In th e S u p re m e Co u rt o f Ge o rg ia

De c id e d: Ju ly 1 1 , 2 0 1 4

S1 3G1 1 9 7 . MILLER e t a l. v . DEAL e t a l.

B L ACKW EL L , Ju stic e

.

In th is la wsu it a g a in st th e De p a rtm e n t o f H u m a n S e rv ic e s, 1 th e tria l c o urt

c e rtifie d a c la s s o f p la in tiffs. Th e De p a rtm e n t a pp e a le d

, a n d in De a l v

. Mille r,

3 2 1 Ga

. Ap p

. 2 2 0 (7 39 S E2 d 4 8 7 ) (2 0 1 3 ), th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls re v e rse d

,

c o n c lu d in g th a t th e na m e d p la in tiffs fa ile d in se v e ra l re sp e c ts to sh ow th a t c la ss

c e rtific a tio n wa s wa rra n te d

. We issu e d a w r i t o f c e rtio ra ri to re v ie w th a t

d e c isio n , a

n d we n o w a ffirm th e ju d g m e nt o f th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls.

1

. Th e na m e d p la in tiffs in t h is la wsu it a re in d ig e nt p a re n ts, a ll o f wh o m

sa y th a t th e y h a v e b e e n in c a rc e ra te d fo r fa ilu re s to pa y c hild su p po rt fo llo win g

c iv il c o n te m

p t p ro c e e d in g s in itia te d b y th e De p a rtm e nt a n d in wh ic h th e

De p a rtm e n t wa s re p re se n te d b y la wy e rs. Th e pla in tiffs c o uld n ot a ffo rd to h ire

1 The lawsuit nam es Governor Nathan Deal and several Depart me nt of f icials as def endants, not the Departm ent itself

. But because the Governor and the other of f i cials were sued only in their of

f icial capacities, t he lawsuit am ounts to a suit against t he D epart m ent.
For that reason, w e ref er in this opinion to the s e v e r a l def endants s i m

ply as the “Departm ent.”th e ir o wn la wy e rs fo r th e se p ro c e e d in gs. With o u t a la w y e r to d e fe n d th e m , th e

p la in tiffs c o n te nd

, th e p ro c e e d in g s in wh ic h th e y we re in c a rc e ra te d fa il e d t o

c o m p o rt with th e c o n stitu tio n a l g u a ra n te e o f d u e p ro c e ss. Alle g in g th a t th e

De p a rtm e n t ro utin e ly in itia te s su c h p ro c e e d in g s a g a in st in d ig e n t p a re n ts, b u t

fa ils to p ro v id e la wy e rs fo r su c h p a re n ts a t th e e x pe n se o f th e De p artm e n t, th e

p la in tiffs su e d

, se e k in g d e c la ra to ry a n d in ju n c ti v e r e lie f no t o n ly fo r th e m se lv e s,

b u t a lso fo r a c la ss o f a ll u nre p re se nte d a n d in d ig e n t p a re n ts wh o a re th re a te n e d

with in c a rc e ra tio n in su c h p ro c e e d in g s. On th e m o tio n o f th e pla in tiffs to c e rtify

th is c la ss, th e tria l c o u rt fo u n d th a t th e p la in tiffs h a d sh o wn e a c h o f t h e fo u r

e sse n tia l p re re q u isite s fo r c la ss c e rtific a tio n u n d e r OCGA § 9 -1 1-2 3 (a ), a s w e ll

a s t h e p r e r e q uisite fo r c e rtific a tio n u n d e r OCGA § 9 -1 1 -2 3 (b ) (2 ). Ba se d o n

th e se fin d in g s, th e tria l c o u rt d e te rm in e d th a t a c la ss a c tio n wa s wa rra n te d

, a n d

it c e rtifie d th e c la ss.

Th e Co u rt o f Ap pe a ls re v e rse d

. To b e g in

, th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls c o rre c tly

e x p la in e d th a t th e p la in tiffs
— if th e y w e re to b e p e rm itte d to se e k re lie f fo r th e

c la ss th a t th e tria l c o u rt c e rtifie d
— h a d to p ro v e th a t th e c la ss wa s su ffic ie n tly

2n u m e ro u s, 2 th a t th e c la im s th a t th e y a sse rte d o n b e h a lf o f th e c la ss p re se n te d

c o m m o n q u e stio n s, 3 th a t th e ir o wn c la im s a re ty p ic a l o f th o se th a t th e y a sse rte d

o n b e h a lf o f th e c la ss, 4 th a t th e y a re a d e q u a te re p re se n ta tiv e s o f th e c la ss, 5 a n d

th a t th e d e c la ra to ry a n d in ju n c tiv e re lie f th a t th e y so u g h t m ig h t b e a p p ro p ria te ly

a wa rd e d to th e c la ss a s a wh o le

. 6 S e e De a l, 3 2 1 Ga

. Ap p

. a t 2 2 1

. In th e e n d

, th e

Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls c o n c lu d e d th a t th e p la in tiffs h a d fa ile d to pro v e c o m m o n a lity

a n d ty p ic a lity

, se e id

. a t 2 2 2 -2 2 6 (1 ) (a ), a nd th a t th e y h a d fa ile d a s we ll to p ro v e

th e p ro p rie ty o f re lie f fo r th e c la ss a s a wh o le

. S e e id

. a t 2 2 6 -2 2 7 (1 ) (b ). Th o u g h

2 See OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (1) (plaintif f s m ust show that “class is so nume r ous that joinder of

all m e m bers is im practicable”).

3 See OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2) (plaintif f s m ust show that “[ t]here are questions of law
or f a ct com m on to the class”).

4 See O CGA § 9-11-23 (a) (3) (plaintif f s m u st s h ow t hat “ [ t]he claim s

. . . of the representative parties are ty pical of the claim s . . . of

the class”).

5 See OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (4) (plaintif f m ust show that “ [ t]he representative parties
will f airly and adequately protect the interests of the class”).

6 See OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (2) (plaintif f m ust show that “[ t]he p arty opposing the class
has acted or ref

u s e d t o act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby m aking appropriate f

inal injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class

as a w h o l e ”). A lthough a plaintif f a lway s m

ust prove each of the f

our circum stances identif ied in OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) ( 1)
- (4), a p l a i ntif f need only prove one of the three
circum stances identif

ied in OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (1)
- (3). In this case, t he t rial court certif ied
the class under OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (2), and s o, we do not c o nsider O CGA § 9-11-23 (b) (1) or (b) (3).

3th e se c on c lu sio n s m a y b e rig h t — w e will g e t to th a t sh o rtly
— th e re a so n in g

b y wh ic h th e Co u rt o f Ap pe a ls re a c h e d th e m is n o t.

As we u n d e rsta n d its o p in io n , th e Co urt o f Ap p e a ls p re m ise d a ll o f its

c o n c lu sio ns o n a fu nd a m e n ta l m isu n d e rsta n din g o f th e c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t t o

c o u n se l. Th e C o u rt o f Ap p e a ls se e m s to h a v e a ssu m e d th a t th e n a m e d p la in tiffs

— an d p re su m a

b ly

, th e oth e r m e m

be rs o f th e c la ss to o — a ll h a v e a

c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t to a

p p o in te d c o u n se l in c iv il c o n te m p t p ro c e e d in g s o f th e

so rt a b o u t wh ic h th e p la in tiffs c o m p la in

. S e e i d

. a t 2 24 (1 ) (a ) (i)

(a c k n o wle d gin g th a t “ th e n a m e d p la in tiffs m a y h a ve ha d th e rig h t to c o u n se l”

(e m p h a sis o m itte d )). Ev e n so , th e Co u rt o f Ap pe a ls re a so n e d

, if a n i n d i g e n t

p a re n t fa ils to a sse rt h is rig h t to c ou n se l in h is o wn c o n te m p t p ro c e e d in g — b y

tim e ly re q u e stin g a la wy e r , b y s e c u rin g a ru lin g o n th a t re q u e st fro m th e

c o n te m pt c o u rt, a n d b y

a p p e a lin g a ny fin d in g o f c o n te m p t e n te re d with o u t th e

b e n e fit o f c o u n se l
— th e pa re n t c a n n o t b e sa id to ha v e b e e n u n c o n stitu tio n a lly

d e n ie d c o un se l. 7 S e e id

. a t 2 2 3 -2 2 4 (1 ) (a ) (i). Wh e t h e r a n in d ig e nt p a re n t is

7 The Court of

Appeals put it this way : In t he present case, the nam ed plaintif f s allege t hat they were injured because they w ere “unconstitutionally denied counsel.” However,

. . . it is undisputed
that the plaintif

f s did not requ e st counsel at or prior to the c i vil contem pt hearings that led to their i ncarceration. Nor did they appeal the trial c o u r ts’

4a d v ise d o f h is rig h t to re q u e st c o u n se l is o f no c o n se q ue n c e , t h e Co u rt o f

Ap p e a ls a d d e d, b e c a

u se no c o u rt h a s a

n o blig a tio n in c iv il c on te m p t p ro c e e d in g s

to in q u ire a b o u t c o u n se l. S e e id

. a t 2 2 4 (1 ) (a ) (i). Ac c o rd in g ly

, th e Co u rt o f

Ap p e a ls e x p la in e d

, wh e th e r a n y c la ss m e m b e r h a d b e e n d e n ie d a rig h t to

c o u n se l wo u ld re q u ire a n in d iv id u a liz e d in q u iry a bo ut th e e x te nt to w h ic h th e y

in siste d u p o n c o u n se l, a

n d a s a re su lt, th e p la in tiffs c o u ld n o t sh o w c o m m o n a lity

a m o n g t h e c la ss. Se e id

. (“ He re , wh e th e r th e n a m e d pla in tiffs a c tu ally we re

d e n ie d c o u n se l is th e e sse n tia l q u e stio n, b e c a u se th e an swe r d e te rm in e s wh e th e r

th e y h a v e sh o wn th e i n

j u r y o n wh ic h th e ir th e o ry o f c o m m o na lity d e p e n d s.”

(Em p h a s is in orig in a l)). Be c a u se th e na m e d pla in tiffs th e m se lv e s h a d n o t

in siste d u p o n c o u n se l in th e ir o wn c o n te m p t pro c e e din g s, th e Co urt o f Ap p e a ls

sa id

, th e y c o u ld n o t sh o w th a t th e ir c la im s we re ty p ic a l o f th o se a sse rte d o n

b e h a lf o f th e c la ss. S e e id

. a t 2 2 6 (1 ) (a ) (ii) (“ He re , th e na m e d p la in tiffs h a v e

n o t sh o w n ty p ic a lity in th a t th e y h a v e n ot sh o wn in ju ry .” )

. A n d lik e wise

, th e

f indings of contem

pt, which m eans they never challenge d t h e i r lack of appointed counsel b e low. Because the trial courts were no t p r e s e n ted with
requests to appoint counsel p r ior to the contem pt hearings, a n d have never ruled on the later requests, plaintif f s h ave not been denied c ou n s e l i n t hat

context. Deal, 321 Ga. App. at 223-224 (1) (a) (i) (em p hasis in original).

5Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls c o nc lu d e d

, th e p la in tiffs c ou ld n o t sh o w th e pro p rie ty o f re lie f

fo r th e c la ss a s a wh o le

, in so fa r a s th e re c o rd d id n o t re fle c t “wh e th e r o th e r

p u ta tiv e c la ss m e m

b e rs h a v e re q u e ste d a n d b e e n d e n ie d c o u n se l.” Id

. a t 2 2 7 (1 )

(b ).

Ge n e ra lly sp e a k in g, to th e e x te n t th a t th e Co n stitu t io n a ffo rd s a rig h t to

c o u n se l a t g o v e rn m e n t e x pe n se , it a ffo rd s a rig h t th a t is n o t w a iv e d m e re ly b y

a p a rty u n k n owin g ly fa ilin g to in sist u po n a la wy e r in a pro c e e d in g in wh ic h h e

is n o t e v e n a d v i s e d t h a t h e m ig h t re q u e st c o u n se l. Th a t c e rta in ly is tru e o f th e

c a te g oric a l rig h t to c o u n se l th a t is g ua ra n t e e d to th e a c c u se d in c rim in a l

p ro se c u tio n s b y th e S ix th A m e n d m e n t. S e e , e .g ., Bre we r v

. Willia m s, 4 3 0 U. S

.

3 8 7

, 40 4 (III) (9 7 SCt 1 2 3 2

, 5 1 LE2 d 4 2 4 ) (1 9 7 7 ) (“ [T] h e rig ht to c o un se l d oe s

n o t de p e n d u p o n a re qu e st b y th e d e fe n d a n t

. . . .” (Cita tio n s o m itte d )); Ca rn le y

v

. Co c h ra n , 36 9 U

. S

. 5 0 6

, 51 3 (8 2 S Ct 8 8 4

, 8 LE2 d 7 0 ) (1 9 6 2 ) (“ [I] t is se ttle d

th a t w h e re th e a ssista n c e o f c o u n se l is a c o n stitu tio n a l re q u isite

, th e rig h t to b e

fu rn ish e d c o u n se l d o e s n o t d e p e n d o n a re q u e st.” (F o o tn ote o m itte d .)). It

a p p e a rs to b e n o le ss tru e o f th e m o re l i mi t e d an d c o n d itio n a l rig h t to c o u n se l

th a t th e c o u rts h a v e re c og niz e d in c e rta in o th e r p ro c e e d in gs a s a n in c id e n t o f d u e

p ro c e ss. S e e , e .g ., Ga g n on v

. S c a rp e lli, 4 1 1 U. S . 7 7 8, 7 9 0 (III) (9 3 S Ct 1 7 5 6

,

63 6 LE2 d 6 5 6) (1 9 7 3 ) (in p ro ba tio n o r p a ro le r e v oc a tio n p ro c e e d in g s,

p re su p p o sin g th a t th e p ro b a tio n e r o r p a ro le e will be “ in fo rm e d o f h is rig h t to

re q u e st c o u n se l” ); Va

u g h n v

. Ru tle d ge , 2 6 5 Ga

. 7 7 3, 77 4 ( 2 ) ( 4 6 2 S E2 d 1 3 2 )

(1 9 9 5 ) (“ A p ro b a tio n e r is e n title d

. . . to b e in fo rm e d o f h is rig h t t o re q u e st

c o u n se l.” (Em

p h a sis o m it t ed ) )

. Th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls se e m s to h a v e

m isc o nstru e d o u r d e c isio n in Ad k in s v

. Ad kin s, 2 4 2 Ga

. 2 4 8

, 2 4 8 (2 ) (2 4 8 S E2 d

6 4 6 ) ( 1 9 7 8 ), a s su g g e stin g th a t a tria l c o u rt n e v e r is re q u ire d to a d v ise o r to

in q u ire a b o u t a n e n title m e n t to c o u n se l in a c iv il c o n te m pt c a se

. Bu t in Ad k in s,

we d e a lt with a n a sse rtio n th a t th e S ix th Ame n dme n t — wh ic h

, o f c o u rse , a p p lie s

o n ly in c rim in a l p ro c e e d in g s a n d h a s n o a p p lic a tio n w h a tso e v e r in a c iv il c a se

— re q u ire d a c iv il c o n te m p t c o u rt to in q u ire a

b o u t c ou nse l. We d id n o t a d d re ss

in Ad k in s a n y rig h t to c o u n se l th a t a ro se fro m th e g u a ra nte e o f d u e p ro c e ss, a s

th e p la in tiffs in th is c a se c la im

. Ac c o rd in g ly

, to th e e x te nt th a t n a m e d p la in tiffs

o r o th e r c la ss m e m

b e rs h a v e a c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t to a p p o in te d c o un se l, th e y d o

n o t wa iv e th a t rig h t sim

p ly b y fa ilin g to in sist up o n c o u n se l i n p ro c e e d in g s in

wh ic h n o o n e a d v ise d th e m th a t th e y c o u ld a sk fo r c o u n se l.

2

. We n e v e rth e le ss c o n c lu d e th a t th e C o u rt o f Ap p e a ls wa s rig h t wh e n it

d e te rm in e d th a t th e p la in tiffs fa ile d to sh ow th e re q u isite c o m m o n a lity

,

7ty p ic a lity

, a n d pro p rie ty o f c la sswid e re lie f. To sh o w th e se th in g s, th e p la in tiffs

re lie d e n tire ly o n th e ir a sse rtio n o f a c a te go ric a l c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t to

a p p o in te d c o u n se l. Bu t in Tu rn e r v

. Ro g e rs,

_ __ U. S

.

_

_ _ ,

_ __ (III) (B) (1 3 1

S Ct 2 5 07

, 1 8 0 LE2 d 4 5 2 ) (2 0 1 1 ), th e Un ite d S ta te s S u pre m e Co u rt m a d e

p e rfe c tly c le a r th a t “ th e D u e P ro c e ss Cla u se do e s n o t au to ma tic ally re q u ire th e

p ro v isio n o f c o u n se l a t c iv il c o n te m p t p ro c e e d in g s to a n in d ig e n t in div id u a l wh o

is su b je c t to a c h ild su p p o rt o rd e r, e v e n if th a t in div id ua l fa c e s in c a rc e ra tio n .”

(Em p h a sis in o rig in a l)

. T o b e su re , Tu rn e r in v o lv e d a n a sse rtio n th a t in d ig e n t

p a re n ts ha v e a c a te g o ric a l rig h t to a p p o in te d c o u n se l in a ll c iv il c o n t e mp t

p ro c e e d in g s in w h ic h th e y a re th re a te n e d with in c a rc e ra tio n fo r a fa ilu re to p a y

c h ild su p p o rt. T h e pla in tiffs in th is c a se , o n th e o th e r h a n d

, a sse rt o n ly th a t

in d ig e n t p a

re n ts h a v e a rig h t to a

p p o in te d c o u n se l in c iv il c o n te m p t p ro c e e d in g s

in wh ic h th e y a re th re a te ne d w ith in c arc e ra tio n fo r a fa ilu re to p a y c h ild su p p ort

a n d in wh ic h th e De p a rtm e n t is re pre se n te d b y a la wy e r, a c irc u m sta n c e th a t th e

S u p re m e Co u rt e x p lic itly d e c lin e d to a d d re ss in Tu rn e r. S e e id

. a t

__ _ (III) (B)

(“ We d o n o t a d d re ss c iv il c o n te m p t p r o ce ed in g s wh e re th e u n d e rly in g c h ild

su p p o rt p a y m e n t is owe d to th e S ta te

. . . . [In su c h p ro c e e d in g s,] [t] h e

g o v e rn m e n t is lik e ly to h a v e c o u n se l o r so m e o th e r c o m p e te n t re p re se n ta tiv e .”

8(Cita tio n s o m itte d )). S till, th e p la in tiffs u rg e a c a te g o ric a l rig ht, e v e n if it is o n e

m o re n a rro w th a n th e c a te g o ric a l rig h t re je c te d in Tu rn e r.

Alth o u g h th e p la in tiffs c ite a n u m b e r o f c o u rt d e c isio n s a ro u n d th e

c o u n try to su p p o rt th e ir c la im o f a c a te g o ric a l c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t, 8 m ost o f th e se

d e c isio n s we re b a se d o n L assite r v

. De p t. of S o c ia l S v c s. o f Du rh a m Co u nty

,

4 5 2 U

. S

. 1 8 (1 0 1 SCt 2 1 5 3

, 68 LE2 d 6 4 0 ) (1 9 8 1 ), and a ll we re d e c id e d b e fo re

La s s ite r wa s c la rifie d b y T u rn e r. In L a ssite r, th e S u p re m e Co u rt re c og n iz e d a

“ p re su m p tio n th a t a

n in d ig e n t litig a n t h a s a rig h t to a p p o in te d c ou n se l o n ly

wh e n , if h e lo se s, h e m a

y b e d e p riv e d o f h is ph y sic a l lib e rty .” 4 52 U. S

. a t 2 6 -2 7

(II) (A). A s th e S u p re m e Co u rt la te r e x p la in e d in Tu rn e r, h o we v e r, La ssite r

d o e s n o t su g g e st c a te g o ric a l rig h ts to a p p o in t e d c o u n se l in c iv il p ro c e e d in g s,

e v e n th o se th a t m a y le a d to in c a rc e ra tio n :

[T] h e Co u rt’s sta te m e n ts in La ssite r c o n stitu te p a rt o f its ra tio n a le
fo r d e n y in g a rig h t to c o u n se l in th a t c a se

. We b e lie v e th o se
sta te m e n ts a re be st re a d a s p o in tin g o u t th a t th e Co u rt p re vio usly

8 See, e.g., W a lker v

. McLain, 768 F2d 1181, 1185 (10 t h Cir. 1985); Sevier v. Turner,
742 F2d 262, 267 (II) (6 t h Cir. 1984); Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F2d 1409, 1413-1415 (5 t h Cir. 1983); Pasqua v. Council, 892 A2d 663, 674 (II) (B) (N.J. 2006); Peters-Riem ers v. Riem ers, 663 NW 2d 6 57, 664-665 (IV) (N.D. 2003); Black v. Div. of Child S upport Enf orcem ent, 686
A2d 1 64, 167-168 (II) (Del. 1 9 96); Mead v. Batchlo r , 4 6 0 N W2 d 4 93, 5 03 (IV) (Mich. 1990).

9h a d fo u n d a rig h t to c o u n se l “ o n ly ” in c a se s in v o lv in g in c a rc e ra tio n ,

n o t th a t a rig h t to c o u n se l e x ists in all su c h c a se s . . . .

_ _ _ U. S . a t _

_ _ (III) (A) (e m

p h a se s in o rig in a l).

Mo re ov e r, a sid e fro m “ c rim in a l p ro se c u tio ns o r p ro c e e d in g s fu n c tio n a lly

a k in to a c rim in a l tria l,” th e Un ite d S ta te s S u p re m e Co u rt “ ha s n e v e r fo u n d in

th e Du e P ro c e ss C la u se a c a te g o ric a l rig h t to a p po in te d c o u nse l.” 9 Tu rn e r,

_ _ _

U. S

. a t

_

_ _ (Th o m a s, J., d isse n tin g ) (c ita tio n a n d p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d ;

e m p h a sis su p p lie d ). Se e a lso La ssite r, 4 5 2 U. S

. a t 31 (II) (C) (n o c a t eg o r ic a l

rig h t to a p p o in te d c o u n se l in p ro c e e d in g s to te rm in a te p a re n ta l rig hts); Vite k v

.

Jo n e s, 4 45 U. S

. 4 8 0

, 4 9 9 (1 0 0 S Ct 1 2 5 4

, 6 3 LE2 d 5 5 2 ) (1 9 8 0 ) (P o we ll, J.,

c o n cu r r i n g ) (n o c a te g o ric a l rig h t to a p p o in te d c o u n se l with re sp e c t to tra n sfe r

o f in m a te to m e n ta l h o sp ita l); Mid d e n d o rf v

. He n ry , 4 2 5 U. S . 2 5 , 4 8 (III) (9 6

S Ct 1 2 8 1

, 4 7 LE2 d 55 6 ) (1 9 7 6 ) ( n o c a te g o ric a l rig h t to c o u n se l in su m m a ry

9 In In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 35-42 (87 SCt 1428, 18 LE2d 527) (1967), the Suprem e Court held that the g overnm ent m u st provide counsel f

or indigent j uveniles in civil “juvenile delinquency ” proceedings that could lead to incarceration as a m atter of due process. But as both the m ajority

and dissent in Turner noted, “[ t]he civil juvenile delinquency proceeding

at issue i n Gault was little dif f erent f rom , and c om

parable in s eriousness to, a c r i mi nal prosecution.” T u rner,

___ U. S. at

___ (III) ( A) (citation and punctuation om i tted). See also
id. a t

_ _ _ ( T h o m as, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, the only circum stance in w hich the Court has
f ound that due process categorically requires appointed c o unsel is ju venile delinquency proceedings, which t he C o urt has described as ‘f unctionally akin to a crim inal trial.’” (Citation om itted)).

1 0c o u rt-m a rtia l p ro c e e d in g s); Je a n n e C h a rn , “ Ce le b ra tin g th e ‘ Nu ll’ F in d in g :

Ev id e nc e -Ba se d S tra te gie s F o r Im p ro v in g Ac c e ss to Le g a l S e rv ic e s,” 1 2 2 Ya le

L.J. 2 2 0 6

, 2 2 1 7 (II) (A) (2 0 13 ) (“ Th e p ro sp e c t o f th e S u pre m e Co urt

re c o g n iz in g a c a te g o ric a l rig h t to c ou n se l in c iv il c a se s is re m o te .” ). E sp e c ia lly

i n s t r u c t i v e , w e th in k, is Ga g no n , 4 1 1 U. S

. a t 7 8 7 (III), in w h ic h th e S u p re me

Co u rt fo u n d n o ca t e g o ric a l rig h t to a pp o in te d c o u n se l in p ro b a tio n a n d p a ro le

re v o c a tio n p ro c e e d in g s ge n e ra lly

, b u t it a c k n o wle d ge d th a t, “ [i] n so m e c a se s .

. . th e p ro b a tio ne r’s o r p a ro le e ’ s v ersio n o f a disp u te d issu e c a n fa irly b e

re p re se n te d on lyb y a tra in e d a d v o c a te .” Id . a t 7 8 8 (III). Lik e th e n a rro w c la ss

o f c on te m

p t pro c e e d in g s a

b o u t wh ic h t h e p la in tiffs in th is c a se c o m p la in

, th e

S u p re m e Co u rt th e n tu rn e d in Ga g n o n fro m re v o c a tio n s g e n e ra lly to a n a rro w

c la ss o f re v o c a tio n p ro c e e d in g s in wh ic h th e n e e d fo r a pp oin te d c o u n se l m ig h t

b e m ore su b sta n tia l:

[C] a se s wh e re , a fte r b e in g in fo rm e d o f his rig h t to re q u e st c ou nse l,
th e p ro b a tio n e r o r p a ro le e m a k e s su c h a re qu e st, b a se d o n a tim e ly

a n d c o lo ra

b le c la im (i) th a t h e h a s n o t c o m m itte d th e a lle ge d

v io la tio n o f th e c o n d itio n s u p o n wh ic h he is a t lib e rty ; o r (ii) th a t,

e v e n if th e v io la tio n is a

m a tte r o f p u b lic re c o rd o r is u n c o n te ste d

, th e re a re su b sta n tia l re a so n s wh ic h j u stifie d o r m itig a te d th e

v io la tio n a n d m a k e r e v o c a tio n in a p p ro p ria te

, a nd th a t th e re a so n s

a re c o m p le x o r o th e rwise d iffic u lt to d e v e lo p o r p re se n t.

1 1Id

. a t 7 9 0 (III). Bu t e v e n a s to th a t p a rtic u la r c la ss o f re v o c a tio n p ro c e e d in g s, th e

S u p re m e Co u rt sa id th a t th e c irc u m sta n c e s re nd e re d th e a p p o in tm e n t o f c o u n se l

o n ly “ [ p ] re su mp tiv e ly ” n e c e ssa ry , n o t a b so lu te ly re q u ire d. Id

. (e m p h a sis

su p p lie d ).

We su p p o se th a t d u e pro c e ss so m e tim e s m a y re q u ire th e a p p o in tm e n t o f

c o u n se l fo r a n in d ig e n t pa re n t in a c iv il c o n te m p t p ro c e e d in g in wh ic h th e p a re n t

is th re a t e n e d w i t h in c a

rc e ra tio n

. An d a s in G a g n o n , p e rh a p s th e re is e v e n a

“ p re su m p tiv e ” rig ht to a

p p o in te d c o u n se l in so m e su c h p ro c e e d in g s if th e p a re n t

is op p o se d b y g o v e rn m e n t la wy e rs. 1 0 B u t e v e n so , p re su m p tio n s so m e tim e s c a n

b e o v e rc o m e , a

n d wh e th e r a n y p a rtic u la r p a re nt is e ntitle d to a la wy e r a t

g o v e rn m e n t e x p e n se d e p e n d s a lwa y s, we th in k

, o n th e p a rtic ula r a n d u n iq u e

c irc u m sta n c e s of h is c a se , in c lu d in g th e c o m ple x i t y o f t h e c a se , a s we ll a s th e

e x te n t to wh ic h a lte rn a tiv e me a su re s m ig h t b e e m p lo y e d to e n su re th a t th e

p ro c e e d in g is fu n d a m e n ta lly fa ir. S e e S ta te v

. C u r r i e r, 2 9 5 P 3 d 8 37

, 84 3 -8 4 4

(Wy o. 2 0 1 3 ). S e e a lso Ga gn o n , 4 1 1 U. S

. a t 7 9 0 -7 9 1 (III). As th e Un ite d S ta te s

S u p re m e Co u rt h a s re m in d e d

, “ th e re q u ire m e n ts of d u e pro c e ss are fle x ib le a n d

10 For this reason, trial courts should consider advising unrepresented parents in such proceedings that they

m ay have a right to request counsel.

1 2c a ll fo r su c h p ro c e d u ra l p ro te c tio n s a s th e p a rtic u la r situ a tio n d e m a n d s.”

Wilk in s o n v

. A u stin

, 54 5 U. S

. 2 0 9

, 2 2 4 (IV) (1 2 5 S Ct 2 38 4, 1 6 2 LE2 d 1 7 4 )

(2 0 0 5 ) (c ita tio n a n d p u n c tu a tio n o m itte d ).

Th e d isse n t po sits th a t, e v e n if th e Un ite d S ta te s Co n stitu tio n a ffo rd s n o

c a te g oric a l rig ht to a

p p o in te d c o u n se l in c iv il c o nte m pt p ro c e e d in g s o f th e so rt

a b o u t wh ic h t h e p la in tiffs c o m p la in

, m ayb e th e G e o rg ia Co nstitu tio n a ffo rd s

su c h a rig h t. Th is is n o t th e c a se , h o we ve r , i n w h ic h to d e c id e th a t qu e stio n

. 1 1

Alth ou g h th e p la in tiffs a sse rt a c a te g o ric a l rig h t un de r b o t h th e Un ite d S ta te s

Co n stitu tio n a n d th e G e o rg ia Co n stitu tio n , th e y n e v e r ha v e e ve n a tte m p te d to

m a k e th e c a se — in th e ir p le a d in g s, in th e ir m o tio n s a n d b rie fs in th e tria l c o urt

o n c la ss c e rtific a tio n , o r in th e ir a p p e lla te b rie fs
— th a t th e G e o rg ia C o n stitu tio n

a ffo rd s m o re pro c e d u ra l rig h ts in c iv il c o n te m p t p ro c e e d in g s a s a m a tte r o f d u e

p ro c e ss th a n d o e s th e Un ite d S ta te s Co n stitu tio n

. To th e e x te n t th e y h a v e

11 W e s uppose that the guarantee of due p r o cess in the Georgia Constitution might
af f ord m ore procedural r ights in civil contem pt proceedings about child support than the

sam e guarantee in the United States Constitution, if only because our Court has not addressed

t h at question bef

o r e. W e note, however, that this Court has held in a num ber o f o t h e r
contexts that the p rocess due u nder the United States Constitution and the G e o r g i a Constitution is t he s am e. See, e.g., DeKalb County School Dist. v. Ga. State Bd. o f Ed., 294 Ga. 349, 369 (4) (a) (751 SE2d 827) (2013) (rem oval f r om public of f ice); Joiner v. Glenn,

288 Ga. 208, 209 (702 SE2d 194) (2010) (term ination of public em ploy m ent); Britt v. Sm ith, 274 Ga. 611, 614 (556 SE2d 435) (2001) (guilty plea).

1 3m e n tio n e d th e Ge o rg ia Co nstitu tio n , th e y m e ntio n it o n ly in p a ssin g , a n d a lm o st

a lwa y s a lo n g sid e a re fe re n c e to th e Un ite d S ta te s Co n stitu tio n (o r c a se s

c o n c e rn in g th e Un ite d S ta te s Co n stitu tio n ). No wh e re in th e p a p e rs file d b y th e

p la in tiffs do w e fin d a r e a s o n e d a rg u m e n t — su p p o rte d by a n a n a ly sis o f th e

p e rtin e n t c o n stitu tio n a l te xt, stru c tu re , a n d histo ry — th a t th e g u a ra n te e o f d u e

p ro c e ss in th e Ge o rg ia Co n stitu tio n m e a ns so m e th in g m o re in th is c o n te x t th a n

th e sa m e gu a ra n te e in th e U n ite d S ta te s Co n stitu t i o n

. S e e Gra d y v

. Un ifie d

Go v t. o f Ath e n s-Cla rk e Co u n ty

, 2 89 Ga

. 7 2 6, 7 3 1

, n

. 3 (2 ) (b ) (7 1 5 S E2 d 1 4 8 )

(2 0 1 1 ). No r d o we fin d su c h a n a rg u m e nt in th e d isse n t, wh ic h sim p ly m u se s

th a t th e Ge o rg ia C o n stitu tio n mig h t a ffo rd m o re p ro c e ss th a n th e Un ite d S ta te s

Co n stitu tio n. We will n ot h a n g o u r d e c is i o n o n an a rg u m e n t th a t n o o n e ha s

m a d e , a n d fo r th e p u rp o se s o f th is a pp e a l, we a c c e p t — a s th e p a rtie s se e m to

h a v e a c c e p te d th ro u g ho ut th is c a se — th a t th e p ro c e ss du e in th is c o nte x t u n d e r

th e Un ite d S ta te s Co nstitu tio n a n d th e Ge o rg iaCo n stitu tio n is th e sa m e

.

We d o n o t d e c id e in th is c a se p re c ise l y w h e n , i f e ve r, a la wy e r m u st b e

a p p o in te d fo r a n in dig e n t p a r e n t in a c iv il c o n te m p t p ro c e e d in g a

bo u t c h ild

su p p o rt. We c o n c lu d e o n ly th a t th e re is n o a bso lu te

, in fle x ib le

, a n d c a te g o ric a l

rig h t to a p p o in te d c o u n se l in su c h p ro c e e d in g s a s a m a tte r of d u e pro c e ss, e v e n

1 4wh e n th e De p a rtm e nt, re p re se n te d b y its o w n la wy e rs, pu rsu e s th e in c a rc e ra tio n

o f a n in d ig e n t p a re n t. 1 2 Th a t is e no ug h to re so lv e th is c a se

. Be c a u se th e re is n o

c a te g oric a l rig h t, wh e th e r a n y n a m e d p la in tiff o r o th e r m e m b e r o f th e c la ss e v e n

h a s a rig h t to a

p p o in te d c o u n se l in a n y p a rtic u la r c iv il c o n te m p t pro c e e d i n g

d e p e n d s u p o n h ig h ly in d iv id u a liz e d c o n sid e ra tio ns. Ac c o rd in g ly

, th e p la in tiffs

c a n n o t sh o w c o m m o na lity o f th e c la im s a sse rte d o n b e h a l f o f th e c la ss, se e

OCGA § 9 -1 1 -2 3 (a ) (2 ), th e y c a n n o t sh o w th a t th e ir o wn c la im s a re ty p ic a l o f

th o se o f th e c la ss , s e e O C GA § 9-1 1 -2 3 (a ) (3 ), a n d th e y c an n o t sh o w th a t

c la sswid e in

ju n c tiv e a n d d e c la ra to ry re lie f is in o rd e r. S e e OCGA § 9 -1 1 -2 3 (b )

12 W e recognize, o f course, that class certif ication is not intended t o be a m e chanism
f or deciding the m erits of a case. See Gay v. B.H. Transf e r Co., 287 Ga. App. 610, 612 (652
SE2d 200) (2007). Nevertheless, t he inquiry required to d ecide class certif ication som etim es

m ay involve “som e overlap with the m erits of t he plaintif f ’s underly ing claim

. That cannot be helped. The c lass determ ination generally involves c onsiderations that are enm eshed in
the f actual and legal issues com prising the plaintif

f ’s cause of action.” W al-Mart Stores v. Duke s ,

_ _ _ U

. S

.

_ __, ___ (II) ( A) (131 S Ct 2541, 180 L E 2d 374) (2011) (citation and punctuation om itted). See also McGarry v. C ingular W ireless, 267 Ga. App. 2 3, 25 (1) (599
SE2d 34) (2004). “ Merits questions m ay be considered to the extent — but only t o the extent

— that they are relevant to determ ining whether the

. . . prerequisites f or class c ertif

ication

are s atisf ied.” Am gen v. Conn. Retirem ent P lans & Trust Funds,

___ U. S

.

_ __, ___ (II) (A) (133 SCt 1184, 185 L E2d 3 08) (2013) (citations om itted). Here, w hether the nam ed plaintif f s and the class have a c ategorical right to appointed counsel in the proceedings about which they com plain is “both a m e rits question and a class question,” Carnett’s, Inc. v. Ham m ond,
279 G a. 1 2 5, 129 (4) (610 SE2d 529) (2005), and it i s one, theref ore, that we p roperly m ay address on class certif

i cation. W e note as well that the q uestion is a p urely legal one, and no discovery or r esolution of f a ctual issues is necessary to determ ine i f t he Constitution categorically requires c ounsel in these sorts of proceedin g s. See Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, 736 F3d 1076, 1081 (7 t h Cir. 2013).

1 5(2 ). F o r th e se re a so ns, th e Co u rt o f Ap p e a ls wa s rig h t to c o n c lu de th a t th e tria l

c o u rt e rre d wh e n it c e rtifie d a c la ss.

Ju d g m e n t a ffirm e d

. All th e Ju stic e s c o n c u r, e x c e p t Be n h a m , J., wh o

c o n c u rs in p a rt a n d d isse n ts in p a rt.

1 6S1 3G1 1 9 7 . MILLER e t a l. v . DEAL e t a l.

BENHAM, Ju stic e , c o n c u rrin g in p a rt a n d d isse n tin g in p art.

Wh ile I a g re e with th e m a

jo rity ’s c o n c lu sio n in Div isio n 1 of th e o p in io n ,

I m u st re sp e c tfu lly d isse n t to th e m a jo rity ’s fin a l d e c isio n to a ffirm th e Co u rt o f

Ap p e a ls.

Ou r sta te c o n stitu t i o n c o u p le d with sta te sta tu to ry la w re qu ire s th a t th e

G e o r g ia Atto rn e y Ge n e ra l re p re se n t sta te e x e c utiv e a g e n c ie s in a n y c o u r t o f

re c o rd

. 1 Th a t m e a n s o u r sta te la w e ffe c ti v e ly g ra n ts to th e D e p a rtm e n t o f

Hu m a n S e rv ic e s (DHS ) a c a te g o ric a l rig h t to b e re p re se n te d b y a la wy e r in a n y

c iv il c o n te m

p t pro c e e d in g a g a in st a n y p a r e n t

, wh e th e r in d ig e n t o r n o t, fo r

n o n pa y m e n t o f c hild su p p o rt. It is th e sta te ’s p o sitio n , h o we v e r, th a t th e p a re n t

in su c h p ro c e e d in g , wh e th e r in d ig e n t o r n o t, h a s no c a te go ric a l rig h t to b e

re p re se n te d b y c o u n se l. If fo u n d to b e in c o n te m p t, m o st in d ig e n t p a re n ts fa c e

in c a rc e ra tio n b e c a

u se th e y la c k th e m e a n s to p u rg e th e m se lv e s o f th e c o n te m p t.

1 “The Attorney General shall act as the l egal advisor of the executive depart me nt, shall r epresent the state

... in all civil ...cases in any court when required by the Governor, and
shall perf orm such other duties as shall be required by law.” Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. V, Sec. III, Pa r a

. I V

. S e e a l so OCGA § 45-15-3 (6) (“It is the duty of the Attorney G eneral ...[ t]o represent the state in all civil actions tried in any court....”)F o r e x a m

p le

, th e tria l c ou rt fo u n d in th is c a se th a t a p pe lla nt Mille r o we d $ 3 ,0 0 0

,

h a d le ss th a n a d o lla r in h is ba n k a c c o u n t, a n d h a d no a sse ts wh e n h e wa s fo u n d

in c o n te m p t a n d in c a rc e ra te d fo r n o n p a y me n t o f c h ild su p p o rt. Ha d h e h a d a

c a te g oric a l o r a

u to m a tic rig h t to c o u n se l, a s do e s DHS u n d e r sta te la w , p e rh a p s

h e wo u ld h a v e a v o id e d ja il wh e n h e c le a rly d id n o t h a v e th e a b i l i t y t o p a y

. 2

P u rp o se fu lly o r n o t

, t h e S ta te h a s fo ste re d a fu n d a m e n ta lly u n fa ir sy ste m fo r

c o lle c t i n g c h ild su p p o rt fro m in dig e n t pa re n ts. Th e sy ste m a t issu e is n o t

sa n c tio n e d by th e Tu rn e r v

. Ro g e r s de c isio n b e c a u se , a s th e m a

jo rity o p in io n

c o n c e de s, th a t c a se sp e c ific a lly le ft o p e n th e q u e stio n a s to w h e th e r a n in d ig e n t

p a re n t h a s t h e r ig h t to c o u n se l in a c iv il c o nte m p t c h ild su p p o rt pro c e e d in g

wh e re th e go v e rn m e n t e n tity is re p re se n te d by c ou nse l. 3 S e e S ta te v

. S to n e , 1 6 5

2 The justif

ication f or incarceration in a contem pt action i s lost when t h e contem nor is unable to pay

. Hughes v. Dep’t of Hum an Res., 2 69 Ga. 587 (2) (502 SE2d 233) (1998).

3 The Turner court specif

ically stated: “W e do not address civil contem pt proceedings
where the underly ing child support pay m ent is owed to the State. [ C it.] Those proceedings

m ore closely resem

ble debt-collection proceedings. The governm e n t i s likely to have counsel

or som e other com

petent representative. Cf

. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–463, 58
S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (“[ T]he average def endant does n ot have the prof essional legal skill to prote c t h i ms e l f w h en brought b ef o re a tribunal with power to take his lif e or liberty

, wherein t he p r osecution is presented b y e xperienced a nd learned counsel ” (em phasis added)). And this kind of p roceeding is not bef ore us.” 131 SCt at 2520. Appellants in this

case have been sued by DHS f or any arrearage owed to their children and f or r eim bursem ent of welf are benef its paid by

the State.

2Wa sh

. Ap p

. 7 9 6

, 8 1 4

, n .1 2 (2 6 8 P 3 d 22 6 ) (2 0 1 2 ) (Tu rn e r d o e s n o t a ffe c t th ose

c iv il c o n t e m

p t p ro c e e d in gs wh e re th e in d ig e n t p e rso n owe s p ay m e n ts to th e

sta te

, la c k s re p re se n ta tio n b y c o u n se l, a n d th e sta te is re p re se nte d b y c o u n se l).

F u rth e rm o re , Tu rn e r d o e s n o t p r ec lu d e th e litig a n ts fro m b e in g a b le to

p ro c e e d a s a c la ss o n th e m e rits u n d e r o u r sta te c o n stitu tio n

. 4 Th e re are a fe w

p o st-Tu rn e r d e c isio n s wh e re sta te c o u rts h a v e u p h e ld th e rig h t to c o u n se l in th e

v e ry c irc u m sta n c e le ft o p e n b y Tu rn e r a s a m a tte r o f sta te sta tu to ry a n d /o r sta te

c o n stitu tio n a l la w. S e e S c ho c h e t v

. Sc ho c h e t, 43 5 N .J. S u p e r. 5 4 2

, 5 4 5 (8 9 A3 d

1 2 6 4) (im plie s th a t c a se la w be sto win g in d ig e nt p a re n ts th e rig h t to c o u n se l in

c h ild su p p o rt c o n te m

p t pro c e e d in g s is still v ia ble u n d e r th e Ne w Je rse y

Co n stitu ti o n ) ; Cra in v

. Cra in

, 2 0 1 2 WL 6 7 3 7 8 3 6 (Oh io Ap p

. De c

. 2 8

, 2 0 1 2 )

(sta te sta tu te g a v e in d ig e n t p a re n ts th e rig h t to c o u nse l in c h ild su p po rt c o n te m p t

p ro c e e d in g s; sa id sta tu te wa s n o t a b ro ga te d b y Tu rn e r b e c au s e a s t a te a g e n c y

b ro u g h t th e c a se a n d wa s re p re se n te d b y c ou n se l)

. W h a t ’ s m o re , th is c a se is

e v e n m ore d istin g u ish a

b le fro m Tu rn e r b y v i r t u e o f th e fa c t th a t Ge o rg ia la w

e ffe c tiv e ly b e sto ws u p o n DHS a c a te g o ric a l rig h t to c ou nse l, a s o p p ose d to th e

4 Appellants specif

ically alleged a claim fo r v i o l a t i o n o f A r t i c l e I, Section I, Paragraphs

I (the right to due process), II ( e qual protection of the laws) and XIV (the right t o counsel and
to conf r ont witnesses) of

the Georgia Constitution.

3a g e n c y sim

p ly h a v in g a n o p tio n a l p o lic y o f be in g re p re se n te d b y la wy e rs a t su c h

p ro c e e d in g s. S u c h c irc u m sta n c e c le arly w a s n o t a d dre sse d b y Tu rn e r. 5 Th u s I

b e lie v e th e re is still a via b le st a t e co n s titu tio na l c la im on th e m e rits to b e

re so lv e d

. 6 I a m n o t pe rsu a d e d b y th e m a jo rity ’s c o n te n tio n th a t th is c a se c a n n o t

g o fo rwa rd b e c a

u se a p p e lla n ts’ e x p re ss c ita tio n to th e Ge o rg ia Co n stitu tio n in

th e ir c o m p la in t wa s to o “ pa ssin g” in n a tu re to b e c o n s id e re d 7 o r b e c a use

a p p e l l a nts h a v e n o t m a d e a sp e c ific a rg u m e n t re ga rd in g th e sc o p e o f o u r sta te

5 The f acts in Turner show that the c le r k o f t h e S outh Carolina f am ily court would
review delinquent child support o rders a nd i s s ue to n on-com pliant parents “ show cause”

o r d e r s r e q u i ring them to appear a nd show why they should not be held i n contem pt. Id. at
2512. No agency of t he s tate was a party to the proceedings. Id. at 2512-2513, 2 519. Also, Turner’s appeal was predicated on the f ederal constitution only . Id. at 2514.

6 “It is a well- r ecognized principle that a state court is f r ee to interpret its state constitution in any way that does not violate principles of f ederal law, and t h e r e b y grant individuals m ore rights than those provided by the U.S. C onstitution.” Powell v. State, 270
Ga. 327, 331, n

. 3 (510 SE 2 d 18) ( 1998). Indeed, in som e instances, w e have held that the Georgia Constitution af

f ords our citizens broader rights than the f ederal constitution. See,

e.g., Statesboro Pub. Co. v. City of Sy lvania, 271 G a. 92 (2) (516 S E2d 2 96) (1999) (Georgia
Constitution af

f ords b r oader f

ree speech protection than the First Am endm ent of the U.S. Constitution) ; G r i s s o m v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 3 74, n. 1 (418 SE2d 2 7) (1992) (Georgia
Constitution' s equal protection provision m ay provide greater rights than U.S. Constitution);
G r e e n v

. S tate, 260 Ga. 6 2 5, 627, (398 SE2d 360) ( 1990) (Georgia Constitution provides
b r oader protection than U .S. Constitution f or r ight against self

- incrim ination); Flem ing v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 690 (386 S E 2 d 3 3 9) (1989) (Georgia Constitution provides greater protection against cruel a nd unusual punishm ent than U.S. Constitution); Colonial Pipeline
Co. v. B rown, 258 Ga. 115(3) (365 SE2d 827) (1988) ( Georgia Constitution provides greater protection against excessive f i nes and f orf eitures than U.S. Constitution).

7 Appellants n eed only m eet the m inim al requirem ents of notice pleading to set f orth
a claim . See Duf

f ield v. Chui, 314 Ga. App. 214, 215, n. 3 (723 SE2d 506) (2012).

4c o n stitu tio n in th is c o n te xt. 8 We a re o n ly d e c id in g th e issu e o f c la ss c e rtific a tio n

a n d th e re is n o re a so n to d e n y c e rtific a tio n sim p ly b e c a u s e t h e re c o rd h a s n o t

b e e n d e ve lo p e d fu lly o n th e m e rits a t th is sta g e o f th e litig a tio n

. 9 I c a nn o t a gre e

with th e m a

jo rity ’s c o n c lu sio n th a t th e re is n o c a se h e re a s fa r a s o u r sta te

c o n stitu tio n is c o nc e rn e d o r th a t th e issu e o f c la ss c e rtific a tio n is so in e xtric a b ly

tie d to th e u n d e rly in g m e rits th a t c e rtific a tio n o f th e c la ss is fo re c lo se d. 1 0 Giv e n

th e qu e stio n le ft op e n b y T u rn e r a n d th e sta te c on stitu tio n a l issu e s in th is c a se ,

th e t ria l c o urt d id n o t a b u se its d isc re tio n wh e n it c e rtifie d th e c la ss. 1 1

8 Appellants have m ade the argum ent that this case f its squarely in the question lef t

open by T urner which question is broad enough the encom p ass a ny stat e constitutional
issues. Furtherm ore, appellants m ade a supplem e ntal f iling i n this appeal alerting this Court

to the decision in Crain v. C rain, s upra, an a ction which i ndicates t o m e t hat they are in f act pursuing the state constitutional claim s raised in their com p laint.

9 See MCG Health, I n c

. v

. P e r r y , ___ Ga. App.

_ __ (1) (755 SE2d 341) ( March 20, 2014) ("In d eterm ining the propriet y o f a c l a ss action, the f irst i ssue to be resolved is not whether the plaintif

f s have stated a cause of action or m ay ultim ately prevail on the m erits[ ,] but whether the requirem ents of OCGA § 9–11–23(a) have been m et.")

10 O ther than citing the lack of a ca t e g o r i c al right t o an attorney under the f ederal constitution per Turner, the m ajority opinion c ontains no discussion of how the class lacks

c o mmo n ality o r ty

picality

. All of the nam ed plaintif f s a nd proposed class m em bers are indigent; t hey have a ll b een subject to child support contem pt proceedings i n which DHS is

represen t e d b y c o unsel; they have all been incarcerated f or n on-pay

m ent of c hild support; and they have not been appointed counsel in their contem pt proceedings.

11 S ee State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Mabry

, 2 74 Ga. 498, 499-500 (1) (556 SE2d 114) (2001) ("On appellate r e v iew of a trial court' s decision on a m o tion to certif y a class,
the discretion of the trial judge in certif y ing or ref

using to certif

y a class a c tion is t o be respected in all cases where not abused. ") (internal punctuation om itted).

5Ac c o rd in g ly

, I wo uld re ve rse th e C o u rt o f Ap p e a ls an d u p h o ld th e tria l c o u rt’s

o rd e r g ra n tin g c la ss-c e rtific a tio n

.

6