Filed 3/8/23 Regos v. Reed CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JOHN REGOS et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

JACKIE LYNN REED,

Defendant and Respondent.

B316267

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC710184)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Wendy Chang, Judge. Reversed.

Nordstrom, Steele, Nicolette and Blythe, Alan K. Nicolette 

for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Derryberry & Associates, Alexander L. Massari for 

Defendant and Respondent.

_______________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

This appeal raises the question of whether the wife of a 

deceased attorney has the right to continue to receive annuity 

payments in fulfillment of an attorney fees award that her 

husband procured in excess of the court’s jurisdiction. Despite 

the passage of time, we conclude the answer is no.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts necessary to resolve this matter are not in 

dispute. 

1. Underlying case of Regos v. Ransom

In 2003, Mary Louise Ebanal

1 (then Regos) was separating 

from her partner Victor Ransom. With her minor children John 

Regos, Jr. and Jenifer2 Regos, she went to the family home to 

remove her belongings. John Regos, Sr., who was her ex-husband 

and the father of her two children, assisted her. Ransom 

appeared and threatened Ebanal and John Regos, Jr. with a gun. 

When Regos Sr. approached, Ransom shot and killed him. 

Ransom is currently in prison for that murder.

Ebanal became the sole source of support for herself and 

her children. While working as a limo driver, she met attorney 

Brian Reed. Reed offered to represent her and her children in a 

wrongful death action against Ransom. Ebanal had no money to 

pay Reed for his services, and Reed told her that they would work 

that out later. Ebanal knew that Reed was not representing 

1 This name is spelled in various ways in the record. Because it 

is spelled “Ebanal” by appellants on appeal, we use that spelling. 

2 This name is also spelled differently in various parts of the 

record. Because it is spelled “Jenifer” by appellants on appeal, 

we use that spelling. 
3

them for free. However, there was no written fee agreement for 

legal services between Reed and Ebanal or her children.

In 2003, Ebanal, John Regos Jr. and Jenifer Regos (the 

Regos plaintiffs) filed a wrongful death action against Ransom. 

Reed represented the plaintiffs. The complaint stated claims 

against Ransom for wrongful death, negligence, intentional 

infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of 

emotional distress.

3 The complaint sought compensatory and 

punitive damages, but did not seek attorney fees, or set forth any 

statutory basis for attorney fees. 

Ransom defaulted in that action. Reed prepared a default 

judgment packet and proposed judgment against Ransom. The 

only evidence offered in support of the proposed judgment were

declarations by each plaintiff. Nothing was presented that 

related to Reed’s entitlement to fees.

In 2004, the trial judge held a default prove-up and 

according to the resulting minute order, awarded the following:

(a) compensatory damages of $1 million to each minor plaintiff

and $350,000 to Ebanal; (b) punitive damages of $100,000 to 

John Regos, Jr., $75,000 to Jenifer Regos, and $50,000 to Ebanal; 

(c) restitution; and (d) $524.50 for “costs plus attorney fees.” 

Reed then submitted a proposed judgment. The judgment 

included the following language: “the Court finds that counsel for 

the Plaintiffs shall receive 25 [percent] of all sums received by 

each minor as and for attorneys’ fees and an amount equal to 33 

1/3 [percent] plus costs from all amounts received by Mary Louise 

Regos, as an individual.” 

3 A fifth claim against the County of Los Angeles for failure to 

provide police services was dismissed after demurrer. 
4

The judgment was signed and filed on November 22, 2004. 

Reed timely advised the plaintiffs of the terms of the judgment 

and they did not express disagreement. The judgment was 

renewed by Reed on November 21, 2014. 

2. The annuity and enforcement of the 

judgment

The only asset that Ransom possessed from which he could 

pay the judgment was a monthly annuity that he had been 

awarded prior to the events leading to the wrongful death action. 

Prior to their separation, Ebanal and Ransom had been in an

auto accident. The resolution of that case resulted in a 

structured settlement whereby Ransom was to receive a $2,000 

monthly annuity payment for the rest of his life. 

After the judgment in Regos was entered, the court 

approved a stipulation between the Regos plaintiffs and Farmers

New World Life and Farmers Services Company (collectively,

Farmers) to permit the Regos plaintiffs to enforce their judgment 

through Ransom’s $2,000 monthly annuity payment. That 

stipulation was entered into by Reed on behalf of the Regos

plaintiffs and by an attorney who represented Farmers. None of 

the plaintiffs signed that stipulation.

Paragraph 2 of that stipulation and order was altered by 

interlineation. The original language read as follows: 

“Intervenors/Defendants will pay the $2,000 monthly payments 

by check payable to Brian E. Reed, John Louis Regos, Jr., Mary 

Louise Regos, individually and as guardian ad litem, for Jenifer 

Louise Regos and shall mail the check to Brian E. Reed.” 

The interlineation struck out the names of the payees and 

replaced the payee with “Brian E. Reed Trust Account.” It 

further added a sentence at the end of that paragraph as follows: 
5

“Mr. Reed will then distribute the sums received to the plaintiffs 

and shall receive his attorney’s fees from each payment.” Only 

the attorneys initialed the interlineations. The stipulation was 

signed as an order of the court on September 22, 2005. 

Reed timely advised the Regos plaintiffs of this 

arrangement and they did not express disagreement with it. 

3. The current dispute and interpleader 

For more than 12 years thereafter, Farmers sent the $2,000 

monthly annuity check to Reed, and Reed deducted $500 from 

each such payment, passing the remainder on to the Regos

plaintiffs.

4 

Reed died in March 2017.5 

After Reed’s death, his widow, Jackie Lynn Reed, wrote to 

Farmers to inform them that her husband had died. Unable to 

cash the checks made out to her husband’s trust account, she 

returned three of the garnishment checks that had been received 

after her husband’s death and sought reissuance of the checks in 

her name. Farmers declined to do so without proof of her 

entitlement as a successor or a court order. Farmers also 

declined to pay any amount directly to the Regos plaintiffs. 

4 It is undisputed that Reed took a flat 25 percent of the monthly 

annuity, despite the judgment’s provision that he was entitled to 

take 33.3 percent of the proceeds that were received by one of the 

three plaintiffs; namely, Ebanal. 

5 The parties also stipulated that Reed was on inactive status as 

of November 2015. Although the Regos plaintiffs argued that 

this made him ineligible for further attorney fee payments as of 

that time, the trial court rejected this argument, finding that he 

fully earned his fee award when he performed the services in the 

Regos v. Ransom case in 2004 and 2005. 
6

In June 2018, the three Regos plaintiffs (all of whom were 

now adults) filed a complaint for declaratory relief against Jackie 

Lynn Reed and Farmers as well as damages for conversion 

against Farmers. They claimed that the entirety of the $2,000 

annuity payments should now be paid to them and that Jackie 

Lynn Reed had no right to payments as her husband’s successor. 

They did not challenge or seek to disgorge the payments that had 

already been made to attorney Reed. They sought relief in the 

form of “a declaration of the parties’ respective duties, rights, and 

responsibilities concerning the $2000/month Ransom annuity 

payments” and “modification of the September 22, 2005 [o]rder to 

require that the $2000/month Ransom annuity payments be 

made directly to [p]laintiffs.” 

Farmers then filed a cross-complaint in interpleader 

against the Regos plaintiffs and Jackie Lynn Reed. Farmers 

admitted that it owed $2,000 per month but alleged that the 

cross-defendants’ respective claims were adverse and conflicted

with the 2005 Stipulation and Order requiring the check to be 

made payable to the Brian Reed trust account. 

Reed then filed her cross-complaint against the Regos

plaintiffs, alleging a single cause of action for declaratory relief. 

In that cross-complaint, Jackie Lynn Reed asserted her right to 

25 percent of all sums awarded to each minor and 33 1/3 percent

of the sums awarded to Mary Louise Regos, for a total of

$685,250 in attorney fees. After providing credits for sums paid 

to Reed pursuant to the stipulation in the amount of $500/month, 

she claimed to still be owed “more than $600,000.” She sought in 

her prayer for relief that each future annuity payment of $2,000 

be awarded in its entirety to her husband’s estate until that debt 

was satisfied. 
7

The claims against Farmers were resolved and Farmers 

was dismissed from the litigation, still waiting for instructions on 

whom to pay the interpleaded funds. 

The matter came on for bench trial in June 2021 as 

between the Regos plaintiffs and Jackie Lynn Reed. No live 

testimony was taken; the parties submitted stipulated facts, 

testimonial evidence by way of declarations, and referred to or 

incorporated prior declarations filed in either this case or in the 

prior Regos action which the court accepted into evidence. 

The trial court ruled in favor of Jackie Lynn Reed. It found 

that although there was no written attorney fee agreement that 

would support an award of contingency fees, the court during the 

default action must have intended to award the fees to Reed on a 

quantum meruit basis. The court further concluded that even if 

the prior judge had no legal authority to make the award, the 

judgment should have been timely challenged by means of a

motion for reconsideration, motion to vacate, or an appeal. 

Finally, the court concluded that the 13-year delay between the 

date of the default judgment and the date the Regos plaintiffs 

filed their complaint was “fatal” to their claims under the 

doctrine of laches.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review

This case involves the interplay between various methods 

of challenging a judgment, entitlement to attorney fees in the 

absence of a written agreement, and the equitable doctrines of 

laches. 

We agree with appellants that the standard of review here 

is de novo. (International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Fedderson & Co.
8

(1995) 9 Cal.4th 606, 611 [where the relevant facts are not in 

dispute, we review the application of law to those facts as a 

question of law, and hence, de novo]; Bakersfield Elementary 

Teachers Assn. v. Bakersfield City School Dist. (2006) 145 

Cal.App.4th 1260, 1274 [“Laches is a question of fact for the trial 

court, but may be decided as a matter of law where, as here, the 

relevant facts are undisputed”].)

6

B. The Regos plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory 

relief 

1. That portion of the 2004 judgment 

regarding attorney fees is void because 

the court lacked jurisdiction 

The Regos plaintiffs’ fundamental argument on appeal, as 

it was below, is that the original award of attorney fees in the 

2004 judgment was void because the court had no jurisdiction to 

make that award. As the fee award was void, they contend, the 

subsequent stipulation and order that purported to grant 

attorney Reed the ability to receive his attorney’s fees from each 

payment was also void.

We agree. The California Supreme Court has consistently 

held that a judgment is void to the extent that a court lacks 

jurisdiction. (In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 56 

[a judgment is void when the court “lack[s] fundamental 

6 Respondent does not dispute that this is the proper standard of 

review. (Cf. Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656

[“appellant must present each point separately in the opening 

brief under an appropriate heading, showing the nature of the 

question to be presented and the point to be made; otherwise, the 

point will be forfeited”].) 
9

authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party”]; 

Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 950 [“Collateral 

attack is proper to contest lack of personal or subject matter 

jurisdiction or the granting of relief which the court has no power 

to grant”]; Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 574 [“a court 

has inherent power, apart from statute, to correct its records by 

vacating a judgment which is void on its face, for such a 

judgment is a nullity and may be ignored”].)7

The jurisdictional error in this case was to provide relief to 

a nonparty (attorney Reed) regarding a matter that was never 

put to it (the fee award). 

“ ‘A judgment in favor of a person who is not a party to the 

action is obviously beyond the authority of the court’ and hence is 

void.” (Moore v. Kaufman (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 604, 615; 2 

Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2022) Jurisdiction, § 331, p. 937.) 

In Overell v. Overell (1937) 18 Cal.App.2d 499 (Overell), a 

very similar fact pattern to the case at bar was presented. In a 

quiet title action, a judgment was entered which included a 

7 The Regos plaintiffs contend that the award of attorney fees was 

a clerical error that can be corrected nunc pro tunc. We disagree. 

“ ‘The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is 

“whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in 

recording the judgment rendered.” ’ ” (Ukegawa Brothers v. 

Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1314, 

1318.) Here, it appears from the minute order that the judge did 

render a decision for “costs plus attorney fees.” The judgment 

then fleshed out in more detail the fees that were owed. Thus, we 

find the case of Estate of Goldberg (1938) 10 Cal.2d 709, 715–716, 

cited by Ebanal, inapplicable. Instead, however, we find the 

error to have been a judicial one that led to a partially void 

judgment. 
10

provision that plaintiff’s attorney was entitled to 25 percent of 

the amounts recovered on behalf of the plaintiff as well as 25

percent of some other items of property. 

The court agreed with the client that this provision was 

void, noting: “The judgment purports to adjudicate and establish 

the rights of the attorney under the agreement as against his 

client. This, of course, could have been done only after the trial of 

an action in which the parties to the agreement had been given 

an opportunity to present their respective demands and . . . 

defenses. . . . It could not be done ex parte nor in a summary 

manner. . . . One who is not originally a party can become a party 

only by order of court upon proper application. [Citation.] A 

judgment must be confined to matters which have been placed in 

issue by the parties and those which are necessarily involved.” 

(Overell, supra, 18 Cal.App.2d at pp. 502–503.) The court 

concluded that while any fee dispute could undoubtedly have 

been resolved in a separate action, there was nothing in the 

judgment roll to show “even remotely, that the court had 

jurisdiction to render any judgment as between [client] and her 

attorney.” (Id. at p. 503; accord Wong v. Superior Court (1966) 

246 Cal.App.2d 541, 546 [“Attorney Wong is not a party to the

action. ‘It is the general rule that a judgment may not be entered 

either for or against a person who is not a party to the 

proceeding, and any judgment which does so is void to that 

extent.’ ”]; Moore v. Kaufman, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 614–

616 [judgment requiring attorney to pay other party’s attorney 

fees was void where attorney was not a party to the action and in 

the absence of statutory authority].) 

In Bandy v. Mt. Diablo Unified School Dist. (1976) 56 

Cal.App.3d 230, a discharged attorney filed a motion for attorney 
11

fees and a lien for fees and costs advanced in his former client’s 

underlying case. After a hearing, the court granted the 

attorney’s motion. On appeal, the court reversed, finding that an 

attorney’s lien against the prospective recovery of a client upon 

his claim “must be enforced . . . in an independent action by the 

attorney against the client and the attorney has no right to 

intervene in the main action to which he is not a party.” (Id. at 

p. 234.) The court found that the judgment granting the attorney 

fees made in the main action was therefore void. (Ibid.)

Here, attorney Reed was not a party to this action, nor did 

he ever file any motion or petition for attorney fees – even 

assuming that he had a statutory basis to do so. As in Overell, 

the judgment is void to the extent it “purports to adjudicate and 

establish the rights of the attorney under the agreement as 

against his client” without notice and an opportunity for both 

parties to present their respective demands and defenses. 

(Overell, supra, 18 Cal.App.2d at p. 502.) “Due process of law 

does not permit an attorney to step out of his fiduciary role 

temporarily and obtain a judgment for his own benefit against his 

client.” (Wong v. Superior Court, supra, 246 Cal.App.2d at 

p. 549.)

In addition to lacking jurisdiction over a nonparty, the 

court also lacked jurisdiction over the issue of the distribution of 

the proceeds between plaintiffs and their lawyer. 

In Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito

(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, the court held that a judgment is void 

when the court grants relief beyond its authority to grant. There, 

the judgment was found void because the trial court had no 

power to grant relief as to any tax payment for which there was 

not a timely claim for refund. (Id. at p. 36; see also Heidary v. 
12

Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 862–864 [judgment void 

when the court had no power to order entry of default when 

defendants failed to appear for trial despite being served].)

In the context of default judgments, Code of Civil Procedure 

section 580 provides that the “relief granted to the plaintiff, if 

there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the 

complaint . . . [or in a statement of damages].” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 580.) A default judgment entered in violation of that statute is 

void “ ‘because it is beyond the court’s jurisdiction to enter.’ ” 

(Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 798.) 

Relying on Code of Civil Procedure section 580, our 

Supreme Court has held that a judgment was void where, among 

other things, it awarded $2,500 in attorney fees where attorney 

fees were not included in the prayer for relief. (Becker v. S.P.V. 

Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 491, 495.)

Many cases have come to the same conclusion. (Burtnett v. 

King (1949) 33 Cal.2d 805, 807 [judgment void where court 

“wholly lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment affecting the 

community property, for there was no demand for such relief”]; 

see also Swycaffer v. Swycaffer (1955) 44 Cal.2d 689, 693 [default 

judgment that exceeds the demand or gives relief where no 

demand is made therefor is void].)

Moreover, if the judgment is only partially void, and the 

void part is severable, that part alone may be collaterally 

attacked, and the remainder will remain effective. (Becker v. 

S.P.V. Construction Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 495 [remanding 

case to the trial court with directions to modify the judgment by 

striking the attorney fees].)

Here, there was no basis for attorney fees set forth in the 

prayer for relief, the request for default, and no motion or 
13

petition for attorney fees was ever filed. Accordingly, the court 

awarded relief in excess of its jurisdiction.

For all these reasons, we agree with the Regos plaintiffs 

that the portion of the judgment awarding a percentage to Reed 

was void. 

2. The attorney fee award cannot be 

justified as a determination of quantum 

meruit

The trial court concluded that even though there was no 

request made for attorney fees in the Regos v. Ransom matter, 

and no evidence of how much the attorney should have received

in the absence of any written contingency agreement, the 

provision in the judgment was a valid “quantum meruit finding” 

by the original Regos v. Ransom judge, as he “was in the best 

position to determine the value [of] that work.” Upon closer 

examination, this conclusion does not withstand scrutiny for the 

same reasons as described above. 

The general principles applicable to enforcement of an 

attorney’s fee in the absence of a written agreement are not in 

dispute. “Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by 

statute, the measure and mode of compensation . . . is left to the 

agreement, express or implied, of the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 1021.)

California law sets forth several requirements for an 

attorney to represent a client on a contingency fee basis. As 

relevant here, Business and Professions Code section 6147,

subdivision (a) requires that the contract be in writing; that it 

include a statement of the contingency fee rate that the attorney 

and client have agreed on; that it state how disbursement and 

costs will affect the client’s recovery; and that it states that the 
14

fee is not set by law but is negotiable between the attorney and 

the client. (Ibid.) Failure to comply with any provision of this 

section renders the agreement voidable8 at the option of the

client, and the attorney shall thereupon be entitled to collect a 

reasonable fee. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6147, subd. (b).)9

However, while it is true that an attorney is entitled to 

quantum meruit in the absence of a valid written contingency fee 

agreement, that dispute must be squarely raised and adjudicated, 

and cannot be decided sub silentio by approving a default 

judgment in which the issue was never mentioned in any 

pleadings.

“[W]hen legal services have been provided without a valid 

written fee agreement, the attorney may recover the reasonable 

value of the services she performed in the action pursuant to a 

common count for quantum meruit.” (Leighton v. Forster (2017) 8 

8 Voidable is distinct from void: A voidable act may be rendered 

null at the option of the wronged party, but is not void until so 

entered. (Depner v. Joseph Zukin Blouses (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 

124, 127; White Dragon Productions, Inc. v. Performance 

Guarantees, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 163, 172 [same].)

9 There is no statute of limitations or other “timeliness 

component” for a client who seeks to void an agreement that fails 

to comply with section 6147. (O&C Creditors Group, LLC v. 

Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 546, 576.) 

It may be voided before or after services are provided. (Alderman 

v. Hamilton (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1038 [clients waived 

their right to void the entire contract by agreeing to pay the 

contingency relating to one part of their case but exercised their 

right to void it when they denied that the contract was 

enforceable and refused to pay any more to attorney for a 

different issue].) 
15

Cal.App.5th 467, 490.) There is a two-year statute of limitations, 

which commences on either the date the last payment was made 

toward the attorney fees, or the last date that the attorney 

performed services in the case. (Ibid.) A claim for quantum 

meruit is considered an action at law, not in equity. (Chodos v. 

Borman (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 76, 97.) The parties to a 

quantum meruit claim have a right to a jury trial. (Jogani v. 

Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 901, 907.) 

For that reason, disputes as to the appropriate amount 

owed under quantum meruit involve cases between the attorney 

and the client. (See, e.g., Wiley v. Silsbee (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d 

520, 521–522 [in case brought by attorney against former client, 

attorney was entitled to quantum meruit even though their 

contract was void as against public policy]; Iverson, Yoakum, 

Papiano & Hatch v. Berwald (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 990, 996 [in 

case brought by attorney against former client, contract was 

unenforceable because not in writing; an action will lie upon a 

common count for quantum meruit and two year statute of 

limitations applies].)

Jackie Lynn Reed argues first, that attorney Reed was 

entitled to recover fees under a quantum meruit analysis, and 

second, that the case of Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 

572 (Flannery) provides a basis to hold that the clients here 

should not able to cut off the attorney’s fee award despite the lack 

of a written fee agreement.

As to the first argument, as noted above, Reed was 

certainly entitled to seek his fees in quantum meruit by filing an

action and supporting his claim with appropriate evidence. 

(Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 
16

257, 272 [setting forth factors to be considered in awarding fees 

in quantum meruit action].) He did not do so. 

As for Flannery, the case is inapposite. In that case, the 

California Supreme Court held that, in the absence of an 

enforceable agreement to the contrary, any attorney fees obtained 

under Government Code section 12965 (the Fair Employment 

and Housing Act) belong to the attorney, not the client. In that 

case, a client brought an action against her attorneys seeking a 

judicial declaration that she was entitled to the statutory 

attorney fee awarded in an earlier action. (Flannery, supra, 26 

Cal.4th at p. 576.) In the earlier action, a motion for statutory 

attorney fees had been filed in the original action for employment 

discrimination on the grounds of both Government Code section 

12965 as well as Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which 

resulted in a fee award payable by the defendant. (Flannery, at 

p. 576; see also Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 

Cal.App.4th 629, 632 [“Plaintiff moved for attorney fees and 

expenses”].) The fees were then put at issue in a subsequent case 

brought by client against the attorney. (Flannery v. California 

Highway Patrol, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.) The only 

dispute in that second action was whether the fees belonged to 

the client or the attorney in the absence of an agreement.

Here, by contrast, there was no attorney’s fee award 

requested in the underlying action, nor was there ever a 

proceeding between attorney and client in which the issue of 

division of the proceeds or entitlement to fees was ever litigated

(until these declaratory relief actions were filed). Again, while 

Reed surely would have had a strong case for quantum meruit 
17

had he ever filed one, he did not.10 The trial court below erred by 

finding that the fee award could stand despite this fundamental 

flaw.

C. The Regos plaintiffs’ challenge was not 

untimely

Respondent’s brief comes close to conceding the impropriety of 

the initial fee award but leans heavily on the trial court’s finding 

that any challenge is time-barred. We disagree.

1. A challenge to a void judgment can be 

brought at any time

As the lower court held, the Regos plaintiffs’ attack on the 

2004 judgment was brought long after the statutory periods set 

forth in many if not all modes of direct attack, whether a motion 

for reconsideration (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008 [10 days]); a motion 

to vacate for relief from default (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b) 

[six months]; but see § 473, subd. (d))

11; or an appeal (Cal. Rules 

of Court, rule 8.104 [generally 60 days].) 

10 The Regos plaintiffs are not seeking return of the 

approximately $80,000 received by Reed prior to his death. As 

the matter is not presented to us, we do not opine as to attorney 

Reed’s estate’s ability to obtain a quantum meruit award or what 

that amount might be.

11 Some courts have held that a motion brought under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which provides that 

the court may “on motion of either party after notice to the other 

party, set aside any void judgment or order” may be brought after 

the normal six-month period set forth in subdivision (b) where a 

judgment was void because the court lacked jurisdiction. (Sindler 

v. Brennan (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1353.)
18

However, the court below erred when it concluded that 

because those statutory periods had passed, it lacked the power 

to vacate or change a judgment issued by another trial court. 

“When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an 

ensuing judgment is void, and ‘thus vulnerable to direct or 

collateral attack at any time.’ ”12 (People v. American Contractors 

Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660; Plaza Hollister Ltd. 

Partnership v. County of San Benito, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 19 [“ ‘a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which 

12 For purposes of this appeal, we need not delve into the complex 

distinction between a collateral or direct attack on a judgment, 

referred to by one commentator as “one of the most obscure areas 

of procedural law.” (Comment, The Value of the Distinction 

Between Direct and Collateral Attacks on Judgments (1957) 66 

Yale L.J. 526.) Suffice it to say that under California law, a 

direct attack is a proceeding instituted for the specific purpose of 

vacating or reversing a judgment such as by a motion for new 

trial or appeal; it is the only method for attacking a judgment 

which, no matter how erroneous it may be, was within the 

jurisdiction of the court. (8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2022) 

Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §§ 1–2, pp. 584–585.)

By contrast, a collateral attack is made not in a proceeding 

brought for the specific purpose of attacking the judgment, but in 

some other proceeding in which the judgment comes up only 

incidentally; in such a proceeding the judgment may be 

challenged only if it is so completely invalid as to require no 

ordinary review to annul it. (8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 

2022) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §§ 6–7, pp. 590–591.) 

“A motion to vacate or set aside the judgment, if made after the 

statutory time has elapsed for direct attack by motion, or if made 

on grounds or under a procedure not authorized by the statutes 

governing direct attack, is a collateral attack.” (Id. at § 8, 

pp. 592–593.)
19

requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show 

its invalidity, may be set aside on motion, at any time after its 

entry, by the court which rendered the judgment or made the 

order’ ”];

13 Wells Fargo & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco

(1944) 25 Cal.2d 37, 40 [“a motion to vacate a judgment, made 

after the expiration of the six-month period allowed in section 

473 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a motion to set aside a 

default judgment, is governed by the rules applicable to collateral 

attack. [Citations.] In the absence of extrinsic fraud or mistake 

[citation] a judgment so attacked cannot be set aside unless it is 

void on its face”].)

Given the viability of challenging a void judgment as 

described above, the cases cited by the court are simply not on 

point. (In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 426–427 [one 

judge should not correct another judge’s prejudgment orders]; 

Elsea v. Saberi (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 625, 630–631 [one judge 

should not grant motion to set aside default judgment when a 

prior judge had already rejected an prior request to set it aside, 

alleging the same basis for relief, which was then pending on 

appeal at the time the second motion was filed]; Church of 

Scientology v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1070 [trial 

court erred in vacating, on its own motion, a prior judge’s order 

sealing the record, during the proceedings].)

13 The judgment roll in a civil action where judgment was entered 

by default, as occurred here, is defined as: the summons, proof of 

service, complaint, the request for entry of default, and the 

judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 670, subd. (a).) 
20

Here, we conclude that the attorney’s fee portion of the 

judgment is void on the face of the record (i.e., by reference to 

who the parties were and what relief was sought as set forth in 

the judgment roll) and hence could be challenged at any time. 

2. The court erred in concluding that laches 

barred relief for the Regos plaintiffs

The trial court here held that “the thirteen-year delay 

Plaintiffs waited to assert their objections is fatal to their current 

claims. . . . Laches may be found where there is 1) an omission to 

assert a right; 2) a delay in assertion of that right for some 

applicable period, and 3) circumstances which would cause 

prejudice to an adverse party if assertion of the right is 

permitted. (Stafford v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 289, 

296.) All elements are met in this matter. Plaintiffs accepted the 

payment arrangements under the 2004 Judgment and the 

Stipulation and refrained from asserting their objections for 13 

years.”

The affirmative defense of laches requires “unreasonable 

delay in bringing suit ‘plus either acquiescence in the act about 

which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting 

from the delay.’ ” (Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 

Cal.3d 614, 624.)14 

14 Although some cases omit the word “unreasonable” when 

stating the delay prong, analysis of those cases shows that the 

delay was in fact found to be unreasonable. In Stafford, for 

example, the party who delayed filing a claim had both full 

knowledge that the other part refused to complete the sale (the 

basis for his claim) and also had no disability; thus, the court 

held there was no reason not to enforce the statute of limitations. 

(Stafford v. Ballinger, supra, 199 Cal.App.2d at p. 295.)
21

However, laches does not apply when a judgment is void. 

In an action seeking to vacate a judgment which is void for lack of 

jurisdiction of the court to enter it, the judgment is “for all 

purposes a nullity” in that regard. (City of Los Angeles v. Morgan

(1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 726, 732.) Accordingly, “neither laches nor 

the ordinary statutes of limitation may be invoked as a defense.” 

(Ibid.) “Prejudice is not a factor” when a challenged order is void.

(Sindler v. Brennan, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1354; see also 

Sugimoto v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V. (1991) 233 

Cal.App.3d 165, 170 [“Prejudice is irrelevant to the issue of 

jurisdiction”].)

Since we conclude that this judgment was in fact void, 

laches may not be invoked as a defense at all, regardless of any 

prejudice.

Even if laches were a defense in this case, though, the 

finding of laches could not be upheld. While some cases define 

unreasonable delay as delay which results in prejudice (see

George v. Shams-Shirazi (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 134, 142), most 

focus either implicitly or explicitly on whether a party’s delay was 

otherwise justifiable or not attributable to that party. (See, e.g., 

Potter v. Contra Costa Realty Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 31, 34 [delay in 

asserting rights justified when the defaulting party represented 

he would make good his default]; Highland Springs Conference & 

Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267, 

286, fn. 5 [comment in Restatement of Judgments § 129 subd. (b) 

explains that establishing a defense of laches requires not merely 

a “ ‘lapse of time’ ” but a showing that the party seeking relief has 

been “ ‘unreasonable in his delay after learning the facts’ ”].) 

When the delay is due to the conduct of another party – in 

particular, the opposing party in the litigation – the party 
22

causing the delay cannot take advantage of its own conduct by 

raising the defense of laches. (See Bakersfield Elementary 

Teachers Assn. v. Bakersfield City School Dist., supra, 145

Cal.App.4th at p. 1275 [“The District may not now complain the 

temporary employees waited too long to assert a right the District 

misled them into believing they had already given up. [Footnote.] 

‘One who comes into equity must come with clean hands.’ ”].)

Laches is even less likely to apply when a party was 

prevented from learning all the relevant facts by a fiduciary, such 

as one’s attorney. “[A] fiduciary has a duty to make a full and 

fair disclosure of all facts which materially affect the rights and 

interest of the parties, and, where a fiduciary relationship exists, 

facts which would ordinarily require investigation may not excite

suspicion.” (Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540, 559–

560.) In such a case, “a plaintiff need not disprove that an earlier 

discovery could have been made upon a diligent inquiry but need 

show only that he made an actual discovery of hitherto unknown 

information within the statutory period before filing the action.” 

(Id. at p. 563; see also Hudson v. Foster (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 

640, 667 [“A plaintiff who has no duty to inquire because of a 

fiduciary relationship does not need to show that he or she could 

not have discovered the facts earlier with a diligent inquiry”].)

Attorney Reed was a fiduciary of the Regos plaintiffs. 

Given his duty to make a full and fair disclosure of all facts which 

materially affected his client’s rights, the Regos plaintiffs are not 

obligated to prove that they could have earlier discovered that 

the attorney’s fee award was void. They brought their action 

within 15 months after Reed passed away and once his widow 

made known her position on her entitlement to the attorney fees, 

presumably with advice from a new attorney. Thus, even if 
23

laches were a defense to an attack on a void judgment, the court 

erred in finding that laches should bar the plaintiffs’ claims in 

the unusual circumstances presented here.
24

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment 

in favor of John Louis Regos, Jr., Jenifer Regos, and Mary Louise 

Ebanal on the first cause of action of their complaint against 

Jackie Lynn Reed, including the declaration that they alone are 

entitled to receive 100 percent of the $2,000 monthly annuity 

payments since the date of Brian Reed’s death and going forward,

and against Jackie Lynn Reed on her cross-complaint. The court 

is further ordered to modify the September 22, 2005 order to 

provide payment directly to appellants. The appellants are 

entitled to their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.*

WE CONCUR:

LAVIN, Acting P.J.

EGERTON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.