IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-1695

Filed June 6, 2018

IN THE INTEREST OF C.T.,

Minor Child,

R.N., Mother,

Petitioner-Appellee,

J.T., Father,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Page County, Amy L. Zacharias, 

District Associate Judge.

Father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights pursuant to 

Iowa Code chapter 600A (2017). AFFIRMED.

Katherine Kaminsky Murphy of Kate Murphy Law, P.L.C., Glenwood, for 

appellant.

Justin R. Wyatt of Woods & Wyatt, PLLC, Glenwood, for appellee.

Vicki R. Danley, Sidney, guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.

In this private termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, Jeremiah, the 

father, appeals from an order terminating his parental rights in his son, C.T. (born 

2006). The petition was filed by C.T.’s mother, Renee, and the district court 

granted the petition and terminated Jeremiah’s rights pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 600A.8(3)(b) and (4) (2017). On appeal, Jeremiah challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory grounds authorizing the 

termination of his parental rights. 

“Termination proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 600A are a two-step 

process. In the first step, the petitioner seeking termination must first show by 

clear and convincing evidence a threshold event has occurred that opens the door 

for potential termination of parental rights. Once that threshold showing has been 

made, the petitioner next must show, by clear and convincing evidence, 

termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.” In re Q.G., ___

N.W.2d ___, ___, 2018 WL 2071823, at *9 (Iowa 2018). 

We review termination proceedings initiated pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 

600A de novo. See In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012). It is 

the petitioner’s burden to prove each element of the case by clear and convincing 

evidence. See Iowa Code § 600A.8. Clear and convincing evidence is a higher 

burden than a preponderance of the evidence but less than evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See In re M.S., 889 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). “It 

is the highest evidentiary burden in civil cases. It means there must be no serious 

or substantial doubt about the correctness of a particular conclusion drawn from 

the evidence.” Id. “Although our review is de novo, we afford deference to the 
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district court for institutional and pragmatic reasons.” Hensch v. Mysak, 902 

N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). This means we give weight to the district 

court’s findings of fact.

Where, as here, the district court terminated a parent’s rights pursuant to 

more than one statutory provision, we will affirm the termination order if any ground 

is supported by sufficient evidence. We turn our attention to Iowa Code section 

600A.8(4). Pursuant to this provision, the district court may terminate a parent’s 

rights upon clear and convincing evidence the “parent has been ordered to 

contribute to the support of the child . . . and has failed to do so without good 

cause.” Iowa Code § 600A.8(4). “If there has been a showing of a substantial 

failure to pay, the court must then consider whether that failure was without good 

cause. In considering whether there is good cause for failure to pay child support, 

the key factual issue is the parent’s ability to pay. A parent’s intent is clearly tied 

to an ability to pay.” See In re M.J.W., No. 17-0149, 2017 WL 2665957, at *3 (Iowa 

Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Here, there is clear and convincing evidence Jeremiah failed to provide 

financial support for the child. The parties were married at one time but have since 

divorced. Jeremiah was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $170 per 

month. In a subsequent modification proceeding Jeremiah was again ordered to 

pay child support in the amount of $170 per month plus an additional $30 per 

month for back child support. Renee testified Jeremiah has not paid child support 

since June 2012. Her testimony was corroborated by payment records from the 

clerk of court. While Jeremiah testified he believed he may have paid additional 

support, he was not able to produce any evidence of payment.
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Jeremiah contends his failure to support was for good cause. Specifically, 

he contends he thought he was paying and/or he was unable to pay. We disagree 

with the contention Jeremiah’s failure to pay was for good cause. The record 

reflects Jeremiah now has four other children in addition to C.T. Jeremiah testified 

his wages were subject to an income withholding order to support his children. 

Jeremiah testified he believed, but never verified, some amount of the withheld 

wages was to provide support for C.T. Renee testified she told Jeremiah she was 

not receiving any support. Renee’s testimony was credible. Despite Renee telling 

Jeremiah she was not receiving any child support for C.T., Jeremiah took no 

action. He did not contact the child support recovery unit to follow up on the issue

and ensure some of his withheld wages were for the support of C.T. He did not 

make voluntary payments or offer to make voluntary payments to Renee. He 

simply chose to ignore his obligation to provide support for this child. That is 

insufficient to establish good cause. See Iowa Code § 600A.1 (providing a parent 

must “affirmatively assume the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent” 

including “fulfillment of financial obligations”); see also In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 

600, 602 (Iowa 1998) (“[T]he legislature intended termination for nonsupport to 

occur where a parent’s failure to pay manifests indifference to a child.”) 

Jeremiah does not challenge whether termination of his parental rights is in 

the best interest of the child. Nonetheless, we briefly address the issue. The 

supreme court recently articulated the best-interest standard:

Iowa Code section 600A.1 provides a lengthy description 

regarding application of the concept of “best interest of the child” in 

termination proceedings. The provision states the best interest of 

the child “shall be the paramount consideration” in interpreting the 

chapter. [Iowa Code] § 600A.1. Yet, the section further provides the 
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interests of the parents of the child “shall be given due 

consideration.” Id.

The best interest of the child requires each parent 

“affirmatively assume the duties encompassed by the role of being a 

parent.” Id. Among other things, the court is directed to consider 

“the fulfillment of financial obligations, demonstration of continued 

interest in the child, demonstration of a genuine effort to maintain 

communication with the child, and demonstration of the 

establishment and maintenance of a place of importance in the 

child’s life.” Id.

In addition to applying the language of Iowa Code section 

600A.1, we have also borrowed from Iowa Code section 232.116(2) 

and (3) to flesh out the best-interest-of-the-child test. In re A.H.B., 

791 N.W.2d 687, 690–91 (Iowa 2010). We consider the child’s 

“physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs” and the 

“closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Iowa Code § 

232.116(2)-(3).

The best-interest-of-the-child test plainly has both backwardlooking and forward-looking components. We have cited with 

approval a discussion of the court of appeals, which stated,

We look to the child’s long-range, as well as immediate, 

interests. We consider what the future holds for the 

child if returned to his or her parents. Insight for this 

determination can be gained from evidence of the 

parent’s past performance, for that performance may 

be indicative of the quality of the future care the parent 

is capable of providing. Our statutory termination 

provisions are preventative as well as remedial. They 

are designed to prevent probable harm to a child.

R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d at 601 (quoting In re C.M.W., 503 N.W.2d 874, 

875 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)).

Q.G., 2018 WL 2071823, at *9–10.

Here, the termination of Jeremiah’s parental rights is in the best interest of 

the child. Jeremiah has not provided financial support for the child since 2012. 

While Jeremiah had exercised visitation on a regular basis, his visitation with the 

child has become infrequent and sporadic due to Jeremiah’s criminal conduct, 

incarceration, lack of employment, and homelessness. The visitations that did 

occur were not positive. By way of example, on one occasion, Jeremiah left C.T. 
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at his apartment unattended in the middle of the night. Jeremiah did so because 

he went to confront his ex-girlfriend and slash her tires. After Jeremiah was 

arrested, Jeremiah’s ex-girlfriend told police C.T. may be “somewhere in the city” 

and they needed to locate the child. The police found C.T. locked in the bedroom 

of Jeremiah’s apartment. This incident led to a founded report of child abuse or 

neglect for denial of critical care.

In contrast to Jeremiah’s conduct, Renee can provide for the financial and 

emotional needs of the child. She has long-term gainful employment and financial 

security. She has remarried. C.T. has a seven-year bond with his step-father,

Shain. Shain testified he wants to adopt C.T. We weigh these factors heavily in 

the best-interest determination. See G.A., 826 N.W.2d at 131 (discussing the fact 

that “G.A.’s step-father provides for all of G.A.’s needs and has expressed a 

willingness to adopt the child pending the outcome of these proceedings”). 

For these reasons, we affirm the order terminating Jeremiah’s parental 

rights.

AFFIRMED.