For convenie nce, the Court shall refe r to Def endants Washing ton, Brown, and Ha rrison 1 c oll e c tiv e ly

a s “ De fe nd ant O ff

ic ia ls, ” and

sh a ll r e fe r t o D e fe nd ants B ro ok s, To pp in a nd Whit e collectively

as “D efe ndant Corre ctional Off icer s.” EST AT E O F MI KA LR. G AI TH ER, by and throug h Pearl Ga ither, Persona l Represe ntative, Plaintiff,
v. DI STRI CT OF COLUMBIA, e t al

. , De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 03-1458 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (September

8, 2009) The a bove-c aptioned matter

was filed by

Plaintiff Pearl Ga ither as mother and per sonal repr esentative of the Estate of Mikal R. Gaither, who was fatally stabbed on De cembe r 14, 2002, while incar cer ated at the District of Columbia Central Dete ntion Fac ility (“CDF ” or the “Jail”). Pla int if f n ame d a s D e fe nd ants the Di str ic t of Col umb ia

(“ D. C.” or

the “ Di str ic t” ); Od ie Was hin g ton , b oth

ind ivi du a lly

and in h is o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity a s D ir e c tor

(n ow -r e tir e d) of

the D. C. Depa rtment of Corre ctions; Marvin L . Br own, both individually and in his officia l capa city as War de n ( no w- re tir e d) of

the Jail ; D e nn is H arr iso n, bo th i nd ivi du a lly and in h is o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity
a s A s s o c i at e W ar d e no f

O p e r at i o n s o f

th e J a i l ; Z e r l i n e B r o o k s , i nh e r i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i ty; Go un od To pp in, in h is i nd ivi du a l c a pa c ity ; and

Jose phWhit e , in

his ind ivi du a l c a

pa c ity 1Plaintiff also named a s Defe ndants in this action J ohn Does 1-20. A lthough discove ry 2 in this case is now closed, the docket doe s not refle ct any eff orts on Plaintiff’s part to identify or serve the Def

endants named only

as “John Does 1-20” in the Sec ond Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is therefor e re quired to file a status report with the Court, on or be fore September 30, 20 09 , e xpla ini ngwhy

JohnDo e s 1 -2 0 h ave no t be e n s e rv e d. I f n o s uc h e xplanatio n is tim e ly filed, the Court shall dismiss Does 1-20 as De fenda nts in thi s action, pursua

nt to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedur e 4(m). 2 (collec tively , “De fenda

nts”). As set forth in Plaintiff’s Second A mended Complaint, Plainti ff 2 alleg es that Ga ither’s de ath re sulted from De fenda nts’ neg lige nce a s well as their de liberate and
rec kless indiffer ence to conditions at the J ail that they knew we re unc onstitut ionally dang erous. Pla int if f a sse rt s thre e c a

us e s o f a c tio n in

he r c omp la int

a g a ins t a ll D e fe nd ants , a lle g inga c la im for violation of Ga ither’s c onstitut ional rig hts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), a s well as c laims for neg lige nce/surviva l action and wr ong ful death. Presently befor e the Court ar e De fenda nts’ [146] Motion for Summary J udg ment and Pla int if f’ s [14 7] Mo tio n f

or Part ia l Summa

ry Judg me nt. Af

te r t ho ro ug hly

re vie wi ngthe pa

rt ie s’ submissi ons, including the attachme nts thereto, applica ble ca se law, statutory

authority , and the
re c or d o f t

he c a se a s a

wh ole , th e Court

sh a ll G RA

NT -I N- PAR T a

nd DENY -I N- PAR T De fe nd ants ’ M oti on

fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt a

nd sh a ll G RA

NT -I N- PAR T a

nd DENY -I N- PAR T Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment, for the r easons se t forth below. More spe cifica lly , the Court GRANTS Def endants’ motion insofar

as De fenda

nts seek dismiss al of Plaintiff’s c laims ag ainst the Def endant Of ficials in their off

icial ca pacity as redunda nt of her c laims ag ainst the District and with re spect to the De fenda nt Correc tional Of fi c e rs ’ c la ims of

qu a lif ie d immun ity

a s a g a ins t Pla int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im. Th e Court , howeve r, DENI ES Defe ndants’ motion insofar a s Defe ndants asser t that issue prec lusion bars Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im. Th e Court a lso DENI ES D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on wi th r e sp e c t toThe Court notes that it strictly adher es to the text of L ocal Civil Rules 7(h) and 56.1 3 wh e n r e so lvi ngmot ion s f or summa ry jud g me nt. Ac c or din g ly , a s th e Court a dv ise d th e pa

rt ie s, it “assumes that fac ts identified by the moving pa

rty in its st atement of

materia l fac ts are a dmitted, unless such a f

act is controve rted in the stateme nt of g enuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” See 9/4 /08 Or de r, Do c ke t N o. [133 ] at 2- 3. Thus , in

mos t in sta

nc e s th e Court

sh a ll c ite only to Plainti ff’ s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts submitted in support of her Partial Motion for Summary Judg me nt ( “ Pl. ’s Stmt .” ) o r D e fe nd ants ’ S tate me nt o f M ate ri a l F a c ts s ub mitte d in 3 Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t, P la int if f’ s n e g lig e nc e -b a se d c la ims a g a ins t a ll Def endants, a nd the Def

endant Of ficials’ c laims of qualified immunity as ag ainst Plainti ff’ s Section 1983 claim, findingthat g enuine issues of disputed material fa ct pre clude summary judgme nt. Wit h respe ct to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion as conce ded to the extent she seeks a n order prec luding De fenda

nts from
ra isi ngan a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e ba se d o n a lle g atio ns that G a ith e r v olu nta ri ly inv olv e d h ims e lf

in an alter cation, but DENI ES Pl aintiff’s motion to the extent she seeks a similar orde r pre cluding Def endants fr om raisingsuch af firmative de fense s based on a lleg ations that Gaither should have notified J ail officia ls of his involvement with a g rand jury murder inve stigation. Acc ording ly , Plaintiff’s rema ining c laims are a s follows: (1) Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim ag ainst the District and the D efe ndant Off icials in their individual capa cities; and (2) Pla int if f’ s n e g lig e nc e -b a se d c la ims a g a ins t th e Di str ic t, t he De fe nd ant O ff

ic ia ls i n th e ir ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s, and

the De fe nd ant C or

re c tio na l O ff

ic e rs in t he ir ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s. I. BACKG ROUND A. Factual Back

ground On De c e mbe r 1 4, 20 02 , M ika l G a ith e r w a s f ata lly sta bb e d b y a fe llo w i nmate wh ile incar cer ated a

t the J ail. Pl.’s St mt. ¶ 1. The stabbingoccur red while Gaither

was housed in the 3su

pp or t of the ir Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt ( “ De fs .’ Stmt .” ) u nle ss a state me nt i s contra dicted by

the opposing party . Where e ither par ty has objec ted to rele vant aspe cts of the oth e r s ide ’s pr of

fe re d mate ri a l f

a c t, t he Court sh a ll c ite to P la int if

f’ s Re sp on se to D e fs .’ Stmt
. (“Pl.’s Resp.”) ; Defe ndants’ Response to Pl.’s Stmt . (“D efs.’ Stmt .”); Plaintiff’s Reply Statement to D e fs .’ Re sp . ( Pl. ’s Re ply Stmt .” ); or

De fe nd ants ’ R e ply

State me nt t o Pl .’ s Re sp . ( De fs .’ Re ply Stmt .”). In addition, where appropr iate, the Court shall cite dire ctly to evidence in the rec ord. As se t f or th i n Pl a int if

f’ s Se c on d A me nd e d Co mpl a int , G a ith e r’ s st a bb ingwa s th e la st 4 of three such incidents that took place at the Jail during a f our-da y period in De cembe r of 2002. On De c e mbe r 1 1, 20 02 , G avin Pe nd le ton

wa s st a bb e d a nd su bs e qu e ntl y

die d a s a re su lt o f h is injuries. Two day s later, on De cembe r 13, 2002, a se cond inmate, B radle y Autman, was stabbe d in the neck by

another inmate, re sulting in his hospitaliz ation. This was followed a day later by Ga ith e r’ s st a

bb ing . Se c . A m. C omp l. ¶ 3. Al tho ug h th e se fa c ts a re mate ri a l to Pla int if

f’ s su it, neither pa rty actua lly addre ssed the prior sta

bbings in their statement of mate rial fa cts or provided the Court with re cord suppor t for these statements. Acc ording ly , althoug h the Court makes note of

these fa cts in order

to provide a f

uller bac kg round of this ca se, the Court has not re lie d o n th e se state me nts in r uli ngon the pa rt ie s’ mot ion s. See, e .g., Def

.’s Mot. to St rike Pl.’s Expert Michele Roberts a nd One of Plaintiff’s 5 Pe no log ist s a s D up lic ativ e , [D oc ke t N o. 11 3], E x. C, ( Re po rt of Mic he le A. Rob e rt s, Es q. ) at 1 (“H avingpleade d g uilty

to one count of distribution of coc aine, Mikal Ga ither wa s in the custody of the D.C. Jail pending sente ncingon Dec ember 14, 2002.”); Pl.’s Mem. of L aw in Support of her O bj. to Mag istrate Judge K ay ’s Orde r Striking Plaintiff’s Sentenc ing E x pert, Doc ket No. [122-2] , at 5 (“ At the time of his death, Mr. G aither w as aw aiting se ntencingin the D.C. Superior Court on a fe lony

drugconviction. Mr. Ga ither pled guilty to one fe lony

count of distribution of 4 in the Northea st Three Cellblock (“NE -3”) of the Jail. Id. At the time of Ga ither’s de ath, Def endant Washing ton was Dire ctor of the D.C. Depa rtment of Corre ctions, Defe ndant B rown was the Warde n for the Jail, and Def endant Ha

rrison wa s the Deputy

Warden for

Oper ations at the J ail. Def

s.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 5-7. Def

endants Toppin, B rooks, and White wer e the c orre ctional office rs assig ned to NE-3. Id. ¶¶ 8- 10. 4 Although ne ither par

ty in their brief

ing now befor e the Court has spe cifica lly addre ssed Gaither ’s status at the Jail at the tim e of his death, it is the Court’s under standing from pre vious filings in this case that Gaither was in Jail awaiting se ntencingin the D.C. Superior Court, having
ear lier pled guilty

to one fe lony

count of distribution of coca ine. For rea sons that are unclea

r, 5coca ine . . . .”)
.

Indeed, G aither is re fer

red to throughout the Second Amende d Complaint as a “pre trial 6 detainee .” See, e .g. Sec. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 63, 76. Plaintiff’s use of this term in the Second Amended Complaint perha ps ref lects the Jail’s appare nt prac tice of r efe rringto all inmates who have not yet bee n sentenc ed as “ pretria l detainee s,” re g ardle ss of whethe r they are awa iting trial or have alre ady

been c onvicted and/or

pled guilty
.

5 ho we ve r, the Se c on d A me nd e d Co mpl a int inc or re c tly a lle g e s th at “ Mr . G a ith e r w a s f ata lly stabbed . . . while he was a pr e tri al de ta ine e at th e Jail awaiti ng trial on drug charges .” Second Am e nd e d Co mpl a int , D oc ke t N o. [34] ( “ Se c . A m. C omp l.” ) ¶ 2 ( e mph a sis a dd e d)
. Qu ite 6 obviously , havingalre ady pled guilty , Gaither

was not—as the Sec ond Amended Complaint
asser ts—awaitingtrial, but rather was a waitingsentenc ing only . The Court hig hlights this fac t at the outset bec ause, a s will become c lear below, Ga ither’s status at the Jail at the time of he wa s stabbed is constitutionally -sig nificant. In the wake of Ga ither’s de ath, the D.C. Metropolitan Police De partment (“ MPD”) conducte d an investig ation into his st abbingat the Jail, and concluded that two of Gaither ’s fellow inmates at the J ail, Delonte Ke nt and Matthew I ng ram, ha d forc ed Ga ither into an open
c e ll i n th e NE -3 c e llb loc k, wh e re the y pr oc e e de d to sta

b h im, c a us ingthe inj ur ie s th at ul tim ate ly killed Gaither. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 13-14. A D.C. Superior Court Gr and Jury indicted Kent a

nd Ing ram for

Gaither ’s Fir st-Degree Murder
. Id. ¶ 14. The G rand Jury found that Ga ither had be en killed beca

use of his pre vious involvement in the gr and jury investigation into t he murde r of a n individual by

the name of

Kenne th Muldrow, J r. Pl.’s Stm t. ¶ 15. Ing ram a nd Kent we re subsequently

tried for Gaither ’s murder , but were found “not guilty ” by the jury on Dec ember

13, 2006. SeeJ oint St atus Report and Consent Motion to L ift Stay , Docke t [ 30]. The re maining f

acts surr ounding G aither’ s incarc eration at the J ail in Dece mber of 20026

are larg ely

in dispute. I n particula

r, the pa rties disag ree as to many

of the mate rial fa cts relating to the policies, proce dures a nd prac tices, as we ll as the conduc t of the De fenda nt Correc tional Offic ers, that Plaintiff alleg es led to Ga ither’s de ath. Given the she er numbe r of f actua l issues raised by the par ties and the number

of alleg ations and def

endants involved in this lawsuit, for clar ity ’s sake , the Court shall addre ss the rema ining f acts be low in discussing a nd ruling upon the parties’ specific arguments. B. Procedural Bac kground As explained above, Plaintiff, a s mother and pe rsonal re prese ntative of the Estate of Mikal R. Gaither, filed the above- captioned la wsuit on J uly

1, 2003. SeeCompl., Docket No. [1] . On Octobe r 6, 2003—bef ore D efe ndants’ re sponse to Plaintiff’s complaint was due — the District moved, with Plaintiff’s consent, for an orde r staying this civil ca se pendingresolution of the cr iminal investigation into Gaither’ s death that wa s beingconducte d by the MPD. See Consent Mot. of Def. D .C. to S tay Pending O utcome of Criminal Case, D ocket No. [7]. The Court gr anted the D istrict’s motion, and the case was stayed, ef fec tive October

8, 2003, pending further notice fr om the parties. See 10 /8/ 03 Min . O rd e r. Th e sta y re ma ine d in

pla c e un til Janu ary 4, 20 07 , whe n th e Court

g ra nte d th e pa

rt ie s’ joi nt r e qu e st t o li ft

the sta y ba se d u po n th e ir repr esentation that the criminal investigation into Gaither’s death was now c omplete and the related cr iminal trials had rec ently conclude d. SeeJ oint St atus Report and Consent Mot. to L ift Stay , D oc ke t N o. [30]; see also 1/4/07 Min. Order. Plaintiff filed her Sec ond Amended Complaint on Fe bruar y 9, 2007, shortly

afte r the stay in this case had be en lifted. See Sec. Am. Compl., Docket No. [34]. P laintiff asser ts three
se pa rate c a us e s o f a c tio n a g a ins t D e fe nd ants . F ir st, Pla int if f s e ts f or th a c la im p ur su ant t o7

Section 1983 for violation of Ga ither’s F ifth Amendment rig hts. More spec ifically , with respec t to the Def

endant Of ficials (in both their of

ficial a nd individual capac ities) and the District ( whom Plaintiff asserts is liable for the conduc t of the De fenda nt Officia ls), Plaintiff alleg es that they subjected G aither to a

“ser ious and unrea sonable risk of violent injury as a r esult of the unconstitutional conditions at the J ail that wer e we ll-known to the defe ndant offic ials,” including

“ pe rv a siv e vio le nc e ; ov e rc ro wd ing ; a sh or ta g e of ne c e ssa ry c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs ; in a de qu ate tr a ini ngof

c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs ; ne g lig e nt s up e rv isi on of c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs ; in a de qu ate po lic ie s, pr oc e dure s, and

pr a c tic e s f

or c ri tic a l st a ff

ing , c la ssi fi c atio n, and

se c ur ity ; and

fa ilure to enfor ce suc h policies, proce dures, a nd prac tices re lating to c ritical staff ing a nd secur ity

that wer e in effe ct.” Id. ¶ 6 3. Ac c or din gto P la int if f, the “ [d]e fe nd ant o ff

ic ia ls’ on g oin gfa ilure to a dd re ss the se un c on sti tut ion a lly

da ng e ro us c on dit ion s w a s th e re su lt o f a c on sc iou s a

nd de lib e rate decision or of

rec kless disreg ard f

or the saf ety of inmates at the Jail,” which c onduct violated Ga ith e r’ s F if

th A me ndme nt r ig hts in t wo dis tin c t w ay s: o ne , b y “ dir e c tly and pr oximate ly caus[ing] Gaither ’s injuries and de ath in violation of the Fifth Ame ndment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;” and two, by

beingof such a

n “egreg ious and outrag eous [nature] that it shocks the contempora

ry conscie nce, the reby

also deprivingplaintiff of substantive due proce ss in violation of the F ifth Amendment and 42 U .S.C. § 1983.” Id. ¶¶ 64- 66. Wit h respe ct to the Def

endant Corr ectional Of

fice rs, Plaintiff alleg es that “one of the three corr ectional of

fice rs assig ned to the NE- 3 Housing Unit left her post with the a cquiesc ence of the other

assig ned cor

rec tional office rs without first arr ang ing f or tempora

ry cover ag e of he r post by a re lief off

icer ,” and that “[t] his and other c onduct by the def endant c orre ctional offic ers was de liberate ly

indiffer ent to and re cklessly disreg arde d the substantial and unre asonable risk of8

harm to Ga ither,” the reby violating Ga ither’s F ifth Amendment rig hts in two dist inct way s: one, by “proximately

caus[ing] his injuries and death,” and two, by beingof such a

n “egreg ious and outrag eous [nature] that it shocks the contempora ry conscie nce.” Id. ¶¶ 69- 71. Se c on d, Pla int if

f a lle g e s a ne g lig e nc e /surv iva l a c tio n a g a ins t a ll D e fe nd ants . With
re sp e c t to the De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls, Pla int if

f a sse rt s th at th e y

“ fa ile d to re qu ir e re a so na bly fre quent and una

nnounced housingunit, inmate, and ce ll shakedowns; to provide for the installation of metal detec tors and nec essar y secur ity came ras; to provide a dequate numbers of
corr ectional of

fice rs to cellblocks at all times; and to provide proper trainingand super

vision for
corr ectional of

fice rs and other

employ ees.” Id. ¶ 75. Plaintiff furthe r alleg es that the “ Def endant of fi c ia ls k ne w, or sh ou ld h ave kn own th at, a s a re su lt o f t

he se and oth e r n e c e ssa

ry and g e ne ra lly
a c c e pte d p ri so n- se c ur ity

po lic ie s, pr a c tic e s a

nd re so ur c e s f

or wh ic h th e y

ha d r e sp on sib ili ty , it
was re asonably

fore seea ble that pre -trial deta inees such a s Gaither w ould be attac ked and seriously injured by

other inmates.” Id. ¶ 75. With respect to the De fenda nt Correc tional Of fi c e rs , Pl a int if

f a lle g e s th at th e y

“ kn e w o r s ho uld

have kn own th at, a s a

re su lt o f t

he ir fa ilure to maintain a leve l of three corr ectional of fice rs on duty

at all times duringthe day and eve ning shifts in Northeast Thre e ce llblock; to control contraba nd; and to take pr actica l steps to control
and mon ito r t he a c tiv ity

and mov e me nt o f i nmate s w he n th e y we re pe rm itt e d to le ave the ir c e lls , it w a s r e a so na

bly fo re se e a ble that inmate s su c h a s G a ith e r w ou ld b e atta c ke d a nd se ri ou sly injured by

other inmates.” Id. ¶ 76. F inally , with respec t to the District, Plainti ff a lleg es that D.C. is “vicar iously

liable under

the doctrine of respondeat superior for the a cts or omissions” of both the Def

endant Of ficials and the Def

endant Corr ectional Of

fice rs. Id. ¶ 77. Third, Plaintiff asser

ts a claim for

wrong ful death ag ainst all Defe ndants, alleg ing that9

“[a]s a direct and pr ox imate re sult” of the De fenda nts’ neg lige nce, a s descr ibed above , “De cede nt Mikal Gaither died on or about Dec ember

