### U.S. Department of Transportation

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Office of Aviation Policy and Plans Washington, D.C. 20591

FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL REGUL ATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS

Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements

PART 117

Final Rule

OFFICE OF AVIATION POLICY AND PLANS

November 2014i 

## Table of Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1 Total Benefits ‐ Base Case ................................................................................................... 6 Disposition of Issues Raised by Comments Received Regarding the Initial SRIA ............ 6 General Issues ................................................................................................................ . 7 Issues Related to Estimation of Costs ........................................................................... 41 Benefit Analysis .............................................................................................................. .. 55 The Nature of Fatigue ................................................................................................... 56 Causes of Fatigue .......................................................................................................... 57 Fatigue and Transportation ........................................................................................... 57 Recent Findings on Fatigue and Occupational Performance ........................................ 59 Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) .................................................................. 61 Effectiveness of Final Rule ........................................................................................... 64 Quantified Benefits ....................................................................................................... 73 Passenger Operations Base Case Estimate................................................................ 75 Passenger Operations High Case Estimate ............................................................... 76 Cargo-only Operations Ba se Case Estimate ............................................................. 78 High Case Estimate ................................................................................................... 81 Non-Quantified Benefits ............................................................................................... 83 Benefit Summary .......................................................................................................... 85 Cost Analysis ................................................................................................................. ... 86 Flight Operations Cost .................................................................................................. 88 Crew Scheduling ....................................................................................................... 89 Computer Programming .......................................................................................... 113 Payroll Cost Savings from Reduci ng Flightcrew Members Fatigue....................... 114 Flight Operations Cost Summary ............................................................................ 117 Rest Facilities .............................................................................................................. 118 Engineering ............................................................................................................. 123 Installation ............................................................................................................... 12 4 Downtime ................................................................................................................ 125 Fuel Consumption Costs ......................................................................................... 126 Fatigue Training .......................................................................................................... 130 Cost Analysis Summary .............................................................................................. 134 Benefit/Cost Summary .................................................................................................... 135 Appendix A: Relevant Accident History ........................................................................ 139 Appendix B: Sensitivity Analyses .................................................................................. 173 Sensitivity #1: Adjusting for Block Hour Discrepancy .............................................. 174 Sensitivity #2: Alternative Weighting of Case Results .............................................. 177 Sensitivity #3: Alternative Assumptions Re garding Percent of Flightcrew Members Who Are Reserves (Passenger Operations) ............................................................................ 181 Sensitivity #4: Alternative Assumption Regardin g Percent of Sick Time that would be Saved Due to the Final Rule ................................................................................................... 183 Sensitivity #5: Alternative Assumptions Related to Cargo Analysis ......................... 186ii 

### Appendix C: Detailed Data Tables ................................................................................. 1921 

## Executive Summary On December 21, 2011, the Federal Aviation Ad ministration (FAA) issued a final rule that was published in the Federal Register as Flight Crew Member Duty and Rest Requirements on January 4, 2012 (77 Fed. Reg. 330, 403). The regu lations, which are limited to passenger operations conducted under 14 CF R part 121 (part 121), becam e effective on January 4, 2014. On December 21, 2011, the FAA also issued a Regul atory Impact Analysis (original RIA) dated November 18, 2011 (FAA-2009-1093-2477). The original RIA provides the basis for the FAA’s decision to (1) promulgate the final rule estab lishing new flight, duty and rest requirements for flight crews in passenger operations; and (2) excl ude flight crews in cargo-only operations from the new mandatory requirements. While cargo-onl y operations are not required to meet the new regulations, the rule permits these operators to opt into the rule if they so choose. On December 22, 2011, the Independent Pilots Association (IPA) f iled a timely petition for review. During the course of reviewing the ad ministrative record for the purpose of preparing the government’s brief, the FAA discovered errors in the original RIA that supports the final rule. The errors were associated with the scope of costs related to the implementation of the regulations for cargo-only operations. These errors appeared to be of a su fficient amount that the FAA concluded it was prudent to review the portion of the cost-benefit analysis related to cargoonly operations and allow interested parties an opportunity to comme nt on the corrected analysis. On May 17, 2012, the FAA asked the United States Court of Appeals fo r the District of Columbia Circuit to suspend the litigation of the final rule while the agency corrected the

inadvertent errors it had discovered. The court granted the FAA’s motion on June 8, 2012. While the passenger operations rule is not at issue in the court proceedings, the FAA, in an abundance of caution, decided to have th at portion of the original RIA reevaluated as well.2 

### The FAA contracted with the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to review the original RIA for accu racy, correct any errors identif ied, and prepare a supplemental regulatory evaluation laying out the revised analysis. The Initial Supplemental RIA (Initial SRIA), dated October 4, 2012, and issued fo r public comment on December 7, 2012, was the product of that review. While the Initial SRIA largely mirrored the original RIA in both content and organizational structure, it prov ided more detail on the potential impacts the final rule would have on both passenger and car go-only operations. In addition, the Initial SRIA provided expanded discussion of the methodology and informa tion sources used in the analysis, corrected some reporting of results and minor calculation errors present in the original RIA, and presented sensitivity analysis on key assumptions used in the analysis. 1 

### In the original RIA, the porti on of scheduling costs related to cargo-only operations of air carriers that conduct both passenge r and cargo-only opera tions (mixed operations carriers) were inadvertently excluded from the reported cost s of extending the fina l rule to cargo-only operations. The Initial SRIA corrected that omi ssion, which significantly in creased its estimates of the costs of extending the final rule to in clude cargo-only operations. Due to inclusion of impacts on cargo-only operations, a few air carrier s were reclassified for ease of explication. 2

1 The Initial SRIA relied on the same data used for the original RIA. In some cases, new estimates were developed and more recent data sources were used. 2 Specifically, in the original RIA, the costs of the rule for a small number of air carriers conducting both passenger operations and cargo ‐ only operations were modeled using the cost assumptions related to cargo ‐ only industry group but the resulting cost estimates associated with those carriers were included in the summary tables labeled

as costs for the passenger industry group. The Initial SRIA reclassified the costs associated with those carriers so that they are reported under the cargo industry group.3 

### The FAA received ten public comments in respon se to the Initial SRIA. This Final SRIA responds to those comments. Where appropriate, the analysis in this Final SRIA has been revised to incorporate new informati on provided by the commenters. This Final Supplemental Regulatory Impact Analysis (Final SRIA) adjusts the methodology used to estimate the prospective bene fits of extending the pr ovisions of the final rule to apply to cargo-only ope rations in the following ways: 3



###  Adjusts the aircraft models used to estim ate the base and high benefits cases for cargo-only operations.

 Accounts for the possibility of non-cr ew passengers traveling on cargo-only flights being involved in a catastrophic accident in the high benefits case.

 Accounts for the possibility that ground fata lities could result from a catastrophic accident involving a cargo-only flight in the high benefits case.

 Accounts for additional medi cal costs of non-fatal inju ries for the base case.

 Revises the effectiveness rating of the provisions of the final rule for the sole cargo accident in the accident history an alysis from 75 percent to 15 percent.

 Includes a section describing the non-qua ntified benefits of the final rule. This Final SRIA adjusts the methodology used to estimate the costs of applying the final rule to in the following ways:

 Calculates the cost of the aircraft do wntime separately for passenger and cargo operations.

3 There are no changes to the benefits estimates for passenger operations.4 

###  Incorporates new data on the number of primary lineholders relative to the number of flightcrew members for ca rriers in the freight industry groups. 4



###  Includes the costs of employer provided bene fits for airline employees in addition to wage costs when estimating labor costs associated with the final rule for both passenger and cargo-only operations.

This Final SRIA also includes an additional sensitivity analysis (found in Appendix B) to explore whether using a limited number of alte rnative assumptions suggested in comments on

the Initial SRIA would affect the central conclusi on that the costs of applying the final rule to cargo-only operations vastly outweigh the estimated benefits. This additional sensitivity analysis

does not alter that central conclusion. 5 

### For passenger operations, we provide a range of estimates for the quantitative benefits of the final rule. Our base case estimate is $401 million ($246 million present value at seven percent and $322 million at three percent) and our high case estimate is $757 million ($465 million present value at seven percent and $609 milli on at three percent). The total estimated cost of the final rule as it applie s to passenger operations is $462 million ($320 million present value at seven percent and $391 million at three percent). Therefore, the costs of the final rule are somewhat higher than the base case benefits estimate, although still well below the high case

estimate of benefits. We also note that if it were to save 85 or more lives in a 10-year period – that is, three-quarters or more of the 112 fatal ities that occurred in fatigue-related accidents

4 Because supplemental carriers provided both passenger and cargo ‐ only service, this changed the cost estimates for passenger operations by a small amount. 5 In addition, this Final SRIA revises the discounting methodology so that 2011 is the base year for present value estimates. In the Initial SRIA, 2012 was used as the base year.5 

### during the 10-year reference period -- the benefits from adopti ng this rule would exceed its

estimated costs. 6



### If the final rule were extended to cover ca rgo-only operations, the base case estimate of additional benefits is $3 million ($2 million presen t value at seven percent and $3 million at three percent) and the high case estimate is $10 million ($6 million present value at seven percent and $8 million at three percent). In comparison, the add itional estimated cost of the final rule if it were extended to cargo-only operations is es timated to be $452 million ($292 million present value at seven percent, and $371 million at three pe rcent). This cost estimate far exceeds both the base and high case estimates of benefits. In orde r for extending the final rule to include cargoonly operations to yield net benefits , its provisions would need to prevent at least eight accidents during the 10-year analysis period. 7 

### In contrast, only one accident occurred in cargo-only operations during the 10-year hist orical period, and the final rule would have reduced the probability of its occurrence by only 15 percent. The Final SRIA re-evaluates the analysis supporting the FAA’s decision to exclude cargo-only operations from the final rule. Beca use the comments provided in response to the

Initial SRIA did not rais e any significant issues with regard to passenger operations, this Final

SRIA does not re-evaluat e the analysis supporti ng the FAA’s decision to issue a final rule

6 This comparison assumes the lives saved would be distributed uniformly over the 10

‐ year analysis period for benefits and using a seven percent discount rate. 7 This breakeven analysis for cargo ‐ only operations is based on total value of an averted accident including not just averted fatalities but also averted hull destruction, cargo loss, and accident investigation costs. The breakeven analysis for passenger operations uses just averted fatalities because lives lost is an intuitive measure and comprises the bulk (93 percent) of the societal value of averting an accident involving a passenger operation. However for cargo ‐ only operations, the lives lost is a much lower proportion (35 percent) of the total value of averting accident. Therefore it is appropriate to conduct the breakeven analysis based on the total value of an averted accident.6 

### implementing new flight, duty and rest requirem ents for part 121 carriers engaged in carrying

passengers.

Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the differences between the original RIA, the Initial SRIA, and the Final SRIA over the 12-year analysis period from 2012 to 2023. 8 

### Table 1: Nominal Costs and Benefits (2012- 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions) Original RIA Initial SRIA Final SRIA Total Benefits ‐ Base Case $376 $401 $401 Total Benefits ‐ High Case $716 $757 $757 Total Costs $390 $457 $462 Table 2: Nominal Costs and Benefits ( 2012-2023), Cargo Operations (2011 $Millions) Original RIA Initial SRIA Final SRIA

Total Benefits ‐ Base Case $20.35* $5 $3 Total Benefits ‐ High Case $32.55* $31 $10 Total Costs $306 $550 $452

* The FAA did not detail potential benefits to cargo ‐ only operations in the original RIA. Rather, the FAA assumed that benefits associated with averting a single catastrophic accident involving

a cargo plane would range between $20.35 million and $32.55 million. 

## Disposition of Issues Raised by Comments Received Regarding the Initial SRIA The following organizations submitted comments regarding the economic analysis

contained in the Initial SRIA: 9



###  Independent Pilots Association (IPA)

 Cargo Airline Association (CAA)

8 This analysis period consists of a two

‐ year period prior to the compliance date of the rule when carriers would incur some costs associated with preparing for compliance with the rule followed by a 10–year period when the provisions of the rule are in effect. 9 All comments on the Initial SRIA are filed in Docket No. FAA

‐ 2009

‐ 1093, posted February 12, 2013, available at www.regulations.gov.7 

###  Airline Professionals Association, Team sters Local 1224 (Airline Professionals Association)

 Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA)

 Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings (AAWW)

 US Chamber of Commerce (US Chamber)

 NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP)

 US Airlines Pilots Association (USAPA)

 Airlines for America (A4A)

 Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) The comments provided were almost exclusivel y directed towards the analysis regarding cargo-only operations. 10 

### The following summarizes the issu es raised and provides the FAA’s response to the issues. The remainde r of this section is organized in to three parts: general issues, issues regarding the benefits estimates, and issues related to the cost estimates.



## General Issues

Several commenters objected in principle to the FAA regulati ng cargo operations differently than passenger operations and voiced their support for “one level of safety.” IPA stated that “[b]y excluding Cargo Operations fro m the Final Rule, FAA has deviated from its previously consistent practice of regulating pilot fitness to fly exactly the same for cargo and passenger operations.” 11 

### IPA used as examples that cargo and passenger pilots are held to the

10 We note that comments discussing whether the FAA was statutorily foreclosed from conducting a cost

‐ benefit analysis are addressed in the Notice of Availability for this FSRIA that was published in the Federal Register. 11 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 75.8 

### same standard in the FAA rules regarding regard s pilots’ use of alcohol and drugs, pilot health examinations, pilot medical certificates, and pilo t mandatory retirement ag e. CAPA stated that “fatigue does not discriminate between types of ope rations, aircraft type, or what is being carried

on the aircraft and neither should safety regulations.” 12 

### USAPA and CAPA stated that they support “One Level of Safety” while ALPA stated that it “has encouraged the FAA and the Air Cargo Industry to [s]upport the principle that all U.S. licensed cargo and passenger-carrying carriers should be required to comply with a ‘s ingle standard’, or ‘One Level of Regulation.’” 13 

### NJSAP stated that one level of safety is a sta ndard that “protects the flying public, professional pilots, and those who reside in communities below the flight paths of the thousands of aircraft that occupy our domestic airspace. For this reason, passenger and car go pilots should be subject to the same duty and rest thresholds.” 14



### Under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, the F AA can “propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs.” 15 

### In this case, the costs of making compliance with this rule mandatory for cargo-only operations outweigh the benefits by a substantial margin. This rule is not unique in recognizing that regulatio ns could differentially impact segments of the air transportation indust ry. There are multiple examples of FAA safety regulations that vary by industr y segments. For instance, the line of demarcation between part

135 and 121 is based on the number of passenger seats installed (type -certificated) in the airplane and the amount of payload the airp lane is certificated to carry. Airplanes type-certificated for 31

12 Coalition of Airline Pilot Associations, Comments, 4. 13 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 26. 14 NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots, Comments, 1. 15 Executive Order 13563 of January 18, 2011, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review , § 1(b) (Summarizing and reaffirming the provisions of Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993, Regulatory Planning and Review .)9 

### or more passenger seats fall into part 121 operations. 16 

### Aircraft with a passenger-seating configuration of 30 or fewer a nd a payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or less fall into part 135 operations. Part 135 regulations are demarcated even further into tw o subsets: (1) regulations that apply to aircraft with 9 or less passenger seats; and (2 ) regulations that apply to aircraft with 10

or more passenger seats.

Several commenters stated that the exclusion of all-cargo operations is contrary to the

best available scie ntific information and undermines aviati on safety. They stated that fatigue does not discriminate between different types of operations, given that cargo pilots fly more nighttime operations and tend to cross time zones mo re often. ALPA stated that passenger pilots can fly 30-32 hours in 7 days while cargo pilo ts flying under supplemental rules can fly 48 hours in a 6-day period, which is 60% more flight tim e than that permitted for passenger flying. ALPA also stated that 60 percent of cargo pilot work hours are sc heduled between midnight and 6:00

am. 17 

### The FAA agrees that fatigue studies show th at working during periods of circadian low, such as during night shifts, and travelling across time zones can c ontribute to fatigue. However, out of the millions of cargo f lights that took place over the 10- year period from 2001 to 2010, there was only one fatigue-related cargo acciden t. Based on this accident history, the FAA estimates that the accident-causing factors discu ssed above will not contribute to more than one fatigue-related cargo accide nt over a 10-year period.

16 However, the Applicability sections of part 121, subparts Q

‐ domestic, R

‐ flag and S

‐ supplement allow for air carriers using airplanes with a passenger seating configuration of 30 or fewer and a payload of 7,500 pounds or less to comply with the flight, duty and rest limits of part 135 (135.261

‐ 135.273). 17 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 3; 5.10 

### IPA stated that the FAA applies inconsistent reasoning to cargo a nd passenger operations. Because there were no fatigue-re lated mainline passenger accident s during the analysis period,

IPA stated that mainline carrier s would be excluded by the logi c that was applied to cargo

carriers. 18 

### The further segmentation of the industry be yond the passenger and cargo-only segments (i.e., narrow-body, wide-body, integrat ed, etc.) is done only to re flect the different operating characteristics present in order to produce more accurate cost estimates. CAA supports this analysis approach noting, “the FAA has once agai n correctly recognized that the United States aviation industry is made up of a number of differing segments , all of which have different operational characteristics.” 19 

### IPA stated that if the FAA is going to exclude a class of operations from the scope of the final rule, then the exclusion should be as narrow as possible. IPA also stated that because the operations of freight integrated ca rriers (FedEx, UPS, Airborne) ar e similar to passenger carriers’ hub and spoke operations, analyzing benefits and costs to integrated cargo carriers separately from supplemental carriers and adjusting other co st and benefit assumptions to reflect IPA’s suggestions might show net benefits. 20 

### The FAA stands by its approach of analyz ing passenger and cargo ope rations separately due to the very clear difference in the impa cts resulting from a pa ssenger versus a cargo

18 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 1; 8. 19 Cargo Airline Association, Comments, 7. 20 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 10.11 

### accident. 21 

### The FAA notes that the logical conseque nce of continued segmentation would be safety regulations specific to e ach individual carrier rather th an general regulatory standards. 22 

### IPA objected to the FAA’s “conservative” appr oach to rulemaking. IPA stated that the FAA’s use of cost estimates that may be overs tated amounts to “putting a thumb on the scale.” Specifically IPA pointed to the FAA’s statemen t in the Initial SRIA on page 68: “The FAA

believes that carriers will be able to redu ce much of the cost shown in Table 21.” IPA also pointed to the following statement on page 35 of the Initial SRIA, “We understand that future

accidents will not be identical to historical accid ents, but our approach provides a conservative

look at the benefits of this ru le based on a snapshot of the pa st.” IPA stated, “FAA apparently assumes, but does not explain why, it is good to pr ovide a ‘conservative l ook at the benefits.” IPA also stated, “Overestimating costs and undere stimating benefits unfai rly and inappropriately

biases the results of the BCA. In order to make its BCA conform to applicable guidance and have some integrity, FAA should correct for these acknowledged biases by developing estimates for

costs and benefits that are realistic and commensu rate with current and future air cargo operating practices.” 23 

### Executive Order 12866 provides th at in “recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulati on only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.” In order to make such a reasoned

21 We note that in previous comments, IPA stated that the FAA should regulate passenger and cargo operations in exactly the same manner. However, this statement by IPA is advocating for further industry segmentation in the RIA. 22 Note that even though supplemental carriers have somewhat higher estimated costs of compliance with the rule, supplemental carriers that carry passengers are subject to the rule. This demonstrates that the sole basis for the FAA’s industry segmentation is whether the aircraft operation carries passengers or whether the operation only transports cargo. 23 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 18

‐ 19.12 

### determination, for a small number of instances in the Initial SRIA, when exact information on certain categories of costs was not available, 24 

### the FAA explored the scenarios using conservative assumptions (i.e., that actual costs might be lower than assumed). Such assumptions are “conservative” in that they implicitly create a higher standard to demonstrate that a proposed

rule has net benefits. In this specific case, the FAA used the best information available to estimate the costs of the final rule to industry. While it is possible th at carriers could reduce the estimated costs by adapting their schedules, the FAA is not able to quantify the magnitude of those potential cost savings. This approach is applied consistently to both passenger and cargo operations and is certainly warranted gi ven Executive Order 12866. 25 

### We also note that the Final SRIA presents a high case for benefits estimates which can act to balance the conservative assump tions used in the cost estimates. Regarding the statement in the Initial SRIA “our approach provide s a conservative look at the benefits of this rule based on a snapshot of the past,” the word “traditional” would have

24 The full statement in the Initial SRIA is “The FAA believes that carriers will be able to reduce much of the cost shown in Table 21. Carriers will engage in additional network optimization to reduce crew scheduling costs, which the FAA is unable to quantify at this point. In the long run, this may involve re ‐ timing flights, changing schedule frequency, and entering or leaving markets. However, there may also be costs associated with these actions such

as changes in aircraft utilization and revenue losses. At this time, the FAA has not estimated potential long

‐ run optimization of crew scheduling costs.” The FAA has removed the statement “The FAA believes that carriers will be able to reduce much of the cost shown in Table 21” from this Final SRIA because while optimizing passenger schedules could easily result in benefits exceeding costs, no amount of schedule optimization would result in cargo operations compliance cost being less than the benefits. 25 Although not explicitly mentioned by any commenter, the Initial SRIA also used the term “conservative” to describe its estimates of the cost of installing rest facilities. The information provided by supplemental type certificate (STC) holders to the FAA describing the expected costs of installing the rest facilities was expressed in ranges and the FAA chose to explore the potential costs of installation using the high end of the range. For example, on page 80 of the Initial Supplemental RIA: “STC designers have indicated that with proper planning, a modifier can install rest facilities in two to four days. We conservatively use a four

‐ day estimate for the calculation of the downtime cost.” The new sensitivity analysis provided in this Final SRIA uses assumptions regarding installation costs that result in even lower estimates of installation costs than would result from using the low end of the ranges provided to the FAA by the STC designers. Therefore a further sensitivity analysis is not required.13 

### been a more accurate description than “conserva tive.” The benefit analysis used in the NPRM used an innovative simulation approach for de termining the extent of the fatigue problems. 26 

### In response to comments to the NPRM, the FAA re placed that approach with a commonly-used methodology grounded in NTSB findings and th e methodology developed by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), 27 

### which is intended to be transparent and easily reproducible. It

is for those reasons that the FAA termed its be nefits estimates “conservative.” This Final SRIA revises its description of th e benefits estimation methodology. CAPA voiced concern that separate rules for passenger and cargo operations create an unfair economic advantage.

The FAA does not think there will be an unfair econo mic advantage because the passenger and cargo air services ar e distinct markets. Differing ru les for those segments should have no competitive impact 28



### . CAPA and USAPA stated that passengers on charter (supplemental) should not be exposed to “degraded” regulatory standards. 29 

### In response to CAPA and US APA’s comment, we note that th e final flight, duty, and rest rule makes compliance mandatory for all pa ssenger operations conducte d under part 121. Thus, charter (supplemental) passenger operations will ha ve to comply with the new fatigue standards.

26 See page 5 of the Initial SRIA. 27 FAA, Fact Sheet

– Commercial Aviation Safety Team (Washington, DC, July 11, 2013), accessed April 2, 2014, http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sh eets/news_story.cfm?newsid=15214 28 The FAA notes that some aircraft, known as combi aircraft, are used for both passenger and all

‐ cargo operations, as these aircraft have passenger seats plus main deck cargo capability. Most combi aircraft are used in very special circumstances where there is a need for main deck cargo capacity but not enough demand to support full freighter operations. Many of these combi flights serve Alaska and other remote areas. The FAA believes that these are distinct markets and we do not expect significant market substitution of all

‐ cargo aircraft for combi aircraft in response to the rule. 29 Coalition of Airline Pilot Associations, Comments, 4; US Airline Pilots Association, Comments, 2.14 

### IPA stated that the cargo i ndustry can afford increased co sts from the final rule.

The FAA considers the societal benefits and costs of a rule, not the industry’s profits when conducting the benefit-cost analys is as outlined in OMB Circular A-4. 30 

### The FAA decided to make compliance voluntary fo r all-cargo operations because the societal compliance costs for those operations significantly exceeded the quantified so cietal benefits. The analysis in this Final SRIA supports th at final rule analysis and decision. 

## Issues Related To Benefits

IPA stated that the FAA’s benefits estimate s based on the value of averting one cargo

accident are “not realistic” becau se UPS insures their fleet for $1.5 billion per accident compared to $5.3 million for the base case and $31.4 million for the high case used in the Initial SRIA.

There is a difference between societal costs an d benefits and a course of action chosen by an individual company. An individual company pr imarily seeks to maximize its profitability, and it may choose a course of action th at is not socially optimal but that maximizes that particular company’s profitability. Thus, individual carriers may insure for amounts greater than the expected average societal costs of an accident, a point which IPA also acknowledges. A carrier’s insurance will cover several types of liabilities that do not have an impact on societal costs and benefits, but do have an impact on that individual carrier’s profitability. For example, a carrier’s insurance policy typically covers punitive damages. Punitive damages awarded in a lawsuit against a carrier ar e a cost to that carri er, but for purposes of societal costs and benefits, these damages are simp ly a transfer from a de fendant to a plaintiff

30 OMB, Circular A

‐ 4: Regulatory Analysis (Washington, DC, September 17, 2003), accessed April 2, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a

‐ 4.15 

### and not a category of social benefits. As a result of individual business c onsiderations, a carrier might also choose a very high limit to cover any extreme scenarios even though those extreme scenarios have only very small probabilities of actually occurring. A private firm’s decisions regarding risk tolerance can be informative, but they do not, by themselv es, drive a cost-benefit analysis for the whole industry. Specifically, the estimates in the Initial SRIA are based on an estimate of typical conditions, i.e., what actually occurred in the base case and an accident involving a larger aircraft in common use for the high case. These scen arios do not attempt to cover the most extreme low-probability examples of what might happen. Several commenters disagreed with what the ba se and high case benefits estimates should represent. Some commenters advocated a high case that represents an extreme worst case scenario. For instance, IPA suggested basing a high case scenario on 24 fatalities on the ground even though a (non-terrorist) accident with th at magnitude of ground fatalities has never

occurred within the U.S. or its territories. 31 

### ALPA suggested using the value of a brand new Boeing 777 as the value of a lost hull for the high benefits case, even though the average age of the cargo fleet is roughly 20 years and just 1.2 per cent of the cargo fleet is less than one year in

age. 32 

### On the other hand, AAWW objected to using a high case scenario that was not found in the actual accident history. The FAA wishes to clarify that “worst cas e” scenarios could be considered only insofar

as those scenarios can be linked to a reasonabl e probability of occurrence. Specifically, OMB

Circular A-4 states:

31 The 20

‐ year accident history involving part 121 cargo operations is presented in Table C

‐ 8 in Appendix C. The highest number of on ‐ ground fatalities for cargo operations in the U.S. or its territories is one fatality.

32 BTS Form 41 Schedule B

‐ 43 (2011).16 

### If fundamental scientific di sagreement or lack of knowledge prevents construction of a scientifically defensible proba bility distribution, you should describe benefits or costs under plausible scenario s and characterize the evidence and assumptions underlying each

alternative scenario 33



### In the Initial SRIA, the base case projects the future based on what actually occurred in the accident history involving the millions of all- cargo flights that occurred in the last 10 years. The high case reflects a situation with more fata lities, larger hull and higher cargo value but thatis still a likely possibility of what could occur in the future. Considering unlikely highconsequence scenarios would undermine the cost-ben efit analysis, as one could always think of unlikely catastrophic accidents whos e avoidance generates huge benefi ts. We also note that even with the “likely” base and high case scenarios, the probability of a fatigue-related cargo accident is extremely low, as evidenced by the occurrence of just one fatigue relate d cargo accident in the 10-year accident history.

IPA stated that FAA did not follow its ow n guidance on regulatory evaluation because, IPA asserted, no sensitivities were performed on benefits.

This statement is not correct. The benefits we re estimated for both a base case and a high case and sensitivity analyses for the cost estimates were provided in the appendices to the Initial SRIA. Further, this Final SRIA introduces an additional sensitivity analysis (found in Appendix B) exploring alternative assumptions regarding the estimation of benefits and costs of the final rule for cargo-only operations.

33 Ibid.17 

### IPA stated that a major weakne ss of the Initial SRIA is “basing it on a statistically insignificant sample size of one accident in ten years for cargo operations.” IPA said that “even assuming that the total fatigue based accident ra te will remain the same, due to small sample size, (4 fatigue related accidents in the BCA high case analysis) for cargo and passenger accidents in the past 10 years, there is simply no statistical or analytical basis for assuming that the split among fatigue re lated accidents will be 3 passenger accidents and 1 cargo accident, rather than evenly split with 2 cargo accidents and 2 passenger accidents or 1 passenger accident and 3 cargo accidents.” 34 

### The FAA disagrees with the characterization of a small sample si ze. During the 10-year historical accident period, there were millions of cargo departures and only one of which resulted in a fatigue-related accident. The small number of accidents does, however, result in a small number of observations for attempting to descri be the impacts from a fatigue-related accident. For that reason, in the Initial SRIA, the FAA expl ored a base and a high case for the benefits estimates, with the base case representing the imp acts that occurred from actual fatigue-related accidents and the high case representing a potentially more severe yet plausible outcome. This Final SRIA adds an additional sensitivity anal ysis (found in Appendix B) exploring alternative assumptions regarding the estimation of benefits and costs of the final rule for cargo-only operations. CAA and AAWW stated that the 75 percent eff ectiveness rating for the cargo accident is too high. They stated that the crew’s rest would have been in compliance with provisions of the new part 117 if those regulations had been in effect at the time of the accident. Therefore, CAA

34 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 11.18 

### and AAWW argued, this accident s hould be removed from the bene fits analysis. CAA further stated that the chance of any future cargo acci dents related to fatigue is very unlikely and therefore the benefits of applyi ng the rule to cargo operations are “extremely small, and certainly less than the estimates made by the FAA.” 35 

### In response to these comments, the FAA r eevaluated the effectiv eness rating of the FedEx accident, 36 

### which is the only all-cargo accident that would be mitigated if this rule was to apply to all-cargo operations. The FAA concur s with CAA and AAWW’s assertion that the

crew’s schedule would have been in compliance with the final rule.

Based on information contained in the NTSB report and information provided by FedEx as part of the CAA comments, the following repr esents how the accident crew’s schedule would have compared to the requirements of this rule:

 The maximum Flight Duty Period (FDP) limit th at would have been applicable to the pilot-in-command (PIC) under th is rule was 9:00 hours. Th e PIC had 2:35 hours of FDP

time at the time of the accident. This would have been within the 9:00 hour limit. The flight-time limit that would have been app licable to the PIC unde r this rule was 8:00 hours. At the time of the accident, the PIC had 1:23 hours of flight time, which was

within the limit. Prior to be ing assigned to reserve status , the PIC also had 12 hours of rest, which would have satisfied the rest requirement of 10 hours in § 117.25(e) and

35 Cargo Airline Association, Comments, 10

‐ 12. 36 NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Collision with Trees on Final Approach, Federal Express Flight 1478, Boeing 727

‐ 232, N497FE, Tallahassee, Florida, July 26, 2002 (Washington, DC, June 8, 2004, NTSB/AAR

‐ 04/02)19 

### 80:51 hours of rest in the previous 168 hours, 37 

### which would have satisfied the requirement of 30 hours in § 117.25(b), if that had been in effect at the time.

 The maximum FDP limit that would have b een applicable to the second-in-command (SIC) under part 117 was 11:00 hours. At the time of the accident, the SIC had 10:29 hours of FDP time, which would have been with in the limits. The flight-time limit that would have been applicable to the SIC wa s 9:00 hours. At the time of the accident, the SIC had 4:02 hours of flight time, which was with in the limit. Prior to flight, the SIC also had 11:03 hours of rest, which would have sati sfied the rest requirement of 10 hours in § 117.25(e) and 41:54 hours of rest in the previous 168 hours, 38 

### which would have satisfied the requirement of 30 hours in § 117.25(b), if that had been in effect at the time.

 The maximum FDP limit that would have been applicable to the f light engineer under part 117 was 12:00 hours. At the time of the accident, the flight engineer had 10:41 hours of FDP time, which would have been within the limits. The flight-time limit that would have been applicable to the flight engineer was 9:00 hours. At the time of the accident, the flight engineer had 3:43 hour s of flight time, which was within the limit. Prior to flight, the flight engineer also had 10:22 hours of rest, which would have satisfied the rest requirement of 10 hours in § 117.25(e) and 95:44 hours of rest in the previous 168 hours, 39 

### which would have satisfied the require ment of 30 hours in § 117.25(b), if that

had been in effect at the time.

37 Ibid., 12

‐ 13. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.20 

### While the crew’s work schedule just prior to the accident was in compliance with the provisions of the final rule, the NTSB did find that fatigue was a contributing factor to the

accident. The FAA believes that the final rule w ould have had some potential for preventing the accident for the following reasons. The PIC reported that he received a "margina l" quality of sleep for the two nights leading up to the day of the accident because he ke pt being woken up by the family dog. The NTSB found evidence of a sleep deficit for the PIC based on this reported sleep quality and small errors made during the accident flight. Similarly, the SIC said he had difficulty adjusting his sleep cycle

and stated that he did not sl eep well during the day. A friend a nd the PIC both described the SIC as looking tired. Subsection 117.25(e) of the flight duty rule requires a pilot to receive a 10-hour rest period with a minimum 8-hour uninterrupted sl eep opportunity immediately before beginning a flight duty period. If a pilot determines that hi s rest period will not provide eight uninterrupted hours of sleep opportunity, subsection 117.25(f) requires that pilot to notify th e certificate holder and prohibits the pilot from reporting to the assigned flight duty period until he receives an uninterrupted 8-hour sleep oppo rtunity. Additionall y, subsection 117.5(d) requires each flightcrew member to affirmatively state that he or she is fit for duty prior to commencing a flight. Here, the PIC’s sleep was repeatedly interr upted by his dog, and as such, the PIC may not have received an uninterrupted 8-hour sleep o pportunity. If that wa s the case, then 117.25(f) would have required him to notify the certificate hol der of his sleep problem and delay the flight until he received an uninterrupted 8 hours of sl eep. In addition, the SIC may have received a poor quality of sleep, and because he looked tired before and during the flight, there is a21 

### possibility that he would not have affirmed that he was fit for duty prior to commencing flight as required by subsection 117.5(d). In factoring in these mitigations, the FAA de termined the effectiven ess score would have been approximately 15% instead of the 75% mitiga tion used in the Initia l SRIA. The FAA agrees with commenters that the 75% effectiveness rating used in the Initial SRIA is overstated, as the flightcrew’s flight time, duty time, and scheduled rest time would have b een in compliance with this final rule if the rule had been in effect at that time and applicable to the FedEx crew. However, the FAA disagrees with the commenters that the mitigation would have been zero. The FAA believes this rule would have provided some mitigation for the FedEx accident if it had applied to the FedEx flightcrew, although that m itigation would not be as high as 75% because the mitigation would be achieved via more subject ive factors, such as fitness for duty and a determination of whether the PIC’s sleep opport unity was interrupted due to his family dog. 40 

### Accordingly, in this Final SRIA the FAA uses a 15 percent effectiveness rating for the FedEx

accident.

A4A noted that some of the accidents included in the benefits analysis for this final rule also appear in the NPRMs for other rules and that in some cases, the sum of the effectiveness ratings across rules exceeds 100%.

40 In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that air carriers be required to assess whether a flightcrew member is fit for duty when that flightcrew member reports for work. Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements NPRM, 75 FR 55852, 55857

‐ 58 (Sep. 14, 2010). The FAA also proposed that air carriers be required to conduct fitness

‐ for

‐ duty testing of flightcrew members who are reported to be fatigued by their coworkers. Id. However, the FAA ultimately rejected both of these proposals in the final rule because “there does not currently exist an objective standard for determining fatigue levels.” Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Final Rule, 77 FR 330, 349 (Jan. 4, 2012).22 

### The previous NPRMs noted by A4A analyzed each accident considering each rule in isolation. Subsequent to those NPRMs, the FAA reanalyzed accidents that were used by more than one rulemaking to determine the effectivene ss ratings for each rule in relation to the rule provisions of the other rulemakings. The FA A’s methodology for estimating effectiveness ratings that were used in the final RIAs for th ose rules ensured that the sum of effectiveness ratings across rulemakings for any individual accid ent did not exceed 100%. As of the date of the writing of this Final SRIA, the benefits estimate s for two other rulemakings, Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrie r Operations Rule (F OQ, RIN 2120-AJ67), and Qualification, Service, and Us e of Crewmembers and Aircra ft Dispatchers (N&O, RIN 2120- AJ00), involved accidents that are also used in th is RIA. As shown in Table C.10 of Appendix C, the effectiveness ratings, when summed across the rules, do not exceed 100%.

ALPA and IPA stated that the benefits s hould be calculated usi ng a 20-year look back period rather than the 10-year period used in the Initial SRIA. IPA stated that having more historical time series data is generally prefer able to less. IPA added that the 20-year period depicts a relatively constant re gulatory environment with regard to flightcrew duty and rest requirements, and consequently, there is not a reason to truncate the historic accident database. ALPA noted that there were 3 fatigue related cargo accidents in the first 10-year portion of the 20-year look back period and ju st 1 in the second 10-year portion and states that “since no one can predict any accident... our opinion is that it would be unwise to discount the probability of

one vs. three accidents.” 41

41 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 23.23 

### The NPRM for this rule propos ed using the 20-year accident history suggested by ALPA and IPA. In response to this proposal, the FAA r eceived comments pointing out that use of such a long accident history failed to account for more recent regulatory actions and safety initiatives in the industry which have acted to reduce the ov erall rate of accidents in the aviation industry. 42 

### Specifically regarding cargo operations, durin g the period 1991 to 2000, there were eight fatal part 121 cargo accidents and approximately 6.25 million cargo aircraft departures, which suggests a fatal accident rate of 1.3 accidents per million departures. 43 

### During the period from 2001 to 2010, there were just five fatal accidents and over 7 million cargo departures, resulting in an accident rate of just 0.7 accidents per million departures, roughly half the accident rate experienced in the previous decade. 44 

### If the accident rate observed during the period 1991 to 2000 had persisted unchanged, we woul d have expected to see nine accidents in the later period when in fact we experienced just five. 45 

### That observation is also suppor ted by the information in Ta ble 4 of the Initial SRIA which shows that there were more fatigue-related fatalities, injuries, and accidents during the period 1991 to 2000 than the period 2001 to 2010. Specifically, the fatigue-related accident rate for all-cargo operations from 1991 to 2000 was 0 .32 accidents per million departures, which fell to a rate of 0.14 accidents pe r million departures for the time period spanning 2001 to 2010.

42 Air Transport Association of America, Comments. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements (Docket No. FAA

‐ 2009

‐ 1093, November 15, 2010), 13

‐ 15, accessed March 3, 2014, http://www.regulations.go v/#!documentDetail;D=FAA

‐ 2009

‐ 1093

‐ 2333. 43 This paragraph refers to all U.S. cargo accidents

– not just the ones caused by fatigue. 44 A listing of the part 121 cargo accidents from the NTSB aviation accident database is provided in Table C.8 of Appendix C. The data on number of cargo departures is taken from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Air Carrier Summary: T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type (omitting piston and rotor engines), accessed March 14, 2014, http://transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table_ID=254. 45 The FAA acknowledges that with such rare incidents, it is difficult to tell whether the observed difference in accident rates during the two periods is statistically significant.24 

### Therefore, FAA uses a 10-year historical accident period because of the decline in fatal accidents after 2000. Although the regu lations regarding flightcrew duty and rest may not have changed during the 20-year period, other safety initiatives have likely partially mitigated the impacts of fatigue issues such that the end result is a lower number of accidents related to fatigue. IPA stated an objection to using the past 10 years as exact mirror for future years since the FAA acknowledges accidents are random in nature and industry is not static but dynamic. In addition, IPA pointed to expected growth in in ternational cargo operations industry. The Airline

Professionals Association also stated that the mode l used to estimate benefits of the final rule is

flawed because it is static. Since one fatigue-related accident occurred during the last 10 years, our best estimate is that one would also occur during the coming decad e without this rule in effect; nevertheless, FAA acknowledges the possibility that more (o r fewer) accidents could occur during that time. Infrequent events such as aviation accidents ar e generally thought to follow a Poisson probability distribution, which gives the probabilities that different numbers of such events will actually occur during a specified time period, when their expected number is known. 46 

### Because of this probabilistic nature of their frequency, it is impossible to predict the exact number of accidents that this final rule could potentially prevent during the next ten years. It is possible to provide the likely outcome as rare events are distributed as a Poisson distribution. Even if the expected mean

46 See for example Pei

‐ Chi Shao, Yu

‐ Hern Chang, and Hubert J. Chen, “Analysis of an aircraft accident model in Taiwan,” Journal of Air Transport Management 27 (2013), pp. 34

‐ 38 and Milan Janic, “An assessment of risk and safety in civil aviation,” “Journal of Air Transport Management 6 (2000), pp. 43

‐ 50.25 

### – one per ten years – is correct and remains unc hanged in the coming decade, we cannot rule out the possibility that a larger (or smaller) number will occur during that time. 47



### Despite this uncertainty, however, the possibility that this rule could prevent a sufficient number of future accidents to generate net econ omic benefits in cargo-only operations remains extremely remote. This is because – as the breakeven analysis reported previously in this Final SRIA shows – the final rule would need to prevent 8 accidents over the coming 10-year period in order to yield net economic benefits for cargo-onl y operations. The likelihood that the true mean is 8 accidents over ten years and we observed only 1 accident is 0.0027, or very unlikely. Further, the rule’s estimated 15 percent effec tiveness rating in reducing fatigue-related accidents in cargo-only operations means that many more than eight such accidents (8 divided by 0.15, or more than fifty) would have to have been an ticipated over the next 10 years for it to yield expected net benefits. Regardless of whether th e expected frequency of accidents is one per decade or some higher – but still plausible -- valu e, the probability that this number of accidents would occur in the coming decade without this rule in effect accidents is negligible. 48



### The FAA agrees that an adjustment for future growth in the industry may be appropriate. However, if one were to incorpor ate industry growth for the benef its calculations one would also need to incorporate growth for cost calculatio ns. Those two adjustments would not impact the

47 If the estimate of one per decade is correct and remains unchanged, and the frequency of aircraft accidents indeed follows a Poisson distribution, the probability that exactly one accident will occur during the next decade is 37 percent; the probability that two or more accidents will occur within the next ten years is 26 percent; and the probability that no accidents will occur is 37 percent. 48 If our best estimate of the expected frequency of fatigue

‐ related accidents in cargo ‐ only operations (one per 10 years) is correct, the probability that 50 or more accidents would occur in the next decade is just one in 10 65

. Even if the true expected frequency were as high as 7.43 per 10 year period (the upper bound of the 99 percent confidence interval of the estimate of the average accident rate), the chance that 50 or more accidents could occur is still exceedingly remote, just one in 10 25

.26 

### conclusion that the costs of ex tending the final rule to car go-only operations significantly outweigh the benefits. Several commenters stated that passenger and cargo systems are interrelated and noted the possibility that a cargo plane could run into a passenger plane on the ground or in the air. CAPA mentions cargo operations were initiall y exempt from implementing Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) but after a passenger and cargo collision and three near misses, TCAS was mandated for all cargo aircraft. The FAA notes that the possibility of a cargo flight colliding w ith a passenger-carrying flight either on the ground or in th e air due to flightcrew member fa tigue is likely to be negligibly small. Passenger and cargo flig hts are usually separated in tim e, with many cargo take-off and landings operations occurring at night and passenger operations occurring during the day. Further, the main cargo hubs do not handle la rge amounts of passenger operations. Finally, during the 10-year fatigue-related a ccident history (as well as fo r the 20-year history), no such incident has occurred, suggesting that such an event is likely to remain exceedingly rare. It is perhaps due to TCAS, mentioned by CAPA, that su ch collisions have be come extremely rare. Regarding the aircraft models used to represent high and low cases for benefits estimates for cargo operations, IPA and AL PA stated that usi ng the Boeing 727 as the base case aircraft hull is not appropriate because the Boeing 727 is only in limited use currently and will not be used in the future. IPA suggested using a repr esentative narrow-body aircraft for the base case and a representative wide-body as the high case . Specifically, IPA recommended using a Boeing 757 with a hull value of $11 million for the base case. IPA presente d a discussion comparing the suitability of either the Boeing 747 or the MD- 11 to represent the high case. IPA supported the use of a Boeing 747 with a hull value of $60.6 million for the high case because it will be27 

### replacing the MD-11s in the future benefits pe riod. ALPA suggested usin g an MD-11 with a hull value of $23.5 million for the base case and br and new Boeing 777 with a hull value of $295.7 million as the high case. IPA also noted that in th e Initial SRIA the value of the aircraft used for the cargo benefits analysis ($1.8 million for th e base case and $15.2 million for the high case) is

at odds with value of aircraft used in retrofitting cost analysis ($69 million). The FAA will adopt IPA’s suggestion to change the base case from reflecting the actual model aircraft involved in the single cargo accide nt to reflecting a representative narrow-body cargo plane and to change the high case to refl ect a representative wide-body plane. The FAA agrees that the Boeing 757 is an appropriate representative model for the cargo narrow-body

fleet. 49 

### As stated in the Initial SRIA, the FAA es timates the hull value of a B757-200F to be $15.2 million based on an average replacement value for a B757-200F made between 1983 and

1999. 50 

### For the high case, the FAA prefers to use the most common wide-body aircraft that is in use today, because appropriate values for use in valuing the benefits of extending this rule to include cargo operations are based on current mark et prices for the aircraft models most commonly flown in cargo opera tions. The most common wide- body cargo aircraft in the US cargo fleet is the DC-10 group comprised of DC -10s, MD-10s, and MD-11s. The FAA will adopt

ALPA’s estimated value of a mid-range MD-11: $23.5 million. 51 

### As a sensitivity analysis for the high case, the FAA presents estimates based on IPA’s recommended model, a Boeing 747 with a

49 Boeing 757 is the most commonly used narrow ‐ body aircraft used for cargo ‐ only operations as shown in the T

‐ 100 Segment Data, (Jan ‐ Oct 2012, Part 121 Cargo

‐ only Operations). 50 Airliner Price Guide , Summer 2011. 51 The $23.5 million hull value estimate lies between the retail and wholesale values for an 1992 MD

‐ 11 published in the Airliner Price Guide (Winter 2012).The FAA agrees that this is an appropriate estimate because the average age of a cargo aircraft is approximately 20 years.28 

### capacity of 124 tons. IPA stated that the average va lue of a Boeing 747 is $60.6 million but did not provide a source for that a ssertion. The FAA has decided to use an estimated value of $42.5 million, which is based on the published wholesale price of a 1993 B747-400F. 52 

### ALPA recommended using the MD-11 for base case but the FAA believes that using a narrow-body

aircraft is a more reasonable choice for the ba se case because: (1) the base case is intended to represent the actual accident hi story; and (2) the single histor ic fatigue-related cargo accident that would be mitigated by this rule involve d a narrow-body aircraft. ALPA’s recommendation to use $295.7, the value of a brand new Boei ng 777, is not supportable because Boeing 777 aircraft account for a small share of cargo-only operations and because most aircraft used in cargo-only operations have been in serv ice for a substantial number of years. 53 

### The FAA notes that using a value for aircraft hull in the “Downtime” section of the cost estimation that is different than the aircraft hull value used in the benefits estimation is justified because the downtime cost is applied only to a subset of aircraft used in extended range operations. Those aircraft may have values that differ from the values of aircraft used in more typical operations. The aircraft va lue of $69 million used as the basis for estimating the cost of downtime is the appraised value of a Boeing 767-300. However, upon further review, the FAA notes that the $69 million value relates to a passenger B767. Th erefore, the FAA will use the value of a Boeing 767-300ERF (Extended Range Freighter) to calculate the downtime costs

52 Airliner Price Guide , Winter 2012. 53 In 2013, the Boeing 777 accounted for only 2.5% of the all

‐ cargo revenue aircraft departures performed per DOT T

‐ 100 data. According to a 2013 study by Boeing, the average age of a freighter aircraft at leaving service was nearly 35 years. (Helen Jiang, Key Findings on Airplane Economic Life , Boeing, March 2013.)29 

### associated with installation of rest facilities for the cargo segm ent. The estimated value of a 10- year old Boeing 767-300ERFF is approximately $40 million. 54 

### ALPA and IPA provided revised estimates of the value of cargo lost during an accident which applied the FAA’s methodology to the cargo capacities of the aircraft they recommended for base and high cases. The FAA will revise the benefits estimates related to cargo value to reflect the choice of using the Boeing 757 as the base case, the MD- 11 as the high case, and Boeing 747 as the high case sensitivity. IPA stated that “contrary to FAA’s statement, there is at least one published report, readily available to the FAA that describes th e value of air cargo in the overnight package industry.” 55 

### IPA points to FedEx Flight 1406 accident for which “insurance estimates of the value of the destroyed cargo totaled about $300 million.” 56 

### IPA prorated the cargo value to account for the cargo capacity of a Boeing 757 a nd derived an estimate of $125 million for the value cargo lost in a cargo accident which is greater than the $2.7 million used by the FAA. IPA

stated that this information should be consider ed by the FAA in estimating benefits for avoiding destruction of cargo. The FAA prefers to use the average value of air cargo from the Commodity Flow Survey. The use of an average from a publicly available da ta source is preferred to anecdotal data from one accident. In addition, it is not clear what an “insurance estimate” of damage is. It may refer

54 Airliner Price Guide, Winter 2011. 55 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 31. 56 Ibid.30 

### to the amount of coverage available for a single accident, not the valu e of the actual cargo

onboard. IPA stated that the FAA improperly omitted from the benefits estimates the value of timely receipt of cargo. IPA also made mention of lives lost from failure to deliver critical medical supplies or equipment, vital documents, irreplaceable historical artifacts lost, and absolute loss of unique materials. The FAA believes that average value per ton of air cargo used in the Initial SRIA is the appropriate value of cargo to use in this RIA. Th e average value per ton of air cargo is derived from the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS), a pub licly accessible data source published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). The data is an overall average of all air cargo and

therefore embodies the value of bo th high value items and unique valu es, to the extent that such

items are included in overall universe of air car go. For most items shipped by air, a replacement item could be shipped the following day meani ng that any losses resulting from “timeliness” would be minimal. Regarding lives lost from crit ical medical supplies, wh ile such instances may occur, the FAA has no data on th e prevalence of such situations on which to base a quantified

benefits estimate. That item will be mentioned in the non-quantified benefits section of this Final

SRIA. Regarding the estimated number of onboard fa talities and injuries for a cargo accident, IPA noted the possibility of non-cr ew passengers aboard a cargo-only flight but provided no data on the prevalence of non-crew passengers on car go-only flights. ALPA stated that their suggested base case aircraft, the MD-11, has an extended range which, if utilized, would require double crew and increase the crew complement fr om three in the base case to four. ALPA’s31 

### suggestion of using an extended range Boeing 777 for the high case would also increase the crew complement from two to four. The FAA agrees that in some cases there may be non-crew pa ssengers onboard or that the crew needed for a cargo flight may be higher than two for some ex tended range flights. However, there is scant data available to desc ribe how frequently thes e situations occur on a typical US carrier cargo flight. In the absenc e of such information, the FAA will assume that there are 3.2 people onboard a typi cal air cargo flight. This estimat e is derived from the average number of people on board the fatal cargo acciden ts involving US carriers during the historical accident period of 2001 to 2010 as shown in Table C.8 in Appendix C. 57



### Several commenters stated that the FAA failed to properly account for damage to persons and property on ground. IPA specifi cally noted the catastrophic 1992 El Al cargo accident in Amsterdam which killed 43 people on ground a nd the 2001 American Airlines Flight 587 accident in Queens, NY. IPA stated that the RIA s hould have considered dama ge to forested area or loss of the property for income producing purposes from the actual FedEx accident near

Tallahassee. IPA further stated that since the lo cation of an accident is random, the FAA should assess probability that an accident may happen in many different places. IPA also recommended adjusting the benefits estimates for the base case for a cargo accident by including 5.5 avoided fatalities on the ground based on the average numb er of external fatali ties from fatal cargo accidents worldwide for the period 2002-2011, as de rived from Boeing’s Statistical Summary

57 Since 2010 there have been two additional cargo accidents involving US carriers. Because the cause of these accidents is still being investigated at this time, the FAA does not include these accidents in this Final Supplemental RIA.32 

### (July 2012). 58 

### For the high case, IPA recommended usi ng 24 fatalities, the midpoint between the average of external fatalities (5.5) and the actual highest know n deaths on the ground from a cargo accident.

The FAA benefits estimates for the base case do account for damage on the ground. The

base-case benefits estimates are based on what actually happened in the historical accidents and as a result, the on-ground deaths resulting from the Colgan accident were accounted for in the passenger benefits analysis. None of the other historical fatigue-relate d accidents resulted in onground fatalities or injuries. Regarding prope rty damage on the ground, the FedEx accident appears to have resulted in only minor damage on the ground. The NTSB report states, “trees along the wreckage path were damaged by the impact and postcrash fire. Some farm vehicles and equipment and a fence line were also damaged by the impact.” 59 

### The FAA does not have access

to the actual dollar value of the damage but the value would appear to be quite small, certainly not enough to change the central conclusion of the RIA for the cargo industry. The FAA agrees that the possibility of damages on the ground should be added to the high case benefits estimates, which aims to repres ent what would be the likely consequences of a future part 121 accident. However, the FAA believes that using worldwide estimates of ground fatalities, as suggested by IPA, is inappropriate fo r use in estimating the costs and benefits of this rulemaking because foreign carriers operate in different operating environments and under different regulations than U.S. carriers. Look ing at on-ground deaths caused by U.S. carriers,

58 The Boeing document reports 13 fatal cargo accidents worldwide for the period, resulting in 44 onboard fatalities and 72 external fatalities for an average of 5.5 external fatalities per fatal cargo accident. A copy of the Boeing document has been placed in the docket associated with this rulemaking. 59 NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Collision with Trees on Final Approach, Federal Express Flight 1478, Boeing 727

‐ 232, N497FE, Tallahassee, Florida, July 26, 2002 (Washington, DC, June 8, 2004, NTSB/AAR

‐ 04/02)33 

### historical analysis shows that ground deaths from aviation accidents involving US carriers are rare. The five fatal cargo accidents involving U.S. carriers that occurred during the 2001 to 2010 historical period resulted in tw o ground fatalities suggesting an average 0.4 ground fatalities per accident (see Table C.8 in Appendi x C). This low rate of ground fata lities may be due to certain characteristics of the U.S. aviation environment, such as airport buffer zones and the relatively lower population density of the US compared to other parts of the world. The FAA will use an estimated 0.4 ground fatalities per cargo accident for the high case benefits estimate in this Final

SRIA. 60 

### IPA and ALPA stated that the FAA had improperly omitted from its analysis potential health benefits to pilots from the rule. IPA stated “FAA attempts to justify excluding those benefits by explaining that they are not related to aviation safety, but this point is off the mark because FAA’s BCA purports to assess the ‘societal benefits’ of the rule.” 61 

### ALPA suggests a method for quantifying the long-term health benefits from reduced fatigue that involves transferri ng a benefits estimate from th e Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) RIA for hours of service (HOS) rules for truck drivers. ALPA states, “FMCSA found a health benefit of $2,112 per driv er per year, or $340 million per year for a pool of 160,000 drivers, due to reduced health mortality risk under th e proposed new hours of service rule... An equivalent net health benefit applied to all cargo pilo ts would result in an overall

60 We also note that foreign air carriers are not subject to the FAA regulations that this rule changes, and as such their operations will be unaffected by this rule. Consequently, this rule will not reduce the number of on ‐ ground fatalities caused by foreign carriers. 61 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 49.34 

### health benefit of over $190 million during the FAA’s 10-year reference period. ($2,122 x 8990 pilots x 10 years).” 62 

### The FAA disagrees with IPA’s characterization of the text in the final rule preamble. The FAA agrees that reducing health problems is a societ al benefit and in fact stated that “the societal cost associated with long-term fatigued-related health problems can be substantial. Decreasing these costs represents a societal benefit.” 63 

### The only reason the FAA did not include those long term fatigue-related health benefits is because we were not able to quantify them. 64 

### This Final SRIA now includes the potential long-term health be nefits to pilots from reduced fatigue in the discussion of non-quantified benefits. The FAA is not able to replicate ALPA’s es timate of $2,122 benefits per truck driver and therefore believes that ALPA may have misinter preted the information in the FMCSA’s RIA for trucking HOS. Regardless, the situation that FMCS A analyzed for truck drivers is very different than the situation for airline pilots and therefor e it is inappropriate to transfer the benefits estimates from the FMCSA analysis to this situ ation. FMCSA found support for an estimate of benefits from reduced mortality impacts from improved sleep opportunities for the subset of truck drivers working the most extreme schedul es. These schedules were so demanding that FMCSA estimates these drivers only achieved 6.2 hours of sleep per night. FMCSA labeled as the “very high” workload group, those drivers who work 70 hours a week with 6 work days per week averaging 11.7 hours per work day. That group is estimated to account for 10 percent of the truck driver work force. The “extreme” workload group, accounting for an additional 5

62 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 13. 63 “Flight Crew Member Duty and Rest Requirements. Final Rule,” Federal Register , 77 (January 4, 2012): 392

‐ 393. 64 The FAA does include an estimate of the short term health benefits from reducing fatigue. This category of benefits is discussed in section titled “Payroll Cost Savings from Reducing Flightcrew Member Fatigue.”35 

### percent of the driver work force, works 80 hours per week with 6 work days per week averaging 13.3 hours per work day. In contrast, due to labo r agreements and the FAA’s existing work hour rules, the work schedules for flightcrew member are much less extreme than those faced by truck drivers. The Crew Pairings analysis, summarized in Table C.9 of Appendix C, shows that for all of the cargo cases, the bid lines had at least 12 days off per mont h and the most intense schedules had less than 43 hours of duty time per week. 65 

### This is significantly less than the 70-hour truck

driver work weeks that were used in FMCSA’s estimate.

IPA stated that the FAA should have included as a category of benefits the loss of airline revenue from lost shipping charges that the airl ines would need to ref und in the case of an

accident. IPA stated that such an estima te “should be readily ascertained by FAA.” 66 

### This issue has two aspects. First, a benefit-cost analysis does not look at the reve nues to the air freight company in isolation. The air freight company experiences a loss when it refunds the shipping fees, but the customer receives a gain. There is not a net societal loss from a simple refund. The second issue is that, arguably, th ose shipping charges could be c onsidered a proxy for the true economic costs of an attempted delivery that di d not actually occur. However, a large portion of the cost of shipping an item is th e cost of using the aircraft, and th e cost of the aircraft is already accounted for in this analysis via the inclusion of the value of th e aircraft hull in the benefits analysis. The value of the aircraft hull is the pres ent value of the stream of delivery services it can provide over its remaining lif e. Therefore to include the lo st shipping charges separately would result in double counting of benefits.

65 GRA, Inc. Summary of CrewPairings, Inc. Economic Analysis of Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Rulemaking. (Jenkintown, PA, September 2012) 66 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 39.36 

### IPA stated that the FAA should have included as a category of benef its “potential short and long-term medical costs if persons are se verely injured or burned rather than killed... 67 

### ” In the Initial SRIA and original RIA the FAA valued avoided injuries using Department of Transportation (DOT) guidance which directs agencies to value prevented injuries as a percentage of the Value of St atistical Life (VSL). In res ponse to this comment, the FAA

consulted with other DOT economi sts regarding whether the resulting estimate of the value of preventing an injury included the value of avoiding medical costs from injuries. From these discussions, the FAA has determined that it may be appropriate to includ e an additional category of benefits related to medical costs for injuries. 68 

### Separate estimates of medical costs for inju ries rated on the Abbr eviated Injury Scale (AIS) are available from a report prepared by DOT’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 69 

### Updating the NHTSA estimate of medical costs for treating an AIS

67 Ibid., 23. 68 The DOT’s Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in Departmental Analyses. Revised Departmental Guidance: Treatment of the Value of Preventing Fatalities and Injuries in Preparing Economic Analyses (July 29, 2011) specifies the use of “Relative Disutility Factors” for valuing prevention of injuries of varying severity, rated on the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS). It describes these factors as “...coefficients that can be applied to VSL [value of a statistical life] to assign each injury class a value corresponding to a fraction of a fatality.” Specifically, the Supplemental RIA applied the Relative Disutility Factor specified for an AIS Category 3 (“Serious”) injury, or 0.105, to the then

‐ current DOT estimate of VSL of $6.2 million (in 2011 dollars) to estimate that the value of preventing each injury likely to occur in cargo aircraft crashes accidents was $0.65 million (also in 2011 dollars). While the VSL is intended to represent an estimate of society’s collective willingness to pay to avoid each accidental fatality, the DOT estimate of VSL is derived largely from estimates of the wage premiums that workers demand as compensation for accepting higher risks of accidental death on the job. Thus the extent to which it incorporates the medical costs likely to be associated with an accidental fatality is unclear, and even if the VSL does include medical costs associated with a fatality, these may be small by comparison to those associated with serious injuries. As a consequence, applying the Relative Disutility Factor to the VSL to estimate the costs of an injury could produce estimates that exclude some medical costs for treating injuries, and using these resulting values to estimate benefits from avoiding injuries that could occur in cargo aircraft crashes accidents might underestimate those benefits. 69 Lawrence Blincoe et al., The Economic Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes 2000 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, May 2002), 9, Table 2.37 

### Category 3 (“Serious”) injury to 2011 dollars using the GDP defl ator produces an estimate of $0.07 million. Including these additional costs raises the estimated value of preventing each injury in a future cargo aircraft accident that was used in the base case in the Supplemental RIA from $0.65 to $0.72 million, or by 11%. IPA commented that “[f]actors that may have led FAA to vastly understate the potential benefits of avoiding a cargo acciden t include... the loss of service for an aircraft that is destroyed

in an accident.” 70 

### IPA stated that “once an aircraft is lo st, there are likely to be some additional costs incurred by cargo carriers to reschedule and recover operations in order to maintain ‘normal’ cargo flow until a re placement aircraft is obtained.” 71 

### IPA subsequently noted that omitting the value of avoiding such a loss of service from the benefits of avoiding cargo aircraft accidents in the Supplemental RIA is inconsistent with including the value of lost aircraft services during the time when aircraft are being retr ofitted with rest facil ities as a cost of cargo carriers’ compliance with the rule. The estimated value of an aircraft potentially lost in an accident represents the stream of services provided by that aircraft. Therefore to include an additiona l category of benefits representing the loss of service of the aircraft would result in double counting benefits. The FAA notes that airlines generally have some slack capacity (spare aircraft) to recover from other unforeseen events such as equipment problems. T hus, the costs of disrupte d service are likely to be quite small. Maintaining slack capacity invo lves some additional costs but the FAA believes that those costs are more appropriately ascribed to the need to recover from general equipment problems than to the very low probab ility of a fatigue-related accident.

70 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 23. 71 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 42.38 

### IPA stated that in the Initia l SRIA, the FAA failed to acc ount for ramp/taxiway accidents, a benefit category the FAA had identified in th e NPRM. IPA restated that the FAA in the NPRM had stated that “ground incidents in the U. S. exceed $3 billion per year,” and “if the rule were to reduce damage by about $600 million ( $340 million in present value) it would break even in terms of net benefits.” Further, IPA noted that FAA maintained that “[i]f even only a few percent of the losses from ground accidents are cau sed by pilot fatigue, the annual losses are large. Three percent would be $90 million per year.” 72 

### CAPA also recounted the $90 million per year figure. The FAA is not aware of any taxi or ramp accidents attributed to fatigue. The FAA prefaced its discussions of ground incidents in the NPRM with the statement that “due to data limitations, the FAA was unable to estimate the cu mulative effect of preventing minor aircraft damage on the ground,” and invited public comment. See NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 55878. In addition, the FAA stated in the NPRM RIA that “the se events are not investigated in detail—i.e., there is a lack of causal information, no hu man factors report with work chronology, etc.” (NPRM RIA, page 69). The FAA received no comme nts nor any data relating to the impact of fatigue on taxi and ramp accidents, nor did the FAA receive any data in response to the Initial SRIA. Because the FAA does not have any data to substantiate any claims of taxi and ramp accidents attributable to fatigue, the FAA in its final rule withdr ew all such benefits claims.

72 Ibid., 46.39 

### IPA stated that in the Initial SRIA, the F AA failed to account fo r “having well-rested (and well-trained) pilots in the cockpit to solv e minor problems before they become accidents,” 73 

### a benefit category the FAA ha d identified in the NPRM.

The FAA continues to believe that this is an additional category of benefits, but the FAA was not able to quantify this be nefit category. A discussion of this category of non-quantified

benefits is included in this Final SRIA. IPA and ALPA both stated that the impacts fr om a hazardous material release following a cargo accident were not included in the benef its analysis. IPA presented examples of the potential cost of hazardous material releases : a 1995 accident in Kansas City that had an estimated environmental clean-up cost of $0.7 m illion, and the Shanksville , PA crash of United Flight 93, which resulted in $1 milli on in environmental clean-up costs. 74 

### The FAA agrees that environmental clean-up cost s are appropriate to include in a benefits analysis. However, we do not have a data sour ce that could provide an average or typical environmental clean-up cost for an aviation accident and relyi ng on anecdotal evidence is not a preferred approach. This Final SR IA contains a discussion of envi ronmental clean-up costs in the non-quantified benefits section. Although the FAA has concerns a bout the applicab ility of the anecdotal information provided by IPA, the new sensitivity analysis includes the suggested value of $1 million in environmental clean-up costs.

IPA stated that the FAA should investigate the cost s related to runway closure after an

accident.

73 Ibid., 47. 74 Both estimates are adjusted to current dollars.40 

### The FAA is not aware of any single database that systematically records runway closures after accidents or impacts of any such closures in terms of, say, flights diverted, delayed, or cancelled or the number of passengers affected. Ba sing benefits estimates of anecdotal “worst

case” scenarios such as the accident at Narita is not defensible for a benefits estimate. As a result, this category of benefits can only be disc ussed in qualitative terms. Such a discussion is included in the non-quantified benefits section of this Final SRIA.

ALPA noted that the Initial SRIA benefits analysis does not contain an estimate of accident response costs. Major airports are required to have dedicat ed aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) capabilities. Therefore, rescue costs are largely a fixed cost that would not change substantially

in the event of an accident. IPA stated, “it appears that the difficult to quantify benefits were given no consideration by the decision-makers.” 75 

### IPA then discussed several categori es of these diffi cult to quantify benefits. IPA included in its comments what it terms a “rough order-of magnitude” estimate of the qualitative and tangible benefits of the final rule if extended to cargo operations, including (but not limited to) avoidance of taxiing acci dents, more alert pilots, premium value for expedited and perishable items (pharmaceuticals, transplant organs, time sensitive legal documents, etc.), health improve ments of pilots who are not fa tigued, and post-accident health

costs from toxic and other chemical substances rel eased as the result of an accident. This “rough order-of-magnitude estimate” is equal to the valu e of statistical life $ 6.2 million for the lower bound and twice this amount for the upper bound.

75 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 15.41 

### The FAA did consider these categories of bene fits. In fact, many of these categories of benefits are mentioned by the FAA in various other documents rela ted to the rulemaking, such as the NPRM and the preamble to the final rule. Ho wever, for the most part, these other categories of difficult to quantify benefits are believed to be of relatively minor significance. As the Final SRIA shows, the quantified costs of making comp liance with this rule mandatory for all-cargo operations are forty-five times greater than the qu antified benefits of doing so. Thus, even if the unquantified benefits could be quantified, they w ould not change the overall conclusion that the benefits of extending the rule to all-cargo operations are signifi cantly lower than the costs. The FAA does not see any basis of support for IPA’s “rough order-of- magnitude” estimates. However, in response to IPA’s concern, the Fina l SRIA includes additional discussion of these difficult to quantify categories of benefits.



## Issues Related to Estimation of Costs

Several commenters, including ALPA, CAPA and IPA, asserted that the FAA overestimated crew scheduling costs because carriers will be able to reduce much of the FAAestimated crew scheduling costs by re-optim izing schedules and making other operational changes. ALPA stated that the Cygnus optimiza tion does not provide a true indication of the rule’s impact because carrier s could modify marketing tech niques to take advantage of optimization possibilities. ALPA felt that cargo carriers could accomplish this by changing flight

schedules to continue on to additional destinations by using the “potential extension of the flight time, and the reduction in required rest upon arrival,” 76 

### when, under current rules, the carrier was

76 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 24.42 

### required to provide crew rest or crew augmentation to continue . ALPA also felt that cargo carriers will be able to adjust time of departur es/arrivals under the Final Rule. ALPA cited an Air Force Institute of Technology stud y that concluded that cargo carr iers currently run optimally and that they would find another optimal so lution to continue DOD missions under the Final Rule. According to ALPA, “the co st of applying Part 117 is no minal” and “ALPA believes that this cost will be more than made up by schedul ing changes to take advantage of the increased flight time allowed by Part 117.” 77 

### IPA stated that, “[f]or certain split duty sh ifts, some crews barely miss the 3 hour 15

minute threshold that the FAA determined is necessary for the crews to complete their paperwork and debriefing, and be shuttled to and fr om the rest facilities so as to obtain 2 hours of

rest.” 78 

### IPA asserted that in this circumstance, th e carrier could comply with the Final Rule without “incurring much expense” by “green light[ing] such crew s for priority in completing the debriefing process and obtaining tran sportation to and from their rest facilities to ensure that they obtain the necessary 2 hours of rest.” 79 

### According to CAPA, one carrier reoptimized its schedule and reduced costs by 25 percent

relative to the FAA-estimated cr ew scheduling costs. IPA stated that carriers would choose to implement a fatigue risk management system (FRM S) if it was the lower co st option and that the FAA should perform sensitivity analyses on crew scheduling costs. IPA asserted that “FAA should develop a rough order-of-magnitude benefit es timate of these cost savings and perform a sensitivity analysis to provide decision-makers with a plau sible range of savings that

77 Ibid., 26. 78 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 64. 79 Ibid.43 

### implementation of such provisions could produ ce. By declining to attempt to quantify an acknowledged cost reduction measure, FAA fa ils its responsibilitie s under the applicable Executive Orders and agency guidance.” 80 

### Conversely, CAA asserted that it is “unrealistic to assume that the final rule would result in any cost savings and as suc h, cost savings should be eliminat ed if they are included in the ‘net’ all-cargo crew scheduling co sts.” CAA stated that, “[a]irlin es schedule crews for a variety of reasons other than the specific fatigue requirements,” 81 

### in support of its argument that cost savings are unrealistic. The FAA believes that the Cygnus optimiza tion does provide a realistic estimate of carriers’ compliance cost with the Final Rule, given existing flight schedules, collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), and scheduling practices. Although ALPA believes that cargo carriers could comply with the Final Rule at “nominal” cost through mo dification of marketing techniques to take advantage of increased max imum flight time limits in certain situations, the

FAA does not believe that this assertion is r easonable. Existing cargo ca rrier flight schedules were chosen for specific reasons. The flight sc hedules must serve the market for air cargo transportation (including guarant eed delivery times marketed by integrated cargo carriers) and must comply with the myriad constraints that carriers must consider when developing a flight schedule, including airport opera ting hours and aircraft maintenance schedules. Changes to existing flight schedules to reduce flightcrew member scheduling compliance costs with the

Final Rule could increase costs in other areas of a carrier’s operations and/or cause it to forgo

revenue.

80 Ibid., 49

‐ 50. 81 Cargo Airline Association, Comments, 10.44 

### As CAA’s comment points out, the FAA cannot arbitrarily assume that carriers can modify flight schedules at no cost, but must reasonably estimate the increased flightcrew member scheduling cost attributable to the Fina l Rule using existing flig ht schedules. The FAA accomplished this objective through use of the industry-standard crew pairing and schedule optimization services developed by CrewPairings . The Cygnus optimization process included all elements of the Final Rule, including the in creased maximum flight time limits in certain situations. Any cost savings attributable to this Final Rule element were included in the results presented in the Initial SRIA. The FAA acknowledges IPA’s point that in some situations, flightcrew members may be close to limits established by the Final Rule. However, the FAA cannot arbitrarily determine that, in certain cases, a schedule is “close enough” to the limit an d therefore discount those costs from the RIA. The buffers used by CrewPairi ngs in its analysis were chosen through a combination of CrewPairings expertise and convers ations with crew sche dulers at the carriers.

The FAA believes that these buffers provided a reasonable basis to develop estimates of carriers’ flightcrew member scheduling comp liance costs with the Final Rule. The FAA applied a consistent, reasonable methodology of estimating flightcrew member scheduling costs attributable to th e Final Rule for all segments of the part 121 industry, including passenger, cargo, and supplemental carriers. By its very nature, a cost-ben efits analysis is an estimate and cannot include every conceivable way that an individual carrier might choose to comply with a final rule. Thus, the FAA did not make unwarranted co st-reducing assumptions, such as carriers complying with the Final Rule at lower cost by modifying marketing techniques. On the other hand, the FAA also did not make unw arranted cost-increasing assumptions, such as45 

### carriers incurring additional expenses (more than the estimates in the Supplemental RIA) because of an inability to implem ent identified optimization results. Although CAPA claimed that one carrier re-opt imized its schedule and reduced costs by 25 percent, the commenter provided no supporting ev idence or details. Consequently, the FAA is unable to evaluate the validity of this claim. The FAA notes, howev er, that AAWW stated that it

estimates that Atlas and Polar cr ew costs would increase 20%. This estimate was confirmed by the crew optimization software provider. The FAA estimates are intended to represent the industry as a whole and any individu al carrier’s experience may vary. The FAA acknowledges IPA’s comment that ca rriers may choose FRMS if the costs are less than complying with the Final Rule. Howeve r, as explained in footnote 48 of the Initial SRIA, “[w]e did not estimate this potential sa vings as we do not kno w how many operators

would use FRMS and the cost of FRMS has a wi de range.” None of the comments regarding the Initial SRIA provided any new information to es timate cost savings from opting to use FRMS. IPA stated that the FAA should have performed a sensitivity analysis on the potential cost savings from an FRMS. For the reasons stated above, the FAA did not estimate cost savings from implementation of an FRMS, but the agency did perform several sensitivity analyses that are contained in Appendix B of the Initial SRIA . Two of the sensitivity analyses focused on

alternative methods of calculating flightcrew member scheduling costs.

IPA asserted that because the FAA estimated crew scheduling costs for the cargo industry using schedules from just one car rier, that the costs cannot be ge neralized for the overall cargo industry and by doing so, the FAA has “introduce[d] a large margin of error in the analysis results.” According to IPA, an important source of this error is likely to be variation in minimum46 

### guarantees (the minimum number of pay hours pe r pay period that flight crew members are guaranteed by the carrier employing th em) at different cargo carriers.

The FAA estimated the costs of the Final Ru le using an industry-standard pairing and bid-line system optimizer de veloped by CrewPairings, Inc. 82 

### The CrewPairings results

eliminated the need for the FAA to make assu mptions regarding flight crew member scheduling actions that carriers may take by using a commer cial flightcrew member scheduling model used by carriers in real-world operations. The CrewPa irings results reflected the outcome of the process by which carriers create the most effici ent flightcrew member schedule possible, in compliance with numerous constraints, including federal regulations, labor agreements, market demands, and operational requirements. The process by which CrewPairings estimated th e impact of the Final Rule on flightcrew member scheduling required substa ntial computer resources, time, and professional expertise. As such, the FAA could not possibly model every carrier and fleet type in the United States part 121 air transportation industry. The F AA and CrewPairings carefully se lected the eight cases to be reasonably representative of the part 121 industry. The carriers which provided data for the eight cases employ a substantial share of the flight crew members in the part 121 industry. In the professional judgment of the FAA and CrewPairi ngs, the CrewPairings Final Rule results are

82 The CrewPairings software is designed to assist air carriers in developing efficient flightcrew member schedules within the constraints imposed by FAA regulations on carrier operations, the provisions of individual carriers’ labor agreements, time patterns of market demand for the services they provide, and operational imperatives associated with their fleets and route networks. It has been utilized by more than 30 major airlines worldwide, including global, national, and regional passenger airlines as well as freight carriers. This same software is employed by some cargo airlines for scheduling flight crew assignments, and its underlying optimization algorithm is similar to that employed in the crew scheduling and assignment software utilized by most other cargo carriers.47 

### considered to be accurate representations of the impact of the Final Rule on flightcrew member scheduling. The FAA recognizes that IPA does not believ e that results from one carrier can be generalized to apply to the entire industry. Howeve r, it is not possible or reasonable to expect the FAA to model the exact, unique ch aracteristics of each part 121 ca rrier and fleet. The change in flightcrew member scheduling costs attributable to the Final Rule may vary among carriers; some carriers may experience costs that are more th an or less than the estimates developed in the Supplemental RIA. However, the goal of the Suppl emental RIA was not to estimate the cost of compliance with the Final Rule fo r individual carriers, but for the part 121 industry as a whole. The FAA believes that its approach in the Supp lemental RIA was reasonable and accomplished this goal.

IPA stated that the FAA over-estimated the crew scheduling costs for UPS because some pilots fly fewer hours than the minimum guar antee negotiated in th eir union’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The CBA contains a guarantee minimum pay based on a minimum

number of credit hours. A fli ghtcrew member whose monthly sc hedule requires fewer credit hours than the minimum guarantee will be paid the amount implied by the minimum credit hour guarantee. Therefore, the Final Rule would not re sult in additional costs for those flightcrew members because their pay will not increase if th ey work a few more hours. According to IPA, the contractual monthly minimum for UPS flight crew members is 75 credit hours and 36 percent of UPS flightcrew members have fewer credit hours than the mi nimum. IPA calculated that the Final Rule would only result in a 1.047 percent increase in cred it hour wages and that the FAA overstated UPS crew scheduling costs by $20 million over the ten-year analysis period. IPA requested that the FAA used FedE x data for its estimate and estimat ed that the Final Rule would48 

### result in an increase of 1.488 pe rcent in credit hours for flightcr ew members at carriers in the freight-integrated group. IPA asserted that the as sumption “only holds true if the credit hours for

all schedules are constructed at or above the collective bargaining agreement minimum guaranteed pay value.” 83 

### According to IPA, the minimum guar antee at FedEx is 68 hours for a 4- week schedule and all regular lines ar e normally at or above the guarantee.

For the reasons cited in res ponse to the previous comment, the FAA was unable to model the impact of the Final Rule on each part 121 carri er. Rather, the FAA selected cases that would be representative of the part 121 industry. Further, the scheduli ng process is very complicated, necessitating sophisticated algor ithms to solve for the optimal schedules. Flightcrew member hours are not necessarily fungible due to real-world constraints. For instance, if a flightcrew member’s monthly schedule ends in Louisville , KY and the flightcrew member has accrued two fewer monthly credit hours than the monthly minimum, those two hours cannot be used to fly a two-hour segment originating in Shenzen, China. Th erefore, it is unlikely that just because some

schedules are below contractual mi nimums that flightcrew members could be utilized in a way to defray the costs of the additional credit hours requ ired by the new rule. One suspects that if UPS is paying for un-utilized capacity, it will soon atte mpt to renegotiate its labor agreements and such cost savings opportunities will be short-live d. In addition, there is still a societal cost

involved even if the airline doe s not incur a monetary cost: th e flightcrew members currently enjoy those remaining hours as leisure but under the scenarios outlined by IPA, they would be required to work. Those indivi duals would incur a cost. Alt hough there will be unique circumstances for each individual part 121 carrier that cause its costs of compliance with the

83 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 53.49 

### Final Rule to be higher or lowe r than the estimated costs presen ted in the Supplemental RIA, the

FAA believes that its cost estimates are reasonable. However, in light of the new data provided by IPA, the FAA will explore the impact on estimated costs and benefits for the cargo i ndustry from incorpora ting the UPS-specific information regarding flightcrew members who have fewer flying hours th an their contractual minimums in the new sensitivity analysis in Appendix B.

IPA stated that the FAA overstated crew scheduling costs by overestimating the percentage of active line pilots in all-cargo opera tions. IPA provided new data regarding the total number of pilots and the number of primary bid lines lineholders for UPS which indicates that 51% of pilots at UPS were primary linehol ders in 2010. IPA also provided information suggesting that for FedEx in July 2011, 52 percen t of pilots were primary lineholders. IPA explained that there are several types of pilots who would be lis ted in NVIS, but not be primary lineholders, including secondary lineholders, hot standby reserves , and pilots w ho are in a nonflying category status because of medical leave of absence, military duty leave of absence, and long-term upgrade or cross aircra ft training, non-flying special proj ects, etc. IPA stated that at UPS, 10 percent of airline p ilots are in a non-flying category status. IPA provided alternative calculations that estimate scheduling costs for th e integrated carriers based on the estimate that 51.65 percent of pilots are lineholders. For the ot her freight industry groups, IPA estimated that 75 percent of pilots are linehol ders (15 percent reserves, 10 pe rcent are non-bidders) (IPA, page 54 and Exhibit 25). The FAA used the new information provided by IPA regarding the percent of pilots in the freight industry groups who are li neholders in its revised cost analysis in this Final SRIA.50 

### IPA noted that the Initial SRIA estimated crew scheduling costs for the supplemental industry group using a synthetic supplemental carri er rather than actual data from a supplemental

carrier and stated that the F AA’s crew scheduling cost estima tes for the supplemental industry group “essentially amount to sheer speculation.” 84 

### IPA objected to the pr ocess by which the FAA created a synthetic supplemental ca rrier, but does not offer any esti mate of what the costs for the supplemental industry group may be. IPA stated that since the supplemental industry group accounted for 72 percent of the “t rue” crew scheduling co sts for the freight integrated industry group, the supplemental industry group should be analyzed separately. For various reasons, including time, resources, a nd data availability constraints, it was not possible for the FAA to model each part 121 air carrier individually. The FAA and CrewPairings carefully selected the eight cases used in the f lightcrew member scheduling cost analysis to be reasonably representative of th e part 121 industry. Although these eight cases did not include a supplemental carrier, the FAA be lieves the modifications it ma de to one of the eight cases produce a reasonable estimate of th e flightcrew member scheduling co sts attributable to the Final Rule for the supplemental industry. The supplemental carrier case us ed the actual flight schedule and crew bases of the allcargo, wide-body aircraft case, a representative supplemental carrier CBA and FAR part 121 subpart S supplemental flight, duty and rest rules. The nature of th e flight schedule was similar to that of supplemental carriers. Approximately 70 pe rcent of the flight segments were short-haul domestic operations characterized by low levels of aircraft and flightcrew member utilization relative to passenger carriers. The remaining 30 pe rcent of the flight se gments were long-haul

84 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 58.51 

### international operations throughout the entire Northe rn Hemisphere that ci rcled the globe in both

directions from bases in the United States. The flights operated infrequently, which meant that deadheading was common except in the cases of operations to military fields which did not offer the possibility of deadheading on scheduled passenger flights. Supplemental flight, duty, and rest regulations in place prior to this rule permitted much more flight and duty time than th e flag and domestic flight, duty and rest regulations for which scheduled passenger carriers and many all-cargo carriers were required to comply. In addition, the representative supplemental carrier CBA perm itted much more flight and duty time than the typical passenger or all-cargo carrier CBA. 85 

### As a result, the estimated increase in cost per line of flying resulting from the final rule wa s highest for supplemental carriers.

IPA and ALPA both stated that the FAA oversta tes costs of installing rest facilities. IPA

stated that the FAA “strained to find costs” by assuming that the instal lation would not be done

in concert with normal aircraft downtime or ma intenance schedules. IPA also stated that the FAA’s cost estimates are overstated because they assume that 107 cargo aircraft would require

rest facilities while IPA’s an alysis suggests that only 75 extended range Boeing 767’s would require rest facilities. IPA stated that the FAA should have considered lower cost options other than the Class I rest facility used for the cost an alysis. IPA added that for the shorter range of the Boeing 767 (compared to the MD-11, Boeing 777, and Boeing 747), the Class 3 option would be more cost effective and provides a lternative unit cost estimates for a Class 3 rest facility in terms of equipment cost, installation cost, engineering co st, and additional fuel cost. ALPA also stated

that the estimated costs for rest facilities used by the FAA is too high and suggested the costs

85 The flight, duty and rest regulations likely impact the negotiations regarding flight and duty time in the CBAs for supplemental carriers.52 

### would actually be half what was estimated by the FAA but provided no data to support that

assertion. In determining rest-facility-installation costs, the FAA followed guidance from OMB Circular A-4 which directs agencies to provide monetized quantitati ve estimates of categories of benefits and costs wherever possible.

The FAA decided to estimate the costs of rest facilities using the assumption that carriers

would choose to install Class 1 rest facilities. This assumption is used because the FAA found that under the final rule, only the us e of Class I rest faci lities will allow for the flight duty periods that are necessary for the existing route struct ures without stopping to re-crew. The Class 3 facilities allow a flight duty period 5 hours shorter than the Class 1 faciliti es. The one-time costs associated with installing rest facilities are likely to be lowe r than costs of continually recrewing, which makes installation of rest facili ties the cheaper option in the long run. While

there are some routes that could be served effec tively with less expensive Class 3 or Class 2 rest facilities, the FAA a ssumed that air carriers will choose to inst all the Class 1 rest facilities in all of the long range aircraft because of th e flexibility a uniform fleet provides. The cost of an aircraft being out of serv ice during installation was estimated for both passenger and cargo operations. The cost estimates assume the installation for a Class 1 rest facility will take 4 days which substantially exceeds the daily downtime window available for cargo operations. Class 2 and 3 facilities could potentially be installed by the airline’s own maintenance department during heavy checks (C or D checks). However, Class 1 facilities would need to be installed by the vendor and the carrier would be subject to the vendor’s schedule, which may or may not coincide with the aircraft ’s maintenance schedule. Therefore, it is not53 

### unreasonable to assume that an aircraft may need to be taken out of servi ce outside of its regular maintenance schedule to pe rform the installation. The FAA’s estimate of the number of cargo aircra ft requiring rest facilities was based on an aircraft-by-aircraft determina tion. We obtained facil ity related data by querying the FAA fleet records and verifying them with the FAA safety inspectors. All aircraft flying international routes are assumed to need rest facilities but we omitted aircraft models that already have rest facilities (e.g. Boeing 777) and those with kno wn conversions from the total counts. These aircraft models are not limited to the Boeing 767 as supposed by IPA; other aircraft models include extended range DC-10s as well as some narrow-body aircraft which are currently used in extended-range cargo operations. Nonetheless, the FAA is incorporating IPA’s co st estimates regarding rest facility costs into the new sensitivity analysis in Appendix B.

IPA stated that the FAA underestimated the co st reductions due to reduced sick time for pilots. IPA stated the FAA should have adopted the amount of sick time reduction it cited from research, which found 40 to 60 percent reductions. The studies cited by the FAA in the Initial SR IA were special studies involving different industries. That information was provided as support for the linkage between reductions in fatigue and reductions in sick time used by empl oyees. The amount of sick time reduction is very uncertain and in recognition of that uncertainty we included a sensit ivity analysis related to that assumption.

CAA asserted that the FAA understated ini tial costs for fatigue training by $146 million.

CAA stated that the FAA estimated the cost of fatigue training for onl y dispatchers and upper management at $1.1 million and that the true cost would be $147.1 million. In addition, CAA54 

### estimated that the costs to hire and train new cr ew members prior to implementation of the rule would total $87 million; this estimate is also supported by AAWW. As stated in the Initial SRIA, no incremental cost of compliance with fatigue training for flightcrew members is attributed to the Final Ru le because part 121 carriers are already required to provide fatigue training to their flightcrew members by the statutory fatigue risk management plan (FRMP) requirement of Section 212 of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-216). The only incremental cost of compliance with fatigue training attributable to the Final Rule is the fa tigue training required for management, schedulers, dispatchers, and any ot her individual directly involved in operational control of the flight. This cost was estimated by the FAA in the Initial SRIA. Turning to CAA’s concern re garding hiring and training of new crewmembers, the CrewPairings analysis shows that the number of additional lines needed under the final rule for cargo operations was minimal. According to the Cr ew Pairings analysis, the percent increase in bid lines required from the new rule was 2.7 percent for cargo na rrow-body operations, 1.5 percent for cargo wide-body ope rations, and 6.5 percent for supplemental operations. The comments by IPA show that there are a substant ial number of reserve flightcrew members

available to cover small increases in workloads. CAA asserted that the FAA did not capture the full crew scheduling costs for airlines because the FAA did not include payroll taxes, pe nsions, and other benefits’ costs in its crew scheduling cost estimate.

To the extent that benefits’ costs increase as an individu al’s hours worked increases,

those costs should be included in the cost anal ysis. In response to this comment, the FAA included an estimate of the costs of employee bene fits for all airline employees when estimating55 

### the cost of additional labor hours required by the final rule. The cost of incremental labor hours for airline employees are estimated for crew sche duling costs, cost savings from reduced use of sick time, and additional training requir ed of management and dispatchers.



## Benefit Analysis This rule is intended to addre ss the problem of fatigued flight crew members flying in part

121 commercial service. The nature and extent of the problem is such that the NTSB continues to list pilot fatigue as one of the Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements. The NTSB recommendations are based on accident investigations and the NTSB safety study on airline safety. The requirements contained in this fina l rule address both NTSB recommendations and existing public law. This benefit estimate first examines the nature of fatigue, followed by its

causes and how it relates to tr ansportation. Second, we summari ze some recent findings on fatigue and occupational performanc e. Next, we look at the magnit ude of flightcrew fatigue in part 121 passenger operations by briefly examining fa tigue reports in the context of this final rule. We then re-analyze the likely effectiveness of the requirements contained in this final rule and the potential to decrease thes e types of accidents in the future. We project a likely number of preventable events that will occur in absence of th is final rule. Finally, we estimate the benefits that will be derived from preventing such events . We provide a base case estimate, and a high case estimate, in addition to a threshold/break even analysis. This Final SR IA also presents both base and high case estimates of the benefits if the final rule were extended to cargo-only operations. New to this Final SRIA , we include a high case sensitivit y analysis that incorporates alternative assumptions to explore the potential impact on the central conclusion that the costs of the final rule far outweigh the be nefits for cargo-only operations.56 

## The Nature of Fatigue

Most fatigue studies agree that , “fatigue refers to a subjec tive desire to rest and an aversion to further work, coupled with an objective decrease in performance.” 86 

### Fatigue is characterized by:

 “increasingly frequent lapses in performance,

 general cognitive slowing, including a lowering of optimum performance,

 memory problems,

 time on task decrements, and

 an increasing inability to main tain the vigilance required to perform the tasks required.” 87



### Fatigue has been described as “a nonspecifi c symptom because it can be indicative of many causes or conditions including physiological states such as sl eep deprivation....[s]ome describe fatigue in terms of physiological data or ‘objective’ observa tions of...decrements in work or performance....or time-related deteriorati on in the ability to pe rform certain mental

tasks.” 88 

### While physiological criteria related to fa tigue can be readily measureable, subjective feelings of fatigue are not di rectly observable, and in some instances individuals who are exhibiting diminished performance levels also feel confident in their ability to focus and perform assigned tasks.

86 Christopher Jones et al., “Working Hours Regulations and Fatigue in Transportation: A Comparative Analysis,” Safety Science 43 (2005): 226. 87 Ibid. 88 Susan Torres

‐ Harding and Leonard A. Jason, “What is Fatigue? History and Epidemiology,” in Fatigue as a Window to the Brain , ed. John DeLuca (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 3

‐ 18.57 

## Causes of Fatigue

A number of factors incr ease the risk of fatigue.

 Time of day is very importan t, because the body follows a rhythm over an approximately 24-hour period, often referred to as a circadian cycle.

 The amount of recent sleep that a person has received also affects the level of fatigue risk; most people need an average of eight hours of sleep per 24-hour period.

 The number of continuous hours awake also increases fatigue risk, and for most individuals, once the number of conti nuous hours awake exceeds 17, fatigue risk increases significantly.

 Sleep debt, the difference between the amount of sleep needed to be fully rested and actual sleep, also contributes to fatigue. Sleep debt accumulates over time, and fatigue risk is higher if sleep debt exceeds eight hours.

 Work load and time on task can also affect fa tigue risk. If work in tensity is high and/or there is a long continuous period of time on task, the risk of fatigue increases.



## Fatigue and Transportation

The nature of work in the transportation sector makes that sector especially susceptible to risks to performance, vigilance and response to hazards that are associated with fatigue. Workdays of those responsible for the safety of transportation operations can be characterized by long work periods, often at nighttime or in the early morning hours. Because transportation workers must sometimes rest or sleep away from home, conditions for rest and sleep quality are also important.58 

### Analysts have examined the links between the specific features of work in the transportation industry, including commercial av iation, and the general features of human physiology and fatigue for decades. For commercia l aviation, it has been nearly two decades since the first citation of fatigue as a probable cause for a major aviation accident. This accident,

the crash of American Interna tional Airways flight 808 at Guan tanamo Naval Air Station, Cuba, on August 18, 1993, was investigated by the NTSB. Pr obable causes of the ac cident identified by the NTSB included “the impaired judgment, deci sion making, and flying ab ilities of the captain and flightcrew due to the effects of fatigue...” 89 

### As part of the investigation of that accident, NASA research ers and contractors performed an analysis of the links between av iation risks and the effects of fatigue on human vigilance and performance. This research wa s reported as part of the NTSB report on the Guantanamo Bay accident and the research was la ter revised for inclusion in an NTSB report on DOT efforts to address fatigue issues in transportation. 90



### This NTSB research and literature su mmary provides a thorough and well-documented

review of these issues. In the 1999 restatement of the research results in the context of addressing fatigue issues in transportation genera lly, the following summary is provided: Fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian di sruption created by transportation operations can degrade performance, alertn ess and safety. An extensive scientific literature exists that provides importa nt physiological information about the

89 NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, American International Airways Flight 808, Douglas DC

‐ 8

‐ 61, N814CK, U.S. Naval Air Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, August 18, 1993 (Washington, DC, May 10, 1994, NTSB/AAR

‐ 94/04) 90 Mark Rosekind, “Fatigue in Transportation: Physiological, Performance, and Safety Issues,” in Evaluation of U.S. Department of Transportation Efforts in the 1990s to Address Operator Fatigue. Safety Report (Washington, DC: NTSB, May 1999, NTSB/SR

‐ 99/01), 68

‐ 81.59 

### human operator, which can be used to guide operations and policy. For example, there are human physiological requirements for sleep, predictable effects of sleep loss on performance and alertness and patte rns for recovery from sleep loss. Additionally, the circadian clock is a pow erful modulator of human performance and alertness, and in tran sportation operations, it can be disrupted by night work, time zone changes, and day/night duty sh ifts. Scientific examination of these physiological considerations has documen ted a direct relationship to errors, accidents and safety. This scientific info rmation can provide important input to policy and regulatory considerations. 91



## Recent Findings on Fatigue and Occupational Performance

Fatigue is prevalent in the U.S. workforce, with nearly 38 percent of workers reporting fatigue during a two-week period. 92 

### The National Sleep Foundati on conducted a poll in 2008, which found that 29 percent have fallen asleep or become very sleepy while at work and two percent did not go to work due to sleepiness or a sleep problem. 93 

### Numerous studies have found that fatigue can significantly reduce productivity. A review of published studies on shift work and productivity found a large de crease in efficiency during the night shift, with the low

91 Ibid., 68. 92 Judith Ricci et al., “Fatigue in the U.S. Workforce: Prevalence and Implications for Lost Productive Work Time,” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 49 (2007): 1–10. 93 WBA Research, 2008 Sleep in America Poll: Summary of Findings (Washington, DC: National Sleep Foundation, March 3, 2008)60 

### occurring at 3:00 am. On average, the authors found that productivity was five percent lower at night. 94 

### A large-scale study was conducted at 40 companie s and institutions in the Netherlands to investigate the relationship between fatigue and future sickness absence. The presence of fatigue was measured using self-reported symptoms, with employers providing absence data. The study controlled for numerous sociodemographic and work characteristics. The investigators found that higher levels of fatigue were st atistically significant predictors of both short-term and long-term

sickness absence. 95 

### A study was conducted to estimate fatigue prev alence and associated health-related lost productive time (LPT) in U.S. workers. The inve stigators found that work ers with fatigue were much more likely to report health-related LPT, with a cost of $136.4 billion annually. This amount exceeded health-related LPT reporte d by workers without fatigue by $101.0 billion. 96 

### A study compared the rate of errors made by medical residents working in the ICU on 80-

hour weeks versus those on 63 hour weeks. The re sidents with the shorter work week schedule experienced half the rate of attention failures. The residents with the lo nger work week schedule made serious medical errors (thos e causing or having the potential to cause harm to a patient) at a rate 22 percent higher than the reside nts with the shorter work week schedule. 97

94 Simon Folkard and Philip Tucker, “Shift Work, Safety and Productivity,” Occupational Medicine (London) 53 (2003): 95

‐ 101. 95 N. Janssen et al., “Fatigue as a Predictor of Sickness Absence: Results from the Maastricht Cohort Study on Fatigue at Work,” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 60 (Supplement 1, 2003): i71–i76.

. 96 Judith Ricci et al., “Fatigue in the U.S. Workforce: Prevalence and Implications for Lost Productive Work Time,” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 49 (2007): 1–10. 97 Committee on Sleep Medicine and Research, Board on Health Sciences Policy, Sleep Disorders and Sleep Deprivation: An Unmet Public Health Problem (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006), 139

‐ 140.61 

### The railroad industry is at a relatively high risk of fatigue, due to typical 24-hour per day operations. A number of railroads have implem ented fatigue countermeasures, which generally

reduced absenteeism. For inst ance, after implementation of fatigue countermeasures for CANALERT, absenteeism decreased from 8.1 to 3.2 percent. After fatigue countermeasures were implemented for the Conrail-Buffalo-Tole do IMPAC project, a st atistically significant

increase in attendance from 95.21 percent to 98.06 percent was observed. 98 

### This data demonstrates the potential for fatigue issues, which we will now examine within the specific requirements of this final rule.



## Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)

One can observe fatigue in aviation by exam ining the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The ASRS collects, analyzes, and responds to voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident reports in order to lessen the likelihood of aviation accidents. It is part of a continuing effort by government, industry, and individuals to maintain and improve aviation safety by collecting voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident/situation reports from flightcrew members, controllers, and others

. The data in the ASRS is used to:

98 Patrick Sherry, Fatigue Countermeasures in the Railroad Industry: Past and Current Developments (Washington, DC: Association of American Railroads, June 2000)62 

###  Identify deficiencies and discrepancies in the National Aviation System (NAS) so that these can be remedied by appropriate authorities.

 Support policy formulation and planning for, and improvements to, the NAS.

 Strengthen the foundation of aviation human factor s safety research. This is particularly important since it is generally conceded that over two-thirds of all aviation accidents and incidents have their roots in human performance errors.

ASRS assures confidentiality and data cannot be traced back to individual operators. So although we cannot claim the rule could prevent any specific ASRS ev ents, it is a useful tool in evaluating and validating the presence of fatigue in part 12 1 operations. We performed a query for part 121 ASRS for fatigue. 99 

### Between June 2009 and the time of the drafting of the original RIA, there were a total of 256 reports where fatigue was cited as a factor. We have neither culled the data nor edited any of the data that was repo rted to ASRS. The top se ven results are listed in

Table 3. Table 3: ASRS Part 121 Fatigue Reports Result Total Relative %

General None Reported / Taken (No action was taken as a result of the fatigue issue reported) 68 26.6%

General Work Refused (Fatigue caused a worker to refuse an assignment) 21 8.2%

General Maintenance Action (Typically a fatigue event related to a maintenance issue—not related to this final rule). 14 5.5%

99 We believe that this is a very conservative approach because other human factors can reveal fatigue, such ad confusion and communications breakdown.63 

### Flight Crew Became Reoriented (Confusion related to some type of malfunction.) 10 3.9%

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action (Crew took action to avoid an accident

or incident) 8 3.1%

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance (Substitute clearance given to get back on track) 5 2.0%

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach 5 2.0%

One captain on an international flight describe d an onerous flight sequence in the Pacific he believed to be unsafe due to cumulative and predictable fatigue: This report concerns a trans-Pacific flight assignment including back to back all night pairings (body clock), two un-augmented inter-Asia segments and 36 hours of flight time. We started the sequence with a 12.7 hour actual flight, single augmented with an hour plus dela y on the front end. When we arrived we cabbed to downtown for an additional 1.5 hours on the body before rest. The first internal Asia leg is all ni ght, un-augmented. The return leg is daylight, but all night body time, followed by anothe r 1.5 hour cab ride downtown. The [opportunities for] rest were insufficient to maintain any alertness particularly on the last leg. Both the First Officer and I experienced periods of unintended sleep

while at the controls. No amount of coffee or mental discipline was sufficient to stay awake!!! This is unsafe and made more unsafe by requiring: 1. Over 12 hours single augmented on the firs t leg. 2. Two un-augmented le gs on the back side of the clock with long preflight awake hours. 3. Over 8 extra hours of "duty time" in CABS!!! Rework this trip before someone gets hurt. No one in the cockpit for the last 6 hours was at their peak to respond to irregular s ituations. We weren't even able to stay awake the whole time in the seat.64 

### Even if no anomalies occur dur ing a flight, fatigued crews may be poorer problem solvers

than well-rested crews as noted in the research ci ted above, and thus add a degree of risk to the system. In addition, taking evasive action and misse d approaches because of fatigue are serious safety events indicating substantial ri sk manifesting in the current system.



## Effectiveness of Final Rule

It is usually the case that multiple factors can be identified as causes of specific accidents, and it is seldom the case that a specific rule is 100 percent effective at addressing a variety of accident causal factors. In particular, fatigue is ra rely a primary or sole cause of an accident, and

therefore this final rule will not likely prevent all future fatigue related accidents. For this final regulatory evaluation, we have established a modi fied effectiveness ratio to categorize accidents for which fatigue may be a contributing causal f actor. This number represents the likelihood the requirements contained in this final rule would have prevented an accident from occurring. It is applied in the calculation of the number of for ecasted fatigue accidents, if no action was taken to address the fatigue problem in part 121 operations. In its analysis of the effectiveness of th e final rule, the FAA reviewed accidents that could have been prevente d or could have been influenced by the requirements contained in this final rule. The effectiveness analysis works by assessing the likely capability of the requirements contained in the final rule to have prevented those accidents. As part of this analysis, the FAA Office of Accident Investigation reviewed the accident reports from NTSB and foreign investigative authorities on all acc idents where the NTSB cited fa tigue or fatigue was thought to

be either a cause or factor. This was done in or der to assess the likelihoo d that the provisions of

the final rule would have averted those accidents (including positioning flights operating under part 91).65 

### A consistent definition was appl ied to the 20-year history as the requirements of the rule apply to all part 121 operations. As such, we review ed the accident history for all operations that would currently operate under part 121. The final analysis takes into account NTSB findings, the FAA’s independent assessment, and comments to the docket. Some accidents reviewed scored “zero” because fatigue could not be established as a significant factor or because the final rule would not prevent such an event had the requirements been in pl ace today. These accidents were removed from our effectiveness analysis and forecast. This discussion focuses on incidents involving passenger operations, because this fina l rule does not mandate compliance with part 117 for cargo-only operations. However, the Initial SRIA and this Final SRIA provide estimates of both base and high case bene fits if the final rule were extended to cargo-only operations.

These estimates are based on the same methodol ogy discussed here for passenger operations. Each accident was then re-evaluated by condu cting a scoring process similar to that conducted by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), a well-documented and wellunderstood procedure, similar to the analysis in the NPRM . The FAA Office of Accident Investigation used the NTSB recommendations, along with narratives , probable causes, contributing factors and other pertin ent data, to score the accidents. 100 

### When these accidents were not well-defined in the probable cause or contributing factors statements of the NTSB reports, Accident Investigation used a Joint Implementation Monitoring Data Analysis Team (JIMDAT)-like method. The JIMDAT-type scoring system ranges from zero to five, and the score is based on the likelihood that a proposed ac tion would have mitigated that accident. The level and percentage of effectiveness criteria are detail ed in Table 4.

100 For this rule, the FAA also analyzed the duty and flight schedules of the flight crews involved in the accidents and assessed how much they deviated from what would be allowed under the final rule.66 

### Table 4: JIMDAT - Type Scoring System 5 90% effectiveness. The proposed requirement directly addresses the NTSB causal factors and would very likely prevent the accident in the future.

4 75% effectiveness. The proposed requirement directly addresses the majority of the NTSB causal factors and would probably prevent or is likely to reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed.

3 50 % effectiveness. The proposed requirement directly addresses one of several NTSB causal factors and is likely to reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed.

2 35% effectiveness. The proposed requirement generally addresses the NTSB causal factors and is likely to reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed. 1 15% effectiveness. The proposed requirement is likely to have reduced the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed. 0 0% effectiveness. The proposed requirement would not reduce the risk of this type of accident in the future.

The FAA applied this methodology to each fli ghtcrew member fatigue accident to reach an overall effectiveness rating fo r the requirements contained in this final rule. The qualitative assessments were zero (0), very low (1), low (2), moderate (3), high (4), and very high (5). The qualitative assessments then were converted to quan titative effectiveness sc ores as follows: zero; 15%; 35%; 50%; 75%; and 90%. As explained above, in response to the comm ents to the Initial SRIA from CAA and AWW, the FAA re-evaluated the effectivene ss rating assigned to the FedEx accident in Tallahassee, FL in July 2002. The effectiveness ra ting used in the original RIA and the Initial SRIA was 75 percent. The revised effectiveness rating used in this Fina l SRIA is 15 percent. For the original RIA, the Initial SRIA, a nd this Final SRIA, the FAA presents the quantified benefits and effectiv eness analysis for a 10-year pe riod. Although we only forecast ten years of benefits, we have included a 20-y ear history of accidents involving passenger operations, as these are the circumstances and ev ents which have led to this final rulemaking.67 

### Table 5 summarizes the past 20 years of fli ghtcrew member fatigue accidents. Appendix A contains a summary of each accident and the corresponding effec tiveness analyses.68 

### Table 5: 20-Year Accident History

Date Location Service Carrier Aircraft On Board Fatalities Dam

‐ age Scenario Score

02/17/1991 Cleveland, OH 121 Cargo Ryan International DC

‐ 9

‐ 15 2 2 Dest LOC Climb

‐ out; Icing 0.5

08/18/1993 GTMO, Cuba 121 Cargo Konnie Kallita DC

‐ 8 3 0 Dest Landed Short 0.9

07/02/1994 Charlotte, NC 121 Pax US Air MD

‐ 82 57 37 Dest LOC on Approach; Icing 0.15

02/16/1995 Kansas City, MO Ferry ATI DC

‐ 8

‐ 63 3 3 Dest LOC in RTO; Engine Out 0.9

12/20/1995 Cali, Colombia 121 Pax American B757 164 160 Dest CFIT High 0.35

08/25/1996 JFK, NY 121 Pax TWA L1011 262 0 Sub Tail Strike Landing 0.35

01/22/1999 Hyannis, MA Positioning Colgan Air (part 91) BE

‐ 1900 4 0 Dest Hard Landing (BETA) 0.15

05/08/1999 JFK, NY 121 Pax American Eagle SF34 30 0 Sub RE Landing 0.5

06/01/1999 Little Rock, AR 121 Pax American MD

‐ 82 145 11 Dest RE Landing 0.15

07/26/2002 Tallahassee, FL 121 Cargo FedEx B727

‐ 200 3 0 Dest CFIT Low on Approach 0.15

10/19/2004 Kirksville, MO 121 Pax Corporate Airlines as American Connexion BAE

‐ 32 15 13 Dest CFIT Low on Approach 0.75

08/27/2006 Lexington, KY 121 Pax Comair as Delta Connection CRJ

‐ 200 50 49 Dest Wrong Runway T/O 0.35

02/18/2007 Cleveland, OH 121 Pax Shuttle America as Delta Connection ERJ

‐ 170 74 0 Sub RE Landing 0.5

04/12/2007 Traverse City, MI 121 Pax Pinnacle as NW Express CRJ

‐ 200 52 0 Sub RE Landing 0.9

06/20/2007 Laramie, WY 121 Pax Great Lakes BE

‐ 1900 11 0 Sub LOC Bounced Landing 0.15

02/12/2009 Buffalo 121 Pax Colgan Air DHC

‐ 8

‐ Q400 49 50 Dest LOC In Flight; RE Landing 0.5

Passenger Average (excluding Tallahassee, FL FedEx cargo accident) 52.5%69 

### James Reason characterizes major accidents and catastrophic system failures as the consequences of multiple, smaller failures that lead up to the actual accident. It is a “Swiss

cheese” model of human error and also a sequential theory of accident causation. 101 

### Reason’s

model describes four levels of human failure , each one influencing the next. Organizational influences lead to instances of unsafe supervisi on which in turn lead to preconditions for unsafe acts and ultimately the unsafe acts of operators. The unsafe acts of operators are where most accident investigations are focused. It is a useful framework to illustrate how analyses of major accidents and catastrophic systems failures tend to reveal multiple, smaller failures leading up to

the actual accident. The chances of the exact same circumst ances happening again and causing the “same accident” are virtually nil but the possibility of preventing a similar set of

circumstances is real. This sequential “Swiss cheese” formulation is a very appropriate tool for characterizing the circumstances leading up to accidents. The nature of fatigue is such that actions, reactions and the thought processes of fati gued crews are more susceptible to the types of cascading errors of judgment described in Reason’ s model of catastrophic failure. The requirements contained in this final rule will decrease flightcrew memb er fatigue and therefore the accompanying accidents that are associated with fatigue. While it is very difficult to accurately at tribute all past accidents to one or more causes indisputably, we have developed the average effectiveness measure to apply to the estimates and recognize that ther e are additional uncertainties with preventing a future fatigue related event. First, we examine an accident that occurred on October 19, 2004:

101 James Reason, Human Error (Cambridge University Press, 1990)70 

### At about 1937 central daylight time, a Corporate Airlines BAE Systems BAE-J3201, struck trees on final approach and crashed short of runway 36 at Ki rksville Regional Airport, in Kirksville, Missouri. The captain, first officer, a nd 11 of the 13 passengers were fatally injured,and two passengers received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a postimpact fire. 102



### Re search and accident history indic ate that fatigue can ca u se flightcrew member s to make

ri sky, impul s ive decisions, to become fixated on one aspect of a s itua tion, and to react s lo w ly to warnings or signs that an approach s hould be discontinued. Fatigue especially affects decision making , and research shows t hat people w ho are fatigued be co me le ss able to consider options

and are more likel y to become fixated on a course of action or a de s ired outcome. A fatigued pilot might fail to discontinue a flawed approach or might make a risky de c i sion to continue a dangerous approach. The fatigued crew reported for duty at 0514. The accident was near the end of the sixth segment on a 'demanding' day. Crew had been on duty 14.5 hours and the PIC is said to have slept poorly the night before. The PIC was observed resting on a sma ll couch in the company

crew room ; however , the quality of rest the PIC obtained during this time could not be determined. Company flightcrew member s state d that the crew room was a noi sy meeting area

that was not ide a l for sleeping.

102 The NTSB evaluated fatigue as a possible factor in this accident and looked at the various circumstances present the day of the accident that might have contributed to the pilots’ fatigue. The pilots’ available rest time (from about 2100 to 0400) did not correspond favorably with either pilots’ reported usual sleeping hours, resulting in much earlier than normal times to go to sleep and awaken. Additionally, the early wakeup call times would have been challenging to both pilots because the human body is normally physiologically primed to sleep between 0300 and 0500. (NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Collision with Trees and Crash Short of the Runway, Corporate Airline Flight 5966, BAE Systems BAE

‐ J3201, N875JX, Kirksville, Missouri, October 19, 2004 (Washington, DC, January 24, 2006, rev. March 6, 2006, NTSB/AAR

‐ 06/01)71 

### Additionally, the flightcrew members' high workload during their long d ay ma y have

in creased their fatigue. The acc iden t occurred during the s ixth flight s egment of the day while the pilots were performing a non-precision approach in lo w cei lings and reduced visibility. The pilot

deficiencies observed in this accident are co nsi ste nt with fatigue imp a irment. Similarly, although the SIC’s junior stat us wi th the co mpan y ma y have been an i ss ue in

hi s failure to cha llenge the PIC during the approach, he may also have been suffering from fatigue; his failure to mon i tor and react to the PIC’s deviat i ons from non-precision approach procedures was consistent with the degrading effects (slowed reactions and/or tunne l vision) of

fat i gue.

The NTSB concluded that , on the basis of the l ess than optimal overnight rest time

available , the early reporting time for duty , the length of the duty day , the number of flight legs , the demanding conditions (non-prec i sion instrument approaches flown manually in conditions of

l ow ceilings and reduced v i sib i lities) encountered dur ing the long duty day (an d the two previous day s), it i s likely that fatigue contr i buted to the flightcrew member s ' degraded performance and decision-making. Another fatigue-related accident occurred in Traverse City, Michigan on April 12, 2007. The accident occurred well after midnight at the end of a demanding day during which the flightcrew members had flown 8.35 hours, made five landings, had been on duty more than 14 hours, and been awake more than 16 hours. During the accident flight, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded numerous yawns and comments that indicate that the flightcrew members were fatigued. Additionally, the captain made refe rences to being tire d at 2332:12, 2341:53, and 0018:43, and the first officer stated, “jeez, I’m tired” at 0020:41. Additionally, the flightcrew members’ high workload (flying in inclement weather conditions, and in the captain’s case,72 

### providing operating experience for the first officer ) during their long day likely increased their fatigue. The aircraft ran off th e departure end of the runway during snowy conditions. Although there were no injuries among the 49 passengers , the aircraft was substantially damaged. 103 

### As we observe a clear accident history and the accompanying science dealing with fatigue, it is apparent that fati gue threatens aviation safety by incr easing the risk of flightcrew

member error that could lead to an accident. Fatigue is characterized by a general lack of alertness and degradation in ment al and physical performance. Fa tigue manifests in the aviation context not only when flightcrew members fall asleep in the co ckpit while cruising, but perhaps more importantly, when they are insufficiently alert during take-off and landing. Each flight segment that is flown by a flightcrew member includes a takeoff and a landing, which are the most task and safety-intensive parts of the flig ht. A flightcrew member whose FDP consists of a single flight segment only has to perform one takeoff and landing, while a flightcrew member whose FDP consists of six flight segments will have to perform six sets of takeoffs and landings. Because takeoffs and landings are extremely task-i ntensive, it logically follo ws that a flightcrew member who has performed six sets of takeoffs and landings will be more fatigued than the flightcrew member who has performed only one takeoff and landing. Re ported fatigue-related events have included procedural errors, unsta ble approaches, lining up with the wrong runway, and landing without clearances. As such, a fatigue d crew is dangerous no matter what “type” or segment of operation is examined and the requirements in this final rule will eliminate the

distinctions between various operations.

103 NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Runway Overrun During Landing, Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712, Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet CL

‐ 600

‐ 2B19, N8905F, Traverse City, Michigan, April 12, 2007 (Washington, DC, June 10, 2008, NTSB/AAR

‐ 08/02)73 

### As we have shown, in an airpla ne accident, there is a series of errors (both causes and factors) that contribute to an accident. Accident scenarios can vary grea tly depending on phase of flight, the type of operation, phase of flight and size of the airp lane. While flightcrew member fatigue can occur during any stage of flight, takeoff and landing are especially critical times for the crew to exhibit good judgm ent and sound decision making. Th e airplane is close to the ground and there is little room for error dur ing these particular phases of flight.



## Quantified Benefits

In this Final SRIA, the FAA provides a ra nge of benefit estimat es for both passenger operations and cargo-only operations. The base case estimates only look at the historical events as a mirror for the future. The high case estimate for passenger operations assumes that regional carriers will begin flying larger planes. The high case estimate for cargo-only operations assumes a catastrophic accident of a wide-body aircraft with fatalities, in place of the one historic cargoonly accident which resulted in a hull loss and in juries, but no fatalities. We understand that

future accidents will not be iden tical to historical accidents, but our approach prov ides a look at the benefits of this rule based on a snapshot of the past and is gr ounded in NTSB findings. Here the FAA provides a quantitative benefit estimate of historical-based accidents (base case), and a high case of expected benefits from future averted accidents once this rule is promulgated. Generally our benefit analysis begins using past hist ory as an important reference from which to begin the benefit analysis. We believe the base case benefit estimate, which is based solely on the outcome of past accident s, may be low for passenger operations because today passenger load factors and aircraft size are already greate r than they were in the past decade. On the other hand, we also note that th is estimate may not fully take into account74 

### changes in regulatory requirements that postdate those accidents and that may mitigate the projected risk. As such, our base case es timate represents a snapshot of risk. Airplane accidents are somewhat random both in terms of airplane size and the number of people on board. For these reasons, projections of fu ture fatalities may be based on future risk exposure, and our projections are typically base d on expected distributi ons around the mean. Our typical scenario incorporates in creasing airplane size, expected load factors, and a breakeven analysis. However, our evaluation of the historic al accidents showed a disproportionate risk among smaller, regional carriers. Accordingly, as we discuss below, the FAA has decided to base its high case estimate of passenger operations benefits on preventing an accident in a regional jet airplane. In response to comments, we have reduced the analysis period from the 20 years provided in the proposed regulatory analysis to 10 years here. We received comments disputing the use of a 20-year time frame for accidents be cause the accident rate has declined over time. While noting the wide range of operations over the last 20 years, we shortened the accident history to the last 10 years. A reduction in the length of the sample period introduces other problems, most importantly with less time th ere are fewer observations. Observations are important, as the nature of aviation accidents is th at while they are rare events, very often these accidents result in severe, high consequences. The FAA Office of Accident Investigation assessed the effectiveness of this rule to prevent the six fatigue-related accidents whic h occurred on passenger-carrying aircraft in a recent 10-year period. This office used the CAST methodology to assign a value to how effective the rule will be at preventing each accident. On average, we expect this rule would have been75 

### 52.5 percent effective in preventing the types of accidents had it been in effect over the last 10

years.



### Passenger Operations Base Case Estimate

The passenger operations base case estimate onl y looks at the historical events as a specific reference point. In this estimate, the exact number of fatalities for each past event is multiplied by the relative rule effectiveness score to obtain the historical number of deaths that

would have been averted with the requirements contained in this fina l rule, had this rule been in

effect at the time. The base case estimate supposes roughly six deaths will be averted annually. Multiplying six annual averted deaths by the $6.2 m illion value of statistical life equals $37.2 million annually. In addition, had the requirements been in place at the time of these historical accidents, $4.0 million in hull damage for each accident would have been averted, 104 

### which equals $12 million for ten years or $1.2 million annually. Finally, we use $5.6 million as the estimated accident investigation cost pe r accident, which equals $1.7 million annually. 105 

### This estimate is based on the investigation costs of fede ral agencies and private industries and aircraft wreckage removal. 106 

### When summed over the 10-year period 2014 through 2023, the base case

104 As in the Initial SRIA, this Final SRIA revises the base case estimate of hull value found in the original RIA. This estimate of hull damage is derived by averaging the low end estimated value of the aircraft types involved in the ten

‐ year accident history cited in Table 5 as found in the Airliner Price Guide (Summer 2012). Note that three of the six historic accidents resulted in destroyed aircraft while the other three resulted in substantial damage. As a result, using replacement value of the aircraft as the estimate of the hull damage may overestimate benefits if repairing the damaged aircraft was less costly than replacing it after an accident. 105 The inclusion of accident investigation costs as a benefit category was not included in the original RIA. Rather, the cost associated with accident investigations was added to address a specific concern raised by flightcrew members for cargo operators in associated litigation who asserted these costs should have been included. Since this cost is reasonably quantifiable, the FAA has determined that it is appropriate to consider. 106 The estimated accident investigation cost was derived from Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide , prepared by GRA for the FAA (October 3, 2007, 8

‐ 4 and 8

‐ 5) and inflated using the GDP deflator. Specifically, the value for a major investigation ($10.5 million in 2011 dollars) was used for the three76 

### estimate is $401 million ($246 million present va lue at seven percent and $322 million present value at three percent).



### Passenger Operations High Case Estimate

Because airplane accidents are relatively rare they are not necessari ly representative of actual risk, especially with rega rd to airplane size and the num ber of people onboard. In addition, future conditions will be different than they were when the accident occurred. Thus, the base case estimate for passenger operations represents a sn apshot of the risk that fatigue introduces in the overall operating environment. It considers ne ither the forecasted increase in load factors nor the larger aircraft types. The future preventable events that this rule addresses will not exactly mirror the past events because the airplane types, utilization, and seating capacity have changed. To quantify the expected benefits in the passenger operations high case scenario, we narrowed the analysis to three of the six histor ic accidents which were catastrophic (all onboard died). In this case, the expected number of pr eventable catastrophic accidents equals the three accidents multiplied by the 52.5 percent effectivene ss rate. Thus, over a 10- year time period, the expected number of preventable accidents is 1.575. Using the Poisson distribution, there is roughly a 20 percent chance for no accident; however, there is also a 47 percent probability of

two or more accidents. While the 20-year accident history has a broa der range of catastrophic accidents, in the shorter 10-year historical period, all three cata strophic accidents were on regional airplanes. We recognize that as regional airp lanes are smaller than the ‘typi cal’ passenger je t, assuming all

catastrophic accidents and the weighted average for air carriers ($0.6 million in 2011 dollars) was used for the non ‐ catastrophic accidents, resulting in an average cost of $5.6 million in 2011 dollars.77 

### future accidents would be on a regional jet understates the relative risk across the fleet of aircraft affected by this rule. It does, however, repres ent historical accidents and may be somewhat representative of actual future risk, since the mainline carrier s typically have collective bargaining agreements that are already largely reflective of the require ments of this rule. 107 

### The B737 and A320 represent typical sized ai rplanes in the forecast period, with an expected number of passengers and crew of 123 given a forecasted 143-seat airplane and a load factor of 83 percent. 108 

### Even though there was a (relative ly large) B757 passenger airplane accident in the 20 year history, if one looks at the past 10 years as truly repres entative of risk, the preventable accident would likely be on a regional airplane. For the high case, the FAA backed away fr om a benefit outcome based on mean fleet, flight hours, and occupant numbers because ultima tely we were persuaded there was information which could not be ignored by the three regi onal passenger accidents occurring without a mainline passenger accident. For this reason, we se lected an 88-seat regional jet (like an ERJ175) to be the representative airplane for the high case. This size airplane is also consistent with the fact that regional ope rators are expected to fly somewhat larger airplanes in the future. The expected benefit from this high cas e follows a simple methodology for estimating and then valuing the expected number of occupant s in a prevented accident. With a total of 0.3 accidents per year over the ten year period multi plied by the 52.5 percent effectiveness rate, the analysis assumes 0.1575 average accidents per y ear. The estimated occupant value for each

107 It is unusual that collective bargaining agreements would closely mirror regulatory requirements. However, flight and duty limitations are unique because they address both safety considerations, which are regulatory in nature, and lifestyle considerations, which are properly addressed in collective bargaining agreements. Because of the impact of collective bargaining agreements on the number of hours that flightcrew members work, those agreements were considered by the FAA in calculating both the costs and benefits of this rule. 108 FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2011

‐ 2031 , Tables 6 and 9.78 

### averted accident equals the average number of s eats (88) multiplied by the load factor of 77 percent plus four crew members fo r a total of 72 averted fatalities. 109 

### Each of these prevented fatalities is multiplied by a $6.2 million value of statistical life. The expected value of a preventable accident equals the sum of the aver ted fatalities at $446.4 million added to the value of the airplane hull loss ($24.0 million replacement value), 110 

### and accident investigation costs ($10.5 million for a major investigation) for a pr evented accident benefi t of $480.9 million. Over a 10-year period, the value of preventing the expected 1.575 accidents equals approximately $757 million ($465 million present value at seven pe rcent and $609 million pr esent value at three percent).



### Cargo

‐ only Operations Base Case Estimate

Just as in the benefit anal ysis for passenger operations, th e cargo-only base case estimate uses historical events to determine the preventabl e accident benefits for the future benefits. There was one air cargo accident during the 10-year analysis period, which occurred July 26, 2002. 111



### In this accident, three crew members were seriously injure d and the hull and cargo were destroyed. Thus, the quantifiable benefit of preventing such an accident in the future consists of averting serious injury to three flightcrew memb ers, the value of the hull and the cargo, and the public and private cost of the accident investigat ion. After estimating the value of each benefit, we apply an effectiveness rating of 15 pe rcent to the sum of these benefits.

109 Assumed load factor of 77 percent is based on forecasted load factors for regional carriers found in Table 25, FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years 2011

‐ 2031

. 110 The value for an ERJ

‐ 175 is taken from Airliner Price Guide (Summer 2012). 111 NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Collision with Trees on Final Approach, Federal Express Flight 1478, Boeing 727

‐ 232, N497FE, Tallahassee, Florida, July 26, 2002 (Washington, DC, June 8, 2004, NTSB/AAR

‐ 04/02)79 

### The value of averting three seriously inju red flightcrew members is $2.16 million. This value is based on the DOT policy guidance that st ates the value of a person losing productivity from a “serious” injury is 10.5 percen t of the value of statistical life. 112 

### Thus, the value of avoiding a serious injury to one flightcrew member is $0.65 million (10.5 percent multiplied by $6.2 million). In response to comments to the Init ial SRIA, this Final SR IA also includes an

estimate of the cost of medical treatment for a serious injury, $70,000. 113 

### The total value for avoiding a serious injury, including medical costs associated with the injury is $0.72 million or $2.16 million for three flightcrew members. The Initial SRIA used the value of a Boeing 727 as the estimated value of avoiding a hull loss for the base case because the only cargo accident during the 10-year history involved a B727-200F. However, comments made regarding th e Initial SRIA stated that the Boeing 727 is no longer in common usage and the estimated value for a Boeing 727 of $1.8 million was too low. In response, the FAA modified the base cas e to represent a typical narrow-body aircraft in common use today, the Boeing 757. The FAA esti mates the hull value of a B757-200F to be $15.2 million based on an average replacement value for a B757-200F made between 1983 and

1999. 114 

### We estimate the average value of cargo on a B757-200F to be $3.7 million. While the FAA is unaware of published esti mates for the value of air cargo, we derived the average value

112 DOT, Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in Departmental Analyses

– 2011 Interim Adjustment (July 29, 2011) 113 The NHTSA estimate of medical costs for treating an AIS Category 3 (“Serious”) injury updated to 2011 dollars using the GDP deflator. (Lawrence Blincoe et al., The Economic Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes 2000 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, May 2002), 9, Table 2.) 114 Airliner Price Guide (Summer 2011), 138

‐ 141. As with the passenger base case, use of the replacement value of the aircraft as a component of the estimate of benefits from avoiding a non ‐ catastrophic accident may be an over estimate, if the costs of repairing the aircraft are lower than the replacement value of the aircraft.80 

### per ton of air cargo by assessing the commodity flow value and commodity flow weight of goods transported by air from the 2007 Commodity Flow Survey (CFS). 115 

### Because both the airfreight weight of shipment and airfreight value of co mmodities vary by origination or destination, the average was used. Inflation adjusted average cargo value per ton of $87,082 was calculated by dividing the origin-destination averaged airf reight value of comm odities by the corresponding averaged airfreight weight of sh ipment, with the inflation rate based upon the Gross Domestic Product deflator. The average cargo value of $3.7 million was calculated by multiplying the maximum cargo weight capacity of a B757-200F ai rcraft (42.9 tons) by the average cargo value per ton ($87,082). 116 

### This estimate is based on a car go load factor of 100 percent. We include the weighted average cost of acci dent investigation ($0.6 million) as a benefit

category. 117 

### The total of the averted costs from three serious injuries of $2.16 million, complete loss of a B757-200F hull valued at $15.2 million, comple te loss of $3.7 million in cargo value, and investigation costs of $0.6 million, equals base case benefits of $21.7 million. The final rule has an effectiveness rating of 15 percent for this accid ent. Multiplying the potential benefits of $21.7 million by the 15 percent effectiveness yields a base case benefit estimate of $3.255 million over the 10-year period, or $0.326 million per year.

The FAA assumes the likelihood of an accident occurring in any year of the forecast period is equal, or uniformly distributed. Total estimated benefit of applying the final rule to

115 Data based on Commodity Flow Survey 2007, a joint survey conducted by the Census Bureau and BTS and updated every 5 years

. ( http://www.bts.gov/publicat ions/commodity_flow_surv ey/2007/state_summaries/ ) 116 Jesse Johnson and Eric Gaier, Air Cargo Operations Cost Database (Hampton, VA: NASA Langley Research Center, April 1998, NASA/CR

‐ 1998

‐ 207655), Table 5

‐ 3. 117 Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide , prepared by GRA for the FAA (October 3, 2007, 8

‐ 4 and 8

‐ 5), and inflated using the GDP deflator.81 

### cargo-only operations over the analysis peri od for the base case is $3.26 million. The present value benefits are $2.00 million when discoun ted at seven percent and $2.62 million when discounted at three percent.



### High Case Estimate

The high benefit case is based on the same accident scenario as in the base case, that is, a single accident, but with a more severe outcome. The high case estimate projects preventing one catastrophic air cargo accide nt over a 10-year period. In response to comments to the Initial SR IA, this Final SRIA adjusts the high case benefits scenario to consider the catastrophic loss of a typical wide-body aircraft. The FAA has determined that a mid-range MD-11 with an es timated replacement value of $23.5 million is an appropriate aircraft to represent a typical wide-body cargo aircraft hull. 118 

### The MD-11 has a cargo capacity of 101 tons. 119 

### Applying the average per ton va lue of air cargo of $87,082 and assuming 100 percent load factor, this results in an estimated benefit of $8.8 million from avoiding the loss of cargo. 120 

### In response to the Initial SRIA, there were comments regarding the assumed number of people on board a cargo flight during a potential future catastrophic accident for the high case. IPA pointed out that there are sometimes non-crew passengers on cargo-only flights and ALPA pointed out that an extended range MD-11 might have a double crew. However, neither

118 IPA provided the $23.5 million hull value estimate in its comments to the Initial SRIA. That value lies between the retail and wholesale values for a 1992 MD

‐ 11 published in Airliner Price Guide (Winter 2012) and is therefore

an appropriate value estimate to use because the average age of a cargo aircraft is approximately 20 years. 119 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 17. 120 Jesse Johnson and Eric Gaier, Air Cargo Operations Cost Database (Hampton, VA: NASA Langley Research Center, April 1998, NASA/CR

‐ 1998

‐ 207655), Table 5

‐ 3.82 

### commenter provided data on the average or typical number of people on a cargo-only flight. In the absence of data on regarding the typical or average situations, the FAA reviewed the history of all US carrier cargo-only fa tal accidents during the histori cal accident period (1991 to 2000) and finds that for the 5 accidents, an average of 3.2 people were on board the aircraft. The FAA also received comments that the FAA had negl ected to factor in th e possibility of ground fatalities from a cargo accident. Again, the FAA re viewed the 10-year accid ent history and found that there were 0.4 ground fatalities on averag e from cargo accidents involving US carriers. Therefore, the FAA assumes there would be 3.6 fata lities in the high case benefits scenario for cargo-only operations. See Table C.8 in Appendix C for details on the historical fatal accidents from cargo operations of US carriers. Applying th e estimated VSL of $6.2 million results in an estimated benefit from avoiding fatalities for the high case of $22.3 million over 10 years. Similar to the passenger high case analysis, we include the cost of a major accident investigation ($10.5 million), which includes public and private accident investigation cost, and aircraft wreckage removal. 121



### In total, the estimated bene fit of preventing an accident in the high case is $65.1 million. Multiplying the estimated benefit of preventing one accident by a 15 percent effectiveness rating equals $9.77 million over the 10-year period or $0.977 per year. The total estimated benefit of applying the final rule to cargo-only operations over the analysis period is $9.77 million ($5.99 million present value at seven percent, and $7.85 million present value at three percent). Table

121 Petitioners in the related litigation argued that the FAA should have included the impact of averted hazardous material spills in calculating benefits. Potential costs from hazardous materials on ‐ board are not included here. There is no historical basis to project any impact, as DOT reporting indicates there were only two “hazmat” accidents involving aviation in the last ten years and there was no cost to the public from those accidents (Hazmat Intelligence Portal, U.S. Department of Transportation. Data as of 9/10/2012). We include anecdotal information

on environmental clean

‐ up in a new sensitivity analysis included in Appendix B.83 

### C.4 and Table C.5 in Appendix C provide details of these calculations.

This Final SRIA includes an additional sens itivity analysis to e xplore whether using nonstandard assumptions would impact the central conclusion that the costs of extending the final rule to cargo-only operations vast ly outweigh the benefits. That se nsitivity uses the assumptions developed for the high case benefits estimates which are modified to include a larger aircraft (a Boeing 747), includes some anecdotal informa tion on the potentia ls costs of environmental cleanup after an airline accident, and uses an u pdated VSL to estimate the value of preventing

fatalities. 122 

### The results of this sensitivity analys is, discussed in Appendix B, support the conclusion that the costs of extending the final rule to cargo-only operations far exceed the

benefits.



## Non

‐ Quantified Benefits

The FAA was able to quantify the following ca tegories of benefits from averting aviation accidents related to flightcrew member fati gue: avoiding onboard and on-ground fatalities, avoiding loss of aircraft and car go, avoiding medical costs associat ed with non-fatal injuries, and avoiding accident investigation costs. Although the FAA was not ab le to identify information on the average or typical costs of environmenta l cleanup from an aviation accident, we have explored the possible magnitude of that benefit category using anecdotal information in the sensitivity analysis included in Appendix B. In addition to the categori es discussed above, the

122 This Final SRIA is based on DOT guidance on valuing the prevention of accidental fatalities that was in effect at the time that the analysis was performed. Subsequent to the analysis, but before this Final SRIA was published, revised DOT guidance on the value of statistical life was issued.84 

### FAA believes there are additional categories of be nefits from the final rule although the FAA was not able to quantify the magnitude of them. Avoiding loss of life re lating to destruction of critical medical supplies. As pointed out by IPA in its comments rega rding the Initial SRIA, vital medical supplies are often transported by air. Transplant organs are a vi vid example of air cargo that is vital and not replaceable. The value of such mate rials is greater than the selli ng price of cargo and includes the life that might be lost as the result of the dest ruction of those vital me dical supplies. However, the FAA has no information on the prevalence of su ch materials in air cargo upon which to base a benefits estimate. Our impression is that such instances of truly life or death cargo are quite rare when compared to the total volume of all air cargo. Long term health benefits to flig htcrew members from reduced fatigue. As discussed in the preamble to the final rule, there may be lo ng-term health benefits from reducing fatigue for flightcrew members although the FAA was not able to quantify them. However, the cost section

includes an estimate of the cost sa vings in the form of reduced use of sick time resulting from the final rule’s positive impact on short term health outcomes. Benefits of having well rested flightcrew members to solve minor problems before they become accidents. This category of benefits was disc ussed in the NPRM as well. The FAA was not able to develop a quantitative esti mate of the magnitude of this benefit. Avoidance of runway closure. As pointed out by IPA in its comments on the Initial SRIA, in some cases, an accident on take-off or landing could result in closure of a runway or even the entire airport during the emergency re sponse, clean up, and investigation phases after the accident. A runway closure can result in can celled flights, delayed fl ights, and re-routings, which would have operational cost impacts on car riers and time costs to passengers and perhaps85 

### even the costs of foregone or delayed trips. However, the FAA is not aware of any single database that systematically records runway cl osures after accidents or impacts of any such closures in terms of say, flights diverted, de layed, or cancelled, or th e number of passengers affected. Therefore, the FAA was not able to quantify this cat egory of benefits.



## Benefit Summary

The new requirements in this final rule will eliminate the current rest and duty distinctions between domestic, flag and suppl emental operations as the requirements apply universally to all part 121 certi ficate holders conducting passenge r operations. The sleep science, while still evolving, is clear in a few important respects: most pe ople need seven to nine hours of sleep to function effectively; most people find it more difficult to sleep during day than during the night, resulting in greater fa tigue if working at night; the longer one has been awake and the longer one spends on task, the greater the likeliho od of fatigue; and fatigue leads to an increased risk of making a mistake. The requirements cont ained in this final rule and the accompanying analysis are designed to reduce th e factors that lead to fatigue in most individuals and for all flight crew. The actual benefits of the final rule will depe nd upon the type and size of accident that the rule averts. Because we recognize the potential variability in the quantified benefits of this final rule, we provide a base case estimate and a high case estimate for both passenger and cargoonly operations. Our base case estimate of the bene fits of the final rule as applied to passenger operations is $401 million ($246 million present valu e at seven percent and $322 million at three percent) and our high case estimate is $757 million ($465 million present value at seven percent and $609 million at three percent). If the final rule were extended to cargo- only operations, our base case estimate of86 

### additional benefits for that population is $3 m illion ($2 million present value at seven percent and $3 million present value three percent), and our high case estimate is $10 million ($6 million present value at seven percent and $8 million present value at three percent). In addition, the following categories of benefits were not quantifiable:

 Avoiding loss of life relati ng to destruction of cr itical medical supplies.

 Long term health benefits to flight crew members from reduced fatigue.

 Avoidance of ramp/taxiway accidents.

 Benefits of having well rested flight crew members to solve minor problems before they become accidents.

 Avoidance of runway closure following an accident. 

## Cost Analysis The cost of the final rule to part 121 passe nger air carriers can be categorized into three main cost components: flight op erations, training, and rest faci lities. Flight operations cost consists of three subcomponents: crew sche duling cost, computer programming of crew management systems cost, and cost savings a ssociated with reduced use of sick time by flightcrew members because of reduced fatigue. Training cost consists of two subcomponents: dispatchers and management fatigue training cost, and curriculum development cost. Rest

facilities cost consists of four subcomponents: engineerin g cost, installation cost, aircraft downtime cost, and increased fuel usage cost. The final rule costs were ca lculated using industryprovided data whenever possible, along with expert analysis.

The total estimated cost of the final rule is $462 million for the 12-year period from 2012 to 2023. The present value is $320 million and $391 million using a seven percent and a three percent discount rate , respectively. If the rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, the additional cost of the rule would be $452 million in nominal terms, $292 million and $371 million using seven percent and three pe rcent discount rates, respectively.87 

### The 2014 effective date of the final rule allowed two years for carriers to become compliant with the final rule. The FAA classi fied costs into thre e main components and estimated the accompanying costs. Data used for the cost estimation was obtained from various industry sources, the sources of whic h are explained in each section. Table 6 and Table 7 present the estimates of the three main cost components for passenger operations and cargo-only operations, respectively. Each of the main cost components are explained in-depth in the followi ng sections of this document. Table 6: Cost Summary (2012 – 2023), Pa ssenger Operations, (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Flight Operations $297 $184 $240



### Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135 

### Training $19 $12 $16



### Total $462 $320 $391 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding Table 7: Cost Summary (2012 – 2023), Car go-Only Operations, (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Flight Operations $382 $235 $307



### Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58 

### Training $7 $4 $5



### Total $452 $292 $371 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding88 

## Flight Operations Cost

The flight operations cost component of the final rule is composed of three subcomponents: crew scheduling costs, crew mana gement system computer programming costs, and payroll cost savings from re ducing flightcrew member fatigue. 123 

### Table 8 and Table 9 provide a summary of the three subcomponents of the flight operations cost for passenger operations and cargo-only operati ons respectively. The derivations of subc omponent costs are explained in-depth in the following sections of the document. The explanation for these different cost components found in this Fina l SRIA and the Initial SRIA is structured slight ly differently than the explanation found in the original RIA. Additionally, in a few instances, the manner of calculating these cost components ha s been modified for clarity, consistency, and to correct some calculation and reporting errors.

Table 8: Summary of Flight Operations Costs (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Flight Operations Cost Subcomponent Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Crew Scheduling $515 $316 $414 

### Computer Programming $8 $7 $7 

### Payroll Savings from Reducing Fatigue -$225 -$138 -$181 

### Total Flight Operations $297 $184 $240 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

123 Operators might be able to reduce their flight operations costs by developing and implementing a fatigue risk management system (FRMS). The FAA is not imposing an FRMS program requirement on part 121 carriers, but does allow carriers the FRMS option. Carriers might develop an FRMS program as an alternative to the final rule flightcrew member duty and rest requirements when the crew scheduling cost savings equal or exceed the costs of the FRMS program. Carriers might do this for ultra

‐ long flights, which have flight times over 16 hours. FRMS is optional and would only be implemented by an operator if their compliance costs could be reduced as FRMS only provides cost relief. We did not estimate this potential savings as we do not know how many operators would use FRMS and the cost of FRMS has a wide range.89 

### Table 9: Summary of Flight Operations Costs (2012 – 2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $Millions)

Flight Operations Cost Subcomponent Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Crew Scheduling $431 $265 $347 

### Computer Programming $2 $1 $2 

### Payroll Savings from Reducing Fatigue -$51 -$31 -$41 

### Total Flight Operations $382 $235 $307 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding



### Crew Scheduling

Overview Numerous commenters objected to the FAA’s assumptions regarding the 25 percent costsavings resulting from long-term scheduling op timization in the NPRM. To address these concerns, the FAA estimated the scheduling compliance costs using a commercial crew scheduling program. The final rule’s impact on crew scheduling costs was evaluated using Cygnus, a pairing and bid line optimizer developed by CrewPairings, Inc. 124 

### A selection of part 121 air carriers provided actual crew schedule data to the FAA for assistance in the cost analysis of the Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requi rements Rulemaking. Each carrier provided data

for one or more “cases.” A case is defined as a carrier fleet, which usually consists of one aircraft type. In some of the cases, th e carrier schedules multip le aircraft types us ing the same pool of flightcrew members; the methodology in the original RIA (also used in this Final SRIA and the Initial SRIA) mirrors actual carrier practice.

124 Cygnus has been used by more than 30 major airlines worldwide over the past 40 years.90 

### In total, carriers provided data for eight cases. This analysis is necessarily limited by the willingness of carriers to provide this detailed crew scheduling data. However, we believe the cases used in this analysis represent the spectrum of cost structures pres ent in the part 121 air transportation industry. Mainlin e passenger carriers were repres ented with two short-haul, narrow-body aircraft cases and two long-haul, wide-body aircra ft cases. Regional passenger carriers were represented with two cases. 125 

### Freight carriers were represented with one shorthaul, narrow-body aircraft case and one long-haul, wide-body aircraft case. In addition to the eight cases based on actua l carrier fleets, a synthetic supplemental carrier case was created because no supplemental carriers provided crew schedule data. Creation of the synthetic supplemental carrier involved modification of the freight wide-body case. The flight schedules and crew bases of the frei ght wide-body case were retained because cargo carriers comprise the major share of supplementa l carriers. The freight carrier CBA rules were replaced with those reflecting a representative supplemental ca rrier CBA. The representative supplemental carrier CBA reflected rules from a number of actual supplemental carrier CBAs. These changes reflect the impacts of this final rule on actual supplement al passenger carriers operating wide-body aircraft with route structures similar to the freight wi de-body aircraft case.

The crew schedule data consisted of one sc heduling period (month) per case. The specific periods varied by carrier, based on data availability. The data incl uded flight schedules, aircraft flow information, pairings and the carrier’s rule set (contractual, manage ment, and discretionary rules). The use of a pairing and bid line optimi zer enabled the FAA to mo re accurately model the

125 Most regional carriers operate code

‐ share flights for a number of mainline partners; crew scheduling is usually performed separately for each mainline partner. This analysis was conducted using the same process as the actual carrier, so each regional carrier case represents a sub

‐ fleet.91 

### impacts of the final rule on industry crew sche duling costs than was possible during NPRM cost analysis. The pairing and bid line optimizer has been used wo rldwide by many types of airlines for their own crew scheduling needs and addresses the optimization and scheduling limitations in the NPRM cost analysis. Due to this extensive re al-world experience, results for these eight cases can be expected to accurately portray the impact s of the final rule on crew scheduling costs for

the cases studied.

Crew Scheduling Analysis Accurately analyzing the fina l rule’s impact on crew sc heduling costs for each of the cases required isolating the final rule’s impact from the impacts of various contractual, management, and discretionary crew scheduling practices. The pairing and bid line optimizer was first calibrated to ensure that it was capable of creating crew schedule s virtually identical to the crew schedules provided by the carriers. After calibration, existing federal regulations relevant to flightcrew member scheduling were removed from the optimizer and replaced with the final rule requirements. Changes in crew sche duling cost could then be attributed solely to

the final rule. The first step in optimizer calibration was receiving and formatting the input data from carriers. The input data included flight schedules, aircraft flow informati on, pairings, regulations, carrier’s unit costs (cre dit hour pay rate, per diem, and hotel room costs), and the carrier’s rule set from the carriers’ crew management systems. Carrier rule sets included parameters for crew bases, maximum/minimum flight time, rest tim e, duty time, and ground time to allow aircraft changes and are based on contract ual, management, and discretiona ry rules. The pairings that were received directly from the carriers in this first step are referred to as the “production

solution.” Since no modifications were made to the production solution by the FAA or the92 

### optimizer, the production solution accurately represents the current crew scheduling environment, including all regulatory, contra ctual, management, and discretionary rules. Once the production solution was established, the bid lines and pairings were set aside. The optimizer was run using only th e flight schedules, aircraft fl ow information, federal aviation regulations, and the carrier’s rule set. The optimizer then create d its own bid lines and pairings, which are referred to as the “baseline solution.” The baseline solution was compared to the production solution using a number of metrics, such as the amount of credit hours, duty periods, hotel room nights required, distri bution of time among crew bases, num ber of aircraft swaps, etc.

Once the baseline solution was identical or vi rtually identical to the production solution, the optimizer was deemed calibrated for each of the cases. This calibration of the optimi zer verified that the optimi zer could accurately reproduce the crew scheduling process at each of the carriers. That is , the baseline solution could be substituted for the production solution at each carr ier with no material ch ange in crew scheduling

cost. To determine the impact of the final rule, th e regulations in the ba seline solution were replaced with the final rule. All provisions of the final rule were implemented in this analysis, including maximum flight time, maximum flight duty time, minimum rest time, and cumulative limits. All other, non-regulatory rules from the baseline solution were retained. Using these inputs, the optimizer created bid lin es and pairings referred to as the “final rule solution.” Since the only difference between the baseline solution and the final rule solution was the substitution

of the final rule for the existin g regulations, the change in cost components between the solutions is solely attributable to the final rule.93 

### In the course of reviewing th e calculations used in estimatin g scheduling costs in support of drafting the Initial SRIA, the FAA became aware th at in the original RIA, in eight of the nine cases, the number of aircraft bl ock hours differed slightly between the baseline run and the final

rule run. This minor difference is due to the trea tment of so called “carry -in/carry-out” flights. Industry practice is to construct each trip pairin g such that each flightcrew member starts and ends the scheduling period at th eir crew base. Consequently, so me bid lines outputted by the optimizer would have left flight crew members away from their cr ew base at the beginning or end of the scheduling period (month). In those inst ances, it is airline practice to include those segments as part of the bid lines for the adjoin ing month (i.e., “carrying” the flightcrew member in or out of the month). While that is reasonabl e practice for airlines, th e practice resulted in introducing a source of variation between the baseline and final ru le run that was not caused by the final rule. That is, because the final rule re sults in different bid lines being constructed, the segments identified as carry-in or carry-out often differ as well. The FAA continues to use the original result s as the basis for this Final SRIA (as was done for the Initial SRIA). Howe ver, Appendix B contains a sens itivity analysis whereby the final rule results are adjusted to explore the possi ble magnitude of the imp act of the difference in

aircraft block hours on the crew scheduling cost estimates caused by the carry-in/carry-out

variation. Table 10 shows the change in cost components a ttributable to the final rule for each case. Note that cases which had no changes in either domestic or international time away from base94 

### (TAFB) were cases that were either so lely domestic or solely international. 126 

### More details on the analysis of each case used in this analysis can be found in the GRA summary report found in the docket associated with this rule-making. 127



### Table 10: Change in Monthly Flightcrew Schedu ling Cost Elements Due to Final Rule, by Case

Industry Group Case Baseline Solution Lines of

Flying Change in Credit Hours Change in Domestic TAFB Hours Change in International TAFB Hours Change in Hotel Stays

Passenger Narrow

‐ body A 924 2,187 18,660 0 660 B 1,698

‐ 429

‐ 15,035 1,030

‐ 944 Passenger Wide

‐ body C 1,121

‐ 70 3,863 8,348 791 D 430

‐ 965 0

‐ 2,741

‐ 34 Regional E 300 57 5,812 0 280 F 240 37 4,148

‐ 16 144 Supplemental I 806 4,642 3,159 9,759 756 Freight Narrow

‐ body G 330 560 890 2,390 54 Freight Wide

‐ body H 1,053 984 6,197 862 240

It is interesting to note that in some instances , the rule change results in the potential for cost savings. For instance, while one provision of the final rule requires increased rests between duty periods for domestic operations, the final rule also allows for increased flying time in certain situations as well as reduced rest times between duty periods for some international operations.

126 In response to a comment on the Initial SRIA, the text in column headings in certain tables has been changed from “Flightcrew Members” to “Lines of Flying” to better communicate the content of the information. 127 GRA, Inc. Summary of CrewPairings, Inc. Economic Analysis of Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Rulemaking. (Jenkintown, PA, September 2012)95 

### Given that maximum flight time and fli ght duty period time now depend on time of day, acclimation, number of flightcrew members, and number of segments, there are situations where flightcrew members can work more hours per duty period under the final rule than under the previous rule, as well as some flights that can now be flown w ith fewer flightcrew members. In some cases, the changes are small. For in stance, maximum flight time per duty period for domestic flights was extended from 8 to 9 hours for duty peri ods beginning from 0500-1959. However, the flight time limits now are in effect fo r actual flight time, rather than planned flight time, which means in practice, carriers will not be able to fully schedule the additional hour of flight time but instead will leave a buffer to al low for instances of unplanned flight delays. In other cases, though, airlines can potentially see significant savings; for example, international flights with three flightcrew members were prev iously limited to 12 hours flying and have now been increased to 13 flight hours, and in so me cases, extended to 17 flight duty hours under certain time of day and rest facility combinatio ns. For some classes of long-haul flying, this means that instead of needing two additional flightcrew members, only one additional flightcrew member is needed. Similarly, rest periods have also potentially decreased for some route types (particularly international), reduc ing the amount of TAFB and cred it hours accruing to flightcrew

members. As an example, Case D de picted in Table 10 shows savings in terms of credit hours, international TAFB, and hotel stay s due to the final rule. The flight segments in Case D were exclusively international flights and the existin g schedules already allo wed rest periods that exceeded the minimum rest period required by the final rule. Additionally, Case D had instances where the increase in flight time allowed by the rule was particularly beneficial and allowed96 

### certain flights to Europe to be operated with one less flightcrew member which resulted in significant cost savings. One of the passenger narrow-body cases and both passenger wide-body cases (Cases B – D) demonstrated decreases in credit hours. The other passenger narrow-body case (Case A) showed an increase in credit hours of 2.9 percent, while both regional car riers (Cases E and F) had credit hour increases of only 0.2 percent. Th e freight and supplemental cases (Cases G – I) had credit hour increases ranging from 1.2 percent to 7.2 percent. TAFB and hotel rooms rose for some passenger carrier cases and fell for others (but generally less than 7.5 percent in either direction), depending largely on the relevant sc hedule and collective bargaining agreement. TAFB and hotel rooms increased for the regional cases (between 5 percent and 9 percent) as their current scheduling practice is optimized ar ound the minimum rest time of the current rule. Freight and supplemental carriers saw across-the-board increases in time away from base and

hotel rooms. In terms of the final rule’s impact on the wo rk schedules of flight crew members at an individual level, the most striking change is for the supplemental case. Flightcrew members in the supplemental case under the fi nal rule will now have two fe wer duty hours per duty period, on average, whereas the other cases showed mo re modest changes in the number of duty hours per duty period (fewer than 30 mi nutes increase or decrease). Th e discrepancy results because

the difference between the current rules and fi nal rule was most pronounced for supplemental operations.97 

### More details on the specifics of each of the cases can be found in the GRA summary

report. 128



### Estimates of Unit Costs We made separate estimates of each of the unit costs for each cost component (credit hour costs, per diem hourly rates, and cost per hot el room) for different types of air carriers. The

estimates are based on actual cost data for a variety of air carriers , wherever possible. The first step of the unit cost estimation pr ocess was to define a collection of industry groups that would collectively cove r all part 121 air carriers and that would group air carriers together based on similarity of characteristics th at would influence their crew scheduling costs. Air carriers were assigned to one of the resulting ei ght industry groups ba sed on a number of metrics such as operating authorit y, aircraft fleet, aircraft uti lization, markets se rved, collective bargaining agreements, etc. In a few cases, a carri er might have been cl assified as a freight carrier even if it did not perf orm any cargo-only operations (or as a passenger carrier even if it did not perform any passenger operations). In thes e instances, other characteristics of the air carrier, such as fleet type or collective bargai ning agreement, were considered to be a more influential factor on crew scheduling costs than whether the carrier tr ansported passengers or cargo. Note that the eventual allocation of costs between pa ssenger and cargo-only operations was based on what the air carrier actually transp orts, not its industry gr oup classification. Table

128 GRA, Inc. Summary of CrewPairings, Inc. Economic Analysis of Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Rulemaking. (Jenkintown, PA, September 2012)98 

### 11 lists the number of air carr iers in each group and the number of flightcrew members in each

group. 129 

### Table C.1 in Appendix C presents further deta il regarding the air carrier classifications.

Table 11: Air Carrier Classifi cation into Industry Groups

Industry Group Number of Part 121 Carriers Total Number of Flightcrew Members Passenger Integrated 7 36,013 Passenger Narrow

‐ body 14 11,899

Passenger Wide

‐ body 1 150 Regional 38 20,511 Supplemental 8 1,674 Freight Integrated 3 7,230 Freight Narrow

‐ body 16 846

Freight Wide

‐ body 3 914 Total 90 79,237

Table 12 presents a summary of the data and calculations used to estimate average credit hour costs per flightcrew member. As shown in Table C.11 of Appendix C, Bureau of Transportation Statistics Form 41 data (Item 51230, Pilots and Copilots, from Schedul e P-5.2) was used to determine the total flightcrew cost for each carrier (Column [A] in Table C.11). Block hours for each carrier were taken from the AirHoursRamp item in the Air Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type report (Column [B] in Table C.11). Both data

sources were the most current available at the tim e of the drafting of the original RIA, reflecting the first three quarters of 2010. 130 

### Total flightcrew cost data a nd aircraft block hour data were

129 The original RIA differed from the classifications used here in a few instances. 130 There was no adjustment made for inflation, as flightcrew member wages are negotiated through contracts.99 

### each summed across carriers by relevant industry group. 131 

### Each industry group’s sum of total flightcrew cost was divided by that industry group’s sum of aircraft block hours. For the passenger integrated carriers, this informati on was summarized separately for narrow-body and wide-body aircraft to preserve the distinct ion between narrow-body a nd wide-body flightcrew member pay rates. 132 

### These calculations resulted in the aver age total flightcrew cost per aircraft block hour (Column [C] inTable C.11). In response to comments regarding the Initial SRIA, the FAA has revised the analys is of pilot costs to include the co sts of employer provided benefits. Wages and salaries account for 70.3 percent of total compensation while benefits account for 29.7 percent. 133 

### However, not all categories of empl oyer provided benefits increase with additional hours worked by an individual employee. The FAA has determined that retirement and savings benefits and legall y required benefits (Social Secu rity and Medicare, federal and state unemployment insurance and workers compen sation) increase with a dditional hours worked while paid leave, supplemental pay, and insuran ce do not. The categories of benefits that vary with hours worked are on average 11.9 percent of total compensation. Therefore, the fully burdened average incremental flightcrew cost per block hour (Column [D] in Table C.11 is calculated by multiplying Column [C] of Table C.11 by 1.169 (70.3 + 11.9 / 70.3). The fully

131 Note that here and elsewhere where data on aircraft block hours are used, the block hours associated with Beechcraft Beech 18 C

‐ 185 and Cessna 208 Caravan have been omitted because corresponding Pilot/CoPilot costs were not available. In addition, the records relating to Arrow Air, Inc. have been excluded from this analysis as that carrier ceased operations in the middle of 2010. 132 The Form 41 data for freight integrated carriers did not support separate calculations for narrow ‐ body and wide

‐ body credit hour costs. The resulting pay rates would have inferred that pay rates for narrow ‐ body flightcrew members are higher than wide

‐ body pay rates, a finding which does not correspond with usual industry practice. The issue appears to lie with the detailed reporting of this block hour and Pilot/CoPilot cost data by aircraft type. To avoid these reporting issues for freight carriers, we use only total Pilot/CoPilot cost and aircraft block hours for each carrier in the freight industry groups. 133 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for Employee Compensation

– June 2013 (Washington, DC: September 11, 2013, USDL

‐ 13

‐ 1835)100 

### burdened average incremental flightcrew cost per bl ock hours is also presen ted in Column [A] of

Table 14. To determine the average cost per block hour for an individual flightcrew member (Column [C] in Table 12), it was necessary to divi de the average total flight crew cost per aircraft block hour by the average number of pilots per flight (Column [B] in Table 12). 134 

### Further adjustments were necessary to convert the estimates of av erage cost per block hour per flightcrew member to the averag e cost per credit hour per flight crew member. First, estimated monthly credit hours per flightcrew member for each industry group were derived from analysis of AIR Inc. Salary Survey da ta (Column [D] in Table 12). 135 

### The AIR Inc. Salary Survey provided estimated monthly cred it hours per flightcrew member for 36 carriers. Weighted average estimated monthly credit hours for eac h industry group were calculated using carrier block hour data from AirHoursRamp item in the Ai r Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type report. Next, crew scheduling data provided by nine carriers to the FAA were analyzed to estimate the average number of block hours per flightcrew member per month for each industry group (Column [E] in Ta ble 12). Each of the nine carriers provided data for two separate sc heduling periods, with data for one scheduling period considered to be a "busy" month and da ta for the other considered to be a "slow"

134 Narrow

‐ body aircraft (including regional) were assumed to have two flightcrew members per flight in all cases. Note that for narrow ‐ body aircraft that require three flightcrew members (such as B727), the third flightcrew member is the flight engineer and is not reported in the Pilots and CoPilots cost item on Form 41 Schedule P

‐ 5.2. Because no cost data specific to flight engineers is available, this analysis uses the calculated pilot and copilot cost as the estimated cost for flight engineers. For wide

‐ body aircraft, the average number of flightcrew members per flight was estimated using proprietary data provided to the FAA by a number of carriers. The average number of flightcrew members per flight for integrated carriers is the average of the number of flightcrew members per flight for narrow ‐ body and wide

‐ body flights, weighted by narrow ‐ body and wide

‐ body block hours from AirHoursRamp item in the Air Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type report. 135 Dan Gradwohl and Kit Darby, [U.S. Airlines] 2006 Salary Survey (Atlanta, GA: AIR, Inc., 2007)101 

### month. 136 

### The estimates of block hours per flightcrew member for the two months were averaged together. (These data are provided in Table C.2 in Appendix C.) Dividing the average flightcrew member block hours per month by the averag e flightcrew member credit hours per month resulted in a ratio of block hours per month to credit hours per month, for each of the industry groups (Column [F] in Table 12). 137 

### Finally, the average cost pe r block hour per flightcrew member (Column [C] in Table 12) was then multip lied by the ratio of block hours per month to credit hours per month (Column [F] in Table 12) to derive the average credit hour cost per flightcrew member for each of the indus try groups (Column [G] in Table 12). 138

136 The data relating to narrow ‐ body operations of passenger carriers were used as estimates for the passenger narrow ‐ body industry group while the data relating to wide

‐ body operations of passenger carriers were used for the passenger wide

‐ body industry group. The data for all operations of passenger carriers was used for the passenger integrated group. The same method was used for the freight industry groups. 137 We note that the estimate of the average credit hours per month comes from a 2006 survey, while the average block hours per month comes from carrier data reflecting more recent years. When constructing a ratio, using data from the same time periods would obviously be preferred; however, data from contemporaneous time periods were not available. 138 This method for estimating credit hour cost per flightcrew member differs from the method used in the original RIA, and results in higher estimates of crew scheduling costs due to the final rule. The method used in the original RIA produced separate estimates of credit hour cost per flightcrew member for the passenger wide

‐ body and passenger narrow ‐ body industry groups. Those two estimates were then combined to produce an estimate of crew scheduling costs for the passenger integrated industry group. The revised method used in introduced in the Initial SRIA (and retained for this Final SRIA) produces separate estimates of credit hour cost per flightcrew member for four different passenger industry groups: carriers operating exclusively passenger narrow ‐ body aircraft, those operating only passenger wide

‐ body aircraft, narrow ‐ body aircraft operations by air carriers comprising the passenger integrated industry group, and wide

‐ body aircraft operations of carriers making up the passenger integrated industry group. (Three industry groups are used for freight: carriers operating only narrow ‐ body aircraft, carriers operating only wide

‐ body aircraft and carriers that operate both narrow ‐ body and wide

‐ body aircraft.) The impetus for this change was the observation that the estimate of credit hours per month per flightcrew member for the passenger wide

‐ body industry group reported in the original RIA (60 credit hours per month) was much different from the estimate of credit hours per flightcrew member per month for passenger integrated carriers (78 credit hours per month)

. One would expect the estimate of credit hours per flightcrew member for the passenger integrated group to be approximately equal to the weighted average of the narrow ‐ body and wide

‐ body estimates. However, averaging 60 credit hours per month (the estimate for passenger wide

‐ body operations) with 82 credit hours per month (the estimate for passenger narrow ‐ body operations) using the relative weights as shown in Table B.4 in Appendix B results in an estimate of 72 credit hours per month, which is much different than the 78 credit hours per month observed for the passenger integrated industry group. For that reason, the observed 60 credit hours per month did not appear to be an appropriate value to use for calculating costs for the passenger102 

### This approach to calculating the average credit hour cost per flightcrew member addresses NPRM comments made by several comme nters. Commenters stated that the salary data used in the NPRM RIA “does not appr oximate current, real world flightcrew unit

costs...” 139 

### ATA suggested that the FAA use DOT Form 41 data for calculation of crew salary costs. The approach to crew salary costs presented in Table 12 responds to this comment by using the most recent 2010 DOT Form 41 data avai lable as of April 2011 for the calculation of average credit hour costs pe r flightcrew member.

integrated industry group. (Note that the estimate of 78 credit hours per month per flightcrew member for the passenger integrated group that was reported in Table 10 of the original RIA was not used in calculating costs for passenger integrated carriers, because that estimate did not differentiate between narrow ‐ body and wide

‐ body operations.) The methodology used in this Final SRIA still relies on the estimate of 60 credit hours per month per flightcrew member for the passenger wide

‐ body industry group, but minimizes its influence by using it only to estimate costs for carriers that conduct passenger wide

‐ body operations exclusively. While using this revised method means that the estimate of credit hours per month per flightcrew member for the passenger and freight integrated industry groups does not distinguish between the narrow ‐ body and wide

‐ body operations of carriers in those groups (since separate credit hour per flightcrew member data for their narrow ‐ and wide

‐ body operations are not available),

we believe it results in more reliable estimates of their unit costs. 139 Air Transport Association of America, Comments. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements , (Docket No. FAA

‐ 2009

‐ 1093, November 15, 2010), 13

‐ 15, accessed March 3, 2014, http://www.regulations.go v/#!documentDetail;D=FAA

‐ 2009

‐ 1093

‐ 2333103 

### Table 12: Average Flightcrew Member Cost per Credit Hour (2011 $)

Industry

Group Fully Burdened Average Incremental

Flightcrew

Cost per Block Hr Flightcrew Members per Flight Average Flightcrew

Member Cost per Block Hr Average Flightcrew

Member

Credit Hrs/Month Average Flightcrew

Member

Block Hrs/month Ratio of Block Hrs/Month

to Credit Hrs/Month Average Flightcrew

Member Cost per Credit Hr

[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] Passenger Integrated $583 2.16 $270 78 59 0.76 $206 

### Passenger Integrated: Narrow

‐ body $473 2.00 $237 78 59 0.76 $180



### Passenger Integrated: Wide

‐ body $735 2.37 $310 78 59 0.76 $236 

### Passenger Narrow

‐ body $509 2.00 $255 82 60 0.73 $186



### Passenger Wide

‐ body $780 2.37 $329 60 59 0.98 $322



### Regional $209 2.00 $105 82 48 0.59 $62



### Supplemental $832 2.16 $384 71 44 0.61 $234 

### Freight Integrated $1,732 2.09 $829 88 44 0.50 $417



### Freight Narrow

‐ body $859 2.00 $430 62 34 0.55 $235



### Freight Wide

‐ body $990 2.09 $473 66 45 0.67 $319 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding Per-diem costs were calculated by multiplying the change in TAFB from the baseline solution to the final rule solution by the appropr iate per diem rate. Becau se flightcrew members at some carriers receive different per diem rates based on whether TAFB is domestic or international, the pairings summary in each of the solutions provided domestic and international TAFB separately. The per diem rates used in this analysis were a block-hour weighted average of104 

### carriers reporting per diem rates in the AIR Inc. Salary Survey. 140 

### Again the block hours for each

carrier were taken from Air Ca rrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Ai r Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type re port. Table 13 shows the weighted average hourly per diem rates by operator type used in this analysis. 141 

### Table 13: Hourly per Diem Rates (2011 $)

Operator Type Weighted Average Domestic per Diem Rate Weighted Average International per Diem Rate Passenger $1.94 $2.28 Regional $1.60 $1.99 Supplemental $2.06 $2.28 Freight $1.99 $2.87

Hotel costs were calculated by multiplying the ch ange in required hotel room nights from the baseline solution to the final rule solution by hot el room cost. In practice, hotel costs can vary by a number of factors including the carrier’s negotiating power with hotel chains, city size, domestic or international location, etc. The hotel room costs used in this analysis were estimated based on data provided to the FAA by various carriers and are presented in Table 14. 142

140 Dan Gradwohl and Kit Darby, [U.S. Airlines] 2006 Salary Survey (Atlanta, GA: AIR, Inc., 2007) 141 The per diem rates are from the 2006 AIR, Inc. survey. The FAA did not adjust those per diem rates for inflation

as the rates are negotiated in contracts. However, where the AIR, Inc. survey reported per diem rates for future years that had been negotiated into contracts as of the time of the survey, those future rates are included. 142 The hotel costs used in the Initial SRIA and this Final SRIA differ slightly from those used in the original RIA, which differed by case. This Final Supplemental RIA uses a simplified hotel room cost structure for ease of explication.105 

### Table 14: Hotel Room Costs (2011 $)

Operator Type Average Hotel Room Cost Passenger $65.00 Regional $58.00 Supplemental $75.00 Freight $75.00

Cost per Line of Flying Estimation As discussed above, eight indus try groups were created for th e final rule cost analysis. The changes in each of the cost component s for the two narrow-bod y passenger cases were summed for the passenger narrow-body industry group and for the narrow-body component of the passenger integrated industry group. The two wide-body passenger cases were summed for the passenger wide-body indus try group and for the wide-body component of the passenger integrated group. The two regional cases were summed for the regional group. The freight narrow-body case was used for the freight narr ow-body industry group while the freight widebody case was used for the freight wide-body in dustry group. The freight narrow-body case and freight wide-body case were summed for the freight integrated case. Table 15 shows the results of combining the case results to form estimat es for each industry group and industry group subcomponent. Appendix B contains a sensitivity an alysis to explore an alternative method for combining the individual case results to create an industry group leve l estimate of crew scheduling costs.106 

### Table 15: Change in Flightcrew Scheduling Cost Elements due to Final Rule, by Industry Group

Industry Group Baseline Solution Lines of

Flying Change in Credit

Hours Change in Domestic

TAFB Hours Change in International TAFB Hours Change in Hotel

Stays

Passenger Integrated: Narrow

‐ body 2,622 1,758 3,625 1,030

‐ 284 Passenger Integrated: Wide

‐ body 1,551

‐ 1,035 3,863 5,607 757 Passenger Narrow

‐ body 2,622 1,758 3,625 1,030

‐ 284

Passenger Wide

‐ body 1,551

‐ 1,035 3,863 5,607 757 Regional 540 94 9,960

‐ 16 424 Supplemental 806 4,642 3,159 9,759 756 Freight Integrated 1,383 1,544 7,087 3,252 294 Freight Narrow

‐ body 330 560 890 2,390 54

Freight Wide

‐ body 1,053 984 6,197 862 240

To estimate the costs of the final rule fo r each industry group, the changes in cost

elements due to the final rule were then multiplied by industry group and subcomponent-specific

estimates of the unit costs for those cost components, namely average credit hour pay rates, average domestic and internationa l per diem hourly rates, and hotel room costs. The derivations of those estimates of unit costs are explained above. 143 

### The results of those calculations are

shown in Table 16.

143 The original RIA used a different method whereby first the costs for each case were calculated using the respective narrow ‐ body and wide

‐ body unit costs and then the costs were summed to create estimates of the integrated industry groups. The Initial SRIA changed that method so that the unit costs specific to the integrated carriers are incorporated.107 

### Table 16: Monthly Change in Flightcrew Sc heduling Cost due To Final Rule (2011 $)

Industry Group Baseline Solution Lines of

Flying Change in Credit Hour Cost Change in Domestic

TAFB Cost Change in International

TAFB Cost Change in Hotel Cost Total Change in Scheduling Cost Passenger Integrated: Narrow

‐ body 2,622 $316,401 $7,048 $2,346 -$18,460 $307,335 

### Passenger Integrated: Wide

‐ body 1,551 -$243,982 $7,510 $12,774 $49,205 -$174,494 

### Passenger Narrow

‐ body 2,622 $327,732 $7,048 $2,346 -$18,460 $318,666 

### Passenger Wide

‐ body 1,551 -$332,885 $7,510 $12,774 $49,205 -$263,397



### Regional 540 $5,788 $15,972 -$31 $24,592 $46,321



### Supplemental 806 $1,088,252 $6,509 $22,270 $56,700 $1,173,731



### Freight Integrated 1,383 $644,321 $14,099 $9,330 $22,050 $689,800



### Freight Narrow

‐ body 330 $131,677 $1,771 $6,858 $4,050 $144,355



### Freight Wide

‐ body 1,053 $314,030 $12,328 $2,472 $18,000 $346,830 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding For each industry group, the change in each of the cost components was divided by the number of lines of flying in the baseline solu tion to determine the monthly final rule crew scheduling cost per line of flying for that i ndustry group. For the passenger integrated industry group, the change in each of the cost elements is summed across sub-components (narrow-body and wide-body) before dividing by the sum of baseline solution lines of flying. The final rule crew scheduling cost is valued by summing the ch ange in credit hour cost, per diem costs, and

hotel cost from the baseline so lution to the final rule soluti on. The annual final rule crew scheduling cost per line of flying was calcula ted by multiplying the monthly cost by 12. Table 17 shows the monthly change in flightcrew scheduli ng cost due to the final rule per line of flying.108 

### Table 17: Monthly Change in Flightcrew Schedu ling Cost per Line of Flying due to Final Rule (2011 $)

Industry Group Baseline Solution Lines of

Flying Change in Credit Hour Cost

due to Final Rule,

per Line of Flying Change in Domestic TAFB Cost

due to Final Rule,

per Line of Flying Change in International

TAFB Cost due to Final

Rule, per Line of Flying Change in Hotel Cost due to Final Rule, per

Line of Flying Total Change in Scheduling

Cost due to Final Rule, per

Line of Flying Passenger Integrated 4,173 $17 $3 $4 $7 $32 

### Passenger Narrow

‐ body 2,622 $125 $3 $1 -$7 $122



### Passenger Wide

‐ body 1,551 -$215 $5 $8 $32 -$170



### Regional 540 $11 $30 $0 $46 $86



### Supplemental 806 $1,350 $8 $28 $70 $1,456 

### Freight Integrated 1,383 $466 $10 $7 $16 $499



### Freight Narrow

‐ body 330 $399 $5 $21 $12 $437 

### Freight Wide

‐ body 1,053 $298 $12 $2 $17 $329 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

Extrapolation of Crew Scheduling Analysis The number of flightcrew members presen ted in Table 18 reflects the number of flightcrew members listed on each part 121 carr ier’s operating certificate in the FAA’s Vital Information Subsystem (VIS) as of December 2010. The total industry final rule cost would be overstated if extrapolation was based on the number of VIS flightcrew members because not all of these flightcrew members are primary lineholders . Recall that the cost es timates are calculated as the change in crew schedu ling cost per line of flying. Each carrier employs a significant number of reserve flightcrew members. In th e original RIA and the Initial SRIA, the FAA109 

### estimated that, on average, reserves comprise 15 percent of flightcrew members for the average part 121 passenger air carrier ba sed on APA published information. 144 

### However, the available information also showed that carriers vary widely in regards to the per cent of their flightcrew

member workforce that are reserves. In its comme nts regarding the Initial SRIA, IPA stated that in addition to adjusting the number of flightcrew members reported in VIS for reserves, the FAA should have adjusted the count for “no bidders,” flightcrew members who are on medical leave of absence, military duty leave of absence, long-term upgrade or cross aircraft training, nonflying special projects duties, etc. IPA stated th at “based on well-documen ted, 6-year statistical data at UPS, approximately 10% of airline pilo ts, at any given time, are in non-flying category status (IPA, page 55).” In addi tion, IPA provided new data for UPS and FedEx (the bulk of the freight integrated industr y group) that demonstrated that just 52 percent of the VIS flightcrew members are primary lineholders. For this Final SR IA, the FAA incorporates both of those items of information in estimating the number of prim ary lineholders for each industry group based on the VIS data. For the freight integrated industry group, the flightcrew memb er count is factored by 52 percent while freight narrow-body and wi de-body and supplemental industry groups are factored by 75 percent to account for reserves (15 per cent) and no-bidders (10 percent). We did not receive new information regarding these fact ors for the passenger industry groups. Therefore for the passenger industry groups, the factor of 85 pe rcent remains unchange d from the Initial SRIA. However, Appendix B contains a sensi tivity analysis on this key parameter for the passenger industry groups.

144 “Productivity,” American Airlines Negotiations, accessed August 1, 2012, http://www.aanegotiations.c om/apaProductivity.asp.110 

### IPA also stated that at UPS, 36 percent of bid lines are below the contractual minimum

number of credit hours. IPA assert s, therefore, that for this subs et of bid lines, the increase in

credit hours due to the final rule would not result in an increase in paid labor hours. The FAA is

not able to estimate the cost of the final rule based on specific situat ions of each individual carrier. Further, as discussed above in the sec tion entitled “Disposition of Public Comments for Final SRIA,” it is not clear that just because some schedules are below contractual minimums, additional hours can be flown without incurring additional costs. Nonetheless, a sensitivity analysis in Appendix B incorporat es IPA’s estimates of the potential cost reductions applicable

to UPS due to this issue. The extrapolation of the crew scheduling an alysis to the part 121 air transportation industry used the estimated number of primary lin eholders shown in Tabl e 18 to determine the final rule crew scheduling cost. Table 18: Tally of Flightcrew Members, By Industry Group

Industry Group Number of Part 121 Carriers Total Number of Flightcrew

Members Adjustment Factor for Reserves and

No

‐ bidders Estimated Primary Line

‐ Holders Passenger Integrated 7 36,013 85% 30,611 

### Passenger Narrow

‐ body 14 11,899 85% 10,114



### Passenger Wide

‐ body 1 150 85% 128 

### Regional 38 20,511 85% 17,434 

### Supplemental 8 1,674 75% 1,256 

### Freight Integrated 3 7,230 52% 3,760 

### Freight Narrow

‐ body 16 846 75% 635



### Freight Wide

‐ body 3 914 75% 686 

### Total 90 79,237 64,622 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding The number of primary lineholders in each i ndustry group shown in Table 18 was multiplied by the appropriate annual cost per lin e of flying in Table 17 to extrap olate the estimated cost to the part 121 air transportation indus try, as shown in the “Total Annual Crew Scheduling Costs”111 

### column in Table 19. This total cost figure is then allocated to passe nger operations and cargoonly operations using the share of revenue departur es attributable to each class of operation in 2010 as reported in Database T1: U.S. Air Ca rrier Traffic and Capacity Summary by Service Class from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The percentage of revenue departures that are passenger and cargo-only for each carrier is presen ted in Table C.1 in Appendix C. As shown in Table 19, there is a total of $51 million a year in flightcrew sc heduling costs for all passenger operations due to the final rule associated with flightcrew credit hours, per diem costs, and hotel room costs. If the final rule applied to cargo- only operations, there w ould be approximately $43 million in additional costs per year. Table 19: Annual Crew Scheduling Costs (2011 $)

Industry Group Final Rule Annual Cost per

Line of Flying Estimated Primary

Line

‐ Holders Total Annual

Crew Scheduling Costs (millions) Passenger Operations Annual Crew

Scheduling Costs (millions) Cargo

‐ Only Operations Annual Crew

Scheduling Costs (millions) Passenger Integrated $351 30,611 $12 $12 $0



### Passenger Narrow

‐ body $1,242 10,114 $15 $15 $0 

### Passenger Wide

‐ body ‐ $1,665 128 $0 $0 $0 

### Regional $1,011 17,434 $18 $18 $0 

### Supplemental $15,133 1,256 $22 $7 $15 

### Freight Integrated $5,176 3,760 $23 $0 $23 

### Freight Narrow

‐ body $4,555 635 $3 $0 $3



### Freight Wide

‐ body $3,435 686 $3 $1 $2 

### Total $95 $51 $43 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

Limitations of Crew Scheduling Analysis Carriers will engage in additional network optimization to reduce crew scheduling costs, which the FAA is unable to quantify at this point. In the long run, this may involve re-timing flights, changing schedule frequency, and entering or leavi ng markets. However, there may also be costs112 

### associated with these actions such as changes in aircraft utilization and revenue losses. At this time, the FAA has not estimated potential long- run optimization of crew scheduling costs.

The final rule economic costs are best m easured as society’s willingness to be compensated for consumption opportunities forgone as a result of resources being diverted to the production of improved aviation safety. Because thes e opportunity costs are difficult to estimate, our estimates of crew scheduling costs reflect, for the most part, financial costs that will be incurred by affected air carriers. These financial costs are likely to overstate the economic costs of the proposed rule. A large part of estimated crew scheduling co sts is increased compensation to flightcrew members for the additional time spent in avoidi ng fatigue. These compensation costs will reflect economic costs only if flightcrew wage rates are accurate measures of the forgone value of goods and services that could otherwise be produced. Ho wever, it is likely that flightcrew members will be able to use some of the time spent avoidi ng fatigue in productive activities, including the production of leisure activities. Ou r cost estimates do not include offsets for the value of these

activities. Increased per diem cost estimates do not incl ude offsets that are likely to occur. For example, meals consumed on the road by flight crew members are substitutes for meals that

would otherwise be consumed at home. Resource savings (the value of labor and food used to produce meals at home in this example) are not reflected in our cost estimates. Similarly, the costs associated with increased hotel expenses do not include offsets for at-home savings that will likely occur—e.g., reduced energy and wate r consumption and avoided cleaning costs.113 

### Computer Programming

Carriers will incur computer programming costs as they will need to update their crew management systems and their schedule optimiza tion systems with the c onstraints imposed by

the final rule. A one-time cost will be incurred in 2013 as carriers update their crew management systems. Crew management system update cost s were estimated for each individual carrier, based on the number of flightcrew members listed on the carrier’s operating certificate. Carriers were assigned to one of three gr oups based on the number of flightcrew members. Computer programming costs, which vary with size of carriers, are estimated using number of person-days and staff costs. Person-da ys required to perform the system update were estimated to be 400, 160, and 80 days for large (more than 1,000 flightcrew members), average (250 to 1,000 flightcrew members), and small (l ess than 250 flightcrew members) carriers, respectively. A daily professional staff cost was assumed to be $625. As shown in Table 20, crew management system update costs due to the final rule for passenger carriers is estimated to be approximately $8 million. If the final rule was extended to cargo-only operations, those carriers who perform just cargo-only operations would experience an estimated $2 million in

costs. 145

145 Since the final rule applies only to passenger operations, a carrier that performs both passenger and cargo ‐ only operations was assigned to the passenger carrier category because we assumed they would incur the full programming costs necessary to support compliance of their passenger operations with the final rule.114 

### Table 20: Crew Management System Update Costs (2011 $) Flightcrew Members Cost per Carrier Passenger Carriers (Count) Freight Carriers (Count) Passenger Carriers (millions) Freight Carriers (millions) >1,000 $250,000 16 2 $4 $1 250

‐ 1,000 $100,000 20 3 $2 $0 <250 $50,000 31 18 $2 $1 Total 67 23 $8 $2 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding



### Payroll Cost Savings from Reducing Flightcrew Members Fatigue

The final rule is designed to reduce the risk to flight operations attributable to fatigued flightcrew members by limiting the maximum number of hours they are permitted to be on duty, the number of hours they actually fly during dut y periods, and by ensuring that they receive adequate rest periods before reporting for duty. A ccording to the CDC, “chronic sleep loss is an under-recognized public health problem that ha s a cumulative effect on physical and mental health. Sleep loss and sleep disord ers can reduce quality of life and productivity, increase use of health-care services, and result in injuries, illness, or deaths.” 146 

### It is expected that the final rule will result in better-rested flightcrew member s and reduce flightcrew member fatigue, thus reducing the use of sick time by flightcrew memb ers. When a flightcrew member is scheduled for duty and calls in sick or fa tigued, the carrier must use a reserve flightcrew member to complete the scheduled duty. The fi nal rule will reduce the use of reserve flightcrew members to cover fatigue-induced sick call -ins by flightcrew members, which will reduce the flight operations cost associated with fatigue issues for carriers.

146 “Perceived Insufficient Rest or Sleep

– Four States, 2006,” MMWR (CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report) 57 (February 29, 2008): 200

‐ 203.115 

### While the current share of current sick ti me attributable to fatigue is unknown, it is almost certainly greater than zero. Similarly, wh ile the precise amount by which the final rule will reduce sick time is unknown, it is also most likely greater than zero. Labor representatives

have informed the FAA that sick ti me is approximately five percent of payroll costs. This data is

consistent with data collected in the rail indus try (see footnote 98). In light of this information, the FAA adopts the assumption that sick time accounts for five per cent of total industry flightcrew member pay. Moreover, the FAA has also assumed for this analysis that the final rule is expected to reduce the use of sick time by five percent. As a result, the FAA estimates the cost savings from reducing use of sick time as 0.25 percen t (five percent of five percent) of flightcrew payroll costs. Appendix B presen ts a sensitivity analysis for this assumption whereby it is

assumed that the final rule will instead reduce use of sick time by three per cent or seven percent. Total industry flightcrew memb er pay was calculated from Fo rm 41 pilot cost data. Form 41 data covers only those air carriers with at l east $20 million in annual revenues. These carriers employ approximately 96 percent of all flightcrew members; therefore we factor up the Form 41 pilot payroll costs by approximately five percent to account for this small gap in coverage of the

data. 147 

### Finally, the pilot payroll costs are multiplied by 1.169 to account for the costs of employer-provided benefits th at vary with hours worked. 148 

### These cost savings were then allocated to passenger and cargo- only operations, again using share of revenue departures for each carr ier that were passenger operations or cargo-only operations in 2010 as reported in Database T1: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Summary

147 The Form 41 data used in the original RIA only covered the first three quarters of 2010. This analysis factors those three quarters of data to account for a full year of flightcrew member payroll costs. Table C.3 in Appendix C provide details of these calculations. 148 See Table C.12 in Appendix C for details.116 

### by Service Class from the Bureau of Transporta tion Statistics. Each carrier’s passenger/cargoonly split was weighted by the number of flightcr ew members the carrier employs to create an overall passenger/cargo-only spl it for each industry group. The annual nominal value of the cost savings is approximately $23 million for passenger operations and an additional $5 million if the rule were extended to cargo-only operations. Tabl e 21 provides details of these calculations of cost savings from reducing flightcrew member fatigue. Table 21: Payroll Cost Savings from Reduc ing Flightcrew Member Fatigue (2011 $)

Industry

Group Fully Loaded Adjusted Total Pilot and CoPilot Costs 1 

### (thousands) Annual Total Payroll Cost Savings

from Reducing Fatigue 2 

### (thousands) Percent of Payroll

Cost Savings Allocated to Passenger Operations Percent of Payroll

Cost Savings Allocated to Cargo

‐ only Operations Annual Passenger Payroll Cost Savings (thousands) Annual Cargo Payroll Cost Savings (thousands)

Passenger Integrated $5,506,802 $13,767 100% 0% $13,760 $7 Passenger Narrow

‐ body $2,045,838 $5,115 100% 0% $5,115 $0

Passenger Wide

‐ body $15,906 $40 100% 0% $40 $0

Regional $1,359,355 $3,398 99% 1% $3,356 $42 Supplemental $180,316 $451 30% 70% $134 $317 Freight Integrated $1,722,238 $4,306 0% 100% $0 $4,306

Freight Narrow

‐ body $79,276 $198 15% 85% $29 $169 Freight Wide

‐ body $135,438 $339 21% 79% $72 $267

Total $11,045,169 $27,613 $22,505 $5,108 *Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 1 Source: Table C.3 2 Fully Loaded Adjusted Total Pilot and CoPilot Costs x 5% x 5%117 

### Flight Operations Cost Summary

The total flight operations co st is composed of the additional crew scheduling costs (flightcrew member salary, hotel , and per diem), plus the com puter programming costs, and less the cost savings from reducing flightcrew me mber’s fatigue. The total net nominal flight operations cost for the period of analysis is approximately $297 million for passenger operations. If the final rule were extended to cargo-only ope rations, the total net nominal flight operations costs over the analysis period would increase by $382 million. Table 22 presents the nominal flight operations costs attributable to the final rule for passenger operations for each year in the analysis period. Table 23 presents the nominal flight operations cost for cargo-only carriers. Table 22: Total Flight Operations Cost (2012- 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Year Scheduling Cost Computer Programming Cost Payroll Cost Savings from

Reducing

Fatigue Total Nominal Cost

2012 $0 

### 2013 $8 $8 

### 2014 $51 -$23 $29 

### 2015 $51 -$23 $29 

### 2016 $51 -$23 $29 

### 2017 $51 -$23 $29 

### 2018 $51 -$23 $29 

### 2019 $51 -$23 $29 

### 2020 $51 -$23 $29 

### 2021 $51 -$23 $29 

### 2022 $51 -$23 $29 

### 2023 $51 -$23 $29 

### Total $515 $8 -$225 $297 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding118 

### Table 23: Total Flight Operations Costs (2012 – 2023), Cargo-Only Operations (2011 $Millions)

Year Scheduling Cost Computer Programming Cost Payroll Cost Savings from

Reducing

Fatigue Total Nominal Cost

2012 $0 

### 2013 $2 $2 

### 2014 $43 -$5 $38 

### 2015 $43 -$5 $38 

### 2016 $43 -$5 $38 

### 2017 $43 -$5 $38 

### 2018 $43 -$5 $38 

### 2019 $43 -$5 $38 

### 2020 $43 -$5 $38 

### 2021 $43 -$5 $38 

### 2022 $43 -$5 $38 

### 2023 $43 -$5 $38 

### Total $431 $2 -$51 $382 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding



## Rest Facilities

The final rule establishes maximum flight -duty period limits for augmented operations that are dependent on the start time of the flight duty period, the number of flightcrew members assigned to the flight, and the cl ass of rest facility installed on the aircraft. The final rule establishes detailed specifications for each of th e three classes of rest facilities. Class 1 rest

facilities are most conducive to reducing the risk of fatigue in augmented operations; accordingly, the maximum flight duty time perm itted for augmented operations conducted with Class 1 rest facility-equipped aircraft is great er than the maximum flight duty time permitted for augmented operations conducted with either Cla ss 2 or 3 rest facility-equipped aircraft. T he FAA

assumed that air carriers will choose to install the Class 1 rest facilities in all of the long range119 

### aircraft because of the flexibility a uniform fleet pr ovides. The definitions of the rest facilities are

as follows:120 

### o A Class 1 rest facility is a bunk or other surface that allows for a flat sleeping position and is located separate from both the flight deck and passenger cabin in an area that is temperature-controlled, allows the crewmember to control light, and provides isolation from noise and disturbance.

o A Class 2 rest facility is a seat in an aircraft cabin that allows for a flat or near flat sleeping position; is separated from passengers by a minimum of a curtain to provide darkness and some sound mitigation; and is reasonably free from disturbance by passengers or crewmembers.

o A Class 3 rest facility is a seat in an airc raft cabin or flight d eck that reclines at least 40 degrees and provides leg and foot support. There are four subcomponents of the rest faci lity cost component of the final rule. The first subcomponent consists of the rest facility design and engineering costs. The second subcomponent consists of the cost resulting from the physical installation of the facilities on the

affected aircraft. The third subc omponent is the value of the airc raft downtime required to install the rest facilities. The final subcomponent is add itional aircraft fuel consumption cost due to the weight of the rest facilities. 149

149 It is possible that the installation of rest facilities may also result in a cost to air carriers due to the loss of space in an aircraft that might otherwise be used to generate revenues. However, for this cost analysis the FAA assumed that air carriers will choose to install the Class 1 rest facilities in all of the long range aircraft because of the flexibility a uniform fleet provides. Therefore the FAA believes that there will be no loss of revenues for passenger operations because the space occupied by a Class I facility would be located below deck, in the cargo hold and would therefore not impact the number of seats available for fare

‐ paying passengers. Further, the FAA does not expect that the below

‐ deck cargo hold is typically at capacity for passenger operations; therefore space lost to the rest facility should not create additional costs for passenger ‐ only operations. However, if the operator chooses to install Class 2 or Class 3 facilities the design, equipment, installation, and fuel costs would be lower than the estimates provided here, but there may be some loss of revenue to due to loss of space in the cabin for revenue ‐ generating passengers.121 

### We estimate that this engineering cost will be incurred in the first year that the rule is published (2012) to allow enough time for the facilities to be installed in the second year after the rule is published (2013). 150 

### This work will need to be accomplished before the rule is implemented in 2014. Once a facility is installed on a part icular aircraft, addi tional fuel will be consumed by that aircraft. For that reason, during the second year of the an alysis period, one-half

of the estimated annual incremental fuel consum ption is included in this cost analysis. The following paragraphs discuss how the FAA estimated each of the rest facility cost subcomponents, and Table 24 deta ils the total cost of each of subcomponents for passenger operations while Table 25 presents the total costs for cargo-onl y operations. The total restfacility cost for passenger operations is a pproximately $146 million in nominal terms, $123 million when discounted at seven percent. If the rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, the additional cost would be $63 million in nominal terms, $53 million when discounted at seven percent. Table 24: Rest Facility Cost Overview (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Rest Facilities Cost Subcomponent Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Engineering $13 $12 $13 

### Installation $100 $87 $94

The FAA acknowledges that for cargo ‐ only operations there may be a loss of revenue due to the space in the below

‐ deck cargo hold occupied by the rest facility. However the space lost would be quite small (about the size of a bunk bed) and likely any revenue lost would also be small. However the FAA does not have an empirical basis to quantify the amount of lost revenue. 150 Delay in issuing the final advisory circular related to rest facilities means that carriers may not be able to develop all the necessary engineering work in 2012. This means some of the costs anticipated for 2012 may shift to 2013 and carriers may need to compress the time for installation of rest facilities. This would not change the nominal cost of the rule, and might decrease the net present value slightly due to costs being incurred further in the future.122 

### Downtime $12 $10 $11 

### Fuel $21 $13 $17 

### Total $146 $123 $135 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding123 

### Table 25: Rest Facility Cost Overview (2012-2023), Cargo-Only Operations (2011 $Millions)

Rest Facilities Cost Subcomponent Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Engineering $3 $2 $2 

### Installation $48 $42 $45 

### Downtime $3 $3 $3 

### Fuel $10 $6 $8 

### Total $63 $53 $58 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding



### Engineering

During NPRM cost analysis, the FAA obtai ned detailed cost estimates from two supplemental type certificate (S TC) holders. For the original RI A, the Initial SRIA, and this Final SRIA, we delineated between engineering and kit/installation co sts, as the engineering cost per operator would be a one-time, non-recurring co st for each type (make and model) of aircraft. We continue using the data provided by the ST C holders as the basis for engineering and installation. The engineering co sts are non-recurring design cost s. These consist of system, development, engineering, analysis, and certi fication costs. We conservatively use the engineering cost of $0.5 million per make/model as estimated by the STC holders. We estimate that 26 designs will be required for passenger oper ators while five additional designs would be required if the rule was extend ed to cargo-only operations. Th e estimates are derived from information gathered by the FAA’s inspectors and are proprietary. The estimated engineering cost is approximately $13 million ($0.5 million x 26) for passenger operators. If the rule were extended to cover cargo-only ope rations, there would be an a dditional $2.5 million ($0.5 million x 5) in costs.124 

### Installation

Based upon public comments in response to the NPRM, the FAA has refined the estimate

of the number of aircraft that will require rest facility insta llation. The FAA now estimates, based on data collected from the FAA’s inspectors, that 225 aircraft used for passenger operations will need crew rest modifications to comply with the final rule. 151 

### This is an increase from the estimate of 104 aircraft used in passenger operati ons in the NPRM cost analysis. However, it is

lower than the estimates of some NPRM commen ters. The FAA believes that the final rule estimate of 225 aircraft represents the worst case scenario because aircraft will be re-optimized based upon current configurations. The FAA estim ates that any additional aircraft, beyond the approximate 225 aircraft used in th is analysis, will already have ad equate rest facilities. Once the additional 225 aircraft have rest facilities installed, each fleet will be re-optimized for the most efficient use. As such, we conservatively assume all of these 225 aircraft will have a Class 1 facility installed for an upper-bound estimation. In its comments regarding the Initial SRIA, IPA objected to the FAA’s assumption that

airlines would choose to install th e most costly Class 1 rest facil ities. In addition, IPA objected to the FAA’s assumption that if the final rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, 107 additional aircraft would require facilities to be installed. IPA’s comments are based on an understanding that only Boeing 767s would require the facilities a nd that Boeing 767s are shorter range and would only require the Cl ass 3 rest facilities. However, more than just B767s would require rest facilities and the FAA assumes that airlines would choos e to install Clas s I facilities

151 All aircraft used in augmented operations by carriers conducting both cargo ‐ only and passenger operations are included in this estimate, since it is not possible to identify whether aircraft are used exclusively in cargo ‐ only operations.125 

### because of the greater flexibil ity for fleet usage that the Class 1 facility would provide. Therefore, for the cost estimates related to rest facil ities for the cargo operations, the FAA retains the analysis used in the Initial SRIA and re stated in this Final SRIA. However, the FAA incorporates IPA’s alternative rest facility cost estimates in the sensitivity analysis presented in Appendix E. We continue to use the equipment and labo r cost provided by an STC holder for our

estimate of installation costs to the carriers. The kit and the installation for each of the individual airplanes will cost roughly $350,00 0 and $95,000, respectively. As suc h, the total cost of each installation will be roughly $445,000 ($350,000 + $95,000). When multiplied by the affected fleet of 225 aircraft used for passenger operations, the total facility installation cost will be approximately $100 million ($445,000 x 225). If the rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, the additional total facility instal lation cost would be approximately $48 million ($445,000 x 107).



### Downtime

Commenters to the NPRM indicat ed that an aircraft could be out of service for two weeks during rest facility in stallation. The FAA estimates the cost to part 121 operators for this potential additional planned time out of service, or downtime, to install the rest facilities. STC designers have indicated that with proper planning, a modifier can install re st facilities in two to four days. We conservatively use a four-day es timate for the calculation of the downtime cost. The FAA conservatively assumes that if an aircraft was to be out of service for any part of a day, that airplane would be out of service for the entire day.

For this analysis, the FAA uses the opportunity cost of capital to approximate the planned downtime cost to the operators. Using guidelines prescribed by the Office of Management and126 

### Budget, the FAA uses seven percent as a proxy fo r average annual rate of return on capital. In this analysis, the FAA uses $69 m illion as the estimated market va lue of a passenger aircraft and $40 million as the estimated mark et value of a cargo aircraft. 152 

### For passenger operations, the yearly opportunity cost of cap ital per aircraft would be $4.83 million, roughly $13,233 per day. When multiplied by the affected fleet (225 aircraft ) and the days out of service (4 days), the downtime cost for the fleet is approximately $12 million (225 x 4 x $13,233) for passenger operations. If the final rule we re extended to cargo-only operati ons, the average cost per day would be $7,671. When multiplied for 4 days of dow ntime for 107 aircraft, the additional cost for cargo operations would be approximately $3 million.



### Fuel Consumption Costs

We have analyzed the costs associated with the design and installation of Class 1 rest

facilities. We assume the rest facilities will be installed in the most efficient manner possible, with no impact on passenger seats or the revenue that th ey generate. As such, we do not estimate

loss of revenue from a Class 1 rest facility because, as defined by the rule, the facilities will be located separate from both the flight deck a nd passenger cabin and will not necessarily require the removal of passenger seats. For example, a Class 1 rest facility can be located in the aircraft belly or overhead area, neither of which requires the removal of passenger seats. Although there will be no revenue impact, there wi ll be an additional cost that wi ll add to the aircraft operating costs due to the estimated additional impact of weight changes on each aircraft. Estimates for the

152 The passenger aircraft value represents the appraised value of a B767

‐ 300 from The Airline Monitor (November, 2010). The cargo aircraft value represents the value of a B767

‐ 300ERF (extended range freighter) from Airliner Price Guide (Winter 2011).127 

### additional incremental weight impact are used to calculate the additional fuel consumption for

the affected fleet. The estimated cost of fuel uses data from the 2011 FAA Aerospace Forecast. We use the fuel consumption methodology as derived from the FAA’s guidance, 153 

### along with the estimated average fuel cost of approximately $2.45 per gallon. 154 

### To calculate the addi tional annual cost of fuel per aircraft, we multiply the 300 additio nal pounds by the fuel consumption factor of 0.005 gallons per hour per pound (consiste nt with a two-engine, wide-body aircraft) and a rrive at 1.5 gallons per hour per aircraft. This product is th en multiplied by the average annual flight hours per aircraft of 2,380 and finally by the cost of fuel ($2.45) to arrive at th e total annual estimated

additional cost of fuel per aircraft of $8,746.50. 155 

### When multiplied by the affected annual fleet (225 aircraft), the annual incremental fuel cons umption cost is approxim ately $2 million. If the rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, the additional annual incremental fuel consumption would be approximately $1 million. Table 26 presents the estimated costs of each of the subcomponents described above. Table 27 presents the total rest facility costs fo r passenger operations while Table 28 presents the additional total rest facility costs if the fina l rule were extended to cargo-only operations. Carriers that conduct both passenger and cargo-only operations have all of these facilities costs ascribed to their passenger operations because the FAA was informed that given the small

153 GRA, Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide (Jenkintown, PA: October 3, 2007) 154 Average of annual system mainline fuel prices forecasts for period 2014 through 2023 from Table 18, FAA Aerospace Forecast 2011

– 2031. 155 The estimate of additional weight (300 pounds) was provided by an STC holder. Fuel consumption factor of .005 gallons per hour is from Table 6.1 of “Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide” (October 2007) written by GRA, Inc. The estimate of 2,380 annual flight hours per aircraft comes from BTS Form 41 Schedule T2

‐ restricted, based on data for the 12

‐ month period October 2009 through Sept 2010 using Account 810 (Aircraft Days Assigned) and Account 650 (HoursAirborne) for a selection of aircraft.128 

### magnitude of the rest facility costs, carriers w ould avoid having to manage two separate fleets,

i.e. those aircraft with facilities and those aircraft without facilities. Table 26: Rest Facilities Costs (2011 $) Rest Facility Cost Subcomponent Passenger Unit Cost Passenger Quantity Passenger Cost Freight Unit Cost Freight Quantity Freight Cost Engineering $500,000 26 $13,000,000 $500,000 5 $2,500,000 Installation $445,000 225 $100,125,000 $445,000 107 $47,615,000 Down Time $52,932 225 $11,909,700 $30,684 107 $3,283,188 Annual Fuel Cost $8,747 $225 $1,967,963 $8,747 $107 $935,876 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding129 

### Table 27: Rest Facilities Total Costs ( 2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Year Engineering Installation Downtime Fuel Total Nominal

Cost 2012 $13 $13 2013 $100 $12 $1 $113 2014 $2 $2 2015 $2 $2 2016 $2 $2 2017 $2 $2 2018 $2 $2 2019 $2 $2 2020 $2 $2 2021 $2 $2 2022 $2 $2 2023 $2 $2 Total $13 $100 $12 $21 $146 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

Table 28: Rest Facilities Total Costs (2012- 2023), Cargo-Only Operations (2011 $Millions)

Year Engineering Installation Downtime Fuel Total Nominal

Cost

2012 $3 $3 

### 2013 $48 $3 $0 $51 

### 2014 $1 $1 

### 2015 $1 $1 

### 2016 $1 $1 

### 2017 $1 $1 

### 2018 $1 $1 

### 2019 $1 $1 

### 2020 $1 $1 

### 2021 $1 $1 

### 2022 $1 $1 

### 2023 $1 $1 

### Total $3 $48 $3 $10 $63 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding130 

## Fatigue Training

In accordance with the Airline Safety and Fe deral Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, Section 212, each air car rier conducting operations under pa rt 121 must have submitted a fatigue risk management plan (FRMP) to the Administrator for review and acceptance. A FRMP is an air carrier’s management plan ou tlining policies and procedures for reducing the risks of flightcrew member fatigue and improving flightcrew memb er alertness. In this final rule the FAA kept the requirement for flightcrew members to receive fa tigue training, but the original RIA, the Initial SRIA, and this Final SRIA do not include an incremental cost of compliance because the operators are already in compliance with FRMP. The final rule introduces a new requirement for management, schedulers, dispatch ers, and any other individual directly involved in operational control of the flight to have fatigue training and the requirement for curriculum development for that fatigue training. Therefore, the original RIA, the Initial SRIA, and this Final SRIA estimate the costs of these new requirements. 156 

### As shown in Tabl e 29, this rule change reduces the fatigue training cost re quirement to $19 million in nominal terms for passenger operations, $12 million when discounted using a seven percent discount rate. Table 30

shows that there would be an additional nominal co st of $7 million in fatigue training costs if the final rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, $4 million when discounted using a seven percent discount rate.

156 The NPRM had originally included estimates of costs for fatigue training and curriculum development for flightcrew members.131 

### Table 29: Fatigue Training Cost Overview (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Training Cost Subcomponents Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Initial Training (First Year of Rule) $4 $3 $4 

### Initial Training (New Hires and Churn) $2 $1 $1 

### Recurrent Training $14 $8 $11 

### Curriculum Development $0 $0 $0 

### Total $19 $12 $16 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

Table 30: Fatigue Training Cost Overv iew (2012-2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $Millions)

Training Cost Subcomponents Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Initial Training (First Year of Rule) $1 $1 $1 

### Initial Training (New Hires and Churn) $1 $0 $0 

### Recurrent Training $5 $3 $4 

### Curriculum Development $0 $0 $0 

### Total $7 $4 $5 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

The final rule requires that dispatchers and upper manageme nt having operational control over flightcrew members be give n fatigue training. The number of dispatchers in the U.S. air transportation industry is equal to approximate ly three percent of the number of pilots. 157 

### The FAA estimates the number of management personne l (immediate supervisor s and schedulers) to be approximately nine percent of flightcrew memb ers. Therefore, the total number of dispatchers and management personnel required to receive fati gue training is estimated to be approximately

157 FAA, Vital Information System (VIS) database, October 22, 2009.132 

### 12 percent of total flightcrew members. We fu rther estimate that each manager and dispatcher will require 5 hours of training when compliance w ith the final rule is required in 2012, which has been valued at a rate of 60 percent of th e credit hour cost per flightcrew member for each industry group as found in Table 12. In out years, this initial training will need to be given to new employees entering the workforce and to employees who switch carriers due to industry churn. We estimate that these groups account for 3.3 and 1.0 percent of the current workforce respectively. Additionally, in the out years the dispatchers and managers will require two hours of recurring training each year. These initial training costs are allocated to passenger and cargoonly operations, again using percent of revenue de partures for each carrier that were passenger operations or cargo-only operations in 2010 as repor ted in Database T1: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Summary by Service Class from the Bureau of Tran sportation Statis tics. Table 31

and Table 32 show the annual costs for these ca tegories of training for passenger and cargo-only operations, respectively. For passenger operations, the final rule will result in $4 million in nominal fatigue training costs for ma nagement and dispatchers in the first year of the rule and an additional $15 million in nominal fatigue training costs during the following nine years. If the final rule were extended to cargo-only operations, there would be an additional $1.3 million in nominal fatigue training costs for ma nagement and dispatchers in the first year of the rule, and an additional $5 million in nominal fatigue trai ning costs during the following nine years.

In addition, carriers will incur a one-time cost to develop a fatigue training curriculum. According to industry standard, curriculum development takes three hours for each hour of course required. Therefore, the time needed to develop the initial training curriculum will be fifteen hours and the time needed to develop the recurrent training curriculum will be six hours. The FAA assumes that the wage rate of the curriculum developer is approximately $100 per133 

### hour. Each of the 67 part 121 air carriers that ha d passenger operations will need to develop its

own curriculum. The total nominal cost of curriculum training is $140,700. If the final rule is extended to cargo-only operations then there wi ll be an additional $48,300 in nominal curriculum

costs for the 23 carriers that conduct only cargo-o nly operations. 158 

### Table 31: Total Fatigue Training Costs (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $)

Year Initial Training (First Year of Rule) Initial Training (New Hires and

Churn) Recurrent Training Curriculum Development Total Nominal Cost

(millions)

2012 $0.00 

### 2013 $0.00 

### 2014 $4,003,341 $140,700 $4.14 

### 2015 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70 

### 2016 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70 

### 2017 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70 

### 2018 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70 

### 2019 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70 

### 2020 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70 

### 2021 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70 

### 2022 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70 

### 2023 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70 

### Total $4,003,341 $1,549,293 $13,792,310 $140,700 $19.49 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

158 The curriculum development costs associated with air carriers that conduct both passenger and cargo ‐ only operations are counted under the costs associated with passenger operations.134 

### Table 32: Total Fatigue Training Costs ( 2012-2023), Cargo-only Op erations (2011 $)

Year Initial Training (First Year of Rule) Initial Training (New Hires and

Churn) Recurrent Training Curriculum Development Total Nominal Cost

(millions)

2012 $0.00 

### 2013 $0.00 

### 2014 $1,336,713 $48,300 $1.39 

### 2015 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57 

### 2016 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57 

### 2017 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57 

### 2018 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57 

### 2019 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57 

### 2020 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57 

### 2021 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57 

### 2022 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57 

### 2023 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57 

### Total $1,336,713 $517,308 $4,605,245 $48,300 $6.51 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding



## Cost Analysis Summary

The cost of the final rule to part 121 passe nger operations over the twelve-year period of analysis is estimated to be $462 million in nomin al value, $320 million when discounted at seven percent, or $391 million when di scounted at three percent. If the final rule were extended to cover pa rt 121 cargo-only operati ons, over the twelveyear period of analysis there would be additional costs of $4 52 million in nominal value, $292 million when discounted at seven percent, or $37 1 million when discounted at three percent.

Table 33 and Table 34 summarize the results of the cost estima tion for passenger and cargo-only operations, respectiv ely. All final rule cost com ponents were calculated using industry-provided data whenever possi ble, along with expert analysis. Table 33: Cost Summary (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions)135 

### Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $297 $184 $240



### Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135 

### Training $19 $12 $16



### Total $462 $320 $391 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding Table 34: Cost Summary (2012-2023), Ca rgo-only Operations (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $382 $235 $307



### Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58 

### Training $7 $4 $5



### Total $452 $292 $371 

### *Items may not sum to reporte d totals due to rounding 

## Benefit/Cost Summary In this Supplemental RIA, we have analyzed the benefits and the costs associated with the requirements contained in this final rule and our estimates are summarized in Table 35 and

Table 36. The final rule was changed significantly fr om the NPRM. The training requirement had been substantially reduced because the FAA has de termined that flightcrew members are already receiving the requisite training as part of th e statutorily required Fa tigue Risk Management Plans. The FAA also removed cargo-only operations from the applicability section of the new part 117 because their estimated compliance costs as shown in the original RIA significantly136 

### exceed the societal benefits. 159 

### The Initial SRIA revised and corre cted the calculations used to

estimate the costs and benefits of the final rule as it applies to passenger operations and to the

estimates of costs and benefits if the rule we re extended to cargo-only operations. This Final SRIA responds to public comments made regard ing the Initial SRIA and where appropriate incorporates new information to revise the es timates of benefits and costs for cargo-only operations. The benefit and cost analysis for the regul atory evaluation is based on the following factors/assumptions:

o Costs and benefits are expressed in 2011 dollars

o Benefits and costs are calculated in cons tant dollars and pres ent values using both 3 percent and 7 per cent discount rates as prescrib ed by OMB in Circular A-4.

o Present value calculations use 2011 as the base year 160



### o The analysis period covers th e 12 year period 2012 through 2023

o The costs associated with computer programming and rest facilities occur in the two years after the rule is published. The other recurring costs of the rule and the benefits are then estimated over the next ten years.

o The benefits of preventing fatalities are valued using the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) of $6.2 million per US DOT guidance in place at the time the original RIA was drafted. 161



### We provide a range of estimates for the quantitati ve benefits of the final rule as it applies to passenger operations. Our base case estimate is $401 million ($246 million present value at seven percent and $322 million at three percent) and our high case estimate is $757 million

159 Carriers may choose to have their cargo ‐ only operations comply with the new part 117 but are not required to do so. Since the carrier would decide voluntarily to comply with the new requirements, those costs are not attributed to the costs of this rule. 160 In the Initial SRIA, 2012 was used as the base year for present value estimates. 161 Sensitivity #5 in Appendix B incorporates the updated DOT guidance for VSL.137 

### ($465 million present value at seven percent and $609 million at three percent). The total

estimated cost of the final rule as it applies to passenger ope rations is $462 million ($320 million present value at seven percent and $391 million at th ree percent). Therefore, the costs of the final rule are somewhat higher than the base case benefits estimate but well below the high case estimate. We also note that saving just 85 lives in a 10 year period would cause this rule to be

cost beneficial. 162 

### Further, even if this rule were only 36 percent effective at preventing accidents due to fatigue (as opposed to the 52.5 percent effectiveness estimated in this analysis), the rule

would still be cost beneficial. 163



### If the final rule were extended to cover ca rgo-only operations, the base case estimate of benefits for that additional population is $3 m illion ($2 million present value at seven percent and $3 million at three percent) and our high case estimate is $10 million ($6 million present value at seven percent and $8 million at three percent). In comparison the additional estimated

cost of the final rule if it we re extended to cargo-only operations is estimated to be $452 million ($292 million present value at seven percent a nd $371 million at three percent). This cost estimate far exceeds both the base and high case esti mates of benefits. In order for the final rule to yield net benefits, the rule w ould need to prevent at least ei ght accidents duri ng the 10-year analysis period. In contrast, only one accident occurred during the 10-year hi storical period and the final rule has an effectiveness rating of just 15 percent for that single accident.

162 This comparison is made assuming the lives saved are distributed uniformly over the 10 year analysis period for benefits and using a seven percent discount rate. 163 This calculation is performed using the parameters from high

‐ case benefits analysis and uses seven percent as the discount rate.138 

### Table 35: Summary of Benefits and Co sts (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Estimates Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Total Benefits - Base Case $401 $246 $322 Total Benefits - High Case $757 $465 $609 Total Costs $462 $320 $391

Net Benefits - Base Case -$61 -$74 -$69 Net Benefits - High Case $295 $145 $218 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding Table 36: Summary of Benefits and Cost s (2012 – 2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $Millions)

Estimates Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Total Benefits ‐ Base Case $3 $2 $3 

### Total Benefits ‐ High Case $10 $6 $8



### Total Costs $452 $292 $371



### Net Benefits ‐ Base Case -$448 -$290 -$368 

### Net Benefits ‐ High Case -$442 -$286 -$363 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding139 

## Appendix A: Relevant Accident History140 

### 1. Accident DCA91MA021 A/C: DC-9-15, registration: N565PC Injuries: 2 Fatal

Date: 2/17/1991 Accident Summary: After takeoff, aircraft rolled to the right, then severely to the left past (90 degrees) and crashed. An ATC and some witnesse s saw a fireball come out of the rear of the plane.

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be failure of the flight crew to detect and remove ice from the aircrafts wings which was largely a result of lack of appropriate response by the FAA, Douglass aircraft company, and Ryan International airlines to the known

critical effect that a minute amount of contamina tion has on the stall char acteristics of the DC-9 series 10 airplane. NTSB considered possibility that fatigue influenced pilots' judgment &

decision not to conduct exterior preflight inspection of A/C. Cr ew had flown same night-time schedule for 6 days, & PIC for 12 of 13 days, av eraging 3.8 flight hours & 5 landings each night. His schedule had recently increased from flying for 5 days, then 9 days off at home in CA. Though his family said he was used to night flying, recent increase in duty & flight time could have induced fatigue. But BTSB wa s divided on exact role of fatigue; some wanted fatigue as a cause, others did not. But fatigue's presence wa s not disputed. In the end, however, the Board

could not reach a firm conclusion & ex cluded fatigue as a cause or factor. Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: Th e captain flew six succ essive night flights the week before the incident, a nd flew another six successive ni ght flights with the same first officer each night, including the night of the event. The total flight time for the six successive night flights, which included the night of the incide nt was 19.6 hrs. The first officer's total flight141 

### time in the 7 days prior to the incident was 19.6 hrs, accumulated all during six successive night flights with the same captain. On the six successive night flights, the cap tain and first officer came on duty around 2145. On the day before the accident, a van driver for the hotel overheard the pilots talking about how little sleep they get. On the day of the incident, an airline mechanic described the pilots as normal and rested. On the day of the accident, the operations supervisor stated the crew remained in the cockpit; normal crewmembers leave the ai rplane for a walk around. Supervisor described the captain as quiet and expressionless. The captain was used to flying nights as a re sult of his military flying. Normal schedule was 5 nights on, 9 nights off. But a few weeks befo re accident, duty schedule changed as a result of airline contract to carry mail for US Postal Se rvice. Airline subsequently hired new pilots and extended duty hrs of experienced pilots. The 2 weeks between his last visit home and the accidents were described as the longest period he had been on duty with the airline. SCORE: 0.5 Requirements would place 200-hour limit on duty time in 672 consecutive hours (4 weeks). That might have ch anged PIC’s schedule substantially.

2. August 18, 1999 in Guantanamo Bay A/C: DC-8, N814CK Injuries: 3 Serious

Date: 8/18/1993 Accident Summary: Aircraft collided with level terrain after captain lost control of aircraft while approaching airfield.

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be the captains impaired judgment, decision making and flying abilities of the night crew due to the effects of fatigue; the captains142 

### failure properly assess the conditions for landing and maintaining vigilant situational awareness of the airplane while maneuvering onto final appro ach; his failure to prevent the loss of airspeed and avoid a stall while in steep band turn; and hi s failure to execute imme diate action to recover

from a stall Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: At the time of the accident, the crew had been on duty for approx 18 hrs, having flown all night be fore accepting the accident flight. The board believes that the substandard performance by th e experienced captain may have reflected the debilitating influence from fatigue. Captain testif ied feeling very lethargi c and indifferent during the landing. First officer testified he felt fatigued ear lier in the trip but felt exhilarated at the time of the landing. The board’s analysis revealed the captain had been awake for 23.5 hrs at the time of the accident, the first officer 19hrs and flight engineer 21 hrs. the accide nt occurred at the end of the afternoon psychological low period, the crewmember s had been awake the pr evious 2 nights, and had attempted to sleep during the day complicating their circadian sleep di sorders - thus fitting the 3 scientific criteria for susceptibility to the debilitating effects of fatigue. At 0830, before crew left airport, chief sche duler found GTMO flight needed crew & was told “no legal problem” as it was “international flight.” Scheduler determined crew could reposition to Norfolk Naval Base (NGU), pick up A/ C, fly to GTMO, then ferry under part 91 to ATL, & remain just within company 24-hour duty limit. Crew discussed timing & agreed to take trip, though “it was pushing the edge.” CAUSE: impaired judgment, decision-making, & flying abilities of PIC & crew due to fatigue; PIC's failure to properly assess conditions; loss of situational awareness while maneuvering onto final; failure to prevent loss of ai rspeed & avoid stall wh ile in steep bank turn;143 

### & failure to execute immediate act ion to recover from stall. Factors; inadequacy of part 121 flight & duty time regulations, supplementa l air carrier, interna tional operations, &

circumstances that led to ex tended flight/duty hours & fatigue ; inadequate CRM training & inadequate training & guidance by carrier for crew on operations at special airports, such as GTMO; & Navy's failure to provide system that would assure that local tower controller was aware of inoperative strobe light so as to advise crew. SCORE: 0.9 At time of accident, PIC & FO had been awake about 24 hours & on duty 22 hours. After such a long day, crew was offered standard straight-i n approach over ocean but they inexplicably chose very demanding approach in darkness. FE had sa id he got a rush on approach like they were shooting an approach to an aircra ft carrier but FE noted that he was “tired & lethargic” as A/C approached airport & he “believed that the other 2 crew members were fatigued.” By including ferry flights, the require ments in this final rule affect duty-day limits would have precluded this cr ew from taking this flight.

3. Accident DCA94MA065

Date: 7/2/1994 July 2, 1994 in Charlotte, NC A/C: MD-82, N954VJ Injuri es: 37 Fatal, 16 Serious Accident Summary: Aircraft collided with trees and a private residence near the Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, Char lotte, North Carolina (CLT), shortly after the flightcrew executed a missed approach from the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to

runway144 

### Probable Cause: Probable cause was determin ed to be the flightcrew’s decision to continue an approach into seve re convective activity that was conducive to a microburst: 2) the flightcrew’s failure to recognize a windshear situ ation in a timely manner , 3) the flightcrew’s failure to establish and maintain the proper airp lane attitude and thrust setting necessary to escape the windshear; and 4) the lack of re al-time adverse weather and windshear hazard information dissemination from air traffic control, all of which led to an encounter with and failure to escape from a micr oburst-induced windshear that was produced by a rapidly developing thunderstorm located at the approach end of runway. Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: Th e captain was off duty for 3 days before the beginning of the accident trip. On the morning of June 28, 1994, he flew with his National Guard squadron, which is based at Wright Patterson Air Fo rce Base Ohio, near his home. On the day of

the accident he awoke about 0455 dr ove to the airport in Dayton Oh io, and departed on a flight to Pittsburgh at around 0745. The re porting time for the trip that included the accid ent flight was 0945, and the departure time for LG A was at 1045. The first officer flew a 4-day trip that ended around 0930 on July 2. On the day of the accident, he arose about 06 I5 and flew the leg to Pittsburgh that departed St. Louis at 0810. He arrived in Pittsburgh at 0030. SCORE: 0.15 Fatigue could have affected FO's performance (PF). PIC, who was off-duty preceding 3 days, was much less vulnerable to fa tigue, but he too had al ready had a long day. Accident occurred 14 hours into PIC’s day. He awoke at 0455, drove to Dayton from home, then flew to PIT to begin duty day. Accident occurred at 1843, at end of third of 4 scheduled legs. His long day may have contributed to his failure to make 2 standard call-outs on approach at 1000 AGL & 100 AGL. As NTSB notes, failure to make these call-outs contribu ted to PIC’s loss of situational awareness, his directing FO to go-around “to the right” instead of following runway145 

### heading as directed, & directing FO to “push down” after FO had initiated 15-degree nose-up & right banking turn.

FO was more vulnerable to fatigue. His duty day ended June 30 at 2230 at Blountsville, TN. NTSB report does not say when that duty day began, nor when FO awoke that day. At Blountville, he went to bed at 0130 & awoke at 0900. His next duty day ended at STL at 2040

EDT. He went to bed at 2230 & awoke at 0615 on accident day. He then flew to PIT & began pairing with accident PIC. Like PIC, FO wa s nearly 14 hours into his day when accident occurred. He was PF on PIT-LGA leg & on accide nt leg from CAE. Fatigue could have contributed to incomplete pre-fl ight brief, failure to maintain sterile cockpit below 10,000 feet, approach briefing in which he omitted field elev ation, FAF altitude, DH, & MAP altitudes, all of

which NTSB noted had contributed to lack of s ituational awareness by both pilots. Finally, all

the above contributed to crew’s choice to init iate non-standard go-aro und. Other factors were important, including ATC performance, A/C's in adequate windshear al gorithm, & abnormally severe windshear. In short, hard to justify a high score, but equally hard to argue that fatigue was

irrelevant.

4. Accident DCA95MA020

Date: 2/16/1995

NTSB Identification: DCA95MA02 0, Air Transport International February 16, 1995 in Kansas City, MO A/C: DC-8-63, N782AL Injuries: 3 Fatal Accident Summary: Aircraft was destroyed by ground impact and fire during attempted

takeoff.146 

### Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be loss of directional control by pilot in command during the takeoff roll, flightcrews l ack of understanding of the three-engine takeoff procedures and their decision to modify these procedures and the failure of the company to ensure that the flight crew had adequate experi ence, training and rest to conduct the non-routine flight Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: Sa fety board believes the captain and other crew members were experiencing fatigue at the time of the accident. The captain’s performance in the accident reveals many areas of degradation in which fatigue is probably a factor. Accident report notes a demanding Delaware -Germany overni ght round trip flight (6 time zones crossed) and a daytime rest period which caused disrupti ons in circadian rhythms. Additionally, the captains last rest period was repeatedly interrupt ed by the company. Report also notes that since flight was non-revenue flight, it was under different duty rules a nd the same flight, were it a revenue flight, would have been illega l given the rest pe riods the crew had. SCORE: 0.9 Fatigue was a significant problem in this accident. With or without crew's inadequate training & knowledge of 3-engine T/O, NPRM would preclude this crew from this ferry trip. Also, all 3 crew performed poorly & all 3 likely were fatigued, per NTSB, & all 3 exhibited “performance degradation” symptomatic of fatigue (difficulties in setting proper priorities & continuation of T/O attempt despite disagreement & confusion on important issues).

5. Date: 12/20/1995

NTSB Identification: DCA96R A020, American Airlines December 20, 1995 in Cali, Colombia A/C: B757-200, N651AA Injuries: 160 Fatal, 4 Serious147 

### Accident Summary: Aircraft crashed 38 miles north of Cali, Columbia into mountainous terrain during a descent unde r instrument flight rules

Probable Cause: Probable causes were determin ed to be the flight crew’s failure to adequately plan and execute the approach to ru nway 19 at SKCL and their inadequate use of automation; Failure of the flightcrew to discon tinue the approach into Cali, despite numerous cues alerting them of the inadvisability of continuing the approach; Th e lack of situational awareness of the flightcrew rega rding vertical navigation, proximity to terrain, and the relative location of critical radio aids; Failure of the fli ghtcrew to revert to basi c radio navigation at the time when the FMS-assisted navigation became confusing and demanded an excessive workload in a critical phase of the flight.

Flight Crew/Fatigue Re lated Information: At 2138 CFIT at 9000; peak at 9190. Night VO R/DME approach from MIA; 2 hrs late. PIC concerned to get cabin crew on ground to meet AAL rules on cab in crew rest (for next day return flight). Cali in long N/S valley; high terrain west & east. Cleared to Cali VOR; readback "cleared direct," entered "direc t;" way points go off display. Late r cleared to interim Tulua VOR. Expecting “direct,” crew became unsure of loca tion. CVR shows crew fumbled with charts & Tulua ID, but already past Tulua. When crew fi nally entered Tulua, A/C began turning back to Tulua; PIC overrode. Then ATC offered direct approach from north (was 01; now 19). Crew rushed to get down. Put in single-letter ID fo r ROSO, but Colombia has 2 navaids with singleletter "R." Per ICAO, software defaults to "R " with more traffic (well north at Romeo VOR-- Bogota); had to punch in all 4 le tters for ROSO. Again A/C began turning back. Crew now very confused & they knew it. FO (PF): "where are we?" PIC says go S/SE – now east of valley, 13148 

### miles off course & below terrain between A/C & Cali. Now more confused; reading DME to ROMEO, thinking it was ROSO. Stepped down ear ly, configured to land as GPWS sounded. Pulled up but did not retract spoilers; slow clim b (184 knots at impact). Hit east slope nose up, skidded over top & down west side. Both p ilots, 6 FA & 152 pax fa tal; 4 pax serious. CAUSE per Colombian CAA: 1. cr ew's failure to adequately plan & execute approach to runway 19 & inadequate use of automation; 2. Failure to discon tinue approach, despite numerous cues; 3. lack of situational awareness regardin g vertical navigation, pr oximity to terrain, & relative location of critical radio aids; 4. Failure to revert to basic radio nav when FMS-nav became confusing & demanded excessive worklo ad. Factors: 1. crew's ongoing efforts to expedite approach & landing to avoid potential delays from exceeding company duty time limits; 2. execution of GPWS escape maneuver with speed brakes deployed; 3. FMS logic that dropped all intermediate fixes from disp lay(s) upon execution of direct routing; 4. FMS-generated nav information that used different naming conve ntion from that publis hed in nav charts." SCORE: 0.35 Crew certainly would have been ti red, despite being first of their duty tour.

PIC had been awake close to 17 hours & FO ha d been awake at least 15 hours (14 & 17 hours are key thresholds in fatigue). Yet even if each had been operating earlier in their day, they likely would not have sorted out confusion created by single-letter identifier for Rozo & Romeo. Yet more rested crew may have avoided readback-hearb ack error related to “direct” with interim way points. Crew clearly knew they were very confus ed & that they were uncertain of their position in rugged terrain. More alert cr ew might have responded more a ppropriately, either by climbing above terrain to sort things out , or by reverting to radio nav until they re-established their position, or may have recognized that over-ride of northbound turn had pushed them across ridge line, east of valley. Thou gh crew certainly would be tired, fatigue was less than a show-stopper.149 

### Key factors would have remained with or wit hout alert crew: non-radar environment; confusion from multiple identifiers; self-induced pressu re; unexpected change to unfamiliar step-down approach at night in mountainous terrain; & sign ificantly delayed flight . The requirements might have led to avoiding confusion or to more appropriate response to confusion.

6. NTSB Identification: NYC96FA174, TWA August 25, 1996 in JFK, NY A/C: L-1011, N31031 Injuries: None

Date: 8/25/1996 Accident Summary: Aircraft was substantially damaged when the tail struck the runway, while landing at John F. Kennedy Internati onal Airport, Jamaica, New York (JFK). On arrival in JFK area, wx was 1⁄4-mile in fog, scattered at 200, & temp/dew of 66/66F. Crew expected 4R, but before reaching FAF, 4R went below minimum & ATC offered 4L (still above minimum). PIC accepted & FO (PF) tran sitioned to 4L. Inspection methods from Lockheed & adopted by TWA did not adequately specify how to check sl at drive system for

slack. But crew failed to reset altimeter bug for new runway (100 feet higher than 4R). PIC also missed several required call-outs on approach & no charts for 4L were on board. When PF asked for charts, PIC said “just fly the approach.” A/C was slow & unstabl e throughout approach & when altimeter read 50 feet (in fact 150 feet), A/ C began to flare. FO re cognized they were high & pushed nose over. On landing, A/C had tail st rike & substantial damage. Failure to reset

altimeter & absence of charts were fundamental in this accident.150 

### Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be the failure of the flight crew to complete the published checklist and to adequately cross-check the actions of each other, which

resulted in their failure to detect that the le ading edge slats had not extended and led to the aircraft's tail contacting the runway during the computer-driven, auto -land flare for landing. Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain reported that he had difficulty adjusting to disruptions in hi s sleeping schedule, and for this reason did not bid to fly international routes. According to his sleep schedule, he had b een awake about 24 hours at the time of the accident and reported th at he that he felt, ""awful, just tired an d exhausted."" The first officer said that the captain attempted to rest dur ing the cruise portion of the flight to JFK, with his head back in the seat, but that there were visiting crewmembers in the cockpit and the captain might not have received good rest. In addition, th e captain commented that he had not slept well

in the hotel. The first officer reported that he had flow n the LAS layover trip several times during July, and had learned the importance of good sleep for flying it. He reported that he had in excess

of 14 hours of rest in the scheduled 24 hours of off duty, which was split over two periods. At the

time of the accident he had been awake for over 9 hours following a rest in excess of 5 1/2 hours. The flight engineer reported that she had not slept well in the hotel on the layover. Additionally, she reported that she felt rested when the accident trip began; however, at the time of the landing she was getting tired

SCORE: 0.35 Had crew been bett er rested, they may not have missed altimeter reset, may have recognized or acted upon unstable appr oach, or may have gone around, as required by company procedures when not stable at 500 feet . NPRM's treatment of night operations may151 

### have affected this flight. Conversely, crews have made similar errors when well rested & flying at mid-day. The FAA believes that avoidable fatigue contributed to crew’s failures on approach.

7. NTSB Identification: NYC99LA052, Colgan Air January 22, 1999 in Hyannis, MA A/C: BE-1900, N215CJ Injuries: None At 1719 (dusk), Beech 1900D by Colgan substa ntially damaged on landing at HYA. No injury to PIC, FO & 2 employees as pax on posi tioning flight from BOS to HYA in IMC. Started

taxi at BOS at 1600. T/O & en route uneventfu l. But RVR at HYA went below minimum while en route. Wx was 100-foot ceiling in fog, with variable winds at 3 knots. On arrival at HYA, PIC performed 2 missed approaches. Before trying 3 rd 

### approach, he advised tower & pax that this was last shot, or they return to BOS. On third approach, both PIC & FO visually acquired runway. FO said PIC line d up with centerline & reque sted flaps. FO said A/C “floated at 20 feet over runway at normal transition when I heard PIC taking power levers over flight idle gate by sound of engine/props .' This placed prop in 'BETA' range. A/C then started to sink, & PIC pul led back on control yoke. Main gear struck ground & fractured dur ing +2.9G touchdown, which occurred 2500 feet beyond approach end of 5,252 foot runway. Ran off right side of runway, 4700 feet beyond approach end & stopped. To place throttles in BETA, it was necessary to lift power levers over flight idle stop. Flight manual included warning: 'Do not lif t power levers in flight.' On accident day, PIC reported for duty at 0535, with first departure from HYA at 0620. He returned to HYA at 0920, after 3 flights & 2:31 flight time. Then with different FO, PIC T/O for Boston at 1100. They flew 5 more flights for 3: 53 flight hours, then returned to BOS at 1540.152 

### Probable CAUSE: PIC’s improper placement of power levers in BETA position while in flight. Factors: fog & dusk conditions. SCORE: 0.15 Accident report summarizes only Captain's flight day, not his preceding 72 hours. Clearly had a long day & difficulty getti ng into HYA did not help. Started taxi at BOS 12.5 hours into duty day for flight to HYA, so he needed to be on ground at HYA within halfhour to beat new NPRM max duty day. May have precuded this PIC from this flight (or not – close call). Also, thoug h better rested PIC may have handled flare better, others have pulled throttle & props into beta. Fatigue might help e xplain PIC’s decision to take 3 shots at landing below mimium,

8. NTSB Identification: NYC99FA110, American Eagle May 8, 1999 in JFK, NY A/C: SF34, N232AE Injuries: 1 Serious

Accident NYC99FA110 Accident Summary: Aircraft sustained subs tantial damage during landing at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be the pilot-in-command's failure to perform a missed approach as required by his co mpany procedures. Factors were the pilot-incommand's improper in-flight decisions, the pilot- in-command's failure to comply with The FAA regulations and company procedures, inad equate crew coordination, and fatigue Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: On May 6, 1999, the captain went off duty about 2030, drove home, and was asleep about 2300. On May 7, 1999, he awoke about 0700. He attempted to nap about 1200, but was unsuccessful. He reported for duty about 2200. The first153 

### officer was off duty on May 6, 1999. He depart ed Las Vegas, Nevada (commuting on a jumpseat) at 1230, and arrived at JFK about 1730. He ate, then rested in the pilot's crew room, but did not sleep. There was a 3 hour time diff erence between Las Vegas and JFK. The trip sequence scheduled the pilots to depart JFK at 2246, arrive at BWI at 2359, on May 7, 1999; and depart BWI for JFK at 0610 on May 8, 1999. They were provided with individual rooms at a local hotel, approximately 10 minutes from the ai rport. Due to a takeoff delay at JFK, the flightcrew did not arrive at BWI until 0025. They arrived at the hotel about 0100. The captain stated that he was asleep by 0130. He awoke at 0445 for the scheduled 0530 van ide back to the airport. The first officer stated that he was asleep between 0130 and 0200. He received a wakeup call at 0445. During post-accident interviews, both pilots stat ed that they were fatigued. At 0702, SF34 by American Eagle substantia lly damaged on landing at JFK; 1 pax serious; no injury to 26 pax, FA & 2 pilots. En route from BWI uneventful. On arrival in NY area, crew completed checklists & briefings fo r runway 04 when ATC a dvised crew that RVR for 04 was 1,600. Crew needed 1800 so ATC cleared them to holding fix at 4,000. While flying toward holding fix, RVR increased. ATC offered crew ILS approach, but advised that they might be too high. PIC accepted clearance nevertheless. C ontroller asked if crew could make approach from their position. PIC said yes & continued en tire approach with excessive altitude, airspeed, & rate of descent, while remaining above glide slope. This violated company procedures & FAR 91.175. Crew then failed to respond to 4 audible GP WS warnings. During approach, FO failed to make required callouts, including missed appr oach callout. Landed 7,000 feet beyond approach end, at 157 knots, & overran. During interviews, both pilots said they were fatigued. Crew was working continuous duty overnight schedule. Continuous duty overnight s (CDO) at American Eagle identifies trip154 

### sequence that is flown during late night hours, extending into early morning hours, with significant elapsed time period be tween one arrival & next depa rture. Since break between flights is not sufficient to qualify as free from duty rest period, crew remains continuously on duty, though carrier may have pr ovide hotel room for rest. On May 6, PIC went off duty at 2030, drove home, & was asleep at 2300. On May 7, he awoke at 0700. He tried to nap about noon but wa s unsuccessful. He reported for duty at 2200. FO was off duty on May 6. He departed LAS (c ommuting on jumpseat) at 0930 local time on May 7 (1230 EDT) & arrived at JFK at 1730. He ate then rested in crew room, but did not sleep. Trip sequence scheduled crew to depart JFK at 2246, arrive BWI at 2359, & then depart BWI for JFK at 0610 on 5/8. They were provided with indi vidual rooms at hotel 10 minutes from airport. But, due to delays at JFK, crew did not arri ve at BWI until 0025. They arrived at hotel at 0100 & PIC was asleep by 0130. He awoke at 0445 for schedul ed 0530 van ride back to airport. FO said he was asleep between 0130 and 0200. He received wake-up call at 0445. CAUSE: PIC's failure to perfor m missed approach as required by company procedures. Factors: PIC's improper in-flight decisions, failure to comply with FARs & company procedures, inadequate crew coordination, & fatigue. SCORE: 0.5 Crew likely was tired, & helps to explain why crew di d little right on or before the approach. Yet, the requirements would not reach the practice of “Continuous Duty Overnight, but it would have reac hed the FO’s continuous day st arting with his commute. This would not have helped PI, but it might have ensured at least one alert crewmember.

9. NTSB Identification: DCA99MA060, American June 1, 1999 in Little Rock, AR155 

### A/C: MD-82, N215AA Injuri es: 11 Fatal, 45 Serious

Accident DCA99MA060 Accident Summary: Aircraft crashed after it overran th e end of runway Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: Th e captain went to sl eep about 2200 the night before the accident and slept until betw een 0700 and 0730. On nonflying days, he would typically go to sleep betw een 2130 and 2200, wake up about 0515, and leave for work about 0600. On May 30, 1999, the first officer traveled from his home outside Los Angeles, California, to Chicago. The first officer indicated that he had been co mmuting from his home to the Chicago-O’Hare base for about 3 months and that, as a result, he was adjusted to the central time

zone. The first officer indicated that he was invo lved in routine activities while in the Chicago

area. He went to bed between 2000 and 2200 the night before the accident and woke up about

0730.

The board found that at the time of the acc ident (2350:44), the captain and the first officer had been continuously awake for at leas t 16 hours. Also the accident time was nearly 2 hours after the time that both pilots went to bed the night before the acci dent and the captain’s routine bedtime (between 2130 and 2200), meaning their circadian systems were not actively promoting alertness. The Safety Board concludes that the flight crew’s degraded performance was consistent with known effects of fatigue. CAUSE: failure to discontinue approach when severe thunderstorms & associated hazards to flight operations had mo ved into airport area, & crew's fa ilure to ensure that spoilers had extended after touchdown. Factors: flight cr ew's (1) impaired performance resulting from fatigue & situational stress associated with intent to land under the circumstances, (2)156 

### continuation of approach when company's max crosswind component was exceeded, & (3) use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 e ngine pressure ratio after landing. SCORE: 0.15 FO was 5 months into 1-year probation & paired with Chief Pilot from ORD base. But FO later testified of good worki ng relationship with PIC & said rank of Chief

Pilot was no barrier. Accident occurred 14 hour s into duty day & nearly 17 hours after awakening. Long day & disrupted flight into & from DFW. FO showed signs on CVR of recognizing that landing was not a good idea, but PIC focused on landing. Was this fatigue or

task fixation? Would more rest have made recen tly hired FO more willing to speak up to PICChief Pilot? Call-outs were made & SOPs indica te crew was engaged. Perhaps a less worn-out PIC would have considered diverting (or not), or may at least have responded to implied warnings from tower. Would have exceeded the requ irements contained in this final rule by 12 minutes at impact; may have changed sequence befo re T/O (had to be released by 2316 - - 2304 might have made a difference).

10. NTSB Identification: DCA02MA054, Federal Express July 26, 2002 in Tallahassee, FL A/C: B727-200, N487FE Injuries: 3 Serious

Accident AAR0402

Date: 7/26/2002 Accident Summary: Aircraft struck trees on short final approach and crashed short of runway 9 at airport. At 0537 (night), A/C destroyed by impact & pos t impact fire when it undershot on visual approach to 09, striking trees along extended centerlin e 3,650 feet short into black hole. FO157 

### flying. Wx: calm, visibility 8, clouds few at 1 00 & scattered at 2500. On arrival at TLH, FO

briefed for visual to 27. Minute later he asked PI C if they should use 09 instead. Some discussion followed but no decision. Ten 10 minutes later, SO asked pilots if they wanted to run approach checklist. FO again raised question of 09 vs 27 & crew decided on 09. Turned onto final 2.5 NM

out. At this point PAPI would ha ve indicated 1 white & 3 red (low). But A/C continued to descend below glide slope & was at 200 AGL at 0.9 miles out. PAPI would have shown 4 red.

CVR shows no discussion about PAPI or altitude other than comment by FO that '(I'm) gonna have to stay just lit tle bit higher... I'm gonna lo se end of runway', to which PIC replied 'yeah... yeah, okay.' About 18 seconds later PIC commented ' it's startin' to disappear in there little bit (isn't) it? Think we'll be alright, yeah.' Then hit trees 11 seconds later. Crew believed they were on glide slope & showed no concern of undershooting. FO later said that 'from time I rolled out (on final), I saw that I was on glide slope... & it never changed.' Approach to 09 is over forest wi th no ground lights or other visual references (black hole), which can lead pilots to believe they are higher than they re ally are. NTSB notes that PAPI should have prevented this trap but FO's first class medical noted he had color vision defect. After accident, he failed 7 red/green vision tests. Specialists ' report found that he had severe congenital deuteranomaly that could result in 'difficulties interpreting red/green & white signal lights.' Report added that '... he would definitely have had problems discriminating PAPIs... because red lights would appear not to be red at all, ... more indistinguishable from white than red... it would be extremely unlikely that he would be capable of seeing even color pink on PAPI... more likely combination of whites & yellows & perhaps, not even that difference.'158 

### Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be the captain's and first officer's failure to establish and maintain a proper glidep ath during the night visual approach to landing. Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The 3 accident flight crewmembers all had different flight, duty and sleep sche dules before the accident. Flight and duty times since the last rest period for the caption, first officer and flight engineer are as follow s: Captain (flight time - 1:23, duty time 2:35), first officer (flight time-4:02, duty time-10: 29), flight engineer (flight time-3:43, duty time-10:41) Captain reported not sleeping very well the 2 night leading up to the day of the accident but reported not feeling fatigued when he reporte d for the accident flight. Board found evidence of a sleep deficit for the captain based on reporte d sleep quality and small errors made during the accident flight the otherwise competent captai n wouldn't normally make as indicated by past performance. First officer had normal sleep prior to accident, however he reported he felt good but he did not recall feeling aler t and he seemed tired according to the captain. Board found the first officers sleep schedule was disrupted and found his performance deficient, which appears inconsistent with characterizations of his past performance. Flight engineer slept normally and appeared alert according to the captain and the board found minimal evidence he was fatigues, however his performance deficiencies may have been a result of workload during a rushed approach.

CAUSE: crew’s failure to establish & maintain proper glidepath in night visual approach. Factors: combination of crew fatigue, failure to adhere to SOPs, FO's co lor vision deficiency &

PIC & FO's failure to monito r approach. 3 crew serious159 

### SCORE: 0.15 Performance of both pilots was deficient & below their usual standard during approach. NTSB believes this was due to fatigue. Besides back-of-clock, both pilots had difficulty getting adequate rest be fore flight. PIC said his sleep 2 days before had 'not really (been) good' or had been 'marginal' because he kept being woken by family dog. FO said he had difficulty adjusting his sleep cycle & inferred he did not sleep well dur ing day. Friend described FO as looking tired & PIC commented on same bus that he 'might be lit tle tired.' Even with color-blindness, causal statement justifies concludi ng that a better rested crew may have avoided the whole scenario early-on in the approac h. But unsure exactly how NPRM would have addressed this case, since rest periods were reasonable (even if not well managed) & accident occurred on visual approach over a black hole wi th a color-blind pilot tr ying to use a PAPI. The strongest argument for fatigue must rely on th e notion that a better rested crew might have monitored the glide slope better and/or might have run a more disciplined checklist & prelanding brief, or that better re sted PIC might have chosen the more common instrument approach

to 27. 11. NTSB Identification: DCA05MA004, Corpor ate Airlines as American Connection October 19, 2004 in Kirksville, MO A/C: BAE-32, N875JX Injuries: 13 fatal, 2 Serious

Accident AAR0601 Accident Summary: Aircraft struck trees on fi nal approach and crashed short of runway.

At 1937 on LOC/DME final at Kirksville in IM C, hit trees at 33 feet QFE on center line 1.3 NM out. WX: wind 020 at 6, visibi lity 4, mist & 300 overcast. On final, PIC (PF) maintained constant descent of 1200 FPM until impact (met company SOP but exceeded that recommended by the FAA for descent below 1000 AGL). At MDA, PIC said 'I can see ground there' (as PF, he160 

### should have been on instruments). Continued through MDA & asked FO 'what do you think?' FO: 'I can't see (expletive).' Sec onds later PIC said 'yeah, there it is. Approach lights in sight' just

as GPWS called “200” & FO announced 'in si ght, continue'. (Both looking out window; nobody on instruments). Never recognized low altitude un til seeing trees 2 seconds before impact. Wx complicated approach but crew never seemed too concerned about wx. Flew approach in casual fashion & lack of professionalism: no sterile cockpit (casual conve rsation); non-standard phraseology; humming; etc. PIC known for sense of humor & was said to 'emphasize fun in the cockpit'. Crew was fatigued: reported for duty at 0514. Accident was near end of 6th sector on 'demanding' day in IMC. Crew had been on duty 14.5 hours & PIC is said to have slept poorly night before. PIC commuted from home in NJ to STL & FO commuted from Ohio. Reported for duty at 1345 on 10/17 (2 days before accident). Fl ew 3 flights in 8-hour duty day & arrived at over-night destination (Quincy) at 2125. On 10/18, departed Quincy at 1415 after more than 15 hours off. Flew 3 flights & 6:20 duty day. Arri ved at over-night destin ation in Burlington at 1945. On 10/19, duty day began at 0514 after 9 hours off. Departed BRL at 0544 to STL & arrived 0644. Next 2 flights cancelled due to w x. T/O for round-trip from STL-Kirksville (IRK)

at 1236. Landed STL at 1745. Probable Cause: failure to follow proced ures & improper non-pr ecision instrument approach at night in IMC, in cluding descent below MDA before acquiring runway environment. Factors: non-standard callouts; unprof essional demeanor; & crew fatigue. Probable cause was determined to be the pilo ts’ failure to follow established procedures and properly conduct a non-precision instrument a pproach at night in IMC, including their descent below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) before required visual cues were available161 

### (which continued un moderated until the airplane st ruck the trees) and their failure to adhere to

the established division of duties between the flying and nonflying (monitoring) pilot Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: Ca ptain reportedly did not sleep well the night

before the accident but did not report feeling tired. He was late r observed resting on a couch the morning of the accident. First officer reportedl y did not have any trouble sleeping the night before the accident and the day of the accident seemed alert and happy. However, the flight crews rest time (2100- 0400) did not correspond favorably with either ones sleeping patterns and at the time of the acci dent, they had been on duty 14.5 hrs and it had been 15 hrs since their last rest period. The board suggests that the pilot deficiencies observed could be consistent with fatigue impairment SCORE: 0.75 Accident flight T/O STL at 1842 for IRK on 6t h flight of day after 6:14 flight time & 14.5-hour day already. Long, brutal da y in IMC that started with limited rest period. Crew was familiar with each other & with IRK. WX & PIC's established practice of "fun in the cockpit" also were factor s. Fatigue had to be a big player , though PIC's history of "fun in cockpit implies other issues. The requirements in this final rule would ha ve precluded this crew from taking this flight.

12. NTSB Identification: DCA06MA064, Comair as August 27, 2006, Lexington, KY A/C: CRJ-200, N431CA Injuries: 49 Fatal, 1 Serious

Accident AAR0705

Date: 8/27/2007162 

### Accident Summary: Aircraft crashed during ta keoff from Blue Gra ss Airport, Lexington, Kentucky.

At 0607 Comair 5191 crashed on T/O from Blue Grass Airport (LEX) for ATL. A/C ran off end of Runway 26 & was destroyed by impact forces & post-crash fire. T/O wrong runway; had been cleared to T/O on Runway 22. PIC, FA & all 47 pax fatal; FO serious. Threshold for 22 & 26 are close & common taxiway had construction near thresholds, possibly inviting confusion in darkness after short taxi from nearby terminal. Al so, sole controller in tower turned away after clearing A/C for T/O (A/C was th e only active A/C on the airport). Runway 22 had minor construction work underway preceding week with NOTAM for “some” lights out. Crew also appeared behind the curve early: approached wrong RJ on ramp (corrected by ramp staff); called Toledo tower rather than LEX (corrected by tower); called wrong flight number (corrected by tower); & voca lly ran through checklis t on taxi so quickly

NTSB had to slow CVR read-out to understand it. Crew then taxied onto da rkened, closed short runway (26). Initiated rolling T/O, further redu cing chance to recognize wrong runway, crossed

intersection with ac tive runway, lighted 7,000-foot Runway 22, 500 feet fro m start of rolling T/O on 26, continued & rotated just as they ran out of pavement. Ran ont o grass & nose lifted slightly (with main gear tracks deepening in grass) just as A/C struck perime ter fence, then rolled at high speed into trees & burned out. PIC, FA & 47 pax fa tal; FO serious. CAUSE: crew's failure to use available cues & aids to identify A/C's location on airport surface during taxi & their failure to cross-check & verify that A/C was on correct ru nway before T/O. Factor s: crew's non-pertinent conversation during taxi, which resulted in loss of positional awareness, and the FAA's failure to require that all runway cro ssings be authorized only by specific ATC clearances.163 

### Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be s the flight crewmembers’ failure to use available cues and aids to identify the ai rplane’s location on the ai rport surface during taxi

and their failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane wa s on the correct runway before

takeoff Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain and the first officer received more than the minimum required rest periods during their respective trips in the days before the accident, and their flight and duty times in the week and month before the accident would not have precluded them from obtaining adequate sleep. Also, both pilots had only been awake for

about 2 hours at the time of the accident. Two f actors in the pilots’ sche dules just before the accident could have been associated with the pot ential development of a fatigued state: acute sleep loss and circadian disruption - The captain and the first officer also awakened on the day of

the accident at a time when th ey would normally be asleep. Overall, The Safety Board concludes that , even though the flight crewmembers made some errors during their preflight activities and the taxi to the runway, there was insufficient

evidence to determine whether fati gue affected their performance SCORE: 0.35 Fatigue likely was not an issu e for PIC (PNF) but it may have affected FO’s performance (PF). FO began his duty tour on 8/25 at JFK. He drove that morning to FLL near his home for flight to JFK. Departed FLL at 0559 & arrived JFK at 0832. NTB does not note when FO awoke, but it likely would have been around 0400 to reach his 0559 departure at FLL. His duty day then began with flight from JFK to ROC at 1305. Return flight to JFK T/O at

1600 but crew had to divert to BDL for fuel & did not land at JFK until nearly 2000. Due to late arrival, crew was asked to reposition A/C to LEX. Departed gate at 2130 but were not able to T/O until 2300; arrived at LEX at 0140. FO reached his hotel at 0210 on 8/26. By the time he got164 

### to bed, FO would have had nearly a 23-hour day. On 8/26, FO had day off. He told his wife that morning by phone that he had “slept in” & planned to go to bed early that night. Phone records, hotel key cards, & credit card records indicate normal day of activity th rough at least 1830 on his rest day, when FO paid for meal in hotel restaurant (probably asleep no earlier than 2000). On 8/27 he & PIC reported for duty at 0515. FO lik ely had same wake-up call as PIC (0415). Though FO had free day before accident, 8/25 was 23-hour day, with very late time to bed, followed on 8/27 by very early start to hi s day. Despite “sleeping in” on 8/26, FO would have been coping with sleep deficit. This could partly explain his confus ion or inattention prior to departing gate. It also could have made hi m more vulnerable to visual confusion caused by

minor construction & related barriers , & his failure to res pond to visual cues of unlighted runway & crossing active runway that was fully lighte d. Yet other factors al so may explain these failures. For example, FO had flown into LEX 2 nights before when “lights were out all over the place.” That was at end of his 23-hour day; neit her he nor that Captain apparently recognized that outages had been NOTAMed on 8/25. On morn ing of accident, runway end identifier lights were out of service. Closeness of 2 runway ends with single taxiway also increases risk of wrong runway T/Os. Finally, with terminal close to runway ends, taxi time was short, increasing percentage of head-down time, at least for PN F. The requirements woul d have precluded FO from taking positioning flight & extending very long duty day on first day. This may have

averted the entire scenario.

13. NTSB Identification: DCA07MA072, Shuttle America February 18, 2007, Cleveland, OH A/C: ERJ-170, N862RW Injuries: None165 

### Accident AAR0801 Accident Summary: Aircraft overran the end of the runway during a landing in snowy

conditions and stuck an ILS antenna a nd fence, and the nose gear collapsed. Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The day of the accident, the captain had been awake for all but about 1 hour of the previous 32 hour s; he stated that his lack of sleep affected his ability to concentrate and process information to make decisions and, as a result, was not “at the best of [his] game.” The captain also reporte d that he had insomnia, which began 9 months to 1 year before the accident and lasted for several days at a time. From Feb 11-14 the first officer flew a total of 18hrs 27 mins. On Feb, he star ted a 3-day 6-leg trip and by the 18th, his total flight time was 11 hrs 50 mins. At the time of the accident, the first officer had been on duty

about 9 hrs 15 mins with a total flight time of 5 hrs 30 mins. The first officer agreed to be the flying pilot because of the captain’s references to fatigue and lack of sleep the night before. A contributing factor to the ac cident was the pilot’s fatigue which affected his ability to effectively plan and monitor th e approach and landing. The Safety Board concludes that the captain was fatigued, which degraded his performance during the accident flight. CAUSE: failure to execute a missed approach when visual cues for runway were not distinct & identifiable. Factors: (1) crew's d ecision to descend to ILS DH instead of localizer (glideslope out) MDA; (2) FO's long landing on shor t, contaminated runway & crew's failure to use reverse thrust & braking to max effectiveness; (3) PIC's fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively plan for & monitor approach; & (4) ca rrier's failure to administer attendance policy that permitted crew to ca ll in as fatigued without fear of reprisals.

SCORE: 0.5 A better rested PIC likely would have flown th is leg, & likely would have increased chances of going around. However, it but probably woul d not have changed confusion166 

### over glideslope & ILS DH versus localizer M DA. Either way, the requirements would have enabled PIC to opt out of flight.

14. NTSB Identification: DCA07FA037, Pinnacle as Northwest Express April 12, 2007, Traverse City, MI A/C: CRJ-200, N8905F Injuries: None

Accident AAR-0802

Date: 4/12/2007 Accident Summary: Aircraft ran off the departure end of the runway during snowy

conditions. Probable Cause: Probably cause was determined to be the pilots’ decision to land at TVC without performing a landing distance assessm ent, which was required by company policy because of runway contamination initially reported by TVC ground operations personnel and continuing reports of deteriora ting weather and runway conditi ons during the approach. This poor decision making likely reflected the eff ects of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty day, and, for the captain, the duties asso ciated with check airman functions Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The accident occurred well after midnight at the end of a demanding day during which the pilo ts had flown 8.35 hours, made five landings, been on duty more than 14 hours, and been awake more than 16 hours. During the accident flight, the CVR recorded numerous yawns and co mments that indicate that the pilots were fatigued. Additionally, the captain made refe rences to being tire d at 2332:12, 2341:53, and 0018:43, and the first officer stated, “jeez, I’m tired” at 0020:41. Additi onally, the pilots’ high167 

### workload (flying in inclement weather conditions , and in the captain’s case, providing operating experience for the first offi cer) during their long day likel y increased their fatigue. SCORE: 0.9 Crew was clearly tired & had b een on duty 15 hours as of accident time & 12:44 hours at pushback; The requirements would have precluded this cr ew from taking this flight.

15. NTSB Identification: DEN07LA101, Great Lakes Airlines June 20, 2007, Laramie, WY A/C: BE-1900D, N253GL Injuries: None

Accident DEN07LA101

Date: 6/20/2007 Accident Summary: The airplane landed long, bounced, and touched down again. The captain tried to slow down and turn the airplane off the runway on to a taxiway at high speed. During the turn attempt, the airplane departed th e runway and the airplane 's right propeller struck the top of an electrical box that powered the runway approach lighting system.

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be The pilot's improper decision, his misjudgment of his speed and distance, and his failure to perform a go- around resulting in the airplane overrunning the runway and striking an electrical box. Factors contributing to the accident were the failure of the crew to perf orm proper crew resource management, the first

officer's failure to intervene before th e accident occurred, and the electrical box. Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: On ly mention of flight crew schedule is the crew was on the third day of a three-day trip , which had started in Cortez, Colorado, that168 

### morning at 0520. The crew had flown from Cort ez to Denver, Colorado, to Farmington, New, Mexico, back to Denver, then to Laramie, and then to Worland. SCORE: 0.15 Given number of days & segmen ts flown, the accident occurred precisely at NPRM's proposed limit of 11-hour duty day. The requirements might have made a difference.

16. NTSB Identification: DCA09MA027, Co lgan Air as Continental Connection February 12, 2009, Clarence Center, NY A/C: DHC-8-400Q, N200WQ Injuries: 50 Fatal

Accident DCA09MA027 Accident Summary: Aircraft crashed into re sidence 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport and was destroyed by im pact and post-crash fires. At 2217 Dash 8-Q400 by Colgan Air as Contin ental Connection crashed on ILS approach to runway 23 at BUF 5 NM NE of airport in Clarence Center. FO arrived EWR on red-eye from West Coast via MEM at 0623. First flight @ 1300 can celled. Accident flight delayed; T/O EWR at 2120. Newly upgraded PIC (110 hours in M/M); FO (PF) had 700 hours in type. Steady, nonpertinent chatter enroute & throughout approach. FO notes little knowledge of icing. Other pilots describe light-moderate rime icing b/ 6,500 & 3,500 but none at 2,300. Accident A/C was in icing 9 minutes. De-icing system was "on" (which increases speed at which crews get low-speed cue, but does not affect actual stall speed). At 22:15:14 BUF Approach cleared flig ht for ILS approach to runway 23 (acknowledged). At 22:16:02, engi ne power levers were reduced to flight idle & Approach

instructed crew to contact Tower. Crew extend ed gear & auto flight system captured ILS 23 localizer. PIC then moved engine conditions levers forward to max RPM position as FO169 

### acknowledged instructions to Towe r. At 22:16:28 FO moved flaps to 10°, & 2 sec onds later stick shaker activated (warning of impending stall) & autopilot disconnecte d, with ”disconnect” horn sounding until impact. Stickpusher then activated (t o correct actual stall). Crew added power to 75% torque. At 2216:37, FO told PIC that she had put flaps up; airspeed now 100 knots, & roll angle reached 105 degrees right wing down before A/C began to roll back to left & stick pusher activated second time (about 2216:40 ). Roll angle then reached 35 degrees left wing down before A/C began to roll again to right. FO then as ked whether she should put gear up; PIC responded “gear up” with expletive. Pitch & roll had reached 25 degrees nose down & 100 degrees right wing down, when A/C entered steep descent. Stick pusher activated third time (at 2216:50), followed by impact. All 4 crew & 45 pax fata l; 1 ground fatal. (Not an icing accident.) Both pilots likely were significantly fatigued. Both pilots were based at EWR. PIC lived near Tampa & FO lived near Seattle. Neither had “crash pad” at EWR & both regularly used crew room to sleep. PIC tried to bid trips that ensured some nights in hotels at out-stations. At EWR he usually slept in crew room. FO always sl ept in crew room at EW R & was open about it. PIC, recently upgraded, commuted to EWR on 2/9 from TPA; arrived EWR at 2005 & spent night in crew room. Phone records & log-in s to crew tracking system indicate he got little sleep. Reported for duty at 0530 on 2/10, flew 3 flights & arri ved at BUF at 1300& had hotel

room. Left hotel at 0515 on 2/11 to report at 0615. Agai n flew 3 flights & re turned to EWR at 1544; spent rest of day & night in crew room . Again, phone, tracking system & contact with

others indicate ve ry little sleep.

FO commuted to EWR from SEA. She aw oke on 2/11/ at 0900, ar rived at PDX at 1730 for FedEx flight to MEM; arrived MEM at 02 30 EST (2230 PST); had about 90 minutes of sleep on flight. She then T/O MEM at 0418 & arrive d EWR at 0623, sleeping for “much of” 2-hour170 

### flight. At EWR, she spent day in crew ro om & napped, but phone, tracking system & conversations show she got little sleep. On 2/12, crew was scheduled for 3 flights: EWR-ROC; ROC-EWR; & EWR-BUF. First 2 cancelled due to winds at EWR & ground dela ys. Dispatch estimated 1910 departure for accident flight. Multiple dela ys; pushed back at 1945 & finally T/O 2120 for BUF. FO noted multiple times that she was not feeling well & befo re T/O said she was “ready to be at hotel” at

BUF. CAUSE: Captain’s inappropriate response to ac tivation of stick shaker, which led to stall

from which A/C did not recover. Factors: (1) crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to rising position of low-speed cue, (2) crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) PIC’s failure to effectively manage flight, & (4 ) Colgan’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection & management during approaches in ic ing conditions. NOTE: NT SB Cited fatigue in findings, but not in causal statement because NTSB said it could not determine “the extent of their impairment & degree to which it contribu ted to performance deficiencies.” But clearly suggests it did contribute. NOTE: NTSB was divided on the issue, with some arguing that the overwhelming issue was skills-based: pulling up to 30 degrees, not pushing power up all the way even well into the stall, and thereby missing severa l opportunities to allow th e aircraft to fly out of the stall. In short, debate is this: though the crew clearly was fatigued, would the outcome have been any different if the same crew were better rested? Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: On the day of the accident, the captain was scheduled to report to EWR at 1330. Because hi s duty period on February 11, 2009, had ended about 1544, he had a 21-hour, 16-minut e scheduled rest period befo re his report time. However, at 0310 on February 12, the capta in logged into Colgan’s CrewTrac computer system. This171 

### activity would have meant that he had, at a mi nimum, a 5-hour opportunity for sleep followed by another sleep opportunity of about 4 hours. Duri ng the 24 hours that preceded the accident, the first officer was reported to have slept 3.5 hours on flights and 5.5 hour s in the crew room. At the time of the accident, the captain would have been awake for at least 15 hours if he

had awakened about 0700 and fo r a longer period if he had aw akened earlier. The accident occurred about the same time that the captain’s sleep opportunities during the previous days had begun and the time at which he normally went to sleep. The first officer had been awake for about 9 hours at the time of the accident, which was about 3 hours before her normal bedtime. The captain had experienced chronic sleep loss, a nd both he and the first officer had experienced interrupted and poor-quality sleep during the 24 hours before the accident The pilots’ failure to detect the impending ons et of the stick shak er and their improper response to the stick shaker coul d be consistent with the know n effects of fatigue. The NTSB concludes that the pilots’ performance was likely impaired because of fatigue, but the extent of their impairment and the degree to which it c ontributed to the performa nce deficiencies that occurred during the flight cannot be conclusively determined SCORE: 0.5 Accident had many issues, but fati gue clearly was one of them. Both pilots had to be exhausted when they initiated appr oach to BUF. PIC was completing 4th day since awakening on 2/ 9. He had opportunity for quality sleep only on night of 2/10, & that was cut short with departure from hotel at 0515 on 2/11. Both pilots e ssentially stayed up all night on 2/11, with no opportunities for deep sleep, then f ound themselves operating late-night flight after day-long cancellations & delays. At one level, any rule that might have diminished this crew's fatigue could have been a show-stopper with a high score. However, crew had other basic problems. PIC clearly was not well versed in stall recognition nor response to stall (never went to172 

### full power, which likely would have enabled the aircraft to fly out of the stall in at least 2 points during the sequence). Same lack of recognition & knowledge appears true of FO; she raised flaps during a stall. Being well rested would not have provided this crew with any more skill than they already had, it would not necessarily have aver ted the chatter sustained throughout flight, nor would it necessarily have led crew to enter proper ref speeds for conditions. BUT more rest may have at least kept them tuned in enough to monitor airspeed. Th at alone could have averted the entire scenario. However, too many other fundamental issues to score above 50%. SCORE: 0.5 Accident had many issues, but fati gue clearly was one of them. Both pilots had to be exhausted when they initiated appr oach to BUF. PIC was completing 4th day since awakening on 2/ 9. He had opportunity for quality sleep only on night of 2/10, & that was cut short with departure from hotel at 0515 on 2/11. Both pilots e ssentially stayed up all night on 2/11, with no opportunities for deep sleep, then f ound themselves operating late-night flight after day-long cancellations & delays. At one level, any rule that might have diminished this crew's fatigue could have been a show-stopper with a high score. However, crew had other basic problems. PIC clearly was not well versed in stall recognition nor response to stall (never went to full power, which likely would have enabled the aircraft to fly out of the stall in at least 2 points during the sequence). Same lack of recognition & knowledge appears true of FO; she raised flaps during a stall. Being well rested would not have provided this crew with any more skill than they already had, it would not necessarily have aver ted the chatter sustained throughout flight, nor would it necessarily have led crew to enter proper ref speeds for conditions. BUT more rest may have at least kept them tuned in enough to monitor airspeed. Th at alone could have averted the entire scenario. However, too many other fundamental issues to score above 50%.173 

## Appendix B: Sensitivity Analyses174 

### This appendix presents results from performing five sensitivity analyses. Four of the cases relate to key components of the analysis supporting estimates of the costs of the rule:

1. Adjusting for minor differences in aircraft block hours between baseline runs and final

rule runs

2. Weighting of individual case result s to represent industry groups

3. Percent of flightcrew members who are re serves (passenger cost analysis only)

4. Percent of flightcrew sick time costs that could be saved due to the final rule. The fifth case explores the impact of incorpor ating alternative assumptions in the estimation of costs and benefits for cargo-only operat ions. These alternative assumptions were suggested in the comments made regarding the Initial SRIA.



## Sensitivity #1: Adjusting for Block Hour Discrepancy

As explained the body of this Final SRIA, wh en reviewing the calcu lations supporting the estimates of crew scheduling costs due to the final rule, the FAA became aware of a small

difference in the number of aircraft block hours betw een the baseline runs a nd the final rule runs.

This minor difference is due to the treatment of so ca lled “carry-in/carry- out” flights. Industry practice is to construct each bid line such that each flightcrew member starts and ends the scheduling period at their home base. Some bid lin es outputted by the optimizer would have left flightcrew members away from their home base at the beginning or end of the scheduling period (month). In those instances, it is airline practice to include those se gments as part of the bid lines for the adjoining month (i.e., “carry ing” the flightcrew member in or out of the month). While that is reasonable practice for airlines, it introd uced a source of variation in costs that was not caused by the final rule. Because the final rule resu lts in different bid line s being constructed, the segments identified as carry-in or carry-out often differ as well. For all cases, the discrepancy in175 

### aircraft block hours was well below one percent. In some cases the aircraft block hours was greater in the baseline run while in other cases the fi nal rule run had more aircraft block hours

included. To explore the possible impacts of this diffe rence on the estimates of the cost impacts of the final rule, we factored the final rule run esti mates of each of the four cost elements (credit hours, domestic and international TAFB, and hotel rooms) by the ratio of baseline aircraft block hours to final rule aircraft block hours for each case. If the final rule had slightly fewer aircraft block hours than the baseline run, the ratio would be slightly larger than one and the estimates of each cost element would increase slightly. The di fference between the adjusted final rule runs

and the baseline runs for each cost element for each case is presented in Table B.1.

Table B.1 Adjusted Change in Monthly Flightcrew Scheduling Cost Elements due to Final Rule, by Case

Industry

Group Case Baseline Solution Lines of

Flying Change in Credit Hours Change in Domestic TAFB Hours Change in International TAFB Hours Change in Hotel Stays

Passenger Narrow

‐ body A 924 2,203 18,717 0 662 B 1,698

‐ 503

‐ 15,215 947

‐ 952 Passenger Wide

‐ body C 1,121

‐ 104 3,811 8,264 787 D 430

‐ 872 0

‐ 2,441

‐ 30 Regional E 300 68 5,857 0 282 F 240 37 4,149

‐ 15 144 Supplemental I 806 4,656 3,183 9,802 758 Freight Narrow

‐ body G 330 594 1,014 2,402 59 Freight Wide

‐ body H 1,053 1,014 6,247 943 244176 

### The rest of the scheduling cost estimation methodology is the same as described in the body of the Final SRIA except that Table B.1 replaces Table 10. This approach in effect applies the average scheduling cost per aircra ft block hour from the final rule run to the sma ll difference in

the number of block hours between the baseline a nd final runs as a met hod of neutralizing the impacts of the carry-in/carry-out issue. To precisely estimate the crew scheduling costs of each specific flight segment related to the carry-in/carr y-out issue, a more in-d epth analysis would be required. As shown in Table B.2, this adjustment in creased the estimated cost of the final rule for passenger operations by $2 million in nominal te rms. Table B.3 shows that the adjustment

increased the estimated cost of the ru le for cargo-only operations by $12 million.

Table B.2 Cost Summary for Block Hour Adjustment (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Total Nominal Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Flight Operations $299 $185 $241

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135 Training $19 $12 $16 Sensitivity Total $464 $321 $392 Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391 Difference $2 $1 $1 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding177 

### Table B.3 Cost Summary for Block Hour Adjustment (2012 – 2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Total Nominal Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Flight Operations $394 $242 $317

Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58 Training $7 $4 $5 Sensitivity Total $464 $299 $381 Final SRIA Total $452 $292 $371 Difference $12 $7 $10 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding



## Sensitivity #2: Alternative Weighting of Case Results

As explained in the body of this Final SRIA, the estimates of crew scheduling costs from the rule are derived using crew sc heduling software to build pairi ngs and bid lines for nine cases for a baseline run that replicates current scheduling practices and a fi nal rule run that replaces the current requirements with the final rule. These nine cases were combined to estimate average costs for each of the eight industry groups us ed in this analysis. The passenger narrow-body, passenger-wide body, and regional industry group each had two representativ e cases. The change in each of the cost elements was summed across the cases, multiplied by the appropriate unit price for the industry group, and divided by the comb ined total number of lines of flying in the

baseline run for both cases to derive the estimat e of average cost per line of flying. For the freight integrated industry group, the change in each of the cost elements for the freight narrowbody case and freight wide-body case were summed, and then multiplied by the unit costs for the freight integrated industry group. For the pass enger integrated industry group, the unit costs specific to the particular subcomponent of the passenger integrated industry group were applied178 

### to the sum of the cost elements of the respective passenger narrow-body and passenger widebody cases. Then the narrow-body and wide-body resu lts were summed and then divided by the

sum of the number of baseline solution lines of flying. Such a method implicitly weights each

case in relation to the number of lines of flying in that case , which may or may not be an accurate representation of the preval ence of carriers with similar cost structures for the industry as a whole. As can be seen in Table 10, in some instances, the final rule caused very different cost impacts even for cases in the same indus try group. For example, in the passenger wide-body industry group, Case C shows modest increases in the cost elements due to the rule, while Case

D shows decreases in the cost elements due to the rule. Several different fact ors contribute to the differing impacts of the rule, including collective bargaining ag reements, flight schedules, network structure, etc. Many of th ese attributes are difficult to observe for every carrier in the industry, and the limited number of cases means that an exact matching of ev ery carrier to one of the case results is not possible. Therefore, it is difficult to determine what the appropriate relative weighting of the cases should be for extr apolation to the enti re industry group. In the absence of information on how to weig ht the individual cases, an alternative to implicitly weighting the case results by the number of lines of flying, is to weight the two cases equally when deriving an estimate for those industry groups derived from multiple cases. An estimate of the change in each of the cost elements per flightcrew member for integrated industry groups was built from a weight ed average of the change in cost elements for the respective narrow-body a nd wide-body industry groups. Th e relative weights for the passenger integrated industry group were base d on the number of block hours for both narrowbody and wide-body aircraft flown by air carriers cla ssified in the passenger integrated industry group multiplied by estimates of average crew size, as shown in Table B.4. A corresponding179 

### procedure was used for the freight integrated in dustry group. The resulting estimates of average scheduling cost per flightcrew member are found in Table B.5. The resulti ng total costs of this sensitivity are found in Table B.6 and Table B.7. Changing to this weighting scheme reduces the estimated cost to the passenger operations by $23 million in nominal terms and $14 million when discounted at seven percent. The impact on the estimated costs to cargo-only operations was slightly larger, decreasing the costs by $28 million, $17 million at 7%.180 

### Table B.4 Relative Weight of Narrow-body and Wide-body Operations for Integrated Carriers

Industry Group Block Hours 1 

### Average Crew Size 2 

### Relative Weight Passenger Integrated: Narrow

‐ body 4,054,243 2.00 54%

Wide

‐ body 2,954,370 2.37 46% Freight Integrated: Narrow

‐ body 38,311 2.00 5%

Wide

‐ body 700,230 2.09 95% 1 

### Source: Form 41 Q1

‐ Q3 2010 2 

### Source: Proprietary Carrier Data

Table B.5 Sensitivity Analysis on Weighting of Cases: Change in Flightcrew Scheduling Cost per Flightcrew Member due To Final Rule (2011 $)

Industry Group Monthly Cost per Flightcrew Member Annual Cost per Flightcrew Member Passenger Integrated -$3 -$41 Passenger Narrow

‐ body $214 $2,567

Passenger Wide

‐ body -$346 -$4,151 Regional $84 $1,013 Supplemental $1,456 $17,475 Freight Integrated $437 $5,249 Freight Narrow

‐ body $437 $5,249

Freight Wide

‐ body $329 $3,952 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding181 

### Table B.6 Cost Summary for Alternative Weig hting of Case Results (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $)

Cost Component Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Flight Operations $274 $170 $222



### Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135 

### Training $19 $12 $16 

### Sensitivity Total $440 $306 $373 

### Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391 

### Difference -$23 -$14 -$18 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

Table B.7 Cost Summary for Alternative Weig hting of Case Results (2012 – 2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $)

Cost Component Total Nominal Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

Flight Operations $354 $218 $285



### Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58 

### Training $7 $4 $5 

### Sensitivity Total $424 $275 $349 

### Final SRIA Total $452 $292 $371 

### Difference -$28 -$17 -$22 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding



## Sensitivity #3: Alternative Assumptions Regarding Percent of Flightcrew

Members Who Are Reserves (Passenger Operations)

The estimates of costs are calculated on a per line of flying basis for each case. To extrapolate the cost impact of the rule to the enti re industry, the estimated costs per line of flying are multiplied by the number of primary lineholders in the industry group as a whole. While the182 

### total number of pilots employed by each carrier is readily available from VIS data, information on the number of primary lineholders was not readily available. It is esti mated that 15 percent of flightcrew members are reserves at large passenger network carriers, 164 

### although this figure apparently varies wide ly across carriers. In comments regarding the Initial SRIA, IP A provided data that gave more specific information for the freight industry groups regard ing the percent of pilo ts that are primary lineholders and that information has been incorpor ated into the central analysis. Therefore this sensitivity focuses on passenger operations. Data supplied by nine different passenger carrier s shows that the percent of the total pilot

workforce who are reserves varied from a low of 12 percent at one carrier to as high as 26 percent at another carrier. Ta ble B.8 and Table B.9 show the estimated cost for passenger operations of the final rule usi ng 12 percent and 26 pe rcent assumptions, respectively. Using a 12 percent reserve figure increases the total estimated cost of the rule by $18 million in nominal terms, and by $11 million when discounted at se ven percent for passenger operations. Using a 26 percent reserve figure reduces the estimated co st of the rule by $67 million ($41 million when discounted at seven percent) for passenger operations.

164 “Productivity,” American Airlines Negotiations, accessed August 1, 2012, http://www.aanegotiations.c om/apaProductivity.asp.183 

### Table B.8 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumpti on that 12% of Flightcrew Members are Reserves (2012- 2023), Passe nger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Nominal Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3% Flight Operations $315 $195 $255

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135 Training $19 $12 $16 Sensitivity Total $481 $331 $406 Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391 Difference $18 $11 $15 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

Table B.9 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumpti on that 26% of Flightcrew Members are Reserves (2012-2023), Passe nger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Nominal Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3% Flight Operations $231 $143 $186

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135 Training $19 $12 $16 Sensitivity Total $396 $279 $337 Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391 Difference -$67 -$41 -$54 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding



## Sensitivity #4: Alternative Assumption Regarding Percent of Sick Time

that would be Saved Due to the Final Rule

Since it is not possible to precisely estimat e the reduction in sick time that will result from the final rule, this section presents a sens itivity analysis to expl ore the possible range of impacts. In the central analysis of this Final SR IA, it was explained that five percent of payroll costs are generally attributable to sick time and it was assumed that five percent of those sick184 

### time payroll costs would be saved because of the final rule. Table B.10 and Table B.11 show the results of assuming that three percent of sick ti me flightcrew member pa yroll costs will be saved because of the final rule for passenger operati ons and cargo-only operations, respectively. While Table B.12 and Table B.13 provide the same info rmation when assuming that seven percent of sick time will be saved due to the final rule, the two assumptions result in altering the total estimated cost of the rule by ±$90 million in nominal terms, and by ±$55 million when discounted at seven percent for passenger ope rations. For cargo-only operations, these two assumptions result in altering the total estimated cost of the rule by ±$20 million in nominal terms, and by ±$13 million when discounted at seven percent. 165



### Table B.10 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 3% Sick Time will be Saved (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Nominal Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3% Flight Operations $387 $240 $312

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135 Training $19 $12 $16 Sensitivity Total $552 $375 $463 Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391 Difference $90 $55 $72 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

165 If there were no cost savings from reduced fatigue, the nominal costs of the rule for passenger operations would be $687 million, $458 when discounted at seven percent. These estimated costs are still below the high case benefits estimates for passenger operations.185 

### Table B.11 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 3% Sick Time will be Saved (2012-2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Nominal Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3% Flight Operations $402 $247 $324

Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58 Training $7 $4 $5 Sensitivity Total $472 $304 $387 Final SRIA Total $452 $292 $371 Difference $20 $13 $16 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

Table B.12 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 7% Sick Time will be Saved (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Nominal Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $207 $129 $168

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135 Training $19 $12 $16 Sensitivity Total $372 $264 $319 Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391 Difference -$90 -$55 -$72 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

Table B.13 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 7% Sick Time will be Saved (2012-2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $Millions)

Cost Component Nominal Cost (millions) PV Cost at 7% (millions) PV Cost at 3% (millions) Flight Operations $362 $222 $291

Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58 Training $7 $4 $5 Sensitivity Total $431 $279 $355 Final SRIA Total $452 $292 $371 Difference -$20 -$13 -$16 *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding186 

## Sensitivity #5: Alternative Assumptions Related to Cargo Analysis

Where appropriate, the FAA incorporated th e input from comments made regarding the Initial SRIA into the central analysis presente d in the body of this Final SRIA. This sensitivity analysis explores the impact adopting alternative assumptions suggested by the commenters for estimating the costs and benefits of appl ying the rule to car go-only operations. This sensitivity analysis uses the cargo high case as the starting point for estimating benefits. However, instead of assuming that the ai rcraft involved in the ac cident is a MD-11, this sensitivity assumes (based IPA’s comments) that a Boeing 747 is involv ed. Although IPA states that a B747 hull is worth $60.6 million, they provided no source for that information. Therefore the FAA estimates the replacement value of an average aged B747 to be $42.5 million based on the published wholesale pr ice of a 1993 B747-400F. 166 

### According to IPA, the B747 has a cargo capacity of 124.2 tons, which, when multiplied by the average per ton value of air cargo of $87,082, results in an estimated value of cargo on board a B747 to be $10.8 million. In addition to modifying the aircraft the bene fit estimate is based on, this sensitivity also incorporates an estimate of th e value of avoiding the environmen tal cleanup following an aircraft accident. IPA presents examples of the potenti al cost of hazardous ma terial releases: a 1995 accident in Kansas City had an estimated envi ronmental clean-up cost of $0.7 million, and in Shanksville, PA, the crash of United Flight 93 resulted in $1 million in environmental clean-up

costs. 167 

### The FAA agrees that environmental clean- up costs are appropriate to include in a benefits analysis. However, we do not have a data source that could provid e an average or typical

166 Airliner Price Guide (Winter 2012) 167 Both estimates are adjusted to current dollars.187 

### environmental clean-up cost for an aviation accid ent and relying on anecdotal evidence is not a preferred approach. Nonetheless, this sensitivity analysis incl udes the suggested value of $1 million in environmental clean-up costs. In February 2013, after the Supplemental RIA was issued for public comment, the DOT provided updated guidance on treatment of th e economic value of statistical life (VSL). 168 

### This guidance directs agencies to use the value of $9.1 million in 2012 dollars and to increase that value for future years at a rate of 1.07 percent annua l to reflect anticipated growth in real income. This sensitivity includes this upda ted guidance on VSL in the benef its estimate. Specifically, the $9.1 million in 2012 dollars is approximately $8.95 million in 2011 dollars when adjusted using the GDP deflator. Growing this value at 1.07 pe rcent annually for 6 y ears to represent the estimated value at the midpoint of the benefits period results in a VSL estimate of $9.5 million (in 2011 dollars). As shown in Table C.4 and Table C.5 of Appe ndix C, these adjustments to the high case benefits estimates for cargo operations increase the benefits estimates to $14.85 million over the analysis period ($9.11 million in present value when discounted at 7 percent and $11.94 million when discounted at 3 percent). In regard to estimating the costs of applying the final rule to car go-only operations, the central analysis described in the body of this RIA incorporated comments from IPA regarding the percent of pilots who are pr imary line holders at the airlines in the freight industry groups. IPA provided additional information specific to UPS regarding the number of lineholders who fly fewer hours than their contr actual minimums. The FAA does not endeavor to estimate the

168 DOT, Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) in U.S. Department of Transportation Analyses (February 28, 2013)188 

### costs and benefits individually for each carrier , but rather to derive estimates that are representative of the industry as a whole. In addition, as discu ssed above in the section entitled “Disposition of Issues Raised by Comments Receive d Regarding the Initial SRIA,” it is not clear that just because some schedul es are below contractual minimu ms additional hours can be flown without incurring additional costs. Nonetheless, this sensitivity analys is incorporates IPA’s estimates of the potential cost reductions applicable to UPS due to this issue. Specifically, IPA states that if the credit hours associated with each regular line was increased by 1.488 percent (the percent change in credit hours for the freight integrated industry group) that the line pay would only increase by 1 .047 percent. Therefore, according to IPA, the annual credit hours cost per line of flying for the freight integrat ed industry group is overstated and should be factored by 0.70 (1.047 / 1.488) fo r UPS. The estimated credit hour cost per flightcrew member in this Final SRIA is $5,592 ($466 * 12 months). 169 

### IPA’s suggestion is to subtract $1,678 (0.30 * $5,592) for each UPS primary lineholder from the cost estimates for the freight integrated industry gr oup. As shown in Table C.1 of Appendix C, there are 2,690 flightcrew members at UPS. This analysis assumes that 52 percen t of flightcrew members in the freight integrated industry group are primary lineholders. Therefor e this sensitivity results in subtracting roughly $2.3 million from the annual scheduling costs for the freight integrated industry group. 170



### IPA further commented that the estimated costs for installing rest facilities were too high in the Initial SRIA. Specifically, IPA questioned the number of aircraft that would require the

rest facilities. IPA estimates th at only Boeing 767s would require rest facilities and finds that

169 See Table 17. 170 See Table C.6 of Appendix C.189 

### there are 75 Boeing 767s in the cargo fleet. Further, IPA stated that airlines might chose to install cheaper Class 3 rest faci lities instead of the Class 1 rest facilities assumed by the FAA. IPA

states that a Class 3 rest fac ility and its installation would cost only $60,000 as opposed to the $445,000 estimated by the FAA. IPA further stated that if the Class 3 faciliti es were chosen, then the engineering costs could be only $1 million fo r the entire cargo industry as opposed to the $2.5 million estimated by the FAA. IPA stated that installation of a Class 3 facility would take only a few hours and would require no incremen tal downtime for the aircraft involved. IPA

stated that the Class 3 facili ty would weigh 10 more pounds th an the seat it would replace therefore additional fuel costs would be just $21,825 per year. The FAA estimated that a Class 1 facility would add 300 pounds of additional weight and which would result in an additional $1 million per year in fuel costs. Taken together, IP A estimates that the total the nominal costs for rest facilities for the cargo industry over the analysis peri od would be just $5.7 million in contrast to the $63 million estimated by the FAA. 171 

### For reasons explained in the section of this document titled “Disposition of Issues Raised by Comments Received Regarding the Initial SRIA,” the FAA stands by its original analysis. However, this sensitivity analysis incorporates IPA’s alternative estimates on the costs of installing rest facilities.The results of adopting the alternative assumptions regarding the cost estimates for cargoonly operations are presented below in Table B.14. The total estimated costs are $371 million over the analysis period ($229 million in presen t value when discounted at 7 percent and $299 million when discounted at 3 percent).

171 See Table C.7 in Appendix C.190 

### Table B.14 Total Costs Sensitivity Analysis (2012-2023), Cargo Operations (2011 $Millions)

Year Flight Operations Rest Facilities Training Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3%

2012 2013 $2 $3.25 $5 $4 $5 2014 $36 $2.27 $1.4 $39 $32 $36 2015 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $28 $32 2016 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $26 $31 2017 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $24 $30 2018 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $23 $29 2019 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $21 $29 2020 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $20 $28 2021 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $18 $27 2022 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $17 $26 2023 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $16 $25 Total $359 $6 $7 $371 $229 $299 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding

Table B.15 summarizes the estimated costs a nd benefits for extending the final rule to cover cargo-only operations that result from adopting alterna tive assumptions suggested by public comments regarding the Initial SRIA. Th e results show that adopting alternative assumptions do not change the central conclusion that for cargo-only opera tions; the costs of the final rule vastly outweigh the benefits.191 

### Table B.15 Total Benefits and Costs Sensit ivity Analysis (2012-2023), Cargo Operations (2011 $Millions)

Estimates Total Nominal

Cost PV Cost at 7% PV Cost at 3% Total Benefits - Sensitivity $15 $9 $12 Total Costs - Sensitivity $371 $229 $299 Net Benefits - Sensitivity -$356 -$220 -$287 

### *Items may not sum to repor ted totals due to rounding192 

## Appendix C: Detailed Data Tables