1

Complications from an automobile accident have prevented Judge Gibson from

reviewing this opinion prior to its being filed. The opinion is consistent with Judge

Gibson's vote at conference. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-3916

___________

Cynthia M. Dykes, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of the *

Social Security Administration, * [PUBLISHED]

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: May 10, 2000

Filed: August 21, 2000 

___________

Before BOWMAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON,1

 and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Cynthia M. Dykes applied for Social Security disability and supplemental

security income benefits, claiming a disability onset date of February 10, 1994, due to

tendinitis and adhesive capsulitis of the right shoulder caused by a November 1993

work injury, and myofascial pain syndrome and headaches. After a hearing, the
2The HONORABLE CHARLES R. WOLLE, United States District Judge for

the Southern District of Iowa.

3See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42

(1987).

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Commissioner’s administrative law judge found that Dykes has severe right shoulder

impairments, but not listed impairments, and that she could not return to her past

relevant work, various jobs that “were unskilled and lower level semi-skilled jobs

performed at light to heavy levels of exertion.” However, viewing the record as a

whole, including the opinion testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that

Dykes is not disabled because she retains the residual functional capacity to perform

light and sedentary unskilled jobs that do not require significant lifting, such as airline

security, parking enforcement, and escort vehicle driving. 

After the Commissioner’s Appeals Council denied further administrative review,

Dykes commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s adverse

final decision. The district court2 affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, concluding

that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s finding that Dykes

is not disabled. Dykes appeals. We affirm.

On appeal, Dykes first argues that the ALJ erred in not requiring, at step five of

the sequential disability evaluation process,3 that the Commissioner prove by objective

medical evidence that she has the residual functional capacity to perform other work.

To the extent Dykes is arguing that residual functional capacity may be proved only by

medical evidence, we disagree. The current regulations make clear that residual

functional capacity is a determination based upon all the record evidence. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1545; Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-8p, at pp. 8-9. We agree with Dykes to this

extent -- the record must include some medical evidence that supports the ALJ’s

residual functional capacity finding. See Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th

Cir. 1995). That requirement is more than satisfied here, both in the treatment histories
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of Dykes’s shoulder condition, and in the fact that at least one of her treating physicians

released her to return to light duty work.

Dykes further argues that the ALJ erred in failing to acknowledge two of her

impairments, myofascial pain syndrome and headaches; in failing to properly consider

medical evidence of greater functional limitations; and in posing a hypothetical question

to the vocational expert that did not include all her limitations. After carefully

considering the record as a whole, we reject these contentions for the reasons stated in

the district court’s Judicial Review Decision of October 13, 1999.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.