NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL SCHRUPP,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 18

- 15893

D.C. No. 2:16

- cv
- 00636

- WBS

- KJN

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 7, 2020 ** San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and HILLMAN, *** District Judge.

Plaintiff

- Appellant Paul Schrupp (“Mr. Schrupp”) appeals from the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant

- Appellee Wells Fargo

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Timothy Hillman, United States District Judge f or the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

JAN 9 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Bank, N.A. (“Wells Farg o”) on his breach of contract and related claims, the

admission of Meredith Deal ’s Declaration (the “Deal Declaration”) on summary judgment , and the denial of his motion for leave to amend his complaint. We affirm.
Mr. Schrupp argues that the district court erred in entering summary judgment
against him because, contrary to the court’s findings otherwise, he made the three
timely trial period payments required by the terms of the parties’ Trial Period Plan
( the “ Agreement ” )

. 1 He suggests that his May 26, June 28, and July 27 , 2011 , payments to the bankruptcy trustee were timely trial period payments. But under the
Agreement , Wells Fargo

— not the bankruptcy trustee

— had to receive the trial
period payments in a timely manner, and Wells Fargo indisputably did not receive
these payments within the required time frames.
Mr. Schrupp alternatively argues that the payments Wells Fargo received on
May 11 and July 12 , 2011 , were timely trial period payments. Mr. Schrupp,
however, made the May 11 , 2011 , payment on April 29, 2011, well before Wells
Fargo offered to modify his loan. Given the timing, we agree with the district court
that Wells Fargo appropriately applied the May 11 payment to Mr. Schrupp’s
obligations under his Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan rather than treating it as a trial

1 We reject Mr. Schrupp’s contention that it was impossible to make timely trial period payments given the procedures for securing the bankruptcy court’s approval of any loan modification. Mr. Sch rupp could have continued making full payments while pursuing the bankruptcy court’s approval for a loan modification, and those payments necessarily would have covered the lower trial period payment amounts.3

period payment

. Because Mr. Schrupp fail ed to comply with the express terms of
the Agreement, he was not entitled to a loan modification. Accord ingly , the district
court properly concluded that Mr. Schrupp failed to establish a breach of contract
claim. Because Mr. Schrupp’s remaining claims depend ed on Wells Fargo’s alleged
breach, Wells Fargo was likewise entitled to summary judgment on th ose c laims.
Next, Mr. Schrupp contends that the district court erred in admitting the Deal

Declaration

. But e ven if the district court erred in its evidentiary ruling , any error

was harmless. Every piece of information in the Deal Declaration to which Mr.

S chrupp objects was disclosed in evidence submitted by Mr. Schrupp himself at the
summary judgment stage

. Finally, Mr. Schrupp argues that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint. We disagree. Mr. Sc hrupp

moved to amend his complaint after discovery had closed, and the district court
properly reasoned that any amendment would require reopening discovery. See
Solomon v. N. Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. , 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding

that a d istrict court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend when
“[a]llowing the motion would . . . require[] re

- opening discovery”).

AFFIRMED.