IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-1673

Filed March 9, 2016

IN THE INTEREST OF A.F. AND C.F.,

Minor Children,

J.J., Mother,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights. AFFIRMED.

Joshua T. Cobie of Brubaker, Flynn & Darland, P.C., Davenport, for 

appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd and 

Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.

Jean Capdevila, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Potterfield, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Judge.

A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to her two minor children, born in 2006 and 2007.1 During the pendency of 

the proceedings, the mother pleaded guilty to multiple counts of child 

endangerment involving the children in question. She was incarcerated at the

time of the termination hearing and does not anticipate being discharged until 

2018. On appeal, she maintains the State failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the children could not be returned to her care at the time of the 

termination hearing. She also maintains the State failed to make reasonable 

efforts at reunifying the children with her and that termination of her parental 

rights was not in the best interests of the children.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The children were removed from the mother’s care in May 2014 after 

police officers found pornographic images of at least one of the children in the 

possession of a known sex offender. As part of the resulting investigation, the 

Iowa Department of Human Services learned the mother and maternal 

grandmother had left the children unsupervised with known sex offenders. 

Multiple men have since admitted sexually abusing the children. 

The mother was criminally charged with aggravated child endangerment

and a criminal no-contact order was entered on August 25, 2014, which 

prevented the mother from having contact with the children. The mother pleaded 

guilty to three counts of aggravated child endangerment. On July 30, 2015, she 

 

1 The father filed an untimely appeal in this matter along with a motion asking our 

supreme court to accept it. The supreme court denied the motion and dismissed the 

father’s appeal. 
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was sentenced to three terms of incarceration not to exceed two years. The 

sentences were set to run consecutively, and her tentative discharge date is in 

April 2018. Although the mother filed a motion to dismiss or modify the nocontact order, the district court denied the motion and the no-contact order 

remained in place.

On September 28, 2015, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f), and (i) 

(2015). 

The mother appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We conduct a de novo review of termination of parental rights 

proceedings. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 745 (Iowa 2011). An order terminating 

parental rights will be upheld if there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds 

for termination under section 232.116. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 

2010). Evidence is considered “clear and convincing” when there are no “serious 

or substantial doubts as to the correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the 

evidence.” Id.

III. Discussion.

The mother maintains the State has not proved by clear and convincing 

evidence the children could not be returned to her custody at the time of the 

termination hearing. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to section 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f), and (i). The only statutory ground 

challenged by the mother appears in section 232.116(f). When a court 

terminates parental rights on more than one ground, we may affirm the order on 
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any of the grounds. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. The mother's failure to 

challenge section 232.116(1)(d), (e), and (i) waives any claim of error related to 

those grounds. See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996) (“[O]ur 

review is confined to those propositions relied upon by the appellant for reversal 

on appeal.”). Therefore, we affirm the termination on statutory grounds under 

section 232.116(1)(d), (e), and (i).

The mother maintains the State failed to make reasonable efforts to 

reunify her with the children because the State “did not provide the mother with 

any visitation or contact with the children since August of 2014.” The mother has 

not had contact with the children since August 2014 because of the criminal nocontact order that was entered. The reasonable efforts concept includes 

visitation designed to facilitate reunification while also providing adequate 

protection for the children. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). 

“Visitation between a parent and child is an important ingredient to the goal of 

reunification.” In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). However,

the best interests of the child controls the nature and extent of visitation. Id.

Additionally, “[t]he services required to be supplied an incarcerated parent, as 

with any other parent, are only those that are reasonable under the 

circumstances.” In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000). Here, it 

was reasonable—and in fact necessary—for the State to withhold visits between 

the children and the mother due to the no-contact order that was entered by the 

criminal court. Based on these circumstances, we cannot say the State failed to 

make reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and the children.
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The mother also maintains termination of her parental rights was not in the 

children’s best interests due to the closeness of their relationship. At the time of 

the termination hearing, the children had not had contact with the mother in more 

than a year due to the criminal no-contact order. Still, in an April 2015 report to 

the court, the children’s guardian ad litem expressed that both children were 

“absolutely terrified” of their mother. According to the guardian ad litem, the older 

child had expressed fear of the mother appearing unexpectedly, while the 

younger child was “simply afraid and very verbal about it.” The record does not 

support the mother’s assertions regarding her bond with the children. 

Additionally, the children were reported to be thriving in the home of the foster 

family, and the foster family intended to adopt the children. Termination of the 

mother’s parental rights will enable the children to achieve permanency, which is 

in their best interests. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014) (citing

In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially) 

(noting the “defining elements in a child’s best interest” are the child’s safety and 

her “need for a permanent home”)). 

The mother did not argue any of the exceptions or factors against

termination apply in this case. Upon our de novo review, we conclude no 

exception or factor in section 232.116(3) applies to make termination

unnecessary.

IV. Conclusion. 

The State did not fail to make reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and 

the children, and termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best 

interests of the children. The mother challenged only one of the statutory 
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grounds for termination, section 232.116(1)(f) , and we affirm the termination on 

the statutory grounds under section 232.116(1)(d), (e), and (i). 

AFFIRMED.