UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-5205

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BRIAN S. RANALDSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, 

Jr., District Judge. (2:07-cr-00168-1)

Argued: May 11, 2010 Decided: June 29, 2010

Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge King joined.

ARGUED: David O. Schles, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID SCHLES, Charleston, 

West Virginia, for Appellant. Monica Lynn Dillon, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

ON BRIEF: Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, Charleston, 

West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from a conviction and sentence for 

assaulting a person executing a federal search warrant in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2231(a). The appellant challenges the 

district court’s decisions denying a motion to suppress, denying 

a motion to sever offenses, refusing to instruct the jury about 

self-defense, denying a motion for acquittal or a new trial, and 

calculating his applicable sentencing range under federal 

sentencing guidelines. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

A.

On August 3, 2007, West Virginia State Troopers assembled 

to execute a federal search warrant at the Red Roof Inn motel in 

Charleston, West Virginia. Trooper Andy Purdue had obtained the 

warrant following a controlled purchase of cocaine base from 

Sean Holloway in Room 209. Once the police officers assembled 

outside Room 209, Sergeant Ronald Arthur tapped the door with a 

battering ram and yelled “State Police, search warrant.” 

J.A. 29. After waiting a few moments, they tried to enter using 

a key card provided by the manager, but a deadbolt lock 

prevented them from doing so. The officers then rammed the door 

repeatedly but still could not enter. They finally broke the 
3

window beside the door and called out, “State Police, open the 

door.” J.A. 70.

When the door opened from the inside, Sergeant Michael 

Oglesby entered and found Appellant Brian Ranaldson displaying 

his hands and lying on the floor several feet from the door. 

Noticing the bathroom door close, Oglesby announced that someone 

was there and, stepping over Ranaldson, proceeded directly to 

the bathroom. There he discovered Holloway. Oglesby searched 

Holloway for weapons, laid him outside the bathroom, and secured 

his hands using flexible restraints.

Arthur entered immediately after Oglesby and began 

surveying the room for weapons. When Arthur drew near, 

Ranaldson seized him by the legs and pulled hard. Arthur and 

Ranaldson then struggled feverishly, striking each other 

repeatedly with fists and knees, and becoming locked in a bear 

hug. Sergeant Robert Medford and the canine handler intervened, 

but Ranaldson continued fighting even after the police dog bit 

him. Oglesby soon realized that Arthur needed help and, “being 

a bear of a man, six-feet-three, 275 pounds,” came and tackled 

everybody to the floor. J.A. 118.

Once knocked over, Ranaldson stopped struggling and the 

officers finally managed to secure his hands using flexible 

restraints. The officers then hoisted him onto a chair. After 

calming down, Ranaldson stated, “I’m sorry for fighting you,”
4

J.A. 39, and explained, “I don’t know what I was thinking,”

J.A. 74. Upon searching the motel room, the officers discovered 

marijuana, cocaine base, digital scales, and the cash that had 

been used for the controlled purchase.

B.

On August 6, 2007, Ranaldson and Holloway were charged by 

criminal complaint with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or 

more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 

(count 1), and aiding and abetting possession with intent to 

distribute 5 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (count 2). Holloway later entered a plea 

agreement and pleaded guilty to count 2.

Ranaldson moved to suppress his statements and all seized 

evidence on the ground that the officers used excessive force. 

During a hearing on the motion, Ranaldson testified that he had 

not resisted, but that the officers nonetheless struck him 

repeatedly and allowed the police dog to bite him. Ranaldson 

stated that when they entered the motel room Oglesby stepped on 

his face and Arthur kicked him lying down, causing him to black 

out. Ranaldson added that, upon regaining consciousness, he 

found himself stripped almost naked and heard Holloway say that 

the officers had beaten him severely. Regarding his injuries, 

Ranaldson explained, “my whole face was swollen like I was in a 
5

boxing match,” “both of my knees . . . had glass contusions all 

around them and on them,” “a piece of my thigh was just 

literally hanging down from a dog bite, and I got two teeth 

marks on the side of my thigh of just a dog gripping in on my 

leg.” J.A. 89.

Arthur and Oglesby also testified during the suppression 

hearing. Arthur testified that Ranaldson grabbed his legs, 

tried to pull him down, and then fought desperately until 

Oglesby intervened. Arthur stated that he first struck 

Ranaldson only when Ranaldson almost grabbed Arthur’s holstered 

handgun. Arthur also stated that Ranaldson grabbed Medford’s 

rifle by the magazine (containing cartridges that are fed into 

the gun chamber) but that part detached from the weapon. 

Describing Ranaldson’s intensity, Arthur stated that “his eyes 

glazed over” and “at that point he became where I felt like I 

was fighting for my life.” J.A. 35. Arthur also explained why 

force had been necessary: “It seemed like everything we did, 

instead of getting compliance, the fight got more intensified 

and he seemed to get stronger and more dangerous. . . . He 

never did give in and just let us take him into custody.” J.A. 

38. Corroborating this account, Oglesby testified to rushing to 

help Arthur and Medford upon seeing “Ranaldson literally pick 

those two guys up as he returned to his feet.” J.A. 72-73.
6

On December 3, 2007, after hearing the evidence, the 

district court denied Ranaldson’s motion to suppress. The court 

found that “[t]he steps that the officers took with increasing 

intensity as their effort to gain entry proceeded [were] 

entirely reasonable and [were] commensurate with the needs of 

the moment.” J.A. 119.

C.

On December 11, 2007, the government filed a superseding 

indictment against Ranaldson. In addition to counts 1 and 2, 

the indictment included another count for assaulting a person 

executing a federal search warrant in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2231(a) (count 3). Specifically, the government alleged that 

Ranaldson “did unlawfully and forcibly assault and resist, 

oppose, impede, and interfere with West Virginia State Police 

Sgt. Ronald D. Arthur, a person authorized to execute search 

warrants, while he was engaged in the performance of executing a 

federal search warrant.” J.A. 126.

On January 9, 2008, Ranaldson moved to sever count 3 from 

counts 1 and 2 under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.1

 

1 Rule 14 provides in relevant part: “If the joinder of 

offenses . . . in an indictment . . . appears to prejudice a 

 He 

(Continued)
7

argued that joining the offenses prejudiced him because he 

wanted to testify regarding count 3 but exercise his Fifth 

Amendment privilege regarding counts 1 and 2. The district 

court denied this motion, reasoning that count 3 implicated 

counts 1 and 2, and that evidence admissible regarding counts 1 

and 2 was also admissible regarding count 3, and vice versa.

On January 29, 2009, the case proceeded to trial by jury. 

Although Ranaldson did not take the stand, Holloway testified 

about what he had observed:

From what I seen, Brian [Ranaldson] looked like he was 

unconscious. So, I mean, I don’t know what had 

happened before when I was in the bathroom, but when I 

came out, when I seen him, he was laying on the floor. 

There was like a dude in front of him. I don’t know 

if he was choking him or not, but it looked like he 

was choking him to me. And there was another officer 

over there with a dog and they put me on the floor. 

When they put me on the floor, I’m trying to look 

forward. One of the officers put like a hat in front 

of my face, so I couldn’t see what was going on. I 

pulled my head to the right and I seen a little bit, 

but I really -- I really couldn’t tell what was all 

going on.

J.A. 164. Holloway later reiterated, “It looked like one 

[officer] was choking him [Ranaldson] and it looked like the 

other one was just standing there,” J.A. 176, and also stated, 

 

defendant . . . the court may order separate trials of counts.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).
8

“I guess as soon as they noticed I could see, they put a hat 

like in front of me, in front of my face,” J.A. 177. Based upon 

this testimony, Ranaldson requested a jury instruction about 

self-defense regarding count 3. The district court denied this

request, however, reasoning that “there [was] a lack of 

evidentiary support.” J.A. 366.

After presenting its evidence, the government sought 

judicial notice that “West Virginia state troopers are 

authorized by law to serve federal search warrants.” J.A. 333. 

The district court then found “as a matter of law that the first 

of the three elements of the assault offense in count three 

[wa]s and ha[d] been established; that being that on August 3, 

2007, West Virginia State Police Sergeant Ronald D. Arthur was a 

person authorized to execute the federal search warrant in this 

case.” J.A. 371. The court later instructed the jury as 

follows: “I notice and note to you now that as to that first 

element, the court has found as a matter of law that Sergeant 

Arthur was at that time a person authorized to execute the 

federal search warrant in this case.” J.A. 373.

The jury convicted Ranaldson on count 3 and acquitted him 

on counts 1 and 2. He timely moved for acquittal or a new trial 

under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and 33. Ranaldson 

argued that, even if West Virginia State Troopers are authorized 

by law to execute federal search warrants, the jury instruction 
9

about count 3’s first element erroneously prevented the jury 

from determining whether Arthur was a West Virginia State 

Trooper during the August 3, 2007, search. Although agreeing 

with this argument and acknowledging the error, the district 

court found this error harmless and denied the motion.

Ranaldson was sentenced on November 19, 2008. Under

federal sentencing guidelines, the district court determined 

that a base offense level of 14 using section 2A2.2’s 

“aggravated assault” offense guideline was appropriate because

Ranaldson had assaulted Arthur while trying to disarm Medford. 

The court added 3 levels under section 2A2.2(b)(3) upon finding 

that Arthur suffered bodily injury, 6 levels under section 

3A1.2’s “official victim” enhancement upon finding that 

Ranaldson attacked due to Arthur’s search warrant, and 2 levels 

under section 3C1.1’s “obstruction of justice” enhancement upon 

finding that Ranaldson lied during the suppression hearing. The 

court also refused to reduce Ranaldson’s offense level for 

acceptance of responsibility under section 3E1.1. Given 

Ranaldson’s criminal history category of II, the court 

calculated a sentencing range of 63 to 78 months using section 

5A’s sentencing table. Because the crime of assaulting a person 

executing a federal search warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 2231(a) 

carries a maximum penalty of three years, however, the court 

determined that Ranaldson’s guideline sentence became 36 months 
10

pursuant to section 5G1.1. Ultimately, the court sentenced 

Ranaldson to the statutory maximum of three years imprisonment. 

This appeal followed.

II.

Ranaldson now challenges the decisions below regarding (1) 

his motion to suppress, (2) his motion to sever offenses, (3) 

his request for a jury instruction about self-defense, (4) his 

motion for acquittal or a new trial, and (5) his applicable 

sentencing range. We address each matter in turn.

A.

We first consider the district court’s denial of 

Ranaldson’s motion to suppress his apology and all evidence 

seized during the search on August 3, 2007. “In assessing a 

trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review factual 

findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo.” 

United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 375 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Under the clear-error standard, “[a] factual finding by the 

district court may be reversed only if, ‘although there is 

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed.’” Walton v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160, 

173-74 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting United States v. U.S. 
11

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)); see United States v. 

Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2008) (same). “‘Where 

there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 

factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’” 

Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 141 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985)).

Ranaldson asserts that the district court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress should be reversed because the court’s 

finding that the officers used reasonable force is clearly 

erroneous. We disagree. Because the district court was 

presented with contradictory accounts of what happened, 

Ranaldson’s argument about excessive force depended primarily 

upon a determination of witness credibility.2

 

2 Ranaldson conceded this below. See J.A. 114 (“On the 

issue of excessive force, no question, the court has factual 

conflict in testimony to resolve. . . . I agree with the U.S. 

Attorney, the defendant’s testimony is directly contradictory to 

the police officers, and cannot be reconciled. The court will 

have to make a credibility determination on that.”); J.A. 134-35

(noting that “[i]t’s simply a credibility issue” because “the 

only conceivable evidence as to what transpired in that motel 

room is direct testimony from people who were there”).

 “[W]hen a district 

court’s factual finding is based upon assessments of witness 

credibility, such finding is deserving of the highest degree of 

appellate deference.” United States v. Thompson, 554 F.3d 450, 

452 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). Given our 
12

deferential standard of review, we see no compelling reason to 

disturb the district court’s finding that the officers used 

reasonable force. The finding was supported by credible 

evidence that Ranaldson initiated the altercation with Arthur, 

fought desperately despite increasingly forceful attempts to 

secure and arrest him, and posed a considerable threat to the 

officers’ safety -- e.g., nearly seizing Medford’s rifle. The 

finding was also supported by Ranaldson’s spontaneous admission, 

“I’m sorry for fighting you.” J.A. 39. For these reasons, we 

conclude that the district court’s finding that the officers 

used reasonable force is not clearly erroneous, and we therefore 

affirm the denial of Ranaldson’s motion to suppress.3

B.

We next consider the district court’s denial of Ranaldson’s 

motion to sever count 3 from counts 1 and 2 under Rule 14. We 

review “refusal to sever for abuse of discretion.” United 

 

3 Ranaldson also asserts that his motion to suppress should 

have been granted because the officers violated the “knock-andannounce” rule. Because the Supreme Court declared the 

exclusionary rule inapplicable to “knock-and-announce”

violations, Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), we find 

this argument unavailing, see Appellant’s Br. at 14-15 

(“Defendant concedes that Hudson . . . states that a violation 

of the ‘knock and announce’ rule standing alone is not 

sufficient grounds for suppression.”).
13

States v. Montgomery, 262 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 2001); see

Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993) (“Rule 14 

leaves the determination of risk of prejudice and any remedy 

that may be necessary to the sound discretion of the district 

courts.”).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 provides that “[t]he 

indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate 

counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged . . . are 

of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act 

or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a 

common scheme or plan.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). Rule 14 

provides, however, that “[i]f the joinder of offenses . . . in 

an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial 

appears to prejudice a defendant . . . the court may order 

separate trials of counts.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). Under 

Rule 14, “[t]he party seeking severance bears the burden of 

demonstrating a strong showing of prejudice.” United States v. 

Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 341 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations 

omitted).

Ranaldson maintains that joinder of count 3 with counts 1 

and 2 under Rule 8 prejudiced him because he wanted to testify 

regarding count 3 but assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 

regarding counts 1 and 2. We previously articulated legal 

principles governing this argument as follows:
14

[B]ecause of the unfavorable appearance of testifying 

on one charge while remaining silent on another, and 

the consequent pressure to testify as to all or none, 

the defendant may be confronted with a dilemma; 

whether, by remaining silent, to lose the benefit of 

vital testimony on one count, rather than risk the 

prejudice (as to either or both counts) that would 

result from testifying on the other. Obviously no 

such dilemma exists where the balance of risk and 

advantage in respect of testifying is substantially 

the same as to each count. Thus . . . no need for a 

severance exists until the defendant makes a 

convincing showing that he has both important 

testimony to give concerning one count and strong need 

to refrain from testifying on the other. In making 

such a showing, it is essential that the defendant 

present enough information -- regarding the nature of 

the testimony he wishes to give on one count and his 

reasons for not wishing to testify on the other -- to 

satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is 

genuine and to enable it intelligently to weigh the 

considerations of economy and expedition in judicial 

administration against the defendant’s interest in 

having a free choice with respect to testifying.

United States v. Goldman, 750 F.2d 1221, 1225 (4th Cir. 1984) 

(quoting Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 

1968) (internal quotations omitted)); see United States v. 

Jamar, 561 F.2d 1103, 1108 n.9 (4th Cir. 1977) (indicating that 

Baker, quoted wholesale by Goldman, “does not require a 

severance every time a defendant merely alleges that he wishes 

to offer limited testimony,” but instead “a particularized 

showing must be made concerning the testimony the defendant 

wishes to give and his reasons for remaining silent on the 

joined counts, so that the court can make an independent 
15

evaluation of whether the defendant will be prejudiced to an 

extent that outweighs the interests favoring joinder”).

Ranaldson explained below that he wished to testify 

regarding count 3 because he hoped to establish the legal 

justification of self-defense. Regarding why he wished to 

remain silent regarding counts 1 and 2, Ranaldson said only that

[h]e would be subject to cross-examination as to the 

nature, extent, and duration of his relationship with 

Mr. Holloway, who was his initial codefendant who has 

now pled guilty and is expected to testify against 

him; the circumstances surrounding his travel from 

Ohio to Charleston, West Virginia; his whereabouts and 

activities during his [sic] period that he was in 

Charleston, West Virginia; [and] the events leading up 

to the very moment when the police entered the motel 

room.

J.A. 135-36. The district court correctly noted, however, that 

evidence regarding counts 1 and 2 would be admissible during a 

trial solely on count 3. Evidence that Ranaldson helped 

Holloway sell cocaine base, for instance, would be admissible to 

show (1) why Arthur had arrived with a federal search warrant 

issued following a controlled purchase of cocaine base and (2) 

that Ranaldson had wanted to delay the officers’ search to give 

Holloway the chance to destroy contraband.4

 

4 Ranaldson appears to have conceded the second example. 

See J.A. 138 (arguing that the alleged drug conspiracy does not 

encompass Ranaldson’s alleged assault, but admitting that 

 Ranaldson 

(Continued)
16

accordingly offered no valid reason for wishing to assert his 

Fifth Amendment privilege regarding counts 1 and 2. 

