[Cite as State v. Davila, 2024-Ohio-2672.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- vs -

EDWIN J. DAVILA,

Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO. 2024-T-0024

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas

Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00781

O P I N I O N

Decided: July 12, 2024

Judgment: Reversed

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant 

Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 

44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

Elizabeth Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Melissa Seabolt, Assistant Public Defender, 

250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Defendant-Appellant).

MATT LYNCH, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Edwin J. Davila, appeals the judgment of the trial court 

finding him to have violated his probation. For the following reasons, we reverse the 

judgment of the court below.

{¶2} On January 5, 2023, Davila entered a plea of guilty to a single count of 

Attempted Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first 

degree in violation of R.C. 2923.16(D) and (I).
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{¶3} On February 14, 2023, Davila was sentenced to one year of community 

control with a suspended sentence of 180 days in the Trumbull County Jail and a 

suspended fine of $1,000.

{¶4} On January 18, 2024, the trial court issued a Probation Warrant for Davila 

for a violation of his probation / community control.

{¶5} On March 5, 2024, a probation violation hearing was held. Davila argued 

that the trial court was without authority to proceed because his probation expired on 

February 9, 2024. The court rejected the argument and Davila pled to the violation. The 

court ordered Davila to serve 180 days in the Trumbull County Jail.

{¶6} On March 8, 2024, Davila filed a Notice of Appeal. On appeal, he raises 

the following assignment of error: “The trial court lacked authority to sentence Mr. Davila 

for a probation violation after his term of community control expired.”

{¶7} The question of whether a lower court is authorized to conduct proceedings 

for violation of community control and/or probation is reviewed de novo. State v. Sayers, 

2023-Ohio-672, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.).

{¶8} It is well-established that a court of common pleas lacks authority to revoke 

a defendant’s community control and/or probation and impose sentence after the period 

of community control has expired. State v. Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706, ¶ 16; Sayers at ¶ 11 

(although Rue was a felony case governed by R.C. 2929.15(A)(1), “its holding is 

applicable to misdemeanor matters since both the felony and misdemeanor statutes 

relating to probation/community control contain essentially identical provisions”). “A 

community control sanction continues for the period that the judge or magistrate 

determines and ... may be extended.” R.C. 2951.07. “If the offender under community 
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control absconds or otherwise leaves the jurisdiction of the court without permission from 

the probation officer, the probation agency, or the court to do so, or if the offender is 

confined in any institution for the commission of any offense, the period of community 

control ceases to run until the time that the offender is brought before the court for its 

further action.” Id. Likewise, “a trial court is ‘authorized to conduct proceedings on the 

alleged community-control violations even though they were conducted after the 

expiration of the term of community control, provided that the notice of violations was 

properly given and the revocation proceedings were commenced before the expiration.’” 

(Citation omitted.) Rue at ¶ 18.

{¶9} In the present case, the State of Ohio acknowledges “the fact that the trial 

court did not specifically issue a judicial determination that Appellant had absconded prior 

to the expiration of his community control sanctions” and “that the trial court did not initiate

formal court proceedings, nor schedule the violation court proceedings, until Appellant’s 

apprehension after the expiration of his community control sanctions.” Answer Brief of 

Plaintiff-Appellee at 5. The narrow issue before this Court, then, is whether the issuance 

of the Probation Warrant on January 18, 2024, extended the period of Davila’s community 

control sanction so that the trial court had authority to conduct revocation proceedings. 

We conclude that the issuance of the Probation Warrant did not extend the period of 

community control sanctions. The Probation Warrant only authorized Davila’s arrest for 

a “probation violation.” It does not constitute proper notice of the violation, i.e., it did not 

describe the violation or petition the court to initiate revocation proceedings. Such a 

petition does not appear to have been filed in the present case at all. The court did not 

set the matter for hearing and issue proper notice of that hearing until February 26, 2024, 
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after the expiration of the period of community control on February 9. Compare State ex 

rel. Untied v. Ellwood, 2011-Ohio-6343, ¶ 2 (“[t]he charge against Untied for violating 

community control was filed on February 16, 2011, i.e., before his community control 

expired”); State v. Thomas, 2014-Ohio-2912, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.) (“the probation officer filed 

the statement of violation on July 16, 2013, and an entry setting a revocation hearing was 

filed that same date (and prior to the expiration of community control)”).

{¶10} This Court reached the same conclusion, i.e., that the issuance of a 

Probation Warrant does not extend the period of community control, in State v. 

Washington, 2024-Ohio-XXXX, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.) (“the mere issuance of a warrant will not 

automatically toll the expiration of a community control sanction”).

{¶11} In this regard, we also find the reasoning of State v. Padgett, 2023-Ohio4357 (3d Dist.) to be persuasive:

While that arrest warrant contained language stating that Padgett 

“has failed to abide by conditions of supervision” and stating that her 

whereabouts were unknown, we do not find that merely issuing the 

arrest warrant constitutes a “determination” by the trial court in 

“timely initiated proceedings” that the defendant had absconded, as 

required by the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Rue. Additionally, 

as the Ohio Supreme Court deemed necessary in Rue, the arrest 

warrant contained no language that would have served to put 

Padgett on notice, even constructively, that her term of community 

control had been extended, or tolled, as a result of her failure to abide 

by the conditions of her supervision. Finally, we note that the 

defendant in State v. Rue also had warrants issued for his arrest after 

absconding supervision and, while not addressed directly by the 

Ohio Supreme Court in its decision, the fact that a warrant had been 

issued was seemingly not a factor relevant to the issue of whether 

the community control term had been tolled by the trial court.

Id. at ¶ 19.

{¶12} The sole assignment of error is with merit.
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{¶13} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court below 

finding Davila guilty of a probation violation and imposing a jail sentence. Costs to be 

taxed against the appellee.

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.