IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

August 21, 2018 Session

ROBIN LYNN BOLT v. MICHAEL DAVID BOLT

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County

No. V16278S J. Michael Sharp, Judge

No. E2017-02357-COA-R3-CV

This appeal arose from a divorce action filed by the wife. Prior to the onset of the 

litigation, the parties had been married for eighteen years with one minor child born 

during the marriage. On November 2, 2017, the trial court granted the divorce; divided 

the marital property according to the wife’s proposed property distribution; awarded to 

the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,100 per month; awarded to the wife half of 

her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido; and adopted the husband’s proposed permanent

parenting plan. Although the husband’s permanent parenting plan contained a child 

support calculation based on monthly income estimates, the court ordered the child 

support payments to be calculated using the average of the parties’ respective incomes 

from the previous three years. The husband has appealed. Because it is unclear whether 

the trial court classified the real property upon which the marital home is located as 

marital property or the wife’s separate property prior to awarding her its value and

because we determine that the order appealed from contains an internal inconsistency

with respect to the amount of child support awarded, we vacate the trial court’s 

distribution of marital property and its awards of alimony and child support. We remand 

for the trial court to clarify its property classification and resolve the inconsistency

concerning child support prior to rendering judgment regarding an award of alimony. 

The trial court’s judgment granting the divorce is otherwise affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., joined.

Robert L. Jolley, Jr., and Megan A. Swain, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, 

Michael David Bolt.

10/30/2018
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Steven B. Ward, Madisonville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Robin Lynn Bolt.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Robin Lynn Bolt (“Wife”) and Michael David Bolt (“Husband”) were married on 

July 18, 1998, and had one child during the marriage, who was sixteen years old at the 

time of trial in 2017. On November 21, 2016, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in the 

Monroe County Circuit Court (“trial court”) on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 

or, in the alternative, inappropriate marital conduct. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

101(11), (14) (2017). In her complaint, Wife requested, inter alia, an equitable 

distribution of marital assets and debt and awards of “suitable alimony in futuro, alimony 

in solido, temporary alimony, rehabilitative alimony, permanent alimony, attorney’s fees 

and suit expenses[.]”

On December 2, 2016, Husband filed an answer to the divorce complaint,

admitting irreconcilable differences and denying inappropriate marital conduct. In an 

order entered on February 10, 2017, the trial court directed that mediation be scheduled. 

The parties accordingly participated in mediation, which ultimately did not result in a 

settlement. On July 13, 2017, Husband filed a counter-complaint for divorce, alleging

the ground of irreconcilable differences or, in the alternative, grounds of inappropriate 

marital conduct and indignities to Husband’s person. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

101(11), (12), (14). Husband concomitantly filed a proposed permanent parenting plan 

wherein Wife was designated as the primary residential parent with 251 days per year of 

residential co-parenting time. Husband’s proposed permanent parenting plan also 

incorporated a child support worksheet in which he listed Wife’s gross monthly income 

at $3,500.00 and Husband’s gross monthly income at $8,290.05, calculating Husband’s 

monthly child support payments to be $748.00.

The trial court conducted a bench trial over the course of two days on September 

29, 2017, and October 5, 2017. During the trial, the court considered testimony from 

Husband, Wife, the parties’ minor child, Wife’s adult daughter from a previous marriage, 

Husband’s mother, and two women whom Wife alleged to have been in extramarital 

relationships with Husband. As part of the proof, the parties presented self-reported 

estimates of their income and expenses, separate estimates of the value of marital assets, 

and separate proposals for the division of marital assets and debt. At the conclusion of 

the trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement, affording the parties four or 

five days to reach an agreement regarding the issues prior to the issuance of the court 

order.
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On November 2, 2017, the trial court entered a final order listing its findings of 

fact and addressing in turn the permanent parenting plan, the grounds for divorce, the 

equitable division of marital property, an award of alimony to Wife, attorney’s fees, and 

court costs. Pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found that Wife, who was fifty-two

years old at the time, had an annual income ranging from $44,000.00 to $45,000.00 and 

that Husband, who was forty-seven years of age, had “averaged well in excess of 

$90,000.00 for the last three years.” The trial court further found that both parties should 

be able “to work full time in their current or better positions for the foreseeable future,” 

although the court expressed concerns regarding Wife’s physical health.

The trial court granted a divorce to Wife based on the ground of Husband’s 

inappropriate marital conduct.1 The trial court adopted Husband’s proposed permanent 

parenting plan, specifically finding in pertinent part:

The court finds [Husband’s] proposed permanent parenting plan to be in the 

best interest of the child and the court adopts [Husband’s] proposed 

permanent parenting plan as the permanent parenting plan going forward.

However, with regard to the child support calculation, the court finds 

that the parties shall use the average of their previous three years income as 

the income figure to be used for calculating child support. The court finds 

that the parties’ gross income average during the last three years is an 

accurate reflection of their actual income earning ability as well as an 

accurate reflection of their real income.

(Internal citations to record omitted.) The permanent parenting plan, entered on 

November 7, 2017, listed the monthly child support as $748.00 per month, as was 

previously calculated in Husband’s proposed permanent parenting plan. However, the 

permanent parenting plan did not include an updated child support worksheet or provide 

any other indication as to whether the court had adjusted the child support calculation to 

reflect the parties’ incomes as averaged from the past three years as ordered.

As to the division of marital property, the trial court made what it determined to be 

an equitable division of the marital estate, which included the parties’ marital residence, a 

modified double-wide mobile home, located on real property purchased by Wife prior to 

 

1 Although Husband contends that the trial court erred in its determination regarding grounds for divorce, 

Husband did not include divorce grounds within his statement of the issues on appeal. See Tenn. R. App. 

P. 13(b) (“Review generally will extend only to those issues presented for review.”); Owen v. Long Tire, 

LLC, No. W2011-01227-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 6777014, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011) (“The 

requirement of a statement of the issues raised on appeal is no mere technicality.”). Therefore, we will 

not extend our review to the trial court’s finding of inappropriate marital conduct.
4

the marriage. The trial court directed that the marital residence should be appraised and 

that Wife would be entitled to the current value of the underlying real property because 

she had purchased that property “out of her own funds.” The trial court further 

determined that the marital home and any fixtures to the real property should be valued 

and that the parties were entitled to an equal portion of that value. As an equitable 

division, the trial court ordered that after the appraisal of the property, “the parties shall 

have the right to either (a) bid on the house individually, with the highest bidder 

purchasing the home, or (b) the parties may choose to list the house for sale and the 

proceeds shall be used to pay the marital debt . . . with any remaining balance to be split 

equally between the parties.”

With respect to spousal support, the trial court awarded to Wife $1,100.00 per 

month in the form of alimony in futuro and half of her attorney’s fees as alimony in 

solido. The court made the following findings in pertinent part:

The relative earning capacity of [Wife] has been and, in the court’s 

opinion, will remain less than half of what the earning capacity of 

[Husband] has been and is. Because [Husband’s] earning capacity is so 

much greater, and his income has been so much greater, then his profit 

sharing and/or retirement plans or pension plans are far greater than 

[Wife’s].

[Wife], prior to taking her present job, went back to school and 

received the appropriate training to become a radiology technician. Given 

her age and the length of time that she has been in her job, the court finds 

that it is not reasonable to assume that she can go back to school to the 

point of securing such an education and/or training to improve her earning 

capacity to a level anywhere near what [Husband] has been earning the 

previous three years, and actually more than the previous three years. . . . 

given the fact that [Wife] is about five years older than [Husband], and 

given the fact that her physical health is at least of concern to the court, and 

given the great disparity of their current incomes and their income earning 

potential, the court finds that alimony is called for in this case.

* * * 

Both parties have essentially equal separate assets, and based upon the 

court’s division of the marital estate, each will leave this marriage with 

similar assets and liabilities.

* * * 
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Ultimately, the court finds that [Wife] is the economically 

disadvantaged spouse, and has a definite need for alimony. The court finds 

that it is not likely that [Wife] could do any additional educational training, 

or take any reasonable steps to substantially increase her earning capacity to 

a level anywhere near the earning capacity already existing for [Husband], 

based upon the history of his income. Additionally, the court finds, based 

upon the history of [Husband’s] annual income, that [Husband] has the 

ability to pay alimony.

On December 1, 2017, Husband filed a notice of appeal. Ten days later, Wife 

filed a Motion to Enforce and to Calculate Child Support in the trial court, alleging that 

the trial court’s November 2, 2017 order was not a final order because the court had not 

yet calculated child support pursuant to the Tennessee child support guidelines. Upon a 

review of the trial court’s order, we determine that because the trial court’s judgment 

included an order of child support, it is a final order vesting this Court with subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). 

In this Court, Husband filed a “Motion to Consider Post-Judgment Facts and/or to 

Supplement the Record” with a child support worksheet and an appraisal of the marital 

residence. Although Husband states in his brief that “the child support worksheet [was] 

subsequently ordered by the trial court,” no court order was presented to this Court with 

the child support amount in the worksheet. This Court denied the motion, pursuant to 

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 14, without prejudice to Husband’s ability to 

seek supplementation of the record with the trial court if the documents were made part 

of the record below. Husband did not further pursue supplementation of the record.

II. Issues Presented

Husband presents three issues on appeal, which we have restated slightly as 

follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by determining that awards to Wife of 

alimony in futuro and alimony in solido were appropriate prior to 

calculating child support and valuing the marital estate.

2. Whether the trial court erred by awarding alimony in futuro and 

alimony in solido to Wife.
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3. Whether the trial court erred by awarding the value of the real 

property on which the marital residence was located to Wife as her 

separate property.

III. Standard of Review

In a case involving issues of spousal support, our Supreme Court has elucidated 

the applicable standard of review as follows:

[A] trial court’s decision regarding spousal support is factually driven and 

involves the careful balancing of many factors. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 

S.W.2d 220, 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see also Burlew [v. Burlew], 40 

S.W.3d [465,] 470 [(Tenn. 2004)]; Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 

340-41 (Tenn. 2002). As a result, “[a]ppellate courts are generally 

disinclined to second-guess a trial judge’s spousal support decision.” 

Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 234. Rather, “[t]he role of an appellate court in 

reviewing an award of spousal support is to determine whether the trial 

court applied the correct legal standard and reached a decision that is not 

clearly unreasonable.” Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d 216, 220 

(Tenn. 2006). Appellate courts decline to second-guess a trial court’s 

decision absent an abuse of discretion. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 343. An 

abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court causes an injustice by 

applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the 

case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on 

reasoning that causes an injustice. Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 

S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011); Henderson v. SAIA, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 328, 

335 (Tenn. 2010). This standard does not permit an appellate court to 

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, but “‘reflects an awareness 

that the decision being reviewed involved a choice among several 

acceptable alternatives,’ and thus ‘envisions a less rigorous review of the 

lower court’s decision and a decreased likelihood that the decision will be 

reversed on appeal.’” Henderson, 318 S.W.3d at 335 (quoting Lee 

Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010)).

Consequently, when reviewing a discretionary decision by the trial court, 

such as an alimony determination, the appellate court should presume that 

the decision is correct and should review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the decision. Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 176; Henderson, 318 

S.W.3d at 335.

Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105-06 (Tenn. 2011) (internal footnotes 

omitted).
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Additionally, our Supreme Court has explained the applicable standard of 

appellate review in a case involving the proper classification and distribution of assets 

incident to a divorce as follows:

This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in 

dividing marital assets and “we are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s 

decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results 

in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and 

procedures.” Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1996). As such, when dealing with the trial court’s findings of fact, we 

review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must 

honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the 

contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 

S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Because trial courts are in a far better position 

than this Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the weight, faith, 

and credit to be given witnesses’ testimony lies in the first instance with the 

trial court. Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1991). Consequently, where issues of credibility and weight of testimony 

are involved, this Court will accord considerable deference to the trial 

court’s factual findings. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2007) (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984 

S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)). The trial court’s conclusions of law, 

however, are accorded no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. 

Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (Tenn. 2002).

Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). Questions related to the classification 

of assets as marital or separate are questions of fact. Bilyeu v. Bilyeu, 196 S.W.3d 131, 

135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 

Furthermore, as this Court has previously explained:

Because Tennessee is a “dual property” state, a trial court must 

identify all of the assets possessed by the divorcing parties as either 

separate property or marital property before equitably dividing the marital 

estate. Separate property is not subject to division. In contrast, Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 36-4-121(c) outlines the relevant factors that a court must consider 

when equitably dividing the marital property without regard to fault on the 

part of either party. An equitable division of marital property is not 

necessarily an equal division, and § 36-4-121(a)(1) only requires an 

equitable division.
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McHugh v. McHugh, No. E2009-01391-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 1526140, at *3 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2010) (internal citations omitted). See Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 

306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that appellate courts reviewing a distribution of 

marital property “ordinarily defer to the trial judge’s decision unless it is inconsistent 

with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance 

of the evidence.”).

IV. Awards of Alimony

Husband contends that the trial court erred in its awards of alimony to Wife, 

arguing that the facts in the record are contrary to the trial court’s findings on the issue. 

Husband asserts that the trial court did not properly consider the issue of alimony because 

it had not first calculated child support, which has a material effect on both Wife’s need 

and Husband’s ability to pay. Upon a thorough review of the record and relevant case 

law, and upon discerning the existence of an internal inconsistency in the trial court’s 

award of child support, we conclude that the trial court’s determination of alimony prior 

to calculating child support was premature.

Tennessee law recognizes four types of spousal support: (1) alimony in futuro, 

also known as periodic alimony; (2) alimony in solido, also known as lump-sum alimony; 

(3) rehabilitative alimony; and (4) transitional alimony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d) 

(2017); Mayfield v. Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108, 115 (Tenn. 2012). Our statutory scheme 

indicates a legislative preference favoring short-term spousal support, rehabilitative and 

transitional alimony, over the long-term types of support, alimony in futuro and alimony 

in solido. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2)-(3); Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d at 115; 

Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d 453, 456 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

It is well settled that “trial courts in Tennessee have broad discretion to determine 

whether spousal support is needed and, if so, to determine the nature, amount, and 

duration of the award.” Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d at 114; see also Fickle v. Fickle, 287 

S.W.3d 723, 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). When determining whether spousal support is 

needed and the appropriate nature of the support, Tennessee law instructs trial courts to 

look first to whether a spouse is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse, 

then to whether rehabilitation is feasible. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2)-(3). As 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(d)(2) explains:

To be rehabilitated means to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning 

capacity that will permit the economically disadvantaged spouse’s standard 

of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of 

living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living 
9

expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant 

statutory factors and the equities between the parties.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(i) (2017) provides the following relevant

statutory factors for a trial court to consider:

(1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial 

resources of each party, including income from pension, profit 

sharing or retirement plans and all other sources;

(2) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and 

opportunity of each party to secure such education and training, and 

the necessity of a party to secure further education and training to 

improve such party’s earnings capacity to a reasonable level;

(3) The duration of the marriage;

(4) The age and mental condition of each party;

(5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, 

physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease;

(6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek 

employment outside the home, because such party will be custodian 

of a minor child of the marriage;

(7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible 

and intangible;

(8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined 

in § 36-4-121;

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;

(10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and 

intangible contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker 

contributions, and tangible and intangible contributions by a party to 

the education, training or increased earning power of the other party;

(11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its 

discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and
10

(12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as 

are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.

“Although each of these factors must be considered when relevant to the parties’

circumstances, ‘the two that are considered the most important are the disadvantaged 

spouse’s need and the obligor spouse’s ability to pay.’” Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 110 

(quoting Riggs, 250 S.W.3d at 457). “Child support decisions should precede decisions 

about spousal support because a spouse’s ability to pay spousal support may be directly 

and significantly influenced by the amount of child support he or she has been ordered to 

pay.” Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Although the trial court stated in its order that it would adopt Husband’s proposed 

permanent parenting plan, the court specified: “However, with regard to the child 

support calculation, the court finds that the parties shall use the average of their previous 

three years income as the income figure to be used for calculating child support.” The 

trial court’s specification of income averaging for calculation of child support subsequent 

to the court’s adoption of Husband’s permanent parenting plan ostensibly indicates that 

the court intended to adopt a different amount of monthly child support than the amount

Husband had originally proposed. However, the permanent parenting plan entered by the 

trial court includes monthly child support payments in the amount of $748.00, which is 

identical to Husband’s proposed monthly child support amount in the permanent 

parenting plan filed with his counter-complaint. 

Certainly, it is possible that the trial court’s calculations averaging the parties’ 

respective incomes from the past three years resulted in an amount of monthly child 

support that was coincidentally identical to Husband’s proposed child support payments. 

Nonetheless, without a child support worksheet or other documentation indicating how 

the trial court arrived at $748.00 as the monthly child support payment, we cannot discern

whether this amount accurately reflects the court’s order. We additionally note that Wife 

in her post-judgment motion had argued that child support had not yet been calculated, 

indicating some question resulting from the trial court’s order. 

We therefore determine that the trial court’s order and approved permanent 

parenting plan contain an apparent inconsistency as to the specific amount of the monthly 

child support payment. Moreover, the amount of child support awarded materially 

affects whether spousal support is appropriate and the amount of spousal support 

awarded. See Anderton, 988 S.W.2d at 679. Child support thus being a fundamental

factor for decisions regarding spousal support, we vacate the trial court’s order awarding 

child support and alimony to Wife. We also remand this matter to the trial court for the 
11

purpose of resolving the inconsistency in its order concerning child support prior to 

determining the amount and nature of alimony that is appropriate in this case.

V. Marital Property Division

Husband additionally contends that the trial court erred by determining that the 

real property on which the marital residence was situated was Wife’s separate property 

and not marital property to be equitably divided. Husband does not dispute that prior to 

the marriage, Wife purchased the unimproved real property, used title to the real property 

to secure the loan obligation on the mobile home, and placed the mobile home on the real 

property. Following the marriage, both parties contributed to payments toward the loan 

for the marital home. The parties also added improvements to the structure, including the 

construction of a porch and two additional bedrooms, which have rendered what had been 

a mobile home indisputably immobile. Husband’s argument centers on the proposition 

that any increase to the value of the land based on the parties’ contribution during the 

marriage would be marital property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(i) (2017). 

When equitably distributing the marital property, the trial court should first 

identify all property interests at issue in the divorce proceeding. See Keyt v. Keyt, 244 

S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tenn. 2007). After identifying the property interests, the trial court 

should then classify the property as either marital or separate property. Id. It is well 

settled that a trial court must identify all assets of the parties in divorce proceedings as 

either separate or marital property prior to equitably distributing the marital property. See 

Keyt, 244 S.W.3d at 328; McHugh, 2010 WL 1526140, at *3. The classification of the 

property “is an important threshold matter because courts do not have the authority to 

make a distribution of separate property.” Summer v. Summer, 296 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2008).

Upon our thorough review of the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions, we determine that the trial court’s final judgment is unclear regarding the 

court’s classification of the real property on which the marital home is located. 

Regarding the unimproved real property and the marital residence, the trial court found as 

follows in pertinent part:

[Wife] purchased the real property, upon which the parties’ marital 

residence sits, prior to the marriage. [Wife] paid for the property out of her 

own personal funds prior to the marriage. [Wife] paid $9,500.00 for the 

property, based upon the sworn affidavit shown on the Deed. [Wife]

purchased the double wide mobile home that became the parties[’] marital 

residence prior to the parties[’] marriage. [Wife] used her real property as 

collateral for the loan for the double wide mobile home. [Wife] began 
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paying for the double wide mobile home out of her own personal income 

prior to the marriage. However, the parties married soon after the purchase 

of the double wide mobile home, and both parties have contributed to the 

payment of the double wide mobile home since the date of their marriage. 

Since the date of the marriage, both parties also contributed to the payment 

of a home equity line of credit (HELOC) that was used to build onto the 

double wide mobile home on at least two occasions, once to add on two 

bedrooms, and another time to add a porch and/or sun room. The sun room 

remains unfinished. Both parties agree that the bedroom addition, as well 

as possibly the other addition, were done by family and/or friends, and may 

not be completely structurally sound and/or correct as it relates to the 

construction. However, there is no question that the rooms have added to 

the overall space and livability of the home.

* * * 

With regard to the parties’ marital residence, the court finds that the 

marital residence should be appraised by a qualified/certified real estate 

appraiser, and the parties shall divide the proceeds as follows: [Wife] is 

entitled to the value of the real property since she bought and paid for the 

real property out of her own funds and is entitled to whatever the current 

value of the real property alone is. Otherwise, the house and any fixtures to 

the real property shall be valued and the parties are entitled to an equal 

share of the remaining value based upon a current real estate appraisal. The 

court finds it necessary to do this, due to the fact that both parties’ proposed 

values are so vastly different. . . . Once the property value is determined, 

then the parties shall have the right to either (a) bid on the house 

individually, with the highest bidder purchasing the home, or (b) the parties 

may choose to list the house for sale and the proceeds shall be used to pay 

the marital debt . . . with any remaining balance to be split equally between 

the parties.

(Internal citations to record omitted.) 

Determining that Wife was entitled to “whatever the current value of the real 

property alone is,” the trial court divided the value of the marital residence and any 

fixtures thereto equally between Wife and Husband. We discern two possible 

interpretations of this division. First, the trial court may have awarded the real property 

on which the marital home was located to Wife as her separate property. Alternatively, 

the trial court may have awarded the value of the real property to Wife as part of an 

equitable distribution of the marital property, taking into consideration the fact that she 
13

purchased the land prior to the marriage. See Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228, 231 

(Tenn. 2010) (holding that an equitable division of a marital estate is not necessarily an 

equal division). Following a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial 

court’s classification of the real property is unclear, which precludes our review of 

whether the trial court erred by awarding the value of the real property to Wife in its 

judgment. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s division of the marital estate and 

remand for a proper classification of the real property at issue prior to the trial court’s 

equitably dividing the marital estate.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order granting awards of 

child support and alimony to Wife and equitably dividing the marital estate. We remand 

to the trial court to resolve the inconsistency with respect to its award of child support to 

Wife and to specifically classify the real property prior to equitably dividing the marital 

estate, setting child support, and awarding alimony. We affirm the trial court’s judgment 

in all other respects. Costs on appeal are taxed one-half to the appellant, Michael David

Bolt, and one-half to the appellee, Robin Lynn Bolt.

_________________________________ 

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE