COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Beales and Senior Judge Bumgardner 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

CORTEZ WILLIAMS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1355-09-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK 

AUGUST 3, 2010 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Johnny E. Morrison, Judge 

 Gregory K. Matthews (Office of the Public Defender, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Karen Misbach, Assistant Attorney General II (Kenneth T. 

Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Cortez Williams, appellant, was convicted, in a bench trial, of grand larceny in violation 

of Code § 18.2-95. On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

his conviction. For the reasons that follow, we find the evidence sufficient and affirm 

appellant’s conviction. 

BACKGROUND

 During the morning of July 18, 2008, D.V. noticed that his 1996 silver Jeep Cherokee 

was missing from his house in Norfolk. When the vehicle was eventually returned to him, D.V. 

observed that several personal items were missing from inside the Jeep and the steering column 

had been broken. Before the Jeep was repaired, D.V. had to use a screwdriver to start the engine. 

He testified that he had not given anyone permission to use his Jeep. 

 Later, on the same day that D.V. discovered his Jeep missing, L.A. was sitting on her 

front porch in Portsmouth with her husband when she observed a silver Jeep Cherokee being 
- 2 - 

driven recklessly, stopping in front of her house. She watched as three young men got out of the 

vehicle, appellant exiting from the front passenger side. L.A. recognized appellant as someone 

she knew, and she heard him say, “Oh, so far today we haven’t gotten arrested.” Finding these 

events suspicious, L.A. called the police who eventually located the three individuals. 

 Tyeshawn Harris, a codefendant, testified at appellant’s trial that appellant and the driver, 

Jubee, were already riding in the Jeep when they picked him up. Harris wanted a ride to the 

store to get some beer. Harris and appellant were friends, but Harris had only seen Jubee twice 

before. Along the way to the store, the three young men stopped to speak with appellant’s 

cousin and then they walked to appellant’s house. When they later returned to the Jeep and 

resumed their ride, Harris noticed a large screwdriver on the floor between the driver and 

passenger seats. He asked if the vehicle was stolen, and appellant told him that it was. 

 The trial court convicted appellant of grand larceny, and this appeal follows. 

ANALYSIS

Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to convict him as a principal in the 

second degree of grand larceny. He argues that although he was a passenger in a vehicle he 

knew was stolen, the Commonwealth presented no evidence that he assisted in the theft, 

transportation or disposition of the vehicle. At oral argument, appellant also asserted that he 

must be the driver of the vehicle in order to assist in the theft. We disagree. 

Faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must give trial courts and juries the wide discretion to which a 

living record, as distinguished from a printed record, logically 

entitles them. The living record contains many guideposts to the 

truth which are not in the printed record; not having seen them 

ourselves, we should give great weight to the conclusions of those 

who have seen and heard them. 

Bradley v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1126, 1136, 86 S.E.2d 828, 834 (1955). In bench trials, the 

“trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role 
- 3 - 

comes expertise.” Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 11, 602 S.E.2d 402, 407 (2004) 

(citation omitted). 

Consequently, a reviewing court does not “ask itself whether it believes that the 

evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (emphasis in original, citation omitted). Instead, we ask only 

‘“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442, 657 S.E.2d 499, 502 (2008) (quoting 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (emphasis in original). These principles recognize that appellate 

courts are “not permitted to reweigh the evidence,” Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 408, 641 

S.E.2d 494, 507 (2007), because we have no authority “to preside de novo over a second trial.” 

Haskins, 44 Va. App. at 11, 602 S.E.2d at 407. 

“‘Larceny is a common law crime, although it is regulated by 

statute.’” Hudgins v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 219, 233, 597 

S.E.2d 221, 227-28 (2004) (en banc) (quoting Darnell v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 948, 957, 408 S.E.2d 540, 545 

(1991)); see Code § 18.2-95. It is “defined . . . as ‘the wrongful or 

fraudulent taking of personal goods of some intrinsic value, 

belonging to another, without [the owner’s] assent, and with the 

intention to deprive the owner thereof permanently.’” Bryant v. 

Commonwealth, 248 Va. 179, 183, 445 S.E.2d 667, 670 (1994) 

(quoting Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 521, 524, 35 S.E.2d 

763, 764 (1945)). In order to establish a wrongful taking of the 

property, the Commonwealth must prove that there was an 

asportation or carrying away of the property. Id. at 183, 445 

S.E.2d at 670. At the time of the asportation of the property, the 

thief must act with the intent “to permanently deprive” the owner 

of that property. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 519, 506 

S.E.2d 312, 314 (1998).1

 1

 Appellant does not challenge that a larceny occurred and that the value of the property 

was greater than $200. 
- 4 - 

McAlevy v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 318, 322, 605 S.E.2d 283, 285 (2004), aff’d, 270 Va. 

378, 620 S.E.2d 758 (2005) (internal footnote omitted). Because larceny is a continuing offense, 

anyone who knows that personal property is stolen and assists in its transportation or disposition 

is guilty of larceny. Hampton v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 644, 650-51, 529 S.E.2d 843, 846 

(2000). 

The Commonwealth relies on the theory of joint exclusive possession of recently stolen 

property. “Once the crime [of larceny] is established, the unexplained possession of recently 

stolen goods permits an inference of larceny by the possessor.” Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 

Va. 79, 85-86, 459 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1995). 

In order for the presumption to arise, the possession must be 

exclusive, but “[o]ne can be in exclusive possession of an item 

when he jointly possesses it with another,” as long as “the accused 

was consciously asserting at least a possessory interest in the stolen 

property or was exercising dominion over [it].” 

Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 13, 492 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1997) (quoting Best v. 

Commonwealth, 222 Va. 387, 389, 282 S.E.2d 16, 17 (1981)). 

“There must be evidence of joint control to justify the inference of joint possession.” 

Reese v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 172, 175, 335 S.E.2d 266, 267 (1985). “[A]nyone who knows 

that personal property is stolen and assists in its transportation or disposition is guilty of 

larceny.” Moehring v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 568, 290 S.E.2d 891, 892 (1982). 

Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he was acting either as a 

principal in the second degree in the theft of the vehicle, or that he was in control of the vehicle. 

We disagree. 

“A principal in the second degree is one who is not only present at a crime’s commission, 

but one who also commits some overt act, such as inciting, encouraging, advising, or assisting in 

the commission of the crime or shares the perpetrator’s criminal intent.” Id. at 567, 290 S.E.2d 
- 5 - 

at 892. “Mere presence during the commission of a crime and subsequent flight do not constitute 

sufficient evidence to convict a person as a principal in the second degree.” Id. Proof that a 

defendant knew that an automobile is stolen and was in the automobile as a passenger does not 

suffice to prove the defendant guilty of larceny of the automobile. Burgess v. Commonwealth, 

14 Va. App. 1018, 1023, 421 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1992). 

Appellant relies on Moehring to support his position that the appellant must be the driver 

of the stolen vehicle. In Moehring, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a hitchhiker 

who had accepted a ride in a vehicle that he knew was stolen. There, the Supreme Court found 

no evidence that Moehring took part in the planning or taking of the vehicle, or that he condoned 

the theft. 223 Va. at 568, 290 S.E.2d at 893. Specifically, the Court stated that there was no 

evidence that “Moehring assisted in any way in the transportation or disposition of the truck he 

knew to be stolen.” Id. We find that not to be the case here. 

While driving a vehicle is indicia of control, nothing in Moehring suggests it is the 

exclusive means of establishing control. While the accused in Moehring did not drive the stolen 

vehicle, his status as a passenger was not the ratio decidendi of that decision. The Moehring

Court found the accused did not exercise any dominion or control over the stolen vehicle. “The 

most that can be said with reasonable certainty is that this defendant-hitchhiker accepted a ride 

from the first person who stopped and that he knew that person was driving a stolen vehicle.” Id. 

There was no evidence that Moehring directed the movement of the stolen vehicle or assisted “in 

its transportation or disposition.” Id.

Here, appellant was more than a mere passenger in a known stolen vehicle. The evidence 

was sufficient to establish that appellant exercised dominion and control over the Jeep Cherokee 

and that he thus had joint, exclusive possession of the vehicle. Appellant’s statement in the 

cul-de-sac that he had not yet been arrested is probative of a guilty mind evincing the requisite 
- 6 - 

intent for knowingly participating in the larceny of the vehicle as a principal in the second 

degree. Additionally, he admitted to Harris that the Jeep was stolen. He and the driver stopped 

to give Harris a ride, who was a friend of the appellant. From appellant’s relationship with 

Harris, the fact finder could reasonably conclude that appellant directed Jubee to stop the Jeep to 

accommodate his friend. More importantly, Jubee parked the automobile, allowing appellant to 

speak with his cousin and walk to appellant’s house. The trial court could make a reasonable 

inference that these stops were at the behest of appellant, proving that appellant exercised some 

control over the movement and destination of the stolen vehicle while the offense of larceny 

continued. 

Rather than trying to stop the continued use of a stolen vehicle, appellant persisted in 

using the Jeep to accommodate a friend, meet a family member, and ride to his own home. Thus, 

the trial court had before it more than an accused’s presence in the vehicle. The evidence was 

sufficient for a rational finder of fact to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, at a 

minimum, exercised some control over the movement and destination of the stolen Jeep. 

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, we find the evidence sufficient to sustain appellant’s 

conviction for grand larceny. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Affirmed.