UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4116

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

SHEKETA HOKE,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,

Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00224-RJC-1)

Submitted: July 28, 2011 Decided: August 15, 2011

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

R. Deke Falls, BARNETT & FALLS, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Sheketa Hoke pled guilty without a written plea 

agreement to: conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 371 (2006); armed bank robbery and aiding and abetting the 

same, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d), 2 (2006); conspiracy to use and 

possess a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 

18 U.S.C. § 924(o); and possession of a firearm during and in 

relation to a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the 

same, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 2 (2006). Hoke was sentenced to 144 

months in prison. She now appeals. Her attorney has filed a 

brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), raising two issues but stating that there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Hoke was advised of her right to 

file a pro se supplemental brief but has not filed such a brief. 

We affirm.

I

Hoke first contends that her guilty plea to the 

firearm offenses was invalid because she neither used nor 

possessed a firearm. This claim is at odds with her statements 

at the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing that she understood the 

offenses with which she was charged and that she was guilty of 

those offenses. Additionally, at the hearing, Hoke represented 

to the court that her plea was not the result of threats or 
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intimidation, and that no one had forced her to plead guilty or 

promised her a lenient sentence in exchange for her plea. At 

Hoke’s sentencing, the parties stipulated that there was a 

factual basis for the guilty plea.

Absent compelling evidence to the contrary, the “truth 

of sworn statements made during a Rule 11 colloquy is 

conclusively established.” United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 

216, 221-22 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 

U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (holding that a defendant’s declaration at 

the Rule 11 hearing “carr[ies] a strong presumption of verity”); 

United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir. 1991) 

(concluding that a defendant’s statements at a Rule 11 hearing 

that he was neither coerced nor threatened was “strong evidence 

of the voluntariness of his plea”). 

In light of these authorities, Hoke’s admission of 

guilt at the Rule 11 hearing, the stipulation of a factual 

basis, and the absence of compelling contrary evidence, we 

conclude that Hoke’s claim lacks merit.*

 * We note additionally that, under the Pinkerton doctrine, 

see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946), 

“[a] defendant may be convicted of a § 924(c) charge on the 

basis of a coconspirator’s use of a gun if the use was in 

furtherance of the conspiracy and was reasonably foreseeable to 

the defendant.” United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 305 (4th 

Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Cummings, 937 F.2d 941, 

944 (4th Cir. 1991). Here, Hoke entered the bank with three coconspirators, one of whom brandished a firearm. She accordingly 

 

(Continued)
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II

Hoke also contends that her base offense level was 

improperly increased by two levels based on her use of a minor 

in the offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.4 

(2009). The Guidelines provides for an enhancement “[i]f the 

defendant used or attempted to use a person less than eighteen 

years of age to commit the offense.” “Use or attempted use 

includes directing, commanding, encouraging, intimidating, 

counseling, training, procuring, recruiting, or soliciting.” 

USSG § 3B1.4, cmt. n.1.

The district court credited the testimony at

sentencing of FBI special Agent Chad Pupillo. According to 

Pupillo, Malik Shropshire and Frances Howze both informed 

authorities that it was Hoke’s idea to rob the bank and that 

Hoke asked Shropshire, who was seventeen, to scout the bank in 

advance of the robbery. Shropshire did as Hoke requested, 

posing as a college student who wanted to open an account when 

he cased the bank. Hoke also assigned Shropshire his role 

during the robbery. This testimony clearly establishes that the 

enhancement was appropriate.

 

was liable for the firearms offenses under the Pinkerton

doctrine.
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III

After reviewing the entire record in accordance with 

Anders, we conclude that there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel 

inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the 

client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served 

on his client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED