. *..

OF TEXAS

WI~I.WIIA~ON **A ’** **FToILNEyOENE=AI-** *u~ll~o~ rzi

Honorable M. B. Morgan OPINION NO.WW-114 Commlss loner,Bureau of Labor Statistics Re: Does the opinion of the Austin, Texas. Court In St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. ffriff'in,

106 Tex.477, 171 S.W. 703,(1914) invalidateArticle 5196,Vernon's Civil Statutes (BlacklistingLaw) in its entirety, or Is the opinion limited to a holding on the validity of Section 3 of Article 5196 Dear Mr. Morgan: alone? This Opinion is In response to your letter of April 11, 1957, concerning the present status of Article 5196,Vernon's Civil Statutes. In this request you ask a questionwhich is substantiallyas follows:

Does the opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas .inSt. Louis Southwestern Rallwa 106 Tex. 477 171 S W 703 (19147 ~~%%aatld f';:'$" Article 5196:Vernon's Civil Statutes, or was the opinion limited to a holding on Section 3 of the Article with the result that the remainder of the Act is constitutional? The Supreme Court of Texas in the Griffin case was interpreting the provisionsof a prior Act, Artldle 594, Revised Civil Statutes, 1911. Attorney General's OpinionNo. O-3562, fromwhich you quoted in your request, sets out the history of the present form of theAct, Article 5196, Vernon's Civil Statutes; and points out that this latterArticle Is virtually identical in language to that of Article 594. The Court, after finding the Act unconstitutionalbecause of provisions of Section 3, then proceeds to set out other grounds to supoort their conclusion. ,.In doing so, it sets out an analysis of other sections of the Act, and pointsout within the provisions of these other sectionsHonorable M, B. Morgan page 2 Ww-114

additionalgrounds for holding theAct unconstitutional.It then atatea, “Beyondcontroversy, theAct of the Legfslature Is void, unless it can be sustained as an exercise of the police power”. The opinion then goes on to hold that theAct cannotbe sustained as an exercise of the police power, and la void. The concluding languageof the Court IS as follows:

“The subject of legislation in this statute and its v~rlous provisions,as stated above, are purely personalas between the employee and the corporationand do not directly affect the public, in health, safety, comfort, convenience,or otherwise. The Act la in violation of the Constltutlon of this State and of the United States, and is void.” It seems clear to us that the Supreme Court in the Griffin case,was deflnitelg not limiting Itsholding to an interpretationof Section 3 of Article 594,R.C.S. 1911,

.but,to the contrary,was quite definite that it should declare the act void in its entirety. As pointedout inAttorney General’s OpinionNo.O-3562, though the Court in the Griffin case was ruling on a prior law, the acts are so aim-that the Court’s opinionmay also be cited as controllingon the present form of theAct, Article 5196. SUMMARY The opinion Railway Co. (1914) invalidated the entire act which is now Article 5196,V.C.S.

of the court in St. Louis Southwestern v. Grlffln, 106 Tex. 477; 171 S.W.703 -.-

Very truly yours,

WILL WIISON Attorney General of Texas

WCR:jl:rh AssistantHonorablr M. B. Morgan, page 3 w-114

APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE: H. Grady Chandler,Chairman W. V. Geppert Edwin P. Horner Wm. R Hemphlll REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BYGeo. P. Blackburn