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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48478

AMY MARIE HEPWORTH, nka AMY 

MARIE EVANS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JAMES HEPWORTH,

Respondent.

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Opinion Filed: November 23, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Gerald F. Schroeder, District Judge. Hon. Diane M. Walker, 

Magistrate.

Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, 

affirming the orders of the magistrate court, reversed; and case remanded.

Bevis, Thiry & Schindele, P.A.; Philip M. Bevis, Boise, for appellant. Philip M. 

Bevis argued.

Sanderson Law Office; James K. Sanderson, Afton, WY, for respondent. James K. 

Sanderson argued.

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HUSKEY, Chief Judge

Amy Marie Hepworth, nka Amy Marie Evans, appeals from the district court’s decision 

affirming the magistrate court’s orders of post-judgment interest pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-

104(2). Amy alleges the district court erred because it concluded the divorce decree was the 

judgment referenced in I.C. § 28-22-104(2), thereby precluding Amy from obtaining prejudgment

interest pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(1). In this case, the relevant judgment was not the divorce 

decree but, instead, the later-entered 2017 and 2018 money judgments. As a result, Amy was 

eligible for an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(1). Accordingly, we

reverse the district court’s decision affirming the magistrate court’s order and remand the case for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 29, 2015, the magistrate court issued a divorce decree, divorcing Amy and 

James Hepworth pursuant to their stipulation resolving custody, child support, and division of 

property and debt. The decree awarded Amy one-half of the C purchase shares and one-half of 

the D purchase shares of Redtop Holding Limited (Redtop Holding). Because the rights in the 

shares could not be transferred at the time the decree was entered, James retained the shares, 

holding Amy’s portion in trust. James was required to provide Amy all necessary information 

regarding her shares, give her notice of any sale, and promptly notify her in writing of the 

occurrence of any event or receipt of any notification regarding her shares. 

Despite these requirements, on or about November 1, 2017, James liquidated all shares in 

Redtop Holding, including Amy’s shares. James initially received $1,795,666.10 from the sale, 

which was deposited into his personal bank account. An additional $66,488.06 from the sale was

held in escrow for a twelve-month period. James attempted to conceal his receipt of the 

$1,795,666.10 by transferring the money to the bank account of Swarthep LLC, a company he 

formed in Wyoming two days prior to the sale. James did not notify Amy that he sold the Redtop 

Holding shares, that he received $1,795,666.10 from the sale of the shares, that an additional 

amount of money was held in escrow after the sale, or that he transferred the funds from the sale 

of her shares to another business entity. One year later, on November 5, 2018, James received a 

wire transfer of $66,488.06, representing the funds that had been held in the escrow account. James 

did not notify Amy that he received the escrow funds or transfer her portion of the funds to her. 

During the time of the sale and funds transfer, James and Amy were involved in ongoing 

litigation regarding child custody and child modifications. As part of this litigation, Amy 

requested information regarding her Redtop Holding shares, including their potential sale. Despite 

a court order to do so, James did not provide Amy with any information regarding her shares. Amy

had information that James purchased some luxury vehicles, including a Lamborghini, and she 

suspected James had sold her shares without telling her. Amy contacted Redtop Holding and

received a letter indicating James had sold all of their shares in the company. 

Because the divorce decree allocated the shares of stock, but did not include a value of the

shares, Amy could not execute on the divorce decree to collect her portion of the sale from James. 

Amy filed a petition to enforce the divorce decree and a motion for partial summary judgment, 
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requesting the magistrate court determine the value of her shares to be one-half of the total amount 

James received from the sale and order James to compensate her accordingly. In the motion to 

enforce the divorce decree, Amy specifically requested that she be awarded interest at the statutory 

rate pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104 from the date James received the money from the sale. Amy 

provided a calculation using a statutory rate of 6.250% annual interest but she reserved the issues

of the amount of interest and attorney fees for trial. 

James continued to deny receiving the proceeds from the sale and contested Amy’s motion 

for partial summary judgment, despite lack of a factual or legal basis to do so. During the ensuing 

litigation, James failed to timely answer discovery, failed to appear for and walked out of

scheduled depositions, did not post a court-ordered bond, and contested the entry of a money 

judgment to reflect the amount Amy was owed under the divorce decree. The magistrate court 

granted Amy’s motion for partial summary judgment and awarded Amy a money judgment (2017 

money judgment) against James for $897,833.05 representing one-half of the $1,795,666.10 he 

received on November 7, 2017. The 2017 money judgment did not include pre- or post-judgment 

interest. James subsequently conceded that Amy was entitled to one-half of the escrow funds, and

the magistrate court awarded Amy another money judgment (2018 money judgment) for 

$33,244.03, representing one-half of the $66,488.06 James received on November 5, 2018. 

The magistrate court held a trial to determine if, and at what rate, interest on the 2017 and 

2018 money judgments should apply. Amy argued, in part, that pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(1), 

her share of the money became due when James sold her shares and, as a result, she should receive 

prejudgment interest (12% per year) from the time James received the money from the sale of her 

shares until the time the magistrate court entered the respective money judgments. After the money 

judgments were entered, Amy argued she was entitled to post-judgment interest (approximately 

7.125% per year) pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(2). James argued Amy waived any claim for 

prejudgment interest and, alternatively, that pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(2) any interest on the 

2017 and 2018 money judgments should be calculated at the post-judgment rate from the date the 

magistrate court entered the money judgments, not the date James received the money. 

After trial, the magistrate court found that Amy was entitled to interest from the day James 

received the money from the sale of Amy’s shares. In support of this conclusion, the magistrate 

court found: (1) James received the full benefit of Amy’s money without her permission or 

authority, concealed receipt of the funds, and improperly kept the funds for his own use; 
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(2) because the divorce decree did not include a value of Amy’s shares, it did not serve as a money 

judgment and, thus, Amy had no ability to collect her portion of the assets from James without a 

subsequent judgment from the court; (3) case law supported an award of interest; (4) equity 

supported an award of interest because James should not benefit from using Amy’s money without 

paying interest; and (5) there was “no cogent reason why interest on the sum should not be awarded 

to Amy from the date James received the funds.” 

The magistrate court reasoned that because the divorce decree was the relevant judgment 

and James’ sale of the shares occurred after its entry, I.C. § 28-22-104(2) was applicable and Amy 

could only receive post-judgment interest. Accordingly, the magistrate court awarded Amy postjudgment interest pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(2) from the date James sold the shares with an 

interest rate of 6.250% on the 2017 money judgment of $897,833.05 and an interest rate of 7.375% 

on the 2018 money judgment of $33,244.03.

James appealed to the district court and Amy cross appealed. While James conceded that 

interest should apply to his sale of Amy’s shares, he alleged the magistrate court erred by ordering 

the accrual of interest from the date he received the funds, instead of the date the court entered the 

money judgments. In her cross appeal, Amy asserted the magistrate court erred by failing to award 

prejudgment interest from the time James received the money from the sale of the shares until the

entry of the money judgments. 

The district court heard argument and noted the “very strong equitable argument” for 

ordering interest on the money judgments. Ultimately, the district court found that James’ conduct 

fell “below legal and decency standards” and case law supported an award of interest from the 

time James received the money from the sale of the shares. Accordingly, the district court affirmed 

the magistrate court’s order. However, the district court did not address Amy’s contention that 

she is entitled to prejudgment interest from the time James received the money from the sale of 

the shares until the entry of the money judgments. Amy appeals. 

II. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Where a district court has affirmed the decision of a magistrate court on intermediate 

appeal, “this Court must focus on the findings of fact and conclusions of law made in the magistrate 

court proceeding and determine whether they were (1) supported by the evidence in the record and 

(2) consistent with the law.” Herr v. Herr, ___ Idaho ___, ___, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (2021). If so, 
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we affirm the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure; if not, we must reverse. Id. at 

____, ____ P.3d at ___.

The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which we exercise free review. 

Aguilar v. Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 649-50, 262 P.3d 671, 678-79 (2011). Such interpretation 

must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and 

ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l 

Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). It is well established that where statutory 

language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted 

for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. Id. Only where a statute 

is capable of more than one conflicting construction is it said to be ambiguous and invoke the rules 

of statutory construction. L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40 

P.3d 96, 101 (2002).

We review an award of prejudgment interest under the abuse of discretion standard. Med. 

Recovery Servs., LLC v. Neumeier, 163 Idaho 504, 511, 415 P.3d 372, 379 (2018). When a trial 

court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered 

inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 

(2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards 

applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). 

III.

ANALYSIS 

Amy makes two arguments on appeal. First, she asserts that the relevant judgment for 

purposes of I.C. § 28-22-104(2) is one that has a readily ascertainable monetary value. Because 

the divorce decree awarded her stock, not money, it is not the relevant judgment for purposes of 

the statute. The relevant judgments, she asserts were the money judgments entered in 2017 and 

2018. Second, Amy argues that James’ sale of her Redtop Holding shares prior to the entry of 

those judgments triggered the application of I.C. § 28-22-104(1) and, pursuant to that subsection, 

Amy’s share of the money “became due” when James received the money from the sale. As a 

result, Amy asserts that she should be awarded prejudgment interest from the date James received 

money from the sale until the magistrate court entered the relevant money judgments. In response, 

James argues the divorce decree was “the judgment” referenced in I.C. § 28-22-104(2); thus,
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because James sold Amy’s shares after the entry of the divorce decree, Amy’s money was “money 

due on the judgment” pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(2) and Amy can only receive post-judgment 

interest from the sale.1

A. Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) Does Not Preclude Multiple Judgments in a Case 

Idaho Code § 28-22-104 prescribes the application and legal rates of pre- and postjudgment interest. In the relevant portions, the statute provides: 

(1) When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, 

interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the hundred by the year 

on:

. . . .

2. Money after the same becomes due.

. . . .

(2) The legal rate of interest on money due on the judgment of any competent court 

or tribunal shall be the rate of five percent (5%) plus the base rate in effect at 

the time of entry of the judgment. 

(Emphasis added.) 

We must first decide whether “the judgment” as referenced in subsection (2) refers to a 

singular judgment in a proceeding. As with all statutory interpretation questions, we begin with 

the plain language of the statute, keeping in mind that we will not construe a statute to mean 

something it does not say. Gregory v. Stallings, 167 Idaho 123, 130, 468 P.2d 253, 260 (2020). 

The plain language of I.C. § 28-22-104(2) does not indicate that the words “the judgment” 

in I.C. § 28-22-104(2) must refer to a single judgment in a particular case. Idaho Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(a)(1) defines a judgment as:

“Judgment” as used in these rules means a separate document entitled “Judgment”

or “Decree”. A judgment must state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or 

more claims for relief in the action, which may include dismissal with or without 

prejudice. A judgment must not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a 

master, the record of prior proceedings, the court’s legal reasoning, findings of fact,

or conclusions of law. 

Under that same rule:

A judgment is final if either it is a partial judgment that has been certified as final 

pursuant to subsection (b)(1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims 

for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action.

Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 802 similarly defines a judgment:

 

1 The parties agree that after the magistrate court entered the 2017 and 2018 money 

judgments, post-judgment interest would accrue pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2). 
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“Judgment” means a separate document entitled “Judgment” or “Decree”. A 

judgment must state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for 

relief in the action, which may include dismissal with or without prejudice. A 

judgment must not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, the record 

of prior proceedings, the court’s legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of

law. A judgment is final if either it is a partial judgment that has been certified as 

final pursuant to subsection (b)(1) or judgment has been entered on all claims for 

relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action. A 

judgment or partial judgment must begin with the words “JUDGMENT IS 

ENTERED AS FOLLOWS . . . ,” and it must not contain any other wording 

between those words and the caption. A judgment may include any findings of fact 

or conclusions of law expressly required by statute, rule, or regulation.

Neither definition requires that in order for a document to be a judgment, it must be either the only 

judgment or the final judgment entered in the case. Accordingly, we conclude that the plain 

language of I.C. § 28-22-104(2) does not limit “the judgment” to a single judgment in a proceeding

and, thus, the statute allows for the possibility of multiple judgments in a case. 

The Idaho Supreme Court similarly concluded that I.C. § 28-22-104(2) allowed for 

multiple judgments in a proceeding in Roesch v. Klemann, 155 Idaho 175, 178, 307 P.3d 192, 195 

(2013). There, the Court held “the judgment” language in subsection I.C. § 28-22-104(2) applied

broadly to all judgments entered in a proceeding: 

[I.C. § 28-22-104(2)] provides that the defined rate “shall be” the rate applied to 

money due on a judgment and that it “shall operate” as the applicable rate for “all” 

judgments. Thus, the plain language of subsection (2) indicates that the mandatory 

interest rate on an amount due on a judgment is the rate provided in the statute, and 

further that the statutory rate applies to all judgments declared during the relevant 

time period.

Id. at 178, 307 P.3d at 195 (emphasis added).

Thus, a plain reading of I.C. § 28-22-104(2) does not preclude multiple judgments in a 

proceeding. This does not change because the issue arises in a family law context. See Josephson 

v. Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 1151, 772 P.2d 1236, 1245 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding “[a]lthough 

the date of the divorce decree is a benchmark for determining the value of property for equitable 

division, interest would only accrue on a money judgment setting forth the obligation to pay”) 

overruled on other grounds by Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520, 835 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App. 1992). 

Here, however, the magistrate court found the divorce decree served as the “one true 

[j]udgment” in the proceeding. Specifically, the magistrate court cited Worthington v. Thomas, 

134 Idaho 433, 4 P.3d 545 (2000) and found:
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In this case, there is only one true “Judgment”--the divorce decree that was entered 

on October 29, 2015. All other subsequent documents titled “judgments” either 

amend the October 29, 2015 Judgment, modify the October 29, 2015 Judgment, 

enforce the Judgment that already exists (money judgment), or are more 

appropriately titled post-judgment orders. 

In reaching this conclusion, the magistrate court did not recognize that I.C. § 28-22-104(2) does 

not preclude multiple judgments in a proceeding. Worthington does not change our interpretation 

of the statute. 

In Worthington, Worthington and Thomas were divorced parents of minor children. 

Worthington, 134 Idaho at 434, 4 P.3d at 546. Thomas sought and received a judgment 

consolidating years of unpaid child support. The magistrate court entered a judgment, listing 

nearly $11,000.00 as the principal amount due. The judgment also stated that the amount Thomas 

owed “would accrue ‘interest thereon from the date thereof at the judgment rate as provided by 

law.’” Worthington later moved to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest on her 

award. The motion was not heard for seven years, and then following a hearing, the magistrate 

court denied the motion. Worthington appealed. Id. 

On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Hunsaker v. Hunsaker, 117 

Idaho 192, 786 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1990), child support payments are self-executing judgments. 

Worthington, 134 Idaho at 435, 4 P.3d at 547. Therefore, there was no reason to enter a separate 

judgment on the past due principal for interest to accrue. Id. Instead, to collect, the payee may 

obtain a writ of execution based upon an affidavit which sets forth a calculation of interest and the 

principal amount due under the judgment. Id. However, the Court held once the amount was 

consolidated into a single judgment, any claim to interest that Worthington had was merged into 

the consolidated judgment. Id. at 436, 4 P.3d at 548. The Court further held that because 

Worthington waited seven years to pursue her claim, res judicata precluded Worthington from 

collecting prejudgment interest. Id. at 437, 4 P.3d at 549. The Court did not explicitly or implicitly 

hold that the only judgment in the proceeding was the divorce decree.2 

 

2 The dissent disagreed that the magistrate court entered a final judgment when it issued the 

consolidated judgment, reasoning that “the only true judgment entered in this case” was on the 

date the decree was entered when Thomas was ordered to pay child support. Worthington, 134 

Idaho at 438, 4 P.3d at 550 (Walters, J. dissenting). Based on this “true judgment” rationale, the 

dissent concluded any judgment entered after that should have been entitled a “post-judgment 

order.” Id. The dissent, however, is not binding authority. 
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The plain language “the judgment” in I.C. § 28-22-104(2) is not limiting language and does 

not preclude multiple judgments in a proceeding. It is undisputed that the divorce decree was a 

judgment in this case. However, the 2017 and 2018 money judgments were also judgments 

because they met the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(c) and I.R.F.L.P. 802. Each of the 2017 and 

2018 money judgments were entitled “money judgment,” began with the relevant language, and 

stated the relief granted by containing a valuation of Amy’s shares reduced to a specific, monetary 

amount. Further, neither money judgment contained a recitation of pleadings, findings of fact, or 

conclusions of law. As such, the divorce decree, the 2017 money judgment, and the 2018 money 

judgment were all judgments for purposes of applying I.C. § 28-22-104. Consequently, the district 

court erred in affirming the magistrate court’s conclusion that the divorce decree served as the 

“one true [j]udgment” in this case. 

B. The 2017 and 2018 Money Judgments Were the Relevant Judgments for Purposes of 

Imposing Interest 

Because the divorce decree and the 2017 and 2018 money judgments were all judgments, 

the next question is which were “the judgment(s)” contemplated by I.C. § 28-22-104(2). If the 

divorce decree served as the judgment, then Amy may only receive post-judgment interest on 

James’ sale of her Redtop Holding shares because James initiated the sale after the decree was 

entered and the proceeds of the sale would be “money due on the judgment” pursuant to I.C. § 28-

22-104(2). However, if the 2017 and 2018 money judgments were the relevant judgments for 

purposes of determining interest, the proceeds of the sale were “[m]oney after the same became 

due” pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(1) because the sale occurred prior to the entry of judgment and 

Amy may receive prejudgment interest from the date James received the money until the entry of 

the money judgments. 

The magistrate court concluded that the interest rate should be set at the post-judgment rate 

pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(2) based, in part, on its conclusion that Idaho courts have generally 

held that post-judgment interest applies to family law judgments where some money is due at a 

future date. As support for this decision, the magistrate court cited Worthington, Hunsaker, and 

Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 759 P.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1988). However, none of these cases hold 

that the divorce decree is necessarily “the judgment” for purposes of determining interest. Rather, 

those cases involved judgments containing a readily ascertainable money value, which happened 

to be the divorce decree. See Worthington, 134 Idaho at 438, 4 P.3d at 550 (unpaid child support 

where property settlement agreement ordered father to pay $115.00 per child per month); 
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Hunsaker, 117 Idaho at 193, 786 P.2d at 584 (application of interest to accumulation of unpaid 

child support obligations ordered in divorce decree); Krebs, 114 Idaho at 572-73, 759 P.2d at 78-

79 (awarding interest on property discrepancy settlement award of $22,898.00). Further, in both 

Worthington and Hunsaker, the missed child support payments at issue served as self-executing 

judgments; consequently, there was no reason to enter a separate judgment on the past due 

principal for interest to accrue. Worthington, 134 Idaho at 435, 4 P.3d at 547; Hunsaker, 117 Idaho 

at 194-95, 786 P.2d at 585-86. 

Thus, in Worthington, Hunsaker, and Krebs the relevant judgment in each case contained 

a specific monetary amount. This is an important factor for two reasons. First, it allowed the

aggrieved party to redress her grievance by using the monetary amount specified in the original 

judgment to readily ascertain the value of her claim. Second, it provided a readily ascertainable 

amount to which interest could be applied. However, in circumstances where the judgment only 

allocates an asset without a readily ascertainable monetary value, the original judgment provides 

no such starting point. Instead, the trial court must adjudicate the valuation wholly from outside 

sources and the aggrieved party cannot seek recompense without this subsequent valuation and

judgment from a trial court. See AgStar Fin. Servs., ACA v. Nw. Sand & Gravel, Inc., 168 Idaho 

358, 371, 483 P.3d 415, 428 (2021) (holding “[p]rejudgment interest can [only] be awarded as a 

matter of law from the date the sum became due in cases where the amount claimed, even though 

not liquidated, is capable of mathematical computation”); see also Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 

276, 178 P.3d 639, 641 (Ct. App. 2007) (“[A] person who could not determine the amount owed 

should not be charged interest on the sum that is ultimately found to be due.”). 

Unlike Worthington, Hunsaker, and Krebs, here the divorce decree only allocated an asset 

with no readily ascertainable value. In order for Amy to enforce the divorce decree, she needed 

the magistrate court’s valuation of the asset and a money judgment. Accordingly, we do not find 

these cases persuasive. 

The magistrate court also relied on Swope v. Swope, 122 Idaho 296, 834 P.2d 298 (1992)

(Swope II). While the facts in Swope are similar to the facts here, the issue raised is not. Swope 

II, in part, concerned an award of bonds to the wife; the husband retained and controlled the bonds 

for approximately five years after entry of the divorce decree. Id. at 298, 834 P.2d at 300. What 

is unclear from either the first appeal, Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974, 739 P.2d 273 (1987), or the 

second appeal, Swope II, is whether the bonds were associated with a specific monetary amount. 
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What is clear, however, is that the wife sought an award of post-judgment interest, specifically

pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(2), earned on the bonds during the time the husband retained the

bonds after the divorce decree was entered. Swope II, 122 Idaho at 301-02, 834 P.2d at 303-04. 

The request that interest be awarded specifically pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(2) was likely 

because under the version of the statute at that time, post-judgment interest was six percent higher 

than the rate for prejudgment interest. See Swope II, 122 Idaho at 298, 834 P.2d at 300. The 

magistrate court denied the wife’s request and granted the wife an interest rate equal to the actual 

investment yield of the bonds. Id. at 301, 834 P.2d at 303. The district court reversed the 

magistrate court. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court simply adopted the district court’s reasoning as 

follows:

The starting point for resolution of this issue is the applicable statute [I.C. § 28-22-

104]. The statutory rate applies to money due on judgments. Here, [wife] was 

denied the cash payment of the interest on the asset awarded in the decree. This 

cash payment can be viewed as money due on the judgment. It is held that the 

appropriate rate is, therefore, the statutory judgment rate. 

Id. at 302, 834 P.2d at 304. Thus, the Court found the district court did not err in awarding the 

wife the higher rate of interest listed in I.C. § 28-22-104(2). Id. Accordingly, Swope II does not

stand for the proposition that the words “the judgment” in I.C. § 28-22-104(2) is synonymous with 

the divorce decree as a final judgment without regard to the nature of the asset at issue. 

The above opinions are consistent with the equitable considerations that underlie family 

law cases, see Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442, 446, 835 P.2d 677, 681 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding 

principles of equity generally govern marriage dissolution), and the award of prejudgment interest

itself. See Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 289, 766 P.2d 751, 759 (1988) (holding 

“[i]n the area of prejudgment interest, equitable principles are emphasized”). If the relevant 

judgment for purposes of I.C. § 28-22-104(2) is always the divorce decree, then prejudgment 

interest cannot apply to claims that, for equitable reasons, should be awarded prejudgment interest. 

For example, had Amy successfully pursued a tort claim for conversion or breach of a fiduciary 

duty outside of the family law proceeding, she would have been eligible to receive prejudgment 

interest prior to the entry of the money judgment and she would be entitled to post-judgment 

interest thereafter. See Schenk v. Smith, 117 Idaho 999, 1001, 793 P.2d 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1990) 

(recognizing that in “conversion cases, the equities lie with parties who have been deprived of the 

use of their money or property during the pendency of their claims,” and tort claims for conversion 

of property may receive prejudgment interest). Reading the statute narrowly such that “the 
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judgment” refers only to the divorce decree excludes parties in family law cases from obtaining 

prejudgment interest in a case, like this one, where fraudulent behavior occurs after the entry of 

the divorce decree, but before the entry of a judgment upon which the aggrieved party can execute. 

This is because prejudgment interest is only allowed where a claim is liquidated, where the amount 

due can be ascertained by mathematical computation, or where the amount due can be determined 

by reference to a recognized standard. Id. at 1001, 793 P.2d at 233; see also AgStar, 168 Idaho at 

372, 483 P.3d at 429. In light of all these considerations, we conclude “the judgment” referenced 

in I.C. § 28-22-104(2) is the judgment that contains a readily ascertainable monetary amount for 

the asset at issue. 

In this case, only after the magistrate court entered the 2017 and 2018 monetary judgments 

were there judgments that contained a readily ascertainable monetary value for the asset at issue. 

Accordingly, the 2017 and 2018 money judgments are the relevant judgments for the purposes of 

I.C. § 28-22-104(2). 

C. Amy is Entitled to Prejudgment Interest Under I.C. § 28-22-104(1) From the Date

James Received Money From the Sale of the Shares Until the Entry of the 2017 and 

2018 Money Judgments

Pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(1) prejudgment interest may be awarded on “[m]oney after 

the same becomes due.” “The purpose of awarding prejudgment interest is to compensate an 

injured party for the time value of money.” AgStar, 168 Idaho at 372, 483 P.3d at 429. 

The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s finding that Amy should be awarded 

interest from the date James sold Amy’s Redtop Holding shares. However, because the magistrate 

court erroneously found the divorce decree was the relevant judgment for purposes of I.C. § 28-

22-104(2), it did not consider that an award of prejudgment interest under I.C. § 28-22-104(1) was 

permissible. When the magistrate court weighed the facts and considered the equitable principles,

it concluded that equitable reasons justified awarding Amy interest from the date James sold the 

shares and unlawfully retained the proceeds.3 Because James’ sale of Amy’s shares occurred prior 

to the entry of the 2017 and 2018 money judgments, the sale triggered the application of I.C. § 28-

 

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In its determination that Amy was entitled to post-judgment interest pursuant to I.C. § 28-

22-104(2), the magistrate court weighed the equitable considerations raised by the facts of the case. 

However, post-judgment interest is statutory, thus it accrues from entry of the relevant judgment 

regardless of the equitable considerations. See Roesch v. Klemann, 155 Idaho 175, 178, 307 P.3d 

192, 195 (2013) (“[T]he plain language of subsection (2) indicates that the mandatory interest rate 

on an amount due on a judgment is the rate provided in the statute.”).
13

22-104(1) and, thus, the money James owed Amy was “[m]oney after the same becomes due.” As 

a result, Amy should be awarded prejudgment interest pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(1) from the 

date James received the funds from the sale of the shares until the date each money judgment was 

entered. As of the date the 2017 and 2018 money judgments were entered, Amy is entitled to postjudgment interest pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(2). 

D. Attorney Fees and Costs 

Amy seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal. An award of attorney fees may be granted 

under I.C. § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 to the prevailing party, and such an award is 

appropriate when the court finds that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, 

unreasonably, or without foundation. We do not find that James defended this appeal frivolously, 

as such we decline to award attorney fees on appeal. Costs are awarded to Amy pursuant to 

I.A.R. 40.

IV.

CONCLUSION 

The plain language of I.C. § 28-22-104(2) does not limit “the judgment” to the final 

judgment in a case. Instead, it applies to all judgments entered in a case. In this case, the relevant 

judgments were the 2017 and 2018 money judgments because these judgments contained readily 

ascertainable monetary values for the assets at issue. Because James acquired the money prior to 

the entry of the 2017 and 2018 money judgments, Amy’s share was “[m]oney when such becomes 

due” pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(1). The district court erred in affirming the magistrate court’s 

order because the magistrate court erroneously applied I.C. § 28-22-104(2) instead of I.C. § 28-

22-104(1) from the date James received the money until the entry of the money judgments. 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s decision affirming the magistrate court, and remand 

the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Amy is awarded costs but not 

attorney fees on appeal. 

Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.