Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 

JJ., and Russell and Lacy1, S.JJ. 

CRAIG K. HERON, JR., ET AL. OPINION BY 

SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 

v. Record No. 061813 September 14, 2007 

TRANSPORTATION CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Lydia Calvert Taylor, Judge 

 The Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-296, 94 

Stat. 793 (1980), requires entities registered as interstate 

motor carriers with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration (FMCSA) to maintain liability insurance for the 

protection of the public. 94 Stat. at 820-32.2

 The requisite 

insurance is provided by a federally-mandated form called an 

“MCS-90” endorsement, and is a required part of any policy of 

insurance maintained by a registered interstate motor carrier. 

This appeal presents the question whether MCS-90 coverage 

extends to judgments recovered against a registered interstate 

motor carrier arising from negligence in the operation of a 

vehicle engaged in a purely intrastate haul. 

 1

 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 

August 16, 2007. 

2

 The codification of these provisions is currently found 

in 49 U.S.C. §§ 13906, 31138 and 31139 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 

Federal regulations implementing the requirements of the 

statutes and setting forth the text of the required 

endorsement may be found in 49 C.F.R. at §§ 387.1 et seq., 

particularly §§ 387.7, 387.9, and 387.15 (2006). 
2

Facts and Proceedings

 The essential facts are stipulated. ER Transport 

Services, Inc. (ER) is a Florida corporation with its 

principal place of business in Miami, Florida. ER was 

registered with the FMCSA as an interstate motor carrier and 

its vehicle bore its motor carrier number (formerly called an 

ICC number) at the time of the events in question. ER 

obtained an insurance policy with Transportation Casualty 

Insurance Company (TCI) through an insurance broker in 

Florida, disclosing that ER was engaged in operations in 

various states, and furnishing its motor carrier number so 

that the policy would conform to FMCSA requirements. The 

policy, issued on February 3, 2004, contained the MCS-90 

endorsement, which reads in pertinent part: 

In consideration of the premium stated in the policy 

to which this endorsement is attached, the insurer 

(the company) agrees to pay, within the limits of 

liability described herein, any final judgment 

recovered against the insured for public liability 

resulting from negligence in the operation, 

maintenance or use of motor vehicles subject to the 

financial responsibility requirements of Sections 29 

and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 regardless 

of whether or not each motor vehicle is specifically 

described in the policy and whether or not such 

negligence occurs on any route or in any territory 

authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere. 

 Fifty percent of ER’s business consisted of hauling mulch 

resulting from tree removal, as well as other debris caused by 

hurricane damage. On February 23, 2004, ER’s employee, Arturo 
3

M. Rosello, who had traveled from Florida to Virginia the 

previous day, was driving a tractor-trailer owned by ER in the 

City of Virginia Beach. Rosello’s destination was nearby 

Chesapeake, Virginia, where the vehicle was to be measured to 

haul mulch. The mulch, in turn, was to be delivered to 

Suffolk, Virginia. While driving on Interstate 64 in Virginia 

Beach, Rosello’s tractor-trailer collided with an automobile 

operated by Craig K. Heron. Craig K. Heron and Alma P. Heron 

were killed and their daughter, Cassandra S. Heron, suffered 

serious and permanent injuries. 

 TCI brought a motion for declaratory judgment in the 

circuit court against the estates of Craig and Alma Heron and 

the guardian of Cassandra Heron, seeking a judicial 

determination that the insurance policy issued by TCI to ER 

provided no coverage for the accident and that TCI had no 

obligation to pay any judgment that might be rendered as a 

result of it. After hearing the case on stipulated facts, 

exhibits and depositions, the court ruled that the MCS-90 

endorsement only applies to accidents that occur in the course 

of transportation in interstate commerce. The accident in 

question here, the court reasoned, occurred while the driver 

of the tractor-trailer was engaged in an activity that was 

exclusively intrastate, and therefore the MCS-90 coverage was 
4

not available.3 The Court entered a final declaratory judgment 

order consistent with that ruling and we awarded an appeal to 

the guardian and the personal representatives of the Herons. 

Analysis

 Because this appeal turns entirely upon a question of 

law, we review the circuit court’s decision de novo. PMA 

Capital Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc., 271 Va. 352, 357-58, 626 

S.E.2d 369, 372 (2006). The language of the MCS-90 

endorsement has been interpreted and applied by several courts 

which have reached differing conclusions.4

 The circuit court 

analyzed those authorities and concluded that the language of 

the endorsement should be interpreted in the light of the 

federal statutes and regulations that engendered its use. 

 3

 Because Rosello had a bad driving record, the policy 

explicitly excluded him as a covered driver. The parties 

stipulate that the policy affords no coverage for the accident 

unless coverage is provided by the MCS-90 endorsement. 

4

 See, e.g., Century Indem. Co. v. Carlson, 133 F.3d 591, 

594 (8th Cir. 1998) (MCS-90 applies only to motor carriers 

engaged in interstate commerce); Reliance Nat'l Ins. Co. v. 

Royal Indem. Co, No. 99 Civ. 10920 (NRB), 2001 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 12901, at *15-21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2001) (when a 

shipper enters into a lease for a vehicle with the clear 

intent of using it for interstate shipping services, MCS-90 

applies to a single intrastate use of such vehicle); Royal 

Indem. Co. v. Jacobsen, 863 F. Supp. 1537, 1540-42 (D. Utah 

1994) (MCS-90 applies to the transport of commodities, even 

when such commodities are exempt from the ICC's jurisdiction); 

Branson v. MGA Ins. Co., 673 So.2d 89, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 

1996) (MCS-90 does not apply to wholly intrastate hauls); 

Thompson v. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co., 120 S.W.3d 511, 514-16 (Tex. 

App. 2003) (MCS-90 does not apply to solely intrastate 

transport). 
5

Thus, the court reasoned, the MCS-90 coverage applies only in 

accordance with the mandates of §§ 29 and 30 of the Motor 

Carrier Act of 1980, which only require coverage when a 

vehicle transports property in interstate commerce. The court 

concluded that “the coverage provided by the MCS-90 form is 

limited to interstate commerce, as contemplated by 49 C.F.R. 

§387.3.” 

 With deference to the authorities that have reached a 

different result, our analysis is less complex. Regardless of 

the forces that have motivated the insurance industry to adopt 

the language of the MCS-90 endorsement, the question presented 

to us is a simple one of interpreting the plain language of a 

written contract. The MCS-90 is a part of a contract between 

insurer and insured. In Magann Equipment v. Buffkin, 238 Va. 

712, 385 S.E.2d 619 (1989), we considered the language of the 

MCS-90 endorsement in a different context, determining which 

of two insurance policies provided primary, rather than 

secondary, coverage. Although we found the language unclear 

as to its effect on the rest of the policy, we found the 

language of the MCS-90 endorsement, within its four corners, 

to be clear and unambiguous. Id. at 720, 385 S.E.2d at 623. 

We held that the endorsement must be construed by first 

looking to its language. Id. at 718, 385 S.E.2d at 622. In 

the present case, the parties agree that the rest of the 
6

policy has no application. Thus, the answer to the question 

presented on appeal lies entirely within the four corners of 

the MCS-90 endorsement. 

 Written contracts are construed as written, without 

adding terms that were not included by the parties. When the 

terms in a contract are plain and unambiguous, the contract is 

construed according to its plain meaning. The words that the 

parties used are normally given their usual, ordinary and 

popular meaning. No word or clause in a contract will be 

treated as meaningless if a reasonable meaning can be given to 

it, and there is a presumption that the parties have not used 

words needlessly. PMA Capital Ins. Co., 271 Va. at 358, 626 

S.E.2d at 372-73. 

 We adhere to the view we adopted in Magann: The language 

of the MCS-90 endorsement, insofar as it sets forth the 

coverage therein provided, is clear, plain and unambiguous. 

In consideration of the premium, the insurer agrees to pay 

“any final judgment recovered against the insured for public 

liability resulting from negligence in the operation, 

maintenance or use of motor vehicles subject to the financial 

responsibility requirements of Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor 

Carrier Act of 1980, regardless of whether or not each motor 

vehicle is specifically described in the policy and whether or 

not such negligence occurs on any route or in any territory 
7

authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere.” On the 

stipulated facts, ER, the named insured, was the owner of a 

vehicle that was subject to the financial responsibility 

requirements of the Motor Carrier Act. ER was subject to a 

claim and a potential judgment for damages resulting from 

negligence in the operation of that vehicle. The insurer was 

obligated to pay any such judgment arising from negligence in 

the operation of that vehicle anywhere. The contract language 

contains no terms limiting the coverage to the use or 

operation of the vehicle in interstate commerce, and we will 

not read such absent terms into the contract the parties made. 

It is therefore unnecessary to consider the federal statute or 

regulations that motivated the parties to adopt the language 

they chose to employ. The language speaks for itself. 

Conclusion

 For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment 

appealed from and remand the case to the circuit court with 

direction to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with this 

opinion. 

Reversed and remanded.