United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-10297

Summary Calendar

Jarrod Hammonds, 

Plaintiff — Appellant,

versus

Dallas County; City of Dallas; Lashon Butler; Liliana 

Gonzalez; Tina Morales; Molly Seanyear; Pamela Pope 

Johnson; Edward Lopez, Jr.; David L. Horan; John Doe 1-

20, 

Defendants — Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:17-CV-1661

Before Smith, Dennis, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 11, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Jarrod Hammonds appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, 

alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and several 

federal statutes, following a sheriff’s sale of his property in Duncanville, 

Texas, to collect delinquent property taxes. The district court dismissed the 

suit, finding the action barred by the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1341. We affirm.

The TIA withholds federal jurisdiction over any suit to “enjoin, 

suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State 

law where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of 

such State.” Id. It applies with full force to taxes “imposed by 

municipalities.” Home Builder’s Ass’n v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 

n.6 (5th Cir. 1998). The TIA is “a broad jurisdictional impediment to federal 

court interference with the administration of state tax systems.” Washington 

v. Linebarger, Goggan, Blair, Pena & Sampson, LLP, 338 F.3d 442, 444 (5th 

Cir. 2003) (quoting United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F.2d 323, 326 

(5th Cir. 1979)). Accordingly, we have held the TIA is not limited to suits

directly challenging “taxes only,” but also extends to “the broader activities 

of assessing, levying, and collecting taxes.” Id.; see, e.g., Dawson v. Childs, 665 

F.2d 705, 710 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (TIA barred attempt to enjoin state tax 

lien).

The TIA bars this lawsuit. Hammonds challenges the sale of his 

property in order to collect delinquent property taxes, penalties, interest, and 

fees owed to Dallas County and various other local taxing units. This practice 

is authorized by Texas law as a mechanism for tax collection. See Tex. Tax 

Code Ann. § 33.41; id. § 33.53. The sale was part of the “collection of [a] 

tax under State law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341; accord Washington, 338 F.3d at 444 

(TIA barred challenge to nonpayment penalty). Moreover, Texas state 

courts provide “a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy” for Hammonds’ 

complaints. Id.; see McQueen v. Bullock, 907 F.2d 1544, 1550 (5th Cir. 1990) 

(noting that “Texas has a vast arsenal to assure orderly adjudication of 

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serious federal constitutional questions” (cleaned up)); Dawson, 665 F.2d at 

710 (Texas state courts provided adequate remedy in action to enjoin state 

tax lien); Clark v. Andrews Cty. Appraisal Dist., 76 F. App’x 525, 526 (5th Cir. 

2003) (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges against county taxing 

authorities could be adequately adjudicated in Texas state court).

Hammonds argues the TIA does not bar his suit because his property 

was not subject to taxation under Texas law. This misses the point: the TIA 

bars us from determining whether a state tax was properly administered if the 

result may be to “enjoin, suspend or restrain” tax collection. Hammonds also 

appears to argue that the TIA does not apply because he alleges violations of 

his civil and constitutional rights. But we have consistently applied the TIA 

to bar such claims. See, e.g., McQueen, 907 F.2d 1544.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Hammonds’s

claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We do not address 

Hammonds’s claim, raised for the first time here, that the district court had 

jurisdiction over his claims pursuant to an exception to the Anti-Injunction 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

AFFIRMED.

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