Filed 6/23/21 In re S.S. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re S.S. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B309447

 

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP07386A-B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VERONICA O.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Steff R. Padilla, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Reversed.
2

Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

____________________________________

INTRODUCTION

Veronica O., mother of now four-year-old S.S. and two-yearold G.S., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings 

and disposition order removing the children from her care and 

placing them under the supervision of the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services. Veronica argues

that substantial evidence did not support the court’s jurisdiction 

findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivision (b),

1 and that we must therefore reverse them along 

with the disposition order. We agree and do.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Department Files a Section 300 Petition, and the 

Juvenile Court Holds a Detention Hearing

On November 13, 2019, as part of a narcotics investigation, 

Detective Yanez of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

was surveilling a motel when he saw Sesar Uribe exit one of the 

rooms with “a white paper bag” in his hand, get into a parked car,

and drive away. Detective Yanez had a warrant to search Uribe, 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 
3

and he contacted other sheriff’s deputies with instructions to pull 

Uribe over. They did so, and when Detective Yanez arrived on 

the scene, one of the deputies showed him “a white plastic bag” 

containing “a large quantity” of methamphetamine Uribe had 

tossed from the car before he was pulled over. Detective Yanez 

questioned Uribe, who stated that he had spent the past two 

nights in the room at the motel, that he had no drugs or weapons 

there, and that the deputies were welcome to search the room. 

The deputies arrested Uribe, who later admitted he had been 

selling methamphetamine for the previous 10 months. 

On returning to the motel room, the deputies encountered 

Veronica, S.S., and G.S. Asked if she was staying in the room, 

Veronica answered, “Yes, me and my kids stayed here last night 

with my friend Sesar because I had nowhere to go.” Asked if 

there were any illegal drugs or weapons in the room, she said, “I 

don’t know.” The deputies found no drugs or weapons in the 

room, but they did learn Veronica had an outstanding arrest 

warrant, issued in September 2016, for absconding from 

probation after a conviction for identity theft. The deputies 

arrested Veronica, took the children into protective custody, and 

transported all three to the station.

A Department social worker, Ava Vivar, met the deputies 

at the station and interviewed Veronica. Veronica told Vivar that 

she and her children were currently homeless and that the

children’s father, Gilbert S., was incarcerated in Oregon. She 

said that she and the children had previously lived with Gilbert’s 

mother, Lucy S., but that they had moved out because Veronica 

“wanted to move on with her life.” Veronica stated that Uribe 

was a longtime friend, that they had no romantic relationship, 

and that, aware of her “living situation,” he allowed her and the 
4

children to stay one night with him at the motel. She denied any 

prior knowledge of the drugs the deputies recovered from Uribe 

and stated that she did not see any drugs or drug paraphernalia 

in the motel room and that she and the children had never ridden 

in Uribe’s car. Veronica said she had last used drugs “a long time 

ago” and agreed to contact the Department for drug testing on 

her release from custody. Vivar informed Veronica the 

Department intended to detain S.S. and G.S. because no parent 

was available to care for them.

Vivar also interviewed Uribe. He stated that he and 

Veronica had been friends for more than 10 years, that they did 

not have a romantic relationship, and that, running into her the 

day before his arrest and learning she and her children were 

homeless, he let them sleep in his motel room for one night. It 

was no inconvenience to him, he explained, “as he was hardly 

ever in his room.” He insisted that Veronica did not know about 

the methamphetamine in his possession and that he kept them in 

his car and did not bring them into the room. He admitted he 

had smoked methamphetamine for the last four years, including 

the day before his arrest, but denied smoking it in the motel room 

or around S.S. and G.S. 

Having detained S.S. and G.S. and placed them with Lucy, 

the Department filed a petition under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1), alleging in a single count (b-1) that Veronica 

“created a detrimental and endangering home environment for 

the children in that [she] allowed . . . Uribe, who is a Registered 

Controlled Substance Offender and a current user of 

methamphetamine, to reside in the children’s home and to have 

unlimited access to the children.” In its detention report the 

Department stated that Gilbert was incarcerated in Oregon in 
5

connection with, among other crimes, possessing and delivering 

methamphetamine and that his earliest release date was 

December 8, 2021. 

