RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2644-17T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LEROY T. FAULKS, a/k/a RAHEEM

FAULKS, LEROY R. FAULKS, 

LEROY J. FAULKS, LEROY T.

FAULKS, JR., LEROY FAULKES, 

LE ROY-JR FAULKS, LEROY-JR 

FAULKS,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________

Submitted December 18, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Hoffman and Geiger.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 10-05-1256.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Michael J. Confusione, Designated Counsel; 

William P. Welaj, on the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 24, 2019
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Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

Defendant Leroy Faulks appeals from the December 1, 2017 Law Division 

order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an 

evidentiary hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On May 19, 2010, an Essex County grand jury indicted defendant, 

charging him with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-

2(a)(1); second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); and second-degree 

endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). 

The charges stemmed from a sexual offense defendant committed against 

his granddaughter in November 2009. At the time of the offense, the victim was 

four years old, and defendant was forty-four years old. The victim reported the 

incident to her mother (defendant's daughter). The State presented the testimony 

of Detective Eric Marino of the Essex County Prosecutor's Office to the grand 

jury; during his testimony, he played a video interview involving the victim, and 

also read into the record a statement given to law enforcement by the victim's 

mother. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to second-degree 

sexual assault and the State agreed to recommend dismissal of the remaining 
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charges. At his plea hearing before Judge Thomas Moore on January 4, 2012,

defendant acknowledged he had discussed the plea agreement and its 

consequences with defense counsel; he was satisfied with counsel's services; he 

read, initialed, signed, and understood the plea forms; he entered the plea freely 

and voluntarily; no threats or promises were made to him; he fully understood 

what was taking place at the hearing; and he had enough time to meet with 

defense counsel prior to the hearing. Defendant also provided a factual basis 

for his plea. 

On June 6, 2012, defendant underwent a psychological evaluation by Dr. 

Mark Frank, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist and forensic mental health clinician. 

The court ordered the evaluation to determine his "eligibility for sentencing 

under the purview of the New Jersey Sex Offender Act." N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1. 

During the examination, defendant "claimed to have no memory of committing 

the" offense, asserting that he was on "Xanax and some others," and that he 

blacked out. "[H]e acknowledged," however, that he "did [not] think his 

granddaughter would lie about something so serious." Dr. Frank previously

evaluated defendant in 1993 when he was charged with aggravated sexual 

assault against a twelve-year-old; during that evaluation, defendant admitted 

that although he was heavily intoxicated at the time, he recalled the incident. 
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Dr. Frank concluded defendant has "serious psychological problems, most likely 

a psychotic disorder," rather than a "specific sexual compulsion" disorder. 

On July 27, 2012, the trial court sentenced defendant to eight years 

imprisonment, subject to eighty-five percent parole ineligibility pursuant to the 

No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, consistent with defendant's plea 

agreement. Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. 

On January 11, 2017, defendant filed a PCR petition, arguing that his trial

counsel was ineffective because he failed to: (1) request an independent 

evaluation of defendant's amnesia claim; and (2) investigate and consider certain 

defenses, such as diminished capacity and intoxication. Defendant claimed that 

without an independent psychological evaluation, he "was incompetent to 

provide a factual basis to support a guilty plea." 

On December 1, 2017, following oral argument, Judge James W. Donohue 

entered an order denying defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary 

hearing, and issued a written opinion setting forth his findings and conclusions. 

Judge Donohue found that defendant failed to assert a prima facie case in support 

of his petition under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The judge 

further determined that defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
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because he could not demonstrate a likelihood that his claim would succeed on 

the merits. 

First, the judge found defendant's claims procedurally barred, as 

defendant "had six months to raise all the issues regarding trial counsel's failure 

to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation or to move to withdraw his guilty 

plea. [Defendant] had adequate time before sentencing to move to withdraw the 

plea." The judge also found that defendant's claims could have been raised on 

direct appeal. Notwithstanding these findings, the judge went on to address

defendant's claims on the merits. 

The judge addressed defendant's claim regarding his trial counsel's failure 

to obtain an independent evaluation before his guilty plea. The judge found that 

trial counsel had the autonomy to make the strategic decision to not obtain an 

independent evaluation, and that defendant failed to demonstrate that the result 

of the proceedings would have been different. The judge also found that at 

sentencing, "trial counsel acknowledged the lengthy process of evaluations that 

the defendant underwent and explained the consequences of his guilty plea." 

Next, the judge addressed defendant's claim that trial counsel failed to 

consider cognizable defenses such as diminished capacity, amnesia, and 

intoxication. The judge found that defendant offered nothing in the record to 
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show that "expediency overtook vigilance," as defendant asserted. On the other 

hand, the judge found the record rife with proofs that trial counsel had 

knowledge of defendant's mental health complications. At his plea hearing, 

defendant affirmed that he had enough time to speak with his counsel, that he 

was satisfied with the services of his attorney, and that he understood what was 

discussed at the hearing. At sentencing, trial counsel acknowledged defendant 

had spent time prior to sentencing at Ann Klein Psychiatric Center, was 

"[i]nitially found incompetent then later found competent," and such facts were 

not in Dr. Frank's report. Trial counsel contended defendant should receive jail 

credits and psychiatric treatment. Ultimately, the PCR judge found defendant's 

claim meritless on the basis of trial counsel's "thorough representation of the 

defendant," as demonstrated by the record, and that any alleged prejudice was 

"highly unlikely as the defendant . . . knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty." 

Lastly, the judge found that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently pled guilty to one count of second-degree sexual assault. Defendant 

argued that he was incompetent to provide a factual basis to support his guilty 

plea, primarily based on his counsel's failure to obtain an independent 

psychological evaluation prior to the plea. The judge reviewed the plea hearing, 

and found there was "nothing in the transcript which suggest[ed] that . . . 
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defendant did not comprehend either the plea process or the questions he was 

being asked by Judge Moore or by his trial attorney," and that defendant 

"unequivocally indicated that he inappropriately touched the victim." The judge 

further found that defendant did not assert he was "'misinformed' about a 

material element of [the] plea negotiation[,] or that his . . . 'reasonable 

expectations,' grounded in terms of the plea agreement[] were not fulfilled," 

State v. Luckey, 366 N.J. Super. 79, 88 (App. Div. 2004) (internal quotations 

omitted) (quoting State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 122-23 (1988)), a requirement 

for a claim to vacate a guilty plea.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:

POINT I:

THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT ERRED

IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR 

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT 

AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE

FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL 

REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL, 

RESULTING IN A GUILTY PLEA WHICH WAS 

NOT FREELY, KNOWINGLY AND 

VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 

A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES 

REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY 

HEARINGS AND PETITIONS FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF.
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B. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE 

ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM 

TRIAL COUNSEL AS A RESULT OF COUNSEL'S 

FAILURE TO REQUEST AN INDEPENDENT

EVALUATION OF THE DEFENDANT AS WELL AS 

HIS FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND CONSIDER 

CERTAIN DEFENSES ON HIS BEHALF. 

C. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE 

ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM 

TRIAL COUNSEL RESULTING IN A GUILTY PLEA 

WHICH HAD NOT BEEN FREELY, KNOWINGLY

AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.

For a defendant to establish a case of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

defendant must show that defense "counsel's performance was deficient," and 

that "there exists 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" State v. 

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463-64 (1992) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

Our Supreme Court approved that two-part test in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 

(1987), in which it held that the federal standard for evaluating an ineffective -

assistance-of-counsel claim approved in Strickland should apply in defining our 

state constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.

"When a guilty plea is part of the equation," our Supreme Court has 

explained that 
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[t]o set aside a guilty plea based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (i) 

counsel's assistance was not within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases; 

and (ii) that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have 

pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

[State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) 

(alterations in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 

N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).]

We have carefully considered defendant's arguments in light of the 

applicable law, and we conclude his arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the 

reasons expressed by Judge Donohue in his cogent December 1, 2017 written 

decision. We are satisfied that defendant has not established a prima facie case 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, as he has not shown his trial counsel's 

performance was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Even assuming 

arguendo trial counsel performed deficiently, defendant failed to show the 

results of the proceeding "would have been different," State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 

269, 279-80 (2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694), or that there was a 

reasonable probability that he would have refused to plead guilty and insisted 

on going to trial. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. at 139. Furthermore, defendant is not 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing as he failed to demonstrate a reasonable 
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likelihood of success on the merits. See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158

(1997) (citing Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63).

Affirmed.