### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Fe bruary15, 200 5 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. WILLIE JOE F RA Z IER
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Marshall County No. 8356 Charles Lee , Judge

No. M2003- 03014-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jul y 26, 2005

I n 1980, the Appellant, Willie J oe Frazier, wa s indicted for multiple counts of a rmed robbe ry

and related assaults stemming f rom his pa

rticipation, along with two other acc omplices, in the robbery of a number of employ ees and customers of a pharma cy in L ewisburg . Howeve r, Frazier e scape d from jail bef

ore his sche duled t ri al an d wa s not apprehe nded until 2002. I n 2003, Fr azier wa s c on vic te d b y

a Ma rs ha ll Co un ty

jury of tw o c ou nts of

ma lic iou s sh oo tin g , on e c ou nt of a ssa ult wi th i n t ent t o commit voluntary manslaug hter, one count of a ssault with intent to commi t first deg ree mur de r, on e c ou nt o f ag g ra vate d ass ault , six co un ts o f a rm e d r ob be ry , a ndtw o c ou nts of a ssa ult wi th intent to commit robb er y

. The jury sentenc ed Frazier to indeterminate sentenc es for all the
c on vic tio ns e xce pt the six arm e d r ob be ri e s, fo r w hic h th e jury fi xed se nte nc e s of l if

e imp ri so nme nt. The tr i al court g rouped the thirteen c onvictions into t hree cate g ories for purposes of c onsecutive sentenc ing, r esulting in six concurre nt life sentenc es conse cutive to conc urre nt sentence s of eig ht to twenty y ear s and conse cutive to a ten to twe nty -five y ear sentenc e. This re sulted in an eff ective sentenc e of life plus eig hteen to forty -five y ear s in the Department of Corr ection. On a ppeal, Frazier arg ues: (1) he was sentenced to crimes for which no g uiltyverdic ts were returne d by the jury ; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for a ssault with intent to commi t robbery of Ollie Ba g ley

and assault with int ent to commit robbery of Goldi e C rabtre e; (3) the jury ’s sentenc ing verdic ts refle ct two sentenc es which w ere not authorized for the c rimes for which he was c onvicted; (4) his convic tions for malicious shooting must be set a side bec ause (a) he wa s never indicted for these c rimes, (b) they are not le sser offe nses of any indicted offe nses, and (c) his dual convictions for malicious shooting and assault wi th intent to commit voluntary manslaug hter of Judy

Watson
c on sti tut e do ub le je op ard y ; a nd(5 ) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y imp os ing c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s.
After revie w, we find no err or with r eg ard to issues (1) and (5). With reg ard to issue (2) , we c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e is ins uff ici ent to s up po rt

his tw o c on vic tio ns of

a ssa ult wi th i nte nt t o c omm it r ob be ry ; th e re fo re , th e c on vic tio ns aremod if ie d to re fl e c t c on vic tio n s f o r a g g r av a te d a ssa

ult , wi th the re sp e c tiv e se nte nc e s f ixed a t not les s tha n tw o y e ars no r m or e than te n y e ars . I ssu e (3 ) i s re nd e re d mo ot i n v ie w o f o ur ho ldi ng in iss ue (2 ). With re g ardto i ssu e (4 ), we c on c lud e that do ub le jeopar dy princip l es p re clude dual convictions for a ssault with intent to commi t voluntary
ma ns laug hte r andma lic iou s sh oo tin g . A c c or din g ly , w e me rg e the Ap pe llant’ s c on vic tio n f or a ssa ultC o

- d efend ant Fail s’ sur nam e i s spell ed “Fel l s” i n t he t ri al t rans cri p t ; ho wever, o t her d o cum ent s i n t he reco rd 1
ref l ect a s p el l i ng of “Fai l s. ” A d d i t i o nal l y , t hi s co urt uti l i zed the spe l l i ng “Fa i l s” i n a de ci si o n i nvo l vi ng co

- d efend ant D ia n e G ro o m s. S e e S t a t e v
. Gr o o ms , 65 3 S.W

. 2 d 27 1 , 27 3 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. 19 8 3 ).
-2- with intent to commit voluntary manslaug hter into his c onviction f or malicious shooting and rema nd fo r e n tryo f as i n gl e j u d gm en to f c o n v i ct i o n fo r m al i ci o u s s h o o t i n g. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t; Re verse d in P art; Modif ied in Part ; and Rem anded

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and T HOMAS T. W O O D A LL , J ., joined.

Merrily n Fe irman, Na shville, Tennessee ; and Andre w J ackson Dea ring , I I I , Shelby ville, Tennesse e, for the A ppellant, Will ie J oe Frazier.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th T . Ry a n, As sis ta nt Attorne y Ge ne ra l; W. Mi chae l Mc C o wn , District Attorney Gene ral; and Weakley

E. Ba rnar d, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

The evidence at t rial established that on October 11, 1980, the Appellant, a long w ith J erry F a ils a ndDi a ne Gr oo ms, e nte re d H & S Pha rm a c y in L ewi sb urg soon a ft e r the sto re ’s 8:0 0 a .m. 1 opening . Fa ils was arme d with a 16-g aug e pump shotg un, and the Appellant carrie d a pistol. The trio herde d store cle rk Ann Worley , sevente en-y ear -ol d em p l o y ee Richard Tate, pharmacist Sam She lto n, bo ok

ke e pe r Jud y

Pig g , and eig hty -o ne -y e ar- oldde liv e ryma n O lli e B a g le y , a lon g wi th customers, Jacki e L owe, Dor othy Colli ns, Goldie Crabtre e, B illyPugh, and Pugh’ s g randnie ce at g un po int to a sma ll o ff ic e a t th e ba c k o f the sto re . A ft e r e sc ortin g the vic tim s to th e off ic e , F a ils
a nn ou nc e d th a t e ve ry on e wo uldbe sh ot. L a te r F a ils app are ntl y recons id ered a ndtol d th e vic tim s that th e y wo uldbe tie d u p. Ho we ve r, wh e n th e a ssailants ran o ut o f r op e , th e vic tim s w e rea g a in i n f o r m e d t h a tt h e y w o u l d b e s h o t

. F o r t u n a t e l y, a d d i t i o n a l b i n d i n g s w e r e f o u n d

. A ttr i a l , W o r l e y, Tate, Pig g , Pugh, a nd Colli ns testified that afte r being order ed to lie on the floor, the ir jewe lry and wallets we re taken. The Appellant told Worley that if she di dn’t take he r ring s off, he would cut off her f inge rs. B ag ley

was kicke d to the floor and “ stomped” i n the head. L owe testified that no money was taken fr o mh erp er s o n

. W h en P u gh ’s ei gh t ee n -m o n t h -o l d gra n d n i ec e b ega n t o cr y , Fa i l s d i rec ted the Appellant to kill the child, but the Appellant re fused. While Fails and Grooms were in the pharma cy are a of the store st ealing narc otics and a bank deposit bag containing money , the Appellant
re ma ine d inthe of

fi c e wi th the vic tim s.-3-

Ric ha rda ndJudy

Wat so n a rrive d at H & S Pha

rm a c y wh ile the ro bb e ry wa s still in p ro g re ss. Mr. Watson left his wife in t he ca r while he went inside the store to purcha se a birthday car d. As Mr. Watson was re ading car ds, Fa ils approac hed and pointed a gun at him. Fails then ordere d W at s o n t o “c o m e h er e, ” a n d , u p o n co m p l i an ce , Fa i l s p l ac ed t h e gu n b arre l n ex tt o W at s o n 's l ef tt h i gh and pulled the trigger. T h e s h o t g un injury require d amputation of the leg . Grooms told the Appellant and F ails, “[W atson] has a wife or a g irlfriend in the c ar,” and one of the men re sponded, “we have g ot to ge t her in her e.” I n the meantime, Mrs. Watson, tired of w aiting f or her husband, de c ide d to g o in sid e the ph arm a c y to i nv e sti g a te his de la y . A s sh e ste pp e d o ut of he r ve hic le , M rs

. Watson saw the Appellant a nd Gro o ms carry ing a larg e box from the store. Gr ooms looked back in the store, smiling a nd waiving , and said, “see y ou later.” As Mrs. Watson enter ed the store and
wa lke d to wa

rdthe c ardse c tio n, F a ils po int e d a sh otg un at her and sai d, “ I g ot y ou r G odda mn husband, and y ou are g oing to be next, y ou white bitch.” Af ter she saw her husband ly ing in a pool of blood, she wa s pulled past the offic e and into the storag e are a wher e Fails told her to lie down and then proc eede d to shoot her in the rig ht leg . The trio then f led in Grooms’ automobile.

