An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1155

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 April 2014

In the Matter of:

Guilford County

No. 11 JT 163

P.V.M.

Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 18 July 2013 

by Judge Wendy Enochs in Guilford County District Court. Heard 

in the Court of Appeals 31 March 2014.

Mercedes O. Chut, for Guilford County Department of Social 

Services, petitioner-appellee.

Smith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, L.L.P., by Margaret Rowlett, 

for guardian ad litem.

J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant.

ERVIN, Judge.

Respondent-Father David M. appeals from an order 

terminating his parental rights in P.V.M.1 On appeal, 

Respondent-Father contends that the trial court erred by 

determining that his parental rights in Peter were subject to 

 

1P.V.M. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this 

opinion as “Peter,” which is a pseudonym used for ease of

reading and to protect the juvenile’s privacy.
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termination and that Peter’s best interests would be served by 

the termination of Respondent-Father’s parental rights. After 

careful consideration of Respondent-Father’s challenges to the 

trial court’s order in light of the record and the applicable 

law, we conclude that the trial court’s order should be 

affirmed.

I. Factual Background

Peter was born out of wedlock in 2006. On 8 March 2011, 

the Guilford County Department of Social Services filed a 

petition alleging that Peter was a neglected and dependent 

juvenile based upon allegations that Peter’s mother, Valerie M., 

lacked stable and adequate housing, had a substance abuse

problem, could not properly care for Peter, and had failed to 

comply with her case plan and obtained the issuance of an order 

authorizing it to take Peter into non-secure custody. As the 

result of DNA testing conducted on 1 March 2011, RespondentFather was determined to be Peter’s father. On 9 August 2011,

Judge K. Michelle Fletcher entered an order finding that Peter

was a neglected and dependent juvenile, retaining Peter in DSS 

custody, ordering both of Peter’s parents to comply with their 

case plans, and authorizing visitation between Respondent-Father 

and Peter.
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Although Respondent-Father initially complied with portions 

of his case plan and developed a loving relationship with Peter, 

he failed to obtain independent housing, failed a number of 

substance abuse screens, and engaged in other conduct that 

raised questions about his ability to successfully parent Peter. 

On 17 December 2012, DSS filed a petition seeking to have the 

parental rights of both Peter’s mother and Respondent-Father in 

Peter terminated. On 19 February 2013, Peter’s mother 

relinquished her parental rights in Peter. After conducting a 

hearing on 25 June 2013, the trial court entered an order on 18 

July 2013 determining that Respondent-Father’s parental rights 

in Peter were subject to termination on the grounds that he had

(1) neglected Peter; (2) willfully left Peter in foster care for 

more than twelve months without making reasonable progress 

toward correcting the conditions that had led to Peter’s removal 

from the home; (3) willfully refused to pay a reasonable portion 

of the cost of Peter’s care despite having the physical and 

financial ability to do so during the six month period preceding 

the filing of the termination petition; and (4) failed to 

establish paternity, legitimate Peter, or provide substantial 

financial support or consistent care for Peter and his mother 

and that Peter’s best interests would be served by the 

termination of Respondent-Father’s parental rights. Respondent-
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Father noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s 

order.

II. Substantive Legal Analysis

In his brief, Respondent-Father contends that the trial 

court erred by finding that his parental rights in Peter were 

subject to termination and that Peter’s best interests would be 

served by the termination of his parental rights. More 

specifically, Respondent-Father contends that the trial court 

erred by determining that his parental rights in Peter were 

subject to termination on the grounds of neglect, failure to 

make reasonable progress, failure to make a reasonable 

contribution toward the cost of Peter’s care, and failure to 

establish paternity, legitimate Peter, or provide substantial 

support or consistent care for Peter and his mother on the 

grounds that the record evidence and the trial court’s findings 

did not support these determinations and by failing to properly 

consider certain relevant factors in determining that Peter’s 

best interests would be served by the termination of RespondentFather’s parental rights. Respondent-Father’s arguments do not 

justify a decision to overturn the trial court’s termination 

order.

A. Standard of Review
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“The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, 

cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in 

turn, support the conclusions of law. We then consider, based 

on the grounds found for termination, whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in finding termination to be in the best 

interest of the child.” In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221-

22, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (citation and quotation marks omitted), 

disc. review denied sub nom. In re D.S., 358 N.C. 543, 599 

S.E.2d 42 (2004). We will now utilize the applicable standard 

of review in evaluating the validity of Respondent-Father’s 

challenges to the validity of the trial court’s order.

B. Grounds for Termination

In his initial challenge to the trial court’s termination 

order, Respondent-Father contends that the trial court erred by 

concluding that he had neglected Peter and that there was a

reasonable probability that Peter would be subject to additional

neglect in the event that Respondent-Father were to be made 

responsible for his care. In support of this contention, 

Respondent-Father argues that the trial court’s determination 

that his parental rights in Peter were subject to termination 

for neglect lacked adequate support in either the record 

evidence or the trial court’s findings of fact given that Peter 
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was taken into DSS custody on the basis of his mother’s neglect 

of Peter rather than on the basis of any of Respondent-Father’s 

own conduct and that Respondent-Father’s parental rights should 

not be terminated based upon neglectful conduct engaged in by 

someone else. We do not find these arguments persuasive.

A parent’s parental rights in his or her child are subject 

to termination on the grounds of neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). A parent neglects his or her child by 

failing to provide the child with proper care, supervision, 

discipline or a safe environment, or by abandoning the child. 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). As the Supreme Court has clearly 

stated:

[t]he fact that a parent does provide love, 

affection and concern, although it may be 

relevant, should not be determinative, in 

that the court could still find the child to 

be neglected within the meaning of our 

neglect and termination statutes. Where the 

evidence shows that a parent has failed or 

is unable to adequately provide for his 

child’s physical and economic needs, whether 

it be by reason of mental infirmity or by 

reason of willful conduct on the part of the 

parent, and it appears that the parent will 

not or is not able to correct those 

inadequate conditions within a reasonable 

time, the court may appropriately conclude 

that the child is neglected.

In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 251-52 

(1984). In determining that a parent’s parental rights in a 

child are subject to termination for neglect, the trial court 
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must conclude that neglect exists at the time of the termination 

hearing or that there is a probability that neglect will occur 

in the future. See In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 

227, 232 (1984). A prior adjudication that the child is abused 

or neglected is not required in order to terminate parental 

rights on this ground. In re Faircloth, 153 N.C. App. 565, 571, 

571 S.E.2d 65, 69 (2002).

In its termination order, the trial court found, among 

other things, that Respondent-Father had completed a parenting 

assessment and complied with the recommendations resulting from 

the assessment, that Respondent-Father had failed to obtain 

stable housing given that he did not have a permanent place at 

which he and Peter could live at the time of the termination 

hearing, and that he had tested positive for alcohol or 

controlled substances eight times between 3 May 2011 and 16 

April 2013 despite participating in substance abuse treatment. 

More particularly, the trial court found that:

The father was previously renting a room at 

a boarding house from his significant other, 

. . . . [His significant other] had 

reported to DSS that this was a temporary 

living situation for the father. Subsequent 

to that, the father obtained subsidized 

housing for a brief period of time, but was 

later evicted, reportedly due to nonpayment 

of rent. Thereafter he returned to the home 

of [his significant other]. At some point 

during the pendency of this matter, [the 

father’s significant other] indicated that 
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the juvenile could come and stay with [the 

father] at her home, but [the father] has 

since been required to leave due to a 

disagreement between himself and [his 

significant other’s] daughter. [The father] 

is currently staying with a friend, but has 

been told that he must vacate that residence 

within the next 30 days. He does not have 

another place to live arranged at this time.

. . . .

The father completed a substance abuse 

assessment on [8 August 2012]. He was 

referred for outpatient services at Daymark 

Recovery Center. The father participated in 

group counseling two times a week. The 

father is now participating in group 

sessions two times a week and in Individual 

sessions two times per month at Family 

Services of the Piedmont. The father has 

complied with random drug screens. The 

father has tested negative for all illicit 

substances nine separate times since the 

child came into care. However, the father 

has tested positive for illicit substances 

or alcohol as follows:

May 3, 2011 — positive for alcohol

June 4, 2012 — positive for alcohol

July 17, 2012 — positive for cocaine

July 25, 2012 — positive for cocaine

January 5, 2013 — positive for cocaine and 

marijuana

February 25, 2013 — positive for cocaine

March 5, 2012 — positive for cocaine

April 16, 2013 — positive for cocaine

In addition, the trial court found that:

[The father] has not achieved substantial 

compliance with the objectives of his case 

plan. He has not been able to provide a 

secure or stable home for the juvenile or 

show that he has effectively addressed his 

substance abuse problem. He has not been 
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able to demonstrate that he has been able to 

translate the teachings of the parenting 

classes into his own interactions with 

[Peter]. It is evident that he cares for 

[Peter] very much, but he has not gained the 

skills to effectively parent this child or 

provide a safe and secure home for him.

As a result, the trial court determined that Respondent-Father’s 

parental rights in Peter were subject to termination for neglect 

as authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) given that 

Respondent-Father “has neglected the juvenile within the meaning 

of [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B-101, and such neglect is reasonably 

likely to continue if the said juvenile is returned to his 

custody and control.”

The trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that 

Respondent-Father is unable to provide for Peter’s physical and 

economic needs, has had to rely upon friends for temporary 

housing for himself, and has been evicted from subsidized 

housing for failure to pay rent. The trial court’s findings 

further show that Respondent-Father failed to abstain from the 

use of illicit substances given the fact that he has tested

positive for consumption of alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana on 

several occasions between 3 May 2011 and 16 April 2013. 

Finally, the trial court found that Respondent-Father has failed 

to apply what he has been taught in parenting classes during his 

own interactions with Peter and has not gained the skills 
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necessary to parent Peter effectively or provide a safe and 

secure home for him. As a result of the fact that RespondentFather has failed to challenge the sufficiency of the record 

support for these findings, all of which relate to conduct by 

Respondent-Father rather than by Peter’s mother, the relevant 

findings of fact are presumed to have adequate evidentiary 

support and are binding upon us for purposes of appellate 

review. In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 

(1982).

As this Court has previously held, the fact that a parent 

has failed to provide a stable residence for a child and exposed

the child to users of illegal drugs supports a determination of 

neglect. In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511-12, 491 S.E.2d 

672, 676 (1997). The trial court’s findings of fact reveal the 

existence of just such a situation in this case. As a result, 

we hold that the trial court’s findings have adequate record 

support; that these findings support the trial court’s 

determination that Respondent-Father has neglected Peter and 

that there is a reasonable probability that Peter will be 

neglected if Respondent-Father is made responsible for his care

in the future; that the fact that Peter was initially placed 

into DSS custody as a result of conduct in which Peter’s mother 

engaged does not preclude a determination that Respondent-
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Father’s parental rights in Peter were subject to termination

for neglect; and that the trial court did not err by concluding 

that Respondent-Father’s parental rights in Peter were subject 

to termination for neglect.2

C. Best Interests Determination

In addition, Respondent-Father contends that the trial 

court erred by concluding that Peter’s best interests would be 

served by terminating Respondent-Father’s parental rights. More 

specifically, Respondent-Father argues that the trial court 

failed to properly consider the criteria enunciated in N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7B-1110(a) in making its best interests decision given 

that it failed to give adequate weight to the strength of 

Respondent-Father’s bond with Peter; failed to give adequate 

weight to the poor health and advanced age of Peter’s 

prospective adoptive parent, who was his maternal grandmother;

and ignored a therapist’s testimony to the effect that a 

 

2Although Respondent-Father has also challenged the trial 

court’s determination that his parental rights in Peter were

subject to termination for failure to make reasonable progress 

toward correcting the conditions that led to his placement in 

DSS custody, to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of Peter’s 

care, and to establish paternity, legitimate Peter, or provide 

reasonable financial assistance to or care for Peter and his 

mother, we need not address these components of RespondentFather’s challenge to the trial court’s order given that a 

single ground for termination suffices to support a 

determination that a parent’s parental rights are subject to 

termination. In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 8, 618 S.E.2d 241, 

246 (2005), aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 

(2006).
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decision to terminate Respondent-Father’s parental rights would

not be in Peter’s best interests. We do not find these 

arguments persuasive.

A trial court’s decision concerning the extent to which the 

termination of a parent’s parental rights would be in the 

child’s best interests is discretionary in nature and is, as we 

have already noted, reviewed on appeal using an abuse of 

discretion standard of review. In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 

94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). “A ruling committed to a 

trial court’s discretion is to be accorded great deference and 

will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that 

it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” 

White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985). 

According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a), the trial court must 

consider “[t]he age of the juvenile”; “[t]he likelihood of 

adoption of the juvenile”; “[w]hether the termination of 

parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent 

plan for the juvenile”; “[t]he bond between the juvenile and the 

parent”; “[t]he quality of the relationship between the juvenile 

and the proposed adopting parent, guardian, custodian, or other 

permanent placement”; and “[a]ny [other] relevant 

consideration.” In making its best interests decision, a trial

court is entitled to assign more weight to one or more of the 
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statutorily delineated factors than to others. In re C.L.C., 

171 N.C. App. 438, 448, 615 S.E.2d 704, 709 (2005), aff’d, 360 

N.C. 475, 628 S.E.2d 760 (2006).

In its order, the trial court found that Peter is six years 

old and highly adoptable. In addition, the trial court found 

that the likelihood that Peter would be adopted by his maternal 

grandmother, who has been involved in his care since birth, who 

had become his foster parent after Peter was taken into DSS 

custody, and who had been responsible for his care on a fulltime basis for 25 months prior to the termination hearing, was 

high. The trial court further found that Peter is a bright, 

healthy, and well-adjusted child; that Peter had thrived in the 

care of his maternal grandmother; that Peter referred to his 

maternal grandmother’s residence as his home; that Peter knew 

that his maternal grandmother would provide for all of his 

needs; and that Peter had known his maternal grandmother to be 

his caretaker for his entire life. Although the trial court

found the bond between Peter and his maternal grandmother was

“very strong,” it characterized the bond between Peter and 

Respondent-Father as simply “strong.” In apparent recognition 

of the advanced age and less-than-robust health of Peter’s

maternal grandmother, the trial court noted that Peter’s halfbrother, who attends college, has lived with Peter’s maternal 
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grandmother since the age of two, continues to live in that home 

when he is not attending school, and actively supports his 

maternal grandmother by helping her care for Peter when he is at 

home and that one of Peter’s uncles has played an active role in

Peter’s life and has helped Peter’s maternal grandmother care 

for Peter. Although Respondent-Father might have preferred that 

the trial court weigh the relevant factors differently in making 

its best interests decision, we are not entitled to disturb a 

trial court’s best interests determination on the grounds 

advanced in Respondent-Father’s brief. As a result, given that 

a careful analysis of the relevant portions of the trial court’s 

order demonstrates that the trial court carefully weighed the 

relevant statutory criteria and utilized those statutory 

criteria to make a reasoned evaluation of whether Peter’s best 

interests would be served by the termination of RespondentFather’s parental rights, we conclude that the trial court did 

not commit any error of law in the course of making its best 

interests determination.

III. Conclusion

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, none of RespondentFather’s challenges to the trial court’s order justify a 

decision to provide an award of appellate relief. As a result, 

the trial court’s order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.
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AFFIRMED.

Judges ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).