NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JESUS ARMANDO GARCIA-CORRALES, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0288 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2012-134163-001 

The Honorable Pamela Hearn Svoboda, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Eric K. Knobloch 

Counsel for Appellee 

Ballecer & Segal, LLP, Phoenix 

By Natalee Segal 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. GARCIA-CORRALES 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined. 

P O R T L E Y, Judge: 

¶1 Jesus Armando Garcia-Corrales appeals his convictions for 

dangerous crimes against children. He argues it was fundamental error for 

the jury to hear evidence relating to a sentence enhancement during the 

guilt phase of trial, and that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the 

finding of dangerous crimes against a child on two of the counts against 

him. Because we disagree with the premise of his argument, we affirm. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 M. lived in an apartment with her four children, husband 

(“Husband”), and two of his co-workers. Early one morning, she heard a 

loud noise, looked and saw people jumping over the wall, and told 

Husband that someone was entering the house. He quickly put on his 

pants, opened the bedroom door, and was hit by one of three intruders. A 

gun was put to his head. M., who was holding their three-year-old 

daughter, D., was told not to scream or make noise, as guns were pointed 

at her.

¶3 M.’s fifteen-year-old son, who heard the noise and hid in his 

closet in his locked bedroom, called the police. He was found and taken 

downstairs, joining Husband, the two co-workers, and M., who was still 

holding D. The intruders terrorized the residents by handcuffing and 

beating Husband, as well as beating M., who was trying to hold and protect 

her child. The intruders, knowing Husband bought, refurbished, and sold 

used cars, took phones, money, jewelry, car titles and car keys, and fled 

when they heard a helicopter over the apartment. 

¶4 An officer in the helicopter watched a person running from 

the direction of the apartment to a waiting vehicle. The car sped out of the 

 

1 We view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in 

the light most favorable to upholding the verdict. State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 

246, 246, ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 914, 914 (App. 1999) (citation omitted). 
STATE v. GARCIA-CORRALES 

Decision of the Court 

3

complex, was pursued by police officers, and subsequently caught. GarciaCorrales, the driver, was arrested, along with Omar Camacho, one of the 

intruders. The adult victims recognized Garcia-Corrales; he had attended

a birthday party at the apartment weeks before the home invasion. 

¶5 Garcia-Corrales was indicted for burglary; six counts of 

kidnapping, one of which was a dangerous crime against children; six 

counts of aggravated assault, one of which was a dangerous crime against 

children; and unlawful flight. All the charges, except for the unlawful 

flight, were also charged as dangerous crimes because guns were involved. 

The jury found Garcia-Corrales guilty as charged. He was subsequently 

sentenced to a lengthy prison sentence, totaling nearly twenty-eight years. 

After failing to file a timely notice of appeal, Garcia-Corrales filed a 

successful petition for post-conviction relief requesting leave to file a 

delayed notice of appeal. He then filed this appeal. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12–120.21(A)(1), 13–4031, and 

–4033(A).2

DISCUSSION 

¶6 Garcia-Corrales argues the court committed fundamental 

error by allowing the jury to resolve the “dangerous crime against children” 

allegation, claiming that it is merely “a sentencing enhancement” and was 

required to be presented to “the jury only after the guilt phase of trial.” He 

contends that because the jury heard about the child’s age at the time of the 

home invasion, the information “likely inflamed and prejudiced the jury.” 

He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding 

that he was an accomplice in targeting a child under the age of fifteen. 

I. “Dangerous Crime Against Children” Evidence 

¶7 Garcia-Corrales first contends that the trial court committed 

fundamental error by allowing the jury to hear about the age of the three 

year old child-victim during the guilt phase of the trial. He specifically 

argues the evidence was inflammatory and prejudicial, and that Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 19.1 was violated because it requires a 

finding of guilt before addressing sentencing enhancements. We review 

questions involving the application of court rules de novo. Haroutunian v. 

Valueoptions, Inc., 218 Ariz. 541, 549, ¶ 22, 189 P.3d 1114, 1122 (App. 2008). 

 

2 We cite the current version of the applicable statutes unless otherwise 

noted. 
STATE v. GARCIA-CORRALES 

Decision of the Court 

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¶8 We reject his argument. Although Rule 19.1 details the order 

of proceedings in a criminal trial, including sentencing, the rule does not 

require that an element of an offense, such as a dangerous crime against 

children allegation or an allegation that the crime was dangerous because a 

gun or other weapon was used, be only proven subsequent to the 

determination of guilt on the underlying charges. And Garcia-Corrales has 

not cited to any statute or case law requiring such, and we have found none. 

