Filed 9/23/15 T.W. v. G.S. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

T.W.,

Defendant and Appellant,

v.

G.S.,

Plaintiff and Respondent.

 B257777

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. PF004541)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Michelle 

Williams Court, Judge. Reversed.

Law Offices of Melissa Buchman, Melissa B. Buchman, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Lipton and Margolin, Hugh A. Lipton and Brian Magruder for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 
2

The family law court issued restraining orders pursuant to Family Code section 

3048,1 a child abduction statute, that prohibits plaintiff and appellant T.W. (Mother) from 

removing her daughter from Los Angeles County absent either the consent of defendant 

and respondent G.S. (Father) or permission from the court. We consider whether 

sufficient evidence supports the predicate for the court’s orders, namely, the finding there 

was a risk Mother would abduct her daughter, G. 

BACKGROUND

Mother and Father work for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (the 

Department). Mother lives in Lancaster with G., and Father resides in Santa Clarita. At 

the time of G.’s birth, Mother and Father were no longer romantically involved. Since 

G.’s birth, Mother has been in a relationship with a man (now her fiancé) who lives in 

Tehachapi, a city roughly 50 miles northwest of Lancaster. Until the issuance of the 

orders that are the subject of this appeal, Mother and G. often spent time with her fiancé 

and his two children in Tehachapi attending family gatherings, birthday parties, and 

church services. 

Court custody proceedings between Mother and Father began in 2009 when Father 

filed a paternity action and obtained custody and visitation orders permitting him to visit 

G. twice a week. In 2011, Mother filed an Order to Show Cause asking to move to

Tehachapi with G. Initial custody proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, ensued 

over the next two years and Mother put her plans to move on hold. 

The family law court made its initial custody determination in December 2013, 

awarding Mother primary physical custody of G. and granting both parents joint legal 

custody. The court observed that discord between the parties had resulted in a high 

conflict parenting situation, that G.’s contact with Mother had been greater than G.’s 

contact with Father, but that G.’s contact with Father had been limited by Mother’s 

actions. The court found that Mother had difficulty co-parenting with Father and had 

 

1 All undesignated references are to the Family Code.
3

made allegations against him the court found to be untrue. However, the court also 

recognized G.’s strong emotional bond with Mother and her stated intention to protect G.

from harm. The court concluded: “It is not in [G.]’s best interest to divest Mother of 

significant parental rights and responsibilities at this time. Rather, the court has ordered a 

child custody evaluation for more information and insight into a more permanent custody 

and visitation plan.” The court entered an order for the evaluation pursuant to section 

3111, subdivision (a), and set a visitation schedule for the parties. 

Shortly after the court’s initial custody order, Mother informed Father that she had 

become engaged to the man she had been seeing and that she intended to relocate with G. 

to Tehachapi. Father disapproved and immediately moved ex parte for modification of 

the initial custody order, seeking sole legal and physical custody of G. and asking the 

court to enjoin Mother from moving G. to Tehachapi. Mother responded that she had the 

right to move as the primary custodial parent, and she contended her move would not 

interfere with Father’s custodial rights because she would continue to work in Lancaster 

and G. would continue to attend therapy and childcare in Lancaster. 

The court granted Father’s request to enjoin Mother from moving G. outside Los 

Angeles County pending completion of the custody evaluation.2 The court set the matter 

for a further hearing approximately five months later, in May 2014. In the weeks that 

followed, Mother took medical leave from the Department after suffering an injury. She 

also sold her home in Lancaster and purchased a home in Tehachapi with her fiancé. 

Mother and G., however, continued to live in Lancaster at Mother’s parents’ house 

pending further resolution of the ongoing custody proceedings. 

On May 16, 2014, Father’s attorneys received a copy of the court-ordered child 

custody evaluation report prepared by Susan Ralston, Ph.D. Five days later, on May 21, 

Father filed a declaration accompanied by a “Request for Order” Judicial Council form—

without notice to Mother. Father’s ex parte filing sought to reverse the existing custody 

 

2 This injunction did not prohibit Mother and G. from visiting Tehachapi. It only 

prevented Mother from changing G.’s residence to a home anywhere outside Los Angeles 

County. 
4

order and to obtain sole legal and physical custody of G. pending further proceedings in 

the case. Notwithstanding a prior stipulation that Dr. Ralston’s evaluation report would 

not be admitted into evidence unless she testified in court, Father’s declaration quoted 

excerpts from Dr. Ralston’s report to justify his request for custody.

Father also asked, in the event the court declined to modify the initial custody 

order, that the court restrain Mother from taking G. out of the County of Los Angeles at 

any time. In support of that request, Father submitted a Judicial Council form application 

for a child abduction prevention order pursuant to section 3048. Father checked boxes on 

the form to indicate that he thought Mother might take G. without his permission to 

another county in California (Kern County, where Tehachapi is located) or to another 

state (Texas). On the portion of the Judicial Council form that asked Father to explain his 

reasons for thinking Mother might take G. without his permission, he asserted (again, by 

checking the relevant boxes) that Mother had violated or threatened to violate a custody 

or visitation order in the past, that Mother had recently done things that made it easier to 

take G. away without permission, and that Mother had a history of not cooperating with 

him in parenting.

Except as to the assertion that Mother had recently done things that made it easier 

to take the children away, Father provided no additional information on the form to 

explain the three abduction factors he asserted were present. As to that factor where a 

brief explanation was provided, Father stated Mother was living temporarily in her 

mother’s home and claimed Mother was on disability and had no intention to return to 

her job working for the Department. 

Relying on Father’s submission, the court entered a temporary emergency order 

preventing Mother from taking G. outside Los Angeles County and denied without 

prejudice all of Father’s other requests relating to a change in custody. In its order, 

issued on Judicial Council Forms FL-305 and FL-341(B), the court found that there was a 

risk Mother would take G. without permission for the reasons asserted by Father: she had 

violated or threatened to violate a court order, her status on disability leave from her job 

and living temporarily with her mother were things that made it easy for her to take G. 
5

away without permission,3 and she had a history of not cooperating with Father in 

parenting. The court also set a hearing for further proceedings on the temporary 

emergency order. 

Both Mother and Father subsequently appeared in court for further proceedings on 

the May 21 ex parte order. The court continued the matter to June 12, 2014, in order to 

consider Mother’s request that the court recuse itself, a request that the court later denied. 

Both parties filed documents in advance of the June 12, 2014, hearing date. Father 

submitted a declaration to “further detail the reasons [he] believe[d] that [Mother] is a 

flight risk with our daughter . . . which were set forth in [his] Request for Child 

Abduction Prevention Orders (FL-312).” Father’s declaration asserted that Mother had 

failed to comply with a July 2010 court order obligating her to place Father’s name on 

G.’s birth certificate. Father’s declaration also summarized additional reasons on which 

he based his claim that G. might be abducted by Mother: “(1) The sale of her house, (2) 

Stating that she had no intention of returning to work for the Sherriff’s Department, (3) 

[Mother’s] fiancé . . . selling his house, (4) [G.] telling [Father] that her mother and [her 

fiancé] were moving with [G.] to Texas, and—most importantly—Dr. Ralston’s analysis 

of our daughter’s well-being while in [Mother’s] custody . . . .” Father’s declaration did 

acknowledge, however, that Mother had provided him with her fiancé’s first Tehachapi 

address, and that after her fiancé had bought a new house, Mother had recently provided 

him with that address as well. 

Mother filed a responsive declaration the day before the hearing. She directly 

addressed Father’s assertion that she might move to Texas stating, “I have never been to 

Texas. I have no family in Texas. My fiancé has no family in Texas. I have no ties to 

Texas. The only connection my fiancé and I have with Texas is that my fiancé is a huge 

Dallas Cowboys football fan . . . [and] has shown [G.] his Dallas Cowboys 

 

3 Father’s request for an order relied on Mother’s sale of her home to support the 

assertion that she had done things that would make it easier to abduct G. The court did 

not rely on the sale of the home in support of its findings. 
6

memorabilia. . . . During Dr. Ralston’s custodial evaluation, Dr. Ralston asked both me 

and my fiancé if we planned to travel or move to Texas. I told Dr. Ralston that we have 

no intention of relocating. I explained to her that my family lives in Lancaster and my 

fiancé’s two children . . . live in Southern California. I also told her my fiancé owns a 

home in Kern County and his immediate family resides in Kern County. Finally, my 

fiancé is a deputy sheriff in Los Angeles County.” Mother also stated that she had never 

traveled with G. out of state and that she had not been on an airplane for over ten years. 

In addition, Mother’s declaration addressed other matters raised by Father in 

connection with his claim that she might abduct G. Mother stated that she informed 

Father that she had sold her home in an email sent to him on March 27, 2014—almost 

two months before Father sought the ex parte restraining order in May. Mother also 

stated that she and her fiancé had since purchased a new home together in Tehachapi 

(about a mile from his old home), but that she and G. would continue to live at her 

parents’ home in Lancaster until she received permission from the court to move. Mother 

acknowledged that she was on medical leave from her job at the Department as the result 

of an injury she suffered through no fault of her own. She explained that she was still 

employed, but if her doctor did not clear her to return to duty she might be medically 

retired by her employer; in that event, she would need to find new employment and she 

had therefore enrolled in an online masters program to become a teacher. Finally, Mother 

asserted that her failure to add Father’s name to G.’s birth certificate in response to a 

2010 court order had no significance because she stipulated to Father’s status as G.’s 

biological father, which permitted Father to add his name to G.’s birth certificate on his 

own. 

At the June 12 hearing, after hearing from the parties, the court stated that unless 

the parties could agree to G.’s travel outside Los Angeles County, they would need to 

come to court to get an order. The court observed, “[s]o one of the things that no one’s 

really talking about is the fact that when the court made the orders on the [May 21, 2014,] 

ex parte application, there was a pending move away request and the information that the 

court had was that Mother had already moved . . . .” The court stated that it was 
7

“concerned about a de facto move away,” and that “there is good cause, based on the 

entire history of this case and excluding anything that may or may not be in Dr. 

[Ralston’s] report, to issue the temporary orders that were issued [on May 21, 2014,] so 

those orders will remain in full force and effect . . . .” The court also ruled it would not 

consider a change in custody, deferring that determination instead to the upcoming 

custody trial. Mother asked the court to issue a statement of decision and a stay of its 

restraining order; the court declined. 

On July 21, 2014, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Code of Civil 

Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) that challenges the court’s order of May 21, 

2014, as continued in effect by order of the court on June 12, 2014. 

DISCUSSION

The family law court issued its temporary ex parte order using the relevant 

Judicial Council forms and subsequently ordered, without issuing a statement of decision, 

the restraining order to remain in force. The court relied on section 3048 in issuing the 

orders and both parties identify and discuss a second potential basis for the orders: 

section 3064. Under either statute, we conclude insufficient evidence supports the orders. 

We therefore reverse.

I

The parties agree that we review the challenged orders for abuse of discretion, a 

standard this court commonly applies when reviewing a trial court ruling that must 

account for and consider various statutory factors. (See, e.g., Brewer v. Carter (2013) 

218 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1319-1320; In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 

479-480.) “‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it 

calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial 

court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are 

reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary 

and capricious.’” (In re Marriage of Walker (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 137, 146, quoting 
8

Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.) Accordingly, a proper 

exercise of discretion must at a minimum be based upon factual findings that are 

supported by substantial evidence. (See Dept. of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel 

Bd. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 813, 831 (Dept. of Parks) [“[I]n the absence of any 

substantial evidence supporting its findings, the Board has no discretion to modify or 

revoke the discipline imposed by the appointing power”].)

“The substantial evidence rule measures the quantum of proof adduced at a 

hearing and assesses whether the matters at issue have been established by a solid, 

reasonable and credible showing.” (Dept. of Parks, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 830.) A 

reviewing court draws all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, gives 

deference to any witness credibility determinations, and does not reweigh the evidence. 

(R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 780; In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 

315, 321.) But substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. Rather, the 

evidence must be “‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be 

“substantial” proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.’” (Dept.

of Parks, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 830; accord, In re B.T. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th

685, 691; In re James R., Jr. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.) 

II

The Synclair-Cannon Child Abduction Prevention Act of 2002 added section 3048 

to the Family Code. Subdivision (b)(1) of the statute provides: “In cases in which the 

court becomes aware of facts which may indicate that there is a risk of abduction of a 

child, the court shall, either on its own motion or at the request of a party, determine 

whether measures are needed to prevent the abduction of the child by one parent. To 

make that determination, the court shall consider the risk of abduction of the child, 

obstacles to location, recovery, and return if the child is abducted, and potential harm to 

the child if he or she is abducted.” To determine whether there exists a risk of abduction, 
9

section 3048 states that a court “shall consider” eight factors specified in the statute.4 

(§ 3048, subd. (b)(1).)

Where a court finds a risk of abduction exists, section 3048 lists 11 possible 

preventative measures a court must consider taking. (§ 3048, subd. (b)(2).) These range 

from ordering supervised visitation to authorizing the assistance of law enforcement. As 

relevant here, the statute permits a court to restrict the right of a parent “to remove the 

child from the county, the state, or the country.” (§ 3048, subd. (b)(2)(C).)

Mother urges us to find the court abused its discretion because it applied the 

wrong legal standard. She points to the court’s comments at the June 12 hearing that it 

was “concerned about a de facto move-away” and that there was “good cause” to issue 

the temporary orders. While we believe the court’s comments might generate some 

confusion, the May 21 order was issued via the Judicial Council form that specifies the 

relevant factors under section 3048, factors that the court necessarily considered in filling 

out the form. Because we presume the correctness of the family law court’s orders (see 

Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 563), we find the record 

shows the court knew of and applied the correct legal standard.

Nevertheless, the question remains whether sufficient evidence supports the 

issuance of the orders under section 3048. Father asserted there was a risk Mother would 

take G. without permission to another state, Texas, or to another county within this state, 

Kern County. The family law court relied on Father’s evidentiary submission and 

concluded several section 3048 factors were present and established a risk of abduction. 

We therefore examine the evidence that ostensibly supports the relevant statutory factors.

 

4 The statutory factors for consideration are whether a party (1) has previously taken 

or concealed a child in violation of the right of custody/visitation, or (2) threatened to do 

so; (3) lacks strong ties to California; (4) has “strong familial, emotional, or cultural ties 

to another state or country”; (5) has no financial reason to stay in California, including 

whether the party is unemployed, able to work anywhere or is financially independent; 

(6) has engaged in “planning activities that would facilitate the removal of a child from 

the state,” including closing a bank account, selling her primary residence or applying for 

a passport among other considerations; (7) has a history of a lack of parental cooperation 

or child abuse; and (8) has a criminal record. (§ 3048, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(H).) 
10

First, the court’s May 21 order concluded that Mother engaged in “planning 

activities that would facilitate [] remov[ing] [G.] from the state . . . .”

5

 (§ 3048, subd. 

(b)(1)(F).) Subdivision (b)(1)(F) lists potential indicia of such planning activity: closing 

a bank account, quitting a job, selling a primary residence, hiding or destroying 

documents, applying for a passport, purchasing airline tickets, liquidating other assets, or 

applying to obtain a birth certificate or school or medical records. The challenged court 

orders relied on none of the indicia listed in the statute itself. Instead, the court cited 

Mother’s status on disability leave from her job and the fact that she was living 

temporarily with her mother. 

It was undisputed, however, that Mother’s medical leave was triggered by an onthe-job injury for which she was not at fault. Suffering an unexpected injury cannot 

fairly be characterized as “planning activity” by Mother to facilitate an abduction. 

Further, there was no dispute that Mother continued to be employed by the Department 

despite being unable to work, and Mother’s declaration established that she had no 

intention of resigning from the Department unless she first secured a position as a 

teacher. 

As for living temporarily with her mother, that is, if anything, evidence that 

Mother would not abscond with G. During the proceedings in this case, Mother notified

either the court or Father about her desire to move with G. to Tehachapi before moving: 

Mother did so in 2011 when she first sought permission from the court to move, and she 

did so again in December 2013 when she informed Father that she had plans to move to 

her fiancé’s home—which led to the order that same month barring her from moving with 

G. By the time of the court’s temporary orders in May and June, Mother had sold her 

home and purchased a new one in Tehachapi with her fiancé; there is no doubt that she 

 

5 The Judicial Council form that the court used to issue the May 21, 2014, 

restraining order approximates but does not exactly track the text of section 3048, 

subdivision (b)(1)(F). The form directs a court to check a box if it finds a parent “has 

done things that make it easy for him or her to take the children away without any 

permission . . . .” We analyze the issue by focusing on the language of the statute itself.
11

wanted to move with G. to that new home. But the circumstances demonstrate she

continued to live temporarily in her parents’ home in Lancaster not as a means of 

planning to take G. away without permission, but to comply with the court’s December 

2013 order that restrained her from relocating with G.

Moreover, subdivision (b)(1)(F) directs a court to consider whether there has been

any planning activity that would facilitate removing a child “from the state.” (Emphasis 

added.) Father’s evidentiary showing, which served as the basis for the challenged court 

orders, is particularly lacking in any evidence that Mother planned to remove G. from 

California. Father’s ex parte application for an order on May 21 was devoid of any 

evidence in support of the assertion Mother planned to take G. to Texas. After the court 

issued the ex parte order he sought, Father filed a declaration before the noticed June 12 

hearing that did aver G. said Mother was going to become a teacher and move with her 

fiancé to Texas. Other than this single reported statement, Father offered nothing else to 

indicate that Mother had any plans to take G. to Texas. Furthermore, Father’s declaration 

offered G.’s alleged statement solely for “its effect on the listener (me).” By contrast, 

Mother’s declaration filed the day before the June 12 hearing denied any intention to take 

G. to Texas and set forth myriad facts explaining why there was no risk she would do so, 

including her ties to California, her fiancé’s ties to California, and her lack of any ties to 

Texas (other than, of course, her fiancé’s support of Dallas’s football team). 

Second, the family law court checked the appropriate box on the Judicial Council 

form to indicate it found a risk that Mother would abduct G. because, in the form’s 

words, she “has violated—or threatened to violate—a custody or visitation order in the 

past.” The evidence Father offered to support that finding was the assertion in his June 3, 

2014, declaration that Mother had failed to comply with a 2010 order that she place his 

name on G.’s birth certificate. Mother’s responsive declaration asserted that she believed 

her stipulation to paternity obviated the need for her to add Father’s name to the birth 

certificate because it enabled him to do so himself. The dispute on the point is 

immaterial. Even accepting Father’s assertion and disregarding Mother’s response, the 
12

evidence regarding non-compliance with the 2010 order does not support a finding under 

the relevant statutory factor.

The Judicial Council form seeks to simplify and condense the section 3048 factors 

found at subdivisions (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B). Looking to the statutory factors 

themselves, a violation of the 2010 order to add Father’s name to G.’s birth certificate is 

not the type of conduct the statute directs a court to consider in assessing whether a risk 

of abduction is present. Subdivision (b)(1)(A) directs a court to consider “[w]hether a 

party has previously taken, enticed away, kept, withheld, or concealed a child in violation 

of the right of custody or of visitation of a person,” and subdivision (b)(1)(B) directs a 

court to consider whether a party has threatened to do the same. (§ 3048, subd. (b)(1)(A) 

and (B).) Father’s allegation that Mother failed to add his name to G.’s birth certificate is 

not evidence that Mother enticed away, kept, or concealed G. in violation of his right of 

custody or visitation. Father has not identified any other evidence in the record that 

would indicate Mother had withheld G. in violation of a custody order. There is, in fact,

evidence in the record that points in the opposite direction: a May 26, 2014, declaration

from Mother (with supporting documentation) stating (1) that G. missed only three visits 

during two years of monitored visitation with Father, and those only because G. was sick 

on two occasions and the monitor was unavailable on the third; and (2) that G. had not 

missed any of her custodial time with Father after the family law court made its initial 

custody determination in December 2013. 

Third, the family law court relied on Mother’s history of not cooperating with 

Father in parenting to find there was a risk that Mother would take G. without 

permission. There was an acrimonious relationship between Mother and Father; based on 

the history of the proceedings, the court had a basis to conclude that the acrimony was 

due at least in part to Mother’s lack of cooperation in parenting. For many of the reasons 

already discussed, however, there was negligible evidence that Mother’s lack of 

cooperation was probative of a risk that she was planning to abduct G. Moreover, a lack 

of cooperation in parenting is (regrettably) a common feature of contested custody cases. 
13

In the absence of more extreme circumstances not present here, the existence of a lack of 

cooperation alone is not substantial evidence of a risk of abduction.

We therefore conclude the finding that there was a risk Mother would abduct G. 

was not established by evidence that is “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid 

value.” (Dept. of Parks, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 830.)

III

The parties also address whether the challenged orders are justified pursuant to 

sections 3063 and 3064. Section 3063 provides that “[i]n conjunction with any ex parte 

order seeking or modifying an order of custody, the court shall enter an order restraining 

the person receiving custody from removing the child from the state pending notice and a 

hearing on the order seeking or modifying custody.” Section 3064 operates as a 

limitation on section 3063 and states that a court “shall refrain from making an order 

granting or modifying a custody order on an ex parte basis unless there has been a 

showing of immediate harm to the child or immediate risk that the child will be removed 

from the State of California.”6 (§ 3064, subd. (a).) The California Rules of Court, rule 

5.151(d)(5) imposes additional obligations on a party proceeding under section 3064. 

The rule requires, among other things, the moving party to describe the date and details 

of the most recent incidents showing immediate harm to the child or an immediate risk 

the child would be removed from this state.

The family law court made no finding of immediate harm to the child in issuing 

the challenged orders, so we do not address that aspect of section 3064 here. Further, for 

the reasons we have already given in connection with section 3048, we hold no 

substantial evidence was before the court to justify an order under section 3064 based on 

an immediate risk G. would be removed from California. 

 

6 Section 3064 further defines “immediate harm to the child” to include situations 

that involve a parent who has committed acts of domestic violence or that involve sexual 

abuse of the child. (§ 3064, subd. (b).)
14

IV

For purposes of discussion, we have individually analyzed the factors and the 

evidence before the family law court, but we emphasize we reach a conclusion as to 

whether the orders are supported by substantial evidence by considering all the evidence 

before the family court as a whole. For the reasons we have discussed, the evidence was 

insufficient to support issuance of the orders under section 3048 or section 3064.

Because we conclude the challenged restraining orders were issued in error and 

the error was prejudicial, we need not consider Mother’s alternative arguments for relief. 

Mother withdrew her “move away” request on May 22, 2014, in the face of Father’s ex 

parte application, and thus the issue was not decided by the family law court. Whether 

Mother is entitled to move with G. to Tehachapi and whether such a move would impact

the court’s custody determination are questions not before us, and we express no opinion 

on either issue. We are confident the family law court will be able to address either or 

both questions in the first instance, if presented.
15

DISPOSITION

The May 21, 2014, injunctive order, as continued in force by the Superior Court’s 

order of June 12, 2014, is reversed. Appellant is to recover her costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We Concur:

TURNER, P.J.

MOSK, J.