IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-22-00018-CR

CALEB FLETCHER,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 13th District Court

Navarro County, Texas

Trial Court No. D39599-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In one issue, appellant, Caleb Fletcher, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in 

an amount more than four grams but less than two hundred grams with intent to deliver. 

See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d). Because we conclude that the 

evidence is sufficient to support Fletcher’s conviction, we affirm. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence
Fletcher v. State Page 2

On appeal, Fletcher concedes that the evidence is legally sufficient to show that he 

was in possession of methamphetamine. Instead, Fletcher argues that his conviction is 

not supported by sufficient evidence because he mistakenly believed that the pills that 

were found in a motel room he occupied were methamphetamine, as opposed to ecstasy. 

Thus, Fletcher asserts that he did not “knowingly” possess a controlled substance.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of sufficiency 

issues as follows: 

When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider 

whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 

99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer “to 

the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from 

basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh 

the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams 

v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting 

a sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy 

but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d 

at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or 

evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the 

facts so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at 

trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences 

from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution.

Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because 

the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the 

witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 

S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial 
Fletcher v. State Page 3

evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be 

sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the 

incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey 

v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 

13. 

We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient 

to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as 

defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. 

State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically 

correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by 

the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof 

or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately 

describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id; see 

also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law 

as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the 

offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 

S.W.3d at 665.

Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 

A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent 

to deliver if he knowingly possesses a controlled substance, such as methamphetamine, 

in an amount between four and 200 grams with intent to deliver. See TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d); see also Erskine v. State, 191 S.W.3d 374, 379 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2006, no pet.) (citing Nhem v. State, 129 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2004, no pet.)). Under the Texas Penal Code, “[p]ossession” is defined as “actual, 

care, custody, or management.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39). Thus, to prove 

unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must establish that the accused 

(1) exercised care, control, or management over the contraband, and (2) knew the 

substance was contraband. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), 
Fletcher v. State Page 4

overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 173, & n.32 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2015); Moreno v. State, 195 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. 

ref’d). Possession may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, but the evidence 

must show that the accused’s connection with the substance was more than fortuitous. 

Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405-06; see Blackman v. State, 350 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). Fletcher does not challenge the intent-to-deliver element on appeal. 

When the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the contraband 

is found, the State must show additional facts and circumstances that affirmatively link 

the accused to the contraband. See Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406; see also Olivarez v. State, 

171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). An affirmative link 

generates a reasonable inference that the accused knew of the contraband’s existence and 

exercised control over it. Olivarez, 171 S.W.3d at 291. 

Texas courts have identified the following factors that may affirmatively link the 

accused to a controlled substance:

(1) The defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the 

contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the 

accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the 

influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed 

other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant 

made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant 

attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) 

whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband 

or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or 

had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether 

the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the 
Fletcher v. State Page 5

defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the 

conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. 

Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 

158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). Texas courts have further recognized that this is a 

nonexclusive list of factors that may be sufficient, either individually or in combination, 

to establish a defendant’s possession of a controlled substance. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 

n.12. “It is . . . not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all 

of the evidence, direct and circumstantial.” Id. at 162. The ultimate inquiry remains that 

set forth in Jackson: “Based on the combined and cumulative force of the evidence and 

any reasonable inferences therefrom, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt?” Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19).

DISCUSSION

On July 8, 2019, Officer Jacob Palos of the Corsicana Police Department observed 

a drug sale while conducting surveillance outside of a Traveler’s Inn motel in an area 

known for drug trafficking. He observed an exchange between a male, later identified as 

Matthew Elmore, and a female, later identified as Tyqutari Lewis, outside one of the 

motel rooms. Officer Palos testified that, based on his training and experience, this 

interaction was an exchange of money for drugs. After Elmore departed, Officer Palos 

initiated a traffic stop of Elmore’s vehicle. Officer Palos found cocaine in Elmore’s 

underwear, as well as a bag of marihuana inside the vehicle. Based on statements made 
Fletcher v. State Page 6

by Elmore that he had purchased drugs from Lewis’s motel room before, as well as 

observations of the drug exchange at the motel, Officer Palos obtained a warrant to search 

the motel room from which Lewis emerged. 

When Officer Palos and three other Corsicana Police officers executed the search 

warrant on the motel room, they observed Fletcher retreat to a bathroom, which the 

officers believe can be indicative of a consciousness of guilt. Fletcher, Lewis, and three 

children under the age of six were present in the motel room. Officers also found cell 

phones; eleven individually packaged bags of marihuana; loose marihuana debris; one 

plastic bag containing 31 pills; two digital scales, one of which that had suspected traces 

of cocaine; a partially smoked marihuana cigarette, and a THC oil cartridge. Officers later 

learned that Elmore communicated with Fletcher via Snap Chat or text message to buy 

drugs. 

Officer Michael Self of the Corsicana Police Department testified that he was 

present during the search of the motel room and that he observed Lewis and Fletcher in 

the motel room with “a bunch of different colorful pills which I believed to be ecstasy at 

that time.” Lewis later testified that the pills found inside the motel room were ecstasy, 

otherwise known as “XOs,” and that Fletcher and his friend had brought them to the 

motel room two or three days prior to the search. Lewis admitted that she had previously 

told police that Fletcher sold cocaine and MDMA when he could. Lindsay Ornelas, a 

forensic scientist for the Texas Department of Public Safety, tested 23 of the pills found in 
Fletcher v. State Page 7

the motel room and concluded that they weighed 4.31 grams, plus or minus 0.03 grams. 

Furthermore, Ornelas’s lab report was admitted into evidence showing that the 23 pills 

were methamphetamine, not ecstasy or MDMA.

1

Officers also searched Fletcher’s cell phone for narcotics transactions pursuant to 

the search warrant. Officer Jarrett Girard of the Corsicana Police Department discovered 

numerous text messages detailing Fletcher’s sale of “green,” “white,” and “XOs.” Officer 

Girard also noted that, in the drug trade, “XOs” are ecstasy.

The foregoing evidence touches on many of the Evans links. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d 

at 162 n.12; see also Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414. Based on the logical force of all of the evidence, 

both direct and circumstantial, we cannot say that Fletcher’s connection to the drugs 

found inside the motel room, including the methamphetamine pills, was merely 

fortuitous. See Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414; Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162; Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 

405-06. The evidence adduced at trial establishes Fletcher’s ongoing involvement with 

drugs and links him to the methamphetamine pills. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162; 

Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405; see also Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1995). Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, 

we cannot conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support appellant’s conviction. 

1 Ecstasy, otherwise known as 3-4 methylenedioxy methamphetamine, and methamphetamine are 

both controlled substances under the Texas Health and Safety Code. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§§ 481.102(6), 481.103(a)(1). 
Fletcher v. State Page 8

See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d); see also Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732-33; 

Erskine, 191 S.W.3d at 379; Nhem, 129 S.W.3d at 699. 

And with respect to Fletcher’s contention on appeal that the evidence is 

insufficient as to the knowing element based on his mistaken belief that the pills were 

ecstasy, rather than methamphetamine, we note that the Texas Penal Code only requires 

Fletcher to have knowledge that he possessed a controlled substance, not that he knew 

the actual drug he possessed. See Carter v. State, 575 S.W.3d 892, 899 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2019), aff’d, 620 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (noting that to show mens rea, 

“[t]he prosecutor may show ‘the defendant’ 1) knew ‘he possessed a substance listed on 

the schedules, even if he did not know which substance it was’ or 2) knew ‘the identity 

of the substance he possessed.” (quoting McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 192, 135 

S. Ct. 2298, 2304, 192 L. Ed. 2d 260 (2015))); Blackman, 350 S.W.3d at 594; Poindexter, 153 

S.W.3d at 405; Moreno, 195 S.W.3d at 325; see also Rand v. State, No. 14-16-00409-CR, 2017 

Tex. App. LEXIS 9014, at *24 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication) (“Although none of the messages contain 

methamphetamine, the Texas Penal Code only requires appellant to have knowledge that 

he possessed a controlled substance, not that he knew the drug he possessed was actually 

methamphetamine.” (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112)). We therefore

overrule Fletcher’s sole issue on appeal.

Conclusion
Fletcher v. State Page 9

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

MATT JOHNSON

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Johnson,

and Justice Smith

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed October 12, 2022

Do not publish

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