J ackie Gre en, a de puty

sherif f w it hth eM a r s h all County

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment, was on r outine patrol in a vehicle unequippe d with a police r adio when he noticed an olde r model, dar k g ree n Buic k with A labama tag s speeding down West Commerc e. The car eventua lly pulled over on the shoulder of the roa d, and Gr een pulled be hind it. Fails, who was in the passenge r seat of t he car, e x ited the vehicle and fired two shots at Green, shattering his windshield. Fails then g ot back in the c ar, and sped aw ay . Unable to r adio for ba ckup, Gr een stopped at a g as station and ca lled the sherif f’s department. Grooms’ abandoned vehic le was f ound sever al miles away . Soon therea fter, de tectives with the L ewisburg Police Depa rtment found the Appe llant hitchhiking a short distance fr om the abandone d vehicle. H is acc omplices wer e ar rested the next day

. Whil e a waiti ng tr ia l in the sp ri ng of 19 81 , the Ap pe llant e sc ape d f ro m th e Ma

rs ha ll Co un ty J ail. I n September 2002, the Appellant was stopped by a Vancouver , Washington police of fice r for
a cr acke d windshield. A routine computer chec k of the Appe llant’s driver’ s license ultimately led t o h i s arre s tan d re t u rn t o M ar s h al l C o u n t y , T en n es s ee

. Fo l l o wi n g a j u rytri al an d j u rys en t en ci n g, the Ap pe lla nt w a s c on vic te d o f the fo llo wi ng of fe ns e s a ndse nte nc e d a s f oll ow s: 1. Malicious shooting of Richa rd Watson - 4 to 10 y ear s 2. Assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaug hter of Judy

Watson - 2 to 5 y ear s 3. Malicious shooting of Judy Watson - 4 to 10 y ear s 4. Assault with intent to commit first deg ree murder of J ack G ree n - 10 to 25 y ear s 5. Ag g ravated assault of Jackie L owe - 4 to 10 y ear s 6. Armed r obbery

of Sam Shelton - life 7. Armed r obbery

of B illyPugh - life 8. Armed r obbery

of JudyPigg - life 9. Armed r obbery

of Dorothy

Colli ns - life 10. Armed r obbery of Ann Whorley

- life 11. Armed r obbery of Richar d Tate - life 12. Assault with intent to commit robbery of Ollie B ag ley

- 10 to 42 y ear s 13. Assault with intent to commit robbery of Goldie Cra

btree - 10 to 21 y ear sAs di s cu s s ed i n f ra , t he t ri al co urt did no t charg e t he l ess er offense of ass aul t wi t h i nt ent t o co m m i t rob b ery 2
b y m e a n s o f a d e a d ly we a p o n

. -4- Ana lys is
I. Absence of Guilty Ver dicts

Th e Ap pe lla nt co nte nd s tha t he wa s sen te nc e d by the jury fo r c ri me s f

or wh ic h n o v e rd ic ts of g uilt were returne d. Specifica lly , he asse rts that althoug h he wa s indicted and sente nced f or the
arm e d r ob be ri e s o f A nn Who rl e y a ndRic ha

rdTate , th e jury

faile d to re turn v e rd ic t forms o f g uil t fo r the se of

fe ns e s. Th e re c or d c on ta ins g uil ty ve rd ic t f orms f or the tw o r e sp e c tiv e c on vic tio ns

. Ac c or din g ly , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

II. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence Next, the Appellant arg ues that the e vidence is in s u f f ic ie n t t o s u p p ort his separate convictions for a ssault with the intent to commit robbery of Ollie Ba g ley and of Goldie Cra btree . The Appe llant was indicted f

or the a rmed robbery of both Cra btree and Ba g ley ; how ever , at the close of the proof, the trial court grante d a judg ment of ac quittal on these cha rg es, as no pr oof wa s prese nted that anything wa s taken fr om either victim

. T h e t ri al court, however , char g ed the jury on the lesser included off

ense of assault with intent to c ommit robbe ry

. To convict of this c rime, the State was 2 require d to prove be y ond a reasonable doubt the foll owing essential ele ments: (1) that the de fendant
un la wf ull y a ssa ult e d th e a lle g e d v ic tim ; ( 2) that thede fe nd a nt i nte nd e d to c omm it the sp e c if ic offe nse of robbery ; and (3) that the offense of robbery was not consummated. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-607 (1980) (re peale d 1982).
The Ap p e ll a n t a

r g u e s th a t th e c o n v ic ti n g p r o o f is in s u f f ic ie n t b e c au s e n o e v id e n c e w as introduced to e stablish that either B ag ley or Crabtre e wa s the intended vic t i m o f a robbe ry . The
rec ord re veals that B ag ley was de cea sed by

the time this case c ame to trial in 2002. Goldie Cra btree was not a w itness at trial, and no e x planation was pr ovided for this per son’s absenc e.
Con sid e ri ng thi s issu e , w e app ly the ru le that w he rethe su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e is
c ha lle ng e d, the re le va nt q ue sti on fo r the re vie wi ng c ou rt is “ wh e the r, a ft e r vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the light most favor able to the [State], any rational t ri er o f fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S

. 30 7, 31 9, 99 S. Ct. 27 81 , 2 78 9 ( 19 79 ); se e als o Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) . Mo re o v er , t h e State is entitled to the stron g e s t l e g it im a te v ie w o f th e e v id e n c e a n d a ll r e a s o n ab le in f e r e n c e s w h ic h may

b e d raw n there from. Sta te v . H

ar ris , 83 9 S.W. 2d 54 , 75 (T e nn

. 19 92 ). Al l qu e sti on s inv olv ing the c re dib ili ty of witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, and all fac tual issues are resolved by the trier of fac t. State v. Pappas , 754 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. This c ourt will not
rew eig h or re evaluate the evidenc e prese nted. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)

.-5-

“A g uiltyverdic t by

the jury , appro v ed b y t he trial judg e, ac cre dits the testimonyof the witnesses for

the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory

of the State.” State v. Grac e , 49 3 S.W. 2d 47 4, 47 6 (T e nn . 1 97 3) . A jury c on vic tio n r e mov e s th e pr e su mpt ionof inn oc e nc e wi th which a de fendant is ini tially cloake d and re place s it with one of g uilt, so that on appea l, a convicte d defe n d an t has the burde n of demonstrating that the e vidence is insufficient. Sta te v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . These r ules are applicable to finding s of g uilt predicate d upon direc t evidenc e, circumstantial evidenc e, or a combination of both. Sta te v . M att he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

. The State a

rg ues that the jury

could infer

from the totali t y o f t h e ev idence that it was the Appellant’s intent to rob Bag ley and C rabtre e following t heir removal wit h the ot hers to the offic e are a. We w ould a g ree that a convic tion may be base d entirely

on circ umstantial evidence wher e the fac ts are “s o cl ea rl y i nterwove n and conne cted that the f inge r of g uilt is pointed unerringly at the defe ndant.” Sta te v . S

mi th , 868 S.W .2d 561, 5 6 9 (Tenn. 1993) . Howeve r, it is appare nt from the
rec ord that the robbe rs’ primary purpo s e for c onfining the victims in the back off ice wa s for the Appellant to maintain control ove r their pe rson while the two other robber s collecte d narc otics and cash f rom the pharmacy . Although the majority o f t h o s e confined in the off ice testified that they
were rob bed at g un po int , at le a st o ne vic tim te sti fi e d th a t th e pe rp e tr a tor s at no tim e a tte mpt e d to
remove valuables f

rom her posse ssio n

. At t ri al, three victims briefly testified re g arding the Appellant’s a nd Fa ils’ treatment of B ag ley and Crabtr ee w hile the two wer e in the off ice. How ever , n o t e s t i m o n y

s u g g e s t e d t h a te i t h e r

B a g l e y o r C r ab tr e e w a s e v e r t h e i n t e n d e d v i c t i m o f a r o b b e r y

