Supreme Court No. 2020

- 115

- M.P. (Docket No. 4688)
In re Block Island Power Company Petition for Declaratory Judgment. :

NOTICE : This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222

- 3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal error s in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.- 1

- Supreme Court
No. 2020

- 115

- M.P. (Docket No. 4688)
In re Block Island Power Company Petition for Declaratory Judgment

. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, JJ. O P I N I O N Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. This Court issued a writ of certiorari to review a decision and judgment of the Public Utilities Commission ( the PUC) regarding the Town of New Shoreham Project, enacted by G.L. 1956 § 39

- 26.1

- 7. The petitioner, Block Island Utility District d/b/a Block Island Power Company (BIPCo) , requests a reversal of the PUC’s decision to deny BIPCo’s petition for a declaratory judg ment . BIPCo sought a declaratory judgment declaring that the enabling act , specifically § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f), requires the costs for BIPCo’s interconnection facilities and backup transformer to be socialized across all electric ratepayers in Rhode Island, not j ust those in the Town of New Shoreham ( Block Island or the town ). 1 As an intervening party , Narragansett Electric Co mpany d/b/a National Grid ( National Grid ) argued before the PUC that § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) does not

1 This opinion will use the terms Block Island, the Town of New Shoreham, and the town, interchangeably.- 2

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encompass BIPCo’s interconnection facilities or backup transformer and, therefore, BIPCo and its ratepayers are solely responsible for those costs

. The PUC issued a decision and judgment against BIPCo

. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm t he decision of the PUC.
I Facts and Travel We glean the facts in this case from the PUC’s decision and judgment , the transcripts of both open meetings held before the PUC, and the submissions of the parties. The Town of New Shoreham Project In 2009, the Legislature enacted § 39

- 26.1

- 7 (the enabling act) , which authorize d t he Town of New Shoreham Project (the project). T he enabling act greenlit the construction of a five

- turbine wind farm off the coast of Block Island, which is twelve miles south of Rhode Island’s mainland. Specifically, t he enabling act declare d that the project w ould “facilitate the construction of a small

- scale offshore wind [farm] * * * including an undersea transmission c able that interconnects Block Island to the mainland[.]” Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(a). 2 Within the

2 The Block Island wind farm was completed in 2016 and BIPCo interconnected to i t in May 2017 . There is no dispute among the parties that the interconnection exists and operates today. The matter before this Court concerns the allocation of certain costs between BIPCo and National Grid , according to the terms of the enabling act.- 3

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statute, the Legislature describe d its vision for th is small

- scale wind farm to be a “demonstration project [.] ” Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(a). As t he first of its kind in the nation, the Block Island wind farm was meant to symboliz e Rhode Island’s unique role pioneering solutions for renewable energy across the United States. Section (a) of the enabling act enumerate d four public

- policy goals drivin g the project ; namely, to (1) “position the state to take advantage of the economic development benefits of the emerging offshore wind industry”; (2) “promote the development of renewable energy sources that increase the nation’s energy independence from foreign sources of fossil fuels ” ; (3) “ reduce the adverse environmental and health impacts of traditional fossil fuel energy sources ” ; and (4)

“ provide the t own of New Shoreham with an electrical connection to the mainland. ” Section 39

- 26 .1

- 7(a)

. When the Legislature passed the enabling act , Block Island was not at all connected to Rhode Island’s mainland electrical grid. For many years, w ithout a hookup to mainland power, Block Island sourced its electricity exclusively from diesel

- powe red generators. The se generators were operated by Block Island’s sole electric utility provider, BIPCo. 3 One of the imperatives for the enabling act was to, at last, provide Block Island with an alternative power source that would render its polluting d iesel generators obsolete

.

3 At the time the enabling act was passed, BIPCo was a privately owned company.- 4

-

The vehicle for this new power source

— and the subject at the heart of this

case

— is a n underwater transmission cable

. S ee § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f). T his cable is but one piece of t he multifaceted project, which includes the five

- turbine wind farm , an underwater transmission cable connecting the wind farm to a National Grid

- owned and

- operated substation on Block Island , the substation , and an underwater transmission cable connecting the substation to the mainland grid in the Town of Narragansett. Of the two transmission cables involved in the project, the one relevant to this case is the second

— the cable that runs from National Grid’s substation on Block Island to the mainland. See § 39

- 26.1

- 7(a) (contemplating “an undersea transmission c able that interconnects Block Island to the mainland ” ). This system operates by transmit ting wind

- generated power from the turbines to the National Grid substation via the first transmission cable, at which po int it diverts energy from the substation to BIPCo’s local distribution system and then transfers the remaining power , unused by BIPCo’s customers , to the mainland grid via the second transmission cable. T hus, t he substation serves as the juncture

— or inte rconnection

—

between BIPCo’s distribution system and National Grid’s network accessing the mainland. The two pieces of infrastructure at issue in this case are (1) BIPCo’s interconnection facilities and (2) the backup transformer. BIPCo’s interconnection
f acilities include the “ wooden poles, overhead lines, a switch, and circuit breaker”- 5

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required to connect its local distribution system to the National Grid substation where it receives power from the wind farm. The backup transformer would, as the name suggests, act as a backup for the principal transformer that powers BIPCo’s interconnection to the substation. 4 BIPCo argues that both units

— the interconnection facilities and backup transf orm er

— are covered in the cost allocation scheme laid out in section (f) of the enabling act. S ection (f) of the enabling act governs the construction, ownership, and cost allocation associated with the transmission cable project

. Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(f). In relevant part, secti on (f) provides that “the [D ivision of Public Utilities and Carriers] shall support transmission rates and conditions that allow for the costs related to the transmission cable and related facilities to be charged in transmission rates in a manner that socializes the costs throughout Rhode Island .” Id. ( e mphasis added). This portion of section (f) provides the basis for BIPCo’s claim that its

4 Typically, utility servicers retain spare or backup transformers because weather and manufacturing defects commonly cause outages. Here, however, the transformer powering BIPCo’s electricity supply to the island requires a special voltage due to the uniqu e nature of the wind

- powered project. As such, an additional transformer for this project is inordinately expensive and threatens extensive delays to build and obtain. BIPCo claimed that it could take as long as six months to procure a replacement transf

ormer if necessary , which would force BIPCo to resort to its diesel generators to provide the island with power. At the time BIPCo petitioned the PUC for a declaratory judgment, BIPCo had not yet procured a backup transformer from National Grid, but discu ssions between the two entities concerning the cost and specifications for the transformer had taken place.- 6

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interconnection expenses should be socialized to all Rhode Island ratepayers because , arguably, those expenses q ualify as “related facilities” costs. 5
S ection (f) also g ranted National Grid the option to own and operate the transmission cable project by purchasing “the transmission cable and related facilities” from the developer. Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) (“The electric distribution company, at its option, may elect to own, operate, or otherwise participate in such transmission cable project. * * * The electric distribution company may elect to purchase the transmission cable and related facilities from the devel oper or an affiliate of the developer, pursuant to the terms of a transmission facility’s purchase agreement[.]”). On January 15, 2015, National Grid exercised that option and purchased the transmission cable project from the wind farm developer, Deepwate r Wind Block Island , LLC (Deepwater), including the “engineering, permits, property rights, and other development work [.]” Deepwater subsequently constructed and installed the wind turbines , while National Grid built the Block Island substation and the un derwater transmission cables connecting the wind farm, the island, and the mainland.

5 Before the PUC and in its briefs, BIPCo claimed that its facility interconnection costs summed to $26 3 ,700; grid interconnection costs were $1,83 6,000; and the spare transformer cost was $450,000. The total cost, $2,549,700, socialized among the roughly two thousand Block Island ratepayers would translate to a charge of $1,275 per customer. That amount would be collected from BIPCo’s ratepayers o ver a six

- year amortization period. If the total cost were to be socialized across all Rhode Island ratepayers, the charge would come to about $5 per customer.- 7

- The Local Service Agreement
T he project is subject to the authority of ISO

- New England Inc. ( ISO

- NE ) , a private, nonprofit entity that operates within the federal regulatory hierarchy headed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)

. 6 ISO

- NE promulgates transmission rates, terms, and conditions for utility projects operating in New England throu gh its ISO

- NE Transmission, Markets and Service s Tariff (the ISO

- NE tariff) , which ensures regional compliance with federal standards

. As required by federal regulation , four agreements were filed with FERC in connection with the project , including a Local Service Agreement (LSA) executed between BIPCo (the Transmission Customer), New England Power Company (NEP) (the Transmission Owner ) , and ISO

- NE (the Regional Transmissi on Organization). The LSA between BIPCo, NEP, and ISO

- NE incorporated all terms of the ISO

- NE tariff. The original LSA was submitted , uncontested, before FERC, allowing the commission to simply approve the agreement as presented without imposing its own determination.

6 ISO

- NE serves as one of the many independent system operators or regional transmission organi zations in the nation created by FERC in the late 1990s. See Regional Transmission Organizations , 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (Dec. 20, 1999); see also 18 C.F.R. § 35.34. ISO

- NE manages the power companies that own the transmission lines in New England, in this case New England Power Company

— a wholly owned subsidiary of National Grid

— under a set of rates, terms , and conditions contained in the ISO

- NE Transmission, Markets and Service s Tariff ( ISO

- NE tariff )

.- 8

-

In a letter to FERC dated April 7, 2015 , NEP and ISO

- NE jointly sought to amend the original LSA because the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (the d ivision) determined that the original LSA did not comply with the enabling act. Specifically, the d ivision informed NEP and ISO

- NE that the LSA improperly calculated the transmission cable surcharge because it did not assess a higher rate to Block Island ratepayers, as secti on (f) directs

. 7 To rectify th e error and bring the LSA

— and by extension the tariff

— in compliance with section (f) , the LSA was amended to adjust the rate calculation such that Block Island ratepayers would never pay less than 120 percent of the rate charged to typical National Grid customers.

7 Section (f) provides that the transmission rates for the cable shall be calculated in the following manner:

“The allocation of the costs related to the transmission cable through transmission rates or otherwise shall be structured so that the estimated impact on the typical residential customer bill for transmission costs for customers in the t own of New Shoreham shall be higher than the estimated impact on the typical residential customer bill for customers on the mainland of the electric distribution company. This higher charge for th e customer s in the t own of New Shoreham shall be developed by allocating the actual cable costs based on the annual peak demands of [BIPCo] and the electric distribution company, and these resultant costs recovered in the per

- KWh charges of each company. * * * [T]he difference in the individual charge per KWh or per customer/month shall not exceed the ratio of average demand to peak demand for [BIPCo] , relative to the electric distribution company, currently at 1.8 to 1.0 respecti vely.” Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) (emphasis added)

.- 9

-

FERC tariffs , including the ISO

- NE tariff, typically contain “Direct Assignment Facility” (DAF) charges that an interconnecting customer must pay to the electric distribution company as reimbursemen t for the cost of connecting the
new customer to the existing grid. BIPCo’s LSA contained a rate schedule, Schedule 21, which listed the DAF charges BIPCo owed to National Grid for the cost of connecting to the grid. The DAF charges included under Schedu le 21 were as follows: “ I nterconnection facilities and associated equipment: [one ]34.5kV breaker, [one ]34.5/4.16kV/2.4kV transformer, [and a] 5kV insulated line to customer substation and associated equipment.” Schedule 21, however, by its own terms, operated “in accordance with the rates, terms and conditions of Schedule 21

- NEP [ , ] ” which came from the IS O

- NE tariff and was incorporated by reference into the LSA

. Schedule 21

- NEP include d pro forma language providing :

“ [I] nterconnection facilities and additional facilities shall be the financial responsibility of the Transmission Customer, to the extent co nsistent with Commission policy.”
BIPCo d id not dispute any of the LSA terms quoted above , but rather argued before the PUC that the enabling act language controls. BIPCo submitted that the d ivision’s previous amendment to bring the LSA in conformity with section (f) established that the enabling act trumps the tariff

. National Grid disputed BIPCo’s argument , cautioning the PUC that a ruling in favor of BIPCo would challenge the- 10

-

tariff’s authority, flout FERC’s plenary jurisdiction over the wholesale energy market , and potentially create federal preemption issues.
T he PUC Decision On January 31 , 2017, BIPCo filed a petition for declaratory judgment before the PUC. BIPCo contended that it should not be solely responsibl e for shouldering the costs of (1) the interconnection facilities required to hook up to National Grid’s substation and (2) the backup transformer because these are “related facilities” with respect to the transmission cable that should be socialized to all Rhode Island ratepayers per § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f). BIPCo averred that FERC precedent, which requires interco nnecting customers to pay for interconnections to the main grid, does not apply to BIPCo because § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) is a “specific provision that overrides the general interconnection tariff.” Additionally, BIPCo maintained that the backup transformer is not a proper DAF charge under the LSA because the LSA refer s to only one transformer, not a second, backup transformer

