United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 19-3543

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Frank Edward Adams, also known as Tank Adams

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of South Dakota - Pierre 

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Submitted: November 19, 2020

 Filed: March 22, 2021

[Unpublished] 

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Before SHEPHERD, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM. 

Following a jury trial, Frank Adams was convicted of conspiring to distribute 

500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine. See 21 
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U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846. The district court1 sentenced him to 360 

months in prison. We affirm both his conviction and sentence.

The challenge to Adams’s conviction begins with the sufficiency of the 

evidence, which we review de novo after construing the evidence “in favor of the 

verdict.” United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 2006). The evidence 

in this case was overwhelming. A total of 16 witnesses testified against him, 

including five who were directly involved in the drug conspiracy itself. Several said 

they personally sold drugs for Adams. Standing alone, this evidence was more than 

sufficient to show that the conspiracy existed and that he was a part of it. See United 

States v. Conway, 754 F.3d 580, 587 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[E]vidence at trial that consists 

primarily of testimony from other members of the conspiracy may suffice to 

establish defendant’s guilt.”). 

It does not matter that there were no controlled buys, wiretaps, or other “hard” 

evidence. See id.; see also United States v. Coplen, 533 F.3d 929, 931 (8th Cir. 

2008) (noting that we “have repeatedly upheld jury verdicts based solely on the 

testimony of co-conspirators and cooperating witnesses” (emphasis added) 

(quotation marks omitted)). Nor does it make any difference that Adams now tries 

to cast doubt on the credibility of numerous witnesses. In the end, the jury found 

them credible, and we are in no position to disagree. See United States v. Mayfield, 

909 F.3d 956, 963 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he jury’s credibility determinations are wellnigh unreviewable because the jury is in the best position to assess the credibility of 

witnesses and resolve inconsistent testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 

1

The Honorable Roberto A. Lange, United States District Judge for the 

District of South Dakota.
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Given the overwhelming evidence, we further conclude that the admission of

text messages, letters, and recorded jail phone calls with a co-conspirator did not

affect Adams’s “substantial rights or ha[ve] more than a slight influence on the 

verdict.” United States v. Halk, 634 F.3d 482, 488 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks 

omitted); see United States v. Lindsey, 702 F.3d 1092, 1100 (8th Cir. 2013). Neither

the letters nor the phone calls were particularly inculpatory. And even if the text 

messages were, we are confident that any error in admitting them did not “affect[] 

the outcome.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (applying plain-error review). The evidence against Adams was so 

overwhelming that he would have been convicted either way.

The challenges to Adams’s sentence fare no better. See United States v. Berry, 

930 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 2019) (“We review application of the Guidelines to the 

facts de novo . . . [and] factual findings at sentencing for clear error.”). First, the 

district court did not clearly err in attributing between 1.5 and 5 kilograms of 

methamphetamine to him based on the presentence investigation report, which 

reflected the testimony of eight witnesses. See United States v. Sainz Navarrete, 955 

F.3d 713, 720 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “the testimony of co-conspirators may 

be sufficiently reliable evidence upon which the court may base its drug quantity 

calculation for sentencing purposes” (quotation marks omitted)). 

Second, the district court had plenty of reason to impose a two-level 

enhancement for an offense “committed . . . as part of a pattern of criminal conduct 

engaged in as a livelihood.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(15)(E) (2016). The court found, 

again based on witness testimony, that Adams was not “actually . . . running 

some . . . legitimate business[] that in any way rivaled [his] income from 

methamphetamine distribution,” which included over $300,000 from the sales made 

by just one co-conspirator alone. See Berry, 930 F.3d at 999. Besides, with or 

without the enhancement, Adams’s recommended range under the Sentencing 

Guidelines was the same, meaning that any error would be harmless. See United 

States v. Bah, 439 F.3d 423, 431 (8th Cir. 2006).
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We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.2

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2

We also grant the pending motion to strike the portion of the government’s 

non-conforming Rule 28(j) letter that exceeds 350 words.