Jesse J. Murphy, et al. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.

Misc. No. 5, September Term 2021

Administrative Authority of Chief Judge – Emergency Powers of Chief Judge. Under 

the Maryland Constitution, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is the administrative 

head of the Judicial Branch of the Maryland State government. In the exercise of its 

rulemaking authority with respect to administration of, and practice and procedure in, the 

State courts, the Court of Appeals has adopted rules to guide the Chief Judge’s exercise of 

that administrative authority in the circumstances of an emergency affecting the court 

system. Among other things, measures taken should be consistent with actions taken in 

the other branches of government when the Governor has declared a state of emergency 

pursuant to the authority granted to the Governor by the General Assembly in the Public 

Safety Article of the Maryland Code. An administrative order of the Chief Judge 

temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under Maryland law with respect to civil actions 

during the Covid-19 pandemic was within the authority of the Chief Judge under the 

Maryland Constitution and Maryland Rules in light of the state of emergency that had been 

declared by the Governor. Maryland Constitution, Article IV, §18; Maryland Rules 16-

1001 et seq.

Separation of Powers – Emergency Powers of Chief Judge. An administrative order of 

the Chief Judge temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under Maryland law with respect 

to civil actions during the Covid-19 pandemic did not violate the principle of separation of 

powers of the branches of Maryland State government guaranteed by Article 8 of the 

Maryland Declaration of Rights.

Prohibition Against Suspension of Laws – Emergency Powers of Chief Judge. An 

administrative order of the Chief Judge temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under 

Maryland law with respect to civil actions during the Covid-19 pandemic did not violate 

the prohibition against suspension of laws set forth in Article 9 of the Maryland Declaration 

of Rights.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Misc. No. 5

September Term, 2021

JESSE J. MURPHY, ET AL.

V.

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.

_____________________________________

*Getty, C.J.,

*McDonald

Watts

Hotten

Booth

Biran

Gould,

 JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by McDonald, J.

______________________________________

Filed: April 27, 2022

*Getty, C.J., and McDonald, J., now Senior 

Judges, participated in the hearing and 

conference of this case while active members of 

this Court; after being recalled pursuant to 

Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, 

they also participated in the decision and 

adoption of this opinion.

United States District Court 

for the District of Maryland

Case No. 1:20-cv-01961-SAG

Argument: December 3, 3021
On April 24, 2020, then-Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera issued an administrative 

order that temporarily tolled statutes of limitations in civil cases for a period of time during 

the state of emergency occasioned by the Covid-19 pandemic. A commercial dispute is 

pending in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland between Appellants 

J.M. Murphy Enterprises, Inc., and its president Jesse J. Murphy (collectively, “Murphy 

Enterprises”) and Appellee Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”). The 

timeliness of certain claims alleged in that case, as well as the diversity jurisdiction of the 

federal court over that action, may depend on the validity of the Chief Judge’s 

administrative tolling order. Pursuant to statute and rule,1the federal district court has 

certified to this Court a question of law as to whether that administrative order exceeded 

the powers of the Chief Judge under the Maryland Constitution. As framed by the parties, 

the answer to that question turns on whether the Chief Judge’s administrative tolling order 

violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights – in particular, Article 8, which guarantees the 

separation of powers of the branches of Maryland State government, and Article 9, which 

prohibits the “suspension” of laws.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that the Chief Judge acted 

within her authority when, in her capacity as administrative head of the Maryland Judiciary, 

she issued the administrative tolling order concerning the timeliness of complaints filed in

Maryland courts during the pandemic. Specifically, the administrative order was based on 

1 Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code, Courts 

& Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), §12-601 et seq.; Maryland Rule 8-305.
2

the authority of the Chief Judge under the Maryland Constitution, the Maryland Code, and 

the Maryland Rules. In issuing that order, the Chief Judge did not, under the circumstances 

that existed at that time, unduly take upon herself – or, in the language of the case law 

concerning separation of powers, “usurp” – core functions belonging to either the 

Executive or the Legislative branches of State government. Nor did the emergency rules 

on which the administrative tolling order was based usurp another branch’s core function. 

Finally, the tolling order did not violate the prohibition against the suspension of laws.

I

Background

A. Administrative Authority and Rulemaking in the Maryland Judiciary

The question posed by the federal district court relates to the administrative 

authority of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and the rulemaking authority of the 

Court. Those powers are simply stated in Article IV, §18 of the Maryland Constitution and 

elaborated to some extent in the Maryland Code and Maryland Rules.

1. Administrative Authority

The State Constitution provides that the “Chief Judge ... shall be the administrative 

head of the Judicial system of the State.” Article IV, §18(b)(1). Subsection (b) sets forth

certain aspects of that authority with respect to the assignment of judges. §18(b)(2)-(5). It 

further provides that, in the absence of the Chief Judge, the administrative authority 

devolves upon the judge of the Court with the most seniority. §18(b)(5). Finally, it states

that “[t]he powers of the Chief Judge set forth in [§18] shall be subject to any rule or 

regulation adopted by the Court of Appeals.” Id. 
3

The Maryland Rules acknowledge this constitutional delegation of power to the 

Chief Judge. See Maryland Rules 16-101 (general administrative structure of the 

Judiciary), 16-102 (noting the Chief Judge’s “overall responsibility for the administration 

of the courts of this State”). 

2. Rulemaking

The State Constitution also confers rulemaking authority on the Court of Appeals 

with respect to (1) practice and procedure in the courts and (2) the administration of the 

courts. It states that “[t]he Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and 

regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate 

courts and in the other courts of this State....” Article IV, §18(a). The rules adopted by 

the Court “shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of 

Appeals or otherwise by law.” Id.

2

The General Assembly has acknowledged the rulemaking power of the Court of 

Appeals with respect to both practice and procedure and judicial administration. In 

particular, it has directed that “[t]he power of the Court of Appeals to make rules and 

regulations to govern the practice and procedure and judicial administration ... shall be 

liberally construed.” CJ §1-201(a). That statute further provides that “[w]ithout intending 

to limit the comprehensive application of the term ‘practice and procedure,’ the term 

2 The Constitution also authorizes other courts of the State to adopt rules of practice 

and procedure or administrative rules “subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the 

Court of Appeals or otherwise by law.” Article IV, §18(a). A statute limits the purview 

of such local rules. CJ §1-201(b).
4

includes the forms of process; writs; pleadings; motions; parties; depositions; discovery; 

trials; judgments; new trials; provisional and final remedies; appeals; unification of practice 

and procedure in actions at law and suits in equity, so as to secure one form of civil action 

and procedure for both; and regulation of the form and method of taking and the 

admissibility of evidence in all cases, including criminal cases.” Id.

In the Maryland Rules, the Court has established a Standing Committee on Rules of 

Practice and Procedure (“Rules Committee”)3and a process for the Court’s consideration 

and adoption of rules. See Maryland Rule 16-802. 

B. Statutes of Limitations

The timeliness of a claim in a civil action is generally measured against the pertinent 

statute of limitations or under the doctrine of laches.4 As the label itself indicates, a statute 

3 The Rules Committee is appointed by the Court of Appeals to assist the Court in 

the exercise of its constitutional rulemaking powers. Maryland Rule 16-701. The 

committee consists of judges, court officials, lawyers, and others with interest and expertise 

in the subject matter of court rules. Among the Committee’s members are two legislators 

appointed from the State Senate and House of Delegates, respectively. Id.

4 The doctrine of laches is a judicially-developed doctrine applicable to equitable 

claims in civil cases under which a court will decline to consider that claim when there has 

been an unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff in asserting it, to the prejudice of the 

defendant. State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles LP, 438 Md. 451, 585-87 (2014). In 

applying the doctrine of laches, a court will “look to the General Assembly for guidance” 

by consulting an analogous statute of limitations or the general period of limitations in CJ 

§5-101. Id. at 603-04; see also Frederick Road LP v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 117 

(2000) (when a case involves concurrent legal and equitable remedies, the deadline set by 

the statute of limitations is applied).
5

of limitations is a product of legislation enacted by a legislative body5 – in this case, the 

General Assembly. A statute of limitations represents “a policy judgment by the 

Legislature that serves the interest of a plaintiff in having adequate time to investigate a 

cause of action and file suit, the interest of a defendant in having certainty that there will 

not be a need to respond to a potential claim that has been unreasonably delayed, and the 

general interest of society in judicial economy.” Ceccone v. Carroll Home Services, LLC, 

454 Md. 680, 691 (2017). In being faithful to that legislative judgment, the courts typically 

construe such statutes strictly. Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC, 475 Md. 4, 38 (2021). 

However, a statute of limitations is not immutable. Ceccone, 454 Md. at 692. This Court 

has recognized, in both rule and case law, that the deadline for filing an action seemingly 

set forth in a statute of limitations may be extended and, in some cases, shortened.

Because a statute of limitations sets a deadline for filing an action in court, it falls 

to the courts to interpret and administer that deadline. Some of that work is done by rule. 

For example, a court rule details how “any period of time” prescribed by rule or “any 

applicable statute” is to be computed. Maryland Rule 1-203.6 Accordingly, that rule 

5 Another legislatively-created filing deadline that is a close cousin to a statute of 

limitations is a statute of repose. See Anderson v. United States, 427 Md. 99, 117-22 (2012) 

(noting that, while both types of statutes set deadlines for the assertion of a claim, a statute 

of limitations is triggered by accrual of the claim while a statute of repose may extinguish 

a claim before it accrues). We need not delve into the differences between a statute of 

limitations and a statute of repose here. There is no question that the filing deadline at 

issue in this case is a statute of limitations.

6 That rule appears to be consistent with a statute that also describes generally the 

computation of time periods in statutes. See Maryland Code, General Provisions Article, 

§1-302. A Rules Committee Note codified with the rule observes that section (a) of the 
6

governs the computation of time for purposes of a statute of limitations. Excluded from 

those computations of filing deadlines are, among others, days on which the pertinent 

clerk’s office is not open for regular hours. Maryland Rule 1-203(a)(2). 

Another court rule provides an additional 30 days for a plaintiff to file suit in a 

Maryland court, if the lawsuit was initially filed within the Maryland statute of limitations 

in another jurisdiction and dismissed by the court in the other jurisdiction for certain 

reasons specified in the rule. Maryland Rule 2-101(b). 

Like other statutes, the application of a statute of limitations is also construed in 

case law. For example, the question of when a cause of action accrues – and thereby 

triggers the start of the limitations period – “is one left to judicial determination.” Cain, 

475 Md. at 35. Under that rubric, this Court developed a “discovery rule” that delays 

accrual of a cause of action, for purposes of computing the statute of limitations, until the 

plaintiff is aware, or reasonably should be aware, of the wrong done by the defendant. See

Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634-38 (1981); Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179 

(1917).7

rule supersedes the statute to the extent of any inconsistency. See Maryland Constitution, 

Article IV, §18(a) (rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Court of Appeals have 

“the force of law”).

7 The discovery rule was originally developed to apply to medical malpractice cases, 

see Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179 (1917), and “culminated in Poffenberger v. Risser, 

290 Md. 631 (1981), where [the Court] made the discovery rule applicable in all civil suits.” 

Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 689-90 (1996). There is also now a statute of limitations 

that includes a discovery rule specific to medical malpractice actions. CJ §5-109.
7

In addition, the Court has applied “judicial tolling” to a statute of limitations when 

the tolling would “gratify legislative intent” – in other words, “prevent perversion of the 

[legislative] policy and purpose” underlying the statute of limitations. Philip Morris USA, 

Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 238-39 (2006), abrogated on other grounds, Mummert 

v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207 (2013). Judicial tolling is appropriate in a particular case if a 

two-part test is met: “(1) there is persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations 

supporting the recognition of the tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling 

exception is consistent with the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes 

of limitations.” Id.; see also Cain, 475 Md. at 53-69. 

Finally, because a statute of limitations does not affect a court’s jurisdiction over a 

claim, parties may generally toll or lengthen a period of limitations by agreement or waiver. 

Ceccone, 454 Md. at 692. In some circumstances, they may agree to shorten a statutory 

period of limitations in a way that courts will recognize. The courts have, by case law, 

established criteria as to when a private alteration of a limitations period will be given 

effect. Id. at 692-95.

The bottom line is that a statute of limitations is an expression of legislative policy 

to be implemented by and in the courts. In giving effect to a statute of limitations, as in 

A related statutory exception, known as the fraud exception, that was enacted in 

1868 and that is now codified at CJ §5-203, was based on a judicially-created doctrine that 

tolled the period for filing an action in equity where the defendant’s fraud had induced the 

plaintiff not to sue within the applicable period. See Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 316 

(1955). 
8

construing other statutes and acts of the Legislature, the courts must ascertain and carry out 

the legislative purpose underlying the statute of limitations in harmony with other 

enactments of the Legislature.

C. Dealing with Emergencies under Maryland Law

1. The Governor and General Assembly

As head of the Executive Branch of State government,8the Governor inevitably 

must take the lead in dealing with state-wide emergencies. The General Assembly has 

specifically conferred certain powers on the Governor for that purpose. Several sections 

of the Public Safety Article (“PS”) of the Maryland Code pertaining to emergency powers

are relevant here. 

The Legislature has authorized the Governor to declare a state of emergency “if 

public safety is endangered or on reasonable apprehension of immediate danger to public 

safety.” PS §14-303(a)(1); see also PS §14-107(a). The Legislature has further authorized 

the Governor to take certain actions for dealing with that emergency, including 

promulgation of “reasonable orders, rules, or regulations that the Governor considers 

necessary to protect life and property or calculated effectively to control and terminate the 

public emergency in the emergency area.” PS §14-303(b). Among other things, those 

orders, rules, or regulations may:

8 See Maryland Constitution, Article II, §1 (“The executive power of the State shall 

be vested in a Governor”), §9 (the Governor “shall take care that the Laws are faithfully 

executed”); see also Maryland Code, State Government Article, §3-302 (“The Governor is 

the head of the Executive Branch of the State government and, except as otherwise 

provided by law, shall supervise and direct the officers and units in that Branch.”). 
9

(1) control traffic, including public and private transportation, in the 

emergency area;

(2) designate specific zones in the emergency area in which the 

occupancy and use of buildings and vehicles may be controlled;

(3) control the movement of individuals or vehicles into, in, or from 

the designated zones;

(4) control places of amusement and places of assembly; [and]

(5) control individuals on public streets; . . . .

PS §14-303(b)(1)-(5). More generally, upon declaring a state of emergency, the Governor 

may “suspend the effect of any statute or rule or regulation of an agency of the State or a 

political subdivision” after finding such action “necessary in order to protect the public 

health, welfare, or safety.” PS §14-107(d)(1)(i). The Director of the Maryland Emergency 

Management Agency (“MEMA”) is to “coordinate the activities of the agencies of the State 

and of those political subdivisions included in the declaration in all actions that serve to 

prevent or alleviate the ill effects of the imminent or actual emergency.” PS §14-107(c)(1).

Other powers conferred on the Governor are triggered by a “catastrophic health 

emergency” – defined as a “situation in which extensive loss of life or serious disability is 

threatened imminently because of exposure to a deadly agent.” PS §14-3A-01(b). The 

phrase “deadly agent” includes, among other things, a “viral agent” or “other biological 

agent capable of causing extensive loss of life or serious disability.” PS §14-3A-01(c)(1).

If the Governor determines that a catastrophic health emergency exists in the State,

the Governor may issue a proclamation to that effect and may, among other things, order 

(1) “the evacuation, closing, or decontamination of any facility” and (2) “[i]f necessary and 
10

reasonable to save lives or prevent exposure to a deadly agent ... [that] individuals ...

remain indoors or refrain from congregating.” PS §14-3A-03(d). The General Assembly 

has authorized the Governor to delegate certain duties to the Secretary of Health during 

such an emergency and authorized the Secretary to issue directives concerning the isolation 

or quarantine of individuals during the emergency. PS §14-3A-03 through §14-3A-05.

The statutes also specify the content of emergency declarations and certain notice, 

duration, and procedural requirements for a declaration of a state of emergency. PS §§14-

107(a)(2)-(b), 14-303(c)-(d), 14-3A-02. The General Assembly has retained for itself the 

power to terminate a declared state of emergency by joint resolution “at any time.” PS 

§14-107(a)(4)(i).

2. The Judiciary

The Maryland Rules describe the authority of the Chief Judge for dealing with 

public emergencies. Maryland Rules 16-1001 et seq.

9

The rules concerning emergency powers apply when the Governor has declared a 

state of emergency or in the event of “a natural or other event that significantly affects 

9 As we shall see, the rules codified in Maryland Rules 16-1001 et seq. were adopted 

at the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Such rules had been previously contemplated, and 

the rules that the Court adopted are not limited to emergencies caused by a viral pandemic.

Before the pandemic, the Court had adopted other rules related to catastrophic health 

emergencies. Those rules concern proceedings that might be brought by an individual or 

group of individuals to contest an isolation or quarantine directive issued by the Secretary 

of Health under PS §14-3A-05 and Maryland Code, Health-General Article, §18-901 et 

seq. See Maryland Rule 15-1101 et seq. Those rules do not bear on the issues in this 

opinion.
11

access to or the operations of one or more courts or other judicial facilities of the State or 

the ability of the Maryland Judiciary to operate effectively.” Maryland Rule 16-1001(a), 

(b). As described by a Rules Committee Note10 codified with Rule 16-1001(c), the “Rules 

recognize that, in the event of an emergency declared by the Governor, the authority 

granted under these Rules must be exercised in harmony with lawful directives of the 

Governor and other Executive Branch officials to the maximum extent practicable.” Upon 

a declaration of a state of emergency by the Governor, the Chief Judge “directly or through 

designees, shall, to the extent practicable, consult with the Governor, the Governor’s 

designees, the Maryland Emergency Management Agency, and, as appropriate, other 

Executive Branch officials, in order to coordinate Judicial and Executive Branch responses 

to the emergency.” Maryland Rule 16-1002.

The rules further describe specific actions the Chief Judge may take in an

emergency. Maryland Rule 16-1003(a). Any such actions are to be “to the extent 

practicable, ... compatible with directives and orders issued by the Governor” in 

connection with a declared state of emergency. Maryland Rule 16-1003(b).

Pertinent to this case, the rule authorizes the Chief Judge to: 

(2) suspend the operation of Rules that cannot be implemented as 

intended because of the emergency or event;

***

10 A Rules Committee Note is approved by the Court of Appeals as part of its 

consideration of rules proposed by the Rules Committee and is an authoritative basis for 

construing the rule to which it is appended. See, e.g., State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 317 

(1997); Palmisano v. Baltimore County Welfare Board, 249 Md. 94, 101 (1968).
12

(7) suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from time 

deadlines, requirements, or expirations otherwise imposed by 

applicable statutes, Rules, or court orders, including deadlines for 

appeals or other filings, deadlines for filing or conducting judicial 

proceedings, and the expiration of injunctive, restraining, protective, or 

other orders that otherwise would expire, where there is no practical 

ability of a party subject to such deadline, requirement, or expiration to 

comply with the deadline or requirement or seek other relief;

(8) suspend any judicial business that is deemed not essential by

the Chief Judge or close a court entirely when necessary;

(9) triage cases and categories of cases with respect to expedited 

treatment;

***

(14) take any other appropriate action necessary to ensure that, to 

the maximum extent possible, essential judicial business is effectively 

handled by the courts.

Maryland Rule 16-1003(a). A Rules Committee Note codified with subsection (a)(7) 

states: “Granting relief from filing deadlines may take the form of directing relation back 

of filings made promptly after termination of the emergency to the day before the deadline 

expired.”

Upon termination of an emergency, the Chief Judge is to review any measures taken 

under the emergency rules and devise a “reasonable schedule” for rescission of those 

measures. Maryland Rule 16-1003(b). A Rules Committee Note accompanying that 

section acknowledges that, upon termination of an emergency, some extensions of 

deadlines “may need to remain in place for a reasonable time.”

Finally, the rules provide for the publication of any directives or orders of the Chief 

Judge on the Judiciary website and for notice of those actions to be given specifically to 
13

the Governor, the legislative leadership, the director of MEMA, and (in the case of a 

catastrophic health emergency) the Secretary of Health. Maryland Rule 16-1003(d).

II

The Pandemic, the State of Emergency, and 

the Chief Judge’s Administrative Tolling Orders

The Chief Judge issued the administrative tolling order that is the subject of this 

case as part of the State’s response to the Covid-19 emergency that began in early 2020. It 

was issued against the backdrop of the pandemic and various measures taken by the 

Governor and Legislature in response to that emergency.

A. The Pandemic

Everyone above a very young age is conscious of the Covid-19 pandemic – the 

worst public health crisis in a century – that suddenly and pervasively altered life 

worldwide during the past two years. For future readers of this opinion on the other side 

of the pandemic, the history books will provide the details. For now, it suffices to say that 

the pandemic upended the patterns, rituals, and timelines of daily life – how one worked, 

shopped, played, and prayed; where one went; when and how one met with others; who 

was present for births, deaths, and the major life events in between. Mandated vaccination, 

self-testing for the disease, masking, and “social distancing” became commonplace and, 

on occasion, controversial. 

Some of the most drastic measures were taken in the early days of the pandemic 

during the spring of 2020 when its virulence was unknown, and the medical tools to combat 

it – vaccination and treatment – were a hope rather than a certainty. Government offices 
14

were closed, “non-essential” businesses were shuttered, stay-at-home orders were issued, 

and personal interaction of any sort was viewed as risky. At that time, a federal judge in 

Maryland, who was presiding over a case concerning anti-Covid-19 measures required to 

protect inmates at a local detention center, alluded to grim statistics on the spread of the 

virus and the resulting deaths and “struggle[d] to put into words the magnitude of COVID19’s devastation.”11

The tide began to turn in early 2021 as vaccines became available. There were 

further advances and retreats as variants of the virus emerged, proliferated, and dissipated. 

People are resilient and have adapted, but adaptation takes time. The story of Covid-19 is 

not yet over, but this account is sufficient for purposes of this opinion.

We turn next to the specific measures taken in Maryland during the late winter and 

early spring of 2020.

B. Legal Measures Taken to Combat the Pandemic

1. January – February 2020: Preparation for Arrival of the Virus in Maryland

The response of the Maryland State government to the pandemic began to take shape 

in January 2020, when the Governor directed State agencies to plan for a possible outbreak 

of Covid-19 in the State. On February 27, 2020, in anticipation of the arrival of the virus 

in Maryland, the Governor announced that he had added funds to the State budget for 

emergency preparedness, that the Department of Health and MEMA were coordinating the 

11 Seth v. McDonough, 461 F.Supp.3d 242, 247 (D. Md. 2020). 
15

effort, and that his administration would brief members of the General Assembly, the 

Comptroller, the Attorney General, and the Treasurer.12 

Also on February 27, the State Office of Personnel Services and Benefit Policy 

issued a notice entitled “Pandemic Flu and Other Infectious Diseases – Attendance and 

Leave.” The stated purpose of the notice was to “ensure that the State has . . . policies that 

facilitate the containment of pandemic flu or other infectious disease while supporting 

Executive Branch operations and protecting the health and welfare of employees.” The 

notice outlined three “levels” of agency operations during a pandemic flu or other 

infectious disease that, depending on the severity of the outbreak, would result in reduced 

operations that could include the closure of schools and public buildings.

13

 The policy 

explicitly applied to Executive Branch agencies in the State Personnel Management 

12 A list of certain actions taken by the Governor and other Executive Branch 

officials referenced in this section of this opinion is provided, with links, in Appendix A to 

this opinion. The appendices to this opinion are available at the following link: 

https://perma.cc/J237-W89M. It should be noted that this list is hardly exhaustive of the 

many measures taken by the Governor, other Executive Branch officials, and local 

governments in Maryland during the early days of the pandemic.

13 At “Level I” – the category for a “low to moderate” number of cases –

“absenteeism in agencies may become noticeable and begin to concern the agency as a 

whole, or affect specific operations.” At Level II, “cases will continue to increase,” 

“[s]ome schools may have closed,” and “[a]bsenteeism in agencies will be noticeable, and 

perhaps significant, and will cause disruption in agency operations as a whole, or in specific 

locations.” Level III, “Emergency Operations,” would be marked by “a high number of 

pandemic flu . . ., and/or a greater severity of the resulting illness, with the likelihood of 

increasing mortality rates.” At that level, public schools and public buildings would be 

closed, either state-wide or in affected areas; “only mission-critical functions” would 

continue; only essential employees, as designated by their employer, were to report to 

work; and telework requirements could be relaxed.
16

System. It thus did not encompass personnel in the Judicial Branch, which is not part of 

that personnel system. See Maryland Code, State Personnel and Pensions Article (“SPP”), 

§6-303 (“All positions in the Judicial Branch of State government are excluded from the 

State Personnel Management System except as otherwise provided by law.”); §2-201 

(“Except as otherwise provided by law, an employee in the Judicial, Legislative, or 

Executive Branch of State government is governed by the laws and personnel policies and 

procedures applicable in that branch.”). 

2. March 2020: Governor Declares State of Emergency

One week later, on March 5, 2020, a Covid-19 case was reported in Maryland, and 

the Governor declared a “state of emergency and catastrophic health emergency” to 

“control and prevent the spread of Covid-19 within the entire state of Maryland.” The State 

was not alone in taking such actions. On March 11, the World Health Organization 

declared the outbreak to be a global pandemic. 

Each branch of State government then began taking measures to limit access to 

public buildings and reduce interactions among government personnel and members of the 

public. In the Executive Branch, the Governor activated the National Guard, closed the 

public schools, and issued orders prohibiting large gatherings, closing senior citizen 

centers, controlling the movement of people into the State’s ports, and restricting the use 

of large government buildings.

The Governor also issued an order in which he found that, “to protect and save lives, 

it is necessary and reasonable” to extend expiring “permits, licenses, registrations, and 

other governmental authorizations,” not only because of increased employee absences and 
17

alternative working arrangements within the State’s workforce, but also because the 

renewal of such authorizations “often requires the public to enter public buildings and 

interact with State employees and other persons, which may be contrary to prudent social 

distancing.” The order authorized the “head of each unit of State or local government” to 

suspend “any legal or procedural deadline . . . or other time of an act or event described 

within any State or local statute, rule, or regulation that it administers.” 

Then in mid-session, the General Assembly announced on the evening of March 12 

that its buildings would be closed to the general public.

14 The Legislature enacted 

emergency legislation targeted at various aspects of the pandemic, including providing the 

Governor with enhanced emergency powers for its duration. Chapters 13, 14, Laws of 

Maryland 2020. Shortly thereafter, the General Assembly announced that it would adjourn 

its session early, reportedly for the first time since the Civil War.15 

During the remainder of March 2020, as the virus spread in Maryland and elsewhere 

in the country, the Governor issued orders limiting public gatherings and activities in 

various ways. On March 23, the Governor issued an order closing “all non-essential 

businesses,” finding that, in order to “protect the public health, welfare, and safety, prevent 

14 See Bryan Renbaum, Ferguson Urges Calm in Response to Coronavirus

(MarylandReporter.com March 13, 2020).

15 See Erin Cox & Ovetta Wiggins, Coronavirus to Shut Down Maryland General 

Assembly (Washington Post March 16, 2020); Pamela Wood & Luke Broadwater, 

Maryland Lawmakers to End General Assembly Session Wednesday, with Threat of 

Coronavirus Looming (Baltimore Sun March 15, 2020).
18

the transmission of the novel coronavirus, control the spread of COVID-19, and save lives, 

it is necessary to control and direct the movement of individuals in Maryland, including 

those on the public streets” and “to control and direct in Maryland the occupancy and use 

of buildings and premises.” One week later, the Governor issued a further directive 

“requiring all persons to stay at home.” It stated that, unless specifically excepted, “all 

persons living in the State of Maryland are hereby ordered, effective as of 8:00 p.m. on 

March 30, 2020, to stay in their homes or places of residences.” That order has been 

described as a “shelter-in-place” order. See Duvall v. Hogan, No. CV ELH-94-2541, 2020 

WL 3402301, at *3 (D. Md. June 19, 2020).

3. March 2020: Initial Emergency Response of the Judiciary

On March 11, 2020, the Secretary of Health briefed the Judicial Council, an 

advisory body to the Chief Judge,16 about the State’s response to the expected pandemic. 

The Secretary advised the Council that there was currently no vaccine or therapy to treat 

the rapidly-spreading virus and that the Judiciary should plan for courts to be closed for 

16 The 21-member Judicial Council includes, among others, the Chief Judge of the 

Court of Appeals, the Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, the Chair of the 

Conference of Circuit Judges, the Chief Judge of the District Court, the State Court 

Administrator, the Chair of the Conference of Circuit Court Clerks, the Chair of the 

Conference of Circuit Court Administrators, the Chair of the Court of Appeals Standing 

Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the Chief Clerk of the District Court. 

See Maryland Rule 16-110.
19

some time during the public emergency.

17

 One member of the Council, noting that most 

District Court facilities are in State buildings and that the courts “have a constitutional 

requirement to stay open to address certain matters,” suggested that the Governor could 

defer to the Chief Judge as to whether courts would close or remain open upon declaration 

of a state of emergency. 

The Secretary provided the Judicial Council with information about quarantine and 

incubation periods. He stated that the “executive branch is experimenting with telework, 

to the extent possible, to mitigate exposure to risks,” requested that the courts accept 

written reports in lieu of status hearings in certain cases, and expressed a concern that

backlogs in community placement for individuals ready for release would soon develop.

The Chief Judge asked the members of the Judicial Council to maintain “open and constant 

communication” with the Department of Health. 

On March 12 – the same day that the Governor issued the order restricting use of 

government buildings and imposing restrictions on large gatherings and that the General 

Assembly closed its buildings to the public – the Chief Judge issued two administrative 

orders suspending jury trials and non-essential matters, respectively.

18

 In those orders, the 

17 Minutes of the Judicial Council (March 11, 2020), available at 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/judicialcouncil/pdfs/minutes/minutes20200

311.pdf (https://perma.cc/A85U-2NFZ).

18 See Administrative Order on the Statewide Suspension of Jury Trials (March 12, 

2020), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200312suspensionofjurytrials.pdf (https://perma.cc/GC7U-QDBA); 

Administrative Order on the Statewide Suspension of Non-Essential Judicial 

Activities Due to Emergency (March 12, 2020), available at
20

Chief Judge found that the Covid-19 outbreak had caused “an emergency . . . that poses a 

threat of imminent and potentially lethal harm to vulnerable individuals, including some 

Judiciary personnel, who may come into contact with a court or judicial facility and 

personnel.” In light of that emergency, the Chief Judge suspended jury trials and certain 

non-essential activities. The next day, March 13, the Chief Judge issued an additional

administrative order that closed courthouses to the public for all but certain emergency 

matters.19

In those administrative orders, the Chief Judge invoked her authority under the State 

Constitution as administrative head of the Judicial Branch. Simultaneously, the Rules 

Committee was drafting rules governing use of that authority for dealing with a public 

emergency.

4. Court of Appeals: Adoption of Rules Relating to Emergencies

On March 13, 2020, the Rules Committee considered a set of proposed rules relating 

to the emergency authority of the Chief Judge. At that meeting, the Chair of the Committee 

explained that the few provisions in statute and rule concerning public emergencies and the 

https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200312suspensionnonessential.pdf (https://perma.cc/QTF2-5LUJ).

19 See Administrative Order on Statewide Closing of the Courts to the Public Due 

to the COVID-19 Emergency (March 13, 2020), available at

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200313statewideclosingofcourts.pdf (https://perma.cc/BRQ3-PSS2).
21

Judiciary had resulted from specific past emergencies.20 He said that the development of 

more general emergency rules had been contemplated, but could be delayed no longer in 

light of the rapidly-spreading coronavirus. The Chair noted that the Governor had

comprehensive authority under a number of statutes to deal with emergencies, but that the

statutes made little reference to the Judiciary. He stated that the lack of mention of the 

Judiciary was understandable because the responsibility to run the Judicial Branch is vested 

by the Maryland Constitution in the Court of Appeals and the Chief Judge, to be 

implemented primarily through the Court’s rulemaking authority. He noted that the 

proposed rules recognized that any emergency actions taken by the Chief Judge must be 

taken in harmony with the Governor’s lawful directives. 

The Rules Committee approved the proposed rules with minor amendments and 

submitted its report to the Court of Appeals that day. The report noted that the authority 

of the Chief Judge “to assure, to the extent possible, the continued functioning of the courts 

and the judicial system” was “necessarily broad,” but that “its exercise is limited to those 

things that prove necessary to assure reasonable access to the courts during and 

immediately following an emergency or other disabling event.”21

20 Minutes of Rules Committee Meeting, pp. 12-13 (March 13, 2020), available at 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/minutes-rules/minutes20200313.pdf

(https://perma.cc/MD6K-TMQ5).

21 204th Report of the Rules Committee, p. 3 (March 13, 2020), available at 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules/reports/204threport.pdf

(https://perma.cc/2F8P-ZA9T).
22

The following Monday, March 16, the Court of Appeals considered the rules in an 

open hearing. The Court adopted the proposed rules, which are codified at Maryland Rule 

16-1001 et seq. as described in Part I.C.2 of this opinion. As noted there, those rules, 

among other things, delegated to the Chief Judge a conditional authority to extend 

deadlines that was substantially analogous to the authority that the Governor’s March 12 

order had granted to heads of the units of State and local governments for deadlines 

imposed by the laws that the agencies in those units administered. 

5. Administrative Orders Issued under Emergency Rules

Closing Clerks’ Offices 

On March 16, the Chief Judge issued an order that closed clerks’ offices, with 

limited exceptions.22 That order, which stated that it was effective immediately, noted the 

safety measures that the courts had taken thus far and found that there was “a threat of 

imminent and potentially lethal harm to vulnerable individuals who may come into contact 

with a ... judicial facility and personnel” and that “[f]urther rapid escalation of the 

emergency requires more comprehensive measures to protect the health and safety of 

Maryland residents and Judiciary personnel.” Citing the new emergency rules, the Chief 

Judge ordered that the courts, offices, and units in the Maryland Judiciary, and the offices 

of the clerks of the circuit courts and the District Court, “shall be restricted to emergency 

22 Administrative Order on Statewide Judiciary Restricted Operations Due to the 

COVID-19 Emergency (March 16, 2020), available at 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200316restrictedoperationsduetocovid19.pdf (https://perma.cc/F8S6-G5CS).
23

operations and closed with limited exceptions as described in this order beginning on 

March 17, 2020, through April 3, 2020, or until further order of the Chief Judge . . . .” The 

order specified that MDEC – the Judiciary’s electronic case management system –

“continues to be available for electronic filing and is required to be used for all MDEC 

counties.”23 Regarding “pleadings not required to be filed electronically,” the order 

provided that “filings will be received by mail and may be received via drop boxes installed 

at local courthouses.” The order further specified that “[o]ther than as set forth in this 

Administrative Order, deadlines established by Maryland statutes or rules remain in 

effect[.]”

Extending Filing and Hearing Dates 

On April 3, 2020, the Chief Judge issued the initial order extending filing and 

hearing dates as a result of the pandemic.

24 Finding that the Covid-19 outbreak “continues 

to require comprehensive measures to protect the health and safety of Maryland residents 

and Judiciary personnel” and citing Article IV, §18 of the Maryland Constitution and Rule 

16-1003(a)(7) as authority, she ordered that:

23 At the time of the order, all jurisdictions except Baltimore City, Montgomery 

County, and Prince George’s County were part of the MDEC electronic filing system.

24 See Administrative Order on Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statute of 

Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and 

Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters (April 3, 2020), available at 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200403emergencytollingorsuspensionofstatutesoflimitationsetc.pdf

(https://perma.cc/N3QU-UBNT). 
24

all statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters 

required to be filed in a Maryland state court, including statutes of 

limitations, shall be tolled or suspended, as applicable, effective March 

16, 2020, by the number of days that the courts are closed to the public 

due to the COVID-19 emergency by order of the Chief Judge of the 

Court of Appeals[.]

The April 3 order further provided that “such deadlines shall be extended by a period to 

be described in an order by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals terminating the 

COVID-19 emergency period.” The order also tolled deadlines regarding hearings in 

pending matters.25

The April 24 Administrative Tolling Order 

On April 24, 2020, the Chief Judge issued the order to which the certified question

in this case refers. That order was titled “Amended Administrative Order Clarifying the 

Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines 

in Pending Matters.” A copy of that order appears in Appendix B to this opinion.26 It

elaborated on the April 3 order and recited, in a series of “whereas” clauses, the backdrop 

against which the tolling order was issued. In particular, it stated that the “comprehensive 

measures” required by the Covid-19 emergency, including “the stay-at-home orders 

issued by the Governor and restricted operations of the courts and judicial facilities,” were 

“causing delays in the processing of routine matters,” that the restrictions were having “a 

25 The Chief Judge amended the April 3 order on April 8 in ways not relevant here.

26 Appendix B, as well as the other appendices to this opinion, may be found at the 

following link: https://perma.cc/J237-W89M.
25

widespread detrimental impact upon the administration of justice, impeding the ability of 

parties and potential litigants to meet with counsel, conduct research, gather evidence, and 

prepare complaints, pleadings, and responses,” with the greatest impact on impoverished 

individuals, and that the impact of the pandemic “is so widespread as to have created a 

general and pervasive practical inability for certain deadlines to be met.” The order 

reiterated that the tolling period would begin on March 16, 2020 and run for “the number 

of days that the courts are closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency.” 

The April 24 order made clear that the tolling provision applied to matters in both 

the trial and appellate courts27 and contained a new provision explaining that the tolling 

provision applied regardless of whether a party made a specific showing of hardship as a 

result of the pandemic.

28

27 The order amended the language in the April 3 order regarding the tolling or 

suspending of statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters “required to 

be filed in a Maryland state court” to read “required to be filed in a Maryland state trial or 

appellate court.”

28 The order stated:

Justice requires that the ordering of the suspension of such deadlines 

during an emergency as sweeping as a pandemic be applied consistently and 

equitably throughout Maryland, and no party or parties shall be compelled to 

prove his, her, its, or their practical inability to comply with such a deadline 

if it occurred during the COVID-19 emergency to obtain the relief that this 

Administrative Order provides[.]
26

Later Administrative Orders Relevant to Tolling 

During May 2020, the Chief Judge issued administrative orders setting forth

additional findings on the impact of the pandemic-related restrictions on the courts. 

A May 1, 2020 order concerning “Case Time Standards and Related Reports” stated 

that the pandemic “has forced the restriction of court operations and closure of facilities, 

requiring postponements of thousands of court events across the state,” that the “restricted 

operations have resulted in a backlog of new and pending matters causing heretofore 

unforeseen delays in the resolution of cases that must be processed when the courts can be 

re-opened to routine operations,” and that “it is anticipated that the courts will be required 

to reopen in phases and may continue to be constrained by safety measures . . . .”29

A May 4 order “Expanding and Extending Statewide Judiciary Restricted 

Operations”30 addressed the mechanics of filing in the courts and ordered that the clerks of 

the various courts “shall continue to process” filings, whether electronic or otherwise, “to 

the extent possible with essential staff working onsite, staff teleworking, or both[.]” The 

29 Administrative Order on Case Time Standards and Related Reports for Fiscal 

Years 2020 and 2021 in Light of the COVID-19 Emergency (May 1, 2020), available at 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200501casetimestandardsandrelatedreports.pdf (https://perma.cc/9Z2W5AER).

30 Fourth Amended Administrative Order Expanding and Extending Statewide 

Judiciary Restricted Operations Due to the COVID-19 Emergency (May 4, 2020), available 

at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200504fourthamendedadministrativeorderexpandingandextendingjudiciaryrestr

ictedoperations.pdf (https://perma.cc/89L4-N46A).
27

order further provided that another order issued that day would “control as to statutory and 

rules deadlines,” except as to criminal jury trials. The latter order, “Further Clarifying the 

Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines 

in Pending Matters,” retained the March 16, 2020 effective date of the earlier tolling orders 

and did not change the earlier orders in ways relevant here. 

On May 22, the Chief Judge issued an order that superseded the April 24 tolling 

order. Among other things, the new order noted that clerks’ offices would be reopened on 

July 20, 2020 – which would mark the end of the tolling period established in the previous 

orders. The order elaborated on the previous tolling orders by specifying that, for purposes 

of tolling the statutes and limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters, 

the 126 days during which the clerks’ offices were closed (March 16, 2020 until July 20, 

2020) “do not count against the time remaining for the initiation of the matter.” The May 

22 order further extended the filing deadlines for the initiation of matters by an additional 

15 days past the date on which clerks’ office reopened and provided an example as to how 

a new filing deadline would be computed. 

From June 2020 through March 2022, the revised administrative tolling order was 

amended 11 times. The amendments included some minor changes to the tolling order,31

31 An amended order issued on November 24, 2020, added a definition of “matters” 

to which the tolling orders would apply “nunc pro tunc” – i.e., the definition applied 

retroactively. That definition has no bearing on this case and its validity is not before us.
28

but largely consisted of updated cross-references to other administrative orders concerning 

the Covid-19 pandemic.32 On March 28, 2022, the Chief Judge issued a “final” 

administrative tolling order; it recognized the termination of emergency operations in the 

Judiciary as of April 3, 2022.

A list of all the administrative tolling orders, and links to each, is contained in 

Appendix C to this opinion.

33

6. Informing the Legislature about the Judiciary’s Response to the Emergency

On May 7, 2020, the Chief Judge briefed the Senate Judicial Proceedings 

Committee on the Judiciary’s response to the pandemic and specifically informed the

committee about the various administrative orders, including the order tolling statutes of 

limitations and other filing deadlines. On May 28, the Chief Judge provided a similar 

briefing to the House Judiciary Committee and again described the administrative orders, 

including the tolling orders.

On January 8, 2021, the Chief Judge provided a further briefing to the Senate 

Judicial Proceedings Committee on “the Courts and Criminal Justice System During the 

COVID-19 Pandemic.” Attached to the agenda of that meeting was a timeline of the 

32 According to the Judiciary website, a total of 107 administrative orders have been 

issued concerning various matters related to the pandemic emergency. The vast majority 

of those orders consist of minor revisions of a relatively small number of distinct orders. 

See https://mdcourts.gov/coronavirusorders (https://perma.cc/82HA-4Q32).

33 Like the other appendices to this opinion, Appendix C may be found at the 

following link: https://perma.cc/J237-W89M.
29

Judiciary’s response, including links to the April 3 and 24, 2020 tolling orders and many 

of the succeeding ones, and a statement that “[t]he Maryland Judiciary has maintained 

ongoing communication with the Maryland Department of Health, the Department of 

Public Safety and Correctional Services, Department of Juvenile Services, the Department 

of General Services, the Maryland State Bar Association and the Governor’s Office of 

Legal Counsel.”34

III

The Dispute between Liberty Mutual and Murphy Enterprises

The federal district court’s certification order describes the lawsuit and proceedings 

there that gave rise to the certified question of law.

A. Payment and Performance Bonds and Claims for Indemnification

The facts of the underlying dispute do not affect our answer to the certified question. 

We describe them briefly for context. As indicated in the federal court’s certification order, 

34 Maryland Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Briefing on the Courts and 

Criminal Justice System During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Agenda (Jan. 8, 2021), 

available at https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2021RS/meeting_material/jpr%20-

%20132545970372917678%20-%20JPR%20Briefing%20January%208.pdf

(https://perma.cc/DZP4-5X4H).
30

Liberty Mutual35 issued payment and performance bonds to Murphy Enterprises,36 a 

concrete subcontractor on a construction contract for a Maryland State Police facility at 

Martin State Airport. Under a related indemnification agreement, Murphy Enterprises 

agreed to indemnify Liberty Mutual in certain circumstances. According to Liberty 

Mutual, Murphy Enterprises defaulted on its obligations at the construction project, 

resulting in claims against the payment and performance bonds. Liberty Mutual allegedly 

made payments to third parties as a result of those claims on five occasions during February 

2017 through August 2017. According to Liberty Mutual, it is entitled to indemnification, 

including associated legal fees and other costs, from Murphy Enterprises for those 

payments. 

B. Litigation in Federal Court Concerning the Claims for Indemnification

On July 2, 2020, Liberty Mutual sued Murphy Enterprises in a diversity action in 

federal court to recover the amounts allegedly owed. The complaint asserted a breach of 

contract claim and alleged that the damages exceeded the jurisdictional amount of $75,000 

for purposes of the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jesse 

J. Murphy, et al., Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-01961-SAG (D. Md.).

35 According to the complaint filed in the federal district court, Liberty Mutual 

brought the action as administrator and assignee of another entity that had issued the 

payment and performance bonds. For simplicity, we refer solely to Liberty Mutual in the 

text. 

36 Jesse J. Murphy, the individual defendant in the underlying case, is identified in 

the caption of the complaint in the federal district court as the president and resident agent 

of J.M. Murphy Enterprises, Inc.
31

Murphy Enterprises moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the 

federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. It argued that several of the bond payments 

were made more than three years before the complaint was filed, that the claims related to 

those payments accrued outside the relevant period of limitations under Maryland law,

37

that the amount of those claims should not be included in computing the amount in 

controversy, and that the remaining claims did not meet the $75,000 jurisdictional 

threshold for a diversity action in federal court. Liberty Mutual countered that the claims 

were timely under Maryland law because the April 24, 2020 administrative tolling order 

had tolled the applicable statute of limitations. In reply, Murphy Enterprises argued that 

the tolling order exceeded this Court’s authority under Maryland’s Constitution to “adopt 

rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of 

the appellate courts and in other courts of the State” and “constituted an unlawful 

assumption of legislative power.” Liberty Mutual rejoined that the Court had properly 

exercised its emergency powers. 

C. Federal Court Certifies Question of Maryland Law

On July 2, 2021, the federal district court issued a memorandum opinion in which 

it opined that the April 24, 2020 administrative tolling order was “substantive law” that 

tolled the statute of limitations under Maryland law and that would apply in a federal 

37 The general statute of limitations under Maryland law applicable to breach of 

contract claims is three years. CJ §5-101.
32

diversity action if “validly enacted.”

38 Accordingly, the court concluded that the validity 

of the administrative tolling order could be determinative of its jurisdiction over the 

litigation. Two weeks later, the federal district court transmitted its certified question of 

law to this Court to resolve that issue. 

The timeliness of certain claims asserted in Liberty Mutual’s complaint in the 

federal court action – and the jurisdiction of the federal court over that action – thus may 

turn on whether the April 24, 2020 administrative tolling order was a proper exercise of 

powers under the Maryland Constitution.39 For that purpose, the federal court has certified 

a question of law to this Court, which we rephrase as follows:40

38 Under the “Erie doctrine,” a federal court is to apply the substantive law of the 

state in which it sits, including the state’s choice-of-law rules, in an action brought under 

the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

39 While we have no reason to dispute the federal court’s view of how the validity 

of the administrative tolling order may affect its jurisdiction over the litigation, we express 

no opinion as to when the various claims asserted by Liberty Mutual actually accrued.

40 The federal district court worded the certified question as follows:

Did the Maryland Court of Appeals act within its enabling authority 

under, inter alia, the State Constitution and the State Declaration of Rights 

when its April 24, 2020 Administrative Order tolled Maryland’s statutes of 

limitation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic?

We have reformulated the question to reflect that, as noted in Part II.B of this opinion, the 

April 24 administrative tolling order and the subsequent tolling orders that revised it were 

issued by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, not the entire Court, and that those 

orders invoked rules adopted by the Court in addition to the Chief Judge’s administrative 

authority as head of the Judicial Branch under the State Constitution. Our rephrasing is 

simply an effort to present the important issue identified by the federal court more precisely 

in terms of Maryland law. Our rephrasing also recognizes that the Chief Judge’s 

administrative orders for criminal matters and other deadlines are not at issue in this matter.
33

Did the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland act within 

her authority under Maryland law when, in response to the Covid-19 

pandemic, she issued Administrative Orders that tolled statutes of limitations

related to civil cases?

The certification order designated Murphy Enterprises and Mr. Murphy as appellants in 

this Court and so Liberty Mutual is to be treated as appellee. Maryland Rule 8-305(b).

IV

Discussion

A. Certified Questions of Law

Under the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, CJ §12-601 et 

seq., this Court may “answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States 

or by an appellate court of another state or of a tribe, if the answer may be determinative 

of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate 

decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State.” CJ §12-603; see also Maryland 

Rule 8-305. For that purpose, we may reformulate the question certified to us, as we have 

done in this case. CJ §12-604. In responding to a certification from another court, this

Court resolves only issues of Maryland law, not questions of fact. Parler & Wobber v. 

Miles & Stockbridge, 359 Md. 671, 681 (2000). 

In responding to the certified question from the federal district court, it is not our 

role to decide the timeliness of the claims asserted by Liberty Mutual, to determine whether 

the amount in controversy satisfies the minimum for federal diversity jurisdiction, or to 

resolve Murphy Enterprises’ motion to dismiss. Those are jobs for the federal court. Our 
34

task is simply to answer the question of Maryland law posed to us to assist the federal court

in resolving the questions before it.

The federal district court has asked whether the Chief Judge acted within her 

authority under Maryland law, including the Maryland Constitution, in issuing the 

administrative tolling order.41 We answer that question in two steps. 

First, we address whether there is authority under Maryland law for a Chief Judge 

to issue such an order in an emergency. The answer to that question is relatively 

straightforward and largely answered in the text of the administrative tolling order itself. 

Second, we consider whether, regardless of the authority for issuing such an order, 

that order violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Murphy Enterprises contends that

two provisions of the Declaration of Rights precluded that order: (1) Article 8, which 

guarantees separation of powers of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of the 

Maryland State government, and (2) Article 9, which prohibits the suspension of laws. 

B. Whether the Chief Judge Had Authority to Issue the Order

The administrative tolling order issued on April 24, 2020 was based on explicit 

authority provided by Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7) for the Chief Judge to “suspend, toll, 

extend, or otherwise grant relief from time deadlines ... otherwise imposed by applicable 

statutes ....” The Chief Judge’s authority to take such action is triggered under Maryland 

41 Although our analysis and answer relate, as does the certified question of law, 

specifically to the April 24, 2020 administrative tolling order as it affected statutes of 

limitations governing civil actions, the same analysis applies to the later iterations of that 

provision in the amended administrative tolling orders issued by the Chief Judge.
35

Rule 16-1001 when the Governor declares a state of emergency – as the Governor had done

in March 2020 prior to the issuance of the administrative tolling order. Those rules were

adopted by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to the Court’s rulemaking authority in Article 

IV, §18(a) of the Maryland Constitution after notice and a public hearing, albeit on a short 

timetable due to the pandemic emergency. There is no contention that the adoption of the

rules was procedurally deficient.

The administrative tolling order also invoked Article IV, §18 of the Maryland 

Constitution and alluded to the Chief Judge’s role as the “administrative head” of the 

Maryland judicial system. See Part I.A.1 of this opinion. The order was based in part on 

the Chief Judge’s administrative responsibility to ensure that the courts were available to 

discharge their constitutional duty to adjudicate disputes. As the recitals in the 

administrative order indicate, at the time the order was issued in the spring of 2020, the 

pandemic had disrupted access to the courts and the ability of the State Judiciary to operate 

effectively. See Appendix B (text of April 24, 2020 order). In particular, the Chief Judge 

found that the measures the Judiciary had taken to respond to that emergency, in 

compliance with directives of the Governor and guidance from the federal Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, had had a “detrimental impact” that “imped[ed] the ability

of parties and potential litigants to meet with counsel, conduct research, gather evidence, 

and prepare complaints, pleadings, and responses.” Id. As a result, there was a “general 

and pervasive practical inability” to meet certain deadlines. Id. Moreover, the Chief Judge 

found that the pandemic had affected not only the ability of litigants to file pleadings – a 
36

problem addressed at least in part by drop boxes and MDEC – but also the ability to prepare 

them in the first place. 

In setting the amount of additional time that would be allowed for the “initiation of 

matters,” section (a) of the order stated that the tolling period would run from March 16, 

2020 – the date on which access to clerks’ offices was first restricted – and consist of “the 

number of days that the courts are closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency.”42 

A later administrative order set the end date of the tolling period as July 20, 2020, once the 

courts had been reopened.43 Accordingly, the tolling period was explicitly tied to the period 

that the courts were closed to the public. 

There thus was ample and explicit authority under Article IV of the State 

Constitution and the Maryland Rules for the Chief Judge to issue the administrative tolling 

order. The remaining issue is whether, as Murphy Enterprises argues, the order – and 

presumably the rules on which it was based – overreached the authority of the Judiciary by 

offending other provisions of the Maryland Constitution, in particular, Articles 8 and 9 of 

the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

42 Other sections of the order applied a similar tolling period to deadlines in pending 

matters and made clear that the tolling applied universally without a requirement that 

litigants demonstrate a hardship in a particular case. See sections (b) and (c) of the April 

24, 2020 order.

43 Later revisions of the order also added a 15-day grace period to the tolling period. 

That was apparently based on Rule 16-1003(b), which, according to the accompanying 

Rules Committee Note, contemplates that some extensions of deadlines might remain in 

place for a reasonable time after termination of an emergency. See Part I.C.2 of this 

opinion.
37

C. Whether the Order Violated Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights

1. Article 8 – Separation of Powers

The Three Branches

The Maryland Constitution establishes State government in three branches –

Legislative, Executive, and Judicial – that are often referred to as “Departments” in that 

document. Article II, entitled “Executive Department,” sets forth the powers of the 

Governor as to that branch; Article III, entitled “Legislative Department,” concerns the 

General Assembly, its composition, and its powers; and Article IV, entitled “Judicial 

Department,” concerns the composition and powers of the Judiciary. Article 8 of the 

Maryland Declaration of Rights sets forth a principle of separation of powers with respect 

to those branches. It states, in its entirety: “That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial 

powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no 

person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the 

duties of any other.” 

Shared Authority

Read literally, Article 8 appears to presuppose that each branch can, and must, carry 

out its functions without performing any of the functions assigned to another branch. 

However, this Court has long acknowledged that the “respective powers of the legislative, 

executive and judicial branches of government are not ‘wholly separate and unmixed,’”

Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463, 476 (1829).
38

In a well-known opinion concerning the relationship of the branches of government 

under the federal constitution, Justice Robert Jackson described how the principle of 

separation of powers does not isolate each branch in its own silo:

The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and 

cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches 

based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While 

the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also 

contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a 

workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but 

interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 

concurring).

The Maryland Constitution recognizes on its face that the powers of the three 

branches of State government are often and inevitably intertwined. For example, the 

General Assembly has a role in elections and appointments to positions in the Executive 

Branch under Article II. See Article II, §6 (vacancies in offices of Governor and Lieutenant 

Governor), §10-11 (Senate confirmation of gubernatorial appointees). The Governor, as 

well as the General Assembly, plays a role in the enactment of legislation and in the 

organization of the Executive Branch. Article II, §17, 24. The Governor, as well as the 

General Assembly, has an important role in the State budget process. See Article III, §52; 

Judy v. Schaefer, 331 Md. 239, 261-62 (1993) (describing the Governor’s role in the State 

budget process as “a major legislative-type role”). 

Other examples of shared authority necessarily occur in practice. The General 

Assembly, in enacting a statute, may delegate some legislative-type powers to an Executive 

Branch agency charged with administering the statute, so long as the statute provides 
39

“sufficient safeguards” to guide the agency’s exercise of those powers. Department of 

Transportation v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 72 (1987); see also Department of Natural

Resources v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 218-20 (1975). The authority of one branch may 

overlap with those of another in some circumstances “because each branch may be 

concerned with different objectives.” Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 677 (2015) 

(recognizing the shared authority of the Executive and Judiciary branches to restrict an

individual’s driving privileges). 

The separation of powers concept embodied in Article 8 accommodates the fact that,

in addition to the specific powers and functions that the Constitution expressly grants to 

the three branches of government, each branch must as a practical matter “possess[]

additional powers perforce implied from the right and obligation to perform its 

constitutional duties.” Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 690-91 (1981). 

Because each branch has those implied powers, which are also referred to as “incidental” 

or “inherent” powers, Article 8 “may constitutionally encompass a sensible degree of 

elasticity.” Id. at 689 (quoting Linchester, 274 Md. at 220 (1975) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Accordingly, instead of interpreting Article 8 in a “literal sense,” the Court has 

read it to “preserve to the one branch of government its essential functions” and to “prohibit 

any other branch from interfering with or usurping those functions.” McCulloch v. 

Glendening, 347 Md. 272, 283-84 (1997) (internal punctuation and citations omitted)..

The Limits of Sharing – “Usurping” the Powers of Another Branch

Still, the meaning of Article 8 “cannot be stretched to a point where, in effect, there 

no longer exists a separation of governmental power, as the Maryland Constitution does 
40

not permit a merger of the three branches of our State government, nor does it ‘make any 

one of the three departments subordinate to the other, when exercising the trust committed 

to it.’” Merchant v. State, 448 Md. 75, 97 (2016) (quoting Linchester, 274 Md. at 220). 

Generally, in determining where that point might lie, the Court has looked to whether the 

branch whose power was challenged was “usurping” a power of another branch. See, e.g.,

Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519 (2006) (holding invalid an action taken by the Legislature 

that fell within the Executive’s purview). To the same effect, the Court has considered 

whether the performance of a function by one branch “encroach[ed]” on the other branch’s 

powers, see, e.g., Linchester, 274 Md. at 220, and whether the branch in question had “a 

significant role” in the subject of the action, or whether, by contrast, that subject lay “solely 

and exclusively within the purview of [a different] branch.” McCulloch, 347 Md. at 284.

In considering whether one branch’s action usurped a function properly belonging to 

another branch, the Court has considered not only the respective roles and functions of 

each branch as to the particular subject matter, but also the surrounding circumstances. 

See, e.g., Schisler, 394 Md. at 542 (recounting the circumstances that led to the General 

Assembly’s adoption of legislation that encroached on the Executive appointment power).

2. Application to the Administrative Tolling Order

The certified question in the present case involves the respective powers and 

functions of all three branches. The issue here is whether the Judiciary had a “significant 

role” in the courts’ application of statutes of limitations during an emergency or whether, 

instead, that subject fell solely within the purview of either the Legislative or the Executive 

branch such that the administrative tolling order interfered with the performance by the 
41

other two branches of their essential functions. In short, did the Chief Judge’s 

administrative tolling order “usurp” another branch’s power?

Separation of Powers and the Judiciary

This Court has addressed the Judiciary’s place in Maryland’s system of government 

in numerous contexts. The cases can be sorted into four broad categories: (1) those

involving a legislative attempt to assign to the courts a task that had nothing to do with 

adjudicating cases, such as approving the accounts that county officers presented to a board 

of county commissioners for payment;

44 (2) those involving actions taken by, or requested 

of, a particular court in a particular proceeding that encroached upon a legislative or 

executive function;

45 (3) those that concern whether the adoption of a particular rule by the 

44 Beasley v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641(1902). Other examples of such statutes include laws 

requiring a court to find facts, for referral to the Legislature for its action, as to whether a 

candidate for register of wills had violated the state Corrupt Practices Act, Duffy v. 

Conaway, 295 Md. 242, 261 (1983); requiring a court to appoint members of a board of 

visitors to a county jail, Robey v. Prince George’s County, 92 Md. 150 (1900); or requiring 

the circuit court to receive petitions on whether to permit the sale of liquor in the county 

and order an election if the petitions met the required threshold, Board of Supervisors 

Elections v. Todd, 97 Md. 247 (1903). 

With regard to legislation that limits the Judiciary’s powers, the Legislature retains 

authority to limit the Judiciary’s exercise of its powers to the extent that a power is “not an 

essential [one] inherent in the courts in the discharge of their constitutionally mandated 

duty to administer justice.” Commission on Medical Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 

402 (1981).

45 See, e.g., Getty v. Carroll County Board of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 738 (2007)

(holding that the circuit court had exceeded its powers in issuing a consent order 

implementing an agreement between a county resident and the election board to adopt a 

particular redistricting plan and explaining that the circuit court had “assumed a role that, 

in fact, constitutionally belongs to the legislative and executive departments of our 

government”); Maryland-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n v. Randall, 209 Md. 18, 27 
42

Court of Appeals exceeded the Court’s authority under Article IV, §18(a) to adopt rules 

and regulations concerning “the practice and procedure” in the courts;

46 and (4) those

involving whether a particular rule or other action by the Judiciary exceeded the 

rulemaking authority of the Court of Appeals under that same section concerning “the 

administration” of the courts.

47

 

The last two categories of cases are the most instructive here. The certified question 

of law concerns the validity of an administrative order that invoked the Chief Judge’s 

authority under both Article IV, §18(b) and the emergency rules, which themselves were 

based on the rulemaking authority of the Court of Appeals under Article IV, §18(a) (“The 

Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the 

practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other 

courts of this State ...” (emphasis added)). 

(1956) (affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of a petition to enjoin the Secretary of State 

from transmitting a vetoed bill back to the legislative house of origin).

46 See, e.g., Consol. Const. Servs., Inc. v. Simpson, 372 Md. 434, 448-49 (2002)

(provision of rule governing garnishment actions effected a substantive change in the cause 

of action that exceeded the Court’s rulemaking authority).

47 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368 (1986) (rule granting 

power to assign cases to a circuit court administrative judge was within the rulemaking 

power under §18(a)).
43

Whether the rules and administrative tolling order fell within the Court’s

rulemaking powers related to “practice and procedure” 

The “practice and procedure” category includes cases in which the Court held 

invalid either its own rule or a local rule adopted by a circuit court with rulemaking 

authority, and cases in which the Court held instead that the rule fell properly within the 

Judicial Branch’s role in regulating practice and procedure in the courts. In a case in which 

a rule was found to be invalid, the Court held that it had exceeded its power and had 

encroached on the General Assembly’s legislative power by adopting a rule that added a 

substantive element to attachment and garnishment proceedings. Those proceedings, the 

Court explained, are “creatures of statute,” such that the “substance of the statute . . . is the 

province of the Legislature and not the courts.” Consol. Const. Servs., Inc. v. Simpson, 372 

Md. 434, 451–52 (2002); see also State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 183 (1999) (“It is 

doubtful that this Court’s rule-making authority would extend to the creation of a separate 

cause of action.”).

A statute of limitations, however, neither creates a right of action nor pertains to the 

merits of a cause of action; rather, it regulates the plaintiff’s exercise of that right. See 

Park Plus, Inc. v. Palisades of Towson, LLC, ___ Md. ___ (March 25, 2022), slip op. at 18 

(“Statutes of limitations have historically been considered procedural, not substantive 

defenses, and are generally understood to extinguish the remedy for enforcing a right, not 

the right itself.”) (emphasis in original); see also Foos v. Steinberg, 247 Md. 35, 38 (1967);

Snyder v. Cearfoss, 187 Md. 635, 639 (1947); Young v. Mayne Realty Co., Inc., 48 Md.

App. 662, 664-66 (1981).
44

The tolling of the statute of limitations thus falls within the field of procedural 

matters in which the Court may play a role. Further, as noted in Part I.B. of this opinion, 

the Court has played a role on the subject, both by rule and through the development in 

case law of doctrines applicable to broad categories of cases. As noted earlier, Rule 2-

101(b) tolls the statute of limitations for filing in a Maryland court for a plaintiff whose 

lawsuit was initially filed in federal court or a court of another state, but dismissed in that 

forum on jurisdictional or certain other grounds. See Turner v. Kight, 406 Md. 167, 190 

(2008) (applying Rule 2-101(b) in conjunction with a federal statute); see also Christensen, 

394 Md. at 242 (referring to Rule 2-101(b), stating, “this Court not only has the authority 

to adopt rules that alter the operation of existing statutes of limitations, it has exercised its 

rulemaking authority to adopt such a rule”). That rule, adopted to preserve a plaintiff’s 

ability to litigate an action timely brought in federal court but dismissed there on certain 

grounds not bearing on the merits, illustrates that “practice and procedure” may include 

generally-applicable measures to ensure that the courts’ procedures are fair to litigants. 

Similar policy goals underlie the various judicially-created doctrines that extend the 

deadline for filing suit for various categories of claimants, such as the “discovery rule” and 

“judicial tolling.” In creating such categorical exceptions, the Court has looked to the 

several interests accommodated in a statute of limitations. For example, in extending the 

discovery rule to latent disease claims that the plaintiff could not have discovered within 

the applicable time period, the Court concluded that “avoiding possible injustice in these 

situations outweighed interests in repose and administrative expediency.” Hecht v. Resol. 

Tr. Corp., 333 Md. 324, 335 (1994) (recounting the Court’s development of the discovery 
45

rule). And, the Court has applied the doctrine of “judicial tolling” when “(1) there is 

persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the 

tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the generally 

recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitations.” Christensen, 394 Md. at 

238.48

Certainly, the tolling of a statute of limitations is a subject that also lies within the 

sphere of the legislative branch; as this Court has noted, “the harshness” of the general rule 

that the limitations period runs upon the occurrence of the alleged wrong has “led to the 

creation of both legislative and judicial exceptions.” Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 634

(emphasis added). One such legislated exception is provided by CJ §5-202, which tolls the 

pertinent statute of limitations on the claims against a defendant who files a “petition in 

insolvency” for a period of time between “the filing and the dismissal” of such a petition. 

See Ali v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 416 Md. 249, 252, 259 (2010) (construing CJ §5-

202). Another is set forth in PS §14-207, which provides for the tolling of the statute 

regarding persons in emergency management or, during the emergency period, persons 

suffering certain injuries or damages. And, at times, the Legislature has codified a 

judicially-created exception by amending a statute to include it, or creating a new statutory 

cause of action. See, e.g., Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 316 (1955) (describing a statutory

amendment that extended the judicially-created fraud exception to cases filed at law).

48

 The federal district court did not ask, and we express no opinion on, whether 

judicial tolling would be appropriate in this particular case.
46

Just as certainly, however, the General Assembly’s authority to enact legislation on 

the subject of tolling does not deprive the Judicial Branch of its constitutional authority to 

adopt rules that regulate the method by which litigants exercise a right of action. The 

shared authority of the two branches in that broad field – and the back-and-forth between 

the two branches that may occasionally and constitutionally occur – can be seen in Hensley 

v. Bethesda Sheet Metal Co., 230 Md. 556 (1963). That case also illustrates the principle 

under Article IV, §18 that, when a rule and statute conflict in this area, the last enacted 

provision prevails.49

The decision in Hensley concerned the procedure by which a workers’

compensation claimant was to seek judicial review of an adverse decision of the Workers’

Compensation Commission. As of 1959, a claimant was required by a longstanding statute 

to serve notice of such an appeal on the Commission as a prerequisite to obtaining judicial 

review. That year, the Court adopted a general rule for appeals from administrative 

agencies – which would include an appeal of a Commission decision.50 That rule required 

a claimant to note an appeal in circuit court and did not require service on the administrative 

tribunal. In 1960, in the course of amending the statute pertaining to the Commission, it 

49 That principle is akin to the direction that the General Assembly has given for 

resolving contradictory provisions in its own enactments. See Maryland Code, General 

Provisions Article, §1-207.

50 At that time, the Maryland Rules referred to an “appeal” of an administrative 

agency decision. Currently, the rules refer, more accurately, to “judicial review” of such 

decisions. See Maryland Rule 7-201 et seq.
47

repealed and re-enacted that statute, which still included the requirement that a claimant 

note an appeal with the Commission. In 1962, the Court re-promulgated the rules 

concerning appeals from administrative agencies, including the rule regarding the 

prerequisites for pursuing such an appeal, thereby superseding once again the legislative 

provision concerning service on the Commission. Id. at 559-60. In Hensley, a claimant 

had followed the statutory procedure while appealing an adverse Commission decision in 

1961; the circuit court dismissed that appeal for failing to comply with the court rule. This 

Court reversed that decision, holding that the claimant had properly followed the statutory 

procedure during the interlude when the statute prevailed over the rule. The Court 

explained that it had, “pursuant to the constitutional grant of power, promulgated [the rules]

to govern the method, manner and mechanics of appeals from administrative agencies.” 

Id. Just as constitutionally, the Legislature had enacted legislation that overrode the 

Court’s rules on that subject.51

The Court’s adoption of rules providing for the tolling of the statute of limitations 

in the event of an emergency fell within the Court’s constitutional authority to adopt rules 

51 Another example of the concurrent roles of the two branches in procedural matters 

involved the regulation of appeals of a court’s denial of a request for an injunction. As 

related in Funger v. Mayor & Council of Town of Somerset, 244 Md. 141 (1966), a statute 

had made such denials immediately appealable; the Court of Appeals adopted a rule that 

superseded the statute as to certain actions; and the Legislature then “restored the situation 

to where it was” before the Rule was adopted. The Court explained, “[i]n enacting [that 

law,] the Legislature was concerned directly and precisely with the interplay of its statutes 

and the rules of the Court of Appeals. In that enactment it repealed statutes which were 

made ineffective or obsolete by the new rules and preserved or newly enacted the statutes 

it desired to be still effective.” 244 Md. at 150. 
48

of practice and procedure. It is also evident that the tolling order itself did not usurp powers 

belonging solely to another branch. As set forth in Part II of this opinion, the Chief Judge 

issued the administrative tolling order against the backdrop of the rapidly-spreading Covid19 outbreak in Maryland. The tolling order addressed the effect of the emergency on the 

ability of litigants and attorneys to comply with filing deadlines – a matter that the 

Governor had already addressed in substantially similar terms for deadlines administered 

by Executive Branch agencies52 – and the ability of Judiciary personnel to process 

pleadings – an issue that the Executive Branch had analogously addressed in its policy 

applicable to employees in that branch.53 When the Chief Judge’s pandemic tolling order

is viewed in that context, and also viewed against the backdrop of the Governor’s orders 

limiting the movements of the public, the Judiciary’s role as to litigants and members of 

the bar, the representation of the Legislature on the Rules Committee, and, particularly, the 

ongoing communications between the Judiciary and the Executive and Legislative 

branches, it becomes apparent that the administrative tolling order did not usurp a function 

52 In its brief, Liberty Mutual argues that the Chief Judge acted “under the ambit” 

of the Governor’s executive order declaring a state of emergency, suggesting that the 

Governor had delegated authority to issue a tolling order to the Chief Judge. However, as 

shown by the administrative order, the Chief Judge did not purport to act under a delegation 

from the Governor; instead, she expressly relied on the constitutional grant of 

administrative authority to the Chief Judge and of rulemaking authority to the Court of 

Appeals. As outlined in Part I.C.2 of this opinion, the pertinent rules required the Chief 

Judge to act “in harmony” with the measures taken in the Executive Branch and to consult 

with the Governor and other officials in exercising the powers specified in the rules.

53 As a general rule, the Governor’s executive authority does not extend to employees 

in other branches. SPP §2-201. Nor does the Public Safety Article direct the Executive 

Branch to coordinate activities in the Judicial Branch in the event of an emergency.
49

solely belonging to another branch. Instead, the order not only comported with the 

Executive Branch policy of limiting interactions among the public but also served the 

statutory purposes of the statute of limitations by affording litigants adequate time in which 

to prepare and file their pleadings and by avoiding the filing of inadequately-investigated 

lawsuits in the courts.

Whether the tolling order and enabling rules fell within the Court’s power over the 

administration of the courts

The second category of instructive Article 8 cases is comprised of those that address 

the validity of a rule or other Judiciary action regarding the administration of the courts –

a power that the Constitution grants to both the Court of Appeals and the Chief Judge. The 

Court described that power in Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368, 375-76 

(1986). There, the petitioner challenged the validity of a rule54 that authorized the 

administrative judge of each circuit to “assign any judge of his judicial circuit to sit as a 

judge of the Circuit Court of any county in the judicial circuit, in any specified case or 

cases or for any specified time.” Id. Holding that the rule was consistent with the Court’s 

general power under Article IV, §18(a) to adopt rules concerning the administration of the 

courts, as well as §18(b) concerning the Chief Judge’s authority to make assignments, the 

Court stated that “whether it be by the Court of Appeals directly or the circuit 

54 Former Maryland Rule 1202(b)(1). That rule, with minor amendments, has been 

re-codified and now appears as Maryland Rule 16-108(c). See also Strickland v. State, 407 

Md. 344, 360 (2009).
50

administrative judge as its alter ego in the circuit, this power and authority encompasses 

all facets of the internal management of our courts.” Id. at 376.

There are many facets of the internal management of the Judiciary, among them the 

management of Judiciary personnel, operations, and facilities. Additionally, the Court

holds the incidental (or implied or inherent) power to regulate the legal profession, because 

lawyers are officers of the Court. See, e.g., Waldron, 289 Md. 683 (discussing the 

Judiciary’s role with regard to members of the Maryland bar). In both areas, the authority 

of the Judiciary and, as applicable, its administrative head, is not only inherent, but also 

expressly recognized by statute. See, e.g., CJ §1-201(a) (providing that the Court’s power 

to issue rules and regulations concerning practice and procedure and judicial administration 

in the courts is to be “liberally construed”); SPP §2-201 (stating that employees in the 

Judicial Branch are governed by that branch’s personnel policies). 

Both the administrative tolling order and the emergency rules fell within the 

administrative powers assigned to the Judicial Branch. As noted above, the Chief Judge’s 

April 24, 2020 order stated the comprehensive impact that the pandemic-related 

restrictions, including the Governor’s stay-at-home orders and the restricted operations of 

the courts, were having on logistical matters such as the processing of routine matters and 

the ability of parties and potential litigants to meet with counsel, conduct research, and 

prepare pleadings. Under those emergency circumstances, the Chief Judge’s order was

within her authority as administrative head of the Courts. And, as noted above, the Chief 

Judge issued orders that followed on, and did not contravene, the Executive Branch orders 

that governed the general public, State buildings, and Executive Branch personnel. 
51

Further, the Judiciary conferred with Executive Branch agencies throughout, and the Chief 

Judge reported those actions to committees of both houses of the General Assembly –

which had retained for itself in statute, but did not exercise in these circumstances, the 

power to terminate a declared state of emergency.

Whether the order or rules “usurped” the function of another Branch

The Chief Judge’s April 24, 2020 administrative tolling order did not usurp the 

Legislative Branch’s powers. The rules on which that order was based fell within the 

Court’s “practice and procedure” and administrative functions under the Maryland 

Constitution. The order was not an expression of a Judicial policy preference for a period 

of limitations different from that set by the Legislature. Rather, in a sense, it was an effort 

to respect the period of limitations set by the General Assembly by ensuring that the 

administrative obstacles faced by litigants and the courts during the early days of the 

pandemic did not effectively and retroactively shorten the period of limitations in those 

cases in which the period would expire while the courts were closed. Thus, while an order 

tolling a statute of limitations would not ordinarily be an administrative matter, in this 

instance there were good grounds for treating it as such. Given the Court’s role regarding 

the procedural aspects of the statute of limitations, and given the Judiciary’s coordination 

with the Executive Branch with regard to the pandemic response, the rule and order also 

did not encroach upon the Executive Branch’s emergency powers. 
52

D. Whether the Order Violated Article 9 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights

1. Article 9 – Prohibition Against Suspension of Laws

Article 9 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides “[t]hat no power of 

suspending Laws or the execution of Laws, unless by, or derived from the Legislature, 

ought to be exercised, or allowed.” This provision has been part of the Maryland 

Declaration of Rights since 1776 and was derived from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. 

See Dan Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Praeger 2006)

20. It has never been construed by this Court.55 An earlier treatise on the Maryland 

Constitution suggests why there is a paucity of case law concerning Article 9. See Alfred 

S. Niles, Maryland Constitutional Law (Hepbron & Haydon 1915). Niles classified the 

various articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights into four different categories. Id. at 

12-14. In his view, Article 9 fell into a category of “(d)eclarations of abstract principles 

whose sole practical effect is to declare from what standpoint the law shall be considered 

and in what spirit interpreted .... [I]n reality they amount to little more than a statement as 

to the point of view from which the court is expected to look at any particular concrete 

question.” Id. at 12, 22 (emphasis in original). 

55 The Court of Special Appeals has had occasion to consider the application of 

Article 9 on two occasions and held that it did not apply in those cases. See Paula v. Mayor 

& City Council of Baltimore, 253 Md. App. 566, ___ (2022) (affirming circuit court 

decision that Article 9 did not confer standing on plaintiff seeking to challenge alleged 

actions and inactions of police civilian review board); Doctor’s Hospital of Prince 

George’s County v. Maryland Health Resources Commission, 65 Md. App. 656, 675-76 

(1986) (Commission decision not to issue certificate of need to hospital, despite a provision 

in the State Health Plan contemplating additional beds in the county, was not an “illegal 

moratorium” that violated Article 9).
53

2. Application to this Case

Murphy Enterprises does not articulate why it believes the administrative tolling 

order violated Article 9 other than to quote the language of the constitutional provision. 

Even if Article 9 is read literally to provide a specific safeguard as opposed to an abstract 

principle of construction, it must be read in harmony with the rest of the State Constitution

of which it is part. A “basic rule of construction” applicable to the principles stated in the 

Maryland Declaration of Rights is “that ordinarily the specific prevails over the general.” 

State v. Smith, 305 Md. 489, 511 (1986). In other words, a specific power conferred in the 

State Constitution prevails over a general principle stated in the Declaration of Rights. Id.

56

 

As outlined earlier in this opinion, the State Constitution specifically assigns to the 

Judiciary the power to make rules and regulations to govern the practice and procedure and 

judicial administration in the courts of the State. 

As explained above, the Court’s adoption of the emergency rules, which authorized 

the issuance of an administrative tolling order such as the one that is the subject of the 

certified question, was inherently within the Court’s constitutional rulemaking power. The 

Constitution also designates the Chief Judge as administrative head of the Judiciary. The 

specific constitutional grants of rulemaking and administrative powers to the Court of 

Appeals and Chief Judge, respectively, would prevail over the more general principle 

56 In Smith, the defendant argued that the issuance of a statement of charges by a 

District Court Commissioner violated the separation of powers guaranteed by Article 8 of 

the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court rejected that argument, holding that the

specific powers conferred on commissioners under Article IV, §41G of the Constitution 

prevailed over the general principle of separation of powers stated in Article 8.
54

stated in Article 9. In any event, the adoption of a new rule under the Court’s rulemaking 

power, and the issuance of an administrative order based on that rule, do not appear to fit 

the description of a “suspension” of the laws. 

Furthermore, even if the tolling of a period of limitations could be characterized as 

a “suspension” of a law, in the circumstances of this emergency, it was consistent with 

legislative policies and actions. The Legislature has granted certain emergency powers to 

the Governor that include suspending State and local laws and has specified emergency 

exemptions in particular statutes. Constitutionally, however, the Chief Judge, not the 

Governor, is the administrative head of the Judiciary. As an incident of its core 

constitutional powers, the Judiciary must be able to address emergencies affecting judicial 

operations and personnel, whether those emergencies be local and brief, such as a hurricane 

or public safety event, or widespread, such as the pandemic. Particularly when such powers 

are exercised consistently with the statutorily-authorized actions taken by the Governor 

upon the Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency and coordinated with the other 

branches of State government, including the Legislature, it cannot be said that there is a 

“suspension” of laws that is not in some way “derived from the Legislature.”

E. Summary

The certified question of law presents a novel question as to the extent of the 

Judiciary’s authority to manage the State’s court system, including its personnel, the public, 

and court facilities, during a prolonged state of emergency that, at various times, has 

affected many litigants’ ability to marshal facts and find, engage, and meet with lawyers; 

has affected lawyers’ ability to meet with clients and assess their cases, gather facts and 
55

records, and prepare pleadings; and has affected the ability of the court system to serve and 

docket pleadings and set scheduling orders. Under such circumstances, the strict 

application of the usual tolling rules in the various statutes of limitations would in many 

cases have resulted in the filing of a premature complaint, not founded on sufficientlyconfirmed facts, or in an untimely filing, or in an abandoned cause of action, or in more

interactions among people at risk to the public health. None of these results would have 

served the cause of justice; none would have promoted judicial efficiency; none would 

have been necessary to effectuate the purposes of such statutes; and all would have had an 

impact on the administration of, and practice and procedure in, the judicial system. We 

therefore conclude that the tolling order fell within the scope of the Judiciary’s role in 

Maryland government, did not usurp another branch’s power, and did not contravene the 

Maryland Declaration of Rights. 

V

Conclusion

The federal district court has asked whether the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals 

acted within her authority and consistently with the Maryland Constitution when she issued

an administrative order temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under Maryland law with 

respect to civil actions during the Covid-19 pandemic.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the answer to that question is “yes.”

CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW ANSWERED AS SET FORTH 

ABOVE. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE 

PARTIES.

1

List of and Links to Selected Documents

Concerning Actions Taken by the Executive Branch

Related to the Covid-19 Pandemic

February 27, 2020 Governor Hogan Announces Additional Steps to Protect 

Marylanders from Coronavirus

https://governor.maryland.gov/2020/02/27/governor-hoganannounces-additional-steps-to-protect-marylanders-fromcoronavirus/ (https://perma.cc/5SK3-843F)

February 27, 2020 Office of Personnel Services and Benefits Policy, Pandemic 

Flu and Other Infectious Diseases: Attendance and Leave

https://dbm.maryland.gov/employees/Documents/PandemicFl

uAttendanceLeavePolicy.pdf (https://perma.cc/E3ED-U46F)

March 5, 2020 Declaration of State of Emergency and Existence of 

Catastrophic Health Emergency – COVID-19

https://governor.maryland.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Proclamation-COVID-19.pdf

(https://perma.cc/M45P-7U2B)

March 12, 2020 Order of the Governor Prohibiting Large Gatherings and 

Events and Closing Senior Centers

https://governor.maryland.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Prohibiting-Large-Gatherings.pdf

(https://perma.cc/4TZF-3UJA)

March 12, 2020 Order of the Governor Extending Certain Licenses, Permits, 

Registrations, and Other Governmental Authorizations, and 

Authorizing Suspension of Legal Time Requirements

https://governor.maryland.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Licenses-Permits-Registration.pdf

(https://perma.cc/P9UB-2PC5)
2

March 23, 2020 Order of the Governor Number 20-03-23-01 Amending and 

Restating the Order of March 19, 2020, Prohibiting Large 

Gatherings and Events and Closing Senior Centers, and 

Additionally Closing All Non-Essential Businesses and Other 

Establishments

https://governor.maryland.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Gatherings-THIRD-AMENDED3.23.20.pdf (https://perma.cc/CZR5-6RET)

March 30, 2020 Order of the Governor Number 20-03-30-01 Amending and 

Restating the Order of March 23, 2020, Prohibiting Large 

Gatherings and Events and Closing Senior Centers, and All 

Non-Essential Businesses and Other Establishments, and 

Additionally Requiring All Persons to Stay at Home

https://governor.maryland.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Gatherings-FOURTH-AMENDED3.30.20.pdf (https://perma.cc/ADA2-7HJZ)





*This order is the subject of the certified question of law.

1

List of and Links to 

the Initial and Amended Administrative Tolling Orders 

Related to the Covid-19 Pandemic

Initial Tolling Order Setting Date for Beginning of Tolling Period

April 3, 2020 Administrative Order on Emergency Tolling or Suspension of 

Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to 

the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines 

in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200403emergencytollingorsuspensionofstatutesoflimitatio

nsetc.pdf (https://perma.cc/N3QU-UBNT)

April 8, 2020 Amended Administrative Order on Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200408emergencytollingorsuspensionofstatuesoflimitatio

nsamended.pdf (https://perma.cc/58XN-VEQR)

Detailed Tolling Order and its Amendment

* April 24, 2020 Amended Administrative Order Clarifying the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200424clarifyingemergencytollingorsuspensionofstatuteso

flimitationsamended.pdf (https://perma.cc/GC97-6R5Q)

May 4, 2020 Amended Administrative Order Further Clarifying the Emergency 

Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and 

Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain 

Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200504furtherclarifyingstatutesoflimitations.pdf

(https://perma.cc/9C9K-W7PB)
2

Amended Detailed Tolling Order Setting End Date of Period

May 22, 2020 Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200522revisedemergencytollingorsuspensionofstatutesofli

mitations.pdf (https://perma.cc/T3KQ-J5S3)

Revisions of Tolling Order Largely Changing Cross References to Other Orders

June 3, 2020 Second Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200603secondrevisedemergencytollingorsuspensionofstat

utesoflimitationanddeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/ML58-EEMC)

October 2, 2020 Third Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20201002thirdrevisedorderonemergencytollingorsuspension

ofstatutesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf 

(https://perma.cc/ML8N-CEQ3)

November 12, 2020 Fourth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20201112fourthrevisedorderonemergencytollingorsuspensio

nofstatutesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf

(https://perma.cc/SJ23-RD4K)
3

November 24, 2020 Fifth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20201124fifthrevisedemergencytollingorsuspensionofstatute

soflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf

(https://perma.cc/Z4AJ-AYDL)

December 22, 2020 Sixth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20201222sixthrevisedadministrativeorderonemergencytollin

gorsuspensionofstatuesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.p

df (https://perma.cc/Y4YC-CWWL)

February 2, 2021 Seventh Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20210202seventhrevisedadministrativeorderontheemergency

tollingorsuspensionofstatutesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadli

nesetc.pdf (https://perma.cc/YTB3-GDB2)

February 16, 2021 Eighth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20210216eighthrevisedorderonemergencytollingorsuspensio

nofstatuesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf

(https://perma.cc/Y8N7-3TEK) 
4

May 24, 2021 Ninth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20210524ninthrevisedorderontheemergencytollingorsuspens

ionofstatuesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf

(https://perma.cc/QM56-PLKQ) 

August 6, 2021 Tenth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/adminorders/20210806tenthrevisedorderontheemergencytollingorsuspensi

onofstatuesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf

(https://perma.cc/EWW5-BHX6) 

February 18, 2022 Eleventh Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/adminorders/20220218eleventhrevisedonemergencytollingorsuspensionofs

tatutesoflimitationsandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/75HL8XCF) 

March 1, 2022 Twelfth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or 

Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory 

and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/adminorders/20220301twelfthrevisedonemergencytollingorsuspensionofsta

tutesoflimitationsandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/3NNSHFSY) 
5

Final Tolling Order Recognizing Return to Normal Operations

March 28, 2022 Final Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension 

of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related 

to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules 

Deadlines in Pending Matters During the Covid-19 Emergency

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/adminorders/20220328finalonemergencytollingorsuspensionofstatutesofli

mitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/5DHT5VPX)