SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

201 

CA 13-01562 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

GAETANO FARRUGGIA AND GABRIELLA FARRUGGIA, 

PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TOWN OF PENFIELD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT-RESPONDENT, 

KENNETH HERSHEY AND SUZANNE HERSHEY, 

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

SUGARMAN LAW FIRM, LLP, SYRACUSE (JENNA W. KLUCSIK OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT-RESPONDENT. 

DOLCE & PANEPINTO, P.C., BUFFALO (STEPHEN C. HALPERN OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS. 

CHAMBERLAIN D’AMANDA OPPENHEIMER & GREENFIELD LLP, ROCHESTER (HENRY R.

IPPOLITO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Supreme Court,

Monroe County (John J. Ark, J.), entered April 3, 2013. The order,

among other things, denied the motion of defendant Town of Penfield

for summary judgment and granted the motion of defendants Kenneth

Hershey and Suzanne Hershey for summary judgment. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is modified

on the law by granting the motion of defendant Town of Penfield and

dismissing the complaint and cross claim against it, denying

plaintiffs’ motion in its entirety, and denying those parts of the

motion of defendants Kenneth Hershey and Suzanne Hershey for summary

judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence

causes of action against them and reinstating those causes of action,

and as modified the order is affirmed without costs. 

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this Labor Law and common-law

negligence action seeking damages for injuries sustained by Gaetano

Farruggia (plaintiff) when the backhoe that he was operating fell into

a ravine. Defendant Town of Penfield (Town) hired plaintiff’s

employer to perform sidewalk and paving work on property owned by

defendants Kenneth Hershey and Suzanne Hershey (Hershey defendants). 

Specifically, the Town hired plaintiff’s employer to replace the

sidewalk abutting the Hershey defendants’ main driveway, which was

located on the northern end of their property, and to perform some

paving work on that driveway (hereafter, sidewalk project). The

sidewalk project was located within the Town’s right-of-way, which was
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CA 13-01562 

60 feet in width. There was also a second driveway on the southern

portion of the Hershey property (hereafter, south driveway), which was

located 700 to 800 feet from the main driveway. Plaintiff’s accident

occurred in what the parties refer to as a “landing area” adjacent to

the south driveway. Plaintiff was parking the backhoe in the landing

area at the end of his work day when it rolled or tipped into a

ravine. The Hershey defendants and the Town moved for summary

judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims against them. 

Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor

Law § 240 (1) and for leave to amend their bill of particulars to

assert a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-9.4 (c) as a basis for their Labor

Law § 241 (6) cause of action against the Town. The Town appeals and

plaintiffs cross-appeal from an order denying the Town’s motion for

summary judgment, granting the Hershey defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, denying that part of plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary

judgment, and granting that part of plaintiffs’ motion for leave to

amend their bill of particulars.

Addressing first the appeal, we agree with the Town that the

court erred in denying the Town’s motion for summary judgment

dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action

against it, inasmuch as the Town is not an “owner” for purposes of

those statutes (see Sanzone v City of Rome, 292 AD2d 777, 778). It is

well settled that “the term ‘owner’ is not limited to the titleholder

of the property where the accident occurred and encompasses a person

‘who has an interest in the property and who fulfilled the role of

owner by contracting to have work performed for his [or her] 

benefit’ ” (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866, quoting

Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565, 566). Here, the accident occurred

well outside of the Town’s right-of-way, and the Town had no other

interest in or legal authority over the landing area, which was

located entirely on the Hersheys’ private property (see id. at 866-

867). The Town established that it was Kenneth Hershey, not the Town,

who gave plaintiff permission to park in the landing area; that the

Town had no authority to grant such permission to plaintiff; and that

Kenneth Hershey directed plaintiff where to park. Further, the Town

established that the landing area was not part of the construction

site (see Flores v ERC Holding LLC, 87 AD3d 419, 421; Sprague v Louis

Picciano, Inc., 100 AD2d 247, 249-250, lv denied 62 NY2d 605). No

work was being performed in the landing area, and the landing area was

not contiguous or in proximity to the construction site (see Sprague,

100 AD2d at 250). Moreover, the Town established that it was not

necessary for plaintiff to park the backhoe in the landing area. The

Town provided plaintiff with parking in a municipal garage, which was

located a few miles from the work site. Plaintiff, however, testified

at his deposition that he chose to use the landing area because it was

closer to the work site and more “convenient” to do so (cf. Kane v

Coundorous, 293 AD2d 309, 311-312; Zito v Occidental Chem. Corp., 259

AD2d 1015, 1015-1016, lv dismissed 93 NY2d 999). 

We further agree with the Town that plaintiff’s accident did not

involve “an elevation-related risk of the kind that the safety devices

listed in [Labor Law §] 240 (1) protect against” (Broggy v Rockefeller
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CA 13-01562 

Group, Inc., 8 NY3d 675, 681; see Primavera v Benderson Family 1968

Trust, 294 AD2d 923, 924; Mazzu v Benderson Dev. Co., 224 AD2d 1009,

1010-1011). We thus conclude that plaintiff’s accident was “not

within the class of hazards against which Labor Law § 240 (1) was

intended to guard” (Ferreira v Village of Kings Point, 68 AD3d 1048,

1050; see Wynne v B. Anthony Constr. Corp., 53 AD3d 654, 655).

With respect to the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence

causes of action against the Town, it is well settled that 

“ ‘[l]iability for a dangerous condition on property is predicated

upon occupancy, ownership, control or a special use of [the] 

premises’ ” (Clifford v Woodlawn Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 31 AD3d

1102, 1103). “ ‘The existence of one or more of these elements is

sufficient to give rise to a duty of care[, but w]here none is

present, a party cannot be held liable for injury caused by the

defective or dangerous condition of the property’ ” (id.). Here, the

Town met its initial burden on the motion “by establishing that [it]

did not occupy, own, or control the [landing area] and did not employ

it for a special use, and thus did not owe plaintiff a duty of care”

(Knight v Realty USA.COM, Inc., 96 AD3d 1443, 1444), and plaintiffs

failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see generally

Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). We therefore modify

the order by granting the Town’s motion for summary judgment and

dismissing the complaint and cross claim against it. In view of that

determination, we further modify the order by denying plaintiffs’

motion in its entirety, inasmuch as there is no longer a basis for

plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their bill of particulars in

connection with a cause of action against the Town.

With respect to the cross appeal, we agree with plaintiffs that

the court erred in dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law

negligence causes of action against the Hershey defendants. It is

undisputed that the Hershey defendants owned and controlled the

property where the accident occurred, and we conclude that they failed

to establish as a matter of law that they lacked actual or

constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition on their

property (see Mendez v Jackson Dev. Group, Ltd., 99 AD3d 677, 679-680;

Ozimek v Holiday Val., Inc., 83 AD3d 1414, 1416-1417). We therefore

further modify the order accordingly. 

All concur except WHALEN, J., who dissents in part and votes to

modify in accordance with the following Memorandum: I respectfully

dissent in part, because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion

that defendant Town of Penfield (Town) is not an “owner” for the

purposes of Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6). I therefore would

affirm the order insofar as it denied that part of the Town’s motion

for summary judgment dismissing those causes of action against it. As

the majority rightly notes, “the term ‘owner’ is not limited to the

titleholder of the property where the accident occurred and

encompasses a person ‘who has an interest in the property and who

fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for

his [or her] benefit’ ” (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866,

quoting Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565, 566). Here, the Town

satisfied the definition of “owner” inasmuch as it had an undisputed
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CA 13-01562 

property interest, i.e., the right-of-way, and it fulfilled the role

of owner by contracting for the sidewalk replacement work (see Larosae

v American Pumping, Inc., 73 AD3d 1270, 1272; Reisch v Amadori Constr.

Co., 273 AD2d 855, 856; see also Walp v ACTS Testing Labs, Inc./Div.

of Bur. Veritas, 28 AD3d 1104, 1104-1105). It is undisputed that the

backhoe was regularly parked at the “landing area” overnight, to be

used in the construction project the following day. The “landing

area,” moreover, was part of the property subject to the Town’s rightof-way on which the reconstruction project was taking place. Thus,

the facts here are distinguishable from those in Sanzone v City of

Rome (292 AD2d 777), inasmuch as in Sanzone the accident occurred, not

on property that was part of the construction project, but at a

parking lot leased for the sole purpose of storing equipment and

materials. 

I also respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that

the accident was not the result of the type of hazard that the use or

placement of the safety devices enumerated in Labor Law § 240 (1) was

designed to protect against. In my view, issues of fact remain

whether the accident resulted from an elevation-related risk. The

Town did not meet its initial burden of establishing that parking the

backhoe at the edge of a steep ravine did not involve an elevationrelated risk that called for placement of a safety device to shield

Gaetano Farruggia (plaintiff) from the danger arising from the

significant elevation differential (see DeLong v State St. Assoc., 211

AD2d 891, 892; see generally Labor Law § 240 [1]; Salazar v Novalex

Contr. Corp., 18 NY3d 134, 139). Thus, “[w]hether plaintiff’s

injuries were proximately caused by the lack of a safety device of the

kind required by the statute is an issue for the trier of fact to

determine” (Wilinski v 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 18 NY3d 1,

11). 

Entered: July 3, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court