alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Clemmie WILLIAMS, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.

No. A-12076.

Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.

Nov. 10, 1954.

Valdhe F. Pitman, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

JONES, Judge.

A motion to dismiss the appeal was filed by the Attorney General on the ground that the casemade was not served within - the time granted by the trial court in which to prepare and serve a casemade, nor within any valid subsequent extension of time so granted.

An examination of the casemade reveals that the motion should be sustained. Defendant was sentenced on September 24, 1953, and at that time was granted 60 days in which to prepare and serve casemade. On December 4, 1953, an order was entered undertaking to grant defendant an extension of 60 days from December 1, 1953, in which to make and serve casemade. (The time originally granted had expired'on November 23, 1953.) However, no casemade was prepared and served within the subsequent 60 day attempted extension of time. On February 1, 1954, after the second attempted extension of time had elapsed, a purported order was entered attempting to grant defendant a further extension of time to prepare and serve casemade until March 24, 1954. This last date was the final day on which an appeal from the judgment of conviction could have been lodged. ■ ' ■

The casemade was served on the county attorney on March 24, 1954, and was filed in the office of the Clerk of this court on the same day. Evidently it was never presented to the trial judge for certification as the page inserted in the casemade for signing and settling the same by the trial judge was not signed.

No response was filed to the motion to dismiss the appeal and it appearing that the casemade was not prepared and served in the time fixed by law nor any valid subsequent extension of time nor was it settled and signed by the trial judge as prescribed by law, the same is insufficient to vest jurisdiction in this court to consider the purported appeal. 22 O.S. 1951 §§ 1059, 1060. It was sufficient to constitute a transcript, but none of the assignments of error could *784be determined by reference to a transcript only.

It is the policy of this court to overrule motions to dismiss appeals and consider appeals on their merits whenever it is possible to do so. As the record appears before us and in the absence of any response, we feel compelled to sustain the state’s motion. It is therefore ordered that the purported appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.

POWELL, P. J., and BRETT, J., concur.
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10
- 14
- 00121
- CR JEFFREY DEAN GERRON , Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

From the 40th District Court Ellis County, Texas Trial Court No. 36,660CR

ORDER
In a motion filed on September 2, 2014, appellant asked this Court to order the originals of Defendant’s Exhibits 4, 6, 8, and 9, which were admitted into evidence during a pretrial hearing for the sole purpose of the hearing, to be delivered to this
Court

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 34.6(g)(2) (giving the appellate court the authority to direct the delivery of original exhibits to the appellate court). These exhibits were also excluded during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Appellant contends these
exh ibits are necessary for issues to be presented in his appeal. Appellant’s motion isJeffre y Dean Gerron v. The State of Texas Page 2

granted. The trial court clerk or the court reporter, whoever currently possesses the original exhibits, is ordered to send to this Court, by courier receipted delivery o r by hand delivery, the original of Defendant’s Exhibits 4, 6, 8, and 9. Once the opinion of the Court issues in this appeal, the exhibits will be returned, by courier receipted delivery or hand delivery, to the clerk or reporter, whoever was in possessio n of the
exhibits. Appellant also requested reasonable access to Defendant’s Exhibits 4, 6, 8, and 9 for use in the preparation of appellant’s brief. That request is also granted. The specific details of appellant’s access are to be determined by a sub sequent motion by appellant when the extent and timing of the access needed can be more readily determined.

PER CURIAM Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Motion granted Order issued and filed September 18, 2014
Approved under assigned authority 

on January 21, 2010*

Linda L. Lundell (for)

Director, Office of International Aviation

* We will require the carrier to institute service in the subject U.S.-Mexico markets no later than 

February 22, 2010. We acted on this motion without awaiting expiration of the answer period 

with the consent of all parties served with the request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Troy Anthony NEWMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-6987.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 21, 2003.

Decided Feb. 10, 2003.

Troy Anthony Newman, Appellant Pro Se. William Edward Fitzpatrick, Office of the United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Troy Anthony Newman seeks to appeal the district court’s July 26, 2000, order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion, and the district court’s April 3, 2001, order denying his motion for reconsideration.

As to Newman’s appeal of the district court’s July 26, 2000, order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), when the United States is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, unless: (1) under Fed. R.App. P. 4(b)(4), the district court, upon the defendant’s showing of good cause or excusable neglect, grants the defendant a thirty day extension; (2) under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), the district court extends the appeal period; or (3) under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6), the district court reopens the appeal period. This appeal period is mandatory and jurisdictional. *Browder v. Director, Deft of Corr.,*434 U.S. 257, 267, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting *United States v. Robinson,*361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (I960)). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on July 26, 2000. Newman’s *666notice of appeal was filed on June 6, 2001. Newman failed to file a timely notice of appeal, and he did not seek an extension or reopening of the appeal period. We therefore deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss Newman’s appeal as to this order. *See United States v. Newman,*No. CR-99-22-A (E.D. Va. filed July 25, 2000, entered July 26, 2000).

As to Newman’s appeal of the district court’s April 3, 2001, order denying his motion for reconsideration, we have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See United States v. Newman,*No. CR-99-22-A (E.D. Va. filed Apr. 2, 2001, entered Apr. 3, 2001).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

*DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.*
#### Allen D. HEFLIN, and wife Jean LaRue Heflin, and Rue Ellen Heflin, next of kin and survivors of Hugh Allen Heflin, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STEWART COUNTY, TENNESSEE, David Hicks, Joe Henry Crutcher, and Wanda Luffman, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 90-6585.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

July 1, 1992.

Before KENNEDY and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and LIVELY, Senior Circuit Judge.

ORDER

The appellants filed a petition for rehearing with the suggestion for rehearing en banc. The required number of judges did not vote in favor of rehearing en banc and accordingly the petition was referred to the original hearing panel. This panel denied the petition for rehearing in an order filed June 3, 1992.

Upon reconsideration, the panel grants the petition for rehearing to the limited extent of noting that the individual defendants David Hicks, Harry Joe Crutcher and Wanda Luffman were sued only in their official capacities. The judgment entered by the district court awarded damages against the defendant Stewart County and the individual defendants jointly and severally. This court reversed the judgment against the defendant Wanda Luffman and affirmed the judgment against Stewart County, David Hicks and Harry Joe Crutcher, 958 F.2d 709. Because David Hicks and Harry Joe Crutcher were sued only in their official capacities, any judgment against them becomes a judgment against the county. Thus, only the defendant Stewart County may be held liable for the payment of the jury award.

Circuit Judge KENNEDY would grant rehearing for the reasons stated in her dissent.

Entered by order of the court.
##### 



EXHIBIT 99.1
 (I Flow Logo)
I-FLOW
CORPORATION
    
    20202 Windrow Drive
Lake Forest, CA 92630
(800) 448-3569 (949) 206-2700
Fax (949) 206-2600
    
    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
 
 Investor Contact:
Neil Berkman
Berkman Associates
(310) 277-5162info@BerkmanAssociates.com
    
    Company Contact:
James R. Talevich 
Chief Financial Officer 
(949) 206-2700 www.iflo.com
 I-Flow Announces Closing of Acquisition of AcryMed Incorporated
 LAKE FOREST, CALIFORNIA I-FLOW CORPORATION (NASDAQ:IFLO)
 ® TM ®
  About I-Flow
 www.IFLO.com
 Safe Harbor Statement
 Statements by the Company in this press release and in other reports and statements
released by the Company are and will be forward-looking in nature and express the Companys
current opinions about trends and factors that may impact future operating results.
Statements that use words such as may, will, should, believes, predicts,
estimates, projects, anticipates or expects or use similar expressions are intended
to identify forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to material
risks, assumptions and uncertainties, which could cause actual results to differ materially
from those currently expected, and readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these
forward-looking statements. Except as required by applicable law, the Company undertakes no
obligation to publish revised forward-looking statements to reflect the occurrence of
unanticipated or subsequent events. Readers are also urged to carefully review and consider
the various disclosures made by the Company in this press release that seek to advise
interested parties of the risks and other factors that affect the Companys business.
Interested parties should also review the Companys reports on Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K and
other reports that are periodically filed with or furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The risks affecting the Companys business include, among others: physician
acceptance of infusion-based therapeutic regimens; implementation of the Companys direct
sales strategy; successful integration of the Companys recent acquisition of AcryMed
Incorporated and further development and commercialization of AcryMeds technologies;
dependence on the Companys suppliers and distributors; the Companys continuing compliance
with applicable laws and regulations, such as the Medicare Supplier Standards and the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, and Medicares and the FDAs concurrence with managements subjective
judgment on compliance issues; the reimbursement system currently in place and future changes
to that system; product availability, acceptance and safety; competition in the industry;
technological changes; intellectual property challenges and claims; economic and political
conditions in foreign countries; currency exchange rates; inadequacy of booked reserves; and
reliance on the success of the home health care industry. All forward-looking statements,
whether made in this press release or elsewhere, should be considered in context with the
various disclosures made by the Company about its business.
#### PETER P. ARTASERSE, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF PETER DOELGER. BREWING CORPORATION. PROSECUTOR-APPELLANT, v. THE DIVISION OF TAX APPEALS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

Argued November 15, 1948

Decided November 29, 1948.

*Mr. Mention Morrill*argued the cause for the prosecutor-appellant *(Messrs. Cole, Morrill & Nadell,*attorneys).

*131
      *Mr. William- K. Miller*argued -the cause for the defendants-respondents *(Mr. Walter D. Van Riper,*Attorney-General).

Per Ctiriam.

The judgment will be affirmed for the reasons expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Eastwood in the court below.

*For affirmance*Chief Justice Vanderbilt and Justices Case, Heher, Oliphant, and Aokerson—S.

*For reversal:*Justices Waci-ieneeld and Burling—2.
Exhibit 31.2
 Certification of Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a) Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
              By:
    /s/ MARK W. DURANDMark W. DurandSenior Vice President  Chief Financial Officer


(Principal Financial Officer)
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-60549

Summary Calendar

Gilmar Batista De Andrade, 

Petitioner,

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A078 966 396

Before Davis, Jones, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Gilmar Batista De Andrade, a native and citizen of Brazil, seeks review 

of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his motion to 

reopen. The petition for review is denied. 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 30, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 20-60549 Document: 00516149031 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/30/2021
No. 20-60549

2

This court reviews the denial of a motion to reopen under a highly 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 303 

(5th Cir. 2005). The BIA’s decision will be affirmed unless it is “capricious, 

racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so 

irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible rational 

approach.” Id. at 303-04 (internal citation omitted). 

An in absentia removal order may be rescinded and the proceedings 

reopened if the alien demonstrates that he did not receive written notice of 

the hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). 

Written notice “is not required if an alien has failed to keep the immigration 

court apprised of his current mailing address.” Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 

560 F.3d 354, 359 (5th Cir. 2009). The government “satisfies the notice 

requirement for obtaining a removal order when it gives proper notice at the 

most recent mailing address the alien provided.” Hernandez-Castillo v. 

Sessions, 875 F.3d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 2017). Batista De Andrade admits that 

he never provided his address to the immigration court. He does not dispute 

that he was personally served with a NTA advising him of his obligation to 

provide an address. This portion of the petition for review is denied. Id.

Regarding Batista De Andrade’s credibility argument, the BIA must 

“weigh the credibility of an affidavit in determining whether an alien has 

rebutted the presumption of notice.” Hernandez v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 266, 270 

(5th Cir. 2016). Batista De Andrade signed a document stating that an 

address in Texas would be his mailing address, and he did not provide an 

explanation of how someone else could have provided it. Under these facts, 

“[a]ny reasonable adjudicator” would not be “compelled to conclude” that 

the affidavit was credible. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). This portion of the 

petition for review is denied. 

The petition for review is DENIED.

Case: 20-60549 Document: 00516149031 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/30/2021
##### 



Exhibit 99.3

MERISTAR HOSPITALITY CORPORATION
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of MeriStar Hospitality Operating Partnership, L.P., (the "Registrant")
on form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, James A. Calder, Chief Accounting Officer of MeriStar Hospitality
Operating Partnership, L.P., certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:



|1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and                              
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  
|2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Registrant.

/s/ James A. Calder

---
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906  OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Scott H. Ray, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:

(a)   The
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of United Online, Inc. for the quarter ended March 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(b)   The
information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|Date: May 12, 2008                                                               |  | 
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|/s/SCOTT H. RAYScott H. Ray Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |  | 

---



QuickLinks
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-40798

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

EDWARD DAVID ROSA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:09-CR-260-1

Before WIENER, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Edward David Rosa appeals his sentence following

his guilty plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He argues

that the district court erred in increasing his base offense level by two levels

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) and assigning a base offense level of 20

pursuant to § 2K1.1(a)(4)(B) because the pipe bomb found at his residence did

not constitute a destructive device. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 3, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 11-40798 Document: 00512070662 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/03/2012
No. 11-40798

We have determined that a pipe bomb is a destructive device under

§ 5845(f). See United States v. Hunn, 344 F. App’x 920, 921 (5th Cir. 2009)

(finding that homemade pipe bomb was a destructive device under § 5845(f));

United States v. Charles, 883 F.2d 355, 357 (5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that three

pipe bombs were destructive devices under § 5845(f)). Thus, the district court

did not clearly err in enhancing Rosa’s sentence pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) or

in assigning a base offense level of 20 pursuant to § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). See United

States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

2

 Case: 11-40798 Document: 00512070662 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/03/2012
<PAGE>






Exhibit 99.3


                    CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report for the period ending March 29,
2003, of Roadway Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, James
D. Staley, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company for the dates and periods covered by the Report.

A signed original of this written statement has been provided to Roadway
Corporation and will be retained by Roadway Corporation and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

May 7, 2003                                  /s/ James D. Staley
                                            -------------------
                                            James D. Staley
                                            Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 32.2




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)





In connection with the quarterly report of First National Energy Corporation (the "Registrant"), on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ending September 30, 2012, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date, I, Peter Wanner, as Principal Accounting Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.




Date: October 31, 2012
By:
/s/ Peter WannerName: Peter WannerTitle: Chief Financial Officer





This certification accompanies each Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Registrant for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.





A signed original of this statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John L. TINCHER, William K. Tincher, and James E. Acord, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 92-3796 to 92-3798.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Dec. 21, 1993.

Before: KEITH and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges; and, LIVELY, Senior Circuit Judge.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petitions for rehearing filed separately by defendants-appellants John L. Tincher and James E. Acord on November 3 and November 5, 1993, respectively, the petitions are ORDERED denied.

The previous opinion and judgment of this Court filed on October 22, 1993 and reported at 8 F.3d 350 is ORDERED withdrawn and is replaced by an unpublished *per curiam*opinion.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
      Name: Robert M. Kaminski
  37