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In re C-A-, Respondent 

Published June 15, 20061

U.S. Department of Justice 

Executive Office for Immigration Review 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

(1) The members of a particular social group must share a common, immutable 

characteristic, which may be an innate one, such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or a shared 

past experience, such as former military leadership or land ownership, but it must be one 

that members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change, 

because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. Matter of Acosta, 

19 I&N Dec. 211(BIA 1985), followed. 

(2) The social visibility of the members of a claimed social group is an important 

consideration in identifying the existence of a “particular social group” for the purpose 

of determining whether a person qualifies as a refugee. 

(3) The group of “former noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel” 

does not have the requisite social visibility to constitute a “particular social group.” 

FOR RESPONDENT: Michael D. Ray, Esquire, Miami, Florida 

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Maria M. Lopez-Enriquez, 

Assistant Chief Counsel 

BEFORE: Board Panel: HOLMES, HURWITZ, and MILLER, Board Members. 

HOLMES, Board Member: 

The respondents, a married couple and their two minor children, are natives 

and citizens of Colombia. In their deportation proceedings, the lead 

respondent requested asylum and withholding of deportation, claiming fear of 

persecution in Colombia on account of an imputed political opinion and 

membership in a particular social group. On July 31, 1997, an Immigration 

Judge denied their claims for relief and granted voluntary departure. In a 

decision dated March 20, 2002, we affirmed the Immigration Judge’s 

decision. 

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 

determined that the lead respondent was threatened with harm on account of 

membership in a group composed of noncriminal informants. Castillo-Arias 

The August 13, 2004, order in this case, which was affirmed by the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney General, 446 F.3d 

1190 (11th Cir. 2006), is published with editorial changes consistent with our designation 

of the case as a precedent. 

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v. U.S. Atty. Gen. (11th Cir. 2003) (table). The court has remanded the case 

for us to decide in the first instance whether noncriminal informants are a 

“particular social group” as that term is used in the definition of a “refugee” 

in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000). As discussed below, we find that the group of 

noncriminal informants is not a “particular social group.” 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Facts 

The lead respondent provided the following account of events related to his 

claim for asylum. He testified that he was born and raised in Cali, Colombia, 

the headquarters of the Cali drug cartel. He lived with his wife and two 

children in Cali, where he operated a bakery from 1990 to some time in 1995. 

During this time, he was an acquaintance of A-D-, a former policeman in the 

Cali Police Department who, after being fired for corruption, became the chief 

of security for the Cali cartel. The respondent was also a good friend of 

V-M-M-, the General Counsel for the city of Cali, who was responsible for 

investigating and prosecuting drug traffickers in Cali. 

Between 1990 and 1994, A-D- would visit the respondent’s bakery on 

weekends and talk openly about his involvement with the Cali cartel. A-Didentified people, places, and events related to the cartel’s exportation of 

narcotics from Colombia to the United States and Europe. A-D- also 

informed the respondent of his close ties with the Rodriguez brothers and 

others involved in running the Cali drug cartel. The respondent passed the 

information he learned from A-D- along to V-M-M-. He told V-M-M- about 

A-D-’s statements that the Cali cartel had declared war against the 

Government of Colombia and that they would kill politicians who opposed the 

cartel. He also told V-M-M- what he had learned from A-D- about the 

location and size of Cali cartel assets, including banks, bank accounts, 

mansions, haciendas, villas, and other assets both within and outside of 

Colombia. 

On May 15, 1995, the respondent was with his son, who was riding a 

bicycle, when a car suddenly blocked their path. Three men with pistols and 

an automatic weapon attempted to force the respondent into the car. When he 

resisted he was forced to the ground and beaten. The respondent’s son 

screamed and one of the men hit him in the face with a pistol. The commotion 

brought people in the neighborhood out of their houses and the men fled in 

their car. As they departed, they warned the respondent that things would get 

worse for him and his family and that they would also get V-M-M-. The 

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respondent took his son to a clinic where he underwent reconstructive surgery 

to repair his mouth and jaw. 

After this attack, the respondents went to the lead respondent’s parents’ 

home in the northern section of Cali for the remainder of the month of May 

1995. The respondent attempted to rent his bakery while he was away but 

the lessees were intimidated and some lessees were harmed for failing to 

disclose the whereabouts of the respondent. V-M-M- advised the respondent 

to go into hiding and eventually to leave Colombia. The respondent’s parents 

relocated in Cali in attempts to evade persons looking for their son. After the 

respondent made two trips to the United States in 1995, the respondents 

entered this country in February 1996 as visitors for pleasure with 

authorization to remain until August, 8, 1996. 

The respondent last spoke to A-D- in early 1995, and he has heard 

unconfirmed reports that A-D- may have been killed. The Rodriguez brothers, 

leaders of the Cali cartel, were prosecuted and served time in prison. The 

respondent did not appear as a witness in the criminal proceedings against 

members of the Cali cartel. V-M-M- left Colombia for Spain after attempts 

against his life by the Cali cartel. In April 1997, the respondent’s parents and 

two sisters left Colombia for Germany. 

B. The Immigration Judge’s Decision 

The Immigration Judge found the respondent’s testimony credible but 

concluded that he had failed to establish either past persecution or a 

well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground under the 

Act. The Immigration Judge reasoned that the assault and threats against the 

lead respondent were based on retaliation or retribution because of his 

voluntary decision to provide information to the Colombian Government 

concerning the operations of the Cali cartel. Finding a lack of the required 

nexus, the Immigration Judge denied the respondents’ applications for asylum 

and withholding of deportation. 

C. The Board’s Decision 

On appeal to the Board, the lead respondent argued that he had suffered 

past persecution and had a well-founded fear of persecution based on (1) a 

political opinion imputed by the drug cartel and (2) membership in a particular 

social group composed of noncriminal informants who had informed against 

the Cali drug cartel. We rejected the first argument, holding that the people 

who threatened the respondent did so “out of personal motives and not due to 

any political opinion imputed to the respondent.” 

We did not separately address the claim based on membership in a 

particular social group but stated that we agreed with the Immigration Judge 

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“that the record contains insufficient evidence that there was any motivation 

behind the actions of the cartel members against the respondent, other than 

revenge for the aid he provided to the government.” We therefore affirmed 

the Immigration Judge’s decision and dismissed the appeal.2 

D. The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision. 

The Eleventh Circuit found that the evidence of record supported our 

conclusion that the threats to the respondent were not on account of his 

political opinion or imputed political opinion. The court found, however, that 

it was unable to determine on the record before it whether the respondent had 

been targeted because of his membership in a particular social group. 

In addressing the particular social group issue, the court found that “[t]he 

BIA implicitly acknowledged two possible bases for the action of the cartel 

members: retribution, and [the respondent’s] status as an informant.” The 

court found that the Board erred in concluding, based on the evidence in the 

record, that the sole motive for the actions against the respondent was revenge 

for the aid he provided to the Colombian Government. The court stated that 

“[a]lthough there certainly is evidence to support the BIA’s conclusion that 

revenge was a motive in the action of cartel members, a reasonable fact-finder 

would be compelled to conclude that [the respondent] has produced evidence 

from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated by his 

membership in a group composed of noncriminal informants.” 

Having found that the respondents were targeted because of their 

membership in a group composed of noncriminal informants, the court 

reversed the Board’s finding that the sole motive for harming the respondents 

was retaliation or retribution. Because we had not addressed whether 

noncriminal informants constitute a “particular social group” within the 

meaning of the Act, the court has now remanded that question for our 

consideration. 

With his appeal brief the respondent submitted documents marked Exhibits A and B in 

support of his argument that internal relocation was not an option. The Exhibit A 

documents concerned the respondent’s brother-in-law, a civic leader who worked against 

the Cali cartel and who was shot in November 1998 after returning from a government 

meeting. The Exhibit B document concerned threats to the surviving spouse of the 

respondent’s brother-in-law. We did not reach the issue of internal relocation in our prior 

decision and therefore did not address the additional evidence submitted with the appeal. 

Nor do we now find that the information contained in these Exhibits would affect the 

resolution of the particular social group issue, which we have been directed to address on 

remand. 

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II. ANALYSIS 

A. Matter of Acosta Formulation 

The starting point in defining the phrase “particular social group” is set 

forth in Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). There we explained 

that “persecution on account of membership in a particular social group” 

refers to 

persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of 

persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared 

characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some 

circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership 

or land ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under 

this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, 

whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the 

members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change 

because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. Only when this 

is the case does the mere fact of membership become something comparable to the 

other four grounds of persecution under the Act, namely, something that is beyond the 

power of an individual to change or that is so fundamental to his identity or 

conscience that it ought not be required to be changed. By construing “persecution 

on account of membership in a particular social group” in this manner, we preserve 

the concept that refuge is restricted to individuals who are either unable by their own 

actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required, to avoid persecution. 

