10-1741-cv Ragin v. E. Ramapo Cent. School Dist.



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**



## SUMMARY ORDER

**R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT**  **. C**  **ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**
**ON OR AFTER J** **ANUARY 1,**  **2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY**  **F EDERAL**  **R ULE OF**  **A PPELLATE**  **P ROCEDURE**  **32.1 AND THIS COURT**  **’ S**  **L OCAL**  **R ULE**  **32.1.1. W**  **HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A**
**DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT ,**  **A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F**  **EDERAL A** **PPENDIX OR AN**
**ELECTRONIC DATABASE (**  **WITH THE NOTATION “**  **SUMMARY ORDER ”).**  **A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST** 
**SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .** 
**At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan** 2 **United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of** 3 **New York, on the 31 st** **day of March, two thousand eleven.** 4 5 **PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,** 6 **Chief Judge ,**  7 **GUIDO CALABRESI,** 8 **RAYMOND J. LOHIER, Jr.,** 9 **Circuit Judges**

**.** 10 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 12 **COLETTE D. RAGIN,** 13 **Plaintiff-Appellant ,**  14 15 **-v.- 10-1741-cv** 16 17 **EAST RAMAPO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,** 18 **Defendant-Appellee**

**.** 19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 20 21 **FOR APPELLANT:** Michael H. Sussman, Sussman & Watkins, 22 Goshen, New York. 23 24 **FOR APPELLEES:** Gregg T. Johnson, Lemire Johnson, LLC, 25 Malta, New York. 26 27 28 29 302 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 1 Court for the Southern District of New York (Gardephe, J. ). 2 3 **UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED** 4 **AND DECREED**that the judgment of the district court be 5
**AFFIRMED**

. 6 7 Plaintiff-Appellant Colette Ragin (“Ragin”) appeals 8 from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 9 of Defendant-Appellee East Ramapo Central School District 10 (the “School District”), and dismissal of her employment 11 discrimination action. We assume the parties’ familiarity 12 with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the 13 issues presented for review. 14 15 We review an order granting summary judgment de novo 16 and ask whether the district court properly concluded that 17 there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the 18 moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 19 SeeReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. , 570 20 F.3d 513, 517 (2d Cir. 2009). In determining whether there 21 are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to 22 resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual 23 inferences in favor of the party against whom summary 24 judgment is sought,” Terry v. Ashcroft , 336 F.3d 128, 137 25 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted), but “conclusory 26 statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to 27 defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York , 316 28 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). 29 30 Even assuming Ragin suffered an adverse employment 31 action, we agree with the district court that Ragin failed 32 to offer evidence that could allow a reasonable jury to find 33 that her termination was the result of racial animus on the 34 part of the School District. “It is well-settled that an 35 inference of discriminatory intent may be derived from a 36 variety of circumstances, including, but not limited 37 to: . . . ‘the employer’s criticism of the plaintiff’s 38 performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious 39 comments about others in the employee’s protected group; or 40 the more favorable treatment of employees not in the 41 protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the 42 plaintiff’s discharge.’” Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ. , 584 43 F.3d 487, 502 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Chambers v. TRM Copy 44 Ctrs. Corp. , 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal 45 citations omitted)). 46 473 The discriminatory comments allegedly were made by 1 Principal Neil Kaplicer (“Kaplicer”); however, Kaplicer 2 retired more than five months before the School District 3 decided to terminate Ragin, and nothing in the record 4 suggests that Kaplicer’s comments influenced the decision 5 when it was later made. SeeTomassi v. Insignia Fin. Group, 6 Inc. , 478 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The relevance of 7 discrimination-related remarks does not depend on their 8 offensiveness, but rather on their tendency to show that the 9 decision-maker was motivated by assumptions or attitudes 10 relating to the protected class.”); McLee v. Chrysler Corp.
, 11 109 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is no evidence in 12 the record from which it could rationally be inferred that 13 [plaintiff’s] allegations of discrimination . . . played any 14 part in [the decision-maker’s] decision to fire 15 [plaintiff].”). 16 17 The legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by the 18 School District to justify Ragin’s termination included: 19 Ragin’s tardiness and frequent absences; her refusal to sign 20 a memorandum setting out her job responsibilities; her 21 unprofessional behavior; her failure to complete a 22 substantial amount of her assigned work, including her 23 teacher evaluations; and her performance in the areas of 24 scheduling, budgets, and communications with the Central 25 Administrative offices. Accordingly, because the ERCSD 26 provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for 27 terminating Ragin, and because Ragin failed to demonstrate 28 that these reasons were pretextual, Ragin’s claims fail. 29 SeeMcPherson v. New York City Dept. of Educ. , 457 F.3d 211, 30 216 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We are interested in what ‘motivated 31 the employer’ . . . .” (quoting United States Postal Service 32 Bd. of Governors v. Aikens , 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) 33 (internal quotations omitted))). 34 35 We have considered all of Ragin’s remaining arguments, 36 and in particular her claims of unlawful retaliation and 37 hostile work environment, and find them to be without merit. 38 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 39 court is hereby **AFFIRMED**

. 40 41 FOR THE COURT: 42 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 43 44