Filed 8/18/14 P. v. Karawia CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

OUSAMA W. KARAWIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B248405

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA355163)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Sam 

Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.

David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II and 

Marc A. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

A jury found defendant Ousama W. Karawia guilty of one count of grand theft 

(Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); count 2),1 one count of insurance fraud by presenting a false 

claim to the State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF) (§ 550, subd. (b)(1); count 7), 

one count of insurance fraud by making misrepresentations to SCIF regarding facts 

material to the insurance premium (Ins. Code, § 11880, subd. (a); count 13), and four 

counts of possession of an assault weapon (former § 12280, subd. (b), renumbered 

§ 30605; counts 15-18).2 The trial court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison 

on the fraud by misrepresentation count, suspended execution of that sentence, and 

placed defendant on probation for a period of five years on the condition that he serve 

240 days in custody, which could be served by electronic monitoring.3 On the remaining 

counts, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for 

five years. Defendant appeals from the judgment (order granting probation), contending 

that in treating his assault weapons convictions as felonies rather than misdemeanors, the 

trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion and abused that discretion. We 

disagree and affirm.

 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 He was acquitted of conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)) and several counts of 

insurance fraud (Ins. Code, §§ 550 & 11880, subd. (a)) and failure to file an income tax 

return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706). The jury also found not true excessive taking 

allegations under former section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(1) and (2), and section 

1203.045, subdivision (a). 

3 The court postponed proceedings regarding restitution. 
3

BACKGROUND

Because defendant’s contentions relate solely to sentencing, we only briefly 

describe the evidence introduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

judgment and presuming in support every fact that reasonably can be deduced from the 

evidence. (See People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)4

Through a wholly-owned holding company, defendant owned several security 

companies that provided security services for construction sites, office buildings, and 

other sites and activities in California and other states and countries. The companies 

operated under the name International Protective Services and derivative names. 

Defendant was tried with codefendant Allan Bailey.

5

The prosecution’s theory was that beginning in 2003, defendant conspired with 

Bailey to defraud SCIF of approximately $10 million. The alleged scheme was as 

follows: by using similar names for his companies and by misrepresenting the ownership 

structure of them when applying for coverage from SCIF in 2003 through 2006, 

defendant obtained workers’ compensation coverage for all of his employees at the cost 

of insuring only those who were employed by a single company, International Armored 

Solutions. Further, the prosecution alleged that defendant conspired with Bailey to 

present workers’ compensation claims under the International Armored Solutions policy 

for injured workers employed by defendant’s other companies. Audits conducted by 

SCIF for the years 2004 through 2006 revealed that in those years, 46 employees made 

claims on the policy issued to International Armored Solutions. When asked by an

investigator from SCIF about five specific claimants who did not work for International 

Armored Solutions, defendant said the claimants had been mislabeled as out-of-state 

 

4 We are aided in this task by the trial court’s thoughtful summary of the charges, 

evidence, and convictions at the time of sentencing. 

5 Bailey was convicted of failing to file a tax return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706) 

and possession of an assault weapon (former § 12280, subd. (b)). He is not a party to this 

appeal. 
4

employees. He did not say that they worked for companies other than International 

Armored Solutions. These claimants received substantial payouts from SCIF on the 

policy issued to International Armored Solutions in the sums of approximately $44,000 

(to Maria Bernabe for two claims), $78,000 (to Rogelio Talacay), $31,000 (to Judy 

Hoiten), $1,600 (to Martha Jacquez), and $83,000 (to Miguel Zuniga). 

The jury acquitted defendant of conspiracy, most of the related insurance fraud 

counts, and filing a false tax return, and it found the excessive taking allegations not true. 

(See fn. 2, ante.) It convicted defendant of only three counts based on his dealings with 

SCIF: count 2, grand theft (§ 487); count 7, presenting a false claim to SCIF related to a 

$38,000 payout to employee Maria Bernabe in 2005 (§ 550, subd. (b)(1)); and count 13, 

misrepresenting facts material to the insurance premium related to the SCIF audit for 

2005 (§11880, subd. (a)). 

As relevant to defendant’s assault weapons convictions, on April 15, 2009, a 

search warrant was executed at defendant’s residence in connection with the investigation 

of defrauding SCIF. Defendant told investigators that a safe in an upstairs room 

contained firearms. A search of the safe revealed several firearms, including four that are 

classified as assault weapons under California law: a Colt .223 caliber Model HBAR 

Sporter, an L. Franchi Model SPAS12 12-gauge shotgun, an IMI Uzi nine-millimeter 

Model B, and a Calico nine-millimeter Model M-900. To lawfully possess such 

weapons, an owner was required to have registered them by January 1, 1992. (Former 

§ 12285, subd. (f).) The relevant data bases did not contain any such registration filed by 

defendant for any of the assault weapons in the safe.

DISCUSSION

Taking out of context a comment made by the trial court in sentencing 

codefendant Bailey, defendant contends that the trial court applied improper criteria in 

declining to treat defendant’s assault weapons convictions as misdemeanors. Defendant 

also contends that the court abused its discretion. We disagree with both arguments.
5

I. Relevant Proceedings

In addition to his convictions for grand theft and insurance fraud, defendant was 

convicted of four counts of possessing an assault weapon, in violation of former section 

12280, subdivision (b)(1) (now § 30605, subd. (b)(1)). The crime is an alternative 

felony/misdemeanor, punishable in the court’s discretion (§ 17, subd. (b)) by 

imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding one year or by imprisonment 

in state prison for 16 months, two, or three years. (See §§ 30605, subd. (a), 1170, subd. 

(h)(1); see also In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 873 [former § 12280, subd. (b), 

was an alternative felony/misdemeanor].)

In his written sentencing memorandum, defendant asked that all of his convictions 

be reduced to misdemeanors. As relevant to the assault weapons convictions, defendant 

noted that he had significant firearms training, a permit from the State of California to 

carry an exposed firearm, and a federal license to sell firearms. He was also a reserve 

deputy with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. Defendant argued that the 

assault weapons convictions should be treated as misdemeanors because his four guns 

were legally purchased by one of his companies before the date of the regulation of such 

weapons, they were kept securely in a safe, and they were never used. Further, he was a 

first time offender. 

The sentencing hearing was held in two sessions. At the first sentencing session, 

held on February 20, 2013, defendant appeared with codefendant Bailey. The court 

engaged in a lengthy review of the charges, evidence, and convictions, and also gave a 

thoughtful analysis of relevant sentencing considerations relating to defendant’s case, 

focusing on the insurance fraud convictions and defendant’s personal characteristics. In 

deciding to grant defendant probation, the court discussed all of the general sentencing 

objectives of California Rules of Court, rule 4.410 and all of the criteria affecting 

probation in rule 4.414. The court also discussed the option of sentencing defendant 

under realignment (§ 1170, subd. (h)) to a sentence without probation or a split sentence. 
6

The court chose straight probation because it intended to order restitution as a condition 

of probation. 

Insofar as the assault weapons convictions were concerned, the court stated:

“Based on the nature of his profession as a provider of security guard services, I do not 

find that [defendant’s] possession of an assault weapon changes the picture in any 

significant way. This is not a man who has aggressive tendencies who was arrested for 

illegal arms possession. This is a man who bought these arms legally but then later failed 

to adequately account for them with the State of California. Given the totality of these 

considerations and in light of the jury’s verdict in this matter, the appropriate level of 

punishment in this case is for the court to grant probation to the defendant.” 

The court then stated its intent to impose the upper term of five years on the 

insurance fraud conviction in count 13, reasoning that “the amount taken is of such 

severity that the imposition of the high term is appropriate.” The court also stated its 

intention to suspend execution of that sentence and place defendant on probation for five 

years. As to counts 2, 7, and 15 through 18 (15-18 being the assault weapons 

convictions), the court stated its intention to suspend imposition of sentence and place 

defendant on probation for five years. The court then considered the relevant sentencing 

criteria for codefendant Bailey and elected probation for him as well. 

Defendant’s attorney then argued concerning the amount of jail time that the court 

might impose and asked for community service. After a lengthy colloquy with defense 

counsel concerning defendant’s background and the hardship the instant case imposed on 

him, the court stated that it intended to impose a certain amount of jail time and ordered 

defendant to return for that determination. 

Codefendant Bailey was convicted of a single count of possessing an assault 

weapon and four counts of failing to file an income tax return. Before the court 

scheduled the second phase of the sentencing hearing, Bailey’s attorney brought up the 

subject of reducing those convictions to misdemeanors. The court replied: “I have the 

discretion to either do that or not to do that. And in my opinion, when a person evades 

filing an income tax for a number of years and the amount of income that he is earning is 
7

fairly substantial, then that person . . . is worthy of a felony conviction.” Bailey’s counsel 

asked if the court’s thinking would be the same as to the assault weapons conviction 

“because it is a bit different.” The court replied: “It is a bit different, but he has not 

complied with the requirements of all of the elements that make a first-time offense a 

misdemeanor. So as I stated in my denial of the motion for a new trial, your client 

. . . may not have known specifically [that the gun he possessed was classified as an 

assault weapon], but he is a man who has routine contact with firearms. And as such, I 

see him in a different position than someone who was perhaps given an assault weapon 

by a grandfather, had it in his closet, didn’t know that it was an assault weapon . . . . I 

just see a different person sitting in front of me.” 

At no time did defendant’s attorney or counsel for codefendant Bailey suggest that 

the court somehow misunderstood the nature of its discretion to reduce the assault 

weapons convictions to misdemeanors. 

At the second sentencing proceeding on March 18, 2013, the court again heard 

argument on how much custody time to impose on defendant. The court then formally 

sentenced defendant to the upper term of five years on count 13, suspended execution of 

that sentence, and placed defendant on probation for five years, subject to the condition 

that he serve 240 days in county jail, which could be served by electronic monitoring. As 

to the remaining counts, including the assault weapons convictions, the court suspended 

imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for five years. Defendant’s 

attorney did not request that the assault weapons convictions be treated as misdemeanors

and did not suggest that the court failed to understand its discretion to do so.

II. The Trial Court Understood the Proper Nature of Its Discretion

Seizing upon the trial court’s comment to Bailey’s attorney that Bailey had “not 

complied with the requirements . . . that make a first-time offense a misdemeanor,” 

defendant contends that the court misunderstood the nature of its discretion to reduce 

Bailey’s assault weapons conviction to a misdemeanor. He then extrapolates that the 

court must also have misunderstood the nature of its discretion to reduce his assault 
8

weapons convictions as well. According to defendant, in the comment concerning Bailey 

not having complied with requirements to make a first time offense a misdemeanor, the 

court was referring to former section 12280, subdivision (b), which provided that a first 

time offense is punishable by a $500 fine if certain conditions are met—conditions that 

neither Bailey nor defendant could meet.6 Defendant argues that by referring to this 

provision, the court was relying on factors that have “nothing to do with the 

misdemeanor/felony wobbler issue.” 

We note that having failed to contend below that the trial court misunderstood its 

discretion, defendant forfeited this issue on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 

331, 356.) In any event, a full consideration of the court’s comments in response to 

Bailey’s attorney shows that the court fully understood its discretion. 

“A court ha[s] broad discretion under section 17, subdivision (b) in deciding 

whether to reduce a wobbler offense to a misdemeanor. [Citation.] We will not disturb 

the court’s decision on appeal unless the party attacking the decision clearly shows the 

decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] Absent such a showing, we presume the 

court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives.” (People v. Sy (2014) 223 

Cal.App.4th 44, 66.) 

As stated in People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978

(disapproved on other grounds in People v. Williams (2005) 35 Cal.4th 817, 832): “We

find scant judicial authority explicating any criteria that inform the exercise of section 

17[, subdivision] (b) discretion. [Citation.] However, since all discretionary authority is 

 

6 Former section 12280, subdivision (b) stated in relevant part: “[A] first violation 

of these provisions is punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) if 

the person was found in possession of no more than two firearms in compliance with 

subdivision (c) of Section 12285 and the person meets all of the following conditions: [¶] 

(1) The person proves that he or she lawfully possessed the assault weapon prior to the 

date it was defined as an assault weapon pursuant to Section 12276, 12276.1, or 12276.5. 

[¶] (2) The person has not previously been convicted of a violation of this section. [¶] 

(3) The person was found to be in possession of the assault weapon within one year 

following the end of the one-year registration period established pursuant to subdivision 

(a) of Section 12285. [¶] (4) The person relinquished the firearm pursuant to Section 

12288, in which case the assault weapon shall be destroyed pursuant to Section 12028.”
9

contextual, those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions are relevant, including 

‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude 

toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor 

at the trial.’ [Citations.] When appropriate, judges should also consider the general 

objectives of sentencing . . . . The corollary is that even under the broad authority 

conferred by section 17[, subdivision] (b), a determination made outside the perimeters 

drawn by individualized consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest 

‘exceeds the bounds of reason.’ [Citation.]”

In the present case, when first asked by Bailey’s counsel to reduce the tax fraud 

and assault weapons conviction to misdemeanors, the court acknowledged that it had 

discretion to do so. When later directed specifically to the assault weapons conviction, 

the court’s reference to the first time offender provisions of former section 12280, 

subdivision (b) was entirely appropriate—Bailey was not eligible under that provision. 

Further, the comment was merely prefatory to the heart of the court’s analysis, which was 

that because Bailey was involved in the security business and familiar with firearms, the 

court did not consider him deserving of reduction to a misdemeanor. That consideration 

is clearly within the proper bounds of discretion. Moreover, the record shows that the 

trial court exercised extraordinary care in sentencing and showed superior knowledge of 

sentencing rules. In light of those facts, there is no basis to conclude that the court failed 

to understand either the nature of its discretion or factors relevant to determining whether 

to treat Bailey’s single assault weapons conviction (or by extension defendant’s four 

assault weapons convictions) as a felony rather than a misdemeanor. 

III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

Defendant also contends that in implicitly denying defendant’s written request to 

treat the assault weapons convictions as misdemeanors, the trial court abused its 

discretion. We are not persuaded.

Defendant possessed not one or two, but four, illegal assault weapons. Based on 

his background—significant firearms training, possession of a permit from the State of 
10

California to carry an exposed firearm, possession of a federal license to sell firearms, 

and employment as a reserve deputy with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department—it reasonably could be inferred that he knew possession of those guns was 

illegal, even though they initially were purchased legally. Moreover, by violating the law 

in possessing those weapons, defendant also violated the public trust imposed on him 

based on his status as a licensed firearms dealer and a reserve deputy sheriff. Further, the 

trial court showed substantial leniency in granting defendant probation. Under these 

circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant even further 

leniency by treating the assault weapons convictions as misdemeanors. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EDMON, J.*

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

WILLHITE, J.

 

*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.