MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 9 ME 51 Docket: Cum

- 18

- 292 Argued: February	4,	2019 Decided: April 4 ,	2019 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. DANIEL	B. TUCCI	SR.	et	al.

MEAD ,	J. [ ¶1] Daniel	B.	Tucci	Sr. ,	Beatrix	T.	Tucci,	and	March	31,	LLC	(collectively, the	Tuccis) appeal	from a	judgment of	the	Superior	Court	(Cumberland County , L.	Walker,	J. )	in	favor	of	the	State	on	the	State’s	complaint	against	the Tuccis	for fraudulent	 transfer	 pursuant	 to	 14 M.R.S.	 §	 3575(1)(A)	 (201 8 ). The	 Tuccis argue	that	the	State’s	action	is	barred	by 14	M.R.S.	§ 3580 (1)	(2018) ,	pursuant to	which	a	cause	of	action	with	respect	to	a	fraudulent	transfer	is	extinguished unless	b rought	within	six	years	after	 the	 transfer	or ,	if	later, within	one	year after	the	transfer	was	or	could	reasonably	have	been	discovered. Although we conclude that section	3580	is	a	statute	of	repose that	has	displaced	the	common law	 doctrine	 of	 estoppel on	 which	 the	 court	 relied	 in	 rejecting	 the	 Tuccis’ section	 3580(1)	 defense, we	 nevertheless	 affirm	 the	 judgment	 because	 the2 court’s	factual	findings	apply	with	equal	force	to	trigger	the	one

- year	discovery exception	to	the	six

- year	limitation	provided	in	s ection	3580(1).
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ]		The	following	facts	are	drawn	from	the	Superior	Court’s judgment and	are	supported	by	the	record. The Tucci s are	longtime	residents	of	property on	Monument	Street	in	Portland.		Beginning	no	later	than	the	year	2000, Da niel Tucci	was	engaged	in	business	as	 a	sole	proprietor	doing	 various	handyman and	 home	 repair	 projects.	 	 Tucci	 was	 the subject of	 numerous	 customer complaints.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 2008	 he	 was	 convicted	 of	 Class	 B	 theft	 after charging	$10,000	to	a	customer’s credit	card	without	her	permission.		In	2009, two	other	customers	obtained	judgments	against	him	in	the	amounts	of	$3,500 and	$1,800. [¶ 3 ]		On	January	23,	2009,	Tucci	inherited	a one - quarter interest	in	the
Monument Street	property , which	was valued	at approximately	 $81,000.		On February 24, 2009,	Tucci	transferred	his	interest in	the	property to	himself	and his	wife, as	joint	tenants,	for	no	consideration.		The	release	deed	was	recorded in	 the	Cumberland	County	Registry	 of	Deeds. On	September 23,	2009, Tucci formed	March 31,	LLC,	of	which	his	wife	and	the	couple’s	three	children	were named	members

— Tucci	was	not	a	member.		On	November	24,	2009,	Tucci	and3 his	 wife	 conveyed	 their	 joint one - quarter interest	 in	 the	 property	 to March 31, LLC,	for	no	considera tion.		The	release	deed	was also recorded	in	the Cumberland	County	Registry	of	Deeds. [¶ 4 ]	 	 In	 2009	 and	 2010,	 Tucci	 claimed	 on	 his	 tax	 returns	 that	 he	 paid $6,000	in	rent	and	paid	no	property	taxes.		Following	a	stroke	in	2010,	Tucci began	 to	 receive	 Soci al	 Security	 Disability	 Income	 (SSDI)	 and	 temporary assistance	for	needy	families	(TANF)	benefits.		At	this	time , however,	Tucci	had a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 cash	 hidden	in	 his	 bedroom	 ceiling that he	 failed	 to disclose	to	the	Maine	Department	of	Health	and Human	Services. [¶ 5 ]		Around	2011,	after	receiving	a	number	of	complaints,	the	Consumer Protection	Division	of	the	Attorney	General’s	Office	began	investigating	Tucci’s handyman	 business. The Attorney	 General issued	 Tucci	 a	 civil	investigative demand	 for documents	 and	 testimony.	 	 Tucci	 produced	 no	 documents	 and testified	that	he	was	receiving	food	stamps	and	SSDI.		Based	on	his receipt	of needs

- based benefits	and	his	repeated	representations	of	poverty, the Attorney General concluded that Tucci could	not	p ay	any	civil	judgment	 that	might	be entered	against	him but	continued	 to	pursue	a	permanent	injunction	barring him	from	conducting	business.4 [¶ 6 ]	 	 In	 February	 2012,	 the	 State commenced	 an	 action against	 Tucci alleging	that	he	had	violated	the	Unfair	Trade	Practices	Act	(UTPA) , see 5	M.R.S. §§ 205

- A to 214	 (2018) .	 	 Throughout the	 course	 of discovery,	 he	 never disclosed	the	existence	of	March	31,	LLC.		At	the	trial o n the	UTPA	complaint , Tucci	agai n	testified	to	having	no	assets,	and	several	consumers	also	testified that	 Tucci	 had	 stated	 that	 he	 had	 no	 assets.	 	 In	 April 2013,	 the court permanently	 enjoined	 Tucci	 from	 operating	 a	 home	 repair	 or	 handyman business.		He	was	ordered	to	pay	$236,500.50	in restitution	for	the	benefit	of the	 consumers	 he	 had	 harmed,	 as	 well	 as	 $140,000	 in	 civil	 penalties , which were	suspended	as	long	as	he	paid	$250	per	month	toward	the	restitution. [¶ 7 ]	 	 Although Tucci did	 not	 make	 payments,	 the	 State	 chose	 not	 to

commence a	disclosure	hearing	during	which	Tucci	would	have	been	required to	 disclose under	 oath his	 income	 and	 assets, see 14 M.R.S.	 §§ 3122

- 3125 (2018);	neither	did	the S tate	search	registries	of	deeds	to	determine	whether Tucci	owned	any	real	property. [¶ 8 ] The Superior	 C ourt	 found	 that “ ba sed	 on	 the	 various representations	 Tucci	 made	 to	 the [Attorney	 General] ,	 his	 tax	 returns,	 and testimony	of	consumers	at	the	UTPA	trial,	[the Attorney	General ]	believed	Tucci had	no	significant	assets	and	was	a	tenant	in	an apartment	at	[the]	Monument5 Street	[property].”		On	March	29,	2016,	the Attorney	General’s office	received	a tip	 that	 Tucci	 may	 have	 an	 ownership	 interest	 in	 the	 property	 and	 that the property was	 listed	 for	 sale	 for	 $2.5	 million. T he Attorney	 General the n undertook a	title	search	and	discovered	the	2009	transfers	to	Tucci	and	his	wife and	to	March	31,	LLC. [¶ 9 ] Within	days	of	that	discovery,	o n	April	8,	2016,	the	State	brought	a complaint	for	fraudulent	transfer	pursuant	to	the	Uniform	Fraudulent	Transfe r Act	(UFTA),	14	M.R.S.	§§ 3571

- 3582 (201 8 ) against the Tucci s .		A	bench	 trial was	 held	 on	 February	 12	 and	 13, 2018.	 	 Thereafter	 the	 parties	 submitted extensive	proposed	findings	of	fact	and	conclusions	of	law. After	considering the	evidence	introduced	at	trial	and	the	parties’	proposed	findings,	the Superior
Court entered	a	judgment	and	order	in	the	State’s	favor.		The	court	determined that	 the	 Tucci s	 were equitably estopped	 from	 asserting the	 bar	 set	 out	 in
section 3580(1)	as	a n	affirmative	defense	and	that	the	State	had	show n by	clear and	convincing	evidence that	Tucci	transferred	his	property	with	actual	intent to	hinder,	delay,	 or	defraud	creditors i n	 violation	 of	14	M.R.S.	 § 3575(1) (A)

. 1 The	Tuccis	appeal.

1 The Tucci s timely	 filed	a	motion	 for	amended	or	additional	 findings,	amended	or	additional conclusions	of	law,	and	an	amended	judgment,	which	the	court	granted	in	part.		The	court	made	no substantive	changes	to	the	judgment	but amended	the	judgment	to insert	clarifying	language	with respect	to	remedies.6 II.		DISCUSSION [ ¶1 0 ]	 	 The	 Tucci s argue	 that	 the	 State’s	 fraudulent	 transfer	 claim	 is barred	by	 the time	limitations	established	by section	3580.		Pursuant	 to that

statute ,	“[a]	cause	of	action	with	respect	to	a	fraudulent	transfer	or	obligation under	[the	UFTA]	is	extingu ished	unless	action	is	brought	.	.	.	[u]nder	section 3575[(1)(A)]	within	6	years	after	the	transfer	was	made	or	the	obligation	was incurred	or,	if	later,	within	one	year	after	the	transfer	or	obligation	was	or	could reasonably	 have	 been	 discovered	 by	 the	 c laimant.”	 	 In	 response,	 the	 State asserts	that	(1)	section	3580(1)	does	not	apply	to	the	State	because	the	statute does	not	specifically	name	the	State,	(2)	even	if	the	statute	applies	to	the	State, the	 Tuccis	 are equitably	 estopped	 from	 raising section	 3580(1) as	 an affirmative	 defense,	 and	 (3)	 even	 if	 the	 statute	 applies	 to	 the	 State	 and	 the Tuccis	are	not	estopped	from	raising	the	defense,	the	Tuccis	did	not	prove	their section	3580(1)	defense	by	a	preponderance	of	the	evidence.		Each of	the	St ate’s arguments will	be	discussed	in	turn.
A. Applicability	of	Section	3580	to	the	State [¶1 1 ]		The	State	asserts	 that	it	is	not	bound	by	any	 statute	unless it	is expressly	named in	it

. See State	v.	Crommett ,	151	Me.	188,	193,	116	A.2d	614, 616	(19 5 5)	(“I t	is	a	general	rule	in	Maine	that	the	State	is	not	bound	by	a	statute7 unless	expressly	named	therein.”). The	plain	language	of	section	3580(1)	does not	explicitly	name	the	State ; it	uses only the	term	“claimant

. ” “Claimant” is	not defined	by	the	UFTA ,	bu t,	pursuant	to section	3572,	a	creditor	“means	a	person who	has	a	claim”	and	a	person	“means	an	individual,	partnership,	corporation, association,	 organization, government	 or	 governmental	 subdivision	 or	 agency , business	trust,	estate,	trust	or	any	other	le gal	or	commercial	entity.” 14	M.R.S. § 3572(4),	(9)	(emphasis	added). [¶1 2 ]		Because	the	State ,	by	definition, is	a “ person ” with	a	claim	under the	 statute, the Tuccis ’ contention	 that	 section	 3580(1)	 is	 broad	 enough	 to apply	to	the	State	is	not	without	merit.		However,	we	need	not resolve the	issue because	we	hold	that	section	3580	is	a	statute	of	repose. 2 “A	statute	of	repose is	 a	 statute	 barring	 any	 suit	 that	 is	 brou ght	 after	 a	 specified	 time	 since	 the defendant	acted

. .	 .	 . ” Baker	v.	 Farrand ,	2011	ME	91,	¶ 16	 n.4,	 26 A.3d 806 (quotation	marks	omitted) .		It	“effect[s]	a	legislative	judgment	that	a	defendant should	be	free	from	liability	after	the	legislative ly deter mined	period	of	time.”

2 Statutes	of	limitations	and	statutes	of	repose	are	both	mechanisms	used	to	limit	the	temporal duration	 of	 liability,	 but	 each	 ha s a	 distinct	 purpose. Cal.	 Pub.	 Emps.’	 Ret.	 Sys .	 v.	 ANZ	 Sec.,	 Inc. , 582 U.S. __,	137	S.	Ct.	2042, 2049 (2017). A	s tatute	of	limitations	govern s the	time	within	which	an action	must	be	commenced	and	begin s to	run	when	the	cause	of	action	accrues , whereas a statute	of repose	limit s the	time	within	which	an	action	may	be	brought	and is not	related	to	the	accrual	of	any cause	of	action. See id.8 Cal.	 Pub.	 Emps.’	 Ret.	 Sys.	 v.	 ANZ	 Sec.,	 Inc. ,	 582	 U.S.	 ___,	 137	 S.	 Ct.	 2042,	 20 49 (2017) (quotation	marks	omitted)

. [¶1 3 ]	 	 That	 section	 3580	 is	 a	 statute	 of	 repose	 is	 confirmed	 by	 the language	 of	 the	 statute,	 which	 “reflects	 the	 leg islative	 objective	 to	 give	 a defendant	a	complete	defense	to any suit	after	a	certain	period.” Id. ; see also CTS	Corp.	v.	Waldburger ,	573	U.S.	1,	8	(2014); Nat'l	Auto	Serv.	Ctrs.	v.	F/R	550,
L L C ,	 192	 So.	 3d	 498,	 510	 (Fla.	 Dist.	 Ct.	 App.	 2016).	 	 In	 particular,	 the	 term “extinguished” used	in	section	3580 sets	an	outer	limit	on	the	right	to	bring	an action, rather	 than	 merely	 barring	 the	 remedy. See Nat’l	 Auto	 Serv.	 Ctrs. , 192 So. 3d	 at	 510.	 	 Furt hermore,	 the UFTA’s official	 comments specifically
express the statutory intent	 to	 bar	 the	 underlying	 right	 and	 not	 merely	 the remedy upon expiration	of	the	statutory	periods	prescribed.		Unif. Fraudulent Transfer	Act	Prefatory	Note,	7A Pt.	II U.L.A.	249 (2017). [¶1 4 ]		Accordingly, because section	3580	affect s a	claimant’s substantive right	to	bring	a	fraudulent	transfer	action,	it	is	applicable	to	all	parties	who	seek relief	 under	 the	 statute. S ee Unif.	 Fraudulent	 Transfer	 Act	 §	 9	 cmt.	 1,
7A Pt. II U.L.A

. 555	 (2017)	 (stating	 that	 the	 statute	 rejects	 the	 rule	applied	in United States	v.	Gleneagles	Inv.	Co. ,	565	F.	Supp.	556,	583	(M.D.	Pa.	1983),	that	a state	statute	of	limitations	did	not	to	apply	to	a	fraudulent	conveyance	action9 by	 the	 United	 States government).	 	 Thus,	 u nlike	 a	 traditional	 statute	 of limitations that would	not	apply	against	the	State	unless	the	State	was	expressly named	therein, see Crommett ,	151	Me. at 193 ,	116	A.2d at 616 ,	a fter	the	passage of	the	prescribed	time	period in the statu te	of	repose,	there	exists	no	right	for
any claimant

— even	 the	 State

— to	 bring	 an	 action unless	 an	 exception	 is demonstrated

. B. Equitable	Estoppel [¶1 5 ]		Having	concluded	that	section	3580	is	a	statute	of	repose,	we	next consider	the	State’s contention that	the	Tuccis	are	estopped	from	asserting	it

. We hold that	 section	 3580	 displaces our general power	 to	 apply	 equitable doctrines	to	prevent	a	defendant	from	asserting a statute	of	repose	as	a	defense. Cf. Baker ,	2011	ME	91,	¶ 21	n.5,	26	A.3d	806	(“Thro ugh	statutory	enactment, the	 Legislature	 has	 foreclosed	 our	 capacity	 to	 define	 when	 the	 statute	 of limitations

.	.	. may	be	tolled

.	.	. or	to	establish	instances	where	the	discovery rule	may	be	applied.”). [¶1 6 ] The United	 States Supreme	 Court has held that,	 although	 time requirements	 are	 customarily	 subject	 to	 equitable	 doctrines	 such	 as	 tolling, such	doctrines	 are	 fundamentally	inconsistent	with	 a	 statute	 structured	as	a

one - year	discovery	period	with	a	period	of	repose

. Lampf,	Pleva,	Lipkind,	Prupis10 &	 Petigrow	 v.	 Gilbertson ,	 501	 U.S.	 350,	 363	 (1991). Similarly , as	 we	 discuss below, section	3580(1)’s	one

- year	discovery	period	begins	after the	claimant’s actual	 or	constructive discovery	 of	 the	 fraudulent	 transfer,	making equitable tolling	 or	 estoppel	 u nnecessary,	 and	 the	 six

- year extinguishment	 period	is	 a cutoff	to	which	equitable	principles	do	not logically apply

. See id. “[T]he	object of	a	statute	of	repose,	 to	grant	complete	peace	 to	defendants,	supersedes	 the application	of	a	tolling	rule	based	i n	equity.” Cal. Pub.	Emps. ’ Ret.	Sys. ,	137	S.	Ct. at	2052; see also CTS	Corp. ,	573	U.S.	at	9	(noting	that	repose	periods	are	fixed and will not be delayed	 by	 estoppel	 or	 tolling); Aresty	 Int’l	 Law	 Firm,	 P.C.	 v. Citibank,	N.A. ,	677	F.3d	54,	58	n.6	(1 st Cir

. 2012)	( same ).		Thus, “ [b]ased	on	the long

- standing	 recognition	 that	 statutes	 of	 repose	 create	 an	 absolute	 bar	 to untimely	actions	and	 the	specific	language	of	 [the	UFTA	statute],	.	.	.	 [a	UFTA action]	is	not	 subject	 to	an	 assertion	 of	 equitable estoppel.” Nat'l	Auto	Serv.
Ctrs. ,	192	So.	3d	at	512. [¶1 7 ]	 	 Accordingly,	 although	 principles	 of	 law	 and	 equity	 may supplement	 the	provisions	of	 the	UFTA	unless	displaced	by	 the	provisions	of the UFTA , see 14 M.R.S.	§	3581, the	State	may	not	assert	estopp el here	because section	3580	has	displaced the applicability	of	equitable	doctrines that	might otherwise	bear	on	that	statute .		This conclusion is	further	reinforced	by	Maine11 Comment	3 to section	3580	of the	UFTA ,	which	states	that	“ [ t ] he	six	year	statute of	 limitations	 from	 date	 of	 discovery	 in	 cases	 of	 fraudulent	 concealment provided	by	14 M.R.S.A.	§ 859	is	not	available f or	actions	under	the	Act.		The more	limited	discovery	rule	provided	in	subsection	(1)	is	the only exception	to the	 general	 six

- year	limitation	 period	 provided	 by	 this	 section.”	 	 14	 M.R.S.A. § 3580	Maine c mt.	3	(emphasis	added). “ That	the	statute	provides	this single discovery

- based	 exception	 and	 does	 not	 provide	 any	 others	 is	 a	 textual indication	tha t	equitable	estoppel	principles,	which	would effectively	create	a second	discovery

- based	exception	when	a	plaintiff	is	delayed	in	learning	of	the fraudulent	nature	of	the	transaction	by	the	defendants ’ misrepresentation,	are not	to	apply.” Nat’l	Auto	Serv .	Ctrs. ,	192	So.	3d	at	513 ; s ee also United	States	v. Brockamp , 5 19	U.S.	347,	350

- 52 (1997)	( explaining	that	when	time	limitations and	 exceptions	 are	 explicit,	 the	 statute	 cannot	 easily	 be	 read	 as	 containing implicit	exceptions); Musk	v.	Nelson ,	647	A.2d	1 198,	1201

- 02	(Me.	1994) ( " [A] well

- settled	rule	of	statutory	interpretation	states	that express	mention	of	one concept	implies	 the	exclusion	of	others	not	listed

. .	.	. The	statute	provides	a single	exception	and	implicitly	denies	the	availability	of	any	other. ”).12 C. Discovery	Exception [¶1 8 ]		Because	the	State	may	not	assert	equitable	estoppel	in	this	case, we	next	consider the	Tuccis’	contention	 that section	3580(1)	bars	 the	State’s claim. The State concedes	that	it did	not	bring	its	action	within	six	years	after the	transfers	were	made;	however, the	State	argues	that	the	Tuccis	cannot	show that	 the	 State	 failed	 to	 bring	its	 claim	 within	 one	 year	 afte r	it	 discovered	 or reasonably could	 have	 discovered	 the	 transfers. See 14	 M.R.S.	 § 3580(1)

. Although	 the	 State	 brought	 its	 complaint	 on	 April 8, 2016,	 ten	 days	 after discovering	the	transfers,	the	Tuccis	argue	that	the	State	could	have	discovered the	tra nsfers	as	early	as	2011	during	the	UTPA	proceedings	and	that	it	should have	performed	an	online	check	of	the	Cumberland	County	Registry	of	Deeds , which	would	have	revealed	the	transfers	in	2009. 3 [¶1 9 ]		We	have	interpreted	a	similar	discovery	rule,	found in	14	M.R.S. § 859	(2018), “as	a	provision	that	prevents	commencement	of	the	limitations period	until	the	existence	of	the	cause	of	action	or	fraud	is	discovered	or	should have	 been	 discovered	 by	 the	 plaintiff	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 due	 diligence	 and

3 We	decline	to	address	the	Tuccis’	argument	that	under	the	laws	of	agency,	because	Cumberland County	had	actual	knowledge	of	the	transfers when	they	were	recorded	in	2009,	the	State	is	likewise charged	with	knowledge. See Brown	v.	Town	of	Starks ,	2015	ME	47,	¶ 6,	114	A.3d	1003	(“In	order	to preserve	an	issue	for	appellate	review,	a	party	must	timely	present	that	issue	to	the	original	tribuna l; otherwise,	the	issue	is	deemed	waived.”).13 ordinary prudence .” Drilling	 &	 Blasting	 Rock	 Specialists,	 Inc.	 v.	 Rheaume , 2016 ME	131,	¶	19,	147	A.3d	824	(quotation	marks	omitted).		In	that	context,

we reasoned	that	“a	failure	to	conduct	a	title	search	at	the	registry	will	not,	as	a matter	 of	 law,	 constitute	 a	 failure	 to	 exercise	 due	 diligence	 for	 purposes	 of preventing	 the	 commencement	 of	 the	 limitations	 period	 on	 a	 fraud	 claim. Whether	 a	 plaintiff	 ex ercised	 due	 diligence	 depends	 on	 the	 factual circumstances	 of	 a	 given	 case	 .	 .	 .	 .” Id. ¶	 29.	 	 Recordation	 of	 the	 fraudulent conveyance	is merely one	circumstance	for	the	court	to	consider. See Westman v.	Armitage ,	215	A.2d	919,	922	(Me.	1966). [¶ 20 ] As	with	 section	 859 ,	 for	 purposes	 of	 commencing	 the	 statutory period	pursuant	to	section	3580(1),	the	claimant	must	exercise	due	diligence. Accord Davimos	v.	Hallé ,	No.	1:13

- cv - 225

- GZS,	2013	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	136221,	at *11	 (D. Me.	 Sep t .	 24,	 2013)	 (finding	 our	 decisions	 interpreting	 section 859 instructive	in	assessing	whether	a	plaintiff	could	have	discovered	a	fraudulent transfer	pursuant	to	section	3580(1)).		Although section	3580(1)	uses	the	term “could,” whereas section	 859	 looks	 to	 when	 the	 fraud	 “should	 have	 been discovered,” Rheaume , 2016	 ME	 131,	 ¶ 19,	 147 A.3d 824	 (quotation	 marks omitted),	the	rational	meaning	of	section	3580(1)	is	that	the	actions	taken	by the	 defrauded	 claimant	 to	 discover	 the	 fraud	 must	 be	 reasonable	 in	 the14 particular	circumstances	of	the	case. 4 See,	e.g. , Janvey v.	Democratic	Senatorial Campaign	Comm.,	 Inc. ,	712	F.3d	185,	195	(5th	Cir.	2013)	( applying	 the	Texas Uniform	Fraudulent	Transfer	Act,	which	in	pertinent	part	is	identical	to	Maine’s, and	using	the	terms	“could”	and	“should”	interchangeably). [¶ 2 1] In	 this case,	 the	 Superior	 Court	 made	 extensive	 findings	 of	 fact detailing	 the	many	deceptive	and	misleading	actions	 that	Tucci	undertook	 to present	 the	 appearance	 of	 insolvency.	 	 The	 court	 found,	 for	 purposes	 of	 the equitable	estoppel	defense	to	the	section	3580 (1)	six

- year	limitation,	that	the State’s	failure	to	conduct	a	search	at	the	registry	of	deeds	or	pursue	a	disclosure hearing	was	reasonable	in	light	of Tucci’s	misrepresentations.		Those	findings, which	are	supported	by	the	record,	apply	with	equal	force to	the	State’s	duty	of due	 diligence	 pursuant	 to	 the	 one

- year	 discovery	 rule	 of	 section	 3580(1). Accordingly,	because	the	State’s c omplaint	was	filed	within	the	one

- year	period following	 the	 discovery	 of	 Tucci’s	 fraud,	 and	 the	 State could	 not	 have reasonably	discovered	the	fraud	before	the	actual discovery,	the	State’s	cause of	action	was	not	extinguished	by	section	3580(1).

4 Were	it	otherwise,	the	claimant	could	benefit	from	the	discovery	rule	only	by	engaging	in	every readily available	means	to	try	to	learn	of	the	fraud,	regardless	of	whether	it	is	reasonable	under	the circumsta nces .		We	doubt	the	Legislature	intended	to	impose	such	a	burden	on	a defrauded	party, and	thus	we	apply	section	3580(1)	in	the	more	sensible	way	that	will	require	the	claimant	to	act reasonably	based	on	the	particular	circumstances	of	the	case	actually	or constructively	known	to the claimant	at	the	time.15 [¶ 22 ] With	respect	to	the	merits	of	the	State’s	claim,	the	Superior	Court appropriately	considered	 the	 factor s	laid	out	in	section 3575(2) of	 the	UFTA and	 determined	 that	 the	 State	 had	 established,	 by	 clear	 and	 convincing evidence,	that	Tucci ’ s	transfers	were	made	with	actual	intent	to	hinder,	delay, or	defraud	creditors. See 14.	M.R.S.	§	3575(1)(A); FDIC	v.	Pro ia ,	663	A.2d	1252, 1254	 (Me. 19 9 5).	 	 Because	 the	 court’s	 findings	 are	 supported	 by	 competent evidence	in	the	record,	we	affirm the	judgment

. The	entry	is: Judgment affirmed

.

Lawrence	C.	Winger,	Esq. (orally) ,	Portland,	for	appellants	Daniel	B.	Tucci,	Sr., Beatrix	T.	Tucci,	and	March	21,	LLC Janet	 T.	 Mills,	 Attorney	 General,	 and	 Thomas	 A.	 Knowlton,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen. (orally) ,	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appell ee	State	of	Maine

C umberland	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV

- 201 6

- 154 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY