* Pursua nt to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-60317

(Summary Calendar)

LISA BOWERS, M.D.

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHRISTOPHER J. CAMPBELL, M.D.; ANESTHESI A ASSOCIATES OF NORTH

MISSISSIPPI, P.A.

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - On Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Mississippi

(98-CV-156)

- - - - - - - - - - February 21, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

This Mississippi employment disput e is before us on diversity

jurisdiction. Plaintiff-Appellant Dr. Lisa Bowers challenges the

district court’s (1) gr ant of the motion of Defendant-Appellee

Anesthesia Associates of North Mississippi (“AANM”) for judgment as a

matter of law (“j.m.l.”) and a remittitur regarding Dr. Bowers’s claims

for consequential damages and damages for emotional distress resulting

from AANM’s breach of its employment contract with her and (2) denial2

of Dr. Bowers’s motion for a new trial regarding her claim of tortious

breach of contract. In the district court, Dr. Bowers sought damages

for employment termination on the ground that the termination violated

the terms of her employment contract and did so in a manner that

inflicted emotional distress on her. As we agree with the district

court’s conclusion that Bowers’s claims for damages for emotional

suffering and tortious breach of contract are without merit and that she

i s only entitled to 30 days’ compensation for AANM’s failure properly

to notify her of the termination of her employment, we affirm the

rulings of the district court.

I. Facts and Proceedings

Dr. Bowers was employed as a specialized physician anesthesiologist

by AANM, a small anesthesiologist group founded by Drs. James Cook and

Christopher Campbell. After the death of Dr. Cook in 1996, the group

was owned solely by Dr. Campbell. The employment agreement between the

parties to this litigatio n was a one-year contract that “would be

extended automatically for su c cessive one year periods” beginning on

August 1, up to and including a third year. It was signed by Dr. Bowers

and Dr. Cook. Dr. Bowers asserts that she began working for AANM with

the understanding that she would be made a partner after three years of

satisfactory performance. The contract contained two paragraphs

allowing AANM to terminate an employee. Paragraph 8B states that:

This contract may be termin a ted by either party on not less

than 30 days advance written notice thereof. If the employee

violates any of the provisions of the contract, the Group may

terminate the employment immediately without further3

obligation except to pay the employee for compensation earned

pr ior to the termination of this contract. However, the

medical gro up may terminate the employment hereunder

immediately if, in t heir best judgment, it is necessary to

protect its business or good name. . . .

Paragraph 8D provides that:

This agreement shall automatically terminate at any time, if,

in the sole judgment of the Group, employee becomes unfit to

properly perform the duties set out in the Work Agreement or

employee is deemed unf i t for reasons including but not

limited to interpersonal relation difficulties with other

employees or members of the Group, or if Anesthesiologists

skills are found to be severely lacking and patient care is

unacceptable. . . .

Dr. Bowers contends that when a colleague was denied partnership after

completing the third of his three one-year con tracts, she became

concerned for her own future with AANM and asked Dr. Campbell whether

she was still on partnership track. According to Dr. Bowers, Dr.

Campbell responded that “I never intended to make you a partner.” After

being thus informed, Dr. Bowers began looking for jobs elsewhere. As

a result of her search, she scheduled an on-site interview with an

anesthesiology group in Florida at the beginning of January, 1998.

On the evening of Friday January 2, 1998, Dr. Campbell called Dr.

Bowers at home and told her to take the job in Florida because she was

to be terminated by AANM; when pressed fo r a reason, Dr. Campbell

asserted that there had been some complaints about her conduct and her

personality. Dr. Campbell asked Dr. Bowers to clean out her locker at

the hospital over the weekend but she chose instead to keep her

interview with the group in Florida. When she returned and attempted4

to clean out her locker on Monday morning, sh e was provided with a

written notice of her termination which contained no sp ecification of

cause. Dr. Campbell then threatened to have Dr. Bowers charged with

tresp ass for allegedly causing a scene and had her escorted from the

hospital by security guards. AANM paid Dr. Bowers no further salary

under the contract and cancelled her malpractice and health insurance.

Unsuccessful in finding employment with another group, Dr. Bowers moved

to Florida and began building a solo practice. She asserts that, in

doing so, she spent $80,000 of her savings and borrowed an additional

$30,000 to support herself and her daughter until her practice got under

way.

Dr. Bowers br ought this suit, alleging that Dr. Campbell, acting

individ ually and on behalf of AANM, breached the employment contract

between the part i es by terminating Dr. Bowers without cause with five

months remaining on the one-year contract. She also advanced a claim

for tortious breach of contract, and she sought compensatory damages for

loss of income, costs incurred in relocating and establish i ng her own

practice, and mental anguish and emotional distress, as well as punitive

damages. At the conclusion of the presentation of all the evidence, the

d istrict court granted AANM’s motion for a j.m.l. rejecting Bowers’s

claim for to r tious breach of contract against both Dr. Campbell and

AANM. The jury was then instructed to determine whether Dr. Campbell

had breached Paragraph 8D of the contract in terminating Dr. Bowers, to

which the jury re sponded affirmatively. It was also asked to assess

compensatory damages, including “emotional distress and mental anguish,”1 Harrington v. Harris

, 118 F.3d 359, 367 (5 th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Hiltgen v. Sumrall , 47 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir.1995)).

2 Harringto n , 118 F.3d at 367 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

50(a)(1)).

3 Eiland v. Westinghouse Elect ric Corporation , 58 F.3d 176,

183 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Westbrook v. General Tire and Rubber

Co. , 754 F.2d 1233, 1242 (5th Cir. 1985)).

4 Eiland

, 58 F.3d at 183 (quoting Caldarera v. Easte r n

Airlines, Inc. , 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983)).

5 for which the jury awarded Dr. Bowers $175,000. She then filed a motion

for a ne w trial on her claim for tortious breach of contract, which

motion the district court denied. The district court granted AANM’s

motion for remittitur and a j.m.l

. , concluding that Dr. Bowers was

entitled only to 30 days’ pay ($15,660) for AANM’s failure to furnish

her with 30 days’ advance notice of termination pursuant to Parag r aph

8B. Dr. Bowers appeals both decisions of the district court.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

“‘A motion for judgment as a matter of law . . . in an action

tried by jury is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the jury's verdict.’” 1 We apply the same standard as does the

district court, i.e., “[a] jury verdict must be upheld unless ‘there is

no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find’

as the jury did.” 2

Remittitu r is allowed if the damages awarded by the jury are

excessive. 3 “A verdict is excessive if it is ‘contrary to right reason’

or ‘entirely disproportion ate to the injury sustained.’” 4 Finally, we5 Stinnett v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. , 227 F.3d 247, 254

(2000).

6 Fusilie r, Ott, & McKee, P.A. v. Moeller , 507 So.2d 63, 67

(Miss. 1987) (quoting 9 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of

Contracts, § 1017 (1967)).

6 review the district court’s interpretation of an unambiguous contract,

a question of law, de novo

. 5

B. Discussion

1. Interpretation of the Contract

Dr. Bowers insists that the district court erred in granting AANM’s

motion for a j.m.l., thereby overturning the ju r y’s verdict in her

favor. She contends that Dr. Campbell purported to terminate her

employment for cause when no cause existe d, and that in doing so he

violated paragraph 8D of the contract, as the jury found. As such, she

claims, Dr. Campbell, individually, and AANM are liable for damages for

lost salary, relocation costs, and emotiona l and mental distress, for

which the jury awarded her $175,000.

After the jury had rendered its verdict, the district court granted

AANM’s motion for a j.m.l., concluding that Dr. Bowers’s employment was

subject to an a t-will provision, as set forth in paragraph 8B of the

contract, requiring only 30 days’ notice. Under Mississippi law, when

an employment contract “‘stipulates for, or where usage r equires, a

certain period of notice, the employment may be cancelled on shorter

n otice or with none at all, upon payment of wages or salary for the

p eriod of notice.’” 6 Applying that rule, the district court properly

found that Dr. Bowers was entitled only to 30 days salary. As a result,7 Eselin-Bullock & Assocs. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat’l Gen.

Ins. Co. , 604 So.2d 236, 240 (Miss. 1992).

7 the district court correctly granted AANM’s motion for remittitur and

reduced the jury’s damages award from $17 5,000 to $15,660, which

represents 30 days’ salary under th e employment contract between Dr.

Bowers and AANM. The trial court’s reduction of the damage award was

appropriate because any amou nt of compensatory damages awarded by the

jury in excess of 30 days’ salary, such as, for example, damages for the

emotional distress suffered by Dr . Bowers or the relocation costs she

incurred, is by definition excessive unde r the contract’s provision

allowing at-will termination on 30 days’ notice.

2. Tortious Breach of Contract

Dr. Bowers advances that the district court erred in dismissing her

claims for tortious breach of contract against AANM and Dr. Campbell in

his individual capacity because, sh e contends, there was sufficient

evidence to support her claim that Dr. Campbell knowingly breached the

contract. Under Mississippi law, when such evidence is presented at

trial, the court must allow the jury to resolve the f actual question

whether such a breach occurred. 7 Dr. Bowers insists that Dr. Campbell

knowingly breached the terms of the contract in terminating her

employment for cause when n o cause existed. The district court

correctly found, however, that Dr. Campbell did not terminate Dr. Bowers

pursuant to the “for cause” p r ovision but rather under a separate

provision allowing for at-will termination on 30 days’ notice. And even

though Dr. Campbell fai l ed to provide Dr. Bowers with the requisite8 Fusilier , 507 So.2d at 69.

9 Burroughs v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P.

, 28 F.3d 543, 549

(5th Cir. 1994).

8 notice, that failure is rem edied by the district court’s award of 30

days’ salary in compensation, which we agree is proper here.

Dr. Bowers also appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claim

for tortious breach of contract and her request for punitive damages,

urging that Dr. Campbell intentionally inflicted emotional distress on

her by the manner in which he terminated her employment and the manner

in which he treated her when she returned to the hospital to clean out

her locker. Under Mississippi law, punitive damages are only to be

awarded if th e breach of contract is accompanied by an “intentional

wrong, insult, abuse or such gros s negligence as to constitute an

independent tort.” 8 We agree with the district court that the evidence

adduced here is insufficient to prove that such an independent tort was

suffered by Dr. Bowers.

Although Mississippi law allows “damages for intentional torts even

where they are not accompanied by physical or bodily injury,” 9 it does

so only in limited circumstances, under the rubric of intentional

infliction of emotional distress (“i.i.e.d.”). “‘In such instances, it

is the nature of the act itself

—— as opposed to the seriousness of the

consequences —— which gives impetus to legal redress.’ The law

inter v enes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no10 Id. (citations omitted).

11 Id. at 546 (citations omitted).

12 In Burroughs

, we applied Mississippi law in holding that

emotional injuries described as leaving the plaintiff “jittery,

upset, unnerved, depressed, crying, emotional, mortified, terribly

upset, bothered tremendously, and very badly hurt” and resulting in

9 reasonable man could be expected to endure it." 10

[A] plaintiff must prove that defendant's conduct is "extreme

and outrageous." It has not been enough that the defendant

has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal,

or that he has intended to i nflict emotional distress, or

even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice," or

a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to

punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found

only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character,

and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds

of decency, and to be regard ed as atrocious, and utterly

intolerab le in a civilized community. Though plaintiff need

not prove cognizable physical injuries, the emotional stress

must be genuine and severe. 11

Although the behavior of Dr. Campbell, if it was as represented by Dr.

Bowers, would be d eplorable, it would not be so egregious as to

constitut e an independent tort under Mississippi law. Dr. Bowers

complains that in the wake of her termination, she suffered from anxiety

over both her finances and possible damage to her reputation, and that

she was humiliated by being escorted out of t he hospital by security

guards in t he presence of her former colleagues and friends. We

nevertheless agree with the district court that these claims, even when

viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Bowers as the non-movant, were

insufficient as a matter of law to sustain her claim for tortious breach

of contract. 12her “poor church attendance in the period following the incidents

of this case and to her overall lower level of partic ipation in

community affairs” but not including “medical testimony describing

any clinical manif estations of depression or other mental

infirmities” were “insufficient to sustai n damages for i.i.e.d.”

Burroughs , 28 F.3d at 549.

13 Mississippi Printing Co., Inc. v. Maris, West and Baker,

Inc. , 492 So.2d 977, 978 (Miss.1986).

10 Dr. Bowers contends further that Dr. Campbell should be held liable

individually for to rtious breach of contract. “[W]hen a corporate

officer directly participates in or authorizes the commission of a tort,

even on behalf of the corporation, he may be held personally liable.” 13

Because we find that no to rt was committed by Dr. Campbell in

terminating Dr. Bowers, he is protected from liability by the legal

fiction of the corporate veil. As such, we agree with the decision of

the district court to grant Dr. Campbell’s motion for a j. m .l.,

rejecting those claims against him in his individual capacity.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons , we conclude that the district court

correctly gra nted AANM’s motion for a j.m.l. and remittitur, and

correctly limited the damages to Dr. Bowers to $15,660. We also

conclude that the district court was correct in dismissing Dr. Bowers’s

claim for tortious breach of contract against both AANM and Dr. Campbell

in his individual capacity because she failed to ad duce sufficient

evidence to support that claim. Therefore, the judgment of the district

court is, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.11