IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-0725

Filed June 21, 2023

TERRELL ONTERIAL LOBLEY,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark D. Cleve, Judge.

Terrell Lobley appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief 

following his 2007 convictions for second-degree murder and intimidation with a 

dangerous weapon. AFFIRMED.

Thomas Hurd of Law Office of Thomas Hurd PLC, Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

The State charged Terrell Lobley with crimes arising out of a shooting in 

Davenport. A jury found him guilty of second-degree murder and intimidation with 

a dangerous weapon. See State v. Lobley, No. 07-0167, 2008 WL 2357672, at *1 

(Iowa Ct. App. June 11, 2008). The court of appeals affirmed his convictions. Id.

at *3. Lobley filed an application for postconviction relief. The district court denied 

the application following an evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, Lobley contends his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to

(1) impeach the State’s key witness; (2) investigate another potentially beneficial 

witness; and (3) file a posttrial motion to set aside the verdicts as inconsistent and 

irreconcilable. Lobley had to show (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Our ultimate concern is 

with ‘the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being 

challenged.’” State v. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d 130, 131 (Iowa 1987) (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 696). 

The first issue is premised on counsel’s cross-examination of Roy 

Washington, a State witness who was incarcerated with Lobley. Lobley contends 

“multiple available impeachable offenses were not utilized to impeach”

Washington. He points to “two first degree thefts back in ’96,” separate convictions 

for theft in the ‘third and fourth degree’” and a recent plea to “theft 5th.” In his view, 

the State opened the door to consideration of the convictions. The State responds 

that the evidentiary rule on use of prior convictions to attack witness credibility 

contained a time limit of ten years, subject to the court’s balancing of probative 

value and prejudicial effect. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.609. The State vigorously denies 
3

opening the door to consideration of the dated crimes and also argues “[f]urther 

impeachment with additional theft convictions would not have led the jury to 

discount Washington’s testimony and acquit Lobley.” 

Washington testified at Lobley’s trial more than ten years after his 1996 

convictions. That fact alone diminished their probative value as an impeachment 

tool. Additionally, those convictions and others were not needed to undermine 

Washington’s credibility, in light of admitted evidence of the same nature. 

Washington acknowledged he had pending charges of second-degree burglary 

and fourth-degree criminal mischief as a habitual offender, which the State would 

dismiss if Washington agreed to testify against Lobley. He stated the possible 

sentence as a habitual offender was “15 years” and he would be required to serve 

“[s]even” if the charges were not dismissed. When Lobley’s attorney suggested 

he was more concerned with the length of the sentence he was facing than the 

circumstances of Lobley’s case, Washington responded, “You’re damn right.” 

Washington also agreed he was presently in jail on the charges, previously pled 

guilty to and served time for first-degree theft, and previously had been in prison 

for a parole violation. In short, Washington’s credibility was severely impugned 

without evidence of the additional convictions.1 For purposes of impeachment, 

those convictions were cumulative.

The second issue relates to counsel’s claimed failure to investigate a 

possibly beneficial witness who also was incarcerated with Lobley. Lobley’s

attorney admitted he did not speak to the witness. He explained, he “had no 

1

In light of our conclusion, we find it unnecessary to address whether the State 

opened the door to consideration of the outdated convictions.
4

indication that [the witness] would be a favorable witness” and would “contradict 

what was said by Roy Washington.” “[I]n fact,” counsel stated, the witness “very 

well could have just confirmed [Lobley’s] confession” as recounted by Washington.

That was far from a speculative risk, given Washington’s suggestion that the 

witness wanted to “jump on” Lobley. As the postconviction court pointed out,

counsel’s decision not to investigate the witness “would have involved a strategic 

decision” because “[c]ounsel would have run the serious risk of having [the 

witness] learn of the[ ] substantial benefit Washington would receive from his 

testimony,” which “could have incentivized [the witness] to testify similarly, which 

would have resulted in the State ending up with an even stronger case against the 

applicant.” We conclude counsel did not engage in deficient performance by 

declining to investigate the witness.

We are left with Lobley’s claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to file 

a new trial motion to challenge inconsistent verdicts.2 The claim is premised on 

an opinion decided four years after his trial. See State v. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d 

805, 815 (Iowa 2010). There, the court held “a criminal conviction of a compound 

offense cannot stand when the defendant has been acquitted of the underlying 

predicate offense.” Id. at 806.

Counsel did not have an obligation to predict a change in the law. State v. 

Schoelerman, 315 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Iowa 1982) (“[A]n attorney need not be a ‘crystal 

gazer’ who can predict future changes in established rules of law in order to provide 

2 The State contends that, if Lobley’s argument can be read as a direct challenge 

to the verdicts, rather than a challenge under an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

rubric, it is unpreserved because the issue was not raised in the trial court. We 

agree.
5

effective assistance to a criminal defendant.”). But, even if Halstead was the law 

at the time of Lobley’s trial, we agree with the district court that its holding did not 

apply to Lobley’s circumstances because Lobley “was convicted and not acquitted 

of what the Halstead court would term the underlying predicate crime, and 

conversely he was not convicted of what would be termed the compound felony, 

but was instead convicted of one of its lesser-included offenses.” See State v. 

Sanchez, No. 14-1912, 2016 WL 530409, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2016) 

(“Halstead is inapposite because [the defendant] was not acquitted of a predicate 

felony and found guilty of a compound felony.”). 

We conclude Lobley’s trial attorney was not ineffective. We affirm the denial 

of Lobley’s postconviction-relief application.

AFFIRMED.