August 7, 1959 

Honorable H. H. Wellborn Opinion No. WW-683 

County Attorney 

Rusk County Re: Questions relating to 

Henderson, Texas the "Welfare and Probation Office" of 

Dear Mr. Wellborn: Rusk County. 

In your brief of the case you have, outlined the 

following: 

"In 1935, the Commissioners Court of 

Rusk County, duly passed an order which 

was entered in the minutes, to this effect: 

‘The Court engages the services of 

(naming the person) as Probation Offor Rusk County; that said officers duties 

shall be that as enumerated in Art. 5142, 

of the R.C.S. 1925, and in addition that 

all relief or charity cases coming up for 

consideration to be handled through her office, that the appointment shall be for a 

term of 2 years, etc.' 

"The party appointed at that time, did 

some work for the Sheriff and District Attorney's office, in the way of handling female prisoners. But at least 99% of the 

work of the office was looking after charltY. Of late years, the 'Welfare Officers' 

have performed the charity provisions exclusively. Facts show the two welfare 

officers investigate cases of alleged needy 

persons and give 'orders' for groceries, 

medical and hospital attention, then present the bill to the County (Commissioners 

Court) who approve the bill, and pay them 

by drafts drawn on the County. 
,- . 

Honorable H. H. Wellborn, page 2 (W-683) 

"Article 51391, Revised Civil Statutes, 

creates a 'Juvenile Board' for Rusk and Harrlson Counties and the Juvenile Officer has been 

authorized by the Court, and we are now In the 

process of employing one under the statute 

above set out. 

"The Welfare bill of Rusk County last 

year was $63,000.00~~ 

Your first question is: 

"Does the 'Welfare and Probation Office' 

legally exist under the above facts?"~ 

It Is presumed that the Juvenile Officers appointed 

In 1935 were appointed under authority of the Acts of the 36th 

Legislature, Second Called Session, 1919, Chapter 51, page 130, 

codified as Article 5142 In Vernon's Civil Statutes., We would 

like to point out that this statute Is a general law applying to all counties in general and was not limited to any 

specific county. The statute providing for a "juvenile board 

for Rusk and Harrison Counties" Is set up in the Acts of 1955, 

54th Legislature, Regular Session, Chapter 106, page 385, and 

codified as Article 51393 of Vernon's Civil Statutes. This 

Is a special law covering the subject of juvenile boards and 

juvenile officers in Harrison and Rusk Counties. 

In the case styled Ssm Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of 

Houston, 145 Tex. 492, 198 9 S. .2 

The general rule is that when the 

law msGs'a'genera1 provision, apparently for 

all cases, and a special provision for a particular class, the general must yield to the special In so far as the particular class Is concerned. Perez v. Perez, 59 Tex. 322. This 

rule is based upon the principal that all acts 

and parts thereof must stand, If possible, each 

occupying its proper place; and that the lntention of the Legislature Is more clearly reflected 

by a particular statute than by a general one. 

Accordingly, a specific act la properly regarded 

as an exception to, or qualification of, a general law on the same subject previously enacted . . .'I 

See also Townsend v. Terrell, 118 Tex. 463, 16 

S.W.2d 1063; Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 

161, 214 S.W.2d 282 (1948). 
Honorable H. H. Wellborn, page 3 (~~-683) 

We would also point out that Section 4 of Article 

51393 of Vernon's Civil Statutes, which Is the special law 

setting up the Juvenile Board in Rusk County, provides: 

All laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith are repealed to the extent of 

such conflict." 

From the holding In the case just cited above, and 

from the repealing section of this Statute, It would seem 

that the general provisions of Article 5142 of Vernon's 

Civil Statutes as to appointment of juvenile officers is 

repealed and superseded by the provisions of Article 51393, 

which Is a special law and gives jurisdiction to the County 

Juvenile Board of Rusk County. 

We cannot find authority for the use of Juvenile 

Officers "to make investigations for charity in Rusk County." 

From an examination of Article 5142 of Vernon's Civil Statutes, it seems that the only counties where the extra duties 

of Juvenile Officers "shall be to make investigations for the 

Commissioners' Court on applications for charity" is In counties having a population of 150,000 or more. No such extra 

duties are specified for counties having a lesser population, 

such as Rusk County. 

Therefore in answer to your first and third questions, 

you are advised that the Welfare and Probation Office will not 

legally exist and will be vacated by the provisions of Article 51393 when the Juvenile Board appoints new juvenile offlcers. 

In answer to your other two questions, which read as 

follows: 

"2. Do the Welfare and Probations Officers 

(though doing nothing but welfare) have the power 

to purchase groceries, medicine and hospitilization for needy persons, whose needs, they alone 

determine, without prior authority to incur such 

Indebtedness, from the Commissioners Court?" 

“4. May the Commissioners Court delegate 

their authority, to provide for paupers and indigent sick of the County, to the so called 

'Welfare and Probation Officers' and will the 

County be obligated to pay suoh bills, such 

officers, to authorize these expenditures before consulting the Court?" 
Honorable H. H. Wellborn, page 4 (WW-683) 

we point out the following: 

Section 11 of Article 2351 of Vernon's Civil Statutes, 

provides: 

%ach commissioners court shall: 

II 

. . . 

"11. Provide for the support of paupers 

and such idiots and lunatics as cannot be admitted Into the lunatic asylum, residents of 

their county, who are unable to support themselves. . . .' 

Section 18 of Article V of the Constitution of Texas 

reads in part: 

II 

. . . The County Commissioners so chosen, 

with the County Judge presiding officer, shall 

compose the County Commissioners Court, which 

shall exercise such powers and jurisdlatlon over 

all county business as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may 

be hereafter prescribed." (Emphasis added.) 

The general rule is that County Commissioners Courts 

have no power, except that specially conferred by the Constltution or statute. v. Campbell, 48 S.W.2d 515 (Civ.App. 

Howard v. Hen on County,116 S.W.2d 479 (Civ.App. 

However, where a duty is Imposed or a power conferred 

by statute upon a commissioners court within the boundaries 

of power which the Constitution has created, then the commlssloners court has implied authority to exerclse.broad dlscretion to accomplish purposes intended by such statute. El Paso 

County v. Elem, 106 S.W.2d 393 (Clv.App. 1937); Dodson v. Marshall 18 S W 2d 621 (Civ.App. 1938); Anderson v. 

%&!O:, 152 S.W.2d 1084. 

W ood, 137 

The commlssloners court Is the general business and 

contracting agency of a county , and It alone has authority 

to make contracts binding on the county, unless otherwise 

specifically provided by-statute. 

i61 S.W. 2d 322 (Civ.App. 1942). 

Weir~v. Anderson County 

A contract between an individual and a county must 

be made through the agency of the commissioners court, or it 
Honorable H. H. Wellborn, page 5 (WW-683) 

is not binding on either party. 

85 S.W. 475 (Clv.App. 1905). 

Presidio County v. Clarke, 

In the case of Gano, et al. v. Palo Pinto County, 71 

Tex. 99, 8 S.W. 634, it is said: 

. . We think it the duty of these courts 

&&mnissioners Courtgto select themselves 

such agents as may be necessary to assist 

them In the discharge of their functions, 

when such agents have necessarily to exercise judgment and discretion in the performance of the work assigned them. The 

duty of making such selection should not be 

delegated. . . .~'I 

!Phe language of the above cited cases Indicate that 

the commissioners courts can select agents to assist them In 

county functions and may employ such oounty welfare workers 

as in-their discretion are necessary to achomplish the duties 

imposed on them by Section 11 of Artiale 2351, Vernon's Civil 

Statutes. 

In order for funds to pay a welfare worker and funds 

for relief to be available for the purposes set out under 

Section 11 of Article 2351, Vernon's Civil Statutes, the Commissioners Court would have to so provide in its budget and 

designate such money for that purpose. The welfare worker 

could then contract for the expenditure of such welfare funds 

as directed by the Commissioners Court, but such contracts 

would be subject to the review and approval of the Conmissioners Court before being payable by the County. 

You have referred to that portion of Attorney General's 

Opinion O-1919 (1940) which holds that "the Commissioners' 

Court is not authorized to employ a county welfare worker". 

That portion of that opinion is modified so far as It conflicts with the holding of this opinion so as to conform to 

the holding of this opinion. 

SUMMARY 

The Acts of the 54th Legislature, 1955, 

chapter 106, page 385, codified as Artlcle 51393, Vernon's Civil Statutes, supersedes the Acts of the 36th Legislature, 

Second Called Session, 1919, page 130, 

codified as Article 5142 of Vernon's 

Civil Statutes, and future Juvenile 
Honorable H. H. Wellborn, page 6 (~~-683) 

Officers shall be appointed and dismissed by the County Juvenile Board of 

Rusk County; and the Commissloners~ 

Court no longer has the power to appoint or maintain Juvenile Officers 

appointed under the provisions of 

Article 5142, Vernon's Civil Statutes. 

The Commissioners Court may delegate 

their authority to provide for paupers 

and Indigent sick of the county to welfare workers, whose powers shall be to 

investigate and determine who are paupers and indigent sick persons and to 

contract for expenditure of budgeted 

funds for the relief of those persons 

who are qualified to receive them under 

Section 11 of Article 2351, Vernon's 

Civil Statutes, but all contracts so 

made are subject to the review and approval of the Commissioners Court before 

becoming payable by the County. 

Yours very truly, 

QCR:zt:mfh 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

ffeo. P. Blackburn, Chairman 

Qrundy Wlllisms 

Bean I&via 

Paul W. Floyd, Jr. 

WILL WILSON 

Attorney Qeneral of Texas 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY: Leonard Passmore