* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50419

Summary Calendar

RAUL G. TORRES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SCOTT, SHERWOOD, BRINDLEY FOUNDATION;

SCOTT & WHITE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; SCOTT &

WHITE CLINIC,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(W-96-CV-3341)

December 8, 1998

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Raul G. Torres appeals an adverse summary judgment in his Title VII 1 complaint

of discrimination because he is hisp anic and in retaliation for making internal

complaints. The court granted judgment to Scott and White Memorial Hospital and to2 Despite all of the conjunctives suggesting to the contrary, this is just one entity. Another

defendant, Scott and White Clinic, was dismissed from the suit; this dismissal is not at issue

in this appeal.

3 International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc. , 939 F.2d 1257 (5 th Cir. 1991).

4 Pfau v. Reed , 125 F.3d 927 (5 th Cir. 1997).

5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

2 Scott, Sherwood and Brindley Foundation. 2 Torres also appeals the trial court’s refusal

to grant his motion to extend discovery.

Torres was hired to work in the audio visual depa rtment of Scott and White.

After his employer received recurring complaints that Torres was viewing pornography

at work, in violation of its sexual harassment policy, Torres was suspended and,

ultimately, discharged.

ANALYSIS

We review a district court’s refusal to extend a discovery deadline for abuse of

discretion, 3 and we review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

criteria as those applied by the district court. 4 Summary judgment should enter if the

record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, “show[s] that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.” 5

A. Extension of Discovery Deadline

Torres sought and was granted an extension of time for discovery. When he

sought a second extension it was denied. In requesting the further extension he merely

asserted that he had been unable to complete discovery because of other obligations.6 Rally’s , 939 F.2d at 1267.

7 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak

Co. , 104 F.3d 702 (5 th

Cir. 1997).

8 St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

9 Id. at 515.

3 This is insufficient under our precedents which require – in addition to a showing of

diligent efforts

– a showing by the nonmoving party as to “how the additional discovery

will defeat the summary judgment motion.” 6 The record before the district court is

devoid of any showing of the latter requirement. We perceive no abuse of discretion

in the trial court’s ruling.

B. Grant of Summary Judgment

The elements of proof required of a Title VII complainant are well-established;

the district court succinctly summarized the law governing c l aims of race/national

origin discrimination and retaliation. To state a claim for unlawful discrimination based

on race/national origin or retaliation, a Title VII plaintiff generally must establish a

prima facie case. 7 If he succeeds in establishing a prima facie violation, the employer

must produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory r eason for the adverse em ploym ent

action. 8 Once the employer discharges this burden of production, the plaintiff must

demonstrate pretext

– he must show that the reason given by the employer is false and

that the real reason for the adverse employment action is discriminatory. 9 Having laid

out the applicable law, we analyze Torres’s claims seriatim.

Torres conten ds that Scott and White discriminated against him based on

race/national origin b y paying him a lower wage than another white employee. For1 0 We reject out of hand Torres’s suggestion that superior experience and education cannot

be cred i ted as a legitimate reason for the wage difference because the white employee’s

credentials exceed the minimal job requirements. Courts have long held that an employer

is not subject to a disparate treatment suit simply for hiring the best qualified candidate. S ee,

e.g., Nichols v. Lewis Grocer

, 138 F.3d 563 (5 t h Cir. 1998); Parker v. Board of School

Comm’rs , 729 F.2d 524 (7 th Cir. 1984).

4 present purposes we assume, without deciding, that Torres has made out a prima facie

case of discrimination. Scott and White, however, presented unrebutted evidence that

the white employee received a higher w age because he had m ore experience and

education than Torres. Torres offered no evidence that Scott and White did not in fact

care about education and experience with respect to the job he performed and that the

true reason for the pay differential was discrimination. 10

Torres next claims that Scott and White discriminated and retaliated against him

by reclassifying his job, a reclassification accompanied by a pay raise but which Torres

regarded as a demotion. Even if, as Torres contends, the reclassification qualifies as

an adverse employment action cognizable under Ti t le VII, he nonetheless cannot

prevail on this clai m. Torres introduced no evidence to show a causal connection

between the reclassification and his internal complaint of discrimination, made years

before the reclassification. Without such evidence, he has not and cannot establish a

prima facie case of retaliation.

Finally, Torres contends that his suspension and subsequent termination are the

product of discrimination and ret aliation. He presented no evidence to show that

similarly-situated white employees were treated differently, as required to state a prima

facie case of discrimination. In fact, Scott and White has terminated whites and blacks

for violat i ng its sexual harassment policy. The record reflects that Scott and White5

detailed a well-documented reason for Torres’ suspension and discharge, i.e., violation

of its sexual harassment policy.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.