IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Corrections, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 802 C.D. 2018

: ARGUED: April 11, 2019

Pennsylvania State Corrections :

Officers Association, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge 

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: May 13, 2019

The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) petitions for 

review of an arbitrator’s award entered May 15, 2018. The arbitrator found the 

Department had just cause to demote and transfer Corrections Officer Edward Patla 

(Patla). Accordingly, the arbitrator denied the grievance asserted on Patla’s behalf 

by the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association (Union). Nonetheless, 

the arbitrator ordered the Department to provide Patla with an opportunity for 

reinstatement to his former position. After thorough review, we affirm the 

arbitrator’s award in part and vacate it in part.

I. Background

Patla began working for the Department in 1997 as a Corrections Officer 1 

(“CO1”) at the State Correctional Institution in Dallas (SCI-Dallas). In 2006, he 
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attained the rank of sergeant as a Corrections Officer 2 (“CO2”) in conjunction with

joining the Department’s K-9 Unit. All K-9 Unit members hold at least the rank of 

sergeant and the position of CO2. Patla held that rank and position until 2016.

Patla’s CO2 position with the K-9 Unit required him to work without 

supervision and to rotate among various state correctional institutions. With his

assigned canine, he performed security search activities, including searches of 

inmates’ cells, visitors’ vehicles, and any other areas as needed by each institution.

In late 2015, one institution reported to the Department that Patla had failed 

to arrive for his assignment there. The Department’s inquiries into the situation 

revealed that Patla had failed to report to work at various institutions on seven dates 

during the second half of 2015. He had not informed his supervisor of his absences

and had not submitted leave slips relating to those absences. He had also traveled to 

SCI-Dallas on various dates without documenting the trips or recording his mileage.

In addition, the Department learned Patla had repeatedly violated Department

search protocols. The violations included performing inadequate cell and vehicle 

searches, failing to notify correct personnel on arriving at an institution, making 

unilateral decisions on where to search rather than working where the institution 

needed him, and failing to take along a witness during searches.

Based on the results of its investigation, the Department charged Patla with 

multiple violations of its Code of Ethics and its K-9 Unit policy. Department 

personnel met with Patla on two occasions to provide him an opportunity to respond 

to the charges or offer any mitigating circumstances. Thereafter, finding the charges 
3

were substantiated, the Department demoted Patla to his original CO1 position and 

transferred him back to SCI-Dallas.1

The Union filed a grievance on Patla’s behalf, challenging his demotion and 

removal from the K-9 Unit. After the grievance procedure set forth in the collective 

bargaining agreement failed to resolve the grievance, the parties proceeded to 

arbitration. The parties stipulated to the precise issue to be presented to the 

arbitrator: “Whether the [Department] has disciplined [Patla] for just cause, and, if 

not, what restitution is to be made.” Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 1/3/18, at 11

(emphasis added).

The arbitrator held a hearing in January 2018. In May 2018, the arbitrator 

issued his decision and award. 

The arbitrator noted that Patla suffered a seizure in June 2015. His neurologist 

diagnosed some short-term memory loss, but nonetheless cleared Patla to return to 

work. He returned to work in August 2015.

The arbitrator found Patla committed the infractions enumerated by the 

Department, and those infractions had negative security consequences at the 

correctional institutions. The arbitrator concluded Patla’s failures to follow 

Department protocols prevented the correctional institutions from directing him to 

the areas where searches were needed, prevented the presence of witnesses when 

contraband was found, and left inmates uncontrolled while their cells were being 

searched. The arbitrator observed that closed circuit videos showed Patla’s cell 

searches on at least 2 days averaged only 8 seconds each, although a correctly 

 

1 Of significance, in its letter notifying Patla of the demotion and transfer, the Department 

pointed out that Patla had previously incurred a one-day suspension in 2010 for violations of the 

same search policies. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 308a.
4

performed search would take 15 to 30 seconds. Patla also failed to search several

required areas of a vehicle.

The arbitrator expressly concluded: “The [Department] has shown just cause 

to demote and transfer Patla, on this record.”2 Op. and Award, 5/15/18, at 7. In 

support of that conclusion, the arbitrator stated, “Patla’s position as a K-9 Sergeant 

involved discovering contraband in state prisons. The repercussions of doing that 

job in a shoddy manner cannot be over[-]emphasized.” Id.

The arbitrator further noted that in Patla’sfact-finding interview, he was asked 

about his absences and deficient searches and “offered no reasons” in response, 

although he acknowledged he did know correct search procedures. Id. at 8. 

Significantly, the arbitrator found Patla never told the Department he was suffering 

any ongoing effects related to his 2015 seizure. The arbitrator stated, “Some 

responsibility must fall on Patla for never simply informing the [Department] of his 

continuing memory difficulties.” Id. 

Concerning Patla’s hearing testimony, the arbitrator observed:

When testifying, Patla was quick to explain that he 

wasn’t “playing horse shoes [sic] and stuff,” or “partying” 

during his unexcused absences, but rather, he had no 

recollection of what he did during those days. On cross 

examination he was asked the obvious question[:] if he 

had no memory of his actions on those days, how could he 

be so sure what he wasn’t doing? Patla had no 

explanation. (N.T. 234.)

 

2 A theft of time in the form of seeking payment for time not worked constitutes just cause 

for termination. City of Easton v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 756 A.2d 1107 (Pa. 

2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & 

Mun. Emps., 52 A.3d 1117 (Pa. 2012).
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Id. at 9. Further, the arbitrator rejected the Union’s attempt to link the timing of 

Patla’s seizure to his deficient searches and unexplained absences, noting that 

“[c]orrelation . . . does not establish causation.” Op. and Award at 8-9.

Finally, the arbitrator concluded: “There is nothing on this record to establish 

that Patla, absent constant supervision, will perform with the proficiency as he had 

in the past.” Id. at 9. Therefore, the arbitrator issued an award expressly denying 

the Union’s grievance. Id. at 10.

However, despite his denial of the grievance and his lengthy explanation of 

his finding of just cause, the arbitrator posited that Patla’s “twenty-year record with 

the [Department] cannot be ignored.” Id. at 9. Apparently based on that single 

sentence, the arbitrator added a provision to his award, ordering the Department to 

allow Patla to reapply for his prior K-9 sergeant position, and to reinstate him if he 

can successfully meet the requirements of that position. Id. at 10.

This appeal followed.

II. Issue

The Department contends the arbitrator’s award is not rationally derived from 

the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. The Department argues the arbitrator 

exceeded his authority by issuing an award outside the confines of the stipulated 

issue submitted by the parties. Further, the Department asserts that the arbitrator 

exceeded his authority and infringed on the Department’s managerial right under the 

Pennsylvania Employe Relations Act (PERA)3to select and direct its workforce. 

III. Discussion

Our review of a grievance arbitration award under PERA is governed by the 

standard of review known as the “essence test.” Office of the Attorney Gen. v. 

 

3 Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101 - 1101.2301.
6

Council 13, Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 844 A.2d 1217, 1222 (Pa. 2004). 

The essence test has two prongs. First, we determine whether the issue submitted to 

arbitration is encompassed within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 

Second, we determine whether the arbitrator’s award can be rationally derived from 

the collective bargaining agreement. We must uphold the arbitrator’s award if it can 

be rationally derived from the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.

A. The Submitted Issue

The parties’ collective bargaining agreement provides, in pertinent part: “The 

[Department] shall not demote, suspend, discharge or take any disciplinary action 

against an employee without just cause.” R.R. at 299a. The parties’ stipulated issue

for arbitration related directly to the question of just cause for an employee 

demotion. Thus, the issue submitted to arbitration was encompassed within the 

terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the first prong of the 

essence test is satisfied.

B. Propriety of the Award

1. The Arbitrator’s Authority to Provide a Remedy

The Department argues the arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing an 

award outside the confines of the stipulated issue submitted by the parties. The 

parties’ stipulated issue was whether the Department had just cause for demoting 

and transferring Patla, and if not, what the proper remedy would be. Although the 

arbitrator found just cause, he nonetheless proceeded to provide Patla with a remedy 

by altering the Department’s action. Therefore, the Department contends the 

arbitrator’s award was not rationally derived from the parties’ collective bargaining 

agreement. We agree.
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“The jurisdiction of an arbitrator is restricted to resolving the dispute that the 

parties have submitted for arbitration.” Dep’t of Corr. v. Pa. State Corr. Officers 

Ass’n, 920 A.2d 989, 900 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (DOC I) (citing Bensalem Twp. Sch. 

Dist. v. Bensalem Twp. Educ. Ass’n, 512 A.2d 802 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986)). A 

stipulation of an issue to be arbitrated is a form of contract, and it determines the 

scope of the arbitration, under general contract principles. Id. (citing Sley Sys. 

Garages v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 178 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1962)). Moreover, if 

the parties’ collective bargaining agreement confines arbitrations to the precise 

issues submitted, that contractual provision is binding. Id. at 901.

Here, the parties’ collective bargaining agreement expressly limited 

arbitration to the issue submitted, providing in pertinent part: “The arbitrator shall 

be confined to the precise issue submitted for arbitration and shall have no authority 

to determine any other issues not so submitted.” R.R. at 303a. That agreement was 

binding. DOC I.

The parties’ stipulated issue first required the arbitrator to determine whether 

the Department had just cause to demote and transfer Patla; only if there was not just 

cause did the arbitrator have authority to consider a remedy. This was true under

general contract principles based on the parties’ agreement as to the issue, as well 

under the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, the arbitrator could not 

consider any remedy for the Department’s disciplinary action unless the Department 

lacked just cause for that action.

Decisions in analogous cases have confirmed that an arbitrator lacks authority 

to modify an employer’s disciplinary action that is supported by just cause. For 

example, in Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Independent State Stores Union, 

553 A.2d 948 (Pa. 1989), a state store employee was suspended and later terminated 
8

after he falsified store records and misappropriated funds. The union filed a 

grievance on his behalf, claiming he suffered from mental illness that caused his 

misconduct. 

The collective bargaining agreement required “just cause” for disciplinary 

action. Id. at 950. The parties stipulated to the precise issue for arbitration: “Was 

the [g]rievant dismissed for just cause, and if not, what shall the remedy be?” Id.

Applying concepts of intent and culpability analogous to criminal law, the 

arbitrator found that the grievant’s conduct resulted from mental illness and was not 

his fault. Therefore, the arbitrator concluded there was not just cause for 

termination. The arbitrator ordered the employer to reinstate the grievant and 

provide him with an opportunity to demonstrate his recovery and capability of 

responsible job performance.

This Court affirmed the arbitrator’s award, but our Supreme Court reversed. 

Citing the agency’s “fundamental responsibility to protect the integrity of its 

operation,” our Supreme Court found: 

[T]he concepts of culpability and mitigation applicable in criminal law 

are not applicable to this area. In this setting the issue must be confined 

to the competency and ability of the employee to perform the tasks 

required by the position in which he is serving. The fact that the 

dereliction may not have been maliciously inspired or that at some 

future time the impediment which occasioned the unsatisfactory 

performance may be removed, has no place in the inquiry.

Id. at 953 (citing Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Union of Sec. Officers #1, 455 A.2d 625 (Pa. 

1983) (public employer had an absolute responsibility to ensure the integrity of its

security force)).

Here, the Department is responsible for safety and security in Pennsylvania’s 

correctional institutions. See Iseley v. Beard, 841 A.2d 168 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). 
9

Thus, as in Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the Department has a responsibility 

to ensure the integrity of its security force. Consequently, as our Supreme Court 

concluded in Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the arbitrator was not permitted 

to consider whether Patla may have recovered his capability of performing his 

former job in the K-9 Unit. This is particularly true in light of the job requirement 

of unsupervised performance and the arbitrator’s observation that Patla would need 

constant supervision.

In Manheim Central Education Association v. Manheim Central School 

District, 572 A.2d 31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), a union filed a grievance after a teacher 

was dismissed for writing love letters to two female students. The collective 

bargaining agreement required “just cause” for disciplinary action. Id. at 33. The 

parties stipulated to the precise issue to be arbitrated: “Whether the grievant was 

discharged for just cause? If not, what shall the remedy be?” Id. at 34.

The arbitrator acknowledged that the grievant’s conduct constituted 

“immorality” as that term was defined in the applicable statute. Id. at 32. However, 

the arbitrator noted, as mitigating circumstances, the grievant’s exemplary 

employment record during the prior 20 years, as well as serious emotional and 

economic stress he was suffering during the time he wrote the letters. The arbitrator 

concluded immediate termination was too severe a penalty in light of the mitigating 

factors. The arbitrator ordered the district to allow the grievant to use all of his 

accumulated sick leave before the termination would be effective.

This Court determined that the arbitrator’s finding of immorality equated to 

a finding of just cause. We observed that under the parties’ stipulated issue, the 

arbitrator was to consider a remedy only if he determined there was not just cause 

for the grievant’s dismissal. Citing Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, we found 
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that once the arbitrator concluded there was just cause for the discipline imposed, 

his inquiry should have ended. Therefore, the arbitrator exceeded his authority by 

ordering a remedy after finding just cause.

Here, the arbitrator answered the parties’ stipulated issue by finding the 

Department had just cause to demote and transfer Patla. We agree with the 

Department that having reached that conclusion, the arbitrator lacked authority to 

address the issue of a remedy.4 See Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. Cent. Dauphin Educ. 

Ass’n, 767 A.2d 16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (citing Pa. Liquor Control Bd. and Manheim 

Cent. Educ. Ass’n).

Where an arbitrator exceeds his authority, his award cannot be rationally 

derived from the collective bargaining agreement. Cent. Dauphin (citing Pa. Liquor 

Control Bd. and Manheim Cent. Educ. Ass’n). Therefore, we agree with the 

Department that the arbitrator’s award must be vacated to the extent that it purported 

to order the Department to provide an opportunity for reinstatement even though

there was just cause for Patla’s demotion and transfer.

2. The Department’s Managerial Rights

In an alternative argument, the Department asserts that the arbitrator also 

exceeded his authority because his reinstatement directive impermissibly impinged 

the Department’s managerial prerogatives, which are safeguarded by both the

 

4 The Union insists that even though the arbitrator found Patla committed the misconduct 

charged by the Department, the arbitrator still had authority to alter the specific discipline imposed. 

As a general statement of law, the Union is correct that a factual finding of misconduct does not 

automatically equate to a legal determination of just cause. See Office of the Attorney Gen. v. 

Council 13, Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 844 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 2004). However, that 

statement of the law has no application in this case. Here, the arbitrator did not merely find 

misconduct as a fact. Rather, he applied the legal principle of just cause to the facts surrounding 

Patla’s conduct and its consequences to the affected institutions, and reached the express legal 

conclusion that there was just cause for the Department’s demotion and transfer of Patla.
11

collective bargaining agreement and PERA. In light of our disposition of the 

Department’s other argument, we need not reach this issue. However, we address it 

briefly in the interest of completeness. We agree with the Department.

In support of its argument, the Department cites Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections v. Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association, 173 A.3d 854 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (DOC II). In that case, the grievant, a corrections officer, was 

discharged for misconduct in the course of his supervision of inmates working in a 

prison kitchen. An arbitrator found the Department had just cause to discipline the 

grievant, but not to discharge him. The arbitrator reduced the discharge to a 

suspension and directed the Department not to assign the grievant to supervise 

inmates on his return. However, supervision of inmates is fundamental to the 

Department’s operations and is a duty common to all its corrections officers. 

Restricting the Department’s placement of a corrections officer to positions not 

requiring inmate supervision would severely undermine the employee’s usefulness. 

This Court therefore vacated the arbitrator’s award, finding that it infringed the 

Department’s managerial rights because it “effectively created a second class of 

corrections officers, one with less utility to the Department . . . .” Id. at 859.

Here, the arbitrator specifically found: “There is nothing on this record to 

establish that Patla, absent constant supervision, will perform with the proficiency 

as he had in the past.” Op. and Award at 9. The arbitrator thus acknowledged that 

Patla could not perform as a sergeant in a CO2 position with the K-9 Unit without

“constant supervision.” Id. However, the record indicates that position consists 

almost completely of unsupervised work. Thus, as in DOC II, the arbitrator’s award 

imposes a directive at odds with the fundamental nature of the position at issue. In 

consequence, as in DOC II, the award impinges the managerial rights retained by 
12

the Department, under both the collective bargaining agreement and PERA, to select 

and direct its employees.

IV. Conclusion

The arbitrator expressly determined the Department had just cause for 

demoting and transferring Patla. The arbitration award expressly denied the Union’s 

grievance. Therefore, the arbitrator’s reinstatement directive exceeded his authority 

by going beyond the scope of the parties’ stipulated issue submitted to him. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the portion of the arbitration award ordering the 

Department to reinstate Patla if he met the K-9 Unit CO2 requirements was not

rationally drawn from the collective bargaining agreement.

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Corrections, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 802 C.D. 2018

:

Pennsylvania State Corrections :

Officers Association, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13th day of May, 2019, the portion of the arbitration award 

denying the grievance of the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association 

on behalf of Edward Patla (Patla) is AFFIRMED. The portion of the arbitration 

award directing the Department of Corrections to allow Patla to reapply for a K-9 

Unit position, and to reinstate him if he meets the qualifications for that position, is

VACATED.

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge