(1991). If the parents share joint physical custody, the analysis differs. 

See Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 50, 327 P.3d 511, 515-16 

(2014); Potter v. Potter, 121 Nev. 613, 618, 119 P.3d 1246, 1249-50 (2005). 

When classifying a physical custody arrangement as joint or primary, 

courts should primarily consider whether joint or primary custody is in the 

children's best interest, while also inquiring whether each parent has 

custody at least 40 percent of the time. See Bluestein v. Bluestein, 131 

Nev., Adv. Op. 14, 345 P.3d 1044, 1049 (2015). The district court 

considered respondent's openness in allowing frequent contact between 

appellant and the children, and found this demonstrated good coparenting which enriched the children's lives, but also weighed in favor of 

maintaining respondent's status as primary physical custodian. The court 

also considered the parties' similar but different custody calendars and 

heard evidence regarding the parties' timeshare The district court's 

conclusion that respondent maintained primary custody, and thus, that 

the Schwartz analysis applied, is supported by substantial evidence and 

was not an abuse of discretion. See Bluestein, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 14, 345 

P.3d at 1049 (providing that a district court has broad discretion in 

matters of child custody); Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 

699, 704 (2009) (explaining that this court will uphold district court 

factual findings if supported by substantial evidence). 

Appellant next argues that the district court abused its 

discretion when it determined that the Schwartz relocation factors 

weighed in favor of relocation. Specifically, appellant asserts that there 

was no evidence that respondent's or the children's quality of life would 

improve upon relocation, and that appellant's alternative visitation would 

not sufficiently foster and preserve his parental relationship with the 

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Gibbons Pickering 

'We have determined that this appeal should be submitted for 

decision on the fast track briefing and appellate record without oral 

argument. See NRAP 3E(g)(1); NRAP 34(0(1). 

3 

children. See Schwartz, 107 Nev. at 382-83, 812 P.2d at 1271 (factors (1) 

and (5)). The district court, however, specifically considered both of these 

factors when it weighed the totality of the Schwartz factors and found that 

they counseled in favor of the relocation. Additionally, substantial 

evidence supports the district court's factual findings as to each factor. 

Ogawa, 125 Nev. at 668, 221 P.3d at 704. 

Finally, appellant challenges the district court's award of 

attorney fees. Under NRS 125.040, a district court may award attorney 

fees to a party in a divorce action. The award of attorney fees in divorce 

proceedings lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Miller v. 

Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 622, 119 P.3d 727, 729 (2005). Although appellant 

argues that the $3,500 awarded was unfair because certain motion 

practice could have been avoided and because appellant lost the relocation 

motion, appellant has not demonstrated that the district court's attorney 

fee award was an abuse of discretion. See id. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judginerinif the district court AFFIRMED.' 

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cc: Hon. Bryce C. Duckworth, District Judge, Family Court Division 

McFarling Law Group 

Fine Law Group 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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