2

Note: OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Energy Markets and Contingency Information Division. Projections:

EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005); and U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, World

Petroleum Assessment 2000 (Reston, VA, July 2000).
Table E2. World Oil Production Capacity by Region and Country, High Oil Price Case, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Appendix E

158 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History (Estimates) Projections

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

OPEC

Persian Gulf

Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.5

Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.0 3.1 3.1 3.5 4.0

Kuwait. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.1 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.5

Qatar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8

Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 9.2 10.4 10.5 10.8 11.0

United Arab Emitates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.9 3.4 3.4 3.7 4.0

Total Persian Gulf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.7 20.7 24.4 24.5 26.2 27.8

Other OPEC

Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.2

Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4

Libya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.2

Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.9

Venezuela. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.9

Total Other OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 9.9 10.6 10.6 11.6 12.6

Total OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.2 30.6 35.0 35.1 37.8 40.4

Non-OPEC

Mature Market Economies

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 9.3 10.2 10.5 10.9 11.0

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.9 4.0 5.4 5.9 6.4

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.6 4.5 4.9 5.1 5.3

North Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 6.3 6.2 5.8 5.4 4.9

Australia and New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.1 23.7 26.6 28.3 29.0 29.2

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 11.2 14.1 16.6 17.8 19.6

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 11.4 14.5 17.0 18.2 20.1

Emerging Economies

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7

Other Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.4 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.0

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 3.1 4.4 5.7 6.7 8.1

Central and South America . . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.9 5.2 6.4 7.2 8.0

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 14.3 18.5 21.5 23.5 25.8

Total Non-OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.2 49.4 59.6 66.7 70.7 75.1

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69.4 80.0 94.6 101.8 108.5 115.5

Note: OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Energy Markets and Contingency Information Division. Projections:

EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005); and U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, World

Petroleum Assessment 2000 (Reston, VA, July 2000).
Table E3. World Oil Production Capacity by Region and Country, Low Oil Price Case, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Oil Production and Capacity Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 159

Region/Country

History (Estimates) Projections

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

OPEC

Persian Gulf

Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.7 4.8 5.6 6.2 6.9

Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.0 4.0 5.7 7.1 8.6

Kuwait. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.1 3.6 4.5 5.4 6.2

Qatar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9

Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 9.2 15.6 16.5 18.1 20.4

United Arab Emitates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.9 4.0 4.8 6.0 7.0

Total Persian Gulf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.7 20.7 32.8 37.9 43.6 50.0

Other OPEC

Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.6 2.2 2.6 3.1 3.7

Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5

Libya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.6 2.2 2.6 3.3 3.9

Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.3 3.3 4.3 5.5 6.4

Venezuela. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.1 4.6 5.4 6.4 7.3

Total Other OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 9.9 13.8 16.4 19.8 22.8

Total OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.2 30.6 46.6 54.3 63.4 72.8

Non-OPEC

Mature Market Economies

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 9.3 9.5 9.1 8.9 8.4

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.9 3.4 4.3 4.4 4.4

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.6 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.7

North Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 6.3 5.7 5.2 4.8 4.3

Australia and New Zealand . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.1 23.7 24.4 24.7 24.2 23.3

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 11.2 13.1 14.9 15.8 16.9

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 11.4 13.4 15.3 16.2 17.3

Emerging Economies

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.3

Other Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.7

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 3.1 4.0 4.9 5.5 6.7

Central and South America . . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.9 4.8 5.6 6.1 6.5

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 14.3 17.2 19.0 20.1 21.8

Total Non-OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.2 49.4 55.0 59.0 60.5 62.4

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69.4 80.0 101.6 113.3 123.9 135.2

Note: OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Energy Markets and Contingency Information Division. Projections:

EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005); and U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, World

Petroleum Assessment 2000 (Reston, VA, July 2000).
Table E4. World Oil Production by Region and Country, Reference Case, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Appendix E

160 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History (Estimates) Projections

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

Conventional Production. . . . . . . . . . . . 66.7 76.6 91.5 98.0 105.2 113.2

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.6 28.3 37.0 40.0 45.5 51.4

Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 19.0 25.8 27.9 32.1 36.7

North Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 3.0 3.6 3.9 4.4 4.6

West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.6

South America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.9 3.5 4.0 4.4 5.0

Non-OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.1 48.3 54.5 58.0 59.7 61.8

Mature Market Economies. . . . . . . . . 20.1 22.9 23.5 23.0 22.4 21.8

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 9.3 9.9 9.7 9.5 9.3

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.6 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.9

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 6.9 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.0

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Australia and New Zealand . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9

Transitional Economies. . . . . . . . . . . 11.6 11.4 13.9 15.7 16.8 18.0

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 11.2 13.6 15.3 16.4 17.5

Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 9.6 10.3 10.8 11.1 11.3

Caspian and Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 1.6 3.3 4.5 5.3 6.2

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5

Emerging Economies. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 14.0 17.1 19.3 20.5 22.0

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5

Other Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.8

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.9 3.8 4.9 5.5 6.5

Central and South America . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.8 4.6 5.5 6.0 6.5

Nonconventional Production . . . . . . . . 0.0 1.5 2.8 4.9 5.5 5.7

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Other North America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.8 1.7 3.1 3.3 3.5

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1

Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3

Central and South America . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.5 0.8 1.4 1.5 1.5

Liquids Production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66.7 78.1 94.3 102.9 110.7 118.9

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.6 28.7 37.7 41.3 46.8 52.7

Non-OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.1 49.4 56.6 61.7 63.9 66.2

Persian Gulf Production as a

Percentage of World Consumption . . . 24.5% 24.3% 27.5% 27.3% 29.2% 31.0%

Notes: OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Conventional production includes crude oil (including lease condensates), natural gas liquids, other hydrogen hydrocarbons for refinery feedstocks, refinery gains, alcohol, and liquids produced

from coal and other sources. Nonconventional liquids include production from oil sands, ultra-heavy oils, gas to liquids technologies,

coal to liquids technologies, biofuel technologies, and shale oil. Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Energy Markets and Contingency Information Division. Projections:

EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005); and U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, World

Petroleum Assessment 2000 (Reston, VA, July 2000).
Table E5. World Oil Production by Region and Country, High Oil Price Case, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Oil Production and Capacity Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 161

Region/Country

History (Estimates) Projections

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

Conventional Production. . . . . . . . . . . . 66.7 76.6 88.5 92.6 97.3 102.4

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.5 30.2 32.0 31.2 33.1 35.0

Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.2 20.9 22.3 21.8 23.3 25.1

North Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.1

West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4

South America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.4

Non-OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.2 46.4 56.5 61.4 64.2 67.4

Mature Market Economies. . . . . . . . . 20.1 22.9 24.3 24.1 23.9 23.2

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 9.3 10.1 10.1 10.1 9.8

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.6 4.5 4.9 5.1 5.3

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 6.9 6.7 6.3 5.9 5.4

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Australia and New Zealand . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9

Transitional Economies. . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 9.5 14.4 16.9 18.1 20.0

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 9.3 14.0 16.5 17.7 19.5

Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 7.7 10.7 11.6 12.0 12.5

Caspian and Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 1.6 3.3 4.9 5.7 7.0

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5

Emerging Economies. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 14.0 17.8 20.4 22.2 24.2

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7

Other Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.4 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.9

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.9 4.1 5.2 6.1 7.4

Central and South America . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.8 4.8 5.9 6.6 7.2

Nonconventional Production . . . . . . . . 0.0 1.5 4.3 7.1 8.8 10.5

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.2

Other North America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.8 2.1 3.7 4.2 4.7

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7

Central and South America . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.5 1.4 2.0 2.5 3.0

Liquids Production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66.7 78.1 92.8 99.7 106.1 112.9

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.5 30.6 33.3 33.0 35.4 37.9

Non-OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.2 47.5 59.6 66.7 70.7 75.1

Persian Gulf Production as a

Percentage of World Consumption . . . 24.4% 26.7% 22.7% 20.1% 19.7% 18.4%

Notes: OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Conventional production includes crude oil (including lease condensates), natural gas liquids, other hydrogen hydrocarbons for refinery feedstocks, refinery gains, alcohol, and liquids produced

from coal and other sources. Nonconventional liquids include production from oil sands, ultra-heavy oils, gas to liquids technologies,

coal to liquids technologies, biofuel technologies, and shale oil. Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Energy Markets and Contingency Information Division. Projections:

EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005); and U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, World

Petroleum Assessment 2000 (Reston, VA, July 2000).
Table E6. World Oil Production by Region and Country, Low Oil Price Case, 1990-2025

(Million Barrels per Day)

Appendix E

162 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country

History (Estimates) Projections

1990 2002 2010 2015 2020 2025

Conventional Production. . . . . . . . . . . . 66.7 76.6 96.4 106.1 115.9 126.6

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.5 28.3 43.4 50.3 58.7 67.6

Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.2 19.0 30.3 35.1 41.4 48.4

North Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 3.0 4.3 4.9 5.7 6.0

West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.0 2.9 3.4 4.0 4.7

South America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.9 4.1 5.0 5.7 6.5

Non-OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.2 48.3 53.0 55.8 57.2 59.0

Mature Market Economies. . . . . . . . . 20.1 22.9 22.8 22.0 21.4 20.4

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 9.3 9.5 9.1 8.9 8.4

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.6 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.7

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 6.9 6.3 5.8 5.4 4.9

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Australia and New Zealand . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8

Transitional Economies. . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 11.4 13.4 15.3 16.2 17.3

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 11.2 13.1 14.9 15.8 16.9

Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 9.6 10.0 10.5 10.6 10.9

Caspian and Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 1.6 3.1 4.4 5.2 6.0

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4

Emerging Economies. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 14.0 16.8 18.5 19.6 21.3

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.0 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.3

Other Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.7

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.9 3.8 4.7 5.3 6.5

Central and South America . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.8 4.6 5.3 5.8 6.2

Nonconventional Production . . . . . . . . 0.0 1.5 2.6 4.0 4.3 4.3

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Other North America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.7 2.8 2.9

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2

Central and South America . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.2

Liquids Production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66.7 78.1 99.0 110.1 120.2 130.9

OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.5 28.7 44.0 51.1 59.7 68.5

Non-OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.2 49.4 55.0 59.0 60.5 62.4

Persian Gulf Production as a

Percentage of World Consumption . . . 24.4% 24.3% 30.6% 31.9% 34.5% 37.0%

Notes: OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Conventional production includes crude oil (including lease condensates), natural gas liquids, other hydrogen hydrocarbons for refinery feedstocks, refinery gains, alcohol, and liquids produced

from coal and other sources. Nonconventional liquids include production from oil sands, ultra-heavy oils, gas to liquids technologies,

coal to liquids technologies, biofuel technologies, and shale oil. Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Energy Markets and Contingency Information Division. Projections:

EIA, System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005); and U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, World

Petroleum Assessment 2000 (Reston, VA, July 2000).
Appendix F

Projections of Nuclear Generating Capacity

• Reference Case

• Strong Nuclear Power Revival Case

• Weak Nuclear Power Case

• Kyoto Protocol Case

Table F1. World Nuclear Generating Capacity by Region and Country, Reference Case, 2002-2025

(Gigawatts)

Nuclear Generating Capacity Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 165

Region/Country 2002

Projections

2010 2015 2020 2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110.9 116.5 118.1 118.6 117.9

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 100.6 102.2 102.7 102.7

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 14.5 14.5 14.5 13.8

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127.0 120.1 114.9 104.6 95.1

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 47.4 48.5 51.2 54.8

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 47.4 48.5 51.2 54.8

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . . . 283.8 284.1 281.5 274.4 267.8

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.5 39.2 38.2 44.5 51.8

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 24.6 23.9 28.1 35.5

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2 14.7 14.3 16.3 16.3

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 12.2 13.2 14.1 15.1

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.2 51.5 51.4 58.5 66.9

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.3 49.0 60.1 70.7 79.7

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 10.8 18.1 21.1 26.0

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 7.9 10.5 14.2 15.3

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.7 22.0 23.3 24.1 25.5

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 8.3 8.2 11.3 13.0

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0

Central and South America . . . . . . . 3.0 2.8 4.8 4.4 4.4

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 1.9 3.1 3.1 3.1

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 0.9 1.6 1.3 1.3

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.1 54.6 67.8 78.1 87.1

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361.2 390.1 400.7 411.0 421.8

Nations Participating in

Kyoto Protocol Annex I

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 13.7 15.8 17.3 18.8

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127.0 125.0 130.2 132.0 147.0

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 48.5 61.5 66.8 69.6

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 12.2 13.2 14.1 15.1

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.5 38.9 38.2 42.8 50.1

Total Annex I Participants . . . . . . . 231.8 238.2 258.9 273.0 300.6

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington,

DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web site

www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table F2. World Nuclear Generating Capacity by Region and Country, Strong Nuclear Power Revival Case,

2002-2025

(Gigawatts)

Appendix F

166 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country 2002

Projections

2010 2015 2020 2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110.9 115.7 119.5 123.7 126.3

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 100.6 102.2 102.7 102.7

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 13.7 15.8 17.3 18.8

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.4 1.4 3.7 4.9

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127.0 125.0 130.2 132.0 147.0

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 48.5 61.5 66.8 69.6

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 48.5 61.5 66.8 69.6

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . . . 283.8 289.2 311.1 322.5 343.0

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.5 42.0 49.6 61.7 72.0

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 27.4 31.8 41.5 46.9

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2 14.7 17.8 20.3 25.1

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 12.0 15.2 20.6 30.9

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.2 54.1 64.8 82.3 102.9

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.3 44.9 63.7 77.2 100.4

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 9.9 21.1 23.3 28.9

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 6.3 9.4 12.6 16.2

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.7 20.6 23.3 26.0 30.1

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 8.0 9.9 15.3 25.2

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.9 3.1 6.3 9.1

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.8 2.1 3.6 6.4

Central and South America . . . . . . . 3.0 4.8 4.8 6.0 8.4

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 5.5

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.6 1.6 2.8 2.8

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.1 52.3 73.7 93.1 124.3

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361.2 395.6 449.6 498.0 570.1

Nations Participating in

Kyoto Protocol Annex I

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 13.7 15.8 17.3 18.8

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127.0 125.0 130.2 132.0 147.0

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 48.5 61.5 66.8 69.6

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 12.0 15.2 20.6 30.9

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.5 41.7 48.3 57.7 66.7

Total Annex I Participants . . . . . . . 231.8 240.8 271.0 294.4 333.0

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington,

DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web site

www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table F3. World Nuclear Generating Capacity by Region and Country, Weak Nuclear Power Case, 2002-2025

(Gigawatts)

Nuclear Generating Capacity Projections

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 167

Region/Country 2002

Projections

2010 2015 2020 2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110.9 114.2 114.6 114.9 111.2

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 100.6 102.2 102.7 102.7

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 12.1 11.0 10.8 7.1

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127.0 107.1 94.6 73.2 45.2

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 46.8 47.4 45.1 40.5

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 46.8 47.4 45.1 40.5

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . . . 283.8 268.0 256.6 233.2 196.9

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.5 36.8 37.0 34.6 30.3

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 23.7 23.9 21.5 18.9

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2 13.1 13.1 13.1 11.4

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 10.7 10.8 11.4 10.2

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.2 47.5 47.8 46.0 40.4

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.3 39.0 47.5 54.4 55.7

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 8.6 12.8 16.8 18.5

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 5.7 6.2 7.8 10.0

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.7 16.8 20.6 22.8 23.3

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 7.9 7.9 7.0 3.9

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 0.3

Central and South America . . . . . . . 3.0 2.8 2.5 3.1 2.5

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.5

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.0

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.1 44.5 52.7 60.4 59.5

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361.2 360.1 357.1 339.7 296.8

Nations Participating in

Kyoto Protocol Annex I

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 13.7 15.8 17.3 18.8

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127.0 125.0 130.2 132.0 147.0

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 48.5 61.5 66.8 69.6

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 10.7 10.8 11.4 10.2

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.5 36.8 37.0 34.6 29.3

Total Annex I Participants . . . . . . . 231.8 234.6 255.3 262.2 274.9

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington,

DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web site

www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Table F4. World Nuclear Generating Capacity by Region and Country, Kyoto Protocol Case, 2002-2025

(Gigawatts)

Appendix F

168 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Region/Country 2002

Projections

2010 2015 2020 2025

Mature Market Economies

North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110.9 116.5 118.1 118.6 118.0

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 100.6 102.2 102.7 102.7

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 14.5 14.5 14.5 13.9

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127.0 123.3 119.7 117.9 109.8

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 47.7 51.5 61.1 61.1

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 47.7 51.5 61.1 61.1

Australia/New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total Mature Market . . . . . . . . . . . 283.8 287.5 289.3 297.6 288.9

Transitional Economies

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.5 40.1 42.8 50.0 54.9

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 25.5 28.5 31.8 35.5

Other FSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2 14.7 14.3 18.2 19.4

Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 12.3 14.3 16.2 19.8

Total Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.2 52.5 57.1 66.1 74.7

Emerging Economies

Emerging Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.3 49.0 60.1 70.7 79.7

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 10.8 18.1 21.1 26.0

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 7.9 10.5 14.2 15.3

South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.7 22.0 23.3 24.1 25.5

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 8.3 8.2 11.3 13.0

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0

Central and South America . . . . . . . 3.0 2.8 4.8 4.4 4.4

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 1.9 3.1 3.1 3.1

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 0.9 1.6 1.3 1.3

Total Emerging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.1 54.6 67.8 78.1 87.1

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361.2 394.6 414.2 441.8 450.7

Nations Participating in

Kyoto Protocol Annex I

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 14.5 14.5 14.5 13.9

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127.0 123.3 119.7 117.9 109.8

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.9 47.7 51.5 61.1 61.1

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 12.3 14.3 16.2 19.8

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.5 39.8 42.8 48.3 53.2

Total Annex I Participants . . . . . . . 231.8 237.6 242.8 257.9 257.8

Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.

Sources: 2002: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington,

DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. Projections: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2005, DOE/EIA-0383(2005) (Washington, DC, February 2005), October futures case, AEO2005 National Energy Modeling System, run CF2005.D111104A, web site

www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/; and System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005).
Appendix G

Key Assumptions for the IEO2005 Kyoto Protocol Case

Energy-Related Emissions of Greenhouse Gases

The System for the Analysis of Global energy Markets

(SAGE)—the model used by the Energy Information

Administration (EIA) to prepare the International Energy

Outlook 2005 (IEO2005) mid-term projections—does not

include non-energy-related emissions of greenhouse

gases, which are estimated at about 15 to 20 percent of

total greenhouse gas emissions, based on inventories

submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). SAGE models

global energy supply and demand and, therefore, does

not address agricultural and other non-energy-related

emissions.

EIA implicitly assumes that percentage reductions of

non-energy-related emissions and their associated

abatement costs will be similar to those for energyrelated emissions. Non-energy-related greenhouse gas

emissions are likely to grow faster than energy-related

emissions; however, the marginal abatement costs for

non-energy-related greenhouse gas emissions are not

known and cannot be estimated reliably. In SAGE, each

region’s emissions reduction goal under the Kyoto Protocol is based only on the corresponding estimate of that

region’s energy-related carbon dioxide emissions, as

determined by EIA data. It is assumed that the required

reductions will also be proportionately less than if all

gases were included.

Carbon Dioxide Emissions

For IEO2005, EIA modeled only energy-related carbon

dioxide emissions. Energy-related emissions of other

greenhouse gases, such as methane, nitrous oxide, and

sulfur hexafluoride, are not included in the analysis. The

current SAGE framework uses historical data on fuel

consumption and emissions from EIA’s International

Energy Annual 2002 to calibrate the base year for the

model’s Reference Energy System (RES). The International Energy Annual does not provide historical data for

methane and nitrous oxide emissions, and currently

there are no plans to do so in the future.

EIA assumes that emissions reduction proportions and

abatement costs for energy-related methane and nitrous

oxide will be sufficiently similar to those for carbon

dioxide that—given their lesser share of total emissions

(approximately 15 percent from energy and non-energy

sources combined)—the per-unit carbon price derived

by modeling carbon dioxide alone is representative of

the abatement costs for all energy-related greenhouse

gas emissions. The UNFCCC estimates that total Annex

I emissions of greenhouse gases (in carbon dioxide

equivalents) in 2002 had the following composition:

energy-related carbon dioxide, 78.1 percent; nonenergy-related carbon dioxide, 3.8 percent; methane,

10.0 percent; nitrous oxide, 6.4 percent; and other gases,

1.7 percent.19

Emissions Reduction Targets

The emissions reduction targets modeled in SAGE were

derived from EIA’s historical data on greenhouse gas

emissions, not on UNFCCC data. Similarly, the historical values for fuel consumption used in SAGE are based

on EIA data. For methodological reasons, the EIA and

UNFCCC data on emissions differ; therefore, the emissions targets used for the IEO2005 analysis differ from

those used by the UNFCCC, as shown by the examples

in Table G1.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 169

Table G1. Differences Between IEO2005 and UNFCCC Regional Emissions Reduction Targets for 2010

SAGE Region

EIA Target

(Thousand

Metric Tons)

UNFCCC Target

(Thousand

Metric Tons)

Difference

Thousand

Metric Tons

Percent of

IEO2005 Target

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444,375 396,591 47,784 10.75

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,056,157 967,862 88,295 8.36

Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . 3,091,752 3,080,200 11,552 0.37

Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,230 985,432 -55,202 -5.93

Western Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,122,701 2,936,310 186,391 5.97

Sources: EIA Target: Derived from Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA0219(2002) (Washington, DC, March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. UNFCC Target: United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse Gas Inventory Database, web site http://ghg.unfccc.int/index.html, queried for 1990 or

base year “Total Fuel Combustion (Sectoral Approach)” for CO2 for all Annex I countries.

19United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse Gas Inventory Database, Queried for 2002

“National Totals” and “Total Fuel Combustion (Sectoral Approach)” for all GHGs for all Annex I countries except Russia, Poland, and

Liechtenstein, web site http://ghg.unfccc.int/index.html.
Regional Aggregration

SAGE aggregates individual countries into 15 fixed

global regions and forecasts all energy consumption

activity and consequent emissions at the regional level.

Because the model does not distinguish specific countries within a region, the methodology in effect creates a

joint emissions reduction target for all participating

Annex I countries in the region. For regions with a mix of

participating and non-participating countries (e.g.,

Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet

Union), the “joint target” by methodological necessity

includes the non-participating countries (but with no

emissions reduction obligation from their baselines).

This approach makes it somewhat easier for countries to

achieve their targets. It allows, by definition, the equivalent of “off-book” joint implementation projects and

emission credit trading among participants and nonparticipants in a single region. Further, renewable

resources located in one area may be employed to meet

demand from another area within a single large region,

with no transmission costs. The associated carbon price,

therefore, tends to be understated based on these two

assumptions.

The SAGE model results show that Eastern Europe and

the former Soviet Union have sufficient room under

their emissions reduction targets to meet all the permit

trading demand generated by other signatory regions

through 2025. Therefore, the IEO2005 projections do not

include Clean Development Mechanism projects, which

are likely to be more costly than purchases of emission

permits.

Reduction Targets Through 2025

Under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, emissions reduction targets continue in the second commitment period

(beyond 2012) at the same levels as in the initial commitment period. In SAGE, those target levels are assumed to

continue through 2025.

Macroeconomic Impacts

In SAGE, elasticity of demand is modeled with respect

to the costs of energy end-use services; however, the

response of gross domestic product (GDP) to higher

energy prices is not modeled. That is, SAGE does not

model the macroeconomic impacts of the Kyoto

Protocol.

SAGE derives demand for energy end-use services (residential space heating, personal road transportation, etc.)

as a function of exogenously developed macroeconomic

drivers (GDP, population, etc.). The SAGE linear program then solves for the least-cost technology mix that

will meet the projected demand. Although SAGE does

not endogenously change the projections provided

exogenously for the macroeconomic drivers, most of the

effect of higher energy prices is captured in the elastic

demand. Furthermore, higher GDP growth projections

tend to increase the introduction of newer, more efficient technologies.

Minimum Market Shares

SAGE imposes minimum market shares for some

energy-efficient technologies (e.g., new, more efficient

personal automobiles, such as gas-electric hybrids) that

have capital costs higher than those of less efficient competing technologies. (Because of the “winner-take-all”

nature of linear program models, the more efficient but

more costly technologies would not be selected without

the imposed minimum shares.)

For the IEO2005 Kyoto Protocol case, EIA assumed no

increase in the minimum market share imposed for

energy-efficient new technologies. Although in the

Kyoto Protocol case their costs compare more favorably

with the costs for their less energy-efficient competitors

than in the reference case, the new technologies still cost

more and therefore enter the forecast only at their

imposed minimum market shares. Furthermore, SAGE

does not adjust for changes in consumer preferences,

such as switching to subcompact cars that have both

lower capital costs and lower operating costs. This

attribute of the model tends to yield a higher projected

carbon price than would be expected if such changes in

consumer behavior were included in the analysis.

170 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005
Appendix H

Comparisons With Other Forecasts, and Performance of

Past IEO Forecasts for 1990, 1995, and 2000

Forecast Comparisons

Three organizations provide forecasts comparable with

those in the International Energy Outlook 2005 (IEO2005).

The International Energy Agency (IEA) provides “business as usual” projections to the year 2030 in its World

Energy Outlook 2004; Petroleum Economics, Ltd. (PEL)

publishes world energy forecasts to 2025; and Petroleum

Industry Research Associates (PIRA) provides projections to 2015. For this comparison, 2002 is used as the

base year for all the forecasts, and the comparisons

extend to 2025. Although IEA’s forecast extends to 2030,

it does not publish a projection for 2025.

In addition to forecasts from other organizations, the

IEO2005 projections are also compared with those in last

year’s report (IEO2004). Because 2002 data were not

available when IEO2004 forecasts were prepared, the

growth rates from IEO2004 are computed from 2001.

Regional breakouts among the forecasting groups vary,

complicating the comparisons. For example, IEO2005

and PIRA include Mexico in North America; IEA

includes Mexico in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) North America; but PEL

includes Mexico in Latin America. Because the IEA and

IEO2005 provide separate forecasts for Mexico, for purposes of this comparison, Mexico has been removed

from North America in the IEO2005 and IEA projections

and is included with Central and South America to form

a “Latin America” country grouping. Unfortunately,

PIRA does not provide separate forecasts for Mexico,

and so PIRA’s North American forecasts are somewhat

inconsistent with the other forecasts.

Further, PIRA includes only Japan in mature market

Asia, whereas mature market Asia in the IEO2005 forecast comprises Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, and

the IEA forecasts an OECD Pacific that includes those

three countries plus South Korea. IEO2005 includes Turkey in the Middle East, but IEA includes Turkey—as

well as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and

Slovakia—in “OECD Europe” (which is designated as

“Western Europe” for this comparison). PEL also places

Turkey in Western Europe but includes the Czech

Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in Eastern

Europe, as does IEO2005. Although most of the differences involve fairly small countries, they do contribute

to the variations among the forecasts.

All the forecasts provide projections out to the year 2010

(Table H1). The 2002-2010 time period shows wide variation among the forecasters’ expectations. This is, in

part, reflective of the volatility experienced over the past

several years in the world’s energy markets. Growth

rates for energy consumption among the reference case

forecasts range from 2.0 percent per year (PEL) to 2.7

percent per year (PIRA), with the IEO2005 forecast projecting 2.6 percent per year. The forecasters are in general agreement that energy demand in the mature

market economies will expand more slowly than in the

transitional economies, and that the fastest growth in

world energy use will occur among the emerging economies. However, the IEO2005 reference case forecasts

much slower energy demand growth for Western

Europe than do any of the other forecasts, and in fact all

the other forecasts fall above the range defined by the

IEO2005 high economic growth case for the 2002 to 2010

period.

The IEA forecast anticipates much higher growth for

mature market Asia than any of the other forecasts,

though this may likely be the case because the IEA figures include projections for South Korea, in addition to

Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. IEA’s 2002-2010

growth rate for mature market Asia exceeds that of the

IEO2005 high economic growth case.

In the transitional EE/FSU region, forecasts are largely

in agreement about expected growth, except for the

PIRA forecast. PIRA is much more optimistic about projected growth for the EE/FSU region than any other

forecast, and PIRA’s 2.7 percent per year projected

growth rate for the EE/FSU falls above the IEO2005 high

economic growth case of 2.5 percent per year for the

2002 to 2010 period.

The IEA projections for the developing world are also

generally lower than the IEO2005 projections. The IEA

growth rates are lower than the projected growth rates

in IEO2005 for each developing region, and they fall

below the IEO2005 low economic growth case for China

and Africa. For China, the IEA’s projection of 3.4-percent

annual growth in energy demand between 2002 and

2010 is substantially lower than the 6.8 percent per year

forecast in the IEO2005 reference case. In part, this may

be explained by China’s particularly high economic

growth and corresponding energy demand growth that

accompanied it in 2003 and 2004, which would not have

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 171
been anticipated when the IEA forecast was being prepared for publication.

Similarly to IEA’s China forecast, PEL has a lower

growth rate than the IEO2005 low economic growth

case, at 4.0 percent per year. The PEL forecast (March

2004) is among the oldest of the forecasts in the comparison group, and, as with IEA, the unanticipated explosive

growth in China’s energy demand in the past few years

probably explains the differences between the PEL and

IEO2005 forecasts. The PIRA forecast for the 2002 to 2010

period is very similar to the IEO2005 reference case projections for the developing world, with the exception of

the Middle East, where PIRA projects growth in energy

demand which exceeds that in the IEO2005 high economic growth case.

The IEO2005 reference case forecast is higher than in last

year’s outlook for the 2000 to 2010 period, particularly

for the transitional EE/FSU and emerging economy

regions. For the EE/FSU, projected growth in energy use

is substantially higher in IEO2005 than in IEO2004 (with

demand growth averaging 2.0 percent and 1.1 percent

per year, respectively, in the two forecasts). In the case of

the emerging economies, much of the upward revision

can be attributed to China and the other emerging Asia

nations, where unexpectedly strong growth in energy

demand was recorded over the past 2 years and is

reflected in the 10-year forecast period. In the case of the

EE/FSU, the higher forecast in IEO2005 reflects substantially higher expectations for economic growth over the

time period (5.6 percent per year in IEO2005 and 4.5

percent per year in IEO2004). This growth is largely

attributed to the impact of recent high world oil prices

on oil exporters in the FSU.

IEO2005, PIRA, and PEL provide forecasts for energy

use in 2015 (Table H2), which is the end of the PIRA forecast horizon. Their projections for worldwide growth in

energy consumption between 2002 and 2015 vary from

2.0 percent per year (PEL) to 2.6 percent per year (PIRA),

with IEO2005 expecting average annual growth of 2.3

percent. As it does for 2002-2010, PIRA forecasts much

faster growth in energy use for the EE/FSU during

2002-2015 than does IEO2005. In China and the Middle

East, PIRA’s energy growth projections exceed the

IEO2005 high economic growth case forecasts. Whereas

the IEO2005 reference case anticipates that China’s

energy demand growth will slow in the 2010 to 2015

period, PIRA does not. The PEL growth rates are, for the

most part, fairly similar to those in the IEO2005 forecast.

Only the growth rates for China are substantially lower

than the IEO2005 reference case; it appears that PEL did

not anticipate the strong near-term growth in China, and

this is reflected through the 2015 time horizon.

The IEO2005 reference case projection of worldwide

growth in energy use, at 2.3 percent per year for the 2002

to 2015 period, is higher than was projected in IEO2004.

By region, the largest differences between the two forecasts are within the developing world, with the IEO2004

forecasts for China, other emerging Asia, the Middle

East, and Africa falling below those of the IEO2005 low

economic growth case. In all cases, the forecasts for

172 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Table H1. Comparison of Energy Consumption Growth Rates by Region, 2002-2010

(Average Annual Percent Growth)

Region

IEO2005

Low Growth Reference High Growth IEO2004 IEA PIRA PEL

Mature Market Economies . . . . 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.1

United States and Canada. . . . . 1.4 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.2

Western Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.1 1.2 1.0

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.0a 1.0

Transitional Economies . . . . . . 1.5 2.0 2.5 1.1 1.8 2.7 1.8

Emerging Economies . . . . . . . . 3.8 4.4 5.0 2.6 3.1 4.5 3.4

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 6.8 7.4 3.6 3.4 6.7 4.0

Other Emerging Asiab . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.7 4.3 2.4 3.2 3.8 3.3

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 3.4 4.0 2.0 3.2 4.4 3.3

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.4 3.9 1.8 2.7 3.6 3.1

Latin America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.8 3.4 2.2 2.7 2.3 2.6

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.6 3.0 1.7 2.2 2.7 2.0

a

Japan only.

b

Other Asia includes India and South Korea.

Sources: IEO2005: Energy Information Administration (EIA), System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005). IEO2004:

EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004, DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004), Table A1, p. 163. IEA: International

Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004 (Paris, France, October 2004), pp. 430-517. PIRA: PIRA Energy Group, Retainer Client

Seminar (New York, NY, October 2004). PEL: Petroleum Economics, Ltd., World Long Term Oil and Energy Outlook (London,

United Kingdom, March 2004).
economic growth are somewhat higher, particularly for

China, in IEO2005 than in IEO2004. This largely explains

the upward revision in energy use in the developing

regions.

IEO2005, PEL, and IEA provide energy consumption

projections for 2020 (Table H3). The three forecasts have

similar projections for energy demand growth from 2002

to 2020, projecting average annual increases in the

world’s total energy consumption that range from 1.9

percent (IEA and PEL) to 2.1 percent (IEO2005). The

highest growth rates are projected for the emerging

economies and the slowest for the mature market

economies. The largest variations among the regional

forecasts are for China, where growth expectations for

energy use range from 2.9 percent per year (IEA) to 4.6

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 173

Table H2. Comparison of Energy Consumption Growth Rates by Region, 2002-2015

(Average Annual Percent Growth)

Region

IEO2005

Low Growth Reference High Growth IEO2004 PIRA PEL

Mature Market Economies . . . . 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0

United States and Canada. . . . . 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.1 1.2

Western Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.6 1.1 0.8

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8a 0.9

Transitional Economies . . . . . . 1.4 1.9 2.4 1.4 2.5 1.8

Emerging Economies . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.8 4.4 2.7 4.3 3.2

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 5.4 6.0 3.7 6.2 3.8

Other Emerging Asiab . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.4 4.0 2.5 3.6 3.2

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 3.0 3.6 2.1 4.3 3.1

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 3.2 3.8 2.1 3.6 3.0

Latin America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.7 3.2 2.2 2.3 2.5

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.3 2.7 1.8 2.6 2.0

a

Japan only.

b

Other Asia includes India and South Korea.

Sources: IEO2005: Energy Information Administration (EIA), System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005). IEO2004:

EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004, DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004), Table A1, p. 163. PIRA: PIRA Energy

Group, Retainer Client Seminar (New York, NY, October 2004). PEL: Petroleum Economics, Ltd., World Long Term Oil and Energy

Outlook (London, United Kingdom, March 2004).

Table H3. Comparison of Energy Consumption Growth Rates by Region, 2002-2020

(Average Annual Percent Growth)

Region

IEO2005

Low Growth Reference High Growth IEO2004 IEA PEL

Mature Market Economies . . . . 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0

United States and Canada. . . . . 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.2

Western Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.7

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.8

Transitional Economies . . . . . . 1.2 1.7 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.8

Emerging Economies . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.4 4.0 2.7 2.8 3.1

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 4.6 5.2 3.6 2.9 3.6

Other Emerging Asiab . . . . . . . . 2.5 3.1 3.7 2.5 2.9 3.2

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.7 3.3 2.1 3.0 2.9

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 2.9 3.4 2.2 2.6 2.9

Latin America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.4 2.9 2.3 2.7 2.5

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.9 1.9

a

Japan only.

b

Other Asia includes India and South Korea.

Sources: IEO2005: Energy Information Administration (EIA), System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005). IEO2004:

EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004, DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004), Table A1, p. 163. IEA: International

Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004 (Paris, France, October 2004), pp. 430-517. PEL: Petroleum Economics, Ltd., World

Long Term Oil and Energy Outlook (London, United Kingdom, March 2004).
percent per year (IEO2005). IEA is more optimistic than

the other forecasts about energy demand growth in

mature market Asia, where the 1.3-percent annual rate

projected by IEA exceeds the rate in the IEO2005 high

economic growth case.

As was the case for the 2002-2010 and 2002-2015 comparisons, China is the region with the largest differences

between the IEO2005 and IEO2004 reference case forecasts for 2002-2020. The IEO2005 reference case projects

annual energy demand growth for China that is a full

percentage point higher than in last year’s forecast, and

last year’s reference case projection is lower than that in

the IEO2005 low economic growth case.

IEO2005 and PEL are the only forecasts that extend to

2025 (the IEA forecast extends to 2030, but no forecast is

proffered for 2025). For the 2002 to 2025 period (Table

H4), the two forecasts are largely in agreement, with the

PEL projections falling within the range provided by the

IEO2005 low and high economic growth cases. Again,

the largest difference between the two forecasts is for

China, with PEL projecting 3.5-percent average annual

growth in China’s energy demand from 2002 to 2025 and

IEO2005 projecting a 4.1-percent average.

The forecasts vary not only with respect to levels of total

energy demand but also with respect to the mix of primary energy inputs. All the forecasts provide energy

consumption projections by fuel in 2010 (Table H5).

There is a wide range of views among the forecasts

regarding the mix of fuels that will fulfill projected

demand. Whereas IEO2005 and PIRA expect coal to be

the fastest growing fuel source in the 2002 to 2010

period—at 3.1 percent per year and 3.9 percent per year,

respectively—IEA and PEL expect much lower growth

for coal.

IEO2005, IEA, and PEL all project fairly strong relative

growth in nuclear power demand over the time period,

but PIRA projects worldwide nuclear demand growth

rates that are about half those of the other forecasts. IEA

projects much higher growth in renewable energy use

than any of the other forecasts, although all the forecasts

expect growth in renewables to average 2.0 percent per

year or above from 2002 to 2010. The expectations for

growth in oil demand range from 1.8 percent per year

(PEL) to 2.4 percent per year (IEO2005). The relatively

bullish IEO2005 forecast for the 2002 to 2010 period is

almost entirely due to increases in China’s oil demand.

All the forecasts expect relatively strong growth in natural gas use.

The IEO2005 projections are higher than the IEO2004

projections for each energy source, largely as a result of

the unanticipated strong expansion of energy demand

in recent years. This year’s reassessment of the

near-term forecast is so profound relative to last year’s

forecast that the IEO2004 projections for every fuel type

except oil fall below those in the IEO2005 low economic

growth case.

PEL, PIRA, and IEO2005 provide world energy consumption projections by fuel for 2015 (Table H6). PIRA

remains much more bullish in its projections for coal

demand over this time period, exceeding the IEO2005

174 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Table H4. Comparison of Energy Consumption Growth Rates by Region, 2002-2025

(Average Annual Percent Growth)

Region

IEO2005

Low Growth Reference High Growth IEO2004 PEL

Mature Market Economies . . . . 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.9

United States and Canada. . . . . 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.1

Western Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.6

Mature Market Asia . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.7

Transitional Economies . . . . . . 1.2 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.7

Emerging Economies . . . . . . . . 2.5 3.1 3.7 2.7 3.0

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 4.1 4.7 3.5 3.5

Other Emerging Asiab . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.9 3.5 2.5 3.1

Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.5 3.1 2.1 2.8

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.7 3.2 2.3 2.9

Latin America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.3 2.7 2.5 2.4

Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.0 2.4 1.8 1.9

a

Japan only.

b

Other Asia includes India and South Korea.

Sources: IEO2005: Energy Information Administration (EIA), System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005). IEO2004:

EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004, DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004), Table A1, p. 163. PEL: Petroleum Economics, Ltd., World Long Term Oil and Energy Outlook (London, United Kingdom, March 2004).
high economic growth case. In contrast, PEL is much

more pessimistic about coal use over the 2002 to 2015

period, and its projected growth rate for worldwide coal

demand is lower than that in the IEO2005 low economic

growth case. IEO2005 expects nuclear power to expand

by 1.3 percent per year, as compared with 0.9 percent per

year in the PEL forecast and 0.7 percent per year in the

PIRA forecast.

IEO2005, PEL, and IEA provide energy consumption

projections for 2020 (Table H7). The three forecasts

largely agree about the growth rate for total energy use,

ranging from 1.9 percent per year (PEL and IEA) to 2.1

percent per year (IEO2005) between 2002 and 2020. That

said, the projected fuel mixes differ among the forecasts.

Whereas IEO2005 expects nuclear power generation to

grow by 1.1 percent per year from 2002 to 2020, both IEA

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 175

Table H5. Comparison of World Energy Consumption Growth Rates by Fuel, 2002-2010

(Average Annual Percent Growth)

Fuel

IEO2005

Low Growth Reference High Growth IEO2004 IEA PIRA PEL

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.4 3.0 1.9 2.0 2.2 1.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.4 3.0 1.7 2.7 2.8 3.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.1 3.5 1.3 1.8 3.9 1.6

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.5 0.7 1.3

Renewable/Other. . . . . . 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.2 3.2 2.3 2.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.6 3.0 1.7 2.2 2.7 2.0

Sources: IEO2005: Energy Information Administration (EIA), System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005). IEO2004:

EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004, DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004), Table A1, p. 163. IEA: International

Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004 (Paris, France, October 2004), pp. 430-517. PIRA: PIRA Energy Group, Retainer Client

Seminar (New York, NY, October 2004). PEL: Petroleum Economics, Ltd., World Long Term Oil and Energy Outlook (London,

United Kingdom, March 2004).

Table H6. Comparison of World Energy Consumption Growth Rates by Fuel, 2002-2015

(Average Annual Percent Growth)

Fuel

IEO2005

Low Growth Reference High Growth IEO2004 PIRA PEL

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.2 2.7 1.9 2.1 1.8

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.6 3.2 2.0 3.0 3.0

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.6 2.9 1.4 3.6 1.5

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.9

Renewable/Other. . . . . . 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.3 2.7 1.8 2.6 2.0

Sources: IEO2005: Energy Information Administration (EIA), System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005). IEO2004:

EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004, DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004). PIRA: PIRA Energy Group, Retainer

Client Seminar (New York, NY, October 2004). PEL: Petroleum Economics, Ltd., World Long Term Oil and Energy Outlook (London,

United Kingdom, March 2004).

Table H7. Comparison of World Energy Consumption Growth Rates by Fuel, 2002-2020

(Average Annual Percent Growth)

Fuel

IEO2005

Low Growth Reference High Growth IEO2004 IEA PEL

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.0 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.7

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.4 2.9 2.1 2.6 2.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.3 2.7 1.5 1.6 1.5

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.7

Renewable/Other. . . . . . 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.7 2.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.9 1.9

Sources: IEO2005: Energy Information Administration (EIA), System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005). IEO2004:

EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004, DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004). IEA: International Energy Agency,

World Energy Outlook 2004 (Paris, France, October 2004), pp. 430-517. PEL: Petroleum Economics, Ltd., World Long Term Oil and

Energy Outlook (London, United Kingdom, March 2004).
and PEL project much slower growth (0.6 percent and

0.7 percent per year, respectively). IEO2005 projects

smaller increases in natural gas demand than the other

two forecasts. IEA is more optimistic about the growth

potential of renewable energy sources, projecting

2.7-percent annual growth between 2002 and 2020, as

compared with the IEO2005 reference case projection of

1.9 percent and the PEL projection of 2.1 percent.

For the 2002 to 2020 period, the IEO2005 reference case

projections by fuel are generally higher than in last

year’s report. In particular, coal demand is expected to

grow by 2.3 percent per year from 2002 to 2020 in

IEO2005, but in IEO2004 coal demand was expected to

increase by 1.5 percent per year. The increase in coal use

relative to last year’s outlook is due to increases in

demand among the emerging Asian economies.

As noted above, the only two forecasts for the 2002 to

2025 period, IEO2005 and PEL, are largely in agreement

with respect to the increase in total energy demand

(Table H8). PEL projects an average annual growth rate

of 1.9 percent for total world demand and IEO2005 2.0

percent per year. The fuel mix does vary between the

two forecasts, with PEL projecting stronger growth in

natural gas use than IEO2005 (in fact, PEL’s growth rate

exceeds the projected rate in the IEO2005 high economic

growth case). In contrast, IEO2005 expects stronger

growth in coal use and nuclear power. The IEO2005 reference case forecast shows generally higher growth on a

by-fuel basis than last year’s report, except for oil, which

grows slightly slower in the 2002 to 2025 period, and

renewables, for which the projected growth rates are the

same in the IEO2004 and IEO2005 forecasts.

Performance of Past IEO Forecasts

for 1990, 1995, and 2000

In an effort to measure how well the IEO projections

have estimated future energy consumption trends over

the 20-year history of the series, a comparison of IEO

forecasts produced for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000 is

presented here. The forecasts are compared with actual

data published in EIA’s International Energy Annual 2002,

as part of EIA’s commitment to provide users of the IEO

with a set of performance measures to assess the forecasts produced by this agency.

The IEO has been published since 1985. In IEO85, midterm projections were derived only for the world’s market economies. That is, no projections were prepared for

the centrally planned economies (CPE) of the Soviet

Union, Eastern Europe, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Laos,

Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam. The IEO85 projections extended to 1995 and included forecasts of energy

consumption for 1990 and 1995 and primary consumption of oil, natural gas, coal, and “other fuels.” IEO85

projections were also presented for several individual

countries and subregions: the United States, Canada,

Japan, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany,

Italy, the Netherlands, other OECD Europe, other OECD

(Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. Territories),

OPEC, and other developing countries. Beginning with

IEO86, nuclear power projections were published separately from the “other fuel” category.

Regional aggregations have changed from report to

report. In 1990, the report coverage was expanded for

the first time from only the market economies to the

entire world. Projections for China, the FSU, and other

CPE countries were provided separately. Starting with

IEO94, the regional presentation was changed from market economies and CPE countries to OECD, Eurasia

(China, FSU, and Eastern Europe), and “Rest of World.”

Beginning in 1995 and essentially continuing until the

current issue, the regional presentation changed to further group the world according to economic development: industrialized nations (essentially the OECD

before the entry of South Korea and the Eastern European nations, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and

Slovakia), the transitional economies of the EE/FSU,

and the developing world (including China and India).

The forecast time horizon has also changed over the

years (Table H9). In the first edition of the report, IEO85,

projections were made for 1990 and 1995. IEO86 saw the

176 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

Table H8. Comparison of World Energy Consumption Growth Rates by Fuel, 2002-2025

(Average Annual Percent Growth)

Fuel

IEO2005

Low Growth Reference High Growth IEO2004 PEL

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.8 2.3 1.9 1.6

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.3 2.8 2.2 2.9

Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.1 2.5 1.6 1.4

Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.6

Renewable/Other. . . . . . 1.4 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.0 2.4 1.8 1.9

Sources: IEO2005: Energy Information Administration (EIA), System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (2005). IEO2004:

EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004, DOE/EIA-0484(2004) (Washington, DC, April 2004). PEL: Petroleum Economics, Ltd.,

World Long Term Oil and Energy Outlook (London, United Kingdom, March 2004).
addition of projection year 2000. In IEO91, forecasts

were no longer published for 1990, but forecasts for 2010

were added to the report. The projection horizon remained the same until IEO96, when projection year 2015

was added. In 1998, the forecast was extended again, out

to 2020. With IEO2003, the forecast period was extended

to 2025.

Comparisons of Forecasts for Market Economies

Projections for market economies were made in the eight

issues of the IEO that were published between 1985 and

1993 (no IEO was published in 1988). Historical data for

total regional energy consumption in 1990 show that the

IEO projections from those early years were consistently

lower than the actual data for the market economies. For

the four editions of the IEO printed between 1985 and

1989 in which 1990 projections were presented, total projected energy consumption in the market economies ran

between 3 and 7 percent below the actual amounts published in the International Energy Annual 2001 (Figure

H1).

In addition, market economy projections for 1995 in the

1985 through 1993 IEO reports (EIA did not release forecasts for 1995 after the 1993 report) were consistently

lower than the actual, historical 1995 data (Figure H2).

Most of the difference is attributed to those market economy countries outside the OECD. Through the years,

EIA’s economic growth assumptions for OPEC and

other market economy countries outside the OECD have

been low. The 1993 forecast was, as one might expect, the

most accurate of the forecasts for 1995, but its projection

for OPEC and the other market economy countries was

still more than 10 percent below the actual number.

Similarly to the year 1995 projections, year 2000 projections were also consistently lower than actual 2000 data

in each of the IEOs published between 1986 and 1993

(Figure H3). The consumption estimates for the market

economies increased in each edition, from 265 quadrillion Btu in IEO86 to 292 quadrillion Btu in IEO93. As late

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 177

Table H9. Years Included in IEO Projections

by Edition, 1985-2005

Edition 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

IEO85 . . . . x x

IEO86 . . . . xxx

IEO87 . . . . xxx

IEO89 . . . . xxx

IEO90 . . . . xx x

IEO91 . . . . xx x

IEO92 . . . . xx x

IEO93 . . . . xx x

IEO94 . . . . xxx

IEO95 . . . . xxx

IEO96 . . . . xxxxx

IEO97 . . . . xxxx

IEO98 . . . . xxxxx

IEO99 . . . . xxxxx

IEO2000 . . xxxx

IEO2001 . . xxxx

IEO2002 . . xxxx

IEO2003 . . xxxxx

IEO2004 . . xxxx

IEO2005 . . xxxx

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International Energy

Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various years).

242

234

228

225

225

Actual 1990

IEO89

IEO87

IEO86

IEO85

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Quadrillion Btu

Figure H1. Comparison of IEO Forecasts with 1990

Energy Consumption in Market

Economies

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various

years).

274

269

268

260

258

256

251

245

247

Actual 1995

IEO93

IEO92

IEO91

IEO90

IEO89

IEO87

IEO86

IEO85

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Quadrillion Btu

Figure H2. Comparison of IEO Forecasts with 1995

Energy Consumption in Market

Economies

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various

years).
as 1993, the IEO forecasts were underestimating consumption of all energy sources in the market economies,

by between 2 percent (oil) and 7 percent (natural gas and

nuclear power).

