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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48978

PAMELA K. VOUK, VONDEL CHAPMAN,

JANA L. REED, DEWEY L. CHAPMAN,

BRAD L. CHAPMAN, and CHARLES W.

CHAPMAN, as individuals and beneficiaries

of the Chapman Family Multiple Power

Liquidity Trust and PAMELA K. VOUK

AND VONDEL CHAPMAN, as Trustees of

the Chapman Family Multiple Power

Liquidity Trust,

 Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

WADE CHAPMAN, as an individual, and as

Trustee of the Chapman Family Multiple

Power Liquidity Trust,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Boise, August 2022 Term 

Opinion Filed: December 7, 2022

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 

Idaho, Bonneville County. Dane H. Watkins, District Judge.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and the case remanded with 

instructions to enter an amended judgment consistent with this opinion.

Murray, Ziel & Johnston, Idaho Falls, for Appellant. Paul Ziel argued.

Parson Behle & Latimer, Idaho Falls, for Respondents. Slade Sokol argued.

_____________________

BRODY, Justice 

This case involves a claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of a trustee’s decision 

to retain the death benefit of a life insurance policy owned by a trust. Wade Chapman (“Wade”) 

and his six siblings (“Siblings”) are the children of Wilford (“Bill”) Chapman. Bill had a life 

insurance policy for $7,000,000 that named the Chapman Family Multiple Power Liquidity Trust 
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(“Trust”) as its owner. Wade, along with Siblings, were named as the Trust’s beneficiaries. Wade 

was also named a trustee. After Bill passed away, Wade learned that he was listed as the sole 

beneficiary of the life insurance policy and retained the entirety of the death benefit for himself. 

Siblings sued Wade for breach of fiduciary duty, among other causes of action, arguing that the 

policy was a Trust asset, and its proceeds should have been distributed equally among them. The 

district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Siblings. It also awarded 

prejudgment interest against Wade under Idaho Code section 28-22-104 and attorney fees under 

Idaho Code section 15-8-201, a provision of the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act 

(“TEDRA”). For the reasons set out below, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Siblings, affirm in part and reverse in part the award of prejudgment interest, and

reverse the grant of attorney fees to Siblings under TEDRA. We remand this matter to the district 

court with instructions to enter an amended judgment consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Bill and Margaret Chapman (the Chapmans) established the Trust in 1993 as an 

irrevocable trust. The Chapmans named their seven children as beneficiaries of the Trust: Pamela 

Kay Vouk, VonDel Chapman, Jana Lee Reed, Wade Chapman, Dewey Lynn Chapman, Brad 

Lee Chapman, and Charles W. Chapman. Wade, Pamela and VonDel were also named its 

trustees. The Trust held two assets at the time it was settled: a Phoenix Home Life policy 

insuring Bill’s life for roughly $2,500,000, and a second Phoenix Home Life policy insuring the 

life of another person (who is not directly involved in this appeal) for roughly $1,000,000. 

In 2004, the Phoenix Home Life policy insuring Bill’s life was replaced with a Jackson 

National Life Insurance Company policy (the “Jackson Policy”) as part of a tax free 1035 like 

kind exchange. A 1035 exchange allows one life insurance policy to be exchanged for another 

without having to pay certain federal taxes. See 26 U.S.C. § 1035. The Jackson Policy provided a 

death benefit of $7,000,000. The policy listed the Trust as its owner and Wade as its sole 

beneficiary. At some point before August 2007, the Trust also acquired shares in Idaho Supreme 

Potatoes, Inc. 

In August 2007, the trustees and beneficiaries entered into an Agreement for Distribution 

of Assets and Assignment of Shares (“Distribution Agreement”). The Distribution Agreement 

stated that “[t]he Trust has served its purpose and it is not necessary that the Trust Assets be held 

further.” Accordingly, it provided that “the Trust should be, and in equity is, hereby terminated, 
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and . . . the Trust Assets should be distributed to the Beneficiaries in equal shares.” The 

Distribution Agreement described the Trust’s assets as “35 shares of the common shares of Idaho 

Supreme Potatoes, Inc., . . . and certain life insurance policies.”

Margaret Chapman passed away in June 2018, and Bill passed away in October 2018.

Wade applied for the death benefit under the Jackson Policy in November 2018. Wade did not 

know he was named the sole beneficiary of the policy until he applied for the benefit and was

informed of this by a representative at the Jackson National Life Insurance Company. According 

to Wade, he told the representative that his “understanding [was] that [the policy] was a trust 

asset and the beneficiary was to be . . . the trust,” with the proceeds to be divided equally 

between him and his siblings. However, after the death benefit was paid to Wade, he kept all 

$7,000,000. 

Siblings subsequently filed a complaint against Wade in district court alleging, among 

other things, breach of fiduciary duty. A month later, the district court entered an order based 

upon a stipulation of the parties requiring Wade to deposit $6,000,000 with the court pending

resolution of the case. 

During the course of discovery, Siblings filed a motion for leave to amend their 

complaint to add an additional cause of action for mutual mistake of fact after learning that Wade

shared Siblings’ understanding that the Jackson Policy was a Trust asset at the time he applied 

for the death benefit and that the Trust was also the beneficiary. Siblings sought reformation of 

the Jackson Policy by the district court. 

Shortly after moving to amend their complaint, Siblings filed a motion for summary 

judgment on their breach of fiduciary duty claim and their claim seeking reformation of the 

Jackson Policy. The following day, Wade also filed a motion for summary judgment. Wade 

advanced three primary arguments in support of his motion: (1) the Jackson Policy was 

unambiguous in its designation of him as the sole beneficiary of the policy, (2) he did not owe 

fiduciary duties in 2018 when the death benefit was distributed because the Trust had been 

terminated by the Distribution Agreement in 2007, and (3) any claims for breach of contract or

breach of fiduciary duty were barred by the statute of limitations. Wade also filed a motion “to 

strike any and all deposition testimony and any references to the intent of any Grantor or Trustee 

expressed outside of” the Trust, Jackson Policy, or Distribution Agreement. 

In July 2020, the district court issued an order addressing Siblings’ motion to amend, 
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Wade’s motion to strike, and both parties’ motions for summary judgment. First, the district 

court denied Wade’s motion to strike and granted Siblings’ motion to amend their complaint 

based on Wade’s testimony. However, it ultimately denied Siblings’ request for reformation 

because the alleged mutual mistake of fact was not between the parties to the Jackson Policy

(i.e., the insurance company and the insured), but “a unilateral mistake of fact amongst parties on 

the same side of a contractual bargain.” Despite this, the district court granted Siblings’ motion 

for summary judgment regarding their breach of fiduciary duty claim and denied Wade’s motion 

for summary judgment on all claims, holding that each of his arguments was without merit. 

After prevailing on their claim, Siblings filed a memorandum of costs and attorney fees, 

alleging they were entitled to an award of fees under Idaho Code section 15-8-208, a provision of 

TEDRA. Wade filed a motion for reconsideration the same day. Two weeks later, Wade objected 

to Siblings’ motion for attorney fees, arguing that it was premature and that the fees provision of 

TEDRA did not apply. The district court agreed with Wade that the motion was premature but 

held that the fees provision of TEDRA applied to the case. 

In February 2021, the district court entered an order granting Siblings’ motion for

voluntary dismissal of their unresolved claims. Given its prior orders, the district court agreed 

with Siblings that the remaining claims sought essentially the same relief it had already granted, 

and that it was appropriate to dismiss the claims without prejudice.

Siblings subsequently submitted a proposed final judgment, which included an award of 

prejudgment interest under Idaho Code section 28-22-104 in the amount of $1,548,000.00, minus 

interest actually earned while on deposit with the court, resulting in an outstanding total of 

$1,432,393.65. Wade objected to the proposed judgment, arguing that prejudgment interest could 

not properly be awarded under section 28-22-104. After further briefing, the district court held a 

hearing to address the proposed judgment. The district court issued an oral ruling, holding that 

prejudgment interest was due to Siblings under section 28-22-104. Furthermore, because interest 

had continued to accrue in the three months since the proposed judgment had first been filed, the 

district court ordered Siblings to submit a revised proposed judgment reflecting the increased 

total. The district court signed a judgment awarding Siblings $1,755,616.44 in prejudgment 

interest, minus interest actually earned, resulting in an outstanding total of $1,603,521.66. The 

district court subsequently entered an order awarding Siblings attorney fees in the amount of 

$148,551.45 pursuant to TEDRA. Wade timely appealed. 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In reviewing a district court’s ruling to grant a motion for summary judgment, this Court 

employs the same standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion.” Black v. 

DJO Glob., Inc., 168 Idaho 849, 851, 488 P.3d 1283, 1285 (2021) (citing Eldridge v. West, 166 

Idaho 303, 308, 458 P.3d 172, 177 (2020)).

The party initially bringing the motion has the burden to prove that no 

genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. After the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the 

nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. This

Court will construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. However, the 

adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings but must set 

forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.

Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 103–04, 294 P.3d 1111, 

1115–16 (2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Siblings on their

breach of fiduciary duty claim. 

A trustee owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to “administer the trust in the interest of the 

beneficiaries alone, and to exclude from consideration his own advantages and the welfare of 

third persons.” Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 260, 127 P.3d 156, 163 (2005) (quoting Edwards 

v. Edwards, 122 Idaho 963, 969, 842 P.2d 299, 305 (Ct. App. 1992)). Consistent with this 

principle, Idaho Code section 68-108 requires a trustee to obtain court approval before engaging 

in a transaction where his personal interest conflicts with his interest as a trustee. I.C. § 68-

108(b). Generally, good faith is not a defense to a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty because 

“[i]n enforcing the duty of loyalty the court is primarily interested in improving trust 

administration by deterring trustees from getting into positions of conflict of interests, and only 

secondarily in preventing loss to particular beneficiaries or unjust enrichment of the trustee.” 

Edwards, 122 Idaho at 969, 842 P.2d at 305 (quoting G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, Law of Trusts 

§ 95 (5th ed. 1973)).

Article II, section 1 of the Trust provides that it is to be administered for the benefit of all 

seven Chapman siblings. In granting summary judgment to the siblings, the district court held 

that “[b]y keeping the entirety of the Jackson Policy proceeds for himself, Wade engaged in a 

disloyal transaction.” Furthermore, it held that regardless of whether Wade acted under a good 
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faith belief that the death benefit was solely his to retain, he could not do so without court 

authorization. 

1. Wade argues that the district court erred by holding he breached his duty of loyalty 

for five reasons: (1) it was permissible for contributions to the Trust to be designated 

for the benefit of specific beneficiaries and the Jackson Policy was intended to benefit 

him alone, (2) he owed no fiduciary duties anyway because the Trust was terminated 

by the Distribution Agreement in 2007, (3) even if the Trust did exist when the death 

benefit was paid in 2018, any breach would have occurred many years prior and is

now barred by the statute of limitations, (4) Idaho Code section 68-106(c)(1) allows a 

trustee to retain an asset in which he is personally interested without court 

authorization, and (5) “[t]here is no document that expressly added the Jackson Policy 

to the Trust.” None of these arguments have merit. No evidence supports that the 

Jackson Policy was intended for Wade’s benefit alone.

Wade argues that Bill, as grantor of the Trust, had a right to make contributions to the 

Trust after it was established and, furthermore, that Bill had the right to direct that a contribution 

be made unequally among beneficiaries.

Article II, section 2 of the Trust provides that separate trusts were to have been 

established for each beneficiary:

SEPARATE TRUSTS: The Trustee shall establish a separate trust for the benefit 

of each beneficiary. An equal portion of each contribution to the Trust, by anyone 

other than a beneficiary, shall be allocated to each beneficiary’s trust unless any 

contribution is specifically designated to one specific trust or in specific portions 

among the separate trusts by the donor in which event the Trustee shall allocate 

the contribution in accordance with the written instructions of the donor.

Insofar as Wade argues it would have been permissible for Bill to have contributed the Jackson 

Policy to a separate trust established for Wade’s benefit, he is correct. However, Wade’s 

argument that Bill contributed the Jackson Policy to a specific trust for Wade under Article II, 

section 2 is not supported by any facts in the record. 

First, no facts support Wade’s claim that the Jackson Policy was Bill’s to contribute in 

the first place. The application for the policy indicates it was acquired in a 1035 exchange with 

the Phoenix Home Life policy, which belonged to the Trust, not to Bill. Nor do any facts suggest 

that Bill paid premiums on the Jackson Policy. 

Next, there are no facts alleged to support the assertion that separate trusts were ever

created for the benefit of Wade or any other beneficiary. Wade argues this is not so because 

Article II, section 2’s language is mandatory: “[t]he Trustee shall establish a separate trust” for 

each beneficiary. Even though Wade was a trustee tasked with the duty to establish individual 
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trusts, he did not provide evidence supporting that he or his co-trustees took steps to do so, 

discussed individual trusts, or paid taxes on individual trusts. Indeed, there is no mention of 

individual trusts anywhere in the record outside of Wade’s allegations. In opposing a motion for 

summary judgment, a “party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings but must set 

forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Boise Mode, LLC, 154 

Idaho at 104, 294 P.3d at 1116. Here, there is nothing beyond Wade’s allegations to support his 

argument.

Finally, Wade posits that if Bill did not intend the Jackson Policy to be for Wade’s

individual benefit, then the trustees did. While this argument is consistent with the Policy Data 

Page of the Jackson Policy, it offers Wade no relief. Article III, section 3 of the Trust allows the 

Trust to acquire insurance policies (including in individual trusts for each beneficiary), but it 

requires that the trust holding a policy must also be designated as the beneficiary of the policy:

INSURANCE RELATED POWERS: The Trustee shall have the following 

additional powers:

a. To acquire in any trust . . . one or more policies insuring the life of any 

beneficiary of the trust or any person in whom any beneficiary has an 

insurable interest, and to retain each policy as a part of the property of 

the trust, provided, however, that as long as any policy constitutes a 

part of the property of the trust, the benefits thereunder shall be 

payable to that trust.

(Emphasis added). Because the Policy Data Page names the Trust as the owner of the policy, it 

must also be the beneficiary of the policy under the terms of the Trust. To the extent Wade 

argues that the trustees acquired the Jackson Policy but intended to name his individual trust as

its sole beneficiary, he is essentially arguing that the trustees—himself included—intentionally

breached the terms of the Trust.

In sum, no facts support Wade’s position that Bill contributed the Jackson Policy or its 

death benefit to an individual trust established for Wade’s benefit. The Jackson Policy named the 

Trust as its owner. Whether by accident or intention, the Trust was not named as the beneficiary 

of the policy’s death benefit. Such an arrangement was expressly prohibited by the Trust. 

Because Wade failed to comply with the terms of the Trust and distributed the death benefit only 

to himself, the district court correctly concluded Wade breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty.

2. The district court did not err in determining that Wade owed fiduciary duties because

the Distribution Agreement did not terminate the Trust.
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Next, Wade argues that: (1) the Distribution Agreement stated that the Trust was 

terminated and its provisions control, (2) the district court erroneously concluded that the Trust 

continued to hold property after 2007, and (3) he is indemnified from liability by the terms of the 

Distribution Agreement. 

In his first argument, Wade asserts that the written terms of the Distribution Agreement 

control and “[t]here was no language indicating that there would be a winding up period.” 

Furthermore, he argues that “[w]ords of contracts have meaning. The plain meaning in this case 

is that the Trust would not hold assets after the execution of the agreement. . . . The actions or 

inactions of the parties do not matter. The Distribution Agreement stated that the assets were 

distributed and released from the Trust.” Regardless of whether the Distribution Agreement 

stated there would be a winding up period, the law is clear that trustees owe fiduciary duties until 

a trust is wound up. See Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 710, 201 P.3d 1282, 1287 (2009). And,

in determining whether the Trust was wound up, the actions and inactions of the parties, do, in 

fact, matter. 

Second, Wade argues that the district court erred in concluding that the Jackson Policy 

was a Trust asset because an equitable share of its cash surrender value was distributed to each of 

the beneficiaries in 2007. However, there is no evidence in the record that Siblings ever had a

right to surrender the Jackson Policy for its cash value. Under the terms of the Jackson Policy, 

only the owner of the policy has the right to surrender it, and any change of ownership must be 

made by written request to the insurance company. Yet, there is no evidence that the ownership 

of the Jackson Policy was transferred from the Trust to the beneficiaries. 

Third, Wade argues that the following provision in the Distribution Agreement relieves

him from any potential liability:

Beneficiary Estoppel Statement and Indemnity. Beneficiaries, each for 

themselves, acknowledge and agree that this distribution and termination is done 

at the request of Beneficiaries for the benefit of the Beneficiary, and that the Trust 

Assets will be released from trust to the Beneficiaries in equal shares. Each 

Beneficiary agrees that they will have no standing to ever complain, and will be 

estopped from complaining against Grantors, Trustees, any other Beneficiary, or 

any other party that the distribution and termination of the trust was wrongful or 

injured Beneficiary in any regard. Each Beneficiary, pro rata, agrees to indemnify, 

hold harmless and defend, the trustees from any claims of any person arising out 

of the termination and distribution of the Trust Assets.

(Emphasis added?) However, as the district court held, this provision is conditioned on the 
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distribution and termination of the Trust in equal shares. Because this never happened—and 

Wade offers no cogent argument to the contrary—this provision does not relieve Wade from 

liability.

For the above reasons, we hold that the district court correctly determined that Wade 

continued to owe fiduciary duties after the execution of the 2007 Distribution Agreement. 

3. The district court did not err in determining that the statute of limitations had not run.

The catchall four-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 5-224 applies to claims 

alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 159 Idaho 103, 109, 356 P.3d 1049, 

1055 (2015). According to Wade, the breach alleged by Siblings occurred in 2004, when the 

Jackson Policy was first acquired and named Wade as the sole beneficiary. Siblings disagree, 

arguing the relevant breach occurred when he repudiated the terms of the Trust and distributed 

the death benefit to himself. The district court noted that “[a] contract may be breached in more 

than one way” and the breach relevant to its decision was Wade’s repudiation of his duties in 

2018. We agree with the district court’s analysis. While the designation of Wade as the sole 

beneficiary of the death benefit may have constituted a breach of fiduciary duty in 2004 because 

it was done in violation of Article III, section 3 of the Trust, Wade’s unilateral decision in 

December 2018 to retain the entire $7,000,000 death benefit for himself was a separate, 

actionable breach of fiduciary duty that violated Article II, section 1 of the Trust requiring the 

Trust to be administered for the benefit of all seven siblings. Siblings filed their claim within 

months of Wade’s 2018 breach of fiduciary duty, so it is well within the statute of limitations.

4. The district court did not err in holding that Wade was required to obtain court 

authorization before distributing the death benefit to himself.

As noted above, Idaho Code section 68-108(b) provides that a trustee must obtain court 

approval before engaging in a transaction that creates a conflict of interest. Wade argues that the 

district court erred by holding he violated this statute because Idaho Code section 68-106(c)(1) 

provides that a trustee may retain an asset in which he has an interest.

Idaho Code section 68-106 provides that a trustee may hold property in which he is 

personally interested without court authorization, but only under certain conditions:

(a) From time of creation of the trust until final distribution of the assets of the 

trust, a trustee has the power to perform, without court authorization, every act 

which a prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust including but 

not limited to the powers specified in subsection (c).
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(b) In the exercise of his powers including the powers granted by this act, a trustee 

has a duty to act with due regard to his obligation as a fiduciary.

(c) A trustee has the power, subject to subsections (a) and (b):

(1) to collect, hold, and retain trust assets received from a trustor until, in 

the judgment of the trustee, disposition of the assets should be made; and 

the assets may be retained even though they include an asset in which the 

trustee is personally interested

I.C. § 68-106 (emphasis added). Thus, a trustee’s power to retain assets in which he is interested 

under section 106(c) is subject to three conditions: the retention must be (1) for the purposes of 

the trust, (2) consistent with the trustee’s fiduciary duties, and (3) only until a future distribution. 

Inasmuch as the district court held that Wade distributed the entirety of the Jackson Policy to 

himself in violation of the Trust’s terms and his fiduciary duty, its decision is not inconsistent 

with section 106(c)(1) in any way. 

Wade also asserts that he was unaware that the Jackson Policy named him as beneficiary 

when he signed it, and that because the Trust was terminated in 2007, he could not have been in 

breach of his duty in 2018. The first is a good faith argument, which is not a defense to a claim 

that a trustee has breached the duty of loyalty. Edwards, 122 Idaho at 969, 842 P.2d at 305. Even 

if it were, the district court held that the relevant breach was Wade’s refusal to distribute the 

funds in 2018, not the acquisition of the Jackson Policy in 2004. The second argument is 

meritless, because the Trust did not terminate in 2007 (as discussed above). 

5. Wade’s argument that it is unclear whether the Trust owned the Jackson Policy is 

without merit. 

Finally, Wade asserts that “[t]here is no document that expressly added the Jackson 

Policy to the Trust” and the Court should not have to assume that it did. Wade argues that “[o]n 

this point alone, Siblings’ argument should fail.”

This argument is also unavailing. Most importantly, this argument is waived because it is 

raised for the first time in Wade’s reply brief. Bell v. Idaho Dep’t of Labor, 157 Idaho 744, 749, 

339 P.3d 1148, 1153 (2014) (quoting Myers v. Workmen’s Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 

P.3d 977, 990 (2004)) (holding that the Court “will not consider arguments raised for the first 

time in the appellant’s reply brief”). Even if we were to consider it, Wade’s argument is contrary 

to the face of the Jackson Policy, which lists the Trust as its owner. Moreover, the application for 

the policy indicates it was acquired in a 1035 exchange with the Phoenix Home Life policy, 

which no one disputes belonged to the Trust. Wade conceded below that the Trust owned the 
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Jackson Policy. In fact, in his motion for summary judgment, Wade asserted that it was an 

“undisputed fact” that the Trust owned the policy. 

Ultimately, every argument raised by Wade regarding Siblings’ breach of fiduciary duty 

claim is without merit. Thus, we affirm the district court’s decision granting summary judgment 

in favor of Siblings. 

B. The district court did not err by granting Siblings’ motion for voluntary 

dismissal of several claims, nor by dismissing Wade’s motion for 

reconsideration.

Wade argues that the district court erred by denying summary judgment in his favor.

Wade is incorrect. Most of Wade’s arguments reflect the same arguments as above, and as such, 

are incorrect. Because Wade’s arguments above are without merit, we dismiss these arguments 

as duplicative of his others. Further, while Wade complains in each argument that the district 

court denied summary judgment in his favor, “denial of summary judgment by a district judge is 

not appealable unless the district judge was acting as an appellate court or unless we grant 

permission to appeal.” N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 251, 252–53, 939 P.2d 570, 570–72 

(1997) (citing I.A.R. 11(a)(1), I.A.R. 12 and Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 454, 649 

P.2d 1209, 1210 (1982)). Here, the district court was not sitting in an appellate capacity nor is 

this a permissive appeal. 

C. The case is remanded to the district court to recalculate prejudgment interest 

and enter an amended judgment.

The district court awarded Siblings prejudgment interest under Idaho Code section 28-22-

104 calculated from the time the death benefit was wired to Wade until judgment was entered. 

The district court, highlighting that there was a substantial amount of time between when Wade 

received the money and when he eventually turned it over to the court, held that the scenario 

described in 28-22-104(4) (“[m]oney received to the use of another and retained beyond a 

reasonable time without the owner’s consent, express or implied,”) was applicable in this case. 

The total amount awarded was $1,603,521.66.

Wade challenges this award, arguing primarily that prejudgment interest can only be 

awarded in cases involving commercial transactions. Alternatively, he argues that even if 

prejudgment interest was proper, it should not have accrued once he stipulated to deposit the 

insurance proceeds with the district court. We hold that while the district court did not err in 

awarding prejudgment interest to Siblings under Idaho Code section 28-22-104(4), the accrual of 
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interest started on December 26, 2018, and ended on August 8, 2019, when Wade deposited the 

money with the district court. We remand the case with instructions to recalculate the 

prejudgment interest owed and enter an amended judgment to reflect that amount.

Idaho Code section 28-22-104 provides for the award of prejudgment interest under 

certain circumstances:

(1) When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, 

interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the hundred by the year on:

1. Money due by express contract.

2. Money after the same becomes due.

3. Money lent.

4. Money received to the use of another and retained beyond a reasonable 

time without the owner's consent, express or implied.

5. Money due on the settlement of mutual accounts from the date the 

balance is ascertained.

6. Money due upon open accounts after three (3) months from the date of 

the last item.

(2) The legal rate of interest on money due on the judgment of any competent 

court or tribunal shall be the rate of five percent (5%) plus the base rate in effect 

at the time of entry of the judgment. . . . 

The district court held that Siblings were due prejudgment interest on two bases under 28-22-

104(1): (1) “[m]oney after the same becomes due” and (2) “[m]oney received to the use of 

another and retained beyond a reasonable time . . . .”

Wade argues that the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest because Idaho 

Code section 28-22-104 is codified under Title 28 of the Idaho Code, which is titled 

“Commercial Transactions.” Because this dispute does not involve a commercial transaction, 

Wade argues that the statute cannot apply. However, nothing in the plain language of the statute 

confines its operation to commercial transactions. 

Wade also argues that the district court erred in relying on Hunsaker v. Hunsaker, 117 

Idaho 192, 786 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1990), to hold that awards of prejudgment interest under 

section 28-22-104 are not confined to commercial transactions. In Hunsaker, the Idaho Court of 

Appeals affirmed an award of prejudgment interest in a dispute over child support payments. 

Hunsaker, 117 Idaho at 194, 786 P.2d at 585. Because the award in Hunsaker involved interest 

under subsection (2) of section 28-22-104 (“money due on the judgment of any competent 
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court”), rather than subsection (1), which the district court applied below, Wade argues that the 

case is distinguishable. However, the district court used Hunsaker to illustrate that the 

codification of the prejudgment interest statute in Title 28 does not mean that its operation is 

confined to commercial transactions. Because both subsections of the statute are contained in 

Title 28, the district court did not err in its reliance on Hunsaker.

In its decision, the district court noted that Harris v. Coates, 8 Idaho 491, 69 P. 475 

(1902), also supported its award of prejudgment interest in a case not involving a commercial 

transaction. In Harris, this Court held that a district court erred by not awarding statutory 

prejudgment interest in a dispute between family members over the distribution of a decedent’s 

estate. Harris, 8 Idaho at 96, 69 P. at 476–77. Wade argues that the district court erred because 

“it failed to analyze whether the applicable statute in 1902 contained the same language as 

today’s statutory interest legislation.” Because the prejudgment interest statute in effect in 1902 

and the current version of Idaho Code section 22-28-104(1) are identical except for the rate of 

interest to be awarded, this argument is meritless. Compare I.C. § 28-22-104(1) with 1933 Idaho 

Sess. Laws 390–91 (providing the text of the statute in effect from 1899 to 1933).

Lastly, Wade argues that it was improper for the district court to award prejudgment 

interest because he voluntarily deposited the funds with the district court. Thus, Wade contends 

he “was not exercising control over the money” and if Siblings “believed they were being 

unfairly deprived use of money” they should not have stipulated to its deposit with the Court.

Applying the plain language of section 28-22-104(4) to the facts, Wade received the 

death benefit from the insurance company via wire on December 26, 2018, and retained the 

money for his own use without the consent of Siblings. His retention of that money was 

unreasonable from the outset, but he eventually stipulated to deposit the money with the district 

court on August 8, 2019. Once he deposited the money with the district court he no longer

“retained” the money and prejudgment interest should have ceased at that time. Accordingly, we 

remand the case with instructions to recalculate the prejudgment interest owed and enter an 

amended judgment to reflect the new amount.

D. The district court erred in awarding attorney fees to Siblings under TEDRA. 

The district court awarded attorney fees to Siblings under Idaho Code section 15-8-208, 

the attorney fee provision of TEDRA. Siblings brought a judicial proceeding under TEDRA as 

part of their initial and amended complaints. Their Eleventh Cause of Action was captioned as 
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“Declaratory Judgment – Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 et seq., 15-8-201 et seq., I.R.C.P. 57”. The 

remedy Siblings prayed for was a decree that Wade violated the Trust and breached his fiduciary 

duties as trustee:

135. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Declaratory Judgment, pursuant to Idaho 

Code §§ 10-1201 et seq., § 15-8-201 et seq., and I.R.C.P. 57 adjuring and 

decreeing that Defendant Wade Chapman has violated the terms of the Trust 

Agreement and Distribution Agreement, has breached his fiduciary duties as 

Trustee, and is required to distribute the proceeds from the Insurance Policy in 

accordance with the terms of the Trust Agreement and Distribution Agreement.

Following the district court’s grant of summary judgment, Siblings submitted a 

memorandum of costs and attorney fees seeking an award under TEDRA. Wade objected to the

award, arguing among other things, that it was premature and that TEDRA did not apply because 

Siblings had not pursued any form of relief under the statute. The district court sustained Wade’s 

objection, holding an award of attorney’s fees was premature because there were unresolved 

claims, and the court was unable to engage in the prevailing party analysis required under Rule 

54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Citing judicial expediency, however, the district court’s decision also went on to analyze 

the statutory basis for Siblings’ claim for attorney fees. The district court held that TEDRA 

governed Siblings’ claims, explaining that the complaint included a declaratory judgment claim 

expressly invoking TEDRA and reasoning that the other claims for relief fell squarely within the 

definition of “matter” in Idaho Code section 15-8-103(1)(c). About a month after the district 

court’s ruling on the attorney’s fees award, Siblings moved to dismiss the remaining claims in 

their complaint without prejudice, including, the Eleventh Cause of Action requesting 

declaratory relief under TEDRA. The district court subsequently granted that motion.

After the voluntary dismissal of their remaining claims, Siblings again filed a 

memorandum of costs and attorney fees. The district court noted that it had already determined 

that TEDRA applied to the request for fees and concluded that an award of fees in the amount of 

$148,551.45 was equitable. 

Wade’s primary arguments against the award are that although Siblings invoked TEDRA 

as part of the declaratory judgment claim set forth in their complaint, they did not pursue that 

claim as part of the litigation, it was not part of the claim upon which relief was granted, and 
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Siblings voluntarily dismissed the claim after the district court granted summary judgment in 

their favor. We agree with Wade that an award of attorney fees under TEDRA was improper.

We review a district court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Lola L.

Cazier Revocable Tr. v. Cazier, 167 Idaho 109, 115, 468 P.3d 239, 245 (2020). When applying 

the abuse of discretion standard, the Court asks whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived 

the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted 

consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) 

reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 

421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). In this case, we are focused on the legal standard for awarding 

attorney fees under TEDRA.

TEDRA provides for an equitable award of costs and attorney fees by the trial court and 

on appeal. I.C. § 15-8-208. The purpose of TEDRA is to provide nonjudicial methods for the 

resolution of estate and trust matters by agreement. I.C. § 15-8-101(2). TEDRA also provides for 

judicial resolution of disputes. Id. When it comes to judicial resolution, TEDRA provides that

any party may have a judicial proceeding for the declaration of rights or legal relations with 

respect to any “matter” defined in section 15-8-103, or with respect to the resolution of any other 

case or controversy. I.C. § 15-8-201(1)(a) and (b) (emphasis added). A “matter” is defined as 

“any issue, question, or dispute involving... the determination of any question arising in the 

administration of an estate or trust.” I.C. § 15-8-103(1)(c). TEDRA goes on to say, “[a] judicial 

proceeding under this chapter may be commenced as a new action or as an action incidental to an 

existing judicial proceeding relating to the same trust or estate or nonprobate asset.” I.C. § 15-8-

202(2). “Once commenced, the action may be consolidated with an existing proceeding or 

converted to a separate action upon the motion of a party for good cause shown, or by the court 

on its own motion.” I.C. § 15-8-202(3). 

In ruling that attorney fees were available to Siblings under TEDRA, the district court 

reasoned:

On summary judgment the Court was required to construe the Trust, Distribution 

Agreement, and the Jackson Policy to determine questions arising from the 

Trust’s administration—endeavors falling with the scope of section 15-8-

103(1)(c). The Court’s involvement in this action falls squarely within the 

definition of a “matter” under section 15-8-103(1)(a) and is an authorized judicial 

proceeding pursuant to section 15-8-201(1).
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The focus of the district court’s analysis was whether Siblings’ claims fell within the definition 

of a “matter.” We agree with Wade, however, that whether attorney fees can be granted under 

TEDRA turns first on the form of relief sought and granted. 

At its core, TEDRA provides a statutory cause of action for a declaratory judgment. The 

operative language is in section 15-8-208(1), which states “any party may have a judicial 

proceeding for the declaration of rights or legal relations . . . .” I.C. § 15-8-201 (emphasis 

added). This language is substantially similar to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act which 

states in part “Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare

rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” I.C. 

§ 10-1201 (emphasis added). While we agree with the district court that it was required to 

construe the terms of the Trust, Distribution Agreement, and the insurance policy, that analysis 

was all part and parcel of Siblings’ breach of fiduciary duty claim, not part of their claim to 

“declare” rights or legal relations under the Trust or Distribution Agreement. In a declaratory 

judgment action, the final judgment itself “declares” the rights and legal relations. There was no 

such relief granted in the judgment entered by the district court nor was it sought by Siblings 

after the filing of the complaint. In fact, the claim for declaratory relief was dismissed before the 

district court granted Siblings attorney fees. If this case, by way of example, had been brought 

before the insurance proceeds had been paid, a “declaration” by the district court in a final 

judgment that Wade had a fiduciary duty to distribute the funds equally to Siblings would have 

been proper. As it stands, the district court granted full relief to Siblings for their breach of 

fiduciary duty claim without the necessity of any declaratory judgment. For these reasons, we 

reverse the district court’s grant of attorney fees to Siblings under TEDRA.

E. Siblings are not entitled to costs or attorney fees on appeal.

Siblings request an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. Because of the mixed 

results of this appeal, we hold that neither party prevailed and deny Siblings’ requests.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand this case 

for entry of an amended judgment consistent with this opinion.

Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER, MOELLER and ZAHN CONCUR.