*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 02-20549

Summary Calendar

_____________________

HELEN G. MURRAY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division

USDC No. H-01-CV-599

_________________________________________________________________

September 30, 2002

Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Helen Murray appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the defendant, ExxonMobil. Murray asserted a

federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as state

law promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, and intentional infliction

of emotional distress claims against the defendant. She argues

that she, the only African American in her division, was

discriminated against when ExxonMobil offered her employment that

required relocation from Houston, TX to Fairfax, VA. She maintains
**Complaint, at 3. Murray does not renew or address any claims other than her § 1981 claim

on appeal.

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the offer was not made in good faith but was intended to deprive

her of severance benefits by “forcing” her to retire. An at-will

employee with Exxon since 1975, Murray voluntarily retired after

turning down the position. At retirement, Murray was 56 years old

and was earning $92,700 per year. Murray has not sought employment

since she retired. 

In February 2001 she filed this lawsuit alleging three causes

of action. First, a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in

which she alleged that ExxonMobil “compelled her” to retire early

in violation of her right to enter into and enforce contracts on

the same terms as white people. She contends the company offered

her employment in Virginia knowing she would not accept it, with

the intent of forcing her to resign without severance plan

benefits. Her promissory estoppel and quantum meruit claims

asserted she relied on an alleged promise that Exxon would not

transfer her out of Houston. Her emotional distress claim alleged

ExxonMobil’s actions have caused her to experience “wounded pride,

shame, despair, and utter devastation.”**

I

This court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. Pratt

v. City of Houston, 247 F.3d 601, 605-606 (5th Cir. 2001). Summary

judgment is properly granted when the evidence, viewed in the light
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most favorable to the non-movant, reflects no genuine issue of

material fact. Rubinstein v. Administrators of the Tulane

Educational Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2000). After a

review of the record before us, we conclude that we must agree with

the lower court and affirm the grant of summary judgment.

II

We are aided by the district court’s carefully considered and

thorough summary judgment order, entered on April 30, 2002. After

reviewing the applicable legal standards for summary judgment in a

case of racial discrimination under § 1981, and the record

evidence, the district court granted defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. Under the burden-shifting standard for race

discrimination claims, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing

that her employer intentionally discriminated against her on the

basis of race. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802-804 (1973); Pratt v. City of Houston, 247 F.3d 601, 606 n.1.

(5th Cir. 2001). 

The district court assumed, arguendo, that Murray had

established a prima facie case. Accordingly, the burden shifted to

ExxonMobil to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory rationale

for its decision. The district court concluded that the defendant

had borne its burden: after the merger, a position comparable to

Murray’s was to be created for the merged entity at the new

corporate headquarters, and she was qualified to fill it. 
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Murray attempted to demonstrate why the proffered rationale

was pretextual. We find the district court was clearly correct in

concluding that the reasons offered were insufficient to meet her

summary judgment burden. See Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238

F.3d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 2001). ExxonMobil presented uncontradicted

evidence that her assignment to Fairfax was consistent with the

merged company’s business plan. Furthermore, numerous co-workers

in her department were offered jobs which required relocation.

Murray offered no evidence of racial animus or of disparate

treatment based on race. In view of the circumstances surrounding

the post-merger reorganization of ExxonMobil, her unsubstantiated

assertions that ExxonMobil’s proffered rationale is a pretext for

racial discrimination must fail. Because the plaintiff is unable

to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact about whether the

defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext for racial

discrimination, summary judgment was warranted.

III

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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