NO. 1-95-2631WC                    IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS                              FIRST DISTRICT                      Industrial Commission DivisionGERALDINE STEPHENS,                )    Appeal from          Appellant,               )    Circuit Court of          v.                       )    Cook CountyTHE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.   )    No. 95L50028(Cook County, Illinois,            )a local government, Appellee).     )    Honorable                                   )    Alexander P. White,                                   )    Judge Presiding._________________________________________________________________          PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of thecourt:          Claimant Geraldine Stephens appeals from an order of thecircuit court of Cook County confirming a decision of the IllinoisIndustrial Commission (Commission) awarding attorney fees pursuantto section 16 of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS305/16 (West 1994)) at a rate of 20% of awarded compensation.  Thismatter was considered by the Commission on remand from this courtwhich directed the Commission to take evidence in its determinationto award section 16 attorney fees.  Stephens v. Industrial Comm'n,246 Ill. App. 3d 1113 (1993) (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23).  Respondent employer is the County of Cook.  TheCommission has filed a responsive brief in this appeal.          The issues raised on appeal are whether (1) Commissionrule 7080.10(a)(1) (50 Ill. Adm. Code �7080.10(a)(1) (1985)) is avalid rule (820 ILCS 305/16a (West 1994)); (2) as a matter of law,the award of attorney fees was defective because the Commissionmisinterpreted sections 16 and 16a of the Act; (3) the Commissionfinding that the expending of 120 hours of post-Commissionlitigation was not extraordinary service was against the manifestweight of the evidence; and (4) the Commission improperly refusedto reimburse claimant for attorney fees paid to recover benefitsand medical expenses withheld by respondent in violation ofsections 19(k) and 16 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(k) (West 1994)). We affirm.          Claimant, a correctional officer, was injured on February3, 1987, when she fell while chasing an inmate.  On July 8, 1988,the arbitrator awarded claimant benefits and penalties undersection 19(l) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par.138.19(l)) for respondent's delay in paying temporary totaldisability (TTD).  Both parties sought review before the Commis-sion, but respondent's petition for review was dismissed onrespondent's motion which indicated claimant had been paid.  TheCommission denied claimant's request for additional attorney feesand penalties because claimant failed to prove respondent's delayin paying TTD after the arbitrator's decision was unreasonable andwithout good cause.  The circuit court found the Commission hadimproperly imposed upon claimant the burden of proving that therespondent's filing of a petition for review was vexatious andunreasonable under the circumstances.  The cause was remanded forthe Commission to consider section 19(l) penalties, additionalcompensation pursuant to section 19(k) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch.48, par. 138.19(k)), and section 16 attorney fees (Ill. Rev. Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 138.16).            On remand from the circuit court, the Commission deniedthe respondent's request for a de novo hearing and found thatrespondent had failed to present any evidence that the 65-day delayin paying the award was reasonable; that the payment came afterrepeated delays in paying TTD; and the explicit mandate of the Actto provide prompt, sure, and definite compensation was contravened. The Commission awarded $5,322.78 in additional compensationpursuant to section 19(k) of the Act, $1,064.76 (20% of the 19(k)penalty) in attorney fees pursuant to section 16 of the Act, and$650 in penalties pursuant to section 19(l) of the Act.  Thecircuit court confirmed the decision.  This court reversed andremanded solely on the issue of whether the allowance of attorneyfees pursuant to section 16 of the Act was adequate.  This courtfound that the Commission did not have any evidence as to timeexpended and value of services provided by claimant's attorney andthe award of 20% of the amount of section 19(k) penalty wasarbitrary and against the manifest weight of the evidence.  Thecause was remanded to the Commission for an evidentiary hearing todetermine the amount of attorney fees, if any, to be awardedclaimant pursuant to section 16 of the Act.  The order of thiscourt did not direct the Commission to award or deny attorney fees,but required the Commission to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Stephens, 246 Ill. App. 3d 1113 (slip order at 5-6) (1993) (unpub-lished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).          Following the most recent remand, claimant's attorney,Ivan M. Rittenberg, sought a total of $48,400 in attorney fees forthe time expended following the Commission's initial decision. Claimant's attorney used a $200-per-hour rate and a multiplier oftwo because, in his opinion, the work performed was significant,important, and contingent on a vindication of the Act.  Claimanthas apparently dropped the multiplier on appeal.            On the issue of attorney fees, the Commission's decisionstated:               "Based on the facts of this case it is          clear that Petitioner's attorney diligently          pursued the issue of penalties due the Peti-          tioner for the unreasonable 65[-]day delay          caused by the Respondent in payment of [TTD]          benefits.  It is equally clear that it was          only through the efforts of Petitioner's          attorney in appealing this matter through the          Commission and into the circuit court that          justly deserved �19(k) and (l) penalties were          obtained for the benefit of the Petitioner.           However, this case represents no truly unique          legal questions and constitutes nothing more          than a Workers' Compensation case where the          Petitioner had to earnestly pursue justifiable          penalties.  The purpose of �19(k) penalties is          to protect the injured worker by penalizing          the employer for vexatious and unreasonable          conduct.  The purpose of awarding attorneys'          fees as a penalty under �16 is to relieve the          Petitioner of the responsibility for paying          the attorney's fees he would otherwise be          obligated to pay.  Allowing the increase of          fees based on a quantum meruit theory is not          warranted.  There is nothing in the experience          of the Commission that leads to the belief          that attorneys are unwilling to represent          injured workers if they are paid fees at the          rate established by the Act.  Fees based on          quantum meruit constitute an unreasonable cost          burden on the system.  In a vexatious case          involving �16, fees may be awarded on all          compensation.  A fee should not exceed what          the Petitioner would have had to pay or 20% of          the total award due."          In confirming the Commission's decision, the circuitcourt quoted sections 16 and 16a(A) and (B) of the Act (820 ILCS305/16a(A), (B) (West 1994)), section 7080.10(a)(1) of theCommission's rules, Spinak, Levinson & Associates v. IndustrialComm'n, 209 Ill. App. 3d 120, 125, 568 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1990), andMuller v. Jones, 243 Ill. App. 3d 711, 713, 613 N.E.2d 271, 272-73(1993).  The circuit court reasoned that to require the respondentto pay the attorney fees requested by claimant would pay Rittenbergfar in excess of the value of his services to claimant.  Accordingto the circuit court, the fact that time and effort was expendedbeyond that contemplated by claimant's attorney was a circumstancewhich the attorney must bear.  The circuit court concluded, "Todecide otherwise would encourage protracted litigation in thepursuit of penalties, with minimal benefit accruing to theclaimant."  Noting that in Muller, it was stated that the legisla-ture contemplated that the fee schedule under the Act includedcompensation for prosecuting a judicial review, the circuit courtfound the Commission's finding of the reasonableness of the feesawarded and the implicit finding of no extraordinary service werenot against the manifest weight of the evidence.          We first address whether Commission rule 7080.10(a)(1) isa valid rule.  Claimant admits that this issue was raised for thefirst time in this case in this appeal because the circuit courtreferred to the rule.  Although respondent and the Commission donot argue that the issue is waived, an issue not raised before theCommission is waived.  Taylor Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 301Ill. 381, 387-88, 134 N.E. 169, 171 (1922).          In any event, it is unnecessary to consider the validityof this rule in this case.  The rule in question states, inrelevant part:          "Whether a dispute has arisen between a Peti-          tioner and his attorney or former attorney          concerning the amount of payment of fees for          services rendered or reimbursement of costs          incurred in the prosecution of a claim, or a          claim is made for fees in excess of the fees          provided in Section 16(a) [sic] of the          Workers' Compensation Act for extraordinary          services, either the Petitioner or his attor-          ney or former attorney may file with the          Commission a Petition to Fix Fees which shall          set forth the facts surrounding the dispute          and the relief requested."  50 Ill. Adm. Code          �7080.10(a)(1), at 5749 (1985).Although claimant argues that the term "for extraordinary services"is a substantive limitation on sections 16 and 16a of the Act whichthe Commission is without authority to create, it is obvious thatthe rule pertains to disputes over the amount of attorney feeswhich arise between a claimant and the claimant's attorneys, andnot in the situation that is presented in the case at bar.            The next issue is whether, as a matter of law, the awardof attorney fees was defective because the Commission misinterpret-ed sections 16 and 16a of the Act.  Section 16 of the Act providesthat the Commission has the power to determine the reasonablenessand fix the amount of attorney fees.  Then this section adds in aseparate paragraph:               "Whenever the Commission shall find that          the employer, his or her agent, service compa-          ny or insurance carrier has been guilty of          delay or unfairness towards an employee in the          adjustment, settlement or payment of benefits          due such employee within the purview of the          provisions of paragraph (c) of Section 4 of          this Act; or has been guilty of unreasonable          or vexatious delay, intentional under-payment          of compensation benefits, or has engaged in          frivolous defenses which do not present a real          controversy, within the purview of the provi-          sions of paragraph (k) of Section 19 of this          Act, the Commission may assess all or any part          of the attorney's fees and costs against such          employer and his or her insurance carrier."           (Emphasis added.)  820 ILCS 305/16 (West          1994).Section 16a states in relevant part:               "(A) In the establishment or approval of          attorney's fees in relation to claims brought          under this Act, the Commission shall be guided          by the provisions of this Section and by the          legislative intent, hereby declared, to en-          courage settlement and prompt administrative          handling of such claims and thereby reduce          expenses to claimants for compensation under          this Act.               (B) With respect to any and all proceed-          ings in connection with any initial or origi-          nal claim under this Act, no claim of any          attorney for services rendered in connection          with the securing of compensation for an          employee or his dependents, whether secured by          agreement, order, award or a judgment in any          court shall exceed 20% of the amount of com-          pensation recovered and paid, unless further          fees shall be allowed to the attorney upon a          hearing by the Commission fixing fees, and          subject to the other provisions of this Sec-          tion."  820 ILCS 305/16a(A), (B) (West 1994).          In section 16a, the legislature set the amount ofattorney fees that may be obtained at 20% of an award, unless theCommission allows further fees.  If a section 19(k) additionalaward is found by the Commission, the Commission may assessattorney fees of the claimant against the respondent under section16 of the Act.  It is clear from the language of these sections ofthe Act that further fees would not be awarded simply because aclaimant's attorney asked for them.  The Commission was left todetermine when such fees would be appropriate.  Section 16a(B)evidences a legislative intent that, generally, 20% of the award isthe maximum fee.  Moreover, section 16a(I) states the attorney feesare payable from the award.  820 ILCS 305/16a(I) (West 1994).  Inthe context of section 16a, which applies primarily to disputesbetween claimants and claimants' attorneys, the legislature did notenvision a claim for attorney fees in excess of an award, as isrequested here.            Here, claimant's attorney wants to use the provision insection 16 allowing the Commission the prerogative to order therespondent to pay claimant's attorney fees as a method of obtaininga "punitive" award in the form of attorney fees by allowing theCommission to order the respondent to pay more attorney fees thanthose for which the claimant would be liable.  The plain languageof the sections of the Act relied on by claimant do not supportreading such a provision into the Act.  The purpose of thesesections of the Act is to provide relief to the claimant, not toprovide a method whereby claimant's attorneys can obtain increasedfees.          Although we have determined that section 16a does notdirectly pertain to the situation presented in this case, theCommission could look to section 16a in determining the reasonable-ness of attorney fees to be awarded under section 16.  In section16a, the legislature has expressed a public policy to generallylimit attorney fees in workers' compensation cases to 20% of theaward.          The above reasoning necessarily leads to the third issue,whether the Commission finding as to the amount of attorney feeswhich respondent was required to pay was against the manifestweight of the evidence.  There are burdens and benefits forattorneys representing claimants in workers' compensation cases. In any case, an attorney may be required to pursue the matter tothe highest court for resolution.  However, the Act does notprovide that an attorney is to be paid for judicial review separateand apart from the Act's general provisions relating to attorneyfees.  Muller, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 713, 613 N.E.2d at 272-73.          When a clear and unambiguous express contract exists,quantum meruit cannot be used to recover attorney fees.  Muller,243 Ill. App. 3d at 712, 613 N.E.2d at 272; Spinak, 209 Ill. App.3d at 125, 568 N.E.2d at 44.  Claimant does not suggest there wasno express contract for fees between her and her attorney forrepresentation in this workers' compensation case.  See 820 ILCS305/16a(C) (West 1994).  At oral argument, claimant's attorneystated that quantum meruit is not the basis on which recovery issought in this case.  We agree.  Claimant's attorney seeks arecovery which is punitive in nature.  However, in determining theamount of attorney fees to tax against respondent, the Commissionmay, by analogy, look to other legal principles which bear on adetermination of the reasonableness of the fees sought to berecovered by claimant.          The determination of the reasonableness of the amount ofattorney fees is a question of fact for the Commission which willnot be overturned unless it is contrary to the manifest weight ofthe evidence.  Augustine v. Industrial Comm'n, 239 Ill. App. 3d561, 573, 607 N.E.2d 229, 237 (1992).  Before the Commission inthis case, claimant asked that attorney fees be set at $200 perhour for 120 hours of post-Commission litigation, then multipliedthe resultant amount by two because of the significance of thecase.  The Commission specifically found this case presented notruly unique legal question even though claimant had to earnestlypursue justifiable penalties.          Courts will not substitute their judgments for that ofthe Commission simply because different inferences could have beendrawn.  Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons Construction Co., 143 Ill. 2d542, 549, 578 N.E.2d 921, 924 (1991).  The Commission decision inthis case is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.            The final issue is whether the Commission improperlyrefused to reimburse claimant for attorney fees paid to recoverbenefits and medical expenses withheld by respondent in violationof sections 19(k) and 16 of the Act.  The Commission did not refuseto order respondent to pay attorney fees, but ordered payment ofless than claimant's attorney thought he deserved.          In her reply brief, claimant has also raised for thefirst time in this appeal an argument that the Commission's actionviolated her rights to equal protection and due process and made arequest that this court take judicial notice of the annual reportsof the Commission.  Because these arguments were improperly raisedfor the first time in the reply brief (155 Ill. 2d R. 341(g)), theywill not be addressed.          The order of the circuit court of Cook County confirmingthe decision of the Commission is affirmed.          Affirmed.          RAKOWSKI, COLWELL, HOLDRIDGE and RARICK, JJ., concur.