### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

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NO. 03-0 5 -00 156 -CR

Thom as Ja m e s C le m e ns , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 3040 165 , HO NORAB LE JON N. WIS SER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Our o p in io na n d

ju d g me n t i s s u e d

o nJa n u ar

y 1 1 , 2 0 0 7 , ar e w it

h dr aw n , an d

the following opinion is subs tituted.

T h o m a s C l e m e n s w a s c o n v i c t e d o f a t t e m p t e d

ar s o no f D a v i d Le i b s o n ’ s h o m e . In thr e e iss ue s o n a

pp e a l, C le me ns argue s th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fac tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o support his conviction and t hat t he dis trict court erre d in admitting the testimony of Sandra

Budg e,
a c ri min a lis t for

the State F ir e Mars ha l, s ta tin g that va ri ou s it e ms f

ound on L e ibs on ’s pr op e rt

y
c on ta ine d g a so lin e . B e c a us e the e vid e nc e is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the c on vic tio n, we wi ll
reve rse the judg ment of the district cour t and re nder a

judgme nt of ac quittal.2 BACK GR OUND Clemens was c harg ed with attempted a rson of a h ab i t at i on. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. § 1 5. 01 (a ) ( Wes t 20 03 ), § 2 8. 02 (We st Su pp . 2 00 6) . T he ind ic tme nt s pe c if ie d th a t:
on or about the 17th da

y of J an u ar y

A.D. 2004, . . . [Clemens] did then and ther e, wi th the sp e c if

ic int e nt to co mmi t the of fe ns e of ars on of
. . . a ha bit a tio n, do an a c t, to-wit: th r e w anin c e n d ia r y d e v ic e thr o u g h th e w in d o w o f s a id h a b it a ti o nw h ic h dev i ce , a bottle of flammable liquid and a fuse was in the manne r of its use or intended use w as ca

pable of causing death or

serious bodily

injury , which amounted to more than mer e pre paration that tended but failed to e ffe ct the commission of the offe nse intended. Clemens waived his rig ht to a jury trial, and a

bench tr ial was he ld. Th e fo llo wi nginf

or ma tio n wa s r e ve a le d thro ug h te sti mon y int ro du c e d at tr ia l. Clemens and L eibson wer e roommate s and re sided at L eibson’s house in Austin, Texas. After Clemens moved out of the house, he su ed L eibson, claiming that L eibson had fa iled to return proper ty to him. The court orde red L eibson to return va rious items to Cl emens’s attorney
. Some time after Cleme ns filed suit, L eibson’s bedroom window was shatter ed at approximately

midnight one e vening in J anuar y 2004 while L eibson was in the r oom. Although the wind o w s h a tt e r e d , th e e xte r io r s c r e e n r e ma in e d in ta c t, an d w h a te v e r h it th e w in d o w d id n ot enter the house. Af

ter putting on his pa

nts, L eibson ran outside to investig ate a nd saw Clemens rushing to h is c ar. Al tho ug h L e ib so n adm it ted that it wa s d ark , h e te sti fi e d th a t he re c og nize d Cl e me ns . Fur ther, L eibson stated that Clemens y elled an expletive at hi m upon seeing him outsi de and that he
rec og nized Cl emens’s voic e. L eibson observe d Clemens drive off and, su b s equently , called the p o l i ce t o re p o rt t h e i n ci d en t
. Of fi ce r R i v er a, t h e re s p o n d i n g o ff i ce r, t es t i fi edt h at , af

t er i n v es t i gat i n g,3

he could not dete rmine what had hit the scre en and w indow causingthe window to brea k. Howeve r, he testified that L eibson identified Clemens as the party responsible for

brea king the window. L e ib s o n ’ s n e ig hb or, D o n n a D o y le , te s ti f

ie d th a t a r o u n d n in e o ’ c lo c k

th e n e xt morning , while she wa s clea ning he r living r oom, she saw Clemens wa lk down L eibson’s porch steps, cut throug h L eibson’s y ard, and walk by L eibson’s car . Doyle testified that, althoug h she had
ne ve r t a lke d to him , s he ha d s e e n Cl e me ns a t L e ibs on ’s ho us e be fo re and re c og nize d h im. Do y le stated that the ne x t time she looked up from clea ning, approximately a minute later, she saw a fire underne ath L eibson’s ca

r. After seeing t h e fi re , Doy le ra n out of her house and over to L eibson’s ca

r. She testified that the fire had bee n set using be er bottles a nd a pape r sac k. I n addition, she stated that she noticed that ther e wa s liquid i nside the bottles but did not sm ell any thing. She further te stified that the fire intensified when she inadver tently knocked one of the bottles over while attempting to move the bo t t l e s aw ay

f r o m t h e c ar ’ s g a s t an k

u s i n g h e r

b r o o m . A f

t e r u n s u c c e s s f

u l l y a t t e mp t i n g to exti ng uish the fire, Doy le t hen knocked on L eibson’s fr ont door and told him about the fire . L eibson
wa s a ble to e xtinguis h th e fi re and , s ub se qu e ntl y , c a lle d th e po lic e . L e ibs on te sti fi e d th a t, d

ur inghis attempt to ext inguish the f ire, he noticed that the beer bot tles had rag s place d into the necks of the bottles and noticed that the a rea smelled like g asoline. Offic er A rturo Gonz alez responde d to L eibson’s ca ll. He testified that, whe n he
arr ive d at th e sc e ne , h e c ou ld s e e that th e re ha d b e e n a sma ll fi re un de rn e a th L e ibs on ’s c ar. He a lso observe d sever al bee r bottles that wer e filled with fluid and ha d rag s stuffed into their ne cks. Off icer Gonzalez testified he could smell g asoline in the ar ea a round the c ar.4 Whil e inspec tin g t h e remainder of the house, L eibson found anothe r bottle on the g ro un d ne ar the wi nd ow that ha d b e e n b ro ke n th e nig ht b e fo re . L e ibs on te sti fi e d th a t th e bo ttl e mus t have be en the objec t that hit the ex terior window sc ree n and shatter ed his b ed ro om window. He further o p i n ed t h at the scr een must have preve nted the bottle from e ntering his house. L eibson informed Office r Gonz alez about t he bott le, and Offic er Gonzalez noticed that, like the bottles found underne ath L eibson’s ca

r, this bottle also contained liquid and had a rags t u ff ed int o its neck. He further noticed that the rag was burned on both ends. Alt houg h he did not pick up the bottle to sniff it and admitted that he did not know for c erta in what was in the bottle, O ffice r Gonzalez testified that he could f

aintl y s m el l g asoline nea r the bottle but that the smell was not as strongas it was nea r L e ibs on ’s c ar. L e ibs on

a lso te sti fi e d th a t he fo un d y e t ano the r b ott le on the oth e r s ide of

his ho us e and that he c ould smell ga soline near that bottle as well. Sand ra B ud g e , a

c ri mi nal is t for

the State F ir e Mars ha l’ s ars on la bo ra tor y , a lso testified at the tria l. She stated that part of her job wa s to test ev i d en ce she re ceive d from law enfor ceme nt officials for

the pre sence of i g nitable l iquid residue. She stated t hat, in conducting an analy sis for this case, she tested t hree liquid samples collec ted from the be er bottles and c oncluded that eac h sample conta ined g asoline.

T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtf

o u n d C l e m e n s g u i l t y o f a t t e mp t e d ar s o n , a s e c o n d

- d e g r e e f e l o n y, and assessed punishment at ten y ear s’ imprisonment, but the sentence was suspende d to four y ear s of community

supervision. Clemens appe als the judg ment of the district cour t.
DI SCU SSIO N I n his first issue on appea l, Clemens contends that t he evide nce is leg ally insufficient to s up po rt

his c onvic tio n. I n h is s e c on d is su e , Cl e me ns argue s th a t the evi den ce i s f a c tua lly5

insufficient. Alter

natively , Clemens asser

ts that there is a materia l varianc e betwe en the e vidence offe red at trial and the crime alleg ed in the indictment. I n his third issue on appeal, Clemens a rg ues that the district court e rre d in admitting Budg e’s testim ony reg arding tests she per formed on the three liquid samples she rec eived beca use no proof of chain of custody was off ere d. Be cause we c onclude that the e vid e nc e is le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt to su

pp or t Cle me ns ’s c on vic tio n, we need n ot add re ss Clemens’s sec ond and third issues.
The Evi de nc e is L e ga llyIns uffic ie nt

Clemens argues that the e vidence i s insufficient to support his conviction for the crime of attempted ar son of a habitation. Clemens insists that the evidence presented, if it proves any thing, only proves that he place d all the beer bottles on L eibson’s prope rty on the morning of the fire a nd insists that proof of

such an a ct does not prove the cr ime char g ed. I n deter mining whe ther e vidence is leg all y sufficie nt to support a conviction, we consider a ll the evidence in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t a

nd deter mine whether

a rational trier of fac t cou l d h av e found the defe ndant g uilty of all the e lements of the of fense bey ond a
rea sonable doubt base d on the evidenc e and r easona ble infer ence s from the e vidence
. Drichas v. Sta te , 1 75 S.W. 3d

79 5, 79 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Gue v ara v . S tat e , 152 S.W .3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). I n making this determin at i o n , ap p el late cour ts consider a ll the evidence reg ardle ss o f wh ether

the evidenc e wa s proper ly or improper ly

admitted. Se e Mo

ff v . S tat e , 131 S.W. 3d 48 5, 48 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ). I n re vie wi ng the su ff ic ie nc y , ap pe llate c ourt s are no t to
re -e va lu ate the we ig ht a nd c re dib ili ty

of the re c or d e vid e nc e , n or sh ou ld t he y su bs tit ute the ir judgme nt for that of the fac t-finder
. De wbe rry v . S tat e , 4 S.W .3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).6

A fa ct-finde r’s ve rdict must not be disturbed unless it is found to be “irrational or unsupported by more than a ‘m er e modicum’ of the e vidence .” Ep ps v . S tat e , 811 S.W .2d 237, 240 (T ex . Ap p . — Da l l as 1 9 9 1 , n o p et
. ) ( qu o t i n g Mo re no v . S ta te , 755 S.W .2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).

No t e ve ry fa c t ha s to su

pp or t th e defe nd ant’ s g uil t, b ut t he c umu la tiv e e ff

e c t of a ll incriminating evidenc e must sup p o rt t h e conviction. Se e J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 871 S.W .2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Furthe rmore, a conviction ca

n be based on circ umstantial evidence alone. Se e Mu tto ni v. Sta te , 25 S.W. 3d 30 0, 30 8 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 00 , n o p e t.) ; see also Nicholson v. Sta te , 162 S.W .3d 389, 395 n.5 (Tex. A pp.—Be aumont 2005, pet. re f’d) (“Circ umstantial evidence is ‘direc t proof of a

seconda ry fac t which, by

logic al infer ence , demonstrates the ultimate fac t to be p ro v en . ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Cow an v . S tat e , 840 S.W .2d 435, 438 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). I n addition, the evidence may

be leg ally

sufficie nt despite the nee d for makingmultipl e re asonable infere nces to support the conviction as long as “e ach inf ere nce is supporte d by

the evidenc e presented at trial.” Ho op e r v . S

tat e , N o . PD
- 1 3 2 5
- 0 5 , 2 0 0 7 T e x. Cr im
. A p p . L E X I S 1 0 2 , * 1 5 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . J an. 31, 2007) (de signated for publica tion). Whi le rea sonable infere nces a re pe rmissible, a g uilty

verdic t may not be base d on mere speculation. Id. (“Spec ulation is mere theor izi ng or g uessing about the possible meaning of fa cts and e vidence prese nted”)
.

A pe rs on c omm its the of

fe ns e of ars on if he sta

rt s a fi re or c a

us e s an e xplos ion

wi th int e nt t o d e str oy

c e rt a in t y pe s o f p ro pe rt

y . T e x. Pe na l Co de Ann. § 2 8. 02
. Ar so n of a ha bit a tio n is
a first-deg ree felony , and attempted arson of a habitation is a second- deg ree felony
. See id. §§ 28.02 (a rs on of ha bit a tio n is fi rs t- de g re e fe lony ), 15 .0 1( d) (We st 2 00 3) (atte mpt c on sti tut e s c ri me wh os e punishment level is one categ ory lower tha

n completed of

fense ). A pe rson is gu ilty of attempt if,7

with specific intent to commit an off ense, “ he does a

n act amounting to m ore than mere pr epar ation that tends but fails to eff

ect the c ommissi on of the off ense intende d.” Id. § 15 .0 1( a ). “ Atte mpt ” is
mor e compre hensive than “ intent,” and it implies both a purpose a nd an ac tual eff

ort to car ry that purpose into execution. Fl or es v . S tat e , 902 S.W .2d 618, 620 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, pet. ref ’d). Conviction for an attempted criminal offense does not require acc omplishm ent of ever y act short of actua l c ommissi on of the offe nse. Id. Specific intent to commi t an offe nse mea ns that the ac cused inten d ed t o b ri ng about the off ense in que stion. Grav es v . S tat e , 782 S.W .2d 5, 6 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, pe t. ref’ d). Intent may be infe rre d from cir cumstantial evidenc e. Roane

v . S tat e , 959 S.W .2d 387, 389 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1998, pet. re f’d)
.

When the evidenc e is viewe d in the light most favor able to t h e verdict, we be lieve that th e e vid e nc e fa ils to e sta bli shbe y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t Cle me ns wa s g uil ty of the c ri me of attempted a

rson of L eibson’s house. I n making its case a g ainst Clemens, the State was r equire d to prove that Clemens committed a n act “amounting to mor e than mere prepa ration” that tended but failed to e ffe ct the commission of the offense intende d: setting L eibson’s house on f ire. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. §§ 15.01(a) , 28.02
. T h e ac t alleg ed in the indictment stated that Clemens “thre w an ince ndiary

device ,” spec ifically

“a bottle of flammable liqui d,” “throug h the window” of L eibson’s house. Se e Mo sh e r v . S tat e , 901 S.W .2d 547, 549 n.1 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.) (fire investigator testified that Molotov cocktail is g ener ally made from g lass bottle containing flammable liquid with ragor pape r wick in top par t of bot tle that is lit prior to bottle being thrown at intended targ et). Be cause the act was an essential element of the crime, the State had the bur den of provingthe ac t bey ond a re as o nable doubt. Se e Sh or t v . S tat e , 874 S.W .2d 666, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).8 At fi rs t g lanc e , the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d ap pe ars c omp e lli ngthat Cle me ns e ng a g e d in
c ri min a l a c tiv ity

on L e ibs on ’s pr op e rt

y . H ow e ve r, up on

c lose r ex a min a tio n, we are fo rc e d to conclude that insuffi ci ent evidence, c ircumstantial or other wise, wa s prese nted demonstratingthe
s eq u en ce o f e v en t s n ec es s ary t o co n v i ct C l em en s o f t h e c ri m e c h ar gedi nt h e i n d i ct m en t
. Al t h o u gh L eibson testified that he sa w C l em ens rushing to his car shortly afte r the window w as broke n, no witness observe d Clemens throw any object at the w indow, nor is there any evidenc e, other

than Clemens’s mere prese nce, that he threwany thing at the house. See M osher , 901 S.W .2d at 549 (evi d en ce s u fficie nt where neig hbor saw de fenda nt throw Molotov cocktail at victim’s house). Fur ther, no e vidence was introduced showing that the bottle found nea r the window w as the objec t that shattere d the bedr oom window. There was no e vidence indicating th at t h e b o t t l e had been damag ed, in any

way , as a r esult of its alleg ed impact with L eibson’s house. Indeed , fr o m the te sti mony , it

se e ms that th e bo ttl e wa s n ot o nly un br ok e n b ut s til l cont ain ed so me liq uid , d e sp ite being plugg ed with only

a ra g. I n addition, there is no evide nce e stablishing that the bottle found beneath the bedroom window w as pre sent o n L ei bson’s proper ty during the cr

ucial time betwe en wh e n the wi nd ow wa s sh a tte re d and the ne xt m or nin g wh e n the fi re un de r the c ar wa s se t. Th e on ly evidenc e conc erningthe bottle’s location at this critical time is to the contra ry : neither L eibson nor Offic er River a sawa bottle when the y sear ched the are a around the window shortly afte r the window was broke n. Cf. id. a t 548 (b ro ke n re ma ins of Mo lot ovc oc kta il w e re dis c ov e re d b y vic timsh or

tly afte r she hear d something hit he r house). The bottle w as not disc overe d until the nex t morning w hen the bottles under the car wer e discovere d and another bottle w as found near L eibson’s house on the side opposite L eibson’s bedr oom. Finally , other than the testimony that the rag stuffed into t he nec k
a pp e are d b ur

ne d o n both e nd s, the re is n o e vid e nc e that th e bo ttl e wa s th ro wn a t th e ho us e wh ile lit
.9

No evidenc e was introduce d indicating that L eibson’s house, window sc ree n, or y ard sustaine d any d a ma g e f r o m f ir e. Cf. id. at 54 9 ( g ara g e do or , f ro nt o f h ou se , b ru sh , a

nd g ra ss i n f

ro nt o f h ou se sustained fire damag e). The only evidenc e conc erningsuch d amag e is to the contra ry : Office r Gonzalez testified that L eibson’s house ha d not sustained any fire da mag e. The evidenc e prese nted does not establish and it ca nnot rea sonably

be infe rre d from this evidence that the bottle found bene ath L eibs on’s bedr oom window was the obje ct that was thr ow n at or

sh a tte re d L e ibs on ’s wi nd owor that th e ra g in t

he bo ttl e ’s ne c k w a s li t w he n th e bo ttl e was thrown. T he establishment of t hese f acts by some evidenc e wa s nece ssary to convict Clemens of the c rime cha

rg ed—the throw ing of

an ince ndiary

device t hroug h L eibson’s window with the intent to set fire to the house. Given the suspicious behavior e ng ag ed in by Clements, it mi g ht be po ssi ble to s pe c ulate tha

t th e bo ttl e wa s th e ob

je c t th ro wn

a t th e be dr oo m w ind ow, th a t th e ra g in the bottle was lit when the bottle wa s thrown, and t h at the bottle was on the g round duringthe investigation by Offic er Rivera on the night of the incident but w as overlooke d. Howeve r, this ty pe
o f spec ulation cannot take the place of evide nce a nd rea sonable infe renc es base d on the evidenc e neede d to support a conviction.

I n light of the previous discussion, we must conc lude that Clemens’s convic tion for attempted ar s o n o f a h ab i t ati on is not supported by more than a

mere modicum of the evide nce. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the e vidence is leg ally insufficient to support Clemens’s c onviction for the offe nse charg ed. There fore , we sustain his first issue. Havingsustained Clemens’s first issue on appea l, we nee d not addre ss Clemens’s second a nd third issues.10 CO NC LU SION B e c a us e the e vid e nc e wa s ins uf fi c ie nt to su

pp or t Cle me ns ’s c on vic tio n, we re ve rs e the judg ment of the district cour t and re nder a

judgme nt of ac quittal. Se e W he e le r v . S

tat e , 35 S.W .3d 126, 131-32 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. re f’d)
.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and Waldrop Reverse d and Rende red on Motion for Re hear ing Filed: Mar ch 9, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh