[Cite as Lee v. Lafayette Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 193 Ohio App.3d 795, 2011-Ohio-2086.] 

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA ) 

LEE ET AL., 

 Appellants, 

 v. 

LAFAYETTE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF 

ZONING APPEALS ET AL., 

 Appellees. 

C.A. No. 10CA0077-M 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO 

CASE No. 09CIV2436 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: May 2, 2011

APPEARANCES: 

J. Douglas Drushal and Andrew P. Lycans, for appellants. 

Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tom J. Karris and David J. Folk, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys; and Michael L. Laribee, for appellees. 

 

WHITMORE, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellants, William and Nicole Lee, appeal from the judgment of the Medina 

County Court of Common Pleas in favor of appellees, the Lafayette Township board of Zoning 

Appeals and the Schwab family trust. This court reverses. 

I 

{¶2} Elizabeth Schwab’s family built a small cottage on their Chippewa Lake lot in the 

mid-1930s and transferred the property within their family through quit-claim deeds until it came 

into Schwab’s possession, as trustee for the trust, in 1997. In July 1999, the cottage on the 

property was destroyed after a storm caused a tree to fall on it. Schwab razed the cottage instead 
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of rebuilding it, and the lot, which is lakeside property, has remained free of any structures since 

that time. After Schwab razed the cottage, there was no impediment blocking the view of the 

lake from the adjacent lot. 

{¶3} In 2006, the Lees purchased the lot adjacent to the trust’s lot and renovated their 

property to maximize their view of the lake. They learned in 2009, however, that Schwab was 

seeking to build a structure on the trust’s property, the dimensions of which would interfere with 

their view. Specifically, Schwab sought to build a 1,032 square foot, one and one-half story 

house on the trust’s 2,662 square foot lot. Because the proposed building plans for the house 

conflicted with several zoning resolutions, Schwab sought five variances. Schwab’s zoning 

application asked the board to approve variances with respect to the following Lafayette 

Township Zoning Resolutions: (1) the minimum lot size, pursuant to Section 301.4-A-1, (2) the 

minimum setback, pursuant to Section 301.5-A, (3) the minimum east-side yard width, pursuant 

to Section 301.5-B, (4) the minimum west-side yard width, pursuant to Section 301.5-B, and (5) 

the minimum square footage for a single-family dwelling, pursuant to Section 214-A-1-2. 

{¶4} The board held a public hearing on the requested variances on November 5, 2009. 

Schwab and the Lees spoke at the hearing, as did numerous other concerned residents of the area. 

At the end of the hearing, the board voted on the variances and approved them.1

 The board 

issued a formal decision approving all five variances on November 12, 2009. 

 

1

 We note that the transcript from the board’s public hearing contains a discrepancy with regard 

to the vote of the board members. One of the members, Lisa Takach, moved to grant all five 

variances at issue. Her motion was seconded, and the chair called the vote. The transcript then 

lists Takach as voting against all five variances. Because the variances were granted by a 

majority and Takach’s vote either way does not change that fact, the discrepancy has no bearing 

on the board’s ultimate decision. This court merely notes the discrepancy for purposes of the 

record. 
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{¶5} On December 11, 2009, the Lees filed a notice of appeal in the Medina County 

Court of Common Pleas, challenging the board’s decision. The trust sought to intervene in the 

action as the owner of the property to which the variances applied, and the trial court permitted 

the intervention. The Lees, the board, and the trust all filed briefs in support of their positions. 

On June 9, 2010, the court affirmed the board’s decision to allow the variances. 

{¶6} The Lees now appeal from the court’s judgment and raise four assignments of 

error for our review. For ease of analysis, we consolidate the assignments of error. 

II 

Assignment of Error Number One

The common pleas court erred in failing to sufficiently detail its 

reasoning in such a way as to allow the appellate court to conduct a 

meaningful review of the decision. 

Assignment of Error Number Two

The common pleas court erred by failing to properly apply the 

practical difficulties standard. 

Assignment of Error Number Three

The decision of the board and the common pleas court is not supported by 

the evidence in the record. 

Assignment of Error Number Four

The common pleas court erred by allowing the board to “correct” 

the zoning resolution’s “mistake” in applying rural residential zoning 

requirements to Chippewa Lake by way of variances. 

{¶7} In the foregoing assignments of error, the Lees argue that the trial court erred by 

affirming the board’s decision to grant the trust’s requested variances. Specifically, they argue 

that the court erred by (1) failing to set forth any analysis in its judgment that would allow for a 

meaningful review on appeal, (2) adopting the board’s flawed application of the practical-
4 

 

difficulties test, and (3) affirming a decision that is not supported by the evidence in the record 

and is the result of an ad hoc response to an unworkable zoning scheme. 

{¶8} Administrative appeals initiated under R.C. 2506.04 require the trial court to 

“consider[] the entire record before it and ‘determine[] whether the administrative order is 

unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the 

preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.’ ” Summit Cty. v. Stoll, 9th Dist. 

No. 23465, 2007-Ohio-2887, at ¶ 9, quoting Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals

(2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147. Based on its review, the trial court may “affirm, reverse, vacate, 

or modify the order.” R.C. 2506.04. The trial court’s judgment “may be appealed by any party 

on questions of law.” Id. Whether the trial court abused its discretion is “[w]ithin the ambit of 

‘questions of law’ for appellate court review.” Kisil v. Sandusky (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 

fn. 4. An appellate court’s review in such an instance, however, “does not include the same 

extensive power to weigh ‘the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence,’ as 

is granted to the common pleas court.” Henley, at 147; Kisil at 34, fn. 4. Rather, we must affirm 

the trial court’s decision if such evidence exists in the record. Summit Cty. v. Stoll, 9th Dist. No. 

24681, 2009-Ohio-6615, at ¶ 6, citing Kisil at 34. “Appellate courts must not substitute their 

judgment for those of an administrative agency or a trial court absent the approved criteria for 

doing so.” Henley at 147. 

{¶9} “The standard for granting a variance which relates solely to area requirements 

should be a lesser standard than that applied to variances which relate to use *.*.*; it is sufficient 

that the application show practical difficulties.” Kisil at syllabus. 

The factors to be considered and weighed in determining whether a 

property owner seeking an area variance has encountered practical difficulties in 

the use of his property include, but are not limited to: (1) whether the property in 

question will yield a reasonable return or whether there can be any beneficial use 
5 

 

of the property without the variance; (2) whether the variance is substantial; (3) 

whether the essential character of the neighborhood would be substantially altered 

or whether adjoining properties would suffer a substantial detriment as a result of 

the variance; (4) whether the variance would adversely affect the delivery of 

governmental services (e.g., water, sewer, garbage); (5) whether the property 

owner purchased the property with knowledge of the zoning restriction; (6) 

whether the property owner’s predicament feasibly can be obviated through some 

method other than a variance; (7) whether the spirit and intent behind the zoning 

requirement would be observed and substantial justice done by granting the 

variance. 

Duncan v. Middlefield (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 83, syllabus. “[N]o single factor controls in 

a determination of practical difficulties.” Id. at 86. “The key to this standard is whether 

the area zoning requirement, as applied to the property owner in question, is reasonable.” 

Id. 

{¶10} While the trust, through Schwab, sought five separate variances in this case, they 

all stem from Schwab’s desire to build one structure, a single-family dwelling. Due to the 

diminutive size of the trust’s lot, the placement of virtually any structure on it presents a 

difficulty in terms of zoning. For purposes of context, we outline the size of the variances sought 

by the trust. To conform to Zoning Resolution Section 301.4-A-1’s requirement that all lots 

containing a single-family dwelling be a minimum of 87,120 square feet (two acres), the trust 

sought a variance of 84,458 feet to build a dwelling on its 2,662 square foot lot. To conform to 

Section 301.5-A’s minimum setback requirement of 80 feet, the trust sought a 64- foot variance. 

To conform to Section 301.5-B’s requirement that side yards have a minimum width of 15 feet, 

the trust sought a seven-foot variance for the east side of its property and an eight-foot variance 

for the west side of its property. Finally, to conform to Section 214-A-1-2’s requirement that 

single-family dwellings without basements contain a minimum of 1,400 square feet, the trust 

sought a 368 foot variance for its proposed 1,032 square foot dwelling. 
6 

 

{¶11} After a careful review of the record, this court concludes that the proper remedy 

in this matter is a remand to the trial court. The record here does not support the conclusion that 

the trial court considered the board’s interpretation and application of Lafayette Township 

Zoning Resolution Section 706. Section 706 reads as follows: 

In any district in which single family dwellings are permitted, a 

single family dwelling *.*.* may be erected on any legal lot of record at 

the effective date of adoption or amendment of this Resolution, 

notwithstanding limitation imposed by other provisions of this Resolution, 

provided all such lots are approved by the Medina County Health 

Department for on-site sewer and water facilities, if applicable. This 

provision shall apply even though such lot fails to meet the requirements 

for area or width, or both, that are generally applicable in the district 

provided that yard dimensions and requirements other than those applying 

to area or width, or both, of the lot shall conform to the current regulations 

for the district in which such lot is located. Variances of requirements 

listed in Article III of this Resolution other than lot area or lot width shall 

be obtained only though action of the board * * *. 

Thus, Section 706 constitutes a grandfathering provision, whereby single family dwellings may 

be erected on lots that were “legal lot[s] of record” at the time of the zoning resolution’s 

adoption, regardless of the fact that those lots do not meet certain requirements pertaining to area 

or width. We read Section 706 as a provision that exempts eligible lots from certain area and 

width requirements such that a variance would be unnecessary. 

{¶12} The trial court did not refer to Section 706 in upholding the trust’s variances, 

almost all of which requested area and width deviations. Although Section 706 was discussed at 

the public hearing before the board, the result of that discussion is troubling. At the hearing, the 

zoning inspector stated the following: 

[B]asically what [Section 706] is saying is [the trust’s lot] is a lot 

of record and it’s a current lot of record and technically it’s a buildable lot. 

The fact that you can’t put a house on there that you would like to put, it’s 

still a viable lot – it’s not a taking. But [Section 706 is] saying that if they 

can’t meet the lot requirements as far as setbacks and all those good 

things, then it shall be obtained only through the action of the board of 
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Zoning Appeals. So the board of Appeals can, if it wants to, grant 

variances to the side yards and setbacks so that a house can be put on it. 

As further explained below, Section 706’s plain language and the zoning inspector’s statements 

about the section are less than clear. 

{¶13} Lafayette Township’s Zoning Resolution splits lot requirements and yard 

requirements into two distinct sections, Sections 301.4 and 301.5. The “lot requirement” section 

sets forth restrictions for minimum lot area, frontage, and width, while the “yard requirements” 

section sets forth restrictions for minimum setbacks, side-yard widths, and rear yard depths. The 

definitional section of the zoning resolution also separately defines “lot” and “yard.” Even so, 

the “lot” definition appears to encompass “yard[s]” to some extent. See Lafayette Township 

Zoning Resolution, Art. XII, Definitions: Lot (“[A] lot is a recorded parcel of land of sufficient 

size to meet minimum zoning requirements for use, coverage, and area, and to provide such 

yards * * * as are herein required”). Moreover, the zoning inspector’s comments at the public 

hearing add to the confusion. The zoning inspector commented that Section 706 applies if 

owners “can’t meet the lot requirements as far as setbacks.” According to the zoning resolution, 

however, setbacks are yard requirements, not lot requirements. See Lafayette Township Zoning 

Resolution, Section 301.5(A). It is unclear, then, whether the zoning inspector and the board 

consider “yard[s]” to be encompassed within the term “lots” for purposes of Section 706. 

Section 706’s plain language also adds to the confusion. 

{¶14} The full text of Section 706, as it pertains to single family dwellings, is quoted 

above. The portion of concern here reads as follows: 

This provision shall apply even though such lot fails to meet the 

requirements for area or width, or both, that are generally applicable in the district 

provided that yard dimensions and requirements other than those applying to 

area or width, or both, of the lot shall conform to the current regulations for the 

district in which such lot is located. 
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(Emphasis added.) Initially, we note that the zoning resolution contains a provision and 

definition only for yard “requirements,” not yard “dimensions.” More important, however, it is 

unclear whether the emphasized portion of the text means (1) that area and width requirements, 

regardless of whether they are lot requirements or yard requirements, will not apply to eligible 

lots; or (2) that area-and-width lot requirements will not apply to eligible lots, but yard 

requirements will still apply and necessitate a variance. Section 706 is entitled only 

“Nonconforming Lots of Record,” but the zoning resolution does not contain a provision for 

nonconforming yards. Thus, either Section 706 encompasses yard requirements in addition to lot 

requirements, or the zoning resolution does not exempt yard requirements in any instance. 

{¶15} Because virtually all the variances here are area-and-width related, the 

interpretation of Section 706 is a crucial determination. It is necessary, therefore, for the trial 

court to consider the board’s interpretation and application of Section 706 in the first instance 

and determine what effect it has on the variances at issue here. To the extent that the Lees argue 

within their second and third assignments of error that the board and the trial court did not 

consider Section 706, we find merit in that assertion. In light of our conclusion that this matter 

must be remanded for the trial court to address Section 706, we do not reach the Lees’ additional 

arguments attacking the breadth of the trial court’s analysis and the board’s ultimate decision to 

grant the trust’s variances. Those additional arguments are premature at this time. 

III 

{¶16} The Lees’ second and third assignments of error are sustained, in part, to the 

extent that they challenge the application of Lafayette Township Zoning Resolution Section 706. 

We do not address the remainder of their assignments of error, as they are premature. The 
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judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the cause is remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

CARR, J., concurs. 

BELFANCE, P.J., concurs separately. 

BELFANCE, Presiding Judge, concurring. 

{¶17} I concur because the trial court should interpret Section 706 of the Lafayette 

Township Zoning Resolution in the first instance. I write separately to emphasize that the trial 

court should not feel constrained by what may be perceived as this court’s interpretation of 

Section 706. While this court has listed two possible interpretations of Section 706, these may 

not be the only reasonable interpretations. Further, I would note that it is also possible that the 

record before the trial court may not provide sufficient evidence to allow for a meaningful 

interpretation and application of Section 706; if that is the case, it should be determined whether 

additional evidence can be taken pursuant to R.C. 2506.03 or whether a remand to the Lafayette 

Township Board of Zoning Appeals is necessary.