## I n the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 21

- 00444

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court a t Law No. 1 Wichita County, Texas Trial Court No. CCL1

- JV2020

- 0027

Before Sudderth, C.J. ; B irdwell and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell 

### I N THE 

### M ATTER OF 

### B.C.2 MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction Appellant B.C. appe als the juvenile court ’ s order wa iving it s jur isdiction and transferring his case to a crimi nal district court f or prosecution as an adult

. I n one issue, B.C. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in tra nsferring his case
be cause t he reco rd does not support its finding s that

• the State had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that for reasons beyond the State’s control , proceeding in the juvenile court before B.C .’s eighteenth birthday was not practicable and

• the State had us ed due dil ig ence in attem pt ing to co mplete the proceedin gs before B. C. ’ s eighte enth birthday

. We ho ld that the record supports the juvenile court ’ s findings and, th us, it did not
abuse its d iscretion in transferring his c ase to the adult criminal cou rt s . We ove rrule
B.C. ’ s iss ue and aff irm the juvenile court ’ s or der. II. Background
In late M arch 2020, t he State filed its original p etiti on alleg ing that B.C. had engaged in delinquent conduct

. At the time, B.C. was six teen ye ars old.
In December 2021

— about twenty

- one mo nth s after the State had filed its

or iginal pe tition and about four months after B.C. had turned ei ghteen years o ld

— the juvenile court signed an order w aiving its j urisdiction and transferring his c a se t o a dist rict court where he w ould be pro secut ed as an a dult

. Regarding the delay, the juvenile court fou nd:3 For reasons beyond [the] control of the State

— i ncluding but not l i m i ted to [B.C. ’ s] lengthy commitment to t he N orth Texas State H ospital s o on af ter he committed the offen se alleged, t he ef fe cts of CO VI D

- 19 on the courts of this County [,] and t he facility limita t ion s with regards to j ury trials i n Wichita County

— i t was not pract i cab l e to proceed i n j uvenile court befor e [B.C. ’ s] 18 th birthda y . [ See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(j)(4)(A) .] Fur the rm ore, the prosecuting atto rney exercised due d i l i gence i n an attempt to c omplete the proceeding before the respond e nt became 18 years of age. [ See id. § 51.0412(3) .] With these two f indings, B.C. f inds fau lt. I n a single issue, he argue s that the juve nile court ab used i ts discretion in making the Secti on 54.02(j)(4)( A

) and Section 51.0412(3) finding s and , thus, in transferring his case to the adult criminal courts

. III. Applicable La w A. Juv e nile d elinquency and juvenile courts
Children are not ordinar il y subject t o crimin al proceedings like adults. In re
S.G.R. , 496 S.W.3d 235, 238 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 20 16, no pet.). W hen a child eng ages in behavior that would be considere d crimin a l if c ommitted by an adult,
it is called “del inquent co nduct. ” S ee Tex. Fa m. Code Ann. § 51.03(a)(1). Juvenile
courts have excl usive original jurisdiction over cases involving children ten years old or older and under seventeen years old who have allegedl y engag ed in de linquent
conduc t
. Id. §§ 51.02( 2)(A), 51.04(a). A j u venile s even teen year s of age or older and under eighteen year s of age is also defined as a “ child ” and subject to the juvenile

court ’ s jurisdiction if the juvenile allegedly engage d in or w as fou nd to have engaged
in delinquent conduc t as a re sult of ac ts committ ed before the juvenile ’ s sevent ee nth4 birthday

. Id. § 51.02(2)( B )

. T he Juvenile Justice Code governs d elinquency
pr oceedi ngs . See id. §§ 51.01

– 61.107.
B. Juvenile courts and t ransfer s of ju risdiction to adult courts
U nder certa in conditions , a ju ve nile cou rt may waive i ts exclusive original jurisdictio n and transfer the proceeding to a dis trict court for criminal prosecu tion. See
id. § 54.02(a), (j). T ransfer ring a child from juvenil e court to criminal court for prosecution as a n adult should b e r egarded as the exception , not the rule. Ex parte
Thomas , 623 S.W.3d 370, 376 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2021) . W henever feasible, children should be p rotected and rehabilitated rather than subj ected to the ha rshness of the criminal system. Id. The State must prov e t hat a tran sfer is approp riate. Id.
C. Tr ansfer hearings and eighteenth birthdays
What the Stat e mus t prove to obtain a transfer depends on whether the juvenile has reached the age of eightee n by th e date of the transfer hearing. Section 54.02(a) applie s whe n the ju venile is under eighteen at the time of the t ransfer hearing, while
Section 5 4.02( j) ap plies whe n the ju venile is eighteen or older at the time of the hearing. Tex. Fam. Cod e Ann. § 5 4 .0 2 ( a) , (j) ; see Morrison v. State , 503 S. W.3d 724, 727

– 28 (Tex . App.

— Ho uston [14th Dis t.] 2016, pet. ref’d)

. D. Transfer he arings after the juvenile ’ s eighteenth birthday
B ecause B.C. was eighteen years old at the time of his transfer heari ng, Section
5 4.02 (j ) applies. S ee Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 5 4 .0 2 (j)

. Although Sec tion 54.0 2(j) has5 severa l elements, B.C. contests the juvenile court ’ s fin dings as to only one of them, so

we limit our discussion to that one element : (j) The juvenile court may waive its exc l usive original jur isdiction and transfer a p erson to the appr opri ate di strict court . . . for criminal proceedings if :

. . . (4) [it] finds from a preponderance of the evidence that: ( A) for a reason beyond the control of the [S]ta te i t was no t practicab l e to p roceed in ju venile court before the [e ighteenth] birthd ay o f the person . . . . Id

. § 54.02(j)(4)( A

).
E. Juri sd ictional implicatio ns when the ju venile turns eighteen Section 51.0412 of the Texas Family Code governs the jurisdictional
im plications when t he State beg ins proceedings when the j uvenile is younge r th an eig hteen years old bu t fails to complete the m before the juveni le ’s eighteenth birthday

. See id. § 51.0412. Provided the juvenile co urt find s “that the pro se cuting attorne y

exerc ised due d il igence in an attempt to co mplete the proceeding before the [juv enile] b ecame [eighteen] . . . years of age , ” the juvenile court retains jurisdiction. Id. § 51.0412(3) ; see In re B.R.H. , 426 S.W.3d 163, 166

– 68 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [1st Dist.] 2012, or ig. pr oceeding) (recognizing th at Section 51.0412 abro gated In re N .J.A. , 997 S.W.2d 55 4 , 556 (Tex. 1999) , which held that after the juvenile ’ s eighteenth b irthday, the juvenile court ’ s jurisdiction was limited to either transf er ring the case to
an appr opriate d istrict co urt or dismissing the case )

. Due diligence requ ires the State6 to move a head or reasonably explain delays , but it does not require the State to do everything conceivable to avoid delay. In re J.C.W .G. , 613 S.W.3d 5 60, 566 (Tex. App.

— San A ntonio 20 20, no pet .)

. F . Standard of r eview
When reviewing a disc reti onary tran sfer, we evaluate the trial court’s factual findings under traditional sufficiency

- of

- the

- evidence principles. In re J.G. , 495 S.W.3 d 354, 369 (Tex. A pp . — Houston [1st Dist.] 20 16, pet

. denied)

. Under a legal

- sufficiency analysis , we credit e vide nce favorab le to t he challenged finding and disregard contrary evidence unles s a reasonable factfinder could not rejec t the evidence. Id. at 3 70

. We review t he e vidence in the light m ost fav orabl e to t he trial court ’ s findings. J.C.W.G. , 613 S.W.3d at 569

. U nless onl y on e inference can be drawn from the evidence , w e do not second

- gu ess the fact finder

. J.G. , 495 S.W.3d at 370. If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support t he
findin g, th e no

- e vidence challenge fai ls. Id

. Under a factual

- su fficien cy chall enge , w e consider all the evidence presented to
determine if t he court’s finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence as to be clearly wro ng or unj ust. Id

. Unl ess th e re cord clearly shows that
a different result i s appro priate, we m ust give due defere nce to the factfinder ’ s determinations, particularly if those determinations turn on w eight and cre dibility

. See In re J.B.C. , 2 33 S.W.3d 88, 97 (Tex. A pp.

— For t Wor th 200 7, pet. denied)

.7 If the fin dings of the juvenile court are supporte d b y legally and factually sufficient proof, then we review the ultimate tr ansfer decision under an abuse

- of

discretion standard. In re H.Y. , 512 S .W.3d 467, 478

– 79 (Tex. Ap p.

— Ho uston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) ; J.G. , 495 S.W.3d at 3 70. As wit h any dec isi on that lies within the trial court’s discretion, the question is not whether we might have decided the issue differently. H.Y

. , 512 S.W.3d at 4 79 . Instead , we ask whet her the juve nile court
acted arbitrar il y, giv en the evid ence befor e it , o r whether it s d ecision represent ed a reasonably principled application of the legislative criteria. Id.
I V. Discussion
At both the beginning and the end of t he tra ns fer hearing, the j uvenile cour t took judicial notice of its fil e. Because the juvenile c our t took ju dic ial not ice of its file,
it had no t only the evidence presented at the hearing

— th at is, the evidence found in

our reporter ’ s rec or d

— but it also had the co ntents of it s file

— ef fectively the contents

o f our clerk ’ s record

— with which to work. Be twe en the juven ile court ’ s file and the
evidence admitted at the hearing, the re cord shows the following.
A. March 2020
— State file d its original pe tition The State filed on March 25, 2020, a p etiti on alleging delinquent conduct

. The
Stat e alleged that o n or abou t Februar y 24, 2020, B.C. had intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to a public servant by stri king th e public servant in the
face wit h a clo sed fist

. Bo rn in early August 20 03, B.C. wa s sixteen years old w hen th is
offense alleg edl y occurred

. As alleged, if t ried as an adult, the offense would be a8 third

- degree felony. See T ex. Penal Code Ann. § 2 2.01(a)(1), (b)(1) ( assault on a public servant)

. The State also alleged that B.C. had three pr ior adjud ica tio ns for en ga ging in violent del i nqu ent c o nduct

. B. May 2020
— B.C. sent to mental health h ospital, and S tate file d amended petition
O n May 5, 20 20 , B .C. was admitted to the N o rth Texas State Hospital a fter acting out and ma king suicidal st atements
. 1 Two days later, on May 7, 2020, B.C. ’ s

a ttorney filed a “Motion for Exami nation and Hearing on Fitness to Stand Trial.”
Co unsel a verred tha t B.C. had neither the “present a bility to consult wit h c ounsel with

a re asonable deg ree of ra tional under standing ” nor “ a ra tional or factual
under standin g of the proceedings again st him. ” Couns el asked that “ a disinterested
expe rt be a ppointed i n order to obtain an independent opinion of [B.C. ’ s] m ent al

status. ” On May 20, 2020 , the State filed its first amended petition alleg ing d elinquent
condu ct in whic h, in a dd ition to the previous allegations, it pleade d that B.C. had, on or about April 30, 2020, intentionally and knowingly caused serious bodi ly injury to a child fourte en y ears of age or yo ung er by chok ing or strangl ing th e child

. Had an adult
committe d the all ege d offense , it would have been a fir st

- degree felony

. See Tex. Pena l

1 North T e xas State H os pital serves “ peop le wi th mental illness a nd co
occurring mental illnes s an d i ntellectual disabilities who have been screened and referre d by t he ir local mental health authori ties. ” North Texas State Hospital, https://northtexasstatehospit al.com (la st v i sited Apr. 26 , 2022 ). It also serve s
“ forens ic psychiatric patients prim a ril y r eferred for competency restoration. ” Id.9 Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(1), (e) (injury t o a child )

. At the time of t he alleged offense, B .C.

was still sixteen years o ld.
A dditionally, o n May 20, 2020, a grand jury cer tified B. C. fo r de terminate

se ntencing for both the ass ault

- on

- a
- pu blic

- servant and the injury

- to

- a
- c hild offenses

. See Tex. Fam. Code A nn. § 53.035

. Absent this cer tification, the maxim um disposit ion
that B.C. could have received in the j u venile court extended onl y t o his nineteenth birthday. See Tex . Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 245.151(d). With the certification, B. C.
faced a maximu m d etermi na te sentence of ten ye ars for the th ird

- degree felo ny and
fo rty years for the fir st

- degree felony. See T ex. F am. Code Ann. § 5 4.04 (d)(3)(A) , ( C). These two new develo pments

— B.C. ’ s tri p to the ment al health hospital and
B.C. ’ s co mmi tting a new offense

— wer e significant. B.C. now was no longer available
for trial , and he had now all egedly committed a far mor e serious off ense . A fac tfind er could have reasonably conclude d t hat t he se new dev elopments were be yond the
S t ate ’ s control , so b oth are some evidence su pp orting the juvenile cour t ’ s Sect ion 54.02(j)(4)(A) fi nding

. See J.C.W.G. , 613 S.W.3d at 569 (requiring appellate courts to view evide nce in the light most favorable the trial c ourt ’ s fin ding s when determining legal sufficiency ); J. B.C. , 233 S.W.3d at 97 (r e qu iring appellate court s to g iv e due
defere nce to th e trial cour t ’ s finding s w hen d etermining factual sufficiency ). The State filed its am ended petit ion and procured gr and

- jur y certifi c ation
within one month of when this second al leged offense occurred. A f a ctfinder could

reason ably con clude th at the State had acted diligently , so both t he amended petition10 and the grand

- jury certificat ion ar e some evidence supporting the juvenile court ’ s S e ction 51.0412 (3) finding. See J.C.W.G. , 613 S .W.3d at 569 ; J.B.C. , 233 S. W.3d at 97

. C. June t o Septem ber 2020
— B.C. evaluat ed on whether he wa s fit to pro ceed On June 23, 2020, the juvenile court appointed Dr. Stac ey Shipley to examin e B.C. t o deter mine wheth er he was fit to stand tri al. And on September 20, 2020 , Dr.
S hi pley issued a n evalua tion in w hi ch she found that B .C. was fit to proc eed

. A
factfinder c o uld ha ve reasona bly conclude d that the time it to ok to determ ine wheth er B.C. was fit t o proceed was beyond th e State’s c ontrol, so here aga in is some evidence supporting the juvenile court’s Section 54.02(j)(4)(A) finding. See J.C.W.G. , 613 S.W.3d at 569 ; J

. B.C. , 233 S.W.3d at 97

. D. Sept ember 2020 to M arc h 2021
— B. C. remain ed in mental he alth ho spital
Yet due to his s elf

- harm ing behavior, B.C. re main ed in the hospital until
March 3, 20 2 1 , when he was di scharged

. Juvenile probation officer Tyler T ackett

tes tif ied that he thought that B.C. wanted to re main at the mental hea lth hospital to avoid having to stay at the detention faci lity. In all, B.C. spent about ten months in a
mental health hospita l. B.C. is not arguing that the Sta te shou ld have tr ied him in absent ia , and nothing in the recor d suggests that t he S t ate had any control o ver wh en the men tal health hospital r eleased B.C. A factfinder could have reasonably conclude d
that the time that B. C. spent in the mental health h ospi tal was beyond th e State’s
control , so this evidence support s the juvenile co urt’s Sec t ion 54.02(j)(4)(A) fi nding.
See J.C.W .G. , 613 S.W.3d at 56 9 ; J.B.C. , 233 S.W.3d at 97

.11 Onc e b ack in juvenile detention on March 3, 202 1 , however, B.C. began self

harming an d screa mi ng that he want ed to kill himself

. D etention perso n nel called
Ame rican M ed i c al Response, the Wic hita Falls Fi re Department, and th e Wichita County Sherriff’s Offi ce to assist in transporting B .C. back to the mental health hospital for a suicidal e valuati on , but th e h o spital denied admission

. B.C . was transported back to juvenile detention o n March 4, 20 21. This evidence supports the reasonable inference that B.C. remained in the mental health hospital as lon g as he did
based on his behavior. See J.C.W.G. , 613 S.W.3d at 569 ; J.B.C. , 233 S.W. 3 d at 97

. Another rea sonable in fer ence i s that at some point the hospital concluded that B.C. ’ s behavior was more manipulative than substantive. See J.C.W.G. , 613 S.W.3d at 569 ; J

.B.C. , 233 S.W.3d at 97

. E. April 2021
— B.C. request e d jury trial
Sho rtl y after returning to ju venile detenti on, o n Ap ril 1 3, 2021, B. C. reque ste d a jury trial

. Tackett expla ined that due to the COVID

- 19 pandemic, the juvenile court

was not co nductin g any j ury trials

. Unt il such ti me a s th e COVID

- 19 rest rictions w ere

remove d, t he State was not abl e to procee d

. A factfin d er could have reasonably conclude d that any delay caused by B.C. ’ s request for a jury tr ial and the pandemic tha t made jury trials impossible was beyond
the State’s c ontrol a nd that the f ailure to pro ceed wa s not d ue to any lack of du e diligence b y the St a te , so this evidence sup port s the juvenile court’s Section12 54.02(j)(4)(A) and Section 51.0412(3) finding s . See J.C. W.G. , 6 13 S .W.3d at 569 ; J.B.C. , 233 S.W.3d at 97

. F. May 2021
— B. C. released from detent ion
T he juvenile cour t signed an order o n Ma y 3, 2021, rel e asing B.C. fro m deten tion with condi tions. This allo wed B.C. to wait f or his j ury trial from his
mother ’ s home. G. June 2021
— B.C. withdr e w request for jury trial , and benc h trial set for August
B.C. withd re w his reques t for a jury trial o n June 2 8 , 2021

. Two days later, o n June 30, 2 021, t he juvenile court set the case fo r a bench trial on August 18, 2021. August 18 was , however, after B .C. ’ s eighteenth bi rthday. The trial date was set p romptly aft er B.C. withd rew his request for a jury t r ia l.
No thing here su ggests an abs ence of due diligence. The trial date it s elf was a function
of the court ’ s doc ket, something over which the S t a te had no control. Both support the juvenile court’s Sec tion 54.02(j)(4)( A) and Sectio n 51.0412(3) finding s . See J

.C.W.G. , 613 S.W.3d a t 569 ; J.B.C. , 233 S.W.3d at 97

. H. July 2021
— State fi le d petiti o n for discretionary transfer About three weeks after the juvenile court set B.C. ’ s case for trial, o n July 19 , 2021, the State filed a pe tition f or disc retionary tra nsfer

. J uly 19 wa s less than a m onth before B.C. ’ s eighteenth birthday

. F iled before B.C. ’ s ei ghteenth b irthday, the Sta te relie d exclusively o n Section 54.02(a) of the Texas Fam ily Code. See Tex. Fam. Code13 Ann . § 54.0 2(a). As discussed below , the State arg ued th at Section 54.02(a) ap plied regardless of w hether the t r ansfer hearing itself occurred after B.C. ’ s eig hteenth b irthday. B.C. argues that the sixteen month s between the filing of the o riginal peti tion
alle ging delinquen t conduct and the filing of the pet it

ion to transf er was un tenable. See J.G. , 495 S.W.3d at 3 59 , 370 ( noting four months between original petition and
motion to t ransfer); B.R.H. , 426 S.W.3d at 1 65

– 66 , 16 8 ( noting (1) the five

- m onth delay between the date that the S t ate received the offense report and the date tha t th e State char ged the juvenile a nd (2) the t wo
- month delay between the date that the State filed its original petition and the date of the f irst hearing). We disagre e. B.C. cites no statute dict ating that the State must file a pe tition to tran sfer by a
date certain. B .C. attribute s the delay to a lack of due diligence , but the d elay also
could hav e be en a ttrib uted to a n intention to keep B.C. ’ s case in the ju venil e court

— at lea st until a cert ain point

. When it became apparent that B.C. cou ld not be tried in the juvenil e court until after his eighteenth birthday, the Sta te apparently reevaluated how to pr oc eed a nd d ecided to seek a transfer. In short, the tim ing of the State ’ s petition to transfer lent itself to mu ltiple inferences. See J.G. , 495 S.W.3d at 370. Thus , the tim ing of th e State ’ s petition to transfer

— about three weeks after it was fi nally able t o pro c ure a t ria l setting

— could b e reasona bly viewed as due dilig ence or, at the very least, could b e reasonably viewed as not s howing a lack of due d il igence. See J.C .W.G. , 613 S. W.3d at 569 ; J.B.C. , 233 S.W.3d at 97

.14 I
. July 2021 to November 2021
— Diagno stic stud y prepa red
After the State filed it s petitio n to tr a nsfer on J uly 19, 2021 , B.C. fil ed on July 21, 2021, an “ Opposition to Petition for Discret ionary Transfer ” and a “ Motio n for Continuance ” in whic h he reque sted an independent examinat ion as requ ired by
th e Texas Fa mi ly Cod e and a trial contin uance so tha t the required diagnostic r eport could be prepared

. See Tex. Fam. Co de Ann. § 54.02 (d)

. The juvenile court , howeve r, had already ordered the dia gnostic study o n J uly 19, 2021

. And o n J uly 2 2 , 2021, t he juvenile cour t signed an ord er (1) a ppoi n ting Dr. Shipl ey to con duct the study and

c omplete i t by S eptember 1 5, 2021 , and (2) granting a “ continuan ce of the benc h trial set for August 18, 2021, pending the receipt of t he diagnostic repo rt [] and [ a ] hearing
on the matter of Discreti on ary Transfe r . ” Preparing the diagnos tic study took longer than an ticipated. Dr. Shiple y filed a 53

- page, single

- spaced diagn ostic study on November 16, 2021. Reg arding the delay,
Dr. S hipley stated, Being mind f ul of the court ’ s time, I will ju st say that in addition to the great deal of rec ords an d the breadth of th e ev aluation, I thi nk in Septembe r there were two trials

-- I b elieve they w ere all Septe mber

-- tha t I testified in, one I was on standb y and had p r epared for. I also had to return to Iowa with my mom to help her em pty a house that she needed to get herse lf o ut of to be sol d, and I had a n aunt and a grandmother pass away w ithin t hat same mont h as wel l. And due to COVID concerns, we went ba ck 30 days l ater for my aunt ’ s services. And I also had a prior com mitment at a forensic conference to do two sepa rate pres entations that last week in O ctober that I had committed to in th e summe r.15 A f act fin der could reasonably conclude that th e delay occ a sioned by the diagnos tic study was beyond the State ’ s c ontrol, wh ich would support the ju venile court ’ s Sec tion 54.02(j)(4 )(A) finding. See J.C.W.G. , 6 13 S.W.3d at 569 ; J.B.C. , 233 S. W.3d at
97

. J . Nov emb er 2021
— B.C. abscond ed ; B.C. detained
Wh ile Dr. Ship l e y was still working on the diagnostic study, o n November 8, 2021, the juvenile court sign ed a “ Directive to Apprehend an d D etai n ” authori zing
law enf or cement to detain B.C. and reman d “ said ju venil e to a su it able detention facility. ” T he supportin g af fid avit indi cated that B.C. had removed his electronic leg
monitor and t hat B.C. ’ s w here abouts were unk no wn. Wi thin a few hours, B.C. ’ s brother located hi m . B ut B.C. cut his wri s ts when t he po lice arrived , so he wa s transported t o a hospi ta l. Although the extent of B.C. ’ s injuries is not clear, a

reason able inference i s that they could not have been that severe because two da ys lat er, a t th e Nov e mber 10, 20 21 det ention hearing, the juvenile c ourt o rdered B.C. to

r emain in the juvenile detention facility. A reasonable inference is that B.C. wa nted to
avoid the transfer hearing. See J.C.W.G. , 613 S.W.3d at 569 ; J.B.C. , 233 S.W.3d at 97

. K . De cember 2021
— Transf er hearing
1. Exh au stion o f juvenil e ser vices
The heari ng on the State ’ s petition for discretionary transfer occurred on
Dec ember 17, 202 1

— about four month s after B.C. ’ s eighteenth birthday. Tackett

test ified that the juve n i le depar tment had “ offered ever yt hing we could thr ow at him16 that he qualifies for and at this time there’s nothing left that we can offer him in the community. ”
2. St ate s tymied
Tackett acknowledge d that while B.C. was a t the mental hospit al, B .C. technically rema ined in the proba t ion d epartmen t’s custody. He also acknowl edged
that w hile B.C. was in the hospital, at no point was B.C. not f it for trial. Despite b eing
in the probation department ’ s custody a nd despit e B. C

. ’ s bei ng fit for trial, Tackett expl a in ed that he had not heard of an y instance when a self

- harming juven ile would be brought from the hospital to juvenile cou rt to stand trial. 2 Finally, Tackett explained the significance of B.C

. ’ s reque stin g a jury trial on ce he returned from th e ho spital. D uring th e pandemic , the juvenil e court had no jury
trials

. 3. Confu sion over which transfer prov ision applied
At the clos e of the hearing, t he State argued that Section 54. 02(a), not Sect ion
5 4.02 (j) , applied because it had filed it s petition t o transfer before B. C. ’ s eighteenth birthda y . The juvenile court, however, opte d t o apply Sec tion 54.02(j). The State did not dispute that Section 51.0412

— the jurisdictiona l pr o vision

— applied.

2 Although B .C. expressed s uicidal ideation when h e was returned to the juvenile d et ention facility in March 2021, and although B.C. cu t his wri s ts whe n appr ehend ed by the police in November 2021, these inciden ts were osten sibly treated as attempts to manipulate. See J.C.W.G ., 613 S .W.3d at 569; J.B.C. , 2 33 S.W.3d at 97.17 B.C. ar gues that be ca use the State thought that it was proceeding under Section
54. 02(a), it failed to pro ve up Section 54.02(j)( 4)(A)

— that it was not prac ticable to proceed in juvenile court before his eighteenth birth d ay f o r reason s beyond the State ’ s control

— a nd, in the pro cess, als o failed to prove up the State’s due diligence under Section 51.0412(3). We disagre e . The record shows that t he State was aware that Section 51.0412 applied and,
inferentiall y, t h at i t had to prove due diligence. Bo th Section 51.04 12 (3) and Section
5 4.02(j)(4)(A) are concerned with delays and their explanati on s , so evidence to
sup port on e frequently suppo rt s the oth er. And the record shows that the juvenile

cour t was aware tha t Se c t ion 54.02(j) applied , so

— regardless o f what the Sta te believed

— the juvenile court focused on whether the State had prove n that , f or reasons beyond the S tate ’ s control, proceeding in juve ni le court before B.C .’s eighteenth birthday was not pract icable

. A s discussed above, evidence supports the ju

venile cour t ’ s Section 51.0412 (3) and Section 5 4.02(j)(4)(A) findings.
L. Ruling
We hold that m or e than a scinti lla of evidence supports the juvenile c ourt ’ s finding s that for reason s beyond the control of the St ate, it was not pr actica b l e to
proce ed in t he juvenile cour t before B.C. ’ s eighteenth b irthday and that the State u sed
due d il igence , an d w e hold tha t those fin dings are not so against the grea t wei ght and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wron g or u n just. See J. G. , 495 S.W.3d
at 3 69

– 70. Because B.C. con tested only these t wo findings, and because we find t he18 evidence both lega lly and factu ally su fficient to s upport them, we further hold that the juvenile court ’ s decision to waive its jurisdiction and tra n sfer B.C. ’ s proceedings to a
di strict court was both r easonable and principled and , thus, d id not constitut e an abuse of discret ion

. See H.Y

. , 51 2 S.W.3d at 47 8

– 7 9 ; J. G. , 495 S.W.3d a t 370. We
overrule B.C. ’ s sole issue.
V . Conclusion Having over rule d B. C . sole issue, we affirm the juvenile cour t ’ s order. /s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade B irdwell Justice Delivered: May 5, 2022