FILED

June 23, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

LORI PARR, SUE MURRAY, )

OLLIE STUART, KEVIN )

SELLERS, MARY LOU DAVY, )

)

Plaintiffs/Appellants ) Appeal No.

) 01-A-01-9811-CV-00573

v. )

) Rutherford Circuit

TOWER MANAGEMENT ) No. 36015

COMPANY, CEDAR PARK )

MOBILE HOME ESTATES, )

CATHY BORN, ANN SNELL, )

)

Defendants/Appellees. )

)

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR 

RUTHERFORD COUNTY

AT MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. CORLEW, JUDGE

LORI PARR, Pro Se

1784 West Northfield Blvd., Box 267

Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37129

SUE MURRAY STEWART, Pro Se

1263 Wenlon Drive

Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37130

BARBARA J. PERUTELLI

Schulman, LeRoy & Bennett

501 Union Street, 7th Floor

P. O. Box 190676

Nashville, Tennessee 37219-0676

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE

OPINION
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This case started with a five page complaint in the Circuit Court of

Rutherford County, Tennessee and expanded to occupy the known universe.

Plaintiffs, Lori Parr, Sue Murray, Ollie Stuart, Kevin Sellers and Mary

Lou Davy, employed attorney, Lawrence H. Hart, to file suit against Tower

Management Company, Cedar Park Mobile Home Estates, Cathy Born, and Ann

Snell, collectively and individually.

Suit was filed December 27, 1995, alleging that Plaintiffs were present

and former lessees of mobile home lots in Cedar Park Mobile Home Estates.

The complaint charged all Defendants with being ". . . deliberately and wilfully

engaged in a course of unfair, deceptive, unlawful and outrageous conduct which

victimized and caused injury to the plaintiffs and other residents of the mobile

home park." Among the practices alleged were unlawful ouster and eviction

from their respective lots, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act,

intentional infliction of emotional harm, and unlawful ouster under Tennessee

Code Annotated section 66-28-504. Plaintiffs sought treble damages under the

Consumer Protection Act, punitive damages and compensatory damages.

By amended complaint filed December 28, 1995, William Steel, Login

Boggs, and Mary Jane Boggs were added as individual Defendants.

Extensive discovery followed and Plaintiffs ultimately filed a motion

to add additional Plaintiffs while Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment.

On January 9, 1998, the following order was entered:

This cause came on further to be considered by the

Court on three separate issues, first a motion to add

additional Plaintiffs, opposed by the Defendants; second a

motion of the Defendants for summary judgment, opposed

by the Plaintiffs; and third a joint motion of the parties that

the cause set for trial January 12, 1998 be continued in order

to allow the matter to be presented through arbitration, and

from the entire file in this cause, the Court finds that the first

two motions should be denied and that the joint motion

should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to add
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additional Plaintiffs is denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants'

motion for summary judgment is denied.

FINALLY IT IS ORDERED that the joint motion of the

parties to continue the trial from the setting of January 12,

1998 is granted, and the joint motion to proceed to

arbitration pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Code

Annotated §29-5-101, et seq. is granted. Further this cause

shall remain on the active docket in this court through May

31, 1998, not subject to further orders of dismissal prior to

that time, subject to further proceedings pursuant to the

provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated §29-5-118.

Costs are reserved pending the entry of the final order

in this cause.

On January 12, 1998, the trial court entered the following order:

As evidenced by signature of counsel for the respective

parties hereto, it is agreed that the parties shall resolve all

disputes by submitting them to arbitration. The Arbitrator

shall determine all issues in this cause including the

assessment of discretionary costs and court costs. The costs

of arbitration shall be shared equally by plaintiffs and

defendants.

With no further orders of the court the case was heard on arbitration by

Judge Joe C. Loser on March 5, 1998. Lawrence H. Hart appeared as counsel for

the plaintiffs and Barbara J. Perutelli appeared as counsel for the defendants All

of the plaintiffs, including Lori Parr and Sue Murray, fully participated in the

arbitration hearing. The arbitrator took the case under advisement and on March

31, 1998, issued a twenty page "arbitration award" finding in favor of the

plaintiffs and against the defendants. In this arbitration award Judge Loser held,

in part:

Thereafter, in 1994, the rules and regulations were

changed by adding rule 6a, which states:

All homes moving into the community must

not be older than eight (8) years old, and approved

by management.

The new rule was interpreted to mean that any buyer of

the plaintiffs' mobile homes, all of which were older than

eight years, would be required to remove the mobile home

from the park. The interpretation caused the plaintiffs'

mobile homes to lose value, for which no compensation was

offered or paid.

Under such circumstances, the action of Cedar Park was
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unfair and deceptive in violation of the Tennessee Consumer

Protection Act, and Cedar Park is thus liable to the plaintiffs,

and each of them, for their "actual damages," which, under

the circumstances of these cases, is either the difference in

value of the mobile home immediately before and after the

changed rule for selling older homes or, if the evidence does

not establish the before and after values, the reasonable cost

of relocating the home to a similar location. The most

credible evidence of the reasonable relocation cost was the

$1,500.00 estimate by Mr. Boggs.

The arbitrator finds the following actual damages to

have been established from a preponderance of the evidence:

Mary Lou Davy, $5,000.00, representing the

difference between the before and after value of

her home;

Lori Parr, $1,500.00, representing the

reasonable cost of relocation;

Sue Murray, $1,500.00, representing the

reasonable relocation cost7; and

Kevin Sellers, $10,500.00, representing the

difference between [the between] the before and

after value of his home.

Additionally, and as the Act provides, each of the

plaintiffs may recover a reasonable attorney's fee not

exceeding one-third of his or her recovery. If the parties are

unable to agree on the reasonable value of the services

provided by plaintiffs' counsel, an additional evidential

hearing may be requested.

The arbitrator finds that the defendants' violation of the

Consumer Protection Act was not willful or wanton. Thus,

this is not an appropriate case for an award of treble

damages.

______________________

7 Ollie Stewart has no separate claim.

On April 15, 1978, the defendants paid the arbitration award, including

attorney fees and one-half of the arbitrator's fee into the Circuit Court of

Rutherford County.

At this point, Plaintiff, Lori Parr, allied with Plaintiff, Sue Murray,

fired their attorney, Lawrence H. Hart, and proceeded thereafter to represent

themselves.

Thereafter, hundreds of pages of documents reflecting little regard for

Rules of Procedure or Rules of Law, are set forth in this record, bitterly second
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guessing the trial tactics of Attorney Hart and attacking, with near equal vigor,

the actions of Attorney Perutelli.

Returning now to the correct procedural and substantive track, it is first

noted that, although Lori Parr and Sue Murray participated and testified in a full

hearing before the arbitrator on March 8, 1998, we are favored with no

evidentiary transcript of that hearing. Keeping in mind that the defendants cast

before the arbitrator have paid the judgment in full into the registry of the court;

and that only certain of the prevailing plaintiffs, who are dissatisfied with their

respective awards seek to disavow the arbitration; we proceed.

Weaving our way through the seemingly endless objections interposed

by Plaintiffs Parr and Murray, we reach the review by the trial judge of the

actions of the arbitrator. The trial judge is bound, as are we, by the stringent

limitations set forth in Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc., 914 S.W.2d 445

(Tenn. 1996). Therein, the Supreme Court, in construing the Tennessee

arbitration statutes, held:

We begin with a discussion of the standards of review

to be used by a trial court when reviewing an arbitration

award and by the Court of Appeals when reviewing the trial

court's judgment in an arbitration case. Tennessee has

adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§

29-5-301 through 320 (Supp. 1995). This Act "governs the

scope of judicial review of arbitration awards." International

Talent Group, Inc. v. Copyright Management, Inc., 769

S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tenn. App. 1988). For guidance, we can

look to other jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform

Arbitration Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-320 ("This part

shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to

make uniform the law of those states which enact it.").

The standard to be applied by the trial court is a narrow

one. It is well established that courts should play only a

limited role in reviewing the decisions of arbitrators. United

Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CI0 v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.

29, 36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 369, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). 

[W]here the party has agreed to arbitrate, he or

she, in effect has relinquished much of [the right

to a court's decision on the merits.] The party still

can ask a court to review the arbitrator's decision,

but the court will set that decision aside only in

very unusual circumstances.

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, _____ U.S. _____,

_____, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995)
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(emphasis added) (citations omitted).2 The trial court is

limited by the provisions of the statute which allow a

vacation or modification of an award. See International

Talent Group, 769 S.W.2d at 218.

__________________

2 While First Options of Chicago concerns the Federal

Arbitration Act, we note that the purpose of the Federal and

Uniform Arbitration Act is the same: to promote private

settlement of disputes, thereby bypassing the courts. As

such, the scope of review advanced by the United States

Supreme Court has equal application in a case under the

Uniform Arbitration Act to the extent that such review

furthers the common goal of the acts.

 * * *

The limiting language ofthe statutes governing vacation

and modification of arbitration awards evidences an intent to

limit severely the trial court's authority to retry the issues

decided by arbitration. As the New Mexico Supreme Court

observed in Melton v. Lyon: "It is not the function of the

Court to hear cases de novo and consider evidence presented

to the arbitrators, but rather to conduct an evidentiary hearing

and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law upon each

issue raised in the application to vacate or modify the

award." 108 N.M. 420, 773 P.2d 732, 733 (1989) (citation

omitted). Moreover, the trial court must accord deference to

the arbitrator's award.

Arnold v. Morgan Keegan Co., Inc., 914 S.W.2d 445, 447-48 (Tenn. 1996).

Thoroughly conscious of the limitations thus placed upon his authority

by the Uniform Arbitration Statutes and the construction thereof by the

Tennessee Supreme Court, the learned chancellor held:

The court has considered the provisions of the statutory

and case law, and has determined that all Plaintiffs are bound

by the decision of their attorney to submit the matter to

binding arbitration combined with the participation by these

parties in the arbitration process, that the decision of the

arbitrator must be affirmed, . . .

This holding by the chancellor is clearly correct when the actions of

Lori Parr and Sue Murray are considered in the context of the arbitration

proceeding. While it is true that Attorney Hart could not bind his clients to

compulsory arbitration without their agreement, and the record does not disclose

an affirmative agreement to arbitrate by them, it is equally true that they have

ratified his actions and cannot now be heard to complain about the arbitration.
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The record before this court shows no complaint at all by Parr or Murray until

after the arbitrator disappointed them. The fully participated in the proceeding,

testified before the arbitrator, consulted with their attorney before the arbitrator,

and uttered no protest which would allow the trial court to vacate the award

under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-5-313 or otherwise. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 29-5-313 (Supp. 1998). No such protest is preserved for appellate

review. As the chancellor held, they cannot acquiesce and indeed fully

participate in the arbitration and then, disappointed with the outcome, disavow

the action of their attorney and agent.

It is an undisputed principle of law that where an agent in the

first place exceeds his authority, or acts without authority,

such acts may become the acts of the principal by

ratification, which may be either expressed or implied. See

1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1195, and authorities

cited; McClure v. Evartson, 14 Lea, 495; Oil Works v.

Jefferson, 2 Lea, 581; Williams v. Storm, 6 Cold. 207; Evans

v. Buckner, 1 Heisk, 294. It is further well-settled law that,

if a party does not disavow the acts of his agent as soon as he

can after they come to his knowledge, he makes these acts

his own. See Pars. Cont. 49, 50, and authorities above cited.

In the case of Williams v. Storm it is said: "Where the

principal has the option to repudiate the contract or to ratify

it, he is bound promptly to do either the one or the other." 6

Cold. 207. It is stated in all the authorities on these subjects,

however, that, before a ratification can be implied or binding,

the principal must have knowledge of the acts which he is

supposed to ratify. In some of the cases it is stated that he

must have full knowledge, and in others that he must have

knowledge of all the material facts and circumstances. See

1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1189. It is also held that

knowledge of facts by another agent, where the matter is

within the scope of his agency, is sufficient. See authority

last cited, p. 1192. It is further held that, if the facts show a

ratification, the intention of the parties is immaterial; so that,

to constitute a ratification, it is not material whether a

ratification was contemplated or not. See Hazard v. Spears,

2 Abb. Dec. 353. It has further been held that the conduct of

the principal will be liberally construed in favor of a

ratification or adoption of the acts of the agent (see 1 Am. &

Eng. Enc. Law. p. 1195, and authorities there cited); in all the

cases it being held that, when a knowledge of the transaction

comes to the principal, he must with reasonable promptness

disaffirm the acts of the agent, or he will be held bound

thereby. 

Bement & Sons v. Armstrong, 39 S.W. 899, 903 (Tenn. Chan. App. 1896).
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After affirming the decision of the arbitrator, the trial court ordered

distribution of the arbitration award as follows:

ITISTHEREFOREORDEREDthat the Court approves

the award determined by the arbitrator. Further it is ordered

that the Clerk shall pay the following sums to the following

individuals: to Plaintiff Parr the sum of $1,220.07; to

Plaintiff Murray the sum of $1,220.07; to Plaintiff Davy the

sum of $4,067.02; and to Plaintiff Sellers the sum of

$8,541.20; to Attorney Hart the sum of $6,166.66 for

attorney's fees, and the sum of $1,261.14 as reimbursement

for out-of-pocket expenses for court reporter fees, advanced

payment to the arbitrator, and long distance telephone

charges; to Arbitrator Loser the sum of $2,190.50,

representing half of the cost of arbitration, which must be

paid by the awards to the Plaintiff. Further it is ordered that

the requests for payment and further reimbursements for

assistance in trial preparation submitted by Plaintiff Parr

must be respectfully denied. Further it is ordered that

Plaintiffs Parr and Murray shall proceed further in this cause

pro se, upon their request, and Attorney Hart is relieved from

further responsibility for representation of these Plaintiffs.

This order entered June 25, 1998, on pages 293-295 in Volume II of the

record, would appear to have been intended by the trial judge as a final

judgment, but 294 pages later, in Volume IV of the transcript under date of

October 26, 1998, the following order appears:

This cause came on to further be considered by the

Court on this the 26th day of October, 1998, upon the entire

file in this cause, from all of which the Court finds that the

pending motions for a new trial, and to alter or amend the

prior judgment must be respectfully denied, and the Order of

June 25, 1998 shall be affirmed, and made the final order of

the Court in this cause, and that all other pending motions

must be respectfully denied.

It is therefore ordered that the Court approves the award

determined by the arbitrator. It is further ordered that the

Clerk shall pay the following sums to the following

individuals:

To Plaintiff, Parr, the sum of $ 1220.07;

To Plaintiff, Murray(Stewart), the sum of $ 1220.07;

To Plaintiff, Davy, the sum of $ 4067.02;

To Plaintiff, Sellers, the sum of $ 8541.20;

To Attorney, Hart, the sum of $ 6166.66 for attorney's

fees, and the sum of $ 1261.14 as reimbursement for out of

pocket expenses for Court Reporter fees, advanced payment

to the arbitrator, and long distance telephone charges;

To Arbitrator, Loser, the sum of $ 2190.50, representing
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one-half of the cost of arbitration (the other one-half having

been previously paid to him by the Defendants).

Further it is ordered that the request for payments and

further reimbursements for assistance in trial preparation

submitted by Plaintiff, Parr must be respectfully denied. All

further pending motions are also respectfully denied.

Costs in the cause, including a $ 30.00 cost of service of

process are taxed against the Defendants up to, through, and

including, all costs of the entry of the June 25, 1998 Order,

but the costs incurred after June 25, 1998 must be paid by

Ms. Parr.

IT IS SO ORDERED AS ABOVE.

Enter this the 26th day of October , 1998.

From this October 26, 1998 order, Lori Parr and Sue Murray appealed.

The voluminous record on appeal reveals neither verbatim transcript

nor Rule 24(c) statement, preserving any evidence heard by the trial judge at any

of the hearings in this case.

This court has held:

Our ability to deal with this issue is hampered by the absence

of either a transcript of the proceedings in the trial court or a

statement of the evidence prepared in accordance with Tenn.

R. App. P. 24(c).

When a trial court decides a case without a jury, it's

findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the

evidence in the record preponderates against them. Tenn. R.

App. P. 13(d). This court cannot review the facts de novo

without an appellate record containing the facts, and therefor,

we must assume that the record, had it been preserved, would

have contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court's

factual findings. McDonald v. Onoh, 772 S.W.2d 913, 914

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Irvin v. City of Clarksville, 767

S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Gotten v. Gotten,

748 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tenn. App. 1992).

Pro se Appellantsfiled, with the trial court, what purports to be a Rule

24(c) statement of the proceedings before the arbitrator on March 5, 1998. This

document is not approved by the trial judge in conformity with Rule 24(f), and

is not, in fact, a statement of evidence but simply another rambling complaint
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against the lawyers in the case. Typical of its contents is the following:

The plaintiffs Sue Murray and Lori Parr submit the

following statement to the Court of what occurred at the

arbitration hearing of March 5, 1998. No transcript of the

hearing is available because the plaintiffs' former attorney,

Lawrence Hart, refused to comply with the plaintiffs' request

for a court reporter to be present at the arbitration hearing by

stating to the plaintiffs "Who's going to pay for it, are you?

I'm certainly not." Therefore, the plaintiffs' will present to

the Court their recollection of what transpired at the

arbitration hearing with respect to those issues that are the

bases of the plaintiffs' appeal, as per Rules of Appellate

procedure, Rule 24 C.

 * * *

In reference to the defendants' attorney Perutelli's

Response to the plaintiffs' Murray and Parr's Motions To

Make Additional Findings Of Fact, Motions To Alter Or

Amend/Alter Judgment, and Motion For A New Trial, page

3, in regards to plaintiff Murray and Parr's "displeasure",

plaintiffs Murray and Parr do hereby state to this Honorable

Court that the true displeasure of plaintiffs Parr and Murray

are that two officers of the Court - one who was supposed to

be representing and protecting their best interests - instead

chose to fabricate a false story to the arbitrator, to the

plaintiffs, and to the trial Court, eventually deceiving this

Honorable Court into confirming an arbitration award that

was not based upon truth, but instead was based upon false

facts, and deliberate lies.

Without a verbatim transcript of the arbitration proceedings or some

other kind of transcript, the trial court was hardly in a position to review the

award of the arbitrator under the narrow standard of review provided by the

Uniform Arbitration Act. Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc., 914 S.W.2d

445, 448 (Tenn. 1996).

As we labor under the same handicaps, along with the additional

handicap of having no transcript of any of the proceedings that occurred before

the trial judge, we have no basis on which to find the decision of the trial judge

to be "clearly erroneous" under the standards applicable to appellate court

review. Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tenn.

1996).

We have no choice but to affirm the judgment of the chancellor.
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The appellees assert that the trial court was in error in failing to grant

summary judgment to the appellees rather than submitting the case to arbitration.

We affirm the chancellor's decision that material issues of fact existed

and summary judgment was improper.

Defendants seek damages for frivolous appeal.

While it is true that these pro se litigants have burdened the courts and

counsel with a deluge of unnecessary and improper documentation, mostly as to

matters not properly drawn in issue in this case, it must be observed that no

agreement executed by Parr and Murray appears in this record for submitting the

case to arbitration rather than to trial. They are bound by the arbitration because

their voluntary participation therein constituted ratification of the otherwise

unauthorized (as far as the record shows) action of Mr. Hart in agreeing to

arbitration. The application for frivolous appeal damages will be denied.

All costs on appeal are assessed against Lori Parr and Sue Murray and

the judgment of the chancellor is in all respects affirmed. The cause is remanded

to the trial court for the purpose of collecting costs.

_____________________________________

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE

CONCUR:

______________________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, P.J., M.S.

______________________________________

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE