[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12471

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

FERRELL WALKER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 7:07-cr-00030-HL-TQL-1

____________________

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Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ferrell Walker appeals his sentence of imprisonment for violating conditions of his supervised release. He argues that the district court violated his right against double jeopardy because the 

conduct that formed the basis of the sentence also formed the basis 

of a separate prosecution. He argues in the alternative that the sentence is unreasonable. Because the first argument is foreclosed by 

precedent and the second is unsupported by the record, we affirm.

I. 

In 2007, Walker pleaded guilty to one count of possessing

child pornography. During the term of supervised release included 

in his sentence, the government searched his home and discovered 

a cell phone containing more than one thousand images of child 

pornography, a photograph of his driver’s license, a nude photograph that he had taken of himself, and a sexually explicit messaging thread with photographs of Walker’s face and unidentified 

male genitalia. Upon finding that Walker violated conditions of his 

supervised release by possessing these materials, the district court 

revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to sixty months’ 

imprisonment, the statutory minimum under section 3583(k), followed by twenty-five years’ supervised release. In a separate criminal action, Walker was convicted of possessing child pornography

and was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment and a lifetime

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term of supervised release to be served consecutively and concurrently with his revocation sentence, respectively. 

Walker appealed both sentences. After consolidating the 

cases, we affirmed his sentence for possession but remanded his 

revocation sentence on ex post facto grounds because the sixtymonth mandatory minimum provision of section 3583(k) was not 

in effect when Walker was sentenced in 2007. On remand, the district court resentenced Walker under section 3583(e)(3)—the statute in effect in 2007—to the statutory maximum sentence of

twenty-four months’ imprisonment followed by twenty-five years’ 

supervised release. 

Walker appeals the district court’s revocation sentence. 

First, he argues that, under Haymond,

1 the district court violated 

the Double Jeopardy Clause by basing his revocation sentence on 

the same set of facts used in his prosecution for possessing child 

pornography. Second, he argues that his statutory maximum sentence is substantively unreasonable. 

II. 

We review “claims of double jeopardy de novo.” United 

States v. Campo, 840 F.3d 1249, 1267 (11th Cir. 2016) (emphasis 

omitted). The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person 

shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 

1 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). 

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of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “This guarantees against a 

second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second 

prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple 

punishments for the same offense.” United States v. Bobb, 577 

F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009). 

Walker argues that his sentences were based on “the same 

conduct” and thus “he was twice placed in jeopardy and twice punished for the same offense . . . in violation of the Fifth Amendment.” He bases this argument on the proposition that “[t]he facts 

in Haymond are almost identical to the facts presented in [this]

case.” 

However “identical” the facts of these cases may be, the corresponding law is dissimilar. Haymond dealt only with section 

3583(k), under which Walker originally was sentenced for violating 

the conditions of his supervised release. See 139 S. Ct. at 2386 

(Breyer, J., concurring). But Haymond did not disturb our precedent that a sentence for violating supervised release under section 

3583(e)(3), under which Walker was resentenced, doesn’t violate 

the Double Jeopardy Clause because it isn’t a successive punishment for the same offense but rather is a part of the penalty for the 

initial offense. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 

(2000); United States v. Woods, 127 F.3d 990, 992–93 (11th Cir. 

1997). Haymond has no bearing on this case. See 139 S. Ct. at 2383

(plurality opinion) (“As we have emphasized, our decision is limited to [section] 3583(k) . . . and the Alleyne problem raised by its 

[five]-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.”).

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III. 

We review a “sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release for reasonableness.” United States v. Velasquez 

Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). To this end, we 

must ensure that the district court didn’t commit a “significant procedural error,” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), “fail[]

to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant 

weight, give[] significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or commit[] a clear error of judgment in considering the proper 

factors,” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(en banc) (cleaned up).

“On appeal, [Walker] bears the burden to show that his sentence is unreasonable.” United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 

1232 (11th Cir. 2015). “Given the broad sentencing discretion that 

district courts have,” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 

1261 (11th Cir. 2015), we do not overturn a sentencing decision unless we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment . . . by arriving at a 

sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case,” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (internal quotation omitted). 

Walker hasn’t carried his burden to show such “clear error 

of judgment.” He doesn’t argue that the district court committed 

any procedural error. Instead, he argues only that “the applicable 

[guidelines] range of imprisonment is [four] to [ten] months.” 

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But the record lacks any indication that the district court

failed to treat the guidelines as advisory, selected a sentence based 

on clearly erroneous facts, or failed to explain the chosen sentence

adequately. The district court articulated the section 3553(a) factors used to support its sentence, including the need “to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the violation offenses, and to protect the 

public from further crimes of” Walker. It noted that Walker was 

“intentionally deceptive” about his “possession and use of internet[-]capable devices which allowed [him] to commit further 

crimes of possession of child pornography.” It heard the parties’ 

arguments at length and explicitly stated that it considered the advisory guidelines range and the totality of the circumstances. The 

record therefore shows that the district court “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own 

legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 

1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted).

As to supervised release, for a defendant convicted for possessing child pornography, such as Walker, a district court may impose “any term of years or life” under section 3583(k).

2 Walker’s

twenty-five-year term of supervised release, which is well below 

2 Unlike the sixty-month mandatory minimum, this provision was in effect in 

2007 and was unaffected by Haymond. See 139 S. Ct. at 2379 n.4 (“Because 

we hold that this mandatory minimum rendered Mr. Haymond’s sentence unconstitutional . . . we need not address the constitutionality of the statute's effect on his maximum sentence under Apprendi.” (citations omitted)).

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this statutory maximum, is reasonable for all the reasons the district court gave under section 3553(a). See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). 

CONCLUSION 

Binding precedent forecloses Walker’s argument that his 

revocation sentence violated his right against double jeopardy, and 

the record does not support his argument that it is unreasonable. 

Thus, we affirm the sentence.

AFFIRMED. 

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