J-S41041-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEREMY MASON ARKINS,

Appellant No. 1872 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 3, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-67-CR-0001529-2013

BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2015

Appellant, Jeremy Mason Arkins, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his stipulated bench trial and conviction1of four 

counts of driving under the influence (DUI).2 We affirm. 

The trial court aptly summarized the facts of this case in its May 8, 

2014 opinion as follows:

Trooper Levi Dively of the Pennsylvania State Police was 

on patrol in Southern York County on December 12, 2012 at 

approximately 2:29 a.m. At that time, he was following a red 

Nissan Sentra on Orr Road, where it intersects Lime Road (SR 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The stipulation followed the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to 

suppress evidence. 

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i), 3802(d)(1)(iii), 3802(d)(3), and 3802(e), 

respectively. 
J-S41041-15

- 2 -

2028). This is an intersection where Lime Road and Orr Road 

come together at a very close angle to each other. It is 

designated to be posted as a three-way stop. On the night in 

question, there was supposed to be a Stop sign posted on the 

right hand side of Lime Road where it intersects Orr Road, as 

well as a second Stop sign posted on the left hand side of Lime 

Road where it intersects Orr Road. 

Brian Reigart of the Pennsylvania Department of 

Transportation [(PennDOT)] testified at the [suppression] 

hearing. Mr. Reigart indicated that this was an intersection 

where the Stop signs are frequently knocked down or removed 

by vandals. Trooper Dively testified that on December 12, 2012 

at 2:29 A.M., the red Nissan Sentra driven by [Appellant] 

proceeded through the intersection of Lime Road and Orr Road 

without stopping. [The officer stopped Appellant and noticed an 

odor of alcohol coming from him. (See Stipulation 9/18/14, at

1-2, ¶¶ 2-3)]. The officer testified that there was a Stop sign 

posted on the left hand side of the road facing the line of travel 

of the [Appellant], which signaled to motorists traveling on Lime 

Road that they should stop before proceeding onto Orr Road. 

The officer testified that he did not notice a Stop sign posted on 

the right hand side of the road. Based on the testimony of 

Trooper Dively not noticing a Stop sign posted on the right hand 

side of the intersection in the direction of travel, as well as the 

testimony of Mr. Reigart that the Stop sign was frequently 

knocked down, removed or vandalized at that location, the [trial 

c]ourt [found] that on the night in question there was a Stop 

sign posted on the left hand side of the intersection but not on 

the right hand side of the intersection. The [c]ourt [found] that 

[Appellant] proceeded through the intersection without stopping 

for the Stop sign that was posted on the left hand side of the 

intersection. The Trooper testified at the hearing that the only 

reason for the traffic stop was [Appellant’s] failure to stop at the 

intersection.[3] The officer testified that the Stop sign at the left 

____________________________________________

3 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(b) (stating in pertinent part: “Duties at stop 

signs.—. . . [E]very driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at 

a clearly marked stop line or, if no stop line is present . . . then at the point 

nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a clear view of 

approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering.”). 
J-S41041-15

- 3 -

hand side of the intersection was visible to drivers proceeding in 

the direction of travel that he and [Appellant] were traveling. 

Mr. Reigart . . . indicated that this is a well-known 

intersection to PennDOT because of its unusual layout. He 

testified that in the year 2000 a directive came down from 

PennDOT to put a Stop sign on the left hand side of the 

intersection as well as the right hand side. He further testified 

that in 2011 PennDOT decided to post an extra-large 36-inch 

sign on both sides of the intersection. The 36-inch sign was in 

place on the date of the traffic stop of [Appellant] by Trooper 

Dively. Mr. Reigart testified that it is not unusual for PennDOT 

to post a Stop sign on the left hand side of an intersection, 

especially when visibility at the intersection is bad. [He] 

characterized the intersection in question in this case as being 

an intersection where visibility is bad. Mr. Reigart testified that 

this was a “very unus[ual] intersection,” with “sight distance 

[issues].” [(N.T. Suppression Hearing, 12/18/13, at 18-19)]. 

He noted that it is a very narrow road and there is no shoulder. 

He also indicated that there were numerous accidents occurring 

at this intersection. Mr. Reigart indicated that the [Federal 

Highway Administration’s] Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 

Devices [(MUTCD)] is the manual and reference that guides 

where PennDOT places traffic control devices. 

(Trial Court Opinion, 5/08/14, at 1-2). 

On September 17, 2013, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion 

seeking suppression of the evidence. The trial court held a hearing on 

December 18, 2013, and it entered its order denying the motion on May 8, 

2014. The case proceeded to a bench trial on September 18, 2014, at which 

the parties stipulated that Appellant was guilty of the four DUI counts. (See

Stipulation, 9/18/14, at 2, ¶ 9; Order, 9/18/14, at 1-2). On November 3, 

2014, after a hearing and review of a pre-sentence investigation report, the 

court sentenced Appellant to a term of six months’ county intermediate 
J-S41041-15

- 4 -

punishment. (See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 11/03/14, at 3). This timely 

appeal followed.4

On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was illegal. (See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 6, 15-17).5 Specifically, he asserts that the stop was not supported 

by probable cause where there was no stop sign posted on the right side of 

the intersection, and the sign posted on the left side was merely an advisory 

safety measure. (See id. at 17). He bases his argument on certain 

provisions of the MUTCD, which he claims requires stop signs to be placed 

on the right-hand side of the road. (See id. at 3, 6, 15). This issue does 

not merit relief. 

The standard and scope of review for a challenge to the 

denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

____________________________________________

4

Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed a timely concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal on November 19, 2014. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court entered its opinion on February 2, 2015. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

5 Appellant’s brief does not contain a statement of the questions involved, as 

required by Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2116. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2116(a). Generally, the failure to include such a statement would result in a 

waiver of all claims on appeal. See id. (“No question will be considered 

unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly 

suggested thereby.”). However, because we can discern the crux of 

Appellant’s issue from other portions of his brief, we will overlook this 

briefing deficiency. See Commonwealth v. Stradley, 50 A.3d 769, 771 

n.2 (Pa. Super. 2012) (declining to find waiver on basis of Rule 2116 

violation where issue raised in other section of brief and defect did not 

impede this Court’s ability to address merits). 
J-S41041-15

- 5 -

drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing rulings of a 

suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the 

prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. Where the record supports findings of the 

suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse 

only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Leonard, 951 A.2d 393, 396 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citation omitted).

“Further, [i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province as 

factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 

their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 455 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Section 6308 of the Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part:

§ 6308. Investigation by police officers

* * *

(b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police officer . . . 

has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is 

occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request 

or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, 

proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or 

engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other 

information as the officer may reasonably believe to be 

necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis added). 

When the police stop a vehicle in this Commonwealth for 

investigatory purposes, the vehicle, and its occupants are 

considered ‘seized’ and this seizure is subject to constitutional 

constraints. Police can initiate an investigatory stop when they 

have reasonable suspicion of a [Vehicle Code] violation. 

Neither the federal nor the state constitution prevents 
J-S41041-15

- 6 -

police from stopping and questioning motorists when [the 

police] witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws, even 

if it is a minor offense.

Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citations and some quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 

[T]o establish grounds for reasonable 

suspicion, the officer must articulate specific 

observations which, in conjunction with reasonable 

inferences derived from those observations, led him 

reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, 

that criminal activity was afoot and that the person 

he stopped was involved in that activity. The 

question of whether reasonable suspicion existed at 

the time [the officer conducted the stop] must be 

answered by examining the totality of the 

circumstances to determine whether the officer who 

initiated the stop had a particularized and objective 

basis for suspecting the individual stopped. 

Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing 

court must be an objective one, namely, whether the 

facts available to the officer at the moment of the 

[stop] warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in 

the belief that the action taken was appropriate.

. . . While an actual violation need not be 

established, a reasonable basis for the officer’s 

belief is required to validate the stop.

Commonwealth v. Postie, 110 A.3d 1034, 1039-40 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis original). “Indeed, even 

stops based on factual mistakes generally are constitutional if the mistake is 

objectively reasonable.” Muhammed, supra at 901 (citation omitted).

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has recently held that 

a police officer’s reasonable mistake of law can give rise to reasonable 

suspicion justifying a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. See Heien 
J-S41041-15

- 7 -

v. North Carolina, 135 S.Ct. 530, 534 (2014) (holding traffic stop lawful 

where officer’s mistake about brake-light law was reasonable). 

Here, at the suppression hearing, Trooper Dively testified that he 

observed Appellant’s vehicle “come up on a three-way intersection and fail[] 

to stop at the posted [extra-large thirty-six inch] stop sign there.” (N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 12/18/13, at 11; see id. at 22; Trial Ct. Op., 5/08/14, 

at 2). He stated that the stop sign was posted conspicuously on the lefthand side of the road, and that Appellant was “driving directly towards the 

left posted stop sign.” (N.T. Suppression Hearing, 12/18/13, at 11; see id.

at 15). The trooper further testified that, to his knowledge, Appellant’s 

failure to stop at the sign was a violation of the Vehicle Code. (See id. at 

11); see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(b). 

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that Trooper 

Dively articulated the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant. (See 

Trial Ct. Op., 2/02/15, at 2); see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b); Postie, 

supra at 1039-40. Appellant’s argument premised on incorrect stop sign 

placement fails because “an actual [Vehicle Code] violation need not be 

established[.]” Postie, supra at 1040 (emphasis omitted). Therefore, we 

conclude that the court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress 

evidence. See Leonard, supra at 396; see also Muhammed, supra at 

902-03 (determining police officer had reasonable suspicion of Vehicle Code 

violation when he stopped appellant; therefore, trial court properly denied 
J-S41041-15

- 8 -

suppression motion). Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/6/2015