EMERALD COAST UTILITIES 

AUTHORITY,

Appellant,

v.

BEAR MARCUS POINTE, LLC; 

A FLORIDA LIMITED 

LIABILITY COMPANY,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D15-5714

_____________________________/

Opinion filed August 10, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

Gary L. Bergosh, Judge.

Bradley S. Odom and Richard D. Barlow of Odom & Barlow, P.A., Pensacola, for 

Appellant.

Major B. Harding and Erik M. Figlio of Ausley & McMullen, Tallahassee; William 

A. Fixel of Fixel & Willis, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal from an order denying its motion for relief from judgment

pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), appellant claims that the trial 
2

court abused its discretion in not vacating and reentering its order assessing 

attorneys’ fees, which appellant alleged to have never received, so that appellant 

could file a timely notice of appeal. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

On March 18, 2014, the trial court rendered an order assessing attorneys’ fees 

against appellant in an eminent domain proceeding. On March 20, 2014, the clerk 

of the court served the order by email sent to the email addresses designated by

counsel for each party. On May 12, 2014, appellant filed a motion for relief from 

the order, requesting the trial court to vacate and reenter the order to allow appellant 

to file a timely notice of appeal because appellant did not receive a copy of the order 

until after expiration of the time to appeal.

At the hearing on appellant’s motion, Lendy Davis, the IT director for the 

clerk of the court, testified that the log from the clerk’s e-service system indicated 

that emails containing the order were sent to the primary and secondary email

addresses designated by appellant’s attorneys at 7:28 p.m. on March 20, 2014. The 

clerk’s email server contacted the email server for the domain of these addresses and 

handed off the messages to the recipient server. Davis explained that if the email 

had not been accepted by the recipient server, an error message would have been 

generated notifying the clerk’s office that the email had not been delivered. The log 

contained no such error message. Davis did not know what happened after the email 

was accepted by the recipient server.
3

William Hankins testified that he provided IT consulting services for 

appellant’s counsel—the law firm of Odom & Barlow P.A.—beginning in 2007. In 

2011, about two months after the firm installed its Microsoft Exchange server with 

a built-in email filtering system, the email filtering system was configured to drop 

and permanently delete emails perceived to be spam without alerting the recipient 

that the email was deleted. Hankins advised Richard Barlow that the firm’s email 

system should not be configured to permanently drop and delete emails without 

alerting the recipient that the email was dropped because the built-in spam filtering 

on the server was very unreliable and created the risk of identifying and filtering 

legitimate emails as spam (false positives). Although Hankins believed that it was 

better to hire a third party that handled spam filtering on a full-time basis, Barlow 

rejected his recommendation to use a third-party vendor because he did not want to 

spend the extra money. 

 Hankins reviewed the transaction logs from the clerk’s server to Odom & 

Barlow’s server and concluded that the order assessing attorneys’ fees was properly 

delivered to the Odom & Barlow server. Hankins opined that it was possible that 

the server deleted the email as spam. 

 Importantly, in 2015, Hankins recommended that the firm get an online 

backup system that would have cost approximately $700 to $1200 a year. This
4

recommendation was rejected. Eventually, Hankins stopped working for Odom & 

Barlow because the firm rejected his recommendations.

Stephen Reyes testified that he was a shareholder in the firm of Saltmarsh, 

Cleveland & Gund and managed the information system consulting arms of the firm. 

Reyes reviewed the email log printouts provided by the clerk’s office and saw no 

evidence that the clerk’s office made any mistake or was negligent in the service of 

the emails in question. He also reviewed five work stations and a server at the law 

firm of Odom & Barlow did not find any of the emails, and did not find any evidence 

of destruction of the emails.

 Reyes conceded that it was fairly unusual for a company to configure their 

system to not create any email logs and that if the server had been configured 

differently, he could have had complete logs from the period in question to determine 

whether the server had received the emails from the clerk’s server. He also noted 

that the server was not configured to back up data or configuration files and that it 

was unusual for a business to operate a server system with absolutely no back up or 

disaster recovery process. If the server had backup data or configuration files, this

would have provided information about additional emails and correspondence and 

changes in the email system itself. He suggested that a law firm that maintained 

confidential and highly sensitive information for clients have a backup or disaster 

recovery process.
5

 Reyes could not make a definitive determination whether the emails from 

the clerk’s office were received by Odom & Barlow’s server because the firm did 

not maintain logs or archive or backup emails. If he had complete logs, he would 

have been able to determine whether the emails had been received. However, Reyes 

acknowledged that the absence of any error messages, bounce-backs, or retries in 

the clerk’s server logs made it more likely that the emails were received by Odom 

& Barlow’s server. Moreover, if Odom & Barlow’s server had received other emails 

from the clerk’s server, this would indicate that there was effective communication 

between the two systems. Given the totality of the information he had, Reyes

believed that it was more likely than not that the server received the emails.

James Todd testified that he helped design, implement, and support email 

systems. Todd explained that when sending an email, the sending server would look 

up the recipient server and establish a connection with the recipient server to make 

sure it was there and accepting messages. If there were no issues, the recipient 

server would send an “okay” message for the sending server to transmit the data. 

Once the data was received, the recipient server would send an “okay” message 

letting the sending server know that it got the data. This activity was referred to as 

a “handshake,” after which everything was under the control of the recipient. Todd 

testified that this was the equivalent of placing a piece of mail into a mailbox. 
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Todd reviewed the transaction logs from the clerk’s server to Odom & 

Barlow’s server and concluded that an email attaching an order assessing attorneys’ 

fees was properly delivered to and received by the Odom & Barlow server on March 

20, 2014, without any error messages or bounce-backs. According to Todd, after 

the handshake, an email went through any email filtering system that was in place. 

An email filtering system could be configured to delete emails perceived to be spam 

and to alert recipients of the receipt of email identified as spam. These settings were 

in the exclusive control of the email recipient. Thus, after a handshake occurred, the 

email could be filtered out as spam or delivered to the recipient. 

Based on the information he reviewed, Todd concluded that the law firm of 

Odom & Barlow did not properly implement and utilize its email filtering system. 

It was his understanding that Odom & Barlow’s email filtering system was set to 

drop and delete emails identified as spam. He did not recommend this setup to any 

business of any kind because it resulted in data loss. In fact, he testified that he 

would require the client to sign a waiver exonerating him from responsibility if the 

client insisted on implementing such an email filtering system. 

Joe Fixel, lead counsel for appellee, testified that his firm filed a motion for 

attorneys’ fees that was the subject of a hearing in January 2013. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the trial court asked the parties to submit proposed orders. The court 

did not enter its own orders until March 2014. While they were waiting for the court 
7

to act, Fixel’s office had a protocol where an assigned paralegal would check the 

court’s website every three weeks to see if the court had taken any action or entered 

any orders. Fixel also contacted opposing counsel, Richard Barlow, and suggested 

they file a joint motion for a case management conference to make sure the case had 

not slipped through the cracks. When Barlow categorically refused to join such a 

motion, he consulted with co-counsel who filed a motion for status conference. 

However, before the status conference occurred, the orders were received by email 

by all three attorneys and the paralegal who were assigned to the case at his firm. 

When the attorneys’ fees award had not been paid within thirty days as ordered by 

the court, his paralegal contacted opposing counsel, whose office requested copies 

of the orders.

At the hearing, appellant argued that it was entitled to relief from the 

attorneys’ fees order because it never received the order in time to file a timely 

appeal. Appellee responded that appellant was not entitled to relief because 

appellant’s ability to file a timely appeal was not hindered by any action attributable 

to the trial court or the clerk, but was attributable to the actions of appellant’s 

counsel. Afterwards, the trial court entered an order denying relief. This appeal 

followed.

Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), Florida courts have 

discretion to set aside a final judgment, decree, order, or proceeding based on 
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“mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” Handel v. Nevel, 147 So. 

3d 649, 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). In Pompi v. City of Jacksonville, 872 So. 2d 931 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2004), this court held that the appellants’ failure to file a timely appeal 

constituted excusable neglect entitling appellants to relief from judgment under rule 

1.540(b) where appellants’ counsel made a mistake in reading the file stamp on the 

judgment, which was much less noticeable than the recording stamp. Id. at 933. 

While agreeing that the clerk bore no responsibility for counsel’s error, this court 

noted “the fact that a deputy court clerk made precisely the same mistake when 

reporting the filing date on the telephone is at least some indication that counsel’s 

error was excusable.” Id. 

Subsequently, in Hollifield v. Renew & Co., Inc., 18 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2009), this court observed that the trial court had no authority to grant relief from 

judgment where the neglect in failing to take a timely appeal occurred entirely within 

the office of the party’s counsel and no action attributable to the court or its personnel 

contributed to counsel’s neglect to take a timely appeal. Id. at 617 (citing David M. 

