* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-50729, consolidated with No. 11-50730

WILLIAM ETHRIDGE HILL, Petitioner - Appellant v. RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, Respondent - Appellee
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC Nos. 1:07-CV-399 & 1:07-CV-400
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Petitioner-A ppellant William Ethridge Hill seeks habeas relief from his state court convictions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied relief. We affirm. In 1997, Hill was convicted by a Texas state-court jury for the murder of William Allen and arson ofthe house in which Allen was living and found dead. Before trial, Hill moved to suppress inculpatory statements he made during an interrogation by police. Hill, Allen’s former roommate, had been taken by police United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D July 31, 2012 Lyle W. Cayce ClerkNos. 11-50729 & 11-50730

2 to a station to be interviewed. Forty-five minutes af ter being placed in the interview room, Hill orally was advised only of some of his Miranda rights. In particular, Hill was not told that his statements could be used against him in court. Following three hours of interrogation, Hill admitted being at Allen’s house the night of the fire and Allen’s death and havi ng had a physical altercation with Allen that night. Hill’s statement was reduced to writing. The written statement included a complete Miranda warning. The trial court found the first Miranda warning defective, and thus excluded Hill’s statements following that oral warning. Nevertheless, the court found that the second Miranda warning, in the written statement, adequately apprised Hill of his rights. Consequently, his written statement was admitted against him. On appeal in the Texas courts, Hill’s convictions were affirmed and his requestfor discretionary reviewwasdenied. Hill’s habeas petitions (onefor each
conviction, but identical) in state court were denied, In re Hill , No. 981472-A, 981493-A (331st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Feb. 27, 2007), and on appeal
were affirmed without written order or hearing. Hill then came to the federal courts. The district court denied Hill’s habeas petitions, concluding, inter alia, the state court’s denial of habeas was supported by a reasonable application of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), in that the court reasonably could have found that police did not employ a deliberate “two-step” strategy for obtaining Hill’s confession. H ill v. Thaler, No. 1:07-cv-399-JRN, at *10-13 (W.D. Tex. July 18, 2011). This timely appeal followed. In reviewing requests for federal habeas relief, this court reviews the district court’s findings offact for clear error and its conclusions of lawde novo, “applying the same standards to the state court’s decision as did the district court.” Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A petition for habeas from a state conviction is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254.Nos. 11-50729 & 11-50730

3 AEDPA prohibitsfederal habeas reliefunless thestate adjudication ofthe claim either (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court ofthe United States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). AEDPA also requires the court to presume that the state court’s findings of fact are correct “unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” Valdez v. Cockrell , 274 F.3d 941, 947 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). “The presumption of correctness not only applies to the explicit findings of fact, but it also applies to those unarticulated findings which are necessary tothe state court’s conclusions ofmixed lawand fact.” I d. at 948 n.11. A state court need not cite to, nor even be aware of, applicable Supreme Court precedent. E arly v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). Nor does this court review the reasoning of the state court. N eal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Rather, the court’s review is limited to the “ultimate legal conclusion” of the state court. I d. The court is to determine “what arguments
or theories supported or
. . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Hill’s primary contention is that the state court’s denial of habeas relief
was inconsistentwith Seibert

. He argues that his written inculpatory statement
was the result of a deliberate “two-step” strategy, whereby the interrogating officer surreptitiously provided Hill a deficient Miranda warning, obtained an inculpatory oral statement, and then obtained the same inculpatory statement after a second and completewarning. Hill’s contention is unavailing. Hill points to evidence that perhaps could be reconciled with a deliberate strategy. But farNos. 11-50729 & 11-50730

4 more to the point, by clear and convincing evidence he has not overcome the presumption of correctness owed the determinations necessary to the state court’s denial of habeas. Moreover, the officer who gave the deficient warning testified he did not have wi th him the standard Miranda warning card he ordinarily used when giving the warning. It would not have been unreasonable for the court to find the warning’s deficiency inadvertent. And, any argument that the officer employed a deliberate strategy is undermined by the fact that a partial reading of Miranda rights was given. U nited States v. Naranjo, 223 F. App’x 167, 169 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding warning that defendant did not have to speak toofficerscounted against deliberatenessfinding); United Statesv. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 200 6) (stating “[b]ecause giving any warnings undermines the effectiveness of the ‘question first’ tactic, the fact that some warnings were given strongly evidences that the tactic was not being used”). Hill alsocontends that even ifthe deficiency in the first Miranda warning
was inadvertent, and consistent with Seibert, the second Miranda warning (on the written statement) was insufficient under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985) (requiring “careful and thorough” administration of Miranda warnings when post-warning confession was preceded by a voluntary but unwarned confession). Yet, aswith hisSeibertcontention, Hill has not, by clear and convincing evidence, rebutted the presumption of correctness owed the determinations necessary tothestate court’sdenial ofhabeas, nor has he shown that it would be an unreasonable application of Elstad to find that the second warning given Hill was sufficient properly to advise Hill of his Miranda rights. It is undisputed that: the written warnings included all warnings required by Miranda; Hill acknowledged reading the warnings; he had the opportunity to ask questions; and he agreed that he understood the warnings. Accordingly the judgment of the district court isNos. 11-50729 & 11-50730

1 Dennis, Circuit Judge, concurs in the judgment. 5 AFFIRMED. 1