. On February 25, 2017, National Grid intervened and filed an objection to BIPCo’s petition

. National Grid advanced two key arguments, first that categorizing BIPCo’s interconnection expenses as socializ ed costs would contradict FERC precedent; and second that § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) unambiguously excludes the costs for which BIPCo seeks reimbursement because the statute makes no reference to BIPCo’s interconnection or its transformer

.- 11

-

In March 2017, the d ivision filed a memorandum in support of National Grid’s objection. T he d ivision argued that the socialization for “related facilities” should be limited solely to those costs incurred by Na tional Grid , not BIPCo

. The d ivision also concurred with National Grid ’s claim that BIPCo’s interconnection is entirely separate from the socialization scheme the Legislature established in section (f). On May 30, 2017, the PUC held an open meeting to hear oral arguments from BIPCo, National Grid , and the d ivision. At the meeting, BIPCo argued that the PUC should construe “related facilities” to include its interconnection facilities and backup transform er because such a reading would (1) be consistent with the legislative intent of the statute; and (2) properly regard the statute, not the ISO

- NE tariff, as the prevailing authority for the cable cost calculations

. National Grid countered BIPCo’s claims with several arguments, asserting that (1) the Legislature never intended all costs to be socialized, only those incurred by National Grid for the assets it bought from Deepwater ; (2) the enabling act does not override the ISO

- NE tariff; ( 3 ) BIPCo’s interconnection facilities and backup transformer are “sole

- use”

— or facilities that benefit only the customer

— which FERC precedent requires the customer to cover ; and (4) deciding for BIPCo would open the door for other similarly situat ed customers to seek recovery for interconnecting costs.- 12

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In an open meeting held o n July 27, 2017, the PUC issued its decision with two votes in favor of National Grid and one vote against . The majority of

c ommissioners were convinced that FERC precedent and the ISO

- NE tariff contemplate BIPCo as an ordinary, voluntary interconnecting customer solely responsible for the costs of interconnection. Chairwoman Curran discussed “how interconnections are dealt wit h in the wholesale market” and stated that, typically, “the interconnection to something like the cable * * * is the responsibility of the customer.” Commissioner Gold also added that § 39

- 26.1

- 7 does not technically require BIPCo to interconnect to the p roject at all and that “the legislative goal” of “moving the state and the region off fossil fuels * * * can be met even if Block Island were to continue to use their diesel generators.” In its written decision, the PUC majority engaged with the statutory interpretation issue in greater detail and reasoned that “the transmission cable and related facilities are treated [in the statute] as a package of items.” T he conjunctive phrase “transmission cable and related facilities” deliberately “isolate[d] the

e quipment and infrastructure as items that National Grid * * * elect [ed] to purchase from the developer [,] ” according to the PUC. (Emphasis added.) This infrastructure included everything National Grid received from Deepwater , but not the interconnection facilities, which pertain exclusively to BIPCo and were never owned by Deepwater. The PUC decided that , because BIPCo’s facilities were not- 13

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“necessary to serve the developer’s project,” they are not “related facilities” to th e transmission cable under § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) and that the costs thereof were not subject
to be socialized

. Commissioner DeSimone did not pen a written dissent, but he did articulate his reasons for opposing the majority’s decision at the July meeting . He stressed that, when viewing the statute in its entirety, it became clear to him that failing to socialize the costs of BIPCo’s interconnection would frustrate a fundamental legislative purpose of § 39

- 26.1

- 7: to connect the Town of New Shoreham to the mainland. Commissioner DeSimone further dismissed National Grid ’s concerns that a decision in favor of BIPCo would lead to a slippery slope because the statute is single purpose, necessari ly limiting any ruling from the PUC to this case and this project. Finally, Commissioner DeSimone rejected National Grid ’s claim that BIPCo is a voluntary interconnecting customer, instead perceiving BIPCo as an entity composed of ratepayers

— the citizens and businesses of Block Island

— who had no choice whether to interconnect. This ma de the interconnection cost an “involuntary assessment” to Block Island ratepayers, according to Commissioner DeSimone

. The PUC filed a d ecision and j udgment in favor of National Grid on May 6, 2020. On May 12, 2020, BIPCo filed a petition for writ of certiorari , seeking review of the PUC’s order , which we granted

.- 14

- II Standard of Review The General Assembly has prescribed the standard of review for decisions by the PUC brought before this Court , under G.L. 1956 § 39

- 5

- 3:

“The findings of the commission on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and as found by the commission , and the [S]upreme [C]ourt shall not exercise its independent judgment nor weigh conflicting evidence. An order or judgment of the commission made in the exercise of administrative discretion shall not be reversed unless the commission exceeded its authority or acted illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably.” “[T]hi s Court reviews judgment s and orders of the PUC solely to determine whether the PUC’s findings are lawful and reasonable, fairly and substantially supported by legal evidence, and sufficiently specific to enable us to ascertain if the evidence upon which t he PUC based its findings reasonably supports the result.” In re A & R Marine Corp. , 199 A.3d 533, 537 (R.I. 2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting Narragansett Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission , 773 A.2d 237, 240 (R.I. 2001)). “[P]ure questions of l aw, including statutory interpretations, decided by the [PUC] are reviewed de novo by this Court. ” In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project , 25 A.3d 482 , 504 (R.I. 2011) . “It is well settled that when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Estate of Cardiff , 266 A.3d 1217, 1219 (R.I. 2022) (quoting Butler v. Gavek , 245 A.3d 750, 754 (R.I. 2021) ). “It i s only when confronted with an- 15

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unclear or ambiguous statutory provision that this Court will examine the statute in its entire t y to discern the legislative intent and purpose behind the provision.” Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Kaya , 947 A.2d 869, 87 2 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. LaRoche , 925 A.2d 885, 887 (R.I. 2007)).
T he PUC decision and judgment at issue here is one of statutory interpretation ; we , therefore, proceed with our review de novo

. III Discussion
Thi s is not the first time that the Block Island wind project has reached this Court

. In 2011, in In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project , we dealt with a dispute concerning the power purchase agreement (PPA) between the electric distribution company , Na tional Grid, and the wind farm developer, Deepwater. In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project , 25 A.3d at 485

- 86

. Our decision in that

case also recounted a thorough history of the project , its inception in the General Assembly , and its previous proceedings before the PUC. Id. at 486

- 504. 8
Our discussion here pertains only to the narrow question on which BIPC o seek s review: Does the phrase “related facilities , ” under § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f), cover BIPC o ’s interconnection facilities and backup transformer such that those costs must

8 We encourage the curious reader to review the In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project , 25 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2011), opinion for a more exhaustive background on the project.- 16

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be socialized a cross all Rhode Island ratepayers? This is a question of statutory interpretation. The parties advocate for two opposing interpretations of “related facilities” under § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) , National G rid advancing a narrower definition and BIPCo a broader one. T he PUC deci ded in favor of National Grid , ruling that “related facilities” must be narrowly construed to encompass only the equipment and assets National Grid had t he option to purchase from th e developer

— Deepwater

— as part of the transmission cable project

. See § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f). On th e contrary , BIPCo implores this Court to read the statute as a whole and hold that, as a matter of law, “related facilities” must include its interconnection facilities and backup transformer

. “It is well settled that when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we give the words the ir plain and ordinary meaning.” Butler , 245 A.3d at 754 (quoting Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Providence Business Loan Fund, Inc. , 200 A.3d 153, 157 (R.I. 2019)). Furth er , “ when we examine an unambiguous statute, there is no room for statutory construct ion and we must apply the statute as written.” Morel v. Napolitano , 64 A.3d 1176, 1179 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Mutual Development Corp

. v. Ward Fisher & Co

. , L L P , 47 A.3d 319, 328 (R.I. 2012))

. The Legislature does not define or itemize “related facilities” in section (f), nor does the term possess any existing meaning in our case law to guide this Court ’s- 17

-

understanding of its plain and ordinary meaning

. Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(f); see Jerome

v. Probate Court of Town of Barrington , 922 A.2d 119, 123 (R.I. 2007) (holding that the terms “encumbrance” and “lien” were not ambiguous because , even though undefined in the statute, these terms “have a particular meaning in our law”)

. However, even though the Legislature did not define the term “related facilities,” it did qualify it in a way that extinguishes any ambiguity. See Freepoint Solar LLC v. Richmond Zoning Board of Review , 274 A.3d 1, 6 (R.I. 2022) ( reasoning that “where the Legislature has not defined or qualified the words used within the statute” it is “particularly true” that we must give clear and unambiguous language its plain and ordinary meaning) (emphasis added) (quoting Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v. Neighborhood Health Plan of Rhode Island , 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011))

. “Related facilities” is mentioned three times in § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f), each time in conjunction with the transmission cable. First: “The electric distribution company may elect to purchase the transmission cable a nd related facilities from the developer or an affiliate of the developer, pursuant to the terms of a transmission facility’s purchase agreement[.]” Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) (emphasis added). Second : “Once written consent is provided, the electric distributio n company and its transmission affiliate are authorized to make a filing with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to put into effect transmission rates to recover all of the- 18

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costs associated with the purchase of the transmission cable and related faci lities and the annual operation and maintenance.” Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) (emphasis added).
Thir d : “The division shall support transmission rates and conditions that allow for the costs related to the transmission cable and related facilities to be charged in transmission rates in a manner that socializes the costs throughout Rhode Island.” Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) (emphasis added)

. Observing these three uses of “related facilities,” National Grid in sists that the phrase is clear and unambiguous. Looking to the first use, National Grid argues that “related facilities” refers to the transmission cable project exclusively as National Grid acquired the project from the developer. Moreover , b ecause the developer never owned BIPCo’s interconnection f acilities, National Grid contends, those facilities cannot possibly be related to the transmission cable project optioned from Deepwater. As to the second use , National Grid contends that “related facilities” covers only the infrastructure for which “the electric distribution company and its transmission affiliate” would seek reimbursement through transmission rates filed with FERC. Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(f). National Grid also em phasizes that section (f) never mentions the words interconnection facilities or transformer . Such glaring omissions must , National Grid argues , signal that the Legislature never intended for BIPCo’s interconnection to be socialized.- 19

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And finally, as to the third use, National Grid simply asserts that if the Legislature had intended to socialize all costs associated with the project, includ ing those for BIPCo’s interconnection, it would ha ve written that into the statute. BIPCo, meanwhile, grounds its argument in a more holistic reading of the statute. BIPCo maintains that , because a topline priority of the enabling act is to “provide the t own of New Shoreham with an electrical connection to the mainland,”
any infrastructure facilitating th at connection must be , at minimum, “ related ” to the transmission cable. Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(a). Removing the interconnection and backup transformer from the “related facilities” costs socialized to all Rhode Island ers defeats and frustrates the fundamental purpose of the act, according to BIPCo. Considering t hese arguments, t he PUC based its final decision on National Grid ’s first argument, concurring that “related facilities” encompasses only the facil ities necessary to complete the wind farm as acquired from Deepwater. The PUC ruled , “[I]t is clear from the text of the statute that the ‘related facilities’ associated with the ‘transmission cable’ that National Grid was permitted to purchase from the ‘ developer or affiliate of the developer’ includes only those facilities necessary to serve the developer’s project, the Block Island Wind F arm.” Having review ed the matter de novo , w e agree with the PUC ’s decision. See In re Narragansett Electric Company , 276 A.3d 363, 371 (R.I. 2022)

. U pon each use of the term “related facilities,” the Legislature coupled it with the conjunctive- 20

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connector “and” along with “the transmission cable.” See § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f). R eading section (f) according to this plain construction, “related facilities” clearly refers only
to those facilities directly involved with the transmission cable project as National Grid purchased it from Deepwater. Purely a s a matter of grammar , therefore, the language does not arouse any hint of ambiguity. We also acknowledge that t his reading of section (f) aligns with this Court’s previous analysis of the enabling act in In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project

. In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project , 25 A.3d at 509. In that

case, we drew a distinction between the Town of New Shoreham Project, generally , and the transmission cable project, specifically. See id. (noting that § 39

- 26.1

- 7(f) “refer[s] to National Grid’s optional participation in the ‘ tra nsmission cable project ’ ” and that § 39

- 26.1

- 7(g) “distinguish[es] the ‘ transmission cable project ’ from ‘ the Town of New Shoreham Project ’ ”). 9 We further opined that “the ‘Town of New

