FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-1927

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COLUMBUS WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

___________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

October 2, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Following his arrest, Columbus Williams filed a motion for 

discharge and termination of jurisdiction for incompetency and 

non-restorability, asserting that the intellectual disability 

underlying his incompetency was static and that he could not be 

held on charges without any likelihood of becoming competent to 

stand trial. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, 

finding a substantial probability that Williams would regain 

competency in the reasonably foreseeable future. Williams sought 

this Court’s review by filing a petition for writ of certiorari, which 

we now grant because the trial court’s findings are not supported 

by competent, substantial evidence. 

I.

Williams was first charged in 2002, was soon found 

incompetent due to an intellectual disability, and was admitted to 
2

a forensic facility that provides competency training. In 2007, the 

trial court dismissed the charge, finding that Williams was still 

incompetent after almost five years of training and that there 

was “no reason to believe” he would become competent to stand 

trial in the reasonably foreseeable future. Williams was 

involuntarily committed. Orders continuing Williams’ civil 

commitment were entered in 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, 

all citing the seriousness of his intellectual disability. 

Williams was charged with another crime in 2016. Dr. 

Salvatore Blandino was then ordered to examine Williams’ 

competency, and did so after reviewing limited and miscellaneous 

records. Dr. Blandino noted Williams’ mental health diagnoses, 

including illnesses and intellectual developmental disorder, 

observed that he was “obviously cognitively impaired” during the 

examination, and found him incompetent. However, Dr. Blandino 

also stressed that Williams was overmedicated by an excessive 

regimen of psychotropic medications, which likely contributed to 

his poor performance during the examination. Dr. Blandino’s 

report concluded that contingent upon the stabilization of 

Williams’ medications and competency training, his prognosis 

was “guarded to fair” and a determination as to his likelihood of 

attaining competency would be possible in six to twelve months.

By the time the competency hearing commenced, Dr. 

Blandino had reviewed additional records regarding Williams’ 

developmental services and competency, including those deeming 

him non-restorable due to an intellectual disability years prior. 

Testifying for the State, Dr. Blandino explained that intellectual 

developmental disorder is a static condition that could not 

improve, and the fact that Williams was declared non-restorable 

based on this disorder, rather than any mental illnesses, meant 

that he would never attain competency. He further noted that his 

prior “guarded to fair” prognosis was based on the chance that 

Williams’ incompetency was partially due to overmedication, but 

based on the information later learned, he understands no chance 

of attaining competency now exists regardless of which

medications Williams takes. The only other evidence presented 

by the State was the testimony of Dr. Amanda Graham, who 

agreed that Williams had an intellectual disability, and who had 

seen no indication that he had attained competency since 2002. 
3

The trial court held that Williams was incompetent, but 

denied his motion to discharge, declined to dismiss the charges,

and ordered him to commence competency training. The trial 

court did not find “any evidence” that Williams’ competency 

would not be restored because “people’s conditions change,” 

referenced Dr. Blandino’s prior “guarded to fair” prognosis, and 

concluded that clear and convincing evidence showed that 

Williams had a substantial likelihood of regaining competency in 

the reasonably foreseeable future. 

II.

An incompetent person charged with a crime may only be 

held for the “time necessary to determine whether there is a 

substantial probability” that he or she may attain competency to 

proceed to trial. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).

Appellate courts may review the trial court’s application of these 

due process rights by common law certiorari and for competent, 

substantial evidence. See Vasquez v. State, 496 So. 2d 818, 820 

(Fla. 1986).

A defendant found incompetent due to an intellectual 

disability or autism may only be involuntarily committed for 

competency training if, inter alia, there exists “a substantial 

probability that the intellectual disability or autism causing the 

defendant’s incompetence will respond to training and the 

defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably 

foreseeable future.” § 916.302(1)(d), Fla. Stat. The trial court 

made the findings necessary to satisfy the statutory 

requirements, but competent, substantial evidence does not 

support them. 

The only evidence the trial court cited in announcing its 

ruling was Dr. Blandino’s report. It was error to interpret this 

report as supporting the conclusion that there exists a 

substantial likelihood of Williams attaining competency. Dr. 

Blandino’s report found that Williams was mentally disabled, his 

disability was enhanced by the medications he was taking, and 

that a determination as to his likelihood of attaining competency 

could only be made when his medications were stabilized; Dr. 
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Blandino concluded that he could not make a determination for 

six to twelve months. Upon receiving additional information of 

Williams’ medical and legal history, Dr. Blandino was able to 

then determine that Williams would never attain competency to 

stand trial. In light of this testimony, the non-determination 

made in Dr. Blandino’s prior report does not constitute 

competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s 

finding of a substantial probability that Williams’ intellectual 

disability would soon improve and enable him to attain 

competency.* Because Williams does not meet the criteria to be 

involuntarily committed pursuant to section 916.302, “the State 

must either institute civil commitment proceedings or release” 

him. Mosher v. State, 876 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)

(footnote omitted).

Lastly, we reject the State’s argument that Williams is not 

entitled to dismissal of his charges because the two-year limit 

under section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes, has yet to expire. 

Section 916.303(1) mandates dismissal “within a reasonable 

time” after a determination of incompetency, “not to exceed 2 

years,” unless the trial court specifies reasons indicating that the 

defendant will soon become competent. The reasonableness of 

time is in consideration of the prospects of restoring the 

defendant’s competency. “Thus, a reasonable time has passed, 

and the defendant’s substantive right to dismissal of the criminal 

charge arises, when it becomes evident that the defendant cannot 

be restored to competency.” Gonzalez v. State, 15 So. 3d 37, 40 

(Fla. 2d DCA 2009); see also Roddenberry v. State, 898 So. 2d 

1070, 1073 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); cf. § 916.145, Fla. Stat. 

 * We note that Dr. Blandino’s report was based on a limited 

review of Williams’ medical history, while he testified at the 

hearing after he had a more complete understanding of Williams’ 

history. It is unnecessary to determine whether such a report 

could constitute sufficient evidence to support a holding in some 

situations—see M.A.B. v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 630 So. 

2d 1252, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“An expert’s opinion which is 

based upon incomplete or inaccurate facts cannot be competent 

substantial evidence.”)—because here, the report’s conclusion 

does not support the trial court’s finding.
5

(requiring dismissal for those incompetent due to mental 

illnesses “if the defendant remains incompetent for 5 continuous, 

uninterrupted years”). 

III.

Williams was declared incompetent in 2002 based on his 

intellectual developmental disorder and, in 2007, his continued 

incompetency resulted in the dismissal of his charges and civil 

commitment. Following his 2016 arrest, Williams was again 

found incompetent, with no indication that he had attained 

competency since 2002. At a hearing, the State’s evidence 

demonstrated that Williams’ disorder would never improve and 

he would never attain competency. It was error to find a 

substantial probability that Williams would attain competency in 

the reasonably foreseeable future based on a report making no 

such determination, particularly in the face of direct evidence to 

the contrary. Williams must be civilly committed or released, and 

his charges dismissed. 

Therefore, we GRANT Williams’ petition for writ of certiorari 

and QUASH the trial court’s order. 

RAY, BILBREY, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Marcia Perlin, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Holly Simcox, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.