PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 21-2291

_____________

EDIN DONELSY MADRID-MANCIA,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA

_______________

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency Case No. A206-643-376)

Immigration Judge: David Cheng

_______________

Argued

January 25, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit 

Judges.

(Filed: July 3, 2023)
2

Aleksandra N. Gontaryuk [ARGUED]

AG Law Firm

711 Jersey Avenue, Suite 202

New Brunswick, NJ 08901

Jill S. Westerberg

AG Law Firm

P.O. Box 10188

PMB 45115

Newark, NJ 07101

Counsel for Petitioner

Merrick B. Garland

Spencer Shucard [ARGUED]

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

P.O. Box 878

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

MATEY, Circuit Judge.

Edin Donelsy Madrid-Mancia received a document 

labeled “Notice to Appear” from the Department of Homeland 

Security informing her that she faced removal, but it omitted 
3

the date and time of her removal hearing. A harmless oversight,

reasons the Department of Justice, because it sent MadridMancia a second document (this one labeled “Notice of 

Hearing”) years later providing the missing information. When 

Madrid-Mancia did not appear as directed, she was ordered

removed in absentia. But Congress only allows a supplemental 

notice “in the case of any change or postponement in the time 

and place of [an alien’s removal] proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229(a)(2)(A). Here, no change or postponement occurred, 

and DHS never issued a new Notice to Appear, so we will grant 

Madrid-Mancia’s petition and remand for the agency to rescind 

her removal order. 

I.

For some time, the Attorney General has informed 

aliens about upcoming removal proceedings using a two-step 

process. First, the alien receives a putative Notice to Appear 

(“NTA”), often on arrival, omitting information about the time 

or date of the removal hearing. Then, an immigration court

housed within the Justice Department’s Executive Office for 

Immigration Review mails the alien a “Notice of Hearing,”

often years later, announcing the removal hearing schedule. 

This patchwork process strays from the statute designed to 

control it. To understand how far it has wandered, we go back 

to where it began. 

A.

The practice of starting removal proceedings with an 

NTA began when Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration 

Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

(“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 304(a)(3), 110 

Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587. Under the Act, every NTA must 
4

contain “[t]he time and place at which the [removal] 

proceedings will be held.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). But 

this was not always so. 

Before IIRIRA, removal (then called deportation)

proceedings could begin only after an alien was “given notice, 

reasonable under all the circumstances, of the nature of the 

charges against him and of the time and place at which the 

proceedings [would] be held.” Immigration and Nationality 

Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 242(b)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 

209. The Attorney General followed this directive, issuing 

regulations requiring an “order to show cause” containing the 

hearing’s “time and place.” 21 Fed. Reg. 97, 98–99 (Jan. 6, 

1956) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(b) (1957)). 

But the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

eventually found that process too cumbersome, claiming it was 

often “not possible to hold the hearing as specified in the order 

to show cause.” 43 Fed. Reg. 36,238, 36,238 (Aug. 16, 1978). 

So the Attorney General drafted a new rule relaxing the timeand-place requirement. This allowed the information to “be 

stated in the order [to show cause] or . . . later specified.” Id. at 

36,239 (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(b) (1979)) (emphasis 

added). Another regulation instructed immigration courts to

provide the time-and-place information whenever it was 

omitted from the order to show cause. See 52 Fed. Reg. 2931, 

2939 (Jan. 29, 1987) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(b) (1988)).

Together, these regulations are the blueprint for the two-step 

system the Justice Department used in this case: send a show 

cause order without time-and-place information, and count on 

an immigration court to provide it later. 

Congress responded agreeably and codified these 

regulations in the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
5

649, 104 Stat. 4978. The Act required an “order to show cause” 

to initiate all deportation proceedings. Id. § 545(a), 104 Stat. at 

5061–62 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1994)). And it defined 

an “order to show cause” as “written notice . . . specifying” 

information such as “[t]he acts or conduct alleged to be in 

violation of law,” “[t]he charges against the alien and the 

statutory provisions alleged to have been violated,” and the fact 

that “[t]he alien may be represented by counsel.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252b(a)(1) (1994). There was no need to include time-andplace information—that could be provided “in the order to 

show cause or otherwise.” Id. § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (emphasis 

added). Meaning immigration courts could continue to follow 

up later with the omitted time-and-place information. See 8 

C.F.R. § 242.1(b) (1995).

IIRIRA did a U-turn. Orders to show cause became 

“notice[s] to appear.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). And every NTA 

had to “specify[] . . . [t]he time and place at which the 

proceedings [would] be held.” Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). This new 

language foreclosed on the Attorney General’s past ability to 

send time-and-place information in a second document—a 

change the Executive Branch immediately recognized. With 

IIRIRA’s April 1, 1997, effective date approaching, the INS 

and the EOIR jointly issued a proposed rule to “implement[] 

the language of the amended Act indicating that the time and 

place of the hearing must be on the Notice to Appear.” 62 Fed. 

Reg. 444, 449 (Jan. 3, 1997). The agencies said they would 

“attempt to implement this requirement as fully as possible by 

April 1, 1997,” with the aid of “automated scheduling.” Id. But 

the preamble to the proposed rule claimed that “such 

automated scheduling [would] not be possible in every 

situation (e.g., power outages, computer crashes/downtime[]).” 
6

Id. And the final rule—now codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.181—

states that the Executive “shall provide in the Notice to Appear, 

the time, place and date of the initial removal hearing, where 

practicable.” 62 Fed Reg. at 457 (emphasis added). A 

convenience Congress did not write into the bills passed by 

both Houses and presented to the President for approval.

For a time, executive agencies demonstrated their 

ability to take care that IIRIRA’s requirements be faithfully 

executed, developing an “Interactive Scheduling System” 

(“ISS” for short) that “enable[d] the Department of Homeland 

Security . . . to enter case data and to schedule the initial master 

calendar hearing.” Uniform Docketing System Manual, U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review, 

Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, at I-2 (Rev. Sept. 

2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1157516/download 

(“Docketing Manual”). ISS ensured that every NTA would 

automatically “contain the date and time of hearing,” id., right 

down to the exact courtroom.2 Then, for whatever reason, DHS

stopped using ISS around May 2014, choosing instead to return 

to the two-step process for all removal proceedings.

3 The 

1 See 68 Fed. Reg. 9824, 9830 (Feb. 28, 2003) 

(transferring 8 C.F.R. § 3.18 to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18). 

2 See Brief of Former BIA Chairman and Immigration 

Judge Paul Wickham Schmidt as Amicus Curiae in Support of 

Petitioner at 6, Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) (No. 

17-459) (“ISS . . . allowed DHS to specify an exact date, time, 

and courtroom for the Master Calendar in the NTA, while also 

marking that date as now occupied by the new case.”).

3 See Defendant Executive Office for Immigration 

Review’s Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories 
7

Executive’s exception had circumvented Congress’s 

command.

That decision received a cold reception at the Supreme 

Court. In Pereira v. Sessions, for example, the Court rejected 

the Justice Department’s attempt to rely on an NTA lacking 

time-and-date information to trigger the “stop-time rule.” 138 

S. Ct. 2105, 2113–14 (2018).

4 Here we consider a different 

at 8, attached as Ex. F. to Decl. of Glenda M. Aldana Madrid 

in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Mendez Rojas v. 

Kelly, No. 2:16-cv-01024 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2017), ECF 

No. 58-1, 

https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/fil

es/litigation_documents/mendezrojas_v_john_son_exhibits_in_support_of_plantiffs_motion_f

or_summary_judgement.pdf. Between 2015 and 2018, “almost 

100 percent” of “notices to appear” lacked “the time and date 

of the proceeding.” Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2111

(2018) (citation omitted).

4 The government revived ISS after Pereira. See

Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Director, to All of 

EOIR (Dec. 21, 2018), 

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1122771/download 

(“Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira . . . [a]ll 

three DHS components authorized to issue NTAs now have 

access to ISS. . . . DHS may utilize ISS in order to schedule 

hearings for specific dates and to reflect those scheduled 

hearings on NTAs.”). Then it merged ISS’s functionality into 

the EOIR Courts & Appeals System, which allows DHS users 

to “[s]chedule an initial master hearing for non-detained cases” 

“24 hours / 7 days a week.” EOIR Courts & Appeals System 
8

section of IIRIRA, but the issue is the same: whether the 

government’s two-step notice scheme follows Congress’s 

command. We hold it does not. Notice in steps or stages may 

be efficient or convenient, but “the personal liberty of 

individuals . . . cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion 

of the [Executive], without the explicit permission of the laws.” 

