alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-15-00293-CR

EX PARTE Steven M. GARY

Original Habeas Corpus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 20, 2015

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

On May 11, 2015, relator Steven M. Gary filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

seeking to have this court order his release from incarceration due to delay in bringing his pending 

criminal charges to trial. In the underlying criminal proceeding, relator is charged with assault, 

second offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (West Supp. 2014). Relator’s pending 

criminal charges are currently scheduled for trial later this month. 

This court, as an intermediate court of appeals, is not authorized to grant the relief relator 

seeks. Pursuant to section 22.221(d) of the Texas Government Code, in civil matters, a court of 

appeals “may issue a writ of habeas corpus when it appears that the restraint of liberty is by virtue 

of an order, process, or commitment issued by a court or judge because of the violation of an order, 

 1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2014CR2945, styled The State of Texas v. Steven M. Gary, pending in the 

175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Mary D. Roman presiding.
04-15-00293-CR

- 2 -

judgment, or decree previously made, rendered, or entered by the court or judge in a civil case.” 

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(d) (West 2004). In criminal matters, however, an intermediate 

court of appeals has no original habeas corpus jurisdiction. Chavez v. State, 132 S.W.3d 509, 510 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Watson v. State, 96 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2002, pet. ref’d); Dodson v. State, 988 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, 

no pet.). In criminal matters, the courts authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus are the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, and county courts. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 11.05 (West 2005). Therefore, relator’s petition for writ of habeas is dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction.

In addition, we note that relator has been appointed trial counsel to represent him in 

connection with the currently pending criminal charges. We conclude that any original proceeding 

on relator’s behalf should be presented by relator’s trial counsel. Relator is not entitled to hybrid 

representation. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The absence of 

a right to hybrid representation means relator’s pro se petition presents nothing for this court’s 

review. See id.; see also Gray v. Shipley, 877 S.W.2d 806, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

1994, orig. proceeding).

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 16

- 14921 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:15

- cr - 00283

- LSC

- HGD

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus PATRICK DEWAYNE HALL , Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________ (May 10, 2017) Before TJOFLAT , WILLIAM PRYOR and BLACK , Circ uit Judges.
PER CURIAM: W. Scott Brower, appointed counsel for Patrick Hall in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and

Case: 16-14921 Date Filed: 05/10/2017 Page: 1 of 22 filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED , an d Hall ’s conviction s and sentence s are AFFIRMED

.

Case: 16-14921 Date Filed: 05/10/2017 Page: 2 of 2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GEO EDWARD McCALIP, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

TED CONFERENCES, LLC; SAPLING 

FOUNDATION, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55510 

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01121-AB-GJS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 8, 2017**

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Geo Edward McCalip appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various federal and state law 

claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a 

dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 10 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-55510 

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed McCalip’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. 

Civ. Code § 52.1 claims because McCalip failed to allege facts sufficient to show 

that defendants acted under the color of state law. See Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. 

Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011) (elements of § 1983 action); 

Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Merely 

complaining to the police does not convert a private party into a state actor.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Jones v. Kmart Corp., 949 P.2d 

941, 943-44 (Cal. 1998) (private individual cannot be liable under § 52.1 for 

alleged direct violation of federal constitutional right). 

The district court properly dismissed McCalip’s Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 claim 

because McCalip did not allege facts demonstrating malice, oppression, or fraud. 

See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (requirements for punitive damages under California 

law).

We reject as unsupported by the record McCalip’s contentions regarding 

defendants misleading the district court.

We do not consider evidence, allegations, or arguments raised for the first 

time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); 
3 16-55510 

Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The appellate process is 

for addressing the legal issues a case presents, not for generating new evidence to 

parry an opponent’s arguments.”); United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of 

the record on appeal.”). To the extent McCalip requests in his opening brief that 

we vacate and remand so that he may introduce allegations and evidence related to 

contracts between defendants and the City of Long Beach that were in McCalip’s 

possession, but not introduced, during the underlying proceedings, we deny the

request.

AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Boardof Gladstone Capital Corporation (the “Company”), hereby certifies on the datehereof, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350(a), as adopted pursuant to Section 906 ofThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterended March 31, 2006 (“Form 10-Q”), filed concurrently herewith by the Company,fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the information containedin the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Dated:  May 3, 2006

 

 
| /s/ David Gladstone     |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
| David Gladstone         |
| Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
I am glad the EPA is considering changes to water quality standards regulation. However, they 

don’t go far enough. I would like to see EPA look at the bigger picture and consistent with this, I 

would like to propose an approach to protecting our nation’s waters from toxics. The current 

approach, which involves setting water quality standards for toxics on a chemical-by-chemical 

basis, is not effective. This is evidenced by the fact that EPA has managed to set standards for 

less than 1% of the chemicals in use in our economy.

The assumption on which the current approach is based is that in order to protect water quality 

from toxics, we have to define safe levels of these chemicals. While this seems perfectly logical, 

in practice it is very difficult to do. In any case, the chemicals for which EPA is trying to 

develop standards for or should be trying to develop standards for, have already been introduced 

into the environment, sometimes in large quantities. The debate over how much is safe is not 

useful if it serves primarily to delay action. 

We need to shift our focus from defining safe levels of chemicals to developing disincentives for 

using them when there is scientific evidence that they cause harm, even if that evidence is not 

sufficiently developed for us to be able to define the level at which they may be considered 

“safe”. 

What might these disincentives look like? One option would be to require manufacturers to 

provide toxicity rating on the labels of consumer products. The rating could appear as say, a 

score from 1 to 10.

Coming up with these ratings need not be difficult. For consumer products that go down to the 

drain, it could be done using an existing regulatory tool. This tool is known as Whole Effluent 

Toxicity (WET) testing. It is currently used to evaluate the toxicity of sewage treatment plant 

effluent. It basically involves assessing the impact of treated effluent on the growth and survival 

of a select group of aquatic species. WET tests could be used to evaluate the toxicity of 

consumer products and the results translated into a toxicity rating to appear on the label.

By giving consumers a way to distinguish between more or less hazardous products, 

manufacturers would have a reason to reduce their toxicity, perhaps well ahead of when water 

quality standards may be developed for all of the chemicals they contain. Manufacturers who are 

already producing less toxic products would have a competitive edge. The field of green 

chemistry would get a boost.

It costs on the order of $5000 to run a set of WET tests on a sample of sewage effluent. This is 

trivial compared to what manufacturers might spend to advertise a single product. It is also 

modest compared to the cost of treating a single case of cancer.

In fact, compared to trying to determine which of the 80,000 chemicals currently in use in our 

economy are safe and at what concentrations, the proposal to use WET testing to evaluate the 

toxicity of consumer products is modest indeed. Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

Sonja Biorn-Hansen
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or coll ateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 30 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. KENNETH LYNN LLOYD, Defendant-Appellant. No. 97-7110 (D.C. No. 97-CV-237-S) (EOK)



### ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, BRORBYand BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Kenneth Lloyd, a pro se prisoner, appeals from the district court order-2-

dismissing his petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We deny his motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appe al. Mr. Lloyd was convicted and is currently serving a prison sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm shipped an d transported in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In hi s petition for relief he asserted six grounds of error and contended the judgment andsentence of the district court were unlawful. The district court concluded that M r. Lloyd’s section 2255 petition raised the exact issues he alleged in his direct appeal, in which this court affirmed his conviction on all grounds. See United States v. Lloyd , 13 F.3d 1450 (10th Cir. 1994). The court then dismissed the pe tition on the ground that a defendant may not collaterally address issues raise d unsuccessfully on direct appeal absent a supervening change in the law. See United States v. Warner , 23 F.3d 287, 291 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Co ok , 997 F.2d 1312, 1318 n.6 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Prichard , 875 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1989). Although Mr. Lloyd alluded in his section 2255 peti tion to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, an examination of the record reveals that Mr. Lloyd failed to support this claim with any facts which would distinguish it from his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counse l, which we rejected on direct appeal. On any application for collateral review, a certifi cate of appealability will-3-

issue only if the “applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” United States v. Simmonds , 111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th Cir. 1997). We agree with the district court’s determin ation that Mr. Lloyd’s petition is entirely duplicative of his direct appeal. Because Mr. Lloyd’s petition raises no issues which differ from those raised as part of hi s direct appeal, he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constituti onal right. The certificate of appealability is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED

. ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour Chief Judge
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1903 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.1903

                       One Hundred Fourth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

         Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
   the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six

                                 An Act

 
  To designate the bridge, estimated to be completed in the year 2000, 
that replaces the bridge on Missouri highway 74 spanning from East Cape 
Girardeau, Illinois, to Cape Girardeau, Missouri, as the ``Bill Emerson 
               Memorial Bridge'', and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF BILL EMERSON BRIDGE.

    The bridge, estimated to be completed in the year 2000, that 
replaces the bridge on highway 74 spanning from East Cape Girardeau, 
Illinois, to Cape Girardeau, Missouri, shall be known and designated as 
the ``Bill Emerson Memorial Bridge''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the bridge referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Bill Emerson Memorial 
Bridge''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
----

----

I Besluiten waarvan de publicatie voorwaarde is voor de toepassing

----

VERORDENING (EG) Nr. 1897/2006 VAN DE RAAD

van 19 december 2006

tot wijziging van Verordening (EG) Nr. 1255/96 houdende tijdelijke schorsing van de autonome rechten van het gemeenschappelijk douanetarief voor bepaalde industrie-, landbouw- en visserijproducten

DE RAAD VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE,

Gelet op het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Gemeenschap, met name op artikel 26,

Gezien het voorstel van de Commissie,

Overwegende hetgeen volgt:

HEEFT DE VOLGENDE VERORDENING VASTGESTELD:

Artikel 1

De bijlage bij Verordening (EG) nr. 1255/96 wordt vervangen door de tekst in de bijlage bij deze verordening.

Artikel 2

De tijdelijke schorsingen van de autonome rechten van het gemeenschappelijk douanetarief voor de in de bijlage vermelde producten zijn van toepassing met ingang van 1 januari 2007. Zij komen te vervallen op de in die bijlage vermelde data.

Artikel 3

Deze verordening treedt in werking op de dag volgende op die van haar bekendmaking in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie.

Zij is van toepassing met ingang van 1 januari 2007.

Deze verordening is verbindend in al haar onderdelen en is rechtstreeks toepasselijk in elke lidstaat.

Gedaan te Brussel, 19 december 2006.

Voor de Raad

De voorzitter

J. KORKEAOJA

----

(1)PB L 158 van 29.6.1996, blz. 1. Verordening laatstelijk gewijzigd bij Verordening (EG) nr. 963/2006 (PB L 176 van 30.6.2006, blz. 3).

(2)PB C 128 van 25.4.1998, blz. 2.

----

BIJLAGE

BIJLAGE

----

(1)  Indeling onder deze onderverdeling is onderworpen aan de voorwaarden en bepalingen vastgesteld bij de op dit gebied geldende communautaire bepalingen (zie artikelen 291 t/m 300 van Verordening (EEG) nr. 2454/93 van de Commissie — PB L 253 van 11.10.1993 blz. 1 en latere wijzigingen).

(2)  De schorsing is van toepassing op vis die bestemd is om aan een andere behandeling dan uitsluitend een of meer van de volgende behandelingen te worden onderworpen:

De schorsing is niet van toepassing op vis die aan voor begunstiging in aanmerking komende behandelingen wordt onderworpen door de kleinhandel, restaurantbedrijven, kantines en dergelijke. De schorsing geldt alleen voor vis die bestemd is voor menselijke consumptie.

(3)  Schorsing is echter niet van toepassing indien de behandeling wordt verricht door de kleinhandel of door restaurantbedrijven, kantines en dergelijke.

----
<PAGE>
                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

                     LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

As of December 31, 2002, the Registrant owned all of the issued and outstanding
capital stock of (1) Great Bay Power Marketing, Inc., a Maine corporation, and
(2) BayCorp Ventures, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company.

On December 31, 2002, the Registrant's wholly-owned subsidiaries, (1) Great Bay
Power Corporation, a New Hampshire corporation, and (2) Little Bay Power
Corporation, a New Hampshire corporation, were dissolved.

As of December 31, 2002, the Registrant owned approximately 46.4% of the issued
and outstanding capital stock of HoustonStreet Exchange, Inc., a Delaware
corporation ("HSE-Del.") (giving effect to the conversion into HoustonStreet
Common Stock of all issued and outstanding shares of HoustonStreet Preferred
Stock convertible into HoustonStreet Common Stock).

In May 2002, HSE-Del.'s approximately 86%-owned subsidiary,  HoustonStreet B.V.,
a Netherlands company, was dissolved.

In May 2002, HoustonStreet B.V.'s wholly-owned subsidiary, HoustonStreet
Exchange, Ltd., a company formed under the laws of England and Wales, was
dissolved.

Great Bay Power Marketing, Inc. conducts business only under the business name
of Great Bay Power Marketing, Inc. BayCorp Ventures, LLC conducts business only
under the business name of BayCorp Ventures, LLC. HSE-Del. Conducts business
only under the names HoustonStreet Exchange, Inc. and HoustonStreet and
HoustonStreet.com.
Independent Auditors' Consent


The Board of Directors
Ugly Duckling Corporation:

We  consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No.
33-06615  and  No.  33-08457) on Form S-8 of Ugly Duckling Corporation of our
report  dated  January  31,  1997,  except  for  note 19  to the consolidated
financial  statements  which  are  as  of  February 13, 1997, relating to the
consolidated  balance sheets of Ugly Duckling Corporation and subsidiaries as
of  December  31,  1996  and 1995, and the related consolidated statements of
operations, stockholders' equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the
three-year  period  ended  December  31,  1996,  which  report appears in the
December 31, 1996 annual report on Form 10-K of Ugly Duckling Corporation.




                                              KPMG Peat Marwick LLP


Phoenix, Arizona
March 26, 1997



























<PAGE>  122
Calendar No. 549

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 1931

A BILL

To provide that the United States Post Office

and Courthouse’’.designated as the ‘‘L. Clure Morton Post OfficeStreet, Cookeville, Tennessee, shall be known andbuilding that is to be located at 9 East Broad

JULY 30, 1996

Reported with an amendment and an amendment to the

title
II

Calendar No. 549

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 1931

To provide that the United States Post Office building that is to be located

at 9 East Broad Street, Cookeville, Tennessee, shall be known and

designated as the ‘‘L. Clure Morton Post Office and Courthouse’’.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 8, 1996

Mr. THOMPSON (for himself and Mr. FRIST) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs

JULY 30, 1996

Reported by Mr. STEVENS, with an amendment and an amendment to the title

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To provide that the United States Post Office building that

is to be located at 9 East Broad Street, Cookeville,

Tennessee, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘L.

Clure Morton Post Office and Courthouse’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•S 1931 RS

1 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF L. CLURE MORTON POST

2 OFFICE AND COURTHOUSE.

3 The United States Post Office building that is to be

4 located at 9 East Broad Street, Cookeville, Tennessee,

5 shall be known and designated as the ‘‘L. Clure Morton

6 Post Office and Courthouse’’.

7 SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

8 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document,

9 paper, or other record of the United States to the United

10 States Post Office building referred to in section 1 shall

11 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘L. Clure Morton Post

12 Office and Courthouse’’.

13 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF L. CLURE MORTON UNITED

14 STATES POST OFFICE AND COURTHOUSE.

15 The United States Post Office and Courthouse building

16 located at 9 East Broad Street, Cookeville, Tennessee, shall

17 be known and designated as the ‘‘L. Clure Morton United

18 States Post Office and Courthouse’’.

19 SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

20 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document,

21 paper, or other record of the United States to the United

22 States Post Office and Courthouse building referred to in

23 section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘L. Clure

24 Morton United States Post Office and Courthouse’’.

Amend the title so as to read: ‘‘A bill to provide that

the United States Post Office and Courthouse building
3

•S 1931 RS

located at 9 East Broad Street, Cookeville, Tennessee,

shall be known and designated as the ‘L. Clure Morton

United States Post Office and Courthouse’.’’.