NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 13a0799n.06 No. 12-5243 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

CAROL I NE D. STEVENS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SAI NT EL I Z AB ETH MEDI CAL CEN TER, IN C

. ; D O N A LD S A E LIN G E R , M

. D

. ; PATI ENT FI RST P HYS I CI ANS GROUP; PHYSI CI AN ASSOCI ATES, L L C, Def endants-A

ppellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

OPI NI ON

Be fore : BOG GS, ROGERS, and STR ANCH, Circuit J udg es. JANE B. STRANCH , Circuit J udg e. Plaintiff Caroline D. Stevens, who was employ ed by defe ndants Phy sician Associates, L L C and Patient First Phy sicians Gr o u p , s er v ed as a nurse and persona l assistant to defe ndant Dr. D onald Saeling er, the Chief Executive Off icer of Patient First, which was later a cq u i re d by Saint Eliz abeth Medical C enter

. Stevens and S aeling er eng ag ed in a

consensua l romantic and sexual relationship for sever al y ear s. Shortly afte r the relationship ended, S t ev en s wrote a letter alleg ing that she was being pressure d to take another position despite h er desire to continue working with Saeling er. An independe nt investigation reve aled that Stevens and Saeling er had sex at t h e o ff i ce , and both wer e g iven the option of resig ning or being terminated. Saeling er resig ned; Stevens was terminated. Stevens subsequently filed suit ag ainst the defe ndants,

-1-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 bring ing claims of sexual hara ssment under Title VII an d Kentucky ’s anti-discrimination laws, reta liatory discharg e, and fra ud. The district court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of both Saeling er and the other defe ndants. Stevens appea ls these decisions. For the following rea sons, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t. BACK GR OUND I n mid-2007, while Stevens serve d as Saeling er’ s nurse and persona l assistant, Stevens and Saeling er undertook a romantic and sexual rel at i o n ship. Both parties wer e marrie d to others, but Stevens eventua lly obtained a divorce

. Saeling er repe a te d ly a s sured Stevens that he was also seeking a divorc e, but his assuranc es we re untrue

. I nitially , there was no express discussion of the relationship at work. This chang ed, howeve r, afte r Saeling er’ s wife confr onted Stevens and S ae l i n ger i n October 2007 at an apar tment he was renting

. After

this event, Stevens informed site ma nag er G ary

Br own that she a

nd Saeling er w ere romantica lly involved. Around late summer 2009, St ev en s ch o se to end the relationship afte r discovering that Saeling er had never filed for divorce

. I n September, Stevens saw Saeling er’ s wife in the Patient First parking lot. Stevens explained her history with Saeling er to co-w orker Mary Ann Neur oth a nd asked that Neur oth walk with her to the parking lot. Neur oth r eporte d the incident to Br own. Stevens claimed this reve aled the “sca ndal” p ar t o f t he rela

tionship and also admitted mentioning the r elationship to some of Saeling er’ s patients. Shortly afte r the parking lot incident, Saeling er decide d to reduc e his patient load, alleg edly

so that h e could spend more time on duties related to the pending merg er with Saint Eliz abeth. Stevens claimed that Br own pressure d her to take a job at the Diabete s Center, in whi ch she had -2-Stevens v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, et al.

No. 12-5243 previously expressed interest. She further alleged that none of Saelinger’s patients were transferred to other doctors and, although some appointments were moved to Saturdays, Stevens was not allowed to work on that day. Although Stevens’s hours were never actually reduced, she claimed this was because of an October 26, 2009 letter she sent to Brown, Jim Korb (the human resources director), and Saelinger. The letter stated that Stevens felt pressured to leave because of “personal agendas” and due to“perceived threats of legal action.” She stated that her true desire was “to do my job in a nonthreatening environment” and “to continue my work with Dr. Saelinger and our patients.” Stevens claimed that later in the week, Brown asked her to speak with “Ken” presumably Ken Folz, the chief operating officer of Physician Associates and Korb and inform them that no harassment took place and she would not sue. Stevens was later allowed to come in on Fridays to do charts and messages. Stevens’s letter prompted an investigation by an outside attorney, which revealed that Saelinger and Stevens had sex several times in the office after working hours. This led to the end of the employment of both. Saelinger agreed to and signed a severance agreement. Stevens was given the option of resigning with benefits or being fired but she refused to resign and was subsequently terminated for having sex on the office premises. The second reason given for her termination was that the relationship had become a workplace disruption. When asked who made the decision to terminate her, Stevens stated that Joe Gross, President and CEO of Saint Elizabeth, was the only signature other than hers on the papers. Stevens said that she did not believe he made the decision alone. She admitted having no direct knowledge of Saelinger’s involvement. -3-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 Stevens sued the defe ndants, alleg ing sexual hara ssmen t, g ender discrimination, and reta liatory discharg e in violation of Title VI I and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. She also asser ted state-law claims for frau d an d i n t entional infliction of emotional distress. Saeling er and Stevens filed m otions for summ ary judgme nt. As to the s exual hara ssment and discrimination claims, the d i s t ri ct court held that Saeling er did not meet the definition of “employ er” under either statute. Although concluding that Saeling er could be found persona lly liable for reta liation under Kentucky law, the court deter

mined that Stevens failed to establish the requisite causa l connec tion betwee n her October 26 letter and her termination. The court also ruled that Stevens failed to all ege an y pecunia ry harm re sulting fr om Saelinge r’s a lleg ed fr aud. Following these ruling s, additional deposition testimony was t ak en. This testimony shed light on three points: (1) Saeling er’ s actions towar d Stevens afte r their r elationship ended; (2) the effec t o f t he relationship’s demise on other office employ ees; and (3) the motivation behind the reduc tion in S aeling er’ s schedule. I n s u b s equent deposition testimony , Stevens claimed that Br own asked if she felt unsafe around Saeling er and she responde d that she did not think that Saeling er “would forc e himself on” her. She c laimed that she g ener ally tried to avoid Saeling er, and Dorothy Dolwick confirme d that

on one occa sion Stevens sent her a text messag e from the bathroom asking that Dolwick let her know when Saeling er left. Stevens also claimed that Saeling er sexually hara ssed her afte r the rela tionship ended. She stated: He would close his office door or a patient door when I was in a room . . . and say I love y ou and diffe rent thing s and put his arms around me and kiss me. At times he would tex t m e o r call me repe atedly

. I f I would not respond, I was pag ed sever al -4-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 times in the office .

. . . He just want ed t o h ea r from me. He .

. . was more car eful about what he ty

ped or what was documented but he woul d still on occa sion try to pursue me. (R. 74-1 at Page I D 1 3 9 2 -9 3 ) She viewed her October 26 letter as descr ibing “a hostile environment.” Br own t estified that afte r S tevens found out Saeling er wa s not seeking a divorce, she had “a meltdown” and beg an discussing the relationship with her co-w orker s. Debbie Adams, the attorney who conducte d the independe nt investigation, also testified that a number of Stevens’s coworke rs expressed “ a kind of g ossip fatig ue” r eg ardingthe re lationship. As to the reduc tion in Saeling er’ s workload, Br own confirme d that this action was proposed beca use of the pending merg er with Saint Eliz abeth. When asked wh et h er t his reduc tion was partially meant to cause Stevens to resig n v o l untarily , Br own admitted that it also would have eliminated issues resulting from the relationship. Adams’s notes from her interview with Saeling er i n d i cate that a meeting conce rning the reduc tion in his hours with his staff occur red afte r a

conver s at i on with Korb and Folz, during which they decide d that a reduc ed schedule would, in eff ect, cause Stevens to leave

. During his interview, Korb descr ibed the impetus for the meeting with Saeling er’ s staff as primarily based on the desire to have Stevens and S aeli n ger n o t wo rk direc tly toge ther. The rema ining defe ndants then filed a motion for summ ar y j u d gm ent. The district court conclude d that althoug h Saeling er’ s actions following the demise of the relation s h ip mi g h t h a v e been “unwe lcome” or “upsetting ”, they did not cre ate an objectively hostile work environment. The court also reje cted the reta liation claim, ruling that: (1) it was unclea r whether either complaint relied on -5-Stevens v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, et al.

No. 12-5243 by Stevens the October 26 letter or her complaint to Brown constituted protected activity; (2) the plan to get Stevens to quit did not constitute an adverse employment action; and (3) even assuming that Stevens’s complaints arose out of Saelinger’s advances and that her termination was an adverse employment action, a causal connection between the two was not established because Saelinger was fired first. ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Chapman v. United Auto Workers Local 1005 , 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 2012). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 665 F.3d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (c)). The burden falls on the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts view the facts, including all inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc. , 686 F.3d 339, 346 (6th Cir. 2012). A jury, rather than a judge, is responsible for making credibility determinations, weighing the evidence, and drawing legitimate inferences from the facts. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The central inquiry at the summary judgment stage “is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission of [the plaintiff’s] claims to a jury or whether the

-6-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 evidenc e is so one-sided that [t he defenda nt] must preva il as a matter of law.” Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC , 689 F.3d 642, 648 ( 6th Cir. 2012). II. Discussion A. Sexual Harassme nt Claim 1. Hostile W

ork Environme nt Title VI I p ro t ec ts employ ees “fr om a ‘workpla ce [] perme ated with discriminatory intimi dation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficie ntly sever e or perva sive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employ

ment and cre ate an abusive working environment.’” Barrett v. W hirlp o o l Co rp. , 556 F.3d 502, 514 (6th Cir. 2009) (alter ation in orig inal) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993))

. Two ty

pes of sexual hara ssment are gen er al ly rec og nized: (1) “har assment that

cre ates an offe nsive or hostile environment” ; and (2) quid pro quo hara ssment, wher e “a supervisor demands sexua l fa v o rs as a condition for job benef its.” Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Di v. , 970 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1992). The district court analy zed Stevens’s claim under t h e “hostile work e nvironment” rubr ic. I n Stevens’s re sponse to the def endants’ motion for summar y judgme nt, howeve r, she included arguments based on a quid pro quo analy sis, and does the same in her brief befor e this court. The defe ndan t s argue that any case s involving quid pro quo sexual hara ssment should be disreg arde d. I n our view, the label aff

ix ed to the claim is not dispositi ve; instead, the focus should be on the substance of the plaintiff’s alleg ations. We have noted that the Supreme Court ha s “sig naled a shift from the use of the terms ‘hos t ile work environment’ and ‘quid pro quo’ in the employ ment liability context.” W

illiams v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 187 F.3d 553, 561 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999). And the -7-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 Second Circuit has expressed hesitancy in “sug g est[ing] a rig id rule that would require plaintiffs to

use the words ‘quid pro quo’ or ‘hostile work environment’ in the district court or else be treated as having waived such claims.” Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc. , 445 F.3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 2006). That cour t expl ained: [B]ecause these terms are judicially cre ated for analy tical purposes, not distinctions in the statute itself, we think it is most appropr iate

. . . to look to the substance of the alleg ed misconduct of which the p laintiff complains rathe r than the terms used to descr ibe it. I f, for example, a plainti ff were to argue that she had been demoted for ref using to re spond positively to he r supervisor’ s sexual overtures, we would think that the asser

tion would prese rve her quid pro quo claim eve n if she neve r used the phrase “quid pro quo” in the district court to descr ibe it. Id. We ag ree that no “magi c wo rd s ” are nece ssary to state a claim and we should instead examine the substance of a plaintiff’ s alleg ations. Stevens’s alleg ations focuse d on the cr eation of

a hostile work environment. Her complaint descr ibed “pre ssure [she] was rec eiving to move from her job,” and alleg ed Saeling er “sexually hara s s ed [ h er ] by cre ating a hostile work environment” followi n g t h e en d of their rela tionship. Simi larly , Stevens’s deposition testimony seems to contemplate a hostile work environment based both on Saelin ger ’s unwelcome post-relationship advanc es and on other threats to her job. Stevens’s complaints about Saeling er’ s behavior fit more

-8-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 comforta bly in the “hostile work e nvironment” c ateg ory , and ther efor e the district court corr ectly 1 employ ed this analy sis. W e apply that analy sis as well. To establish a hostile work environment claim based on sexual hara ssment, a plaintiff must make a prima fac ie showing that: (1) she was a member of a protec ted class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual hara ssment; (3) the hara ssment was based on sex; (4) the hara ssment cre ated

a hostile work environment; and (5) there is a basis for holding the employ er liable. Shields v. Fed. Express Customer Info. Servs. Inc. , 499 F. App’x 473, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2012). A worke r experience s

an abusive working environment when her workpla ce is “per meated with discriminatory intimi dation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficie ntly sever e or perva sive to alter the conditions of the victim’s e mploy

ment.” Barrett , 556 F.3d at 514 (interna l c itations a nd quotation ma

rks omitted). An objective a

nd subjective test must be satis fied; “in other words, the conduct must be so seve re

or perva sive as to constitute a hostile or abusive working environment both to the rea sonable person and the actua l victim.” Randolph v. Ohio Dep’ t of Y outh Servs. , 453 F.3d 724, 733 (6th Cir. 2006). I n deter mining whether a working environment is hostile, this court looks at the totality o f t he circ umstances and considers “the frequenc y of t he dis criminatory conduct; it s sever ity ; whether it is phy sically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offe nsive utteranc e; and whether it unrea sonably

Saeling er’ s actions, as descr ibed by Stevens, do not sug g est that she neede d to succumb to 1 his advanc es or fac e termination. Cf. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. , 339 F.3d 1158, 1162-63, 1173 (9th Cir. 20 0 3 ) (finding that plaintiff’s employ ment was conditioned on continued sex ual activity with her boss when evidenc e demonstrated that she rec eived neg ative perf ormanc e evaluations afte r rebuf fing his advanc es and r ece ived positive review s when she ha d sex wit h him). -9-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 interfe res with a

n employ ee’ s work perf

ormanc e.” Barrett , 556 F.3d at 515 (interna l c itations a nd quotation marks omitted). The district c ourt found that Stevens was a member of a protec ted class and was subjected to unwelcome hara ssment based on sex, but failed to establish that Saeling er’ s actions cre ated a work environment t h at a rea sonable person would find objectively hostile. We ag ree . Although there

we re a number of text messag es exchang ed betwee n Saeling er and Stevens during Augus t an d November 2009, they are neither offe nsive nor vulga r; in fac t, most simply ask how Stevens is doing, respond to text s sent by Stevens, or inform Stevens of things happening in Saeling er’ s life. Occ asionally , howeve r, Saeli ng er’ s text s inappropriately express continued aff ection for Stevens, such as descr ibing her as his “soul mate.” As to intera ct i ons with Saeling er at the office, S tevens alleg ed that he would close an office door at times and “say I love y ou and differ ent things and put his arms around me and kiss me.” She also claimed that she sometimes hid from S aeling er in the bathroom. The text s of aff ection and the phy s i ca l contact descr ibed may have been unwanted or unsolicited and wer e clea

rly inappropria

te. Howeve r, the working environment was not perme ated with discriminatory intimi dation or ridicule, nor was it phy sically threatening such that it would have

unrea sonably

interfe red w ith St evens’ s work per formanc e. I n sum, neither the text messag es nor the interac tions betwee n Stevens and Saeling er at work

wer e so sever e or perva sive that an objectively hostile e nvironment was cre ated. I mportantly , it is questionable whe ther Stevens herself vie wed these actions as se vere and per vasive since the main object i v e expressed in her letter was to continue working with Saeling er. Cf. Betts v. Costco W holesale Corp. , 558 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding plaintiff’s claim of a h o s t i l e work -10-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 environment to be “under mined b y h er admi ssion that she herse lf did not fee l hara ssed”)

. Acc ording ly , the g rant of summar y judgme nt on the hostile work environme nt claim is affirme d. 2. Retaliation Title VI I prohibits an employ er from “discriminat[ing] ag ainst any of his employ ees . . . beca use [t he employ ee] has opposed any prac tice made an unlawful employ ment prac tice by [Tit le VI I ].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3( a). Under Kentucky ’s anti-discrimination statute, it is unlawful for one

or more persons “to conspire

. . . [t ]o reta liate or discriminate in any manner ag ainst a person beca use he has opposed a prac tice decla red unlawful” by the statute. Ky

. Rev. Stat. § 344.280(1). The only meaning ful distinction betwe en t h es e provisions is that “[t] he Kentucky reta liation statute

. . . permits the imposit ion of liability on individuals.” Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Court , 201 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2000). To establish a prima fac ie case of reta liation under either statute, an employ ee must show that (1) he or she eng ag ed in protec ted ac tivity ; (2) the defe ndant knew of the exercise of the protec ted rig ht; (3) an adver se employ ment action was subsequently taken ag ainst the employ ee; and (4) there

was a causa l connec tion betwee n the protec ted activity and the adver se empl o y m en t ac tion. Nisw ander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. , 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Brooks v. LexingtonFaye tte Urban Cnty. Hous. Auth. , 1 3 2 S.W .3d 790, 803 (Ky

. 2004). I f the plaintiff establishes a prima fac ie case , the burden of production shifts to the defe nd an t to articula te a leg itimate

n o n d is c r im in a

tory rea son for the adver se employ ment action. Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc. , 66 3 F.3d 806, 814 (6th Cir. 2011). The defe ndant meets this burden by “cle arly set[ti ng ] forth, throug h the introduction of admissible evidenc e,” such re as o ns for the adver se employ ment action. Id. at -11-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 815. “I f a defe ndant succe ssfully produce s such a leg itimate rea son, then the burden of production returns to the plaintiff to de monstrate by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the proff ere d rea son

was a mere prete x t for discrimination.” Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist. , 710 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2013). Stevens challeng es the district court’s ruling on her reta liation claims ag ainst both Saeling er (under state law) and the defe ndants (under fede ral and state law). The district court noted, as does Saeling er, that Stevens’s theory on what constituted her protec ted activity chang ed. As to Saeling er, she cla imed that her O ctober 26 letter wa s the protec ted ac tivity ; as to the other de fenda nts, that it

was a co m p l ai n t made to Br own in September. I n her brief befor e this court, Stevens appea rs to consider the September complaint to be the protec t ed activity as to both defe ndants. Saeling er argues that Stevens may not a ssert a claim based on the September complaint ag ainst him because it was not raised to or considere d by the district court. Both alleg ations wer e befor e the district court and it considere d both in resolving the defe ndants’ respe ctive motions for summary judgme nt. We will do the same. We beg in with the reta liation claim ag ainst Saeling er. The first step is to deter mine whether the October 26 letter constituted protec ted activity

. We have held that “a v agu e charg e of discrimination in an internal letter or memorandum is insufficient to con stitut e opposition to an unlawful employ

ment prac tice.” Booke r v. Brown & W illiamson Tobacco Co. , 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989). Booke r does not, howeve r, require that th e p l ai n t i ff’ s complaint be lodge d with absolute for

mality , clar ity , or pre cision. For example, in Truji llo v. Henniges Automotive Sealing Systems North Ame rica, Inc. , 495 F. App’ x 651, 653 (6th Cir. 2012), the plaintiff c omplained to a -12-Stevens v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, et al.

No. 12-5243 human relations officer about several racist remarks made by a member of management during a business trip. The plaintiff was fired a week later. Id. We concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in protected opposition. Unlike the letter in Booker , which complained about management practices and included a vague charge of “ethnocism” a term that the Booker court had been “unable to define” Trujillo’s complaint only raised the issue of the racial comments, which the panel found “relevant to the underlying alleged Title VII violation in a way that is not the case in Booker ,” and “far more concrete than a charge of ‘ethnocism.’” Id. at 655-56; see also Fields v. Fairfield Cnty. Bd. of Developmental Disabilities , 507 F.App’x 549, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding that plaintiff’s e-mails to a friend complaining about discriminatory hiring practices and a subsequent request for the state civil rights commission’s contact information which were surreptitiously viewed by her employer were not too generalized to constitute protected activity). Some of the complaints in the letter could be construed as engaging in protected activity. Stevens mentioned a “desire . . . to do my job in a non-threatening environment,” which could refer to sexual harassment on Saelinger’s part. This inference, however, may have been undercut by the very next sentence, which expresses Stevens’s desire to continue working with Saelinger. But even assuming that the letter meets the requisite threshold and that the remaining elements of the prima facie case are established, legitimate non-discriminatory reasons were offered by the defendants for 2 We perceive Stevens’s termination, not the alleged “plan” to push her out of Saelinger’s 2 group, as the adverse employment action. We have defined an adverse employment action “as ‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Ct. , 201 F.3d 784, 789 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). Although the consultation between high-level -13-Stevens v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, et al.

No. 12-5243 Stevens’s termination her in-office sex with Saelinger and the ongoing office disruption resulting from the relationship. There is no dispute that Saelinger, who was allegedly responsible for sexually harassing Stevens, did not fire her. Stevens acknowledged that Joe Gross, President and CEO of Saint Elizabeth’s, was the only other signature on her termination papers. There is nothing to indicate that Gross was involved in the alleged plan to push Stevens out. Moreover, the lack of pretext is also illustrated by the fact that Saelinger had no control over Stevens’s discharge he suffered the same fate as Stevens, and did so at an earlier point in time. As to the remaining defendants, the September complaint was not protected activity based on this record. That complaint is described in one of Stevens’s affidavits, where she claimed that because she was pressured to agree to changed conditions of work, she talked with Gary Brown and expressed concern for her “job future.” This language does not express any concern about sexual harassment; in fact, the natural inference evidenced by the facts and Stevens’s statements during that time frame is a fear of reduced hours or concern about job stability as the merger with St. Elizabeth moved forward. For these reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Saelinger and the other defendants on the retaliation claims was appropriate. B. Fraud In order to assert an actionable fraud claim, Kentucky law requires a plaintiff to prove the following elements by clear and convincing evidence: management officials regarding this “plan” is undoubtedly troubling here, it did not lead to any significant change in Stevens’s employment status or any of its attendant benefits. -14-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 (1) that the decl ar an t made a materia l repr esentation to the plaintiff, (2) that this repr esentation wa s false, (3) that the decla rant knew the repr esentation was false or made it re ck lessly , (4) that the decla rant induced the plaintiff to act upon the misrepre sentation, (5) that the plaintiff relied upon the mis r e prese ntation, and (6) that the misrepre sentation ca

used injury

to the plaintiff. Flegles, In c. v. T

r uServ Corp. , 289 S.W .3d 544, 549 (Ky

. 2009). A pl aintiff mus t also “suff er an actua l pe cuniar

y loss.” Stahl v

. St. E lizabeth Med. Ctr. , 948 S.W .2d 419, 423 (Ky

. Ct. App. 1997) (interna l quotation marks omitted). The district court held that Stevens’s fra ud claim was defic ient beca use she f ailed to alleg e or of

fer proof of such loss. Stevens contends that her complaint sufficie ntly alleg ed damag es based on fra ud beca use she claimed that “[t] he tang ible employ ment action was a reque st to transfe r or lose full time position, chang ing hours and ultimately discharg e” and that she lost her annual salary and benef its. Although these statements wer e included in the g ener al alleg ations of Stevens’s complaint, they addre ssed her sexual hara ssment claim. As to the fra ud claim specific ally , Stevens simply alleg ed that her relianc e

on Saeling er’ s false statements reg arding his divorce cause d “seve re emotional injury ” to her. There is no mention of any monetary damag es resulting from Saeling er’ s misrepre sentations. The district court a ppropriate ly

g rante d summary

judgme nt in favor of

Saeling er on this claim. C. Resolution of

State- Law Claim s Stevens argues that the district court should have dismiss ed her st at e- l aw cl aims without prejudice

. The decision of whether to r etain jurisdiction ove r state-law claims afte r fede ral claims have been dismiss ed is left to the district court’s discretion. See Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc. , 392 F.3d 195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004). This court has stated that “[a] trial court must balanc e the interests

. . . when deciding whether to resolve a pendent state claim on the merits. A district court -15-Stevens v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, et al.

No. 12-5243 should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.” Id. at 211 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Harper , we considered the following facts in determining that the district court did not abuse its discretion by exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state-law claims: (1) the case had been on the district court’s docket for 11 months; (2) discovery was complete; (3) the defendants’ summary judgment motions were “ripe for decision”; and (4) the court had made several substantive rulings, meaning that “the district court was familiar with the facts of the case and already had invested significant time in the litigation.” Id. This case was on the court’s docket for well over a year when the motion for summary judgment was granted in favor of Saelinger, and almost two years had passed when the motion for summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants was granted. The district court, therefore, was familiar with the facts, and a significant amount of time had been invested in the litigation by everyone involved. And as the defendants point out, Stevens’s claims based on state discrimination law are essentially the same as those brought under federal law. See Keeton v. Flying J, Inc. , 429 F.3d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that sexual harassment claims brought under Title VII and Kentucky law “are analyzed in the same manner”). Although a retaliation claim under Kentucky law is unique in that an individual such as Saelinger can be held liable, this is the only element that differs from a Title VII retaliation claim. See, e.g. , Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , No. 2011- CA-001210-MR, 2012 WL 5630421, at *2-5 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2012) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to a retaliation claim brought under Kentucky law). -16-Steve ns v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, e t al.

No. 12-5243 The court was su ff

i ciently familiar with the fac ts upon which the claims of fra ud and intentional infliction of emotional distress wer e based, and there is no sug g estion that the applicable law was so unique or complex that a state c ourt would be the more appropr iate forum in which to addre ss them. Moreove r, S tevens requested tha t the district court g rant summary judgme nt in her favor on the fra

ud claim. On balanc e, the interests of judicial economy support the district court’s decision to resolve Stevens’s state- law cla ims. CONCLUSION For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.

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