IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In re Detention of J.G., STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,
v. J.G., Appellant. NO.70369-2-1 DIVISION ONE

ORDER WITHDRAWING OPINION AND SUBSTITUTING AMENDED OPINION


### The panel on itsown motion to correct a clerical error, withdraws the opinion filed on August 5, 2013, and replaces it with an amended opinion. Therefore IT IS ORDERED that the unpublished opinion of this court filed in the aboveentitled action on August 5, 2013, be withdrawn, and IT IS ORDERED that the amended opinion be substituted in its place. 

## Datedthis B^dayofAugust2013.
FOR THE PANEL: udge

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CDIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re Detention of J.G., STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,
v. J.G., Appellant. NO.70369-2-1 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: August 19, 2013 1.0

O

en

Lau, J. — Underthe involuntary treatment act, chapter 71.05 RCW, a person 

### named in a 90-day involuntary treatment petition implicitly waives a jurytrial unless he or she demands a juryas provided by Superior Court Mental Proceedings Rule 

### (MPR) 3.3(b). Because ourrecord contains no evidence that JG demanded ajury trial under MPR3.3(b), we hold that the trial court properlyentered its 90-day involuntary treatment order without a jury trial.70369-2 -112
FACTS On April 20, 2012, the State petitioned under chapter 71.05 RCW to involuntarily detain JG, alleging that his schizoaffective disorder and history ofalcohol abuse 

### rendered him gravely disabled. That same day, the trial court ordered an initial 72-hour detention. On April 23, the State filed a 14-day involuntary treatment petition. Following a probable cause hearing, the court ordered up to 14 days of involuntary treatment. On May 3, the State petitioned for an additional 90 days of involuntary treatment. The court heard the 90-day petition on May 8. Defense counsel appeared and stated he met with JG twice before the hearing. Counsel indicated that JG expressed interest in a jury trial but ultimately decided he wanted an immediate decision on the petition. JG, who was present at the hearing, agreed that counsel's remarks were accurate. The court proceeded to hear the petition without a jury. A mental health professional who evaluated JG testified that among other 

### grounds supporting involuntary treatment, JG had poor hygiene, often urinated on the floor, required crushed medication, and was paranoid, delusional, and strongly 

### influenced by internal stimuli. She also testified he had no independent living skills and would not be able to care for himself ifreleased. JG also testified. He stated that if released, he would take a bus to Walla Walla and stay at a labor camp apartment. 

### The court found by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that JG was gravely disabled and that less restrictive alternatives to involuntary detention were not in his best interests. Itordered up to 90 days of involuntary treatment at Western State 

### Hospital. JG appeals his 90-day involuntary treatment order.

-2-70369-2 -I /3
ANALYSIS JG's sole contention is that the trial court erred in ordering involuntary treatment 

### without an effective waiver ofhis right to ajury trial.1 Wehold that JGwaived hisjury trial right by failing to demand a jury as provided by MPR 3.3(b). A person named in a 90-day involuntary treatment petition has a right to a jury trial under Washington Constitution, article 1, section 21, which provides, "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . . ." But while the right to a jury trial remains inviolate, "the legislature may provide ... for waiving ofthejury in civil cases where the consent ofthe parties interested is given thereto." Wash. Const., art. 1, § 21. When it 

### enacted the involuntary treatment act, the legislature conferred express authority on our 

### Supreme Court to "adopt such rules as it shall deem necessary with respect to the court procedures and proceedings provided for by this chapter." RCW 71.05.570. The 

### Supreme Court then promulgated the MPR. See In re Matter ofMcLaughlin. 100 Wn.2d 832, 844, 676 P.2d 444 (1984). As discussed below, MPR 3.3(b) provides that a detained person waives a jury trial absent a jurydemand. When the State files a 90-day involuntary treatment petition, the court clerk must 

### set a time for a preliminaryappearance on the following judicial day unless the detained 

### person's attorneywaives the appearance. RCW 71.05.300(1). At the preliminary 

## appearance, the courtmust advise the detained person ofhis orherrightto ajurytrial.2 1JG argues, "The court erred in entering a 90-daycommitment orderwithout appellant's knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of hisright to ajury trial." Br. of Appellant at 1. 

### 2Our record does not indicate whether JG appeared at or waived the preliminary 

### appearance. Regardless, he makes no argument related to that issue. Any assignment -3-70369-2 -I /4 RCW 71.05.300(2). The detained person then has two judicial days to demand a jury trial "by serving upon the prosecuting attorney a demand therefor in writing, by filing the demand therefor with the clerk." MPR 3.3(b). Ifthe detained person demands a jury trial as provided by MRP 3.3(b), a jury trial must commence within ten judicial days after the preliminary appearance. RCW 71.05.310. Otherwise, "the matter shall be heard without a jury." MPR 3.3(b). JG contends that a jury trial waiver is effective only ifthe record affirmatively establishes that the wavier was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. While the knowing, 

### voluntary, and intelligent requirement unquestionably applies to jury trial waivers in 

### criminal cases,3 JG cites nocontrolling case authority applying that requirement tocivil 

### involuntary treatment proceedings under chapter71.05 RCW.4 Further, heoffers no persuasive rationale to departfrom the procedures discussed above, which are 

### consistentwith thegeneral approach tojurytrial rights in civil cases.5 We adhere to the 

## jury demand and waiverprocedures in MRP 3.3(b) and RCW71.05.300-.310.6 of error involving the preliminary appearance iswaived. RAP 10.3(a)(4); RAP 10.3(g); Uniqard Ins. Co. v. Mut. ofEnumclaw Ins. Co.. 160 Wn. App. 912, 922, 250 P.3d 121 (2011).

### 3See, e^, City ofBellevue v. Acrev. 103Wn.2d 203, 207, 691 P.2d 957 (1984) (a criminal defendant mustwaive his or herright to ajury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently); State v. Hos. 154 Wn. App. 238, 249, 225 P.2d 389 (2010) (same). 4In In re Detention ofJ.S.. 138 Wn. App. 882, 895, 159 P.3d 435 (2007), 

### Division Two of this court required a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the 

### rightto counsel in involuntary treatment proceedings underchapter71.05 RCW. J^ is inapposite because it did not address the question of jurytrial waivers. 

### 5See CR38(b)-(d) (jury waived unless requesting party files and serves ajury demand and pays the juryfee); CR 39(b)(1) (issues forwhich no jury demand is made 

### will generally be tried by the court); Sackettv. Santilli, 101 Wn. App. 128, 133-34, 5 -4-70369-2 -I lb Our record contains no evidence that JG demanded a jury trial under MPR 3.3(b). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err when itdecided the State's petition without a jury. We affirmthe court's 90-day involuntary treatment order.

WE CONCUR:

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P.3d 11 (2000) (civil rules permitting implied consent to bench trial in the absence of a 

### jury demand comport with Washington Constitution, article 1, section21); see also 4A Karl B.Tegland, Washington Practice: Rules Practice MPR 3.3, at 601 (7th ed. 

### 2008) ("The statute [RCW 71.05.310] allows a jurytrial on the issue of 90-day or 180- 

### daytreatment, but does notspecify a procedurefor demanding ajury trial. MPR 3.3(b) fills this gap with an adaptation of CR 38(b)."). We note that in proceedings under the 

### sexually violent predator act, chapter71.09 RCW, nojury trial is held unless demanded 

### by thedetained person, prosecuting agency, orjudge. RCW 71.09.050(3); In rePet, of Coppin, 157 Wn. App. 537, 542, 238 P.3d 1192 (2010). 

### 6JG articulates no cogent argument that MPR 3.3(b) is unconstitutional. -5-