In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-1514

ROBERTO GONZALEZ and

GLORIA HOLLAND,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

NICHOLAS KOKOT and

DEVERICK DIXON

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 01 C 304—Allen Sharp, Judge.

____________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 20, 2002—DECIDED DECEMBER 27, 2002

____________

Before EASTERBROOK,RIPPLE,andKANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. This appeal comes to us from a

grant of summary judgment in favor of two East Chicago,

Indiana police officers. A Chicago, Illinois police officer

and his friend brought this § 1983 lawsuit, alleging that

their constitutional rights had been violated when the

East Chicago officers wrongfully arrested them and used

excessive force in doing so. This lawsuit by Roberto Gonzalez and Gloria Holland faced an immediate hurdle,

however, given that they had previously executed releases of any claims they might have had against the

East Chicago officers. They nevertheless proceeded with
2 No. 02-1514

1 Deverick Dixon has since had his name legally changed to

Janci Mumba. As a matter of convenience, this opinion will continue to refer to him as Dixon, as did the district court.

their lawsuit, on the theory that the releases they signed

were invalid and unenforceable either as a matter of contract law or as violating public policy. Because we agree

with the district court that the releases are valid and

thus fully enforceable, we affirm the grant of summary

judgment.

I. History

A. The Arrest of Gonzalez and Holland

The § 1983 claims asserted by Gonzalez and Holland

arose out of an April 10, 1999 incident that began when

Officers Nicholas Kokot and Deverick Dixon1

 were dispatched to an address on Drummond Avenue in East

Chicago, Indiana. Upon their arrival, the two officers began to move pieces of wood and concrete sitting in the

street onto the grassy area between the street and the

sidewalk. Gonzalez, apparently unhappy with the transfer

of the wood from the street to a position in front of his

house, opened the door of his home and complained to

the officers that the wood was damaging his lawn. The

officers responded that if Gonzalez wanted the wood removed, he would have to speak with city officials.

From this point, the precise details of the encounter

are somewhat unclear, but it is undisputed that Gonzalez

and the officers continued to exchange words. According

to the version advanced by Gonzalez, he initially spoke

to the officers in a calm, measured tone, but as the interchange continued, Gonzalez admits to raising his voice,

apparently making liberal use of profanity throughout

the exchange. There is some disagreement as to the ex-
No. 02-1514 3

2 Section 35-45-1-3(2) provides that “[a] person who recklessly,

knowingly, or intentionally . . . makes unreasonable noise and

continues to do so after being asked to stop . . . commits disorderly

conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(2) (2002).

3 Section 35-44-3-3(a)(1) provides: “A person who knowingly or

intentionally . . . forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a

law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while

(continued...)

act warning Officer Kokot then gave Gonzalez; Kokot

asserts that he told Gonzalez to lower his voice, redirect

his anger, or be arrested. Gonzalez claims that Kokot

said nothing about lowering his voice. Gonzalez admits

that he then began to belittle Kokot, and that in doing

so he was “yelling, but not ‘at the top of top of [sic] his

lungs.’ ” (Appellant Br. at 8.)

The interchange between Gonzalez and the officers culminated in Officer Kokot’s attempt to arrest Gonzalez.

Gonzalez acknowledges resisting Kokot’s effort to handcuff him, holding back his unrestrained arm to avoid being cuffed and attempting to stand up after Kokot put

him on the ground. During this arrest attempt, Gonzalez’s

companion Gloria Holland came out of the house and

attempted to position herself between Kokot and Gonzalez, asking the officers not to arrest him while she

grabbed Gonzalez’s uncuffed arm. She refused Dixon’s request to stop interfering with Gonzalez’s arrest, which

led Dixon to grab her arm and arrest her as well. Holland

twice withdrew her arm from his attempt to handcuff

her, leading Dixon to place her on the ground to finish

handcuffing her.

Gonzalez was charged with disorderly conduct in violation of Indiana Code § 35-45-1-3(2),2

 and with forcibly resisting, obstructing, or interfering with a law enforcement

officer in violation of Indiana Code § 35-44-3-3(a)(1).3
4 No. 02-1514

3 (...continued)

the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties as

an officer . . . commits resisting law enforcement . . . .” Ind. Code

§ 35-44-3-3(a)(1) (2002).

