NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LINDA ANN ISGRO, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0156

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2015-008317

The Honorable Roger E. Brodman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Hymson Goldstein Pantiliat & Lohr, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Eddie A. Pantiliat, Evan B. Schechter

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Curley & Allison, LLP, Phoenix

By Roger D. Curley, Kiernan S. Curley 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Gust Rosenfeld P.L.C., Phoenix

By Scott A. Malm, Mina C. O’Boyle

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee First American Title Insurance Company

Fidelity National Law Group, Phoenix

By Patrick J. Davis, David M. LaSpaluto 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Security Title Agency, Inc.

FILED 1-22-2019
ISGRO v. WELLS FARGO, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Linda Ann Isgro challenges the trial court’s rulings 

denying leave to amend her complaint to add four new plaintiffs and 

granting summary judgment to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), 

First American Title Insurance Company (“First American”), and Security 

Title Agency, Inc. (“Security Title”) (collectively “Appellees”) on statute of 

limitations and laches grounds. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This appeal arises out of the administration of the estate of 

Goldie Brown (the “Estate”), which opened in probate in the late 1970s. 

Brown’s will (the “Will”) left one fifth of the Estate’s assets to Ron Porter

and Oma Lee Bergman, her niece and nephew, and divided the remaining 

assets into four equal shares, one of which was held in trust for Vada 

Chrisman Roberts (“Trust B”). Vada Chrisman Roberts passed away in 

1991, leaving Trust B payable to her four children, including John Roberts, 

Isgro’s father. John Roberts predeceased Vada Chrisman Roberts, leaving 

his share payable to Isgro and her two siblings.

¶3 In this lawsuit, Isgro alleges Appellees acted improperly 

while administering either the Estate or its related trusts many years ago. 

We set forth the undisputed facts regarding the Appellees’ involvement 

below.

I. Wells Fargo, the Estate, and Trust B

¶4 First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A. (“First Interstate”), now 

owned by Wells Fargo, served as personal representative for the Estate and 

as trustee of Trust B. First Interstate wrote Isgro in 1992 to inform her that 

it was ready to make cash distributions of her Trust B share, but that it was 

not possible to liquidate the land contracts Trust B held at that time. First 

Interstate wrote that Isgro and the other beneficiaries “would receive the 

contracts outright as . . . interest beneficiar[ies]” and asked how she would 
ISGRO v. WELLS FARGO, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

like the property to be titled. She responded that she would accept title as 

joint tenants with her husband, Carmelo P. Isgro.

¶5 Isgro also received assignments of her beneficial interest in 

three other trusts, referred to as “Trust No. 6588,” “Trust No. 6369,” and 

“CSC Trust No. 9950” in 1992. Isgro received approximately $122,000 in 

distributions in 1992, with the last distribution occurring in December. 

Shortly after receiving her last distribution, Isgro contacted First Interstate 

to inquire about a parcel, and she was reassured the bank “would defend 

and send a representative to protect the best interests of the Estate.”

II. First American and Trust No. 6588

¶6 The Estate conveyed certain property to Trust No. 6588 in 

1978. Isgro received payments from Trust No. 6588 through First American, 

its then-administrator, until 1993. First American closed Trust No. 6588 in 

1995.

¶7 Isgro communicated with First American in 1996 expressing 

concern that certain payments owed to her had become delinquent. Nearly 

twenty years later, she alleged that “from 1993 up until the present time 

certain parcels of real estate whereby Isgro held recorded interests . . . have 

been acquired . . . for values that total more than $900,000,000.” She also 

alleged she is entitled to “financial benefits” from these “subsequent 

transactions.”

III. Security Title and Trust No. 6369

¶8 In 1992, Security Title became trustee of Trust No. 6369, which

had been established to hold certain real property and land grazing rights. 

Prior to Security Title’s involvement, the original Trust No. 6369’s “Second 

Beneficiary,” Goldie Brown Homestead, reached an agreement with the

original “first beneficiaries” under which it agreed to pay four million 

dollars over time for the trust property. Isgro, as a subsequent “first 

beneficiary,” received annual payments from Trust No. 6369 from 1993 to 

1997 stemming from these transactions.

