8652 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 27 / Thursday, February 8, 2024 / Notices 

1Table 1 of Appendix A to Subpart B of 10 CFR 

830 lists acceptable methodologies for developing 

safety analyses to meet requirements in 10 CFR 830. 

Such methodologies are referred to as ‘‘safe 

harbors.’’ Throughout this document the phrase 

‘‘onsite transportation safe harbors’’ refers to both 

DOE Order 460.1D, Hazardous Materials Packaging 

and Transportation Safety, and DOE Guide 460.1– 

1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 

460.1A, Packaging and Transportation Safety, as 

they relate to the preparation of an onsite TSD for 

radioactive materials that are not of national 

security interest. 

Dated: February 5, 2024. 

Aaron T. Siegel, 

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison 

Officer, Department of Defense. 

[FR Doc. 2024–02612 Filed 2–7–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6001–FR–P 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

SAFETY BOARD 

Recommendation 2023–01 

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board. 

ACTION: Notice; recommendation. 

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board has made a 

Recommendation to the Secretary of 

Energy concerning the U.S. Department 

of Energy’s (DOE) regulatory safety 

framework related to onsite 

transportation and safety deficiencies in 

Los Alamos National Laboratory’s 

transportation safety document. 

Pursuant to the requirements of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board is publishing the 

Recommendation and associated 

correspondence with DOE and 

requesting comments from interested 

members of the public. 

DATES: Comments, data, views, or 

arguments concerning the 

recommendation are due on or by 

March 11, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments concerning 

this notice to: Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue NW, 

Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004–2001. 

Comments may also be submitted by 

email to comment@dnfsb.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tara 

Tadlock, Associate Director for Board 

Operations, Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue NW, 

Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004–2901, 

(800) 788–4016. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Recommendation 2023–1 to the 

Secretary of Energy 

Onsite Transportation Safety 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(b)(5) 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As 

Amended 

Introduction. The Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board (Board) has 

evaluated Los Alamos National 

Laboratory’s (LANL) safety basis for 

onsite transportation, detailed in the 

laboratory’s transportation safety 

document (TSD); the safe harbors 1 for 

onsite transportation of radioactive 

materials identified in the U.S. 

Department of Energy’s (DOE) Nuclear 

Safety Management rule, 10 Code of 

Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830; and 

the ability of DOE’s safety oversight 

framework to identify and correct safety 

issues with its safe harbors and the 

TSDs at its defense nuclear facilities. 

The Board identified safety 

weaknesses in LANL’s onsite TSD, 

stemming in part from weaknesses in 

the safe harbors that govern TSD 

development, and communicated its 

safety concerns to the Secretary of 

Energy in a January 6, 2022, letter. The 

National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s (NNSA) management 

and operating contractor at LANL, Triad 

National Security, LLC, implemented 

compensatory safety measures for onsite 

transportation of radioactive materials 

in March 2023, following a letter of 

direction from the NNSA Los Alamos 

Field Office (NA–LA). Triad formally 

incorporated the compensatory 

measures into revisions of the LANL 

TSD and technical safety requirements 

(TSR), which NA–LA approved in 

August 2023, with two conditions of 

approval (COA) [2]. These measures and 

COAs represent an improvement to the 

safety of onsite transportation of 

radioactive materials at LANL; however, 

more work is necessary to ensure the 

LANL TSD appropriately identifies all 

hazards, analyzes all pertinent accident 

scenarios, and evaluates the 

effectiveness of all credited safety 

controls. 

NA–LA had approved Triad’s 

deficient TSD on the basis that it met 

the applicable safe harbors for safety 

analysis identified in 10 CFR 830. Until 

DOE revises the safe harbors for onsite 

transportation of radioactive materials 

to provide clear and effective safety 

requirements, the risk remains that 

LANL or other defense nuclear sites 

may regress to inadequate TSDs that fail 

to provide an effective set of safety 

controls. The Board has concluded the 

following: 

(1) The recently approved 

compensatory safety measures are 

welcomed; however, the LANL TSD 

requirements and their implementation 

do not ensure that onsite transportation 

activities at LANL are conducted in a 

manner that ensures adequate 

protection of public health and safety; 

(2) The requirements of the safe 

harbors do not ensure that onsite 

transportation activities are conducted 

in a manner that ensures adequate 

protection of public health and safety; 

and 

(3) DOE failed to address known 

safety deficiencies in its safe harbors for 

onsite transportation of radioactive 

materials and neglected to take timely 

action to correct the safety issues with 

the LANL TSD. 

Background. 10 CFR 830 specifies 

that onsite transportation of radioactive 

materials at DOE sites may be 

conducted either in accordance with 

Department of Transportation (DOT) 

regulations or under a specific type of 

documented safety analysis (DSA) 

known as a TSD. Table 1 in Appendix 

A to Subpart B of 10 CFR 830 identifies 

the following safe harbor methodology 

for preparing DSAs/TSDs for onsite 

transportation activities: 

• Preparing a Safety Analysis Report 

for Packaging in accordance with DOE 

Order 460.1A, Packaging and 

Transportation Safety, October 2, 1996, 

or successor document; and 

• Preparing a Transportation Safety 

Document in accordance with DOE 

Guide 460.1–1, Implementation Guide 

for Use with DOE O 460.1A, Packaging 

and Transportation Safety, June 5, 1997, 

or successor document. 

Following a safety review of the 

LANL TSD, the Board identified safety 

issues with both the LANL TSD and the 

onsite transportation safe harbors in 10 

CFR 830. The Board documented these 

safety issues in a letter to the Secretary 

of Energy dated January 6, 2022. DOE 

responded on September 13, 2022, 

stating its agreement with, and plans to 

address, the Board’s safety concerns. 

However, DOE’s response only partially 

addressed the safety concerns identified 

by the Board. Furthermore, DOE did not 

ensure that LANL took timely action to 

implement compensatory measures at 

LANL that are needed to provide 

adequate protection of workers and the 

public during onsite transportation 

activities in the absence of an adequate 

TSD. 

Analysis. Attachment B, Findings, 

Supporting Data, and Analysis, provides 

additional detail and supporting 

analysis for this recommendation, the 

conclusions of which are discussed 

below. 

LANL Transportation Safety 

Document—10 CFR 830 defines a DSA 

(including TSDs) as ‘‘a documented 

analysis of the extent to which a nuclear 

facility can be operated safely with 

respect to workers, the public, and the 


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2By way of comparison, the safe harbor for DOE 

nonreactor nuclear facilities, DOE Standard 3009– 

2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Safety 

Documented Safety Analysis, applies the concept of 

an evaluation guideline (25 rem total effective dose 

for a member of the offsite public), which ‘‘the 

safety analysis evaluates against,’’ and ‘‘is 

established for the purpose of identifying the need 

for and evaluating safety controls’’ [16]. 

environment, including a description of 

the conditions, safe boundaries, and 

hazard controls that provide the basis 

for ensuring safety’’ [3]. The LANL TSD 

has fundamental flaws in critical safety 

areas and thus does not demonstrate 

that members of the public and workers 

are adequately protected during onsite 

transportation activities. 

The LANL TSD does not adequately 

(1) identify all potential hazards, (2) 

analyze accident scenarios, and (3) 

demonstrate the effectiveness of its 

safety control set. These safety issues 

are particularly concerning given the 

high material-at-risk (MAR) allowed by 

the TSD, the proximity of LANL’s onsite 

transportation routes to the public, and 

the nature of several credible accident 

scenarios. These factors result in high 

calculated unmitigated dose 

consequences to the public without an 

adequate safety control strategy. On 

January 31, 2023, Triad informed NA– 

LA that it would implement 

compensatory safety measures by late 

March 2023 and would submit a revised 

TSD with updated TSRs by June 1, 

2023. Triad implemented the 

compensatory measures procedurally on 

March 31, 2023, and submitted a revised 

TSD and TSRs that incorporated those 

measures to NA–LA for approval on 

June 1, 2023. NA–LA approved the 

revised TSD and TSRs on August 10, 

2023, with two COAs which require 

Triad to address additional NA–LA 

comments in the 2023 and 2024 annual 

update of the TSD and TSRs [2]. The 

compensatory measures and COAs 

improve the safety of LANL onsite 

transportation operations and partially 

address the LANL-specific safety issues 

that the Board raised in January 2022. 

Therefore, DOE should ensure that 

Triad continues to implement these 

compensatory measures until it 

develops a TSD in full compliance with 

10 CFR 830 that would resolve the 

safety issues of adequate protection 

identified in this recommendation. 

Onsite Transportation Directives— 

The Board identified four primary safety 

concerns with the DOE directives 

related to onsite transportation. First, 

the onsite transportation safe harbors do 

not contain all applicable requirements 

from 10 CFR 830; therefore, they do not 

ensure that TSDs meet all 10 CFR 830 

requirements. In DOE’s response to the 

Board’s January 6, 2022, letter, DOE 

asserted that 10 CFR 830 requirements 

apply ‘‘regardless of the methodology 

for DSA development that is used,’’ and 

that, consequently, 10 CFR 830 

requirements do not need to flow down 

into the onsite transportation safe 

harbors [4]. DOE’s assertion is 

inconsistent with the role of safe 

harbors, which is to provide an 

approved DSA methodology such that if 

a contractor follows the safe harbors, 

then all the requirements of 10 CFR 830 

will be fulfilled. This concern is 

illustrated by the LANL TSD: although 

the LANL TSD follows the safe harbor 

methodology specified in 10 CFR 830, it 

fails to properly derive hazard controls 

necessary to ensure adequate protection 

of workers and the public. Additionally, 

the lack of requirements in the safe 

harbors has led sites across DOE’s 

defense nuclear facilities complex to 

seek supplementary guidance from 

other documents. Specifically, several 

sites supplement guidance from the 

onsite transportation safe harbors with 

methodologies from DOE Standard 

3009–94 Change Notice 3, Preparation 

Guide for U.S. Department of Energy 

Nonreactor Nuclear Facility 

Documented Safety Analyses, for 

development and analysis of unique, 

bounding accident scenarios, including 

quantitative analysis [5]. Examples 

include the 2011 Hanford TSD, the 2015 

Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory (LLNL) TSD, and the 2017 

Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) 

TSD. The sites’ reliance on methods 

from another safe harbor to adequately 

evaluate accident conditions highlights 

the weakness of the onsite 

transportation safe harbors in meeting 

10 CFR 830 requirements, particularly 

related to the evaluation of accident 

conditions. 

Second, the onsite transportation safe 

harbors do not provide specific criteria 

against which to deterministically 

evaluate the effectiveness of the safety 

control set, leading to an incomplete 

understanding of the risk of onsite 

transportation operations.2 Instead, they 

require that TSDs demonstrate an 

equivalent level of safety to DOT and 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

regulations for offsite transportation. 

However, the onsite transportation safe 

harbors do not provide a clear definition 

of equivalent safety. In DOE’s response 

to the Board’s January 6, 2022, letter, 

DOE acknowledged that an improved 

methodology ‘‘to better document 

analyses of equivalent safety’’ was 

warranted and committed to providing 

better guidance [4]. DOE has not 

provided a timeline for that new 

guidance in its response, nor in any 

subsequent communication. 

Third, the onsite transportation safe 

harbors do not provide guidance on 

methods to control public access during 

onsite transfers conducted under TSDs. 

Restricting public access is important 

from both regulatory and safety 

perspectives, because onsite transfers 

may use roads open to the public. If 

public access is not properly restricted, 

the public could be closer to onsite 

transportation activities than intended. 

Members of the public could initiate an 

accident (e.g., vehicle crash) and could 

receive a higher radiation dose by being 

in the vicinity of a transport accident if 

a release occurred. Additionally, the 

onsite transportation safe harbors do not 

provide detailed guidance on 

controlling onsite traffic of site 

personnel. Similar to the concern with 

members of the public, site personnel 

traveling onsite in government or 

personal vehicles could initiate an 

accident during onsite transfers of 

radioactive material. At LANL in 

particular, the high operational tempo 

needed to accomplish its greatly 

expanded pit manufacturing mission 

will inevitably increase onsite traffic. 

Therefore, it is incumbent upon DOE to 

develop requirements and guidance on 

the control of site traffic during onsite 

transfers of radioactive material to 

ensure TSDs adequately address that 

hazard. 

Finally, DOE Standard 1104–2016, 

Review and Approval of Nuclear 

Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design 

Basis Documents, does not contain 

specific guidance for federal review and 

approval of TSDs. As a result, DOE 

oversight personnel do not have specific 

criteria to evaluate whether a TSD 

ensures safety and complies with the 

onsite transportation safe harbors, as 

they would have for a DOE Standard 

3009-compliant DSA. In response to the 

Board’s January 6, 2022, letter, DOE 

stated it would ‘‘review DOE–STD–1104 

to determine whether improvements are 

warranted’’ [4]. DOE’s response did not 

provide a timeline for that evaluation. 

To ensure adequate and consistent 

reviews by DOE oversight personnel 

across the defense nuclear complex, 

DOE should add review and approval 

criteria specific to TSDs to DOE 

Standard 1104–2016. 

DOE Oversight—DOE and NNSA 

failed to independently identify 

deficiencies in the onsite transportation 

safe harbors and the LANL TSD. 

Additionally, DOE and NNSA did not 

ensure that timely corrective actions 

were taken when the Board identified 

transportation safety concerns and have 

struggled to resolve safety concerns 


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when collaboration across program 

offices is required. 

DOE issued DOE Guide 460.1–1, the 

10 CFR 830 safe harbor methodology for 

preparing TSDs, in 1997 and has not 

updated it since. Practitioners at DOE’s 

defense nuclear facilities have at least 

tacitly recognized the deficiencies in the 

guide for many years. As discussed 

above, several sites use DOE Standard 

3009–94 to supplement the onsite 

transportation safe harbors in 

developing their TSDs. 

Additionally, NNSA did not resolve 

safety issues with the LANL TSD. In 

2007, an NNSA safety basis review team 

identified several of the safety issues 

discussed in this Recommendation. 

Personnel from the NNSA Packaging 

Certification Division, who were part of 

the safety basis review team, 

‘‘concluded that the TSD as submitted 

did not provide an adequate level of 

analysis to support the conclusions that 

for non DOT compliant packages the 

overall transport system provided an 

equivalent level of safety’’ [6]. To 

address these issues, NA–LA directed 

the contractor to provide quantitative 

analysis, which was included in 

subsequent revisions of the TSD. 

However, in Revision 9, which became 

effective in November 2012, the LANL 

management and operating contractor 

completely rewrote the safety analysis, 

removing the quantitative analysis. 

When approving the 2012 revision, and 

each subsequent revision, NA–LA failed 

to identify the safety issues that had 

previously been corrected. Additionally, 

NNSA’s Office of Packaging and 

Transportation conducted an 

assessment of LANL’s packaging and 

transportation program in July 2015. 

This assessment provided an 

opportunity for NNSA to identify the 

weaknesses in the LANL TSD, but it did 

not. Finally, DOE’s response to the 

Board’s January 6, 2022, letter, stated 

that ‘‘NNSA uses the Biennial Review 

process to review field office 

performance in meeting requirements 

for the review and approval of TSDs’’ 

[4]. However, these biennial reviews did 

not identify the weaknesses in NA–LA’s 

review and approval of the LANL TSD. 

The Board brought the safety concerns 

with the LANL TSD and the onsite 

transportation safe harbors to DOE’s 

attention in its January 6, 2022, letter; 

however, DOE did not take timely 

action to address them. It took more 

than a year for LANL to implement any 

compensatory measures to address the 

Board’s safety concerns. More than ten 

months passed before NA–LA 

transmitted a letter requesting that Triad 

consider a wide-ranging list of potential 

compensatory measures. NA–LA 

considered Triad’s first response on 

December 9, 2022, unsatisfactory. After 

additional discussions between Triad 

and NA–LA personnel, Triad sent a new 

letter to NA–LA on January 31, 2023, in 

which Triad agreed to implement a set 

of compensatory measures that 

represented an improvement to the 

safety posture of onsite transportation 

operations. It is noteworthy, however, 

that Triad’s letter did not acknowledge 

that the compensatory measures were 

needed to address any safety issues. 

Further, given the safety concerns 

identified with the onsite transportation 

safe harbor and LANL TSD, DOE would 

greatly benefit from conducting a 

complete extent of condition review of 

all sites’ TSDs. While the DOE Office of 

Environmental Management did 

conduct an extent of condition review 

for a subset of sites under its purview 

in 2021, it was done before the Board’s 

letter highlighted the specific safety 

issues, and therefore the review’s scope 

and approach were not informed by the 

Board’s conclusions. Moreover, the 

review was not formally documented. 

Finally, the Board is concerned with 

DOE’s ability to address safety issues 

that require collaboration across 

program offices. DOE’s September 13, 

2022, letter that responded to the 

Board’s January 6, 2022, letter 

acknowledged that DOE would need to 

evaluate ‘‘how we communicate across 

offices, engage with the field, and share 

operating experiences across the 

Department.’’ The Board concurs with 

DOE’s recognition and need for such an 

evaluation, and for DOE to take 

corrective actions to ensure effective 

collaboration in developing appropriate 

requirements in the revised onsite 

transportation safe harbors. 

In summary, DOE’s historical 

management of the safe harbors for 

onsite transportation of radioactive 

materials and the LANL TSD in 

particular indicates deficiencies in 

DOE’s ability, as the regulatory 

authority, to recognize transportation 

safety issues and ensure that timely 

action is taken to address them. 

Recommendations. To ensure 

adequate protection during onsite 

transportation activities at DOE sites 

with defense nuclear facilities, the 

Board recommends that DOE carry out 

the following actions, organized by 

topical area below: 

1. LANL Transportation Safety 

Document 

a. Revise the LANL TSD to address 

the safety concerns identified in this 

Recommendation and to comply with a 

revised safe harbor methodology per 

sub-Recommendation 2.a. 

b. Ensure compensatory safety 

measures remain in place until 

implementation of the LANL TSD 

revised per sub-Recommendation 1.a 

above. 

2. Onsite Transportation Directives 

a. Rewrite DOE safe harbors for onsite 

transportation—DOE Order 460.1D, 

Hazardous Materials Packaging and 

Transportation Safety, and DOE Guide 

460.1–1, Implementation Guide for Use 

with DOE O 460.1A, Packaging and 

Transportation Safety—to: 

i. Provide requirements and guidance 

to ensure TSDs comply with all 

applicable 10 CFR 830 safety basis 

requirements including requirements 

related to accident evaluation and 

hazard controls. 

ii. Include robust evaluation criteria 

to ensure TSDs demonstrate that safety 

controls are effective at reducing risk. 

iii. Include implementation guidance 

for restricting public access to 

transportation routes, and controlling 

onsite traffic, during onsite 

transportation of radioactive materials. 

b. Change DOE Standard 1104, Review 

and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety 

Basis and Safety Design Basis 

Documents, to incorporate requirements 

and guidance for DOE review and 

approval of TSDs. 

c. Conduct an extent of condition 

review of TSDs for DOE sites with 

defense nuclear facilities to identify any 

near-term actions necessary to ensure 

safety until the safe harbors are revised 

and implemented. 

3. DOE Oversight 

a. Perform an independent causal 

analysis for the safety issues identified 

in this Recommendation, including the 

effectiveness of DOE oversight of 

contractor TSDs, DOE’s management of 

its onsite transportation directives, and 

DOE’s evaluation of and actions in 

response to the safety issues identified 

in prior Board correspondence on onsite 

transportation safety. Identify and 

implement corrective actions to address 

appropriate causal analysis results that 

preclude recurrence of the safety issues. 

Joyce L. Connery 

Chair 

Attachment A—Risk Assessment for 

Draft Recommendation 2023–1 

In making its recommendations to the 

Secretary of Energy and in accordance with 

42 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2286a.(b)(5), 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 

(Board) shall consider, and specifically assess 

risk (whenever sufficient data exists). This 

risk assessment supports Recommendation 

2023–1, Onsite Transportation Safety. The 

Board’s Policy Statement 5, Policy Statement 

on Assessing Risk, states: 


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3The current revision of the Area G safety basis 

does not include a similar transportation accident 

scenario. 

4An enclosed cargo compartment is ‘‘an 

enclosure with floor, walls on all sides, and a roof 

in which materials are transferred’’ [22]. 

5This term comes from DOE Standard 1027– 

1992, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis 

Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 

5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. This 

standard determines which of four hazard 

categories—1, 2, 3, or less than 3—applies to a 

facility, based on the amount of nuclear material it 

contains. In this case, a hazard category 2 quantity 

equates to approximately 1 kg or more of 

plutonium-239, or equivalent. 

6 DOE defines MNSI as ‘‘Hazardous materials 

used in the development, testing, production, and 

maintenance of nuclear weapons and other 

materials that have been designated as critical to the 

national security of the United States’’ [31]. 

7Table 1 of Appendix A of 10 CFR 830, Subpart 

B, lists acceptable methodologies for developing 

safety analyses to meet requirements in 10 CFR 830. 

Such directives are referred to as ‘‘safe harbors.’’ 

Throughout this document the phrase ‘‘onsite 

transportation safe harbors’’ refers to both DOE 

Order 460.1D, Hazardous Materials Packaging and 

Transportation Safety, and DOE Guide 460.1–1, 

Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, 

Packaging and Transportation Safety, as they relate 

to the preparation of an onsite TSD for radioactive 

materials that are not of national security interest. 

Risk assessments performed in accordance 

with the Board’s revised enabling statute will 

aid the Secretary of Energy in the 

development of implementation plans 

focused on the safety improvements that are 

needed to address the Board’s 

recommendations. 

This recommendation identifies safety 

issues with (1) the Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL) transportation safety 

document (TSD), (2) the Department of 

Energy’s (DOE) onsite transportation safe 

harbors that contain the methodology for 

development of the safety basis for onsite 

transportation of radioactive materials, and 

(3) inadequate oversight from DOE and the 

National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) in identifying and addressing these 

deficiencies and safety issues. 

Development of a safety basis is one of the 

primary mechanisms by which DOE ensures 

adequate protection of workers and the 

public. To that end, DOE Policy 420.1, 

Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy, 

states that DOE is committed to 

‘‘[e]stablishing and implementing nuclear 

safety requirements,’’ with the ‘‘[k]ey nuclear 

safety elements to be addressed [to] include 

hazard identification, assessment and 

control’’ [7]. The issues identified in 

Recommendation 2023–1 with regard to the 

onsite transportation safe harbors 

demonstrate that DOE has not met this 

commitment for onsite transportation of 

radioactive material. 

Therefore, TSDs that are developed 

following this methodology may not contain 

sufficient analysis to establish appropriate 

hazard controls. This issue is illustrated by 

the LANL TSD. The LANL TSD does not 

provide adequate analysis to demonstrate 

that significant public consequences are not 

credible and does not identify and analyze 

various credible hazards. 

Since the current LANL TSD does not 

calculate the likelihood and consequence of 

a vehicle accident, the Board used data from 

previously approved LANL TSDs. The July 

2007 through March 2012 revisions of the 

LANL TSD contained quantitative analysis of 

the risk of LANL onsite transportation 

activities [8]. Those older revisions of the 

TSD referenced the ‘‘Area G Transuranic 

[TRU] Waste Transportation Accident and 

Fire’’ scenario from the Area G safety basis 

dated April 2003.3 In this accident scenario, 

a vehicle crashes or rolls over, causing a fire 

and spilling the waste containers [9]. The 

postulated material-at-risk (MAR) in this 

scenario was the maximum inventory for a 

waste transportation truck at the time (about 

17.7 kg plutonium 239, or Pu-239, 

equivalent). The estimated unmitigated dose 

consequence to the public was about 190 rem 

total effective dose (TED). 

From November 2012 through June 2023, 

the LANL TSD had a MAR limit of 20 kg Pu239 equivalent, the corresponding estimated 

dose consequence to the public is about 217 

rem TED. The 2003 Area G accident scenario 

estimated the unmitigated likelihood of the 

accident to be 10¥3 instances per year (once 

per thousand years). Additionally, the July 

2007 through March 2012 revisions of the 

TSD noted that the distance to the site 

boundary for some onsite transportation 

routes is closer than the distance to the site 

boundary for Area G. As a result, as noted in 

those TSDs, the unmitigated dose 

consequence for those transportation 

activities could be substantially higher. The 

current LANL TSD identifies some 

engineered controls (e.g., the package and 

enclosed cargo compartment 4) that may 

provide some confinement in an accident. 

However, these safety controls are not 

designed to withstand the hypothetical 

accident conditions described in the relevant 

Department of Transportation and Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission regulations. 

Therefore, the reduction in risk they provide 

is not known. Additionally, the current 

LANL TSD allows for transfers of up to 1.9 

kg Pu-239 equivalent without either a 

package or enclosed cargo compartment. 

The Area G TRU waste transportation and 

fire accident scenario is just one of many 

potential onsite transportation accidents at 

LANL involving significant MAR quantities. 

From discussions with NNSA Los Alamos 

Field Office (NA–LA) personnel, the Board 

understands that LANL averages between 30 

and 40 shipments of hazard category 2 

quantities 5 of material per year. 

In the TSD and technical safety 

requirements submitted in June 2023 and 

approved in August 2023, NNSA’s 

management and operating contractor at 

LANL, Triad National Security, LLC, 

established a reduced MAR limit of 8.8 kg 

Pu-239 equivalent for onsite transfers at 

LANL [10] [11]. Using this value for the Area 

G TRU waste transportation accident 

scenario, the estimated unmitigated dose to 

the public would be about 96 rem TED. 

Given the high dose consequence and 

likelihood of potential accident scenarios for 

onsite transportation of radioactive materials 

at LANL, together with the lack of analysis 

in the LANL TSD to show the effectiveness 

of safety controls, the Board has determined 

this recommendation is justified and 

necessary from a risk perspective. 

Attachment B—Findings, Supporting 

Data, and Analysis 

Background. Department of Energy (DOE) 

Order 460.1D, Hazardous Materials 

Packaging and Transportation Safety, states 

that DOE has ‘‘broad authority under the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as 

amended, to regulate activities involving 

radioactive materials . . . including the 

transportation of radioactive materials’’ [12]. 

In most cases, DOE uses commercial carriers 

that are regulated by the Department of 

Transportation (DOT) and/or the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC). However, in 

some cases, DOE ‘‘exercises its AEA 

authority to regulate certain Departmental 

shipments, including . . . onsite transfers’’ 

[12]. 

The order also states that onsite transfers 

of hazardous materials must be conducted in 

accordance either with ‘‘49 CFR [Code of 

Federal Regulations] Parts 171–180 and the 

relevant federal regulations governing each 

mode of transportation,’’ or a transportation 

safety document (TSD) [12]. Per DOE Order 

460.1D, a ‘‘TSD must describe the 

methodology and compliance process to meet 

equivalent safety for any deviation from 49 

CFR parts 171–180 and 49 CFR parts 350– 

399’’ and ‘‘[f]or onsite transfers involving 

nuclear facility Hazard Category 2 or 3 

quantities, the TSD must comply with the 

Safety Basis Requirements of 10 CFR part 

830, subpart B’’ [12]. 

Additionally, 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 

requires that each DOE contractor prepare a 

documented safety analysis (DSA) for 

transportation activities not covered by DOT 

regulations. Table 1 in Appendix A of 10 CFR 

830, Subpart B, provides the acceptable 

methodologies for preparing a DSA; these 

methodologies are called ‘‘safe harbors.’’ For 

transportation activities not involving 

materials of national security interest 

(MNSI),6 Table 1 identifies DOE Order 

460.1A and DOE Guide 460.1–1, 

Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 

460.1A, Packaging and Transportation Safety, 

as the safe harbors [13]. The order contains 

the methodology for preparing a safety 

analysis report for packaging, and the guide 

contains the methodology for preparing a 

TSD. 

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board (Board) conducted a safety review of 

the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) 

TSD, and identified safety issues with both 

the LANL TSD and the onsite transportation 

safe harbors.7 The Board communicated 

these safety concerns in a letter to the 

Secretary of Energy dated January 6, 2022, 

and requested that DOE provide a written 

report and briefing within 120 calendar days 

(May 6, 2022). On May 12, 2022, DOE 

responded with a letter stating that it was 

addressing the Board’s safety concerns, but 

the final report was still in process, and DOE 

anticipated transmitting the report by July 6, 

2022. On September 13, 2022, the Board 

received DOE’s written report, and DOE 


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8656 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 27 / Thursday, February 8, 2024 / Notices 

8Pipe Overpack Containers (POCs) and SAVY 

4000 containers are two types of robust packages 

used routinely at LANL in various applications. 

briefed the Board on its response on 

November 4, 2022. 

DOE’s September 13, 2022, cover letter 

stated that DOE agreed with and planned to 

address the Board’s safety concerns. 

However, the enclosed report only partially 

addressed the safety concerns identified by 

the Board. For instance, the response asserted 

that it was unnecessary to flow down 

requirements from 10 CFR 830 to the onsite 

transportation safe harbor, as the 

requirements apply regardless. However this 

is inconsistent with the role of safe harbors 

in 10 CFR 830, which describes them as 

acceptable methodologies for preparing a 

DSA (meaning that if a contractor follows the 

safe harbors, then all the requirements of 10 

CFR 830 will be fulfilled). Further, the 

response acknowledged that DOE’s safe 

harbor for development of safety bases for 

onsite transportation of radioactive materials 

was deficient but then incongruously 

contended that the LANL TSD was 

acceptable because it met the deficient safe 

harbor. 

During this time, the management and 

operating contractor responsible for the 

LANL TSD, Triad National Security, LLC 

(Triad), took no compensatory safety actions 

to ensure the safety of the public and workers 

during onsite transfers of radioactive 

material. On October 11, 2022, the National 

Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) 

Los Alamos Field Office (NA–LA) sent a 

memorandum to Triad requesting that it 

develop an impact assessment of a list of 

potential compensatory measures, propose 

revisions to those measures, and propose 

additional measures, as applicable, within 60 

days. Triad responded to the NA–LA memo 

on December 9, 2022, stating that there 

would be ‘‘minimal impact on cost, scope, 

and schedule of Laboratory operations,’’ 

because ‘‘the recommended compensatory 

measures are already included in the TSD 

implementation procedures as part of normal 

day-to-day operations’’ [14]. Triad further 

stated that it would provide the revised TSD 

and associated technical safety requirements 

(TSR) to NA–LA by June 1, 2023 [14]. In 

follow-up discussions with Board personnel, 

NA–LA indicated that Triad’s response was 

unsatisfactory. 

Following further engagement with NA– 

LA, Triad sent a new response to NA–LA on 

January 31, 2023 [15]. It discussed what 

quantities of radioactive materials would 

constitute high material-at-risk (MAR) 

transfers and provided detailed 

compensatory measures for high MAR 

transfers. Triad implemented these 

compensatory measures procedurally on 

March 31, 2023, and submitted to NA–LA for 

approval a revised TSD and TSRs which 

incorporated those measures on June 1, 2023 

[1], which NA–LA approved in August 2023, 

with two conditions of approval (COA) [2]. 

Findings 

1. LANL Transportation Safety Document 

Per 10 CFR 830, the purpose of a DSA (or 

a TSD, which is a specific type of DSA) is 

to ‘‘provide reasonable assurance that a DOE 

nuclear facility can be operated safely in a 

manner that adequately protects workers, the 

public, and the environment’’ [3]. Further, 

DOE Standard 3009–2014 says ‘‘although all 

elements of the DSA preparation are 

important, three elements—hazard analysis, 

accident analysis, and hazard control 

selection—are fundamental, because they 

determine the hazard controls needed to 

provide protection for workers, the public, 

and the environment’’ [16]. The LANL TSD 

has flaws in all three fundamental elements, 

and thus it does not demonstrate that 

members of the public or workers are 

adequately protected during onsite 

transportation activities. 

Inadequate Hazard Identification—10 CFR 

830, Subpart B, states that the safety basis 

must ‘‘identify and analyze the hazards 

associated with the work’’ [3]. The LANL 

TSD does not contain sufficient analysis for 

a number of transportation-related hazards. 

Cliffs Along Transportation Routes—The 

LANL TSD acknowledges that packages used 

for onsite transportation may not survive a 

30-foot drop and states additional controls 

are identified to compensate. Many onsite 

transfers at LANL occur along the Pajarito 

corridor, a specific section of Pajarito Road 

on the LANL footprint near facilities such as 

Area G, the Plutonium Facility, and the 

Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF). There are 

steep cliffs along one side of the road, with 

drops of significantly more than 30 feet in 

some locations. However, the LANL TSD 

makes no mention of the specific hazard of 

the cliffs [17]. During the Board’s review of 

the LANL TSD, Triad personnel identified 

guardrails and run-off distances along that 

route and stated that falling down a cliff was 

not a credible accident scenario. However, 

neither the guardrails nor the run-off 

distances are identified, credited, or shown 

to be sufficient to prevent drops down the 

cliffs in the LANL TSD. Therefore, the hazard 

posed by the cliffs along the transfer route is 

neither identified nor adequately controlled 

with the specific controls within the LANL 

TSD. 

Incompatible Materials—The LANL TSD 

identifies incompatible materials as a 

potential hazard in Table 7–1, P&T 

Hazardous Materials and Associated Design 

Basis Conditions. However, Table 7–4, 

Design Basis Conditions and Packaging 

Performance Envelope for P&T Activities, 

asserts that the packages meet Type B 

equivalent level of safety for incompatible 

materials and thus no additional safety 

controls are needed. The Type B requirement 

in 10 CFR 71.43 states there must be 

assurance that ‘‘there will be no significant 

chemical, galvanic, or other reaction among 

the packaging components, among package 

contents, or between the packaging 

components and the package contents’’ 

(emphasis added). To meet this requirement, 

the LANL TSD would need to provide 

assurance that incompatible materials will 

not be present in packages, but it currently 

does not. 

LANL’s Packaging Evaluation Program 

document states ‘‘the incompatible materials 

requirements are satisfied through shipper 

inspection . . . [and] specified in P&T–WI– 

001’’ [18]. However, there is no 

corresponding section of P&T–WI–001 to 

verify that package contents meet the 

requirements under 10 CFR 71.43 [19]. 

Furthermore, the TWF TSRs state that when 

a container is found that contains oxidizing 

chemicals or chemical incompatibilities, it is 

to be removed immediately from TWF, per 

Limiting Condition of Operation 3.2.3, 

Condition A, which would rely on onsite 

transportation to do so [20], thus violating 

the Type B requirements. 

Given that there is no inspection of 

package contents prior to transfer specifically 

dedicated to ensuring that incompatible 

materials are not present, and that the TWF 

TSR requires removal of containers 

containing incompatible materials, it can be 

assumed that transfers of incompatible 

materials may occur. Therefore, the LANL 

TSD assertion that no additional safety 

controls need to be developed to account for 

this hazard is not supported. 

Pyrophoric Materials—The LANL TSD 

previously asserted that pyrophoric materials 

were not applicable. In other words, the 

hazard of pyrophoric materials did not need 

to be further analyzed and controlled, 

because they would never be transported. 

However, in August 2020, LANL transported 

pyrophoric material that was not recognized 

as pyrophoric at the time of transfer. In early 

March 2021, after titanium metal fines 

caused sparking in the Plutonium Facility, 

additional suspect pyrophoric containers 

were transported from TWF back to the 

Plutonium Facility (the originator facility). 

After the fact, Triad completed an analysis 

that concluded the transported materials 

were not pyrophoric. 

The titanium sparking event resulted in a 

positive unreviewed safety question 

determination, and in July 2021, NA–LA 

approved an addendum to the TSD and a 

revision to the TSRs. The additional 

packaging control requires ‘‘that either a 12- 

inch POC [pipe overpack container] or a 

SAVY 4000 container inside a DOT 7A Type 

A drum be used to transport potentially 

pyrophoric material’’ 8 [21]. Triad’s analysis 

concluded the packaging configurations 

would not be ‘‘adversely impacted by the 

oxidation of limited quantities of pyrophoric 

material’’ [21]. These containers are also 

limited to specific quantities of potentially 

pyrophoric material, per the specific 

administrative control (SAC) [22]. 

However, the analysis which supports the 

addendum to the TSD, and the subsequent 

revision to the TSRs, uses a limited 

definition of pyrophoric material that only 

addresses small pieces of special nuclear 

material metal. This definition would not 

consider other potentially pyrophoric 

payloads such as plutonium oxide dispersed 

within powdered sodium. In this case, since 

the special nuclear material is not metal 

pieces, the mixture would not be classified 

as potentially pyrophoric per the addendum 

and revised TSRs. Therefore, additional 

analysis is needed to ensure that all 

potentially pyrophoric materials are analyzed 

in the TSD. 

Inadequate Accident Analysis—10 CFR 

830, Subpart B, requires that a DSA must 

evaluate ‘‘normal, abnormal, and accident 


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The LANL TSD provides no further 

fifth and sixth columns 

discuss how each of the controls listed in the 

assumptions. Moreover, the TSD does not 

discussion of initial conditions or 

either qualitative or quantitative, nor any 

unmitigated or mitigated dose consequences, 

discussion of event frequency, estimated 

description of these accidents; there is no 

specifically function 

credited (as discussed in the 

in each of the events for which they are 

Inadequate 

Control Set section below). The LANL TSD, 

requirements in 10 CFR 830. 

clearly demonstrate alignment with 

accident analysis and therefore does not 

of controls, does not constitute formal 

with its brief description of events and list 

The NNSA safety basis review team for 

shall develop additional analysis . . . that 

approval including the condition that ‘‘LANL 

LANL TSD with various conditions of 

concern. NNSA approved Revision 3 of the 

Revision 3 of the LANL TSD raised a similar 

includes quantitative estimates of the 

likelihood of credible scenarios leading to the 

of the public 

estimate of what radiological dose a member 

without TSD controls in place, as well as an 

release of nuclear materials both with and 

located at the most likely site 

section. 

entire rewrite of the safety assessment 

which made major changes, including an 

included until Revision 9 of the LANL TSD, 

[6]. The resulting quantitative analysis was 

boundary could receive’’ (emphasis added) 

Inadequate Control Set—10 CFR 830, 

credited. Rather, the LANL TSD describes 

accident scenario for which the controls are 

hazard controls in relation to each specific 

TSD does not evaluate the effectiveness of 

or mitigate identified hazards’’ [3]. The LANL 

adequacy of these controls to eliminate, limit, 

environment’’ and ‘‘demonstrate the 

protection of workers, the public, and the 

hazard controls necessary to ensure adequate 

Subpart B, requires that DSAs ‘‘derive the 

a given accident scenario

descriptions state the objective of the SSC in 

safety functions: ‘‘Safety function 

3009–2014 expands on the definition of 

defining a safety function’’ [3]. DOE Standard 

analysis’’ which ‘‘is accomplished by first 

performance in the documented safety 

definition of minimum acceptable 

B, states that safety SSCs ‘‘require formal 

scenario. Appendix A to 10 CFR 830, Subpart 

functions in the context of each accident 

feature and SAC, instead of specific safety 

generic safety functions for each design 

’’ (emphasis added) 

[16]. 

Due to the lack of specific evaluation, the 

vehicle (

credits the straps that hold the package to the 

or nonexistent. For example, the LANL TSD 

scenarios where the safety function is unclear 

LANL TSD credits controls for accident 

i.e., tie-down system) as a preventive 

system appears to provide no preventive 

package movement, for which the tie-down 

control in fire scenarios not initiated by 


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8658 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 27 / Thursday, February 8, 2024 / Notices 

9An enclosed cargo compartment is ‘‘an 

enclosure with floor, walls on all sides, and a roof 

in which materials are transferred’’ [22]. 

safety function. Further, due to the generic 

evaluation of controls, the LANL TSD fails to 

compensate for the absence of the enclosed 

cargo compartment 9 (ECC) design feature 

and the package design feature in some 

allowed transfers. For instance, the LANL 

TSD permits transfer of large packages which 

would not fit within an ECC. In these cases, 

the LANL TSD credits a SAC that prohibits 

all traffic as a replacement for the ECC safety 

function. However, the SAC does not address 

numerous accidents where prohibition of 

traffic would not replace the safety functions 

of an ECC (e.g., vehicle drop-off, vehicle 

impact from other convoy vehicles, fire 

events from vehicle malfunctions). 

Additionally, while the TSD limits the 

quantity of MAR for transfers without an ECC 

to 1.9 kg plutonium (Pu) 239 equivalent, it 

provides no quantitative analysis for this 

lower MAR limit. 

The LANL TSD also permits transfers of 

large objects that ‘‘may not fit inside any 

known package that meets the criteria’’ in the 

TSD [24]. In this situation, items such as 

large pieces of equipment or gloveboxes 

would be sealed with tape, plastic wrap, or 

other means, but this sealing method does 

not provide the same safety function as a 

package. In some cases these items may also 

be transported without an ECC. The transfer 

of large objects then can involve the loss of 

at least one, if not two, design features, 

without additional analysis, and therefore the 

remaining control set for these accident 

scenarios may not be effective. 

Significant Public Consequences—As 

previously discussed, the LANL TSD does 

not adequately identify all potential hazards, 

does not adequately analyze accident 

scenarios, and does not demonstrate the 

effectiveness of its safety control set. These 

safety issues are particularly concerning 

given the high MAR limits, the proximity of 

transportation routes to the offsite public, 

and the nature of several credible accident 

scenarios (e.g., vehicle fire events). These 

factors result in the possibility of high 

unmitigated dose consequences to the offsite 

public. 

The July 2007 through March 2012 

revisions of the LANL TSD contained 

quantitative analysis of the risk of LANL 

onsite transportation activities. These older 

revisions of the TSD referenced the Area G 

transuranic (TRU) waste transportation 

accident and fire scenario from the Area G 

safety basis dated April 2003. In this accident 

scenario, a vehicle crashes or rolls over, 

causing a fire and spilling the waste 

containers. The postulated MAR in that 

scenario was the maximum inventory for a 

truck at the time, which was about 17.7 kg 

Pu-239 equivalent, and the estimated 

unmitigated dose consequence to the public 

was about 190 rem. From November 2012 to 

June 2023, the LANL TSD allowed up to 20 

kg Pu-239 equivalent MAR; therefore, the 

corresponding estimated dose consequence 

to the public would have been about 217 

rem. The 2003 Area G accident scenario had 

an estimated likelihood of 10 3 instances 

per year (once per thousand years). 

Additionally, the July 2007 through March 

2012 revisions of the LANL TSD noted that 

the distance to the site boundary for some 

onsite transportation routes is closer than the 

distance to the site boundary for Area G; 

therefore, the July 2007 through March 2012 

revisions stated the unmitigated dose 

consequence for those transportation 

activities could be substantially higher. 

The MAR limit within the November 2012 

to June 2023 versions of the LANL TSD was 

based on ‘‘an analysis of historical and 

potential future operations,’’ with a review of 

several years of data of onsite transfers, and 

the ‘‘maximum amount of material 

transferred during this time frame was 

approximately 18 kg Pu-239 equivalent 

material’’ [17], thus the ‘‘MAR limit of 20 kg 

Pu-239 equivalent is bounding for historical 

operations, and is expected to be bounding 

for future operations’’ [22]. However, as 

stated in DOE Standard 1189–2016, 

Integration of Safety Into the Design Process, 

a step in an inherently safe design process is 

to consider the ‘‘removal or reduction of 

hazards before controls need to be 

developed,’’ for example, through ‘‘reducing 

the amount of hazardous material present at 

any one time’’ [25]. Rather than basing the 

MAR limit on historical operations, 

consideration should be given to reducing 

MAR to the lowest practicable amount. Other 

sites’ TSDs contain much lower MAR limits 

than LANL’s. For example, LLNL and NNSS 

both specify a MAR limit of 5 kg Pu-239 

equivalent. 

Current Compensatory Measures—Given 

the deficiencies in the LANL TSD, it cannot 

be relied upon to ensure adequate protection 

of the public or workers during onsite 

transportation activities. Therefore, until the 

LANL TSD is revised to address the above 

safety concerns and/or is revised to comply 

with an improved safe harbor methodology, 

compensatory measures are warranted to 

ensure safety. 

As discussed previously, on October 11, 

2022, NA–LA transmitted a memo to Triad, 

with an enclosure containing proposed 

compensatory measures, requesting that 

Triad develop an impact assessment of the 

proposed compensatory measures, propose 

revisions to those measures, and propose 

additional measures, as applicable, within 60 

days. The majority of NA–LA’s proposed 

compensatory measures were related to 

improvements to existing SACs that would 

have minor impact on overall safety posture. 

For instance, NA–LA proposed a 

compensatory measure to revise the language 

of the road condition restrictions SAC to 

include a requirement to check the weather 

within two hours. While more prescriptive 

wording in SAC language would be an 

improvement, this action is already in place 

per implementing procedures, and therefore 

this change would have a minor impact. The 

most impactful proposed compensatory 

measures from NA–LA were related to MAR 

limits, packaging, and traffic restrictions. 

Triad’s second response to the NA–LA letter 

on January 31, 2023, outlined the 

compensatory measures it planned to 

implement within 60 days and incorporate in 

the TSD and TSRs by June 1, 2023. Triad 

implemented these compensatory measures 

procedurally on March 31, 2023, and 

submitted for NA–LA approval a revised TSD 

and TSRs which incorporated those 

measures, on June 1, 2023 [10] [11]. 

NA–LA approved the revised TSD and 

TSRs on August 10, 2023, with two COAs [2]. 

The first COA directed Triad to resolve NA– 

LA’s comments regarding Type A packaging 

and the use of functionally equivalent 

versions of DOT markings. Triad completed 

this action and submitted the newly revised 

TSD and TSRs on October 4, 2023 [26]. The 

second COA directed Triad to resolve 

additional NA–LA comments on the TSD and 

TSRs by the 2024 annual update and provide 

NA–LA with periodic briefings on the status. 

These additional NA–LA comments covered 

multiple topics, including hazard 

identification and control effectiveness, and 

addressed some of the Board’s safety 

concerns with the LANL TSD. 

In the case of the compensatory measure of 

reduced MAR limits, while any reduction in 

MAR would be an improvement, given the 

high unmitigated dose consequences, a 

significant reduction in MAR would be 

preferable. To this end, Triad’s January 31, 

2023, letter defined high MAR TRU waste 

shipments as TRU waste transfers that exceed 

1.9 kg Pu-239 equivalent and/or 10 g heat 

source plutonium. It stated all TRU waste 

transfers with greater than this quantity of 

MAR would be conducted using an ECC. 

Previously, transfers of up to 5 kg Pu-239 

equivalent could be conducted without an 

ECC; therefore, Triad’s compensatory 

measure effectively lowers the MAR limit for 

non-ECC transfers from 5 to 1.9 kg Pu-239 

equivalent. Further, Triad stated that no TRU 

waste transfers would exceed 8.8 kg Pu-239 

equivalent or 80 g heat source plutonium. 

Previously, the LANL TSD had a limit of 20 

kg Pu-239 equivalent for all shipments of 

radioactive materials. Triad’s letter did not 

articulate compensatory measures for high 

MAR transfers other than TRU waste, and 

rather stated Triad would engage with NA– 

LA to develop transfer-specific controls if 

there is a need to perform such transfers 

before an updated TSD is implemented. 

However, the MAR limits approved in 

August 2023 do not distinguish between TRU 

waste and other radioactive materials, apart 

from the special case of heat source 

plutonium, and limit transfers of all 

radioactive materials other than heat source 

plutonium to 8.8 kg Pu-239 equivalent [10] 

[11]. 

Further, NA–LA’s list of proposed 

compensatory measures also specified that 

reductions in MAR be considered in 

conjunction with packaging. Triad’s January 

31, 2023, letter stated that heat source 

plutonium TRU waste shall be transferred in 

POCs, a relatively robust form of package. 

While Triad also stated that other plutonium 

(e.g., non-heat source) TRU waste packages 

would meet Type A requirements, this 

assumption was already part of the TSD 

package performance envelope. The TSD and 

TSR approved in August 2023only require 

POCs for packages that contain greater than 

10 g of heat source plutonium [11] [10]. This 

may allow transfers of up to 80 g of heat 

source plutonium in non-POCs as long as 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 27 / Thursday, February 8, 2024 / Notices 8659 

10For instance, the guide provides an example of 

hazardous material that is required to be in a 

package where the DBC for a fall is 30 feet (i.e., the 

package can survive a 30-foot drop). The TSD 

would then evaluate whether the package can 

survive a 30-foot drop; otherwise, ‘‘additional 

administrative controls would need to be imposed 

on the transport system to ensure an adequate level 

of safety during transport’’ [13]. The guide further 

describes how TSDs can include site- and routespecific information in developing and evaluating 

DBCs. Continuing from the previous example, an 

evaluation of onsite transportation activities may 

determine that the greatest fall possible on the 

transfer route is 10 feet. In this case, if the TSD also 

imposed a control prohibiting lifting the package 

above 10 feet during handling, then the DBC would 

be a fall of 10 feet. From there, the guide includes 

an expectation that either the package will be 

shown to survive a 10-foot drop, or additional 

administrative controls would be needed. 

each individual package within the shipment 

contains less than 10 g. 

Finally, NA–LA’s list of proposed 

compensatory measures included a traffic 

restriction for certain (e.g., high MAR) 

shipments. Triad’s January 31, 2023, letter 

stated that public access would be restricted 

on transfer routes and that all traffic would 

be restricted during transfers when an ECC is 

not used; however, both of these safety 

controls were previously in place. 

Overall, the compensatory measures 

incorporated in the TSD and TSRs approved 

in August 2023, and the resolution of NA– 

LA’s comments covered by the two COAs, 

represent an improvement in the safety 

posture of onsite transportation operations. 

However, to demonstrate adequate protection 

of the public and workers at LANL, the 

hazard analysis, accident analysis, selection 

of controls, and development of TSRs for 

onsite transportation need to be reevaluated 

in accordance with the requirements of 10 

CFR 830. 

2. Onsite Transportation Directives 

The onsite transportation safe harbors do 

not ensure that TSDs meet 10 CFR 830 

requirements or that TSDs contain sufficient 

analysis and hazard controls for safe 

operations. Additionally, DOE Standard 

1104–2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear 

Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis 

Documents, does not contain specific 

guidance for federal review and approval of 

TSDs. 

Noncompliance with 10 CFR 830—The 

onsite transportation safe harbors lack 

requirements or guidance for several 10 CFR 

830 requirements, most significantly those 

pertaining to accident evaluation and hazard 

controls. The table in Attachment C shows an 

analysis of missing or inadequate 

requirements and guidance in the onsite 

transportation safe harbors. 

On September 13, 2022, DOE responded to 

the Board’s January 2022 letter. DOE asserted 

that 10 CFR 830 requirements apply 

‘‘regardless of the methodology for DSA 

development that is used,’’ and consequently 

stated that 10 CFR 830 requirements do not 

need to flow down into the onsite 

transportation safe harbors [4]. However, this 

assertion is inconsistent with the purpose of 

safe harbors, which is to ‘‘provide approved 

methodologies for meeting the DSA 

requirements of 10 CFR part 830,’’ as stated 

in DOE Standard 1104–2016 [23]. This means 

that if a contractor follows the safe harbors, 

then the contractor is assured that all the 

requirements of 10 CFR 830 will be fulfilled. 

Given that the onsite transportation safe 

harbors do not clearly address several 10 CFR 

830 requirements, TSDs will not meet the 

fundamental 10 CFR 830 requirements by 

solely following the safe harbor 

methodologies. This is illustrated in the 

LANL TSD, discussed earlier in this report. 

This section will discuss the most 

important 10 CFR 830 requirements that are 

not covered by DOE Guide 460.1–1, and then 

will illustrate how other sites’ TSDs have 

supplemented the guide with methodology 

from DOE Standard 3009–94. Additionally, 

this section includes discussion of several 

DOE directives in comparison to the onsite 

transportation safe harbors. These include 

DOE Order 461.2, Onsite Packaging and 

Transfer of Materials of National Security 

Interest, and DOE Order 461.1C, Packaging 

and Transportation for Offsite Shipment of 

Materials of National Security Interest. 

Evaluation of Accident Scenarios—10 CFR 

830 requires evaluation of ‘‘normal, 

abnormal, and accident conditions, including 

consideration of natural and man-made 

external events, identification of energy 

sources or processes that might contribute to 

the generation or uncontrolled release of 

radioactive and other hazardous materials’’ 

[3]. Systematic evaluation of accident 

conditions is a necessary component of safety 

bases to demonstrate adequate protection of 

the public and workers, as the safety bases 

are used to determine the need for safety 

controls. However, the onsite transportation 

safe harbors do not have requirements or 

detailed guidance related to the development 

and evaluation of specific or detailed 

accident scenarios. 

DOE Guide 460.1–1 mentions accidents 

when discussing how TSDs should develop 

safety controls. It states that TSDs should 

include ‘‘control requirements appropriate 

for the level of containment and 

communication provided that take into 

account the possibility and consequences of 

credible accidents’’ [13]. However, the guide 

does not elaborate on how TSDs should 

determine the credibility of accidents or 

consider their risks. 

Instead of evaluating accidents, there is 

vague guidance related to the development 

and evaluation of ‘‘design basis conditions’’ 

(DBC), which are the conditions that 

packages should be able to withstand for 

certain insults (e.g., fall, fire, penetration).10

While determining the conditions that 

packages can withstand is important, this 

evaluation is not the same as evaluating 

accident scenarios. The guide does not 

discuss identifying initial conditions, 

assumptions, or specific initiators of various 

package insults. Further, the guide does not 

advise that TSDs consider scenarios where 

multiple package insults could occur (e.g., a 

vehicle crash with fire that results in a 

package both falling down some distance and 

being exposed to fire). 

Evidence of the lack of requirements and 

guidance for accident analysis in the safe 

harbors can be seen in TSDs across the 

complex. Several sites supplement guidance 

from the onsite transportation safe harbors 

with methodologies from DOE Standard 

3009–94 for development and analysis of 

unique, bounding accident scenarios, 

including quantitative analysis. Examples 

include the 2011 Hanford TSD, the 2015 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

(LLNL) TSD, and the 2017 Nevada National 

Security Site (NNSS) TSD. For instance, the 

Hanford TSD states that ‘‘the accident 

analysis demonstrates consistency with the 

guidance in DOE–STD–3009–94’’ [27]. The 

LLNL TSD states that DOE–STD–3009–94 

was used in ‘‘the development of the hazard 

analysis, accident analysis, selection of 

controls, and development of’’ TSRs [28]. 

The NNSS TSD states that the ‘‘analysis 

process used to evaluate NNSS onsite 

transportation hazards is patterned after the 

approach of DOE–STD–3009’’ [29]. The sites’ 

reliance on methods from another safe harbor 

to adequately evaluate accident conditions 

highlights the weakness of the onsite 

transportation safe harbors. 

A comparison of the onsite transportation 

safe harbors to the DOE order for onsite 

transfers of MNSI further illuminates the 

weaknesses in the safe harbors. For onsite 

transfers of MNSI, DOE Order 461.2 states 

that the ‘‘safety assessment must document 

all credible onsite accident conditions’’ [30]. 

Additionally, it states, ‘‘[f]or higher hazard 

(e.g., hazard category II [sic]) transfers, it is 

recommended that a more quantitative 

analysis be applied (i.e., DOE–STD–3009). 

For lower hazard transfers the assessment 

may be considerably more qualitative’’ [30]. 

In contrast, DOE Guide 460.1–1 does not 

include specific requirements and guidance 

for accident evaluation, such as that in DOE 

Standard 3009–2014. 

Comparing DOE Guide 460.1–1 to DOE 

Order 461.1C illustrates this issue further. 

This order establishes the requirements for 

offsite shipments of MNSI that do not comply 

with DOT and NRC regulations. Regarding 

accident analysis, it states, ‘‘the DSA must 

include analysis of the bounding accidents 

that could occur (i.e., design basis accidents 

or DBAs), per the requirements of DOE 

Standard 3009–2014’’ [31]. 

Hazard Controls—The onsite 

transportation safe harbors have no guidance 

related to the 10 CFR 830 requirement to 

demonstrate the adequacy of hazard controls 

‘‘to eliminate, limit, or mitigate identified 

hazards’’ [3]. While DOE Guide 460.1–1 

states that controls ‘‘should ensure that the 

packaging operates within its established 

performance envelope,’’ it provides no 

guidance or direction on how to evaluate the 

effectiveness of a control to do so [13]. LLNL 

and NNSS supplemented their TSDs with 

guidance from DOE Standard 3009–94 and 

demonstrated the effectiveness of controls to 

reduce risk through mitigated hazard and 

accident analyses. In these analyses, the sites 

documented the reduction in frequency or 

consequence caused by applying the safety 

controls. Further, unlike the onsite 

transportation safe harbors, both DOE Order 

461.1C and DOE Order 461.2 provide 

additional guidance on the 10 CFR 830 

requirement to demonstrate the adequacy of 

controls for transport of MNSI. DOE Order 

461.1C refers to the methodology in DOE 


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11 ‘‘ ‘Type A package’ means a packaging that, 

together with its radioactive contents limited to A1

or A2 as appropriate, meets the requirements of 

§§ 173.410 and 173.412 and is designed to retain 

the integrity of containment and shielding required 

by this part under normal conditions of transport 

as demonstrated by the tests set forth in § 173.465 

or § 173.466, as appropriate.’’ [39] 

‘‘ ‘Type B package’ means a packaging designed 

to transport greater than an A1 or A2 quantity of 

radioactive material that, together with its 

radioactive contents, is designed to retain the 

integrity of containment and shielding required by 

this part when subjected to the normal conditions 

of transport and hypothetical accident test 

conditions set forth in 10 CFR part 71.’’ [39] 

‘‘A1 and A2 values are given in in § 173.435 or 

are determined in accordance with § 173.433.’’ [39] 

Standard 3009–2014 to meet this 

requirement. DOE Order 461.2 is less specific 

but does state that the safety assessment 

portion of the TSD may select controls and 

‘‘provide analysis, factoring in the control 

application’’ [30]. 

Appendix A to 10 CFR 830, Subpart B also 

states that developing functional 

requirements and applicable performance 

criteria provides assurance that the hazard 

control will perform its safety function. 

There is no discussion in DOE Guide 460.1– 

1 on functional requirements or performance 

criteria for controls. However, LLNL and 

NNSS, both of which used DOE Standard 

3009–94 to supplement their TSDs, 

documented specific functional requirements 

for their credited controls. 

Finally, 10 CFR 830 requires a safety basis 

to ‘‘define the process for maintaining the 

hazard controls current at all times and 

controlling their use’’ [3]. The onsite 

transportation safe harbors do not contain 

guidance for implementing this requirement. 

DOE Guide 421.1–2A, Implementation Guide 

for Use in Developing Documented Safety 

Analyses to Meet Subpart B of 10 CFR 830, 

states an ‘‘expectation associated with any of 

the safe harbors is that the safety 

classification guidance for safety SSCs (i.e., 

safety class and safety significant SSCs) and 

specific administrative controls (SACs) of 

DOE–STD–3009 will be used in developing 

the DSA’’ [32]. 

Unlike the onsite transportation safe 

harbors, DOE Order 461.1C provides several 

requirements to meet this expectation for 

transport of MNSI. Due to the proximity to 

the public for offsite shipments, DOE Order 

461.1C requires all such controls to be 

identified as safety SSCs and requires the 

application of ‘‘the requirements associated 

with safety-class controls for these ‘safety 

SSCs’ ’’ [31]. In comparison, the safe harbors 

for onsite transportation have no discussion 

of, or requirements related to, the 

applicability of other DOE directives’ 

requirements for TSD controls (e.g., 

applicability of the design criteria for safety 

SSCs from DOE Order 420.1C, Facility 

Safety). Additionally, DOE Order 461.1C 

requires identification of SACs for 

administrative controls necessary for public 

safety, worker safety, or defense in depth for 

transport of MNSI. In comparison, the safe 

harbors for onsite transportation do not 

mention SACs, and therefore have no 

discussion of, or requirements related to, the 

applicability of requirements contained in 

DOE Standard 1186–2016, Specific 

Administrative Controls. 

Inadequate Evaluation Criteria—An 

important component of evaluating the level 

of safety documented in a safety basis is 

having an objective metric to assess the 

effectiveness of safety controls at reducing 

risk. For instance, both the 1994 and 2014 

revisions of DOE Standard 3009 apply the 

concept of an evaluation guideline (25 rem 

total effective dose for a member of the offsite 

public), which ‘‘the safety analysis evaluates 

against’’ and ‘‘is established for the purpose 

of identifying the need for and evaluating 

safety class controls’’ [16]. For non-reactor 

facilities, NRC has criteria similar to DOE 

Standard 3009, namely for credited controls 

to reduce the frequency of an event to highly 

unlikely or its consequence to less severe 

than 100 rem for the worker and 25 rem for 

the offsite public. For DOT transportation 

regulations pertinent to DOE’s offsite 

shipments of radioactive materials, the 

evaluation criteria apply to the package 

design itself. For instance, for Type B 

packages,11 10 CFR 71, Subpart E, has a 

requirement to demonstrate ‘‘no loss or 

dispersal of radioactive contents,’’ during 

normal conditions of transport, and to limit 

radioactive material releases to less than 

specific amounts during defined hypothetical 

accident conditions [33]. 

The onsite transportation safe harbors, in 

contrast, do not provide specific quantitative 

criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of the 

safety control set, and thus to understand the 

risk of onsite transportation operations. 

Instead, they require that TSDs demonstrate 

an equivalent level of safety to DOT and NRC 

regulations for offsite transportation. 

Specifically, DOE Order 460.1D states that 

the TSD must ‘‘describe the methodology and 

compliance process to meet equivalent safety 

for any deviation from 49 CFR parts 171–180 

and 49 CFR parts 350–399’’ [12]. As noted 

above, DOT and NRC offsite transportation 

regulations primarily rely on credited 

packages to provide containment for 

radioactive materials during pre-defined 

normal transport and hypothetical accident 

conditions. DOE Guide 460.1–1 elaborates on 

this expectation of containment: ‘‘For 

hazardous materials, such as Type B 

radioactive materials, the transport system 

would be expected to prevent loss of 

containment both for normal handling and 

for all credible onsite accidents’’ [13]. 

However, while the guide allows for options 

other than the use of credited Type B 

packages (i.e., it does not mandate the use of 

Type B packages), it does not describe 

specifically how to demonstrate an 

equivalent level of safety for this 

containment expectation for transportation of 

packages that cannot survive normal 

handling or credible onsite accidents (i.e., 

non-equivalent packages). 

In the absence of clear guidance on what 

constitutes equivalent safety, several sites 

across the DOE defense nuclear facility 

complex used quantitative accident analysis 

to demonstrate that credited controls 

sufficiently reduced the risk from credible 

accidents. Sites varied in the thresholds they 

used; some used 25 rem, and others used 5 

rem for the dose to the public. Sites that 

included a co-located worker analysis used a 

threshold of either 5 rem or 100 rem. 

Notably, one site that used the 5 rem 

threshold stated that this demonstrated 

equivalent safety to DOT/NRC transportation 

regulations. The 2017 NNSS TSD states that 

it achieves equivalent safety by 

accomplishing several things, including ‘‘no 

release of contents under ‘credible accident’ 

scenarios,’’ and if a ‘‘release is possible, 

radiological dose consequences cannot 

exceed 5 rem to any person in close 

proximity to the accident within 30 minutes 

of the incident’’ [29]. 

Additionally, the DOE order for offsite 

transportation of MNSI instructs analysts to 

perform quantitative accident analyses, 

rather than demonstrating equivalent safety. 

DOE Order 461.1C states that safety bases 

‘‘must include analysis of the bounding 

accidents that could occur (i.e., design basis 

accidents or DBAs), per the requirements of 

DOE Standard 3009–2014’’ [31]. The 

requirements of DOE Standard 3009–2014 

include using 25 rem as the evaluation 

guideline for accident analysis. Similarly, the 

order for onsite transportation of MNSI 

recommends analysts perform quantitative 

accident analyses, rather than demonstrating 

equivalent safety. DOE Order 461.2 states 

that the TSD ‘‘must substantiate the 

conclusion that a credible accident must not 

cause individuals to receive a total effective 

dose (TED) greater than the levels referenced 

in DOE–STD–1189, Integration of Safety into 

the Design Process, public protection criteria 

per Appendix A, section A.2.1’’ [30]. The 

cited section defines 25 rem to the public as 

exceeding the evaluation guideline and 5 rem 

to the public as challenging the evaluation 

guideline. 

The Board communicated the concern with 

the lack of a clear definition of equivalent 

safety in its January 6, 2022, letter. In 

response, DOE acknowledged that improved 

methodology ‘‘to better document analyses of 

equivalent safety’’ was warranted and 

committed to providing better guidance [4]. 

While this is one method to resolve the 

concern of inadequate evaluation criteria 

(i.e., by better defining equivalent safety), 

other options exist for providing evaluation 

criteria, such as using the quantitative 

methodology provided in DOE Order 461.1C, 

DOE Order 461.2, and DOE Standard 3009– 

2014. 

Methods to Restrict Public Access—The 

onsite transportation safe harbors do not 

provide clear guidance on methods to control 

public access during onsite transfers 

conducted under TSDs. Multiple 

correspondences between LANL contractors 

and DOT have yielded different 

interpretations of how to restrict public 

access. This suggests the need for the DOE 

onsite transportation safe harbors to clearly 

specify methods for restricting public access. 

DOE Guide 460.1–1, Attachment 2, is a 

copy of a 1991 letter from the DOT chief 

counsel to the director of the Transportation 

Management Division of DOE. The crux of 

this letter is defining what constitutes a 

‘‘public highway’’ and when transportation 

of hazardous materials is considered ‘‘in 

commerce.’’ This is important because 

‘‘government agencies offering hazardous 


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materials for transportation in commerce or 

transporting hazardous materials in 

furtherance of a commercial enterprise are 

subject to’’ the Hazardous Materials 

Transportation Act, which includes all of the 

Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) [13]. 

In other words, if a road is considered in 

commerce, it would not be permissible to 

conduct onsite transfers of radioactive 

material in accordance with a TSD; instead, 

all HMRs would need to be met. 

A road on government property may still 

constitute a road in commerce if public 

access is not controlled. As the 1991 DOT 

letter states, ‘‘[i]f a road is used by members 

of the general public (including dependents 

of Government employees) without their 

having to gain access through a controlled 

access point, transportation on (across or 

along) that road is in commerce. On the other 

hand, if access to a road is controlled at all 

times through the use of gates and guards, 

transportation on that road is not in 

commerce’’ [13]. The letter provides several 

examples and specifically states that relying 

on signs alone to restrict public usage would 

not be enough to consider the road not in 

commerce. 

During the Board’s review of the LANL 

TSD, it became apparent that the guidance 

contained in the 1991 DOT letter did not 

provide enough clarity for implementation. 

The issues raised in the 1991 letter continue 

to be discussed. For instance, in 2006, a 

member of the LANL Packaging and 

Transportation group requested DOT to 

clarify whether the 1991 letter was still valid 

‘‘[g]iven the vintage of this correspondence’’ 

[34], and the chief of standards development 

in the DOT Office of Hazardous Materials 

Standards responded affirmatively [35]. 

Additionally, LANL personnel provided 

the Board with a letter that the president of 

Regulatory Resources (a subcontractor 

located in Los Alamos) sent to DOT in 2018 

to request that DOT ‘‘confirm the use of 

signage as a means to achieve public access 

restriction’’ [36], and DOT’s response [21]. 

This 2018 letter did not refer to the 1991 

DOT letter. DOT responded that ‘‘[s]hipments 

that occur on private roads whose access is 

restricted to the public (e.g., limited to 

authorized personnel), whether by signage 

(as you described and presented in your 

letter) or physical barriers, are not subject to 

the requirements of the HMR’’ [37]. This 

response appears to contradict the 1991 letter 

included in DOE Guide 460.1–1. However, 

LANL personnel stated that they currently 

use flaggers to continuously restrict public 

access to roads during onsite transfers. They 

further stated that if they decided to apply 

the guidance in the 2018 letter, they would 

first declare an Unreviewed Safety Question 

and obtain DOE approval prior to relying 

solely on signs to restrict public access. 

These communications between individual 

entities and DOT suggest the need for the 

DOE onsite transportation safe harbors to be 

more specific regarding the methods 

necessary to restrict public access. 

Adequately restricting public access is 

important from both regulatory and safety 

perspectives. If public access is not properly 

restricted, then the public could be closer to 

onsite transportation activities than analyzed. 

Therefore, a member of the public could 

initiate an accident (e.g., vehicle crash), and 

could receive a higher radiation dose by 

being in the vicinity of a transport accident 

if a release occurred. 

Additionally, the onsite transportation safe 

harbors do not provide detailed guidance on 

controlling onsite traffic of site personnel. 

Similar to the concern with members of the 

public, site personnel traveling onsite in 

government or personal vehicles could 

initiate an accident during onsite transfers of 

radioactive material. At LANL in particular, 

the high operational tempo needed to 

accomplish its greatly expanded pit 

manufacturing mission will inevitably 

increase onsite traffic. Therefore, it is 

incumbent upon DOE to develop 

requirements and guidance on the control of 

site traffic during onsite transfers of 

radioactive material. 

DOE Review and Approval of TSDs—DOE 

Standard 1104–2016, Review and Approval 

of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety 

Design Basis Documents, does not contain 

guidance for the review and approval of 

TSDs. The standard mentions transportation 

only once as an example of other safe harbors 

allowed by 10 CFR 830 and states that the 

format of the safety evaluation report (SER) 

should be based on the safe harbor 

methodology used. DOE Standard 1104–2016 

is divided into topical areas and these ‘‘areas 

and associated criteria established in this 

Standard form the foundation for reviewing 

and documenting DSA and TSR approval in 

an SER’’ [23]. The lack of guidance related to 

TSDs is problematic, because field office 

personnel do not have a set of specific 

criteria to evaluate whether a TSD ensures 

safe operations and complies with the onsite 

transportation safe harbors, as they would 

have for a DOE Standard 3009-compliant 

DSA. 

In response to the Board’s January 6, 2022, 

letter, DOE stated that it would ‘‘review 

DOE–STD–1104 to determine whether 

improvements are warranted’’ [4]. The Board 

concludes that adding criteria specific to 

TSDs to DOE Standard 1104–2016 is 

necessary to ensure adequate and consistent 

reviews by field office personnel across the 

DOE defense nuclear complex. 

3. DOE Oversight 

DOE and NNSA failed to identify safety 

deficiencies in both the DOE directives 

related to onsite transportation and the LANL 

TSD. Additionally, DOE and NNSA neglected 

to ensure that timely corrective actions were 

taken when the Board identified safety 

concerns and have struggled to resolve safety 

concerns when collaboration across program 

offices is required. 

DOE Oversight of Directives—DOE issued 

DOE Guide 460.1–1, the 10 CFR 830 safe 

harbor methodology for preparing TSDs for 

onsite transfers of radioactive materials, in 

1997 and has not updated it since then. DOE 

initially issued 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, in 

2001, four years after the guide was written. 

As noted in previous sections, the guide does 

not contain sufficient guidance to meet 

several 10 CFR 830 safety basis requirements, 

which is probably due to being written before 

10 CFR 830, Subpart B, was established. As 

discussed below, DOE did not act on 

indications of weaknesses with the onsite 

transportation safe harbors that presented 

themselves over many years, and its process 

for revising directives likewise failed to 

identify these weaknesses. 

Safety basis personnel at DOE’s defense 

nuclear facilities have at least tacitly 

recognized the safety deficiencies in DOE 

Guide 460.1–1 for many years, but DOE has 

not taken action to improve the guide. For 

example, many DOE sites supplemented 

guidance from the onsite transportation safe 

harbors with methodologies from DOE 

Standard 3009–94 for development and 

analysis of unique, bounding accident 

scenarios, including quantitative analysis. 

DOE Guide 421.1–2A states that DOE 

Standard 3009 ‘‘is a safe harbor for any of the 

specialized areas covered by the other safe 

harbors (with the exception of Hazard 

Category 1 nuclear reactors) and can be used 

in lieu of any of them’’ [32]. While there is 

no issue with using DOE Standard 3009 

methodology when developing TSDs, DOE 

failed to recognize that its widespread use to 

supplement the onsite transportation safe 

harbors’ methodology indicated safety 

deficiencies in the safe harbors. Field offices 

responsible for reviewing and approving 

these TSDs could have reached out to the 

Office of Primary Interest (OPI) for DOE 

Guide 460.1–1, alerting them to the safety 

issues with the guide. 

As another example, DOE revised DOE 

Order 461.1C in 2016. Previous to this 

revision, the methodology for developing 

TSDs for offsite shipments of MNSI was 

similar to the current DOE Guide 460.1–1. 

One key change was the addition of an 

appendix that states that ‘‘DOE Standard 

3009–2014 . . . is an approved methodology 

for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 

part 830. DSAs developed by OST [Office of 

Secure Transport] must comply with the 

requirements of DOE Standard 3009–2014, 

except for deviations that are specifically 

identified in this Appendix’’ [31]. DOE failed 

to recognize the corresponding weaknesses in 

the onsite transportation safe harbors and 

take action to address them. 

Additionally, DOE’s process for revising 

directives failed to identify the weaknesses in 

the onsite transportation safe harbors. DOE’s 

directives review process described in DOE 

Order 251.1, Departmental Directives 

Program, assumes the OPI for each directive 

will review them periodically and propose 

revisions, as needed, to the Directives Review 

Board; however, DOE does not require these 

reviews to be done with a specific 

periodicity, and OPIs are not required to 

actively reach out to field elements to solicit 

feedback. In the case of onsite transportation 

safety directives, with the DOE Office of 

Environmental Management designated as 

the OPI for DOE Guide 460.1–1, this process 

failed to identify and correct the safety 

deficiencies in the onsite transportation safe 

harbors. 

NNSA Oversight of the LANL TSD—In 

addition to DOE’s failure to correct the safety 

deficiencies in the transportation directives, 

NNSA has not resolved safety issues with the 

LANL TSD specifically. NA–LA and NNSA 

headquarters packaging and transportation 

organizations have had multiple 


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opportunities throughout the years to do so, 

and yet lasting corrective actions were not 

taken. 

The NNSA safety basis review team tasked 

with review and approval of Revision 3 of the 

LANL TSD in 2007 consisted of subject 

matter experts from the Los Alamos Site 

Office (LASO) (the predecessor organization 

to NA–LA), the NNSA Service Center, and an 

independent contractor [6]. Personnel from 

the NNSA Packaging Certification Division, 

who were part of the safety basis review 

team, ‘‘concluded that the TSD as submitted 

did not provide an adequate level of analysis 

to support the conclusions that for non DOT 

compliant packages the overall transport 

system provided an equivalent level of 

safety’’ [6]. The associated SER therefore 

contained several conditions of approval, 

which included requiring additional analysis 

supporting the basis for the MAR limit in 

subsequent TSDs. This additional analysis 

was to include ‘‘quantitative estimates of the 

likelihood of credible scenarios leading to the 

release of nuclear materials both with and 

without TSD controls in place, as well as an 

estimate of what radiological dose a member 

of the public located at the most likely site 

boundary could receive as a result of these 

release scenarios with the TSD controls in 

place’’ [6]. Subsequent revisions of the TSD 

included such quantitative analysis. 

However, Revision 9, which became effective 

in November 2012, contained an entire 

rewrite of the safety analysis which removed 

the quantitative analysis. When approving 

this revision, and each subsequent revision, 

NA–LA failed to identify the same safety 

issues that had previously been corrected. 

Subsequent reviews by NNSA years later 

failed to detect and correct the same safety 

issues. NNSA’s Office of Packaging and 

Transportation conducted an assessment of 

LANL’s packaging and transportation 

program in 2015. While its assessment was 

primarily focused on MNSI, it also reviewed 

the LANL TSD. During this review, the team 

concluded that ‘‘LANL has an approved 10 

CFR 830 compliant TSD and TSRs that meet 

460.1C requirements’’ [38]. 

Finally, as discussed in DOE’s response to 

the Board’s January 6, 2022, letter, on the 

safety deficiencies in DOE’s onsite 

transportation safety harbors and the LANL 

TSD, NNSA stated that it ‘‘use[s] the Biennial 

Review process to review field office 

performance in meeting requirements for the 

review and approval of TSDs’’ [4]. However, 

despite these biennial reviews, NNSA did not 

identify the safety deficiencies in the LANL 

TSD. 

In conclusion, despite multiple instances 

of NNSA engagement with the LANL TSD, 

both at the field office level and NNSA 

headquarters level, NNSA failed to resolve 

issues with the LANL TSD. 

DOE Oversight of Identified Safety Issues— 

Even after the Board expressed safety 

concerns with the LANL TSD and the onsite 

transportation safe harbors in its January 6, 

2022, letter to the Secretary of Energy, DOE 

did not take timely action to address these 

safety concerns. 

Regarding the LANL TSD, more than a year 

elapsed between the Board issuing its letter 

identifying safety deficiencies and Triad 

issuing its letter informing NA–LA that it 

would institute compensatory measures for 

its onsite transportation activities. NA–LA 

did not begin work on developing proposed 

compensatory measures through a baseline 

assessment of TSDs at other NNSA sites until 

July 2022, six months after the Board sent its 

letter. NA–LA then transmitted a letter to 

Triad on October 12, 2022, over 10 months 

after DOE received the Board’s letter, which 

contained a wide-ranging list of potential 

compensatory measures for Triad to evaluate. 

Triad’s first response on December 9, 2022, 

was unsatisfactory. After additional 

discussions with NA–LA personnel, Triad 

sent a new letter to NA–LA on January 31, 

2023, that agreed to implement a set of 

compensatory measures that represented an 

improvement to the safety posture of onsite 

transportation operations. Nevertheless, this 

letter did not acknowledge that the 

compensatory measures were needed to 

address any safety issues. 

Further, given the safety concerns 

identified with the onsite transportation safe 

harbor, it would have been prudent for DOE 

to conduct a complete extent of condition 

review of all sites’ TSDs. While DOE’s Office 

of Environmental Management had 

previously conducted an extent of condition 

review for a subset of sites under its purview 

in 2021, it was not formally documented and 

was done prior to receiving the Board’s letter 

highlighting the specific safety issues. 

Finally, the Board is concerned with DOE’s 

ability to address safety issues that require 

collaboration across program offices. DOE’s 

September 13, 2022, letter that responded to 

the Board’s January 6, 2022, letter frankly 

acknowledged that it would need to evaluate 

‘‘how we communicate across offices, engage 

with the field, and share operating 

experiences across the Department.’’ 

Attachment C—Analysis of Gaps in 

Onsite Transportation Safe Harbors 

Related to 10 CFR 830 Requirements 

Topical area 10 CFR 830, subpart B 

requirement DOE order 460.1D and/or DOE guide 460.1–1 reference Analysis of gaps 

Hazard Identification.830.204(b)(2)—‘‘Provide a systematic identification of both natural and man-made hazards associated with the facility’’.DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.3.1.d. states that the TSD is 

expected to include ‘‘a description of the process and analysis [that] is used to ensure that equivalent safety requirements are established. This should include a technically 

justified basis for equivalency. For example, this could include a hazards analysis associated with the transfer.’’ 

(emphasis added). 

DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.3.2.c: ‘‘This section should 

identify the physical location of the site and associated facilities on legible maps . . . All features of the site which 

are mentioned in any part of the document, such as . . . 

transportation hazards, should be clearly identified on one 

or more maps.’’ 

DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.4.1: ‘‘A site seeking to establish a graded approach to compliance with DOE O 460.1A 

should develop a hierarchy in which hazardous material are 

grouped into a series of hazard levels.’’ The Guide then 

discusses ‘‘low hazards’’, ‘‘higher hazards’’, and ‘‘hazardous materials, such as Type B radioactive materials.’’ 

The order does not contain requirements or guidance for 

this requirement. While the 

guide discusses identifying 

transportation hazards on 

maps and lists hazard analysis as one part of an acceptable way to establish 

equivalent safety, the guide 

does not discuss how to 

systematically identify hazards, including natural and 

man-made hazards. Further, 

while the guide discusses 

developing a hierarchy of 

hazardous materials, it does 

not describe how to use this 

process to identify hazards. 


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Topical area 10 CFR 830, subpart B 

requirement DOE order 460.1D and/or DOE guide 460.1–1 reference Analysis of gaps 

Hazard Categorization.830.202(b)(3)—‘‘Categorize the facility consistent with DOE–STD–1027–92’’.DOE Order 460.1D 4.b.(3)(b): ‘‘For onsite transfers involving 

nuclear facility Hazard Category 2 or 3 quantities, the TSD 

must comply with the Safety Basis Requirements of 10 

CFR 830, Subpart B.’’.

DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.1.2: ‘‘Such an integrated approach should include hazard classification of the material.’’ 

DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.4.1: ‘‘A site seeking to establish a graded approach to compliance with DOE O 460.1A 

should develop a hierarchy in which hazardous material are 

grouped into a series of hazard levels.’’ The guide then discusses ‘‘low hazards’’, ‘‘higher hazards’’, and ‘‘hazardous 

materials, such as Type B radioactive materials.’’ 

By requiring that TSDs for 

transfers of Hazard Category 2 and 3 quantities follow the Safety Basis Requirements in 10 CFR Part 

830, Subpart B, the order 

implicitly requires TSDs to 

categorize the operations 

under the hazard categorization scheme of DOE 

Standard 1027–92. However, the guide does not discuss or invoke the hazard 

categorization scheme in 

DOE Standard 1027–92. Instead, the guide allows sites 

to develop their own hierarchy of hazard classification or levels. The guide 

frames these levels in terms 

of low hazards, higher hazards, and hazardous materials such as Type B radioactive materials, which is 

not the same type of framework as the DOE Standard 

1027–92 hazard categorization scheme. 

Hazard Controls .... 830.204(b)(4)—‘‘Derive the hazard controls 

necessary to ensure adequate protection of 

workers, the public, and the environment, 

demonstrate the adequacy of these controls 

to eliminate, limit, or mitigate identified hazards, and define the process for maintaining 

the hazard controls current at all times and 

controlling their use’’.

DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.1.2 ‘‘Such an integrated approach should include hazard classification of the material, 

hazard containment, hazard communication, and control 

measures commensurate with the hazard of the material 

being transported, such as . . . control requirements appropriate for the level of containment and communication 

provided that take into account the possibility and consequences of credible accidents. These control requirements should result in minimal acceptance of risk above 

the risks accepted in the context of existing Hazardous Materials Regulations’’ (emphasis added). 

DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.3.1.d. states that the TSD is 

expected to include ‘‘a description of the process and analysis [that] is used to ensure that equivalent safety requirements are established. This should include a technically 

justifiable basis for equivalency. For example, this could include . . . a discussion of mitigating measures proposed to 

ensure the equivalent safety requirements will be employed.’’ 

DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.4.2 ‘‘Before non-equivalent 

packaging may be used for onsite transport, a performance 

envelope should be established for the packaging and specific control and communication requirements should be developed which ensure that the transport system will operate 

safely within the performance envelope.’’ 

DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.4.2.c. ‘‘controls should be 

commensurate with the hazard represented by the package 

being transported, and should ensure that the packaging 

operates within its established performance envelope. The 

hazard levels and associated performance requirements 

documented in Chapter VII of the TSD will greatly facilitate 

development and justification of appropriate transport controls. Controls may include establishment of special communication requirements (e.g., radio contact with emergency response personnel) which are required to compensate for packaging inadequacies.’’ 

While the guide indicates that 

hazard controls should be 

developed as needed, it 

does not present or require 

a method to determine adequacy of these controls to 

eliminate, limit, or mitigate 

hazards. 

The guide does not define a 

process for maintaining the 

hazard controls or controlling their use. 

The guide states that TSDs 

should establish control requirements that will result in 

‘‘minimal acceptance of risk 

above those accepted in the 

context of existing Hazardous Materials Regulations.’’ However, the guide 

does not include a clear and 

consistent definition of what 

equivalency to these regulations entails. 


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8664 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 27 / Thursday, February 8, 2024 / Notices 

Topical area 10 CFR 830, subpart B 

requirement DOE order 460.1D and/or DOE guide 460.1–1 reference Analysis of gaps 

Evaluation of Accident Conditions.830.204(b)(3)—‘‘Evaluate normal, abnormal, 

and accident conditions, including consideration of natural and man-made external 

events, identification of energy sources or 

processes that might contribute to the generation or uncontrolled release of radioactive and other hazardous materials, and 

consideration of the need for analysis of accidents which may be beyond the design 

basis of the facility’’.

DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.1.2 ‘‘Such an integrated approach should include hazard classification of the material, 

hazard containment, hazard communication, and control 

measures commensurate with the hazard of the material 

being transported, such as . . . control requirements appropriate for the level of containment and communication 

provided that take into account the possibility and consequences of credible accidents’’ (emphasis added).

DOE Guide 460.1–1 Section 5.4.2.b. ‘‘To establish the performance envelope of the packaging, evaluation of design 

basis conditions (DBCs) is recommended. DBCs should be 

site-specific and possibly route-specific conditions under 

which the packaging should be able to provide containment 

during onsite transport. DBCs to be considered for a particular hazardous materials transport will depend on the 

hazard level of the material.’’ 

‘‘Chapter VII of the TSD should include guidance on which 

DBCs should be developed for each hazard level, and 

should establish minimum performance requirements for 

each hazard level. Examples of DBCs which may be appropriate for some hazard levels are shock, vibration, collision, fall, fire, penetration, and immersion. Others may also 

be appropriate.’’ 

‘‘To illustrate how the performance requirements established 

in Chapter VII of the TSD can be used to develop an appropriate DBC, a particular hazardous material may be 

grouped into a hazard level that requires a packaging to be 

able to survive a 3-ft drop with no loss of containment. For 

this hazardous material, a 3-ft drop would then become the 

DBC for falls, without regard to conditions along the transport route or during handling which might expose the packaging to a fall from a higher distance. If the packaging 

could not survive a 3-ft drop, additional administrative controls would need to be imposed on the transport system to 

ensure an adequate level of safety during transport. Guidance regarding appropriate administrative controls should 

be provided in Chapter VII of the TSD.’’ 

The order does not contain requirements or guidance for 

this requirement. 

The guide discusses including 

control requirements that 

consider the frequency and 

consequence of credible accidents, but does not require 

such evaluation of accidents. Further, the guide 

does not describe what type 

of accidents must or should 

be included. 

The guide also discusses analyzing transport conditions 

and ensuring that packages 

are not exposed to conditions they cannot survive, 

such as a large drop-off. 

While this could constitute 

an analysis of transportation 

conditions, such analysis 

does not necessarily evaluate the initiators, frequency, 

or consequences of accident 

conditions. 

‘‘As an example of how physical limitations of a site may be 

incorporated into a DBC, a particular hazardous material 

may be grouped into a hazard level that requires a packaging to be able to survive a 30-ft drop. For this particular 

hazardous material shipment, an evaluation of the transport 

route may show that, for any accident which could occur 

along the transport route, the packaging could never fall 

more than 10 ft. If a control on the packaging is also imposed requiring that the packaging never be elevated more 

than 10 ft during handling, the DBC need only consider a 

10-ft fall.’’ 

Technical Safety 

Requirements.

830.205(a)(1)—‘‘Develop technical safety requirements that are derived from the documented safety analysis’’.

830.205(a)(2)—‘‘Prior to use, obtain DOE approval of technical safety requirements and 

any change to technical safety requirements’’.

No requirement or guidance in the order or guide. Neither 

document mentions technical safety requirements.

The order and the guide lack 

requirements and guidance 

regarding technical safety 

requirements. While DOE 

has other directives related 

to technical safety requirements (e.g., DOE Guide 

423.1–1B, Implementation 

Guide for Use in Developing 

Technical Safety Requirements), the safe harbors do 

not reference those other 

relevant DOE directives. 

References 

[1] Triad National Security, LLC, Submittal of 

PT–SA–002–R15, P&T Transportation 

Safety Document, and PT–TSR–001–R13, 

Technical Safety Requirements, NSP– 

23–042, 2023. 

[2] Los Alamos Field Office, Approval of 

Submittal of PT–SA–002–R15 Packaging 

and Transportation Safety Document and 

PT–TSR–001–R13 Technical Safety 

Requirements, NNSA–2023–004544, 

August 10, 2023. 

[3] Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 

830, Nuclear Safety Management. 

[4] J. Hruby, Department letter responding to 

the Board letter of January 6, 2022, 

regarding the adequacy of the LANL 

onsite transportation safety document 

and the onsite transportation safe 

harbors, September 13, 2022. 

[5] Department of Energy, Preparation Guide 

for U.S. Department of Energy 

Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented 

Safety Analyses, DOE Standard 3009–94 

Change Notice 3, 1994. 

[6] Los Alamos Site Office, Transmittal of 

Safety Evaluation Report Approving 

Annual Update of Transportation Safety 

Document (TSD) and Technical Safety 

Requirements (TSRs), March 22, 2007. 

[7] Department of Energy, Department of 

Energy Nuclear Safety Policy, DOE P 

420.1, 2011. 

[8] Los Alamos National Laboratory, 

Transportation Safety Document, P&T– 

SA–002, R8.1, 2012. 

[9] Los Alamos National Laboratory, TA–54 

Area G Documented Safety Analysis, 

ABD–WFM–001, R.0, April 2003. 

[10] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging 

and Transportation Transportation 

Safety Document, P&T–SA–002–R15, 

2023. 

[11] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging 

and Transportation Technical Safety 

Requirements, PT–TSR–001–R13, 2023. 

[12] Department of Energy, Hazardous 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 27 / Thursday, February 8, 2024 / Notices 8665 

12 DOE letter and report to Joyce Connery, Board 

Chair, responding to DNFSB January 6, 2022, letter 

regarding onsite transportation safety at DOE 

defense nuclear facilities, dated September 13, 

2022. 

13Letter to Jennifer Granholm, Secretary of 

Energy, from Joyce Connery, Board Chair, dated 

January 6, 2022, requesting a report and briefing 

regarding onsite transportation safety at DOE 

defense nuclear facilities. 

Materials Packaging and Transportation 

Safety, DOE Order 460.1D Chg 1, June 

2022. 

[13] Department of Energy, Implementation 

Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, 

Packaging and Transportation Safety, 

DOE G 460.1–1, June 1997. 

[14] Triad National Security, LLC, P&T 

Transportation Safety Document Impact 

Assessment, NSP–22–094, December 9, 

2022. 

[15] Triad National Security, LLC, P&T 

Transportation Safety Document 

Compensatory Measures, January 31, 

2023. 

[16] Department of Energy, Preparation of 

Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented 

Safety Analysis, DOE–STD–3009–2014, 

November 2014. 

[17] Triad National Security, LLC, 

Transportation Safety Document (TSD), 

P&T–SA–002, R12, April 2017. 

[18] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging 

Evaluation Program, P&T–PLAN–018, 

R12, May 7, 2020. 

[19] Triad National Security, LLC, 

Transportation Safety Document 

Authorized Shipper/Transfer Evaluator 

Instructions, P&T–WI–001, R19, July 24, 

2020. 

[20] Triad National Security, LLC, Technical 

Safety Requirements for Transuranic 

Waste Facility (TWF), TSR–TWF–002, 

Rev 2.4, April 2020. 

[21] Los Alamos Field Office, Approval of 

P&T–SA–002–R12 Addendum 3–R0, 

Analysis of Transport of Pyrophoric 

Material, and P&T–TSR–001–R10–.1, 

Technical Safety Requirements, NNSA– 

2021–002752, July 2021. 

[22] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging 

and Transportation Technical Safety 

Requirements, P&T–TSR–001–R10.1, 

May 17, 2021. 

[23] Department of Energy, Review and 

Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis 

and Safety Design Basis Documents, 

DOE–STD–1104–2016, December 2016. 

[24] Los Alamos National Laboratory, 

Packaging Evaluation Program, P&T– 

PLAN–018, R12, May 2020. 

[25] Department of Energy, Integration of 

Safety into the Design Process, DOE– 

STD–1189–2016, December 2016. 

[26] Triad National Security, LLC, Submittal 

of P&T–SA–002–R16, P&T 

Transportation Safety Document and 

PT–TSR–001–R14, Technical Safety 

Requirements, NSP–23–091, October 4, 

2023. 

[27] Hanford Site, Hanford Sitewide 

Transportation Safety Document, DOE/ 

RL–2001–36, Revision 1–E, May 2011. 

[28] Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory Transportation 

Safety Document, UCRL–MA–152462– 

REV–5, December 2015. 

[29] National Security Technologies, LLC, 

Nuclear Onsite Transportation Safety 

Document for the Nevada National 

Security Site, OTSD–NSAF.100, Rev. 3, 

June 2017. 

[30] Department of Energy, Onsite Packaging 

and Transfer of Materials of National 

Security Interest, DOE O 461.2, 

November 2010. 

[31] Department of Energy, Packaging and 

Transportation for Offsite Shipment of 

Materials of National Security Interest, 

DOE O 461.1C, December 2019. 

[32] Department of Energy, Implementation 

Guide for Use in Developing 

Documented Safety Analyses to Meet 

Subpart B of 10 CFR 830, DOE G 421.1– 

2A, December 2011. 

[33] Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, 

Part 71, Subpart E, Package Approval 

Standards. 

[34] J. Lowery, Letter to Director of Office of 

Hazardous Materials Standards at U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Los 

Alamos: Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Packaging and Transportation, May 17, 

2006. 

[35] J. A. Gale, Response Letter to Joseph 

Lowery, Ref. No. 06–0135, Washington: 

Standards Development, Office of 

Hazardous Materials Standards, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, July 11, 

2006. 

[36] W. Winters, Letter to Standards and 

Rulemaking Division, Pipeline and 

Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration of the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Los Alamos: Regulatory 

Resources Inc., November 29, 2018. 

[37] D. Der Kinderen, Response Letter to 

Letter from Wade Winters President of 

Regulatory Resources Inc., Reference No. 

18–0152, Washington: Standards 

Development Branch, Standards and 

Rulemaking Division, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, April 16, 2019. 

[38] NNSA Office of Packaging and 

Transportation, Assessment Report for 

DOE Orders 461.1B, 461.2 and 460.1C 

Compliance Review at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory, March 2016. 

[39] Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 

173, Shippers—General Requirements 

for Shipments and Packages. 

Correspondence With the Secretary of 

Energy 

Department of Energy Request for Extension 

of Time 

September 15, 2023 

The Honorable Joyce L. Connery Chair 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 

Indiana NW, Suite 700 

Washington, DC 20004 

Dear Chair Connery: 

The Department of Energy (DOE) received 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 

(DNFSB) draft Recommendation 2023–1, 

Onsite Transportation Safety, on August 3, 

2023. The draft Recommendation spans 

multiple DOE program, staff, and site offices, 

and DOE is currently coordinating our review 

among the relevant offices. 

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. 2286d(a)(2), 

the Department requests a 60-day extension 

through November 2, 2023, to provide 

comments. This extension will afford DOE 

sufficient time to assess the findings, 

supporting data, and analyses of the draft 

Recommendation. 

If you have any questions, please contact 

Mr. Ahmad M. Al-Daouk, National Nuclear 

Security Administration Associate 

Administrator for Environment, Safety, and 

Health, at (505) 845–4607. 

Sincerely, 

Jennifer Granholm 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 

Response to Extension Request 

September 19, 2023 

The Honorable Jennifer Granholm Secretary 

of Energy 

U.S. Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Avenue SW, 

Washington, DC 20585–1000 

Dear Secretary Granholm: 

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board (Board) has received the Department of 

Energy’s September 15, 2023, letter 

requesting an extension until November 2, 

2023, to provide comments regarding the 

Board’s draft Recommendation 2023–1, 

Onsite Transportation Safety. In accordance 

with 42 U.S.C. 2286d(a)(2), the Board grants 

this request. 

Please note that the Atomic Energy Act 

allows the Board to issue a final 

recommendation after the expiration of a 30- 

day period for the Secretary to provide 

comments on a draft recommendation. 42 

U.S.C. 2286d(a)(3). In this instance, the 30- 

day period expired on September 2, 2023. 

The Board respectfully requests that, in the 

future, if the Department wishes to seek an 

extension of the 30-day period, it do so 

before that period elapses, so that the Board 

receives and can consider extension requests 

in a timely manner. 

Sincerely, 

Joyce L. Connery Chair 

Department of Energy Comments on Draft 

Recommendation 

November 1, 2023 

The Honorable Joyce L. Connery 

Chair, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board, 625 Indiana NW, Suite 700 

Washington, DC 20004 

Dear Chair Connery: 

The Department of Energy (DOE) received 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 

(DNFSB/Board) Draft Recommendation 

2023–1, Onsite Transportation Safety, dated 

August 3, 2023. This letter discusses DOE’s 

recent efforts for improving onsite 

transportation safety at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL) and provides comments 

on Draft Recommendation 2023–1. 

As captured in DOE’s September 2022 

response 12 to the Board’s January 2022 

letter,13 the Department has already agreed to 

take actions to address some of the items in 

Draft Recommendation 2023–1. The National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 

previously agreed to identify near-term 

improvements to the LANL Transportation 

Safety Document (TSD) controls, and on 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
8666 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 27 / Thursday, February 8, 2024 / Notices 

August 10, 2023, the Los Alamos Field Office 

approved an update to the LANL TSD and 

Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The 

approved LANL TSD and TSRs elevate the 

compensatory measures to TSRs as discussed 

in Draft Recommendation 2023–1 and directs 

LANL to address, as conditions of approval, 

NNSA comments that are consistent with the 

concerns raised by the Board in your 

observations and previous letters. NNSA will 

ensure the Los Alamos Field Office and 

LANL address the remaining conditions of 

approval in the TSD and TSRs by the next 

annual update in August 2024. Correcting 

these issues will strengthen onsite 

transportation safety at Los Alamos until the 

regulatory framework is updated. 

In the report attached to DOE’s September 

2022 letter, DOE stated that it ‘‘plans to 

review the requirements of 10 CFR part 830, 

subpart B, and will determine whether an 

improved methodology and/or guidance for 

performing 10 CFR part 830, subpart Bcompliant [documented safety analysis] and 

TSR development for onsite transportation at 

DOE defense nuclear facilities is warranted.’’ 

DOE also agreed to ‘‘update the discussion in 

DOE Standard (STD) 1104–2016, Review and 

Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and 

Safety Design Basis Documents, to clarify the 

expectations for DOE to review and approve 

TSDs.’’ 

The Department previously agreed to 

improving interfaces for how we 

communicate, engage, and share expertise 

with the field after the near-term and longterm actions for onsite transportation safety 

are completed, and we intend to share 

operating experiences across the defense 

nuclear facility complex. 

DOE has the following two comments on 

Draft Sub-Recommendations 2.c and Draft 

Recommendation 3: 

1. In Draft Sub-Recommendation 2.c, the 

Board recommends DOE ‘‘[c]onduct an extent 

of condition review of TSDs for DOE sites 

with defense nuclear facilities to identify any 

near-term actions necessary to ensure safety 

until the safe harbors are revised and 

implemented.’’ As identified in the Draft 

Recommendation, the DOE Office of 

Environmental Management conducted an 

extent of condition assessment in 2021. 

Therefore, DOE suggests the Board change 

Sub-Recommendation 2.c to limit the extent 

of condition review to NNSA sites. NNSA 

would commit to complete these reviews in 

a timely manner. 

2. DOE believes that Departmental 

resources for ensuring safety of onsite 

transportation activities are best used to 

support the actions encompassed in Draft 

Recommendations 1 and 2. SubRecommendation 3a appears to recommend 

analysis and review that will be an essential 

part of the approach to developing improved 

safe harbor(s) required as part of 

Recommendation 2. Sub-Recommendation 3b 

appears to require a second parallel process 

that would replicate corrective action 

activities that will be required for 

Recommendation 1. DOE suggests removing 

Draft Recommendation 3, or at least SubRecommendation 3b. 

Thank you for providing Draft 

Recommendation 2023–1 for our review. We 

appreciate the Board’s insights and advice on 

this important topic. DOE remains committed 

to sharing information with the Board and 

offers to brief the Board or DNFSB staff on 

the status of these issues as we progress. 

With the consideration of the comments 

above, DOE believes that these actions 

adequately address the Board’s concerns. If 

you have any questions, please contact Mr. 

Ahmad M. Al-Daouk, NNSA Associate 

Administrator for Environment, Safety, and 

Health, at (505) 845–4607. 

Sincerely, 

Jennifer Granholm 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 2286d(b)(2). 

Dated: February 1, 2024. 

Joyce Connery, 

Chair. 

[FR Doc. 2024–02513 Filed 2–7–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3670–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

President’s Board of Advisors on 

Historically Black Colleges and 

Universities 

AGENCY: President’s Board of Advisors 

on Historically Black Colleges and 

Universities, Office of the Secretary, 

U.S. Department of Education. 

ACTION: Announcement of an open 

meeting. 

SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the 

agenda for the winter 2024 meeting of 

the President’s Board of Advisors on 

Historically Black Colleges and 

Universities (Board) and provides 

information to members of the public 

about how to attend the meeting, 

request to make oral comments at the 

meeting, and submit written comments 

pertaining to the work of the Board. 

DATES: On February 29, 2024, the Board 

will hold a virtual meeting from 11 a.m. 

to 3:30 p.m. E.D.T. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Sedika Franklin, Associate Director/ 

Designated Federal Official, U.S. 

Department of Education, White House 

Initiative on Historically Black Colleges 

and Universities, 400 Maryland Avenue 

SW, Washington, DC 20202, (202) 453– 

5630 or by email at sedika.franklin@

ed.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Board’s Statutory Authority and 

Function: The Board is established by 

20 U.S.C. 1063e (the HBCUs Partners 

Act) and Executive Order 14041 

(September 3, 2021) and is continued by 

Executive Order 14109 (September 29, 

2023). The Board is also governed by the 

provisions of 5 U.S.C. chapter 10 

(Federal Advisory Committees), which 

sets forth standards for the formation 

and use of advisory committees. The 

purpose of the Board is to advise the 

President, through the White House 

Initiative on Historically Black Colleges 

and Universities (Initiative), on all 

matters pertaining to strengthening the 

educational capacity of Historically 

Black Colleges and Universities 

(HBCUs). 

The Board shall advise the President 

in the following areas: (i) improving the 

identity, visibility, and distinctive 

capabilities and overall competitiveness 

of HBCUs; (ii) engaging the 

philanthropic, business, government, 

military, homeland-security, and 

education communities in a national 

dialogue regarding new HBCU programs 

and initiatives; (iii) improving the 

ability of HBCUs to remain fiscally 

secure institutions that can assist the 

Nation in achieving its educational 

goals and in advancing the interests of 

all Americans; (iv) elevating the public 

awareness of, and fostering appreciation 

of, HBCUs; (v) encouraging publicprivate investments in HBCUs; and (vi) 

improving government-wide strategic 

planning related to HBCU 

competitiveness to align Federal 

resources and provide the context for 

decisions about HBCU partnerships, 

investments, performance goals, 

priorities, human capital development, 

and budget planning. 

Meeting Agenda: The meeting agenda 

will include roll call; approval of the 

minutes from the June 21, 2023 Board 

meeting); an update from the Board 

Chairperson; an update from U.S. 

Department of Education staff; an 

update from the Executive Director of 

the Initiative; a status report from each 

of the Board’s subcommittees 

(Preservation and Growth, 

Infrastructure, and Career Pathways and 

Financial Support and Research); and a 

discussion regarding the status of the 

Board’s report to the President. The 

public comment period will begin 

immediately following the conclusion of 

such discussions. The Board will hold 

a vote on recommendations presented 

by its subcommittees and/or any final 

elements of its report to the President. 

Access to the Meeting: An advance 

RSVP is not required to attend the 

meeting. The public may join the 

meeting at the following link: https://

events.intellor.com/login/507127. 

Members of the public who cannot join 

by computer may dial in by phone at 1– 

202–735–3323 with access code 

7485504#. 

To join the meeting, please click on 

the appropriate link, enter your name, 

email address, and organization, and 

follow the prompts to connect to the 

meeting audio by computer or 


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