### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Bri efs December 3, 2002 TONY BLAN D v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. P-25954 Carolyn Wade Blackett, Judge

No. W2002-01784-CCA-R3-PC - F iled January 6, 2003

The petitioner challenges the dismissal of his petition for p ost-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court, which dismissed the pe tition based upon t he sta tute o f limitatio ns. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed J OE G. R ILEY , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which T HOM AS T. W OODA LL and A LAN E. G LENN , JJ., joined. Ross A. Sampson, Memphis, Tennessee (in post-conviction court), for the appellant, Tony Bland; and Tony B land, Pro Se (on appeal). Paul G. Summers , Attorne y General and Repor

ter; Chris tine M. Lapp s, Assista nt Attorne

y General ; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney Gene

ral; and Gail Ann VerMaas, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Te nnessee.

OPINION Petitioner pled guilty on

Ma y 7, 1990, to the offense s of selling cocaine and agg ravated burglary , and on June 19, 1990, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent, probated sente nces of three years a

nd four ye ars, re spective

ly. His probation was revoked on October 4, 1991; he served his sentences in the Tennessee Department of Corr ection; and he was paroled on January 30, 1992. He was subsequently indicted in the State of Mississippi, and the two Tennessee convictions were allegedly used as a basis to declare him a habitual offender under Mississippi law. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on December 6, 2001, alleging h is guilty pleas wereunknowingly a nd involuntarily entered a nd he was deprived

of the effective assistance1 The post-c onvic tion co urt app ointed coun sel upo n the filin g of the p etit ion, an d counsel f iled an amended petiti on. Th e reco rd d oes n ot reflec t why ap poin ted co unsel is no t r epre sentin g petitio ner o n app eal. W e take th is opp ortun ity to note th e obli gati on of appoint ed couns el t o cont inu e to r epres ent a post -con vict ion petit ioner on appeal upon denia l of relief b y the po st-conv iction co urt. Dru mm er v. Sta te , 6 S.W.3d 520, 523 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p. 199 9) (also a Shelby County case). However, due to the nature of the narrow issue present ed in this appeal , we envi sion no pra ctic al reason to further

address this s hortcoming. -2- of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petiti on based upon the st

atute of limitations

. This pro se appeal ensued. 1

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS A petition for

post-conviction relief must be filed within one year of the final action of the highest state ap pellate c ourt to whi ch an ap peal is ta ken, or, if no appe al is taken, within one year of the date on which t

he judg ment bec ame fina l, or cons id eration of the petition is barred. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 -30- 202(a). Time is of the essence in claiming post-conviction re lief, and compliance with the on e-yea r statute is an element of the right to file a petition. Id. The statu te itself provides three exceptions to the one-year statute of limitations: (1) when a new constitutional right has beenrecognized; (2) when the petitioner' s innocence has been established by new scientif

ic evidence; or (3) when a previous conviction that enhanced the petitioner 's sen tence ha s been he ld invalid. Id. § 40-30-202(b). The post-conviction court must also consider

an other wise untim

ely petition if the application of the statute of limitations would be a denialof due process. See Seals v. State , 23 S.W.3d 272, 278-79 (Tenn. 2000). The petition was filedmore tha n eleven ye ars afte r the judg ment bec ame fina

l. None of the three statutory

exception s apply

to the late-filed petition. Furthermore, the petitioner’s contention that “compelling circumstances of his present situation being incarcerated in the State of Mississippi made it impossible

for him to

know the laws of Tennessee or keep up with the

chang e in law . . . [so as to raise] this issue in a timely manner” does not cr eate a due process avenu e of relief. Se e Guillermo Matiaz Juan v. State , No. 03C01 -9708-CR- 00318, 199 9 Tenn. Cr im. App. LEXI S 140, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 18, 1999, at Knoxville), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. July 12, 1999) (holding ignorance of the law does not bar a pplication of the post-con viction sta

tuteof limitations); William Ly

nn Johnson v. Sta

te , No . 02 C0 1-9 605 -CR -00 136 , 19 97 T enn . C rim . Ap p. LE XIS 555, at **8-9 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 1997, at Jackson), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 15, 1997) (holding that incarceration in a federalprison without access to Tennessee legal re sources does not fallwithin the statutory exceptions nor the due process exception) . Appl ication o f th e statute of limitationsin this cas e does not violate d ue proce ss. Accord ingly , we aff

irm the jud

gment of the post- convicti on court.

____________________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE