alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Small Business Administration [Disaster Declaration #20168; CALIFORNIA Disaster Number CA-20006 Declaration of Economic Injury]
 AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.
 ACTION: Notice.
 SUMMARY: This is a notice of an Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) declaration for the State of California dated 01/26/2024. *Incident:*
                         Interstate 10 Fire and Road Closures. *Incident Period:*
                         11/11/2023 through 11/19/2023.
 DATES: Issued on 01/26/2024. *Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date:*
                         10/28/2024.
 ADDRESSES: *Visit the MySBA Loan Portal at https://lending.sba.gov*
                         to apply for a disaster assistance loan.
 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alan Escobar, Office of Disaster Recovery & Resilience, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW, Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205-6734.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of the Administrator's EIDL declaration, applications for disaster loans may be submitted online using the MySBA Loan Portal 
                    *https://lending.sba.gov*
                     or other locally announced locations. Please contact the SBA disaster assistance customer service center by email at 
                    *disastercustomerservice@sba.gov*
                     or by phone at 1-800-659-2955 for further assistance. The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected by the disaster: *Primary Counties:*
                     Los Angeles *Contiguous Counties:*
                     California Kern, Orange, San Bernardino, Ventura. The Interest Rates are: PercentBusiness and Small Agricultural Cooperatives without Credit Available Elsewhere
4.000Non-Profit Organizations without Credit Available Elsewhere
3.250
 The number assigned to this disaster for economic injury is 201680. The State which received an EIDL Declaration is California. (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008) Isabella Guzman, Administrator.


[FR Doc. 2024-02013 Filed 1-31-24; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8026-09-P
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-23-00183-CR

ELIAS MARTINEZ-VARGAS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 19th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020-700-C1

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Elias Martinez-Vargas appeals his conviction of three counts of Aggravated Sexual 

Assault of a Child. The judgments were signed on June 2, 2022. Martinez-Vargas’ notice 

of appeal was due July 5, 2022. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). It's filing on June 21, 2023, 

is untimely. 

Martinez-Vargas also presented a motion for an extension of time to file his notice 

of appeal. It is untimely as well. See id. 26.3. When both the notice of appeal and the 

motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal are untimely, we have no 
Martinez-Vargas v. State Page 2

jurisdiction to grant an out of time appeal; that authority belongs exclusively to the Court 

of Criminal Appeals through a writ of habeas corpus. See Parr v. State, 206 S.W.3d 143, 

144-45 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.).

We have no jurisdiction of an untimely appeal, and this appeal must be dismissed. 

See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (no appellate jurisdiction 

where notice of appeal is untimely). Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.1

Martinez-Vargas’ motion for leave and motion for extension of time are also 

dismissed.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray, 

Justice Johnson, and 

Justice Smith 

Appeal dismissed

Motions dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed July 26, 2023

Do not publish

[CR25]

1 Even if Martinez-Vargas’ notice of appeal was timely, this appeal would still be dismissed because 

Martinez-Vargas pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain and the trial court's certificate of right of appeal 

indicates Martinez-Vargas has no right to appeal and has waived his right to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

25.2(d) ("The appeal must be dismissed if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal 

has not been made part of the record under these rules."); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006) (plea bargain); Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (waiver of appeal).
Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly report of Megola, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB for the period ending April 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Joel Gardner, acting
in the capacity as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

                                /s/ Joel Gardner
                                ----------------
                                Joel Gardner
                                CEO and CFO
                                June 19, 2006
SUSANA MARTINEZ Governor JOHN A. SANCHEZ Lieutenant Governor January 24, 2012 

### NEW MEXICO ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT 

### AirQuality Bureau
1301 SilerRoad, Building B Santa Fe, NM 87507 Phone (505) 476-4300 Fax (505) 476-4375 www.nmenv.state.nm.llS DAVEMARTIN CabinetSecretary BUTCHTONGATE Deputy Secretary

Mr. Michael Feldman Environmental Engineer AirPlanning Section

- 6PD-L U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency, Region6 1445 Ross Avenue Dallas, Texas 75202 RE: New Mexico DustControl Measures DearMr. Feldman: The New Mexico Environment Department currently has two Natural Events Action Plans in place in southern New Mexico; one for Dona Ana County and one for Luna County. Both of these plans are on our website at http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/agbINEAP/dona ana2.html for Dona Ana County and at http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/agbINEAPlLuna Co.html for Luna County. Dust control ordinances have been adopted by Dona Ana and Luna counties and by the cities ofLas Cruces and Deming. Copies ofthe Natural Events Action Plans and the ordinances are enclosed. In addition to these dust control measures, the City of AlbuquerquelBernalilio County Air Quality Division enforces a dust control regulation adopted by the AlbuquerquelBernalillo CountyAir Quality Control Board (20.11.20 NMAC). A copy ofthatregulation is also enclosed. Please let me know ifyou need additional information regarding dust control measures currently inplace inNew Mexico. Sincerely,

Rita Bates Planning SectionChief
S. 2153

One Hundred Fourth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,

the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six

An Act

To designate the United States Post Office building located in Brewer, Maine,

as the ‘‘Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain Post Office Building’’, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF JOSHUA LAWRENCE CHAMBERLAIN

POST OFFICE BUILDING.

The United States Post Office building located at 22 Parkway

South, Brewer, Maine, shall be known and designated as the

‘‘Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain Post Office Building’’.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, record,

or other paper of the United States to the United States Post

Office building referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be

a reference to the ‘‘Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain Post Office

Building’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Macreport.net, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the three month period ended February 29, 2004 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, V. William Lucchetti, Jr., Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and
President (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Accounting and Financial
Officer) of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


/s/  V. William Lucchetti, Jr.
----------------------------------
     V. William Lucchetti, Jr.
     Chief Executive Officer


April 14, 2004
**Exhibit 32.2**
**SARBANES-OXLEY ACT SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION**
     In connection with this annual report on Form 10-K of MeriStar HospitalityCorporation (the “Issuer”) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),I, Donald D. Olinger, Chief Financial Officer of the Issuer, hereby certifypursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C 78mor 78o(d)); and  2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, inall material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Issuer.
Date: March 15, 2004         /s/ Donald D.Olinger   Donald D. Olinger   Chief Financial OfficerMeriStar Hospitality Corporation
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

**____________** No. 23 - 10147 Summary Calendar

**____________ United States of America,**  Plaintiff

— Appellee **,** versus **Keenan Fisher,** Defendant

— Appellant **.**

**______________________________** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 2:22
- CR
- 66 - 1

**______________________________** Before **Smith, Higginson,** and **Engelhardt,** Circuit Judges **. Per Curiam**  **:** ***** The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Keenan Fisher has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Fisher has no t filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We

**_____________________** * This opinion is not designated for publication. See **5th Cir .**  **R .**  47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 23, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 23-10147 Document: 00516868860 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/23/2023No. 23
- 10147

2 concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for le ave to withdraw is **GRANTED** , counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the appeal is **DISMISSED** . See **5th Cir. R.** 42.2 . Case: 23-10147 Document: 00516868860 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/23/2023
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, November 04, 2021. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, November 04, 2021 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A22I0056. COURSON'S TIRE CENTER, INC. d/b/a COURSON TIRE et al. v. ANNIE PEARL BLACK.
Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: SUS2019000624
Reinstated; Vacated and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed May 2 2 ,

2014

.

In The



## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 12

- 00913

- CV

LEON THOMAS , Appellant

V.
CHANDRA JONES , Appellee

On Appeal from the 58th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Tria l Court Cause No. A

- 189,572

- A



### M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
This is an appeal f

rom a partial summary judgment signed August 22, 2012, which was made final by an order of severance signed September 13, 2012. Appellee Chandra Jones sued appellant for personal injuries after an automobile
accident. After Santa Fe Auto Insurance Company, appellant’s insurer, was placed into receivership by the State of Texas and later declared insolvent
, the appeal was abated pursuant to the Texas Insurance Code. See Tex. Ins. Code §§ 44 3.008(d) ;2

462.309. After expiration of t he period for a stay as set out in Section 462.309, appellee requested that we continue the abatement of this appeal so that the parties’ settlement of the underlying dispute could be completed. We granted the motion
and extended the abatement. On May 15, 2014, the parties filed an agreed motion to vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with their settlement agreement

. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1 (a)(2) . The motion is granted

. Accordingly, we reinstate the appeal and order the trial court’s judgment signed August 22, 2012 , vacated and set aside without regard to the merits. We
remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the parties’ settleme nt agreement.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Donovan and Brown

.
#### James GRIFFEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 33025.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 5, 1961.

*884John C. Cutler, Houston, Roy H. Bray (on appeal only), Houston, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DICE, Commissioner.

Upon a trial before the court without a jury, appellant was convicted of unlawfully possessing policy paraphernalia, and his punishment assessed at 30 days in jail and a fine of $500.

Officers, armed with a search warrant, went to a certain house in the City of Bryan to search for gambling equipment. Upon being admitted inside by appellant, the officers proceeded to search the house and found various articles of policy paraphernalia therein. It was shown that at the time of the search the house was under, lease to the appellant.

Appellant objected to the evidence offered by the State of the search on the ground that the search warrant was invalid fpr various reasons.

Appellant’s first contention on appeal is that the affidavit for the search warrant and. the warrant itself are both fatally defective because of the uncertainty of the> party alleged to be in charge of and in control of the premises to be searched.

The affidavit, which by reference was made a part of the search warrant, described the premises as

> “ * * * a certain place in Brazos County, Texas, described as the third white frame house on the right side of the road,, beyond Adams Store, 4308 Highway 6,. North', going north on Highway 6, North from Bryan, Texas, and being the premises under the control of and in charge of a Mrs. Gunn, or others, whose address and identity are unknown * * *

The warrant to search for gambling paraphernalia was authorized under Title 6 of Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. and Art. 633, Vernon’s Ann.P.C. Cagle v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 354, 180 S.W.2d 928.

In Cágle v. State, supra, a similar affidavit and warrant was held sufficient under the statutes to authorize a search for gambling paraphernalia.

We are unable to agree with appellant that the use of the word “or” in the affidavit rendered the same uncertain and meaningless under the rule generally applied to the use of the term “and/or” in a legal instrument.

It is next contended that the affidavit for the search warrant did not allege sufficient facts to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. In the affidavit, the affiant swore that the house in question

> “ * * * is a place where implements are kept for the purpose of aiding in the commission of offenses as defined by the Penal Code of the State of Texas, to-wit: the establishment and operation of a' lottery, to-wit: Keno Cards and other paraphernalia.”

: Such was a sufficient statement under oath to authorize issuance of the warrant. Cagle v. State, supra, and Griffey v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 327 S.W.2d 585.

Finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and no reversible error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.

WOODLEY, P, J., absent.
#### COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS, Appellant, v. J. T. HERRELL, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 24, 1964.

Robert L. Montague, III, Frankfort, for appellant.

Joseph- K. Beasley, Harlan, Joseph J. Leary, Marion Rider, Frankfort, for ap-pellee.

DAVIS, Commissioner.

The Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Department of Military Affairs sued J. T. Herrell in the Franklin Circuit Court seeking recovery of $28,809, allegedly obtained by Herrell from 88 veterans who assigned their bonus claims to him. The bonus claims in question arose pursuant to the provisions of KIRS Ch. 40. The complaint as amended was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds (1) that the Commonwealth and the Department of Military Affairs are without legal right to maintain the action, and (2) that any cause of action which might exist is vested exclusively in the veteran.

The Commonwealth and Department of Military Affairs appeal, challenging the two grounds just stated.

The parties agreed in pretrial conference as follows: (1) each of the 88 veterans filed proper application for bonus and each was entitled to bonus; (2) the Department of Military Affairs mailed, properly stamped and addressed, to each of the 88 veterans a check in payment of such bonus; these checks were properly endorsed in some instances by the veteran in person, and in others by the appellee as authorized attorney in fact; the checks were paid by the Treasurer of Kentucky; (3) the 88 veterans referred to in the complaint have no right of action or claim against the Commonwealth or the Department of Military Affairs for the payment of the bonus; and (4) no assignment of the claims of the veterans to the appellee was received by, tendered or presented to any officer of the Commonwealth prior to the issue of the 88 checks, nor were the proceeds of the checks hypothecated, to any person prior to their being issued with knowledge of the Commonwealth or its Department of Military Affairs.

No statutory provision specifically affords any authority to the Commonwealth or the Department of Military Affairs to maintain this action. None is cited to us, nor are we able to discover any. The Department insists that it has legal standing to maintain this action; it asserts this prerogative is implied by KRS 40.230 authorizing the administrator of the Department to make rules and regulations for the implementation of KRS, Ch. 40. We do not construe that statute as affording basis for this action.

The Commonwealth and its Department of Military Affairs have discharged fully the bonus payments due the 88 veterans. None *835of the veterans makes complaint in this action. We can perceive no basis whereby the Commonwealth or Department of Military Affairs has any proprietary interest in the proceeds of the checks.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### George W. BLANDIN, Appellant, v. The FIRST-WICHITA NATIONAL BANK OF WICHITA FALLS, Independent Executor of Estate of Vesta Harriett Blandin, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 16695.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

Jan. 14, 1966.

Short & Smith, and Donald E. Short, Wichita Falls, for appellant.

Prothro & Sellers, and Lee Sellers, Wichita Falls, for appellee.

RENFRO, Justice.

The First-Wichita National Bank of Wichita Falls, Independent Executor of the Estate of Vesta Harriett Blandin, deceased, and George W. Blandin were joint owners of considerable personal and real property. Upon application of the Bank a receiver was appointed over the property.

Defendant appealed from the order of appointment on four points of error. We have studied the entire record and have found they present no reversible error. The points are not discussed, however, for the reason hereinafter set forth.

The only relief prayed for by plaintiff was for the appointment of a receiver to protect, preserve, save and operate the property, and on final trial a partition of the property.

It has properly been made to appear to us that since the appeal was perfected plaintiff and defendant have settled their differences.

On November 19, 1965, plaintiff executed and delivered to defendant warranty deeds to all of the real property and bills of sale to all of the personal property involved in the receivership. Possession of all property, real and personal, was delivered to defendant. Plaintiff no longer claims any interest in any of the property.

There is no property for the receiver to manage or operate. The record does not *664show that the receiver ever assumed control over any of the property. In any event it is now in the ownership and possession of defendant with no other person claiming any interest therein.

By necessary implication, if not expressly, the receivership was for all practicable purposes terminated when plaintiff sold all the property involved to the defendant and surrendered possession to him; hence the appeal as to the propriety of the appointment of a receiver has become moot. McMurrey v. McMurrey, 168 S.W.2d 944 (Fort Worth Civ.App., 1943, no writ hist.). There no longer exists a controversy between the parties. An appellate court will not retain jurisdiction to decide a controversy after the parties settle it. James v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 133 S.W.2d 183 (Waco Civ.App., 1939, no writ hist.); 3 Tex.Jur.2d 315, § 51. The existence of an actual controversy is essential to an exercise of appellate jurisdiction; Dowlen v. Amarillo Independent School Dist., 175 S.W.2d 288 (Amarillo Civ.App., 1943, ref. w. m.). Validity of an interlocutory order to which an appeal has been taken will not be passed upon, when the appeal becomes moot, merely to determine a question of cost. Robinson v. State, 87 Tex. 562, 29 S.W. 649 (1895).

The appeal is dismissed.