¶9 Isgro expected to receive another payment in 1998 and 

contacted Security Title when it did not arrive. According to Isgro, a 

Security Title employee told her (1) the 1997 payment was her last payment;

(2) she had received her full share of payments; and (3) Trust No. 6369 had 

no more assets. Isgro did not follow-up on this conversation.
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4

¶10 In 1998, Security Title conveyed the Trust No. 6369 property 

to Goldie Brown Ranch Limited Partnership (“GBRLP”) and closed the 

trust. GBRLP sold the property to the City of Scottsdale in 1999.

IV. The Current Dispute

¶11 In early 2015, Isgro wrote Appellees on behalf of “the first 

beneficiaries of the Goldie C. Brown Estate” alleging each had breached its 

fiduciary duties in the transactions described above and demanding 

compensation. She then sued in September 2015 alleging breach of contract, 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of 

fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligence.

¶12 As against Wells Fargo, Isgro alleged having been told

“[s]ubsequent to 1993 . . . that any real estate that remained with the Estate 

was worthless, mountainous with steep slopes, and unable to be 

developed.” She also alleged that Wells Fargo “executed a Final Plat” on 

land she had “recorded interests on” in 2000 and that she “never received 

notice or financial compensation” relating to the “Final Plat.” She further 

alleged that Wells Fargo, as the personal representative of the Estate, was 

responsible for the alleged misconduct of First American and Security Title.

¶13 As for First American, Isgro alleged that, after receiving the 

last payment from Trust No. 6588 in 1993, First American told her that “ten 

land contracts were delinquent.” She further alleged having provided First 

American with “documentation” regarding the contracts in 1995 and 1996, 

but First American “failed to protect the assets of the Estate.”

¶14 As for Security Title, Isgro alleged she was entitled to a “1.67 

percent” share of the purchase funds GBRLP received from the City of 

Scottsdale in 1999. She also contends Security Title failed to pay her share 

of a reimbursement Trust No. 6369 received from the state relating to

grazing leases.

¶15 First American moved for summary judgment in April 2017, 

contending, among other things, that Isgro’s claims were time-barred under 

the applicable statutes of limitations and the doctrine of laches. Shortly 

thereafter, Isgro moved for leave to amend her complaint to add four new 

plaintiffs—Porter, Bergman, and her siblings Gail Leonard Turner and 

Robert Leonard. Each Appellee opposed the proposed amended

complaint. Wells Fargo and Security Title also moved for summary 

judgment on statute of limitations and laches grounds.
ISGRO v. WELLS FARGO, et al.

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5

¶16 The trial court denied leave to amend and granted summary 

judgment on Isgro’s contract claims. In denying leave to amend, the court 

found that adding the new plaintiffs would “substantially change the size 

of the claimed damages” and “raise[] new issues requiring preparation for 

factual discovery which would not otherwise have been necessitated nor 

expected.” The court also noted that the discovery cutoff was less than forty 

days away and that Isgro “present[ed] no persuasive reason for her delay 

in filing an amendment.” The court also determined that the proposed 

amendments were futile because “[t]here is a two-year statute of limitations 

for breach of trust” and “[t]he four new plaintiffs have known about this 

cause of action for more than two years.”

¶17 The court later granted summary judgment to all three 

Appellees, finding the applicable statutes of limitations and laches barred 

Isgro’s tort claims. The court entered final judgment and awarded 

attorneys’ fees to Appellees pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) sections 12-341.01(A) and 14-11004. Isgro timely appealed the 

judgment and the denial of her motion for leave to amend the complaint. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

ANALYSIS

I. The Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment

¶18 On review of a grant of summary judgment, we determine de 

novo whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial 

court properly applied the law. Sign Here Petitions LLC v. Chavez, 243 Ariz. 

99, 104, ¶ 13 (App. 2017). We view the facts and reasonable inferences in 

the light most favorable to Isgro as the non-prevailing party. Id. Summary 

judgment should be granted only “if the facts produced in support of [a] 

claim . . . have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence 

required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion 

advanced by the proponent of the claim.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 

309 (1990).

A. Statute of Limitations

¶19 Each of Isgro’s tort claims is subject to a two- or three-year 

limitations period.1 See A.R.S. § 14-11005(C)(2) (“[A] judicial proceeding by 

 

1 The trial court granted summary judgment on Isgro’s contract claims 

based on its conclusion that “’[a] trustee who fails to perform his duties . . . 

is not liable to the beneficiary for breach of contract.’” In re Naarden Tr., 195 
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a beneficiary against a trustee for breach of trust must be commenced 

within two years after the . . . termination of the beneficiary’s interest in the 

trust.”); A.R.S. § 12-543(3) (setting a three-year limitations period for fraud 

claims); Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 241 Ariz. 440, 444, ¶ 9 (App. 2017) 

(explaining the two-year limitations period of A.R.S. § 12-542 applies to 

breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and negligent 

misrepresentation claims). “Given our preference to resolve claims on their 

merits, the statute of limitations defense is not favored.” Coulter, 241 Ariz. 

at 444, ¶ 7 (internal quotation omitted). “Nevertheless, claims that are 

clearly brought outside the relevant limitations period are conclusively 

barred.” Id.

¶20 Generally, a cause of action accrues, and the limitations 

period begins to run when the plaintiff becomes aware of information that 

would put a reasonable person on notice to investigate whether a claim 

exists. Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 316, ¶¶ 22-23 (2002). Accrual thus 

normally presents a question of fact for the jury. Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, 

323, ¶ 32 (1998). Here, however, the Appellees presented undisputed 

evidence showing Isgro had sufficient knowledge to investigate the alleged 

wrongdoing many years before she sued in 2015.

¶21 Wells Fargo established that Isgro understood her last 

distribution would arrive in December 1992, having already received 

approximately $122,000, and that she received assignments of her beneficial 

interest in Trust No. 6588, Trust No. 6369, and CSC Trust No. 9950 during 

that same timeframe. It also established that she contacted First Interstate 

to request that it foreclose on an unidentified parcel shortly after receiving 

her last distribution but did nothing thereafter until she sent her 2015 

demand letter.

¶22 First American established that it made its last payment to 

Isgro in 1993 and closed Trust No. 6588 in 1995. It also established that Isgro 

communicated with First American demanding it act upon allegedly 

delinquent accounts in 1996. Despite believing First American did not meet 

that demand, she did not take further action until 2012.

¶23 Security Title established that Isgro knew her Trust No. 6369 

payments would start in 1993. When those payments ended in 1998, she 

 

Ariz. 526, 529, ¶ 12 (App. 1999) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts 

§ 197 cmt. b (1959)). Isgro does not challenge that ruling on appeal.
ISGRO v. WELLS FARGO, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

contacted Security Title and was told she would not receive any further 

payments. She took no further action for approximately fourteen years.

1. Discovery Rule

¶24 While Isgro does not dispute these facts, she contends the 

discovery rule tolled the applicable limitations periods because she 

“believed the Appellees when they indicated everything was satisfactory” 

and had “no reason to question anything.” We disagree.

¶25 It is the plaintiff’s burden to show the discovery rule applies. 

Wyckoff v. Mogollon Health All., 232 Ariz. 588, 591, ¶ 9 (App. 2013). The 

statements Isgro claims to have “believed”—and apparently chose not to 

investigate—were made in the 1990s. She contends she was not “led to 

question whether Appellees had concealed anything in the early/mid 

1990s” until she purportedly “discovered numerous documents regarding 

the Estate and Trusts that she had never received or seen before,” but offers 

only her own conclusory testimony in support. This self-serving testimony 

is, by itself, insufficient to overcome summary judgment. See e.g., Florez v. 

Sargeant, 185 Ariz. 521, 526 (1996). Moreover, the discovery rule does not 

allow Isgro to profess longstanding ignorance when a reasonable 

investigation—which ostensibly would have included searching for and 

reviewing the Estate and trust documents she claims to have first 

discovered in 2014—would have alerted her to what she now alleges to

have been Appellees’ misconduct many years earlier. Gust, Rosenfeld & 

Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 589 (1995) (The 

discovery rule generally applies only where “[t]he injury or the act causing 

the injury, or both, have been difficult for the plaintiff to detect.”) (internal 

quotation omitted).

2. Fraudulent Concealment

¶26 Citing Walk, Isgro also contends actual knowledge is required 

to trigger the statute of limitations for claims alleging a breach of the 

fiduciary duty of disclosure. There, our supreme court held “if fraudulent 

concealment is established, the [plaintiff] is relieved of the duty of diligent 

investigation required by the discovery rule and the statute of limitations is 

tolled until such concealment is discovered, or reasonably should have been 

discovered.” Walk, 202 Ariz. at 319, ¶ 35 (internal quotation omitted) 

(emphasis added).

