Filed 12/18/23 In re W.L. CA2/5

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re W.L. et al., Persons Coming 

Under The Juvenile Court Law.

_______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

V.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B328487

 (Los Angeles County Super.

Ct. No. 19CCJP07632B-E)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Annabelle G. Cortez, Judge. Affirmed.

Jacques Alexander Love, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

V.L. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders 

denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 

388 and terminating her parental rights over four of her 

children.1 Mother does not challenge the merits of those orders; 

instead, she argues the Department failed to comply with the

notice requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 225 et seq.; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) by 

failing to supply more detailed information in the notices. 

The Department responds that (1) the notice requirement 

was never triggered because the Department’s investigation 

yielded no “reason to know” the children were Indian children, 

and (2) the inclusion of additional information on the notices 

would have made no difference because on two occasions, both 

orally and in writing, the Hopi tribe advised DCFS that it had 

determined that the children were ineligible for membership 

because the parents were not tribal members. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother has seven children with two fathers. Only four of 

her children are at issue in this appeal. At the time of the orders

denying the 388 petition and terminating parental rights, the 

children ranged from 10 to 14 years old. Because mother’s appeal 

only challenges the Department’s ICWA efforts regarding her 

side of the family’s Indian ancestry, we recite the ICWA-related 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code. 
3

facts only as they concern mother’s family.2 Also because of the 

limited nature of the appeal, we do not discuss in detail the facts 

that led to jurisdiction over the children and the ultimate 

termination of parental rights.

In November 2019, the Department filed a petition alleging 

four of mother’s children were at risk of serious harm due to 

mother and her boyfriend’s history of domestic violence, mother’s 

substance abuse, and mother’s possession of drugs and of guns 

within reach of her children.3

Before it filed the petition, the Department asked mother 

whether she had Indian ancestry, and she said no. But on

November 27, 2019—the date of the detention hearing—mother

filed an ICWA-020 form stating mother “may have Indian 

ancestry,” and adding “unsure, DNA says yes.” At the same 

hearing, the court ordered the children removed from mother’s 

care and required mother to leave the home she shared with 

adult daughter Celeste and the children. Celeste remained the 

children’s caregiver for the duration of the dependency 

proceedings and repeatedly reaffirmed her desire to adopt them. 

In December 2019, mother’s other adult daughter, Celena,

reported to the Department that mother did not have Indian 

ancestry and that Celeste would know more. Celeste in turn

reported that she “think[s]” her family is Hopi, but she “d[id]n’t 

2 The fathers and their family members the Department 

interviewed all denied Indian ancestry. 

3 Because of the number of relatives referred to in this 

opinion and to avoid confusion, we have identified them by first 

name or familial description (e.g., “maternal aunt”) rather than 

by initials. 
4

really know,” and “mother would have more information.” 

Mother’s sister Andrea reported she did not know whether 

mother had Indian ancestry and also suggested that mother 

might have more information. Mother told the Department that 

neither she nor the children were enrolled in a tribe, but that her 

“maternal grandmother was from Colorado and . . . was part of 

the Hopi Tribe.”4 Mother identified maternal great grandmother

as Annie, but said she had no further information. 

Based on mother’s report, on December 17, 2019, the 

Department sent ICWA notices to the Hopi tribe and the Bureau 

of Indian Affairs (BIA).

5 The Hopi tribe responded by letter in 

February 2020 stating the children “are not eligible for 

enrollment with the Hopi Tribe; therefore, [the Hopi] will not be a 

party to this case.” The letter did not ask for any additional 

information.

After several continuances, on December 4, 2020, the 

juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition in its entirety. 

Six months later, in June 2021, the court terminated mother’s 

reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing. 

For reasons the record does not reveal, in August 2021, the 

court ordered the Department “to follow up with” “notice to the 

Hopi tribe and provide an update to the court” “for .26 purposes.”

In February 2022, the court again ordered the Department 

“to follow up and for .26 purposes reinitiate the ICWA 

4 Mother was raised by her grandmother (maternal great 

grandmother). Maternal great grandmother and both maternal

grandparents are deceased. 

5 Mother did not include these notices in the record on 

appeal. 
5

investigation given that mother previously indicated . . . that the 

maternal [great] grandmother was . . . part of the Hopi tribe.”

The court ordered the department to “interview appropriate 

relatives . . . and anyone else who may have information 

regarding the potential American Indian ancestry,” and to “follow 

up with tribes . . . and provide detailed information regarding 

[the Department’s] efforts to investigate as well as obtain 

information from the tribes.”6

In April 2022, the Department spoke with mother’s sister,

maternal great aunt Elaine. Elaine informed the Department 

that that “the family ‘talked’ of possibly having” Hopi ancestry

from maternal great grandfather Ruben who was deceased and 

whose dates of birth and death she did not know. However, 

Elaine also reported that Ruben was “from Mexico and did not 

have any American Indian heritage.” 

In May 2022, the Department sent the Hopi tribe a second 

set of notices (ICWA-030 forms) to inform it of the upcoming 

permanency planning hearing for the children. The notice stated 

the children “[are] or may be eligible for membership” in the Hopi 

tribe. The forms contain each child’s name, date and place of 

birth, and birth certificate, as well as the full names of mother 

and the children’s respective fathers, and each parent’s address 

and birthdate. The forms also list the names of maternal 

grandmother, maternal grandfather, and maternal great 

grandmother, but provide no other information about these 

6 The record does not reveal why the court ordered the 

Department to reinitiate the ICWA investigation given that the 

Hopi tribe had already indicated the family’s lack of membership 

or eligibility for membership in February 2020.
6

relatives. For each child and relative, the form lists “Does not 

apply” in the box provided for “Tribe or band, and location.” 

The following month, the Department telephoned the Hopi 

tribe to follow up about the ICWA notices, and was told the ICWA 

coordinator was not available. The Department reinterviewed 

adult daughter Celeste about Indian ancestry. Celeste

“reiterate[d] that there is no American Indian heritage in her 

family,” and reported “mother [had] told her that she will use any 

and all means necessary” to prevent Celeste from adopting the 

children. 

In September 2022, the Department contacted the Hopi’s 

ICWA coordinator who requested the children’s and parent’s 

names, which the Department provided. 

In October 2022, the ICWA coordinator called the 

Department and explained that “the parents are not enrolled 

which . . . make[s] all of the children ineligible.” The Hopi tribe 

then sent the Department a letter stating that neither the 

parents nor the children are enrolled or eligible for enrollment in 

the Hopi tribe. 

At a hearing in February 2023, the court asked mother 

whether there were “any additional relatives that the 

Department can reach out to beyond those that [mother has] 

already identified to the Department,” to which mother 

responded: “No. My mother’s deceased now. My grandmother’s 

deceased . . . . That’s who would have . . . any kind of bloodline 

. . . and they’re both deceased.” The court nonetheless asked 

mother for maternal great uncle’s (Leonard) contact information, 

and she provided his phone number.

In February of 2023, mother filed a 388 petition in which 

she requested the return of her children or, in the alternative, 
7

reinstatement of reunification services. She also asked that her 

visits be unmonitored. 

In March 2023, the Department contacted maternal great 

uncle who stated that his mother Annie talked about his father 

Ruben being American Indian but that no specific tribe was 

mentioned. Leonard stated that he never met Ruben, and that he 

believed Ruben died in the 1970s or 1980s. Leonard informed the 

Department that the only other person who might know anything 

about Indian ancestry was Elaine, with whom the Department 

had already spoken.

At a hearing on April 7, 2023, the juvenile court denied 

mother’s section 388 petition and found “there is no reason to

know that there’s any American Indian ancestry and that the 

children are Indian children or eligible for enrollment.” Three 

days later, the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights 

and found the children adoptable. 

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

1. ICWA Overview

Mother argues that the Department failed to comply with 

ICWA because the “notice[s] only contained the names of three 

relatives, with no other information about them.” The 

Department responds that (1) no formal notice was required 

because no information the Department obtained gave it “reason 

to know” the children were Indian children (§ 224.2, subd. (f)),

and (2) any flaw in the notices was harmless because the Hopi’s 

determination was based on the parents’ uncontested lack of 

enrollment with the tribe. 

Congress enacted ICWA out of concern that “ ‘an 

alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by 
8

the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by 

nontribal public and private agencies.’ ” (Haaland v. Brackeen

(2023) 599 U.S. 255, 265.) Under ICWA and the related 

California statutes (§§ 224-224.6), a juvenile court and the 

Department have duties aimed at determining whether a

dependent child is an “Indian child.” (§§ 224.2, 224.3.) 

An “Indian child” is a child who is (1) “a member of an 

Indian tribe,” or (2) “is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe

and is the biological child of a member of an Indian Tribe.” 

(25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (a).) “ ‘Conversely, if the child 

is not a tribe member, and the mother and the biological father 

are not tribe members, the child simply is not an Indian child.’ ” 

(In re A.A. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 393, 399 (A.A.).) 

“ICWA does not define ‘ “member of a tribe” ’ or ‘ “eligible 

for membership in an Indian tribe.”’ ” (A.A., supra, 

88 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.) Instead, Indian tribes have the sole 

authority to determine whether a child is a member or is eligible 

for membership. (Ibid.) A tribe’s determination that a child is 

not eligible for membership is therefore conclusive. (Ibid.)

The Department and juvenile court have “three distinct 

duties” under ICWA. (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 

1052.) The initial “duty” is “to inquire whether [a] child is, or 

may be, an Indian child,” which the Department discharges by 

“asking” family members, including “extended family members,”

and “others who have an interest in the child.” (§ 224.2, subds. 

(a) & (b).) For its part, the juvenile court is required, “[a]t the 

first appearance” in a dependency case, to “ask each participant 

present” “whether the participant knows or has reason to know 

that the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) There 
9

appears to be no serious dispute that the Department discharged 

its initial duty.

The second duty is that of “mak[ing] further inquiry 

regarding the possible Indian status of the child.” (§ 224.2, subd. 

(e).) This duty is triggered when the Department “has reason to 

believe that an Indian child is involved” (ibid.), and obligates the 

Department to conduct a “more robust investigation” and to make 

a “ ‘meaningful effort’ ” through further interviews aimed at 

gathering information, and through contacting the BIA and 

relevant Indian tribes. (In re M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 70; 

In re K.T. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 744; In re D.F. (2020) 

55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) The Department “has reason to believe 

that an Indian child is involved” if the Department or the court 

“has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or 

the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an 

Indian tribe,” including information “indicat[ing]” but not 

“establish[ing]” the existence of any of the six circumstances

satisfying the “reason to know” a child is an Indian child, which 

are detailed next. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) “At this stage, contact 

with a tribe ‘shall, at a minimum,’ include telephone, facsimile, or 

electronic mail contact to each tribe’s designated agent for receipt 

of ICWA notice, and ‘sharing information identified by the tribe 

as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility 

determination, as well as information on the current status of the 

child and the case.’ ” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 

1049.)

The third duty is the duty to notify the relevant Indian 

tribes. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) This duty is triggered when the 

Department or the court “knows or has reason to know . . . that 

an Indian child is involved” based on the further inquiries 
10

performed under the second duty. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) “[R]eason 

to know a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child” arises 

from one of six statutorily defined circumstances. Only two of 

these circumstances are conceivably relevant here: “[a] person 

having an interest in the child . . . informs the court that the 

child is an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)) or “[a]ny 

participant in the proceeding . . . informs the court that it has 

discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian 

child” (id., subd. (d)(3)). We conclude neither actually applies in 

this case.

In assessing ICWA compliance, we independently review 

any questions of law, but review the court’s ICWA findings for 

substantial evidence. (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 

103 Cal.App.4th 247, 254; In re Rebecca R. (2006) 

143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430.) 

2. The Requirement of Formal Notice to the Hopi Tribe 

Was Not Triggered 

The Department does not dispute that its initial inquiry 

yielded information that required it to conduct a further inquiry

because mother’s statement about maternal great grandmother’s 

possible Hopi ancestry gave it “reason to believe” the children 

may have Native American ancestry. Formal notice to the Indian 

tribes is only required if information the Department gleans from

its further investigation yields a “reason to know” a child is an 

Indian child. The Department’s argument that no notice was 

required may also suggest that the Department questions 

whether the notices to the tribe constituted proper notice. 

We start our analysis with a review of the ICWA facts that 

we have previously summarized. After initially reporting no 

Indian ancestry, mother filed an ICWA-020 form stating she 
11

“may have Indian ancestry.” The parties seem to agree that 

mother’s report of her grandmother’s possible Hopi ancestry

provided a “reason to believe” the children may be Indian 

children, triggering the Department’s duty to conduct a “further 

inquiry.” (See, e.g., In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 292 

[mother’s and maternal grandmother’s statement of possible 

Indian ancestry triggered duty of further inquiry]; In re A.M. 

(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 322 [mother’s statement she may 

have Indian ancestry through her grandfather did not trigger 

ICWA notice requirement, but did require further inquiry].) 

As part of its initial inquiry, the Department interviewed 

mother’s adult daughters and maternal aunt, each of whom 

indicated a lack of knowledge of Indian ancestry and deferred to 

mother. In its further inquiry, the Department interviewed 

maternal great aunt, who told the Department “the family 

‘talked’ of possibly having” Hopi ancestry from maternal great 

grandfather Ruben, then deceased. Maternal great uncle was 

interviewed and unable to provide any additional information or 

to identify any individuals who might know more and who had 

not already been interviewed. 

The Department also sent a second set of notices to the 

Hopi tribe inquiring about tribal membership. Having received 

no initial response, the Department spoke with the Hopi’s ICWA 

coordinator in September 2022, who requested the children’s and 

parent’s names The following month, on October 25, 2023, the 

ICWA coordinator orally advised DCFS that “the parents are not 

enrolled which would make all of the children ineligible.” Two 

days later, in an “Updated Information as to ICWA,” DCFS 

advised the juvenile court that “the Hopi Tribe provided a letter 

stating that the children [names omitted], and the mother and 
12

the father [names omitted] are not enrolled in the Hopi Tribe.” 

The tribe did not request any further information; nor did it 

suggest that the information it had was insufficient to determine 

whether the parents or the children were enrolled or were eligible 

for enrollment in the Hopi tribe. Even with this information, the 

court asked mother whether she had any other relatives the 

Department might inquire with regarding Indian ancestry, to 

which mother responded, “No,” and explained that her mother 

and grandmother who might have had more information were 

both deceased. 

None of the information gleaned from mother, her relatives,

or from the Hopi tribe revealed any of the circumstances giving 

rise to a “reason to know” the children were Indian children 

(§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)-(6)). The possibility of any such “reason to 

know” is precluded by the fact that on two occasions the 

Department provided notice and received a response from the 

Hopi tribe – both orally and in writing – that the children were 

not members or eligible to be members of the Hopi tribe because 

their parents were not members. We conclude that no further 

ICWA notice was required, and any flaws in the notices the 

Department sent are of no legal consequence.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. 

RUBIN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOOR, J. KIM, J.