### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 614 -CR

Ca r l Edwar d He ide n Jr . , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. CR2006 -38 6 , HO NORAB LE JACK H. RO B ISO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury con v i ct ed C arl Edward He iden, J r., of the of fense of possession with intent to d e liv e r a

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e , me tha

mph e tamin e , in

an amou nt m or e tha

n 4 grams and

le ss than 200 g rams. See Tex. Hea lth & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(d) ( West S upp. 2008). Punishment
was assessed at ten y ear s’ imprisonment, pr obated for ten y ear s, and a $2,000 fine . I n a sing le issue
on a pp e a l, H e ide n c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his mot ion to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e . We wi ll
a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND

The unde rlying f

acts of this ca se ar e not disp u t ed o n ap peal. On Aug ust 8, 2006,
a c o u rt o r d e r w a s is s u e d to ta k e H e id e n in to c u s to dy f o r th e p u r

p o s e o f tr an s p o rting him to a
s tate h o s p it a l f

o r a me n ta l h e a lt

h e xamination. SeeTex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 573.0112

(We st 2 00 3) , § § 5 73 .0 12 , . 02 1 (We st Sup p. 20 08 ), §§ 57 3. 02 2, 57 4. 04 5 ( Wes t 20 03 ). Atta c he d to t h e o rd er wa s an af

fi d av i tb y He i d en ’s m o t h er

i nwh i ch s h e s t at edt h e f

o l l o wi n g: [He ide n] ha s sl e e ple ss n ight s and thi nk s so me on e is w a tc hin g him thr ou g h h is be dr oo m w ind ow s and

sp ra y ingso me kin d o f p ois on int o h is r oo m to kil l hi m. He ha s made phone calls to the police a nd 911 beca

use he w ants them to catc h wh oe ve r i s d oin g thi s to him
.

. . . . I ’m g re a tly c on c e rn e d th a t he po se s a da ng e r t o h ims e lf

or oth e rs . He thre a te ns tha

t he wi ll k ill wh oe ve r i s d oin g the se thi ng s to him and in h is de lus ion a l state of min d he may a t so me po int

thi nk that th is c ou ld b e my se lf or his fathe r or a

n innocent per son. Si n c e h e d o e s h a v e a c c e s s t o f i r e ar m s I f e e l t h a t t h i s p o s e s a t h r e a t t o b o t h h ims e lf and oth e rs . Ife e l it ha s r e a c he d a po int wh e re so me thi ng ha s to be do ne be fo re so me thi ngdr a sti c oc c ur s. Iwant to g et help for

him before he hurts someone
. Th is m or nin g he wa s a tte mpt ingto m a ke a mol a tof f [s ic ] co c kta il w itha

lig ht b ulb which he ha d drilled a hole in one end.
Th a t a ft e rn oo n, a t a

pp ro xima te ly

3:0 0 p .m. , thre e of

fi c e rs fr om th e Coma l Co un ty She ri ff ’s Offic e ar

rived at the residenc e of H eiden’ s pare nts—where Heiden w as living at the time—to ex ecute the orde r. One of the off icers , De p u t y E n rique Sanc hez, testified at the hea ring on the motion to suppress. A ccor ding to Sanc hez, as the off icer s approa ched the residenc e, He iden
arr ived in his car. Sanc hez testified that, as He iden was g etting out o f t h e ca r, Heiden’s father
came out of the hous e and “eng ag ed in a conversation with his son.” The of fice rs then appr oache dSee M iranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 1 See Te rry

v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 2 3 Heiden, ve rified his identity , and i n fo rm ed He i den of the order and “our purpose or

rea son for be ing the re .” Sanc he z te sti fi e d that He ide n “ imm e diate ly g ot a g itate d w ithhis fathe r. ” At thi s p oin t, Sanchez testified, De puty J eff Adams proc eede d to handcuf f him. When asked if, in hi s mind, Heiden w as under

arr est at this point, S anche z testi fied, “ Yes, h e’ s i n cu s t ody .” Howe ver, the
o f f ic e r s d id n o t M ir an d iz e Heiden or tell him that he was under arr est. I nstead, Sanc hez rec alled, 1 “we told him t hat we w ere placinghandcuf fs on him for saf

ety purposes.” Ne x t , S an ch e z s e a rc h edHe i d en . I nre s p o n s e t o d ef en s e c o u n s el ’s qu es t i o n i n g, Sanc he z de sc ri be d th e se arc h a s f oll ow s:
A: I t’ s a

—in the be g inn ingwh a t w e do is c on sid e re d a fr isk se arc h fo r we a

po ns . We fee l the outer pa

rt of the c lothing. And then w e g o a little bit further on an ar rest, wh i ch i s t h e sea

rch inc ident to arre st. W e g o into the person’s pockets a nd any wher e whe re c ontraba

nd can be hidden. Q : O k ay. A: Or we a

po ns . Q: Okay . I f I

understand you corr ectly , first y ou do just a Te rry [ ] or light fr isk. 2 A n d i f yo uf i n d s o m e t h i n g , t h e n

yo us e ar c h a

l i t t l e m o r e c l o s e l y— A: Cor

re c t.
Whe n a sk e d w hat he fo un d in the ini tia l pat- do wn

se arc h, Sanc he z te sti fi e d, “ Ifel t th e —I g ue ss a lump. Ig uess what I

would call it is just an object in his pocket.” Sanchez adde d that he believe d the item to be “just an objec t,” not a we apon. Sanchez then rea ched into He iden’s rig ht frontThe re cord c ontains contradic tory evidenc e about the timing of and ba sis for Sanche z’s 3 sear ch of H eiden’ s vehicle. A t the suppression hea ring , Sanchez testified that he se arc hed He iden’s vehicle be fore Heiden w as transpor ted to the hospital as par t of what Sanc hez char ac t er i z ed as a “se arch i n ci d ent t o arr est.” Additionally , in the offe nse re port that was a dmitted into evidence during the suppression hea ring , Sanchez stated that he “sea rche d said vehicle incident t o arr est.” Howeve r, duringtrial, Sanche z testi fied that, a fter the other off i ce rs transpor

ted Heide n to the ho sp ita l, h e “ sta

y e d” a t the re sid e nc e and

se arc he d th e ve hic le . Sa nc he z la te r t e sti fi e d at tr ia l th a t, “during[Heiden’s] transportation, Iwas able to look in his car .” When asked if he was a ble to see any thing in “ plain view” in the ve hicle, Sanche z testi fied, “ That wa s the plastic bag s.” Ther e wa s no testimony

elicited duringthe suppression hea ring about the bag s being in plain view. 4 pants pocke t and pulled out a pre scr i p t i o n bottle. Sanchez “showe d the bottle to [ Heiden] and asked him if he was under any medication.” Acc ording to Sanc hez, H eiden voluntee red, “No, that’s meth.” After Heiden made thi s statement, S anche z opened the presc ription bottle. Sanchez testified that what he saw inside the bottle w as consistent with what Heiden had told him. San ch ez t hen “seized the e vidence .”

He i d en was then tra

nsported to McKe nna State Hospital in San Antonio by the other off icer s. At some point either bef ore or afte r He iden was tra

nsported to the hospital, Sanche z
se arc he d H e ide n’ s v e hic le and sei z ed c le ar, e mpt y Z ipl oc ba g s. L a te r, Sanc he z me t up wi th

3 the other of

fice rs at the hospital a

nd waited f

or He iden to be eva luated. On August 9, after Heiden had bee n examined, another c ourt order was issued to take Heiden into prot ec t i ve custody and transport him to San Antonio St ate Hospital. T h i s order was e x ecute d by

the same of

fice rs who executed the f

irst order. T he followingday , on Aug ust 10, an ar rest wa rra nt was issued for

Heiden fo r t he of fe ns e of me tha mph e tamin e po sse ssi on . Heide n w a s u lti mate ly c ha rg e d w iththe of

fe ns e of methamphe tamine possession with intent to deliver.The district cour t submitted an ar

ticle 38.23 instruction. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. 4 art. 38.23(a ) (West 2005).

5

P ri or to trial, Heide n filed a motion to suppress the e vidence obtained whe n the of fi cers too k h im i nto c us tod y a t hi s p are nts ’ r e sid e nc e . Sp e c if ic a lly , H e ide n s ou g ht t o suppress (1) the pre scription bottle s ei z ed fr om his pocket, (2) his stateme nt to Sanchez that the bottle contained “ meth,” (3) the methamphetamine subsequently discovere d in the bottle, and (4 ) t he pla sti c ba g s th a t w e re se ize d f ro m H e ide n’ s ve hic le
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e mot ion

to
su pp re ss, and

the c a se pr oc e e de d to tr ia l. He ide n w a s su bs e qu e ntl y

c on vic te d a

nd se nte nc e d. Th is 4 appea l followed.
AN AL YSI S

I n his only issue on appea l, Heiden c halleng es the district cour t’s denial of his motion to suppress. We revie w a ruling on a mot ion to suppress evidence for abuse of discre tion. Sh e ph e rd

v . S tat e , ___ S.W .3d ___, 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 855, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. S ept. 10, 2008) (c i t i n g State v. Dixon , 2 0 6 S
. W
. 3 d 5 8 7 , 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). I n so doing, w e view the fac ts in the light most favor able to the tria l court’s de cision. Id
. Whe n, a s h e re , th e tr ia l c ourt fa ils to make explicit findings of fa ct, we imply fac t f indings that support the trial court’ s ruling so long as the e vidence support s t h e finding s. Sta te v . Ke lly , 204 S.W .3d 808, 818-19 (Te x . Crim. App. 200 6 )
. We g iv e a lm o s t to ta l d e f e r e n c e to a tr ia l c o u rt’ s e xp r e s s o r im p li e d d e te rmination of his tor ic a l fa c ts and re vie w de no vo the c ourt ’s a pp lic a tio n o f t

he law o f s e arc h a

nd se izur e to t

ho se fac ts. Id
. (c i t i n g Sta te v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).6 Be cause the motion to suppress was not relitig ated by the par ties during trial, our revie w of the district court’s ruling is limited to the evidenc e that was befor e it during the hear ing on the motion to suppress. See, e .g. , Ra nge l v . S tate , 250 S.W .3d 96, 97-98 (Te x . Crim. App. 2008) (per curiam) (“ W e re fu s e t o examine the propriety of a tria l judge ’s ruling based on e vidence that th e tr ia l ju dg e ha d no op po rt un ity to c on sid e r whe n h e ma de his ru lin g .” ); W e ath e rre d v . S

tate , 15 S.W .3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. Ap p . 2 0 0 0 ) (In revie wing trial court’ s ruling on a dmissibi lity of evidenc e, “the appellate court must re view the trial court’s ruling in lig ht of what was be fo re t he tr ia l c ourt a t th e tim e the ru lin g wa s ma de .” ); Ra c ha l v . S tate , 917 S.W .2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 96) ( “ [I ]n de te rm ini ngwh e the r a tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

is s up po rt e d b y

the re c or d, we g e ne ra lly consider only

evidenc e adduc ed at the suppr ession hear ing beca use t he ruling was based on it rather than evidenc e introduce d later.” ). The prescription bottle and Ziploc bags

Two of the items H eiden soug ht to suppress wer e the pr escr iption bott le seized from his pa nts po c ke t ( a dmi tte d d

ur ingtr ia l a s State ’s Exhi bit 3) and the Z ip loc b a g s se ize d f ro m hi s
ve hic le (a dmi tte d d

ur ingtr ia l a s State ’s Exhi bit 4)
. Re g ard ing the bo ttl e , H e ide n a sse rt s th a t D e pu ty Sanchez ex ce ed ed the per missibl e scope of a pat-down fr isk by rea ching into Heiden’s poc ket
and pu lli ngou t an o bje c t th a t Sanc he z did no t be lie ve to be a we a

po n. Re g ard ing the Z ipl oc ba g s, Heiden c laims that the warr antless sea rch of his vehicle wa s not s u p p o rted by probable cause or
e xig e nt c ir c ums tanc e s.

T h e St a te ar g u e s th a t H e id e n w a iv e d an y e r r o r in th e a dmi s s io no f

th e s e it e ms . We ag ree . As a general rule, w hen a pr etrial motion to suppress evidenc e is overr uled, the def

endant7

ne e d n ot s ub se qu e ntl y

ob je c t at tr ia l to the same e vid e nc e in o rd e r t o p re se rv e e rr or on a pp e a l. See Liv ing sto n v . S tate , 7 39 S.W. 2d

31 1, 33 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ); Fi gu e ro a v. Sta te , 250 S.W .3d 49 0, 51 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 08 , p e t. re f’ d)
. Ho we ve r, wh e n th e de fe nd ant a ff ir mativ e ly a sse rt s during trial he ha s “no objec tion” to the admi ssion of the complained- of evide nce, he waives a ny
err or in the admission of the evide nce that otherwise would have bee n prese rved by th e pre -trial objection and r

uling. Se e Ho lm es v . S

tate , 2 4 8 S
. W
. 3 d

1 9 4 , 1 9 6 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 8 ) ; Har ris
v . S tat e , 6 56 S.W. 2d

48 1, 48 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 83 ); Bo y k in v . S tate , 5 0 4 S.W .2d 855, 857 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 74 ); Figueroa , 250 S.W .3d at 514. I n this c ase, when the presc ription bottl e and the Z iploc bag s were offe red into evide nce, the following exchang e occ urre d:
The Court: Now, what are y ou offe ring now? [P rosec utor]: State’s 3, 4, a n d 9 , S t at e’ s 3 being the pre scription bottle,

State’s 4 beingsome plastic bag s rec overe d fr o m the de fe nd ant’ s v e hic le, an d St a te ’s Exhi bit 9 b e ingthe pa c ke ts of me tha mph e tamine lo c a te d in sid e of State ’s Exhi bit Number 3. [ D e f e n s e C o u n s e l ] : Your Hono r , I h a v e n o o b je c ti o n s to St a te ’ s 3 and 4. Howeve r, I

object to State’s 9, th e actua l methamphetamine itself, and my

objection is lack of f

oundation.
The dist rict cour

t proce eded to a dmit all three exhibit s. By aff irmatively

stating “ no objection” at trial to the admission of two of these e x hibits—t he pre scription bo t t l e seized from his pocket a nd the plastic bag s sei z ed fr om his vehicle—He iden waive d any complaint on appea l conce rning the ad m i s s i b i l i t y o f th i s ev i d en ce t h at o t h erwi s e wo u l d h av e be en p re s erv ed at t h e s u p p re s s i o nh ea ri n g.T h e S t at e al s o as s er t s t h at He i d en wa i v edan y erro r i nt h e a dm i s s i o no f t h e b o t t l e a n d b ags 5 by testifying a

bout this evidence at trial. We need not addr ess this additional gr ound for wa iver. The State c laims that Heiden wa ived er ror r eg ar d i n g t h e admi ssion of the 6 me tha mph e tamin e its e lf

(S tate ’s Exhi bit

9) be c a us e (1 ) t he me tha mph e tamin e wa s insi de the bo ttl e at the time it was seized, (2) H eiden’ s objection to the methamphetam i n e wa s l i m i t ed to “lac k of foundation,” a

nd (3) He iden af

firmatively

stated “no obje ction” to the admission of t h e lab r eport (State’s Exhibit 7) conf

irming that the substance was methamphetamine. We disag ree that Heiden waived his c omplaint as to this evidence. F irst, while the methamphetamine may have be en inside the bottle at the time it was discovered , it was admitted into evidence separ ately from the empty presc ription bottl e. He iden, althoug h raising the addition al obj ection at tria l to “lack of foundation,” did not aff

irmatively state “no objection” to the methamphetamine itself so as to waive his objection from the suppre ssion hearing . Finally , altho u gh He iden af firmatively

stated “no objection” to the lab report verify ing that the s ubstance was methamphetamine, t he lab report wa s admitted into evidence separ ately from the methamphetamine itself, and did n o t i n d icate that the substance deter

mined to be methamphetamine was the same substance D eputy Sanchez found in the presc ription bottl e. 8 See Holmes , 2 48 S.W. 3d a t 20 1; Mo od

yv . S tate , 827 S.W .2d 875, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Kla pe sk yv . S tate , 256 S.W .3d 442, 449 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref ’d). 5
He ide n’ s st at e m e nt and t he m e th am phe ta m ine found i n t he bot tl e

Howeve r, there was no wa iver re g arding H ei den’s state ment to Sanchez that the pr e sc ri pti on

bo ttl e c on ta ine d “ me th” and the re su lti ngdis c ov e ry

of the me tha

mph e tamin e wi thi n the bottle. There fore , we c onsider whe t h er t h e district court abuse d its discretion in admitti ng

6 this evidence
. First, we addre ss the i ncriminating statement. Acc ording to Heiden, beca use he “ had be e n s ig nifi cant ly dep ri ve d o f h is f re e do m of

a c tio n w he n h e wa s h and c uf fe d” by the of fi c e rs , he sh ould hav e been advise d o f h is Miranda rig hts prior to being asked by Sanchez “if he was
un de r a ny me dic atio n. ” B e c a

us e he wa s no t so a dv ise d, He ide n a sse rt s, his state me nt t hat th e bo ttl e contained “ meth” should have been suppressed as the result of imprope r “c ustodial interrog ation.”9 “Custodial inter

rog ation” is de fined as “questioning initiated by law en fo rcement office rs af

ter a p er s o n has bee n taken into custody or otherw ise deprive d of his fre edom of a ction in any signific ant way .” Miranda v. Arizona , 3 84 U. S. 4 36 , 44 4 (19 66 ). “ Unwa rn e d s tate me nts obtained as a

result of c ustodial interrog ation may not be used as evidenc e by the State in a cr iminal proce eding during its case -in-chie f.” He rre ra v . S tate , 241 S.W .3d 520, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (c i t i n g Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444). Howeve r, “the specia l proce dural saf eguards outlined in Miranda
are require d not where a suspect is simply taken into custody , but rather wher e a suspe ct in custody is subjected to interrog ation.” Rh od e Is lan d v . I

nn is , 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). Even if Heiden was in c ustody for pur poses of Miranda , we c onclude that the r ecor d
su pp or ts a n im pli e d f ind ingby the dis tr ic t c ourt

that H e ide n w a s n ot s ub

je c te d to “ int e rr og a tio n” in th e sense of Miranda . “Interrog ation” re fer s “not only to express questioning, but also to any
w o r d s o r a c t i o n s o nt h e p arto f

t h e p o l i c e ( o t h e r

t h ant h o s e n o r

m a l l y a t t e n d an t t o ar

r e s t an d c u s t o dy) th at t h e poli ce should know a re r easona

bly likely to elicit an incriminating response .” In nis , 446 U.S. at 301. “The latter portion of this definiti on focuse s primarily upon the per ceptions of the suspect, rather than the i ntent of t he police.” Id
. “ Th is is no t to sa y that the int e nt o f t

he po lic e is irrele vant, for it may

well have a bea

ring on whether

the police should have known that their wor ds
or ac tions we re rea sonably likely to e voke an incr iminating re sponse.” Id . at 301 n.7. “[S] ince the po lic e sure ly

c ann ot b e hel d acc ounta ble fo r t he un fo re se e a

ble re su lts of

the ir wo rd s o r a c tio ns , the def inition of int err og ation can e x tend only to words or actions on the part of police of fice rs that t h e y should have k

nown wer e reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response .” Id . at 301-02 (empha sis in original).For example, the case s in Miranda inv olv e d “ inc omm un ic a do int e rr og a tio n o f i nd ivi du a ls 7 in a police- d o minated atmosphere ” in which the de fenda nts were “thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run throug h menac ing police interrog ation proce dures.” 384 U.S. at 445, 457. 10 Fur thermore , “‘inter

rog ation,’ as c onceptua liz ed in the Mir anda op ini on , mu st ref lect a measure of compulsion above a nd bey ond that inhere nt in custody itself.” Id . at 30 0; see als o B e rk e me r v . M

c Car ty , 468 U.S
. 420, 43 7 ( 19 84 ) ( “ F ide lity to t he do c tr ine ann ounc e d in Miranda require s th at i t b e enfor ced stric tly , but only in those ty

pes of situations in which the
c on c e rn s th a t po we re d th e de c isi on are imp lic a te d. ” ); J

o n es v . Sta te , 7 9 5 S
. W.2d 171, 176 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (“[T]he Miranda safe g uards do not exist t o protec t sus p ec t s fr o m the
c omp uls ion inh e re nt i n c us tod y a lon e , n or

do the y pr ote c t su sp e c ts f

ro m th e ir ow n p ro pe ns ity

to speak, a bsent some police c onduct which knowing ly tries t o t ak e advantag e of the propensity .”). Thus, not all post-arre st police questioning c an be c lassified as i n terrog ation. Jones , 795 S.W .2d
a t 17 4; Ro dr igu e

z v . S tate , 191 S.W .3d 428, 447 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2 0 0 6 , p et . ref ’d). Ty pes of que stions tha tar e n o tco n s i d er edi n t erro gat i o ni n cl u d e “ ro u t i n e i n qu i ri es , qu es t i o n s i ncident to booking, br oad g ener al questions suc h as ‘what ha ppened’ upon arr ival at the sce ne of a crime, and questions mandate d by public safe ty

conce rns e.g . ‘whe re did you hide the we apon’ w hen the wea pon has just been hidden in the immediate vicinity .” Jones , 795 S.W .2d at 174 n.3. “Any state me nt g ive n f

re e ly and vo lun tari ly wi tho ut any c omp e lli ng inf lue nc e s is , o f c ours e , a dmi ssi ble in evidence .” Miranda , 384 U.S. at 478. “In distinguishing situations which r equire safe guards to pr otect the privileg e ag ainst self-inc rimination f rom those that do not, the Miranda court pointed to i so la tio n a

nd int imi datio n a s k e y

a sp e c ts o f a

n in te rr og a tio n th a t un de rm ine an in div idu a l’ s a bil ity to speak voluntarily .” Rodriguez , 191 S.W .3d at 447. “In order to de termine whether interrog ation 7Se e als o M ar tin e z v . S tate , No. 04-06-00812- CR, 2008 Tex . App. L EXI S 5430, at *12 8 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio July

23 , 2 00 8, pe t. d ism ’d ) ( de sig nate d f or pu bli c a ti on); Bi

so r v . S tate , 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 2223, at *9-10 (Te x . App.—Dallas Ma r. 22, 2007, no pet.) ( not desig nated for publication). 11 occur red, w e do not l o o k at the statements made by police in a va cuum; rathe r we construe those statements in lig ht of the circ umstances of the intera ction betwee n the police a nd the ac cused on each p ar ticular oc casion.” Mo ra n v . S tate , 171 S.W .3d 382, 388 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005), rev’d , 2 1 3 S
. W
. 3 d 9 1 7 ( T e x . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Mo rri s v . S tate , 897 S.W .2d 528, 532 (Tex. App.—El P aso 1995, no pet.))
. I nte rr og a tio n, a s th a t te rm ha s b e e n d e fi ne d b y

the c ourt s, 8 usually involves situations i n which an of fice r asks que stions of a suspect re lating to a criminal investigation. See, e .g. , In nis , 44 6 U.S. a t 30 1 n .5 (n oti ngthat “ inc ri min a tin g re sp on se ” re fe rs to “any response —whether

inculpatory

or exculpatory

—that the prosec ution may seek to introduce
a t tr ia l” ); Ra mi re

z v . S tate , 105 S.W .3d 730, 741 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no p et.) (defe ndant suspected of

marihuan a p o s session; office r had f ound contra

band in def

endant’ s g ara g e, took de fe nd ant i nto c us tod

y and a sk e d h im, “ I s the re any

thi ng e lse I ’m g oin g to fi nd in t he re that’ s il le g a l,
any mor e mari hu a

na ? ” ; qu e sti on he ld t o b e int e rr og a tio n) ; Cas tle be rry v . S tate , 100 S.W .3d 400, 404 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (during burg lary investigation, car in which suspects were fo un d w a s inve nto ri e d; o ff ic e r f ound kn if e un de r d ri ver’ s se a t and

a sk e d s us pe c ts “ wh os e kn if e it
wa s” ; qu e sti on

he ld t o b e int e rr og a tio n) ; Si m s v . Stat e , 7 3 5 S.W .2d 913, 918 (Tex. App.—Dallas 19 87 , p e t. r e f’ d) (d e fe nd ant s us pe c te d of d ri vin g wh ile int oxic a te d; o ff ic e r a sk e d s us pe c t “ wh e n d idS e e a l s o C a m a c h o v . Sta te , No . 08-05-00089- CR, 2006 Tex . App. L EXI S 5338, at *12 9 (Tex. A pp.—El Paso J une 22, 2006, no pet.) (not desig nated f or publication) ( defe ndant suspecte d of narcotics poss ession; narc otics discovere d in vehicle; off icer asked suspe ct “if he had any other narc otics on his person”; question held to be inter rog ation). Although Heiden had been place d in ha ndcuff s, the office rs had advised He iden that they 10 had done so “ for sa fety

purposes.” Also, Sanchez testified that the of fice rs did not tell Heiden he wa s und e r a

rr e st. 12 y ou last eat” and “what did y ou eat” ; questions held to be interrog ation beca use re sponses could be incriminating in context of DW Itrial). 9

I n th is c a se , th e recor d s up po rt s a fi nd ingthat H e ide n w a s n ot s ub je c te d to int e rr og a tio n w he n Sa

nc he z as ke d h im “ if

he wa s un de r any me dic a tio n. ” F ir st, the re c or d r e fl e c ts that the offic ers we re not e ng ag ed in a cr i m i n al i nvestig ation at the time the question wa s asked. Sanchez testified that, prior to He iden g etting out of his car, he had not observe d any criminal activity and did not have a

ny rea son to believe that Heiden might have been involved in any kind of criminal ac tivity . Rather than inve stigating a crime, the office rs wer e at the re sidence to execute a civil pr otective custody order to tr ansport Heiden to a state hospital for a me ntal-hea lth evaluation. When asked if the “ sole rea son” he was at the residenc e was “to take [Heiden] int o custody on [t he trial court’s] order ,” Sanche z testi fied, “ True.” Fur thermore , the re cord suppor ts a finding by

the district court that this purpose wa s communicated to He iden. San ch ez testified that the off icer s “informe d him of the order and . . . our pur

pose for being there .” Thus, the district court c ould have found that He iden would have perc eived that the que sti o n Sanchez aske d was not re lated to a criminal investig ation. Se e In nis , 44 6 U. S. a t 30 1 ( de fi nit ion of int e rr og a tio n “ fo c us e s p ri mari ly 10 up on the pe rc e pti on s o f t

he su sp e c t” ). Sanc he z al so te sti fi e d th a t w he n h e fo un d th e pi ll b ott le in Heiden’ s pocket, he was not conduc ting a narc otics i n v es t i gat i o n, and he did not know if the re13

wer e nar cotics in the bottle. There fore , the district c ourt could have impliedly found that Sanchez asking Heiden “if he was under any medication” w as not a que stion that S anche z shoul d have know n
wa s “ re a so na

bly lik e ly to e lic it a

n in c ri min a tin g re sp on se, ” becaus e Sanc he z ha d n o r e a so n to suspect Heiden of

narc otics possession. Se e id . at 301-02 (of fice rs “c annot be he ld acc ountable for the unfore seea

ble re sults of their words or a ctions”). Additionally , the d istrict court could have impliedly found that, in asking the question, S an ch ez was simply trying to de termine whe ther He iden’s er ratic be havior wa s being inf lue nc e d b y

wh a te ve r m e dic a tio n, if

any , H e ide n mig ht be “ un de r. ” Sanc he z te sti fi e d th a t he did not rec all having contac t w ith He iden befor e this incide nt. There fore , Sanchez testified, he did not know if He iden was a

dang erous or

a pea cef ul person. Howe v er, Sanc hez had observe d Heiden be c ome “ a g itate d” wi th h is fathe r wh e n the of fi c e rs inf or me d He ide n of the or de r t o ta ke him int o custody . When asked to explain what he mea nt by “ag itated,” Sanc hez expl ained,
A: He wa s—

he wa s ang ry . A t any

tim e he c ou ld b e c ome vio le nt. Q: Ok ay . W as h e m o v i n g h i s arm s ar o u n d ? W as h e s h o u t i n g? A: He wa s s h o u t i n g. Q: Was he cursingat his father ? A: Ye s. Q: Was he ca lm and in control of himself? A: No , h e wa s n ot.14

Additionally , Sanchez knew that he was taking Heiden into custody pursuant to an or der r equiring Heiden “ to submit to medical examination for mental illness.” Thus, the district c ourt could have imp lie dly fo un d th a t Sanc he z ha d r e a so n to be lie ve that H e ide n p re se nte d a threat to h ims e lf and other s, and that Sanche z asked the question about medica tio n in order to de termine He iden’s phy sical condition. I f He iden was on me d i ca t i o n , it would be important that the medication be documented to e nsure that he continue to rec eive it. Such a question, the district court could have imp lie dly fo un d, wa s p art

of a ro uti ne po lic e pr oc e dure no rm a lly a tte nd ant t o tak ing pe op le int o custody under suc h circ umstances. See Sims , 735 S.W .2d at 917-18 (“[W] e hold that the questions
conce rning appellant’ s phy sical condition, such as w hether appellant wa s sick, injured, diabetic, or epileptic, and w hether

appellant ha d any

phy sical disab i l i ties or impairments, ar e questions of leg itimate conce rn to the police at any time a person is arr ested and taken into custody beca use the p o l i ce wi l l b e r es p o n s i b l e, t o s o m e d egr ee , fo r t h e a rr es t edp er s o n ’s ca re an d p h y s i ca l we l l -b ei n g. Be c a u s e o f th is le g it im a te c o n c e r

n , w e h o ld

th a t s u c h qu e s ti o n s ar e a ls o a mo n g th o s e ty p e s of q u es tions normally

attendant to ar

rest and c ustody , and ar e not interrog ation protec ted by the fi ft h ame ndme nt. ” ); see also United States v . Bishop , 66 F.3d 569, 572 n . 2 (3 rd C ir. 1995) (conc luding that district cour t did not e rr in f

inding that question by

office r to suspect who ha d been limping about “what was the matter with his leg ” wa s “par t of the book i n g proce dure de signe d to f ulf ill th e g ov e rnme nt’ s o bli g a tio n to pr ov ide me dic a l atte nti on if ne c e ssa ry” ); Colon v . S

tate , 256 Ga. App. 505, 568 S.E.2d 811, 813-14 ( Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that “police of fice rs have the re s p o n s i b i l ity

to ask medica l questions as part of r outine booking in or der to fulf ill the g ov e rnme nt’ s obli g a tio n to pro vid e me dic a l tr e a tme nt t o o ne in c us tod y ” ); State v. Ge asley , 85 Oh io15

Ap p. 3d 36 0, 61 9 N .E .2 d 1 08 6, 10 93 (O hio Ct. Ap p. 19 93 ) (“Th e po lic e mus t be pe rm itt e d s ome leewa y into inquiring into the prese nt me dical condition of the arr estee
. The purpose of such inquiry is not to elicit i ncriminating response s, but rather to ensure the safe ty

and we ll-being of the suspec t while in the custody

of the police . Acc ording ly , asking an ar restee whether

he has rece ntly

seen a ph y sic ian, is tak ingme dic a tio n, or ha s any me dic a l c on dit ion

re qu ir ingsp e c ia l tr e a tme nt i s a leg itimate police conc ern w hen booking a suspec t.”). Bec ause the rec ord supports a finding by the dis tr ic t c ourt

that He ide n wa s n ot s ub

je c t to c us tod ia l “ int e rr og a tio n” wh e n Sa nc he z as ke d h im “ if he wa s und e r a

ny me dic a tio n, ” we c on c lud e tha t th e dis tr ic t co urt di d n ot a bu se its dis c re tio n in admitting He iden’s answ er to the que stion.

Finally , we a ddress the se izure of t he methamphetamine from inside the pr escr iption bo tt le. The F ourt

h A me ndme nt p ro hib its the se arc h o r s e izur e of c los e d c on ta ine rs wi tho ut a
war rant in the absenc e of e x ige nt circumstanc es. United St ates v. Chadwick , 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); State v. Porter , 9 4 0 S
. W .2d 391, 393 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.). This prohibition has been applied t o presc ription bottl es. Se e Ho war d v . S tate , 599 S.W .2d 597, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 80 ). Ho we ve r, the re are e xce pti on s to the wa rr ant r e qu ir e me nt. On e su c h exce pti on is t he “ pla in
v ie w ” d o c tr in e . Te

x as v . B ro wn , 4 60 U. S. 7 30 , 7 36 (1 98 3) . A n o ff ic e r m ay se ize ite ms f

ound in plain view without a wa

rra nt if the office r was lawfully on the premises or otherwise proper ly in a positionto v ie w th e o b

je c t, an d if it w a s im me d iate ly

a p p ar e n t t o th e o f

f ic e r th a t t h e it em
was e vidence of cr iminal activity
. Se e Ho rto n v . Ca lif or nia , 49 6 U .S. 12 8, 13 4- 36 (1 99 0) ; Joseph

v . S tat e , 8 0 7 S
. W
. 2 d

3 0 3 , 3 0 8 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 1 99 1) ; Ar ri c k v . S tate , 107 S.W .3d 710, 719 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

20 03 , p e t. r e f’ d) . “ I mme diate ly a pp are nt” sim

ply me ans that the re is p ro ba ble
cause to associate the item with criminal activity
. Se e Br own , 460 U.S. at 741-42; W alte r v . S tate ,16

28 S.W. 3d

53 8, 54 1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Arrick , 1 07 S.W. 3d a t 71 9. “ [P]ro ba

ble c a us e is a flexibl e, common-se nse standar d.” Br own , 4 60 U. S. at 74 2. “I t mer e ly re qu ir e s th a t th e fa c ts
a va ila ble to t he of fi c e r w ou ld ‘w arr ant a man of re a so na ble c a uti on in the be lie f, ’ that c e rt a in i te ms may be contr aband or

stolen proper

ty or usef ul as evidenc e of a

crime.” Id
. (c i t i n g Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).

Her e, the r ecor d supports a finding by the district co u rt t h at the State satisfied the plain view doc trine. As we have a lrea dy explained, Heiden wa ived any er ro r re g arding the seizure of the presc ription bottl e fr om Heiden’ s pocket. Thus, the only question is whether, once Sanc hez possessed the bottle, he ha d probable cause to open it witho u t a wa rr an t
. Sanchez testified that Heide n told him the bottle c ontained “meth.” Such an admission would “wa rra nt a man of re asonable caution in the belief ” that the bot tle contained c ontraba nd. Sanchez also testified that he did not open the bottle until after Heiden ma de this statement. The State e licited the following testimony about what Sanc hez did after be ing informed that the bot tle contained me thamphetamine: Q: Now at that point did y ou look in the bottle to see what wa s there? A: Yes, I

did. Q: Did y ou rec og nize what y ou saw ba sed on y our trainingand experienc e? A: Ye s. Q: I s that consistent with what Mr. He iden had told y ou? A: Ye s, it w a s. Q: I s it lega l to possess methamphetamine? A: I t’s not leg al.17

Thus, the record supports a findingby the district court that, be fore Sanchez sea rche d the inside of the presc ription bottl e and se ized its contents, he ha d probable cause to believe the bottle c ontained contra band. Se e Br own , 4 60 a t 73 9- 40 , 7 42 -4 3 ( wa rr antl e ss s e izur e of

g re e n ba llo on

fo un d in suspect’s ve hicle author ized because t h er e wa s probable cause for of fice r to believe balloon
c on ta ine d n arc oti c s) ; J

on es v . S tate , 5 6 5 S
. W
. 2 d 934, 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that
wa rr antl e ss s e izur e of

pis tol fo un d in

su sp e c t’ s a

pa rtme nt w a s a

uth or ize d b e c a

us e “ c on tr a

ba nd in pla in v ie w . . . may be law ful ly seized by an o ff ic e r who is l awf

ull y on the pr e mis e s” ); W

ill ifo rd

v . Sta te , 127 S.W .3d 309, 313 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2004, pet. r ef’ d) (wa rra ntless seizure of computer a

uthorized beca

use there was probabl e ca use for office r to believe computer c ontained
c hil d p or no g ra ph y ); Arrick, 107 S.W .3d at 719 (wa rra ntless se izure of appellant’ s shoes authorized beca use there was proba

ble ca use for office rs to believe mur der victim’s blood might be found on sh oes); see also Mic higan v. Long , 4 6 3 U
. S. 1 0 3 2 , 1 0 5 0 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ( h o ld in g th a t if o f f ic er, w hen conductingleg al sea

rch f or we apons, “discove r[s] contra band other than wea

pons, he clea

rly cannot be re quired to ig nore the contra band, and the Fou rth Amendment doe s not require its suppression in s uc h c ir c ums tanc e s” ); Mo rri so n v . S tate , No. 03-06-00090- CR, 2008 Tex . App. L EXI S 7512, at *9 (Te x . App.—Austin Oct. 2, 2008, no pet.) (not desig nated for publication) (holding that, afte r
a pp e lla nt a dmi tte d to of

fi c e r t hat it e m in

his po c ket was mari hu ana , o ff ic e r w a s “

jus tif ie d in retrie ving the contra

band”) . Thus, the district court did n o t ab u s e its discretion in admitting the methamphetamine f

ound in the bottle. We o ve rr ule He ide n’ s so le iss ue on a pp e a l.18 CO NC LU SION We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Mar ch 25, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh