U.S. Department of Transportation 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Office of Aviation Policy and Plans 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 

Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements 

PART 117 

Final Rule 

OFFICE OF AVIATION POLICY AND PLANS 

November 2014 
i

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1

Total Benefits ‐ Base Case ................................................................................................... 6

Disposition of Issues Raised by Comments Received Regarding the Initial SRIA ............ 6

General Issues ................................................................................................................. 7

Issues Related to Estimation of Costs ........................................................................... 41

Benefit Analysis ................................................................................................................ 55

The Nature of Fatigue ................................................................................................... 56

Causes of Fatigue .......................................................................................................... 57

Fatigue and Transportation ........................................................................................... 57

Recent Findings on Fatigue and Occupational Performance ........................................ 59

Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) .................................................................. 61

Effectiveness of Final Rule ........................................................................................... 64

Quantified Benefits ....................................................................................................... 73

Passenger Operations Base Case Estimate................................................................ 75

Passenger Operations High Case Estimate ............................................................... 76

Cargo-only Operations Base Case Estimate ............................................................. 78

High Case Estimate ................................................................................................... 81

Non-Quantified Benefits ............................................................................................... 83

Benefit Summary .......................................................................................................... 85

Cost Analysis .................................................................................................................... 86

Flight Operations Cost .................................................................................................. 88

Crew Scheduling ....................................................................................................... 89

Computer Programming .......................................................................................... 113

Payroll Cost Savings from Reducing Flightcrew Members Fatigue....................... 114

Flight Operations Cost Summary ............................................................................ 117

Rest Facilities .............................................................................................................. 118

Engineering ............................................................................................................. 123

Installation ............................................................................................................... 124

Downtime ................................................................................................................ 125

Fuel Consumption Costs ......................................................................................... 126

Fatigue Training .......................................................................................................... 130

Cost Analysis Summary .............................................................................................. 134

Benefit/Cost Summary .................................................................................................... 135

Appendix A: Relevant Accident History ........................................................................ 139

Appendix B: Sensitivity Analyses .................................................................................. 173

Sensitivity #1: Adjusting for Block Hour Discrepancy .............................................. 174

Sensitivity #2: Alternative Weighting of Case Results .............................................. 177

Sensitivity #3: Alternative Assumptions Regarding Percent of Flightcrew Members 

Who Are Reserves (Passenger Operations) ............................................................................ 181

Sensitivity #4: Alternative Assumption Regarding Percent of Sick Time that would be 

Saved Due to the Final Rule ................................................................................................... 183

Sensitivity #5: Alternative Assumptions Related to Cargo Analysis ......................... 186
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Appendix C: Detailed Data Tables ................................................................................. 192
1

Executive Summary

On December 21, 2011, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a final rule 

that was published in the Federal Register as Flight Crew Member Duty and Rest Requirements 

on January 4, 2012 (77 Fed. Reg. 330, 403). The regulations, which are limited to passenger 

operations conducted under 14 CFR part 121 (part 121), became effective on January 4, 2014. 

On December 21, 2011, the FAA also issued a Regulatory Impact Analysis (original RIA) dated 

November 18, 2011 (FAA-2009-1093-2477). The original RIA provides the basis for the FAA’s 

decision to (1) promulgate the final rule establishing new flight, duty and rest requirements for 

flight crews in passenger operations; and (2) exclude flight crews in cargo-only operations from 

the new mandatory requirements. While cargo-only operations are not required to meet the new 

regulations, the rule permits these operators to opt into the rule if they so choose. 

On December 22, 2011, the Independent Pilots Association (IPA) filed a timely petition 

for review. During the course of reviewing the administrative record for the purpose of preparing 

the government’s brief, the FAA discovered errors in the original RIA that supports the final 

rule. The errors were associated with the scope of costs related to the implementation of the 

regulations for cargo-only operations. These errors appeared to be of a sufficient amount that the 

FAA concluded it was prudent to review the portion of the cost-benefit analysis related to cargoonly operations and allow interested parties an opportunity to comment on the corrected analysis. 

On May 17, 2012, the FAA asked the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit to suspend the litigation of the final rule while the agency corrected the 

inadvertent errors it had discovered. The court granted the FAA’s motion on June 8, 2012. While 

the passenger operations rule is not at issue in the court proceedings, the FAA, in an abundance 

of caution, decided to have that portion of the original RIA reevaluated as well. 
2

The FAA contracted with the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to 

review the original RIA for accuracy, correct any errors identified, and prepare a supplemental 

regulatory evaluation laying out the revised analysis. The Initial Supplemental RIA (Initial 

SRIA), dated October 4, 2012, and issued for public comment on December 7, 2012, was the 

product of that review. 

While the Initial SRIA largely mirrored the original RIA in both content and 

organizational structure, it provided more detail on the potential impacts the final rule would 

have on both passenger and cargo-only operations. In addition, the Initial SRIA provided 

expanded discussion of the methodology and information sources used in the analysis, corrected 

some reporting of results and minor calculation errors present in the original RIA, and presented 

sensitivity analysis on key assumptions used in the analysis.1

 

In the original RIA, the portion of scheduling costs related to cargo-only operations of air 

carriers that conduct both passenger and cargo-only operations (mixed operations carriers) were 

inadvertently excluded from the reported costs of extending the final rule to cargo-only 

operations. The Initial SRIA corrected that omission, which significantly increased its estimates 

of the costs of extending the final rule to include cargo-only operations. Due to inclusion of 

impacts on cargo-only operations, a few air carriers were reclassified for ease of explication.2 

 

1 The Initial SRIA relied on the same data used for the original RIA. In some cases, new estimates were developed

and more recent data sources were used. 2 Specifically, in the original RIA, the costs of the rule for a small number of air carriers conducting both passenger

operations and cargo‐only operations were modeled using the cost assumptions related to cargo‐only industry

group but the resulting cost estimates associated with those carriers were included in the summary tables labeled

as costs for the passenger industry group. The Initial SRIA reclassified the costs associated with those carriers so

that they are reported under the cargo industry group.   
3

The FAA received ten public comments in response to the Initial SRIA. This Final SRIA 

responds to those comments. Where appropriate, the analysis in this Final SRIA has been revised 

to incorporate new information provided by the commenters. 

This Final Supplemental Regulatory Impact Analysis (Final SRIA) adjusts the 

methodology used to estimate the prospective benefits of extending the provisions of the final 

rule to apply to cargo-only operations in the following ways: 3 

 Adjusts the aircraft models used to estimate the base and high benefits cases for 

cargo-only operations. 

 Accounts for the possibility of non-crew passengers traveling on cargo-only 

flights being involved in a catastrophic accident in the high benefits case. 

 Accounts for the possibility that ground fatalities could result from a catastrophic 

accident involving a cargo-only flight in the high benefits case. 

 Accounts for additional medical costs of non-fatal injuries for the base case. 

 Revises the effectiveness rating of the provisions of the final rule for the sole 

cargo accident in the accident history analysis from 75 percent to 15 percent. 

 Includes a section describing the non-quantified benefits of the final rule. 

This Final SRIA adjusts the methodology used to estimate the costs of applying the final 

rule to in the following ways: 

 Calculates the cost of the aircraft downtime separately for passenger and cargo 

operations. 

 

3 There are no changes to the benefits estimates for passenger operations.
4

 Incorporates new data on the number of primary lineholders relative to the 

number of flightcrew members for carriers in the freight industry groups.4

 Includes the costs of employer provided benefits for airline employees in addition 

to wage costs when estimating labor costs associated with the final rule for both 

passenger and cargo-only operations. 

This Final SRIA also includes an additional sensitivity analysis (found in Appendix B) to 

explore whether using a limited number of alternative assumptions suggested in comments on 

the Initial SRIA would affect the central conclusion that the costs of applying the final rule to 

cargo-only operations vastly outweigh the estimated benefits. This additional sensitivity analysis 

does not alter that central conclusion.5

 

For passenger operations, we provide a range of estimates for the quantitative benefits of 

the final rule. Our base case estimate is $401 million ($246 million present value at seven 

percent and $322 million at three percent) and our high case estimate is $757 million ($465 

million present value at seven percent and $609 million at three percent). The total estimated cost 

of the final rule as it applies to passenger operations is $462 million ($320 million present value 

at seven percent and $391 million at three percent). Therefore, the costs of the final rule are 

somewhat higher than the base case benefits estimate, although still well below the high case 

estimate of benefits. We also note that if it were to save 85 or more lives in a 10-year period – 

that is, three-quarters or more of the 112 fatalities that occurred in fatigue-related accidents 

 

4 Because supplemental carriers provided both passenger and cargo‐only service, this changed the cost estimates

for passenger operations by a small amount. 5 In addition, this Final SRIA revises the discounting methodology so that 2011 is the base year for present value

estimates. In the Initial SRIA, 2012 was used as the base year.
5

during the 10-year reference period -- the benefits from adopting this rule would exceed its 

estimated costs.6

 

If the final rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, the base case estimate of 

additional benefits is $3 million ($2 million present value at seven percent and $3 million at three 

percent) and the high case estimate is $10 million ($6 million present value at seven percent and 

$8 million at three percent). In comparison, the additional estimated cost of the final rule if it 

were extended to cargo-only operations is estimated to be $452 million ($292 million present 

value at seven percent, and $371 million at three percent). This cost estimate far exceeds both the 

base and high case estimates of benefits. In order for extending the final rule to include cargoonly operations to yield net benefits, its provisions would need to prevent at least eight accidents 

during the 10-year analysis period.7 In contrast, only one accident occurred in cargo-only 

operations during the 10-year historical period, and the final rule would have reduced the 

probability of its occurrence by only 15 percent. 

The Final SRIA re-evaluates the analysis supporting the FAA’s decision to exclude 

cargo-only operations from the final rule. Because the comments provided in response to the 

Initial SRIA did not raise any significant issues with regard to passenger operations, this Final 

SRIA does not re-evaluate the analysis supporting the FAA’s decision to issue a final rule 

 

6 This comparison assumes the lives saved would be distributed uniformly over the 10‐year analysis period for

benefits and using a seven percent discount rate. 7 This breakeven analysis for cargo‐only operations is based on total value of an averted accident including not just

averted fatalities but also averted hull destruction, cargo loss, and accident investigation costs. The breakeven

analysis for passenger operations uses just averted fatalities because lives lost is an intuitive measure and

comprises the bulk (93 percent) of the societal value of averting an accident involving a passenger operation.

However for cargo‐only operations, the lives lost is a much lower proportion (35 percent) of the total value of

averting accident. Therefore it is appropriate to conduct the breakeven analysis based on the total value of an

averted accident.
6

implementing new flight, duty and rest requirements for part 121 carriers engaged in carrying 

passengers. 

Table 1 and 

Table 2 summarize the differences between the original RIA, the Initial SRIA, and the 

Final SRIA over the 12-year analysis period from 2012 to 2023.8

Table 1: Nominal Costs and Benefits (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions) 

   Original RIA Initial SRIA Final SRIA

Total Benefits ‐ Base Case $376   $401   $401  

Total Benefits ‐ High Case $716   $757   $757  

Total Costs $390   $457   $462  

Table 2: Nominal Costs and Benefits (2012-2023), Cargo Operations (2011 $Millions) 

   Original RIA Initial SRIA Final SRIA

Total Benefits ‐ Base Case $20.35* $5 $3

Total Benefits ‐ High Case $32.55* $31 $10

Total Costs $306 $550 $452

* The FAA did not detail potential benefits to cargo‐only operations in the original RIA. Rather,

the FAA assumed that benefits associated with averting a single catastrophic accident involving

a cargo plane would range between $20.35 million and $32.55 million.  

Disposition of Issues Raised by Comments Received Regarding

the Initial SRIA

The following organizations submitted comments regarding the economic analysis 

contained in the Initial SRIA:9

 Independent Pilots Association (IPA) 

 Cargo Airline Association (CAA) 

 

8 This analysis period consists of a two‐year period prior to the compliance date of the rule when carriers would

incur some costs associated with preparing for compliance with the rule followed by a 10–year period when the

provisions of the rule are in effect. 9 All comments on the Initial SRIA are filed in Docket No. FAA‐2009‐1093, posted February 12, 2013, available at

www.regulations.gov.
7

 Airline Professionals Association, Teamsters Local 1224 (Airline Professionals 

Association) 

 Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA) 

 Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings (AAWW) 

 US Chamber of Commerce (US Chamber) 

 NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP) 

 US Airlines Pilots Association (USAPA) 

 Airlines for America (A4A) 

 Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 

The comments provided were almost exclusively directed towards the analysis regarding 

cargo-only operations.10 The following summarizes the issues raised and provides the FAA’s 

response to the issues. The remainder of this section is organized into three parts: general issues, 

issues regarding the benefits estimates, and issues related to the cost estimates. 

General Issues

Several commenters objected in principle to the FAA regulating cargo operations 

differently than passenger operations and voiced their support for “one level of safety.” IPA 

stated that “[b]y excluding Cargo Operations from the Final Rule, FAA has deviated from its 

previously consistent practice of regulating pilot fitness to fly exactly the same for cargo and 

passenger operations.”11 IPA used as examples that cargo and passenger pilots are held to the 

 

10 We note that comments discussing whether the FAA was statutorily foreclosed from conducting a cost‐benefit

analysis are addressed in the Notice of Availability for this FSRIA that was published in the Federal Register. 11 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 75.
8

same standard in the FAA rules regarding regards pilots’ use of alcohol and drugs, pilot health 

examinations, pilot medical certificates, and pilot mandatory retirement age. CAPA stated that 

“fatigue does not discriminate between types of operations, aircraft type, or what is being carried 

on the aircraft and neither should safety regulations.”12 USAPA and CAPA stated that they 

support “One Level of Safety” while ALPA stated that it “has encouraged the FAA and the Air 

Cargo Industry to [s]upport the principle that all U.S. licensed cargo and passenger-carrying 

carriers should be required to comply with a ‘single standard’, or ‘One Level of Regulation.’”13

NJSAP stated that one level of safety is a standard that “protects the flying public, professional 

pilots, and those who reside in communities below the flight paths of the thousands of aircraft 

that occupy our domestic airspace. For this reason, passenger and cargo pilots should be subject 

to the same duty and rest thresholds.”14

Under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, the FAA can “propose or adopt a regulation 

only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs.”15 In this case, the costs of 

making compliance with this rule mandatory for cargo-only operations outweigh the benefits by 

a substantial margin. This rule is not unique in recognizing that regulations could differentially 

impact segments of the air transportation industry. There are multiple examples of FAA safety 

regulations that vary by industry segments. For instance, the line of demarcation between part 

135 and 121 is based on the number of passenger seats installed (type-certificated) in the airplane 

and the amount of payload the airplane is certificated to carry. Airplanes type-certificated for 31 

 

12 Coalition of Airline Pilot Associations, Comments, 4. 13 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 26.   14 NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots, Comments, 1.   15 Executive Order 13563 of January 18, 2011, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, § 1(b) (Summarizing

and reaffirming the provisions of Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993, Regulatory Planning and Review.)
9

or more passenger seats fall into part 121 operations.16 Aircraft with a passenger-seating 

configuration of 30 or fewer and a payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or less fall into part 135 

operations. Part 135 regulations are demarcated even further into two subsets: (1) regulations that 

apply to aircraft with 9 or less passenger seats; and (2) regulations that apply to aircraft with 10 

or more passenger seats. 

Several commenters stated that the exclusion of all-cargo operations is contrary to the 

best available scientific information and undermines aviation safety. They stated that fatigue 

does not discriminate between different types of operations, given that cargo pilots fly more 

nighttime operations and tend to cross time zones more often. ALPA stated that passenger pilots 

can fly 30-32 hours in 7 days while cargo pilots flying under supplemental rules can fly 48 hours 

in a 6-day period, which is 60% more flight time than that permitted for passenger flying. ALPA 

also stated that 60 percent of cargo pilot work hours are scheduled between midnight and 6:00 

am.17

The FAA agrees that fatigue studies show that working during periods of circadian low, 

such as during night shifts, and travelling across time zones can contribute to fatigue. However, 

out of the millions of cargo flights that took place over the 10-year period from 2001 to 2010, 

there was only one fatigue-related cargo accident. Based on this accident history, the FAA 

estimates that the accident-causing factors discussed above will not contribute to more than one 

fatigue-related cargo accident over a 10-year period. 

 

16 However, the Applicability sections of part 121, subparts Q‐domestic, R‐flag and S‐supplement allow for air

carriers using airplanes with a passenger seating configuration of 30 or fewer and a payload of 7,500 pounds or

less to comply with the flight, duty and rest limits of part 135 (135.261‐135.273). 17 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 3; 5.  
10

IPA stated that the FAA applies inconsistent reasoning to cargo and passenger operations. 

Because there were no fatigue-related mainline passenger accidents during the analysis period, 

IPA stated that mainline carriers would be excluded by the logic that was applied to cargo 

carriers.18 

The further segmentation of the industry beyond the passenger and cargo-only segments 

(i.e., narrow-body, wide-body, integrated, etc.) is done only to reflect the different operating 

characteristics present in order to produce more accurate cost estimates. CAA supports this 

analysis approach noting, “the FAA has once again correctly recognized that the United States 

aviation industry is made up of a number of differing segments, all of which have different 

operational characteristics.”19

IPA stated that if the FAA is going to exclude a class of operations from the scope of the 

final rule, then the exclusion should be as narrow as possible. IPA also stated that because the 

operations of freight integrated carriers (FedEx, UPS, Airborne) are similar to passenger carriers’ 

hub and spoke operations, analyzing benefits and costs to integrated cargo carriers separately 

from supplemental carriers and adjusting other cost and benefit assumptions to reflect IPA’s 

suggestions might show net benefits.20

The FAA stands by its approach of analyzing passenger and cargo operations separately 

due to the very clear difference in the impacts resulting from a passenger versus a cargo 

 

18 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 1; 8.   19 Cargo Airline Association, Comments, 7.   20 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 10.  
11

accident.21 The FAA notes that the logical consequence of continued segmentation would be 

safety regulations specific to each individual carrier rather than general regulatory standards.22

IPA objected to the FAA’s “conservative” approach to rulemaking. IPA stated that the 

FAA’s use of cost estimates that may be overstated amounts to “putting a thumb on the scale.” 

Specifically IPA pointed to the FAA’s statement in the Initial SRIA on page 68: “The FAA 

believes that carriers will be able to reduce much of the cost shown in Table 21.” IPA also 

pointed to the following statement on page 35 of the Initial SRIA, “We understand that future 

accidents will not be identical to historical accidents, but our approach provides a conservative 

look at the benefits of this rule based on a snapshot of the past.” IPA stated, “FAA apparently 

assumes, but does not explain why, it is good to provide a ‘conservative look at the benefits.” 

IPA also stated, “Overestimating costs and underestimating benefits unfairly and inappropriately 

biases the results of the BCA. In order to make its BCA conform to applicable guidance and have 

some integrity, FAA should correct for these acknowledged biases by developing estimates for 

costs and benefits that are realistic and commensurate with current and future air cargo operating 

practices.”23

Executive Order 12866 provides that in “recognizing that some costs and benefits are 

difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the 

benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.” In order to make such a reasoned 

 

21 We note that in previous comments, IPA stated that the FAA should regulate passenger and cargo operations in

exactly the same manner. However, this statement by IPA is advocating for further industry segmentation in the

RIA.

22 Note that even though supplemental carriers have somewhat higher estimated costs of compliance with the

rule, supplemental carriers that carry passengers are subject to the rule. This demonstrates that the sole basis for

the FAA’s industry segmentation is whether the aircraft operation carries passengers or whether the operation

only transports cargo. 23 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 18‐19.  
12

determination, for a small number of instances in the Initial SRIA, when exact information on 

certain categories of costs was not available,24 the FAA explored the scenarios using 

conservative assumptions (i.e., that actual costs might be lower than assumed). Such assumptions 

are “conservative” in that they implicitly create a higher standard to demonstrate that a proposed 

rule has net benefits. 

In this specific case, the FAA used the best information available to estimate the costs of 

the final rule to industry. While it is possible that carriers could reduce the estimated costs by 

adapting their schedules, the FAA is not able to quantify the magnitude of those potential cost 

savings. This approach is applied consistently to both passenger and cargo operations and is 

certainly warranted given Executive Order 12866.25 

We also note that the Final SRIA presents a high case for benefits estimates which can 

act to balance the conservative assumptions used in the cost estimates. 

Regarding the statement in the Initial SRIA “our approach provides a conservative look 

at the benefits of this rule based on a snapshot of the past,” the word “traditional” would have 

 

24 The full statement in the Initial SRIA is “The FAA believes that carriers will be able to reduce much of the cost

shown in Table 21. Carriers will engage in additional network optimization to reduce crew scheduling costs, which

the FAA is unable to quantify at this point. In the long run, this may involve re‐timing flights, changing schedule

frequency, and entering or leaving markets. However, there may also be costs associated with these actions such

as changes in aircraft utilization and revenue losses. At this time, the FAA has not estimated potential long‐run

optimization of crew scheduling costs.” The FAA has removed the statement “The FAA believes that carriers will be

able to reduce much of the cost shown in Table 21” from this Final SRIA because while optimizing passenger

schedules could easily result in benefits exceeding costs, no amount of schedule optimization would result in cargo

operations compliance cost being less than the benefits.   25 Although not explicitly mentioned by any commenter, the Initial SRIA also used the term “conservative” to

describe its estimates of the cost of installing rest facilities. The information provided by supplemental type

certificate (STC) holders to the FAA describing the expected costs of installing the rest facilities was expressed in

ranges and the FAA chose to explore the potential costs of installation using the high end of the range. For

example, on page 80 of the Initial Supplemental RIA: “STC designers have indicated that with proper planning, a

modifier can install rest facilities in two to four days. We conservatively use a four‐day estimate for the calculation

of the downtime cost.” The new sensitivity analysis provided in this Final SRIA uses assumptions regarding

installation costs that result in even lower estimates of installation costs than would result from using the low end

of the ranges provided to the FAA by the STC designers. Therefore a further sensitivity analysis is not required.  
13

been a more accurate description than “conservative.” The benefit analysis used in the NPRM 

used an innovative simulation approach for determining the extent of the fatigue problems.26 In 

response to comments to the NPRM, the FAA replaced that approach with a commonly-used 

methodology grounded in NTSB findings and the methodology developed by the Commercial 

Aviation Safety Team (CAST),27 which is intended to be transparent and easily reproducible. It 

is for those reasons that the FAA termed its benefits estimates “conservative.” This Final SRIA 

revises its description of the benefits estimation methodology. 

CAPA voiced concern that separate rules for passenger and cargo operations create an 

unfair economic advantage. 

The FAA does not think there will be an unfair economic advantage because the 

passenger and cargo air services are distinct markets. Differing rules for those segments should 

have no competitive impact28. 

CAPA and USAPA stated that passengers on charter (supplemental) should not be 

exposed to “degraded” regulatory standards.29

In response to CAPA and USAPA’s comment, we note that the final flight, duty, and rest 

rule makes compliance mandatory for all passenger operations conducted under part 121. Thus, 

charter (supplemental) passenger operations will have to comply with the new fatigue standards. 

 

26 See page 5 of the Initial SRIA. 27 FAA, Fact Sheet – Commercial Aviation Safety Team (Washington, DC, July 11, 2013), accessed April 2, 2014,

http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsid=15214 28 The FAA notes that some aircraft, known as combi aircraft, are used for both passenger and all‐cargo operations,

as these aircraft have passenger seats plus main deck cargo capability.  Most combi aircraft are used in very special

circumstances where there is a need for main deck cargo capacity but not enough demand to support full freighter

operations. Many of these combi flights serve Alaska and other remote areas. The FAA believes that these are

distinct markets and we do not expect significant market substitution of all‐cargo aircraft for combi aircraft in

response to the rule. 29 Coalition of Airline Pilot Associations, Comments, 4; US Airline Pilots Association, Comments, 2.
14

IPA stated that the cargo industry can afford increased costs from the final rule. 

The FAA considers the societal benefits and costs of a rule, not the industry’s profits 

when conducting the benefit-cost analysis as outlined in OMB Circular A-4.30 

The FAA decided to make compliance voluntary for all-cargo operations because the societal 

compliance costs for those operations significantly exceeded the quantified societal benefits. The 

analysis in this Final SRIA supports that final rule analysis and decision. 

Issues Related To Benefits 

IPA stated that the FAA’s benefits estimates based on the value of averting one cargo 

accident are “not realistic” because UPS insures their fleet for $1.5 billion per accident compared 

to $5.3 million for the base case and $31.4 million for the high case used in the Initial SRIA. 

There is a difference between societal costs and benefits and a course of action chosen by 

an individual company. An individual company primarily seeks to maximize its profitability, and 

it may choose a course of action that is not socially optimal but that maximizes that particular 

company’s profitability. Thus, individual carriers may insure for amounts greater than the 

expected average societal costs of an accident, a point which IPA also acknowledges. A carrier’s 

insurance will cover several types of liabilities that do not have an impact on societal costs and 

benefits, but do have an impact on that individual carrier’s profitability. 

For example, a carrier’s insurance policy typically covers punitive damages. Punitive 

damages awarded in a lawsuit against a carrier are a cost to that carrier, but for purposes of 

societal costs and benefits, these damages are simply a transfer from a defendant to a plaintiff 

 

30 OMB, Circular A‐4: Regulatory Analysis (Washington, DC, September 17, 2003), accessed April 2, 2014,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a‐4.
15

and not a category of social benefits. As a result of individual business considerations, a carrier 

might also choose a very high limit to cover any extreme scenarios even though those extreme 

scenarios have only very small probabilities of actually occurring. A private firm’s decisions 

regarding risk tolerance can be informative, but they do not, by themselves, drive a cost-benefit 

analysis for the whole industry. Specifically, the estimates in the Initial SRIA are based on an 

estimate of typical conditions, i.e., what actually occurred in the base case and an accident 

involving a larger aircraft in common use for the high case. These scenarios do not attempt to 

cover the most extreme low-probability examples of what might happen. 

Several commenters disagreed with what the base and high case benefits estimates should 

represent. Some commenters advocated a high case that represents an extreme worst case 

scenario. For instance, IPA suggested basing a high case scenario on 24 fatalities on the ground 

even though a (non-terrorist) accident with that magnitude of ground fatalities has never 

occurred within the U.S. or its territories.31 ALPA suggested using the value of a brand new 

Boeing 777 as the value of a lost hull for the high benefits case, even though the average age of 

the cargo fleet is roughly 20 years and just 1.2 percent of the cargo fleet is less than one year in 

age.32 On the other hand, AAWW objected to using a high case scenario that was not found in 

the actual accident history. 

 The FAA wishes to clarify that “worst case” scenarios could be considered only insofar 

as those scenarios can be linked to a reasonable probability of occurrence. Specifically, OMB 

Circular A-4 states: 

 

31 The 20‐year accident history involving part 121 cargo operations is presented in Table C‐8 in Appendix C. The

highest number of on‐ground fatalities for cargo operations in the U.S. or its territories is one fatality. 32 BTS Form 41 Schedule B‐43 (2011).
16

If fundamental scientific disagreement or lack of knowledge prevents construction of a 

scientifically defensible probability distribution, you should describe benefits or costs 

under plausible scenarios and characterize the evidence and assumptions underlying each 

alternative scenario 33

In the Initial SRIA, the base case projects the future based on what actually occurred in 

the accident history involving the millions of all-cargo flights that occurred in the last 10 years. 

The high case reflects a situation with more fatalities, larger hull and higher cargo value but that 

is still a likely possibility of what could occur in the future. Considering unlikely highconsequence scenarios would undermine the cost-benefit analysis, as one could always think of 

unlikely catastrophic accidents whose avoidance generates huge benefits. We also note that even 

with the “likely” base and high case scenarios, the probability of a fatigue-related cargo accident 

is extremely low, as evidenced by the occurrence of just one fatigue related cargo accident in the 

10-year accident history. 

IPA stated that FAA did not follow its own guidance on regulatory evaluation because, 

IPA asserted, no sensitivities were performed on benefits. 

This statement is not correct. The benefits were estimated for both a base case and a high 

case and sensitivity analyses for the cost estimates were provided in the appendices to the Initial 

SRIA. Further, this Final SRIA introduces an additional sensitivity analysis (found in Appendix 

B) exploring alternative assumptions regarding the estimation of benefits and costs of the final 

rule for cargo-only operations. 

 

33 Ibid.
17

IPA stated that a major weakness of the Initial SRIA is “basing it on a statistically 

insignificant sample size of one accident in ten years for cargo operations.” IPA said that “even 

assuming that the total fatigue based accident rate will remain the same, due to small sample 

size, (4 fatigue related accidents in the BCA high case analysis) for cargo and passenger 

accidents in the past 10 years, there is simply no statistical or analytical basis for assuming that 

the split among fatigue related accidents will be 3 passenger accidents and 1 cargo accident, 

rather than evenly split with 2 cargo accidents and 2 passenger accidents or 1 passenger accident 

and 3 cargo accidents.”34

The FAA disagrees with the characterization of a small sample size. During the 10-year 

historical accident period, there were millions of cargo departures and only one of which resulted 

in a fatigue-related accident. The small number of accidents does, however, result in a small 

number of observations for attempting to describe the impacts from a fatigue-related accident. 

For that reason, in the Initial SRIA, the FAA explored a base and a high case for the benefits 

estimates, with the base case representing the impacts that occurred from actual fatigue-related 

accidents and the high case representing a potentially more severe yet plausible outcome. This 

Final SRIA adds an additional sensitivity analysis (found in Appendix B) exploring alternative 

assumptions regarding the estimation of benefits and costs of the final rule for cargo-only 

operations. 

CAA and AAWW stated that the 75 percent effectiveness rating for the cargo accident is 

too high. They stated that the crew’s rest would have been in compliance with provisions of the 

new part 117 if those regulations had been in effect at the time of the accident. Therefore, CAA 

 

34 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 11.
18

and AAWW argued, this accident should be removed from the benefits analysis. CAA further 

stated that the chance of any future cargo accidents related to fatigue is very unlikely and 

therefore the benefits of applying the rule to cargo operations are “extremely small, and certainly 

less than the estimates made by the FAA.” 35 

In response to these comments, the FAA reevaluated the effectiveness rating of the 

FedEx accident,36 which is the only all-cargo accident that would be mitigated if this rule was to 

apply to all-cargo operations. The FAA concurs with CAA and AAWW’s assertion that the 

crew’s schedule would have been in compliance with the final rule. 

Based on information contained in the NTSB report and information provided by FedEx 

as part of the CAA comments, the following represents how the accident crew’s schedule would 

have compared to the requirements of this rule: 

 The maximum Flight Duty Period (FDP) limit that would have been applicable to the 

pilot-in-command (PIC) under this rule was 9:00 hours. The PIC had 2:35 hours of FDP 

time at the time of the accident. This would have been within the 9:00 hour limit. The 

flight-time limit that would have been applicable to the PIC under this rule was 8:00 

hours. At the time of the accident, the PIC had 1:23 hours of flight time, which was 

within the limit. Prior to being assigned to reserve status, the PIC also had 12 hours of 

rest, which would have satisfied the rest requirement of 10 hours in § 117.25(e) and 

 

35 Cargo Airline Association, Comments, 10‐12. 36 NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Collision with Trees on Final Approach, Federal Express Flight 1478, Boeing 727‐

232, N497FE, Tallahassee, Florida, July 26, 2002 (Washington, DC, June 8, 2004, NTSB/AAR‐04/02)
19

80:51 hours of rest in the previous 168 hours,37 which would have satisfied the 

requirement of 30 hours in § 117.25(b), if that had been in effect at the time. 

 The maximum FDP limit that would have been applicable to the second-in-command 

(SIC) under part 117 was 11:00 hours. At the time of the accident, the SIC had 10:29 

hours of FDP time, which would have been within the limits. The flight-time limit that 

would have been applicable to the SIC was 9:00 hours. At the time of the accident, the 

SIC had 4:02 hours of flight time, which was within the limit. Prior to flight, the SIC also 

had 11:03 hours of rest, which would have satisfied the rest requirement of 10 hours in § 

117.25(e) and 41:54 hours of rest in the previous 168 hours,38 which would have satisfied 

the requirement of 30 hours in § 117.25(b), if that had been in effect at the time. 

 The maximum FDP limit that would have been applicable to the flight engineer under 

part 117 was 12:00 hours. At the time of the accident, the flight engineer had 10:41 hours 

of FDP time, which would have been within the limits. The flight-time limit that would 

have been applicable to the flight engineer was 9:00 hours. At the time of the accident, 

the flight engineer had 3:43 hours of flight time, which was within the limit. Prior to 

flight, the flight engineer also had 10:22 hours of rest, which would have satisfied the rest 

requirement of 10 hours in § 117.25(e) and 95:44 hours of rest in the previous 168 

hours,39 which would have satisfied the requirement of 30 hours in § 117.25(b), if that 

had been in effect at the time. 

 

37 Ibid., 12‐13.   38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.
20

While the crew’s work schedule just prior to the accident was in compliance with the 

provisions of the final rule, the NTSB did find that fatigue was a contributing factor to the 

accident. The FAA believes that the final rule would have had some potential for preventing the 

accident for the following reasons. 

The PIC reported that he received a "marginal" quality of sleep for the two nights leading 

up to the day of the accident because he kept being woken up by the family dog. The NTSB 

found evidence of a sleep deficit for the PIC based on this reported sleep quality and small errors 

made during the accident flight. Similarly, the SIC said he had difficulty adjusting his sleep cycle 

and stated that he did not sleep well during the day. A friend and the PIC both described the SIC 

as looking tired. 

Subsection 117.25(e) of the flight duty rule requires a pilot to receive a 10-hour rest 

period with a minimum 8-hour uninterrupted sleep opportunity immediately before beginning a 

flight duty period. If a pilot determines that his rest period will not provide eight uninterrupted 

hours of sleep opportunity, subsection 117.25(f) requires that pilot to notify the certificate holder 

and prohibits the pilot from reporting to the assigned flight duty period until he receives an 

uninterrupted 8-hour sleep opportunity. Additionally, subsection 117.5(d) requires each 

flightcrew member to affirmatively state that he or she is fit for duty prior to commencing a 

flight. 

Here, the PIC’s sleep was repeatedly interrupted by his dog, and as such, the PIC may not 

have received an uninterrupted 8-hour sleep opportunity. If that was the case, then 117.25(f) 

would have required him to notify the certificate holder of his sleep problem and delay the flight 

until he received an uninterrupted 8 hours of sleep. In addition, the SIC may have received a 

poor quality of sleep, and because he looked tired before and during the flight, there is a 
21

possibility that he would not have affirmed that he was fit for duty prior to commencing flight as 

required by subsection 117.5(d). 

In factoring in these mitigations, the FAA determined the effectiveness score would have 

been approximately 15% instead of the 75% mitigation used in the Initial SRIA. The FAA agrees 

with commenters that the 75% effectiveness rating used in the Initial SRIA is overstated, as the 

flightcrew’s flight time, duty time, and scheduled rest time would have been in compliance with 

this final rule if the rule had been in effect at that time and applicable to the FedEx crew. 

However, the FAA disagrees with the commenters that the mitigation would have been zero. 

The FAA believes this rule would have provided some mitigation for the FedEx accident if it had 

applied to the FedEx flightcrew, although that mitigation would not be as high as 75% because 

the mitigation would be achieved via more subjective factors, such as fitness for duty and a 

determination of whether the PIC’s sleep opportunity was interrupted due to his family dog.40

Accordingly, in this Final SRIA the FAA uses a 15 percent effectiveness rating for the FedEx 

accident. 

 A4A noted that some of the accidents included in the benefits analysis for this final rule 

also appear in the NPRMs for other rules and that in some cases, the sum of the effectiveness 

ratings across rules exceeds 100%. 

 

40 In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that air carriers be required to assess whether a flightcrew member is fit for

duty when that flightcrew member reports for work.  Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements NPRM, 75

FR 55852, 55857‐58 (Sep. 14, 2010).  The FAA also proposed that air carriers be required to conduct fitness‐for‐

duty testing of flightcrew members who are reported to be fatigued by their coworkers.  Id.  However, the FAA

ultimately rejected both of these proposals in the final rule because “there does not currently exist an objective

standard for determining fatigue levels.”  Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Final Rule, 77 FR 330,

349 (Jan. 4, 2012).
22

The previous NPRMs noted by A4A analyzed each accident considering each rule in 

isolation. Subsequent to those NPRMs, the FAA reanalyzed accidents that were used by more 

than one rulemaking to determine the effectiveness ratings for each rule in relation to the rule 

provisions of the other rulemakings. The FAA’s methodology for estimating effectiveness 

ratings that were used in the final RIAs for those rules ensured that the sum of effectiveness 

ratings across rulemakings for any individual accident did not exceed 100%. As of the date of the 

writing of this Final SRIA, the benefits estimates for two other rulemakings, Pilot Certification 

and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations Rule (FOQ, RIN 2120-AJ67), and 

Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers (N&O, RIN 2120-

AJ00), involved accidents that are also used in this RIA. As shown in Table C.10 of Appendix C, 

the effectiveness ratings, when summed across the rules, do not exceed 100%. 

ALPA and IPA stated that the benefits should be calculated using a 20-year look back 

period rather than the 10-year period used in the Initial SRIA. IPA stated that having more 

historical time series data is generally preferable to less. IPA added that the 20-year period 

depicts a relatively constant regulatory environment with regard to flightcrew duty and rest 

requirements, and consequently, there is not a reason to truncate the historic accident database. 

ALPA noted that there were 3 fatigue related cargo accidents in the first 10-year portion of the 

20-year look back period and just 1 in the second 10-year portion and states that “since no one 

can predict any accident... our opinion is that it would be unwise to discount the probability of 

one vs. three accidents.”41

 

41 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 23.
23

The NPRM for this rule proposed using the 20-year accident history suggested by ALPA 

and IPA. In response to this proposal, the FAA received comments pointing out that use of such 

a long accident history failed to account for more recent regulatory actions and safety initiatives 

in the industry which have acted to reduce the overall rate of accidents in the aviation industry.42 

Specifically regarding cargo operations, during the period 1991 to 2000, there were eight 

fatal part 121 cargo accidents and approximately 6.25 million cargo aircraft departures, which 

suggests a fatal accident rate of 1.3 accidents per million departures.43 During the period from 

2001 to 2010, there were just five fatal accidents and over 7 million cargo departures, resulting in 

an accident rate of just 0.7 accidents per million departures, roughly half the accident rate 

experienced in the previous decade.44 If the accident rate observed during the period 1991 to 

2000 had persisted unchanged, we would have expected to see nine accidents in the later period 

when in fact we experienced just five.45 

That observation is also supported by the information in Table 4 of the Initial SRIA 

which shows that there were more fatigue-related fatalities, injuries, and accidents during the 

period 1991 to 2000 than the period 2001 to 2010. Specifically, the fatigue-related accident rate 

for all-cargo operations from 1991 to 2000 was 0.32 accidents per million departures, which fell 

to a rate of 0.14 accidents per million departures for the time period spanning 2001 to 2010. 

 

42 Air Transport Association of America, Comments. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Flightcrew Member Duty

and Rest Requirements (Docket No. FAA‐2009‐1093, November 15, 2010), 13‐15, accessed March 3, 2014,

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA‐2009‐1093‐2333. 43 This paragraph refers to all U.S. cargo accidents – not just the ones caused by fatigue. 44 A listing of the part 121 cargo accidents from the NTSB aviation accident database is provided in Table C.8 of

Appendix C. The data on number of cargo departures is taken from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Air

Carrier Summary: T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type (omitting piston and rotor

engines), accessed March 14, 2014, http://transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table_ID=254. 45 The FAA acknowledges that with such rare incidents, it is difficult to tell whether the observed difference in

accident rates during the two periods is statistically significant.
24

Therefore, FAA uses a 10-year historical accident period because of the decline in fatal accidents 

after 2000. Although the regulations regarding flightcrew duty and rest may not have changed 

during the 20-year period, other safety initiatives have likely partially mitigated the impacts of 

fatigue issues such that the end result is a lower number of accidents related to fatigue. 

IPA stated an objection to using the past 10 years as exact mirror for future years since 

the FAA acknowledges accidents are random in nature and industry is not static but dynamic. In 

addition, IPA pointed to expected growth in international cargo operations industry. The Airline 

Professionals Association also stated that the model used to estimate benefits of the final rule is 

flawed because it is static. 

Since one fatigue-related accident occurred during the last 10 years, our best estimate is 

that one would also occur during the coming decade without this rule in effect; nevertheless, 

FAA acknowledges the possibility that more (or fewer) accidents could occur during that time. 

Infrequent events such as aviation accidents are generally thought to follow a Poisson probability 

distribution, which gives the probabilities that different numbers of such events will actually

occur during a specified time period, when their expected number is known.46 Because of this 

probabilistic nature of their frequency, it is impossible to predict the exact number of accidents 

that this final rule could potentially prevent during the next ten years. It is possible to provide the 

likely outcome as rare events are distributed as a Poisson distribution. Even if the expected mean 

 

46 See for example Pei‐Chi Shao, Yu‐Hern Chang, and Hubert J. Chen, “Analysis of an aircraft accident model in

Taiwan,” Journal of Air Transport Management 27 (2013), pp. 34‐38 and Milan Janic, “An assessment of risk and

safety in civil aviation,” “Journal of Air Transport Management 6 (2000), pp. 43‐50.
25

– one per ten years – is correct and remains unchanged in the coming decade, we cannot rule out 

the possibility that a larger (or smaller) number will occur during that time.47 

Despite this uncertainty, however, the possibility that this rule could prevent a sufficient 

number of future accidents to generate net economic benefits in cargo-only operations remains 

extremely remote. This is because – as the breakeven analysis reported previously in this Final 

SRIA shows – the final rule would need to prevent 8 accidents over the coming 10-year period in 

order to yield net economic benefits for cargo-only operations. The likelihood that the true mean 

is 8 accidents over ten years and we observed only 1 accident is 0.0027, or very unlikely. 

Further, the rule’s estimated 15 percent effectiveness rating in reducing fatigue-related accidents 

in cargo-only operations means that many more than eight such accidents (8 divided by 0.15, or 

more than fifty) would have to have been anticipated over the next 10 years for it to yield 

expected net benefits. Regardless of whether the expected frequency of accidents is one per 

decade or some higher – but still plausible -- value, the probability that this number of accidents 

would occur in the coming decade without this rule in effect accidents is negligible.48 

The FAA agrees that an adjustment for future growth in the industry may be appropriate. 

However, if one were to incorporate industry growth for the benefits calculations one would also 

need to incorporate growth for cost calculations. Those two adjustments would not impact the 

 

47 If the estimate of one per decade is correct and remains unchanged, and the frequency of aircraft accidents

indeed follows a Poisson distribution, the probability that exactly one accident will occur during the next decade is

37 percent; the probability that two or more accidents will occur within the next ten years is 26 percent; and the

probability that no accidents will occur is 37 percent. 48 If our best estimate of the expected frequency of fatigue‐related accidents in cargo‐only operations (one per 10

years) is correct, the probability that 50 or more accidents would occur in the next decade is just one in 1065. Even

if the true expected frequency were as high as 7.43 per 10 year period (the upper bound of the 99 percent

confidence interval of the estimate of the average accident rate), the chance that 50 or more accidents could occur

is still exceedingly remote, just one in 1025.
26

conclusion that the costs of extending the final rule to cargo-only operations significantly 

outweigh the benefits. 

Several commenters stated that passenger and cargo systems are interrelated and noted 

the possibility that a cargo plane could run into a passenger plane on the ground or in the air. 

CAPA mentions cargo operations were initially exempt from implementing Traffic Collision 

Avoidance System (TCAS) but after a passenger and cargo collision and three near misses, 

TCAS was mandated for all cargo aircraft. 

The FAA notes that the possibility of a cargo flight colliding with a passenger-carrying 

flight either on the ground or in the air due to flightcrew member fatigue is likely to be negligibly 

small. Passenger and cargo flights are usually separated in time, with many cargo take-off and 

landings operations occurring at night and passenger operations occurring during the day. 

Further, the main cargo hubs do not handle large amounts of passenger operations. Finally, 

during the 10-year fatigue-related accident history (as well as for the 20-year history), no such 

incident has occurred, suggesting that such an event is likely to remain exceedingly rare. It is 

perhaps due to TCAS, mentioned by CAPA, that such collisions have become extremely rare. 

Regarding the aircraft models used to represent high and low cases for benefits estimates 

for cargo operations, IPA and ALPA stated that using the Boeing 727 as the base case aircraft 

hull is not appropriate because the Boeing 727 is only in limited use currently and will not be 

used in the future. IPA suggested using a representative narrow-body aircraft for the base case 

and a representative wide-body as the high case. Specifically, IPA recommended using a Boeing 

757 with a hull value of $11 million for the base case. IPA presented a discussion comparing the 

suitability of either the Boeing 747 or the MD-11 to represent the high case. IPA supported the 

use of a Boeing 747 with a hull value of $60.6 million for the high case because it will be 
27

replacing the MD-11s in the future benefits period. ALPA suggested using an MD-11 with a hull 

value of $23.5 million for the base case and brand new Boeing 777 with a hull value of $295.7 

million as the high case. IPA also noted that in the Initial SRIA the value of the aircraft used for 

the cargo benefits analysis ($1.8 million for the base case and $15.2 million for the high case) is 

at odds with value of aircraft used in retrofitting cost analysis ($69 million). 

The FAA will adopt IPA’s suggestion to change the base case from reflecting the actual 

model aircraft involved in the single cargo accident to reflecting a representative narrow-body 

cargo plane and to change the high case to reflect a representative wide-body plane. The FAA 

agrees that the Boeing 757 is an appropriate representative model for the cargo narrow-body 

fleet.49 As stated in the Initial SRIA, the FAA estimates the hull value of a B757-200F to be 

$15.2 million based on an average replacement value for a B757-200F made between 1983 and 

1999.50 

For the high case, the FAA prefers to use the most common wide-body aircraft that is in 

use today, because appropriate values for use in valuing the benefits of extending this rule to 

include cargo operations are based on current market prices for the aircraft models most 

commonly flown in cargo operations. The most common wide-body cargo aircraft in the US 

cargo fleet is the DC-10 group comprised of DC-10s, MD-10s, and MD-11s. The FAA will adopt 

ALPA’s estimated value of a mid-range MD-11: $23.5 million.51 As a sensitivity analysis for the 

high case, the FAA presents estimates based on IPA’s recommended model, a Boeing 747 with a 

 

49 Boeing 757 is the most commonly used narrow‐body aircraft used for cargo‐only operations as shown in the T‐

100 Segment Data, (Jan ‐ Oct 2012, Part 121 Cargo‐only Operations). 50 Airliner Price Guide, Summer 2011. 51 The $23.5 million hull value estimate lies between the retail and wholesale values for an 1992 MD‐11 published

in the Airliner Price Guide (Winter 2012).The FAA agrees that this is an appropriate estimate because the average

age of a cargo aircraft is approximately 20 years.
28

capacity of 124 tons. IPA stated that the average value of a Boeing 747 is $60.6 million but did 

not provide a source for that assertion. The FAA has decided to use an estimated value of $42.5 

million, which is based on the published wholesale price of a 1993 B747-400F.52 ALPA 

recommended using the MD-11 for base case but the FAA believes that using a narrow-body 

aircraft is a more reasonable choice for the base case because: (1) the base case is intended to 

represent the actual accident history; and (2) the single historic fatigue-related cargo accident 

that would be mitigated by this rule involved a narrow-body aircraft. ALPA’s recommendation 

to use $295.7, the value of a brand new Boeing 777, is not supportable because Boeing 777 

aircraft account for a small share of cargo-only operations and because most aircraft used in 

cargo-only operations have been in service for a substantial number of years. 53

The FAA notes that using a value for aircraft hull in the “Downtime” section of the cost 

estimation that is different than the aircraft hull value used in the benefits estimation is justified 

because the downtime cost is applied only to a subset of aircraft used in extended range 

operations. Those aircraft may have values that differ from the values of aircraft used in more 

typical operations. The aircraft value of $69 million used as the basis for estimating the cost of 

downtime is the appraised value of a Boeing 767-300. However, upon further review, the FAA 

notes that the $69 million value relates to a passenger B767. Therefore, the FAA will use the 

value of a Boeing 767-300ERF (Extended Range Freighter) to calculate the downtime costs 

 

52 Airliner Price Guide, Winter 2012. 53  In 2013, the Boeing 777 accounted for only 2.5% of the all‐cargo revenue aircraft departures performed per DOT

T‐100 data. According to a 2013 study by Boeing, the average age of a freighter aircraft at leaving service was

nearly 35 years. (Helen Jiang, Key Findings on Airplane Economic Life, Boeing, March 2013.)
29

associated with installation of rest facilities for the cargo segment. The estimated value of a 10-

year old Boeing 767-300ERFF is approximately $40 million.54 

ALPA and IPA provided revised estimates of the value of cargo lost during an accident 

which applied the FAA’s methodology to the cargo capacities of the aircraft they recommended 

for base and high cases. 

The FAA will revise the benefits estimates related to cargo value to reflect the choice of 

using the Boeing 757 as the base case, the MD-11 as the high case, and Boeing 747 as the high 

case sensitivity. 

IPA stated that “contrary to FAA’s statement, there is at least one published report, 

readily available to the FAA that describes the value of air cargo in the overnight package 

industry.”55 IPA points to FedEx Flight 1406 accident for which “insurance estimates of the 

value of the destroyed cargo totaled about $300 million.”56 IPA prorated the cargo value to 

account for the cargo capacity of a Boeing 757 and derived an estimate of $125 million for the 

value cargo lost in a cargo accident which is greater than the $2.7 million used by the FAA. IPA 

stated that this information should be considered by the FAA in estimating benefits for avoiding 

destruction of cargo. 

The FAA prefers to use the average value of air cargo from the Commodity Flow Survey. 

The use of an average from a publicly available data source is preferred to anecdotal data from 

one accident. In addition, it is not clear what an “insurance estimate” of damage is. It may refer 

 

54 Airliner Price Guide, Winter 2011. 55 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 31. 56 Ibid.
30

to the amount of coverage available for a single accident, not the value of the actual cargo 

onboard. 

IPA stated that the FAA improperly omitted from the benefits estimates the value of 

timely receipt of cargo. IPA also made mention of lives lost from failure to deliver critical 

medical supplies or equipment, vital documents, irreplaceable historical artifacts lost, and 

absolute loss of unique materials. 

The FAA believes that average value per ton of air cargo used in the Initial SRIA is the 

appropriate value of cargo to use in this RIA. The average value per ton of air cargo is derived 

from the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS), a publicly accessible data source published by the 

Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). The data is an overall average of all air cargo and 

therefore embodies the value of both high value items and unique values, to the extent that such 

items are included in overall universe of air cargo. For most items shipped by air, a replacement 

item could be shipped the following day meaning that any losses resulting from “timeliness” 

would be minimal. Regarding lives lost from critical medical supplies, while such instances may 

occur, the FAA has no data on the prevalence of such situations on which to base a quantified 

benefits estimate. That item will be mentioned in the non-quantified benefits section of this Final 

SRIA. 

Regarding the estimated number of onboard fatalities and injuries for a cargo accident, 

IPA noted the possibility of non-crew passengers aboard a cargo-only flight but provided no data 

on the prevalence of non-crew passengers on cargo-only flights. ALPA stated that their 

suggested base case aircraft, the MD-11, has an extended range which, if utilized, would require 

double crew and increase the crew complement from three in the base case to four. ALPA’s 
31

suggestion of using an extended range Boeing 777 for the high case would also increase the crew 

complement from two to four. 

The FAA agrees that in some cases there may be non-crew passengers onboard or that the 

crew needed for a cargo flight may be higher than two for some extended range flights. 

However, there is scant data available to describe how frequently these situations occur on a 

typical US carrier cargo flight. In the absence of such information, the FAA will assume that 

there are 3.2 people onboard a typical air cargo flight. This estimate is derived from the average 

number of people on board the fatal cargo accidents involving US carriers during the historical 

accident period of 2001 to 2010 as shown in Table C.8 in Appendix C.57 

Several commenters stated that the FAA failed to properly account for damage to persons 

and property on ground. IPA specifically noted the catastrophic 1992 El Al cargo accident in 

Amsterdam which killed 43 people on ground and the 2001 American Airlines Flight 587 

accident in Queens, NY. IPA stated that the RIA should have considered damage to forested area 

or loss of the property for income producing purposes from the actual FedEx accident near 

Tallahassee. IPA further stated that since the location of an accident is random, the FAA should 

assess probability that an accident may happen in many different places. IPA also recommended 

adjusting the benefits estimates for the base case for a cargo accident by including 5.5 avoided 

fatalities on the ground based on the average number of external fatalities from fatal cargo 

accidents worldwide for the period 2002-2011, as derived from Boeing’s Statistical Summary 

 

57 Since 2010 there have been two additional cargo accidents involving US carriers. Because the cause of these

accidents is still being investigated at this time, the FAA does not include these accidents in this Final Supplemental

RIA.
32

(July 2012).58 For the high case, IPA recommended using 24 fatalities, the midpoint between the 

average of external fatalities (5.5) and the actual highest known deaths on the ground from a 

cargo accident. 

The FAA benefits estimates for the base case do account for damage on the ground. The 

base-case benefits estimates are based on what actually happened in the historical accidents and 

as a result, the on-ground deaths resulting from the Colgan accident were accounted for in the 

passenger benefits analysis. None of the other historical fatigue-related accidents resulted in onground fatalities or injuries. Regarding property damage on the ground, the FedEx accident 

appears to have resulted in only minor damage on the ground. The NTSB report states, “trees 

along the wreckage path were damaged by the impact and postcrash fire. Some farm vehicles and 

equipment and a fence line were also damaged by the impact.”59 The FAA does not have access 

to the actual dollar value of the damage but the value would appear to be quite small, certainly 

not enough to change the central conclusion of the RIA for the cargo industry. 

The FAA agrees that the possibility of damages on the ground should be added to the 

high case benefits estimates, which aims to represent what would be the likely consequences of a 

future part 121 accident. However, the FAA believes that using worldwide estimates of ground 

fatalities, as suggested by IPA, is inappropriate for use in estimating the costs and benefits of this 

rulemaking because foreign carriers operate in different operating environments and under 

different regulations than U.S. carriers. Looking at on-ground deaths caused by U.S. carriers, 

 

58 The Boeing document reports 13 fatal cargo accidents worldwide for the period, resulting in 44 onboard

fatalities and 72 external fatalities for an average of 5.5 external fatalities per fatal cargo accident. A copy of the

Boeing document has been placed in the docket associated with this rulemaking. 59 NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Collision with Trees on Final Approach, Federal Express Flight 1478, Boeing 727‐

232, N497FE, Tallahassee, Florida, July 26, 2002 (Washington, DC, June 8, 2004, NTSB/AAR‐04/02)
33

historical analysis shows that ground deaths from aviation accidents involving US carriers are 

rare. The five fatal cargo accidents involving U.S. carriers that occurred during the 2001 to 2010 

historical period resulted in two ground fatalities suggesting an average 0.4 ground fatalities per 

accident (see Table C.8 in Appendix C). This low rate of ground fatalities may be due to certain 

characteristics of the U.S. aviation environment, such as airport buffer zones and the relatively 

lower population density of the US compared to other parts of the world. The FAA will use an 

estimated 0.4 ground fatalities per cargo accident for the high case benefits estimate in this Final 

SRIA.60 

IPA and ALPA stated that the FAA had improperly omitted from its analysis potential 

health benefits to pilots from the rule. IPA stated “FAA attempts to justify excluding those 

benefits by explaining that they are not related to aviation safety, but this point is off the mark 

because FAA’s BCA purports to assess the ‘societal benefits’ of the rule.”61 

ALPA suggests a method for quantifying the long-term health benefits from reduced 

fatigue that involves transferring a benefits estimate from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration’s (FMCSA) RIA for hours of service (HOS) rules for truck drivers. ALPA states, 

“FMCSA found a health benefit of $2,112 per driver per year, or $340 million per year for a pool 

of 160,000 drivers, due to reduced health mortality risk under the proposed new hours of service 

rule... An equivalent net health benefit applied to all cargo pilots would result in an overall 

 

60 We also note that foreign air carriers are not subject to the FAA regulations that this rule changes, and as such

their operations will be unaffected by this rule. Consequently, this rule will not reduce the number of on‐ground

fatalities caused by foreign carriers. 61 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 49.
34

health benefit of over $190 million during the FAA’s 10-year reference period. ($2,122 x 8990 

pilots x 10 years).”62 

The FAA disagrees with IPA’s characterization of the text in the final rule preamble. The 

FAA agrees that reducing health problems is a societal benefit and in fact stated that “the societal 

cost associated with long-term fatigued-related health problems can be substantial. Decreasing 

these costs represents a societal benefit.”63 The only reason the FAA did not include those long 

term fatigue-related health benefits is because we were not able to quantify them.64 This Final 

SRIA now includes the potential long-term health benefits to pilots from reduced fatigue in the 

discussion of non-quantified benefits. 

The FAA is not able to replicate ALPA’s estimate of $2,122 benefits per truck driver and 

therefore believes that ALPA may have misinterpreted the information in the FMCSA’s RIA for 

trucking HOS. Regardless, the situation that FMCSA analyzed for truck drivers is very different 

than the situation for airline pilots and therefore it is inappropriate to transfer the benefits 

estimates from the FMCSA analysis to this situation. FMCSA found support for an estimate of 

benefits from reduced mortality impacts from improved sleep opportunities for the subset of 

truck drivers working the most extreme schedules. These schedules were so demanding that 

FMCSA estimates these drivers only achieved 6.2 hours of sleep per night. FMCSA labeled as 

the “very high” workload group, those drivers who work 70 hours a week with 6 work days per 

week averaging 11.7 hours per work day. That group is estimated to account for 10 percent of 

the truck driver work force. The “extreme” workload group, accounting for an additional 5 

 

62 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 13. 63 “Flight Crew Member Duty and Rest Requirements. Final Rule,” Federal Register, 77 (January 4, 2012): 392‐393. 64 The FAA does include an estimate of the short term health benefits from reducing fatigue. This category of

benefits is discussed in section titled “Payroll Cost Savings from Reducing Flightcrew Member Fatigue.”
35

percent of the driver work force, works 80 hours per week with 6 work days per week averaging 

13.3 hours per work day. In contrast, due to labor agreements and the FAA’s existing work hour 

rules, the work schedules for flightcrew member are much less extreme than those faced by truck 

drivers. The Crew Pairings analysis, summarized in Table C.9 of Appendix C, shows that for all 

of the cargo cases, the bid lines had at least 12 days off per month and the most intense schedules 

had less than 43 hours of duty time per week.65 This is significantly less than the 70-hour truck 

driver work weeks that were used in FMCSA’s estimate. 

IPA stated that the FAA should have included as a category of benefits the loss of airline 

revenue from lost shipping charges that the airlines would need to refund in the case of an 

accident. IPA stated that such an estimate “should be readily ascertained by FAA.”66 This issue 

has two aspects. First, a benefit-cost analysis does not look at the revenues to the air freight 

company in isolation. The air freight company experiences a loss when it refunds the shipping 

fees, but the customer receives a gain. There is not a net societal loss from a simple refund. The 

second issue is that, arguably, those shipping charges could be considered a proxy for the true 

economic costs of an attempted delivery that did not actually occur. However, a large portion of 

the cost of shipping an item is the cost of using the aircraft, and the cost of the aircraft is already 

accounted for in this analysis via the inclusion of the value of the aircraft hull in the benefits 

analysis. The value of the aircraft hull is the present value of the stream of delivery services it 

can provide over its remaining life. Therefore to include the lost shipping charges separately 

would result in double counting of benefits. 

 

65 GRA, Inc. Summary of CrewPairings, Inc. Economic Analysis of Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements

Rulemaking. (Jenkintown, PA, September 2012) 66 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 39.
36

IPA stated that the FAA should have included as a category of benefits “potential short 

and long-term medical costs if persons are severely injured or burned rather than killed...67” 

In the Initial SRIA and original RIA the FAA valued avoided injuries using Department 

of Transportation (DOT) guidance which directs agencies to value prevented injuries as a 

percentage of the Value of Statistical Life (VSL). In response to this comment, the FAA 

consulted with other DOT economists regarding whether the resulting estimate of the value of 

preventing an injury included the value of avoiding medical costs from injuries. From these 

discussions, the FAA has determined that it may be appropriate to include an additional category 

of benefits related to medical costs for injuries.68 

Separate estimates of medical costs for injuries rated on the Abbreviated Injury Scale 

(AIS) are available from a report prepared by DOT’s National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA).69 Updating the NHTSA estimate of medical costs for treating an AIS 

 

67 Ibid., 23. 68 The DOT’s Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in Departmental Analyses. Revised Departmental

Guidance: Treatment of the Value of Preventing Fatalities and Injuries in Preparing Economic Analyses (July 29,

2011) specifies the use of “Relative Disutility Factors” for valuing prevention of injuries of varying severity, rated on

the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS). It describes these factors as “...coefficients that can be applied to VSL [value of a

statistical life] to assign each injury class a value corresponding to a fraction of a fatality.” Specifically, the

Supplemental RIA applied the Relative Disutility Factor specified for an AIS Category 3 (“Serious”) injury, or 0.105,

to the then‐current DOT estimate of VSL of $6.2 million (in 2011 dollars) to estimate that the value of preventing

each injury likely to occur in cargo aircraft crashes accidents was $0.65 million (also in 2011 dollars). While the VSL

is intended to represent an estimate of society’s collective willingness to pay to avoid each accidental fatality, the

DOT estimate of VSL is derived largely from estimates of the wage premiums that workers demand as

compensation for accepting higher risks of accidental death on the job.  

Thus the extent to which it incorporates the medical costs likely to be associated with an accidental fatality is

unclear, and even if the VSL does include medical costs associated with a fatality, these may be small by

comparison to those associated with serious injuries.

As a consequence, applying the Relative Disutility Factor to the VSL to estimate the costs of an injury could

produce estimates that exclude some medical costs for treating injuries, and using these resulting values to

estimate benefits from avoiding injuries that could occur in cargo aircraft crashes accidents might underestimate

those benefits. 69 Lawrence Blincoe et al., The Economic Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes 2000 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, May

2002), 9, Table 2.
37

Category 3 (“Serious”) injury to 2011 dollars using the GDP deflator produces an estimate of 

$0.07 million. Including these additional costs raises the estimated value of preventing each 

injury in a future cargo aircraft accident that was used in the base case in the Supplemental RIA 

from $0.65 to $0.72 million, or by 11%. 

IPA commented that “[f]actors that may have led FAA to vastly understate the potential 

benefits of avoiding a cargo accident include... the loss of service for an aircraft that is destroyed 

in an accident.”70 IPA stated that “once an aircraft is lost, there are likely to be some additional 

costs incurred by cargo carriers to reschedule and recover operations in order to maintain 

‘normal’ cargo flow until a replacement aircraft is obtained.”71 IPA subsequently noted that 

omitting the value of avoiding such a loss of service from the benefits of avoiding cargo aircraft 

accidents in the Supplemental RIA is inconsistent with including the value of lost aircraft 

services during the time when aircraft are being retrofitted with rest facilities as a cost of cargo 

carriers’ compliance with the rule. 

The estimated value of an aircraft potentially lost in an accident represents the stream of 

services provided by that aircraft. Therefore to include an additional category of benefits 

representing the loss of service of the aircraft would result in double counting benefits. The FAA 

notes that airlines generally have some slack capacity (spare aircraft) to recover from other 

unforeseen events such as equipment problems. Thus, the costs of disrupted service are likely to 

be quite small. Maintaining slack capacity involves some additional costs but the FAA believes 

that those costs are more appropriately ascribed to the need to recover from general equipment 

problems than to the very low probability of a fatigue-related accident. 

 

70 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 23. 71 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 42.
38

IPA stated that in the Initial SRIA, the FAA failed to account for ramp/taxiway accidents, 

a benefit category the FAA had identified in the NPRM. IPA restated that the FAA in the 

NPRM had stated that “ground incidents in the U.S. exceed $3 billion per year,” and “if the rule 

were to reduce damage by about $600 million ($340 million in present value) it would break 

even in terms of net benefits.” Further, IPA noted that FAA maintained that “[i]f even only a 

few percent of the losses from ground accidents are caused by pilot fatigue, the annual losses are 

large. Three percent would be $90 million per year.”72 CAPA also recounted the $90 million per 

year figure. 

The FAA is not aware of any taxi or ramp accidents attributed to fatigue. The FAA 

prefaced its discussions of ground incidents in the NPRM with the statement that “due to data 

limitations, the FAA was unable to estimate the cumulative effect of preventing minor aircraft 

damage on the ground,” and invited public comment. See NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 55878. In 

addition, the FAA stated in the NPRM RIA that “these events are not investigated in detail—i.e., 

there is a lack of causal information, no human factors report with work chronology, etc.” 

(NPRM RIA, page 69). The FAA received no comments nor any data relating to the impact of 

fatigue on taxi and ramp accidents, nor did the FAA receive any data in response to the Initial 

SRIA. Because the FAA does not have any data to substantiate any claims of taxi and ramp 

accidents attributable to fatigue, the FAA in its final rule withdrew all such benefits claims. 

 

72 Ibid., 46.
39

IPA stated that in the Initial SRIA, the FAA failed to account for “having well-rested 

(and well-trained) pilots in the cockpit to solve minor problems before they become accidents,”73

a benefit category the FAA had identified in the NPRM. 

The FAA continues to believe that this is an additional category of benefits, but the FAA 

was not able to quantify this benefit category. A discussion of this category of non-quantified 

benefits is included in this Final SRIA. 

IPA and ALPA both stated that the impacts from a hazardous material release following a 

cargo accident were not included in the benefits analysis. IPA presented examples of the 

potential cost of hazardous material releases: a 1995 accident in Kansas City that had an 

estimated environmental clean-up cost of $0.7 million, and the Shanksville, PA crash of United 

Flight 93, which resulted in $1 million in environmental clean-up costs.74 

The FAA agrees that environmental clean-up costs are appropriate to include in a benefits 

analysis. However, we do not have a data source that could provide an average or typical 

environmental clean-up cost for an aviation accident and relying on anecdotal evidence is not a 

preferred approach. This Final SRIA contains a discussion of environmental clean-up costs in the 

non-quantified benefits section. Although the FAA has concerns about the applicability of the 

anecdotal information provided by IPA, the new sensitivity analysis includes the suggested value 

of $1 million in environmental clean-up costs. 

IPA stated that the FAA should investigate the costs related to runway closure after an 

accident. 

 

73 Ibid., 47. 74 Both estimates are adjusted to current dollars.
40

The FAA is not aware of any single database that systematically records runway closures 

after accidents or impacts of any such closures in terms of, say, flights diverted, delayed, or 

cancelled or the number of passengers affected. Basing benefits estimates of anecdotal “worst 

case” scenarios such as the accident at Narita is not defensible for a benefits estimate. As a 

result, this category of benefits can only be discussed in qualitative terms. Such a discussion is 

included in the non-quantified benefits section of this Final SRIA. 

ALPA noted that the Initial SRIA benefits analysis does not contain an estimate of 

accident response costs. 

 Major airports are required to have dedicated aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) 

capabilities. Therefore, rescue costs are largely a fixed cost that would not change substantially 

in the event of an accident. 

IPA stated, “it appears that the difficult to quantify benefits were given no consideration 

by the decision-makers.”75 IPA then discussed several categories of these difficult to quantify 

benefits. IPA included in its comments what it terms a “rough order-of magnitude” estimate of 

the qualitative and tangible benefits of the final rule if extended to cargo operations, including 

(but not limited to) avoidance of taxiing accidents, more alert pilots, premium value for 

expedited and perishable items (pharmaceuticals, transplant organs, time sensitive legal 

documents, etc.), health improvements of pilots who are not fatigued, and post-accident health 

costs from toxic and other chemical substances released as the result of an accident. This “rough 

order-of-magnitude estimate” is equal to the value of statistical life $6.2 million for the lower 

bound and twice this amount for the upper bound. 

 

75 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 15.
41

The FAA did consider these categories of benefits. In fact, many of these categories of 

benefits are mentioned by the FAA in various other documents related to the rulemaking, such as 

the NPRM and the preamble to the final rule. However, for the most part, these other categories 

of difficult to quantify benefits are believed to be of relatively minor significance. As the Final 

SRIA shows, the quantified costs of making compliance with this rule mandatory for all-cargo 

operations are forty-five times greater than the quantified benefits of doing so. Thus, even if the 

unquantified benefits could be quantified, they would not change the overall conclusion that the 

benefits of extending the rule to all-cargo operations are significantly lower than the costs. The 

FAA does not see any basis of support for IPA’s “rough order-of-magnitude” estimates. 

However, in response to IPA’s concern, the Final SRIA includes additional discussion of these 

difficult to quantify categories of benefits. 

Issues Related to Estimation of Costs

Several commenters, including ALPA, CAPA and IPA, asserted that the FAA overestimated crew scheduling costs because carriers will be able to reduce much of the FAAestimated crew scheduling costs by re-optimizing schedules and making other operational 

changes. ALPA stated that the Cygnus optimization does not provide a true indication of the 

rule’s impact because carriers could modify marketing techniques to take advantage of 

optimization possibilities. ALPA felt that cargo carriers could accomplish this by changing flight 

schedules to continue on to additional destinations by using the “potential extension of the flight 

time, and the reduction in required rest upon arrival,”76 when, under current rules, the carrier was 

 

76 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 24.
42

required to provide crew rest or crew augmentation to continue. ALPA also felt that cargo 

carriers will be able to adjust time of departures/arrivals under the Final Rule. ALPA cited an Air 

Force Institute of Technology study that concluded that cargo carriers currently run optimally 

and that they would find another optimal solution to continue DOD missions under the Final 

Rule. According to ALPA, “the cost of applying Part 117 is nominal” and “ALPA believes that 

this cost will be more than made up by scheduling changes to take advantage of the increased 

flight time allowed by Part 117.”77

IPA stated that, “[f]or certain split duty shifts, some crews barely miss the 3 hour 15 

minute threshold that the FAA determined is necessary for the crews to complete their 

paperwork and debriefing, and be shuttled to and from the rest facilities so as to obtain 2 hours of 

rest.”78 IPA asserted that in this circumstance, the carrier could comply with the Final Rule 

without “incurring much expense” by “green light[ing] such crews for priority in completing the 

debriefing process and obtaining transportation to and from their rest facilities to ensure that they 

obtain the necessary 2 hours of rest.” 79

According to CAPA, one carrier reoptimized its schedule and reduced costs by 25 percent 

relative to the FAA-estimated crew scheduling costs. IPA stated that carriers would choose to 

implement a fatigue risk management system (FRMS) if it was the lower cost option and that the 

FAA should perform sensitivity analyses on crew scheduling costs. IPA asserted that “FAA 

should develop a rough order-of-magnitude benefit estimate of these cost savings and perform a 

sensitivity analysis to provide decision-makers with a plausible range of savings that 

 

77 Ibid., 26. 78 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 64. 79 Ibid.
43

implementation of such provisions could produce. By declining to attempt to quantify an 

acknowledged cost reduction measure, FAA fails its responsibilities under the applicable 

Executive Orders and agency guidance.”80

Conversely, CAA asserted that it is “unrealistic to assume that the final rule would result 

in any cost savings and as such, cost savings should be eliminated if they are included in the 

‘net’ all-cargo crew scheduling costs.” CAA stated that, “[a]irlines schedule crews for a variety 

of reasons other than the specific fatigue requirements,”81 in support of its argument that cost 

savings are unrealistic. 

The FAA believes that the Cygnus optimization does provide a realistic estimate of 

carriers’ compliance cost with the Final Rule, given existing flight schedules, collective 

bargaining agreements (CBAs), and scheduling practices. Although ALPA believes that cargo 

carriers could comply with the Final Rule at “nominal” cost through modification of marketing 

techniques to take advantage of increased maximum flight time limits in certain situations, the 

FAA does not believe that this assertion is reasonable. Existing cargo carrier flight schedules 

were chosen for specific reasons. The flight schedules must serve the market for air cargo 

transportation (including guaranteed delivery times marketed by integrated cargo carriers) and 

must comply with the myriad constraints that carriers must consider when developing a flight 

schedule, including airport operating hours and aircraft maintenance schedules. Changes to 

existing flight schedules to reduce flightcrew member scheduling compliance costs with the 

Final Rule could increase costs in other areas of a carrier’s operations and/or cause it to forgo 

revenue. 

 

80 Ibid., 49‐50. 81 Cargo Airline Association, Comments, 10.
44

As CAA’s comment points out, the FAA cannot arbitrarily assume that carriers can 

modify flight schedules at no cost, but must reasonably estimate the increased flightcrew 

member scheduling cost attributable to the Final Rule using existing flight schedules. The FAA 

accomplished this objective through use of the industry-standard crew pairing and schedule 

optimization services developed by CrewPairings. The Cygnus optimization process included all 

elements of the Final Rule, including the increased maximum flight time limits in certain 

situations. Any cost savings attributable to this Final Rule element were included in the results 

presented in the Initial SRIA. 

The FAA acknowledges IPA’s point that in some situations, flightcrew members may be 

close to limits established by the Final Rule. However, the FAA cannot arbitrarily determine 

that, in certain cases, a schedule is “close enough” to the limit and therefore discount those costs 

from the RIA. The buffers used by CrewPairings in its analysis were chosen through a 

combination of CrewPairings expertise and conversations with crew schedulers at the carriers. 

The FAA believes that these buffers provided a reasonable basis to develop estimates of carriers’ 

flightcrew member scheduling compliance costs with the Final Rule. 

The FAA applied a consistent, reasonable methodology of estimating flightcrew member 

scheduling costs attributable to the Final Rule for all segments of the part 121 industry, including 

passenger, cargo, and supplemental carriers. By its very nature, a cost-benefits analysis is an 

estimate and cannot include every conceivable way that an individual carrier might choose to 

comply with a final rule. Thus, the FAA did not make unwarranted cost-reducing assumptions, 

such as carriers complying with the Final Rule at lower cost by modifying marketing techniques. 

On the other hand, the FAA also did not make unwarranted cost-increasing assumptions, such as 
45

carriers incurring additional expenses (more than the estimates in the Supplemental RIA) 

because of an inability to implement identified optimization results. 

Although CAPA claimed that one carrier re-optimized its schedule and reduced costs by 

25 percent, the commenter provided no supporting evidence or details. Consequently, the FAA is 

unable to evaluate the validity of this claim. The FAA notes, however, that AAWW stated that it 

estimates that Atlas and Polar crew costs would increase 20%. This estimate was confirmed by 

the crew optimization software provider. The FAA estimates are intended to represent the 

industry as a whole and any individual carrier’s experience may vary. 

The FAA acknowledges IPA’s comment that carriers may choose FRMS if the costs are 

less than complying with the Final Rule. However, as explained in footnote 48 of the Initial 

SRIA, “[w]e did not estimate this potential savings as we do not know how many operators 

would use FRMS and the cost of FRMS has a wide range.” None of the comments regarding the 

Initial SRIA provided any new information to estimate cost savings from opting to use FRMS. 

IPA stated that the FAA should have performed a sensitivity analysis on the potential cost 

savings from an FRMS. For the reasons stated above, the FAA did not estimate cost savings 

from implementation of an FRMS, but the agency did perform several sensitivity analyses that 

are contained in Appendix B of the Initial SRIA. Two of the sensitivity analyses focused on 

alternative methods of calculating flightcrew member scheduling costs. 

IPA asserted that because the FAA estimated crew scheduling costs for the cargo industry 

using schedules from just one carrier, that the costs cannot be generalized for the overall cargo 

industry and by doing so, the FAA has “introduce[d] a large margin of error in the analysis 

results.” According to IPA, an important source of this error is likely to be variation in minimum 
46

guarantees (the minimum number of pay hours per pay period that flight crew members are 

guaranteed by the carrier employing them) at different cargo carriers. 

The FAA estimated the costs of the Final Rule using an industry-standard pairing and 

bid-line system optimizer developed by CrewPairings, Inc.82 The CrewPairings results 

eliminated the need for the FAA to make assumptions regarding flightcrew member scheduling 

actions that carriers may take by using a commercial flightcrew member scheduling model used 

by carriers in real-world operations. The CrewPairings results reflected the outcome of the 

process by which carriers create the most efficient flightcrew member schedule possible, in 

compliance with numerous constraints, including federal regulations, labor agreements, market 

demands, and operational requirements. 

The process by which CrewPairings estimated the impact of the Final Rule on flightcrew 

member scheduling required substantial computer resources, time, and professional expertise. As 

such, the FAA could not possibly model every carrier and fleet type in the United States part 121 

air transportation industry. The FAA and CrewPairings carefully selected the eight cases to be 

reasonably representative of the part 121 industry. The carriers which provided data for the eight 

cases employ a substantial share of the flightcrew members in the part 121 industry. In the 

professional judgment of the FAA and CrewPairings, the CrewPairings Final Rule results are 

 

82 The CrewPairings software is designed to assist air carriers in developing efficient flightcrew member schedules

within the constraints imposed by FAA regulations on carrier operations, the provisions of individual carriers’ labor

agreements, time patterns of market demand for the services they provide, and operational imperatives

associated with their fleets and route networks. It has been utilized by more than 30 major airlines worldwide,

including global, national, and regional passenger airlines as well as freight carriers. This same software is

employed by some cargo airlines for scheduling flight crew assignments, and its underlying optimization algorithm

is similar to that employed in the crew scheduling and assignment software utilized by most other cargo carriers.
47

considered to be accurate representations of the impact of the Final Rule on flightcrew member 

scheduling. 

The FAA recognizes that IPA does not believe that results from one carrier can be 

generalized to apply to the entire industry. However, it is not possible or reasonable to expect the 

FAA to model the exact, unique characteristics of each part 121 carrier and fleet. The change in 

flightcrew member scheduling costs attributable to the Final Rule may vary among carriers; 

some carriers may experience costs that are more than or less than the estimates developed in the 

Supplemental RIA. However, the goal of the Supplemental RIA was not to estimate the cost of 

compliance with the Final Rule for individual carriers, but for the part 121 industry as a whole. 

The FAA believes that its approach in the Supplemental RIA was reasonable and accomplished 

this goal. 

IPA stated that the FAA over-estimated the crew scheduling costs for UPS because some 

pilots fly fewer hours than the minimum guarantee negotiated in their union’s collective 

bargaining agreement (CBA). The CBA contains a guarantee minimum pay based on a minimum 

number of credit hours. A flightcrew member whose monthly schedule requires fewer credit 

hours than the minimum guarantee will be paid the amount implied by the minimum credit hour 

guarantee. Therefore, the Final Rule would not result in additional costs for those flightcrew 

members because their pay will not increase if they work a few more hours. According to IPA, 

the contractual monthly minimum for UPS flightcrew members is 75 credit hours and 36 percent 

of UPS flightcrew members have fewer credit hours than the minimum. IPA calculated that the 

Final Rule would only result in a 1.047 percent increase in credit hour wages and that the FAA 

overstated UPS crew scheduling costs by $20 million over the ten-year analysis period. IPA 

requested that the FAA used FedEx data for its estimate and estimated that the Final Rule would 
48

result in an increase of 1.488 percent in credit hours for flightcrew members at carriers in the 

freight-integrated group. IPA asserted that the assumption “only holds true if the credit hours for 

all schedules are constructed at or above the collective bargaining agreement minimum 

guaranteed pay value.”83 According to IPA, the minimum guarantee at FedEx is 68 hours for a 4-

week schedule and all regular lines are normally at or above the guarantee. 

For the reasons cited in response to the previous comment, the FAA was unable to model 

the impact of the Final Rule on each part 121 carrier. Rather, the FAA selected cases that would 

be representative of the part 121 industry. Further, the scheduling process is very complicated, 

necessitating sophisticated algorithms to solve for the optimal schedules. Flightcrew member 

hours are not necessarily fungible due to real-world constraints. For instance, if a flightcrew 

member’s monthly schedule ends in Louisville, KY and the flightcrew member has accrued two 

fewer monthly credit hours than the monthly minimum, those two hours cannot be used to fly a 

two-hour segment originating in Shenzen, China. Therefore, it is unlikely that just because some 

schedules are below contractual minimums that flightcrew members could be utilized in a way to 

defray the costs of the additional credit hours required by the new rule. One suspects that if UPS 

is paying for un-utilized capacity, it will soon attempt to renegotiate its labor agreements and 

such cost savings opportunities will be short-lived. In addition, there is still a societal cost 

involved even if the airline does not incur a monetary cost: the flightcrew members currently 

enjoy those remaining hours as leisure but under the scenarios outlined by IPA, they would be 

required to work. Those individuals would incur a cost. Although there will be unique 

circumstances for each individual part 121 carrier that cause its costs of compliance with the 

 

83 Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 53.
49

Final Rule to be higher or lower than the estimated costs presented in the Supplemental RIA, the 

FAA believes that its cost estimates are reasonable. 

However, in light of the new data provided by IPA, the FAA will explore the impact on 

estimated costs and benefits for the cargo industry from incorporating the UPS-specific 

information regarding flightcrew members who have fewer flying hours than their contractual 

minimums in the new sensitivity analysis in Appendix B. 

IPA stated that the FAA overstated crew scheduling costs by overestimating the 

percentage of active line pilots in all-cargo operations. IPA provided new data regarding the total 

number of pilots and the number of primary bid lines lineholders for UPS which indicates that 

51% of pilots at UPS were primary lineholders in 2010. IPA also provided information 

suggesting that for FedEx in July 2011, 52 percent of pilots were primary lineholders. IPA 

explained that there are several types of pilots who would be listed in NVIS, but not be primary 

lineholders, including secondary lineholders, hot standby reserves, and pilots who are in a nonflying category status because of medical leave of absence, military duty leave of absence, and 

long-term upgrade or cross aircraft training, non-flying special projects, etc. IPA stated that at 

UPS, 10 percent of airline pilots are in a non-flying category status. IPA provided alternative 

calculations that estimate scheduling costs for the integrated carriers based on the estimate that 

51.65 percent of pilots are lineholders. For the other freight industry groups, IPA estimated that 

75 percent of pilots are lineholders (15 percent reserves, 10 percent are non-bidders) (IPA, page 

54 and Exhibit 25). 

The FAA used the new information provided by IPA regarding the percent of pilots in the 

freight industry groups who are lineholders in its revised cost analysis in this Final SRIA. 
50

IPA noted that the Initial SRIA estimated crew scheduling costs for the supplemental 

industry group using a synthetic supplemental carrier rather than actual data from a supplemental 

carrier and stated that the FAA’s crew scheduling cost estimates for the supplemental industry 

group “essentially amount to sheer speculation.”84 IPA objected to the process by which the FAA 

created a synthetic supplemental carrier, but does not offer any estimate of what the costs for the 

supplemental industry group may be. IPA stated that since the supplemental industry group 

accounted for 72 percent of the “true” crew scheduling costs for the freight integrated industry 

group, the supplemental industry group should be analyzed separately. 

For various reasons, including time, resources, and data availability constraints, it was not 

possible for the FAA to model each part 121 air carrier individually. The FAA and CrewPairings 

carefully selected the eight cases used in the flightcrew member scheduling cost analysis to be 

reasonably representative of the part 121 industry. Although these eight cases did not include a 

supplemental carrier, the FAA believes the modifications it made to one of the eight cases 

produce a reasonable estimate of the flightcrew member scheduling costs attributable to the Final 

Rule for the supplemental industry. 

The supplemental carrier case used the actual flight schedule and crew bases of the allcargo, wide-body aircraft case, a representative supplemental carrier CBA and FAR part 121 

subpart S supplemental flight, duty and rest rules. The nature of the flight schedule was similar to 

that of supplemental carriers. Approximately 70 percent of the flight segments were short-haul 

domestic operations characterized by low levels of aircraft and flightcrew member utilization 

relative to passenger carriers. The remaining 30 percent of the flight segments were long-haul 

 

84Independent Pilots Association, Comments, 58.
51

international operations throughout the entire Northern Hemisphere that circled the globe in both 

directions from bases in the United States. The flights operated infrequently, which meant that 

deadheading was common except in the cases of operations to military fields which did not offer 

the possibility of deadheading on scheduled passenger flights. 

Supplemental flight, duty, and rest regulations in place prior to this rule permitted much 

more flight and duty time than the flag and domestic flight, duty and rest regulations for which 

scheduled passenger carriers and many all-cargo carriers were required to comply. In addition, 

the representative supplemental carrier CBA permitted much more flight and duty time than the 

typical passenger or all-cargo carrier CBA.85 As a result, the estimated increase in cost per line of 

flying resulting from the final rule was highest for supplemental carriers. 

IPA and ALPA both stated that the FAA overstates costs of installing rest facilities. IPA 

stated that the FAA “strained to find costs” by assuming that the installation would not be done 

in concert with normal aircraft downtime or maintenance schedules. IPA also stated that the 

FAA’s cost estimates are overstated because they assume that 107 cargo aircraft would require 

rest facilities while IPA’s analysis suggests that only 75 extended range Boeing 767’s would 

require rest facilities. IPA stated that the FAA should have considered lower cost options other 

than the Class I rest facility used for the cost analysis. IPA added that for the shorter range of the 

Boeing 767 (compared to the MD-11, Boeing 777, and Boeing 747), the Class 3 option would be 

more cost effective and provides alternative unit cost estimates for a Class 3 rest facility in terms 

of equipment cost, installation cost, engineering cost, and additional fuel cost. ALPA also stated 

that the estimated costs for rest facilities used by the FAA is too high and suggested the costs 

 

85 The flight, duty and rest regulations likely impact the negotiations regarding flight and duty time in the CBAs for

supplemental carriers.
52

would actually be half what was estimated by the FAA but provided no data to support that 

assertion. 

In determining rest-facility-installation costs, the FAA followed guidance from OMB 

Circular A-4 which directs agencies to provide monetized quantitative estimates of categories of 

benefits and costs wherever possible. 

The FAA decided to estimate the costs of rest facilities using the assumption that carriers 

would choose to install Class 1 rest facilities. This assumption is used because the FAA found 

that under the final rule, only the use of Class I rest facilities will allow for the flight duty periods 

that are necessary for the existing route structures without stopping to re-crew. The Class 3 

facilities allow a flight duty period 5 hours shorter than the Class 1 facilities. The one-time costs 

associated with installing rest facilities are likely to be lower than costs of continually recrewing, which makes installation of rest facilities the cheaper option in the long run. While 

there are some routes that could be served effectively with less expensive Class 3 or Class 2 rest 

facilities, the FAA assumed that air carriers will choose to install the Class 1 rest facilities in all 

of the long range aircraft because of the flexibility a uniform fleet provides. 

The cost of an aircraft being out of service during installation was estimated for both 

passenger and cargo operations. The cost estimates assume the installation for a Class 1 rest 

facility will take 4 days which substantially exceeds the daily downtime window available for 

cargo operations. Class 2 and 3 facilities could potentially be installed by the airline’s own 

maintenance department during heavy checks (C or D checks). However, Class 1 facilities would 

need to be installed by the vendor and the carrier would be subject to the vendor’s schedule, 

which may or may not coincide with the aircraft’s maintenance schedule. Therefore, it is not 
53

unreasonable to assume that an aircraft may need to be taken out of service outside of its regular 

maintenance schedule to perform the installation. 

The FAA’s estimate of the number of cargo aircraft requiring rest facilities was based on 

an aircraft-by-aircraft determination. We obtained facility related data by querying the FAA fleet 

records and verifying them with the FAA safety inspectors. All aircraft flying international 

routes are assumed to need rest facilities but we omitted aircraft models that already have rest 

facilities (e.g. Boeing 777) and those with known conversions from the total counts. These 

aircraft models are not limited to the Boeing 767 as supposed by IPA; other aircraft models 

include extended range DC-10s as well as some narrow-body aircraft which are currently used in 

extended-range cargo operations. 

Nonetheless, the FAA is incorporating IPA’s cost estimates regarding rest facility costs 

into the new sensitivity analysis in Appendix B. 

IPA stated that the FAA underestimated the cost reductions due to reduced sick time for 

pilots. IPA stated the FAA should have adopted the amount of sick time reduction it cited from 

research, which found 40 to 60 percent reductions. 

The studies cited by the FAA in the Initial SRIA were special studies involving different 

industries. That information was provided as support for the linkage between reductions in 

fatigue and reductions in sick time used by employees. The amount of sick time reduction is very 

uncertain and in recognition of that uncertainty we included a sensitivity analysis related to that 

assumption. 

CAA asserted that the FAA understated initial costs for fatigue training by $146 million. 

CAA stated that the FAA estimated the cost of fatigue training for only dispatchers and upper 

management at $1.1 million and that the true cost would be $147.1 million. In addition, CAA 
54

estimated that the costs to hire and train new crew members prior to implementation of the rule 

would total $87 million; this estimate is also supported by AAWW. 

As stated in the Initial SRIA, no incremental cost of compliance with fatigue training for 

flightcrew members is attributed to the Final Rule because part 121 carriers are already required 

to provide fatigue training to their flightcrew members by the statutory fatigue risk management 

plan (FRMP) requirement of Section 212 of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation 

Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-216). The only incremental cost of 

compliance with fatigue training attributable to the Final Rule is the fatigue training required for 

management, schedulers, dispatchers, and any other individual directly involved in operational 

control of the flight. This cost was estimated by the FAA in the Initial SRIA. 

Turning to CAA’s concern regarding hiring and training of new crewmembers, the 

CrewPairings analysis shows that the number of additional lines needed under the final rule for 

cargo operations was minimal. According to the Crew Pairings analysis, the percent increase in 

bid lines required from the new rule was 2.7 percent for cargo narrow-body operations, 1.5 

percent for cargo wide-body operations, and 6.5 percent for supplemental operations. The 

comments by IPA show that there are a substantial number of reserve flightcrew members 

available to cover small increases in workloads. 

CAA asserted that the FAA did not capture the full crew scheduling costs for airlines 

because the FAA did not include payroll taxes, pensions, and other benefits’ costs in its crew 

scheduling cost estimate. 

To the extent that benefits’ costs increase as an individual’s hours worked increases, 

those costs should be included in the cost analysis. In response to this comment, the FAA 

included an estimate of the costs of employee benefits for all airline employees when estimating 
55

the cost of additional labor hours required by the final rule. The cost of incremental labor hours 

for airline employees are estimated for crew scheduling costs, cost savings from reduced use of 

sick time, and additional training required of management and dispatchers. 

Benefit Analysis

This rule is intended to address the problem of fatigued flightcrew members flying in part 

121 commercial service. The nature and extent of the problem is such that the NTSB continues 

to list pilot fatigue as one of the Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements. The NTSB 

recommendations are based on accident investigations and the NTSB safety study on airline 

safety. The requirements contained in this final rule address both NTSB recommendations and 

existing public law. This benefit estimate first examines the nature of fatigue, followed by its 

causes and how it relates to transportation. Second, we summarize some recent findings on 

fatigue and occupational performance. Next, we look at the magnitude of flightcrew fatigue in 

part 121 passenger operations by briefly examining fatigue reports in the context of this final 

rule. We then re-analyze the likely effectiveness of the requirements contained in this final rule 

and the potential to decrease these types of accidents in the future. We project a likely number of 

preventable events that will occur in absence of this final rule. Finally, we estimate the benefits 

that will be derived from preventing such events. We provide a base case estimate, and a high 

case estimate, in addition to a threshold/break even analysis. This Final SRIA also presents both 

base and high case estimates of the benefits if the final rule were extended to cargo-only 

operations. New to this Final SRIA, we include a high case sensitivity analysis that incorporates 

alternative assumptions to explore the potential impact on the central conclusion that the costs of 

the final rule far outweigh the benefits for cargo-only operations. 
56

The Nature of Fatigue

Most fatigue studies agree that, “fatigue refers to a subjective desire to rest and an 

aversion to further work, coupled with an objective decrease in performance.”86

Fatigue is characterized by: 

 “increasingly frequent lapses in performance, 

 general cognitive slowing, including a lowering of optimum performance, 

 memory problems, 

 time on task decrements, and 

 an increasing inability to maintain the vigilance required to perform the tasks required.”87

Fatigue has been described as “a nonspecific symptom because it can be indicative of 

many causes or conditions including physiological states such as sleep deprivation....[s]ome 

describe fatigue in terms of physiological data or ‘objective’ observations of...decrements in 

work or performance....or time-related deterioration in the ability to perform certain mental 

tasks.”88 While physiological criteria related to fatigue can be readily measureable, subjective 

feelings of fatigue are not directly observable, and in some instances individuals who are 

exhibiting diminished performance levels also feel confident in their ability to focus and perform 

assigned tasks. 

 

86 Christopher Jones et al., “Working Hours Regulations and Fatigue in Transportation: A Comparative Analysis,”

Safety Science 43 (2005): 226. 87 Ibid. 88 Susan Torres‐Harding and Leonard A. Jason, “What is Fatigue? History and Epidemiology,” in Fatigue as a

Window to the Brain, ed. John DeLuca (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 3‐18.
57

Causes of Fatigue

A number of factors increase the risk of fatigue. 

 Time of day is very important, because the body follows a rhythm over an approximately 

24-hour period, often referred to as a circadian cycle. 

 The amount of recent sleep that a person has received also affects the level of fatigue 

risk; most people need an average of eight hours of sleep per 24-hour period. 

 The number of continuous hours awake also increases fatigue risk, and for most 

individuals, once the number of continuous hours awake exceeds 17, fatigue risk 

increases significantly. 

 Sleep debt, the difference between the amount of sleep needed to be fully rested and 

actual sleep, also contributes to fatigue. Sleep debt accumulates over time, and fatigue 

risk is higher if sleep debt exceeds eight hours. 

 Work load and time on task can also affect fatigue risk. If work intensity is high and/or 

there is a long continuous period of time on task, the risk of fatigue increases. 

Fatigue and Transportation

The nature of work in the transportation sector makes that sector especially susceptible to 

risks to performance, vigilance and response to hazards that are associated with fatigue. 

Workdays of those responsible for the safety of transportation operations can be characterized by 

long work periods, often at nighttime or in the early morning hours. Because transportation 

workers must sometimes rest or sleep away from home, conditions for rest and sleep quality are 

also important. 
58

Analysts have examined the links between the specific features of work in the 

transportation industry, including commercial aviation, and the general features of human 

physiology and fatigue for decades. For commercial aviation, it has been nearly two decades 

since the first citation of fatigue as a probable cause for a major aviation accident. This accident, 

the crash of American International Airways flight 808 at Guantanamo Naval Air Station, Cuba, 

on August 18, 1993, was investigated by the NTSB. Probable causes of the accident identified by 

the NTSB included “the impaired judgment, decision making, and flying abilities of the captain 

and flightcrew due to the effects of fatigue...”89

As part of the investigation of that accident, NASA researchers and contractors 

performed an analysis of the links between aviation risks and the effects of fatigue on human 

vigilance and performance. This research was reported as part of the NTSB report on the 

Guantanamo Bay accident and the research was later revised for inclusion in an NTSB report on 

DOT efforts to address fatigue issues in transportation.90

This NTSB research and literature summary provides a thorough and well-documented 

review of these issues. In the 1999 restatement of the research results in the context of addressing 

fatigue issues in transportation generally, the following summary is provided: 

Fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption created by transportation 

operations can degrade performance, alertness and safety. An extensive scientific 

literature exists that provides important physiological information about the 

 

89 NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, American International Airways Flight 808,

Douglas DC‐8‐61, N814CK, U.S. Naval Air Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, August 18, 1993 (Washington, DC, May

10, 1994, NTSB/AAR‐94/04) 90 Mark Rosekind, “Fatigue in Transportation: Physiological, Performance, and Safety Issues,” in Evaluation of U.S.

Department of Transportation Efforts in the 1990s to Address Operator Fatigue. Safety Report (Washington, DC:

NTSB, May 1999, NTSB/SR‐99/01), 68‐81.  
59

human operator, which can be used to guide operations and policy. For example, 

there are human physiological requirements for sleep, predictable effects of sleep 

loss on performance and alertness and patterns for recovery from sleep loss. 

Additionally, the circadian clock is a powerful modulator of human performance 

and alertness, and in transportation operations, it can be disrupted by night work, 

time zone changes, and day/night duty shifts. Scientific examination of these 

physiological considerations has documented a direct relationship to errors, 

accidents and safety. This scientific information can provide important input to 

policy and regulatory considerations.91

Recent Findings on Fatigue and Occupational Performance		

Fatigue is prevalent in the U.S. workforce, with nearly 38 percent of workers reporting 

fatigue during a two-week period.92 The National Sleep Foundation conducted a poll in 2008, 

which found that 29 percent have fallen asleep or become very sleepy while at work and two 

percent did not go to work due to sleepiness or a sleep problem.93 Numerous studies have found 

that fatigue can significantly reduce productivity. A review of published studies on shift work 

and productivity found a large decrease in efficiency during the night shift, with the low 

 

91 Ibid., 68.

92 Judith Ricci et al., “Fatigue in the U.S. Workforce: Prevalence and Implications for Lost Productive Work Time,”

Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 49 (2007): 1–10. 93 WBA Research, 2008 Sleep in America Poll: Summary of Findings (Washington, DC: National Sleep Foundation,

March 3, 2008)
60

occurring at 3:00 am. On average, the authors found that productivity was five percent lower at 

night.94

A large-scale study was conducted at 40 companies and institutions in the Netherlands to 

investigate the relationship between fatigue and future sickness absence. The presence of fatigue 

was measured using self-reported symptoms, with employers providing absence data. The study 

controlled for numerous sociodemographic and work characteristics. The investigators found that 

higher levels of fatigue were statistically significant predictors of both short-term and long-term 

sickness absence.95

A study was conducted to estimate fatigue prevalence and associated health-related lost 

productive time (LPT) in U.S. workers. The investigators found that workers with fatigue were 

much more likely to report health-related LPT, with a cost of $136.4 billion annually. This 

amount exceeded health-related LPT reported by workers without fatigue by $101.0 billion.96

A study compared the rate of errors made by medical residents working in the ICU on 80-

hour weeks versus those on 63 hour weeks. The residents with the shorter work week schedule 

experienced half the rate of attention failures. The residents with the longer work week schedule 

made serious medical errors (those causing or having the potential to cause harm to a patient) at 

a rate 22 percent higher than the residents with the shorter work week schedule.97

 

94 Simon Folkard and Philip Tucker, “Shift Work, Safety and Productivity,” Occupational Medicine (London) 53

(2003): 95‐101. 95 N. Janssen et al., “Fatigue as a Predictor of Sickness Absence: Results from the Maastricht Cohort Study on

Fatigue at Work,” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 60 (Supplement 1, 2003): i71–i76. . 96Judith Ricci et al., “Fatigue in the U.S. Workforce: Prevalence and Implications for Lost Productive Work Time,”

Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 49 (2007): 1–10.   97 Committee on Sleep Medicine and Research, Board on Health Sciences Policy, Sleep Disorders and Sleep

Deprivation: An Unmet Public Health Problem (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006), 139‐140.
61

The railroad industry is at a relatively high risk of fatigue, due to typical 24-hour per day 

operations. A number of railroads have implemented fatigue countermeasures, which generally 

reduced absenteeism. For instance, after implementation of fatigue countermeasures for 

CANALERT, absenteeism decreased from 8.1 to 3.2 percent. After fatigue countermeasures 

were implemented for the Conrail-Buffalo-Toledo IMPAC project, a statistically significant 

increase in attendance from 95.21 percent to 98.06 percent was observed.98 This data 

demonstrates the potential for fatigue issues, which we will now examine within the specific 

requirements of this final rule. 

Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)		

One can observe fatigue in aviation by examining the Aviation Safety Reporting System 

(ASRS). The ASRS collects, analyzes, and responds to voluntarily submitted aviation safety 

incident reports in order to lessen the likelihood of aviation accidents. It is part of a continuing 

effort by government, industry, and individuals to maintain and improve aviation safety by 

collecting voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident/situation reports from flightcrew 

members, controllers, and others. The data in the ASRS is used to:

 

98 Patrick Sherry, Fatigue Countermeasures in the Railroad Industry: Past and Current Developments (Washington,

DC: Association of American Railroads, June 2000)
62

 Identify deficiencies and discrepancies in the National Aviation System (NAS) so that 

these can be remedied by appropriate authorities. 

 Support policy formulation and planning for, and improvements to, the NAS. 

 Strengthen the foundation of aviation human factors safety research. This is particularly 

important since it is generally conceded that over two-thirds of all aviation accidents and 

incidents have their roots in human performance errors. 

ASRS assures confidentiality and data cannot be traced back to individual operators. So 

although we cannot claim the rule could prevent any specific ASRS events, it is a useful tool in 

evaluating and validating the presence of fatigue in part 121 operations. We performed a query 

for part 121 ASRS for fatigue.99 Between June 2009 and the time of the drafting of the original 

RIA, there were a total of 256 reports where fatigue was cited as a factor. We have neither culled 

the data nor edited any of the data that was reported to ASRS. The top seven results are listed in 

Table 3. 

Table 3: ASRS Part 121 Fatigue Reports 

Result Total Relative %

General None Reported / Taken (No action was taken as a result of the

fatigue issue reported)

68 26.6%

General Work Refused (Fatigue caused a worker to refuse an

assignment)

21 8.2%

General Maintenance Action (Typically a fatigue event related to a

maintenance issue—not related to this final rule).

14 5.5%

 

99 We believe that this is a very conservative approach because other human factors can reveal fatigue, such ad

confusion and communications breakdown.
63

Flight Crew Became Reoriented (Confusion related to some type of

malfunction.)

10 3.9%

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action (Crew took action to avoid an accident

or incident)

8 3.1%

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance (Substitute clearance given to

get back on track)

5 2.0%

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach 5 2.0%

One captain on an international flight described an onerous flight sequence in the Pacific 

he believed to be unsafe due to cumulative and predictable fatigue: 

This report concerns a trans-Pacific flight assignment including back to 

back all night pairings (body clock), two un-augmented inter-Asia segments and 

36 hours of flight time. We started the sequence with a 12.7 hour actual flight, 

single augmented with an hour plus delay on the front end. When we arrived we 

cabbed to downtown for an additional 1.5 hours on the body before rest. The first 

internal Asia leg is all night, un-augmented. The return leg is daylight, but all 

night body time, followed by another 1.5 hour cab ride downtown. The 

[opportunities for] rest were insufficient to maintain any alertness particularly on 

the last leg. Both the First Officer and I experienced periods of unintended sleep 

while at the controls. No amount of coffee or mental discipline was sufficient to 

stay awake!!! This is unsafe and made more unsafe by requiring: 1. Over 12 hours 

single augmented on the first leg. 2. Two un-augmented legs on the back side of 

the clock with long preflight awake hours. 3. Over 8 extra hours of "duty time" in 

CABS!!! Rework this trip before someone gets hurt. No one in the cockpit for the 

last 6 hours was at their peak to respond to irregular situations. We weren't even 

able to stay awake the whole time in the seat. 
64

Even if no anomalies occur during a flight, fatigued crews may be poorer problem solvers 

than well-rested crews as noted in the research cited above, and thus add a degree of risk to the 

system. In addition, taking evasive action and missed approaches because of fatigue are serious 

safety events indicating substantial risk manifesting in the current system. 

Effectiveness of Final Rule

It is usually the case that multiple factors can be identified as causes of specific accidents, 

and it is seldom the case that a specific rule is 100 percent effective at addressing a variety of 

accident causal factors. In particular, fatigue is rarely a primary or sole cause of an accident, and 

therefore this final rule will not likely prevent all future fatigue related accidents. For this final 

regulatory evaluation, we have established a modified effectiveness ratio to categorize accidents 

for which fatigue may be a contributing causal factor. This number represents the likelihood the 

requirements contained in this final rule would have prevented an accident from occurring. It is 

applied in the calculation of the number of forecasted fatigue accidents, if no action was taken to 

address the fatigue problem in part 121 operations. 

In its analysis of the effectiveness of the final rule, the FAA reviewed accidents that 

could have been prevented or could have been influenced by the requirements contained in this 

final rule. The effectiveness analysis works by assessing the likely capability of the requirements 

contained in the final rule to have prevented those accidents. As part of this analysis, the FAA 

Office of Accident Investigation reviewed the accident reports from NTSB and foreign 

investigative authorities on all accidents where the NTSB cited fatigue or fatigue was thought to 

be either a cause or factor. This was done in order to assess the likelihood that the provisions of 

the final rule would have averted those accidents (including positioning flights operating under 

part 91). 
65

A consistent definition was applied to the 20-year history as the requirements of the rule 

apply to all part 121 operations. As such, we reviewed the accident history for all operations that 

would currently operate under part 121. The final analysis takes into account NTSB findings, the 

FAA’s independent assessment, and comments to the docket. Some accidents reviewed scored 

“zero” because fatigue could not be established as a significant factor or because the final rule 

would not prevent such an event had the requirements been in place today. These accidents were 

removed from our effectiveness analysis and forecast. This discussion focuses on incidents 

involving passenger operations, because this final rule does not mandate compliance with part 

117 for cargo-only operations. However, the Initial SRIA and this Final SRIA provide estimates 

of both base and high case benefits if the final rule were extended to cargo-only operations. 

These estimates are based on the same methodology discussed here for passenger operations. 

Each accident was then re-evaluated by conducting a scoring process similar to that 

conducted by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), a well-documented and wellunderstood procedure, similar to the analysis in the NPRM. The FAA Office of Accident 

Investigation used the NTSB recommendations, along with narratives, probable causes, 

contributing factors and other pertinent data, to score the accidents.100 When these accidents 

were not well-defined in the probable cause or contributing factors statements of the NTSB 

reports, Accident Investigation used a Joint Implementation Monitoring Data Analysis Team 

(JIMDAT)-like method. The JIMDAT-type scoring system ranges from zero to five, and the 

score is based on the likelihood that a proposed action would have mitigated that accident. The 

level and percentage of effectiveness criteria are detailed in Table 4. 

 

100 For this rule, the FAA also analyzed the duty and flight schedules of the flight crews involved in the accidents

and assessed how much they deviated from what would be allowed under the final rule.
66

Table 4: JIMDAT - Type Scoring System 

5 90% effectiveness. The proposed requirement directly addresses the NTSB causal factors

and would very likely prevent the accident in the future.

4 

75% effectiveness. The proposed requirement directly addresses the majority of the

NTSB causal factors and would probably prevent or is likely to reduce the risk of the

respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed.

3 

50 % effectiveness. The proposed requirement directly addresses one of several NTSB

causal factors and is likely to reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the

circumstances that prevailed.

2 

35% effectiveness. The proposed requirement generally addresses the NTSB causal

factors and is likely to reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances

that prevailed.

1 15% effectiveness. The proposed requirement is likely to have reduced the risk of the

respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed.

0 0% effectiveness. The proposed requirement would not reduce the risk of this type of

accident in the future.

The FAA applied this methodology to each flightcrew member fatigue accident to reach 

an overall effectiveness rating for the requirements contained in this final rule. The qualitative 

assessments were zero (0), very low (1), low (2), moderate (3), high (4), and very high (5). The 

qualitative assessments then were converted to quantitative effectiveness scores as follows: zero; 

15%; 35%; 50%; 75%; and 90%. 

As explained above, in response to the comments to the Initial SRIA from CAA and 

AWW, the FAA re-evaluated the effectiveness rating assigned to the FedEx accident in 

Tallahassee, FL in July 2002. The effectiveness rating used in the original RIA and the Initial 

SRIA was 75 percent. The revised effectiveness rating used in this Final SRIA is 15 percent. 

For the original RIA, the Initial SRIA, and this Final SRIA, the FAA presents the 

quantified benefits and effectiveness analysis for a 10-year period. Although we only forecast ten 

years of benefits, we have included a 20-year history of accidents involving passenger 

operations, as these are the circumstances and events which have led to this final rulemaking. 
67

Table 5 summarizes the past 20 years of flightcrew member fatigue accidents. Appendix A 

contains a summary of each accident and the corresponding effectiveness analyses. 

 
68

Table 5: 20-Year Accident History 

Date Location Service Carrier Aircraft On

Board Fatalities Dam‐age

Scenario Score

02/17/1991 Cleveland,

OH

121 Cargo Ryan

International

DC‐9‐15 2 2 Dest

LOC Climb‐out;

Icing

0.5

08/18/1993 GTMO,

Cuba

121 Cargo

Konnie

Kallita

DC‐8 3 0 Dest Landed Short 0.9

07/02/1994 Charlotte,

NC

121 Pax US Air MD‐82 57 37 Dest

LOC on

Approach; Icing

0.15

02/16/1995 Kansas City,

MO Ferry ATI DC‐8‐63 3 3 Dest

LOC in RTO;

Engine Out

0.9

12/20/1995 Cali,

Colombia

121 Pax American B757 164 160 Dest CFIT High 0.35

08/25/1996 JFK, NY 121 Pax TWA L1011 262 0 Sub

Tail Strike

Landing

0.35

01/22/1999 Hyannis,

MA Positioning Colgan Air(part 91)

BE‐1900 4 0 Dest

Hard Landing

(BETA) 0.15

05/08/1999 JFK, NY 121 Pax

American

Eagle

SF34 30 0 Sub RE Landing 0.5

06/01/1999 Little Rock,

AR

121 Pax American MD‐82 145 11 Dest RE Landing 0.15

  

07/26/2002 Tallahassee,

FL

121 Cargo FedEx

B727‐

200

3 0 Dest

CFIT Low on

Approach

0.15

10/19/2004 Kirksville,

MO

121 Pax

Corporate

Airlines as

American

Connexion

BAE‐32 15 13 Dest

CFIT Low on

Approach

0.75

08/27/2006 Lexington,

KY

121 Pax

Comair as

Delta

Connection

CRJ‐200 50 49 Dest Wrong Runway

T/O 0.35

02/18/2007 Cleveland,

OH

121 Pax

Shuttle

America as

Delta

Connection

ERJ‐170 74 0 Sub RE Landing 0.5

04/12/2007 Traverse

City, MI

121 Pax

Pinnacle as

NW Express

CRJ‐200 52 0 Sub RE Landing 0.9

06/20/2007 Laramie,

WY

121 Pax Great Lakes BE‐1900 11 0 Sub

LOC Bounced

Landing

0.15

02/12/2009 Buffalo 121 Pax Colgan Air

DHC‐8‐

Q400

49 50 Dest

LOC In Flight; RE

Landing

0.5

Passenger Average (excluding Tallahassee, FL FedEx cargo accident)   52.5%
69

James Reason characterizes major accidents and catastrophic system failures as the 

consequences of multiple, smaller failures that lead up to the actual accident. It is a “Swiss 

cheese” model of human error and also a sequential theory of accident causation.101 Reason’s 

model describes four levels of human failure, each one influencing the next. Organizational 

influences lead to instances of unsafe supervision which in turn lead to preconditions for unsafe 

acts and ultimately the unsafe acts of operators. The unsafe acts of operators are where most 

accident investigations are focused. It is a useful framework to illustrate how analyses of major 

accidents and catastrophic systems failures tend to reveal multiple, smaller failures leading up to 

the actual accident. The chances of the exact same circumstances happening again and causing 

the “same accident” are virtually nil but the possibility of preventing a similar set of 

circumstances is real. 

This sequential “Swiss cheese” formulation is a very appropriate tool for characterizing 

the circumstances leading up to accidents. The nature of fatigue is such that actions, reactions 

and the thought processes of fatigued crews are more susceptible to the types of cascading errors 

of judgment described in Reason’s model of catastrophic failure. The requirements contained in 

this final rule will decrease flightcrew member fatigue and therefore the accompanying accidents 

that are associated with fatigue. While it is very difficult to accurately attribute all past accidents 

to one or more causes indisputably, we have developed the average effectiveness measure to 

apply to the estimates and recognize that there are additional uncertainties with preventing a 

future fatigue related event. First, we examine an accident that occurred on October 19, 2004: 

 

101 James Reason, Human Error (Cambridge University Press, 1990)
70

At about 1937 central daylight time, a Corporate Airlines BAE Systems BAE-J3201, 

struck trees on final approach and crashed short of runway 36 at Kirksville Regional Airport, in 

Kirksville, Missouri. The captain, first officer, and 11 of the 13 passengers were fatally injured, 

and two passengers received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a postimpact fire.102

Research and accident history indicate that fatigue can cause flightcrew members to make 

risky, impulsive decisions, to become fixated on one aspect of a situation, and to react slowly to 

warnings or signs that an approach should be discontinued. Fatigue especially affects decision 

making, and research shows that people who are fatigued become less able to consider options 

and are more likely to become fixated on a course of action or a desired outcome. A fatigued 

pilot might fail to discontinue a flawed approach or might make a risky decision to continue a 

dangerous approach. 

The fatigued crew reported for duty at 0514. The accident was near the end of the sixth 

segment on a 'demanding' day. Crew had been on duty 14.5 hours and the PIC is said to have 

slept poorly the night before. The PIC was observed resting on a small couch in the company 

crew room; however, the quality of rest the PIC obtained during this time could not be 

determined. Company flightcrew members stated that the crew room was a noisy meeting area 

that was not ideal for sleeping. 

 

102 The NTSB evaluated fatigue as a possible factor in this accident and looked at the various circumstances present

the day of the accident that might have contributed to the pilots’ fatigue. The pilots’ available rest time (from

about 2100 to 0400) did not correspond favorably with either pilots’ reported usual sleeping hours, resulting in

much earlier than normal times to go to sleep and awaken. Additionally, the early wakeup call times would have

been challenging to both pilots because the human body is normally physiologically primed to sleep between 0300

and 0500. (NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Collision with Trees and Crash Short of the Runway, Corporate Airline

Flight 5966, BAE Systems BAE‐J3201, N875JX, Kirksville, Missouri, October 19, 2004 (Washington, DC, January 24,

2006, rev. March 6, 2006, NTSB/AAR‐06/01)
71

Additionally, the flightcrew members' high workload during their long day may have 

increased their fatigue. The accident occurred during the sixth flight segment of the day while the 

pilots were performing a non-precision approach in low ceilings and reduced visibility. The pilot 

deficiencies observed in this accident are consistent with fatigue impairment. 

Similarly, although the SIC’s junior status with the company may have been an issue in 

his failure to challenge the PIC during the approach, he may also have been suffering from 

fatigue; his failure to monitor and react to the PIC’s deviations from non-precision approach 

procedures was consistent with the degrading effects (slowed reactions and/or tunnel vision) of 

fatigue. 

The NTSB concluded that, on the basis of the less than optimal overnight rest time 

available, the early reporting time for duty, the length of the duty day, the number of flight legs, 

the demanding conditions (non-precision instrument approaches flown manually in conditions of 

low ceilings and reduced visibilities) encountered during the long duty day (and the two previous 

days), it is likely that fatigue contributed to the flightcrew members' degraded performance and 

decision-making. 

Another fatigue-related accident occurred in Traverse City, Michigan on April 12, 2007. 

The accident occurred well after midnight at the end of a demanding day during which the 

flightcrew members had flown 8.35 hours, made five landings, had been on duty more than 14 

hours, and been awake more than 16 hours. During the accident flight, the cockpit voice recorder 

(CVR) recorded numerous yawns and comments that indicate that the flightcrew members were 

fatigued. Additionally, the captain made references to being tired at 2332:12, 2341:53, and 

0018:43, and the first officer stated, “jeez, I’m tired” at 0020:41. Additionally, the flightcrew 

members’ high workload (flying in inclement weather conditions, and in the captain’s case, 
72

providing operating experience for the first officer) during their long day likely increased their 

fatigue. The aircraft ran off the departure end of the runway during snowy conditions. Although 

there were no injuries among the 49 passengers, the aircraft was substantially damaged. 103

As we observe a clear accident history and the accompanying science dealing with 

fatigue, it is apparent that fatigue threatens aviation safety by increasing the risk of flightcrew 

member error that could lead to an accident. Fatigue is characterized by a general lack of 

alertness and degradation in mental and physical performance. Fatigue manifests in the aviation 

context not only when flightcrew members fall asleep in the cockpit while cruising, but perhaps 

more importantly, when they are insufficiently alert during take-off and landing. Each flight 

segment that is flown by a flightcrew member includes a takeoff and a landing, which are the 

most task and safety-intensive parts of the flight. A flightcrew member whose FDP consists of a 

single flight segment only has to perform one takeoff and landing, while a flightcrew member 

whose FDP consists of six flight segments will have to perform six sets of takeoffs and landings. 

Because takeoffs and landings are extremely task-intensive, it logically follows that a flightcrew 

member who has performed six sets of takeoffs and landings will be more fatigued than the 

flightcrew member who has performed only one takeoff and landing. Reported fatigue-related 

events have included procedural errors, unstable approaches, lining up with the wrong runway, 

and landing without clearances. As such, a fatigued crew is dangerous no matter what “type” or 

segment of operation is examined and the requirements in this final rule will eliminate the 

distinctions between various operations. 

 

103 NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Runway Overrun During Landing, Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712,

Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet CL‐600‐2B19, N8905F, Traverse City, Michigan, April 12, 2007 (Washington, DC,

June 10, 2008, NTSB/AAR‐08/02)
73

As we have shown, in an airplane accident, there is a series of errors (both causes and 

factors) that contribute to an accident. Accident scenarios can vary greatly depending on phase of 

flight, the type of operation, phase of flight and size of the airplane. While flightcrew member 

fatigue can occur during any stage of flight, takeoff and landing are especially critical times for 

the crew to exhibit good judgment and sound decision making. The airplane is close to the 

ground and there is little room for error during these particular phases of flight. 

Quantified Benefits

In this Final SRIA, the FAA provides a range of benefit estimates for both passenger 

operations and cargo-only operations. The base case estimates only look at the historical events 

as a mirror for the future. The high case estimate for passenger operations assumes that regional 

carriers will begin flying larger planes. The high case estimate for cargo-only operations assumes 

a catastrophic accident of a wide-body aircraft with fatalities, in place of the one historic cargoonly accident which resulted in a hull loss and injuries, but no fatalities. We understand that 

future accidents will not be identical to historical accidents, but our approach provides a look at 

the benefits of this rule based on a snapshot of the past and is grounded in NTSB findings. 

 Here the FAA provides a quantitative benefit estimate of historical-based accidents (base 

case), and a high case of expected benefits from future averted accidents once this rule is 

promulgated. Generally our benefit analysis begins using past history as an important reference 

from which to begin the benefit analysis. We believe the base case benefit estimate, which is 

based solely on the outcome of past accidents, may be low for passenger operations because 

today passenger load factors and aircraft size are already greater than they were in the past 

decade. On the other hand, we also note that this estimate may not fully take into account 
74

changes in regulatory requirements that postdate those accidents and that may mitigate the 

projected risk. As such, our base case estimate represents a snapshot of risk. 

Airplane accidents are somewhat random both in terms of airplane size and the number of 

people on board. For these reasons, projections of future fatalities may be based on future risk 

exposure, and our projections are typically based on expected distributions around the mean. Our 

typical scenario incorporates increasing airplane size, expected load factors, and a breakeven 

analysis. However, our evaluation of the historical accidents showed a disproportionate risk 

among smaller, regional carriers. Accordingly, as we discuss below, the FAA has decided to base 

its high case estimate of passenger operations benefits on preventing an accident in a regional jet 

airplane. 

In response to comments, we have reduced the analysis period from the 20 years 

provided in the proposed regulatory analysis to 10 years here. We received comments disputing 

the use of a 20-year time frame for accidents because the accident rate has declined over time. 

While noting the wide range of operations over the last 20 years, we shortened the accident 

history to the last 10 years. A reduction in the length of the sample period introduces other 

problems, most importantly with less time there are fewer observations. Observations are 

important, as the nature of aviation accidents is that while they are rare events, very often these 

accidents result in severe, high consequences. 

The FAA Office of Accident Investigation assessed the effectiveness of this rule to 

prevent the six fatigue-related accidents which occurred on passenger-carrying aircraft in a 

recent 10-year period. This office used the CAST methodology to assign a value to how effective 

the rule will be at preventing each accident. On average, we expect this rule would have been 
75

52.5 percent effective in preventing the types of accidents had it been in effect over the last 10 

years. 

Passenger Operations Base Case Estimate

The passenger operations base case estimate only looks at the historical events as a 

specific reference point. In this estimate, the exact number of fatalities for each past event is 

multiplied by the relative rule effectiveness score to obtain the historical number of deaths that 

would have been averted with the requirements contained in this final rule, had this rule been in 

effect at the time. The base case estimate supposes roughly six deaths will be averted annually. 

Multiplying six annual averted deaths by the $6.2 million value of statistical life equals $37.2 

million annually. In addition, had the requirements been in place at the time of these historical 

accidents, $4.0 million in hull damage for each accident would have been averted,104 which 

equals $12 million for ten years or $1.2 million annually. Finally, we use $5.6 million as the 

estimated accident investigation cost per accident, which equals $1.7 million annually.105 This 

estimate is based on the investigation costs of federal agencies and private industries and aircraft 

wreckage removal.106 When summed over the 10-year period 2014 through 2023, the base case 

 

104 As in the Initial SRIA, this Final SRIA revises the base case estimate of hull value found in the original RIA. This

estimate of hull damage is derived by averaging the low end estimated value of the aircraft types involved in the

ten‐year accident history cited in Table 5 as found in the Airliner Price Guide (Summer 2012). Note that three of

the six historic accidents resulted in destroyed aircraft while the other three resulted in substantial damage. As a

result, using replacement value of the aircraft as the estimate of the hull damage may overestimate benefits if

repairing the damaged aircraft was less costly than replacing it after an accident. 105 The inclusion of accident investigation costs as a benefit category was not included in the original RIA. Rather,

the cost associated with accident investigations was added to address a specific concern raised by flightcrew

members for cargo operators in associated litigation who asserted these costs should have been included. Since

this cost is reasonably quantifiable, the FAA has determined that it is appropriate to consider.   106 The estimated accident investigation cost was derived from Economic Values for FAA Investment and

Regulatory Decisions, A Guide, prepared by GRA for the FAA (October 3, 2007, 8‐4 and 8‐5) and inflated using the

GDP deflator. Specifically, the value for a major investigation ($10.5 million in 2011 dollars) was used for the three
76

estimate is $401 million ($246 million present value at seven percent and $322 million present 

value at three percent). 

Passenger Operations High Case Estimate

Because airplane accidents are relatively rare they are not necessarily representative of 

actual risk, especially with regard to airplane size and the number of people onboard. In addition, 

future conditions will be different than they were when the accident occurred. Thus, the base 

case estimate for passenger operations represents a snapshot of the risk that fatigue introduces in 

the overall operating environment. It considers neither the forecasted increase in load factors nor 

the larger aircraft types. The future preventable events that this rule addresses will not exactly 

mirror the past events because the airplane types, utilization, and seating capacity have changed. 

To quantify the expected benefits in the passenger operations high case scenario, we 

narrowed the analysis to three of the six historic accidents which were catastrophic (all onboard 

died). In this case, the expected number of preventable catastrophic accidents equals the three 

accidents multiplied by the 52.5 percent effectiveness rate. Thus, over a 10-year time period, the 

expected number of preventable accidents is 1.575. Using the Poisson distribution, there is 

roughly a 20 percent chance for no accident; however, there is also a 47 percent probability of 

two or more accidents. 

While the 20-year accident history has a broader range of catastrophic accidents, in the 

shorter 10-year historical period, all three catastrophic accidents were on regional airplanes. We 

recognize that as regional airplanes are smaller than the ‘typical’ passenger jet, assuming all 

 

catastrophic accidents and the weighted average for air carriers ($0.6 million in 2011 dollars) was used for the non‐

catastrophic accidents, resulting in an average cost of $5.6 million in 2011 dollars.
77

future accidents would be on a regional jet understates the relative risk across the fleet of aircraft 

affected by this rule. It does, however, represent historical accidents and may be somewhat 

representative of actual future risk, since the mainline carriers typically have collective 

bargaining agreements that are already largely reflective of the requirements of this rule.107 

The B737 and A320 represent typical sized airplanes in the forecast period, with an 

expected number of passengers and crew of 123 given a forecasted 143-seat airplane and a load 

factor of 83 percent.108 Even though there was a (relatively large) B757 passenger airplane 

accident in the 20 year history, if one looks at the past 10 years as truly representative of risk, the 

preventable accident would likely be on a regional airplane. 

For the high case, the FAA backed away from a benefit outcome based on mean fleet, 

flight hours, and occupant numbers because ultimately we were persuaded there was information 

which could not be ignored by the three regional passenger accidents occurring without a 

mainline passenger accident. For this reason, we selected an 88-seat regional jet (like an ERJ175) to be the representative airplane for the high case. This size airplane is also consistent with 

the fact that regional operators are expected to fly somewhat larger airplanes in the future. 

The expected benefit from this high case follows a simple methodology for estimating 

and then valuing the expected number of occupants in a prevented accident. With a total of 0.3 

accidents per year over the ten year period multiplied by the 52.5 percent effectiveness rate, the 

analysis assumes 0.1575 average accidents per year. The estimated occupant value for each 

 

107 It is unusual that collective bargaining agreements would closely mirror regulatory requirements. However,

flight and duty limitations are unique because they address both safety considerations, which are regulatory in

nature, and lifestyle considerations, which are properly addressed in collective bargaining agreements. Because of

the impact of collective bargaining agreements on the number of hours that flightcrew members work, those

agreements were considered by the FAA in calculating both the costs and benefits of this rule.   108 FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2011‐2031, Tables 6 and 9.
78

averted accident equals the average number of seats (88) multiplied by the load factor of 77 

percent plus four crew members for a total of 72 averted fatalities.109 Each of these prevented 

fatalities is multiplied by a $6.2 million value of statistical life. The expected value of a 

preventable accident equals the sum of the averted fatalities at $446.4 million added to the value 

of the airplane hull loss ($24.0 million replacement value),110 and accident investigation costs 

($10.5 million for a major investigation) for a prevented accident benefit of $480.9 million. Over 

a 10-year period, the value of preventing the expected 1.575 accidents equals approximately 

$757 million ($465 million present value at seven percent and $609 million present value at three 

percent). 

Cargo‐only Operations Base Case Estimate

Just as in the benefit analysis for passenger operations, the cargo-only base case estimate 

uses historical events to determine the preventable accident benefits for the future benefits. There 

was one air cargo accident during the 10-year analysis period, which occurred July 26, 2002.111

In this accident, three crewmembers were seriously injured and the hull and cargo were 

destroyed. Thus, the quantifiable benefit of preventing such an accident in the future consists of 

averting serious injury to three flightcrew members, the value of the hull and the cargo, and the 

public and private cost of the accident investigation. After estimating the value of each benefit, 

we apply an effectiveness rating of 15 percent to the sum of these benefits. 

 

109 Assumed load factor of 77 percent is based on forecasted load factors for regional carriers found in Table 25,

FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years 2011‐2031. 110 The value for an ERJ‐175 is taken from Airliner Price Guide (Summer 2012). 111 NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Collision with Trees on Final Approach, Federal Express Flight 1478, Boeing 727‐

232, N497FE, Tallahassee, Florida, July 26, 2002 (Washington, DC, June 8, 2004, NTSB/AAR‐04/02)
79

The value of averting three seriously injured flightcrew members is $2.16 million. This 

value is based on the DOT policy guidance that states the value of a person losing productivity 

from a “serious” injury is 10.5 percent of the value of statistical life.112 Thus, the value of 

avoiding a serious injury to one flightcrew member is $0.65 million (10.5 percent multiplied by 

$6.2 million). In response to comments to the Initial SRIA, this Final SRIA also includes an 

estimate of the cost of medical treatment for a serious injury, $70,000.113 The total value for 

avoiding a serious injury, including medical costs associated with the injury is $0.72 million or 

$2.16 million for three flightcrew members. 

The Initial SRIA used the value of a Boeing 727 as the estimated value of avoiding a hull 

loss for the base case because the only cargo accident during the 10-year history involved a 

B727-200F. However, comments made regarding the Initial SRIA stated that the Boeing 727 is 

no longer in common usage and the estimated value for a Boeing 727 of $1.8 million was too 

low. In response, the FAA modified the base case to represent a typical narrow-body aircraft in 

common use today, the Boeing 757. The FAA estimates the hull value of a B757-200F to be 

$15.2 million based on an average replacement value for a B757-200F made between 1983 and 

1999.114 

We estimate the average value of cargo on a B757-200F to be $3.7 million. While the 

FAA is unaware of published estimates for the value of air cargo, we derived the average value 

 

112 DOT, Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in Departmental Analyses – 2011 Interim Adjustment

(July 29, 2011) 113 The NHTSA estimate of medical costs for treating an AIS Category 3 (“Serious”) injury updated to 2011 dollars

using the GDP deflator. (Lawrence Blincoe et al., The Economic Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes 2000 (Washington,

DC: NHTSA, May 2002), 9, Table 2.)   114 Airliner Price Guide (Summer 2011), 138‐141. As with the passenger base case, use of the replacement value of

the aircraft as a component of the estimate of benefits from avoiding a non‐catastrophic accident may be an over

estimate, if the costs of repairing the aircraft are lower than the replacement value of the aircraft.
80

per ton of air cargo by assessing the commodity flow value and commodity flow weight of goods 

transported by air from the 2007 Commodity Flow Survey (CFS).115 Because both the airfreight 

weight of shipment and airfreight value of commodities vary by origination or destination, the 

average was used. Inflation adjusted average cargo value per ton of $87,082 was calculated by 

dividing the origin-destination averaged airfreight value of commodities by the corresponding 

averaged airfreight weight of shipment, with the inflation rate based upon the Gross Domestic 

Product deflator. The average cargo value of $3.7 million was calculated by multiplying the 

maximum cargo weight capacity of a B757-200F aircraft (42.9 tons) by the average cargo value 

per ton ($87,082).116 This estimate is based on a cargo load factor of 100 percent. 

We include the weighted average cost of accident investigation ($0.6 million) as a benefit 

category.117 

The total of the averted costs from three serious injuries of $2.16 million, complete loss 

of a B757-200F hull valued at $15.2 million, complete loss of $3.7 million in cargo value, and 

investigation costs of $0.6 million, equals base case benefits of $21.7 million. The final rule has 

an effectiveness rating of 15 percent for this accident. Multiplying the potential benefits of $21.7 

million by the 15 percent effectiveness yields a base case benefit estimate of $3.255 million over 

the 10-year period, or $0.326 million per year. 

 The FAA assumes the likelihood of an accident occurring in any year of the forecast 

period is equal, or uniformly distributed. Total estimated benefit of applying the final rule to 

 

115 Data based on Commodity Flow Survey 2007, a joint survey conducted by the Census Bureau and BTS and

updated every 5 years . (http://www.bts.gov/publications/commodity_flow_survey/2007/state_summaries/) 116 Jesse Johnson and Eric Gaier, Air Cargo Operations Cost Database (Hampton, VA: NASA Langley Research

Center, April 1998, NASA/CR‐1998‐207655), Table 5‐3.   117 Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide, prepared by GRA for the FAA (October

3, 2007, 8‐4 and 8‐5), and inflated using the GDP deflator.
81

cargo-only operations over the analysis period for the base case is $3.26 million. The present 

value benefits are $2.00 million when discounted at seven percent and $2.62 million when 

discounted at three percent. 

High Case Estimate		

The high benefit case is based on the same accident scenario as in the base case, that is, a 

single accident, but with a more severe outcome. The high case estimate projects preventing one 

catastrophic air cargo accident over a 10-year period. 

In response to comments to the Initial SRIA, this Final SRIA adjusts the high case 

benefits scenario to consider the catastrophic loss of a typical wide-body aircraft. The FAA has 

determined that a mid-range MD-11 with an estimated replacement value of $23.5 million is an 

appropriate aircraft to represent a typical wide-body cargo aircraft hull.118 The MD-11 has a 

cargo capacity of 101 tons.119 Applying the average per ton value of air cargo of $87,082 and 

assuming 100 percent load factor, this results in an estimated benefit of $8.8 million from 

avoiding the loss of cargo.120 

In response to the Initial SRIA, there were comments regarding the assumed number of 

people on board a cargo flight during a potential future catastrophic accident for the high case. 

IPA pointed out that there are sometimes non-crew passengers on cargo-only flights and ALPA 

pointed out that an extended range MD-11 might have a double crew. However, neither 

 

118 IPA provided the $23.5 million hull value estimate in its comments to the Initial SRIA. That value lies between

the retail and wholesale values for a 1992 MD‐11 published in Airliner Price Guide (Winter 2012) and is therefore

an appropriate value estimate to use because the average age of a cargo aircraft is approximately 20 years. 119 Airline Pilots Association International, Comments, 17.   120 Jesse Johnson and Eric Gaier, Air Cargo Operations Cost Database (Hampton, VA: NASA Langley Research

Center, April 1998, NASA/CR‐1998‐207655), Table 5‐3.  
82

commenter provided data on the average or typical number of people on a cargo-only flight. In 

the absence of data on regarding the typical or average situations, the FAA reviewed the history 

of all US carrier cargo-only fatal accidents during the historical accident period (1991 to 2000) 

and finds that for the 5 accidents, an average of 3.2 people were on board the aircraft. The FAA 

also received comments that the FAA had neglected to factor in the possibility of ground 

fatalities from a cargo accident. Again, the FAA reviewed the 10-year accident history and found 

that there were 0.4 ground fatalities on average from cargo accidents involving US carriers. 

Therefore, the FAA assumes there would be 3.6 fatalities in the high case benefits scenario for 

cargo-only operations. See Table C.8 in Appendix C for details on the historical fatal accidents 

from cargo operations of US carriers. Applying the estimated VSL of $6.2 million results in an 

estimated benefit from avoiding fatalities for the high case of $22.3 million over 10 years. 

Similar to the passenger high case analysis, we include the cost of a major accident 

investigation ($10.5 million), which includes public and private accident investigation cost, and 

aircraft wreckage removal. 121 

 In total, the estimated benefit of preventing an accident in the high case is $65.1 million. 

Multiplying the estimated benefit of preventing one accident by a 15 percent effectiveness rating 

equals $9.77 million over the 10-year period or $0.977 per year. The total estimated benefit of 

applying the final rule to cargo-only operations over the analysis period is $9.77 million ($5.99 

million present value at seven percent, and $7.85 million present value at three percent). Table 

 

121 Petitioners in the related litigation argued that the FAA should have included the impact of averted hazardous

material spills in calculating benefits. Potential costs from hazardous materials on‐board are not included here.

There is no historical basis to project any impact, as DOT reporting indicates there were only two “hazmat”

accidents involving aviation in the last ten years and there was no cost to the public from those accidents (Hazmat

Intelligence Portal, U.S. Department of Transportation. Data as of 9/10/2012). We include anecdotal information

on environmental clean‐up in a new sensitivity analysis included in Appendix B.
83

C.4 and Table C.5 in Appendix C provide details of these calculations.

This Final SRIA includes an additional sensitivity analysis to explore whether using nonstandard assumptions would impact the central conclusion that the costs of extending the final 

rule to cargo-only operations vastly outweigh the benefits. That sensitivity uses the assumptions 

developed for the high case benefits estimates which are modified to include a larger aircraft (a 

Boeing 747), includes some anecdotal information on the potentials costs of environmental 

cleanup after an airline accident, and uses an updated VSL to estimate the value of preventing 

fatalities.122 The results of this sensitivity analysis, discussed in Appendix B, support the 

conclusion that the costs of extending the final rule to cargo-only operations far exceed the 

benefits. 

Non‐Quantified Benefits

The FAA was able to quantify the following categories of benefits from averting aviation 

accidents related to flightcrew member fatigue: avoiding onboard and on-ground fatalities, 

avoiding loss of aircraft and cargo, avoiding medical costs associated with non-fatal injuries, and 

avoiding accident investigation costs. Although the FAA was not able to identify information on 

the average or typical costs of environmental cleanup from an aviation accident, we have 

explored the possible magnitude of that benefit category using anecdotal information in the 

sensitivity analysis included in Appendix B. In addition to the categories discussed above, the 

 

122 This Final SRIA is based on DOT guidance on valuing the prevention of accidental fatalities that was in effect at

the time that the analysis was performed. Subsequent to the analysis, but before this Final SRIA was published,

revised DOT guidance on the value of statistical life was issued.  
84

FAA believes there are additional categories of benefits from the final rule although the FAA 

was not able to quantify the magnitude of them. 

Avoiding loss of life relating to destruction of critical medical supplies. As pointed 

out by IPA in its comments regarding the Initial SRIA, vital medical supplies are often 

transported by air. Transplant organs are a vivid example of air cargo that is vital and not 

replaceable. The value of such materials is greater than the selling price of cargo and includes the 

life that might be lost as the result of the destruction of those vital medical supplies. However, 

the FAA has no information on the prevalence of such materials in air cargo upon which to base 

a benefits estimate. Our impression is that such instances of truly life or death cargo are quite 

rare when compared to the total volume of all air cargo. 

Long term health benefits to flightcrew members from reduced fatigue. As discussed 

in the preamble to the final rule, there may be long-term health benefits from reducing fatigue for 

flightcrew members although the FAA was not able to quantify them. However, the cost section 

includes an estimate of the cost savings in the form of reduced use of sick time resulting from the 

final rule’s positive impact on short term health outcomes. 

Benefits of having well rested flightcrew members to solve minor problems before 

they become accidents. This category of benefits was discussed in the NPRM as well. The FAA 

was not able to develop a quantitative estimate of the magnitude of this benefit. 

Avoidance of runway closure. As pointed out by IPA in its comments on the Initial 

SRIA, in some cases, an accident on take-off or landing could result in closure of a runway or 

even the entire airport during the emergency response, clean up, and investigation phases after 

the accident. A runway closure can result in cancelled flights, delayed flights, and re-routings, 

which would have operational cost impacts on carriers and time costs to passengers and perhaps 
85

even the costs of foregone or delayed trips. However, the FAA is not aware of any single 

database that systematically records runway closures after accidents or impacts of any such 

closures in terms of say, flights diverted, delayed, or cancelled, or the number of passengers 

affected. Therefore, the FAA was not able to quantify this category of benefits. 

Benefit Summary

The new requirements in this final rule will eliminate the current rest and duty 

distinctions between domestic, flag and supplemental operations as the requirements apply 

universally to all part 121 certificate holders conducting passenger operations. The sleep science, 

while still evolving, is clear in a few important respects: most people need seven to nine hours of 

sleep to function effectively; most people find it more difficult to sleep during day than during 

the night, resulting in greater fatigue if working at night; the longer one has been awake and the 

longer one spends on task, the greater the likelihood of fatigue; and fatigue leads to an increased 

risk of making a mistake. The requirements contained in this final rule and the accompanying 

analysis are designed to reduce the factors that lead to fatigue in most individuals and for all 

flight crew. 

The actual benefits of the final rule will depend upon the type and size of accident that 

the rule averts. Because we recognize the potential variability in the quantified benefits of this 

final rule, we provide a base case estimate and a high case estimate for both passenger and cargoonly operations. Our base case estimate of the benefits of the final rule as applied to passenger 

operations is $401 million ($246 million present value at seven percent and $322 million at three 

percent) and our high case estimate is $757 million ($465 million present value at seven percent 

and $609 million at three percent). 

If the final rule were extended to cargo-only operations, our base case estimate of 
86

additional benefits for that population is $3 million ($2 million present value at seven percent 

and $3 million present value three percent), and our high case estimate is $10 million ($6 million 

present value at seven percent and $8 million present value at three percent). 

In addition, the following categories of benefits were not quantifiable: 

 Avoiding loss of life relating to destruction of critical medical supplies. 

 Long term health benefits to flightcrew members from reduced fatigue.

 Avoidance of ramp/taxiway accidents. 

 Benefits of having well rested flightcrew members to solve minor problems 

before they become accidents. 

 Avoidance of runway closure following an accident. 

Cost Analysis

The cost of the final rule to part 121 passenger air carriers can be categorized into three 

main cost components: flight operations, training, and rest facilities. Flight operations cost 

consists of three subcomponents: crew scheduling cost, computer programming of crew 

management systems cost, and cost savings associated with reduced use of sick time by 

flightcrew members because of reduced fatigue. Training cost consists of two subcomponents: 

dispatchers and management fatigue training cost, and curriculum development cost. Rest 

facilities cost consists of four subcomponents: engineering cost, installation cost, aircraft 

downtime cost, and increased fuel usage cost. The final rule costs were calculated using industryprovided data whenever possible, along with expert analysis. 

The total estimated cost of the final rule is $462 million for the 12-year period from 2012 

to 2023. The present value is $320 million and $391 million using a seven percent and a three 

percent discount rate, respectively. If the rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, the 

additional cost of the rule would be $452 million in nominal terms, $292 million and $371 

million using seven percent and three percent discount rates, respectively. 
87

The 2014 effective date of the final rule allowed two years for carriers to become 

compliant with the final rule. The FAA classified costs into three main components and 

estimated the accompanying costs. Data used for the cost estimation was obtained from various 

industry sources, the sources of which are explained in each section. 

Table 6 and Table 7 present the estimates of the three main cost components for 

passenger operations and cargo-only operations, respectively. Each of the main cost components 

are explained in-depth in the following sections of this document. 

Table 6: Cost Summary (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations, (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component

Total

Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Flight Operations $297 $184 $240

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135

Training $19 $12 $16

Total $462 $320 $391

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Table 7: Cost Summary (2012 – 2023), Cargo-Only Operations, (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component

Total

Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Flight Operations $382 $235 $307

Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58

Training $7 $4 $5

Total $452 $292 $371

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 
88

Flight Operations Cost

The flight operations cost component of the final rule is composed of three 

subcomponents: crew scheduling costs, crew management system computer programming costs, 

and payroll cost savings from reducing flightcrew member fatigue.123 Table 8 and Table 9 

provide a summary of the three subcomponents of the flight operations cost for passenger 

operations and cargo-only operations respectively. The derivations of subcomponent costs are 

explained in-depth in the following sections of the document. The explanation for these different 

cost components found in this Final SRIA and the Initial SRIA is structured slightly differently 

than the explanation found in the original RIA. Additionally, in a few instances, the manner of 

calculating these cost components has been modified for clarity, consistency, and to correct some 

calculation and reporting errors. 

Table 8: Summary of Flight Operations Costs (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 

$Millions) 

Flight Operations Cost Subcomponent

Total

Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Crew Scheduling $515 $316 $414

Computer Programming $8 $7 $7

Payroll Savings from Reducing Fatigue -$225 -$138 -$181

Total Flight Operations $297 $184 $240

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

 

123 Operators might be able to reduce their flight operations costs by developing and implementing a fatigue risk

management system (FRMS). The FAA is not imposing an FRMS program requirement on part 121 carriers, but

does allow carriers the FRMS option. Carriers might develop an FRMS program as an alternative to the final rule

flightcrew member duty and rest requirements when the crew scheduling cost savings equal or exceed the costs of

the FRMS program. Carriers might do this for ultra‐long flights, which have flight times over 16 hours. FRMS is

optional and would only be implemented by an operator if their compliance costs could be reduced as FRMS only

provides cost relief. We did not estimate this potential savings as we do not know how many operators would use

FRMS and the cost of FRMS has a wide range.
89

Table 9: Summary of Flight Operations Costs (2012 – 2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 

$Millions) 

Flight Operations Cost Subcomponent

Total

Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Crew Scheduling $431 $265 $347

Computer Programming $2 $1 $2

Payroll Savings from Reducing Fatigue -$51 -$31 -$41

Total Flight Operations $382 $235 $307

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Crew Scheduling		

Overview

Numerous commenters objected to the FAA’s assumptions regarding the 25 percent costsavings resulting from long-term scheduling optimization in the NPRM. To address these 

concerns, the FAA estimated the scheduling compliance costs using a commercial crew 

scheduling program. The final rule’s impact on crew scheduling costs was evaluated using 

Cygnus, a pairing and bid line optimizer developed by CrewPairings, Inc.124 A selection of part 

121 air carriers provided actual crew schedule data to the FAA for assistance in the cost analysis 

of the Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements Rulemaking. Each carrier provided data 

for one or more “cases.” A case is defined as a carrier fleet, which usually consists of one aircraft 

type. In some of the cases, the carrier schedules multiple aircraft types using the same pool of 

flightcrew members; the methodology in the original RIA (also used in this Final SRIA and the 

Initial SRIA) mirrors actual carrier practice. 

 

124 Cygnus has been used by more than 30 major airlines worldwide over the past 40 years.
90

In total, carriers provided data for eight cases. This analysis is necessarily limited by the 

willingness of carriers to provide this detailed crew scheduling data. However, we believe the 

cases used in this analysis represent the spectrum of cost structures present in the part 121 air 

transportation industry. Mainline passenger carriers were represented with two short-haul, 

narrow-body aircraft cases and two long-haul, wide-body aircraft cases. Regional passenger 

carriers were represented with two cases.125 Freight carriers were represented with one shorthaul, narrow-body aircraft case and one long-haul, wide-body aircraft case. 

In addition to the eight cases based on actual carrier fleets, a synthetic supplemental 

carrier case was created because no supplemental carriers provided crew schedule data. Creation 

of the synthetic supplemental carrier involved modification of the freight wide-body case. The 

flight schedules and crew bases of the freight wide-body case were retained because cargo 

carriers comprise the major share of supplemental carriers. The freight carrier CBA rules were 

replaced with those reflecting a representative supplemental carrier CBA. The representative 

supplemental carrier CBA reflected rules from a number of actual supplemental carrier CBAs. 

These changes reflect the impacts of this final rule on actual supplemental passenger carriers 

operating wide-body aircraft with route structures similar to the freight wide-body aircraft case. 

The crew schedule data consisted of one scheduling period (month) per case. The specific 

periods varied by carrier, based on data availability. The data included flight schedules, aircraft 

flow information, pairings and the carrier’s rule set (contractual, management, and discretionary 

rules). The use of a pairing and bid line optimizer enabled the FAA to more accurately model the 

 

125 Most regional carriers operate code‐share flights for a number of mainline partners; crew scheduling is usually

performed separately for each mainline partner. This analysis was conducted using the same process as the actual

carrier, so each regional carrier case represents a sub‐fleet.
91

impacts of the final rule on industry crew scheduling costs than was possible during NPRM cost 

analysis. The pairing and bid line optimizer has been used worldwide by many types of airlines 

for their own crew scheduling needs and addresses the optimization and scheduling limitations in 

the NPRM cost analysis. Due to this extensive real-world experience, results for these eight cases 

can be expected to accurately portray the impacts of the final rule on crew scheduling costs for 

the cases studied. 

Crew Scheduling Analysis

Accurately analyzing the final rule’s impact on crew scheduling costs for each of the 

cases required isolating the final rule’s impact from the impacts of various contractual, 

management, and discretionary crew scheduling practices. The pairing and bid line optimizer 

was first calibrated to ensure that it was capable of creating crew schedules virtually identical to 

the crew schedules provided by the carriers. After calibration, existing federal regulations 

relevant to flightcrew member scheduling were removed from the optimizer and replaced with 

the final rule requirements. Changes in crew scheduling cost could then be attributed solely to 

the final rule. 

The first step in optimizer calibration was receiving and formatting the input data from 

carriers. The input data included flight schedules, aircraft flow information, pairings, regulations, 

carrier’s unit costs (credit hour pay rate, per diem, and hotel room costs), and the carrier’s rule 

set from the carriers’ crew management systems. Carrier rule sets included parameters for crew 

bases, maximum/minimum flight time, rest time, duty time, and ground time to allow aircraft 

changes and are based on contractual, management, and discretionary rules. The pairings that 

were received directly from the carriers in this first step are referred to as the “production 

solution.” Since no modifications were made to the production solution by the FAA or the 
92

optimizer, the production solution accurately represents the current crew scheduling 

environment, including all regulatory, contractual, management, and discretionary rules. 

Once the production solution was established, the bid lines and pairings were set aside. 

The optimizer was run using only the flight schedules, aircraft flow information, federal aviation 

regulations, and the carrier’s rule set. The optimizer then created its own bid lines and pairings, 

which are referred to as the “baseline solution.” The baseline solution was compared to the 

production solution using a number of metrics, such as the amount of credit hours, duty periods, 

hotel room nights required, distribution of time among crew bases, number of aircraft swaps, etc. 

Once the baseline solution was identical or virtually identical to the production solution, the 

optimizer was deemed calibrated for each of the cases. 

This calibration of the optimizer verified that the optimizer could accurately reproduce 

the crew scheduling process at each of the carriers. That is, the baseline solution could be 

substituted for the production solution at each carrier with no material change in crew scheduling 

cost. 

To determine the impact of the final rule, the regulations in the baseline solution were 

replaced with the final rule. All provisions of the final rule were implemented in this analysis, 

including maximum flight time, maximum flight duty time, minimum rest time, and cumulative 

limits. All other, non-regulatory rules from the baseline solution were retained. Using these 

inputs, the optimizer created bid lines and pairings referred to as the “final rule solution.” Since 

the only difference between the baseline solution and the final rule solution was the substitution 

of the final rule for the existing regulations, the change in cost components between the solutions 

is solely attributable to the final rule. 
93

In the course of reviewing the calculations used in estimating scheduling costs in support 

of drafting the Initial SRIA, the FAA became aware that in the original RIA, in eight of the nine 

cases, the number of aircraft block hours differed slightly between the baseline run and the final 

rule run. This minor difference is due to the treatment of so called “carry-in/carry-out” flights. 

Industry practice is to construct each trip pairing such that each flightcrew member starts and 

ends the scheduling period at their crew base. Consequently, some bid lines outputted by the 

optimizer would have left flightcrew members away from their crew base at the beginning or end 

of the scheduling period (month). In those instances, it is airline practice to include those 

segments as part of the bid lines for the adjoining month (i.e., “carrying” the flightcrew member 

in or out of the month). While that is reasonable practice for airlines, the practice resulted in 

introducing a source of variation between the baseline and final rule run that was not caused by 

the final rule. That is, because the final rule results in different bid lines being constructed, the 

segments identified as carry-in or carry-out often differ as well. 

The FAA continues to use the original results as the basis for this Final SRIA (as was 

done for the Initial SRIA). However, Appendix B contains a sensitivity analysis whereby the 

final rule results are adjusted to explore the possible magnitude of the impact of the difference in 

aircraft block hours on the crew scheduling cost estimates caused by the carry-in/carry-out 

variation. 

Table 10 shows the change in cost components attributable to the final rule for each case. 

Note that cases which had no changes in either domestic or international time away from base 
94

(TAFB) were cases that were either solely domestic or solely international.126 More details on 

the analysis of each case used in this analysis can be found in the GRA summary report found in 

the docket associated with this rule-making.127

Table 10: Change in Monthly Flightcrew Scheduling Cost Elements Due to Final Rule, by 

Case 

Industry Group Case

Baseline

Solution

Lines of

Flying

Change in

Credit Hours

Change in

Domestic

TAFB Hours

Change in

International

TAFB Hours  

Change in

Hotel Stays

Passenger

Narrow‐body

A 924 2,187 18,660 0 660

B 1,698 ‐429 ‐15,035 1,030 ‐944

Passenger

Wide‐body

C 1,121 ‐70 3,863 8,348 791

D 430 ‐965 0 ‐2,741 ‐34

Regional E 300 57 5,812 0 280

F 240 37 4,148 ‐16 144

Supplemental I 806 4,642 3,159 9,759 756

Freight

Narrow‐body G 330 560 890 2,390 54

Freight Wide‐

body H 1,053 984 6,197 862 240

It is interesting to note that in some instances, the rule change results in the potential for 

cost savings. For instance, while one provision of the final rule requires increased rests between 

duty periods for domestic operations, the final rule also allows for increased flying time in 

certain situations as well as reduced rest times between duty periods for some international 

operations. 

 

126 In response to a comment on the Initial SRIA, the text in column headings in certain tables has been changed

from “Flightcrew Members” to “Lines of Flying” to better communicate the content of the information. 127 GRA, Inc. Summary of CrewPairings, Inc. Economic Analysis of Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements

Rulemaking. (Jenkintown, PA, September 2012)  
95

Given that maximum flight time and flight duty period time now depend on time of day, 

acclimation, number of flightcrew members, and number of segments, there are situations where 

flightcrew members can work more hours per duty period under the final rule than under the 

previous rule, as well as some flights that can now be flown with fewer flightcrew members. 

In some cases, the changes are small. For instance, maximum flight time per duty period 

for domestic flights was extended from 8 to 9 hours for duty periods beginning from 0500-1959. 

However, the flight time limits now are in effect for actual flight time, rather than planned flight 

time, which means in practice, carriers will not be able to fully schedule the additional hour of 

flight time but instead will leave a buffer to allow for instances of unplanned flight delays. In 

other cases, though, airlines can potentially see significant savings; for example, international 

flights with three flightcrew members were previously limited to 12 hours flying and have now 

been increased to 13 flight hours, and in some cases, extended to 17 flight duty hours under 

certain time of day and rest facility combinations. For some classes of long-haul flying, this 

means that instead of needing two additional flightcrew members, only one additional flightcrew 

member is needed. Similarly, rest periods have also potentially decreased for some route types 

(particularly international), reducing the amount of TAFB and credit hours accruing to flightcrew 

members. 

As an example, Case D depicted in Table 10 shows savings in terms of credit hours, 

international TAFB, and hotel stays due to the final rule. The flight segments in Case D were 

exclusively international flights and the existing schedules already allowed rest periods that 

exceeded the minimum rest period required by the final rule. Additionally, Case D had instances 

where the increase in flight time allowed by the rule was particularly beneficial and allowed 
96

certain flights to Europe to be operated with one less flightcrew member which resulted in 

significant cost savings. 

One of the passenger narrow-body cases and both passenger wide-body cases (Cases B – 

D) demonstrated decreases in credit hours. The other passenger narrow-body case (Case A) 

showed an increase in credit hours of 2.9 percent, while both regional carriers (Cases E and F) 

had credit hour increases of only 0.2 percent. The freight and supplemental cases (Cases G – I) 

had credit hour increases ranging from 1.2 percent to 7.2 percent. TAFB and hotel rooms rose for 

some passenger carrier cases and fell for others (but generally less than 7.5 percent in either 

direction), depending largely on the relevant schedule and collective bargaining agreement. 

TAFB and hotel rooms increased for the regional cases (between 5 percent and 9 percent) as 

their current scheduling practice is optimized around the minimum rest time of the current rule. 

Freight and supplemental carriers saw across-the-board increases in time away from base and 

hotel rooms. 

In terms of the final rule’s impact on the work schedules of flightcrew members at an 

individual level, the most striking change is for the supplemental case. Flightcrew members in 

the supplemental case under the final rule will now have two fewer duty hours per duty period, 

on average, whereas the other cases showed more modest changes in the number of duty hours 

per duty period (fewer than 30 minutes increase or decrease). The discrepancy results because 

the difference between the current rules and final rule was most pronounced for supplemental 

operations. 
97

More details on the specifics of each of the cases can be found in the GRA summary 

report.128

Estimates of Unit Costs

We made separate estimates of each of the unit costs for each cost component (credit 

hour costs, per diem hourly rates, and cost per hotel room) for different types of air carriers. The 

estimates are based on actual cost data for a variety of air carriers, wherever possible. 

The first step of the unit cost estimation process was to define a collection of industry 

groups that would collectively cover all part 121 air carriers and that would group air carriers 

together based on similarity of characteristics that would influence their crew scheduling costs. 

Air carriers were assigned to one of the resulting eight industry groups based on a number of 

metrics such as operating authority, aircraft fleet, aircraft utilization, markets served, collective 

bargaining agreements, etc. In a few cases, a carrier might have been classified as a freight 

carrier even if it did not perform any cargo-only operations (or as a passenger carrier even if it 

did not perform any passenger operations). In these instances, other characteristics of the air 

carrier, such as fleet type or collective bargaining agreement, were considered to be a more 

influential factor on crew scheduling costs than whether the carrier transported passengers or 

cargo. Note that the eventual allocation of costs between passenger and cargo-only operations 

was based on what the air carrier actually transports, not its industry group classification. Table 

 

128 GRA, Inc. Summary of CrewPairings, Inc. Economic Analysis of Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements

Rulemaking. (Jenkintown, PA, September 2012)  
98

11 lists the number of air carriers in each group and the number of flightcrew members in each 

group.129 Table C.1 in Appendix C presents further detail regarding the air carrier classifications. 

Table 11: Air Carrier Classification into Industry Groups 

Industry Group Number of Part

121 Carriers

Total Number of

Flightcrew

Members

Passenger Integrated 7 36,013

Passenger Narrow‐body 14 11,899

Passenger Wide‐body 1 150

Regional 38 20,511

Supplemental 8 1,674

Freight Integrated 3 7,230

Freight Narrow‐body 16 846

Freight Wide‐body 3 914

Total 90 79,237

Table 12 presents a summary of the data and calculations used to estimate average credit 

hour costs per flightcrew member. 

As shown in Table C.11 of Appendix C, Bureau of Transportation Statistics Form 41 data 

(Item 51230, Pilots and Copilots, from Schedule P-5.2) was used to determine the total 

flightcrew cost for each carrier (Column [A] in Table C.11). Block hours for each carrier were 

taken from the AirHoursRamp item in the Air Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier 

Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type report (Column [B] in Table C.11). Both data 

sources were the most current available at the time of the drafting of the original RIA, reflecting 

the first three quarters of 2010.130 Total flightcrew cost data and aircraft block hour data were 

 

129 The original RIA differed from the classifications used here in a few instances. 130 There was no adjustment made for inflation, as flightcrew member wages are negotiated through contracts.
99

each summed across carriers by relevant industry group.131 Each industry group’s sum of total 

flightcrew cost was divided by that industry group’s sum of aircraft block hours. For the 

passenger integrated carriers, this information was summarized separately for narrow-body and 

wide-body aircraft to preserve the distinction between narrow-body and wide-body flightcrew 

member pay rates.132 These calculations resulted in the average total flightcrew cost per aircraft 

block hour (Column [C] inTable C.11). In response to comments regarding the Initial SRIA, the 

FAA has revised the analysis of pilot costs to include the costs of employer provided benefits. 

Wages and salaries account for 70.3 percent of total compensation while benefits account for 

29.7 percent.133 However, not all categories of employer provided benefits increase with 

additional hours worked by an individual employee. The FAA has determined that retirement 

and savings benefits and legally required benefits (Social Security and Medicare, federal and 

state unemployment insurance and workers compensation) increase with additional hours worked 

while paid leave, supplemental pay, and insurance do not. The categories of benefits that vary 

with hours worked are on average 11.9 percent of total compensation. Therefore, the fully 

burdened average incremental flightcrew cost per block hour (Column [D] in Table C.11 is 

calculated by multiplying Column [C] of Table C.11 by 1.169 (70.3 + 11.9 / 70.3). The fully 

 

131 Note that here and elsewhere where data on aircraft block hours are used, the block hours associated with

Beechcraft Beech 18 C‐185 and Cessna 208 Caravan have been omitted because corresponding Pilot/CoPilot costs

were not available. In addition, the records relating to Arrow Air, Inc. have been excluded from this analysis as that

carrier ceased operations in the middle of 2010. 132 The Form 41 data for freight integrated carriers did not support separate calculations for narrow‐body and

wide‐body credit hour costs. The resulting pay rates would have inferred that pay rates for narrow‐body flightcrew

members are higher than wide‐body pay rates, a finding which does not correspond with usual industry practice.

The issue appears to lie with the detailed reporting of this block hour and Pilot/CoPilot cost data by aircraft type.

To avoid these reporting issues for freight carriers, we use only total Pilot/CoPilot cost and aircraft block hours for

each carrier in the freight industry groups. 133 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for Employee Compensation – June 2013 (Washington, DC:

September 11, 2013, USDL‐13‐1835)  
100

burdened average incremental flightcrew cost per block hours is also presented in Column [A] of 

Table 14. 

To determine the average cost per block hour for an individual flightcrew member 

(Column [C] in Table 12), it was necessary to divide the average total flightcrew cost per aircraft 

block hour by the average number of pilots per flight (Column [B] in Table 12).134 Further 

adjustments were necessary to convert the estimates of average cost per block hour per 

flightcrew member to the average cost per credit hour per flightcrew member. First, estimated 

monthly credit hours per flightcrew member for each industry group were derived from analysis 

of AIR Inc. Salary Survey data (Column [D] in Table 12).135 The AIR Inc. Salary Survey 

provided estimated monthly credit hours per flightcrew member for 36 carriers. Weighted 

average estimated monthly credit hours for each industry group were calculated using carrier 

block hour data from AirHoursRamp item in the Air Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier 

Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type report. Next, crew scheduling data provided by 

nine carriers to the FAA were analyzed to estimate the average number of block hours per 

flightcrew member per month for each industry group (Column [E] in Table 12). Each of the 

nine carriers provided data for two separate scheduling periods, with data for one scheduling 

period considered to be a "busy" month and data for the other considered to be a "slow" 

 

134 Narrow‐body aircraft (including regional) were assumed to have two flightcrew members per flight in all cases.

Note that for narrow‐body aircraft that require three flightcrew members (such as B727), the third flightcrew

member is the flight engineer and is not reported in the Pilots and CoPilots cost item on Form 41 Schedule P‐5.2.

Because no cost data specific to flight engineers is available, this analysis uses the calculated pilot and copilot cost

as the estimated cost for flight engineers. For wide‐body aircraft, the average number of flightcrew members per

flight was estimated using proprietary data provided to the FAA by a number of carriers. The average number of

flightcrew members per flight for integrated carriers is the average of the number of flightcrew members per flight

for narrow‐body and wide‐body flights, weighted by narrow‐body and wide‐body block hours from AirHoursRamp

item in the Air Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Statistics by Aircraft Type report.   135 Dan Gradwohl and Kit Darby, [U.S. Airlines] 2006 Salary Survey (Atlanta, GA: AIR, Inc., 2007)
101

month.136 The estimates of block hours per flightcrew member for the two months were averaged 

together. (These data are provided in Table C.2 in Appendix C.) Dividing the average flightcrew 

member block hours per month by the average flightcrew member credit hours per month 

resulted in a ratio of block hours per month to credit hours per month, for each of the industry 

groups (Column [F] in Table 12).137 Finally, the average cost per block hour per flightcrew 

member (Column [C] in Table 12) was then multiplied by the ratio of block hours per month to 

credit hours per month (Column [F] in Table 12) to derive the average credit hour cost per 

flightcrew member for each of the industry groups (Column [G] in Table 12).138 

 

136 The data relating to narrow‐body operations of passenger carriers were used as estimates for the passenger

narrow‐body industry group while the data relating to wide‐body operations of passenger carriers were used for

the passenger wide‐body industry group. The data for all operations of passenger carriers was used for the

passenger integrated group. The same method was used for the freight industry groups. 137 We note that the estimate of the average credit hours per month comes from a 2006 survey, while the average

block hours per month comes from carrier data reflecting more recent years. When constructing a ratio, using data

from the same time periods would obviously be preferred; however, data from contemporaneous time periods

were not available. 138 This method for estimating credit hour cost per flightcrew member differs from the method used in the original

RIA, and results in higher estimates of crew scheduling costs due to the final rule. The method used in the original

RIA produced separate estimates of credit hour cost per flightcrew member for the passenger wide‐body and

passenger narrow‐body industry groups. Those two estimates were then combined to produce an estimate of crew

scheduling costs for the passenger integrated industry group. The revised method used in introduced in the Initial

SRIA (and retained for this Final SRIA) produces separate estimates of credit hour cost per flightcrew member for

four different passenger industry groups: carriers operating exclusively passenger narrow‐body aircraft, those

operating only passenger wide‐body aircraft, narrow‐body aircraft operations by air carriers comprising the

passenger integrated industry group, and wide‐body aircraft operations of carriers making up the passenger

integrated industry group. (Three industry groups are used for freight: carriers operating only narrow‐body

aircraft, carriers operating only wide‐body aircraft and carriers that operate both narrow‐body and wide‐body

aircraft.)

The impetus for this change was the observation that the estimate of credit hours per month per flightcrew

member for the passenger wide‐body industry group reported in the original RIA (60 credit hours per month) was

much different from the estimate of credit hours per flightcrew member per month for passenger integrated

carriers (78 credit hours per month) . One would expect the estimate of credit hours per flightcrew member for

the passenger integrated group to be approximately equal to the weighted average of the narrow‐body and wide‐

body estimates. However, averaging 60 credit hours per month (the estimate for passenger wide‐body operations)

with 82 credit hours per month (the estimate for passenger narrow‐body operations) using the relative weights as

shown in Table B.4 in Appendix B results in an estimate of 72 credit hours per month, which is much different than

the 78 credit hours per month observed for the passenger integrated industry group. For that reason, the observed

60 credit hours per month did not appear to be an appropriate value to use for calculating costs for the passenger
102

This approach to calculating the average credit hour cost per flightcrew member 

addresses NPRM comments made by several commenters. Commenters stated that the salary 

data used in the NPRM RIA “does not approximate current, real world flightcrew unit 

costs...”139 ATA suggested that the FAA use DOT Form 41 data for calculation of crew salary 

costs. The approach to crew salary costs presented in Table 12 responds to this comment by 

using the most recent 2010 DOT Form 41 data available as of April 2011 for the calculation of 

average credit hour costs per flightcrew member. 

 

 

integrated industry group. (Note that the estimate of 78 credit hours per month per flightcrew member for the

passenger integrated group that was reported in Table 10 of the original RIA was not used in calculating costs for

passenger integrated carriers, because that estimate did not differentiate between narrow‐body and wide‐body

operations.)

The methodology used in this Final SRIA still relies on the estimate of 60 credit hours per month per flightcrew

member for the passenger wide‐body industry group, but minimizes its influence by using it only to estimate costs

for carriers that conduct passenger wide‐body operations exclusively. While using this revised method means that

the estimate of credit hours per month per flightcrew member for the passenger and freight integrated industry

groups does not distinguish between the narrow‐body and wide‐body operations of carriers in those groups (since

separate credit hour per flightcrew member data for their narrow‐ and wide‐body operations are not available),

we believe it results in more reliable estimates of their unit costs. 139 Air Transport Association of America, Comments. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Flightcrew Member Duty

and Rest Requirements, (Docket No. FAA‐2009‐1093, November 15, 2010), 13‐15, accessed March 3, 2014,

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA‐2009‐1093‐2333  
103

Table 12: Average Flightcrew Member Cost per Credit Hour (2011 $) 

Industry

Group

Fully

Burdened

Average

Incremental

Flightcrew

Cost per

Block Hr

Flightcrew

Members

per Flight

Average

Flightcrew

Member

Cost per

Block Hr

Average

Flightcrew

Member

Credit

Hrs/Month

Average

Flightcrew

Member

Block

Hrs/month

Ratio of

Block

Hrs/Month

to Credit

Hrs/Month

Average

Flightcrew

Member

Cost per

Credit Hr

[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G]

Passenger

Integrated

$583 2.16 $270 78 59 0.76 $206

Passenger

Integrated:

Narrow‐body

$473 2.00 $237 78 59 0.76 $180

Passenger

Integrated:

Wide‐body

$735 2.37 $310 78 59 0.76 $236

Passenger

Narrow‐body

$509 2.00 $255 82 60 0.73 $186

Passenger

Wide‐body

$780 2.37 $329 60 59 0.98 $322

Regional $209 2.00 $105 82 48 0.59 $62

Supplemental $832 2.16 $384 71 44 0.61 $234

Freight

Integrated

$1,732 2.09 $829 88 44 0.50 $417

Freight

Narrow‐body $859 2.00 $430 62 34 0.55 $235

Freight Wide‐

body $990 2.09 $473 66 45 0.67 $319

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

 Per-diem costs were calculated by multiplying the change in TAFB from the baseline 

solution to the final rule solution by the appropriate per diem rate. Because flightcrew members 

at some carriers receive different per diem rates based on whether TAFB is domestic or 

international, the pairings summary in each of the solutions provided domestic and international 

TAFB separately. The per diem rates used in this analysis were a block-hour weighted average of 
104

carriers reporting per diem rates in the AIR Inc. Salary Survey.140 Again the block hours for each 

carrier were taken from Air Carrier Summary Data, T2: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity 

Statistics by Aircraft Type report. Table 13 shows the weighted average hourly per diem rates by 

operator type used in this analysis.141 

Table 13: Hourly per Diem Rates (2011 $) 

Operator Type

Weighted Average

Domestic per Diem

Rate

Weighted Average

International per Diem

Rate

Passenger   $1.94 $2.28

Regional $1.60 $1.99

Supplemental $2.06 $2.28

Freight $1.99 $2.87

Hotel costs were calculated by multiplying the change in required hotel room nights from 

the baseline solution to the final rule solution by hotel room cost. In practice, hotel costs can vary 

by a number of factors including the carrier’s negotiating power with hotel chains, city size, 

domestic or international location, etc. The hotel room costs used in this analysis were estimated 

based on data provided to the FAA by various carriers and are presented in Table 14.142

 

 

140 Dan Gradwohl and Kit Darby, [U.S. Airlines] 2006 Salary Survey (Atlanta, GA: AIR, Inc., 2007)   141 The per diem rates are from the 2006 AIR, Inc. survey. The FAA did not adjust those per diem rates for inflation

as the rates are negotiated in contracts. However, where the AIR, Inc. survey reported per diem rates for future

years that had been negotiated into contracts as of the time of the survey, those future rates are included.   142 The hotel costs used in the Initial SRIA and this Final SRIA differ slightly from those used in the original RIA,

which differed by case. This Final Supplemental RIA uses a simplified hotel room cost structure for ease of

explication.
105

Table 14: Hotel Room Costs (2011 $) 

Operator Type

Average

Hotel

Room Cost

Passenger   $65.00

Regional $58.00

Supplemental $75.00

Freight $75.00

Cost per Line of Flying Estimation

As discussed above, eight industry groups were created for the final rule cost analysis. 

The changes in each of the cost components for the two narrow-body passenger cases were 

summed for the passenger narrow-body industry group and for the narrow-body component of 

the passenger integrated industry group. The two wide-body passenger cases were summed for 

the passenger wide-body industry group and for the wide-body component of the passenger 

integrated group. The two regional cases were summed for the regional group. The freight 

narrow-body case was used for the freight narrow-body industry group while the freight widebody case was used for the freight wide-body industry group. The freight narrow-body case and 

freight wide-body case were summed for the freight integrated case. Table 15 shows the results 

of combining the case results to form estimates for each industry group and industry group 

subcomponent. Appendix B contains a sensitivity analysis to explore an alternative method for 

combining the individual case results to create an industry group level estimate of crew 

scheduling costs. 
106

Table 15: Change in Flightcrew Scheduling Cost Elements due to Final Rule, by Industry 

Group 

Industry Group

Baseline

Solution

Lines of

Flying

Change

in Credit

Hours  

Change in

Domestic

TAFB

Hours  

Change in

International

TAFB Hours  

Change

in Hotel

Stays  

Passenger Integrated:

Narrow‐body 2,622 1,758 3,625 1,030 ‐284

Passenger Integrated: Wide‐

body 1,551 ‐1,035 3,863 5,607 757

Passenger Narrow‐body 2,622 1,758 3,625 1,030 ‐284

Passenger Wide‐body 1,551 ‐1,035 3,863 5,607 757

Regional 540 94 9,960 ‐16 424

Supplemental 806 4,642 3,159 9,759 756

Freight Integrated 1,383 1,544 7,087 3,252 294

Freight Narrow‐body 330 560 890 2,390 54

Freight Wide‐body 1,053 984 6,197 862 240

To estimate the costs of the final rule for each industry group, the changes in cost 

elements due to the final rule were then multiplied by industry group and subcomponent-specific 

estimates of the unit costs for those cost components, namely average credit hour pay rates, 

average domestic and international per diem hourly rates, and hotel room costs. The derivations 

of those estimates of unit costs are explained above.143 The results of those calculations are 

shown in Table 16. 

 

143 The original RIA used a different method whereby first the costs for each case were calculated using the

respective narrow‐body and wide‐body unit costs and then the costs were summed to create estimates of the

integrated industry groups. The Initial SRIA changed that method so that the unit costs specific to the integrated

carriers are incorporated.
107

Table 16: Monthly Change in Flightcrew Scheduling Cost due To Final Rule (2011 $) 

Industry Group

Baseline

Solution

Lines of

Flying

Change in

Credit

Hour Cost  

Change

in

Domestic

TAFB

Cost  

Change in

International

TAFB Cost  

Change in

Hotel

Cost  

Total

Change in

Scheduling

Cost  

Passenger

Integrated: Narrow‐

body

2,622 $316,401 $7,048 $2,346 -$18,460 $307,335

Passenger

Integrated: Wide‐

body

1,551 -$243,982 $7,510 $12,774 $49,205 -$174,494

Passenger Narrow‐

body 2,622 $327,732 $7,048 $2,346 -$18,460 $318,666

Passenger Wide‐

body 1,551 -$332,885 $7,510 $12,774 $49,205 -$263,397

Regional 540 $5,788 $15,972 -$31 $24,592 $46,321

Supplemental 806 $1,088,252 $6,509 $22,270 $56,700 $1,173,731

Freight Integrated   1,383 $644,321 $14,099 $9,330 $22,050 $689,800

Freight Narrow‐

body 330 $131,677 $1,771 $6,858 $4,050 $144,355

Freight Wide‐body 1,053 $314,030 $12,328 $2,472 $18,000 $346,830

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

For each industry group, the change in each of the cost components was divided by the 

number of lines of flying in the baseline solution to determine the monthly final rule crew 

scheduling cost per line of flying for that industry group. For the passenger integrated industry 

group, the change in each of the cost elements is summed across sub-components (narrow-body 

and wide-body) before dividing by the sum of baseline solution lines of flying. The final rule 

crew scheduling cost is valued by summing the change in credit hour cost, per diem costs, and 

hotel cost from the baseline solution to the final rule solution. The annual final rule crew 

scheduling cost per line of flying was calculated by multiplying the monthly cost by 12. Table 17 

shows the monthly change in flightcrew scheduling cost due to the final rule per line of flying. 
108

Table 17: Monthly Change in Flightcrew Scheduling Cost per Line of Flying due to Final 

Rule (2011 $) 

Industry Group

Baseline

Solution

Lines of

Flying

Change in

Credit

Hour Cost

due to

Final Rule,

per Line

of Flying

Change in

Domestic

TAFB Cost

due to

Final Rule,

per Line

of Flying

Change in

International

TAFB Cost

due to Final

Rule, per

Line of Flying

Change in

Hotel

Cost due

to Final

Rule, per

Line of

Flying

Total

Change in

Scheduling

Cost due

to Final

Rule, per

Line of

Flying

Passenger

Integrated 4,173 $17 $3 $4 $7 $32

Passenger

Narrow‐body 2,622 $125 $3 $1 -$7 $122

Passenger

Wide‐body 1,551 -$215 $5 $8 $32 -$170

Regional 540 $11 $30 $0 $46 $86

Supplemental 806 $1,350 $8 $28 $70 $1,456

Freight

Integrated 1,383 $466 $10 $7 $16 $499

Freight

Narrow‐body 330 $399 $5 $21 $12 $437

Freight Wide‐

body 1,053 $298 $12 $2 $17 $329

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Extrapolation of Crew Scheduling Analysis

The number of flightcrew members presented in Table 18 reflects the number of 

flightcrew members listed on each part 121 carrier’s operating certificate in the FAA’s Vital 

Information Subsystem (VIS) as of December 2010. The total industry final rule cost would be 

overstated if extrapolation was based on the number of VIS flightcrew members because not all 

of these flightcrew members are primary lineholders. Recall that the cost estimates are calculated 

as the change in crew scheduling cost per line of flying. Each carrier employs a significant 

number of reserve flightcrew members. In the original RIA and the Initial SRIA, the FAA 
109

estimated that, on average, reserves comprise 15 percent of flightcrew members for the average 

part 121 passenger air carrier based on APA published information.144 However, the available 

information also showed that carriers vary widely in regards to the percent of their flightcrew 

member workforce that are reserves. In its comments regarding the Initial SRIA, IPA stated that 

in addition to adjusting the number of flightcrew members reported in VIS for reserves, the FAA 

should have adjusted the count for “no bidders,” flightcrew members who are on medical leave 

of absence, military duty leave of absence, long-term upgrade or cross aircraft training, nonflying special projects duties, etc. IPA stated that “based on well-documented, 6-year statistical 

data at UPS, approximately 10% of airline pilots, at any given time, are in non-flying category 

status (IPA, page 55).” In addition, IPA provided new data for UPS and FedEx (the bulk of the 

freight integrated industry group) that demonstrated that just 52 percent of the VIS flightcrew 

members are primary lineholders. For this Final SRIA, the FAA incorporates both of those items 

of information in estimating the number of primary lineholders for each industry group based on 

the VIS data. For the freight integrated industry group, the flightcrew member count is factored 

by 52 percent while freight narrow-body and wide-body and supplemental industry groups are 

factored by 75 percent to account for reserves (15 percent) and no-bidders (10 percent). We did 

not receive new information regarding these factors for the passenger industry groups. Therefore 

for the passenger industry groups, the factor of 85 percent remains unchanged from the Initial 

SRIA. However, Appendix B contains a sensitivity analysis on this key parameter for the 

passenger industry groups. 

 

144 “Productivity,” American Airlines Negotiations, accessed August 1, 2012,

http://www.aanegotiations.com/apaProductivity.asp.
110

 IPA also stated that at UPS, 36 percent of bid lines are below the contractual minimum 

number of credit hours. IPA asserts, therefore, that for this subset of bid lines, the increase in 

credit hours due to the final rule would not result in an increase in paid labor hours. The FAA is 

not able to estimate the cost of the final rule based on specific situations of each individual 

carrier. Further, as discussed above in the section entitled “Disposition of Public Comments for 

Final SRIA,” it is not clear that just because some schedules are below contractual minimums, 

additional hours can be flown without incurring additional costs. Nonetheless, a sensitivity 

analysis in Appendix B incorporates IPA’s estimates of the potential cost reductions applicable 

to UPS due to this issue. 

The extrapolation of the crew scheduling analysis to the part 121 air transportation 

industry used the estimated number of primary lineholders shown in Table 18 to determine the 

final rule crew scheduling cost. 

Table 18: Tally of Flightcrew Members, By Industry Group 

Industry Group

Number of

Part 121

Carriers

Total Number

of Flightcrew

Members

Adjustment

Factor for

Reserves and

No‐bidders

Estimated

Primary Line‐

Holders

Passenger Integrated 7 36,013 85% 30,611

Passenger Narrow‐body 14 11,899 85% 10,114

Passenger Wide‐body 1 150 85% 128

Regional 38 20,511 85% 17,434

Supplemental 8 1,674 75% 1,256

Freight Integrated 3 7,230 52% 3,760

Freight Narrow‐body 16 846 75% 635

Freight Wide‐body 3 914 75% 686

Total 90 79,237 64,622

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

The number of primary lineholders in each industry group shown in Table 18 was multiplied by 

the appropriate annual cost per line of flying in Table 17 to extrapolate the estimated cost to the 

part 121 air transportation industry, as shown in the “Total Annual Crew Scheduling Costs” 
111

column in Table 19. This total cost figure is then allocated to passenger operations and cargoonly operations using the share of revenue departures attributable to each class of operation in 

2010 as reported in Database T1: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Summary by Service 

Class from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The percentage of revenue departures that are 

passenger and cargo-only for each carrier is presented in Table C.1 in Appendix C. As shown in 

Table 19, there is a total of $51 million a year in flightcrew scheduling costs for all passenger 

operations due to the final rule associated with flightcrew credit hours, per diem costs, and hotel 

room costs. If the final rule applied to cargo-only operations, there would be approximately $43 

million in additional costs per year. 

Table 19: Annual Crew Scheduling Costs (2011 $) 

Industry Group

Final Rule

Annual

Cost per

Line of

Flying  

Estimated

Primary

Line‐

Holders

Total

Annual

Crew

Scheduling

Costs

(millions)

Passenger

Operations

Annual Crew

Scheduling

Costs  

(millions)

Cargo‐Only

Operations

Annual Crew

Scheduling

Costs

(millions)  

Passenger Integrated $351 30,611 $12 $12 $0

Passenger Narrow‐

body $1,242 10,114 $15 $15 $0

Passenger Wide‐body  ‐$1,665 128 $0 $0 $0

Regional $1,011 17,434 $18 $18 $0

Supplemental $15,133 1,256 $22 $7 $15

Freight Integrated $5,176 3,760 $23 $0 $23

Freight Narrow‐body $4,555 635 $3 $0 $3

Freight Wide‐body $3,435 686 $3 $1 $2

Total     $95 $51 $43

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Limitations of Crew Scheduling Analysis

Carriers will engage in additional network optimization to reduce crew scheduling costs, which 

the FAA is unable to quantify at this point. In the long run, this may involve re-timing flights, 

changing schedule frequency, and entering or leaving markets. However, there may also be costs 
112

associated with these actions such as changes in aircraft utilization and revenue losses. At this 

time, the FAA has not estimated potential long-run optimization of crew scheduling costs.

The final rule economic costs are best measured as society’s willingness to be 

compensated for consumption opportunities forgone as a result of resources being diverted to the 

production of improved aviation safety. Because these opportunity costs are difficult to estimate, 

our estimates of crew scheduling costs reflect, for the most part, financial costs that will be 

incurred by affected air carriers. These financial costs are likely to overstate the economic costs 

of the proposed rule. 

A large part of estimated crew scheduling costs is increased compensation to flightcrew 

members for the additional time spent in avoiding fatigue. These compensation costs will reflect 

economic costs only if flightcrew wage rates are accurate measures of the forgone value of goods 

and services that could otherwise be produced. However, it is likely that flightcrew members will 

be able to use some of the time spent avoiding fatigue in productive activities, including the 

production of leisure activities. Our cost estimates do not include offsets for the value of these 

activities. 

Increased per diem cost estimates do not include offsets that are likely to occur. For 

example, meals consumed on the road by flight crew members are substitutes for meals that 

would otherwise be consumed at home. Resource savings (the value of labor and food used to 

produce meals at home in this example) are not reflected in our cost estimates. Similarly, the 

costs associated with increased hotel expenses do not include offsets for at-home savings that 

will likely occur—e.g., reduced energy and water consumption and avoided cleaning costs. 
113

Computer Programming

Carriers will incur computer programming costs as they will need to update their crew 

management systems and their schedule optimization systems with the constraints imposed by 

the final rule. 

A one-time cost will be incurred in 2013 as carriers update their crew management 

systems. Crew management system update costs were estimated for each individual carrier, 

based on the number of flightcrew members listed on the carrier’s operating certificate. 

Carriers were assigned to one of three groups based on the number of flightcrew 

members. Computer programming costs, which vary with size of carriers, are estimated using 

number of person-days and staff costs. Person-days required to perform the system update were 

estimated to be 400, 160, and 80 days for large (more than 1,000 flightcrew members), average 

(250 to 1,000 flightcrew members), and small (less than 250 flightcrew members) carriers, 

respectively. A daily professional staff cost was assumed to be $625. As shown in Table 20, 

crew management system update costs due to the final rule for passenger carriers is estimated to 

be approximately $8 million. If the final rule was extended to cargo-only operations, those 

carriers who perform just cargo-only operations would experience an estimated $2 million in 

costs.145 

 

 

145 Since the final rule applies only to passenger operations, a carrier that performs both passenger and cargo‐only

operations was assigned to the passenger carrier category because we assumed they would incur the full

programming costs necessary to support compliance of their passenger operations with the final rule.
114

Table 20: Crew Management System Update Costs (2011 $) 

Flightcrew

Members

Cost per

Carrier

Passenger

Carriers

(Count)

Freight

Carriers

(Count)

Passenger

Carriers

(millions)

Freight

Carriers

(millions)

>1,000 $250,000 16 2 $4 $1

250‐1,000 $100,000 20 3 $2 $0

<250 $50,000 31 18 $2 $1

Total     67 23 $8 $2

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Payroll Cost Savings from Reducing Flightcrew Members Fatigue

The final rule is designed to reduce the risk to flight operations attributable to fatigued 

flightcrew members by limiting the maximum number of hours they are permitted to be on duty, 

the number of hours they actually fly during duty periods, and by ensuring that they receive 

adequate rest periods before reporting for duty. According to the CDC, “chronic sleep loss is an 

under-recognized public health problem that has a cumulative effect on physical and mental 

health. Sleep loss and sleep disorders can reduce quality of life and productivity, increase use of 

health-care services, and result in injuries, illness, or deaths.”146 It is expected that the final rule 

will result in better-rested flightcrew members and reduce flightcrew member fatigue, thus 

reducing the use of sick time by flightcrew members. When a flightcrew member is scheduled 

for duty and calls in sick or fatigued, the carrier must use a reserve flightcrew member to 

complete the scheduled duty. The final rule will reduce the use of reserve flightcrew members to 

cover fatigue-induced sick call-ins by flightcrew members, which will reduce the flight 

operations cost associated with fatigue issues for carriers. 

 

146 “Perceived Insufficient Rest or Sleep – Four States, 2006,” MMWR (CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report)

57 (February 29, 2008): 200‐203.
115

While the current share of current sick time attributable to fatigue is unknown, it is 

almost certainly greater than zero. Similarly, while the precise amount by which the final rule 

will reduce sick time is unknown, it is also most likely greater than zero. Labor representatives 

have informed the FAA that sick time is approximately five percent of payroll costs. This data is 

consistent with data collected in the rail industry (see footnote 98). In light of this information, 

the FAA adopts the assumption that sick time accounts for five percent of total industry 

flightcrew member pay. Moreover, the FAA has also assumed for this analysis that the final rule 

is expected to reduce the use of sick time by five percent. As a result, the FAA estimates the cost 

savings from reducing use of sick time as 0.25 percent (five percent of five percent) of flightcrew 

payroll costs. Appendix B presents a sensitivity analysis for this assumption whereby it is 

assumed that the final rule will instead reduce use of sick time by three percent or seven percent. 

Total industry flightcrew member pay was calculated from Form 41 pilot cost data. Form 

41 data covers only those air carriers with at least $20 million in annual revenues. These carriers 

employ approximately 96 percent of all flightcrew members; therefore we factor up the Form 41 

pilot payroll costs by approximately five percent to account for this small gap in coverage of the 

data.147 Finally, the pilot payroll costs are multiplied by 1.169 to account for the costs of 

employer-provided benefits that vary with hours worked.148

These cost savings were then allocated to passenger and cargo-only operations, again 

using share of revenue departures for each carrier that were passenger operations or cargo-only 

operations in 2010 as reported in Database T1: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic and Capacity Summary 

 

147 The Form 41 data used in the original RIA only covered the first three quarters of 2010. This analysis factors

those three quarters of data to account for a full year of flightcrew member payroll costs. Table C.3 in Appendix C

provide details of these calculations. 148 See Table C.12 in Appendix C for details.
116

by Service Class from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Each carrier’s passenger/cargoonly split was weighted by the number of flightcrew members the carrier employs to create an 

overall passenger/cargo-only split for each industry group. The annual nominal value of the cost 

savings is approximately $23 million for passenger operations and an additional $5 million if the 

rule were extended to cargo-only operations. Table 21 provides details of these calculations of 

cost savings from reducing flightcrew member fatigue.

Table 21: Payroll Cost Savings from Reducing Flightcrew Member Fatigue (2011 $) 

Industry

Group

Fully Loaded

Adjusted

Total Pilot

and CoPilot

Costs1

(thousands)

Annual

Total

Payroll Cost

Savings

from

Reducing

Fatigue2

(thousands)

Percent of

Payroll

Cost

Savings

Allocated

to

Passenger

Operations

Percent of

Payroll

Cost

Savings

Allocated

to Cargo‐

only

Operations

Annual

Passenger

Payroll Cost

Savings

(thousands)

Annual

Cargo

Payroll Cost

Savings

(thousands)

Passenger

Integrated $5,506,802 $13,767 100% 0% $13,760 $7

Passenger

Narrow‐body $2,045,838 $5,115 100% 0% $5,115 $0

Passenger

Wide‐body $15,906 $40 100% 0% $40 $0

Regional $1,359,355 $3,398 99% 1% $3,356 $42

Supplemental $180,316 $451 30% 70% $134 $317

Freight

Integrated $1,722,238 $4,306 0% 100% $0 $4,306

Freight

Narrow‐body $79,276 $198 15% 85% $29 $169

Freight Wide‐

body $135,438 $339 21% 79% $72 $267

Total $11,045,169 $27,613 $22,505 $5,108

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding

1 Source: Table C.3

2 Fully Loaded Adjusted Total Pilot and CoPilot Costs x 5% x 5%
117

Flight Operations Cost Summary

The total flight operations cost is composed of the additional crew scheduling costs 

(flightcrew member salary, hotel, and per diem), plus the computer programming costs, and less 

the cost savings from reducing flightcrew member’s fatigue. The total net nominal flight 

operations cost for the period of analysis is approximately $297 million for passenger operations. 

If the final rule were extended to cargo-only operations, the total net nominal flight operations 

costs over the analysis period would increase by $382 million. Table 22 presents the nominal 

flight operations costs attributable to the final rule for passenger operations for each year in the 

analysis period. Table 23 presents the nominal flight operations cost for cargo-only carriers.

Table 22: Total Flight Operations Cost (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Year

Scheduling

Cost  

Computer

Programming

Cost

Payroll Cost

Savings from

Reducing

Fatigue

  

Total

Nominal Cost

2012 $0 

2013 $8 $8 

2014 $51 -$23 $29 

2015 $51 -$23 $29 

2016 $51 -$23 $29 

2017 $51 -$23 $29 

2018 $51 -$23 $29 

2019 $51 -$23 $29 

2020 $51 -$23 $29 

2021 $51 -$23 $29 

2022 $51 -$23 $29 

2023 $51 -$23 $29 

Total $515 $8 -$225 $297 

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

 
118

Table 23: Total Flight Operations Costs (2012 – 2023), Cargo-Only Operations (2011 

$Millions) 

Year

Scheduling

Cost  

Computer

Programming

Cost

Payroll Cost

Savings from

Reducing

Fatigue

  

Total

Nominal Cost

2012 $0

2013 $2 $2

2014 $43 -$5 $38

2015 $43 -$5 $38

2016 $43 -$5 $38

2017 $43 -$5 $38

2018 $43 -$5 $38

2019 $43 -$5 $38

2020 $43 -$5 $38

2021 $43 -$5 $38

2022 $43 -$5 $38

2023 $43 -$5 $38

Total $431 $2 -$51 $382

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Rest Facilities

The final rule establishes maximum flight-duty period limits for augmented operations 

that are dependent on the start time of the flight duty period, the number of flightcrew members 

assigned to the flight, and the class of rest facility installed on the aircraft. The final rule 

establishes detailed specifications for each of the three classes of rest facilities. Class 1 rest 

facilities are most conducive to reducing the risk of fatigue in augmented operations; 

accordingly, the maximum flight duty time permitted for augmented operations conducted with 

Class 1 rest facility-equipped aircraft is greater than the maximum flight duty time permitted for 

augmented operations conducted with either Class 2 or 3 rest facility-equipped aircraft. The FAA 

assumed that air carriers will choose to install the Class 1 rest facilities in all of the long range 
119

aircraft because of the flexibility a uniform fleet provides. The definitions of the rest facilities are 

as follows: 
120

o A Class 1 rest facility is a bunk or other surface that allows for a flat sleeping 

position and is located separate from both the flight deck and passenger cabin in 

an area that is temperature-controlled, allows the crewmember to control light, 

and provides isolation from noise and disturbance. 

o A Class 2 rest facility is a seat in an aircraft cabin that allows for a flat or near flat 

sleeping position; is separated from passengers by a minimum of a curtain to 

provide darkness and some sound mitigation; and is reasonably free from 

disturbance by passengers or crewmembers. 

o A Class 3 rest facility is a seat in an aircraft cabin or flight deck that reclines at 

least 40 degrees and provides leg and foot support. 

There are four subcomponents of the rest facility cost component of the final rule. The 

first subcomponent consists of the rest facility design and engineering costs. The second 

subcomponent consists of the cost resulting from the physical installation of the facilities on the 

affected aircraft. The third subcomponent is the value of the aircraft downtime required to install 

the rest facilities. The final subcomponent is additional aircraft fuel consumption cost due to the 

weight of the rest facilities. 149 

 

149 It is possible that the installation of rest facilities may also result in a cost to air carriers due to the loss of space

in an aircraft that might otherwise be used to generate revenues. However, for this cost analysis the FAA assumed

that air carriers will choose to install the Class 1 rest facilities in all of the long range aircraft because of the

flexibility a uniform fleet provides. Therefore the FAA believes that there will be no loss of revenues for passenger

operations because the space occupied by a Class I facility would be located below deck, in the cargo hold and

would therefore not impact the number of seats available for fare‐paying passengers. Further, the FAA does not

expect that the below‐deck cargo hold is typically at capacity for passenger operations; therefore space lost to the

rest facility should not create additional costs for passenger‐only operations. However, if the operator chooses to

install Class 2 or Class 3 facilities the design, equipment, installation, and fuel costs would be lower than the

estimates provided here, but there may be some loss of revenue to due to loss of space in the cabin for revenue‐

generating passengers.   
121

We estimate that this engineering cost will be incurred in the first year that the rule is 

published (2012) to allow enough time for the facilities to be installed in the second year after 

the rule is published (2013).150 This work will need to be accomplished before the rule is 

implemented in 2014. Once a facility is installed on a particular aircraft, additional fuel will be 

consumed by that aircraft. For that reason, during the second year of the analysis period, one-half 

of the estimated annual incremental fuel consumption is included in this cost analysis. The 

following paragraphs discuss how the FAA estimated each of the rest facility cost 

subcomponents, and Table 24 details the total cost of each of subcomponents for passenger 

operations while Table 25 presents the total costs for cargo-only operations. The total restfacility cost for passenger operations is approximately $146 million in nominal terms, $123 

million when discounted at seven percent. If the rule were extended to cover cargo-only 

operations, the additional cost would be $63 million in nominal terms, $53 million when 

discounted at seven percent. 

Table 24: Rest Facility Cost Overview (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 

$Millions) 

Rest Facilities

Cost

Subcomponent

Total

Nominal

Cost

PV Cost

at 7%

PV Cost

at 3%

Engineering $13 $12 $13

Installation $100 $87 $94

 

The FAA acknowledges that for cargo‐only operations there may be a loss of revenue due to the space in

the below‐deck cargo hold occupied by the rest facility. However the space lost would be quite small (about the

size of a bunk bed) and likely any revenue lost would also be small. However the FAA does not have an empirical

basis to quantify the amount of lost revenue. 150 Delay in issuing the final advisory circular related to rest facilities means that carriers may not be able to

develop all the necessary engineering work in 2012. This means some of the costs anticipated for 2012 may shift to

2013 and carriers may need to compress the time for installation of rest facilities. This would not change the

nominal cost of the rule, and might decrease the net present value slightly due to costs being incurred further in

the future.
122

Downtime $12 $10 $11

Fuel $21 $13 $17

Total $146 $123 $135

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding

 
123

Table 25: Rest Facility Cost Overview (2012-2023), Cargo-Only Operations (2011 

$Millions) 

Rest Facilities

Cost

Subcomponent

Total

Nominal

Cost

PV Cost

at 7%

PV Cost

at 3%

Engineering $3 $2 $2

Installation $48 $42 $45

Downtime $3 $3 $3

Fuel $10 $6 $8

Total $63 $53 $58

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Engineering

During NPRM cost analysis, the FAA obtained detailed cost estimates from two 

supplemental type certificate (STC) holders. For the original RIA, the Initial SRIA, and this 

Final SRIA, we delineated between engineering and kit/installation costs, as the engineering cost 

per operator would be a one-time, non-recurring cost for each type (make and model) of aircraft. 

We continue using the data provided by the STC holders as the basis for engineering and 

installation. The engineering costs are non-recurring design costs. These consist of system, 

development, engineering, analysis, and certification costs. We conservatively use the 

engineering cost of $0.5 million per make/model as estimated by the STC holders. We estimate 

that 26 designs will be required for passenger operators while five additional designs would be 

required if the rule was extended to cargo-only operations. The estimates are derived from 

information gathered by the FAA’s inspectors and are proprietary. The estimated engineering 

cost is approximately $13 million ($0.5 million x 26) for passenger operators. If the rule were 

extended to cover cargo-only operations, there would be an additional $2.5 million ($0.5 million 

x 5) in costs. 
124

Installation

Based upon public comments in response to the NPRM, the FAA has refined the estimate 

of the number of aircraft that will require rest facility installation. The FAA now estimates, based 

on data collected from the FAA’s inspectors, that 225 aircraft used for passenger operations will 

need crew rest modifications to comply with the final rule.151 This is an increase from the 

estimate of 104 aircraft used in passenger operations in the NPRM cost analysis. However, it is 

lower than the estimates of some NPRM commenters. The FAA believes that the final rule 

estimate of 225 aircraft represents the worst case scenario because aircraft will be re-optimized 

based upon current configurations. The FAA estimates that any additional aircraft, beyond the 

approximate 225 aircraft used in this analysis, will already have adequate rest facilities. Once the 

additional 225 aircraft have rest facilities installed, each fleet will be re-optimized for the most 

efficient use. As such, we conservatively assume all of these 225 aircraft will have a Class 1 

facility installed for an upper-bound estimation. 

In its comments regarding the Initial SRIA, IPA objected to the FAA’s assumption that 

airlines would choose to install the most costly Class 1 rest facilities. In addition, IPA objected to 

the FAA’s assumption that if the final rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, 107 

additional aircraft would require facilities to be installed. IPA’s comments are based on an 

understanding that only Boeing 767s would require the facilities and that Boeing 767s are shorter 

range and would only require the Class 3 rest facilities. However, more than just B767s would 

require rest facilities and the FAA assumes that airlines would choose to install Class I facilities 

 

151 All aircraft used in augmented operations by carriers conducting both cargo‐only and passenger operations are

included in this estimate, since it is not possible to identify whether aircraft are used exclusively in cargo‐only

operations.
125

because of the greater flexibility for fleet usage that the Class 1 facility would provide. 

Therefore, for the cost estimates related to rest facilities for the cargo operations, the FAA retains 

the analysis used in the Initial SRIA and restated in this Final SRIA. However, the FAA 

incorporates IPA’s alternative rest facility cost estimates in the sensitivity analysis presented in 

Appendix E. 

We continue to use the equipment and labor cost provided by an STC holder for our 

estimate of installation costs to the carriers. The kit and the installation for each of the individual 

airplanes will cost roughly $350,000 and $95,000, respectively. As such, the total cost of each 

installation will be roughly $445,000 ($350,000 + $95,000). When multiplied by the affected 

fleet of 225 aircraft used for passenger operations, the total facility installation cost will be 

approximately $100 million ($445,000 x 225). If the rule were extended to cover cargo-only 

operations, the additional total facility installation cost would be approximately $48 million 

($445,000 x 107). 

Downtime

Commenters to the NPRM indicated that an aircraft could be out of service for two weeks 

during rest facility installation. The FAA estimates the cost to part 121 operators for this 

potential additional planned time out of service, or downtime, to install the rest facilities. STC 

designers have indicated that with proper planning, a modifier can install rest facilities in two to 

four days. We conservatively use a four-day estimate for the calculation of the downtime cost. 

The FAA conservatively assumes that if an aircraft was to be out of service for any part of a day, 

that airplane would be out of service for the entire day. 

For this analysis, the FAA uses the opportunity cost of capital to approximate the planned 

downtime cost to the operators. Using guidelines prescribed by the Office of Management and 
126

Budget, the FAA uses seven percent as a proxy for average annual rate of return on capital. In 

this analysis, the FAA uses $69 million as the estimated market value of a passenger aircraft and 

$40 million as the estimated market value of a cargo aircraft.152 For passenger operations, the 

yearly opportunity cost of capital per aircraft would be $4.83 million, roughly $13,233 per day. 

When multiplied by the affected fleet (225 aircraft) and the days out of service (4 days), the 

downtime cost for the fleet is approximately $12 million (225 x 4 x $13,233) for passenger 

operations. If the final rule were extended to cargo-only operations, the average cost per day 

would be $7,671. When multiplied for 4 days of downtime for 107 aircraft, the additional cost 

for cargo operations would be approximately $3 million. 

Fuel Consumption Costs

We have analyzed the costs associated with the design and installation of Class 1 rest 

facilities. We assume the rest facilities will be installed in the most efficient manner possible, 

with no impact on passenger seats or the revenue that they generate. As such, we do not estimate 

loss of revenue from a Class 1 rest facility because, as defined by the rule, the facilities will be 

located separate from both the flight deck and passenger cabin and will not necessarily require 

the removal of passenger seats. For example, a Class 1 rest facility can be located in the aircraft 

belly or overhead area, neither of which requires the removal of passenger seats. Although there 

will be no revenue impact, there will be an additional cost that will add to the aircraft operating 

costs due to the estimated additional impact of weight changes on each aircraft. Estimates for the 

 

152 The passenger aircraft value represents the appraised value of a B767‐300 from The Airline Monitor (November,

2010). The cargo aircraft value represents the value of a B767‐300ERF (extended range freighter) from Airliner

Price Guide (Winter 2011).
127

additional incremental weight impact are used to calculate the additional fuel consumption for 

the affected fleet. 

The estimated cost of fuel uses data from the 2011 FAA Aerospace Forecast. We use the 

fuel consumption methodology as derived from the FAA’s guidance,153 along with the estimated 

average fuel cost of approximately $2.45 per gallon.154 To calculate the additional annual cost of 

fuel per aircraft, we multiply the 300 additional pounds by the fuel consumption factor of 0.005 

gallons per hour per pound (consistent with a two-engine, wide-body aircraft) and arrive at 1.5 

gallons per hour per aircraft. This product is then multiplied by the average annual flight hours 

per aircraft of 2,380 and finally by the cost of fuel ($2.45) to arrive at the total annual estimated 

additional cost of fuel per aircraft of $8,746.50.155 When multiplied by the affected annual fleet 

(225 aircraft), the annual incremental fuel consumption cost is approximately $2 million. If the 

rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, the additional annual incremental fuel 

consumption would be approximately $1 million. 

Table 26 presents the estimated costs of each of the subcomponents described above. 

Table 27 presents the total rest facility costs for passenger operations while Table 28 presents the 

additional total rest facility costs if the final rule were extended to cargo-only operations. 

Carriers that conduct both passenger and cargo-only operations have all of these facilities costs 

ascribed to their passenger operations because the FAA was informed that given the small 

 

153 GRA, Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide (Jenkintown, PA: October 3, 2007)   154 Average of annual system mainline fuel prices forecasts for period 2014 through 2023 from Table 18, FAA

Aerospace Forecast 2011 – 2031.   155 The estimate of additional weight (300 pounds) was provided by an STC holder. Fuel consumption factor of .005

gallons per hour is from Table 6.1 of “Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide”

(October 2007) written by GRA, Inc. The estimate of 2,380 annual flight hours per aircraft comes from BTS Form 41

Schedule T2‐restricted, based on data for the 12‐month period October 2009 through Sept 2010 using Account 810

(Aircraft Days Assigned) and Account 650 (HoursAirborne) for a selection of aircraft.
128

magnitude of the rest facility costs, carriers would avoid having to manage two separate fleets, 

i.e. those aircraft with facilities and those aircraft without facilities. 

Table 26: Rest Facilities Costs (2011 $) 

Rest Facility 

Cost 

Subcomponent 

Passenger 

Unit Cost 

Passenger 

Quantity 

Passenger 

Cost 

Freight 

Unit 

Cost 

Freight 

Quantity 

Freight 

Cost 

Engineering $500,000 26 $13,000,000 $500,000 5 $2,500,000

Installation $445,000 225 $100,125,000 $445,000 107 $47,615,000

Down Time $52,932 225 $11,909,700 $30,684 107 $3,283,188

Annual Fuel 

Cost $8,747 $225 $1,967,963 $8,747 $107 $935,876

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

 
129

Table 27: Rest Facilities Total Costs (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Year Engineering Installation Downtime Fuel

Total

Nominal

Cost

2012 $13 $13

2013 $100 $12 $1 $113

2014 $2 $2

2015 $2 $2

2016 $2 $2

2017 $2 $2

2018 $2 $2

2019 $2 $2

2020 $2 $2

2021 $2 $2

2022 $2 $2

2023 $2 $2

Total $13 $100 $12 $21 $146

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Table 28: Rest Facilities Total Costs (2012-2023), Cargo-Only Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Year Engineering Installation Downtime Fuel

Total

Nominal

Cost  

2012 $3 $3

2013 $48 $3 $0 $51

2014 $1 $1

2015 $1 $1

2016 $1 $1

2017 $1 $1

2018 $1 $1

2019 $1 $1

2020 $1 $1

2021 $1 $1

2022 $1 $1

2023 $1 $1

Total $3 $48 $3 $10 $63

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 
130

Fatigue Training

In accordance with the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act 

of 2010, Section 212, each air carrier conducting operations under part 121 must have submitted 

a fatigue risk management plan (FRMP) to the Administrator for review and acceptance. A 

FRMP is an air carrier’s management plan outlining policies and procedures for reducing the 

risks of flightcrew member fatigue and improving flightcrew member alertness. In this final rule 

the FAA kept the requirement for flightcrew members to receive fatigue training, but the original 

RIA, the Initial SRIA, and this Final SRIA do not include an incremental cost of compliance 

because the operators are already in compliance with FRMP. The final rule introduces a new 

requirement for management, schedulers, dispatchers, and any other individual directly involved 

in operational control of the flight to have fatigue training and the requirement for curriculum 

development for that fatigue training. Therefore, the original RIA, the Initial SRIA, and this 

Final SRIA estimate the costs of these new requirements.156 As shown in Table 29, this rule 

change reduces the fatigue training cost requirement to $19 million in nominal terms for 

passenger operations, $12 million when discounted using a seven percent discount rate. Table 30 

shows that there would be an additional nominal cost of $7 million in fatigue training costs if the 

final rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, $4 million when discounted using a 

seven percent discount rate. 

 

 

156 The NPRM had originally included estimates of costs for fatigue training and curriculum development for

flightcrew members.
131

Table 29: Fatigue Training Cost Overview (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 

$Millions) 

Training Cost Subcomponents

Total

Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Initial Training (First Year of Rule) $4 $3 $4

Initial Training (New Hires and Churn) $2 $1 $1

Recurrent Training $14 $8 $11

Curriculum Development $0 $0 $0

Total $19 $12 $16

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Table 30: Fatigue Training Cost Overview (2012-2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 

$Millions) 

Training Cost Subcomponents

Total

Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Initial Training (First Year of Rule) $1 $1 $1 

Initial Training (New Hires and Churn) $1 $0 $0 

Recurrent Training $5 $3 $4 

Curriculum Development $0 $0 $0 

Total $7 $4 $5 

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

The final rule requires that dispatchers and upper management having operational control 

over flightcrew members be given fatigue training. The number of dispatchers in the U.S. air 

transportation industry is equal to approximately three percent of the number of pilots.157 The 

FAA estimates the number of management personnel (immediate supervisors and schedulers) to 

be approximately nine percent of flightcrew members. Therefore, the total number of dispatchers 

and management personnel required to receive fatigue training is estimated to be approximately 

 

157 FAA, Vital Information System (VIS) database, October 22, 2009.
132

12 percent of total flightcrew members. We further estimate that each manager and dispatcher 

will require 5 hours of training when compliance with the final rule is required in 2012, which 

has been valued at a rate of 60 percent of the credit hour cost per flightcrew member for each 

industry group as found in Table 12. In out years, this initial training will need to be given to 

new employees entering the workforce and to employees who switch carriers due to industry 

churn. We estimate that these groups account for 3.3 and 1.0 percent of the current workforce 

respectively. Additionally, in the out years the dispatchers and managers will require two hours 

of recurring training each year. These initial training costs are allocated to passenger and cargoonly operations, again using percent of revenue departures for each carrier that were passenger 

operations or cargo-only operations in 2010 as reported in Database T1: U.S. Air Carrier Traffic 

and Capacity Summary by Service Class from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Table 31 

and Table 32 show the annual costs for these categories of training for passenger and cargo-only 

operations, respectively. For passenger operations, the final rule will result in $4 million in 

nominal fatigue training costs for management and dispatchers in the first year of the rule and an 

additional $15 million in nominal fatigue training costs during the following nine years. If the 

final rule were extended to cargo-only operations, there would be an additional $1.3 million in 

nominal fatigue training costs for management and dispatchers in the first year of the rule, and an 

additional $5 million in nominal fatigue training costs during the following nine years. 

In addition, carriers will incur a one-time cost to develop a fatigue training curriculum. 

According to industry standard, curriculum development takes three hours for each hour of 

course required. Therefore, the time needed to develop the initial training curriculum will be 

fifteen hours and the time needed to develop the recurrent training curriculum will be six hours. 

The FAA assumes that the wage rate of the curriculum developer is approximately $100 per 
133

hour. Each of the 67 part 121 air carriers that had passenger operations will need to develop its 

own curriculum. The total nominal cost of curriculum training is $140,700. If the final rule is 

extended to cargo-only operations then there will be an additional $48,300 in nominal curriculum 

costs for the 23 carriers that conduct only cargo-only operations.158

Table 31: Total Fatigue Training Costs (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $) 

Year

Initial Training

(First Year of

Rule)

Initial

Training (New

Hires and

Churn)

Recurrent

Training

Curriculum

Development

Total

Nominal Cost

(millions)

2012 $0.00

2013 $0.00

2014 $4,003,341 $140,700 $4.14

2015 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70

2016 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70

2017 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70

2018 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70

2019 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70

2020 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70

2021 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70

2022 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70

2023 $172,144 $1,532,479 $1.70

Total $4,003,341 $1,549,293 $13,792,310 $140,700 $19.49

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

 

 

158 The curriculum development costs associated with air carriers that conduct both passenger and cargo‐only

operations are counted under the costs associated with passenger operations.
134

Table 32: Total Fatigue Training Costs (2012-2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $) 

Year

Initial Training

(First Year of

Rule)

Initial

Training (New

Hires and

Churn)

Recurrent

Training

Curriculum

Development

Total

Nominal Cost

(millions)

2012 $0.00

2013 $0.00

2014 $1,336,713 $48,300 $1.39

2015 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57

2016 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57

2017 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57

2018 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57

2019 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57

2020 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57

2021 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57

2022 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57

2023 $57,479 $511,694 $0.57

Total $1,336,713 $517,308 $4,605,245 $48,300 $6.51

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Cost Analysis Summary

The cost of the final rule to part 121 passenger operations over the twelve-year period of 

analysis is estimated to be $462 million in nominal value, $320 million when discounted at seven 

percent, or $391 million when discounted at three percent. 

If the final rule were extended to cover part 121 cargo-only operations, over the twelveyear period of analysis there would be additional costs of $452 million in nominal value, $292 

million when discounted at seven percent, or $371 million when discounted at three percent. 

Table 33 and Table 34 summarize the results of the cost estimation for passenger and 

cargo-only operations, respectively. All final rule cost components were calculated using 

industry-provided data whenever possible, along with expert analysis. 

Table 33: Cost Summary (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions) 
135

Cost Component

Total

Nominal

Cost

(millions)

PV Cost

at 7%

(millions)

PV Cost

at 3%

(millions)

Flight Operations $297 $184 $240

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135

Training $19 $12 $16

Total $462 $320 $391

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Table 34: Cost Summary (2012-2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component

Total

Nominal

Cost

(millions)

PV Cost

at 7%

(millions)

PV Cost

at 3%

(millions)

Flight Operations $382 $235 $307

Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58

Training $7 $4 $5

Total $452 $292 $371

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Benefit/Cost Summary

In this Supplemental RIA, we have analyzed the benefits and the costs associated with 

the requirements contained in this final rule and our estimates are summarized in Table 35 and 

Table 36. 

The final rule was changed significantly from the NPRM. The training requirement had 

been substantially reduced because the FAA has determined that flightcrew members are already 

receiving the requisite training as part of the statutorily required Fatigue Risk Management 

Plans. The FAA also removed cargo-only operations from the applicability section of the new 

part 117 because their estimated compliance costs as shown in the original RIA significantly 
136

exceed the societal benefits.159 The Initial SRIA revised and corrected the calculations used to 

estimate the costs and benefits of the final rule as it applies to passenger operations and to the 

estimates of costs and benefits if the rule were extended to cargo-only operations. This Final 

SRIA responds to public comments made regarding the Initial SRIA and where appropriate 

incorporates new information to revise the estimates of benefits and costs for cargo-only 

operations. 

The benefit and cost analysis for the regulatory evaluation is based on the following 

factors/assumptions: 

o Costs and benefits are expressed in 2011 dollars

o Benefits and costs are calculated in constant dollars and present values using both 

3 percent and 7 percent discount rates as prescribed by OMB in Circular A-4. 

o Present value calculations use 2011 as the base year160

o The analysis period covers the 12 year period 2012 through 2023

o The costs associated with computer programming and rest facilities occur in the 

two years after the rule is published. The other recurring costs of the rule and the 

benefits are then estimated over the next ten years.

o The benefits of preventing fatalities are valued using the Value of Statistical Life 

(VSL) of $6.2 million per US DOT guidance in place at the time the original RIA 

was drafted.161

We provide a range of estimates for the quantitative benefits of the final rule as it applies 

to passenger operations. Our base case estimate is $401 million ($246 million present value at 

seven percent and $322 million at three percent) and our high case estimate is $757 million 

 

159 Carriers may choose to have their cargo‐only operations comply with the new part 117 but are not required to

do so. Since the carrier would decide voluntarily to comply with the new requirements, those costs are not

attributed to the costs of this rule. 160 In the Initial SRIA, 2012 was used as the base year for present value estimates. 161 Sensitivity #5 in Appendix B incorporates the updated DOT guidance for VSL.
137

($465 million present value at seven percent and $609 million at three percent). The total 

estimated cost of the final rule as it applies to passenger operations is $462 million ($320 million 

present value at seven percent and $391 million at three percent). Therefore, the costs of the final 

rule are somewhat higher than the base case benefits estimate but well below the high case 

estimate. We also note that saving just 85 lives in a 10 year period would cause this rule to be 

cost beneficial.162 Further, even if this rule were only 36 percent effective at preventing accidents 

due to fatigue (as opposed to the 52.5 percent effectiveness estimated in this analysis), the rule 

would still be cost beneficial.163

If the final rule were extended to cover cargo-only operations, the base case estimate of 

benefits for that additional population is $3 million ($2 million present value at seven percent 

and $3 million at three percent) and our high case estimate is $10 million ($6 million present 

value at seven percent and $8 million at three percent). In comparison the additional estimated 

cost of the final rule if it were extended to cargo-only operations is estimated to be $452 million 

($292 million present value at seven percent and $371 million at three percent). This cost 

estimate far exceeds both the base and high case estimates of benefits. In order for the final rule 

to yield net benefits, the rule would need to prevent at least eight accidents during the 10-year 

analysis period. In contrast, only one accident occurred during the 10-year historical period and 

the final rule has an effectiveness rating of just 15 percent for that single accident. 

 

162 This comparison is made assuming the lives saved are distributed uniformly over the 10 year analysis period for

benefits and using a seven percent discount rate. 163 This calculation is performed using the parameters from high‐case benefits analysis and uses seven percent as

the discount rate.  
138

Table 35: Summary of Benefits and Costs (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 

$Millions) 

Estimates

Total

Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Total Benefits - Base Case $401 $246 $322 

Total Benefits - High Case $757 $465 $609 

 

Total Costs $462 $320 $391 

Net Benefits - Base Case -$61 -$74 -$69 

Net Benefits - High Case $295 $145 $218 

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Table 36: Summary of Benefits and Costs (2012 – 2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 

$Millions) 

Estimates

Total

Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Total Benefits ‐ Base Case $3 $2 $3

Total Benefits ‐ High Case $10 $6 $8

  

Total Costs $452 $292 $371

  

Net Benefits ‐ Base Case -$448 -$290 -$368

Net Benefits ‐ High Case -$442 -$286 -$363

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

 
139

Appendix A: Relevant Accident History

 
140

1. Accident DCA91MA021

A/C: DC-9-15, registration: N565PC Injuries: 2 Fatal 

Date: 2/17/1991 

Accident Summary: After takeoff, aircraft rolled to the right, then severely to the left past 

(90 degrees) and crashed. An ATC and some witnesses saw a fireball come out of the rear of the 

plane. 

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be failure of the flight crew to detect 

and remove ice from the aircrafts wings which was largely a result of lack of appropriate 

response by the FAA, Douglass aircraft company, and Ryan International airlines to the known 

critical effect that a minute amount of contamination has on the stall characteristics of the DC-9 

series 10 airplane. NTSB considered possibility that fatigue influenced pilots' judgment & 

decision not to conduct exterior preflight inspection of A/C. Crew had flown same night-time 

schedule for 6 days, & PIC for 12 of 13 days, averaging 3.8 flight hours & 5 landings each night. 

His schedule had recently increased from flying for 5 days, then 9 days off at home in CA. 

Though his family said he was used to night flying, recent increase in duty & flight time could 

have induced fatigue. But BTSB was divided on exact role of fatigue; some wanted fatigue as a 

cause, others did not. But fatigue's presence was not disputed. In the end, however, the Board 

could not reach a firm conclusion & excluded fatigue as a cause or factor. 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain flew six successive night flights 

the week before the incident, and flew another six successive night flights with the same first 

officer each night, including the night of the event. The total flight time for the six successive 

night flights, which included the night of the incident was 19.6 hrs. The first officer's total flight 
141

time in the 7 days prior to the incident was 19.6 hrs, accumulated all during six successive night 

flights with the same captain. 

On the six successive night flights, the captain and first officer came on duty around 

2145. On the day before the accident, a van driver for the hotel overheard the pilots talking about 

how little sleep they get. On the day of the incident, an airline mechanic described the pilots as 

normal and rested. On the day of the accident, the operations supervisor stated the crew remained 

in the cockpit; normal crewmembers leave the airplane for a walk around. Supervisor described 

the captain as quiet and expressionless. 

The captain was used to flying nights as a result of his military flying. Normal schedule 

was 5 nights on, 9 nights off. But a few weeks before accident, duty schedule changed as a result 

of airline contract to carry mail for US Postal Service. Airline subsequently hired new pilots and 

extended duty hrs of experienced pilots. The 2 weeks between his last visit home and the 

accidents were described as the longest period he had been on duty with the airline. 

SCORE: 0.5 Requirements would place 200-hour limit on duty time in 672 consecutive 

hours (4 weeks). That might have changed PIC’s schedule substantially. 

2. August 18, 1999 in Guantanamo Bay 

A/C: DC-8, N814CK Injuries: 3 Serious 

Date: 8/18/1993 

Accident Summary: Aircraft collided with level terrain after captain lost control of 

aircraft while approaching airfield. 

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be the captains impaired judgment, 

decision making and flying abilities of the night crew due to the effects of fatigue; the captains 
142

failure properly assess the conditions for landing and maintaining vigilant situational awareness 

of the airplane while maneuvering onto final approach; his failure to prevent the loss of airspeed 

and avoid a stall while in steep band turn; and his failure to execute immediate action to recover 

from a stall 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: At the time of the accident, the crew had been 

on duty for approx 18 hrs, having flown all night before accepting the accident flight. The board 

believes that the substandard performance by the experienced captain may have reflected the 

debilitating influence from fatigue. Captain testified feeling very lethargic and indifferent during 

the landing. First officer testified he felt fatigued earlier in the trip but felt exhilarated at the time 

of the landing. 

The board’s analysis revealed the captain had been awake for 23.5 hrs at the time of the 

accident, the first officer 19hrs and flight engineer 21 hrs. the accident occurred at the end of the 

afternoon psychological low period, the crewmembers had been awake the previous 2 nights, and 

had attempted to sleep during the day complicating their circadian sleep disorders - thus fitting 

the 3 scientific criteria for susceptibility to the debilitating effects of fatigue. 

At 0830, before crew left airport, chief scheduler found GTMO flight needed crew & was 

told “no legal problem” as it was “international flight.” Scheduler determined crew could 

reposition to Norfolk Naval Base (NGU), pick up A/C, fly to GTMO, then ferry under part 91 to 

ATL, & remain just within company 24-hour duty limit. Crew discussed timing & agreed to take 

trip, though “it was pushing the edge.” 

CAUSE: impaired judgment, decision-making, & flying abilities of PIC & crew due to 

fatigue; PIC's failure to properly assess conditions; loss of situational awareness while 

maneuvering onto final; failure to prevent loss of airspeed & avoid stall while in steep bank turn; 
143

& failure to execute immediate action to recover from stall. Factors; inadequacy of part 121 

flight & duty time regulations, supplemental air carrier, international operations, & 

circumstances that led to extended flight/duty hours & fatigue; inadequate CRM training & 

inadequate training & guidance by carrier for crew on operations at special airports, such as 

GTMO; & Navy's failure to provide system that would assure that local tower controller was 

aware of inoperative strobe light so as to advise crew. 

SCORE: 0.9 At time of accident, PIC & FO had been awake about 24 hours & on duty 22 

hours. After such a long day, crew was offered standard straight-in approach over ocean but they 

inexplicably chose very demanding approach in darkness. FE had said he got a rush on approach 

like they were shooting an approach to an aircraft carrier but FE noted that he was “tired & 

lethargic” as A/C approached airport & he “believed that the other 2 crew members were 

fatigued.” By including ferry flights, the requirements in this final rule affect duty-day limits 

would have precluded this crew from taking this flight. 

3. Accident DCA94MA065

Date: 7/2/1994 

July 2, 1994 in Charlotte, NC 

A/C: MD-82, N954VJ Injuries: 37 Fatal, 16 Serious 

Accident Summary: Aircraft collided with trees and a private residence near the 

Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina (CLT), shortly after the 

flightcrew executed a missed approach from the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to 

runway 
144

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be the flightcrew’s decision to 

continue an approach into severe convective activity that was conducive to a microburst: 2) the 

flightcrew’s failure to recognize a windshear situation in a timely manner, 3) the flightcrew’s 

failure to establish and maintain the proper airplane attitude and thrust setting necessary to 

escape the windshear; and 4) the lack of real-time adverse weather and windshear hazard 

information dissemination from air traffic control, all of which led to an encounter with and 

failure to escape from a microburst-induced windshear that was produced by a rapidly 

developing thunderstorm located at the approach end of runway. 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain was off duty for 3 days before the 

beginning of the accident trip. On the morning of June 28, 1994, he flew with his National Guard 

squadron, which is based at Wright Patterson Air Force Base Ohio, near his home. On the day of 

the accident he awoke about 0455 drove to the airport in Dayton Ohio, and departed on a flight 

to Pittsburgh at around 0745. The reporting time for the trip that included the accident flight was 

0945, and the departure time for LGA was at 1045. The first officer flew a 4-day trip that ended 

around 0930 on July 2. On the day of the accident, he arose about 06 I5 and flew the leg to 

Pittsburgh that departed St. Louis at 0810. He arrived in Pittsburgh at 0030. 

SCORE: 0.15 Fatigue could have affected FO's performance (PF). PIC, who was off-duty 

preceding 3 days, was much less vulnerable to fatigue, but he too had already had a long day. 

Accident occurred 14 hours into PIC’s day. He awoke at 0455, drove to Dayton from home, then 

flew to PIT to begin duty day. Accident occurred at 1843, at end of third of 4 scheduled legs. His 

long day may have contributed to his failure to make 2 standard call-outs on approach at 1000 

AGL & 100 AGL. As NTSB notes, failure to make these call-outs contributed to PIC’s loss of 

situational awareness, his directing FO to go-around “to the right” instead of following runway 
145

heading as directed, & directing FO to “push down” after FO had initiated 15-degree nose-up & 

right banking turn. 

FO was more vulnerable to fatigue. His duty day ended June 30 at 2230 at Blountsville, 

TN. NTSB report does not say when that duty day began, nor when FO awoke that day. At 

Blountville, he went to bed at 0130 & awoke at 0900. His next duty day ended at STL at 2040 

EDT. He went to bed at 2230 & awoke at 0615 on accident day. He then flew to PIT & began 

pairing with accident PIC. Like PIC, FO was nearly 14 hours into his day when accident 

occurred. He was PF on PIT-LGA leg & on accident leg from CAE. Fatigue could have 

contributed to incomplete pre-flight brief, failure to maintain sterile cockpit below 10,000 feet, 

approach briefing in which he omitted field elevation, FAF altitude, DH, & MAP altitudes, all of 

which NTSB noted had contributed to lack of situational awareness by both pilots. Finally, all 

the above contributed to crew’s choice to initiate non-standard go-around. Other factors were 

important, including ATC performance, A/C's inadequate windshear algorithm, & abnormally 

severe windshear. In short, hard to justify a high score, but equally hard to argue that fatigue was 

irrelevant. 

4. Accident DCA95MA020

Date: 2/16/1995 

NTSB Identification: DCA95MA020, Air Transport International 

February 16, 1995 in Kansas City, MO 

A/C: DC-8-63, N782AL Injuries: 3 Fatal 

Accident Summary: Aircraft was destroyed by ground impact and fire during attempted 

takeoff. 
146

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be loss of directional control by pilot 

in command during the takeoff roll, flightcrews lack of understanding of the three-engine takeoff 

procedures and their decision to modify these procedures and the failure of the company to 

ensure that the flight crew had adequate experience, training and rest to conduct the non-routine 

flight 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: Safety board believes the captain and other 

crew members were experiencing fatigue at the time of the accident. The captain’s performance 

in the accident reveals many areas of degradation in which fatigue is probably a factor. Accident 

report notes a demanding Delaware -Germany overnight round trip flight (6 time zones crossed) 

and a daytime rest period which caused disruptions in circadian rhythms. Additionally, the 

captains last rest period was repeatedly interrupted by the company. Report also notes that since 

flight was non-revenue flight, it was under different duty rules and the same flight, were it a 

revenue flight, would have been illegal given the rest periods the crew had. 

SCORE: 0.9 Fatigue was a significant problem in this accident. With or without crew's 

inadequate training & knowledge of 3-engine T/O, NPRM would preclude this crew from this 

ferry trip. Also, all 3 crew performed poorly & all 3 likely were fatigued, per NTSB, & all 3 

exhibited “performance degradation” symptomatic of fatigue (difficulties in setting proper 

priorities & continuation of T/O attempt despite disagreement & confusion on important issues). 

5. Date: 12/20/1995 

NTSB Identification: DCA96RA020, American Airlines 

December 20, 1995 in Cali, Colombia 

A/C: B757-200, N651AA Injuries: 160 Fatal, 4 Serious 
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Accident Summary: Aircraft crashed 38 miles north of Cali, Columbia into mountainous 

terrain during a descent under instrument flight rules 

Probable Cause: Probable causes were determined to be the flight crew’s failure to 

adequately plan and execute the approach to runway 19 at SKCL and their inadequate use of 

automation; Failure of the flightcrew to discontinue the approach into Cali, despite numerous 

cues alerting them of the inadvisability of continuing the approach; The lack of situational 

awareness of the flightcrew regarding vertical navigation, proximity to terrain, and the relative 

location of critical radio aids; Failure of the flightcrew to revert to basic radio navigation at the 

time when the FMS-assisted navigation became confusing and demanded an excessive workload 

in a critical phase of the flight. 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: 

At 2138 CFIT at 9000; peak at 9190. Night VOR/DME approach from MIA; 2 hrs late. 

PIC concerned to get cabin crew on ground to meet AAL rules on cabin crew rest (for next day 

return flight). Cali in long N/S valley; high terrain west & east. Cleared to Cali VOR; readback 

"cleared direct," entered "direct;" way points go off display. Later cleared to interim Tulua VOR. 

Expecting “direct,” crew became unsure of location. CVR shows crew fumbled with charts & 

Tulua ID, but already past Tulua. When crew finally entered Tulua, A/C began turning back to 

Tulua; PIC overrode. Then ATC offered direct approach from north (was 01; now 19). Crew 

rushed to get down. Put in single-letter ID for ROSO, but Colombia has 2 navaids with singleletter "R." Per ICAO, software defaults to "R" with more traffic (well north at Romeo VOR--

Bogota); had to punch in all 4 letters for ROSO. Again A/C began turning back. Crew now very 

confused & they knew it. FO (PF): "where are we?" PIC says go S/SE – now east of valley, 13 
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miles off course & below terrain between A/C & Cali. Now more confused; reading DME to 

ROMEO, thinking it was ROSO. Stepped down early, configured to land as GPWS sounded. 

Pulled up but did not retract spoilers; slow climb (184 knots at impact). Hit east slope nose up, 

skidded over top & down west side. Both pilots, 6 FA & 152 pax fatal; 4 pax serious. 

CAUSE per Colombian CAA: 1. crew's failure to adequately plan & execute approach to 

runway 19 & inadequate use of automation; 2. Failure to discontinue approach, despite numerous 

cues; 3. lack of situational awareness regarding vertical navigation, proximity to terrain, & 

relative location of critical radio aids; 4. Failure to revert to basic radio nav when FMS-nav 

became confusing & demanded excessive workload. Factors: 1. crew's ongoing efforts to 

expedite approach & landing to avoid potential delays from exceeding company duty time limits; 

2. execution of GPWS escape maneuver with speed brakes deployed; 3. FMS logic that dropped 

all intermediate fixes from display(s) upon execution of direct routing; 4. FMS-generated nav 

information that used different naming convention from that published in nav charts." 

SCORE: 0.35 Crew certainly would have been tired, despite being first of their duty tour. 

PIC had been awake close to 17 hours & FO had been awake at least 15 hours (14 & 17 hours 

are key thresholds in fatigue). Yet even if each had been operating earlier in their day, they likely 

would not have sorted out confusion created by single-letter identifier for Rozo & Romeo. Yet 

more rested crew may have avoided readback-hearback error related to “direct” with interim way 

points. Crew clearly knew they were very confused & that they were uncertain of their position 

in rugged terrain. More alert crew might have responded more appropriately, either by climbing 

above terrain to sort things out, or by reverting to radio nav until they re-established their 

position, or may have recognized that over-ride of northbound turn had pushed them across ridge 

line, east of valley. Though crew certainly would be tired, fatigue was less than a show-stopper. 
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Key factors would have remained with or without alert crew: non-radar environment; confusion 

from multiple identifiers; self-induced pressure; unexpected change to unfamiliar step-down 

approach at night in mountainous terrain; & significantly delayed flight. The requirements might 

have led to avoiding confusion or to more appropriate response to confusion. 

6. NTSB Identification: NYC96FA174, TWA 

August 25, 1996 in JFK, NY 

A/C: L-1011, N31031 Injuries: None 

Date: 8/25/1996 

Accident Summary: Aircraft was substantially damaged when the tail struck the runway, 

while landing at John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York (JFK). 

On arrival in JFK area, wx was 1⁄4-mile in fog, scattered at 200, & temp/dew of 66/66F. 

Crew expected 4R, but before reaching FAF, 4R went below minimum & ATC offered 4L (still 

above minimum). PIC accepted & FO (PF) transitioned to 4L. Inspection methods from 

Lockheed & adopted by TWA did not adequately specify how to check slat drive system for 

slack. 

But crew failed to reset altimeter bug for new runway (100 feet higher than 4R). PIC also 

missed several required call-outs on approach & no charts for 4L were on board. When PF asked 

for charts, PIC said “just fly the approach.” A/C was slow & unstable throughout approach & 

when altimeter read 50 feet (in fact 150 feet), A/C began to flare. FO recognized they were high 

& pushed nose over. On landing, A/C had tail strike & substantial damage. Failure to reset 

altimeter & absence of charts were fundamental in this accident. 
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Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be the failure of the flight crew to 

complete the published checklist and to adequately cross-check the actions of each other, which 

resulted in their failure to detect that the leading edge slats had not extended and led to the 

aircraft's tail contacting the runway during the computer-driven, auto-land flare for landing. 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain reported that he had difficulty 

adjusting to disruptions in his sleeping schedule, and for this reason did not bid to fly 

international routes. According to his sleep schedule, he had been awake about 24 hours at the 

time of the accident and reported that he that he felt, ""awful, just tired and exhausted."" The first 

officer said that the captain attempted to rest during the cruise portion of the flight to JFK, with 

his head back in the seat, but that there were visiting crewmembers in the cockpit and the captain 

might not have received good rest. In addition, the captain commented that he had not slept well 

in the hotel. 

The first officer reported that he had flown the LAS layover trip several times during 

July, and had learned the importance of good sleep for flying it. He reported that he had in excess 

of 14 hours of rest in the scheduled 24 hours of off duty, which was split over two periods. At the 

time of the accident he had been awake for over 9 hours following a rest in excess of 5 1/2 hours. 

The flight engineer reported that she had not slept well in the hotel on the layover. 

Additionally, she reported that she felt rested when the accident trip began; however, at the time 

of the landing she was getting tired 

SCORE: 0.35 Had crew been better rested, they may not have missed altimeter reset, 

may have recognized or acted upon unstable approach, or may have gone around, as required by 

company procedures when not stable at 500 feet. NPRM's treatment of night operations may 
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have affected this flight. Conversely, crews have made similar errors when well rested & flying 

at mid-day. The FAA believes that avoidable fatigue contributed to crew’s failures on approach. 

7. NTSB Identification: NYC99LA052, Colgan Air 

January 22, 1999 in Hyannis, MA 

A/C: BE-1900, N215CJ Injuries: None 

At 1719 (dusk), Beech 1900D by Colgan substantially damaged on landing at HYA. No 

injury to PIC, FO & 2 employees as pax on positioning flight from BOS to HYA in IMC. Started 

taxi at BOS at 1600. T/O & en route uneventful. But RVR at HYA went below minimum while 

en route. Wx was 100-foot ceiling in fog, with variable winds at 3 knots. 

On arrival at HYA, PIC performed 2 missed approaches. Before trying 3rd approach, he 

advised tower & pax that this was last shot, or they return to BOS. On third approach, both PIC 

& FO visually acquired runway. FO said PIC lined up with centerline & requested flaps. FO said 

A/C “floated at 20 feet over runway at normal transition when I heard PIC taking power levers 

over flight idle gate by sound of engine/props.' This placed prop in 'BETA' range. A/C then 

started to sink, & PIC pulled back on control yoke. 

Main gear struck ground & fractured during +2.9G touchdown, which occurred 2500 feet 

beyond approach end of 5,252 foot runway. Ran off right side of runway, 4700 feet beyond 

approach end & stopped. To place throttles in BETA, it was necessary to lift power levers over 

flight idle stop. Flight manual included warning: 'Do not lift power levers in flight.' 

On accident day, PIC reported for duty at 0535, with first departure from HYA at 0620. 

He returned to HYA at 0920, after 3 flights & 2:31 flight time. Then with different FO, PIC T/O 

for Boston at 1100. They flew 5 more flights for 3:53 flight hours, then returned to BOS at 1540. 
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Probable CAUSE: PIC’s improper placement of power levers in BETA position while in 

flight. Factors: fog & dusk conditions. 

SCORE: 0.15 Accident report summarizes only Captain's flight day, not his preceding 72 

hours. Clearly had a long day & difficulty getting into HYA did not help. Started taxi at BOS 

12.5 hours into duty day for flight to HYA, so he needed to be on ground at HYA within halfhour to beat new NPRM max duty day. May have precuded this PIC from this flight (or not – 

close call). Also, though better rested PIC may have handled flare better, others have pulled 

throttle & props into beta. Fatigue might help explain PIC’s decision to take 3 shots at landing 

below mimium, 

8. NTSB Identification: NYC99FA110, American Eagle 

May 8, 1999 in JFK, NY 

A/C: SF34, N232AE Injuries: 1 Serious 

Accident NYC99FA110

Accident Summary: Aircraft sustained substantial damage during landing at John F. 

Kennedy International Airport (JFK) 

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be the pilot-in-command's failure to 

perform a missed approach as required by his company procedures. Factors were the pilot-incommand's improper in-flight decisions, the pilot-in-command's failure to comply with The FAA 

regulations and company procedures, inadequate crew coordination, and fatigue 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: On May 6, 1999, the captain went off duty 

about 2030, drove home, and was asleep about 2300. On May 7, 1999, he awoke about 0700. He 

attempted to nap about 1200, but was unsuccessful. He reported for duty about 2200. The first 
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officer was off duty on May 6, 1999. He departed Las Vegas, Nevada (commuting on a 

jumpseat) at 1230, and arrived at JFK about 1730. He ate, then rested in the pilot's crew room, 

but did not sleep. There was a 3 hour time difference between Las Vegas and JFK. The trip 

sequence scheduled the pilots to depart JFK at 2246, arrive at BWI at 2359, on May 7, 1999; and 

depart BWI for JFK at 0610 on May 8, 1999. They were provided with individual rooms at a 

local hotel, approximately 10 minutes from the airport. Due to a takeoff delay at JFK, the 

flightcrew did not arrive at BWI until 0025. They arrived at the hotel about 0100. The captain 

stated that he was asleep by 0130. He awoke at 0445 for the scheduled 0530 van ide back to the 

airport. The first officer stated that he was asleep between 0130 and 0200. He received a wakeup call at 0445. During post-accident interviews, both pilots stated that they were fatigued. 

At 0702, SF34 by American Eagle substantially damaged on landing at JFK; 1 pax 

serious; no injury to 26 pax, FA & 2 pilots. En route from BWI uneventful. On arrival in NY 

area, crew completed checklists & briefings for runway 04 when ATC advised crew that RVR 

for 04 was 1,600. Crew needed 1800 so ATC cleared them to holding fix at 4,000. While flying 

toward holding fix, RVR increased. ATC offered crew ILS approach, but advised that they might 

be too high. PIC accepted clearance nevertheless. Controller asked if crew could make approach 

from their position. PIC said yes & continued entire approach with excessive altitude, airspeed, 

& rate of descent, while remaining above glide slope. This violated company procedures & FAR 

91.175. Crew then failed to respond to 4 audible GPWS warnings. During approach, FO failed to 

make required callouts, including missed approach callout. Landed 7,000 feet beyond approach 

end, at 157 knots, & overran. 

During interviews, both pilots said they were fatigued. Crew was working continuous 

duty overnight schedule. Continuous duty overnights (CDO) at American Eagle identifies trip 
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sequence that is flown during late night hours, extending into early morning hours, with 

significant elapsed time period between one arrival & next departure. Since break between 

flights is not sufficient to qualify as free from duty rest period, crew remains continuously on 

duty, though carrier may have provide hotel room for rest. 

On May 6, PIC went off duty at 2030, drove home, & was asleep at 2300. On May 7, he 

awoke at 0700. He tried to nap about noon but was unsuccessful. He reported for duty at 2200. 

FO was off duty on May 6. He departed LAS (commuting on jumpseat) at 0930 local time on 

May 7 (1230 EDT) & arrived at JFK at 1730. He ate then rested in crew room, but did not sleep. 

Trip sequence scheduled crew to depart JFK at 2246, arrive BWI at 2359, & then depart BWI for 

JFK at 0610 on 5/8. They were provided with individual rooms at hotel 10 minutes from airport. 

But, due to delays at JFK, crew did not arrive at BWI until 0025. They arrived at hotel at 0100 & 

PIC was asleep by 0130. He awoke at 0445 for scheduled 0530 van ride back to airport. FO said 

he was asleep between 0130 and 0200. He received wake-up call at 0445. 

CAUSE: PIC's failure to perform missed approach as required by company procedures. Factors: 

PIC's improper in-flight decisions, failure to comply with FARs & company procedures, 

inadequate crew coordination, & fatigue. 

SCORE: 0.5 Crew likely was tired, & helps to explain why crew did little right on or 

before the approach. Yet, the requirements would not reach the practice of “Continuous Duty 

Overnight, but it would have reached the FO’s continuous day starting with his commute. This 

would not have helped PI, but it might have ensured at least one alert crewmember. 

9. NTSB Identification: DCA99MA060, American 

June 1, 1999 in Little Rock, AR 
155

A/C: MD-82, N215AA Injuries: 11 Fatal, 45 Serious 

Accident DCA99MA060

Accident Summary: Aircraft crashed after it overran the end of runway 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain went to sleep about 2200 the night 

before the accident and slept until between 0700 and 0730. On nonflying days, he would 

typically go to sleep between 2130 and 2200, wake up about 0515, and leave for work about 

0600. On May 30, 1999, the first officer traveled from his home outside Los Angeles, California, 

to Chicago. The first officer indicated that he had been commuting from his home to the 

Chicago-O’Hare base for about 3 months and that, as a result, he was adjusted to the central time 

zone. The first officer indicated that he was involved in routine activities while in the Chicago 

area. He went to bed between 2000 and 2200 the night before the accident and woke up about 

0730. 

The board found that at the time of the accident (2350:44), the captain and the first 

officer had been continuously awake for at least 16 hours. Also the accident time was nearly 2 

hours after the time that both pilots went to bed the night before the accident and the captain’s 

routine bedtime (between 2130 and 2200), meaning their circadian systems were not actively 

promoting alertness. The Safety Board concludes that the flight crew’s degraded performance 

was consistent with known effects of fatigue. 

CAUSE: failure to discontinue approach when severe thunderstorms & associated 

hazards to flight operations had moved into airport area, & crew's failure to ensure that spoilers 

had extended after touchdown. Factors: flight crew's (1) impaired performance resulting from 

fatigue & situational stress associated with intent to land under the circumstances, (2) 
156

continuation of approach when company's max crosswind component was exceeded, & (3) use 

of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ratio after landing. 

SCORE: 0.15 FO was 5 months into 1-year probation & paired with Chief Pilot from 

ORD base. But FO later testified of good working relationship with PIC & said rank of Chief 

Pilot was no barrier. Accident occurred 14 hours into duty day & nearly 17 hours after 

awakening. Long day & disrupted flight into & from DFW. FO showed signs on CVR of 

recognizing that landing was not a good idea, but PIC focused on landing. Was this fatigue or 

task fixation? Would more rest have made recently hired FO more willing to speak up to PICChief Pilot? Call-outs were made & SOPs indicate crew was engaged. Perhaps a less worn-out 

PIC would have considered diverting (or not), or may at least have responded to implied 

warnings from tower. Would have exceeded the requirements contained in this final rule by 12 

minutes at impact; may have changed sequence before T/O (had to be released by 2316 - - 2304 

might have made a difference). 

10. NTSB Identification: DCA02MA054, Federal Express 

July 26, 2002 in Tallahassee, FL 

A/C: B727-200, N487FE Injuries: 3 Serious 

Accident AAR0402

Date: 7/26/2002 

Accident Summary: Aircraft struck trees on short final approach and crashed short of 

runway 9 at airport. 

At 0537 (night), A/C destroyed by impact & post impact fire when it undershot on visual 

approach to 09, striking trees along extended centerline 3,650 feet short into black hole. FO 
157

flying. Wx: calm, visibility 8, clouds few at 100 & scattered at 2500. On arrival at TLH, FO 

briefed for visual to 27. Minute later he asked PIC if they should use 09 instead. Some discussion 

followed but no decision. Ten 10 minutes later, SO asked pilots if they wanted to run approach 

checklist. FO again raised question of 09 vs 27 & crew decided on 09. Turned onto final 2.5 NM 

out. 

At this point PAPI would have indicated 1 white & 3 red (low). But A/C continued to 

descend below glide slope & was at 200 AGL at 0.9 miles out. PAPI would have shown 4 red. 

CVR shows no discussion about PAPI or altitude other than comment by FO that '(I'm) gonna 

have to stay just little bit higher... I'm gonna lose end of runway', to which PIC replied 'yeah... 

yeah, okay.' About 18 seconds later PIC commented 'it's startin' to disappear in there little bit 

(isn't) it? Think we'll be alright, yeah.' Then hit trees 11 seconds later. 

Crew believed they were on glide slope & showed no concern of undershooting. FO later 

said that 'from time I rolled out (on final), I saw that I was on glide slope... & it never changed.' 

Approach to 09 is over forest with no ground lights or other visual references (black hole), which 

can lead pilots to believe they are higher than they really are. NTSB notes that PAPI should have 

prevented this trap but FO's first class medical noted he had color vision defect. After accident, 

he failed 7 red/green vision tests. Specialists' report found that he had severe congenital 

deuteranomaly that could result in 'difficulties interpreting red/green & white signal lights.' 

Report added that '... he would definitely have had problems discriminating PAPIs... because red 

lights would appear not to be red at all, ... more indistinguishable from white than red... it would 

be extremely unlikely that he would be capable of seeing even color pink on PAPI... more likely 

combination of whites & yellows & perhaps, not even that difference.' 
158

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be the captain's and first officer's 

failure to establish and maintain a proper glidepath during the night visual approach to landing. 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The 3 accident flight crewmembers all had 

different flight, duty and sleep schedules before the accident. Flight and duty times since the last 

rest period for the caption, first officer and flight engineer are as follows: Captain (flight time - 

1:23, duty time 2:35), first officer (flight time-4:02, duty time-10:29), flight engineer (flight 

time-3:43, duty time-10:41) 

Captain reported not sleeping very well the 2 night leading up to the day of the accident 

but reported not feeling fatigued when he reported for the accident flight. Board found evidence 

of a sleep deficit for the captain based on reported sleep quality and small errors made during the 

accident flight the otherwise competent captain wouldn't normally make as indicated by past 

performance. First officer had normal sleep prior to accident, however he reported he felt good 

but he did not recall feeling alert and he seemed tired according to the captain. Board found the 

first officers sleep schedule was disrupted and found his performance deficient, which appears 

inconsistent with characterizations of his past performance. Flight engineer slept normally and 

appeared alert according to the captain and the board found minimal evidence he was fatigues, 

however his performance deficiencies may have been a result of workload during a rushed 

approach. 

CAUSE: crew’s failure to establish & maintain proper glidepath in night visual approach. 

Factors: combination of crew fatigue, failure to adhere to SOPs, FO's color vision deficiency & 

PIC & FO's failure to monitor approach. 3 crew serious 
159

SCORE: 0.15 Performance of both pilots was deficient & below their usual standard 

during approach. NTSB believes this was due to fatigue. Besides back-of-clock, both pilots had 

difficulty getting adequate rest before flight. PIC said his sleep 2 days before had 'not really 

(been) good' or had been 'marginal' because he kept being woken by family dog. FO said he had 

difficulty adjusting his sleep cycle & inferred he did not sleep well during day. Friend described 

FO as looking tired & PIC commented on same bus that he 'might be little tired.' Even with 

color-blindness, causal statement justifies concluding that a better rested crew may have avoided 

the whole scenario early-on in the approach. But unsure exactly how NPRM would have 

addressed this case, since rest periods were reasonable (even if not well managed) & accident 

occurred on visual approach over a black hole with a color-blind pilot trying to use a PAPI. The 

strongest argument for fatigue must rely on the notion that a better rested crew might have 

monitored the glide slope better and/or might have run a more disciplined checklist & prelanding brief, or that better rested PIC might have chosen the more common instrument approach 

to 27. 

11. NTSB Identification: DCA05MA004, Corporate Airlines as American Connection 

October 19, 2004 in Kirksville, MO 

A/C: BAE-32, N875JX Injuries: 13 fatal, 2 Serious 

Accident AAR0601

Accident Summary: Aircraft struck trees on final approach and crashed short of runway. 

At 1937 on LOC/DME final at Kirksville in IMC, hit trees at 33 feet QFE on center line 

1.3 NM out. WX: wind 020 at 6, visibility 4, mist & 300 overcast. On final, PIC (PF) maintained 

constant descent of 1200 FPM until impact (met company SOP but exceeded that recommended 

by the FAA for descent below 1000 AGL). At MDA, PIC said 'I can see ground there' (as PF, he 
160

should have been on instruments). Continued through MDA & asked FO 'what do you think?' 

FO: 'I can't see (expletive).' Seconds later PIC said 'yeah, there it is. Approach lights in sight' just 

as GPWS called “200” & FO announced 'in sight, continue'. (Both looking out window; nobody 

on instruments). Never recognized low altitude until seeing trees 2 seconds before impact. Wx 

complicated approach but crew never seemed too concerned about wx. Flew approach in casual 

fashion & lack of professionalism: no sterile cockpit (casual conversation); non-standard 

phraseology; humming; etc. PIC known for sense of humor & was said to 'emphasize fun in the 

cockpit'. 

Crew was fatigued: reported for duty at 0514. Accident was near end of 6th sector on 

'demanding' day in IMC. Crew had been on duty 14.5 hours & PIC is said to have slept poorly 

night before. PIC commuted from home in NJ to STL & FO commuted from Ohio. Reported for 

duty at 1345 on 10/17 (2 days before accident). Flew 3 flights in 8-hour duty day & arrived at 

over-night destination (Quincy) at 2125. On 10/18, departed Quincy at 1415 after more than 15 

hours off. Flew 3 flights & 6:20 duty day. Arrived at over-night destination in Burlington at 

1945. On 10/19, duty day began at 0514 after 9 hours off. Departed BRL at 0544 to STL & 

arrived 0644. Next 2 flights cancelled due to wx. T/O for round-trip from STL-Kirksville (IRK) 

at 1236. Landed STL at 1745. 

Probable Cause: failure to follow procedures & improper non-precision instrument 

approach at night in IMC, including descent below MDA before acquiring runway environment. 

Factors: non-standard callouts; unprofessional demeanor; & crew fatigue. 

Probable cause was determined to be the pilots’ failure to follow established procedures 

and properly conduct a non-precision instrument approach at night in IMC, including their 

descent below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) before required visual cues were available 
161

(which continued un moderated until the airplane struck the trees) and their failure to adhere to 

the established division of duties between the flying and nonflying (monitoring) pilot 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: Captain reportedly did not sleep well the night 

before the accident but did not report feeling tired. He was later observed resting on a couch the 

morning of the accident. First officer reportedly did not have any trouble sleeping the night 

before the accident and the day of the accident seemed alert and happy. 

However, the flight crews rest time (2100-0400) did not correspond favorably with either 

ones sleeping patterns and at the time of the accident, they had been on duty 14.5 hrs and it had 

been 15 hrs since their last rest period. The board suggests that the pilot deficiencies observed 

could be consistent with fatigue impairment 

SCORE: 0.75 Accident flight T/O STL at 1842 for IRK on 6th flight of day after 6:14 

flight time & 14.5-hour day already. Long, brutal day in IMC that started with limited rest 

period. Crew was familiar with each other & with IRK. WX & PIC's established practice of "fun 

in the cockpit" also were factors. Fatigue had to be a big player, though PIC's history of "fun in 

cockpit implies other issues. The requirements in this final rule would have precluded this crew 

from taking this flight. 

12. NTSB Identification: DCA06MA064, Comair as 

August 27, 2006, Lexington, KY 

A/C: CRJ-200, N431CA Injuries: 49 Fatal, 1 Serious 

Accident AAR0705

Date: 8/27/2007 
162

Accident Summary: Aircraft crashed during takeoff from Blue Grass Airport, Lexington, 

Kentucky. 

At 0607 Comair 5191 crashed on T/O from Blue Grass Airport (LEX) for ATL. A/C ran 

off end of Runway 26 & was destroyed by impact forces & post-crash fire. T/O wrong runway; 

had been cleared to T/O on Runway 22. PIC, FA & all 47 pax fatal; FO serious. Threshold for 22 

& 26 are close & common taxiway had construction near thresholds, possibly inviting confusion 

in darkness after short taxi from nearby terminal. Also, sole controller in tower turned away after 

clearing A/C for T/O (A/C was the only active A/C on the airport). 

Runway 22 had minor construction work underway preceding week with NOTAM for 

“some” lights out. Crew also appeared behind the curve early: approached wrong RJ on ramp 

(corrected by ramp staff); called Toledo tower rather than LEX (corrected by tower); called 

wrong flight number (corrected by tower); & vocally ran through checklist on taxi so quickly 

NTSB had to slow CVR read-out to understand it. Crew then taxied onto darkened, closed short 

runway (26). Initiated rolling T/O, further reducing chance to recognize wrong runway, crossed 

intersection with active runway, lighted 7,000-foot Runway 22, 500 feet from start of rolling T/O 

on 26, continued & rotated just as they ran out of pavement. Ran onto grass & nose lifted slightly 

(with main gear tracks deepening in grass) just as A/C struck perimeter fence, then rolled at high 

speed into trees & burned out. PIC, FA & 47 pax fatal; FO serious. CAUSE: crew's failure to use 

available cues & aids to identify A/C's location on airport surface during taxi & their failure to 

cross-check & verify that A/C was on correct runway before T/O. Factors: crew's non-pertinent 

conversation during taxi, which resulted in loss of positional awareness, and the FAA's failure to 

require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific ATC clearances. 
163

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be s the flight crewmembers’ failure 

to use available cues and aids to identify the airplane’s location on the airport surface during taxi 

and their failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before 

takeoff 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The captain and the first officer received more 

than the minimum required rest periods during their respective trips in the days before the 

accident, and their flight and duty times in the week and month before the accident would not 

have precluded them from obtaining adequate sleep. Also, both pilots had only been awake for 

about 2 hours at the time of the accident. Two factors in the pilots’ schedules just before the 

accident could have been associated with the potential development of a fatigued state: acute 

sleep loss and circadian disruption - The captain and the first officer also awakened on the day of 

the accident at a time when they would normally be asleep. 

Overall, The Safety Board concludes that, even though the flight crewmembers made 

some errors during their preflight activities and the taxi to the runway, there was insufficient 

evidence to determine whether fatigue affected their performance 

SCORE: 0.35 Fatigue likely was not an issue for PIC (PNF) but it may have affected 

FO’s performance (PF). FO began his duty tour on 8/25 at JFK. He drove that morning to FLL 

near his home for flight to JFK. Departed FLL at 0559 & arrived JFK at 0832. NTB does not 

note when FO awoke, but it likely would have been around 0400 to reach his 0559 departure at 

FLL. His duty day then began with flight from JFK to ROC at 1305. Return flight to JFK T/O at 

1600 but crew had to divert to BDL for fuel & did not land at JFK until nearly 2000. Due to late 

arrival, crew was asked to reposition A/C to LEX. Departed gate at 2130 but were not able to 

T/O until 2300; arrived at LEX at 0140. FO reached his hotel at 0210 on 8/26. By the time he got 
164

to bed, FO would have had nearly a 23-hour day. On 8/26, FO had day off. He told his wife that 

morning by phone that he had “slept in” & planned to go to bed early that night. Phone records, 

hotel key cards, & credit card records indicate normal day of activity through at least 1830 on his 

rest day, when FO paid for meal in hotel restaurant (probably asleep no earlier than 2000). On 

8/27 he & PIC reported for duty at 0515. FO likely had same wake-up call as PIC (0415). 

Though FO had free day before accident, 8/25 was 23-hour day, with very late time to 

bed, followed on 8/27 by very early start to his day. Despite “sleeping in” on 8/26, FO would 

have been coping with sleep deficit. This could partly explain his confusion or inattention prior 

to departing gate. It also could have made him more vulnerable to visual confusion caused by 

minor construction & related barriers, & his failure to respond to visual cues of unlighted runway 

& crossing active runway that was fully lighted. Yet other factors also may explain these 

failures. For example, FO had flown into LEX 2 nights before when “lights were out all over the 

place.” That was at end of his 23-hour day; neither he nor that Captain apparently recognized 

that outages had been NOTAMed on 8/25. On morning of accident, runway end identifier lights 

were out of service. Closeness of 2 runway ends with single taxiway also increases risk of wrong 

runway T/Os. Finally, with terminal close to runway ends, taxi time was short, increasing 

percentage of head-down time, at least for PNF. The requirements would have precluded FO 

from taking positioning flight & extending very long duty day on first day. This may have 

averted the entire scenario. 

13. NTSB Identification: DCA07MA072, Shuttle America 

February 18, 2007, Cleveland, OH 

A/C: ERJ-170, N862RW Injuries: None 
165

Accident AAR0801

Accident Summary: Aircraft overran the end of the runway during a landing in snowy 

conditions and stuck an ILS antenna and fence, and the nose gear collapsed. 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The day of the accident, the captain had been 

awake for all but about 1 hour of the previous 32 hours; he stated that his lack of sleep affected 

his ability to concentrate and process information to make decisions and, as a result, was not “at 

the best of [his] game.” The captain also reported that he had insomnia, which began 9 months to 

1 year before the accident and lasted for several days at a time. From Feb 11-14 the first officer 

flew a total of 18hrs 27 mins. On Feb, he started a 3-day 6-leg trip and by the 18th, his total 

flight time was 11 hrs 50 mins. At the time of the accident, the first officer had been on duty 

about 9 hrs 15 mins with a total flight time of 5 hrs 30 mins. The first officer agreed to be the 

flying pilot because of the captain’s references to fatigue and lack of sleep the night before. 

A contributing factor to the accident was the pilot’s fatigue which affected his ability to 

effectively plan and monitor the approach and landing. The Safety Board concludes that the 

captain was fatigued, which degraded his performance during the accident flight. 

CAUSE: failure to execute a missed approach when visual cues for runway were not 

distinct & identifiable. Factors: (1) crew's decision to descend to ILS DH instead of localizer 

(glideslope out) MDA; (2) FO's long landing on short, contaminated runway & crew's failure to 

use reverse thrust & braking to max effectiveness; (3) PIC's fatigue, which affected his ability to 

effectively plan for & monitor approach; & (4) carrier's failure to administer attendance policy 

that permitted crew to call in as fatigued without fear of reprisals. 

SCORE: 0.5 A better rested PIC likely would have flown this leg, & likely would have 

increased chances of going around. However, it but probably would not have changed confusion 
166

over glideslope & ILS DH versus localizer MDA. Either way, the requirements would have 

enabled PIC to opt out of flight. 

14. NTSB Identification: DCA07FA037, Pinnacle as Northwest Express 

April 12, 2007, Traverse City, MI 

A/C: CRJ-200, N8905F Injuries: None 

Accident AAR-0802

Date: 4/12/2007 

Accident Summary: Aircraft ran off the departure end of the runway during snowy 

conditions. 

Probable Cause: Probably cause was determined to be the pilots’ decision to land at TVC 

without performing a landing distance assessment, which was required by company policy 

because of runway contamination initially reported by TVC ground operations personnel and 

continuing reports of deteriorating weather and runway conditions during the approach. This 

poor decision making likely reflected the effects of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty 

day, and, for the captain, the duties associated with check airman functions 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: The accident occurred well after midnight at 

the end of a demanding day during which the pilots had flown 8.35 hours, made five landings, 

been on duty more than 14 hours, and been awake more than 16 hours. During the accident 

flight, the CVR recorded numerous yawns and comments that indicate that the pilots were 

fatigued. Additionally, the captain made references to being tired at 2332:12, 2341:53, and 

0018:43, and the first officer stated, “jeez, I’m tired” at 0020:41. Additionally, the pilots’ high 
167

workload (flying in inclement weather conditions, and in the captain’s case, providing operating 

experience for the first officer) during their long day likely increased their fatigue. 

SCORE: 0.9 Crew was clearly tired & had been on duty 15 hours as of accident time & 

12:44 hours at pushback; The requirements would have precluded this crew from taking this 

flight. 

15. NTSB Identification: DEN07LA101, Great Lakes Airlines 

June 20, 2007, Laramie, WY 

A/C: BE-1900D, N253GL Injuries: None 

Accident DEN07LA101

Date: 6/20/2007 

Accident Summary: The airplane landed long, bounced, and touched down again. The 

captain tried to slow down and turn the airplane off the runway on to a taxiway at high speed. 

During the turn attempt, the airplane departed the runway and the airplane's right propeller struck 

the top of an electrical box that powered the runway approach lighting system. 

Probable Cause: Probable cause was determined to be The pilot's improper decision, his 

misjudgment of his speed and distance, and his failure to perform a go-around resulting in the 

airplane overrunning the runway and striking an electrical box. Factors contributing to the 

accident were the failure of the crew to perform proper crew resource management, the first 

officer's failure to intervene before the accident occurred, and the electrical box. 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: Only mention of flight crew schedule is the 

crew was on the third day of a three-day trip, which had started in Cortez, Colorado, that 
168

morning at 0520. The crew had flown from Cortez to Denver, Colorado, to Farmington, New, 

Mexico, back to Denver, then to Laramie, and then to Worland. 

SCORE: 0.15 Given number of days & segments flown, the accident occurred precisely 

at NPRM's proposed limit of 11-hour duty day. The requirements might have made a difference. 

16. NTSB Identification: DCA09MA027, Colgan Air as Continental Connection 

February 12, 2009, Clarence Center, NY 

A/C: DHC-8-400Q, N200WQ Injuries: 50 Fatal 

Accident DCA09MA027

Accident Summary: Aircraft crashed into residence 5 nautical miles northeast of the 

airport and was destroyed by impact and post-crash fires. 

At 2217 Dash 8-Q400 by Colgan Air as Continental Connection crashed on ILS approach 

to runway 23 at BUF 5 NM NE of airport in Clarence Center. FO arrived EWR on red-eye from 

West Coast via MEM at 0623. First flight @ 1300 cancelled. Accident flight delayed; T/O EWR 

at 2120. Newly upgraded PIC (110 hours in M/M); FO (PF) had 700 hours in type. Steady, nonpertinent chatter enroute & throughout approach. FO notes little knowledge of icing. Other pilots 

describe light-moderate rime icing b/ 6,500 & 3,500 but none at 2,300. Accident A/C was in 

icing 9 minutes. De-icing system was "on" (which increases speed at which crews get low-speed 

cue, but does not affect actual stall speed). 

At 22:15:14 BUF Approach cleared flight for ILS approach to runway 23 

(acknowledged). At 22:16:02, engine power levers were reduced to flight idle & Approach 

instructed crew to contact Tower. Crew extended gear & auto flight system captured ILS 23 

localizer. PIC then moved engine conditions levers forward to max RPM position as FO 
169

acknowledged instructions to Tower. At 22:16:28 FO moved flaps to 10°, & 2 seconds later stick 

shaker activated (warning of impending stall) & autopilot disconnected, with ”disconnect” horn 

sounding until impact. Stickpusher then activated (to correct actual stall). Crew added power to 

75% torque. At 2216:37, FO told PIC that she had put flaps up; airspeed now 100 knots, & roll 

angle reached 105 degrees right wing down before A/C began to roll back to left & stick pusher 

activated second time (about 2216:40). Roll angle then reached 35 degrees left wing down before 

A/C began to roll again to right. FO then asked whether she should put gear up; PIC responded 

“gear up” with expletive. Pitch & roll had reached 25 degrees nose down & 100 degrees right 

wing down, when A/C entered steep descent. Stick pusher activated third time (at 2216:50), 

followed by impact. All 4 crew & 45 pax fatal; 1 ground fatal. (Not an icing accident.) 

Both pilots likely were significantly fatigued. Both pilots were based at EWR. PIC lived 

near Tampa & FO lived near Seattle. Neither had “crash pad” at EWR & both regularly used 

crew room to sleep. PIC tried to bid trips that ensured some nights in hotels at out-stations. At 

EWR he usually slept in crew room. FO always slept in crew room at EWR & was open about it. 

PIC, recently upgraded, commuted to EWR on 2/9 from TPA; arrived EWR at 2005 & 

spent night in crew room. Phone records & log-ins to crew tracking system indicate he got little 

sleep. Reported for duty at 0530 on 2/10, flew 3 flights & arrived at BUF at 1300& had hotel 

room. Left hotel at 0515 on 2/11 to report at 0615. Again flew 3 flights & returned to EWR at 

1544; spent rest of day & night in crew room. Again, phone, tracking system & contact with 

others indicate very little sleep. 

FO commuted to EWR from SEA. She awoke on 2/11/ at 0900, arrived at PDX at 1730 

for FedEx flight to MEM; arrived MEM at 0230 EST (2230 PST); had about 90 minutes of sleep 

on flight. She then T/O MEM at 0418 & arrived EWR at 0623, sleeping for “much of” 2-hour 
170

flight. At EWR, she spent day in crew room & napped, but phone, tracking system & 

conversations show she got little sleep. 

On 2/12, crew was scheduled for 3 flights: EWR-ROC; ROC-EWR; & EWR-BUF. First 

2 cancelled due to winds at EWR & ground delays. Dispatch estimated 1910 departure for 

accident flight. Multiple delays; pushed back at 1945 & finally T/O 2120 for BUF. FO noted 

multiple times that she was not feeling well & before T/O said she was “ready to be at hotel” at 

BUF. 

CAUSE: Captain’s inappropriate response to activation of stick shaker, which led to stall 

from which A/C did not recover. Factors: (1) crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to 

rising position of low-speed cue, (2) crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) 

PIC’s failure to effectively manage flight, & (4) Colgan’s inadequate procedures for airspeed 

selection & management during approaches in icing conditions. NOTE: NTSB Cited fatigue in 

findings, but not in causal statement because NTSB said it could not determine “the extent of 

their impairment & degree to which it contributed to performance deficiencies.” But clearly 

suggests it did contribute. NOTE: NTSB was divided on the issue, with some arguing that the 

overwhelming issue was skills-based: pulling up to 30 degrees, not pushing power up all the way 

even well into the stall, and thereby missing several opportunities to allow the aircraft to fly out 

of the stall. In short, debate is this: though the crew clearly was fatigued, would the outcome 

have been any different if the same crew were better rested? 

Flight Crew/Fatigue Related Information: On the day of the accident, the captain was 

scheduled to report to EWR at 1330. Because his duty period on February 11, 2009, had ended 

about 1544, he had a 21-hour, 16-minute scheduled rest period before his report time. However, 

at 0310 on February 12, the captain logged into Colgan’s CrewTrac computer system. This 
171

activity would have meant that he had, at a minimum, a 5-hour opportunity for sleep followed by 

another sleep opportunity of about 4 hours. During the 24 hours that preceded the accident, the 

first officer was reported to have slept 3.5 hours on flights and 5.5 hours in the crew room. 

At the time of the accident, the captain would have been awake for at least 15 hours if he 

had awakened about 0700 and for a longer period if he had awakened earlier. The accident 

occurred about the same time that the captain’s sleep opportunities during the previous days had 

begun and the time at which he normally went to sleep. The first officer had been awake for 

about 9 hours at the time of the accident, which was about 3 hours before her normal bedtime. 

The captain had experienced chronic sleep loss, and both he and the first officer had experienced 

interrupted and poor-quality sleep during the 24 hours before the accident 

The pilots’ failure to detect the impending onset of the stick shaker and their improper 

response to the stick shaker could be consistent with the known effects of fatigue. The NTSB 

concludes that the pilots’ performance was likely impaired because of fatigue, but the extent of 

their impairment and the degree to which it contributed to the performance deficiencies that 

occurred during the flight cannot be conclusively determined 

SCORE: 0.5 Accident had many issues, but fatigue clearly was one of them. Both pilots 

had to be exhausted when they initiated approach to BUF. PIC was completing 4th day since 

awakening on 2/ 9. He had opportunity for quality sleep only on night of 2/10, & that was cut 

short with departure from hotel at 0515 on 2/11. Both pilots essentially stayed up all night on 

2/11, with no opportunities for deep sleep, then found themselves operating late-night flight after 

day-long cancellations & delays. At one level, any rule that might have diminished this crew's 

fatigue could have been a show-stopper with a high score. However, crew had other basic 

problems. PIC clearly was not well versed in stall recognition nor response to stall (never went to 
172

full power, which likely would have enabled the aircraft to fly out of the stall in at least 2 points 

during the sequence). Same lack of recognition & knowledge appears true of FO; she raised flaps 

during a stall. Being well rested would not have provided this crew with any more skill than they 

already had, it would not necessarily have averted the chatter sustained throughout flight, nor 

would it necessarily have led crew to enter proper ref speeds for conditions. BUT more rest may 

have at least kept them tuned in enough to monitor airspeed. That alone could have averted the 

entire scenario. However, too many other fundamental issues to score above 50%. 

SCORE: 0.5 Accident had many issues, but fatigue clearly was one of them. Both pilots 

had to be exhausted when they initiated approach to BUF. PIC was completing 4th day since 

awakening on 2/ 9. He had opportunity for quality sleep only on night of 2/10, & that was cut 

short with departure from hotel at 0515 on 2/11. Both pilots essentially stayed up all night on 

2/11, with no opportunities for deep sleep, then found themselves operating late-night flight after 

day-long cancellations & delays. At one level, any rule that might have diminished this crew's 

fatigue could have been a show-stopper with a high score. However, crew had other basic 

problems. PIC clearly was not well versed in stall recognition nor response to stall (never went to 

full power, which likely would have enabled the aircraft to fly out of the stall in at least 2 points 

during the sequence). Same lack of recognition & knowledge appears true of FO; she raised flaps 

during a stall. Being well rested would not have provided this crew with any more skill than they 

already had, it would not necessarily have averted the chatter sustained throughout flight, nor 

would it necessarily have led crew to enter proper ref speeds for conditions. BUT more rest may 

have at least kept them tuned in enough to monitor airspeed. That alone could have averted the 

entire scenario. However, too many other fundamental issues to score above 50%. 
173

Appendix B: Sensitivity Analyses

 
174

This appendix presents results from performing five sensitivity analyses. Four of the 

cases relate to key components of the analysis supporting estimates of the costs of the rule: 

1. Adjusting for minor differences in aircraft block hours between baseline runs and final 

rule runs 

2. Weighting of individual case results to represent industry groups 

3. Percent of flightcrew members who are reserves (passenger cost analysis only) 

4. Percent of flightcrew sick time costs that could be saved due to the final rule. 

The fifth case explores the impact of incorporating alternative assumptions in the estimation 

of costs and benefits for cargo-only operations. These alternative assumptions were 

suggested in the comments made regarding the Initial SRIA. 

Sensitivity #1: Adjusting for Block Hour Discrepancy

As explained the body of this Final SRIA, when reviewing the calculations supporting the 

estimates of crew scheduling costs due to the final rule, the FAA became aware of a small 

difference in the number of aircraft block hours between the baseline runs and the final rule runs. 

This minor difference is due to the treatment of so called “carry-in/carry-out” flights. Industry 

practice is to construct each bid line such that each flightcrew member starts and ends the 

scheduling period at their home base. Some bid lines outputted by the optimizer would have left 

flightcrew members away from their home base at the beginning or end of the scheduling period 

(month). In those instances, it is airline practice to include those segments as part of the bid lines 

for the adjoining month (i.e., “carrying” the flightcrew member in or out of the month). While 

that is reasonable practice for airlines, it introduced a source of variation in costs that was not 

caused by the final rule. Because the final rule results in different bid lines being constructed, the 

segments identified as carry-in or carry-out often differ as well. For all cases, the discrepancy in 
175

aircraft block hours was well below one percent. In some cases the aircraft block hours was 

greater in the baseline run while in other cases the final rule run had more aircraft block hours 

included. 

 To explore the possible impacts of this difference on the estimates of the cost impacts of 

the final rule, we factored the final rule run estimates of each of the four cost elements (credit 

hours, domestic and international TAFB, and hotel rooms) by the ratio of baseline aircraft block 

hours to final rule aircraft block hours for each case. If the final rule had slightly fewer aircraft 

block hours than the baseline run, the ratio would be slightly larger than one and the estimates of 

each cost element would increase slightly. The difference between the adjusted final rule runs 

and the baseline runs for each cost element for each case is presented in Table B.1. 

Table B.1 Adjusted Change in Monthly Flightcrew Scheduling Cost Elements due to 

Final Rule, by Case 

Industry

Group Case

Baseline

Solution

Lines of

Flying

Change

in

Credit

Hours  

Change in

Domestic

TAFB Hours

Change in

International

TAFB Hours

Change in

Hotel Stays  

Passenger

Narrow‐body

A 924 2,203 18,717 0 662

B 1,698 ‐503 ‐15,215 947 ‐952

Passenger

Wide‐body

C 1,121 ‐104 3,811 8,264 787

D 430 ‐872 0 ‐2,441 ‐30

Regional E 300 68 5,857 0 282

F 240 37 4,149 ‐15 144

Supplemental I 806 4,656 3,183 9,802 758

Freight

Narrow‐body G 330 594 1,014 2,402 59

Freight Wide‐

body H 1,053 1,014 6,247 943 244
176

The rest of the scheduling cost estimation methodology is the same as described in the body 

of the Final SRIA except that Table B.1 replaces Table 10. This approach in effect applies the 

average scheduling cost per aircraft block hour from the final rule run to the small difference in 

the number of block hours between the baseline and final runs as a method of neutralizing the 

impacts of the carry-in/carry-out issue. To precisely estimate the crew scheduling costs of each 

specific flight segment related to the carry-in/carry-out issue, a more in-depth analysis would be 

required. As shown in Table B.2, this adjustment increased the estimated cost of the final rule for 

passenger operations by $2 million in nominal terms. Table B.3 shows that the adjustment 

increased the estimated cost of the rule for cargo-only operations by $12 million. 

Table B.2 Cost Summary for Block Hour Adjustment (2012 – 2023), Passenger 

Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component

Total

Nominal

Cost

PV Cost

at 7%

PV Cost

at 3%

Flight Operations $299 $185 $241

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135

Training $19 $12 $16

Sensitivity Total $464 $321 $392

Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391

Difference $2 $1 $1

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

 
177

Table B.3 Cost Summary for Block Hour Adjustment (2012 – 2023), Cargo-only 

Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component

Total

Nominal

Cost

PV Cost

at 7%

PV Cost

at 3%

Flight Operations $394 $242 $317

Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58

Training $7 $4 $5

Sensitivity Total $464 $299 $381

Final SRIA Total $452 $292 $371

Difference $12 $7 $10

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Sensitivity #2: Alternative Weighting of Case Results

As explained in the body of this Final SRIA, the estimates of crew scheduling costs from 

the rule are derived using crew scheduling software to build pairings and bid lines for nine cases 

for a baseline run that replicates current scheduling practices and a final rule run that replaces the 

current requirements with the final rule. These nine cases were combined to estimate average 

costs for each of the eight industry groups used in this analysis. The passenger narrow-body, 

passenger-wide body, and regional industry group each had two representative cases. The change 

in each of the cost elements was summed across the cases, multiplied by the appropriate unit 

price for the industry group, and divided by the combined total number of lines of flying in the 

baseline run for both cases to derive the estimate of average cost per line of flying. For the 

freight integrated industry group, the change in each of the cost elements for the freight narrowbody case and freight wide-body case were summed, and then multiplied by the unit costs for the 

freight integrated industry group. For the passenger integrated industry group, the unit costs 

specific to the particular subcomponent of the passenger integrated industry group were applied 
178

to the sum of the cost elements of the respective passenger narrow-body and passenger widebody cases. Then the narrow-body and wide-body results were summed and then divided by the 

sum of the number of baseline solution lines of flying. Such a method implicitly weights each 

case in relation to the number of lines of flying in that case, which may or may not be an 

accurate representation of the prevalence of carriers with similar cost structures for the industry 

as a whole. As can be seen in Table 10, in some instances, the final rule caused very different 

cost impacts even for cases in the same industry group. For example, in the passenger wide-body 

industry group, Case C shows modest increases in the cost elements due to the rule, while Case 

D shows decreases in the cost elements due to the rule. Several different factors contribute to the 

differing impacts of the rule, including collective bargaining agreements, flight schedules, 

network structure, etc. Many of these attributes are difficult to observe for every carrier in the 

industry, and the limited number of cases means that an exact matching of every carrier to one of 

the case results is not possible. Therefore, it is difficult to determine what the appropriate relative 

weighting of the cases should be for extrapolation to the entire industry group. 

In the absence of information on how to weight the individual cases, an alternative to 

implicitly weighting the case results by the number of lines of flying, is to weight the two cases 

equally when deriving an estimate for those industry groups derived from multiple cases. 

An estimate of the change in each of the cost elements per flightcrew member for 

integrated industry groups was built from a weighted average of the change in cost elements for 

the respective narrow-body and wide-body industry groups. The relative weights for the 

passenger integrated industry group were based on the number of block hours for both narrowbody and wide-body aircraft flown by air carriers classified in the passenger integrated industry 

group multiplied by estimates of average crew size, as shown in Table B.4. A corresponding 
179

procedure was used for the freight integrated industry group. The resulting estimates of average 

scheduling cost per flightcrew member are found in Table B.5. The resulting total costs of this 

sensitivity are found in Table B.6 and Table B.7. Changing to this weighting scheme reduces the 

estimated cost to the passenger operations by $23 million in nominal terms and $14 million when 

discounted at seven percent. The impact on the estimated costs to cargo-only operations was 

slightly larger, decreasing the costs by $28 million, $17 million at 7%. 

 
180

Table B.4 Relative Weight of Narrow-body and Wide-body Operations for Integrated 

Carriers 

Industry Group Block Hours1 Average

Crew Size2

Relative

Weight

Passenger Integrated:          

Narrow‐body 4,054,243 2.00 54%

Wide‐body 2,954,370 2.37 46%

Freight Integrated:

Narrow‐body 38,311 2.00 5%

Wide‐body 700,230 2.09 95%

1 Source: Form 41 Q1‐Q3 2010

2 Source: Proprietary Carrier Data

Table B.5 Sensitivity Analysis on Weighting of Cases: Change in Flightcrew Scheduling 

Cost per Flightcrew Member due To Final Rule (2011 $) 

Industry Group Monthly Cost per

Flightcrew Member

Annual Cost per

Flightcrew Member

Passenger Integrated -$3 -$41

Passenger Narrow‐body $214 $2,567

Passenger Wide‐body -$346 -$4,151

Regional $84 $1,013

Supplemental $1,456 $17,475

Freight Integrated $437 $5,249

Freight Narrow‐body $437 $5,249

Freight Wide‐body $329 $3,952

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

 
181

Table B.6 Cost Summary for Alternative Weighting of Case Results (2012 – 2023), 

Passenger Operations (2011 $) 

Cost Component

Total

Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Flight Operations $274 $170 $222

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135

Training $19 $12 $16

Sensitivity Total $440 $306 $373

Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391

Difference -$23 -$14 -$18

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Table B.7 Cost Summary for Alternative Weighting of Case Results (2012 – 2023), 

Cargo-only Operations (2011 $) 

Cost Component

Total

Nominal

Cost

PV Cost

at 7%

PV Cost

at 3%

Flight Operations $354 $218 $285

Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58

Training $7 $4 $5

Sensitivity Total $424 $275 $349

Final SRIA Total $452 $292 $371

Difference -$28 -$17 -$22

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Sensitivity #3: Alternative Assumptions Regarding Percent of Flightcrew

Members Who Are Reserves (Passenger Operations)

The estimates of costs are calculated on a per line of flying basis for each case. To 

extrapolate the cost impact of the rule to the entire industry, the estimated costs per line of flying 

are multiplied by the number of primary lineholders in the industry group as a whole. While the 
182

total number of pilots employed by each carrier is readily available from VIS data, information 

on the number of primary lineholders was not readily available. It is estimated that 15 percent of 

flightcrew members are reserves at large passenger network carriers,164 although this figure 

apparently varies widely across carriers. 

In comments regarding the Initial SRIA, IPA provided data that gave more specific 

information for the freight industry groups regarding the percent of pilots that are primary 

lineholders and that information has been incorporated into the central analysis. Therefore this 

sensitivity focuses on passenger operations. 

Data supplied by nine different passenger carriers shows that the percent of the total pilot 

workforce who are reserves varied from a low of 12 percent at one carrier to as high as 26 

percent at another carrier. Table B.8 and Table B.9 show the estimated cost for passenger 

operations of the final rule using 12 percent and 26 percent assumptions, respectively. Using a 12 

percent reserve figure increases the total estimated cost of the rule by $18 million in nominal 

terms, and by $11 million when discounted at seven percent for passenger operations. Using a 26 

percent reserve figure reduces the estimated cost of the rule by $67 million ($41 million when 

discounted at seven percent) for passenger operations. 

 

 

164 “Productivity,” American Airlines Negotiations, accessed August 1, 2012,

http://www.aanegotiations.com/apaProductivity.asp.
183

Table B.8 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumption that 12% of Flightcrew Members 

are Reserves (2012- 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Flight Operations $315 $195 $255

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135

Training $19 $12 $16

Sensitivity Total $481 $331 $406

Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391

Difference $18 $11 $15

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Table B.9 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumption that 26% of Flightcrew Members 

are Reserves (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Flight Operations $231 $143 $186

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135

Training $19 $12 $16

Sensitivity Total $396 $279 $337

Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391

Difference -$67 -$41 -$54

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Sensitivity #4: Alternative Assumption Regarding Percent of Sick Time

that would be Saved Due to the Final Rule

Since it is not possible to precisely estimate the reduction in sick time that will result 

from the final rule, this section presents a sensitivity analysis to explore the possible range of 

impacts. In the central analysis of this Final SRIA, it was explained that five percent of payroll 

costs are generally attributable to sick time and it was assumed that five percent of those sick 
184

time payroll costs would be saved because of the final rule. Table B.10 and Table B.11 show the 

results of assuming that three percent of sick time flightcrew member payroll costs will be saved 

because of the final rule for passenger operations and cargo-only operations, respectively. While 

Table B.12 and Table B.13 provide the same information when assuming that seven percent of 

sick time will be saved due to the final rule, the two assumptions result in altering the total 

estimated cost of the rule by ±$90 million in nominal terms, and by ±$55 million when 

discounted at seven percent for passenger operations. For cargo-only operations, these two 

assumptions result in altering the total estimated cost of the rule by ±$20 million in nominal 

terms, and by ±$13 million when discounted at seven percent.165

Table B.10 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 3% Sick Time will 

be Saved (2012 – 2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Flight Operations $387 $240 $312

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135

Training $19 $12 $16

Sensitivity Total $552 $375 $463

Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391

Difference $90 $55 $72

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

 

 

165 If there were no cost savings from reduced fatigue, the nominal costs of the rule for passenger operations

would be $687 million, $458 when discounted at seven percent. These estimated costs are still below the high case

benefits estimates for passenger operations.  
185

Table B.11 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 3% Sick Time will 

be Saved (2012-2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component Nominal

Cost  

PV Cost

at 7%  

PV Cost

at 3%  

Flight Operations $402 $247 $324

Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58

Training $7 $4 $5

Sensitivity Total $472 $304 $387

Final SRIA Total $452 $292 $371

Difference $20 $13 $16

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Table B.12 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 7% Sick Time will 

be Saved (2012-2023), Passenger Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component

Nominal

Cost

(millions)

PV Cost

at 7%

(millions)

PV Cost

at 3%

(millions)

Flight Operations $207 $129 $168

Rest Facilities $146 $123 $135

Training $19 $12 $16

Sensitivity Total $372 $264 $319

Final SRIA Total $462 $320 $391

Difference -$90 -$55 -$72

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding

Table B.13 Cost Summary for Alternative Assumptions that 7% Sick Time will 

be Saved (2012-2023), Cargo-only Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Cost Component

Nominal

Cost

(millions)

PV Cost

at 7%

(millions)

PV Cost

at 3%

(millions)

Flight Operations $362 $222 $291

Rest Facilities $63 $53 $58

Training $7 $4 $5

Sensitivity Total $431 $279 $355

Final SRIA Total $452 $292 $371

Difference -$20 -$13 -$16

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 
186

Sensitivity #5: Alternative Assumptions Related to Cargo Analysis		

Where appropriate, the FAA incorporated the input from comments made regarding the 

Initial SRIA into the central analysis presented in the body of this Final SRIA. This sensitivity 

analysis explores the impact adopting alternative assumptions suggested by the commenters for 

estimating the costs and benefits of applying the rule to cargo-only operations. 

This sensitivity analysis uses the cargo high case as the starting point for estimating 

benefits. However, instead of assuming that the aircraft involved in the accident is a MD-11, this 

sensitivity assumes (based IPA’s comments) that a Boeing 747 is involved. Although IPA states 

that a B747 hull is worth $60.6 million, they provided no source for that information. Therefore 

the FAA estimates the replacement value of an average aged B747 to be $42.5 million based on 

the published wholesale price of a 1993 B747-400F.166 According to IPA, the B747 has a cargo 

capacity of 124.2 tons, which, when multiplied by the average per ton value of air cargo of 

$87,082, results in an estimated value of cargo on board a B747 to be $10.8 million. 

In addition to modifying the aircraft the benefit estimate is based on, this sensitivity also 

incorporates an estimate of the value of avoiding the environmental cleanup following an aircraft 

accident. IPA presents examples of the potential cost of hazardous material releases: a 1995 

accident in Kansas City had an estimated environmental clean-up cost of $0.7 million, and in 

Shanksville, PA, the crash of United Flight 93 resulted in $1 million in environmental clean-up 

costs.167 The FAA agrees that environmental clean-up costs are appropriate to include in a 

benefits analysis. However, we do not have a data source that could provide an average or typical 

 

166 Airliner Price Guide (Winter 2012) 167 Both estimates are adjusted to current dollars.
187

environmental clean-up cost for an aviation accident and relying on anecdotal evidence is not a 

preferred approach. Nonetheless, this sensitivity analysis includes the suggested value of $1 

million in environmental clean-up costs. 

In February 2013, after the Supplemental RIA was issued for public comment, the DOT 

provided updated guidance on treatment of the economic value of statistical life (VSL).168 This 

guidance directs agencies to use the value of $9.1 million in 2012 dollars and to increase that 

value for future years at a rate of 1.07 percent annual to reflect anticipated growth in real income. 

This sensitivity includes this updated guidance on VSL in the benefits estimate. Specifically, the 

$9.1 million in 2012 dollars is approximately $8.95 million in 2011 dollars when adjusted using 

the GDP deflator. Growing this value at 1.07 percent annually for 6 years to represent the 

estimated value at the midpoint of the benefits period results in a VSL estimate of $9.5 million 

(in 2011 dollars). 

As shown in Table C.4 and Table C.5 of Appendix C, these adjustments to the high case 

benefits estimates for cargo operations increase the benefits estimates to $14.85 million over the 

analysis period ($9.11 million in present value when discounted at 7 percent and $11.94 million 

when discounted at 3 percent). 

In regard to estimating the costs of applying the final rule to cargo-only operations, the 

central analysis described in the body of this RIA incorporated comments from IPA regarding 

the percent of pilots who are primary line holders at the airlines in the freight industry groups. 

IPA provided additional information specific to UPS regarding the number of lineholders who 

fly fewer hours than their contractual minimums. The FAA does not endeavor to estimate the 

 

168 DOT, Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) in U.S. Department of

Transportation Analyses (February 28, 2013)  
188

costs and benefits individually for each carrier, but rather to derive estimates that are 

representative of the industry as a whole. In addition, as discussed above in the section entitled 

“Disposition of Issues Raised by Comments Received Regarding the Initial SRIA,” it is not clear 

that just because some schedules are below contractual minimums additional hours can be flown 

without incurring additional costs. Nonetheless, this sensitivity analysis incorporates IPA’s 

estimates of the potential cost reductions applicable to UPS due to this issue. 

Specifically, IPA states that if the credit hours associated with each regular line was 

increased by 1.488 percent (the percent change in credit hours for the freight integrated industry 

group) that the line pay would only increase by 1.047 percent. Therefore, according to IPA, the 

annual credit hours cost per line of flying for the freight integrated industry group is overstated 

and should be factored by 0.70 (1.047 / 1.488) for UPS. The estimated credit hour cost per 

flightcrew member in this Final SRIA is $5,592 ($466 * 12 months).169 IPA’s suggestion is to 

subtract $1,678 (0.30 * $5,592) for each UPS primary lineholder from the cost estimates for the 

freight integrated industry group. As shown in Table C.1 of Appendix C, there are 2,690 

flightcrew members at UPS. This analysis assumes that 52 percent of flightcrew members in the 

freight integrated industry group are primary lineholders. Therefore this sensitivity results in 

subtracting roughly $2.3 million from the annual scheduling costs for the freight integrated 

industry group.170

IPA further commented that the estimated costs for installing rest facilities were too high 

in the Initial SRIA. Specifically, IPA questioned the number of aircraft that would require the 

rest facilities. IPA estimates that only Boeing 767s would require rest facilities and finds that 

 

169 See Table 17. 170 See Table C.6 of Appendix C.
189

there are 75 Boeing 767s in the cargo fleet. Further, IPA stated that airlines might chose to install 

cheaper Class 3 rest facilities instead of the Class 1 rest facilities assumed by the FAA. IPA 

states that a Class 3 rest facility and its installation would cost only $60,000 as opposed to the 

$445,000 estimated by the FAA. IPA further stated that if the Class 3 facilities were chosen, then 

the engineering costs could be only $1 million for the entire cargo industry as opposed to the 

$2.5 million estimated by the FAA. IPA stated that installation of a Class 3 facility would take 

only a few hours and would require no incremental downtime for the aircraft involved. IPA 

stated that the Class 3 facility would weigh 10 more pounds than the seat it would replace 

therefore additional fuel costs would be just $21,825 per year. The FAA estimated that a Class 1 

facility would add 300 pounds of additional weight and which would result in an additional $1 

million per year in fuel costs. Taken together, IPA estimates that the total the nominal costs for 

rest facilities for the cargo industry over the analysis period would be just $5.7 million in 

contrast to the $63 million estimated by the FAA.171 For reasons explained in the section of this 

document titled “Disposition of Issues Raised by Comments Received Regarding the Initial 

SRIA,” the FAA stands by its original analysis. However, this sensitivity analysis incorporates 

IPA’s alternative estimates on the costs of installing rest facilities. 

The results of adopting the alternative assumptions regarding the cost estimates for cargoonly operations are presented below in Table B.14. The total estimated costs are $371 million 

over the analysis period ($229 million in present value when discounted at 7 percent and $299 

million when discounted at 3 percent). 

 

 

171 See Table C.7 in Appendix C.
190

Table B.14 Total Costs Sensitivity Analysis (2012-2023), Cargo Operations (2011 

$Millions) 

Year Flight 

Operations 

Rest 

Facilities Training

Total 

Nominal 

Cost 

PV Cost 

at 7% 

PV Cost 

at 3% 

2012 

2013 $2 $3.25 $5 $4 $5

2014 $36 $2.27 $1.4 $39 $32 $36

2015 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $28 $32

2016 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $26 $31

2017 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $24 $30

2018 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $23 $29

2019 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $21 $29

2020 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $20 $28

2021 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $18 $27

2022 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $17 $26

2023 $36 $0.02 $0.6 $36 $16 $25

Total $359 $6 $7 $371 $229 $299

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding 

Table B.15 summarizes the estimated costs and benefits for extending the final rule to 

cover cargo-only operations that result from adopting alternative assumptions suggested by 

public comments regarding the Initial SRIA. The results show that adopting alternative 

assumptions do not change the central conclusion that for cargo-only operations; the costs of the 

final rule vastly outweigh the benefits. 

 
191

Table B.15 Total Benefits and Costs Sensitivity Analysis (2012-2023), Cargo 

Operations (2011 $Millions) 

Estimates 

Total 

Nominal 

Cost 

PV Cost 

at 7% 

PV Cost 

at 3% 

Total Benefits - Sensitivity $15 $9 $12

Total Costs - Sensitivity $371 $229 $299

Net Benefits - Sensitivity -$356 -$220 -$287

*Items may not sum to reported totals due to rounding
192

Appendix C: Detailed Data Tables