If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

AMY HJERSTEDT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

FOR PUBLICATION

August 22, 2024

9:30 a.m.

v No. 358803

Chippewa Circuit Court

CITY OF SAULT STE. MARIE, LC No. 20-016126-CZ

Defendant-Appellee.

ON REMAND

Before: PATEL, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PATEL, P.J.

This case returns to us on remand from the Supreme Court to determine whether the City 

of Sault Ste. Marie Police Department’s use-of-force policy is subject to disclosure under the 

Michigan Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., or whether the policy reveals

the contents of law enforcement staff manuals and thus is exempt from disclosure under MCL 

15.243(1)(s)(vi). Previously, this Court held that the unredacted policy was not exempt from 

disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(n) (because the policy did not contain a record of law 

enforcement communication codes or plans for deployment), MCL 15.243(1)(s)(v) (because the 

policy did not disclose law enforcement operational instructions), and MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vii) 

(because disclosure would not endanger the safety of law enforcement officers). Hjerstedt v City 

of Sault Ste Marie, 345 Mich App 573, 577, 594; 7 NW3d 102, rev’d in part, app den in part 513 

Mich 925; 997 NW2d 451 (2023) (Hjerstedt I). However, because the trial court did not analyze 

MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi) or rely on it in reaching its decision, this Court did not analyze whether the 

staff manual exemption applied to the city’s use-of-force policy. Id. at 594 n 7.

On December 1, 2023, the Supreme Court denied the city’s request to review our holding; 

however, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court reversed Footnote 71of our opinion and 

 

1 Footnote 7 of our prior opinion stated:
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remanded the case to us with further instructions to remand the case to the trial court for 

consideration of whether the staff manual exemption in MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi) applied to the city’s 

use-of-force policy. Hjerstedt v City of Sault Ste Marie, 513 Mich 925; 997 NW2d 451 (2023)

(Hjerstedt II). On remand, the trial court held that the staff manual exemption applies and prevents 

the unredacted disclosure of the city’s use-of-force policy under FOIA. 

We find that the trial court erred by concluding that the unredacted policy was exempt from 

disclosure under MCL 15.243(s)(vi). Accordingly, we reverse the court’s grant of the city’s 

motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and remand for further proceedings. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

George Floyd’s death in May 2020 ignited a mass movement of citizens advocating for 

systemic change in law enforcement use-of-force procedures across the country. Weeks after 

Floyd’s death, plaintiff, Amy Hjerstedt, requested a copy of the city’s use-of-force policy under 

FOIA. Our prior opinion set forth the background to this case:

On June 25, 2020, Hjerstedt submitted a FOIA request to the city seeking 

the “Sault Police use of force policy/standard.” The city denied Hjerstedt’s request, 

claiming that the policy was exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(n) 

because “it would prejudice the city’s ability to protect the public safety.” Hjerstedt 

appealed the denial, asserting that MCL 15.243(1)(n) was misinterpreted because 

the use-of-force policy “does not include deployment plans or communication 

codes.” The appeal was submitted to the city commission for consideration.

The city’s staff, including the city attorney and city manager, provided the 

city commission with an analysis and a recommendation to disclose the use-offorce policy with redactions. The staff maintained that the policy was part of the 

“general orders and policies for various basic operations” of the police department 

and included

information, which if made public, would inform individuals with 

criminal threat intent or resistance when and how an officer would 

use his or her training and the limitations therein in order to 

eliminate the threat or overcome the resistance presented. This 

information would allow the opportunity for a subject to overpower 

 

The city also claims that the redacted material is exempt from disclosure under 

MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi). But the trial court clearly rejected this argument because it 

only found that the material was exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(n), 

(s)(v), and (s)(vii), and the city did not file a cross-appeal. Notwithstanding, we 

find no merit in the city’s argument. [Hjerstedt I, 345 Mich App at 594 n 7.]
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an officer’s efforts to eliminate the threat or resistance, placing the 

officer and/or innocent citizen in jeopardy of severe injury or death.

The staff contended that the policy was exempt from disclosure because it (1) was 

an investigating record that would endanger the safety of law enforcement officers 

if disclosed, MCL 15.243(1)(b)(vi); (2) was a record of law enforcement 

communication codes or plans for deployment, MCL 15.243(1)(n); (3) disclosed 

law enforcement operational instructions, MCL 15.243(s)(v); (4) revealed the 

contents of law enforcement staff manuals, MCL 15.243(s)(vi); and (5) would 

endanger the safety of law enforcement officers if disclosed, MCL 15.243(s)(vii).

But “given the social climate around Force of Use [sic] policies,” the staff 

recommended releasing information that would not place the officers’ safety in 

jeopardy. The city commission voted to release a redacted version of the policy.

Hjerstedt received a heavily redacted copy of the policy.

Hjerstedt initiated this FOIA action challenging the decision. The city 

moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10), arguing 

that the redacted information was exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(n), 

(s)(v), (s)(vi), and (s)(vii) and necessary “for the public and/or officer safety.” The 

city relied on affidavits from the city’s current and former police chiefs who 

claimed that the disclosure of the information

would or could impact safety of the public and/or officers because 

it would inform individuals with criminal intent or those who resist 

know [sic] when and how an officer would use his or her training to 

respond and the limitations posed in order to eliminate the threat or 

to overcome the resistance presented.

7. The information if disclosed would or could impact safety of the 

public and/or officers because it would inform individuals with 

criminal intent or those who resist also know the factors that are 

important for the officer to consider in making a decision how to 

respond.

8. Armed with this information a potential suspect could circumvent 

the officer’s actions thus placing both the suspect and officer in 

danger.

In response, Hjerstedt requested judgment as a matter of law under MCR 

2.116(I)(2). She also filed a cross-motion for summary disposition pursuant to 

MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10). She described the police chiefs’ affidavits as “conclusory,” “self-serving opinions” that did not actually “address the purported 

exemptions.” She relied on unredacted use-of-force policies from the Michigan 

State Police, Department of Homeland Security, Michigan Association of Chiefs of 

Police, Lake County Sheriff Department, and Newaygo County Sheriff’s 

Department that were available to the public online. Hjerstedt posited that the other

departments’ unredacted policies were nearly identical to the unredacted portions 
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of the city’s policy. Because anyone could access unredacted copies of the other 

departments’ policies, she asserted that the city’s argument that disclosure of an 

unredacted copy of its policy would arm persons with information to circumvent 

officers’ actions was meritless. Hjerstedt argued that the exemptions claimed by 

the city were inapplicable and that the public’s interest warranted disclosure.

The city’s police chief, Wesley Bierling, testified that he believed the 

redactions were necessary to protect the safety of officers and the public. Chief 

Bierling was not the city’s police chief at the time that the redactions were made, 

and he was not the decision maker with regard to Hjerstedt’s FOIA request. But he 

maintained that he would have made the same redactions. Consistent with his 

affidavit, Chief Bierling testified that the redacted information “could or would 

impact the safety of [the] officers and [the] public” because it could provide information on how the officers “may use force, may consider using force, or may 

react to certain situations, and what they would use in their decision-making 

process.” He was not concerned about what other municipalities did with their 

policies, stating that it was “not an apples-to-apples comparison.” He testified that 

when he makes a decision to redact public records, he “always err[s] on the side of 

caution” in order to ensure officer safety.

In addition to the evidence and testimony presented by the parties, the trial 

court reviewed an unredacted copy of the city’s use-of-force policy in camera. The 

court found that the redacted portion of the policy involved “tactics and techniques 

or operational guidelines and according to the affidavit of former City Police Chief, 

John Riley, disclosure of the information would impact the public and/or officer 

safety because it would use his or her training to respond and the limitations posed 

in order to eliminate the threat or to overcome the resistance presented.” The court 

noted that the former chief’s decision was supported by Chief Bierling. The court 

found “that the [d]isclosure of the unredacted Use of Force Policy would or could 

in fact impact the officer’s [sic] ability to protect the public and/or themselves. The 

safety of the Sault Ste. Marie Police Officers’ safety [sic] is paramount and 

consequently the public interest is outweighed in the disclosure of said policy.” 

The trial court granted the city’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed 

Hjerstedt’s complaint, concluding that the city’s decision to redact the policy fit 

within the exemptions set forth in MCL 15.243(1)(n), (s)(v), and (s)(vii). . . .

[Hjerstedt I, 345 Mich App 578–82 (alternations in original) (footnotes omitted).].

On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court, and held that the city’s use-of-force policy 

was not exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(n), (s)(v), and (s)(vii). Id. at 577, 594. The 

Supreme Court denied the city’s application for leave to appeal the substantive portions of this

Court’s judgment analyzing each exemption, but the Court reversed Footnote 7 of our opinion and 

remanded the case to us with further instructions to remand the case to the trial court for 

consideration of whether the staff manual exemption in MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi) applied to the city’s 

use-of-force policy. Hjerstedt II, 513 Mich at 925. 
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This Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to consider whether the 

staff manual exemption in MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi) applies.2 On remand, the court held that the staff 

manual exemption applies and precludes unredacted disclosure of the policy, reasoning:

The specific exemption at issue here pertains to tactical strategies of law 

enforcement and set forth in MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi). MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi) provides 

that public records of a law enforcement agency may be withheld when they: 

Reveal the contents of staff manuals provided for law enforcement 

officers or agents; MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi)[.]

In this case, pursuant to a meeting of the Commission and upon 

recommendation of City Police staff, the City produced a redacted copy of the City 

Police Department’s Use of Force Policy. The portion redacted deals with tactics 

and techniques or operational guidelines and according to the affidavit of former 

City Police Chief, John Riley, disclosure of the information would impact the 

public and/or officer safety because it would use his or her training to respond and 

the limitations posed in order to eliminate the threat or to overcome the resistance 

presented. As newly hired City Police Chief Wesley Bierling testified, he supports 

the decision. Chief Bierling indicates that the disclosure of this information poses 

a threat of injury to both the suspect and the officer. Further testifying that if 

withholding of the information would or could save one life or one injury it is worth 

the public’s interest in nondisclosure. 

In addition to the foregoing, in interpreting the specific wording of 

exemption MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi), the Court needs to assess whether the disclosure 

of the public record (in this case public records pertaining to “Sault Police use of 

force policy /standard”) would reveal the “contents” of “staff manuals” provided 

for law enforcement officers or agents. It is clear in this case that the redacted 

portions of the Policy are in fact “contents” of a “staff manual” provided for the 

law enforcement officers. A Police “staff manual” can certainly be described as a 

book or set of policies (i.e. “contents”) that tell the law enforcement officers how 

to do something and as such, the Policy in this case certainly falls within that 

exemption at least as to the common place use of terms used therein. Such being 

the case, the matter rests with whether the public interest is outweighed in the 

nondisclosure of the Policy.

After careful review of the Policy and the plain language of the statute, 

together with the testimony of the former and current Chiefs of Police that 

disclosure would or could in fact impact the officer’s ability to protect the public 

and/or themselves, the Use of Force Policy qualifies for the staff manual exemption 

of MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi). As such, the City’s decision to provide Plaintiff with a 

 

2 Hjerstedt v City of Sault Ste Marie, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 

25, 2024 (Docket No. 358803).
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redacted copy of the policy is supported by law and fits within the exemption set 

forth in MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi), specifically.

This Court permitted the parties and amici American Civil Liberties Union and the 

Michigan Press Association to file supplemental briefs after remand.3 The matter is now back 

before this Court for further review. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The applicable standard was articulated in our prior opinion:

“We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary 

disposition.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 

665 (2019). In this case, the trial court did not expressly indicate whether it granted 

the city’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (10), but because it considered 

affidavits and testimony beyond the pleadings, we can fairly surmise that the 

motion was granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Cuddington v United Health Servs, 

Inc, 298 Mich App 264, 270, 826 NW2d 519 (2012). A motion for summary 

disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the 

complaint. Woodring v Phoenix Ins Co, 325 Mich App 108, 113; 923 NW2d 607 

(2018). We consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. Summary 

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is only appropriate when there is no genuine 

issue of material fact. Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, 

giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue 

upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Zaher v Miotke, 300 Mich App 132, 

139-140; 832 NW2d 266 (2013). 

The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law that we 

review de novo. Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 226, 229; 661 NW2d 557 

(2003). We likewise review “de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted 

and applied the FOIA.” Mich Open Carry, Inc v Dep’t of State Police, 330 Mich 

App 614, 621; 950 NW2d 484 (2019). The court’s factual findings underlying its 

application of FOIA are reviewed for clear error. Id. “Clear error exists only when 

the appellate court is left with [the] definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made.” Herald Com Inc v Eastern Mich Univ Bd of Regents, 475 Mich 463, 

471; 719 NW2d 19 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[C]ertain FOIA 

provisions require the trial court to balance competing interests.” Id. at 470. When 

we review “a decision committed to the trial court’s discretion, such as the 

balancing test at issue in [FOIA] case[s], we “must review the discretionary 

determination for an abuse of discretion and cannot disturb the trial court’s decision 

 

3 Hjerstedt v City of Sault Ste Marie, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 1, 

2024 (Docket No. 358803); Hjerstedt v City of Sault Ste Marie, unpublished order of the Court of 

Appeals, entered April 24, 2024 (Docket No. 358803).
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unless it falls outside the principled range of outcomes.” Id. at 472. [Hjerstedt I, 

345 Mich App at 582–83.]

III. ANALYSIS

Hjerstedt argues that the trial court erred in holding that the staff manual exemption under 

MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi) applies and prevents disclosure of the unredacted use-of-force policy. We 

agree. 

Michigan has a strong public policy favoring public access to government information and

grants the public an opportunity to “examine and review the workings of government and its 

executive officials.” Messenger v Ingham Co Prosecutor, 232 Mich App 633, 641; 591 NW2d 

393 (1998). Consistent with this policy, FOIA commands that persons “are entitled to full and 

complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who 

represent them as public officials and public employees . . . so that they may fully participate in 

the democratic process.” MCL 15.231(2). Although certain information may be exempt from 

disclosure, the exemptions stated in § 13 are not intended to shield public bodies from the 

transparency that FOIA was designed to foster. “On its express terms, the FOIA is a prodisclosure 

statute, and the exemptions stated in § 13 are narrowly construed.” Herald Co v Bay City, 463 

Mich 111, 119; 614 NW2d 873 (2000). See also Sole v Michigan Economic Development Corp, 

509 Mich 406, 413; 983 NW2d 733 (2022); Mager v Dep’t of State Police, 460 Mich 134, 143;

595 NW2d 142 (1999); Swickard v Wayne Co Med Examiner, 438 Mich 536, 544; 475 NW2d 304 

(1991).

The public body has the burden of proving the applicability of any statutory exemption that 

it claims applies to a FOIA request. Detroit Free Press, Inc v Southfield, 269 Mich App 275, 281; 

713 NW2d 28 (2005). “To meet this burden, the public body claiming an exemption should 

provide complete particularized justification, rather than simply repeat statutory language.” 

Detroit Free Press v Warren, 250 Mich App 164, 167; 645 NW2d 71 (2002). 

On remand, the trial court concluded, without any detailed analysis, that the redacted 

material was exempted from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi), which exempts “the contents 

of staff manuals provided for law enforcement officers or agents” from disclosure “[u]nless the 

public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure in the particular 

instance[.]” The trial court reasoned:

It is clear in this case that the redacted portions of the Policy are in fact “contents” 

of a “staff manual” provided for the law enforcement officers. A Police “staff 

manual” can certainly be described as a book or set of policies (i.e. “contents”) that 

tell the law enforcement officers how to do something and as such, the Policy in 

this case certainly falls within that exemption at least as to the common place use 

of terms used therein.

FOIA does not define “staff manuals,” and there is no caselaw interpreting this 

subparagraph. Thus, resolution of this issue requires us to interpret this statutory exemption. “The 

principal goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, and the most 

reliable evidence of that intent is the plain language of the statute.” South Dearborn Environmental 
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Improvement Ass’n, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 502 Mich 349, 360-361; 917 NW2d 

603 (2018). When determining the meaning of a statute’s plain language, we examine “the statute 

as a whole, reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative scheme.” 

Kemp v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 500 Mich 245, 252; 901 NW2d 534 (2017). “Where 

the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain meaning reflects the Legislature’s intent and the 

statute must be applied as written.” Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP v City of Detroit, 

505 Mich 284, 294; 952 NW2d 358 (2020) (cleaned up). Further, FOIA’s exemptions “must be 

narrowly construed to serve the policy of open access to public records.” Mich Open Carry, 330 

Mich App at 625.

We do not quibble with the trial court’s definition of a staff manual. Indeed, the common 

understanding of a staff manual can be described as a book or compendium of policies given to 

staff (e.g., law enforcement officers), informing them about workplace expectations and 

instructions on how to conduct business. The term “staff manual” thus could plausibly be read as 

being synonymous with an employee handbook. Such handbooks routinely contain workplace 

policies, such as antidiscrimination policies, sexual harassment policies, workplace leave policies, 

and, in the specific context of law enforcement agencies, use-of-force policies. 

However, there is no evidence in the record that the city’s use-of-force policy is contained 

in a staff manual or handbook that was disseminated to law enforcement officers. Rather, it is part 

of a standing general order that was issued on June 18, 2013. The policy is titled, “General Order”

and simply states “13-02 Use of Force” in the upper right corner of the first page. There was no 

evidence that this stand-alone order was part of an employee handbook or “staff manual.” In fact, 

no staff manual was presented to the trial court during the evidentiary hearing. The only evidence 

that the city presented to establish that the policy was a “staff manual” was Chief Bierling’s 

conclusory statement that he considered it to be a staff manual without any further explanation. 

As the party asserting the exemption, the city has the burden of establishing its applicability. 

Detroit Free Press, Inc, 269 Mich App at 281.

We conclude that the term “staff manual” was intended to be used synonymously with 

terms such as “employee handbook” and be limited to tools provided to employees to outline terms 

of employment, internal employment-related procedures, and, at times, workplace policies. The 

city’s use-of-force policy is contained in a stand-alone general order that does not fit within this 

definition and thus was not exempt from disclosure under subparagraph (s)(vi). Because we find 

that the redacted portions of the use-of-force policy are not part of a staff manual, it is unnecessary 

for us to consider the balancing test set forth in MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi).4

 

4 Although we do not need to reach the issue, it is unlikely that the city could establish that the 

public’s interest in nondisclosure outweighed the public’s interest in disclosure of the unredacted 

portions of the use-of-force policy. The trial court failed to recognize, much less analyze and 

weigh, the public’s compelling interest in understanding when and how police officers are 

authorized to use force, and the evidence did not establish that any meaningful risk would be posed 

to the safety of the police by disclosure. The trial court premised its conclusion that disclosure of 

the policy would or could impact an officer’s ability to protect the public or themselves, and thus 
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IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court clearly erred by finding that the unredacted policy was exempt from 

disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi). We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition 

in favor of the city, and we remand for entry of judgment in favor of Hjerstedt. On remand the 

trial court shall: (1) order disclosure of the unredacted use-of-force policy; (2) award Hjerstedt 

reasonable attorney fees, costs, and disbursements under MCL 15.240(6); and (3) determine 

whether Hjerstedt is entitled to punitive damages under MCL 15.240(7).

Reversed and remanded for further proceeding consistent with this opinion. We do not 

retain jurisdiction. Hjerstedt, as the prevailing party, may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Sima G. Patel 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

Shapiro, J., not participating, having retired from the Court of Appeals effective March 15, 2024.

 

weighed in favor of nondisclosure, by reasoning that “[t]he portion redacted deals with tactics and 

techniques or operational guidelines” and “disclosure of the information would impact the public 

and/or officer safety.” The trial court’s foundational reasoning is inconsistent with this Court’s 

decision in Hjerstedt I, which remains binding published authority, not to mention the law of the 

case here. See Rott v Rott, 508 Mich 274, 286; 972 NW2d 789 (2021) (an appellate court’s 

determination of an issue in a case binds lower tribunals on remand and the appellate court in 

subsequent appeals). As to whether the policy contained operational instructions, this Court

unequivocally determined that it did not. Hjerstedt I, 345 Mich App at 590. This Court also 

determined that, contrary to the arguments made by the city, the city did not present evidence to 

support that disclosure of the unredacted policy would endanger the life or safety of law 

enforcement officers. Id. at 593-594.