16‐398‐ag

Peng Lin v. Sessions

BIA

Morace, IJ

                               A205 930 983   

                

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

          

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.  CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.  WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE

(WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ).  A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT

ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in

the City of New York, on the 23rd day of April, two thousand eighteen.

PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,

    DENNY CHIN,

    SUSAN L. CARNEY,

      Circuit Judges.      

    

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PENG LIN, AKA JIEDI LIN,   

      Petitioner,   

   

     v.           16‐398‐ag   

           

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED STATES  

ATTORNEY GENERAL,         

      Respondent.

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FOR PETITIONER: TROY NADER MOSLEMI, Flushing, New

York.  
   

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FOR RESPONDENT: CHRISTOPHER BUCHANAN, Trial Attorney,

(Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney

General, Civil Division, Melissa Neiman‐

Kelting, Assistant Director, on the brief), Office

of Immigration Litigation, United States

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C..  

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a decision

of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the ʺBIAʺ), IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is hereby DENIED.  

Petitioner Peng Lin, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a

January 19, 2016 decision of the BIA affirming the May 18, 2015 decision of an

Immigration Judge (ʺIJʺ) denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under

the Convention Against Torture (ʺCATʺ).  In re Peng Lin, No. A205 930 983 (B.I.A. Jan.

19, 2016), aff’g No. A205 930 983 (Immig. Ct. New York City, May 18, 2015).  We assume

the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and

issues on appeal.

    Under the circumstances of this case, we consider both the IJʹs and the

BIAʹs opinions ʺfor the sake of completeness.ʺ  Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448

F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).  The applicable standards of review are well established.  

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165‐66 (2d Cir. 2008) (per

curiam).     
   

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    Substantial evidence supports the agencyʹs determination that Lin was not

credible.  Although Lin testified consistently with his earlier statements regarding the

alleged police abuse he suffered at an unregistered church in China, he made a number

of admittedly false statements about his prior travel, including: (1) how many times he

had obtained a passport; (2) whether he obtained a passport to flee persecution or to

travel; (3) when and how often he left China; and (4) where he travelled.  These

numerous false statements provided a substantial basis for the agency to question Linʹs

veracity with respect to all aspects of his claims.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also

Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (ʺSo a single false document or a single

instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the

alienʹs uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.ʺ).   

    Lin also failed to exhaust his due process claim.  Linʹs brief to the BIA only

characterized his claim regarding the unsubmitted record as evidentiary in nature, with

a single citation to Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a).  ʺWhile this Court will not limit the

petitioner ʹto the exact contours of his argument belowʹ . . . the issue raised on appeal

must be either a ʹspecific, subsidiary legal argument[]ʹ or ʹan extension of [an] argument

. . . raised directly before the BIA.ʹʺ  Steevenez v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 2007)

(per curiam) (quoting Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005)).  Linʹs claim on appeal is

neither a specific, subsidiary legal argument nor an extension of his argument below.  

We therefore conclude that Linʹs due process claim was unexhausted.  Moreover, even
   

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assuming the claim was exhausted, Lin was not prejudiced by the Government’s failure

to submit the document in question because he admitted the veracity of the information

contained therein.  See Garcia‐Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008).   

    We have considered Lin’s remaining arguments and determined they lack

merit.  Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED.  As we have completed our

review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.   

       FOR THE COURT:  

       Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk