UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MARY ELLEN ANDERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND AT

BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE;

JOHN TALBOTT,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

No. 97-2452

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

ANESTHESIOLOGY ASSOCIATES, PA;

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS, PA;

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

PSYCHIATRY ASSOCIATES, PA;

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL

SYSTEM,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Andre M. Davis, District Judge.

(CA-95-1222-AMD)

Submitted: October 27, 1998

Decided: November 30, 1998

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
COUNSEL

Thomas J. Dolina, Kelly A. Koermer, BODIE, NAGLE, DOLINA,

SMITH & HOBBS, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for Appellant. J. Joseph

Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Sara Slaff, Assistant Attorney General,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Mary Ellen Anderson appeals from the district court's order denying her motion to vacate its previous order of dismissal without prejudice. We affirm.

Anderson, who suffers from multiple sclerosis, was terminated

from her position as an administrator for the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Maryland, Baltimore. In April 1995, Anderson

filed suit in the district court asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1994), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.§ 794 (1994), and

the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Act. In June 1997, the

parties tentatively reached a settlement agreement and notified the

district court that the settlement agreement would be executed within

two weeks. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), the parties filed a

joint stipulation for dismissal without prejudice, which the district

court approved on June 23, 1997.

In August 1997, following the stipulation for dismissal without

prejudice, Anderson's attorney filed a motion to strike appearance and

Anderson filed a motion to vacate the order of voluntary dismissal.

The district court held a hearing on September 15, 1997, at which

time the court granted Anderson's attorney's motion to strike appear-

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ance and denied Anderson's motion to vacate. In denying Anderson's

motion to vacate, the court stated that Anderson was free to reinstate

the case because the dismissal was without prejudice and that Anderson could file a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of

the dismissal order. Anderson did not file a Rule 60(b) motion but

noted a timely appeal to this court.

On appeal, Anderson asserts that the district court erred by failing

to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Local Rule 111.1 of the

Maryland District Court, to determine whether good cause existed to

reopen the case. Rule 111.1 does not require the district court to hold

an evidentiary hearing. Rather, Rule 111.1 states that "[s]uch an order

of dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of a party to move

for good cause to reopen the case within a time set by the Court if the

settlement is not consummated." Anderson moved to vacate the dismissal order because the terms of the settlement agreement differed

from her understanding of them. The district court held a hearing and

determined that Anderson failed to establish good cause for reopening

the case because she failed to so move until two months after the dismissal order. Further, the court noted that Anderson's attorneys stated

that a settlement had been reached. In addition, Anderson acknowledged that she understood she could refile the suit. Thus, we conclude

the district court did not err in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing

and in finding that good cause did not exist to reopen the case.

Anderson next asserts that the district court erred in failing to hold

an evidentiary hearing and to vacate the dismissal order pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Anderson's motion was neither characterized

by Anderson nor construed by the district court as a Rule 60(b)

motion. In fact, the record shows that during the hearing, the district

court denied the motion to vacate and instructed Anderson to file a

Rule 60(b) motion if she desired to seek an equitable rescission of the

dismissal order. The court also stated that Anderson was free to reinstate her case because the dismissal was without prejudice. Anderson

failed to either file a 60(b) motion or to reinstate her case.

Even if Anderson's motion to vacate were construed as a Rule

60(b) motion, Anderson fails to establish that the district court abused

its discretion by denying it. In order to obtain relief under Rule 60(b),

a party must show timeliness, a meritorious defense, a lack of unfair

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prejudice to the opposing party, and exceptional circumstances. See

Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir.

1993) (quoting Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 1984)).

After a party has crossed this initial threshold, he then must satisfy

one of the six specific sections of Rule 60(b). Id. On appeal, Anderson asserts mistake because she is not happy with the settlement

agreement negotiated by her attorneys. In essence, Anderson has

rejected the settlement agreement and wishes to reinstate her case by

attacking the dismissal order. This does not establish a basis for relief

under Rule 60(b). Again, under the dismissal order, Anderson is free

to reinstate her case if she so desires.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying Anderson's motion to vacate the dismissal order. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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