. *.. 

OF TEXAS 

WI~I.WIIA~ON 

A’FToILNEyOENE=AI- 

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Honorable M. B. Morgan OPINION NO. WW-114 

Commlss loner, Bureau of 

Labor Statistics Re: Does the opinion of the 

Austin, Texas. Court In St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company 

v. ffriff'in, 106 Tex.477, 

171 S.W. 703,(1914) invalidate Article 5196,Vernon's Civil Statutes 

(Blacklisting Law) in its 

entirety, or Is the opinion limited to a holding 

on the validity of Section 3 of Article 5196 

Dear Mr. Morgan: alone? 

This Opinion is In response to your letter of April 11, 

1957, concerning the present status of Article 5196,Vernon's 

Civil Statutes. In this request you ask a question which 

is substantially as follows: 

Does the opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas 

.in St. Louis Southwestern Rallwa 

106 Tex. 477 171 S W 703 (19147 ~~%%aatld f';:'$" 

Article 5196: Vernon's Civil Statutes, or was the 

opinion limited to a holding on Section 3 of the 

Article with the result that the remainder of the 

Act is constitutional? 

The Supreme Court of Texas in the Griffin case was interpreting the provisions of a prior Act, Artldle 594, Revised Civil Statutes, 1911. Attorney General's Opinion No. 

O-3562, from which you quoted in your request, sets out the 

history of the present form of the Act, Article 5196, Vernon's Civil Statutes; and points out that this latter Article Is virtually identical in language to that of Article 

594. 

The Court, after finding the Act unconstitutional because of provisions of Section 3, then proceeds to set out 

other grounds to supoort their conclusion. ,.In doing so, it 

sets out an analysis of other sections of the Act, and 

points out within the provisions of these other sections 
Honorable M, B. Morgan page 2 Ww-114 

additional grounds for holding the Act unconstitutional. It 

then a ta tea, “Beyond controversy, the Act of the Legfslature Is void, unless it can be sustained as an exercise of 

the police power”. The opinion then goes on to hold that 

the Act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police 

power, and la void. The concluding language of the Court 

IS as follows : 

“The subject of legislation in this statute 

and its v~rlous provisions, as stated above, are 

purely personal as between the employee and the 

corporation and do not directly affect the public, 

in health, safety, comfort, convenience, or otherwise. The Act la in violation of the Constltutlon of this State and of the United States, and is 

void. ” 

It seems clear to us that the Supreme Court in the 

Griffin case, was deflnitelg not limiting Its holding to an 

interpretation of Section 3 of Article 594, R.C.S. 1911, 

. but,to the contrary, was quite definite that it should declare the act void in its entirety. 

As pointed out in Attorney General’s Opinion No.O-3562, 

though the Court in the Griffin case was ruling on a prior 

law, the acts are so aim-that the Court’s opinion may 

also be cited as controlling on the present form of the Act, 

Article 5196. 

SUMMARY 

The opinion 

Railway Co. 

(1914) invalidated the entire act which is now 

Article 5196, V.C .S. 

of the court in St. Louis Southwestern 

v. Grlffln, 106 Tex. 477; 171 S.W.703 -.- 

Very truly yours, 

WILL WIISON 

Attorney General of Texas 

WCR: jl:rh Assistant 
Honorablr M. B. Morgan, page 3 w-114 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE: 

H. Grady Chandler, Chairman 

W. V. Geppert 

Edwin P. Horner 

Wm. R Hemphlll 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY 

Geo. P. Blackburn