#25863-a-JKM 

2011 S.D. 28

IN THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

JEREMY D. LLOYD, Claimant and Appellant, 

 v. 

BYRNE BRANDS d/b/a CICI’S 

MIDWEST, ALLIED INSURANCE, 

DAKOTALAND PIZZA, L.L.C. 

and FIRST COMP, Employers, Insurers 

and Appellees. 

* * * * 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 

THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 

MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

HONORABLE WILLIAM J. SRSTKA, JR. 

Judge 

* * * * 

BRAM WEIDENAAR of 

Hoy Trial Lawyers, Prof. L.L.C. 

Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for claimant 

and appellant. 

 * * * * 

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS 

ON MAY 23, 2011 

 OPINION FILED 06/22/11
RICHARD L. TRAVIS 

ERIC D. DENURE of 

May & Johnson, P.C. 

Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for appellee 

 Bryne Brands d/b/a 

 Cici’s and Allied. 

STEVEN J. MORGANS of 

Lynn, Jackson, Shultz 

 & Lebrun, P.C. 

Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for appellee 

Dakotaland Pizza and 

First Comp. 
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MEIERHENRY, Retired Justice 

[¶1.] Jeremy Lloyd was the general manager at CiCi’s Pizza in Sioux Falls, 

South Dakota, which was owned by Dakota Land Pizza. In 2008, Lloyd agreed to 

temporarily manage two CiCi’s Pizzas in Omaha, Nebraska, which were owned by 

Byrne Brands. Lloyd agreed to manage the Omaha CiCi’s Pizzas for two months in 

December 2008 and January 2009. Under this agreement, Lloyd was paid his usual 

salary from Dakota Land. Byrne Brands then reimbursed Dakota Land for Lloyd’s 

services. Byrne Brands reimbursed Lloyd personally for using his vehicle to travel 

from Sioux Falls to Omaha and between the two CiCi’s restaurants in Omaha. 

Byrne Brands also reimbursed Lloyd for hotel expenses in Omaha, meal expenses in 

Omaha, and travel expenses for two prearranged trips from Omaha to Sioux Falls. 

[¶2.] On a separate, non-prearranged and unreimbursed trip between 

Omaha and Sioux Falls in January 2009, Lloyd was involved in a rollover accident 

on Interstate 29. Lloyd subsequently filed a workers’ compensation claim against 

Dakota Land and Byrne Brands. The issue before this Court is whether Lloyd’s 

injuries sustained when driving from Omaha to Sioux Falls arose out of or in the 

course of his employment with Dakota Land or Byrne Brands. 

Analysis 

[¶3.] The facts of this case are undisputed. On these undisputed facts, the 

Department of Labor determined that no genuine issue of material fact 

demonstrated that Lloyd’s injuries arose out of or in the course of his employment. 

The Department therefore granted Dakota Land’s and Byrne Brands’ motions for 

summary judgment. The circuit court affirmed. This Court reviews the circuit 

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court’s decision to grant summary judgment by determining whether there are any 

genuine issues of material fact. Dykstra v. Page Holding Co., 2009 S.D. 38, ¶ 23, 

766 N.W.2d 491, 496 (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Ultimately, this Court “will affirm a 

granting of summary judgment ‘if the trial court correctly decided the legal 

issues[.]’” S.D. State Cement Plant Comm’n v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 2000 

S.D. 116, ¶ 9, 616 N.W.2d 397, 401 (quoting Alverson v. Nw. Nat’l Cas. Co., 1997 

S.D. 9, ¶ 4, 559 N.W.2d 234, 235 (citation omitted)). 

[¶4.] “To recover under workers’ compensation, a claimant must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that [he] sustained an injury ‘arising out of and in 

the course of the employment.’” Mudlin v. Hills Materials Co., 2005 S.D. 64, ¶ 7, 

698 N.W.2d 67, 71 (citing SDCL 62-1-1(7)). Both the “arising out of” and “in the 

course of the employment” requirements must be established. Id. ¶ 9. “[W]hile 

each factor must be analyzed independently, they are part of the general inquiry of 

whether the injury or condition complained of is connected to the employment.” Id. 

As with all workers’ compensation laws, the terms used are to be construed liberally 

in the employee’s favor. Id. ¶ 8. But “[g]enerally, employees injured while going to 

and coming from work are not covered under workers’ compensation.” Id. ¶ 7 (citing 

S.D. Pub. Entity Pool for Liab. v. Winger, 1997 S.D. 77, ¶ 19, 566 N.W.2d 125, 131 

(outlining the “going and coming” rule)). 

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 “Arising out of” employment 

[¶5.] The “arising out of” language requires a claimant to demonstrate that 

a “causal connection [exists] between the injury and the employment.” Id. ¶ 9. “The 

employment need not be the direct or proximate cause of the injury, rather it is 

sufficient if the ‘accident had its origin in the hazard to which the employment 

exposed the employee while doing [his] work.’” Id. ¶ 11 (quoting Canal Ins. Co. v. 

Abraham, 1999 S.D. 90, ¶ 12, 598 N.W.2d 512, 516). “The injury ‘arose out of the 

employment if: 1) the employment contributes to causing the injury; 2) the activity 

is one in which the employee might reasonably engage; or 3) the activity brings 

about the disability upon which compensation is based.’” Id. (quoting Grauel v. S.D. 

Sch. of Mines and Tech., 2000 S.D. 145, ¶ 12, 619 N.W.2d 260, 263). 

[¶6.] In discussing whether Lloyd’s injuries arose out of his employment, 

both parties rely on Mudlin v. Hills Materials. In Mudlin, an employee was 

assigned to work on a road construction project near Faith, South Dakota. Id. ¶ 1. 

While driving to the job site from Rapid City, South Dakota, where she lived, 

Mudlin was involved in a one-vehicle accident. Id. She then filed a claim for 

workers’ compensation. This Court ultimately affirmed the Department’s decision 

to award Mudlin workers’ compensation benefits. The decision to award benefits 

was premised, in notable part, on the employer’s policy requiring Mudlin to drive to 

the job site. Id. ¶ 13. This Court stated that there was a “causal connection 

between the injuries that Mudlin sustained while traveling to the job site and her 

employment. Therefore, Mudlin’s injuries ‘arose out of’ her employment.” Id. ¶ 14. 

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t or motive. 

 

[¶7.] Lloyd argues that his injuries arose out of his employment because 

“had [he] not been assigned to work in Omaha, he would have had no need to be on 

I-29 where the accident occurred[.]” This contention, however, does not specifically 

demonstrate the causal connection between his employment and injury. It is 

undisputed that Lloyd was driving on I-29 because he wanted to be home for his 

wife’s birthday. This trip was not prearranged or assigned as part of his duties. 

The trip was for Lloyd’s benefit on his days off. And unlike in Mudlin, there was no 

company policy that required Lloyd to make the trip for the company’s benefit. No 

aspect of the trip was in furtherance of Dakota Land’s or Byrne Brands’ interests. 

While Lloyd’s employment put him in Omaha on the day of his accident, his 

employment did not require or compel him to return to Sioux Falls at that time. 

Therefore, under these facts, Lloyd has failed to demonstrate the causal connection 

between his employment and his injury.1 As a result, this Court must conclude 

that Lloyd’s injuries did not arise out of his employment. Instead, they arose from

his personal decision to attend a family event independent of any company 

requiremen

[¶8.] Because Lloyd has failed to satisfy the “arising out of” requirement for 

a workers’ compensation claim, it is unnecessary to address whether his injury 

1. In Krier v. Dick’s Linoleum Shop, 78 S.D. 116, 120, 98 N.W.2d 486, 488 

(1959), this Court held that an employee’s decision to drive to dinner a short 

distance out of the town he was working in for the day was not a significant 

“deviat[ation] from the course of his employment” so as to preclude workers’ 

compensation coverage. There, this Court reasoned that the employee had 

not sufficiently “stepped aside from his employment to do some act of his own 

not connected with or contemplated by the employment.” Id. Here, however, 

that is precisely the case. 

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resulted “in the course of his employment.” It is also unnecessary to determine 

whether Dakota Land and Byrne Brands are jointly liable. 2

[¶9.] Affirmed. 

[¶10.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, ZINTER, and 

SEVERSON, Justices, concur. 

2. The parties argue that the “dual employment doctrine” must be considered 

here because Dakota Land Pizza “lent” Lloyd to Byrne Brands for a short 

time. The central issue in this case – whether workers’ compensation 

benefits should be extended as a result of Lloyd’s accident – does not depend 

on Lloyd’s status as a dual employee. Therefore it is unnecessary to address 

this issue having determined that Lloyd’s injuries are not compensable.