******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARY J. AMES

(AC 38397)

Beach, Prescott and Mullins, Js.*

Argued September 22, 2016—officially released March 14, 2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, Blue, J.; O’Keefe, J.; Keegan, J.)

Emily H. Wagner, assistant public defender, with

whom were Lauren Weisfeld, chief of legal services,

and Timothy H. Everett, assigned counsel,forthe appellant (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington,

former state’s attorney, and Michael A. Pepper, senior

assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

MULLINS, J. The defendant, Mary J. Ames, appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial

before a three judge court, of murder in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-54a. On appeal, the defendant

claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that

she failed to prove her affirmative defense of extreme

emotional disturbance by a fair preponderance of the

evidence, (2) concluded that the state had disproven

her self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt, (3)

concluded that the state had established that she possessed the specific intent to cause the victim’s death

beyond a reasonable doubt, and (4) interrupted and

questioned counsel during the parties’ closing arguments in violation of her right to the assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the court.

After a trial, the court found the following facts. ‘‘At

approximately 12:56 a.m., on May 24, 2010, at Doran’s

Bar, located at 80 Old Broadway in North Haven, [the

victim] Christopher Hall, a bartender employed by the

bar, died of a stab wound to the heart. The fatal wound

was inflicted by a knife with a blade approximately

three and one-half inches in length. The knife was

wielded by [the defendant].

‘‘The bar contains two rooms significant to this case,

a poolroom and a barroom. Five people were in these

rooms at the time of the stabbing, [the victim], [the

defendant], [the defendant’s] adult son, Michael Ames,

Nicholas Moalli, a customer of the bar, and Joseph Iezzi,

a friend of [the victim’s] who had recently arrived to

drive him home at the end of the shift. Of these five

people, at least three, [the victim], [the defendant], and

Iezzi, had been drinking heavily, and the remaining two,

Moalli and Michael Ames, had been drinking at least

moderately. It is safe to assume that alcohol played at

least some role in the tragedy that happened. . . .

‘‘[The victim] was working the night shift at the bar

and was the sole employee on the premises. At approximately 11:15 p.m. on May 23, 2010, the defendant and

her son arrived at the bar. They had already been drinking heavily and began to drink more at the bar. Moalli

arrived at approximately 11:30, and the four occupants

of the bar proceeded . . . to drink beer and shots.

‘‘At approximately midnight, the four occupants

moved from the barroom into the poolroom to play

pool. Two teams were formed. [The defendant] and [the

victim] formed one team, and Michael Ames and Moalli

formed the other. The defendant believed that a wager

was made. In her mind, the members of the losing team

in two of three games would buy shots for each member

of the winning team.

‘‘The team of Michael Ames and Moalli won the first

two games. Iezzi arrived shortly before the end of the

match. Iezzi and Moalli stayed in the poolroom. [The
victim] returned to the barroom followed by [the defendant] and Michael Ames. Although [the defendant] had

been a member of the losing team, she was determined

to claim the proceeds of the bet for her son. She specifically was determined to pour a shot of tequila. [The

victim] resisted.

‘‘Autopsy findings established that [the victim] was

punched in the face and kicked in the groin. The totality

of all the evidence persuades us that both [the defendant] and Michael Ames took part in this assault.

‘‘[The defendant’s] statement to the police and her

testimony to the court establish that during the struggle,

she initially hit [the victim] in the chest with a sheathed

knife that she carried in a pocketbook. She then

removed the sheath and inflicted several wounds on

[the victim]. Some of these were defensive wounds to

[the victim’s] hands and wrist. The fatal wound was a

stab to the heart. All of these wounds were consistent

with the knife . . . seized from the bar. The nature of

these wounds convinces us that [the defendant] had

the specific intent to kill [the victim] when she inflicted

the fatal blow.’’

On the basis of the foregoing conduct, the state

charged the defendant with (1) murder in violation of

§ 53a-54a, (2) felony murder in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-54c, and (3) attempt to commit robbery

in the first degree in violation of General Statutes

§§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-134 (a) (2). The case was tried

before a three judge court, which consisted of Blue,

O’Keefe, and Keegan, Js. At trial, the defendant presented a claim of self-defense pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-19.1

In the alternative, the defendant also

presented the affirmative defense of extreme emotional

disturbance pursuant to § 53a-54a (a).2 The court found

the defendant guilty of murder, but not guilty of felony

murder and attempt to commit robbery. The court

rejected both the defendant’s claim of self-defense and

her defense of extreme emotional disturbance.

After the judgment, the defendant filed motions

wherein she requested that the court vacate its finding

of guilty of murder and instead render judgment of

guilty of manslaughter in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (2) or (3), or, in the

alternative, render judgment of acquittal.3 The court

denied those motions and sentenced the defendant to

a period of thirty-five years of incarceration followed

by ten years of special parole. This appeal followed.

Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

I

EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE

The defendant’s first claim is that the court erroneously concluded that she failed to prove her affirmative

defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a fair

preponderance of the evidence. In particular, she
asserts that ‘‘the record in this case is devoid of ‘ample

evidence’ contradicting the claim.’’ The state responds

that the defendant failed to carry her burden of proving

that she killed the victim under the influence of an

extreme emotional disturbance. We agree with the

state.

We first set forth the relevant law and our standard

of review. Section 53a-54a (a) provides in relevant part:

‘‘[I]n any prosecution [for murder], it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme

emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable

explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is

to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the

defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the

defendant believed them to be.

‘‘[E]xtreme emotional disturbance is a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to

manslaughter. . . . Pursuant to General Statutes § 53a12 (b), [w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative

defense is raised at trial, the defendant shall have the

burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance

of the evidence. . . . A homicide influenced by an

extreme emotional disturbance . . . is not one which

is necessarily committed in the hot blood stage, but

rather one that was brought about by a significant mental trauma that caused the defendant to brood for a

long period of time and then react violently, seemingly

without provocation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cannon, 165 Conn. App. 324, 333–34, 138

A.3d 1139, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924, 138 A.3d 285

(2016).

Our Supreme Court has observed that § 53a-54a

‘‘describes the two elements of that defense as: (1) the

defendant committed the offense under the influence

of extreme emotional disturbance; and (2) there was a

reasonable explanation or excuse for the defendant’s

extreme emotional disturbance.’’ State v. Forrest, 216

Conn. 139, 148, 578 A.2d 1066 (1990).

The first element requires the defendant to make

three subsidiary factual showings: ‘‘[T]he defendant

must persuade the trier of fact that . . . (1) the emotional disturbance is not a mental disease or defect that

rises to the level of insanity as defined by the penal

code; (2) the defendant was exposed to an extremely

unusual and overwhelming state, that is, not mere

annoyance or unhappiness; and (3) the defendant had

an extreme emotional reaction to it, as a result of which

there was a loss of self-control, and reason was overborne by extreme intense feeling, such as passion,

anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation or other similar emotions.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Crespo, 246 Conn. 665, 677,

718 A.2d 925 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1125, 119 S.

Ct. 911, 142 L. Ed. 2d 909 (1999). ‘‘Consideration is given
to whether the intensity of these feelings was such that

his usual intellectual controls failed and the normal

rational thinking for that individual no longer prevailed

at the time of the act. . . . [T]he term extreme refers

to the greatest degree of intensity away from the norm

for that individual.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Ruben T., 104 Conn. App. 780, 786, 936 A.2d 270

(2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 917, 943 A.2d 476 (2008).

‘‘The determination of the presence or absence of

extreme emotional disturbance is one of fact for the

trier, and our review is the same whether the trier of

fact is a judge, a panel of judges or a jury.’’ State v.

Blades, 225 Conn. 609, 628, 626 A.2d 273 (1993).

Accordingly, ‘‘[t]his court will construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s

[finding of guilt] and will affirm the conclusion of the

trier of fact [regarding the affirmative defense of

extreme emotional disturbance] if it is reasonably supported by the evidence and the logical inferences drawn

therefrom.’’ State v. D’Antuono, 186 Conn. 414, 421, 441

A.2d 846 (1982).4In the present case, the court rejected

the defendant’s affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, ruling: ‘‘After a careful consideration, we cannot conclude that the credible evidence

supports this affirmative defense. Even if we were to

hypothetically conclude that the defendant was

exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming

stress, we cannot find that she had an extreme emotional reaction to that stress. While the evidence suggests that there was indeed stress in her personal life,

we cannot find that her quarrel with [the victim], and

her eventual killing of him, was a reaction to that stress.

[The victim] had nothing to do with that personal stress.

The killing was, rather, the result of a barroom brawl

which the defendant herself had initiated.’’ (Emphasis added.)

After reviewing the record and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the

court’s finding of guilt, we conclude that the court’s

rejection of the defendant’s affirmative defense of

extreme emotional disturbance was reasonably supported by the evidence and the logical inferences

drawn therefrom.

To establish the defense that she acted under the

influence of an extreme emotional disturbance, the

defendant relied on her own testimony and the testimony of Catherine F. Lewis, an expert in forensic psychiatry. During her testimony, the defendant admitted

to killing the victim, but she claimed that she had done

so under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance. She contended that her extreme emotional disturbance had two sources: (1) the altercation with the

victim, and (2) several unrelated stressful circumstances in her life.
Regarding the altercation with the victim, the defendant testified to the following. The defendant believed

that she and the victim had made a wager in which

the losers of the pool match would buy drinks for the

winners. When the match concluded, the defendant and

the victim began to argue over whether the victim, having lost the match, would buy the defendant’s son a

drink. As the victim left the poolroom to return to the

barroom, the defendant followed him and continued

arguing with him. The victim repeatedly refused to buy

the defendant’s son a drink. The argument continued

as the victim and the defendant exchanged profanities,

and, according to the defendant, the victim eventually

‘‘put his hands on [the defendant’s] throat.’’ The defendant testified that, when the victim touched her, it

caused her to feel ‘‘terrified,’’ ‘‘trapped,’’ and ‘‘like [she]

was going to be hurt.’’ She claimed that these feelings

were largely due to prior unrelated incidents in which

she allegedly was assaulted and raped. As a result of

those incidents, the defendant claimed to have started

carrying a knife in her pocketbook for self-protection.

Because the victim’s touching of her made her feel

‘‘scared,’’ ‘‘upset,’’ and ‘‘[like] a mess,’’ she ‘‘freaked

out,’’ retrieved the knife from her pocketbook, and

stabbed the victim in an effort to ‘‘get away.’’

Regarding the other unrelated stressors in the defendant’s life that contributed to her extreme emotional

disturbance, she asserted that those included the following: (1) caring for her ill mother and managing her

mother’s finances, (2) losing her job, (3) ending a relationship with her boyfriend, and (4) relapsing into alcohol abuse after years of sobriety.

The defendant also presented the testimony of Lewis

to support her extreme emotional disturbance defense.

Lewis, an expert in forensic psychiatry, testified that

after interviewing the defendant and reviewing the

defendant’s background and psychiatric history, she

diagnosed the defendant with chronic post-traumatic

stress disorder. Lewis opined that the defendant’s stress

disorder primarily was caused by two incidents in which

the defendant claimed she previously had been

assaulted and raped.5 Furthermore, Lewis testified that

a person suffering from this type of stress disorder is

in a ‘‘perpetual state of hyperarousal’’ and responds to

a threat in a manner ‘‘way out of proportion to what it

should be.’’ As a result, Lewis opined, if the defendant

‘‘truly believes she is at risk [physically], she would be

at risk to respond with extreme force or whatever force

it took to stop that risk from happening to her.’’

Regarding the defendant’s altercation with the victim,

Lewis agreed with defense counsel that the defendant

told her that the victim ‘‘had his hands physically touching herin some way.’’As a result of this physical contact,

the defendant told Lewis, she felt ‘‘trapped’’ and that

she stabbed the victim only because she believed that
she had ‘‘to get him off me.’’

On the basis of the defendant’s account of her altercation with the victim, Lewis, in offering the following

opinion, agreed with defense counsel that (1) the defendant ‘‘was exposed to an extremely unusual and overwhelming stress’’ at the ‘‘time of [the] physical

altercation’’; (2) the defendant had ‘‘an extreme emotional reaction to the physical struggle between her and

[the victim]’’; and (3) the defendant’s ‘‘ability to reason

and act rational[ly] was overborne by intense feelings.’’6

The defendant’s stress disorder, according to Lewis,

was an ‘‘important factor’’ in concluding that the defendant had acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance.

The state did not call its own expert witness. Instead,

it sought to impeach Lewis’ testimony on cross-examination by undermining both her stress disorder diagnosis and her opinion that the defendant acted under

the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance. In

particular, the state successfully elicited that Lewis had

not sought and obtained collateral evidence concerning

some of the defendant’s background and psychiatric

and medical history.

The state also undertook a lengthy examination of

how the defendant related the details of the altercation

to Lewis. For instance, Lewis recalled that although

the defendant claimed the victim ‘‘grabbed her by the

throat,’’ Lewis did not ask the defendant to demonstrate

exactly how the victim grabbed her. Furthermore, Lewis

had ‘‘trouble understanding’’ how and where on the

defendant’s person the victim grabbed the defendant:

‘‘I remember . . . that [the victim] was not throttling

her, and it wasn’t clear to me, even in talking to her

for some time . . . .’’ ‘‘[W]hen she was describing him

putting his hands on her . . . I could not elicit if it was

throat or more . . . shoulder.’’

Lewis also indicated that the defendant provided her

with two different accounts of how the altercation

occurred. In the first version, the defendant claimed

that the victim ‘‘reached across a bar’’ and ‘‘grabbed

her by the throat,’’ and, in the second version, the victim

supposedly grabbed the defendant after the defendant

had followed the victim behind the bar. Lewis acknowledged that she was aware of a third version that the

defendant provided to the police, in which the defendant indicated that she lunged across the bar at the

victim, struck him, tackled him, and stabbed him.

As reflected in both the defendant’s testimony and

the testimony of her expert, the defendant’s claim of

extreme emotional disturbance was largely premised

on the crucial fact that her stress disorder was triggered

when the victim grabbed her throat. The reasoning

underlying the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance claim is as follows: (1) Lewis’ expert testimony
established that the defendant had been suffering from

a severe stress disorder, namely, post-traumatic stress

disorder, at the time of the incident; (2) Lewis’ testimony also established that the defendant’s stress disorder, when triggered, could cause the defendant to react

in a violent and extreme manner;(3) according to Lewis,

the defendant’s stress disorder could be triggered when

she felt physically at risk; (4) on the basis of the defendant’s assertion that the victim grabbed her throat, in

Lewis’ opinion, the victim’s actions triggered the defendant’s stress disorder; and (5) therefore, this triggering

ofthe defendant’s stress disorder compelled herto react

in an extreme and violent manner, and to stab the defendant under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance.

Importantly, however, the court did not make the

factual finding that the victim grabbed the defendant’s

throat. Because this finding was a crucial factual premise upon which the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance defense was predicated, the defendant’s

failure to prove it was fatal to that affirmative defense.

Absent the finding that the victim had grabbed the

defendant by the throat, the defendant failed to establish any connection between her post-traumatic stress

disorder and her stabbing of the victim. As a result, she

failed to carry her burden in showing that she had

an extreme emotional reaction to her ‘‘unusual and

overwhelming state,’’ which, the court hypothetically

assumed, was her stress disorder. Thus, the court reasonably could have concluded that because the victim

did not grab the defendant’s throat, her stress disorder

was not triggered and, therefore, that her stabbing of

the victim simply was a reaction to ‘‘a barroom brawl

[that] [she] herself had initiated,’’ not a reaction to her

stress disorder. Our review of the record reveals that

there is ample evidence in the record to support this

conclusion.

The defendant testified that she instigated an argument with the victim because he refused to buy her

son a drink that she believed the victim owed him. The

defendant decided that ‘‘[i]f [the victim] was not going

to pour the drink for my son, I was going to pour the

drink for my son.’’ As the argument intensified, the

defendant indicated in a statement to the police, she

threatened the victim by telling him, ‘‘I’ll kick you[r]

son-of-a-bitchen ass . . . .’’ In that statement to the

police, the defendant also disclosed that she eventually

attacked the victim by lunging at him, tackling him,

striking him, and stabbing him. Indeed, on the basis of

this evidence, the court concluded that the defendant

‘‘pursued the victim into the barroom, threatened him,

and lunged at him . . . [leaving] [the court] with no

doubt that she was the initial aggressor.’’

Although the defendant argues that, in testifying at

trial and talking to the police and to Lewis, she consis-
tently alleged that the defendant grabbed herthroat, the

court was free to disbelieve this self-serving testimony.

‘‘The trier of fact can disbelieve any or all of the evidence proffered concerning the defense of extreme

emotional disturbance, including expert testimony, and

can construe such evidence in a manner different from

the defendant’s assertions. . . . In a case tried before

a court, the [panel] is the sole arbiter of the credibility

of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific

testimony. . . . On appeal, we will give the evidence

the most favorable reasonable construction in support

of the [trier of fact’s finding of guilt] to which it is

entitled.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Ruben T., supra, 104 Conn. App. 788.

Because the court noted that the ‘‘credible evidence

[did not] support [the extreme emotional disturbance

defense],’’ we must presume that the court simply did

not believe the defendant’s testimony that the victim

had grabbed her throat. Indeed, the court’s decision

not to credit the defendant’s testimony that the victim

had grabbed her by the throat was supported by the

testimony of two law enforcement officers, who indicated that they did not observe any visible signs of

injury on the defendant’s throat or on any other part

of her body.7

Similarly, because Lewis’ expert opinion was premised largely on the unproven subordinate fact that the

victim grabbed the defendant’s throat, the court also

readily could have found her opinion unpersuasive.

‘‘The trier may accept or reject the evidence presented

by the defendant and may choose to believe or disbelieve expert testimony, even when uncontroverted.’’

State v. Ricketts, supra, 37 Conn. App. 755. ‘‘Despite

the defendant’s contention to the contrary, the trial

court is not required to accept uncontradicted expert

testimony. The court might reject it entirely as not worthy of belief or find that the opinion was based on

subordinate facts that were not proven.’’ State v. Blades,

supra, 225 Conn. 629.

Accordingly, in construing the evidence in the light

most favorable to sustaining the court’s finding of guilt,

we conclude that the court’s determination that the

defendant did not prove her affirmative defense of

extreme emotional disturbance by a fair preponderance

of the evidence was reasonably supported by the evidence and the logical inferences drawn therefrom.

II

SELF-DEFENSE

The defendant’s second claim on appeal is that the

court erroneously rejected her claim of self-defense.

Specifically, the defendant argues that the court

improperly concluded that she was the initial aggressor

in the altercation with the victim and, therefore, that

she was not justified in using physical force against the
victim. The state responds that it refuted the defendant’s self-defense claim by establishing that the defendant was the initial aggressor. We agree with the state.

We first set forth our standard of review and the

relevant law. ‘‘On appeal, the standard for reviewing

sufficiency claims in conjunction with a justification

offered by the defense is the same standard used when

examining claims of insufficiency of the evidence. . . .

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we

apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the [trier of

fact’s finding of guilt]. Second, we determine whether

upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [fact finder] reasonably could

have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

. . . . This court cannot substitute its own judgment

for that of the [fact finder] if there is sufficient evidence

to support the [trier of fact’s finding of guilt]. . . .

Moreover, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable

view of the evidence that would support a reasonable

hypothesis ofinnocence. We ask, instead, whetherthere

is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the

[fact finder’s determination of guilt].’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Revels,

313 Conn. 762, 778, 99 A.3d 1130 (2014), cert. denied,

U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 1451, 191 L. Ed. 2d 404 (2015).

‘‘Self-defense is raised by way of justification, and

when such defense is asserted the state shall have the

burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable

doubt. . . . Whether the defense of the justified use of

. . . force, properly raised at trial, has been disproved

by the state is a question of fact for the [fact finder],

to be determined from all the evidence in the case and

the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.

. . . As long as the evidence presented at trial was

sufficient to allow the [fact finder] reasonably to conclude that the state had met its burden of persuasion,

the [fact finder’s determination of guilt] will be sustained.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Hunter, 99 Conn. App. 736, 745, 916 A.2d 63, cert.

denied, 282 Conn. 925, 926 A.2d 667 (2007).

Section 53a-19 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A] person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon

another person to defend himself . . . from what he

reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of

physical force, and he may use such degree of force

which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such

purpose; except that deadly physical force may not be

used unless the actor reasonably believes that such

other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical

force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily

harm.’’

Pursuant to § 53a-19 (c), however, ‘‘a person is not

justified in using physical force when . . . he is the
initial aggressor, except that his use of physical force

upon another person under such circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to

do so, but such other person notwithstanding continues

or threatens the use of physical force . . . .’’ ‘‘Therefore, if the [panel] found that the defendant was the

aggressorin [her] encounter with the victim, [s]he could

not prevail on [her] claim of self-defense.’’ State v. Jimenez, 228 Conn. 335, 339–40, 636 A.2d 782 (1994).

Our Supreme Court has defined the term initial

aggressor as ‘‘the person who first acts in such a manner

that creates a reasonable belief in another person’s

mind that physical force is about to be used [on] that

other person . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 320 Conn. 22, 53–54, 128 A.3d

431 (2015).

In the present case, the courtrejected the defendant’s

self-defense claim, holding: ‘‘The defendant claims that

she was justified in using physical force against [the

victim], pursuant to . . . § 53a-19. The evidence does

not support this claim. On the contrary, the evidence

that she pursued [the victim] into the barroom, threatened him, and lunged at him leaves us with no doubt that

she was the initial aggressor. . . . There is no claim or

evidence that having commenced this encounter she

ever withdrew from it.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Our review of the record reveals that there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that the

defendant was the initial aggressor in the altercation

with the victim and, therefore, that she was not justified

in using force against him. As set forth in part I of this

opinion, the defendant indicated in her statement to the

police and in hertestimony at trial that she instigated an

argument with the victim over a shot of tequila, pursued

the victim as the argument escalated, threatened the

victim, lunged at the victim, tackled the victim, struck

the victim, and then stabbed the victim in the chest.

Additionally, the court reasonably could have inferred

from the lack of any signs of injury on the defendant’s

person, as well as the numerous defensive type wounds

that the victim sustained,8

that it was the victim who

had been acting in self-defense, not the defendant. See,

e.g., State v. Riggsbee, 112 Conn. App. 787, 795, 963

A.2d 1122 (2009) (trial court properly concluded that

state disproved self-defense claim where police officers

testified that they observed signs of injury on victim’s

person but not on defendant’s person).

Accordingly, in construing the evidence in the light

most favorable to sustaining the court’s finding of guilt,

we conclude that the court properly determined that

the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant did not act in self-defense.
III

SPECIFIC INTENT TO CAUSE DEATH

The defendant’s third claim on appeal is that the

court erroneously concluded that the state established

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific intent to cause the death of the

victim. In particular, the defendant argues that because

she was intoxicated when she stabbed the victim, her

intoxication prevented her from forming the specific

intent to kill the victim. The state responds that there

was ample circumstantial evidence in the record to

support the court’s conclusion that the defendant

intended to cause the victim’s death, notwithstanding

the fact that the defendant may have been intoxicated.

We agree with the state.

We first set forth the relevant law and our standard

of review. ‘‘Under . . . § 53a-54a (a), the state must

prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent

to cause the death of the victim. . . . Intent is a mental

process which ordinarily can be proven only by circumstantial evidence. An intent to cause death may be

inferred from circumstantial evidence such as the type

of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the

type of wound inflicted and the events leading to and

immediately following the death. . . . The use of inferences based on circumstantial evidence is necessary

because direct evidence of the accused’s state of mind

is rarely available. . . .

‘‘Whether a criminal defendant possessed the specific

intent to kill is a question for the trier of fact. . . . This

court will not disturb the trier’s determination if, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Chace, 199 Conn. 102, 104–105, 505 A.2d 712 (1986).

