In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 01-3148 & 01-3493

Robert Snipes,

Plaintiff-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee,

v.

Illinois Department of Corrections,

Defendant-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 96 C 137--Samuel P. King,/1 Judge.

Argued April 19, 2002--Decided May 23, 2002

 Before Bauer, Posner and Easterbrook,

Circuit Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. Robert Snipes

initiated this suit, claiming

discriminatory retaliation by the

Illinois Department of Corrections in

violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-3(a),

for his complaints of racial

discrimination while working as a

correctional officer at the Department.

The district court entered judgment in

favor of the Department, finding that

Snipes failed to prove that he was

terminated in retaliation for his

discrimination complaints. Snipes then

filed this appeal, arguing that the

district court erred in excluding and

failing to consider evidence regarding

the disparate treatment of other

correctional officers under the

Department’s attendance policy. The

Department cross-appealed, asserting that

the district court abused its discretion

in denying a bill of costs for $1785.00

submitted by the Department.

Background

 Snipes was employed as a correctional

officer at the Department from August

1988 to September 1991, when he was

discharged for violating the Department’s
attendance policy eleven times (more than

the threshold number for discharge under

the policy). Within one hundred and

eighty (180) days of his termination,

Snipes filed a Charge of Discrimination

with the Illinois Department of Human

Rights. A "right to sue" letter was

subsequently issued to Snipes by the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

 In January of 1996, Snipes filed a pro

se complaint against the Department.

After receiving permission to proceed in

forma pauperis, Snipes filed an amended

complaint through court appointed

counsel, claiming that he was discharged

by the Department in retaliation for

complaining about instances of race

discrimination at the Department. The

case proceeded to a bench trial, where

the only issue ultimately before the

court was whether the Department used its

attendance policy as a pretext for

terminating Snipes in retaliation for his

complaints of racial discrimination.

 In an effort to prove his retaliation

claim, Snipes sought to introduce the

disciplinary records of other

correctional officers. The Department

moved to exclude such evidence regarding

the discipline given to and received by

other correctional officers for

violations of the Department’s attendance

policy. The Department argued that

disparate disciplinary treatment of

correctional officers by different

supervisors in different time periods is

irrelevant because disparate treatment is

not an element of a retaliation claim.

The court found that the lack of

commonality in supervisors among those

correctional officers disciplined for

attendance violations rendered them

incomparable and therefore irrelevant to

Snipes’ case.

 At the conclusion of the trial, the

court found that the evidence presented

failed to establish a causal link between

Snipes’ statutorily protected expression

(i.e., his complaints of racial

discrimination) and the adverse

employment action he suffered (i.e., his

termination). Judgment was entered in

favor of the Department.

 Following the trial, the Department

filed a timely motion for an award of

costs. The bill of costs submitted by the
Department sought $1785.00 for deposition

and trial transcripts as well as for

copying fees. In response, Snipes

submitted a declaration detailing his

financial status. After reviewing this

information, the court determined that

Snipes was indigent, and was presently

and prospectively unable to pay the

costs.

Discussion

A) Exclusion of Evidence

 We review the district court’s decision

to exclude evidence under an abuse of

discretion standard. United States v.

Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 290 (7th Cir.

1998). Our inquiry is not whether we

would have ruled the same way, but rather

whether any reasonable person would agree

with the trial court. United States v.

Johnson, 127 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.

1997).

 Where a plaintiff claims that he was

disciplined by his employer more harshly

than a similarly situated employee based

on some prohibited reason, a plaintiff

must show that he is similarly situated

with respect to performance,

qualifications and conduct. Radue v.

Kimberly Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617

(7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Such

a showing normally entails establishing

that "the two employees dealt with the

same supervisor, were subject to the same

standards, and had engaged in similar

conduct without such differentiating or

mitigating circumstances as would

distinguish their conduct or the

employer’s treatment of them." Id. at

617-18 (citations omitted). Requiring

that the plaintiff establish these

similarities is simply common sense, as

"[d]ifferent employment decisions,

concerning different employees, made by

different supervisors . . . sufficiently

account for any disparity in treatment,

thereby preventing an inference of

discrimination." Id. at 618 (citations

omitted).

 The district court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that Snipes failed

to meet this minimum evidentiary

threshold. Snipes argues that despite the

lack of commonality in supervisors among

the correctional officers disciplined for

attendance violations, he and those
correctional officers are nonetheless

similarly situated because they held the

same job positions, were subjected to the

same evaluation process, worked for the

Department during the same time frame,

were subjected to the same attendance

policy, and were exposed to the same

multi-layer, centralized disciplinary

process for those violations. We are not

persuaded.

 While Snipes and the other correctional

officers were technically subject to the

same written attendance policy and formal

disciplinary process, the record also

shows that the difference in supervisors

under whom Snipes and the other

correctional officers worked resulted in

disparate application of and adherence to

such policy and process. Given the

inconsistent administration of relevant

policy and process under different

supervisors, the district court’s conclu

sion that the lack of commonality in

supervisors among the correctional

officers disciplined for attendance

violations precluded an inference of

discrimination is not unreasonable. See,

e.g., Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp.,

281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002)

(finding that plaintiff was not

comparable to another employee in all

material respects where plaintiff and

other employee were evaluated by

different supervisors); Radue, 219 F.3d

at 618 (finding that lack of common

supervisor precluded showing of

similarity because when "different

decision-makers are involved, two

decisions are rarely similarly situated

in all respects") (citations omitted).

Because the district court acted within

its discretion in determining that Snipes

and other correctional officers

disciplined for attendance violations

were not similarly situated, evidence

regarding the disciplinary records of

those officers was properly excluded.

B) Bill of Costs 

 With respect to the issue of costs, the

Department failed to comply with Circuit

Rule 30, which requires that a crossappellant include in its brief any

"judgment or order under review and any

opinion, memorandum of decision, findings

of fact and conclusions of law, or oral

statement of reasons delivered by the

trial court or administrative agency upon
the rendering of that judgment, decree,

or order" not included by the appellant.

7th Cir. R. 30. The purpose of Rule 30 is

to ensure that this Court has all

documents necessary to a fair and

complete consideration of the arguments

presented. Hill v. Porter Memorial Hosp.,

90 F.3d 220, 225-26 (7th Cir. 1996). It

is well established that where an

appellant or cross-appellant thwarts this

purpose by failing to comply with Rule

30, this Court may dismiss the appeal or

summarily affirm the judgment. Id.

(citations omitted). Because the

Department failed to include in its

appendix the subject order denying its

motion for costs, summary affirmance is

proper.

Conclusion

 The decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED in all respects.

FOOTNOTES

/1 Judge King is a Senior District Judge for the

United States District Court of Hawaii, sitting

in the Northern District of Illinois by

designation.