15, 2002.” Id. ¶ 80. Currently pendingbefor e the Court ar e De fenda nts’ Motion for Summary J udg ment, see Docke t No. [146] , and Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment, see Docke t No. [147]
. The pa rties have eac h filed their r espec tive oppositions and replies. SeeDef s.’ Opp’n, D ocket No. [157] ; Pl.’s Opp’n, Docke t No. [155] ; Defs.’ Reply , Docke t No. [162] ; Pl.’s R eply , Docke t No. [163] . The motions are thus fully briefe d and now r ipe for the Court’s resolution. II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a par ty is entitled to summ ary

judgme nt “if the ple ading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that the re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matter of la

w.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Tao v. Fre eh , 27 F.3d 635, 638 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). Under the summary

judgme nt standard, the movingparty bear s the “initial responsibility of informingthe district court of the basis for [its] motion, and identifying those portions of the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits which [it ] believe[s] demonstrate the absenc e of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t.” Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 7 7 U. S
. 3 1 7 , 3 2 3 (1 9 8 6 ). Inre s p o n s e, th e n o n -m o v i n g p arty mu s t“go beyond the pleading s and by [i ts] own af

fidavits, or depositions, answer s to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, ‘desig nate’ specific fac ts showing that ther e is a g enuine issue f or trial.” Id. at 324 (interna l citations omit ted). Although a

court should dra

w all infer ence s from the supportingrec ords submitted by the nonmoving pa

rty , the mere exis tence of a f actua l dispute, by

itself, is insufficient to bar summar y10

judgme nt. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To be materia l, the fac tual asser

tion mustbe ca

pable of aff ectingthe substantive outcome of the litigation; to be g enuine, the issue must be suppor ted by sufficie nt admissible evidence that a re asonable trier- offac t could find for the nonmoving pa rty . Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 8 13 F .2 d 1 23 6, 12 42 -4 3 ( D. C. Cir . 1 98 7) ; Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 251 (the c ourt must determine “ whether the evidenc e prese nts a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one par

ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w”) . “I f the e vidence is merely colora ble, or is not sufficie ntly

probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d.” Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (interna l citations omit ted). “ Mere alleg ations or denials in the a dverse party ’s pleading s are insufficient to def

eat a n otherwise pr oper motion for summar y judgme nt.” W

illiams v. Callaghan , 9 38 F . Su

pp . 4 6, 49 (D .D .C. 19 96 ). Th e a dv e rs e pa rt y mus t do mor e tha

n s imp ly “show that ther e is some metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.” Ma tsu sh ita Ele c . I nd us . Co. v . Ze nit

h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, while the movant bear s the initial responsibility

of identifying those portions of the re cord that demonstrate the a bsence of a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t, t he burd e n s hif

ts t o th e no n- mov ant t o “ c ome fo rw ard wi th ‘s pe c if ic fa c ts s ho wi ngthat th e re is a genuine issue for trial .’” Id. at 58 7 ( c iti ngF e d. R. C iv. P. 56(e) ) (e mphasis in origina l). III . D ISC USS ION The Court turns first to consider Def endants’ motion for summar y judgme nt, which advanc es seve ral a

rguments—many

in the alternative—with respec t to both P laintiff’s constitutionally -base d and neg lige nce- based c laims. First, Def endants a rgue that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, as a sserted a g ainst all Defe ndants, is barre d by the doctrine of issueDef endants orig inally

included a sixth arg ument in their motion for summary 7 judgme nt—namely , that Gaither ’s contributory neg lige nce a

nd/or assumption of the risk bar red Plaintiff’s claims. SeeDef s.’ MSJ at 42-46. This ar g ument has since be en withdra wn by Def endants. SeeNotice of

Wit hdraw al of Ar g ument, Docke t No. [148]
.

11 prec lusion. S econd, D efe ndants contend that Plainti ff’ s claims (both constitutionally -base d and
ne g lig e nc e -b a se d) a g a ins t th e De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls i n th e ir

of fi c ia l c a pa c ity , a s o pp os e d to the ir individual capac ity , should be dismissed as redunda nt of her c laims ag ainst the District. Third, De fe nd ants a sse rt

that Pla int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t mu st f a il b e c a us e Plaintiff cannot substantively prove he r cla im for municipal liability . Four th and fifth, De fe nd ants c on te nd

that th e De fe nd ant O ff

ic ia ls a nd the De fe nd ant C or

re c tio na l O ff

ic e rs , re sp e c tiv e ly , a

re e nti tle d to qu a lif

ie d immun ity

a s a g a ins t Pla int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im. F if th
and fi na lly , D e fe nd ants argue that Pla int if f’ s n e g lig e nc e -b a se d c la ims a g a ins t a ll D e fe nd ants must fail beca

use she c annot show that the De fenda nts violated any

applicable national standar ds of ca re. 7 The Court will then consider the merits of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgme nt. Plaintiff has moved on the sole issue of Gaither ’s contributory

neg lige nce a

nd/or assumption of risk, arguing that there is no evide nce f rom which a

rea sonable jury

could conc lude that Gaither
c on tr ibute d to or

c a us e d h is o wn

de ath. Pla int if

f t he re fo re se e ks an o rd e r p re c lud ingDe fe nd ants from ra ising the de fense of contributory neg lige nce a

nd/or assumption of risk at trial. A. TheDo c tri neof I

ssu e Pr e c lus ion Do es No t B ar Plain tif f’ s S e c tio n 1 98 3 Claim De fe nd ants fi rs t c on te nd

that Pla int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t a ll D e fe nd ants is ba rr e d b e c a us e “ the iss ue of

wh e the r t he re e xiste d c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns at th e Jail in Dec ember

2002, and whe ther the Jail officials exhibit ed deliber ate indiffe renc e to the hea lth and12

sa fe ty of the pr e tr ia l de ta ine e s and inm ate s, wa s a lr e a dy

de c ide d in

the ne g ativ e by

the U. S. District Court [ of the District of Columbia] in March 2003,” in a n order issued in two relate d
c ivi l a c tio ns : Campbell v. Mc Gruder , Civil Act. No. 71- 1462, and Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jack son , Civil Act. No. 75- 1668. Def s.’ MSJ at 21. For

the re asons set for

th below, the Court finds that Def

endants have fa iled to meet their burde n of demonstrating that issue pr eclusion
a pp lie s to ba

r P la int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im. As an initial matter, althoug h Def endants broa dly

contend that “ [t ]he doctrines of r es jud ic ata and /or iss ue pr e c lus ion

ba rs [ sic ] pl aintiff’s c onstitut ional claims,” De fs.’ MSJ at 20-21, it is apparent upon c loser re view that De fenda nts have in fa ct re lied only on the doctrine of issue prec lusion in arg uing that Plainti ff is bar red f rom litigatingcer

tain issues. The doctr ine of re s judicata, whic h is aimed at “‘ preve nt[ ing] repe titious litigation involving the sa me ca uses of action or the same issues,’” is “‘usually [] parse d into claim and issue pre clusion.’” Nextwave Pers. Commc’n, Inc. v . Fed. Commc ’n Comm’n , 254 F.3d 130, 142- 43 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund v . Indus. Gear M fg. Co. , 723 F.2d 944, 946 ( D.C. Cir. 1983)).

“ ‘Und e r t he c la im p re c lus ion

a sp e c t of re s ju dic ata , a

fi na l ju dg me nt o n th e me ri ts i n a pr ior su it involving the same par

ties or their privies ba

rs subsequent suits based on the same c ause of action.’” Id. at1 4 3 (qu o t i n g I.A.M Nat’l Pension Fund, 723 F.2d at 946-47). It applies whethe r or not the newclaims wer e ac tually litigated in the pr evious ac tion; rather, “ [i ]tis sufficient if the claims ‘could have bee n raised’ at an e arlier juncture.” Ve lik

on ja v . A sh c ro

ft , 355 F. Supp. 2d 197, 201 (D.D.C. 2005). B y contra st, “‘[u] nder the issue prec lusion aspect of r es judicata , a fina l judgme nt on the merits in a prior suit prec ludes subsequent re litigation of issues ac tually litigated
and de te rm ine d in

the pr ior su it, re g ard le ss o f whe the r t he su bs e qu e nt s uit

is b a se d o n th e same13

cause of ac tion.’” Nextwave , 2 5 4 F. 3 d at1 4 7 (qu o t i n g I.A.M Nat’l Pension Fund, 723 F.2d at 947). De fe nd ants , unf

or tun ate ly , h ave ig no re d th is d ist inc tio n. Th e y re pe ate dly

a sse rt in t he ir briefingthat Plaintiff’s claims are barr ed by “re s judicata a

nd/or issue prec lusion” without clar ifying whether , by

addingthe phra se “r es judicata ,” they intended to asser

t that Plainti ff’ s claims are barr ed by

claim pre clusion as well as issue pr eclusion. Se e ge ne ra lly Def s.’ MSJ at 19 -2 3. Pla int if

f h a s tr e ate d D e fe nd ants ’ a rgume nts on

thi s p oint a s a sse rt ingbo th i ssu e and c la im prec lusion. SeePl. ’s Op p’ n at 2- 6. I t is a pp are nt, ho we ve r, that D e fe nd ants have in a c tua lity
re lie d s ole ly

on the do c tr ine of

iss ue pr e c lus ion

—a nd no t th e re late d d oc tr ine of c la im pr e c lus ion

—in arguin gthat Pla int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im i s b arr e d. F or e xamp le , D e fe nd ants ’ memorandum in support of their motion for summary

judgme nt sets forth only

the eleme nts for issue prec lusion (and not for c laim prec lusion), and cites solely to case law discussingthe doctrine of

issue prec lusion (and not to the doctrine of claim pre clusion). See Def s.’ MSJ at 19- 23. In addition, Defe ndants have made no attempt to demonstrate that the par ticular causes of action in t

he pr ior laws uit s are ide nti c a l to tho se br ou g ht i n th e pe nd ingmatte r, a s is ne c e ssa ry in provingthe application of claim prec lusion. See ge nerally id. ; see also Def s.’ Reply at 36-37. Finally , Def

endants themselve s make c lear that their ar g uments on this point are based on a n
a s s e rti o nth at “ th e p la inti f f in th is c a s e c an n o t r e li ti g ate [c e rta in ] issues in this l awsuit” that we re,
acc ordingto Defe ndants, alre ady raised in a

nd decide d by

the district court in Cam

pb e ll and In ma te s o f D .C. J ail

. De fs .’ MSJ at

2 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T hu s, de sp ite the la c k o f c lari ty in Def endants’ br iefing , it is apparent that De fenda nts assert a de fense of issue pre clusion only
. Acc ording ly , the Court proce eds with the under standing that Def endants’ r es judicata

argument14

is premised solely

on the doctrine of issue pre clusion. Turningthen to the merits of De fenda nts’ briefing , Def

endants a rgue that Plaintiff’s constitutional claim is barred by the litigation in the Cam

pb e ll and Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jack son actions. De fs.’ MSJ at 21. Cam pb e ll and In ma te

s o f D .C. J ail wer e both class a ction lawsuits broug ht in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by pretria l de ta ine e s and

c onvic te d p ri so ne rs , r e sp e c tiv e ly , s e e kin gde c larator y and inj un c tiv e re lie f a g a ins t various alleg edly

unconstitutional conditions at the J ail. See Campbell v. Mc Gruder , 580 F.2d 52 1, 52 4 ( D. C. C ir . 1 97 8) ; Inmates of D.C. Jail v. J ackson , 416 F. Supp. 119, 120 (D.D .C. 1976). InM ar ch o f 2 0 0 3 , af

t er m o re th an th i rt y

y ea rs o f o n go i n g l i t i gat i o nan d co urt -o v er s i gh t , J u d ge Wil liam B. B ry ant g rante d the District’s motion to terminate all orde rs for pr ospective r elief previously

issued and orde red the case s dismis sed. See Campbell v. Mc Gruder , Civil Act. No. 71-1462, Doc ket No. [867] , (“Ma rch 21, 2003 O rder ”). A ccor ding to De fenda nts, the Marc h 21, 2003 Orde r bar s Plainti ff’ s Section 1983 claim bec ause “ the issue of whe ther ther e existed constitutional viol ations at the Jail i n Dec ember 2002, and whe ther the Jail officials exhibit ed deliberate indiffer ence to the health and sa fety of the pre trial detaine es and inmate s was alr eady decide d in the neg ative by the U.S. District Court [ of the District of Columbia] in March 2003.” Def s.’ MSJ at 21. In o rd e r t o d e mon str ate that is su e pr e c lus ion a pp lie s, the fo llo wi ngthr e e c on dit ion s mu st be me t: First, the same issue now being raised must have been contested by the par ties and submitt ed for judicial deter mination in the prior case . Second, the issue must have been a ctually

and nece ssarily deter

mined by a cour t of compete nt jurisdiction in t hat pr ior c a se . T hir d, pr e c lus ion

in t he se c on d c a se mus t not wor k a b a sic un fa ir

ne ss t o the par ty bound by the first dete rmination.15

Y amaha Corp. of Am. v. United States , 961 F.2d 245, 254 ( D.C. Cir. 1992) (interna l citations omi tte d) . Cl a im p re c lus ion is a n a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e , a

nd De fe nd ants , a s th e pa

rt y pr op on e nt, bear the burde n of establishingall nece ssary elements. See F e d. R. C iv. P. 8 (c ); see also Am. Fed’n of Gov ’t Employe es v. Fe d. Labor Relations Auth. , 835 F.2d 1458, 1463 ( D.C. Cir. 1987) (propone nt has “the bur den of pr oving r es judicata ”). Plaintiff c ontends that Def endants have failed to de monstrate that the issues now r aised by Plaintiff were considere d and re solved by the court in Cam

pb e ll and In ma te

s o f J ail . Pl.’s Opp’n at 6-9. The Court ag ree s. As an initial matter, De fenda nts paint with too broad a brush. The mere fac t that both the instant action and the pr evious civil matters both involve—at the most abstrac t level—alleg ations of “c onstitut ional violations” at the Jail i s insufficient, by itself, to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are ba rre d by issue prec lusion. There a re, quite obviously , a wide va riety of

“ c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns ” that an in div idu a l ma y a lle g e , b ut D e fe nd ants have ma de no e ff or t to i d e n t i f y w i than y d e g r e e o f

s p e c i f i c i ty th e p r e c i s e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i s s u e s i nqu e s t i o n . S i m i l ar l y, De fe nd ants ’ b ro a d c la im that bo th c a se s invo lve c la ims a bo ut “ de lib e rate ind if

fe re nc e ” by

Jail officia ls is ins ufficie nt to show that issue preclusion is appropr iate. Of course , when view ed from 20,000 fe et, almost any case that raises a lleg ations of unconstitutional jailhouse conditions may be said to ra ise and re solve the same g ener al “issue.” That, howe ver, is not suffic ient. Although the issues raised in a nd resolved by

the pre vious lit iga

tion need not be “ prec isely the same” as those now r aised by Plaintiff, the D.C. Circuit has advised that “ the basic issue in both”
case s must “never

theless” be the same. McLaughlin v. Bradlee , 803 F.2d 1197, 1203 ( D.C. Cir. 1986) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). In consideringwhether issues are sufficie ntly

simil ar for pur poses of issue pre clusion, courts consider whether : (a) “ the issues in the two suits are ve ry16

‘closely related;’” ( b) “the re r emains at lea st ‘a substantial over lap betwe en the e vidence or argument to be adva

nced in the se cond proc eedingand that adva nced in the f

irst;’” and ( c) “evide ntiary

proce eding s in the first action could ‘ rea sonably be expected to have embr ace d the matter soug ht to be prese nted in the sec ond.’” Id. (q uo tin gRe state me nt ( Se c on d) of Judg me nts § 27 , c omm e nt c (1 98 2) ). In th is c a se , D e fe nd ants have ma de no e ff or t to a dd re ss a ny of the se fac tors or otherw ise demonstrate that the constitutional violations allege d in this case ar e the
same a s those in the Cam

pb e ll / In ma te s o f D .C. J ail lit ig atio n. F or

thi s r e a so n a lon e , D e fe nd ants ’
c la im o f i ssu e pr e c lus ion

mus t f a il. Reg ardle ss, the Court finds that the specific issues raised by Plaintiff in the instant litigation—when c onsidered in the pr oper sc ope—we re not a ctually decide d by

the Marc h 21, 2003 Orde r in Cam

pb e ll / In ma te s o f J ail , a s D e fe nd ants c la im. On fi rs t bl us h, De fe nd ants ’ argument appea

rs to have some merit. Plaintiff’s suit alleg es that unconstitutional conditions at the J ail in late 2002 led to a se ries of inmate -on-inmate sta bbing a ttacks in Dec ember

of that y ear , including the lethal attac k on Gaither
. SeeSec. Am. Compl. Si milarly , the Cam pb e ll and In ma te s in J ail actions alleg ed unconstitutional conditions at the J ail. Although the ear lier
a c tio ns pr inc ipa lly

fo c us e d o n e nv ir onme nta l and he a lthiss ue s— su c h a s v iol atio ns of D. C. BuildingCode, Plumbi ngCode, HousingRegulations, Health Regulations, Food Regulations and F ir e Cod e —th at are no t at is su e in t his c a se , th e a c tio ns a lso a pp e ar t o h ave tou c he d u

po n s a fe ty iss ue s, su c h a s o ve rc ro wd ingand ina de qu ate c la ssi fi c atio n s y ste ms, that are a lso at is su e in Plaintiff’s suit. Se e Cam

pb e ll , 4 16 F . Su

pp . at 10 3, 10 5- 06 . N on e the le ss, up on c los e r r e vie w, it is clear that none of the issues now raise d by Plaintiff in fact we re r aised a nd decide d by

the Marc h 21, 2003 Orde r as De fenda nts claim.Curiously , althoug h Def endants’ a

rgument rests on the pre clusive ef fec t of this March 8 21, 2003 Orde r, De fenda

nts have not ac tually

provided the Court with a c opy of that orde r. Rather, De fenda

nts have submitted only

a copy of Judge B ry ant’s Jul y

22, 2003 Orde r dismissing the Cam pb e ll and In ma te

s o f D .C. J ail c a se s in the ir e nti re ty and a c op y of the D. C. C ir c uit mandate a ffirmingthe dismissal. SeeDe fs .’ MSJ, E x. A ( c op y of D. C. C ir c uit

mand ate and

July 22, 2003 Orde r). None theless, bec ause the Marc h 21, 2003 Orde r is elec tronically available on the public docke t, the Court was able to reviewthe orde r for itself. In addition, the Court notes that Defe ndants have also cited to“tra nscripts of the Cam

pb e ll proce eding s” in support of their a rgument that issue prec lusion applies in this case , but did not actua lly provide such material to the Court. SeeDe fs .’ MSJ at 21 . Si mil arl y , D e fe nd ants c ite d to various docke t entries in the Cam pb e ll lit ig atio n, but f

a ile d to a c tua lly

atta c h th e c ite d mate ri a l to their motion. See id. at 13. The Court wa s able to re view the c ited filings in the Cam pb e ll c a se only beca use Plaintiff—rathe r than De fenda nts—provided the Court with copies of the cited materia l. Defe ndants, as the pa rty proponents, have the burde n of demonstrating that the doc trine of iss ue pr e c lus ion

a pp lie s, and

that in c lud e s p ro vid ingthe Court wi th a ll r e le va

nt c ite d mate ri a l; Def endants’ f ailure to do so is inexcusable. 17 The Court’s a

naly sis beg ins with the March 21, 2003 O rder itself. That orde r, howe ver,

8 is lit tle more than two pa g es longand conta ins no substantive discussion or description of the issues raised a

nd decide d by

J udg e B ry ant. SeeMa

rc h 2 1, 20 03 Or de r. Al tho ug h D e fe nd ants contend that the Ma

rch 21, 2003 O rder

“cle arly” dec ided that there wer e no constitutional vio latio ns at th e Jail in D e c e mbe r 2 00 2, and that Jai l of

fi c ia ls h a d n ot e xhibi te d d e lib e rate indiffer ence to the health and sa fety of the pre trial detaine es and inmate s, see Def s.’ MSJ at 21, the orde r itself includes no suc h swee ping c onclusions. Rather, the Ma rch 21, 2003 O rder

states in s ub sta nc e on ly that “ the Court

do e s n ot f

ind that pr os pe c tiv e re lie f r e ma ins ne c e ssa ry to
corr ect c urre nt and ong oing violations of F eder al rig hts at the” Jail, without specify ing what “F eder al rig hts” wer e at issue. Ma rch 21, 2003 O rder

at 2. The Ma

rch 21, 2003 O rder

itself thus sheds little light on the ac tual issues decide d by J udg e B ry ant. Acc ording ly , to help illumi nate the pr ecise issues raised in a nd decide d by

the Marc h 21, 2003 Orde r, Plaintiff, in opposition t o Def endants’ motion, has provide d the Court with copies of18

the par ties’ brief ing f iled in Cam

pb e ll / In ma te s o f J ail with respec t to the March 21, 2003 O rder
. SeePl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 3 (The Special Of fice r’s Repor

t on I ssues Related to Environmenta l Conditi ons at the D.C. J ail, Marc h 7, 2003); Ex. 4 (Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Ter minate); Ex. 5 (M e m. i n Su

pp or t of D. C.’ s Mo t. t o T e rm inate Pop ulatio n L imi tatio n) ; E x. 6 ( Me m. i n S u p p o rto f D
. C
. ’s M o t . t o T erm i n at e)
. As b ec o m es ap p ar en tu p o nre v i ew o f t h atb ri ef

i n g, J u d ge Br y ant’s dec ision, as set forth in the Mar ch 21, 2003 Or der, r elated only to environmental
c on dit ion s in

the Jail , s uc h a s b e d s pa c e , te mpe ra tur e c on tr ol a

nd ve nti latio n, c lot

hin gre qu e sts , maintenanc e re pairs, issuance of basic supplies, c lothing and linen e x chang e, sanitation and housekee ping issues, e tc. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 3 (The Special Of fice r’s Repor

t on I ssues Related to Environmenta l Condit ions at the D.C. J ail, Marc h 7, 2003); Ex. 4 (Memora ndum of Points and Authorities in Opposit ion to Defe ndants’ Motion to Terminate) at 5; E x. 6 ( Me m. i n Su

pp or t of D. C.’ s Mo t. t o T e rm inate ) at 5- 17 . T he se iss ue s a re , q uit e obviously , not the same ba sic issues raised by Plaintiff in the instant li tigation. Mo re ov e r, c on tr ary

to D e fe nd ants ’ a sse rt ion s, the pr e c ise iss ue s n owra ise d b y Pla int if f i n the instant liti g ation wer e g iven little, if any , attention by the par ties in their briefingsubmitt ed with respec t to the March 21, 2003 O rder . Indeed, the only mention in either the pa

rties’ brie fing or the Court’s Mar ch 21, 2003 Or der of inmate-on-inmate violence is a brief one para g raph summary in the District’s brief

ing submitted to J udg e B ry ant, which include s a mere sentenc e noting that in De cembe r of 2002 “ two inmates wer e murde red in unre lated assa ults and a third inmate was stabbe d in another unr elated inc ident.” See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 6 (Mem. in S upport of D.C.’s Mot.n to Terminate) at 9. In addition, although, a s discussed above , cer tain issues—such as ove rcr owdingat the19

J ail—appea

r to have been r aised in the c ourse of the Cam pb e ll/ In ma te s o f J ail lit ig atio n, the se matters we re not at issue in the March 21, 2003 O rder . For example, although Judge Br y ant had imposed a population limit ation in J uly 1985 to addre ss the problem of ove rcr owding , the population cap wa s subsequently terminated in June of 2002, well bef ore the Dec ember

2002 incidents that are the foc us of Plaintiff’s suit; iss ues re lating to ove rcr owdingand the imposed population cap we re thus re solved befor e Ga ither’s de ath and be fore the Marc h 21, 2003 Orde r Def endants now r ely

upon. SeeDef

s.’ Stmt. ¶ 2. Ultimately , the Court finds that Def endants have fa iled to demonstrate that the pa rticular issues raised by

Plaintiff in the instant lawsuit reg ardingalleg ed over crow ded conditions and inadequate staff

ing, tr ainingand super

vision, as well as def

iciencie s in security

policies and pr a c tic e s th at e xiste d in

De c e mbe r o f 2 00 2, we re ra ise d in or de c ide d b y

Judg e B ryant i n h is Marc h 21, 2003 Orde r. The me re f act that this ca se and the Cam pb e ll / In ma te s o f D .C. J ail matters both involve, at the most g ener al level, a lleg ations of unconstitutional violations does not
su pp or t a fi nd ingthat is su e pr e c lus ion ba rs Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im. Al tho ug h D e fe nd ants appea r to believe that the Marc h 21, 2003 Orde r should be re ad to pre clude a ny inmate who wa s incar cer ated pr ior Marc h 21, 2003 from litiga ting a ny alleg ations of constitutional violations at the J ail, the Court is not so persuaded. A ccor dingly , the Court conclude s that the application of the doctrine of issue pre clusion is inappropriate in this ca se. De fenda nts’ motion for summary jud g me nt i s th e re fo re DENI ED wi th r e sp e c t to the ir re s ju dic ata

c la ims
. B. Plain tif

f’ s Claim s A ga ins t th e De

fe nd an t O ffi c ial s in the ir O

ffi c ial Cap ac ity ar e Re du nd an t Def endants ne x t contend that Plaintiff’s cla ims (both her Section 1983 cla im as well as20

her ne g lige nce- based c laims) ag ainst the Def endant Of ficials in their off

icial ca pacity —as opposed to their individual capa cities—are redunda nt of the Plaintiff’s cla ims ag ainst the District and ther efor e ca

nnot be maintained. De fs.’ MSJ at 23-24. As De fenda nts corre ctly

observe ,

“ [a]n of fi c ia l c a pa c ity su it ‘ is n ot a

su it a g a ins t th e of

fi c ia l pe rs on a lly , f

or the re a l pa

rt y in interest is the entity .’” Ro bin so n v . D .C. , 4 03 F . Su pp . 2 d 3 9, 49 (D .D .C. 20 05 ). “ Th is C ir c uit has re cog nized that ‘[a] section 1983 suit for dama g es ag ainst municipal officia ls in their official capa cities is . . . equivalent to a suit ag ainst the municipality itself.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Atchinson v. D. C. , 7 3 F .3 d 4 18 , 4 24 (D .C. Cir .1 99 6) ). “ L ike wi se , ‘ a tor t a c tio n b ro ug ht a g a ins t c ity of fi c ia ls in their offic ial capa cities is equivalent to an a ction ag ainst the city itself.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Barnes
v . D .C. , Civ. No. 03-2547, 2005 WL1241132, at *3 (D.D .C. May 24, 2005)). “ Acc ording ly , ‘a plaintiff see king to r ecove r on a da mag es judg ment in an offic ial-ca pacity suit must look to the g overnme nt entity

itself.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). In light of this re ality , district courts in this Ci rcuit routinely dismiss claims broug ht
a g a ins t D istri c t of

fi c ia ls i n th e ir

of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s w he re su c h c la ims are du pli c ativ e of

c la ims broug ht ag ainst the District itself. Al tho ug h n e ith e r t

he Sup re me Cou

rt no r the Di str ic t of Columbi a Cir c uit have he ld that g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic ia ls s ue d in

the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s in

c on junctio n w ithsu its also filed ag ainst the municipality should be summarily

dismiss ed, t h is is the overwhelming approa ch that has been taken by members of this Court, as well as the position t aken by

other c ourts. This approa ch is based on the theory that reta ining the officia l as a named def

endant is a “ redunda

nt and an ine fficie nt use of judicial resour ces.” Pr ic e v . D .C. , 5 4 5 F. S u

p p . 2 d 8 9 , 9 4 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Chisholm v. Superior Court of D. C. , No. 06-2174, 2007 WL1601718, at *2 (D.D .C. J une 4, 2007)) (collec ting c ases) . Pursuant to t his a pp ro a c h, c ourt s c on sis te ntl y dis mis s a s d

up lic ativ e bo th S e c tio n 1 98 3 a nd tor t c la ims21

asser ted ag ainst District officia ls in their official c apac ity
. See, e .g., Ha rd yv . D .C. , 601 F. Supp. 2d 182, 186-87 (D.D .C. 2009) (“B eca use plaintiffs make the same c laims ag ainst the District of Columbi a, the same claims ag ainst [former Dire ctor of D .C. Depar tment of Correc tions] and [fo rm e r Ja il Wa

rd e n] in the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s a re re dund ant a

nd wi ll b e dis mis se d. ” ); Price , 545 F. Supp. 2d at 94-96 ( dismiss ing Sec tion 1983 and neg lige nce c laims ag ainst District officia ls as “not only

redunda nt but also unnece ssary

when the municipa lity

is also a named de fe nd ant” ); Cot ton v . D .C. , 4 21 F . Su pp . 2 d 8 3, 86 (D .D .C. 20 06 ) ( dis mis sin gtor t c la ims
a g a ins t D istri c t of

fi c ia ls a s “ du

pli c ativ e ” wh e re pla int if

f a lso name d D .C. a s d e fe nd ant a nd D. C. ha d f ile d a n a ns we r t o p la int if

f’ s c omp la int ); Robinson , 403 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (dismissing pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 a

nd Sur viv a l A c t c la ims a g a ins t Ch ie f o f t he MPD in h is o ff

ic ia l c a pa c ity as “c lear ly

duplicative of he r cla ims ag ainst the District itself”). Pla int if f n on e the le ss o bje c ts, arguin gthat “ un tim e ly dis mis sa l [of

Pla int if f’ s c la ims ] would otherwise w ork an injustice to limit P laintiff’s ability to choose how she prese nts her claims to a jury .” Pl.’s Opp’n at 21. Plainti ff, howe ver, ha s not directed the Court to any leg al
a uth or ity in s up po rt

of he r p os iti on , a

nd the Court

is n ot s o p e rs ua de d. As he r o ff ic ia l- c a pa c ity claims ag ainst the Def

endant Of ficials mer g e into her c laims ag ainst the District, Plaintiff suffer s
no pr e jud ic e fr om d ism iss a l of

the se c la ims , a

nd , a s d e mon str ate d a

bo ve , th e we ig ht o f t

he c a se law in this district counsels in favor of dismiss ing the redunda

nt claims at this stage in the litigation. Acc ording ly , the Court GRANTS Def endants’ motion to the extent they seek dismiss al of Plaintiff’s c laims ag ainst the Def endant Of ficials in their off

icial ca pacities. C. Plain tif

f’ s S e c tio n 1 98 3 Claim Ag

ain st t heDi str ic t Su rv iv es S

um ma ry J ud gm e nt As e xpla ine d a

bo ve , Pl a int if

f’ s Se c on d A me nd e d Co mpl a int a sse rt s a c la im p ur su ant t oThe Court notes that Plaintiff alleg es only that the District is liable for the Def endant 9 Offic ials’ conduc t under Sec tion 1983. SeeSec. Am. Compl. ¶ 68. Plaintiff makes no similar alleg ation that the District is also liable for the conduct of the Def endant Corr ectional Of

fice rs under Sec tion 1983. See ge nerally id. ¶¶ 69- 71. 22 Section 1983 for violation of Ga ither’s F ifth Amendment rig hts ag ainst the District, alleg ing that the Di str ic t is lia

ble fo r t he De fe nd ant O ff

ic ia ls’ a c tio ns (o r l a c k th e re of ). Ac c or din gto 9 Plaintiff, the Def

endant Of ficials subjec ted Gaither

to a “se rious and unre asonable risk of violent injury as a r esult of the unconstitutional conditions at the J ail that wer e we ll-known to the defe ndant offic ials,” including“per vasive violenc e; over crow ding; a shortag e of ne cessa

ry
corr ectional of

fice rs; inadequate trainingof cor rec tional office rs; neg lige nt supervision of
co rr ec t i o n al o ff

i ce rs ; i n ad equ at e p o l i ci es , p ro ce d ure s , an d p ra ct i ce s fo r c ri t i ca l s t af

fi n g, classification, and secur ity ; and fa ilure to enfor ce suc h policies, proce dures, a nd prac tices re lating to critical staf

fingand sec urity

that wer e in ef

fec t.” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 63. Plaintiff asser ts that the Def endant Of ficials’ “ ong oing f

ailure to a ddress these unconstitutionally dang erous conditions” violated Ga ither’s F ifth Amendment rig hts. Id. ¶¶ 64- 66. Def endants have moved for summary

judgme nt on this claim, arguing that the Plaintiff cannot esta blish muni cipal lia bil ity a g a ins t th e Di str ic t a s r e qu ir e d und e r S e c tio n 1 98 3. De fs .’ MSJ at 24 -2 9. De fe nd ants , in so moving, have org anized their ar g uments around f our g ener al topics based upon Plaintiff’ s alleg ations in her complaint—name ly , classification, staffing , secur ity and tra ining/super

vision. Acc ording ly , in addre ssing De fenda nts’ arguments, the Court shall do the same. Be fore doing so, how ever , the Court first pauses to re view the r eleva nt leg al standar ds implicated by

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim ag ainst the District—a task whic h neither pa rty has attempted. Indeed, the parties ha ve both larg ely

failed to provide any

discussion of the leg al23

framework ne cessa

ry for r esolution of Plaintiff’s claims. As a r esult, the brief s submitt ed by

the parties f ocus almost entirely

on fac tual alleg ations in a manner wholly divorce d from the r eleva nt leg al standar ds. One g laringconseque nce of the poor qua lity

of the pa rties’ brie fingis the failure to p ro pe rl y

e sta bli shthe a

pp ro pr iate c on sti tut ion a l st and ard s th at a pp ly in t his c a se , a

qu e sti on to which the Court now turns. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to see k monetary damag es fr om gove rnment off icials who have violate d his or her c onstitut ional rig hts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A municipality , such as the District, is also subject to suit under Section1983, but its li ability is lim ited only

to circumstanc es “whe n execution of a g overnme nt’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the g overnme nt
as an e ntity

is responsible under

§ 1983.” M

o n e l l v . D e p ’ t o f S o c . S e rv s . o f C i t yo f N

. Y. , 4 36 U. S. 694 (1978)) . In this case, Plaintiff has br oug ht a Section 1983 claim base d on alleg ations that
c on dit ion s at th e Jail vio late d G a ith e r’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts —a nd mor e sp e c if

ic a lly , h is F if

th Amendment rig hts. Si g nificantly , howeve r, althoug h it is undi sputed that the United States Constit ution impos es ce rtain oblig ations on prison officia ls to ensure the he alth and saf ety of incar cer ated individuals, whethe r that rig ht is gua rante ed under

the Fif th Amendment (a s Plainti ff alleg es) or

under the Eig hth Amendment depe nds upon the status of the inca rce rate d individual—a point that neither par ty has addr essed. I t is well established that the Eig hth Amendment’s prohibition on “cr uel and unusua l punishment” imposes various oblig ations upon prison officia ls, including a s is releva nt to the
case at hand, a

