NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Alfredo Ramos-Velasquez,

Petitioner,

v.

Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 21-670

Agency No. A089-815-569

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 13, 2023

Submission Withdrawn March 20, 2023

Resubmitted October 16, 2023**

Before: LEE, BRESS, MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Alfredo Ramos-Velasquez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision that affirmed the 

Immigration Judge’s (IJ) finding of adverse credibility, denied his application for 

withholding of removal, and found him ineligible for protections under the 

Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 18 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 21-670

and we deny the petition.

Ramos-Velasquez was first removed from the United States to Mexico in 

2008, after he repeatedly presented himself as a Mexican national using a false 

birth certificate and fake identifying information. Between 2008 and 2012, 

Ramos-Velasquez attempted to reenter the United States five additional times; on 

each occasion, he was permitted to depart voluntarily. Ramos-Velasquez 

returned to Guatemala in 2012. In 2015, while still in Guatemala, RamosVelasquez claims that he was attacked by gang members who attempted to extort 

him and prevent his efforts to curb gang recruitment through his church. RamosVelasquez reentered the United States in 2017, at which time the Department of 

Homeland Security reinstated removal proceedings.

1

1. Ramos-Velasquez’s claim for withholding of removal fails because 

substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding. “We 

review the [agency’s] findings of fact, including adverse credibility 

determinations and the findings underlying the denial of relief, for substantial 

evidence.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1268–69 (9th Cir. 2011). “Under the 

REAL ID Act, there is no presumption that an applicant for relief is credible, and 

the IJ is authorized to base an adverse credibility determination on ‘the totality of 

1 The government now concedes that we have jurisdiction under Alonso-Juarez 

v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1039 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that the thirty-day deadline 

provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) is a non-jurisdictional rule and that a reinstated 

order of removal becomes final only after withholding-only proceedings have 

concluded).
3 21-670

the circumstances’ and ‘all relevant factors.’” Ling Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 

1149, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).

Here, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that RamosVelasquez lacked credibility based on his “willful misrepresentations about his 

identity” that were unrelated to the persecution that he later allegedly 

experienced. See Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 

that a deception that is “completely unrelated to escaping immediate danger or 

gaining entry to the United States” can support an adverse credibility 

determination). In addition, given that Ramos-Velasquez did not submit any 

corroborating evidence to support his testimony that he was persecuted, the BIA 

appropriately concluded that Ramos-Velasquez failed to establish past 

persecution or likelihood of future persecution on account of a protected ground. 

Ramos-Velasquez’s withholding of removal claim thus fails.

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s holding that Ramos-Velasquez 

failed to establish his entitlement to CAT protection. The BIA further determined

that even if Ramos-Velasquez’s testimony were credible, he did not demonstrate 

a likelihood of future torture with the consent or acquiescence of the Guatemalan 

government. Substantial evidence supports this determination. First, RamosVelasquez’s partner—whom he claims was also threatened by the gang—

continues to reside in Guatemala, in a community not far from RamosVelasquez’s hometown, where she has experienced no gang-related problems.

This suggests that Ramos-Velasquez could safely relocate within Guatemala. See
4 21-670

Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). Second, although 

Ramos-Velasquez contends that law enforcement did not assist him after the 

alleged assault, government ineffectiveness in controlling crime does not amount 

to acquiescence in torture. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th 

Cir. 2016). Finally, Ramos-Velasquez reported that he never had any problems 

with the Guatemalan government or its officers, including the police, and that he 

does not think that the police or government could harm him in the future. Based 

on these facts, we are not compelled to conclude that the BIA erred in denying 

Ramos-Velasquez’s CAT claim.

PETITION DENIED.