In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-17-00226-CR

JUSTIN GEROME HORN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th District Court

Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 46,873-B

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A surveillance video from the Walgreens store located on North Fourth Street in Longview, 

Gregg County, Texas, recorded a man in shorts purchasing some merchandise with a credit card 

at approximately 6:20 p.m. on July 19, 2016, while a contemporaneous Walgreens receipt 

documented a transaction in which a Visa credit card having the last four digits 6379 was swiped 

at 6:20:13 p.m., charging $220.18 for merchandise. Other evidence demonstrated that the card 

used in the transaction belonged to Dolorosa Welch and that, on that occasion, Welch had not 

authorized the use of that card by anyone, including the man in the video. One officer recognized 

Justin Gerome Horn from the video as the man involved in the transaction. When interviewed by 

law enforcement, Horn initially admitted, and later denied, that the person so depicted was him.

Horn appeals his resulting conviction for the offense of credit card abuse and a sentence of 

fourteen months’ confinement. In a single point of error, Horn asserts that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the guilty verdict, claiming instead mistaken identity. Because sufficient 

evidence supported Horn’s conviction for credit card abuse, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency, we review all of the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 

S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

319 (1972); Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d). 

We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to 

the responsibility of the fact-finder “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, 
3

and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 

9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 

772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Under Section 32.31(b)(1)(A) of the Texas Penal Code, the elements of the offense of 

credit card abuse are (1) a person (2) with intent to fraudulently obtain (3) property or services 

(4) presents or uses (5) a credit card (6) with knowledge that the card was not issued to him or her

and (7) with knowledge that he or she does not have the effective consent of the cardholder. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.31(b)(1)(A) (West 2016); see Ex parte Williams, 622 S.W.2d 876, 877 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In this case, the State’s indictment against Horn stated that

on or about the 19th day of July, 2016 . . . JUSTIN GEROME HORN, hereinafter 

called Defendant, did then and there with the intent to fraudulently obtain a benefit, 

used a credit card, namely, Chase credit card ending in 6379, with knowledge that 

the card had not been issued to the said defendant, and with knowledge that said 

card was not used with the effective consent of the cardholder, namely, Dolorosa 

Welch. 

Horn concedes that the State presented sufficient evidence to show that someone other than 

Welch used her credit card to make the purchases and that Welch did not give her consent for 

anyone to use her credit card. Horn contends, however, that there was insufficient proof that he 

was the individual who committed the offense. 

In his interview of Horn, Gregg County Sheriff’s Office Investigator Antonio Monsivais1

showed Horn a photograph taken from the Walgreens surveillance video, asking, “[W]ho is this?” 

 

1After being notified by her credit card company on July 25, 2016, that her card had been used on July 19, Welch 

contacted Monsivais. After speaking with Welch, Monsivais obtained the receipt. From the data on the receipt, 

Monsivais obtained the surveillance video recording matching the time on the receipt. From the surveillance video, 

Monsivais made still photographs of the individual. Monsivais posted either the surveillance videos or the 

photographs on the Gregg County website in hopes that someone would recognize the individual. After seeing 
4

Horn responded, “That’s me.” When Horn was shown another photograph, he responded, “Yeah, 

that look[s] like me.” When Horn was asked again if he was the individual in the photograph, 

Horn answered in the affirmative. 

Horn continued to look through the photographs, and then he asked Monsivais if the person 

in one of the photographs was wearing green shorts. When Monsivais answered that the shorts 

appeared to be green to him, Horn quickly stated that he did not own a pair of green shorts. 

Monsivais also emphasized that the person in the photograph was wearing a “big ol’ watch.” Horn 

agreed that he owned a black and gold watch. After pointing out that the individual in one of the 

photographs was wearing sandals, Horn informed Monsivais that he did not own any sandals.2 At 

that point, Horn stated that he was not, in fact, the person in the photographs. Horn then stated, “I 

might need a lawyer[,]” at which point Monsivais ended the interview. 

Horn maintains that the State failed to prove that he was the person who appeared in the 

security video footage or the photographs. We disagree. The evidence shows that by matching 

the time on the Walgreen’s credit card receipt to the timing on the store’s recording device, the 

store manager was able to isolate video footage of the individual using Welch’s credit card. The 

trial court was able to review that recording. In addition, Monsivais explained that the photographs 

that were admitted into evidence were produced directly from that video recording. Likewise, the 

 

Monsivais’ posting, a Longview police officer contacted him, explaining that he recognized the individual as being 

Horn. Monsivais also learned that Horn was being housed in the Gregg County Jail and went to the jail to speak with 

Horn. 

2At trial, Horn’s mother, Mary Davis, testified that Horn never wore sandals. Davis also stated that Horn did not drive 

and that, if he needed to go somewhere, either Davis, Horn’s sister, or a friend would give him a ride. 
5

trial court also had the opportunity during the non-jury trial to review photographs of the individual 

who had used Welch’s credit card in Kroger. Horn was seated in the courtroom during the entire 

trial, thereby giving the trial court the opportunity to compare Horn’s physical attributes to the 

person seen on the surveillance video and in the photographs. Most importantly, however, Horn 

was heard on the audio recording during the interview with Monsivais admitting that he was the 

person in the photographs. Despite his repeated admissions, Horn emphasizes that he eventually 

denied being the individual in the photographs when he noticed that the person was wearing green 

shorts and sandals, neither of which he owned. As the trier of fact, the trial court was the sole 

judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to the evidence. Fuentes v. State, 

991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When faced with a record that supports conflicting 

inferences, we presume the trier of fact resolved the conflict in support of the verdict. See id.; 

Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Considering all of these factors together, we find there is legally sufficient evidence to 

support the trial court’s verdict. Therefore, we must defer to its determination, assume that any 

conflicting evidence or inferences were resolved in favor of the guilty verdict, and overrule Horn’s 

sole point of error.
6

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: July 30, 2018 

Date Decided: August 3, 2018

Do Not Publish