The detention report also stated the Department had 

received a referral concerning Veronica when she gave birth to 

G.S. in February 2019. The referral source expressed concerns 

because Veronica had admitted a history of methamphetamine 

use and tested positive for methamphetamine during a prenatal 

examination in September 2018. G.S., however, “tested negative 

for all drugs,” and Veronica “tested negative for all substances” 

nine days after G.S. was born, at which time Veronica stated she 

“had been sober for five to six years.” The Department concluded 

at that time there was no evidence to support intervention.

The detention report also included statements from an 

interview with Lucy. Lucy stated that Veronica had lived with 

her for three years before moving out in March 2019. She stated 

that Veronica said she was moving in with a friend whose mother 

had Alzheimer’s, to work as the mother’s caretaker, but also that 

Veronica moved out because she “did not like all of [Lucy’s]

rules.” Veronica later told Lucy that the arrangement with the 

friend did not work out and that Veronica was now homeless, but 

that she was receiving motel vouchers from a church and 

expected to receive additional housing assistance. Veronica also 

told Lucy that Veronica’s social worker suggested Veronica “‘find 

someone in a similar situation to share a room’” with and that, by 

following that advice, she and the children spent the night with 

Uribe in the motel. 

Lucy also reported that, although Veronica no longer lived 

with her, Veronica visited her “on a daily basis” and S.S. “always 

ate in her home.” Lucy denied ever seeing Veronica under the 
6

influence of drugs or in possession of drugs or drug 

paraphernalia. Lucy did state “she had concerns about possible 

drug use” by Veronica, and when asked why, she said Veronica 

smoked cigarettes and she (Lucy) believed “cigarettes were 

gateways to drugs.” Lucy stated that she had no “concerns 

regarding neglect of the children by [Veronica]” and that 

Veronica “simply . . . needed to be more organized with the 

children.” 

At the detention hearing in November 2019, counsel for 

Veronica stated that, “when [Veronica] is released, she does want 

to be drug testing for the Department.” The juvenile court found 

the Department made a prima facie case the children were 

persons described by section 300 and ordered their continued 

detention. The court also ordered “parenting referrals, drug and 

alcohol counseling, and testing referrals.” The court asked 

Veronica, “What’s your rap sheet look like?” Veronica mentioned 

the warrant for identity theft and then said, “I think it was 

driving without owner’s consent. It was a long time ago 2013 or 

2011—something like that.” The court ordered, “Drug and 

alcohol testing—counseling and testing.” The minute order from 

the hearing stated: “Mother to receive referrals for parenting, 

drug testing and counseling.” 

B. The Department Files an Amended Petition and a 

Jurisdiction and Disposition Report

In January 2020 the Department filed an amended 

petition, adding two new counts under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1). Count b-2 alleged Veronica “has a history of 

use of illicit substances, that includes a history of arrests for 

controlled substances, and having had positive test for 
7

methamphetamines when pregnant with [G.S.] In addition, 

[Veronica] has a recurrent close affiliation with people who abuse 

methamphetamines that has included [Gilbert], and most 

recently with unrelated male friend, Sesar Uribe. [Veronica] has 

placed the children at risk of harm in that the police arrested 

Sesar Uribe at the children’s home on 11/13/19, during which Mr. 

Uribe was admitted to having used methamphetamines the night 

prior to his arrest and methamphetamine[ ] was found in his 

vehicle parked outside the motel residence where [Veronica] and 

the children were staying with Mr. Uribe.” Count b-3 alleged 

Gilbert “has a history of substance abuse, and is a recent user of 

the methamphetamines. [He] recently suffered a drug relapse 

and is presently serving a prison sentence for drug-related 

offences.” 

The Department also filed a jurisdiction and disposition 

report stating that Veronica and Gilbert remained incarcerated, 

but that Veronica expected to be released in February 2020. The 

Department reported Veronica was arrested four times in 2013 

on drug-related charges: in May 2013 for possessing a controlled 

substance, possessing a controlled substance while armed, and 

being under the influence of a controlled substance; in September 

2013 for possessing a controlled substance and bringing a 

controlled substance into a prison; in December 2013 for

possessing a controlled substance for sale, though she was 

released on that occasion for lack of evidence; and again in 

December 2013 for possessing controlled substance

paraphernalia. In August 2015 a warrant for Veronica was 

issued in connection with, among other things, pending drugrelated charges. In December 2015 she was arrested on the 

warrant and for, among other things, possessing a controlled 
8

substance for sale.

2 The Department reported Gilbert had a 

number of (undated) convictions for drug-related offenses. 

The Department also reported that in a January 2020 

interview, referring to her decision to move out of Lucy’s home in 

March 2019, Veronica stated “she realizes she made poor choices 

by choosing to leave and later choosing to not return to [Lucy’s] 

residence where she said was always available to her and safe for 

the children, given she had limited means.” Veronica also 

suggested the referral indicating she tested positive for 

methamphetamine while pregnant with G.S. was “inaccurate.” 

The Department also interviewed Gilbert in January 2020. 

He stated Veronica “told him of the people she had started to 

hang out with following his recent incarceration, and said he 

tried to dissuade her from keeping company with such people 

because of the drug related activities.” He also said that he asked 

Veronica whether she was using drugs and that she answered no. 

He said that he had never known Veronica to use 

methamphetamine, but that she “used to drink alcohol 

excessively” before having S.S. and G.S. Gilbert’s expected 

release date of December 8, 2021 remained unchanged. 

C. The Juvenile Court Sustains the Petition and 

Removes the Children

In January 2020 the juvenile court held a jurisdiction 

hearing, which it continued, ultimately, to March 10, 2020. In 

the meantime, Veronica was released from custody (on 

2 It is unclear from the record how the drug-related charges 

against Veronica were resolved. 
9

February 6, 2020).

3 At the hearing the court sustained the 

petition, finding count b-2 true as alleged, finding count b-3 true 

after striking the allegation that Gilbert “recently suffered a drug 

relapse,” and dismissing count b-1. 

Regarding count b-2, the court stated: “Mother was . . . 

arrested that day for a no-bail warrant for identity theft. Mother 

has an extensive history of arrests and convictions for theft and, 

as I indicated, an arrest warrant for failure to appear on identity 

theft as well as controlled substances. She then—[Gilbert], who

is the presumed father of the children is—was engaged in 

narcotics offenses which is why he is in prison, and then she 

expects—well, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 

that she is now with a second gentleman who has been arrested 

for drugs. There’s way too much drugs around these children. 

And therefore the court finds b-2 is found to be true by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Mother’s around drugs. She 

makes her children [sic] around drugs, and she’s around people 

who have drugs. That is a risk. They don’t have to actually 

ingest it. The court’s concerned about the lack of judgment.” At 

the conclusion of the hearing, the court asked Veronica, “Are you 

testing?” Veronica answered, “Yes.” The court responded, “Good. 

Let’s see those results.” 

After a number of continuances because of the COVID-19

pandemic, the court held a disposition hearing on October 30, 

2020. In the meantime, the Department filed several last minute 

information reports, which stated Veronica had “not provided the 

3 The Department reported Veronica “declined to utilize the 

referral provided to her by [the Department] and by a local 

church,” choosing instead to sleep in her car.

 
10

Department with any letters of enrollment for any Court ordered 

program,” was a “No Show” for drug tests on July 8, July 24, 

September 30, and October 6, 2020,4 and maintained “she was 

not going to drug test as the Court had not ordered her to do so.” 

At the disposition hearing the Department and counsel for 

the children asked the court to remove the children. Counsel for 

Veronica asked the court to place the children with Veronica on 

the condition she comply with the case plan and live in Lucy’s 

home. Counsel for Veronica addressed the Department’s report 

that Veronica was not participating in services: “I would note 

that [Veronica] has not been ordered to do any services. She was 

not ordered to drug test. So I disagree with the [Department] 

that she is noncompliant, as she is not currently in violation of 

any court orders . . . . ” Counsel added that Veronica 

“understands on this court date the court can order her to 

participate in services.” The court declared the children 

dependents of the court and removed them from Veronica and 

Gilbert. Veronica timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes a juvenile court 

to exercise dependency jurisdiction over a child if the ‘child has 

suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 

serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or 

4 The Department reported that one of its social workers 

spoke with Veronica on July 1, 2020 and “placed [her] on random 

drug testing on this date[ ] and sent [her] a follow-up email with 

drug testing information.” 
11

inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or 

protect the child, or . . . by the inability of the parent . . . to 

provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . mental 

illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.’ [Citation.]

A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), 

requires [the Department] to demonstrate the following three 

elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) neglectful 

conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and 

(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of 

serious physical harm or illness.” (In re L.W. (2019) 

32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848; see In re Joaquin C. (2017) 

15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561.)

“In deciding whether there is a substantial risk of serious 

physical harm, within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b), 

courts evaluate the risk that is present at the time of the 

adjudication hearing. ‘While evidence of past conduct may be 

probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is 

whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the 

minor to the defined risk of harm.’” (In re Roger S. (2018) 

31 Cal.App.5th 572, 582; In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 

775 [child protective agency “must establish a nexus between the 

parent’s past conduct and the current risk of harm”].) 