Furthermore, all three counts were logically related because 

they involved similar evidence and centered around the same 

August 3, 2007, search. See United States v. Mir, 525 F.3d 351, 

357 (4th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of severance because 

“[t]rying the . . . charge[s] separately would have led to 

significant inconvenience for the government and its witnesses, 

and required a needless duplication of judicial effort in light 

of the legal, factual, and logistical relationship between the 

charges”). For these reasons, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion and therefore affirm the 

denial of Ranaldson’s motion for severance under Rule 14.

C.

We next consider Ranaldson’s denied request for a jury 

instruction about self-defense. “We review the district court’s 

decision to give or refuse to give a jury instruction for abuse 

of discretion.” United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 221 

 

“certainly they [the government] are entitled, I believe, to 

make the argument that in their opinion it goes to motive”).
17

(4th Cir. 2009). “[A] district court should give the 

instruction that a criminal defendant requests as to any defense 

as long as the instruction: 1) has an evidentiary foundation; 

and 2) accurately states the law applicable to the charged 

offense.” United States v. Stotts, 113 F.3d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 

1997). “A district court commits reversible error in refusing 

to provide a proffered jury instruction only when the 

instruction (1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered 

by the court’s charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point 

in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested 

instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to 

conduct his defense.” Passaro, 577 F.3d at 221 (internal 

quotations omitted).

Ranaldson argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by refusing to instruct the jury about self-defense 

because trial testimony provided a sufficient evidentiary 

foundation for the instruction. Assuming that the doctrine of 

self-defense applies to assaulting a person executing a federal 

search warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 2231(a),5

 

5 In United States v. Gore, 592 F.3d 489 (4th Cir. 2010), we 

considered whether common-law self-defense was available even 

though the relevant federal criminal statute contained no 

language providing for any affirmative defense. Neither party 

we have recognized 

(Continued)
18

that this doctrine has limited applicability where police 

officers are involved:

[A] defendant generally cannot invoke self-defense to 

justify an assault on a police or correctional 

officer. A standard self-defense instruction 

therefore does not apply to such cases. However, a 

limited right of self-defense does arise if the 

defendant presents evidence that the officer used 

excessive force in carrying out his official duties. 

A defendant who responds to an officer’s use of 

excessive force with force reasonably necessary for 

self-protection under the circumstances has acted with 

justifiable and excusable cause . . . .

Stotts, 113 F.3d at 496 (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). Regarding whether “excessive force” was used, we have 

explained that “[t]he test for whether force employed to effect 

a seizure is excessive is one of ‘“objective reasonableness”

under the circumstances.’” Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 

476 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 

(1989)). “Because ‘police officers are often forced to make 

split-second judgments . . . in circumstances that are tense, 

uncertain, and rapidly evolving,’ the facts must be evaluated 

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and 

 

raised that issue in this case, and because we affirm on other 

grounds, we do not consider it.
19

the use of hindsight must be avoided.” Id. at 476-77 (quoting 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).

Ranaldson argues that Holloway’s testimony provided a 

sufficient evidentiary foundation for a jury instruction about 

self-defense because Holloway stated, “It looked like one 

[officer] was choking him [Ranaldson] and it looked like the 

other one was just standing there,” J.A. 176, and also stated, 

“I guess as soon as they noticed I could see, they put a hat 

like in front of me, in front of my face.” J.A. 176-77. These 

statements alone are insufficient to establish self-defense 

because, although they describe the officers’ conduct, the 

statements reveal nothing about whether Ranaldson responded 

“with force reasonably necessary for self-protection.” Stotts, 

113 F.3d at 496. Holloway also admitted, “I don’t know what had 

happened before when I was in the bathroom,” “I don’t know if he 

was choking him or not,” and “I really couldn’t tell what was 

all going on.” J.A. 164. For these reasons, the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by not instructing the jury about 

self-defense. We therefore affirm this decision.
20

D.

We next consider the district court’s denial of Ranaldson’s 

motion for acquittal under Rule 29 or a new trial under Rule 33.6

 

6 Rule 29 provides that “the court on the defendant’s motion 

must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the 

evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 29(a). And Rule 33 provides that “[u]pon the 

defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant 

a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 33(a).

 

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion 

for judgment of acquittal,” United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 

681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005), but “[w]e review for abuse of 

discretion a district court’s denial of a [Rule 33] motion . . . 

for a new trial,” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th 

Cir. 2006). With regard to Rule 29, “we are obliged to sustain 

a guilty verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Government, it is supported by ‘substantial 

evidence,’” meaning “‘evidence that a reasonable finder of fact 

could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion 

of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Alerre, 430 

F.3d at 693 (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 

(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). With regard to Rule 33, “a trial 

court should exercise its discretion to award a new trial 

sparingly, and a jury verdict is not to be overturned except in 
21

the rare circumstance when the evidence weighs heavily against 

it.” Smith, 451 F.3d at 217 (internal quotations omitted).

Ranaldson challenges the district court’s determination 

that its erroneous jury instruction regarding count 3 was 

harmless error. For the offense of assaulting a person 

executing a federal search warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 2231(a), 

the government had to prove three elements: (1) that on August 

3, 2007, Arthur was authorized to execute a federal search 

warrant; (2) that Ranaldson “did unlawfully and forcibly assault 

or resist, oppose, impede, or interfere” with Arthur; and (3) 

that Ranaldson did this while Arthur was executing a federal 

search warrant. J.A. 373. Having concluded that all West 

Virginia State Troopers are authorized to execute federal search 

warrants, the district court instructed the jury that the first 

element was established: “I notice and note to you now that as 

to that first element, the court has found as a matter of law 

that Sergeant Arthur was at that time a person authorized to 

execute the federal search warrant in this case.” J.A. 373. 

The court later admitted that this was error because, although 

any West Virginia State Trooper may have had authority to 

execute the search warrant, the jury should have been required 

to determine whether Arthur was a West Virginia State Trooper on 
22

August 3, 2007.7

The district court’s determination of harmlessness was 

based upon our precedent United States v. Lovern, 293 F.3d 695 

(4th Cir. 2002). There, the defendant was charged under 26 

U.S.C. § 7212(a) with intimidating a federal employee acting in 

his official capacity under Title 26. The district court 

instructed the jury that the employee whom the defendant 

allegedly threatened “was acting in the scope of his official 

duties under Title 26 during the . . . conversation.” Id. at 

699. Because this established an essential element of the 

charged offense, we found that giving this instruction was 

constitutional error. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 

506, 510 (1995) (noting that the Fifth Amendment Due Process 

 Regardless, the court denied Ranaldson’s motion 

for acquittal or a new trial upon concluding that the error was 

harmless.

 

7 Ranaldson maintains that the jury should have also been 

required to determine whether West Virginia State Troopers are 

authorized by law to execute federal search warrants. The 

district court ruled that Congress had granted them such 

authority pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3105 and W. Va. Code § 15-2-

12. Because this was purely a legal question, see Stephens ex 

rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 2009)

(considering statutory interpretation “a quintessential question 

of law”), the court did not err by deciding it for the jury, see

Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (“The controlling 

distinction between the power of the court and that of the jury 

is that the former is the power to determine the law and the 

latter to determine the facts.”).
23

Clause and the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee “require 

criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the 

defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he 

is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt”). We found this error 

harmless, however, because although the defendant “contested the 

element’s not being submitted to the jury, he did not ‘raise[] 

evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding . . .’ to that 

reached by the judge.” Lovern, 293 F.3d at 701 (quoting Neder 

v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999)) (alterations in 

original).

Under Lovern, we should assess harmlessness here by 

considering whether Ranaldson offered sufficient evidence during 

trial to establish that Arthur had not been a West Virginia 

State Trooper during the August 3, 2007, search. We conclude 

that he did not.

Arthur wore his police uniform during trial and testified 

that he had been employed by the West Virginia State Police 

Department for the last 13 years. The evidence also showed that 

Arthur conducted himself as a West Virginia State Trooper during 

the August 3, 2007, search. More importantly, Ranaldson offered 

no evidence to the contrary. Indeed, defense counsel frequently 

called Arthur “Sergeant Arthur,” J.A. 270, and conceded during 

oral argument that Arthur was indeed a West Virginia State 

Trooper on August 3, 2007. For these reasons, we agree that the 
24

erroneous jury instruction about count 3 was harmless. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Ranaldson’s 

motion for acquittal under Rule 29 or a new trial under Rule 33.

E.

We finally turn to several challenges that Ranaldson brings 

regarding the district court’s application of federal sentencing 

guidelines. “In considering challenges to a sentencing court’s 

application of the Guidelines, we review factual determinations 

for clear error and legal issues de novo.” Elliot v. United 

States, 332 F.3d 753, 761 (4th Cir. 2003).

First, Ranaldson argues that his offense of conviction 

should have been deemed a “minor assault” under section 2A2.3 

rather than an “aggravated assault” under section 2A2.2. 

According to relevant commentary, “‘[a]ggravated assault’ means 

a felonious assault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with 

intent to cause bodily injury (i.e., not merely to frighten) 

with that weapon; (B) serious bodily injury; or (C) an intent to 

commit another felony.” USSG § 2A2.2 application note 1. The 

district court reasoned that Ranaldson’s assault involved 

“intent to commit another felony” because Ranaldson tried to 

seize Medford’s rifle during the struggle and West Virginia law 

provides that “[a]ny person who intentionally . . . attempts to 

disarm any law-enforcement officer acting in his or her official 
25

capacity, is guilty of a felony.” W. Va. Code § 61-5-17(b). We 

find no error here and Ranaldson provides no guidance about how 

the court might have been incorrect.8

Second, Ranaldson argues that the district court should not 

have applied the specific offense characteristic of section 

2A2.2(b)(3)(A), namely, that the victim suffered “bodily 

injury.” According to relevant commentary, “‘[b]odily injury’

means any significant injury; e.g., an injury that is painful 

and obvious, or is of a type for which medical attention 

ordinarily would be sought.” USSG § 1B1.1 application note 

1(B); see USSG § 2A2.2 application note 1. The district court 

reasoned that Arthur suffered “significant injury” under that 

standard because Ranaldson’s punches caused him to spit out 

blood and chip a tooth. The court further noted that Arthur 

also received various bumps and bruises. Ranaldson concedes 

these factual findings but concludes without explanation that

Arthur’s injuries were insufficiently serious. We find this 

argument unpersuasive and thus affirm the district court’s 

 We therefore affirm the 

district court’s finding that Ranaldson’s offense of conviction 

was an “aggravated assault” under section 2A2.2.

 

8 Ranaldson’s only argument here misconstrues the district 

court’s reasoning. See Appellant’s Br. at 49-50.
26

conclusion that Arthur suffered “bodily injury” under section 

2A2.2(b)(3)(A).

Third, Ranaldson argues that the district court should not 

have applied the “official victim” enhancement under section 

3A1.2. The enhancement applies “[i]f (1) the victim was . . . a 

government officer or employee . . . and (2) the offense of 

conviction was motivated by such status.” USSG § 3A1.2(a). The 

district court applied the enhancement upon finding that “the 

defendant engaged in the assault against the officers in order 

to interfere with the official investigation of the drug 

offense, that is, to give Holloway time to flush the drugs.” 

J.A. 478. Given the record evidence already discussed, we 

cannot find clear error here and thus affirm the court’s 

decision to apply the “official victim” enhancement under 

section 3A1.2.9

Finally, Ranaldson argues that the district court erred by 

not reducing his offense level under section 3E1.1 for 

acceptance of responsibility. The court refused because 

 

9 Ranaldson also argues that the district court erred by 

applying the “obstruction of justice” enhancement of section 

3C1.1 after finding that Ranaldson had lied during the 

suppression hearing in denying the police officers’ allegations. 

Other than insisting upon his innocence, Ranaldson gives no 

reason why this factual finding was clearly erroneous. We thus 

affirm the court’s decision.
27

Ranaldson had declined to plead guilty. Such reasoning accords 

with the relevant commentary: “This adjustment is not intended 

to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of 

proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of 

guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses 

remorse.” USSG § 3E1.1 application note 2. The court’s finding 

that Ranaldson falsely denied conduct relevant to the offense

also supports refusing to apply section 3E1.1. See Elliot, 332 

F.3d at 766 (affirming denial of adjustment for acceptance of 

responsibility under section 3E1.1 because the defendant “did 

falsely deny certain aspects of her relevant conduct” (emphasis 

omitted)). We therefore affirm the district court’s refusal to 

reduce Ranaldson’s offense level under section 3E1.1 for 

acceptance of responsibility.

III.

For the reasons stated above, we

AFFIRM.