10-2311-cv

Fait v. Regions Financing Trust, et al.

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3 _____________________

4

5 August Term, 2010

6

7 (Argued: May 9, 2011 Decided: August 23, 2011)

8

9 Docket No. 10-2311-cv

10 _____________________

11

12 ALFRED FAIT, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

13

14 Plaintiff,

15

16 HOWARD M. RENSIN, TRUSTEE FOR THE HOWARD M. RENSIN IRA,

17

18 Plaintiff-Appellant,

19 v.

20

21 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION, REGIONS FINANCING TRUST III, C. DOWD RITTER, SAMUEL

22 W. BARTHOLOMEW, JR., GEORGE W. BRYAN, DAVID J. COOPER, EARNEST W. DEAVENPORT, JR.,

23 DON DEFOSSET, JAMES R. MALONE, SUSAN W. MATLOCK, CHARLES D. MCCRARY, CLAUDE B.

24 NIELSEN, JORGE M. PEREZ, LEE J. STYSLINGER, III, SPENCE L. WILSON, JOHN R. ROBERTS, ERNST

25 & YOUNG LLP, UBS SECURITIES LLC, CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., MERRILL LYNCH,

26 PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED, WACHOVIA CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC, MORGAN

27 STANLEY & CO. INCORPORATED, MORGAN KEEGAN & COMPANY, INC.,

28

Defendants-Appellees.

* 29

30

31 Before: POOLER, B.D. PARKER, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.

32 ________________

33

34 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

35 New York (Kaplan, J.) granting defendants’ motion to dismiss complaint alleging violations of

36 sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933.

37

38 AFFIRMED.

39 __________________

40

*

 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to read as shown above.
1 ERIC ALAN ISAACSON, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd

2 LLP, San Diego, CA (Darren J. Robbins, Andrew J.

3 Brown, Amanda M. Frame, Robbins Geller Rudman

4 & Dowd LLP, San Diego, CA; Samuel H. Rudman,

5 David A Rosenfeld, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd

6 LLP, Melville, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiff7 Appellant.

8

9 DAVID B. TULCHIN (William J. Snipes, on the brief),

10 Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, New York, NY, for

11 Regions and Individual Defendants-Appellees.

12

13 KENNETH S. GELLER, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington,

14 DC (Mauricio A. España, Mayer Brown LLP, New

15 York, NY; Stanley J. Parzon, James C. Schroeder,

16 John J. Tharp, Jr., Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, IL, on

17 the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Ernst & Young

18 LLP.

19

20 SCOTT A. EDELMAN (Douglas W. Henkin, on the brief),

21 Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, New York,

22 NY, for Underwriter Defendants-Appellees.

23 ___________________________________________

24

25 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

26 This case requires us to consider whether certain statements concerning goodwill and

27 loan loss reserves in a registration statement of Defendant-Appellee Regions Financial

28 Corporation give rise to liability under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933. The

29 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.) concluded that

30 they do not and dismissed the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff-Appellant

31 Howard M. Rensin appeals. We conclude that the statements in question were opinions, which

32 were not alleged to have falsely represented the speakers’ beliefs at the time they were made. 

33 Therefore, we affirm.

34

2
1 BACKGROUND

2 The following facts, which we assume to be true, are drawn from the amended complaint

3 and documents incorporated by reference. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551

4 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 708 (2d Cir. 2011). In

5 November 2006, Regions Financial Corporation (“Regions”), a regional bank holding company

6 operating in the South, Midwest, and Texas, acquired another bank holding company, AmSouth

7 Bancorporation (“AmSouth”), in a stock transaction valued at approximately $10 billion. The

8 proxy statement issued in connection with the acquisition disclosed that following the

9 acquisition, Regions would record AmSouth’s assets and liabilities at fair value, and that any

10 excess of purchase price over net fair value would be recorded as goodwill. 

