[Cite as State v. Bridges, 2023-Ohio-1048.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 111833

v. :

ANDREY L. BRIDGES, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 30, 2023 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-13-574201-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Andrey L. Bridges, pro se. 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:

Defendant-appellant Andrey Bridges, pro se, appeals the trial court’s 

denial of several postconviction motions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

trial court. 
Procedural History and Factual Background

Bridges has an extensive history with this court related to his 2013 

convictions. 

In November 2013, following a jury trial, Bridges was found guilty of 

murder, felonious assault, tampering with evidence and offenses against a human 

corpse in connection with the death of Carl Acoff, Jr. Bridges was sentenced to an 

aggregate term of 18 years and six months to life in prison. His convictions were 

affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100805, 2014-

Ohio-4570 (“Bridges I”); see also State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100805, 

2015-Ohio-1447 (denying application to reopen appeal). The Ohio Supreme Court

declined to accept jurisdiction over Bridges’ discretionary appeals. State v. Bridges,

142 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2015-Ohio-1353, 28 N.E.3d 123 (direct appeal); State v. 

Bridges, 143 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2015-Ohio-2911, 34 N.E.3d 932 (application to 

reopen appeal).

On July 23, 2014, while his direct appeal was pending, Bridges filed, 

pro se, a petition for postconviction relief. Bridges argued that his convictions 

violated various provisions of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, because (1)

the state “failed to reach its burden of proof,” no eyewitness identified him as the 

perpetrator to the crime, he was “actually innocent” and a police report “pointed to 

someone other than [Bridges] being responsible for the crime,” (2) he was denied 

the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to 

investigate “an alternative suspect” identified in the police report, failure to 
investigate witnesses and other evidence supporting Bridges’ alibi, failure to raise 

various objections to the admission of evidence at trial and failure to subpoena alibi 

witnesses and phone records, (3) “tainted evidence” was improperly admitted at 

trial and used to convict him and (4) there was prosecutorial misconduct. The trial 

court denied his petition without a hearing and issued findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, detailing the reasons for its ruling. Bridges appealed, pro se, the 

trial court’s denial of his petition in two appeals, both of which were dismissed. State 

v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101938 and 101942.1 

In March 2015, Bridges filed, pro se, a “petition to vacate or set aside 

judgment of conviction or sentence pursuant to [R.C.] 2953.23(A)(1)(a)-(b).” 

Bridges claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel (based on alleged 

deficiencies that included trial counsel’s failure to: investigate and interview key 

witnesses, timely file a motion for an expert or private investigator, challenge DNA 

evidence, call his son to testify, object to or seek exclusion of certain evidence 

1 Appeal No. 101938 was dismissed, sua sponte, on October 1, 2014, pursuant to 

R.C. 2505.02 and 2953.21 due to Bridges’ failure to attach a signed copy of the trial court’s 

findings of fact and conclusions of law to his notice of appeal. Appeal No. 101942 was 

dismissed, sua sponte, on October 31, 2014, “for failure to file the record” in accordance 

with App.R. 3(A), 10 and Loc.App.R. 10.

On December 20, 2021, Bridges filed, pro se, a “motion for leave to file judicial 

notice and correction and to modify the record pursuant to App.R. 9” in Appeal No. 

101938, arguing that this court had “mistakenly dismissed” Appeal No. 101938 and 

Appeal No. 101942, asserting that “[a] review of the online docket will for sure show 

standing in each case for support of show” [sic] and requesting that the court reinstate his 

appeal in Appeal No. 101938. This court denied the motion, stating: “The decision in this 

appeal was released on October 1, 2014. This court no longer has jurisdiction over the 

appeal.”
presented at trial, admit an “accurate weather report” and file a motion for a “gag 

order” to avoid prejudicial publicity), that the trial court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction to hear his case because of an alleged improper bindover (i.e., that he 

was “not properly bound-over by a Berea Municipal Court [j]udge to the Cuyahoga 

County Court of Common Pleas”), that his speedy trial rights pursuant to R.C. 

2945.71 had been violated and that he was denied a fair trial due to witness and 

prosecutorial misconduct. In May 2015, Bridges filed, pro se, a motion for a new 

trial. Bridges argued that the state had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Bridges had committed the crimes at issue for various reasons, including due to

the alleged existence of “a statement that someone other than [Bridges] had 

committed the crime[s],” that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting 

prejudicial, “highly inflammatory and gruesome” photographic evidence and that 

his $5 million bond was unconstitutional. The trial court denied these motions, 

Bridges appealed, and we affirmed those rulings. State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga Nos. 102903 and 103090, 2015-Ohio-5428 (“Bridges II”). We concluded 

that Bridges’ petition to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence was 

untimely, was not based on newly discovered evidence and that the claims asserted 

could have been raised in the trial court or on direct appeal and were, therefore, 

barred by res judicata. Id. at ¶ 9-21. We concluded that Bridges’ motion for a new 

trial was untimely, that his evidentiary arguments were not based on newly 

discovered evidence and were barred by res judicata and that Bridges’ challenge to 

the amount of his pretrial bond was moot. Id. at ¶ 24-31. The Ohio Supreme Court 
declined to accept jurisdiction over Bridges’ discretionary appeal. State v. Bridges, 

145 Ohio St.3d 1458, 2016-Ohio-2807, 49 N.E.3d 320.

In August 2015, while his appeal in Bridges II was pending, Bridges 

filed a motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial (“delayed motion for 

new trial”) based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (arguing that trial 

counsel failed to file a motion to suppress, notice of alibi and “other defense 

motions”), “actual/factual innocence” (arguing that his convictions were not 

supported by sufficient evidence) and the alleged improper denial of his motion for 

a private investigator. In May 2016, Bridges filed a motion for leave to correct error

in his conviction due to insufficient evidence (“motion to correct error”), in which 

he raised challenges to his convictions based on the sufficiency and manifest weight 

of the evidence. The trial court denied both motions. Bridges appealed the trial 

court’s rulings, and, in October 2016, we affirmed the trial court. State v. Bridges, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103634 and 104506, 2016-Ohio-7298 (“Bridges III”). In 

affirming the trial court’s denial of Bridges’ delayed motion for new trial, we 

concluded that Bridges had failed to establish that he was unavoidably prevented 

from timely filing his motion for new trial and that the claims set forth in the motion 

were barred by res judicata. Bridges III at ¶ 24-28. In affirming the trial court’s 

denial of Bridges’ motion to correct error, construed as a petition for postconviction 

relief, we found that his claims were barred by res judicata and that Bridges’ petition 

was untimely. Id. at ¶ 31-39. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept 
jurisdiction over Bridges’ discretionary appeal. State v. Bridges, 148 Ohio St.3d 

1445, 2017-Ohio-1427, 72 N.E.3d 658.

In December 2017, Bridges filed, pro se, a “motion [for] leave to file 

void or voidable judgment,” claiming that he was denied due process and that his 

sentence was contrary to law because the trial court had improperly considered facts 

outside the record (including considering the victim’s sexual orientation or “gender 

life style” as motive for the murder) and had made “illegal determination[s]” when 

sentencing him. The trial court denied Bridges’ motion, and Bridges appealed. We 

affirmed the trial court, finding that Bridges’ motion was an untimely petition for 

postconviction relief and that, even if it were not untimely, his claims were barred 

by res judicata. State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106653, 2018-Ohio-4113, 

¶ 12-17 (“Bridges IV”). The Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction over 

Bridges’ discretionary appeal. State v. Bridges, 154 Ohio St.3d 1510, 2019-Ohio601, 116 N.E.3d 1289.

On April 8, 2019, Bridges filed a “motion to rebut violent offender 

database and duties and raise factu[a]l innocence.” The trial court denied the

motion; Bridges did not appeal. On June 26, 2019, Bridges filed a “motion to 

proceed with finding of fact and conclusion of law,” arguing that the trial court was 

required to provide reasons for denying his April 8, 2019 motion. The trial court 

denied the motion, and Bridges appealed. Construing Bridges’ motion for findings 

of fact and conclusions of law as a successive petition for postconviction relief, we 

affirmed the trial court on the grounds that a trial court has no duty to issue findings 
of fact and conclusions of law on successive petitions for postconviction relief. State 

v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109019, 2020-Ohio-1625, ¶ 6-9 (“Bridges V”).

The Current Appeal

On November 29, 2021, Bridges filed, pro se, a “motion to 

correct/revised post-conviction judgment entry” (“motion to correct postconviction 

judgment entry”), requesting that the trial court (1) amend its September 3, 2014 

judgment entry2 to issue “proper” findings of facts and conclusions of law with 

respect to its denial of his July 23, 2014 petition for postconviction relief and (2) 

order the clerk to send him a copy of the “corrected” judgment entry so that he could 

“have meaningful appeal rights.” On November 30, 2021, Bridges filed, pro se, a 

“motion [for] leave to allow defendant to amend/supplement post-conviction 

relief,” seeking leave to amend or supplement his July 23, 2014 petition for 

postconviction relief to make additional arguments and identify additional evidence 

in support of his previously asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and 

prosecutorial misconduct. 

In June 2022, Bridges filed a “motion to vacate a void judgment of 

common law ancestry” (“motion to vacate a void judgment”)in which he argued that 

his constitutional rights had been violated and “the judgment in this case is void”

because: (1) the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the lesser-included 

2 In his motion to correct, Bridges requested that trial court correct “the postconviction entry of [the] court[’]s September 3rd, 2014 order and judgment.” There is no 

September 3, 2014 judgment entry. Presumably, Bridges was referring to the trial court’s 

findings of fact and conclusions of law filed on September 8, 2014. 
offense of involuntary manslaughter and (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel by failing to “test the prosecutor’s case,” file motions to 

suppress and present a defense showing his innocence. In support of his motion to 

vacate a void judgment, Bridges filed a “motion for transcript to support motion to 

vacate a void judgment of common law” (“motion for transcript”) an “affidavit of 

merit of motion to vacate a void judgment of common law” and two documents 

entitled “These Statements Supports [sic] Statement of Facts at 1 through 16 and 

Claims Two and Three” and “These Transcripts Support Claims One[,] Two and 

Three Under Facts of Case at 1 through 16” (collectively, the “supporting 

statements”).3 The state filed an omnibus response to Bridges’ 2021 and 2022 

motions, and the trial court denied them.

Bridges appealed, raising the following six assignments of error for 

review:

Assignment of Error I: The trial court abused its discretion, under 

common law, and due process was denied, when the court failed to 

3 In his affidavit of merit, Bridges asserts that he is “an innocent man” and sets 

forth a number of general statements regarding alleged errors he contends occurred in 

the case and alleged deficiencies in the evidence presented at trial. The supporting 

statements consist of what appear to be excerpts of various police reports (some with 

handwritten notes); email communications exchanged among various police officers or 

detectives from April 2013; an affidavit from Bridges’ son dated August 29, 2014 

regarding how (on some unidentified date) his father cut his hand on a can of vegetables, 

a letter from Bridges’ ex-girlfriend dated August 27, 2020, regarding events that had 

occurred “[a]round the first week of January 2013,” her communications with Bridges’ 

lawyer and her willingness to testify on Bridges’ behalf; some undiscernible objects or 

photographs identified as “objects to [sic] small to [h]old [t]he body in water”; various 

climatological data reports for January 2013; a motion for appointment of private 

investigator filed October 28, 2013; excerpts from the transcripts of pretrial proceedings, 

trial and sentencing; the November 15, 2013 sentencing journal entry and Bridges’

indictment in this case. 
instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary 

manslaughter.

