### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 22, 200 5
WILLIAM E. EA KES, III v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 99-A- 36 Seth Norm an, Jud ge

No. M2005- 01016-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Janu ary 23, 2006

This is an appea l as of rig ht from the summary dismiss al of a petition for post-conviction relief . The trial court dismissed the ame nded post-conviction petition because the court found the petition was
n o t v e r if i e d u n d e r o a t h a n d f

a i l e d t o i n c l u d e t h e f

a c t u a l b a s i s u p o n w h i c h r e l i e f w a s s o u g h t

. We aff irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

R y a n C a l d w e l l , N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e a p p e l l a n t , W i l l i a mE

. E ak e s , III

.
Paul G . Su mme rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; B e njamin A. B a ll, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Vi c tor S. Joh ns on , D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; andDan H a mm, As sis ta nt Di stric t Attorne y Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

F AC TS

The re cord r efle cts that the Petitioner, Will iam E

. E ak es, I I I , was indicted by a Da vidson Countyg rand jury in January of 1999 on one c ount of first deg ree felony murder and one count of second de g ree murder. SeeTenn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 13-202 and 39- 13-210. The Petitioner w as found g uiltyby jury verdic t of bot h offe nses, and the trial court mer g ed the se cond deg ree murder
co n v ic ti o n in to th e f

ir s t d e g r e e f

e lo n y mu r d e r c o n v ic ti o n a n d s e n te n c e d th e Pe ti ti o n e r to life imp r is on me n t. Se e St a tev

. Wi ll iam E

. E ak e s , I I I , N o

. M 2 0 0 1

- 0 1 4 2 0

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 3 WL 21523244, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, J uly 1, 200 3). The Petitioner’ s judgme nt was af f irme d o n d ir e c t a

p p e a l b y th is Co u rt i n Ju ly

o f 2 0 0 3 , a n d th e T e n n e s s e e Su p r e meCo u rt d e n ied his application for pe rmission to appeal in Dec ember of 2003. See I d.T he p et i t i o n i ni t i al l y st at es t hat t he p et i t i o ner i s p roce ed i ng “by and t hrough hi s [nam ed ] at t o rney

. ” E l sewhere 1
i n t he pet i t i on, t he pet i t i oner s t at es he i s not “ cur r ent l y r epre s ent ed by coun s el

. ” La t er, the pet i t i on r eques t s t hat an at t or n ey be a ppoi n t ed t o r epr es en t t h e pet i t i on er

. T h er ea f t er t h e pet i t i on a l l eg es t h at a na med at t or n ey , di f fer en t f r om t h e a t t or n e y i n i t i a l l y n a me d, h a s a s s i s t e d h i m i n t h e pr e pa r a t i on of t h e pe t i t i on

. The pe t i t i on do e s n ot c on t a i n t h e n a me
o r s i gnat ure of

an at t o rney purp o rt i ng t o represent t he p et i t i o ner.
-2- The Petitioner timely fi l ed h is origina l petition for post-conviction re lief in Dec ember of 2004. I n his origina l pe tition, filed with some assistance from an attorney , the Petitioner alleg ed that 1 he was “denie d the eff

ective assistance of counsel at trial,” but failed to pr ovide any fac tual basis for thi s c la im. I n Janu ary

of 20 05 , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt iss ue d a n o rd e r g ranti ng thePe tit ion e r thirty day s inwh ic h to a me ndhis pe tit ionfo r p os t- c on vict io n relie f andre su bmi t it to the c ou rt . In th is order the court found that the Petitioner’s orig inal petition for p o s t- c o n v ic tion relief f ailed to “spe cify alleg ati o n s upon which such c laim [ of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel] is based,” and wa s not verifie d under oath.

The Petitioner submitted an ame nded petition for post-c onviction relief w ithin the allotted time. The ame nded petition was filed as a “Pro Se” petition. On appe al the Petitioner conc edes that he rec eived the assistance of an attorney . I n Marc h of 2005, the trial c ourt issued an orde r dismissing t h e P et i t i o n er ’s am en d ed p et i t i o n fo r p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n re l i ef , s t at i n g:

The petitioner in this cause has timely filed a Petition for P o s t -Conviction Relief with the Da vidson CountyCri m i n al C o urt Clerk on De cembe r 20, 2004. Howeve r, with reg ard to his claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, he did not specify alleg ations upon which such c laim is based. The pe titioner was then a llowed 30 day s to su bmi t a ve ri fi e d pe tit ion statin g sp e c if ic g ro un ds up on wh ic h h e ma y ba se a claim for ineffe ctive assistance of counsel. On Fe bruary 23, 2005, he submitted y et another unverifie d, g ener al petition. . . . The pe titioner’s second filing of the Petition merely restate s the alleg ations of theini tia l Pe tit iona nddo e s n ot i nc lud e a ny sp e c if ic fa c tual basi s to bo lst e r h is arg ument. Mo re o v er, pe titions for post-c onviction relief must be ve rified unde r oath. . . . Pet i t i o n er ’s second f iling does not mee t the standard [of being verifie d under
o a th ]. Ba sed on the fore g oing analy sis, it does not appear a s though the petitioner has followed the statutory presc ribed e lements requisite to t h e p roper filing of a pe tit ionfo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f. As a re su lt, thepe tit ion e r’ s Pe tit ionfo r P os tConviction Relief is accor dingly respe ctfully

dismiss ed.
This appea l followed.

AN AL YSI S Th e Pe tit ion e r no w a

rg ue s th a t th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt e rr e d insu mma

ri ly dis mis sin g his post-conviction petition without the appointment of counsel a nd without an evidentiary hearing. T o support this claim, the Petiti oner first arg ues that his amende d petition did include both the gr ounds-3-

upon which he soug ht relief a s well as a s u ff i ci ent fa ctual basis for

those g rounds. Second, the Petitioner arg ues that the post-conviction court “should have” determined that he wa s indige nt and appointed him c ounsel to a ssist i n the dra fting of his post-conviction petition. Finally , the Petitioner arg ues that, beca

use he submitt ed his pe titions pro se, this Court should overlook the fa ct that neither his origina l nor amende d petition was properly verifie d under oath. We find all three of the Petitioner’s arg uments unpersua sive.

Tenne ssee’ s Post-Convi ction Procedur e Ac t, codified in Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-30-101 e t seq., outlines the statutory elements re quired fo r properly filing f or post-convic tion relief . These statutes mandate that a petition for such r elief

mus t c on ta in a

c le ar andsp e c if

ic state me nt o f a ll g ro un ds up on whi ch re lie f i s soug ht, including f

ull disclosure of the f

actua l bas i s o f t hose g rounds. A bar e alleg ation that a constit utional rig ht has been violated and mere c onclusions of law shall not be sufficie nt to war rant any further proce eding s. Failure to state a f actua l basis for the g rounds alleg ed shall result in immediate dismiss al of the pe tition. I f, howeve r, the pe tition was filed pro se, the judg e may enter an orde r stating that the petitioner must file an amende d petition that complies with this section within fifteen (15) day s or the petition will be dismiss ed.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-106(d)

. Ad d i t i o nally , “[t] he petitioner sha ll include alleg ations of fa ct supporting eac h claim for relief set forth in the petition,” and “[t] he petition and an yam ended petition shall be verifie d under oath.” Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-30-104( e).

I n this case, the Petitioner f irst arg ues that his amende d petition does contain “spe cific f actua l alleg ations,” citing to the three conclusory statements he added to his claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ou ns e l in his a me nd e d p e tit ion . T he Pe tit ion e r argues th at th e se thr e e on e -l inestate me nts , in which he a lleg es his trial counsel 1) “fai l ed t o adequately investigate prior to trial,” 2) “did not pr e pa rea c le ar the ory

of de fe ns e ,” a nd3) “ le ft pe tit ion e r wi th no de fe ns e to the c ha rg e s, ” are“ fa c ts” that satisfy

the statutory

require ments for a

valid post-conviction petition. We disagr ee.

I n t h i s ca s e t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi rs to rd eri n fo rm ed t h e P et i t i o n er t h ath e w as re q u i re d t o al l ege a c le ar and sp eci fi c st ate me nt o f the g ro un ds up on wh ic h h e so ug ht re lie f andpr ov idea fu ll disclosure of the fac tual basis of those g rounds in his petition for post-conviction relief . The c ourt t h e n , w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , g r a n t e d t h e P e t i t i o n e r t h i rt y d a ys t o a m e n d h i s p e t i t i o n a c c o r d i n g l y. Neve rtheless, the Petitioner submitted an amende d petition that ag ain failed to contain any fac tual basis, much less a “full disclosure of the fac tual basis” of the g rounds upon which he soug ht relief. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0 -3 0 -1 0 6 (d ). A fair re ading of the re cord r evea ls that the “fa cts” the Pe tit ion e r r e lie s o n a

resimply thr e e on e -l inea lle g a tio ns a tta c kin g his tria l cou ns e l, anda mou nt t o no thi ng mor e than “ ba

rea lle g a tio n[s] th a t a

c on sti tut ion a l rig ht h a s b e e n v iol a te d. ” I d. Th us , h is claim that his Six th Amendment ri gh t to effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel was violated is a “mer e c o n c lu s io n [] o f law

. ” I d

. T h e p e ti ti o n d o e s n o t s u g g e s t th e f a v o r ab le f

a c ts th a t a n “ade quate” investigati o n would have unc overe d, nor does it sug g est the “the ory of def ense” that should have-4-

been pr epar ed. The petition as amende d does not s u gges t h o w the Petitioner may have be en prej u d ic e d b y

h is c o u n s e l’ s a c ti o n s o r

in a c ti o n s

. B e c au s e th e Pe ti ti o n e r f a il e d to s tatea n y

f a c tu al basis to support the alleg ations in his post-conviction petition, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Rather, “ immediate dismissal of the petition” was wa rranted. I d.

We also note th at the Rules of the Te nnessee Supreme Court conc erning post-conviction proce dure, as well as a si g nificant body of case law, support the post-conviction court’s dismiss al of thePe tit ion e r’ s p e tit ionun de r the fa c ts o f this c a se . Te nn e sse e ru le s r e qu ir e a pe tit ionfo r p os tconviction re lief to contain “specific f acts supporting eac h claim for r elief a sserted by petitioner.” Tenn. R. S. Ct. 28, § 5(E)( 4). Furthermore , the “Eff ect of Failure to Comply Wit h Rule” is that “[a] petition may

be dismissed without a hearing if it . . . does not contain spec ific fa ctual alleg ations.” Tenn R. S. Ct. 28, § 5(F)(3)

.

I n Arnold v. State, 143 S.W. 3d 784 (Tenn. 2004), our supre me court considere d whether a pro-se petition for post-con v i ct ion relief pr esente d a “c olorable c laim.” I n Arnold, the pe tition
a lle g e d th a t:

Petitioner from Arr est to Trial and Re- Trial wa s subject to T h e News Media [sic] Constant Ex ploitation of said Charg es and No fair tria l could ever be had in Carter Countyand Counsel of Rec o[r] d Did Nothing to pr event sa me to the harms way of Petition[ er] in his Day in Court, and Unjust Verdicts, a nd I lleg al I mprisonment for
same.

. . . Petitioner after I neff

ective Assistance of Counsel was f ound Guilty

afte r a mini-trial of a day or two a moc kery

of Jus tice itself as it should have ta k en we ek s t o pick a J ury in a Town a lrea dy

since His Ar

rest. . . .
Arnold, 143 S.W. 3d at 786.

I n concluding that this petiti on did st at e a co l o rable claim, our supre me court rea soned as fo llo ws : Arnold’s pe tition allege s that the media c overa g e involving h i s chil d rape char g es wa s b o thc o n s tan t an d e xp lo it a ti v e

. D e s p it e th is a d v e r s e p u b li c ity , A r n o ld ’ s trial attorney failed to re quest a c hang e of ve nue and f ailed to ade quately

q u es tion potential jurors t o determine the ex tent to which they wer e subjec ted and influe nced by this constant and exploi tative m edia covera g e. Arnold links hi s convictions and his consecutive se ntence s to his attorney ’s defic ient perf ormanc e and sug g ests that a fair trial was impossible under the circ umstances. Specifica lly , he alleg es that the jury selec tion pr ocess and the leng th of the trial demonstrate a “moc kery of Jus ticeW e n ot e t hat t he P et i t i oner was decl ar ed i ndi gen t by t he po s t

- convi ct i on cour t i n J un e of 200 5 and appo i nt ed 2

c o u n se l t o re p re se n t him in this a p p e a l.
-5- its e lf .” Un de r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, we ho ld that th e pe tit ion state s a c olo ra blec la im and that the post-c onviction court er red in dismissing the pe tition.
Arnold, 143 S.W. 3d at 787.

Unlike the petition in Arnold, the pe tition herein does not include a fac tual basis supporting the g rounds for r elief. Thepetition contains no fac tual assert i o ns in any way direc ted towar d or related t o t h e fa ct s and circ umstances pr esente d at the trial of the Petitioner. Even thoug h the Pe tit ion e r w a s g ive n the op po rtun ity to a me nd the pe tit ion , he no ne the le ss f a ile d to inc lud e a

“ fu ll disclosure of the fac tual basis” of the g rounds upon which he soug ht relief . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106( d). His assertions are simply conclusory

alleg ations of inadequate re prese ntation.

This Court ha s previously upheld summary dismiss als of petitions for post-conviction re lief wher e a pe tition “did not contain clear and spec ific statements of g rounds, including full disclosure of the fa ctual basis of the g rounds,” but rather “ contained ba re a lleg ations of violation s of constitutional rights with mere conclusions of law.” Powell v. State, 8 S.W .3d 631, 633 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). See also Pewitt v. State, 1 S.W .3d 674, 676 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (upholding summary dismiss al of a

post-convicti o n petition after f inding that “ [t ]he petitioner’s amende d petition adds nothing in the way of re levant alleg ations except for his claim of ineff ective a ssistance of co u n s e l. H o w e v e r , th e a ll e g a ti o n s o f f a c t a s to th a t c laim , ta

k e n a s tr u e , d o n o t s h o w that the defe ndant’s Six th Amendment rig ht to the effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel was violated.” ); Har ris v. State, 996 S.W .2d 840, 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (upholding summary dismiss al of a pe tition for post-c onviction relief a fter de termining that “[a]lt houg h the petition alleg es the ine ff ec t ive assistance of counse l, it does not contain a full disclosure of the factual basis of the g rounds asserted. The pe tition i n s t ead contains barealleg ations of violations of constitutional rights and me re c on c lus ion s o f l a w. ” ). Ac c or din g ly , w e co nc lud e that th e tria l c ou rt didno t e rr

in s umm ari ly dism is s in g th e Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s p e ti ti o n f o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f

b a s e d o n it s f

in d in g th a t th e petition failed to c ontain a full disclosure of the factual basis upon which the g rounds for r elief w ere based.

The Petitioner also a

rg ues t h at the trial court erre d beca use it “should have de termined [P etitioner’s] indigenc y

status and appoint[ed] counsel.” We are unable to dire ctly addre ss this i ssue beca use the re cord on appea l f

ails to c ontain a petition for a decla ration of indig ency

or any evidenc e supporting such a claim. Neve rtheless, the Petitioner’s arg ument fails bec ause it is well established 2 that “‘a clea r but patently

