[Cite as Sheffield Crossing Station, L.L.C. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2020-Ohio-6938.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Sheffield Crossing Station, L.L.C., : 

 Appellant-Appellant, : 

 No. 19AP-687 

v. : (B.T.A. No. 2018-926)

Lorain County Board of Revision et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Appellees-Appellees. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 29, 2020 

 

On brief: The Gibbs Firm, LPA, Ryan J. Gibbs, and Geoffrey 

N. Byrne, for appellant Sheffield Crossing Station, L.L.C. 

Argued: Geoffrey N. Byrne. 

On brief: Pepple & Waggoner, Ltd., and Christian M. 

Williams, for appellees Sheffield-Sheffield Lake City School 

District Board of Education. Argued: Christian M. 

Williams.

On brief: Dennis P. Will, Lorian County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Cara M. Finnegan, for appellees Lorian County 

Board of Revision and Lorian County Auditor. Argued:

Cara M. Finnegan. 

 

APPEAL from the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals 

BEATTY BLUNT, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant Sheffield Crossing Station, L.L.C., appeals the September 10, 2019 

decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA") valuing the subject property, a shopping 

mall consisting of ten combined tax parcels with an anchor tenant of Giant Eagle, for tax 

year 2017 at the December 23, 2015 purchase price of $16,095,000. The BTA's opinion 

neatly summarizes the facts and proceedings in this case: 
No. 19AP-687 2 

The subject property is a shopping center anchored by a Giant 

Eagle. The subject sold on December 23, 2015 for $16,095,000. 

The record shows a company called Sheffield Ridge Equities 

LLC sold the subject property—ten parcels in total—to Sheffield 

Crossing via limited warranty deed, and the deed was recorded 

on December 23, 2015. The parcel card confirms general sale 

information, including a sale price of $16,095,000. The parties 

do not dispute the sale date or sale price. 

The auditor valued the subject property at approximately 

$13,693,350 for tax year 2017. Sheffield Crossing filed a 

decrease complaint with an opinion of value at $11,950,000, 

and the appellee school board filed a counter-complaint asking 

the subject to be valued in accordance with the December 2015 

sale. Sheffield Crossing did not appear at the BOR hearing but 

did submit an appraisal developed by Richard G. Racek, Jr., 

MAI, which valued the property at $11,950,000 as of January 1, 

2015. The school board objected to the appraisal since the 

appraisal was for a different tax-lien date and because Mr. 

Racek did not appear to authenticate the appraisal. The school 

board instead relied on the information contained in the sale 

documents and asked the BOR to value the subject in 

accordance with the sale. The BOR agreed with the school 

board and ultimately did value the subject in accordance with 

the sale. 

Sheffield Crossing appealed to [the BTA]. At [the BTA's] 

evidentiary hearing, Sheffield Crossing offered the appraisal 

and testimony of Mr. Racek who valued the subject (in a new 

appraisal) at $11,250,000 as of January 1, 2017. The BOR 

offered the appraisal and testimony of Thomas D. Sprout, MAI, 

who valued the subject at $17,655,000 as of January 1, 2017. 

No party offered testimony from a person with actual 

knowledge of the December 2015 sale. 

Mr. Racek valued the subject [property] at $11,250,000 using 

the sales comparison and income capitalization approach * * *. 

[He concluded a sales comparison] value of $100 per square 

foot or $11,368,800 * * *. Capitalized at 8%, Mr. Racek's 

income approach came to $11,150,000 rounded. He reconciled 

both approaches to a value of $11,250,000 as of the tax-lien 

date. 

Mr. Sprout valued the subject at a combined $17,655,000 using 

the sales comparison and income capitalization approaches. 

For his sales comparison approach, Mr. Sprout segregated the 

shopping center into smaller subunits, e.g., the anchor, the inline retail space, a Cracker Barrel, an Arby's, a BP, an auto 
No. 19AP-687 3 

service garage. He then compared each subunit using 

comparable properties. He followed a similar method in his 

income approach and reconciled each individually. 

* * * 

[W]e find no credible evidence to show the December 2015 sale 

was anything but arm's-length. Although the subject was 

allegedly sold as part of a portfolio sale, no party presented 

evidence from any person with actual knowledge of the sale; 

therefore, the sale created a rebuttable presumption of value in 

favor of the sale price. Second, while Sheffield Crossing argues 

the sale should be rejected because the sale was for a fee simple 

estate subject to an existing lease, the record is clear the sale 

price and existing lease rates were in line with market rates. As 

we noted recently * * * a fee simple sale subject to a lease does 

not disqualify a sale unless the lease is above market. 

Ultimately, this case boils down to the fact that the sale is more 

persuasive evidence of value. * * * The appraisal process 

requires a wide variety of subjective judgments about 

underlying data. Here, two MAI appraisers developed very 

different appraisals using different methodologies. One came 

to an opinion of value below the sale. One came to an opinion 

of value above the sale. However, both appraisals contain raw 

data that suggests to [the BTA] that the sale was in accord with 

the market. 

We are further compelled to find the sale is the best evidence of 

value because both appraisals have features that make them 

less persuasive than the sale. For example, Mr. Racek valued 

the property using a definition of encumbrance that this board 

and the Ohio Supreme Court have rejected. Sheffield Crossing 

argues R.C. 5713.03 required Mr. Racek "to value the property 

not as if it were leased as of January 1, 2017, but as if the 

property were available to be leased on that date. As [the BTA] 

noted * * * the Ohio Supreme Court rejected such [an] 

argument in Harrah's Ohio Acquisition Co, LLC v. Cuyahoga 

Cty. Bd. of Revision, 154 Ohio St.3d 340, 2018-Ohio-4370. 

 (Decision at 2-6.)

{¶ 2} In accordance with its rejection of the appraisals, the BTA adopted the 2015 

sale price as the true value of the property for tax year 2017. Sheffield Crossing Station 

appeals to this court, and asserts 14 assignments of error with that decision: 

[I.] The Board of Tax Appeals erred by adopting the recent sale 

price of a leased-encumbered property as the value for tax 
No. 19AP-687 4 

purposes when the record contained competent and probative 

appraisal evidence of the subject property's unencumbered 

value. 

[II.] The Board of Tax Appeals erred as a matter of law when it 

determined that the recent lease-encumbered sale price 

remained the "best evidence" of value despite being 

affirmatively rebutted by unencumbered appraisal evidence. 

[III.] The Board of Tax Appeals erred when it found that a sale 

is the best evidence of value when its leases are "at market" 

despite this premise being explicitly rejected by the Ohio 

Supreme Court in Terraza 8, L.L.C. v. Franklin County Board 

of Revision, 83 N.E.3d 916, 150 Ohio St.3d 527, 2017-Ohio4415. 

[IV.] The Board of Tax Appeals erred as a matter of law when it 

held that the proper value standard in Ohio is "fee simple sale 

subject to a lease" at market when R.C. 5713.03 explicitly states 

that property must be valued "as if unencumbered." 

[V.] The Board of Tax Appeals erred as a matter of law when it 

adopted a lease-encumbered sale price, without any 

adjustment, when the Ohio Supreme Court has previously 

stated that R.C. 5713.03 demands valuation "free of 

encumbrances such as leases." 

[VI.] The Board of Tax Appeals erred by deviating from the 

plain meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute. 

[VII.] The Board of Tax Appeals erred as [a] matter of law when 

it found that the fact that the recent sale of the subject property 

was "market driven" overrode the requirement that only the 

subject property's unencumbered value be taxed under R.C. 

5713.03. 

[VIII.] The Board of Tax Appeals' use of appraiser Thomas 

Sprout's lease comparables for the subject property's anchor 

space as support for adopting the sale price is an 

unconscionable abuse of discretion as each of the leases were 

signed more than a decade prior to the tax lien date. The Board 

has previously rejected this same approach from Mr. Sprout in 

Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA 

No. 2017-1023 (August 12, 2019) & Lowe's Home Centers, LLC 

v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2017-1135 (August 21, 

2019). This treatment by the Board is violative of the Equal 

Protection and uniform assessment requirements set forth in 

Errors 12 and 13 herein. 
No. 19AP-687 5 

[IX.] The Board of Tax Appeals erred as a matter of law when it 

rejected Appellant's argument that R.C. 5713.03 requires 

valuation "as if available to be leased" rather than "as if it were 

leased as of January 1, 2017," and in its misstatement of the 

Ohio Supreme Court's decision Harrah's Ohio Acquisition Co., 

LLC v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 154 Ohio St.3d 340, 

2018-Ohio-4370 to support this rejection. 

[X.] The Board of Tax Appeals' rejection of Mr. Racek's 

definition of "encumbrance" is wholly unsupported by the 

record and is in active defiance of the Ohio Supreme Court's 

holdings in Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. v. Washington County 

Bd. of Revision, 116 N.E.3d 79, 154 Ohio St.3d 463, 2018-Ohio1974 and Harrah's Ohio Acquisition Co., LLC v. Cuyahoga Cty. 

Bd. of Revision, 154 Ohio St.3d 340, 2018-Ohio-4370. 

[XI.] The Board of Tax Appeals erred by failing to 

independently determine the unencumbered value of the 

subject property using the unencumbered data in the record. 

[XII.] The Board of Tax Appeals decision violates the 

separation of powers implied by the Ohio Constitution in 

Articles II, III and IV and the United States Constitution. 

[XIII.] The Board of Tax Appeals' decision and order violates 

the Ohio Constitution's mandate of uniform assessment. 

Article XII, Section 2. 

[XIV.] The Board of Tax Appeals' decision and order violates 

the Equal Protection clauses under Article I, Section 2 of the 

Ohio State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution by applying the definition of fee 

simple, as if unencumbered, and interpreting §5713.03 of the 

Ohio Revised Code, in a manner that discriminates against 

certain taxpayers. 

As these assignments of error are all related, we will address them together. 

{¶ 3} Our review of the BTA's decision is governed by R.C. 5714.04, which provides: 

Appeals from decisions of the board upon all other appeals or 

applications filed with and determined by the board [including 

decisions from a county board of revision] shall be by appeal to 

the court of appeals for the county in which the property taxed 

is situation or in which the taxpayer resides * * *. If upon 

hearing and consideration of such records the court decides 

that the decision of [the BTA] is reasonable and lawful it shall 

affirm the same, but if the court decides that such decision of 

the board is unreasonable or unlawful, the court shall reverse 
No. 19AP-687 6 

and vacate the decision or modify it and enter final judgment 

in accordance with such modification. 

Accordingly, "[w]hen reviewing a BTA decision, we determine whether the decision is 

reasonable and lawful; if it is both, we must affirm." NWD 300 Spring L.L.C. v. Franklin 

Cty. Bd. of Revision, 151 Ohio St.3d 193, 2017-Ohio-7579, ¶ 13 (citing statute). See also MDC 

Coast I, L.L.C. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-721, 2020-Ohio-683, ¶ 7. 

Appellate review of BTA decisions "is guided by the premise that '[t]he fair market value of 

property for tax purposes is a question of fact, the determination of which is primarily 

within the province of the taxing authorities.' " (Other citation omitted.) NWD 300 Spring

at ¶ 13, quoting EOP-BP Tower, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 1, 

2005-Ohio-3096, ¶ 17. The BTA's factual findings are entitled to deference as long as they 

are supported by reliable and probative evidence in the record. Bd. of Edn. of the 

Westerville City Schools v. Franklin Cty Bd. of Revision, 146 Ohio St.3d 412, 2016-Ohio1506, ¶ 26. Furthermore, "[t]he standard for reviewing the BTA's determination of the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is abuse of discretion." 

NWD 300 Spring at ¶ 14. Thus, where the parties present competing appraisals, the BTA is 

vested with wide discretion in determining credibility of the witnesses and weighing the 

evidence before it. Bd. of Edn. of the Westerville City Schools at ¶ 21 and NWD 300 Spring

at ¶ 13. The BTA's decision finding one appraisal more probative than another appraisal 

and adopting a land value in one appraisal over the land value in another appraisal is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 16. " 'Abuse of discretion connotes an 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.' " Olentangy Local Schools Bd. of Edn. 

v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 153 Ohio St.3d 241, 2017-Ohio-8385, ¶ 7, quoting Renacci 

v. Testa, Tax Commr., 148 Ohio St.3d 470, 2016-Ohio-3394, ¶ 32. And although the BTA 

is responsible for determining factual issues, this court will not hesitate to reverse a BTA 

decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion. Bd. of Edn. of the Westerville City 

Schools at ¶ 21. We review questions of law de novo. See Terraza 8, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. 

Bd. of Revision, 150 Ohio St.3d 527, 2017-Ohio-4415, ¶ 7, and Columbus City Schools Bd. 

of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 151 Ohio St.3d 12, 2017-Ohio-2734, ¶ 13. See also 

MDC Coast I, L.L.C. at ¶ 7. 

{¶ 4} Like other recent decisions of this court, see, e.g., MDC Coast I, L.L.C. at ¶ 9-

16, and Lowe's Home Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Brooklyn City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 
No. 19AP-687 7 

19AP-179, 2020-Ohio-464, ¶ 21-27, this valuation dispute revolves around the 2012 

amendment to R.C. 5713.03. Prior to this amendment, a recent arm's-length sale was 

deemed to create an irrebuttable presumption of true value. See generally Berea City 

School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio4979. But in 2012, the legislature overrode Berea City, and specifically the three words "as 

if unencumbered." The statute now provides: 

The county auditor, from the best sources of information 

available, shall determine, as nearly as practicable, the true 

value of the fee simple estate, as if unencumbered but subject 

to any effects from the exercise of police powers or from other 

governmental actions, of each separate tract, lot, or parcel of 

real property and of buildings, structures, and improvements 

located thereon * * *. In determining the true value of any tract, 

lot, or parcel of real estate under this section, if such tract, lot, 

or parcel has been the subject of an arm’s length sale between 

a willing seller and a willing buyer within a reasonable length 

of time, either before or after the tax lien date, the auditor may 

consider the sale price of such tract, lot, or parcel to be the true 

value for taxation purposes. However, the sale price in an arm's 

length transaction between a willing seller and a willing buyer 

shall not be considered the true value of the property sold if 

subsequent to the sale: (A) The tract, lot, or parcel of real estate 

loses value due to some casualty; (B) An improvement is added 

to the property. 

(Emphasis sic.) R.C. 5713.03. 

{¶ 5} In Terraza 8, the Supreme Court concluded that the 2012 amendment to the 

statute had the effect of legislatively overruling Berea, and held that "a recent arm's-length 

sale price is not conclusive evidence of the true value of property under R.C. 5713.03 as 

amended by H.B. 487." Id. at ¶ 30. The court went on to observe that while "sale price * * * 

is the best evidence of the property's true value, subject to rebuttal * * * Market rent 

becomes relevant only if an opponent presents it as evidence in an attempt to rebut a sale 

price." Id. at ¶ 34. 

