# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 19

- 10297 Summary Calendar

**Jarrod Hammonds,**

Plaintiff

— Appellant **,**

versus

**Dallas County; City of Dallas; Lashon Butler; Liliana Gonzalez; Tina Morales; Molly Seanyear; Pamela Pope**  **Johnson; Edward Lopez, Jr.; David L. Horan; John Doe 1**

**- 20,** 

Defendants

— Appellees

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:17

- CV

- 1661

Before **Smith, Dennis,** and **Duncan,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** *

* Pursuant to **5th Circuit Rule**  47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Circuit Rule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 11, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 19-10297 Document: 00515523431 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/11/2020No. 19

- 10297

2 Jarrod Hammonds appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and several federal statutes, following a sheriff’s sale of his property in Duncanville, Texas, to collect delinquent property taxes. The district court dismissed the suit, finding the action barred by the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1341. We affirm.
The TIA withholds federal jurisdiction over any suit to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State.” Id. It applies with full force to taxes “imposed by municipalities.” Home Builder’s Ass’n v. City of Madison , 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998). The TIA is “a broad jurisdictional impediment to federal
court interference with the administration of state t ax systems.” Washington v. Linebarger, Goggan, Blair, Pena & Sampson, LLP , 338 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman , 595 F.2d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 1979)). Accordingly, we have held the TIA is not limited to suit s directl y challenging “taxes only , ” but also extends to “the broader activities of assessing, levying, and collecting taxes.” Id. ; see, e.g. , Dawson v. Childs , 665 F.2d 705, 710 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (TIA barred attempt to enjoin state tax lien).

The TIA bars thi s lawsuit. Hammonds challenges the sale of his property in order to collect delinquent property taxes, penalties, interest, and fees owed to Dallas County and various other local taxing units. This practice is authorized by Texas law as a mechanism for tax collection. See **Tex. Tax**
**Code Ann.** § 33.41; id. § 33.53. The sale was part of the “collection of [a] tax under State law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341; accord Washington , 338 F.3d at 444 (TIA barred challenge to nonpayment penalty). Moreover, Texas state
courts prov ide “a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy” for Hammonds’ complaints. Id. ; see McQueen v. Bullock , 907 F.2d 1544, 1550 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that “Texas has a vast arsenal to assure orderly adjudication of Case: 19-10297 Document: 00515523431 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/11/2020No. 19

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3 serious federal constitutional questions” (clean ed up)); Dawson , 665 F.2d at 710 (Texas state courts provided adequate remedy in action to enjoin state tax lien); Clark v. Andrews Cty. Appraisal Dist. , 76 F. App’x 525, 526 (5th Cir. 2003) (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges against county taxing authorities could be adequately adjudicated in Texas state court).
Hammonds argues the TIA does not bar his suit because his property was not subject to taxation under Texas law. This misses the point: the TIA
bars us from determining whether a state tax w as properly administered if the result may be to “enjoin, suspend or restrain” tax collection. Hammonds also appears to argue that the TIA does not apply because he alleges violations of his civil and constitutional rights. But we have consistently applied the TIA
to bar such claims

. See, e.g. , McQueen , 907 F.2d 1544.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Hammonds’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We do not address Hammonds’s claim, raised for the first time here, that the district court had jurisdiction over his claims pursuant to an exception to the Anti

- Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

**AFFIRMED**

. Case: 19-10297 Document: 00515523431 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/11/2020