IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 12, 2020

CHRISTOPHER LEE WILLIAMS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2014-D-3138 Angelita Blackshear Dalton, Judge1

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No. M2019-01195-CCA-R3-PC

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The Petitioner, Christopher Lee Williams, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his convictions of 

aggravated kidnapping, reckless endangerment, and domestic assault, and resulting 

effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we 

affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.

MONTGOMERY, JR., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Jesse Pratt Lords, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Christopher Lee Williams.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Amy M. Hunter, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

In the early morning hours of September 8, 2014, the Petitioner and his live-in 

girlfriend got into an argument, and the Petitioner assaulted her. State v. Christopher Lee 

Williams, No. M2016-00568-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1063480, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

at Nashville, Mar. 21, 2017), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. July 18, 2017). After the assault, 

the Petitioner repeatedly prevented the victim from leaving their apartment. Id. at *5. Later 

 

1

Judge Dalton did not preside over the Petitioner’s trial or sentencing hearing.

08/14/2020
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that morning, the victim went to work to pick up her paycheck. See id. at *2. Upon seeing 

the victim’s injuries, her manager encouraged her to go to a hospital. Id. The victim 

ultimately agreed to go to a hospital, and two coworkers accompanied her to the emergency 

room at Vanderbilt Hospital. See id. The victim spoke with several police officers at the 

hospital, and someone photographed her injuries. Id. at *3.

In December 2014, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Petitioner for 

aggravated assault by strangulation in count one, especially aggravated kidnapping in 

which the victim suffered serious bodily injury in count two, and domestic assault causing 

bodily injury in count three. The Petitioner went to trial in November 2015.

At trial, the victim testified that during the assault, the Petitioner hit her head and 

face. See id. at *1-2. She also testified that he pushed her head into the floor, which 

prevented her from taking a full breath for three to five minutes. Id. at *2. Dr. Tom 

Deering, a forensic pathologist from the Davidson County Medical Examiner’s Office,

testified that the State asked him to review the victim’s medical records. He described the 

victim’s injuries “as a facial contusion, a minor closed head injury, a cervical neck strain, 

a bruised coccyx, and a small eye hemorrhage.” Id. at *3. However, he said the records 

did not show evidence of strangulation or fractures. Id.

The Petitioner did not present any proof, and the jury convicted him of reckless 

endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault; 

aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, as a lesser-included offense of especially 

aggravated kidnapping; and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor, as charged in the 

indictment. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Petitioner serve ten 

years at one hundred percent release eligibility for aggravated kidnapping and concurrent 

sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for reckless endangerment and domestic 

assault for a total effective sentence of ten years in confinement.

The Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his convictions, claiming that his dual 

convictions of aggravated kidnapping resulting in bodily injury and domestic assault based 

on bodily injury were improper and that the trial court failed to consider his voluntary 

release of the victim as a mitigating factor during sentencing. See id. at *3, 5. This court 

affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and effective ten-year sentence. See id. at *6-7.

After our supreme court denied the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal, 

he filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court appointed counsel, and 

counsel filed an amended petition, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective because trial 

counsel failed to meet with the Petitioner and keep him informed about the evidence against 

him, failed to provide him with discovery, failed to review discovery with him, failed to 
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discuss pretrial motions with him, and failed to review the State’s notice of enhanced

punishment with him. The amended petition also alleged ineffective assistance because 

trial counsel failed to subpoena the Vanderbilt doctor who treated the victim and because 

trial counsel allowed Dr. Deering to testify about the Vanderbilt doctor’s report. 

At the evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner testified that trial counsel was appointed 

to represent him and that they only met when the Petitioner appeared in court. They did 

not discuss the Petitioner’s case, the Petitioner never received discovery, and trial counsel 

never reviewed the State’s evidence with the Petitioner. They also never discussed trial 

strategy or trial counsel’s preparation for trial. Trial counsel was the Petitioner’s second 

attorney because the Petitioner “dismissed the previous attorney for the same reason.”

The Petitioner testified that he sent “countless” letters to trial counsel, asking him 

to file motions such as a motion for a speedy trial. However, the Petitioner never received 

any letters from trial counsel. Trial counsel did not review the State’s notice of enhanced 

punishment with the Petitioner, and the Petitioner did not even know the State had filed the 

notice. The Petitioner wanted to testify at trial, but trial counsel claimed that the Petitioner

“didn’t have to because the evidence that was against the claims was overwhelming.” The 

Petitioner wanted to testify anyway, but trial counsel told the Petitioner that he was not 

going to call the Petitioner to the stand. The Petitioner did not have any input as to trial 

strategy. He said that he tried to give trial counsel some ideas to argue but that trial counsel 

“ignored it.” The Petitioner acknowledged that if trial counsel had communicated with 

him, he would have been able to assist trial counsel with his defense. 

On cross-examination, the Petitioner testified that he also wanted trial counsel to 

file a motion to suppress pictures of the victim’s injuries. He acknowledged that the trial 

court advised him of his right to testify and that he told the trial court he did not want to 

testify. He said, though, that trial counsel “instructed” him not to testify and that he did 

what trial counsel said because he thought trial counsel “would present the case like it was 

supposed to be.”

Trial counsel testified for the State that he was appointed to represent the Petitioner 

after the Petitioner’s first attorney was relieved from the case. Trial counsel said that he 

thought he was appointed about one month before the Petitioner went to trial; therefore, he 

was “on a very tight course in preparing.” Trial counsel “brought in” one of his law 

partners to help him with the case, and they were prepared for trial because they “made 

time” for trial preparation. Trial counsel said that he and his law partner “spent consecutive 

days with little to no sleep preparing for the trial” and that their strategy “hinged on a case 

that I think [had] just come out of the Court of Appeals, State v. Crawford, I believe.” Trial 

counsel said his law partner “worked on that issue in conjunction with . . . the attorney who 

argued the case that we relied upon.” 
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Trial counsel testified that by the time he got involved in the Petitioner’s case, the 

State already had turned over discovery materials to the defense. When trial counsel first 

met with the Petitioner, the Petitioner had a copy of discovery. Trial counsel said the 

Petitioner brought the discovery materials to every court appearance “because he would 

have it rolled up in his hand.” Trial counsel and the Petitioner discussed discovery each 

time they met. The Petitioner claimed the victim was lying and “absolutely had a very 

good understanding of the facts in evidence that the State had against him.” 

Trial counsel testified that he prepared witnesses for direct and cross-examination 

testimony. Trial counsel negotiated with the State about a plea, and the State offered for 

the Petitioner to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of six years and one month to serve

in confinement. However, the Petitioner rejected the offer. Trial counsel said that the 

Petitioner wanted to go to trial and that the Petitioner was “very confident that he could get 

this case beat.” Trial counsel stated that he did not remember the Petitioner asking him to 

file a motion to suppress photographs of the victim’s injuries and that he did not know of 

a basis for suppressing the photographs. Trial counsel said he did not subpoena the 

Vanderbilt doctor who signed the victim’s medical records because the doctor had “just 

[overseen] a medical student’s examination [of the victim]” and did not have any 

independent knowledge about the victim’s case. Moreover, trial counsel did not want the 

doctor to testify because “it was clear from the medical records that they believed she was 

strangled . . . [and] abused.” Instead, trial counsel allowed Dr. Deering, “who was 

completely neutral,” to read the victim’s medical records into evidence. 

Trial counsel testified that the victim made statements at the Petitioner’s preliminary 

hearing that contradicted what she told doctors, what she told the police, and what she said 

at trial. Therefore, trial counsel used her preliminary hearing testimony to cross-examine 

her. Trial counsel said that he paid for the preliminary hearing transcript “out of [his] own 

pocket” because he did not have time to get court approval for the transcript. 

At the conclusion of trial counsel’s direct testimony, the State asked if there was 

anything else he wanted the post-conviction court to know about his work on the 

Petitioner’s case. Trial counsel said he thought the State “overcharge[ed]” the Petitioner 

based on the facts. He also stated that he was a “newer” attorney who had been practicing 

only three years at the time of the Petitioner’s trial and that he had “wanted to do an 

extremely good job” for the trial court. He said that he went “out of [his] way” to get other 

attorneys to help him with the Petitioner’s case for free, that he “paid out of pocket,” that 

he “sacrificed time” with his family, and that he slept at his office to prepare for the 

Petitioner’s trial.
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On cross-examination, trial counsel acknowledged that he thought he had only four 

weeks to prepare for trial. At that point, the post-conviction court noted that trial counsel 

was appointed to represent the Petitioner in April 2015 and that the Petitioner went to trial 

in August 2015. Trial counsel clarified that he had four months, not four weeks, to prepare. 

Trial counsel acknowledged that he could have argued in a motion to suppress that the 

photographs of the victim’s injuries were more prejudicial than probative. He said, though, 

that he did not think such an argument would have been successful because the photographs 

were “very necessary” for the State’s case. The Petitioner thought this case was “just a 

simple assault.” Trial counsel said that he reviewed discovery with the Petitioner, that 

“there was a small window in which [their] conversations were productive,” and that the 

Petitioner “was very knowledgeable about the case and the charges.”

The post-conviction court filed a written order denying the petition for postconviction relief. In the order, the post-conviction court accredited trial counsel’s 

testimony that he met with the Petitioner in court, that the Petitioner brought discovery 

materials with him to every meeting, and that the Petitioner was very knowledgeable about 

the case. The post-conviction court also accredited trial counsel’s testimony that he did 

not think a motion to suppress the victim’s photographs would have been successful. The 

post-conviction court concluded that, in any event, the Petitioner failed to show that a 

motion to suppress would have been granted. Finally, the post-conviction court accredited 

trial counsel’s testimony that he did not subpoena the Vanderbilt doctor who treated the 

victim because the doctor did not have any independent recollection of treating her and 

trial counsel’s testimony that he strategically decided not to call the doctor so that the 

doctor could not testify that the victim had been abused.

II. Analysis

The Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because 

trial counsel failed to communicate adequately with him. Specifically, the Petitioner 

contends that trial counsel failed to meet with him and discuss the case against him, did not 

allow him to participate in his own defense, did not provide him with a copy of discovery, 

did not allow him to assist in preparing for trial, and never discussed a trial strategy with 

him. The State argues that the post-conviction court properly denied relief. We agree with 

the State.

To be successful in a claim for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove the 

factual allegations contained in the post-conviction petition by clear and convincing 

evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). “‘Clear and convincing evidence means 

evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the 

conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1999) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992)). 
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Issues regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be accorded their 

testimony, and the factual questions raised by the evidence adduced at trial are to be 

resolved by the post-conviction court as the trier of fact. See Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 

572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). Therefore, the post-conviction court’s findings of fact are entitled 

to substantial deference on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. 

See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. See

State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). We will review the post-conviction 

court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption that those findings are correct. See

Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 458. However, we will review the post-conviction court’s conclusions 

of law purely de novo. Id.

When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance 

of counsel, “the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 

369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To 

establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was 

below “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 

523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that 

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Further,

[b]ecause a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove 

either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the 

ineffective assistance claim. Indeed, a court need not address the 

components in any particular order or even address both if the [petitioner] 

makes an insufficient showing of one component.

Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). Moreover, in the context of 

a guilty plea, “the petitioner must show ‘prejudice’ by demonstrating that, but for counsel’s 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted upon going to trial.” 

Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

Turning to the instant case, the post-conviction court accredited trial counsel’s 

testimony that he met with the Petitioner when the Petitioner came to court, that the 

Petitioner had a copy of the discovery materials at every meeting, and that the Petitioner 

was knowledgeable about his case. Although the Petitioner contends that trial counsel did 

not discuss a trial strategy with him, the Petitioner has not suggested what strategy trial 
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counsel should have used to change the outcome of his case. Accordingly, we agree with 

the post-conviction court that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was 

deficient or that the Petitioner was prejudiced by any deficiency.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

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NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE