In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-3440

MONARCH BEVERAGE CO., INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAVID COOK, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

1:13-cv-01674-SEB-MJD — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MARCH 29, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 30, 2017

____________________

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. We are again asked to decide whether an aspect of Indiana’s alcohol regulation system violates 

the Equal Protection Clause. Two years ago we upheld an 

Indiana law that prohibits grocery and convenience stores 

from selling chilled beer. See Indiana Petroleum Marketers &

Convenience Store Ass'n v. Cook, 808 F.3d 318 (7th Cir. 2015). In 

this case Monarch Beverage Company challenges a feature 

of Indiana’s “prohibited interest” law that separates beer and 
2 No. 15-3440

liquor wholesaling by prohibiting beer wholesalers from

holding an interest in a liquor-distribution permit. See IND.

CODE §§ 7.1-3-3-19, 7.1-5-9-3, 7.1-5-9-6. Monarch contends 

that this component of the prohibited-interest law lacks a 

rational basis. A district judge rejected this argument and 

upheld the law. We affirm that judgment. Indiana’s policy of

separating beer and liquor wholesaling survives review for 

rationality.

I. Background

Indiana’s alcohol regulatory scheme, like that of many 

other states, divides the market along two dimensions: three 

tiers of the distribution chain (producers, wholesalers, and 

retailers) and three kinds of alcohol (beer, liquor, and wine).

A permit is required to do business in any part of this market. See id. §§ 7.1-3-2-1 to -5-5 (beer producer, wholesaler, 

and retailer permits); 7.1-3-7-1 to -10-13 (liquor); 7.1-3-12-1 to 

-15-3 (wine). With limited exceptions, Indiana prohibits any 

person who holds a permit in one tier of the distribution 

chain from also holding an interest in a permit in another 

tier. For example, anyone holding an interest in a beer 

producer’s permit may not also hold an interest in a beer 

wholesaler’s permit. See id. § 7.1-5-9-2. And anyone who 

holds an interest in any kind of retailing permit is generally

prohibited from having any interest in a manufacturer’s or 

wholesaler’s permit of any type. See id. § 7.1-5-9-10(a).

(Small-scale brewers and distillers are exempt from this 

restriction. See id. § 7.1-5-9-10(b).)

In addition to restricting permits across the vertical tiers

of the distribution chain, Indiana also restricts the issuance 

of permits within the wholesaling tier by type of alcohol. The 

law allows some wholesaling permits to be combined: a beer
No. 15-3440 3

wholesaler can get a permit to wholesale wine; a liquor 

wholesaler can also get a permit to wholesale wine. See id.

§ 7.1-3-13-1. But the prohibited-interest law requires the 

separation of beer and liquor wholesaling: a beer wholesaler

may not acquire an interest in a liquor-wholesaling permit

and vice versa.1 See id. § 7.1-5-9-3, -6. This aspect of Indiana’s

regulatory scheme is apparently unique to the state.

Monarch holds permits to wholesale both beer and wine

and would like to expand its business to include liquor.

Indiana doesn’t allow that combination of permits, so 

Monarch sued members of Indiana’s Alcohol and Tobacco 

Commission to invalidate the law. (The defendants are sued 

in their official capacities, so we’ll refer to them collectively 

as “Indiana.”) The suit alleges that this aspect of the prohibited-interest law facially discriminates against beer wholesalers in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equalprotection guarantee. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district 

court rejected Monarch’s challenge and upheld the law. The 

judge’s decision proceeds along two lines of reasoning. First, 

she ruled that the equal-protection claim failed at the starting gate because Monarch could not identify a similarly 

situated class of persons that receives better treatment under 

the statute. Second, she applied rational-basis review and 

upheld the law as a rational regulatory measure. Monarch 

appealed.

 1 Wine wholesalers may distribute brandy, which Indiana otherwise 

classifies as a type of liquor, see IND. CODE § 7.1-1-3-21, so the separation 

between beer and liquor wholesaling isn’t completely airtight, see id.

§ 7.1-3-13-3.
4 No. 15-3440

Meanwhile, separate litigation against the Commission 

is ongoing in state court on a related question testing how 

the prohibited-interest law applies to corporate alcohol 

distributors with overlapping ownership interests. While 

Monarch’s appeal in this case has been pending, a Marion 

County judge issued a ruling rejecting the Commission’s 

interpretation of the statute. Spirited Sales, LLC v. Indiana

Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n, No. 49D01-1502-PL-5520 (Marion 

Cty. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2016). The case is now before the 

Indiana Supreme Court, which heard argument on 

February 23, 2017. Though the cases involve the same statutory provisions, the question here is distinct and seems

unlikely to be affected by the outcome of Spirited Sales, so we 

proceed to decision.

II. Discussion

We review a summary judgment de novo. Life Plans, Inc. 

v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 343, 348–49 (7th Cir. 

2015). Indiana’s prohibited-interest law doesn’t draw lines 

based on race or any other suspect classification, it doesn’t 

burden a fundamental right, and it raises no federalism 

concerns under the Supreme Court’s dormant commerceclause doctrine. So Monarch’s equal-protection challenge 

triggers only the most lenient form of judicial review: the 

law is valid unless it lacks a rational basis. Fitzgerald v. 

Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107 (2003); Indiana

Petroleum Marketers, 808 F.3d at 322. This deferential standard of review is a notoriously “heavy legal lift for the challenger[].” Indiana Petroleum Marketers, 808 F.3d at 322.

Monarch devotes considerable attention to the origins of 

Indiana’s prohibited-interest laws, arguing that the “uncontested historical evidence suggests that the prohibition was 
No. 15-3440 5

enacted to protect and promote a patronage system that 

operated to the benefit of state and local politicians.” That 

may be true; Indiana doesn’t put much effort into contesting 

Monarch’s historiography. But any disagreement about the 

genesis of this law can be left unresolved. The Supreme 

Court has made it clear that under rational-basis review, the 

challenger must “negative every conceivable basis” that 

might support the challenged law, and “it is entirely irrelevant ... whether the conceived reason for the challenged 

distinction actually motivated the legislature.” FCC v. Beach 

Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993).

The parties also dispute, this time more vigorously,

whether certain threshold difficulties doom Monarch’s claim 

from the start. Indiana contends that we don’t need to decide 

whether the prohibited-interest law has a rational basis 

because (1) Monarch has not identified a similarly situated

class of persons that is treated more favorably; and 

(2) Monarch chose to be a beer wholesaler and therefore 

cannot “complain of unequal treatment compared with 

those who made a different choice within the same system of 

limited permits.” These contentions are mistaken; no threshold obstacles to rational-basis review exist here.

It is of course true, as the Supreme Court has often said, 

that the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction 

that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” 

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 

(1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Relying

entirely on “class of one” equal-protection cases, Indiana

argues that the prohibited-interest law is not subject to any

judicial review unless Monarch first identifies a similarly
6 No. 15-3440

situated comparator class that receives preferential treatment under the statute.

Indiana’s reliance on the class-of-one line of cases is misplaced. In that kind of equal-protection litigation, the plaintiff doesn’t challenge a statute or ordinance but argues

instead that a public official (or group of officials) has treated him differently than other persons similarly situated for 

an illegitimate or irrational reason.2 The difference in treatment can take the form of selective enforcement of a criminal 

law, LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937 

(7th Cir. 2010), or selective withholding of government 

benefits or services, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 

562 (2000) (failure to provide water service); Harvey v. Town 

of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2011) (ignoring complaints about mosquito-infested pond); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 

588 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2009) (failure to provide water service); 

RJB Props., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 468 F.3d 1005 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (denial of government contract to provide janitorial services); Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 

975 (7th Cir. 2006) (denial of special land-use application); 

 

2 The class-of-one label is somewhat misleading because what distinguishes these cases isn’t necessarily the fact that the plaintiff is the only 

one harmed. This category includes suits alleging, for example, selective 

enforcement of a criminal law against fans of a particular sports franchise or refusal to provide utility services to an entire neighborhood. The 

distinguishing element in this kind of equal-protection claim is that the 

plaintiff claims that the law’s “improper execution through duly constituted agents” is unconstitutional. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 

562, 564, n.* (2000) (explaining that the complaint “could be read to 

allege a class of five,” but whether it is “a class of one or of five is of no 

consequence because we conclude that the number of individuals in a 

class is immaterial for equal protection analysis”).
No. 15-3440 7

Smith v. City of Chicago, 457 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2006) (failure to 

reimburse attorney’s fees); Racine Charter One, Inc. v. Racine 

Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2005) (failure to bus 

students).

In litigation of that type, if the plaintiff can’t identify a 

similarly situated person or group for comparison purposes, 

it’s normally unnecessary to take the analysis any further; 

the claim simply fails. Harvey, 649 F.3d at 532. It’s easy to see 

why. The equal-protection guarantee is “concerned with 

governmental classifications that ‘affect some groups of 

citizens differently than others.’” Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of 

Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (quoting McGowan v. 

Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)). In a class-of-one equalprotection case, it may not be clear that the challenged 

governmental action entails any classification at all. Identifying a similarly situated comparator is a way to show that 

disparate treatment in fact has occurred and sets “a clear 

standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, [can] be readily assessed.” Id. at 602. In contrast, where 

(as here) the plaintiff challenges a statute or ordinance that 

by its terms imposes regulatory burdens on a specific class of 

persons (in this case, beer distributors), there’s no need to 

identify a comparator; the classification appears in the text of 

the statute itself.

Indiana also contends that Monarch cannot challenge the 

prohibited-interest law because it knew the consequences of 

becoming a beer wholesaler—namely, that doing so would 

put liquor distribution off limits—and chose to become one 

anyway. This argument is hard to square with our decision

in Indiana Petroleum Marketers. There we reviewed Indiana’s

law prohibiting grocery and convenience stores from selling 
8 No. 15-3440

chilled beer. 808 F.3d at 322–25. Though no one thought to 

mention it, the beer sellers were no doubt aware of the “no 

cold beer” restriction before they applied for a beer dealer’s 

permit, yet we reviewed the claim on the merits. Monarch’s 

situation is no different.

Indiana insists that Indiana Petroleum Marketers is distinguishable because the ban on cold-beer sales was “ancillary” 

to the statutorily defined class, while the law separating beer 

and liquor distribution is part of the class definition. It’s not

at all clear why this distinction (if it is one) should make any

difference in the analysis. Indiana cites no cases to support

this proposed ancillary/definitional dichotomy. It’s not even 

clear that the restriction Monarch is challenging is definitional rather than ancillary.

In an effort to illustrate the distinction and explain why it 

matters, Indiana points to laws prohibiting fishing without a 

license and says that a system in which only fishing license

holders may fish can’t be challenged on equal-protection 

grounds because the difference in treatment (license holders 

v. nonlicense holders) precisely defines the class. We’re not 

so sure about that conclusion, but the analogy is inapt in any 

event. Monarch is not challenging Indiana’s law that prohibits liquor wholesaling without a permit; it is challenging the 

law prohibiting beer wholesalers from obtaining liquorwholesaling permits. This restriction is not inherent in the 

tripartite permitting scheme; after all, wine wholesalers are 

allowed to have liquor-wholesaling permits.

The rule Indiana proposes is unsupported and unworkable. It’s also wholly unjustified. The only demand the EqualProtection Clause places on a nonsuspect statutory classification is that it be rational. We see no reason to limit applica-
No. 15-3440 9

tion of this basic constitutional requirement as Indiana 

proposes.

Moving to the merits of Monarch’s claim, Indiana’s

prohibited-interest law comes to us with “a strong presumption of validity.” Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 314. Monarch 

must shoulder the heavy burden “to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Id. at 315 (quoting 

Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 

(1973)). And Indiana does not need to present actual evidence to support its proffered rationale for the law, which

can be “based on rational speculation unsupported by 

evidence or empirical data.” Id.

In the district court, Indiana offered three reasons for its 

policy choice to separate beer and liquor wholesaling; it

repeats those justifications here. The first is essentially a 

temperance rationale: Indiana argues that it has a legitimate 

interest in discouraging alcohol consumption, especially the 

consumption of hard liquor, which has higher alcohol 

content. The separation of beer and liquor wholesaling 

rationally serves this interest by making distribution more 

expensive, which in turn increases prices for consumers.3

Second, Indiana points to its interest in maintaining tax 

revenue, arguing that separating the beer- and liquorwholesaling markets helps to maintain the number of independent liquor wholesalers that in turn pay alcohol excise 

taxes. Finally, Indiana relies on its interest in market stabil-

 3 Indiana also maintains that the prohibited-interest law helps limit 

consumption by prohibiting “tied houses”—conglomerates whose 

operations extend across the retail, wholesale, and manufacturing tiers,

and whose size arguably brings market power that can be used to 

pressure retailers to increase sales.
10 No. 15-3440

ity, arguing that market upheaval would ensue if the

prohibited-interest law is invalidated.

The first of these reasons is stronger than the others. Indeed, Indiana makes little effort to defend the tax-revenue 

rationale other than to note that it was endorsed by the 

district judge. The market-upheaval justification is briefly 

outlined in Indiana’s brief but not really defended.4 So we’ll

limit our discussion to the temperance rationale.

Everyone agrees that reducing liquor consumption is a 

legitimate governmental interest. Monarch argues that it’s 

irrational to think that the prohibited-interest law furthers 

 

4 Indiana’s interest in protecting against market upheaval is essentially 

equivalent to an interest in protecting incumbent industry. The Supreme 

Court has said that “classifications serving to protect legitimate expectation and reliance interests do not deny equal protection of the laws,” 

Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 13 (1992), but it’s unclear whether that rule 

applies when the expectation and reliance interests were themselves 

created by the allegedly unconstitutional measure. A few circuits have 

addressed whether incumbent protectionism is a legitimate state interest. 

Compare St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2013)

(“[N]either precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere economic 

protection of a particular industry is a legitimate governmental purpose ... .”), Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“[E]conomic protectionism for its own sake, regardless of its relation to 

the common good, cannot be said to be in furtherance of a legitimate 

governmental interest.”), and Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 

2002) (“Courts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete 

interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.”), with Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 

2004) (“[W]hile baseball may be the national pastime of the citizenry, 

dishing out special economic benefits to certain in-state industries 

remains the favored pastime of state and local governments.”). We do 

not need to weigh in today.
No. 15-3440 11

this interest in any meaningful way. We disagree. It’s certainly not the most direct way of achieving this aim (a tax is 

the most direct way), but it’s hardly irrational to think that 

separating beer and liquor wholesaling is likely to impose 

higher distribution costs than if beer and liquor wholesaling 

were combined. That, in turn, keeps liquor prices higher, 

with the salutary corresponding effect of reducing consumption.

More specifically, rational regulators could believe that 

Indiana’s beer wholesalers—with their robust franchise 

protections and existing distribution infrastructures (warehouses, drivers, relationships with retailers, etc.)—would

vigorously compete with liquor wholesalers if allowed to 

hold permits to distribute both kinds of alcohol.5 Rational 

regulators might also believe that this increased competition 

could drive down liquor prices for consumers and thereby 

increase consumption. See, e.g., Christopher T. Conlon &

 

5 Monarch argues that Indiana’s franchise protections for beer wholesalers are irrelevant because they were not in place when the prohibitedinterest laws were originally enacted. As we’ve explained, the actual

historical impetus for the law is immaterial to rational-basis review. 

Monarch also argues that the franchise protections wouldn’t allow beer 

wholesalers to enter the liquor market and immediately slash prices. To 

illustrate the point, Monarch notes that beer wholesalers have not 

overtaken the wine-wholesaling market even though they are permitted 

to also hold wine-wholesaling permits. But Indiana doesn’t need to 

prove that in the absence of its law separating beer and liquor wholesaling, beer wholesalers would completely dominate the liquor-wholesaling 

market. It’s enough that rational regulators could conclude that entry by 

beer wholesalers into the liquor-wholesaling market would lower prices 

through increased competition. Moreover, it’s not irrational to think that 

the franchise protections enjoyed by beer wholesalers would give them 

at least a slight advantage against incumbent liquor wholesalers.
12 No. 15-3440

Nirupama Rao, The Price of Liquor is Too Damn High: Alcohol 

Taxation and Market Structure 17 (Kilts Booth Marketing 

series, Paper No. 2-009, 2015) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstract_id=2610118) (finding that requiring 

wholesalers to publicly list prices “promote[s] noncompetitive pricing behavior among wholesalers, potentially 

leading to higher prices”); Alexander C. Wagenaar, et al., 

Effects of Beverage Alcohol Price and Tax Levels on Drinking: A 

Meta-analysis of 1003 Estimates from 112 Studies, 

104 ADDICTION 179 (2009) (concluding that higher prices 

reduce consumption).

Monarch’s response is to argue that there are far more 

direct and effective ways for Indiana to increase liquor prices

and thus reduce consumption—most obviously, through 

taxation.6 Monarch insists that the attenuated connection 

between the prohibited-interest law and Indiana’s temperance objective and the obvious availability of a more direct 

alternative call the rationality of this law into question.

The Supreme Court has on limited occasions been willing 

to infer irrationality from the availability of an alternative 

policy that more directly and effectively furthers the government’s asserted interest. For example, in United States

Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), the 

Court invalidated a statute that prohibited households of

unrelated individuals from receiving food stamps. The 

 6 Indiana is currently among the 10 states with the lowest excise taxes on 

liquor (excluding Washington, D.C., and the 17 states that sell liquor 

themselves). Federation of Tax Administrators, State Tax Rates on Distilled 

Spirits (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.taxadmin.org/assets/docs/Research/

Rates/liquor.pdf.
No. 15-3440 13

government justified the law on fraud-prevention grounds. 

Applying rational-basis review, the Court rejected that 

rationale because other statutory provisions were aimed

“specifically at the problems of fraud, ... [and the] existence 

of these provisions necessarily casts considerable doubt 

upon the proposition that the [challenged provision] could 

rationally have been intended to prevent those very same 

abuses.” Id. at 536–37; see also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446

(relying on Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535, and explaining that the 

government “may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the 

distinction arbitrary or irrational”).

The Supreme Court’s broader rational-basis jurisprudence, however, points in the opposite direction. The Court 

has repeatedly said that “[t]he fact that other means are 

better suited to the achievement of governmental ends ... is 

of no moment under rational basis review.” Tuan Anh 

Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001); see also Gregory v. 

Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (“[A] State ‘does not violate 

the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.’” (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 (1976))). Against 

this backdrop, Moreno and City of Cleburne are better understood as extraordinary rather than exemplary rational-basis 

cases. The Supreme Court has never invalidated an economic regulation on rational-basis review because a more direct

or effective policy alternative was available. Neither have 

we, and Monarch has given us no reason to change course.

Indiana’s law separating beer and liquor wholesaling is 

rationally related to the state’s interest in encouraging 
14 No. 15-3440

temperance; that it serves this purpose indirectly does not 

make the law irrational.

AFFIRMED.
No. 15‐3440    15

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. I

agree with my colleagues that Indiana’s law is constitutional‐

ly valid. Monarch says that state law cuts down competition,

injuring consumers. But so did the laws in Exxon Corp. v.

Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); New Orleans v.

Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); and The Slaughter‐House Cases, 83

U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Supreme Court has facilitated

anticompetitive legislation by creating an exception to anti‐

trust principles when states curtail competition as part of a

regulatory program. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),

and its successors. State limits on the extent of competition

thus have a long pedigree, and regulation of the liquor in‐

dustry receives an additional boost from §2 of the Twenty‐

First Amendment.

My colleagues say that Indiana prevails because its law

has a rational basis. That’s the standard under the Equal Pro‐

tection Clause for classifications that do not entail race or

other suspect criteria. But like the district judge I do not see

any classification. Indiana does not treat any person differ‐

ently from any other. No one, directly or through a corpora‐

tion or other business, can have all three alcohol wholesale

licenses. That may be sensible or silly, but it does not dis‐

criminate. Beer wholesalers can get one other license type,

just as wine or liquor wholesalers may, but not two others. A

beer–liquor license combination is forbidden to everyone by

Ind. Code §7.1‐5‐9‐3 and §7.1‐5‐9‐6.

Monarch says that this understanding of discrimination

would eliminate rational‐basis review of statuses (such as

beer wholesaler) that people assume voluntarily, and so it

would. My colleagues think this dispositive against Mon‐

arch’s position, but I do not.
No. 15‐3440 16

Monarch’s demand that the liquor‐distribution scheme be

adequately justified even though it does not treat any person

differently from any other person is a substantive‐due‐

process claim in disguise. And the Supreme Court has held

that only persons whose “fundamental” rights have been

abridged can maintain substantive‐due‐process claims. See

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). No one would

be so bold as to contend that holding three kinds of alcohol

wholesale licenses simultaneously is a fundamental right.

Litigants should not be allowed to evade the limits on sub‐

stantive due process by characterizing substantive objections

to state‐law rules as equal‐protection claims.

Back in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was rati‐

fied, the sort of argument Monarch presents would not have

been seen as either an equal‐protection or a substantive‐due‐

process theory. It would have been conceived as a request for

relief under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. A bare ma‐

jority of the Court in Slaughter‐House drained that clause of

force, but calls to overrule Slaughter‐House have not succeed‐

ed. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Recasting a

privileges‐or‐immunities theory as an equal‐protection theo‐

ry has the benefit (for plaintiffs) of evading both Slaughter‐

House and Glucksberg, but it lacks a constitutional footing.

Perhaps the Supreme Court has given this portfolio to the

Equal Protection Clause despite the lack of historical prove‐

nance and textual support. That’s what my colleagues think.

If they are right, judges of the courts of appeals must fall into

line. But the Justices consistently write about the Equal Pro‐

tection Clause as if it operates on discriminatory classifica‐

tions. Because I don’t see any classification at all in Indiana’s

scheme, I would treat Monarch’s contention as a substantive
No. 15‐3440    17

objection that fails at the threshold under Slaughter‐House

and Glucksberg.