## I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 11-40582

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee

v. JOSE BENITEZ-OSORIO, Defendant - Appellant

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 7:11-CR-264-1

Before JONES, DENNIS, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * 

### Appellant Jose Benitez-Osorio challenges his sentence for p l eading guilty to unlawful presence i n the United States following deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1 326(a) & (b). Because he also p led guilty in 1998 to attempted kidnapping in violation of §§ 664 and 2 09(b) of the California Penal Code, 1 

### the base offense was enhanced by sixteen levels for a pri o r c o n v iction involving a crime of violence. U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

## F I L E D February 21, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5, the court has d eterm ined that this op inion s hould not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et f orth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4.

1 Ap p ellant contend s the d is trict court erred by cons id ering the charged cond uct of car jack ing, cf

. Shep a rd v
. U

ni ted S ta tes , 544 U .S. 13, 125 S. Ct. 1254 ( 2005) , but this unp res erved
error is harm les s. The d ef end ant ad m itted to car jack ing but w e cons id er here only his p lea. 

### Case: 11-40582 Document: 00512150870 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/21/2013

### No. 11-40582

The district court s entenced Benitez-Osorio to 46 months i m prisonment—a bottom of the guidelines sentence—and he timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM. DISCUSSION Interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines are r e v i e w e d d e n o v o
. U n ited States v. Boni l l a , 5 2 4 F.3d 6 47, 651 (5th C ir. 2008). When error is p roperly preserved, this court “review[s] the district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United S tates v. Neal , 578 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2009). 2 

### The Sentencing Guidelines impos e a s ixteen-level enhancement to an illegal reentry count whenever a defendant p reviously committed a “crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). A prior o ffense qualifies as s uch if it is either (1) listed as an enumerated offense—which includes kidnapping—or (2) falls under the residual clause implicating crimes p e r p e t r ated t hrough the “use, attempted use, or threatened use o f p h y s ical force.” I d. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). This case is resolved under prong one. Attempted kidnap p i n g u n d er the California Penal Code i s equivalent to the enumerated c rime of k idnapping in the Guidelines. To reach this conclusion,

we c ompare both C alifornia attempt (§ 664) and kidnapping (§ 209(b)) to the generic, contemporary definitions of those crimes. 3 

### The g eneric definition s of the enumerated crimes come f rom a “common-sense” meaning divined b y surveying

sources such a s the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), legal treatises, modern state
cases, and dictionaries. United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez , 477 F.3d 3 10, 316

2 Find in g n o e rror, w e need not d ecid e w hether the def end ant’s objection below w as s uf f icient to w arrant de nov o review of this is s ue.

3 “[ A] conviction f

or attem p ted ‘k id nap p ing’ may qualif y as the enum erated of f ens e of k id nap ping f

or p urp os es of s ection 2L1. 2( b) ( 1) ( A) .” U ni ted Sta t e s v
. G onz al ez - Ra m i rez , 477 F. 3d 310, 312 ( 5th Cir. 2007)

. 

### 2 Case: 11-40582 Document: 00512150870 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/21/2013

### No. 11-40582

(5th Cir. 2 00 7 )

. In this c ase, §§ 664 and 2 09(b) align with these generic definitions. F i r s t, California’s v ersion of attempt i s in conformity with the gener i c definition of attempt represented in the MPC’s “substantial step” formulation. Se e United States v. Saavedra-Velazquez , 578 F.3d 1103, 1107–09 (9th Cir. 2009) (suggesting California’s definition may be even more exacting). Citing People v. Decker , 157 P.3d 1017 ( Cal. 2007), Appellant argues for a theoretical difference between “substantial step” and the “slight acts” c onception of attempt found in California case law. That case, however, actually involves the same actus reus

as the M PC. In Decker , the California Supreme Court required a specific intent and a direct but ineffectual a ct done toward its commission. 4 

### Id. at 1 021. These attempt e lements dovetail with this court’s recent interpretation of “substantial step” in United States v. Sanchez , 667 F.3d 555, 5 63 (5th Cir. 2012): i ntent and

some act beyond just preparation, even a small one. California attempt is thus tantamount to generic attempt. Second, the California aggravated k idnapping statute 5 

### fits comfortably within this circuit’s understanding of the generic d e finition of k idnapping. U n i t e d S tates v
. Gonzalez-Ramirez , 477 F.3d 310, 319 (5th Cir. 2007), whic h analyzed Tennessee’s kidna p p i n g s t a t u t e , c o n t r o l s t h i s i n q u i r y . After the statute there w as held to not sweep more broadly than the gene r i c d e finition, its four

4 The s light but inef

f e c t ual act in D ecker w as s oliciting a p olice of f icer to carry out a m urd er. The court s aid it w as enough of an a ctus reus to qualif y und er other inchoate crim es s uch as cons p iracy had the d ef end ant been d ealing w ith an actual hired k iller.

5 C A L

. P E N

A L C ODE A N N

. § 209( b) ( Wes t 1998) : ( 1) Any p ers on w ho k id nap s or carries aw ay any ind ivid ual to com m it robbery, rap e, s p ous al rap e, oral cop ulation, s od om y , or rap e by ins trum ent

. . . s h a ll be p unis hed

. . . . ( 2 ) T h is s ubd ivis ion s hall only ap p ly if the movem ent of the victim is beyond that m erely incid ental to the com m is s ion of , and increas es the ris k of harm to t h e victim over and above that neces s arily p res ent in, the intend ed und erlying of f ens e. 

### 3 Case: 11-40582 Document: 00512150870 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/21/2013

### No. 11-40582

elements became the standard in this circuit f or comparing o ther states’ laws. 6 

### Generic kidnapping includes (1) knowing c onfinement; ( 2) substantial interference with t he victim’s liberty; (3) u se of force, t hreat, or fraud; and (4) a substantial risk of bodily i njur y . We r eject A ppellant’s argument that only elements one and t hree are present here. As interpreted, § 209(b) requires the offender to move the victim a substantial distance w ithout the v ictim’s consent. People v. Dominguez , 140 P.3d 866, 8 74 (Cal. 2006). T h i s s atisfies G onzalezRamirez ’ s second factor. The California statute’s requirement of increased “risk of harm to the victim ov e r a nd above that necessarily present in, the intended underlying offense” m ay also meet the fourth. Given the physical nature of the aggravating acts listed in the California statute, the risk of harm a ppears to be b o d i l y . 7 

### W h i le California’s simple kidnapping statute—§ 2 0 7 ( a )

— w a s p r e v i o u s l y held not to be a crime of violence, United States v. M o reno-Florean , 542 F.3d 445, 456 (5th C ir. 2008) , t hat statute lacked aggravating factors present here. Because the Gonzalez-Ramirez elements a r e substantially present in § 209(b), and b e c a u s e a n aggravating factor o f robbery o r sexual assault is e xplicitly

r e q u i r e d , the statute meets a ny “common-sense” definition of kidnap p i n g e a s i l y . 8

6 See, e. g. , U

ni ted Sta tes v
. C

erv a ntes- Bl a nco , 504 F. 3d 576, 586 ( 5th Cir. 2007) ( relying
on Gonz a l ez - Ra mi rez but noting that though none of the “elem ents are es s ential, the court d id
em p has ize that where the s p ecif ied p urp os es of the M PC k id nap p ing d ef inition are lack ing,
som e aggravating elem ents are neces s ary to bring a s tatute clos er to the M PC d ef inition”)

.
7 Cf

. U ni ted Sta tes v
. Ini

guez
- Ba rba , 485 F. 3d 790, 791–92 ( 5th C ir. 2007) ( p er curiam ) ( h o l d i n g t hat s atis f

action of only the f

irs t three G onz a l ez - Ra m i rez f actors w as s uf

f icient f or conclud ing that a N ew Y ork k id nap p ing s tatute w as equivalent to the enum erated of f ens e)

.
8 Ap p ellant argues that the M PC requires a f elony p urp os e and that s om e of the s exual of f ens es lis ted in the Calif ornia s tatute coul d be m is d em eanors
. There are s everal reas ons to reject this

. Firs t, the pres um ption on thes e s exual of fens e “w obblers ” is that they are f elonies

. Second , and m ore im p ortantly, the M PC— to the extent that it m us t control— requires a s p ecif ic (f elony) p urp os e or som e other a ggra va ti ng f

actor

. The und erlying of f ens e f or f elony k id nap ping need not be a f elony its elf in ord er to s atis f y a “com m on- s ens e” d ef inition.


### 4 Case: 11-40582 Document: 00512150870 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/21/2013

### No. 11-40582 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.

5 Case: 11-40582 Document: 00512150870 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/21/2013