SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0708-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JEREMIAH A. JACKSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted February 4, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and Hoffman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 12-08-1955.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (John Vincent Molitor, Designated Counsel, 

on the brief).

Damon G. Tyner, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (Nicole Lynn Campellone, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief. 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

March 11, 2020
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Defendant appeals from an order entered by the Law Division on August 

1, 2018, which denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.

I.

In August 2012, an Atlantic County grand jury returned Indictment No. 

12-08-1955, charging defendant with second-degree burglary, while armed,

N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count one); second-degree conspiracy to commit burglary, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1) and (b)(2) (count two); second-degree 

burglary, during which bodily injury was inflicted, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count 

three); first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count four); seconddegree conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-

1 (count five); first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) (count six); 

first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count seven); first-degree 

felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(2) (count eight); second-degree possession 

of a weapon (shotgun) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count 

nine); second-degree conspiracy to possess a weapon (shotgun) for an unlawful 

purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count ten); second-degree 

possession of a weapon (handgun) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) 

(count eleven); second-degree conspiracy to possess a weapon (handgun) for an 

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count twelve); second-
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degree unlawful possession of a weapon (shotgun), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(1) 

(count thirteen); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (handgun); 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count fourteen); and fourth-degree tampering with 

physical evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (count fifteen). 

Defendant was tried before a jury. At the trial, the State presented 

evidence showing that on the evening of December 9, 2011, Ellis Spell, Jr. was 

in his bedroom with his cousins and a friend at the home of his parents, Rhonda 

Lawrence and Ellis Spell, Sr. At around 8:30 p.m., one of Ellis, Jr.'s cousins 

observed a person, who was apparently looking for his older brother, but he was 

not at home.

Ellis, Jr. turned on the porch light and saw a black male, dressed in black, 

with a "black shirt tied around his face." Ellis, Jr. realized that the man was 

holding a shotgun. He locked the door and ran to his bedroom to alert his cousins 

and his friend. One of Ellis, Jr.'s cousins saw a man on the porch holding "a 

long gun." He saw another person making his way around the house. Another 

cousin heard "pounding" on the front door or the porch wall and heard someone 

say, "[y]ou know what we [are] here for." 

Ellis, Jr. went to the kitchen to lock the back door. He saw someone 

pointing "a silver revolver," and he went to warn his parents. Ellis, Sr. pushed 
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him into one of the bedrooms. Rhonda hid in a bedroom closet and called 9-1-

1. She could hear Ellis, Sr. cursing at the men and demanding to know what 

they wanted. According to Rhonda, a man said, "You know what we came for." 

She heard Ellis, Sr. enter the bedroom and slam the door, after which there were 

sounds indicating that the men kicked the bedroom door open. She heard a 

scuffle and "three gunshots." 

One of Ellis, Jr.'s cousins jumped out of the bedroom window and Ellis, 

Jr. followed. Ellis, Jr. said that before he left the house, he heard his father 

demand to know what the men wanted, followed by the sounds of a "tussle . . . 

like[] they were fighting." The cousin stated that once outside, he heard three 

gunshots. He saw three black men carrying what appeared to be two handguns 

and a long gun. They ran past him and entered a four-door vehicle. 

Police responded to the 9-1-1 call and found Ellis, Sr. lying on his back 

on the bathroom floor. He was dead. The medical examiner determined that he 

had been struck by two, small-caliber bullets. One of the bullets entered at the 

bottom of his right cheek, exited his body, and reentered his chest. The second 

bullet pierced the right shoulder and traveled downward. The medical examiner 

attributed Ellis, Sr.'s death to the gunshot wounds and scalp lacerations. 
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Three days after the shooting, the police received a tip from a confidential 

informant and arrested Tyree Kelly on the street. Kelly was carrying the guns 

used in the murder and robbery. Kelly agreed to testify for the State. He stated 

that he and defendant were close friends. He met defendant the morning after 

the shooting. Defendant was with two other men, whom Kelly did not know. 

Defendant told Kelly he went to the Spell residence with an older man, who had 

a gun, and a "younger guy." 

Defendant asked Kelly to get rid of the guns, which were dropped off at 

Kelly's apartment a day or two later. Defendant said he targeted the Spell 

residence for a robbery because he and the other men heard they were moving 

drugs out of the house. Defendant stated that when they entered the house, the 

older man had been "fighting . . . at the [back] door." He told Kelly there was a 

scuffle. The shotgun fell and discharged. 

Kelly stated that he cleaned the guns so that he could sell them. 

Defendant's blood was found on the t-shirt Kelly used to clean the guns. Kelly 

was on his way to Philadelphia to sell the guns when the police arrested him. 

He said that shortly after the murder, defendant bragged about the shooting and 

admitted he "did it." 
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The State's ballistics expert testified that the bullets found in Ellis, Sr.'s 

body had been fired from the handgun the police recovered from Kelly. In 

addition, the State's forensic scientist testified that a sweatshirt found on the 

floor of defendant's car had DNA of Ellis, Sr. and defendant.

The jury found defendant guilty of murder (count six), felony murder 

(count seven), burglary while armed with a firearm (count one), conspiracy to 

commit armed burglary (count two), burglary during which bodily injury was 

inflicted (count three), conspiracy to possess a weapon (shotgun) for an unlawful 

purpose (count ten), and conspiracy to possess a weapon (handgun) for an 

unlawful purpose (count twelve). The jury found defendant not guilty of the 

other charges. 

The judge later sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of fifty years of 

imprisonment with an eighty-five-percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant 

to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant appealed 

from the judgment of conviction dated September 24, 2013. He raised the 

following arguments:

POINT I

THE MURDER CONVICTION MUST BE 

REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO 

CHARGE AGGRAVATED AND RECKLESS 
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MANSLAUGHTER AS LESSER-INCLUDED 

OFFENSES. (Not Raised Below).

POINT II

THE CONVICTIONS FOR BURGLARY AND 

BURGLARY FELONY MURDER MUST BE 

REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT INSTRUCTED 

THE JURY THAT IN ORDER TO CONVICT 

DEFENDANT OF BURGLARY IT HAD TO FIND 

THAT HE ENTERED THE PREMISES FOR THE 

PURPOSE OF COMMITTING MURDER, BUT 

FAILED TO EXPLAIN THAT AS AN 

ACCOMPLICE, DEFENDANT MAY NOT HAVE 

SHARED THE PRINCIPAL'S INTENT TO COMMIT 

MURDER. (Not Raised Below).

POINT III

THE CONVICTIONS FOR BURGLARY AND 

BURGLARY FELONY MURDER MUST BE 

VACATED BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND, IN 

ACCORDANCE WITH THE COURT'S 

INSTRUCTION, THAT THE BURGLARY WAS 

COMMITTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF 

COMMITTING MURDER, AND THE STATE 

FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 

DOUBT THAT THAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE 

BURGLARY. (Not Raised Below).

POINT IV

THE CONVICTIONS FOR BURGLARY AND 

BURGLARY FELONY MURDER MUST BE 

VACATED BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO 

PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT 

DEFENDANT ENTERED THE PREMISES 

WITHOUT LICENSE OR PRIVILEGE, AN

ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF BURGLARY. (Not 

Raised Below).
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POINT V

THE SENTENCE OF 50 YEARS, 42.5 YEARS 

WITHOUT PAROLE, IMPOSED ON THE MURDER 

CONVICTION IS EXCESSIVE AND IS BASED ON 

IMPROPER CONSIDERATIONS TREATED AS 

AGGRAVATING FACTORS.

We affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences in an unpublished 

opinion. State v. Jackson, No. A-1425-13 (App. Div. 2015) (slip op. at 9 to 24). 

Thereafter, the Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. 

State v. Jackson, 223 N.J. 282 (2016). 

II.

On April 28, 2016, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition in the Law 

Division, alleging he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. The 

court assigned counsel to represent defendant. Thereafter, defendant filed 

certifications dated November 17, 2016, and April 12, 2018, in support of his 

petition. 

In his certifications, defendant claimed his trial attorney was ineffective 

because the attorney: (1) failed to advise him adequately with regard to the 

State's plea offer; (2) did not provide him with the discovery so that he could 

make an informed decision regarding the State's plea offer; (3) failed to 

challenge the State's DNA evidence; (3) advised him to reject the State's plea 

offer and go to trial because counsel "was familiar" with one of the jurors; (4) 
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conceded defendant was present at the crime scene and was shot at that location; 

(5) failed to object to "expert-like" testimony of a witness who said defendant 

suffered an injury to his thumb; (6) did not conduct an independent investigation 

of certain suspects or contact other witnesses defendant identified; (7) did not 

request voir dire of a juror who was seen sleeping during trial; (8) failed to 

consult a DNA expert to test the results of the State's expert; and (9) did not

object to the trial court's instructions. 

On August 1, 2018, the PCR court heard oral argument and placed an oral 

decision on the record. The judge found that defendant was barred from raising 

many of the issues presented in his petition because they should have been raised 

on direct appeal. The judge further found that defendant failed to present a 

prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The judge found that defendant had not established that his trial attorney

was deficient in his handling of the case. The judge also found that defendant 

failed to show he was prejudiced by any of the attorney's claimed errors. The 

judge noted that at trial, the State had presented a strong case which established 

that defendant committed the offenses for which he was found guilty. The judge 

entered an order dated August 1, 2018, denying PCR. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant's appellate PCR counsel argues:
10 A-0708-18T4

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL 

COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S 

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

BECAUSE DEFENDANT RAISED A PRIMA FACIE 

CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL THROUGH HIS ALLEGATIONS THAT 

HIS TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO CONTEST THE 

STATE'S EVIDENCE AND IMPROPERLY 

RELIEVED THE STATE OF ITS BURDEN TO 

PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE 

DOUBT. 

Defendant has filed a pro se supplemental brief. He argues:

PCR COUNSEL WAS INEFFECIVE FOR FAILING 

TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT 

INVESTIGATION OF THE LEGAL CLAIMS 

RAISED IN MY PETITION FOR POST 

CONVICTION RELIEF IN ACCORDANCE WITH 

THE [PRINCIPLES] ESTABLSIHED IN STATE [v.] 

RUE, [175 N.J. 1] (2002); [R.] 3:22-1. 

III.

As noted, defendant argues that the PCR court erred by failing to conduct 

an evidentiary hearing on his petition. He contends he presented a prima facie 

case of ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. 

An evidentiary hearing is only required on a PCR petition when the 

defendant has established a prima facie case in support of PCR, the court has 

determined there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved 

based on the existing record, and the court finds an evidentiary hearing
11 A-0708-18T4

necessary to resolve the claims presented. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 

(2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)). "To establish a prima facie case, defendant must 

demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts 

alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on 

the merits." R. 3:22-10(b). 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 

must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) counsel's performance 

was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. See

State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the two-prong test from 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) for proving ineffective 

assistance of counsel). The "mere raising of a claim of [ineffective assistance 

of counsel] does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing." State v. 

Peoples, 446 N.J. Super. 245, 254 (App. Div. 2016). A court should not grant 

an evidentiary hearing if "defendant's allegations are too vague, conclusory, or 

speculative." R. 3:22-10(e)(2). 

To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must overcome 

a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A deficient 

performance means that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
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functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 

Id. at 687. 

Furthermore, to establish the prejudice prong, the defendant must 

establish "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome of the matter." Id. at 694. 

However, in order to establish a prima facie claim, a defendant "must do 

more than make bald assertions he was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). The 

defendant "must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged 

substandard performance." Ibid. Moreover, when a defendant claims his trial 

attorney did not adequately investigate the case, "he must assert the facts an 

investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications 

based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the 

certification." Ibid. (citing R. 1:6-6).

On appeal, defendant argues that his trial attorney was deficient because 

he failed to perform an independent investigation to locate certain unnamed 

"suspects." He contends his attorney "did nothing" to contest the State's DNA 
13 A-0708-18T4

evidence. He also contends his attorney's lack of effort left him with two choices 

– either plead guilty to a crime he allegedly did not commit, or go to trial with 

an attorney who "refused to do anything to contest the State's evidence." 

As stated previously, defendant claims his trial attorney failed to conduct 

an adequate investigation of other "suspects" or persons who could have 

provided testimony exonerating him. However, he did not identify those 

persons, nor did he provide the PCR court with any affidavits or certifications 

from these individuals, based upon their personal knowledge, setting forth their

proposed testimony. 

Defendant also claims his trial attorney was deficient because he failed to 

challenge the State's DNA evidence. However, he did not provide the PCR court 

with an affidavit or certification from a qualified DNA expert, setting forth an 

opinion with the basis upon which the State's DNA evidence could have been 

challenged. 

Defendant also alleges that his trial attorney was deficient because he 

failed to provide him with discovery. He claims that without such information, 

he was not able to make an informed decision regarding the State's plea offer. 

The PCR court found, however, that record of the pre-trial conference on 
14 A-0708-18T4

December 17, 2012, refuted defendant's claims. The record supports that 

finding. 

At the pre-trial conference, the judge noted that defendant had been 

charged with various offenses in fifteen counts. Defendant's attorney told the 

judge that he had reviewed the discovery with defendant, and that he had 

discussed the State's plea offer with defendant. The record shows that under the 

State's plea offer, defendant would plead guilty to felony murder and the State 

would recommend a twenty-five-year prison term, with an eighty-five percent 

period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to NERA.

The prosecutor briefly summarized the facts of the case. He said that at 

trial, the State intended to prove that defendant and two unnamed persons went 

to the victim's house. The prosecutor said defendant and the other persons tried 

to get in the front door, but they were "stymied." According to the prosecutor,

defendant and the others entered the house through the back door and surprised 

the victim while he was in the shower. They shot and killed the victim and fled 

in an automobile. The prosecutor said the State's evidence included the weapons

used in the incident, DNA evidence of defendant and the victim, and witness 

testimony. 
15 A-0708-18T4

The judge then questioned defendant on the record. The judge told 

defendant he faced serious charges including murder, felony murder, and armed 

robbery. The judge explained that if convicted of felony murder, defendant 

could be sentenced to life imprisonment, with a lengthy period of parole 

ineligibility. The judge also told defendant that if he were convicted of other 

offenses, additional sentences could be imposed, which could be consecutive.

The judge asked defendant if he understood what he had told him. 

Defendant said, "Yes." Defendant stated that he wanted to reject the State's 

plea offer and proceed to trial. The judge asked defendant if he was sure he 

wanted to "turn down [twenty-five years]." Defendant replied, "Yes." 

Thus, the record establishes that defendant was provided with the 

discovery and that trial counsel had advised defendant concerning the State's 

plea offer. Defendant told the judge he wanted to reject the offer. He did not 

have any questions, or suggest he had not been adequately counseled regarding 

the plea offer.

Defendant also claims that his attorney failed to discuss trial strategy with 

him. However, defendant has not explained the strategies he believes counsel 

should have discussed with him, or how the alleged lack of these discussions 

prejudiced his defense. As we stated previously, defendant "must do more than 
16 A-0708-18T4

make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." 

Ibid.

We therefore conclude that the record supports the PCR court's finding 

that defendant failed to establish that his attorney's performance was deficient. 

The record also supports the court's determination that defendant failed to show 

he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficiencies. As the PCR court found, 

the State presented strong evidence at trial, which supported the jury's verdict. 

Assuming that trial counsel's handling of the matter was deficient in some 

respects, defendant failed to show the result here probably would have been 

different, but for those alleged deficiencies. 

We also conclude that because defendant failed to present a prima facie

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR court correctly determined 

that defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition. 

IV.

As noted, in his pro se supplemental brief, defendant contends he was

denied the effective assistance of PCR counsel because counsel failed to conduct 

an independent investigation of the claims raised in his petition. He claims he 
17 A-0708-18T4

asked his attorney to consult a DNA expert to examine the DNA evidence and

requested counsel to file a motion for post-conviction DNA testing. He also 

disputes the State's evidence that a sweatshirt was found in his car with 

bloodstains on it. 

In addition, defendant asserts that PCR counsel failed to investigate 

whether his trial attorney advised him of his sentencing exposure when the State 

made its plea offer. He claims the plea offer was "actually" an offer of twentyfive years to life, instead of an offer of twenty-five years with an eighty-five 

percent period of parole ineligibility. He alleges he relied upon his trial attorney 

to advise him properly during the trial and pre-trial plea discussions. 

Defendant claims that at the pre-trial conference, the trial judge 

"attempted" to explain his sentencing exposure. He asserts, however, that this 

was his attorney's responsibility. He states that his trial attorney did not fully 

explain the plea offer to him and he did not "fully understand" the State's offer. 

He asserts that he "naively" rejected the State's plea offer because his attorney

did not "fully" explain it to him. 

Defendant also claims his trial attorney was ineffective because he 

conducted plea negotiations before the court ruled on his pre-trial motions. He 

contends plea negotiations should be conducted after the court decides the pre-
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trial motions so that he could be in a better position to determine whether to 

accept the plea offer or proceed to trial.

We are convinced that defendant's supplemental arguments lack sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We note, 

however, that defendant has not shown that PCR counsel was deficient in 

handling the petition, or that the matter would have been resolved differently if 

PCR counsel had conducted a further investigation of defendant's claims or 

consulted with a DNA expert. 

Defendant did not provide any certification or affidavit explaining what a 

further investigation would have revealed. He failed to establish that the result 

of a PCR proceeding would have been different if PCR counsel had conducted 

a further investigation.

Moreover, as noted previously, the PCR court addressed defendant's claim 

that his trial counsel failed to advise him adequately regarding the State's plea 

offer, and correctly determined that defendant failed to establish that his 

attorney's advice regarding the plea was deficient. The contention that PCR 

counsel was deficient in handling that issue is entirely without merit. 

Defendant's other claims that he was denied the effective assistance of PCR 

counsel are unsupported by the record. 
19 A-0708-18T4

Affirmed.