UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MARIO RAMOS-HERNANDEZ, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 15-9524 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, GORSUCH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Mario Ramos-Hernandez is a native and citizen of Guatemala who entered the 

United States illegally in 2014. In an effort to avoid removal, he applied for relief 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and the Convention Against Torture. An immigration 

judge and later the BIA denied Mr. Ramos-Hernandez’s application because (among 

other things) they found his account of past persecution in Guatemala not credible. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 15, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Mr. Ramos-Hernandez seeks relief from this ruling, arguing that we should 

find it wanting for two reasons: (1) he never received an adequate opportunity to 

explain the inconsistencies in his testimony; and (2) the ruling is premised on a 

factual mistake. 

This court is precluded by law from considering the first argument. Before 

bringing an argument to court, an alien seeking relief under the immigration laws 

must first “present the same specific legal theory to the BIA.” Garcia-Carbajal v. 

Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010). This Mr. Ramos-Hernandez failed to 

do with respect to his first theory for relief. 

Mr. Ramos-Hernandez did exhaust his second argument so we may proceed to 

consider its merits. Before the immigration judge Mr. Ramos-Hernandez claimed 

that he would be persecuted if returned to Guatemala because of his past participation 

in demonstrations against the policies of government agencies responsible for energy 

distribution. The immigration judge found this claim not credible because Mr. 

Ramos-Hernandez was himself “employed by government-funded electrical 

agencies” in Guatemala at the time of his past activism. Before this court, Mr. 

Ramos-Hernandez contends that this credibility determination is legally 

unsustainable because it was premised on a factual mistake: Mr. Ramos-Hernandez 

worked for private companies, not a “government-funded agency.” And it’s certainly 

true that to be sustained credibility findings “may not be based on speculation, 

conjecture, or unsupported personal opinion . . . [but] must be supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.” Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1205 
3 

(10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation mark omitted). The problem Mr. RamosHernandez faces is that, according to his own testimony, the companies for whom he 

worked were “hired by” and “vertically integrated” with and operated “under the 

purview of” the government. And given this testimony, it’s difficult to see how the 

immigration judge’s factual finding about the nature of his former employer might be 

characterized as based on speculation or conjecture rather than substantial record 

evidence. 

Having found the adverse credibility determination in this case sustainable, 

and given that this determination by itself supplies a legally sufficient basis to 

support the BIA’s decision, the petition for review is denied. 

Entered for the Court 

Neil M. Gorsuch 

Circuit Judge