* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

January 19, 2006

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JAMES L. BROOKS,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

HENRY E. COUCHMAN, JR.;

KENNETH E. MOORE; DELIA M.

YORK; WAYMAN FAVORS;

R. WAYNE LAMPSON; BRENDA

HIGHBERGER; JAMES

CHRISTOPHER ALLMAN;

FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION; UNITED

STATES MARSHAL SERVICE;

SANDY GONZALEZ; DEBORAH

GRABER; DANIEL A. DUNCAN;

RYAN CARPENTER; T. N.

HYLTON; PHILIP SIEVE; DAVID J.

WAXSE,

 Defendants-Appellees.

No. 05-3018

(D.C. No. 04-CV-2209-KHV)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before O’BRIEN, HOLLOWAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
1 To the extent Mr. Brooks attempts to appeal from two orders of the

magistrate judge involved in this case, we note that he failed to file objections to

those orders in the district court, and thus has waived any opportunity for

appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property , 73 F.3d 1057,

1059 (10th Cir. 1996). 

2

In addition to dismissing under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court analyzed

some claims against some defendants under alternative rationales. Because we

find the dismissals under 12(b)(6) to be correct, we need not address other

theories supporting dismissal.

-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

Appellant James L. Brooks appeals from two orders of the district court and

from the corresponding judgment dismissing with prejudice his civil rights action

against various federal, state, and local defendants.1

 We affirm. 

The first order appealed from dismissed all but one of the defendants

because of failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).2 The second order dismissed the remaining defendant and

construed Mr. Brooks’s motion for temporary injunction as a motion to recuse and

denied it. We conduct a de novo review of dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), Sutton

v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999), and

review refusals to recuse for abuse of discretion, Higganbotham v. Okla. ex rel.

Okla. Transp. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003). Based on these
-3-

standards, we affirm the judgment of the district court for substantially the same

reasons stated by that court in the orders appealed from.

With regard to the specific arguments made by Mr. Brooks and to the extent

we can understand them, we note that two of his arguments have already been

foreclosed by this court. See Brooks v. Sauceda, No. 00-3025, 2000 WL 1730892,

at **2 (10th Cir. Nov. 22, 2000) (unpublished) (rejecting argument that he was

entitled to a default judgment because defendants filed a motion to dismiss

instead of an answer); see also Brooks v. Graber, 15 Fed. Appx. 764, 765-66

(10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (same and further rejecting Mr. Brooks’s

contention “that federal judges are boneheads while he is a legal scholar”);

Sauceda, 2000 WL 1730892 at **3 (rejecting argument that certain local

ordinances are bills of attainder).

As for his other arguments, Mr. Brooks failed to advance any factual

support for his conclusory allegation that a conspiracy prompted the ten-day

extension of time given the defendants in which to answer or otherwise defend. 

The district court properly determined its jurisdiction in both of the orders

appealed from. The court did not abuse its discretion in striking Mr. Brooks’s

second amended complaint. Mr. Brooks’s contention that certain orders issued by

this court are fakes is unsupported and ludicrous. And finally, the district court

was well within its discretion to refuse to recuse.
-4-

As alluded to above, we have expended valuable court resources on at least

two separate occasions dealing with Mr. Brooks and his various meritless

theories. We repeat our sentiment expressed in Graber, 15 Fed. Appx. at 766:

“We will spend no more judicial time or resources addressing his frivolous

claims.” Our local rule 46.5(D) permits this court, on its own motion, to impose

an appropriate sanction against any person who brings frivolous arguments on

appeal. Those sanctions can include a monetary fine and/or an order to pay the

reasonable expenses of the opposing party, including attorney’s fees. We take

this occasion to warn Mr. Brooks that, should he appear before this court at any

time in the future with the same meritless arguments we have already rejected, he

will be subject to the sanctions described above.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock

Circuit Judge