[Cite as State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462.]

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BLOOMER, APPELLANT. 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MOSMEYER, APPELLANT. 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BARNES, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462.]

Criminal law — Sentencing — Mandatory postrelease control omitted from 

sentencing judgment. 

(Nos. 2007-0693, 2007-1415, and 2007-1439 ─ Submitted December 17, 2008 ─

Decided June 9, 2009.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Fulton County, 

No. F-06-012, 2007-Ohio-1039. 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-060747. 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, 

No. 2006-P-0089, 2007-Ohio-3362. 

____________________ 

O’DONNELL, J.

{¶ 1} Three separate cases have been consolidated for purposes of 

review and combined for a single opinion where we again confront the 

consequences of the trial court’s failure to either notify an offender about 

postrelease control at the time of sentencing or incorporate postrelease control 

into its sentencing entry. The issues presented here also concern the application 

of R.C. 2929.191, which provides a mechanism for correcting a judgment entry if 

a trial court fails to notify the offender of postrelease control or to impose it. 

I. History and Overview

{¶ 2} R.C. 2967.28(B) requires a sentencing court imposing a prison 

term on a first- or second-degree felony offender or certain other offenders to 

notify them that a period of mandatory postrelease control will be imposed by the 
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parole board upon release from prison.1 In addition, R.C. 2929.19 mandates that 

a court, when imposing sentence, must notify the offender at the hearing that he 

will be supervised pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and that upon violating supervision 

or a condition of postrelease control, the parole board may impose a prison term 

of up to one-half of the prison term originally imposed upon the offender. See, 

e.g., R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c) and (e). 

{¶ 3} This court has previously addressed the consequences of a 

sentencing court’s failure to follow the requirements of these and other sentencing 

statutes in a series of cases beginning with State v. Beasley (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 

74, 14 OBR 511, 471 N.E.2d 774. There, we considered whether the trial court’s 

erroneous imposition of a sentence less than the minimum prescribed by statute 

and its subsequent correction of that sentence violated the defendant’s 

constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Id. at 75. We recognized that 

“[a]ny attempt by a court to disregard statutory requirements when imposing a 

sentence renders the attempted sentence a nullity or void.” Id. Because jeopardy 

does not attach to a void sentence, we held that the court’s subsequent correction 

of the void sentence did not violate double jeopardy. Id. 

{¶ 4} Next, in Woods v. Telb (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 

1103, we considered whether R.C. 2967.28, which authorized the parole board to 

impose discretionary postrelease control for Woods’s theft offense, violated the 

separation of powers doctrine.2

 We concluded that the parole board’s statutory 

authority to impose postrelease control did not violate the separation of powers 

 

1. R.C. 2967.28(B) states: “Each sentence to a prison term for a felony of the first degree, for a 

felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree that is not 

a felony sex offense and in the commission of which the offender caused or threatened to cause 

physical harm to a person shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of 

post-release control imposed by the parole board after the offender’s release from imprisonment.” 

2. We use the term discretionary postrelease control to denote those periods of postrelease control 

authorized pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(C) for persons imprisoned for felonies of the third, fourth, or 

fifth degree who are not subject to the postrelease control required by R.C. 2967.28(B). 
January Term, 2009 

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doctrine provided, however, that the trial court incorporated postrelease control 

into its entry at the time of sentencing. Id. at 512-513. 

{¶ 5} In State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 

N.E.2d 864, we considered the consequences of a trial court’s failure to advise an 

offender about postrelease control at the sentencing hearing. Id. at ¶ 1. Applying 

Beasley, we held that “[b]ecause a trial court has a statutory duty to provide notice 

of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing, any sentence imposed without 

such notification is contrary to law” and void. Id. at ¶ 23. 

{¶ 6} We again confronted a sentencing court’s failure to notify an 

offender or incorporate postrelease control into its sentencing entry in Hernandez 

v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301; however, 

discovery of the sentencing error did not occur until after the offender had been 

released from prison, placed on postrelease control by the parole board, and 

subsequently reimprisoned for violating the terms of postrelease control. Id. at ¶ 

5-7, 10. We granted Hernandez a writ of habeas corpus in conformity with our 

decisions in Jordan and Woods, holding that the parole board lacked authority to 

impose postrelease control because the trial court had failed to notify the offender 

of postrelease control or to incorporate it into the sentencing entry, and Hernandez 

had finished serving that sentence at the time the error was discovered. Id. at ¶ 

32. 

{¶ 7} Following Hernandez, we denied a petition for a writ of 

prohibition to vacate a resentencing entry imposing a mandatory period of 

postrelease control. State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-

Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 1. In contrast to Hernandez, the court discovered 

the sentencing error before the inmate completed serving the sentence and 

therefore conducted a resentencing hearing and imposed a mandatory three-year 

period of postrelease control. Id. at ¶ 9-11. Citing Beasley and Jordan, and 

distinguishing Hernandez on the basis that Cruzado had not yet completed his 
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sentence, we held that the trial court did not patently and unambiguously lack 

jurisdiction to correct the sentence. Id. at ¶ 19-28, 32. 

{¶ 8} More recently, in State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, we concluded that an offender is entitled to a new 

sentencing hearing for the trial court to correct a sentence that omitted notice of 

postrelease control. Id. at syllabus. However, because Bezak had already 

completed his term of imprisonment, the court could not conduct resentencing. 

Id. at ¶ 18. 

{¶ 9} Most recently, in State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-

Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 6, we stated: “[I]n cases in which a defendant is 

convicted of, or pleads guilty to, an offense for which postrelease control is 

required but not properly included in the sentence, the sentence is void, and the 

state is entitled to a new sentencing hearing to have postrelease control imposed 

on the defendant unless the defendant has completed his sentence.” 

{¶ 10} In conformity with the development of this jurisprudence, the 

General Assembly enacted Sub.H.B. No. 137 (“H.B. 137”), effective July 11, 

2006, which amended R.C. 2967.28, 2929.14, and 2929.19 and enacted R.C. 

2929.191 to provide a mechanism for correcting sentences in which the trial court 

failed either to notify the offender of postrelease control or to incorporate it into 

the sentencing entry. 

{¶ 11} As amended, R.C. 2967.28(B) now provides: 

{¶ 12} “Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code applies if, prior to July 11, 

2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in 

this division and failed to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(3)(c) of 

section 2929.19 of the Revised Code regarding post-release control or to include 

in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence pursuant to 

division (F)(1) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code a statement regarding 

post-release control.” 
January Term, 2009 

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{¶ 13} Likewise, R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) and 2929.19(B)(3)(c) and (e), as 

amended by H.B. 137, now provide that if a court imposed a sentence before July 

11, 2006, and failed to either notify the offender of postrelease control or to 

include postrelease control in the judgment entry, then R.C. 2929.191 applies. 

{¶ 14} R.C. 2929.191 provides: 

{¶ 15} “(A)(1) If, prior to the effective date of this section, a court 

imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in division 

(B)(3)(c) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code and failed to notify the offender 

pursuant to that division that the offender will be supervised under section 

2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison or to include a 

statement to that effect in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in 

the sentence pursuant to division (F)(1) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, 

at any time before the offender is released from imprisonment under that term and 

at a hearing conducted in accordance with division (C) of this section, the court 

may prepare and issue a correction to the judgment of conviction that includes in 

the judgment of conviction the statement that the offender will be supervised 

under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison. 

{¶ 16} “ * * * 

{¶ 17} “(2) If a court prepares and issues a correction to a judgment of 

conviction as described in division (A)(1) of this section before the offender is 

released from imprisonment under the prison term the court imposed prior to the 

effective date of this section, the court shall place upon the journal of the court an 

entry nunc pro tunc to record the correction to the judgment of conviction and 

shall provide a copy of the entry to the offender or, if the offender is not 

physically present at the hearing, shall send a copy of the entry to the department 

of rehabilitation and correction for delivery to the offender. If the court sends a 

copy of the entry to the department, the department promptly shall deliver a copy 

of the entry to the offender. The court’s placement upon the journal of the entry 
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nunc pro tunc before the offender is released from imprisonment under the term 

shall be considered, and shall have the same effect, as if the court at the time of 

original sentencing had included the statement in the sentence and the judgment 

of conviction entered on the journal and had notified the offender that the 

offender will be so supervised regarding a sentence including a prison term of a 

type described in division (B)(3)(c) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code * * *. 

{¶ 18} “ * * * 

{¶ 19} “(C) On and after the effective date of this section, a court that 

wishes to prepare and issue a correction to a judgment of conviction of a type 

described in division (A)(1) or (B)(1) of this section shall not issue the correction 

until after the court has conducted a hearing in accordance with this division. 

Before a court holds a hearing pursuant to this division, the court shall provide 

notice of the date, time, place, and purpose of the hearing to the offender who is 

the subject of the hearing, the prosecuting attorney of the county, and the 

department of rehabilitation and correction. The offender has the right to be 

physically present at the hearing, except that, upon the court’s own motion or the 

motion of the offender or the prosecuting attorney, the court may permit the 

offender to appear at the hearing by video conferencing equipment if available 

and compatible. An appearance by video conferencing equipment pursuant to this 

division has the same force and effect as if the offender were physically present at 

the hearing. At the hearing, the offender and the prosecuting attorney may make a 

statement as to whether the court should issue a correction to the judgment of 

conviction.” 

{¶ 20} We now consider the specific cases of James C. Bloomer, Jeffrey 

Mosmeyer, and Marcus D. Barnes. 

II. State v. Bloomer

{¶ 21} James C. Bloomer appeals from a decision of the Sixth District 

Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s order imposing postrelease control 
January Term, 2009 

7 

following a resentencing hearing. The trial court had failed to impose postrelease 

control in its original entry. Bloomer challenges the constitutionality of his 

resentencing on due process and double jeopardy grounds and the 

constitutionality of H.B. 137 and its enactment of R.C. 2929.191. 

A. Facts and Procedural History of Bloomer’s Case 

{¶ 22} On July 17, 2002, the Fulton County Grand Jury returned a sixcount indictment against Bloomer, charging him with two counts of illegal 

manufacture of drugs, one count of assembly or possession of chemicals for the 

manufacture of drugs, one count of having weapons while under disability, and 

two counts of endangering children. In September 2002, Bloomer pleaded guilty 

to one count of illegal manufacture of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.04(A), a 

second-degree felony, and the state dismissed the remaining counts. The court 

sentenced him to four years in prison. Although Bloomer signed a guilty-plea 

form and an acknowledgment of sentencing components that advised him of the 

mandatory three-year period of postrelease control, the court failed to include 

postrelease control in its sentencing entry. 

{¶ 23} In April 2006, near the end of Bloomer’s four-year term of 

incarceration, the state filed a motion to resentence him, pursuant to this court’s 

decision in Hernandez, seeking to have the court impose the three-year period of 

mandatory postrelease control required by R.C. 2967.28(B)(2). The court granted 

the motion and on May 23, 2006, conducted that resentencing hearing. At that 

hearing, Bloomer addressed the court and asked it to deny the prosecutor’s 

motion, asserting that he had done everything in his power to reform himself 

while in prison. However, stating that it had “no leeway” and that it intended to 

“modify” or “correct” its prior sentence, the court reimposed Bloomer’s four-year 

prison term, added a three-year period of mandatory postrelease control, and 

notified Bloomer that a violation of the conditions of that control could result in 

the imposition of a prison term of up to one-half of the stated prison term. 
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Additionally, in response to the prosecutor’s inquiry regarding the imposition of 

fines and costs, the court stated: “Previous sentence in all respects are [sic] 

otherwise ratified.” 

