1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ABDOLJAVAD SHAHNIA, et al. , Plaintiffs ,

v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al. , Defendants

. Case No. 1:23-cv-2337 (ACR)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs are Iranian citizens who have appl ied for immigrant visas to move to the United States. In April 2023, consular officers refused Pl aintiffs’ applications pending further administrative processing. After four months wit hout further developments, Plaintiffs joined the tidal wave of litigants in this District chal lenging visa-processing dela ys. Understandable as Plaintiffs’ frustration may be, their Complaint do es not state any plausible claims. The Court therefore dismisses this case without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND A. Legal Background A U.S. citizen who wants to help a nonciti zen relative obtain lawful permanent resident status may file an I-130 Petition for Alien Re lative with U.S. Citi zenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a subagency of th e Department of Homeland Security. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154; 8 C. F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). If USCIS approves the petition and the beneficiary relative is outside the United Stat es, the agency forwards the case to the State Department’s National Visa Center (NVC) fo r processing. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(3). The beneficiary relative must then submit additional paperwork, incl uding a visa application form.2 See 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.62-.63; 9 Foreign Affs. Manu al § 504.1-2(b), https://fam.state.gov/FAM/ 09FAM/09FAM050401.html [https://perma.cc/B6J7-Q 748]. Once the applicant (that is, the beneficiary relative) meets t hose requirements, the NVC coor dinates with the appropriate consulate or embassy to schedule the applic ant for a required consular interview. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.62; 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(b)-(d). Following the interview, the consular officer “must” generally either “issue the visa” or “refuse the visa.” 1 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). If the consular officer determines that she needs additional information to determine the appli cant’s eligibility, she may, “in accordance with [State] Department procedures,” refuse the vi sa pending “further administrative processing.” Administrative Processing Information , U.S. Dep’t of State, http s://travel.state.gov/content/ travel/en/us-visas/visa-inform ation-resources /administrative-proces sing-information.html [https://perma.cc/WVZ8-GRT8]. B. Factual Background The Court takes the facts from Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC , 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Plaintiff Abdoljavad Shahnia is an Iranian ci tizen, as is his stepson, co-Plaintiff Shahryar Shahnia. Dkt. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 9. Abdoljava d’s wife, Arezou Akhyari, is a U.S. citizen. 2 Id. In June 2021, Akhyari filed an I-130 petition on Plaintiffs’ behalf. Id. ¶ 10. In September 2021, USCIS approved the petition a nd forwarded it to the NVC. Id. ¶ 11; Dkt. 1-6 at 8. “Plaintiffs

1 The consular officer must instead “discontinue granting the visa” if the applicant’s country is subject to visa sanctions under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d) . 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). No party argues that such sanctions apply to Iran.

2 The Complaint does not specify the relationshi p between Akhyari and Shahryar; Plaintiffs’ Opposition refers to her as his stepmother. Dkt. 5 at 17.3 submitted . . . online . . . [v]isa [a]pplication” fo rms in January 2022. 3 Compl. ¶¶ 5, 12. Consular officials at the U.S. Embassy in Yere van, Armenia, interviewed Plaintiffs on April 6,
2023. Id. ¶ 13. “After the interview, Plaintiff[s] received a notice . . . that their [a]pplications had been ‘refused’ . . . [pending fu rther] administrative processing.” Id. ¶ 14. Consular officials requested that Plaintiffs pr ovide additional information, which Plaintiffs submitted. 4 Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs have received no furt her “explanation or justification for the delay,” which remains ongoing. Id. ¶ 16. C. Procedural Background Plaintiffs filed this case against the U.S. Department of State and Secretary of State Anthony J. Blinken in August 2023. Compl. Citing both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706, and the Manda mus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Complaint asserts that the delay in in ad judicating Plaintiffs’ applications is unreasonable and requests an order requiring prompt adjudi cation. Compl. ¶¶ 28-45; id. at 10. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in October 2023. Dkt. 4 (Mot.).

3 The parties oscillate between referring to a sing le “application” and to multiple “applications.” Compare, e.g. , Compl. ¶ 12, and Dkt. 4 at 2 (singular), with Compl. ¶ 14, and Dkt. 4 at 9 (plural). The Court’s best reading of the filings is that, in State Department parlance, Plaintiffs each submitted an application, see, e.g. , Dkt. 5 at 1-2; see also 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1 (describing application process), and the Court therefore uses th e plural. This numerosity nit makes no substantive difference; the Court’s conclusions woul d not change if Plaintiffs submitted only one joint application.

4 Plaintiffs do not state when th ey submitted this information. See Compl. ¶ 15. They cite an exhibit to the Complaint as “confirm[ing Defendants’] receipt” of the supplemental submissions, id. , but all the dates in th at exhibit are from before April 2023, Dkt. 1-6 at 24-26, so it is hard to see how Plaintiffs could have submitted the listed documents in response to post-interview inquiries. The Court does not dwell on this point, however, because even if Plaintiffs answered all follow-up questions on the day they intervie wed, the delay still would not be unreasonable.4 II. LEGAL STANDARD Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and unde r Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintif f bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. E.g. , Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Where, as here, “the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations,” Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola , 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the Court “assume[s] the truth of all material fact ual allegations in the complaint and construe[s] the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. , 642 F.3d at 1139 (cleaned up). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contai n sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). To meet that standard, a pl aintiff’s allegations must support a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but itasks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (cleaned up). “Where a co mplaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitl ement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up).5 III. ANALYSIS Defendants argue both that Pl aintiffs have sued the wrong parties—and therefore lack standing—and that the Complaint does not state any plausible claims. 5 The Court rejects the first argument but agrees with the second.
A. Plaintiffs Have Sued Appropriate Defendants
Defendants contend that Plai ntiffs lack standing—which requires, among other things, “that a favorable decision will like ly redress” Plaintiffs’ injuries, City of Scottsdale v. FAA , 37 F.4th 678, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up)—because “neither [Secretary Blinken nor the State Department] can favorably adjudicate an application for a visa.” Mot. at 5. This Court, like many (though not all) others in this District, has previously reject ed this argument, and it stands by that conclusion. See Rashidian v. Garland , No. 23-cv-1187, 2024 WL 1076810, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024); see also, e.g. , Sharifymoghaddam v. Blinken , No. 23-cv-1472, 2024 WL 939991, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2024). But see Nusrat v. Blinken , No. 21-cv-2801, 2022 WL 4103860, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2022) (finding no sta nding to sue Secretary Blinken). “[W]hile the Secretary of State has no legal authority to control which visa applications consular officers grant or deny, nothing precludes hi m from directing them to decide pending applications within a reasonable time,” and an order requiring him to do so would likely redress Plaintiffs’ injuries by

5 Defendants also argue that the consular nonreviewability doctrin e bars Plaintiffs’ claims and that Defendants do not have any clear, nondisc retionary duty to act, as is necessary for a mandamus claim. Mot. at 6-17. The Court has previously explained why it need not address these arguments—neither of which implicates its Article III jurisdiction over this case—before dismissing a visa-delay case fo r failure to state a claim, see Rashidian v. Garland , No. 23-cv1187, 2024 WL 1076810, at *5 & n.5 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024), a nd sticks to that approach here. In addition, Defendants contend that the Court should treat their Motion as conceded because Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the Opposition to the Motion roughly two weeks late. Dkt. 6 at 1-2; see LCvR 7(b); Dkts. 4, 5. The Court does not condone Plaintiffs’ counsel’s l ack of diligence, but, since the Court will grant the Motion on the me rits and Defendants have shown no prejudice from the late filing, the Court excuses this lapse.6 ending the challenged delay. Rashidian , 2024 WL 1076810, at *4 (quoting Khazaei v. Blinken , No. 23-cv-1419, 2023 WL 6065095, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023)). The same reasoning extends to the State Department, which, Defenda nts acknowledge, is “effectively . . . the same” party as Secretary Blinken in this context. Dkt. 6 at 2. Plaintiffs t hus have standing to sue Defendants.
B. Plaintiffs Have Not Stated Plausible Unreasonable-Delay Claims The Court turns to the merits of Plaintiffs ’ unreasonable-delay clai ms under the APA and the Mandamus Act. “[T]he central question” under both statutes is “wheth er the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.” Barazandeh v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 23-cv-1581, 2024 WL 341166, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024) (quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc. , 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). To answer that question, courts in this Circuit consider the six “ TRAC ” factors, drawn from the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Telecommunications Research & Action Center (TRAC) v.
FCC , 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984): (1) “[T]he time ag encies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason”; (2) “where Congre ss has provided a timeta ble or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason”; (3) “delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human hea lth and welfare are at stake”; (4) “the court should consider the effect of e xpediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority ”; (5) “the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by de lay”; and (6) “the court need not find any impropriety lurking7 behind agency lassitude in order to hold th at agency action is unreasonably delayed.” Id. at 80 (cleaned up). “These considerations are of ten grouped into four basic inquiries”: First, is there any rhyme or reas on—congressionally prescribed or otherwise—for an agency’s delay (factors one and two)? Second, what are the consequences of delay if the Court does not compel the agency to act (factors three and fi ve)? Third, how might forcing the agency to act thwart its ability to address other priorities (factor four)? Finally, is the delay intent ional or due to a ny impropriety on the part of the agency (factor six)?
Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up). Conducting these four inquiries, the Court concludes that the TRAC factors do not plausibly point Plaintiffs’ way, making dismissal appropriate. See Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off. , 80 F.4th 330, 340-46 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (affir ming dismissal of visa-delay case for failure to state claim based on TRAC factors).
1. TRAC factors one and two The first two factors, which consider whethe r the agency is following a “rule of reason,” “congressionally prescribed or otherwise,” Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up), support dismissal. Plaintiffs c oncede that “there exists no . . . congressional mandate on the time frame [sic]” for adjudicating th eir applications. Dkt. 5 (Opp.) at 18. Thus, the question is whether Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that there is no “rhyme or reason” behind the delay. Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up). Plaintiffs have not done so. An agency “em ploys a rule of reason” when it processes immigration applications on a “first-in, first-out” basis, Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 340-41, and “[c]ourts in this jurisdiction often look to the length of delay as a r ough yardstick to determine whether that ‘first-in, first-out’ ru le is, in fact, being applied,” Khoshrou v. Blinken , No. 22-cv2859, 2023 WL 4930086, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2023); accord, e.g. , Barazandeh , 2024 WL8 341166, at *8 (“Absent a congressionally supplied yard stick, courts typically turn to caselaw as a guideline.” (cleaned up)). Caselaw confirms that the delay here is neither unusual nor inconsistent with a rule of reas on. Visa processing inevitably “t akes a baseline amount of time,” and “courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess of five, six, seven years are unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not unreasonable.” Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6. The delay in this case— roughly fifteen months since Plaintiffs’ interviews 6 —is similar to or shorter than those that courts have found reasonable in similar

cases. See, e.g. , Sharifymoghaddam , 2024 WL 939991, at *5 (fifteen-month delay); Barazandeh , 2024 WL 341166, at *7-8 (twenty-month delay). Sin ce Plaintiffs cite nothing other than the length of the delay in support of their argument, th eir allegations do not support a reasonable inference that the agency is not processing appli cations in an orderly, ra tional way. The first two
TRAC factors favor Defendants.
2. TRAC factor four The fourth factor, “the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority,” TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80, “carries significant weight,” Barazandeh , 2024 WL 341166, at *9, and cuts heavily in Defendants’ favo r. The D.C. Circuit has “refused to grant relief, even though all the ot her factors considered in TRAC favored it, where a judicial order putting [a party] at the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space and produce no net gain.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton , 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs s eek exactly this type of relief. “Consular

6 Courts disagree as to th e details of how to calculate delay in cases like this one—for example, whether the relevant end date is the day of the case’s filing or the day of the decision. See, e.g. , Dehkordi v. Bitter , No. 22-cv-2470, 2023 WL 5651845, at *4 n.4 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2023). The Court follows Plaintiffs’ lead in treating the interview date as the start of the delay, see, e.g. , Opp. at 19; Dkt. 7 at 2, and assume s, favorably to Plaintiffs, that the delay runs through today.9 processing capacity is . . . a zero-sum game, so granting [Plaintiffs] re lief would necessarily mean additional delays for other applicants—man y of whom undoubtedly face hardships of their
own.” Ahmadi v. Scharpf , No. 23-cv-953, 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2024) (cleaned up); accord Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 343-44. “Any such reordering of the queue of applicants seeking adjudication would be in appropriate . . . because there would be no demonstrable net gain in vi sa processing at large.” Ahmadi , 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (cleaned up); accord Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 343-44. Plaintiffs respond that this analysis “assume[s] without any factual basis that . . . Plaintiffs’ . . . [a]pplication[s are] not already at the front of the line or completely ignored by . . . Defendants.” Opp. at 19 (cleaned up ). But it is Plaintiffs’ burden to allege sufficient facts to support a “reasonable inference th at [Defendants are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. The Court has already explained why the length of the delay thus far, standing alone, cuts against Plaintiffs’ claims, see supra Section III.B.1, and they cite nothing else in the Complaint showing that Defendant s have deprioritized Plaintiffs ’ applications. The fourth TRAC factor “weighs against ju dicial intervention.” Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344.
3. TRAC factors three and five
TRAC factors three and five, which examine “t he interests prejudiced by the delay,” including the effect on “hum an health and welfare,” Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344 (quoting TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80), arguably favor Plai ntiffs but are not enough to swi ng the balance. Plaintiffs allege that the delay “has caused them . . . sign ificant, ongoing harm [bec ause] they remain in legal limbo as to whether they [will] be reunited [with Ms. Akhyari] in the United States,” Compl. ¶ 18, and courts in this District have conc luded that similar allegations tilted these factors in other plaintiffs’ favor, if only narrowly, see, e.g. , Siddiqui v. Blinken , 646 F. Supp. 3d 69, 7710 (D.D.C. 2022) (finding th at the third and fifth TRAC factors “slightly” favored a visa-delay plaintiff based on an allegation that the delay “‘had a profoun d and negative impact’ on his life”). But see Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344-45 (concluding that these factors did not favor visadelay plaintiffs absent harms beyond “the uncertain ty that results any time an individual must continue to wait to secure a benefit”). But, while Plaintiffs’ distress is understandable, “many others facing similar circumstances ” are suffering the same harm. Siddiqui , 646 F. Supp. 3d at 77 (cleaned up). Without mo re unusual or urgent inju ries, the third and fifth TRAC factors do not justify the Court’s ov erruling the agency’s priorities and m oving Plaintiffs to the head of the line. See Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344-45.
4. TRAC factor six The sixth TRAC factor—whether “any impropriety lurk[s] behind agency lassitude,”
TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80 (cleaned up)—doe s not favor either side. Pl aintiffs concede that they “have not alleged any impropriety.” Opp. at 20. Since the Court “need not find any [impropriety] in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed,” this factor is neutral.
Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 345-46 (cleaned up).
* * * The TRAC factors do not plausibly point Plaintif fs’ way, and their unreasonable-delay claims therefore fail.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The Court sympathizes with Plaintiffs’ situ ation. But their Complaint does not state plausible unreasonable-delay claims, and so the Court must dismiss this case.11 For these reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 4;
DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Dkt. 1, a nd this case without prejudice; and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case.
SO ORDERED. This is a final appealable Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Date: June 27, 2024 _________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge