COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Bray 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

ANTONIE CARUTH JONES, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS 

 ANTOINE CARUTH JONES 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1893-95-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 SEPTEMBER 3, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Verbena M. Askew, Judge 

 George M. Rogers, III, for appellant. 

 Brian Wainger, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Antoine Caruth Jones (defendant) was convicted in a bench 

trial for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. 

Defendant complains on appeal that the trial court erroneously 

admitted evidence resulting from an unlawful search and 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the requisite 

knowledge and intent to distribute the offending drugs. Finding 

no error, we affirm the conviction. 

 On December 14, 1994, Newport News police executed a search 

warrant for an apartment occupied by Linda Williams.1

 The 

warrant sought evidence pertaining to a robbery and murder 

unrelated to the instant offense, including "a handgun, 

ammunition, gold ring . . ., cellular telephone and gold chain." 

 When police entered the residence, defendant, then a visitor 

seated in the "living room," and Ms. Williams were the only 

 

 1The validity of the warrant is not at issue. 
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persons present. While several officers searched "upstairs," 

Detective V. D. Williams and another officer "maintained visual 

observation" of defendant and Ms. Williams "downstairs." 

 Shortly after the search commenced, defendant asked 

Detective Williams for permission to leave the apartment. 

Because defendant "didn't have anything to do with the search 

warrant . . .," the detective agreed and defendant proceeded 

toward the door. It was a "cold day," and Ms. Williams reminded 

defendant, clad only in "pants and shirt," "Don't forget your 

jacket." Defendant then "turned around . . ., picked up [a] 

jacket" which was "laying across the back portion of a chair" 

located in the "center of the living room," and exited the 

apartment. Detective Williams quickly realized that the jacket, 

which was on the chair when the officers entered the residence, 

had not yet been searched and stopped defendant "five steps" 

beyond the threshold of the apartment. Defendant was holding the 

jacket in his hand, and the detective, after explaining the need 

to search it, "obtained" the jacket from him. 

 As Detective Williams began to search, defendant became 

"very fidgety" and "started towards the jacket," prompting the 

detective to "take a couple of steps back." Inside the left 

pocket, Detective Williams discovered "two tubes" containing 

crack cocaine concealed within a "black glove," but no 

paraphernalia with which to ingest the drug. A subsequent search 

of defendant's person incidental to arrest revealed $454 in a 
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trouser pocket. Newport News Detective Richard Gaddis testified, 

without objection, as an "expert in reference to drugs and their 

sale and possession." He noted that the cocaine was "cut" into 

"50 to 75 rocks," which "normally sold on the street 

individually, . . . [at] about 40 bucks a piece," having an 

aggregate weight of "approximately 25 grams" and total value of 

$2,500 to $3,000. Gaddis opined that this quantity of "cut 

rocks" was inconsistent with the possession of crack cocaine for 

personal use. 

 Defendant testified that he had visited with Ms. Williams 

for only a "couple of minutes" prior to the arrival of the 

police. He admitted ownership of the jacket, but denied 

knowledge of the cocaine, claiming the jacket had been in the 

residence for several days. Defendant, then unemployed, 

explained that the cash was his "mother's rent money," which, 

though due on the "first of the month," remained in his 

possession on December 14 because "she trusts me." At the 

conclusion of defendant's testimony, the trial court commented 

that it "just doesn't believe" defendant, that he "had no 

credibility." 

 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE 

 Upon appeal from a trial court's refusal to suppress 

evidence, we must review the record in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party, the Commonwealth in this instance, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 
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therefrom. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 

407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991); Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 

430, 436, 388 S.E.2d 659, 663 (1990). The findings of the court 

will not be disturbed unless "plainly wrong," Grimstead, 12 Va. 

App. at 1067, 407 S.E.2d at 48, and the burden is upon the 

appellant to show that the disputed ruling constituted reversible 

error. Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 436, 388 S.E.2d at 663. 

 It is uncontroverted that the jacket was resting on a chair 

located in the living room when the police entered the apartment, 

and defendant conceded that it was subject to search under 

authority of the warrant. Nevertheless, relying upon Lett v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 191, 372 S.E.2d 195 (1988), he contends 

that, once police permitted him to take possession of the jacket 

and remove it from the premises, "there was no probable cause to 

search" the garment.2 However, defendant's argument overlooks 

evidence that Detective Williams authorized defendant to leave 

the apartment before defendant claimed or obtained possession of 

the jacket. Defendant's attention was first directed to the 

jacket by Ms. Williams after the detective had acceded to his 

request. Within moments thereafter, Detective Williams recalled 

that the jacket had not been searched and stopped defendant, then 

only a few steps beyond the apartment door, for that purpose. 

 

 2In Lett, the accused was in actual possession of a 

pocketbook upon the arrival of police to execute a search warrant 

and successfully challenged its search pursuant to the warrant or 

otherwise. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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 Defendant's implicit assertion that the authority of the 

search warrant dissipated with his exit from the apartment is 

without merit. It is well established that "[a] lawful search of 

premises described in a warrant 'extends to the entire area in 

which the object[s] of the search may be found . . . .'" Kearney 

v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 202, 205, 355 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1987) 

(quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982)). 

"'[A] search may be as extensive as reasonably required to locate 

the items described in the warrant.'" Id. (citation omitted). 

"A warrant to search a [premises] would support a search of every 

part of the [premises] that might contain the object of the 

search." Ross, 456 U.S. at 821. Moreover, "a warrant to search 

. . . carries with it the limited authority to detain the 

occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." 

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). Thus, once the 

police have initiated a search pursuant to a warrant, persons may 

not subvert its lawful purposes by removing articles properly 

within its scope. 

 Here, in executing the search warrant of Ms. Williams' 

residence, the police were directed to a handgun, ammunition, a 

gold ring, a cellular telephone, and a gold chain. The jacket in 

issue was initially "bereft of any external indicia of 

ownership," clearly a "plausible repository" for those items 

sought by the police and, concededly, subject to search while it 

remained within the apartment. See United States v. Gray, 814 
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F.2d 49, 51 (1987). Under such circumstances, it would be absurd 

to later exclude the jacket from the embrace of the warrant 

simply because defendant was inadvertently allowed to carry it a 

few feet beyond the entryway. 

 Accordingly, we find that a search of defendant's jacket was 

within the ambit of the warrant, and the trial court properly 

admitted the attendant evidence. 

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 

 Defendant further contends that the evidence is insufficient 

to support his conviction. Under familiar principles of 

appellate review, we examine the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 

Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment of a 

trial court, sitting without a jury, is entitled to the same 

weight as a jury verdict and will be disturbed only if plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it. Id. "The weight which 

should be given to evidence and whether the testimony of a 

witness is credible are questions which the fact finder must 

decide." Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 

S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986). 

 Defendant's conviction required the Commonwealth to prove 

that he "'intentionally and consciously possessed' the drug, 

either actually or constructively, with knowledge of its nature 

and character, together with the intent to distribute it." 
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Wilkins v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 293, 298, 443 S.E.2d 440, 

444 (1994) (quoting Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 

99-102, 390 S.E.2d 491, 497-99 (1990) (en banc)). "Because 

direct proof of [the] intent [to distribute] is often impossible, 

it must be shown by circumstantial evidence."3 Servis v. 

Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988). 

Circumstances relevant to proof of an intent to distribute 

include the "quantity of drugs and cash possessed, the method of 

packaging, and whether [defendant] himself used drugs." 

Poindexter v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 730, 735, 432 S.E.2d 527, 

530 (1993). 

 When the police initially entered the apartment, the jacket 

was draped over a living room chair. Although defendant was 

dressed only in "pants and a shirt" and it was "cold outside," he 

clearly intended to leave without his jacket. Once reminded of 

the jacket, however, defendant acknowledged ownership and took 

possession of it. When confronted by the detective, he became 

"fidgety" and moved toward the jacket during the search. From 

such evidence, the trial court properly inferred that defendant 

entered the residence wearing the jacket and removed and placed 

it on the chair. Later, the police entered the premises and 

defendant, aware of the presence and nature of the contraband 

 

 3"Circumstantial evidence . . . is evidence of facts or 

circumstances not in issue from which facts or circumstances in 

issue may be inferred." Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence 

in Virginia, § 12-1 (4th ed. 1993). 
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concealed within, attempted to disassociate himself from it. The 

record further established that the "cut" and quantity of cocaine 

were inconsistent with personal use, and no evidence suggested 

that defendant was a cocaine user. Moreover, the cash discovered 

on defendant's person and his untruthfulness to both police and 

the court were indicative of guilt. 

 Thus, sufficient evidence in the record supports the finding 

that defendant consciously possessed the cocaine, aware of its 

nature and character, together with the requisite intent to 

distribute. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.