alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 29, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00392-CV

HELEN MAYFIELD, Appellant

V.

JOHN CUOCO, STEVE FULLJART, KBTX NEWS, a Corporation, and GRAY 

COMMUNICATIONS, a Corporation, Appellees

On Appeal from the 80th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-26159

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On January 10, 2012, appellant filed a notice of appeal from a December 13, 2011, 

final summary judgment. The appeal was assigned to this court and docketed under our 

case number 14-12-00037-CV. Appellant also filed an affidavit of indigence, and the 

Harris County District Clerk filed a contest to the affidavit. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1. 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 21, 2012, stating that she seeks to appeal an 

order signed April 16, 2012, denying of her claim of indigency. Appellant’s second 

appeal was docketed under our case number 14-12-00392-CV.
2

Rule 20.1 allows a party to proceed on appeal without advance payment of costs if 

(1) the party files an affidavit of indigence in compliance with the rule, (2) either the 

claim of indigence is not contested or the contest is not sustained, and (3) the party timely 

files a notice of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 20.1(a)(1)-(3); see also Morris v. Aguilar, 369 

S.W.3d 168, 170 n.3 (Tex. 2012). We may review an order sustaining a contest when 

there is a pending appeal from a final judgment or other appealable order. Tex. R. App. P. 

20.1; In re Arroyo, 988 S.W.2d 737, 738–39 (Tex.1998); In re Velez-Uresti, 361 S.W.3d 

200, 202-03 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied).

This court ordered a partial clerk’s record containing the documents relevant to 

appellant’s claim of indigence. In addition, we abated the related appeal from the 

summary judgment in case number 14-12-00037-CV until the indigence appeal has been 

decided. The indigence record has now been filed. The record reflects that on April 16, 

2012, the trial court signed an order overruling the Harris County District Clerk’s contest 

to appellant’s affidavit. Therefore, appellant is entitled to proceed without the advance 

payment of costs in case number 14-12-00037-CV. Accordingly, this appeal is moot. See 

Whittaker v. U.S. Mail Serv., 14-11-00475-CV, 2011 WL 3585991 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Aug. 16, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that because appellant challenged

the denial of his claim of indigence, the trial court’s ruling upholding his claim of 

indigence and finding that he was unable to pay filing fees rendered the challenge moot).

On November 7, 2012, notification was transmitted to all parties of the court’s 

intention to dismiss this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). No response was filed.

We dismiss this appeal as moot. The appeal pending in case number 14-12-00037-

CV remains pending before the court and is ordered reinstated by separate order.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Seymore, Boyce, and McCally.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

December 21, 2012

s1218

Order 

December 21, 2012

146162

SC: 146162

In re KIECA, Minors. COA: 307194

Oakland CC Family Division:

11-782768-NA

_______________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 28, 2012 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

MARILYN KELLY, J., would grant leave to appeal.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>


                                   EXHIBIT 27.4
<ARTICLE> 5

<CIK>                                 0001012704
<NAME>                        UGLY DUCKLING CORP
<MULTIPLIER>                               1,000

       
<S>                          <C>              
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                    DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                         SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                     1,406
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                            130,081
<ALLOWANCES>                              17,865
<INVENTORY>                               36,205
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            0<F1>
<PP&E>                                    36,287
<DEPRECIATION>                             6,856
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           284,752
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       0<F1>
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                 169,691
<OTHER-SE>                                11,727
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             284,752
<SALES>                                   73,580
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                          96,714
<CGS>                                     42,763
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                          33,542
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          16,298
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                         1,482
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            2,629
<INCOME-TAX>                               1,102
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        1,527
<DISCONTINUED>                            (3,628)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                              (2,101)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                               (.11)
<EPS-DILUTED>                               (.11)
<FN>
<F1>UNCLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET </FN>         

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 31.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Maurice H. Madrid, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly  report on Form 10-QSB/A of Sales  Strategies,
Inc.;

2.  Based on my  knowledge,  this  annual  report  does not  contain  any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements
were made,  not  misleading  with  respect to the period  covered by this annual
report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information  included  in this annual  report,  fairly  present in all  material
respects the financial  condition,  results of operations  and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers  and  I are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:

a) designed  such  disclosure  controls and  procedures  to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others  within those  entities,  particularly  during the
period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b) evaluated  the  effectiveness  of the  registrant's  disclosure  controls and
procedures  as of a date  within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual
report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the  disclosure  controls  and  procedures  based  on our  evaluation  as of the
Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation,  to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors:

a) all significant  deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
which  could  adversely  affect the  registrant's  ability  to record,  process,
summarize and report  financial data and have  identified  for the  registrant's
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b) any  fraud,  whether  or not  material,  that  involves  management  or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and

6. The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers  and I have  indicated in this
annual report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls
or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent
to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with
regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date: September 22, 2003              /s/ Maurice H. Madrid
                                      -----------------------
                                      Maurice H. Madrid
                                      Acting Financial Officer/
                                      Director
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

          We consent to the incorporation by reference into the following
Registration Statements, including amendments, pertaining to the Stock Option
Plan(s) of Film Roman, Inc.: Form S-8 (No. 333-19387), Form S-8 (No. 333-80779),
Form S-8 (No. 333-90003), and Form S-8 (No. 333-90009), of our report dated
March 24, 2003, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Film
Roman, Inc. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
December 31, 2002.

                                               /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
                                              ----------------------------------
                                               Ernst & Young LLP

Los Angeles, California
March 31, 2003

                                       43
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                              5

<S>                                               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                 DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                    JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                      MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,121
<OTHER-SE>                                      (1,121)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0



</TABLE>
```

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 240 (Wednesday, December 15, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78335-78336]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-31499]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 7268]

Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``Thomas Lawrence: Regency Power and Brilliance''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and

[[Page 78336]]

Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 
note, et seq.), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, and 
Delegation of Authority No. 236-3 of August 28, 2000, I hereby 
determine that the objects to be included in the exhibition ``Thomas 
Lawrence: Regency Power and Brilliance,'' imported from abroad for 
temporary exhibition within the United States, are of cultural 
significance. The objects are imported pursuant to loan agreements with 
the foreign owners or custodians. I also determine that the exhibition 
or display of the exhibit objects at the Yale Center for British Art, 
New Haven, CT, from on or about February 24, 2011, until on or about 
June 5, 2011, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to 
be determined, is in the national interest. Public Notice of these 
Determinations is ordered to be published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the exhibit objects, contact Carol B. Epstein, Attorney-
Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State 
(telephone: 202/632-6473). The address is U.S. Department of State, SA-
5, L/PD, Fifth Floor, Washington, DC 20522-0505.

    Dated: December 7, 2010.
Ann Stock,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2010-31499 Filed 12-14-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```
<PAGE>
                                                                 EXHIBIT 24.2



                             POWER OF ATTORNEY


The undersigned director and/or officer of Karrington Health, Inc. (the
"Company"), does hereby constitute and appoint Richard R. Slager and Alan B.
Satterwhite, or either of them, my true and lawful attorneys and agents, each
with full power of substitution, to do any and all acts and things in my name
and on my behalf in my capacity as a director of the Company and to execute
any and all instruments for me and in my name in the capacity indicated
above, which said attorneys or agents, or either of them, may deem necessary
or advisable to enable the Company to comply with the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended, and any rules, regulations and requirements of the
Securities and Exchange Commission thereunder, in connection with the filing
requirements of the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 1996 (the "1996 Form 10-K"), including specifically but
without limitation, power and authority to sign for me in my name, in the
capacity indicated above, the 1996 Form 10-K and any and all amendments to
such 1996 Form 10-K; and I do hereby ratify and confirm all that the said
attorneys and agents, or their substitute or substitutes, or either of them,
shall do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

                                        /S/ ALAN B. SATTERWHITE
                                        --------------------------
                                       Alan B. Satterwhite
                                       Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial
                                       Officer and Director
#### STARR COUNTY, Texas, Appellant, v. J. C. GUERRA, Appellee.

No. 13044.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Dec. 5, 1956.

*380Gerald Weatherly, Laredo, for appellant.

Sawnie B. Smith, Edinburg, for appel-lee.

POPE, Justice.

The question is whether a County Commissioner may be appointed Road Commissioner for the entire county and receive pay as permitted by Article 2350(6), Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats. The County Auditor, J. C. Guerra, refused to countersign the warrants to pay Efrain A. Duran as Road Commissioner, and in a suit brought by Starr County to compel Guerra to sign the warrants, the trial court ruled that Guerra, the Auditor, correctly refused to countersign these warrants.

Duran was the duly elected and acting County Commissioner of Precinct No. 1, Starr County. During January, 1955, the Commissionei's’ Court of Starr County adopted an order designating the entire county as Road Commissioner District Number One, and authorized the employment of a road commissioner at a salary as provided by law. The Court then appointed County Commissioner Duran as the Road Commissioner for the district which extended to the entire county. The auditor in refusing to sign the warrants contended that the appointment of a county commissioner as road commissioner was invalid. We agree.

Commissioners’ Courts may exercise only such powers as the Constitution or the Statutes have specifically conferred upon them. Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 S.W.2d 451, 453. We find only two statutes which authorize road commissioners. They are Articles 6737 and 6762, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats. Unless Duran falls within the terms of one of them he was not properly appointed road commissioner and was not entitled to receive the funds provided by Article 2350(6).

Article 6737 empowers the Commissioners’ Court to employ not more than four road commissioners. The statute also fixes the compensation for the road commissioners. Duran can not avail himself of employment by force of that statute. The Commissioners’ Court may employ road commissioners, but they may not employ any of the members of the court. To do so is contrary to the policy of the law and the oath each commissioner must take. Arts. 2340, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats.; Art. 373, Vernon’s Ann.Penal Code; Knippa v. Stewart Iron Works, Tex.Civ.App., 66 S.W. 322, 324; Cornutt v. Clay County, Tex.Civ.App., 75 S.W.2d 299.

Article 6762 designates the members of the Commissioners’ Court as ex-officio road commissioners in counties having as many as forty thousand inhabitants. Duran can not bring himself within that article and qualify as an ex-officio road commissioner, since Starr County falls below the statutory population bracket. It follows, therefore, that Duran has not been lawfully employed as Road Commissioner and is not entitled to receive the salary provided for that employment by Article 2350(6).

The judgment is affirmed.
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50874

Summary Calendar

PAUL R GONZALEZ,

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

LAURA CORTEZ, Supervisor, Region 5, Texas Department of Criminal Justice

Parole Division; STACIE RAY, Supervisor, Region 5, Texas Department of

Criminal Justice Parole Division; GAY GLASPIE, Assistant Director, Region 5,

Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division; JOE FLORES, Director,

Region 5, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division; BRYAN

COLLIER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division,

Respondents-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:07-CV-62

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Paul R. Gonzalez appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Gonzalez filed a civil rights complaint against Laura

Cortez, Stacie Ray, Gay Glaspie, Joe Flores, and Bryan Collier, all employees at

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 2, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-50874

2

the relevant times of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division.

Gonzalez alleged that the defendants conspired to arrange for the issuance of a

false parole violation warrant against Gonzalez. Gonzalez alleged that law

enforcement officers arrived at his home to effectuate the warrant but left

without executing it. Gonzalez asserted that the incident violated his liberty

interests and caused him psychological trauma.

Gonzalez was not detained or arrested on the warrant and thus failed to

show a violation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See United

States v. Tippens, 39 F.3d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1994). Although he alleged that he

suffered mental anguish from the incident, he may not recover under § 1983 for

emotional distress absent a violation of his constitutional rights. See Grandstaff

v. City of Borger, Tex., 767 F.2d 161, 172 (5th Cir. 1985).

Gonzalez additionally argues that the defendants retaliated against him

on the basis of his extensive correspondence to them over the course of two years

in which he threatened to sue the defendants for various parole practices.

Gonzalez produced no direct evidence of the defendants’ motivations for two

prior parole revocation arrests. His vague and conclusory assertions about both

the chronology of events and the violation charges are insufficient to state a

plausible claim that the violation charges were retaliatory in nature. See Jones

v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999).

Gonzalez’s appeal is DISMISSED.