United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-40045

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Felipe De Jesus Gutierrez, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:19-CR-612-1

______________________________

Before Barksdale, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges. 

Per Curiam:*

Felipe De Jesus Gutierrez conditionally pleaded guilty to one count of 

possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (defining 

principals), reserving his right to contest the denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence. He challenges the district court’s denial at the end of an 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 20, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-40045 Document: 00516974482 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/20/2023
No. 23-40045

2

evidentiary hearing of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his 

vehicle and his post-arrest confession. (Gutierrez testified at the hearing.) 

For the contested denial of a suppression motion, our court reviews 

“the factual determinations for clear error and the legal conclusions de 

novo”. United States v. Powell, 732 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation 

omitted). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party, in this instance the Government. See United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 

352, 356–57 (5th Cir. 2005).

First, Gutierrez challenges the court’s finding reasonable suspicion 

justified the stop of his vehicle. “Reasonable suspicion is a low threshold, 

requiring only a minimal level of objective justification.” United States v. 

Alvarez, 40 F.4th 339, 345 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). The officers 

responded to a tip containing a range of details related to the planned drug 

transaction, including predictive information. See Alabama v. White, 496 

U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (highlighting importance of tip’s prediction of future 

conduct); Powell, 732 F.3d at 369 (“Reasonable suspicion can be formed by a 

confidential informant’s tip so long as the information is marked by indicia of 

reliability.” (citation omitted)). The officers independently corroborated the 

tip and observed predicted activities. Based on the totality of the 

circumstances, reasonable suspicion supported the stop of Gutierrez’ 

vehicle. E.g., Alvarez, 40 F.4th at 345 (“Reasonable suspicion takes into 

account the totality of the circumstances . . . .” (citation omitted)). 

Next, Gutierrez asserts the search of his vehicle violated the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement. We hold the officers had probable cause 

to search Gutierrez’ tractor-trailer when a dog alerted to the presence of 

narcotics in it. See United States v. Ned, 637 F.3d 562, 567 (5th Cir. 2011)

(permitting warrantless searches of automobiles if supported by probable 

cause); Resendiz v. Miller, 203 F.3d 902, 903 (5th Cir. 2000) (“A drugCase: 23-40045 Document: 00516974482 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/20/2023
No. 23-40045

3

sniffing canine alert is sufficient, standing alone, to support probable cause 

for a search.”). 

Nor did Gutierrez show the officers’ actions converted the stop into 

an arrest. See United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 206–07 (5th Cir. 1993)

(“[U]sing some force on a suspect, pointing a weapon at a suspect, ordering 

a suspect to lie on the ground, and handcuffing a suspect—whether singly or 

in combination—do not automatically convert an investigatory detention 

into an arrest requiring probable cause.”). 

Finally, Gutierrez contends his confession was involuntary and not 

sufficiently attenuated from his claimed illegal arrest to be admissible. The 

testimony at the suppression hearing establishes Gutierrez: initiated the 

meeting with the officers following his initial request for an attorney; was

never threatened or coerced; and was aware of his rights but waived them. 

Gutierrez’ confession was therefore voluntary. See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 

42, 45–46 (1982) (explaining once suspect invokes right to counsel, 

government may not interrogate him further unless he initiates); United 

States v. Mendez, 885 F.3d 899, 910–11 (5th Cir. 2018) (concluding statement 

was voluntary where defendant was twice advised of Miranda rights, 

voluntarily waived them, there was no evidence of physical coercion, and 

defendant was not threatened). And, because we hold Gutierrez’ arrest was 

constitutional, his confession was also not the fruit of an illegal arrest. See 

United States v. McCowan, 469 F.3d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 2006) (ruling arrest 

permissible when officers have probable cause to conclude suspect 

committed offense). Gutierrez’ contention that the delay in presenting him 

to a magistrate judge was unreasonable is likewise incorrect because the 

reasons for delay, including case-processing, were permissible. E.g., United 

States v. Boche-Perez, 755 F.3d 327, 337 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he McNabb–

Case: 23-40045 Document: 00516974482 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/20/2023
No. 23-40045

4

Mallory doctrine tolerates delays related to legitimate law enforcement 

procedures . . . .”).

AFFIRMED.

Case: 23-40045 Document: 00516974482 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/20/2023