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *134 (George 

Sharswood ed., 1893) (1765).

B.

With the background painted, we turn to MadridMancia, who entered the United States from Honduras without 

being admitted or paroled. She was immediately detained and 

served a putative NTA charging her as removable. The 

document advised Madrid-Mancia of the nature of her removal 

proceedings and the supporting legal authority. It also 

contained allegations about her specific conduct, and a citation 

to the statutory provision she allegedly violated. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229(a)(1)(A)–(D). The putative NTA directed MadridMancia that she was “required to provide the DHS, in writing, 

with [her] full mailing address and telephone number,” and 

“notify the Immigration Court immediately” of any changes in 

this information. A.R. 118. It also warned Madrid-Mancia that 

“a removal order may be made by the immigration judge in 

[her] absence” if she failed to appear when summoned. Id. But 

the document did not tell Madrid-Mancia when her removal 

hearing would take place. Only that the hearing would occur 

on “a date to be set at a time to be set.” A.R. 117. Madrid-

(ECAS) – Online Filing: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review 

(Sept. 23, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/ecas/dhs-FAQs

(select “Q: What are the benefits of ECAS?” hyperlink).
9

Mancia acknowledged service and provided a mailing address 

where she planned to reside.

Around April 2014, Madrid-Mancia moved from the 

address she provided to a new residence.

5 Years later, in

August 2017, the Newark Immigration Court mailed a

document captioned “Notice of Hearing in Removal 

Proceedings” to the address Madrid-Mancia provided at the 

border. A.R. 116. It stated that her hearing was scheduled for 

“Aug[ust] 30, 2017 at 1:00 P.M.” A.R. 116. But it did not 

provide information on the nature of her proceedings, the 

government’s allegations, or the statutory provision she 

allegedly violated. Madrid-Mancia claims she never received 

this document and, when she did not appear at the hearing, an

Immigration Judge ordered her removed in absentia.

In October 2019, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement sent Madrid-Mancia a letter requesting that she 

appear before a Deportation Officer. Madrid-Mancia complied

and voluntarily reported as directed. There, Madrid-Mancia 

learned she had been ordered removed in absentia. She

5 About a month later, she “went to the Mount Laurel 

ICE Office to change [her] address.” A.R. 99. But “they told 

[her] that there was no way for [her] to change [her] address 

since [she] was not in their system.” A.R. 99. Since MadridMancia’s cousin still lived at the original address, she “knew 

that [she] could rely on him to regularly check the mail for [her] 

so that [she did] not miss any documentation.” A.R. 99. 

Madrid-Mancia claims she either went to the original address 

or called her cousin every three days to see if she received 

anything from immigration authorities.
10

promptly moved to reopen her proceedings and rescind her in 

absentia removal order for lack of proper notice.

The IJ denied Madrid-Mancia’s motion, and the Board 

of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal. Madrid-Mancia

timely petitioned for review.

6

6 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.1(b)(3) and dismissed the appeal on June 7, 2021. 

Madrid-Mancia timely petitioned for review on July 7, 2021, 

and we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review 

the BIA’s written opinion and the underlying IJ ruling “only 

insofar as the BIA defers to it.” Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 

372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010). And we review the agency’s denial of 

Madrid-Mancia’s motion to reopen her proceedings and 

rescind her removal order for an abuse of discretion. Darby v. 

Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2021). Reversal is 

warranted only if the agency acted in a manner that was 

“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Id. We review all the 

agency’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.

Madrid-Mancia suggests we should also review a 

decision the BIA issued in response to a second motion to 

reopen that she filed directly with the BIA. But “[b]ecause 

[Madrid-Mancia] has not petitioned for review of the [BIA’s 

May 2022 decision], we lack jurisdiction to review it.” Camara 

v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2009). Still, 

Madrid-Mancia has properly sought review of the BIA’s June 

2021 decision. And that decision presents two preserved issues 

for our review: 1) whether Madrid-Mancia’s defective NTA 

alone requires reopening and rescission given the notice 

requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A); and 2) whether 

Madrid-Mancia has rebutted the presumption of delivery 
11

II.

Congress empowered the Attorney General to order an 

alien removed in absentia after providing proper written notice. 

That notice always requires an NTA containing time-and-place 

information. In cases involving “any change or postponement 

in the time and place of [removal] proceedings,” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229(a)(2)(A), the alien must receive additional notice 

specifying “the new time or place of the proceedings,” id.

§ 1229(a)(2)(A)(i). Madrid-Mancia’s putative NTA lacked the 

time and date of her removal hearing. And because no hearing 

at all had been scheduled, the additional “Notice of Hearing” 

the Immigration Court sent Madrid-Mancia identified a time or 

place but did not communicate any “change” or 

“postponement.” Given the Attorney General’s failure to 

provide proper written notice, we will grant Madrid-Mancia’s

petition for review and remand for reopening and rescission. 

A.

Our analysis of IIRIRA’s in absentia removal provision 

requires us to “proceed[] methodically” through the statute’s 

text. Badgerow v. Walters, 142 S. Ct. 1310, 1317 (2022). The 

goal, as always, is to give effect to the legislature’s charge, 

Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797), as expressed 

in the text’s “ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress 

enacted the statute,” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 

(1979). This is a “fundamental canon of statutory 

despite the no-notice provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B).

Our decision on the first issue is sufficient to resolve this 

petition. Madrid-Mancia prevails because the government gave 

her a putative NTA without time-and-date information. See 

infra Section II.B.
12

construction.” Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 

2074 (2018) (quoting Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42). See also Minor 

v. Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 46, 64 

(1828). We interpret the language using “all the standard tools 

of interpretation,” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414 

(2019), reading the words “in their context and with a view to 

their place in the overall statutory scheme,” Parker Drilling 

Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1888 (2019) 

(citation omitted). See also United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 

Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (“It is undoubtedly a well established 

principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be 

considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted 

from the whole.”). And where these efforts lead to multiple 

ordinary meanings, we adopt “the best reading” of the statutory 

text. Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv., 141 S. 

Ct. 2434, 2442 (2021).

The removal provision of IIRIRA states that “[a]ny 

alien who, after written notice required under paragraph (1) or 

(2) of section 1229(a) of this title has been provided to the 

alien . . . , does not attend a proceeding under this section, shall 

be ordered removed in absentia if [the government] establishes 

by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the written 

notice was so provided.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). The 

removal mandate (an alien who misses a removal hearing must 

be ordered to leave the country) comes with a condition 

precedent (the alien must have received the required notice 

before the hearing).

7 Meaning an alien cannot be ordered 

7 We have already held that an NTA lacking time-orplace information does not “deprive[] an immigration judge of 

jurisdiction over the removal proceedings.” See Nkomo v. Att’y 
13

removed in absentia without proper notice. The rescission 

provision mirrors the removal provision. It states that an in 

absentia removal order “may be rescinded . . . at any time if the 

alien demonstrates that the alien did not receive notice in 

accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) of this 

title.” Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). Both sections invite the 

question: what kind of notice is required under paragraphs (1) 

and (2) of § 1229(a)?

IIRIRA provides the answer. The notice under 

paragraph (1) is a “[n]otice to appear,” or again, NTA for short.

Id. § 1229(a)(1). IIRIRA states that every NTA must 

“specify[]” several pieces of case-initiating information, 8

including the “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings 

will be held.” Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Sometimes plans change 

and the agency needs to move the time or place of an alien’s 

Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2019). Our holding today 

leaves Nkomo’s rule intact. We merely clarify the kind of 

notice the government must provide before it can order an alien 

removed in absentia. 

8 Specifically: (A) “[t]he nature of the proceedings 

against the alien,” (B) “[t]he legal authority under which the 

proceedings are conducted,” (C) “[t]he acts or conduct alleged 

to be in violation of law,” (D) “[t]he charges against the alien 

and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated,” 

(E) information about representation by counsel, (F) “[t]he 

requirement that the alien must immediately provide (or have 

provided) the Attorney General with a written record of an 

address and telephone number (if any) at which the alien may 

be contacted respecting proceedings,” and (G) “[t]he time and 

place at which the proceedings will be held.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229(a)(1).
14

removal proceedings. That is where notice under paragraph (2) 

comes in: “in the case of any change or postponement in the 

time and place of such proceedings,” the government must 

inform the alien of “the new time or place of the proceedings.”

Id. § 1229(a)(2)(A). IIRIRA aptly calls this other notice a

“[n]otice of change in time or place of proceedings.”

9

Id.

§ 1229(a)(2). 

These provisions entitle Madrid-Mancia to relief. The 

government needed to give Madrid-Mancia “written notice 

required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).” 8 

U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). But it gave her a putative NTA that 

omitted the time and date of her hearing, even though notice 

under paragraph (1) requires “[t]he time and place at which the 

proceedings will be held.” Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). And it gave 

her a so-called “Notice of Hearing” that scheduled the time and 

date of her hearing, even though notice under paragraph (2) is 

9 The Justice Department prefers a different label in its 

briefing: a “Notice of Hearing” or “NOH.” See, e.g., Response 

Br. 4. A term likely borrowed from the form it mailed MadridMancia captioned “Notice of Hearing in Removal 

Proceedings.” A.R. 116. But that is not what Congress said, 

and one needs no years of law school to see the difference 

between a “notice of hearing” and a “[n]otice of change in time 

or place of proceedings.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2). While

“headings and titles are not meant to take the place of the 

detailed provisions of the text,” Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. 

Baltimore & O. R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947), the label here 

confirms what the following provision makes clear: a second 

notice is only applicable “in the case of any change or 

postponement in the time and place of [removal] proceedings.” 

8 U.S.C § 1229(a)(2)(A).
15

applicable only “in the case of any change or postponement in 

the time and place of such proceedings.” Id. § 1229(a)(2)(A).

Both documents are glasses half full that leave Madrid-Mancia

without the kind of “written notice required under paragraph 

(1) or (2).” Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). 

B.

The Justice Department concedes that Madrid-Mancia’s 

putative NTA omitted the time and date of her removal 

proceeding. But it argues she still received sufficient notice 

because the word “or” in the removal provision means it only 

needed to provide Madrid-Mancia with either an NTA under 

paragraph (1) or a “Notice of Hearing” under paragraph (2). 

See Response Br. 10–11 (“Notice under either subsection 

(a)(1) or (a)(2) is ‘sufficient’ . . . .”); Gov’t Suppl. Br. 13–14 

(“[S]ervice of either a compliant NTA or a compliant NOH 

authorizes an in absentia removal.”). According to the 

Department, this disjunctive phrasing makes Madrid-Mancia’s 

defective NTA immaterial. Madrid-Mancia got a “Notice of

Hearing,” A.R. 116, and that alone, it concludes, is enough for 

in absentia removal. 

That is not enough because § 1229a(b)(5)(A) always 

requires a complete NTA. And the Attorney General cannot 

cure defects in an NTA by sending out a self-styled “Notice of 

Hearing” because announcing the time and date of a removal 

hearing for the first time is not a “change or postponement” in 

the time or place. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A).

1.

We look at the text and structure of the removal 

provision, mindful that interpretation should not be “confined 
16

to a single sentence” because “the text of the whole statute 

gives instruction as to its meaning.” Maracich v. Spears, 570 

U.S. 48, 65 (2013). The statute authorizes in absentia removal 

only “after written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2)

of section 1229(a).” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (emphasis 

added). So when and what kind of notice is “required” is 

spelled out in paragraphs (1) and (2). Id.

Paragraph (1) applies to all “removal proceedings under 

section 1229a.” Id. § 1229(a)(1). And it states that aliens “shall 

be given” “a ‘notice to appear’” containing “[t]he time and 

place at which the proceedings will be held.” Id.

§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i); see Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 

1474, 1480 (2021) (“The singular article ‘a’ [in § 1229(a)]

stubbornly require[s] ‘a’ written notice containing all the 

required information.”). Paragraph (2) places another

requirement on the Executive, but only “in the case of any 

change or postponement in the time and place of such 

proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A). Here, “a written 

notice shall be given” to the alien disclosing “the new time or 

place of the proceedings.” Id. § 1229(a)(2)(A)(i). So in every 

case, an alien must receive an NTA containing the time and

place of the removal hearing. Additional notice is only 

“required,” id. § 1229a(b)(5)(A), under paragraph (2) if the 

agency changes or postpones the time or place of the hearing. 

All showing that the notice requirement in paragraph (2)

applies along with—not in place of—the notice requirement in 

paragraph (1).

The structure of § 1229(a) similarly shows that a 

“[n]otice of change in time or place of proceedings,” id.

§ 1229(a)(2), may supplement—but not substitute—a 

“[n]otice to appear,” id. § 1229(a)(1). See 1 Edward Coke, The 

First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England § 728, at 
17

381a (19th ed. 1832) (1628) (“[I]t is the most naturall and 

genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part of the 

statute by another part of the same statute, for that best 

expresseth the meaning of the makers.”). Paragraph (1)

contains an exhaustive list of information that “shall be given” 

“[i]n removal proceedings under section 1229a.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229(a)(1). It requires that the government give notice of the 

“nature of the proceedings,” the agency’s “legal authority,” the 

“acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law,” and the 

“charges against the alien.” Id. § 1229(a)(1)(A)–(D). 

Paragraph (2) requires none of this. It merely obligates the 

government to keep an alien informed of any “change[s] or 

postponement[s]” to the “time and place” of her proceedings. 

Id. § 1229(a)(2)(A). 

These textual and structural differences demonstrate the

distinct purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2). See 1 Blackstone, 

Commentaries *60 (“[T]he most universal and effectual way 

of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are 

dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the 

cause which moved the legislator to enact it.”). A “written

notice” is “required under paragraph (1),” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(b)(5)(A), in all “removal proceedings under section 

1229a,” id. § 1229(a)(1). It must contain “[t]he time and place 

at which the proceedings will be held.” Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).

But a “written notice” is “required under paragraph . . . (2),” 

id. § 1229a(b)(5)(A), only “in the case of any change or 

postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,” id.

§ 1229(a)(2)(A).

As best read, the use of “or” in § 1229a(b)(5)(A) means

the government may remove an alien in absentia after 

providing her with a compliant NTA or, “in the case of any 

change or postponement,” a compliant NTA plus a second 
18

notice that informs her of the “new time or place of the 

proceedings.” Id. § 1229(a)(2)(A). Sufficient notice can be a 

compliant NTA without a second notice. But it cannot consist 

of a putative second notice without a compliant NTA. 

2.

All agree Madrid-Mancia’s putative NTA lacked the 

time and date of her removal proceeding. And the Justice 

Department does not (and could not) argue that the “Notice of 

Hearing” it mailed Madrid-Mancia communicated a 

“postponement” in the hearing time. Instead, it states that the 

“Notice of Hearing” announced a “change” in the time of 

Madrid-Mancia’s hearing—from “to be set” to a date certain. 

In a vacuum, the word “change” might have this broad 

meaning. See Change, Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary 372 (1993) (“to make different”). Or it may mean 

something much narrower, such as “[a]n alteration; a 

modification or addition; [or] substitution of one thing for 

another.” Change, Black’s Law Dictionary 231 (6th ed. 1990). 

Hopeless ambiguity? Hardly, once we apply the 

traditional tools of statutory interpretation to reach the “best 

interpretation,” Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., 

concurring), that explains “how a reasonable person, 

conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, 

would read the text in context,” John F. Manning, The 

Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2392–93 (2003).

Context shows the narrow definition of “change” fits 

best within paragraph (2). That is, when the provision states 

that it applies only “in the case of any change . . . in the time” 

of removal proceedings, the word “change” presupposes a time 

has already been set. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A). Clue number 
19

one: the immediately preceding statutory provision requires the 

agency to set an initial time and place for the removal hearing. 

See id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) (requiring all NTAs to inform the 

alien of “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be 

held”). Clue number two adds more: once the agency has set 

an initial time for the hearing and the time changes, paragraph 

(2) requires the agency to tell the alien of “the new time or 

place of the proceedings.” Id. § 1229(a)(2)(A)(i). Not the 

“initial time,” or even “the time.”10 But “the new time.” Id.

(emphasis added). 

Both clues confirm what common sense suggests: 

IIRIRA requires the agency to give an alien time-and-place

information in her NTA, and then let her know if that 

information changes. The agency cannot opt out of the timeand-place requirement and then cure any deficiencies by 

providing that information—for the first time—in a document

reserved to communicate “the new time or place” of 

proceedings “in the case of any change or postponement.” Id. 

§ 1229(a)(2)(A).

