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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOE BALTAS

(SC 18633)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued September 18, 2013—officially released June 3, 2014
Pamela S. Nagy, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington,

state’s attorney, and Michael Pepper, senior assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The defendant, Joe Baltas, was convicted, after a trial by jury, of one count of murder in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a),1two counts

of assault in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1), one count of burglary in the

first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101

(a) (1), one count of burglary in the first degree in

violation of § 53a-101 (a) (2),2 and one count of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a). The defendant has appealed from his

conviction directly to this court,3 claiming that the trial

court improperly: (1) excluded evidence that the defendant claims was highly relevant to his defense, thus

violating the defendant’s constitutional right to present

a defense and also preventing the defendant from engaging in cross-examination regarding that evidence, thus

violating the defendant’s constitutionalright to confrontation; (2) failed to give a hybrid third party culpability

jury instruction or, in the alternative, failed to instruct

the jury on the defendant’s theory of his defense; (3)

refused to instruct the jury regarding the motive of one

of the complaining witnesses to testify falsely; and (4)

refused to reverse the defendant’s convictions, which

the defendant claims were tainted by improper comments made by the prosecutor in this matter. Because

we conclude that certain evidence relating to the potential impeachment of Misty Rock, a prosecution witness,

should have been admitted and that the state has not

proven that the failure to admit that evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to the defendant as it

relates to his conviction for the crimes of kidnapping

in the second degree and burglary in the first degree,

we reverse the judgment of the trial court as to those

counts only and order a new trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. The defendant was involved in a relationship with

Rock, one of the complaining witnesses in this case,

from December, 2005 until October, 2006. At some point

during the month of October, the two discussed leaving

Meriden, the town in which both of them lived, to start

a new life in South Carolina.

On October 25, 2006, Rock was living with her

brother, Christopher Laverty (Christopher), her mother,

Linda Laverty (Linda), and her stepfather, Michael

Laverty (Michael). At approximately 10 p.m., Linda and

Michael were sitting in the living room of their apartment watching a movie, while Christopher and Rock

were on the second floor of the home. Christopher

came downstairs and opened the door to the basement,

intending to check on the status of a load of laundry.

As he opened the basement door, he encountered a

masked person who was dressed all in black, wearing

a ski mask, and holding at least one knife. The masked
person stabbed Christopher in the stomach, and then

moved out of the basement and into the living room,

where he proceeded to fatally stab Michael.4 The

masked person then turned to Linda, stated ‘‘die, bitch,’’

and stabbed her in the neck. Linda later testified that

she recognized the masked person as the defendant

because of his eyes, the sound of his voice, and his

body mannerisms. The masked person walked to the

staircase leading to the upper floor of the home, and

while on the staircase, he ran into Rock, who had heard

the commotion from upstairs. In the collision, the

masked person’s knife went through Rock’s sweatshirt

and t-shirt and inflicted a scratch on her stomach. The

masked person then forced Rock in front of him,

grabbed her by the hair, and forced her out of the

apartment.5 While this was happening, Christopher

grabbed a knife from the kitchen and a telephone and

exited the home, running next door to ask a neighbor

to call the police. Rock and the masked person then

exited the apartment and were walking down the street,

away from the apartment. Christopher attempted to

stop them, and Rock told him to stop and not come

any closer. Christopher then sat down on a bench and

called the police himself, identifying the defendant as

the masked person who had just assaulted his family.

The defendant and Rock then walked to an abandoned car and sat in it. Rock testified that, at this point,

the defendant told her that he had killed Michael and

stabbed Linda and, although Rock could not remember

if the defendant was still wearing a mask, Rock recognized his voice. The defendant and Rock waited in the

car until Rock informed the defendant that she needed

to use the bathroom. The defendant led Rock to the

Pulaski School, at which point the defendant—who at

that time was not wearing a ski mask or a dark shirt—

and Rock were confronted by police officers. The police

observed the defendant holding a butter knife in his

hand and told him to drop it. When the defendant did

not comply with their command, the police tasered him

and he fell to the ground; as he did so, a folding knife

later found to be stained with Michael’s blood fell out

of the defendant’s pocket.

A K-9 officer was also dispatched as a result of Christopher’s 911 call, and the officer’s dog tracked the path

that the defendant and Rock took away from the apartment. The K-9 officer also had his dog perform an ‘‘article recovery . . . .’’ Between the K-9 officer’s search

and the actions of other police officers in the area, the

following items along the path taken by the defendant

and Rock were recovered that evening: (1) a ski mask,

the interior of which later tested positive for the defendant’s DNA, and the exterior of which tested positive

for Michael’s blood;(2) a dark, bloody shirt which tested

positive for the blood of Linda and Michael; (3) a latex

glove stained with the blood of Linda and also possibly

of Michael; and (4) a long knife stained with the blood
of Michael, which the state medical examiner later concluded was the weapon that caused his fatal wounds.

Tests also indicated that Michael and Linda were the

sources of various bloodstains found on the defendant’s

pants, sneaker, and arms when he was arrested. Finally,

the police matched a shoe print that was formed in

blood at the crime scene to the shoe of the defendant.

In addition to the crimes of which he was convicted,

the defendant was also charged with two counts of

attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a (a), one count of

assault in the second degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2), one count of kidnapping in

the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a92 (a) (2) (A), and one count of kidnapping in the first

degree in violation of § 53a-92 (a) (2) (C). The court

granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the second degree assault charge,

and the defendant was acquitted of both attempted

murder charges and both first degree kidnapping

charges. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE AND RIGHT

TO CONFRONTATION

The first issue raised by the defendant on appeal

involves evidence excluded by the trial court that, the

defendant claims, tended to show that Rock was a participant, not a victim, in the crimes committed by the

defendant. The defendant argues that by excluding this

evidence and preventing the defendant from crossexamining Rock about it, the trial court violated his

constitutional rights to present a defense and to confrontation. We agree. Further, we hold that the state

has failed to prove that the proffered impeachment

evidence of Rock, as it related to the kidnapping and

burglary charges, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment of conviction on the charges of kidnapping in the

second degree and burglary in the first degree and order

a new trial on those counts alone.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to this issue. In early October, 2006, Rock

and the defendant had discussed leaving Meriden for

South Carolina. At that time, Rock was a drug addict,

and the defendant wanted to help her and get away

from drugs. On October 6, 2006, the defendant and

Rock got into an argument that devolved into a physical

altercation, and after the defendant left to get some

cigarettes, Rock attempted to commit suicide by overdosing on prescription medication. Rock testified that

after the incident, she went back to the defendant’s

apartment to retrieve her personal effects and moved

out.
At trial, the defense sought to portray Rock not as a

victim, but as a participant in the crime. When police

encountered Rock and the defendant at the Pulaski

School, Rock told the officers that she had her father’s

blood on her hands. The defense also noted that, in her

original statement to police, Linda placed Rock in the

living room during the assault, and that the clothing

that Rock was wearing that evening was consistent with

the description that Linda gave of her attacker.6 The

defense also offered forensic evidence, showing that

Rock had bloodstained hands, that a ring that she wore

on her hand had Michael’s blood embedded in it, and

that she also had bloodstains on her clothing. Finally,

the defense provided the testimony of a neighbor who

did not think the defendant was using any force to get

Rock to accompany him away from the apartment and

also pointed to the description provided in the report

of a police officer who observed the defendant and

Rock walking ‘‘[h]olding hands.’’

The defense also sought to demonstrate that Rock

had a motive to participate in these crimes. During an

offer of proof outside the presence of the jury, Rock

testified that, in the past, she and her stepfather,

Michael, did not get along, but she maintained that

their relationship had improved in the weeks before his

murder. The defense claims that this testimony

impeached Rock on her claim that she had been kidnapped by the defendant, because it suggested that

Rock had a motive to participate in the attack and an

incentive to leave with the defendant. The trial court

excluded this evidence, finding that the prejudicial

impact of Rock’s testimony regarding her relationship

with Michael outweighed its limited probative value.

The court also found that, regarding the defendant’s

third party culpability argument, the evidence of Rock’s

poor relationship with Michael was insufficient to create a direct connection between Rock and the crimes

for which the defendant was being prosecuted.

The defense later attempted to introduce evidence

through the testimony of Sheila Pappas, a former friend

of Rock. Pappas testified that she and another friend

of Rock’s, Aleta Marerro, went to Midstate Hospital in

Meriden to visit Rock in the early morning hours of

October 26, 2006. Pappas testified that Rock’s hair, face,

neck, and arms were stained with dried blood. Out of

concern for Rock’s health, Pappas took Rock into a

hospital bathroom and used a washcloth to remove

the blood from Rock’s body. Pappas testified that she

observed a scratch on one of Rock’s hands, but could

not identify a wound that could account for the amount

of blood on Rock. Pappas testified that Rock was anxious to leave the hospital as soon as possible, and Rock,

Marerro, and Pappas departed from Midstate Hospital

at approximately 6 a.m. Later that day, Pappas accompanied Rock to the defendant’s home, where Rock
retrieved four bags of clothing from a truck that Pappas

believed was owned by the defendant. Pappas testified

that Rock, along with Marerro and another friend, Gail

Woodtke, then transported the clothing to Woodtke’s

home, where Marerro did some laundry.Rock showered

and put on makeup, and then Pappas, Marerro, and

Rock attempted to gain access to the Laverty home,

where they were turned away by a police officer

because the home was still an active crime scene. At

no point on October 26, 2006, could Pappas recall Rock

expressing concern for either Linda or Christopher.

Finally, outside the presence of the jury, Pappas testified in an offer of proof for the defense that she had

not spoken to Rock for approximately six months prior

to the night of October 25, but that she knew that Rock

and Michael had a terrible relationship, to the point

that Michael would sleep in his car to avoid Rock. Pappas also testified in the offer of proof that Rock had told

her that Michael had come into a sum of approximately

$35,000, and that Rock and Linda wanted to obtain

those funds. Pappas admitted that she had no firsthand

knowledge of the status of Rock and Michael’s relationship for the six months leading up to the murder, but

she did maintain that within that time period Rock had

expressed similar sentiments to another friend, Marrero, who then told Pappas. The trial court excluded

Pappas’ testimony on this subject, again concluding

that, because Pappas had no firsthand knowledge of

the status of Rock’s relationship with Michael for the

six months leading up to the murder, her testimony on

the relationship was neither relevant nor credible.

The defendant claims that the trial court should not

have prevented the defendant from cross-examining

Rock in front of the jury about her relationship with

Michael, and, further, the defendant claims that the

trial court should not have excluded Pappas’ testimony

regarding both the poor relationship Rock had with

Michael and Rock’s purported desire to acquire the

$35,000 that Michael had apparently recently obtained.

Specifically, the defendant claims that the exclusion of

this testimony violated his right to present a defense

because his theory of the case was that Rock participated in the crimes for which he was convicted. The

defendant also claims that the exclusion of Rock’s testimony about her poor relationship with Michael violated

his right to confrontation guaranteed by the sixth

amendment to the United States constitution because

her testimony impeached Rock’s claim that the defendant kidnapped her and also suggested that Rock had

an incentive to testify falsely in order to cover up her

own alleged involvement in the events of October 25,

2006. We review the underlying evidentiary rulings of

the trial court only for abuse of discretion; see, e.g.,

State v. Devalda, 306 Conn. 494, 516, 50 A.3d 882 (2012);

and ‘‘[i]f . . . we conclude that the trial court properly

excluded the proffered evidence, then the defendant’s
constitutional claims necessarily fail.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We address each of the defendant’s claimed constitutional violations in turn.

The defendant claims that the exclusion of the testimony from Rock and Pappas addressing Rock’s relationship with Michael and of Rock’s potential financial

motive to kill him violated the defendant’s constitutional rights to present a defense and to confrontation.7

Specifically, the defendant claims that these rights were

violated by the exclusion of Rock’s and Pappas’ testimony regarding the unhappy relationship betweenRock

and Michael, and also regarding Rock’s statement to

Pappas about Rock’s desire to obtain the $35,000 that

Michael had recently received.

‘‘It is well established that [t]he federal constitution

require[s] that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. . . .

The sixth amendment . . . [guarantees] the right to

offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their

attendance, if necessary, [and] is in plain terms the right

to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s

version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the

jury so that it may decide where the truth lies. . . .

When defense evidence is excluded, such exclusion

may give rise to a claim of denial of the right to present

a defense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621, 634, 1 A.3d 1051 (2010).

‘‘The sixth amendmentto the [United States] constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal

prosecution to confront the witnesses against him. . . .

The primary interest secured by confrontation is the

right to cross-examination . . . and an important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’

motivation in testifying. . . . Cross-examination to

elicit facts tending to show motive, interest, bias and

prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly

restricted. . . .

‘‘Impeachment of a witness for motive, bias and interest may also be accomplished by the introduction of

extrinsic evidence. . . . The same rule that applies to

the right to cross-examine applies with respect to

extrinsic evidence to show motive, bias and interest;

proof of the main facts is a matter ofright, but the extent

of the proof of details lies in the court’s discretion. . . .

The right of confrontation is preserved if defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from

which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility,

could appropriately draw inferences relating to the

reliability of the witness. . . .

‘‘Although it is within the trial court’s discretion to

determine the extent of cross-examination and the

admissibility of evidence, the preclusion of sufficient

inquiry into a particular matter tending to show motive,

bias and interest may resultin a violation ofthe constitu-
tional requirements [of the confrontation clause] of the

sixth amendment. . . . Further, the exclusion of

defense evidence may deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense. . . .

‘‘[T]he confrontation clause does not [however] suspend the rules of evidence to give the defendant the

right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination. . . .

Rather, [a] defendant is . . . bound by the rules of

evidence in presenting a defense. . . . Although exclusionary rules of evidence cannot be applied mechanistically to deprive a defendant of his rights, the [federal]

constitution does not require that a defendant be permitted to present every piece of evidence he wishes.

. . . To the contrary, [t]he [c]onfrontation [c]lause

guarantees only an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in

whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense

might wish. . . . Thus, [i]f the proffered evidence is

not relevant [or constitutes inadmissible hearsay], the

defendant’s right to confrontation is not affected, and

the evidence was properly excluded.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis,

298 Conn. 1, 8–10, 1 A.3d 76 (2010).

In analyzing the defendant’s claims, we first examine

the trial court’s challenged evidentiary rulings. The

defendant points to the exclusion of two pieces of testimony by two different witnesses regarding the same

subject matter, namely, a potential motive for Rock to

have participated in the violence against the rest of

her family. The first challenged ruling involved Rock’s

testimony regarding her relationship with Michael during voir dire outside the presence of the jury.8 The

defendant argued that this testimony was relevant

because it impeached Rock regarding her claim that the

defendant kidnapped her and also suggested a potential

motive for engaging in the crimes for which the defendant was charged. The court determined that this testimony was inadmissible, finding that the probative value

of this statement did not outweigh its prejudicial

impact. The trial court noted that ‘‘I am not saying

that you are not allowed to attempt in the future to

reintroduce that area, but . . . some of the things that

you claimed on third party require the testimony of

additional witnesses that I haven’t heard from yet.

You’ve represented what these things say, but they

haven’t been introduced in court. . . . I will permit you

at a later time, if you want to recall the witness to

discuss this, to do so . . . .’’ The other evidentiary ruling challenged by the defendant was the trial court’s

exclusion of that portion of Pappas’ testimony dealing

with Rock’s relationship with Michael and a potential

financial incentive for Rock to participate in the crimes

of which the defendant was convicted.9 The defendant

argued that Pappas’ testimony on this point was relevant to the defendant’s third party culpability defense,

as well as relevant to establishing that Rock had a
motive to harm Michael and suggesting that she was

biased against him. The trial court refused to admit this

testimony, stating that the defendant had not made a

sufficient showing of third party culpability, that the

probative value of Pappas’ statements was limited

because she admitted that she had not been friends

with Rock for the six months prior to October 26, 2006,

and that Pappas’ testimony about Rock’s potential

financial motive to kill Michael was too vague.

The defendant relies primarily on our decision in

State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 630 A.2d 577 (1993), in

support of his contention that it was reversible error

to deny the defendant the opportunity to impeach Rock

by attempting to show that Rock had a motive to murder

Michael. In Colton, this court reversed the defendant’s

conviction because the defendant was prevented from

cross-examining the only eyewitness or otherwise introducing evidence about (1) the eyewitness’ history of

drug use and prostitution, and (2) the fact that the

eyewitness was receiving ‘‘reward money’’ from the

state. Id., 249–52. Under the circumstances of that case,

the eyewitness’ credibility was extremely important.

Id., 250. In Colton, no physical evidence tied the defendant to the crime and, as the only claimed eyewitness

to the crime, this court determined that ‘‘[t]he motivation of [the eyewitness] in testifying was of paramount

importance.’’ Id. We concluded that ‘‘[i]n assessing [the

eyewitness’] credibility, the jury had to inquire into the

circumstances that led to her becoming a state’s witness, the reasons for her long delay before coming forward and, most importantly, what role, if any, the

reward money played in prompting her statements to

the police a short while after the reward had been

offered.’’ Id. We later examined the effect that some of

the excluded evidence might have had on the jury’s

evaluation of the eyewitness’ credibility: ‘‘Had this evidence [of the eyewitness’ continued drug abuse and

prostitution to support her drug habit] been admitted,

the jury might well have inferred that [the eyewitness’]

testimony was motivated by an expensive drug habit,

for which she prostituted herself to support, and that

the existence of the reward presented her with a means

of supporting that habit, thereby alleviating temporarily

the necessity to engage in prostitution. Without this

additional evidence, [the eyewitness’] insistent testimony that her old lifestyle had been left behind, after

what appeared to be an exhaustive cross-examination,

not only deprived the jury of exposure to facts from

which it could assess the motivation of the witness in

testifying, but also led to the appearance that defense

counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line

of attack on the motivation of an otherwise blameless

witness.’’ Id., 251.

In the present case, the defendant was given wide

latitude by the trial court to cross-examineRock. During

her cross-examination, Rock admitted that she had
been in love with the defendant, and that they had

spoken about leaving Meriden for South Carolina to get

a fresh start. Rock admitted that during the relevant

time period, she had been addicted to drugs and, as a

result, her memory of everything that happened in that

time period was unreliable. Rock also admitted that she

was a compulsive liar. Although Rock was a key state’s

witness forthe charges of kidnapping in the first degree,

the defendant was acquitted on both of those counts,

suggesting that the jury did not credit at least some of

Rock’s testimony.10 However, because the defendant

was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree, the

testimony of Rock was an important factor regarding

that charged offense. The fact that Rock had a stormy

relationship with Michael and may have had a financial

incentive to assist in the crimes should have been considered by the jury.11

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion

in excluding Rock’s description of her relationship with

Michael. Rock’s testimony—that her relationship with

Michael had been poor but was improving in the months

leading up to his death—should have been presented to

the jury because this testimony was relevant to establish

Rock’s potential motive for participating in these crimes

along with the defendant.

With regard to Pappas’ testimony, we conclude that

the trial court abused its discretion in excluding her

testimony regarding Rock’s relationship with Michael

and Rock’s purported financial incentive to murder

Michael. With regard to Pappas’ testimony about Rock’s

relationship with Michael, Pappas admitted that she

had not socialized with Rock in the six months leading

up to the night of Michael’s murder, and thus had no

personal knowledge of the state of the relationship

between Rock and Michael at the time the assault took

place. This time gap, however, went to the weightrather

than the admissibility of this impeachment evidence.

With regard to the claimed financial incentive, Pappas

could not provide a definitive amount that Rock

believed she would receive if Michael died, nor could

Pappas identify the source of the funds that Michael

apparently obtained. However, the fact that Rock had

discussed this potential financial incentive should have

been presented to the jury.

The motivation of Rock in testifying was of paramount importance regarding both the kidnapping and

burglary charges. In assessing her credibility, the jury

was entitled to know about her past relationship with

Michael and her potential financial incentive for planning his death. We have previously concluded that

inquiry into the possible financial stake of a witness in

the outcome of a case in which the witness is testifying

is a proper subject of impeachment. Id., 250. Had the

proffered testimony been admitted, the jury may have

concluded that Rock was a participant in the crimes
and, therefore, it would have been impossible, pursuant

to statute, for the defendant to have kidnapped her.

Further, if Rock provided the defendant access to the

Laverty’s home, the jury may not have convicted him

on the burglary charges.

We conclude, therefore, that the matters that the

defendant sought to prove through the evidence he

proffered at trial were clearly relevant to Rock’s bias,

interest and motive for testifying. The trial court’s rulings precluded the defendant from offering a constitutionally sufficient minimum of evidence to impeach

Rock’s testimony.

We next consider whether the trial court’s improper

exclusion of evidence pertaining to Rock requires a

new trial on the kidnapping and burglary charges.

Although the outright denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for motive, bias and interest

implicates the constitutional protection of the confrontation clause, such a denial is subject to harmless error

analysis. Id., 253. ‘‘A new trial is therefore required

only if the exclusion of the proffered evidence is not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ Id.

‘‘Whether such error is harmless in a particular case

depends upon a number of factors, such as the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s

case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points,

the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,

and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s

case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 254.

If Rock’s testimony had been impeached to the point

that the jury believed that she was a participant, the

kidnapping charge would have failed. Indeed, the jury

acquitted the defendant on first degree kidnapping.

Obviously, it did not entirely credit Rock’s testimony.

If the additional testimony had been admitted, the evidence may have had a tendency to influence the jury.

Rock was a key witness regarding the kidnapping

charge. The proffered testimony was not cumulative.

Without her testimony the state had a weak case on

the kidnapping charge. The exclusion of evidence bearing on the motivation of a chief witness is an important

factor in any analysis of harmless error, particularly in

the present case where no physical evidence corroborated the material aspects of Rock’s testimony. The

state has not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt

that the exclusion of the proffered testimony constituted harmless error. Therefore, we reverse the defendant’s conviction on the charge of kidnapping in the

second degree and remand the case for a new trial on

that count.

For a similar reason, we conclude that the inability

of the jury to consider evidence of Rock’s motive to
participate was harmful to the defendant’s defense to

the charges of burglary in the first degree. A person

commits the crime of burglary, as that crime is defined

pursuant to § 53a-101 (a) (2), when ‘‘such person enters

or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and, in the course of committing

the offense, intentionally, knowingly or recklessly

inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone

. . .’’ See also General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1) (indicating that person commits crime of burglary in first

degree when ‘‘such person enters orremains unlawfully

in a building with intent to commit a crime therein

and is armed with . . . a deadly weapon or dangerous

instrument’’). ‘‘A person ‘enters or remains unlawfully’

. . . when the premises, at the time of such entry or

remaining, are not open to the public and when the

actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so.’’

General Statutes § 53a-100 (b). Had the jury heard the

excluded portions of Rock’s and Pappas’ testimony

dealing with Rock’s poor relationship with Michael and

considered the rest of her described behavior that night

in light of that testimony, it might have inferred that

Rock had consented to the defendant’s entry into the

Laverty’s home.12 Consequently, we also reverse the

defendant’s convictions on the charges of burglary in

the first degree and remand the case for a new trial on

those counts.

With respect to the murder and assault charges,

assuming, arguendo, without deciding that the exclusion of the evidence rose to the level of a constitutional

violation, we conclude that the state has proven that

the exclusion of the proffered evidence was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.13 As set forth previously in

this opinion, Rock was not the key witness on the other

charges. Linda and Christopheridentified the defendant

as the person who killed Michael and assaulted their

family. One of the two knives that tested positive for

Michael’s blood fell out of the defendant’s pocket. The

other knife was dropped along the path that the defendant traveled after leaving the house. The defendant’s

DNA was discovered on the ski mask worn by the assailant. Further, the defendant conceded he was at the

home on the night in question. Rock’s testimony as

to these offenses was cumulative to that of the other

witnesses and there was also substantial corroborative

physical evidence. Thus, the state’s case was extremely

strong regarding the other counts. We conclude, therefore, that the state has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the denial of the proffered impeachment

evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as

it related to the murder and assault charges.

