Affirmed and Opinion filed June 11, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00877-CR

EX PARTE RICHARD DEWAYNE JONES

On Appeal from the 405th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 11-CR-3416

O P I N I O N

Appellant is charged with evading arrest–use of vehicle, a third-degree 

felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04 (West Supp. 2012). In a pre-trial 

application for writ of habeas corpus, appellant argued he is illegally restrained 

because the legislative bill which amended punishment for his offense violated the 

“single-subject rule” of the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. III, § 35. 

Specifically, appellant contends that, because the subject of Senate Bill 1416 (“SB 

1416”) was tire deflation devices, the inclusion of an additional subject in the 

bill—amending punishment for evading arrest–use of vehicle—violated the single-
2

subject rule. The trial court denied appellant’s application, and appellant filed this 

accelerated appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 31.2. We affirm.

PRE-TRIAL APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

A. Standard of Review

We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an 

application for writ of habeas corpus. Phuong Anh Thi Le v. State, 300 S.W.3d 

324, 327 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). The trial court has no 

discretion to analyze the law incorrectly; thus, when the trial court’s ruling turns on 

the constitutionality of a statute, we review the ruling de novo. See Rivera v. State,

363 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (reviewing de 

novo trial court’s ruling on pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus in which 

accused asserted ordinance was unconstitutional). When the constitutionality of a

statute is challenged, we presume the statute is valid. Rodriguez v. State, 93 

S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The burden rests upon the individual who 

challenges the statute to establish its unconstitutionality. Id.

B. Single-Subject Rule

The Texas Constitution contains the following single-subject rule: 

(a) No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace 

the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which 

moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject.

(b) The rules of procedure of each house shall require that the subject 

of each bill be expressed in its title in a manner that gives the 

legislature and the public reasonable notice of that subject. The 

legislature is solely responsible for determining compliance with the 

rule.

(c) A law, including a law enacted before the effective date of this 

subsection, may not be held void on the basis of an insufficient title.

Texas Const. art. III, § 35.
3

The purpose of the single-subject rule is to prevent log-rolling—the 

inclusion in a bill of several subjects having no connection with each other in order 

to create a combination of various interests in support of the whole bill. LeCroy v. 

Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex. 1986). A bill satisfies the rule, even if it 

contains numerous provisions, however diverse, as long as the provisions relate, 

directly or indirectly, to the same general subject, have a mutual connection, and 

are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title. Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 

521, 524–25 (Tex. 1974).

C. Analysis

Appellant correctly notes that, as originally introduced, SB 1416 did not 

contain any revisions to the evading arrest statute:

A BILL TO BE ENTITLED

AN ACT

relating to the creation of the offense of possession, manufacture, 

transportation, repair, or sale of a tire deflation device; providing 

criminal penalties.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE 

OF TEXAS:

SECTION 1. Section 46.01, Penal Code, is amended by adding 

Subdivision (17) to read as follows:

(17) “Tire deflation device” means a device, including a 

caltrop or spike strip, that, when driven over, impedes or stops the 

movement of a wheeled vehicle by puncturing one or more of the 

vehicle’s tires.

SECTION 2. Section 46.05, Penal Code, is amended by 

amending Subsection (a) and adding Subsection (b-1) to read as 

follows:

(a) A person commits an offense if the person [he] 

intentionally or knowingly possesses, manufactures, transports, 

repairs, or sells:

(1) an explosive weapon;

(2) a machine gun;

(3) a short-barrel firearm;
4

(4) a firearm silencer;

(5) a switchblade knife;

(6) knuckles;

(7) armor-piercing ammunition;

(8) a chemical dispensing device; [or]

(9) a zip gun; or

(10) a tire deflation device.

(b-1) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the 

actor’s conduct was incidental to dealing with a tire deflation device 

solely for the purpose of making the device available to an 

organization, agency, or institution listed in Subsection (b).

SECTION 3. This Act takes effect September 1, 2011.

SB 1416 (introduced version), 

http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/82R/billtext/html/SB01416I.htm (last visited 

June 2013).1 Nothing in the title or text of the introduced version of SB 1416 

refers to evading arrest, use of a vehicle, or Penal Code section 38.04.

However, SB 1416 was amended and ultimately approved and signed into 

law as follows:

AN ACT

relating to the creation of the offense of possession, manufacture, 

transportation, repair, or sale of a tire deflation device and to the 

offense of attempting to evade arrest through the use of a vehicle or a 

tire deflation device; providing criminal penalties.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE 

OF TEXAS:

SECTION 1. Section 46.01, Penal Code, is amended by adding 

Subdivision (17) to read as follows:

(17) “Tire deflation device” means a device, including a 

caltrop or spike strip, that, when driven over, impedes or stops the 

movement of a wheeled vehicle by puncturing one or more of the 

vehicle’s tires. The term does not include a traffic control device that:

(A) is designed to puncture one or more of a 

 

1

Proposed text is underlined, and proposed deletions are struck through and surrounded 

by brackets. 
5

vehicle’s tires when driven over in a specific direction; and

(B) has a clearly visible sign posted in close 

proximity to the traffic control device that prohibits entry or warns 

motor vehicle operators of the traffic control device.

SECTION 2. Subsections (a), (d), and (e), Section 46.05, Penal 

Code, are amended to read as follows:

(a) A person commits an offense if the person [he] 

intentionally or knowingly possesses, manufactures, transports, 

repairs, or sells:

(1) an explosive weapon;

(2) a machine gun;

(3) a short-barrel firearm;

(4) a firearm silencer;

(5) a switchblade knife;

(6) knuckles;

(7) armor-piercing ammunition;

(8) a chemical dispensing device; [or]

(9) a zip gun; or

(10) a tire deflation device.

(d) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section 

that the actor’s conduct:

(1) was incidental to dealing with a switchblade knife, 

springblade knife, [or] short-barrel firearm, or tire deflation device

solely as an antique or curio; [or]

(2) was incidental to dealing with armor-piercing 

ammunition solely for the purpose of making the ammunition 

available to an organization, agency, or institution listed in Subsection 

(b); or

(3) was incidental to dealing with a tire deflation device 

solely for the purpose of making the device available to an 

organization, agency, or institution listed in Subsection (b).

(e) An offense under Subsection (a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), (8), or 

(9) [this section] is a felony of the third degree [unless it is committed 

under Subsection (a)(5) or (a)(6), in which event, it is a Class A 

misdemeanor]. An offense under Subsection (a)(10) is a state jail 

felony. An offense under Subsection (a)(5) or (6) is a Class A 

misdemeanor.

SECTION 3. Subsections (b) and (c), Section 38.04, Penal 

Code, are amended to read as follows:

(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, 
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except that the offense is:

(1) a state jail felony if[:

[(A)] the actor has been previously convicted 

under this section; [or

[(B) the actor uses a vehicle while the actor is in 

flight and the actor has not been previously convicted under this 

section;]

(2) a felony of the third degree if:

(A) the actor uses a vehicle while the actor is in 

flight [and the actor has been previously convicted under this section]; 

[or]

(B) another suffers serious bodily injury as a 

direct result of an attempt by the officer from whom the actor is 

fleeing to apprehend the actor while the actor is in flight; or

(C) the actor uses a tire deflation device against 

the officer while the actor is in flight; or

(3) a felony of the second degree if:

(A) another suffers death as a direct result of an 

attempt by the officer from whom the actor is fleeing to apprehend the 

actor while the actor is in flight; or

(B) another suffers serious bodily injury as a 

direct result of the actor’s use of a tire deflation device while the actor 

is in flight.

(c) In this section:

(1) “Vehicle”[, “vehicle”] has the meaning assigned by 

Section 541.201, Transportation Code.

(2) “Tire deflation device” has the meaning assigned by 

Section 46.01.

SECTION 4. Section 38.04, Penal Code, as amended by this 

Act, applies only to an offense committed on or after the effective 

date of this Act. An offense committed before the effective date of 

this Act is governed by the law in effect on the date the offense was 

committed, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose. 

For purposes of this section, an offense was committed before the 

effective date of this Act if any element of the offense occurred before 

that date.

SECTION 5. This Act takes effect September 1, 2011.

SB 1416 (enrolled version), 

http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/82R/billtext/html/SB01416F.htm (last visited
7

June 2013).

2

The title of the enrolled version of SB 1416 was broader than the title in the 

introduced version and specifically mentioned evading arrest with a vehicle: “AN 

ACT relating to the creation of the offense of possession, manufacture, 

transportation, repair, or sale of a tire deflation device and to the offense of 

attempting to evade arrest through the use of a vehicle or a tire deflation device; 

providing criminal penalties.” Id. (emphasis added). In section 3 of the enrolled

version, Penal Code section 38.04 was amended to include certain uses of a tire 

deflation device as third- and second-degree-felony forms of evading arrest. 

Additionally, section 3 amended the third-degree-felony form of evading arrest–

use of vehicle by removing the requirement that the defendant must have been 

previously convicted under section 38.04.

We agree with appellant that the enrolled version SB 1416 did not pertain 

solely to criminalizing possession of tire deflation devices. Nevertheless, liberally 

construing the bill in favor of constitutionality, we conclude the overarching 

subject of the bill was criminal offenses related to vehicles. As the device name 

suggests, the Legislature decided to criminalize possession of tire deflation devices

because individuals use the devices to stop vehicles. The Legislature also decided 

to address other vehicle-related offenses, namely evading arrest–use of vehicle and 

evading arrest–use of tire deflation device. The common theme of these topics is 

criminal behavior related to vehicles—behavior that has recently become more 

problematic in South Texas. See SB 1416 (bill analysis for enrolled version), 

http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/82R/analysis/html/SB01416F.htm (last 

visited June 2013) (“Recently, law enforcement officials in South Texas, when in 

 

2

Proposed text is underlined, and proposed deletions are struck through and surrounded 

by brackets. 
8

pursuit of suspects, have had to deal with the suspects throwing ‘tire deflation 

devices’ at law enforcement officials’ vehicles and then evading arrest as a 

result.”). Thus, the topics “relate, directly or indirectly, to the same general 

subject, have a mutual connection, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in 

the title.” Robinson, 507 S.W.2d at 525; see also Dellinger v. State, 28 S.W.2d 

537, 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930) (“[W]here the provisions are germane in any 

degree, the law will be upheld.”); Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Silver City 

Club, 315 S.W.3d 643, 645–48 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (holding 

bill’s numerous provisions, ranging from regulation of alcoholic beverages and 

sexually-oriented businesses to unclaimed wages and agriculture, did not violate 

single-subject rule because common subject of bill, according to title, was 

government reform).

3

 

In State Board of Insurance v. National Employee Benefit Administrators, 

Inc., the court of appeals concluded a bill violated the single-subject rule, 

recognizing the bill’s title referred to “third party administrators” and “nonprofit 

subscription programs” as distinct concepts by separating the phrases with the 

word “and.” 786 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ). The court 

also noted sections 1 through 3 of the bill pertained solely to “third party 

administrators” whereas section 4 pertained solely to “nonprofit subscription 

programs.” Id. We conclude SB 1416 is distinguishable. Although the title of SB 

1416 also contains the conjunction “and,” offenses based on possession of tire 

deflation devices, evading arrest using such devices, and evading arrest using 

 

3 Appellant argues the portions of SB 1416 pertaining to punishment changes for evading 

arrest were part of an earlier introduced bill that failed. He also notes that, when discussing SB 

1416, legislators mentioned the importance of prohibiting tire deflation devices but did not 

express concerns about evading arrest by using a vehicle. However, even if correct, these facts 

are irrelevant in our single-subject rule analysis because the common subject of SB 1416’s 

provisions was offenses related to vehicles.
9

vehicles all reasonably come within the subject of offenses related to vehicles.

4

 

Finally, appellant relies on the Court of Criminal Appeals’s decision in 

White v. State. 440 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). In White, the title of a 

bill stated the bill’s purposes was to add certain drugs to the list of “dangerous 

drugs” but did not mention the bill was amending penalty provisions of the 

Dangerous Drug Act. Id. at 662–63. The court held the title did not afford readers 

of the bill fair notice that penalty provision were being amended and thus violated 

article III, section 35. Id. at 665–67. The holding in White is not instructive here 

because it was based on the title-sufficiency rule of article III, section 35, not on 

the single-subject rule. Furthermore, article III, section 35 was amended in 1986

and no longer authorizes courts to declare a bill is void based on the titlesufficiency rule. See Tex. Const. art. III, § 35(c); Baggett v. State, 722 S.W.2d 

700, 701–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 

Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s 

denial of appellant’s pre-trial application for writ of habeas corpus.

/s/ John Donovan

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Boyce, and Donovan.

Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

 

4 We also note that, in State Board, provisions pertaining to the two subjects became 

effective on different dates, whereas all provisions of SB 1416 became effective September 1, 

2011. 786 S.W.2d at 108.