alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-1760

CARL G. SULLIVAN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus FAYETTEVILLE STATE UNIVERSITY; UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (CA-97-914-BO) Submitted: August 13, 1998 Decided: August 31, 1998 Before WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Carl G. Sullivan, Appellant Pro Se. Joyce S. Rutledge, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court’s order and judgment granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and dismissing Appellant’s complaint filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (“TitleVII”). Appellant filed two separate charges with the EEOC and received two separate right-to-sue-letters. The district court dismissed Appellant’s complaint as to one charge (#141960280) because the complaint was untimely. The court dismissed the complaint as to the second charge (#141960425) because Appellant filed that charge with the EEOC beyond the 180-day limit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1) (1994). The court also dismissed other claims in the complaint for failing to present those claims to the EEOC. On appeal, Appellant does not challenge the court’s basis for dismissing the complaint as to charge #141960425 or the unexhausted claims. Because the court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, appellate review is waived. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). We affirm that part of the court’s judgment on the reasoning of the district court. See Sullivan v. Fayetteville State Univ. , No. CA-97-914-BO (E.D.N.C. Apr. 17, 1998). As for charge #141960280, Appellant contends the court erred in finding he failed to file his complaint within ninety-days of receiving the right-to-sue letter. We decline to rule on this issue and affirm on alternate grounds. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d3 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996). Defendants correctly argued that charge#141960280, which was filed more than 500 days after the discriminatory event, was not timely filed with the EEOC. Therefore, Appellant cannot pursue this claim in federal court. See Beall v. Abbott Lab. , 130 F.3d 614, 620 (4th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument becausethe facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Noriyuki Kanayama, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly  report on Form 10-QSB of Entertainment Is Us,
Inc. for the quarter ended March 31, 2006;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information  included in this quarterly  report,  fairly present in all material
respects the financial  condition,  results of operations  and cash flows of the
small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining  disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and
have:

(a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures,  or caused such disclosure
controls and  procedures to be designed  under our  supervision,  to ensure that
material  information  relating to the small business issuer is made known to us
by others,  particularly  during the  period in which this  quarterly  report is
being prepared;

(b)  evaluated  the  effectiveness  of the small  business  issuer's  disclosure
controls and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure  controls and procedures,  as of the end of the period covered by
this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) disclosed in this report any change in the small business  issuer's internal
control  over  financial  reporting  that  occurred  during  the small  business
issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business  issuer's  fourth fiscal
quarter in the case of an quarterly report) that has materially affected,  or is
reasonably  likely to materially  affect,  the small business  issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,
based  on  our  most  recent  evaluation  of  internal  control  over  financial
reporting,  to the small business  issuer's  auditors and the audit committee of
the small  business  issuer's  board of  directors  (or persons  performing  the
equivalent functions);

(a) all  significant  deficiencies  and  material  weaknesses  in the  design or
operation of internal  control over  financial  reporting  which are  reasonably
likely to  adversely  affect  the small  business  issuer's  ability  to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) any fraud,  whether  or not  material,  that  involves  management  or other
employees who have a significant  role in the small business  issuer's  internal
control over financial reporting.

June 22, 2006



/s/ Noriyuki Kanayama
---------------------
Noriyuki Kanayama
Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial
Officer)
#### Grady Edward LLOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. P.E. MCLEOD, Warden; FNU Mactaggart, Associate Warden; FNU Clayton, Associate Warden; FNU Randell, Official, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-7760.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 30, 2003.

Decided Feb. 5, 2003.

Grady Edward Lloyd, Appellant Pro se.

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Grady Edward Lloyd appeals from the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. The district court’s dismissal without prejudice is not appealable. *See Domino Sugar Corp. v.*
      *218
      *Sugar Workers Local Union §92,*10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir.1993). A dismissal without prejudice is a final order only if “ ‘no amendment [in the complaint] could cure the defects in the plaintiffs case.’ ” *Id.*at 1067 (quoting *Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates,*844 F.2d 461, 463 (7th Cir.1988)). In ascertaining whether a dismissal without prejudice is renewable in this court, the court must determine “whether the plaintiff could save his action by merely amending his complaint.” *Domino Sugar,*10 F.3d at 1066-67. In this case, Lloyd may move in the district court to reopen his case and to file an amended complaint specifically alleging facts sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the dismissal order is not appealable. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Exhibit 32.3



Statement



Pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. §1350, the undersigned officer of Paperweight Development Corp. (the
Company), hereby certifies that to his knowledge:



| | (1) |  | the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 29, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       |  |  |  | PAPERWEIGHT DEVELOPMENT CORP.
|---------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------
|                       |  | 
|Dated: August 11, 2003 |  |  |  |                              
|                       |  |  | 
|                       |  |  |  |                              
|                       |  |  |  |                              
|                       |  |  |  |                              



This certification accompanies this
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended
June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert H.B. Baldwin, Jr., President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

This certification is being provided pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not deemed to be filed for any purpose
whatsoever.

Date: August 6, 2010



/s/ Robert H.B. Baldwin, Jr.Robert H.B. Baldwin, Jr.President and Chief Financial Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1787 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 1787

   To amend the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States with 
                         respect to fireworks.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 21, 1996

  Mr. Pressler (for himself, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Breaux, and Mr. Graham) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
                          Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States with 
                         respect to fireworks.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DUTY ON DISPLAY FIREWORKS.

    Chapter 35 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
is amended by striking subheading 3604.10.00 and inserting the 
following new subheadings:

``        3604.10               Fireworks:..........                                                            
          3604.10.10              Display fireworks   2.4%             Free (A*, CA, E, IL,  12.5%              
                                 (Class 1.3C).                          J, MX)                                  
          3604.10.90              Other (including    5.3%             Free (A*, CA, E, IL,  12.5%            ''
                                 Class 1.4G).                           J, MX)                                 .

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    (a) In General.--The amendment made by section 1 applies with 
respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, 
on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (b) Retroactive Treatment.--Notwithstanding section 514 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1514) or any other provision of law, upon 
a request filed with the Customs Service before the 90th day after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, any entry, or withdrawal from 
warehouse for consumption--
            (1) which was made on or after January 1, 1996, and before 
        the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
            (2) with respect to which there would have been a lesser 
        duty if the amendment made by section 1 applied to such entry 
        or withdrawal,
shall be liquidated or reliquidated as though such amendment applied to 
such entry or withdrawal.
                                 <all>
```
#### Barry HALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C. MOORE; G. Meade; Commonwealth of Virginia, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-7870.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 6, 2003.

Decided Feb. 13, 2003.

*709Barry Hall, Appellant Pro Se. Jim Harold Guynn, Jr., Guynn & Memmer, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia; Pamela Anne Sargent, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before WILKINS, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Barry Hall appeals the district court’s orders denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint, the reconsideration of that order, and his motion to amend his complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See Hall v. Moore,*No. CA-02-1105-7 (W.D.Va. Nov. 22, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1


                           Motorvac Technologies,Inc.
                   Calculation of Proforma Net Loss Per Share
                           For the Three Months Ended
                                 March 31, 1996


<TABLE>
<S>                                                                        <C>
Proforma Net Loss:

Net Loss                                                                    (491,997)
Proforma Reduction of Interest Expense                                       106,263
                                                                         -----------
Proforma Net Loss                                                           (385,734)
                                                                         ===========
Proforma Weighted Average Outstanding Common and
    Common Equivalent Shares:

Common Stock Outstanding, December 31, 1995                                  948,000

Common stock equivalents:
    Conversion of Series A Preferred Stock                                   966,247
    Conversion of Series B Preferred Stock                                   570,150
    Common Shares Issued in Initial Public Offering                                0
    Incremental Shares, assuming exercise of options granted
        after January 1, 1995 (0 if dilutive to EPS)                               0
    Conversion of $4,410,300 of Notes Payable to Related party               820,521
    Shares Related to repayment of Interest                                   19,770
                                                                         -----------
Proforma Weighted Average Outstanding Common and
    Common Equivalent Shares                                               3,324,688
                                                                         ===========
Proforma Net Loss per Share                                                    -0.12
                                                                         ===========
</TABLE>
#### William Hiran ALLEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 30869.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 7, 1959.

Douglass, Thompson & Douglass by Malcolm C. Douglass, Pampa, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, three days in jail and a fine of $150.

Officer Syrios of the Borger police department testified that on the night in question he received a call to investigate a disturbance at a. residence and, while there, his attention was directed to a pass*766ing automobile, that he gave chase, brought the automobile to a halt, and found, the appellant alone therein. He stated that the appellant had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, was incoherent in his speech, and expressed the opinion that he was intoxicated; that he recovered a partially *empty*fifth of whiskey from the seat of the automobile, placed the appellant under arrest, carried him to the scene of the disturbance and thence to the police station.

Officers Green and Markham testified that they observed the appellant at the police station after his arrest, that he was unsteady on his feet, that his speech was not plain, that he had alcohol on his breath, that his eyes were bloodshot, that he was perspiring profusely, and expressed the opinion that he was intoxicated.

The appellant, testifying in his own behalf, admitted drinking two beers on the day in question, but denied that he had drunk from the whiskey bottle found in his automobile and denied that he was intoxicated. His testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.

The jury resolved this conflict in the evidence against the appellant, and we find it sufficient to sustain their verdict.

The sole question presented by brief relates to the admissibility of certain evidence concerning the disturbance which the officers were called to investigate in which the appellant kicked a widow with whom he had been keeping company. We need not pass upon the admissibility of such testimony because the witness was later permitted to testify, without objection, as follows:

> “Q. Mr. Allen gave you no reason for kicking you? Did he say anything when he kicked you? A. No.

> “Q. He just walked in the door and kicked you? A. Yes.”

The accused is in no position to complain of the admission of testimony where the same or similar testimony is admitted without objection. Moseley v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 578, 258 S.W.2d 331. See also 4 Tex.Jur., § 414, p. 587, and 5 Tex.Jur. (2d), § 446, p. 704.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nelson Rafael ZAPATA-VICENTE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-4281.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 20, 2002.

Decided Sept. 3, 2002.

Douglas A. Ramseur, Bowen, Bryant, Champlin & Carr, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Robert E. Trono, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Nelson-Zapata Vicente appeals his convictions and sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846 (2000), and distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2000). Finding no reversible error, we affirm. On appeal, Zapata-Vicente first contends that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that he owned a handgun. *722He claims that the evidence had no relevance to the drug trafficking charges and that its admission prejudiced him by making him- appear more dangerous to the jury. We have held that evidence of gun possession is relevant evidence in a drug conspiracy trial, even if there is no specific evidence linking the weapon to the conspiracy. *United States v. Ward,*171 F.3d 188, 195 (4th Cir.1999). In addition, we have noted that “guns are tools of the drug trade and are commonly recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia.” *Id.*(citing *United States v. Ricks,*882 F.2d 885 (4th Cir.1989)). Our review of the record in this case reveals that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of evidence regarding the handgun outweighed any undue prejudice to Zapata-Vicente. *Ward,*171 F.3d at 195 (stating standard of review). Accordingly, we find this claim to be without merit.

Zapata-Vincente next contends that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of conspiracy. The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it. *Glasser v. United States,*315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); *United States v. Burgos,*94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996). We have reviewed the record and find that the testimony of the Government’s witnesses, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, was sufficient to sustain Zapata-Vicente’s convictions. Although Zapata-Vincente attacks the credibility of these witnesses on appeal, we note that credibility determinations are within the sole province of the jury and thus are not susceptible to judicial review. *See United States v. Lowe,*65 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir.1995).

Accordingly, we affirm Zapata-Vincente’s convictions and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
EXHIBIT 21

LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES



|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |  |  |  |                                                                                          
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Name of Subsidiary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |  |  | State/Country of Incorporation/Organization                                              
|ICT Canada Marketing, Inc. Eurotel Marketing Limited Harvest Resources, Inc. Yardley Enterprises, Inc. ICT International ICT Australia Pty. Ltd. ICT Barbados, Inc. ICT Marketing Services of Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. ICT Marketing Services of Asia Pacific Pte Ltd ICT Marketing Services, Inc. |  |  |  | Canada Ireland Delaware Delaware Delaware Australia Barbados Mexico Singapore Philippines
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED MA Y 8, 2014

NO. 03

- 12

- 00204

- CR

Rickey Rea Rowlett, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PE MBERTON , AND ROSE

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment entered by the trial court. Having reviewed the record and

the parties’ arguments, the Court hol ds that there was no reversible error in the trial court’s

judgment . Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment

. Because appellant is indigent

and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.