PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4432

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHNNY SYLVESTER EDGELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for Northern District of West Virginia, at 

Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (1:16-cr-00045-IMK-MJA-1)

Argued: November 1, 2018 Decided: January 25, 2019

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Sentence vacated and case remanded by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the 

opinion, in which Chief Judge Gregory and Judge Niemeyer joined. 

ARGUED: Linn Richard Walker, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen Donald Warner, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: 

Kristen M. Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL 

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Powell, 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, 

West Virginia, for Appellee. 
2

PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:

After negotiating a plea agreement with the government, Johnny Sylvester Edgell

pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm as an unlawful drug user and one count 

of distributing methamphetamine. In exchange for that plea, the government agreed to a 

stipulation limiting Edgell’s total drug conduct to “less than five (5) grams of substances 

containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine,” J.A. 193, which corresponded to an 

advisory sentencing range of 10 to 16 months’ imprisonment. But after the agreement was 

signed, the government received lab results showing that the substances in question were 

actual methamphetamine, and once the government shared that information with the 

probation office, Edgell’s sentencing range increased to 30 to 37 months. At sentencing, 

the government advocated for a sentence consistent with that elevated range, and Edgell 

was sentenced to 30 months in prison. 

Edgell contends that the government breached his plea agreement in two respects: 

first, by disclosing the post-plea lab report to the probation office and sentencing court; and 

second, by failing to honor the agreement at sentencing, and instead advocating for a 

sentence inconsistent with its original stipulation. We cannot agree that the government 

breached its plea agreement by disclosing relevant and accurate information to the 

sentencing court. But we agree with Edgell that the government’s conduct at the sentencing 

hearing denied him the benefit of his bargain. Given the government’s breach, we vacate 

Edgell’s sentence and remand for resentencing before a different district judge. 

I.
3

Following three controlled buys in July 2015, Johnny Sylvester Edgell was indicted 

by a federal grand jury on three counts of distributing methamphetamine, in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and one count of unlawfully possessing a firearm, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2). 

Edgell and the government negotiated a plea agreement. For his part, Edgell agreed 

to plead guilty to the single firearm charge and to one count of distributing 

methamphetamine. In exchange, the government agreed to a stipulation that Edgell’s drug 

conduct involved “less than five (5) grams of substances containing a detectable amount 

of methamphetamine” – that is, substances of a lower purity level than actual 

methamphetamine. J.A. 193. Pursuant to that stipulation, Edgell’s advisory sentencing 

range would be 10 to 16 months’ imprisonment.1

 The government additionally agreed to 

“recommend that any sentence of incarceration imposed . . . be at the lowest end of the 

applicable guideline range,” J.A. 193, and to dismiss the remaining counts of the 

indictment.

The plea agreement also contained certain reservations. First, it specified that the 

sentencing court was not bound by the parties’ stipulations and was not required to accept 

 1 While the plea agreement did not specify the resulting sentencing range, the parties 

do not dispute that the agreement contemplated a range of 10 to 16 months’ imprisonment. 

The agreement’s drug conduct stipulation produces a base offense level of 12. See 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(14). Considering the relevant adjustments – including a two-level 

enhancement for his possession of a dangerous weapon and a two-level reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1), 3E1.1 – and Edgell’s Category 

I criminal history, Edgell’s advisory sentencing range under the agreement indeed would 

have been 10 to 16 months. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
4

them. The agreement also reserved the government’s “right to provide to the Court and 

the United States Probation Office . . . relevant information including defendant’s 

background, criminal record, offense charged in the indictment and other pertinent data . . 

. as will enable the Court to exercise its sentencing discretion,” and “to respond to any 

questions raised by the Court, to correct any inaccuracies or inadequacies in the anticipated 

pre-sentence report, and to respond to any written or oral statements made by the Court, by 

defendant or his counsel.” J.A. 194.

At the time the government entered into its agreement with Edgell, it had requested,

but not yet received, a laboratory analysis of the substances distributed by Edgell. When 

that laboratory report was returned to the government – only after the agreement was 

finalized – it revealed that the substances in question were not merely “substances

containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine,” as the parties had stipulated, J.A. 

193, but instead actual methamphetamine. The government disclosed that information to 

the probation office, which incorporated it into its Presentence Report (PSR), attributing 

3.5344 grams of actual methamphetamine to Edgell. As a result, the PSR calculated 

Edgell’s guidelines sentencing range as 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment, rather than the 10 

to 16 months anticipated under the plea agreement.2 In light of that discrepancy, the PSR 

suggested that a downward variance might be appropriate. 

 2 Edgell’s new drug conduct resulted in an offense level of 20. See U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1(c)(10). Edgell received a two-level enhancement for possessing a dangerous 

weapon under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) and a three-level reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), for a total offense level of 19. Combined with 

(Continued)
5

At sentencing, the district court acknowledged that the PSR’s factual findings and 

sentencing calculations were “certainly different from . . . the parties’ expectation from the 

plea agreement.” J.A. 91. Nevertheless, and without objection from either party, the court 

adopted the PSR’s advisory guidelines range of 30 to 37 months. 

Consistent with the PSR’s suggestion, Edgell requested a downward variance. The 

government did not join Edgell’s request. Nor did it recommend a sentence consistent with 

the agreed-upon stipulation as to drug conduct and the corresponding 10 to 16 months 

sentencing range. Instead, purporting to follow its commitments under the plea agreement, 

the government advocated for a sentence at the “low end” of the guidelines range adopted 

by the court, or 30 months’ imprisonment. J.A. 108. The court followed the government’s 

recommendation and sentenced Edgell to 30 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a 

term of three years of supervised release. Edgell timely appealed. 

II.

Edgell contends the government breached its plea agreement by disclosing the postagreement lab results to the probation office and the sentencing court, and by failing at 

sentencing to honor the agreement’s explicit drug conduct stipulation – that he was 

responsible for distributing “less than five (5) grams of substances containing a detectable 

amount of methamphetamine,” J.A. 193. Because Edgell did not challenge the 

 

his Category I criminal history, the resulting sentencing range was 30 to 37 months’ 

imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). 
6

government’s purported breach of the plea agreement before the district court, we review 

his claim for plain error. United States v. Tate, 845 F.3d 571, 575 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). Under that standard, Edgell must show that the government plainly 

breached its plea agreement with him and that the breach both affected his substantial rights 

and called into question the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 

See United States v. Dawson, 587 F.3d 640, 645 (4th Cir. 2009). For the reasons given 

below, we find that Edgell has satisfied that demanding standard. 

A.

We first consider whether the government breached the clear requirements of its 

plea agreement with Edgell. “Plea agreements are grounded in contract law,” and as with 

any contract, each party is entitled to receive the benefit of his bargain. Tate, 845 F.3d at 

575. While “we employ traditional principles of contract law as a guide” in enforcing plea 

agreements, “we nonetheless give plea agreements greater scrutiny than we would apply 

to a commercial contract because a defendant’s fundamental and constitutional rights are 

implicated when he is induced to plead guilty by reason of a plea agreement.” United 

States v. Warner, 820 F.3d 678, 683 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted). At a minimum, “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 

agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 

consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 

(1971).

Here, Edgell maintains that his plea agreement rested on the government’s promise 

to limit his relevant drug conduct to “less than five (5) grams of substances containing a 
7

detectable amount of methamphetamine,” J.A. 193, and the associated sentencing range, 

and that he was denied the benefit of his bargain when the government breached that 

promise. Specifically, Edgell challenges both the government’s disclosure of the postagreement lab results to the probation office and sentencing court, and the government’s 

failure at sentencing to defend or advocate in any way for the parties’ drug conduct 

stipulation. We address each of these challenges in turn.

To the extent Edgell contends that the government breached its plea agreement by 

disclosing lab results to the probation office and court, we must disagree. The government

has a “duty to furnish complete and accurate information at sentencing,” and we have 

expressed doubt as to whether a plea agreement may abridge that duty. United States v. 

Crisp, 817 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1987). Other courts of appeals, too, have emphasized 

that even where a plea agreement binds the government to certain sentencing 

recommendations, the government retains a duty “to ensure that the court has complete and 

accurate information, enabling the court to impose an appropriate sentence.” United States 

v. Maldonado, 215 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Casillas, 853 

F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2017) (government may not “stand mute in the face of factual 

inaccuracies or [] withhold relevant factual information from the court” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)); United States v. Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d 277, 283 (1st Cir. 2017) (“[A] 

plea agreement may not abridge the [government’s] solemn obligation to provide relevant 

information to the sentencing court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Indeed, consistent with this understanding, Edgell’s plea agreement does not purport 

to limit or override the government’s duty of candor to the court. Instead, it recognizes 
8

that duty, and expressly reserves the government’s “right to provide to the Court and the 

United States Probation Office . . . relevant information including defendant’s background, 

criminal record, offense charged in the indictment and other pertinent data . . . as will enable 

the Court to exercise its sentencing discretion.” J.A. 194. The government’s disclosure of 

the lab results, which went directly to the offense charged in the indictment and to Edgell’s

base offense calculation, was thus consistent with both the parties’ plea agreement and the 

government’s broader duty to provide complete and accurate information to the sentencing 

court.

But the government did more than that here. And we agree with Edgell that the 

government crossed the line and breached its plea agreement when it failed at sentencing 

to honor its drug conduct stipulation. As one court of appeals to consider this precise 

question has explained, “Although the Government has a duty to provide the sentencing 

court with relevant factual information and to correct misstatements, it may not hide behind 

this duty to advocate a position that contradicts its promises in a plea agreement.” United 

States v. Munoz, 408 F.3d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 2005). Instead, the government must carefully

balance its duty of candor to the sentencing court with the sometimes competing – but 

equally solemn – duty to honor its commitments under a plea agreement. See United States 

v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). And as courts that have addressed the question 

agree, this balance is achieved where the government makes the necessary disclosures to 

the sentencing court, but nevertheless “continue[s] to advocate for acceptance of the 

agreement.” Casillas, 853 F.3d at 218; see also United States v. Franco–Lopez, 312 F.3d 

984, 993 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We conclude that the government did not breach the plea 
9

agreement by providing information to the Probation Department regarding [the 

defendant’s] criminal activity while recommending successfully to the district court that it 

not rely on that information in sentencing.”); Saxena, 229 F.3d at 7 (finding no breach 

where the government disclosed information inconsistent with the plea agreement, but 

nevertheless “resolutely stood by the bottom-line recommendation that [it] had committed 

to make”).

The government failed to strike the necessary balance here. At sentencing, the 

government did not “continue to advocate for acceptance,” Casillas, 853 F.3d at 218, of its 

agreement with Edgell. It did not ask the court to impose a sentence consistent with the 10 

to 16 months range that corresponded to its drug conduct stipulation. It did not join in 

Edgell’s request for a downward variance. And it did not otherwise encourage the court to 

consider in any way the factual stipulation to which it agreed in exchange for Edgell’s 

guilty plea. Instead, the government affirmatively undermined the plea agreement by 

requesting a sentence inconsistent with its stipulation, effectively tripling its recommended 

sentence from the 10 months anticipated under the plea agreement to the 30 months at the 

low end of the post-lab report range calculated by the PSR.

3

 3 We appreciate the awkward situation the government faced at sentencing; 

balancing the competing duties of candor to the court and adherence to a plea agreement 

can be a difficult task under circumstances like these. But this is not the first case in which 

a prosecutor was required to walk that line. In United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 4 (1st 

Cir. 2000), for instance, the government had agreed in a plea agreement to recommend a 

sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, consistent with an anticipated sentencing range of 

24 to 30 months. At sentencing, however, it disclosed to the court post-plea activities by 

the defendant that led the court to adopt a higher guidelines range of 33 to 41 months. Id. 

at 4–5. But when it came time to make a sentencing recommendation, the prosecutor 

(Continued)
10

At oral argument, the government suggested for the first time that its sentencing 

recommendation did not breach the plea agreement because Edgell “assumed the risk” that 

it would discover the actual nature of the substances he distributed. But it was the 

government, of course, that knew of an outstanding lab report and nevertheless decided to 

go forward with the plea agreement without waiting for the results, thus assuming precisely 

the risk that materialized: that the lab report ultimately would come back with information 

inconsistent with the agreement’s drug conduct stipulation. The government’s apparent

misjudgment about the importance of the lab report is not grounds for relieving the 

government of its obligations under the plea agreement.

Moreover, the government’s assumption-of-risk argument misconstrues the very 

nature of plea agreements. Plea agreements, as any contract, bind one party to do 

something the other party desires in exchange for some benefit. United States v. Bownes, 

405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, the government agreed to the drug conduct 

stipulation, which came with a corresponding sentencing range of 10 to 16 months, and to 

 

continued to advocate for the 24 months to which the parties had agreed, explaining to the 

court:

The government’s recommendation in this case is pursuant to our plea 

agreement. And I’m well aware, your Honor, of the fact that my 

recommendation is below what the Court has determined the guidelines 

applicable to be. Nonetheless, bound by that agreement the government does 

recommend a sentence of 24 months which, of course, was based on the 

calculations [of] the parties.

Id. at 7. Because it “resolutely stood by” a sentencing recommendation consistent with its 

plea agreement, the First Circuit concluded in Saxena, the government had not breached 

the agreement, notwithstanding its disclosure of post-plea information to the court. Id. at 

7–8.
11

recommend a sentence at the bottom of the applicable range. In return, Edgell relieved the 

government of its burden to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and eliminated the 

need for the government to expend its resources on a full criminal trial. Both parties bound 

themselves to their respective commitments, and each “assume[d] the risk of future 

changes in circumstances in light of which [their] bargain may prove to have been a bad 

one.” Id. Just as we often enforce plea agreements against criminal defendants even in the 

face of subsequent, favorable changes in the law, see, e.g., United States v. Archie, 771 

F.3d 217, 222 (4th Cir. 2014), so, too, must we enforce plea agreements that may later 

prove less advantageous than the government had anticipated.

The government’s failure at sentencing to stand by its drug conduct stipulation, and 

its recommendation of a sentence inconsistent with that stipulation, denied Edgell a central 

benefit of his bargain. It follows that the government breached its plea agreement with 

Edgell. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. And because the government’s duties pursuant 

to the plea agreement were sufficiently clear – that is, the drug conduct stipulation was 

unambiguous – that error was plain. Cf. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 143 (2009)

(“Not all breaches [of plea agreements] will be clear or obvious. Plea agreements are not 

always models of draftsmanship, so the scope of the Government’s commitments will on 

occasion be open to doubt.”). Edgell therefore satisfies the initial requirements of plain 

error review.

B. 

Having found that the government plainly breached its plea agreement at

sentencing, we next consider whether that breach affected Edgell’s substantial rights. A 
12

breach of a plea agreement affects a defendant’s substantial rights only if it prejudices the 

defendant. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. And a defendant suffers no prejudice where (1) he 

obtained the benefits of the plea agreement despite the government’s breach – that is, where 

he nevertheless received the sentence the prosecutor promised to request – or (2) “he likely 

would not have obtained those benefits in any event.” Id. at 141–42. Where the record 

does not reflect either of the above circumstances, “we are free to conclude that the 

defendant has shown a reasonable probability, based on the appellate record as a whole, 

that but for the error he would have received a more favorable sentence.” Dawson, 587 

F.3d at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Edgell has made the requisite showing of potential prejudice. First, there is no 

question that Edgell did not receive the benefit of his bargain: He was sentenced to 30 

months’ imprisonment, a sentence that far exceeded the sentencing range that would have 

resulted from the drug conduct stipulation in the parties’ plea agreement. Second, we 

cannot conclude from this record that, had the government honored the plea agreement,

there would have been no benefit to Edgell. It is true that, under the plea agreement, the 

sentencing court was not bound by the parties’ stipulation,4 and the court did voice a 

 4 That the court was not bound by the drug conduct stipulation, of course, does not 

excuse the government from its commitments under the agreement. The parties “did intend 

for the stipulation to bind the government, and it is the government’s breach of that 

agreement that is the focus of our inquiry.” United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575, 1579 

(11th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Normil, 129 F.3d 1261, at *4 (4th Cir. 1997) 

(unpublished table decision) (“To the extent that a stipulation entered by the government 

is essential to the defendant’s bargain, it is binding. This is true even if the court is not 

bound by the stipulation.” (citation omitted)).
13

concern that the plea agreement – and the sentencing range it contemplated – did not 

account for the severity of Edgell’s offenses. But at the same time, the district court made 

clear that it was considering a sentence well below the 30 to 37 months range it had 

adopted. And in the end, it adopted precisely the sentence the government recommended: 

30 months. Had the government instead urged the court to impose a sentence consistent 

with its plea agreement, or joined in Edgell’s request for a downward variance, then the 

court may well have taken the government’s position into account and arrived at a sentence 

within, or at least closer to, the sentencing range anticipated by the plea agreement. Edgell 

thus has “demonstrated a reasonable probability that the outcome of his sentencing would 

have been different had the government made the appropriate recommendation.” Dawson, 

587 F.3d at 646; cf. United States v. Navarro, 817 F.3d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[C]ases 

where we have found that the defendant failed to prove the prejudice prong are ones in 

which the record compellingly reflects the sentencing court was not influenced by the 

government’s recommendation.”). Accordingly, we find that the government’s breach of 

the plea agreement affected Edgell’s substantial rights.

C.

We similarly find that the government’s breach of the plea agreement seriously 

affected the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” Puckett, 556 

U.S. at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned that this 

prong of plain error “is meant to be applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis,”

and is not automatically satisfied whenever the government breaches a plea agreement. Id.

at 142–43. “Nevertheless, . . . courts have recognized that the Government’s breach of a 
14

plea agreement constitutes a particularly egregious error that, in the absence of strong 

countervailing factors, seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” United States v. Kirkland, 851 F.3d 499, 505 (5th Cir. 2017)

(emphasis added) (collecting cases). This is so because “[t]he breach of a promise made 

to induce a defendant to enter a guilty plea – and thereby waive important constitutional 

rights – harms not only the defendant, but . . . involves the honor of the government, [and]

public confidence in the fair administration of justice.” United States v. Lewis, 633 F.3d 

262, 269 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 

Peglera, 33 F.3d 412, 414 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Because a government that lives up to its 

commitments is the essence of liberty under law, the harm generated by allowing the 

government to forego its plea bargain obligations is one which cannot be tolerated.”). 

Here, the government does not contest that its purported breach affects the integrity, 

fairness, or public reputation of plea agreements and judicial proceedings generally. 

Accordingly, because Edgell has shown the government failed to honor its clear 

commitments under his plea agreement and the government fails to provide even a single 

countervailing factor, we find Edgell has satisfied the final requirement of plain error 

review. 

III.

Having found that the government breached the plea agreement and that the breach 

constitutes plain and reversible error, the only remaining issue is the appropriate remedy. 

“In most cases in which the Government has breached its agreement with the defendant, 
15

we prefer to leave the fashioning of appropriate relief to the sound discretion of the district 

court.” United States v. Wood, 378 F.3d 342, 350 n.6 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Where, however, the defendant does not seek to withdraw his guilty plea 

and instead requests only “the lesser relief of specific performance of the agreement[,] . . . 

then the court should honor that election,” and “remand with the direction that the 

defendant ‘be resentenced by a different judge.’” Warner, 820 F.3d at 685 (quoting 

Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263). 5

 

Because Edgell seeks only specific performance, we will honor his election. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we find the government breached its plea agreement with 

Edgell and that this breach constitutes reversible plain error. We do not doubt that the 

government’s breach was the result of inadvertence rather than bad faith, but Edgell

nonetheless was denied the benefit of his bargain. Accordingly, we vacate Edgell’s 

sentence and remand the case for resentencing before a different district judge. 

SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED

 5 When specific performance is elected by a defendant, resentencing always takes 

place before a different judge. See Peglera, 33 F.3d at 415 (“We remand the case to a 

different district judge for resentencing as we are required to do.”) As the Supreme Court 

has emphasized, that standard remedy “is in no sense to question the fairness of the 

sentencing judge,” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, and our decision today should not be 

understood as a “reflection on [Edgell’s] trial judge, who handled the case admirably under 

the circumstances,” Peglera, 33 F.3d at 415.