{¶ 24} The court then issued a comprehensive resentencing entry that 

reimposed the four-year prison term, the $1,500 fine, the three-year driver’s 

license suspension, and the order of forfeiture and destruction of all items seized 

by the Multi-Area Narcotics Task Force. That entry also included the court’s 

notice that Bloomer would be subject to three years of mandatory postrelease 

control and that a violation of the conditions of that control could result in the 

imposition of a prison term of up to one-half of the stated prison term. 

{¶ 25} Bloomer appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, 

challenging his resentencing on due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto 

grounds. State v. Bloomer, Fulton App. No. F-06-012, 2007-Ohio-1039, ¶ 3. In 

accordance with our decision in Beasley, the appellate court affirmed Bloomer’s 

resentencing, holding that the correction of a “statutorily incorrect sentence” does 

not violate an offender’s right to be free from double jeopardy. Id. at ¶ 9. The 

appellate court stated that the trial court had followed the procedure set forth in 

R.C. 2929.191 for correcting a sentence imposed before July 11, 2006, the 

effective date of H.B. 137. Id. We accepted jurisdiction to review Bloomer’s 

resentencing. 114 Ohio St.3d 1506, 2007-Ohio-4285, 872 N.E.2d 949. 

B. Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Finality 

{¶ 26} Bloomer first contends that in the absence of a direct appeal by the 

state, his resentencing violates the guarantees of the Due Process and Double 

Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution by increasing his punishment 

and interfering with his legitimate expectation of finality in his original and nearly 

completed sentence. These arguments are not well taken. 

{¶ 27} In accordance with our decision in Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 

2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, a sentence is void if the court fails to follow 
January Term, 2009 

9 

the statutory mandates to impose postrelease control. As we have explained, “ 

‘The effect of determining that a judgment is void is well established. It is as 

though such proceedings had never occurred; the judgment is a mere nullity and 

the parties are in the same position as if there had been no judgment.’ (Citations 

omitted.)” Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, at ¶ 12, 

quoting Romito v. Maxwell (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 266, 267-268, 39 O.O.2d 414, 

227 N.E.2d 223; see also Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 

N.E.2d 568, at ¶ 19. Because jeopardy does not attach to a void sentence, the 

subsequent imposition of the statutorily required sentence cannot constitute 

double jeopardy. Jordan at ¶ 25. 

{¶ 28} Furthermore, “there can be no reasonable, legitimate expectation of 

finality in [a void sentence].” Simpkins at ¶ 36, citing United States v. Crawford

(C.A.5, 1985), 769 F.2d 253, 257-258. As in Simpkins, Bloomer had served the 

majority of his prison term at the time of resentencing, but he had not completed 

it. Since his original sentence lacked a statutorily mandated term, it failed to 

comply with law, and therefore Bloomer had no legitimate expectation in its 

finality. Accordingly, the resentencing does not offend the Double Jeopardy or 

Due Process Clauses. Simpkins at ¶ 37. 

C. Standing to Challenge the Constitutionality of H.B. 137 

{¶ 29} Bloomer also challenges the constitutionality of H.B. 137. 

Specifically, he contends that R.C. 2929.191 violates the Double Jeopardy Clause 

of the United States Constitution and that H.B. 137 violates the single subject rule 

and the separation of powers doctrine. The state, on the other hand, contends that 

because Bloomer’s original sentencing hearing and his resentencing occurred 

before the effective date of the act, he has no standing to challenge its 

constitutionality because it has no effect on him. 

{¶ 30} Before a court may decide the merits of a case, the party seeking 

relief must have standing to do so. “A person has no standing to attack the 
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constitutionality of an ordinance unless he has a direct interest in the ordinance of 

such a nature that his rights will be adversely affected by its enforcement.” 

Anderson v. Brown (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 53, 42 O.O.2d 100, 233 N.E.2d 584, 

paragraph one of the syllabus. The doctrine of standing applies to both civil and 

criminal matters and generally requires a person challenging the constitutionality 

of a statute to demonstrate that the statute infringes upon his legally protected 

right. See, e.g., State v. Burgun (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 354, 365, 10 O.O.3d 485, 

384 N.E.2d 255 (“a person who is seeking to raise the issue of the validity of a 

discriminatory enactment has no standing for that purpose unless he belongs to 

the class which is prejudiced by the statute”). Thus, we must determine whether 

H.B. 137 applies to Bloomer such that he has standing to challenge its 

constitutionality. 

{¶ 31} H.B. 137 became effective July 11, 2006. Bloomer acknowledges 

that his sentencing and his resentencing occurred before that date. Thus, Bloomer 

was not resentenced pursuant to R.C. 2929.191, as enacted by H.B. 137, and 

Bloomer has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the act. 

{¶ 32} Bloomer now argues that the trial court failed to conduct a de novo 

resentencing hearing as mandated by Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 

868 N.E.2d 961. Although the trial court stated that it was modifying or 

correcting its prior sentence, it did not merely add postrelease control to its 

original sentence as Bloomer now claims. Instead, the trial court proceeded to 

conduct a full resentencing hearing, at which it afforded Bloomer his right of 

allocution, reimposed his original prison term, and advised him of the applicable 

three-year period of mandatory postrelease control as well as the penalty for 

violating that postrelease control. In light of the foregoing, these propositions of 

law are not well taken, and we affirm the judgment of the appellate court with 

respect to the resentencing in Bloomer’s case. 

III. State v. Mosmeyer
January Term, 2009 

11 

{¶ 33} Jeffrey Mosmeyer appeals from a decision of the First District 

Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s resentencing order, which imposed a 

term of mandatory postrelease control that had been omitted from Mosmeyer’s 

original sentence. In addition to challenging the constitutionality of his 

resentencing on due process and double jeopardy grounds, Mosmeyer also 

contends that R.C. 2929.191 and H.B. 137 violate the separation of powers 

doctrine and the one subject rule. 

A. Facts and Procedural History of Mosmeyer’s Case 

{¶ 34} In 1999, Mosmeyer pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated 

robbery, a first-degree felony, and two counts of robbery, second-degree felonies. 

Mosmeyer signed a plea form that notified him that he may be subject to a fiveyear period of postrelease control for his first-degree felony or up to a three-year 

period for his other offenses. At his sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a 

prison term of eight years for aggravated robbery, concurrent with six-year 

concurrent terms for each robbery. The court also informed Mosmeyer that upon 

his release from prison, he would serve concurrent terms of five years’ postrelease 

control for the aggravated robbery and three years for the robbery convictions. 

Additionally, the court explained that if he violated the terms of his postrelease 

control, the parole board could extend his period of postrelease control, make it 

more restrictive, or return him to prison for up to one-half of his original sentence. 

However, the court neglected to include the postrelease control language in its 

sentencing entry. 

{¶ 35} On July 7, 2006, the trial court, sua sponte, journalized an entry 

scheduling a resentencing hearing pursuant to our decision in State v. Jordan, 104 

Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, based upon its failure to include 

language about the mandatory period of postrelease control in its sentencing entry 

in Mosmeyer’s case. 
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{¶ 36} At the August 23, 2006 resentencing hearing, Mosmeyer objected, 

arguing that pursuant to Hernandez, he was not subject to resentencing for 

purposes of imposing postrelease control. Rejecting that argument, the court 

notified Mosmeyer that he would serve a five-year period of mandatory 

postrelease control upon his release from prison and explained the consequences 

for violating postrelease control. The court then reimposed Mosmeyer’s original 

prison terms. Following the hearing, the court incorporated its oral 

pronouncement into a nunc pro tunc judgment entry. 

{¶ 37} On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals held that pursuant to 

Cruzado, the trial court had jurisdiction to correct Mosmeyer’s void sentence, and 

that the correction did not extend his term of imprisonment or postrelease control 

beyond that contemplated at his original sentencing hearing. See State v. 

Mosmeyer (June 20, 2007), Hamilton App. No. C-060747. Applying Cruzado, 

the court decided it did not need to address Mosmeyer’s constitutional challenges 

to H.B. 137. Id. We accepted Mosmeyer’s discretionary appeal challenging the 

trial court’s authority to resentence him as well as the constitutionality of H.B. 

137 and R.C. 2929.191. 115 Ohio St.3d 1472, 2007-Ohio-5735, 875 N.E.2d 626. 

B. Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Finality 

{¶ 38} Mosmeyer contends that in the absence of a timely direct appeal by 

the state, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a resentencing to add an 

omitted term of postrelease control. He also asserts that his resentencing violates 

the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution because it interferes 

with his legitimate expectation of finality in his nearly completed prison sentence. 

Mosmeyer does not present these challenges in the context of R.C. 2929.191. For 

the reasons stated in our analysis in Bloomer, these claims are overruled. 

C. Separation of Powers 

{¶ 39} Mosmeyer next contends that R.C. 2929.191 is unconstitutional 

because it violates the separation of powers doctrine in two respects. First, he 
January Term, 2009 

13 

argues that Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution grants this court the 

authority to prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all state courts 

and that the legislature has usurped this power by regulating court procedure.3

 

Second, he maintains that the procedure set forth in R.C. 2929.191 

unconstitutionally permits a trial court to conduct appellate review of its own 

judgment. 

{¶ 40} Denying that the legislature usurped judicial authority by enacting 

R.C. 2929.191, the state contends that it codifies a procedure established by this 

court in Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, to 

impose an omitted term of postrelease control to a criminal sentence. In 

reviewing this contention, we recognize that R.C. 2929.191 became effective in 

2006 and that this court announced its decision in Simpkins in 2008. Thus the 

statute did not codify any procedure established by this court. We also recognize, 

however, that although we announced our decision in 2008, the facts in Simpkins 

arose before the effective date of the statute, and hence R.C. 2929.191 had no 

application to Simpkins. 

{¶ 41} Statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. State v. 

Carswell, 114 Ohio St.3d 210, 2007-Ohio-3723, 871 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 6, citing 

Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 535, 538, 706 N.E.2d 323. A party 

challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving that it is 

unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 

2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 12; State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 

513, 521, 728 N.E.2d 342. 

 

3. Mosmeyer also argues that to the extent R.C. 2967.28 purports to authorize the parole board to 

impose postrelease control even in the absence of a judicially imposed postrelease control 

sentence, the statute infringes upon the court’s authority to sentence offenders, violating the 

separation-of-powers doctrine and our holding in Woods v. Telb (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 

N.E.2d 1103. However, as the state notes in its brief, the proposition of law accepted by this court 

deals only with the constitutionality of R.C. 2929.191 in relation to the separation-of-powers 

doctrine. Therefore, the argument attacking the constitutionality of R.C. 2967.28 is not properly 

before the court. 
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{¶ 42} Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution vests this court 

with the power to “prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts 

of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive 

right” and further provides that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of 

no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Here, however, 

Mosmeyer has failed to identify any existing rule of criminal procedure that 

conflicts with R.C. 2929.191. 

{¶ 43} Mosmeyer also contends that the procedure set forth in R.C. 

2929.191 unconstitutionally permits a trial court to conduct appellate review of its 

own judgment. He relies on our decision in S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio 

St.3d 157, 28 OBR 250, 503 N.E.2d 136, for the proposition that the General 

Assembly cannot confer authority upon a common pleas court to review its own 

judgment. However, Jemison is inapposite. 

{¶ 44} In Jemison, we considered the constitutionality of former R.C. 

4509.101, effective January 1, 1984, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 679-686, which 

governs the financial responsibility of persons operating motor vehicles, and held 

that the statute violated the separation of powers doctrine because it conferred 

authority upon the registrar of motor vehicles to review a prior court order. 

Jemison, 28 Ohio St.3d at 159, 162, 28 OBR 250, 503 N.E.2d 136. 

{¶ 45} Jemison is distinguishable from the present case because nothing 

in R.C. 2929.191 purports to confer the power of appellate review on an 

administrative agency. Instead, this statute provides a mechanism for a trial court 

to correct its own judgment entry when it fails to notify the offender about or to 

impose postrelease control. R.C. 2929.191(A)(1). Accordingly, Mosmeyer has 

not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that R.C. 2929.191 violates the 

separation of powers doctrine. 

D. One Subject Rule 
January Term, 2009 

15 

{¶ 46} Mosmeyer further contends that H.B. 137 violates the one subject 

rule because it combines two unrelated topics – the sealing of juvenile court 

records and postrelease control. The state urges us to uphold the act against this 

challenge, contending that both provisions address criminal justice matters. 

{¶ 47} Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides: “No 

bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its 

title.” The primary and universally recognized purpose of the one-subject rule is 

to prevent logrolling – “ ‘the practice of several minorities combining their 

several proposals as different provisions of a single bill and thus consolidating 

their votes so that a majority is obtained for the omnibus bill where perhaps no 

single proposal of each minority could have obtained majority approval 

separately.’ ” State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 141, 142-143, 11 

OBR 436, 464 N.E.2d 153, quoting 1A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory 

Construction (4th Ed.1972), Section 17.01. 

{¶ 48} We have stated: “Our role in the enforcement of the one-subject 

provision is limited. To avoid interfering with the legislative process, we must 

afford the General Assembly ‘great latitude in enacting comprehensive legislation 

by not construing the one-subject provision so as to unnecessarily restrict the 

scope and operation of laws, or to multiply their number excessively, or to 

prevent legislation from embracing in one act all matters properly connected with 

one general subject.’ ” State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., AFSCME, Local 

11, AFL-CIO v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 104 Ohio St.3d 122, 2004-Ohio-6363, 

818 N.E.2d 688, ¶ 27, quoting Dix, 11 Ohio St.3d at 145, 11 OBR 436, 464 

N.E.2d 153. We have further emphasized that “every presumption in favor of the 

enactment’s validity should be indulged.” Hoover v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 19 OBR 1, 482 N.E.2d 575. 

{¶ 49} In recognition of this deference to the legislature, we have held: 

“A manifestly gross and fraudulent violation of the one-subject provision 
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contained in Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution will cause an 

enactment to be invalidated.” In re Nowak, 104 Ohio St.3d 466, 2004-Ohio-6777, 

820 N.E.2d 335, paragraph one of the syllabus. We have further acknowledged 

that as long as a common purpose or relationship exists between topics, the mere 

fact that a bill embraces more than one topic will not be fatal. Ohio Civ. Serv. 

Emps. Assn., 104 Ohio St.3d 122, 2004-Ohio-6363, 818 N.E.2d 688, at ¶ 28, 

citing State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio 

St.3d 451, 496, 715 N.E.2d 1062, and Hoover, 19 Ohio St.3d at 6, 19 OBR 1, 482 

N.E.2d 575. And we have emphasized that it is the disunity of subject matter, 

rather than the aggregation of topics, that causes a bill to violate the one-subject 

rule. Nowak at ¶ 59; Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 496, 715 N.E.2d 1062; Hoover at 

6, 19 OBR 1, 482 N.E.2d 575; and Dix, 11 Ohio St.3d at 146, 11 OBR 436, 464 

N.E.2d 153. 

{¶ 50} Applying this deferential test, we have upheld the constitutionality 

of a bill that amended both Ohio’s financial responsibility law and laws governing 

uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage, noting that the topics were “part 

of a legislative scheme to reduce the dangers posed by uninsured and 

underinsured motorists.” Beagle v. Walden (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 59, 61-62, 676 

N.E.2d 506. 

{¶ 51} We have also upheld a resolution proposing an amendment to the 

Ohio Constitution authorizing the issuance of general obligation bonds to create 

and preserve jobs, enhance employment and educational opportunities, and 

promote economic growth through (1) the funding of public infrastructure capital 

improvements, (2) research and development, and (3) the development of certain 

business sites and facilities. State ex rel Willke v. Taft, 107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-

Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 2, 5. Recognizing that the General Assembly’s 

combination of the three programs into one amendment was “seemingly the 

product of a tactical decision,” we stated that it was “not so incongruous that it 
January Term, 2009 

17 

could not, by any reasonable interpretation, be considered germane to the 

purposes of statewide job creation and economic development.” Willke at ¶ 38. 

{¶ 52} In contrast, finding no common purpose or relationship, we have 

invalidated a tort reform bill that attempted “to combine the wearing of seat belts 

with employment discrimination claims, class actions arising from the sale of 

securities with limitations on agency liability in actions against a hospital, recall 

notification with qualified immunity for athletic coaches, [and] actions by a roller 

skater with supporting affidavits in a medical claim.” Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 

497-498, 715 N.E.2d 1062. We have also invalidated a statutory provision that 

excluded certain employees from a collective-bargaining process when the 

provision was enacted as part of an appropriations bill encompassing a wide range 

of budgetary concerns. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., 104 Ohio St.3d 122, 2004-

Ohio-6363, 818 N.E.2d 688, ¶ 32-36. Similarly, we have held that a statute 

allowing the recording of a defectively executed mortgage to serve as constructive 

notice of the mortgage violated the one-subject rule when it appeared “cryptically 

between provisions covering aviation and construction certificates for major 

utility facilities on one side and regulations for the Department of Transportation 

on the other,” which were then surrounded by provisions ranging from liquor 

control to food-stamp trafficking. Nowak, 104 Ohio St.3d 466, 2004-Ohio-6777, 

820 N.E.2d 335, at ¶ 59. 

{¶ 53} Here, while H.B. 137 addresses two distinct topics – postrelease 

control and the sealing of juvenile delinquency records, those topics share a 

common relationship because they concern the rehabilitation and reintegration of 

offenders into society. 

{¶ 54} Although this court has previously characterized juvenile 

delinquency proceedings as civil in nature, Cope v. Campbell (1964), 175 Ohio 

St. 475, 26 O.O.2d 88, 196 N.E.2d 457, paragraph one of the syllabus, we have 

long recognized that such proceedings also possess inherently criminal aspects. 
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In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 76; State v. 

Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 26 (“numerous 

constitutional safeguards [including various Fifth and Sixth Amendment 

protections, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, double jeopardy, 

and ex post facto principles] normally reserved for criminal prosecutions are 

equally applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings”). We have expressly 

acknowledged that juvenile delinquency proceedings, like criminal proceedings, 

involve the enforcement of criminal laws. In re C.S. at ¶ 76, citing Walls at ¶ 26. 

Moreover, we note that the procedure for sealing juvenile records set forth in H.B. 

137 is comparable to that in the adult criminal justice system. Compare R.C. 

2151.356 and 2953.32. One of the overriding purposes of our juvenile justice 

system is the rehabilitation of offenders. R.C. 2151.01; see also In re Caldwell

(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 157-158, 666 N.E.2d 1367. “Since its origin, the 

juvenile justice system has emphasized individual assessment, the best interest of 

the child, treatment, and rehabilitation, with a goal of reintegrating juveniles back 

into society.” State v. Hanning (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 88, 728 N.E.2d 1059. 

The provisions of H.B. 137 regarding the sealing of juvenile delinquency records 

promote these goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into society by permitting 

rehabilitated offenders to apply to have their records sealed so that they can leave 

their youthful offenses in the past. R.C. 2151.356 and 2151.357; see also In re 

T.R. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 16, 556 N.E.2d 439. 

{¶ 55} Although R.C. 2929.11(A) states that “[t]he overriding purposes of 

felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and 

others and to punish the offender,” the statute further provides that “[t]o achieve 

those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for * * * 

rehabilitating the offender.” As we observed in Jordan, “postrelease control 

furthers the goal of successfully reintegrating offenders into society after their 

release from prison.” Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2009 

19 

864, at ¶ 21, citing State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398, 2002-Ohio-6661, 780 

N.E.2d 250, at ¶ 16. See also Woods, 89 Ohio St.3d at 512, 733 N.E.2d 1103 

(“post-release control sanctions are sanctions aimed at behavior modification in 

the attempt to reintegrate the offender safely into the community”). Thus, 

postrelease control and the sealing of juvenile records share a common 

relationship because both concern the rehabilitation of persons who have violated 

Ohio’s criminal laws and their reintegration into society. 

{¶ 56} Because postrelease control and the sealing of juvenile 

delinquency records share this common relationship, the legislature’s combination 

of these related topics into a single bill does not constitute a manifestly gross or 

fraudulent violation of the one-subject rule. Accordingly, we hold that H.B. 137 

does not violate Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution and affirm the 

judgment of the appellate court with respect to the resentencing in Mosmeyer’s 

case. 

IV. State v. Barnes 

A. Facts and Procedural History of Barnes’s Case 

{¶ 57} Marcus D. Barnes appeals from a decision of the Eleventh District 

Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s judgment, which corrected his 

sentence, pursuant to R.C. 2929.191, and imposed a mandatory term of 

postrelease control. Convicted of involuntary manslaughter and felonious assault 

as lesser included offenses of the indicted offenses of murder and attempted 

murder, Barnes initially received consecutive prison terms of nine and six years 

respectively for those offenses. On direct appeal, however, the appellate court 

reversed these convictions. State v. Barnes (July 21, 2000), Portage App. No. 98-

P-0052. We accepted jurisdiction of the state’s appeal and held that a defendant 

asserting self-defense may not introduce evidence of specific acts of the victim to 

demonstrate that the victim was the initial aggressor, and that the trial court’s 

erroneous lesser included offense instruction on felonious assault did not rise to 
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the level of plain error that supported a reversal of the conviction. State v. Barnes

(2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 25, 28, 759 N.E.2d 1240. We remanded the cause for 

further proceedings consistent with our opinion. Id. at 29. 

{¶ 58} On remand, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing to 

make the findings required to support its imposition of greater-than-minimum and 

consecutive sentences. After making the requisite findings, the court reimposed 

Barnes’s nine-year prison term for involuntary manslaughter and six-year prison 

term for felonious assault but ordered him to serve the sentences concurrently. 

However, at the resentencing hearing, the court failed to mention postrelease 

control or include it in its entry. 

{¶ 59} Barnes then appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals a 

second time. The appellate court affirmed his convictions and sentence, State v. 

Barnes, Portage App. No. 2002-P-0079, 2003-Ohio-6674, and we declined to 

accept jurisdiction over his appeal. State v. Barnes, 102 Ohio St.3d 1412, 2004-

Ohio-1763, 806 N.E.2d 563. 

{¶ 60} The trial court sua sponte issued an order for the sheriff to 

transport Barnes to court for a resentencing hearing. On August 15, 2006, the 

court convened a resentencing hearing pursuant to this court’s decision in 

Hernandez. At the hearing, the prosecutor noted that R.C. 2929.191 authorized 

the court to return an offender to court to be advised of postrelease control, to 

advise the offender of postrelease control, and to issue a nunc pro tunc journal 

entry incorporating postrelease control. 

{¶ 61} At the hearing, Barnes objected to the issuance of a nunc pro tunc 

order on the ground that such an order may reflect only what actually occurred at 

the first hearing but was not journalized. The court informed Barnes that upon his 

release from prison, he would be “subject to Post Release Control pursuant to 

Ohio Revised Code 2967.28” and that if he violated the terms of that control, he 
January Term, 2009 

21 

could “receive an additional prison term not to exceed fifty percent of [his] 

original prison term.” 

{¶ 62} On August 17, 2006, and again on September 1, 2006, the court 

issued nunc pro tunc sentencing orders stating that it had “notified the Defendant 

that after release from prison, the Defendant may be supervised under post release 

control R.C. 2967.28,” and that “if the Defendant violates the terms of the postrelease control, the Defendant could receive an additional prison term not to 

exceed 50 percent of his original prison term.” (Emphasis added.) The second 

entry reimposed concurrent terms of nine years for involuntary manslaughter and 

six years for felonious assault. 

{¶ 63} Barnes appealed his resentencing entry for the third time to the 

Eleventh District Court of Appeals, challenging the use of a nunc pro tunc entry 

to amend his sentence and the constitutionality of his resentencing and of R.C. 

2929.191, as well as the statute’s application to his case, claiming violations of 

the separation of powers doctrine, the prohibition against ex post facto legislation, 

double jeopardy, res judicata, and his right of allocution. The appellate court 

rejected each of these assignments of error and affirmed the resentencing in all 

respects. 

{¶ 64} We accepted jurisdiction over Barnes’s discretionary appeal to 

review his contentions that (1) imposing postrelease control after an offender has 

commenced serving a sentence constitutes double jeopardy, violates rights to due 

process, and is barred by res judicata, (2) a sentence imposing postrelease control 

deprives an offender of due process when he is neither afforded his right of 

allocution nor properly informed of the conditions of postrelease control, (3) the 

application of R.C. 2929.191 to a sentence originally imposed in 1997 violates the 

constitutional prohibition against ex post facto and retroactive legislation, (4) a 

court’s entry of a nunc pro tunc order to supply an omission rather than a 

correction of a previous action by the court violates due process, and (5) when a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

22 

court conducts a hearing to impose an omitted period of postrelease control, it 

must conduct a full resentencing hearing.4

 

B. Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Finality 

{¶ 65} We first address Barnes’s contention that in the absence of a direct 

appeal by the state, the trial court could not constitutionally resentence him. As 

did Bloomer and Mosmeyer, Barnes argues that his resentencing violates the Due 

Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution because it 

increased his punishment after he began serving his sentence and interfered with 

his legitimate expectation of finality in his original, unappealed sentence. Barnes 

did not raise these arguments in the context of R.C. 2929.191. For the reasons 

stated in our analysis of Bloomer, these arguments are without merit and are 

overruled. 

C. Failure to Comply with R.C. 2929.191 and Supreme Court Precedent 

{¶ 66} The essence of Barnes’s remaining propositions of law is that our 

precedent required the trial court to conduct a full resentencing hearing to impose 

an omitted term of mandatory postrelease control, and that to the extent that R.C. 

2929.191 requires less than a full resentencing hearing, it is unconstitutional. 

{¶ 67} The state urges us to affirm Barnes’s resentencing because he has 

failed to satisfy his burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that R.C. 

2929.191 is unconstitutional. Moreover, the state contends that the trial court 

fully complied with the directives of the statute by informing Barnes of the 

applicability of postrelease control and by incorporating it into its nunc pro tunc 

sentencing entry. However, because Barnes is entitled to relief on other grounds, 

it is not necessary for us to reach these constitutional issues. See Massachusetts v. 

Westcott (1977), 431 U.S. 322, 323, 97 S.Ct. 1755, 52 L.Ed.2d 349 (recognizing 

that courts should decide constitutional questions only when necessary); State ex 

 

4. Barnes also argues that H.B. 137 violates the one-subject rule. Having resolved that issue in 

the context of Mosmeyer’s appeal, we do not address it here. 
January Term, 2009 

23 

rel. Crabtree v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 504, 507, 644 

N.E.2d 361. 

{¶ 68} Despite any differences between R.C. 2929.191 and our holdings 

in Jordan, Hernandez, and Cruzado, at their core, each fundamentally requires a 

court imposing mandatory postrelease control to include in the sentencing entry a 

statement that an offender convicted of a first- or second-degree felony offense 

will be subject to postrelease control after leaving prison. R.C. 2929.191(A)(1) 

(“the court may prepare and issue a correction to the judgment of conviction that 

includes in the judgment of conviction the statement that the offender will be 

supervised under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves 

prison”); Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, at ¶ 17 

(“a trial court is required to notify the offender at the sentencing hearing about 

postrelease control and is further required to incorporate that notice into its 

journal entry imposing sentence” [footnote omitted]); Hernandez, 108 Ohio St.3d 

395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, at ¶ 16 (“The trial court * * * committed 

error because it did not notify him at his sentencing hearing that he would be 

subject to mandatory postrelease control and did not incorporate postrelease 

control into its sentencing entry”); Cruzado, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, at ¶ 28 (the court “was authorized to correct the invalid 

sentence to include the appropriate, mandatory postrelease-control term”). See 

also R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) (“If a court imposes a prison term for a felony of the first 

degree, [or] for a felony of the second degree * * * it shall include in the sentence 

a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control after 

the offender’s release from imprisonment * * *”). 

{¶ 69} Here, although mandatory postrelease control terms of five and 

three years applied, the trial court advised Barnes at the sentencing hearing, 

“[Y]ou will now be subject to Post Release Control pursuant to Ohio Revised 

Code 2967.28. If you violate the terms of your Post Release Control you could 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

24 

receive an additional prison term not to exceed fifty percent of your original 

prison term * * *.” (Emphasis added.) However, the trial court failed to state the 

length of the postrelease control term. Additionally, in its nunc pro tunc entry, the 

court erroneously stated that Barnes “may be supervised under post release 

control R.C. 2967.28.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court also stated that “if the 

Defendant violates the terms of the post-release control, the Defendant could 

receive an additional prison term not to exceed 50 percent of his original prison 

term,” but again failed to state the length of the postrelease control term. Thus, 

the court failed to satisfy the most basic requirement of R.C. 2929.191 and our 

existing precedent – that it notify the offender of the mandatory nature of the term 

of postrelease control and the length of that mandatory term and incorporate that 

notification into its entry. 

{¶ 70} Moreover, Barnes completed his prison term on January 5, 2007, 

and has now been released. As we stated in Bezak and Simpkins, once an offender 

has completed the prison term imposed in his original sentence, he cannot be 

subjected to another sentencing to correct the trial court’s flawed imposition of 

postrelease control. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, 

¶ 18; Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, at 

syllabus. 

{¶ 71} Furthermore, in the absence of a proper sentencing entry imposing 

postrelease control, the parole board’s imposition of postrelease control cannot be 

enforced. Imposition of punishment is a function of the judicial branch of 

government. Ex parte United States (1916), 242 U.S. 27, 41-42, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 

L.Ed. 129 (“Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses 

against the criminal laws, and, upon conviction, to impose the punishment 

provided by law, is judicial * * *”). See also Woods, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 

N.E.2d 1103. In Woods, we held that because postrelease control is part of the 

original judicially imposed sentence, the parole board’s discretionary ability to 
January Term, 2009 

25 

impose postrelease control sanctions does not impede the function of the judicial 

branch and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 512. This is 

so because the sentencing court made the decision to impose the penalty of 

postrelease control and the executive officers carried out that judgment. 

{¶ 72} However, the legislature has now amended R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) to 

provide: “If a court imposes a sentence including a prison term of a type 

described in this division on or after July 11, 2006, the failure of a court to include 

a post-release control requirement in the sentence pursuant to this division does 

not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory period of post-release control 

that is required for the offender under division (B) of section 2967.28 of the 

Revised Code.” Nothing in that division, however, provides that the executive 

branch may impose postrelease control if the sentencing court has not ordered it, 

nor does its language conflict with our precedent. However, a sentencing court 

must impose postrelease control before an offender completes the stated term of 

imprisonment. See Woods, 89 Ohio St.3d at 512, 733 N.E.2d 1103; Hernandez, 

108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, at ¶ 32; Cruzado, 111 Ohio 

St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, at ¶ 28; Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 

2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, at ¶ 16-18. We therefore reverse the decision 

of the court of appeals and discharge Barnes. 

V. Conclusion 

{¶ 73} Based upon the foregoing, the judgments of the courts of appeal in 

Bloomer and Mosmeyer are affirmed. The judgment of the court of appeals in 

Barnes is reversed, Barnes is discharged, and the trial court is instructed to note 

on the record that because Barnes has completed his prison sentence, he will not 

be subject to resentencing pursuant to law. 

Judgment accordingly. 

 MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

26 

 LUNDBERG STRATTON and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in part and dissent in 

part. 

__________________ 

LANZINGER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

{¶ 74} I have maintained my position, most recently stated in State v. 

Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, that errors made 

during a plea hearing or at sentencing should be corrected on direct appeal. 

Boswell at ¶ 17. Failure to notify a defendant of postrelease control or to include 

it within a sentencing entry should render a sentence voidable, meaning subject to 

correction. Before enactment of Sub.H.B. No. 137 (“H.B. 137”), effective July 

11, 2006, a trial court had no special statutory power to correct a sentence that 

contained a postrelease control error. Now, however, R.C. 2929.191 allows a trial 

court to correct a sentencing error related to the imposition of mandatory 

postrelease control, provided that the correction is made after the offender is 

given a hearing and while the offender is still serving a prison term. 

{¶ 75} I agree that H.B. 137 does not violate Section 15(D), Article II of 

the Ohio Constitution and that it has not been demonstrated beyond a reasonable 

doubt that R.C. 2929.191 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. With 

respect to Bloomer, who was sentenced before the statute’s effective date, I 

dissent from the judgment and would hold that Bloomer’s original sentence must 

stand because the state did not appeal the sentence containing the postrelease 

control error. With respect to Mosmeyer, I concur in the judgment because the 

trial court correctly followed the statutory procedure to impose postrelease control 

at his August 23, 2006 resentencing. With respect to Barnes, although I do not 

agree with the majority’s reasoning, I also concur in the judgment, because 

Barnes has already served his prison term. 

{¶ 76} The facts of Barnes’s case illustrate one of the difficulties that arise 

when the majority determines a sentence of this type to be void, meaning imposed 
January Term, 2009 

27 

by a court without jurisdiction. It is impossible for me to see how Barnes could 

be released if indeed the sentence already served were void and a nullity—a full 

resentencing first would be required to impose a valid penalty. Apparently what 

the majority holds is that a sentence is void only until it is served completely, 

when it then has full effect. This does not seem to be logical. 

{¶ 77} I respectfully concur in the judgments as to Mosmeyer and Barnes

and dissent with respect to the judgment in Bloomer. 

 LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

__________________ 

Roger D. Nagel, Fulton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paul H. 

Kennedy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee in case No. 2007-0693. 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. 

Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee in case No. 2007-1415. 

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela J. 

Holder, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee in case No. 2007-1439. 

Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 

Assistant Public Defender, for appellant in case No. 2007-0693. 

Derek W. Gustafson, for appellant in case No. 2007-1415. 

Paul Mancino Jr., for appellant in case No. 2007-1439. 

__________________