Ordinary usage illustrates the meaning of the text in 

context.11 Any reasonable reader would understand paragraph 

10 Paragraph (1) already requires “[t]he time.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).

11 The statutory history discussed in Section I.A 

solidifies our understanding. As outlined, the government 

could serve an “order to show cause” without time-and-place 

information before IIRIRA. See 43 Fed. Reg. at 36,239 (stating 

that time-and-place information “may be stated in the order [to 

show cause] or may be later specified” (emphasis added)); 8 

U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994) (stating that time-and-place 
20

(2)’s use of “change” to mean a change from something to a 

different something—not from nothing to something. Cf. In re 

Brewer, 863 F.3d 861, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Ex nihilo nihil 

fit.”); William Shakespeare, King Lear, act 1, sc. 1 (Bernhard 

Tauchnitz 1868) (“Nothing will come of nothing.”). Examples 

abound. No reasonable diner would expect to get seating for 

two by calling a restaurant to “change” a reservation he never 

made. Confusion, not a boarding pass, would follow a 

traveler’s request to “change” a flight from business to first 

class when no seat of any kind had been purchased. Informing 

the dealership that you want to “change” your new convertible 

from metallic blue to classic silver only gets you a different 

color if you have already bought the car. Calling the first try a 

second thought is a clumsy (and likely unsuccessful) way to 

make plans or purchases. 

information could be provided “in the order to show cause or 

otherwise” (emphasis added)). But IIRIRA extinguished the 

government’s ability to provide time-and-place information at 

a later date. It required (and still requires) service of “a ‘notice 

to appear’ . . . specifying . . . [t]he time and place at which the 

proceedings will be held.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). “When 

Congress amends legislation” like this, we “must ‘presume it 

intends [the change] to have real and substantial effect.’” Ross 

v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 641–42 (2016) (quoting Stone v. INS, 

514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995)). IIRIRA requires the government to 

serve NTAs that inform aliens of the time and place of their 

proceeding. Though agency regulations only require time-andplace information in an NTA “where practicable,” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.18(b), “self-serving regulations never ‘justify departing 

from the statute’s clear text.’” Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1485 

(quoting Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2118).
21

So too with the attempt to order Madrid-Mancia

removed in absentia based on a provision designed only to 

communicate changes in the time or place of her removal 

proceeding. The provision only applies when changes in the 

time or place arise, not when the government first sets the 

schedule. A conclusion the Supreme Court endorsed in 

Pereira: 

By allowing for a “change or postponement” of 

the proceedings to a “new time or place,” 

paragraph (2) presumes that the [g]overnment 

has already served a “notice to appear under 

section 1229(a)” that specified a time and place 

as required by § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Otherwise, 

there would be no time or place to “change or 

postpon[e].”

138 S. Ct. at 2114. Justice Alito agreed, writing that 

“[p]aragraph (2) undoubtedly assumes that notices to appear 

will state the ‘time and place’ of the removal proceeding as 

required by § 1229(a)(1).” Id. at 2127 (Alito, J., dissenting). 

Meaning the Court reads paragraph (2) to mean what it says: it 

only applies “in the case of any change or postponement.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A).12

12 So do three circuits. See Laparra-Deleon v. Garland, 

52 F.4th 514, 520 (1st Cir. 2022) (“By concluding that ‘there 

would be no time or place to “change or postpone”’ unless a 

‘notice to appear’ under § 1229(a)(1) itself had set such a 

‘time,’ Pereira necessarily reads ‘change’ in § 1229(a)(2) to 

refer to ‘the substitution of one thing for another’ or ‘the 

succession of one thing in place of another . . . .’” (cleaned up) 
22

Because the Justice Department never changed or 

postponed Madrid-Mancia’s hearing, no written notice was 

required under paragraph (2). See id. The government was, 

however, obligated to give her proper notice under paragraph 

(1). See id. § 1229(a)(1). Because it failed to fulfill this 

obligation, it cannot establish “by clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing evidence that the written notice was so provided.” 

