FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TASHA WILLIAMSON, an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CITY OF NATIONAL CITY; LUCKY 

NGUYEN; JOHN MCGOUCH,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 20-55966

D.C. No.

3:18-cv-02394-

WQH-JLB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 10, 2021

Pasadena, California

Filed January 24, 2022

Before: Susan P. Graber, Consuelo M. Callahan, and 

Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Forrest
2 WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of 

defendants’ summary judgment motion asserting qualified 

immunity in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

and state law alleging that police officers used excessive 

force when they removed plaintiff from a city council 

meeting where she and others were protesting. 

The protest prevented the city council meeting from 

continuing and police officers warned the protesters that they 

had to leave the meeting room or they would be arrested. The 

protesters refused to leave and passively resisted being 

removed by going limp. Officers handcuffed the protesters 

and carried or pulled them by their arms from the meeting 

room. Plaintiff Tasha Williamson alleged that she suffered 

wrist and shoulder injuries when she was forcibly removed.

The panel determined that it had jurisdiction over this 

interlocutory appeal, noting that whether an officer’s 

conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is a legal issue. The 

panel next held that it had jurisdiction over the denial of 

summary judgment on Williamson’s California’s Tom Bane 

Civil Rights Act (the Bane Act) claim, under the doctrine of 

pendent appellate jurisdiction because the rulings related to 

that claim and Williamson’s Section 1983 claim were 

inextricably intertwined.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY 3

The panel concluded that the Officers did not violate 

Williamson’s Fourth Amendment rights; therefore, there 

was no need to address the clearly-established prong of the 

qualified immunity analysis. Even viewing the evidence in 

Williamson’s favor, the type and amount of force used by 

the Officers in this case was minimal. The Officers did not 

strike Williamson, throw her to the ground, or use any 

compliance techniques or weapons for the purpose of 

inflicting pain on her. Rather, they held her by her arms and 

lifted her so they could pull her out of the meeting room after 

she went limp and refused to leave on her own or cooperate 

in being removed. 

The panel further concluded that although National 

City’s interest in forcibly removing Williamson from the city 

council meeting was low, it was not nonexistent; the city was 

not required to permit the organized lawlessness conducted 

by the protestors. The panel concluded that the severity of 

the officers’ intrusion and the weight of National City’s 

interests were aligned; that is, the city’s interests were low, 

and the Officers’ use of force was appropriately minimal. 

The Officers were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. 

Because the panel concluded that defendants did not violate 

Williamson’s Fourth Amendment rights, it reversed the 

district court’s decision denying summary judgment on 

Williamson’s Bane Act claims.
4 WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY

COUNSEL

Lee H. Roistacher (argued), Mitchell D. Dean, and 

Heather E. Paradis, Dean Gazzo Roistacher LLP, Solana, 

Beach, California, for Defendants-Appellants.

Douglas S. Gilliland (argued), The Gilliland Firm, San 

Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

This excessive force case concerns how police officers 

responded to a protest that Plaintiff Tasha Williamson and 

others participated in during a National City, California, city 

council meeting. The protest prevented the city council 

meeting from continuing, and police officers warned the 

protesters that they had to leave the meeting room or they 

would be arrested. The protesters refused to leave and 

passively resisted being removed by going limp. Officers 

handcuffed the protesters and carried or pulled them by their 

arms from the meeting room. Williamson sued under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she suffered wrist and 

shoulder injuries when she was forcibly removed. We 

conclude that the officers did not use excessive force in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment, and we reverse the 

district court’s denial of the officers’ summary judgment 

motion asserting qualified immunity.
WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY 5

I. BACKGROUND1

A. The protest

In July 2018, protestors, including Williamson, 

performed a “die-in” at a city council meeting in National 

City, related to the death of Earl McNeil, a black man who 

died in police custody.2 At a predetermined time, the

protestors disrupted the meeting by chanting, and several of 

them made their way toward the public speaking podium and 

city council members. After showing the city council 

members their “bloody hands,” six protesters lay down on 

the ground near the podium, keeping their red-painted hands 

raised and chanting “I am Earl McNeil,” and “you have 

blood on your hands.” Several other people associated with 

the protest remained in the audience showing painted red 

hands, chanting, and video-recording the demonstration. The 

mayor called for order, but the protesters refused to stop their 

demonstration, and the council meeting was adjourned.

A few minutes after the protest began, National City 

police officers informed the protesters that they would be 

arrested if they did not leave the podium area. When the six 

protesters ignored repeated requests to leave, the officers 

1 Given the procedural posture of this case, we present the facts in 

the light most favorable to Williamson. Ames v. King County, 846 F.3d 

340, 347 (9th Cir. 2017). However, “[w]e do not credit a party’s version 

of events that the record, such as an unchallenged video recording of the 

incident, ‘quite clearly contradicts.’” Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 

1120 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Scott v. County of San Bernardino, 903 

F.3d 943, 952 (9th Cir. 2018)); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 

380–81 (2007).

2 McNeil’s death was ruled a homicide by the medical examiner. See 

DA Releases Video of Earl McNeil’s Detention by National City Police, 

NBC News San Diego, Sept. 22, 2018.
6 WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY

began arresting them. The protesters had previously agreed 

that, if arrested, they would act as dead weight and refuse to 

cooperate with being removed. The six protestors followed 

through with this agreement, and officers pulled or carried 

each of them out.

B. Williamson’s arrest

Officers Lucky Nguyen and John McGough3 (the 

Officers), handcuffed Williamson with her wrists behind her 

back and brought her to a seated position. But as they lifted 

her toward a standing position, they lost their grip on her and 

she rolled back to the ground on her stomach. The Officers 

then repositioned Williamson onto her back and again tried 

lifting her. Officer Nguyen held Williamson under her left 

arm, and Officer McGough held her under her right arm. As 

they lifted her up, Williamson initially placed her feet under 

her, but she did not support her own weight. The Officers 

struggled to lift Williamson and pulled her backward by her 

arms and wrists while she was in nearly a seated position. 

Williamson was loudly chanting before the Officers started 

removing her from the room. During the approximately 

12 seconds that she was being pulled from the room, 

Williamson screamed continually. As the Officers and 

Williamson approached the exit door, Officer McGough 

released Williamson’s upper right arm, and Officer Nguyen 

dragged her through the doorway alone, by her left wrist and 

forearm.

In the hallway outside the meeting room, Williamson 

told the Officers that they had hurt her shoulder, and they 

3 Officer McGough’s name is spelled inconsistently throughout the 

record and the district court’s decision. This opinion uses the spelling 

from Officer McGough’s declaration.
WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY 7

called an ambulance. The Officers also double-cuffed 

Williamson to lessen the tension on her arms and make her 

more comfortable, but she complained that they were “still 

pulling” her arms in doing so. Paramedics arrived, evaluated 

Williamson, and offered to take her to the hospital, but she 

refused to go with them. The Officers then arrested

Williamson and took her to a detention facility. After she 

was released the next morning, Williamson drove herself to 

the hospital. She suffered a sprained wrist, mild swelling, 

and a torn rotator cuff.4

C. Summary judgment proceedings

Williamson sued the Officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

and California’s Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (the Bane Act), 

Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, alleging that they used excessive 

force against her in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

Specifically, she claimed that it was excessive for them to 

“pull[] the full weight of her body by her hyperextended 

arms.” The Officers moved for summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity. The district court denied the Officers’ 

motion concluding—in pertinent part—that Williamson 

“present[ed] a genuine issue of material fact as to the 

excessive force claim regarding [the Officers’] pulling of 

[Williamson]’s arms and hands such that a reasonable jury 

could find excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 

Considering whether existing law clearly established a 

constitutional violation, the district court held that “[i]t was 

clearly established at the time of the incident that Defendant 

4 The parties dispute whether the torn rotator cuff resulted from this 

incident or from a prior arrest that is the subject of a different lawsuit. 

Because this case is on appeal from a denial of summary judgment, we 

lack jurisdiction to resolve factual disputes and must accept 

Williamson’s version of events. See Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2017).
8 WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY

Nguyen’s and Defendant McGou[g]h’s use of force must be 

reasonable under the circumstances.”

II. DISCUSSION

We typically lack jurisdiction to hear interlocutory 

appeals from denials of summary judgment, but an exception 

exists for denials premised on qualified immunity. Isayeva, 

872 F.3d at 944–45; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, this 

exception is limited to legal issues, not factual disputes; 

whether an officer’s conduct violated the Fourth 

Amendment is a legal issue. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 

572 U.S. 765, 773 (2014). We have jurisdiction over the 

denial of summary judgment on Williamson’s Bane Act 

claims under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction 

because the rulings related to that claim and Williamson’s 

Section 1983 claim are inextricably intertwined. See Huskey 

v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2000). 

We review de novo “a district court’s denial of summary 

judgment on qualified immunity grounds.” Roybal v. 

Toppenish Sch. Dist., 871 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 2017).

A. Section 1983 claims

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 

seizures. Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2021). An 

arrest is the “quintessential seizure of the person.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Qualified 

immunity shields a police officer from liability for civil 

damages under Section 1983 “unless the officer[] violated a 

clearly established constitutional right.” Monzon v. City of 

Murrieta, 978 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020). Thus, the 

qualified-immunity analysis involves two prongs: 

(1) whether the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional 

right, and (2) whether that right “was clearly established at 

the time of the events at issue.” Id. Here, we conclude that 
WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY 9

the Officers did not violate Williamson’s Fourth 

Amendment rights; therefore, we have no need to address 

the clearly-established prong of the analysis.

“In evaluating a Fourth Amendment claim of excessive 

force, we ask ‘whether the officers’ actions [wer]e 

“objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting them.’” Rice, 989 F.3d at 1121 

(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). To 

determine whether an officer’s actions were objectively 

reasonable, we consider: “(1) the severity of the intrusion on 

the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating the 

type and amount of force inflicted, (2) the government’s 

interest in the use of force, and (3) the balance between the 

gravity of the intrusion on the individual and the 

government’s need for that intrusion.” Id. (quoting Lowry v. 

City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1256 (9th Cir. 2017) (en 

banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We must judge 

the reasonableness of a particular use of force ‘from the 

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than 

with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 

490 U.S. at 396). It is also well-established that police 

officers “are not required to use the least intrusive degree of 

force possible.” Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1259 (internal quotations 

and citation omitted).

1. Type and amount of force

We consider the “specific factual circumstances” of the 

case in classifying the force used. Id. at 1256. The nature and 

degree of physical contact are relevant to this analysis, 

Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 

1994), as are the “risk of harm and the actual harm 

experienced,” Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 879 

(9th Cir. 2012). For example, in Forrester we held that 

police officers did not act unreasonably in using “pain 
10 WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY

compliance techniques” against protesters because this use 

of force was “less significant than most . . . [where] police 

did not threaten or use deadly force and did not deliver 

physical blows or cuts.” 25 F.3d at 807. Instead, the officers 

used “physical pressure . . . on the demonstrators’ limbs in 

increasing degrees, resulting in pain.” Id.; see also Johnson 

v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 793 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(describing “hard pulling and twisting” used to remove a 

fleeing armed robbery suspect from a car as a “minimal 

intrusion” under the circumstances). Similarly, in Felarca v 

Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 817 (9th Cir. 2018), we held that 

police officers’ baton strikes and jabs against a mass of 

student protestors who blocked police from accessing tents 

erected on campus in violation of university policy was a 

minimal use of force under the circumstances. On the other 

hand, in Nelson we held that shooting someone in the face 

with a pepperball when trying to break up a party was a 

“significant” intrusion where “officers were advised not to 

shoot pepperballs indiscriminately or at individuals that 

were not posing a threat,” “[t]he possibility of serious injury 

was apparent to the officers at the time of the shooting,” and 

the pepperball caused “significant damage to [plaintiff’s] 

eye.” 685 F.3d at 878–79.

Even viewing the evidence in Williamson’s favor, the 

type and amount of force used by the Officers in this case 

was minimal. The Officers did not strike Williamson, throw 

her to the ground, or use any compliance techniques or 

weapons for the purpose of inflicting pain on her. Rather, 

they held her by her arms and lifted her so they could pull 

her out of the meeting room after she went limp and refused 

to leave on her own or cooperate in being removed.

Moreover, the inherent risk of two officers pulling 

someone who has gone limp and refuses to move by her own 
WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY 11

power is not significant. It cannot reasonably be disputed 

that the force the Officers used in this case was less 

significant than “yanking, pulling, jerking, and twisting” a 

person whose legs are pinned underneath a car seat—which 

we have deemed a minimal intrusion. Johnson, 340 F.3d 

at 792–93. Indeed, the officers’ removing Williamson in the 

manner that they did also was a lesser degree of force than 

what was used in Forrester and Felarca, where officers used 

techniques and weapons to intentionally inflict physical pain 

on the protesters. In fact, the protesters in Forrester even

argued that “dragging and carrying” them would have been 

a more reasonable use of force than the pain compliance 

techniques that the officers used. 25 F.3d at 807.

Finally, Williamson’s injuries—a sprained wrist, mild 

swelling, and a torn rotator cuff—though not trivial, are 

roughly equivalent to those in Forrester (bruises, pinched 

nerve, broken wrist) and much less severe than those in 

Johnson (rendered a paraplegic). And in both of those cases, 

we concluded that the intrusion at issue was minimal despite 

the injuries that occurred. We conclude the same here.

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the district court 

focused exclusively on Williamson’s injuries. But that is not 

the only factor relevant to this analysis; the type and amount 

of force used and the risk of harm it created must also be 

considered. See Nelson, 685 F.3d at 879. Consideration of 

both the actual harm and the risk of harm is important as the 

Fourth Amendment is concerned with reasonableness. Id. 

at 878. There can be situations in which the risk of harm 

presented is objectively less significant than the actual harm 

that results. And if a person reacts more adversely to a use 

of force than would be expected objectively, that does not 

itself establish that “a reasonable officer on the scene” failed 
12 WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY

to appreciate the risks presented and act accordingly. Rice, 

989 F.3d at 1121 (citation omitted).

For these reasons, we conclude that the totality of 

circumstances in this case establishes that the type and 

amount of force that the Officers used was minimal.

2. Governmental interest

Next, we “evaluate the state’s interests at stake by 

considering ‘(1) how severe the crime at issue was, 

(2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the 

safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect 

was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 

flight.’” Rice, 989 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Mattos v. Agarano, 

661 F.3d 433, 443 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). “Among these 

considerations, the ‘most important’ is the second factor—

whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to others.” Id. 

(quoting Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 947). “These factors are nonexhaustive, and we examine the totality of the 

circumstances, including the availability of less intrusive 

alternatives to the force employed and whether proper 

warnings were given.” Id. at 1121–22 (internal citation

omitted). Where an arrestee’s conduct risks the lives or 

safety of innocent bystanders, the court also considers her 

relative culpability under the second factor. See Scott, 

550 U.S. at 384.

It is undisputed that Williamson’s crime was minor, that 

she posed no threat to anyone, and that she was not actively 

resisting arrest. Nonetheless, the Officers argue that they had 

a legitimate interest in removing and arresting her, 

particularly where proper warnings were given before they 

used any physical force. They also argue that we should 

consider Williamson’s “relative culpability” in refusing to 

get up. Williamson counters that the governmental interest 
WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY 13

was “about as low as it gets,” even considering her relative 

culpability.

We conclude that National City’s interest in forcibly 

removing Williamson from the city council meeting was 

low, but it was not nonexistent. Williamson’s nonviolent 

disruption of the city council meeting was a minor offense. 

And where Williamson’s actions did not pose any physical 

danger to others, we do not consider her relative culpability. 

See id. But even if the city’s interest was low given the lack 

of exigency posed by threat of harm or other factors, this 

does not mean that the city was “required to permit the 

‘organized lawlessness’ conducted by the protestors.” 

Felarca, 891 F.3d at 818. “Even passive resistance may 

support the use of some degree of governmental force if 

necessary to attain compliance . . . depend[ing] on the 

factual circumstances underlying that resistance.” Nelson,

685 F.3d at 881 (quoting Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 

805, 830 (9th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Moreover, the risk posed by the protesters was not zero. 

While the six who laid down near the podium were docile 

and merely refused to leave the area when directed, other 

protesters (or people sympathetic to the protesters’ 

demonstration) who remained in the audience area were 

yelling at the officers and at times trying to push into the 

podium area. This is not the same strain of risk posed by the 

crowds in Forrester and Felarca, but it is nonetheless 

relevant in assessing the totality of circumstances that the 

officers faced when they decided to remove the protesters 

participating in the demonstration rather than allow the 

demonstration to continue.

It goes without saying that citizens have a right to 

express their disagreement and dissatisfaction with 

government at all levels. But they do not have a right to 
14 WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY

prevent duly installed government from performing its 

lawful functions. See Felarca, 891 F.3d at 818. To conclude 

otherwise would undermine the very idea of ordered society. 

See id. Officers repeatedly warned the protesters that they 

had to leave the front of the meeting room or they would be 

arrested, and they refused to comply. Their demonstration 

disrupted the city council meeting, which was adjourned “for 

order to be restored.” National City’s choice was to allow the 

protesters to remain in the city council’s meeting room until 

they chose to leave on their own—which the constitution 

does not require—or to forcibly remove them. Williamson 

has not identified any less intrusive means available to the 

Officers for restoring order in the city council room so that 

the city’s legitimate business could proceed. Other means of 

physically removing her when she refused to leave or 

cooperate with being moved, such as using more officers to 

carry her or pulling her by her legs instead of her arms, 

would not have involved an appreciably smaller risk of 

causing pain or injury. In sum, we conclude that, as in 

Forrester, National City had a legitimate interest in 

“dispersing and removing lawbreakers,” but the extent of its 

interest was low because it was not facing a voluminous 

crowd acting with a “concerted effort to invade private 

property, obstruct business, and hinder law enforcement,” as 

was the case in Forrester. 25 F.3d at 807; see also Felarca, 

891 F.3d at 818; Nelson, 685 F.3d at 880 (“Although the 

officers plainly had an interest in clearing the apartment 

complex . . . , the desire to do so quickly, in the absence of 

any actual exigency, cannot legitimize the application of 

force when it is not otherwise justified.”).

3. Balance of interests

Finally, we must weigh the Officers’ intrusion onto 

Williamson’s Fourth Amendment rights through their use of 
WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY 15

physical force against National City’s interests in responding 

to illegal conduct and restoring order in the city council 

meeting room. We conclude that the severity of the Officers’ 

intrusion and the weight of National City’s interests are 

aligned; that is, the city’s interests were low, and the 

Officers’ use of force was appropriately minimal.

Williamson testified that she and the other protesters had 

decided in advance that they would not willingly leave the 

meeting room. The very purpose of their protest was to 

disrupt the city council meeting and interfere with the city 

conducting its business. Thus, they created a situation in 

which the city had to either succumb to the disruption or use 

some amount of force to remove the protesters from the 

meeting room. The city chose the latter, and the “undisputed 

evidence shows that the officers used only the force 

reasonably necessary to remove [Williamson] from the 

meeting.” Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800, 826 

(9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

Williamson could have avoided or reduced the pain and 

injury she alleges she suffered from the Officers’ conduct by 

cooperating with them and leaving the room under her own 

power. She did not. But her choice does not render the 

Officers’ conduct unreasonable. To conclude otherwise 

would be to discount entirely the City’s legitimate interests 

in maintaining order and ensuring that the public’s business 

is not circumvented by people engaging in disruptive, albeit 

nonviolent, conduct.

Because we conclude that the Officers did not use 

excessive force in violation of Williamson’s Fourth 

Amendment rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity 

as a matter of law.
16 WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY

B. California Bane Act claims

California’s Bane Act requires proof of an underlying 

constitutional violation. Reese v. County of Sacramento, 

888 F.3d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he elements of the 

excessive force claim under [the Bane Act] are the same as 

under § 1983[.]” (quoting Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 

751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014))). Because we conclude 

that the Officers did not violate Williamson’s Fourth 

Amendment rights, we reverse the district court’s decision 

denying summary judgment on Williamson’s Bane Act 

claims as well.

REVERSED.