In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 99-1508 and 99-2183

Federal Election Commission,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Al Salvi for Senate Committee

and Stephanie Mustell, as Treasurer,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 C 4933 and No. 98 C 1321--George W. Lindberg, Judge.

Argued December 8, 1999--Decided March 8, 2000

 Before Harlington Wood, Jr., Coffey and Flaum, Circuit

Judges.

 Flaum, Circuit Judge. The Federal Election

Commission ("Commission") appeals an order of the

United States District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois denying the Commission’s

motion under Rules 60(b)(1) and (b)(4) for relief

from an order dismissing a civil enforcement

action the Commission had brought against the Al

Salvi for Senate Committee and its treasurer,

Stephanie Mustell, (collectively, "defendants")

for violations of the Federal Election Campaign

Act. The Commission also appeals the dismissal,

and refusal to alter or amend the judgment, of a

subsequent action, which the district court held

was barred by the first dismissal under res

judicata. For the reasons stated below, we

affirm.

Background

 On March 3, 1998, the Commission filed a

complaint in the district court alleging that the

defendants violated the Federal Election Campaign

Act of 1971 by failing to properly report

campaign contributions. At the time it filed the

complaint, the Commission had no attorneys on the

case who were members of the Northern District of

Illinois Bar, and the Commission had neither
designated local counsel for service, as required

by the district court’s General Rule 3.13, nor

filed a petition for admission pro hac vice under

General Rule 3.12. 

 On April 2, 1998, the Commission filed an ex

parte motion for waiver of the local counsel and

admission requirements. On April 7, the district

court issued an order denying the Commission’s

motion for failure to comply with General Rule

15(B), which requires that an ex parte motion be

supported by an affidavit showing cause. The

front side of the order stated, at the bottom of

the page, that further details were printed on

the reverse side. On the reverse side, the order

indicated that the court had considered and

rejected the merits of the Commission’s motion

for waiver of the court’s requirements: "even if

the requirements of 15(B) had been met and even

if the court had determined plaintiff’s motion

was appropriate for consideration ex parte, the

motion would have been denied." 

 Due to a recording error at the court clerk’s

office, the Commission’s counsel only received

notice of the April 7 order on May 8, 1998. At

that time, the Commission’s counsel only copied

and read the front side of the order, and were

therefore unaware that the court had considered

and rejected the merits of the Commission’s April

2 motion. Consequently, the Commission refiled

its motion for waiver of the court’s local

counsel and admission requirements.

 On June 10, 1998, the district court again

denied the Commission’s motion, and this time

struck all documents filed by the Commission for

failure to designate local counsel. The June 10

order also noted that the Commission’s counsel

had, in failing to do so, directly violated the

court’s previous, April 7 order. On July 8, 1998,

the court, sua sponte, entered an order pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)

dismissing the Commission’s action.

 According to the Commission, it had begun

compliance with the court’s directives upon

receipt of the June 10 order by obtaining local

counsel, petitioning for admission pro hac vice,

and filing an amended complaint, appearance form,

and summonses. Following dismissal of its case,

on August 10, 1998, the Commission refiled its

case against the defendants, and this second case

was assigned to the same district court judge as

the first action. The Commission did not move to

alter or amend the July 8 dismissal order nor did

it file a notice of appeal of the court’s ruling

in the original action. On November 30, 1998, the

court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss

the second action with prejudice on the ground
that it was barred by the doctrine of res

judicata, because the original action was

dismissed with prejudice. 

 Upon learning from the court’s November 30

order that the court’s first dismissal was with

prejudice, the Commission filed a motion under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate

the July 8 order dismissing the first action and

to thereby permit the Commission to file a

complaint to replace the one stricken by the

court in June. The Commission argued that the

dismissal was void as a matter of law; that it

was based on the court’s mistaken belief that the

Commission had failed to comply with previous

orders; and that any delay in complying with

prior orders was the result of "excusable

neglect." The Commission concurrently filed a

motion under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the

judgment in the second action, arguing that the

second action was not barred by the first action

because, to the extent the earlier dismissal

constituted a final judgment, it was void. The

court denied these motions. The Commission now

appeals the district court’s denial of its Rule

60(b) motion as well as the judgment dismissing

the Commission’s second action.

Discussion

 Although we are asked today to review several

decisions by the district court stemming from two

separate actions, the Commission ultimately seeks

to revisit the district court’s sua sponte

dismissal with prejudice of the first action. We

are somewhat sympathetic to the Commission--

though it seems clear that this case is before us

because the Commission’s counsel repeatedly

failed to heed clear directives from the district

court--because, as explained below, we believe

the district court abused its discretion in

dismissing the first action with prejudice.

However, the procedural posture of this case

leaves us no choice but to affirm the decisions

on which this appeal is based.

A.

 The Commission argues that the district court

erred in concluding that the sua sponte dismissal

of the first action barred the second action

under res judicata. The Commission contends that

when the court dismissed the first action for

failure to satisfy local counsel and admission

requirements, the court did not purport to

address the merits and did not specify whether

the dismissal was with or without prejudice to

the Commission’s refiling its complaint. The

defendants respond that the district court’s

dismissal of the first action was not based on
technical, procedural shortfalls. Rather, they

argue, the district court ordered the first

action dismissed as a sanction for the

Commission’s violation of court orders. While the

July 1998 order of dismissal did not address the

merits of the first action, Rule 41(b)

establishes a presumption that such an order

operates as an adjudication of the merits. Any

later suit with the same allegations was

therefore subject to dismissal based on res

judicata.

 The district court in the second action

resolved this dispute in favor of the defendants,

stating that its July 1998 dismissal was a

sanction for what amounted to lack of

prosecution. In its order dated November 30,

1998, dismissing the second action as barred by

res judicata, the district court stated that the

first action "was involuntarily dismissed as a

sanction for plaintiff’s violation of this

court’s rules and violation of a court order. .

. . The dismissal of the prior action was not for

lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure

to join a party under Rule 19. Therefore, since

the order of dismissal did not otherwise specify,

dismissal of the prior action operated as

adjudication on the merits of the claims brought

in that action." The heart of the Commission’s

appeal is that the district court’s dismissal "on

the merits" was improper.

 Although the local counsel rule, Northern

District of Illinois General Rule 3.13,

specifically indicates that a party’s documents

may be stricken as a sanction for failure to

obtain local counsel, the language of the rule

does not preclude alternative remedies when

necessary. Moreover, a federal court is granted

authority to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule

41(b) for failure to comply with a prior court

order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Finally, courts have

discretion to impose sanctions to protect the

judicial process, Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501

U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991), and the authority of a

court to dismiss cases sua sponte for lack of

prosecution has long been considered an "inherent

power" that is "necessarily vested in courts to

manage their own affairs so as to achieve the

orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."

Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31

(1962). 

 We appreciate the district court’s frustration

with the Commission’s lack of diligence and its

failures to comply with court directives in the

first action. We also recognize that district

courts must have wide discretion to manage

litigation. "Because district judges have a

better understanding of their litigants and their
docket, review of managerial decisions such as

this one are appropriately deferential." Johnson

v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 1994). In

this case, however, we believe the district court

acted beyond its discretionary authority in

dismissing sua sponte the first action.

 In Link, the Supreme Court held that the

absence of express notice prior to a sua sponte

dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute

is not an automatic denial of due process. 370

U.S. at 632. However, in Ball v. City of Chicago,

2 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 1993), we restricted a

district court’s dismissal powers in this regard

by requiring the court to provide "due warning"

to plaintiff’s counsel. Although we recognized in

Ball that there may be extreme circumstances in

which an explicit warning is unnecessary before

sua sponte dismissal is used as a sanction, id.

at 756; see also Johnson, 34 F.3d at 468

(encouraging, but not requiring, a warning before

dismissing a case for failure to prosecute where

the plaintiff repeatedly delayed the litigation

and finally failed to attend the trial without

sufficient excuse), we have repeatedly emphasized

the general rule that explicit warning must be

given to a plaintiff’s counsel prior to

dismissal. See Williams v. Chicago Bd. of Educ.,

155 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 1998). "[D]ismissals

without warning are appropriate in only the most

extreme cases, where it is clear that counsel

must have expected his actions (or inaction) to

be answered with dismissal." In re Bluestein &

Co., 68 F.3d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1995).

 Although we do not excuse the Commission’s

conduct--indeed, we are puzzled that the

Commission put itself in this position at all--it

is hard to see how the recitation of the local

rules in the April order would have highlighted

the possibility of sanctions far beyond those

authorized by the rules themselves. Under Ball,

the district court’s actions in this case amount

to abuse of discretion.

B.

 Nevertheless, despite our conclusion that the

district court abused its discretion in

dismissing the first action with prejudice, that

decision itself is not so squarely before us.

Presumably because the Commission’s counsel did

not realize that the dismissal was on the merits

until after the time limit for doing so expired,

the Commission did not bring a direct appeal.

Rather, it brought a second suit, and now asks us

to review the district court’s dismissal of that

suit as barred by the first one, as well as the

district court’s refusal to vacate the first

judgment under Rule 60. None of these avenues
provides relief in this case.

 The Commission first relies on two subdivisions

of Rule 60(b), which enables the district court

to "relieve a party or a party’s legal

representative from a final judgment, order or

proceeding." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The Commission

argues that the district court should have

vacated the first dismissal judgment under Rule

60(b)(4), which applies to void judgments, or

alternatively under Rule 60(b)(1), which applies

to adverse judgments stemming from excusable

neglect. The district court denied the

Commission’s Rule 60 motion, finding the

Commission’s pleas meritless. 

 The Commission argues that it was entitled to

relief under Rule 60(b)(4) because the dismissal

of the first action is void. A judgment is void

within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(4) where it is

entered by the court without jurisdiction or in

contravention of due process, Wesco Products Co.

v. Alloy Automotive Co., 880 F.2d 981, 984 (7th

Cir. 1989), and we review denials of 60(b)(4)

motions de novo to the extent they turn on errors

of law. Grun v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 163 F.3d 411,

423 (7th Cir. 1998). The Commission contends that

the dismissal violated due process because the

court failed to give it adequate notice that the

court was contemplating dismissal of the

Commission’s action. However, Link made it clear

that failure to notify a party of the possibility

of dismissal does not necessarily render an

involuntary dismissal void. 370 U.S. at 632.

While we believe the district court’s failure to

warn of the impending dismissal constituted abuse

of discretion, under the facts of this case it

cannot be said that the district court’s

discretionary abuse rose to the level of due

process deprivation. Although a warning would

have been appropriate, this case was not

dismissed entirely out of the blue, over an issue

that the Commission was never apprized of. See,

e.g., Grun, 163 F.3d at 423-24 (holding that the

plaintiff was denied due process when his case

was dismissed for failure to appear at trial,

when he did not receive notice of the trial

date). To the contrary, the district court made

clear its intention to enforce the local rules

strictly in its orders, which at every turn the

Commission chose to read in the light affording

it the most flexibility. We agree that the

dismissal should not have been vacated under Rule

60(b)(4) as void. See Link, 370 U.S. at 633

("[W]hen circumstances make such an action

appropriate, a District Court may dismiss a

complaint for failure to prosecute even without

affording notice of its intention to do so or

providing an adversary hearing before acting.

Whether such an order can stand on appeal depends
not on power but on whether it was within the

permissible range of the court’s discretion.").

 The Commission also contends that the district

court’s July order dismissing the action should

have been vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).

Under this subsection, a court may vacate a final

judgment based on mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect. Fed.R.Civ.P.

60(b)(1). Unlike the Rule 60(b)(4) inquiry, this

one focuses not on the dismissal itself but on

the conduct that gave rise to it. The Supreme

Court explained in Pioneer Investment Services

Co. v. Brunswick Associates, 507 U.S. 380 (1993),

that attorney carelessness can constitute

excusable neglect, but 60(b)(1) relief remains a

discretionary safety valve, and our review under

Rule 60(b)(1) is extremely deferential. United

States v. Golden Elevator, Inc., 27 F.3d 301, 303

(7th Cir. 1994). Our review of the district

court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion convinces

us that the district court adequately considered

the Commission’s explanations for its delays in

complying with court orders as well as delays

resulting from the court clerk’s own errors.

Although the circumstances of this case might

arguably constitute excusable neglect permitting

relief, they certainly do not compel that

conclusion. See id. (stating that a Rule 60(b)(1)

motion stands "unless no reasonable person could

have acted as the judge did"). Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s denial of the

Commission’s Rule 60(b) motion.

 In addition to appealing the Rule 60 motion

pertaining to the first action, the Commission

appeals the district court’s judgment in the

second action, which dismissed the case as barred

under res judicata by the first dismissal, and

the Commission also appeals the district court’s

denial of the Commission’s Rule 59(e) motion to

alter or amend that second judgment. This

challenge rests on the assumption that the first

judgment was not on the merits, for it is

undisputed that a decision on the merits would

bar relitigation of the same claim by the

Commission. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd.

of Educ., 68 F.3d 172, 177 (7th Cir. 1995).

However, we have already found that the first

action was dismissed with prejudice, and that the

sua sponte dismissal in that case (though an

abuse of discretion) therefore operated as

adjudication on the merits. Faced with the

dismissal of its first suit, the Commission could

have taken the customary paths of seeking

reinstatement of its first suit, moving for

amendment of that judgment under Rule 59(e), or

directly appealing. By filing the second action,

and now appealing the dismissal of that action as

barred by res judicata, the Commission is
pursuing what amounts to an impermissible

collateral attack on the first judgment. See

Hudson v. Hedge, 27 F.3d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1994)

(holding that a plaintiff "cannot use a new suit

to contend that the disposition of the first was

mistaken"). The Commission cannot use review of

the dismissal of the second action to revisit

decisions in the first action that it should have

challenged directly. Accordingly, we find no

error in the district court’s disposition of the

second action.

Conclusion

 For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the

rulings of the district court