In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2856

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DOMINIC MILLER,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 15 CR 30 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 17, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. In late 2014, Defendant Dominic

Miller and Amy Wagner used and sold methamphetamine to‐

gether in northwestern Wisconsin. After law enforcement

learned of the couple’s illicit activity, Miller pled guilty to pos‐

sessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. The

district judge found that Miller and Wagner were jointly en‐
2 No. 15‐2856

gaged in the distribution of between 500 grams and 1.5 kilo‐

grams of methamphetamine and sentenced Miller to eight

years in prison.  

On appeal, Miller argues that the district judge’s drug‐

quantity finding was erroneous, principally on the ground

that he sold only a small portion of the drugs in question.

However, Miller’s relevant conduct includes not only the

sales he directly made himself, but also the drug sales that

Wagner foreseeably made in furtherance of their joint distri‐

bution scheme. Given this fact, there is no genuine dispute

that Miller’s relevant conduct involved between 500 grams

and 1.5 kilograms.  

Miller also claims that his eight‐year sentence is substan‐

tively unreasonable because he is simply a drug addict in

need of rehabilitative services. But the district judge ade‐

quately explained why Miller’s sentence was necessary in

light of his history of drug use and drug sales, and in any case,

he has failed to overcome the presumption that his below‐

Guidelines sentence is reasonable. So we affirm the district

court’s judgment.  

I. BACKGROUND

Dominic Miller and Amy Wagner met in northwestern

Wisconsin sometime around September 2014. They began da‐

ting, moved into an apartment together, and began using and

selling methamphetamine. During this time, the couple’s re‐

lationship was not without issues. Specifically, Wagner sus‐

pected that Miller was unfaithful, and installed a webcam in

the couple’s bedroom to record Miller’s actions while she was

away.  
No. 15‐2856 3

In November 2014, a confidential informant purchased

methamphetamine from Wagner on two separate occasions.

Law enforcement later obtained a search warrant for Wagner

and Miller’s apartment and found small quantities of meth‐

amphetamine and LSD, as well as various drug parapherna‐

lia. Wagner was arrested, and while in police custody, she ad‐

mitted to using and selling methamphetamine and informed

law enforcement that her home computer contained a number

of videos that her webcam had captured. Law enforcement

obtained the computer and the videos, which captured sev‐

eral apparent drug transactions involving Wagner, Miller,

and others.  

Miller was later charged with distributing methampheta‐

mine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possessing more than 50

grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and maintaining a place for the purpose

of distributing methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1).

Miller pleaded guilty to the possession charge. In its initial

presentence report (“initial PSR”), the probation office found

that Miller and Wagner were engaged in a jointly undertaken

criminal activity, and that as a result Miller was responsible

for distributing between 1.5 kilograms and 5.0 kilograms of

methamphetamine. Miller filed an objection to the initial PSR,

arguing that his relevant conduct should only involve his ac‐

tivities after September 2014. Miller did not, however, object

to the conclusion that the drug distribution was a joint under‐

taking. In response, the office prepared a revised presentence

report (“revised PSR”) with a reduced drug‐quantity range of

500 grams to 1.5 kilograms.
4 No. 15‐2856

At Miller’s sentencing hearing, Wagner testified about

how she and Miller coordinated their drug‐distribution ef‐

forts. Wagner explained that she typically purchased between

four and six ounces of methamphetamine every couple of

days during the seven weeks she and Miller were dating. She

added that Miller accompanied her to some (but not all) of the

purchase meetings, that she typically sold most of the meth‐

amphetamine to one of her customers, and that she and Miller

divvied up and sold the remaining amount to their respective

customers, some of whom overlapped. In addition, Wagner

stated that she and Miller weighed, packaged, and sold meth‐

amphetamine in their shared apartment, and that she and

Miller combined their sales proceeds to pay the rent and pur‐

chase additional drugs. Later on in the hearing, Miller’s attor‐

ney stated that he believed Wagner’s testimony was truthful.  

The district judge found that Miller was responsible for

between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine,

explaining:  

I think that the probation office was correct in

determining that Mr. Miller’s relevant conduct

involved at least 500 grams but less than 1.5 kil‐

ograms of methamphetamine for the period

from late September 2014 through November of

2014, which is when he and Ms. Wagner were

obtaining large amounts of methamphetamine,

probably as much as 3 to 5 pounds. I think it’s

very possible that there was more methamphet‐

amine being distributed, but I’m convinced that

defendant has not shown that his relevant con‐

duct involved less than 500 grams of metham‐
No. 15‐2856 5

phetamine. So that’s the amount that I’m rely‐

ing on in the — that was proposed by the pro‐

bation office in its revised report.

The district judge sentenced Miller to 96 months’ imprison‐

ment, below the Guidelines’ range of 100 to 125 months. In

doing so, the judge referenced Miller’s difficult upbringing,

employment history, prior incarceration, and history of using

and selling methamphetamine. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. No Clear Error in Finding that Relevant Conduct In‐

volved Between 500 Grams and 1.5 Kilograms of Meth‐

amphetamine

On appeal, Miller contends that the district judge used an

incorrect drug‐quantity range when calculating his sentence

under the Guidelines. We review the district court’s interpre‐

tation of the Guidelines de novo, and review for clear error

the factual determinations underlying the district court’s ap‐

plication of the Guidelines. United States v. Harper, 766 F.3d

741, 744 (7th Cir. 2014).  

We have repeatedly observed that “determining drug

quantities attributable to defendants is not an exact science.”

United States v. Austin, 806 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 2015) (cita‐

tion and internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, a

drug‐quantity estimate must be “based on evidence pos‐

sessing a sufficient indicia of reliability and not nebulous eye‐

balling.” United States v. Durham, 211 F.3d 437, 444 (7th Cir.

2000); see also U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). We have encouraged district

courts to “err on the side of caution” and consider the more

conservative estimate when two or more plausible estimates

exist. United States v. Bozovich, 782 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2015)
6 No. 15‐2856

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However,

we will reverse a drug‐quantity finding “only if a review of

the record leaves us with a ‘firm and definite conviction that

a mistake has been made.’” United States v. Cooper, 767 F.3d

721, 730 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Adams, 746

F.3d 734, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2014)).

We conclude that the district judge did not err in finding

that Miller’s relevant conduct included sales of between 500

grams and 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. Following her

arrest, Wagner told law enforcement officials that she and

Miller distributed approximately three to five pounds (or 1.36

to 2.27 kilograms) of methamphetamine between September

and November 2014. That is consistent with Wagner’s testi‐

mony at the sentencing hearing, where she said that she typi‐

cally obtained fourto six ounces (or 113 to 170 grams) of meth‐

amphetamine “every couple [of] days” for seven weeks. That

adds up to 2.83 to 4.25 kilograms if the purchases occurred

every other day, and 1.93 to 2.89 kilograms if the purchases

occurred every third day. In addition, the revised PSR identi‐

fied nearly a dozen individuals who corroborated the nature

and scope of Miller and Wagner’s distribution activities.

Miller attacks the district judge’s finding on several

grounds, arguing first that the finding was based on inaccu‐

rate and unreliable information supplied by Wagner. Accord‐

ing to Miller, the district judge should not have credited Wag‐

ner’s statements and testimony because Wagner was a crimi‐

nal with a motivation to lie. But Millerfails to substantiate this

conclusory assertion, which is unsurprising given the fact that

inflating the joint enterprise’s drug quantity would have been

against Wagner’s penal interest. And at the sentencing hear‐

ing, Miller’s attorney acknowledged without prompting that
No. 15‐2856 7

he believed Wagner had testified truthfully. Miller also criti‐

cizes Wagner for making statements to law enforcement that

were inconsistent with her testimony at the sentencing hear‐

ing. Although Wagner was inconsistent about whether she or

Miller distributed the majority of the drugs they obtained, she

consistently indicated that she and Miller collectively distrib‐

uted at least 500 grams of methamphetamine. Indeed, Miller’s

attorney conceded at oral argument that Wagner and Miller

together distributed more than 500 grams of methampheta‐

mine.  

In an attempt to deflect attention away from this 500‐gram

threshold, Miller emphasizes that he himself sold only a por‐

tion of the drugs that he and Wagner obtained. But this over‐

looks the district judge’s finding that Wagner and Miller were

engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity, which made

Miller responsible for all acts within the scope of, in further‐

ance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with that

activity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); see also United States v. Da‐

vison, 761 F.3d 683, 685 (7th Cir. 2014).  

There is ample evidence in the record that supports that

finding. At Miller’s sentencing hearing, for example, Wagner

stated that: (i) she and Miller sometimes coordinated their

drug purchases; (ii) Miller sometimes traveled with her when

she picked up methamphetamine from her sources or deliv‐

ered it to her customers; (iii) Miller sometimes weighed and

packaged methamphetamine for sale; (iv) she and Miller had

at least five shared customers; (v) after she received phone

calls asking for methamphetamine, she sometimes sent Miller

out to make the sale; and (vi) she and Miller combined their

sales proceeds to purchase additional drugs. In addition, Mil‐

ler’s attorney conceded at the hearing that Wagner and Miller
8 No. 15‐2856

“were a group” and that Miller “was involved in some distri‐

bution.” See United States v. Salem, 657 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir.

2011) (concluding that district judge did not err in finding ex‐

istence of jointly undertaken criminal activity where “there is

a single scheme, similarities in modus operandi, coordination

of activities among co‐schemers, and sharing of resources”);

United States v. Adeniji, 221 F.3d 1020, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000) (con‐

cluding that record adequately supported joint undertaking

finding since there was “a single scheme to defraud” that

lasted approximately eight weeks and involved multiple con‐

versations between the participants and sharing of proceeds).

Second, Miller contends that the district judge adopted the

revised PSR’s recommended drug‐quantity range without ar‐

ticulating any reasons for doing so. This argument ignores the

substance of Wagner’s testimony at the hearing and how that

testimony compares to her earlier statements about drug

quantity. Cf. United States v. Longstreet, 567 F.3d 911, 928 (7th

Cir. 2009) (“The district court ... is not limited to reviewing

the PSR when calculating drug quantity; what controls the

analysis is the ‘entire evidence’ before the district court.” (ci‐

tation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  

As discussed above, Wagner’s testimony at the hearing in‐

dicated that she obtained approximately 1.93 to 4.25 kilo‐

grams (or 4.25 to 9.37 pounds) of methamphetamine, and Mil‐

ler’s attorney conceded at the hearing that Wagner had testi‐

fied truthfully. Critically, this range was consistent with Wag‐

ner’s earlier statement to law enforcement—which was refer‐

enced not only in the revised PSR but also by the district judge

at the sentencing hearing—that Wagner and Miller had ob‐

tained approximately three to five pounds of methampheta‐

mine. Miller has never directly contested that statement. So it
No. 15‐2856 9

was not necessary forthe district judge to explain with greater

detail why the revised PSR’s recommended range was ade‐

quately supported. See United States v. Ali, 619 F.3d 713, 719

(7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court may accept any undisputed

portion of the PSR as a finding of fact.”); United States v. Burke,

148 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Provided that the facts con‐

tained in a PSR bear sufficient indicia of reliability to support

their probable accuracy, the district court may adopt them as

support for its findings and conclusions regarding the quan‐

tity of drugs attributable to a defendant.” (quoting United

States v. Edwards, 115 F.3d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1997))).

Third, Miller claims that the district judge improperly

placed the burden of persuasion on Miller regarding the drug

quantity. “A district court may rely on information contained

in a PSR so long as the report is well‐supported and appears

reliable.” United States v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir.

2013) (citations omitted). When a district judge relies on the

report in sentencing the defendant, the defendant bears the

burden of showing that the report is unreliable or inaccurate.

United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2004). “Only

when the defendant creates ‘real doubt’ does the burden shift

to the government to demonstrate the accuracy of the infor‐

mation.” Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459 (citation omitted).

We find that the district judge did not err in her burden‐

shifting analysis. The judge began by stating that “the proba‐

tion office was correct in determining that Mr. Miller’s rele‐

vant conduct involved at least 500 grams but less than 1.5 kil‐

ograms.” She referenced the relevant time period and the

three‐to‐five pound range that Wagner had noted in her inter‐

view with law enforcement. Only after that did the district

judge say she was “convinced that defendant has not shown
10 No. 15‐2856

that his relevant conduct involved less than 500 grams.” In

short, the judge found that (i) the government satisfied its in‐

itial burden regarding the reliability of the revised PSR’s

drug‐quantity determination, and (ii) Miller did not satisfy

his burden when it shifted to him. Miller argues that he did in

fact satisfy his burden, but we disagree. Miller emphasizes

that in his rebuttal to the initial PSR, he demonstrated that he

did not purchase and sell most of the methamphetamine by

himself. As noted above, however, that potential fact is irrel‐

evant since Miller and Wagner were jointly engaged in a crim‐

inal activity.

Fourth and finally, Miller argues that he was denied due

process at the hearing because he lacked “any meaningful op‐

portunity to rebut the evidence presented [due to] the court’s

disinterested treatment of the counterevidence.” Not so. Mil‐

ler filed objections to the original PSR, cross‐examined Wag‐

ner at the hearing, but declined the opportunity to call his

own witnesses. In sum, Miller has failed to show that the dis‐

trict judge clearly erred in finding that Miller’s relevant con‐

duct involved the sale of between 500 grams and 1.5 kilo‐

grams of methamphetamine.

B. Sentence Not Substantively Unreasonable

“A sentence is reasonable if the district court gives mean‐

ingful consideration to the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) ... and arrives at a sentence that is objectively rea‐

sonable in light of the statutory factors and the individual cir‐

cumstances of the case.” United States v. Shannon, 518 F.3d 494,

496 (7th Cir. 2008). The factors enumerated in § 3553(a) in‐

clude the nature and circumstances of the offense; the defend‐

ant’s history and characteristics; the need for the sentence im‐

posed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, deter criminal
No. 15‐2856 11

conduct, protect the public, and provide the defendant with

needed educational or vocational training; the kinds of sen‐

tences available; the need to avoid unwanted sentencing dis‐

parities; and the need to provide restitution to victims. Rather

than discussing each factor in “checklist fashion,” a district

judge need only discuss the factors in the “form of an ade‐

quate statement of the judge’s reasons.” United States v. Dean,

414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005). We review the substantive

reasonableness of a sentence under “a deferential, abuse of

discretion standard with the presumption that a sentence

within or below the guidelines range is reasonable.” United

States v. Boroczk, 705 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2013).

Miller claims that his sentence is substantively unreason‐

able because the district judge “provided little insight into

how it was that she felt a 96 month stay in prison, for a meth‐

amphetamine addict, would be the least means necessary to

meet any of the goals set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.” As an initial

matter, we observe that Miller may have waived this argu‐

ment, since it essentially amounts to a mere two sentences in

his brief and is not supported by a single relevant case cita‐

tion. See C & N Corp. v. Gregory Kane & Ill. River Winery, Inc.,

756 F.3d 1024, 1026 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Arguments that are ‘un‐

derdeveloped, conclusory, or unsupported by law’ are

waived on appeal.” (quoting Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d

709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012))).

Even assuming Miller did not waive his reasonableness

argument, the argument reflects a gross misunderstanding of

the district judge’s sentencing rationale. The judge discussed

at length (i) Miller’s continued distribution of methampheta‐

mine in spite of two distribution‐related charges in 2008 and

2013; (ii) Miller’s inability to remain employed and sober after
12 No. 15‐2856

returning to Wisconsin from Maine in late 2013; (iii) Miller’s

“deep” addiction to methamphetamine and daily use of the

drug over the prior several years; (iv) Miller’s introduction of

“large quantities of methamphetamine into northwestern

Wisconsin”; (v) the need for Millerto “get out of th[e]routine”

of associating with fellow drug users and sellers; and (vi) the

need to “hold [Miller] accountable” for his actions and “pro‐

tect the community.” The judge also referenced a number of

factors in Miller’s favor, including his difficult upbringing, his

learning disabilities and lack of education, his two minor chil‐

dren, and his willingness to participate in substance abuse

counseling. Miller clearly has failed to overcome the pre‐

sumptive reasonableness of his below‐Guidelines sentence.

And since he has failed to demonstrate that the district judge

improperly calculated the applicable Guidelines range, his

procedural error claim also lacks merit.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.