9 Section (g) of the enabling act r eads, in relevant part:

“Any charges incurred by [BIPCo] * * * in implementing this section * * * shall be recovered annually in rates through a fully reconciling rate adjustment, subject to approval by the commission. If the electric distribution company owns * * * the transmission cable project, pursuant to section (f) of this section, the provisions of § 39

- 26.1

- 4 shall not apply to the cable cost portion of the t own of New Shoreham project.” Section 39

- 26.1

- 7(g). National Grid argues that any cost

- reco very options available to BIPCo are contemplated in section (g), negating any claims it may seek under section (f). This argument does not impact our analysis as we find the language in section (f) to be- 21

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Shoreham Project’ was the umbrella project over which the contract fo r the purchase of renewable energy and the ‘transmission cable project’ were integral, but not necessarily simultaneous parts.” Id. at 491. We further stated that “the general policy goals for the Town of New Shoreham Project” do not “create an express mandate ” for each of its composite parts, including the transmission cable project. Id. at 5 09

- 10 (rejecting the notion that section (a)’s policy goals informed the requirements for the 2010 PPA because “§ 39

- 26.1

- 7(a)’s policy intention * * * of i nterconnecting Block Island [was] directed at the ‘ Town of New Shoreham project ’ to ‘ effectuate ’ ”).
BIPCo ’s attempt to use the section (a) policy goals to graft new language o nto section (f)

— like “interconnection” and “transformer”

— defies this Court’s explicit disaggregation of the Town of New Shoreham Project from the transmission cable project. Section (f) covers the transmission cable project only , which need not advance the general policy goals espoused in section (a). See In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project , 25 A.3d at 509 (admonishing the petitioners for “cherrypick[ing] and then cobbl[ing] together the overarching policy goals for the Town of New Shoreham Project to form what they allege is a * * * mandate for the 20 10 PPA”) . BIPCo misunderstands the framework of the enabling act with its contention that the project’s goal in section (a) to “provide the t own of New

unambiguous and exclusive of BIPCo’s interconnectio n costs , regardless of section (g)

.- 22

-

Shoreham with an electrical connection to the mainland” must inform the meaning of “related facilities” as it appears in section (f). Section s 39

- 26.1

- 7(a), (f). That is not what this Court held in In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project and it is not what a plain and ordinary reading of the statutory language demands

. Noting that “ w e accord great def erence to the PUC [] * * * and [that] we will not disturb an order unless the PUC ‘ clearly * * * acts illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably [ , ]’ ” we observe no grounds to overturn the PUC’s decision. In re Kent County Water Authority Change Rate Schedules , 996 A.2d 123, 128 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Narragansett Electric Co. , 773 A.2d at 240 )

. W e hold that “related facilities” clea rly and unambiguous ly excludes the costs of BIPCo’s interconnection facilities and backup transformer

. See In re A & R Marine Corp. , 199 A.3d at 537. As such, we affirm the PUC’s decision in favor of National Grid

. 10
IV Conclusion For the reasons stated herein , we affirm the decision and judgment of the PUC

. We remand the record to the PUC with our decision endorsed thereon.

10 Given our affirmance of the PUC’s definition of “related facilities,” no conflict exists between section (f) of the enabling act and the terms of the ISO

- NE tariff. The ISO

- NE tariff, Schedule 21

- NEP , incorporates BIPCo’s interconnection and backup transf ormer as DAF charges owed by BIPCo and its ratepayers. This scheme is not at odds with the cost allocation structure established in either section (f) or (g) of the enabling act. Absent any conflict, we need not reach the parties’ arguments as to the tar iff or preemption of FERC’s plenary authority.SU

- CMS

- 02 A (revised November 2022 ) STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT

– CLERK’S OFFICE L icht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case In r e Block Island Power Company Petition f or Declaratory Judgment

. Case Number No. 2020

- 115

- M.P

. (Docket No. 4688) Date Opinion Filed February 10 , 20 23

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, JJ. Written By Ch i ef Justice Paul A. Suttell
Source of Appeal The Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission

Judicial Officer from Lower Court N/ A

Attorney(s) on Appeal For Petitioner : Leah J. Donaldson, Esq. For Respondent: Tiffany A. Parenteau, Esq. Christine E. Dieter, Esq.