### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 15 , 200 6
JAM ES M ATT HEW GR AY v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2002-D- 2051 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr ., Judge

No. M2005- 02142-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Dece m ber 7, 2006

T h e p et i t i o n er , J am es M at t h ew Gr ay , p l ed gu i l t y i n t h e D av i d s o n C o u n t y

C ri m i n al C o u rt t o a c h ar ge of re ckless homicide. He was sentenc ed to twelve y ear s in the Department of Correc tion as a ca ree r offe nder with a rele ase elig ibilit y of six ty perc ent. He was orig inally indicted on two counts : (1) fe lon y mur de r, a nd

(2 ) e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d rob be ry

. As pa rt of his ple a a g re e me nt, he a g re e d to plead out of rang e of his of fende r status. On appea l, he ar g ues that his g uiltyplea wa s involuntary and unknowing ly

enter ed bec ause he asserts that he rec eived ineffe ctive assistance of counse l. After
car eful review, we conclude t hat t he petiti oner ha s not met his burden of showing that he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e and, f urther, that he has not shown that his plea wa s involuntary and unknowing

. No g rounds for relief exis t, and the judg ment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., and J. S. (S TEVE ) D ANI EL , S R

. J ., joined.

J e f r e S

. G o l d tr ap , N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , J a m e s M a t t h e w G r a y.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ral and Re po rt e r; L e sli e E. Pr ic e , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. (Torry ) Johns on, I I I , District Attorne y G e n e r a l; an d

L is a N aylor, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Fa cts and Proce dural History
During the g uiltyplea he aring , the prosec ution offer ed the f ollowing state ment of proof reg arding the under ly ing of fense s in this m atter:-2-

The proof in this case would show that, on Aug ust tenth of two-thousand-a ndtwo, a robbe ry

and shooting took place at a fruit stand located on Old -- on -

- L ebanon Roa d, near

Old Hickory

Boule vard, in He rmitag e.
Th e vic tim

wa s A lph e us T. Hi nto n, the Th ir d, wh o w a s so rt of ma nn ing that f

ru it stand.

Th e pr oo f w ou ld f

urthe r s ho w that th e re we re tw o o the r c o- de fe nd a nts , a lon g wi th Mr. Gray , orig inally

MistySidicaine and He idi Sm iley . They have a lrea dy

pled g u i l t y. The proof would show that Mr. Gray drove Ms. Sidicaine a nd Ms. Smi ley to the fr uit sta nd . H e re ma ine d in the c ar. On e of the wo me n h a d p re vio us ly ha d s ome de a lin g s w ith Mr . H int on a ndkn e w that he of te n k e pt a larg e a mou nt o f m on e y

in his truck at the f

ruit stand.

She was a rmed with a f

irea rm. She went to Mr. Hinton and de manded money

. He r efuse d to give her a ny . She produce d the g un. At that point the gun w as either shot into the air or

into the trunk of a c ar.
Af te r tha t Mr . H int on , th e vic tim in this c a se , b e g a n to str

ug g le wi th M s. Sid ic a ine , in or de r t o g e t th e g un . M s. Smil e y wa s p re se nt d uring a ll o f this

. During that alterc ation and during that strug g le, Mr. Hinton was shot; and hedied approximately

two day s later f

rom that g unshot wound.

The wome n then re turned to the ve hicle, whe re Mr . Gra y was wa iting; and they d r o v e a w a y.
Th e y we re sto pp e d b y

a po lic e of fi c e r, wh o w a s u na wa

re of wh a t ha d ju st
occur red. Mr . Gra y

didn’t have a

driver’ s license, but he a llowed them to g o on.
The victim was a

ble to stumble to a near

by pay phone and c all Nine-O ne-O ne and g ive a de sc ri pti on of

the c ar, a s w e ll a s w ho ha d s ho t hi m.
The off icer then re alized, when he he ard on dispatc h, that that was the c ar he had just stopped. So, he found it a short time later. I n the ca r they found the murde r wea pon.
As I no te d, Ms. Sid ic a ine a ndMs. Smil e y pr e vio us ly

ple a de d g uil ty . T he y

did ag ree , as part of their plea ag ree ment, to testify

ag ainst Mr. Gray , should that b e c o m e n e c e s s ar y.-3-

Th e y wo uldte sti fy

-- Mr . G ray

dis a g re e s w ith thi s v e ry

str on g ly -- bu t th e y

wo uld te sti fy fo r the Sta te that, i n th e ho te l r oo m th a t th e y we re stay ing in p ri or

to this happening , they

all ag ree d that they

neede d money ; that Ms. Si dicaine kne w, a g a in, that Mr . H int onof

te n h a d c a sh ; th a t Mr . G ray g a ve the m a

we apo n a ndtol d them to be sure that they

came back w ith money , that this was not just a dry run.

Ba sed on these f

acts, the State’ s proof a t trial would’ve be en that Mr. Gr ay was awa re tha t this was going to be a r obbery and that the murde r incurr ed (sic) during t h e s tru g g l e d u r i n g t h a tr o b b e r y.

I would also note for

the re cord that the victim’s family in this case -- we ha ve dis c us se d th is r e so lut ion wi th the m, andthe y are a wa re of it.
At the post-conviction hea ring , the petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he repr esente d the petitioner beg inning some tim e between Gener al S essions Court and the Criminal Court indictment
a ndthat he wa s e mpl oy e d a s th e pu bli c de fe nd e r. Cou ns e l s aid that th e pe tit ion e r w a s o ri g ina lly char g ed with fe lony

murder and especially

ag g rava ted robbe ry

and that he ne g otiated a plea ag ree ment to rec kless homicide. He r eca lled there wer e two co-defe ndants cha rg ed along with the petitioner and tha t he investig ated the c o-def endants, their sta tements, and the f actua l issues about the case

. Counsel r eca lled that either he or someone in his office met with the petitioner numerous times to discuss the investigation of the c ase . He r eca lled that the petitioner ha d some prior misdemeanor c onvictions but had no felony convictions though the eventua l plea ag ree ment called fo r h im t o p le a d a s a

c are e r o ff

e nd e r. He sa id that he me t w ith the pe tit ion e r t o e xpla in the of fe r t o him and that they

met at least once at the jail and once at the courthouse. H e re called e x plaining the sentenc ing r ang es to the petitioner a nd wher e the pe titioner would fall in those rang es. He sa id they probably explained to the petitioner that the law a llowed a ne g otiated plea that was out of ra ng e. He said the petitioner wa s unhappy about the of

fe r but felt it was more attrac tive than some of the possibili ties at trial. He sa id his advice would ha ve bee n to acc ep t t h e agr eeme nt, because the pe tit ion e r wa s a t g re a t ri sk if he we nt to tr ia l. He wa nte d the pe tit ion e r to un de rs ta nd that th e y c ou ld
e a sil y los e a t tria l.

Counsel did not rec all any communication problems with the petit ioner but did testify that he ofte n had to explain conce pts to him sever al t imes befor e he f elt the petitioner unde rstood. He
sa id h e be lie ve d th e pe tit ion e r kn e w he wo uld no t ha ve a thi rt y pe rc e nt re le a se e lig ibi lit y a ndhe did
n o tre c al l t h e p et i t i o n ers ay i n g t o t h e c o u rt t h at h i s agr ee m en two u l d b e a tt h i rt y p er ce n to r R an ge I . He sa id he believe d the petitioner e ntere d his plea knowing ly to the extent t hat the petitioner
u n d er s t o o d wh at t h eywe re d o i n g. He s ai d t h e p et i t i o n erkn ew wh at t h e r el ea s e e l i gi b i l i t y p er ce n t age meant in terms of y ear s and time to serve

. On c ro ss- e x ami nat io n, cou ns el t est if ied th at h e was th e P ub li c Defen der for David so n Co un ty
a ndthat he ha d h e ld tha t of fi c e sin ce Nov emb er 19 99. H e sa id the pe tit ion e r’ s c a se wa s in iti a lly assig ned to a diff

ere nt attorney

in his office. Counsel e x plained that he took ove r the ca se af ter that
a tto rn e y le ft his po sit ion to wo rk a s a fe de ra l pu bli c de fe nd e r. Cou ns e l e sti ma te d th a t he ha d th e c a se-4-

fo r a y e ar a nda

ha lf a nd that he wa s ass ist e d by oth e r at torne y s in hi s o ff ic e in p re pa

ratio n f or tr ia l. He sa id he had pr actice d law for twenty -nine y ear s wi th a primary basis in criminal law a nd
e sti ma te d th a t he ha d h a nd le d h un dr e ds of se ri ou s c ri me c a se s.

He r eca lled that the District Attorney made a n open file discove ry to him, and he re viewed all the discovery

with the petitioner. He said he met with the petit ioner mul tiple times in preparation fo r the tr ia l. He sa id bo th c o- de fe nd a nts imp lic a te d the pe tit ion e r i n th e ir state me nts a ndbo th w ou ld have te stified that the petitioner insisted that they made sure to ge t cash fr om the v i cti m. The pe tit ion e r’ s st a te me nts to p oli c e pla c e d h im o n th e sc e ne in the se ns e that he dr ov e the c o- de fe nd a nts both to an d fr o m t h e l o ca tion of the crime. H e said that he knew the pe titioner was a Ra ng e I of fe nd e r a ndthat he expl a ine d to him what it me a nt to ple a d out of rang e . H e e xpla ine d to him his possible expos ure a s to eac h count of the unde rly ing ind i ctm ent. He e x plained that conse cutive
s e n t e n c i n g w a s a n u n l i k e l y p o s s i b i l i t y.
Cou ns e l te sti fi e d th a t de fe nd a nts c ha rg e d wi th a se ri ou s c ri me ple a d c los e to t ri a l. H e sa id that the petitioner wa s unhappy about g oing to prison because he ha d difficulty understanding that he could be held re sponsible for the homicide r es u l t i n g fr o m t he underly ing f elony . He sa id he beli ev ed the petitioner understood the na ture of his g uiltyplea a nd that the petitioner’s a ctual sentenc e, twelve y ear s at six ty perc ent, was clea r from the rec ord. Counsel said he r eviewe d the plea petition with the petitioner.

Th e pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t he a ndhis c ou ns e l di d n ot dis c us s the c a se tho ro ug hly . H e sa id he did not understand c ounsel’s explanation and he f elt that counsel w as try ing to r ush him int o a ple a . H e sa id h e tol d c ou ns e l that he wa nte d to g o to tr ia l. H e sa id that, i f h e wa s c on vic te d, he fe lt he would have rec eived a twenty -five- y ear sentenc e. He also testified t hat he knew a life sentenc e c arrie d a re le a se e lig ibi lit y

of fi ft y -o ne y e ars

. He maintaine d that counsel tried t o rush hi m into entering a g uiltyplea. He said he ha d q u e s ti o n s to a s k in f

r o n t o f th e ju d g e , b u t h e d id n o t th in k th e ju d g e w a n te d to h e ar him. He
a c kn ow le dg e d th a t coun sel re vie we d th e dis c ov e ry wi th h im, inc lud ing the c o- de fe nd a nts ’ state me nts . H e sa id c ou ns e l di d n ot t e ll h im that it is the jury ’s re sp on sib ili ty to we ig h the state me nts of witnesses a nd determine if they wer e truthful. He testified that he understood the jury made the d e c i s i o n ab o u tt h e w i t n e s s e s ’ tru t h f u l n e s s

. H e s a i d t h a th e d i d n o te n t e r h i s p l e a v o l u n t ar i l y.
On cr oss-examination, the petitioner said the judg e told him he could g o to trial but counsel told him he did not need to do g o to trial. His counsel encour ag ed him to take the plea r ather than g o to trial and fa ce a

possible life sentenc e. He acknowledg ed that both co-defe ndants implicated him a s th e drive r and

that the y bo th g a ve state me nts imp lic a tin g him in the c ri me . H e c la ime d th a t, if he pled g uilty , he did not think he would rec eive a twelve- y ear

sentenc e at sixt y

perc ent and that the pe rc e nta g e wa s n ot e xpla ine d to him

. On re dir e c t e xami na tio n, he te sti fi e d th a t hi s r e a l c on c e rn wa s th e sixty pe rc e nt r e le a se elig ibilit y and that he w ould be happy if the court was able to alter that pe rce ntag e.-5- An a ly sis

I ni tia lly , w e no te that th e pe tit ion e r w a s late in f ili ng his no tic e of

app e a l. T he po stc on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fi na l or de r de ny ing re lie f wa s e nte re d July 13 , 2 00 5, bu t th e pe tit ion e r d id n ot f ile a notice of appea l until Aug ust 31, 2005. A notice of appea l must be filed within 30 day s from the da te of e ntry of the jud g me nt. Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 4( a ). Ho we ve r, in the int e re st of ju st ice , we wi ll
re vie w the pe tit ion e r’ s a

pp e a l on the me ri ts d e sp ite the fa c t th a t no e xpla natio n wa s g ive n f or the la te fi lin g of the no tic e of

app e a l.
The pe titioner arg ues that his g uil t y plea in the unde rly ing c ase w as not knowing ly or v o l u n t ar i l y e n t e r e d b e c a u s e h e c l a i m s t h a th e r e c e i v e d i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f

c o u n s e l

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, he c on te nd s th a t c ou ns e l f a il ed to ex pl ain to h im the rang e of pu nis hme nt andits imp a c t on his rele ase e ligibility

date

. He a vers that, without this information, his plea could not have been knowing and voluntary . The State a rg ues that the petitioner knew what he w as doing and that, base d on the evidenc e of the petitioner’s g uilt and h i s s i g nificantly reduc ed sente nce, it is unlikely the petitione r w o u ld h a v e g o n e to tria l. T h e St a te c o n te n d s th a t th e p e ti ti o n e r f a il e d to s how that counsel’s pe rformance was de ficient or that he was pr ejudiced by counsel’s pe rformance

. Since the petitioner a lleg ed ineffec tive assistance of counsel, it was the petitioner’s burde n in the post-conviction court to pr ove the alleg ations by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e in orde r to g et
re lie f. T. C.A . § 40 -3 0- 11 0( f) . We are re qu ir e d to a ff ir m the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s u nle ss the petitioner prove s that th e ev i d ence preponde rate s ag ainst those finding s. State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn.1999)

.
I n order to prove inef

fec tive assi s t an ce o f counsel, the petitioner must prove that: (1)
co u n s el ’s p er fo rm an ce wa s d ef i ci en t , an d (2 ) t h e d ef

i ci en cywa s p re

j u d i ci al i n t er m s o f r en d er i n g a r e a s o n ab le p r o b ab il it y th a t th e r e s u lt o f th e tria l w a s u n r e li ab le o r th a t th e p r o c e e d ing s were fundame ntally

unfair. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct . 2052, 2064 (1984). T h e T e n n e s s e e Su p r e me Co u r t h a s a ls o ap p li e d th is s tan d ar d to th e r ig h t to tria l c o u n s el under Article I , Section 9 of t h e T ennesse e Constituti on, State v. Melson, 772 S.W .2d 417, 419 n.2 (T e nn .1 98 9) , a ndto the ri g ht to c ou ns e l on dir e c t app e a l un de r the F ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nt. Campbell v. State, 904 S.W .2d 594, 596 (Tenn. 1995)

.
I n Hill v. L ockhart, 474 U .S. 52, 106 S. C t. 366 (1985), the Supre me Court applied the twopart Strickland standa

rd to ineff ective assistance of counsel claims arising out of a g uiltyplea. The Cou rt in H ill mod if

ie d th e pr e

jud ic e re qu ir e me nt b y

re qu ir ing a

pe tit ion e r t o s ho w that th e re is a
re a so na ble pr ob abi li ty th at, b ut f or c ou ns e l’ s e rr or s, he wo uldno t ha ve ple a de d g uil ty a ndwo uld have insisted on g oing to tria l. 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W .3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002)

.
He re , th e pe tit ion e r h a s n ot s ho wn that c ou ns e l’ s p erfo rm a nc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. He pr e se nts only his own t estimony that counsel did not explain to him the s ignif icanc e of e ntering a g uiltyplea outside of t h e n o rmal sentenc ing r ang e. The post-conviction court found that the petitioner wa s-6-

adequately

informed by

his counsel of the c onsequenc es of ple ading g uiltyand the likelihood of b e in g c o n v ic te d if h e c h o s e to p r o c e e d to tria l. T h e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u r t a ls o f ound that the petitioner was informed of the constitutional rig hts he would waive by pleading g uiltyand that, by the pe tit ion e r’ s o wn a dmi ssi on a t th e e ntry of his ple a , no one wa s for c ing him to e nte r i nto the g uil ty plea.
Up on re vie w, a n a pp e llate c ou rt wi ll not

re we ig h o r r e e va luate the e vid e nc e be low ; a ll q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g th e c r e d i b i l i t y o f w i t n e s s e s , t h e w e i g h ta n d v a l u e t o b e g i v e n t h e i r t e s t i m o n y, a ndthe fa c tua l is su e s r a ise d b y the e vid e nc e are to be re so lve d b y the tr ia l ju dg e , n ot the app e llate courts. Momon v. State, 18 S.W .3d 152, 156 (Tenn.1999)

. The post-conviction court’s f indings of fac t o n a petition for post-c onviction relief a re a ffor ded the we ight of a jury verdic t and ar e conclusive on a

ppeal unless the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst those finding s. Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 156; Henley

v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn.1997)

. The c ourt’s application of the law to the fac ts, ho we v er , is reviewe d de novo without any presumption of cor

rec tness. State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn.1999)

. Post-conviction relief may only be g iven if a c onviction or sentenc e is void or voidable bec ause of a violation of a c onstitut ional rig ht. T.C.A. § 40-30-103.

After car eful revie w, we conclude that the petitioner ha s not met his burden of proving that counsel’s pe rformance was defic ient by clea r and convincing evidenc e. Further, he has not shown that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had be en counse led diffe rently . The pe titioner’s main contention on appe al dea ls with his displeasure at being require d to serve at least six ty perc ent of the imposed twelve -y ear sentenc e. The petitioner cle arly made a voluntary and intellige nt choice among all the alternatives available to him at t he ti me he entere d his plea. He chose to take the offe r of ser ving at least seven y ear s instead of taking a chance on se rving fifty -one y ear s befor e bec oming
e lig ibl e fo r p aro le . T he po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt fo un d, a ndwe a g re e , th a t th e pe tit ion e r ple d g uil ty to
a vo id r e c e ivi ng a

muc h g re a te r pe na lty a t tr ia l ha d he be e n c on vic te d o f f e lon y mur de r ande sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

. He has offe red no proof to show that he would have pr efe rre d to go to tria l. The petitioner has pr oved neither that his plea wa s involuntary and unknowing nor that he re ceive d ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l. We a ff

ir m th e de c isi on of

the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

. Conclusion

Ba sed on the for eg oing a nd the re cord a s a whole, w e af firm the denia l of post-conviction
re lie f b y the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE