UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

JUDY LUANNE POLSON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 

of Social Security Administration, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 12-7039 

(D.C. No. 6:10-CV-00463-KEW) 

(E.D. Okla.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before KELLY, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Judy Luanne Polson appeals from a judgment of the magistrate judge1

affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Upon the parties’ consent, the case was referred to the magistrate judge to 

conduct all proceedings and to order entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 23, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
- 2 - 

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Exercising jurisdiction under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

Polson was born in 1962, has a high school education, and has prior work 

experience as a home health aide, teacher’s aide, cashier, and sales clerk. Her right 

leg was surgically repaired after a 1983 motorcycle accident, and she was diagnosed 

with degenerative joint disease in her knees and right hip in 2002. The magistrate 

judge’s decision thoroughly describes the medical evidence in the record, thus we do 

not repeat it here. Polson applied for benefits in December 2006, claiming disability 

due to aching and swelling in her right leg and right hip. Her application was denied 

initially and on reconsideration. She then received a de novo hearing before an 

administrative law judge (ALJ), at which she and a vocational expert (VE) testified. 

The ALJ found that Polson (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since September 2004; (2) had severe impairments of degenerative joint disease, 

degenerative disc disease, and a prior right leg fracture; (3) did not have an 

impairment, or combination of impairments, that met the criteria for presumptive 

disability; (4) had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a full range of 

sedentary work, and could not return to her past relevant work; but (5) could perform 

other work that exists in significant number in the economy, applying the 

medical-vocational guidelines (Grids). Based on the above the ALJ concluded 

Polson was not disabled. See Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010) 
- 3 - 

(describing five-step evaluation process). The Appeals Council denied review, and 

the magistrate judge, sitting by consent, affirmed. 

Polson raises two issues on appeal, arguing that the ALJ (1) did not perform a 

proper step-five determination, and (2) failed to perform a proper credibility 

determination. “We review the [magistrate judge’s] decision de novo and 

independently determine whether the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and 

supported by substantial evidence.” Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 

(10th Cir. 2005). 

We first address the ALJ’s credibility determination. Polson contends the ALJ 

failed to discuss and properly apply the factors for assessing credibility when he 

found her subjective complaints of disabling pain not to be credible. A disability 

claimant’s complaints of disabling pain are evaluated using the three-step analysis set 

out in Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987). Under Luna, an ALJ faced 

with a claim of disabling pain is required to consider and determine (1) whether the 

claimant established a pain-producing impairment by objective medical evidence; 

(2) if so, whether the impairment is reasonably expected to produce some pain of the 

sort alleged; and (3) if so, whether, considering all the evidence, both objective and 

subjective, the claimant’s pain was in fact disabling. Id. at 163-64. 

The ALJ did discuss a number of the Luna factors and tied them to evidence in 

the record. In evaluating Polson’s subjective complaints of disabling pain the ALJ 

compared them to objective factors: there is no medical evidence that Polson sought 
- 4 - 

treatment for, or complained of, leg or hip pain until four to five years after her 

degenerative joint disease was diagnosed, and radiographic studies showed no 

worsening of her condition since 2000. Moreover, her treating physicians did not 

place functional limitations on her activities precluding sedentary work, and 

according to two consultative medical experts she could perform more than sedentary 

work. Finally, Polson described restricted daily activities but, as the ALJ noted, 

there was no evidence of her medical providers placing these restrictions on her. So 

long as the ALJ “sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in evaluating the 

claimant’s credibility,” he need not make a “formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of 

the evidence.” Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000). Objective 

evidence does not support her subject complaints. 

Polson complains of the boilerplate language used by the ALJ, to wit: her 

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] 

symptoms [were] . . . not credible to the extent they [were] inconsistent with [his 

RFC] assessment.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2, at 13. The use of boilerplate language, “in 

the absence of a more thorough analysis” is insufficient to support an ALJ’s 

credibility determination. Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 2004). 

But here, the ALJ did more than merely recite boilerplate. As noted above, he 

provided specific reasons for his credibility determination, and he linked his 

credibility determination to the evidence, as required. We fully concur with the 

magistrate judge’s discussion and analysis of the record: the ALJ properly evaluated 
- 5 - 

Polson’s credibility and his findings are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. 

We now turn to the ALJ’s use of the Grids. At step five the ALJ has the 

burden to show there are other jobs a claimant can adjust to that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy. See Daniels v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 1129, 1132 

(10th Cir. 1998). This burden can be met either by (1) the testimony of a VE, or 

(2) by reference to the Grids. Id. “The [G]rids are matrices of the four factors 

identified by Congress—physical ability, age, education, and work experience—and 

set forth rules that identify whether jobs requiring specific combinations of these 

factors exist in significant numbers in the national economy.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Generally, the Grids may not be used conclusively if the claimant 

has nonexertional impairments, such as pain or mental impairments, limiting the 

ability to do the full range of work within a classification. See Thompson v. Sullivan, 

987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1993). Polson contends the ALJ’s use of the Grids 

was error because she has nonexertional limitations of pain and a mild mental 

impairment of anxiety. 

As the magistrate judge correctly noted, use of the Grids is foreclosed only 

where the “nonexertional impairments are significant enough to limit the range of 

jobs available in a given work category.” Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1396 

(10th Cir. 1994). As discussed above, the ALJ found Polson’s pain not to be limiting 

in her ability to perform a full range of sedentary work. Further, after discussing the 
- 6 - 

evidence, the ALJ found her anxiety to be mild and treatable, not imposing more than 

a slight effect on her ability to work. See Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 

(10th Cir. 1995) (ability to perform “substantial majority” of work in RFC assessment 

suffices for purposes of Grids). These findings are supported by substantial evidence 

in the record. 

Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Polson’s 

nonexertional impairments did not limit her RFC to perform a full range of sedentary 

work. Although Polson has some pain and anxiety, the evidence does not indicate 

that these impairments prevent her from working. Thus, the ALJ did not err in 

applying the Grids. See Castellano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 

1027, 1030 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[t]he mere presence of a nonexertional impairment 

does not preclude reliance on the grids”; it “must interfere with the ability to work.”). 

Polson also complains about the ALJ’s step-five determination, claiming it 

was flawed because his hypothetical question to the VE did not contain any 

limitations due to her alleged anxiety. This argument is without merit. The ALJ only 

questioned the VE at step four, and his only question was to confirm Polson’s 

inability to return to her past relevant work. Because the ALJ found that Polson had 

the RFC to perform a full range of sedentary work, he relied upon the Grids only to 

make his step-five determination, without need of consultation with the VE. Thus, 

there was no error in the ALJ’s step-five determination. 
- 7 - 

 The judgment of the magistrate judge is affirmed. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Terrence L. O’Brien 

 Circuit Judge