UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JUDY LUANNE POLSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. No. 12-7039 (D.C. No. 6:10-CV-00463-KEW) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , McKAY , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.

Judy Luanne Polson appeals from a judgment of the magistrate judge 1 affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of he r application for disability

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1 Upon the parties’ consent, the case was referred to the ma gistrate judge to conduct all proceedings and to or der entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - benefits under Title II of the Social Se curity Act. Exercising jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Polson was born in 1962, has a high sc hool education, and has prior work experience as a home health aide, teacher’s aide, cashier, and sales clerk. Her right leg was surgically repaired after a 1983 mo torcycle accident, and she was diagnosed with degenerative joint disease in her knees and right hip in 2002. The magistrate judge’s decision thorou ghly describes the medical eviden ce in the record, thus we do not repeat it here. Polson a pplied for benefits in Decemb er 2006, claiming disability due to aching and swelling in her right leg a nd right hip. Her application was denied initially and on reconsiderati on. She then received a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), at which she and a vocational expert (VE) testified. The ALJ found that Polson (1) had not en gaged in substantia l gainful activity since September 2004; (2) had severe impair ments of degenerative joint disease, degenerative disc disease, and a prior right leg fracture; (3) did not have an impairment, or combination of impairment s, that met the crite ria for presumptive disability; (4) had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perf orm a full range of sedentary work, and could not return to her past relevant work; but (5) could perform other work that exists in significa nt number in the economy, applying the medical-vocational guidelines (Grids). Based on the above the ALJ concluded Polson was not disabled. See Wilson v. Astrue , 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010)- 3 - (describing five-step evaluation process). The Appeals Council denied review, and the magistrate judge, sitti ng by consent, affirmed. Polson raises two issues on appeal, arguing that the ALJ (1) did not perform a proper step-five determination, and (2) failed to perform a proper credibility determination. “We review the [mag istrate judge’s] d ecision de novo and independently determine whether the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and supported by substa ntial evidence.” Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart , 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005). We first address the ALJ’s credibility de termination. Pols on contends the ALJ failed to discuss and properly apply the factors for assessing credibility when he found her subjective complaints of disablin g pain not to be credible. A disability claimant’s complaints of disabling pain are evaluated us ing the three-step analysis set out in Luna v. Bowen , 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987). Under Luna , an ALJ faced with a claim of disabling pain is required to consider and determine (1) whether the claimant established a pa in-producing impairment by objective medical evidence; (2) if so, whether the impair ment is reasonably expected to produce some pain of the sort alleged; and (3) if so, whether, cons idering all the eviden ce, both objective and subjective, the claimant’s pain was in fact disabling. Id . at 163-64. The ALJ did discuss a number of the Luna factors and tied th em to evidence in the record. In evaluating Polson’s subject ive complaints of disabling pain the ALJ compared them to objective fa ctors: there is no medical evidence that Polson sought- 4 - treatment for, or complained of, leg or hi p pain until four to five years after her degenerative joint disease was diagnos ed, and radiographic studies showed no worsening of her condition since 2000. Mo reover, her treating physicians did not place functional limitations on her activities precluding sedentary work, and according to two consultative medical experts she could pe rform more than sedentary work. Finally, Polson described restrict ed daily activities but , as the ALJ noted, there was no evidence of her medical providers placing these restrictions on her. So long as the ALJ “sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in evaluating the claimant’s credibility,” he n eed not make a “formalistic f actor-by-factor recitation of the evidence.” Qualls v. Apfel , 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000). Objective evidence does not support her subject complaints. Polson complains of the boilerplate langua ge used by the ALJ, to wit: her “statements concerning the intensity, pe rsistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms [were] . . . not cred ible to the extent they [wer e] inconsistent with [his RFC] assessment.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2, at 13. The use of boilerplate language, “in the absence of a more thorough analysis” is insufficient to support an ALJ’s credibility determination. Hardman v. Barnhart , 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 2004). But here, the ALJ did more than merely recite boilerplate. As noted above, he provided specific reasons for his credibil ity determination, and he linked his credibility determination to the evidence, as required. We fully concur with the magistrate judge’s discussion and analysis of the record: the ALJ properly evaluated- 5 - Polson’s credibility and his findings are s upported by substantial evidence in the record. We now turn to the ALJ’s use of the Gr ids. At step fi ve the ALJ has the burden to show there are other jobs a claima nt can adjust to that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. See Daniels v. Apfel , 154 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 1998). This bur den can be met either by (1) the testimony of a VE, or (2) by reference to the Grids. Id . “The [G]rids are matric es of the four factors identified by Congress—physical ability, age, education, and work experience—and set forth rules that identify whether jobs requiring specific comb inations of these factors exist in significant numbe rs in the national economy.” Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, the Grids may not be used conclusively if the claimant has nonexertional impairments, such as pain or mental impairments, limiting the ability to do the full range of wo rk within a classification. See Thompson v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1993). Polson contends th e ALJ’s use of the Grids was error because she has nonexertional li mitations of pain and a mild mental impairment of anxiety. As the magistrate judge correctly noted , use of the Grids is foreclosed only where the “nonexertional impairments are si gnificant enough to limit the range of jobs available in a given work category.” Glass v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1994). As discussed above, the ALJ found Po lson’s pain not to be limiting in her ability to perform a full range of se dentary work. Further, after discussing the- 6 - evidence, the ALJ found her anxiety to be m ild and treatable, not imposing more than a slight effect on he r ability to work. See Evans v. Chater , 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10 th Cir. 1995) (ability to perform “substan tial majority” of work in RFC assessment suffices for purposes of Grids) . These findings are suppor ted by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence supported th e ALJ’s conclusion that Polson’s nonexertional impairments did not limit her RFC to perform a full range of sedentary work. Although Polson has some pain a nd anxiety, the evidence does not indicate that these impairments prevent her from working. Thus, the ALJ did not err in applying the Grids. See Castellano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1030 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[t]he mere presence of a nonexertional impairment does not preclude reliance on the grids”; it “m ust interfere with th e ability to work.”). Polson also complains about the ALJ’s step-five determination, claiming it was flawed because his hypothetical ques tion to the VE did not contain any limitations due to her alleged anxiety. This argument is without merit. The ALJ only questioned the VE at step four, and hi s only question was to confirm Polson’s inability to return to her past relevant wo rk. Because the ALJ found that Polson had the RFC to perform a full range of sedentar y work, he relied upon the Grids only to make his step-five determination, without need of consultation with the VE. Thus, there was no error in the ALJ’s step-fiv e determination.- 7 - The judgment of the magist rate judge is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Terrence L. O’Brien Circuit Judge