Holland was charged solely with resisting law enforcement. The charges against Gonzalez and Holland were

brought in East Chicago City Court, where Gerald Kray, a

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Lake County, was assigned the case. The defendants retained attorney Jeffrey

Schlesinger.

B. The Releases

On or about February 28, 2000, while the criminal

charges against Gonzalez and Holland were pending,

their attorney Schlesinger served the City of East Chicago with a Notice of Tort Claim, asserting the claim that

Officers Kokot and Dixon had arrested Gonzalez and

Holland without probable cause and with the use of excessive force, violating their constitutional rights. Schlesinger

also told prosecutor Kray of the tort claim, and Kray

relayed this information to the East Chicago Law Department, as apparently was his practice, by calling Roy

Dominguez, corporation counsel for East Chicago. Thus,

Kray became aware of the civil rights claim to be filed

by the defendants.

According to Schlesinger, he initiated plea discussions

with Kray sometime after the charges were filed. During these discussions, Schlesinger told Kray that Gonzalez was a Chicago police officer and that Gonzalez

would face job repercussions if he were found guilty or

were to plead guilty. At some point, the issue of releases

was introduced into the discussions. According to Kray,

it was Schlesinger who first offered signed releases of
No. 02-1514 5

claims if Kray would agree to a plea arrangement that

led to a dismissal of the charges against his clients.

Schlesinger, on the other hand, testified that Kray indicated that it was the City of East Chicago that was requiring releases from the defendants in return for its

consent to a dismissal of the charges. Kray also testified

that it was his practice to obtain the consent of the arresting officers before dismissing any criminal charges and

that Kokot and Dixon wanted releases from Gonzalez

and Holland before they would provide their consent to

any dismissal.

In any event, the prosecutor, Schlesinger, and Kokot

and Dixon reached an agreement providing for dismissal

of the criminal charges in exchange for the release of any

claims by Gonzalez and Holland—an arrangement known

as a release-dismissal agreement. Sometime after the

issue was introduced into the plea discussions, releases

were prepared by the East Chicago Law Department

and forwarded to Schlesinger. The releases were signed

by Gonzalez and Holland, in the presence of their lawyer,

on June 14, 2000. The releases provide in part:

For the sole consideration of ZERO ($0.00) dollars,

the receipt and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned hereby releases and forever

discharges Nicholas D. Kokot, Officer, Officer Deverick

Dixon, Frank Acala, Chief of Police, Mayor Robert A.

Pastrick, Office of the City Attorney, East Chicago Police Department and the City of East Chicago . . . from

any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes

of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever,

and particularly on account of all injuries, known or

unknown, both to person and property, which have

resulted or may in the future develop from an accident

which occurred on or about the 10th day of August,

1999, at 3723 Drummond Street, East Chicago, Indiana . . . .
6 No. 02-1514

(Pl.’s Ex. 1 & 2.) Schlesinger delivered the executed releases to Kray in court on the day the criminal charges

against Gonzalez and Holland were dismissed.

C. The § 1983 Lawsuit

On April 19, 2001, less than one year after the dismissal

of criminal charges against them, Officer Gonzalez and

his friend Holland brought this § 1983 suit against Officers Kokot and Dixon, raising their original Fourth Amendment claims. Kokot and Dixon moved for summary judgment, raising the executed releases as an affirmative

defense to these claims.

In opposing the officers’ motion for summary judgment, Gonzalez and Holland argued that the releases they

signed were not supported by consideration and thus

invalid under traditional principles of contract law. Additionally, they argued that even if the releases were contractually valid, they were nonetheless unenforceable

as against public policy. The district court held that the

releases were valid and thus barred the lawsuit, noting

“[t]his Court has no doubt whatsoever that these plaintiffs executed these releases freely and voluntarily and

with the advice of counsel, and that these releases are

valid and enforceable.” The district court accordingly entered summary judgment in favor of Kokot and Dixon.

