No. 66725 

FILED 

MAY 1 2 2016 

IE EMAN 

5'.ti 1;4/40 

P Y LERK 

No. 67035 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

VINCENT T. SCHETTLER; AND 

VINCENT T. SCHETTLER, TRUSTEE 

OF VINCENT T. SCHETTLER LIVING 

TRUST, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

RALRON CAPITAL CORPORATION, A 

NEVADA CORPORATION, 

Respondent. 

VINCENT T. SCHETTLER; AND 

VINCENT T. SCHETTLER, TRUSTEE 

OF THE VINCENT T. SCHETTLER 

LIVING TRUST, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

RALRON CAPITAL CORPORATION, A 

NEVADA CORPORATION, 

Respondent. 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

These are consolidated appeals from a district court summary 

judgment entered on remand in a contract action and a post-judgment 

award of attorney fees and costs. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark 

County; Elissa F. Cadish, Judge. 

Docket No, 66725 

Appellants first contend that the district court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction because respondent failed to establish that it had 

standing to enforce the Loan Documents. We disagree. See Arguello v. 

Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 368, 252 P.3d 206, 208 (2011) 

(recognizing that "[s]tanding is a question of law reviewed de novo"). In 

conjunction with respondent's first motion for summary judgment, 

respondent produced an affidavit in which the affiant attested that 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A (ea 
respondent acquired the Loan Documents from the FDIC. This evidence, 

particularly in the absence of contrary evidence, was sufficient to 

demonstrate that respondent had standing to enforce the Loan 

Documents. 1 Thus, in granting respondent's second motion for summary 

judgment, the district court correctly determined that there was an 

evidentiary basis to support respondent's status as the real party in 

interest with standing to enforce the Loan Documents. See id. (observing 

that the issue of standing "overlaps with" the inquiry into whether a party 

is a real party in interest under NRCP 17(a)). 

Similarly, the district court also correctly found that 

appellants had not previously challenged that evidentiary basis and had 

also previously acknowledged that respondent was the real party in 

interest. Based on those findings, the district court was within its 

discretion in denying appellants' request to conduct additional discovery 

on the issue of whether respondent was the real party in interest. Cf. 

Choy v. Ameristar Casinos, Inc., 127 Nev. 870, 872, 265 P.3d 698, 700 

(2011) (recognizing that a district court has the discretion to grant or deny 

a continuance of a motion for summary judgment to allow further 

discovery). Accordingly, we conclude that appellants' argument regarding 

subject matter jurisdiction does not warrant reversal of the district court's 

summary judgment. 

'Although appellants suggest for the first time on appeal that this 

evidence was not "admissible," they do not articulate a basis for that 

suggestion. Cf. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 

n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (explaining that this court need not 

consider arguments that are not cogently made and supported by salient 

authority). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

2 

(0) 1947A e 
SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) I947A 

Appellants next contend that an issue of material fact exists 

as to whether respondent 2waived its contractual rights to freeze Vincent 

Schettler's line of credit and to declare him in default. Specifically, 

appellants contend that a waiver occurred by virtue of (1) respondent 

sending the Commitment Letter, (2) disbursing two draws on the line of 

credit at a time when respondent was aware of Schettler's updated 

financial condition; or, alternatively (3) accepting an interest payment 

from Schettler. We disagree. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 

729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (reviewing de novo a district court's 

decision to grant summary judgment). The district court correctly 

determined that neither respondent's Commitment Letter nor its 

acceptance of an interest payment was conduct inconsistent with 

respondent's contractual rights under the Loan Documents. Cf. Hudson v. 

Horseshoe Club Operating Co., 112 Nev. 446, 457, 916 P.2d 786, 792 (1996) 

("Waiver occurs where a party knows of an existing right and . . . exhibits 

conduct so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a 

reasonable belief that the right has been relinquished."). And to the 

extent that respondent's disbursement of two draws could plausibly be 

construed as inconsistent conduct, we agree with the district court's 

construction and application of the Business Loan Agreement's "No 

Waiver By Lender" provision. 3 See May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672, 

2For the sake of clarity, we refer to Silver State Bank and 

respondent collectively as "respondent." 

3We have not considered appellants' argument, raised for the first 

time in their reply brief, that the "No Waiver By Lender" provision could 

itself be waived. See Francis v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 127 Nev. 657, 671 

n.7, 262 P.3d 705, 715 n.7 (2011). 
119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005) ("Contract interpretation is subject to a de 

novo standard of review."). 

Appellants lastly contend that an issue of material fact exists 

as to whether respondent anticipatorily breached the Loan Documents. 

Specifically, appellants contend that a breach occurred because 

respondent sent the Default Letter at a time when (1) Schettler was 

current on his interest payments, and (2) the offer in the Commitment 

Letter was still pending. Again, we disagree. Appellants have not 

identified any contractual language that prohibited respondent from 

freezing Schettler's line of credit and declaring him in default at a time 

when he was current on his interest payments. To the contrary, the 

district court found that there was evidence to support at least eight 

occurrences that constituted a default under the Loan Documents, none of 

which appellants contest on appeal. Similarly, appellants have not 

identified any contractual language suggesting that the Commitment 

Letter was a part of the Loan Documents, such that an arguable breach of 

the Commitment Letter would constitute a breach of the Loan Documents. 

The district court therefore correctly determined that no issue of material 

fact existed regarding whether respondent anticipatorily breached the 

Loan Documents. See Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029; May, 121 

Nev. at 672, 119 P.3d at 1257. 

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the district court's 

summary judgment being challenged in Docket No. 66725. 

Docket No. 67035 

Aside from contending that the award of attorney fees and 

costs should be reversed if the summary judgment is reversed, appellants 

make no arguments regarding the propriety of that award. Thus, in light 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

4 

(.0 ) 1947A 
of our resolution of the appeal in Docket No. 66725, we affirm the award of 

fees and costs being challenged in Docket No. 67035. 

It is so ORDERED. 

Ao.A 

Harplesty 

, J. 

Saitta 

, J. 

cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge 

Schwartz Flansburg PLLC 

Feldman Graf 

Robison Belaustegui Sharp & Low 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

5 

KG) 1947A 0