DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

July Term 2014

MICHAEL MANSUETO,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D12-522

[October 8, 2014]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Thomas M. Lynch, IV, Judge; L.T. Case No. 08-012803 

CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Karen E. Ehrlich, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mark J. Hamel, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CIKLIN, J.

Michael Mansueto appeals his convictions for four counts of sexual 

battery on a child while in a position of familial or custodial authority 

committed against his biological daughter. He argues that the trial court 

erred by permitting a witness to vouch for the credibility of a Williams1

rule witness and by allowing the testimony of the Williams rule witness to 

become a feature of the trial. Because Mansueto failed to properly object 

to the errors now alleged on appeal, we affirm.

Before trial commenced, the state filed a notice of intent to call the 

victim’s sister (Mansueto’s other daughter) as a Williams rule witness.

Following an evidentiary hearing on the state’s notice of intent, the trial 

court properly found that the evidence was reliable and showed a 

common scheme and plan. Mansueto then sought to exclude references 

to the Williams rule evidence in both opening statements and closing 

1 Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1960).
2

arguments. The trial court denied his request, but explained that it 

would consider any properly made objection regarding the use of the

Williams evidence as a feature at trial. 

The victim testified at trial regarding the sexual battery she suffered 

as a minor at the hands of Mansueto, describing a quid pro quo system 

in which Mansueto would give her money, privileges, or permission for 

certain activities in exchange for submitting to sexual acts. The victim 

also described a birthmark on Mansueto’s penis, which was corroborated 

with a photograph entered into evidence by the state. The victim’s sister

(“sister”) testified to also being a victim of Mansueto under a similar 

pattern of abuse and confirmed that the state’s photograph correctly

depicted Mansueto. Mansueto made no objection to the Williams rule

testimony becoming a feature.2

The defense vigorously cross-examined the sister about prior 

representations the sister allegedly made to a detective in which she

indicated that she had not been molested by Mansueto. Additionally, the 

defense introduced into evidence a sketch of Mansueto’s birthmark

drawn by the sister, apparently to show variations between the drawing 

and the previously admitted photograph.

After the state rested, the defense called both the mother of the victim

(“mother”) and the sister. The mother testified to a prior false allegation 

of abuse made by the victim against “Norman,” the victim’s stepfather

(and mother’s second husband).

On cross-examination by the state, the mother testified that the 

victim and the sister together told their mother that Mansueto had 

molested them, which the mother believed to be true. When the state 

asked the mother about her belief in the accusations against Mansueto 

versus her conclusion that the accusations against Norman were false, 

the mother clarified that she believed the allegations against Mansueto

because the sister (apparently unlike the victim) never lied to her. The 

2 Williams rule evidence becomes a proscribed “feature” of trial “when inquiry 

into the collateral crimes ‘transcend[s] the bounds of relevancy to the charge 

being tried’ and the prosecution ‘devolves from development of facts pertinent to 

the main issue of guilt or innocence into an assault on the character of the 

defendant.’” Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 945 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Williams, 

117 So. 2d at 475). Simply put, Williams rule evidence is a feature if it 

‘“overwhelms’ evidence of the charged crime and becomes ‘an impermissible 

attack on the defendant's character or propensity to commit crimes.’” Grier v. 

State, 27 So. 3d 97, 101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Samuels v. State, 11 So. 

3d 413, 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).
3

defense objected to the question and asserted, “It’s the ultimate issue for 

the jury.” The trial court overruled the objection. The jury found 

Mansueto guilty.

On appeal, Mansueto argues that the trial court erred in admitting 

the mother’s testimony concerning the veracity of the sister and further 

asserts that the trial court committed error by permitting Williams rule 

evidence to become a feature at trial. The state argues that the errors 

raised by Mansueto were not preserved for review because Mansueto

failed to lodge proper objections. We agree.

Generally, proper preservation of an issue for appellate review 

requires three components: (1) a timely, contemporaneous objection, (2) 

a stated legal ground for the objection, and (3) to be cognizable on 

appeal, the argument “must be the specific contention asserted as legal 

ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.” State v. Calvert, 15 

So. 3d 946, 948 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citations omitted) (emphasis in 

original). Issues not properly raised in the lower tribunal are typically 

waived on appeal save for unpreserved issues that constitute 

fundamental error. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 

1982).

Stated another way, “to be preserved for further review by a higher 

court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific 

legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part 

of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.” Tillman v. State, 

471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985) (citations omitted). Below, Mansueto 

objected and asserted, “It’s the ultimate issue for the jury.” Because the 

“ultimate issue” ground alleged as the legal basis of the objection during

trial is distinct from the error now alleged on appeal (improper vouching 

for a witness’s credibility), Mansueto’s issue on appeal was not preserved 

for our review. 

As to Mansueto’s issue on appeal alleging that the trial court erred in 

permitting the Williams rule evidence to become a feature at trial,

Mansueto likewise failed to lodge an objection at the time the evidence 

was being presented below. The contemporaneous objection rule

requires a party to object during trial at the time of the alleged error. 

Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536, 574 (Fla. 2007). The rationale for the 

contemporaneous objection rule “is two-fold: 1) to require an objection at 

the time the error is committed to give the trial court the opportunity to 

correct it; and 2) to prevent a litigant from allowing an error to go 

unchallenged so it may be used as a tactical advantage later.” Crumbley 

v. State, 876 So. 2d 599, 601 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing F.B. v. State, 
4

852 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2003)).

3

It cannot be said that the errors alleged by Mansueto on appeal were

fundamental in nature and thus we affirm.

Affirmed.

STEVENSON and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

3 In some instances, assertion of a contemporaneous objection may raise 

concerns of a speaking objection particularly when a trial judge has issued an 

adamant pre-trial order in limine. The issue of speaking objections and the 

need to seek a bench conference has previously been addressed by this court:

Judges frown on speaking objections and often both lawyers and trial 

judges do not want the jury to hear the argument on the objection 

because of a legitimate concern that a discussion in front of the jury may 

only highlight the error. Yet, a properly articulated specific objection is 

necessary not only for appellate preservation but to assist the trial court 

in making a proper ruling as well. Therefore, to address the tension 

between the need for a specific objection and the desire to shield the jury 

from the argument, often either the trial judge or the lawyer will ask that 

the objection be heard at sidebar.

Datus v. State, 126 So. 3d 363, 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Salazar v. 

State, 991 So. 2d 364, 380–81 (Fla. 2008) (Pariente, J., specially concurring) 

(footnote omitted)).

Needless to say however, there is no viable substitute for well-versed trial 

advocacy and no shortcut for acquiring a firm grasp on the articulation of 

proper and contemporaneous trial objections.