alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Opinion issued October 25 , 201 2

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 1 1
- 0 0743
- CR

——————————— LONNIE WEBSTER ROBERTSON, JR. , Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court Chamber s County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 26786

MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant of the offense of assault with bodily injury and assessed punishment of confinement for 270 days

. A ppellant , proceeding pro se, timely appealed. The court reporter has informed the Court that appellant has2

neither paid nor made arrangements to pay the f ee for preparing the reporter’s record. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 37.3 (c)

. On June 22, 2012, the Court abated the appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to det ermine whether appellant desires to pursue the appeal and, if so, to determine whether appellant is indigent and whether appellate counsel should be appointed. The trial court con ducted a hearing and filed findings in this
Court. The trial court found that, although appellant had been served with notice, he did not appear at the hearing. Appellant’s appointed trial counsel and the State’s attorney appeared . The trial court found that, on or about July 28, 2011, it had received testimony from appellant that he had the financial ability to retain counsel, but that appellant had not reta ined counsel. The trial court found that appellant “does not wish to pro secute the appeal.” In addition, a

ppellant’s a ppointed trial counsel filed an affidavit in this Court, stating that he has spoken with appellant and that appellant does not wish to pay for a reporter’s record or pursue the appeal. Appellant has not fi led a written motion to dismiss the appeal. See T EX
. R.
A PP
. P. 42.2(a). However , we conclude that good cause exists to suspe nd the operation of Rule 42.2(a) in this case. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 2 , 42.2 (a)

.3

Accordingly, we reinstate and dismiss the appeal. We dismiss all other pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle

. Do not publish. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2( b ).
#### Leigh-Davis GLASS, an individual, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. WILSHIRE CREDIT CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation; et al., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 02-55446.

D.C. No. CV-01-09999-RMT.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 13, 2003.*

Decided Jan. 22, 2003.

*461Before BEEZER, KLEINFELD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Leigh-Davis Glass interlocutorily appeals pro se two district court orders, one denying her request for a preliminary injunction as moot, and the other sanctioning her under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (“Rule 11”) for filing two requests for default judgment while settlement negotiations were still ongoing. We have jurisdiction over the denial of her request for a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review for an abuse of discretion. *See Roe v. Anderson,*134 F.3d 1400, 1402 n. 1 (9th Cir.1998). We affirm in part, and dismiss in part.

Glass’ contentions that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her request for a preliminary injunction are unpersuasive. *See Holloway v. United States,*789 F.2d 1372, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1986).

We lack jurisdiction to interlocutorily consider Glass’ Rule 11 sanction because she is a party to the action and the sanction was not made payable immediately. *See Riverhead Savings Bank v. National Mortgage Equity Corp.,*893 F.2d 1109. 1113 (9th Cir.1990).

Glass’ pending motion to excuse her brief deficiency before this court is granted, and all other motions before this court are denied.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, AND DISMISSED IN PART.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 1996 AND
AS OF MARCH 31, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<NAME> FARADAY FINANCIAL, INC.
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<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                         CALLISTO PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.

FORM 10-QSB/A FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2003 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I am the Chief Executive Officer of Callisto Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"). I am delivering this certificate in connection with
the Form 10-QSB/A of the Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2003 and filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Form 10-QSB").

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge,
the Form 10-QSB/A fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information
contained in the Form 10-QSB/A fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: July 2, 2004





                 /s/ Gary S. Jacob
                 -----------------
                 Gary S. Jacob
                 Chief Executive Officer
#### Application of Elbert RIDDLE for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

No. A-12239.

Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.

Jan. 18, 1956.

Writ of Certiorari Denied March 26, 1956.

See 76 S.Ct. 557.

*1044Elbert Riddle, McAlester, petitioner pro se.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

POWELL, Judge.

Petitioner sets out that he is at this time incarcerated in the State Penitentiary at McAlester, serving a life sentence by reason of a. conviction in the district court of Comanche County where he had been charged with the crime of murder.

Petitioner sets out that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to .enter the judgment rendered for the reason that allegedly the first day of trial. only ■ eleven jurors were selected, and the court recessed, leaving as-sumedly, the twelfth juror to be selected the following day. But the gist of the complaint is that the. court abused its discretion in permitting the eleven jurors to Separate during the night and go to their respective homes. It is claimed that the separation was over the objection of defendant.

If the jury was allowed to separate the court no doubt relied on Tit. 22 O.S.1951 § 853.

We note from the records of this court that the petitioner here was jointly charged with his sister, Maudine Virginia Riddle, with the crime of the murder of one Robert W. Henry. Maudine Viginia Riddle appealed her case to this court and raised the above question. See Riddle v. State, 92 Okl.Cr. 397, 223 P.2d 379, 380. In the fourth paragraph of the syllabus in that case we said:

> “There is no statute requiring prospective jurors to be kept together overnight pending the selection of a Jury.”

The complaint here involves an alleged error occurring during the trial of the case, and is properly a matter that should have been brought to this court by appeal, and can not be brought by habeas corpus. Ex parte Simmons, 96 Okl.Cr. 279, 252 P.2d 935. The province of habeas corpus proceedings is to inquire only into jurisdictional matters, and it can not be made to perform the office of an appeal. Ex parte Newman, 67 Okl.Cr. 401, 94 P.2d 556; Perry v. Waters, 97 Okl.Cr. 17, 256 P.2d 1119.

The burden is on petitioner in ha-beas corpus action to at least make a prima facie showing that his confinement is unlawful, , and where facts stated in petition will not warrant petitioner’s discharge, the writ will be denied. Ex parte Gray, 71 Okl.Cr. 123, 109 P.2d 513; Ex parte *Linam,*71 Okl.Cr. 155, 109 P.2d 838.

The writ is .denied.

JONES, P. J., and BRETT, J., concur.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">AAAMG Leasing Corp., as Assignee of Darnier Phillipe, Respondent, <br><br>against<br><br>NY Central Mutual Ins. Co., Appellant. </font></b></div><br><br><p>Nightingale Law, P.C. (Michael S. Nightingale of counsel), for appellant.Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov of counsel), for respondent.</p><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Odessa Kennedy, J.), entered August 22, 2017. The order denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.</p><p>In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court denying defendant's motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations.</p><p>For the reasons stated in <i>Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C., as Assignee of Hill, Laquan v Citiwide Auto Leasing</i> (___ Misc 3d ___, 2019 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2017-1220 K C], decided herewith), the order is reversed and defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.</p><p>PESCE, P.J., WESTON and ALIOTTA, JJ., concur.</p><br>ENTER:<br>Paul Kenny<br>Chief Clerk<br>Decision Date: August 02, 2019<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
#### Milton O’BRYANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MIDLAND, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-8239.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 22, 1993.

*422John E. Gunter, Glen D. Aaron, II, Midland, TX, for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard D. Davis, Jr., Kristi F. Hyatt, Cotton, Bledsoe, Tighe & Dawson, Midland, TX, for defendant-appellee.

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD, Circuit Judge, and PARKER,* District Judge.

*

 Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

Milton O’Bryant appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his claims based on a conclusion by the district court that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is not retroactive.

O’Bryant’s complaint is based on actions allegedly taken by the defendant City of Midland in July 1990 and in July 1991 as a result of a disabling injury O’Bryant sustained in October 1989. Congress specifically made the ADA effective with respect to state and local governments as of January 26,1992. The statute becomes effective as to private employers, depending on the number of employees, either on July 26,1992, or July 26, 1994. O’Bryant’s complaint was filed on September 28, 1992.

Persuaded that Congress did not intend retroactivity for the ADA and perceiving no basis for concluding otherwise, we hold that the ADA is not to be given retroactive effect and, accordingly, AFFIRM.
Exhibit 10.2

 

FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE

UNITED THERAPEUTICS CORPORATION

2011 SHARE TRACKING AWARDS PLAN

 

WHEREAS, United Therapeutics Corporation (the “Corporation”) maintains the United Therapeutics Corporation 2011 Share Tracking Awards Plan (the “Plan”); and

 

WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the Corporation has the authority under Section 10.1 of the Plan to amend the Plan at any time.

 

NOW, THEREFORE, Section 5.1 of the Plan is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows:

 

5.1.         Share Tracking Awards.  The maximum number of Share Tracking Awards available under this Plan shall be 4,000,000, subject to adjustment as provided in Article 7.  Any Share Tracking Award which, for any reason, expires, is cancelled, is forfeited or otherwise is terminated unexercised as to such shares may again be subject to a Share Tracking Award granted under this Plan.  No shares of Common Stock shall be issued pursuant to this Plan and payments made under this Plan, if any, shall be made solely in cash.

 

This First Amendment to the Plan shall become effective upon its adoption by the Board of Directors of the Corporation.
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.1
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
            August 14, 2007
    
    
    
    By:
    
    /s/ SCOTT D. PETERSDate
    
    
    
    
    
    Scott D. PetersChief Executive Officer and President(principal executive officer)
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 17 (Thursday, January 25, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 5002]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-01400]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

POSTAL SERVICE


International Product Change--Priority Mail Express 
International, Priority Mail International & First-Class Package 
International Service Agreement

AGENCY: Postal Service<SUP>TM</SUP>.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the 
Postal Regulatory Commission to add a Priority Mail Express 
International, Priority Mail International & First-Class Package 
International Service contract to the list of Negotiated Service 
Agreements in the Competitive Product List in the Mail Classification 
Schedule.

DATES: Date of notice: January 25, 2024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christopher C. Meyerson, (202) 268-
7820.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The United States Postal Service[supreg] 
hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on 
January 12, 2024, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a USPS 
Request to Add Priority Mail Express International, Priority Mail 
International & First-Class Package International Service Contract 35 
to Competitive Product List. Documents are available at www.prc.gov, 
Docket Nos. MC2024-166 and CP2024-172.

Christopher Doyle,
Attorney, Ethics & Legal Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2024-01400 Filed 1-24-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Commerce

###### Foreign-Trade Zones Board

          - [B-50-2023]

      ( print page 3636)    
On September 18, 2023, Epson Portland, Inc. submitted a notification of proposed production activity to the FTZ Board for its facility within Subzone 45F, in Hillsboro, Oregon.

                    The notification was processed in accordance with the regulations of the FTZ Board (15 CFR part 400), including notice in the                     **Federal Register**                     inviting public comment (88 FR 65365, September 22, 2023). On January 16, 2024, the applicant was notified of the FTZ Board's decision that no further review of the activity is warranted at this time. The production activity described in the notification was authorized, subject to the FTZ Act and the FTZ Board's regulations, including section 400.14.                

Dated: January 16, 2024.

Elizabeth Whiteman,

Executive Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2024-00984 Filed 1-18-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
#### ARTHUR et al. v. ARTHUR et al.

No. 35991.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 7, 1953.

*1192Little & Hoyt, Oklahoma City, Charles S. Arthur, Manhattan, Kan. and Virgil Shaw, El Reno, for plaintiffs in error.

Porta & Weaver and Rinehart & Rine-hart, El Reno, for-defendants in error.

BLACKBIRD,'Justice.

This action was commenced in the trial court by the filing of a petition by Ira W. Arthur and Lizzie Kaler, coexecutors of the-estate of J. E. Shirk, deceased, against Virgil M. Shaw, guardian of the person and estate of Cassie Vance, an incompetent person, Charles S. Arthur and Anna Pearson Arthur.

' The petition alleges that Lizzie Kaler and Ira W. Arthur are coexecutors of the estate of J. E. Shirk, deceased, appointed the 19th day of August, 1912; that Charles S. Arthur and Anna Pearson Arthur are husband and wife; that Charles S. Arthur is the nephew of Cassie Vance; that by -reason of the receipt of certain property Charles S. Arthur and his wife became indebted to the estate of J. E. Shirk, deceased, and the estate of Cassie Vance.

Issues:were joined by answer after which the court ordered Charles S. Arthur and Anna Pearson Arthur to make an accounting of all funds, money and property received from the estate of J. E. Shirk, deceased, or from Cassie Vance.

The defendants Charles S. Arthur and Anna Pearson Arthur have appealed to this court from this order in separate petitions in error filed in this cause and the plaintiffs have filed a motion to dismiss-on the ground that the order is not a final order and the errors complained of cannot be presented to this court until there, has been a final determination on the merits in the trial court.

The motion must be sustained. In Oklahoma City Land & Development Co. v. Patterson, 73 Okl. 234, 175 P. 934, this court said:

> “An appeal does not lie to this court from an intermediate or interlocutory order made during the pendency of an action, which intermediate or interlocutory order leaves the parties in court to have the issues tried on the merits, unless the appeal sought to be taken comes within some one of the special orders from which an appeal is authorized by statute prior to final judgment in the main action.”

Plaintiff s - have cited the case of Warren v. Howell, 204 Okl. 674, 232 P.2d 934, in support of their position. That case is not applicable here. There, it is obvious we merely held that an order establishing *the existence of a partnership*was an ap-pealable order. Our opinion makes-it plain that said order pertained to the merits of the action and that the accounting sought was merely incidental and dependent upon a prior determination of that' primary and principal issue. Here, the order of - the trial court for an accounting was purely an interlocutory order and any error therein cannot be presented here until final judgment in the case.

There is also filed in this case an application to stay the proceedings in the trial court pending this appeal. The application to stay the proceeding is denied and the appeal is dismissed.