Id. at 233-34. 

Under the standard established in Matter of Acosta, we have recognized 

“particular social groups” in a number of cases. Matter of V-T-S-, 21 I&N 

Dec. 792, 798 (BIA 1997) (Filipinos of mixed Filipino-Chinese ancestry); 

Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1996) (young women of the 

Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe of northern Togo who did not undergo female 

genital mutilation as practiced by that tribe and who opposed the practice); 

Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1996) (members of the Marehan subclan 

of Somalia who share ties of kinship and linguistic commonalities); Matter of 

Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819 (BIA 1990) (persons identified as 

homosexuals by the Cuban Government); Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 

658 (BIA 1988) (former members of the national police of El Salvador). 

The First, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have adopted our Acosta 

formulation. See Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003) 

(applying Acosta to find that “tattooed youth” were not a “particular social 

group”); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that parents of 

Burmese student dissidents shared a common, immutable characteristic 

sufficient to comprise a particular social group); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 

1239-41 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a subgroup of Iranian feminists who 

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refuse to conform to the government’s gender-specific laws and social norms 

may constitute a particular social group); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 

621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying Acosta in determining that family relations 

can be the basis of a particular social group). 

The Ninth Circuit initially defined a “particular social group” as having a 

“voluntary associational relationship” among its members, described as a 

“collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by 

some common impulse or interest.” Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 

1576 (9th Cir. 1986). In a recent decision, however, the Ninth Circuit has 

recognized that groups sharing immutable characteristics, such as a familial 

relationship or sexual identity, could also be considered social groups within 

the meaning of the refugee definition. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 

1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a “‘particular social group’ is one 

united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by an 

innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of 

its members that members either cannot or should not be required to change 

it”).

The Second Circuit follows the Ninth Circuit’s “voluntary associational 

relationship” standard, but also requires that the members of a social group 

must be externally distinguishable. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 

1991) (explaining that “[l]ike the traits which distinguish the other four 

enumerated categories–race, religion, nationality and political opinion–the 

attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and discrete).” 

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) has 

recently adopted guidelines that combine elements of the Acosta immutable 

or fundamental characteristic approach, as well as the Second Circuit’s “social 

perception” approach. See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: 

“Membership of a particular social group” within the context of Article 1A(2)

of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 

Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002), available at 

http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3 

d58de2da (“UNHCR Guidelines”). The UNHCR Guidelines define a 

“particular social group” as 

a group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being 

persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often 

be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, 

conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.

 Id. at ¶ 11. 

Having reviewed the range of approaches to defining particular social 

group, we continue to adhere to the Acosta formulation. Under Acosta, we do 

not require a “voluntary associational relationship” among group members. 

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Nor do we require an element of “cohesiveness” or homogeneity among group 

members. As discussed below, we have considered as a relevant factor the 

extent to which members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in 

question as members of a social group. 

B. Application of the Acosta Formulation 

The Eleventh Circuit has directed us to consider whether “noncriminal 

informants” are a particular social group in the context of this case. We find 

that this group is too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particularity. 

The group of “noncriminal informants” could potentially include persons who 

passed along information concerning any of the numerous guerrilla factions 

or narco-trafficking cartels currently active in Colombia to the Government 

or to a competing faction or cartel. In considering whether informants are a 

particular social group, it is important to know the persons between whom the 

information is being provided, as well as the nature of the information passed 

along.

Although “noncriminal informants” do not constitute a particular social 

group, the respondent, in his initial appeal to the Board, referred to a subgroup 

of “former noncriminal government informants working against the Cali drug 

cartel.” On remand, the respondent also refers to “noncriminal drug 

informants working against the Cali drug cartel.” We understand the Eleventh 

Circuit’s directive on remand to require consideration of these potentially 

narrower formulations of the particular social group within the larger group 

of noncriminal informants. We therefore examine whether “noncriminal drug 

informants working against the Cali drug cartel” constitute a particular social 

group.

Nothing in the statute, the regulations, or case law provides a definitive 

answer to this question. In its brief on remand, the Department of Homeland 

Security refers to a Tenth Circuit decision rejecting a social group claim based 

on alleged membership in a social group consisting of “persons who have 

worked as informants for drug enforcement agencies of the United States and 

who are in danger of being retaliated against upon return to [Mexico]” as “not 

supported by case law” or “by the principles underlying the Act.” United 

States v. Aranda-Hernandez, 95 F.3d 977, 980-81 (10th Cir. 1996). The 

Tenth Circuit decision, however, mentions the social group argument only in 

passing and sheds little light on the resolution of the issue in this case.3 

The issue in United States v. Aranda-Hernandez, supra, was whether the respondent had 

been prejudiced by the Immigration Judge’s rejection of his asylum claim. The Immigration 

Judge had rejected the claim on the merits but had also found that the respondent was 

ineligible because of aggravated felony drug convictions. It is not clear from the decision 

(continued...) 

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Courts have recognized that informants in some situations may be able to 

demonstrate persecution on account of political opinion. See, e.g., Grava v. 

INS, 205 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that threats against whistleblower 

who reported corrupt behavior of government officials might be on account 

of political opinion); Briones v. INS, 175 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 

that death threats by a rebel group against confidential informer working for 

the government were on account of political opinion); cf. Adhiyappa v. INS, 

58 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that evidence supported our conclusion 

that threats by terrorists were on account of status as a government informant 

rather than based on political opinion). As far as we have found, no court has 

held that government informants against a criminal enterprise such as a drug 

cartel constitute a particular social group. We therefore examine, as a matter 

of first impression, whether the respondent’s past acts–passing along 

information concerning the Cali cartel to the Colombian Government–is the 

kind of shared past experience that constitutes membership in a particular 

social group. 

1. Immutability Based on Past Experiences 

The respondent asserts that the historical fact of having informed on the 

Cali cartel is an immutable characteristic within the meaning of Acosta. A 

past experience is, by its very nature, immutable, as it has already occurred 

and cannot be undone. However, that does not mean that any past experience 

that may be shared by others suffices to define a particular social group for 

asylum purposes. For example, we do not afford protection based on social 

group membership to persons exposed to risks normally associated with 

employment in occupations such as the police or the military. Matter of 

Fuentes, supra. In part, this is because persons accepting such employment 

are aware of the risks involved and undertake the risks in return for 

compensation. Similarly, a person who agrees to work as a government 

informant in return for compensation takes a calculated risk and is not in a 

position to claim refugee status should such risks materialize. 

In Matter of Fuentes, supra, we stated that, although a former member of 

the national police in El Salvador could not demonstrate persecution as a 

member of a social group based on attacks by guerrillas while performing his 

official duties as a police officer, his status as a former member of the national 

police was “an immutable characteristic, as it is one beyond the capacity of the 

respondent to change.” Id. at 662. Were a situation to develop in which 

(...continued) 

the extent to which Aranda’s social group argument may have been affected by his own 

involvement in drug transactions. 

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former police officers were targeted for persecution because of the fact of 

having served as police officers, a former police officer could conceivably 

demonstrate persecution based upon membership in a particular social group 

of former police officers. On the other hand, if a former police officer were 

singled out for reprisal, not because of his status as a former police officer, but 

because of his role in disrupting particular criminal activity, he would not be 

considered, without more, to have been targeted as a member of a particular 

social group. 

The respondent emphasizes in his brief on remand that he informed on the 

Cali cartel, not for compensation or other quid pro quo, but out of a sense of 

civic duty and moral responsibility. The question in this case becomes 

whether the respondent’s civic motives for working as a government 

informant distinguish his situation from that of informants employed by the 

government. We find that the fact that the respondent acted out of a sense of 

civic responsibility does not suffice to define a subgroup of uncompensated 

informants who would be considered to constitute a particular social group. 

Some persons employed as informants or otherwise receiving compensation 

as informants, including police officers, also act partly out of a sense of civic 

responsibility. Many such informants could plausibly claim that their primary 

motivation was a sense of civic duty and the compensation alone would not 

have provided sufficient incentive to undertake the risks involved. Therefore, 

the distinction between informants who are compensated and those who act 

out of civic motives is not particularly helpful in addressing the question of 

who is deserving of protection under the asylum law. 

2. Visibility 

Our decisions involving social groups have considered the recognizability, 

i.e., the social visibility, of the group in question. Social groups based on 

innate characteristics such as sex or family relationship are generally easily 

recognizable and understood by others to constitute social groups. In 

considering clan membership in Matter of H-, supra, we did not rule 

categorically that membership in any clan would suffice. Rather, before 

concluding that membership in the Marehan subclan in Somalia constituted 

membership in a particular social group, we examined the extent to which 

members of the purported group would be recognizable to others in Somalia. 

We found evidence in the record of “the presence of distinct and recognizable 

clans and subclans in Somalia.” Id. at 343. Significantly, we found that the 

various clans could be differentiated based on linguistic commonalities as well 

as kinship ties. We noted that the former Immigration and Naturalization 

Service’s Basic Law Manual also recognized that “clan membership is a 

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highly recognizable, immutable characteristic that is acquired at birth and is 

inextricably linked to family ties.” Id. at 342. 

Our other decisions recognizing particular social groups involved 

characteristics that were highly visible and recognizable by others in the 

country in question. See, e.g., Matter of V-T-S-, supra (Filipinos of mixed 

Filipino-Chinese ancestry); Matter of Kasinga, supra (young women of a 

particular tribe who were opposed to female genital mutilation); Matter of 

Toboso-Alfonso, supra (persons listed by the government as having the status 

of a homosexual); Matter of Fuentes, supra (former members of the national 

police). The two illustrations of past experiences that might suffice for social 

group membership provided in Matter of Acosta, supra, at 233, i.e., “former 

military leadership or land ownership,” are also easily recognizable traits. 

The recent Guidelines issued by the United Nations confirm that “visibility” 

is an important element in identifying the existence of a particular social 

group. The Guidelines explain that the social group category was not meant 

to be a “catch all” applicable to all persons fearing persecution. UNHCR 

Guidelines, supra, at ¶ 2. In this regard, the Guidelines state that “a social 

group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that it is targeted for 

persecution.” Id. However, “persecutory action toward a group may be a 

relevant factor in determining the visibility of a group in a particular society.” 

Id. at ¶ 14 (emphasis added). 

When considering the visibility of groups of confidential informants, the 

very nature of the conduct at issue is such that it is generally out of the public 

view. In the normal course of events, an informant against the Cali cartel 

intends to remain unknown and undiscovered. Recognizability or visibility 

is limited to those informants who are discovered because they appear as 

witnesses or otherwise come to the attention of cartel members. 

The respondent’s reliance on the distinction between informants who act 

out of a sense of civic responsibility, rather than for compensation to limit the 

membership in the relevant social group, would also tie group membership to 

a factor not “visible” to the Cali cartel or to other members of society. 

Notably, there has been no showing that whether an informant was 

compensated is of any relevance to the Cali cartel. Nor would members of 

society in general recognize a social group based on informants who act out 

of a sense of civic duty rather than for compensation. 

The record in this case indicates that the Cali cartel and other drug cartels 

have directed harm against anyone and everyone perceived to have interfered 

with, or who might present a threat to, their criminal enterprises. In this sense, 

informants are not in a substantially different situation from anyone who has 

crossed the Cali cartel or who is perceived to be a threat to the cartel’s 

interests. In fact, the Department of State country reports indicate that 

“[n]arcotics traffickers frequently resorted to terror in attempts to intimidate 

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the Government and the general population.” Committees on Foreign Affairs 

and Foreign Relations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices for 1993 393 (Joint Comm. Print 1994) (emphasis added). 

The victims of the narcotics traffickers included “politicians, labor organizers, 

human rights monitors, and–overwhelmingly–peasant farmers.” Committees 

on International Relations and Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995 362 (Joint Comm. Print 

1996); Committees on Foreign Relations and International Relations, 104th 

Cong., 1st Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 350 

(Joint Comm. Print 1995). While these respondents present very sympathetic 

personal circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that any “group,” as actually 

perceived by the cartel, is much narrower than the general population of 

Colombia. 

Given the voluntary nature of the decision to serve as a government 

informant, the lack of social visibility of the members of the purported social 

group, and the indications in the record that the Cali cartel retaliates against 

anyone perceived to have interfered with its operations, we find that the 

respondent has not demonstrated that noncriminal drug informants working 

against the Cali drug cartel constitute a “particular social group” as that term 

is used in the definition of a “refugee” in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the lead respondent has not 

demonstrated that he was persecuted based on membership in a particular 

social group within the meaning of the “refugee” definition. We will therefore 

dismiss the respondents’ appeal. 

ORDER: The respondents’ appeal is dismissed. 

FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the Immigration Judge’s order and in 

accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris, 16 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 

1997), the respondents are permitted to depart from the United States 

voluntarily within 30 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond 

that time as may be granted by the district director; and in the event of failure 

so to depart, the respondents shall be deported as provided in the Immigration 

Judge’s order. 

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