COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

TONI WOOD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1147-97-4 PER CURIAM 

 AUGUST 26, 1997 

DIANA CARR SNIPES 

AND 

LEROY EDWARD SNIPES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 

James H. Chamblin, Judge 

 (Alan J. Cilman, on brief), for appellant. 

 No brief for appellees. 

 Toni Wood appeals the circuit court's denial of her petition 

to intervene in divorce proceedings between Diana Carr Snipes and 

Leroy Edward Snipes.1 Wood contends that she has suffered 

damages because she was falsely accused of having an adulterous 

relationship with Leroy Snipes, the defendant in the pending 

action. She raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether she was 

entitled under Rule 2:15 to intervene in the divorce proceeding; 

and (2) whether she was entitled to sequester all records. Upon 

reviewing the record and opening brief, we conclude that this 

appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 1Wood styles her opening brief "Petition for Writ of 

Mandamus/Appellant's Opening Brief." Wood has not followed the 

correct procedures to file a petition for writ of mandamus. See

Code § 8.01-644 et seq. Accordingly, we do not treat this matter 

as a petition for writ of mandamus. 
 2 

decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.2

Intervention

 Rule 2:15 provides that "[a] new party may by petition filed 

by leave of court assert any claim or defense germane to the 

subject matter of the suit." The trial court denied Wood's 

motion to intervene. We find no abuse of discretion in the 

court's decision. Wood's claims of damage are not germane to the 

subject matter of the suit, i.e., Diana Snipes' action for 

divorce against Leroy Snipes. Moreover, broadening the divorce 

case to encompass Wood's claims for damage would be merely 

tangential to the main action. Any rights Wood has are not 

defeated by the denial of her motion to intervene in the 

underlying suit for divorce. See, e.g., Stubbs v. Cowden, 179 

Va. 190, 18 S.E.2d 275 (1942). 

Closing Records

 The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that, 

 [i]n light of the legislative history of Code 

§ 17-43 and its common-law underpinnings, 

. . . subject to statutory exceptions, a 

rebuttable presumption of public access 

applies in civil proceedings to judicial 

records . . . . [T]o overcome that 

presumption, the moving party must bear the 

burden of establishing an interest so 

compelling that it cannot be protected 

reasonably by some measure other than a 

protective order . . . . 

 

 2We assume jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Code 

§ 17-116.05(4)(ii). Cf. Jones v. Rhea, 130 Va. 345, 369, 107 

S.E. 814, 822 (1921) (the circuit court's "order rejecting the 

application of the petitioners to intervene in the pending 

proceeding, and excluding them entirely from participation 

therein, was certainly, as to them, a final order"). 
 3 

Shenandoah Pub. House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253, 258-59, 368 

S.E.2d 253, 256 (1988). Wood alleged that "she has had to endure 

suspicious looks, office gossip and impairment of her career" and 

that the records are available to "people who may be 

investigating [Wood] for security, credit or other sensitive 

matters . . . ." We cannot say that the record before us 

demonstrates that Wood has such a compelling interest in closing 

the judicial records that the trial court erred in denying 

closure. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.