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*********************************************** 
RICHARD QUINT v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(AC 44162)

Prescott, Suarez and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted previously of operating a motor

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, failure

to register as a sex offender, and possession of narcotics, sought a writ

of habeas corpus, claiming that he received ineffective assistance from

his criminal trial counsel. The habeas court rendered judgment denying

the habeas petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held:

1. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner’s trial counsel

did not render ineffective assistance by failing to meaningfully explain

the state’s plea offer: the habeas court explicitly credited the testimony

of counsel that he had sufficiently apprised the petitioner of the contours

of the state’s plea offer, as he had advised the petitioner about the

strength of the state’s case, the charges and the elements of each offense

that the state would have to prove to secure a conviction at trial, the

petitioner’s overall maximum exposure in the case, his chances of acquittal at trial, that the plea offer was ‘‘phenomenal,’’ and that it was not to

the petitioner’s advantage to take his case to trial, and counsel discussed

potential defenses with the petitioner; moreover, the petitioner made

no claim that the habeas court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous,

and it was the function of that court to weigh the evidence and determine

credibility.

2. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner’s trial counsel

did not render ineffective assistance by failing to ensure that the petitioner would receive presentence jail credit for the time he had served

between his sentencing in a separate proceeding at the Superior Court

in the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden and his sentencing in

the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield for this case: the

petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that, if not for his

counsel’s alleged deficient performance, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, as he testified twice at

the habeas trial that he would have pleaded guilty or that he likely

would have pleaded guilty regardless of his trial counsel’s failure to

ensure that he would receive presentence jail credit, and, therefore, he

failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result of any alleged

deficiency in his trial counsel’s performance.

Argued November 16, 2021—officially released March 1, 2022

Procedural History

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and

tried to the court, Chaplin, J.; judgment denying the

petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of

certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Justine F. Miller, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(petitioner).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino,

state’s attorney, and Cornelius Kelly, former assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

BISHOP, J. In this certified appeal from the judgment

of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus, the petitioner, Richard Quint, claims

that the court improperly concluded that his trial counsel rendered effective assistance. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the record establishes that his counsel failed (1) to meaningfully communicate the state’s

plea offer and (2) to ensure that the petitioner would

receive presentence jail credit for the time that he was

incarcerated between his March 17, 2017 sentencing in

the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven

at Meriden (Meriden) and his April 10, 2017 sentencing

in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield

(Bridgeport).1 We affirm the judgment of the habeas

court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On February 10, 2017, in the Superior

Court in Bridgeport, the petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine2

to multiple criminal charges,

including (1) one count of operating a motor vehicle

while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs

in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a, (2) one count

of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of

General Statutes § 54-252, and (3) two counts of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a279 (a) (1). During the plea canvass, the court questioned the petitioner and his counsel, Attorney Michael

Hillis, as to the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent

nature of the petitioner’s pleas.3 The court informed

the petitioner that if he was convicted after a trial, he

faced a possible maximum sentence of seven and onehalf years of imprisonment, followed by five years of

probation and potential fines.

The court found that the petitioner’s pleas were

knowing and voluntary, accepted the pleas, and scheduled his sentencing for March 3, 2017. The sentencing

date was postponed to March 17, 2017, to allow for a

hearing concerning the state’s seizure of the petitioner’s

money as a result of the criminal charges.

On March 3, 2017, the petitioner entered a plea under

the Alford doctrine in the Superior Court in Meriden

on the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit in

violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a).4 The court

imposed a total effective sentence of one year to serve,

and the court stayed the execution of the sentence until

March 17, 2017—the scheduled sentencing date for the

petitioner’s matters in the Superior Court in Bridgeport.

On March 17, 2017, the Superior Court in Meriden lifted

the stay, imposing the mandatory minimum sentence

of one year to serve; however, the petitioner was not

sentenced for the matters in the Superior Court in

Bridgeport on this date as originally scheduled because

Hillis had requested that the sentencing be continued
until April 10, 2017.5

The sentencing hearing in the Superior Court in

Bridgeport took place on April 10, 2017. At the hearing,

the state and the petitioner agreed to split the seized

money, each taking $434. With respect to the charge of

failure to register as a sex offender, the court imposed

a sentence of five years of incarceration, execution

suspended after one year and three years of probation.

With respect to each of the two charges of possession

of narcotics, the court imposed a concurrent sentence

of one year of incarceration. With respect to the charge

of operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, the court imposed a concurrent

sentence of six months of incarceration. The total effective sentence imposed was five years of incarceration,

execution suspended after one year, with three years

of probation. Hillis requested that the court indicate on

the mittimus that the petitioner should be entitled to

jail credit on his sentences dating back to December

22, 2016, the date he was incarcerated for these charges.

Immediately as the court began to announce the sentence, the petitioner indicated for the first time that he

thought that the offense of operating under the influence had been nolled at the plea proceeding on February 10. The court and Hillis indicated that the petitioner

was incorrect as that charge was not nolled. Hillis twice

asked the petitioner whether the petitioner wanted him

to ask the court to vacate the plea and the sentence,

to which the petitioner declined.

On May 2, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus in the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Tolland. On December 14, 2018, the petitioner

filed an amended petition asserting claims related to

the Bridgeport convictions, that Hillis (1) failed to

meaningfully explain the plea offer to the petitioner,

(2) failed to adequately advise the petitioner of the

charges encompassed in the plea offer, (3) failed to

ensure that the petitioner understood the consequences

of the guilty plea, (4) failed to seek a sentencing date

that would minimize or eliminate the petitioner’s ‘‘dead

time,’’6

(5) failed to adequately request jail credit at

sentencing, and (6) improperly pressured the petitioner

to accept the plea offer. After an evidentiary hearing,

the habeas court concluded that the petitioner failed

to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance in

the underlying criminal proceedings constituted deficient performance or that he suffered prejudice and

denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The

petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from

the habeas court’s ruling, which the court granted on

February 28, 2020. This appeal followed.

In this certified appeal, the petitioner claims that the

habeas court erred in concluding that he had failed to

demonstrate that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance. We are not persuaded.
We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of

review and decisional law that guide our analysis of

the petitioner’s claims. ‘‘When reviewing the decision

of a habeas court, the facts found by the habeas court

may not be disturbed unless the findings were clearly

erroneous. . . . The issue, however, of [w]hether the

representation [that] a defendant received at trial was

constitutionally inadequate is a mixed question of law

and fact. Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 698,

104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)]. As such, that

question requires plenary review by this court unfettered by the clearly erroneous standard. . . . Under

the Strickland test, when a petitioner alleges ineffective

assistance of counsel, he must establish that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings

would have been different had it not been for the deficient performance. . . . Furthermore, because a successful petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, failure to satisfy either prong is fatal to a

habeas petition. . . .

‘‘To satisfy the first prong, that his counsel’s performance was deficient, the petitioner must establish that

his counsel made errors so serious that [counsel] was

not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the [petitioner] by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. . . . The petitioner

must thus show that counsel’s representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness considering all

of the circumstances. . . . [A] court must indulge a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;

that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

might be considered sound trial strategy. [Id.] 689. Furthermore, the right to counsel is not the right to perfect

counsel.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peterson

v. Commissioner of Correction, 142 Conn. App. 267,

271–72, 67 A.3d 293 (2013).

I

The petitioner first claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to meaningfully

explain the state’s plea offer. Specifically, the petitioner

claims that his trial counsel should have advised him

of the strength of the state’s evidence, the elements of

the offenses, potential defenses, the chances of acquittal, and the petitioner’s total effective exposure had he

proceeded to trial. The respondent, the Commissioner

of Correction, contends that the petitioner failed to

meet his burden of proving that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel and argues that the petitioner’s challenge to the habeas court’s ruling is based

on the erroneous premise that the court credited the

petitioner’s own testimony in support of each of his
claims. The record supports the respondent’s argument.

‘‘To determine whether trial counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and

whether the petitioner was therefore prejudiced, we

must consider the nature of the underlying claim. . . .

Although there had been some debate about whether

the constitutional right to the effective assistance of

counsel applies to the rejection of a plea offer by the

government, it is now well settled that a criminal defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel

in conjunction with the acceptance or rejection of a

plea offer.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Peterson v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 142 Conn. App. 272.

‘‘[C]ounsel must communicate to the defendant the

terms of the plea offer . . . and should usually inform

the defendant of the strengths and weaknesses of the

case against him . . . . Counsel’s conclusion as to how

best to advise a client in order to avoid, on the one

hand, failing to give advice and, on the other, coercing

a plea enjoys a wide range of reasonableness because

[r]epresentation is an art . . . and [t]here are countless

ways to provide effective assistance in any given case

. . . . Counsel rendering advice in this critical area may

take into account, among other factors, the defendant’s

chances of prevailing at trial . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 274.

Both the petitioner and Hillis testified at the habeas

trial, each conflicting with the other’s testimony. The

petitioner testified that Hillis did not discuss the case

with him with particularity. Specifically, he testified

that Hillis only ‘‘somewhat’’ discussed the charges and

elements of each offense with him, failed to advise him

of potential defenses, failed to discuss the chances of

acquittal at trial, and failed to advise him of his maximum exposure should he elect to go to trial. To the

contrary, Hillis testified that he comprehensively discussed the case with the petitioner during telephone

calls and in person, which included discussing the

charges and elements of each offense, discovery materials, and the strengths of the defenses to the state’s case

against the petitioner. In addition, he testified that he

had advised the petitioner that it was not advisable to

take the case to trial due to the strength of the evidence

involved. He testified further that the petitioner had

expressed an understanding of the law and had significant prior experience with the criminal justice system.

Fatal to the petitioner’s claim is the fact that the court

explicitly credited Hillis’ testimony—that he sufficiently

apprised the petitioner of the contours of the state’s

plea offer. Specifically, the court found that Hillis had

(1) advised the petitioner about the strength of the

state’s case, (2) advised the petitioner about the charges

and the elements of each offense that the state would

have to prove to secure a conviction at trial, (3) dis-
cussed the potential defenses with the petitioner, (4)

advised the petitioner of his chances of acquittal at trial

by advising him that the plea offer was phenomenal

and that it was not to his advantage to take his case to

trial, and (5) advised the petitioner as to his overall

maximum exposure in the Bridgeport disposition, and,

in his testimony at the habeas trial, the petitioner demonstrated his understanding of the sentence under the

plea agreement in contrast to the fifteen and one-half

years maximum exposure for the offenses charged. The

court also credited Hillis’ testimony that the petitioner

‘‘was a good participant in discussions about his case,

expressed an understanding of the law and had significant experience with the criminal justice system.’’

The petitioner makes no claim that the court’s factual

findings were clearly erroneous. It is the function of

the habeas court to weigh the evidence and determine

credibility. See Sanchez v. Commissioner of Correction, 314 Conn. 585, 604, 103 A.3d 954 (2014) (‘‘[W]e

must defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment of the

credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude. . . .

The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter

of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be

given to their testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.)). Because the habeas court found credible

Hillis’ testimony that he meaningfully explained to the

petitioner the contours of the state’s plea offer, we

cannot conclude that the petitioner’s counsel rendered

deficient performance.7

II

Next, the petitioner claims that his trial counsel’s

failure to ensure that he would receive presentence jail

credit for the time he had served between the March

17, 2017 sentencing in the Superior Court in Meriden

and the April 10, 2017 sentencing in the Superior Court

in Bridgeport was deficient and prejudicial. Specifically,

the petitioner argues that Hillis ‘‘made no effort to persuade the Meriden public defender to postpone the

March 17 sentencing and reschedule it for the April 10

. . . Bridgeport sentenc[ing], or in the alternative, at

the April 10 sentencing to implore [the trial judge] to

make the start date of the sentence there retroactive

to the March 17 date of the commencement of the

Meriden sentence’’ in order to ensure that the petitioner

did not serve ‘‘dead time.’’ The respondent argues that

‘‘the petitioner expressly acknowledged . . . that any

delay in his release date due to the Bridgeport sentencing continuance would not have mattered and that he

nevertheless still would have accepted the plea offer

and entered his Alford pleas.’’

In its analysis, a reviewing court may look to the

performance prong or the prejudice prong first. We

rely on the prejudice prong.8

‘‘A petitioner’s claim will

succeed only if both prongs are satisfied. . . . Unless
a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said

that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in

the adversary process that renders the result unworkable. . . . A court can find against a petitioner, with

respect to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

on either the performance prong or the prejudice prong,

whichever is easier.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Leon v. Commissioner of Correction, 189 Conn. App. 512, 531, 208 A.3d 296, cert. denied,

332 Conn. 909, 209 A.3d 1232 (2019).

‘‘For effectiveness claims resulting from guilty pleas,

we apply the standard set forth in Hill v. Lockhart, [474

U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)] which

modified Strickland’s prejudice prong. . . . To satisfy

the prejudice prong, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on

going to trial. . . . Reasonable probability does not

require the petitioner to show that counsel’s deficient

conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in

the case, but he must establish a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome. . . . A

reviewing court can find against a petitioner on either

ground, whichever is easier.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Merle S. v. Commissioner of Correction, 167

Conn. App. 585, 599, 143 A.3d 1183 (2016).

The petitioner bore the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to establish that it is reasonably probable

that, if not for his counsel’s alleged deficient performance, he would not have pleaded guilty but would

have insisted on going to trial. See id. The plaintiff failed

to meet this burden. At the habeas trial, the petitioner

was asked the following question: ‘‘[H]ad Attorney Hillis

explained to you that you’d be serving dead time

because of the way you were sentenced, would that

have impacted your decision to plead out in this case?’’

The petitioner testified that ‘‘[i]t wouldn’t have had any

impact on it at all . . . .’’ Additionally, the petitioner

was asked: ‘‘And had you known that you would have

to do an extra month in jail, would you have accepted

the deal?’’ The petitioner testified that he ‘‘probably

would have still accepted the plea deal . . . .’’ In its

memorandum of decision, the habeas court expressly

found that the petitioner would not have withdrawn

his pleas even if he had been correctly advised of the

consequences of the dead time. It therefore found that

‘‘[t]he petitioner’s testimony demonstrate[d] that he suffered no prejudice.’’ The petitioner has not established

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome, having twice testified at the habeas trial that

he would have pleaded guilty or that he likely would

have pleaded guilty regardless of Hillis’ alleged failure

to ensure that he would receive presentence jail credit.

Because the petitioner cannot demonstrate that he has

suffered prejudice as a result of any alleged deficiency

in Hillis’ performance, we conclude that the petitioner’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See

Merle S. v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 167

Conn. App. 599.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Upon our review of the briefs, it is unclear whether the petitioner also

asserts a third claim concerning counsel’s alleged failure to ensure that the

petitioner would receive presentence jail credit, independent of his decision

of whether to plead guilty. Nevertheless, even if this claim is being made,

this claim is inadequately briefed for our review. See Villafane v. Commissioner of Correction, 190 Conn. App. 566, 578–79, 211 A.3d 72, cert. denied,

333 Conn. 902, 215 A.3d 160 (2019).

2

‘‘Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed.

2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt . . .

but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of

proceeding to trial. . . . A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial

oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that

the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept

the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless. . . . A defendant often pleads guilty

under the Alford doctrine to avoid the imposition of a possibly more serious

punishment after trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.Baldwin,

183 Conn. App. 167, 169 n.1, 191 A.3d 1096, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 922, 194

A.3d 288 (2018).

3 During the court’s plea canvass, the following colloquy took place:

‘‘The Court: Have you discussed with your attorney what you’re pleading

guilty to today?

‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Did he go over the elements of each crime charged which

the state would have to prove you guilty of beyond a reasonable doubt?

‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes

‘‘The Court: Did he explain the evidence that would prove each element

beyond a reasonable doubt?

‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Did he explain to you the maximum penalty for each charge?

‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.

* * *

‘‘The Court: Are you satisfied with how he represented you?

‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Counsel, did you go over all of this with your client?

‘‘[Attorney Hillis]: Yes, Your Honor.

* * *

‘‘The Court: The court finds the pleas are knowingly and voluntarily made

with assistance of effective and competent counsel. . . .’’

4 The petitioner was not represented by Hillis in the Meriden matter.

5 At the habeas trial, Hillis explained that he was either sick or on another

trial as the reason for requesting the change in the sentencing date in the

Superior Court in Bridgeport.

6

‘‘[D]ead time is prison parlance for presentence confinement time that

cannot be credited because the inmate is a sentenced prisoner serving

time on another sentence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bagalloo v.

Commissioner of Correction, 195 Conn. App. 528, 531 n.2, 225 A.3d 1226,

cert. denied, 335 Conn. 905, 226 A.3d 707 (2020).

7

In light of our determination that the petitioner failed to establish that

Hillis’ performance was deficient, we need not address the prejudice prong.

See Leon v. Commissioner of Correction, 189 Conn. App. 512, 531, 208 A.3d

296, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 909, 209 A.3d 1232 (2019).

8

In the court’s memorandum of decision, it noted that ‘‘[t]he petitioner

testified that he probably still would have accepted the plea deal if his

attorneys had not coordinated the sentences to be imposed on the same

date. . . . [H]e testified that . . . Hillis explaining the implications of him

serving any dead time would not have had any impact on his entering the

pleas. Additionally, the petitioner also testified as to his overall satisfaction

with the total effective sentence imposed [concerning the Bridgeport convictions].’’ On that basis, we focus solely on the prejudice prong.