Docket No. 104935.



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IL LINOIS

JO ANN ABRUZZO, I

ndependent Adm’r of t

h e Estate of Joseph Furio, Deceased, A

ppel lant, v. THE CITY OF PARK RI DGE, Appellee.

Opinion filed October 2, 2008.

JUSTICE KIL BRIDE delivered the

judgment of the co urt, with opinion. Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke conc urred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Plaintiff Jo Ann Abr

u zzo sued the City of Park Ridge, alleging the City’s emerg ency medic al technicians were dispatched to provide medical care to her minor son, Joseph Furio, but left without examining him or p roviding any treatment. Plaintiff alleged Joseph died as a res ult of the C ity’ s willful a

nd wanton

misconduct. The City filed a motion to dismiss under section 2–619 of the C ode of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 IL CS 5/2–619(a )(9 ) (West 2004)), asserting imm unity under the Local Gove rnmental and Governmental EmployeesTort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity

Act ) (745 I

LCS 10/1–101 et seq. (West 2004)). The circuit cour t of Cook County granted the motion t

o dismiss, a

nd the app ellate

court affirmed. 374-2- Ill. App. 3d 743. We allowed plaintiff’s petition for

leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). In this appeal, we must decide whether the Tort I mmun ity Ac t immunizes the City from liability for the acts alleged in the complain t. We hold that the limited immunity provision of the Emergency

Medical Services (EMS) S yst ems Act (EMS Act) (210 IL CS 50/3.150(a) (Wes t 20 04)) applies to these facts over the Tort Immun it y Act. Accordingly , we reverse the dismissal of plaintiff’s complain t and remand for f

urther proceed

ings.

I. BACKGROUND Pl aintiff filed a complaint as the independent administrat or o f Joseph’s estate seeking

damages under the

Wrongful Death Act (740 IL CS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2004)), the Sur vival Act (755 I LCS 5/27–6 (West 2004)), and the Right s o f Married Persons Act (750 IL CS 65/15 (Wes t2004)). Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged that Joseph was 15 ye ars old a nd stay ing with his father, Lawre

nce Furio, inthe City of Park Ridge on O ctob er 3 1, 2004. At 1:06 a.m., Lawrence called 911 to request emergency assistance for Joseph, “a nonresponsive child who required CPR.” The City dispatched a fire engine a nd an ambulance staffed by emergency

medical technicians (E MTs), parame dics, and firefig hters. Upontheir arrival, Jos eph w as unresponsive. Plaintiff alleged the EMTs, parame dics, and fire fighte rs did not evaluate, assess, provide advanced life support, or transport Joseph to a h ospital de spite his condition requiring immediate medical treatment. The comp laint fur ther all eged that the EMTs and paramedics kne w or should have knownthat Joseph had a history of drug abuse. Plaintiff al leged the City acted with willful and wanton disregard for

Joseph’s health and safety by responding

to the request for emergency medical service s and failing to evaluate or assess him, failing to transport him to a hospital, and failing to prepare a “run sheet” for the 911 call. Plaintiff further alleged that Joseph died as a result of the allege d acts or omissions. Plaintiff attache d to her a

mended c omplaint a

certifi cate of

merit with a physician’s r

eport, as req

uiredby section 2–622 of the Code (735 IL CS 5/2–622 (West 2004)). The physic ian’s report notes that-3- the EMTs an d para medics did not prepare a run sheet for the emergency

response an d there is no record of any assessment or treatment during the response. Thereport states that basic principles of training, standing orders and protoco ls, a nd accepted emergenc y procedu res req uire EMTs

to evalua te and as sess any person w ith an altered mental sta

tus. The tr

eatment f or a per son with

an altered mental status requires initiation of advanced life support and assessment

of airway , breathing, and circulation. Joseph was pr esume d to have an altered mental status because he was unresponsive. The p hy sician’s report further states that a second 911 ca ll was made on Joseph’s behalf at 9 a.m. on October 31, 2004. Joseph was incardiac arrest upon the emerg en cy responders’ arrival. The emergency

responders began resuscitation and transported Joseph to

a local hospital where he died. Th e cause of death was anoxic encephalopathy

due to cocaine and opiate intoxication. The physician’sreport c oncluded that fa ilures of the emergency responders were a proximate cause of Joseph’s death. The City filed a motion t o d ismiss the complaint under section 2–619, claiming immunity based on sections 6–105 and 6–106(a) of the Tort I mmunity Act (745 IL CS 10/6–105, 6–106(a ) (West 2004)). The City asserte d that pla

intiff’s allega tions fell within the

absolute immunity of sections 6–105 a

nd 6–106( a), bar

ring lia bility agains t a loca l public entity for failure to evaluate, diagnose, or prescr ib e treatment for an illness or phy sical condition. Plaintiff responded that the Tort Immunity Act did no t immu

nize the alleged act of failing to provide a ny assistance to her unresponsive

son. Along with her res p onse, plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to confor m with the phys ician’s r

eport. Plaintiff

sought to add allega tions that t

he City acted withwillful and wanton disregard for Jo se ph ’s he al th by f

ailing to initiate advanced life support and failing to assess his airw ay, bre athing, and circulation. Plaintiff alleged that those

actio n s were required due to Joseph’s altered mental status. The City replied that the EMTs’ a lle ged fa ilure to prov id e services fell squarely within the provisions of the Tort Immun ity Act. The trial court found that the Tort Immunity Ac t app lied to the allegations of the co mplaint. T he trial c ourt did

not rule onplaintiff’s-4- motion to amend t

he compla

int, but not

ed that th e prop osed amendment

would not alter or pre vent app lication of the Tort Immun ity Act to these facts. Accordingly , the trial court

granted the City’s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. Onappeal, p laintiff

argue d that the

Tort I mmunity Act is inapplic able because the immunity provision of the EMS Act is more specific ally

directed to the facts alleged in the compl aint. Plaintiff contended that the EMS Act does not provide immunity in this cas e because the emergency

responders were willful and wanton in failing to pr ov id e a ny tr eatment to Joseph. The City maintained that the absolute immunity provision of the To rt Im munity Act applied because no treat ment was provided by th e emerg ency responde rs. The appellate court held that the plain languag e of the T o rt Immun ity A ct applied to plaintiff’s allegations that the EMTs and paramedics failed to examine, diagnose, or otherw ise treat the decede nt. The Tort

Immun ity Act applie d to the ex clusion of the immuni ty provision of the EMS Act. The City was, there fore
, immune fr om li ab il it y. A cc or di ng ly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint. 374 Ill. App. 3d 743. We allowed p laintiff

’s petition for lea

ve to appe al. 210 Ill. 2 d R. 315(a). We then allowed the Associated Firefightersof Il linois to fi le

an amicus curiae brief in support of the City. 210 I ll. 2d R. 345.

II. AN ALYS IS The sole issue

in this app eal is w

hether sections 6–105 and 6–106(a) of the Tort Immunity Act apply to immunize the City from lia bili ty for the acts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff contends that the EMS Act’s immunity provision applies here beca use that Act is compreh ensive le gislation desig nedto ensure delivery of emergency

medic al se rvices. Plaintiff also argues that the limited immunity provision in the EMS Act is mor e specif ic and sho uld apply

over the more general provisions of the T ort Im munity Act. The City’s alleged wil lful and wanton misconduct is not immunized under the EMS Act. Accordingly , plaintiff contends that the trial court erred ingranting the City ’s section 2 –619 motion

to dismiss the

complain t. Th e City responds that the T ort I

mmunity Act appli es befo r e providing any

emerg ency

medical s ervice s. The EMS Act immunity-5- provision ap pl ie s o nl y after medical services are undertaken ingood faith. The Tort Immunity Act, therefore, app lie s to plaintiff’s allega tions that the emergency responders arrived, but failed t o examine, diagno se, or pr

escribe any treatme nt for Josep

h. The City also argues that the EMS Act does not impose a duty to provide emergency

medical services in responding to a 911 call. Rather, the EMS Ac t a pp li es on ly u pon p roviding actual emergenc y medical service s. The City

contends , theref

ore, tha t the tria l co urt prope

rly found pla intiff’s claim bar red by the Tort I

mmunity Act. We note the facts alleged in the complaint are unusua l. Ordinar ily
, it is acce pted that emerg ency

responde rs will p rovi de nece ssary aid upon arriving at

an e mer gen cy. In this case, however, plaintiff alleges that the emergency

responders a rrived at the residence and then left withoutevaluating or

giving necessary

treatment to her

unresponsive minor son. Althoug

h these a lleged facts a re unusua l, we must

accept them as true in rev ie wing the dismissal under section 2–619. See Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge , 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115 (19 9 3) (a de fendant filing a section 2

–619(a) (9) motion

to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint, bu t asserts a defense to defeat the claim other tha n negation of the plaintiff’s essential allegations). Thu s, although plaintiff’s factual allega tions

se emunusual, we must determine whether sections 6–105 an d 6–106(a) of the Tor

t Immu nity Act or th e EMS Act’ s immunity provision gover ns those a llegat ions. Section 2–619(a)(9) of the Code provides for dismissal of a cla im if it is barred by “ affirma

tive matte r.” 735 I LCS 5/2 –619(a) (9) (West 20 04). I mmunity under the Tort I mmunity Act is an affirmative matter properl y c onsidere d in a sec tion 2–619 m otio n to dismiss. De Smet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 504 ( 2006)

. Governmental entiti es bear the burden of establi shing immunity under the Tort Immunity

Act. Van Meter v. Darien Park District
, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 370 (2003). In ruling on a section 2–619 motion to dismiss, the court must interp ret the pleadings and supporting materials in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

. Van Meter , 207 Ill. 2d at 367-6 8, quo ting In re Ch icago Flood Litigation , 176 Ill. 2d 179, 189 (1997). We review de novo the d ismi ssal of a complaint under section2–619. Glisson v. City of Marion
, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999).-6- Inthis case, we must construe the provisions of the Tort I mmunity Act and the EMS Ac t. We revi ew de novo the interpretation of a statute as a qu e stion of law. People v . Roberts , 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116 (2005). The car

dinal rule of statutory

construction is to ascertain and give ef fect tothe intent of the legislature. People v . Cordell , 223 Ill. 2d 380, 389 (2006). The best indication of the leg islature ’s intent i s the statu tory langu age givenits p lain a nd ord inary mean ing. Rosewood

Care Center, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 226 Ill. 2d 559, 567 (2007 ). Wh en the langua ge of a statu te is clear a

nd unambig

uous, it must be applied without

resort to other

aids of construction. Murray v. Chicago Youth Center , 224 Ill. 2d 213, 235 (2007). The City contends that if the statutes appear

to conflic t, they must be interpreted in pari mate ri a givin g e ffect to

both. When t

he plain language of

two statutes conflicts, we will attempt to construe them together, in pari mate

ria , if such a

n interpr etati on is reasonable. Moore v. Green , 21 9 Il l. 2d 470, 479 (2006). Legislative intent remains the f

oremost consideration, however. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 479. In de termining that inten t, we may consider the statut es in their entirety , their purposes , the problems they targ et, and the goals they seek to achieve. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 479-8 0, cit ing In re

Detention of Lieberman , 201 I ll. 2d 300, 3 08 (2002) . Words and phrases should notbe inter

preted i n isolation, but must be construed in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Town & Country U tilitie s, Inc. v. Illinois Po llution Cont

rol Board , 225 Ill. 2d 103, 117 (2007). The first step in our analysis is to determine whe ther both statutes actually apply to plaintiff’s complaint. Sect io n 6–105 of Tort Immun ity Act provid

es: “Neither a local public entity nor

a public employee

acting within the scope of his employment is liable for injury caused by the failure to make a

phy sical or mental exa

mination, o

r to

make a n adequate phy sical or mental examination of any person fo r the purpose of determining whether such person has a diseas e or physical or mental condition tha t would constitute a haz a rd to the health or safety of himself or others.” 745 IL CS 10/6–105 (West 2004). Section 6– 106(a) provides:-7- “Neither a local p ublic entity

nor a pub lic employee a

cting within the scope

of his emp loyment

is liable for injury resulting from diagnosing or failing to diagnose that

a person is afflicted with mental or ph ysical illness or addiction or fromfailing to pre scribe for mental or phy sical illness or addiction.” 745 IL CS 10/6–106(a) (West 2004). On i ts face , the plai

n language of

these sta

tutory provisi on s applies to plaintif

f’s comp laint. I

n partic ular, se ction 6–10 5 gran

ts local public en

tities imm

unity fo r failing to perform a phy sical examination to deter

mine whet

h er a p erson has a condition constituting a ha za rd to that p erson’s health or

safety . 745 ILCS 10/6–105 (West 2004). It is undisputed that the City is a local public

en ti ty. Plaintiff

allege s that the C ity f

ailed to e

valuate or asses s Joseph or o therw ise provi de any assistanc e. Plaintif

f’s alle gations
, therefore, fall withi

n the City ’s immun ity for failing to examine Joseph. Alterna tively , the EMS Ac

t’s immunity

provision

states: “Any person, a

gency or gove rnmenta l b o dy certifie d, licensed or authorized pursuant to this Act or rules thereunder, who in good faith provides emergen cyor nonemergency

medical services du

ring a Department approved training course, in the no r mal cour se of con ducting their dut ies, or in an e

merge ncy , shall not

be civilly

liable as a resul tof their a

cts or omis sions in pr

oviding s uch serv ic e s unless such acts or omissions, includi ng th e bypassing of nearby hospitals or medical facilities in accordance with the protocol s develope d pursuan t to this Ac t, constitu

te w illful and wanton misconduct.” 210 IL CS 50/3.150( a) (West 2004). In American National Bank &Trust Co. v. City of Chicago
, 192 Ill

. 2d 274 (2000), this court interpreted a previous version of t h e EMS Act immunity provision. We find that our decision in American National Bank is direct ly a ppli cable to our interpretation of the current version of t hat provision. In American National Bank , the plaintiff alleged that the City

of Chicago and two of its paramedics failed to respond properly

to an emergency

cal l formedical assistance. According to the plain tiff, the decede nt suffe red an a sthma attack at her apartment and called 911. She provided her addre ss and telephone number and informed the 911 operator that she lived onthe-8- third floor of the building. Upon arriva l, the par amedics were le t into the building by her ne ighbor and went to the third floor. The neighbor informed the paramedics that he had not called for help. The paramedics knocked on the door of the only other third- floor apartme nt, but received no response. The neighbor esc orted a firefighter though h is apartment to the back of the building. The firefighter received no r

esponse when he knocked on the back door, and he could not see into the apartment. The dispatch er confi rmed that the paramedics were at the c o rrect a ddress. T he dispat cher al so stated t he caller did not give her ag e and an attempted return cal l reached an answering machine. The neig hbor in formed the paramedics that a

you ng coup le with

no appar ent medic al proble

ms lived in the apa

rtment. The paramedics concluded that they were

not needed at the apartment and left the building. That afternoon , the paramedics returne d to the ap artme nt in r esponse to another emergency

call. A man let them

into the apartment, where they found the decedent

on the floor. American National Bank , 192 Ill. 2d at 276- 77. The plaintiff

alleged , in pertinent part, that the front door of the decede nt’s apartment was unlocked when the paramedic s arrived
, an d that they acted ne glige

ntly , willfully

, and wan

tonly in failing

to attempt to open the

door and ente r the apartment. The City and the paramedics moved to dismiss the complaint, conten din g they were immune from liab ility

under the EMS Act. American National Bank
, 192 I ll. 2d at 27 7-78. At that time, th e EMS Act provided t hat: “Any person, a ge nc y or governmental body licensed or authorized

pursuant to this Act

or its rule s, who in g ood faith provides life support services during a Department approved training course, in the nor mal cour se of con

ducting th e ir duties, or in an eme

rgenc y shall not be

civilly or criminally liableas a res

ult of thei r acts or omissions in providing those services unless the acts or omissions, including the bypassing of nearby hospitals o

r medica l faciliti e s for t he purpose of transporting a trauma patient to a designated

trauma c enter in accordancewith

the proto cols developed pursuant to Section 27 of thi s Act, are inc onsi stent with the pe rson’ s trai ning o r constitute willful and wanton

misc onduct.”

210 I LCS 50/17(a) (West 1994).-9- The plaintiff responded that the EMS Act immunity

provision did notapply to bar the

claims. Sim

il ar to th e City ’s arg

ument in thi s case, the plain

tiff cont ended tha t section 1 7(a) ap

pli ed only

when

em ergen cy

responders actually

furnished life support treatment to a patient and t hat the provision was inapplicable because the paramedics failed to administer any tr eatment. American National Bank
, 192 Ill. 2d at 282. This court rejected the plaintiff ’s arg ument, stating that the scope of the immunity provision wasnot as narrow as the plaintiff contended. American National Bank
, 192 Ill. 2d at 283. Alth ough the EMS Act de fined t he terms “advanced life support–mobile intensive care service s,” “basic life support s ervices,” and “intermediate life support services” to include acts or procedure s directly involving patient care, this court noted that those definitions

are designe d to dist inguish one level of care from another . The legisl ature could hav e reasonably decided to omit fro m those definitions conduct common to them all or, though preparator y t o pr oviding actual medical care, is no less integra l in providing life support services. American National Bank , 192 Ill. 2d at 283. This court further no t ed that se ction 17( a) also r eferr ed to transp ort ation of patients and reasoned that “[i]f transporting a patient to a hospita

l is an asp ect of lif

e support service s, then so t

oo is locating a patient in the first place.” American National Bank
, 192 I ll. 2d at 283. Finally, this court obser ved that the EMS Act’s regulation of matters i ncluding communic ations, response time, and ambulance operation standards revealed the Act’s broad scope. Accordingly , we held tha t the term “lif

e support service s” must be

given a n equally broad meaning. American National Bank , 192 Ill. 2d at 283. We, therefore, concluded that the EMS Act’s immunity provision applied to the plaintiff’s allegations, even though the alleged acts and omissions did not relat e to provi ding actual life support tr

eatment. American National Ban k , 19 2 Il l. 2d at 283. We reasoned that “[l]ocating a person in n eed of emergency

medical treatment is the first step in providing life support services.” Ameri can National Bank
, 192 Ill. 2d at 286. The City a rgues t hat American National Bank does not control our interpretation

of the EMS Act immunity provision b e cause that provision was amended after Amer ica n National Bank . The City observes that the term “life s uppo rt servic es” has b een cha nged to-10- “emergency

or non -emerge nc y medical ser vices.” As noted by

the appellate court, however, the amended statute is at least as broad as the prior version. 374 Ill. App. 3d at 754. In fact, we be lieve that the phrase “emergency

or non-emergency

medical service s” is broader in scope because

it encompa sses medic al servic es in response to either

an em er ge nc y or a n on em er ge nc y. Inthe prev

ious vers ion of the

Act, the d

efin i tions of advanced, intermediate, and basic life supp ort services referred to providing “emergency care” for th e treatment of life-threatening c onditions. 210 IL CS 50/4.01, 4.02, 4.06, 4.19, 4.20 (West 1994). Those provisions did notmention nonemergency care or services. The amended statute, however, expressly includes “non-eme rgency medical care” in the definitions of advan

ced, inte rmediate , and bas ic life su pport ser vices. 210 IL CS 50/3.10(a), (b), (c) (West 2004). “Non-emergency medical care” is define d to include m edical s ervice s given t o patient s during transportation

to heal th-care facilities to obtain nonemergenc y service s. 210 IL CS 50/3.10(g) (West 2004). The phrase “emerg ency
ornon-emergency

medical services” is broader in scope bec ause i t includes both emergency and nonemergency

services. Thus, the substitution of

“emergency

or non-emergency

medical services” for “life support services” cannot provide a basis for

giving the immunit

y provi sion a narro wer mea ning. The other chang es to the s tatuteidentified by the City also do not affect our interpretation

in American National

Bank . The City

asserts that the phra se “shall not be civilly or criminally liable” was changed to “shall no t be civill

y l iable.” The City does not explain how th is amendment

affects the meaning of

the statut e as appl ied in American National Bank or this case. We f ind that the deletion of criminal liability from the immunity provision does not affect our interpretation

in American National

Bank and is irr elevant to this cas e involving a claim f or civil da

mages. The City also notes that the phrase “for purposes of transporting a trauma patient” was deleted from the statute. The City argues that the holding of American National Bank is inappli cable because the refe rence to “tran sporting ” was eli minated. The pre

vious statu

te provided immunity

for acts or

omissions, “including the bypassing of nearby hospitals or medical facilities for the purpo se of transporting

a trauma p atient to a

designa ted trau ma center .” The a

mended st

atute-11- still refer s to “by

passi ng of n earby hospitals or me dical facilities.” Transportation

of patients is impliedby that refer ence. I n fact, deleting the phras e “for pur poses of t ranspor ting a tr auma pat ient” broadened

the statute because that phras e limit ed the immunity for bypassing hospitals t

o cir cu mstance s when the purpose was to transport a trauma patient to a designated trauma c ent er. Now the immunity for bypassing

a hos pital doe s not conta in that spe cific limitation. We conclude that deletion of

the term “transporting” does notsupport a narr ow er i nt erp ret ati on o f th e im mu ni ty st atu te. If anything, it supports a br

oader interpretation. Fi na ll y, the City notes that the previous immun ity statute pr ovided for an exception to immunity if the acts or omissions were “in con sistentwith the person’s training or constitute willful and wantonmisconduct,” while the amended s tatu te only allows for an exception to immunity if the acts or omissions “constitute willful and wantonmisconduct.” Ag ain, t he City does not explain how th is amendment

supports a

narrow er interpretat ion of the EMS Act immunity provision. In American National Bank , the plaintiff alleged that the acts were willful and wanton. American National Bank , 192 Ill. 2d at 284-85. The plaintiff did not allege that

the paramedics acted beyond their level of training. American National Bank , 192 Ill. 2d at 284-85. T hus, th e phras e “inco nsis tent w ith t he pers on’s t raini ng”

was not at issue in that case, and it could not have affected the interpretation

of the immunity provision. As in American Nation al Bank
, the plain

tiff her e alleg es t hat the acts or omissions of the

e m ergency

responde rs constit uted willf ul and wa

nton misconduct. The deletion of the phrase “inconsistent with the perso n’s tr ainin g” does no t affe ct our interpretation of the immunity provision as a pplied here. We conclude that the City’s ef forts to distinguish America n National Bank are not persuasive. This court’s broad interpretation of the EMS Act immu

nity provision in American National Bank is not nullified by the cited ame

ndments to that provision. In fact, the amendme nts further broadened

the scope of the immu

nity provision. Ad di ti on al ly, in Ameri can Na tional Bank , we relied upon the broad scope of the EMS Act to s upport o ur interpretation of the immunity provision. See American National Bank , 192 Ill. 2d at 283. The EMS Act continues to regula te expansi

v el y t he delivery of-12- emergency

medical service s in Il linois. The express intent of the Act is to: “provide the St ate w ith systems for emerg ency medic al services by e stabli shi ng within the State Department of Publ ic Health a c en tr al au th or it y r e sponsible for the coordination and integra tion of all activities within the State concerning prehospital and inter-hospital emergency medical services, as well as non-emergency

medical transpo rts, a nd the ove rall plann ing, evaluation, and reg ul ation of pre-hospital emerg ency

medical s ervice s sy stems.

* * * This legislation is intended to provide m inimum standards for the state wide deli very of EMS services. ” 210 I

LCS 50/ 2 (West 2004). The Act’s provisions are directed at acc ompli shing the broad purpose of plannin

g, delivering, evaluating, a nd regulat ing emergency medical services. The Act re quires establishment of Emergency Medical Services Systems (EMS Sy stems) includi n g hospita ls, veh icle service providers, and personnel approve d by the Dep artment

. 210 IL CS 50/3.20(a) (West 2004 ). Responsib ility for eac h EMS System is vested in a resource hospital through t he EMS medical direct or. 210 I LCS 50/3.155 (Wes t 2004). T he EMS Sy

stems coordina te and provide prehospital and interhospital emergency care under a System program plan appr oved by the Depa rtment. 21 0 IL CS 50/3.20(a) (West 2004). “Pre-hospital care” is defined to include“e mergency medical services rendered to emergenc y patients for ana

lytic, resuscitative, stabi lizi ng, or preventive purposes, p recedent to and during trans p ortationof such patients to hospitals.” 210 IL CS 50/3.10(e) (West 2004). Th e Act de fines various levels of care, including

a dvan ced, intermed

iate, an d basic lif

e support service s. 210 I

LCS 50/3.10(a), (b), (c) (West 20 04). Th ose leve ls of car e encomp ass a wide range of emer gency and nonemergency

medical services. 210 IL CS 50/3.10(a), (b), (c) (West 2004). The Act requires the delivery of care to be initiated as authorized by the EMS medical director o r under the direction of a phy sician or emergency communications registered nurse. 210 I

LCS 50/3.10(a), (b), (c) (West 2004).-13- The Department is given exp ansive a uthority and resp onsibility t o regulate EMS Sy stems. 210 IL CS 50/3.20(c) (West 2004 ). Th e Department’s responsibilities include, among other things: app roving EMS Syst

ems meeti

n g its minimum standards and criteria; monitoring EMS Systems bas e d on its standards for continuing operation; renewing EMS Sy stem approvals followinganinspection; susp endin g, revok ing, o r refus ing t o renew approva l of an EMS Syst em; and re quiring EMS Systems to adopt written protocols for transporting patients t

o hospitals. 210 IL CS 50/3.20(c) (West 2004). The EMS Act pr

ovides for licensi

ng of EMTs, the

scope of their practice, and their trai ning and continuing education. 210 ILCS 50/ 3.50, 3.55, 3.65 (West 2004). Additionally, the Act governs training and certifi cation of

regist ered nur ses p roviding emergency c are with in EMS Sys tems. 210 I LCS 50/3.75, 3.80 (West 2004 ). The Ac

t also provides for training, certification, continuing education, and overall

r egulation

of emergency

medical dispatchers. 210 IL CS 50/3.7 0 (West 2004). Th e Depar

tment is re sp onsi ble for regulating ambulances and other

emerg ency

vehicle s, incl uding their design, specific ations, equipment an d s taffing requirements, and opera tion and maintenance standards. 210 I LCS 50/3.85 (West 2004). T he Act provides for investigation of complaints (210 ILC S 50/3.125 (West 2004)) and fines fo r nonc omplianc e (210 I LCS 50/3.140 (West 2004)). The Department may also enforce the Act by seekingan injunction to prevent operation without a license or authorization. 210 ILCS 50/3.180 (West 2004). Thus, our review of the EMS Act reveals tha t it is a comprehensive, omnibus sou rce of r ules gov ernin g the pl annin g, de li ve ry, evaluation, and regulation of emer gency medical s ervice s in Illinois. Our broa

d constru

ction of the immunity

provis ion i n American Natio nal Bank to include prepar atory conduct i

ntegra l to providing emerg ency

treatme nt continues to be sup ported by the EMS Act’s comprehensive scope. The City argue s, nonetheless, that the EMS Act applies only a fter emergency

services in the form of treatment are provi ded, and the Tort Imm unity Act applies befor

e any e xamination, assessment, or treatment is undertaken. Thu s, the City contends that the EMS Act and the Tort Im munity

Act do not

conflic t, but oper

ate “ea ch in its

ownsphere.” In su

pport of i ts argu ment, the City relies on this court’s-14- decisionin Henric h v . Libertyville High School , 186 Ill. 2d 381 (1998). In Henrich , this court considered whether the Tort I mmunity Act

or the Schoo l Code immun ity p rovisio ns appli ed to the plaintiff’s complain t. Henrich , 186 I ll. 2d at 38 3. The pla intiff al leged t

hat h e underwent

spine fus ion surg ery

and his surgeon advised

him that he

was permanently r

estricted from participating in contac t spor ts during his high s chool physical educat ion cl ass. T he high school knew of the restriction. A substitute teacher, nevertheless, required the plaintiff to particip ate in a water basketball game during physical educa

tion class. During

the game, the pla

intiff w as sever

ely and permanently injured. Henrich , 186 Ill. 2d at 384. The plaintiff

allege d, in pert

inent par t, that the sc hool district’s actions constituted willful and wantonmisconduct. The district filed

a mo ti on to di sm is s, as se rt in g a bs ol ut e i mm un it y u n der sections 3–108(a) and 3–109 of the Tor t Immu nity Act (745 IL CS 10/3–108(a), 3–109 (West 1994)). T he pl aintiff r esponde d that his claim was cont rolled by se ctions 2 4–24 and 34–84a of the School Code (105 I

LCS 5/2 4–24, 34–8 4a (West 1994)), p roviding immunity agains tnegligence

claims, but not for willful and want on miscond

uct. Henrich
, 186 Ill. 2d

at 384-85. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims based on the Tort Immunity Act, and the appellate court affirmed. Henrich , 186 Ill. 2d at 385-86. T hi s court af

firmed th e appell ate cour t, holding that the p lain langua ge of the Tort Immunity Act controlled

the disposition of the plaintiff’s complaint. Henrich , 186 Ill. 2d at 395. Thep laintiff’s argument that the specific provisions of the School Code controlled

over th e g en er al pr ov is io ns of th e T or t Im mu ni ty A ct was n ot dispositive. Rather, in construing the relevant provisions together, we f ound that “each stands in its own sphere.” Henrich , 186 I ll. 2d a t 391-92. Section 24–24 of the School Code applies to both public and priva te schools while section 3–108(a) of the Tort I mmunity Act applies only

to public s chools. Henrich , 186 I ll. 2d at 39 2. This court concluded

that the plain language of the Tort I mmunity Act indicated the legislature’s intent to grant public schoo l di stricts and teachers greater immunity than private schools and their tea chers. Hen rich
, 186 Ill. 2d at 392.-15- The City argue s that the provisions of the EMS Act and the Tort Immun ity Act can be harmonized as in Henrich . The City asserts that the Tort Immunity

Act should be cons truedto apply before emerge ncy

treatment is provided and the EMS Act to apply after emergency

treatment is given. We disagr

ee with the City’s arg

ument that the EMS Act

and Tort Immun ity Act can be harmonized. As the appellate court noted, the City’s interpretation of the EMS Ac t immu nity provision

to apply only after treatment has begun is counte r to our de cision in American National Bank

. See 374 Ill. App. 3d at 752-53. In American National Bank
, we rejected the argument that the immunity provision applied only when treatment was actually administered

to a patie nt. American National Bank , 192 Ill. 2d at 282-83. I nstead, we held that the immunity provision encompassed pre parator y c onduct int

egral to providing emergency

treatment. American National Bank
, 192 Ill. 2d at 283. Our interpretation is considered part of the statute

itself unt il the legislature amends it contrary to that interpretation. Henrich , 186 Ill. 2d at 3 87, ci ting Miller v. Lockett, 98 I ll. 2d 478, 483 (1983). The legislature has not amended the immunity provision con trary to our interpretation

to limit its meaning. If anything, the legislature’s amendme nts have bro adened

the scope

of th at pr ovision. Thus, we

canno tharmonize the EMS Act immunity provision with the To r t Imm un it y Ac t b y co ns tr ui ng it in th e m an ne r s ug ge st ed by t he Ci ty. Our decision in Moore v. Green , 219 Ill. 2d 470 ( 2006), is a lso app licabl e here. In Moore , the plaintiff alleged that the City of C hicago and two of its police officers were willful and wanton i n faili n g to respon

d proper ly to a call for assista

nce fro m a domesti c violence victim. Moore , 219 I ll. 2d at 474-75. The sole issue was whether the absolute

immunity

provision s of the Tort Im munity Act (745 IL CS 10/4–102, 4–107 (West 2002)), or the limited i mm unity provis ion of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 ( 750 ILC S 60/305 (West 2002)), governed the plaintiff’s a llegations. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 474. Th is cour t held that the immunity provisions could not be harmonized

because they

both clearly a

p pl ied to the plaintiff’s allega tions. Moore , 219 I ll. 2d at 48 7. We reje cted as u nreasonable the defendants’ contention that the Domestic Violence Act immunity provision should be limited to law enforcement officers who were-16- outside the scope of the Tort Immunity Act. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 487-88. We determined

that “[i]t wo

uld pervert the broad purposes of the Domestic Violence Act to conclude that the immunity created by section305 was in

tended to apply only

to law enforcement agencie s and agents beyond the Tort

Immun ity Act’s shie ld, who ar

e less like ly to investig ate domestic v

iolence calls or to enforce the Act.” Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 488. This court held that the defendant’s interpretation would undermine the Dome stic Viole nce Act provisio ns outl ining the duties of municipal police officers in responding to domes tic violence calls. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 488. Inthis case, both the Tort Immunity Act and the EMS Act immunity provisions apply to plaintiff’s complaint

. Thus, thos e statutes cannot be

harmonize d. Se e Mo ore , 219 Ill. 2d at 487 (immunity

provisions could not be harmonized because both applied to the plaintiff’s complaint). Whi l e we will attempt to interpret conflicting statutes t

ogeth er, in pari mater ia , when such an interpretation

is reasona

ble ( Moor e , 219 Ill. 2d at 479), the City ’s propose d construction of the EMS Act immunity provision is not

r easonab le b ecause

it direct ly c ontradicts our con struction of the EMS Act in American National Bank

. Moreover, the City’s construc tion is inconsistent with the EMS Act’s comprehensive scope. The EMS Act provi des f or the coordination

and integ

ratio n of all prehospital and interhospital emergency

medical s ervice s. 210 I

LCS 50/2 (West 2004 ). The Ac t is

anomnibus so urce of rules governing all aspects of emergency medical service s, including overall plan ning, delivery , evaluation, and

re gulation. The City’s narrow interpretation of the EMS Ac t immunity provis ion cannot be squared with that Act’s comprehensive scope. See American Nationa l Ban k , 192 Ill. 2d at 283 (EMS Act immunity provision must be give n a broad meaning in light of the Act’s expansive scope). Our interpre tation of t

he EMS Act

immuni ty provision in A meric an National Bank remains valid. That provision has been interpreted

br oa dl y to i nclude pr eparat ory actions in

tegra l to providing emergency

treatment. Plaintiff here all eges that the City failed to assess, examine, or transport Joseph to a hospital. Assessment

and evaluation are integral to provi ding emergency medical services. One of the first steps in providing emergency

care-17- is assessing the patient to determine the necessary medical s ervice s. No tr eatment or emergency care can be provided until the patient’s condition is assessed. We also note that the EMS Act immunizes “ acts or omission s” in providing emergency

medical services unless those acts or omissions constitute willful and wanton misconduct. 210 IL CS 50/3.150(a) (We st 2004). Th e failur

e to asse ss or examine is an “o mission” in providing emergency

medical services under our interpretation of the im munity provision. See also Moore , 219 I ll. 2d at 49 0 (polic e off icers’ failure

to offer any emerg ency

assistanc e fell wi

thin Domestic Violence Act immunity for acts or omissions in providing emergency

assistanc e). Thus , we conc lu de that the EMS Act immunity pro vi sion appli es to the a

llegat ions of pla

intiff’s complain t. Having determined that both immunity provisions may app ly to t hese facts, we must decide whether the EMS Act or the Tor t Immun ity Act governs here. When a general statutory provision and

a more specific

one rela te to the same subject, we will presume that the legisla

ture inte nded the m

o re speci fic statute to govern. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d a t 480 , citi ng Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms , 202 Il l. 2d 450, 459(2002). We will also presume that the leg isl atur e intended the more recent provision to control. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 480, c itin g State v. Mikusch , 138 Ill. 2d 242, 254 (1990). The EMS A ct is d ir ec te d s pe ci fi ca ll y to th e p la nn in g, de li ve ry, evaluation, and regulation of emerge ncy medica

l services. The immunity provision applies to all people, agencies, and g overnmental bodies licensed or authorized under the Act to provide t hose ser vices. 210 IL CS 50/3.150(a) (West 2004). Thus, the EMS Act is designed to ap pl y t o the del ivery

of emer gency medical s ervice s. In

contras t, the relevant sections of

the Tort Immunity

Act have a more gener

al applicationto tort cla

ims aga inst local public en

tities and public employees

for fai ling to p erform, or adequately perform, an exami nation or a diag

nosis. 745 I

LCS 10/ 6–105, 6–1 06(a) ( West 2004). We conclude

that the EMS Act is mor

e specif ically related to the facts here involving emerg ency re sponders an d the delivery of emergency

medical care. The EMS Act was also enacted more recent ly than the Tort Immun ity A ct provisions. Sections 6–105 and 6–106(a) of the Tort Immun ity Act were enacted

in 1965 (745 IL CS 10/6–105, 6–106(a)-18- (West 2004)), w hile the EMS Act immunity provision was enacted 30 years later, in 1995 (210 IL CS 50/3.150(a) (West 2004)). Ac co rd in gl y, we pres

ume that the EMS Act c ontrols he re beca use it is the more specific and recent provision. I n M oore , we also looked to the legislature’s intent in deciding whether the Tort Immunity

Act or the Domestic Violence Act governed the plaintiff’s allegations. We reaffirmed that our “singular concern” is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 488. We concluded that the legislature’s intent was cl ear fro m the l anguage o f the D omest ic Vio lence A ct, st ating: “The structure of

that Act r

eflects a comprehensive statutory scheme for ref orm of the

legal syst

em’s his tori cally inadequa te resp ons e to domes tic violen ce. The Domestic Viole nce Act , in effect, is an omnibus source for rules regarding such cases. It beg

ins with a broad sta tement of its purp oses [c itation] an

d a broad statemen t of the pe

rsons it protect s [citation] . Most important ly f or this ca se, it deta

ils the responsibilities of law enforcement officers.” Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 488-89. We conclude d that the

limi ted immu

nity provision

of the Do mestic Viol ence A ct was a d

irect expr ession of legisla tive inten t, and it governed the plaintiff’s allega tions. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 489-90. Similar to the Domestic Violence Act, the E MS Act beg

ins with

a broad statement of its purpose. The purpose of the Act includes coordinatingand integrating all prehosp ital emergency medical services acti

vitie s. 210

IL CS 50/2(We st 20 04). The Act’s expr

ess purpose al so in cl ud es pr ov id in g f or th e o ve ra ll pl an ni ng , d el iv er y, evaluation, an d regula

tion of eme

rgenc y me dical se

rvices syst

ems. 210 IL CS 50/2 (West 2004 ). Th e provisions of the Act are also an omnibus source o f rules a imed at ac

hieving those bro ad purpo ses. The broad purposes, comprehensivescheme, and entire structure of the EMS Act indicate an intent for the immunity provision from that Act to g overn ca ses involv ing eme rgenc y me dical se

rvices. The City notes that the Domestic Violence Ac t det ails the responsibilities of police officers in respon ding todomestic violence situations
, but the E MS Act does not enumerate any duties of emergency

responde rs. The Ci ty e mphasizes t

his distinction, arguing-19- that the EMS Act does no t imp ose any duty to provide emergency medical s ervice s. We recognize that in Moore this court relied, in part, on the duties imposed upon police officers in concluding that the Dome stic Violence Act governed. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 488-89. That factor wa s notdispositive, ho wever. Rather, it was only one factor weighing upon the dete

rmination of the le gislatu

re’s intent . Our dec ision in Moore was based on several factors. We presume tha t the EMS Act controls here as the more specific and recent statute. Additionally, the purpose, scheme, and structure of the EMS Act shows the legislature intended for its immunity provision to govern. We also note

that t he City has not challenged the existence of a duty to provide emergency

medical assistance in this case. I n fact, the City admitted the legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s tort claims, including the existence of a duty, by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint under section 2–619. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 477-78. The only issue here is w hether a n immunity

applies to

bar plai ntiff’s c laims. Insum, we conclude that the E MS A ct limited i mmunity provision governs hereover sections 6–105 and 6–106(a) of the Tort Immun ity Act. The onl y ba sis f

or dismissal asserted in the City’s section2–619 motion t o dismiss was absolute immunity under sections 6–105 an d 6–106(a) of the Tort Immunity Act. Given our conclusionthat

the Tort Immunity

Act does not govern here, we must

revers e the dismissal of the complaint and remand the mat ter for further procee dings.

III. CONCL USION For the foregoing reasons, the jud gments of the circuit and appella te courts are revers ed and the cause is remande d to the ci

rcuit court for furthe

r proce edings.

Reversed and remanded.