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15-1767-cr 

United States v. Artis 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 23rd day of June, two thousand fifteen. 

 

PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, 

 CHESTER J. STRAUB, 

REENA RAGGI, 

Circuit Judges. 

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. No. 15-1767-cr 

 

SOLOMON ARTIS, AKA Light, AKA Spaz, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

*

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APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: LAWRENCE MARK STERN, ESQ., New 

York, New York.

APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: ALLON LIFSHITZ (Peter A. Norling, Rena 

Paul, on the brief), Assistant United States 

Attorneys, for Kelly T. Currie, Acting United 

States Attorney for the Eastern District of 

New York, Brooklyn, New York. 

 

*

 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption to conform 

with the above. 
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Interlocutory appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of New York (Dora L. Irizarry, Judge; James Orenstein, Vera M. 

Scanlon, Magistrate Judges). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the order entered on May 18, 2015, is AFFIRMED. 

Defendant Solomon Artis, who stands indicted for conspiracy to commit murder in 

aid of racketeering and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, see 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(5), 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 2, appeals from the district court’s order 

detaining him without bail pending trial, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142, 3145(c). We review 

the district court’s findings of fact—including its ultimate findings as to risk of flight and 

danger to the community—for clear error, see United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 

319–20 (2d Cir. 2011), and will not reverse “unless on the entire evidence we are left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” United States 

v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We 

review questions of law de novo. See United States v. English, 629 F.3d at 319–20. 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, 

which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 

1. Legal Standard 

The Bail Reform Act of 1984 ordinarily requires pre-trial release under such 

conditions as the court “determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person 

as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(b), (c). If, however, the court finds “that no condition or combination of 
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conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety 

of any other person and the community,” the court “shall order the detention of the 

person before trial.” Id. § 3142(e)(1); see United States v. English, 629 F.3d at 318–19; 

United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 75. The government bears the burden of proving 

risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence, but it must prove danger to the 

community by clear and convincing evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); United States 

v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 74–75. 

Where probable cause supports a charge that the person seeking bail committed 

certain offenses, including violations of § 924(c), there is a rebuttable presumption that 

no conditions of release will reasonably assure against flight or dangerousness. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). “[A]n indictment returned by a duly constituted grand jury 

conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause for the purpose of triggering the 

rebuttable presumptions set forth in § 3142(e).” United States v. English, 629 F.3d at 

319 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a presumption shifts to the defendant “a 

limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion” to adduce “evidence that he 

does not pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” United States v. Mercedes, 

254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). Such production does not eliminate the presumption; 

rather, the presumption “remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the 

court,” id., which factors are delineated in the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). “At all 

times, however, the government retains the ultimate burden of persuasion.” United 

States v. English, 629 F.3d at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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2. The District Court’s Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous 

Artis argues that the facts alleged in the original charging complaint do not 

establish probable cause to think he committed a § 924(c) offense triggering the statutory 

presumption. That question is now rendered moot by Artis’s indictment, which 

conclusively establishes probable cause for the firearm charge. See United States v. 

English, 629 F.3d at 319. 

At the detention hearing, Artis attempted to rebut the § 3142(e)(3) presumption in 

favor of detention by pointing to the purported weakness of the government’s case and 

his own lack of a prior criminal record. These circumstances are not so compelling as to 

defeat the presumption or to manifest clear error in the district court’s determination that 

no combination of release conditions, and specifically not the conditions proposed by 

Artis, could reasonably assure against dangerousness and the risk of flight. 

We have considered Artis’s remaining arguments, and we conclude that they are 

without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: 

CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court