1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

ABDOLJAVAD SHAHNIA, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 1:23-cv-2337 (ACR) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiffs are Iranian citizens who have applied for immigrant visas to move to the United 

States. In April 2023, consular officers refused Plaintiffs’ applications pending further 

administrative processing. After four months without further developments, Plaintiffs joined the 

tidal wave of litigants in this District challenging visa-processing delays. Understandable as 

Plaintiffs’ frustration may be, their Complaint does not state any plausible claims. The Court 

therefore dismisses this case without prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Legal Background 

 A U.S. citizen who wants to help a noncitizen relative obtain lawful permanent resident 

status may file an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS), a subagency of the Department of Homeland Security. See 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154; 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). If USCIS approves the petition and the 

beneficiary relative is outside the United States, the agency forwards the case to the State 

Department’s National Visa Center (NVC) for processing. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(3). The 

beneficiary relative must then submit additional paperwork, including a visa application form. 
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See 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.62-.63; 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(b), https://fam.state.gov/FAM/ 

09FAM/09FAM050401.html [https://perma.cc/B6J7-Q748]. Once the applicant (that is, the 

beneficiary relative) meets those requirements, the NVC coordinates with the appropriate 

consulate or embassy to schedule the applicant for a required consular interview. See 22 C.F.R. 

§ 42.62; 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(b)-(d). 

 Following the interview, the consular officer “must” generally either “issue the visa” or 

“refuse the visa.”1

 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). If the consular officer determines that she needs 

additional information to determine the applicant’s eligibility, she may, “in accordance with 

[State] Department procedures,” refuse the visa pending “further administrative processing.” 

Administrative Processing Information, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://travel.state.gov/content/ 

travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/administrative-processing-information.html 

[https://perma.cc/WVZ8-GRT8]. 

B. Factual Background 

 The Court takes the facts from Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

 Plaintiff Abdoljavad Shahnia is an Iranian citizen, as is his stepson, co-Plaintiff Shahryar 

Shahnia. Dkt. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 9. Abdoljavad’s wife, Arezou Akhyari, is a U.S. citizen.2

 Id. In 

June 2021, Akhyari filed an I-130 petition on Plaintiffs’ behalf. Id. ¶ 10. In September 2021, 

USCIS approved the petition and forwarded it to the NVC. Id. ¶ 11; Dkt. 1-6 at 8. “Plaintiffs 

1

 The consular officer must instead “discontinue granting the visa” if the applicant’s country is 

subject to visa sanctions under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d). 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). No party argues that 

such sanctions apply to Iran. 

2

 The Complaint does not specify the relationship between Akhyari and Shahryar; Plaintiffs’ 

Opposition refers to her as his stepmother. Dkt. 5 at 17. 
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submitted . . . online . . . [v]isa [a]pplication” forms in January 2022.3

 Compl. ¶¶ 5, 12. 

Consular officials at the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, Armenia, interviewed Plaintiffs on April 6, 

2023. Id. ¶ 13. “After the interview, Plaintiff[s] received a notice . . . that their [a]pplications 

had been ‘refused’ . . . [pending further] administrative processing.” Id. ¶ 14. Consular officials 

requested that Plaintiffs provide additional information, which Plaintiffs submitted.4 Id. ¶ 15. 

Plaintiffs have received no further “explanation or justification for the delay,” which remains 

ongoing. Id. ¶ 16. 

C. Procedural Background 

 Plaintiffs filed this case against the U.S. Department of State and Secretary of State 

Anthony J. Blinken in August 2023. Compl. Citing both the Administrative Procedure Act 

(APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706, and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Complaint 

asserts that the delay in in adjudicating Plaintiffs’ applications is unreasonable and requests an 

order requiring prompt adjudication. Compl. ¶¶ 28-45; id. at 10. Defendants moved to dismiss 

the Complaint in October 2023. Dkt. 4 (Mot.). 

3

 The parties oscillate between referring to a single “application” and to multiple “applications.” 

Compare, e.g., Compl. ¶ 12, and Dkt. 4 at 2 (singular), with Compl. ¶ 14, and Dkt. 4 at 9 

(plural). The Court’s best reading of the filings is that, in State Department parlance, Plaintiffs 

each submitted an application, see, e.g., Dkt. 5 at 1-2; see also 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1 

(describing application process), and the Court therefore uses the plural. This numerosity nit 

makes no substantive difference; the Court’s conclusions would not change if Plaintiffs 

submitted only one joint application. 

4

 Plaintiffs do not state when they submitted this information. See Compl. ¶ 15. They cite an 

exhibit to the Complaint as “confirm[ing Defendants’] receipt” of the supplemental submissions, 

id., but all the dates in that exhibit are from before April 2023, Dkt. 1-6 at 24-26, so it is hard to 

see how Plaintiffs could have submitted the listed documents in response to post-interview 

inquiries. The Court does not dwell on this point, however, because even if Plaintiffs answered 

all follow-up questions on the day they interviewed, the delay still would not be unreasonable. 
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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 

 When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Where, as 

here, “the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional 

allegations,” Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000), 

the Court “assume[s] the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe[s] 

the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived 

from the facts alleged,” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 642 F.3d at 1139 (cleaned up). 

 To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (cleaned up). To meet that standard, a plaintiff’s allegations must support a “reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard 

is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (cleaned up). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up). 
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III. ANALYSIS 

 Defendants argue both that Plaintiffs have sued the wrong parties—and therefore lack 

standing—and that the Complaint does not state any plausible claims.5

 The Court rejects the first 

argument but agrees with the second. 

A. Plaintiffs Have Sued Appropriate Defendants 

 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack standing—which requires, among other things, 

“that a favorable decision will likely redress” Plaintiffs’ injuries, City of Scottsdale v. FAA, 37 

F.4th 678, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up)—because “neither [Secretary Blinken nor the State 

Department] can favorably adjudicate an application for a visa.” Mot. at 5. This Court, like 

many (though not all) others in this District, has previously rejected this argument, and it stands 

by that conclusion. See Rashidian v. Garland, No. 23-cv-1187, 2024 WL 1076810, at *4 

(D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024); see also, e.g., Sharifymoghaddam v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1472, 2024 WL 

939991, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2024). But see Nusrat v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-2801, 2022 WL 

4103860, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2022) (finding no standing to sue Secretary Blinken). “[W]hile 

the Secretary of State has no legal authority to control which visa applications consular officers 

grant or deny, nothing precludes him from directing them to decide pending applications within a 

reasonable time,” and an order requiring him to do so would likely redress Plaintiffs’ injuries by 

5

 Defendants also argue that the consular nonreviewability doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ claims and 

that Defendants do not have any clear, nondiscretionary duty to act, as is necessary for a 

mandamus claim. Mot. at 6-17. The Court has previously explained why it need not address 

these arguments—neither of which implicates its Article III jurisdiction over this case—before 

dismissing a visa-delay case for failure to state a claim, see Rashidian v. Garland, No. 23-cv1187, 2024 WL 1076810, at *5 & n.5 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024), and sticks to that approach here. In 

addition, Defendants contend that the Court should treat their Motion as conceded because 

Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the Opposition to the Motion roughly two weeks late. Dkt. 6 at 1-2; see

LCvR 7(b); Dkts. 4, 5. The Court does not condone Plaintiffs’ counsel’s lack of diligence, but, 

since the Court will grant the Motion on the merits and Defendants have shown no prejudice 

from the late filing, the Court excuses this lapse. 
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ending the challenged delay. Rashidian, 2024 WL 1076810, at *4 (quoting Khazaei v. Blinken, 

No. 23-cv-1419, 2023 WL 6065095, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023)). The same reasoning 

extends to the State Department, which, Defendants acknowledge, is “effectively . . . the same” 

party as Secretary Blinken in this context. Dkt. 6 at 2. Plaintiffs thus have standing to sue 

Defendants. 

B. Plaintiffs Have Not Stated Plausible Unreasonable-Delay Claims

 The Court turns to the merits of Plaintiffs’ unreasonable-delay claims under the APA and 

the Mandamus Act. “[T]he central question” under both statutes is “whether the agency’s delay 

is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.” Barazandeh v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 23-cv-1581, 

2024 WL 341166, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024) (quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 

849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 

 To answer that question, courts in this Circuit consider the six “TRAC” factors, drawn 

from the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Telecommunications Research & Action Center (TRAC) v. 

FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984): (1) “[T]he time agencies take to make decisions must be 

governed by a rule of reason”; (2) “where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication 

of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory 

scheme may supply content for this rule of reason”; (3) “delays that might be reasonable in the 

sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake”; 

(4) “the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a 

higher or competing priority”; (5) “the court should also take into account the nature and extent 

of the interests prejudiced by delay”; and (6) “the court need not find any impropriety lurking 
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behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.” Id. at 80 

(cleaned up). “These considerations are often grouped into four basic inquiries”: 

First, is there any rhyme or reason—congressionally prescribed or 

otherwise—for an agency’s delay (factors one and two)? Second, 

what are the consequences of delay if the Court does not compel the 

agency to act (factors three and five)? Third, how might forcing the 

agency to act thwart its ability to address other priorities (factor 

four)? Finally, is the delay intentional or due to any impropriety on 

the part of the agency (factor six)? 

Khazaei, 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up). 

 Conducting these four inquiries, the Court concludes that the TRAC factors do not 

plausibly point Plaintiffs’ way, making dismissal appropriate. See Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. 

Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 340-46 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of visa-delay case for 

failure to state claim based on TRAC factors). 

 1. TRAC factors one and two 

 The first two factors, which consider whether the agency is following a “rule of reason,” 

“congressionally prescribed or otherwise,” Khazaei, 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up), 

support dismissal. Plaintiffs concede that “there exists no . . . congressional mandate on the time 

frame [sic]” for adjudicating their applications. Dkt. 5 (Opp.) at 18. Thus, the question is 

whether Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that there is no “rhyme or reason” behind the delay. 

Khazaei, 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up). 

 Plaintiffs have not done so. An agency “employs a rule of reason” when it processes 

immigration applications on a “first-in, first-out” basis, Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 340-41, and 

“[c]ourts in this jurisdiction often look to the length of delay as a rough yardstick to determine 

whether that ‘first-in, first-out’ rule is, in fact, being applied,” Khoshrou v. Blinken, No. 22-cv2859, 2023 WL 4930086, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2023); accord, e.g., Barazandeh, 2024 WL 
8 

341166, at *8 (“Absent a congressionally supplied yardstick, courts typically turn to caselaw as a 

guideline.” (cleaned up)). Caselaw confirms that the delay here is neither unusual nor 

inconsistent with a rule of reason. Visa processing inevitably “takes a baseline amount of time,” 

and “courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess of five, six, seven years are 

unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not unreasonable.” Khazaei, 

2023 WL 6065095, at *6. The delay in this case—roughly fifteen months since Plaintiffs’ 

interviews6

—is similar to or shorter than those that courts have found reasonable in similar 

cases. See, e.g., Sharifymoghaddam, 2024 WL 939991, at *5 (fifteen-month delay); Barazandeh, 

2024 WL 341166, at *7-8 (twenty-month delay). Since Plaintiffs cite nothing other than the 

length of the delay in support of their argument, their allegations do not support a reasonable 

inference that the agency is not processing applications in an orderly, rational way. The first two 

TRAC factors favor Defendants. 

 2. TRAC factor four 

 The fourth factor, “the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher 

or competing priority,” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80, “carries significant weight,” Barazandeh, 2024 

WL 341166, at *9, and cuts heavily in Defendants’ favor. The D.C. Circuit has “refused to grant 

relief, even though all the other factors considered in TRAC favored it, where a judicial order 

putting [a party] at the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space and 

produce no net gain.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 

1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs seek exactly this type of relief. “Consular 

6

 Courts disagree as to the details of how to calculate delay in cases like this one—for example, 

whether the relevant end date is the day of the case’s filing or the day of the decision. See, e.g., 

Dehkordi v. Bitter, No. 22-cv-2470, 2023 WL 5651845, at *4 n.4 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2023). The 

Court follows Plaintiffs’ lead in treating the interview date as the start of the delay, see, e.g., 

Opp. at 19; Dkt. 7 at 2, and assumes, favorably to Plaintiffs, that the delay runs through today. 
9 

processing capacity is . . . a zero-sum game, so granting [Plaintiffs] relief would necessarily 

mean additional delays for other applicants—many of whom undoubtedly face hardships of their 

own.” Ahmadi v. Scharpf, No. 23-cv-953, 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2024) 

(cleaned up); accord Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 343-44. “Any such reordering of the queue of 

applicants seeking adjudication would be inappropriate . . . because there would be no 

demonstrable net gain in visa processing at large.” Ahmadi, 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (cleaned 

up); accord Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 343-44. 

 Plaintiffs respond that this analysis “assume[s] without any factual basis that . . . 

Plaintiffs’ . . . [a]pplication[s are] not already at the front of the line or completely ignored by . . . 

Defendants.” Opp. at 19 (cleaned up). But it is Plaintiffs’ burden to allege sufficient facts to 

support a “reasonable inference that [Defendants are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. The Court has already explained why the length of the delay thus far, standing 

alone, cuts against Plaintiffs’ claims, see supra Section III.B.1, and they cite nothing else in the 

Complaint showing that Defendants have deprioritized Plaintiffs’ applications. The fourth TRAC

factor “weighs against judicial intervention.” Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344. 

 3. TRAC factors three and five 

TRAC factors three and five, which examine “the interests prejudiced by the delay,” 

including the effect on “human health and welfare,” Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344 (quoting TRAC, 

750 F.2d at 80), arguably favor Plaintiffs but are not enough to swing the balance. Plaintiffs 

allege that the delay “has caused them . . . significant, ongoing harm [because] they remain in 

legal limbo as to whether they [will] be reunited [with Ms. Akhyari] in the United States,” 

Compl. ¶ 18, and courts in this District have concluded that similar allegations tilted these factors 

in other plaintiffs’ favor, if only narrowly, see, e.g., Siddiqui v. Blinken, 646 F. Supp. 3d 69, 77 
10 

(D.D.C. 2022) (finding that the third and fifth TRAC factors “slightly” favored a visa-delay 

plaintiff based on an allegation that the delay “‘had a profound and negative impact’ on his 

life”). But see Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344-45 (concluding that these factors did not favor visadelay plaintiffs absent harms beyond “the uncertainty that results any time an individual must 

continue to wait to secure a benefit”). But, while Plaintiffs’ distress is understandable, “many 

others facing similar circumstances” are suffering the same harm. Siddiqui, 646 F. Supp. 3d at 

77 (cleaned up). Without more unusual or urgent injuries, the third and fifth TRAC factors do 

not justify the Court’s overruling the agency’s priorities and moving Plaintiffs to the head of the 

line. See Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344-45. 

 4. TRAC factor six 

 The sixth TRAC factor—whether “any impropriety lurk[s] behind agency lassitude,” 

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80 (cleaned up)—does not favor either side. Plaintiffs concede that they 

“have not alleged any impropriety.” Opp. at 20. Since the Court “need not find any 

[impropriety] in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed,” this factor is neutral. 

Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 345-46 (cleaned up). 

* * * 

 The TRAC factors do not plausibly point Plaintiffs’ way, and their unreasonable-delay 

claims therefore fail. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

 The Court sympathizes with Plaintiffs’ situation. But their Complaint does not state 

plausible unreasonable-delay claims, and so the Court must dismiss this case. 
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For these reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 4; 

DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Dkt. 1, and this case without prejudice; and DIRECTS the 

Clerk of Court to close this case. 

SO ORDERED.

 This is a final appealable Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). 

Date: June 27, 2024 _________________________ 

ANA C. REYES 

 United States District Judge