[Cite as State v. Houston, 2013-Ohio-686.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SCIOTO COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 12CA3472 

 : 

 vs. : 

 : DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

MARCO DWAYNE HOUSTON, : ENTRY

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : Released: 02/07/13 

_____________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES:

Elbert L. Hatchett, Pro Hac Vice Counsel, Pontiac, Michigan, and Vicki 

Lynn Ward, Local Counsel, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. 

Mark E. Kuhn, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pat Apel, Scioto 

County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellee. 

_____________________________________________________________ 

 

McFarland, P.J. 

{¶1} Marco D. Houston appeals his conviction in the Scioto County 

Court of Common Pleas after he was found guilty of trafficking in drugs 

with a forfeiture specification, a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(c)(1)(e), 

possession of drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(1)(d), and tampering 

with evidence, a violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). On appeal, Houston 

contends (1) the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress 

when he was seized and detained beyond the time necessary to effectuate a 

parking violation; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 2 

attorney was inadequately prepared to argue the suppression motion and 

advised Appellant to withdraw his “no contest” plea and enter a plea of 

“guilty,” thereby waiving issues on appeal; and, (3) the trial court committed 

plain error when it sentenced Appellant on three separate charges of similar 

import, thereby, rendering the sentence null and void. For the reasons 

which follow, we disagree with Appellant. Accordingly, we overrule all 

assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

FACTS 

{¶2} Appellant was arrested for various drug- related offenses on 

September 9, 2011. He was later indicted, arraigned, and scheduled for trial. 

During the trial court proceedings, he and a co-defendant, Danny Horsley, 

filed motions to suppress.1

 Appellant’s motion requested an order 

suppressing all evidence as it was obtained as the result of an 

unconstitutional seizure of Appellant’s person and vehicle. 

{¶3} At the suppression hearing, Officer Tiffany Hedrick (“Hedrick”) 

of the Portsmouth Police Department testified on September 9, 2011, she 

was on routine patrol in the “East End” of Portsmouth at 9:20 a.m. when she 

observed a white Chevrolet Malibu parked at an angle, obstructing traffic. 

The vehicle’s right front tire was over twelve inches from the curb and the 

 

1

 Co-defendant Horsley has several aliases and was also known under the name “Clyde Lark.” 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 3 

right rear tire approximately two to three feet from the curb. R.C. 4511.69 

and Portsmouth City Ordinance 351.04 prohibit parking more than twelve 

inches from the curb. The “East End” is known as a high crime area due to 

the volume of crimes involving prostitution, drugs, thefts, and burglaries. 

Hedrick initiated a traffic stop on her inboard computer, ran the license 

plate, and discovered the vehicle was a rental car from Cleveland, Ohio. She 

then contacted Patrolman Steve Timberlake (“Timberlake”) because he was 

looking for a white vehicle earlier in the day. 

{¶4} Patrolman Timberlake testified on the morning of September 

9th, he received information that two black males in a white rental car were 

selling drugs in the Farley Square area. Earlier, Timberlake could not find 

them, but he notified other officers. When Hedrick contacted him, 

Timberlake arrived at the scene in less than two minutes. Hedrick had begun 

writing a parking ticket. Timberlake noted the white rental car was parked 

near a residence surrounded by a chain link fence. He was familiar with the 

residence due to his previous work assignment with the narcotics unit. 

Timberlake had seized a large quantity of cocaine from the previous 

residents, drug traffickers. 

{¶5} At that point, Appellant came out of the residence. Appellant 

asked if there was a problem with the vehicle. Hedrick informed him it was 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 4 

parked illegally, and Appellant immediately went back into the house. 

Shortly thereafter, Appellant exited the house a second time and offered to 

move the vehicle. The officers told him he needed identification because 

they were going to issue a parking citation. Appellant then went back into 

the house. Soon, Appellant exited the house a third time and evasively 

continued around the fence and the back of the car. The officers thought he 

was possibly trying to get in the car and drive away. Hedrick and 

Timberlake again requested identification. 

{¶6} Appellant then produced his ID. He acted nervous and kept 

trying to walk away from the officers. Timberlake testified based on 

Appellant’s erratic and evasive actions, along with the confidential 

information he had heard in the morning, he did a pat-down search for 

weapons. During this pat-down, Appellant backed away from Timberlake. 

When Timberlake finished the pat-down, he told Appellant to sit on the curb 

while he was being detained for the warrant check. 

{¶7} Lee Bower (“Bower”), a narcotics detective and canine handler 

testified he received a call from Timberlake on September 9th, advising him 

that Hedrick was with a new white Chevy on 8th Street. When he arrived, 

Appellant was lying down, but as he walked up to Appellant, Appellant 

began walking away and looking around. Bower said “Hey, you’re making 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 5 

me nervous.” Appellant replied “Well you’re making me nervous.” Bower 

asked: “Well would you feel better if you set in the back of the patrol car?” 

Appellant answered “Yes.” He was placed in the back of Hedrick’s cruiser. 

Appellant told Timberlake his cousin was inside the house, yet he was 

unable to provide his cousin’s name. 

{¶8} Timberlake briefed Bower on Appellant’s nervous, erratic and 

evasive actions. Bower and Timberlake proceeded to the house’s front door. 

Hedrick went to the rear door. Sherry Dixon opened the front door and let 

the officers inside. Dixon advised Appellant was visiting her boyfriend, who 

inexplicably had just run out the back door. Bower asked for permission to 

search the house and Dixon gave consent. Dixon, another male, and a child 

were inside the house. The officers separated. Bower saw another male in 

the house, who ended up being co-defendant Horsley. Bower did a patdown and requested Horsley’s ID. The other officers told Hedrick to come 

inside the house. Bower handed Hedrick Horsley’s ID, and Bower walked 

outside. 

{¶9} Bower decided to have his canine sniff the white Malibu. 

Bower testified by now, he had been on the scene approximately ten 

minutes. The dog alerted on the driver’s side door. Bower told Appellant the 

dog alerted. Appellant advised he had been stopped by law enforcement in 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 6 

West Virginia the night before and there was nothing in the car. Bower 

testified Appellant gave him consent to check the car. When Bower 

searched the car, he discovered over $13,000.00 in cash, 1000 oxycodone 

pills, and over 100 Opana pills. Appellant and co-defendant Horsley were 

subsequently arrested at the scene. Timberlake testified the warrant check 

was completed sometime after the officers cleared the house. 

{¶10} The date of the parking ticket is listed at 9:32 a.m. by Officer 

Hedrick. Appellant’s name does not appear on the ticket. Appellant was 

arrested at 9:50 a.m. Appellant did not testify at the suppression hearing. 

The trial court found that at the point Officer Bower asked Appellant if he 

would like to sit in the cruiser, Timberlake had not yet received a response to 

his inquiry about Houston’s ID. The court found based on the totality of the 

circumstances, the officers conducted the issuance of the traffic ticket in a 

diligent manner and detained Appellant for a reasonable and lawful time. 

The court further found the exterior sniff of the vehicle by the canine was 

conducted during the time period necessary to effectuate the original 

purpose of the contact between the officers and the defendants. 

{¶11} On November 4, 2011, Appellant entered pleas of no contest to 

trafficking in drugs with a forfeiture specification, possession of drugs, and 

tampering with evidence. On February 2, 2012, Appellant was sentenced to 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 7 

an agreed sentence of consecutive prison terms on the charges, for a total 

stated prison term of ten years. This appeal followed. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS WHEN THE SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT 

EXTENDED BEYOND THE TIME NECESSARY TO 

EFFECTUATE THE PARKING VIOLATION AT ISSUE 

PURSUANT TO TOWNSEND, BONILLA AND PROGRENY AS 

WELL AS OHIO LAW AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY 

THE RESULTANT SEARCHES WERE FRUIT OF THE 

POISONOUS TREE. 

II. APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 10 AND 16, ARTICLE I OF 

THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL 

INADEQUATELY PREPARED AND INEFFECTUALLY 

ARGUED THE SUPPRESSION MOTION, AND ALLOWED 

AN/OR ADVISED DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS “NO 

CONTEST PLEA” AND TO PLEAD GUILTY THEREBY 

WAIVING THE ISSUE. 

III. TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 

SENTENCING DEFENDANT ON THREE SEPARATE CHARGES 

OF SIMILAR IMPORT THAT HE COULD ONLY BE FOUND 

GUILTY OF ONLY ONE AND SENTENCED FOR ONLY ONE 

RENDERING UNATHORIZED IMPOSED SENTENCE A NULITY 

OR 

VOID. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE 

{¶12} Under this assignment of error, Appellant contends he 

voluntarily approached the officers, offered to move his car, and gave his 

identification. A background check revealed no outstanding warrants. The 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 8 

parking citation lists “issue” at 9:32 a.m. and Appellant was arrested at 9:50 

a.m. Appellant argues that placing him in the cruiser, questioning Dixon in 

her house, and having the dog sniff of the vehicle all occurred after the ticket 

was issued. Therefore, the seizure and investigation occurred beyond the 

permissible time to detain him. Appellee argues under the totality of the 

circumstances, the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain 

Appellant. We agree with Appellee. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 {¶13} Our review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress 

presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St. 3d 

71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, at ¶ 100, citing State v. Burnside,

100 Ohio St. 3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, at ¶ 8. When 

considering a motion to suppress, the trial court acts as the trier of fact and is 

in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness 

credibility. Id. Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if 

they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Landrum, 137 

Ohio App.3d 718, 722, 739 N.E.2d 1159 (2000). Accepting those facts as 

true, we must independently determine whether the trial court reached the 

correct legal conclusion in analyzing the facts of the case. Roberts at ¶ 100, 

citing Burnside at ¶ 8. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 9 

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶14} In this matter, Appellant argues the officers who 

detained him had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to detain him, 

outside of his erratic behavior of quickly going in and out of the nearby 

house three times and looking nervous. As a preliminary consideration, 

Appellee State of Ohio urges that Appellant does not have standing to raise 

this issue. 

{¶15} “‘Standing is defined as a party’s right to make a legal claim or 

seek a judicial enforcement of a duty or right.’” Coleman v. Davis, 4th Dist. 

No. 10CA5, 2011-Ohio-506, 2011 WL 345772, ¶ 16, citing State ex rel. 

Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 124 Ohio 

St. 3d 390, 922 N.E.2d 945, 2010-Ohio-169, at ¶ 19, quoting Ohio Pyro, Inc. 

v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 875 N.E.2d 550, 2007-

Ohio-5024, at ¶ 27 (other internal quotation omitted). “‘Whether established 

facts confer standing to assert a claim is a matter of law.’” Cuyahoga Cty. 

Bd. of Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 858 N.E.2d 330, 2006-Ohio6499, at ¶ 23, quoting Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 

106, 846 N.E.2d 478, 2006-Ohio-954, at ¶ 90. “‘We review questions of 

law de novo.’” State v. Elkins, 4th Dist. No. 07CA1, 2008-Ohio-674, at ¶ 

12, quoting Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. at ¶ 23; see, also, Bridge v. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 10 

Midas Auto Experts # 322, 8th Dist. No. 94115, 2010-Ohio-4681, at ¶ 6 

(“The question of standing is an issue of law, which we review de novo.”) 

(citation omitted). 

{¶16} Modern understandings of the Fourth Amendment recognize 

that it serves to protect an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy if 

that expectation is reasonable and justifiable. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 

128, 143, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 381, 88 

S. Ct. 507 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. Buzzard, 112 Ohio St.3d 

451, 860 N.E.2d 1006 (2007). 

{¶17} Moreover, an individual must have standing to challenge the 

legality of a search or seizure. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421 

(1978); State v. Coleman, 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 544 N.E. 2d 622 (1989). The 

person challenging the search bears the burden of proving standing. State v. 

Williams, 73 Ohio St. 3d 153, 652 N.E.2d 721 (1995). That burden is met 

by establishing that the person has an expectation of privacy in the place 

searched that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id; Rakas v. 

Illinois, supra. 

 {¶18} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that an individual who is 

in lawful possession of a vehicle, although not the titled owner, does possess 

a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle searched, if he or she can 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 11 

demonstrate that the owner gave them permission to use the vehicle. State v. 

Carter, 69 Ohio St. 3d 57, 63, 630 N.E.2d 355 (1994). See also, State v. 

Hines, 92 Ohio App.3d 163, 166, 634 N.E.2d 654 (10th Dist. 1993); State v. 

Middleton, 8th Dist. No. 88327, 2007 Ohio 2227, 2007 WL 1366430, ¶ 25. 

{¶19} In this matter, the issue of standing was discussed prior to the 

parties putting on evidence at the suppression hearing. Both defense 

counsels argued the State was claiming their clients had possessory interest 

in the white Chevrolet. Counsel for Appellant argued his client had standing 

as the individual who rented the vehicle. The trial court found that both 

defendants admitted to standing. 

{¶20} In State v. Hale, 5th Dist. No. 02CA00024, 2002-Ohio-4537, 

2002 WL 2016411, at ¶ 12, the appellate court held because appellant was 

never legally in possession of a rental vehicle and vehicle had been missing 

from Alamo Rent-a-Car for three months, appellant lacked standing to 

challenge the search of stolen vehicle. In State v. Kitcey, 11th Dist. No. 

2007-A-0014, 2007-Ohio-7124, 2007 WL 4564405, at ¶ 57, the appellate 

court noted without a possessory interest in the car [or property subject of 

the search and seizure] Kitcey lacked standing to challenge the search. 

{¶21} However, in State v. Henderson, 5th Dist. No. 07COA031, 

2008-Ohio-5007, 2008 WL 4408594, ¶ 29, the court of appeals held a 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 12 

defendant had standing to challenge the search of a rental vehicle even 

though he was not an authorized driver of the vehicle. The Court noted 

although appellant’s possession might be challengeable as a civil wrong, it 

did not render his expectation of privacy null and void. Henderson, at ¶ 30. 

{¶22} Here, we agree with the trial court’s ruling as to Appellant’s 

standing to challenge the search. Appellant was the person who rented the 

white Malibu and asserted a privacy interest via his counsel. We turn next to 

Appellant’s argument that the search and seizure here constituted a violation 

of his Fourth Amendment rights. 

{¶23} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provide for “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure * * * against unreasonable searches and seizures * * *.” 

Searches and seizures conducted without a prior finding of probable cause 

by a judge or magistrate “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment, subject to only a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct., 

1982 (1991); State v. Tincher, 47 Ohio App.3d 188, 548 N.E.2d 251 (1988). 

If the government obtains evidence through actions that violate an accused’s 

Fourth Amendment rights, that evidence must be excluded at trial. State v. 

LeMaster, 4th Dist. No. 11 CA3236, 2012-Ohio-971, 2012 WL 762542, ¶ 8. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 13 

{¶24} The scope and duration of a routine traffic stop “must be 

carefully tailored to its underlying justification * * * and last no longer than 

is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 

U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983); see, also, State v. Gonyou, 108 Ohio 

App.3d 369, 372, 670 N.E. 2d 1040 (6th Dist. 1995) and State v. Hughes, 

4th Dist. No. 97CA2309, 1998 WL 363850, (June 25, 1998), at *3. The rule 

set forth in Royer is designed to prevent law enforcement officers from 

conducting “fishing expeditions” for evidence of a crime. See generally, 

Gonyou; Sagamore Hills v. Eller, 9th Dist. No. 18495, 1997 WL 760693 

(Nov. 5, 1997); see, also, Fairborn v. Orrick, 49 Ohio App.3d 94, 95, 550 

N.E.2d 488, 490 (2nd Dist. 1988), (stating that “the mere fact that a police 

officer has an articulable and reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop a motor 

vehicle does not give that police officer ‘open season’ to investigate matters 

not reasonably within the scope of his suspicion”). 

{¶25} “When a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle for a traffic 

violation, the officer may detain the motorist for a period of time sufficient 

to issue the motorist a citation and to perform routine procedures such as a 

computer check on the motorist’s driver’s license, registration, and vehicle 

plates.” State v. Aguirre, 4th Dist. No. 03CA5, 2003-Ohio-4909, 2003 WL 

22136234, at ¶ 36, citing State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 598, 647 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 14 

N.E. 2d 591 (9th Dist.1995). “In determining if an officer completed these 

tasks within a reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the duration 

of the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances and consider whether 

the officer diligently conducted the investigation.” Id., citing State v. Cook, 

65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521-522, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992), (fifteen minute detention 

was reasonable); United States v. Sharp, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S. Ct. 1568 

(1985), (twenty minute detention was reasonable). 

 {¶26} We agree with the trial court’s finding that based on the totality 

of the circumstances, the officers conducted issuance of the traffic ticket in a 

diligent manner and detained Appellant for a reasonable and lawful length of 

time. The facts at the suppression hearing demonstrated that Officer 

Hedrick discovered the white rental vehicle illegally parked, contacted 

Timberlake, and started writing the ticket. While writing the ticket, 

Appellant made consensual contact with the officers, and they noticed 

nervous, erratic, and evasive behavior. The officers requested ID twice and, 

based on the information known to Timberlake, performed a pat-down 

search for weapons. Appellant was detained on the curb for a warrants 

check and soon after, consented to sitting in a cruiser. The trial court noted 

that at the time Appellant chose to sit in the cruiser, the warrants check had 

not been completed. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 15 

{¶27} In addition to Appellant’s nervous, erratic, and evasive 

actions, there were other factors giving rise to reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity which were in the evidence before the trial court. Of chief 

importance is the factor conspicuously missing from Appellant’s brief, that 

Officer Timberlake testified to having confidential information that two 

black males driving a white rental vehicle were selling drugs in the area. 

This information was known before the white rental vehicle was discovered 

illegally parked in a high crime area. 

{¶28} An officer may derive his knowledge from an informant’s tip. 

State v. Kelley, 4th Dist. No. 10CA3182, 2011-Ohio-3545, 2011 WL 

2792338, at ¶ 25. In State v. Walker, 10th Dist. No. 97APA09-1219, 1998 

WL 429121 (July 28, 1998), the court held: 

“‘* * *[P]olice have probable cause to conduct a search for 

contraband when detailed information provided to them by a 

confidential but reliable in formant is subsequently corroborated in 

some significant combination, with respect to the name or physical 

description of a suspect, the location of the illegal sale, the time of the 

sale, the description of the automobile drive by the suspect, or the 

car’s license plate numbers.’” 

{¶29} Additionally, an officer may rely upon information collectively 

known to the law enforcement officers involved in the search or 

investigations. Kelley, at ¶ 26. See State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St. 3d 516, 521, 

605 N.E.2d 70 (1992). “An officer need not have knowledge of all the facts 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 16 

necessary to justify [a search], as long as the law enforcement body as a 

whole possesses such facts and the detaining officer reasonably relies upon 

those who possess the facts.” Id. Thus, for example, “[a] radio broadcast 

may provide the impetus for an investigatory stop, even when the officer 

making the stop lacks all of the information justifying the stop.” Id. The 

Ohio Supreme Court has therefore described the relevant Fourth 

Amendment inquiry as “whether the law enforcement community as a whole 

complied with the Fourth Amendment; the entire system is required to 

possess facts justifying the stop or arrest, even though the arresting officer 

does not have those facts.” Id. (citations omitted). As the court explained in 

State v. Royster, 5th Dist. No. 1997CA00372, 1998 WL 351413, (June 1, 

1998) at *3: 

{¶30} “In the case of a common investigation, the knowledge of one 

officer is the knowledge of all, and the collection knowledge of all the 

investigating officers and the available objective facts are the criteria to be 

used in assessing probable cause.” United States v. Stratton (C.A. 1972), 

453 Fed.2d 36, 37 cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1069, 92 S. Ct. 1515. See also, 

State v. Gough, 35 Ohio App.3d 81, 82, 519 N.E.2d 842 (5th Dist.1986) 

(police may rely on collective knowledge in making arrest); State v. Roach, 

8 Ohio App.3d 42, 455 N.E.2d 1328 (12th Dist. 1982) (officer intruding in 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 17 

restroom stall did not have knowledge of defendant’s conduct, but police 

department as a whole had probable cause.)” 

{¶31} In this case, Timberlake testified Appellant, while in the 

cruiser, indicated his cousin was inside the house, yet did not know his 

cousin’s name. Timberlake was also familiar with the house as one where 

drug traffickers had previously resided. The out-of-county rental vehicle was 

discovered in a high-crime area. The tip Timberlake had received contained 

detailed information. The above factors were combined with Appellant’s 

nervous, erratic, and evasive behavior. We agree with the trial court’s 

finding that under the totality of the circumstances, there was reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity to detain Appellant. 

{¶32} Appellant emphasizes the parking ticket was “issued” at 9:32 

and argues the purpose of the traffic stop was effectuated at that point. On 

the subject of the ticket’s “issue,” Hedrick testified “he exited the house and 

we were going to put his name on the ticket is what I planned on doing, and 

I never ended up doing that.” She finished “Because he started acting 

nervous, and Timberlake had him sit on the curb.” Bower testified he did 

not know when the parking ticket was issued. Timberlake first testified 

ticket was issued at 9:32, yet when asked about when the parking ticket was 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 18 

placed on the Malibu, testified, “I don’t know. I didn’t do this parking 

violation.” 

{¶33} We would note the ticket lists “issue” as 9:32 a.m. Appellant 

did not testify so as to clarify his understanding of when the ticket was 

“issued.” Based on Officer Hedrick’s testimony, the inference can be made 

that she began writing the ticket at 9:32 and never fully completed it, due to 

Appellant’s actions which caused him to be detained for the warrants check 

and the unfolding events at the scene. 

 {¶34} In this matter, even if Appellant’s constitutional rights had 

somehow been infringed, which we find has not been the case, the 

independent source doctrine would apply. Evidence discovered in a 

warrantless search is not derived from a constitutional violation if the 

evidence would inevitably have been discovered during the course of a 

lawful investigation. See State v. Perkins, 18 Ohio St. 3d 193, 480 N.E. 2d 

763(1985), syllabus, citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 

2501(1984); State v. Clary, 4th Dist. No. 96CA7, 1996 WL 560522 (Sept. 

30, 1996), at *3. 

{¶35} A lawfully detained vehicle may be subjected to a canine check 

of the vehicle’s exterior even without the presence of a reasonable suspicion 

of drug-related activity. State v. Rusnak, 120 Ohio App.3d 24, 28, 696 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 19 

N.E.2d 633 (6th Dist.1997). Both Ohio courts and the United States 

Supreme Court have determined that “the exterior sniff by a trained 

narcotics dog to detect the odor of drugs is not a search within the meaning 

of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.” State v. Jones, 4th Dist. No. 

03CA61, 2004-Ohio-7280, 2004 WL 3090198, ¶ 24; United States v. Place,

462 U.S. 696, 103 S. Ct. 2367 (1983). Thus, a canine check of a vehicle 

may be conducted during the time period necessary to effectuate the original 

purpose of the stop. Jones, at ¶ 24. But if the individual does not act to 

preserve that privacy, such as by leaving an object in the plain view of the 

public, then the state has not “searched” within the meaning of the 

constitution, because the individual has exposed those objects to others, 

rather than keeping them to himself. Katz, 389 U.S. 361, 88 S. Ct. 507 

(Harland, J., concurring); 1 LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the 

Fourth Amendment (4th Ed.2004) 445-446, Section 2.2; see, also, Texas v. 

Brown, 460 U.S. 730,740, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) (plurality opinion noting 

that a police officer without a warrant is not precluded from viewing what a 

private citizen would be able to view); Buzzard, supra at ¶ 15. “Although 

society generally respects a person’s expectations of privacy in a dwelling, 

what a person chooses voluntarily to expose to public view thereby loses its 

Fourth Amendment protection. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 20 

213, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812-13 (1986); Buzzard, 15. Generally, the police 

are free to observe whatever may be seen from a place where they are 

entitled to be. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696 

(1989).” Buzzard, 15. 

{¶36} In this matter, had Appellant never exited the residence, 

Officer Hedrick would have still come up on the illegally parked vehicle and 

reasonably would have contacted the other officers. Officer Bower would 

have arrived on the scene to conduct a lawful canine sniff of the vehicle 

without permission of Appellant. In fact, Appellant gave permission for the 

officer to conduct the dog sniff of the vehicle, just as the record 

demonstrates he consented to sit in the cruiser and Sherry Dixon consented 

to the search of her residence. Appellant provided no evidence to contradict 

this testimony at the suppression hearing. The trial court found the officers’ 

testimony to be credible. 

{¶37} We agree with the trial court’s finding Appellant’s detention 

and search was lawful under the totality of the circumstances. As such, we 

overrule Appellant’s first assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO 

{¶38} Appellant’s argument that his counsel was ineffective is 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 21 

two-fold. First, Appellant argues his counsel allowed or advised him to 

withdraw a previously entered “no contest” plea and enter a guilty plea, 

thereby waiving his right to appeal the suppression issue. Second, Appellant 

argues his counsel failed to brief and properly argue the suppression motion. 

For the reasons which follow, we disagree with Appellant. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶39} Criminal defendants have a right to counsel, including a right to 

the effective assistance from counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 

759, 770, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970); State v. Stout, 4th Dist. No. 07CA5, 2008-

Ohio-1366, 2008 WL 757521, ¶ 21. To establish constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense and deprived him of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St. 3d 49, 67, 

752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State v. Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 139, 694 N.E.2d 

916 (1998). “In order to show deficient performance, the defendant must 

prove that counsel’s performance fell below an objective level of reasonable 

representation. To show prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006 Ohio-
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 22 

2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 95 (citations omitted). “Failure to establish either 

element is fatal to the claim.” State v. Jones, 4th Dist. No. 06CA3116, 

2008-Ohio-968, 2008 WL 613116, ¶ 14. Therefore, if one element is 

dispositive, a court need not analyze both. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St. 3d 

378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000) (stating that a defendant’s failure to satisfy 

one of the elements “negates a court’s need to consider the other”). 

{¶40} When considering whether trial counsel’s representation 

amounts to deficient performance, “a court must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, “the defendant 

must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. To 

establish prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that a reasonable 

probability exists that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would 

have been different. State v. White, 82 Ohio St.3d 15, 23, 693 N.E.2d 772 

(1998); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), at 

paragraph three of the syllabus. Furthermore, courts may not simply assume 

the existence of prejudice, but must require that prejudice be affirmatively 

demonstrated. See State v. Clark, 4th Dist. No. 02CA684, 2003-Ohio-1707, 

2003 WL 1756101, ¶ 22; State v. Tucker, 4th Dist. No. 01CA2592, 2002-
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 23 

Ohio-1597, 2002 WL 507529, (Apr. 2, 2002); State v. Kuntz, 4th Dist. No. 

1691, 1992 WL 42774, (Feb. 26, 1992). 

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶41} Appellant entered pleas to a charge of trafficking in drugs, 

possession of drugs, and tampering with evidence. At the sentencing 

hearing, the court began by reciting the terms of the agreed sentence: (1) on 

trafficking, Appellant would be sentenced to a five-year mandatory prison 

term; (2) on possession, he would be given a three-year non-mandatory 

prison term; and, (3) on tampering Appellant would receive a two-year 

prison term. The court summarized the terms as running consecutively for a 

ten-year prison term. At this point, the transcript reflects the sentencing was 

interrupted by Appellant’s balking at entering a plea to the agreed sentence. 

 {¶42} As to Appellant’s first contention that his counsel urged him 

to plead guilty, the sentencing hearing transcript demonstrates Appellant’s 

hesitation at entering a plea occurred after the court described the sentence 

and when it added “And there is no agreement at this point in time about a 

judicial release.” Appellant claimed he did not agree to the sentence the 

court described. Although the transcript does not contain Appellant’s request 

to terminate his counsel and hire new counsel, the record reflects a 

discussion in which the State proposed to proceed with the sentencing or 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 24 

revoke Appellant’s bond. The State submitted “He can file a motion to 

withdraw.” Shortly thereafter, the court held a bench conference with 

counsel, then recessed. When court resumed, the trial court addressed 

defense counsel and Appellant, stating, “Now, I’ve already stated on the 

record what the –what the agreement is...is that the agreement?” to which 

both Appellant and his counsel responded affirmatively. The court went on 

to note Houston would be filing an appeal. 

{¶43} We also take note of the judgment entry of sentence dated 

February 8, 2012 states as follows in the first paragraph: 

“This cause came on to be heard on the 4th day of November , 2011, 

upon the request of the Defendant by and through the Defendant’s 

counsel to withdraw a former plea of no contest guilty and enter a plea 

of guilty.” 

 However, the fifth paragraph of the judgment entry of sentence reads: 

“Upon Defendant’s plea of no contest, the Court makes a finding of 

guilty to Count 1 Trafficking in Drugs with a Forfeiture Specification, 

in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2925.03(A)(2)/(C), being a 

felony of the first degree, Count 4 Possession of Drugs, in violation of 

Ohio Revised Code Section 2925.11(A), being a felony of the third 

degree, and County 7 Tampering with Evidence, in violation of Ohio 

Revised Code Section 2921.12(A)(1), being a felony of the third 

degree.” 

In its brief, Appellee State of Ohio sets forth the following on 

page 24: 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 25 

 “The State does not contend that the Appellant entered a guilty plea. 

Rather, the agreement was a no contest plea and the record reflects a nocontest plea. 

 Therefore, there is no issue on the point of a guilty plea.” 

 {¶44} We agree that there is no issue as to counsel’s alleged 

ineffectiveness with regard to Appellant’s plea. Although the first paragraph 

of the judgment entry of sentence indicates Appellant was entering a guilty 

plea, the fifth paragraph indicates a no contest plea. The record reflects there 

was an understanding that Appellant would be filing an appeal. Appellee 

State of Ohio has not countered in its argument in the first assignment of 

error that Appellant waived his rights of appeal on the suppression issue by 

his plea. In fact, Appellee recalls the agreement as on a no contest plea. For 

the above reasons, we agree with Appellee there is no issue as to Appellant’s 

plea. As such, Appellant’s argument that his counsel was ineffective as to 

the plea entered must fail. 

 {¶45} Furthermore, we do not agree with Appellant’s claim his 

counsel was ineffective as relates to the briefing of the suppression motion 

and supplemental filing. Appellant argues the brief was vague and not 

specific as to the actual issue of inordinate detention. Yet, we note State v. 

Chatton, 11 Ohio St. 3d 59, 463 N.E.2d 1237 (1984) was cited in counsel’s 

motion to suppress, along with the language regarding unlawful detentions. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 26 

{¶46} At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, Appellant’s 

counsel requested additional time to brief the issues before the trial court 

rendered its decision. Appellant also argues his counsel’s supplemental 

filing was deficient as counsel “could only muster five paragraphs- one a 

single sentence long.” The supplemental memorandum was filed one day 

after the suppression hearing was concluded. The memorandum contains the 

succinct facts favorable to Appellant and testified to at the hearing, along 

with application of the Chatton case to the facts. We are aware of no 

mandate that memoranda of this nature conform to a certain length in order 

to be effective and moreover, the concise nature of the supplemental filing 

was more likely to be looked upon favorably by any court, given the 

evidence had already been heard. We also note that in co-counsel’s closing 

argument, three times he agreed with arguments and fact pointed out by 

Appellant’s counsel. 

{¶47} “A properly licensed attorney is presumed to execute his duties 

in an ethical and competent manner.” State v. Taylor, 4th Dist. No. 07CA1, 

2008-Ohio-482, 2008 WL 343328, ¶ 10, citing State v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 

98, 100, 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). Therefore, a defendant bears the burden 

to show ineffectiveness by demonstrating that counsel’s errors were so 

serious that he or she failed to function as the counsel guaranteed by the 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 27 

Sixth Amendment. State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006 Ohio-6679, 

860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 62; State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 524 N.E.2d 476 

(1988). 

{¶48} In this matter, the trial court made its decision based on all the 

evidence before it. Appellant has not shown that his counsel’s brief, 

supplemental filing, or conduct was deficient, nor has he overcome the 

presumption that his counsel’s trial strategy was sound. Based on review of 

the record, we find Appellant was not rendered ineffective assistance. As 

such, we overrule the second assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE 

{¶49} Appellant contends the trial court committed plain error 

in sentencing him on three separate charges of similar import, trafficking, 

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)/(C), possession, R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C), and tampering 

with evidence, R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), when he could be found guilty of only 

one offense and sentenced on only one offense. Appellant argues his 

convictions arose from one transaction on one date and time under one case 

number. He requests this Court to order resentencing in this matter. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶50} For a reviewing court to find plain error: 1.) there must 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 28 

be an error, i.e., “a deviation from a legal rule”, 2.) the error must be plain, 

i.e. “an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial court proceedings”; and 3.) the error 

must have affected “substantial rights,” i.e., it must have affected the 

outcome of the proceedings. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 

N.E.2d 1240 (2002); State v. Williams, 4th Dist. No. 11CA3408, 2012-Ohio4693, 2012 WL 4789848, ¶ 19. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio 

has admonished courts that notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be 

taken “’with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only 

to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Id., quoting State v. Long, 53 

Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus; 

Williams, ¶ 19. 

{¶51} When determining whether multiple offenses should have 

merged under R.C. 2941.25, “[o]ur standard of review is de novo.” (Internal 

citations omitted). Williams, supra at ¶ 82. 

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶52} R.C. 2941.25, the multi-count statute provides: 

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 

constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 

indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, 

but the defendant may be convicted of only one. 

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses 

of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more 

offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 29 

separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain 

counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all 

of them. 

As the Supreme Court explained in State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio 

St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, under R.C. 2941.25, “the 

court must determine prior to sentencing whether the offenses were 

committed by the same conduct.” Johnson at ¶ 47. Williams, ¶ 83. The 

initial question is whether it is possible to commit the two offenses with the 

same conduct. Johnson at ¶ 48; Williams at ¶ 83. If so, we must then look 

to the facts of the case and determine whether the two offenses actually were 

committed by the same conduct, “i.e., ‘a single act, committed with a single 

state of mind.’” Johnson at ¶ 49, quoting State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 

447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, at ¶ 50; Williams, at¶ 83. “If the 

answer to both questions is yes, then the offenses are allied offenses of 

similar import and will be merged.” Johnson at ¶ 50; Williams, at ¶ 83. 

 {¶53} “Conversely, if the court determines that the commission of 

one offense will never result in the commission of the other, or if the 

offenses are committed separately, or if the defendant has separate animus 

for each offense, then, according to R.C. 2941.25(B), the offenses will not 

merge.” Johnson at ¶51; Williams at ¶ 84. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 30 

{¶54} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the simultaneous 

possession of different types of controlled substances can constitute multiple 

offenses under R.C.2925.11. State v. Delfino, 22 Ohio St.3d 270, 490 

N.E.2d 884 (1986), at syllabus; State v. Westbrook, 4th Dist. No. 09CA3277, 

2010-Ohio-2692, 2010 WL 2354018, at ¶ 42. R.C. 2925.11(A) states: “No 

person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance.” A 

controlled substance is defined as any substance listed in Schedules I 

through V under R.C. 3719.41 and as amended by R.C.3719.43 and .C. 

3719.44. See R.C. 2925.01(A) and R.C. 3719.01(C); Westbrook at ¶ 42. 

Depending on the type of controlled substance involved, R.C. 2925.11(C) 

provides the title of and penalty for the offense. The legislature clearly 

intended that possession of different drug groups constitutes different 

offenses. Delfino at 274, 490 N.E.2d 884; Westbrook at ¶ 43. 

{¶55} In this case, Appellant was sentenced on count one, trafficking 

in drugs, Oxycodone, a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(e) and count 

four, possession of drugs, Oxymorphone, a violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A)(1)(C)(1). 2

 Oxycodone is listed under R.C. 3719.41(A)(1)(n), 

and is a Schedule II drug. Oxymorphone is also a Schedule II drug, listed 

under R.C. 3719.41(A)(1)(o). Under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) (C)(1)(e), person 

 

2

 We note the complete Revised Code sections are contained in the indictment, not in the judgment entry of 

sentence. The entry also lists Count 4, Possession of Drugs, as a felony of the third degree. Appellee’s 

brief appropriately references the conviction as a felony of the second degree. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 31 

who trafficks a controlled substance if the amount of the drug involved 

equals or exceeds fifth times the bulk amount but is less than one hundred 

times the bulk amount is guilty of “aggravated trafficking in drugs.” 

Oxycodone is a Schedule II controlled substance. R.C. 3719.41 Schedule 

II(A)(1)(n). Appellant committed a first degree felony under R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(e) because the amount of Oxycodone confiscated was 

equal or exceeded fifty times the bulk amount but was less than one hundred 

times the bulk amount. There are cases in which merging allied offenses for 

sentencing may be appropriate, where a person convicted of trafficking in a 

controlled substances also effectively possesses, and is convicted, of that 

same controlled substance. State v. Lewis, 4th Dist. No. 08CA3226, 2008-

Ohio- 6691, 2008 WL 5266102(case remanded for consideration of whether 

possession and trafficking in crack cocaine were committed separately or 

with a separate animus); State v. Westbrook, 4th Dist. No. 09CA3277, 2010 

Ohio – 2692, 2010 WL 2354018 (sentences for possessing and trafficking 

oxycodone vacated and remanded for new sentencing under either R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2) or R.C. 2925.11(A).). 

{¶56} Under R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(c), a person who possesses a 

controlled substance if the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds 

five times the bulk amount but is less than fifty times the bulk amount is 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 32 

guilty of “aggravated possession of drugs.” Oxymorphone is also a Schedule 

II controlled substance. R.C. 3719.41, Schedule II, (A)(1)(o). Appellant 

committed a felony of the second degree under R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(c) 

because the amount of Oxymorphone he possessed equaled or exceeded five 

times the bulk amount but less than fifty times the bulk amount. R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(e) and R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(c) each required proof of 

different facts, i.e., here, the different drugs and different amounts, to 

establish violations of the Revised Code. Therefore, they are not allied 

offenses of similar import. The legislature clearly intended that possession 

of different drug groups constitutes different offenses. Delfino at 274, 490 

N.E.2d 884; Westbrook, at ¶ 43. Here, the facts show that not only are there 

different drugs involved, but also different bulk amounts. Merger as allied 

offenses is simply not correct in this matter. 

 {¶57} Finally, tampering with evidence, R.C. 2921.12, provides as 

follows: 

(A) No person, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation is 

in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall do any of 

the following: 

(1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, 

with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such 

proceeding or investigation; 

(2) Make, present, or use any record, document, or thing, knowing it 

to be false and with purpose to mislead a public official who is or may 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 33 

be engaged in such proceeding or investigation, or with purpose to 

corrupt the outcome of any such proceeding or investigation. 

(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of tampering with 

evidence, a felony of the third degree. 

 The offense of tampering with evidence is not allied to either of the 

above-discussed offenses. 

 {¶58} Appellee has pointed out in its brief, the sentence was an 

agreed sentence, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) 

provides: 

“A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under 

this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been 

recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, 

and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” 

{¶59} Inasmuch as we have determined Appellant’s sentence was 

authorized by law, we also note it was an agreed sentence. The transcript and 

the judgment entry of sentence reflect this. We find no error, let alone plain 

error, in the trial court’s sentencing of Appellant. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶60} Based on the record of the trial court proceedings, we find no 

merit to Appellant’s three assignments of error. We therefore affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 34 

Kline, J., dissenting. 

{¶61} I respectfully dissent because I find that the record is 

ambiguous, confusing, and not certain in itself regarding whether the 

defendant pled guilty or no contest. As a result, I would remand for 

clarification of the record under App.R. 9(E). 
Scioto App. No. 12CA3472 35 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the 

Appellee recover of Appellant costs herein taxed. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing 

the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of 

the date of this entry. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Exceptions. 

Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion. 

Kline, J.: Dissents with Opinion. 

 

 For the Court, 

 BY: _________________________ 

 Matthew W. McFarland 

Presiding Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from 

the date of filing with the clerk.