Filed 6/23/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. TYSON THEODORE MAYFIELD, Defendant and Respondent. G057970 (Super. Ct. No. 18NF2623)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Roger B. Robbins, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Todd Spitzer , District Attorney, and Elizabeth Molfetta, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.2 The members of this panel have enjoyed long careers in the p ractice of law. We’ve seen enough to make it difficult to shock us. But not, as it turns out, impossible.

Respondent Tyson Theodore Mayfield has a n extensive criminal record that
i ncludes multiple acts of violence against racial minorities. In this cas e, he threatened to
make a pregnant African

- American woman “ drop ” her unborn baby while she was waiting at a bus st ation. As a third

- strike defendant, respondent was facing a mandatory prison sentence of 25 years to life

. However, the trial court dismissed one of his prior strike convictions in the interest of justice under Penal Code section 1385 and sentenced him to five years in prison.

The district attorney contends the dismissal constitutes an abuse of discretion, a nd we agree. Completely

. Everything about respondent’s crime and his
record shout s for application of the Three Strikes law. T here is nothing about his
criminal history or personal character that suggests he somehow falls outside the spirit of
the Three Strikes law. We t herefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jasmine C. is an African

- American woman who was eight months pregnant
in September of 2018. That day, she was waiting at the Fullerton b us s tation for her boyfriend to pick her up when she heard respondent talking nearby. He was telling his two male companions h ow he hates “niggers” like Jasmine and “ gets his kicks ” by hurting pregnant black women. He also asked his cohorts if they wanted to see him go over to Jasmine and make her “drop her baby.”

Jasmine became frightened. Her anxiety increased even more when respondent walked over to her and said, “I don’t like pregnant niggers like you,” “I’m goi ng to make sure you drop your baby.” Jasmine told respondent to stay away from her , but he continued to hurl racial epithets at her. Fearing for her safety, and the safety of her unborn baby, Jasmine took out her pepper spray and sprayed r espondent with it

.3 In response , respondent grabbed Jasmine’s backpack and left the scene momentarily. He then came running back toward her with his fists balled up and told her, “You’re going to pay now, you nigger, I’m going to make sure you really drop this baby. ” By now, Jasmine was so terrified her body was shaking uncontrollably. S he
somehow managed to run to a nearby café and call the police before respondent was able

to carry out his threat. Officers arrived a short time later and took him into custody.

He was charged with committing a hate crime by threatening Jasmine for the purpose of violating her constitutional rights and with the present ability to commit a violent injury or cause actual physical injury. (Pen. Code, § 422.7, subd. (a).) 1 The compl aint also alleged one count each of making a criminal threat and petty theft. ( §§ 422, 484 /488.) And it included a sentence enhancement allegation that the criminal
threat constituted a hate crime. ( § 422.75 , subd. (a) .) In addition, the complaint alle ged two prior strike convictions ( §§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C) , 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C) ), two prior serious felony convictions ( § 667, subd. (a) ) and two prior prison terms ( § 667 .5, subd. (b) ). Those six recidivist enhancements were based on respondent’s convictions for assault with a deadly weapon in 2005 and mayhem in 2008.

All told, respondent was facing a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life in prison under the Three Strikes law, plus 13 years for the remaining enhancements. At his

ar raignment he pleaded not guilty , and ov er the course of the next several months, h is preliminary hearing was continued several times to facilitate a plea bargain

. During that period, r espondent was unable to reach a plea agreement with the district attorn ey. However, the trial judge indicated he would be willing to strike one of respondent’s prior
strike convictions and sentence him as a second

- strike offender to five years in prison if he pleaded guilty to the charges.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.4 The prosecution vehemently opposed this proposed disposition. On March 15, 2019, it filed a lengthy sentencing brief arguing the interests of justice did not support the trial judge’s indicated sentence. According to the brief, respondent was convicted of
1 8 offenses during the 20

- year p eriod leading up his current crimes in 201 8

. 2 Eighteen

– a remarkable number considering how much of those 20 years he spent in custody.

Most of these earlier convictions were for misdemeanors . However, in 2003, respondent was convicted of felony battery on a police officer , and in 2005, he suffered his first strike conviction for stabbing a man outside a liquor store

. Respondent had no prior relationship with the man he stabbed . He just walked up to him , accused
him of be ing a child rapist /murderer and slashed his face with a knife

. Respondent
received a two

- year prison sentence for the attack. However, f ollowing his release from prison, he soon reoffended

.

In 2006, respondent and a companion contacted a nonwhite cou ple at a gas station and asked them if they had any spare change. When t he woman said no, respondent began making racist statements to her. Then he began pu nching the man in
the face and did not relent u ntil a bystander intervened. In the end, t he man suffered a
lacerated lip that required eight stitches and for a time hindered his ability to speak and

eat

. Respondent was convicted of battery with serious bodily injury and mayhem

– his
second strike conviction

– and sentenced to nine years in prison.

2 Here is a list of those convictions by date: 1997: Driving under the influence; 2000: Driving with a suspended license ; 2003: Battering a police office, resisting arrest and using illegal drug s ; 2004: Petty theft and disorderly conduct; 2005: Assault with a deadly weapon; 2006: Failure to appear in court; 2007: Assault and battery; 2008: Mayhem and battery with serious bodily injury; 2016: Driving under the influence ; 2017: Hate crime, assault , battery, and driving under the influence.5 That was in 2008. Following his release from prison, respondent was quickly convicted for drunk driving. And in 2017, one year before the instant case arose,
he reoffended yet again. The victim in that case was a Turkish man with dark skin and
dreadlocks. Respondent approached him outside a liquor store and asked for a light

. When the man said he didn’t smoke, respondent called him a “fucking nigger” and began pounding him with his fists

. The incident led to respondent being convicted of a felony hate crime, but the trial court inexplicably reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17 , subdivision (b) and sentenced him to a year in jail.

In addition to providing this information about respondent’s prior cases, the prosecut ion’s sentencing brief noted respondent has consistently violated the terms of his probation and parole through out the years . The brief also reminded the court respondent presently had four misdemeanor cases pe nding against him that were unrelated to the present case. One of those cases was for punching a fellow inmate at the Orange County jail without provocation

. Respondent boasted to jail authorities that he was not going to
cease his violent behavior while in custody so long as he was forced to have contact with
other inmates.

Given respondent’s violent and racist conduct over the past two decades, including his actions in the present case, the prosecution ’s brief argued he was a threat to public safety and deserved to be incarcerated for an indeterminate life term pursuant to
the Three Strikes law. Nevertheless, the trial judge stood by his indicated sentence of five years, which predictably prompted respondent to change his plea to guilty.

At the change of plea/sentencing hearing, the judge did not receive a ny information from the probation department because respondent had waived his right to a presentence report. However, the judge did confirm he had re ad the prosecution’s sentencing brie f , which was filed two months before the hearing

. In addition, the judge
heard from Jasmine C. , who read her victim impact statement into the record.6 Jasmine described how respondent accosted her at the bus station on the day in question, as set forth above. She said that when respondent called her a nigger and
threatened to make her drop her ba by, she was physically and emotionally traumatized
and that, ultimately, she had to “run for [her] life” in order to get away from him. She
also said the inci dent exacerbated her PTSD , and she was extremely worried that if respondent only received a five

- year sentence, he would try to track her down and hurt
her when he is released. In light of the tremendous anguish and anxiety respondent
caused her, she beli eved he should be imprisoned for “a very long time,” much longer than just five years.

Arguing on behalf of the People, Orange County District Attorney Todd Spitzer 3 described respondent as an “evil” and “dangerous” person whose history of racist
behavior and actions toward Jasmine were “ beyond alarming

. ” Like Jasmine, the district attorney said he was v ery concerned that a five

- year sentence for respondent w ould be insufficient to protect soci ety and deter him from commit ting additional hate crimes against more innocent victims in the future.

For his part, defense counsel did not present any new facts or information for the court to consider, nor did he dispute any factual aspect of the pros ecution’s sentencing brief or Jasmine’s victim impact statement . He simply did not believe the
circumstances of respondent’s present offense warranted an indeterminate life term.

The trial judge exercised his discretion under section 1385, and struck respondent’s 2005 strike conviction in the interest of justice for the following reasons: 1)

t he circumstances surrounding the current offense “ do not indicate a greater degree of danger to society [,] ” 2) “ [t] here was no injury to any person [,]” 3) “[t] here was no

3 It is not typical in this county of three million for the district attorney to argue a sentencing. He
usu ally leaves th at to one of his 306 deputies. He thought this important enough to do himself.7

weapon used [,] ” 4) respondent’s prior strike conviction is “ 14 years old and now remote in time, ” and 5) respondent was pleading guilty at an early stage of the proceedings. 4

T he judge sentenced respondent to a prison term of five yea rs, representing the requisite double the two

- year midterm on the criminal threats count, plus one year for
the hate crime enhancement attendant to that count. In so doing, the judge not only
struck respondent’s 2005 conviction for purpose s of the Three S trikes law, he also struck
all of the prior serious felony and prior prison term enhancements. Sentencing on the remaining two counts was stayed pending the completion of respondent’s five

- year term. So a defendant with 38 years’ exposure who had been se ntenced to 9 years for his previous felony, got 5 years for this one.
DISCUSSION The district attorney contends the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing respondent’s 2005 strike conviction. We agree.

As a preliminary matter, we address a pr ocedural point raised by respondent. He contends the information in the district attorney’s appellate brief regarding the underlying facts of the case and respondent’s criminal history is “distorted
and one

- sided ” because it was derived entirely from the sentencing brief t he prosecution filed in the trial court. Respondent claims th e information in the sentencing brief cannot be trusted as a basis to impugn the trial court’s ruling because there is no indication
where it came from or whether it i s reliable.

However, i n addition to including information from the prosecution’s sentencing brief, the district attorney’s appellate brief also contains a full two

- page description of Jasmine’s victim impact statement. That statement, which provide s a detailed account of what respondent did to Jasmine at the bus station , was filed with the

4 As an additional justification for his decision, the judge stated, “The current offense is not a violent or serious felony[.]” However, after the distri ct attorney pointed out that making a criminal threat is a serious felony (see § 1192.7, subd. (c)(38)), the judge retracted that statement.8

trial court and read out loud by Jasmine at the sentencing hearing without objection from respondent. T he trial court properly considered it, and so may we. ( § 1191 .1 ; People v.
Jones (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574. )

As for the information in the district attorney’s appellate brief pertaining to respondent’s criminal record and the circumstances surrounding his prior offenses, respondent is correct in saying that information came exclusively from the prosecution’s sentencing brief. However, w hile respondent assails that information as inaccurate and biased, he did not object to it below, nor did he file his own sentencing brief in the trial

court , despite having over two months to do so from the time the People filed their brief
until the time the sentencing hearing was conducted . Nor does he ide ntify any specific
inaccuracies

. In light of these circumstances, and given the fact respondent expressly waived his right to a presentence probation report, he is in no position to complain about the accuracy of the information contained in the district attorney’s filings. ( See generally People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 [ the forfeiture rule

– which is designed to encourage prompt detection and correction of error, and to reduce the number of unnecessary appellate claims

– precludes the parties from r aising procedural sentencing issues for the first time on appeal].)

Respondent also faults the district attorney for failing to supply the trial court, and by extension this court, with any facts about his personal background, prospects or character. B ut as the party seeking section 1385 relief in the trial court, it was respondent’s duty to provide this information to the court. ( Daire v. Lattimore (9th Cir. 2016) 818 F.3d 454, 464: People v. Thimmes (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1213 .)
He offered nothing. There was thus nothing be fore the trial judge to suggest he should exercise his discretion in favor of the respondent. Character and prospects cannot be evaluated by looking at people, and that’s all the trial judge had to go on here. T he
record shows the prosecution addressed respondent’s character and prospects in its sentencing brief, describing them as “poor” and “not good” respectively , and there is9

nothing in the record to contradict this assessment. Indeed, we think his character speaks
for itself

. For all of these reasons, we do not believe there is any basis for disregarding
the information contained in the prosecution’s sentencing brief or the district attorney’s
statement of facts on appeal.

We now turn to the merits of th e trial court’s decision to dismiss respondent’s prior strike conviction. We do so fully cognizant of the discretion vested in
trial courts in the area of criminal s entencing. We are always loath to reject the exercise
of such discretion. But this is no t a close call.

In reviewing th is decision, we must keep in mind t he Three Strikes law is designed to “punish repeat criminal offenders severely” and “drastically curtail a sentencing court’s ability to reduce the severity of a sentence by eliminating a lternatives to prison incarceration[.]” ( People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 641.) To that end,
the law mandates the imposition of a 25

- year

- to

- life prison sentence in cases

– such as
this one

– whe re the defendant is convicted of a serious or violen t felony and has previously been convicted of two such felonies. ( §§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C) , 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C).) In other words, “ If, after having suffered two qualifying felony convictions, an offender commits a third qualifying felony, the Three S trikes law presumes he or she is incorrigible and requires a life sentence. ” ( People v. Vargas , supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 63 8 .) That doesn’t mean trial courts are powerless to deviate from the Three
Strikes law. Under section 1385, the trial court is empowered to strike a prior strike conviction “in the furtherance of justice

. ” ( § 1385, subd. (b); People v. Superior Court (Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529

- 530.) However, th at great power should only be
used in “extraordinary” circumstances, whe n the ends of justice demand it. ( People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 37 8 ; People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 337

– 338 .)10 In determining whether such circumstances exist in a given case, the trial

court must balance societ y’s legitimate interest in imposing longer sentences for repeat offenders and the defendant’s constitutional right against disproportionate punishment. ( P eople v. Superior Court ( Romero ) , supra , 13 Cal.4th at pp. 530

– 531.) It must also
consider the nature of the defendant’s present felonies and prior strike convictions, as well as hi s background, character and prospects

. ( People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 ( Williams ) .) And, of course, t he court must remember the Three Strikes law is not discretionary in nature. Rather , the law must be applied when the defendant has two

or more prior strike s , unless the court conclud es an excepti on to the law should be made because, for articul able reasons that can withstand scrutiny for abuse , the defendant lies outside the spirit of the law s uch that he should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more strikes. ( Ibid .; People v. Carmony , supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 37 6 .)

In this case, the trial court’s stated reasons for striking respondent’s prior
strike conviction do not withstand scrutiny. Although the abuse

- of

- discretion standard of
review is defere ntial, it is not sycophantic

. And here we deal with a statute passed specifically to limit the court’s discretion. Reversal is required here because the trial judge’s stated reasons reflect an unreasonable application of the sentencing principles
discuss ed above to the facts of the case before him . ( Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) In striking respondent’s prior strike conviction , the trial judge focused primarily on the nature of his current crimes against Jasmine. The judge did no t believe
th ose offenses posed a great degree of danger to society as compared to other crimes because respondent did not use a weapon or cause Jasmine injur y . It is true respondent
did not use a tangible weapon , such as a knife or a gun , during his encoun ter with
Jasmine

. However, he was so aggressive and hateful toward her , so frighteningly intense,
she resorted to pepper spray to protect herself

. And even that did not deter respondent ;11

instead of backing off after being sprayed , he ran toward Jasmine b randishing his fists and threatening her, “Now you’re going to pay , nigger. Now I’m going to make sure you really drop your baby.”

The result was an eight

- month pregnant woman running for her life

– and
the life of her unborn child

– from declarations of overt and despicable intent. Surely the language used here

– “Now you’re going to pay, nigger”

– addressed to a pregnant woman demonstrates a danger to society as clearly as displaying a knife or a screwdriver.

Indeed, r espondent’s prior offenses dem onstrate the dangerous import of
his threat s

. Even though respondent was not armed with a physical weapon when he attacked his victims in 2006 and 2017, he was able to make them “p ay” with his bare
hands. In deed, in both of those cases, respondent repeat ed ly beat his victim about the
head and face without any provocation whatsoever . A nd as a result of the 2006 attack,
his victim nee ded eight stiches to his lacerated lip and could not eat or talk without considerable difficulty.

What’s more, defendant had already gotten a pass on his first formally charged hate crime in 2017. This was not a n isolated instance of uncontrolled detestability. He had a history of such conduct

– including a n attack on a law
enforcement officer.

Jasmine did not suffer similar physical injury. But when she addressed the court at sentencing, she said the incident with respondent affected her both “emotionally and physical ly ” and that it put a lot of stress on her and her unborn baby. She described
how her heart began to race and her legs began to shake when respondent confronted her.
And how she had to “run for [her] life ” when respondent came running toward her. She
also said the incident worsened her PTSD and that she continues to live with the fear12

respondent will track her down a nd hurt her after he is released from prison , simply
because of the color of her skin. 5

I n that regard, Jasmine made it clear respondent’s actions toward her were particularly painful because they were racially degrading and motivated by bigotry

. Having been the victim of a hate crime, Jasmine said she will never forget what respondent put her through that day

. The incident served as a grim reminder to her that

“ the world is full of hate” and how difficult it is to deal with racial violence and hatred on a personal level.

The trial judge did not mention the race issue in granting respondent leniency. However, this is not the first time respondent has laced his c riminal behavior
with racist statements. As he did to Jasmine in this case , he called his Turkish victim a “nigger” when he attacked him a year earlier. He also made racist comments toward the couple he confronted a t a gas station in 2006 before going of f on the man for no apparent

reason. As our nation’s high est court has recognized, the defendant ’s motive for offending is an important factor in the sentencing equation. ( Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993) 508 U.S. 476, 485.) When the defendant’s criminal be havior is driven by racist
attitudes , greater punishment is generally deemed w arranted on the basis such conduct
i nflict s unique harm to both the individual victim and society as a whole. ( Id . at pp. 487

- 488 ; accord, In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 726 [“ hate crimes injure members of the protected class and society more severely than do random crimes ”].)

What the Supreme Court did not say but we find considerable here is that
racism and misanthropy are motives that are not likely to diminish or di sappear . A defendant who boasts about his fight s with other inmates and has a long and depressing history of random violence is not likely to emerge from whatever portion of five years his

sentence requires him to serve with a thoughtful and pacific appro ach to his fellow man.

5 A not unreasonable concern given h is history.13 Suffice it to say, we do not believe the nature of respondent’s current
offense s is in any way mitigating, let alone a sufficient basis for striking his prior strike
conviction. The offense s w ere not as serious as some crimes, to b e sure, but considered in light of respondent’s criminal history

– and with a complete and utter absence of any mitigating “character and prospects” evidence

– they represent the continuation of respondent’s disturb ing penchant for victimiz ing innocent min orit ies in our community. By virtue of his prior offenses, respondent has shown he is fully willing and able to inflict great physical harm on his victims , and there is nothing to suggest he would not have done so again in this case, had Jasmine not been able to flee the scene and summon help
from the police.

In dismissing respondent’s prior strike conviction, the trial judge also relied
on the fact the co nviction was 14 years old at the time of sentencing. The judge felt this circumstance rendered the conviction too remote to use it against respondent at this stage of his criminal career, but as our Supreme Court’s decision in Williams illustrates, older
strike convictions do not deserve judicial forgiveness unless the defendant has used them as a pivot point for reforming his ways.

In Williams , the defendant had suffered two prior strikes and served three prison terms by the time he committed his third strike offense by driving under the
influence of PCP. As part of an indicated sentence, the trial judge struck one of his
strikes under section 1385 and sentenced him as a second

- strike offender to nine years in prison after he pleaded guilty to the char ges . The judge felt that result was justified because the prior strike was 13 years old and the defendant’s record since that time had
not been sufficiently egregious to warrant an indeterminate life term . However, the Supreme Court did not see it that w ay.

On review, the Williams court found the striking decision constituted an
abuse of discretion given the length and severity of the defendant’s criminal record.
While the court recognized 13 years passed between the time of the defendant’s strike14

convictions, it found that mattered little because he did not refrain from criminal activity during that interim period. To the contrary, he committed multiple misdemeanor and felony offenses, including one involving actual violence, and he performed poorly on probation and parole. The Williams court saw this as proof the defendant had not changed from the time of his prior offenses and was thus un deserving of leniency under

s ection 1385. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s striking decision a nd remanded the matter to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. ( Williams,

supra , 17 Cal.4th at pp. 163

- 165.)

Like the defendant in Williams , respondent fail ed to reform his behavior during the decade

- plus that elapsed between his first strike conviction and his third strike
conviction. Instead, he continued to do the same thing he has been doing since 1997 : break the law on a remarkably regular basis and wi th reckless abandon

. Following his
first strike conviction in 2005 for slashing a man’s face with a knife, he went on to commit over a dozen more offenses , including his present crimes in 2018. As detailed
above , many of those offense s involved actual violence and were utterly unprovoked.

What’s even more astonishing is that the 13

- year period respondent wants to rely on was one in which he spent over 10 years in jail or prison

. Despite spending more time in custody between strikes than the defendant in Williams , respondent managed to rack up just about the same number of convictions

.

Respondent was also given a tremendous break in 2017 when the court reduced his felony hate crime to a misdemeanor . This enabled him to avoid the imposition of a lengthy prison sentence at that time

. 6 Yet, before the dust settled on that case, he went out and committ ed another hate crime , against Jasmine

. His unrelenting criminal behavior since suffering his first strike conviction in 2005 demonstrates him to
be an unchanged man, with a stubborn character and no discern i ble prospects for reform.

6 The record does not reflect how in the world that happened

.15

W e therefore do not believe his first strike conviction w as what the law considers cognizably remote for purposes of the Three Strikes law. ( Willi ams, supra , 17 Cal.4th at pp. 162

- 164 ; People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [reversing order dismissing 20

- year

- old strike conviction because the defendant led “ a continuous life of
crime ” after th at conviction]; People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal .App.4th 310, 321 [ “the
remoteness in time of the (defendant’s 17

- year

- old) strike priors is not significant in light
of ( his ) continuous crime spree, which has substantially spanned his entire adult life” ] ;
compare People v. Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1 245 [upholding the dismissal of two prior strike convictions that were 17 to 20 years old where the defendant’s criminal activity since those convictions was limited to a handful of minor offenses].)

That brings us to the final factor the trial court cited to justify its sentencing
decision in this case , namely, that respondent pleaded guilty at an earl y stage of the proceedings. While this circumstance is relevant to our analysis, Williams teaches th e

mere presence of some mitigating circumstance s cannot insulate a trial court’s decision to strike a prior strike conviction against a charge of abuse of discretion. (See Williams,

supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 163 [ finding an abuse of discretion despite evide nce the defendant had a stable living arrangement , wa s a caring father, and was still loved and supported by his family ].) Respondent may have saved the state some expense by pleading guilty early

on in this case, but his extensive criminal record proves he is “an exemplar of the ‘revolving door’ career criminal to whom the Three Strikes law is addressed.” ( People v.
Stone (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 707, 717 .) Any expense saved the state by his plea would likely be re

- incurred with interest if he gets out in five years and there are still bus stops.

All of this convinces us the trial court abused its discretion in offering him
a reduced sentence. Wisely a nticipating we might reach this conclusion, respondent ’s
counsel asks t hat we remand the matter to permit him to file a sentencing brief or other documentation that might somehow justify the trial court’s sentencing decision. However, respondent had every opportunity to do so prior to his sentencing hearing ; he is16

not entitl ed to another bite at the apple. T he Williams decision makes clear that when, as here, the defendant’s guilty plea was motivated by the court’s indicated willingness to strike a prior strike conviction, the proper remedy is to reverse the judgment and rem and the matter to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed without that willingness complicating his decisions . ( Williams, supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 164.) Given this remedy, we decline respondent’s invitation to simply remand the matter for the presentation of further evidence. All charges and enhancements will be reinstated and the case returned to status quo ante the court’s offer.

We also find it unnecessary to consider the district attorney’s claim that, not only did the trial cour t abuse its discretion in striking respondent’s prior strike conviction, it a bused its discretion by striking his prior serious felony convictions and his prior prison t erms. Whether respondent deserves to have one or more of those
enhancements str icken i s something th e trial court can re visit should it be in a position to

resentence him in the future. While we do not rule out the possibility such relief may be warranted if respondent is ultimately convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison under the Three Strikes law, we express no opinion on that issue at this stage of the proceedings.17 DISPOSITIO N The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to permit respondent to withdraw his guilty plea and plead anew

.

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FYBEL, J.

THOMPSON, J

.