SUMMARY 

February 8, 2018 

2018COA16

No. 16CA1522, Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC v. Colorado 

Citizens Protecting our Constitution — Election Law — 

Campaign Finance — Major Purpose Test 

A division of the court of appeals considers whether an 

administrative law judge properly applied the “major purpose” test 

described in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976), and Colorado 

Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 

2007), to determine whether an organization qualified as a political 

committee. The division concludes that (1) the major purpose test 

applied to this case; and (2) the record supported the administrative 

law judge’s determination that the organization was not a political 

committee because, based on the amount of its spending on 

political advocacy for candidates, it did not have the major purpose 

of nominating or electing candidates. 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. 
The division also concludes that the administrative law judge 

did not err when he (1) evaluated a consecutive twelve-month 

period, instead of a calendar year period, in considering the 

organization’s spending for political advocacy for candidates; and (2) 

excluded expenditures from his analysis that the organization did 

not make within the consecutive twelve-month period. 

The division therefore affirms the administrative law judge’s 

order. 

 
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA16

Court of Appeals No. 16CA1522 

Colorado Office of Administrative Courts No. 0S2016-0005 

Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

Colorado Citizens Protecting our Constitution, 

Respondent-Appellee, 

and 

Colorado Secretary of State, 

Intervenor-Appellee. 

ORDER AFFIRMED 

Division VII 

Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD 

Berger and Freyre, JJ., concur 

Announced February 8, 2018 

Matthew Arnold, Authorized Representative, Denver, Colorado, of Campaign 

Integrity Watchdog, LLC 

Holland & Hart LLP, Douglas L. Abbott, Denver, Colorado, for RespondentAppellee 

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Matthew D. Grove, Assistant Solicitor 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Intervenor-Appellee
1 

¶ 1 This appeal asks us to review the decision of an administrative 

law judge who employed the “major purpose test,” which the United 

States Supreme Court first set forth in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 

79 (1976), to determine whether an organization was a political 

committee. We conclude that the record supports the judge’s 

holding that the organization was not a political committee because 

it did not have the major purpose of nominating or electing 

candidates. 

¶ 2 The organization in question was Colorado Citizens Protecting 

our Constitution, which we shall call “Colorado Citizens.” 

Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC, which we shall call “Campaign 

Integrity,” filed a complaint against Colorado Citizens, alleging that 

it had not registered as a political committee when it should have. 

The judge dismissed the complaint. Campaign Integrity appeals. 

We affirm. 

I. Background 

¶ 3 Between September and November 2015, Colorado Citizens 

paid for a radio advertisement that supported the candidacy of Bob 

Gardner for state senate. The advertisement stated as follows: 
2 

He’s a conservative leader who’s served our 

community and our country his entire life. 

Now he’s running to represent Colorado 

Springs in the state senate. Bob Gardner. As 

a young cadet at the Air Force Academy, he 

learned the true meaning of leadership. Then 

Bob Gardner fought for school choice as a 

founder of Cheyenne Mountain Charter 

Academy. And as a state legislator, Bob 

Gardner stood up against trial lawyers, 

teachers’ unions, and big spending politicians, 

earning him multiple legislator of the year 

awards. Now Bob Gardner is running for state 

senate. To make sure our veterans get the 

care they deserve. To fight for our rights on 

guns, school choice, and health care. And to 

take on the big spenders in both parties. A 

fiscal hawk with the unflinching guts to stand 

up for what’s right. Bob Gardner. Paid for by 

Colorado Citizens Protecting our Constitution. 

¶ 4 The advertisement ran on one or more radio stations in 

Colorado Springs from September through November 2015. 

¶ 5 Following the advertisement’s airing, Campaign Integrity filed 

a complaint with the Colorado Secretary of State. It alleged that 

Colorado Citizens had not registered as a political committee, as 

required by article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution and the Fair 

Campaign Practices Act, sections 1-45-101 to -118, C.R.S. 2017. 

The Secretary’s office referred the case to the Office of 
3 

Administrative Courts, which assigned an administrative law judge 

to preside over it. 

¶ 6 The Secretary moved to intervene in the proceedings. The 

judge granted the motion in part, noting that the Secretary would 

be allowed to intervene only to “submit[] an amicus-style brief 

addressing the legal issues relevant in the complaint.” 

¶ 7 Both Colorado Citizens and the Secretary moved for summary 

judgment. Relying on Colorado Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. 

Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2007), and Alliance for 

Colorado’s Families v. Gilbert, 172 P.3d 964 (Colo. App. 2007), 

Colorado Citizens contended that it was not a political committee 

because it did not have the “major purpose” of supporting or 

opposing candidates. The Secretary supported that contention, but 

it added that Colorado Citizens could not be a political committee 

because it did not make or receive contributions. Because of the 

Secretary’s limited party status, the judge construed the motion as 

a legal brief supporting Colorado Citizens’ position. The judge 

denied both summary judgment motions. 

¶ 8 The judge then held a hearing on the merits to determine 

Colorado Citizens’ major purpose. He found that, based on the 
4 

financial information admitted into evidence, Colorado Citizens’ 

spending on political candidates only accounted for little more than 

one-third of its total spending, while the majority of its spending 

involved political issues. So he concluded that Colorado Citizens 

was not a political committee because it did not have the major 

purpose of nominating or electing political candidates. 

II. Standard of Review and General Legal Principles 

¶ 9 We will uphold the decision of an administrative law judge 

unless his or her decision is arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by 

the evidence, or contrary to law. See Sherritt v. Rocky Mountain Fire 

Dist., 205 P.3d 544, 545 (Colo. App. 2009). “[W]e accept [a judge’s] 

factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported 

by evidence in the record.” Colo. Educ. Ass’n v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65, 

77 (Colo. 2008). But whether the judge applied the correct legal 

standard is a question of law that we review de novo. See Cerbo v. 

Protect Colo. Jobs, Inc., 240 P.3d 495, 500-01 (Colo. App. 2010); see 

also Stamm v. City & Cty. of Denver, 856 P.2d 54, 57 (Colo. App. 

1993)(noting that “[a] reviewing court is required to set aside the 

final orders of an administrative agency if the agency applied an 

erroneous legal standard”). 
5 

¶ 10 In an administrative hearing, evidence is admissible if it 

“possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and 

prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs.” Colo. Motor Vehicle 

Dealer Licensing Bd. v. Northglenn Dodge, Inc., 972 P.2d 707, 713 

(Colo. App. 1998). But a judge “has discretion to determine the 

relevancy of evidence.” Aviado v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 228 

P.3d 177, 179 (Colo. App. 2009). “Evidentiary decisions are firmly 

within a[] [judge’s] discretion . . . and will not be disturbed absent a 

showing of abuse of that discretion.” Youngs v. Indus. Claim 

Appeals Office, 2013 COA 54, ¶ 40. “An abuse of discretion occurs 

when the [judge’s] order is beyond the bounds of reason, as where it 

is unsupported by the evidence or contrary to law.” Heinicke v. 

Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 197 P.3d 220, 222 (Colo. App. 2008). 

III. “The Major Purpose” Test 

¶ 11 Campaign Integrity contends that the judge erred when he 

held that Colorado Citizens was not a political committee. The error 

arose, this contention continues, from the judge’s misapplication of 

the major purpose test. We disagree. 
6 

A. Additional Background 

¶ 12 The judge’s decision applied the major purpose test that the 

United States Supreme Court set forth in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79. 

He determined that, “although the major purpose test is not 

expressly included within Article XXVIII’s definition of political 

committee, [he could not] constitutionally apply that definition to 

[Colorado Citizens] unless the evidence proves that [Colorado 

Citizens’] major purpose was to support or oppose one or more 

political candidates.” 

¶ 13 The judge analyzed the major purpose issue from two 

perspectives. First, he looked at Colorado Citizens’ “statement of 

organizational purpose.” He found that this statement did not 

mention political advocacy, but “political advocacy in one form or 

another is all [that Colorado Citizens] did over the one-year period 

under study.” So he “attache[d] little weight to [its] statement of 

organizational purpose.” 

¶ 14 The judge then looked at Colorado Citizens’ financial records. 

He found that spending on candidates for a year beginning in 2015 

and ending in 2016 accounted for only 33.5 percent of its total 

spending. Because more than half of Colorado Citizens’ spending 
7 

went to something other than candidates, he found that it was not a 

political committee. 

