IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-1570

Filed June 6, 2018

IN THE INTEREST OF A.T. and A.T.,

Minor Children,

A.B., Mother,

Petitioner-Appellee,

K.T., Father,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton Ploof, 

District Associate Judge.

Father appeals from the termination of his parental rights pursuant to Iowa 

Code chapter 600A (2017). AFFIRMED.

G. Brian Weiler, Davenport, for appellant.

Candy K. Pastrnak of Pastrnak Law Firm. P.C., Davenport, for appellee.

Rebecca C. Sharpe of Aitken, Aitken & Sharpe, P.C., Bettendorf, guardian 

ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.

Kendale appeals from the termination of his parental rights in A.M.T. (born 

2007) and A.J.T. (born 2010) pursuant to Iowa Code section 600A.8(3)(b) and (4)

(2017). The termination action was brought by the children’s mother, Alex. On 

appeal, Kendale challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory 

grounds authorizing the termination of his parental rights and the sufficiency of the 

evidence establishing the termination of his parental rights was in the best interest 

of the children.

I.

“Termination proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 600A are a two-step 

process. In the first step, the petitioner seeking termination must first show by 

clear and convincing evidence a threshold event has occurred that opens the door 

for potential termination of parental rights. Once that threshold showing has been 

made, the petitioner next must show, by clear and convincing evidence, 

termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.” In re Q.G., ___

N.W.2d ___, ___, 2018 WL 2071823, at *9 (Iowa 2018). It is the petitioner’s burden 

to prove each element of the case by clear and convincing evidence. See Iowa 

Code § 600A.8. We review termination proceedings arising under Iowa Code 

chapter 600A de novo. See In re Q.G., 2018 WL 2071823, at *8; In re G.A., 826 

N.W.2d 125, 127 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012). We defer to the factual findings of the 

district court, especially witness-credibility findings, but we are not bound by them. 

See G.A., 826 N.W.2d at 127. 
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II.

A.

We first address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the grounds 

authorizing the termination of Kendale’s parental rights. Where, as here, the 

district court terminated a parent’s rights pursuant to more than one statutory 

provision, we will affirm the termination order if any ground is supported by 

sufficient evidence. We turn our attention to Iowa Code section 600A.8(4). 

Pursuant to this provision, the district court may terminate a parent’s rights upon 

clear and convincing evidence the “parent has been ordered to contribute to the 

support of the child . . . and has failed to do so without good cause.” Iowa Code 

§ 600A.8(4). “If there has been a showing of a substantial failure to pay, the court 

must then consider whether that failure was without good cause. In considering 

whether there is good cause for failure to pay child support, the key factual issue 

is the parent’s ability to pay. A parent’s intent is clearly tied to an ability to pay.” 

See In re M.J.W., No. 17-0149, 2017 WL 2665957, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 

2017).

By way of background, Kendale and Alex were teenagers when Alex 

became pregnant with A.M.T. After the birth of A.M.T., Kendale and Alex remained 

in an on-again, off-again relationship for four or five years. During this time, the 

parents had another child, A.J.T. Throughout the children’s lives, Kendale has 

been involved in criminal activity and provided little to no financial support for the 

children due to periods of incarceration and voluntary unemployment. The district 

court found: 
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Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing proof that [Kendale] 

was ordered to contribute to the support of his children and that he 

failed to contribute to their support within the definition of 600A.8(4). 

Part of the time he was incarcerated and therefore unable to 

contribute to their support. But he also did not contribute when he 

was working and when he was released. The largest payment made 

by him was due to a garnishment of a tax return. He has paid 

approximately 10% of his ordered financial support. He has an 

outstanding balance of over $6,000.00 and was only ordered to pay 

$50.00 monthly. There is absolutely no evidence that he contributed 

financially to the care and upkeep of his children beyond the $840.00 

Like the district court, we conclude there is clear and convincing evidence 

Kendale failed to contribute to the support of the children when ordered to do so 

without good cause. Kendale was ordered to pay only a nominal amount of child 

support for his two children, but he has failed to even pay that amount. While it is 

true Kendale was incarcerated for a portion of the children’s lives, incarceration 

alone cannot excuse the failure to pay. See In re C.J.D., No. 07-0766, 2007 WL 

4322213, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2007); In re J.L.W., 523 N.W.2d 622, 624 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1994), overruled on other grounds by In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 

(Iowa 2010). “An incarcerated parent must take full responsibility for the conduct 

that resulted in his confinement. Our courts are generally unsympathetic toward 

self-created obstacles to supporting one’s children.” C.J.D., 2007 WL 4322213, at 

*4 (citations omitted). 

Even when not incarcerated, Kendale failed to contribute financial support 

for the children. Kendale had several jobs, but “[h]e may have [had] a job for 

month, two months, three months, and then he would just not show up or quit.” 

Kendale’s voluntary decision to become unemployed rather than support his 

children does not constitute good cause. See M.J.W., 2017 WL 2665957, at *3 
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(finding father’s “deliberate decision to forgo work was a deliberate decision to not 

support his own child. It does not amount to good cause.”). 

In addition, even the nominal amounts of support paid were involuntary 

payments through garnishment of a tax return and wage withholding. A significant 

consideration in evaluating intent is the voluntariness of the payments. See In re 

K.N.B., No. 11-1061, 2012 WL 1246524, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2012) 

(finding no good cause where “[w]e note that in those years when she paid child 

support, this was primarily due to the seizure of tax refunds or other government 

payments”); see also M.J.W., 2017 WL 2665957, at *3 (“We also note the 

contributions Christopher did make resulted from wage garnishments and 

withholding tax refunds, not voluntary payments.”); In re C.M.W., 503 N.W.2d 874, 

876 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (noting there was no showing of good cause for failure 

to pay child support in light of parent’s failure to make voluntary payments during 

times he had the ability to pay). 

Kendale chose not to provide financial support for his children. His 

consistent failure to pay manifests indifference to his children and their needs. We 

find clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of Kendale’s parental 

rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 600A.8(4). Because we reach this 

conclusion, we need not address the other termination ground challenged on 

appeal. See In re M.R.P., No. 15-1683, 2016 WL 1761318, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Apr. 27, 2016).
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B.

We next address whether the termination of Kendale’s rights is in the best 

interest of the children. The supreme court recently articulated the best interest 

standard:

Iowa Code section 600A.1 provides a lengthy description 

regarding application of the concept of “best interest of the child” in 

termination proceedings. The provision states the best interest of 

the child “shall be the paramount consideration” in interpreting the 

chapter. [Iowa Code] § 600A.1. Yet, the section further provides the 

interests of the parents of the child “shall be given due 

consideration.” Id.

The best interest of the child requires each parent 

“affirmatively assume the duties encompassed by the role of being a 

parent.” Id. Among other things, the court is directed to consider 

“the fulfillment of financial obligations, demonstration of continued 

interest in the child, demonstration of a genuine effort to maintain 

communication with the child, and demonstration of the 

establishment and maintenance of a place of importance in the 

child’s life.” Id.

In addition to applying the language of Iowa Code section 

600A.1, we have also borrowed from Iowa Code section 232.116(2) 

and (3) to flesh out the best-interest-of-the-child test. In re A.H.B., 

791 N.W.2d 687, 690–91 (Iowa 2010). We consider the child’s 

“physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs” and the 

“closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2)-(3).

The best-interest-of-the-child test plainly has both backwardlooking and forward-looking components. We have cited with 

approval a discussion of the court of appeals, which stated,

We look to the child’s long-range, as well as immediate, 

interests. We consider what the future holds for the 

child if returned to his or her parents. Insight for this 

determination can be gained from evidence of the 

parent’s past performance, for that performance may 

be indicative of the quality of the future care the parent 

is capable of providing. Our statutory termination 

provisions are preventative as well as remedial. They 

are designed to prevent probable harm to a child.

In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 [Iowa 1998] (quoting 

In re C.M.W., 503 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1993)).
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Q.G., 2018 WL 2071823, at *9–10.

There is clear and convincing evidence the termination of Kendale’s rights 

is in the best interest of the children. As noted above, Kendale has not provided 

financial support for either child. Alex testified she worked and supported herself, 

Kendale, and the children. 

Further, Kendale has had limited involvement with his children. Alex’s 

parents watched the children while Alex worked when Kendale and Alex were a 

couple. After that point, Kendale exercised some visitation with the children 

between 2013 to 2015. These visits took place at Kendale’s girlfriend’s house until 

the children reported witnessing physical violence by Kendale. According to Alex, 

Kendale has not visited the children since an incident in October 2015. During the 

incident, Kendale tried to strangle Alex in front of the children. Alex sought and 

obtained an order of protection, which contained set visitation times for Kendale. 

Kendale consented to the order of protection. Alex testified Kendale almost never 

called during the scheduled times over the following years. Since 2015, Kendale 

sent “maybe two letters” for the children. Kendale also sent “five or six letters” to 

the maternal grandmother’s house for the children in the last two years. When 

Kendale was at a halfway house from June to November 2016, he talked to the 

children four times. He testified he called Alex daily, but she refused to answer or 

give him visits. The juvenile court found this testimony was “simply not credible.” 

We agree. The evidence reflects Kendale has had only a de minimis role in the 

children’s lives for an extended period of time.
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Even the limited relationship between Kendale and the children is not 

positive, and there is little prospect of building a better relationship. According to 

Alex and her mother, the children are afraid of Kendale after witnessing Kendale’s 

assault on Alex. Kendale is currently incarcerated. While he has a potential 

release date of June 2018, that is not certain. Even then, Kendale has 

demonstrated a history of criminal behavior and subsequent incarceration over a 

long period of time. There is nothing in this record to demonstrate Kendale will 

change this behavior upon his release from prison.

The detriment imposed on the children by terminating Kendale’s parental 

rights is minimal while the benefit is positive. Alex’s fiancé intends to adopt the 

children. The children are excited by this prospect. It will bring stability and 

permanency to their family structure. This is in the children’s best interest and 

augurs in favor of terminating Kendale’s parental rights. See In re B.L.A., 357 

N.W.2d 20, 23–24 (Iowa 1984); In re N.F.A., No. 05-1127, 2006 WL 229039, at *4 

(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2006).

III.

We affirm the termination of Kendale’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.