COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Humphreys 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MARK ANTHONY LAWRENCE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record Nos. 0716-01-4 and CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 1385-01-4 DECEMBER 3, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Leslie M. Alden, Judge 

 Vanessa Antoun, Senior Assistant Public 

Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; 

H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Mark Anthony Lawrence (appellant) contends the trial court 

violated his due process rights when it revoked his probation and 

imposed the full term of his three-year suspended sentence. 

Finding no due process violation, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The essential facts are not in dispute. In November 1995, 

appellant was convicted of attempted abduction. He was sentenced 

to five years in the penitentiary, followed by three years of 

active probation. On March 9, 2000 the trial court issued a bench 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
warrant charging that appellant had violated the terms of his 

probation. Specifically the bench warrant charged: 

MARK ANTHONY LAWRENCE has violated the terms 

of his probation: 

Condition #6: To follow my Probation and 

Parole Officer's instruction and be truthful 

and cooperative; 

On February 7, 2000 subject was transported 

to the Kennedy Shelter, 9155 Richmond 

Highway, Alexandria, VA., and instructed to 

obey all of the shelter's rules and to 

conduct himself in a manner so as not to be 

removed from the shelter. On February 22, 

2000, Mr. Joe Boodie, Case Manager, Kennedy 

Shelter reported that about 5:30 pm on 

February 21, 2000, subject made unwanted 

sexual advances toward Ms. Lisa Jones, Night 

Manager at the shelter. He said words to 

the effect that, I need some loving or I 

need some sex. Subject was immediately 

removed from the shelter. 

And the Defendant has not been of good 

behavior and there is good reason to believe 

his suspended sentence should be revoked. 

 Appellant was arrested on the bench warrant February 1, 2001 

and on February 16, 2001 at the resulting revocation hearing 

denied that he "[was] removed from the shelter for non-compliance 

with the rules there." At this hearing, appellant objected to the 

Commonwealth presenting evidence concerning his failure to 

maintain contact with the probation office because the bench 

warrant did not list that as a basis for a violation. 

Notwithstanding his objection, appellant presented evidence as 

part of his case that he and others on his behalf had attempted to 

contact his probation officer on several occasions after his 

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termination from the Kennedy Shelter. The Commonwealth then 

called a probation officer who testified about the facts 

surrounding his removal from the shelter and his failure to keep 

in contact with the probation office. At the conclusion of that 

hearing, the trial court revoked appellant's probation and stated: 

I'm convinced that the condition was given 

to you that you were to abide by all the 

rules of the Kennedy Shelter. I'm convinced 

you failed to do that. And I am also 

convinced that you absconded from probation 

after that. 

 On May 18, 2001 the trial court granted appellant's motion to 

rehear and allowed appellant to present additional evidence of his 

attempts to contact his probation officer after being removed from 

the shelter. At the close of the reconsideration hearing, the 

trial court again found appellant to be in violation and sentenced 

him to three years incarceration. The sole issue presented in 

these combined appeals is whether the trial court violated 

appellant's due process rights by considering evidence on 

"absconding" from probation when that information was not 

specifically noticed as a basis for revocation on the bench 

warrant.1

 1

 Appellant noted an appeal to the March 2, 2001 order 

revoking his probation on March 19, 2001. However, appellant 

then sought reconsideration in the trial court. When the trial 

court denied reconsideration by order dated May 22, 2001, 

appellant again noted an appeal. There is only one issue to be 

resolved by this Court. 

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II. ANALYSIS 

 "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 

property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend V.; 

Va. Const. art. 1, § 11. "In general, due process requires that 

individuals have notice of those acts which may lead to a loss 

of liberty." Holden v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 38, 45, 497 

S.E.2d 492, 495 (1998) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 

188, 191 (1977)). In the context of revocations 

minimum due process requirements include: 

(1) written notice; (2) disclosure of the 

evidence against the accused; (3) an 

opportunity to be heard and to present 

evidence and witnesses; (4) an opportunity 

to confront and cross-examine adverse 

witnesses; (5) a "neutral and detached" 

hearing body; and (6) a written statement as 

to the evidence relied on and reasons for 

revoking parole. 

Copeland v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 754, 756, 419 S.E.2d 294, 

295 (1992) (citing Morrissey v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). 

An order requiring the defendant to appear to show cause why his 

suspension of sentence should not be revoked satisfies the 

notice requirement. See id. at 756, 419 S.E.2d at 296. 

 In the instant case, the bench warrant expressly stated 

that appellant had been removed from the Kennedy Shelter for 

inappropriate conduct. The record supports the trial court's 

finding that appellant was terminated from his shelter placement 

for cause. This was clearly the issue outlined in the language 

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of the bench warrant and provides an adequate basis for the 

trial court's revocation of appellant's suspended sentence. 

 "In any case in which the court has suspended the execution 

or imposition of sentence, the court may revoke the suspension 

of sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that 

occurred at any time within the probation period, or within the 

period of suspension fixed by the court." Code § 19.2-306(A). 

"A trial court has broad discretion to revoke a suspended 

sentence and probation based on Code § 19.2-306, which allows a 

court to do so for any cause deemed by it sufficient." Davis v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86, 402 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1991) 

(citing Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326, 228 S.E.2d 

555, 556 (1976); Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 365, 38 

S.E.2d 479, 483 (1946)). "'The court's findings of fact and 

judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of 

abuse of discretion.'" Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 

31, 35, 537 S.E.2d 611, 613 (2000) (quoting Davis, 12 Va. App. 

at 86, 402 S.E.2d at 687). The trial court found as a fact that 

appellant failed to abide by the rules of the Kennedy Shelter as 

set out in the bench warrant, and this alone provides a 

sufficient basis for the revocation. Credible evidence supports 

this finding. 

 Moreover, appellant waived his due process objection to the 

trial court's consideration of evidence that he "absconded" from 

his probation when he presented evidence on absconding. 

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Appellant "is confronted by a substantive rule of law which 

renders irreversible the action of the trial court" in receiving 

evidence on absconding. Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 1, 9, 

413 S.E.2d 875, 879 (1992). "The rule is that 'where an accused 

unsuccessfully objects to evidence which he considers improper 

and then on his own behalf introduces evidence of the same 

character, he thereby waives his objection, and we cannot 

reverse for the alleged error.'" Id. (quoting Saunders v. 

Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 401, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970)); see 

also Combs v. Norfolk and Western Rwy. Co., 256 Va. 490, 499, 

507 S.E.2d 355, 360 (1998). Initially, appellant presented 

evidence on this issue at the February 16, 2001 revocation 

hearing. He also requested and received permission to present 

additional evidence of this nature at the hearing on his motion 

to reconsider. The record reflects that appellant had notice 

and ample opportunity to be heard on all issues and, thus, no 

due process violation occurred. The trial court is affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

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