IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2014-CP-01810-COA AKIVA KAREEM CLARK A/K/A AKIVA CLARK APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/10/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAVID H. STRONG JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: AKIVA KAREEM CLARK (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LISA L. BLOUNT NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: GRANTED IN PART AND DISMISSED W I TH PREJUDICE IN PART THE MOTIONS FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/03/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ. LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶1. This case concerns the postconviction claim s of A kiva K a r e e m Clark. On July 29, 2005, Clark pleaded guilty in the Pike County Circuit Court to Count I, accessory af ter the
f act t o arm ed robbery , and Count II, conspiracy to com m it arm e d robbery in c a use num ber
2005-256-PKS. The trial court senten c ed Clark to f ive y ears on each count, to run consecutively to e ach o t her, a nd t o serve t he f i rst three y ears o f Count I a n d t he f irst two
y ears of Count II in the c ustody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections (MDOC). Thesuspended portion (two y ears on Count I and three y ears o n C ount II) wa s t o b e s e rved as

postrelease supervision (PRS)

. T h e t rial court also o rdered Clark banished f rom the state upon release f

rom the MDOC. ¶2. T h e s a me day , Clark also pleaded guilty t o Count I, possession of a f ir e a r m b y a convicted f

elon, and Count II, p ossession of stolen p r o p e r t y , i n cause n um

ber 2005-271-PKS. The trial court sentenced Clark to t h ree y ears on Count I and ten y ears on Count II, to run consecutively to each other, and t o serve the f irst two y ears on Count I and th e f irst three
y ears on Count II in the custody of the MDOC. The suspended portion (one y ear on Count
I and seven y ears on Count II) w as t o be serv e d a s P R S

. The sentences in cause num bers 2005-256-PKS and 2005-271-PKS were ordered to be served consecutively

. ¶3. On March 4, 2014, Clark pleaded guilty to f o ur counts of t h e s a l e o f a c o n trolled substance in cause num

ber 2013-302-PKS. He was sentenced to twenty y ears on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently , and ordered t o serve t en y e ars, with the rem a ining ten
y ears suspended. During h is sentencing hearing, Clark waived his right t o a f orm al revocation hearing and adm i tted that the guilty plea violated his PRS. Thus, the trial court ordered him to serv e t h e r e m aining sentences in cause num bers 2005-256-PKS and 2005-
271-PKS. The trial court ordered Clark to serve the rem ainder of h is sentences concurrently with the sentences im

posed in cause num

ber 2013-302-PKS. ¶4. In October 2014, Clark f i led eight separate m otions f or postconviction relief

(PCR) addressing e ach of his prior convictions (two c o unts i n cause n u m b e r 2005-256-PKS, two
counts in cause n u m

ber 2005-271-PKS, and f our c o unts i n cause num

ber 2 013-302-PKS).

2On Decem

ber 10, 2014, t he trial court issued an order f inding the sentencing court’s order of b anishm ent was im

proper and vacated that po r t i o n o f C lark’s sentence. T he trial court dism issed the rem ainder of Clark’s PCR m otions with prejudice. ¶5. Clark now appeals, ar g u i n g t h e f o l lowing: (1) his right to a “speedy sentence” was violated; (2) the trial court erred in banishing him f rom the state; (3) his s entences exceed the

m axim u m ; and (4) his 2005 sentencing proceeding was illegal. 1

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6. W h en reviewing a trial court’s d enial o r dism issal o f a PCR mo t i o n , we will only disturb the trial c ourt’s decision if i t is clearly erroneous; however, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review. Hughes v
. State , 106 So. 3d 836, 838 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
DISCUSSION ¶7. As an initial m a tter, the State contends that C lark violated the on e - j u d g m e n t r u l e. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-9 (Rev. 2015) states that a PCR m otion “shall be lim ited t o the assertion of a claim f or r elief a gainst one (1) judgm ent o nly

. I f a petitioner desires to attack the validity of other judgm ents under w hich he is in custody , he shall do so by separate m otions.” The record indic a t e s C l a rk f iled eight separate PCR m otions, with each m otion addressing one conviction. Thus, Clark com plied with section 99-39-9.
I. “Speedy Sentence”

1 C lark h as f

iled a m o tio n a sk in g th e M ississip p i S u p rem e C o u rt to r etain an d ru le o n h is ap p eal. P u rsu an t to M ississip p i R u le o f A p p ellate P r o ced u re 1 6 (e), t h i s C o u rt can n o t reassig n C lark ’s a

p p ea l t o th e su p rem e c o u rt. H o w e v e r, s in ce th e tw o issu es C lark raised in h is m o tio n are th e sam e as issu es I an d II o n ap p eal, w e w ill ad d ress th e m e rits. 3¶8. In his f irst issue o n appeal, Clark c laim s t h e S t a t e v i o l a t e d h is right to a “speedy sentencing” by

f ailing to enf

orce the term s of his banishm ent. Clark argues the right to be tim ely s e ntenced is encom passed within a def

endant’s right t o a speedy trial. According to Clark, once he was released f ro m M DOC custody , the banishm ent portion of his sentence was never enf

o rced. ¶9. In t his instance, there was no delay in sentencing Clark. The t r i a l c o u r t im posed a sentence at the tim e of

Clark’s guilty

plea in 2005, and t his sentence included banishm ent. The banishm ent m ay n ot have b e en enf orced, but we do not f

ind t his triggers a ny due-process

concern s . Since the trial court’s Decem ber 10, 2014 order v acated the banishm ent portion of the 2005 sentence, we f

ind this issue without m e rit.
II. Banishm ent ¶10. Clark next argues that the trial court violated his c onstitutional rights when it included banishm ent in his 2 005 sent e n c e. However, since the trial c ourt vacated the banishm ent portion of Clark’s sentence in 2014, we f ind this issue m oot.
III. Max im um Sentences ¶11. C l ark claim s the s entences im posed during his revocation exceeded t h e ma x i mu m allowed by statute. Af

ter p leading guilty on M arch 4, 2014, the trial court revoked Clark’s
PRS and ordered him to serve the rem aining sentences on cause num b ers 2005-256-PKS and
2005-271-PKS. 2 T he rem aining sentences were ordered to be served c oncurrently with each

2 T h is in clu d ed tw o y ears to serv e o n th e accesso r y co n v ictio n , th ree y ears to serv e o n th e co n sp iracy co n v ictio n , o n e y ear to serv e o n th e co n v ictio n f o r f elo n in p o ssessio n o f a f irearm , an d sev en y ears to serv e o n th e sto len -p ro p erty co n v ictio n . 4other and concurrently with the f our convic t i o n s f

o r sale of a controlled substance. Ultim a tely , the total tim e Clark was ordered to serve was ten y ears. 3 ¶12. The versions of the statutes in ef f ect at the tim e Clark com m itted his crim es in 2 005
p r o v ided the f

ollowing m axim

um sentences: f

i ve y ears f

or conspiracy ; f

ive y ears f

o r
accessory ; three y ears f

or f elon in possession of a f

irearm ; and ten y ears f

or possession of stolen property

. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-1-1, 97-1-5, 97-37-5 & 97-17-70 (Rev. 2006). Clark’s sentences, including tim e spent on PRS, f ell within the statutory g uidelines in ef f ect at the tim e . ¶13. Clark also m akes a vague claim about a m iscalculation of his sentence on h is MDOC tim e sheets. The trial court determ i ned th a t C l a r k d i d not s h ow he exhausted the adm inistrative rem e dies as required b y M i s sissippi Code Annotated section 47-5-803(2) (Rev. 2015). In his record excerpts, Clark has included d ocum ents in support o f this claim , but these docum ents were not provided to the trial court bef ore it ruled on Clark’s PCR

m otions. Thus, they a re outside our review. See W ebster v. State , 152 So. 3d 1200, 1202 n.2 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
IV. 2005 Sentencing Hearing ¶14. In his f

i n a l i ssue on a

ppeal, Clark argues his 2005 sentences were “ undef ined as to PRS and banishm ent.” However, the 2005 s entencing orders clearly set o u t C l a r k ’s

sentences in regard to the length of tim e he w as ordered to serve, the suspended portions of the sentences, and PRS. As previously stated, the banishm ent provision was vacated. This

3 T o reiterate, C l ark h ad b een sen ten ced to t w en ty y ears o n each co u n t, w ith ten y ears to serv e o n each co u n t. A ll f o u r sen ten ces w ere to b e s erv ed co n cu rren tly

.

5issue is without m erit.

¶15. THE JUDGMENT O F THE PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT GRANTING IN PART AND DISMISSING IN PART THE M OTIONS FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. A LL COSTS OF TH I S A P P E A L A RE ASSESSED TO PIKE COUNTY. IRVING AND G RIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.

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