II. Analysis

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all the facts, and drawing inferences from those facts,

in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Furnish

v. SVI Systems, Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2001).

Gonzalez and Holland argue that summary judgment in

favor of the arresting officers was improper, essentially

raising the same arguments presented to the district court
No. 02-1514 7

in opposition to the motion: that the releases they executed

were invalid and unenforceable—and therefore imposed no

bar to their lawsuit.

Gonzalez and Holland contend that the prosecutor in

their case was aware that Kokot and Dixon did not have

probable cause to arrest them, that the prosecutor should

have thus simply dismissed the charges against them

rather than act as the private representative of the arresting officers in securing the releases, and that the releases

were not subject to judicial supervision as they were not

made part of the record in the criminal case when the

charges were dismissed.

A. Indiana Contract Law

We first consider the appellants’ argument that the releases they signed are invalid under Indiana contract law.

Under Indiana law, a valid release bars any subsequent

lawsuit on the claims covered by the release. McWaters v.

Parker, 995 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Lechner

v. Reutepohler, 545 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)).

It is not disputed that the language of the releases at issue

here, if valid, would cover and bar the claims asserted by

Gonzalez and Holland against the officers.

Instead, the appellants argue that the releases are

invalid. “Under Indiana law, release agreements are to ‘be

interpreted in the same manner as any other contract

document, with the intention of the parties regarding the

purpose of the document governing.’ ” Deckard v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Huffman v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 588 N.E.2d

1264, 1267 (Ind. 1992)). Indiana law requires that a release

be supported by consideration to be valid. Bogigian v.

Bogigian, 551 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (citing

Pope v. Vajen, 22 N.E. 308 (Ind. 1889) and Gates v. Fauvre,
8 No. 02-1514

74 N.E. 155 (Ind. App. 1918)). In addition, the parolevidence rule prohibits courts from considering evidence

outside the four corners of an agreement unless the terms

of that agreement are ambiguous. Deckard, 307 F.3d at

563; Thomas v. Thomas, 577 N.E.2d 216, 219 (Ind. 1991)

(“When a contract is unambiguous, the intent of the parties should be determined by the language employed in the

document.” (citations omitted)).

In this case, Gonzalez and Holland argue that the

language of the releases clearly indicates that they were

not supported by consideration. They note that both releases state on their faces that “ZERO ($0.00)” was the “sole

consideration” given for the release of claims, and that

Indiana’s parol-evidence rule prohibits a court from taking notice of any facts beyond this language.

We cannot say, however, that the terms of these release

agreements are clear and unambiguous. Certainly, it is

not clear why Gonzalez and Holland, counseled by their

attorney, would enter into an agreement that would be

unenforceable from the beginning. The fact that these

releases were drafted to indicate that “ZERO ($0.00)” was

given as consideration—a curious statement given that

“nothing” generally is not “given” as consideration—suggests that the term was meant to reflect something else, not

that the agreements were invalid from the outset. Most

likely, the “ZERO ($0.00)” consideration term was included

to reflect the fact that no monetary consideration was

given in exchange for the releases. But at the very least,

this term creates an ambiguity in the release agreements

that requires the use of parol evidence to interpret the

agreements in such a way as to give full effect to the intentions of the parties.

Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving parties, the evidence here clearly shows that

the releases signed by Gonzalez and Holland were sup-
No. 02-1514 9

ported by consideration. They bargained for and received

dismissal of the criminal charges against them in exchange

for their release of any claims they had against the arresting officers or the city. Consideration need not be monetary; the dismissal of criminal charges was certainly something of value to Gonzalez and Holland, especially in light

of Gonzalez’s concern for his job as a Chicago police officer.

Cf. Dye v. Wargo, 253 F.3d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding a release of § 1983 claims valid under Indiana law

because although the § 1983 plaintiff “did not get cash for

his settlement . . . he did receive value (avoidance of any

debt that might hang over him after prison)”). The city

lived up to its end of the bargain by consenting to the

dismissal of the criminal charges; Gonzalez and Holland

cannot now claim that they’re not bound to live up to theirs.

We find that the release-dismissal agreement here was

a valid contract, supported by adequate consideration,

under Indiana law.

B. Federal Public Policy

The appellants next argue that even if the releases are

valid under Indiana contract law, this release-dismissal

agreement is unenforceable as against federally declared

public policy. They contend that Kokot and Dixon have

failed to prove that the releases were given voluntarily, that

the prosecutor acted improperly to protect the private

interests of the police officers despite his knowledge of

police misconduct, and that the agreement was not subject to judicial supervision.

The potential for the abuse of release-dismissal agreements has led the Supreme Court to urge the use of

a critical eye when courts are asked to enforce them. See

Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1987).

But despite the risk of misuse, as Gonzalez and Holland

acknowledge, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a
10 No. 02-1514

rule of per se invalidity of these agreements. Id. at 392.

Rather, the Court noted that while “in some cases these

agreements may infringe important interests of the criminal defendant and of society as a whole,” id. at 392, in

general release-dismissal agreements “may further legitimate prosecutorial and public interests,” id. at 397 (plurality opinion). The Court therefore chose to follow, in Justice

O’Connor’s words, “a case-by-case approach [, which] appropriately balances the important interests on both sides

of the question of the enforceability of these agreements.”

Id. at 399 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

According to Rumery, before enforcing a release-dismissal agreement, a court must find that the agreement

was “voluntary, that there [was] no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, and that enforcement of this agreement

would not adversely affect the relevant public interests.”

Id. at 398. The burden of proving the validity of a releasedismissal agreement is on the party seeking to enforce

the agreement. See id. at 399 (O’Connor, J., concurring)

(“[I]t is the burden of those relying upon such covenants

to establish that the agreement is neither involuntary

nor the product of an abuse of the criminal process.”). Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Rumery provides

additional guidance as to the types of factors a court

should examine when determining the validity of a particular release-dismissal agreement:

Many factors may bear on whether a release was

voluntary and not the product of overreaching, some

of which readily come to mind. The knowledge and

experience of the criminal defendant and the circumstances of the execution of the release, including, importantly, whether the defendant was counseled, are

clearly relevant. The nature of the criminal charges

that are pending is also important, for the greater

the charge, the greater the coercive effect. The existence of a legitimate criminal justice objective for ob-
No. 02-1514 11

taining the release will support its validity. And, importantly, the possibility of abuse is clearly mitigated

if the release-dismissal agreement is executed under

judicial supervision.

Id. at 401-02 (O’Connor, J., concurring). We now turn to

an examination of these factors in this case.

1. Voluntariness

According to the Court in Rumery, a valid release-dismissal agreement must be the result of “an informed

and voluntary decision.” Id. at 393. In that case, the Court

focused on several factors in evaluating whether the

agreement at issue had been entered into voluntarily.

The Court noted that Rumery was a “sophisticated businessman,” that he was not in jail at the time he signed

the release, that he was counseled by “an experienced

criminal lawyer,” and that the benefits of the agreement

to Rumery were “obvious.” Id. at 394. Taken together,

these factors indicated that Rumery had “voluntarily

waived his right to sue under § 1983.” Id.

While the decision in Rumery requires that releasedismissal agreements be the result of voluntary decisions,

neither the Supreme Court nor this Court have yet addressed the question as to what standard of proof is required to prove the voluntariness of a release-dismissal

agreement. Several circuits have previously addressed

this question, coming to different conclusions as to what

the standard should be.

The Third Circuit has held that the voluntariness of

an oral release-dismissal agreement, like the agreement

at issue in this case, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 535-36 (3d Cir. 1996). The Third Circuit reasoned that a heightened standard of proof was nec-
12 No. 02-1514

essary because release-dismissal agreements “implicate ‘important individual interests or rights’ ”—namely, the redressing of possible constitutional-rights violations. Id.

at 535 (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)).

In addition, a clear and convincing standard was thought

to provide “the salutary effect of reducing the overall risk

of misunderstandings in the conclusion of release-dismissal agreements, and increasing the accuracy of juries’

decisions as to whether a release-dismissal agreement

was concluded voluntarily.” Id. at 536.

The Sixth Circuit reached a different conclusion, holding

that voluntariness need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See Burke v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 276,

285 (6th Cir. 1999). In Burke, the court addressed the

voluntariness of an oral release-dismissal agreement

read into the record at a plea hearing. While the court

noted that an on-the-record agreement presented less

serious problems of proof than an oral agreement like

the kind addressed by the Third Circuit in Livingstone, it

went on to observe that a preponderance-of-the-evidence

standard is considered sufficient for determining the voluntariness of waivers of other constitutional rights. Id.

at 284-85 (noting that a preponderance standard is used

to determine the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda

rights, the voluntariness of a confession, and the involuntariness of a guilty plea attacked in a habeas proceeding).

The court then concluded that, “[i]f a preponderance of

evidence standard applies when determining if there is

a voluntary waiver of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights, we see no reason for application of an elevated standard where lesser rights are implicated.” Id.

at 285.

We agree with the Sixth Circuit that the voluntariness

of a release-dismissal agreement need only be proved by

a preponderance of the evidence. The preponderance standard is sufficient to ensure that a release of claims is en-
No. 02-1514 13

tered into voluntarily, just as it has proven sufficient for

determining the voluntariness of waivers of constitutional rights. In addition, the burden of proving voluntariness

remains on the party seeking to invoke the agreement,

further safeguarding against coerced or involuntary releases.

Under a preponderance standard, it is apparent that

the releases signed by Gonzalez and Holland were the

product of voluntary and informed decisions. The record

indicates that Gonzalez and Holland signed the releases

as the result of a voluntary choice, with a full understanding of the consequences. Gonzalez, as a Chicago police officer, undoubtedly had an understanding of the criminaljustice process. Both Gonzalez and Holland were represented by counsel who had actively bargained with the

prosecutor for a dismissal of charges, and the possibility

of a release-dismissal agreement had been under discussion for a significant period of time, giving Gonzalez and

Holland—and their attorney—ample time to consider the

consequences of signing the releases. Gonzalez and Holland had their attorney present when they actually signed

the releases. And the benefits of the release-dismissal

agreement to Gonzalez especially are obvious: he avoided

potential problems with his job as a Chicago police officer.

Given these facts, considered in light of Rumery, the execution of these releases was neither involuntary or uninformed.

2. Legitimate Prosecutorial Conduct

Also important to the Supreme Court’s analysis in

Rumery was the fact that “the prosecutor had an independent, legitimate reason to make this [release-dismissal]

agreement directly related to his prosecutorial responsibilities.” Rumery, 480 U.S. at 398. Such a legitimate reason ensures that the prosecutor acts consistent with his
14 No. 02-1514

duties to uniformly enforce the criminal law, rather than

as the agent for the private interests of potential § 1983

defendants. In this case, we believe that the prosecutor

did not engage in any improper conduct inconsistent with

his role as prosecutor, nor were his efforts in securing the

releases from Gonzalez and Holland the result of any

prosecutorial overreaching.

First, the prosecutor did not act improperly when he

pursued the charges against Gonzalez and Holland. The

appellants go to great lengths to argue that the pursuit

of charges against them was wholly unjustified. In disputing the disorderly conduct charge, they admit that Gonzalez was yelling, but argue that it was not “at the top of

top of [sic] his lungs.” In challenging the charges of resisting law enforcement, they admit that they offered some

resistance during the arrest attempt, but that their resistance was not “forcible.” They also point to inconsistent

accounts given by Officers Kokot and Dixon in their depositions as evidence of misconduct and apparent complicity

by the prosecutor in ignoring the inconsistencies. But as

the Sixth Circuit has noted, “the existence of discrepancies among the accounts of prosecution witnesses does

not amount to ‘substantial evidence’ of police misconduct

such that an inference of prosecutorial misconduct” arises.

Burke, 167 F.3d at 286. Even accepting Gonzalez’s and

Holland’s characterization of the charges, we believe that

there was enough evidence to send the criminal case to

the trier of fact. The charges brought against Gonzalez and

Holland were certainly not “unfounded criminal charges

used as bargaining chips to cover up police misconduct.” Id.

(quotations omitted).

Second, the prosecutor did not abandon his responsibilities in securing the releases from Gonzalez and Holland.

Prosecutors may legitimately consider the strength of the

defendants’ § 1983 claims when considering whether to

enter into a release-dismissal agreement. See Rumery, 480
No. 02-1514 15

U.S. at 396 (plurality opinion) (“To the extent releasedismissal agreements protect public officials from the

burdens of defending such unjust [§ 1983] claims, they

further this important public interest.”); id. at 399 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]here are substantial policy reasons for permitting release-dismissal bargains to be struck

in appropriate cases. Certainly some § 1983 litigation is

meritless, and the inconvenience and distraction of public officials caused by such suits is not inconsiderable.”).

We cannot say that it would have been inappropriate

for Prosecutor Kray (as well as Gonzalez and Holland

themselves) to have considered the strength of the § 1983

case in deciding whether or not to enter into a releasedismissal agreement.

In addition, the plurality opinion in Rumery noted that

“[p]rosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple.” Id.

at 396 (plurality opinion). Prosecutors must consider the

strength and importance of a particular case, government

enforcement priorities, and the appropriate allocation of

scarce prosecutorial resources. Id. Justice O’Connor’s

concurring opinion in Rumery notes that “[s]paring the

local community the expense of litigation associated with

some minor crimes for which there is little or no public

interest in prosecution may be a legitimate objective of

a release-dismissal agreement.” Id. at 399-400 (O’Connor,

J., concurring) (citation omitted). In this case, prosecutor

Kray testified in his deposition that “[t]his was a very

minor case that got out of hand.” (Kray Dep. at 10.) Avoiding a potentially costly and lengthy trial over relatively

minor matters, with a settlement that was acceptable to

both sides, was certainly a legitimate goal related to Kray’s

duties as a prosecutor.

3. The Public Interest

Finally, we cannot say that enforcement of the releases

in this instance will be to the detriment of any public
16 No. 02-1514

interest. The plurality opinion in Rumery noted that release-dismissal agreements might “tempt prosecutors to

trump up charges in reaction to a . . . civil rights claim,

suppress evidence of police misconduct, and leave

unremedied deprivations of constitutional rights.” Id. at

394 (quotation omitted) (plurality opinion). These agreements thus raise the potential of harm to the public’s

interests in the proper and uniform enforcement of criminal laws and in seeing episodes of police misconduct

adequately addressed.

We see no evidence of harm to either of these public

interests by the enforcement of the releases signed by

Gonzalez and Holland. As discussed above, the charges

against them were not trumped up in response to their

§ 1983 suit; the record indicates that there were colorable

cases against each. Nor does the record indicate that

Gonzalez and Holland will be left with any significant

constitutional violations unredressed. They did, after all,

receive something of value in exchange for the dismissal

of their § 1983 claims: the dismissal of the criminal charges

against them and the avoidance of the time and expense

of a criminal trial.

The lack of judicial supervision is also not fatal to this

agreement’s enforceability. The Rumery Court acknowledged that while “it would be helpful to conclude releasedismissal agreements under judicial supervision . . . . such

supervision is not essential to the validity of an otherwise proper agreement.” Rumery, 480 U.S. at 398 n.10.

Because we find that the release-dismissal agreement

at issue in this case was entered into voluntarily, without evidence of prosecutorial overreaching, we do not

believe that the lack of judicial supervision by itself renders these releases unenforceable. Rather, we believe

Kokot and Dixon have adequately demonstrated that the

agreement comports with public policy.
No. 02-1514 17

III. Conclusion

The releases signed in this case were part of a contractually valid release-dismissal agreement, fully consistent

with considerations of public policy. Because we find

them valid and enforceable, the releases must serve to

bar this § 1983 suit. The grant of summary judgment in

favor of Officers Kokot and Dixon is AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—12-27-02