“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting jurisdictional findings . . . , we ‘consider the entire 

record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s findings.’ [Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence is 

evidence that is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value”; such 

that a reasonable trier of fact could make such findings.’” (In re 

L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 848.) In reviewing for 

substantial evidence, “a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the 
12

evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve 

evidentiary conflicts.’” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 

640.) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no 

evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the 

findings . . . .” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.) 

B. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the

Jurisdiction Finding Relating to Veronica

Veronica contends the juvenile court erred in finding her 

conduct caused the children to suffer, or to be at substantial risk 

of suffering, serious physical harm, as alleged in count b-2. She 

argues that there is no substantial evidence she placed the 

children at risk of physical harm by staying with them for one 

night in the motel room with Uribe and that, even if there were, 

there is no substantial evidence any such risk remained at the 

time of the jurisdiction hearing.5 We agree with her, at a 

minimum, on the latter point. 

The parties wrangle over the “white paper bag” Deputy 

Yanez observed in Uribe’s hand as Uribe left the motel room on 

November 13, 2019. The Department argues the juvenile court 

could reasonably infer that it was the same “white plastic bag” 

full of methamphetamine the sheriff’s deputies later recovered 

from Uribe and that Veronica had allowed her children to stay 

the night in a motel room where Uribe “possessed and used 

methamphetamine.” The Department argues “[i]t is well settled 

that allowing children to be in proximity to drugs and drug 

paraphernalia places them at substantial risk of serious physical 

harm,” and for that proposition it cites (only) People v. Perez 

5 The Department has never contended the children suffered

actual physical harm or illness as a result of Veronica’s conduct. 
13

(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1462 (Perez). Veronica argues that 

Deputy Yanez deliberately distinguished the “paper” bag Uribe

left the motel room with from the “plastic” bag of drugs the 

deputies later recovered, that all the other evidence showed

Uribe kept the drugs in his car and did not take them into the 

motel room or near the children, and that there was no evidence 

Uribe used drugs inside the motel room or in the presence of the 

children. 

There are two problems with the Department’s argument. 

First, the court’s holding in Perez, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1462

was not as broad as the Department advertises. In that case, 

where a defendant was convicted of willfully endangering the 

health of a child (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)), the court found 

there was substantial evidence to support “the element of 

willfully causing or permitting [the child] to be placed in a 

situation in which her safety was endangered.” (Perez, at 

p. 1472.) Citing undisputed evidence that heroin and liquid-filled 

syringes lay on various two-foot-high and four-feet-high surfaces 

in a house where a four-year-old regularly visited, the court found 

“the jury could have reasonably concluded that leaving drugs and 

drug paraphernalia in plain view and/or within easy access of a 

four-year-old child placed that child at unreasonable risk of her 

personal safety.” (Id. at p. 1473.) The circumstances here were

distinguishable: Even assuming Uribe took a bag of drugs into

the motel room for some period on the night in question, there is 

no evidence G.S. and S.S., who were nine months old and two 

years old, respectively, at the time, could easily access the drugs

or were otherwise physically endangered by their “proximity.” 

Second, even assuming Veronica placed the children at 

substantial risk of physical harm by allowing them to stay one
14

night in a motel room with Uribe and his drugs, there is no 

evidence any such risk remained at the time of the jurisdiction

hearing. Nothing in the record suggests that Veronica had ever

previously shared a motel room or other “residence” with Uribe, 

that she ever would again, or that Veronica, Gilbert, or anyone 

else ever kept drugs in the children’s proximity. The Department 

does not even argue there was any such evidence. 

In fact, the Department’s argument here is essentially that, 

at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, the children were at 

substantial risk of physical harm because of what the 

Department variously describes as Veronica’s “long-standing 

association with illegal drugs,” “associating with people known to 

be involved with drugs,” and “longstanding and ongoing 

association with illegal drugs and people who used and sold 

them.” But an ill-advised “association” is not, without more, a 

basis for juvenile court jurisdiction. The Department “‘has the 

burden of showing specifically how the minor[ ] ha[s] been or will 

be harmed’” (In re J.N., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 775), which 

requires showing “an actual nexus” between the parent’s conduct 

“and any specifically identified, substantial, current risk of 

serious physical harm” (ibid.) to the child. Repetitious

incantations of Veronica’s “association” with illegal drugs do not 

satisfy that requirement. (See id. at p. 776 [“although we 

acknowledge that, on an abstract level, violent crime is 

incompatible with child safety, [the Department] cannot use such 

generalities to satisfy its burden of proving an ‘identified, specific 

hazard in the child’s environment’ that poses a substantial risk of 

serious physical harm to him”].) 

