This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A15-1502 

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Dennis Lowell Halverson, 

Appellant. 

Filed December 5, 2016 

Affirmed 

Stauber, Judge 

Hennepin County District Court 

File No. 27CR1436278 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

James Hoeft, Champlin City Attorney, Jennifer C. Moreau, Assistant City Attorney, Barna, 

Guzy & Steffen, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public 

Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and 

Reyes, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

STAUBER, Judge 

Appellant challenges his trespass convictions, arguing that the state failed to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he lacked a claim of right to return to an area adjoining 
2 

the complainant's condominium or lacked a bona fide belief that he had a claim of right 

to be in that area when he returned to the property after being told to leave. We affirm. 

FACTS 

 Appellant Dennis Lowell Halverson lives in a condominium owned by his mother 

at Elm Creek Court Homes in Champlin. A.K., the victim in this case, is the president of 

the board of directors of the Elm Creek Court Home Association (Association). 

The Association rules include the following procedure for reporting violations: 

Unit owners and residents are encouraged to attempt to 

resolve individual differences with their neighbors before 

seeking recourse through the Rules and Regulations channel. 

An owner or resident may deliver to a member of the Board or 

the Management Company a written and signed complaint or 

email stating which rule is being violated (by citing the rule or 

describing the action), by whom and when (date, and time 

where practical). 

The condominium property is managed by Omega Management (Omega). 

Appellant routinely made complaints to A.K. about Association rules infractions 

he had personally observed at the condominium property, including such matters as 

plants being hung on a fence, the placement of garbage cans, and vehicles parked on the 

property with expired tabs. A.K. learned from Omega that before she became president 

of the Association board and due to the frequency of appellant’s complaints, Omega had 

asked appellant to send his complaints directly to Omega. But in the fall of 2014, 

appellant personally delivered complaint letters to A.K. at her condominium “multiple 

times a week at different hours.” At first, A.K. would personally deliver appellant’s 
3 

letters to Omega, but she eventually asked appellant to send them directly to Omega 

himself because the job of forwarding his letters was becoming “unwieldy.” 

Despite A.K.’s attempts to curtail appellant’s personal deliveries, appellant 

continued to bring his complaint letters to A.K. into the month of December. A.K. then 

stopped answering her door, but during a four-day period in early December appellant 

came to her condominium unit 13 times when she was at home, on one occasion 

pounding on her door for five minutes. On December 7, appellant came to A.K.’s 

condominium five different times and rang the doorbell. 

 Early in the morning of December 8, A.K. went to the Champlin police to initiate 

trespass charges against appellant. Officer Terry Cassem advised A.K. to call the police 

the next time appellant came to her condominium. When appellant again came to her 

door at 11 a.m. on that same day, A.K. called the police. They responded and located 

appellant on A.K.’s sidewalk, between her driveway and front door, and issued him a 

notice of trespass that directed him to stay off of A.K.’s property. At 4:15 p.m. on the 

same day, appellant walked across A.K.’s lawn, up her walkway to her porch, rang the 

doorbell, and then left. Police again came to A.K.’s condominium, located appellant 

about a half a block away, and issued appellant a citation for misdemeanor trespass. 

Even after the citation was issued, appellant continued to mail complaints to A.K. 

 At appellant’s jury trial, the central issue was whether appellant’s actions 

constituted trespass. The Association rules provide that condominium property consists 

of “[t]he entire parcel of land and all improvements thereon, including Common 

Elements, Limited Common Elements and Units.” A “unit” is defined as “[t]hat portion 
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of the Condominium designed for living purposes and designated for separate 

Ownership.” A “common element” is defined as “[a]ll portions of the Condominium and 

the Condominium property other than the Units.” “Limited Common Elements” are 

defined as “[a]ny part of the Common Elements which has been designated specifically 

for the enjoyment and exclusive use of a particular unit, such as patios, Garage Stalls, and 

exterior doors and windows.” 

A.K. testified that the limited common elements connected to each unit are for the 

exclusive use of the unit owner, and described the Association’s role in those areas as to 

promote “consistency of esthetic” on the property. She also described the limited 

common elements as being “for one unit’s use” and stated that they include such things 

as her “front door, . . . walkway, . . . porch, . . . patio, [and] front windows.” The 

Association rules require condominium owners to pay for necessary repairs to their 

limited common elements. 

The jury found appellant guilty of trespass. The district court imposed a 30-day 

stayed sentence and placed appellant on probation. He now appeals. 

D E C I S I O N 

 On a claim of insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict, an appellate court 

will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict 

and assume that the factfinder disbelieved any testimony 

conflicting with that verdict. The verdict will not be 

overturned if, giving due regard to the presumption of 

innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt, the factfinder could reasonably 

have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense. 
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State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted). 

“It is axiomatic that it is the State’s burden to prove every element of the charged 

offense.” State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Minn. 2015). 

 Under Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(8) (2014), a person commits a 

misdemeanor “if the person intentionally . . . returns to the property of another within one 

year after being told to leave the property and not to return, if the actor is without claim 

of right to the property or consent of one with authority to consent.” “‘[W]ithout claim of 

right’ is an element the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt” by offering evidence 

“from which it is reasonable to infer that the defendant has no legal claim of right to be 

on the premises where the trespass is alleged to have occurred.” State v. Brechon, 352 

N.W.2d 745, 750 (Minn. 1984). Under traditional principles of property law, this 

evidence would consist of evidence “that the title or right of possession is in a third party 

and that no title or permission has been given to defendant, or if given has been 

withdrawn.” Id. 

 If the state satisfies its burden to prove that the defendant acted “without claim of 

right” in returning to the subject property, “the burden then shifts to the defendant who 

may offer evidence of his reasonable belief that he has a property right, such as that of an 

owner, tenant, lessee, licensee or invitee.” Id. But “[t]he claim of right is a defense only 

if it is bona fide.” State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Minn. 1981). 

An act which, as related to the true owner of land, might appear 

to be trespass is not in fact a trespass, if the act is committed in 

good faith by one who actually and sincerely believes that he 

is authorized (either because authorized by the true owner, or 
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because he believes himself to be the true owner) to do the act 

in question. 

Id. (quotation omitted). In contrast to a bona fide claim of right, a false claim made by a 

person who cannot establish “circumstances indicative of innocent purposes” is not a 

defense to trespass. State v. Quinnell, 277 Minn. 63, 70-71, 151 N.W.2d 598, 604 

(1967). 

 Appellant argues that A.K. lacked a claim of right to the limited common elements 

adjoining her condominium. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict, the evidence is sufficient to prove this element of the offense. A.K. individually 

owned her condominium unit, which by Association rules was “designated for separate 

Ownership.” The area around A.K.’s unit that constituted limited common elements was 

“designated specifically for the enjoyment and exclusive use of [A.K.’s] particular unit,” 

and A.K. was required to pay for repairs to that area. (Emphasis added.) This gave A.K. 

a sufficient possessory interest to exclude others from that area. See State v. Zimmer, 478 

N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. App. 1991) (noting that in criminal trespass action the state had 

the burden to prove that a priest was the “lawful possessor” of church property and could 

order person off the property), aff’d, 487 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1992); cf. Minch Family 

LLLP v. Buffalo-Red River Watershed Dist., 628 F.3d 960, 967 (8th Cir. 2010) (“In 

Minnesota, the elements of trespass are a rightful possession in the plaintiff and unlawful 

entry upon such possession by the defendant.” (quotation omitted)); Poppler v. Wright 

Hennepin Co-op Elec. Ass’n, 834 N.W.2d 527, 551 (Minn. App. 2013) (stating that “[t]he 
7 

gist of the tort of trespass is the intentional interference with rights of exclusive 

possession” (quotation omitted)), aff’d, 845 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. 2014). 

 Further, in addition to having a possessory interest in the limited common 

elements, A.K. was also part-owner of all of the condominium property, including her 

unit, the common elements, and the limited common elements. As a part-owner of the 

limited common elements adjoining her unit, A.K. had a claim of right that allowed her to 

exclude others with no ownership interest from that area. Appellant offered no evidence 

to show that he had either an ownership or possessory interest in any of the condominium 

property. He did not offer evidence to show that he owned a condominium unit on the 

property. Moreover, he did not offer evidence to show that he had a possessory interest 

in the property by meeting the Association’s definition of a “renter,” because he “leas[ed] 

or rent[ed] from a Unit Owner.”1

 As such, appellant did not offer sufficient evidence to 

establish a claim of right to be in the area where he trespassed. 

Affirmed. 

 

1

 Appellant resided in his mother’s condominium.