* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 19, 2006
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JAMES L. BROOKS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. HENRY E. COUCHMAN, JR.; KENNETH E. MOORE; DELIA M. YORK; WAYMAN FAVORS; R. WAYNE LAMPSON; BRENDA HIGHBERGER; JAMES CHRISTOPHER ALLMAN; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; UNITED STATES MARSHAL SERVICE; SANDY GONZALEZ; DEBORAH GRABER; DANIEL A. DUNCAN; RYAN CARPENTER; T. N. HYLTON; PHILIP SIEVE; DAVID J. WAXSE, Defendants-Appellees. No. 05-3018 (D.C. No. 04-CV-2209-KHV)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before O’BRIEN , HOLLOWAY , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.1 To the extent Mr. Brooks attempts to appeal from tw o orders of the

magistrate judge involved in this case, we note that he failed to file objections to those orders in the district court, and thus has wa ived any opportunity for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property , 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996).

2 In addition to dismissing under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court analyzed some claims against some defendants under alternati ve rationales. Because we find the dismissals under 12(b)(6) to be correct, w e need not address other theories supporting dismissal. -2- After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellant James L. Brooks appeals from two orders o f the district court and from the corresponding judgment dismissing with pre judice his civil rights action against various federal, state, and local defendant s. 1 We affirm. The first order appealed from dismissed all but one of the defendants because of failure to state a claim upon which reli ef could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 2The second order dismissed the remaining defendant and construed Mr. Brooks’s motion for temporary injunct ion as a motion to recuse and denied it. We conduct a de novo review of dismissa ls under Rule 12(b)(6), Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999), and review refusals to recuse for abuse of discretion, Higganbotham v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Transp. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003). Based on these-3-

standards, we affirm the judgment of the district c ourt for substantially the same reasons stated by that court in the orders appealedfrom. With regard to the specific arguments made by Mr. B rooks and to the extent we can understand them, we note that two of his arg uments have already been foreclosed by this court. See Brooks v. Sauceda , No. 00-3025, 2000 WL 1730892, at **2 (10th Cir. Nov. 22, 2000) (unpublished) (rej ecting argument that he was entitled to a default judgment because defendants f iled a motion to dismiss instead of an answer); see also Brooks v. Graber , 15 Fed. Appx. 764, 765-66 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (same and further re jecting Mr. Brooks’s contention “that federal judges are boneheads while he is a legal scholar”); Sauceda , 2000 WL 1730892 at **3 (rejecting argument that c ertain local ordinances are bills of attainder). As for his other arguments, Mr. Brooks failed to advance any factual support for his conclusory allegation that a conspi racy prompted the ten-day extension of time given the defendants in which to answer or otherwise defend. The district court properly determined its jurisdic tion in both of the orders appealed from. The court did not abuse its discret ion in striking Mr. Brooks’s second amended complaint. Mr. Brooks’s contention that certain orders issued by this court are fakes is unsupported and ludicrous. And finally, the district court was well within its discretion to refuse to recuse.-4-

As alluded to above, we have expended valuable court resources on at least two separate occasions dealing with Mr. Brooks and his various meritless theories. We repeat our sentiment expressed in Graber , 15 Fed. Appx. at 766: “We will spend no more judicial time or resources a ddressing his frivolous claims.” Our local rule 46.5(D) permits this court , on its own motion, to impose an appropriate sanction against any person who brin gs frivolous arguments on appeal. Those sanctions can include a monetary fin e and/or an order to pay the reasonable expenses of the opposing party, includin g attorney’s fees. We take this occasion to warn Mr. Brooks that, should he ap pear before this court at any time in the future with the same meritless argument s we have already rejected, he will be subject to the sanctions described above. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge