### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT D ecember 3, 2004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 01- 1713 3

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ D.C. Dock etNo. 9 9- 08 12 5- CR-DTKH UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us RAPHAEL R. LEVY , D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ (O pin ionA ug. 3, 200 4, 11th C ir . , 379 F . 3d 1 241) Befo re EDMONDSON, Ch ie f Ju dg e, TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, BIRCH, D U BIN A , BL A CK , CA RN E S, BA RKE T T , H U L L , MA RC U S, W IL SO N a nd PR Y O R, Ci rc uit

Jud ge s.2

O R D E R : T he Co urt havin g be enpol le d a t the r eque st o f one of the m em be rs of the Co urt and a

m aj or ity of the Ci rc uit

Jud ge s w ho are in re gul ar a ct ive se rv ic e not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, F ederal R ules of Appellate Pr ocedure; Elev en th Cir cu it Ru le 35 -5 ), th e Su gg es ti on of R eh eari ng En Ba nc is DENIED.

/s / J . L. E DMONDSON CHIEF JUDGE3

HU LL , C ircuit Judg e, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, in which A N D E RS O N , CA RN E S an d P RY O R, Ci rc uit Jud ge s, j oin : W e co nc ur

in thi s C ourt’ s de nia l of

r eh eari ng e n banc be ca

use D ef en dant L ev y did not r ai se ac la im

r eg ar din g ar igh t t o aj ur y tr ia l onhis se nte nc ing en ha nc em en ts un ti l af

te r th is Co ur t h adaffi rm edhi s co nv ic ti on an d s en te nc e. In de ed , L ev y

ple d gu ilty

a nd c onc ed es that he ne ve r as ke d f or aj ur y tr ia l onhis se nte nc ing e nhanc em en ts e ith er in the dis tr ic t c ourt or

in his dir ec t a

ppe al to thi s Co urt. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. L ev y , 374 F . 3d 1 023 (1 1 Ci r. 200 4) ( af fi rm ing th convictio n and sentence). Af ter this Court affir

m ed Le vy ’ s convictio n and sentence, the U nited States Su pr em e Co urt de ci de d B lake ly v. W as hin gto n, 124 S . Ct . 253 1 ( 2004 ), e xte ndi ng the r ule a nnounc ed

in Appr en di v . N ewJe rs ey , 530 U . S. 466 , 120 S . Ct . 234 8 (2 000) . D ef

en dant B lake ly

a rg ue d th at

he ha d ar igh t t o aj ur

y tr ia l on“ al l f

ac ts legally essential to his s entence. ” Blakely , 124 S. Ct. at 2536. T he United State s Suprem e Court “ rej ected the state’ s argum ent that Blakely ’ s case w as dis tin gui sha

ble f ro m Appr en di b ec au se his 90- m onth se nte nc e did not e xc ee d th e 10- y ear statut or

y m ax im um . . . . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. L ev y , 379 F . 3d 1 241, 124 2 (11 Cir. 2004 ). Blakely is basically

an extension o f the Apprendi rule. S ee I n re th De an, 375 F. 3d 12 87, 1289-90 (11 Cir. 2004 ). th4

A ft er Bl ak el y , L ev y

f ile d ape tit ionf

or r eh eari ng i n th is C ourt and, f or the fi rs t t im e, a rg ue d th at

he ha d ar igh t t o aj ur

y tr ia l r eg ar din g hi s f

ed er al se nte nc ing en hanc em en ts. A lth oughBl ak el y did not inv olv e the f

ed er al se nte nc ing gui de lin es , L ev y

a rg ue d th at

“ the r ea soni ng” of

Appr en di, Ri ng v . A ri zo na , 536 U. S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), and Blakely clear ly lead to the conclusio n that the f ed er al se nte nc ing gui de lin es a re c onst itu tio na lly inf irm ( he re ina ft er

r ef er re d to as L evy ’ s “ Blakely -ty

pe” claim). T his Co urt pr ope rl y

de nie d L ev y ’ s pe tit ionf

or r eh eari ng b as ed

on this Co urt’ s lo ng- standi ng r

ule that i ssu es r ai se d f

or the f ir st t im e in a

pe tit ionf or rehear ing and n ot raised in an appellant’ s initial brief will not be considered. S ee L ev y , 379 F . 3d at 12 42- 45 ( co lle ct ing c as es ). I n de ny ing L ev y ’ s pe tit ionf or rehear ing, this Court no ted that our pr ac tic e ha s be enlon gst an din g. A s w e ha ve e xpl ai ne d, the r ule re qui ri ng tha t i ssues be r ai se d inope nin g br ie fs “ se rv es va lua ble pu rp o s e s , as d o a ll of t he pro cedur al de fau lt rul es , whi ch is why we re gul ar ly appl y the m . S ee ge ne ra lly

P re sne ll v. K em

p, 835 F. 2d 1 567, 1573 -7 4 ( 11 Ci r. 198 8) . ” U nit ed S ta te s v. A rd le y , 273 F. 3d 9 91, 991 th (1 1 Ci r. 200 1) (e n banc ). I m portantl y , thi s r

ule appl ie s ne utr al ly

to al l th ap pe llants , w he the r the gov er nm en t or the de fe ndant. L ev y , 379 F . 3d at 12 44. T he dis se nt c onc ed es that: (1 ) the L ev y pane l w as bound b y

c ir cu it pr ec ed en t, se e U nit ed

S ta te s v. A rd le y , 242 F . 3d 9 89, 990 ( 11 Ci r. 200 1) th5

(collecting cases); and (2) this Court recently denied en banc reviewof the very questio n in thi s case; that is, whether the rules concerning retroac tivityare subject to this Co urt’ s pr oc ed

ur al r ule s. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. A rd le y , 273 F . 3d 9 91 ( 11 th Ci r. 200 1) ( de ny ing r eh eari ng e n banc a nd e xpl ai nin g w hy D ef en dant’ s Appr en di cl ai m w as pr oc ed

ur al ly barr ed ) (C ar

ne s, J. , c onc ur

ri ng) , c er t. de nie d, A rd le y

v. United States, 535 U.S . 979, 122 S. Ct. 1457 (2002). As in A rdley , ther e ar e tw o rules at issue in Levy ’ s case: (1) the rule that Supr em e Co ur t d eci si on s ar e to be ret ro act iv el y ap pl ie d t o c as es on di rect rev ie w; an d ( 2) the pr oc ed

ur al r ule that e nti re ly

ne wc onst itu tio na l i ssu es w ill not be co ns id ered forth e fi rs t t im e b y th is Co ur t i n a pe ti ti on forreh eari ng . The t wo rules in this case are e qually im portant, but play

separate roles and answer d i f f e r e n tqu e s t i o n s . As we e x p l a i n e di n Ar d l e y, [r] etroactivity

doctrine answer s the questio n of w hich cases a new de ci sio n appl ie s to, as sum ing that the iss ue inv olv ing that ne wde ci sio n has been tim ely raised and preserved. Procedural bar doctrine answer s the qu e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r a n i s s u e w a s t i m e l y r a i s e d a n d p r e s e rv e d , a nd i f n o t , wh e t h e r

i ts h o u l db e d e c i d e da n ywa y. A rd le y , 273 F . 3d at 99 2 ( Carn es , J. , c onc ur ri ng) . Many

of the dis se nt’ s arg um en ts in this case are answere d in Ardley , 273 F. 3d at 991 -93. I n particular, Ar dley al read y ex pl ai ne d wh y

th e d is se nt im

pr op erl y co nf la te s t he se two rul es . Id. A rd le y a lso a rt ic ulate s w hy , if

the dis se nt’ s po sit ionw as a dopt ed , no ty pe of6

pr oc ed ur al bar co uld

be a dopt ed

on d ir ec t a

ppe al . I d. a t 99 2. The dissent’ s m ain focus now is that und er G riffith v. Ke ntucky , 479 U. S. 314, 107 S . Ct . 708 ( 1987 ), thi s C ourt i s r eq uir ed to al lowD ef

en dant L ev y

to ra ise , f or the f ir st t im e, aBl ak el y -ty

pe iss ue in a pe tit ionf

or r eh eari ng a ft er

thi s Co urt ha s is sue d an op ini on a ff irm ing his c onvi ct iona nd s en te nc e. T he dis se nt w oul d have r etro ac tiv ity

r ule s tr um p and e lim inate a ny

pr oc ed ur al de fa ult r ule on direct appeal. E ssentially , the dissent’ s rule w ouldbe that a newSuprem e Court de ci sio n a

ppl ie s r etro ac tiv el y

pe r se – e ve n if

the de fe ndant h as ne ve r ra ise d or pr es er ve d th e co nst itu tio na l i ssu e an d th is C ourt ha s a lr ea dy a ff irm ed the d e f e n d an t ’s c o n v i c t i o n a n ds e n t e n c e – a s l o n g a s th e d e f

e n d a n ti s s t i l l i n s o me pha se of the dir ec t a

ppe al pr oc es s. N oth ing in G ri ff

ith , nor a ny oth er S upr em e Co urt de ci sio n, r equir es thi s result. I n fact, Suprem e Court prec edent indicates that the rules of retroactivity are su bjec t t o e st ab li sh edpri nc ip le s o f pr oc edur al de fau lt , waiv er, an d t he li ke . In de ed , a s ou tli ne d be low , the de fe ndant i n G ri ff ithti m el y pr es er ve d th e constitu tional error at issue during his trial and on appeal. The dissent dism isses the fact that the def

endants in Griffith preser ved the consti tutio nal issue. T hat fact is im portant, however . W e thus first exam ine Gr iffith in detail, and then other ar gum en ts i n th e dis se nt.7 I. SUPREM E COURT CASE LAW InG ri ff ith , the U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt c onc lud ed that “ a ne wr

ule f or th e co nd uc t o f cri m in al pro se cu ti on s i s t o b e ap pl ie d re tro act iv el y to all cas es . . . pendin g on di rect r eview or not y et final . . . . ” G riffith, 479 U.S . at 328, 107 S. Ct . a t 71 6. Adis cu ssi on o f G ri ff ithis in o rd er

be ca use that de ci sio n is the fo undatio n f

or the dis se nt’ s arg um en ts. H ow ev er , a s e xpl ai ne d be low , nothin g in G ri ff ithsave d an unpr es er

ve d e rr or in a dir ec t a

ppe al . Af ter the Suprem e Court decided Batson v. K entucky , 476 U. S. 79, 106 S. Ct . 171 2 ( 1986 ), a nd r ej ec te d aportio n of the r ea soni ng o f Sw ai n v. A la ba m a, 380 U.S. 20 2, 8 5 S . Ct. 8 24 (19 65 ), th e Supr em e Co ur t g ran te d c ert io rari in two se parate c ri m ina l c as es f

ro m K en tuc ky

a nd O klahom a, in w hic h th e de fe ndants ha d m ad e unsu cc es sf

ul c ha lle nge s un de r Sw ai n to the gov er nm en t’ s us e of perem ptory challenges. G riffith, 479 U.S . at 316-20 , 107 S. Ct. at 709-11. In ea ch of the se c as es , the de fe ndant ( pr ior to Batso n) ha d pr es er

ve d an ob j ec tio n inthe trial court and at ever

y stage of his direct appeal that the prosecutor had exercised his perem ptory challenges in a rac ially

discrim inatory

m anner. G riffith, 479 U.S . at 316 -2 0, 107 S . Ct . a t 70 9- 11. T he de fe ndants m ad e thi s ob j ec tio n a t e ve ry

sta ge even thoug h the defendants had clearly failed to prove that the prosecutor had en ga ge d inapa tte rnof

c ha lle ngi ng b la ck

j ur or s inase ri es of

c as es , a s r equir ed

by8

S w a i n . S e e i d . ( d i s c u s s i n g p r o c e du r a l h i s t o ry o f th e tw o c a s e s ) . No ts u r

p r i s i n g l y, each defe ndant lo st at each stage of his direct a ppeal because eac h court held that the proof of discrim ination wa s inadequate und er S wa in. Id. (sam e). Inm id- 1985 , the de fe ndants in G ri ff ithpe tit ion ed

the S upr em e Co urt f

or ce rt ior ar i w hil e the ir

c onvi ct ion s w er e sti ll on d ir ec t r ev ie w . O n Apr il 30, 198 6, the United States S uprem e Court decided Batson. I n Batson, the Suprem e Court de part ed f ro m S w ai n’ s r equir em en t of

apa tte rnof

r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n re qui re m en t i n ase ri es of c as es a nd c onc lud ed

that a c ri m ina l de fe ndant c oul d es ta bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n vi olativ e of the F ourte en th A m en dm en t, ba se d so le ly on the pr ose cu tio n’ s us e of pe re m pto ry c ha lle nge s to s t ri k e mem

b er s o f t h e d ef

en d an t ’s ra ce fr o m

th e ju ry v en i re i n th e d ef en d an t ’s ca se . B at son, 476 U . S. a t 93 , 96- 97, 106 S . Ct . a t 17 21- 23. F urthe rm or e, onc e the de fe ndant h ad

m ad e the pr im a fa ci e show ing , the bur de n sh if te d to the pr ose cu tio n to com e forw ard w ith a neutral explanation for thos e challenges. Id. at 97, 106 S. Ct . a t 17 23. O n June 2, 198 6, the S upr em e Co urt gr an te d c er tio rari in G ri ff

ithf or the lim ited issu e of w hether Batson would be applied retroactively on direct ap pe al . G ri ff

ith , 479 U . S. a t 32 0, 107 S . Ct . a t 71 1. The r etroactive application of Batson appeared to be forec losed byUnited S t a t e s v . J o h n s o n , 4 5 7 U . S . 5 3 7 , 1 0 2 S . C t . 2 5 7 9 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , i n w h i c h th e S up r e meSee Allen v. Ha rdy , 478 U.S. 255, 106 S. C t. 2878 (1986). 1 9 Co urt ha d e xpl ai ne d th at , w he n ane wr ule of c ri m ina l pr oc ed

ur e is a “ cl ear br eak” with past precedent, as Batson wa s a clear break from Sw ain, the new r

ule was 1 not to be appl ie d r etro ac tiv el y to ca se s ondir ec t a

ppe al . G ri ff

ith , 479 U . S. a t 32 6, 107 S. Ct. at 715. D espite courts’ repeated conclusio ns that the defendants h ad failed to satisfy

Sw ain, the G riffith defe ndants con tinued to argue, and therefore pr es er ve , that the gov er

nm en t e xe rc ise d it s pe re m pto ry c ha lle nge s inar ac ia lly discrim inatory

m anner. The per sistence of the Gr iffith defendants paid off. The S uprem e Court gr an te d th ei r pe tit ion s, dis card ed the “ cl ea r br eak” r ule de sc ri be d inJoh nson , a nd applied Batson retroactively to their appeal. Gr iffith, 479 U. S. at 326-28, 107 S. Ct . a t 71 5- 16. T he S upr em e Co urt r ev er se d th ei r co nvi ct ion s ba se d on co nsi de ratio ns o f fa ir

ne ss f or de fe ndants w ho w er e sim ilarl y sit ua te d to the de fe ndant i n B at son – th at is, de fe ndants w ho, li ke Batso n, ha d pr es er ve d th ei r obj ec tio ns t o th e pr ose cu tio n’ s r ac e- ba se d pe re m pto ry c ha lle nge s duri ng tri al a nd on appeal. T he Gr iffith Court did no t require, however, that a dissim ilarly situated defendant – one who did no t preserve his obje ctions to rac e-based pere m ptory ch al le nge s – w oul d so m eh owbe ne fi t f ro m the r etro ac tiv e ap pli catio n of Batso n. G ri ff ithde al t w ithaBatso n si tuatio n inw hic h th e de fe ndants pr ope rl y10

pr es en te d and p re se rv ed

the ir c onst itu tio na l c ha lle nge s to the pr ose cu tio n’ s us e of p e r e mp t o ry s t r i k e s b o t h du r i n g tr i a l a n dth r o u g h o u td i r e c tr e v i e w . I mp o rt a n t l y, the de fe ndants pr es er

ve d th e iss ue by

r ai sin g B at son- ty

pe c ha lle nge s be fo re the Su pr em e Co urt de ci de d B at son. T he re fo re , the dis put e be tw ee n th e m aj or ity a nd the dis se nt i n th is c as e is larg el y ove r w he the r G ri ff

ith ’ s r etro ac tiv ity

r ule sho uld

be e xte nde d to unpreserved error raised for the f irst tim e af

ter a decision on the m erits of a dire ct appeal. That is, shoul d all defendants during any portion o f direct r eview au tom at ic al ly

ge t the be ne fi t of

r etro ac tiv ity

no m atte r w he n th ey

r ai se the iss ue or is the application of the G riffith re troactivity rule subje ct to we ll-established rules re gard ing unp re se rv ed

e rr or , w ai ve r, a nd p ro ce dur al de fa ult . A s m en tio ne d a

bove , G ri ff

ithde al t w ithaBatso n c la im in w hic h th e de fe ndants pr ope rl y

pr es en te d and p re se rv ed the ir c onst itu tio na l c ha lle nge s to the pr ose cu tio n’ s us e of

r ac e- ba se d pe re m

pto ry str ike s bo th d

ur ing tr ia l and thr ough out

dir ec t r ev ie w . T he re fo re , G ri ff ithc an not , a nd d oe s no t, c ontro l a sit ua tio n inw hic h th e de fe ndant, suc h a s L ev y , ne ve r ra ise d no r pr es er ve d a co nst itu tio na l c ha lle nge , but , ins te ad , r ai se s it f or the f ir st t im e in a

pe tit ionf orSee Ande rs v. Hometown Mortg ag e Servs., Inc., 346 F .3d 1024, 1031 (11 Cir. 2003) 2 t h (“ [W]hile we mus t a

pp ly [a p ri or ] de c isi on

to f a c ts a nd c ir c ums tanc e s su ff

ic ie ntl y sim ila r t o those under which it arose, w e ar e not obligated to extend the decision to differ ent situations.”); Watts v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 316 F .3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2003) (“ [J ]udi cial decisions ca

nnot make law be y ond the fa cts of the c ases in which those decisions ar e ann ounc e d. ” ); Un ite d St ate s v . A guil lard , 2 17 F .3 d 1 31 9, 13 21 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 0) (p e r c ur iam) (“The holdings of a

prior dec ision can re ach only as fa r as the f acts a nd circ umstances pr esente d to the court in the c ase which produc ed that dec ision.” (citation and inter nal marks omitted)). 11 rehear ing after this Court has affir m ed his conv iction and sen tence. 2 A lth oughthe dis se nt d ism iss es the f ac t tha t the de fe ndants in G ri ff ith pr es er ve d th ei r Batso n- ty

pe c la im s, the S upr em e Co urt ha s a lr ea dy r ec ogni ze d th e im portant d ist inc tio n be tw ee n th ose li tig an ts who p re se rv e iss ue s and those w ho do no t. I n Shea v. Louisiana, 479 U.S . 51, 59 105 S. Ct. 1065 , 1070 (1985), which is discus sed in Griff

ith, the Suprem e Court concluded that the new rule annou nced in Edwards v. A rizona, 451 U.S . 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981), applied to cases pendin g on di rect r eview at the tim e E dwar ds was decided. N otably , the S hea C o u rts t a t e dth a t“[ a ]s w e h o l d , i f ac a s e w a s p e n d i n g o n d i r e c tap p e a l a tth e t i me E dw ar ds w as de ci de d, the appe llate c ourt m ust giv e re tr oa ct ive e ff

ec t t o E dw ar ds, subj ec t, of

c our se , to es ta

bli she d pr inc ipl es of

w ai ve r, harm le ss e rr or , a nd the lik e. ” S he a, 479 U . S. at 58 n. 4, 105 S . Ct . at 10 69 n . 4 ( em pha sis a dde d) . T he dissent is unable to po int to anydecision where the S uprem e Court applied a new co nst itu tio na l r

ule r etro ac tiv el y

to lit igants w ho d id n ot p re vio usl y pr es er ve the iss ue on a ppe al .12 II. PROC EDURAL RULES A s no te d a

bove , ind ep en de nt o f an d se parate f ro m the G ri ff ithhol din g is this Court’s long-standin g procedural rule that issues m ust be properly

presented in the ope nin g br ie fs be fo re thi s C ourt i s r equir ed to ad dr es s th em . A rd le y , 242 F. 3d at 99 0 ( co lle ct ing c as es ). A s th e dis se nt a dm its , the A rd le y Co urt, in 2001 , ap pli ed thi s lo ng- standi ng p ro ce dur al r ule in anAppr en di- co nte xt s im ilar to the s i tu a t i o n p r e s e n t e di n Le v y. In Ar dley , the S uprem e Court re m anded the defendant’ s case to this Court so th atitco ul d b e rec on si de redin li gh t o f App ren di . Ardl ey , 24 2 F .3dat 9 90 . T he A rd le y

Co urt de te rm ine d th at

the f ac t tha t the de fe ndant f

ai le d to pr ope rl y present and preserve his argum ents trum ped whatever m erit those constitu tional argum ents m ight h ave, stating: “ In the absence of any requirem ent to the contrary in e ith er Appr en di o r in the or de r re m an din g th is c as e to u s, w e ap ply our w el lestablished rule that iss ues and contenti ons no t tim ely raised in the briefs ar e d ee m ed ab an d o n ed .” Ar d l ey, 2 4 2 F. 3 dat 9 9 0 (c i t i n g ca s es ). Th i s Co u rt ’s pr oc ed ur al r ule ha s op er at ed

ind ep en de ntl y

of G ri ff ithf or alon g ti m e be ca

use it is not inc onsi ste nt i n any

w ay w iththe pr es er

ve d- er ro r Batso n is sue a ddr es se d in G ri ff ith . I n f ac t, the S upr em e Co urt i tse lf ha s r ec ogni ze d th at

the r etro ac tiv ity

r ule is “ subj ec t, of

c our se , to es ta

bli she d pr inc ipl es of

w ai ve r, harm le ss e rr or , a nd the13

lik e. ” S he a, 479 U . S. at 58 n. 4, 105 S . Ct . at 10 69 n . 4. T his is an oth er w ay of say ing that the r etro ac tiv ity r ule is subj ec t t o pr oc ed

ur al r ule s and d oe s no t op er at e i n av a c uu m. Be ca use ne ith er

G ri ff ithnor a ny oth er S upr em e Co urt de ci sio n c ontro ls the pr es en t si tuatio n, the que sti on, in ef fe ct , is: S houl d th is C ourt c hange it s lo ngstandin g precedent and extend Grif fith to unp reser

ved error or shoul d Levy , a s sim ilar defe ndants in the past, be held to this Court’s long-standing procedural ru le s? This Court rec ently m ade that choice in Ar dley and concluded, as explained ab ove , that a

de fe ndant i s bo und by

thi s C ourt’ s pr oc ed

ur al r ule s, e ve n inli ght

of ne wc onst itu tio na l r igh ts. S ee A rd le y , 242 F . 3d at 99 0. T he re fo re , a s th e dis se nt co nc ed es , c ir cu it pr ec ed en t square ly on p oin t m an da te s th at

w e co nc lud e that L ev y cannot r ai se his Bl ak el y -ty

pe iss ue s th at

w er e not pr ope rl y pr es en te d and preserved. Bec ause this Court’s proce dural rules require that all issues be raised in an a ppe llant’ s op en ing br ie f, a nd L ev y f ir st r ai se d hi s B lake ly -ty

pe c la im in a pe tit ionf or r eh eari ng a ft er

ade ci sio n a ff

irm ing his c onvi ct iona nd s en te nc e, thi s Court need not cons ider L evy ’ s Blakely -ty pe issue. III . A DMINI ST RAT IO N O F JUS TI CE T he dis se nt c la im s th at

if thi s C ourt do es not

pe rm it L ev y

to ra ise his14

Blakely -ty

pe claim at this late stage, we unnecessarily invite litig ants to raise a
w hol e host

of que sti ona

ble iss ue s onthe of

f- ch an ce the S upr em e Co urt m igh t re ve rs e co ur se on s om e lin e of pr ec ed en t w hil e the ir

dir ec t a ppe al is pe ndi ng. T he dis se nt’ s lo gic is fl aw ed

f or tw o r ea sons . Fi rs t, the dis se nt’ s c at as tr ophi c pr ed ic tio ns r eg ar din g th e or de rl y ad m i n i s t ra t i o n o f ju s t i ce i f t h i s Co u rt el ec t s n o tt o co n s i d erth e d ef en d an t ’s Bl ak el y -ty

pe c la im a re sim ply inc or re ct a nd unf ound ed . R athe r, a tto rn ey s w ill co nti nue to ra ise iss ue s th at a re w ith in the sc ope of

a cc ep ta ble a rg um en ts. F or ex am ple , the lon g and u se le ss l aundr y li st p re dic te d by

the dis se nt i n A rd le y , a nd ag ai n h ere, h as no t m at eri al iz edon acco un t o f th e p la in -err orst an da rdof r ev ie w. If def endants were going to raise a long and useless laund ry list of objections, they al re ady w oul d have be endoi ng e xa ct ly that i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt so obj ec tio ns c oul d re ce ive f ull de nov o r ev ie wby

thi s C ourt, r athe r than pl ai n- er ro r re vie w . S ee Ma iz
v. V ir an i, 253 F . 3d 6 41, 676 ( 11 Ci r. 200 1) ( “ Pl ai n e rr or r ev ie wis ane xtr em el y th str ing en t f

orm of r ev ie w . ” (c itatio n om itt ed )) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. K ing , 73 F . 3d 1 564, 1572 ( 11 Ci r. 199 6) ( “ T he pla in e rr or te st i s di ff

ic ult to m ee t. ” (quot at ionm ar ks th and citations o m itted)). Se co nd, the r

ule a nnounc ed

in A rd le y

a nd L ev y

is not ove rl y hars h be ca

use nothin g inour

pr ec ed en t pr ev en te d L ev y f ro m r ai sin g hi s B lake ly -t

y pe c la im in his15

ini tia l br ie f on d ir ec t a

ppe al . Whil e it is c or

re ct that this Co urt’ s e n banc de ci sio n in United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11 Cir. 2001 ) (e n banc), m eans that th his Blakely -ty

pe claim likely would have failed, that likely failure does not m ean that L ev y c oul d no t have m ad e the a rg um en t t o th e pane l and l at er in a pe tit ionf

or re he ar ing e n banc . Mo re im portantl y , L ev y

c oul d have r ai se d th e ar gum en t t o pr es erv e th e is su e fo r cer ti or ari rev ie w. T his is to s ay

that a li tig an t i s ne ve r pr ec lud ed f ro m r ai sin g an is sue sim

ply be cau se a pr ev io us ap pe al ha s b een de ci de d t ha t re jects a pa rti cu la r arg um en t. T his is so b ec au se the re is nothin g pr ohi bit ing thi s C ourt si tti ng e n banc or the Su pr em e Co urt f

ro m r ec onsi de ri ng o r ove rr

uli ng arg um en ts tha t ha d pr ev iou sly be enr ej ec te d. S ee , e . g. , E ngl e v. I sa ac , 456 U . S. 107 , 130 , 102 S . Ct . 155 8, 157 3 (1 982) ( “ E ve n astate c ourt tha t ha s pr ev iou sly r ej ec te d ac onst itu tio na l arg um en t m ay decide, upon ref

lection, that the contention is valid.”). T he re is a good

e xa m ple of the c ont inu ed

a va ila bil ity of pr ev iou sly fo re cl ose d arg um en ts i n th e Appr en di l ine of c as es . I n W al tonv. A ri zo na , 497 U . S. 639 , 649 , 110 S . Ct . 304 7, 305 4- 55 ( 1990 ), the S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t the A ri zo nac ap ita l se nte nc ing sc he m e did not vio la te the S ixth A m en dm en t be ca use the a ddi tio na l f

ac ts f ound by the j udge w er e se nte nc ing c onsi de ratio ns, not

“ el em en t[ s] of

the of fe nse of c ap ita l m ur de r. ” A ft er

Appr en di, the S upr em e Co urt,16

in R ing , ove rr

ule d W al ton“ to the e xte nt tha t i t a llo w s ase nte nc ing j udge , sittin g w ith out aj ur y , to fi nd an a ggr av at ing c ir cum stanc e ne ce ssary f or im posi tio n of

the d e a t h p e n a l t y. ” R i n g , 5 3 6 U . S . a t6 0 9 , 1 2 2 S . C t . a t2 4 2 8 . I n R i n g , th e S up r e me Co urt c onc lud ed

that “ [b ] ec au se A ri zo na ’ s e num er at ed a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s op er at e as ‘ the f unc tio na l e qui va le nt o f ane le m en t of agr eate r of

fe nse , ’ . . . the S ixth A m en dm en t r equir es that the y be f ound by aj ur y . ” I d. ( quot ing Appr en di, 530 U . S. a t 49 4 n. 19) . T he de fe ndant i n R ing pr es er ve d hi s arg um en t un de r Appr en di ev entho ugh that arg um en t a ppe ar ed to be f or ec los ed by W al ton . M o r e s i g n i f

i c a n t l y, a f t e r o u r S a n c h e z d e c i s i o n , b u tb e f o r e th e S up r e me Co urt’ s B lake ly

de ci sio n, num er ous de fe ndants be fo re thi s C ourt r ai se d Appr en dity pe a rg um en ts i n th ei r ch al le nge s to e nhanc em en ts unde r the f ed er al S en te nc ing Guidelines. I n United States v. Petrie , 302 F. 3d 12 80, 1289-90 (11 Cir. 2002 ), th
ce rt . de nie d, 538 U . S. 971 , 123 S . Ct . 177 5 ( 2003 ), U nit ed S ta te s v. S ny de r, 291 F. 3d 1 291, 129 4 n. 3 ( 11 Ci r. 200 2) , a nd U nit ed S ta te s v. Ro dr igu ez , 279 F . 3d th 947, 950 n. 2 ( 11 Ci r. 200 2) , the de fe ndants a sse rt ed be fo re thi s C ourt tha t the th district court viol ated their rights to a j ury trial w hen it enhanced their sentences be ca use aj ur y did not de te rm ine be y ond a re as ona ble doubt a ll fa ct s le ga lly essential to their sentences. T hese cases all c am e af ter Sanchez and before Bl ak el y a nd i llu str at e that m an y

de fe ndants w er e as se rt ing Appr en di- ty pe17

ar gum en ts a

bout f ed er al se nte nc ing e nhanc em en ts and tha t de fe ndants have not be enpr ev en te d f

ro m m ak ing that arg um en t de spi te apr ior a dve rs e pr ec ed en t of thi s C ourt. Mor e re ce ntl y , in U nit ed

S ta te s v. Re es e, 382 F . 3d 1 308 (1 1 Ci r. 200 4) , the th defendant, despite Sanchez , pre served his Apprendi-ty pe argum ent to his federal sentencing enh ancem ents in the dis trict court. Specif ically , the district court co nc lud ed

that R ee se pos se sse d af

ir earm in co nne ct ionw itha nothe r fe lon y of fe nse be ca

use dr ugs w er e fo und in the glo ve c om partm en t of

the ve hic le Re es e wa s driving . Reese argued to the dis trict court and to this Cou rt that this fact fi ndi ng s houl d have be ende te rm ine d by aj ur y be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt; na m el y , that the pr es en ce of the dr ugs co nst itu te d af

el ony , r athe r than asim

ple poss ession m isdem eanor. Ree se asserted that the district court’ s finding s usurped the role of the j ury

and violated th e core value of Apprendi. Ree se, 382 F. 3d at 1309 . Furthe rm or e, be ca

use Re es e pr ope rl y

pr es er ve d hi s Appr en di ty

pe a rg um en t both in the district court and th is Court, this Court perm itted Reese to file a supp le m en ta l l ette r br ie f an d a ddr es s th e im pli catio ns o f Bl ak el y . R ee se , 382 F . 3d at 1309. Le vy

could have don e the sam e in his petitio n for re hearing if he had at le as t r ai se d an Appr en di- ty pe c la im in his ini tia l br ie f on a

ppe al .Whil e an attorney ’s fa ilure to anticipate a cha ng e in the law doe s not constitute ineffec tive 3 assistance of counse l, attorney s routinely make a rguments based on r easona ble extensions of exis ting Supre me Court case law. The comments of the Supre me Court dissenters may have encour ag ed the attorney s in Reese, Petrie, Snyder, a nd Rodrigue z. For example, in J ones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S. Ct . 1215 (1999), Justi ce K ennedy noted: Depa rtingfrom this rec ent authority , the Court’s swee ping constitutional discussion casts doubt on sentenc ing pr actice s and assumptions f ollowed not only

in the fede ral sy stem but also in many

States. Thus, amongother unsettlingconseque nces, toda y ’s decision intrudes upon l e g it imate and vital state inter ests, upsetting the proper fede ral ba lanc e . I

dis se nt f ro m th is unf

or tun ate and

unne c e ssa

ry re su lt. I d. at 254, 119 S. Ct. 1229-30 (Kenne dy , J ., dissenting) (empha sis added). Justi ce O ’Connor echoe d J ustice Ke nnedy ’s conc erns in Appr endi, and state d: J ustice Ke nnedy

rig h t l y cr i ticized the [ J ones] Court for its failure to explain the orig ins, contours, or conse quence s of its purported co n s t i tutional principle; for the inconsistency of that principle with our pr ior ca ses; and for the serious doubt that the holding c ast on sentenc ing sy stems employ ed by the Fe dera l Governme nt and States a lik e . T od ay , in

wh at w ill sure ly

be re me mbe re d a s a

wat e rs he d c ha

ng e in c on sti tut ion a l l aw, the Court imp os e s a s a

c on sti tut ion a l r

ule the pr inc ipl e it f

ir st ide nti fi e d in

Jone s. Appre ndi, 530 U.S. at 523-24, 120 S. Ct. at 2380 (O’Connor, J ., dissenting) (empha sis added). 18 A s sh ow n inRe es e, P etri e, S ny de r, a nd R odr igu ez , the r ule in L ev y

a nd A rd le y lauda bly e nc our ag es c ouns el f

or de fe ndants to be co m e know le dge ab le ab out S upr em e Co urt de ci sio ns, suc h a s Appr en di, a nd t o c onsi de r m ak ing ar gum en ts tha t are ba se d onr ea sona ble e xte nsi ons of

e xis tin g S upr em e Co urt c as e law. A t the tim e L evy

filed his initial b rief, law y ers w ere clear ly on not ice that suc h Appr en di- ty

pe a rg um en ts c oul d be r ea sona bly a dvanc ed

ba se d one xis tin g Suprem e Court prec edent. T his Court’s proce dural rules force law y ers to look at 3 the appl ic ab ili ty

of suc h arg um en ts at an e ar lie r sta ge so tha t the y c anr ec ei veIn fac t, in L evy ’s ca se, the pa nel opinion alrea dy

notes: “[W ]e conclude that there is no 4 miscarr iag e of justice if

we de cline to addr ess B lakely -ty pe issues not raise d in openingbriefs on appea l. L evy , 379 F.3d at 1243 n.3. 19 ei the r fu ll or , a t l ea st, pla in- er ro r re vie wby

thi s C ourt or

the S upr em e Co urt. T his Co urt’ s pr ec ed en ts e sta bli sh a c le ar , c onsi ste nt, a nd w orkable r ule , a nd one that i s no t ov er ly

hars h. A s th e Su

pr em e Co urt ha s st at ed , “ w e se e little 4
re as on why

c ouns el ’ s f

ai lur e to d et ec t a

c olo ra ble c onst itu tio na l c la im

sho uld be tr eate d di ff

er en tly f ro m ade lib er at e but

e qua lly pr ej udi ci al f

ai lur e by c ouns el to ra ise suc h ac la im . ” Murr ay v. Carr ie r, 477 U . S. 478 , 492 , 106 S . Ct . 263 9, 264 7 (1986). IV. WAIVER, FORFEITURE, an d ABANDONMENT The dissent also attem

pts to m ake a distinction betwee n waiver , f orfeiture, an d a bandon m en t. H ow ev er , the dis se nt m isunde rs tands the iss ue . T he iss ue is not whether L evy ’ s failure to ra ise his Blakely -ty pe issue necessarily

constitu tes w ai ve r, f or fe iture , or

abandon m en t. R athe r, the iss ue is w he the r thi s C ourt w ill apply its well-e stablish ed procedural rules; that is, this Court will not consider cl ai m s r ai se d inape tit ionf or r eh eari ng tha t w er e ne ve r ra ise d, in an y f orm , in a de fe ndant’ s in iti al br ie f on d ir ec t a ppe al . The dissent attem

pts to con fuse the issue by discussi ng the difference betwee n waiver , f

orfeiture, and abandonm ent. T he issue is no t whether this Court20

ha s t he po wer t o c on si de r is su es no t ra is edin th e in it ia l b rie f; o f co ur se itdo es . Rathe r, thi s C ourt, out

of c onc er ns f or j udi ci al e co nom

y a nd f ina lity , ha s e le ct ed

to ad opt a nd a ppl y pr oc ed ur al r ule s un ive rs al ly

a nd e qua lly . T his is not

onl y f ai r an d consist ent, but a logical extension o f the Suprem e Court’ s decision in Shea. Inf ac t, the dis se nt’ s po sit ionis int er na lly inc onsi ste nt. A lth oughthe dis se nt argues that this Court sh ouldperm it the defendant to raise a Blakely -ty pe claim at any point while still on direct review , the dissent recognizes that issues no t raised at trial should b e re viewed f or plain error only . In eff ect, the dissent recognizes that procedural default rules re lating to the tim eliness of issues raised at trial sh ou ldbe en fo rced , bu t t ha t t hi s C ou rt i s wi th ou t t he po wer t o e nf or ce i ts own pr oc ed ur al de fa ult r ule s duri ng the appe llate pr oc es s. The dissent never explains why enforcing trial-level proce dural default rules by li m iti ng a

ppe llate r ev ie wto pla in e rr or is som eh owpe rm iss ibl e unde r the Suprem e Court’ s retroac tivitydoctrine, but enforcing appellate-level proce dural de fa ult r ule s is not . A s Ju dge Carn es state d inA rd le y : “ If the r etro ac tiv ity doc tr ine r equir es that w e ad dr es s is sue s th at have be enpr oc ed

ur al ly de fa ult ed on ap pe al , w hy

doe s it not r equir e that w e ad dr es s f ull bor e tho se iss ue s th at

have been procedurally

defaulted at trial instead of lim iting our reviewto plain error?”As we e x plained in Ardle y , “[o] ne of the best indications of the na rrowne ss of plain err or 5 revie w is the fac t that this C ourt has not y et found a ny Appre ndi error

to fit within t he scope of the plain er

ror doc trine.” Ardley , 273 F.3d at 992 (Carne s, J ., concur ring ) (c ollectingcase s). 21 A rd le y , 273 F . 3d at 99 3 ( Carn es , J. , c onc ur ri ng) . T his Co urt’ s a

ppl ic at ionof 5
w el l- es ta bli she d pr oc ed

ur al de fa ult r ule s is pr ude nt and w el l- es ta

bli she d. T ha t i s,

“ [t] he retroac tivitydoctrine either trum ps the procedural default doctrine or it does not . O ur pos iti on, w hic h is c onsi ste nt, is that i t do es not . ” I d.

V. CONCLUSION As in A rdley , this Court corre ctly denied Levy ’ s petition for r ehearing en banc . C ontrary

to the dis se nt’ s arg um en ts, S upr em e Co urt pr ec ed en t do es not m an da te th atrul es of r et ro act iv it y au to m at ic al ly trump all pro cedur al rul es . Instead, S uprem e Court case lawclear ly indicates that rules of retroac tivityare subject to procedural r

ules, such as w aiver and the like. T he uni fo rm

appl ic at ionof

thi s C ourt’ s pr oc ed

ur al de fa ult r ule s pr ovi de s a cl ear, int el lig en t, a nd c onsi ste nt r ule f or li tig an ts t o f

oll ow : r ai se the iss ue in y our ini tia l br ie f or

r isk pr oc ed ur al bar. T his r

ule appl ie s e qua lly

to al l l iti gants , w he the r the gov er

nm en t or ac ri m ina l de fe ndant.22

T JO FL A T , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , dis se nti ng f

ro m the de nia l of

r eh eari ng e n banc , in w hic h W IL SO N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , j oin s: The f acts of this case ar e set forth in detail in the panel’ s first opinio n. S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. L ev y , 374 F . 3d 1 023, 102 4- 29 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) . P ur suant t o a w ri tte n pl ea

a gr ee m en t, de fe ndant R ap ha el L ev y ple d gu ilty

to co nspi ra cy

to com m it m ail fra

ud and cons piracy

to com m it m oney

laundering. T he district court se nte nc ed L ev y to 120 m onths o n th e m ai l f ra ud c harg e an d 48 m onths o n th e m oney laundering charge, w ith the sentences to be served consecutiv ely , f or a total se nte nc e of

168 m onths. T he se nte nc e inc lud ed atw o- le ve l vu lne ra

ble vic tim en hanc em en t and a

f our -l ev el r ole -i n- the -o ff

en se e nhanc em en t. O n June 23, 200 4, the pane l a ff

irm ed L ev y ’ s se nte nc es , r ej ec tin g hi s c la im s th at the G ove rn m en t br ea ch ed his ple a ag re em en t and tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d de pr ive d hi m of due pr oc es s by

a llo w ing c er

ta in w itn es se s to te sti fy

a t hi s se nte nc ing he ar ing . T he ne xt d ay , the U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t the “ statut or

y m ax im um ” fo r Appr en di p ur

pose s is the m ax im

um sentence a j udge m ay

im pose sol ely

on the basis o f the fa cts ref lected in the j ur y ve rd ic t or

a dm itt ed by the de fe ndant. I n othe r w or ds, the re le vant “ statut or

y m ax im um ” is n ot the m ax im

um se nte nc e a j udge m ay im pose after f

indin g additio nal facts, but the m axim um he m ay im pose w ith out

a ny a ddi tio na l f

ind ing s. Bl ak el y v. W as hin gto n, __ U . S. __, 124 S . Ct . 253 1, 253 7, 159 L . E d. 2d 4 03Ap pr e nd i v. Ne w Je rs e y , 5 30 U. S. 4 66 , 1 20 S. Ct . 2 34 8, 14 7 L . E d. 2d 43 5 ( 20 00 ), he ld t

hat, 1 “[o] ther than the fac t of a prior conviction, any

fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a crime be y ond the pr e sc ri be d s tatut or

y maximummus t be su

bmi tte d to a

jur y , a nd pr ov e d b e y on d a

re a so na ble doubt.” I d. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. 23 (2 004) ( ci ta tio ns o m itt ed ). A lth oughthe Co urt f orm al ly “ ex pr es s[ ed ] no o pin ion 1 on” the c onst itu tio na lity

of the F ed er al S en te nc ing G uid el ine s, id. a t __ , 124 S . Ct . at 2538 n .9, the decision has, at a m inim um , “ cast a long shadow over [them ] .” United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 , 510 (7th Cir. 2004 ), cert. granted,__ U. S. __, 125 S. C t. 11, __ L. Ed. 2d __, (Aug. 2, 2004) (N o. 04-104). I ndeed, the Court ha s s in ce g ran te d c ert io rari an d h eard ora l ar gu m en ts on pre ci se ly thi s i ss ue . Id.; U nit ed S ta te s v. F an fan, __ U . S. __, 125 S . Ct . 12, __ L . E d. 2d _ _, ( A ug. 2, 200 4) (No . 04 -1 05 ). Fo llo w ing Bl ak el y

—and b ef

or e his c onvi ct ionha d be co m e fi na l— L ev y filed a petition for rehearing in which he argued for the f irst tim e that under Bl ak el y he ha d aS ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o aj ur y tr ia l onhis f

ed er al se nte nc ing en ha nc em en ts . Uni te d S ta te s v . Levy, 37 9 F .3d12 41 , 12 41 -4 2 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 4) . T ha t this w as the f

ir st t im e that L ev y

ha d a dvanc ed

suc h ac la im

is ce rt ai nly unde rs tanda

ble giv enthat this c ourt un equiv oc al ly r ej ec te d th e sa m e ar gum en t i n U nit ed S ta te s v. S an ch ez , 269 F . 3d 1 250, 126 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) . N ev er the le ss, the pane l r ef use d to “ en te rt ai n th is n ewiss ue be ca use L ev y did not ti m el y r ai se it inSe e a lso Un ite d St ate s v . N ja u, 38 6 F .3 d 1 03 9, 10 41 -4 2 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 4) (r e fu sin gto 2 c on sid e r a

B lake ly c la im f ir st r a ise d in

a le tte r s ub mitte d p ur su ant t o F e de ra l Ru le of Ap pe llate Procedur e 28(j)) ; United States v. Hembre e, 381 F .3d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 2004) (de nying motion to fil e a substitute or amended pr incipal brief raisinga B lakely

claim); United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2004) ( denying motion to file supplemental br ief raisingBlakely

claim). United States v. Ardley , 242 F.3d 989, r eh’gen banc denied, 273 F .3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001), 3 cre ated this circ uit spli t by ref using to c onsider an A

pprendi c laim in a case in which the Supreme Court GVR’d in lig ht of Appre ndi—i.e., g rante d the petition for ce rtiorar i, vacated our initial judgment, and r emande d for r econside ration in light of A pprendi. See 242 F.3d at 990 (c on c lud ingthat no thi ngin t he sta nd ard GV R r e qu ir e s a

c ourt of a pp e a ls t o c on sid e r a

rgume nts no t r a ise d in

a de fe nd ant’ s in iti a l br ie f o n a pp e a l) . B ut s e e Stutso n v . Unit e d St ate s, 51 6 U .S. 19 3, 19 7, 11 6 S. Ct. 60 0, 60 3, 13 3 L . E d. 2d 57 1 ( 19 96 ) ( “ a

GV R or de r b oth

pr omo te s f

a ir ne ss and re spects the dig nity

of the Court of Appe als by enablingit to consider potentially rele vant 24 his ini tia l br ie f on a

ppe al . ” L ev y , 379 F . 3d at 12 42. 2 T he pane l’ s de ci sio n inthi s c as e is p ro ble m at ic f or f our r ea sons . F ir st, it unj ust if ia bly li m its the pr inc ipl e of

G ri ff ithv. K en tuc ky , 479 U . S. 314 , 107 S . Ct . 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987), that “ a newrule for the conduct of crim inal prosecution s is to be appli ed retroac tively to all cases . . . pending on d irect r eview or not y et f ina l. ” I d. a t 32 8, 107 S . Ct . a t 71 6 ( em pha sis a dde d) . S ec ond, by er ro ne ousl y te rm ing L ev y ’ s f

ai lur e to r ai se aBl ak el y -ty pe c la im in his ope nin g br ie f a “ w ai ve r” r athe r than am er e “ fo rf ei tur e, ” the de ci sio n un dul y li m its our sc ope of r ev ie wund er

F ed er al Ru le of

Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 52( b) , a s in te rp re te d by the S upr em e Co urt i n U nit ed S ta te s v. O lano, 507 U . S. 725 , 113 S . Ct . 177 0, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993). T hird, it continues a circuit split th at finds this cou rt standin g alone. Fourth, it sends a clear m essage to appellate counsel that they 3decisions and a rguments that were not previously befor e it” (e mphasis added) ). Com pa re wi th Unit e d St ate s v . B attl e , 1 63 F .3 d 1 , 1 -2 (1 1th Cir . 1 99 8) (c itatio ns omi tte d) : 4 Even in a de ath-pe nalty case , the cour

t expects counsel to be hig hly selec tive about the issues to be a

rgued on appe al . . . .

. . . . Th e Sup re me Court

of the Un ite d St ate s h a s . . . str e sse d . . . that th e be st advoca cy relies on se lectivity . I t is well settled that counsel nee d not “ra ise eve ry ‘colora ble’ c laim” on appe al. 25 shou ld brief ever

y colorable claim

—even those claim s that are squarely forec losed by our ow n pr ec ed en t— or

e lse r isk c ost ing the ir

c lie nts the be ne fi t of

af av or ab le int er ve nin g de ci sio n. A s a

r es ult , c ouns el w ill be te m pte d to be le ss 4 dis cr im inatin g inse le ct ing iss ue s to be a rg ue d onappe al , a nd b ri ef s w ill ne ce ssari ly

be le ss s pe ci fi c an d c le ar , w hic h w ill in tur n si gni fi cantl y

hin de r the fai r an d e ffi ci en t ad m in is tra ti on of ju st ic e in th is cir cu it . For t he se reas on s, I dissent from

the denial of rehearing en banc. I. InG ri ff ith , the S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t “ a ne wr ule f or the c ondu ct

of cr im ina l pr ose cu tio ns i s to be appl ie d r etro ac tiv el y to al l c as es . . . pe ndi ng o n dir ec t r ev ie wor

not y et f ina l. ” 479 U . S. a t 32 8, 107 S . Ct . a t 71 6 ( em pha sis a d d e d ) . Ac a s e i s “f

i n a l ” a n dth u s o u t s i d e th e s c o p e o f G r i f f i t h o n l y w h e n “a j udgm en t of

c onvi ct ionha s be enr en de re d, the a va ila bil ity of appe al e xhaust ed , an d th e tim e fo r a pe tit ionf or c er tio rari e la pse d or ape tit ionf

or c er tio rari f ina lly26

denied.” I d. at 321 n.6, 107 S. Ct. at 712 n.6. A ny failure to adhere to this clear ru le “ vio la te s ba sic nor

m s of c onst itu tio na l a dj udi catio n” f or tw o r ea sons : Fi rs t, it is a se ttl ed

pr inc ipl e that this Co urt a dj udi cate s on ly “ ca se s” and “ controversies.” Unlike a legislature, w e do not prom ulgate new rules of constitut ional crim inal procedure on a broad basis. Rather, the na tur e of

j udi ci al r ev ie wr equir es that w e ad j udi cate spe ci fi c ca se s, a nd e ac h c as e usua lly be co m es the ve hic le f

or a nnounc em en t of ane wr ule . B ut a ft er

w e ha ve de ci de d ane wr ule in the c as e selected, the integrity

of j udicial review requires that w e apply that ru le to all si m il ar ca se s p en di ng on di rect rev ie w.

. . . . Se co nd, se le ct ive appl ic at ionof ne wr ule s vi olate s th e pr inc ipl e of treating sim ilarly

situated defendants th e sam e. . . . [T ] he problem w ithnot appl y ing ne wr

ule s to c as es pe ndi ng o n di re ct r ev ie wis “ the ac tua l i ne qui ty

that r es ult s w he n th e Co urt c hoos es w hic h of m an y sim ilarly situated defendants sh ouldbe the chance benef iciary ” of a new r ule. Id . a t 32 2- 23, 107 S . Ct . a t 71 3 ( quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. Joh nson , 457 U . S. 537 , 556 n .16, 102 S. Ct. 2579 , 2590 n.16, 73 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1982)). The C ourt further not ed that be ca use it c an not , “ [a ] s apr ac tic al m atte r, . . . he ar e ac h c as e pe ndi ng o n dir ec t r ev ie wa nd a

ppl y the ne wr ule , ” it “ fu lf

ill [s ] [ its ] j udi ci al r es pons ibi lity by instructin g the lower c ourts to app ly the new r ule retroac tively

to cases not y et fin al .” Griff

it h, 4 79 U.S. at 3 23 , 10 7 S . Ct. at 71 3. Appl y ing thi s r

ule in cr im ina l c as es , the Co urt ha s ne ve r dr awn di sti nc tio nsSee, e.g ., Tea gue v. L ane, 489 U .S. 288, 310, 109 S. C t. 1060, 1075, 103 L . Ed. 2d 334 5 (1989) ( “Unless they

fall within an exception to the g ener al rule, ne w constitutional rules of criminal proc edure will not be applicable to those c ases whic h have be come f inal befor e the ne w rules ar e announc ed.”) ; Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328, 107 S. Ct. at 716 (holding “ that a new rule for the conduc t of criminal prose cutions is to be applied re troac tively to all case s . . . pendingon dir e c t r e vie w o r n ot ye t f

ina l, w ithno e xce pti on

fo r c a se s in

wh ic h th e ne w r

ule c on sti tut e s a ‘cle ar br eak’ with the past”); Johnson, 457 U.S. at 556 & n.17, 102 S. Ct. at 2591 & n.17 (holdingthat in Fourth Ame ndment case s “all nonfinal c onvictions” must be decide d “under the same rule of law” and re

jectingthe alter

native standa

rds for r etroa ctivity). 27 am ong d efendants on any basis oth er than the finality of their convictions . In 5 G ri ff ith , f or e xa m ple , the Co urt di sc ar de d th e “ cl ear br eak” e xc ep tio n to re tr oa ct ivi ty

be ca use it c onc lud ed

that the f ac t tha t a de ci sio n is ac le ar

br eak w ith pr ec ed en t si m

ply “ ha s no be ar ing on the ‘ ac tua l i ne qui ty that r es ult s’ w he n on ly one of m an y sim ilarl y sit ua te d de fe ndants r ec ei ve s th e be ne fi t of the ne wr ule ” or the pr inc ipl e that a

c ourt m ust “ not dis re gard

c ur re nt l aw [] w he n it

a dj udi cate s a ca se pe ndi ng b ef

or e it on d ir ec t r ev ie w . ” I d. a t 32 6- 27, 107 S . Ct . a t 71 5- 16 (quot ing Joh nson , 457 U . S. a t 55 6 n. 16, 102 S . Ct . 259 1 n. 16) . L ike w ise , in thi s case, it is difficult to see how the fac t that Levy ’ s brief om itted a claim that wa s the n square ly

f or ec los ed by our ow n pr ec ed en t e ith er

m iti ga te s th e “ ac tua l i ne qui ty that r es ult s” f

ro m dis tin gui shi ng b etw ee n L ev y a nd a sim ilarl y sit ua te d de fe ndant who did raise the issue (perhaps only because his lawy er had not even rea d Sanc he z) or

j ust if ie s our dis re gard ing the lawa s it nowstands. T he onl y dis tin ct ionthe Co urt ha s m ad e fo r pur pose s of r etro ac tiv ity

in28

crim inal cases is betwe en direct and collatera l review : “ [u] nless they fall w ithin an ex ce pti on t o th e ge ne ra l r ule , ne wc onst itu tio na l r

ule s of c ri m ina l pr oc ed

ur e w ill not be appli cable to those cases which have bec om e final befor e the newrules are an no un ced .” Teag ue v. Lan e, 48 9 U.S. 2 88 , 31 0, 1 09 S. Ct. 1 06 0, 1 07 5, 1 03 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) . T his dis tinction is not sim ply one of convenience, but rather de ri ve s f ro m the ve ry f unc tio n and p ur

pose of f ed er al ha be as c or pus: [T ] he threat of habea s corpus serves as a nece ssary addition al incentive for trial and appellate courts througho ut the land to conduct their proceedings in a m anner consistent with establish ed co nst itu tio na l st an dard s. I n or de r to p er fo rm thi s de te rr en ce f

unc tio n,

. . . the habeas court need only apply the constitu tional stand ards that prevailed at the tim e the original proceedings to ok place. Id . a t 30 6, 109 S . Ct . a t 10 73 ( quot ing D es ist v. U nit ed S ta te s, 394 U . S. 244 , 262
- 63, 89 S . Ct . 103 0, 104 1, 22 L . E d. 2d 2 48 ( 1969 ) (H ar lan, J. , dis se nti ng) ). T hus, because habeas does not exist si m ply to serve som e “perceived need to assure that an in di vi du al accu se d o f a cri m e is affo rd eda tr ia l fr ee o f co ns ti tu ti on al erro r,” we ighty“ interests of com ity and finality ” have persuaded the Court that new rules governin g crim inal prosecution s shou ld not be applied retroactively in cases that ar e al re ady

f ina l. T ea gue , 489 U . S. a t 30 8, 109 S . Ct . a t 10 74. T he se int er es ts d o not, however, apply

to direct appeals fr om

feder al conviction s. C om ity , of course, is an issue on ly

wher e a f

ederal habea s court review s a state conviction. And anConcurringin the denial of r ehea ringen banc in Ardley , J udg e Carne s emphasized that our 6 prec edent f

orec losed any

Appre ndi-based ha

beas c laims the defe ndant, whose situation was muc h li ke L e vy ’s , mi g ht b ri ng . Se e 27 3 F .3 d at 99 3- 94 . B ut t he fa c t th at L e vy

is unli ke ly

to succe ed on collate ral re view does not mea n that he ca

nnot try , which mea

ns that a district court wi ll i n a ll l ike lih oo d h ave to a dd re ss t his c la im a

nd , u lti mate ly , th at w e wi ll a s w e ll, at le a st i n the form of

an application for a c ertificate of a ppeala bility . 29 int er es t i n f

ina lity w ei ghs in f

av or of a ddr es sin g L ev y ’ s c la im s no w , f or he w ill ce rt ai nly r ai se the m

on c oll at er al r ev ie wif

w e do n ot. 6 G ri ff ith ’ s ho ldi ng i s th er ef

or e cl ear: r etro ac tiv ity

e xte nds to a ll ca se s st ill pe ndi ng o n di re ct

r ev ie w . T he re is sim

ply nothin g inthe opi nio n to sug ge st tha t a de fe ndant m

ust r ai se the iss ue in his ini tia l a ppe llate br ie f in o rd er

to re ce ive the be ne fi t of r etro ac tiv ity . T o th e co ntr ar y , it c onsi ste ntl y

r ef er s to a ll ca se s or

a ll co nvi ct ion s no t y et

f ina l. G ri ff

ith , 479 U . S. a t 32 3, 324 , 328 , 107 S . Ct . a t 71 3, 716 (em phasis add ed). T hat the defendant in Griff ith advanced the argum ent that ultim ately

resulted in the new r

ule is, of c ourse, true, but the Court in n o way em pha siz ed thi s f ac t or m ad e it a part

of it s ho ldi ng. T he re fo re , w hil e it is a lso true that the Gr iffith Court wa s concerned that “ selective application of new rules vio la te s th e pr inc ipl e of

tr eatin g si m ilarl y

sit ua te d de fe ndants the sam e, ” an y sugg estion th at L evy

is dissi m ilarly

situated sim

ply because he f

ailed to predict Blakely in his in itial brief overlooks the next th ree sentences of the opinio n, w hich re fe r to “ ca se s pe ndi ng o n di re ct r ev ie w , ” “ ca se s ondir ec t r ev ie w , ” an d “ al l convictio ns . . . not y et final. ” Id. at 323-24, 107 S. Ct. at 713. G riffith theref oreIn Shea v. L ouisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 58 n.4, 105 S. Ct. 1065, 1069 n.4, 84 L . Ed. 2d 38 (1985), 7 the Court dis c us se d th e re tr oa c tiv e a pp lic atio n o f E dw ard s v . A ri zon a , 4 51 U. S. 4 77 , 1 01 S. Ct . 18 80 , 6 8 L . E d. 2d

37 8 ( 19 81 ), a s f

oll ow s: As we hold, if a

case was pe nding on dir ect r eview at the time Edwards w as decide d, the appe llate cour t must give re troac tive eff ect to Edwa

rds, subject, of course , to established principles of waiver , harmless e rror , and the like. I f it does not, then a cour

t conductingcollater al re view of suc h a convic tion should rectify th e e r r o r a n d a p p l y E dw ar d s r e tr o a c t i v e l y. As in Griffith, re troac tivity is phrased in mandatory

terms: if a c ase is pendingon direc t review when a new r ule is announce d, appellate courts must g ive the dec ision retroac tive eff ect. The Court do e s sa y that r e tr oa c tiv ity

is “ su bje c t . . . to e sta

bli sh e d p ri nc ipl e s o f w a ive r. ” B ut a s is discussed in Part I I , infra, the panel’ s conclusion that “L evy . . . waived his B lakely-ty pe cla im by no t r a isi ngit i n h is i nit ia l br ie f o n a pp e a l,” L e vy , 3 79 F .3 d at 12 45 , is fl atly inc on sis te nt w ith Supreme Court pre cede nt on the meaningof “w aiver ,” and the ref ore doe s not support lim iting retroa ctivity

or pre cludingrevie w under Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The Court also states he re that if a newrule is not g iven re troac tive eff ect on dire ct re vie w, “ the n a

c ourt c on du c tin gc oll ate ra l r e vie w . . . sh ou ld r e c tif y the e rr or and a pp ly [it] retroa ctively .” Thus, bec ause othe r circ uits do not consider claims like L evy ’s “wa ived,” if a state cour t outside this circuit did not apply Blakely retroa ctively

in a direc t appea l like this one, a fe dera l habea s court would “r ectify the er ror” and apply

it retroac tively

on collater al re view. 30 re qui re s us to co nsi de r L ev y ’ s c la im be ca use Bl ak el y

w as de ci de d be fo re his co nvi ct ionbe cam e fi na l. 7 L ev y m ay , of c our se , r ai se his Bl ak el y c la im on c oll at er al r ev ie w , e ith er a s a subs tantive Blakely

claim or in the form

of an ineff

ective assistance claim . If, however, we consider how such claim s will be re ceived, it bec om es even clear er that G ri ff ithr equir es us t o c onsi de r the m on d ir ec t r ev ie wnotw ith standi ng the ir om iss ionf

ro m L ev y ’ s in iti al br ie f. O n on e hand, it appe ar s un lik el y

that i n a28 U . S. C. § 22 55 p ro ce ed ing L ev y w ill be able to es ta

bli sh “ ca use ” fo r his f

ai lur e to ra ise ati m el y

Bl ak el y c la im on d ir ec t r ev ie w . S ee Mc Co y v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 266 F. 3d 1 245, 125 8- 59 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( hol din g th at ne ith er the nov el ty

of , nor31

pe rc ei ve d f

uti lity of r ai sin g, a n Appr en di c la im c onst itu te s “ ca

use ” fo r fa ilure to raise the issue on direct review ). A nd on the other hand, an ineff ective assistance cl ai m ba se d onc ouns el ’ s f

ai lur e to r ai se the Bl ak el y iss ue in his ini tia l br ie f al so ap pe ar s un lik el y

to suc ce ed . S ee , e . g. , P itt s v. Co ok, 923 F . 2d 1 568, 157 3- 74 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that counsel’s f ailure to raise a

Batson-ty

pe claimpreBa t s o n d i dn o tco n s t i tu t e i n ef fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el an dth at co u n s el ’s fa ilure to be “ inn ova tiv e” w ill r ar el y , if e ve r, sup port su chac la im ); B ro w n v. U nit ed S ta te s, 311 F . 3d 8 75, 878 ( 8thCi r. 200 2) ( hol din g th at c ouns el ’ s f

ai lur e to raise an Apprendi claim

on direct appeal does not cons titute ineffective assistance of c ouns el “ sim

ply be ca use the c ourt [ pr ev iou sly

he ld] that an Appr en di- ty pe ch al le ng e was reas on ab ly avai labl e” at th e ti m e o f di rect ap pe al ). W e ha ve pr ev iou sly

c onc lud ed

that su ch“ a ‘ ga

p’ be tw ee n th e sphe re s of n o v e l t y an di n e f

f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f

c o u n s e l ” i s n o tp r o b l e mat i c , b u ti s mer e l y a func tio n of

the sc ope of

“ ca use ” on the one hand and “ ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e” on the other. S ee P itts, 923 F.2d at 1573. But when the r ule established in United States v. Ar dley , 242 F. 3d 98 9, re h’ g en banc denied, 273 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001 ) an d f

oll ow ed he re is ap pli ed

in a “ ga p” c as e, the ups hot

is that a ne wr ule governin g crim inal prosecution s that sho uld be retroactively applicable to all cases still pend ing on direct re view becom es com pletely unavailable to a defendant such32

as L evy —whose appeal w as pending when the r ule was annou nced—in any form on e ith er dir ec t or c oll at er al r ev ie w . T hus, L ev y ’ s B lake ly c la im w ill e nd u

p rece iving the sam e treatm ent as a prisoner w hose conv iction was alre ady final
w he n B lake ly

w as de ci de d, the re by

r en de ri ng the dis tin ct ionG ri ff itha nd T ea gue dr awbe tw ee n f

ina l and n on- fi na l c onvi ct ion s m eanin gle ss. Mor eo ve r, the f

ac t tha t L ev y ’ s po te nti al ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e cl ai m

is unl ike ly to suc ce ed

il lus tr at es af

urthe r poi nt: the A rd le y -L ev y r ule e ff ec tiv el y lim its retroactivity

in cases such as L evy ’ s to defendants whose couns el w as

“ inno vative” (Pitts, supra)—i.e ., better than j ust “ effe ctive.” Ye t the qualityof a de fe ndant’ s law y er

is cl earl y ir re le vant t o G ri ff

ith ’ s r at ion al e that “ sim ilarl y situated defendants” sh ouldbe treated “ the sam e” and that “ the integrity of j udicial reviewrequires that w e apply that rule to all sim ilar ca ses pendin g on di rect review .” G riffith, 479 U.S . at 322-23 , 107 S. Ct. at 713. Indeed, in cases such as thi s on e, the A rd le y -L ev y r ule e ff ec tiv el y r ec re at es the ve ry

c le ar br eak e xc ep tio n t h a tth e G r i f

f i t h C o u rtr e

j e c t e d

— i . e . , b e c au s e c o u n s e l i s u n l i k e l y t o p r e s s c l a i ms that w oul d r equir e a cl ear br eak w ithpr ec ed en t, A rd le y -L ev y w ill de pr ive the client of the benefit of re troactivity shoul d that clear bre ak subsequ ently occur. In Ar dley and again here, this court “ has essentially superim posed an a d d i t i o n a l r e qu i r e me n to n t o r e t r o a c t i v i t y d e t e rmi n a t i o n s . Wh i l e th e S up r e me33

Court has clearly

stated that all cases pending on direct appeal at the tim e of an int er ve nin g de ci sio n are e nti tle d to the be ne fi t of ane wr ule , the pane l’ s de ci sio n narr ow s th e cl as s of

c as es e nti tle d to r etro ac tiv ity . ” A rd le y , 273 F . 3d at 99 9 (T j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng f

ro m the de nia l of

r eh eari ng e n banc ). T his c ont inu es to be the onl y c ir cu it in whic h “ ca se s are e nti tle d to the be ne fi t of a n in te rv en ing de ci sio n on ly

if : 1) the c as e w as not

y et f ina l a t the ti m e of

the int er ve nin g de ci sio n; and 2 ) the li tig an t pr es ag ed the int er ve nin g de ci sio n by

r ai sin g th e iss ue ad dr es se d by

that de ci sio n inthe li tig an t’ s in iti al br ie f on a ppe al . ” I d. P er

ha ps Ar d l ey an dLe v y ar e o n l y an at t emp tt o l i m i tth e i m p ac to f t h e S up re m e C o u rt ’s r e c e nt w a t e r sh e d se nt e nc i ng d e c i si on s. S e e D ou gl a s A . B e rm a n, D o- ov e r s? , Sentencing Lawand Policy , Aug. 4, 2004, at h t tp : // s e n t e n c i n g . t yp e p a d . c o m/ s e n t e n c i n g

_ l a w

_ a n d

_ p o l i c y/ 2 0 0 4 / 0 8 / d o o v e r s . h t ml (n oti ng tha t “ the pot en tia l num be r of se nte nc ing ‘ do- ove rs ’ a ft er Bl ak el y is m ind
bogg lin g” a nd c iti ng L ev y a s “ ev ide nc e that l ow er

c ourts are goi ng t o r es ist ‘ doovers’ however they

can”) . But when the Suprem e Court decided G riffith, it wa s w el l aw ar e that e xte ndi ng r etro ac tiv ity to al l c as es pe ndi ng o n di re ct r ev ie ww oul d ca use suc h di sr

upt ionin the low er

c ourts. I n othe r w or ds, the Co urt ha s a lr ea dy
w ei ghe d th e “ re lianc e by lawe nf or ce m en t auth or iti es on the old standard s and effe ct on the adm inistration of j ustice of a re troactive application of the new rule”34

against the equalityand instit ution al concerns discussed abov e and determ ined retroac tivityshoul d extend “ to all cases . . . pending on d irect r eview or not y et fin al .” Griff

it h, 4 79 U.S. at 3 24 -2 5, 3 28 , 10 7 S . Ct. at 71 4, 7 16 (em ph as is ad de d) . A s ac o u rto f

ap p e a l s , we c a n n o tn o wr e e v a l u a t e s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o n ac a s e - b yca se ba sis —G ri ff

ithm ad e thi s de ci sio n f

or us. II.

“ A pla in e rr or

that a ff ec ts s ubst an tia l r igh ts m ay be c onsi de re d e ve n th ough it w as not br ough t t o th e co urt’ s a tte nti on. ” F ed . R. Cr im . P . 52( b) . “ If ale ga l r ule
w as vio la te d duri ng the dis tr ic t c ourt pr oc ee din gs, a nd i f the de fe ndant d id n ot w ai ve the r

ule , the n th er e ha s be ena n ‘ er ro r’ w ith in the m eanin g of Ru le 52( b) de spi te the abse nc e of

ati m el y obj ec tio n. ” O lano, 507 U . S. a t 73 2- 33, 113 S . Ct . at 177 7 ( em

pha sis a dde d) . T he pane l he ld tha t “ L ev y . . . w ai ve d hi s B lake ly -ty pe cl ai m by not r ai sin g it in his ini tia l br ie f on a

ppe al . ” L ev y , 379 F . 3d at 12 45 (e m pha sis a dde d) . A lth oughthe pane l op ini on s ugge sts that this c onc lus ionis str ai ght fo rw ar d and unc ontro ve rs ia l, it is not ; i n f

ac t, af ind ing of “ w ai ve r” is cr iti ca l t o th e iss ue pr es en te d by L ev y ’ s pe tit ionf

or r eh eari ng. T his is be ca

use

“ [m ] er e fo rf

ei tur e, a s op pose d to w ai ve r, doe s no t e xti ngui sh an ‘ er ro r’ und er

Ru leTelling ly , Rule 52(b) re fer s to error s “not broug ht to the court’s attention,” not error s not 8 broug ht to the trial court’s attention. This is beca use the rule was intende d not only to allow appellate courts to cor

rec t error s not objected to at trial, but also to allow them to cor rec t error s not raised on a

ppeal. The 1944 advisory committee note thus descr ibes the rule a s a “r estateme nt of existi nglaw” a

nd cites for

mer Supreme Court Rule 27, which “provide [d] that err ors not specifie d will be disreg arde d, ‘save as the c ourt, at its option, may notice a pla in error

not a ssi g ne d o r s pe c if

ie d. ’” Th e Sup re me Court ha s a lso no te d th at Ru le 52 (b ) “ c od if ie d” the pla in err or “standa

rd laid down in United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S. Ct . 391, 392, 80 L . Ed. 555 (1936).” United States v. Young , 470 U.S. 1, 6-7, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1042, 84 L . Ed. 2d 1 ( 19 85 ). Atkin so n h e ld t hat, “ [i]n e xce pti on a l c ir c ums tanc e s, e sp e c ia lly in c ri min a l c a se s, appellate courts, in the public intere st, may , of their own motion, notice e rror s to which no exception has bee n taken.” 297 U.S. at 160, 56 S. Ct . at 392. Thus, Rule 52(b) doe s not distinguish betwee n trial-leve l and appe llate-leve l forfe itures; rathe r, the c rucia l issue is whether the claim wa s waived or

only forf eited. See O lano, 507 U.S. at 732-34, 113 S. Ct. at 1777. L e vy ’s fi rs t br ie f w a s f

ile d o n M ay

21 , 2 00 2. Th e Sup re me Court g ra nte d c e rt ior ari in 9 Blakely on October

20, 2003. Blakely

v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 429, 157 L . Ed. 2d 309 (2003). 35 52(b).” Olano, 507 U.S . at 733, 113 S. Ct. at 1777 (em phasis add ed). 8

“ W ai ve r is d if

fe re nt f ro m f or fe iture . W

he re as f or fe iture is the f

ai lur e to m ak e the ti m el y

a sse rt ionof

ar igh t, w ai ve r is the ‘ int en tio na l r el inquis hm en t or ab an donm en t of

akno w n r igh t. ’ ” I d. ( quot ing Joh nsonv. Z er bst , 304 U . S. 458 , 464, 58 S. C t. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938)). He re, Le vy wa s unaware of a Si xthA m en dm en t r igh t t o aj ur y tr ia l onhis f

ed er al se nte nc ing e nhanc em en ts unti l Blakely wa s decided. I ndeed, L evy ’ s first brief w as filed m ore than a y ear before the Co urt gr an te d c er

tio rari in Bl ak el y , a nd o ur de ci sio n inS an ch ez spe ci fi ca lly 9 he ld tha t he ha d no suc h r igh t, se e 269 F. 3d at 12 62. A s su ch , it sim ply m ak es no se nse to say

that L ev y

“ w ai ve d” his Bl ak el y

c la im , a s no suc h “ known r igh t”Irea liz e that we regularly ref er to a failure to brief a

n issue as a “ waived.” See, e.g ., United 10 States v. Veltman, 6 F .3d 1483, 1493 (11th Cir. 1993). In a ty pical cr iminal appeal—i.e., when a defe ndant’s cla im is notbased on a new r ule announc ed by

a dec ision that postdates his ini tial br ie f— thi s is the c or

re c t te rm ino logy . T hu s, a de fe nd ant who se lawye r f a ils to r a ise a

c la im based on a

case decide d befor e the de fenda nt’s brief is filed c an be sa id to have “w aived” the claim (a nd thus the rig ht to have the de cision retroa ctively applied in his case ). Such a de fenda nt would be re leg ated to bring ing a n ineffe ctive assistanc e cla im rather tha n one base d direc tly

on the interve ning de cision. But as e x plained in this Part and re cog nized by the other c ourts of appea ls that have a ddresse d the issue, ca ses such a s L evy ’s ar e diffe rent be cause a def endant cannot intentionally

relinquish a right that has not y et evolved. See, e.g ., Fr ey

tagv. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 894 n.2, 111 S. C t. 2631, 2647 n.2, 115 L . Ed. 11 2d 764 (1991) ( Scalia, J., concurringin part and c oncurr ing in judg ment) (“ Waiver, the intentional relinquishment or aba ndonment of a known rig ht or privileg e, is mere ly one mea ns by which a f orfe iture may

occur . Some rig hts may

be for feited by

means short of w aiver , but others may no t. Ari g ht t

hat c ann ot b e wa ive d c ann ot b e fo rf e ite d b y oth e r m e ans (a

t le a st i n th e same proce eding ), but the conve rse is not true. In this case, pe titioners expressly consente d to the Special Tria l J udg e’s r ole. As fa r as my analy sis is concerne d, howeve r, it would not matter if an even mor e inadve rtent for feiture wer e involved—that is, if petitioners had not e ven conse nted but ha d me re ly

fa ile d to ob

je c t in tim e ly fa sh ion .” (c itatio ns and

qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ); Ra lph

S. Spritz er, Criminal Waiver, Proc edura l Defa ult and the B urg er Court, 126 U. Pa. L . Rev. 473, 475 (1978) ( “first, he who ‘wa ives’ must have a minimal degr ee of

persona l awar eness ( how much will depend on the c ontext ) of wha t is being r elinquished; second, the r elinquishment must be a matter of pe rsonal choic e”) ; Peter Westen, Awa y from Waiver: A Rationale for the F orfe iture of Constit utional Rights in Criminal P roce dure, 75 Mich. L . Rev. 1214, 1214-15 (1977) (“The signific ant diffe renc e betwe en wa iver a nd forf eiture is that a de fenda

nt can f orfe it his defenses without ever ha

ving ma de a de liberate , informed de cision to relinquish them . . . . Unlike waiver , forf eiture oc curs by

operation of law without reg ard to the de fenda nt's state of mind.”). L evy ’s B lakely

claim asser

ts a violation of his Si x th Amendment rig ht to a trial by jury on 12 his fe de ra l se nte nc inge nh anc e me nts . Ava lid wa ive r o f t

he ri g ht t o a

jur y tr ia l r e qu ir e s a defe ndant’s “e x press, intellig ent conse nt” and must be “ approve d by the re sponsible judgment of the trial cour

t.” Adams v. United States e x rel. McCa nn, 317 U.S. 269, 277, 63 S. C t. 236, 241, 87 L . Ed. 268 (1942). Indeed, unde r F eder al Rule of Criminal Procedur e 23(a ), “[i] f the 36 ex ist ed w he n L ev y

f ile d hi s br ie f. U nsur

pr isi ngl y , non e of

the auth or iti es the 10 O lano C ourt c ite d to e xpl ai n th e cr iti ca l di sti nc tio n be tw ee n w ai ve r an d fo rf ei tu re ar t i cu l at es th at d i s t i n ct i o n i n a man n erth at s up p o rt s cl as s i fyi n g Le v y’ s

11 unkn ow ing om iss iona s aw ai ve r. O lano, 507 U . S. a t 73 3, 113 S . Ct . a t 17 77. 12de fe nd ant i s e nti tle d to a jur y tr ia l, t he tr ia l mu st b e by

jur y un le ss: (1 ) t

he de fe nd ant w a ive s a jury trial in writing; ( 2) the g overnme nt consents; and (3) the cour t approve s.” 37 On t hi s p oi nt , ou r co ur t i s u nd en iabl y in co nf li ctwit h s ev eral ot he r ci ru it s. Fo r ex am ple , in U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ro ge rs , 118 F . 3d 4 66, 471 ( 6thCi r. 199 7) , the Si xthCi rc uit

r ej ec te d th e G ove rn m en t’ s arg um en t tha t the de fe ndant h ad “ w ai ve d” a claim based on a then-rece nt Suprem e Court decision by failing to object at tr ial o r a d v an ce th e c l ai m

i n h i s i n i t i al b ri ef

. Th e c o u rt ’s re as o n i n g wa s s i m p l e: “ [o ]f co ur se , [ the de fe ndant] c oul d no t have kno w ing ly w ai ve d ac onst itu tio na l r igh t that e vol ve d a ft er

he f ile d hi s a ppe llate br ie f be ca

use r ai sin g th e iss ue w oul d have been futile in light of then-applicable prece dent.” I d. S im ilarly , in a case in w hich

“ Appr en di w as de ci de d a ft er br ie fi ng and o ne of

the de fe ndants r ef

er [r ed ] [ the court] to the new decision in his p ost-argum ent brief, ” the Fif th Circuit concluded that i t w as “ not

c om ple te ly a cc ur at e to c hara ct er iz e the iss ue a s w ai ve d or abandoned” and th us consi dered the claim under the plain error standard. U nited St at es v. Mi randa , 248 F . 3d 4 34, 444 ( 5thCi r. 200 1) . A nd f ina lly , in a re ce nt c as e that was brief

ed and argued pre-B lakely , the S eventh Circuit reasoned that

“ [g ] ive n th e pr ec ed en t i n th is c ir cu it pr ior to Bl ak el y , w e thi nk i t w oul d be unf ai r to character ize [the def

endant] as having waived a challenge to the validity of her sentencing enh ancem ent.” United State s v. Pr ee, 384 F.3d 378, 396 (7th Cir.38

20 04 ); a cco rdUni te d S ta te s v . Henn in gs en , 38 7 F .3d58 5, 5 91 (7t h C ir. 2 00 4) . In de ed , the c ourt r ai se d th e iss ue sua spo nte a nd c onc lud ed

that the re ha d be enno w ai ve r notw ith standi ng the de fe ndant’ s f ai lur e to r ai se the Bl ak el y iss ue in an y so rt o f po st -Bl ak el y

su bm is si on . Pree, 3 84 F.3d at 3 96 -9 7. Ina ddi tio n to the se c as es , it appe ar s th at

e ve ry oth er c ir cu it is w ill ing to consider claim s like Levy ’ s despite the ordin ary rule that issues not briefed are de em ed w ai ve d. S ee inf

ra P ar t I II . A lth oughoth er

c ir cu its have not

a ddr es se d th e w ai ve r/ fo rf

ei tur e dis tin ct iondir ec tly , the f ac t that the se c ourts h av e co nsi de re d th e m er its of suc h c la im s do es se em

to im ply a gr ee m en t w iththe r ea soni ng o f the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. Indeed, that such claim s are c ogni zable under Rule 52(b) notwithstand ing a defendant’ s failure to include them in his in itial brief m ay have be entho ught

so o bvi ous as to not

m er it dis cu ssi on. III . T he pane l op ini on i n th is c as e co nte nds that “ our pr ac tic e” of

r ef usi ng t o co nsi de r cl ai m s li ke L ev y ’ s is “ lon gst an din g. ” L ev y , 379 F . 3d at 12 44. T his sim ply is not th e case . While the panel does catalogue a litany of cases in w hich
w e re fu se d to c onsi de r cl ai m s no t r ai se d inini tia l br ie fs , it c ite s no pr e- Appr en di case in w hich we r efused to consid er a claim based on a new r

ule announ ced af

ter a cr im ina l de fe ndant f

ile d hi s f ir st b ri ef . I n othe r w or ds, w hil e in the or din ar y c as eThe only pre- Ardley

case the pane l cites that is even a rguably on point is McGinnis v. 13 Ingra m E qu ip. Co. , 9 18 F .2 d 1 49 1 ( 11 th C ir . 1 99 0) (e n b anc ), in whic h w e he ld t hat a c ivi l defe ndant waive d its right to ar gue that discriminatory demotion and dischar g e we re not actionable under 42 U .S.C. § 1981 by failingto make the a

rgument at trial or in its initi al brief , even though the Supreme Court c ase that established this new rule w as not dec ided until after the de fe nd ant’ s b ri e f w a s f

ile d. As we have re c ognize d, ho we ve r, “ c ri min a l c a se s [are ] a r e a lm which is wholly

distinct (as far

as re troac tivity

is conce rned) from civil ca ses.” Mc Kinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1566 ( 11th Cir. 1994) (en ba nc). The ref

ore, while the issues-not-brie fed- are waived r ule may limitretroa ctivity

in civil cases, se e James B. B eam Distilling Co. v. Geor g ia, 501 U.S. 529, 544, 111 S. C t. 2439, 2448, 115 L . Ed. 2d 481 (1991) ( Souter, J .) (“ when the Court has applied a

rule of la w to the litigants in one c ase it must do so with respec t to all others not barr ed by proce dural re quirements or r es judicata ” (e mphasis added) ), the Court has ne ver sug g ested a s much in the criminal conte x t. Moreove r, while Rule 52(b) provides an e x plicit ex ception to the conte mporane ous ob je c tio n r ule in c ri min a l c a se s, the re is n o s imi lar e xce pti on tha t is dir e c tly

a pp lic a ble in c ivi l case s. There fore , althoug h we ha ve held that the r

ule applies by

analogy so that in ex ceptional c ir c ums tanc e s w e may

no tic e pla in e rr or

in c ivi l c a se s, se e , e .g ., S.E .C. v. Di ve rs if ie d Co rp or ate Con su lti ngGr ou

p, 37 8 F .3 d 1 21 9, 12 27 n. 14 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 4) , w e have a lso re a so ne d th at it s scope is sig nificantly

narr ower in that context, s ee, e .g ., id.; Maiz v. Virani, 253 F .3d 641, 676-77 (11th Cir. 2001); Oxford Furniture Cos., v. Drexel Heritag e F urnishings, Inc., 984 F .2d 1118, 1128 (11th Cir. 1993); see a lso Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mar t Stores, Inc., 178 F .3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 19 99 ) ( no tin gthat th e re qu ir e me nts of the pla in e rr or

ru le are a pp lie d “ e ve n mo re str ing e ntl y” in civil case s); Fa shauer

v. New Jersey

Transit Rail Oper ations, Inc., 57 F .3d 1269, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995) (“ I f any

thing, the pla in error

power in the civil context—which is j udicially rathe r than statutorily cre ated—should be use d even mor e spar ingly .”). A dditionally , it is noteven c lear that plain err or re view could have helpe d the def endant in McG innis. J ohnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S. C t. 1544, 137 L . Ed. 2d 718 (discussed in Part IV, infra ), which c larified that “whe re the law at the time of trial was se ttled and clea rly contra ry to the law at the time of appea l[ ,] i t is enoug h that an er ror be ‘plain’ at the time of appe llate consider ation,” id. at 468, 117 S. Ct . at 1549, was de cided se ven year s after McGinnis. Thus, when Mc Ginnis was dec ided, it was not clea

r that a litig ant—in either a civil or a c riminal case —in the position of the defe ndant in that case could eve r bene fit from a f avora ble interve ning de cision even if the court wer e to addr ess the new ly raised c laim on the merits. See Olano, 507 U .S. at 734, 113 S. C t. at 1777 (“We ne ed not consider the spec ial case wher e the e rror was unc lear

at the time of trial but become s clea

r on appe al bec ause the applicable law has be en cla rified.” ); United States v. Vazquez, 53 F.3d 1216, 1222 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) ( noting a circ uit spli t as to whether the er ror 39 it is our lon gstandi ng practice to consider onlyclaim s actually presented in initial br ie fs , our

r ef usa l t o c onsi de r the m er its of c la im s su cha s L ev y ’ s is ar ec en t p h e n o men o n . I n d e e d , th e p r a c t i c e d a t e s b a c kl e s s th a n f o u r ye a r s t o Ar d l e y. 13must be plain at trial and de clining to a nswer that question). Indeed, be cause J ohnson interpre ted the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e dure , it is s til l no t c le ar t

hat it a pp lie s in c ivi l c a se s. In s ho rt , M c Gi nn is d oe s n ot s up po rt Ar dle y or the re su lt h e re be c a

us e c ri min a l and

c ivi l retroa ctivity

are “wholly

distinct” issues, and bec ause pla in error revie w is signific antly

narr ower in civil cases a

nd may not be ava ilable at all in a c ase like Mc Ginnis. 40 Prior to A rdley , w e addressed the m erits of claim s like Levy ’ s on several occasions. See , e .g. , United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11 th Cir. 2001 ) (“ [D ef

en dant] did

not r ai se ac onst itu tio na l ob

j ec tio n onAppr en di g ro unds
u n t i l h e f i l ed a p et i t i o n fo r r eh ea ri n g an ds u g g es t i o n fo r r eh ea ri n g en b an c . . . . We the re fo re m ay

onl y r ev ie wthe c la im

f or pla in e rr or . ”) ; U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ca lho on, 97 F . 3d 5 18, 529 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ( re vie w ing f or pla in e rr or

ac la im ba se d onthe the n- re ce nt d ec isi on i n U nit ed S ta te s v. G au din , 515 U . S. 506 , 115 S . Ct . 231 0, 13 2 L. Ed. 2 d 4 44 (19 95 ), th atwas fi rs t ra is edin th e d efen da nt ’s rep ly brie f). T he pane l di sm iss es the se pr e- A rd le y c as es be ca

use , a m ong oth er

thi ngs, they “ do no t m ention, m

uch less discu ss, . . . any

of the bindin g, prior panel pr ec ed en ts, w hic h pr ec lud e the r ai sin g of ne wiss ue s inr eh eari ng p et iti ons an d in supp le m en ta l and r ep ly

br ie fs ” or

“ dis cu ss o r ci te a ny

auth or ity f or c onsi de ri ng the m erits of newissues no t raised in an appellant’ s initial brief.” Le vy , 379 F. 3d at 1245 . As explained j ust abov e, however, the cases to w hich the panel refer s wer e not in fac t “ bind ing, prior panel prece dents” because they do not concern new ru le s f or the c ondu ct

of c ri m ina l pr ose cu tio ns m ad e re tr oa ct ive ly appl ic ab le bySee supra note 3. 14 Un ite d St ate s v . Cl int on , 2 56 F .3 d 3 11 , 3 13 (5 th C ir . 2 00 1) (o n r e mand fr om t he Sup re me 15 Court, review ing f

or plain er

ror a n Appre ndi claims not raised in the district cour t or in the defe ndant’s initial appea l); United States v. Delg ado, 256 F .3d 264, 280 (5th Cir. 2001) (re viewingfor plain e rror Appre ndi claim first made in a supplemental brief

afte r the de fenda

nt failed to objec t at sentenc ing or raise the issue in his ini tial brief) ; United States v. Cernobyl, 255 F.3d 1215, 1216, 1218 ( 10th Cir. 2001) (same) ; United States v. Miranda, 248 F .3d 434, 443-44 (5th Cir. 2001) (same ); United States v. Gar cia, 242 F .3d 593, 599 & n.5 ( 5th Cir. 2001) (same) ; United States v. Ter

ry , 240 F.3d 65, 72- 73 (1st Cir. 2001) (same ); United States v. White, 238 F.3d 537, 541 ( 4th Cir. 2001) (same) ; United States v. Mietus, 237 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir. 2001) (s ame ); Un ite d St ate s v . Po ula c k, 23 6 F .3 d 9 32 , 9 35 -3 7 ( 8th Cir . 2 00 1) (s ame ); se e a lso Pe op le v. L athon, 740 N.E. 2d 377, 380 (I ll. App. Ct. 2000) (“The State a rgues that def

endant ha s 41 G ri ff ith . T hus, be ca

use the se c as es w er e (and are ) not on p oin t, the re w as no reason for the panels in cases such as Candelario or Calhoon to have discussed the m . Mo re ove r, be ca

use the de fe ndants in tho se c as es ha d no t “ w ai ve d” G ri ff ith retroac tivityor plain error reviewunder Rule 52(b), se e supra Par ts I-II , ther e w as also no need for those panels to “ cite any authority for considering the m erits of” the ir c la im s—i nde ed , be ca

use the de fe ndants ’ c la im s w er e not pr ec lud ed , tho se pane ls w oul d have ne ed ed to loc at e au tho ri ty

onl y if the y ha d de ci de d no t t o co nsi de r the c la im s. In other circ uits, the law is consis tent with our own pre- Ar dley cases—that is, c ourts c onsi de r cl ai m s li ke L ev y ’ s a s am atte r of c our se . I nde ed , in the af te rm ath of

Bl ak el y , suc h c as es c anbe f ound on a ne ar ly da ily ba sis . F oll ow ing Appr en di, anum

be r of c ourts f ac ed thi s pr ec ise iss ue , a nd a ll (e xc ep t f or thi s co urt ) re ac he d th e m er its of c la im s li ke L ev y ’ s. T he sam e ha s be entr ue pos t- 14 15wa ive d a

ny c ha lle ng e to t

he c on sti tut ion a lity

of his se nte nc e . . . . Th e de fe ns e [re lie s o n G ri ff ith v. Kentucky]. Defenda

nt’s case was pe nding on dir ect r eview when Appr endi was de cided. The Appre ndi opinion was issued by the United States Supreme Court the sa me day the orig inal order in this case wa s issued and there fore Appre ndi was prope rly raised by defe ndant in the petition fo r r e he ari ng .” ). As Ia c kn ow le dg e d in my dis se nt f ro m th e de nia l of

re he ari nge n b anc in A r d l e y, th e F i r s tC i r c u i t ’ s p o s i t i o nw a s n o te s p e c i a l l y w e l l
- d e f i n e d p o s t - Ap p r e n d i . S e e A r d l e y, 27 3 F .3 d at 10 01 n. 13 . In T e rr y , s up ra , th e c ourt

ana ly zed an App re nd i c la im und e r t he pla in err or standar d even though the def endant ha d not raised the issue at trial or in his init ial brief. But in United States v. Padro B urg os, 239 F.3d 72, 77 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001), the c ourt denied the de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to ra ise a n App re nd i c la im i n a

su pp le me nta l br ie f “ wi tho ut p re jud ic e to h is rig ht to raise Appr endi by way of an a pplication for c ollatera l relief in the e vent his direct a ppeal fa ile d. ” Th e F ir st C ir c uit ’s po st- B lake ly pr on ounc e me nts on

thi s q ue sti on , h ow e ve r, se e m to clar ify that a cla im like L evy ’s is not waived simply beca use it is not raised in the def endant’ s initial brief. See, e .g ., United States v. Cordoza-Estrada , 385 F.3d 56, 59 ( 1st Cir. 2004) (“Since Ap pe lla nt’ s argume nt d e pe nd s u

po n a de c isi on tha t di d n ot e xist at th e tim e of br ie fi ng , a

[Rule 28 (j ) l e tte r f

ile d th e da

y be fo re or a l argume nt] i s a pe rf e c tly a pp ro pr iate ave nu e by

wh ic h to prese nt it . . . .”). See, e.g ., United States v. Glenn, __ F .3d__, 2004 WL2676766, at *4 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 16 2004) (r eviewingfor plain e rror a B lakely

claim first ra ised in a supplemental br ief); United State s v . St e arn s, 38 7 F .3 d 1 04 , 1 06 -0 7 ( 1s t Cir . 2 00 4) (r e vie wi ngfo r p la in e rr or a B lake ly c la im first raise d in a post-ora l argument letter); United States v. Satter field, 2004 WL2491574, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 5, 2004) (unpublished op.) (re viewingfor plain e rror Blakely claim first ra ised in a supplemental brief

); Henning sen, 387 F .3d at 591 (“ Although [the def endant] did not raise the [Blakely] i ssue . . . in his brief, he made notice of the B lakely and B ooker de cisions in a subsequent filingand ra ised the issue duringargument. In light of the uncer tainty surrounding this iss ue and the questionable c onstitut ionality of [his] sentenc ing e nhance ment, we do not find that [he] has wa ived his [claim] .”); United States v. Gr iffith, 385 F.3d 124, 127 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (orde ringthat, notwithstanding the de fenda nt’s failure to raise a

Blakely -ty

pe cla im in his initial brief, “ the mandate in this case will be held pe nding the Supreme Court’s de cision in Booker and F anf an” a nd that “ the pa

rt ie s w ill have until 14 da y s f oll ow ingthe Sup re me Court ’s de c isi on to file supplemental pe titions for r ehea ring ”); United States v. Moore , 109 Fe d. Appx. 503, 505 n.2, 2004 WL2241169, at *2 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) ( unpublished op.) (notingthat a B lakely claim that was fir st raised in a suppleme ntal brief w ould be re viewed f or plain er

ror but dec lining to g rant the de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to fi le su c h a br ie f b e c a

us e it w a s c le ar t

hat he c ou ld n ot e sta

bli shpla in e rr or); Un ite d St ate s v . Co rd oza -E str a da , 3 85 F .3 d 5 6, 59 (1 st C ir . 2 00 4) (r e vie wi ngfo r p la in err or a B lakely

claim first ra ised in a Rule 28(j) letter sent to the court the da

y befor e ora l argument and notingthat “[s] ince Appe llant’s argument depends upon a decision that did not exis t at the time of brief

ing, a 28(j) letter

is a perf ectly appropr iate ave nue by

which to pre sent it”); Pree, 384 F .3d at 396-97 (r aisingBlakely issue sua sponte); United States v. Pepsny , 108 Fe d. Appx. 713, 716-17, 2004 W L1873996, at *3 (3d Cir. 2004) ( unpublished op.) (re manding 42 B l a k e l y. 16fo r r e -s e nte nc ingon no n- B lake ly

g ro un ds and

statin gthat a

de fe nd ant who fi rs t r a ise d a B lake ly claim in a post-ar gument filing c ould attempt to raise the B lakely issue on rema

nd); United States v. Musleh, 106 Fe d. Appx. 850, 857 n.4, 2004 W L1858247, at *5 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004) (unpublished op.) (“ The Supreme Court issued its decision in [ Blakely ], shortl y afte r we hear d oral a rgument in this case. [Although the de fenda nt had not raised a

Blakely -ty

pe cla im, we] then sua sponte or dere d the par ties to submitsupplemental brief ing r espec ting the e ffe ct of Blakely on the Fe dera l SentencingGuidelines.”) ; United States v. Ba dilla, 383 F.3d 1137, 1142 n.2 (10th Cir. 2004) (re viewingfor plain e rror a B lakely

claim that was f

irst raised in a motion for post-submission consideration); United States v. Westover, 107 Fe d. Appx. 840, 847, 2004 WL1790016, at *6 (10th Cir. 2004) (r ejec ting a ll claims raised in the de fenda nt’s brief but reta ining jurisdiction and pe rmitting a suppleme ntal “brie f to raise additional issues in light of Blakely ,” which w as “de cided a fter initial brief ing a nd argument”); United States v. Ame line, 37 6 F .3 d 9 67 , 9 74 (9 th C ir . 2 00 4) (“ Our p re c e de nt p ro vid e s ampl e su pp or t f or our a uth or ity to consider sua

sponte a [Blake ly ] claim that was not initi ally raised on a

ppeal.” ). In one unpublished dec ision, the Tenth Circuit refuse d to consider a Blakely claim ra ised in a letter submitted to the cour t pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Appellate Proc edure 28(j), citing L evy . United States v. Rosales, 2004 WL2307370, at *6 (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 2004). I n other case s, that court has de clined to consider Blakely claims raise d in Rule 28(j) letters “ beca use [the defe ndant] did notask to file a br ief ra ising a proper Blakely challeng e.” United States v. Maldonado-Ramires, 384 F.3d 1228, 1230 n.1 ( 10th Cir. 2004); see, e.g ., United States v. Horn, 20 04 WL24 07 13 1, at *2 (1 0th Cir . O c t. 2 8, 20 04 ) ( un

pu bli sh e d o p. ). Whil e at f

ir st g lanc e the se case s might appe ar to c onflict with the Tenth Circuit’s dec isions in W estover a nd Ba dilla, noted above, the more likely

explanation is t hat the cour t was holdingonly

that a Rule 28(j) le tter is not a pr op e r v e hic le fo r r a isi nga ne w a rgume nt— i.e ., Rul e 28 (j ) l e tte rs sh ou ld b e us e d o nly to ide nti fy ne w a uth or ity re latin gto a

rgume nts a lr e a dy

ra ise d— and

tha t th e de fe nd ant w a ive d h is rig ht to raise a B lakely

claim by not properly

seekingpermission to file a supplementa l brief. Indeed, in one case the cour t specifica lly

cited B adilla for the proposition that plain error revie w would apply

if the def endant ha d proper ly

raised the issue in a brief . Maldonado-Ramires, 384 F.3d at 1230 n.1. And in other ca ses, the cour t relied on United States v. Kimler , 335 F.3d 1132, 1138 n. 6 (10th Cir.2003), which state s: “We will not address issues not raised in the a ppellant’s openingbrief, e specia lly

wher e the a

rguments are based on a

uthority that was re adily

available at the tim e of

br ie fi ng .” Se e , e .g ., Ho rn , at *2 . M or e ov e r, a s n ote d in no te 15 , s up ra , th e Te nth Circuit considere d Appre ndi-based c laims under similar circ umstances. See Cernobyl, 255 F.3d at 1216, 1218 (re viewingfor plain e rror Appre ndi claim first raise d in a supplemental brie f af ter the def endant f ailed to object at sentencingor ra ise the issue in his initi al brief ). Thus, take n toge ther, these case s sugg est that the Tenth Circuit will consider c laims such as L evy ’s as longas the def endant pr operly

seeks to ra ise them in a supplemental br ief. Simi larly , in an unpublished opinion, an Eig hth Circuit panel without any explanation denied a motion to fil e a supple mental brief in light of B lakely . United States v. CastilloTorre cilla, 111 Fe d. Appx. 444, 445, 2004 W L2341791, at *1 (8th Cir. 2004). This dec ision, howeve r, appe ars to conf lict with that court’s administrative orde r re g ardingBlakely case s and re c e nt p ub lis he d d e c isi on s, wh ic h s ug g e st that th e Ei g hth Cir c uit wi ll h old the mand ate in a ll 43Blakely

case s and consider

Blakely claims afte r B ooker a

nd Fa nfan a re de cided. See , e.g ., Administrative Orde r Reg ardingBlakely Cases (8th Cir. Sept. 27, 2004), at http:// www.c a8.uscour

ts.gov/files/blake ly final.pdf; U n it e d St ate s v . B a

b ia r , _ _ F . 3 d _ _ 2 0 0 4 WL 2 6 9 4 8 8 2 , at * 1 n . 2 ( 8 th

Ci r . N o v . 2 9 , 2 0 0 4 ) ; Un it e d St ate s v . Pi e r c e , _

_ F . 3 d _ _ , 2 0 0 4 WL 2 5 2 0 4 9 9 , atn . 2 ( 8 thC i r . N o v . 9 , 2 0 0 4 ) ; s e e a l s o U n i t e d S t at e s v . P i r an i , 2 0 0 4 U . S . Ap p . LE X IS 16117, at *21-36 (8th Cir. Aug . 5, 2004) (r eviewingfor plain e rror Blakely claim first ra ised afte r oral a rgument), op. vac ated a

nd reh’ gen banc g rante d, 2004 U.S. App. L EXI S 17012 (8th Cir. Aug . 16, 2004); United States v. Poulack, 236 F .3d 932, 935-37 (8th Cir. 2001) (r eviewingfor plain err or Appre ndi claim first made in a supplemental brief

afte r the de fenda

nt failed to objec t at sentenc ing or

raise the issue in his ini tial brief) . In another rec ent Eig hth Circuit case, a de fe nd ant a

rgue d th at he sh ou ld b e a llo we d to ra ise a B lake ly c la im f or the fi rs t ti me in h is r e ply brief be cause “(1) Blakely was de cided ‘ shortly

afte r the dra ftingof [his] appea l had begun,’ and (2) ‘ the dec ision was unknown to . . . counsel a nd was c onsequently

left out of the br ief.’” United States v. Ceballos, 2004 WL2676446, at *2 (8th Cir. Nov. 23, 2004) ( unpublished op.). The pa nel re jected this ar gument, stating that these we re “ inadequate justifications since [the de fe nd ant’ s o pe nin g ] br ie f w a s n ot f ile d unti l July

23 , 2 00 4— a lmo st a

month a ft e r t

he B lake ly decision wa s relea sed.” I d. In acc ordanc e with the cour t’s administrative orde r, howe ver, the pa ne l st ay e d th e ma

nd ate pe nd ingre so lut ion

of B oo ke r a nd F anf an; i t e xpla ine d th at “ in t

his unus ua l c ir c ums ta

nc e , [th e de fe nd ant’ s] ma nd ate wi ll b e sta

y e d d e sp ite his fa ilure to r a ise thi s issue in his opening br ief.” I d. at *2 n.1. I take the pa

nel’s discussion of the issue to sug g est that it would have conside red the Blakely issue proper ly

raised if the def endant’ s openingbrief ha d been f iled befor e, rather than “ almost a month after ,” B lakely was de cided. So far a s Ican te ll, state appellate courts ar e also c onsideringthe merits of c laims like L e vy ’s . Se e , e .g ., State v. Mir and a -C a br e ra , 9 9 P. 3d

35 , _ _ ( Ar iz. C t. A

pp . 2 00 4) (“ [T]he State argues that [the defe ndant] waived any claim he mig ht have to re sentenc ing pur suant to . . . Blakely by failingto raise it at the se ntencinghear ing or in his opening br ief. . . . De cisions of the United States Supreme Court that cr eate new r ules apply

to all criminal ca ses still pending on direc t review . Griff

ith v. Kentucky . Be cause [t he def endant’ s] case is still pendingon direc t re vie w, we wi ll c on sid e r t he a pp lic atio n o f t

he ru le se t f

or th i n B lake ly

to t he se nte nc ingin h is case .” (c itations omi tted)); People v. B arne s, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 243 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2004) “f ound a B lakely

waiver based on the def endant’ s failure to raise the issue until supplemental brie fingon appea l,” but concluding th atth e “ ru l e ap p l i edi nth atca s e ap p ea rs s tri ct er th an C al i fo rn i a’ s ru l e” an d thu s co n s i d er i n g a Blakely claim first ra ised in a supplemental br ief); People v. Wilson, 2004 W L2677090, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.) (unpublished op.) ( consideringBlakely claim first ra ised in a petition for rehe aring ); Kre bs v. State, 816 N.E. 2d 469, 474-75 (I nd. Ct. App. 2004) (“w e eva luate sua sp onte the c on sti tut ion a lity of [the de fe nd ant’ s] se nte nc e un de r t he Un ite d St ate s Su

pr e me Court’s rec ent dec ision in Blakely v. Washington”) ; State v. Conge r, 687 N.W. 2d 639 (Minn. C t . Ap p . 2 0 0 4 ) ( co n s i d er i n g Bl ak el y cl ai mfi rs tra i s edi na s u

p p l em en t al b ri ef

); S t at e v . Ki n g, 858 A.2d 4, 13-14 (N .J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (same); State v. Murrin, 2004 WL2677454, at *3-4 (O hio Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004) (consider ing B lakely issue sua sponte af

ter the de fenda

nt challeng ed only

the trial cour

t’s application of O hio’s sentenc ing guidelines); State v. Shaw,

442004 WL2191044, at *8 (Te nn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2004) (unpublished op.) (r ejec ting the

State ’s argume nt “ that th e de fe nd ant w a ive d th e [B lake ly ] iss ue by fa ili ngto r a ise it i n h is orig inal brief” ). B ut see People v. A bey ta, 2004 WL2320090, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (unpublished op.) ( 2-1 dec ision) (“[Defe ndant’s B lakely claim] was not asserte d in the trial court. The ref

ore, a ll of defe ndant’s B lakely based f eder al constitutional contentions have be en forf eited.”) 45 T he c le ar es t st at em en ts i n th es e post -B lake ly c as es have c om e fr om

the Se ve nthCi rc uit

in U nit ed

S ta te s v. P re e, se e supr a Part I I, a nd f ro m the N inth Circuit in United States v. Am eline, 376 F. 3d 96 7 (9th Cir. 2004). In A m eline, ev entho ugh the de fe ndant “ m ad e no c ha lle nge to the appl ic ab le standard of pr oof or to the j udge ’ s f

ac tf ind ing auth or ity , ” the N inth C ir cu it he ld “ that the S ixth A m en dm en t i m

pli catio ns o f Bl ak el y

a llo w [e d] [ the c ourt] to ex am ine sua spo nte its pot en tia l i m

pa ct on [ the de fe ndant’ s] se nte nc e. ” I d. a t 97 4. T hus, w hil e the Se ve ntha nd N inth C ir cu its have r ai se d th e Bl ak el y iss ue sua spo nte , w e ha ve refused to consider even claim s raised in supp lem ental briefs filed shortly after Bl ak el y w as de ci de d. A nd whil e Pr ee , A m el ine , a nd the de ci sio ns o f the F if th and Si xthCi rc uit s di sc uss ed

in Part I I, sup ra , a re pe rh ap s th e cl eare st d isc uss ion s of thi s is sue , the c as es c ite d innot es 15 and 1 6, sup ra , de m onstrate that this c ourt i s truly a m inority

of one on this issue. Indeed, the eleven other fe deral cir cuits that ha ve be enpr es en te d w ithc la im s li ke L ev y ’ s have a ll co nsi de re d th e m er its ofT h e c as es d i s cu s s edi nP artI Ian d ci t edi nn o t es 1 5 an d

1 6 , s u p ra , co v er th e F i rs tth ro u gh 17 Tenth Circuits. In addition, in United States v. Byers, 740 F .2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984), thenJ udg e Scalia wrote:

Neither at trial nor on a

ppeal did appe llant raise this Six th Amendment c la im. Ap pe lla

nt c on c e de s th at it

wa s a sse rt e d f

or the fi rs t ti me (b y

ne w c ouns e l) in his P etition for Rehea

ringand Sug g estion for Rehe aringEn Ba nc. Appe llees argue that we are there fore prec luded from c onsideringit. I t is true as a g ener al rule that a ppellate c ourts will not consider questions raised f or the fir st tim e on appea l. Howeve r, we are “bound to consider any chang e, either

in fac t or in law, which has supe rvene d since the judg ment [from which appe al is taken] was enter ed,” Patter son v. Alabama , 294 U.S. 600, 607, 55 S. C t. 575, 578, 79 L . Ed. 1082 (1935). We think that the Supreme Court’s de cision in Estelle v. Smi th, [451 U.S . 454, 101 S. Ct . 1866, 68 L . Ed. 2d 359 (1981),] handed down during our consider ation of [appellant’s] Petit ion for Rehe aring , which ele vated [appellant’s] S ix th Amendment claim fr om completely untenable to plausible, invokes this lim ited exception. I d. at 1115 n.11 (Sca lia, J .) (c itations omi tted). Althoug h J udg e Scalia wrote for only six of twelve pa rticipatingjudge s, J udg e B azelon’s dissent, joined by J udg es Wald and Mikva, agree d that the Six th Amendment claim wa s proper ly befor e the c ourt for the same re asons. See id. at 11 61 n. 13 8. Th e D. C. C ir c uit ’s re a so nin gis p art ic ula rl y a pt h e re g ive n th at B lake ly sim ila rl y “ e le vate d [L e vy ’s c la im] f ro m c omp le te ly

unte na ble ,” se e Sanc he z, 2 69 F .3 d at 12 62 , “ to plausible.” 46 tho se c la im s. I thu s do not und er stand h owthi s c ourt c anc ont inu e to r ej ec t the 17
soun d reasoning of ou r sister cir cuits without anysort of explanation o r even an ac know le dgm en t of

tho se c as es . IV. A f inal reason for re

j ecting the rule established in Ar dley and followed here is tha t i t se nds a cl ear m es sa ge to ap pe llate c ouns el that the y sho uld br ie f an y cl ai m that pa sse s th e laugh te st r eg ar dle ss o f w he the r it ha s any sup port i n, or

is ev ensqu ar el y

f or ec los ed by , our ow n pr ec ed en t. H er e, f

or e xa m ple , by f ai lin g to ra ise ac la im

w e ha d a lr ea dy

f la tly r ej ec te d, L ev y ’ s c ouns el c ost his c lie nt the47

be ne fi t of the ne wr ule a nnounc ed

in Bl ak el y . T hus, in ad dit ionto be ing i n c o n s i s t e n twi t h Gr i f

f i t h , Ol a n o , a n dth e l a wo f e v e ry o t h e r

c i r c u i t , th e Ar d l e yLe vy rule is also quite sim

ply an im prudent exercise of the prudential rule that iss ue s no t br ie fe d are de em ed w ai ve d. S ee Mi randa , 248 F . 3d at 44 3 ( “ [T ] he iss ue s- not -b ri ef

ed -are -w ai ve d r

ule is a pr ude nti al c onstru ct

that r equir es the exercise of discretion.”). Wh e n f a c e dw i t h as i mi l a r

c a s e i n J o h n s o n v . U n i t e dS t a t e s , th e S up r e me Co urt op te d f

or apa th tha t w oul d avoi d “ co unse l’ s in ev ita bly m ak ing alon g and virtua lly use le ss l aundr

y li st o f obj ec tio ns t o r

uli ngs that w er e pla inl y

sup porte d by ex is ti ng pre ced en t.” 5 20 U.S. 46 1, 4 68 , 11 7 S . Ct. 1 54 4, 1 54 9, 1 37 L. Ed. 2d71 8. In Johns on, as here , the def endant sou ght to raise a

claim on appeal that was square ly f or ec los ed by pr ec ed en t a t the ti m e of

tr ia l ( an d thus w as not

r ai se d th en ) but was viable by

the tim e of appeal due to an intervening Suprem e Court de ci sio n. T he dif

fe re nc e be tw ee n Jo hnso n and L ev y ’ s c as e is tha t the int er ve nin g de ci sio n inJoh nsonw as iss ue d inti m e fo r the de fe ndant t o r ai se the c la im in his fi rs t a ppe llate br ie f, a nd the que sti on b ef or e the Co urt w as w he the r fo r Ru le 52( b) pur pose s e rr or

m ust be “pla in” a s of

the ti m e of

tr ia l or onl y a s of the ti m e of ap pe al . T he Co urt he ld tha t “ w he re the lawa t the ti m e of tr ia l w as se ttl ed

a nd cl earl y c ontrary to the lawa t the ti m e of

appe al [, ] it

is en oughthat an e rr or

be48

‘ plain’ at the tim e of appellate c onsid eration.” Id. T he Court’ s rationale wa s sim ple : i t r ea sone d th at

if it int er pr et ed Ru le 52( b) to re qui re that e rr or be “pla in” as of the ti m e of

tr ia l, tr ia l c ouns el w oul d in te rp ose num er ous ba se le ss o bj ec tio ns to r uli ngs that w er e cl earl y

c or re ct und er pr ev ai lin g lawin or de r to avoi d f or fe iti ng the be ne fi t of

G ri ff ithr etro ac tiv ity

f or c la im s ba se d onf

av or ab le int er

ve nin g decisions . In Ar dley

and again here, however, this court has taken a posi tion th at en co ur ag es pr ec ise ly

suc h a“ laundr

y li st” of appe llate a rg um en ts, the re by opt ing fo r ne ed le ss w as te of

le ga l r es our ce s. Be ca use I f ind the para lle l be tw ee n Jo hnso n and the ins tant c as e part ic ularl y co m pe lli ng, I w ill tr

y to state it a s c le ar ly

a s po ssi ble : “ T he narr ow ne ss o f the pla in er ro r ru le is a re fl ec tio n of

the im portanc e, ind ee d ne ce ssi ty , of the co nte m por an eo us o bj ec tio n r

ule to w hic h it

is ane xc ep tio n. T he c ont em por an eo us objec tion rule fosters finality of j udgm ent and deters ‘ sandbagg ing’ . . . . ” U nited St at es v. P ie la go, 135 F . 3d 7 03, 709 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) . I t “ al so p ro m ote s th e sa lut ar y int er es t of

m ak ing the tr ia l the m ai n e ve nt” ; i n sh or t, it “ is e sse nti al to the int eg ri ty a nd e ff ic ie nc y of our j udi ci al pr oc es s. ” I d. S im ilarl y , the pur pose of the iss ue s- not -b ri ef

ed -are -w ai ve d r

ule —and F ed er al Ru le of Appe llate P ro ce dur e 28Se e L e vy , 3 79 F .3 d at 12 44 : 18 To allow a ne w issue to be ra ised in a petition for re hear ing, or a supplementa l brief, or a re ply brief c ircumvents F eder al Rule of Appe llate Proce dure 28( a)( 5), which re quires than a

n appellant’ s initi al brief

must contain “a state ment of the issues prese nted for r eview.” Whil e some of our decisions re fusingto consider new issues in re ply , supplemental, or r ehea ringbriefs ha

ve mentioned this rule or its pr e de c e sso r, oth e rs have no t. 49 in g en er al —“ is t o c onse rv e the ti m e an d e ne rg y of the c ourt and c le ar ly

to advis e 18 the opp osi te party

of the poi nts he is obl ige d to m ee t. ” T hy s C o. v. A ngl o C al . N at ’ l B an k, 219 F . 2d 1 31, 133 ( 9thCi r. 195 5) . T hus, both th e co nte m por an eo us objec tion rule and the iss ues-not-briefed-ar e-w aived rule are intended to ensure the int eg ri ty

of the a dve rs ar

y pr oc es s and c onse rv e le ga l r es our ce s. Joh nson ad opt ed abr oa de r int er

pr et at ionof

the pla in e rr or

e xc ep tio n inor de r to avoi d use le ss o bj ec tio ns tha t w oul d in ev ita bly und er m ine the ve ry

pur pose s th e contem poraneous ob

j ection rule serves. Fac ed with the sam e problem , how ever, the panel opin ion in flexibly applies the prudenti al issues-not-briefed-are -w aived ru le in a w ay

that un de rm ine s th e ve ry pur pose s it se rv es . Fi na lly , I do n ot s ee howA rd le y a nd L ev y

c anbe squ ar ed

w ithour a dvi ce to counsel in United States v. Battle, 163 F. 3d 1 (11th Cir. 1998 ):

E ve n inade ath- pe na lty

c as e, the c ourt e xpe ct s c ouns el to be hi gh ly sele ct iv e ab ou t t he is su es to be arg ue d o n app eal . . . .

. . . . The Supr em e Co ur t o f th e Uni te d S ta te s h as . . . st res se d . . . that the best advo cacy

relies on selectivity . It is we ll settled that co unse l ne ed

not “ ra ise e ve ry

‘ co lor ab le ’ c la im ” on a

ppe al . . . . A nd,50

the form er C hief Judge of this circuit, John C. G odbo ld, has given this advi ce: “ [C] ouns el m ust select with dispassio nate and detached m ind the iss ue s th at

c om m on s en se a nd e xpe ri en ce te ll him a re li ke ly to be disp ositiv e. H e m

ust rej ect other issues or give them short tre at m en t.” Id. at 1-2 (citations om itted). C ertainly , w e cannot continu e to give such advi ce af te r A rd le y

a nd L ev y . L ev y ’ s c ouns el he ed ed our a dvi ce —i nde ed , he did

not ha ve to re sort t o “ co m

m on s en se a nd e xpe ri en ce ” to d et er m ine that a

Bl ak el y -ty

pe claim wa s not lik ely

to succeed because w e had alre ady specifically

rej ected that claim in Sanchez. But by

holdi ng that Griff

ith on ly applies if counsel anticipates the new r ule and raises a sim ilar claim in the defendant’ s first brief, we are es se nti al ly

te lli ng c ouns el that the y

sho uld “ ra ise e ve ry

c olo ra ble c la im on a ppe al ” an d th at if the y a re too “ hig hly

se le ct ive about

the iss ue s to be a rg ue d onappe al ” the y m ay do g re at inj ur y to the ir c lie nts . A s ar es ult , I w oul d e xpe ct c ouns el to rai se m or e cl ai m s o n app eal , in cl ud in g c la im s s qu arel y for ecl os edby ourown pr ec ed en t, a nd tha t the a rg um en ts s uppo rt ing tho se c la im s w ill ne ce ssari ly be le ss clear and specific. Such kitchen-sink briefs will, of course, m ake this court’ s work m or e d iff ic ul t an d was te jud ic ia l re so ur ces , no t t o m en ti on co un se l’s o wn t im e. T hus, e ve n if

the A rd le y -L ev y

r ule w er e not

in co nf lic t w ithG ri ff

ith , O lano, a nd the lawof

e ve ry oth er c ir cu it, I w oul d st ill dis se nt f ro m the c ourt’ s r ef

usa l t o re he ar thi s c as e enbanc sim

ply be ca use the r ule w ill do g re at

harm to the f ai r an d51

ef fi ci en t a dm ini str at ionof

j ust ic e in this c ir cu it.

V. To r ecap, I dissent from

the denial of rehearing en banc for four prim ary reasons. F irst and forem ost, the rule announced in Ardley and followed here unj ust if ia bly li m its the c le ar

hol din g of

G ri ff ithv. K en tuc ky

that “ a ne wr

ule f or th e co nd uc t o f cri m in al pro se cu ti on s i s t o b e ap pl ie d re tro act iv el y to all cas es . . . pe ndi ng o n di re ct

r ev ie wor

not y et f ina l. ” 479 U . S. a t 32 8, 107 S . Ct . a t 71 6 (e m pha sis a dde d) . B ec au se the re is no d isp ute that L ev y ’ s c as e is s til l “pe ndi ng on d ir ec t r ev ie w ” an d is “ not y et f ina l, ” G ri ff

ith ’ s c onst itu tio na l r

ule ne ce ssari ly tru m ps th e st ric tl y

pru de nt ia l ru le th atis su es no t b rie fedare d eem edwaiv ed . Se co nd, the pane l’ s c onc lus ionthat L ev y “ w ai ve d” his Bl ak el y

c la im is inconsi stent with Olano’ s distin ction between “ wa iver” and “ forfe iture.” “ Whereas fo rf ei tur e is the f

ai lur e to m ak e the ti m el y

a sse rt ionof

ar igh t, w ai ve r is the

‘ intentio nal relinquish m ent or abandonm ent of a known right.’ ” O lano, 507 U. S. at 73 3, 1 13 S. Ct. at 17 77 (qu ot in g J oh ns on , 30 4 U.S. at 46 4, 5 8 S . Ct. at 10 23 ). T his dis tin ct ionis cr

uc ia l, f or “ [m ] er e fo rf

ei tur e, a s op pose d to w ai ve r, doe s no t extingu ish an ‘ error ’ under Rule 52(b),” id. (e m phasis add ed), or, for that m atter, j ust if y li m iti ng r etro ac tiv ity

und er G ri ff ith , se e supr a not e 7. Whe n L ev y ’ s f ir st br ie f w as f

ile d, the S upr em e Co urt ha d no t e ve n gr an te d c er tio ra ri in Bl ak el y , a nd52

we ha d s qu arel y

reject edth e v ery cl ai m

th e p an el no w fau lt s h im forom it ti ng . As su ch , th ere was no “ kn own rig ht ” fo r Lev y to ha ve “ in te nt io na ll y

rel in qu is he d,” an d h is om is si on is a cl ear e xa m pl e o f a “ fo rfei tu re,” n ot a “ waiv er.” Third, the panel’ s opin ion cont inues a circuit split that find s this cou rt standi ng a lon e. I nde ed , w he re as w e ha ve be ena nxi ous to f ind unt im el y Bl ak el y cl ai m s “ w ai ve d, ” se e supr a not e 2, the S ev en th a nd N inth C ir cu its have , in w el lreasoned opinio ns, ra ised Blakely issues su a sponte. O f course, inconsis tency with other circ uits do es not byitself prove that we have adopted the incorrect view. But I do not und erstand how w e can c ontin ue to igno re the num erous cases co nsi de ri ng c la im s su cha s L ev y ’ s, part ic ularl y giv enthat our dis ag re em en t w ith th os e cas es is a rel at iv el y rece nt de ve lo pm en t an d n ot a “ lo ng st an di ng pra ct ic e.” Fi na lly , the pos iti on w e ha ve a dopt ed w ill r es ult

in “ co unse l’ s in ev ita

bly m aking a long and virtually useless laund ry

list” of appellate ar gum ents that are pla inl y uns uppo rt ed , or

e ve n f or ec los ed , by

pr ec ed en t. I t a lso goe s di re ct ly a ga ins t our pr ev iou s a dvi ce that w e “ ex pe ct [] c ouns el to be hig hly se le ct ive about

the issues to be argued on appeal” and “ that counsel n eed not raise ever y ‘ colorable’ cl ai m . ” Battl e, 163 F . 3d at 1- 2 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks o m itt ed ). A s su ch , in ad dit ionto be ing inc onsi ste nt w ithS upr em e Co urt pr ec ed en t, A rd le y a nd p ro ge ny are quite sim

ply an im prudent exercise of a prudential rule.53

Fo r the se r ea sons , I c ont inu e to d isa gr ee w iththe r ule a dopt ed

in A rd le y

a nd followed here. I there fore dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.United States v. L evy , 379 F.3d 1241 ( 11th Cir. 2004). Although I ag ree , and joined a pa

nel 1 in I n r e De an, 37 5 F .3 d 1 28 7 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 4) to h old , th at B lake ly do e s n ot a

pp ly re tr oa c tiv e ly

to a cr iminal case on c ollatera l review , Ithink that a criminal ca se still pending on dire ct appe al – a pipeline ca se – is an entire ly differ ent matter. 54 BARKE TT , C ircuit Judg e, dissenti ng from the denial of rehearing en banc: T he pane l de ci sio n inthi s c as e hol ds tha t a de fe ndant m ay

not r ai se Bl ak el y v. W as hin gto n, 124 S . Ct . 253 1 ( 2004 ) on d ir ec t r ev ie wunl es s it w as r ai se d inthe ini tia l a ppe llate br ie f. L ev y

say s th at if it w as not r ai se d inthe ini tia l br ie f, the 1 iss ue ha s be en“ w ai ve d. ” I do n ot s ee howw e can f ai rl y or le ga lly pr ec lud e lit igants f ro m m ak ing Bl ak el y

a rg um en ts i n th ei r post -i nit ia l su bm iss ion s inli ght of two extra ordinarily

significant facts, am

plified below. First, wa iver applies onlyto thos e situations wher e a def endant could have raised an issue in his ini tial br ie f but f ai le d to do s o. L ev y

c oul d no t have r ai se d aS ixth A m en dm en t ob j ec tio n to h is s en te nc ing be ca

use in U nit ed

S ta te s v. S an ch ez , 269 F . 3d 1 250, 126 2 ( 11th Ci r. 200 1) , thr ee y ears be fo re Bl ak el y w as hande d do w n, w e he ld tha t Appr en di doe s no t a

ppl y to the F ed er al S en te nc ing G uid el ine s. T his dif fe re nti at es the instant case from

our precedents in United States v. Ne aly , 232 F. 3d 82 5 (11 Cir. th 2000 ) and U nited States v. A rdley , 242 F. 3d 98 9 (11 Cir. 2001 ), on bot h of which th the Le vy panel relies. Sec ond, Gr iffith v. K entucky , 479 U. S. 314 (198 7), which m ak es ne w ly

de cl ar ed r ule s of c ri m ina l pr oc ed

ur e ap pli ca

ble to al l c as es sti ll pe ndi ng o n di re ct

r ev ie w , dic ta te s th at

L ev y be giv enthe opp ortun ity to ra ise his55

Bl ak el y c la im s be fo re thi s c ourt.

I. G riffith Applies to All P ipeline Cases The S uprem e Court has held that “ failure to apply a new ly declare d c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r

u l e t o c r i mi n a l c a s e s p e n d i n g o n d i r e c tr e v i e wv i o l a t e s b a s i c n o rms of constitu tional adjudication.” G riffith, 479 U.S . at 322. The Gr iffith Court state d th at

“ af te r w e ha ve de ci de d ane wr ule in the c as e se le ct ed , the int eg ri ty of j udi ci al r ev ie wr equir es that w e ap ply that r ule to al l si m ilar ca se s pe ndi ng o n dir ec t r ev ie w . ” I d. a t 32 2- 23. I n so hol din g, the Co urt m ad e cl ear that i t w oul d not harbor an exception to retroac tivityfor ca ses in which the new r ule constitu ted a “ cl ear br eak” w iththe pa st. I d. a t 32 8. O ur int er na l c ir cu it ru le s f

or howa nd whe the r aniss ue c anbe r ai se d on ap pe al c an not

ove rr ide the c onc er

ns a bout f undam en ta l f

ai rn es s and the int eg ri ty of j udi ci al r ev ie wthat the S upr em e Co urt i de nti fi ed in G ri ff ith . I f the “ fa ilure to apply a new ly declare d constit ution al rule to crim inal cases pending o n direct reviewviolates basic norm s of constitu tional adjudication,” id. at 322, surely that fa ilure w oul d vi olate c onst itu tio na l no rm s a s m uc h inthe c as e of

ade fe ndant who fa ile d to r ai se a

ne wr ule of c ri m ina l pr oc ed

ur e that w as not

a va ila ble w he n he fi le d hi s in iti al appe llate br ie f as it w oul d inthe c as e of

ade fe ndant who d id anticipate the new r

ule.56

It so h ap pe ns tha t i n G ri ff

ith , the de fe ndant d id m an ag e to p re se rv e his Batso n ob j ec tio ns t o th e pr ose cu tor ’ s us e of pe re m pto ry c ha lle nge s. B ut the re is no b as is i n G ri ff

ithor e lse w he re to co nc lud e that the de ci sio n a ppl ie s on ly

to de fe ndants w ho h av e pr es er ve d th ei r co nst itu tio na l c ha lle nge s, w he the r dur ing tr ia l, thr ough out

dir ec t r ev ie w , or

both. T he G ri ff

ithCo urt gr an te d c er

tio rari to an sw er the que sti on “ w he the r the r uli ng i n B at son ap pli es r etro ac tiv el y to a state co nvi ct ionpe ndi ng o n di re ct r ev ie wa t the ti m e of

the Batso n de ci sio n. ” G ri ff ith , 479 U . S. a t 31 8. G ri ff

ithne ith er

pos ed nor a nsw er ed

the m or e lim ite d qu es tio n of
w he the r Batso n a

ppl ie s r et ro ac tiv el y

onl y to a de fe ndant who h as pr es er ve d hi s obj ec tio n to apr ose cu tor ’ s pe re m pto ry c ha lle nge s. R athe r, sum m ar iz ing it s pr ior case law , the C ourt obs erved that in a num ber of separ ate opinion s since Linkletter, various Mem bers of the Co urt have a sse rt ed

that, a t a m ini m um , a ll de fe ndants w hose cas es were s ti ll pe nd in g o n d ire ctap pe al at t he ti m e o f th e la wchanging decision sh ouldbe entitled to inv oke the new r ule. G ri ff ith , 479 U . S. a t 32 2 ( quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. Joh nson , 457 U . S. 537 , 545 a nd n.9 (1982) (H arlan, J.) (internal quotation s om itted) (em phasis add ed). T he Court dis tin gui she d no t be tw ee n de fe ndants w ho p re se rv ed the ir Batso n ob

j ec tio ns and tho se w ho f

ai le d to , but

r athe r be tw ee n “ ca se s th at have be co m e fi na l and thoseThe Gr iffith Court found that in the first two categ ories, “the new r ule alre ady

was 2 retroa ctively

applied: (1) when a de cision of this Court did not hing mor e than a pply settled prec edent to diffe rent fa ctual situations . . . and (2) when the ne w rulingwas that a trial court lacke d authority

to convict a c riminal defe ndant in the first plac e.” G riffith, 479 U.S. at 324 (empha sis added). Thus, the se two categ ories ca nnot be used to say

any thing a bout Griffith, let alone the instant c ase. 57 that have not.” G riffith, 479 U.S . at 322. The Gr iffith Court we nt on to hold th at [i ] n Ju sti ce H ar lan’ s vi ew , a nd n owin our s, f ai lur e to a ppl y ane w ly declare d constit ution al rule to crim inal cases pending o n direct review vio la te s ba sic nor

m s of c onst itu tio na l a dj udi catio n. . . [ A ] ft er w e ha ve decided a newrule in the case sele cted, the integrity of j udicial re vie wr equir es that w e ap ply that r ule to al l si m ilar ca se s pe ndi ng o n di rect rev ie w. Id. at 322-23 (em

phasis add ed). T he re a re no e xc ep tio ns t o th e G ri ff ithr ule . I t i s tr

ue that pr ior

to G ri ff ith , in J ohns on, the S upr em e Co urt a cknow le dge d th re e ex ce pti ons to the r ule of re tr oa ct ivi ty

in the c ri m ina l pr oc ed

ur e co nte xt. T he f

ir st tw o w er e not

a t i ssu e in G ri ff itha nd are not

a t i ssu e he re . T he thi rd e xc ep tio n – whe re ane wr ule 2
co nst itu te s a“ cl ear br eak” w ithpa st p re ce de nt – w as a t i ssu e in the li ne of retroac tivitycases lea ding up to Jo hnso n and Griff ith, but the Grif

fith Court re fu se d to le av e an y

r oom f or thi s e xc ep tio n. I nst ea d, the Co urt r ei te rate d th e ab sol ute br ea dthof

it s ho ldi ng:58

W e theref

ore hold that a new r

ule for the conduct of crim inal pr ose cu tio ns i s to be appl ie d r etro ac tiv el y to al l c as es , state or

f ed er al , pendin g on di rect r eview or not y et final, with no exception for cases in whic h th e ne wr

ule c onst itu te s a

‘ cl ear br eak’ w iththe pa st.
Id. at 328 (em

phasis add ed). A ny

attem pt to read into Griff

ith an unarticulated fo urth e xc ep tio n – f

or de fe ndants w ho f

ai le d to pr es er

ve Batso n ( or

Appr en di, et c. ) obj ec tio ns –

is unc onvi nc ing . II . S an ch ez F or ec los ed

L ev y ’ s Appr en di C la im T he pane l’ s r ef

usa l t o a ppl y the ne w ly

de cl ar ed Bl ak el y r ule he re is al l the le ss j ust if ie d gi ve n th at

L ev y ’ s “ fa ilure ” to r ai se his S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o a j ur y tr ia l t o c ha lle nge his f

ed er al se nte nc ing e nhanc em en ts w as dic ta te d by thi s ve ry c ourt. P ri or

to Bl ak el y , thi s c ourt, a lon g w ithe ve ry oth er appe llate c ourt i n the na tio n, ha d he ld tha t Appr en di d id n ot a ppl y to the F ed er al S en te nc ing G uid el ine s. S ee S an ch ez , 269 F . 3d at 12 62 ( “ Appr en di d oe s no t a ppl y to j udge -m ad e de te rm inatio ns p ur suant t o th e Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s) . S ee a lso U nit ed S ta te s v. N ea ly , 232 F . 3d 8 25, 829 n. 3 ( 11th C ir . 2000 ) (" T he S en te nc ing G uid el ine s are not

sub j ec t t o th e Appr en di r

ule . ") ; U nit ed

S ta te s v. H ar

ri s, 244 F. 3d 8 28, 829 -3 0 ( 11th C ir . 2001 ) (h old ing that Appr en di d oe s no t a ppl y to theThe una nimous ag ree ment of our sister c ircuits on this pointis documented in Jus tice 3 O’Connor’s dissentingopinion in Blakely . See B lakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2547 n.1 (2004). 59 re le vant c ondu ct

pr ovi sio n of

the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s) ; and U nit ed S ta te s v. D ia z, 248 F . 3d 1 065, 110 5 ( 11th C ir . 2001 ) (n oti ng tha t " Se nte nc ing G uid el ine issues are not sub

j ect to the Appre ndi rule and, thus, there is no requirem ent that sentencing facts be subm itted to a jury and found b ey ond a reasonable doub t"). 3 A cc or din gly , howc oul d w e poss ibl y c onsi de r “ w ai ve d” a n is sue that w e ha ve al re ady de ci de d? E ve n th oughc ri m ina l de fe ndants be fo re Bl ak el y w oul d have ha d a

bsol ute ly no r ea son to r ai se Appr en di i n c onne ct ionw iththe F ed er al G uid el ine s ( giv enour hol din g inS an ch ez ), the pane l pe na liz es de fe ndants f or not havin g th e fo re sig ht t o p r e d i c tB l a k e l y: [W ] hil e L ev y

m ay not have pr ed ic te d th e Su

pr em e Co urt’ s ul tim at e co nc lus ion s inBl ak el y , it is al so tru e that the ge ne ra l arg um en t tha t a j ury m ust determ ine all fac ts regarding sentence enhancem ents was av ai la ble to L ev y

a nd i nde ed

m ad e by de fe ndants e ve r sin ce the Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s c am e int o be ing .
L ev y , 379 F . 3d at 12 43 . I n f ac t, how ev er , that “ ge ne ra l arg um en t” – w hic h is60

m or e ac curate ly

de sc ri be d a s th e spe ci fi c hol din g and v er y poi nt o f Bl ak el y , a lbe it not ne ce ssari ly

w ithr ef er en ce to the F ed er al G uid el ine s – w as not a va ila ble to L ev y , be ca

use w e too k it

a w ay f ro m him in Sanc he z. T he pane l de ri ve d it s

“ ge ne ra l arg um en t” a rg um en t f ro m our de ci sio n inMc G inn is v . I ngr am E qui pm en t Com pany , 918 F. 2d 14 91 (11th Cir. 1990 ). In that case, we held that an em ploy er ha d w ai ve d it s r igh t t o arg ue that di sc ri m inator y de m oti on and d isc harg e w er e not actionable under § 198 1 by failing to raise those issu es at trial, even thoug h an int er ve nin g S upr em e Co urt de ci sio n ( Patte rs on) that m ad e tho se iss ue s ava ila ble wa s not decided u ntil after tria l. B ut the panel neglects to add ress a c ardinal dif fe re nc e be tw ee n M cG inn is and the ins tant c as e: the re w as no e qui va le nt o f Sanc he z in M cG inn is. T he e m plo y er in Mc G inn is, that i s, w as not a lr ea dy on notice prior to Patterson that it would be futile to attem pt to argue before this court that § 198 1 did n ot extend to claim s of discrim inatory dem otion and discharge. T he pane l no ne the le ss arg ue s th at by not r ai sin g inthe ir

ini tia l a ppe llate br ie fs a“ Bl ak el y -ty

pe c la im ” – aphr as e that hard ly c ap tur es the r ad ic al ism

of Blakely ’ s hold ing – d efendants wa ive their right to inv oke Blakely . But the panel ne ve r cl ar if

ie s e xa ct ly

w ha t i t m eans b y

a“ Bl ak el y -ty

pe c la im . ” H ad

it don e so, the pane l w oul d have be enf or ce d to c onf

ro nt the pr ac tic al sig nif

ic an ce of our hold ing in Sanchez. Is a claim challenging th e application of the Federa lO n e mo n th a f te r L e v y w a s d e c id e d , th is c o urt h e ld in U n it e d St ate s v . Re e s e , 2 0 0 4 WL 4 1946076 (11 Cir., Sept. 2, 2004), that Blake ly does not apply

to the Fe dera l Guidelines. L evy th was thus dec ided at a time whe n the application of Blake ly in this circuit was not y et clea r. As the Sup re me Court , o n O c tob e r 4 , 2 00 4, ha s r e c e ntl y he ard argume nt o n th is q

ue sti on , w e wi ll soon know whethe r our r

uling in Ree se will hold up. The point here is that we ca nnot now fore close de fenda

nts from makinga B lakely argument on direc t appea l. Moreover , if we do not no w r e so lve the qu e sti on

of ho w t o a pp ly ne w c on sti tut ion a l r

uli ng s to pe nd ingdir e c t a pp e a ls, w e w i l l h av e t o f

a c e th i s i s s u e a g a i nw h e nth e S u p r e m e C o urtc l ar i f

i e s B l ak e l y. 61 Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s inli ght of Appr en di a

“ Bl ak el y -ty

pe c la im ”? I f so, c oul d the re be a ny

r ea son w hy

ade fe ndant, a ft er

S an ch ez , w oul d se e an y

r ea son to r ai se Appr en di f

or thi s purp ose be fo re the E le ve nthor a ny oth er Ci rc uit ? T his is the cl as sic c as e of

ac at ch -2 2: d ef

en dants c anonl y

r ai se Bl ak el y

if the y have a lr ea dy raised Apprendi, and y et this court (and every other circuit) said specific ally that the y c oul dn’ t have r ai se d Appr en di! If L ev y c oul d no t have r ai se d Appr en di i n hi s in iti al appe llate br ie f, in ac co rd an ce w ithour

c as e law , I do n ot s ee howw e can pr ev en t hi m f ro m r ai sin g Blakely in a post-init ial subm issio n. T o this con sideration, I w ouldadd that 4 virtua lly e ve ry c om m en ta tor in the land who h as a ddr es se d B lake ly , inc lud ing Jus tic es O ’ Co nnor

a nd B re y er

in the ir dis se nts , ha s e m

pha siz ed the dr am at ic noveltyof the decision and its potential to reshape the nation’ s crim inal law sy ste m . S ee Bl ak el y , 124 S . Ct . a t 25 48- 49, 256 2.

II I. T he P ro ce dur al Bar Ru le Cannot O ve rr ide G ri ff

ith T he pane l op ini on i gnor es both of the above poi nts in favor of r ec iti ng the62

various cases in which we have denied appellants th e ability to raise newissues not c ove re d inthe ir

ini tia l br ie fs on a

ppe al . A s no te d a

bove , the va st m aj or ity

of t h e s e c a s e s d i d

n o ti n v o l v e an e wr

u l e o f c r i mi n a l p r o c e du r e th a tth e S up r e me Court announ ced af

ter a defendant filed his init ial appellate brief. T he panel relies on Nealy , how ever, for the propositio n that sup plem ental briefs can be authorized

“ onl y w he n in te rv en ing de ci sio ns o r ne wde ve lop m en ts ari se a ft er the m ovi ng party ’ s br ie f ha s be enf

ile d and o nly

w he n th at

ne wauth or ity

r el at es to aniss ue or iss ue s a lr ea dy

pr ope rl y r ai se d inthe party ’ s in iti al br ie f. ” L ev y , 379 F . 3d at 12 43 (sum m arizing Ne aly , 232 F. 3d at 830 ) (e m phasis add ed). As the panel notes, N ealy wa s based on Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5), which requires an appellant’ s initial brief to contain “ a statem ent of the issues presented fo r re vie w . ” T he pane l arg ue s th at to al lowane wiss ue to be r ai se d inape tit ion fo r re he ar ing , sup ple m en ta l br ie f, or r ep ly br ie f w oul d “ ci rc um

ve nt” thi s r

ule . T he pr oc ed ur al bar ru le of

N ea ly , how ev er , doe s no t se rv e as it s own auth or ity , but de ri ve s it s le git im ac y

f ro m the e xte nt t o w hic h it

se rv es oth er

le ga l and ins tit uti ona l va lue s. A s su ch , the r ule is subj ec t t o c ount er

va ili ng l eg al a nd ins tit uti ona l no rm s. I n th e ci rc um stanc es of thi s c as e, the pane l’ s r ea din g of F ed . R. App. P . 28( a) (5 ) w oul d r ai se ase ri ous co nst itu tio na l pr obl em , sin ce it w oul d conflict with the absolute rule of retr oactivity that the Suprem e Court announcedAs no te d a bo ve , G ri ff

ithhe ld t hat “ fa ilure to a

pp ly a ne wl y de c lare d c on sti tut ion a l r

ule to 5 criminal ca ses pendingon direc t reviewviolates basic nor ms of constitutional adjudication.” Griff ith, 479 U.S. at 322. The Griff ith Court based this holding on, inter a lia, the “c ases” and “contr oversies” require ment of Article I I I , § 2. 63 in Grif fith. T o avoid a const itutio nal conflict with G riffith, Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5) should be read to exclude issues th at are raised by a newrule of cr im inal pr oc ed ur e an noun ce d a ft er

ade fe ndant h as f

ile d hi s in iti al appe llate br ie f. S uc h a re ad ing c om

ports w iththe r

ule of statut or y int er pr et at ionse t f

orth i n E dw ar d J. De Bartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & C onst. Tr ades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 ( 1988 ) (“ w he re a n othe rw ise a cc ep ta ble c onstru ct ionof

astatut e w oul d ra ise se ri ous co nst itu tio na l pr obl em s, the Co urt w ill c onstru e the statut e to avoi d suc h pr obl em s un le ss s uc h c onstru ct ionis pla inl y c ontrary to the int en t of Congress.”). T he Feder al Rules of Appellate Procedure are statutory lawsubject to the DeBartolo rule, and there can be no doubt that Gr iffith is a constitut ional hol din g. 5 T he pane l a lso not es that e ve n w he re a n a ppe llant, pur suant t o F ed . R. App. P. 28( j ), w ish es to fi le ar el ev an t su ppl em en ta l auth or ity

that “ co m e[ s] to lig ht after a party ’ s initial brief wa s filed,” Le vy , 379 F. 3d at 124 4, the supplem ental le tte r m ust r ef er e ith er to a pa ge of

the ini tia l br ie f or

to a poi nt arg ue d or al ly . T he sugg estion is that even supp lem ental authorities filed by letter are only

perm itted
w he re the y

r el at e to an is sue f

la gge d inthe ini tia l br ie f (o r in o ra l arg um en t) . F ed .64

R. App. 28(

j ) doe s in de ed

r equir e that su

ppl em en ta l auth or iti es r ef er to a pa ge of the ini tia l br ie f or

to a poi nt arg ue d or al ly , but it r ef er s ge ne ra lly

a nd l oose ly

to al l

“ pe rt ine nt and s ign if

ic an t auth or iti es [ that] c om e to a party ’ s a tte nti on a ft er

the party ’ s brief has been filed” (em phasis add ed) – not to iss ues affir m atively raised by ne wr ule s of c ri m ina l pr oc ed

ur e an noun ce d by

the S upr em e Co urt a ft er

the party ’ s initial brief has been filed. To suggest that Blakely is a case that has sim ply “ com e to [L evy ’ s] attention” since it was announced by the Suprem e Court i s s o me t h i n g o f

ae up h e mi s m. Mor eo ve r, e ve n onit s own te rm s, N ea ly doe s no t c le ar ly

e xte nd t o th e fa ct s of the ins tant c as e. N ea ly

inv olv ed ade fe ndant who arg ue d a t tri al that he c oul d not be se nte nc ed

pur suant t o af

ed er al statut e that di sti ngui she d se nte nc ing m axim um s based on drug quantityunless th e fa ct of drug quantitywa s subm itted to the j ur y . A ft er Appr en di w as hande d do w n, the de fe ndant s ough t t o arg ue f or the f ir st t im e that the ind ic tm en t m ust inc lud e the e le m en t of

dr ug quanti ty . N ea ly he ld tha t the de fe ndant c oul d no t thus ra ise the “ tot al ly ne w ” iss ue of

his in di ct m en t wh ere h is in it ia l b rie f ha d o nl y rai se d a qu es ti on as t o h is sen te nc e. N ea ly , 232 F . 3d at 83 0. I n th is c as e, L ev y ha s a lr ea dy

r ai se d th e va lid ity

of the tr ia l c ourt’ s vu lne ra

ble vic tim

e nhanc em en t duri ng s en te nc ing , a lbe it on the ba sis of te sti m ony

that L ev y

a rg ue s sh oul d no t have be ena dm itt ed . H e is n ot e xte ndi ngFor

the re asons expressed in our r espec tive dissents to the denial of re hear ing e n banc in that 6 case , both J udg e Tjoflat a nd Ibelieve that Ardley

was wr ong ly

decide d. I t is worth noting that our sister cir cuits have not a dopted ver sions of the Ardley and Ne aly

rule. 65 his le ga l c ha lle nge to ane nti re ly se parate a spe ct

of the c ri m ina l pr oc ee din gs leading to h is convictio n and sentence. R ather, he seeks to apply a new ly declare d co nst itu tio na l r

ule to ana spe ct

of tho se pr oc ee din gs h e ha s a lr ea dy c ha lle nge d: the application o f the Fe deral Se ntencing Guidelin es to his case. A lth oughc om

para ble iss ue s w er e de ba te d inU nit ed S ta te s v. A rd le y , 273 F. 3d 9 91 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) , that c as e is a lso ina ppl ic ab le . A rd le y

appl ie d th e 6 procedural bar r

ule to an Apprendi claim even afte r the Suprem e Court re m anded to us wit h i ns tru ct io ns to reco ns id er a p rio r pa ne l o pi ni on in li gh t o f App ren di . But the defendant in Ardley had available to him

at the tim e of his initial brief a

“ general ar gum ent” that wa s subs equently elevated into a new rule of cr im inal procedure by

the Suprem e Court. A s already noted, in this case Le vy

had no such

“ ge ne ra l arg um en t” a va ila ble to him

a t the ti m e of

his ini tia l br ie f be ca

use our de ci sio n inS an ch ez ha d take n aw ay his abil ity

to inv oke Appr en di t o c ha lle nge the appl ic at ionof

the F ed er al S en te nc ing G uid el ine s. T his e xc ep tio na l si tuatio n distin guish es the instant case from Ar dley , Mc Ginnis, N ealy , and ind eed every oth er c as e ci te d by

the L ev y pane l. IV . T he P ro ce dur al Bar Ru le F ru str at es E ff ic ie nc y Co nc er ns i n th is C ont ex t66

The panel dec ision has the unanticip ated consequence of frustrating rather than pr om oti ng the j udi ci ar y ’ s in te re st i n c onse rv ing it s sc ar ce r es our ce s. A s th e p a n e l d e c i s i o n n o t e s , th e p r o c e du r a l b a r r u l e “ s e rv e s v a l u ab l e p u r

p o s e s . ” Le v y, 379 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Pre snell v. Ke m p, 835 F.2d 1567, 1573 -74 (11 Cir. th 1988 )). O ne of these purposes is to “ conserve j udicial and paraj udicial resources.” Presnell, 835 F.2d at 1573. By requiring defendants to raise foreclosed issues over an d ov er a ga in, no m atte r howunam big uous ly thi s c ourt ha s a lr ea dy

de ci de d th ose iss ue s, L ev y

giv es c ri m ina l de fe ndants a n in ce nti ve to fl ood the f ed er al c ourts o f thi s c ir cu it w ithc ount le ss c la im s th at a re c le ar ly

f or ec los ed by c ur re nt p re ce de nt, j ust as Levy ’ s Apprendi claim wa s clearly

forec losed bySanchez. T he district courts (and this court) will then be forced to address those claim s over and over ag ai n. Th is is no t a v ery effe ct iv e way of c on se rv in g s carc e jud ic ia l re so ur ces . Mor eo ve r, the S upr em e Co urt ha s r ej ec te d – a lbe it in a dif fe re nt c ont ex t (tha t of pla in e rr or ) – th e pane l’ s vi ewthat de fe ndants sho uld be f or ce d to r ai se obj ec tio ns tha t are c le ar ly w ith out m er it in l igh t of

c ur re nt p re ce de nt, sim

ply in or de r to b e ab le to pr es er ve the ir c la im s onappe al . I n Jo hnso n, the de fe ndant ra ise d f or the f ir st t im e on a

ppe al a n in te rv en ing S upr em e Co urt auth or ity , U . S. v. G au din , 515 U . S. 506 ( 1995 ), that r equir es atr ia l c ourt t o su bm it the iss ue of m at er ia lity

in a pe rj ur

y pr ose cu tio n to the j ur

y . T he tr ia l c ourt ha d de ci de d th is67

issue itself, consistent with the state of the law at the tim e, and the defendant (as one w oul d e xpe ct ) fa ile d to obj ec t a t tri al . I n de ci din g w ha t i t w oul d take to establish “ plain” error in these circum stances, the Johnson Court observed as fo llo w s: T he G ove rn m en t c ont en ds tha t f or a n e rr or to be “pla in, ” it m

ust have be enso b otha t the ti m e of tr ia l and at the ti m e of

appe llate co nsi de ratio n. I n th is c as e, it say s, pe tit ion er

sho uld have obj ec te d to the [trial] court’ s deciding th e issue of m ateriality , e ven thou gh nearuni fo rm pr ec ed en ts b othf

ro m thi s C ourt and f

ro m the Co urts o f Appeals held that course proper. Petitioner, on the oth er hand, urges that su char

ule w oul d r es ult

in co unse l’ s in ev ita

bly m ak ing alon g and virtuallyuseless laund ry list of objections to ruling s that wer e pla inl y sup porte d by

e xis tin g pr ec ed en t. W e ag re e w ithpe tit ion er on th is po in t. . .
John son, 520 U.S . at 467-68 . Thus, it see m s that the Suprem e Court has rej ected the r ea soni ng tha t un de rl ie s th e pane l’ s po sit iona nd f ound that i t i s ne ith er

j ust nor effic ient to expect a defendant to raise obj ections even where “ near-uniform pr ec ed en t” of

the S upr em e Co urt and the Co urts o f Appe al s f or ec los es tho se68

obj ec tio ns. A s no te d e ar lie r, pr ior to Bl ak el y , thi s and e ve ry oth er c ir cu it co urt i n th e n at io n h adhe ldth atApp ren di do es no t ap pl y to th e Fed eral Gui de li ne s. Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , I dis se nt.