Present: All the Justices 

MICHAEL LEE FITZGERALD 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 061361 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 April 20, 2007 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In a jury trial held in the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania 

County, Michael Lee Fitzgerald was convicted on two counts of 

indecent liberties with a minor by a person in a custodial or 

supervisory relationship, Code § 18.2-370.1, and one count of 

object sexual penetration, Code § 18.2-67.2. In this appeal, 

the sole issue we consider is whether the trial court erred in 

permitting a licensed professional counselor to testify as an 

expert witness that the alleged victim suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).1

BACKGROUND 

 To resolve the limited issue presented in this appeal, we 

need not recite the trial evidence that led to Fitzgerald’s 

criminal convictions. The case arises from allegations, 

supported by the Commonwealth’s evidence, that Fitzgerald 

engaged in unlawful sexual acts with his stepdaughter (“the 

 

1

 We consider a similar issue with regard to expert 

testimony by a licensed clinical social worker in Conley v. 

Commonwealth, 273 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2007) (this day 

decided). 
2

victim”), who was under the age of thirteen years at the time. 

The focus of our analysis in resolving the issue presented is 

upon the challenged testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert 

witness, Linda Giles. 

 At trial, the Commonwealth called Giles, a licensed 

professional counselor,2 to testify as an expert witness. Giles 

testified that she held a master’s degree in counseling in 

addition to a bachelor’s degree. Additionally, Giles testified 

that she had completed three years of clinical training, which 

involves supervision by a licensed psychologist or a licensed 

professional counselor. Giles related that, at the time of 

trial, she had practiced as a licensed professional counselor 

for nine years and that her “primary background” involved 

working with children who were victims of abuse. 

 Giles testified that she first met with the victim and her 

mother through a referral by Child Protective Services. Giles 

explained that at that time her objective as a clinician was to 

“determine symptomology and treat the symptoms.” She further 

explained that “[w]hat I would do with someone with [the 

 

2

 Code § 54.1-3500 defines a “[p]rofessional counselor” as 

“a person trained in counseling interventions designed to 

facilitate an individual’s achievement of human development 

goals and remediating mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders 

and associated distresses which interfere with mental health and 

development.” 
3

victim’s] background would be to try and make her feel safe in 

the world again . . . based on the symptoms that I was seeing 

with her.” 

 Giles testified that she conducted six counseling sessions 

with the victim after the initial meeting, and had an ongoing 

professional relationship with her at the time of trial. During 

the counseling sessions, Giles determined from the victim and 

her mother that Fitzgerald “[a]llegedly . . . had an 

inappropriate sexual penetration with [the victim] on her living 

room floor when her mother was not there.” 

 Giles then testified that the victim “experiences 

moderately severe symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder,” 

which she defined as “a collection of symptoms that happen after 

a traumatic event that has occurred that has made someone feel 

horror, helplessness.” She stated that “any kind of 

inappropriate sexual contact with a . . . child qualifies and 

they relive the experience in all of their senses.” 

 At this point, Fitzgerald objected, stating that Giles was 

not “clinically qualified to make that diagnosis.” Fitzgerald 

asserted that a diagnosis of PTSD “has to be made by a doctor 

and cannot be made by a licensed professional counselor.” The 

trial court overruled Fitzgerald’s objection. 
4

 Continuing her testimony, Giles stated that she uses the 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders 

(“DSM”) as her standard for looking for symptoms and making a 

diagnosis. She testified that the DSM “is the standard printed 

by the American Psychiatric Association and [is] used by 

psychologists, licensed professional counselors, [and] licensed 

clinical social workers.” Giles explained that the DSM “is an 

effort to organize symptoms and organize thoughts in such a way 

that we can effect a treatment.” 

 Giles testified that she first encountered PTSD, which she 

characterized as a “psychiatric diagnosis,” in her master’s 

degree program but encountered it in “much more detail” during 

her clinical training. She listed numerous symptoms 

characteristic of PTSD, and stated that the victim reported or 

displayed “most” of those symptoms. Giles testified that under 

the specific diagnostic scoring system set forth in the DSM for 

PTSD, the victim clearly met the criteria for PTSD and it was 

“[n]owhere near” a close call. 

 On cross-examination, Giles reiterated that PTSD is a 

“psychiatric diagnosis.” However, she did not agree that 

psychiatric diagnoses are usually made by psychiatrists, again 

stating that psychologists, licensed professional counselors, 

and licensed clinical social workers are trained to use the DSM. 
5

 At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found 

Fitzgerald guilty of the charged offenses.3 Fitzgerald perfected 

an appeal to the Court of Appeals. 

 A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals concluded that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Giles’ 

testimony because “Virginia law expressly permits professional 

counselors to diagnose . . . mental, emotional, and behavioral 

disorders” and “the evidence adduced at trial supported a 

finding that Giles was, in fact, qualified to exercise that 

diagnostic authority in this case.” Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 

48 Va. App. 271, 276, 630 S.E.2d 337, 339 (2006). This appeal 

followed. 

DISCUSSION 

 Fitzgerald’s principal basis for making the assertion that 

the trial court erred in permitting Giles to testify as an 

expert that the victim suffered with PTSD is that a diagnosis of 

PTSD is a “psychiatric diagnosis” and Giles is not a 

psychiatrist. According to Fitzgerald, only a psychiatrist or 

psychologist4

 may qualify to give expert testimony regarding a 

 

3

 The jury found Fitzgerald not guilty of an additional 

count of object sexual penetration. 

4

 On brief, while referring both to a psychiatrist, who is a 

physician, and a psychologist, who is a non-physician, 

Fitzgerald necessarily concedes that a psychologist may qualify 

to render an expert opinion regarding a mental disorder. See
6

diagnosis based on the mental disorders identified in the DSM 

and, thus, licensed professional counselors, including Giles, 

are categorically unqualified to give such testimony. 

 To support his contentions, Fitzgerald asserts that no 

provision in Title 54.1, Chapter 35 of the Code, which is 

entitled “Professional Counseling,” Code §§ 54.1-3500 through -

3515, enables a licensed professional counselor to engage in the 

practice of psychiatry or psychology. Furthermore, Fitzgerald 

notes that Title 54.1, Chapter 36 of the Code, which is entitled 

“Psychology,” Code §§ 54.1-3600 through –3616, contains “no 

mention of a licensed professional counselor or anyone other 

than a psychologist.” Thus, Fitzgerald maintains that the 

organization of the Code in this manner supports the conclusion 

that psychology, and making related diagnoses, is a field of 

expertise limited to psychiatrists and psychologists. We 

disagree with Fitzgerald’s contentions. 

 It is axiomatic that in order to qualify to give expert 

testimony a witness must possess sufficient knowledge, skill, or 

experience regarding the subject matter of the testimony to 

assist the trier of fact in the search for truth. See Velazquez 

v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 95, 103, 557 S.E.2d 213, 218 (2002) 

 

Ward v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 648, 653, 570 S.E.2d 827, 831 

(2002). 
7

(quoting Neblett v. Hunter, 207 Va. 335, 339-40, 150 S.E.2d 115, 

118 (1966)); Sami v. Varn, 260 Va. 280, 284, 535 S.E.2d 172, 174 

(2000); Combs v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 256 Va. 490, 496, 

507 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1998). Generally, a witness possesses 

sufficient expertise when, through experience, study or 

observation the witness acquires “knowledge of a subject beyond 

that of persons of common intelligence and ordinary experience.” 

Velazquez, 263 Va. at 103, 557 S.E.2d at 218; see also Norfolk & 

Western Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 207 Va. 567, 571, 151 S.E.2d 628, 

631 (1966). “[A]ll that is necessary for a witness to qualify 

as an expert is that the witness have sufficient knowledge of 

the subject to give value to the witness’s opinion.” Velazquez, 

263 Va. at 103, 557 S.E.2d at 218. Notwithstanding these 

general principles, we have concluded that certain subject 

matter is exclusive to a particular field of expertise such that 

only witnesses trained as professionals in that field of 

expertise are qualified to render expert opinions regarding that 

subject matter. See Combs, 256 Va. at 496-98, 507 S.E.2d at 

358-59 (holding that only a medical doctor may testify as to the 

causation of a human physical injury); John v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 

321, 559 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2002) (following Combs). But see

Velazquez, 263 Va. at 104, 557 S.E.2d at 218 (sexual assault 
8

nurse examiner may testify as to cause of sexual assault related 

physical injury). 

 In resolving the issue presented, Conley v. Commonwealth, 

273 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2007) (this day decided), is 

instructive. In Conley, we held that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in permitting a licensed clinical social 

worker to render an expert opinion that the victim of a sexual 

offense suffered from PTSD. We concluded that the statutory 

scheme by which clinical social workers become licensed and 

submit to other regulation authorized licensed social workers to 

“provide direct diagnostic, preventive and treatment services” 

regarding mental disorders such as PTSD. Accordingly, we held 

that since licensed clinical social workers are authorized by 

statute to provide direct diagnostic services, they may in 

appropriate circumstances render expert testimony as to such 

diagnoses. 

 While Conley involved testimony by a licensed clinical 

social worker, this case involves testimony by an individual 

belonging to a different category of mental health professional, 

a licensed professional counselor. However, licensed 

professional counselors are governed by a statutory scheme 

similar to the one applicable to licensed clinical social 

workers discussed in Conley. Professional counselors are 
9

governed by a health regulatory board, the Board of Counseling, 

which possesses the authority and duty to issue licenses to 

qualified applicants seeking to join the profession. See Code 

§ 54.1-3503; Code § 54.1-2400(3). Furthermore, Code § 54.1-3506 

requires that “[i]n order to engage in the practice of 

counseling . . . it [is] necessary to hold a license” issued by 

the Board of Counseling. 

 As provided in the statutory scheme pertaining to the 

regulation of professional counselors the term “[p]rofessional 

counselor” is defined as a “person trained in counseling 

interventions designed to . . . remediat[e] mental, emotional, 

or behavioral disorders.” Code § 54.1-3500. More 

significantly, “[c]ounseling” is defined to include “the 

therapeutic process of . . . conducting assessments and 

diagnoses for the purpose of establishing treatment goals and 

objectives and . . . to identify and remediate mental, emotional 

or behavioral disorders and associated distresses which 

interfere with mental health.” Id. With absolute clarity, this 

statutory language expressly authorizes those qualified to 

engage in the practice of counseling to make diagnoses of mental 

disorders and design treatment strategies for them. 

 Furthermore, Code § 16.1-356 authorizes licensed 

professional counselors to perform competency evaluations for 
10

juveniles. Without question, such evaluations may entail 

identifying and diagnosing mental disorders. 

 Based upon these statutes, and in accordance with our 

holding in Conley, we hold that a licensed professional 

counselor is authorized to diagnose recognized mental disorders 

such as PTSD. Thus, we further hold that a licensed 

professional counselor may in appropriate circumstances render 

expert testimony regarding a diagnosis of a mental disorder. 

 However, we stress that the trial court must determine 

whether a licensed professional counselor called as an expert 

witness in a given case in fact possesses sufficient skill, 

knowledge and experience as to the subject matter of the 

anticipated testimony. “The issue whether a [potential] witness 

is qualified to testify as an expert on a given subject is a 

matter submitted to the trial court’s discretion, and the trial 

court’s ruling in this regard will not be disturbed on appeal 

unless it plainly appears that the witness was not qualified.” 

Velazquez, 263 Va. at 104, 557 S.E.2d at 218 (citing Johnson v. 

Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 679, 529 S.E.2d 769, 783 (2000)). 

Here, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion when it permitted Giles to testify as an 

expert that the victim suffered from PTSD. We agree with the 

Court of Appeals. 
11

 Giles’ educational background clearly indicates that she is 

well-versed in the area of mental health treatment. She 

underwent seven years of higher education, receiving a master’s 

degree in counseling in addition to her bachelor’s degree. She 

also completed three years of clinical training under the 

supervision of another counselor or a psychologist. 

Furthermore, her training initially focused on working with 

children who were victims of abuse. At the time of trial, Giles 

had practiced as a licensed professional counselor for nine 

years. 

 Giles testified that she studied PTSD while getting her 

master’s degree and “in much more detail” during her three year 

clinical training. At trial, she listed the symptoms of PTSD 

set forth in the DSM, which is the standard diagnostic manual of 

the American Psychiatric Association. Giles testified that she 

had met with the victim several times and determined that, under 

the DSM’s diagnostic criteria, the victim suffered from PTSD. 

 The record contains sufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s conclusion that Giles possessed sufficient 

knowledge and experience regarding PTSD and the victim’s mental 

condition that Giles’ opinion could be of value to the jury. 

Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct to hold that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Giles to 
12

testify as an expert witness under the circumstances of this 

case. 

CONCLUSION 

 For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals 

correctly held that the trial court did not err in ruling that 

Giles was qualified to testify as an expert. Accordingly, the 

Court of Appeals’ judgment will be affirmed. 

Affirmed.