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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRIAN J. SMITH

(AC 38103)

(AC 38104)

(AC 38105)

DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crimes of, inter alia, operating a motor vehicle while

under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs and tampering with

a witness, the defendant, who also was convicted of being a third time

offender, appealed to this court. A state police trooper had observed

the defendant’s stationary vehicle in the travel lane of a road with its

brake lights illuminated. When the trooper positioned his vehicle behind

the defendant’s vehicle, the trooper saw the defendant’s brake lights go

off and his parking lights go on. The trooper smelled burnt marijuana

in the defendant’s vehicle and, when he asked the defendant for his

driver’s license and the vehicle’s registration, observed that the defendant’s speech was slurred and that his eyes were bloodshot and glazed

over. The trooper thereafter administered field sobriety tests, which the

defendant failed. After the defendant was released from police custody,

he engaged his girlfriend, K, and P and A, who were friends of K and

who testified at trial, in a plan to create a false narrative of the events

that led to his arrest so that he could claim that he had pulled over for

safety and had not driven his automobile because it was inoperative

when he encountered the trooper. After P changed her mind about

participating in the defendant’s plan, he sent her messages on Facebook

in which he attempted to calm her and made various threats against

her if she did not testify on his behalf. On appeal, the defendant claimed,

inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction

of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating

liquor or drugs because it failed to show that he had operated his vehicle

just prior to his encounter with the trooper. Held:

1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating

liquor or drugs, the state having presented sufficient evidence to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a motor vehicle

while he was intoxicated: contrary to the defendant’s claim, there was

ample evidence to support a finding that he had operated his vehicle

just prior to the point in time that he encountered the trooper, as a

written statement that the defendant provided to the police following

his arrest permitted the jury to reasonably find that he had admitted

that he pulled over for safety just prior to the trooper’s arrival on the

scene, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant’s

explanation to K about the incident with the trooper reflected an implicit

admission that he had been driving just prior to the time that he encountered the trooper, and it would have been reasonable for the jury to

conclude from the trooper’s testimony that he saw the defendant’s parking lights go on when the brake lights went off, that the defendant had

shifted the gears in the automobile with the key in the ignition, which

contradicted the defendant’s testimony that his vehicle had been disabled prior to his encounter with the trooper; moreover, the jury reasonably could have rejected as untruthful the defendant’s testimony that

the automobile was inoperable, as the state presented ample evidence

that, following his arrest, the defendant engaged others to provide a

false version of events concerning his operation of the automobile, and

that evidence was highly probative of the fact that he had operated

the vehicle just prior to his encounter with the trooper and of his

consciousness of guilt for having operated the motor vehicle while under

the influence.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

admitted into evidence a copy of a written Facebook message that he

had sent to P in which he asked her to corroborate his version of the

events that led to his arrest; the state satisfied its burden of authenticating the exhibit at issue because it presented sufficient evidence to sup-
port a finding that the evidence was what the state claimed it to be,

namely, a Facebook message sent to P by the defendant, as P’s personal

knowledge of the defendant and the subject matter of the message, as

well as the distinctive characteristics of the communication in light

of the surrounding circumstances in which it was made, constituted

sufficient circumstantial evidence of authenticity, the defendant had a

full opportunity to expose to the jury what he believed were weaknesses

in the evidence and to argue that it lacked probative value, and any

error with respect to the admission of the written Facebook message

was harmless, as the message was merely cumulative of other efforts

made by the defendant to induce P to testify falsely.

Argued October 23, 2017—officially released February 20, 2018

Procedural History

Two part substitute information charging the defendant, in the first two cases, with the crimes of operating

a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, operating a motor vehicle with an

elevated blood alcohol content and making a false statement in the second degree, and with possession of a

small amount of a cannabis-type substance, and the

infractions of improper parking and operating a motor

vehicle without carrying an operator’s license, and, in

the second part, with having previously been convicted

of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence,

and substitute information in the third case, charging

the defendant with two counts of the crime of tampering

with a witness, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of Tolland, geographical area number

nineteen, where the court, Graham, J., granted the

state’s motion to consolidate the cases for trial; thereafter, the charges in the first and third cases of operating

a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, operating a motor vehicle with an

elevated blood alcohol content, making a false statement in the second degree and tampering with a witness

were tried to the jury before Oliver, J.; verdicts of guilty;

subsequently, the charges in the first two cases of possession of a small amount of a cannabis-type substance,

improper parking and operating a motor vehicle without

carrying an operator’s license were tried to the court,

Oliver, J.; finding of guilty; thereafter, the defendant

was presented to the court, Oliver, J., on a plea of nolo

contendere to the second part of the first information;

judgment of guilty; subsequently, the court, Oliver, J.,

vacated the verdict of guilty of operating a motor vehicle

with an elevated blood alcohol content; judgments of

guilty, from which the defendant filed separate appeals

with this court; thereafter, this court consolidated the

appeals. Affirmed.

Jennifer B. Smith, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Matthew C. Gedansky, state’s

attorney, and Charles W. Johnson, assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

KELLER, J. In these consolidated appeals,1the defendant, Brian J. Smith, appeals from the judgments of

conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of operating

a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug in violation of General Statutes

§ 14-227a (a) (1), and tampering with a witness in violation of General Statutes § 53a-151 (a). The defendant

claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict

him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug and (2) the court

erroneously admitted certain evidence relating to the

witness tampering count. We affirm the judgments of

the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. At approximately 1:50 a.m. on March 7, 2014,

James Grimes, a state police trooper, was patrolling

near the intersection of Route 44 and Route 195 in

Manchester when he observed a stationary motor vehicle in the eastbound travel lane of Route 320, which

intersects with Route 195 a short distance from the

intersection of Route 44 and Route 195. The motor

vehicle, a tan colored Volvo, was impeding travel.

Grimes observed the vehicle for a few minutes and saw

that the vehicle’s brake lights were on and that the

vehicle remained stationary.

Grimes positioned his police cruiser behind the stationary vehicle and activated his vehicle’s emergency

lights. At that time, he observed that ‘‘the brake lights

[on the stationary vehicle] went off because you could

see the parking lights go on as the vehicle was shifted

into park.’’ Grimes exited his cruiser and knocked on

the passenger window. The sole occupant and operator

of the vehicle, the defendant, rolled down the passenger

window. Immediately, Grimes smelled burnt marijuana.

Grimes asked the defendant ‘‘what was going on,’’ to

which the defendant replied, ‘‘I’m just stopped,’’ and

that he was trying to use his cell phone. Grimes, after

concluding that the defendant was not experiencing a

medical issue and that there were not any mechanical

issues with the vehicle, told him that he could have

chosen a more suitable location. Grimes then asked

the defendant for his driver’s license and his vehicle’s

registration. The defendant, however, did not have his

driver’s license with him.

While the defendant was searching for his license

and registration, Grimes asked him several questions

to gauge whether he was impaired. Grimes observed

that the defendant’s speech was slurred and that his

eyes were bloodshot and ‘‘glazed over . . . .’’ The

defendant’s responses were ‘‘kind of slow and kind of

spacy,’’ and the defendant was ‘‘struggling’’ to understand or was not fully engaged in the conversation. For

example, the defendant first told Grimes that he was
traveling from Willimantic, but then told Grimes that

he was coming from his place of employment at a restaurant in Waterford.

Grimes walked to the driver’s side of the defendant’s

vehicle and the defendant complied with his request to

roll down the window. Grimes smelled not just burnt

marijuana, but also alcohol. Grimes asked the defendant

if he had been drinking or smoking marijuana, and the

defendant denied that he had used either substance.

Grimes then asked the defendant, who was still in

the vehicle, to complete two tests to gauge his sobriety

and coordination. The defendant was asked to recite

specified portions of the alphabet and to complete a

‘‘finger dexterity test’’ that required him to count aloud

while touching each of his fingertips with his thumb.

The defendant failed these tests.

Grimes returned to his cruiser to inform his dispatcher that he was going to administer standardized

field sobriety tests to the defendant. When he walked

in the direction of the defendant’s vehicle, he observed

the defendant quickly ‘‘shoving’’ candy into his mouth.

In Grimes’ experience, ‘‘this was a way for people that

are driving under the influence to try and mask their

breath or try to get something in their system that’s

going to dilute the alcohol concentration in their system.’’ Grimes instructed him to stop.

At Grimes’ direction, the defendant exited the vehicle.

He moved slowly and kept his right hand closed. Grimes

ordered him to open his hands and to keep them raised,

but the defendant did not comply fully as he continued

to keep his right hand closed. Grimes opened the defendant’s hand to reveal a small brown pipe. The pipe, like

the defendant’s vehicle, smelled like burnt marijuana.

The pipe contained marijuana residue.

Grimes then administered three standard field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test,

the walk and turn test, and the one leg stand test. The

defendant failed all of these tests.

At 2:10 a.m., Grimes arrested the defendant after

which the defendant was handcuffed, seated in the

police cruiser, and transported to the state police barracks for Troop C in Tolland. After Grimes advised the

defendant of his Miranda rights,2

the defendant pleaded

with Grimes to let him go because ‘‘he didn’t need this,’’

and that he was worried about losing his job. He stated

that ‘‘he just was going to see this girl and just wanted

to . . . sleep it off . . . .’’

At the state police barracks, Grimes searched the

defendant’s clothing. In a pocket of the defendant’s

jacket, he discovered a cigar holder containing marijuana. Grimes requested that the defendant submit to

a breath test. He advised the defendant of his rights in

this regard, as well as the significance of a refusal to

submit to the test.3 The defendant then spoke with his
attorney by telephone.

Grimes asked the defendant for his decision with

respect to the breath test. The defendant stated that he

wanted to talk to his attorney again. Grimes informed

the defendant that his indecision constituted a refusal

to submit to the test. Grimes summoned another state

police trooper, Jonathan Neihengen, to the processing

room. At that time, Neihengen witnessed the defendant’s failure to cooperate with respect to the test,

which constituted his refusal. Grimes again permitted

the defendant an opportunity to use the telephone to

inform his attorney that he had refused to submit to

the test.

As the defendant turned to use the telephone, he

inserted a candy or a breath mint into his mouth. Earlier,

while Grimes was transporting the defendant to the

state police barracks, one of the things he discussed

with the defendant was that he could not have anything

to eat or drink until after he had completed the test.

When Grimes informed the defendant that his conduct,

which included eating candy, amounted to a refusal to

submit to a breath test, the defendant replied that he

had sustained injuries to his wrists as a result of the

handcuffs and that he wanted medical treatment at a

hospital. Emergency medical personnel arrived on the

scene, but they declined to transport him to the hospital

to treat what they considered to be an ‘‘extremely

minor’’ abrasion. When Grimes told the defendant that

he would not be going to the hospital, he then complained for the first time that he wanted to go to the

hospital because he was experiencing heart problems

and trouble breathing. The defendant’s outward appearance was normal, yet, on the basis of the defendant’s

new complaints, the emergency medical personnel at

the scene made the decision to transport the defendant

to Rockville General Hospital for examination.

Despite the fact that Grimes already had recorded

the defendant’s refusal to submit to a breath test, a state

police sergeant, Craig Jones, afforded the defendant yet

another opportunity to submit to a breath test. The

defendant declined this request, but stated that he

would provide a blood sample once he was at the hospital. Grimes accompanied the defendant to the hospital.

Upon his arrival, the defendant informed hospital staff

that he was experiencing chest pains and palpitations.

Hospital staff detected an alcohol-like odor being emitted from the defendant. When hospital staff asked to

perform an electrocardiogram and lab work, the defendant immediately replied that he needed to speak with

his attorney, his pain had subsided, and he was feeling

better since his arrival at the hospital. After speaking

with his attorney, the defendant told hospital staff that

he would submit to an electrocardiogram test and provide a urine sample, but he stated that he would not

submit to a blood test because he was afraid of needles.
Ultimately, at 5:08 a.m., more than three hours after

Grimes first encountered the defendant, the defendant

provided a blood sample to hospital staff. The defendant’s urine sample tested positive for marijuana use,

his blood sample reflected a blood alcohol content of

0.10 percent,4 and the result of his electrocardiogram

test was normal. By 6 a.m., the defendant had been

discharged from the hospital because he was not suffering from any health issues, and he was returned to

the state police barracks. The defendant then gave the

police a written statement in which he admitted that

when Grimes came upon him earlier that morning, he

had pulled his automobile ‘‘over for safety’’ and was

attempting to complete a telephone call. After the police

completed processing the defendant, he was issued a

summons to appear in court and was released from

police custody.

The defendant called his girlfriend at that time, Lena

Knowles, from the police barracks because he needed

to be picked up. Later that day, he stated to her that

he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and that he had, in fact, consumed a couple glasses

of wine. The defendant stated to her, however, that he

had a plan to deal with his arrest because, if he was

convicted, he would be separated from his son. Specifically, he planned on claiming that he had not driven

his automobile. He asked Knowles to relate the following facts to law enforcement: she had been driving the

defendant’s automobile on March 6, 2014, while she

was out with friends. Meanwhile, the defendant was at

home with Knowles’ children. A friend of Knowles, Kelly

Aston, was following Knowles home when the defendant’s automobile began ‘‘acting funny . . . .’’ Knowles

pulled over the disabled automobile, and Aston drove

her home. Later that night, Knowles drove the defendant

to the disabled automobile and left him with the automobile so that he could call for roadside assistance.

After Knowles departed, the police encountered the

defendant in the automobile.

Despite the fact that no aspect of this story was

accurate, Knowles indicated to the defendant that she

would relate these facts to the authorities on his behalf

because she felt sorry for him. The defendant told

Knowles that he had spoken with Aston, who had

agreed to corroborate this version of events, and asked

Knowles to persuade another friend of hers, Danielle

Petsa, to corroborate this version of events.

Later that day, at Knowles’ residence, the defendant

spoke with Aston. He told her about the circumstances

of his arrest, specifically, that he had consumed wine

at his place of employment, began driving to Knowles’

residence, and ‘‘was pulled over’’ on the road when the

police found him in his automobile. The defendant told

Aston the version of events that he had fabricated and,

initially, Aston agreed to ‘‘go along’’ with the defendant’s
story. Subsequently, she spoke with an investigator

working for the defendant’s attorney and made statements that were consistent with the defendant’s false

version of events. After speaking with family members

about the matter, however, Aston decided that she

would not make any further false statements concerning the incident because she was not comfortable doing

something that could get her into trouble with law

enforcement.

Soon after the incident, Knowles called Petsa on the

telephone and invited her to her residence to discuss

the defendant’s plan. Petsa met with the defendant and

Knowles at Knowles’ residence. The defendant and

Knowles discussed the details of her providing information to law enforcement on the defendant’s behalf in

accordance with his plan. When Petsa was contacted

by an inspector working for the defendant’s attorney,

however, she had difficulty providing facts that were

consistent with the defendant’s version of events. She

had second thoughts about participating in the defendant’s plan, experienced panic attacks, and ultimately

decided that she would not provide a false statement.

In a second conversation with the investigator, she told

him that she would not be involved with this any longer

and would not ‘‘cover’’ for the defendant.

When the defendant learned that Petsa was apprehensive about providing false statements to the investigator

and had difficulty doing so, he communicated with her

on Facebook in an attempt to calm her and assure her

that she could do what he had asked of her. Later, when

the defendant learned from Knowles that Petsa would

not provide the information that he wanted her to provide, he sent her one or more messages on Facebook

in which he stated, among other things, that if she did

not testify on his behalf, he would tell the police that

she drives with her children in an unregistered automobile and that he would tell the wife of a married man

with whom she was having an affair about the affair.5

Additional facts will be set forth in our analysis of the

defendant’s claims.

I

First, the defendant claims that the evidence was

insufficient to convict him of operating a motor vehicle

while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any

drug. We disagree.

To sustain a conviction under § 14-227a (a) (1), the

state bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable

doubt that (1) the defendant operated a motor vehicle

and (2) that he did so while under the influence of an

intoxicating liquor. The defendant does not argue that

the evidence did not support a finding that he was

intoxicated when Grimes encountered him in the early

morning of March 7, 2014. As he did before the trial

court,6

the defendant argues that the state did not pre-
sent sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he had

operated a motor vehicle at or near the time that he

encountered Grimes.

‘‘The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction

we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.

Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom

the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded

that the cumulative force of the evidence established

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘We note that the jury must find every element proven

beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the

basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions

need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude

that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is

permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider

it in combination with other proven facts in determining

whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves

the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime

charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force

of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of

evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . .

It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving

substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . In evaluating

evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept

as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with

the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of fact]

may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or

facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . .

‘‘Finally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a

reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable

doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found

credible by the [finder of fact], would have resulted in

an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether

there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would

support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask,

instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact’s] verdict of

guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Crespo, 317 Conn. 1, 16–17, 115 A.3d 447 (2015).

Focusing on the essential element of operation of a

motor vehicle as used in § 14-227a (a) (1), we observe

that although evidence of driving readily proves that

operation occurred, the state may prove that operation
occurred other than by proof of driving. ‘‘Nothing in

our definition of ‘operation’ requires the vehicle to be

in motion or its motor to be running.’’ State v. Haight,

279 Conn. 546, 552, 903 A.2d 217 (2006). ‘‘It is well

settled that operating encompasses a broader range of

conduct than does driving. . . . [T]here is no requirement that the fact of operation be established by direct

evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Sienkiewicz, 162 Conn. App. 407, 410,

131 A.3d 1222, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 924, 134 A.3d

621 (2016). ‘‘Operation occurs when a person in the

vehicle intentionally does any act or makes use of any

mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in

sequence will set in motion the motive power of the

vehicle. . . . This court has clarified the meaning of

operation by holding that an intent to drive is not an

element of operation. . . . An accused operates a

motor vehicle within the meaning of . . . § 14-227a (a)

when, while under the influence of alcohol or any drug

and while in the vehicle and in a position to control

its movements, he manipulates, for any purpose, the

machinery of the motor or any other machinery manipulable from the driver’s position that affects or could

affect the vehicle’s movement, whether the accused

moves the vehicle or not.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Roth, 104 Conn. App. 248, 251 n.3,

932 A.2d 1071 (2007); see also State v. Wiggs, 60 Conn.

App. 551, 554, 760 A.2d 148 (2000).

In his assessment of the evidence, the defendant

relies heavily on his trial testimony. Notably, the defendant testified that that his automobile was inoperable

at the time that Grimes came upon him and that he had

not driven the vehicle before it became inoperable. The

defendant testified to the following version of events:

He was driving to Knowles’ residence at approximately

7 p.m. on March 6, 2014, when his automobile experienced problems of an electrical or mechanical nature

that were related to a continuously running fan. He

pulled to the side of the road and removed the key from

the ignition. He called Aston for a ride. Aston drove

the defendant to a bar where he and Aston smoked

marijuana. At a second bar, the defendant consumed

alcohol for the first time that evening. At approximately

1 a.m., on March 7, 2014, Aston drove the defendant

back to his disabled automobile and left immediately

after dropping him off.7 When he was back inside of

his automobile, he began searching for his roadside

assistance card. This is when Grimes approached him.

It was only after Grimes walked to his automobile and

instructed him to roll down his window that he retrieved

his key from his jacket, inserted the key into the ignition,

and turned the ignition to the ‘‘on’’ position so that he

could lower the window. According to the defendant,

the automobile had enough battery power to lower the

window, but not enough battery power ‘‘to power up

the vehicle.’’ The defendant testified that he never
attempted to induce Knowles, Aston, or Petsa to make

a false statement to help him in connection with the

present case.

Relying on his testimony that the automobile was

inoperable,8 as well as the fact that Grimes did not

observe the automobile in motion, the defendant argues

that operation could not have occurred in the present

case. The defendant cites precedent standing for the

proposition that an automobile that is totally disabled

or incapable of movement cannot be said to have been

operated. See, e.g., State v. Cyr, 291 Conn. 49, 60, 967

A.2d 32 (2009); State v. Swift, 125 Conn. 399, 404, 6

A.2d 359 (1939).

The defendant’s analysis of the claim is flawed

because, in arguing that the evidence was insufficient

to support a finding that he operated the automobile,

he disregards ample evidence that supported a finding

that he had operated the vehicle just prior to the point in

time that Grimes arrested him. In our role as a reviewing

court, we are bound to examine the evidence in the

light most favorable to the jury’s finding of guilt. State

v. Crespo, supra, 317 Conn. 16. The evidence included

the written statement that the defendant provided to

the police following his arrest. Therein, the defendant

stated in relevant part that ‘‘[o]n [March 7, 2014,] at

about 1:30 [a.m.,] I was stopped along [Route 195] near

the four corners and CVS in Willington, CT. I was

attempting to make a phone call and had pulled over

for safety. A [s]tate [t]rooper then pulled in behind my

car and came up to the passenger side of my car and

asked for my paperwork.’’ The jury, exercising common

sense in its evaluation of the evidence, reasonably could

have found that, when the defendant provided this

explanation to the police to explain what had occurred

when the police found his automobile obstructing traffic, he admitted that he had ‘‘pulled over for safety’’

just prior to Grimes’ arrival on the scene. At trial, the

defendant testified that several events took place

between the time of operation and the time that he

encountered Grimes. Yet, the jury reasonably could

have inferred that the omission of these events from

the defendant’s statement suggested that his testimony

was not true. A rational interpretation of the statement

reflects that the defendant’s conduct in pulling over

was occasioned by and occurred contemporaneously

with his attempt to make a telephone call.9

Consistent with the defendant’s written statement

was Aston’s testimony that the defendant told her that,

prior to Grimes’ arrival, he had consumed wine at his

place of employment, began to drive to Knowles’ residence upon leaving work, and pulled his automobile

over for some reason. He was pulled over when Grimes

came upon him. The jury reasonably could have interpreted the evidence of the defendant’s candid explanation to Aston in the same manner that it reasonably
could have interpreted the defendant’s statement to the

police, namely, as evidence of an implicit admission by

the defendant that he had operated his automobile just

prior to his encounter with Grimes. Moreover, Knowles

testified that when she discussed the incident with the

defendant upon his release from police custody, he

revealed to her that ‘‘he had been pulled over and that

he was arrested,’’ and that ‘‘[h]e said he had a couple of

glasses of wine.’’ Nothing in this explanation remotely

suggests that the myriad of events detailed by the defendant in his trial testimony occurred between the time

that he ceased operating the automobile and the time

that Grimes came upon the scene. Additionally, the

defendant stated that he ‘‘had a plan to say that he

hadn’t been driving,’’ which included Knowles, Petsa

and Aston corroborating a false version of events. In

light of the evidence viewed in its entirety, the jury

reasonably could have inferred that the defendant’s

explanation to Knowles reflected an implicit admission

by the defendant that, in fact, he had been driving just

prior to the time that he encountered Grimes.

Further supporting a finding that the defendant had

operated his automobile just prior to his encounter

with Grimes was Grimes’ testimony that when he first

observed the defendant’s automobile, it was parked in

the middle of the roadway with its brake lights illuminated. Grimes testified that he stopped behind the

defendant’s automobile and activated his emergency

lights, at which time ‘‘the brake lights went off because

you could see the parking lights go on as the vehicle

was shifted into park.’’10 It would have been reasonable

for the jury to have concluded that this evidence, which

suggested that the defendant had shifted the gears in

the automobile with the key in the ignition, plainly contradicted his testimony that, when Aston returned him

to the automobile, he merely was in the process of

looking for his roadside assistance card.

The defendant testified that he had turned off the

motor of his automobile and removed the key from

the ignition because a display inside of the automobile

warned him of the potential for irreversible damage.

Although he denied having driven the automobile just

prior to his encounter with Grimes, the defendant

acknowledged that, after Aston returned him to his

automobile and Grimes arrived on the scene, he

inserted his key into the ignition and turned the key so

that he could lower his window. The defendant stated

that he did so because Grimes had knocked on the

window and motioned for him to lower it.

The defendant does not dispute that a finding that

he drove the automobile was sufficient to demonstrate

operation, and that relevant precedent reflects that the

act of inserting the key into the ignition and turning

the key within the ignition of an operable motor vehicle

is sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant has oper-
ated it. See, e.g., State v. Haight, supra, 279 Conn. 553;

State v. Bereis, 117 Conn. App. 360, 366–67, 978 A.2d

1122 (2009); State v. Clausen, 102 Conn. App. 241, 244,

925 A.2d 372 (2007). The defendant rebuts the evidence

of operation by focusing on the evidence that he presented to demonstrate that the automobile was inoperable. The jury, having carefully considered the evidence

in its entirety, reasonably could have relied on the evidence that the defendant had operated the automobile

and reasonably could have rejected as untruthful the

defendant’s testimony that his automobile was inoperable. Moreover, the state presented ample evidence that,

following his arrest, the defendant engaged others to

provide a false version of events concerning his operation of the automobile. The evidence presented by the

state to demonstrate that the defendant tampered with

witnesses was highly probative of the fact that he had

operated the vehicle just prior to his encounter with

Grimes and of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt

for having operated a motor vehicle while under the

influence. These facts supported the jury’s reliance on

the state’s evidence and theory of the case.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the state

presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a motor vehicle

while he was intoxicated. Accordingly, we reject the

defendant’s claim.

II

Next, the defendant claims that the court erroneously

admitted certain evidence relating to one of the tampering with a witness counts. See footnote 1 of this opinion.

We disagree.

During its case-in-chief, the state presented testimony

from Petsa about how she was asked to corroborate

the defendant’s version of events leading up to his

arrest. Petsa testified that, initially, Knowles called her

on the telephone and asked her to corroborate ‘‘a story

that would help keep [the defendant] from getting in

trouble.’’11 Petsa testified that she then met with

Knowles and the defendant at Knowles’ residence, and

that ‘‘[t]he conversation’’ centered around a false narrative of the events leading up to the defendant’s arrest.

Petsa testified that, after Knowles and the defendant

discussed the plan with her, she did not discuss the

plan with either of them until after she spoke with

an investigator working on behalf of the defendant’s

attorney. At that time, she decided that she did not

want to get into trouble for making a false statement

to law enforcement. Petsa testified that she spoke with

an investigator working on behalf of defense counsel,

but she was told that the defense did not intend to rely

on her because her answers ‘‘didn’t match what the

other people were saying.’’ Thereafter, she spoke with

her friend, Knowles, to let her know that she was experiencing panic attacks and did not want to be involved
with the defendant’s plan.

Petsa testified: ‘‘Once [the defendant] found out that

I was having panic attacks and stuff like that about it,

he tried reaching out to me on Facebook and messaging

me on Facebook. You know, kind of some of the first

ones were, like, you know, you can handle this; you

know, just keep it calm and everything else like that,

and then when he found out I wasn’t going to back up

his story, I started getting messages and, like, pages

upon pages of stuff from him saying that he was going

to call the state police on me and tell them that I’m

driving [without a license or registration] with my kids

in the car . . . and if I don’t testify on his behalf, then

he’s going to call the state police and let them know

where I drive and all that kind of stuff to get me caught.’’

Petsa testified that, through her relationship with

Knowles, the defendant knew that she was having an

affair with a married man and that, in an eight page

message on Facebook, he also threatened both her and

the man by ‘‘saying that he was going to rat him out to

his wife’’ if Petsa did not cooperate. Petsa testified

that ‘‘[a]ny messages on Facebook from [the defendant]

were definitely after I talked to the investigator.’’

The prosecutor showed Petsa a document marked

for identification purposes. Petsa stated that it was an

excerpt from one of the Facebook messages that she

had received from the defendant and that she had provided it to the prosecutor. She stated that she knew it

was from the defendant ‘‘[b]ecause it comes in from my

Facebook and it says who it comes from on Facebook.’’

Petsa stated that the defendant’s name appeared at the

top of the message because ‘‘[i]t prints out automatically

from the Internet.’’

The state offered the Facebook message as a full

exhibit on the ground that it was a statement made by

a party opponent, the defendant. The court excused the

jury after defense counsel objected to the admission of

the exhibit. Defense counsel argued that the state had

not authenticated the exhibit because the state failed

to prove that it came from the defendant’s Facebook

account or that it was his message.

The prosecutor conducted a voir dire examination

of Petsa in an attempt to provide a more complete

foundation for the proffered exhibit. Petsa testified that

she had a Facebook account for a couple of years and

that the defendant was not blocked from her Facebook

page. She testified that the exhibit at issue was part of

a series of messages that the defendant sent to her on

Facebook. In this series of messages, the defendant

threatened to expose Petsa’s affair with a married man,

discussed a baseball team on which Petsa and Knowles

played, and discussed the role that Petsa played in the

demise of the defendant’s relationship with Knowles.

Petsa testified that all of the messages she had received

from the defendant made sense to her in light of her
relationship with him and with Knowles. She testified

that she did not have any reason to believe that the

message at issue did not originate from the defendant.

She testified: ‘‘I knew it came from [the defendant].

. . . Just from meeting [the defendant] and knowing

how he talks and how he, like, lays himself out there,

that definitely was a message from [the defendant].’’

Defense counsel argued that the state failed to satisfy

its burden of authenticating the message because it

failed to prove that the defendant sent it. Defense counsel suggested that anyone could have sent the message

by using the defendant’s Facebook account and that

Petsa, familiar with the defendant’s manner of speaking,

could have manufactured the message at issue. The

prosecutor argued that, in accordance with § 9-1 of the

Code of Evidence, the state had presented sufficient

evidence, in the form of Petsa’s testimony, for the finder

of fact to determine that the evidence was what it was

purported to be, namely, a message sent to Petsa from

the defendant. The prosecutor disagreed that any additional proof, such as testimony from a Facebook

employee, was required to demonstrate that the message was authentic.

The court asked Petsa for additional information with

respect to how the message had been printed because,

in the court’s opinion, the message appeared to be typewritten on plain white paper and was not similar in

appearance to other ‘‘print-offs from Facebook’’ with

which the court apparently was familiar. In response,

Petsa testified that, earlier that month, she was in the

prosecutor’s office and had printed the message by

copying it from her Facebook account and pasting it

into a computer program known as ‘‘Word’’ so that she

could print it. She stated that ‘‘we had an issue with

[it] at the office at that time . . . trying to print it from

Facebook directly whereas we copied and pasted from

[the defendant’s] message to put it into Word so that I

could print it for [the prosecutor], but if you were to

. . . allow me to log onto my Facebook [account], you

could see all that directly under his messages.’’

The court, stating that it had reviewed the relevant

evidentiary rule, ruled as follows: ‘‘Based on the content

of the writing and the testimony of this witness with

the surrounding circumstances, it meets the threshold

to be sufficiently put before the jury and to leave to

them with cross-examination and rebuttal testimony

how much weight they give to it based on the credibility

of this witness, other witnesses in support of this . . .

plan. So the objection is overruled . . . .’’

Thereafter, in the presence of the jury, the prosecutor

asked Petsa about the exhibit, as follows:

‘‘Q. Ms. Petsa, is state’s [exhibit] 20, which is now a

full exhibit, part of a series of Facebook messages that

you printed out for me?
‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Was I in your presence when you printed those

out?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. And did you actually do that on the computer in

my office?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Was that shortly after I learned that those messages existed?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Did you alter any text in those messages in

any way?

‘‘A. None at all.’’

The prosecutor published the exhibit for the jury by

reading it aloud. The exhibit, which bears a date of May

29, a time of 11:55 p.m., and the defendant’s name,

states in relevant part: ‘‘Danielle, please give me a call

before you call my [l]awyer’s [i]nvestigator back tomorrow. Lena told me that, you had a mini panic attack &

didn’t answer any of his questions today, now you were

worried he is suspect. I have dealt with this investigator

before & there is absolutely nothing for you to be

stressed or have panic about. Your statement in this is

so small & I want you to call him & insist that, he either

take your statement over the phone, or he drive to

you because, you just can’t get down there. You are a

[w]itness Dani, not the 1 on [t]rial. I’ll be the 1 on [t]rial,

if it goes that far. He works for my [l]awyer & his job

is 2 things. His job is to gather evidence for my [l]awyer

so, we don’t have to go to [t]rial because, my [w]itnesses

are so solid that, [t]rial could possibly be avoided. He

is also prepping you for [t]rial, in case I do have to go

to [t]rial. I know you got nervous but, don’t be. Call

Lena in the morning & do what her & Kelly did. Write

down everything she tells you to write down so, you

can have the answers in front of you on paper so, you

won’t get nervous. I want to give you a positive pep

talk & ask you the questions I think he might ask, to

prep you for your call with him, after you’ve talked to

Lena & before you call the [i]nvestigator. So, call me

on my cell in the morning. You didn’t blow it. We just

have to get you ready so, you are confident, like you

always are & like Lena & Kelly were, when they talked

to him. Call Lena, take notes, then call me before you

call him. We got this & thank you for having my back

with this. You, Kelly & Lena are really saving my hide

with this & I appreciate it more than I could ever tell

you. The 3 of you will have my loyalty for life for this.

Talk to you in the morning. . . . Goodnight’’

As he did at trial, the defendant argues on appeal that

the state failed to authenticate the written Facebook

message presented to the jury12 by presenting sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that he authored the message

reflected therein.13 In this vein, the defendant argues

that (1) it was not sufficient for the state to demonstrate

that the message originated from the defendant’s Facebook account; (2) Petsa’s testimony concerning other

messages that Petsa believed had been sent to her by

the defendant was insufficient to demonstrate that he

authored the message at issue; (3) the message at issue

did not contain information to suggest that it could

only have originated with him; and (4) the evidence

suggested that it was possible that Knowles could have

accessed the defendant’s Facebook account and sent

the message.

‘‘We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law . . .

for an abuse of discretion.’’ State v. Saucier, 283 Conn.

207, 218, 926 A.2d 633 (2007). ‘‘It is axiomatic that [t]he

trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is

entitled to great deference. . . . In this regard, the trial

court is vested with wide discretion in determining the

admissibility of evidence . . . . Accordingly, [t]he trial

court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned

only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s

discretion. . . . Furthermore, [i]n determining

whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every

reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the

correctness of the trial court’s ruling, and we will upset

that ruling only for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . .

Even when a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is deemed

to be improper, we must determine whether that ruling

was so harmful as to require a new trial. . . . In other

words, an evidentiary ruling will result in a new trial

only if the ruling was both wrong and harmful.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Rios, 171 Conn. App. 1, 29–30, 156 A.3d 18, cert.

denied, 325 Conn. 914, 159 A.3d 232 (2017).

‘‘Preliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.’’

Conn. Code Evid. § 1-3 (a). ‘‘The requirement of authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility is

satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that

the offered evidence is what its proponent claims it to

be.’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 9-1 (a). The official commentary

to § 9-1 (a) of the Code of Evidence provides in relevant

part: ‘‘The requirement of authentication applies to all

types of evidence, including writings, sound recordings,

electronically stored information, real evidence such

as a weapon used in the commission of a crime, demonstrative evidence such as a photograph depicting an

accident scene, and the like. . . . The category of evidence known as electronically stored information can

take various forms. It includes, by way of example only,

e-mails, Internet website postings, text messages and

‘chat room’ content, computer stored records and data,

and computer generated or enhanced animations and

simulations. As with any other form of evidence, a party
may use any appropriate method, or combination of

methods . . . or any other proof to demonstrate that

the proffer is what the proponent claims it to be, to

authenticate any particular item of electronically stored

information.’’ (Citations omitted.)

‘‘It is well established that [a]uthentication is . . .

a necessary preliminary to the introduction of most

writings in evidence . . . . In general, a writing may

be authenticated by a number of methods, including

direct testimony or circumstantial evidence. . . .

‘‘Both courts and commentators have noted that the

showing of authenticity is not on a par with the more

technical evidentiary rules that govern admissibility,

such as hearsay exceptions, competency and privilege.

. . . Rather, there need only be a prima facie showing

of authenticity to the court. . . . Once a prima facie

showing of authorship is made to the court, the evidence, as long as it is otherwise admissible, goes to the

jury, which will ultimately determine its authenticity.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carpenter,

275 Conn. 785, 856, 882 A.2d 604 (2005), cert. denied,

547 U.S. 1025, 126 S. Ct. 1578, 164 L. Ed. 2d 309 (2006).

‘‘[T]he bar for authentication of evidence is not particularly high. . . . [T]he proponent need not rule out all

possibilities inconsistent with authenticity, or . . .

prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it

purports to be . . . . In addition, [a]n electronic document may . . . be authenticated by traditional means

such as direct testimony of the purported author or

circumstantial evidence of distinctive characteristics

in the document that identify the author.’’ (Citation

omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Gagliardi v. Commissioner of Children &

Families, 155 Conn. App. 610, 619, 110 A.3d 512, cert.

denied, 316 Conn. 917, 113 A.3d 70 (2015).

Among the examples of methods of authenticating

evidence set forth in the official commentary to § 9-1

(a) of the Code of Evidence is that ‘‘[a] witness with

personal knowledge may testify that the offered evidence is what its proponent claims it to be,’’ and ‘‘[t]he

distinctive characteristics of an object, writing or other

communication, when considered in conjunction with

the surrounding circumstances, may provide sufficient

circumstantial evidence of authenticity.’’ Conn. Code

Evid. § 9-1 (a), commentary. ‘‘An unsigned document

may be authenticated by any number of circumstances,

including its own distinctive characteristics such as its

contents and mode of expression, as well as the circumstances and context in which it was found.’’ C. Tait & E.

Prescott, Connecticut Evidence § 9.2.3 (5th Ed. 2014).

This court has observed: ‘‘The need for authentication

arises [in the context of electronic messages from social

networking websites] because an electronic communication, such as a Facebook message, an e-mail or a cell
phone text message, could be generated by someone

other than the named sender. This is true even with

respect to accounts requiring a unique user name and

password, given that account holders frequently remain

logged in to their accounts while leaving their computers and cell phones unattended. Additionally, passwords and website security are subject to compromise

by hackers. Consequently, proving only that a message

came from a particular account, without further authenticating evidence, has been held to be inadequate proof

of authorship. . . .

‘‘[T]he emergence of social media such as e-mail, text

messaging and networking sites like Facebook may not

require the creation of new rules of authentication with

respect to authorship. An electronic document may continue to be authenticated by traditional means such as

the direct testimony of the purported author or circumstantial evidence of distinctive characteristics in the

document that identify the author. . . .

‘‘Nevertheless, we recognize that the circumstantial

evidence that tends to authenticate a communication

is somewhat unique to each medium. . . . [I]n the case

of electronic messaging . . . a proponent of a document might search the computer of the purported

author for Internet history and stored documents or

might seek authenticating information from the commercial host of the e-mail, cell phone messaging or

social networking account.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Eleck, 130 Conn. App. 632, 638–41, 23 A.3d 818 (2011),

aff’d, 314 Conn. 123, 100 A.3d 817 (2014).14

In the present case, the state satisfied its burden of

authenticating the exhibit at issue because it presented

sufficient evidence to support a finding that the evidence was what the state claimed it to be, namely, a

Facebook message sent to Petsa by the defendant. Petsa

testified about the circumstances in which she received

the message at issue. She and the defendant were Facebook account holders. She received the message, bearing the defendant’s name, only after she had agreed

to be a part of the defendant’s plan to provide false

statements to law enforcement and after she had met

with an inspector working for defense counsel. This

meeting was unfavorable for the defendant because,

during the meeting, Petsa did not sufficiently corroborate the defendant’s false version of events. Petsa testified that the message at issue was part of a larger series

of messages that culminated in the defendant threatening her in various ways after she informed Knowles

that she would not participate in the defendant’s plan.

The fact that the message at issue was part of a larger,

related series of messages was part of how the state

properly attempted to demonstrate through circumstantial evidence that the message at issue was sent by

the defendant. Therefore, it was not improper, as the
defendant argues, for the state to have relied on the

other Facebook messages that he sent to Petsa as evidence of the circumstances under which Petsa had

received the written message that was memorialized in

the exhibit at issue. Petsa testified that the content of

these messages made sense to her and revealed things

that she would expect the defendant to know. Moreover, Petsa testified that the message at issue, in terms

of the unique speaking style that it reflected, as well

as its content, led her to believe definitively that it had

been sent to her by the defendant.

The defendant’s arguments before the trial court and

before this court seemingly reflect his belief that the

state bore the insurmountable burden of ruling out any

possibility that the message was not sent by the defendant. The state’s burden as the proponent of the evidence, however, was to present ‘‘evidence sufficient to

support a finding that the offered evidence was what

its proponent claims it to be.’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 9-

1 (a). Here, in terms of evidence of Petsa’s personal

knowledge of the defendant and the subject matter of

the message, as well as the distinctive characteristics

of the communication in light of the surrounding circumstances in which it was made, the state presented

sufficient circumstantial evidence of authenticity.15 It

suffices to observe that the court’s ruling that the evidence was admissible did not affect the weight that the

jury should afford the evidence. The defendant argues

that the content of the message did not reflect facts

that could only have been known by the defendant and

that there was evidence to suggest that it would have

been possible for Knowles to have sent the message.

These arguments, which were appropriate fodder for

the jury in its scrutiny of the state’s case, are misdirected

at the court’s decision to admit the evidence. The defendant had a full opportunity to expose what he believed

to be weaknesses in the evidence and to argue to the

jury that the evidence lacked probative value.16

Finally, we conclude that, even if the court admitted

the evidence in error, the ruling was harmless. ‘‘When

an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in

nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful. . . . [A] nonconstitutional error is harmless when an appellate court has a

fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect

the verdict. . . . [O]ur determination [of whether] the

defendant was harmed by the trial court’s . . . [evidentiary ruling] is guided by the various factors that we have

articulated as relevant [to] the inquiry of evidentiary

harmlessness . . . such as the importance of the . . .

testimony in the [state’s] case, whether the testimony

was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence

corroborating or contradicting the testimony . . . on

material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of

the [state’s] case. . . . Most importantly, we must
examine the impact of the evidence on the trier of fact

and the result of the trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, 311 Conn. 80, 89, 83 A.3d

595 (2014).

The defendant argues that the evidence cannot be

considered to be harmless because ‘‘it was the only

evidence to support the charge of tampering with a

witness with respect to Danielle Petsa. Petsa testified

that the Facebook message was the only direct communication she had with the defendant about what to say.

. . . In the absence of the message, there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant induced or

attempted to induce Petsa to provide false information.’’

(Citations omitted; footnote omitted.)

The record contradicts the defendant’s assessment

of the evidence. Prior to the admission of the written

Facebook message, the state asked Petsa about her

communications with the defendant generally. As

detailed previously in this opinion, Petsa testified that,

initially, Knowles told her about the defendant’s plan.

Petsa testified that, soon after the defendant’s arrest,

she met with the defendant and Knowles at Knowles’

residence and that the defendant and Knowles discussed the defendant’s plan for her to provide false

information. Petsa testified that, after she spoke with

the investigator, the defendant messaged her on Facebook to reassure her that she could ‘‘handle this’’ and

to ‘‘keep it calm . . . .’’ Petsa testified that, after she

made it known to Knowles that she would not ‘‘back

up’’ the defendant’s false story, the defendant sent her

a series of messages on Facebook in which he threatened her in various ways. Thus, apart from the written

Facebook message that was admitted as an exhibit,

there was evidence in the form of Petsa’s testimony

that described in general terms the defendant’s initial

attempt on Facebook to encourage Petsa to corroborate

his version of events and, later, his unmistakable

attempt on Facebook to threaten her to do so. Petsa’s

oral description of these Facebook messages from the

defendant, viewed in light of her entire testimony, supported a finding that the defendant attempted to induce

Petsa to testify falsely. At trial, the defendant objected

to the admission of the written Facebook message but

did not object to Petsa’s description of the messages

she had received from him on Facebook. In light of

Petsa’s testimony, the admission of which is not challenged in this appeal, we conclude that the written

Facebook message was merely cumulative of other

efforts made by the defendant to induce Petsa to testify

falsely. Thus, any error with respect to the admission

of the evidence was harmless.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In docket numbers CR-14-0104814-S and MV-14-0372091-S, the state

charged the defendant with operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug in violation of General Statutes

§ 14-227a (a) (1), operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood

alcohol content in violation of § 14-227a (a) (2), possession of a small amount

of a cannabis-type substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279a (a),

improperly parking a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-

251, operating a motor vehicle without carrying an operator’s license in

violation of General Statutes § 14-213, and making a false statement in the

second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-157b (a). Additionally,

under docket numbers CR-14-0104814-S and MV-14-0372091-S, the state

charged the defendant in a part B information as being a third time offender

in violation of § 14-227a (g) (3). Under docket number CR-15-016544-S, the

state charged the defendant with two counts of tampering with a witness

in violation of General Statutes § 53a-151 (a).

The defendant elected a jury trial with respect to the criminal offenses

charged by the state, namely, operating a motor vehicle while under the

influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, operating a motor vehicle while

having an elevated blood alcohol content, making a false statement, and

tampering with a witness. The defendant elected a court trial with respect

to the infractions charged by the state, namely, improperly parking a motor

vehicle and operating a motor vehicle without carrying an operator’s license,

and the charge of violation of possession of a small amount of a cannabistype substance. Over the defendant’s objection, the court granted the state’s

motion to consolidate all of the pending charges for trial.

The jury found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle while

under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, operating a motor

vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content, making a false

statement in the second degree, and two counts of tampering with a witness.

The court found the defendant guilty of possession of a small amount of a

cannabis-type substance, improperly parking a motor vehicle, and operating

a motor vehicle without carrying an operator’s license. Thereafter, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of being a third time

offender as alleged in the part B information. Following a canvass of the

defendant, the court accepted the plea and made a finding of guilt with

respect to the part B information. Prior to imposing sentence, the court,

pursuant to State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242, 61 A.3d 1084 (2013), vacated

the verdict of guilty of operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated

blood content. Thereafter, with respect to the remaining charges, the court

imposed a total effective sentence of fifteen years of incarceration, execution

suspended after seven years, followed by five years of probation.

Although our rules of practice permitted the defendant to bring a joint

appeal; Practice Book § 61-7 (a) (1); the defendant, instead, filed three

separate appeals: In AC 38103, he appealed from the judgment of conviction

rendered in docket number CR-14-0104814-S; in AC 38104, he appealed from

the judgment of conviction rendered in docket number MV-14-0372091-S;

and in AC 38105, he appealed from the judgment of conviction rendered in

docket number CR-15-016544-S. Later, this court, sua sponte, ordered that

the three appeals be consolidated.

Despite the fact that, on his appeal forms, he has indicated that he is

appealing from all of the crimes and infractions of which he was convicted,

he has brought claims on appeal that pertain to only two criminal offenses.

His first claim pertains to his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while

under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug in violation of § 14-

227a (a) (1). His second claim pertains to only one of his two convictions

for tampering with a witness in violation of § 53a-151 (a). One of the tampering counts was based on his conduct toward Lena Knowles and the other

of the tampering counts was based on his conduct toward Danielle Petsa.

His second claim pertains to the count based on his conduct toward Petsa.

Because he failed to brief any claims with respect to the remaining convictions, he has abandoned any challenge to those convictions. See Deutsche

Bank National Trust Co. v. Bertrand, 140 Conn. App. 646, 648 n.2, 59 A.3d

864, cert. dismissed, 309 Conn. 905, 68 A.3d 661 (2013).

2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.

2d 694 (1966).

3 Grimes advised the defendant, as follows: ‘‘You are requested to submit

to a blood, breath or urine test chosen by the police officer. You may refuse

a blood test, in which case another test will be selected. If you elect to

submit to testing, you will be requested to submit two samples. If you refuse

to submit, the test will not be given. Your refusal will result in the revocation

of your operator’s license for [twenty-four] hours and the suspension of

your operator’s license for at least six months. If you submit to the test and
the results indicate that you have an elevated blood content, your operator’s

license will be revoked for [twenty-four] hours and will be suspended for

at least [ninety] days. If you hold a commercial driver’s license, a CDL, your

CDL will be disqualified for at least one year. Furthermore, if you are

operating a commercial motor vehicle and do not hold a CDL, your privilege

to obtain a CDL as well as your privilege to operate a commercial motor

vehicle will be disqualified for at least one year. If you hold an operator’s

license from a state other than Connecticut, your driving privilege in Connecticut is subject to the same revocation and suspension penalties. The

results of the test or the fact of a refusal may be admissible in evidence

against you in a criminal prosecution for driving under the influence of

alcohol and/or drugs or other offense. The evidence of a refusal may be

used against you in any criminal prosecution.’’

4 There was evidence at trial that these results reflect that, at the time

that the defendant’s blood was drawn, he had the equivalent of five alcoholic

drinks in his body and that a person typically ‘‘lose[s] one drink per hour

with the range of about a half a drink to a drink-and-a-half per hour.’’

5 Ultimately, neither Knowles, Aston, nor Petsa provided false information

to law enforcement in accordance with the defendant’s plan. After her

relationship with the defendant ended, Knowles told an investigator working

with defense counsel that the information she previously had provided to

him was untrue. She provided a sworn written statement to an inspector

working on behalf of the prosecutor in which she detailed the defendant’s

plan for her to provide a false statement on his behalf. Similarly, Petsa

provided an inspector working on behalf of the prosecutor with a sworn

statement in which she described the defendant’s plan for her to provide a

false statement on his behalf. Similarly, prior to trial, Aston told defense

counsel that she did not want to lie under oath.

6 At the close of the state’s case-in-chief, the defendant moved for a

judgment of acquittal with respect to the operating under the influence

charge. In relevant part, the defendant argued that there was no evidence

that he had operated the motor vehicle. The court, referring to Grimes’

testimony that he had observed the defendant’s automobile ‘‘go into park

and the brake lights go off,’’ determined that there was sufficient evidence

of operation. The court denied the motion.

7 Aston, called by the state as a rebuttal witness, testified that she was

not in the company of the defendant at any time during the hours leading

up to his arrest.

8

In addition to his testimony, the defendant presented evidence that the

automobile had experienced mechanical problems that led to repairs by a

mechanic on March 5, 2014. Also, he presented evidence that, following

his arrest, he stated to Knowles and his former wife, Lisa Smith, that the

automobile had experienced mechanical problems. Lisa Smith testified that

she purchased the defendant’s automobile in March, 2014, and that the

automobile’s motor was repaired on March 5, 2014, because a fan would

run when the vehicle was not running. Lisa Smith also testified that the

defendant called her in the middle of the night from the police station to

tell her that he had experienced a problem with the automobile and that

he had been arrested. Smith testified that, after the events at issue, the

automobile was repaired for a second time and a new battery was installed

in the automobile. It suffices to observe that the issue of whether the

defendant’s automobile was operable was a disputed issue of fact, the jury

was not obligated to accept as true any of the evidence presented by the

defense, and that there was ample evidence to support a finding that the

defendant had operated the automobile just prior to his encounter with

Grimes.

9 Contrary to the version of events about which the defendant testified

at trial, Aston testified that the defendant merely told her that, after he had

finished work, he consumed wine at his place of employment ‘‘and then,

against his better judgment, he ended up deciding to go over to visit

[Knowles] and got pulled over that night.’’ The defendant told her that ‘‘he

was pulled over when the police pulled up behind him.’’

10 Relying on his own testimony that the automobile was inoperable, the

defendant discounts the probative value of Grimes’ observation of the vehicle’s lights. We reiterate that the jury, however, could have determined that

the defendant’s self-serving testimony that the automobile was inoperable

was not truthful.

11 Knowles testified that she contacted her friend, Petsa, because the

defendant asked her to do so. Also, Knowles testified that Petsa met with

her at Knowles’ residence very soon after the defendant’s arrest.
12 We observe that the defendant does not raise any claim of error with

respect to Petsa’s testimony that he sent her other messages via Facebook

in which, in furtherance of his plan, he attempted to compel her to participate

in his plan to provide false statements. The state did not attempt to present

documentary evidence with respect to these other messages, but their

incriminatory content was revealed to the jury by means of Petsa’s testimony.

13 Within his analysis of the authentication issue, the defendant refers to

Petsa’s testimony, which, as set forth previously, reflects that she copied

and pasted the message at issue, and that it was not downloaded and printed

directly from her Facebook account. According to the defendant, ‘‘[t]his

raises valid concerns as to whether the message was a true and accurate

copy and whether it actually came from [his] account.’’ At the time of oral

argument before this court, however, the defendant clarified that he was

not raising a separate claim in this regard. Such an evidentiary claim is not

preserved, and we would decline to consider its merits. The trial transcript

reveals that the gravamen of the defendant’s objection was that the state

failed to demonstrate that he authored the message. Although the court

asked Petsa to explain in further detail how the message was printed and

why, in the court’s opinion, it did not appear to have been printed directly

from her Facebook account, the defendant’s attorney did not raise any

objection in this regard. ‘‘[T]he standard for the preservation of a claim

alleging an improper evidentiary ruling at trial is well settled. This court is

not bound to consider claims of law not made at the trial. . . . In order to

preserve an evidentiary ruling for review, trial counsel must object properly.

. . . In objecting to evidence, counsel must properly articulate the basis of

the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise nature of the

objection and its real purpose, in order to form an adequate basis for a

reviewable ruling. . . . Once counsel states the authority and ground of

[the] objection, any appeal will be limited to the ground asserted.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jorge P., 308 Conn. 740, 753, 66 A.3d

869 (2013).

14 In Eleck, this court rejected a defendant’s claim that a trial court erroneously excluded from evidence a Facebook message; the trial court’s ruling

was based on a lack of authentication and, specifically, the defendant’s

failure to prove authorship of the message. State v. Eleck, supra, 130 Conn.

App. 641–44. In affirming this court’s judgment, our Supreme Court assumed,

without deciding, that the trial court’s ruling was improper and concluded

that the evidentiary ruling under review was harmless under the unique

facts of the case. State v. Eleck, 314 Conn. 123, 129–31, 100 A.3d 817 (2014).

15 The message contains what appears to be the defendant’s cell phone

number. Although the parties did not refer to this number, or its significance,

we observe that during argument on the defendant’s objection, the presence

of the number on the Facebook message supported a finding that the message was authentic.

16 The defendant argues that the evidence supported a finding that Knowles

could have used his Facebook account to send the message at issue to

Petsa. During his cross-examination of Petsa, defense counsel asked her if

Knowles had access to the defendant’s Facebook account. Petsa testified

that she did not know the answer. Moreover, during closing argument, the

defendant’s attorney argued in relevant part: ‘‘The Facebook message, [the

defendant] said he didn’t send that. People can open Facebook accounts

in anybody’s name. There are a lot of people with axes to grind here, a lot

of people who want to set people up, who don’t like people anymore. There’s

a lot of bad stuff going on here. So, I would ask you to just ignore that,

discredit it. If you don’t and you decide that it’s from [the defendant] to

them, I would ask you to look at it critically. Is he telling [them] what to

say? No. He’s asking them to be clear, to write things down, to get it straight

because it’s important to him.

‘‘It’s easy to misread something. It’s easy to assume it’s from someone,

but those accounts are very easy to open. I could open a Brian Smith account

today with Facebook, and nobody questions it and I could start sending all

kinds of Brian Smith messages to anybody I care to send them to. There

should be more controls on that, but there are not.’’