As noted above, in the 1994 edition of the IEO, the regional aggregation “market economies” was dropped

altogether and replaced with delineation of member

countries of the OECD, Eurasia, and Rest of World

(ROW). As a result of that reorganization, it is not possible to recreate a forecast for the CPE countries: except

for China, the FSU, and Eastern Europe, the remaining

CPE countries—noted above—were included in “other

ROW.”

Comparisons of Forecasts for Year 1995

IEO90 marked the first release of a worldwide energy

consumption forecast. In IEO90 through IEO93, the

forecasts for worldwide energy demand in 1995 were

between 1 and 4 percent higher than the actual amounts

consumed (Figure H4). Much of the difference can be

explained by the unanticipated collapse of the Soviet

Union economies in the early 1990s. The IEO forecasters

could not foresee the extent to which energy consumption would fall in the FSU region. In IEO90, total energy

consumption in the FSU was projected to reach 67 quadrillion Btu in 1995. The projection was reduced steadily

in the next three IEO reports, but even in IEO93 energy

demand for 1995 in the FSU region was projected to be

53 quadrillion Btu, as compared with actual 1995 energy

consumption of 43 quadrillion Btu—a difference equivalent to about 5 million barrels of oil per day.

Forecasts for 1995 can also be compared in terms of their

depiction of the fuel mix. Every IEO after 1990 projected

the share of each energy source relative to total energy

consumption within 2.6 percentage points of the actual

1995 distribution. The earliest IEOstended to be too optimistic about the growth of coal use in the market economies (Figure H5) and too pessimistic about the recovery

of oil consumption after the declines in the early 1980s

that followed the price shocks caused by oil embargoes

in 1973 and 1974 and the 1979-1980 revolution in Iran

(Figure H6). The IEO85 and IEO86 reports projected that

oil would account for only about 40 percent of total

178 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

306

292

290

280

276

274

270

265

Actual 2000

IEO93

IEO92

IEO91

IEO90

IEO89

IEO87

IEO86

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Quadrillion Btu

Figure H3. Comparison of IEO Forecasts with 2000

Energy Consumption in Market

Economies

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various

years).

366

375

377

374

383

Actual 1995

IEO93

IEO92

IEO91

IEO90

0 100 200 300 400 500

Quadrillion Btu

Figure H4. Comparison of IEO Forecasts with 1995

World Energy Consumption

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various

years).

2,363

2,326

2,270

2,287

2,363

2,356

2,382

2,411

Actual 1995

IEO93

IEO92

IEO91

IEO90

IEO87

IEO86

IEO85

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000

Million Short Tons

Figure H5. Comparison of IEO Forecasts with 1995

Coal Consumption in Market

Economies

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various

years).
energy consumption for the market economies in 1995,

whereas oil actually accounted for 45 percent of the total

in 1995.

The 1995 forecasts for world coal consumption that

appeared in the IEOs printed between 1990 and 1993

were consistently high, between 5 and 17 percent higher

than actual coal use (Figure H7), largely because of overestimates for the FSU and Eastern Europe—regions that

experienced substantial declines in coal consumption

during the years following the collapse of the Soviet

Union. Most of the projections for the FSU by fuel were

greater than the actual consumption numbers, with the

exception of hydroelectricity and other renewable

resources (Figure H8). Natural gas use did not decline as

much as oil and coal use, because natural gas is a plentiful resource in the region and was used extensively to

fuel the domestic infrastructure; however, even the IEO

estimates for 1995 natural gas use were 18 to 26 percent

higher than the actual use.

The IEO projections for total energy consumption in

China were below the actual 1995 consumption level

in IEO90 (by 13 percent) and IEO91 (by 8 percent) but

higher in IEO92 (by 6 percent) and about the same

in IEO93. The underestimates in the earlier IEOs balanced, in part, the overestimates for the EE/FSU countries; however, even the 4- to 17-percent underestimate

of projected 1995 coal use in China could not make up

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 179

60

60

59

58

56

54

53

51

50

Actual 1995

IEO93

IEO92

IEO91

IEO90

IEO89

IEO87

IEO86

IEO85

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Million Barrels per Day

Figure H6. Comparison of IEO Forecasts with 1995

Oil Consumption in Market Economies

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various

years).

5,106

5,439

5,375

5,592

6,184

Actual 1995

IEO93

IEO92

IEO91

IEO90

0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000

Million Short Tons

Figure H7. Comparison of IEO Forecasts with 1995

World Coal Consumption

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various

years).

58

34

22

25

60

36

29

27

22

19

16

17

58

37

29

36

39

36

18

21

8

-12

-18

-12

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

Total

Oil

Natural Gas

Coal

Nuclear

Renewables/

Other

Percent Difference From Actual 1995

Figure H8. Comparison of IEO Forecasts with 1995

Energy Consumption in the

Former Soviet Union by Fuel Type

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various

years).
for the 29- to 58-percent overestimate of FSU coal use. In

terms of other fuels, the IEO forecasts consistently overestimated China’s natural gas consumption and underestimated its oil consumption. Nuclear power forecasts

were fairly close for China, within 5 percent of the actual

consumption (Figure H9). It is noteworthy, however,

that consumption of natural gas and nuclear power was

quite small in 1995, so that any variation between actual

historical consumption and the projections results in a

large percentage difference. EIA consistently underestimated economic growth in China. As late as 1993, EIA

expected GDP in China to grow by about 7.3 percent per

year during the decade of the 1990s, whereas it actually

grew by 10.7 percent per year between 1990 and 1995.

Comparisons of Forecasts for Year 2000

Ten editions of the IEO report contained worldwide

forecasts for the year 2000 (IEO90 through IEO99). The

forecasts of total world energy consumption for 2000

were all above, but within 5 percent of, the actual total

(Figure H10). IEO97 provided the highest estimate of

world energy use in 2000. This may seem surprising at

first glance, but it is also true that the economic recession

that would take hold in 1998 among the emerging economies of southeast Asia had not occurred and was not

foreseen in the IEO97 forecast. In fact, IEO97 overestimated year 2000 energy use in emerging Asia by 9 quadrillion Btu, or about 12 percent (Figure H11), and in

mature market Asia by 3 quadrillion Btu (9 percent).

180 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

-13

-8

6

1

-19

-25

-25

-16

14

14

14

14

-17

-15

-10

-4

-3

5

5

-3

-14

-7

-2

-2

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

IEO90

IEO91

IEO92

IEO93

-40 -20 0 20 40 60

Total

Oil

Natural Gas

Coal

Nuclear

Renewables/

Other

Percent Difference From Actual 1995

Figure H9. Comparison of IEO Forecasts with 1995

Energy Consumption in China

by Fuel Type

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various

years).

399

403

413

416

407

403

404

410

410

402

408

Actual 2000

IEO99

IEO98

IEO97

IEO96

IEO95

IEO94

IEO93

IEO92

IEO91

IEO90

0 100 200 300 400 500

Quadrillion Btu

Figure H10. Comparison of IEO Forecasts with

2000 World Energy Consumption

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484 (Washington, DC, various

years).

119

70

30

59

91

15

13

19

118

67

28

52

81

20

12

21

North America

Western Europe

Industrialized Asia

EE/FSU

Developing Asia

Middle East

Africa

Central & South America

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

Quadrillion Btu

IEO97

Actual 2000

Figure H11. Comparison of IEO97 Forecasts with

2000 Energy Consumption by Region

Sources: Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Annual 2002, DOE/EIA-0219(2002) (Washington, DC,

March 2004), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/, and International

Energy Outlook 1997, DOE/EIA-0484(97) (Washington, DC,

April 1997).
Projections for the EE/FSU in IEO97 were also too optimistic, overestimating the rate of economic recovery in

the region and as a result overestimating the growth in

energy consumption by 12 quadrillion Btu (22 percent).

IEO97 did not anticipate the August 1998 devaluation of

the Russian ruble and the economic recession that followed in the FSU region. By IEO99, total EE/FSU energy

use had been adjusted downward to 52 quadrillion

Btu—just slightly lower than the region’s actual consumption in 2000.

The projections for year 2000 by fuel were mixed in

terms of accuracy. For all energy sources except coal,

total world consumption forecasts fell within 13 percent

of the actual levels. As was the case with forecasts for the

years 1990 and 1995, world coal consumption projections were consistently high relative to actual consumption in 2000. The world coal forecast presented in IEO90

was 30 percent higher than actual 2000 values. The forecasts for the CPE countries were responsible for the large

discrepancy between projected IEO90 and actual coal

consumption in 2000. In fact, IEO90 projected that the

market economies would consume 2,801 million short

tons of coal in 2000, and the actual estimate for coal use

among the market economies was 2,969. However, in

the CPE countries—including the EE/FSU—IEO90 projected that coal use would climb to 3,841 million short

tons in 2000, whereas actual coal consumption was only

2,119 million short tons.

Much of the discrepancy between the IEO90 projection

and actual 2000 coal consumption can be attributed to

the FSU. As noted above, IEO90 did not foresee the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1990 when the report projections were prepared. Indeed, coal use in the FSU in

IEO90 was expected to expand to 1,132 million short

tons in 2000, whereas in reality coal use in the FSU began

to decline precipitously after 1990, hitting a low of 391

million short tons in 1998 before edging up somewhat to

405 million short tons in 2000. The story was similar for

Eastern Europe and the other CPE countries (excluding

China), where coal use in 2000 was overestimated by 202

percent in IEO90.

The year 2000 forecasts for oil, natural gas, and hydroelectricity and other renewable energy sources were, for

the most part, higher than actual levels. In contrast, projections for nuclear power were consistently lower than

the actual 2000 values. Interestingly, the forecasts for the

United States were largely responsible for the underestimation. Even in IEO99—the latest IEO that included

projections for 2000—analysts were expecting nuclear

power to begin to decline. In IEO90 there was widespread pessimism about the future of nuclear power in

the mid-term, given the aftermath of Chernobyl and the

problems associated with nuclear waste disposal. In the

political climate of the early 1990s, IEO90 could not

anticipate the life extensions and consistently improving

efficiencies that have allowed nuclear power plants to

generate more electricity and operate with shorter

downtimes for maintenance, even without expanding

their installed capacities.

The comparison of IEO projections and historical data in

the context of political and social events underscores the

importance of those events in shaping the world’s

energy markets. Such comparisons also point out how

important a model’s assumptions are to the derivation

of accurate forecasts. The political and social upheaval in

the EE/FSU dramatically affected the accuracy of the

projections for the region. If higher economic growth

rates had been assumed for China, more accurate forecasts for that region might have been achieved. It is

important for users of the IEO or any other projection

series to realize the limitations of the forecasts. Failing an

ability to predict future volatility in social, political, or

economic events, the projections should be viewed as a

plausible path or trend for the future and not as a precise

prediction of future events.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 181

Appendix I

System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets (SAGE)

The projections of world energy consumption appearing

in this year’s International Energy Outlook (IEO) are based

on the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA’s)

international energy modeling tool, System for the

Analysis of Global Energy markets (SAGE). SAGE is an

integrated set of regional models that provide a technology-rich basis for estimating regional energy consumption. For each region, reference case estimates of 42

end-use energy service demands (e.g., car, commercial

truck, and heavy truck road travel; residential lighting;

steam heat requirements in the paper industry) are

developed on the basis of economic and demographic

projections. Projections of energy consumption to meet

the energy demands are estimated on the basis of each

region’s existing energy use patterns, the existing stock

of energy-using equipment, and the characteristics of

available new technologies, as well as new sources of

primary energy supply.

Period-by-period market simulations aim to provide

each region’s energy services at minimum cost by simultaneously making end-use equipment and primary

energy supply decisions. For example, in SAGE, if there

is an increase in residential lighting energy service,

either existing generation equipment must be used more

intensively or new equipment must be installed. The

choice of generation equipment (type and fuel) incorporates analysis of both the characteristics of alternative

generation technologies and the economics of primary

energy supply.

The IEO provides projections of total world primary

energy consumption, as well as projections of energy

consumption by primary energy type (oil, natural gas,

coal, nuclear, and hydroelectric and other renewable

resources) and projections of net electricity consumption. Projections of carbon dioxide emissions resulting

from fossil fuel use are also provided. All projections

are computed in 5-year intervals through the year

2025. Further, more detailed tables that emphasize

the end-use demand-driven nature of SAGE are new to

this year’s report.

SAGE provides projections for 15 regions or countries,

including the North American countries of the United

States, Canada, and Mexico; Western Europe; Japan;

Australia/New Zealand; Eastern Europe; the former

Soviet Union (FSU); China; India; South Korea; other

developing Asia; the Middle East; Africa; and Central

and South America. An offline procedure is used to

develop projections for Russia in the FSU and for Brazil

in Central and South America.

Projections of world oil prices over the forecast horizon

are provided to SAGE from EIA’s International Energy

Module, which is a submodule of the National Energy

Modeling System (NEMS). Projections of world nuclear

energy consumption are derived from nuclear power

electricity generation projections from EIA’s International Nuclear Model (INM), PC Version (PC-INM). All

U.S. projections are taken from EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook (AEO).

A full description of the SAGE model is available in a

two-volume set. The first volume provides a general

understanding of the model’s design, theoretical basis,

necessary user-defined assumptions, and output. It also

lists the software necessary to develop and analyze the

results of SAGE-based policy and energy market scenarios. In addition, Volume I includes a Reference Guide,

which explains each equation in detail. The second volume serves as a User’s Guide for those actively developing SAGE-based scenario analyses. The documentation

is available on EIA’s web site in the model documentation section of “Current Publications” (http://www.eia.

doe.gov/bookshelf/docs.html). SAGE documentation

is also available as part of the documentation for the

MARKAL family of models (http://www.etsap.org/

MRKLDOC-III_SAGE.pdf).

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 183

Appendix J

Regional Definitions

The six basic country groupings used in this report

(Figure J1) are defined as follows:

•Mature Market Economies (15 percent of the 2005

world population): North America—United States,

Canada, and Mexico; Western Europe—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,

Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; Mature Market

Asia—Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

•Transitional Economies (6 percent of the 2005 world

population): Eastern Europe (EE)—Albania, Bosnia

and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,

Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and

Montenegro, Slovakia, and Slovenia; Former Soviet

Union (FSU)—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,

Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

•Emerging Economies (78 percent of the 2005 world

population):

- Emerging Asia (53 percent of the 2005 world population)—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei,

Cambodia (Kampuchea), China, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,

Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Macau, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Nauru, Nepal, New Caledonia, Niue, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New

Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon

Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand,

Tonga, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.

- Middle East (4 percent of the 2005 world population)—Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,

Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,

Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and

Yemen.

- Africa (14 percent of the 2005 world population)—

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005 185

Key

Africa

Industrialized Countries

EE/FSU

Developing Asia

Middle East

Central and South America

Figure J1. Map of the Six Basic Country Groupings

Source: Energy Information Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting.
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African

Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville),

Congo (Kinshasa), Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial

Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,

Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya,

Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,

Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique,

Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao

Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra

Leone, Somalia, South Africa, St. Helena, Sudan,

Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda,

Western Sahara, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

- Central and South America (7 percent of the 2005

world population)—Antarctica, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahama Islands, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin Islands,

Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,

Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,

El Salvador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana,

Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,

Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama Republic, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia,

St. Vincent/Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and

Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, Uruguay, U.S.

Virgin Islands, and Venezuela.

In addition, the following commonly used country

groupings are referenced in this report:

•Countries that have ratified, accepted, acceded, or

approved the Kyoto Climate Change Protocol on

Greenhouse Gas Emissions as of May 27, 2005:

Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,

Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,

Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,

Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile,

China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech

Republic, Congo (Kinshasa), Denmark, Djibouti,

Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El

Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,

Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,

Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland,

Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati,

Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia,

Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,

Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall

Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Mongolia,

Morocco , Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru,

Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,

Nigeria, Niue, North Korea, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,

Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Moldova,

Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent/

Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South

Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Macedonia,

Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,

Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,

United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,

Venezuela, Vietnam, and Yemen.

•Annex I Countries (countries participating in the

Kyoto Climate Change Protocol on Greenhouse Gas

Emissions): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,

Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,

European Community, Finland, France, Germany,

Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco,

the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,

Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,

Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the

United Kingdom.20

•European Union (EU): Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,

Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,

Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,

Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,

Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,

and the United Kingdom.

•G8: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,

United Kingdom, and the United States.

•North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

Member Countries: Canada, Mexico, and the United

States.

•Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD): Australia, Austria, Belgium,

Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,

Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,

Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New

Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South

Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the

United Kingdom, and the United States.

•Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC): Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,

Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab

Emirates, and Venezuela.

•Pacific Rim Developing Countries: Hong Kong,

Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South

Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.

•Persian Gulf: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar,

Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

186 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2005

20Turkey and Belarus are Annex I nations that have not ratified the Framework Convention on Climate Change and did not commit to

quantifiable emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. In 2001, the United States withdrew from the Protocol. In 2002, Australia

announced that it will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol unless the United States does.