¶9 Moreover, two counts in the indictment alleged that the 

crimes were dangerous crimes against children because one of the childvictims was under fifteen years of age. Specifically, count 7, the kidnapping 

charge, stated that Garcia-Corrales “knowingly restrained [D.], under 

fifteen years of age, with the intent to inflict . . . physical injury . . . or to 

otherwise aid in the commission of a felony.” And count 13, the aggravated 

assault charge, contained similar language; namely that “using a firearm, a 

deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, intentionally placed [D.], a 

person under 15 years of age, in reasonable apprehension of imminent 

physical injury.” Because the allegation was an element of each offense, the 

State, in order to meet its burden of proof, was required to present evidence 

that Garcia-Corrales and his compatriots “focused on, directed against, 

aimed at, or target[ed] a victim under the age of fifteen.” State v. Williams, 

175 Ariz. 98, 103, 854 P.2d 131, 136 (1993). 

¶10 Moreover, the child-victim’s age at the time of the crimes was 

relevant and probative of an element to two of the charged crimes. Ariz. R. 

Evid. 401. The jury was properly instructed and we presume they followed 

the instruction. State v. Reyes, 232 Ariz. 468, 471, ¶ 7, 307 P.3d 35, 38 (App. 

2013). As a result, we find no error. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

¶11 We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de 

novo, State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, 289, ¶ 30, 349 P.3d 1117, 1126 (App. 2015) 

(citation omitted), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the verdict, and reversing only if there is no substantial evidence 

supporting the conviction, State v. Fimbres, 222 Ariz. 293, 297, ¶ 4, 213 P.3d 

1020, 1024 (App. 2009) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is proof 

that ‘reasonable persons could accept as adequate . . . to support a 

conclusion of [the] defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. 

Bearup, 221 Ariz. 163, 167, ¶ 16, 211 P.3d 684, 688 (2009) (citation omitted). 
STATE v. GARCIA-CORRALES 

Decision of the Court 

5

¶12 Garcia-Corrales was the driver of the get-away car and 

convicted as an accomplice to the home invasion. An accomplice is a person 

who with the “intent to promote or facilitate the commission” of the offense: 

1. Solicits or commands another person to commit the offense; 

or

2. Aids, counsels, agrees to aid or attempts to aid another 

person in planning or committing an offense. 

3. Provides means or opportunity to another person to 

commit the offense. 

A.R.S. § 13-301. An accomplice may be held “criminally accountable for the 

conduct of another” if, in the course of helping that person commit an 

offense, another offense occurs “that is a natural and probable or reasonably 

foreseeable consequence of the offense for which the person was an 

accomplice.” A.R.S. § 13-303(A)(3). 

¶13 Here, a month before the home invasion, Garcia-Corrales’s 

sister was invited to D.’s birthday party at the apartment, and she brought 

Garcia-Corrales and his children. He, as a result, knew M. had a three year 

old living with her when he drove his compatriots to the apartment at two 

o’clock in the morning, and he knew, or should have known, that the three 

year old would be with her parents. Consequently, by driving his three 

friends to the apartment to break in, terrorize the occupants, take items that 

did not belong to them, and then attempt to drive them from the scene, 

Garcia-Corrales is responsible for the crimes committed by the three he 

drove to the apartment. And he is equally responsible for the dangerouscrimes-against-children counts because it was reasonably foreseeable that, 

in the commission of the burglary, D. would be present, restrained along 

with the others, and placed in reasonable apprehension of imminent 

physical injury. 

¶14 Garcia-Corrales asserts that there is no evidence that he 

entered the home. However, he did not need to enter the residence to be 

held accountable as an accomplice. It was enough that he drove his friends 

to the apartment and then tried to drive away after the commission of the 

crimes, albeit unsuccessfully. Garcia-Corrales was apprehended with a codefendant, who admitted to conducting the home invasion, after the police 

found the co-defendant with a handgun and the victims’ jewelry. Because 

there was sufficient evidence that Garcia-Corrales was involved with his 

comrades, who committed the home invasion and related crimes, he was 

an accomplice for all their crimes. We therefore affirm the jury’s verdicts. 

See State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. at 290, ¶ 35, 349 P.3d at 1127 (App. 2015) 
STATE v. GARCIA-CORRALES 

Decision of the Court 

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(affirming jury finding of dangerous crime against children where 

defendant knew baby lived at house and was aware that by his 

indiscriminate shooting bullets into house at 5:00 a.m., it was likely he 

would be directing his fire at the baby, who was occupying the house and 

likely to be home asleep).

CONCLUSION 

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Garcia-Corrales’s 

convictions and sentences.