* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________ No. 98-21153

Summary Calendar

_________________

MARIA SERRANO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ST JOSEPH’S HOSPITAL,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-97-CV-3337)

August 5, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff-Appellant, Maria Serrano (“Serrano”), appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee, St. Joseph’s Hospital (“St. Joseph’s”). Serrano alleges that

St. Joseph’s violated her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et

seq . (“FMLA”) when it fired her for allegedly abusing its leave of absence policy.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo

. S ee Boyd v. State Farm

Ins. Co.

, 158 F.3d 326, 328 (5 th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is enti tl ed to

judgment as a matter of law." F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(c).

Serrano contends that the district co urt erred in granting summary judgment because she-2-

raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she lied when she applied for and obtained her

leave of absence. Serrano also contends that, because St. Joseph’s agreed to her leave of absence,

the district court erred in not finding St. Joseph’s estopped from firing her.

When St. Joseph’s granted Serrano leave it required her, pursuant to the FMLA, to provide

a medical certification that she had a “serious health c o ndition.” S ee 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).

Serrano, however, has never demonstrated that she had “serious health co ndit ion” entitling her to

leave for the full period of her absence from work. The record shows that Serrano spent part of her

leave visit ing her daughter in Chicago. Serrano has not shown that she took this part of her leave

because of a “serious health condition,” or that she was otherwise entitled to this part of her leave

under the FMLA. S ee 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1); s e e also Murray v. Red Kap Indus., Inc.

, 124 F.3d

695, 696 (5 th Cir. 1997) (finding no violation of the F MLA, where employer fired employee for

missing eight days of work, and where employee could not show that she suffered from a “serious

health condition”). Moreover, Serrano has not shown a causal connection between the leave to which

she was entitled to under the FMLA and her subsequent discharge. Accordingly, the district court

properly concluded that Serrano failed to establish a prima facie case that St. Joseph’s fired her in

retaliation for exercising her rights under the FMLA. See Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., Inc.

, No.

98-30155, 1999 WL 414269, at *2 (5 t h Cir. June 22, 1999) (noting that to establish a prima facie

case the plaint iff must establish a causal connection between the protected activity and the discharge).

Additionally, Serrano has not shown that an agreement ex ist ed bet ween herself and St.

Joseph’s permitting her to take leave to visit her daughter. Her estoppel claim, therefore, also fails.

See Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Vela

, 147 Tex. 478, 485, 217 S.W.2d 660, 663 (1949) (“An estoppel

is defensive in character. It does not create a cause of action. Its function is to preserve rights, and

not to bring into being a cause of action.”); Roberts v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co.

, 470

S.W.2d 719, 726 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1971) (“[E]stoppel serves to prevent a party’s conduct

and actions from operating as a denial of the right of enforcement of a contractual obligation already

created .”) (emphasis added).-3-

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment.