Filed 9/24/20 P. v. Roachford CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRIAN ANTHONY ROACHFORD,

Defendant and Appellant.

B299360

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. MA075272

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Charles A. Chung, Judge. Affirmed.

G. Martin Velez, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and

Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.

_________________________
2

A jury convicted Brian Anthony Roachford of resisting two 

executive officers, attempting to take a law enforcement vehicle, 

and vandalism. He appeals, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

An amended information charged Roachford with two 

counts of resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69)1 (counts 

2 and 4), one count of attempted taking of a law enforcement 

vehicle (Veh. Code, §§ 664 & 10851, subd. (b)(2)) (count 3), and 

one count of vandalism over $400 (§ 594, subd. (a)) (count 5). The 

information alleged Roachford served three prior prison terms 

and had two prior serious felony convictions.

The trial centered on events on the morning of December 7, 

2018. Wendy Peterson testified she was driving her minivan 

to work on the 14 Freeway north in Lancaster when she saw a 

white sedan stopped in the middle of the freeway. Roachford and 

another man stood next to a truck stopped on the right shoulder.

Roachford walked onto the freeway toward the white sedan, and 

Peterson and all the other drivers on the freeway stopped their 

cars to avoid hitting him. Worried about Roachford’s safety,

Peterson called 911. Roachford tried to open the back driver’s 

side door on the sedan. The car drove off with Roachford hanging 

onto the door handle, and dragged him a short distance until 

he let go and fell onto the freeway. Injured, he walked toward 

Peterson’s minivan.

As Peterson talked to the 911 operator, Roachford pounded 

on her window, looking scared and unwell and saying he needed 

help. He tried to open all the minivan’s doors, slamming his body 

into the sides of the minivan. Roachford climbed on top of the 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent statutory 

references are to the Penal Code.
3

minivan, and then slid down the windshield onto the hood and

walked away, taking off his shirt. As traffic began to move past

him, he returned and again begged Peterson for help, banged 

on her window, tried to open all the doors, and climbed back 

on top of the minivan.

Peterson saw a black and white police car driving 

southbound. Roachford got off the top of the minivan, hopped 

over the center divider, and wandered into slowing traffic on the 

southbound lanes. A car’s side mirror hit his arm. The police car 

pulled into the freeway median and uniformed deputies got out 

of the car. Roachford walked toward them and they tried to 

handcuff him, but after a brief struggle, Roachford ran away. 

One of the officers tased him, he fell to the ground, and the police 

tied his hands and his feet.

Peterson’s minivan was dented, scratched, and smeared 

with blood. Repair of the damage cost over $3,500, and Peterson 

paid a $500 deductible.

Sheriff’s Deputy Russell Williams drove to the scene with 

his partner Deputy Ulise Ruiz in response to a radio call, with 

the car’s lights and sirens on. Deputy Williams saw Roachford 

walking against traffic in the southbound lane of the freeway. 

Dodging other vehicles, he parked the car facing southbound 

in front of Roachford. Roachford, who was very sweaty although 

it was cold and he wore a tank top, was staring blankly into 

the distance. He complied with a command to put his hands on 

the driver’s side fender of the police car. Deputy Williams was on 

his right side and Deputy Ruiz was on his left. Deputy Williams

reached for Roachford’s right arm and told him to put his hands 

behind his back, but “[h]e was so sweaty and covered in blood 

it was like grabbing a wet noodle.” Deputy Ruiz reached for 
4

Roachford’s left wrist, but was unable to keep his grasp as 

Roachford fought to break free, flailing his arms side to side and 

moving his body back and forth. Deputy Williams told Roachford 

to stop fighting and made more than five failed attempts to 

get Roachford’s arms behind his back, but Roachford resisted, 

tightening his muscles and becoming very rigid. He screamed,

“I need to get out of here,” turned to the right, and threw an 

elbow at Deputy Williams’s face. Deputy Williams jumped back.

Roachford lunged to the driver’s door and grabbed the 

handle, yelling, “I’m going to take your car.” He opened the door 

one to three feet, pushing Deputy Williams into the side of the 

car and breaking the side mirror. The sheriff’s car was running 

with the keys in the ignition and all the deputies’ gear inside, and 

Deputy Williams was afraid Roachford would drive off. Deputy 

Williams lunged forward and managed to shut the door with both 

hands, but Roachford opened the door again. Deputy Williams 

grabbed Roachford’s right arm with both hands and pulled 

him away from the door. He lost his grip and Roachford ran 

southbound toward moving traffic while the deputies told him 

to stop running. Deputy Ruiz pulled out his taser and tased 

Roachford, who fell onto his stomach three or four feet away.

After five seconds Roachford began to kick and yell, 

and Deputy Ruiz warned he would tase him again if he kept 

struggling. The deputies got on top of Roachford and struggled 

to handcuff him as he kicked, thrashed his body side to side, and 

tried to stand up. Roachford yelled he had insects in his anus 

and his mouth and he needed to get them out, reaching inside the 

back of his pants. After about five minutes, additional deputies 

arrived, and they managed to restrain Roachford, handcuff him,

and hobble his legs together. Eventually they took the hobble off 
5

and he was able to walk to a gurney. Paramedics took him to 

the hospital, where he was medically cleared.

Based on their training and experience, the deputies 

thought Roachford was under the influence of PCP, although they 

did not know whether his blood or urine was tested. PCP could 

cause hallucinations and paranoia, rigid muscles, elevated body 

temperature, aggression, and agitation.

The parties stipulated that Roachford was on parole on 

the day of the incident.

The jury convicted Roachford on all counts. On count 3 

(attempted driving or taking of a law enforcement vehicle without 

consent), the jury found true that in committing the offense, 

Roachford attempted to take or drive a Los Angeles County 

Sheriff’s Department Patrol Vehicle. The trial court found true 

that Roachford had two prior serious felony convictions and 

three prior prison terms. The court sentenced him to six years 

in state prison on count 2 (resisting an executive officer/Deputy 

Williams), doubling the upper term of three years under the 

Three Strikes law. The court stayed the sentences on the other 

counts under section 654, and struck the prior prison term 

enhancements.

DISCUSSION

Roachford argues the trial court erred when it instructed 

the jury that his defense of voluntary intoxication did not apply 

to the counts of resisting an executive officer.

The jury instructions on counts 2 and 4 (resisting executive 

officers Williams and Ruiz in the performance of their duty, § 69)

told the jury the prosecution had to prove Roachford used force to 

resist the executive officer, the officer was performing his duties, 
6

and when Roachford acted, he knew the executive officer was 

performing his duties.

The instructions on count 3 (attempted unlawful taking 

of the patrol car, Veh. Code, § 10851, subds. (a) and (b)) required 

the prosecution to prove Roachford attempted to take a vehicle 

(the patrol car) without the owner’s consent, and “intended to 

deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for 

any period of time.” The instruction continued: “If you find the 

defendant guilty of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, you 

must then decide whether the People have proved the additional 

allegation that the defendant took or drove an emergency vehicle 

on call. To prove this allegation, the People must prove that: 

1. The vehicle was a distinctively marked law enforcement 

vehicle; 2. The vehicle was on an emergency call when it was 

taken; AND 3. The defendant knew that the vehicle was on 

an emergency call.” (See Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (b)(2).)

The court instructed the jury it could consider evidence of

Roachford’s voluntary intoxication “only in deciding whether the 

defendant acted with the specific intent required in Count 3. . . . 

In connection with the crime charged in count 3, the People 

have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant acted with the required specific intent. If the people 

have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not 

guilty of count 3. You may not consider evidence of voluntary 

intoxication for any other purpose. Voluntary intoxication is 

not a defense to the crimes charged in counts 2, 4, and 5.”

In closing, the prosecutor argued Roachford himself stated 

he was going to take the patrol car. The additional allegation 

in count 3 was proven by photographic evidence the patrol car 

was distinctively marked, the deputies testified they were on 
7

an emergency call, and the car’s lights and sirens were on,

so Roachford knew the car was responding to an emergency. 

Voluntary intoxication was a defense to this count only, and 

for the defense to be valid, “he had to have been so high that 

he didn’t understand what was happening so much so that 

he couldn’t form the intent to try to take the vehicle.” To the 

contrary, Roachford told the deputies he was going to take 

their car. The defense argued Roachford did not know what 

he was doing that day because he was under the influence, 

perhaps of PCP.

Roachford argues the court was required to instruct the 

jury that voluntary intoxication was also a valid defense to the 

two counts alleging a violation of section 69. Although trial 

counsel did not object to the voluntary intoxication instruction

as given, we must address the merits of a claim of instructional 

error affecting substantial rights. (People v. Bedolla (2018) 28 

Cal.App.5th 535, 544.) As we conclude the claim has no merit, 

we do not address Roachford’s argument that failure to object 

was ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 29.4 provides: “(a) No act committed by a person 

while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by 

reason of his or her having been in that condition. Evidence 

of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the 

capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, 

including, but not limited to, . . . [the] knowledge . . . with 

which the accused committed the act. (b) Evidence of voluntary 

intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not 

the defendant actually formed a required specific intent. . . .” 

(Italics added.) This language means “[e]vidence of voluntary 

intoxication is inadmissible to negate the existence of general 
8

criminal intent.” (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 81.) 

“ ‘A crime is characterized as a “general intent” crime when the 

required mental state entails only an intent to do the act that 

causes the harm; a crime is characterized as a “specific intent” 

crime when the required mental state entails an intent to cause 

the resulting harm.’ ” (Id. at p. 86.)

Although distinguishing general intent and specific intent 

is “notoriously difficult” (People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456),

section 69 is an example of that distinction. The first part of 

subdivision (a) penalizes “[e]very person who attempts, by means 

of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer 

from performing any duty imposed upon the officer by law.” 

(§ 69, subd. (a).) Attempting by violence to deter or prevent 

an officer from performing a duty is a specific intent offense, 

because the defendant must act with the intent to cause harm 

by preventing the officer from performing the duty. (People v. 

Rasmussen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1420.) But the second 

part of subdivision (a), the offense of which Roachford was 

convicted, penalizes anyone “who knowingly resists, by the use 

of force or violence, the officer, in the performance of his or her

duty.” (§ 69, subd. (a).) This is a general intent offense, because 

the defendant must act only with the knowledge that the victim 

is an officer doing his duty, without any separate intent to cause 

a certain outcome. (Rasmussen, at pp. 1419-1421.) Intoxication 

was not a defense.

Roachford cites People v. Foster (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 649, 

655, and People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975 (Reyes), 

to support his argument that voluntary intoxication is a defense 

to general intent crimes when actual knowledge is an element. 

People v. Foster held voluntary intoxication was relevant to 
9

defend against the charge of possession of heroin, a general 

intent crime requiring knowledge. (Foster, at p. 655.) But the 

statute then in effect, section 22 (the predecessor to section 29.4),

allowed evidence of voluntary intoxication “ ‘whenever the 

actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is 

a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree 

of crime.’ ” (Foster, at p. 654.) By contrast, the statute in effect 

at the time of Roachford’s trial, section 29.4, states in subdivision 

(a) that voluntary intoxication is not relevant to the defendant’s

capacity to form “any mental states for the crimes charged, 

including . . . knowledge,” and in subdivision (b) that evidence 

of voluntary intoxication is admissible only to show whether 

a defendant “actually formed a required specific intent.” (Italics

added.)

The defendant in People v. Reyes was charged with the 

receipt of stolen property, which required the prosecution to 

prove the property was stolen, the defendant possessed it, and 

the defendant knew the property was stolen. (Reyes, supra, 

52 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) Conscious possession of stolen 

property was not enough; additional evidence must show the 

defendant knew the property was “ ‘tainted.’ ” (Id. at pp. 984-

985.) But simply receiving stolen goods with the knowledge they 

were stolen is not a crime if the defendant intended to restore 

it to the owner: “ ‘The critical factor is the defendant’s intent 

at the time he receives or initially conceals the stolen property 

from the owner. The intent to restore must exist at the moment 

the stolen property is accepted. . . . If the defendant received 

or concealed stolen property with general criminal intent to aid 

the thief, or to deprive the owner of possession . . . he possesses 

the requisite wrongful intent.’ ” (Id. at p. 985.) “[W]ith regard 
10

to the element of knowledge, receiving stolen property is 

a ‘specific intent crime.’ ” (Ibid.)

People v. Reyes has been criticized as based on outdated 

and inapplicable authority. (People v. Berg (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th

959, 969.) In any event, it is easily distinguishable here.2 All the 

prosecution had to prove is that Roachford knowingly resisted 

an officer engaged in performing his duty. The second part of 

section 69, subdivision (a) does not require any additional intent 

or goal, or any knowledge beyond that the officers were doing 

their duties. The trial court was not required to instruct on 

voluntary intoxication as a defense to counts 2 and 4.

And even if the court had erred when it restricted the jury’s 

consideration of voluntary intoxication to count 3, it would be 

state law error, requiring reversal only if there was a reasonable 

probability the error affected the verdict adversely to Roachford. 

(People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134-1135.) We 

see no such probability here. Although it was free to consider 

Roachford’s voluntary intoxication on count 3, in finding him 

guilty and finding true the allegation, the jury necessarily found 

he was able to form the intent to deprive the officers of the use 

of the patrol vehicle, and able to know the patrol car was on 

an emergency call. It is not reasonably probable the jury would 

2 People v. Moore (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 889, 894, states: 

“For example, the crime of resisting arrest requires the 

perpetrator to know the person they are resisting is an officer, 

and thus evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to show 

the defendant did not know. (Reyes, [supra, 52 Cal.App.4th] 

at pp. 985-986.)” People v. Quarles (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 631, 

635 quotes this passage, and in turn Roachford quotes it in his 

opening brief. Reyes does not even mention the crime of resisting 

an officer, and makes no such holding.
11

at the same time conclude his voluntary intoxication made 

Roachford unable to know the deputies were officers performing 

their official duty and acquit him on counts 2 and 4.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

DHANIDINA, J.