II

JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUES

We turn to the defendant’s claims related to the trial

court’s jury instructions, namely, that the trial court
should have: (1) instructed the jury on the defendant’s

defense of third party culpability; or (2) in the alternative, instructed the jury on the defendant’s theory of the

defense that Rock was at the very least a participant—if

not the sole participant—in the crimes of which the

defendant was convicted; and (3) instructed the jury

on Rock’s motive to testify falsely.

‘‘We begin with the well established standard of

review governing the defendant’s challenge[s] to the

trial court’s jury instruction. Our review of the defendant’s claim requires that we examine the [trial] court’s

entire charge to determine whether it is reasonably

possible that the jury could have been misled by the

omission of the requested instruction. . . . While a

request to charge that is relevant to the issues in a case

and that accurately states the applicable law must be

honored, a [trial] court need not tailor its charge to the

precise letter of such a request. . . . If a requested

charge is in substance given, the [trial] court’s failure

to give a charge in exact conformance with the words

of the request will not constitute a ground for reversal.

. . . As long as [the instructions] are correct in law,

adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance

of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as

improper. . . . Additionally, we have noted that [a]n

[impropriety] in instructions in a criminal case is reversible . . . when it is shown that it is reasonably possible

for [improprieties] of constitutional dimension or reasonably probable for nonconstitutional [improprieties]

that the jury [was] misled.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 454–55, 10

A.3d 942 (2011).

A

Third Party Culpability Charge

The defendant claimed that he was entitled to a third

party culpability instruction in light of (1) the forensic

evidence, which demonstrated that Rock was present

at the scene, and (2) the excluded testimony of Rock

and Pappas. The defendant claims that a direct connection between Rock and the commission of the crimes

of which he was convicted was established on the basis

of this evidence.14

‘‘In determining whether the trial court improperly

refused a request to charge, [w]e . . . review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to

supporting the . . . proposed charge. . . . A request

to charge which is relevant to the issues of [a] case and

which is an accurate statement of the law must be given.

. . . If, however, the evidence would not reasonably

support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court

has a duty not to submit it to the jury. . . . Thus, a

trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with

a party’s requestto charge [only]ifthe proposed instructions are reasonably supported by the evidence.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v.Arroyo, 284Conn.

597, 607–608, 935 A.2d 975 (2007). ‘‘[T]he very standards

governing the admissibility of third party culpability

evidence also should serve as the standards governing

a trial court’s decision of whether to submit a requested

third party culpability charge to the jury.’’ Id., 608–609.

‘‘The admissibility of evidence of third party culpability is governed by the rules relating to relevancy. . . .

Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is material to the

determination of the proceeding more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence. . . .

Accordingly, in explaining the requirement that the

proffered evidence establish a direct connection to a

third party, rather than raise merely a bare suspicion

regarding a third party, we have stated [that] [s]uch

evidence is relevant, exculpatory evidence, rather than

merely tenuous evidence of third party culpability

[introduced by a defendant] in an attempt to divert

from himself the evidence of guilt. . . . In other words,

evidence that establishes a direct connection between

a third party and the charged offense is relevant to the

central question before the jury, namely, whether a

reasonable doubt exists as to whether the defendant

committed the offense. Evidence that would raise only

a bare suspicion that a third party,ratherthan the defendant, committed the charged offense would not be relevant to the jury’s determination. A trial court’s decision,

therefore, that third party culpability evidence proffered by the defendant is admissible, necessarily entails

a determination that the proffered evidence is relevant

to the jury’s determination of whether a reasonable

doubt exists as to the defendant’s guilt. . . . Finally,

[t]he trial court’s ruling on the relevancy of third party

inculpatory evidence will be reversed on appeal only

if the court has abused its discretion or an injustice

appears to have been done.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hedge, supra, 297

Conn. 635–36.

Whether a defendant has sufficiently established a

direct connection between a third party and the crime

with which the defendant has been charged is necessarily a fact intensive inquiry. In other cases, this court

has found that proof of a third party’s physical presence

at a crime scene, combined with evidence indicating

that the third party would have had the opportunity to

commit the crime with which the defendant has been

charged, can be a sufficiently direct connection for purposes of third party culpability. See, e.g., Id, 636–37.

Similarly, this court has found the direct connection

threshold satisfied for purposes of third party culpability when physical evidence links a third party to a crime

scene and there is a lack of similar physical evidence

linking the charged defendant to the scene. See, e.g.,

State v. Cerreta, 260 Conn. 251, 262–66, 796 A.2d 1176

(2002). Finally, this court has found that statements
by a victim that implicate the purported third party,

combined with a lack of physical evidence linking the

defendant to the crime with which he or she has been

charged, can sufficiently establish a direct connection

for third party culpability purposes. See, e.g., State v.

Arroyo, supra, 284 Conn. 607–15.

In the present case, it is undisputed that Rock was

physically present at the Laverty’s home on the night

that Michael was murdered and Christopher and Linda

were assaulted, and it is also undisputed that Rock’s

clothing and one of her rings were stained with the

blood of some of the other victims. There exists, however, a fatal flaw in the defendant’s attempt to successfully raise the defense of third party culpability: the

lack of a showing of sufficient evidence to provide

a credible, alternative explanation for the substantial

forensic evidence arrayed against the defendant.

Although itremains true that, to be relevant to a defense

of third party culpability, evidence need not exonerate

the defendant, we have previously held that, in order

for such evidence to be submitted to the jury for consideration, it must ‘‘provid[e] a credible, alternative theory

as to who committed the crime . . . .’’ State v. Hedge,

supra, 297 Conn. 647. The problem with the defendant’s

theory of his third party culpability defense—specifically, that Rock may not have been a victim, but a

willing participant in the crimes—is that it does nothing

to refute the defendant’s own involvement.

The following facts reveal the defendant’s involvement in the events of the night of October 25, 2006: (1)

one of the two knives that tested positive for Michael’s

blood fell out of the defendant’s pocket when he was

subdued by police officers outside the Pulaski School;

(2) the interior of the ski mask worn by the assailant

tested positive for the defendant’s DNA; (3) a shoe print

in Michael’s blood at the crime scene matched the shoe

worn by the defendant; (4) two of the victims, Linda

and Christopher, identified the defendant as their assailant and testified that they saw the defendant grasp Rock

by her hair and force her out of the apartment; (5)

various articles of clothing worn by the defendant,

including his pants, shoes, and outer shirt, were stained

with the blood of Michael, Linda, and Christopher; and

(6) the defendant conceded that he was present at the

Laverty’s home during these events.

The evidence presented by both parties established

that Rock was also in the home and that, at some point,

she traveled through the living room and hallway where

the assaults took place. Rock’s hands were covered in

blood, and a ring worn on one of her hands tested

positive for Michael’s blood. There was a slit in Rock’s

sweatshirt and tank top, and a small scratch on her

stomach that had not existed prior to the night in question. Rock also stated that she was wearing sunglasses

on top of her head during the assault. Once outside the
home, witnesses reported that the defendant did not

appear to force Rock to accompany him, Rock told

Christopher not to follow her, and Rock appeared fearful at the time the defendant was arrested. Rock also

had bags of clothes stored in a truck at the defendant’s house.

At trial, the defendant pointed to the bloodstains on

Rock’s hands and tried to suggest that Rock, and not

the defendant, stabbed Michael, Linda, and Christopher.

The defendant also points to the fact that Linda’s original description of the attacker was consistent with the

clothing worn by Rock on the night in question. Neither

side presented any evidence, however, explaining how

Rock’s hands came to be bloody, and neither side presented any evidence indicating that Rock had access to

the murder weapon that was discarded along the route.

Taking into consideration the excluded evidence of

Rock’s poor relationship with Michael and potential

financial motive in having him killed, we must conclude

that the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence

to provide a credible, alternative explanation for the

substantial forensic evidence arrayed against him. In

addition, the defendant failed to establish a nexus

between Rock and the weapons used to murder Michael

and assault Christopher and Linda. For example, the

defendant did not offer any evidence suggesting that

Rock had access to or possession of the weapons used

in this case, nor did he offer an explanation for the

presence of his DNA on the inside of the ski mask

or the presence of the blood of Michael, Linda, and

Christopher on his various articles of clothing. As a

result, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a jury

instruction on third party culpability in the present case.

B

Theory of Defense Charge

The defendant claims, in the alternative, that this

court should exercise its supervisory authority to create

a rule requiring trial courts in Connecticut to give a

‘‘theory of defense’’ instruction to juries for any theory

of defense with a foundation in the evidence presented

at trial. A theory of defense instruction consists of an

explanation of the defendant’s theory of defense, and

other courts have found that a defendant is entitled to

such an instruction in a given case so long as ‘‘there is

a foundation in the evidence . . . even if the trial court

determines that the evidentiary foundation of the

defense theory is only tenuous . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) United States v. Paul, 110 F.3d 869, 871 (2d Cir.

1997). The defendant claims that, because his requested

charge was not given as a theory of defense instruction,

his defense was rendered meaningless as jurors were

unable to consider the effect of Rock’s possible participation on the charges against the defendant.
Courts in Connecticut generally do not provide a

theory of defense instruction at the defendant’s request,

nor is there any requirement that such an instruction

be provided. Instead, pursuant to State v. Rosado, 178

Conn. 704, 707, 425A.2d 108 (1979), ‘‘[w]hen a defendant

admits the commission of the crime charged but seeks

to excuse or justify its commission so that legal responsibility for the act is avoided, a theory of defense charge

is appropriate. A defendant must, however, assert a

recognized legal defense before such a charge will

become obligatory. A claim of innocence or a denial

of participation in the crime charged is not a legally

recognized defense and does not entitle a defendant to

a theory of defense charge.’’ In Rosado, this court was

presented with the issue of whether it was improper

for a trial court to refuse to instruct the jury ‘‘on any

theory of defense for which there is any foundation in

the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible . . . .’’

Id. We concluded that it was not, noting that such a

conclusion was appropriate in Connecticut due to the

fact that ‘‘[o]ur statutes expressly set out a number of

affirmative defenses available to a criminal defendant

. . . only when evidence indicating the availability of

. . . [a] legally recognized [defense] is placed before a

jury is a defendant entitled as a matter of law to a theory

of defense instruction.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis

omitted.)Id., 708. We have faithfully continued to follow

Rosado even as other jurisdictions have adopted the

broader approach suggested by the defendant—that the

defendant be entitled to an instruction on his or her

theory of defense, whatever it might be, so long as it

has a foundation in the evidence. See, e.g., State v.

Golodner, 305 Conn. 330, 352, 46 A.3d 71 (2012) (‘‘When

a defendant admits the commission of the crime

charged but seeks to excuse or justify its commission

so that legal responsibility for the act is avoided, a

theory of defense charge is appropriate. . . . A claim

of innocence or a denial of participation in the crime

charged is not a legally recognized defense and does

not entitle a defendant to a theory of defense charge.’’

[Internal quotation marks omitted.]), quoting State v.

Rosado, supra, 707; State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55,

88–89, 621 A.2d 728 (1993) (‘‘When a defendant admits

the commission of the crime charged but seeks to

excuse or justify its commission so that legal responsibility for the act is avoided, a theory of defense charge

is appropriate. A defendant must, however, assert a

recognized legal defense before such a charge will

become obligatory. A claim of innocence or a denial

of participation in the crime charged is not a legally

recognized defense and does not entitle a defendant to

a theory of defense charge.’’ [Internal quotation marks

omitted.]), quoting State v. Rosado, supra, 707.

The defendant in this case acknowledges that, under

our law developed pursuant to Rosado, his claimed

theory of defense is not a ‘‘legally recognized’’ defense
on which a court would be required to instruct a jury.

Instead, he invites us to overrule or modify Rosado in

order to adopt the approach, taken by other jurisdictions, which would entitle a defendant to an instruction

on his or her theory of defense regardless of whether

it is legally recognized. To do otherwise, the defendant

claims, would be to deprive the defendant of the opportunity to present a defense.

In the present case, the defendant’s chosen theory

of defense was that, although he conceded he was present at the scene of the crime, and although the physical

evidence collected by law enforcement officials tied

him to the stabbings of each of the victims, Rock may

also have been a participant in these crimes and, thus,

might have been responsible for all or some of the

crimes for which the defendant was convicted. The trial

court in this case included in its jury instructions a

lucid and clear charge on the issue of identity: ‘‘The

issue of identity is an issue in every criminal case. The

state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt as to any

charge that this defendant was the individual who committed each of the crimes that the jury considers. You

must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the

accuracy of the identification of the defendant before

you convict him. It is your duty to recall, and weigh,

and consider all of the evidence relating to the identification of the defendant. You should consider the opportunity the witnesses had to observe the defendant, the

degree of certainty of the identifications made by the

witnesses, whether the witnesses knew the defendant

before the identification, and any other circumstances

that you think are relevant to the issue ofidentification.’’

Later on, in describing the elements of each of the

violent crimes for which the defendant was prosecuted,

the court explained that, to find him guilty, the jury

must have found that the defendant was the person

who engaged in the behavior causing harm to each of

the victims. For example, in explaining the elements of

murder, the trial court explained that ‘‘[t]he second

element the state must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt in murder is, acting with [the intent to cause the

death of Michael], [the defendant] did, in fact, cause

the death of Michael . . . .’’ Thus, although the defendant did not succeed in having his proposed jury charge

on his theory of defense included into the jury instructions,15 the jury was instructed on the relevant legal

concepts that the defendant sought to have included

in the charge.

Courts in this state are already obligated to adequately instruct the jury on each essential element in

a criminal offense. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 212

Conn. 31, 37, 561 A.2d 897 (1989)(‘‘the failure to instruct

a jury on an essential element of a crime charged is

error because it deprives the defendant of the right to

have the jury told what crimes he is actually being tried

for and what the essential elements of those crimes
are’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). We are satisfied that our law under Rosado, when combined with

the requirement that trial courts must adequately

instruct juries on each essential element of each crime

for which the defendant is being prosecuted, adequately

protects the defendant’s right to present a defense. We

therefore decline the defendant’s invitation to use our

supervisory powers to modify or overrule our holding

in Rosado.

C

Motive to Testify Falsely

The defendant next claims that the trial court should

have instructed the jury specifically regarding Rock’s

motive to testify falsely.16 The defendant claims that the

jury could inferfrom the evidence presented that Rock’s

potential participation in the crimes charged gave rise

to a motive to testify in a way that would not expose

her to criminal prosecution. The state argues that,

because the trial court properly refused to give a third

party culpability charge, a charge on Rock’s motive

to testify truthfully was inappropriate. The state also

claims that the trial court’s general charge on the credibility of witnesses sufficiently apprised the jury of the

various factors it was to consider when evaluating

Rock’s testimony, particularly when combined with the

defendant’s extensive cross-examination of Rock. Relying primarily on State v. Cooper, 182 Conn. 207, 438

A.2d 418 (1980), and State v. Ferrara, 176 Conn. 508,

408 A.2d 265 (1979), the defendant argues that a specific

instruction on Rock’s motive to testify falsely should

have been given to the jury because Rock was a complaining witness who could have been subjected to

criminal prosecution based on evidence presented at

trial if her claimed status as a victim of these crimes

was disbelieved by law enforcement officials. We agree,

and find this error harmful as to the defendant’s convictions for burglary and kidnapping.

The trial court denied the defendant’s request to give

a specific instruction on Rock’s credibility, but did provide a general instruction to the jury on the credibility

of witnesses.17

‘‘Generally, a [criminal] defendant is not entitled to

an instruction singling out any of the state’s witnesses

and highlighting his or her possible motive for testifying

falsely.’’ State v. Ortiz, 252 Conn. 533, 561, 747 A.2d

487 (2000); accord State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 227,

864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S.

Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005). We have recognized

two exceptions to this general rule, however: the complaining witness exception; and the accomplice exception. See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, supra, 561. Under the

complaining witness exception, when ‘‘the complaining

witness [himself] could . . . have been subject to prosecution depending only upon the veracity of his account
of [the] particular criminal transaction, the court should

. . . [instruct] the jury in substantial compliance with

the defendant’s request to charge to determine the credibility of that witness in the light of any motive for

testifying falsely and inculpating the accused.’’ State v.

Cooper, supra, 182 Conn. 211–12. ‘‘In order for [such

a] request to be applicable to the issues in the case,

there must be evidence . . . to support the defendant’s

assertion that the complaining witness was the culpable

party. Id., 212.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452, 467–68, 886 A.2d

777 (2005).

The defendant relies primarily on our decision in

Cooper, a case in which this court held that the trial

court committed harmless error when it refused to

instruct the jury on the motive of the complaining witness in that case to testify falsely. State v. Cooper, supra,

182 Conn. 212–13. In Cooper, the defendant claimed

that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury

that the complaining witness had a motive to testify

falsely because, depending on whether his testimony

was truthful or not, the complaining witness could have

been subject to criminal prosecution himself. Id., 211–

12. In that case, the defendant and two other men

attempted to rob the complaining witness while he was

sitting in his bedroom. Id., 208. In response, the complaining witness grabbed a shotgun that was within

reach and wounded one of the other robbers. Id. In

addition, years earlier, the complaining witness had

been convicted of aggravated assault for shooting a

man, which the complaining witness claimed had been

out of self-defense. Id., 209. This court determined that

the trial court erred in failing to give the requested

instruction, because the complaining witness could

have been subjected to criminal prosecution

‘‘depending only upon the veracity of his account of

this particular criminal transaction.’’ Id., 211–12. This

court ultimately concluded, however, that the failure

of the trial court to give the instruction was harmless

because: (1) the trial court gave a general witness credibility instruction; id., 213–14; (2) the defendant was

permitted wide latitude to cross-examine the complaining witness, and was permitted to ‘‘repeatedly [make

the jury] aware of [the complaining witness’] motive for

fabricating his account of the events at his apartment,’’

including during closing argument; id.; and (3) the

defendant’s chosen defense was that of an alibi: he did

not claim that he was present, ‘‘but that the complaining

witness . . . was the person responsible for the altercation by his assault of the intruders.’’ Id., 214–15.

In the present case, Rock’s behavior could potentially

have constituted a crime if her testimony were not

believed. If the jury concluded that, contrary to her

testimony, Rock assisted the defendant or otherwise

participated in the events on the night in question, she

could be subject to criminal prosecution. Importantly,
although the testimony of Christopher and Linda corroborated some of Rock’s testimony, much of what the

jury heard from Rock regarding her specific interactions

with the defendant, both before the night of October

25, 2006, and after Rock and the defendant left the

house, was not confirmed by any other testimony. If

Rock’s testimony were disbelieved, a reasonable inference might be drawn that she had been privy to the

defendant’s plan or assisted in its execution. For example, the defendant argued that there had been no unlawful entry into the Laverty’s home, which would have

negated one of the essential elements of the crime of

burglary in the first degree and would also suggest that

Rock was a participant in the crimes committed on the

night of October 25, 2006.18 As a result, we conclude

that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the

jury on Rock’s motive to testify falsely.

We next examine whether this error was harmful.

This requires us to determine ‘‘whether it is likely that

the error involved affected the result and, as a consequence, rose to the level of depriving the defendant of

a fair trial.’’ Id., 212. As in Cooper, the defendant in the

present case has not claimed that the trial court’s failure

to instruct the jury on Rock’s motive to testify falsely

violated any of his constitutional rights, so the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the court’s

error was harmful. See id. As we have previously

explained in part I of this opinion, Rock’s testimony

and her credibility were critical to the defendant’s convictions of kidnapping in the second degree and burglary in the first degree. We, conclude, therefore, that

the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to Rock’s

motive to testify falsely was harmful as to those specific counts.

The state argues that the trial court’s general charge

on the credibility of witnesses negated any errorthat the

trial court may have committed in failing to specifically

instruct the jury on Rock’s motive to testify falsely and

also claims that, to the extent that any error occurred,

the error was harmless due to the defendant’s extensive

cross-examination of Rock. As we have already noted

in part I of this opinion, although the court generally

gave the defendant wide latitude to cross-examine

Rock, it improperly failed to allow the defendant to

impeach Rock with evidence suggesting motive or bias

on the part of Rock against Michael. This error also

distinguishes the present case from Cooper because, in

the present case, the defendant was precluded from

making the jury aware of Rock’s potential motive to

participate in or otherwise assist the defendant with

the commission of these crimes, either through the presentation of evidence or during his closing argument.

Regarding the remaining offenses of which the defendant was convicted, we conclude, for the same reasons

described previously in part I of this opinion, that, with
respect to these offenses, any error that may have

occurred was harmless.

III

PROSECUTORIAL IMPROPRIETY

The defendant next argues that this court should

use its supervisory powers to overturn the defendant’s

conviction because of the actions of one of the prosecutors throughout the trial, which the defendant characterizes as deliberate misuse of uncharged misconduct

evidence, the purposeful misrepresentation by the prosecutor of facts not in evidence, and improper vouching

by the prosecutor for Rock’s credibility during his closing argument. The state argues that none of the prosecutor’s actions was improper and, in the alternative, that

none of the claimed improprieties denied the defendant

his right to a fair trial. We conclude that a reversal of the

defendant’s conviction is not the appropriate remedy in

the present case.

‘‘Although prosecutorial [impropriety] is often examined under the rubric of a defendant’s due process protections . . . our review in the present case is limited

to whether reversal is required under our supervisory

authority. As an appellate court, we possess an inherent

supervisory authority overthe administration of justice.

. . . The standards that we set under this supervisory

authority are not satisfied [merely] by observance of

those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by

reason which are summarized as due process of law

. . . . Rather, the standards are flexible and are to be

determined in the interests of justice. . . . Of course,

our supervisory authority is not a form of free-floating

justice, untethered to legal principle. . . . Thus, [e]ven

a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power

. . . is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions. . . .

‘‘[W]hen prosecutorial [impropriety] is not so egregious as to implicate the defendant’s right to a fair trial,

an appellate court may invoke its supervisory authority

to reverse a criminal conviction when the prosecutor

deliberately engages in conduct that he or she knows,

or ought to know, is improper.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Payne, 260

Conn. 446, 450–51, 797 A.2d 1088 (2002).

The defendant claims that the following actions by

the prosecutor during the trial qualify as deliberate misconduct that warrants the use of our supervisory powers to reverse the defendant’s conviction and order a

new trial. The trial court permitted the state to introduce evidence of an episode of domestic violence

between the defendant and Rock, but only for the limited purpose of proving the defendant’s motive or intent

to commit the crimes with which he was charged. On

cross-examination, Rock was asked by defense counsel

if ‘‘back-and-forth’’ physical altercations occurred fre-
quently between the defendant and Rock, and Rock

answered affirmatively. On redirect, the prosecutor

asked Rock if the defendant hit her frequently, whether

she hit him frequently, and whether her physical violence against him would ‘‘have the same effect on him

as it would you physically?’’ The prosecutor also asked

Rock if the defendant had a temper, and whether she

saw evidence of it. In addition, the prosecutor asked

whether Rock varied her Oxycodone use depending on

how bad her bruises were, and Rock answered in the

affirmative, as she had on cross-examination. The prosecutor then pressed further, asking, ‘‘[w]hat did you

mean by how bad the bruises were?’’ Defense counsel

objected, noting that ‘‘[i]t’s the same conversation we

had at sidebar.’’ The trial court sustained the objection.

On recross, Rock answered affirmatively when defense

counsel asked whether the defendant would obtain

Rock’s prescription medication for her and make sure

that Rock took it, and generally that the defendant had

been trying to help Rock. On further redirect, over

defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor displayed

to the jury a photograph of Rock following the domestic

incident with the defendant that depicted her with a

black eye and asked Rock: ‘‘Was he taking care of you

when he did this to you . . . ?’’ During his closing argument, the prosecutor again referenced the defendant’s

domestic violence against Rock in discussing her credibility and whether she was kidnapped by the defendant,

even though at least one witness testified that she

resisted leaving the apartment with him: ‘‘Didn’t she do

the smart thing? She knew what he was capable of

doing. You know what he was capable of doing, you

have seen the pictures from the prior occasion.’’ The

defendant claims that the prosecutor also vouched for

Rock’s credibility during his closing argument by making the following statement: ‘‘You may not approve of

[Rock’s] lifestyle, the decisions she has made, her

admissions of drug use in the past. And I submit that

makes her an easy target. It doesn’t mean that she is

not telling the truth here two weeks ago.’’

Finally, the prosecutor told the jury that Linda had

made two mistakes in her initial statement to police

when, in fact, she had made a substantial number of

changes to her statement and the prosecutor was aware

of this.19 Specifically, during closing, the prosecutor

stated: ‘‘[T]he defense came up with and introduced

two portions of [Linda’s] statement that were inconsistent with what she had said at the time. . . . She admitted she made these mistakes, she corrected it. And

given the fact that . . . she had just been released from

the hospital, she was concerned about burying her husband, considering what she had gone through, she made

two mistakes, which, actually, when you sit down and

think about it, separate yourself for a minute, take those

two mistakes and look at them, and say, did they really

amount to a hill of beans? Did they change the facts
here? Does it [now make Rock] the stabber? I don’t see

it. I don’t get it. Two mistakes out of that [twentyfive] page statement.’’ Defense counsel then objected,

claiming that the prosecutor had mischaracterized the

evidence. The court instructed the jury that its recollection of the facts was to control, and the prosecutor

again repeated: ‘‘Two mistakes out of that [twenty-five]

page statement, is that a bad track record? Does that

mean that there is reasonable doubt here?’’

We disagree with the defendant’s assertion that the

prosecutor impermissibly vouched for Rock’s credibility during closing argument. A prosecutor may not

impermissibly vouch for a witness’ credibility by

expressing his or her own personal opinion as to the

credibility of a particular witness. See, e.g., State v.

Payne, supra, 260 Conn. 454. In the present case, however, the prosecutor merely urged the jury not to disbelieve Rock’s testimony solely because of her lifestyle.

Such a comment did not suggest that the prosecutor

‘‘may have access to matters not in evidence . . .

which the jury may infer to have precipitated the personal opinions’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) id.;

which is the evil this rule is designed at preventing. A

prosecutor is always free ‘‘to comment upon the evidence presented at trial and to argue the inferences that

the jurors might draw therefrom’’; (internal quotation

marks omitted) id.; which is what the prosecutor did

here. Rock’s lifestyle had been explored in great detail

during both the state’s direct and the defendant’s crossexamination, and the prosecutor’s statement merely

suggested to the jury that her lifestyle choices did not

necessitate an inference that she was not telling the

truth about the events of the night of October 25, 2006.

Such an argument, stemming from the evidence presented at trial, was not improper.

Finally, if we were to assume, arguendo, without

deciding, that the prosecutor’s remaining challanged

statements constituted improprieties, however, we

would need to consider additional factors in determining whether reversal of the defendant’s conviction is

an appropriate remedy, including the degree of prejudice to the defendant, the potential emotional trauma

to the victims, and the availability of other sanctions

for such misconduct. See Id., 463–65.

Weighing these factors, we conclude that even if we

were to assume that the prosecutor engaged in impropriety in this case, such impropriety would not have

significantly prejudiced the defendant. The state’s case

against the defendant was overwhelming. The defendant’s clothing was covered in Michael and Linda’s

blood, the defendant was found carrying a knife stained

with Michael’s blood, the defendant’s DNA was found

on the interior of a ski mask, the exterior of which was

stained with Michael’s blood, and the statements and

testimony of Christopher and Linda also linked the
defendant to each of the crimes of which he was convicted. Moreover, regarding the use of the evidence of

domestic violence between the defendant and Rock, it

is clear from the jury’s verdict that it did not entirely

believe Rock’s testimony, as the defendant was acquitted of both counts of kidnapping in the first degree,

and a guilty verdict for either of those counts would

have required the jury to credit Rock’s version of events.

The circumstances in the present case thus differ

greatly from the facts of Payne, in which we concluded

that prosecutorial impropriety greatly prejudiced the

defendant. See State v. Payne, supra, 260 Conn. 464

(‘‘[T]he misconduct in the present case significantly

prejudiced the defendant. Because of a lack of physical

evidence, the state and the defense both depended heavily on eyewitness testimony, necessarily making the

credibility of witnesses the crux of the jury’s analysis.’’).

Therefore, we cannot conclude that the alleged improprieties resulted in significant prejudice to the defendant. This consideration weighs against reversing the

defendant’s conviction. We need not consider the additional factors under Payne since they tend to weigh in

favor of the state.

We conclude that the prosecutor’s comments, even

if we were to find them improper, which we do not,

failed to result in significant prejudice to the defendant.

Therefore, we affirm the defendant’s convictions on the

charges of murder and assault in the first degree.

The judgment is reversed only with respect to the

charges of kidnapping in the second degree and burglary in the first degree, and the case is remanded for

a new trial on those counts; the judgment is affirmed

in all other respects.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 We note that although § 53a-54a was amended in 2012; see Public Acts

2012, No. 12-5, § 7; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this

appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of

the statute.

2 We note that the two counts of burglary in the first degree were merged

into a single count at sentencing. We also note that § 53a-101 (a) was

amended during a special session in January, 2008. See Public Acts, Spec.

Sess., January, 2008, No. 08-1, § 2. That amendment, however, is not relevant

to the present appeal. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the current

revision of the statute.

3 The defendant brought his appeal to this court pursuant to General

Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).

4

In her statement to police, Linda stated that the assailant wore a black,

hooded sweatshirt with a face mask.

5 At some point, either before the masked person walked up the stairs or

as Rock and the masked person exited the apartment, Linda was also stabbed

in the leg.

6 Specifically, Linda testified that Rock was wearing a black, hooded

sweatshirt, and Rock testified that during the evening she had been wearing

sunglasses on top of her head to keep her hair off of her face.

7 We note that the state claims that the statements of Rock and Pappas

are relevant only to the defendant’s claimed third party culpability defense.

To the extent that the defendant sought to use this evidence to suggest that

Rock, and not the defendant, was responsible for the crimes committed on

the night in question, we agree with the state that such a use is properly

evaluated pursuant to a framework of a defense of third party culpability.

We address this issue in part II A of this opinion. We also note, however,
that the defendant’s claimed relevance of this evidence for his defense was

that ‘‘[h]ad the jurors learned about the evidence pertaining to [Rock’s]

motive, they could have determined that she was not a victim but rather

someone who participated with [the] defendant and who planned to leave

the state with him after the stabbing as she had testified about at trial.’’

The defendant claims, and we agree, that he also sought to use this evidence

to impeach Rock, an issue we explore in this part of the opinion. To fully

address the arguments of both parties, we will examine whetherthe excluded

testimony from Pappas and Rock was relevant to the defendant’s defense

and whether the excluded testimony was relevant for any other evidentiary purpose.

8 The excluded portion of Rock’s testimony is as follows: ‘‘We didn’t get

along very well. And it’s weird because the last few weeks before he had

died, we were actually starting to get along. He was going to therapy and

he was taking medication for his moods, but before then, we didn’t get

along very well.’’

9 The relevant portion of Pappas’ excluded testimony regarding Rock’s

relationship with Michael is as follows: ‘‘[Rock] did not get along with

[Michael]. . . . I have seen [Michael] sleeping in his car because he didn’t

want to be around her. . . . [The relationship between Rock and Michael]

was on and off for as long as I have known [Rock]. . . . [Marrero] mentioned

. . . [that Michael] wasn’t happy that [Rock] was back in the house and

they didn’t get along. . . . I don’t think that anything has changed since I

was hanging around with her, as far as I heard.’’

The relevant portion of Pappas’ excluded testimony regarding Rock’s

financial motive to participate in the crimes of which the defendant was

convicted is as follows: ‘‘I’m not sure exactly what [the money which Michael

came into] was, and I’m not sure of the amount. I just know that [Rock]

talked about it a lot. . . . That he came into money. . . . [Rock] had stated

to me a number of times, that she . . . and [Linda] would love it if he was

out of the picture to get her hands on that money.’’

10 Section 53a-92 (a) (2) (A) defines kidnapping in the first degree as when

a person ‘‘abducts another person and . . . restrains the person abducted

with intent to . . . inflict physical injury upon him [or her] or violate or

abuse him [or her] sexually . . . .’’ Section 53a-92 (a) (2) (C) defines kidnapping in the first degree as when a person ‘‘abducts another person and . . .

restrains the person abducted with intent to . . . terrorize him or a third

person . . . .’’ Rock testified that while she and the defendant were seated

in the abandoned car, the defendant told her that he had slit Michael’s

throat, stabbed Linda and Christopher, and that the defendant ‘‘told me that

I had a lot of questions that were going to be answered and that he was

going to inflict a lot of pain onto me.’’ Apparently, the jury did not believe

Rock’s testimony because it acquitted the defendant of both counts of

kidnapping in the first degree.

11 Rock’s credibility was critical to the charge of kidnapping in the second

degree because she had testified that she left the house with the defendant

because he had a knife and she believed that the defendant would have

killed her if she resisted. The crime of kidnapping in the second degree is

defined as when a person ‘‘abducts another person.’’ General Statutes § 53a94 (a). ‘‘ ‘Abduct’ ’’ is defined to mean ‘‘restrain a person with intent to

prevent his liberation by either (A) secreting or holding him in a place where

he is not likely to be found, or (B) using or threatening to use physical force

or intimidation.’’ General Statutes § 53a-91 (2). ‘‘ ‘Restrain’ means to restrict

a person’s movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to

interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to

another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent. As

used herein ‘without consent’ means, but is not limited to, (A) deception

and (B) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is

a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent,

guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of

him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.’’ General Statutes

§ 53a-91 (1). If the jury concluded that Rock had a motive to harm Michael

or otherwise assist the defendant in the commission of the crimes of which

he was convicted, the jury might have disbelieved Rock’s testimony and

instead inferred that she had consented to leave the premises with the

defendant. If the jury were to make such an inference, the defendant could

not have been found guilty of kidnapping in the second degree.

12 The defendant was found in possession of a set of keys when he was

arrested. Rock claimed that she had left a set of keys in the defendant’s
apartment and, after the altercation on October 8, 2006, when Rock returned

to the apartment to retrieve her belongings, the keys were no longer there.

Rock claimed that she had barricaded the basement door with a bureau to

prevent the defendant from using her keys to break in through the basement

door, and police observed that the basement door was locked and barricaded

the following day. The defendant argued that there was no unlawful entry

into the basement, noting that the contents of it had not been disturbed. If

the jury disbelieved Rock on this point, and concluded that the defendant

had her permission to enter the Laverty home, even if they accepted that

the door was barricaded, the jury could have inferred that Rock had notified

the defendant of the fact that, as Christopher testified, the Lavertys placed

the dryer venting system in the open and unlocked basement window when

doing laundry. Police at the crime scene the next day found the window

closed but unlocked. Thus, the jury was free to conclude that the defendant

had entered the basement through the window that Christopher testified

had been unlocked on the evening in question. Similarly, although we have

noted that a burglary may be committed even after a lawful entry—such as

when a defendant remains in a building after his license to enter is revoked;

see, e.g., State v. Belton, 190 Conn. 496, 500, 461 A.2d 973 (1983); we cannot

say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found that such

consent, if given, was ever revoked if the jury inferred that Rock had assisted

the defendant in his crimes.

13 The defendant’s specific theory of harm regarding these charges was

that ‘‘because the state’s theory was that [Rock] was a victim, it did not

charge the defendant as an accessory . . . . Based on the [trial court’s]

instructions, the jurors were required to acquit [the] defendant of all of the

charges if they believed that [Rock] was the stabber instead of the

defendant.’’

14 The charge requested by the defendant was as follows: ‘‘The defense

offered evidence during this case to support its claim that [Rock] may have

had some involvement in the commission of these crimes. If you credit that

evidence, you may then use it to assess what role she may have played, if

any, in the commission of some or all of the counts as charged. This type

of evidence is sometimes referred to as ‘third party guilt evidence.’

‘‘When considering this evidence as offered by the defense, you must not

consider whether the defense has established or proven that, in fact, [Rock]

committed these offenses; rather, your only focus when considering this

evidence is to determine whether it raises any reasonable doubt as to

whether [the defendant] committed some or all of these offenses, and/or

to what extent was his involvement.

‘‘Again, it is the state’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. The state must prove all of the elements of each count

beyond any reasonable doubt, including the fact that it was the defendant

who committed these crimes. This burden rests with the state at all times,

and the defendant has absolutely no burden to establish who may have

committed this offense.’’

15 See footnote 14 of this opinion to review the defendant’s requested

‘‘theory of defense’’ charge in full.

16 The defendant’s requested charge is as follows: ‘‘Further, when you

consider the testimony of [Rock], if you believe that she may have played

a role in this incident, you may then consider what motive, if any, she may

have had to testify falsely in this case. If you find that [Rock] may have

been subject to criminal prosecution, and that her initial version to the

police and subsequent testimony here in court could have motivated her to

inculpate the defendant, then you may consider that interest when you

weigh her credibility. If, however, you believe that [Rock] was not involved

as a participant in this incident, then you would not consider that factor.’’

17 The charge read as follows: ‘‘In deciding what the facts are, you must

consider all of the evidence. In doing this, you must decide what testimony

to believe, what testimony not to believe; you can believe all of it, part of

it, or none of it. In making that decision, you take into account a number

of factors which include the following: Was the witness able to see, hear,

or know about the things which the witness testified [to]? How well was

the witness able to recall and describe those things? What was the [witness’]

manner or demeanor while testifying? Did the witness have an interest in

the outcome of the case or any bias or prejudice concerning any party or

any matter involved in the case? How reasonable was the witness’ testimony

considered in light of all of the evidence in the case? Was the witness’

testimony contradicted by what the witness had said or done at another

time or by the testimony of other witnesses or other evidence?
‘‘Evidence of a witness’ substance abuse at or around the time of an

incident can be used by jurors also to assess the credibility of the witness,

particularly the person’s ability to perceive, recall, and relate accurate information.

‘‘Also, evidence of a witness’ long-standing, serious, and persistent drug

use is relevant, again, to gauge what that witness’ general credibility and

ability to perceive is.

‘‘If you conclude a witness has deliberately testified falsely in some

respect, you should carefully consider whether you should rely on any of

that person’s testimony.

‘‘In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, keep in mind that

people sometimes forget things. You need to consider, therefore, whether

a contradiction is an innocent lapse of memory or an intentional falsehood,

and that may depend on whether it has to do with an important fact or with

only a small detail.

‘‘If you find that a witness has been inaccurate in one respect, remember

it in judging that person’s testimony and give it the weight you think it ought

to have. You should size up the witness and make your own judgments as

to their credibility and decide what portion, all, some, or none, of any

particular witness’ testimony you will believe. You should use all of your

experiences, your knowledge of human nature, and of the emotions which

influence and control human conduct, and you should test the evidence

against that knowledge.’’

18 See footnote 12 of this opinion. If the jury believed, contrary to Rock’s

testimony, that Rock had given the defendant consent to enter the home

she could potentially be subject to criminal prosecution.

19 Two portions of Linda’s revised statement were admitted into evidence;

the statement was never admitted in its entirety.