B. Law 

¶ 15 Section 2(12)(a) of article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution 

defines a “[p]olitical committee” as “any person, other than a 

natural person, or any group of two or more persons, including 

natural persons that have accepted or made contributions or 

expenditures in excess of $200 to support or oppose the nomination 

or election of one or more candidates.” 

¶ 16 In interpreting similar language under federal campaign law, 

the United State Supreme Court held that, to qualify as a political 

committee, the organization must either (1) be “under the control of 

a candidate”; or (2) have “the major purpose of which is the 

nomination or election of a candidate” to qualify as a political 

committee. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79. Because there is no evidence 

in this case that Colorado Citizens was controlled by any candidate, 

including Mr. Gardner, we are only concerned with the second 

consideration, which is known as the “major purpose test.” See 

Alliance for Colorado’s Families, 172 P.3d at 970. (The Supreme 

Court adopted the major purpose test to avoid “serious problems of 
8 

vagueness” that might have “deter[red] those who [sought] to 

exercise protected First Amendment rights.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

76-77.) 

¶ 17 As far as political committees are concerned, the major 

purpose test does not appear in either Colorado’s Constitution or in 

any Colorado statute. But the Tenth Circuit, when analyzing the 

definition of political committee in our state constitution, held that 

it would be unconstitutional as applied if it did not incorporate the 

major purpose test. Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc., 498 F.3d at 

1154. In incorporating the major purpose test, the Tenth Circuit 

provided further guidance on how to apply it. Relying on Federal 

Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 

238, 252 (1986), the circuit stated that there were two ways to 

determine an organization’s major purpose. Colo. Right to Life 

Comm., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1152. First, a court could examine its 

“central organizational purpose.” Id. Second, a court could 

compare “the organization’s independent spending with overall 

spending to determine whether the preponderance of expenditures 

are for express advocacy or contributions to candidates.” Id.
9 

¶ 18 In Alliance for Colorado’s Families, a division of this court 

decided that the major purpose test from Buckley, as augmented by 

Colorado Right to Life Committee, Inc., was the proper test to apply 

when analyzing whether an organization was a political committee. 

(The division did not reach a definitive conclusion about whether 

the major purpose test had been satisfied because the 

administrative law judge had not made sufficient factual findings. 

172 P.3d at 972. So the division remanded the case for “further 

proceedings . . . guided by Colorado Right to Life Committee, Inc. . . . 

and other relevant authority.” Id. at 973.) 

C. Analysis 

¶ 19 We begin by noting that Campaign Integrity agrees that the 

definition of “political committee” found in Colorado’s Constitution 

is “insufficient” because it does not incorporate Buckley’s major 

purpose test. Campaign Integrity then asks us to “clarify the 

standard for applying” that test to political committees. Based on 

Campaign Integrity’s position, we shall proceed, as did the 

administrative law judge, to decide this case employing the major 

purpose test. 
10 

¶ 20 Campaign Integrity contends that the judge in this case 

should have applied the statutory major purpose definition from 

section 1-45-103(12)(b), C.R.S. 2017, which defines “issue 

committee,” to Colorado Citizens’ conduct. It reasons that (1) 

because the great extent of Colorado Citizens’ written and broadcast 

communications supported a candidate, it was a political 

committee, see § 1-45-103(12)(b)(II)(B); (2) the judge erred because 

he did not consider whether Colorado Citizens’ support of Mr. 

Gardner constituted a “considerable portion” of its total activities, 

see § 1-45-103(12)(b)(II)(A); see also Cerbo, 240 P.3d at 501; and (3) 

the judge did not consider Colorado Citizens’ “demonstrated pattern 

of conduct,” see § 1-45-103(12)(b)(II). We disagree with these 

contentions for several somewhat interconnected reasons. 

¶ 21 First, the phrase “major purpose” does not appear in the 

definition of political committee found in section 2(12)(a) of article 

XXVIII. As we have explained above, Colorado Right to Life 

Committee, Inc., held that this definition would be unconstitutional 

without the major purpose test, and Alliance for Colorado’s Families

followed Colorado Right to Life Committee, Inc. We are persuaded by 

the reasoning in Alliance for Colorado’s Families. So we, too, will 
11 

follow Colorado Right to Life Committee, Inc., and we will apply the 

major purpose test in this case as augmented by the alternative 

factors described in Colorado Right to Life Committee, Inc.

¶ 22 Second, we reject Campaign Integrity’s contention that we 

should apply part of the definition of an “issue committee” to 

determine whether Colorado Citizens was a political committee, 

which is, as we have observed above, defined by a different 

constitutional subsection. Unlike the definition of political 

committee, the definition of “issue committee” in article 28, section 

2(10)(a)(I), includes a reference to the issue committee’s major 

purpose: “any person . . . [t]hat has a major purpose of supporting 

or opposing any ballot issue or ballot question.” The term “major 

purpose” as used in that definition is further defined in section 1-

45-103(12)(b). That section states that an organization’s major 

purpose can be determined by 

(I) An organization’s specifically identified 

objectives in its organizational documents at the 

time it is established or as such documents 

are later amended; or 

(II) An organization’s demonstrated pattern of 

conduct based upon its: 
12 

(A) Annual expenditures in support of or 

opposition to a ballot issue or ballot question; 

or 

(B) Production or funding, or both, of written or 

broadcast communications, or both, in support 

of or opposition to a ballot issue or ballot 

question. 

(Emphasis added.) 

¶ 23 But, as we have suggested above, Campaign Integrity’s 

contention contemplates apples when we must discuss oranges. A 

“major purpose,” as defined in section 1-45-103(12)(b), only applies 

to issue committees. And it ignores the importance of the 

legislature’s choice to include a definition of “major purpose” for 

issue committees but to exclude such a definition for political 

committees. See § 1-45-103(14)(defining political committee); Colo. 

Right to Life Comm., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1155 (“The inclusion of the 

‘major purpose’ test in § 2(10)(a) indicates that the decision not to 

include this requirement in the definition of political committee was 

deliberate and consistent with the state’s citizenry’s intent.”). 

Because issue committees and political committees are mutually 

exclusive, see Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(b)(stating that issue 

committees do not include political committees), this legislative 
13 

choice makes clear that the definition of “major purpose” cannot 

apply to both types of committees, see Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 

563, 567-68 (Colo. 2007)(“We do not add words to [a] statute . . . . 

[W]e cannot supply . . . missing language . . . .”). 

¶ 24 Campaign Integrity’s contention is further undercut by the 

language of the statutory definition of “major purpose” because 

section 1-45-103(12)(b) refers to a major purpose of an 

organization, not to the major purpose. See Cerbo, 240 P.3d at 501 

(“[B]y using the indefinite article ‘a,’ the phrase ‘a major purpose’ 

brings within its ambit organizations for which promoting a ballot 

issue is but one major purpose.” (citing Brooks v. Zabka, 168 Colo. 

265, 269, 450 P.2d 653, 655 (1969))). Although, under this statute, 

an issue committee could have more than one major purpose, the 

United States Supreme Court made clear in Buckley that a political 

committee can have only one. See Indep. Inst. v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 

1130, 1137 (Colo. App. 2008)(noting that Buckley’s major purpose 

test determines the “one, central purpose for which [a political 

committee] is created”). 

¶ 25 Third, we think that Campaign Integrity’s reliance on Colorado 

Ethics Watch v. Gessler, 2013 COA 172M, is misplaced. In that 
14 

case, a division of this court struck down the Secretary’s rule 

codifying the major purpose test. Id. at ¶ 38. But, unlike in this 

case, the division’s analysis focused on a question of administrative 

law: Has the legislature, either explicitly or implicitly, delegated the 

authority to an administrative agency to fill a gap in a statute? Id.

at ¶ 22. The division’s analysis therefore did not touch upon 

whether the major purpose test, as described in Colorado Right to 

Life Committee, Inc., and Alliance for Colorado’s Families, should 

apply to political committees in this case. 

¶ 26 Fourth, Campaign Integrity asserts that Colorado Ethics Watch

required the judge to evaluate the major purpose test in terms of 

whether Colorado Citizens “demonstrated [a] pattern of conduct 

reflected in its annual activity and production and/or funding of 

communications.” But this demonstrated pattern of conduct test 

comes directly from section 1-45-103(12)(b), the statute defining 

“major purpose” for issue committees. And, as we have already 

twice observed, this statutory test is inapplicable to this case. 

Colorado Ethics Watch did not suggest otherwise. 
15 

¶ 27 We therefore conclude that the judge properly applied the 

major purpose test as described in Colorado Right to Life Committee, 

Inc., and Alliance for Colorado’s Families. 

¶ 28 We further conclude that the judge’s factual findings 

supported his conclusion that Colorado Citizens was not a political 

committee. The judge considered the alternatives of the major 

purpose test. Our review of the record leads us to agree with him 

that Colorado Citizens’ statement of its organizational purpose was 

unhelpful because the statement and Colorado Citizens’ actual 

activities were inconsistent. For example, the statement of purpose 

referred to “educational outreach regarding the strengthening of 

public education,” but it did not mention political activity or 

political advocacy. But, after reviewing records from Colorado 

Citizens, the judge found that it had engaged in political advocacy 

for a year, although most of the advocacy was on behalf of issues, 

not candidates. 

¶ 29 And we therefore agree with the judge that employing the 

second test from Colorado Right to Life Committee, Inc. — analyzing 

Colorado Citizens’ spending activity — was the appropriate method 

of inquiry. In doing so, as we will describe in more detail below, the 
16 

judge gave Campaign Integrity the benefit of the doubt when 

analyzing Colorado Citizens’ spending activity. For example, he 

treated unexplained spending in Colorado Citizens’ records as 

spending on political advocacy for candidates. Yet, even giving 

Campaign Integrity that benefit, the records merely showed that a 

little over one-third of Colorado Citizens’ spending was on political 

advocacy for candidates. We therefore conclude that the record 

established that Colorado Citizens was not a political committee 

because its major purpose — its “one, central purpose,” Indep. Inst., 

209 P.3d at 1137 — was not supporting candidates. 

IV. Calendar Year Versus Consecutive Twelve Months 

¶ 30 When applying the major purpose test, Campaign Integrity 

contends that the judge should have considered Colorado Citizens’ 

spending in a calendar year, instead of in a consecutive 

twelve-month period from June 2015 to May 2016. We disagree. 

A. Additional Background 

¶ 31 Campaign Integrity subpoenaed financial records from 

Colorado Citizens from July 1, 2015, through April 1, 2016. In 

response, Colorado Citizens produced bank statements from June 

2015 to April 2016. Colorado Citizens also produced a profit and 
17 

loss summary showing expenses from July 2015 to May 2016. 

Finally, Colorado Citizens produced several invoices. 

¶ 32 The parties stipulated to admit these documents. But some of 

them did not provide the judge with information about the purpose 

of some of the expenditures. So, as we observed above, the judge 

sanctioned Colorado Citizens by deciding that it would treat all 

unexplained expenditures as spending on political advocacy for 

candidates. The judge then analyzed Colorado Citizens’ 

contributions from June 2015 to May 2016, and, based on the 

submitted records, he decided that Colorado Citizens’ contributions 

to candidates constituted only slightly more than a third of its 

overall expenditures. 

¶ 33 Although Campaign Integrity did not subpoena documents 

from the first half of 2015, it later told the judge that, for the 

purposes of the major purpose test, he had to analyze Colorado 

Citizens’ expenditures for the calendar year of 2015. It added that, 

if the judge had done so, he would have decided that Colorado 

Citizens had been a political committee in 2015. 
18 

B. Law and Analysis 

¶ 34 We conclude, for the following reasons, that the judge did not 

err when he decided to base the major purpose analysis on the 

records of Colorado Citizens’ expenses in the consecutive twelvemonth period spanning 2015 and 2016. 

¶ 35 First, Campaign Integrity undercut its contention because it 

did not provide sufficient documentary evidence for the judge to 

consider calendar years 2015 and 2016 separately. In an 

administrative hearing, the burden is on an order’s proponent to 

present sufficient evidence to support the requested order. See 

§ 24-4-105(7), C.R.S. 2017; see also Velasquez v. Dep’t of Higher 

Educ., 93 P.3d 540, 542 (Colo. App. 2003). So Campaign Integrity 

had the burden to provide the judge with complete documentation 

from 2015 if it expected the judge to analyze the financial 

information on a calendar-year basis. 

¶ 36 But Campaign Integrity only subpoenaed documents from the 

second half of 2015 and from the first three months of 2016. It did 

not subpoena any records from the first half of 2015. (As we will 

describe in more detail below, the judge had some information 

about expenditures in the first half of 2015 because Colorado 
19 

Citizens voluntarily disclosed it.) Campaign Integrity set the 

parameters for the judge’s analysis, and it cannot now argue that 

the judge should have considered evidence that it did not provide. 

Because the time period that the judge chose included the months 

in which Colorado Citizens paid for and ran the advertisement at 

issue in the complaint, we conclude that the judge did not err when 

he chose the 2015-2016 time period for analysis. 

¶ 37 Second, even if Campaign Integrity had provided sufficient 

documentary evidence, there is no legal authority requiring the 

judge to conduct his analysis on a calendar-year basis. Although 

Campaign Integrity mentions Buckley as a basis for this contention, 

it cites nothing in that case that would lead us to the same 

conclusion, and we have not found anything in our independent 

reading of that case to support that contention. And Campaign 

Integrity’s vague reference to the Internal Revenue Code’s reporting 

requirements is similarly unconvincing. Campaign Integrity does 

not cite any other cases, statutes, or constitutional provisions that 

support its contention, and we have not found any. 
20 

V. Exclusion of $76,000 from March and April 2015 

¶ 38 Campaign Integrity contends that the judge improperly 

excluded evidence that Colorado Citizens had made $76,000 in 

contributions to candidates during March and April of 2015. We 

disagree. 

A. Additional Background 

¶ 39 Some evidence in the record showed that Colorado Citizens 

donated $76,000 in March and April of 2015 to support candidates 

in municipal elections in Colorado Springs. But the judge declined 

to consider these contributions in its analysis “because [Campaign 

Integrity] did not subpoena [Colorado Citizens’] financial records for 

those months, [so] the evidentiary record [was] incomplete as to 

[Colorado Citizens’] total spending in those months.” In other 

words, although the records that the judge had before him showed 

that Colorado Citizens had spent $76,000 in the first half of 2015 

on political advocacy for candidates, the records did not show 

whether Colorado Citizens spent additional funds on non-candidate 

activity. 
21 

B. Law and Analysis 

¶ 40 We conclude, for the following reasons, that the judge did not 

abuse his discretion when he excluded the $76,000 from his 

analysis because his decision was not beyond the bounds of reason 

and because it was supported by the evidence. See Youngs, ¶ 40; 

Aviado, 228 P.3d at 180; Heinicke, 197 P.3d at 222. 

¶ 41 Campaign Integrity did not subpoena any records from March 

and April of 2015; Colorado Citizens gave those records to the court 

voluntarily. The judge determined that the financial records during 

that period were incomplete because they did not include “any 

evidence regarding non-candidate spending that may have occurred 

in the same period.” And the judge also had no financial records 

from May 2015, which created a gap between the March and April 

records and those from the second half of 2015. 

¶ 42 Finally, even if the judge had included the $76,000 in his 

analysis, the total candidate spending for 2015 would still have 

constituted less than fifty percent of Colorado Citizens’ overall 

candidate-related expenditures, or less than what would constitute 

the one, central purpose for which Colorado Citizens was created. 

See Indep. Inst., 209 P.3d at 1137. 
22 

VI. Secretary’s Contentions 

¶ 43 The Secretary urges us to affirm on an alternative basis — 

Colorado Citizens was not a political committee because it did not 

make or receive contributions — if we do not affirm the judge’s 

order based on the major purpose test. Because we have concluded 

that the judge properly (1) applied the major purpose test; (2) used 

the year covered by the records before him instead of calendar year 

2015; and (3) excluded $76,000 in Colorado Citizens’ expenditures 

from his analysis, we decline to address the Secretary’s alternative 

contention. 

¶ 44 The order is affirmed. 

JUDGE BERGER and JUDGE FREYRE concur.