This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 ERNESTINE ESPARZA, 2 Petitioner-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 33,222 4 FRANK ESPARZA, 5 Respondent-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY 7 John F. Davis, District Judge 8
Fuentes Law Office, P.C. 9 Robert R. Fuentes 10 Rio Rancho, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Carter & Valle Law Firm, P.C. 13 Linda L. Ellison 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 172 HANISEE, Judge. 1 {1} This appeal stems from a divorce proceed ing. Husband argues that the district 2 court abused its discretion individing various items of community property, including 3 a retirement account derived from his employment with the State of New Mexico. We 4 conclude that there was no abuse of discretion and affirm. 5 BACKGROUND 6 {2} Frank Esparza (Husband) and Ernestin e Esparza (Wife) were married on 7 November 27, 1981. Approximately twenty-e ight years later, Wife filed a petition 8 seeking dissolution of the marriage. A trial was held to determine how the marital 9 property would be divided, after which the di strict court found, in relevant part for 10 purposes of this appeal, that: (1) Husb and accrued 32.395 hours of annual leave which 11 amounted to a value of approximately $790; (2) Husband earned a Public Employee 12 Retirement Association (PERA) account during the marriage; (3) Husband’s Chase 13 credit card held approximate balances of $3,000 prior to the filing of the divorce 14 petition and $10,800 a little over a year later; (4) Wife earned $8,340 in additional 15 income that had not been shared with the marital community; and (5) Husband has a 16 “Deferred Compensation 457 Account” valu ed at $33,443, of which $5,000 was his 17 separate property gift from his mother. To equalize the division of assets and 181 Option B consists of “[l]ife payments with full continuation to one survivor 17 beneficiary.” Section 10-11-117(B). Under this option, the “retired member is paid a 18 reduced pension for life.” Id . Upon the death of the retir ed member, “the designated 19 survivor beneficiary is paid the full am ount of the reduced pension until death.” Id

. 20 3 liabilities, the district court’s conclusions of law required, among other things, that: 1 (1) Husband retain his accrued and unused annual leave; (2) Husband select Option 2 B as the form of payment of his PERA account pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 10-11- 3 117(B) (1997) and designate Wife as the survivor beneficiary 1 ; (3) Husband pay the 4 Chase credit card debt, includi ng the community debt that preceded the filing of the 5 divorce petition and his ensuing separate debt; (4) Husband keep household goods and 6 furnishings valued at $8,000; (5) Husband pay Wife “transitional spousal support” in 7 the necessary monthly amount of $500 for three years, subject to modification; (6) 8 Husband receive half of the sum of additional income that had previously been earned 9 by Wife, less $779 owed to Wife as interi m support payments for which Husband was 10 in arrears; (7) Husband’s deferred compensation, valued as of the date of divorce, less 11 his $5000 pre-existing separate property interest, would be divided pursuant to a 12 Qualified Domestic Relations Order; and (8) to complete the equalizing process 13 following the ordered division of commun ity assets and liabilities, Husband owed 14 Wife $2,375 within thirty days of the Final Decree of Dissolution of Marriage. 15 {3} Including those set forth above, the district court’s findings of fact and 16 conclusions of law were memorialized in the fourteen-page order from which 174 Husband appeals. Because this is a memo randum opinion and the parties are familiar 1 with the background of the case, we reserv e discussion of more specific facts when 2 pertinent to our legal analysis. 3 Husband’s Annual Leave 4 {4} Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding him his 5 own undivided annual leave, valued at $790, because the issue was neither raised by 6 the parties nor addressed during trial testimony. Therefore, Husband contends the 7 issue was one upon which the district court l acked authority to rule. Wife counters that 8 like other assets, Husband’s annual leave wa s properly before the district court 9 pursuant to the overarching trial inquiry aimed to equalize the division of community 10 property. See Arnold v. Arnold , 2003-NMCA-114, ¶ 17, 134 N.M. 381, 77 P.3d 285 11 (holding that annual or vacation leave and sick leave constitute community property). 12 Both litigants agree that we review i ssues regarding the equitable division of 13 community assets and liabilities for an abuse of discretion. See id . ¶ 6 (recognizing 14 same). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical 15 conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.” Sims v. Sims , 16 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. 17 {5} Despite Husband’s insistence that this i ssue was not before the district court, 18 a pay stub admitted at trial and discussed during oral argument reflected the quantity 195 of Husband’s accrued annual leave. The e xhibit is excluded from the record proper. 1 See Brown v. Trujillo , 2004-NMCA-040, ¶ 34, 135 N.M. 365, 88 P.3d 881 (stating 2 that the appellant bears the burden of providing a sufficient record upon which the 3 issues presented on appeal are rendered su itable for review). While neither litigant 4 submitted proposed findings of fact or conc lusions of law regarding Husband’s annual 5 leave, based on the evidence before it the district court was able to observe and 6 calculate its quantity and value, finding that 32.395 hours, worth about $790, existed. 7 Within its division of assets, the district court ordered that Husb and “shall retain all 8 of his accrued and unused annual [and vacati on] leave.” In moving to reconsider, 9 Husband argued that “sick and annual leave . . . is likely to have been earned post 10 separation and should be awar ded to [Husband].” Despite his request then, Husband 11 now argues that the district court’s distri bution of the annual leave to him was error, 12 adding that its value was next improperl y factored into Husband’s equalization 13 payment. 14 {6} If it was error for the district court to distribute the annual leave to Husband, it 15 was both invited and ultimately capitulated to by virtue of Husband’s motion for 16 reconsideration, in which he sought to keep his annual leave—the very same 17 distribution initially ordered by the district court and, as requested, maintained by it 182 In its order on Husband’s motion to reconsider, the district court denied all 16 matters raised in the motion with the ex ception of a few expressly stated issues. 17 Because the district court stated no modi fication to its initial ruling regarding 18 Husband’s annual leave, we understand that the district court maintained its original 19 ruling on the matter. 20 6 following a hearing on the motion to reconsider. 2Furthermore, the district court was 1 entitled to rely on Husband’s agreement w ith its ruling awarding him his own annual 2 leave. See Cox v. Cox , 1989-NMCA-035, ¶ 22, 108 N.M. 598, 775 P.2d 1315 (holding 3 that a district court may rely on a party’ s proposed property distribution in reaching 4 its decision). “[I]nvited error will not bethe basis for reversal on appeal.” Id . (citing 5 Proper v. Mowry , 1977-NMCA-080, ¶ 70, 90 N.M. 710, 568 P.2d 236). As well, 6 Husband provides no cited authority stating that the district court cannot make 7 determinations regarding co mmunity property evident on the face of trial exhibits 8 unless supported by testimony or written pleadings. See Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co. , 9 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no authority to support 10 an argument, we may assume no such authority exists.”). Similarly, Husband asserts 11 the ruling regarding his annual leave to be so mehow afoul of the “‘first in first out’ ” 12 principle, yet offers no citation regarding the principle’s meaning or from what source 13 of authority it arises. We affirm the decisi on of the district court regarding Husband’s 14 annual leave. 15 Husband’s PERA Retirement Account 167 {7} Husband argues that the district court erred in: (1) neglecting to allocate the cost 1 of the court ordered PERA survivor benef its to Wife since she requested them, (2) 2 ordering Husband to elect Option B, which in cludes the survivor be nefit here payable 3 to Wife as also directed by the court, and (3) wording the final divorce decree contrary 4 to a prior oral ruling. Husband maintains th at the question of survivor benefits is one 5 of first impression and asks us to review the application of PERA de novo as a matter 6 of statutory interpretation. Wife maintain s that abuse of discretion is again the 7 appropriate standard of review. She also asserts that Husband did not sustain his 8 appellate burden insofar as he failed to adequately ar gue the point of appeal and to 9 provide specific citations to the record, along with an accompanying explanation of 10 how the district court abused its discreti on in ordering the selection of Option B, or 11 in not adhering to its own prio r spoken language following trial. 12 {8} At the outset, we disagree with Husband’s contention that this Court should 13 review these issues de novo as a matter of statutory interpretation. Husband provides 14 no specific discussion regarding the statute, th e legislative intent of the statute, or how 15 the statute was misapplied by th e district court. Nor does he argue that the result he 16 prefers today is that which PERA contemplated in circumstances su ch as this. Indeed, 17 Husband’s argument is one of inequity—that the district court’s decision to order 18 Husband to select Option B, and moreover to have done so without requiring Wife to 198 pay the cost of survivor benefits, was unjust. Such an argument does not entail 1 statutory interpretation, nor does it trigger de novo review. Rather, we review the 2 district court’s PERA-related conclu sions for an abuse of discretion. See Clark v. 3 Clark , 2014-NMCA-030, ¶ 24, 320 P.3d 991 (“We review the district court’s 4 equitable distribution of assets and liabilities for an abuse of discretion.”). 5 {9} In examining Husband’s briefing, we canfind no specific discussion related to, 6 or argument describing, why it was error for the district c ourt to employ its discretion 7 to require survivor benefits to Wife or to not separately a ssign her the responsibility 8 of making the accompanying payment that PERA Option B entails. Husband merely 9 offers a few sentences that generally assertthat “[i]t is not equitable that [Husband] 10 pay for these benefits in any way[,]” and Wife’s “50% of the community percentage 11 of the community retirement should be reducedto a lower percentage . . . to allocate 12 for such cost of receivership.” Husband cites no caselaw supporting these statements, 13 nor any statutorily analytic justification for the conclusion he asks us to reach. We will 14 not second guess a district court’s use of its discretion on the basis of such overly 15 general complaints. See Muse v. Muse , 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M. 451, 200 16 P.3d 104. 17 {10} Regarding the requirement that he select Option B, Husband contends that 18 PERA provides “better options av ailable to the parties, suchas Option C[,] . . . a more 193 Pursuant to Option C, “[t]he retired memb er is paid a reduced pension for life[, 18 and w]hen the retired member dies, the designated survivor beneficiary is paid 19 one-half the amount of the reduced pension until death.” Section 10-11-117(C). 20 9 cost effective alternative to both parties.” Ye t Husband fails to direct us to any portion 1 of the record where he asked the districtcourt for that which he now requests on 2 appeal—specifically, PERA Option C. Inhis proposed findings and conclusions, 3 Husband “did not agree” with Wife’s reque st for Option B, but asked instead that 4 “Option A . . . be selected which does not provide for any survi vor beneficiary pay out 5 annuity.” After the district court ordere d Husband to select Option B pursuant to 6 Wife’s request, Husband e xpressed his displeasure by merely asking the court to 7 “reconsider its ruling on the PERA re tirement[,]” a request unaccompanied by 8 indication that he then preferred Option C, instead of Option A. We can find nothing 9 regarding, nor does Husband cite, any mention of Option C in the district court 10 proceedings. 3 11 {11} To present an appellate issue that is suitable for resolution, an appellant must 12 demonstrate that the issue was preserved in the trial court. See Rule 12-213(A)(4) 13 NMRA. “To preserve error for review, a party must fairly invoke a ruling of the 14 district court on the same grounds argued in this Court.” Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep’t of 15 Taxation and Revenue , 2005-NMCA-022, ¶ 14, 137 N.M . 26, 106 P.3d 1273. Here, 16 Husband has not identified when, and appear s nowhere to have stated, his evolved 1710 preference for Option C. Thus, we are in no pos ition to conclude that the district court 1 abused its discretion by not ordering the selection of Option C. See id

. (denying 2 consideration of an issue on appeal where the appellant did not invoke the ruling of 3 the district court or otherwise adequately preserve the issue for appellate review). 4 {12} To the extent Husband argues that the se lection of Option B itself was an abuse 5 of discretion, we note first that Husb and’s PERA account was earned during the 6 marriage, from 1992 until at least the time of dissolution. It is plain from our caselaw 7 that the non-earning spouse possesses a community interest in such a retirement 8 account’s value. See Irwin v. Irwin , 1996-NMCA-007, 121 N.M. 266, 910 P.2d 342, 9 ¶ 20 (“A community interest in a pensi on plan containing a survivor’s benefit 10 provision constitutes a valuable portion of the community assets, and the survivor’s 11 benefit provision should be considered in valuing and distributing the community 12 interest in the retirement plan.”). Although Irwin primarily addressed division of a 13 fully vested retirement account, id . ¶ 22, it held that “where an employee-spouse has 14 a choice of pension options, he or she s hould not be permitted by the choice . . . to 15 defeat or reduce the interest of the non-employee spouse.” Id . ¶ 21. By asking the 16 district court to select Option A, the opti on which excludes survivor benefits, Husband 17 essentially sought that which is disallowed by Irwin . Here, the district court 18 considered both the possibility that Husband would discontinue his state service prior 1911 to retirement, or that he would fully re tire from state service, and assigned divided 1 value percentages for both scenarios. Next, the court directed Husband’s selection of 2 Option B, which safeguarded Wife’s intere st in the community PERA asset. Given 3 Husband’s failure to have offered any viable alternative to the district court and then 4 to persist in such an assertion on appeal, and in light of our precedent’s recognition 5 of the community value of the very interesthere protected by the district court, we 6 have no basis to conclude that the districtcourt abused its discretion in allocating 7 Husband’s PERA account. 8 {13} Lastly, Husband fails as well to specify precisely why it is re versible error for 9 any difference to exist between the district court’s final orders and its previous oral 10 rulings. While Husband notes what he cont ends to be contradi ctions between the 11 district court’s statements following trial and its final order dividing the retirement 12 benefits, he does not explain how any of these differences constitute an abuse of 13 discretion, nor does he ever even notify us specifically as to what those substantive 14 differences were. Such assertions, uns upported by authority or argument, are 15 unpersuasive. See State v. Gonzales , 2011-NMCA-007, ¶ 19, 149 N.M. 226, 247 P.3d 16 1111 (“[T]his Court has no duty to review an argument that is not adequately 17 developed.”). 18 Husband’s Chase Credit Card Debt 1912 {14} Prior to district court litigation, a special commissioner held a hearing to 1 address certain core matters, including Husb and’s payment to Wife of interim support. 2 At the time, the commissioner additionally considered Husband’s credit card debt, 3 then containing a $5,000 retainer to his attorney, and determined that “legal fees 4 [were] appropriately included” in the in terim division. In its later findings and 5 conclusions, the district court found that when the divorce petition was filed, 6 Husband’s Chase credit card had a balance of approximately $3,000, which 7 constituted community debt. The court additi onally found that a littleover a year later, 8 the credit card balance was approximately $10,800, and that Husb and “failed to show 9 that the new debt (i.e. approximately $7,800) benefitted both spouses.” The court 10 assigned the credit card debt “in excess of $3,000” to Husband as separate debt. 11 Although it found the $3,000 to be community debt, in equalizing the division of 12 assets it ordered Husband to pay it “as his sole and separate debt.” In Husband’s 13 motion to reconsider, he cited the interim order in conjunction with his argument that 14 attorney fees are community debt. By reply to his motion, Husband additionally 15 requested his attorney fees and costs. The district court denied both requests. 16 {15} Husband alleges that the district c ourt abused its di scretion by failing to 17 designate all of the Chase credit card debt and accompanying interest as community 18 debt. Husband contends that because the majo rity of the debt consisted of Husband’s 1913 attorney fees, which were allowed as n ecessary expenses in the interim order, 1 substantial evidence does not support the di strict court’s findings and conclusions, 2 which required Husband to pay the entirety of the credit card debt. Husband also 3 argues that the district court erred by failing to divide the pre-divorce credit card 4 balance of $3,000 equally betw een the parties. Husband states that $5,000 of the post5 divorce petition debt is attributable to a retainer for his attorney, but acknowledges 6 that the remainder is attributable to late r attorney fees and his own dental bills. 7 {16} Wife maintains that the district court di d not abuse its discretion as the interim 8 order of the special commission was merely a temporary distribution pending the final 9 order of the district court. Additionally, Wi fe contends that the district court did not 10 err in ordering that Husband be responsiblefor the credit card debt incurred after the 11 filing of the divorce petition as Husband acknow ledges that the debt consisted of his 12 later attorney fees and his dental bills. In support of this argument, Wife directs us to 13 a district court order ruling that each party b ear his or her own costs and attorney fees. 14 {17} As we have stated, we review a districtcourt’s decision of distribution of assets 15 and liabilities for an abuse of discretion. Clark , 2014-NMCA-030, ¶ 24. While 16 Husband argues that the district court abus ed its discretion because the interim order 17 put in place by the special commission served as “the law of the case” and established 18 the community nature of the credit card balance, including Husband’s $5,000 retainer, 1914 he provides no authority in support of this contention. In re Adoption of Doe , 1984- 1 NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 7 64, 676 P.2d 1329 (“We assume where arguments in 2 briefs are unsupported by cited authority, c ounsel after diligent search, was unable to 3 find any supporting authority.”). In fact, the special commissioner’s order expressly 4 indicated that the parties “are to follo w [the] recommendations until further order of 5 the [district c]ourt.” In just such a later order, the district court denied Husband’s 6 requests. 7 {18} To the extent that Husband contends thathis attorney fees and dental bills were 8 community debt, defined as “debt contracted or incurred by either or both spouses 9 during marriage which is not a separate debt[,]” NMSA 1978, § 40-3-9(B) (1983), 10 Husband points us to nothing within the r ecord, nor can we locat e, any documentation 11 about how or when these debts were incurre d, who charged them, nor have we located 12 any documents or exhibits detailing the debts incurred, who charged them, when, and 13 for how much. While Husband does provide us with citations to the hearing, his 14 citations are faulty as they do not corre spond with the provided record proper disks. 15 Without more than a mere assertion of error by counsel, particularly one 16 unaccompanied by supportive caselaw or speci fic argument, we cannot conclude that 17 the district court’s decision ordering Husb and to pay the entire credit card debt was 1815 not supported by substantial evidence. See Gonzales , 2011-NMCA-007, ¶ 19 (“[T]his 1 Court has no duty to review an argument that is not adequately developed.”). 2 {19} As well, we reiterate that it is the district court’s responsibility to equalize the 3 division of assets and liabilitie s, particularly given that not all things are perfectly 4 suited to division. Although not exactingly de scribed, the process by which the district 5 court equalized assets yielded significant ite ms of community value to Husband, such 6 as the household goods and furnishings, as well as to Wife. After the process of 7 division, the district court concluded its order with a final e qualization payment from 8 Husband to Wife. We cannot assume the pr esence of error on the basis that each and 9 every asset was not specifically and equally divided. See Irwin , 1996-NMCA-007, ¶ 10 10 (stating that under New Mexico law, in divorce proceedings district courts are 11 required to divide community property e qually; however, the division “need not be 12 computed with mathematical exactness.”). 13 Spousal Support 14 {20} Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded 15 Wife educational spousal support and in failing to set forth specific terms of the 16 termination of the support, the modification of the support, and the applicable tax 17 implications. Wife contends that the distri ct court ruled appropriately as it considered 18 disparity in income and the earning ability of the litigants. We review the award or 1916 denial of spousal support fo r an abuse of discretion. Hertz v. Hertz , 1983-NMSC-004, 1 ¶ 20, 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169. 2 {21} In a divorce proceeding, the Legislature ha s granted district courts authority to 3 award a party: 4 (a) rehabilitative spousal support that provides the receiving spouse 5 with education, training, work experience or other forms of 6 rehabilitation that increases the receiving spouse’s ability to earn 7 income and become self-supporting. The court may include a 8 specific rehabilitation plan with its award of rehabilitative spousal 9 support and may condition continuation of the support upon 10 compliance with that plan [or] 11 (b) transitional spousal support to supplement the income of the 12 receiving spouse for a limited period of time; provided that the 13 period shall be clearly stated in the courts final order[.] 14 NMSA 1978, § 40-4-7(B)(1)(a), (b) (1997) (Emphasis added. ) In determining whether 15 an award of spousal support is appropriate under the circumstances, the district court 16 must consider the: (1) age, health, and means of support for each spouse; (2) current 17 and future earnings and the earning capacityof each spouse; (3) good-faith efforts of 18 each spouse to maintain employment or to become self-supporting; (4) the reasonable 19 needs of the each spouse, including the standard of living during the marriage, 20 maintenance of medical insurance for each spouse, and appropriateness of life 21 insurance, its availability and cost, and its necessity for the individual paying spousal 22 support; (5) duration of the marriage; (6) amount of property awarded to each spouse; 2317 (7) type and nature of the each spouse’s a ssets; (8) type and nature of each spouse’s 1 liabilities; (9) income producing property ow ned; and (10) agreements made by the 2 spouses in contemplation of the dissolution of marriage or legal separation. Section 3 40-4-7 (E). 4 {22} The district court concluded that Wifewas “in need of transitional spousal 5 support” and ordered Husband to pay her “$500 per month beginning June 1, 2011 6 and continuing through June 2014.” The districtcourt noted that the “award of spousal 7 support [was] modifiable.” Husband argues th at “despite the [transitional] label,” due 8 to oral rulings of the district court referencing educational reasoning, the support was 9 “more in the nature of rehabilitative spousal support for which there was not 10 substantial evidence other than the fact that [Husband] earned more than [Wife].” 11 While Husband cites to portions of the h earing purporting to discuss the educational 12 intent of the spousal support, the citati ons again do not properly correspond to the 13 recorded hearing disk, and we are unabl e to locate the specific testimony Husband 14 refers to. However, our review of the district court’s findings and conclusions reveal 15 that it made findings regarding each of the st atutorily required considerations pertinent 16 to transitional spousal support, with the exception of whether anagreement existed 17 between the parties made in contemplation of separation ordissolution of the 1818 marriage. As to the latter, the parties make no argument that such an agreement 1 existed. 2 {23} The district court ultimately awarded Wife transitional support and explicitly 3 prescribed a duration on the support as required by Section 40-4-7(1)(b). While 4 Husband contends that the district court abus ed its discretion in th is determination, he 5 provides no argument particularizing his reasoning aside from a ge neric statement that 6 there was not substantial evidence to support the ruling. Nothing indicates, as 7 Husband suggests, that the amount ordered wa s solely to facilitateWife’s education. 8 Given the district court’s consideration of all of the Section 40-4-7(E) statutory 9 factors, with the exception of the tenth which Husband does not dispute on appeal, our 10 standard of review dictates that we affirm the support award of spousal support to 11 Wife. 12 Interim Division Payment 13 {24} Husband next argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion in subtracting 14 $779 from his half of the distribution of Wife’s additional income as Husband 15 contends he previously paid Wife the disput ed $779. He asserts that the district court 16 abused its discretion by ordering that “the$779 was to be paid by” a specific date 17 which preceded the district court’s findings and conclusions. Husband maintains as 18 well that substantial evidence does not support the offset. Wife merely contends that 1919 Husband is “confusing two different matters[:]” the interim division payment and 1 Wife’s excess income. 2 {25} In its findings and conclusions, the district court found that Husband “admitted 3 that he had failed to make all interim payments to [Wife] and there is now the sum of 4 $779 due.” The district court ruled that the $779 be deducted from a portion of money 5 Wife owed husband. In his motion to reconsider the ruling of the district court, 6 Husband stated that he “paid interim division arrears of $779.” The district court 7 denied Husband’s motion with regard to this matter. We note that there are no exhibits 8 attached to the motion supporting Husband’s assertion of payment, nor does Husband 9 direct us to any evidence, aside from his own assertion, that the money was in fact 10 paid. Without such evidence, we cannot conc lude that the district court abused its 11 discretion. See Talley v. Talley , 1993-NMCA-003, ¶ 12, 115 N.M. 89, 847 P.2d 323 12 (“When there exist reasons both supporting and detracting from a trial court decision, 13 there is no abuse of discretion.”). 14 Wife’s Additional Income 15 {26} In its findings and conclusions, the distri ct court awarded Husband half of the 16 sum of excess income received by Wife. Husb and contends on appeal that the district 17 court abused its discretion by failing to pr ovide a statement of when and how these 18 funds would be paid to Husband. Husb and additionally argues that there was no 1920 “substantial evidence supporting . . . why th is amount was not due to” Husband by a 1 certain date. Finally, Husband complains that Wife was awar ded one of her own 2 accounts and was not required to divide it w ith Husband. Wife argues that Husband 3 neglects to show where he filed a motion to recover the funds or provided an argument 4 as to how the district court’s division of property was an abuse of discretion. 5 {27} At the outset, we note that we cannotlocate where Husband requested the 6 district court to clarify “when and how” Hu sband’s half of the excess income was to 7 be distributed. While Husband cites to a portion of the hearing where he claims he 8 specifically addressed “a claim for recovery of the additional income[,]” Husband 9 does not explain what he specifically requestedand, again due to the inaccuracy of the 10 recording citation, we cannot review it ourselves. See Crutchfield , 2005-NMCA-022, 11 ¶ 14 (“[O]n appeal, the party mu st specifically point out where, in the record, the party 12 invoked the court’s ruling on the issue. Absent that citation to the record or any 13 obvious preservation, we will not considerthe issue.”). Additionally, Husband fails 14 to cite to any supportive caselaw that indicates a district court’s lack of clarity in the 15 disbursement of community income to be error. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & 16 Revenue Dep’t , 1998-NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969 (stating that the 17 appellate court will not consider argumen ts that contain no citation to supporting 18 authority). Insofar as Husband asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 1921 awarding Wife more than her equitable portion of the community property, Husband 1 fails to direct us to a portion of the reco rd indicating the equalization of property to 2 be mistaken. While Husband points us to e xhibits in the record that he contends 3 support his argument, we are unable to locate these exhibits as they do not appear to 4 have been submitted as part of the record proper. See Brown , 2004-NMCA-040, ¶ 34 5 (stating that the appellant ha s the burden of providing a sufficient record to review the 6 issues presented on appeal). Accordi ngly, we find no abuse of discretion. 7 Husband’s Deferred Compensation 8 {28} Lastly, Husband claims he does not understand with exactitude how the district 9 court divided his deferred co mpensation. This is the extent of Husband’s argument. 10 He requests “clarifying langua ge.” This argument is unde veloped and we decline to 11 review it. See Gonzales , 2011-NMCA-007, ¶ 19. We do note that the district court’s 12 order directly stated that “[f]ive thousand dollars of the funds in the 457 account are 13 [Husband’s] separateproperty . . . [and t]he remaining funds . . . are community 14 property.” Having found this language to beinexact, the appropriate recourse for 15 Husband would have been to file a motion to clarify with the district court. While we 16 note that in his motion for reconsideration Hu sband asked the district court to “review 17 the calculations regarding” the deferred compensation, we can find nothing in the 18 record, nor does he provide any citation to the record, indicating that he brought the 1922 specific issues he now raises on appeal to the attention of the district court. See 1 Crutchfield , 2005-NMCA-022, ¶ 14. Therefore, we decline to address this issue any 2 further. See Muse , 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, (refusing to re verse the district court in the 3 dissolution of a marriage where the husband solely made “surface presentations” of 4 his arguments). 5 CONCLUSION 6 {29} For the foregoing reasons, we determine th ere to be no abuse of discretion and 7 affirm the judgment of the district court. 8 {30} IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

_________________________________ 10 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 11 WE CONCUR: 12

_________________________________ 13 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge 14

_________________________________ 15 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 16