[ P U B L I S H ]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ No. 1 1- 12 78 4

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ D.C. Dock et No. 4 :1 0- cv -0 02 97 -BAE-GRS

NORTH SAVANNAH PROPERTIES, LLC, et al.,

Pla in ti ffs - App el le es

.

ve rs us
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Rec ei ve r of

th e b us in es s an d p ro pe rty of Darb y Ban k & Trus t Co
.,
Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t,

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co ur t fo r th e So ut he rn Dis tri ct of Ge or gi a

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ (J ul y 12 , 20 12 )

Befo re CARNES, M ARTIN an d J ORDAN, Circ ui t J ud ge s.

JOR DAN, Circu it Ju dg e:

Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 1 of 12The Fed eral Dep os it In su ran ce Co r po rat io n, as rece iv er fo r Darb y Ban k &

Trus t Co ., a pp eal s an or de r of th e d is tri ct co ur t rem an di ng th e act io n to st at e co ur t.

The di st ric t co ur t de te rm in ed th at it di d no t ha ve su bjec t-matte r juri sd ic ti on be cau se

th e FDIC had no t b een for m al ly sub st it ut ed as a pa rty in t he st at e co ur t ac ti on pri or

to rem ov al

. Afte r rev ie w, an d wit h th e be ne fit of or al arg um en t, we va cat e th e di st ric t

co ur t’s rem an d or de r

. W e ho ld th at , as a m at te r of fed eral la w, th e FDIC is

“ su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty” in a st at e co ur t pr oc eed in g un de r 12 U.S.C. § 18 19 (b )(2 )(B)

on ce it is ap po in te d rece iv er an d fil es a no ti ce of sub st it ut io n, and m ay at th at po in t

rem ov e th e act io n t o fe de ral co ur t.

I

In Octo be r of 20 10
, Nor th Sav an na h Pro pe rti es , LLC an d two of it s m em be rs

fil ed su it ag ai ns t Darb y in Geo rg ia st at e co ur t. The co m pl ai nt as se rte d on ly st at e la w

cl ai m s ag ai ns t Darb y an d so ug ht eq ui ta bl e re lie f, dam ag es , an d at to rn ey ’s fees

. W hi le

th e li ti ga ti on was pe nd in g, th e Geo rg ia Depa rtment o f Ban ki ng an d F in an ce cl os ed

Darb y an d ap po in te d th e FDIC as rece iv e r

. On Nov em be r 12
, 20 10
, th e FDIC

acce pt ed it s ap po in tm en t pu rs ua nt to 12 U.S.C. § 18 21 (c)( 3) (A), an d a Geo rg ia co ur t

en te red a co ns en t o rd er ap po in ti ng th e FDIC a s re cei ve r.

The FDIC fil ed a no ti ce of it s ap po in tm en t as D a r b y’s rece iv er in th e Nor th

Sav an na h act io n on Decem be r 10
, 20 10
, an d fil ed a no ti ce of su bs ti tu ti on fo r Darb y

2 Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 2 of 12on Decem

be r 21
, 20 10

. The da y aft er fil in g it s n o t i c e of su bs ti tu ti on , th e FDIC

rem ov ed th e cas e to fed eral di st ric t co ur t pu rs ua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 14 41 an d 12 U.S.C.

§ 18 19 (b )(2 )(A)– (B). The FDIC i nd ic at ed in it s n ot ic e o f rem ov al th at it ha d fil ed

a no ti ce of su bs ti tu ti on in th e st at e co ur t, bu t di d no t pr ov id e th e di st ric t co ur t wit h

a co py of th e n ot ic e o f su bs ti tu ti on

. 1

The pl ai nt iff

s fil ed a m ot io n to rem an d ba se d on 12 U.S.C. § 18 19 (b )(2 )(D),

arg ui ng th at th e act io n co ul d no t be r em ov ed be cau se it in vo lv ed on ly pr e-cl os in g

c l a i ms b a se d on st at e la w. The pl ai nt iff s al so la te r as se rte d th at th e di st ric t co u r t

The FDI C failed to include a copy of the notice of substitut ion in its remova l paper s. The 1 FDI C has, howeve r, attac hed a file-stampe d copy of the notice to its reply brief on a

ppeal, a nd the plaintiffs do not dispute that the notice was filed in state court. Although we cannot fathom why the FDI C did not provide the district court with a copy , we are confide nt that we can consider the notice of substitut ion. First, the FDI C ref err ed to the notice of substitut ion in its notice of remova l. Second, we can ta

ke judicial notice of

the documents that we re f iled in the state cour

t proce eding

. See Coney v. Smith
, 738 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1984). Third, g iven the lang uag e of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (providing that a removing party shall file “cop[ies] of all proce ss, pleading s, and order s
serve d upon such defe ndant or defe ndants”), a removing party need not submit copies of paper s that it has filed in state court. See Cook v. Randolph County
, 573 F.3d 1143, 1 1 5 0 (11t h Cir. 2009) (“[T]he defe ndants wer e not require d to file all of the pleading s from the state court proce eding
, only those that wer e serve d on them.”); Usat o r r es v. Marina Merc ante Nicaraguenses, S.A.
, 768 F.2d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 1985) (“B eca use the [defendant’ s] motion [t o dismiss ] was not ‘ser ved upon him,’ there was no require ment that the defendant file it with the di strict court.” ). Four th, ev en if the FDI C was require d to file the notice of substitut ion with the district court, we have held that an omission like the one here is “ mere ly modal and formal and [i s] completely without e ffe ct upon

. .

. removal, if the case i s in its nature remova ble. .

. . [A] ll paper s filed and proceed i n gs

. . . i n t h e state court prior to

. . . remova l

. . . are proper ly a part of the rec ord coming to this court [and] if any of them are lacking from the ori gi nal remova l rec ord, they may be later supplied.” Covington v. Indem nity Ins. Co.
, 251 F. 2 d 9 3 0, 933 (5th Cir. 1958) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Cook
, 573 F.3d at 1150 (fa ilure of removing party to in cl u d e al l s tate court proce ss and pleading s with its notice of remova l, tho u g h “proc edura lly incorre ct,” is not a “jurisdictional def

ect” ).

3 Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 3 of 12la ck ed su bjec t-matte r juri sd ic ti on be ca use the FD IC ha d not be en fo rm al ly su bs ti tu te d

as a pa rty for Dar

by in t he st at e co ur t ac ti on pri or to rem ov al

.
The di st ric t c o u r t gr an te d th e pl ai nt iff s’ m ot io n to rem an d. Se e No rt h

Sa va nn ah Pro

pe rt ie s, LLC v. Dar by Ban k & Tr us t Co

. , 20 11 W L 18 06 98 9 (S.D. Ga.

May 11
, 20 11 ). The di st ric t co ur t de te rm in ed th at th e FDIC ha d no t be en su bs ti tu te d

as a pa rty in th e st at e act io n be cau se th e FDIC ha d no t fil ed a m ot io n fo r su bs ti tu ti on ,

an d, ev en if it ha d do ne so , t h e st at e co ur t ha d no t en te red an or de r su bs ti tu ti ng th e

FDIC as a pa rty, as wou ld ha ve be en req ui red un de r Fed eral Ru le of Ci vi l Pro ced ur e

25 (c). Bec au se th e FDIC’s pa rty st at us was th e on ly ba si s fo r fed eral juri sd ic ti on , th e

di st ric t co ur t co nc lu de d th at it di d n o t ha ve su bjec t-matte r juri sd ic ti on

. Se e id

. at

*2 –* 3. The di st ric t co ur t di d no t ad dr es s whe th er rem an d was ap pr op ria te un de r th e

ex em pt io n to FDIC rem ov al fo r act io ns in vo lv in g on ly pr e-cl os in g c la im s b as ed on

st at e la w. The FDIC ap pe al ed

.

II

W e ha ve juri sd ic ti on to he ar th is ap pe al pu rs ua nt to 12 U.S.C. § 18 19 (b )(2 )(C)
,
whi ch pr ov id es th at “ [t]he [FDIC] m ay ap pe al an y o rd er of rem an d en te red by an y

Uni te d St at es di st ric t co ur t.” Se e Buc zk ow sk i v. FDIC , 41 5 F .3d 59 4, 59 5 (7 th Ci r.

20 05 ) (“ [The FDIC’s] au th or it y to [ap pe al a rem an d or de r], g ran te d by 1 2 U.S.C. §

18 19 (b )(2 )(C)
, is y et an ot he r di ffer en ce fro m no rm al rem ov al pr act ic e, whe re 28

4 Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 4 of 12U.S.C. § 14 47 ( d ) f o r b i d s mo st ap pe al s.”) ; FDIC v. S & I 85 -1

, Lt d.
, 22 F.3 d 10 70
,

10 72 (1 1t h Ci r. 19 94 ) (n ot in g th at § 18 19 (b )(2 )(C) is an ex cep ti on to th e ge ne ral ru le

ba rri ng ap pe al s of rem an d or de rs ). W he th er th e di st ric t co ur t ha d su bjec t-matte r
juri sd ic ti on fo ll owi ng th e F D I C ’s rem ov al is a qu es ti on ov er whi ch we ex erci se
pl en ary rev ie w. Se e Hen so n v. Ci ba

- G e ig y Co rp

. , 26 1 F.3 d 10 65
, 10 68 (1 1t h Ci r.

20 01 ).

A

Fed eral -q ue st io n juri sd ic ti on ge ne ral ly ex is ts whe ne ve r th e FDIC is a pa rty to

li ti ga ti on

. Se e 12 U.S.C. § 18 19 (b )(2 )(A) (“ [A]ll su it s

. . . to whi ch th e Co rp or at io n,

in an y cap aci ty, is a pa rty sh al l be de em ed to ari se u n d e r t h e la ws of th e Uni te d

St at es .”). The FDIC ha s th e st at ut or y rig ht to rem ov e to fed eral co ur t cert ai n st at e

co ur t act io ns wit hi n th e “ 90 -d ay pe rio d be gi nn in g on th e da te t h e a c ti on , su it
, or

pr oc eed i n g i s f

i le d ag ai ns t th e Co rp or at io n or th e Co rp or at io n is su bs ti tu te d as a

pa rt y ,” 12 U.S.C. § 18 19 (b )(2 )(B) (em ph as is ad de d)
, an d th is rig ht of rem ov al ex is ts

“ i r r e sp ect iv e of [th e FDIC’s] al ig nm en t as pl ai nt iff or de fen da nt .” S & I 85 -1
, 22

F.3 d at 10 73

. The cri ti cal qu es ti on fo r us in th is ap pe al is th e m ean in g of th e ph ras e

“ su bs ti tu te d a s a p art y ” in § 1 81 9( b) (2 )(B)

.
The FDIC firs t as ks us to in co rp or at e th e de fin it io n of the sa m e ph ras e fo un d

in a no w-rep eal ed Res ol ut io n Trus t Co rp or at io n st at u t e

. Se e 12 U.S.C. §

5 Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 5 of 1214 41 a( l )(3 )(C) (rep eal ed ). Fo r th e reas on s th at fo ll ow, we de c l i n e t h e FDIC’s

in vi ta ti on to en ga ge in th is type o f st at ut or y bo rro win g.

The RTC, es ta bl is he d in 19 89
, was “ res po ns ib le fo r red uc in g th e co st of th e

sa vi ng s an d lo an cri si s to th e go ve rn m en t.” Cen te x Co rp

. v. Uni te d St at es , 39 5 F.3 d

12 83
, 13 02 (Fed

. Ci r. 20 05 ). Lik e th e FDIC, th e RTC co ul d be ap po in te d as rece iv er

fo r fai le d fin an ci al in st it ut io ns , an d, whe n it was in vo lv ed in li ti ga ti on as a pa rty, ha d

a si m il ar rig ht to rem ov e st at e co ur t act io ns to fed eral co ur t. And
, li ke th e FDIC, th e

RTC’s rig ht to rem ov e was tri gg ered in rel ev an t pa rt by it s su bs ti tu ti on as a pa rty in

th e st at e co ur t act io n. Se e RTC v. Fra ge tt i , 49 F.3 d 71 5, 7 1 7 –1 8 (1 1t h Ci r. 19 95 )

(ci ti ng 12 U.S.C. § 14 41 a( l )(3 )(A)(i ) (rep eal ed )). In 19 91
, Co n g r es s am en de d §

14 41 a to de fin e th e ph ras e “ su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty” in so far as th e RTC was co nc ern ed

.

Pu rs ua nt to th is am en dm en t, th e RTC was de em ed su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty “ up on th e

fil in g of a co py of th e or de r ap po in ti ng th e [RTC] as co ns erv at or or rece iv er fo r th at

pa rty, or th e fil in g of su ch ot he r pl ead in g in fo rm in g th e co ur t th at th e [RTC] ha s be en

ap po in te d co ns erv at or or rece iv er fo r su ch pa rty.” 12 U.S.C. § 1 4 4 1a ( l )(3 )(B)

(rep eal ed ).

Alt ho ug h it wou ld cert ai nl y be eas y to us e th e de fin it io n se t fo rth in th e fo rm er
§ 1 44 1a ( l )(3 )(B) , th ere a re go od reas on s no t to do so . Firs t, § 14 41 (a)( l )(3 )(B) was

rep eal ed in 20 10
, se e Dod d– Fran k W al l St reet Refo rm an d Co ns um er Pro te ct io n Act,

6 Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 6 of 12Pu b. L. No. 11 1– 20 3
, 1 2 4 St at

. 15 55 (2 01 0)
, an d we kn ow of no au th or it y th at

pe rmi t s ( mu c h le ss en co ur ag es ) de fin in g an ex is ti ng st at ut or y te rm or ph ras e by

refe ren ce to a de fin it io n in a se pa rat e st at ut e th at is no lo ng er on th e bo ok s. Seco nd
, 2

th ere is th e m es sy fact th at Co ng res s di d no t de fin e th e ph ras e “ su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty”

fo r th e FDIC as it ha d fo r th e RTC. B e c a u s e w e do no t kn ow whe th er Co ng res s’

fai lu re to pr ov id e a pa ral le l de fin it io n of th e ph ras e fo r th e FDIC was in te nt io na l, or
jus t si m pl y an ov ers ig ht
, th is is on e of th os e cas es whe re th e “ vi ews of a su bs eq ue nt

Co ng res s fo rm a ha zard ou s ba si s fo r in ferr in g th e in te nt of an earl ie r on e.” Rus se ll o

v. Uni te d St at es , 46 4 U.S. 16
, 26 (1 98 3) (ci ta ti on s an d in te rn a l q u o t a ti on m ark s

om it te d)

. In su m , al th ou gh ap pl y in g th e fo rm er § 14 41 a( l )(3 )(B) ’s de fin it io n of th e
ph ras e “ su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty” to § 18 19 (b )(2 )(B) wou ld m ak e th in gs m or e si m pl e,

th ere i s n o p ers ua si ve leg al ba si s t o o pt for si m pl ic it y he re.

The FDIC ne xt arg ue s t ha t, ev en wit ho ut st at ut or y bo rro win g, i t was en ti tl ed

to rem ov e th e Nor th Sav an na h act io n to fed eral co ur t on ce it was ap po in te d rece iv er

fo r Darb y an d fi le d a co py of th e ap po in tm en t o rd er wit h th e st at e co ur t. W e reject

th is arg um en t be cau se it is co nt rary to th e t e x t o f § 18 19 (b )(2 )(B) an d in co ns is te nt

When the Seventh Circuit considere d the FDI C’s identical arg ument in 2005, Congr ess had 2
not y et repe aled § 1441(a) ( l )(3) (B ). Even so, the Seventh Circuit declined to hold that “the definition i n § 1 4 4 1(a) ( l )(3) (B ) ‘applie[d]’ to § 1819(b)( 2)(B )” beca use the two statutes “d[id] not crossref ere nce e ach othe r.” Buczkowski
, 415 F.3d at 597.

7 Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 7 of 12wit h ou r pr eced en t. W e co nc ur wit h th e Sev en th Ci rcu it ’s ob se rv at io n th at th e

la ng ua ge of § 18 19 (b )(2 )(B) can no t be ar th e weig ht of th e FDIC’s i n t e r p r et at io n.

Si m pl y st at ed
, “ [th e FDIC] be co m es a ‘part y ’ on ly in co ur t[,]” a n d th e ph ras es

“ ‘[s]ubs ti tu te d a s a p art y ’ an d ‘ap po in te d a s a r ecei ve r’ are to o d iff eren t t o e qu at e.”

Buc zk ow sk i , 41 5 F.3 d at 59 6. A nd we ha ve pr ev io us ly sa id th at th e ph ras e

“ su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty” d o e s no t m ean “ th e da te [th e] FDIC is ap po in te d rece iv er.”

S & I 85 -1 , 22 F.3d at 1 07 4.

B

Ru le 25 (c) of th e Fed eral Ru le s of Ci vi l Pro ced ur e, wh i c h g o v e rn s th e

su bs ti tu ti on of p art ie s u po n a tra ns fer o f in te res t, p ro vi de s as fol lo ws:

If an in te res t is tra ns ferr ed
, th e act io n m ay be co nt in ue d by or ag ai ns t th e
or ig in al pa rty, un le ss th e c o u r t , on m ot io n, or de rs th e tra ns fere e to be

su bs ti tu te d in th e a c t i o n or joi ne d wit h th e or ig in al pa rty. The m ot io n
m us t b e se rv ed as p ro vi de d i n R ul e 2 5( a)(3 ).

Bec au se st at e pr oc ed ur al la w “ can no t co nt ro l th e pr iv il eg e of rem ov al gr an te d by [a]

fed eral s t a t u t e,” Ch ic ag o, R.I. & P.R. Co

. v. St ud e , 34 6 U.S. 57 4, 58 0 (1 95 4)
, th e

di st ric t co ur t pr op erl y lo ok ed to Ru l e 2 5 (c) fo r gu id an ce as to th e m ean in g of th e
ph ras e “ su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty” in § 18 19 (b )(2 )(B)

. And be cau se be in g ap po in te d as

rece iv er is n ot th e sa m e th in g as be in g su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty, th e di st ric t co ur t

co rrec tl y req ui red th e FDIC to ta ke so m e affi rm at iv e act io n be y on d it s ap po in tm en t

8 Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 8 of 12as rece iv er (s uc h as f i l i ng a no ti ce of su bs ti tu ti on ) in or de r to be “ su bs ti tu te d as a

pa rty.” Se e Buc

zk ow sk i , 41 5 F.3 d at 59 6 (“ su bs ti tu ti on as a pa rty req ui res a sp eci fic

fil in g in co ur t” ). The di st ric t co ur t, ho wev er, wen t to o far in de m an di ng th at th e st at e

co ur t gr an t a m ot io n fo r su bs ti tu ti on in or de r th at th e FDIC be “ su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty”

fo r pu rp os es of § 18 19 (b )(2 )(B)

.
The FDIC’s app oi nt m en t as rece iv er fo r a fai le d in st it ut io n is no t an ord in ary

t r a n sf er of in te res t. Co ng res s ha s de cree d th at , whe n it acce pt s ap po in tme n t a s

rece iv er, th e FDIC su ccee ds “ by op er a t i o n of la w ” to al l of th e fai le d in st it ut io n’s

“ rig ht s, ti tl es , p owe rs , an d pr iv il eg es [.]” 12 U.S.C. § 18 21 (d )(2 )(A)(i ) (em ph as is

ad de d)

. Thu s, “ [w]hen th e FDIC i s ap po in te d a s re cei ve r, it st ep s i nt o t he sh oe s of

th e fai le d in st it u ti on an d ta ke s po ss es si on of bo th th e as se ts an d th e li ab il it ie s.”

Vern on v. FDIC
, 98 1 F.2 d 12 30
, 12 34 (1 1t h Ci r. 19 93 ). Bec au se th e fai le d in st it ut io n

“ ceas e[s ] to ex is t,” McAni nc h v. W in te rmu te , 49 1 F.3 d 75 9, 76 7 (8 th Ci r. 20 07 ), an d

“ va ni sh e[s ] in a pu ff of sm ok e,” Buc zk ow sk i , 41 5 F.3d at 59 7, th e FDIC ne ces sa ril y

be co m es a pa rty to an act io n whe n it fil es a no ti ce of su bs ti tu ti on , an d as a m at te r of

fed eral la w a st at e co ur t do es no t ha ve an y di sc ret io n to de ny su bs ti tu ti on of th e FDIC

fo r a fai le d in st it ut io n whi ch no lo ng er ha s a se pa rat e ex is te nc e. O t h e r wis e, th ere

wou ld be no pa rty rem ai ni ng on on e si de of th e act io n. Se e ge ne ra ll y Est at e of

Ha r d i n g v. Bell
, 81 7 F.Su pp . 1 18 6, 11 93 (D.N.J. 19 93 ) (“ The FDIC ha s su ccee de d

9 Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 9 of 12to al l rig ht s, ti tl es , po wers , an d pr iv il eg es of H o w a r d. Bec au se of th is
, Howar d is

ap tl y ch arac te riz ed as a l e g a l fic ti on wit ho ut as se ts or li ab il it ie s. Und er th es e

ci rcu m st an ces , th e co ur t wil l gr a n t t h e FDIC’s m ot io n fo r su bs ti tu ti on .”) (ci ta ti on

om it te d)

.
As we se e it
, by vi rtu e of § 18 21 (d )(2 )(A)(i ) th e FDIC is au to mat i c a l l y

su bs ti tu te d fo r th e fai le d in st it ut io n as a m at te r of fed eral la w th e m om en t th at it fil es

a no ti ce of su bs ti tu ti on in co u r t , a n d t h e 90 -d ay rem ov al pe rio d se t fo rth in §

18 19 (b )(2 )(B) be gi ns to run fro m th e fi li ng of th at no ti ce. Se e 2 S H O R T E R O X F O R D

E N G LIS H D IC T IO N A R Y 30 91 (5 th ed

. 20 02 ) (d efi ni ng “ su bs ti tu te ” as to “ pu t (a pe rs on

or th in g) in pl ace of an ot he r”). Thi s br ig ht -li ne ru le is co ns is te nt wit h th e few ci rcu it

co ur t de ci si on s on th e is su e, whi ch de cl in e to req ui re a st at e co u r t or de r al lo win g

su bs ti tu ti on or in te rv en ti on as a pr ereq ui si te to FDIC rem ov al

. Se e Buc zk ow sk i , 41 5

F.3 d at 59 5– 97 (h ol di ng th at th e F DIC, as rece iv er, was “ su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty” in

st at e co ur t when it fil ed a pe ti ti on to in te rv en e); Hea to n v. Mon og ra m Cr ed it Ca rd 3

Ban k of Geo rg ia , 29 7 F.3 d 41 6, 42 6 (5 th Ci r. 20 02 ) (“ [T]he FDIC be cam e a ‘part y ,’

fo r pu rp os es of § 18 19 (b )(2 )(A), as so on as it fil ed it s m ot io n to in te rv en e.”). It al so

To the extent that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Buczkowski is not clea r about whether 3 the state court had g rante d the FDI C’s petition to intervene prior to remova l, the district court’s order explains that the FDI C remove d the action prior to a ruling on its petition. See Buczkowski v. Oliva, 2004 WL 1595231, at *2 (N.D . I ll. J uly 15, 2004).

10 Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 10 of 12fu rth ers an im po rta nt fed eral in te res t. Co ng res s ha s “ us ed ve ry st ro ng la ng ua ge to

affo rd th e FDIC ev ery po ss ib il it y of ha vi ng a fed eral fo ru m ,” Ca st le be rr y v. Gol do me

Cr ed it Co rp

. , 40 8 F.3 d 77 3, 78 3 (1 1t h Ci r. 20 05 ) (in te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s om it te d)
,

an d fro m a pr act ic al pe rs pe ct iv e it m ak es li tt le se ns e to m ak e rem ov al de pe nd en t on

th e di ffer en t ap pr oa ch es th at st at es m ig ht ta ke wit h res p e c t t o s ub st it ut io n. Cf

.
Cl ea rf ie ld Tr us t Co . v . Un it ed St at es , 3 18 U.S. 3 63 , 3 67 ( 1 9 4 3 ) (ch oo si ng to ap pl y

fed eral co m

m on la w ru le
, wit h res pe ct to th e effe c t o f de la y in pr ov id in g no ti ce of

fo rg ed in do rs em en t, in cas e in vo lv in g “ is su an ce of co m m erci al pa pe r by th e Uni te d

St at es ” be cau se th e “ ap pl ic at io n of st at e la w, ev en wit ho ut th e co nf li ct of la ws ru le s

of th e fo ru m , wou ld su bjec t th e rig ht s an d du ti es of th e Uni te d St at es to ex cep ti on al

un cert ai nt y ”). Fu rth erm or e, th e pu rp os e of § 18 19 (b )(2 )(B) – al lo win g th e FDIC to

4

ch oo se a fed eral fo ru m – wou ld be fru st rat ed if a st at e co ur t co ul d pr ev en t rem ov al

by de nyin g su bs ti tu ti on

. Se e ge ne ra ll y Mil ne r v. Dep ’t o

f th e Na vy , 13 1 S.Ct. 12 59
,

12 65 –6 6 (2 01 1) (co ns id eri ng st at ut e’s pu rp os e to rei nf or ce in te rp ret at io n of st at ut or y

te xt ).

We rec og nize that Florida
, Geor g ia, and Alabama curr ently have discretionar y substitut ion 4 provisions simil ar to Rule 25(c)

. See F L A

. R. C I V

. P. 1.260(c) ; G A

. C O D E § 99-11-25( c); A L A

. R. C I V

. P. 25(c)

. But nothing preve nts these states from ch an gi ng their provisions in the future or interpre ting them in differ ent way s, and the FDI C’s remova l rig hts s hould not be subject to the vag arie s of state law s.

11

Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 11 of 12Here th e FDIC acce pt ed ap po in tm en t as Darb y ’s rece iv er on Decem be r 10
,

20 10
, an d was “ su bs ti tu te d as a pa rty” in th e Nor th Sav an na h act io n on Decem be r 21
,

20 10
, whe n it fil ed it s no ti ce of su bs ti tu ti on

. Thu s, whe n th e FDIC rem ov ed th e cas e

to fed eral co ur t on Decem be r 22
, 20 10
, fed eral -q ue st io n juri sd ic ti on ex is te d pu rs ua nt

to § 1 81 9( b) (2 )(A), an d re m an d was im pr op er.

C

As no te d earl ie r, th e pl ai nt if f s a l s o m ov ed to rem an d th e cas e to st at e co ur t

pu rs ua nt to 12 U.S.C. § 18 19 (b )(2 )(D), whi ch ex em pt s fro m FDIC rem ov al th os e

cas es whe re th e li ti ga ti on in vo lv es on ly th e pr e-cl os in g rig ht s of th e pl ai nt iff s ba se d

on st at e la w cl ai m s. The di st ric t co ur t di d no t ad dr es s whe th er th is ex em pt io n

ap pl ie d, an d we be li ev e th e be st co ur se of act io n is to al lo w it to de ci de th is se pa rat e

gr ou nd for rem an d i n t he fir st in st an ce.

II I

The di st ric t co ur t’s re m an d o rd er i s VACATED

.

12 Case: 11-12784 Date Filed: 07/12/2012 Page: 12 of 12