COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Beal es and Senior Judge Annunziata

THERESA BOWE YARISH MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1893-08-4 PER CURIAM MAY 12, 2009 MARK ALAN YARISH

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Stanley P. Klein, Judge (Demian J. McGarry; The Carl berg Law Firm, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Susan M. Butler; Luke S. Abra ham; Shoun, Bach & Walinsky, P.C., on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
Theresa Bowe Yarish (mother) appeals from th e trial court’s order regarding the payment of private school tuition. Moth er argues that the tria l court erred by misinter preting a clause in the parties’ final decree of divorce and ordering her to contribute to private sch ool tuition and expenses. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. BACKGROUND The parties divorced on October 28, 2005. Ma rk Alan Yarish (father) had sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ tw o children. One of the children at tended a residential therapeutic school, known as New Leaf Acad emy. The tuition expenses at New Leaf Academy included the cost of intensive th erapy for the child. The parties’ final decree required that the part ies post a bond for child support pursuant to Code § 20-114. The provis ion for the bond states:

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - Pursuant to Virginia Code § 20-114, the sum of $82,845 shall be withheld from each party’s share of the net proceeds from the sale of the marital home, for a total of $165,690. This amount shall be held by counsel for Plaintiff in an interest bearing escrow account. Disbursements shall be made from this account for the children’s tuition, including room and board, if applicable, fees and costs, and tutoring expenses, as recomme nded by either child’s school, beginning with the Fall, 2005 seme ster. Plaintiff shall be reimbursed for payments of tuition, room and board, fees and costs he has made to New Leaf Academy and the McLean School for the Fall 2005 semester. Counsel for Plai ntiff will provide copies of the bank statements and invoices for tuition to Counsel for Defendant as they are received. Plaintiff shall submit any appropriate bills to his health insurance carrier a nd shall pursue reimbursement of coverage for the expenses. To the extent that any health insurance reimbursement is received for tuit ion, room, board, fees and costs, they shall be deposited in the es crow account and credited equally to the parties toward their contri bution. In the event any balance remains, it will be divided equally between the parties. The parties exhausted the fund s from the bond before their child comple ted the program at New Leaf Academy. Father paid the entire tu ition for the last three mo nths and one week of the 2006-2007 school year. On October 26, 2007, the court entere d an order requiring father to be solely responsible for the tuition, begi nning with the 2007- 2008 school year. In 2008, father sou ght reimbursement from mother for unreimbursed medical expenses, which included the tuition at New Leaf Academy for the time betw een the exhaustion of the bond funds and the October 26, 20 07 order. The trial court interpre ted the final decree as holding both parties equally responsible for th ese tuition expenses. Mother obj ected to this in terpretation and timely noted her appeal. ANALYSIS Mother argues that the trial court erred in interp reting the final decree to mean that, after the bond was exhausted, each person was equally responsible for the children’s tuition expenses. “[C]ourts have the authority to interpret their own orders. . . . Furthermore, when construing a lower court’s order, a reviewing co urt should give deferen ce to the interpretation- 3 - adopted by the lower court.”

U Rusty’s Welding Serv., Inc. v. Gibson

U , 29 Va. App. 119, 129, 510 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1999) (en banc) (citations omitted). However, the interp retation needs to be reasonable and shall be reviewed with an abuse of discretion standard.

U Roe v. Commonwealth

U , 271 Va. 453, 458, 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006) (citing

U Smoot v. Commonwealth

U , 37 Va. App. 495, 500, 559 S.E.2d 409, 412 (2002)). Wife contends that the court misinterpreted the last sentence of the bond provision, which states, “In the event any balance remains, it will be divided equally betwee n the parties.” Mother argues that the phrase, “any balance remains,” me ans any balance remaining in the bond; however, father argues that the phrase, “any balance remain s,” means any balance due and owing. The trial court reviewed the entire paragraph and the sent ence in question, and c onstrued their intended meaning to be “any balance that’s due and owing or what the par ties have agreed to do, not any sums that are still there. ” The trial court conclu ded that mother’s constr uction of the provision would render meaningless the Octobe r 26, 2007 order, whic h held father solely responsible for all tuition expenses. “When dealing with discretionary decisions , only ‘when reasonab le jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.’”

U Robbins v. Robbins

U , 48 Va. App. 466, 482, 632 S.E.2d 615, 623 (2006) (quoting

U Hernandez-Guerrero v. Commonwealth

U , 46 Va. App. 366, 370, 617 S.E.2d 410, 412 (2005));

U see also

U U Brandau v. Brandau

U , 52 Va. App. 632, 641, 666 S.E.2d 532, 537 (2008). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretio n in its interpretation of the final decree; therefore, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. Both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the course of this appeal are denied.

U Affirmed.