¶27 Fraudulent concealment requires clear and convincing 

evidence. Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local 

No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund, 201 Ariz. 474, 498 n.24, ¶ 98 (2002). The only 
ISGRO v. WELLS FARGO, et al.

Decision of the Court

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evidence Isgro offered to show fraudulent concealment was her own 

conclusory testimony. Bald accusations of fraudulent concealment do not 

constitute clear and convincing evidence. See KCI Rest. Mgmt. LLC v. Holm 

Wright Hyde & Hays PLC, 236 Ariz. 485, 489, ¶ 14 (App. 2014). Isgro thus 

failed to show that Appellees did anything to prevent her from inquiring 

into or investigating her rights well before 2014. See Anson v. Am. Motors 

Corp., 155 Ariz. 420, 427 (App. 1987) (“In general, to toll the statute of 

limitations the fraud must prevent inquiry, elude investigation or mislead 

the party who claims the cause of action.”). And the trial court did not err 

in finding that her claims were time-barred based upon the undisputed 

evidence discussed above.

B. Laches

¶28 Laches generally will bar a claim when a plaintiff 

unreasonably delays filing suit and the delay prejudices the opposing 

parties. See League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Martin, 219 Ariz. 556, 558, ¶ 6 

(2009); In re Indenture of Tr. Dated January 13, 1964, 235 Ariz. 40, 48, ¶ 22 

(App. 2014). Because we affirm the trial court on the limitations issue, we 

need not reach its ruling on laches.2

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Leave to 

Amend the Complaint

¶29 Isgro also contends the trial court erred in denying leave to 

amend her complaint to add the four new plaintiffs. When a party seeks 

leave to amend before trial, it should be “freely given when justice 

requires.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A court may deny leave to amend, 

however, if it finds “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated 

failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments or undue prejudice to 

the opposing party.” Carranza v. Madrigal, 237 Ariz. 512, 515, ¶ 13 (2015) 

(internal quotation omitted). We review the denial of a motion for leave to 

amend the complaint for an abuse of discretion. Timmons v. Ross Dress For 

Less, Inc., 234 Ariz. 569, 572, ¶ 17 (App. 2014). “In determining whether the 

 

2 We do note, however, that the record in this case adequately 

supports the trial court’s findings concerning unreasonable delay on the 

part of Isgro, the prejudice to Appellees and to the administration of the 

Estate as a result of such delay, and the inequity that would result if Isgro 

were allowed to pursue her stale claims. See Prutch v. Town of Quartzsite, 

231 Ariz. 431, 435, ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (“[L]aches bars a claim when, under the 

totality of circumstances, the delay in prosecuting the claim would produce 

an unjust result.”) (internal quotation omitted).
ISGRO v. WELLS FARGO, et al.

Decision of the Court

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court abused its discretion, we presume that the facts alleged in the 

[proposed amended] complaint are true.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

A. Undue Delay

¶30 The proposed new plaintiffs are Isgro’s siblings and cousins 

who allegedly “had a share in the same land/Estate assets.” Isgro

acknowledged having “discovered the basis for these claims . . . after her 

mother passed away in late 2012” and having written demand letters on 

their behalf in 2015. She characterizes her two-year delay in seeking leave 

to amend the complaint as an “understandable and honest mistake”

because she, as a pro per litigant, “mistakenly thought they could come in at 

any time.” We note Isgro retained her current counsel in December 2015 

yet still chose not to seek leave to amend until May 2017. On this record, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding undue delay.

B. Undue Prejudice

¶31 Undue prejudice for purposes of denying leave to amend can 

be found in “the inconvenience and delay suffered when the amendment 

. . . inserts new parties into the litigation.” Carranza, 237 Ariz. at 515, ¶ 13 

(internal quotation omitted). Isgro contends only minimal additional 

discovery would have been needed because the new plaintiffs’ claims are 

“identical” to hers. This assertion conflicts with her admission that 

Bergman and Porter not only were beneficiaries of a different trust but were 

entitled to different percentages of that trust. Bergman and Porter also

directly received one fifth of the Estate under the Will.

¶32 Isgro attempts to dismiss these differences by arguing her 

claims were “for damage to the Estate as a whole,” but neither she nor any 

of the proposed new plaintiffs purported to represent the Estate. We thus 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to 

amend the complaint based upon undue prejudice.

3 See Haynes v. Syntek 

Fin. Corp., 184 Ariz. 332, 336 (App. 1995).

III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding 

Appellees Attorneys’ Fees

¶33 The Appellees requested, and the trial court awarded, 

attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-11004 and § 12-341.01(A). We note, 

 

3 Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding undue delay and prejudice, we need not decide whether the 

proposed new plaintiffs’ claims were futile.
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however, § 12-341.01(A) only applies to disputes “arising out of a contract,”

and this court has held lawsuits arising out of a trust relationship are not 

suits “arising out of a contract” for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees 

under § 12-341.01(A). See e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Pac. 

Fin. Ass’n, Inc., 241 Ariz. 406, 416, ¶ 39 (App. 2017). Nevertheless, because 

the trial court also based its award on § 14-11004, we will affirm its decision

absent an abuse of discretion. See City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 330 

(1985) (“We recognize the obligation of appellate courts to affirm where any 

reasonable view of the facts and law might support the judgment of the trial 

court.”); Peterson v. City of Surprise, 244 Ariz. 247, 253, ¶ 25 (App. 2018).

¶34 Isgro generally challenges the award of “$266,975.30 in 

attorney[s’] fees to Defendants,” but she did not oppose Wells Fargo’s or 

Security Title’s fee applications. She therefore has waived her challenges to

those awards. See Englert v. Carondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 26, ¶ 13 

(App. 2000).

¶35 As for the fee award to First American, Isgro contends the trial 

court should not have awarded fees because it “never reached the actual 

merits of [her] claims.” A.R.S. § 14-11004(A) does not impose such a 

limitation. Section 14-11004(A) authorizes a trustee to recover reasonable 

fees that “arise out of and that relate to the good faith defense or 

prosecution of a judicial . . . proceeding involving the administration of the 

trust, regardless of whether the defense or prosecution is successful.” First 

American obviously asserted a good faith defense to Isgro’s claims for 

purposes of § 14-11004(A) and is therefore entitled to an award of fees for 

its defense.

¶36 Isgro next contends the fee award will cause hardship but 

only argues First American “is a billion-dollar company.” First American’s 

size has no bearing on whether a fee award would cause Isgro to suffer 

hardship, and she offered no evidence to show such hardship would arise. 

See Rudinsky v. Harris, 231 Ariz. 95, 102, ¶ 32 (App. 2012) (“[T]he party 

asserting financial hardship has the burden of coming forward with prima 

facie evidence of financial hardship.”).

¶37 Finally, Isgro asserts the trial court should not have awarded 

First American any fees it incurred before filing its answer because it did 

not request fees in either its joinder in Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss or 

its separate motion to dismiss, both of which predated its answer. Citing

Balestrieri v. Balestrieri, 232 Ariz. 25 (App. 2013), she contends a defendant 

who does not request fees in a motion to dismiss forfeits any claim to

attorneys’ fees.
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¶38 Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(g)(1), which was revised 

to codify Balestrieri, only requires that a fee claim be made “in the pleadings 

or in a Rule 12 motion filed before the movant’s responsive pleading.” Ariz. 

R. Civ. P. 54(g)(1). First American requested attorneys’ fees in its answer, 

thus satisfying Rule 54(g)(1). Moreover, Balestrieri is distinguishable 

because the court there granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and the 

plaintiff never received notice that fees would be sought. Balestrieri, 232 

Ariz. at 28, ¶ 11 (“[W]e hold that such a defendant forfeits his claim for fees 

by waiting to ask for fees until after the superior court grants his motion to 

dismiss.”). Isgro had ample notice of First American’s fee claim. We thus 

affirm it.

IV. Appellees May Recover Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on 

Appeal

¶39 Appellees request their attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-11004(A). We may order the attorneys’ fees be paid 

by any other party to the action or the trust at issue. A.R.S. § 14-11004(B); 

In re Estate of King, 228 Ariz. 565, 572-73, ¶ 29 (App. 2012). Isgro’s claims 

arise out of the administration of the Estate and its related trusts, all of 

which have been closed for many years and no longer have resources to pay 

a fee award. We therefore award Appellees their reasonable attorneys’ fees 

and costs, to be paid by Isgro, upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil 

Appellate Procedure 21.

CONCLUSION

¶40 We affirm the trial court’s rulings.