(citations omitted)); Singh v. Garland, 24 F.4th 1315, 1320 

(9th Cir. 2022) (“This text presupposes—and common sense 

confirms—that the Notice to Appear provided in paragraph (1) 

must have included a date and time because otherwise, a 

‘change’ in the time or place is not possible.”), reh’g en banc

denied, 51 F.4th 371 (9th Cir. 2022); Rodriguez v. Garland, 15 

F.4th 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2021) (allowing relief following a 

defective NTA under Niz-Chavez but not Pereira), reh’g en 

banc denied, 31 F.4th 935, 937 (5th Cir. 2022) (Duncan, J., 

concurring in denial of en banc rehearing) (“The alien never 

got an initial ‘time or place,’ so there was nothing to ‘change’ 

and any subsequently set ‘time or place’ wouldn’t be ‘new.’”).

The circuits splitting the other way have not evaluated the 

ordinary meaning of “change” or “postponement” in paragraph 

(2), nor have they analyzed the key passage in Pereira. See 

Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486, 491–92 (6th Cir. 2019)

(“Although Santos-Santos may have met his burden in 

showing that he did not receive a notice in accordance with 

paragraph (1), he did not meet his burden to show lack of notice 

in accordance with paragraph (2).”); Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. 

Att’y Gen., 40 F.4th 1312, 1318 n.3 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[A] 

paragraph (2) notice can inform a person of a ‘change or 

postponement in the time and place’ of removal proceedings 

even if the initial hearing information appeared in a follow-on 

notice of hearing.”).
23

Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). Given the lack of proper notice, the 

agency acted beyond its statutory authority when it ordered 

Madrid-Mancia removed in absentia.

C.

Changing tack, the Justice Department cites the nonotice provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B) to suggest 

Madrid-Mancia forfeited her right to any notice of the time or 

place of her removal hearing. Or any notice at all because the 

Department reads § 1229a(b)(5)(B) to impose “a statutory 

duty” on aliens to keep their “current address on file with the 

immigration court.” Response Br. 2 (emphasis added). So, the 

Department concludes, since Madrid-Mancia moved from the 

address she provided at the border, she lost any right to further 

information about her removal. That conclusion finds not a bit 

of support in the text.

Here is what the no-notice provision says: “[n]o written 

notice shall be required” under the removal provision “if the 

alien has failed to provide the address required under section 

1229(a)(1)(F) of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B). So we 

look to that cross-reference which requires “an address . . . at 

which the alien may be contacted respecting proceedings.” Id.

§ 1229(a)(1)(F)(i). Meaning, once again, the Justice 

Department swapped out the words written by Congress for 

language it prefers. Thankfully for aliens and citizens alike, 

that is not the way our Republic works.

Because, of course, “an address” does not necessarily 

mean the alien’s current residential address. See Renaut v. 

Lynch, 791 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2015) (“It is also not 

apparent to us why the BIA (and the government in its briefing) 

assume ‘address’ means residential address.”). “An address” 
24

where the alien “may be contacted” means just that: a place 

where a person can be contacted. The alien’s current residential 

address. Or her cousin’s. Or a PO box. So long as that address 

exists, it is sufficient. Cf., e.g., Dragomirescu v. Att’y Gen., 44 

F.4th 1351, 1353 (11th Cir. 2022) (stale address with no 

alternative); Gudiel-Villatoro v. Garland, 40 F.4th 247, 248

(5th Cir. 2022) (no address ever provided); Spagnol-Bastos v. 

Garland, 19 F.4th 802, 804 (5th Cir. 2021) (nonexistent 

address).

That is the case here. When she arrived in the United 

States, Madrid-Mancia provided her cousin’s residence as “an 

address . . . at which [she] may be contacted respecting 

proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i). Then she moved 

and tried to change her address with the agency. When that 

failed, she continued using her cousin’s address, regularly 

checking to see if she had received any immigration-related 

mail. Cf. Santana Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 506 F.3d 274, 279–

80 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating alien may be able to rebut 

presumption of delivery where alien moved but had her “uncle, 

his wife and son regularly sen[d] [her] mail that was addressed 

to [her]”). All enough to make the no-notice provision 

inapplicable. 

III.

The Justice Department prefers a system of notice to 

aliens different from the law passed by Congress and signed by 

the President. Perhaps its policy makes sense. No matter; “an 

agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own 

sense of how the statute should operate,” nor can it altogether 

disregard Congress’s command. Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 

573 U.S. 302, 328 (2014). Because Madrid-Mancia’s in 

absentia removal did not follow the law given by Congress, we 
25

will grant her petition for review and remand for the agency to 

rescind her removal order.