Dresdner, M.D., P.A. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 972 So. 2d 275, 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2008)). In doing so, this court distinguished Pompi, “whose holding applied to cases 

where the court or court staff substantially contributed to counsel’s failure to file a 

timely notice of appeal.” Id. 
9

We agree with appellant that this language is dicta in light of the true holding

in Hollifield that rule 1.540(b) did not authorize the trial court to grant relief from 

an interlocutory order. Id. However, because we conclude that appellant failed to 

demonstrate any excusable neglect, it is unnecessary to address whether rule

1.540(b) requires proof that some action attributable to the court or its personnel 

contributed to counsel’s neglect to take a timely appeal.

“Excusable neglect is found ‘where inaction results from clerical or secretarial 

error, reasonable misunderstanding, a system gone awry or any other of the foibles 

to which human nature is heir.’” Elliott v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 31 So. 3d 304, 

307 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So. 2d 1103, 

1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)). However, “[t]he law requires certain diligence of those 

subject to it, and this diligence cannot be lightly excused.” John Crescent, Inc. v. 

Schwartz, 382 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). “A conscious decision not to 

comply with the requirements of law cannot be ‘excusable neglect’ under the rule or 

any other equivalent requirement.” Peterson v. Lake Surprise II Condo. Ass’n, 118 

So. 3d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Likewise, gross neglect is not excusable. Brivis 

Enters., Inc. v. Von Plinski, 8 So. 3d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Hornblower 

v. Cobb, 932 So. 2d 402, 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Lehner v. Durso, 816 So. 2d 

1171, 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Otero v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 606 So. 2d 443, 

444 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
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Although appellant claims that its counsel received no notice of the order 

assessing attorneys’ fees until after expiration of the time to appeal, Lendy Davis, 

William Hankins, and James Todd testified that they reviewed emails logs from the 

clerk’s server and concluded that the emails attaching the order assessing attorneys’ 

fees were electronically served by the clerk’s office on March 20, 2014, and received 

without error by Odom & Barlow’s server. Although Stephen Reyes testified that 

he could not make a definitive determination whether the emails were received by 

Odom & Barlow’s server because the firm maintained neither email logs nor archive

or backup emails, he conceded that it was more likely than not that the server 

received the emails. Based on this evidence, the trial court could conclude that the 

order assessing attorneys’ fees was received by Odom & Barlow’s server, which was 

the equivalent of placing a physical copy of the order in a mailbox. 

In addition, testimony was presented that the spam filter of Odom & Barlow’s 

server was deliberately configured in such a way that it could delete legitimate 

emails as spam without notifying the recipient, despite Odom & Barlow being 

warned against this configuration. Specifically, William Hankins advised against 

this configuration because the built-in spam filtering on the server was very 

unreliable and created the risk of identifying and filtering legitimate emails as spam. 

Hankins also recommended that Odom & Barlow hire a third party to handle spam 

filtering on a full-time basis and purchase an online backup system. However, these 
11

recommendations were rejected because the firm did not want to spend the additional 

money. Stephen Reyes noted that the server had the ability to generate email logs, 

but was specifically configured not to create logs in order to save drive space. 

Based on this testimony, the trial court could conclude that Odom & Barlow 

made a conscious decision to use a defective email system without any safeguards 

or oversight in order to save money. Such a decision cannot constitute excusable 

neglect. See Bequer v. Nat’l City Bank, 46 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) 

(reversing an order setting aside a default final judgment based on excusable neglect 

where the bank’s inaction was not the result of a “system gone awry,” but rather of 

a “defective system altogether”). 

Finally, testimony was presented that opposing counsel, Joe Fixel, had a 

protocol where an assigned paralegal would check the court’s website every three 

weeks to see if the court had taken any action or entered any orders. If Odom & 

Barlow had a similar procedure in place, the firm would have received notice of the 

order assessing attorneys’ fees in time to appeal. The neglect of Odom & Barlow’s 

duty to actively check the court’s electronic docket was not excusable. See Yeschick 

v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that counsel’s neglect in 

not checking the docket was not excusable because the parties had an affirmative 

duty to monitor the docket to keep apprised of the entry of orders that they may wish 

to appeal); Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp. LLC, 599 F.3d 403, 413 (4th Cir. 2010) 
12

(holding that counsel’s computer problems did not constitute excusable neglect 

where counsel failed to actively monitor the court’s docket or find some other means 

by which to stay informed of docket activity). 

Moreover, Fixel also contacted Richard Barlow about filing a joint motion for 

a case management conference. Had Barlow not rejected this request, it is likely 

that Odom & Barlow would have received notice of the order assessing attorneys’ 

fees in time to appeal. In short, there was an absence of “any meaningful procedure 

in place that, if followed, would have avoided the unfortunate events that resulted in 

a significant judgment against” appellant. Hornblower, 932 So. 2d at 406. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s rule 

1.540(b) motion.

AFFIRMED.

MAKAR, JAY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.