The district court denied the appellants' petition and ordered 

that a foreclosure certificate be issued. We affirm. 

Standard of review 

We review a district court's factual determinations 

deferentially. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 

(2009) (a "district court's factual findings. . . are given deference and will 

be upheld if not clearly erroneous and if supported by substantial 

evidence"). Legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Clark County v. 

Sun State Properties, 119 Nev. 329, 334, 72 P.3d 954, 957 (2003). The 

choice of sanction in an FMP judicial review proceeding is committed to 

the sound discretion of the district court. Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 

127 Nev. , 255 P.3d 1281, 1287 (2011). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a foreclosure 

certificate to be issued 

To obtain a foreclosure certificate, a deed of trust beneficiary 

must strictly comply with four requirements: (1) attend the mediation, (2) 

participate in good faith, (3) bring the required documents, and (4) if 

attending through a representative, the person present must have 

authority to modify the loan or have access to a person with such 

authority. NRS 107.086(4), (5); Leyva v. National Default Servicing Corp., 

127 Nev. , 255 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2011) (concluding that strict 

compliance with these requirements is necessary). 

The Hoffmanns make three arguments on appea1. 3 

3The Hoffmanns make further arguments and assertions that are 

incoherent, ill-supported, or impertinent. Numerous portions of the briefs 

are either unsupported by citations to legal authority or devoid of 

explanation as to why the inclusions are relevant to the case presently 

before this court. See NRAP 28(e)(1), (j). Furthermore, a deposition 

continued on next page... 

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First, the Hoffmanns contend that the assignment from First 

National Bank of Nevada to Wells Fargo was invalid because the 

assignment did not comply with NRS 111.210's requirement that contracts 

for the sale of land express in writing the consideration paid. Contrary to 

the Hoffmanns' argument, however, we note that NRS 111.205(1) is the 

applicable statute for assignments. Einhorn v. BAC Home Loans 

Servicing, 128 Nev. , 290 P.3d 249, 252 (2012) (applying NRS 

111.205 to an assignment of a deed of trust). NRS 111.205(1) does not 

require an assignment of a deed of trust to include the consideration paid. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 

that the assignment was valid. 

Second, the Hoffmanns contend that Wells Fargo did not 

strictly comply with the document production requirement set forth in 

FMR 11(4), because the statement certifying the copy of the assignment 

does not include a recitation of the producing party's oath. FMR 11(4) 

states that "each assignment of the deed of trust . . . is only satisfied when 

...continued 

transcript relied on by the Hoffmanns in support of one of their arguments 

is poorly reproduced to the point of illegibility, and the appendices do not 

include proper indices. See NRAP 30(b)(1), (c)(2). Thus, we conclude that 

any of the Hoffmanns' arguments not specifically discussed herein were 

improperly raised. 

The poor quality of appellants' counsel's work product in the current 

case continues to obscure the impact and reliability of his arguments. See 

Volkes v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., Docket No. 57304 (Order of 

Affirmance, Feb. 24, 2012) (admonishing counsel for the poor quality of 

appellants' briefs). We strongly caution counsel to comply with the rules 

of this court in future filings. RPC 1.1, 1.3. 

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the mediator receives a statement under oath signed before a notary 

public pursuant to. . . NRS 240.1655(2)." 

The statement certifying the copy of the assignment was 

notarized in Arizona. NRS 240.1655(3)(c) provides that a notarial act 

performed in another state is sufficient if it meets the requirements of 

NRS 240.1655(1) and (2) and is "in a form prescribed by the laws or 

regulations applicable in the place in which the notarial act was 

performed." The document in question, however, appears to only be an 

acknowledgment, and thus does not comply with the Arizona 

requirements for a proper jurat or oath. Compare A.R.S. § 41-311(1) 

(defining an acknowledgment) and A.R.S. § 41-311(5) (defining a jurat). 

Accordingly, the statement certifying the copy of the assignment does not 

strictly comply with FMR 11(4). 

We have previously concluded that the note, deed of trust, and 

each assignment must be provided under the FMRs, Pasillas, 127 Nev. at 

 , 255 P.3d at 1285, and have imposed a strict compliance standard for 

these core or "'essential documents,' Levva, 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 

1277-79; see also NRS 107.086(4), (5) (requiring production of the note, 

deed of trust, and each assignment). However, this strict compliance 

requirement does not extend to non-essential or collateral documents. As 

we stated in Leyva, the purpose of the document production requirements 

is to ensure that the foreclosing party actually owns the note and has the 

authority to negotiate. 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 1279. The Hoffmanns 

only argue that Wells Fargo failed to meet the technical requirements, and 

do not challenge the authenticity of the assignment itself. Thus, the 

defective certification does not affect its authority. Accordingly, the 

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district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Wells Fargo 

complied with FMR 11(4). 

The Hoffmanns' final argument is that Wells Fargo 

participated in the mediation in bad faith by failing to disclose how much 

it paid First National Bank of Nevada for the loan. Specifically, the 

Hoffmanns contend that they needed this information so that they could 

determine whether they might be liable for a deficiency judgment. In 

making this contention, the Hoffmanns argue that NRS 40.451 limits any 

deficiency judgment to the amount Wells Fargo paid for the note. We 

disagree that potential deficiency exposure is controlled by the amount a 

loan was purchased for in the secondary mortgage market. 

In its entirety, NRS 40.451 provides as follows: 

As used in [this subchapter,] "indebtedness" 

means the principal balance of the obligation 

secured by a mortgage or other lien on real 

property, together with all interest accrued and 

unpaid prior to the time of foreclosure sale, all 

costs and fees of such a sale, all advances made 

with respect to the property by the beneficiary, 

and all other amounts secured by the mortgage or 

other lien on the real property in favor of the 

person seeking the deficiency judgment. Such 

amount constituting a lien is limited to the 

amount of the consideration paid by the 

lienholder. 

(Emphasis added). 

With respect to this argument, the Hoffmanns attempt to 

equate "lien" with "debt." Regardless of what NRS 40.451 says about the 

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lienholder's lien, the statute does not affect the amount of debt the 

lienholder is entitled to collect. 4 

The Hoffmanns' promissory note is a negotiable instrument 

and its transfer is governed by Article 3 of Nevada's UCC. Levva, 127 

Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 1279-81. Under Article 3, "[t]ransfer of an 

instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the 

transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument." NRS 

104.3203(2). It is also a well-founded principle of contract law that 

Idenerally, all contract rights may be assigned. . . ." See, e.g., 29 

Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 74:10 (4th ed. 2003); 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317(2) (1981). Further, "[i]t is no 

defense to an obligor that the assignee gave no consideration." 9 John E. 

Murray, Jr., Corbin on Contracts § 48.1 (rev. ed. 2007). In short, Wells 

Fargo is entitled to the same rights of collection of which the original 

holder was entitled. The Hoffmanns' proffered application of NRS 40.451 

appears to contradict not only Article 3, but also these basic contract 

principles. Additionally, we note that nothing within NRS 107.086 or the 

FMP rules requires a disclosure of the original amount paid, nor do these 

4The lack of attention by the Legislature to NRS 40.451 also 

contradicts the meaning that counsel ascribes to the statute. Enacted in 

1969 in substantially its current form, NRS 40.451 was amended only once 

in 1989 without regard to the issue presented here. See 1969 Nev. Stat., 

ch. 327, § 3, at 572-73; 1989 Nev. Stat. ch. 750, § 8, at 1769. It was not 

amended in 2009 in conjunction with the enactment of the FMP, when the 

Legislature amended NRS 40.455 to provide a limited and prospective 

prohibition on a deed of trust beneficiary's right to pursue a deficiency 

judgment. See 2009 Nev. Stat., ch. 310, §§ 2-3, at 1330-31. 

In light of its 2009 actions, it is highly unlikely that the Legislature 

would completely ignore NRS 40.451's potential effect if the statute was 

intended to apply in a manner consistent with counsel's argument. 

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Parraguirre 

Cherry 

rules require a bank to disclose its intentions to seek or forego a deficiency 

judgment. NRS 107.086(4) and (5); Pasillas,127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 

1287. Accordingly, Wells Fargo's nondisclosure of the consideration paid 

does not amount to bad faith. 

Having determined that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in ordering a foreclosure certificate to be issued, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

J. 

Hardesty 

cc: Hon. Patrick Flanagan, District Judge 

Mark L. Mausert 

Tiffany & Bosco, P. A. 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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