### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Su bmitt ed on B ri ef

s S ep te m be r 19, 200 6

I N RE 

### I.C.G., B.M.D., T.N.C., & T.L.C.
Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 192214-18 Suzanne Bail ey, Judge

No. E2006-00746-COA- R3-P T - F ILED OCTO BER 31, 2006

I n th is a pp e a l, S .L .B . ( “ Mo the r” ) c on te nd s th a t the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d in te rm inatin g he r p are nta l r ig hts to four of he r five c hildren. Mo t h er does not cha lleng e the pr opriety of the trial c ourt’s orde r terminating her pa

renta l rig hts as to the fifth child. After ca ref ul review of the e vidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the ev i d ence does not pre ponderate ag ainst the trial court’s fi nd ing by c le ar an d c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that te rm inatio n o f M oth e r’ s p are nta l r ig hts wa s in the be st interest of he r childre n. There fore , we a ffirm.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Affi rm ed; Case Re m anded

S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., and C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., joined.

Ro bert B. P y le, Ch att ano oga, T enn ess ee, f or t he A pp ell ant , S .L .B.

Pau l G

. Su mm e r s , A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l a n d Re p o r te r , a n d Wi ll iam N

. H e lo u , A s s is tan t Attorney G e n e r a l , Na s h v i l l e, T en n es s ee , fo r t h e A p p el l ee , S t at e o f T en n es s ee , De p ar t m en to f C h i l d re n 's Se rv ic e s.Si nce D C S f i l ed i t s P eti t i o n t o T er mi nat e Paren t al Ri gh t s on M ay 19, 200 4, M ot her ha s gi ven bi r t h t o t wo 1

a d d iti o n a l ch ild re n , Jo m a n n a a n d J a c o b . B o th c h ild re n w e re re m o v e d fro m M o the r’s c u sto d y sh o rtly afte r th e ir b irth

a n d p l a c e d i n t h e c u s t od y of DCS. M ot h e r ’ s pa r e n t a l r i g h t s t o t h e s e t w o c h i l dr e n ar e no t at i s s u e i n t h i s ca s e

. At t h e t i me the trial c o u rt re n d e re d it s ju d g m e n t o n F e b ru a ry 2 4 , 2 0 0 6 , M o the r w a s p re g n a n t with he r e igh th c h ild

.

A c c o rd ing to the re c o rd , M o the r is u n a b le to re m e m b e r th e e x a c t d a te o f t h e inc id e n t. 2

A t est o f

t he wa t er tem p era t ure i n M o t he r’ s ap artm en t i nd i ca t ed t ha t t he wa t er c o uld ge t as ho t as 1 5 1 d eg ree s. 3

T y r on e Sr

. , M ot h er ’ s hu s ban d an d t h e f at h er of t h r ee of t h e c h i l dr en at i s s u e i n t h i s c as e, w as i n ca r ce r at ed for 4
d o m e stic v io le n c e a t t h e ti m e o f T yro n e J r.’s inj u ry.
-2- OP IN ION

I. Bac kg ro und

This case involves the t ermination of Mother’s parenta l rig hts to five of he r childre n. I mari 1 G. (born Septe mber 13, 1991) is the s on of Anthony G., who is dec ease d. Br e’A na D. ( born Mar ch 1, 1993) is the daug hter of Mic hael D. T he remaining three children, Ty rone C., Jr., (“Ty

rone Jr.”) (born July30, 1999), Ty shaila C. (born De cembe r 3, 2000), a nd Ty onna C. ( born J uly 7, 2002), we re fathe red by Ty

rone C., Sr. (“Ty

rone Sr.”). The Depa

rtment of Children’s Ser vices (“ DCS”) is not seeking termination of the pare ntal rig hts of Michae l D

. and Ty rone Sr. and is continuing to pr ovide
se rv ic e s to the m. On May 4, 2002, Mother broug ht Tyrone Jr. to the emerg ency room of T.C . Thompson Children’s Hospi tal in Chattanoog a. The child was treated for se cond-de g ree burns on the tops and sides of his fee t, his lef

t elbow, his left buttock, and pa rt of his bac k. He a lso had first-de g ree burns
on his sh ou lde rs

. Ac c or din g to M oth e r, wh o w a s a pp ro xima te ly

se ve n mo nth s p re g na nt at th e tim e of the incident, she was taking a nap a round 11 a.m. on e ither May 1 or 2, 2002, when she awoke

2 to the s ound of Tyrone J r. screaming . Mother said that she f ound the two-y ear -old in the bathtub, and he ha d been burned by hot water in the t ub. Mother testi fied that her elderly g randpa rents we re 3 supposed to be watching the childre n while she slept. Ty rone Jr.’s pediatric ian re ported that Mother 4

c a lle d h im l a te on the nig ht of Ma y 3, 20 02 , to re qu e st a pr e sc ri pti on fo r o int me nt t o tr e a t th e bu rn s, and then br oug ht the child to his office the following morning . Mother wa s told to t ake T yrone Jr. to the emerg ency room, which she did that same day . Doctors told DCS that the burns on Ty rone J r.’s body wer e not wate r burns. Mother had pre viouslybeen inve stigated by DCS because of burns on Br e’A na D. a nd bruises on Ty rone Jr.
On May 8, 2002, the J uvenile Court of Ha milton C ounty enter ed a pr otective c ustody order which veste d DCS with t empora ry custody of I mari G., B re’ Ana D., T yrone Jr., and Ty shaila C. The court found probable cause to believe that the children w ere depende nt and neg lected ba sed on the
sever e injuries sustained by Ty rone J r. whil e in his Mother’s care

. On J uly 9, 2002, the trial court enter ed a pr otective c ustody order reg arding Ty onna C., the n two day s old, and place d her in the c are of DCS based upon the sa me episode of alleg ed abuse

.T h e p e rm a n e n c y p la n s re q u ire d , am o n g o the r t h ing s, tha t M o the r: un d e rg o a p a re n ting a sse ssm e n t; c o m p le te 5
a ps y chol ogi cal ex ami nat i on; ac t i vel y par t i ci pat e i n a ny coun s el i ng r ecomm ended as a r es ult o f the py s chol ogi cal

a sse ssm e n t an d a tten d s u c h c o u n se ling u n til a ll tre a tm e n t g o a ls h a v e b e e n m e t; c o m p le te c o u n se ling d e sig n e d to d e a l with d o m e stic a b u se issu e s; a d m it to a b u sin g he r c h ild re n ; h a v e g a infu l, sta b le e m p lo ym e n t fo r a t l e a st six m o n ths p rio r to her chi l d ren r et urni ng hom e; pro vi d e a saf e, cl ean, and s t ab l e ho m e fo r her c hi l d ren; c o o p erat e wi t h a l l D C S case wo rkers and other pro fess i o nal s ass i gned to w o rk w i t h her; and pa y chi l d s up p o rt t o t he st at e i n acco rdanc e wi t h curr ent gu i d eli ne s.

M o t her pl ead ed gui l t y t o at t em p t ed aggravat ed chi l d negl ect , fo r whi ch she r eceived a t en- y ear s ent ence. T he 6
C rim ina l C o u rt o f H a m ilt o n C o u n ty sus p e n d e d M o the r’s se n te n c e a n d p la c e d he r o n a c tive p ro b a tio n

. -3- DCS drafted pe rmane ncy plans for the children. Mother signe d the perma nency plans for 5 her f our oldest childre n on J une 20, 2002, noting that she did not ag ree to the require ment that she “admit to child abuse or

any other c riminal conduct.” The perma nency plan for the infant, Ty onna C., w a s n o t s ig n e d b y M o th e r

. T h e r e is n o in d ic a ti o n in th e r e c o r d a s to w h y s h e did not sign the final permanenc y

plan, which wa s develope d in September of 2002. H oweve r, the re quirements for Ty onna C.’s plan we re e ssentially the same a s those of the other four c hildren.
On September

9, 2003, the trial court found Mother’s f ive ch i l d ren to be depende nt and neg lected. Furthermor e, the court enter ed a finding of sever e abuse ag ainst Mother, stating that clear and convinc ing e vidence persua ded the c ourt that Moth er ha d intentionally inflicted Ty

rone Jr.’s burns. The tria l court’s finding s were aff irmed by the Circuit Court of Hamilton County

. On April 14, 2004, the trial court terminated Mother’s visitation bec ause of M o t h er’s inappropriate behavior during supervised visits with her children. D uring one of the visits, M other lost her temper , and DCS had to c all security to r emove Mother from the premises. The following month, DCS filed a pe tition t o terminate the pare ntal rig hts of Mother on the g rounds that Mother
aba nd on e d th e c hil dr e n by wi llf ull y faili ng to sup po rt the m; Moth e r co mmi tte d s e ve re abu se a g a ins t Ty rone Jr.; Mother failed to substantially comply with the perma nency

p l an s d raf

ted by DCS; t he children ha ve bee n remove d from Mother’ s home by court orde r for more than six months and the conditions w hich led to the remova l pe rsist a nd are unlikely to be re medied in the nea r future , and the c on tin uatio n o f the mothe r/ c hil d re la tio ns hip g re a tly dim ini sh e s th e c hil dr e n’ s c ha nc e s o f e arl y integ ration i n t o a s af

e, s table, and pe rmane nt home; and Mother wa s sentence d to more than two y ear s’ impr i s o n m en t for c onduct ag ainst Tyrone Jr. DCS further a sserted that the termination of 6 Mother’s pa

renta l rig hts would be in the best intere sts of her f ive childre n.
The trial court g rante d a def ault judgme nt to DCS on September 26, 2005, be cause Mother failed t o ap p ear in court and did not provide an excuse for her a bsence . Mother’s attorney filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court de nied when Mothe r once ag ain fa iled to appea r in court f

or the motion hearing. Mother’s attorney filed a sec ond motion to reconsider the termination, which wa s g rante d on November 9, 2005.
Following a benc h trial, the court entere d a Te rmination of Pare ntal Rights and Final De cre e of Complete Guar dianship on Fe bruary 24, 2006. Th e t ri al court found, by clea r and c onvincingT h e t r i al c ou r t s t at ed t h at “ bec au s e of M ot h er ’ s pr eg n an ci es w i t h c h i l dr en wh o ar e n ot t h e s u bj ec t of t h i s a ct i on 7

an d c l ai ms o f i n a b i l i t y t o w o r k d u r i n g t h o s e p r e g n a n c i e s , t h e Co u r t d o e s n o t f i n d c l e a r a n d c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n ce of abandonment by f ai l ur e t o pay ch i l d s uppo r t

. ”
-4- evidenc e, all of the g rounds for te rmination of M o t h er’s pare ntal rig hts alleg ed by DCS with t he exception of aba ndonment by failure to pay child support. Furthermore , the court found by clea r 7

a ndc on vin c ing e vid e nc e that it wa s in the be st inte re sts of the c hil dr e n th a t Mo the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts be te rm inate d. Mo the r a

pp e a ls.

II. Iss ue

T h e s o l e i s s u e r ai s ed b y

M o t h ero n ap p ea l i s wh et h ert h e t ri al co u rt wa s co rr ec ti n fi n d i n g, by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, that termination of her pa renta l rig hts was in the best interest of I mari G., B re’ Ana D., T y shai l a C ., and Ty onna C. Mother did not appe al the trial c ourt’s finding that termination of her

pare ntal rig hts to Tyrone Jr. was in that child’s best intere st.

III. St andard of Review
A biologic al par ent’s rig ht to the car e and c ustody of his or her c hild is among the olde st of the jud ic ia lly re c og nize d lib e rt y int e re sts pr ote c te d by the du e pr oc e ss c laus e s o f the fe de ra l a ndstate constitutions. Trox e l v . G ra nv ill e , 53 0 U .S. 57 , 6 5 ( 20 00 ); Ha wk v . H awk , 855 S.W .2d 573, 578-79 (T e nn . 1 99 3) ; Ray v. Ray , 8 3 S. W.3 d 7 26 , 7 31 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) . A lth ou g h th is rig ht i s fundame ntal and superior to claims of other pe rsons and the g overnme nt, it is not ab s o l u te. Sta te
v . C. H. K. , 154 S.W .3d 586, 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). This rig ht continues without interruption
on l y a s l o n g a s a p ar e n t h a s n o t r e l i n q u i s h e d i t , ab a n d o n e d i t , o r e n g a g e d i n c o n d u c t re qu ir ing its limit ation or termination. Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W. 3d13 7, 14 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) . A lth ou g h “ pa re nts ha ve a fu nd a me nta l r ig ht t o th e c are , c us tod y , a nd c on tr ol of the ir c hil dr e n, ” thi s rig ht i s n ot a bs olu te and par ental righ t s may

be terminated if there is clear and convinc ing e vidence justify ing suc h termination under the applicable statute. In re Drinnon , 776 S.W .2d 96, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Sta nle

y v . I lli no is , 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
Termination proc eeding s are g overne d by statute in Tennesse e. Parties who ha ve standing to seek the te rmination of a biolog ical par ent’s pa re ntal rig hts must first prove at least one of the statutory g rounds for te rmination. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)( 1). Secondly , they must prove that termination of the pa rent’s rights is in the child’s best intere st. Tenn. C ode Ann. § 36- 1- 11 3( c )( 2) . B e c a us e the de c isi on to te rm inate pa re nta l rig hts ha s p ro fo un d c on se qu e nc e s, c ou rt s mu st apply a hig her standa

rd of pr oof in dec iding termination cases. The ref ore, to just ify

termination of pare ntal rig hts , t h e p arty seeking termination must prove by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e the g round (or

g rounds) for

termination and that ter

mination is in the child’s best intere st. Tenn. Code An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c ); In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W . 3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002)

. The he ighte n ed burden of proof in par ental termination cases minimiz es the risk of
err oneous dec isions. I

n r e C

. W. W. , 3 7 S. W.3 d 4 67 , 4 74 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 00 ); In re M. W .A ., J r. ,-5-

980 S.W .2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). E vidence satisfy ing the clea r and c onvincing evidenc e standard e stablishes that the truth of th e fa ct s asserted is highly probable , Sta te v . D e ma rr , No. M2002-02603-COA- R3-J V, 2003 WL 21946726, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. M .S., filed Aug . 13, 2003), no appl. perm. filed , and eliminates a ny serious or substantial doubt about the co rr ec t n es s o f t he conclusions draw n from the e vidence

. In re Vale ntine , 7 9 S. W.3 d 5 39 , 5 46 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; In re S.M

. , 14 9 S. W.3 d 6 32 , 6 39 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 4) ; I n r e J .J .C. , 148 S.W .3d 919, 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 04 ). I t pr od uc e s in a fa c t- fi nd e r’ s min d a fi rm be lie f or c on vic tio n r e g ard ing the truthof the fa c ts soug ht to be established. In re A.D .A. , 84 S.W.3 d 592 , 596 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; Ray v . Ray , 83 S.W. 3d72 6, 73 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d at 474.

I n a non-jury

case such as this one, we revie w the re cord de novo with a pre sumption of
corr ectne ss a s to the trial court’s determination of fac ts, and we must honor those f indings unless the
e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s to the c on tr ary . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Union Carbide v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87 , 91 (Tenn. 1993) . When a trial court has seen and hear d witnesses, espe cially wher e is s u es o f credibilityand we ight of oral testimony

are involved, considera

ble def ere nce must be
acc orded to the trial court’ s fac tual finding s. Seals v. England/ Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., Inc., 984 S.W .2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)

. Further, “ [o] n an issue which hing es on the credibility of witnesses, the trial court will not be reve rsed unless there is f ound in the rec ord cle ar, c oncre te, and convincing evidenc e other t h an t h e oral testimonyof witnesses whic h contra dict the trial court’s finding s.” Ga lbre ath v . H ar ris , 8 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d 8 8 , 9 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 0 ) ( ci t i n g Tennessee Valley Ka oli n Co rp . v . P e rry , 5 2 6 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 8 , 4 9 0 ( T e n n

. C t

. A p p

. 1 9 7 4 ) )

. T h e tr i a l c o u r t’ s sp e c if ic finding s of fa ct ar e first re viewed and are presumed to be corr ect unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. We the n determine whether the fa cts, either a s found by the trial court or as supported by the prepondera nce of the evidenc e, cle arly and convinc ingly

establish the g rounds for te rminating the biologic al par ent’s par ental rig hts. In re S.M

. , 149 S.W .3d 632, 640 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). T he trial court’ s conclusi o n s o f l aw a re r eviewe d de novo and ar e ac corde d no presumption of
corr ectne ss. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 91 9 S.W.2 d 26, 35 (T e nn . 1 99 6) ; Pre sle y v . B e nn e tt , 860 S.W .2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993)

. IV . Ana ly sis

Mo the r a sserts that

the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in fi nd ing that te rm inatio n o f h e r p are nta l r ig hts is in the best interest of I mari G., Br e’A na D., Ty shaila C ., and Ty onna C. Tenne ssee law provides that
a c ou rt sh a ll co ns ide r the fo llo wi ng fa c tor s whe n de te rm ini ng wh e the r te rm inatio n of pare nta l r ig hts is in the best interest of a

child:
(1) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has m ade suc h an adjustment of circ umstance, c onduct, or c onditions as to make it safe an d i n the child’s best intere st to be in the home of the pa rent or g uardia n; (2) Whether t h e p ar ent or g uardia n has fa iled to effe ct a lasting adjustment af

t er r easona

ble ef forts by available social ser vices-6- ag encie s for such du ra t i o n of time that lasting a djustment does not
rea sonably

appea r possible;
(3) W hether the parent or guar dian has maintained re g ular visitation
or oth e r c on ta c t w ith the c hil d;
(4) Whether

a mea ningf

ul relationship has otherw ise bee n established betwe en the pa rent a nd g uardia n and the c hild;
(5 ) T he e ff

e c t a c ha ng e of

c are take rs a ndph y sic a l envi ronm e nt i s likely to have on the c hild’s emotional, psy cholog ical and me dical condition;
(6) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n, or other person residing with the pare nt or g uardia n, has shown brutality , phy sical, sexual, emotional
or ps y c ho log ic a l a

bu se , o r n e g le c t tow ard the c hil d, or a no the r c hil d or adult in the fa milyor household;
(7) Whether the phy sical environment of the pare nt’s or g uardia n’s home is healthy

and saf e, whe ther ther e is criminal ac tiv i t i yin the home, or whe ther ther e is such use of alcohol or controlled substanc es as may rende r the pa

re n t o r g uardia n consistently unable to ca

re f or the child in a saf

e and sta ble manner ; (8) W h ether the pare nt’s or g uardia n’s mental and/or emotional status would be detrimenta l to the ch i l d o r pre vent the par ent or g uardia n from ef

fec tively providing safe and s t able c are and supervision for the child; or
(9) W hether the par ent or g uardia n has paid c hild support consistent with the child su p p o rt g uidelines promulg ated by the depa rtment pursuant to § 36-5-101.

Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( i) . T he fa c tor s e nu me rate d a bo ve are no t exhaus tiv e , an d “ [t]he statut e do e s n ot r e qu ir e e ve ry

fa c tor to a pp e ar b e fo re a

c ou rt can fi nd that te rm inatio n is in a c hil d' s b e st interest.” D e

p t

. o f C h i l d r e n ' s S v c s
. v
. T

. S

. W. , No. M2001-01735-COA- R3-PT, 2002 W L 970434, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. M.S., fil ed May 10, 2002).

The trial c ourt hea

rd testimony

from s everal witnesses, including DCS employ ees, me ntal health prof

essionals, frie nds of Mother, and Mother her self. Af ter c onsidering all of the e vidence , the court found by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that termination of Mother’s pare ntal rig hts was in the be st i nte re st o f the c hil dr e n. Spe c if ic a lly , th e c ou rt

fo un d th a t:-7-

• The children had been remove d from Mother’s custody by order of the c ourt for at least si x m o n t h s befor e the he aring , and Mother “ failed to make any adjustment of circumstance, conduct or conditions to make it safe and in the Children’s best intere st to be place d in her c are .” See T enn. C ode Ann. § 36- 1-113(i)( 1).

• Despite a ssistance fr om DCS, “ther e is no evidenc e that [Mot her] can provide a home in which the Children will be safe from the thre at of c erta in emotional and psy cholog ical and ve ry likely phy si cal ha

rm caused by

the Mother’ s te nd e nc y to e ng a g e in v iol e nt r e la tionship s andhe r u ntr e a te d p e rs on a lit y disorders.” See Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(i)(2) , (7), ( 8).

• The children “we re t ak en fr o m t h e M o t h er at s u ch a t en d er age t h at no meaning ful pare nt-child relationship ex ists between them a nd their mother.” Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 36- 1- 11 3( i) (4 ). I mari G. ind ic a te d that he wante d to
rema in with his foster family rathe r th an returning to Mother. B re’ Ana D. told Dr. Tom Biller, one of the py schiatrists who counse led the childre n afte r they wer e plac ed with DCS, that if she (B re’ Ana) wer e a pare nt, it would be wrong to treat he r childre n like Mother tre ated he r.

• A cha ng e of c are taker s and homes is likely to have a nega t i ve ef

fec t on the children. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( i)(5). The trial court e mphasized that the childre n have be en in foster car e for four y ear s during the pende ncy of this proce eding , y et “they have achieve d an amazing l evel of permane ncy de sp ite thi s len g thy pr oc e ss. ” Th e c ou rt e xpre sse d co nc e rn that “[i]t is hig hly
un lik e ly that othe r s uc h g oo d o pp ortun iti e s f or pe rm a ne nc y

wi ll b e a va ila

ble if full advanta g e is not taken of the se rig ht away .” F inally , the court noted that c on tin uatio n o f Mothe r’ s par e nta l r e la tio ns hip wi th the c hil dr e n “ g re a tly diminis hes the C h i l d re n ’s cha nces of early integ ration into a stable a nd perma nent home.”

• Be cause of Mother’ s antisocial per sonality disorder, Mother

“cannot provide a saf e envir onment for the Children and she will not ch ange.” See Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-1-1 1 3 (i )( 8 ). The trial court re iterate d testimonyfrom Dr

. Be rt i n Glennon, the psy chiatrist who conduc ted a pa renting assessment of Mo the r, that “ [Mothe r’ s] pe rs on a lit y dis or de r wil l caus e he r t o c on sis te ntl y fail to follow the norma l proce ss of t h inking f or a mother

and that the condition will not chang e.” T he court emphasized that n o n e o f t h e mental health service pr oviders who testified w ould rec ommend that custody of the children be restore d to Mother.

Whil e discussi n g t h e s tatutory g rounds for te rminating Mother’s pa renta l rig hts, the trial
c ou rt c a lle d atte nti on to i ts e arl ie r f ind ing that Mo the r h a d c omm itt e d s e ve re chi ld ab us e a g a ins t-8-

Ty ro ne Jr. Th a t fi nd ing , wh ic h wa s a ff ir me d by the Cir c uit Cou rt of Ha mil ton Cou nty , is also rele vant in the best-inter est ana ly sis. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(i)( 6).

Mother ar g ues that the trial c ourt “ha rdly car ried the day

on best i n t ere sts of the children, much less by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e.” We disag ree

. There is ample evidence in the rec ord to s up po rt

the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd in gs . Ce rt a inl y the his tory

of c hil d a bu se in M oth e r’ s h ou se ho ld would raise c oncerns about the health of these children, should the y be returne d to Mother. Ther e was a lso a history of dom estic vi olence betwee n Mother and he r partners. Mother te stified that she had bee n in three a

busive relationships i n her life time, one of whic h is with her cu rrent husband, Ty rone Sr., who is a lso the father of three of the c hildren at iss ue in this case . Mother wa s diag nosed with personality

disorders by

two mental hea lth professionals, and the court stated that it witnessed sy mptoms of Mother’s antisocial persona litydisorder w hile she wa s testify ing. Furthermor e, ther e is evidence that Mother’s parenting ability will be im paire d beca use of he r mental he alth condition.

Three case manag ers f

rom DCS testified tha t t h ey woul d not rec ommend that Mother be allowed to have custody

of her children. The y described her temper ta ntrums during visits wit h her
c hil dr e n a nda

g e ne ra l un c oo pe rativ e a tti tud e when she int e ra c te d w ith DC S e mpl oy e e s. I n f a c t, Mother’s beh av i o r d u ri n g visits was so ex treme and so upsetting to her children that the court te rm inate d h e r v isi ta tio n. Mo the r wa s als o unc oo pe rativ e du ri ng he r pare nti ng a sse ssm e nt an d d id not c omplete the counseling that was require d as part of her perma nency plan. Sh e fai l ed t o p ay c hil d s up po rt

a ndte sti fi e d th a t sh e do e s n ot w a nt t o g e t a job be c a us e sh e is t

rying to g e t di sa

bil ity pay ments. Th i s s u gges t s that she mig ht not be able to support her children, e ven if they

wer e returne d to her c are

.
A l t h o u g h a p ar e n t ’ s r i g h t t o t h e c ar e a n d c u s t o d y o f h e r c h i l d r e n i s a f u n d a me nta l li be rt y interest prote cted by

both our state and fede ral constitutions, a pare nt’s interest must yield to that of he r c hil dr e n. Af

te r c are fu l r e vie w, we mus t c on c lud e that the e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing by c le ar a nd c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that te rm inatio n of Mo the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts is in the best interest of Imari G., B re’ Ana D., T y shaila C., and Ty onna C.

V . Conclu sion

For the foreg oing rea sons, the j udg ment of t he trial court is aff irmed. This case is remande d to the tr ia l cou rt fo r en fo rc e me nt of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt t e rm inatin g Mo the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts to I mari G. , B re ’A na D. , Ty sh a ila C., a nd Ty on na C. andfo r c oll e c tio n o f c os ts a sse sse d b e low , a ll pu rsu ant to app li cabl e la w. C os ts on app eal are ad ju dged agai ns t t he A pp ell ant , S .L .B.

___________________________________ SHARON G. LEE, J UDGE-9-