IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30666

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

NORMAN ALTON STARK,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:11-CR-84-1

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In 2011, Norman Alton Stark pled guilty to failure to register and update 

his registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 

(“SORNA”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250; he was sentenced to 27 months of 

imprisonment and five years of supervised release. In 2019, after an extensive 

hearing on revocation of supervised release, the district court found that Stark 

had committed at least six violations of the conditions of his supervised release, 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 6, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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including failing to update his sex-offender registration, as required by both 

SORNA and state law, following a change of his residence. The district court 

revoked Stark’s supervised release, sentenced him to 24 months of 

imprisonment, reimposed supervised release, and added several additional 

conditions of release.

Stark first argues that the district court erred in its belief that revocation 

was mandatory under SORNA for a violation of the conditions of supervised 

release. However, he provides no record citations to show that the district 

court held such a belief, and our review of the record finds no evidence to 

support this assertion. Thus, Stark has not shown error.

Next, Stark argues that the district court erred by finding that he 

committed violations justifying revocation. We review a district court’s 

decision to revoke supervised release for an abuse of discretion. See United 

States v. Spraglin, 418 F.3d 479, 480 (5th Cir. 2005). A district court does not 

abuse its discretion if a preponderance of the evidence satisfies the court that 

the defendant has failed to comply with a condition of release. United States 

v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1995); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the record 

contains ample evidence that Stark violated a condition of his release by failing 

to comply with SORNA and state law requiring him to update his registration 

within three days of a change of address. Because this violation provides an 

adequate basis for revocation, we do not address Stark’s claims of error as to 

the other alleged violations. See McCormick, 54 F.3d at 219 n.3.

Stark also challenges his sentence, arguing that he should have received 

a lesser sentence of imprisonment and that he should not have received any

term of supervised release. Because we have concluded that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by revoking supervised release based on Stark’s 

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failure to update his registration in a timely manner, which was a Grade B 

violation, we conclude that Stark has not shown that the district court 

committed any procedural error in calculating the recommended sentencing 

range under the Guidelines. To the extent Stark is challenging the substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence of imprisonment or the decision to impose an 

additional term of supervised release, we evaluate substantive reasonableness 

for “an abuse of discretion, examining the totality of the circumstances.” 

United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2013). We conclude that 

Stark has not shown that the term of imprisonment or the decision to impose 

a term of supervised release was an abuse of discretion. 

Nevertheless, the term of supervised release the district court imposed 

is unclear. The district court said it was reimposing, reinstituting, or 

reinstating supervised release, but it did not list any specific term. Therefore, 

we conclude that Stark’s sentence is ambiguous and illegal. See United States 

v. Setser, 607 F.3d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding in part that a sentence 

“may be illegal if it is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which 

it is to be served”). Although Stark has not raised this error on appeal, “[i]n 

exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases,” we have discretion to 

take sua sponte notice of errors not presented in either the district court or the 

appellant’s brief if “fairness and the public interest” so dictate. United States 

v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 552 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2012). Therefore, we will 

vacate Stark’s sentence of supervised release and remand to the district court 

for resentencing. 

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART. 

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