63042 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 198 / Thursday, October 14, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2010–21–13 McDonnell Douglas 

Corporation: Amendment 39–16473; 

Docket No. FAA–2010–0672; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–047–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD is effective November 18, 2010. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas 

Corporation Model DC–10–10, DC–10–10F, 

DC–10–30, DC–10–30F (KDC–10), DC–10–40, 

and DC–10–40F airplanes, certificated in any 

category, as identified in Boeing Service 

Bulletin DC10–28–262, Revision 1, dated 

June 9, 2010. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28: Fuel. 

Unsafe Condition 

(e) This AD results from fuel system 

reviews conducted by the manufacturer. The 

Federal Aviation Administration is issuing 

this AD to prevent lightning-induced 

transients to the fuel quantity indication 

system, which could cause voltage levels to 

go beyond original design levels between fuel 

tank probes and structure and become a 

potential ignition source at the fuel tank, 

which, in combination with flammable fuel 

vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion 

and consequent loss of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Installation 

(g) Within 60 months after the effective 

date of this AD, install a support bracket and 

coupler on the left and right wing-to-fuselage 

transition, and metallic overbraid on the left 

and right leading edge wire assembly, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 

DC10–28–262, Revision 1, dated June 9, 

2010. 

Installation According to Previous Issue of 

Service Bulletin 

(h) Installing a support bracket and coupler 

on the left and right wing-to-fuselage 

transition, and metallic overbraid on the left 

and right leading edge wire assembly, is also 

acceptable for compliance with the 

requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD if 

done before the effective date of this AD in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 

DC10–28–262, dated January 6, 2010. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(i)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Send information to ATTN: Samuel Lee, 

Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, 

ANM–140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), 3960 Paramount 

Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712– 

4137; telephone (562) 627–5262; fax (562) 

627–5210. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. The AMOC approval letter must 

specifically reference this AD. 

Related Information 

(j) For more information about this AD, 

contact Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, Los 

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 

3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, 

California 90712–4137; telephone (562) 627– 

5262; fax (562) 627–5210; e-mail 

samuel.lee@faa.gov. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(k) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 

DC10–28–262, Revision 1, dated June 9, 

2010, to do the actions required by this AD, 

unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

Boeing Service Bulletin DC10–28–262, 

Revision 1, dated June 9, 2010, under 5 

U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, MC 

D800–0019, Long Beach, California 90846– 

0001; telephone 206–544–5000, extension 2; 

fax 206–766–5683; e-mail 

dse.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https:// 

www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at an NARA facility, call 202–741– 

6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/ 

federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 30, 2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–25442 Filed 10–13–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0479; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–NM–220–AD; Amendment 

39–16472; AD 2010–21–12] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker 

Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 0070 

and 0100 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

* * * * * 

Recently, a brake fire was reported which 

was caused by a ruptured brake piston. The 

fire was quickly extinguished but caused 

damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical 

harness and its components. Detailed 

investigation showed that a hydraulic lock 

must have been present close to the affected 

brake creating enough internal pressure to 

rupture the piston. The most probable 

scenario for the hydraulic lock is a loosened 

(not necessarily disconnected) brake QD 

[quick-disconnect] coupling. Further 

investigation of the service experience files at 

Fokker Services showed that more brake fires 

have occurred on aeroplanes in a pre-mod 

SBF100–32–127 configuration. 

* * * * * 

The unsafe condition is loss of braking 

capability and possible brake fires, 

which could reduce the ability of the 

flightcrew to safely land the airplane. 

We are issuing this AD to require 

actions to correct the unsafe condition 

on these products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

November 18, 2010. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of November 18, 2010. 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 198 / Thursday, October 14, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 63043 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom 

Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–1137; fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on May 19, 2010 (75 FR 27961). 

That NPRM proposed to correct an 

unsafe condition for the specified 

products. The MCAI states: 

During 1995, several reports were received 

of brake QD [quick-disconnect] couplings 

loosened and/or disconnected during 

operation. In a few cases, residual brake 

pressure was trapped in the affected brake, 

causing asymmetric braking and/or resulting 

in hot brakes. Loosened couplings may cause 

a hydraulic leak with the risk of a brake fire. 

Investigation revealed that the installation of 

the brake QD couplings must be done with 

care and that the locking teeth on the light 

alloy sleeve are prone to wear. The Fokker 

70/100 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 

has been revised to include additional 

information to ensure correct removal and 

installation of the couplings. 

In 1997, Fokker Services issued SBF100– 

32–106, recommending the introduction of 

QD couplings with corrosion resistant steel 

(CRES) sleeves that would prevent excessive 

wear of the locking teeth on the light alloy 

sleeve. In response to more reported cases of 

loosened QD couplings resulting in brake 

problems, further improved QD couplings 

were introduced in 2001 through SBF100– 

32–127. These couplings increase the 

reliability of the brake system. 

Recently, a brake fire was reported which 

was caused by a ruptured brake piston. The 

fire was quickly extinguished but caused 

damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical 

harness and its components. Detailed 

investigation showed that a hydraulic lock 

must have been present close to the affected 

brake creating enough internal pressure to 

rupture the piston. The most probable 

scenario for the hydraulic lock is a loosened 

(not necessarily disconnected) brake QD 

coupling. Further investigation of the service 

experience files at Fokker Services showed 

that more brake fires have occurred on 

aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100–32–127 

configuration. 

In order to reduce the probability of a fluid 

fire as described in CS (certification 

specification) 25.863, additional action is 

deemed necessary. 

For the reasons described above, this 

[European Aviation Safety Agency] AD 

requires repetitive [detailed] inspections [for 

wear] of the affected brake QD couplings and 

replacement of the QD couplings with 

improved units. Installation of the improved 

QD couplings terminates the repetitive 

inspections requirements. 

The unsafe condition is loss of braking 

capability and possible brake fires, 

which could reduce the ability of the 

flightcrew to safely land the airplane. 

You may obtain further information by 

examining the MCAI in the AD docket. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

received no comments on the NPRM or 

on the determination of the cost to the 

public. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the available data and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 

provided in the MCAI and related 

service information. 

We might also have required different 

actions in this AD from those in the 

MCAI in order to follow our FAA 

policies. Any such differences are 

highlighted in a NOTE within the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

16 products of U.S. registry. We also 

estimate that it will take about 4 workhours per product to comply with the 

basic requirements of this AD. The 

average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. 

Required parts will cost about $4,814 

per product. Where the service 

information lists required parts costs 

that are covered under warranty, we 

have assumed that there will be no 

charge for these parts. As we do not 

control warranty coverage for affected 

parties, some parties may incur costs 

higher than estimated here. Based on 

these figures, we estimate the cost of 

this AD to the U.S. operators to be 

$82,464, or $5,154 per product. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains the NPRM, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (telephone 

(800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after receipt. 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
63044 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 198 / Thursday, October 14, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2010–21–12 Fokker Services B.V.: 

Amendment 39–16472. Docket No. 

FAA–2010–0479; Directorate Identifier 

2009–NM–220–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective November 18, 2010. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Fokker Services B.V. 

Model F.28 Mark 0070 and 0100 airplanes, 

certificated in any category, all serial 

numbers, with any brake quick-disconnect 

(QD) coupling having part number (P/N) 

AE70690E, AE70691E, AE99111E, or 

AE99119E installed. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 32: Landing Gear. 

Reason 

(e) The mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) states: 

During 1995, several reports were received 

of brake QD couplings loosened and/or 

disconnected during operation. In a few 

cases, residual brake pressure was trapped in 

the affected brake, causing asymmetric 

braking and/or resulting in hot brakes. 

Loosened couplings may cause a hydraulic 

leak with the risk of a brake fire. 

Investigation revealed that the installation of 

the brake QD couplings must be done with 

care and that the locking teeth on the light 

alloy sleeve are prone to wear. The Fokker 

70/100 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 

has been revised to include additional 

information to ensure correct removal and 

installation of the couplings. 

In 1997, Fokker Services issued SBF100– 

32–106, recommending the introduction of 

QD couplings with corrosion resistant steel 

(CRES) sleeves that would prevent excessive 

wear of the locking teeth on the light alloy 

sleeve. In response to more reported cases of 

loosened QD couplings resulting in brake 

problems, further improved QD couplings 

were introduced in 2001 through SBF100– 

32–127. These couplings increase the 

reliability of the brake system. 

Recently, a brake fire was reported which 

was caused by a ruptured brake piston. The 

fire was quickly extinguished but caused 

damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical 

harness and its components. Detailed 

investigation showed that a hydraulic lock 

must have been present close to the affected 

brake creating enough internal pressure to 

rupture the piston. The most probable 

scenario for the hydraulic lock is a loosened 

(not necessarily disconnected) brake QD 

coupling. Further investigation of the service 

experience files at Fokker Services showed 

that more brake fires have occurred on 

aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100–32–127 

configuration. 

In order to reduce the probability of a fluid 

fire as described in CS (certification 

specification) 25.863, additional action is 

deemed necessary. 

For the reasons described above, this 

[European Aviation Safety Agency] AD 

requires repetitive [detailed] inspections [for 

wear] of the affected brake QD couplings and 

replacement of the QD couplings with 

improved units. Installation of the improved 

QD couplings terminates the repetitive 

inspections requirements. 

The unsafe condition is loss of braking 

capability and possible brake fires, which 

could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to 

safely land the airplane. 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Actions 

(g) Do the following actions. 

(1) Within 6 months after the effective date 

of this AD, do a detailed inspection for wear 

of the brake QD couplings by measuring 

dimension ‘‘A,’’ in accordance with Part 1 of 

the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker 

Service Bulletin SBF100–32–156, Revision 1, 

dated June 29, 2009. Repeat the inspection 

thereafter at the applicable intervals specified 

in Table 1 of this AD, except as required by 

paragraph (g)(2) of this AD. 

TABLE 1—REPETITIVE INSPECTION INTERVALS

If dimension ‘‘A’’ is— 

Repeat the 

inspection at 

intervals not to 

exceed— 

Greater than or equal to 0.76 mm .................................................................................................................................................... 6 months. 

Less than 0.76 mm but greater than or equal to 0.72 mm .............................................................................................................. 3 months. 

Less than 0.72 mm but greater than or equal to 0.68 mm .............................................................................................................. 30 days. 

Less than 0.68 mm but greater than or equal to 0.61 mm .............................................................................................................. 7 days. 

Less than 0.61 mm but greater than 0.53 mm ................................................................................................................................ 24 hours. 

(2) If, during any inspection required by 

paragraph (g)(1) of this AD, dimension ‘‘A’’ on 

any brake QD coupling is less than or equal 

to 0.53 mm, before further flight, replace the 

affected brake QD coupling with an improved 

unit having P/N AE73059E or P/N AE73091E, 

as applicable, in accordance with Part 2 of 

the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker 

Service Bulletin SBF100–32–156, Revision 1, 

dated June 29, 2009. 

(3) Within 24 months after the effective 

date of this AD, replace all remaining brake 

QD couplings having P/N AE70690E, P/N 

AE70691E, P/N AE99111E, and P/N 

AE99119E with improved units, in 

accordance with Part 2 of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker 

Service Bulletin SBF100–32–156, Revision 1, 

dated June 29, 2009. 

(4) Installation of brake QD couplings with 

an improved unit having P/N AE73059E or 

P/N AE73091E at all locations terminates the 

repetitive inspections required by paragraph 

(g)(1) of this AD. 

(5) Replacing the brake QD couplings is 

also acceptable for compliance with the 

corresponding requirements of paragraphs 

(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3) of this AD if done 

before the effective date of this AD, in 

accordance with any of the service bulletins 

specified in Table 2 of this AD: 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 198 / Thursday, October 14, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 63045 

TABLE 2—FOKKER CREDIT SERVICE BULLETINS

Fokker Service Bulletins Revision Date 

Fokker Performa Service Bulletin SBF100–32–127, including Appendix XIV, dated February 1, 

2006.

Original ......................... July 20, 2001. 

Fokker Performa Service Bulletin SBF100–32–127, including Appendix XIV, dated February 1, 

2006.

1 .................................... March 6, 2009. 

Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100–32–156 ........................................................................................... Original ......................... March 6, 2009. 

FAA AD Differences 

Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI 

and/or service information as follows: No 

differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(h) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, International 

Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Send information to ATTN: Tom Rodriguez, 

Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, 

ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 

227–1137; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using 

any approved AMOC on any airplane to 

which the AMOC applies, notify your 

principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or 

principal avionics inspector (PAI), as 

appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, 

your local Flight Standards District Office. 

The AMOC approval letter must specifically 

reference this AD. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, under the 

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act 

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) has 

approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(i) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety 

Agency Airworthiness Directive 2009–0176, 

dated August 6, 2009; and Fokker Service 

Bulletin SBF100–32–156, Revision 1, dated 

June 29, 2009; for related information. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(j) You must use Fokker Service Bulletin 

SBF100–32–156, Revision 1, dated June 29, 

2009, to do the actions required by this AD, 

unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Fokker Services B.V., 

Technical Services Dept., P.O. Box 231, 2150 

AE Nieuw-Vennep, the Netherlands; 

telephone +31 (0)252–627–350; fax +31 

(0)252–627–211; e-mail technicalservices.

fokkerservices@stork.com; Internet http:// 

www.myfokkerfleetcom. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/

code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.

html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 29, 2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–25449 Filed 10–13–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0642; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–332–AD; Amendment 

39–16470; AD 2010–21–10] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; BAE 

SYSTEMS (OPERATIONS) LIMITED 

Model BAe 146 and Avro 146–RJ 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

* * * [F]uel leaks and failed fasteners 

[have been reported] in the region of the rear 

spar root joint attachment fitting at wing rib 

2. * * * 

* * * * * 

The unsafe condition is stress corrosion 

failures in the region of the rear spar 

root joint attachment fitting at wing rib 

2, which could lead to reduced 

structural integrity of the wing, and 

consequent reduced controllability of 

the airplane. We are issuing this AD to 

require actions to correct the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

November 18, 2010. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of November 18, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–1175; fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on July 1, 2010 (75 FR 38058). 

That NPRM proposed to correct an 

unsafe condition for the specified 

products. The MCAI states: 

British Aerospace originally issued Service 

Bulletin (SB) 57–033 in 1989 to detect fuel 

leaks and failed fasteners in the region of the 

rear spar root joint attachment fitting at wing 

rib 2. Accomplishment of this SB was 

mandated by the [Civil Aviation Authority] 

CAA United Kingdom AD 044–09–89. 

Revisions 1 through 7 of this SB were 

introduced to inspect pre mod HCM01447A 

standard installations for fuel leaks and loose 

or broken bolts. Modification HCM01447A 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES