NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 210291-U

Order filed November 21, 2022

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2022 

In re MARRIAGE OF )

 ) 

RAYMOND J. TRAPP, JR., ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

and ) 

 ) 

FELICIA E. TRAPP, ) 

 ) 

Respondent-Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Tazewell County, Illinois. 

Appeal No. 3-21-0291 

Circuit No. 18-D-258 

Honorable 

Lisa Y. Wilson, 

Judge, Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Holdridge and Hettel concurred in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________________________

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Trial court’s distribution of marital property, after a trial on disputed financial 

issues, was not an abuse of discretion where the husband presented competent 

evidence of the value of both of his businesses. The distribution of the businesses 

to the husband, with a cash payment to the wife, as modified to reflect increased 

equity, resulted in an equitable distribution of the marital assets. The trial court’s

child support order was reversed and remanded for recalculation of the husband’s 

income. 

¶ 2 The respondent wife appealed from a trial court’s judgment of dissolution of marriage from 

petitioner husband, challenging a number of disputed financial issues. 
2 

¶ 3 FACTS

¶ 4 The petitioner husband, Raymond J. Trapp, Jr., and the respondent wife, Felicia E. Trapp, 

were married on June 23, 2001. Two children were born of the marriage, Z.T., born on October 

14, 2001, and R.T., born on October 18, 2003. On July 19, 2018, the husband filed a petition for 

dissolution of that marriage. A trial on disputed financial issues was held on August 4, 2020. 

¶ 5 Neil Gerber, a certified public accountant and certified business appraiser, who had been 

doing business valuations for 30 years, was hired by the husband to conduct a business valuation 

for both of the husband’s businesses: Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., and Trapp Properties, Inc. Both 

valuations were as of August 31, 2019, and both reports were dated October 31, 2019. Gerber 

testified that in valuing Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., he applied the asset method whereby he subtracted 

the liabilities and debts from the fair market value of the assets and came up with an equity value 

of $320,000. He valued the intangible assets of goodwill and a non-compete agreement as assets 

of the husband at about $90,000. When asked if that value would have substantially changed since 

the valuation date of August 31, 2019, especially with the COVID-19 pandemic, Gerber stated that 

he was not asked to update his valuation. But, Gerber testified that service work had not generally 

been impacted and if the husband were to testify that his income has not changed, then it was 

reasonable to say the value of Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., had not changed either.

¶ 6 As for Trapp Properties, Inc., Gerber testified that he was asked to value the husband’s 

equity in that real estate entity as of August 31, 2019. Two buildings were the major assets of that 

entity. Gerber derived the fair market value of the original building from a July 30, 2018, Broker 

Opinion of Value (hereinafter market analysis) by Justin Ferrill, which Gerber obtained from the 

husband. The new building was just constructed in 2019, so Gerber used the cost of construction, 

which he obtained from the corporation’s tax returns and depreciation schedules, to determine the 
3 

fair market value. Gerber personally inspected both buildings, and he believed it was reasonable 

to rely on the information that he was provided. Gerber testified that he frequently was hired to 

value equity in real estate partnerships, for which he relied on appraisals or other estimates of 

value. Gerber believed that his valuation was accurate, even though he relied on a market analysis

rather than an appraisal to value the original building. Gerber determined the net equity value of 

Trapp Properties, Inc., by taking those two values and subtracting the two mortgages. He 

determined that the net equity value of Trapp Properties, Inc., as of August 31, 2019, was $20,000. 

Gerber could not testify as to whether the market conditions in the year since his valuation would 

have substantially changed the value, but Trapp Properties, Inc., had been making mortgage 

payments during that time, so the equity value would likely be higher. If asked to revalue the 

business as of the date of the hearing, Gerber testified that he would use the current loan balance, 

which, based on the husband’s most recent financial affidavit, would make the equity value 

somewhere between $55,000-$60,000. 

¶ 7 Gerber also valued the wife’s Teacher’s Retirement System fund as of November 15, 2019. 

Gerber determined the present marital value of the wife’s pension to be $288,000, if she retired at 

age 55, and $275,000, if she retired at age 60. 

¶ 8 The husband testified that he was a self-employed electrician. During the marriage, he 

started Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., in 2002 and Trapp Properties, Inc., in approximately 2015. The 

husband was the only shareholder owner in Ray Trapp Electric, Inc. He was responsible for 

bidding jobs and he had employees who went to the work sites. He paid himself a salary, which 

was about $42,000 in 2019. In addition to his salary, the husband paid some personal bills directly 

from Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., totaling about $1900 a month. The husband testified that the 

increase in cash on hand for Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., from around $28,000 at the time the business 
4 

valuation was done in 2019, to $106,341 as of June 30, 2020, was partially due to COVID-relief 

funding. Those funds had been placed in a separate account, and were used for the proper purposes, 

which freed up other funds in the Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., account. Otherwise, the difference was 

due to the timing during the month, and a large electrical supply bill had just been paid that would 

exhaust most of the difference. The husband testified that his 2019 income tax return for Ray Trapp 

Electric, Inc., indicated ordinary business income, or a profit, of $23,021. The husband testified 

that was not profit but rather was a distribution to pay some bills for Trapp Properties, Inc. 

¶ 9 The husband testified that, with respect to the two buildings owned by Trapp Properties, 

Inc., $390,000 was owed on the original building and $434,000 was owed on the new building. 

Although his financial affidavit also listed $000 a month in rental income, the costs of the 

mortgages, insurance, and maintenance on the buildings exceeded that amount. The husband 

testified that he started Trapp Properties, Inc., as basically his retirement plan; he intended to pay 

the buildings off over time and collect rental income when he retires. He acquired the mortgage to 

construct the new building after he filed for divorce. The market analysis was completed by Ferrill, 

who was the husband’s friend and real estate broker, for the bank for the purpose of obtaining a 

loan for the new building. The original building had five spaces for rent; two and a half were

occupied by Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., and two others were rented to tenants. The new building had 

four tenants. On his financial affidavit, the husband valued the original building at $426,000 and 

the new building at $480,000. The husband testified that he had two life insurance policies with 

cash values, for which Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., paid the premiums.

¶ 10 With respect to the husband’s bank accounts, the husband’s financial affidavit indicated 

that the husband had a checking (#9621) and a savings (#9962) account at CEFCU. The balance 

in the savings account was the husband’s share from the sale of the marital home. He also had a 
5 

checking account (#1233) at Morton Community Bank. The husband was questioned regarding 

some other bank accounts that were included in the discovery. Specifically, discovery revealed a 

checking account (#6571) at Heartland Bank in the name of Raymond Trapp, with the balance of 

that account ($34,206) withdrawn on July 3, 2018. The husband testified that Heartland account 

#6571 was his father’s account (Raymond Trapp, Sr.), and the husband identified the handwriting 

on the withdrawal slip as his father’s handwriting. Also, discovery revealed a checking account 

(#2318) at Morton Community Bank, which was opened on June 13, 2020, with a balance of 

$35,997. That account was in the name of Raymond Trapp, Sr., with the husband listed as POD 

(payable on death). The husband denied that either account belonged to him, unless his father was 

to pass away.

¶ 11 The wife’s attorney questioned the husband regarding July 2020 mortgage documents from 

the bank. The loan documents regarding the new building showed a loan balance of $458,124, 

with a collateral value of $1,850,000, and a monthly payment of $3305. The documents indicated 

that the loan on the original building had a principal balance of $376,041, a collateral value of 

$600,000, and a monthly payment of $2741. The husband testified that he did not know where the 

bank arrived at those collateral values. The husband was also questioned regarding a September 

2018 appraisal report completed for the bank in anticipation of the new building, which valued the 

entire property (assuming construction of the new building) at $1,250,000. No one from the bank 

testified.

¶ 12 The wife testified that she was a teacher for the Peoria public schools. She testified that her 

gross income was $63,184 in 2019, with a net income of $57,572. The wife testified that she did

not pay into social security. She had credit card debt of $13,000-$14,000, but she did not provide 

any bills or statements to the court. About $8000 of that debt was for attorney fees; she testified 
6 

that the remainder was for living expenses. She claimed both children on her taxes in 2019, 

receiving federal and state tax refunds, along with a $1500 stimulus check in 2020. She did not 

split any of that money with the husband. The wife did not dispute Gerber’s valuation of Ray Trapp 

Electric, Inc. She did dispute the valuation of Trapp Properties, Inc., but she did not have a separate 

valuation prepared. 

¶ 13 The parties stipulated as to attorney fees. The husband had incurred around $20,000 in fees, 

of which he had paid approximately $14,600. The wife had incurred fees and costs of $22,355 and 

had paid $11,376. The wife still had an outstanding balance of $10,980. 

¶ 14 The trial court entered a written order resolving all remaining financial issues on January 

19, 2021. The trial court found that the husband’s annual gross income in 2019 from Ray Trapp 

Electric, Inc., was $64,452. The wife’s 2019 annual gross income was $72,708. Based on the 

respective incomes, the trial court found that maintenance was not appropriate and the wife’s 

request for such was denied. The wife was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $60 a 

month for the remaining minor child. The marital residence had been sold and the parties equally 

divided the net proceeds. Each party was awarded their respective bank accounts, except the 

husband’s CEFCU checking account (#9621), which was to be split equally between the parties. 

The parties were awarded their respective vehicles along with their respective debts. The trial court 

concluded that the fair market value of Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., was $320,000. It declined to 

include the non-compete agreement and personal goodwill of $90,000 in the valuation. It found 

that the fair market value of Trapp Property, Inc., using the net asset value method, was $20,000. 

The husband was to retain both businesses; the court declined to partition or make the parties 

partners in the businesses. The husband was ordered to pay the wife $170,000 as her share of the 

businesses, plus half the additional cash on hand at Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., which amounted to 
7 

an additional payment to the wife in the amount of $39,193. The husband was ordered to sell the 

two life insurance policies and turn over the cash values to the wife as payment toward the sums 

owed the wife for her half of the businesses.

¶ 15 The wife filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the trial court erred in its valuation and 

distribution of the parties’ assets and debts and erred in calculating the parties’ respective incomes

for maintenance and child support purposes. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider and 

entered the judgment of dissolution of marriage. The wife appealed.

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 The wife challenges a number of the trial court’s findings. She argues that the trial court’s 

valuation of Trapp Properties, Inc., at $20,000, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

She also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of the marital assets and 

debts. The wife also argues that the trial court’s determination of the parties’ respective gross 

incomes for the purposes of calculating maintenance and child support was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence.

¶ 18 Section 503(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) provides 

for the division of marital property in “just proportions” and lists 12 factors for consideration. 750 

ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2018). The division needs to be equitable, which does not necessarily mean 

mathematically equal. In re Marriage of Zwart, 245 Ill. App. 3d 567, 572 (1993). The valuation 

of marital assets generally presents a question of fact that will not be disturbed unless it was against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Brill, 2017 IL App (2d) 160604, ¶ 56. The 

trial court’s decision regarding the equitable distribution of the marital assets will not be disturbed 

absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 162 (2005).

¶ 19 A. Valuation of Trapp Properties, Inc.
8 

¶ 20 The wife argues that the trial court’s determination that the fair market value of Trapp 

Properties, Inc., was $20,000 was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In addition, the wife 

argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the husband the two commercial 

properties owned by Trapp Properties, Inc., and that the properties should be sold and the net 

proceeds split evenly between the parties. The husband argues that the valuation was not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 21 There must be competent evidence of value in order for a court to assign a value to an item 

of marital property. In re Marriage of Abu-Hashim, 2014 IL App (1st) 122997, ¶ 29. Although the 

value of real estate is generally proven through the testimony of experts who have conducted 

appraisals of the subject property, there is no rule of law that dictates what type of evidence 

constitutes “competent evidence.” In re Marriage of Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295, ¶ 36. 

That evidence must be supported by a proper foundation, based on a detailed “market analysis or 

inspection of the home.” Id. ¶ 39. The burden of presenting the court with sufficient evidence to 

equitable value and divide marital property falls on both parties. Blackstone v. Blackstone, 288 Ill. 

App. 3d 905, 910 (1997). Valuing a business is “an art, not a science,” and there is not an exact 

formula. In re Marriage of Gunn, 233 Ill. App. 3d 165, 183 (1992).

¶ 22 In this case, Gerber was not a real estate appraiser, but he was a certified business appraiser, 

who was hired to appraise both businesses. Since Trapp Properties, Inc., was essentially the two 

buildings, Gerber needed to assign values to those buildings. Gerber relied on a market analysis 

on the original building, which was completed by Ferrill in 2018 for the purpose of securing 

financing for the construction of the new building. Ferrill’s analysis was not completed for the 

purposes of the dissolution proceedings. Since the new building was just constructed in August 

2019, Gerber testified that he relied on the cost of construction, which he believed was the best 
9 

evidence of value for a new building. Gerber testified that he often valued equity in real estate 

partnerships, relying on appraisals or other estimates of value from third parties. Gerber personally 

inspected both buildings and, while he relied on the information that he was provided, he found 

that information was reliable. Thus, we find that the trial court’s conclusions that there was a 

sufficient foundation for Gerber’s determination of value, and that Gerber’s valuation constituted 

competent evidence of the equity value in Trapp Properties, Inc., were not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. 

¶ 23 Also, although Gerber’s valuation was completed a year before trial, it was not error for 

the trial court to rely on his valuation, when it was the only expert valuation before the court. First, 

the trial was delayed for reasons outside of the husband’s control—the wife filed a motion to 

continue on August 30, 2019, because she needed to substitute attorneys when her original attorney 

became a judge and then, the matter was set for trial on March 20, 2020, but the courthouse closed 

for the pandemic. Moreover, the wife had a competing valuation of Ray Trapp Electric, Inc.,

completed, which she testified was valued at less than Gerber’s valuation. It is reasonable to 

believe that she made a strategic choice to not get a competing valuation of Trapp Properties, Inc.

See Abu-Hashim, 2014 IL App (1st) 122997, ¶ 29 (“where a party does not offer evidence of an 

asset’s value, the party cannot complain as to the disposition of that asset by the court”). Since 

there was no testimony explaining the basis for the collateral values on the bank statements offered 

by the wife, the statements were not competent evidence of value. Notably, the statements conflict 

with the 2018 appraisal to the bank, which estimated that the proposed market value of the whole 

property, after construction of the new building, would be $1,250,000. See Hamilton, 2019 IL App 

(5th) 170295, ¶ 39 (homeowner’s testimony as to value of property and tax assessor fair market 

value were not competent evidence as to value). While a more current valuation would have been 
10 

useful, due to the circumstances of the delay and the wife’s failure to seek her own valuation, we 

cannot say that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence for the trial court to accept 

Gerber’s valuation. See 750 ILCS 5/503(f) (West 2018) (the date of valuation is the trial date or 

another agreed date). 

¶ 24 Since there was competent evidence of the value of Trapp Properties, Inc., the trial court’s 

distribution of the business to the husband, with a cash payment to the wife, was not an abuse of 

discretion. However, absent an agreement or court order to the contrary, valuation is determined

as of the date of trial. Id. Gerber testified that the equity value of Trapp Properties, Inc., had 

increased due to the fact that the mortgage payments had decreased the principal balance in the 

year between the date of Gerber’s valuation and the date of trial. The husband testified that, as of 

the date of trial, the balance due on both mortgages was $824,000. That was an increase in equity 

of $31,454 from the balances relied upon by Gerber. Thus, the value of Trapp Properties, Inc.,

should have been $51,454, divided equally between the husband and the wife. Since the trial 

court’s order required the husband to pay the wife half of $20,000, the husband owes the wife an 

additional $15,727. 

¶ 25 B. Other Financial Items

¶ 26 The wife argues that the trial court’s distribution of the other assets and debts was an abuse 

of discretion. The husband contends that the trial court equitably distributed the parties’ marital 

assets and debts, and there was no abuse of discretion.

¶ 27 The wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of the parties’ 

bank accounts. The husband contends there was no abuse of discretion. We find that the parties’ 

personal accounts were nominally different. The husband testified that two of the challenged bank 

accounts were actually his father’s bank accounts and did not belong to the husband. The Morton 
11 

Community Bank savings account #2318 was in the husband’s father’s name (Raymond Trapp, 

Sr.), and the husband’s only interest in the account was as a beneficiary upon his father’s death. 

The question is whether those funds originated from Heartland Bank checking account #6571, 

which was closed just prior to the dissolution filing. The husband testified that account #6571 was 

also his father’s account and identified the handwriting on the withdrawal slip as his father’s 

handwriting. There was no testimony regarding when that account was opened. We find no abuse 

of discretion in the trial court’s decision to not award any interest in these two accounts to the wife 

since the testimony indicates that these accounts were not the property of the husband or the wife. 

See In re Estate of Sperry, 2017 IL App (3d) 150703, ¶ 19 n.4 (we may affirm the trial court’s 

judgment on any basis supported by the record). 

¶ 28 The trial court ordered the husband to cash in his two life insurance policies with cash 

values and pay the proceeds to the wife as part payment of the money owed by the husband to the 

wife for the value of the businesses. The wife argues that one-half of the policies should have been 

her marital property. The husband argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The life 

insurance policies had been funded by the businesses. The husband testified that he could not 

secure a loan for the money that he owed the wife for the total value of her share of the value of 

the businesses.

¶ 29 A review of the record does not indicate that the life insurance policies were included in 

the value of Ray Trapp Electric, Inc. Since they were marital property, the trial court’s order to 

cash them both in and pay the proceeds to the wife was not in error, but the wife also should have 

been credited with half of the proceeds. Thus, only $42,029 counts toward the total payment that 

the trial court ordered the husband to pay to the wife.
12 

¶ 30 With respect to debts, the wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not 

equalizing the credit card debts. The husband contends that the wife incurred thousands of dollars 

in debt after they separated. The wife acknowledged at trial that the credit card debt was incurred 

after the dissolution was filed, and about $8000 of the $14,000 in credit card debt was for her 

attorney fees.

¶ 31 The trial court found that the wife had incurred credit card debt in her own name in the 

amount of $14,217.87, and the wife had an outstanding balance for her attorney fees in the amount 

of $10,979.86. The husband had no personal credit card debts, but he did owe some attorney fees 

to his own attorney. The trial court ordered the husband to contribute $5000 toward the wife’s 

remaining attorney fees and pay any balance that he owed to his own attorney. The wife 

acknowledges the $5000 but argues that the husband should have owed an additional $7598.87 to 

equalize the debts.

¶ 32 The wife also argues that the husband should have been ordered to pay one-half of the 

deficiency owed on the wife’s vehicle. The wife contends that she was paying her share of the debt 

of the husband’s vehicle, since that vehicle was included in the valuation of Ray Trapp Electric, 

Inc. At trial, the wife sought to retain her 2015 Chevrolet Equinox, which had a fair market value 

of $10,935. The trial court awarded her that vehicle, including the responsibility for the loan of 

$24,042.74. The wife contends that the husband is receiving an extra $6553.87 in equity by not 

paying one-half of the deficiency. Since the wife requested at trial that the trial court order that she 

keep her vehicle and the debt owed on it, we only consider whether it affects the equitable 

distribution of the parties’ marital debt as a whole. 

¶ 33 Like marital property, marital debts should be divided equitably. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 

2018). As noted above, the division needs to be equitable, but not necessarily mathematically 
13 

equal. Zwart, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 572. Considering the trial court’s order as a whole, including the 

husband’s ordered contribution toward the wife’s attorney fees, we find that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion.

¶ 34 C. Gross Income Calculation for Child Support and/or Maintenance

¶ 35 The wife argues that the trial court’s calculation of the husband’s and the wife’s gross 

incomes, and resulting maintenance and child support calculations, were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Specifically, the wife argues that the husband’s annual gross income 

should have included annual depreciation in the amount of $64,338 from Ray Trapp Electric, Inc.,

and $15,929 from Trapp Properties, Inc., in addition to personal expenses that were run through 

the business. The wife also argues that her mandatory retirement contributions should have been 

deducted from her gross annual income. The husband argues that his annual gross income, from 

salary, rents collected, and personal expenses paid by the business, less ordinary and necessary 

business expenses of mortgage payments and maintenance, left him with a gross income of 

approximately $64,000 per year. He also argues that the current statutory scheme did not allow for 

the deduction of retirement savings or contribution. 

¶ 36 Pursuant to section 505(a)(3)(A) of the Act, gross income includes the total of all income 

from all sources, not including such things as public assistance programs and child support. 750 

ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(A) (West 2018). A trial court’s determination of the parties’ respective incomes 

involves factual questions that we will set aside only if they are clearly against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. In re Marriage of Wojcik, 362 Ill. App. 3d 144, 153 (2005). Of course, any 

question of statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Hochstatter, 2020 IL 

App (3d) 190132, ¶ 21. 

¶ 37 Section 505(a)(3.1) of the Act provides: 
14 

“Business income. For purposes of calculating child support, net business income from the 

operation of a business means gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses 

required to carry on the trade or business. *** 

 *** The accelerated component of depreciation and any business expenses determined 

either judicially or administratively to be inappropriate or excessive shall be excluded from 

the total of ordinary and necessary business expenses to be deducted in the determination 

of net business income from gross business income.” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.1)(A) (West 

2018). 

¶ 38 Thus, nonaccelerated depreciation can be deducted in the calculation of net business 

income. as long as it is an appropriate and necessary expense to carry in the business. Hochstatter, 

2020 IL App (3d) 190132, ¶ 24. 

¶ 39 As directed in section 505(a)(1.5) of the Act, the computation of each parent’s child support 

obligation requires a determination of each parent’s monthly net income. Net income is calculated 

by taking the parent’s gross income, “minus either the standardized tax amount calculated pursuant 

to subparagraph (C) of this paragraph (3) or the individualized tax amount calculated pursuant to 

subparagraph (D) of this paragraph (3), and minus any adjustments pursuant to subparagraph (F) 

of this paragraph (3).” 720 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(B) (West 2018). 

¶ 40 In determining child support and maintenance, the trial court relied on the husband’s child 

support calculation worksheet. The husband’s gross income included his salary from Ray Trapp 

Electric, Inc., plus the personal expenses paid by Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., resulting in an annual 

gross income of $64,452. As noted above, nonaccelerated depreciation may be excluded from the 

husband’s gross income. There was no testimony at trial regarding whether any of the depreciation 

was appropriate and necessary to carry on the businesses, and it appears that much of the 
15 

depreciation was accelerated. At a minimum, we find that $38,496 in special depreciation listed 

on the Ray Trapp Electric, Inc., 2019 tax return was includable as income. We remand for a 

recalculation of the husband’s gross income. Whether any depreciation can be excluded from the 

husband’s gross income should be addressed on remand. Also, Ray Trapp Electric’s 2019 ordinary 

business income of $23,021 is includable in the husband’s gross income pursuant to section 

505(a)(3.1) of the Act. 

¶ 41 The husband’s chart lists the wife’s gross income as $72,708, which is derived from the 

wife’s January 2020 financial affidavit. The wife’s chart lists her gross income as $63,184, which 

is derived from her 2019 W-2. The difference is primarily from the fact that the wife does not pay 

Social Security taxes; rather, she has a mandatory teacher’s retirement deduction. The wife argues 

that this deduction should have been deducted from her gross income. Section 505(a)(3)(A) of the 

Act makes it clear that gross income includes the total of all income from all sources, with some 

exceptions that do not include a mandatory retirement deduction. However, under section 

505(a)(3)(B) of the Act, an individualized tax amount can be calculated, rather than a standardized 

tax amount, to determine net income in certain situations. Id. § 505(a)(3)(B). The individualized 

tax amount is the aggregate of federal income tax, state income tax, and “Social Security or selfemployment tax, if applicable (or, if none, mandatory retirement contributions required by law or 

as a condition of employment) and Medicare tax calculated at the Federal Insurance Contributions 

Act rate.” Id. § 505(a)(3)(D)(III). A review of the record indicates that the standardized tax amount 

applied by the husband resulted in a net income for the wife that was lower than the amount 

calculated by the wife. Thus, we find that the trial court’s adoption of the husband’s calculation of 

the wife’s net income effectively allowed for the deduction of the wife’s mandatory retirement 

contributions from her gross income, and it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
16 

¶ 42 CONCLUSION

¶ 43 The judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is affirmed in part, as modified to 

reflect the additional cash payments due from the husband to the wife, resulting from the 

increased business equity and the wife’s marital interest in the life insurance policies. The child 

support portion of the order is reversed and the matter is remanded for a recalculation of the 

husband’s income for the purpose of calculating any child support or maintenance obligation.

¶ 44 Affirmed in part, as modified and reversed in part. 

¶ 45 Cause remanded with directions.