Filed 4/12/21 P. v. Tittle CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DARRELL JAMES TITTLE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D077928

 (Super. Ct. No. SCD176296)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.

Bruce L. Kotler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.

In October 2004, a jury convicted defendant Darrell James Tittle of 

voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,1 § 192) among other offenses. In 

January 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

1170.95. On August 3, 2020, the court denied the petition, finding defendant 

was statutorily ineligible because he had not been convicted of murder. 

Defendant appealed. Unable to identify any arguable issues, appellate 

counsel has sought independent review of the record pursuant to People v. 

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 

738 (Anders). Affirmed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This summary is taken from defendant’s direct appeal in People v. 

Tittle (May 5, 2006, D045845) [nonpub. opn.] (Tittle I). Defendant has 

requested we take judicial notice of that opinion and we grant his request. 

Defendant and codefendant Na’il Downey,2 then members and 

associates of a Lincoln Park street gang, were stepbrothers by marriage. On 

June 15, 2003, they traveled to Mission Bay Park in San Diego to meet up 

with other gang members and attend a festival. When they arrived, they saw 

people there who were associated with a rival gang, the Skyline Pirus. 

Defendant and Downey walked quickly toward the rival gang members where 

they exchanged hostile and derogatory words. One Skyline member punched 

defendant in the face after a soda can was thrown at that member. The 

gangs then exchanged blows. (Tittle, supra, at *5.)

Within seconds of the fight breaking out, Downey pulled out a .38 

caliber revolver from his waistband and fired between four and six shots at 

the Skyline group. Everyone fled after the shots were fired and police 

immediately arrived. Skyline member Travis Thomas was hit in the upper 

chest by one bullet and died within the hour. A second bullet passed through 

the calf of another Skyline member, causing great bodily injury. A third 

bullet hit the foot of yet another Skyline member. (Tittle, supra, at *6–7.)

2 Downey is not a party to this appeal.
3

Following a lengthy investigation which saw multiple events of 

intimidation, defendant and Downey were arrested.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 29, 2004, defendant, Downey and a third individual were 

charged by amended information in count 1 with the murder of Thomas

(§ 187, subd. (a)); and with special allegations (§§ 12022.53, subds. (d) and 

(e)(1) [use of a firearm] & 186.22, subd. (b)(1) [committed for the benefit of a 

street gang].) In counts 2 and 3 they were charged with attempted murder 

(§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)); and also with special allegations (§§ 12022.53, 

subds. (c), (d) and/or (e)(1) [use of a firearm] & 186.22, subd. (b)(1) [committed 

for the benefit of a street gang].) The amended information further alleged 

defendant had suffered a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)); one serious felony 

prior (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); and one strike prior (id., subds. (b)-(i).)

On October 1, 2004, a jury found defendant in count 1 not guilty of 

murder but guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter

(§ 192), and found true defendant committed count 1 for the benefit of a 

street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found defendant not guilty 

of attempted murder in counts 2 and 3, but as to each count found he was 

guilty of the lesser offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Defendant 

waived jury on the alleged priors and the court made true findings as to the 

prison prior, serious felony prior, and strike prior. (Tittle I, supra, at *2–3.)

On November 11, 2005, the court sentenced defendant to a total term of 

28 years in prison. (Tittle I, supra, at *3.) This court in Tittle I reversed 

defendant’s convictions on counts 2 and 3 for attempted voluntary 

manslaughter based on instructional error. (Id. at *68.)

As noted, on January 9, 2019, defendant filed a pro. per. petition and 

supporting documentation under 1170.95 concerning his remaining 
4

conviction, and requested the conviction be reduced and dismissed. He also 

requested counsel be appointed for him. A motion in opposition was filed by 

the People. The court summarily denied the petition, finding defendant had 

not made a prima facie showing he fell within section 1170.95 because he was 

not convicted of murder.

As also noted, appellate counsel has filed a brief under Wende and 

Anders, stating he has read and thoroughly reviewed the record, and has 

consulted with Appellate Defenders, Inc. Counsel states he has found no 

specific grounds for reversal or modification of the case, and asks we 

independently review the record to determine if we can identify any such 

grounds. Under Anders, counsel requests we consider whether the trial court 

erred in failing to grant relief under section 1170.95, where defendant was 

convicted of voluntary manslaughter and the jury was instructed on the 

natural and probable consequences theory. 

Defendant has filed a supplemental brief in his own behalf, raising 

essentially the same question counsel points out with respect to section 

1170.95.

We have reviewed the entire record and focused attention of the 

question of applicability of section 1170.95. 

DISCUSSION

“ ‘If the language [of a statute] is clear, courts must generally follow its 

plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd 

consequences the Legislature did not intend.’ ” (People v. Flores (2020) 44 

Cal.App.5th 985, 992.) “[S]ection 1170.95 authorizes only a person who was 

‘convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable 

consequences theory [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the 

petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated . . . .’ (Id., subd. 
5

(a), italics added.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or 

she is entitled to relief, the sentencing court must ‘hold a hearing to 

determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence 

and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts . . . .’ (Id., subd. (d)(1), 

italics added.) In lieu of a resentencing hearing, the parties may stipulate 

that ‘the petitioner is eligible to have his or her murder conviction vacated’ 

and to be resentenced. (Id., subd. (d)(2), italics added.)” (Flores, at p. 993.) 

“Through its repeated and exclusive references to murder, the plain language 

of section 1170.95 limits relief only to qualifying persons who were convicted 

of murder.” (Flores, at p. 993; see People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 

884, 887 (Cervantes) [noting the “plain language of [section 1170.95] is 

explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions”].)

“Section 1170.95 does not mention, and thus does not provide relief to, 

persons convicted of manslaughter, which, ‘while a lesser included offense of 

murder, is clearly a separate offense . . . .’ [Citation.] Had the Legislature 

intended to make section 1170.95 available to defendants convicted of 

manslaughter, it easily could have done so.” (Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 993; see Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 887 [concluding there “is no 

reference [in section 1170.95] to the crime of voluntary manslaughter”].)

Because the plain language of section 1170.95 is clear, and does not 

lead to an absurd result, we will follow its plain meaning and conclude that 

convictions for voluntary manslaughter are ineligible for relief under section 

1170.95. In so doing, we are in accord with the uniform line of decisions by 

other Courts of Appeal that hold section 1170.95 applies to defendants 

convicted of murder, not to defendants who plead to and are convicted of a 

lesser offense. (People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914, 916 [charged 

with first degree murder with a gang enhancement, pled guilty to voluntary 
6

manslaughter and admitted enhancement]; People v. Turner (2020) 45 

Cal.App.5th 428, 431–432 [charged with first degree murder and firearm and 

gang enhancements, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted 

firearm enhancement]; Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 989–990 [charged 

with murder with robbery and gang enhancements, pled guilty to voluntary 

manslaughter and admitted enhancements]; Cervantes, supra, 44 

Cal.App.5th at p. 887 [charged with murder, pled no contest to voluntary 

manslaughter].) We therefore conclude the court properly denied defendant’s 

section 1170.95 petition.

Following our independent review, we conclude there are no other 

issues which would modify or reduce the sentence or otherwise reverse this 

case. 

Defendant has been represented by competent counsel on this appeal.

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant relief under section 1170.95 is affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

HALLER, J.