alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Federal Register: September 21, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 182)]
[Notices]               
[Page 57544]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr21se10-137]                         

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

 
Notice of Applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and 
Necessity and Foreign Air Carrier Permits Filed under Subpart B 
(Formerly Subpart Q) During the Week Ending September 4, 2010

    The following Applications for Certificates of Public Convenience 
and Necessity and Foreign Air Carrier Permits were filed under Subpart 
B (formerly Subpart Q) of the Department of Transportation's Procedural 
Regulations (See 14 CFR 301.201 et. seq.). The due date for Answers, 
Conforming Applications, or Motions to Modify Scope are set forth below 
for each application. Following the Answer period DOT may process the 
application by expedited procedures. Such procedures may consist of the 
adoption of a show-cause order, a tentative order, or in appropriate 
cases a final order without further proceedings.
    Docket Number: DOT-OST-2010-0223.
    Date Filed: September 3, 2010.
    Due Date for Answers, Conforming Applications, or Motion to Modify 
Scope: September 24, 2010.
    Description: Joint Application of ASTAR Air Cargo, Inc. (``ASTAR'') 
and ASTAR USA, LLC (``AUSA'') requesting the transfer from ASTAR to 
AUSA of ASTAR's certificates of public convenience and necessity 
authorizing ASTAR to engage in interstate and foreign all cargo 
scheduled air transportation.
    Docket Number: DOT-OST-2010- 0225.
    Date Filed: September 2, 2010.
    Due Date for Answers, Conforming Applications, or Motion to Modify 
Scope: September 23, 2010.
    Description: Joint Application of Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Inc. 
(``ASA'') and ExpressJet Airlines, Inc. (``ExpressJet'') (together, the 
``Joint Applicants'') requesting approval of the de facto transfer of 
ExpressJet's international route authority, consisting of U.S.-Mexico 
designations, to ASA. In addition, the Joint Applicants ask the 
Department to approve the eventual de jure transfer that will occur 
when ExpressJet and ASA merge as anticipated.

Renee V. Wright,
Program Manager, Docket Operations, Federal Register Liaison.
[FR Doc. 2010-23509 Filed 9-20-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P
```
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned, as principal
financial officer of SMTC Corporation (the Company), does hereby certify that to the undersigneds knowledge:



1) the Companys quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended July 4, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2) the information
contained in the Companys quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended July 4, 2004 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Jane ToddJane ToddChief Financial Officer




Date: August 18, 2004



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to SMTC Corporation and will be retained by SMTC Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM INTERIM
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THIRD QUARTER 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY TO
SUCH BAOA, INC. 10Q-SB
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                           1,132
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  115,181
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    102,943
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               219,256
<PP&E>                                          45,856
<DEPRECIATION>                                  24,338
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 251,267
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,149,308
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        16,299
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,402,455
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   251,267
<SALES>                                         58,196
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                58,196
<CGS>                                          111,937
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  111,937
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               508,475
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              39,672
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (601,886)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (601,886)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (601,886)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.04)
        

</TABLE>
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Rehabilitation and Community :

Providers Association, and :

Westmoreland County Blind :

Association, and Associated :

Production Services, Inc., and United :

Cerebral Palsy of Central :

Pennsylvania, Inc. and Scott Howard :

Schwartz by and through Theodore :

A. Schwartz, Co Guardian, and :

Ryan Brett by and through His :

Guardian Francis Brett, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 543 M.D. 2019

:

Department of Human Services :

Office of Developmental Programs, :

Respondents :

PER CURIAM O R D E R

NOW, March 4, 2021, upon consideration of Petitioners’

application for reconsideration and Respondent’s answer in response thereto, 

the application is denied.
EXHIBIT 32.1



                                Certification of
                            American River Bankshares
            pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
regarding Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2006


         Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each
of the undersigned officers of American River Bankshares, a California
corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify that:

         1.       The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter
                  ended September 30, 2006 (the "Form 10-Q") fully complies with
                  the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
                  Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         2.       Information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
                  material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.



         Dated: November 6, 2006       By: /s/ DAVID T. TABER
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           David T. Taber
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer

         Dated: November 6, 2006       By: /s/ MITCHELL A. DERENZO
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Mitchell A. Derenzo
                                           Executive Vice President and
                                           Chief Financial Officer




         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to American River Bankshares and will be retained by American
River Bankshares and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.

                                       41
#### J. W. CARTEE et al., Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 24, 1964.

Holland G. Bryan, Paducah, for appellant.

John B. Breckinridge, Atty. Gen., William A. Lamkin, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Reed Anderson, Paducah, Richard H. Peek, Smithland, for appellee.

*861MILLIKEN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment for the Department of Highways in a suit brought against it by landowners to recover damages for additional impairment of ingress and egress to their property caused by a change in the Department’s construction of the highway from the original plan.

In December, 1954, the Department of Highways procured a deed through condemnation proceedings from the appellants for the improvement of a public road leading from Kentucky Dam to Paducah. At that time the Department presented plans and specifications showing how the proposed improvement would affect the appellants’ property. Subsequently, the Department changed its plans and in 1961 the appellants sued the Department asserting that “their rights of ingress and egress to and from their driveway and property was, and is, partially destroyed and seriously interfered with, in that, instead of being able to turn into or turn out from driveway regardless of the direction in which they may be proceeding; if they are proceeding from the north toward their home, they cannot turn into their driveway but are required to proceed a great distance to Reidland and turn around and come back to their property; or if they are emerging from their driveway and desire to go south towards Reidland, they are required instead to proceed north at least a half mile, then cross over into the south-bound roadway and drive back another half mile to a point opposite their driveway, and then proceed as they desired south toward Reidland.”

The change in plans from an ordinary highway to a divided highway probably has caused some inconvenience to the appellants, but they still have reasonable access to the State Highway System and that is all they are entitled to have. Department of Highways v. Carlisle (1962), Ky., 363 S.W.2d 104; Department of Highways v. Jackson (1957), Ky., 302 S.W.2d 373, 376. And see, also, the re-affirmal of this view in Com. Department of Highways v. Sherrod (1963), Ky., 367 S.W.2d 844, at pages 858, 859. Furthermore, the change in plans and specifications was permissible. Commonwealth Dept. of Highways v. Littrel (1959), Ky., 319 S.W.2d 458.

The judgment is affirmed.
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 464

AN ACT

To make the reporting deadlines for studies conducted in

Federal court demonstration districts consistent with the

deadlines for pilot districts, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 464 ES

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND

2 DELAY REDUCTION DEMONSTRATION PRO3 GRAMS.

4 Section 104 of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990

5 (28 U.S.C. 471 note) is amended—

6 (1) in subsection (a)(1) by striking ‘‘4-year pe7 riod’’ and inserting ‘‘5-year period’’; and

8 (2) in subsection (d) by striking ‘‘December 31,

9 1995,’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 1996,’’.

Passed the Senate March 30 (legislative day, March

27), 1995.

Attest:

Secretary.
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 464

AN ACT

To make the reporting deadlines for studies conand for other purposes. consistent with the deadlines for pilot districts, ducted in Federal court demonstration districts
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Victor Manuel ALCALA-NAVARRO, a.k.a. Dr. Navarro, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-50040, 01-50079, 01-50117.

D.C. No. CR-98-00503-MMM-05 CR-98-00508-LGB CR-98-509-LGB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 22, 2002 *.

Decided July 30, 2002.

Before BROWNING, KOZINSKI and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

In this consolidated appeal, Victor Manuel Alcala-Navarro appeals his convictions and sentences for conspiracy to aid and abet the distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a), and conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.

First, Alcala-Navarro contends that his sentences must be vacated because 21 U.S.C. § 841 is facially unconstitutional under *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Buckland,*289 F.3d 558, 562 (9th Cir.) (en banc), *cert. denied,*- U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2314, 152 L.Ed.2d 1067 (2002). Alternatively, Alcala-Navarro contends that(#§§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) are unconstitutional provisions because the judge’s factual findings at sentencing were based on a preponderance of the evidence. This argument also fails under *Buckland. Id.*at 564-67.

Finally, Alcala-Navarro contends that the district court plainly erred in sentencing him above the default maximum sentence for a crime involving an indeterminate quantity because the indictment failed to allege any drug quantity. Upon review of the record, we conclude there is ample evidence that the conspiracy to which Alcala-Navarro pleaded guilty involved at least five kilograms of cocaine. *See United States v. Cotton,*— U.S. -,-- -, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1786-87, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (holding indictment’s failure to include any allegation regarding quantity of drugs involved in conspiracy does not seriously affect fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings when there is ample evidence in the record of drug quantity); *see also Buckland,*289 F.3d at 571-72 (conceding that *Apprendi*error at sentencing did not affect substantial rights when there was rehable evidence of quantity in the record). We find no plain error; therefore, vacating AlcalaNavarro’s sentence is not justified.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**


**LEV
      PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.**


**PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED**


**PURSUANT
      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Lev Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2006 as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
      Joshua D. Schein, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that:





(1)
          The report fully complies with the requirements of Section
      13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
      all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      the
      Company.




Date: November
              14, 2006
            By:
            /s/ Joshua
              D.
              Schein, Ph.D.Joshua
              D. Schein, Ph.D.Chief
                Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 31.6

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT

TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Nancy E. Pecota, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer, certify that:



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 3 to Annual Report on Form 10-K of Aradigm Corporation for the year ended December 31, 2015; and
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Nancy E. PecotaNancy E. PecotaChief Financial Officer


Dated: August 16, 2016
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                           2,340
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,003
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (105)
<INVENTORY>                                      1,330
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 4,983
<PP&E>                                           8,779
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (4,989)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   8,906
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,327
<BONDS>                                          3,668
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             2
<OTHER-SE>                                       (397)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     8,906
<SALES>                                          4,406
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 4,406
<CGS>                                            4,249
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,249
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                12,116
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    89
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 665
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (18,566)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (18,566)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (18,566)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (9.34)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (9.34)


</TABLE>
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-13-00070- CV

Terr acon Consul tants, Inc., Appellan t

v. F ort Wor th Design & Buil d, In c. d/b/a DB Constructor s, Inc., Appellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 277 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NO. 11- 181- C277, HO NORAB LE K EN ANDERSON, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant and appellee ha v e f il ed a joint motion to dismiss the appea l, explaining that they have settled their dispute. We g rant the motion and dismiss the appea l. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a).

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton and Rose Dismissed on J oint Moti on Filed: Oc tober 15, 2013
#### Helen GONZALES, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 30410.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 11, 1959.

Larry Emerson, W. E. Martin, Houston, for appellant.

Dan Walton, Dist. Atty., Thomas D. White and David A. Gibson, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

The offense is keeping a bawdy house; the punishment, 80 days in jail and a fine of $800.

The record shows that after a mistrial of appellant’s case in either April or June, 1958, a new complaint and information alleging the same charges were filed against her on June 9, 1958. The warrant of arrest was issued and placed in the hands of the sheriff on the same day.

*680Thereafter, about 4:30 P.M., August 7, 1958, when appellant’s case was called for trial' she announced ready and entered a plea of not guilty. The state introduced ■some testimony and then the court recessed until the following day.

The record further shows that the warrant of arrest issued June 9, was executed by the arrest of the appellant on the morning of August 8, 1958. Following her arrest on August 8, she and her attorneys discovered for the first time that a new complaint and information had been filed June 9.

Appellant then informed the court that her arrest on the morning of August 8 was the first information she had of the re-filing by the state of the case in which there had been a mistrial. She requested the court to permit her to withdraw her announcement of ready and allow her two days to prepare for trial in the new case. Such request was refused and appellant excepted.

A new case was instituted when the state filed the new complaint and information. This prosecution is based upon the state’s pleadings in the new case filed June 9, resulting in her arrest therefore on August 8.

Art. 514, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., provides that “In all cases the defendant shall be allowed two entire days, exclusive of all fractions of a day *after his arrest,*and during the term of the court, to file written pleadings.”

The facts and circumstances of this case are not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the appellant knew that she was announcing ready in the new case and thereby waived her right to the time allowed by statute to prepare for trial.

The time allowed by the statute confers a valuable right and must be complied with upon the demand of the accused. Harris v. State, 32 Tex.Cr.R. 279, 22 S.W. 1037; Whitesides v. State, 44 Tex.Cr.R 410, 71 S.W. 969; McFadin v. State, 44 Tex.Cr.R. 471, 72 S.W. 172; Templeton v. State, 66 Tex.Cr.R. 369, 146 S.W. 933; Stephens v. State, 66 Tex.Cr.R. 359, 147 S.W. 235; Tillman v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 246, 75 S.W.2d 683; Pugh v. State, 163 Tex Cr.R. 258, 289 S.W.2d 929.

No conclusion is expressed as to the other contentions presented.

For the failure to grant appellant’s request for the two days’ time allowed by statute, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

Opinion approved by the Court.