11 In February 2008, Regions filed its 2007 Form 10-K wherein it reported $11.5 billion in

12 goodwill, of which $6.6 billion was attributed to the AmSouth acquisition. The 10-K also

13 reported that Regions had increased its loan loss reserves from $142.4 million in the previous

14 year to $555 million. In explaining this increase, the 10-K stated: 

15 Two primary factors led to the increase. Most notably, 2006 included just two

16 months of provision for loan losses added to the portfolio as a result of the November

17 2006 merger with AmSouth, while the provision recorded in 2007 reflected the

18 results of the newly merged Regions for the full year. Additionally, the provision

19 rose due to an increase in management’s estimate of inherent losses in its residential

20 homebuilder portfolio, as well as generally weaker conditions in the broader

21 economy. 

22 J.A. 1026 (Am. Compl. ¶ 10). 

23 In April 2008 Regions Financing Trust III (the “Trust”), a Delaware statutory trust and

24 wholly owned subsidiary of Regions, issued 13.8 million shares of Trust Preferred

25 Securities—“hybrid” securities with characteristics of equity and debt—(the “Securities”) in a

3
1 registered public offering (the “2008 Offering”). The Registration Statement and Prospectus for

2 the 2008 Offering (the “Offering Documents”) incorporated by reference Regions’ 2007 Form

3 10-K and certain additional SEC filings.

4 In SEC filings reporting its financial results for the first three quarters of the 2008 fiscal

5 year, Regions continued to report goodwill of $11.5 billion and moderate increases to its

6 allowance for credit losses. However, in its fourth quarter results released in January 2009,

7 Regions reported a $5.6 billion net loss, “largely driven by a $6 billion non-cash charge for

8 impairment of goodwill,” and doubled its loan loss provision to $1.15 billion as compared to a

9 year earlier. In the months following these disclosures, the price of the Securities and Regions’

10 stock fell, and credit rating agencies downgraded the company’s debt.

11 Following the 2006 AmSouth merger, serious problems emerged in the housing and

12 residential mortgage markets. Beginning in late 2006, several large mortgage lenders,

13 particularly those making predominantly subprime loans, either filed for bankruptcy protection

14 or significantly scaled back their operations. By 2008, the mortgage market problems had spread

15 to larger, more longstanding banks and lenders. This period was also characterized by rising

16 rates of delinquency and foreclosure on home mortgage loans, and slowed housing sales.

17 Following the decline in Regions’ stock price, Alfred Fait, who purportedly acquired

18 Trust Preferred Securities, filed a putative class-action complaint against Regions, the Trust, and

19 other defendants. Pursuant to a district court order, Rensin was later appointed Lead Plaintiff

20 and filed an amended complaint on November 2, 2009. The amended complaint also named as

21 defendants individual members of the board of directors of Regions who signed the Registration

22 Statement and Regions’ 2007 Form 10-K. Additional defendants included Ernst & Young

4
1 (“E&Y”), which served as Regions’ independent public accountant and certified financial

2 statements in Regions’ 2007 Form 10-K, as well as the underwriters of the 2008 Offering.

3 The complaint alleges, in essence, that despite adverse trends in the mortgage and

4 housing markets, particularly in areas where AmSouth’s mortgage loans were concentrated,

Regions failed to write down “goodwill” and to sufficiently increase “loan loss reserves.”1 5 As a

6 consequence of these failures, the complaint contends, the Offering Documents (either explicitly

7 or by reference to other filings) contained “negligently false and misleading” statements

8 concerning goodwill and loan loss reserves. In particular, the complaint asserts that Regions

9 overstated goodwill and falsely stated that it was not impaired, and “vastly underestimated”

10 Regions’ loan loss reserves and failed to disclose that they were inadequate.

11 Relying on these allegations, the complaint further contends that the Offering Documents

12 incorporated false and misleading certifications by management that Regions’ financial

13 statements complied with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) and were prepared in accordance

14 with GAAP. It also alleges that E&Y falsely certified that Regions’ financial results were

15 presented in accordance with GAAP, that E&Y’s audits complied with generally accepted

16 accounting standards (“GAAS”), and that Regions maintained effective internal controls. The

17 complaint alleges that these misleading statements and omissions violated sections 11(a),

1

 As detailed further infra, according to Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”)

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (“SFAS”) No. 141 ¶ 34, following an acquisition,

goodwill is measured as any excess of the purchase price over the value of the assets acquired

and liabilities assumed. Under SFAS No. 142, goodwill is an intangible asset that is recorded

similarly to any other asset, and any subsequent decline in its value is recorded as a loss. Loan

loss reserves refer to the to the amount set aside to cover expected defaults or losses on loans. 

Under generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), see Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co.,

228 F.3d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 2000) (defining GAAP), depository institutions and their holding

companies are required to establish and maintain adequate allowances for loan losses.

5
1 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act” or “1933 Act”). See 15 U.S.C.

2 §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2), 77o.

3 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the challenged statements

4 regarding goodwill and the adequacy of loan loss reserves were matters of opinion, which were

5 not actionable because the complaint failed to allege that those opinions were not truly held at the

6 time they were made. Concluding that the challenged statements were ones of judgment and

7 opinion, rather than fact, Judge Kaplan granted defendants’ motions and dismissed the complaint. 

8 Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). With respect to

9 goodwill, Judge Kaplan observed that “the goodwill reflected in [Regions’] 2007 10-K was the

10 excess of the acquisition price, an objective fact, over the fair value of AmSouth’s assets at the

11 time of the acquisition. . . . [, which] was not a matter of objective fact.” Id. at 122. Instead,“the

12 goodwill stated on [Regions’] balance sheet reflected judgments as to values that were not

13 objectively determinable.” Id. at 123. Thus, “[t]he truth or falsity of that statement . . . was a

14 matter of opinion.” Id. Similarly, Judge Kaplan observed that loan loss reserves “reflect

15 management’s opinion as to the likelihood of future loan losses and their magnitude.” Id. at 124. 

16 Thus, “[w]hether Regions had adequate reserves for its predicted loan losses is not a matter of

17 objective fact,” but instead, “[t]he reserves . . . were statements of opinion by defendants as to the

18 portion of the stated value of Regions’ loans that would prove to be uncollectable.” Id. For these

19 reasons, Judge Kaplan held that the statements in question were not actionable because the

20 complaint failed to allege that defendants did not honestly hold those opinions at the time they

21 were expressed. This appeal followed.

22

6
1 DISCUSSION

2 We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

3 Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing

4 all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493

5 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

6 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

7 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

8 (2007)). In other words, the complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

9 relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

10 Claims under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act have “roughly parallel

11 elements.” In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010). Section

12 11 imposes liability on issuers and other signatories of a registration statement that “contained an

13 untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or

14 necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). Section 12(a)(2)

15 imposes liability under similar circumstances with respect to, inter alia, prospectuses. Id. §

16 77l(a)(2); see also Iowa Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. MF Global, Ltd., 620 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2010)

17 (“To prevail on a § 11 or § 12(a)(2) claim, a plaintiff must show that the relevant communication

18 either misstated or omitted a material fact.”). While “[i]ssuers are subject to ‘virtually absolute’

19 liability under section 11, . . . the remaining potential defendants under sections 11 and 12(a)(2)

20 may be held liable for mere negligence.” In re Morgan Stanley, 592 F.3d at 359 (quoting Herman

21 & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983)). As the parties recognize, in contrast to

22 claims brought pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”

7
1 or “1934 Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., claims under sections 11 and 12 do not require allegations

of scienter, reliance, or loss causation.2 2

3 Although sections 11 and 12 refer to misrepresentations and omissions of material fact,

4 matters of belief and opinion are not beyond the purview of these provisions. However, when a

5 plaintiff asserts a claim under section 11 or 12 based upon a belief or opinion alleged to have been

6 communicated by a defendant, liability lies only to the extent that the statement was both

7 objectively false and disbelieved by the defendant at the time it was expressed. See Virginia

8 Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095-96 (1991).

9 I. Goodwill

10 Under SFAS No. 141, goodwill is “an asset representing the future economic benefits

11 arising from other assets acquired in a business combination that are not individually identified and

12 separately recognized.” J.A. 940 (Business Combinations, SFAS No. 141 ¶ 3j (Fin. Accounting

13 Standards Bd. 2007)). When an acquisition occurs, GAAP requires that any excess of the purchase

14 price over the fair value of the assets acquired and the liabilities assumed be reported as goodwill or

15 “excess purchase price.” GAAP also requires that goodwill be tested for impairment annually, or

16 “more frequently if events or changes in circumstances indicate that the asset might be impaired.” 

2

 Section 15 of the 1933 Act creates liability for an individual or entity that “controls any

person liable” under section 11 or 12. 15 U.S.C. § 77o; accord In re Morgan Stanley, 592 F.3d

at 358. Thus, to succeed on a claim under section 15, a plaintiff must demonstrate primary

liability under section 11 or 12. See In re Morgan Stanley, 592 F.3d at 358. Since we conclude

that the district court properly dismissed the section 11 and 12 claims, we also find no error in

the court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ section 15 claims. See id. at 358, 366; ECA & Local 134

IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2009).

8
1 J.A. 538 (Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, SFAS No. 142 ¶ 17 (Fin. Accounting Standards

2 Bd. 2001)).

3 After the AmSouth acquisition, Regions recorded goodwill of $6.2 billion in connection

4 with the acquisition. Regions then tested for impairment at the end of 2007 and apparently found

5 none. In fact, in its 2007 Form 10-K, Regions increased the amount of goodwill attributed to the

6 AmSouth acquisition to approximately $6.6 billion.

7 Rensin contends that “[d]espite clear indications that impairment testing was necessary,

8 Regions failed to conduct impairment tests in the first three quarters of [fiscal year] 2007 and failed

9 to properly record impairment charges during th[at] period.” J.A. 1085 (Am. Compl. ¶ 155). 

10 Moreover, he alleges, when Regions did conduct impairment testing at the end of 2007, it should

11 have concluded that goodwill was impaired due to “the deterioration of the banking sector” by that

12 time. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 158). Thus, he asserts, “the incorporation of the Company’s 2007 Form

13 10-K in the 2008 Offering led to a materially false and misleading Registration Statement.” Id.

14 As Judge Kaplan correctly recognized, plaintiff’s allegations regarding goodwill do not

15 involve misstatements or omissions of material fact, but rather a misstatement regarding Regions’

16 opinion. Estimates of goodwill depend on management’s determination of the “fair value” of the

17 assets acquired and liabilities assumed, which are not matters of objective fact. See, e.g., Henry v.

18 Champlain Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 610, 619 (2d Cir. 2006) (“There is no universally infallible index

19 of fair market value. There may be a range of prices with reasonable claims to being fair market

20 value.” (quoting Rhodes v. Amoco Oil Co., 143 F.3d 1369, 1372 (10th Cir. 1998))). Plaintiff does

21 not point to any objective standard such as market price that he claims Regions should have but

9
failed to use in determining the value of AmSouth’s assets.3 1 See J.A. 539 (SFAS No. 142 ¶ 23)

2 (“Quoted market prices in active markets are the best evidence of fair value and shall be used as the

3 basis for the measurement, if available.”). Absent such a standard, an estimate of the fair value of

4 those assets will vary depending on the particular methodology and assumptions used. See J.A. 540

5 (SFAS No. 142 ¶ 24) (“If quoted market prices are not available, the estimate of fair value shall be

6 based on the best information available, including prices for similar assets and liabilities and the

7 results of using other valuation techniques.”). In other words, the statements regarding goodwill at

8 issue here are subjective ones rather than “objective factual matters.” See I. Meyer Pincus &

9 Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 936 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The federal securities

10 laws require . . . the disclosure of material objective factual matters.” (quoting Data Probe

11 Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1983))). The question, then, is when, if

12 at all, such statements give rise to liability under sections 11 or 12.

13 Virginia Bankshares is instructive on this point. In that case minority shareholders sued

14 bank directors under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 following a “freeze-out”

merger.4 15 The shareholders alleged that in soliciting proxies, the directors falsely stated that

3

 The complaint also does not allege that the statements about goodwill were stated as

guarantees. Cf. In re IBM Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Statements

regarding projections of future performance may be actionable under Section 10(b) or Rule

10b-5 if they are worded as guarantees . . . .”). To the contrary, Regions’ 2007 10-K states:

“Adverse changes in the economic environment, declining operations of the business unit, or

other factors could result in a decline in implied fair value of excess purchase price.” J.A. 366.

4

 Although Virginia Bankshares involved claims under section 14(a), the Court addressed

whether statements of opinions or beliefs could be considered factual statements under the

securities laws, and we have applied the Court’s approach in Virginia Bankshares to claims

under the 1933 Act. See, e.g., In re IBM, 163 F.3d at 106-11; see also In re Donald J. Trump

Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 372 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Although the Court in

Virginia Bankshares addressed § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, which concerns proxy statements, it is

10
1 shareholders were offered a “high” value and a “fair” price for their stock. 501 U.S. at 1088. The

2 shareholders further contended that at the time they made those statements, the directors did not

3 believe them but made them for ulterior reasons. Consequently, the Court was called on to consider

4 “whether statements of reasons, opinions, or beliefs are statements with respect to material facts so

5 as to fall within the strictures of [Rule 14a-9].” Id. at 1091 (quotation marks and alterations

6 omitted). The Court recognized that the statements of reasons and belief at issue, although not

7 statements of facts in and of themselves, “are factual in two senses: as statements that the directors

8 do act for the reasons given or hold the belief stated and as statements about the subject matter of

9 the reason or belief expressed.” Id. at 1092.

10 In light of these observations, the Court held that such statements may be actionable if they

11 misstate the opinions or belief held, or, in the case of statements of reasons, the actual motivation

12 for the speaker’s actions, and are false or misleading with respect to the underlying subject matter

13 they address. Id. at 1091-96; see also id. at 1108-09 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in

14 the judgment) (“As I understand the Court’s opinion, the statement ‘In the opinion of the Directors,

15 this is a high value for the shares’ would produce liability if in fact it was not a high value and the

16 directors knew that. It would not produce liability if in fact it was not a high value but the directors

17 honestly believed otherwise.”); Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009)

18 (“[O]pinions . . . can give rise to a claim under section 11 only if the complaint alleges . . . that the

19 statements were both objectively and subjectively false or misleading.” (citing Virginia

20 Bankshares)); Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1994) (“A statement

21 of reasons, opinion or belief . . . can be actionable under the securities laws if the speaker knows the

instructive . . . in addressing . . . claims brought under §§ 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act . . . .”).

11
1 statement to be false.” (citing Virginia Bankshares)). This approach makes logical sense. 

2 Requiring plaintiffs to allege a speaker’s disbelief in, and the falsity of, the opinions or beliefs

3 expressed ensures that their allegations concern the factual components of those statements. 

4 Cases from our Circuit apply these principles as well. For example, in Friedman v.

5 Mohasco Corporation, which we decided prior to Virginia Bankshares, we held that a company’s

6 representation that securities it issued in connection with a merger would attain a certain market

7 value, which they did not ultimately attain, was not actionable under the 1933 or 1934 Act because

8 the company’s projections were stated as opinions rather than guarantees. 929 F.2d 77, 78-79 (2d

9 Cir. 1991). In In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, we determined that “expressions of

10 opinion and . . . projections” in a company’s statements about its future prospects were not

11 actionable because “the complaint contain[ed] no allegations to support the inference that the

12 defendants either did not have the[] favorable opinions on future prospects when they made the

13 statements or that the favorable opinions were without a basis in fact.” 9 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir.

14 1993). Subsequently, in In re IBM Securities Litigation, we held that a company’s alleged

15 statements that were “expressions of optimism” and “projections of future performance” were not

16 actionable under the 1933 or 1934 Acts. 163 F.3d at 107, 110-11.

17 Applying these principles here, we conclude that Rensin has not adequately alleged

18 actionable misstatements or omissions regarding goodwill. Plaintiff relies mainly on allegations

19 about adverse market conditions to support the contention that defendants should have reached

20 different conclusions about the amount of and the need to test for goodwill. The complaint does

21 not, however, plausibly allege that defendants did not believe the statements regarding goodwill at

12
the time they made them.5 1 Under Virginia Bankshares and our related cases, such an omission is

2 fatal to plaintiff’s section 11 and 12 claims.

3 II. Loan Losses Reserves

4 Rensin alleges that GAAP required Regions to maintain adequate reserves for: (1) estimated

5 credit losses for loans specifically identified as being impaired; (2) estimated credit losses for loans

6 or groups of loans with specific characteristics that indicate probable losses; and (3) estimated

7 credit losses inherent in the remainder of the portfolio based on current economic events and

8 circumstances. According to SFAS No. 114, “[a] loan is impaired when, based on current

9 information and events, it is probable that a creditor will be unable to collect all amounts due

10 according to the contractual terms of the loan agreement.” J.A. 1089 (Am. Compl. ¶ 169 (quoting

11 Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan, SFAS No. 114 ¶ 8 (Fin. Accounting Standards

12 Bd. 1993))).

13 The complaint acknowledges that Regions increased its allowance for credit losses during

14 the relevant period and reported that these increases were attributable in part to adverse trends in

15 the mortgage and housing markets. Nonetheless, plaintiff contends that “Regions’ loan loss

16 reserves from the first quarter of 2007 through the first three quarters of 2008 were materially

17 inadequate and did not reflect the high risk of loss inherent in its mortgage loan portfolio.” J.A.

18 1088 (Am. Compl. ¶ 168).

5

 Contrary to plaintiff’s concern, the standard applied here does not amount to a

requirement of scienter. We do not view a requirement that a plaintiff plausibly allege that

defendant misstated his truly held belief and an allegation that defendant did so with fraudulent

intent as one and the same. 

13
1 These allegations suffer from the same deficiencies as those regarding goodwill. As Judge

2 Kaplan recognized, determining the adequacy of loan loss reserves is not a matter of objective fact. 

3 Instead, loan loss reserves reflect management’s opinion or judgment about what, if any, portion of

4 amounts due on the loans ultimately might not be collectible. See J.A. 1025-26 (Am. Compl. ¶ 10

5 (“The provision for loan losses is used to maintain the allowance for loan losses at a level that, in

6 management’s judgment, is adequate to cover losses inherent in the loan portfolio as of the balance

7 sheet date.” (emphasis added) (quoting Regions 2007 Form 10-K))). Such a determination is

8 inherently subjective, and like goodwill, estimates will vary depending on a variety of predictable

9 and unpredictable circumstances. See United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1164 (7th Cir. 1996)

10 (“[T]he estimation of probable losses in a large loan portfolio . . . is more an art than a

11 science, and . . . any two analyses of probable losses in the same portfolio are unlikely to

12 exactly correspond . . . .”); Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 1992) (“There

13 appears to be no single method of evaluating and setting loan loss reserves, perhaps because no

14 method has proven foolproof. Some banks set their loan loss reserves by comparing the size of the

15 reserves to that of the loan portfolio. Others also analyze the quality of their loans in varying

16 degrees of detail and according to a range of different criteria and classifications.” (citations

17 omitted)). 

14
Plaintiff does not point to an objective standard for setting loan loss reserves.6 1 Thus, in

2 order for the alleged statements regarding the adequacy of loan loss reserves to give rise to liability

3 under sections 11 and 12, plaintiff must allege that defendant’s opinions were both false and not

4 honestly believed when they were made. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1095. Because the

5 complaint does not plausibly allege subjective falsity, it fails to state a claim.

6 III. SOX, GAAP, and GAAS Allegations

7 Plaintiff’s remaining allegations related to SOX, GAAP, and GAAS are essentially

8 derivative of his primary allegations regarding goodwill and loan loss reserves. In particular,

9 relying on the allegations that defendants failed to account for adverse market trends in estimating

10 and determining whether to test for impairment of goodwill and in setting loan loss reserves,

11 Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ statements regarding these matters, and by extension, their

12 statements that Regions’ financial reporting was performed in accordance with applicable

13 accounting standards and regulations, were false. However, consistent with our conclusion that the

14 complaint does not adequately allege that defendants misstated or omitted material facts regarding

15 goodwill or loan loss reserves, these allegations also fail to state a claim.

16 CONCLUSION

17 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

6

 Nor does he allege that Regions’ statements regarding its loan reserves were framed as

guarantees. See note 2 supra. In fact, the 2007 10-K stated: “We believe that our allowance for

credit losses is adequate. However, if our assumptions or judgments are wrong, our allowance

for credit losses may not be sufficient to cover our actual credit losses. We may have to increase

our allowance in the future . . . to adjust for changing conditions and assumptions, or as a result

of any deterioration in the quality of our loan portfolio.” J.A. 351.

15