FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT J UL 12 , 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO N OT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1208 8 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 00-02962 -CV -RRA -S RICKY RI CARDO DANIEL, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us UNITED STAT ES MARSHAL SERVIC E, GAIL W EISS, etal., Defen da nt s, UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, GOLDEN RULE BBQ, Defen da nt s- App el le es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e N o rth e rn D i s tr i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 12 , 200 6)2

Be fo re BI RC H , MA RC U S an d W IL SO N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Ricky Ricar do Daniel, a fe deral prisoner, claim s that he was inj ured when rid in g i n apri so ne r va n t ha t was tra ns po rti ng hi m to a fed eral co ur th ou se . He ap pe al s pr o se the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en t i n f av or of the U nit ed

S ta te s inboth his negli gence claim

brought pursuant to the Feder al T ort Claim s Act ( “ FT CA” ), 28 U . S. C. § 13 46( b) (1 ), and h is c onst itu tio na l c la im a ga ins t tw o U . S. Mars ha ls an d tw o Jo hn D oe de fe ndants br ough t purs uant t o B ive ns v . S ix Unnam ed A ge nts , 403 U . S. 388 , 91 S . Ct . 199 9 ( 1971 ). W e A FF IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en t.

I. BACKG ROUND On 2 N ovem

ber 2000, Daniel filed an am ended com plaint in the district court and alleged, inter a lia, that, as a r esult of the neglig ence of United States Marshal Se rvice em

ploy ees G ail W eiss and Jud ene T ippett, he suffer ed injuries du rin g ave hi cu la r acc id en t t ha t o ccu rredon 20 Octo be r 19 98 . Sp ec if ic al ly , D an ie l a lle ge d th at , w hil e W ei ss and T ipp ett w er e dr ivi ng D an ie l f ro m Ja spe r, A la

bam a, to Bi rm ing ham , A la bam a, the van th ey

w er e dr ivi ng wa s forced off

the road by

an unkno wn driver. D ue to W eiss and Tippett’ s failure to s ec ur e D an ie l i n ase at be lt, he w as inj ur ed

w he n th e van w as f

or ce d of f theDa nie l a lso ra ise d ( 1) a

state law n e g lig e nc e c la im o n th e ba sis that We iss and Ti pp e tt 1 violated Alaba

ma law by

failingto place him in a se at belt, (2) a claim for ne g lige nce unde r the Fe dera l Employ er’ s L iability Act (“ FELA”) , 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., and (3) an F TCA conver sion claim. Danie l further

alleg ed that the United States Ma rshal Servic e and Pete Patton, W eiss and T i p p e t t ’ s s u

p e r v i s o r , w e r e a l s o d e f

e n d an t s i nth e a

b o v e - m e n t i o n e d

c l a i m s . ( R 1 - 2 1 ) . U l t i m at e l y, the district court dismissed Daniel’ s constitutional, st ate law , FELA, and c onversion cla ims, and dismiss ed the United States Ma rshal Servic e, Patton, Weiss, and Tippett as individual defe ndants. Ther efor e, Da niel’s only

rema ining c laim was his neg lige nce c laim ag ainst the United States, the only

proper defe ndant, pursuant to the F TCA. On appe al, Danie l does not c onte nd that th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s w ithre g ard to t he dis mis sa l of

his state law c la im, his neg lige nce c laim under F ELA, and his conve rsion claim under FTCA we re in e rror . As such, this opini on addre sses only his neg lige nce c laim under the F TCA and his constitutional claim. See Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F .3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001) (holdingthat issues not raised in the initial brief

on appea l are deeme d abandone d).

3 ro ad . D an ie l f

urthe r al le ge d th at

his inj ur ie s r es ult ed

f ro m W ei ss’ s ne gli ge nt dr ivi ng and the f

ac t tha t he w as not

se cure d inhis se at . D an ie l r eque ste d a j udgm en t f

or dam ag es a ga ins t the U nit ed S ta te s M ar sha ll Se rv ic e, pur suant t o th e FT CA . H e al so r ai se d aBi ve ns c la im a ga ins t tw o U . S. Mars ha ls and tw o Jo hn D oe de fe ndants inc lud ing ac la im und er the E igh th A m en dm en t f or de lib er at e ind if fe re nc e to h is m ed ic al c ondi tio n. 1 Inr es pons e, the gov er

nm en t f ile d aspe ci al r ep ort, w hic h w as c onstru ed a s a m otion for sum

m ary j udgm ent. O n 16 Ju ne 2004 , the district court adopted m ag istrate j udge ’ s r ep ort and r ec om m en da tio n. T he r ep ort c onc lud ed that, w hil e Daniel’ s Bivens sho uld be dis m issed, there w ere issues of m aterial f act w ith regard to Daniel’ s negligence claim and that the gov ernm ent’ s m otion for sum m ary4

jud gm en t s ho ul d b e d en ie d. Ther eafte r, Daniel filed num erous m otion s with respect to his case, in cl ud in g ade m an d fo r a jury tri al an d am ot io n fo r th e co ur t t o app oi nt co un se l. The district court did not address Daniel’ s dem and for a j ury trial, but rather set D an ie l’ s c as e fo r a be nc h tr ia l t o c om m en ce on 1 6 M ar ch200 5. I n r es pons e to Dan ie l’s o th er m ot io n, h owe ve r, th e co ur t d idap po in t co un se l. D ur ing the tr ia l c onc er

nin g D an ie l’ s ne gli ge nc e cl ai m , D an ie l t es tif ie d th at , on the day

of his transport from

Jasper to Birm ingh am , W eiss and Tippett placed handc uf fs , body c ha ins , and ankl e ch ai ns o n hi m be fo re the y

pla ce d hi m

int o th e van. D an ie l st at ed

that, dur ing the dr ive , W ei ss w as dr ivi ng b etw ee n 65 and 7 5 m ile s pe r hour

in a 55 m ile pe r hour

z one w he n anothe r ve hic le a tte m pte d to change lanes into th e lane in w hich W eiss was driving. W eiss then veered the van int o th e m ed ian, w hic h c au se d D an ie l t o be thr ow n a bout the van, m om en tari ly los e co nsc iou sne ss, and f al l onthe f

loo r. D an ie l t es tif

ie d th at T ipp ett a ske d hi m

if he wa s hurt and that he replied that his knee wa s swollen. W eiss then conti nued dr i v i n g D an i e l t o B i rmi n g h a m. On cr oss-exam ination , D aniel testified that he did no t reca ll whether the van i n wh i ch h e w as ri d i n g co l l i d edwi th th e o th erv eh i cl e t h at cr o s s edi n t o th e v an ’s lane. Daniel also didnot recall if he requested m edical attention imm ediately after5

the incident. D aniel further stated that he did not kn ow whether another car swe rv edin fro nt of t he va n. Ga il W eiss testified next and st ated that, in ac cordance w ith m arshal service pr oc ed ur e, she and T ipp ett se cure d D an ie l i n handc uf fs and c ha ins be fo re pla ci ng him into th e van. W eiss testified that, w hile she was driving the van in th e left lane a t a ppr oxi m at el y

65 mile s pe r hour , atr

uc k th at w as para lle l t o he r van inthe ri ght lane too k ov er

he r lane w ith out

asig na l. W ei ss e xpl ai ne d th at , to av oid hittin g the truck, she steer ed the van into th e m edian. W eiss further testified that she c oul d no t r ec al l the e xa ct loc at ionw he re the inc ide nt o cc ur re d. A ft er

the incident, W eiss did n ot call the local police because there had been no contact be tw ee n he r van and the tr uc k, but she did c al l he r of

fi ce . W ei ss s ta te d th at

she an d T ipp ett a ske d D an ie l i f he w as okay and i f he ne ed ed

m ed ic al a tte nti on, and that D an ie l r es pond ed

that he w as “ okay . ” R1 2- 316 at 80. W ei ss d id n ot r ec al l Dan ie l co m

pl ai ni ng th athe was i n a ny pai n dur in g t he rem ai nd er o f th e tr ip . On cr oss -e xam inatio n, W ei ss s ta te d th at the pos te d sp ee d li m it fo r the are a w he re the inc ide nt o cc ur

re d w as 65 m ile s pe r hour . S he f urthe r state d th at

she w as not sp eed in g o r swe rv in g i n a ndou t o f th e two lan es . Jude ne T ipp ett a lso te sti fi ed and h er te sti m ony

w as ne ar ly

ide nti ca l t o W eiss’ s testim ony

concerning the facts surrounding the incident. T ippett stated6

that sh e al so a ske d D an ie l i f he w as okay and i f he ne ed ed

m ed ic al a tte nti on. L ike W eiss, she said that Daniel responded th at he w as “ okay ” and did not need m ed ic al a tte nti on. I d. a t 10 2. T ipp ett f urthe r state d th at , w he n th ey arr ive d in Birm ingh am , she a gain asked Daniel if he w as okay and that he said “ y es.” Id. at 105. T ipp ett a lso te sti fi ed that W ei ss w as not

spe ed ing , dr ivi ng r ec kle ssl y , or im pr op erl y ch an gi ng lan es . A ft er the c onc lus ionof

T ipp ett’ s te sti m ony , both part ie s of fe re d c los ing ar gum en ts. T he c ourt su

bse que ntl y

e nte re d j udgm en t i n f

av or of the gov er

nm en t. In its written opinion , the c ourt first found that W eiss and Tippett’ s testim ony wa s credible, and the court acce pted their accounts of the incident at iss ue. The c ourt furthe r fo und that W ei ss h ad not dr ive n r ec kle ssl y

or ne gli ge ntl y

and, thu s, that the gove rn m en t w as not

li ab le f or any inj ur ie s th at

D an ie l m ay

have suf fe re d a s a res ul t o f th e in ci de nt . On appeal, with re gard to his negl igence claim under the FT CA, Daniel ar gue s th at : ( 1) the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in fa ili ng t o ho ld a

j ur y tr ia l w ithr eg ar d to his c la im , ( 2) his tr ia l c ouns el w as ine ff ec tiv e, ( 3) the m ag istrate j udge e rr ed in fa ili ng t o r ec use him se lf

on the gr ound

that he w as bia se d a ga ins t D an ie l, ( 4) the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ac tua l f ind ing s and c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns w er e cl earl y er ro ne ous. W e al so r ev ie ww he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in dis m iss ing his7

co nst itu tio na l c la im s. W e ad dr es s e ac h is sue in tur n. II. D ISCU SSION A. Right to a Jury

Tr ial D an ie l arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt vi olate d hi s S ixth and S ev en th A men d men tr i g h t s t o aju ry tr i a l wi th r e g ar dt o h i s n e g l i g e n c e c l a i m. S p e c i f i c a l l y, D an ie l m ai nta ins that he ha d aS ev en th A m en dm en t r igh t t o aj ur y tr ia l be ca use his ca se w as af

ed er al c ivi l su it fo r m one y dam ag es and, f

urthe r, he e xpl ic itl y re que ste d aj ur

y tr ia l. Inr ev ie w ing c as es inv olv ing F T CAc la im s, w e re vie wque sti ons of lawde novo . W orthing ton v. United States, 21 F.3d 399, 400 (11th Cir. 1994 ). Further,

“ [w ] e re vie wthe de nia l of aj ur y tr ia l w iththe m ost

e xa ct ing sc ru tiny . ” Burn s v. Lawth er, 5 3 F .3d12 37 , 12 40 (11 th Cir . 19 95 ) (p er cu ria m ). U n d e r th e S i x th Ame n d men t , c r i mi n a l d e f e n d an t s ar e e n t i t l e dt o atr i a l b y a j ur y . U . S. Co nst . a m en d. V I. B ec au se D an ie l br ough t a c ivi l c la im , and i s no t a cr im ina l de fe ndant w ithr es pe ct to thi s a ct ion , the S ixth A m en dm en t do es not apply . How ever, the United State s Constit ution also provid es, “ [i] n [s] uits at co m m on l aw , w he re the va lue in co ntr ove rs y sha ll ex ce ed

tw en ty dol lars , the r igh t of tr ia l by j ur y sha ll be pr es er

ve d . . . . ” U . S. Co nst . a m en d. V II . N one the le ss, in D an ie l’ s c as e, the S ev en th A m en dm en t r igh t t o aj ur y tr ia l a lso doe s no t a

ppl y8

because his action was brought pu rsuant to statut e, rather than “ at com m on law. ” Se e 28 U . S. C. § 13 46( b) (1 ). T he re fo re , D an ie l’ s r igh t t o aj ur y tr ia l, if one e xis ts, m us t b e d ecl aredby stat ut e. Under the F TC A, the United State s m ay be liable for a

claim ant’ s injury wher e the inj ury

wa s ca use d by ne gli ge nt o r w ro ngf

ul a ct or om iss ionof

any e m plo y ee of the G ove rnm en t whil e ac tin g w ith in the sc ope of his of fi ce or em ploym ent, under cir cum stances wher e the U nited States, if a pr ivate pe rs on, w oul d be li ab le to the c la im an t i n a cc or danc e w iththe lawof the pla ce w he re the a ct

or om iss ionoc curr ed . Id . W iththe e xc ep tio n of § 13 46( a) (1 ), ata x pr ovi sio n, “ any a ct iona ga ins t the U nit ed S ta te s un de r se ct ion134 6 sh al l be tr ie d by the c ourt w ith out

aj ur y . ” 28 U . S. C. § 24 02. H er e, be ca

use D an ie l f

ile d ac la im

a ga ins t the U nit ed

S ta te s purs uant t o 28 U.S.C. § 1 34 6( b) (1 ), he di d n ot ha ve a ri gh t t o ajury tri al un de r 28 U.S.C. § 2 40 2. Th u s , t h e d i s tri ct co u rtd i dn o terr i n h o l d i n g a b en ch tri al wi th re g ar dt o Da n i el ’s ne gl ig en ce cl ai m . B. Ineff ective A ssistance of Counsel O n a ppe al , D an ie l arg ue s th at his c ouns el w as ine ff

ec tiv e be ca

use his counsel (1) did no t com

m unicate with him , ( 2) failed to present various evidence, (3 ) fa ile d to m ak e tim el y

obj ec tio ns t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt r uli ngs, ( 4) f

ai le d to arg ue9

cau sa ti on an d l iabi li ty, an d (5 ) fai le d t o m ai nt ai n a n a tt orne y -cl ie nt rel at io ns hi p. Inr ev ie w ing c as es inv olv ing F T CAc la im s, w e re vie wque sti ons of lawde novo . W orthi ngt on, 21 F . 3d at 40 0. I n c ri m ina l c as es , the S ixth A m en dm en t provides d efendants the right to have assis tance of c ouns el for their defense. U .S . Co nst . a m en d. V I. H ow ev er , the re is no s uc h si m ilar guaranty f or part ie s inac ivi l proceeding. Se e Mekdeci v. Merr ell Nat’ l La bs., 711 F.2d 151 0, 1523 (11th Cir. 1983 ) (h old ing that “ [t ] he [ S] ixth [ A ] m en dm en t st an dard s f or e ff ec tiv e co unse l i n cr im ina l c as es do n ot a

ppl y in the c ivi l c ont ex t” ). W e expla ine d inMe kde ci that, w hil e part ie s have adue pr oc es s r igh t t o r et ai n c ouns el in ci vil c as es , the r igh t does not encom

pass an assurance that the retained counsel will be ef fective. Id. at 1522 n.19. The only

rem edy a party in a civil proceeding has for the alleged m iscondu ct by

his couns el is a suit against his counsel for m alpractice . See id. at 1523 . D an ie l br ough t a

c ivi l c la im

und er the F T CAa ga ins t the U nit ed S ta te s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt ul tim at el y

appoi nte d c ouns el f

or D an ie l. R eg ar dle ss o f w he the r the co urt a ppoi nte d c ouns el f

or D an ie l, he ha d no c onst itu tio na l r igh t t o e ff ec tiv e assistance of his couns el. See id. at 1522-23. D aniel’ s onlyrem edy is to file a cl ai m a ga ins t hi s c ouns el f

or m al pr ac tic e. S ee id. T he re fo re , w e ne ed not a ddr es s Dan ie l’s i ne ffec ti ve ass is ta nc e o f co un se l cl ai m .10

C. Recusal D an ie l arg ue s onappe al that the m ag istrate j udge in thi s c as e ha d pr ev iou sly presided over a civil forfe iture case in which Daniel w as involv ed. Daniel contends that he m ade the court aw are of the potential conflict before his trial be gan and tha t the c our

t di sr eg ar de d hi s c la im . D an ie l m ai nta ins that the m ag is tra te jud ge sh ou ldha ve recu se d h im se lf d ue to hi s b ia s ag ai ns t Dan ie l. Purs uant t o st at

ute , am ag istrate j udge sho uld dis qua lif y him se lf “ in any pr oc ee din g inw hic h hi s im part ia lity m igh t r ea sona

bly be que sti one d” and a lso

“ wher e he has a per sonal bias o r prej udice concerning a party .” 28 U. S. C. §§ 4 55( a) & (b )( 1) . “ A lth oughali te ra l r ea din g of § 45 5 pl ac es the duty

to recognize the conflict on the j udge, this Court has held th at a m otion to disq ualify m us t b e ti m el y .” See B iv en s Gar de ns Offic e Bl dg ., Inc . v. Barne ttBan ks of F la ., In c. , 140 F . 3d 8 98, 913 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) ( hol din g th at , w he n aparty w as aw ar e of a co nf lic t w ar ranti ng r ec usa l at l ea st thr ee m onths b ef or e the c om

m en ce m en t of trial and the party

chose not to raise the issu e until after the tr ial, the par ty had w a i v e dth e i s s u e wi th r e g a r dt o ap p e l l a t e r e v i e w ) ; s e e a l s o Un i t e dS t a t e s v . S l ay, 71 4 F .2d10 93 , 10 94 (11 th Cir . 19 83 ) (p er cu ria m ). H er e, D an ie l arg ue s th at

the m ag istrate j udge he ld a bia s a ga ins t hi m be ca use the j udge ha d a lso pr es ide d ov er ac ivi l f or fe iture pr oc ee din g in vol vin g11

Daniel. D aniel m aintains that he inform ed the j udge of the conflict before trial be gan, but

he doe s no t pr ovi de us w iththe loc at ionin the r ec or d inw hic h he m ad e his m otion to disq ualify

the j udge. Upon review of the r ecord, it appears that D an ie l di d no t r ai se the r ec usa l i ssu e be low . T hus, D an ie l ha s w ai ve d th e iss ue on ap pe al . See Bi ve ns Gard en s, 1 40 F.3dat 9 13 . E ve n if D an ie l ha d r ai se d th e re cu sa l i ssu e be low , D an ie l do es not e xpl ai n on a ppe al howthe m ag istrate j udge ’ s in vol ve m en t i n hi s f or fe iture pr oc ee din g es ta bli she s bi as on the part

of the j udge in his ne gli ge nc e ac tio n. Apr ev iou s ap pe ar an ce a lon e doe s no t su ppor t an in fe re nc e of

bia s. I t c annot

be sa id, the re fo re , that the m ag istrate j udge abuse d hi s di sc re tio n inf ai lin g to r ec use hi m se lf f ro m Dani el ’s neg li ge nc e act io n. Se e id . at 9 05 (ho ld in g t ha t we re vi ew a jud ge ’s dec is io n c on cern in g wh et he r to recu se hi m se lf f oran ab us e o f di sc ret io n) . D . F ac tua l F ind ing s and C re dib ili ty D et er m inatio ns D an ie l arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d no t have f ound W ei ss and Tippett’ s testim onies credible. D aniel m aintains that W eiss did n ot testify ac curate ly

w ithr eg ar d to the loc at ionof the a cc ide nt and tha t sh e did not a dm it that sh e w as spe ed ing . D an ie l f urthe r obj ec ts t o th e co urt’ s f ind ing that W ei ss d id not drive negl igently . Daniel also contend s that W eiss and Tippett’ s testim onies w er e not c re dib le be ca

use ( 1) the y

w orke d to ge the r an d, thu s, ha d ar ea son to12

te sti fy f al se ly , and ( 2) the re w er e inc onsi ste nc ie s inthe ir te sti m ony

c onc er nin g th e location of the accident, the speed at which W eiss was driving, and the actual sp eedli m iton th e h ig hwa y . W e re view a district court’ s finding s of fac t in an action tried without a jury unde r the c le ar ly

e rr one ous standard . W orthi ngt on, 21 F . 3d at 40 0; s ee a lso F ed . R. Civ. P . 52(a) . “ A f

indin g is clearly

err oneous when the r eviewing court, after as se ssi ng the e vid en ce , is le ft w ithade fi nit e an d f

irm c onvi ct ionthat a

m ist ak e has been com

m itted.” W orthing ton, 21 F.3d at 400 (quotatio ns om itted). F urther, a dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n of the que sti ons of

ne gli ge nc e an d pr oxi m at e cau sa ti on are al so rev ie wedforcle ar err or . Id. The F TC A “ wa s design ed to provid e re dress for ordinary torts recognized by state law .” Stone v. United States, 373 F. 3d 11 29, 1130 (11t h Cir. 2004 ) (per curi am) (quot at ion s om itt ed ). T he a lle ge d to rt in D an ie l’ s c as e oc curr ed in Alabam a and, thus, A labam a tort lawapplies. U nder Ala bam a law , ther e ar e three es se nti al e le m en ts o f ne gli ge nc e ac tio ns: “ [f ] ir st, aduty

ow ed by the de fe ndant t o the pla int if

f[ s] ; se co nd[ , ] abr ea chof that du ty ; and thir d, an in j ur y to pla int if

f[ s] in consequence of that breach. ” Ross v. United States, 640 F. 2d 51 1, 519 (11th Cir. 19 81 ) (p er cu ria m ) (quo ta ti on s o m it te d) . Daniel’ s assertions, that W eiss testified falsely regar ding the speed at w hich13

she dr ove on the day

of the a cc ide nt and the loc at ionof the a cc ide nt, are w ith out s up p o rti n th e r ec o rdb ec au s e, up o n re v i ew o f t h e t ri al tra n s cr i p t , Da n i el ’s testim ony provides th e only

contradiction to W eiss’ s testim ony . The district court de te rm ine d th at

W ei ss w as c re dib le , and the re is nothin g inthe r ec or d to sug ge st that this find ing was clearly err oneous . While Daniel m aintains on appeal that the re w as e vid en ce a dm itt ed a t tri al that de m onstrate d th at the spe ed

li m it on the hig hw ay a t i ssu e w as 55 m ile s pe r hour , r athe r than 65 m ile s pe r hour a s W ei ss stated, it does not appear from the trial transcr ipt that any such evidence was e ver ad m it te d. Furthe r, W ei ss d id n ot p ro vid e inc onsi ste nt t es tim ony c onc er nin g th e loc at ionof

the a cc ide nt, a s D an ie l c la im s, be ca use she onl y

te sti fi ed that sh e did not recall the exact location o f the ac cident. T he fac t that W eiss m ay have been m or e spe ci fi c re gard ing the loc at ionon an e ar lie r af fi davit , a s D an ie l arg ue s, is not ev ide nc e that sh e te sti fi ed f al se ly , but

m er el y sug ge sts that, by

the ti m e the c as e w en t t o tr ia l, she ha d f

or gotte n so m e of

the de ta ils of

the inc ide nt. Mo re ove r, the l o ca t i o n o f t h e i n ci d en ti s n o td i s p o s i t i v e o n th e i s s u e o f l i ab i l i ty an dDa n i el ’s counsel coul d have im

peached W eiss’ s testim ony had he determ ined she was pr ovi din g f

al se te sti m ony . A ft er

r ev ie w ing the r ec or d, w e ar e not “ le ft w itha de fi nit e an d f

irm c onvi ct ionthat a

m ist ak e ha [d ] be enc om

m itt ed . ” W orthi ngt on,14

21 F.3d at 400 (quotatio ns om itted). T herefor e, the district court’ s finding s of fac t an d c red ib il it y

were n ot cle arl y

erro ne ou s. E . Co nst itu tio na l C la im O n a ppe al , in a curs or

y and s om ewha t c onf

usi ng m anne r, D an ie l a

ppe ar s to ra ise aBi ve ns c la im

a ga ins t the de fe ndants due to the ir f ai lur e to p ro vid e him

w ith m ed ic al c ar e af

te r the ve hic le inc ide nt. A s w ill be e xpl ai ne d be low , thi s c la im is pr ope rl y c hara ct er iz ed

a s de lib er at e ind if

fe re nc e of

D an ie l’ s m ed ic al ne ed s in violatio n of the Fifth A m endm ent’ s Due P rocess Clause. T he United State s argues that D an ie l w ai ve d hi s r igh t t o a ppe al the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of his constitu tional claim

because D aniel’ s notice to thi s Court did no t list the dis trict co urt’ s or de r that di sm iss ed thi s c la im . T he U nit ed

S ta te s a lso arg ue s th at

the al le gatio ns i n D an ie l’ s a

ppe llate br ie f w er e ins uf

fi ci en t t o r ai se D an ie l’ s B ive ns cl ai m on a ppe al . T he U nit ed

S ta te s c ite s Whe tst one Candy Co . v. K ra ft F oods , In c. , 351 F . 3d 1 067 (1 1thCi r. 200 3) , in supp ort of it s arg um en t tha t, be ca

use Daniel’ s Bivens claim

invol ve several def

endants who wer e previously dism issed a s i n d i v i du a l p a rt i e s , w e s h o u l dn o tn o wa s s u me j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r th o s e c l a i ms when D aniel failed to provide noti ce that he w as appealing the order that di sm is se d t ho se de fen da nt s. W ithr eg ar d to our

j ur isd ic tio n to he ar

D an ie l’ s B ive ns c la im , w e not e our15

“ oblig at[ion] to inqu ire into subject-m atter j urisdictio n sua spo nte whenever it m ay be la ck ing . ” Ca de t v. Bu lge r, 377 F . 3d 1 173, 117 9 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ( quot at ion s om itt ed ). A cc or din g to F ed er al Ru le of Appe llate P ro ce dur e 3( c) , anot ic e of appeal m ust contain (1) the party

taking th e appeal, (2) the j udgm ent, order , or part thereof being appealed, and (3) the court to which the appeal is taken. H owever , we construe the requirem ents of Rule 3 liberally . See Sm ith v. Bar ry , 502 U. S. 244, 248 , 112 S . Ct . 678 , 681 ( 1992 ). Mo re ove r, w e have he ld tha t, w he n aparty files a notice of a

ppeal from

the final j udgm ent of the district court, w e m ay re vie wa ll pr ior

int er loc uto ry

or de rs . B ar fi el d v. Br ie rt on, 883 F . 2d 9 23, 930 ( 11th Ci r. 198 9) ( hol din g th at

“ the appe al f

ro m af ina l j udgm en t dr aw s inque sti on a ll pr io r no n- fin al ord ers an d ru li ng s wh ic h p ro du cedth e jud gm en t” ). He re , Da n i el ’s n o t i ce o f ap p ea l re fe rr edt o two o rd er s : (1 ) t h e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s order that appointed Daniel’ s counsel, and (2) the district court’ s final j udgm ent as to Dani el ’s neg li ge nc e cl ai m ag ai ns t t he Uni te d S ta te s, p ur su an t t o t he FTCA. Co nstru ing D an ie l’ s pr o se br ie f lib er al ly it appe ar s th at

D an ie l ha s r ai se d hi s Bi v en s cl ai m s o n ap p ea l , e v en th o u g h h e d i dn o tre fe re n ce th e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s dis m iss al of

tho se c la im s inhis not ic e of appe al . S ee Mc Br ide v. S harp e, 25 F . 3d 962, 971 (11t h Cir. 1994 ) (e n banc) (noting ou r obligation to construe pro se briefs l i b e r a l l y) . A s e x p l a i n e dp r e v i o u s l y, w e h a v e h e l dth a tan o t i c e o f ap p e a l f r o m a16

fi na l j udgm en t tha t f

ai ls t o r ef er en ce aspe ci fi c int er loc uto ry or de r doe s no t pr ec lud e us f

ro m r ev ie w ing the int er loc uto ry or de r. S ee Barf

ie ld, 883 F . 2d at 93 0- 31. Further

m ore, while the United States is correc t in asserting that, in Whetston e, w e re fu se d to r ev ie wadis tr ic t c ourt’ s in te rl oc uto ry or de r dis m iss ing ade fe ndant w he n th e ap pe llant f

ai le d to r ef

er en ce the or de r in i ts n oti ce of appe al , that c as e is dis tin gui sha

ble f ro m thi s c as e be ca

use D an ie l i s apr o se appe llant, w he re as the ap pe ll an t i n Whet st on e was rep res en te d b y co un se l. See Whe ts to ne Can dy Co., 35 1 F .3dat 1 07 9- 80 . W e wil l the refo re re vi ew Dan ie l’s Bi ve ns cla im s o n app eal . In s o d oi ng , we reviewde novo a dis m issal for failure to state a claim under 28 U. S. C. § 19 15A (b )( 1) . L ea l v. G a. D ep ’ t of Co rr . , 254 F . 3d 1 276, 127 9 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) (per c uriam ). T his stand ard of r eview is the sam e as the de novo review of a dism issal for failure to state a claim under Federa l Rule of Civil Proce dure 12( b) (6 ). I d. U nde r suc h r ev ie w , “ al l f ac ts s et f orth i n th e pla int if

f' s c om pla int ar e to b e ac ce pte d a s tr

ue and the c ourt [ m

ust ] li m it[ ] it s c onsi de ratio n to the ple ad ing s and e xhi bit s a tta ch ed the re to. ” G ro ssm anv. N at ion sbank, N . A . , 225 F. 3d 1 228, 123 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ( quot at ion s om itt ed ). “ Ac om pla int m ay not be dis m iss ed . . . unl es s it

appe ar s be y ond doub t tha t the pla int if f can pr ove no s et

of fa ct s insup port of

his c la im w hic h w oul d e nti tle him to re lie f. ” I d. a t 12 31- 32.17

T he a va ila

bil ity of ac au se of

a ct ionf or m one tary

dam ag es or

inj unc tiv e relief against federal off

icials in their indiv idual capacities for a violatio n of a federa l constitu tional right wa s established in Bivens. S ee Bivens, 403 U.S . at 395-97 , 91 S. Ct. at 2004-05 . Ac tions for m onetary dam ages against federa l em plo y ee s, pur suant t o B ive ns, have be enpe rm itt ed und er 28 U . S. C. § 13 31 f

or vi ol at io ns of t he Cru el an d Un us ua l Pu ni sh m en t Cl au se of t he Eig ht h Am en dm en t. Se e Carl son v. G re en , 446 U . S. 14, 19, 100 S . Ct . 146 8, 147 2 ( 1980 ). T he E igh th Am endm ent governs th e condition s under which convicted prison ers ar e confined an d th e tr eatm en t the y

r ec ei ve w hil e in p ri son. F ar m er v. Br ennan, 511 U . S. 825 , 8 3 2 , 1 1 4 S. Ct . 1 9 7 0 , 1 9 7 6 (1 9 9 4 ). Ho we v er , b ec au s e t h e E i g h th Am en d m en t ’s prohibi tions against cruel and unusu al punish m ent do no t apply to pretrial de ta ine es , w hic h it

is undi sput ed

that D an ie l w as a t the ti m e of the ve hic le incident, claim s invo lving the m istreatm ent of pretrial detainee s in custo dy are lim ite d to adue pr oc es s c la im . S ee Be ll v. W olf ish , 441 U . S. 520 , 535 , 99 S . Ct . 18 61 , 18 72 (19 79 ); Ti tt le v. J effe rs on Co un ty Comm ’n, 10 F.3d15 35 , 15 39 n.3 (1 1thCi r. 199 4) ( enbanc ). T he D ue P ro ce ss C lause of the F if th A m en dm en t, rather the F ourteenth Am endm ent, governs Daniel’ s Bivens claim because fe deral action is at issue. See Rodriguez-Padron v. IN S, 13 F.3d 1455, 1458 n.7 (11th Cir. 1994 ). T he standard

f or pr ovi din g ba sic hum anne ed s to tho se inc ar ce rate d or in18

de te nti on i s th e sam e unde r both th e E igh th A m en dm en t and the F if th A m en dm en t’ s D ue P ro ce ss C lause . S ee Cu oc o v. Mo ri tsu gu, 222 F . 3d 9 9, 106 ( 2d Ci r. 200 0) ( ap ply ing the E igh th A m en dm en t de lib er at e ind if fe re nc e te st t o a pre-tria l detainee’ s Fifth Am endm ent due process claim ); cf. Marsh v. Butler Co unty , A la . , 268 F . 3d 1 014, 102 4 n. 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( enbanc ) (a ppl y ing the E igh th A m en dm en t de lib er at e ind if fe re nc e te st t o apr e- tr ia l de ta ine e’ s F ourte en th Am en dm en t due pro ces s cl ai m ). 1. D ef en dants W ei ss and T ipp ett T o pr ev ai l onac la im

of de lib er at e ind if

fe re nc e by

gov er nm en t of fi ci al s to the m ed ic al ne ed s of

apr etri al de ta ine e, apla int if f “ m ust sa tis fy both an ob

j ec tiv e and a subjec tive inqu iry . First, [he] m ust prov e an obj ectively

serious m edical ne ed . S ec ond, [ he ] m

ust pr ove that the pr iso n of

fi ci al a ct ed

w ithde lib er at e indifference to that need.” B ozem an v. O rum , 422 F. 3d 12 65, 1272 (11t h Cir. 2005 ) (p er

c ur iam ) (quot at ion s om itt ed ). T o m ee t the sub j ec tiv e el em en t of

the de lib er at e ind if

fe re nc e inq

uir y , r eg ar din g th e gove rn m en t of fi ci al s’ state of

m ind , th r e e e l e me n t s ar e r e qu i r e d : “( 1 ) s ub j e c t i v e kn o w l e d g e o f

ar i s ko f s e r i o u s h arm; (2 ) dis re gard

of that r isk ; ( 3) by

c ondu ct that i s m or e than [ gr oss ] ne gli ge nc e. ” I d. (quot at ion s om itt ed ) (a lte ratio n inor igi na l) . Whil e Bo ze m ande al t w itha de lib er at e ind if

fe re nc e cl ai m

und er the D ue P ro ce ss C lause of the F ourte en th19

A m en dm en t, w e dis ce rn“ no r ea son w hy the ana ly sis sho uld

be dif fe re nt unde r the D ue P ro ce ss C lause of

the F if th A m en dm en t. ” Cu oc o, 222 F . 3d at 10 6. H er e, D an ie l’ s c om

pla int did not sa tis fy the r el ev an t ob

j ec tiv e an d subj ec tiv e inquir ie s. F ir st, D an ie l c annot pr ove that he ha d an “ obj ec tiv el y se ri ous m ed ic al ne ed . ” S ee Bo ze m an , 422 F . 3d at 12 72. D an ie l’ s a sse rt ionthat he ha d a se ri ous m ed ic al ne ed

is dir ec tly

c ontra dic te d by

the f ac t a lle ge d inhis c om

pla int that, a ft er his r el ea se f

ro m c ust ody the sam e day

on whic h th e ve hic le inc ide nt oc curr ed , D an ie l di d no t se ek m ed ic al tr eatm en t f

or his inj ur ie s e ve n th oughhe w as c om ple te ly f re e to d o so . I n f

ac t, D an ie l c onc ed ed , in his obj ec tio ns t o th e m agistrate j udge’s r eport and recom m endation, that he did no t seek m edical tr eatm en t un til tw o w ee ks a ft er the inc ide nt. S ee R6 -1 37 at 13 -1 4. Se co nd, D an ie l c annot

pr ove that W ei ss and T ipp ett a ct ed w ithde lib er at e in di ffer en ce t o h is all eg edm ed ic al ne ed s. See Bo zem an , 42 2 F .3dat 1 27 2. D an ie l a lle ge d th at

W ei ss and T ipp ett kn ew of his inj ur ie s, but

D an ie l do es not su gg es t h ow t he off

ic ers co ul d h av e kno wn t ha t Dan ie l’s kne e an d b ackwere h ur t. D an ie l do es not

r eb ut W ei ss and T ipp ett’ s de cl ar at ionthat the y a ske d D an ie l i f he wa s injured a fter the incident and that Daniel responded th at he w as “ okay .” Mor eo ve r, D an ie l, pr es um ab ly , w as able to ge t up f ro m the f loo r of the van, sit back on the seat, and continue the rem ainder of the trip. D aniel did no t allege that20

he com plained to W eiss and Tippett about h is pain. G iven the circum stances as ev ide nc ed

in the r ec or d, D an ie l c annot pr ove that W ei ss and T ipp ett su bj ec tiv el y knew that D aniel had sustain ed injuries during the incident. T herefor e, the district co urt di d no t e rr

in dis m iss ing D an ie l’ s c onst itu tio na l c la im s a ga ins t W ei ss and T ipp ett f or f ai lur e to s ta te ac la im

upo n w hic h r el ie f co uld

be gr an te d. 2. D ef en dant J ohn D oe I ( Su

pe rv iso r Pe te P atton ) Inde te rm ini ng whe the r a supe rv iso r m ay be li ab le und er

aBi ve ns c la im

f or unc onst itu tio na l de pr ivatio n c au se d by an e m plo y ee , w e loo k to our

pr ec ed en t governin g 42 U.S .C. § 1983 , which allows a plaintiff w ho has been deprived o f a fed eral rig ht to bri ng an act io n a ga in sta pe rs on act in g u nd er co lo r of st at e la w. G ri ff in v . Ci ty of O pa -L oc ka , 261 F . 3d 1 295, 130 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) . W e have pr ev iou sly

de te rm ine d th at

the lawgov er

nin g 42 U . S. C. § 19 83 i s ge ne ra lly ap pl ie d t o aBiv en s ac ti on , whi ch co ve rs th os e who actun de r co lo r of fed eral law. Se e K el ly v. S er na , 87 F . 3d 1 235, 123 8 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ( hol din g th at the ap pli ca ble statut e of

li m itatio ns tha t go ve rn ed a§ 19 83 a ct iona lso gov er ne d a Bi ve ns act io n) . U nde r § 19 83, w e have he ld tha t su chasup er vis or m ay not be li ab le “ on the ba sis of r es pond eat su

pe ri or or vic ar iou s li ab ili ty . ” H ar tle y v. P ar ne ll, 193 F . 3d 1263 , 126 9 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( quot at ion s om itt ed ). S upe rv iso ry li ab ili ty ari se s,21

how ev er , in the f

oll ow ing ins tanc es : either w hen the sup ervisor personally participates in the alleged constitu tional vi olation or w hen there is a ca usal connection betwee n actions of the sup ervising official and the alleged constitu tional deprivation . The c ausal connection can be establish ed when a histo ry of w ide spr ea d a

buse put s th e re spon sib le sup er vis or on n oti ce of

the ne ed to co rr ec t the a lle ge d de pr ivatio n, and h e fa ils to do s o. T he de pr ivatio ns tha t c onst itu te w ide spr ea d a buse suf fi ci en t t o no tif

y the supe rv isi ng o ff

ic ia l m ust be obv iou s, f

la gr an t, r am

pant and o f co nti nue d duratio n, r athe r than is olate d oc curr en ce s . . . . I n a ddi tio n, the c au sa l c onne ct ionm ay be e sta bli she d and s upe rv iso ry

li ab ili ty im po se d wh ere t he supe rv is or ’s im pr op er cu st om

or p ol ic y . . . res ul t[s ] in de li be rat e in di ffer en ce t o c on st it ut io na l ri gh ts . Id . (ci ta ti on an d q uo ta ti on s o m it te d) (al te rat io n i n o rig in al ). Apply ing ou r lawon § 19 83 to Daniel’ s Bivens claim , there is no evidence that P attonw as c au sa lly

c onne ct ed

to suc h de pr ivatio n, e ve n a ssum ing that W ei ss an d T ipp ett ha d de pr ive d D an ie l of ac onst itu tio na l r igh t. P attondid not pe rs ona lly

part ic ipate in the inc ide nt o the r than to take ac al l f ro m T ipp ett i n which he asked if there we re any injuries and Tippett inform ed him that there w ere none . F urthe r, D an ie l di d no t a lle ge that P attonha d e nga ge d inahis tor y of thi s ty pe of deprivation and widespread abuse, nor did he allege that Patton h ad instit uted an im

proper custom

or policy that resulted in Daniel’ s constit ution al de pr ivatio n. S ee H ar

tle y , 193 F . 3d at 12 69. T hus, the re e xis te d no ba sis in the com plaint on which to state a c laim against Patton for any

constitu tional22

de pr iv at io n c au se d b y

hi s emplo y ees . 3. D ef en dant J ohn D oe I I (A ge nt o f W ei ss and T ipp et ) In review ing th e entire r ecord, it is unclear to whom Daniel was r efer

ring as his se co nd J ohn D oe de fe ndant. B ec au se D an ie l f ai le d to c le ar ly

e sta bli sh the JohnD oe ’ s r ole in the a lle ge d c onst itu tio na l de pr ivatio n, or to suf fi ci en tly a lle ge fa ct s th at sup port hi s c la im

a ga ins t this de fe ndant, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in dism issin g Daniel’ s claim against Joh n Doe I I. See Fed. R. Civ. P . 8(a ) (a ple ad ing m

ust c ont ai n “ a shor

t and p la in s ta te m en t of

the c la im sho w ing that the pl ead er i s en ti tl edto rel ie f”); see als o GJ R In vs . Inc . v. Co un ty of Esc am bi a, Fl a., 132 F. 3d 1 359, 136 7 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) ( “ [A ] § 19 83 p la int if f [m ust ] a lle ge w ith som e specificity

the fac ts which m ake out its claim ”).

III. C ONC LUS ION Upo n re vi ew of

th e rec or d a ndco ns id erat io n o f th e p art ie s’ bri efs , we discern no reversible err or. W e af firm the district court’ s denial of Daniel’ s FT CA ne gl ig en ce cl ai m

an d d is m is sa l o f hi s co ns ti tu ti on al cla im . AFFIRMED.