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TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 

State of California
 

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP
 

Attorney General
 

:

 OPINION :

 :

 of : No. 87-102

 :

 JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP : JUNE 2, 1987

 :

 RODNEY O. LILYQUIST :

 Deputy Attorney General :

 :

 -----------------------------------------------------------------

THE HONORABLE GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, 

has requested an opinion on the following questions: 

1. Is the disclosure duty of a designated government employee specified in Health 

and Safety Code section 25180.7 applicable with respect to information obtained prior to January 

1, 1987? 

2. What information and knowledge must a designated government employee have 

in order to be subject to the disclosure duty specified in Health and Safety Code section 25180.7? 

3. What must be proved to sustain a criminal conviction for the failure to disclose 

information required by Health and Safety Code section 25180.7? 

CONCLUSIONS 

1. The disclosure duty of a government employee specified in Health and Safety 

Code section 25180.7 is inapplicable with respect to information obtained prior to January 1, 1987. 

2. The information and knowledge a designated government employee must have 

in order to be subject to the disclosure duty specified in Health and Safety Code section 25180.7 are 

information that an illegal discharge of a hazardous waste has occurred or is threatened in the 

geographical area of his jurisdiction and the knowledge that it is likely to cause substantial injury 

to the public health or safety. 
 

 

3. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the designated government employee 

knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose the information required by Health and Safety Code 

section 25180.7 must be established in order to sustain a criminal conviction. 

ANALYSIS 

On November 4, 1986, the voters of California approved the Safe Drinking Water 

and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 ("Act"). This initiative measure, Proposition 65, amended and 

added sections to the Health and Safety Code1

 concerning the discharge of hazardous waste. Among 

the added statutory provisions was section 25180.7: 

"(a) Within the meaning of this section, a 'designated government employee' 

is any person defined as a 'designated employee' by Government Code Section 

82019, as amended. 

"(b) Any designated government employee who obtains information in the 

course of his official duties revealing the illegal discharge or threatened illegal 

discharge of a hazardous waste within the geographical area of his jurisdiction and 

who knows that such discharge or threatened discharge is likely to cause substantial 

injury to the public health or safety must, within seventy-two hours, disclose such 

information to the local Board of Supervisors and to the local health officer. No 

disclosure of information is required under this subdivision when otherwise 

prohibited by law, or when law enforcement personnel have determined that such 

disclosure would adversely affect an ongoing criminal investigation, or when the 

information is already general public knowledge within the locality affected by the 

discharge or threatened discharge. 

"(c) Any designated government employee who knowingly and intentionally 

fails to disclose information required to be disclosed under subdivision (b) shall, 

upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 

one year or by imprisonment in state prison for not more than three years. The court 

may also impose upon the person a fine of not less than five thousand dollars 

($5,000) or more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). The felony conviction 

for violation of this section shall require forfeiture of government employment within 

thirty days of conviction. 

"(d) Any local health officer who receives information pursuant to 

subdivision (b) shall take appropriate action to notify local news media and shall 

make such information available to the public without delay." 

We are asked whether this statute is applicable with respect to information obtained 

1

All statutory references hereafter to the Health and Safety Code are by section number only. 

2. 87-102
 
 

prior to January 1, 1987, what information and knowledge is necessary to establish the disclosure 

duty, and what must be proved to sustain a criminal conviction. 

1. Information Obtained Prior to January 1, 1987 

Statutes added by an initiative measure are normally effective the day after the 

election. (Cal. Const., art. 2, § 10.) The measure may, however, provide for a different effective 

date. Here, Proposition 65 provided: "This initiative shall take effect on January 1, 1987." (Cal. 

Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elect. (Nov. 4, 1986) p. 63.) 

It is clear that the disclosure duty of section 25180.7 did not arise until the initiative's 

effective date, January 1, 1987. (See Northgate Partnership v. City of Sacramento (1984) 155 

Cal.App.3d 65, 68-69; National Independent Business Alliance v. City of Beverly Hills (1982) 128 

Cal.App.3d 13, 21; Pugh v. City of Sacramento (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 485, 491; Kehrlein v. City 

of Oakland (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 332, 340.) As such, section 25180.7 is neither "retroactive" with 

respect to the disclosure duty nor an ex post facto law making punishable what was not criminal at 

the time of performance. (See People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 849; In re Jackson (1985) 

39 Cal.3d 464, 469; In re La Day (1985) 177 Cal.App.3d 461, 463.) 

The issue remains, however, whether the duty to disclose that began January 1, 1987, 

arose with respect to information obtained prior to the effective date of section 25180.7. In 

answering this question, we may rely upon several well-established principles of statutory 

construction. A statute is to be interpreted by giving the words "their ordinary and generally 

accepted meaning." (People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 310; accord People v. Craft (1986) 41 

Cal.3d 554, 560.) Rules of grammatical construction are to be followed. (See County of Los 

Angeles v. Graves (1930) 210 Cal. 21, 26; Addison v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1977) 69 Cal. 

App. 3d 486, 496 People v. One Chrysler Coupe (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 546, 549.) If possible, a 

sensible and practical approach is to be taken. (Valley Circle Estate v. VTN Consolidated, Inc. 

(1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 608-609; California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 

836, 844; Fields v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, 328.) Statutes are to be interpreted so that they are 

internally consistent with the various parts harmonized and reconciled. (Moore v. Panish (1982) 32 

Cal. 3d 535, 541; People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5; Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. 

(1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230.) 

Returning to the language of subdivision (b) of section 25180.7, we find the 

following six elements of the duty to disclose: (1) Any designated government employee, 2

 (2) who 

2

A "designated government employee" is a "designated employee" as defined in Government 

Code section 82019. ( § 25180.7, subd. (a).) The Government Code provision states:

 "'Designated employee' means any officer, employer, member, or consultant of 

any [state or local government] agency whose position with the agency: 

3. 87-102
 
 

 

3 

obtains information in the course of his official duties,(3) revealing the illegal discharge or 

threatened illegal discharge of a hazardous waste, 3

 (4) within the geographical area of his 

 "(a) Is exempt from the state civil service system by virtue of subdivision (a), 

(c), (d), (e), (f), (g), or (m) of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, unless 

the position is elective or solely secretarial, clerical, or manual.

 "(b) Is elective, other than an elective state office.

 "(c) Is designated in a Conflict of Interest Code because the position entails the 

making or participation in the making of decisions which may foreseeably have a 

material effect on any financial interest.

 "(d) Is involved as a state employee at other than a clerical or ministerial level 

in the functions of negotiating or signing any contract awarded through 

competitive bidding, in making decisions in conjunction with the competitive 

bidding process, or in negotiating, signing, or making decisions on contracts 

executed pursuant to Section 10122 of the Public Contract Code.

 "'Designated employee' does not include an elected state officer, any 

unsalaried member of any board or commission which serves a solely advisory 

function, any public official specified in Section 87200, and also does not include 

any unsalaried member of a nonregulatory committee, section, commission, or 

other such entity of the State Bar of California." 

Government Code section 87200 provides:

 "This article is applicable to elected state officers, judges and commissioners 

of courts of the judicial branch of government, members of the Public Utilities 

Commission, members of the State Energy Resources Conservation and 

Development Commission, members of the board of supervisors, district 

attorneys, county counsels, and chief administrative officers of counties, mayors, 

city managers, city attorneys, chief administrative officers and members of city 

councils of cities, and to candidates for any of these offices at any election." 

Section 25117 provides:

 "'Hazardous waste' means a waste, or combination of wastes, which because of 

its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics 

either:

 "(a) Cause, or significantly contribute to an increase inmortality or an increase 

in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness. 

4. 87-102
 
 

 

jurisdiction, (5) and who knows that such discharge or threatened discharge is likely to cause 

substantial injury to the public health or safety, (6) must, within seventy-two hours, disclose such 

information to the local Board of Supervisors and to the local health officer. 

"Obtains" commonly means "to gain or attain possession or disposal of usually by 

some planned action or method." (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1971), p. 1559.) "Obtains" 

is in the present tense, indicating present time or action as distinguished from the past tense 

("obtained") and past perfect tense ("had obtained"). 

Moreover, to comply with the statutory duty, the employee is required to make 

disclosure within 72 hours of obtaining the information with the requisite knowledge. Such a time 

limitation does not suggest that the information may be 10, 20, or 30 years out of date. 

All the words of the statute, including "obtains," "revealing," "knows," "is," and 

"within seventy-two hours," are consistent with the determination that the information be obtained 

on and after January 1, 1987, for the statute to apply. We thus believe that with respect to whether 

section 25180.7 applies to information obtained prior to January 1, 1987, the statute is plain and 

unambiguous; the answer is "no." In such circumstances we do not add words to the statute so as 

"(b) Pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or 

environment when improperly treated, stored transported, or disposed of, or 

otherwise managed. Unless expressly provided otherwise, the term 'hazardous 

waste' shall be understood to also include extremely hazardous waste." 

Section 25122 provides:

 "'Waste' means either of the following:

 "(a) Any material for which no use or reuse is intended and which is to be 

discarded.

 "(b) Any recyclable material [defined in section 25122.5]." 

Section 25115 provides:

 "'Extremely hazardous waste' means any hazardous waste or mixture of 

hazardous wastes which, if human exposure should occur, may likely result in 

death, disabling personal injury or serious illness caused by the hazardous waste 

or mixture of hazardous wastes because of its quantity, concentration, or chemical 

characteristics." 

"Hazardous waste" is distinguishable from "hazardous substances" and "hazardous material." 

(See § 25501.) 

5. 87-102
 
to cover prior periods. (See People v. Boyd (1979) 24 Cal.3d 286, 294; Great Lakes Properties v. 

City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal.3d 152, 155; Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 

198.) Nothing in the ballot pamphlet proposing the adoption of section 25180.7 suggests a different 

conclusion. 

In answer to the first question, therefore, we conclude that the disclosure duty of a 

designated government employee specified in section 25180.7 is inapplicable with respect to 

information obtained prior to January 1, 1987. 

2. Information and Knowledge

 The second question asks what information and knowledge a designated government 

employee must have to be subject to the disclosure requirements of section 25180.7. Section 

25180.7 requires both "information" of some things and "knowledge" of other things to trigger the 

disclosure requirement. The employee must obtain information which reveals "the illegal discharge 

or threatened illegal discharge of a hazardous waste within the geographical area of his jurisdiction" 

and must know that "such discharge or threatened discharge is likely to cause substantial injury to 

the public health or safety." Both the requisite information and the requisite knowledge must exist 

in the mind of the employee before the duty to disclose arises.

 The second element of the disclosure requirement speaks of one "who obtains information." 

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Webster) defines information as: 

"something received or obtained through informing: as a: knowledge communicated 

by others or obtained from investigation, study or instruction b: knowledge of a 

particular event or situation : intelligence, news, advices (latest information from the 

battle front) (securing information about conditions in the upper atmosphere) 

(information bureau) c: facts or figures ready for communication or use as 

distinguished from those incorporated in a formally organized branch of knowledge 

: data (reliable source of information)." 

Webster's New World Dictionary (2d College Ed.1982) observes that: 

"Information applies to facts that are gathered in any way, as by reading, observation, 

hearsay, etc. and does not necessarily connote validity [inaccurate information]". 

Thus information is that which a person obtains by personal perceptions or from others which makes 

him or her aware of a particular event or situation. Information may be accurate or false. It is the 

data the mind receives about an event or situation.

 Applying this definition to Section 25180.7's information requirement, we note first that it is 

only information which the employee obtains "in the course of his official duties" that can trigger 

the disclosure requirement. This simply means that the information is obtained by the employee 

when he or she is on duty and not during off duty hours, vacation or other absences. It does not 

6. 87-102
 
 

require that there be a law, regulation or order that the employee obtain the information or do 

something with it. 