Assignment of Error II: The trial court abused its discretion, and due 

process was denied, when [the] trial court used res judicata to end a 

void jurisdiction.

Assignment of Error III: Appellant is prejudicially denied void 

jurisdiction under common law, and due process is denied and erred, 

when appellant went to trial with no defense under ineffective 

assistance of counsel while appellant being factually innocent. 

Assignment of Error IV: Appellant is prejudicially denied the right to 

redress the courts of law and trial court abused its discretion.

Assignment of Error V: Appellant is prejudicially denied, and due 

process is denied and erred, when Appellant went to trial with no 

defense under ineffective assistance of counsel when a police report 

shows Appellant innocence.

Assignment of Error [VI4]: The trial court abused its discretion, when 

it did not review the record/transcript before ruling on the motion.

For ease of discussion, we address Bridges’ assignments of error out 

of order and together where appropriate.

Law and Analysis

Motion to Vacate a Void Judgment

In his first, second, third, fifth and sixth assignments of error, Bridges 

challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate a void judgment. In his 

first assignment of error, Bridges asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion to vacate a void judgment because the trial court “committed 

4 In his appellate brief, Bridges identifies this assignment of error as his seventh 

assignment of error; however, his brief contains no sixth assignment of error. 

Accordingly, to avoid confusion, we have renumbered it as the sixth assignment of error 

here. 
prejudicial error” in failing to instruct the jury regarding the lesser-included offense 

of involuntary manslaughter. In his second assignment of error, Bridges asserts that 

res judicata is not a bar to his first assignment of error. In his third and fifth 

assignments of error, Bridges argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion to vacate a void judgment because he was “factually innocent” 

and was denied the effective assistance of counsel during his 2013 trial. 

We construe Bridges’ motion to vacate a void judgment as a 

successive petition for postconviction relief. “Courts may recast irregular motions 

into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the 

motion should be judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 

N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12, citing State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 2002-Ohio-3993, 773 

N.E.2d 522, ¶ 10. ‘“[A] vaguely titled motion to correct or vacate * * * may be 

construed as a petition for post-conviction relief where the motion was filed 

subsequent to a direct appeal, claimed a denial of constitutional rights, sought to 

render the judgment void, and asked for a vacation of the judgment and sentence.”’ 

State v. Meincke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96407, 2011-Ohio-6473, ¶ 8, quoting State 

v. Caldwell, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-05-07, 2005-Ohio-5375, citing State v. 

Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997), syllabus; see also Bridges III

at ¶ 31; Bridges V at ¶ 7. Bridges’ motion to vacate a void judgment satisfies all the 

criteria for it to be construed as a petition for postconviction relief. 

Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i), a person who has been 

convicted of a criminal offense and who “claims that there was such a denial or 
infringement of the person’s rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under 

the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States,” may file a petition

in the court that imposed sentence, asking the court to vacate or set aside the 

judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief. Pursuant to R.C. 

2953.21(A)(2), petitions for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i) 

must generally be filed within 365 days after the trial transcript is filed in the direct 

appeal of the conviction at issue. The trial transcript in Bridges’ direct appeal was 

filed on March 3, 2014. Bridges’ petition for postconviction relief was successive and 

untimely under R.C. 2953.21(A).

A trial court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely or successive petition 

for postconviction relief unless the petition satisfies the criteria set forth under R.C. 

2953.23(A)(1) or (2). R.C. 2953.21(A); R.C. 2953.23(A); State v. Bethel, 167 Ohio 

St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470, ¶ 20; State v. Apanovitch, 155 Ohio 

St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121 N.E.3d 351, ¶ 36-38 (“[A] petitioner’s failure to 

satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A) deprives a trial court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits 

of an untimely or successive postconviction petition.”). R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)5 states, 

in relevant part: 

[A] court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the 

period prescribed in [R.C. 2953.21(A)] or a second petition or 

successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless 

* * * [b]oth of the following apply:

5 R.C. 2953.23(A)(2), which applies to offenders for whom DNA testing was 

performed under R.C. 2953.71 through 2953.81 or former R.C. 2953.82, is inapplicable 

here. 
(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably 

prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must 

rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period 

prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or 

to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court 

recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to 

persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a claim 

based on that right.

(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 

constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found 

the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was 

convicted[.]

We review a decision to grant or deny a petition for postconviction 

relief for abuse of discretion. State v. Hatton, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3991, 

¶ 38, citing State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, 

¶ 51-52, 58. However, whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to 

entertain an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief is a question of 

law, which we review de novo. Hatton at ¶ 38, citing Apanovitch at ¶ 24.

In this case, Bridges’ petition did not satisfy the requirements of R.C. 

2953.23(A)(1). Nothing in Bridges’ petition shows that he was unavoidably 

prevented from discovering the facts on which the claims in his petition were based, 

that any new federal or state right was recognized subsequent to his filing of his 

earlier petitions or that, but for the alleged constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found him guilty of the offenses of which he was convicted. 

Because Bridges did not make the requisite showing under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), the 

trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider his petition for postconviction relief and 

properly denied it. 
Furthermore, Bridges’ claims were barred by res judicata. See, e.g.,

Bridges III at ¶ 36 (“The doctrine of res judicata places another restriction on the 

availability of postconviction relief. * * * When the claims raised in a petition for 

postconviction relief are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, a trial court does not 

abuse its discretion in denying the petition without a hearing.”). “Res judicata 

generally bars a convicted defendant from litigating a postconviction claim that was 

raised or could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 

at 366, 2022-Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470, at ¶ 17, citing State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 

175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus; Hatton, Slip Opinion 

No. 2022-Ohio-3991, at ¶ 22 (“Res judicata applies to * * * petitions for

postconviction relief.”), citing State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131 

(1997). 

In an attempt to avoid the application of res judicata, Bridges asserts, 

in his second assignment of error, that res judicata is not a bar to his claims because 

his 2013 judgment of conviction was void and res judicata does not apply to void 

judgments. 

Although Bridges is correct that res judicata does not apply to void 

judgments, a judgment is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See 

State v. Hudson, 161 Ohio St.3d 166, 2020-Ohio-3849, 161 N.E.3d 608, ¶ 11, 14; 

State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 42; State 

v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 34-37. If the 
court has jurisdiction over the case and the person, a judgment based on an error in 

the court’s exercise of that jurisdiction renders a judgment voidable, not void. 

Hudson at ¶ 11 (“When a case is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the 

parties are properly before the court, any error in the exercise of its jurisdiction 

renders the court’ judgment voidable, not void.”).

Here, the common pleas court was the proper forum for trying the 

offenses for which Bridges was convicted. It had subject-matter jurisdiction over 

the case and personal jurisdiction over Bridges. See Article IV, Section 4, Ohio 

Constitution; R.C. 2931.03; Smith v. Sheldon, 157 Ohio St.3d 1, 2019-Ohio-1677, 131 

N.E.3d 1, ¶ 8 (“[A] common pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over felony 

cases.”); Harper at ¶ 23. As such, the trial court’s 2013 judgment of conviction was 

not void. 

Challenges to jury instructions that could have been raised on direct 

appeal are barred by res judicata. See, e.g., State v. Nunez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

104917, 2017-Ohio-5581, ¶ 46; State v. Taulbee, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 19-CA-26, 

2019-Ohio-3855, ¶ 16; State v. Sullivan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-861, 2014-

Ohio-1260, ¶ 15. Because Bridges could have challenged the trial court’s jury 

instructions on direct appeal, his claims are barred by res judicata. Accordingly, we 

overrule Bridges’ first and second assignments of error. 

In his third and fifth assignments of error, Bridges claims that his trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to timely request “an expert to investigate the 

prosecutor[’s] case,” for failing “to file relevant motions to suppress,” for going to 
trial “with no defense and merely question[ing] off the detective’s report,” for failing 

to point out alleged deficiencies in the DNA evidence and for failing to present 

evidence of alleged favorable facts set forth in statements by Bridges, Bridges’ son, 

Bridges’ ex-girlfriend and the police report. Bridges also takes issue with the 

redaction of certain videos admitted into evidence at trial. 

Res judicata operates to bar successive petitions for postconviction 

relief that raise claims that were or could have been raised on direct appeal or in a 

prior petition. See, e.g., State v. Waver, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108820, 2020-

Ohio-2724, ¶ 32; see also State v. Mack, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101261, 2018-Ohio301, ¶ 15 (“The doctrine of res judicata prevents repeated attacks on a final judgment 

for issues that were or could have been previously litigated.”); Bridges III at ¶ 33 

(“[A] postconviction petition does not provide a petitioner a second opportunity to 

litigate his or her conviction.”). This is not a case involving new claims or issues that 

have not been litigated, or could not have been litigated, before. Compare Hatton, 

Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3991, at ¶ 25.

As detailed above, Bridges raised the same ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims (or slight permutations thereof) in prior petitions for postconviction 

relief and other motions filed with the trial court and in prior appeals before this 

court. Because Bridges raised or could have raised the claims he now raises on direct 

appeal or in prior petitions for postconviction relief, his claims are barred by res 

judicata. See Bridges II at ¶ 7, 12-15; Bridges III at ¶ 25-27.

Bridges’ third and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
Claims Relating to the Trial Transcript 

In his sixth assignment of error, Bridges contends that the trial court 

abused its discretion by (1) denying his request for “proper authentic transcripts by 

the court reporter” and (2) failing to review the record and transcript before ruling 

on his motion to vacate a void judgment. 

On June 6, 2022, Bridges filed a motion for transcript in which he 

requested that (1) “proper authentic transcripts by the court reporter” be provided 

for court use in ruling on his motion to vacate a void judgment (stating that he had 

only “copies” of the transcripts and lacked funds to purchase official transcripts) and 

(2) the trial court “use” the transcripts when considering his motion to vacate a void 

judgment to avoid being “blinded from the facts.” 

It is not entirely clear what Bridges claims should have been done 

differently here. The record reflects that the official trial transcripts (seven volumes) 

were prepared on Bridges’ behalf, at the state’s expense, and filed in his direct appeal

on March 3, 2014. Bridges acknowledges that he has copies of the transcripts and 

he included record citations to the transcripts in, and/or attached excerpts from the 

transcripts to, his motion to vacate a void judgment, affidavit of merit and 

supporting statements. Bridges was not entitled to another copy of the “proper 

authentic transcripts [prepared] by the court reporter” at the state’s expense for use 

in his successive postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Bayles, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 88094, 2007-Ohio-1008, ¶ 11 (‘“[T]he duty to provide a transcript at 

State expense extends only to providing one transcript for the entire judicial system. 
It does not extend to sending the transcript to the indigent person in prison.”’), 

quoting State ex rel. Mramor v. Court of Common Pleas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

73406, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 5996, 2 (Dec. 31, 1997); State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 26327, 2016-Ohio-1100, ¶ 16 (noting that the Ohio Supreme Court 

“has repeatedly adhered to the position that defendants are not entitled to a 

transcript where the transcript has already been filed in their direct appeal, and that 

only one copy of the transcript of criminal trials must be provided to indigent 

criminal defendants”), citing State ex rel. Call v. Zimmers, 85 Ohio St.3d 367, 368, 

708 N.E.2d 711 (1999), citing State ex rel. Grove v. Nadel, 81 Ohio St.3d 325, 326, 

691 N.E.2d 275 (1998), and State ex rel. Murr v. Thierry, 34 Ohio St.3d 45, 517 

N.E.2d 226 (1987). Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in 

denying Bridges’ motion for transcript.

Further, the trial judge who ruled on Bridges’ motion to vacate a void 

judgment was the same trial judge who presided over Bridges’ 2013 trial and the 

same trial judge who has reviewed and ruled on Bridges’ voluminous postconviction

motions and petitions during the last nine years. Accordingly, she is very familiar 

with the record in the case, including the issues Bridges has raised again and again 

in his postconviction motions and petitions. There is nothing in the record to 

support Bridges’ claim that he was denied “a fair right of adjudication on the merits” 

based on the trial court’s alleged failure to review the record and trial transcripts

before ruling on his motion to vacate a void judgment. 
Bridges has failed to establish that he was entitled to any relief with

respect to his sixth assignment of error. Accordingly, we overrule his sixth 

assignment of error.

Motion to Correct Judgment Entry Relating to 2014 Petition for 

Postconviction Relief

Bridges’ fourth assignment of error relates, at least in part, to the trial 

court’s denial of his November 2021 “motion to correct/revised postconviction 

judgment entry.” Bridges contends that the relief requested in his motion to correct 

postconviction judgment entry “should have been given and gone,” that he was 

“denied the rights to redress the courts of law,” that he “did not have a due process 

to appeal” and that the trial court abused its discretion (1) “by not ordering the clerk 

to issue each party a copy” of its signed September 8, 2014 judgment entry in 

accordance with Civ.R. 58(B) and (2) for failing “to send the record for [his] 

appeal(s)” of his July 2014 petition for postconviction relief. Once again, Bridges 

has failed to establish that he was entitled to any relief with respect to his fourth 

assignment of error.

The trial court denied Bridges’ petition for postconviction relief on 

July 30, 2014, and Bridges requested findings and fact and conclusions of law on 

August 6, 2014. In his November 2021 motion to correct/revised postconviction 

judgment entry, Bridges asserted that the trial court “did not provide a proper 

answer” to his August 6, 2014 motion for findings of facts and conclusions of law, 

which he contends “may have * * * been because the entry was * * * not signed,” and 
requested that the trial court issue a “proper finding of fact and conclusion of law” 

and a “proper final appealable order.”

Civ.R. 58 was enacted “to preserve the appellate rights of individuals.” 

State v. Tucker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95556, 2011-Ohio-4092, ¶ 9. Civ.R. 58(B) 

provides:

When the court signs a judgment, the court shall endorse thereon a 

direction to the clerk to serve upon all parties not in default for failure 

to appear notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. 

Within three days of entering the judgment upon the journal, the clerk 

shall serve the parties in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B) and note 

the service in the appearance docket. Upon serving the notice and 

notation of the service in the appearance docket, the service is 

complete. The failure of the clerk to serve notice does not affect the 

validity of the judgment or the running of the time for appeal except as 

provided in App.R. 4(A).

App.R. 4(A)(1) states: “Subject to the provisions of App.R. 4(A)(3), a 

party who wishes to appeal from an order that is final upon its entry shall file the 

notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 30 days of that entry.” App.R. 4(A)(3) 

states: “In a civil case, if the clerk has not completed service of notice of the 

judgment within the three-day period prescribed in Civ.R. 58(B), the 30-day periods 

referenced in App.R. 4(A)(1) and 4(A)(2) begin to run on the date when the clerk 

actually completes service.”6 In other words, failure to perfect service as outlined in 

Civ.R. 58(B), tolls the 30-day period for filing an appeal. See, e.g., Tucker at ¶ 9; 

Howard v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-283, 2022-Ohio6 This court has held that the notice provision in Civ.R. 58(B) and the tolling 

provision in App.R. 4(A) apply to petitions for postconviction relief because they are civil 

in nature. State v. Dowell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110629, 2022-Ohio-615, ¶ 11, citing 

Tucker at ¶ 9, and State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94186, 2010-Ohio-3617, ¶ 7-8.
4071, ¶ 14 (“Failure to complete service of a final judgment under Civ.R. 58(B) tolls 

the thirty-day period for filing a notice of appeal.”); White v. Cent. Ohio Gaming 

Ventures, LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-780, 2019-Ohio-1078, ¶ 12 (“Because 

the clerk did not complete service as required by Civ.R. 58(B), [the appellant’s] time 

to appeal never expired under App.R. 4(A).”).

The record reflects that after requesting and receiving proposed 

findings of fact and conclusions of law from the state, the trial court filed written 

findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Bridges’ petition for postconviction 

relief on September 8, 2014. Bridges filed an appeal of that decision in Appeal No. 

101938, but his notice of appeal did not include the signed version of the trial court’s 

findings of facts and conclusions of law. Appeal No. 101938 was dismissed pursuant 

to R.C. 2505.01 and 2953.21. 

The state concedes that the trial court did not comply with Civ.R. 

58(B) with respect to its September 8, 2014 order. The trial court’s September 8, 

2014 order does not contain an endorsement from the trial court directing the clerk 

to serve the parties with the order. Likewise, there is no notation by the clerk in the 

docket reflecting the date on which any notice of the September 8, 2014 order was 

served on the parties. As a result, the time for filing the notice of appeal was tolled 

pursuant to App.R. 4(A) until the clerk served notice of the order on Bridges. See, 

e.g., Tucker at ¶ 9; Howard at ¶ 14.

Bridges, however, did not need to take advantage of the tolling 

occasioned by the trial court’s failure to comply with Civ.R. 58(B) in order to file a 
timely appeal. He filed his second notice of appeal from the denial of his July 23, 

2014 petition, Appeal No. 101942 — to which he attached a signed copy of the trial 

court’s September 8, 2014 order — on September 17, 2014, nine days after the order 

was filed by the trial court. Pursuant to App.R. 4(A), Appeal No. 101942 was timely. 

Accordingly, Bridges was not deprived of an opportunity to appeal the trial court’s 

denial of his 2014 petition for postconviction relief due to the trial court’s failure to 

comply with Civ.R. 58(B). Bridges is not entitled to multiple appeals of the same

judgment.

As explained above, Appeal No. 101942 was later dismissed, sua 

sponte, pursuant to App.R. 3(A), 10 and Loc.App.R. 10. Even if there were some 

error in this court’s dismissal of Appeal No. 101942, that was not a matter that could 

be addressed by the trial court nearly eight years later.7 The trial court did not err 

in denying Bridges’ November 2021 motion to correct postconviction judgment 

entry.

Because Bridges has failed to establish that he was entitled to any 

relief with respect to his fourth assignment of error, we overrule Bridges’ fourth 

assignment of error. 

7 To the extent Bridges asserts that this court erroneously dismissed other appeals 

he has taken, those rulings are not before the court in this appeal.
Vexatious Litigator Designation Pursuant to Loc.App.R. 23

As detailed above, Bridges has repeatedly raised the same issues in 

numerous postconviction motions or petitions filed in the trial court and in

numerous appeals to this court appealing the denial or dismissal of those 

postconviction motions or petitions.

Pursuant to Loc.App.R. 23(A), an appeal “shall be considered 

frivolous if it is not reasonably well-grounded in fact, or warranted by existing law, 

or by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 

law.” Loc.App.R. 23(B) further provides that a party who “habitually, persistently,

and without reasonable cause engages in frivolous conduct,” may be declared a 

vexatious litigator subject to filing restrictions. 

We find that Bridges’ repeated, continued attempts to litigate the 

same issues constitutes frivolous conduct pursuant to Loc.App.R. 23(A). Thus, we 

find Bridges to be a vexatious litigator under Loc.App.R. 23. See, e.g., State v. 

Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110318, 2021-Ohio-2526, ¶ 22-25. Accordingly, 

Bridges is prohibited from instituting any future legal proceedings in the Eighth 

District Court of Appeals of Ohio without first obtaining leave, and he is further 

prohibited from filing any proceedings in the Eighth District Court of Appeals of 

Ohio without the filing fee and security for costs required by Loc.App.R. 3(A). Any 

request to file an appeal or original action shall be submitted to the clerk of this court 

for the court’s review.

Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR