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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39027

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CLIFFORD R. FRANSEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 342

Filed: February 1, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for trafficking in marijuana, affirmed. 

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Elizabeth A. Koeckeritz, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before LANSING, Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Clifford R. Fransen appeals from his judgment of conviction following his plea of guilty 

to trafficking in marijuana. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1)(A). Specifically, Fransen asserts that the 

district court abused its discretion in ordering Fransen to pay restitution. 

The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is within the discretion of 

the trial court. State v. Russell, 126 Idaho 38, 39, 878 P.2d 212, 213 (Ct. App. 1994). The 

determination of the amount of restitution is a question of fact for the trial court, whose findings 

will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 

943, 935 P.2d 201, 206 (Ct. App. 1997). In this case, the district court ordered Fransen to pay 

restitution pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k) in the amount of $1,088.53, which included $300 for 

forensic testing of the marijuana and $788.53 for investigation expenses. Fransen argues that the 
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district court abused its discretion because it did not logically apply the statutory factors guiding 

the imposition of restitution. 

Idaho Code Section 37-2732(k) provides, in pertinent part:

Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this 

chapter . . . the court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement 

agencies in investigating the violation. Law enforcement agencies shall include, 

but not be limited to, the Idaho state police, county and city law enforcement 

agencies, the office of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting 

attorney offices. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the 

purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and 

witnesses throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and trials, and any 

other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular 

salaries of employees. 

As this Court determined in State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833-34, 252 P.3d 563, 566-67

(Ct. App. 2010), because I.C. § 37-2732(k) contains no provisions concerning the nature of a 

restitution award or the proceedings to obtain that award, we are guided by reference to the 

general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304. Idaho Code Section 19-5304(7) provides:

The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount of 

such restitution, shall consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the 

victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning ability 

of the defendant, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate. The 

immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of itself, 

a reason to not order restitution. 

In ordering Fransen to pay restitution, the district court stated:

[Defense counsel] did object to the restitution that is requested in this 

matter for investigation and testing of the marijuana. The Court has looked at that 

and considered that, also considering your fixed income and the nature of your 

medical issues with regard to your fixed income, but the Court has an abiding 

belief that when you pled guilty, you understood that restitution could be required 

for the cost of investigation of this particular crime, and so I am going to order 

restitution in the amount of $1,088.53.

I am not going to order any additional financial sanctions with regard to 

attorney fees or reimbursement to the county for any costs or maintenance of the 

District Court. I think it’s that--simply a $5000 fine and restitution is more than 

enough for purposes of punishment in this particular case. 

Contrary to Fransen’s assertion, we conclude that the district court logically considered 

the factors guiding imposition of restitution as required by I.C. § 19-5304--the amount of 
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economic loss sustained by the state as a result of Fransen’s offense and the financial resources, 

needs, and earning ability of Fransen.

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 Further, the district court’s finding that $300 for forensic 

testing of the marijuana and $788.53 for investigation expenses were compensable in restitution 

under the statute was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in ordering Fransen to pay restitution. Fransen’s judgment of conviction for

trafficking in marijuana is affirmed. 

 

1 We also note Fransen asserts in his reply brief that the district court’s determination that 

Fransen understood restitution could be required was clearly erroneous because of his response 

to certain parts of the guilty plea questionnaire. This assertion is belied by the record. Prior to 

accepting the guilty plea, the district court inquired:

[COURT] You understand that under the statute that if there are costs 

for prosecution and investigation of this case, I could order that you pay 

restitution?

[FRANSEN] Yes, Your Honor.