The employee must "obtain" the information. We have already noted that Webster 

defines obtain: "to gain or attain possession or disposal of usually by some planned action or 

method." In the context of section 25180.7 we think that obtain refers to mental awareness of the 

information rather than physical possession of any physical record of the information. 

Next we note that the information must "reveal" certain things. Webster defines 

reveal as "to open up to view: show plainly and clearly." The thing which the information must 

reveal is the discharge of a hazardous waste or the threatened discharge of a hazardous waste. 

Further the information must reveal that such discharge is both "illegal" and located within the 

geographical area of the employee's jurisdiction. 

Section 25180.7 requires that there be a "discharge," actual or threatened, of a 

hazardous waste. Discharge is not defined by the statute. Webster defines discharge as a "release 

from confinement." In the context of section 25180.7 we think discharge refers to a release of the 

hazardous waste from a place of safe confinement into an environment where it may cause harm to 

humans. 

Finally, the information must reveal that the discharge or threatened discharge of the 

hazardous waste is "illegal." This means that the illegality of the discharge must be revealed by the 

information obtained by the designated government employee. 

To sum up, the information required by section 25180.7 to give rise to a duty to 

report must make a designated governmental employee aware, while he or she is on duty, of the 

discharge or threatened discharge of a hazardous waste within the geographical area of the 

employee's jurisdiction which discharge is illegal. 

The more difficult question concerns the knowledge element of section 25180.7, 

subdivision (b). To "know" the existence of a fact is "to have perception, cognition, or 

understanding of" or "to recognize the quality of, see clearly the character of, discern." (Webster's, 

supra, p. 1252; see People v. Calban (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 578, 584; 1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes (1985 

Supp.) § 58, p. 84.) Here, the employee must know of the likelihood of substantial injury. The 

statute does not state, for example, that the employee "should have known" of such probability or 

had "reasonable suspicion" thereof. 

How does one "know" the existence of a fact as a practical matter? One leading 

authority on criminal law has observed:

 "'Absolute knowledge can be had of very few things,' said the Massachusetts 

court, and the philosopher might add 'if any.' For most practical purposes 

'knowledge' is 'not confined to what we have personally observed or to what we have 

evolved by our own cognitive faculties.' Even within the domain of the law itself the 

7. 87-102
 
 

word is not always employed with exactly the same signification. Suppose a man 

has been told that a certain bill of exchange is a forgery and he believes the statement 

to be true. Does he have knowledge of this? Obviously not if the purpose of the 

inquiry is to determine whether he is qualified to take the witness stand and swear 

that the instrument is false; but if he passes the bill as genuine he will be uttering a 

forged instrument with 'knowledge' of the forgery if his belief is correct. The need, 

therefore, is to search for the state of mind, or states of mind, which the courts have 

spoken of as 'knowledge' for the purpose of a particular case." (Perkins, Criminal 

Law (2d ed. 1969), p. 775, fns. omitted.) 

Other textbook writers have stated: 

"Much of the difficulty involved in ascertaining what, if any, state of mind, 

is required for a particular crime lies in the ambiguous meaning of the particular 

word or phrase used. Even 'knowingly' is not entirely clear: for instance, does one 

know a fact (e.g., that property is stolen) when he is 95% sure of it but not 

completely certain?" (1 La Fave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) § 3.4, 

p. 299.) 

Knowledge may be attained either directly or indirectly. (Perkins, supra, p. 775.) 

Here the knowledge of the likelihood of substantial injury may be based in part upon experience or 

education received years previously. We find no limitation upon the source of the knowledge 

specified in section 25180.7, subdivision (b). 

Because of the knowledge requirement, one in receipt of false or erroneous 

information or one who has insufficient indication of reliability for the information received would 

not be required by section 25180.7 to disclose. 

In answer to the second question, therefore, we conclude that the information and 

knowledge a designated government employee must have in order to be subject to the disclosure 

duty specified in section 25180.7 are the receipt of information that an illegal discharge of a 

hazardous waste has occurred or is threatened in the geographical area of his jurisdiction and the 

knowledge that it is likely to cause substantial injury to the public health or safety.4 

3. Proof of a Criminal Act 

Subdivision (c) of section 25180.7 provides for a fine of $5,000 to $25,000, 

imprisonment in county jail for up to one year or in state prison for up to three years, and forfeiture 

of government employment for a felony conviction of "knowingly and intentionally fail[ing] to 

4

The employee must, of course, also determine whether the exemptions from disclosure 

contained in the statute would be applicable. The language of the statutory exemptions is 

beyond the scope of this opinion. 

8. 87-102
 
 

disclose information required to be disclosed under subdivision (b)." 

As is often stated, "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 

which he is charged." (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 369; accord Sandstorm v. Montana 

(1979) 442 U.S. 510, 520; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 472; People v. Harris (1985) 165 

Cal.App.3d 1246, 1263.) This constitutional principle is codified in Penal Code section 1096: 

"A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the 

contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is 

satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal, but the effect of this presumption 

is only to place upon the state the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: 'It is not a mere possible doubt; 

because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is 

open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the 

entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors 

in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral 

certainty, of the truth of the charge.'" 

Subdivision (c) of section 25180.7 contains three essential elements in specifying the 

criminal conduct: (1) Any designated government employee, (2) who knowingly and 

intentionally (3) fails to disclose information required under subdivision (b) of the statute. The first 

element describes the subject, the second gives the intent, and the third specifies the act (of 

omission). 

Although "knowingly" is not defined in the Act, we believe that a court would apply 

the Penal Code definition of "knowingly" when construing the elements of a section 25180.7 

criminal violation. Penal Code section 7 provides in part: 

"The word 'knowingly' imports only a knowledge that the facts exist which 

bring the act or omission within the provisions of this code. It does not require any 

knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act or omission." 

As stated in People v. Daniel (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 340, 343, "'[K]nowingly' signifies knowledge 

of the existence of a fact or facts. . . . It has no reference to knowledge of the law." (See CALJIC 

No. 1.21 (1979 Rev.); People v. Calban, supra, 65 Cal.App. 

3d 578, 584-585; Webster's, supra, p. 1252; 1 Witkin, supra, 

§ 58, pp. 62-63.)5 

5

One of the facts that must be obtained under subdivision (b) of section 25180.7 is that the 

discharge or threatened discharge be "illegal." It is not required, however, that the employee 

know his failure to disclose is illegal under subdivision (c) of the statute. 

9. 87-102
 
"Intentionally" may be described as to act in a purposeful manner, with deliberateness 

and design. (Webster's, supra, p. 1176.) "'Intentionally' means done with intention of purpose, 

intended, designed." (People v. Cloward (1961) 196 Cal.App.2 669, 672; see People v. McCree 

(1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 196, 202.) 

"Knowingly" and "intentionally" are distinguishable: 

"A person may lack knowledge and yet act intentionally or deliberately as 

where a person does an act through mistake or unawareness of fact as where a person 

makes a representation such as would constitute a basis for a charge of obtaining 

property by false pretenses, without knowledge of its falsity and under an honest 

belief that it is true or might intentionally pull the trigger of a firearm believing that 

it was not loaded. On the other hand a person may have knowledge of a fact but, 

inadvertently, may perform an act intentionally but inadvertently, not intending the 

act which he in fact performs as where a person, though knowing that one of the bills 

in his wallet is counterfeit, inadvertently pays it out while honestly intending to use 

a good bill." (Fricke & Alarcon, California Criminal Law (11th ed. 1977) pp. 31-

32.) 

Use of the words "knowingly and intentionally" in section 25180.7 precludes a 

conviction where the failure to disclose is accidental or due to misfortune (see Pen. Code, § 26; 

United States v. Murdock (1933) 290 U.S. 389, 394; People v. Calban, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d 578, 

584; Perkins, supra, p. 780), due to inattention, inadvertence, or forgetfulness (see Morrisette v. 

United States (1952) 342 U.S. 246, 270; People v. Peabody (1945) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 49; Perkins, 

supra, pp. 592, 782; 1 Witkin, supra, § 67, p. 71), due to negligence (see Pen. Code, §§ 7, 26; 

Morrisette v. United States, supra, 342 U.S. 246, 255; United States v. Murdock, supra, 290 U.S. 

389, 394-395; People v. Peabody, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 46; Perkins, supra, p. 780; 1 La Fave 

& Scott, supra, §§ 3.3, 3.5, pp. 290, 314; 1 Witkin, supra, § 65, pp. 69-70; Erwin, Millman, Monroe, 

Sevilla & Tarlow, Cal. Criminal Defense Practice (1986) § 140.02, p. 140-13, hereafter "Erwin"), 

due to ignorance or mistake of fact (see Pen. Code, § 26; Morrisette v. United States, supra, 342 U.S. 

246, 270-271; Perkins, supra, pp. 772-779, 785-786, 935, 939; 1 La Fave & Scott, supra, § 5.3, pp. 

289-290, 307, 315), due to coercion (see Pen. Code, § 26; United States v. Murdock, supra, 290 U.S. 

389, 394, Perkins, supra, pp. 949-961; 1 La Fave & Scott, supra, § 5.3, pp. 614-627; 1 Witkin, supra, 

§ 155, p. 149), based on "strict liability" or "vicarious liability" (see Perkins, supra, pp. 784-789, 

812-816; 1 La Fave & Scott, supra, §§ 3.8, 3.9, pp. 340-360; 1 Witkin, supra, § 62, p. 66-67; Erwin, 

supra, § 140.02, p. 140-14); or due to ignorance or mistake of law other than the terms of section 

25180.7 (see Perkins, supra, pp. 935-938; 1 La Fave & Scott, supra, § 3.5, p. 315). Ignorance or 

mistake of law with respect to the provisions of section 25180.7 would not be a defense to the 

criminal charge. (See Morissette v. United States, supra, 342 U.S. 246, 271; People v. Snyder 

(1982) 32 Cal.3d 590; 592-593; People v. Calban, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d 578, 585; Perkins, supra, 

pp. 935-938; 1 La Fave & Scott, supra, § 3.3, pp. 289-291.) 

It must be recognized that "intentionally" is seldom used in criminal statutes and that 

"intent" and "knowledge" convey complex and esoteric concepts; artificial distinctions have lead 

10. 87-102
 
to considerable confusion in this area of criminal law. (See Morissette v. United States, supra, 342 

U.S. 246, 264-265; People v. Beaugez (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 650, 658, fn. 3; Perkins, supra, p. 778; 

1 La Fave & Scott, supra, § 3.4, pp. 297-299; Erwin, supra, § 140.02, p. 140-11; 2 Witkin, supra, 

§ 874, p. 820; Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in Criminal Law (1960) 12 Stan.L.Rev. 731; Roth, 

General versus Specific Intent; A Time for Terminological Understanding in California (1979) 7 

Pepperdine L. Rev. 67.) While the foregoing analysis is thus necessarily general, the applicable rule 

concerning the interpretation of penal statutes is: "The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every 

reasonable doubt . . . as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in 

a statute." (In re Tartar (1959) 52 Cal.2d 250, 256-257; accord People v. Craft, supra, 41 Cal.3d 

554, 560; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 818.) 

Finally, we note the fact that circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences 

drawn from such evidence may be used to prove the elements of the offense described in section 

25180.7, including the element of knowledge. (See People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 215; 

People v. Bynum (1971) 4 Cal.3d 589, 599; People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 395; People v. 

Patino (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 11, 27.) Where, however, evidence offered to establish an element of 

a crime consists principally of circumstantial evidence, "'the facts or circumstances must not only 

be entirely consistent with the theory of guilt but must be inconsistent with any other rational 

conclusion.'" (People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 175; accord People v. Salas (1976) 58 

Cal.App.3d 460, 472.) 

In answer to the third question, therefore, we conclude that proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the designated government employee knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose the 

information required by section 25180.7 must be established in order to sustain a criminal 

conviction. 

* * * * * 

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