# FILED

June 23, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Cle rk LORI PARR, SUE MURRAY, ) OLLIE STUART, KEV

IN ) SELLERS, MARY LOU DAVY, ) ) Plaintiffs/Appell

ants ) Appeal No.

) 01-A-01-9811-CV-00573 v. ) ) Rutherford Circui t TOWER MANAGEMENT ) No. 36015 COMPANY, CEDAR PARK ) MOBILE HOME ESTATE S, ) CATHY BORN, ANN SNELL, ) ) Defendants/Appel

lees. )

)

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUI T COURT FOR RUTHERFORD COUNTY AT MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. CORLEW, JUDGE

LORI PARR, Pro Se 1784 West Northfie

ld Blvd., Box 267 Murfreesboro, T

ennessee 37129 SUE MURRAY STEWART, Pro Se 1263 Wenlon Drive Murfreesboro, T

ennessee 37130

BARBARA J. PERUTELLI Schulman, LeRoy

& Bennett 501 Union Street, 7

th Floor P. O. Box 190676 Nashville, Tennessee 37219-0676

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE 

# OPINION-2- This case started with a five page c ompla int in the Circuit Cou rt of Rutherford County, Tennessee and expanded to occupy the known universe.

Plaintiffs, Lori Parr, Sue Murray, Ollie Stuart, Kevin Sellers and Mary Lou Davy, employed at

torney, Lawre

nce H. Hart,

to file suit aga

inst To wer Management

Company, Cedar

Park Mobile Home Estat

es, Cathy Born, a

nd Ann Snell, collective

ly and individually.

Suit was filed December

27, 1995, alleging

that Plaintiffs w

ere present and former lessees of

mobile home lots in Ce

da r Park Mob ile Home Estates

. The complaint charged a

ll Defendants wit

h being ". . . delibera

tely and wilfully engaged in a course of unfai r, deceptive, unl

awfuland outrageous conduct which victimized and caused injury to th e plaintiffs and othe

r residents of the

mobile home park." Among the practices alleged were unlawful ouster a nd evictio n from their respective

lots, violation of the

Tennessee Consume

r Protection

Act, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and unlawful ouster u n der Tennessee Code Annotated section 66- 28-504. Plaintiffs sought treble damage s under the Consumer Protecti

on Act, punitive dam

ages and compensator

y damages.
By amended complaint f

iled December 28,

1995, William Steel,

Login Boggs, and Mary Jane

Boggs were added a

s individual Defenda

nts.

Extensive discovery followed and Plaintiffs ultim ately filed a motion to add additional Plaintiff s while Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
On January 9, 1998,

the following order

was entered: Th is cause came on fur

ther to be considere

d b y th e Courton three separate issues, first a mot

ion to ad d additional Plaintiffs, opposed by the Def end ants; second a motion of the Defendants for summary judgment, opposed by the Plaintiffs ; an d third a joint motion of the parties that the cause set for trial January 12, 1998 be continued in order to allow the matter to be prese nted through arbitra

tion, and from the entire file in this cause, the Court finds that t he first two motions should be denied an d that the joint motion should be granted. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to add-3- additional Plaintiff

s is denied. I T IS THEREFO

RE ORDERED

that the Defendant

s ' motion for summary j udgment is denied. FINALLY IT IS ORDER

ED that the joint

motion of the parties to continue the trial f rom th e setting of January 1 2, 1998 is granted, and the joint mot ion to proceed to arbitration

pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Code Ann otated §29-5-101, et seq. is granted. Furthe r this c aus e shall remain on the activ

e docket in thiscourt through May 31, 1998, not subject to fu rth er orders of dismissal prior to that time, subject to fu

rther proceedi

ng s pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Code An notated §29-5-118. Costs are reserved pending the entry of the final order in this cause.

On January 12, 1998, the trial court entered the following order: As evidenced by signatur e of counsel for the

respective pa rties her eto, it is agreed th at the parties shall

resolve all disputes by submitt

i ng them to arbitrati

on. The Arbitra

tor shall determine al l issue s in this cause includin g the assessment

of discretionary costs

and court costs. T

he costs of arbitration shall be

shared equally by pla int iff s and defendants.

Withno further orders o

f the court the case

was heard on arbit

ration by Judge Joe C. Loser on

March 5, 1998. Lawrence H. Hart appeared as counsel for the plaintiffs and Bar

bara J. Perutell

i appeared as counse

l for the defendants All of the plaintiffs, inc

luding Lori Parr a

nd Sue Murray, ful

ly participated in the arbitration

hearing. The arbitrator t

ook the case under ad

visement and

on March 31, 1998, issued a twenty page "arbitration award" finding in favor of th e plaintiffs and against

the defendants. I

n this arbitration awar

d Judge Loser held, in part: Thereafter, in 1994, the rule s and regulations were changed by adding rule 6a, which states:

All homes moving into the co mmunity must not be olderthan eight (8) year s old, and approved by management. The new rule was interpreted t o mean that any buyer

of the plaintiffs' mobile homes, all of w hich were older than eight years, would be required to remove the mobile home from the park. The interpretation caused the p lain tiffs' mobile homes to lose value, for which no compensationwas offered or paid. Under such circumstance s, theaction of Cedar Park was-4- unfair and deceptive in viola

tion of the Tennessee Consumer Protection

Act, and Cedar Park is thus l

iable to the plaintiffs, and each of them, for their "actual damages," which, under the circumstances o

f these cases, is either the difference in value of the mobile home im mediately before a

nd after the changed rule for selling older hom es or, if the

evidence does not establish the before and aft

er values, the reasonable cost of relocating the home

to a similar location. The most cred ible evidence of the re asonable relocatio

n cost was the $1,500.00 estimate

by Mr. Boggs. The arbitrator finds th

e following actual damages to have been established fr

oma preponderance of the evidence: Mary Lou Davy, $5,000.00, representing the difference between t

he before and after

value of her home; Lori Parr, $1,500.00 , representing the reasonable cost of r

elocation; Sue Mur r ay, $1,500.00, re

presenting the reasonable reloca

tion cost

7 ; and Kev in Sellers, $10,500. 00, representing th e difference between [the betw een] the before a

nd after value of his home. Additionally, an d as the Act provides, each of the plaintiffs may r ecov er a reasonable a ttorney's fee not exceedingone-third of his or her recovery. If the parties are unable to agree on the rea sonable value of the services provided by plai nti ffs' counsel, an additional evidential hearing may be requ

ested. The arbitrator finds th

at the defendants' violati

on of the ConsumerProtection Act w as not willful or wa

nton. Thus, this is not an appropriate case for an awa

rd of treble damages.

______________________ 7 Ollie Stewart has no separate claim.

On April 15, 1978, the

defendantspaid the arbitratio n award, including att orney fees and one-half of the arbitrator' s fee into the Circu it Cour t o f Rutherford County.

Atthis point, Plaintif

f, Lori Parr,

allied with P

lainti ff, Sue Murray, fired their attorney, L

awrence H. H

art, and proceede

d thereafter to r

epresent themselves.

Thereafter, hundreds of pages of documents reflecting little regard for Rules of Procedure or

Rules of Law, a

re set forth in

this record, bitte

rly second-5-

guessing the trial tactics of Attorney Hart and attacking, with near equal vigor, the actions of Attor

ney Perutelli.
Returningnow to the correct procedural and substantive trac k, it is first noted that, although

Lori Parr and Su

e Murray participa

ted and testified in a

full hearing befor e the arbitrator on Mar ch 8, 1998, we ar

e favored with no evidentiary transcript of that h earing. Keeping in mind that the defen dants cast before the arbitrator hav

e paid the judgment in f

ull into the registry of

the court; and that only certain of

the prevailing plaint

iffs, who are dis satisfied with their respective awar

ds seek to disavow the

arbitration; we pr

oceed.
Weaving our way through the se emingly endless objections interposed by Plaintiffs Parr and Mur ray, we reach the review b y the trial judge of the actions of the arbitrator.

The trial judge is b

ound, as are we,

by t he s tringent limitations set forth in Arnold v. Morgan Ke egan & Co., Inc. , 914 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. 1996). Therein, the Sup reme Court, in constru ing the Te nn essee arbitration statute s, held:

We begin with a discussio n of the standards of

review to be used by a trial cou r t w hen reviewing an ar bitration awardand by the

Court of Appeals when reviewing the trial court's judgment in an arbitration case. Tennessee h as adopted the Uniform A r bitration Act, T enn. Code Ann. §§ 29-5-301 through 320 (Supp. 1995). This Act "governs the scope of judicial review

of arbitration awards ." International Talent Gro up, Inc. v. Copyright Management, Inc. , 769 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tenn. App. 1988). For guidance, we can look to other jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Arbitration

Act. Tenn. Co

de Ann. § 29-5-32

0 ("This part sh all be so construed as to effectuate its general purp ose t o make uniform the law of those states which enact it."). The standard to be applied by the trial court is a narrow one. It is well established that co urts sh ould play only a limited role in reviewing

the decisions of arbit rators. United Paperworkers

Int'l Union, AFL-CI0 v. Misco, In c., 484 U.S. 29, 36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 36 9, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987 ). [W]here t he par ty has agreed to arbi trate, he or she, in effect has re linq uished much of [the r ight to a court's decision o

n the merits.] The party still can ask a court to review the arbitrator's decision, but the court will set that

decision aside only in very unusual circums

tances. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, _____ U.S. _____,

_____, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995)-6- (emphasis added) (citations om itte d). 2 The trial court is limited by the provisions of the statu te which allow a vacation or modification of an awa rd. See International Talent Group , 769 S.W.2d at 218.

__________________ 2 While First Options of Chic ago concerns the Federal Arbitration

Act, we note that the purpose o f the Federal and UniformArbitration Act is the s ame: to promote private settlement

of disputes, thereb y bypassing the co urts. As such, the scope of revie w ad vanced by the United States Supreme Court has equal appli cation in a case un

der th e UniformArbitration Act t o t he extent that such review furthers the commo

n goal of the acts. * * *

The limiting lan guage of the statutes gover ning vacation and modification of ar

bitration awards e

vidences an intent

to limit severely

the trial court's a

uthority to retr y the issues decided by arbitration. As the New Mexico SupremeCourt observed in Melton v. Lyon : "It is not the fu nction of the Courtto hear

cases de novo

and consider evidence presented to the arbitrators, but rather to conduct an evidentiary hear

ing and enter findings

of fact and conclusions of law upon each issue raised i n the application to va cate or modify the award." 108 N.M. 420, 773 P.2d 732, 733 (1989) (citation omitted). Moreover, the tr ial court must

accord deferenc

e to the arbitrator's award. Arnold v. Morgan Keegan Co., Inc. , 914 S.W.2d 445, 447-48 (Tenn. 1996).
Thoroughly

conscious of the

limitations thus place

d upon his authority by the Uniform Arbi

tration Statutes an

d the construction ther

eof by th e Tennessee Suprem

e Court, the lear

ned chancellor held: The court has considered the provisions of the statutory and case law, and has determined thatall Plaintiffs ar

e bound by th e decision of their attorney to submit the matter t o binding arbitration combine d withthe participation by these parties in the arbitrat ion process, that the decision of the arbitrator must be affi rmed, . . .

This holding by the chancell or is clearly corr

ect when the actio

ns of Lori Parr and Sue Murray are considered i n the context of the a rbitration proceeding. While it is true th at Attorney H art could not bind his cl ients to compulsory arbitration without their agreement, and

the record does not di sclose

an a ffirmative agre

ement to arbitrate

by them, it is equall

y true that the

y hav e ratified his actions and cannot now be heard to comp lain abou t th e arbitration.-7-

The record before thi s court s hows no c omplaint at all by Pa rr or Murray until after the arbitrator disappointed them. The fully participated in the proceeding, testified before the arbitr

ator, consulted wi

th their attorney before the arbitrator, and uttered no protest which would allow the trial court to vacate the awa rd underTennessee Code Annota ted section 29-5-3 13 or otherwise. Tenn. C ode Ann. § 29-5-313 (Supp. 1998) . No such protest is preserved for appe

llate review. As the chancellor held , t hey c annot acquiesce and i ndeed fully participate

in the arbitration

and then, disappointed with the outcome, disavow the action of their a

ttorney and agent.

Itis an undisputed principle of law that where an age nt in the first place exceeds his authority, or acts without au tho rity, such acts may become the acts of th e princ ipal by ratification, w

hich may be

either expressed or i mplied. See 1 Am. & Eng. Enc . Law (2d Ed. ) p. 1195, and author ities cited; McClure v. Evartson, 14 Lea, 495; Oil Works v. Jefferson, 2 Lea, 581; Williams v. Storm, 6 Cold.207; Evans v. Buckner, 1 Heisk, 294. It is further well- settled law that, if a party does not disavo

w the acts of his agent as soon as he can after they come to

his knowle dge, he makes these act s his own. See Pars. Cont. 49, 50, and authorities a

bove cited. In the c ase of Williams v.Storm it is said: "W here the principal has the option to repudiate the contract or to ratify it, he is bound promptly

to do either the one or the other." 6 Cold. 207. It is stated in all the auth orities on these subje

cts, however, that, before a ratification ca n be implied or binding, th e princi pal must have knowled ge of the acts whic

h he is supposed to ratify. I n some of the cases i t is stated that he must have full knowledge , and in others th a t he must have knowled ge of all the material facts and circumstances. See 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. La

w (2d Ed.) p. 118 9. It is also held that kn owledge

of facts by another agent, where the matter i s w ithin the scope of his agenc y, is sufficient.See authority last cited, p. 1192. I

t is further held tha

t, if the facts show a ratification,the intention of the pa rties is immaterial; so tha

t, to co nstitute a ratifica

tion, it is not mater

ial wheth er a ratification

was contemplated or not. See Hazard v. Spears, 2 Abb. Dec. 353.It has further bee n held that the

conduct of the principal w ill be liberally construed in favor of a ratification

or adoption of the acts of the agent (see 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law. p.

1195, and authorities there cited); in all the cases it being held that, when a k nowledge of

the transaction comes to the principal, he must with reasonable pr

omptness disaffirm the acts of the agen t, or he will be he

ld bound thereby.
Bement & Sons v. Armstrong , 39 S.W. 899, 903 (Tenn. Chan. App. 1896).-8- After affirming the dec

ision of the

arbitra tor, the trial court ordered distribution of the ar

bitration award a

s follows: IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED th at the Court approves the award determinedby the arbitrator. Further it is ordered that the Clerk shall pay the f ollowing sums to

the following individual s: to Plaintiff Parr the sum of $1,220.07; to Plaintiff Murray the sum of $1, 220.07; to Plaintiff Davy the sumof $4, 0 67.02; and to Plaintif f Sellers the sum of $8,541.20; to Attorney Hart t he sum of $6,166.66

f or attorney's fees,

and the sum of $1,261.14 as reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses for court reporter fees, advanced pay ment to the arbitrator,

and long distance tele phone charges; t o Arbitrator Lose r the sum of $2,190. 50, representing

half of the cost of arbitrat ion, w hich must be paidby the awards to the

Plaintiff. Furt

her it is ordered that the requests for payment an d fu rther reimbursem ents for assistance in trial preparat io n submitted by Plaintiff Parr must be respectfully denied. Further it is ordere d that Plaintiffs Parr and

Murray shall proce

ed further in

this cause pro se, upon their request, and Attorney Hart is

relieved from further responsibil

ity for representa

tion of these Plainti

ffs.

This order entered June

25, 1998, on pages 293-295 in Volume II of the record, would appear to have been intended b y the trial judge as a final judgment, but 294 pages late r, in V olume IV of the tra nscript under date of October 26, 1998, the following order appears: This cause came on to further be considered by the Courton this the

26th day of October,

1998, upon

the entire file in this cause, from all of w hich the Court finds th at the p ending motions for a new trial, and to alter or amen d th e prior judgment must be respe

ctfully denied, and

the Order of June 25, 1998 shall

be affirmed, an

d made the final orde

r of the Court in this cause, and that all other pen ding mot ions must be respectfull

y denied. Itis therefore ordered that the Court approves the award determined by the arbitrator. It is further order ed that the Cler kshall pay the follow ing sums to the follow in g individuals: To Plaintiff, P

arr, the sum of $ 12

20.07; To Plaintiff, Mu

rray(Stewart) , the sum of $ 1220.07; To Plaintiff, D avy, the sum of $ 4067. 02; To Plaintiff, S ellers, the sum of $ 8541.20; To Attorney, Hart

, the sum of $ 6166.66 for attorney's fees, and the s um of $ 1261.14 as reimbu rsement for out of pocket expenses for Court R eporter fees, a

dvanced payment to the arbitrator,

and long distance tele

phone charges; To Arbitrator, L

oser, the sum of $ 21 90.50, represent ing-9- one-half of the cost

of arbitration (the other

one-half having been previously paid to him by the Defendants). Further it is ordered that the re

quest for payments a

nd further reimbursements fo

r assi stance in trial pre

paration submitted by Plaintiff, Pa rr must be respect

fully denied. All further pending motio

ns are also respec

tfully denied. Costs in the cause, inclu

ding a $ 30.00

cost of service of process are taxed against t he Defendants

up to, through, and including, all cos ts o f the entry of the June 25, 1998 Order, but the costs incu rred af

ter June 25, 1998 must b e paid by Ms. Parr. IT IS SO ORDERED AS ABOVE. Enter this the 26th day of October , 1998.

From this October 26, 1998 order, Lori Parr and Su e Murray appealed

.

The voluminous record on appeal reveals neither verbatim tra nscri pt
nor Rule 24(c) statement, preserving any evidence heard by the trial ju dge at any of the hearings in this case.

This court has held: Our ability to deal with

this issue is hampere

d by the absence of either a transcript of the proceedings in the trial court or a statement of the evidence pre

pared in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c). When a trial court

deci des a case without a jury, it's findings of

fact are presume

d to be correct unle ss the evidence in the record preponderates against them. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). This c

ourt cannot review

the facts de novo wit hout an appellate record containing the facts, and there for , we must assume that the r ecord, had it

been preserved, would have contained sufficie

nt evidence to support t

he trial court's factual findings. McDonald v. Onoh , 772 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Irvin v. City of Cl arks ville , 767 S.W.2d 6 49, 653 (Tenn. Ct. A

pp. 1987); Gotten v. Gotten , 748 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tenn. App. 1992).

Pro se Appellants filed, with the tr ial court, what pu

rports to be a Rule 24(c) statement of the pr

oceedings before the

arbitrator on Mar

ch 5, 1998. This document is not approved by the tr ial judge in conformi

ty with Rule 24(f),

and is not, in fact, a stateme

nt of evidence but sim

ply another rambling c

omplaint-10-

against the lawyer

s in the case. Typi

cal of its contents is

the following: The plaintiffs Sue Murray and Lori Parr subm it the followingstatement to the Court of what occu rred at the a rbitration

hearing of March 5, 1998. No transcri pt of th e hearing is available because the plai ntiff s' former attorne y, Lawrence Hart, refused to comply with the plaintiffs'

request for a court reporter to be present at the a rbitration hearing b

y stating to the plaintif

fs "W ho's going to pay for it, are you? I'm certainly not." T

herefore, the pl

aintif fs' w ill present to the Court their recoll

ection of what tra

nsp ired at the arbitration

hearing with respect to those issues t hat are the bases of the plaintiffs' appea l, as per Rules of Appellate procedure, Rule 24 C.

* * * In reference to the def e ndants' attorney Perutelli's R esponseto the plaintiffs' M urray and Parr' s Motio ns T o Make Additional Findings Of Fact, Mo tions To Alter Or Amend/Alter

Judgment, and

Motion For A New

Trial, page 3, in regards to plaintiff Murray and Parr's "displeas u re", plaintiffs Murray and Parr d o hereby state to this Honorable Courtthatthe true displeasure of plaintiffs Parr and Murray are that two officers of the Court - one who was supposed t o be repres entin g and protecting their best interests - instead chose to fabricate a fa

lse story to the arbit

rator, to the plaintiffs, and to the trial Cour t, eventually deceiving

this Honora bl e Court into confirming an arbitration award that was not based upon truth, bu t instead was b ased upo n false facts, and deliber

ate lies.

Without a verbatim transc

ript of the arbit

rat ion proceedings or some otherkind of transcrip

t, the tr ial court was hard

ly in a position to revie

w the

aw ard of the arbitrator under the narrow st andard of review provided by th e U n iformArbitration Act. Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. , 914 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tenn. 1996).

As we labor under the same handicap s, along with the additional handicap of

having no transcript o

f any of the proceedings that occurred before the trial judge, we have no basis on which to find the de cision of the trial ju

dge to be "clearly erro

neous" under the standa rds applicable

to app ellate court review. Arnold v. Mor

gan Keegan & Co, Inc. , 914 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tenn. 1996).
We have no choice but to affirm the judgment of the chancellor.-11- The appellees assert t

hat thetrial court was in error in failing to grant summary judgment to the

appellees rather

than submitting the ca

se to arbitration.

We affirm

the chancellor's decision that material issues of fact existed and summary judgment was improper.

Defendants seek da

mages for frivolous

appeal.

While it is true thatthese pro se litigant s have burdened the c

ourts and counsel withadeluge of unnecessar y and improper docume

ntation, mostly as to matters not properly drawn i n issue in this case,

it must b e obser ved that no agreement

executed by Parr a

nd Murray appears i

n this record for subm

itting the

case to arbitration rathe

r than to trial. They are bound by the arbitration because their voluntary part icipation therein co nstituted ratifica

tion of the otherwise unauthorized (as far as the record shows ) action of Mr. H art in agreeing to arbitration. The

application for fr

ivolous appeal damages will be denied.

All costs on appeal are assessed against Lo ri Parr and Sue Mu

rray and the judgment of the chanc ellor is in all respects

affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court f

or the purpose of coll

ecting costs.

______________________ ________ _______ WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
CONCUR:

__________________________________ ____ BEN H. CANTRELL, P .J., M.S.

__________________________________ ____ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE