* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-50729, consolidated with No. 11-50730

WILLIAM ETHRIDGE HILL,

Petitioner - Appellant

v.

RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

Respondent - Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC Nos. 1:07-CV-399 & 1:07-CV-400

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Petitioner-Appellant William Ethridge Hill seeks habeas relief from his

state court convictions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied

relief. We affirm.

In 1997, Hill was convicted by a Texas state-court jury for the murder of

William Allen and arson of the house in which Allen was living and found dead.

Before trial, Hill moved to suppress inculpatory statements he made during an

interrogation by police. Hill, Allen’s former roommate, had been taken by police

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 31, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
Nos. 11-50729 & 11-50730

2

to a station to be interviewed. Forty-five minutes after being placed in the

interview room, Hill orally was advised only of some of his Miranda rights. In

particular, Hill was not told that his statements could be used against him in

court. Following three hours of interrogation, Hill admitted being at Allen’s

house the night of the fire and Allen’s death and having had a physical

altercation with Allen that night. Hill’s statement was reduced to writing. The

written statement included a complete Miranda warning. The trial court found

the first Miranda warning defective, and thus excluded Hill’s statements

following that oral warning. Nevertheless, the court found that the second

Miranda warning, in the written statement, adequately apprised Hill of his

rights. Consequently, his written statement was admitted against him. 

On appeal in the Texas courts, Hill’s convictions were affirmed and his

requestfor discretionary review was denied. Hill’s habeas petitions (one for each

conviction, but identical) in state court were denied, In re Hill, No. 981472-A,

981493-A (331st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Feb. 27, 2007), and on appeal

were affirmed without written order or hearing. Hill then came to the federal

courts. The district court denied Hill’s habeas petitions, concluding, inter alia,

the state court’s denial of habeas was supported by a reasonable application of

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), in that the court reasonably could have

found that police did not employ a deliberate “two-step” strategy for obtaining

Hill’s confession. Hill v. Thaler, No. 1:07-cv-399-JRN, at *10-13 (W.D. Tex. July

18, 2011). This timely appeal followed. 

In reviewing requests for federal habeas relief, this court reviews the

district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo,

“applying the same standards to the state court’s decision as did the district

court.” Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation

marks omitted). A petition for habeas from a state conviction is governed by the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Nos. 11-50729 & 11-50730

3

AEDPA prohibits federal habeas relief unless the state adjudication of the claim

either (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). AEDPA

also requires the court to presume that the state court’s findings of fact are

correct “unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing

evidence.” Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 947 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1)). “The presumption of correctness not only applies to the explicit

findings of fact, but it also applies to those unarticulated findings which are

necessary to the state court’s conclusions of mixed law and fact.” Id. at 948 n.11.

A state court need not cite to, nor even be aware of, applicable Supreme

Court precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). Nor does this court

review the reasoning of the state court. Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th

Cir. 2002) (en banc). Rather, the court’s review is limited to the “ultimate legal

conclusion” of the state court. Id. The court is to determine “what arguments

or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and

then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that

those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision

of [the Supreme] Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 

Hill’s primary contention is that the state court’s denial of habeas relief

was inconsistent withSeibert. He argues that his written inculpatory statement

was the result of a deliberate “two-step” strategy, whereby the interrogating

officer surreptitiously provided Hill a deficient Miranda warning, obtained an

inculpatory oral statement, and then obtained the same inculpatory statement

after a second and complete warning. Hill’s contention is unavailing. Hill points

to evidence that perhaps could be reconciled with a deliberate strategy. But far
Nos. 11-50729 & 11-50730

4

more to the point, by clear and convincing evidence he has not overcome the

presumption of correctness owed the determinations necessary to the state

court’s denial of habeas. Moreover, the officer who gave the deficient warning

testified he did not have with him the standard Miranda warning card he

ordinarily used when giving the warning. It would not have been unreasonable

for the court to find the warning’s deficiency inadvertent. And, any argument

that the officer employed a deliberate strategy is undermined by the fact that a

partial reading of Miranda rights was given. United States v. Naranjo, 223 F.

App’x 167, 169 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding warning that defendant did not have to

speak to officers counted against deliberateness finding); United States v. Street,

472 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating “[b]ecause giving any warnings

undermines the effectiveness of the ‘question first’ tactic, the fact that some

warnings were given strongly evidences that the tactic was not being used”). 

Hill also contends that even if the deficiency in the first Miranda warning

was inadvertent, and consistent with Seibert, the second Miranda warning (on

the written statement) was insufficient under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,

311 (1985) (requiring “careful and thorough” administration of Miranda

warnings when post-warning confession was preceded by a voluntary but unwarned confession). Yet, as with his Seibert contention, Hill has not, by clear and

convincing evidence, rebutted the presumption of correctness owed the

determinations necessary to the state court’s denial of habeas, nor has he shown

that it would be an unreasonable application of Elstad to find that the second

warning given Hill was sufficient properly to advise Hill of his Miranda rights.

It is undisputed that: the written warnings included all warnings required by

Miranda; Hill acknowledged reading the warnings; he had the opportunity to

ask questions; and he agreed that he understood the warnings. Accordingly the

judgment of the district court is 
Nos. 11-50729 & 11-50730

1 Dennis, Circuit Judge, concurs in the judgment.

5

AFFIRMED.1