Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 92A05-1507-JT-980| January 21, 2016 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Andrew E. Grossnickle

Green, Grossnickle & Flecker, LLP

Syracuse, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of: B.G. and Br.G. (Minor 

Children),

K.F. and Z.G.,

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

January 21, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

92A05-1507-JT-980

Appeal from the Whitley Circuit 

Court

The Honorable James R. Heuer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

92C01-1502-JT-4 and 

92C01-1502-JT-5
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Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] K.F. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights over 

her two minor children, Bra. G. and Bri. G. (“the children”).1 Mother presents 

a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court’s judgment is 

clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In June of 2012, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed 

petitions in which it alleged the children to be Children in Need of Services 

(“CHINS”) due to Mother’s drug use and her incarceration. Mother later 

admitted that the children were CHINS. Consequently, the trial court ordered 

Mother to participate in various services, including certain therapy and 

visitation sessions. 

[3] On February 26, 2015, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights over the children. Following a fact-finding hearing in which numerous 

service providers testified, the court entered the following findings of fact:

19. [Bra. G.] is described as a girl that [sic] likes to keep to 

herself. She has been diagnosed with ADHD.

 

1

 Although Z.G., the children’s father, was a party to the trial court proceedings and also had his parental 

rights terminated, he does not participate in this appeal.
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20. [Bri. G.] is described as rather protective of her older 

sister . . . and is attached to her foster sister . . . . [Bri. G.] enjoys 

doing whatever [her foster sister] does. She has nearly outgrown 

[Bra. G.], although she is approximately a year younger.

21. The children have been in the care of their maternal great 

aunt and uncle . . . since the time the children were removed . . . .

22. [Bra. G.] is involved in speech therapy, and she has an 

Individual Education Plan (IEP).

23. [Bra. G.] sees Dr. Hani Ahmad, a child psychiatrist at the 

Bowen Center in Columbia City, Indiana, as a result of her 

ADHD, behavior problems, and medication management.

24. Dr. Ahmad has seen [Bra. G.] since the summer of 2014.

25. In or around July 2014, Dr. Ahmad made a 

recommendation that [Bra. G.]’s visits with Mother be reduced 

to once a month as a result of behavior problems that relative 

caregivers were experiencing with [Bra. G.] after her visits with 

Mother.

* * *

29. Dr. Ahmad testified that [Bra. G.]’s behaviors improved after 

her visits with Mother were reduced to once a month. Dr. 

Ahmad testified that[,] after visits with Mother were reduced, 

[Bra. G.]’s anxiety got much better, and she was less nervous.

* * *
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34. In regards to Mother’s individual therapy and [participation 

with a Rehabilitation Services Provider (“RSP”)], service 

providers testified that Mother’s participation . . . has been 

inconsistent at least in the last year of the underlying CHINS 

causes.

35. Alicia Johnson, the DCS Local Liaison for Bowen 

Center, . . . testified that Mother was to attend RSP services twice 

weekly.

36. Johnson testified as to Mother’s attendance in RSP services 

since May 2014. Mother’s participation and attendance in RSP 

services was as follows:

a. May 2014: 0 attended sessions; 1 cancelled session;

b. June 2014: 0 attended sessions;

c. July 2014: 0 attended sessions;

d. August 2014: 0 attended sessions;

e. September 2014: 0 attended sessions; 1 cancelled 

session;

f. October 2014: 1 attended session; 1 cancelled session;

g. November 2014: 0 attended sessions; 1 cancelled

session; 1 no-showed session;

h. December 2014: 0 attended sessions; 2 cancelled 

sessions; 1 no-showed session;
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i. January 2015: 0 attended sessions; 1 cancelled session;

j. February 2015: 2 attended sessions;

k. March 2015: 1 attended session;

l. April 2015: 1 attended session;

m. May 2015: 3 attended sessions; 1 no-showed session.

37. Mother was completely absent from RSP services from May 

2014 through September 2014.

38. Amanda Freiburger . . . is Mother’s rehabilitation service 

provider . . . through the Bowen Center, and she has worked with 

Mother since Fall 2013.

39. Freiburger works with Mother on such things as budgeting, 

parenting, obtaining suitable housing, financial stability, 

obtaining her GED, and employment.

40. Mother attended GED classes in Fall of 2013, but she never 

obtained her GED.

41. Freiburger testified that Mother’s participation in services 

has been “up and down.” Freiburger observed that Mother 

would tend not to engage in services when her personal life [wa]s 

going well and would re-engage when her personal life was not 

going well. Freiburger used the example that[,] if Mother had a 

job, she would tend to be less engaged in services.
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42. Mother has been living at the Lighthouse, an organization 

that provides transitional housing, in Columbia City, Indiana[,] 

for approximately five (5) or six (6) months. 

43. Mother had been encouraged by DCS and services providers 

to consider living at the Lighthouse at least as of 2014.

44. Recently, Freiburger assisted Mother in preparing an 

application for shelter care plus, which assists those who have 

low income in getting . . . stable housing.

45. Mother is currently on the wait list for shelter care plus.

46. Freiburger testified that the . . . waiting period for shelter 

care plus could be anywhere from one (1) month to six (6) 

months.

47. Freiburger testified that Mother would need to focus on 

resolving her own issues before she would be in a position to 

have her children in her care.

48. Julie Shearer . . . is employed by the Bowen Center, and she 

is Mother’s therapist.

49. Shearer has been Mother’s therapist since July 2013.

50. Shearer describes Mother as a person who is in recovery and 

struggles with depression and anxiety.

51. Shearer works with Mother on abstinence, maintaining her 

sobriety, healthy relationships, and self-esteem.
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52. Mother was to attend individual therapy sessions once a 

week.

53. [Mother] participated in therapy from July 2013 to May 

2014, but she became inconsistent in attendance beginning in 

February 2014.

54. Mother did not attend any therapy sessions with Shearer 

between May 2014 and September 2014.

55. Shearer attempted to make contact with Mother.

56. Mother re-engaged in therapy on September 17, 2014.

57. Mother’s participation and attendance in therapy since 

September 17, 2014[,] was as follows:

a. October 2014: 2 attended sessions; 4 cancelled 

sessions; 1 no-showed session;

b. November 2014: 1 attended session; 1 cancelled 

session; 3 no-showed sessions;

c. December 2014: 3 attended sessions; 1 no-showed 

session;

d. January 2015: 2 attended sessions; 4 cancelled 

sessions; 1 no-showed session;

e. February 2015: 2 attended sessions; 1 cancelled 

session; 1 no-showed session;
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f. March 2015: 4 attended sessions; 

g. April 2015: 3 attended sessions; 2 cancelled sessions;

h. May 2015: 3 attended sessions; 1 no-showed session;

* * *

60. Mother did not submit to drug screens with Shearer when 

she was absent from participation in therapy.

* * *

71. Throughout the duration of the underlying CHINS causes, 

Mother has had supervised visitations with the children.

72. Mother’s supervised visitation began as goal-directed, a form 

of visitation in which the supervisor plays a more interactive role 

to assist Mother.

73. Mother’s visitation transitioned to supervised, observation 

only, a form of visitation in which the supervisor does not engage 

in the visitation.

74. In April 2015, there was a Child and Family Team Meeting 

in which Mother’s visitation was discussed. The team discussed 

transitioning Mother’s visits back to supervised, goal-directed. 

Mother agreed to this transition.

75. The time of Mother’s visitation also regressed. Throughout 

the underlying CHINS cases, Mother’s visitations increased from 

one (1) hour visits to two (2) hour visits to four (4) hour visits and 
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then back [to] two (2) hours as a result of Mother’s inconsistency 

in participating in services.

76. Throughout the underlying CHINS causes, Mother has 

never transitioned to unsupervised visitation with the children.

77. The CASA volunteer . . . recommends that termination of 

parental rights would serve the best interests of the children . . . .

78. FCM Chelsey Smith testified that terminating the parental 

rights of Mother would be in the children’s best interests.

Appellant’s App. at 18-23. 

[4] In light of its findings, the court concluded in relevant part:

2. There is a reasonable probability that:

a. The conditions which resulted in the children’s removal 

and continued placement outside the home will not be 

remedied by the parents;

b. That continuation of the parent-child relationship poses 

a threat to the children’s wellbeing.

Id. at 24. The court then terminated Mother’s parental rights over the children. 

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights over the 

children. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he 
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traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” 

Bailey v. Tippecanoe Div. of Family & Children (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the 

interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances 

surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re 

K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child 

relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is 

threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be 

terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental 

rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or 

her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[6] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove, in relevant part:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least 

six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

* * *

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 
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placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). That statute provides that DCS need establish only 

one of the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) before the trial court may 

terminate parental rights. DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of parental 

rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-

14-2).

[7] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Ofc. of 

Family & Children (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. 

denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial 

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s 
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judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. 

Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[8] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court entered specific 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment 

contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of 

review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 

2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, 

second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. 

“Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s 

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[9] Mother’s only argument on appeal is that DCS failed to demonstrate that “there 

is a reasonable probability the conditions which resulted in the children’s 

removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 9. In particular, Mother asserts that “the trial court failed to 

give sufficient weight to the efforts made by [M]other to achieve reunification.” 

Id. at 6. That is, Mother asserts that the trial court’s termination order is clearly 

erroneous because the court did not “take into account [Mother’s] fitness at the 

time of the” fact-finding hearing on DCS’s petition for the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 9.
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[10] Mother’s arguments are not well taken. First, she does not challenge the trial 

court’s alternative, and equally valid, basis for termination on the grounds that 

continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of 

the children. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii). Having failed to challenge this 

independent basis for the trial court’s order, Mother has waived this argument, 

and we are obliged to affirm the trial court’s order accordingly. In re L.S., 717 

N.E.2d at 209. 

[11] Second, Mother’s waiver notwithstanding, her challenge to the trial court’s 

order under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i) is merely a request for 

this court to reweigh the evidence. Mother does not challenge DCS’s evidence, 

the court’s factual findings, or the court’s reliance on those findings in its 

conclusions. Rather, she asserts only that the court “failed to give sufficient 

weight” to certain evidence Mother deems more favorable to her than the 

evidence the court relied on. Appellant’s Br. at 6. We will not reweigh the 

evidence on appeal. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265. We cannot say that the trial 

court’s order is clearly erroneous.

[12] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and May, J., concur.