If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

LILLIAN A. SCOTT,

Claimant-Appellant,

FOR PUBLICATION

March 10, 2022

v No. 350690

Berrien Circuit Court

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND ECONOMIC

OPPORTUNITY/UNEMPLOYMENT 

INSURANCE AGENCY,

LC No. 18-000266-AE

Appellee.

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and CAVANAGH and REDFORD, JJ.

REDFORD, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

I concur with the majority in LARA Cases1915 and 916. Since LARA issued a 

redetermination before issuing a determination in those matters, under Dep’t of Licensing and 

Regulatory Affairs/Unemployment Ins Agency v Lucente, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2021) 

(Docket Nos. 160843 and 160844), reversal of the $39,620 judgment against Claimant Lillian A.

Scott is appropriate.

I dissent from the majority in LARA Cases 913 and 775. I would affirm this portion of the 

circuit court decision because the Agency complied with the requirements of Michigan law and 

properly assessed the financial penalties at issue in those cases and correctly entered judgment in 

the amount of $50,060.

 

1 For ease of reference, the cases will be referred to by the last three numbers of the LARA case 

numbers hereinafter, i.e., 913, 775, 915 and 916.
-2-

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In this matter, Scott had four separate case numbers from LARA that were the subject of 

her administrative hearing, the decision of which she appealed to the Michigan Compensation 

Appellate Commission (MCAC), then its decision to the circuit court, and its decision she now 

appeals.

LARA 

Case 

Number

LARA 

Docket 

Number

Notice of 

Determination 

letter dated

Notice of 

Redetermination 

letter dated

Amount 

principal

Amount 

penalty

Total 

amount 

assessed

0-002-333-

913

18-008614 05/09/2014

0-001-824-

775

18-008735 05/09/2014 $10,012 $40,048 $50,060

0-002-333-

915

18-008763 05/09/2014

0-002-333-

916

18-009016 05/09/2014 $7,924 $31,696 $39,620

Scott previously worked for Enterprise Synergy, LLC. After her employment ended with 

the company, she received unemployment benefits before May 2014. On February 10, 2014, 

Scott’s previous employer sent a 4-page document to the Agency advising in detail that Scott 

voluntarily left her employment with the company in May 2013.

On April 24, 2014, LARA sent a letter addressed to Scott at her 856 Ogden address titled

“Request for Information Relative to Possible Ineligibility or Disqualification.” The letter advised:

A question of eligibility and/or qualification has been raised on this claim. Please 

respond to the questions on the reverse side of this form. You should keep a copy 

for your records. The completed form must be received by UIA within 10 calendar 

days of the mail date shown. Failure to respond to this request for information will 

result in issuance of a determination based on available information. [Emphasis 

in original.]

The letter went on to explain possible sanctions including fines and costs. There is no indication 

of a response from her.

On April 24, 2014, LARA also generated a similarly titled document which contained other 

questions regarding information she provided and asked whether she had voluntarily left 

employment because of “quit/personal reasons.” There is no indication of a response from her.

On April 24, 2014, LARA also generated a letter to Enterprise Synergy, LLC titled 

“Request for Information Relative to Possible Ineligibility or Disqualification.” On April 25, 

2014, Synergy responded to the Agency by filling out the form it received. After more than 10

days elapsed, on May 9, 2014, LARA issued a Notice of Determination in Cases 913 and 775 and 

Notices of Redetermination in Cases 915 and 916. On May 9, 2014, LARA also issued letters to 
-3-

Scott to her home address listing the unemployment benefits overpayments made in relation to her 

claims and identifying the amount Scott owed plus penalties to be paid in restitution.

Scott testified during the ALJ hearing, “Well, this is been going on since 2014 when I 

contacted Legal Aid,” and that she engaged legal counsel to assist her in her dispute with the 

Agency and worked with him through 2016 regarding approximately $80,000 to $100,000 that the 

Agency said she owed and because the Agency garnished Scott’s wages and intercepted her federal 

income tax refunds. Scott testified that she had numerous phone conversations with Agency

representatives during 2015 and 2016, and otherwise contested the actions it had taken.

Eventually, an administrative hearing was conducted on August 2, 2018, presided over by 

an administrative law judge. The ALJ’s opinions in all four cases included among others the 

following findings of fact: 

The claimant’s address at the time of filing was 856 Ogden Ave Benton Harbor, 

MI 49022-5135. She has maintained the same address through the time of hearing.

On May 9, 2014, multiple Agency Determinations/Redeterminations were mailed 

to the claimant at 856 Ogden Ave Benton Harbor, MI 49022-5135 that held the 

claimant disqualified for benefits under Section 29(1)(a) of the Act ([18-008614], 

ineligible for benefits under Section 48 of the Act [18-008763], and that the 

claimant committed fraud [18-008735 and 18-009016]. Attached Restitution and 

fraud penalties totaled $89,680.00

The ALJ’s opinion’s Reasoning and Conclusions Of Law in relevant part stated:

I did not find the claimants testimony credible. The claimant rarely answered the 

actual question posed to her regardless of who posed it. The claimant’s testimony 

was all over the board as to what she received in the mail from the Agency, what 

she didn’t receive from the Agency, and what she might have received in the mail 

from the Agency. . . .

While I understand there is no proof of service on the May 9, 2014 Determinations, 

I did not find the claimant’s testimony credible that she did not receive them. 

Further, I did not find the claimant’s testimony credible that she was unaware of 

any issue with her 2012 and 2013 claims for benefits until the end of 2015. . . .

Scott appealed the ALJ’s decision to the MCAC which affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and 

then she appealed that decision to the circuit court. On June 11, 2019, the circuit court affirmed 

the decisions of the ALJ and MCAC. From the circuit court’s decision, Scott has appealed by 

leave granted.

2

 

2 Lillian A. Scott v Enterprise Synergy LLC, order of the Court of Appeals entered February 11, 

2020 (Docket No. 350690).
-4-

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the circuit court’s application of legal principles in reviewing an 

administrative decision, including matters of statutory interpretation. Mericka v Dep’t of 

Community Health, 283 Mich App 29, 36; 770 NW2d 24 (2009). We review the circuit “court’s

review of an administrative decision to determine whether the lower court applied correct legal 

principles and whether it misapprehended or misapplied the substantial evidence test to the 

agency’s factual findings, which is essentially a clear-error standard of review.” Braska v 

Challenge Mfg Co, 307 Mich App 340, 351-352; 861 NW2d 289 (2014) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “A finding is clearly erroneous where, after reviewing the record, this Court is 

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” VanZandt v State 

Employees’ Retirement Sys, 266 Mich App 579, 585; 701 NW2d 214 (2005).

When an ALJ serves as the trier of fact in an administrative proceeding, it is the ALJ who 

“heard testimony . . . , reviewed all the evidence in the record and made findings of fact based on 

the credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence.” Hodge v US Security Assoc, Inc, 497 

Mich 189, 195; 859 NW2d 683 (2015). The ALJ’s role requires that it, and not a circuit court on 

review, make determinations of credibility and resolve evidentiary conflicts. Id. at 194-195. The 

circuit court “must affirm a decision of the ALJ and the MCAC . . . if competent, material, and 

substantial evidence supports it. A reviewing court is not at liberty to substitute its own judgment 

for a decision of the MCAC that is supported with substantial evidence.” Id. at 194. “Substantial 

evidence is that which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a decision, being 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance of the evidence.” VanZandt, 266 Mich 

App at 584 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the MCAC’s factual findings are 

entitled to great deference, they are only conclusive if “any competent evidence” supports those 

findings. Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269, 275; 753 NW2d 207 (2008). “Evidence is 

competent, material, and substantial if a reasoning mind would accept it as sufficient to support a 

conclusion.” City of Romulus v Mich Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 260 Mich App 54, 63; 678 

NW2d 444 (2003). Under the clear error standard, this Court will affirm if the lower court’s 

determination “is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Beason v Beason, 435 

Mich 791, 803; 460 NW2d 207 (1990).

III. ANALYSIS

The Legislature intended that the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA), MCL 

421.1 et seq., be “for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own . . . for the 

public good, and the general welfare of the people of this state.” MCL 421.2(1). Courts should 

interpret MESA and its provisions liberally to give effect to this remedial legislation. Laya v Cebar 

Constr Co, 101 Mich App 26, 34; 300 NW2d 439 (1980). A decision that benefits are owed to an 

individual, or that an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits, is called a determination. 

MCL 421.27(a)(1). If a claimant disagrees with a determination, a person may request a 

redetermination. MCL 421.32a(1). A redetermination request must be made within 30 days after 

the mailing of the determination notice. Id.

In its decision, the ALJ considered the testimony adduced during the hearing and the 

admissible documentary evidence submitted for its review. The ALJ performed its function as the 

trier of fact and ultimately determined that Scott lacked credibility regarding her assertion that she 
-5-

had not received the notices mailed to her home address on May 9, 2014, respecting LARA Cases 

913 and 775, and her claim that she lacked awareness of any issue with her 2012 and 2013 claims 

for benefits until 2015 or perhaps 2016. The MCAC reviewed the ALJ’s decision as well as all of 

the documentary evidence and testimony and concluded that the ALJ had correctly ruled. The 

circuit court found that a preponderance of the evidence supported the ALJ’s and MCAC’s 

decisions. This Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the circuit court because it 

believed the evidence warranted a different result. VanZandt, 266 Mich App at 584.

The record indicates that Scott admitted in her testimony that she received numerous 

mailings by the Agency. The lack of returned mail in Scott’s Agency file permits a reasonable 

inference that the May 9, 2014 determination letters and the restitution letters regarding her claims 

were received by Scott. Although Scott asserted that she never received the determinations and 

only learned of the fraud and misrepresentation issue until sometime in or after 2016, Scott’s 

testimony that she engaged legal counsel in 2014 permits a reasonable inference that the 

determination notices and restitution letters were mailed to her and received by her informing her 

that she had been disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits and had to repay the 

overpayments. The fact that she engaged legal counsel already in 2014 calls into question her 

contention that she knew nothing until her wages were garnished and her income tax refunds were 

intercepted.

The fact that Scott consistently testified that she did not receive the notices does not vitiate 

the deference that this Court must give to administrative findings based on credibility 

determinations. Dep’t of Community Health v Risch, 274 Mich App 365, 372; 733 NW2d 403 

(2007). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there is no affirmative evidence in the record 

to support a finding of fact that the Agency sent the notices. Notably, the record lacks evidence 

of any disruption of the mail service to Scott. She testified she received numerous documents from 

the Agency over the years. In fact, the only delivery issue Scott raises is in reference to the 

documents sent on May 9, 2014. Laura Glynn, the Agency’s representative at the hearing, testified 

that all written communications were sent to Scott’s mailing address and that no notices were 

returned as undeliverable. She explained that, if the mailings had been returned, they would have 

been in Scott’s claim files. Although she acknowledged that no proofs of service were in the 

claims files, the record does not reflect that the Agency had a policy, rule, or regulation that 

required it to file proofs of service. Further, no statutory requirement appears to exist requiring 

the filing of proof of service documentation for mailings to claimants.3 The record reflects that 

 

3 The majority’s opinion intimates that the Agency must establish procedures that will enable it to 

establish unequivocally that a determination has been mailed and received by a claimant, such as 

file proofs of service or by having a person appear and testify to personal knowledge in every 

instance that such determination was deposited in the mail. In essence, the majority imposes a 

heightened burden on the Agency and establishes an evidentiary standard that restrains ALJs and 

the MCAC from considering and being able to rely upon record evidence such as in this case from 

which a reasonable inference may be drawn that the Agency actually mailed the claimant 

determinations. Had the Legislature deemed what the majority describes a necessary requirement, 

surely it would have directed that the Agency do so in the MESC in relation to the statutory notice 

mandate.
-6-

the Agency mailed numerous documents to Scott related to her claims and had copies in Scott’s 

claims files of the documents sent on May 9, 2014, in the ordinary course of the Agency’s business.

I conclude from the record that the circuit court did not misapply the substantial evidence 

test to the ALJ’s factual findings that Scott received the 2014 determinations. Accordingly, I 

would affirm the circuit court’s affirmance of the ALJ’s and MCAC’s decisions respecting LARA 

Cases 913 and 775.

/s/ James Robert Redford