RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0320-22 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

JARON STROTHER, a/k/a 

JARON STROTHERS, 

TYQUAN STROTHER, 

JARON DECHAUN STROTHER, 

and JASON STROTHER, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

 

Argued November 14, 2023 – Decided December 11, 2023 

Before Judges Rose, Smith and Perez Friscia. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 11-10-2489.

Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, Designated Counsel, argued the 

cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, on the 

briefs).

Bethany L. Deal, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0320-22

General, attorney; Lauren Bonfiglio, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

 Defendant Jaron Strother appeals from a July 26, 2022 order denying his 

petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) following an evidentiary hearing. Prior 

to the hearing, defendant contended his plea counsel was ineffective because he 

was not informed his plea might subject him to civil commitment under the New 

Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. 

Defendant sought vacation of his guilty plea and sentence – for the sole purpose 

of effectuating his immediate release from the Special Treatment Unit (STU). 

For the first time during the hearing, defendant claimed he was innocent of the 

sexual offense at issue. Following the hearing, the PCR judge entered the order 

and issued a cogent written decision rejecting defendant's contentions. Because 

the PCR judge's findings are "are supported by sufficient credible evidence in 

the record," State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013), we affirm. 

I.

We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history from the record 

before the PCR judge. In March 2013, defendant pled guilty to second-degree 

sexual assault by physical force or coercion, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c), and seconddegree certain persons not to have firearms, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7, charged in 
3 A-0320-22

Atlantic County Indictment No. 11-10-2489; and fourth-degree hindering 

apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3, charged in a second indictment. 

Pertinent to this appeal, prior to entering his guilty plea to sexual assault, 

defendant initialed and signed the plea form and supplemental plea forms for 

sexual offenses. One of these forms, "New Jersey Judiciary Additional 

Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses," reflected defendant answered, "Yes" in 

response to question 7, which was entitled, "Civil Commitment," and asked: 

Do you understand that if you are convicted of a 

sexually violent offense, such as aggravated sexual

assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual

contact, kidnapping . . . criminal sexual contact, felony 

murder if the underlying crime is sexual assault, an 

attempt to commit any of these offenses, or any offense 

for which the court makes a specific finding on the

record that, based on the circumstances of the case, the 

offense should be considered a sexually violent offense, 

you may upon completion of your term of incarceration 

be civilly committed to another facility for up to life if 

the court finds, after a hearing, that you are in need of 

involuntary civil commitment?

During his plea colloquy, defendant acknowledged under oath that he 

"t[ook] the time to go over the whole form, item by item, with the help of [plea 

counsel]," and "answer[ed] all the questions on the form honestly." Defendant 

also answered, "Yes," to the court's inquiry: "While you were going through 

those papers, to the extent that you had any lingering questions or need[ed] 
4 A-0320-22

explanations of the plea agreement or any other considerations, was [plea 

counsel] able to answer your questions to your satisfaction?" 

Defendant testified he understood in exchange for his guilty pleas the 

State recommended a five-year prison sentence subject to the No Early Release 

Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on the sexual assault charge, to be imposed 

concurrently to a five-year prison sentence, with a mandatory five-year parole 

disqualifier subject to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), on the certain 

persons charge, 365 days' imprisonment on the hindering charge, and dismissal 

of all remaining charges. The plea agreement also subjected defendant to the 

reporting requirements under Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, parole 

supervision for life, a psychological and physical evaluation at the Avenel 

Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC), and no contact with the victim. 

Defendant further acknowledged the "no show – no recommendation" 

term of the plea agreement, permitting the State to argue for the maximum 

sentence if defendant failed to appear at sentencing. See State v. Subin, 222 

N.J. Super. 227, 240 (App. Div. 1988) (permitting the State to recommend a 

harsher sentence if the defendant fails to appear for sentencing). Defendant 

confirmed he was entering a guilty plea because he was guilty of the offenses 

charged and he was satisfied with plea counsel's advice. 
5 A-0320-22

In his factual basis for his guilty plea to the sexual assault offense, 

defendant testified that on July 3, 2011, he had vaginal-penile intercourse "with 

S.S. by holding her down against her will." The court accepted defendant's 

guilty plea finding defendant "read, signed, and understood the plea form and 

the thirteen pa[ges] of supplements." 

 Defendant failed to appear for his mandatory evaluation at the ADTC and 

sentencing hearing. While on the lam, defendant committed new crimes. Just 

prior to his eventual sentencing in June 2014, defendant pled guilty to thirddegree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b), charged in a third indictment, 

and fourth-degree possession of a stun gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(h), charged in a 

fourth indictment. Because his ADTC report indicated his conduct did not 

constitute a pattern of repetitive and compulsive sexual behavior, defendant was 

not eligible for sex offender treatment in prison. See N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3. 

Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of eight years, subject to 

NERA, and the collateral consequences for sexual offenses set forth in the plea 

agreement. The judgment of conviction (JOC) was entered in July 2014. 

On direct appeal, defendant only challenged his sentence, which this court 

heard on an excessive sentencing calendar pursuant to Rule 2:9-11. We rejected 
6 A-0320-22

defendant's contentions and affirmed. State v. Strother, No. A-5638-13 (App. 

Div. Jan. 13, 2015). 

Thereafter, in January 2020, defendant was charged in a fifth indictment 

with various sexual offenses allegedly committed upon two children under the 

age of thirteen.1 Two months later, just prior to defendant's release date, the 

Attorney General's Office moved for civil commitment under the SVPA, and a 

temporary commitment order was issued. After his prison term was completed, 

on March 27, 2020, defendant was transferred to the STU, where he remains 

temporarily committed pending the outcome of his PCR application. 

In July 2021, seven years after the JOC was entered, defendant filed an

untimely pro se petition for PCR, see R. 3:22-12(a)(1), addressing only his

convictions under the first indictment. Defendant asserted neither the trial court 

nor plea counsel informed him about the potential for civil commitment under 

the SVPA. After PCR counsel was assigned, defendant amended his petition, 

clarifying he sought immediate release from the STU. 

Following oral argument on December 9, 2021, the PCR judge, who was 

not the plea and sentencing judge, granted defendant's application for an 

1

 According to the record provided on appeal, the offenses charged in this 

indictment remain open. 
7 A-0320-22

evidentiary hearing. Assuming arguendo defendant was unaware of the 

potential for civil commitment following the completion of his prison term and 

the ensuing pandemic inhibited access to the STU's law library, the judge found 

defendant "made a prima facie case" for a hearing and relaxed the time bar. 

Defendant was the only witness called at the hearing. He claimed plea 

counsel "never discussed" the possibility of civil commitment. Defendant 

testified "had [he] been informed of the possibility of this indefinite period of 

civil commitment," he would not have entered a guilty plea. Defendant stated: 

"I was going to trial the whole time. I entered the guilty plea based on the 

reinstatement of my bail, and the combining of the charges that . . . [were] run 

concurrent." 

Defendant acknowledged plea counsel showed him the plea forms but 

claimed they "didn't have time" to review them. He further claimed plea counsel 

circled all the answers to the questions on the plea forms and "basically told 

[him] that everything that applied to [him] was circled. If it didn't apply to 

[him], it wasn't circled." 

Defendant acknowledged that during the plea hearing he admitted he 

sexually assaulted S.S. but stated he only did so because plea counsel advised 
8 A-0320-22

"that's what needed to be said to fit the qualifications to take the plea deal." 

Defendant testified: "I still maintain my innocence that the sex was consensual." 

On cross-examination, defendant confirmed any answers that were circled 

on the supplemental plea form "applied to [him]," and the answer to question 7 

under "Civil Commitment" was circled. Defendant further confirmed his 

signature appeared at the bottom of the page. When shown the transcript of the 

plea hearing, defendant acknowledged he: answered, "Yes" to several questions 

posed by the plea judge referenced above, including that he recognized the forms 

his plea counsel had reviewed with him; reviewed the questions with the 

assistance of plea counsel; and gave honest answers to the questions posed in 

the forms. 

Following the evidentiary hearing, the PCR judge reserved decision. 

Thereafter, the judge issued a cogent written opinion and memorializing order, 

denying relief. The judge squarely addressed the issues raised in view of the 

governing law. Noting defendant failed to present the testimony of plea counsel, 

"any other witness," or "any other evidence to corroborate his claims," the judge 

"f[ound] his testimony completely self-serving and lacking in credibility." 

Contrasting defendant's colloquy during his plea hearing with his testimony at 

the PCR hearing, the judge rejected defendant's belated claim of innocence. The 
9 A-0320-22

judge reasoned: "As the denial of culpability is more self-serving at this time, 

and the plea to the [second-]degree sexual assault is a more onerous admission 

against [defendant]'s interest, it is clear that his testimony at the evidentiary 

hearing was disingenuous." 

The judge elaborated: 

In the context of the self-serving testimony 

outlined above, the court cannot accept and does not 

accept on the basis of [defendant]'s incredible 

testimony alone, that [defendant]'s attorney at the time 

of the plea failed to review the plea[] forms with him in 

detail and that he was unaware of all of the 

consequences of the plea to these crimes, including the 

potential for civil commitment. While the testimony 

that the plea form was filled out, that the answers to the 

questions were circled when his attorney reviewed it 

with him, may at first blush seem alarming, in reality, 

this court is aware that attorneys will frequently fill out 

the form for their clients as a result of them being 

handcuffed while at court, but nonetheless would 

review the form with their client extensively before 

their undergoing the plea on the record. [Defendant] 

testified he met with his attorney and had an 

opportunity to review the consequences of his plea with 

counsel. He detailed the contents of this conference 

from his self-serving perspective, indicating that while 

there "actually wasn't time" to review the plea forms, 

and that they were shown to him "briefly," he had time 

to discuss the consequences of the plea as he recalls, 

and to quote the exact advice he alleges was given by 

his attorney, which notably did not include any 

reference to the consequences detailed in Paragraph 7 

of S-1, but included essentially all of the other 

consequences of [d]efendant's plea. Yet the question 
10 A-0320-22

was answered and acknowledged by [defendant] on the

record. The very page where this consequence is 

detailed is signed by [defendant], with his signature 

being acknowledged by him, on the record, under oath 

in open court. This court cannot find, by a 

preponderance of the evidence presented by 

[d]efendant, that there has been a substantial denial of 

his constitutional rights, including his right to effective 

assistance of counsel. [Defendant] seeks to expand the 

reach of Bellamy[2] by insisting that the court taking the 

plea should have specifically asked [defendant] 

question 7 verbatim, rather than asking if he had 

reviewed each and every question and answered the 

questions honestly. Bellamy directed the Criminal 

Practice Committee and the Administrative Director to 

revise the plea form to "include an appropriate 

reference to the Act for use in all cases where defendant 

pleads guilty to a predicate offense under the Act." 

This has been the status of the law regarding this type 

of plea since 2003 and no reviewing court has seen fit 

to change or find fault with the procedure whereby a 

plea of this type is taken. With regard to the claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel . . . , [defendant] has 

not shown that counsel was deficient, and while that is 

a necessary component of that claim, [defendant] has 

also not shown a reasonable likelihood of succeeding 

or that the outcome of the proceeding would have been 

different, other than his self-serving testimony that he 

believed he was innocent of the charge and would have 

gone to trial if he knew of the potential for indefinite 

civil commitment, which testimony is wholly lacking in 

credibility. 

This appeal followed. 

2

 State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127 (2003). 
11 A-0320-22

II. 

Defendant now raises the following points for our consideration: 

POINT I 

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT [DEFENDANT] 

[PCR] BECAUSE PLEA COUNSEL FAILED TO 

ADVISE HIM OF THE POTENTIAL FOR CIVIL 

COMMITMENT, WHICH CONSTITUTED THE 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND A 

FUNDAMENTAL INJUSTICE. 

A. New Jersey law requires defense attorneys 

and criminal courts to ensure that defendants 

pleading guilty to certain offenses know that they 

may one day be subject to civil commitment. 

B. The PCR court's factual findings are not 

supported by the record and ignored misleading 

statements by plea counsel and the court 

contained in the plea record. 

POINT II 

[DEFENDANT] ASKS THIS COURT TO GRANT 

HIM [PCR], ALLOW HIM TO WITHDRAW HIS 

GUILTY PLEA, AND ORDER HIS IMMEDIATE 

RELEASE FROM CIVIL COMMITMENT. 

Having considered defendant's contentions in light of our deferential 

standard of review following an evidentiary hearing on PCR, we conclude the 

judge's findings "are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." 

See Nash, 212 N.J. at 540. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by
12 A-0320-22

Judge Nancy Ridgway in her well-reasoned written opinion that accompanied 

the order under review. We add only the following comments. 

As a preliminary matter, we reject the State's argument, raised in its 

responding brief, that defendant's petition was procedurally barred and 

untimely. Noting defendant's direct appeal failed to challenge his sexual assault 

plea or conviction, the State argues defendant's petition is procedurally barred 

pursuant to Rule 3:22-4. The State also contends defendant's petition was 

untimely filed under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1), because it was filed more than five 

years after his JOC was entered and more than one year after he was transferred 

to the STU. The State did not move for leave to appeal from the PCR judge's 

December 9, 2021 decision granting an evidentiary hearing and thereby 

excusing the procedural and timeliness bars.3 

In her July 26, 2022 decision denying PCR, the judge amplified her 

reasons for considering defendant's petition and granting a hearing: 

The court accepted the cause of the delay as 

argued by [defendant] and permitted the time bar to be 

expanded. If the extent and cause of the delay was due 

[to defendant]'s expectations and understanding of his 

plea and the consequences of same, and were the cause 

of the delay, as exacerbated by the C[OVID]-19 

[p]andemic, it would be appropriate to allow this matter 

to be determined by the court. If found to be factual, 

3

 It is unclear from the record whether the judge entered a memorializing order. 
13 A-0320-22

[defendant]'s claim would be of great importance for 

future courts when obtaining a knowing and voluntary 

plea under the Act and requires further inquiry as to 

whether there has been an injustice sufficient to relax 

the limitation. In order to assess [defendant]'s claim the 

court also determined an evidentiary hearing should be 

permitted. 

Based on the confluence of factors presented in this matter, we neither discern 

any error in the judge's decision to address the merits of defendant's claims nor 

to do so following an evidentiary hearing. 

We turn to the contentions raised in defendant's first point. For the first 

time on appeal, defendant argues the Supreme Court's decision in State v. 

Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 138 (2009), when viewed in conjunction with its 

decision in Bellamy, mandates the trial court explicitly inquire whether a 

defendant understands the entry of a guilty plea to certain sexual offenses could 

result in civil commitment. Defendant contends his matter is similar to the 

defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Nuñez-Valdez. Defendant 

argues in that case, the "Court accepted the defendant's factual claims that plea 

counsel misinformed him about the deportation consequences of his plea" even 

though the defendant had completed the plea form with plea counsel, who 

"circled 'yes' next to the question, 'Do you understand that if you are not a United 
14 A-0320-22

States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty?'" 

See id. at 141. Defendant's argument is misplaced. 

"A defendant asserting plea counsel's assistance was ineffective may meet 

the first prong of the Strickland[4] standard if the defendant can show counsel's 

representation fell short of the prevailing standards expected of criminal defense 

attorneys." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 624 (App. Div. 2023) (citing 

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010)). Accordingly, a defense 

attorney must not "provide misleading, material information that results in an 

uninformed plea." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 353 (2012) (quoting NuñezValdez, 200 N.J. at 139-40). "Plea counsel's performance will not be deemed 

deficient if counsel has provided the defendant 'correct information concerning 

all of the relevant material consequences that flow from such a plea.'" Vanness, 

474 N.J. Super. at 624 (quoting State v. Agathis, 424 N.J. Super. 16, 22 (App. 

Div. 2012)); see also Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. at 138-39. 

4

 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring a defendant 

seeking PCR on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds to demonstrate: (1) 

the particular manner in which counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that 

the deficiency prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial); see also State v. Fritz, 

105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey). 
15 A-0320-22

Unlike the defendant in Nuñez-Valdez, defendant in the present matter 

does not assert his plea counsel provided affirmatively inaccurate, false, or 

misleading information about the consequences of his plea. Nor did defendant 

demonstrate that plea counsel failed to inform him about the potential civil 

commitment consequences. 

Rather, the judge discredited defendant's "self-serving" testimony, which 

was belied by the record evidence. That evidence included defendant's signature 

on the supplemental plea form, reflecting defendant answered, "Yes," to the 

"Civil Commitment" question and defendant's colloquy with the trial court 

confirming he had reviewed all the plea forms – "item by item" – with his 

attorney. Further, although the judge granted defendant's application for an 

evidentiary hearing, defendant failed to call plea counsel as a witness or present 

any other evidence in support of his claim. 

In summary, we discern no basis to disturb the PCR judge's decision. Any 

remaining contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.