Finally, the Department suggests Veronica’s positive drug 

test while pregnant with G.S., coupled with her subsequent
15

denial of the accuracy of that test result, constitutes substantial 

evidence to support the true finding on count b-2. But that 

evidence does not support the true finding on count b-2 because 

nothing in count b-2, or anywhere else in the amended petition,

alleged any risk of harm to the children as a result of Veronica’s 

drug use. Nor did the Department make that argument at the 

jurisdiction hearing. “‘“[N]otice of the allegations upon which the 

deprivation of custody is predicated is fundamental to due 

process. [Citations.] Accordingly, a parent must be given notice 

of the specific factual allegations against him or her with 

sufficient particularity to permit him or her to properly meet the 

charge.”’” (In re S. O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 460; see In re 

Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1036-1037.) 

C. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the 

Jurisdiction Finding Relating to Gilbert

We also agree with Veronica that the juvenile court erred 

in sustaining the petition based on Gilbert’s conduct as alleged in 

count b-3. The Department does not attempt to identify any 

actual nexus between Gilbert’s conduct and a specifically 

identified, substantial, current risk of physical harm to the 

children. The Department argues only that Gilbert’s “criminal 

history demonstrates his serious, unresolved decades-long 

problem with illegal drugs” and that a “parent’s substance abuse 

is prima facie evidence of substantial risk to children of tender 

years who require adequate supervision,” a proposition for which 

it cites In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754 (Drake M.).

But that argument is unpersuasive. 

The court in Drake M. explained that “‘[c]ases finding a 

substantial physical danger tend to fall into two factual patterns. 
16

One group involves an identified, specific hazard in the child’s 

environment—typically an adult with a proven record of 

abusiveness. [Citations.] The second group involves children of 

such tender years that the absence of adequate supervision and 

care poses an inherent risk to their physical health and safety. 

[Citations.]’ [Citation.] And we also hold that, in cases involving 

the second group, the finding of substance abuse is prima facie 

evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide 

regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm.” 

(Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 766-767; see In re 

Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 [“because the 

children were six years old or younger at the time of the 

jurisdiction hearing—children of ‘tender years’ in the language of 

[In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814]—‘the finding of 

substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a 

parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a 

substantial risk of harm’”].) 

The presumption the Department invokes from the holding 

in Drake M. applies, then, when the juvenile court has made a 

“finding of substance abuse.” (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 767; see In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385; 

In re Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219.) But the 

juvenile court here did not make a finding of current substance 

abuse by Gilbert and, in sustaining count b-3, even struck the 

allegation Gilbert had “recently suffered a drug relapse.” (Cf. 

In re Christopher R., at pp. 1214, 1219 [applying the presumption 

where the juvenile court found that the mother of children less 

than six years old was “a current abuser of cocaine” whose 

“substance abuse endangers” the children].) Thus, the 

presumption does not apply. 
17

And even if it did, it was rebutted by the absence of any 

evidence Gilbert ever cared for or supervised the children while 

under the influence of drugs. (See In re Rebecca C. (2014) 

228 Cal.App.4th 720, 728 [rejecting the argument that, “when a 

parent engages in substance abuse, dependency court jurisdiction 

is proper”]; cf. In re Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1219 [mother “did not adequately rebut” the juvenile court’s 

substance abuse finding, where “her use of cocaine during the 

last months of her pregnancy confirmed her poor judgment and 

willingness to endanger her children’s safety due to substance 

abuse”].) Indeed, the Department cites no evidence he ever cared 

for or supervised them when sober. Of course, from at least some 

point in 2018, when Gilbert was arrested and incarcerated in 

Oregon, until at least December 8, 2021, the date of his expected 

release, he could not and cannot.

6

6 Because we are reversing the jurisdiction findings, we also 

reverse the disposition orders. (See In re Roger S., supra, 

31 Cal.App.5th at p. 583 [“Because there was no basis for 

dependency jurisdiction, we also reverse the disposition order and 

the custody order the juvenile court issued.”].)
18

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition 

order are reversed. 

SEGAL, J. 

We concur: 

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER, J.