10-1741-cv

Ragin v. E. Ramapo Cent. School Dist. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A

DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST

SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan

3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of

New York, on the 31st 4 day of March, two thousand eleven.

5

6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,

7 Chief Judge,

8 GUIDO CALABRESI,

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, Jr.,

10 Circuit Judges.

11

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13 COLETTE D. RAGIN, 

14 Plaintiff-Appellant,

15

16 -v.- 10-1741-cv

17

18 EAST RAMAPO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,

19 Defendant-Appellee.

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21

22 FOR APPELLANT: Michael H. Sussman, Sussman & Watkins,

23 Goshen, New York.

24

25 FOR APPELLEES: Gregg T. Johnson, Lemire Johnson, LLC,

26 Malta, New York.

27

28

29

30
2

1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

2 Court for the Southern District of New York (Gardephe, J.).

3

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

5 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be

6 AFFIRMED.

7

8 Plaintiff-Appellant Colette Ragin (“Ragin”) appeals

9 from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor

10 of Defendant-Appellee East Ramapo Central School District

11 (the “School District”), and dismissal of her employment

12 discrimination action. We assume the parties’ familiarity

13 with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the

14 issues presented for review.

15

16 We review an order granting summary judgment de novo

17 and ask whether the district court properly concluded that

18 there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the

19 moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

20 See ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 570

21 F.3d 513, 517 (2d Cir. 2009). In determining whether there

22 are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to

23 resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual

24 inferences in favor of the party against whom summary

25 judgment is sought,” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137

26 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted), but “conclusory

27 statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to

28 defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316

29 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).

30

31 Even assuming Ragin suffered an adverse employment

32 action, we agree with the district court that Ragin failed

33 to offer evidence that could allow a reasonable jury to find

34 that her termination was the result of racial animus on the

35 part of the School District. “It is well-settled that an

36 inference of discriminatory intent may be derived from a

37 variety of circumstances, including, but not limited

38 to: . . . ‘the employer’s criticism of the plaintiff’s

39 performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious

40 comments about others in the employee’s protected group; or

41 the more favorable treatment of employees not in the

42 protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the

43 plaintiff’s discharge.’” Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584

44 F.3d 487, 502 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Chambers v. TRM Copy

45 Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal

46 citations omitted)). 

47
3

1 The discriminatory comments allegedly were made by

2 Principal Neil Kaplicer (“Kaplicer”); however, Kaplicer

3 retired more than five months before the School District

4 decided to terminate Ragin, and nothing in the record

5 suggests that Kaplicer’s comments influenced the decision

6 when it was later made. See Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Group,

7 Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The relevance of

8 discrimination-related remarks does not depend on their

9 offensiveness, but rather on their tendency to show that the

10 decision-maker was motivated by assumptions or attitudes

11 relating to the protected class.”); McLee v. Chrysler Corp.,

12 109 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is no evidence in

13 the record from which it could rationally be inferred that

14 [plaintiff’s] allegations of discrimination . . . played any

15 part in [the decision-maker’s] decision to fire

16 [plaintiff].”).

17 

18 The legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by the

19 School District to justify Ragin’s termination included:

20 Ragin’s tardiness and frequent absences; her refusal to sign

21 a memorandum setting out her job responsibilities; her

22 unprofessional behavior; her failure to complete a

23 substantial amount of her assigned work, including her

24 teacher evaluations; and her performance in the areas of

25 scheduling, budgets, and communications with the Central

26 Administrative offices. Accordingly, because the ERCSD

27 provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

28 terminating Ragin, and because Ragin failed to demonstrate

29 that these reasons were pretextual, Ragin’s claims fail. 

30 See McPherson v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 457 F.3d 211,

31 216 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We are interested in what ‘motivated

32 the employer’ . . . .” (quoting United States Postal Service

33 Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)

34 (internal quotations omitted))).

35

36 We have considered all of Ragin’s remaining arguments,

37 and in particular her claims of unlawful retaliation and

38 hostile work environment, and find them to be without merit. 

39 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

40 court is hereby AFFIRMED.

41

42 FOR THE COURT:

43 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK

44