1

Title 19 U.S.C. § 1615 establishes the burdens of proof for

civil forfeiture proceedings. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 96-2545

Non-Argument Calendar.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ONE BEECHCRAFT KING AIR 300 AIRCRAFT, Defendant-Appellant,

Martha Elena Valencia Cardenas, Claimant,

Aerotaxi De Valledupar, Ltda, Claimant-Appellant.

Jan. 8, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Florida. (No. 92-249-CIV-FTM-21D), George T. Swartz,

Unisted States Magistrate Judge.

Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the district

court correctly upheld the constitutionality of 19 U.S.C. § 1615 as

applied in this case.1

 Appellant contends that 19 U.S.C. § 1615 is

unconstitutional as applied in this case because the forfeiture of

its property based only upon a showing of probable cause denied it

due process of law. It argues that a higher burden of proof is

required because civil forfeitures constitute punishment for

purposes of due process. We disagree.

 We agree with the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and

Tenth Circuits, which all have explicitly upheld the

constitutionality of 19 U.S.C. § 1615. United States v. $94,000.00
in United States Currency, 2 F.3d 778, 783-84 (7th Cir.1993)

("[T]he penalty of civil forfeiture, while sufficiently akin to the

criminal law to invoke ... the strictures of the Eighth Amendment,

does not convert a civil forfeiture proceeding into a criminal

matter insofar as the allocation of the burden of proof is

concerned."); United States v. 228 Acres of Land and Dwelling, 916

F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091, 111 S.Ct.

972, 112 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1991) ("We find nothing unconstitutional in

Congress' allocation of the burdens of proof in forfeiture

cases."); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th

Cir.1989) ("Congress may alter the burden of proof in a civil

proceeding as it sees fit, without constitutional implications.");

United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895,

900 (1st Cir.1987) ("Generally, Congress may alter the traditional

allocation of the burden of proof without infringing on the

litigant's due process rights unless the statute is criminal in

nature"); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65, 66

(9th Cir.1976) ("[T]he challenged forfeiture statutes are not

criminal enough to prevent Congress from imposing the burden of

proof on the claimant."); Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968

(10th Cir.1974) (due process does not require transformation of

civil forfeiture proceedings into criminal actions for procedural

purposes), cert. denied sub nom., Bramble v. Saxbe, 419 U.S. 1069,

95 S.Ct. 656, 42 L.Ed.2d 665 (1974).

 Like the foregoing circuits, we view in rem forfeiture as a

civil proceeding. See United States v. Real Property and

Residence, 921 F.2d 1551, 1556-57 (11th Cir.1991). The Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Ursery, --- U.S. ----

116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), supports our view.

Although Ursery did not specifically address Appellant's claim that

19 U.S.C. § 1615's burden of proof violates due process, Ursery

made it clear that the Supreme Court continues to view in rem

forfeiture proceedings as civil actions rather than criminal

punishment. Accordingly, we hold that Congress's decision to

allocate the burden of proof to the claimant in civil forfeiture

proceedings is not unconstitutional. The judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.