NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NELSON YUDINI GUADRON, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General,

Respondent. 

No. 16-72894

Agency No. A094-178-309

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 14, 2018**

Pasadena, California

Before: McKEOWN and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and DONATO,*** District 

Judge.

Nelson Yudini Guadron, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for 

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), which denied 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable James Donato, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 5 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 

his motion to reopen his claims for withholding of removal and protection under 

the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), 

and we deny the petition.

Guadron’s motion to reopen was subject to a 90-day deadline, see 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(c)(2); Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 607–09 (9th Cir. 2014), but was not 

filed until almost three years after the Board’s decision. To excuse this 

untimeliness, Guadron seeks to rely on the exception in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), which provides that “[t]here is no time limit on the filing of a 

motion to reopen” if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in 

the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if 

such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been 

discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” See also 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The Board concluded that Guadron “has not demonstrated a change in 

country conditions material to his claim for relief” and that he “has not established 

a material change in conditions in El Salvador,” and consequently denied 

Guadron’s motion to reopen as “untimely.” We review this denial for abuse of 

discretion, and may reverse the Board’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, 

or contrary to law.” Go, 744 F.3d at 609 (quoting Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770, 

773 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 3 

We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion. The record 

indicates that the Board properly considered all pertinent factors, both favorable 

and unfavorable, in determining whether to grant the motion. It properly 

concluded within the bounds of its discretion that the newly submitted evidence 

showed that ongoing and substantially similar conditions of violence related to 

gangs had existed at the time of the applicant’s hearing. With respect to police 

involvement in, and the government’s awareness and condoning of, extrajudicial 

killing of gang members in El Salvador, the Board did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that the evidence was not definitive. Finally, the Board did not abuse 

its discretion in finding that Guadron had not alleged receiving any new, specific 

threats to him as an individual. 

The Board consequently acted within the “broad discretion” it has in 

deciding a motion to reopen. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 

2010). While both sides have briefed at some length Guadron’s additional 

arguments about his prima facie eligibility for withholding of removal and his 

counsel’s failure to challenge the Immigration Judge’s prior conclusion that 

Guadron is ineligible for that relief because he was convicted of a “particularly 

serious crime,” we need not, and decline to, reach those arguments. See Toufighi v. 

Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 997 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the Board may deny a

motion to reopen for failing to meet any of four burdens, which include prima facie 
 4 

eligibility, need to produce evidence of changed conditions, and that the evidence 

is “material”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.