“duty . . . to protect prisone rs from violenc e at the ha nds of other pr isoners.” Farmer v . Brennan , 5 11 U. S. 8 25 , 8 33 (1 97 0) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . It is e qu a lly well settled, howe ver, that the “[Eighth] Amendment’s prohibition applies only to persons whoIndividuals suing the District f or constitutional due proc ess violations must do s o under 10 the F if th A me ndme nt, and

no t th e F ourt e e nth , a s th e Di str ic t—whic h is no t a state —is su

bje c t to the Due Proc ess Clause of the Fifth Ame ndment. See A therton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor , 567 F.3d 6 7 2 , 6 8 9 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Bu te ra v . D .C. , 235 F.3d 637, 645 n. 7 ( D.C. Cir. 1987)). On thi s p oint, t

he Court no te s th at, a lth ou g h th e Se c on d A me nd e d Co mpl a int no min a lly 11 char acte rizes Gaither a s “pre trial detaine e,” this labe l likely ref lects only the J ail’s policy

of classifying a ll non-sentence d inmates as pre trial detaine es—and doe s not appea r to ref lect whether Gaither is a “pre trial detaine e” f

or purpose s of the F ifth Amendment. 24 are subject to ‘punishment,” whic h excludes “pre trial detaine es . . . who have not bee n adjudicate d as guilty

of any crime a nd are there fore not subject to ‘punishment.’” Powers-Bunce
v . D .C. , 479 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (D.D .C. 2007). Acc ording ly , courts have rec og nized that pr e tr ia l de ta ine e s h ave an in de pe nd e nt d ue -p ro c e ss r ig ht u

nd e r t he F if th a nd F ourt e e nth Amendments to humane conditions while inca rce rate d. Ha rd

yv . D .C. , 601 F. Supp. 2d 182, 10 18 8 ( D. D. C. 2 00 9) . A lth ou g h th e e xac t c on tou rs of a pr e tr ia l de ta ine e ’s ri g ht u nd e r t he F if th Am e ndme nt h ave no t y e t be e n e sta bli sh e d, it i s c le ar t

hat th e Ei g hth

Am e ndme nt p ro vid e s a pretria l detainee “ at le as t as gr e at as the a nalog ous Eighth Ame ndment rig ht.” Id. (interna l quotations marks omitted) (empha sis in original). T hus, althoug h the rig hts under the F ifth and Eig hth Amendments are compar able, it appe ars that the F ifth Amendment may provide a g reater deg ree of protec tion to pretrial detaine es who a re not yet subject to punishment of any kind. Acc ording ly , whether

an individual is a pretr ial detainee is constituti onally -sig nificant. But, a s discussed above , see supra at pp. 4-5, the pa rties have not actually

briefe d the issue. The question theref

ore r emains: is Gaither—a s an individual who had a lrea dy pled guilty , but had not y e t be e n s e nte nc e d— a

pr e tr ia l de ta ine e , who se ri g hts are g ua ra nte e d und e r t

he F if th A me ndme nt, or is he a c onvicted inmate, whose rig hts are guara nteed unde r the Eig hth Amendment. The 11 majority of cour ts that have c onsidered this question have held that an individual who has be enSee Tilmon v. Prator , 368 F.3d 521 ( 5th Cir. 2004) (“We hold that a pr isoner who ha s 12 been c onvicted but has not y et bee n sentenc ed has the same status as a sentenc ed prisoner

for purposes of pur

poses of a naly zing whethe r the prison ha s a liberty interest in ce rtain proc edura l pr ote c tio ns . . . . ” ); Berry v . City of Muskogee , 900 F.2d 1489, 1493 ( 10th Cir. 1990) (“We see no re a so n to tr e at in c arc e rate d p e rs on s w ho se g uil t ha s b e e n a dju dic ate d f or ma lly but w ho awa it sentenc ing like pr etrial de tainees, who are detained pr imarily to ensure the ir prese nce at trial and who ca nnot be punished, and w e per ceive ever y rea son to treat those a

waitingsentenc ing the same a s inmate s a lr e a dy

se nte nc e d. ” ); but see Fue ntes v. W agner , 206 F.3d 335, 341 ( 3rd Cir. 2000) (“ When Fuente s was plac ed in the re straint chair he wa s a convic ted inmate aw aiting sentenc ing. H is status under the Constituti on was ther efor e that of a pretria l detainee .”). 25 c onvic te d a

nd /or ple d guil ty

is not a p r e tr i a l d e t a i n e e f

o r p ur p o s e s o f th e F i f thA m e n dm e n t ? It 12 ap p ea rs fr o mth e C o urt ’s o wn b ri ef re s ea rc hth atth i s i s an o p en qu es t i o ni nth i s C i rc u i t , al th o u gh
case law sug g ests that the D.C. Circuit would follow the majority approa ch. See Campbe ll v. McG ruder , 580 F.2d 521, 527 ( D.C. Cir. 1978) (“pr etrial de tainees . . . a re pr esumed innoce nt. They are unconvic ted of any

crime.” ) (e mphasis added) . Quite clea rly , if the Court wer e to find that an in div idu a l w ho ha s p le d guil ty but ha s n ot ye t be e n s e nte nc e d s ho uld be tr e ate d a s a
co n v i ct edi n m at e, ra th er

th an a p re tri al d et ai n ee , fo r c o n s t i tu t i o n al p urp o s es o f e v al u at i n g a fa ilure -t o- pr ote c t c la im, Pla int if f’ s a lle g atio ns that th e De fe nd ants vio late d G a ith e r’ s Fi fth Amendment rig hts are, to sa y the least, on shaky

g round. Nonethele ss, the Court need not—and inde ed, shall not—resolve this question on the inadequate re cord nowbefor e it. As an initial matter, althoug h the Fif th Amendment may

offe r g re ate r p ro te c tio n th an th e Ei g hth Am e ndme nt, c ourt s h ave g e ne ra lly e mpl oye d th e same standard of

“deliber ate indiffe renc e” to mea sure whe ther prison off icials have violated an individual’s rig ht to humane conditions under e ither the F ifth or Eig hth Amendment. See, e .g., Hardy , 601 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (“ Be cause a pre trial detaine e’s r ights unde r the F ifth Amendment
are at le a st a s g re at a s th os e a ff or de d to a c onvic te d p ri so ne r u

nd e r t he Ei g hth Am e ndme nt,In addition to the arguments discussed below, De fenda nts also alleg e in passingthat 13 even a ssuming“[P] laintiff ca n show defic iencies in the D istrict’s customs, policies, and/or prac tices,” the District is nonetheless entitled to summary judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s Section 1983 claim in its entirety

beca use “the re is insuffic ient evidenc e in the re cord to e stablish that the District’s asser

ted fa ilures proxim ately

cause d Mikal Gaither’ s death.” Def s.’ MSJ at 28-29. Acc ordingto Defe ndants, bec ause G aither “ failed to notify the District def

endants that he had pr ov ide d te sti mony

to t he g ra nd jur y ,” the “ Di str ic t ha d n o w ay of kn ow ingof

any po te nti a l r isk of har m that Gaither’ s assailant posed.” Id. at 29. Fir st, to the ex tent this argument is premised on an a lle g atio n th at G a ith e r s ho uld have no tif

ie d th e Jail of

his g ra nd jur y te sti mony , th is argument is, in essence , based on the same a lleg ations that underlie De fenda nts’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims are barr ed by the af firmative de fense s of contributory neg lige nce a

nd/or assumption of the risk. For the re asons discussed be low, materia l fac tual disputes prec lude summary judgme nt on these asse rted de fense s. Se e inf ra at pp. 52-60. Sec ond, to the extent Def endants a rgue more g ener ally

that Plaintiff has failed to show that Defe ndants’ conduc t pr oximate ly

c a us e d G a ith e r’ s d e ath, the Court de c lin e s to c on sid e r t

his argume nt. De fe nd ants failed to provide any

fac tual or leg al citations in support of this assertion, dedica ting less than a pa ra g ra phto t his argume nt i n th e ir

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt a

nd ig no ri ngit a lto g e the r i n their Reply
. See id. at 28 -2 9. In li g ht o f t his c ur so ry

tr e atme nt, the Court

is n ot i n a

po sit ion to consider D efe ndants’ ar g ument on this point
. Se e als o S mi th , 4 13 F .3 d at 10 3 ( “ ‘t he pr oximate cau s e o f a ni n

j ury i s o rd i n ar i l y

a qu es t i o nfo r t h e j ury . ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Hicks v . United States , 511 F.2d 407, 420 ( D.C. Cir. 1975)). Th e Court

a lso no te s th at D e fe nd ants have ra ise d a ne w a rgume nts fo r t

he fi rs t ti me in their Reply

—namely , that they

are entitled to summary

judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s Section 1983 claim bec ause of

the abse nce of

inmate violence in NE-3 prior to De cembe r 14, 2002. See Def s.’ Re ply at 35 . T he Court , h ow e ve r, sh a ll n ot c on sid e r t his argume nt r a ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me in reply
. See, e .g., Am. W

ildlands v. Kempthorne, No. 07-5179, 2008 WL2651091, at *8 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 20 08 ) ( “ We n e e d n ot c on sid e r t his argume nt b e c a

us e pla int if

fs
. . . r a ise d it

fo r t he fi rs t tim e in t he ir re ply br ie f. ” ); McBridev. Me rrell Dow & Pharm., 80 0 F .2 d 1 20 8, 12 11 (D .C. Cir .1 98 6) (“ Con sid e ri ngan a rgume nt a dv anc e d f

or the fi rs t ti me in a

re ply br ie f .
. . is n ot o nly unfair to a

n appellee , but also entails the risk of a n improvident or ill-advised opinion on the 26 applying the Eig hth Amendment ‘de liberate indiffer ence ’ standar d to measure whether the pla int if fs have a lle g e d a

vio latio n o f t

he ir c le arl y e sta bli sh e d F if

th Ame ndme nt r ig hts is appropr iate.”) . Moreove r, as pr esente d by the par ties, Defe ndants’ motion for summary jud g me nt t

ur ns , n ot o n q

ue sti on s o f l aw, but on

qu e sti on s o f f

a c t. D e fe nd ants have pr ima ri ly argued that they

are entitled to summary

judgme nt beca

use “[P] laintiff ca

nnot show deficie ncies in the District’s customs, policies, and/or pr actice s.” De fs.’ MSJ at 28. The Court conc ludes 13leg al issues tender ed.”) (interna l citation omitt ed). 27 that f a c tua l di sp ute s p re c lud e De fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary . A c c or din g ly , b e c a us e it i s appar ent that g enuine disputes of material fa ct existreg ardle ss of the appr opriate le g al standar d to b e a pp lie d in thi s c a se , th e Court

fi nd s th at—b a se d s ole ly

on the argume nts prese nted—Def

endants a re not e ntitled to sum mary judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s Section 1983 claim. 1

. Pla int if

f’ s A lle g atio ns that th e Di str ic t’ s Cl a ssi fi c atio n Po lic ie s, Procedur es and Pra ctices w ere Inadequate Survive Summary J udg ment As e xpla ine d a

bo ve , Pl a int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t is ba se d, in p art , on a lle g atio ns that th e De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls f a ile d to a dd

re ss c e rt a in u

nc on sti tut ion a l c on dit ion s, inc lud ing“ ina de qu ate po lic ie s, pr oc e dure s, and pr a c tic e s f

or . . . c la ssi fi c atio n. ” Se c . A m. Compl. ¶ 63. More spec ifically , Plaintiff alleg es that the De fenda nt Officia ls failed to implement “an e ffe ctive inmate c lassification sy stem and to eva luate and a ssign sa fe housingand supervision” to inmates. Id. ¶ 3 0; see also id. ¶ 3 1. De fe nd ants c on te nd that th e y are e nti tle d to summary judgme nt as to these alleg ations beca use there is no evidence that Gaither himself was improperly

classified. D efs.’ MSJ at 26-27. Plaintiff has oppose d Def endants’ motion, asser

ting that exis ting f

actua l disputes preclude summary judgme nt. Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. Upon consideration of the rec ord evide nce submitted by the par ties, the Court ag ree s with Pl aintiff that disputed issues of materia l fac t rende r summary judgme nt inappropriate
. The re levant fa cts in the rec ord re lated to the issue of c lassification ar e as f ollows. Upon admission to the J ail in Dece mber of 2002, G aither w as cla ssified as Pretria l/Gener al Population. Def s.’ Stmt. ¶ 17. Although there is no evidence in the rec ord as to what specific c lassification Gaither was g iven at that time— i.e. , whether Gaither was c lassified at the “ minimum ,”28

“medium,” or

“maximum ” sec urity

level—the pa

rties agree that Gaither

had neve r bee n char g ed with, or convicte d of, a violent c rime and ha d no history of violence in the J ail. SeePl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 36, 37. None theless, on Dec ember 14, 2002, Gaither

was a ssigne d to the NE-3 c ellblock, which at that time housed tog ether both inmates classified a s Maxi mum as well as inmates classified a s Pre-Tr ial Minimum and Minimum. P l.’s Resp. ¶¶ 36, 45. Pla int if f h a s intr od

uc e d te sti mony

fr om t wo e xpe rt pe no log ist s th at th is p ra c tic e , a s w e ll as the Jail’s classification sy stem in ge nera l, was inade quate. F or example, Plaintiff’s expert E. Eug ene Miller ha s opined that “the Jail’s approa ch to classific ation at the time of Ga ither’s
mur de r d id n ot c omp ly

wi th g e ne ra lly

a c c e pte d p ra c tic e s in

the fi e ld, ” and

that, h a d th e Jail implemented the re commended c hang es to its classification sy stem (as re fer ence d in Plainti ff’ s Second Amende d Complaint), “Gaither —with no convictions for violent cr imes and no instit utional history

of violent behavior—would not have be en housed w ith predatory inmates with violent convictions and/or violent instit utional histories.” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 8 (Ex pert Repor t of E. Eug ene Miller) (her einaf ter, “ Miller Report”) at 10. Simil arly , Plaintiff’s expert J ames E. Aiken has opine d that “Ga ither should have be en sepa rate ( i.e. , assig ned to a diff ere nt cellblock) from violent inmates,” a

nd that the “a

bsence of a sy stem for sepa ratingpredatory

inmates from non-disruptive inmates cr eate d an unsaf e envir onment for many

inmates, including Gaither .” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 20 (Ex pert Repor t of J ames E. Aike n) (he reina fter “ Aiken Report” ) at 19-20. Def endants, in filing for summary judgme nt, have not provide d any expert testimony

to rebut these c onclusions. Despite the a

bove evide nce, D efe ndants have moved for summar y judgme nt, arguing that Pla int if f c ann ot e sta

bli shthat “ Mik a l G a ith e r w a s im pr op e rl y c la ssi fi e d whe n h e wa s h ou se d w ith29

murdere rs.” De fs.’ MSJ at 26. Def endants’ a

rgument is not well taken. As demonstrated above , Plaintiff has introduced e x pert testimony supporting he r position that the J ail’s classific ation sy stem was inade quate a

nd that Gaither

was inappr opriately

housed in the same c ellblock as violent offende rs. Althoug h Def endants c ontend that Plaintiff’s experts “have failed to support those alleg ations,” De fenda nts’ argument on this pointis based upon a mischa rac terization of the expert’s deposition testimony
. See id. Def endants a ppear to conce de as muc h as they have f ailed to r e sp on d in

the ir Re ply to P la int if

f’ s a sse rt ion , a s se t f

or th i n h e r o pp os iti on , th at D e fe nd ants have misstated the r ecor d evidenc e. Se e ge ne ra lly De fs .’ Re ply . Ind e e d, De fe nd ants ’ R e ply is sil e nt a s to Pla int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t ba se d u po n a lle g e d d e fi c ie nc ie s in the J ail’s classific ation sy stem. Acc ording ly , based on the rec ord above , the Court finds that g enuine issues of disputed material fa ct pre clude summary judgme nt and there fore DENI ES Def endants’ motion with respe ct to Plaintiff’s alleg ations that the District failed to implement an adequate classific ation sy stem.

2. Plaintiff’s Alleg ations that the District’s StaffingPolicies, Procedure s and Pr a c tic e s w e re Ina de qu ate Sur viv e Summary

Judg me nt In support of her

Section 1983 claim ag ainst the District, Plaintiff has also alleg ed that the De fe nd ant O ff

ic ia ls f a ile d to a dd

re ss t he “ sh or ta g e of ne c e ssa ry c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs ” at th e Jail
a s w e ll a s th e Jail ’s “ ina de qu ate po lic ie s, pr oc e du re s, and pr a c tic e s f

or c ri tic a l st a ff

ing ,” and a lso “fa il[ ed] to enforc e such policie s, proce dures a nd prac tices re lating to c ritical staff ing . . . a s were in e ff e c t.” Se c . A m. C omp l. ¶

63 . D e fe nd ants mov e fo r s umm ary jud g me nt o n th e se a lle g atio ns , arguing that “[t] here is [ ] no evidence in this rec ord that the District’s staf finglevels did not satisfy the demand sta

ndard r equire d.” De fs.’ MSJ at 27. Acc ordingto Defe ndants, the Jail’sThe c ritical staff ing c omplement is the number of c orre ctional offic ers that must be in a 14 unit at all times. SeePl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 11 (Deposition Ex cer pt of Marvin B rown) at 93:9-22; 12 1:1 9- 12 2:3 ; se e als o id ., Ex . 22 (De position Ex cer pt of Pamela Chase ) at 118:9-17. 30 sta ff ingpo lic y in e ff e c t in De c e mbe r o f 2 00 2 r e qu ir e d o nly “ that tw o o ff

ic e rs be pr e se nt at a ll times,” and, be cause it is undi sputed that “two off icer s were prese nt when the stabbing
occur red,” Plaintiff’s alleg ations with respec t to staffingmust fail. Id. at 28 . D e fe nd ants ’ argument is thus predicate d entirely on the fa ctual pre mise that the critica l staffingcomplement 14 for the N E-3 ce llblock, effe ctive in Dec ember of 2002, wa s two corr ectional of fice rs. See, e .g., Def s.’ Reply at 30-34 (a

rguing that “Def

endants a re e ntitled to sum mary

judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s constitutional claims concer ning sta ffingbeca

use the undisputed evide nce e stablishes that the J ail did not routinely

fall below the critica l staffingminimum for NE -3”) . In response , Plaintiff
argue s th at th e c ri tic a l st a ff ingc omp le me nt f

or the NE -3 c e llb loc k in

De c e mbe r o f 2 00 2 w a s in fa c t thre e —n ot t

wo —c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs . Pl .’ s O pp ’n

at 17 . T he e vid e nc e on

thi s is su e is contra dictory
. For example, Plainti ff ha s submitt ed a de clar ation by Def endant Washing ton that was previously

filed in 2002 as par

t of a sepa

rate civil action, Fraternal Order of Police/De p’t of Corr. L abor Comm. v. W

illiams , Ci v. Ac t. N o. 02 -4 61 . Pl .’ s O pp ’n , E x. 16 (D e c lara tio n o f O die Washington) ( here inafter “Mar ch 2002 Washing ton Decl.” ). Attac hed to the Mar ch 2002 Washington De clar ation is the then-cur rent “ Critical StaffingComplement,” which states that the critica l staffingcomplement for the NE-3 c ellblock for a ll shifts at that ti me was two c orre ctional office rs. See id. ¶ 6 & pp . 5 -7 . A lth ou g h th e Ma rc h 2 00 2 Wa sh ing ton

De c laratio n it se lf

is undated, it is appar ent from the f ace of the doc ument that it was orig inally filed in the W

illiams matter on Mar ch 25, 2002. See ge nerally id. Th e Ma rc h 2 00 2 Wa sh ing ton

De c laratio n a

nd itsPlaintiff argues that, to the contra ry , the Marc h 2002 Washington De clar ation should be 15 rea d to state that the cr itical staffingcomplement in NE-3 w as three corr ectional of fice rs, not two. In so arguing, Plaintiff f ocuses on languag e in the dec laration that states that “[c]ellbl ocks that are double-c elled will be staff ed with 3 offic ers on the da y and eve ning shifts.” SeePl.’s Op p’ n at 17 & n. 7. Pla int if f a rgue s th at, b e c a

us e NE -3 wa s a

do ub le -c e lle d c e llb loc k, thi s languag e demonstrates that the cr itical staffingcomplement for NE-3 wa s three c orre ctional of fi c e rs , n ot t

wo ; to the e xtent th e atta c he d “ Cr iti c a l Sta ff ingCom ple me nt” c on tr a dic ts this quoted statement, Plaintiff simply contends the attachment should be disre g arde d as inconsistent. See Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 29 & p. 16, n. 4. A s Defe ndants point out, however, Plaintiff’ s argument ignor es the distinction betwee n the number of corr ectional of

fice rs that may

be staff ed on a particula r ce llblock on a par

ticular shift and the “cr itical staffingcomplement”— i.e., the a bs olute minimum number of c orre ctional offic ers that must be a ssigne d to a ce llblock for a pa rticular shift. SeeDe fs .’ Re ply

at 31 -3 2; see also id. , Ex . 6 (De position Ex cer pt of Stephen Minus) at 107:4-19; 109:10-21. Acc ording ly , the statement that double- celled c ellblocks, such as N E-3, would be staff

ed with three corr ectional of fice rs does not nec essar ily contra dict the statement that the cr itical staffingcomplement for NE-3 wa s only

two corr ectional of

fice rs. Reg ardle ss, as explained above, the Ma

rch 2002 Washing ton Decla ration provides e vidence only as to the critica l staffingcomplement that wa s in effe ct in Marc h of 2002, and, a bsent indication that the numbers re mained the same in Dec ember of 2002, does not def

initely resolve the critica l staffing complement that wa s in effe ct duringthe time period re levant to the instant litigation. 31 attachme nts theref

ore suppor

t a findingthat, at least a s of Marc h 25, 2002, the cr itical staffing
c omp le me nt f

or NE -3 wa s o nly

tw o c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs . 15 By contra st, Pl aintiff has a lso submit ted excerpts of the deposition of Def endant B rown, who was Warde n of the Jail in December of 2002, that wa s taken on Oc tober 4, 2007, a s part of the litigation in Be alev . D .C. , Civ. Act. No. 04-959. SeePl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 11 (Deposition Ex cer pt of Marvin B rown). I

n the excerpte d testimony , Br own is ref err ed bac k to an exhibit that had pre viously

been e ntere d on the re cord in the de position and that is described in the tra nscript as “O die Washington’s de clar ation.” Id. at 121:2-7. B rown wa s asked to re view the e x hibit, and to testify as to the substance of the doc ument. Id. at 121:2-12. Ac cordingto the deposition excerpt, B rown testified that the exhibi t describe d the cr itical staffingcomplement for NE-3 a s three corr ectional of

fice rs. Id. Fr om this P laintiff conc ludes that the cr itical staffingcomplementDe fe nd ants have a ssume d th at th e de c lara tio n r e fe rr e d to in t

his de po sit ion

e xce rp t is 16 the same Ma

rch 2002 Washing ton Decla ration discussed a

bove and the ref

ore a rgue that B rown’s testimony does not cre ate a

n issue of disputed fa ct bec ause it is based on a misreadingof the Marc h 2002 Washington De clar ation, which cle arly provides that the c ritical staff ing complement is three corr ectional of fice rs. See De fs .’ Re ply

at 33 . O n th e re c or d n owbe fo re it, howeve r, the Court has no mea ns of conf

irming whether

the“Odie Washington dec laration” ref err ed to in the Octobe r 4, 2007 B rown de position i s the same Ma rch 2002 Washing ton Dec laration filed in Fraternal Order of Police . N e ith e r p art y ha s atta c he d a

c op y of the e xhibi t us e d in the Oc tob e r 4 , 2 00 7 D e po sit ion , a nd it i s unc le ar f

ro m th e de po sit ion

e xce rp t it se lf wh e the r B ro wn

is r e fe rr ingto t

he Marc h 2 00 2 Wa sh ing ton De c laratio n. On e po ssi ble explanation for the appa

rent c ontradiction is that Washington authore d a sec ond decla ration for the Beale litigation, which—unlike the Ma rch 2002 Washing ton Decla ration—states that the critica l staffingcomplement for NE-3 wa s three c orre ctional offic ers. That is, itmay be that the critica l staffingcomplement for NE-3 Unit wa s two corr ectional of fice rs in Marc h of 2002, but subsequently

chang ed to three corr ectional of fice rs at some undisclosed date. Any such conclusion, howe ver, is spec ulative at this point, given the lack of evidenc e in the re cord. 32 at the time of Ga ither’s attack wa s three c orre ctional offic ers. SeePl.’s Resp. ¶ 46. Br own’s excerpted te stimony , howeve r, does not def initively demonstrate that the critica l staffing complement in Dec embe r of 2002 was thre e cor rec tional office rs as it is entirely unclea r fr om the deposition ex cer

pt what pre cise time per iod Brown is refe rringto when he states that the cr itical staffingcomplement wa s three c orre ctional offic ers. See id. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any evidenc e cla

rifying the specific time frame ref err ed to in the deposition nor has Plaintiff submitt ed a c opy

of the de clar ation Br own re fer red to in the de position, which may have she d light on this issue. Although the deposition ex cer pt was take n duringdiscovery for the Be ale 16
matte r, wh ic h a lso fo c us e d o n th e same tim e pe ri od in D e c e mbe r 2 00 2 th at is in i ssu e in t his
case , Plaintiff has not directe d the Court to any evidenc e conc lusively

demonstratingthat the testimony was in fa ct re fer

ringto the critica l staffingcomplement in place in Dece mber of 2002 and not, for e x ample, the policy in place at the time of the deposition itself. Acc ording ly , the Court cannot conc lude that the cited te stimony acc urate ly

descr ibes the policy

in place dur ing theMo re ov e r, the Court no te s th at e ve n if

the c ri tic a l st a ff

ingc omp le me nt i n N E- 3 in 17 eff ect on De cembe r 14, 2002 wa s for two c orre ctional offic ers, a s Defe ndants contend, Plaintiff ha s p re se nte d e xpe rt

te sti mony

—unr e butte d b y

De fe nd ants —th at su c h a po lic y wo uld have its e lf been de ficient. SeeM i l l e r R e p . at7 ( “ In m y o p i n i o n , h av i n gth r e e ( 3 ) o f f i c e r s o nd u ty at a ll times duringthe sec ond and third shifts in the Northea st Three cellblock wa s the absolute bar minimum staffingrequire d to provide eve n a hope of adequate protec tion from harm.” ) (empha sis added). Thus, e ven assumingthe Court wer e to find that De fenda nts’ policy

in effe ct in D e c e mbe r o f 2 00 2 r e qu ir e d o nly tw o c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs be pr e se nt i n N E- 3 at a ll t ime s, Def endants would not nec essar ily be entitled to summary

judgme nt on alleg ations that the District’s staff

ing policie s, proce dures, a nd prac tices we re ina dequate
. 33 rele vant time period. Ultimately , then, the Court is not in a position t o deter mine what the spe cific c ritical staffingcomplement wa s in Dece mber of 2002. B eca use De fenda

nts’ arguments in favor of summary judgme nt on this i ssue ar e pre mised on a findingthat the cr itical staffingcomplement in effe ct at the time of G aither’ s stabbing w as only two corr ectional of

fice rs—a f

act whic h
rema ins in disput e—summary judgme nt is inappropriate at this t ime. Acc ording ly , the Court 17 shall DENY De fenda

nts’ motion for summary

with respec t to Pl aintiff’s a lleg ations of inadequate staff

ing. 3. Plaintiff’s Alleg ations that the District’s Secur ity Policies, Procedure s and Practice s were Inadequate Survive Summary J udg ment In support of her

Section 1983 claim ag ainst the District, Plaintiff alleg es that the Def endant Of ficials fa iled to addre ss the J ail’s “inade quate policies, pr ocedur es, and pr actice s for
. . . secur ity ” and a lso “fail[ed] to enforce such policies, proc edure s and pra ctices r elatingto . . .
secur ity as we re in e ffe ct.” Sec . Am. Compl. ¶ 63. More spec ifically , the alleg ed “[i] nadequa cies in sec urity at the Jail i ncluded the f

ailures to contr ol contraba nd; to inst all metal de te c tor s and

ne c e ssa ry se c ur ity c ame ra s; t o c on tr ol m ov e me nt o f i nmate s w ith in t he Jail ; and

to
c on du c t and

do c ume nt r e a so na

bly fr e qu e nt a

nd un ann ounc e d h ou sin gun it, inm ate , a nd c e llDef endants have not moved for summary judgme nt as to any

of Plaintiff’s re maining 18 a lle g atio ns wi th r e sp e c t to the Di str ic t’ s se c ur ity po lic ie s, pr oc e dure s a

nd pr a c tic e s th at un de rl ie Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim. Se e ge ne ra lly Def s.’ MSJ at 24-29. 34 shakedowns.” Id. ¶ 35. De fenda nts have moved f

or summary

judgme nt solely

on the alleg ation in Plainti ff’ s Second Amende d Complaint t hat the De fenda nt Officia ls failed to ensure that
rea sonably

fre quent and una

nnounced housingunit, inmate, and ce ll shakedowns we re c onducted and docume nted, ar g uing that Plainti ff c annot establish any defic iencies in the Jail’s shakedown policies or pra ctices. See Def s.’ MSJ at 27; Def

s.’ Reply at 21-26. Plaintiff opposes

18 Def endants’ motion, ar g uing that material issues of disputed f act pr eclude summary

judgme nt. The fa cts rele vant to this iss ue ar e as f ollows. Defe ndants contend that it was the J ail’s policy and pra ctice in De cembe r of 2002 to re quire c orre ctional offic ers to: (1) se arc h inmates for
we a po ns e ve ry

tim e the y e nte re d o r e xite d th e NE -3 c e llb loc k a nd to r e c or d th os e se arc he s in which an item of

contra band wa s located, seeDef s.’ Stmt. ¶ 20; Defs.’ MSJ , Ex . E (De position Ex cer pt of Gar y Brinson) at 150:13-151:11; (2) c onduct 5 ra ndom shakedowns of

5 differ ent cells in ea ch housingunit each shift a nd make a

written re cord of

eac h of these r andom shakedowns, see Def

s.’ Stmt. ¶ 22; Defs.’ MSJ , Ex . E (De position Ex cer pt of Gar y Br inson) at 155:1-156:11; (3) shake down an e ntire housingunit each da y , and re cord the shakedowns in the daily shift logs, see Def

s.’ Stmt. ¶ 23; Defs.’ MSJ , Ex . E (De position Ex cer pt of Gar y Br inson) at 163:1-165:16; and (4) c onduct mass shake downs of the e ntire Jail on a quarterly basis, and make
a wr itten rec ord of these shakedowns as well, seeDef s.’ Stmt. ¶ 23; Defs.’ MSJ , Ex . E (De position Ex cer

pt of Gar y Br inson) at 169:1-7. Plaintiff does not dispute that this accura tely descr ibes the policy

in effe ct at the time of Gaither ’s stabbingnor does Plaintiff appe ar to dispute that the policy as written is ade quate.De fe nd ants dis pute that th e Jail ’s po lic y re qu ir e d th e re c or ds be re ta ine d f or fi ve y e ars , 19 arguing instea d that the shake down re cords we re ty pically reta ined for only

30 day s. SeeDef

s.’ Re ply at 25 . In s up po rt

of thi s c la im, De fe nd ants re ly on the de po sit ion

te sti mony

of B ri ns on , in which he states that he “ would assume they would keep a

copy of that [shakedown] sheet for 30 day s at least.” Se e id ., Ex. 5 (D e po sit ion Exc e rp t of

Ga ry B ri ns on ) at 16 7:1 1- 13 ; see also id. at 160:8-11 (“Q . Duringy our tenure as major of operations, can you tell me how longthe shakedown sheets we re ke pt. A. No. My man would take the m for 30 day s. Kee p a copy for 30 da y s. ” ). B ri ns on ’s re c oll e c tio n th at sh ake do wn re c or ds we re ke pt at le a st 3 0 d ay s d oe s n ot, howeve r, direc tly

ref ute Plaintiff’s asser

tion that the J ail’s policy

require d such re cords be reta ined for f

ive y ear s. 35 Rather, Plaintiff asse rts that the policy was not ac tually

followed. Se e ge ne ra lly

Pl.’s Opp’n at 10; Pl.’s R esp. ¶¶

21-24. As Plaintiff emphasizes, the Jail’s own policy require d shakedowns of cells, housingunits and the J ail as a whole to be re corde d, see supra at p. 34 , b ut D e fe nd ants ’
rec ords produc ed to Plaintiff duringdiscovery do not support Defe ndants’ asse rtion that the require d shakedowns were conducte d and docume nted. See id. ¶¶ 21 -2 4. As su

pp or t f or thi s
a sse rt ion , Pl a int if

f i nte nd s to int

ro du c e at tr ia l th e te sti mony of he r e xpe rt

pe no log ist s th at Jai l employ ees w ere require d to document all shake downs and to re tain those documents for five y ear s, but that no such rec ords wer e produc ed, ther eby impeachingDef

endants’ c laim that the 19 shakedowns had in fac t occur red a nd been doc umented. SeeAiken Rep. at 14-15; Miller Rep. at 11. In response , Def

endants attached va

rious rec ords and doc uments to their Reply , which they asser t demonstrate that—c ontrary to Plainti ff’ s claims—the J ail’s policy of conduc ting a

nd documentingfre quent, unannounc ed shake downs was f ollowed in prac tice. See Pl.’s Reply at 23-24 & Ex . 3 (L ogBook Entr ies for N E-3) & Ex . 4 (Contraba nd Reports from June 14, 2002; J uly 15, 2002; Aug ust 15, 2002; August 20, 2002; September 13, 2002; October

15, 2002; and No ve mbe r 1 5, 20 02 ). I t do e s n ot a pp e ar, ho we ve r, that th e se mate ri a ls w e re a c tua lly pr od uc e d toIn addition, Plainti ff a lleg es as pa rt of her Section 1983 claim ag ainst the District that 20 the Def endant Of ficials neg lige ntly

supervised the corr ectional of fice rs. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 63. Def endants have not addr essed this alleg ation. Se e ge ne ra lly Def s.’ MSJ at 24-29. 36 Plaintiff as part of

this li tigation, given that the documents ar e either labeled a s havingbeen produce d in the Beale litigation or c ontain no bates-la bel at all. The rea sonable infe renc e, then, is that Pl aintiff’s e x perts also did not have acc ess to these doc uments when they revie wed the documents produc ed in this lit igation and formed the opinions discussed above. Ultimately , g iven the unsettled re cord nowbefor e the Court and D efe ndants’ lateprese ntation of rec ords that do not appea r to have been pr oduced to or revie wed by

Plaintiff’s experts, the Court declines to g rant summary judgme nt to Defe ndants. At a minimum, P laintiff’s experts should be permitted to revie w the new ly -submitted rec ords to deter mine whether

the exis tence of such r ecor ds alters their opinions in this case. A ccor dingly , the Court shall DENY Def endants’ motion for summar y judgme nt with respec t to Pl aintiff’s a lleg ations in support of her Sec tion 1983 claim that the Def endant Of ficials fa iled to ensure that rea sonably fre quent and
unannounce d housing unit, inmate, a nd cell shake downs wer e conduc ted and doc umented. 4. Plaintiff’s Alleg ation that the Def endant Of ficials Inadequately

Traine d the Cor re c tio na l O ff

ic e rs Sur viv e s Summa

ry Judg me nt Pla int if f a lso a lle g e s in

su pp or t of he r S e c tio n 1 98 3 c la im that th e De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls fa ile d to a de qu ate ly

tr a in t he Jail ’s c or

re c tio na l of

fi c e rs . Se c . A m. C omp l. ¶ 63
. De fe nd ants 20 have move d for summary judgme nt, arguing that Plainti ff c annot show that the District’s
c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs we re ina de qu ate ly

tr a ine d. De fs .’ MSJ at

27 . In p art ic ula

r, De fe nd ants
co n t en d th atP l ai n t i ff

h as fa i l edt o s p ec i fy

an y p art i cu l ar

d ef i ci en cy i ntra i n i n g— i.e. , what specific trainingthe cor

rec tional office rs wer e re quired to, but did not, rece ive—and that Plaintiff37

has not demonstrate d how the alleg ed lac k of ade quate tra ining c ontributed to Gaither’ s death. Id. ; see also Def

s.’ Reply at 26-29. The re levant fa cts in the rec ord re lated to the issue of tra ining a re a s follows. Plainti ff
asser ts, and Def

endants do not objec t, that both ge nera lly -ac cepte d prac tice and national standards r equire that the J ail’s cor rec tional office rs annua lly rec eive at least 40 hours of inse rv ic e tr a ini ngon

re le va nt t op ic s. Pl. ’s Re sp . ¶

50 . Pl a int if

f h a s a lso int

ro du c e d e vid e nc e int o the re cord sug g esting that corr ectional of fice rs did not rec eive a

ny trainingin 2002. Id. ¶ 53 (“ Q. You say the trainingare a close d at L orton . . . ? A. Yes. Q . Where wa s the trainingconducte d if the fa cility

at L orton was c losed? A. I t was not. Q. So do y ou rec all if offic ers r ece ived trainingduring2002? A. I would have to sa

y no.”). Plaintiff’s e x pert, Miller, ha s sugg ested that a fa ilure to train the De fenda nt Correc tional Office rs on the prope r proc edure s for obtainingrelief contributed to Ga ither’s de ath, and ha s expl icitly opined that the fa ilure to train the c orre ctional office rs “in the pr ocedur e of loc king c ell doors af ter the inmate s had bee n let out for re cre ation . . . d ir e c tly fa c ili tate d th e a ssa

ult in t hat G a ith e r’ s a ssa ila

nts we re a

ble to p ull him

int o a n o pe n c e ll and fatally

stab him.” Miller Rep. at 12. De fenda nts have not off

ere d any evidenc e to the
c on tr ary , o the r t

ha n e vid e nc e that D e fe nd ants B ro ok s a nd To pp in r e c e ive d a

pp ro ximate ly

six
wee ks of trainingwhen they wer e orig inally

hired a nd rec eived some spor adic tra ining ther eaf ter. Def s.’ Reply Stmt . ¶¶ 51- 53; Defs.’ Reply , Ex . 1 (De position Ex cer pt of Z erline B rooks) 121:14- 19; 124:10-125:3 (testifying that she rec eived six weeks of tra ining whe n hired a nd there afte r
rec eived some w eapons tra ining a nd y ear ly CPRtraining ); Def

s.’ Reply , Ex . 2 (De position Ex cer pt of Gounod Toppin) at 17:8-20:20 (testifying tha t he re ceive d six wee ks of trainingwhen hired a nd there afte r re ceive d minimal sporadic training ).38

Ba sed on this rec ord, the Court finds that De fenda nts have not shown that they are
e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt o n Pl a int if

f’ s a lle g atio ns that th e De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls f a ile d to
ensure the cor

rec tional office rs wer e ade quately trained. A s the Supreme Court has obse rved, [i]t ma y se e m c on tr ary

to c omm on

sense to a sse rt

that a mun ic ipa lity

wi ll a c tua lly have a policy of not takingrea sonable steps to train its employ ees. B ut it may happen that in light of the duties assigne d to specific of fice rs or e mploy ees the need f or more or diffe rent tra ining is so obvio u s , and the inade quacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rig hts, that the policy maker s of the city can r easona bly be sa id to h ave be e n d e lib e rate ly ind if fe re nt t o th e ne e d. In th at e ve nt, the fa ilure to pr ov ide pr op e r t

ra ini ngmay

fa ir ly be sa id t o r e pr e se nt a

po lic y fo r wh ic h th e c ity

is r e s p o n s i b l e , an d

f o r wh i c hth e c i ty m ay b e h e l d l i a b l e i f i ta c tu a l l y c a

u s e s i n j ur y. City of Can ton v . H

arris , 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). He re, Plaintiff ha s introduced evidenc e—unre butted by

Def endants—that the D istrict failed to provide a ny trainingwhatsoeve r to the J ail’s cor

rec tional office rs in 2002. Moreove r, contra ry to Defe ndants’ asse rtion, Plainti ff ha s id e nti fi e d tw o s pe c if

ic are a s o f t

ra ini ngthat sh e c on te nd s th e c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs sh ou ld have r ece ived, namely , trainingon the proc edure s for obtainingrelief and for closing cellblock doors upon the inmates’ de parture . Given the duties g ener ally assig ned to the Jail’s corre ctional office rs to protec t the inmates’ hea lth and safe ty , the Court conclude s that there is suff icient
e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d f

ro m w hic h a

re a so na ble jur y c ou ld f ind that th e De fe nd ant O ff

ic ia ls’ fa ilure to i mpl e me nt a

ny tr a ini ngpr og ra

m in 20 02 —in c lud ingtr a ini ngon se c ur ity pr oc e dure s, such as the c losing of c ellblock doors and obta ining r elief to e nsure staf fingrema ins adequate at all times—was deliber ately indiffer ent to the safe ty

of Ga ither. More over, a lthough the r ecor d reg ardingcausation is m inimal, the Court is cognizant of the D.C. Circuit’s position that “‘the proxi mate ca

use of a n injury is ordinarily

a question for

the jury .’” Sm ith , 413 F.3d at 103 (qu o t i n g Hicks v . United States , 511 F.2d 407, 420 ( D.C. Cir. 1975)). The Court ther efor e39

DENI ES D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt a s to Pla int if

f’ s a lle g atio n o f i na de qu ate tra i n i n g. D. Genuine D isputes of Material Fact Precludethe Defe ndant Officials’ Cl aim of Qu ali fie d I mm un ity as to P lai nti

ff’ s S e c tio n 1 98 3 Claim De fe nd ants ne xt ar g ue that th e De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls a re e nti tle d to qu a lif

ie d immun ity from Plaintiff’s Section 1983 cla im asserted a g ainst them in their persona l capa cities. Def s.’ M S J at2 9
- 3 5
. P l a i n t i f

f h a s o p p o s e d

th e D e f e n d an tO f f i c i a l s ’ c l a i mo f

qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty,
arguin gthat ( 1) the De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls h ave wa ive d th e ir

ri g ht t o a sse rt

a qu a lif ie d immun ity defe nse, and ( 2) eve n assuming the Def endant Of ficials did not waive the defe nse, they are not substantively

entitled to qualified immunity in this case. Pl.’s Opp’n at 18-20. For the re asons
se t f or th b e low , th e Court

fi nd s th at th e De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls d id n ot w a ive the ir

ri g ht t o c la im qualified immunity , but that ge nuine disputes of mater ial fac t prec lude summary judgme nt on the
asser ted def ense. 1. L e g a l Sta

nd ard fo r Q ua lif

ie d Immunit

y

“ Th e do c tr ine of

qu a lif ie d immun ity

pr ote c ts g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic ia ls ‘ fr om l ia

bil ity fo r c ivi l damag es insofar

as their c onduct does not violate c lear ly established statutory

or constitutional rig hts of which a r easona ble per son would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan , __ U.S. __, 129 S
. C t . 8 0 8 , 8 1 5 (2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 4 57 U. S. 8 00 , 8 18 (1 98 2) ). Th e do c tr ine is available only

to gove rnment off

icials sued in their pe rsonal, rather than of ficial, c apac ity , see Mi tc he ll v . F

or sy th , 427 U.S. 511, 556, n.10 (1985), and se rves a s “an immunity from suit rather than a mer e def

ense to liability ,” Pearson , 1 2 9 S
. C t . at8 1 5 (qu o t i n g Mi tc he ll , 472 U.S. at 526). As e xpla ine d b y

the Sup re me Court , th e re are tw o in qu ir ie s invo lve d in the qu a lif

ie d immun ityPursuant to the Supreme Court’s re cent de cision in Pearson , courts now have discre tion 21 reg ardingwhich of the two prong s of the qualifie d immunit y analy sis to address first. See Pearson , 129 S. Ct . at 818. 40 ana ly sis . F ir st, “ [t]ak e n in the light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he pa rt y a sse rt ingthe inj ur

y , d o th e fa c ts alleg ed show the of

fice r’s c onduct violated a c onstitut ional rig ht? ” Saucier , 5 3 3 U
. S
. at2 0 1
. If the fi rs t qu e sti on

is a ns we re d in

the ne g ativ e , th e ana ly sis is o ve r a nd the of fi c e r i s e nti tle d to qualified immunity
. Id. I f, howe ver, the court de termines that ther e is a c onstitut ional violation, the cour t must t hen turn to the sec ond step in the ana ly sis, which asks “whe ther the r ight wa s clea rly established.” Id. “ Th e re le va nt, dis po sit ive inq

uir y in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a ri g ht i s clea rly established is whethe r it would be cle ar to a rea sonable off

icer that his conduct wa s unlawful in the situation he conf ronted.” Id. at 20 2. Th is s e c on d in qu ir y “ mus t be un de rt ake n in light of the specific context of the case , not as a broa d g ener al proposition . . . . The contours of the ri g ht m

us t be su ff

ic ie ntl y c le ar t hat a re a so na ble of fi c ia l w ou ld u

nd e rs tand that w hat he is doing violate s that rig ht.’ ” Id. at 201-02. 21

2. The De fenda

nt Officia ls Did Not W aive The ir Right to Asser t Qualified I mmunit y Plaintiff first contends that the De fenda nt Officia ls waived their r ight to asse rt qualified immunit y . Pl.’s Opp’n at 18-19. Plaintiff ar g ues that all De fenda nts were require d by

this Court to addre ss and brief

claims of qualifie d immunit y , if any , by no later tha

n September 7, 2008;
acc ording ly , beca

use the De fenda

nt Officia ls did not file any such motion by

September 7, 2008 and instead w aited until their motion for summary judgme nt to assert their c laims of qualified immunit y , Plaintiff contends that they have w aived their

rig ht to do so now. Id. Al th o u gh Plaintiff corre ctly

notes that qualified immunity is an aff irmative def

ense that may

be wa ived, see41

An de rso n-Be

yv . D .C. , 4 66 F . Su

pp . 2 d 5 1, 61 (D .D .C. 20 06 ), the Court do e s n ot a g re e wi th Plaintiff’s asser

tion that the Defe ndant Off icials have waived the ir rig ht to claim qualified immunit y . Plaintiff’s argument relies on the Court’ s August 7, 2007 Scheduling a nd Procedur es Orde r, in which the Court provide d that (a) Def endants we re to notify

the Court by

August 21, 20 07 , if the y int e nd e d to fi le a

mot ion to d ism iss on

the qu e sti on

of qu a lif ie d immun ity

and (b ) i f they intended to file such a

motion, Defenda

nts were require d to do so by September 7, 2007. See 8/7/07 Scheduling a

nd Procedur es Orde r, Doc ket No. [59] , at 6 (he reina fter “ August 7, 2007 SchedulingOrde r”) . Contrary to Plainti ff’ s assertions, the Court’s August 7, 2007 Scheduling and Proce dure O rder

require d only

that, in the event De fenda nts chose to file a

pre- discovery mot ion to d ism iss on

the iss ue of

qu a lif ie d immun ity , th e y

we re re qu ir e d to g ive no tic e and fi le the motion by

a date cer

tain. The August 7, 2007 Scheduling a nd Procedur e Or der sa

y s nothing
a bo ut w a ive r, and

in n o w ay

su g g e sts that D e fe nd ants wo uld be de e me d to have wa ive d th e ir qualified immunity

claims if they

decide d that it was inappropr iate to file a pre- discovery

motion on the issue of qua lified immunit y . See August 7, 2007 Scheduling O rder . Moreove r, as “[w]aiver is traditionally

define d as ‘the intentional r elinquishment or abandonme nt of a known rig ht,’” Anderson-Be

y , 4 6 6 F. S u

p p . 2 d at6 1 (qu o t i n g J

oh ns on v . Ze rb st , 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) , it would be both unrea sonable a nd unfair to hold that De fenda nt Officia ls waived a

ny claim of qua lified immunit y in this case, g iven that they pled qualified immunity

in their answe r and have now asser

ted it in their first motion for summary judgme nt. Accor dingly , the Court fi nd s th at qu a lity

immun ity

de fe ns e ha s n ot b e e n w a ive d b y the De fe nd ant O ff

ic ia ls.The Court notes that Plaintiff has e ntirely failed to a ddress this argument by the 22 Def endant Of ficials. Se e ge ne ra lly

Pl. ’s Op p’ n at 19 -2 0. Ind e e d, Pla int if f’ s a bb re viate d a

na ly sis of De fenda

nts’ qualified immunity

claim provides little assistance to the Court, as it simpl y states that, as a g ener al matter, pr isoners have a constitutional rig ht to be protec ted from violenc e at the hands of other

inmates. See id. No ne the le ss, it i s u lti mate ly the De fe nd ant O ff

ic ia ls’ burd e n to show that they

are entitled to qualified immunity , a burde n which the Court finds De fenda nt Of fi c ia ls h ave no t satis fi e d, g ive n th e e xiste nc e of dis pute d is su e s o f m ate ri a l f a c t. 42 3. Th e De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls H ave No t Sh own T hat T he y are Entit le d to Q u a l i f i e d Im mun i ty Havingdeter

mined that the Def

endant Of ficials did not waive the ir rig ht to assert qualified immunity , the Court turns next t o the merits of their c laim that they are immune from Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im. Al tho ug h D e fe nd ants ’ b ri e fi ngon thi s p oint is le ss t

ha n c le ar, it appea rs that Def

endants’ a

rguments are principally

direc ted at the f

irst prongof the two-f

actor qu a lif ie d immun ity

ana ly sis , whic h c on sid e rs wh e the r t he fa c ts a lle g e d, take n in

the light m os t fa vo ra ble to P la int if

f, sh owthat th e De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls’ c on du c t vi olate d a

c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht. 22 That is, Def

endants a ssert that there is “no evidenc e in this recor d that defe ndants Washington, Br own and/or H arr ison operate d the J ail with deliberate indiffer ence to or a re ckless disreg ard f or the safe ty of Ga ither.” D efs.’ MSJ at 35. At the outse t, t

he Court no te s th at, i n a

rguin gthat qu a lif

ie d immun ity

a pp lie s, De fe nd ants have a pp are ntl y a ssume d th at Pla int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im i s p ro pe rl y pr e dic ate d o n a

c la im that Def endants violated G aither’ s Fifth Amendme nt. See id. As discussed above , it is notclea r on the re cord nowbefor e the Court whe ther Plaintiff may in fac t assert a

predic ate c onstitut ional claim under

the Fif th Amendment as opposed to the E ighth Ame ndment. Se e su pra at pp. 22-25. Howeve r, bec ause D efe ndants’ ar g uments with respec t to qualified immunit y principally

turn on qu e sti on s o f f

a c t, r athe r t

ha n is su e s o f l aw, and

be c a us e the F if

th a nd Ei g hth Am e ndme nts bo th43

require a showingof deliber ate indiffe renc e (a lthough, a s expl ained a bove, the F ifth Amendment may provide g reater prote ction), the Court conc ludes that it may nonetheless c onsider De fe nd ants ’ a

rgume nts . The De fenda

nt Officia ls first contend that the f acts do not support a f

inding that they
wer e deliber ately

indiffer ent to Gaither ’s safe ty beca use “the re is no evide nce in this rec ord that these de fenda

nts knew or should have known that Mikal Gaither was at risk to be stabbed by Matthew Ing ram” or that “the se def endants [had] noti ce of

Gaither ’s impendingstabbing .” Def s.’ MSJ at 31-32. Ac cording ly , Def endants c onclude that, be cause g overnme nt officials “ can only be held liable” under Sec tion 1983 “in those instances whe n plaintiffs ca n prove that they
wer e ‘de liberate ly

indiffer ent’ to a known risk of ser ious harm,” Plaintiff ca nnot show that the Def endant Of ficials violated Ga ither’s c onstitut ional rig hts. Id. at 31. Althoug h Def endants a re
c or re c t th at a pla int if f m us t sh owthat th e g ov e rnme nt e mpl oye e s w e re de lib e rate ly ind if fe re nt i n
or de r t o s uc c e e d o n a

fa ilure -t o- pr ote c t c la im und e r S e c tio n 1 98 3, De fe nd ants ’ a rgume nt o n th is point nonetheless fa ils because it is based on a funda mental misunderstandingof Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim with respe ct to the Def endant Of ficials. Plaintiff does not alleg e that the De fenda nt Officia ls knew or should have known that Ga ith e r w ou ld b e sta

bb e d b y Ing ra m on De c e mbe r 1 4, 20 02 . Ind e e d, Pla int if f h a s r e a dil y
conce ded to Def

endants’ a ssertion that the De fenda nts in thi s case did not have any notice that there wer e spec ific threats made to Gaither and that Ga ither neve r af firmatively

soug ht protective custody from other

inmates. Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 18. Rather, the e ssence of Plaintiff’s alleg ations ag ainst the Def

endant Of ficials is that they

failed to a ddress va

rious unconstitutionally

dang erous conditions at the J ail; that this failure wa s the result of a conscious and de liberate decision or of44

rec kless disreg ard f

or the saf ety of the inmates at the J ail; and that this deliberate indiffer ence and
re c kle ss d isr e g ard

fo r t he su bs tanti a l r isk

of ha rm to i nd ivi du a ls i nc arc e ra

te d at th e Jail dir e c tly and proximately

cause d Gaither ’s injuries and de ath. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63, 64. Plaintiff’s alleg ations are no t ba se d o n a ny a sse rt ion that th e De fe nd ant O ff

ic ia ls w e re de lib e rate ly ind if fe re nt t o a

kn own r isk

that G a ith e r i n p art ic ula

r w ou ld b e sp e c if

ic a lly atta c ke d b y

Ing ra m. Second, De fenda

nts more broa dly

contend that the f

acts do not support a f

inding that the Def endant Of ficials we re de liberate ly

indiffer ent to Gaither ’s safe ty for the sa me re asons that form the ba sis of their ar g uments ag ainst municipal liabilit y under Sec tion 1983—for example, that th e re is n o e vid e nc e that “ Ga ith e r s ho uld no t ha ve be e n p la c e d in

the same ho us ingun it w ith Matth e w Ing ra

m,” De fs .’ MSJ at

31 ; th at th e c ri tic a l st a ff

ingc omp le me nt f

or NE -3 re qu ir e d o nly two corr ectional of

fice rs be pr esent at the time of Gaither ’s stabbing , id. at 34; that Plaintiff has failed to “ point to any

evidenc e that a sy stematic trainingdefe ct ca used Mikal Gaither ’s death,” Def s.’ Reply at 42; and that Plaintiff fa iled to show that the J ail’s shake down policy was not actua lly enfor ced, see id. ; se e als o Def s.’ MSJ at 34-35. Th e Court , h ow e ve r, ha s a lr e a dy fo un d th at g e nu ine dis pute s o f m ate ri a l f a c t e xist, prec luding summary

judgme nt with respec t to Pl aintiff’s Sec tion 1983 claim ag ainst the District. Se e su pra at pp .2 7- 38 . B a se d o n th e re c or d n owbe fo re it, the Court c on c lud e s th at th e se disputes equally

prec lude summary

judgme nt on the Def

endant Of ficials’ c laims of qualified immunit y . “A de fenda

nt’s entitlement to qualified immunity is, of course , a pure question of law to be dec ided by

the Court.” Halcomb v . W ashington Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 526 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2007). Where , howeve r, the mate rial fa cts underly ing a defe ndant’s cla im of qualified immunity

are in dispute, “it is im possible for the c ourt to determine, a s a matter of law,45

what pre dicate f

acts e x ist to decide whe ther or not the of fice r’s c onduct clea

rly violated established law.” Id. ; see also Bolger , 608 F. Supp. 2d at 22. In other wor ds, the Court cannot deter mine at the summary

judgme nt stag e whe ther the c halleng ed conduc t would be viewe d as lawful by an objec tively

rea sonable off

icer if the “ve ry

fac ts establishing what that conduct wa s
are leg itimately

in dispute.” Halcomb , 526 F. Supp. 2d at 22. Ac cording ly , Def endant’ s motion for summary

judgme nt as to the Def

endant Of ficials’ qua lified immunit y claims is DENI ED. E. TheDe

fe nd an t Co rre c tio na l O

ffi c e rs a reEn tit le d to Qu ali fie d I mm un ity as to Plain tif f’ s S e c tio n 1 98 3 Claim Def endants a lso contend that the De fenda nt Correc tional Office rs ar e entitled to qualified immunit y with respec t to Pl aintiff’s Sec tion 1983 claim ag ainst them in their persona l capa cities. As explained above, Plaintiff a lleg es that, shortly befor e Ga ither wa s stabbed on De cembe r 14, 2002, Def

endant B rooks “lef

t her post with the ac quiesce nce of the other a ssigne d corr ectional of fi c e rs wi tho ut f

ir st a rr ang ingfo r t e mpo ra

ry c ov e ra g e of

he r p os t by

a re lie f o ff ic e r. ” Se c . A m. Compl. ¶ 69. Accor ding to Plaintiff, “D efe ndant cor rec tional office rs knew that this act violated the cr itical staffingrequire ments for the housingunit and cre ated a n unrea sonable risk of se rious inmate-on-inmate violence.” Id. In addition, Plainti ff a lleg es that the “ defe ndant cor rec tional office rs fa iled to take nec essar y steps they

could have taken to contr ol activity and movement of the inmates and the prese nce of wea pons in the housing unit.” Id. Pla int if f c on c lud e s th at th is

“ c on du c t by

the de fe nd ant c or

re c tio na l of

fi c e rs wa s d e lib e rate ly

ind if fe re nt t o a

nd re c kle ssl y dis re g ard e d s ub sta

nti a l and unre a so na

ble ri sk of ha rm to G a ith e r a

nd pr oximate ly

c a us e d h is injuries and dea

th” in violation of his constitut ional rig hts. Id. ¶ 70. Although D efe ndants’ brie fingon this pointis less than a model of c larity , it appear s that46

the De fe nd ant C or

re c tio na l O ff

ic e rs pr inc ipa lly

argue that th e y

are e nti tle d to qu a lif

ie d immun ity beca use the Plaintiff ca

nnot show that they

wer e “de liberate ly

indiffer ent” to Ga ither’s saf ety , as is r e qu ir e d und e r S e c tio n 1 98 3. Th at is , it a pp e ars that D e fe nd ants ’ a rgume nts are pr ima

ri ly dir e c te d to the fi rs t pr on gof the tw o- fa c tor

qu a lif ie d immun ity

te st, arguin gthat it

is n ot m e t in this case— i.e. , demonstratingthat the fa cts alleg ed, take n in the light most favor able to Plaintiff, do not show that the Def

endant Corr ectional Of

fice rs’ c onduct violated a c onstitut ional rig ht. Sig nif ic antl y , Pl a int if

f h a s no t opposed the De fenda nt Correc tional Office rs’ a ssertion that they are entitled to qualified immunity . Indeed, a lthough Plaintiff has oppose d the De fe nd ants Of

fi c ia ls’ a sse rt ion s o f q

ua lif ie d immun ity , Pl a int if

f’ s o pp os iti on

is s ile nt w ith respe ct to the Def

endant Corr ectional Of

fice rs’ c laim of qualified immunity
. See ge nerally Pl.’s Opp’n. Plaintiff has thus conc eded the Def endant Corr ectional Of

fice rs’ a rguments on this point
. “It is well understood in this C ircuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive mot ion and a dd re sse s o nly

c e rt a in a rgume nts ra ise d b y

the de fe nd ant, a

c ourt may tr e at th os e arguments that the plaintiff fa iled to addre ss as conc eded.” Hopkins v. W omen’ s Div., Ge neral Bd. of Global Ministri es , 2 84 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 5, 25 (D .D .C. 20 03 ), a ff ’d 98 F e d. Ap px. 8 (D .C. Cir .2 00 4) ; se e als o F

ra nk lin v . P otte r, 600 F. Supp. 2d 38, 60 (D.D .C. 2009) (treating de fe nd ant’ s argume nt i n mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt a s c on c e de d whe re pla int if f f a ile d to addre ss it in hi s response) . Acc ording ly , beca use Plaintiff had the oppor tunity to respond to the De fe nd ant C or

re c tio na l O ff

ic e rs ’ a sse rt ion

of qu a lif ie d immun ity

—a nd mor e pa rt ic ula rl y , th e ir claim that they

wer e not deliber ately

indiffer ent to Gaither ’s hea lth and safe ty —but did not do so, the Court shall construe he r fa ilure as a conce ssion with respect to the mer its of the Def endant Correc tional Office rs’ qua lified immunit y claim. See H

opkins , 284 F. Supp. 2d at 25. The CourtThe Court notes that De fenda nts raised for

the first time in their Reply an asse rtion that 23 De fe nd ant Wh ite is a lso e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt b e c a

us e “ no thi ngin t

he re c or d w ou ld support a findingof liability ” ag ainst him. Defs.’ Reply at 43. Althoug h the Court ag ree s that the re cord nowbefor e it is sparse with re spect to De fenda nt Whi te, the Court shall not consider an ar g ument raised by

Def endants for

the first time in their Reply
. Se e su pra at pp. 26, n. 13. 47 there fore GRANTS the Def endants’ motion insofar

as it arg ues that the De fenda

nt Correc tional Of fi c e rs are e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity

wi th r e sp e c t to Pla int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im. 23 F. Plaintif

f’s Negligence -Based Claims SurviveSummary J udgment In addition to Pl aintiff’s Sec tion 1983 claim, she has also a sserted two c laims based on alleg ations that the Def

endants we re ne g lige nt in breac hing the duty of ca re ow ed to Gaither : (1) a neg lige nce/surviva l action ag ainst all Defe ndants (Count Two); and ( 2) a c laim for wr ong ful death a g ainst all Defe ndants (Count Three ). With respect to the De fenda nt Officia ls, Pl aintiff alleg es that they

“fa iled to require rea sonably fre quent and una

nnounced housingunit, inmate,
and c e ll s hake do wn s; t o p ro vid e fo r t he ins ta llatio n o f i ns ta ll [ sic ] m etal dete ctors and ne cessa ry
se c ur ity c ame ra s; t o p ro vid e a de qu ate numbe rs of c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs at a ll t ime s; a

nd to pr ov ide pr op e r t

ra ini ngand

su pe rv isi on fo r c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs and oth e r e mpl oye e s. ” Se c . A m. Com p. ¶ 7 5. Ac c or din gto P la int if f, the De fe nd ant O ff

ic ia ls “ kn e w o r s ho uld

have kn own th at,
a s a re su lt o f t

he a bs e nc e of the se and oth e r n e c e ssa

ry and g e ne ra lly a c c e pte d p ri so n- se c ur ity po lic ie s, pr a c tic e s, and

re so ur c e s f

or wh ic h th e y

ha d r e sp on sib ili ty , it

wa s r e a so na

bly fo re se e a ble that [i ncar cer ated individuals] would be attacke d and ser iously injured by

other inmates.” Id. Withre sp e c t to the De fe nd ant C or re c tio na l O ff

ic e rs , Pl a int if

f a lle g e s th at th e y

“ kn e w o r s ho uld have known that, as a r esult of their fa ilure to maintain a leve l of three corr ectional of fice rs on duty at all times duringthe day and eve ning shift in Nor

theast Thre e housingunit; to control contra band; and to take prac tical steps to control and monitor the a ctivity and movement of48

inmates when the y

wer e per mitted to leave their c ells, it was rea sonably fore seea ble that inmates such as Ga ither would be attacked a nd seriously

injured by

other inmates.” Id. ¶

7 6
. F i n a l l y, with respec t to the District, Plainti ff a lleg es that D.C. is “vica riously liable under

the doctrine of respondent superior

for” the alleg ed neg lige nce of the Def endant Of ficials and the Def

endant Correc tional Office rs. Id. ¶ 77. De fe nd ants have mov e d f or summa ry jud g me nt o n th e se ne g lig e nc e -b a se d c la ims . T he ir
argume nts on

thi s is su e g e ne ra lly

fa ll i nto tw o c ate g or ie s— fi rs t, t hat Pla int if

f h a s f a ile d to establish an applica

ble standar d of ca

re, a s require d to prove ne g lige nce, a nd, second, that Plaintiff has not shown any defic iencies in the D efe ndants’ policies, proc edure s, and pra ctices or
c on du c t th at c ou ld s up po rt a fi nd ingof

ne g lig e nc e . D e fs .’ MSJ at 38 -4 1. Th e Court

sh a ll addre ss eac h argument in turn below.

1. To the Extent Defenda nts Challenge the Sufficienc y of the Plaintiff’s Ex pert Te stimony , Def

endants’ Motion is Denied First, De fenda

nts argue that Plaintiff has fa iled to establish the applicable standard of car e
nece ssary to succe ed on her

neg lige nce- based c laims. “I t is well settled under District of Col umb ia law that a

pla int if f i n a ne g lig e nc e a c tio n mu st e sta bli shthr e e e le me nts : an a pp lic a ble standard of

car e, a de viation from that standar d by the def endant, a nd injury resultingfrom that deviation.” Sc ott

v . D .C. , 101 F.3d 748, 757 ( D.C. Cir. 1996). “F ailure to prove a standa rd of
car e is thus fatal to a ne g lige nce c laim.” Id. “F urthermor e, whe re the alleg ed neg lige nt act is not ‘w ith in t he re a lm o f c omm on

kn ow le dg e and

e ve ryda y e xpe ri e nc e ,’ pr oo f o f t

he a pp lic a ble standard of

car e must be established by expert testimony .” Id. (qu o t i n g Toy v . D .C. , 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 1988)).49

Neither party disputes that expert testimony is require d in this case to establish the requisite standa

rds of c are . See B riggs v. W ashington Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 481 F.3d 839, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“ Pursuant to the expert testimony require ment, a plaintiff must put on
e xpe rt te sti mony

to e sta bli shwh at th e sta

nd ard of c are is i f t

he su bje c t in qu e sti on is s o d ist inc tly
re l at edt o s o m e s ci en ce , p ro fe s s i o no r o cc u p at i o nas t o b e b ey o n d

th e k en o f t h e a v er age lay pe rs on .” ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s and c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also D.C. v. Carmichae l , 577 A.2d 312, 314-16 (D .C. 1990) (re quiring expert testimony to establish applicable sta ndards of
car e in suit by

prisoner who was a ssaulted by fellow prisone rs alleg ing that injuries were cause d by District’s fa ilure to control contr aband) . Plaintiff has in fac t submit ted copies of expert repor ts written by

her two e x pert pe nologists, Miller and Aike n, that set forth the va rious national standards Plaintiff a sserts ar e applica ble in this case. SeeMil le r R e p. ; see also Ai ke n Re p. ; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. Ac cording ly , as the Court under stands Def endants’ a

rgument, they

are not challeng ing a

lack of expert testimony , but rather the suffic iency

of the e x pert testimony

that is provided by

Plaintiff—namely , whether the Plaintiff’s two desig nated e x pert pe nologists have sufficie ntly

set forth the a

pplicable standa

rds of c are . This question, however , is by no means a

simple one. Under

District law, expert t e s t i m o n y is not sufficien t i f i t mere ly consists of the expert’s opinion as to what he or she wo uld do un de r s imi lar c ir c ums tanc e s. Nor is i t e no ug h f or the e xpe rt

sim ply to decla re that the [defendant] violated the national standa rd of c are . Rather, the e x pert mu s tcl ea rl y

art i cu l at e a n d

re fe re n ce a s t an d ar d o f c ar e b y wh i ch th e d ef

en d an t 's a c tio ns c an b e me a sure d. Thus the e xpe rt mus t c le arl y

re late the sta

nd ard of c are to the pr a c tic e s in fa c t g e ne ra lly fo llo we d by oth e r c omp ara ble
. . . fa c ili tie s or to s ome sta nd ard natio na lly

re c og nize d b y

su c h unit s. Briggs , 4 8 1 F. 3 d

at8 4 6 (qu o t i n g Cla rk

v . D .C. , 708 A.2d 632, 635 (D.C. 1997)) (empha sis and50

alterations in Brig g s). “Ge nera liz ed re fer ence s” to standar ds are insufficient; rather the “ expert
mus t pr of fe r ‘ a sp e c if ic , a rt ic ula ble (a nd art ic ulate d) sta

nd ard of c are ,’ ” and

mus t r e late tho se standards “ direc tly

to the defe ndant’s conduc t.” Briggs , 4 8 1 F. 3 d at8 4 6 -4 7 (qu o t i n g D.C. v. Moreno , 6 47 A. 2d

39 6, 40 0 ( D. C. 1 99 4) ; Carmichael , 577 A.2d at 315-16; a nd Ph ill ips v . D .C. , 714 A.2d 768, 773 (D.C.1998)) . Moreove r, “a rticulation of a spe cific standa rd is essential ‘[e]specially

in circumstanc es in which . . . the de fenda nt is alleg ed to have failed to prote ct the plaintiff from ha

rm.’” Briggs , 4 8 1 F. 3 d

at8 4 7 (qu o t i n g Varner , 8 91 A. 2d at 26 9) (a lte ra

tio ns in Br igg s). Nonethele ss, despite the complexity of this issue and the importanc e of it to Plaintiff’s
case , the par

ties’ brief ing on this point is wholly inadequate. Def

endants, for

their par t, have entirely ignor ed the e x pert re ports and opinions of Plaintiff’s expert penolog ists, Mi ller and Aiken, and do not include any citation to releva

nt case law spec ifically

supporting the ir position that Plaintiff has not sufficiently set forth the a

pplicable standa

rd of c are in this case. Indeed, Def endants’ ope ning br ief provide s only the bar est of ana ly sis on this issue, and their r eply brief fa ils to e ve n me nti on

it. Pla int if

f h a s si mil arl y

fa ile d to pr ov ide the Court wi th a n a de qu ate analy sis. Although Plaintiff has c ited g ener ally to her e x perts’ r eports, she ha s not provided the Court wi th a ny c a se law d e mon str atin gthat th e op ini on s se t f or th b y he r e xpe rt s a

re le g a lly
su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli shthe re qu ir e d s tand ard of c are . T his is p art ic ula

rl y tr ou ble so me g ive n th at, upon the Court’s own brie f re view of the rele vant ca se law, it appe ars that De fenda nts’ asser tions may have some merit, at lea st as to some of Plaintiff’s alleg ations. See, e .g., Carmichael , 577 A.2d at 315 (f

inding that e x pert’s te stimony reg ardinguse of meta l detector s at jail was insufficient whe re the testimony failed to discuss, “f

or example, that a c erta in perc entag e ofThe Court may permit Def

endants to re -ra ise this issue at a later date in adva

nce of 24 trial, if appr opriate. 51 compar able f

acilities did have me tal detec tors” and that “[w] ithout such evidence the jury had not basis for compa

ring[t he jail] with any

other institution, and hence no ba sis for findingthat [the ja il’ s] f

a ilure to h ave fu

nc tio nin gme ta l de te c tor s in pla c e amou

nte d to a de viatio n f

ro m a demonstrated sta

ndard of car e”)
. In li g ht o f t

he pa uc ity of bo th p art ie s’ br ie fi ngon

thi s is su e , th e Court

c on c lud e s th at it

is in no positi on at this tim e to make a definitive rulingreg ardingthe suffic iency of the Plaintiff’s experts’ testimony

in establishing the ne cessa ry standard of

car e for her ne g lige nce- based c laims. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court

DENI ES D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th is p oint. 24 2. Genuine D isputes of Mater ial Fa ct Prec lude Summary J udg ment Moving the n to the second a rgument, Def

endants a ppear to ge nera lly

argue that Plaintiff cannot show that Defe ndants’ policies, proc edure s, and pra ctices or conduct we re de ficient, such th ath er cl ai m s fa i l re gar d l es s o f t h e ap p l i cab l e s t an d ar d o f c ar e. As an i n i t i al m at t er , al th o u gh De fe nd ants ’ b ri e fi ngpurp or ts t o s e e k s umm ary

jud g me nt o n Pl a int if

f’ s n e g lig e nc e -b a se d c la ims in their entirety , upon closer r eview of Def endants’ br iefing , it is apparent that they have a sserted this second ar g ument only with respec t to the following spe cific a lleg ations asserte d by Plaintiff: (a) that Def

endant Of ficials neg lige ntly

failed to provide adequate numbers of corr ectional office rs to housing units at all times; (b) that De fenda nt Officia ls neg lige ntly

failed to re quire
rea sonably

fre quent and una

nnounced housingunit, inmate, and ce ll shakedowns; and ( c) that Def endant Of ficials neg lige ntly

failed to provide proper

trainingand super

vision for corr ectional office rs. See Def

s.’ MSJ at 39-41.52

The Court has a lrea dy

held that mater ial fac tual disputes exi st with respec t to the J ail’s sta ff ingpo lic ie s, its sh ake do wn po lic ie s a

nd pr a c tic e s, and

the tr a ini ngof

c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs in 2002. See supra at pp. 27-38. The se same issues of disputed fac t also prec lude summary jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to De fe nd ants ’ a rgume nts re latin gto P la int if f’ s n e g lig e nc e -b a se d c la ims premised on the sa

me fa ctual alleg ations. Withre sp e c t to Pla int if

f’ s a lle g atio ns that th e De fe nd ant O ff ic ia ls n e g lig e ntl y

fa ile d to pr ov ide a de qu ate su

pe rv isi on , a

n is su e wh ic h th e Cou

rt ha s n ot ye t ha d a

n o pp or tun ity to examine, it is also clea

r that summary

judgme nt in Defe ndants’ fa vor is inappropriate. Def endants’ e ntire ar g ument on this pointconsists of a sing le sentenc e in their ope ning br ief. See Def s.’ MSJ at 41. Moreove r, De fenda nts have e ntirely

ignor ed the pr offe red e x pert re port by Aiken, Plaintiff’s expert penolog ist, that catalogues a litany of def iciencie s in the supervision of the J ail’s cor

rec tional office rs and e mploy ees. See Ai ke n Re p. at 16 -1 8. Gi ve n D e fe nd ants ’ perf unctory analy sis of this is sue, the Court finds as we ll that Defe ndants have not shown they
are e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to Pla int if f’ s a lle g atio ns of

ina de qu ate supervision. Acc ording ly , the Court shall DENY De fenda nts’ motion for summary

judgme nt with respec t to Pl aintiff’s ne g lige nt-based c laims. G. Plaintif

f’s Partial Motion f

or Summary J

udgment is Denie d-in-Part and Grantedin-Pa rt Ha vin gre so lve d D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, the Court

no w t ur ns to Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgme nt. Plainti ff ha s moved for summar y judgme nt solely on the issue of whe ther De fenda nts may raise the defe nse of c ontributory
ne g lig e nc e /a ssumpt ion

of ri sk at tr ia l. D e fe nd ants ind ic ate d d ur ingdis c ov e ry

that th e y int e nd to53

a sse rt the a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e of

c on tr ibutor

y ne g lig e nc e and

/or a ssumpt ion

of ri sk , a nd that th is defe nse is based on two a lternative the ories: (1) that Gaither ha d “involved himself in an alterc ation with one or more inmates,” whic h led to his stabbing, seePl.’s MS J , Ex . 18 (De fs.’ Responses to Plaintiff’s Second Set of Discove ry Requests, Interrog atory

No. 2); and ( 2) that Gaither “fa iled to notify

the District of Columbia of his participation as a witness in a murde r investigation and never

reque sted protec tive custody ,” id. Plaintiff argues that there is no evidenc e in the re cord to support e ither theory of contributory

neg lige nce/a ssumption of risk, and the Court sh ou ld t he re fo re pr e c lud e De fe nd ants fr om r a isi ngany su c h d e fe ns e s at tr ia l. Def endants filed a

n opposition t o Plaintiff’s motion. I n so doing, D efe ndants responde d only to Plainti ff’ s arguments conce rningthe sec ond theory of contributory

neg lige nce— i.e. , that Gaither failed to notify

the District of his g rand jury testimony

—and did not addre ss Plainti ff’ s arguments with reg ards to the f irst theory . Moreove r, De fenda nts have a dmitted that there is no
rec ord evide nce that Gaither voluntar ily involved himself in any

such alter cation on De cembe r 14, 2002. Def

s.’ Resp. ¶ 20. The Court theref ore unde rstands De fenda

nts to have conc eded that there is no evidence in the rec ord to support a possible def ense of contributory

neg lige nce a

nd/or
a ssumpt ion

of ri sk ba se d o n G a ith e r’ s a lle g e d v olu nta ri ly inv olv e me nt i n a

n a lte rc atio n w ith other inmates. See H

opkins , 284 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (“ [W ]hen a plaintiff files a n opposition t o a dispositi ve motion and addr esses only cer tain arguments raised by

the def endant, a court may tr e at th os e argume nts that th e pla int if f f a ile d to a dd

re ss a s c on c e de d. ” ); se e als o F ra nk lin , 6 00 F. Supp. 2d at 60. Accor dingly , the Court deems De fenda nts to have wa ived any

aff irmative defe nse of c ontributory

neg lige nce a

nd/or assumption of risk based upon c laims that Gaither voluntarily

involved himself in an alter cation and G RANTS Plainti ff’ s motion t o the extent she54

seeks a n order prec luding De fenda

nts from raisingan af

firmative de fense based on suc h
a lle g atio ns . The Court thus proce eds with the under standing that the only issue in dispute is whether Def endants c an prove contributory neg lige nce/a ssumption of risk based upon Gaither ’s alleg ed failure to notify

J ail officia ls about his gr and jury testimony . Def

endants oppose Plaintiff’ s mot ion , a rguin gthat th e re is a

mpl e e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d f

ro m w hic h a

jur y c ou ld r e a so na

bly conclude that Gaither

was c ontributorily

neg lige nt. 1. Fa ctual B ackground As is releva

nt to Pl aintiff’s motion, sever al months prior to his incarc eration in Decembe r of 2002, Ga ither had te stified befor e a G rand Jury investigating the mur der of Kenne th Muldrow, J r. Pl.’s Stm t. ¶ 15. Acc ordingto the finding s of a D.C. Superior Gra nd J ury , Gaither

was ultimately

killed beca

use of this testimony
. See id. ¶¶ 14- 15. As previously explained, the Gra

nd J ury indicted two of Ga ither’s fe llow inmates, Delonte Ke nt and Matthew I ng ram, for

Gaither ’s First-D eg ree Murder , concludingthat they had killed him beca

use of his testimony

befor e the Gra nd J ury investigating Muldrow’ s murder. Id. Ing ram a nd Kent we re subse quently tried for Gaither ’s murder , but were found “not guilty ” by the jury on Dec ember

13, 2006. SeeJ oint Status Report and Consent Motion to L ift Stay , Docke t [ 30]. Although the fac t of Gaither ’s par ticipation in the gr and jury proce eding s is undisput ed, the re le va nt s ub sta nc e of his te sti mony

is a matte r o f s ome de bate be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s— in particula r, with respe ct to whether Gaither identified Ing ram a s a par ticipant in Muldrow’sI t appea rs that Ing ram wa s eventua lly char g ed with Muldrow’s murde r. SeeDef s.’ 25 Opp’n at 1. Although this fac t is significa nt in understandingthe issues raise d in Plainti ff’ s motion, neither party

actua lly addre ssed this fact in their state ment of mater ial fac ts nor is there any rec ord evide nce sug g esting the ac cura cy of this statement. Acc ording ly , the Court has not relied on this statement in rulingon Plaintiff’s motion. 55 murder. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, Ga ither did not mention Kent in his gr and jury testimony

and 25
a ff ir mativ e ly te sti fi e d th at Ing ra

m w a s no t a par

ticipant in the fata l attack on Muldrow. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17 ; se e als o Pl. ’s MSJ, E x. 10 (D e c l. o f K art ik N . V e ngus wa my ) ¶ ¶ 7 , 9 . D e fe nd ants ini tia lly claimed that Ga ither had ide ntified Ing ram a s a par ticipant in the attack on Muldrow , seeDef s.’ Stmt . ¶ 11, but failed to pr oduce a ny evidenc e to that ef

fec t and have subsequently acknow ledg ed that they “have been una

ble to locate de fenda

nts’ copy of the tape of Mikal Gaither ’s g rand- jury testimony ,” De fs.’ Resp. ¶¶ 16, 17. As Def

endants have fa iled to refute Plaintiff’s statement of fac t with counterva iling evide nce, the Court proce eds with the under standing that Gaither did not identify Kent in his testimony

befor e the Gr and Jury

and stated that I ng ram wa s not involved with Muldrow’s murder
. Th e pa rt ie s d isp ute wh e the r G a ith e r w a s e ve r d ir e c tly a sk e d d ur ingthe int ake pr oc e ss whether he had pr ovided testimony ag ainst any

individuals. Accordingto Defe ndants, the Jail’s intake policy

and pra ctice r equire s that “inmates ar e intervie wed a nd asked if the y : a) have any enemies in the Jail, b) are testifying a g ainst any body , and c) fee l safe?” Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 14. Pla int if f d oe s n ot d isp ute that inmate s, inc lud ingGa ith e r, are a sk e d whe the r t he y have e ne mie s in the J ail and whe ther they

fee l safe, but a

rgues that inmates ar e not aske d whether they “ar e testifying a g ainst any

body .” Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 14. The e vidence on this iss ue is conflicting . On the one hand, D efe ndants rely on testimony

indicatingthat inmates are asked a series of questions duringintake, includingwhether the inmate is “testifying a g ainst any body .” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 7Def endants have also re lied on the deposition testimony of De fenda

nt Harr ison. See 26 Def s.’ Stmt. ¶ 14. As Pl aintiff cor rec tly notes, howeve r, the c ited portion of the testimony does n o ts u p p o rtth e s p e c i f

i c a s s e rt i o nth ati n m at e s ar e a s k e d i f th e y “ ar e t e s t i f

yi n ga g a i n s tan yb o dy” duringthe intake pr ocess. SeePl.’s Resp. ¶ 14. 56 (De position Testim ony

of Ga ry Br inson) at 97:15-22. As Plaintiff points out, however, B rinson 26 also testified that Ga ither would not have been a sked more spe cifica lly “if he was pa

rticipatingas
a wi tne ss i n a

mur de r i nv e sti g atio n, ” be c a us e inf or matio n r e g ard ingan inmate ’s status a s a testifying w itness should be rec orded a utomatically

in the J ail’s computer

sy stem. Id. at 102:15- 103:22. These state ments appea r to be c ontradictory

to some ext ent. In addition, Gaither’ s intake shee t itself refle cts only that Gaither

repor ted that he wa s “not separ ated f rom anyone” a

nd did not “have a

ny known ene mies at the D.C. Dete ntion Fac ility ;” it includes no mention of whether Gaither ever testified ag ainst anyone. De fs.’ MSJ , Ex . G (intake form). F actua l disputes th e r e f o r e e x i s ta s t o w h atG a i th e r w a s a s k e d

d ur i n gth e i n t ak e p r o c e s s an d , m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y, whether he wa s asked if he had pre viously testified ag ainst anyone. Upon admission to the J ail, Gaither was fir st assigne d to the Northwe st Three Housing
un it. Pl. ’s Stmt . ¶

24 . H e wa s n ot m ov e d to NE -3 , whe re Ing ra m and Ke nt w e re ho us e d, un til 2:50 p.m. on Dece mber 14, 2002— i.e. , only three hours bef

ore he was stabbe d. Id. at 26. Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence in the rec ord that Ga ither wa s awa re that I ng ram wa s
an inmate in t

he Jail in D e c e mbe r o f 2 00 2. Pl. ’s Stmt . ¶ 27 . A lth ou g h D e fe nd ants dis pute thi s fac t, Defe ndants have not produce d any evidenc e demonstrating that Ga ither wa s in fact a war e that Ing ra m w a s in c arc e rate d at th e Jail in t he we e ks and

da y s b e fo re his atta c k. At

mos t, Def endants have introduce d evidenc e that Ga ither saw I ng ram a fewminutes before the attac k on Dec ember

14, 2002. Def

s.’ Resp. ¶ 26. In support of this positi on, Def endants’ r ely

soley on theI t is not altogethe r cle ar f rom the transc ript that Defe ndants filed with this Court 27 wh e the r t his wi tne ss r e c ante d th e e nti re ty of his pr e vio us state me nt t o th e MPD or wh e the r o nly cer tain statements. SeeDef

s.’ Opp’n , Ex. E (Excerpt of Te stimony provided by

J ames E. Simpki n duringKent and I ng ram’s c riminal trial). As is rele vant, af ter Simpkin confirmed that he ha d p re vio us ly

tol d th e MPD that he ha d s e e n G a ith e r w a lk u p th e sta ir s w ithIng ra

m sh or tly be fo re the atta c k, the fo llo wi ngdia logue oc c ur re d: Q. And af

ter that you said y ou saw Mat puttingsomething up into a slot by cell 53? A. Ig ue ss s o, y e s. Q. Wel l you

say “ y ou g ue ss s o, ” do y ou

no t r e me mbe r t

his ? A. No, Idon’t. Itold y ou Ididn’t see this and so I made somethingup and now y ou ’r e tr ying to re fr e sh my me mor y to m ake me re me mbe r i t, I ’m g oin ga lon gbut I c an’ t te ll you

that I sa id i t, I ’m

no t say ing thi s is a lie and I did

n’ t say wh at you

jus t sa id; Ido n’ t r e c a ll this
. Q. So y ou don’t rec all seeing Mat – or excuse me you don’t’ re call say ing that y ou saw M at put an o bje c t in

the c e ll – e xcu se me , a

n o bje c t in

a slo t? A. Ido n’ t r e c a ll i t, b ut i f you sa id I sa id i t, t he n I sa id i t. Id. at p. 6 (82:3-16) . Although the witness states that he “ didn’t see this” a nd there fore “made something up,” it is unclear f rom the transc ript itself whether the witness is ref

err ing only

to the immediately -pre cedingquestion ( i.e. , th at “ Mat put[] som e thi ngint o a slo t” ) o r whe the r h e is ref err ing to the e ntire pre cedingexchang e, includingthe statement that he saw Ing ram a nd Gaither walk up the stairs tog ether
. 57 testimony of anothe r inmate who a

ppare ntly indicated dur ing a

n interview w ith the MPD that he had see n Gaither

and Ing ram wa lk up the stairs in the J ail toge ther shortly befor e the attack. Id. ; Def s.’ Opp’n, Ex. E (Excerpt of Te stimony provided by

J ames E. Simpkin during K ent and Ing ram’s c riminal trial). Althoug h it is som ewhat unclear , it appear s that the witness later
rec anted his statements that he had see n Gaither and Ing ram tog ether
. See Pl.’s Reply at 4-5. 27 2. L eg al Standards Under District law, contr ibutory neg lige nce w ill gene rally bar r ecove ry

on a cla im for neg lige nce. C&

E Servs., I

nc. v. A shland, Inc. , 498 F. Supp. 2d 242, 263 (D.D .C. 2007). Contributory

neg lige nce is de fined a s “the fa ilure ‘to ac t with the prudenc e of a n ordinary
rea sonable pe rson under

the circ umstances.’ ” Krombein v. Gali Serv . Industr., Inc. , 317 F. Supp.Curiously , althoug h Plaintiff has moved for summary judgme nt on the issue of 28 contributory

neg lige nce a

nd/or assumption of risk, she fa iled to actually identify the re levant leg al standar ds in her brie fing
. Se e ge ne ra lly Pl. ’s MSJ; Pl. ’s Re ply . Pe rh a ps a s a re su lt o f t

his oversig ht, Plainti ff ha s argued—without leg al citation—that both “contr ibutory neg lige nce a

nd assumption of risk require a showingthat Gaither actua lly knew a nd understood the f

ull scope and ma g nit ud e of the ri sk po se d b y wa ive r a nd that he , n on e the le ss, e xpos e d h ims e lf to i t intentionally

and unre asonably .” Pl.’s Reply at 2. This asser

tion, however , is incorre ct. As the case law make s clea

r, “[w]hil e it may

look like the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory

neg lige nce ove rlap, a

clea r distinction ex ists between the two. A s opposed to the objective standa

rd employ ed under

contributory

neg lige nce, a ssumption of risk applies where the pla int if f s ub je c tiv e ly kn ow s o f t

he e xiste nc e of

the ri sk and a pp re c iate s it s unr e a so na

ble char acte r.” Se e Kro mb e in , 317 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (inter nal citations and quotation marks omitted). 58 2 d 1 4 , 1 8 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Quee n v. W ash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 842 F.2d 476, 479 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 8) ). “ Th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia

ha s a do pte d th e Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of To rt s’ definition of contributory neg lige nce which explains: ‘[ a] plaintiff’s contributory neg lige nce ma

y be either (a) an intentional and unr easona ble exposure of himself to dang er c reated by the defe ndant’s neg lige nce, of which dang er the plaintiff knows or ha s rea son to know, or (b)
c on du c t w hic h, in r e sp e c ts o the r t ha n th os e state d in

Cla us e (a ), fa lls sh or

t of the sta nd ard to which the r easona

ble man should confor

m in order to prote ct himself from ha rm.’” Id. (quoting D. C. v . B ro wn , 589 A.2d 384, 388, n. 6 (D.C. 1991)) . The e x istence of contributory

neg lige nce is normally

a question of f

act f or the jury , and “‘ [o] nly

in exceptional case s is evidence so clea r and unambiguous that contributory neg lige nce should be found as a matter of la

w.’” Id. (quoting Ly nn v . D .C. , 734 A.2d 168, 172 (D.C. 1999))
. The a ffirmative defe nse of a ssumption of risk also presents a c omplete bar to a plaintiff’s
rec overy under D .C. law. Kro mb e in , 317 F. Supp. 2d at 20. It applies “only wher e ‘the plaintiff .

. . su bje c tiv e ly kn ow [s] of

the e xiste nc e of

the ri sk and a pp re c iate [s] its unre a so na ble char acte r.’” Maalouf v. Swiss Conf ederation , 208 F. Supp. 2d 31, 42 (D.D .C. 2002). “The 2859

sta nd ard is h e avil y

fa c t- ba se d, and

summa ry jud g me nt b a se d o n a ssumpt ion of ri sk sh ou ld there fore be g rante d only if no rea l dispute ex ists as to the plaintiff’s awa rene ss of the re levant dang er.” Id. 3. Plaintiff Has Not Shown that she is Entitled to Sum mary J udg ment on the Affir mative Def

enses of Contributory

Neg lige nce a

nd/or Assumption of Ris k B a se d o n A lle g atio ns that G a ith e r S ho uld Ha ve Di sc los e d h is Involvement in a Gr and Jury Investig ation As explained above, Plaintiff ha s moved for summar y judgme nt, arg

uing that no
rea sonable jury

could find that either

of these a ffirmative defe nses apply based on the rec ord evidenc e in this case. T he Court disag ree s. Taken in a light most favor able to De fenda nts as the non-moving party , the evidenc e shows that Ga ither had pa rticipated a s a witness in a g rand jury
mur de r i nv e sti g atio n le ss t ha n a y e ar b e fo re he wa s in c arc e rate d at th e Jail and that he fa ile d to disclose this fact to Jail officials at any time during his incarc eration in Decembe r of 2002. Although the parties dispute whe ther Ga ither wa s specific ally asked a bout this i nformation duringhis intake proce ss and whethe r he a ctually knew that Ing ram wa s also incar cer ated at the Jail , a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld n on e the le ss q

ue sti on wh e the r G a ith e r w a s n e g lig e nt i n f a ili ngto aff irmatively

disclose his participation in a grand jury investigation to J ail officia ls. As Plainti ff herse lf admits, beingviewed a s a “snitch” or coope rator is “ dang erous.” See Pl.’s Reply at 3. Given that Ga ither wa s no strang er to the Jail environment, havingpreviously been inc arc erated that same year , a re asonable jury could conc lude that Gaither , as a c ooperating witness in a homicide investig ation, should have re asonably notified J ail officia ls of this fact upon admission to the fac ility

— reg ardle ss of whethe r the Jail officials specif ically asked him about a

ny prior involvement in a g rand jury investigation or whether

he knew of Ing ram’s inc arc eration at the J ail. Admittedly , the evidenc e on this rec ord re levant to the af firmative de fense s of contributory60

neg lige nce a

nd/or assumption of risk is mini mal, but give n the “he avily -fa ct base d” natur e of these inquiries, the a

pplicability

of both defe nses is best left to the jury at this point. The Court there fore DENI ES Pl aintiff’s motion for pa rtial summary

judgme nt and Def

endants a re not prec luded from r aising these a ffirmative defe nses at trial ba sed upon alleg ations that Gaither should have infor

med J ail officia ls about his gr and jury testimony
. IV . C ON CL USI ON F or the re a so ns se t f

or th a bo ve , th e Court

GR AN TS- I N- PAR T a

nd DENI ES- I

N- PAR T De fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n f

or Summary

Judg me nt a

nd GR AN TS- I N- PAR T a

nd DENI ES- I

N- PAR T Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment as follows. Fir st , w ithre sp e c t to De fe nd ants ’ Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt, the Cou

rt he re by or de rs that: (1) Def

endants’ motion is DENI ED insofar as De fenda

nts assert that issue pre clusion ba rs Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im; (2) Def

endants’ motion is GRANTED insofa r as it see ks dismis sal of Plaintiff’s claims ag ainst Defe ndant Off icials in their offic ial capa city as re dundant of he r
c la ims a g a ins t th e Di str ic t; (3 ) De fe nd ants ’ m oti on is D EN I ED wi th r e sp e c t to Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im
a g a ins t th e Di str ic t ba se d u po n th e e xiste nc e of

g e nu ine dis pute s o f m ate ri a l f a c t; (4) Def

endants’ motion is DENI ED with respe ct to the Def endant Of ficials’ c laims of qualified immunity

as ag ainst Plainti ff’ s Section 1983 claim based upon the
e xiste nc e of

g e nu ine dis pute s o f m ate ri a l f a c t; (5) Def

endants’ motion is GRANTED with re spect to the De fenda nt Correc tional Of fi c e rs ’ c la ims of

qu a lif ie d immun ity

a s a g a ins t Pla int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im;61 and (6) Def

endants’ motion is DENI ED with respe ct to Plaintiff’s neg lige nce- based
c la ims ba se d u

po n th e e xiste nc e of

g e nu ine dis pute s o f m ate ri a l f a c t. Se c ond, with respec t to Pl aintiff’s Motion for Par tial Summ ary

J udg ment, the Court GR AN TS Pl a int if

f’ s mo tio n a s c on c e de d to the e xtent sh e se e ks an o rd e r p re c lud ingDe fe nd ants fr om r a isi ngan a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e ba se d o n a lle g atio ns that G a ith e r v olu nta ri ly inv olv e d h ims e lf in an alter cation, but DENI ES Pl aintiff’s motion to the extent she seeks a similar orde r prec luding De fenda

nts from raisingsuch af

firmative de fense s based on a lleg ations that Gaither should have notified Jail officials of his involvement with a g rand jury murder inve stigation. Thi rd, Plaintiff shall file a status re port with the Court, on or bef ore Septem ber 30, 2009 , explaining why

J ohn Does 1-20 ha

ve not bee n serve d. I f no such e x planation is timely filed, the Court sh a ll d ism iss Do e s 1 -2 0 a s D e fe nd ants in t his a c tio n, purs ua

nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Procedur e 4(m). An appropr iate Or der a ccompa nies this Memorandum Opinion. Date: September 8, 2009
/s/ C O LLE E N K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge