# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 21, 2019 * Decided December 6, 2019

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1383

MICHAEL JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

ANTHONY GARANT, RAYMOND FOOTE, and WILLIAM BROWN, Defendants-Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 17 C 7293

Manish S. Shah, J udge

.

O R D E R

Michael Johnson, an inmate at the Stateville Correctional Center in Illinois, alleged that three correctional officers knew he was in imminent danger of suicide but took no steps to prevent his suicide attempt, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that any officer was deliberately indifferent to a known risk that Johnson would attempt suicide. We affirm the judgment.

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts an d legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 19-1383 Page 2

Johnson sued the three officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of seriou s harm for their conduct before his suicide attempt. 1 In his complaint, Johnson alleged that when he was being transported back to his cell after a medical appointment, he sepa rately asked the officers to call a Crisis Intervention Team member. He told them th at he was “hearing voices,” his “father was taunting [him],” and he “wanted to commit su icide.” The officers ignored his requests. Johnson also told the officers that he felt unsafe in his cell, but they placed him there anyway, then left him alone. Johnson then attempted suicide by bu rning his arm with a roll of toilet paper that he set on fire.

After discovery, the defendants moved fo r summary judgment, relying primarily on the officers’ declarations and excerpts fr om Johnson’s deposition. In opposing the motion, Johnson did not properly respond to the defendants’ proposed statement of undisputed material facts, which the court then deemed admitted. See N.D. I LL

. R. 56.1(b)(3)(B), (C). According to this statement, while he was being escorted to his cell in a segregation unit, Johnson asked each defe ndant “to see a [Crisis Intervention Team] member because he was feeling suicidal.” Bu t none of the officers recalled this, nor whether Johnson stated he “intended to immediately harm himself.” Johnson then burned himself using “undisclosed means” that were “against prison policy.” Based on these facts, the district court entered summ ary judgment for the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that Jo hnson’s “freestanding” request to speak to a crisis counselor showed the officers’ awarene ss of a substantial risk that Johnson would imminently attempt suicide.

On appeal, Johnson argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the defendants’ awareness of his risk of self-h arm because he told all three officers that he felt suicidal and unsafe in his cell. Ye t they placed him in his cell—where they knew he had access to any number of items that he could use to harm himself—and did not call a crisis team member to come speak with him. Johnson does not challenge the district court’s decision to deem the de fendants’ statement of facts admitted.

To survive summary judgment, Johnson needed evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the defend ants knowingly and unreasonably failed to respond to an objectively serious risk of harm. See Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 844–

1 Johnson also alleged an Eighth Amendme nt violation based on the defendants’ conduct after his suicide attempt. But on appeal, he does not challenge the district court’s ruling in that regard, so we spend no more time on it.No. 19-1383 Page 3

45 (1994); Wilson v. Adams , 901 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2018). When the serious risk at issue is attempted suicide, a defendant acts knowingly and unreasonably if he “(1) subjectively knew the prisoner was at subs tantial risk of committing suicide and (2) intentionally disregarded the risk.” Lisle v. Welborn , 933 F.3d 705, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Collins v. Seeman , 462 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2006)). The defendant “must be cognizant of the significant likelihood that an inmate may imminently seek to take his own life.” Collins , 462 F.3d at 761. There is no question that the defendants did not take any steps to protect Johnson from self-harm, 2 so the only question is whether Johnson raised a genuine issue of material fact about their subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of self-inflicted harm.

Based on the evidence at summary judgme nt, he did not. Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Johnson, a reasonable jury could not find that the defendants knew of a substantial risk of suic ide based only on Johnson’s statements that he felt suicidal and wanted to speak to a crisis counselor. The presence of common items in his cell, including sheets and clothing (even if this argument was not waived for failing to raise it in the district co urt), does not change the analysis. These circumstances lacked any indi cation that he may have “imminently” sought to have harmed himself. Collins , 462 F.3d at 761. And as the district court noted, this case is unlike Sanville v. McCaughtry , 266 F.3d 724. 737–38 (7th Cir. 2001), in which we concluded that allegations supporting the prison guards’ awareness of the inmate’s substantial risk of suicide were sufficient to wi thstand a motion to dismiss. In that case, the inmate (whose allegations were accepted as true given the procedural posture) did more than tell guards that he planned to commi t suicide. According to the plaintiff, the defendants also knew that: he had written a last will and testament; he had previously attempted suicide; he was no longer eating; and his mother had called the prison to alert them that her son was suicidal. See 266 F.3d at 737. These additional facts would be enough to put a defendant on notice th at the plaintiff’s statement was not idle.

2 We put little stock in the defendants ’ argument that, even though it was unknown to Johnson, one of the three officers was, in fact, a Crisis Intervention Team member, and so “Johnson got what he wanted .” Of course, his request was not to be in the presence of an undisclosed crisis coun selor—he wanted a chance to meaningfully speak to someone who could help him. In any case, the defendants disclaim any memory of Johnson’s request, so they ca nnot also argue that they fulfilled it.No. 19-1383 Page 4

The defendants’ argument on this poin t overstates things, however. Citing Collins v. Seeman , 462 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2006), they argue that “a request to see a crisis counselor, standing alone, is not suffi cient” to put a defendant on notice of the inmate’s substantial risk of suicide. That statement in Collins , however, related only to those defendants who were not told why an inmate wanted to see a crisis counselor. See id. at 759, 761. There is no dispute in this case that Johnson also said he felt suicidal.

Nonetheless, these circumstan ces were insufficient to create a triable issue about whether the officers were subjectively aware of a substantial risk that Johnson would imminently attempt suicide. To the extent th at the record contained additional evidence that could support Johnson’s claim, 3 the district court was not required to comb through the record to find it. See Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc. , 919 F.3d 405, 414– 15 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing Local Rule 56.1 and its aim to “make summary-judgment decisionmaking manageable for courts”).

We also note that with the issuance of this Order, Johnson’s “Motion for Status Report” (Dkt. No. 30) is now moot. AFFIRMED

3 Portions of Johnson’s deposition and pr e-incident medical reports reference his diagnosed mental health conditions (inc luding schizophrenia and depression), a previous suicide attempt, and his lack of sc hizophrenia medication in the days before his suicide attempt. But that evidence is no t part of the record on summary judgment. We note, however, that these facts go to the seriousness of the risk of Johnson harming himself, but not the defendants’ subjective knowledge.