2024 IL App (4th) 231354-U 

NO. 4-23-1354 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

PATRICK R. JUSTI, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

McLean County 

No. 20CF99

Honorable 

William G. Workman, 

Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Doherty and DeArmond concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court remanded for the trial court to conduct an inquiry into 

defendant’s pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where,

during a Krankel hearing, the court failed to conduct a factual inquiry regarding a 

possible plea agreement defendant’s trial counsel allegedly failed to communicate 

to him. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Patrick R. Justi, was charged with aggravated driving under the 

influence (DUI) (fourth offense) (count I) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(C) (West 2020)), driving 

while his license was revoked or suspended (tenth offense) (count II) (id. § 6-303(d-4)), and five 

other traffic offenses. Defendant entered into a plea agreement where he agreed to plead guilty to 

counts I and II, and in exchange, the State would dismiss the five pending traffic offenses. The

trial court sentenced defendant to two extended-term sentences: 10 years for count I and 6 years 

for count II, to run concurrently. 

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

September 19, 2024 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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¶ 3 On appeal, defendant raises various arguments; however, we address only his 

argument that the trial court failed to adequately conduct a Krankel inquiry (see People v. 

Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)). As such, we provide only the facts necessary to understand the 

dispositive Krankel issue. We remand with directions. 

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On February 5, 2020, a grand jury indicted defendant with one count of 

aggravated DUI (fourth offense) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(C) (West 2020)) and one count of 

driving while his license was revoked or suspended (tenth offense) (id. § 6-303(d-4)). Defendant 

also received five traffic citations in the following McLean County case Nos.: 20-TR-1415, 20-

TR-1416, 20-TR-1417, 20-TR-1418, and 20-TR-1419. 

¶ 6 On August 24, 2022, defendant appeared for what was supposed to be a jury trial. 

However, the parties informed the trial court that defendant would be entering a partially 

negotiated plea. Per the terms of the agreement, defendant agreed to plead guilty to counts I and 

II, and in exchange, the State would dismiss defendant’s remaining traffic matters. Defendant 

appeared for sentencing and was sentenced to 10 years for count I and to 6 years for count II, to 

run concurrently. 

¶ 7 Afterwards, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing the trial 

court improperly admonished him when it told him that, for both counts I and II, he could 

receive probation or conditional discharge. Defendant also included claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

¶ 8 At the hearing on his motion, defendant testified he was not properly notified by 

counsel of the sentencing parameters in the case and was not aware he faced mandatory 

minimum prison time. Defendant stated that his prior attorney had indicated “some county jail 
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time,” but he was not aware of a mandatory minimum, and he believed probation was a viable 

sentencing option. Defendant also alleged he was not informed of a potential plea agreement by 

his attorney. The trial court questioned trial counsel, who stated that his notes indicated the DUI 

charge was “non-probationable” and that normally, his notes indicated what the conversation 

with the client was. However, counsel did not have an “independent memory of that.” Trial 

counsel did not address the claims of an uncommunicated plea agreement.

¶ 9 The trial court found that trial counsel was not ineffective and denied defendant’s 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

¶ 10 This appeal followed. 

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Defendant argues the trial court failed to adequately conduct a Krankel inquiry. 

Krankel, and the common-law procedure derived from it, establishes procedures for assessing 

pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claims after a conviction. This procedure “serves the 

narrow purpose of allowing the trial court to decide whether to appoint independent counsel to 

argue a defendant’s pro se posttrial ineffective assistance claims.” People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 

111666, ¶ 39. “The sole question in a Krankel inquiry is whether to appoint independent counsel 

to represent the defendant on his pro se ineffective assistance claims.” People v. Rhodes, 2019 IL 

App (4th) 160917, ¶ 12. To prompt a Krankel inquiry, “[a] pro se defendant need only bring his 

or her claim to the trial court’s attention.” People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 96. The 

defendant is not required to file a written motion in the trial court but may raise the issue orally 

or through a letter or note to the court. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11. 

¶ 13 “However, the trial court is not required to automatically appoint new counsel 

when a defendant raises such a claim.” Id. The court must conduct an inquiry to determine the 
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factual basis of the defendant’s claims. Id. “If the court determines the claim lacks merit or 

pertains only to matters of trial strategy, new counsel need not be appointed and the pro se

motion may be denied.” People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d 68, 75 (2010). “However, if the defendant’s 

allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed to argue the 

defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance.” Id. A claim lacks merit if it does not fall within the 

definition of ineffective assistance of counsel as provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). People v. Lawson, 2019 IL App (4th) 180452, ¶ 41. Whether the trial court properly 

conducted a Krankel inquiry is reviewed de novo. People v. Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 120945, 

¶ 39. 

¶ 14 In a letter to the trial court, and at the Krankel inquiry, defendant claimed his 

counsel failed to communicate a potential plea agreement to him. Specifically, at the hearing, 

defendant stated, “There was a plea agreement apparently that the State offered that I was never 

aware of until after it expired.” The court questioned trial counsel at the hearing; however, the 

court did not inquire about the alleged plea agreement. Counsel testified regarding certain claims 

but did not provide any testimony regarding a plea agreement that was allegedly not conveyed to 

defendant. 

¶ 15 It is well established that, in many cases, failing to communicate a possible plea 

agreement to a defendant can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, and courts have held as 

such. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (“[D]efense counsel has the duty to 

communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that 

may be favorable to the accused.”); People v. Trujillo, 2012 IL App (1st) 103212, ¶ 9 (“[A]n 

attorney’s failure to disclose a plea offer to the defendant may give rise to a constitutional claim 

***.”) (citing People v. Curry, 178 Ill. 2d 509, 517 (1997)). 
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¶ 16 As previously stated, a defendant need only bring his claims to the attention of the 

trial court, and then the court is required to conduct a factual inquiry. Here, defendant claimed 

his trial counsel did not communicate to him a plea agreement allegedly offered by the State. If 

true, defendant’s allegations could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, the court 

should have asked counsel, who was present at the Krankel inquiry, about this claim. However, 

the court did not inquire about this matter. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record which 

informs us why the court did not do so. 

¶ 17 In its brief, the State does not provide a rebuttal on this particular claim relating to 

the Krankel inquiry. The State simply restates defendant’s testimony and then goes on to address 

other issues raised at the hearing. The State asserts defendant did not provide the trial court with 

any specific facts related to “the allegation raised.” However, the State does not provide any 

legal basis or articulation of this point. Defendant alleged there was a plea agreement that he was 

not informed of. It follows that if he was not informed of it, he would not know the details of it. 

¶ 18 Therefore, we hold that the trial court failed to properly conduct the Krankel 

inquiry. 

¶ 19 Because we conclude a Krankel inquiry is necessary, we need not consider 

defendant’s other arguments. See People v. Rhodes, 2019 IL App (4th) 160917, ¶ 21 

(“Depending on the result of the *** Krankel inquiry, defendant’s other claims may become 

moot.”) (quoting People v. Bell, 2018 IL App (4th) 151016, ¶ 37). We express no view on the 

merits of defendant’s ineffective assistance claim or any of the other arguments he has made on 

appeal. Pursuant to People v. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d 189 (1990), and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), we retain jurisdiction to address the other issues raised by defendant in 

this appeal. If defendant is unsatisfied with the result of the proceedings on remand, he may 
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again appeal and raise any supplementary claims related to the remanded proceedings. See 

People v. Wilson, 2019 IL App (4th) 180214, ¶ 26. 

¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we remand for the trial court to conduct an inquiry into 

defendant’s pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 22 Remanded with directions.