non-meri t o ri ous petition [ for post-c onviction relief] may be dismissed summarily ,’ without the appointment of counse l or an evidentiary hearing.” Rickman v. State, 972 S.W .2d 687, 692 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Martucc i v. State, 872 S.W .2d 947 , 949 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). S ee al so Pewitt, 1 S .W.3d at 675-76 (holding that “[t] he trial c ourt was not
re qu ir e d to app oin t c ou ns e l f or thepu rp os e of

pr ov idi ng thefa c tua l ba sis fo r the pe tit ion e r’ s c la ims ”W e no t e t hat i t ap p ears t hat nei t her t he p et i t i o n no r t he am end ed p et i t i o n was act ual l y si gned b y t he P et i t i o ner; 3

ra the r, the p e tit io n is sign e d b y so m e o n e e lse “fo r th e p e tit io n e r.”

W e n ot e t h at i n h i s ame n ded pet i t i on , t h e Pet i t i on er made a s t at eme n t r es embl i n g a v er i f i ca t i on , bu t di d n ot 4
p e rs o n a lly sig n the ve rifica tio n (o r th e p e tit io n itself). F u rth e rm o re , the a m e n d e d p e tit io n w a s n o t v e rified “u n d e r o a th.” T h is C o u rt h a s p re v io u sly he ld tha t t h e ve rifica tio n un d e r o a th r e q u ire m e n t f o r a p o st-co n v ic tio n p e ti tio n ge n e ra lly

r equi r es t he do cumen t t o be “ not ar i zed by a n ot ar y publ i c or ac kn owl edged i n t he pres enc e of an off i ci al

. ” Char l es M on t ag u e v

. St at e, N o. E2000- 01330- CC A- R3- PC , 2001 W L 1011464, a t * 1 ( T en n

. Cr i m. App. , K n ox v i l l e, Se pt

. 4, 2 0 0 1 ). A c c o rd ing ly, the P e tit io n e r’s “v e rifica tio n ” w a s n o t un d e r o a th a n d the re fo re faile d the sta tuto ry re q u ire m e n ts fo r a va lid p o st-co n v ic tio n p e tit io n . S e e T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 0 -1 0 4 (e ).

“N o pro s e p et i t i o n s hal l be dis m i ss ed fo r f ai l ure t o fo l l o w t he p res cri b ed fo rm unt i l t he co urt has gi ven t he 5
p et i t i o ner a r easona b l e o p p o rt uni t y t o am end t he p et i t i o n wi t h t he ass i st ance o f co unsel

. ” T enn. R

. S. C t

. 28 , § (B )( 4 )( b ).

W e no te tha t t h e T e n n e sse e R u le s o f t h e S u p re m e C o u rt d e fine a p ro se p e tit io n in th e c o n te x t o f a p o st6

co nvi ct i o n pro ceed i ng as fo l l o ws: “ A pro s e p et i t i o n i s o ne f i l ed b y a p et i t i o ner wi t ho ut t he b enef i t of co unsel

. ” T enn. R

. S

. C t

. 2 8 , § 2 (A ). In thi s ca se, t he P eti t i o ne r ad m i t t ed he rec eive d t he “a ssi st an ce ” o f an att o rne y. H o w ev er, b ec au se

(c o n tinu e d ...)
-6- afte r g ranting the pro se petitioner additional time to submit an amende d petition). Thus, the trial
c ou rt in this c a se didno t e rr

in e le c tin g no t to app oin t c ou ns e l to a ssi st the Pe tit ion e r w ithhis amende d post-conviction petition.

I n his final arg ument, the Petitioner, while not denying t h at his amended pe tition was not verifie d under oath as require d by statute, nevertheless asserts that because he submitted his petition pro se he should be “held to less stringe nt standards” than t hose required of attorney s. There fore , the Petitioner arg ues, the trial c ourt err ed in summarily dismiss ing his pe tition because it wa s not verifie d under oath. We disag ree

. 3

As stated above , a post-convic tion pe tition and any amende d petitions must be verified under oath. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-104( e). We ha ve previously held that “[i] t is im perative that fac tual alleg ations be made and that the pe tit i o n b e verified as trueunder oath.” Hutche rson v. State, 75 S.W .3d 929, 931 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The purpose of the ve rification under oath re quirement is to “deter or

to reduc e intentionally

false a lleg ations primarily made by p et i t i o n ers by

exposi ng the m to a g g ra vate d p e rj ury c ha rg e s, ” ult imate ly

re su lti ng in m or e e ff

ic ie nt u se of thejud ic ia l sy ste m. Sex ton v. State, 151 S

. W

. 3 d 5 2 5 , 5 3 0 (Tenn Crim. App. 2004) . Acc ording ly , we ha ve held that “[w]hether prepa

red by a petitioner or

by counsel, the pe tition and its amendments must be verified under oath.” I d.

I n this case, th e Petitioner did not verify under oath his original pe tition or his amended petition for post-conviction re lief. The P etitioner arg ues that he should be judg ed by “less string ent 4 standards” beca

use he submitted his petitions pro s e, ci t i n g Al len v. State, 854 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tenn. 1993) and Te nn. R. S. C t. 28, § 6(B) (4)( b). T he Petitioner, while prof essing to be pro se, 5 ha s n on e the le ss a dmi tte d in his app e llate brie f t hat here c e ive d th e “ a ssi stanc e of [an ] attorne y ” in prepa ring both his original and his amended post-conviction petitions. Furthermore , this Court has 6(

. . . con t i n u ed) 6

t he P et i t i oner di d not ha ve formal couns el of r ecor d, we wi l l , i n our cons i dera t i on of t he cl ai ms i n t hi s appeal , cons i der h is a m e n d e d p o st-co n v ic tio n p e tit io n a s su b m itt e d p ro se

. -7- previously

questioned the c ontinued applicability of Allen, noting that it inter prete d a former

version of th e P ost-Conviction P roce dure A ct, which ha s subsequently been amended to bec ome more stringe nt in its require ments. See B lair v. State, 969 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Ten n

. C rim. App. 1997). Reg ardle ss, as st ated above, rece nt case law mandates that whether “pre pare d by a petitioner” i.e., pro se, or “by counsel,” a post -convic tion petition and it s amendments “must be verified unde r oath.” Sex ton, 151 S.W .3d at 530.
Additionally , as the State a sser t s in its appellate brief , the trial court in this case did not imm e diate ly dis mis s the fa ulty po st- c on vic tio n pe tit ion , b ut r a the r g a ve thePe tit ion e r “ re a so na ble opportunity ” to amend his pe tition. Tenn. R. S. Ct. 28, § 6(B )(4) (b); see also Tenn. Code A nn. § 40- 30-106(d) . Furthermore , the Petitioner utiliz ed this opportunity to submitan ame nded petition, which he ag ain completed with the “assistanc e” of an attorney

. Acc ording ly , we hold that the trial court did not err

by dismiss ing the petition based upon the Petitioner’s f ailure to ve rify

his petition under oath.

I n s umm ary , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ord ered th e Pe tit ion e r’ s a me nd e d p e tit ionfo r p os tconviction re lief to be dismiss ed beca use it did not c ontain a full disclosure of the fa ctual basis upon wh ic h th e g ro un ds fo r re lie f we re ba se d, ins te a d re lying on ba rea lle g a tio ns of

a vio latio n o f h is Si xth Am e nd me nt rig ht t o e ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l w ithno mor e than me rec on c lus ion s o f la w t o support such allegations. The post-conviction court further found that the Petitioner failed to ve rify his a me nd e d p e tit ionun de r o a th. Con c lud ing th at th e Pe tit ion e r f a ile d to me e t th e statut orily require d elements for

a proper post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court held that the
a me nd e d p e tit iondidno t w arr a nt f urthe r pr oc e e din g s. We c on c lud e that thetria l c ou rt a c te d w ith in its discretionary

authority in dismi ssing the Petitioner’ s petition for post-conviction re lief.

CO NC LU SION B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g re a so nin g a nd auth oriti e s, we a ff irm th e jud g me nt o f the tria l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE