In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-4033

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Robert D. Vaughn,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 99-CR-30068--Jeanne E. Scott, Judge.

Submitted May 8, 2001/*--Decided October 1, 2001 

 Before Bauer, Posner, and Coffey, Circuit

Judges.

 Coffey, Circuit Judge. On August 6,

1999, Robert Vaughn was charged in a

three-count indictment with conspiracy to

distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. sec.

846, retaliating against an informant, 18

U.S.C. sec. 1513(b)(2), and possessing a

firearm in furtherance of a crime of

violence or drug trafficking offense, 18

U.S.C. sec. 924(c). During Vaughn’s

trial, Illinois State Police Sergeant

Agnes Johnson testified regarding

controlled drug purchases she made from

Vaughn in 1994, which were unrelated to

the charged offenses. The trial court

admitted Johnson’s testimony over

Vaughn’s objection under Fed. R. Evid.

404(b), ruling that Johnson’s testimony

was relevant to establish Vaughn’s

intent, modus operandi, and motive.

Vaughn appeals, arguing that Johnson’s

testimony should not have been admitted

because its probative value was

substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice. We affirm.

I. Factual Background

 Vaughn began selling crack cocaine in

late 1993 to early 1994, while living at

Eleanor Gaines’s residence in

Springfield, Illinois. Gaines’s grandson,

Dwight Morgan, also lived at the house at

that time and supplied Vaughn with the
crack that he sold. In addition Vaughn’s

girlfriend, Katherine Kantner, also lived

in Gaines’s house.

 In July 1994, Sergeant Johnson, was

working undercover with the Illinois

State Police’s Central Enforcement Group

in Springfield investigating drug

trafficking. During her assignment,

Johnson was introduced to Donald Pasquale

by Carol Dougherty, who was assisting the

police as an informant. When Johnson and

Dougherty sought to purchase crack

cocaine from Pasquale, he called his

supplier, Vaughn. Vaughn brought the

crack to Pasquale and told Johnson that

she could buy from him directly in the

future and in furtherance of this

procedure he supplied Johnson with his

pager number.

 Sergeant Johnson then made three

controlled buys from Vaughn in August

1994. To initiate each purchase, either

she or Carol Dougherty paged Vaughn. When

Vaughn called them shortly thereafter,

they ordered a quantity of crack, using

coded language to refer to the drugs and

the quantity desired. After receiving the

order, Vaughn gave Johnson and Dougherty

instructions to meet him at a Springfield

grocery store parking lot. On each

occasion, Vaughn drove to meet Johnson

and Dougherty at a transaction location

of his choice. During one of the

purchases, Vaughn made it clear that he

would not make the sale in the presence

of more than one person, telling Johnson

that "[i]t takes two to get indicted." On

that occasion, Vaughn directed Dougherty

to ride briefly as a passenger in his car

before he would make the crack sale.

Vaughn was indicted for his August 1994

drug transactions with Sergeant Johnson

and Carol Dougherty, and pleaded guilty

to the resulting three-count indictment

in July 1996.

 In spite of the 1994 indictment, Vaughn

continued to sell drugs in the time

period between the August 1994 sales to

Sergeant Johnson and his July 1996 guilty

plea resulting from those sales, and the

charged offenses result from his conduct

during that period. Vaughn’s nefarious

enterprise was successful. By late 1995,

Vaughn had stashed $100,000 in proceeds

from his drug business at a house where

his mother lived. However, shortly after

Vaughn’s transactions with Sergeant
Johnson, he was forced to enlist the aid

of his girlfriend Kantner as a result of

the suspension of his driving

privileges./1 Unable to deliver the

drugs to his customers, Vaughn had

Kantner make deliveries for him. 

 On November 7, 1995, Kantner was

arrested for delivering crack to Kim

Ingold, one of Vaughn’s customers who at

the time was acting as an informant for

the Springfield police. Vaughn became

angry that Kantner had been set up by

Ingold because Kantner could no longer

make deliveries for him and he attempted

to hire Needham Davis and Peddie Taylor

to bomb Ingold’s residence. When Davis

and Taylor refused to carry out his

directive to bomb Ingold’s house, Vaughn

stated that he would take care of it

himself. Kantner drove Vaughn to Ingold’s

residence, and at Vaughn’s direction she

placed an explosive device inside

Ingold’s front screen door. The

detonation of the bomb caused extensive

damage to her residence.

 The Springfield police suspected Vaughn

as being responsible for the bombing and

questioned him shortly after the

incident. Vaughn denied any involvement

in the bombing, as did Kantner who was

interrogated by the police at the same

time. Despite Vaughn’s and Kantner’s

denials regarding their involvement in

the bombing, the police continued to

suspect that they were responsible for

the bombing of Ingold’s house. 

 Ultimately in July 1999 (while faced

with other criminal charges), Kantner

admitted her involvement in Vaughn’s drug

enterprise as well as in the bombing

incident. Based upon Kantner’s

confession, Vaughn was indicted and

charged with conspiring with Kantner to

distribute crack cocaine, retaliating

against an informant, and possessing an

explosive device in relation to a drug

trafficking crime.

 At a pretrial hearing on April 28, 2000,

the government filed a notice with the

court of its intent to use evidence

related to Vaughn’s 1994 drug sales to

Sergeant Johnson. Vaughn objected to the

use of evidence of his prior

transactions, and the government filed a

response to his objections. At an

evidentiary hearing on May 4, 2000, the
trial judge reserved her ruling on the

government’s notice, instructing the

parties that she would rule on the

admissibility of the evidence at the

trial.

 During the trial, the government called

Kantner to testify as to the scope and

nature of the conspiracy with Vaughn to

sell crack cocaine. Kantner testified

that she did not become aware of Vaughn’s

drug-dealing operation until after she

had been living with Vaughn for some

time. Kantner identified Morgan as

Vaughn’s source for the drugs that he

sold and further described Vaughn’s

business practices. According to Kantner,

when a customer was interested in making

a drug purchase, the customer would page

Vaughn who would then contact the

customer and designate a location to

complete the sale. In particular, Kantner

noted that Vaughn was careful to avoid

any transactions that he felt might be

suspicious and/or where he felt that the

customer might be cooperating with law

enforcement authorities. Kantner further

explained that Vaughn believed that he

could not be indicted on the word of one

witness on a one-on-one basis and so was

careful not to complete a delivery unless

the customer was alone. 

 Finally, Kantner testified that she

became involved in Vaughn’s drug-dealing

scheme after Vaughn lost his driving

privileges. Kantner stated that Vaughn

supplied her with the names of his

customers and a pager in order that his

customers could contact her, as well as

the drugs that she was to deliver.

Kantner also claims that Vaughn

instructed her regarding his procedures

for completing the sales, particularly

directing her to conduct sales only when

she was alone with the customer. Kantner

testified that after completing

deliveries she would turn the proceeds

over to Vaughn who would count the money

on a nightly basis to ensure his profit

in the illicit drug enterprise. Finally,

Kantner testified that, when Vaughn’s

drug-dealing business hit a low point on

November 7, 1995 after Kantner’s arrest

for selling drugs to Ingold, Vaughn

instructed her to bomb Ingold’s

residence.

 Vaughn’s counsel vigorously challenged

Kantner’s credibility on cross-
examination, suggesting that Kantner

acted alone both in selling drugs and in

bombing Ingold’s residence. In support

Vaughn pointed to the fact that Kantner

had not told the police of Vaughn’s

involvement in the drug sales when she

was arrested in 1995 for selling drugs to

Ingold. Vaughn’s counsel also pointed out

that Kantner did not implicate Vaughn in

the bombing of Ingold’s residence when

she was questioned shortly after the

bombing occurred. Finally, Vaughn’s

counsel pointed to the fact that Kantner

continued to sell drugs from 1996 to 1998

while Vaughn was incarcerated. Vaughn

argued that these facts demonstrated that

Kantner acted alone and without his

knowledge in both the drug sales and the

bombing.

 After Vaughn’s counsel cross-examined

Kantner, the government sought to

buttress her credibility with

thetestimony of Sergeant Johnson who

would testify about Vaughn’s 1994 drug

sales. The government argued that

Johnson’s testimony was relevant to

demonstrate 1) Vaughn’s intent to engage

in the conspiracy to distribute drugs

with Kantner; 2) Vaughn’s method of

operation; and 3) Vaughn’s motive for

entering the conspiracy with Kantner. The

trial court ruled that the government’s

proffered purposes were permissible under

Rule 404(b) and further ruled that the

prejudicial effect of the prior crack

sales did not outweigh its probative

value, especially in light of the fact

that the jury already had knowledge that

Vaughn was in federal custody on another

offense./2 Accordingly, the trial court

allowed Johnson to testify.

 Before Johnson testified, the court gave

the jury a limiting instruction regarding

Johnson’s upcoming testimony. The court

instructed the jury that they could:

consider [Johnson’s testimony] only on

the question of the defendant’s motive,

his intent, his preparation, his plan,

his knowledge, his absence of mistake . .

. and his background or relationship

between himself and certain other

witnesses. That evidence is to be

considered only for [those] limited

purposes in accordance with the

instruction I’ve just given you.

 Thereafter Johnson testified regarding
her undercover assignment with the

Illinois State Police, during which time

she made three controlled purchases of

crack cocaine from Vaughn in 1994.

Johnson also delineated Vaughn’s method

of operation, including the manner in

which she contacted Vaughn and the manner

in which he arranged the transactions.

Johnson also identified Vaughn’s

customers that were known to her.

Finally, Johnson testified about Vaughn’s

refusal to conduct transactions in the

presence of anyone other than the

customer. At the conclusion of the trial,

the trial judge repeated the limiting

instruction he gave earlier concerning

Johnson’s testimony before the jury. The

jury found Vaughn guilty on all counts

and sentenced him to a term of

imprisonment of 720 months.

II. Issues

 Vaughn raises only one issue on appeal:

whether the trial judge abused her

discretion when she admitted, pursuant to

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), Sergeant Johnson’s

testimony regarding Vaughn’s 1994 drug

sales. 

III. Discussion

 We review a trial court’s decision to

admit evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)

for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Denberg, 212 F.3d 987, 992 (7th Cir.

2000); United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d

1348, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997). "’The

district court’s determination of the

admissibility of evidence is treated with

great deference because of the trial

judge’s first-hand exposure to the

witnesses and the evidence as a whole,

and because of [her] familiarity with the

case and ability to gauge the likely

impact of the evidence in the context of

the entire proceeding.’" Denberg, 212 at

987 (internal quotations omitted)

(quoting United States v. Curry, 79 F.3d

1489, 1495 (7th Cir. 1996)). To determine

whether evidence is properly admitted

under Rule 404(b) we use the familiar 4-

prong test. Under this test, we must

determine whether:

(1) the evidence is directed toward

establishing a matter in issue other than

the defendant’s propensity to commit the

crime charged, (2) the evidence shows

that the other act is similar enough and
close enough in time to be relevant to

the matter in issue, (3) the evidence is

sufficient to support a jury finding that

the defendant committed the similar act,

and (4) the evidence has probative value

that is not substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice.

United States v. Gibson, 170 F.3d 673,

678 (7th Cir. 1999). 

 On appeal, Vaughn challenges only the

application of the fourth prong, arguing

that the admitted evidence had little

probative value and that the danger of

unfair prejudice was substantial. Vaughn

argues that Sergeant Johnson’s testimony

had little or no probative value because

Johnson never testified to any

relationship between Vaughn and Kantner.

Instead, Vaughn contends that "the

powerful evidence by Sergeant Johnson

became the focal point of the trial . .

. and acted to convey to the jury that

[he] was a bad person and [that] because

he had engaged in prior drug transactions

and had admitted guilt to same, he must

be equally culpable for the crimes in the

instant offense." We disagree.

 Vaughn’s contention that Sergeant

Johnson’s testimony had little or no

probative value because she never

testified to any relationship between

Vaughn and Kantner is misguided at best.

The government specified not just one,

but three, permissible purposes for the

presentation of Sergeant Johnson’s

testimony, none of which depended upon

Johnson testifying to a relationship

between Vaughn and Kantner. Our review of

the record satisfies us that the

Johnson’s testimony was highly probative.

 First, the government suggested that

Sergeant Johnson’s testimony was relevant

to demonstrate Vaughn’s intent to

distribute crack cocaine. Vaughn offers

only a weak and unconvincing attempt

(unsupported by any citation to Seventh

Circuit case law) to downplay this

purpose, claiming that "the mere fact

that a defendant engages in a drug

transaction in the past . . . does not in

all cases show his intent to distribute

crack cocaine at all future dates."

Vaughn was charged with a specific intent

crime (conspiracy to distribute crack

cocaine). See United States v. Irorere,

228 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2000). We
have repeatedly held that it is proper to

use other acts evidence to establish

intent where the defendant is charged

with a specific intent crime. Den-berg,

212 F.3d at 993; United States v. Lewis,

110 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1997); United

States v. Long, 86 F.3d 81, 84 (7th Cir.

1996); United States v. Harvey, 959 F.2d

1371, 1374 (7th Cir. 1992); United States

v. Chiamson, 760 F.2d 798, 808 (7th Cir.

1985). Further, we have held in the past

that proof of uncharged acts of drug

trafficking are relevant and probative of

whether a defendant had the intent

todistribute drugs in his possession. See

United States v. Allison, 120 F.3d 71, 75

(7th Cir. 1997); United States v.

Hernandez, 84 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir.

1996). Consequently the evidence of

Vaughn’s 1994 drug transactions was

highly probative of his intent to enter

into a conspiracy to distribute drugs

with his girlfriend, Katherine Kantner,

and Vaughn’s argument to the contrary is

without merit. 

 The government also suggested that

Johnson’s testimony was probative of his

method of operation. Modus operandi

evidence must bear "a singular strong

resemblance to the pattern of the offense

charged and that the similarities between

crimes be sufficiently idiosyncratic to

permit an inference of pattern for

purposes of proof." Moore, 115 F.3d at

1354-55 (internal citations and

quotations omitted). We have previously

approved of the admission of testimony

under Rule 404(b) to establish a drug

dealer’s method of operation. See United

States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 613-15

(7th Cir. 2000). In this case, Sergeant

Johnson corroborated Vaughn’s modus

operandi as testified to by Kantner,

which was challenged during counsel’s

cross-examination of Kantner. Sergeant

Johnson’s testimony confirmed several

distinct characteristics of Vaughn’s

method of operation: (1) Vaughn’s method

of arranging a drug transaction; (2)

Vaughn’s desire to avoid suspicious

transactions; (3) Vaughn’s customers; and

(4) Vaughn’s preferred location for

completing the drug transactions. 

 Vaughn claims that the evidence of his

1994 drug transactions cannot serve as

modus operandi evidence because in 1994

he did not use Kantner as a delivery

person, as he was alleged to have done in
the charged offenses. However, in

determining whether evidence is

admissible as modus operandi, we focus

"not on the dissimilarities between the

charged offense and the other acts

evidence, but on their common

characteristics." Id. at 1355. After

reviewing the record we are convinced

that the numerous commonalities in this

case between Vaughn’s 1994 drug sales and

his acts in the charged offense are

sufficiently similar to convince us that

Sergeant Johnson’s testimony was

probative of Vaughn’s method of

operation.

 Finally, the government also suggested

to the trial court that Sergeant

Johnson’s testimony would establish, in

part, the motive for Vaughn to conspire

with Kantner to distribute drugs. Vaughn

argues that because Johnson never did

mention Kantner in her testimony, that

her testimony could not establish

Vaughn’s conspiracy with her. Vaughn’s

argument, however, mischaracterizes the

purpose for which the government used

Johnson’s testimony. The government did

not use Johnson’s testimony to establish

that Vaughn did in fact join in a

conspiracy with Kantner, but instead used

Johnson’s testimony to establish the

motive for Vaughn to enter that

conspiracy. Among other things, Johnson

testified that Vaughn drove to meet his

customers. Johnson further testified that

Vaughn’s driving privileges were

suspended in October 1994. When coupled

with Kantner’s earlier testimony that

Vaughn had enlisted her to help his drugselling scheme shortly after his driving

privileges were suspended, Johnson’s

testimony was relevant: (1) to establish

his need to enlist Kantner in his drugselling scheme to deliver the drugs for

him; and (2) to rebut Vaughn’s suggestion

that Kantner had been acting alone when

she was delivering drugs. We agree with

the trial court that Johnson’s testimony

was probative of Vaughn’s intent to enter

into the conspiracy with Kantner, his

method of operation, and his motive to

enter the conspiracy, all of which are

permissible purposes under Rule 404(b). 

 Vaughn also argues unconvincingly that

the danger of unfair prejudice warranted

the exclusion of Sergeant Johnson’s

testimony despite its probative value.

Vaughn claims and speculates that
Johnson’s testimony regarding his 1994

drug sales would cause the jury to

presume, regardless of the sufficiency of

the government’s case, that Vaughn had

committed the charged offense. But Vaughn

ignores the fact that the prejudicial

impact of Johnson’s testimony had already

been lessened because the jury knew that

he was incarcerated for having committed

a federal offense. 

 Moreover, the trial judge gave the jury

limiting instructions (not once, but

twice) instructing them that they should

consider Sergeant Johnson’s testimony

only as it related to Vaughn’s motive,

intent, and method of operation. We have

held many times that limiting

instructions are effective and proper in

reducing or eliminating any possible

unfair prejudice from the introduction of

Rule 404(b) evidence. Denberg, 212 F.3d

at 994; United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d

484, 500 (7th Cir. 1997); Moore, 115 F.3d

at 1355. Vaughn offered no evidence

suggesting that the trial judge’s

instructions were insufficient or that

the jury failed to follow them, and we

assume that the jury obeyed the

instructions of the court. 

 

IV. Conclusion

 We agree with the district court that

Sergeant Johnson’s testimony served three

permissible purposes in that it was

probative of: (1) Vaughn’s intent to

engage in the conspiracy to distribute

drugs; (2) Vaughn’s method of operation;

and (3) Vaughn’s motive to enter the

conspiracy with Kantner. We further hold

that the alleged danger of any

conceivable unfair prejudice flowing from

Sergeant Johnson’s testimony was slight,

and, if any existed, it was cured by the

trial judge’s limiting instructions.

Moreover, even if any prejudice flowing

from Johnson’s testimony remained uncured

by the limiting instruction, it did not

outweigh the substantial probative value

of the testimony. Consequently, the trial

judge did not abuse her discretion in

admitting Johnson’s testimony. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

/* After examining the briefs and the record, we

have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary.

Accordingly, the appeal is submitted on the
briefs and the record. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

/1 Vaughn’s driving privileges were suspended because of conduct not related to his drug trafficking.

/2 Vaughn’s counsel brought out this fact on voir

dire for strategic reasons.