1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45642
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff

- Respondent,

v. CHAD SCHIERMEIER,

Defendant

- Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Boise, June 2019 Term
Opinion filed: August 26, 2019

Karel A. Le hrman, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Blaine County. Jonathan P. Brody, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Eric Don Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise for Appellant. Jenevieve C. Swinford argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

_______________________________________________ MOELLER, Justice.

I. NATURE OF THE C ASE Following a seven

- day trial , a Blaine County jury found Chad Schiermeier guilty of grand theft. Schiermeier appeals from his judgment of conviction
, argu ing that the St ate did not prove the elements of grand theft beyond a reasonable doubt. Schiermeier also argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. For the re asons stated below, we affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In the early 1990s
, the Blaine Coun ty Sherif f’s Office started Blaine County DARE/PAL
I nc

. ( “ DARE/PAL ” ). According to its articles of incorporation, DARE/PAL was organized exclusively for charitable and educational purpose s within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3)
in order “ to f oster, promote, encourage and increase the knowledge, and und erstanding of2 alcohol and drug addictions or related problems.” Art. III, Art. of Inc

. To further its purpose,
DARE/PAL offered outdoor

- related group activities during the summer months to children between the ages of nine and sixteen. Some of the activiti es included hiking , golfing, fishing, rafting, and attending b aseball games

. The activities were primarily funded by the Blaine County
Sheriff’s O ffice through drug forfeiture funds and by local philanthropists through donations and grants. Chad Schiermeie r was a deputy sheriff for the Blaine County Sheriff’s Office from 1999 to 2015, serving as a middle school resource officer and the director of DARE/PAL

. In 2002, in
accordance with the DARE/PAL by laws
, 1 the board of directors appointed Schiermeier to be the

manager of DARE/PAL

. The by laws and articles of incorporation gave the manager , and therefore Schiermeier,
wide discretion and authorization to spend the DARE/PAL funds in furtherance of the program : Duties . All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of and the affairs of the nonprofit corporation managed under the direction of the Board of Directors, except the Manager is authorized to exercise corporate powers, as set forth in the Articles of Incorporation and these By

- laws. Th e board of directors may:

. . . . (f) audit bills and disburse funds of the corporation; (g) employ agents; (h) determine what, if any, compensation shall be paid to a director of a project; and (i) devise and carry into execution such other measures a s it deems proper and expedient to promote the objects of the nonprofit corporation and to best protect the intere sts and welfare of its members. Art. V, section 4, Byl aws. “A manager is authorized to exercise some or all of the powers which
would otherwis e be exercised by or under the authority of the Board of Directors.” Art. IX, Art.
of Inc

. In order to effectively carry out his managerial duties, the board named Schiermeier an authorized user of th e DARE/PAL bank account.

1 Article VI of the DARE/PAL by laws provide: The Board of Dir ectors may appoint a Member to be a Manager, who is authorized to exercise some or all of the powers which would otherwise be exercised by the Board of Directors. To the extent so authorized, such Manager shall have the duties and responsibilities of the D irectors, and the Directors shall be relieved to that extent from such duties and responsibilities. The Board of Directors may remove the Manager at any time, with or without cause, by a majority vote of the Board of Directors

.3 Following Schiermeier’s appoint ment as manager, the board slowly became inactive
, neglecting its duties and en trusting Schiermeier to hand le all things related to DARE/PAL. By 2009, Schiermeier was the sole corporate officer involved in running the affairs of the program. In July 2015, a charitable group called 100 Men Who Care dona ted approximately $5,100

to D ARE/PAL

. Shortly thereafter
, the group followed up with Schiermeier’s supervisor, Lieutenant Carpita, to see how their donation had been spent

. Carpita in turn asked Schiermeier

. S everal mon ths went by with vague responses, if any , from Schiermeier

. Finally, in November 2015, after more than three months o f requests and meetings , Schiermeier provided Carpita with
the requested DARE/PAL bank records. After reviewing the records, Carp ita became susp icious
after he noticed “a lot of cash withdrawals through the ATM . . . during times when the PAL activities were not going on.” Consequently , Carpita decided to have the matter independently investig ated by the Idaho State Police.
The bank records revealed that from 2009 to 2015, Schiermeier made several extravagant purchases of high

- end outdoor equipment and clothing, including $2,365.91 for Swarovski binoculars, $429.00 for a single sleeping bag, $292.40 for safari

- grade hunting ammunitio n, $1,459.90 for two camera lenses, $69.00 for a goose down pillow, and $617.52 for mountaineering boots, gaiters, and a watch. S chiermeier also made multiple cash withdrawals totaling $17,745.00 in 2009, $17,120.00 in 2010, $19,765.00 in 2011, $13,320.00 in 2012, $12,200.00 in 2013, $4,260.00 in 2014, and $7,820.00 in 2015. Following the independent investigation by the Idaho State Police , t he State charged
Schiermeier with one count of grand theft. 2 The information alleged the following:
That the Defendan t, CHAD R. SCHIERMEIER, on or about January, 2009, up to and including December, 2015, in the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did wrongfully take, and/or obtain, and/or withhold, and/or exercise unauthorized control over, lawful money of the United State s, with an aggregate value in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), from the owner, Blaine County D.A.R.E/P.A.L., INC., with the intent to deprive another of property, and/or to appropriate to himself certain property of another, and/or to appropriat e to a third person certain property of another, to

- wit: through a common scheme or plan did unlawfully, and without authority, withdraw monies from US Bank account number XXXX

- 8338 by cash, and/or check withdrawals, and/or the use of a financial transacti on card, Visa debit card number XXXX

- 7161 and/or XXXX

1876, from an account exclusively for the use of the Blaine County

2 The State initially charg ed Schiermeier wit h six counts of misuse of public moneys by public officers and public employees. See I.C. § 18

- 5701.4 D.A.R.E./P.A.L., INC., to purchase merchandise and/or withdraw money for his personal use where the aggregate amounts of the separate i ncidents exceed one thousand dollars ($1000.00), in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18

- 2403(1), 18

- 2407(1)(b)(1), 18

- 2408(2)(a) GRAND THEFT, a FELONY. The j ury t rial commenced on August 23 , 201 7. After the State rested its case, Schiermeier moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a) . The district court
denied his motion

. At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Schiermeier once again moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(c) , or in the alterna tiv e, a new trial pursuant to Rule 34

. Schiermeier subsequently withdrew his motion because it was untimely.
Schiermeier then moved to dismiss the action in the interest of justice pursuant to Rule 48(a)(2).
The di strict court denied his motion.
On November 7 , 2017, the district court sentenced Schiermeier . The State recommended a sentence of fourteen years with six years fixed . Schiermeier rec ommended probation or a period of retain ed jurisdiction to participate in a r ider

. The district court followed the Sta te’s
recommendation and sentenced Schiermeier to a unified sentence of fourteen years with the first six years fixed

. No fine was imposed. The district court also ordered Schiermeier to pay $86,868 .03 in restitution to DARE/PAL. Schiermeier timely appeal ed

. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW “This Court will uphold a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime be yond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Tryon , 164 I daho 254, 257 , 429 P.3d 142, 145 (2018) (quoting State v. Kralovec , 161 Idaho 569, 572, 388 P.3d 583, 586 (2017)). “Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard.” State v.
Sheahan , 139 Idaho 267, 284, 77 P.3d 956, 973 (2003 ). “Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable, and thus, a clear abuse of discretion.” Id

. IV. ANALYSIS
A. T he State presented substantial evidence to support the jury ’s determination that Schiermeier’s taking, obtaining, withholding, or control of the DARE/PAL funds was wrongful and unauthori zed. Schiermeier contends that the State did not present substantial evidence at trial to convict
him of grand theft because the State failed to show that Schiermeier’s taking, obtaining,5 withholding, or control of the DARE/PAL funds was wrongful or unaut horized. Based upon our review of the proceedings and the trial record, we see no reason to disturb the jury’s verdict.
When a cri minal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict, “[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt but whether ‘after viewi ng the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Eliasen , 158 Idaho 542, 546, 348 P.3d 157, 161 (2015) (quoting State v. A damcik , 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012) (emphasis in original) )

. “ I n conducting this analysis, . . . we do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or
reasonable inferences to b e drawn from the evidence.” Adamcik , 152 Idaho at 460, 272 P.3d at
432. “Thus, ‘the only inquiry for this Court is whether there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have found that the State met its burden of proving the essential
el ements’ of the charged crimes ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Eliasen , 158 Idaho at 546, 348
P.3d at 161 (quoting Adamcik , 152 Idaho at 460, 272 P.3d at 432). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determi ning whether a disputed point of fact has been proven.” Id

. Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that there is substantial evidence in the record to support Schiermeier’s conviction for grand theft. The State charged Schiermeier with grand theft by wrongfully taking, obtaining, withholding
, or exercising unauthorized control over money valued in excess of $1,000 from DARE/PAL with the intent to deprive or ap propriate to himself the property of another. See I.C. §§ 18

- 2403(1), 18

- 2407(1)(b)
, 18

- 2408(2)(a). The jury was instructed as follows: In order for the defendant to be guilty of Grand Theft, the state mu st prove each of the following:
1. On or about or between January 2009 and December 2015 2. in the state of Idaho 3. the defendant Chad Schiermeier wrongfully took, obtained or withheld property or money described as: funds of Blain e County D.A.R.E./P.A.L., Inc., 4. another person was the owner of the funds 5. with the intent to deprive an owner of the funds or to ap propriate the fun ds, and 6. the funds ex ceeded one th ousand dollars ($1000) in value6 OR In order for the defendant to be guilty of Theft by Unauthorized Control, the state

mu st prove each of the following: 1. On or about or between January 2009 and Decembe r 2015 2. in the state of Idaho 3. the defendant Chad Schiermeier took or obtained or withheld money of Blain e County D.A.R.E./P.A.L., Inc., 4. another per son was the owner of the funds, 5. the defendant knew that the defendant was not authorized by the ow ner to do so, and 6. the defendant had the intent to deprive the owner of such funds 7. the funds exceeded one thousand ($1000) in value ( E mphasis added). As conceded by both sides , the jurors did not have to agree on th e form of
theft or the value
, so lon g as each j uror found a value over $1,000. See I.C.J.I. 555 (“ If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the defendant committed the crime of Theft, you should find the defendant guilty. You are not required to agree as to wh ich particular form of theft the defendant committed. ”)

. The only element of grand theft that is at issue is the “ wrongfully ” or “ not authoriz ed ”
element. On this element, t he State’s position at trial was that Sc hiermeier wrongfully and
without authorizat ion took the DARE/PAL funds when he used the funds to purchase high

- end
outdoor items for his personal use, and when he made several large cash withdrawals for undocumented purposes during the winter months when there were no DARE/PAL activities taking pla ce. On appeal, Schiermeier contends that , in order to prove he wrongfully took the funds, the State was required to show that he used the funds exclusively for non

- DARE/PAL

purposes. As Schiermeier’s counsel explained during oral argument, “there is nothin g wrong with Schiermeier using an item once and then gifting it to himself . . . or buying something initially for a personal use and then using it for the corporation.” We conclude that Schiermeier’s argument lack s merit. 3 Schiermeier provides no authorit y to support his contention that the State was required to
show he used the funds exclusively for non

- DARE/PAL purposes

. The district court correctly instructed the jury that in order to reach a guilty v erdict , the taking, obtaining, or withholding of
the DARE/PAL funds had to be “ wron gful” or “un authorized.” Although t he court did not defi ne

3 Accepting Schiermeier’s exclusivity argument would also mean accepting that Schiermeier would be authorized to purchase a $ 10,000 Rolex watch with the DARE/PAL funds provided that he used the watch at least once during a DARE/PAL activity, such as to keep time during a relay race.7 either term for the jury, it was not required to. When terms are of “common usage and are
sufficientl y generally understood,” trial courts do not need to further defin e these words with jury instructions. State v. Zichko , 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996). The common understanding of “wrong” is “not acco rding to the moral standard
, ” “without re gard for what is proper or just, ” or “something wrong, immoral, or unethical; esp : principles, practices, or conduct contrary to justice , goodness, equity, or law.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
1367 (10th ed. 1993). The common understanding of “unauthorized” is “without authority or permission.” Merriam Webste r Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam

webster.com/dictionary/unauthorized (last visited June 19, 2019). Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have determined for itself that Schiermeier’s use of the funds

was “ wrongful ” or “un authori zed” beyond a reasonable doubt. At trial, b oth the State and the defense explained to the jury that Schiermeier had complete authoriz ation to use the DARE/PAL funds, so long as his use was on behalf of an d in
furtherance of the program , as limited by t he a r ticles of incorporation, the by laws , and the

program ’s official designation as a § 501(c)(3) corporation. The State presented substantial
evidence from which a r easonable jury could conclude that Schiermeier did not use the
DAR E/PAL funds to furthe r the p urpose of the program , but instead used the funds to further his own personal interests.
T he St ate presented the jury with account summaries showing that from 2009 to 2015
Schiermeier made several purchases of high

- end outdoor equipment and clothing with the
DARE/PAL financial transaction card s

. Most of the purchases relate d specifically to hunting and archery

. For example, Schiermeier purchased big game hunting videos, safari

- grade hunting ammunition, a pistol grip head, a R ackulator (antler scoring devi ce) , an optimizer, an arrow rest, and a weather resistant men’s camo jacket with matching pants and beanie. The State showed
that n either hunting nor archery was an approved DARE/PAL activit y by admitting DARE/PAL
advertisements from prior years . The adver tisements displayed the type s of activities that
DARE/PAL offered
, none of w hich included hunting or archery

. Several witnesses also testified that hunting and archery were never DARE/PAL activities. Schiermeier, on the other hand, ran an outfitting busine ss on the side and traveled out

- of

- state on many personal hunting trips
, using many of the specified items during these trips, as evidenced by photos in the record.8 Moreover, a lthough the State was not required to show that Schiermeier used the items
excl usively for personal use, the State did in fact show t hat Schiermeier use d some of the items exclusively as his own. O ne key purchase, emphasized by the State at tri al and the district court

at sentencing, was the .375 H & H ammunition. As the district cou rt explained at sentencing, the
“.375 H & H ammunition

. . . would have no application for that program or law enforcement in

any way

. ” The Blaine County Sheriff’s Office did not own any guns that used t hat type of ammunition, and DAR E/PAL never put on any activities that used guns of any sort. On the other hand, that type of ammunition i s often used for hunting.
T he State also sufficiently proved that Schiermeier made multiple cash withdrawals during the winter months when there were no DARE/PAL activities taking place

. The S tate introduced a recording of a meeting between Schiermeier and his supervising lieutenant, Carpita, where Schiermeier explained that he withdrew thousands of dollars in case he needed cas h during one of the activities to pay for lunch es, for example. Schiermeier also explained that he
would use the cash to reser ve spot s at sporting events during the winter months. However, Schiermeier did not have any rece ipts to substantiate his explanatio n, which he was required to keep. Mary Kim Def fe, the DARE/PAL accountant and former treasurer, testified t hat
Schiermeier signed an engagement letter stating that he would keep all records and data in the event that there was any misunderstanding or audit by the IRS

. Moreover, i n 2012, when Deffe

not iced “more cash going out than [she] had noticed in prior years,” she confronted Schiermeier
and he assured her that the cash was going to DARE/PAL activities. Schiermeier had also previously assured Deffe that he had receip ts for all of the expenditures.
Schiermeier attempted to answer the State’s allegations by presenting his own evidence
and witnesses. T he defense repeatedly argued that there was a lack of supervision over
Schiermeier from 2009 to 201 5

. The State discredited this argument by explaining t hat a lack of supervision or control is not a defense to theft. The defense called three witnesses to rebut the
State’s case. One testified that he saw Schiermeier use each of the specified items during
DARE/PAL activities . T he State effectively cross

- exam ined the witness by showing potential
bias . Finally, the defense argued that Schiermeier could compensate himself as the director of the

program , yet explained that “[t]here’s no evidence that he ever did that , but he had the right to do
it. ” Schiermeier h ad also earlier admitted during a mee ting with Carpita that the cash “ doesn’t9 belong to me” and that he kept it in an envelope in case he needed it for any DARE/PAL
activities
, thereby negating his argument that he withdrew the c ash for compensation.
Based on the evidence presented at trial
, the jury was entitled to make a logical and permissible inferen ce that Schiermeier used the DARE/PAL funds for his own personal interests,
rather than in the interest s of the program

. Such an inference would support a f inding that
Schiermeier used the DARE/PAL funds wrongfully or without authorization . Therefore, we
conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support Schiermeier’s conviction for grand
theft

. B. T he district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Schiermeier to fourteen years with six years fixed

. Schiermeier contends that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to
an indeterminate sentence of fourteen years in prison, with the first s ix years fixed
, for grand
thef t. According to Schiermeier, t he mitigating circumstances warranted a more lenient sentence.
The State contends that the district court applied and balance d the goals of sentencing and concluded that a lesser sentence would depreciate t he serious nature of the crime. As noted, “[a]ppellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard.”
Sheahan , 139 Idaho at 284, 77 P.3d at 973

. “Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable, and thus, a cle ar abuse of discretion.” Id

. “A sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Id

. “A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing th at confinement is necessary ‘to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to the given case.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565 , 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)). “Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the Court conducts an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of t he offender and the protection of the public interest.” Id

. “For the purpose of review, this Court considers the fixed term of confinement as the sentence imposed.”
State v. Hansen , 138 Idaho 791, 797, 69 P.3d 1052, 1058 (2003). Here, the district court se ntenced Schiermeier to fourteen years with six years fixed.
U nder Idaho Code section 18

- 2408 (2)(a) , grand theft is punishable “by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one (1) year10 nor more than fourteen (14) years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” Therefore, b ecause Schiermeier was sentenced within the statutory limit s , it i s hi s burden to prove that the sentence of six years of imprisonment is unduly harsh under any rational vi ew of the facts. Schiermeier argues that the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment, retained jurisdiction , or placed him on probation in light of the m itigating factors, including his lack of any criminal history, absenc e of any substance abuse or mental health issues, acceptance of re sponsibility and remorse, and strong support network. According to Schiermeier, the district court did not give adequate weight to the statements of support and good
character , and failed to properly weigh Schiermeier’s contributi on to the community through
DARE/PAL and his time as a resource officer.
T he district court properly based its sentencing decision on the objectives of criminal sentencing which have been long

- recognized by the Idaho appellate courts. The court acknowledged that “the primary objective of sentencing is protection of society” as well as the “related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.” See Sheahan , 139 Idaho at 284, 77
P.3d at 973. The district court a lso recognized that the “reasonableness of the sentence requires consideration of the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and prot ection of the public interest.” Keeping these objectives in mind, the court reviewed and weighed the

aggrava ting and mitigating factors identified in Idaho Code section 19

- 2521. A finding of only
one of the six factors under section 19

- 2521(1) is necessary to support a prison sentence
, I.C. §
19

- 2521(1), while the factors under section 19

- 2521(2) do not “control [ ] the discretion of the court, [but] shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment,” I.C. § 19

- 2521(2). In reviewing the aggravating factors under section 19

- 2521( 1 ) , the court first considered
whether a lesser sanction would d epreciate the seriousness of the crime . The court found that it
would

. The court explained that placing Schiermeier on a rider

— i.e. , retaining jurisdiction

— would be inadequate because Schiermeier has no history of substance abuse or addiction which
contrib uted to the crime, thereby making in

- custody treatment pointless. The court also found
that a fine alone would be inadequate because it would not “serve the purposes of sentencing,” and probation would be inadequate because “[t]here’s an undue risk whether a crime will be committed on probation.” The court looked at the harm that was caused by Schiermeier’s conduct, explaining that he stole thousands of dollars from the community over a span of six11 years , harming the program financially and the public’s tru st

. 4 Finally, t he court found that
Schiermeier did not fully take responsibility for his actions , as evidenced by the PSI . Schiermeier
was focused solely on the crime’s impact on himself, stating that he was not a criminal and
wanted his life back.
In rev iewing the mitigating factors under section 19

- 2521(2) , the court acknowledged
that Schiermeier had a lot of support from family and friends, showing that he “did a lot of positive.” Schiermeier also had no criminal history and complied with all court cond itions while he was released pending trial. The court noted that Schiermeier seemed to show more remorse at the sentencing hearing than he did in his PSI

. T he court also noted that Schiermeier’s time in jail
ha d taken a serious toll on his health as eviden ced by his significant weight loss and gout diagnosis. After considering the objectives of sentencing and after weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors that were present , t he court concluded that a term of incarceration was the only appropriate sen tence . “A lesser sentence would depreciate the serious nature of the crime, would not protect the public interest, and would not appropriately punish [him].” Thus, the court
sentenced Schiermeier to four teen years with six years fixed

. The reasons outline d by the district court for its sentence are sufficient to justify the

sentence. I t is evident from the record that the district court did take into account Schiermeier’s lack of criminal history, his eventual remorse, the community statements of support a nd good character, and his contribution

— a s well as harm

— to the community. Although we agree that the

sentence is rather high for a first

- time offender
, based on the circumstances of this c ase , we conclude that it is not excessive to a degree where we are c ompelled to hold that the district court abused its discretion

. Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s sentence of fourteen years with six years fixed was not excessively harsh.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm Schiermeier’s judgment of convicti on for one co unt of grand theft. We also
affirm the district court’s sentence of four t een years with six years fixed.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BEVAN, STEGNER and Justice Pro Tem WALTERS CONCUR.

4 The record shows that the DARE/PAL program no longer exists in Blaine County due in part to insolvency.