Dn.,20U 

## CSB ISSUES URGENT RECOMMENDATIONS TO CITGO; FINDS INADEQUATE HYDROGEN FLUORIDE WATER MITIGATION SYSTEM DURING CORPUS CHRISTl REFINERY FIRE LAST JULY
Houston, TelUIS, Da:ember

### 9,

### 2009- The 

### U.S. Chemical Safety Board 

### (CSB) 

### todayissued ur:gc:nt safety 

### nlCOIIIIIleDdatons camng onCITOO to 

### immediately improve its

### emezgency water 

### mitigation system inthe 

### event ofanothtll'release of potentially 

### d&adly hyd!ogo.n flumide (HF) 

### vapor, u ocam:ed 

### following an explosion and fire 

### July 

### 19,2009, atCITOO's Coxpus Christi refinery. The 

### Board 

### also**call~!d** 

### on CITOO to pe1fonn thir:d-party 

### audits to eruJlln'l 

### the safety 

### of its hydrogen fluoride llllits 

### at

### its COlpiiS 

### Christi, TC!XU, 

### and Lemont, 

### Illinois, refineries. The CSB issues 

### urgcmtrec:ommsda1ions before completion offinal 

### investigation up:uts in CII!KIS**wh~!re** 

### CSB Board Members datmnine 

### an imminsthazard 

### may be present 

### and has 

### the po1ell1ialto

### cause serious lwm

### unl&SS rec:tified 

### in

### a short

### lime&ame. On

### the day 

### of the accidmrt last

### July, hydrocarbons and 

### hyd!ogen ftuoride Wl!re 

### suddenly n!leased. ftom 

### the refinery's HF alkylation uniL The**hydrocarbon!~** 

### ignited, leading to 

### a fire 

### lhat b'II!Ud. for 

### several day!. 

### The tire 

### critically injured one**~!mployee** 

### and 

### anoth«Wll8 

### treated 

### for 

### possible hyd!og1111 fluoride C!XpOIIIIRI. 

### CSB investigators detamined that 

### a blockage ofliquid caused by 

### the sudden 

### failure ofa control valve led to

### violmrt shaking within tho 

### process recyclepiping. Tho shaking broke tlmiaded. 

### pipe conni!Cti.ons 

### resulting intho reloaso ofhydrocarbons.. Tho cloudofhydrocalbons IeaChod 

### an adjaclll.tunit and 

### ignited. The

### llll.&uing tire

### caused. multiple 

### additional tires 

### and

### the reloaso of approximately42,000 

### pounds ofhydmgen

### fluoride from

### equipment and

### piping within 1M unit. 

### Tho refinery used a water 

### spray system

### to absorb

### tho released HF, but

### the CSB 

### cillld &cillll.tific**literatun.~** 

### to

### conclude thatat

### least4,000 

### pounds ofHF 

### lilcely escaped 

### fimn 1M unit into 

### 1M**atmosph~~~:e** 

### and 

### left

### the mcility. Investigators 

### dllterminMthat

### during the first

### day 

### of response efforts CITQO n&arl.y 

### C!Xhausllldthe Stultdwater 

### supply 

### for tho water

### mitigstion S)'!tem. 

### Apprt-ximately eleven..and-a-halfhO'Ill'S after

### the initial 

### nllease, befoxe

### the watrr 

### supplywas11/1312015 CSB Issues Urgent Recommendations to CIT GO; Finds**I~** Hydrogen FluorideWfilli!r Mitigation System**duri~** Corpus Christi Refinery Fire L.

.. completely exhausted, the refmery beganpumping salt water from the ship channel into the refinery fire water supply. Multiple failures occurred during the salt water transfer including ruptures ofthe barge-to-shore transfer hoses and waterpump engine failures.
CSB Chairman John Bresland said, "It is imperative that refineries have the proper emergency response resources available to control a release ofhazardous materials andprotect against impact on the surrounding community."
The CSB's urgent recommendations call on CITGO to develop and initiate plans within 

### thirty days to ensure an adequate water supply to the refinery's HF mitigation system. The company should also report planned or completed actions 

### to the Refinery Terminal Fire Company and the Local Emergency Planning Committee every thirty days until all planned activities are fully implemented. Investigations Supervisor Robert Hall, P.E., said, "Our investigation closely examined emergency response actions related 

### to this accident. Investigators found that the CITGO water mitigation system serves as the last line ofdefense to protect the community from an HF release. The CSB's urgent recommendation aims to improve the reliability ofCITGO's Corpus Christi, Texas, HF water mitigation system."
A second urgent recommendation called on CITGO to commission independent, third-party audits ofthe safety ofits two HF alkylation units at refineries in Corpus Christi and Lemont, Illinois. The audits should compare safety practices at the alkylation units to those recommended by the American Petroleum Institute (API). Investigators said that CITGO 

### had never conducted such an audit ofthe units, despite an existing industry recommendation for audits every three years. The CSB also released video ofthe initial pipe failure, release, ignition, and fire as captured by two refinery surveillance cameras. Chairman Bresland noted, "The camera footage shows the release and spread ofthe flammable vapor cloud and the moment when the flammable vapor was ignited. It showsjust how severe the release and fire were during this incident."
Chairman Bresland said, however, that the company had raised objections to the CSB's release ofthe video, saying that doing so would "raise substantial issues ofnational security" and would "only sensationalize this unfortunate accident." The CSB subsequently received affirmation from the Department ofHomeland Security that the video did not fall under certain classifications requiring protection from disclosure.
Chairman Bresland said, "We found this claim disturbing and believe that it is contrary to the intent ofa recent law passed by Congress, following similar secrecy claims by Bayer CropScience in Institute, West Virginia. This law, the American Communities' Right to Public Information Act, states that national security classifications may not be used to conceal corporate errors, prevent embarrassment, or improperly delay the release ofinformation to the public. 

### An important part ofthis CSB investigation is to ensure all relevant information and visual materials regarding this accident are made available to the residents ofCorpus Christi."
The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the president and confirmedby the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects ofchemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies inregulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

http:llwww.csb.gav/csb-issues-urgent-recommendations-to-citgo-finds-i**~hydrogen-** II uoride-wfilli!r-miligation-system-d.Jring-corpus-ciTisti-refinery-fi... 2131111312015 CSB Issues Urgllllt Recommenci&lions ID CITGO; Finds lnader.JIIIB HyWogen FluorideWa Mitigation SystBm**vi~** Carpus Christi Refinery Fire L •.• 

### The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Please visit our website, www.csb.gov

. For more information, please contact Hillary Cohen (202) 446-8094 

### cell or Dr. 

### Daniel Horowitz, (202) 441-6074 

### cell.

Back 

# @SB

2175 K. st....t,. NW, Suite 400 I W..hlngtan, DC 20037·1808 Phane: (202) 281·7800 I Fax: (202) 281-7850 I Emili:**n~meOcAp**

02015 CSB.OOV. ALL RIOH'I'S RESERVED**~J/www.<:Sb.ggv/csb-issues-urglri-recommendali~bcitgo-fi~i~hydragen-ftuoride-wala'·mitigali~syslan-<bi~cor~christi-refinery·fi...** 313