Honorable L, W. Pollard 

County Attorney 

Kerr County 

Ksrrville, Texas 

Dear Sir: Opinion Elumber'O-4939 

Re: Whether stihool district may remove 

building frbm land deeded to dlstrlct for school purposes aft&r 

abandonment thereof~and reversion 

to original grantor. 

We have received your letters of October 19 and 26~, 

1942, relative to the above captioned subject. You enclosed 

therevlth a copy of a letter written by you to the Prssldent' 

of the Board of Trustees of the Harper Independent School Dlstrlct. We quote the following from that letter: 

"As requested by you, I have checked into the 

follovFng proposition. Some fev year8 ago a 

tract of land was deeded to the Comirion School 

District in the Harper area, which ha~5 been taken 

inland is now a part of the Harper Independent 

School DlstrLct, This deed has a reversionary 

clause in it as to the effect that in the event 

the property so conveyed was not used for school 

purposes the title thereto would revert to the 

original grantors. After that, the property was 

voted Into the Harper Independent School District 

by the member8 in the Common School District and 

is now a part of the Harper Independent School 

District which takes In a part of Gillespie and 

Kerr Counties. The property in question being 

situated in Kerr County, Texas. 

"As I understand., the property as originally 

deeded, was vithout any improvements but that 

improvements for use were placed thereon by the 

Common School District before the question of 

abandonment occurrwd,and the property ts hot now 

being airectly used for school purposes, although 

you are storing some equipment in the building, 

but no active use has been made of the building 

for the past several years by the Independent 

School District. 
. . 

1 

Honorable L. W. Pollard, page #2 o-4939 

"The proposition you have submitted to me was 

whether or not the Independent School District 

had a right to remove a building erected thereon 

by the Common School District. It is my opinion, 

although I have found no authorities on this question, that the District would have a right to remove such improvements which were placed thereon 

by the Common School District prior to the abandonment thereof for school purposes. Therefore, ~the 

sole question to be determined in this case, aside 

from the one mentioned above, is whether the property has been abandoned for school purposes. The 

information you gave me Is that you have ceased to 

use the building for school purposes, but equipment 

of this nature, which has had no active use, has 

been stored In this buildlng for a number of gears, 

"In view of the fact, it Is therefore my opinion 

that the property has been abandoned for school 

purposes and the title thereto reverts to the 

original grantor, together with all the lmprovements situated thereon, save and except such personal property you may have located ln this bulldlng which belongs to the Harper Independent School 

District. As an ordinary proposition at law, it 

seems to be elementary that improvements built on 

another man's property goes with the property, But 

In this case, if the Improvements had not been removed before the abandonment occurred, then I don't 

think there is any question that the District would 

have any rights to remove the property. This Is 

merely cormnon reasoning D " 

The question In which you are Interested Is stated In 

your letter of October 2&h, as follows: 

"Whet%r or not the Independent School District of arper, Texas as a successor of the 

Common School District, has a right to remove 

a bulldlng from the property which was deeded 

to the Common School by Individuals, with a 

condition, that If the property ceased to be 

used as school property, the title thereto would 

revert to the grantors, their heirs and assigns." 

We do not have a copy of the deed for examination, nor 

do we feel that we have sufficient lnformatlon to pass upon 

the question of abandonment. We surmise from your letters that 

there seems to be little doubt among the parties concerned that 

the property has been abandoned. We think It sufflclent to say 

that it has been held that the use of a building for the stor- 
Honorable L. W. Pollard, page #3 o-4939 

age of school furniture, books, etc., is not for "school purposes' and does not prevent an abandonment of the property 

under a deed specifying that the property was to be used for 

such purposes and containing a reversionary clause. See Putney v:SchoolDlst. No. 4 of Town of Brookfield (Wise.), 255 

N.W. 76; Richey v. Corralltos Union SchoolDist. of Santa 

Crux County (Callf.), 228 P. 348. However,~we think that so 

long as the property Is being used for school purposes, the 

school district could make such improvements OP remove the 

same as would best serve such school purposes. 

We shall now pass to the question of whether a school 

district may remove the school building after the-property has 

been abandoned for school purposes and, therefore, has reverted 

to the grantor. ~The property as orlginallg conveyed was without Improvements, but the school district subsequently built 

a schoolhouse thereon, 

We quote the following excerpts from Texas Jurisprudence, 

pages 950, 951, and 958: 

"School trustees ordinarily have the exclusive control and management of school property 

and exclusive possession thereof. In exercising 

this discretion they may locate and construct 

district buildings upon such sites, and In accordance with such plans and s~eclficatlons as 

in their judgment seem proper. 

'* * *~The laws of Texas, by Implication at 

least, require that the exclusive ownership and 

control of school buildings of a district shall 

be In the trustees thereof," 

After an exhaustive research, we have found only one 

Texas case precisely on the question of the removal of a school 

house after the abandonment of property conveyed under a deed 

for school purposes and containing a reversionar 

T 

clause thereSuch case Is Allen et ux v, Franks et al. 

,'& S.W. 384. 

W. E. Ref.), 

Plaintiffs had conveyed certain property to the trustees of a school district and their successors, and the deed 

of conveyance contained the following stipulation: "Conditioned 

that when the above-described land ceases to be used as school 

purposes, the same shall revert to us.' Thereaf,ter, with money 

obtained through contributions by citizens of the school community a schoolhouse was erected on the property. Defendants 

as successors to the former trustees to whom the deed was executed decided to consolidate the district with another district, 
. - 

Honorable L. W. Pollard, page #4 o-4939 

to move the house upon another location, and to abandon the 

land upon which the house was originally built. Plaintiffs 

instituted suit to enjointhe .removal of the building and alleged that the building was part of the realty, that the land 

had been abandoned, and that by reason thereof the building as 

well as the land had reverted to them. It was contended that 

the contributions for the building were mad,e with the distinct 

understanding with the trustees that the building was to remain upon the land permanently,-~ The court, after citing Artlcles 2822, 2844,-~2845, 2847, and 2849,, R.S. 1911 (Articles 

2748, 2752, 2754, and 2756, R.C.S., 19251, denied plalntlffs 

any relief and h-old that the trustees could remove the school 

building when the land ceased to be used for school purposes. 

We quote the following from the opinion of the court: 

"When the funds were donated for the construction of the building, the title thereto 

passed to the trustees, and the building erected with such funds became subject to the provisions of the statutes above quoted. When 

the contributions were made for the erection 

of the building, persons making such contrlbutions must be held to a knowledge of the statutory provisions giving absolute control of the 

bullding to the trustees and prohibiting the 

fixin: ;f,a+li:n of any character upon the build- 

-a. * 

"If, at the time of the erection of the house, 

the trustees could make it a part of the realty 

by their intention to make it a permanent lmprovement upon the land, or by erecting the same 

without forming any Intention at the time that 

they or their successors In office might remove 

it from the land In the event of a decision to 

abandon the land for school purposes, then they 

could control the title to the house Indefinitely. 

Under express provision of the statutes title to 

the house became vested in the trustees and their 

successors in office as trustees for those to be 

benefited thereby 'under such FUleB as may be established by the state superintendent.' To give 

appellants' deed the construction lnslsted upon 

would, in effect, be to say that the trustees who 

received the deed would have the authority themselves to vest in appellants title to the schoolhouse wlthout receiving any consideration therefor 

and would have authority to bind their successors 

in office to do the same. Clearly, this would 

not be in the Interest of the patrons of the school 
Honorable L, W. Pollard, page #5 o-4939 

and thus deprive them of title to school property 

would be a breach of trust and contrary to public 

policy l * *ll. 

'Certainly it was not within the spirit or 

intention of the statute that those who were 

beneficially interested In the building could 

be deprived of title thereto without receiving 

any consideration therefor by any arbitrary act 

of the trustees who erected it, when the purpose 

of such act was not to subserve any interest of 

the beneficiaries." 

There would be even more reason for the court to hold 

as it did If the building had been erected with tax moneys. 

Other states have reached apparently conf~llcting results. 

See Steel v. Rural Special School District No. 15 (Ark. Sup: 

Ct.), 20 S.W. (2d) 316; Webster County Board of Educatlon'v; 

Gentry (Kg. Ct. App.), 24 S.W. (2d) 910. AN earlier Texas case 

might be construed as being somewhat inconslstent with the 

Allen case. In the case of Stewart, v, Blaln (Clv. App.), 159 

S.W. 928, the court had before It for consideration a deed 

whereby certain property was conveyed to the county judge and 

his successors In office for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse for the benefit of the school community. The deed contained a clause "that in the event of the removal of the schoolhouse therefrom" the land should revert to the grantor or his 

heirs or assigns. A schoolhouse was builtand the property was 

used for school purposes for several years; however, thereafter 

it was not so used, and the county judge, county commissioners, 

and school trustees attempted to convey the property to defendant. Plaintiffs were heirs and assigns of the original grantor. 

The court held, In part as follows: 

"It seems to us that these provisions mean, 

and were intended to mean, that the grantees 

should own and use and enjoy the property so 

long as It was so used for the purpose for which 

It was conveyed, and that when this condition 

ceased the title and right of possession should 

at once revert to the grantor, 'or his heirs or 

assigns' +**** 

'I* * * This sale and the abandonment of the 

land for school purposes was to all intent8 and 

purposes 'a removal of the schoolhouse therefrom'. The building may be there yet, but It 

IS not a schoolhouse." 
Honorable L. W. Pollard, page #6 o-4939 

However, even though the Stewart case has been cited 

many times as authority by more recent cases, we feel that we 

are compelled to follow the Allen case. The Allen case was 

later in time than then Stewart case, and writ of error was 

refused. Also, the precise question was Involved in the'~Allen 

case, and not In the Stewart case, and if the Stewartcase 13 

inconsistent, it Is only Inferentially so. Therefore, until 

the opinion of the court In the Allen case is overruled or 

altered, we feel that we are compelled to follow the holding 

thereof. 

You are, therefore, ad,vised that where, under a deed 

containing a reversionary clause, land has been conveyed to 

a school district for school purposes only and thereafter a 

schoolhouse is erected thereon, the school district may remove such building when the property has been abandoned for 

school purpose and has reverted under the deed to the grantor. 

Very truly yours 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

GWS/s/wc 

APPROVED NOV 10, 1942 

s/Grover Sellers 

FIRST ASSISTANT 

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

By s/George W. Sparks 

George.'W. Sparks 

Assistant 

Approved Opinion Committee By s/BWB Chairman