Filed 1/19/24 Strata Equity Global v. Persky CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

STRATA EQUITY GLOBAL, INC.,

Cross-complainant and 

Respondent,

v.

JORDAN BLAKE PERSKY,

Cross-defendant and Appellant.

 D081385

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-00013655-

 CU-BC-CTL)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Katherine A. Bacal, Judge. Affirmed.

Decker Law, James Daniel Decker and Griffin R. Schindler for Crossdefendant and Appellant.

Ellenoff Grossman & Schole, Eric Neil Landau and Travis Biffar for 

Cross-complainant and Respondent.
2

Jordan Blake Persky sued his former employer, Strata Equity Global, 

Inc. (Strata) for employment-related claims.1 As the litigation was 

proceeding, counsel for Persky informed Strata that Persky had been able to 

access at least one legal invoice from Strata’s counsel regarding work related 

to Persky’s lawsuit. Strata then filed a cross-complaint alleging that Persky 

had violated Penal Code2 section 502, which prohibits unauthorized access to 

computers, computer systems, and computer networks, by allegedly accessing 

Strata’s “computer network and file databases” and viewing and obtaining 

data contained within them, including the legal invoice. Persky filed an antiSLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), asserting that the claims in 

Strata’s cross-complaint arose from Persky’s protected activity involving the 

litigation between the parties. The trial court denied the motion, concluding 

that Strata’s cross-claims against Persky are based on unprotected activity. 

We agree and affirm the court’s order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint and Cross-complaint

In April 2022, Persky filed his complaint against Strata, a real estate 

investing firm, alleging breach of his employment agreement and related 

Labor Code claims. At the time he filed the lawsuit, Persky was employed as 

the Managing Director of Finance, and he continued to work in that role as 

the litigation proceeded. 

At some point after filing this action, Persky accessed Strata’s 

accounting records through its computer network. Relevant to this appeal, 

1 Melissa Frerichs, another Strata employee, also joined Persky as a 

plaintiff in the lawsuit against Strata, but she is not a party to this appeal.

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

Persky is alleged to have reviewed documents in a corporate management file

database, one of which was a legal invoice from Strata’s counsel related to 

Persky’s action. At the time, Persky did not advise Strata he had looked at 

the invoice. In late May 2022, Persky’s lawyer informed Strata’s counsel that 

Persky had accessed a legal invoice.

In June 2022, Strata filed a cross-complaint against Persky, alleging a 

single cause of action for the violation of the Comprehensive Computer Data 

Access and Fraud Act, codified at section 502 of the Penal Code based on 

Persky’s accessing of Strata’s computer network and electronic files stored 

there.3 It specifically referenced as the basis for relief three subdivisions of 

section 502: (c)(1)(B), (c)(2), and (c)(7). The cross-complaint sought 

compensatory damages, which included “all expenditures to investigate 

Strata Global’s computer network, file databases, and data” (§ 502, subd. 

(e)(1)), as well as punitive damages (id., subd. (e)(4)), attorney fees (id., subd. 

(e)(2)), and other unspecified injunctive or equitable relief “as the Court 

deems just and reasonable” (id., subd. (e)(1)).

B. Persky’s Anti-SLAPP Motion

Persky filed a special motion to strike the cross-complaint under Code 

of Civil Procedure section 425.16. He asserted that Strata’s cause of action 

for a violation of section 502 arose from his protected activity because the

“gravamen of Strata’s claim is that Persky impermissibly accessed Strata’s 

files to communicate documents to his attorneys so that he could gain a 

litigation advantage.” Persky further argued that the “claim is premised on 

communications by Persky’s counsel to Strata’s counsel relating to a legal 

3 Strata alleged that Persky “navigated five (5) layers of folders outside 

of his [employment] purview and job responsibilities in order to access the 

folder containing [Strata’s attorneys’] legal invoice.”
4

invoice that Strata had improperly made available to Persky and other 

employees.” 

Persky’s motion principally relied on the allegations in paragraphs 12, 

13, 18, and 19 of the cross-complaint. These allegations are as follows:

“[W]ithout authorization, Mr. Persky has been rummaging 

through Strata Global’s network and databases, including 

its corporate management database, to obtain information 

and documentation, such as legal invoices, which Mr. 

Persky knows are outside his permitted access for use 

against Strata Global in this litigation.” 

“After four months, on May 25, 2022, Strata Global’s 

counsel finally was advised by counsel for Mr. Persky that 

Mr. Persky had gained access to EGS’s legal invoices on 

Strata Global’s shared company server. Strata Global is 

informed and believes and thereon alleges that Mr. Persky 

accessed at least one legal invoice and viewed its contents.

Mr. Persky’s counsel thereafter provide the file path for the 

folder that Mr. Persky accessed.”

“[F]rom December 2021 to present, Mr. Persky has 

knowingly accessed Strata Global’s computer network and 

file databases impermissibly to access, download, copy, or

otherwise take data for his own use in his lawsuit against 

the company in violation of Sections 502(c)(1)(b), 502(c)(2), 

and 502(c)(7) of the Penal Code, Cal. Pen. Code, § 502(c), et 

seq.” 

“Mr. Persky knowingly and willfully accessed confidential 

and privileged litigation documents, taking the contents 

therein in violation of Section 502(c)(2) of the Penal Code, 

with malice and to irreparably harm the case for the 

defense in this litigation.”

With respect to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Persky 

argued that the litigation privilege barred Strata’s claim, making it 

impossible for Strata to establish a probability of prevailing on its cause of 

action. 
5

C. Strata’s Opposition

In response to Persky’s anti-SLAPP motion, Strata primarily argued

that the conduct by Persky forming the basis for its cross-complaint was not a 

“ ‘written or oral statement or writing’ ” in an official proceeding. Rather, 

according to Strata, the conduct underlying its claims was Persky’s 

“accessing, viewing, and taking privileged and confidential data from Strata 

Global’s network . . . , not his discussions with counsel.” Strata specifically 

disclaimed that the cross-complaint included any allegation founded on 

Persky’s “intention to communicate any stolen data to his attorneys,” 

contrary to Persky’s argument otherwise.

Strata also asserted that, to the extent the burden was shifted to Strata

to demonstrate its cross-complaint had minimal merit, it could show a 

probability of success on the merits. Strata maintained that Persky’s status 

as an employee of Strata at the time of the alleged unlawful access to the 

computer network and databases did not bar its claim under section 502 as a 

matter of law. It also contended that the litigation privilege did not apply 

because its cross-complaint was “not premised on Mr. Persky’s 

communication to his attorneys,” but was instead “premised entirely on his 

conduct in illegally accessing” Strata’s computer network and files. 

Strata filed the declaration of one of its attorneys of record, Eric 

Landau, who provided further definition for the factual basis of Strata’s 

cross-claims. Landau stated that on May 25, 2022, he received an email from 

Persky’s lawyer “stating that one of his clients accessed a litigation invoice 

from [Strata’s counsel of record] pertaining to this action on [Strata’s] 

Network.” Landau inquired as to which plaintiff had gained access and how 

the access had been gained. Counsel indicated that Persky had accessed the 

invoice through an “Accounts Payable folder.” Landau initiated an 
6

investigation into the matter on Strata’s behalf, which included interviews of 

relevant Strata employees. Strata filed the cross-complaint against Persky 

on the basis of its preliminary investigation, but at the time of the filing of 

the anti-SLAPP motion, Strata’s investigation was still “ongoing,” and it had 

hired a digital forensics expert to assist in the investigation. Landau 

indicated that individuals from his office had “spent approximately 25 hours” 

investigating the matter at the time of filing the opposition to Persky’s antiSLAPP motion.

Strata also submitted a declaration from Rezlyn Palma, its Chief 

Accounting Officer. Palma explained that Strata uses a “shared folder 

system to save files for documents related to” its corporate operations. 

Typically, Strata saves invoices and proof of payment as a single .pdf file, 

which is then saved in subfolders representing the month and year in which 

the invoice was paid, which are themselves saved within subfolder after 

subfolder, all of which are located within the general “Accounting” folder. 

The invoice and proof of payment that Persky accessed had been saved in this 

manner.

Finally, Strata submitted a declaration from David Thompson, a digital 

forensics investigator hired by Strata to investigate Persky’s “computer 

activities . . . in the Strata Global network and company database.” 

Thompson “was able to determine to a reasonable degree of professional 

certainty that” Persky used his Strata desktop computer to “access[ ] and 

open[ ]” the .pdf document containing the legal invoice and proof of payment 

that was stored on Strata’s network. At the time Persky accessed the file, the 

invoice and proof of payment had been saved “within five layers of subfolders.” Thompson indicated that he had spent more than 60 hours on his 

investigation, and that his rate was $350 per hour.
7

D. Hearing on the Anti-SLAPP Motion

The trial court provided the parties with a tentative ruling in which it

indicated an intent to deny Persky’s anti-SLAPP motion. The court noted 

that the basis for Strata’s sole cause of action was the allegation that “Persky 

allegedly improperly accessed Strata Global’s computer data,” and that any 

allegations about the type of data that was accessed, how that data may have 

been used, and/or with whom the data may have been shared was 

information that was not necessary for Strata to succeed on its cause of 

action.

At oral argument, counsel for Persky began by noting that Strata had 

set out three violations of section 502, under three different subdivisions of 

the statute, and that each claim should be “evaluated separately for purposes 

of the anti-SLAPP motion.” Specifically, counsel noted that, at least with 

respect to a claim for relief under subdivision (c)(1)(B), the provision requires 

that the defendant “did something after” accessing data—that is, the 

defendant must have “altered, damaged, deleted, or otherwise uses the data.” 

She noted “there is not a single allegation of Mr. Persky altering, damaging, 

deleting or destroying any data,” and that the “only allegation Strata submits 

to support its section 502(c)(1)(B) claim is Mr. Persky’s use of that data in 

this litigation.” Counsel asserted that, as a result, the allegations in 

paragraphs 12, 18, and 19, as well as the claim for a violation of subdivision 

(c)(1)(B) must be stricken.

In response to the argument by Persky’s attorney, counsel for Strata 

asserted that Persky’s application of the allegations of the complaint to a 

claim under section 502, subdivision (c)(1)(B) was based on a too-limited 

reading of that provision. Strata’s attorney explained that if subdivision

(c)(1)(B) “ended with ‘or otherwise uses any data,’ ” then Persky’s contention 
8

might have some validity. But the subdivision instead continues beyond the 

word “data,” and “says ‘or otherwise uses any data, computer, computer 

system, or computer network.’ ” (Italics added.) Thus, he explained, “[t]he 

word ‘use’ is not limited to the use of the data, . . . but [is] expanded to both 

the data, a computer system, and a computer network.” Because the usage 

referred to in subdivision (c)(1) may be done with respect to a computer 

system or network, it was not necessary for Strata to meet the “use” element 

with an allegation as to how any particular data may have been used in the 

context of the litigation between the parties.

Persky’s attorney responded with an argument related to one she had 

posited in her demurrer papers. According to counsel, the phrase “otherwise 

uses” in subdivision (c)(1) of section 502 has been interpreted by at least one 

federal district court as referring to conduct that is similar to the preceding

list of prohibited conduct—i.e., some usage that is akin to “alter[ing], 

damag[ing], delet[ing], [or] destroy[ing]” the data.4 She therefore maintained 

that, in order for the cross-complaint to set out a valid claim under 

subdivision (c)(1)(B), the usage of a computer-related item referred to in the 

cross-complaint must be a reference to using the data itself improperly, and 

could not refer to using a computer or computer network to access data.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court confirmed its tentative 

ruling denying Persky’s anti-SLAPP motion. The court’s written minute 

order provided its reasoning:

4 In demurrer papers, Persky cited two federal district court decisions for 

this proposition. (See Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige Entm’t West, Inc.

(C.D.Cal. 2018) 315 F.Supp.3d 1147, 1175 and McGowan v. Weinstein

(C.D.Cal. 2020) 505 F.Supp.3d 1000, 1020.) 
9

“Here, the sole cause of action in the cross-complaint [ROA 

# 31] alleges that Persky allegedly improperly accessed 

Strata Global’s computer data, in violation of the Penal 

Code. The specific type of data, how it was used, and/or to 

whom the information was communicated are all facts that 

might evidence the alleged violation, but are not necessary 

for the claim to proceed.” 

Given its conclusion that the cross-complaint did not arise from protected 

activity, the court declined to address the second anti-SLAPP prong.

DISCUSSION

A. Anti-SLAPP Framework

The anti-SLAPP statute, set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 

425.16, creates a summary-judgment-like procedure at the outset of a case to 

protect litigants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of 

constitutional rights to free speech and petition. (Wilson v. Cable News 

Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884.) Resolving an anti-SLAPP 

motion involves two steps. The moving party bears the initial burden to 

establish that the challenged causes of action arise from its protected speech 

or petitioning activity. (Id. at p. 884; see § 425.16, subd. (e) [listing four 

categories of protected activity].) If the moving party carries its burden, the 

burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate that its claims have at 

least minimal merit. (Wilson, at p. 884.) “Only a cause of action that 

satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from 

protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, 

subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 

Cal.4th 82, 89; see § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

In meeting its prong one burden, “the moving [party] must identify the 

acts alleged in the complaint that it asserts are protected and what claims for 

relief are predicated on them. In turn, a court should examine whether those 
10

acts are protected and supply the basis for any claims.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph 

Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 (Bonni).) “[A] claim may be struck 

only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and 

not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which 

liability is asserted.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University 

(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 (Park), italics added.) “A claim arises from 

protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the 

claim.” (Id. at p. 1062.) Only if the anti-SLAPP movant meets its prong one 

burden does the burden then shift to the opposing party to “demonstrate that 

each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and 

factually substantiated.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral).) 

We review the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Park, 

supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) In appeals in which the inquiry focuses on prong 

one, “[w]e exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on 

our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected 

activity.” (Ibid.) “In addition to the pleadings, we may consider affidavits 

concerning the facts upon which liability is based. [Citations.] We do not, 

however, weigh the evidence, but accept [the pleading party’s] submissions as 

true and consider only whether any contrary evidence from the [anti-SLAPP 

movant] establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter of law.” (Ibid.) 

In determining whether a claim or claims arise from protected activity, we 

consider the elements of the claims, the actions alleged to establish those 

elements, and whether those actions are protected activities. (Bonni, supra,

11 Cal.5th at p. 1015.) If a cause of action is determined to involve both 

protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at 

the conclusion of the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (Baral, supra, 

1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)
11

B. Strata’s cross-claims do not arise from protected activity.

As the party moving to strike, Persky bears the burden on prong one to 

demonstrate that “ ‘the challenged claim arises from activity protected by 

[Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16.’ ” (Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 

669, 678.) He alleges that Strata’s cross-complaint asserts multiple claims 

against him, all of which arise from his protected activity under subdivisions

(e)(1) and/or (e)(2) of section 425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 

Subdivision (e)(1) protects “any written or oral statement or writing made 

before a . . . judicial proceeding” while subdivision (e)(2) protects “any 

written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under 

consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.” Strata does not appear to 

dispute that communications between Persky and his attorney regarding the 

legal invoice at issue would constitute protected activity for purposes of the 

anti-SLAPP statute, but it denies that its claims against Persky arise from

Persky’s communications with his attorney.

In determining whether a party’s claims arise from protected activity, 

courts are to “consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions 

by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for 

liability.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.) The defending party’s burden 

is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those 

acts are protected under section 424.16. (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)

Although Strata drafted its cross-complaint as comprising a single 

cause of action, titled “Violation of Comprehensive Computer Data and 

Access Fraud Act (Cal. Pen. Code[,] § 502),” a review of the allegations of the 

cross-complaint demonstrate that it has set forth at least three separate 

claims for relief within that single cause of action. Specifically, Strata alleges 

that Persky violated three separate subdivisions of section 502: (c)(1)(b), 
12

(c)(2), and (c)(7).5 While all of these subdivisions relate generally to the 

unauthorized accessing of computer networks or data, each subdivision sets 

out slightly different conduct as illegal, while often using similar or even 

identical language. (See People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1440 

[“the statute describes a number of computer crimes in somewhat 

overlapping language”].)

For example, subdivision (c)(1)(B) of section 502 makes it illegal to 

“[k]nowingly access[ ] and without permission alter[ ], damage[ ], delete[ ], 

destroy[ ], or otherwise use[ ] any data, computer, computer system, or 

computer network in order to . . . wrongfully control or obtain money, 

property, or data.” Subdivision (c)(2) makes it illegal for any person to 

“[k]nowingly access[ ] and without permission take[ ], cop[y], or make[ ] use of 

any data from a computer, computer system, or computer network, or take[ ] 

or cop[y] any supporting documentation, whether existing or residing internal 

or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network.” And 

subdivision (c)(7) makes it illegal for one to knowingly and without 

permission access or “cause[ ] to be accessed” a computer or computer system 

or network. In other words, subdivisions (c)(1)(B) and (c)(2) of section 502 do 

not mandate that the accessing of the data, computer, computer system or

network be done without authorization. Instead they require that some 

additional conduct have been done without authorization. In contrast, 

subdivision (c)(7) makes the mere accessing of a computer, computer system 

or computer network illegal if it was done without authorization. 

5 Strata also alleges that it is continuing to investigate whether Persky 

also violated subdivision (c)(4) of section 502 by having “altered, damaged, 

deleted, or destroyed any of Strata Global’s other data without permission,” 

but the cross-complaint does not assert a claim for relief based on this 

subdivision. 
13

Because any violation of the various subdivisions of section 502 could 

provide Strata with a basis for relief, we must examine Strata’s claims under 

each subdivision to determine whether it arises from protected activity. As 

the Supreme Court explained in Bonni, a court “should analyze each claim for 

relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may 

be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts 

are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite 

degree of merit to survive the motion.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) 

Persky initially argues that all three of Strata’s claims for relief under 

section 502 “arose from the alleged use of supposedly wrongfully procured 

data in litigation.” He further reasons that the “data” wrongfully procured

must be the “legal invoice,” and that pursuant to the allegations of the crosscomplaint, the only possible alleged “use” of this invoice “relates to Persky 

and his attorney’s communications about the legal invoice.” Just as he did in 

his arguments before the trial court, Persky relies on four particular 

paragraphs in the cross-complaint to assert that the claims must arise from 

his protected activity in communicating with his attorney about Strata’s legal 

invoice. According to Persky, that his communications with his attorney 

forms the basis of Strata’s claims against him is particularly apparent from 

the cross-complaint’s allegation that “Persky has knowingly accessed Strata 

Global’s computer network and file databases impermissibly to access, 

download, copy, or otherwise take data for his own use in his lawsuit against 

the company in violation of Sections 502(c)(1)(b), 502(c)(2), and 502(c)(7) of 

the Penal Code, Cal. Pen. Code § 502(c), et seq.” (Italics added.) He relies on

additional allegations that similarly attempt to explain why Persky accessed 

the invoice. (Ante, p. 4.)
14

While we appreciate the basis for the argument, we view these 

allegations and the claims in cross-complaint differently than Persky does. 

Specifically, an examination of the elements of the claims at issue as well as 

the relief sought by Strata makes it clear that Strata’s claims are not

predicated on Persky’s asserted protected conduct —i.e., his communications 

about and/or use of the legal invoice. 

As an initial matter, it is readily apparent that Strata’s claim for relief 

under subdivision (c)(7) of section 502 cannot arise from Persky’s conduct in 

sharing or discussing the legal invoice with his attorney. As previously 

noted, subdivision (c)(7) proscribes the knowingly unauthorized accessing of a 

computer system or network. There is no need to demonstrate why the 

computer system or network was accessed. Thus, Strata need only allege and 

ultimately prove that Persky knowingly accessed its computer system and 

did so without permission. Nothing about these elements implicates 

communicative or other litigation-related conduct that could be considered 

protected under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

We also conclude that Strata’s claims for violations of subdivisions

(c)(2) or (c)(1)(B) of section 502 do not arise from Persky’s protected activity. 

Persky appears to assume that Strata’s claim under subdivisions (c)(1)(B) 

and (c)(2) are and can only be based on his accessing Strata’s computer 

system to “use” Strata’s data—in the form of the legal invoice—to obtain an 

advantage in his litigation against Strata. He states that the “obvious and 

necessary implication of [the] allegation [that Persky’s counsel provided the 

file path for the folder that Persky accessed] is that Persky communicated 

and conveyed the invoice to his counsel ‘for use against [Strata] in this 

litigation.’ ” He then argues: “This would appear to be the ‘use’ upon which 

Strata predicated its section 502, subdivisions (c)(1)(B) and (c)(2) allegations.” 
15

“[T]here is,” in his view, “no other use alleged in the Cross-Complaint, and 

certainly no allegation that Persky altered, damaged, deleted, or destroyed 

the invoice.” (Italics added.) We disagree. 

First, with respect to section 502, subdivision (c)(2), a violation occurs 

as soon as an individual “knowingly access[es]” a computer or computer 

system or network and then, without permission, “download[s], cop[ies], or 

otherwise take[s] or make[s] use of” data. (Italics added.) The use of “or” in 

the subdivision makes clear that only one of the listed activities must take 

place—either, the downloading, copying, taking or making use of data—for a 

violation to occur. Strata’s cross-complaint specifically alleges that Persky 

violated this subdivision by accessing Strata’s computer network and 

databases, and without permission “download[ing], copy[ing], or otherwise 

tak[ing]” data that belonged to Strata. The allegation of Persky’s motive—

that he downloaded, copied or took the data for a particular purpose, i.e., “for 

his own use in his lawsuit against” Strata—is unnecessary to the claim, as 

subdivision (c)(2) does not require that the data be downloaded, copied, or 

taken for any particular purpose. Thus, this aspect of the allegation merely 

provides context as to Persky’s possible reason for engaging in the activity 

that constitutes the wrong complained of—i.e., the accessing and 

impermissibly downloading/copying/taking data—but is not itself the 

actionable wrong and it is therefore not the subject of the anti-SLAPP 

statute. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.) 

The allegations regarding the damages Strata asserts that it suffered 

as a result of Persky’s violative conduct further demonstrate that Strata is 

not seeking recovery based on Persky’s speech or petitioning activity, but is 

instead claiming damages arising from Persky’s noncommunicative conduct. 

Strata alleges that it has been damaged “by the costs necessary to conduct 
16

the investigation to ascertain the full extent of Mr. Persky’s unlawful 

intrusion and the damages caused thereby, including [reasonable] attorneys’ 

fees arising therefrom,” and further asserts that Persky’s “actions were a 

substantial factor in th[is] harm to Strata Global because, as a direct result of 

his actions, Strata Global has been forced to divert other employees from 

their regular tasks and retain a computer forensic analysis firm to perform 

an internal investigation to ascertain the full extent of Mr. Persky’s unlawful 

intrusion into Strata Global’s computer network, file databases, and data 

files.” Strata is not seeking damages related to any possible harm to its 

litigation position as result of Persky’s sharing the contents of the invoice, 

nor is it requesting any injunctive relief in connection with the Persky

litigation.6 

We also conclude that, like Strata’s claim under subdivision (c)(2) of 

section 502, Strata’s claim under subdivision (c)(1)(B) does not arise from 

protected conduct. The elements necessary to set out a claim for a violation 

of subdivision (c)(1)(B) are three-fold: (1) the individual must “[k]nowingly 

access[ ] . . . any data, computer, computer system, or computer network”; 

(2) the individual must “without permission alter[ ], damage[ ], delete[ ], 

destroy[ ], or otherwise use[ ]” that same “data, computer, computer system, 

or computer network”; and (3) the accessing and “alter[ing], damage[ing], 

delet[ing], destroy[ing], or otherwise us[ing]” of the “data, computer, 

computer system, or computer network” must have been done for a specific 

6 In fact, the cross-complaint does not set forth an allegation that Persky 

shared the invoice itself, or any information contained within the invoice, 

with his attorney. The cross complaint merely explains how Strata learned 

about the allegedly unlawful conduct by asserting that Persky’s attorney 

advised Strata’s counsel that Persky had “gained access to” legal invoices, 

and that the attorney “provide[d] the file path for the folder that Mr. Persky 

accessed.”
17

purpose—i.e., it must have been done “in order to . . . wrongfully control or 

obtain money, property, or data.” 

Persky assumes that Strata is alleging that the basis for the first and 

second elements is his intentional accessing of Strata’s “data” (i.e., the

invoice) and his unauthorized “use” of that same “data.” Persky again

assumes that Strata’s complaint must be read as alleging that he “used” 

Strata’s “data” in his lawsuit, relying on the allegation that he downloaded or 

copied the data “for use against [Strata] in this litigation.” But we do not 

read Strata’s cross-complaint this way, particularly when we consider the

nature of the damages that Strata identifies in its pleading. Rather, 

subdivision (c)(1)(B) may be satisfied not only by knowingly accessing “data,” 

but also by knowingly accessing a computer or computer system or network. 

And Strata is alleging that accessing a computer or computer system is 

precisely what Persky did: “Mr. Persky knowingly accessed Strata Global’s 

computer network and file databases.” And the allegations in the crosscomplaint further assert that Persky used the computer network and file 

databases to “wrongfully . . . obtain . . . data” (§ 502, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics 

added). In other words, Strata is alleging that Persky knowingly accessed 

and then impermissibly used the computer network in order to wrongfully 

obtain (by downloading or copying) an electronic copy of the invoice.7 This 

understanding of the allegations of the cross-complaint is consistent with the 

limited recovery Strata is seeking—i.e., compensatory damages to recover the 

costs involved in connection with investigating and repairing anything 

7 We do not decide whether such an allegation would—or would not—

suffice to state a claim under section 502, subdivision (c)(1), as that issue is 

not before us. Rather, we are merely identifying the conduct underlying 

Strata’s asserted claim under this subdivision for purposes of determining 

whether the claim must be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.
18

damaged as a result of Persky’s intrusion into its confidential data files on its 

computer network. 

We therefore agree with the trial court that none of Strata’s claims 

arise from Persky’s speech or petitioning activity so as to be subject to an 

anti-SLAPP motion. Strata is instead seeking to hold Persky liable under all 

three identified subdivisions of section 502 based on his unauthorized 

accessing and use of Strata’s computer network. Because Persky did not 

meet his prong one burden as to any of the claims for relief asserted in 

Strata’s cross-complaint, the trial court properly denied his motion without 

reaching prong two. (Freeman v. Schack (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 719, 733.)

DISPOSITION

The order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Strata is 

entitled to recover costs on appeal.

DATO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

CASTILLO, J.