‘‘[I]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the [fact finder] is not barred from drawing those

inferences consistent with guilt and is not required to

draw only those inferences consistent with innocence.

The rule is that the [fact finder’s] function is to draw

whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and

logical.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Francis, 228 Conn. 118, 127, 635 A.2d 762 (1993).

A fact finder may infer intent to cause death from

various types of circumstantial evidence: (1) ‘‘intent to

kill may be inferred from evidence that the defendant

had a motive to kill’’;(internal quotation marks omitted)

State v. Otto, 305 Conn. 51, 67, 43 A.3d 629 (2012); (2)

‘‘thrust[ing] [a] knife with great force and direct[ing]

. . . blows to vital areas, indicat[es] that [the defendant] purposely sought to cause serious injury or
death’’; State v. Chace, supra, 199 Conn. 106; (3) ‘‘if

the defendant has caused a grievous wound that could

cause the victim’s death if not treated promptly, the

failure to summon that treatment is consistent with an

antecedent intent to cause death’’; (internal quotation

marks omitted) State v. Otto, supra, 71–72; and (4)‘‘consciousness of guilt evidence [is] part of the evidence

from which a [fact finder] may draw an inference of

an intent to kill.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 73.

Our review of the record in the present case reveals

that there was ample evidence presented at trial from

which the court could have inferred that the defendant

possessed the specific intent to cause the victim’s death.

First, the court could have found that the defendant

had a motive to kill the victim. The defendant’s testimony and statement to the police indicated that she

instigated an argument with the victim over a shot of

tequila that she believed the victim owed to her son.

The defendant was determined to claim her son’s drink,

stating that ‘‘[i]f [the victim] was not going to pour the

drink for my son, I was going to pour the drink for

my son.’’ In reaction to the victim’s refusal to give the

defendant’s son a drink, the defendant told the victim,

‘‘I’ll kick you[r] son-of-a-bitchen ass . . . .’’ Thereafter,

some type of physical altercation ensued, in which the

defendant lunged at, tackled, and struck the victim. The

defendant concluded that because the victim was much

taller than she is, she would have to lunge at him with

her knife to overcome the size disadvantage.

Second, the court reasonably could have found that

in ‘‘thrust[ing] [a] knife with great force and direct[ing]

. . . blows to [the victim’s] vital areas . . . [the defendant] purposely sought to cause serious injury or

death.’’ State v. Chace, supra, 199 Conn. 106. Indeed,

our Supreme Court has noted that ‘‘[o]ne who uses a

deadly weapon upon a vital part of another will be

deemed to have intended the probable result of that

act, and from such a circumstance a proper inference

may be drawn in some cases that there was an intent

to kill.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 72, 621A.2d 728 (1993). Given

that the heart undoubtedly is a vital area, the testimony

of a state medical examiner that the defendant stabbed

the victim in the chest with enough force to puncture

his skin, soft tissue, cartilage, and heart afforded the

court a strong basis from which it could infer an intent

to kill.

Additionally, the medical examiner testified that the

victim also sustained, at the same time as the stabbing

wound, defensive type wounds to his arms and wrists,

and abrasions to his forehead, arms, lips, neck, legs,

and penis. Such wounds suggest that the defendant

intended to overcome the victim’s resistance so that

she could inflict a final and fatal blow.
Third, because ‘‘the defendant . . . caused a grievous wound that could [have] cause[d] the victim’s death

if not treated promptly, [her] failure to summon that

treatment [was] consistent with an antecedent intent

to cause death.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Otto, supra, 305 Conn. 71–72. The court could

have found that after she had stabbed the victim, the

defendant immediately fled the bar and did not attempt

to render aid to the victim or summon medical assistance. Indeed, the defendant, and her son, Michael

Ames, ran to her car, which was parked in Doran’s

parking lot, and Michael Ames drove them to the defendant’s home.

Fourth, the state presented evidence that suggested

that the defendant manifested a consciousness of guilt

after the stabbing. The state’s evidence showed that

the defendant fled the bar after the stabbing and

attempted to conceal the sheath of the knife somewhere

in her home. See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 229 Conn.

328, 331, 641 A.2d 123 (1994) (jury could have inferred

intent to cause death on basis of defendant’s hiding

murder weapon after crime by ‘‘wrapp[ing] [it] in an

old pair of pants’’ and ‘‘hid[ing] [it] beneath the turntable

of a stereo set in [his] bedroom’’). Moreover, as the

police arrived at the defendant’s home, they observed

from their cruisers that the defendant was walking from

the garage of her home to the front door. When the

defendant turned her head and looked at the police

cruisers, she ‘‘quickened her pace’’ and entered the

home through the front door. Although the defendant

testified that she was unaware that the police were at

her home, the responding officers testified that they

had attempted to make contact with the defendant for

approximately thirty minutes by calling her home telephone, banging on the front door, and yelling loudly.

The defendant never responded to the officers, and the

officers were able to enter the house and apprehend

the defendant only after using a battering ram to knock

down the front door.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the defendant claims

that she could not have formed the intent to kill the

victim because she was intoxicated at the time of the

stabbing. ‘‘Intoxication, as used in General Statutes

§ 53a-7, means a substantial disturbance of mental or

physical capacities resulting from the introduction of

substances into the body. . . . [Although] intoxication

is neither a defense nor an affirmative defense to a

murder charge in Connecticut, evidence of a defendant’s intoxication is relevant to negate specific intent

which is an essential element of the crime of murder.

. . . Intoxication, however, does not automatically

negate intent. . . . It is for the [fact finder] to decide,

after weighing all the evidence adduced at trial, whether

a criminal defendant’s intoxication rendered him incapable of forming the intentrequired to commit the crime
with which he is charged.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Rice, 105 Conn. App. 103, 109, 936

A.2d 694 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 921, 943 A.2d

1101 (2008).

In asserting that she was too intoxicated to form the

intent to kill the victim, the defendant relies mainly on

her own testimony. Specifically, she cites the following

particular claims as negating herintent to kill the victim:

(1) her description of how she first struck the victim

with the knife still sheathed and how she struggled to

remove the sheath from the knife; (2) her confusion

and inability to perfectly recallthe events and the details

of the stabbing; and (3) her conduct after the stabbing,

in which she returned home, fell asleep, ‘‘fully cooperated with police,’’ and was ‘‘remorseful.’’ As we previously indicated in parts I and II of this opinion,

however, the court was free to disbelieve part or all of

the defendant’s self-serving testimony. See, e.g., State

v. Fernandez, 76 Conn. App. 183, 191, 818 A.2d 877 (‘‘[A

trier of fact] may believe or disbelieve all or any portion

of the testimony offered. . . . A trier of fact is free to

reject testimony even if it is uncontradicted . . . and

is equally free to reject part of the testimony of a witness

even if other parts have been found credible.’’ [(Internal

quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 901,

823 A.2d 1220 (2003).

We are mindful that the court did acknowledge that

the defendant had been ‘‘drinking heavily’’ and that

‘‘alcohol played at least some role in the tragedy that

happened.’’ The court, however, in responding to the

defendant’s motion for articulation, asking, ‘‘[h]ow the

evidence of the defendant’s intoxication was considered as to whether she was capable of forming the

intent to kill [the victim],’’ explained: ‘‘As [§ 53a-7] indicates, the substantive question for the fact finder in a

murder case is not whether the defendant was intoxicated, but whether the state has proven all of the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . The sole contested question is whether [the defendant] acted with intent to cause the death of another

person. . . . [T]he court has found that such intent has

been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [T]his

finding has been made after a careful review of all the

evidence in the case.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted.)

Thus, we must conclude that the court, having considered all the evidence presented, simply did not believe

that the defendant was so intoxicated that she could

not form the specific intent to kill. We conclude that

the court acted reasonably in so finding. To be sure,

the court was presented with substantial evidence from

which it could have inferred the defendant’s intent to

kill and from which itreasonably could have determined

that her intoxication did not prevent her from forming

the specific intent to kill the victim.
Accordingly, we conclude that the cumulative effect

of all the evidence adduced at trial and the inferences

reasonably drawn therefrom amply support the trial

court’s conclusion that the defendant was able to and

did form the specific intent to kill the victim.

IV

COURT’S QUESTIONING OF COUNSEL

DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT

The defendant’s final claim is that she was deprived

of her constitutional right to the assistance of counsel

when the court interrupted defense counsel during closing argument.9 Specifically, the defendant asserts that

the court’s questioning was improper because it ‘‘constituted presubmission deliberation’’ that ‘‘deprived the

defendant of her right to have her counsel present her

defense as she saw fit.’’ The state responds that the

defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court’s

questioning interfered with defense counsel’s presentation of her closing argument. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

review of the defendant’s claim. During the parties’

closing arguments, the court interrupted both the prosecutor and defense counsel to ask counsel questions. In

particular, the court asked counsel to explicate their

theories regarding (1) a broken pool cue found in Doran’s poolroom, which the court deemed ‘‘important’’

evidence,10 (2) the cause and significance of the defensive type wounds that the victim sustained, (3) the possibility that the defendant’s son, Michael Ames, inflicted

some of the wounds sustained by the victim, (4) the

precise location in Doran’s where the defendant

stabbed the victim, (5) whether the evidence indicated

that the defendant intended to rob Doran’s cash register, especially in light of testimony that suggested that

the defendant had her hand in or nearthe cash register’s

drawer, and (6) whether the defendant’s attempt to

steal a shot of tequila could serve as the predicate felony

for felony murder.11

The court also interrupted counsel, particularly

defense counsel, to ask other clarifying questions. After

defense counsel stated that ‘‘the issue here is not

whether or not [the defendant] caused the death but,

rather, what were the circumstances, what [was] her

mental state,’’ the court asked, ‘‘just to make it very

clear, there’s no question as to identity or causation[?]’’

Moreover, the court interrupted defense counsel at one

point to clarify whether defense counsel was referring

to Michael Ames orthe defendant, and, at another point,

it asked defense counsel to clarify the location in the

bar to which she was referring. Last, when defense

counsel stated that she was ‘‘not going to discuss the

several alternative theories of how [she thought] that

[the court’s decision] should come out on the murder

charge,’’ the court asked defense counsel to clarify what
alternative theories the defense was presenting: ‘‘If,

hypothetically, we find no intent, hypothetically. . . .

It seems to me that you wish us to consider a lesser

included offense. The appropriate lesser included

offense if, hypothetically, we find no intent, would be

[reckless manslaughter]. . . . Do you agree?’’ The

court also asked if the defendant was seeking a ‘‘straight

not guilty [finding],’’ if ‘‘the self-defense claim is only

claimed if we find intent,’’ and, ‘‘[i]f we hypothetically,

and I mean hypothetically, do not find intent, then we

don’t consider self-defense . . . we go to reckless.’’

On appeal, the defendant claims that the foregoing

interruptions by the court denied defense counsel the

ability to present closing argument as she saw fit and,

therefore, deprived the defendant of her right to the

assistance of counsel. We disagree.

Although the defendant did not preserve this claim

properly at trial by objecting to the court’s interruptions

and questions, she asks us to review the claim pursuant

to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d

823 (1989); see In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120

A.3d 1188 (modifying third condition of Golding). Even

if we were to conclude that the first two Golding prongs

are satisfied, the defendant’s claim fails because it does

not satisfy Golding’s third prong.

‘‘As we recently have noted, [u]nder Golding review

. . . a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional

error not preserved at trial only if all of the following

conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review

the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental

right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . .

exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial;

and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state

has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged

constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . Because a defendant cannot prevail under Golding

unless he meets each of those four conditions, an appellate court is free to reject a defendant’s unpreserved

claim upon determining that any one of those conditions

has not been satisfied.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Cunningham, 168 Conn. App. 519, 528–29, 146 A.3d

1029, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 938, A.3d (2016).

Regarding Golding’s first prong, the record is adequate for review because all of the court’s interruptions

and questioning occurred on the record during closing

argument. Moreover, because the defendant alleges that

the court violated her sixth amendment right to present

a closing argument, her claim is, at least arguably, of

constitutional magnitude, and, therefore, we assume

that it satisfies Golding’s second prong. With respect

to Golding’s third prong, however, the defendant’s

claim fails because the defendant has not shown that

the court’s interruptions and questioning violated her
right to present a closing argument.

‘‘The sixth amendment guarantee in the federal constitution of the right to assistance of counsel has been

held to include the right to present closing arguments.

. . . The defendant enjoys the same right whether the

trial is to a jury or to the bench. . . . If the trial court

denies the defendant an opportunity to give closing

arguments, the reviewing court should grant a new

trial.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Plaskonka, 22 Conn.

App. 207, 210–11, 577 A.2d 729, cert. denied, 216 Conn.

812, 580 A.2d 65 (1990). ‘‘The right to present a closing

argument is abridged not only when a defendant is

completely denied an opportunity to argue before the

court or the jury after all the evidence has been admitted, but also when a defendant is deprived of the opportunity to raise a significant issue that is reasonably

inferable from the facts in evidence.’’ State v. Arline,

223 Conn. 52, 64, 612 A.2d 755 (1992).

‘‘Comments made by a trial judge during closing argument can only warrant reversal if it appears that the

judge’s conduct was clearly prejudicial to the rights of

the party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United

States v. Simpson, 337 F.3d 905, 908 (7th Cir. 2003),

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1128, 124 S. Ct. 1100, 157 L. Ed.

2d 930 (2004). ‘‘Only in rare circumstances will the

court’s interruptions of a defense counsel’s closing

argument callfor a new trial.’’ United States v. Hammer,

25 F. Supp. 2d 518, 533 (M.D. Pa. 1998), appeal dismissed, 226 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534

U.S. 831, 122 S. Ct. 75, 151 L. Ed. 2d 40 (2001).

Regarding a trial court’s interference with closing

argument, our courts have found reversible error only

where the trial court affirmatively precluded defense

counsel from discussing particularissues during closing

argument. Compare State v. Arline, supra, 223 Conn.

64–65 (new trial required where trial court improperly

precluded defense counsel from questioning credibility

of complainant by referring to evidence of complainant’s bias and motive), and State v. Ross, 18 Conn. App.

423, 433–34, 558 A.2d 1015 (1989) (defendant entitled

to new trial where trial court prohibited defense counsel

from commenting on fact that state’s sole eyewitness

did not testify at trial), with State v. McArthur, 96 Conn.

App. 155, 174–75, 899 A.2d 691 (not error for trial court

to preclude defense counsel from commenting on

state’s failure to call witness because defendant did

not demonstrate that failure to call witness necessarily

indicated weakness in state’s case), cert. denied, 280

Conn. 908, 907 A.2d 93 (2006).

The principal flaw in the defendant’s claim is that

she has not identified any specific arguments or issues

that defense counsel was prevented from presenting to

the court. Indeed, a review of defense counsel’s closing

argument reveals that, notwithstanding the court’s

interruptions, defense counsel was able to present
robust argument regarding the evidence and theories

of defense. In particular, defense counsel used the

majority of her time during closing argument to challenge the felony murder and attempt to commit robbery

charges. As indicated by the court’s acquittal on those

charges, defense counsel was successful in demonstrating that the state did not carry its burden of proof on

those charges. Defense counsel also was able to present

argument that the evidence presented at trial failed to

show that the defendant intended to cause the victim’s

death. Furthermore, defense counsel later discussed the

defendant’s ‘‘mental state’’ and how Lewis’ testimony,

evidence of the defendant’s intoxication, and other

physical and testimonial evidence tended to support

her claim of self-defense and the affirmative defense

of extreme emotional disturbance.

Additionally, the defendant has not demonstrated

that the court’s particular questions and interruptions

were so prejudicial that they deprived her of a fair trial.

First, some of the court’s questions were asked for

purposes of clarifying defense counsel’s argument. For

instance, although defense counsel stated that she

would not ‘‘discuss the alternative theories’’ presented

by the defense, the court, presumably to prevent confusion, was able to elicit the defendant’s position with

respect to lesser included offenses, intent, and affirmative defenses. Second, the court asked the same questions of both parties, and when it asked the state a

question that it had not asked defense counsel, defense

counsel was given a chance to respond afterthe completion of closing arguments.12 Third, although it initially

had denied defense counsel’s request for additional

time, the court later granted defense counsel an additional five minutes for argument. Fourth, the court

expressly rejected the defendant’s contention that the

questions were a form of ‘‘premature deliberation.’’ As

previously indicated, the court was careful to indicate

that its questions were ‘‘hypothetical’’ in nature and

that it was not yet making any actual findings.

Ultimately, the defendant’s claim that the court’s

questions and interruptions were prejudicial is unpersuasive. Indeed, rather than view the court’s conduct

as prejudicial to the defendant, many advocates would

view the court’s questions as a welcome opportunity

to learn and then address the fact finder’s specific concerns with any weaknesses and flaws in their arguments. In the present case, this is precisely what the

court’s questions permitted defense counsel to do.

Moreover, as previously discussed, such questions did

not in any way preclude defense counsel from arguing

the defendant’s theories of defense. Therefore, we conclude that, rather than having a detrimental effect on

the presentation of the defendant’s case, the court’s

questions actually aided the defendant in her presentation.
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the

court’s interruptions did not deny defense counsel the

opportunity to present the defendant’s theory of

defense or otherwise prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s questioning of

defense counsel did not deprive the defendant of her

right to the assistance of counsel.13 Therefore, the defendant’s claim fails under the third prong of Golding

because a constitutional violation did not occur.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 General Statutes § 53a-19 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A] person is

justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend

himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use

or imminent use of physical force, and he may use such degree of force

which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose; except that

deadly physical force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes

that such other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical force,

or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm.’’

2 General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person,

he causes the death of such person . . . except that in any prosecution

under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant

committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,

the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a

person in the defendant’s situation underthe circumstances as the defendant

believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall

constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.’’

3 Specifically, the defendant sought vacatur on the grounds that ‘‘the court

did not apply the correct legal analysis as to extreme emotional disturbance’’

and that ‘‘the court erroneously found that the defendant did not establish

[the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance] by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .’’ The defendant sought an acquittal on the ground

that ‘‘the evidence adduced at her trial did not reasonably permit a finding

as to the element of intent to cause death . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)

4 We note that there is a line of cases stating that we apply the abuse of

discretion standard of review to the rejection of an extreme emotional

disturbance defense in an appeal from a trial to the court. This line of cases

originates with the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Zdanis, 182 Conn.

388, 391–92, 438 A.2d 696 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1003, 101 S. Ct. 1715,

68 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). In Zdanis, the court stated: ‘‘Although this case

presents an unusual procedural posture where a three-judge panel serves

as the finder of facts (instead of a jury) and where the burden is on the

defendant to prove his affirmative defense, the normal rules for appellate

review of factual determinations apply and the evidence must be given a

construction most favorable to sustaining the court’s verdict. . . . Moreover, the question is whether upon the facts established and the inferences

drawn therefrom the fact-finder could have reasonably concluded that the

cumulative effect of the evidence failed to establish that the defendant acted

under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance for which there

was a reasonable explanation or excuse. In sum, except where an abuse of

discretion is clearly shown,the conclusion of a trial court should be affirmed

so long as it is a reasonable one on the basis of the evidence adduced and

the inferences drawn therefrom.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.; see also, e.g., State

v. Crespo, supra, 246 Conn. 677 (citing abuse of discretion standard); State

v. Cannon, supra, 165 Conn. App. 335 (same); State v. Ricketts, 37 Conn.

App. 749, 755–56, 659 A.2d 188 (same), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 913, 660 A.2d

355, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977, 116 S. Ct. 481, 133 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1995).

We also note, however, that our jurisprudence is clear that we treat review

of this type of claim in the same manner, regardless of whether it arises

from a court trial or jury trial. State v. Blades, supra, 225 Conn. 628 (‘‘[t]he
determination of the presence or absence of extreme emotional disturbance

is one of fact for the trier, and our review is the same whether the trier of

fact is a judge, a panel of judges or a jury’’ [emphasis added]).

Accordingly, we follow the line of authority that does not require review

under the abuse of discretion standard. See State v. DeJesus, 236 Conn.

189, 203–204, 672 A.2d 488 (1996); State v. Blades, supra, 225 Conn. 628–30;

State v. Steiger, 218 Conn. 349, 378–85, 590 A.2d 408 (1991); State v. D’Antuono, supra, 186 Conn. 420–22. Thus, we review the defendant’s claim to

ascertain whether upon the evidence presented at trial and the reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, the court reasonably could have concluded

that the cumulative effect of the evidence failed to establish that the defendant acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance.

5 Lewis also addressed how other stressors in the defendant’s life had

exacerbated the defendant’s stress disorder. Those stressors included: (1)

having a genetic predisposition for alcohol dependency, (2) managing her

ill mother’s finances, (3) losing her job, (4) abusing alcohol for many years,

and (5) ending a relationship with her boyfriend.

6

In particular, Lewis stated that the defendant experienced intense feelings of ‘‘terror,’’ ‘‘isolation,’’ and ‘‘vulnerab[ility].’’ She testified that the defendant also felt ‘‘like trash,’’ ‘‘like [she was] going to be killed or hurt,’’ and

‘‘as helpless as a little eleven year old girl with, like, death bearing down

on you.’’

7 We note that, even if the court had credited the defendant’s testimony

that the victim grabbed her by the throat, it still could have concluded that

she failed to prove her extreme emotional disturbance defense. We focus

on the throat-grabbing because the defendant appears to emphasize that

occurrence as support for her contention that her stress disorder was triggered and, therefore, that she necessarily acted under the influence of an

extreme emotional disturbance. The court, however, could have found both

that the victim grabbed the defendant and that the defendant’s reaction to

the grabbing was not done under the influence of an extreme emotional

disturbance. The court still was not required to credit any of the other

evidence that the defendant proffered in support of her contention that she

acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance, whether it

was her own testimony or that of her expert witness. In other words, on

the basis of all of the evidence presented, the court properly determined

that the defendant had not met her burden of establishing her defense by

a preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, as noted in part I of this opinion,

the evidence clearly supported the court’s conclusion that the stabbing

simply was a reaction to ‘‘a barroom brawl [that] [she] herself had initiated,’’

rather than a reaction that occurred under the influence of an extreme

emotional disturbance.

8 A state medical examiner testified that the victim sustained slicing injuries to his right hand, left hand, and left wrist, as well as bruises and scraping

to his forehead, arms, lips, neck, legs, and penis.

9 Because the defendant has invoked only the protections of the federal

constitution, we decline to analyze the defendant’s claim under our state

constitution. ‘‘We have repeatedly apprised litigants that we will not entertain

a state constitutional claim unless the defendant has provided an independent analysis under the particular provisions of the state constitution at

issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 140 Conn. App.

479, 481 n.2, 59 A.3d 366, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 917, 62 A.3d 527 (2013).

10 The court stated the following to defense counsel: ‘‘Suppose, hypothetically, I accept your explanation that . . . the pool cue . . . was broken by

one of the—the male participants, and that supports your general argument

that there was some sort of violent struggle in the poolroom. Well, that

could mean that everybody was not telling the truth when they said it was

peaceful in the poolroom and the fight began at the bar. . . . [That] favors

you in some way but . . . disfavors you in another because it doesn’t mean

that this was some sort of grabbing behind the bar.’’

11 When asking some of these questions, the court purported to act as

‘‘the devil’s advocate’’ and posed counterarguments to counsels’ answers.

12 For instance, during the state’s rebuttal closing argument, the court

asked the prosecutor whether the defendant’s attempt to steal a shot of

liquor from the bar could serve as the predicate crime for the felony murder

charge. Realizing that it had not asked this question of defense counsel

during her argument, the court informed defense counsel that she could

‘‘meditate on that’’ and that she would be given a chance to respond after

the state finished its argument. Defense counsel did in fact respond to the

court’s query after the state finished its argument.
13 We note that our conclusion is based on the fact that this case was

tried before a panel of judges and not a jury. The distinct issue of whether

it is improper for a judge to interrupt counsel during closing argument in

a jury trial is not before this court.