UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4268

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

COREY JERMAINE HAIRSTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:11-cr-00071-CCE-1)

Submitted: October 24, 2012 Decided: November 8, 2012

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney,

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Corey Jermaine Hairston pled guilty to distribution of 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and 

received a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range of 

ninety-two months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Hairston argues the 

district court unreasonably ran the federal sentence consecutive 

to his undischarged state sentence rather than concurrent with 

it. We affirm.

At the time of his sentencing, Hairston was serving a 

thirty-five-year sentence on Virginia state convictions for 

second degree murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and use 

of a firearm in connection with a felony. Hairston does not 

argue these offenses were related to the instant federal 

offense. 

We review a sentence for reasonableness under a 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A reasonableness review 

includes both procedural and substantive components. Id. A 

sentence is procedurally reasonable where the district court 

committed no significant procedural errors, such as improperly 

calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or insufficiently explaining 

the selected sentence. United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 

837–38 (4th Cir. 2010). The substantive reasonableness of a 
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sentence is assessed in light of the totality of the 

circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. While a sentence may be 

substantively unreasonable if the § 3553(a) factors do not 

support the sentence, “[r]eviewing courts must be mindful that, 

regardless of ‘the individual case,’ the ‘deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review . . . applies to all sentencing 

decisions.’” United States v. Diosdado–Star, 630 F.3d 359, 366 

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946 (2011) (citing Gall, 

552 U.S. at 52). Moreover, a sentence that falls within a 

properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively 

reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 

2007). 

Hairston asserts that U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual (“USSG”) § 5G1.3(c) (2011) compels a sentencing court to 

construe the undischarged state offense as if it were a federal 

offense and to compute a hybrid Guidelines range that would be 

applicable to both offenses. Cf. United States v. Hill, 59 F.3d 

500, 503 (4th Cir. 1995). However, the application notes to

USSG § 5G1.3(c) no longer advise such a procedure. See USSG 

§ 5G1.3(c), cmt. n.3(A). As this court has explained, a 

district court need not calculate a hypothetical combined 

Guidelines range to comport with the current version of 

§ 5G1.3(c). United States v. Mosley, 200 F.3d 218, 224–25 (4th 

Cir. 1999). Instead, a district court’s discretion in imposing 
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consecutive or concurrent sentences is bounded only by the 

relevant factors that the current version of § 5G1.3(c) directs 

the court to consider. Id. Those factors include the concerns 

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); the type and length of the 

prior undischarged sentence; the time likely to be served before 

release on the undischarged sentence; and the fact that the 

prior undischarged sentence may have been imposed in state court 

rather than federal court. See USSG § 5G1.3(c), cmt. n.3(A). 

Section 5G1.3(c) first directs courts to consider the 

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See USSG § 5G1.3(c), 

cmt. n.3(A). Here, the district court explicitly referred to 

Hairston’s long criminal record, noting the murder and gun 

convictions, and opined that the need to protect the public 

weighed in favor of a consecutive sentence. The district court 

further concluded that a sentence at the bottom of Hairston’s

Guidelines range adequately took into account the long sentence 

he is serving on the state offense and a “record otherwise 

primarily but not exclusively of misdemeanors.” We conclude the 

district court properly considered the relevant factors under 

USSG § 5G1.3(c), and properly explained the sentence it imposed. 

United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir.

2006). 

As this court has emphasized, “[a] district court’s 

decision to impose a sentence that runs concurrently with, 
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partially concurrently with, or consecutively to a prior 

undischarged term of imprisonment is constrained only by its 

consideration of the factors mentioned in the commentary to 

§ 5G1.3(c).” Mosley, 200 F.3d at 223. Because the district 

court considered the factors listed in the commentary to USSG 

§ 5G1.3(c) — including the guideposts referenced in § 3553(a) —

we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence in this case. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED