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respondent Sedgwick CMS, the workers' compensation insurer, construed 

this request as a refusal to participate in the program, and terminated 

Ruiz's vocational rehabilitation benefits on that basis. On administrative 

appeal, the appeals officer also affirmed, finding that Ruiz refused to 

participate in the vocational rehabilitation program, allowing the insurer 

to properly terminate the benefits, and Ruiz was gainfully employed at the 

business his family owned. Ruiz filed a petition for judicial review, which 

the district court denied. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Ruiz argues, among other things, that the appeals 

officer abused her discretion by ignoring new physical restrictions limiting 

him to four hours of training per day, finding that he was gainfully 

employed when he was merely helping his wife at her business, and 

finding that he had rejected his vocational rehabilitation benefits. The 

insurer argues that substantial evidence supports the appeals officer's 

finding that Ruiz refused to participate in the program and that he was 

gainfully employed at the family business. 

It is undisputed that Ruiz was entitled to vocational 

rehabilitation benefits after his industrial injury and that these benefits 

included training in another vocation. See NRS 616C.530(5) (explaining 

the insurer's priority to return an injured employee to work). In the 

vocational rehabilitation program at issue here, Ruiz was to attend class 

or training from 10 a.m. until 4:30 p m every weekday. Although a 

physician approved Ruiz's assessment period plan with a similar schedule, 

that approval came two months before the establishment of the ninemonth program at issue. The record indicates that while this matter was 

pending before the appeals officer, Ruiz presented a physician's note 

restricting him to four hours of training at a time, which the appeals 

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officer did not address when she found that Ruiz had rejected a suitable 

program We conclude that the appeals officer erred by not making 

findings as to whether the program was compatible with Ruiz's physical 

condition. See NRS 616C.555(1). Additionally, the appeals officer made 

no determinations as to the viability of Ruiz obtaining enough formal 

training or education during the nine-month program to return him to 

work. See NRS 616C.530(5). And because there were no findings that the 

program was appropriate in light of Ruiz's physical restrictions and the 

program's potential to return him to work, substantial evidence does not 

support the appeals officer's determination that Ruiz rejected a suitable 

program that was offered to him. See NAC 616C.601 (explaining the 

conditions under which vocational rehabilitation services may be 

suspended or terminated); Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 124 Nev. 553, 

557, 188 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2008) (explaining that this court reviews a 

workers' compensation decision for clear error or an abuse of discretion). 

The appeals officer also determined that Ruiz was gainfully 

employed at his family's business, which provided another basis to 

terminate the vocational rehabilitation benefits. But the appeals officer 

made no findings about Ruiz's potential wages from that type of work and 

is not permitted to order self-employment for an injured employee. See 

NRS 616C.590(1)(c) (requiring that the injured employee be unable to 

return to gainful employment at a gross wage equal to or greater than 80- 

percent of his gross wages at the time of injury in order to qualify for 

vocational rehabilitation benefits); NRS 616C.600 (prohibiting an appeals 

officer from ordering self-employment). Moreover, the insurer's assertion 

that Ruiz was employed full-time is not supported by substantial evidence 

in the record, which shows that Ruiz was at the store inconsistently and 

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only for periods varying from three to six hours per day. See Vredenburg, 

124 Nev. at 557, 188 P.3d at 1087 (defining substantial evidence). 

Therefore, we conclude that the appeals officer abused her discretion by 

finding that Ruiz was gainfully employed without certain findings about 

his potential wages and that substantial evidence does not support a 

finding that Ruiz was employed full-time at the family business. See id. 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order denying 

judicial review and remand this matter to the district court with 

instructions to remand the case to the appeals officer for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. 

It is so ORDERED.' 

Parra guirre 

Saitta 

PICKERING, J., dissenting: 

It is well settled that reviewing courts will not substitute their 

judgment for the appeals officer's decisions as to factual questions and the 

weight of the evidence. NRS 233B.135(3). The district court in this 

matter found that substantial evidence supported the appeals officer's 

decision to affirm the insurer's termination of vocational rehabilitation 

'To the extent that appellant's arguments have not been expressly 

addressed in this order, we conclude that those arguments lack merit. 

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services for appellant and declined to substitute its judgment for the 

appeals officer, and thus, it found that there was no legal error or abuse of 

discretion. I agree with those conclusions, and therefore, I respectfully 

dissent. 

eikeHH tiAf 7

Pickering 

cc: Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge 

Diaz & Galt, LLC/Reno 

Guinasso Law, Ltd. 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

J. 

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