{¶ 6} The court further explained the amendment in Harrah's Ohio Acquisition 

Co., L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 154 Ohio St.3d 340, 2018-Ohio-4370, in 

which it held that the BTA had wrongly refused to consider an appraisal that valued owneroccupied property as if it had been leased. The court observed that it had previously 

approved that technique: 
No. 19AP-687 8 

After recognizing that a property owner may be able to realize 

the value of its property by encumbering it with a lease, we 

concluded that an appraiser may take that possibility into 

account when valuing it. Appraising property in this way is 

consistent with R.C. 5713.03's directive to determine "the true 

value of the fee simple estate, as if unencumbered," so long as 

the appraisal assumes a lease that reflects the relevant realestate market. 

(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 27. In other words, the court has held that the phrase "as if 

unencumbered," means that if the subject property is encumbered, an appraisal should 

adjust for the effects of those encumbrances. Such adjustments account for market rent and 

occupancy levels, and not simply to simulate vacancy. See, e.g., Lowe's Home Ctrs. at ¶ 22. 

Moreover, "[t]he proponent of appraisal evidence need not make any threshold showing 

before a taxing authority must fully consider that evidence. Once a party introduces 

appraisal evidence, the taxing authority has to consider that appraisal in its totality to 

determine whether it or the sale price more accurately values the property." MDC Coast I

at ¶ 10, citing Spirit Master Funding IX, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 155 Ohio 

St.3d 254, 2018-Ohio-4302, ¶ 6, Westerville City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. 

Bd. of Revision, 154 Ohio St.3d 308, 2018-Ohio-2855, ¶ 14, and Menlo Realty Income 

Props. 26, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-316, 2019-Ohio4872, ¶ 5-6. 

{¶ 7} And here, the BTA's opinion did not "fully consider" the merits of either 

appraisal. Instead, it concluded that "the sale price was market driven," and that "both 

appraisals contain raw data that suggests to this board that the sale was in accord with the 

market," and treated that sale price as the de facto value of the property. (See Decision at 

5-6.) Moreover, the BTA discarded the estimated value provided by Sheffield Crossing's 

appraiser Richard Racek because it disagreed with his appraisal's underlying assumption—

that the property should be valued as unoccupied and available to lease. But given that the 

use of this underlying assumption is explicitly permitted by Harrah's and Terraza 8, the 

BTA's rejection of the appraisal is tantamount to ignoring it as legally incorrect rather than 

fully analyzing the claims of valuation made therein. While BTA explains its rejection of the 

Sheffield Crossing appraisal value as "less persuasive than the sale," it gives no basis for its 

rejection other than the appraiser's underlying claim that "R.C. 5713.03 required [him] 'to 
No. 19AP-687 9 

value the property not as if it were leased as of January 1, 2017, but as if the property were 

available to be leased on that date.' " (Decision at 5-6.) 

{¶ 8} And appraisal evidence using the value of the property as available to be 

leased can be (under the statute as amended) just as relevant to the true value of the 

property as the sale price is. The Supreme Court of Ohio has specifically reversed and 

described as "legal error" the BTA's decision to refuse to consider an appraisal assuming a 

lease at market rate, as "[a]ppraising property in this way is consistent with R.C. 5713.03 

directive to determine 'the true value of the fee simple estate, as if unencumbered,' so long 

as the appraisal assumes a lease that reflects the relevant real-estate market." Harrah's at 

¶ 27, quoted in Lowe's Home Ctrs. at ¶ 22. Racek's appraisal specifically valued the property 

as if it was available for lease for the tax year at issue, and the BTA's decision does not 

challenge his analysis of the relevant real-estate market and lease rates. Without more, it 

was legal error for the BTA to discard Racek's appraisal, and that action undermines the 

entire foundations of its decision to adopt the sale price as evidence of true value. 

{¶ 9} Accordingly, we sustain Sheffield Crossing's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, 

seventh, ninth, tenth, and eleventh assignments of error. Its sixth, eighth, twelfth, 

thirteenth, and fourteenth assignments of error are moot and we decline to address them. 

The decision the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals is hereby reversed and this cause is remanded 

to that body for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

Decision reversed and remanded. 

KLATT and NELSON, JJ., concur.