United States Tax Court

T.C. Memo. 2024-20

SUSAN D. TURNER,

Petitioner

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

__________

Docket No. 19487-22. Filed February 8, 2024.

__________

Susan D. Turner, pro se.

Alexander R. Roche and Abigail J. Engelhart, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

CARLUZZO, Chief Special Trial Judge: In a notice of deficiency 

(notice) dated June 27, 2022, respondent determined a deficiency in 

petitioner’s 2020 federal income tax.

The issues for decision are whether petitioner (1) is entitled to an 

earned income tax credit and (2) qualifies for head of household filing 

status.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. When 

the Petition was filed, petitioner resided in Illinois.

Served 02/08/24
2

[*2] Petitioner is the grandmother of A.V.1 and has been A.V.’s court 

appointed guardian since 2007. A.V. was not employed during 2020. 

Throughout the year in issue, petitioner helped A.V. pay for rent, phone 

bills, clothing, food, transportation, and other personal expenses. 

As of the close of 2020, petitioner was not married and A.V. was 

a minor. For most of the year, A.V. lived at a friend’s house. A.V. lived 

with petitioner for approximately 60 days during 2020. 

As relevant here, on her 2020 federal income tax return petitioner 

claimed (1) an earned income credit computed as though A.V. was her 

qualifying child and (2) the standard deduction applicable to an 

individual who qualifies as a head of household.

In the notice respondent (1) disallowed the earned income credit 

and (2) changed petitioner’s filing status from head of household to 

single and adjusted the standard deduction accordingly.

OPINION

In general, the Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of 

deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of 

proving that the determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. 

Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).

As we have observed in countless opinions, deductions and credits 

are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of 

proving entitlement to any claimed deduction or credit. Rule 142(a); 

INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial 

Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). 

I. Earned Income Credit

Petitioner claimed an earned income credit as an eligible 

individual with a qualifying child. According to petitioner, A.V. was her 

qualifying child. According to respondent, petitioner does not have a 

qualifying child within the meaning of section 32(c)(1)(A)(i) and (3), and 

she is not entitled to the credit as claimed.

1 Minor children are not identified by name in documents that are issued by 

the Court and available for public inspection; instead we refer to them by their initials. 

See Rule 27(a)(3). Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal 

Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.), in effect at all relevant times, and Rule 

references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
3

[*3] Subject to various conditions and limitations, an eligible 

individual is entitled to an earned income credit. I.R.C. § 32(a). An 

“eligible individual” includes an individual who has a qualifying child 

for that tax year. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(i). A qualifying child is defined in 

section 32(c)(3)(A) to mean “a qualifying child of the taxpayer (as defined 

in section 152(c), determined without regard to paragraph (1)(D) thereof 

and section 152(e)).” 

In general, an individual may be treated as the qualifying child of 

a taxpayer if the individual (1) is a child of the taxpayer or descendant 

of such a child; (2) has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer 

for more than one-half of such taxable year; (3) meets certain age 

requirements; and (4) has not provided over one-half of such individual’s 

own support for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the 

taxpayer begins. I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)–(3).

A.V. does not fit the definition of a qualifying child under section 

152(c) because, as noted above, A.V. and petitioner did not share the 

same principal place of abode for more than one-half of the year. 

Petitioner does not suggest that any individual other than A.V. fits the 

definition of her qualifying child. It follows that petitioner is not entitled 

to an earned income credit as an eligible individual with a qualifying 

child.2

II. Head of Household 

The amount of the standard deduction depends on the taxpayer’s 

filing status. I.R.C. § 63(c)(2), (4). Section 63(c)(2)(B) provides a specific 

standard deduction for an individual who qualifies as a head of 

household under section 2(b). 

As relevant here, an unmarried individual will qualify as a head 

of household if the individual maintains as the individual’s home a 

household that is the principal place of abode, for at least one-half of the 

year, of (1) a qualifying child as defined under section 152(c) or (2) any 

other person who is a dependent of the taxpayer, if the taxpayer is 

entitled to a deduction for the taxable year for such person under 

section 151. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1). 

2 From what has been submitted, it does not appear that petitioner is entitled 

to an earned income credit applicable to an eligible individual without a qualifying 

child, but we make no finding on the point. If the parties agree that she is, then they 

can reflect that allowance in their Rule 155 computations.
4

[*4] Petitioner’s home was not the principal place of abode for more 

than one half of 2020 of a qualifying child or any other person who might 

qualify as petitioner’s dependent. That being so, petitioner is not 

entitled to head of household filing status for 2020. Respondent properly 

changed her filing status from head of household to single and adjusted 

the standard deduction accordingly.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.