. In the abse nce of an y ev i d en ce of an intent to rob e ither B ag ley or Crabtre e, the Appe llant’s two convictions for a ssault with intent to commi t robbery must be reve rsed a nd vacated.
Notwithstanding a

lack of evidenc e for these crimes, the re cord doe s establish, throug h the testimonyof th e thre e witnesses, Sam Shelton, J udy Pigg , and Dor othy

Colli ns, that Ba g ley

was br u t a l l y a s s au l t e d b y

F a i l s

. A f

t e r t h e e i g h t y
- o n e

- y e ar

- o l d B a g l e y w a s r e m o v e d t o t h e o f

f i c e , his hands we re tied be h i nd his back, a nd he wa s order ed by Fails to “ge t down on the damn floor.” She lto n te sti fi e d th a t a ft e r B a g le y e xpla ine d h e c ou ld no t g e t do wn on the fl oo r, F a ils “ kn oc ke d h im down.” “ When he was lying on the g round (sic) , on his stomach, Fails stood above him and stomped his head a s hard a s he could. It l ooked like he me ant to kill him .” Pigg added that Ba g ley was kicked to the f

loor, and Collins stated that Ba g ley h ad “a gas h on his head” and bled “ profuse ly .” The proof

with reg ard to both B ag ley and Crabtr ee es t ab l ished that they , along with the other victims, were ta

ken to the off

ice at gunpoint and force d to remain ther e at g unpoint, while being subjected to thre ats of death or bodily harm.

On the date of these of

fense s, our code provided, “Any person indicted for assault with intent to kill or assault with intent to commit any other fe lony

may be found g uiltyof assault or ag g ravated assault.

. . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-608 (1980) (re peale d 1982). The trial court c orre ctly instructed the jury that a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult wa s a le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e of a ssa ult wi th i nte nt t o c omm it robbery

. The c ourt specif ically char g ed the jury wi th that po rt ionof the a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult statut e which provide s that befor e the Appe llant could be convic ted of a g g ravated assault, the S t ate was require d to prove be y ond a re asonable doubt that: (1) the def endant a ssaulted an o ther, a nd (2) the-6-

de fe nd a nt d isp la y e d a

de a dly we apo n or the vic tim kn e w the de fe nd a nt ha d a dea dly we apo n inhis possession. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 601(3) ( 1980) (r epea led 1982).

After revie w of the recor d, we c onclude that the e vidence supports convictions for the ag g ravated assaults of Ollie B ag ley and Goldie Cra

btree . Acc ording ly , we modify the Appellant’ s judgme nts of conviction to ref lect convictions of agg ravated assault of Oll ie Bag ley and ag g ravated assault of Goldie Cra

btree . When the proof shows the de fendant guilty of a lesser off ense f rom that which he w as convic ted, which is included in the g reater, a ppellate c ourts s h o u l d sustain the conviction of the lesser offe nse and at the same time f ix the minimum penaltyu n d er t h e l esser offe nse. Cor le w v . S tate , 1 80 S.W. 2d90 0, 90 3 ( Te nn . 1 94 4) ; se e als o Fa rri s v . S tate , 535 S.W .2d 608, 621 (Tenn. 1976) . There fore , we f ix the sentenc e for

eac h of these of

fense s at the minimum sentenc e of not less than two y ear s nor more tha n ten y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 601(4).

III. Unau thorize d Sentences

As previ ou sly

no te d, the Ap pe llant w a s c on vic te d b y the jury of the a ssa ult wi th i nte nt t o commit robbery

of Goldie Cra

btree and of O llie Ba g ley . The Appe llant contends that the jury improperly sentenc ed him in both c ounts f or assault with intent to c ommit armed robbe ry as opposed to the jury ’s verdic t of assault with intent to c ommit robbe ry

. The State conce des the e rror , which resulted f rom the jury ’s being provided with incorr ect jury sentenc ing forms that did not corr espond to the conviction offe nses. This issue, howeve r, is rende red moot i n v i ew o f o u r modification of both assault with intent to commit robbery convictions to ag g ravated assault.

IV . U nindi c te d Offe nse s a nd D oubl e Je opa r dy

The A p p e ll a n t a

r g u e s th a t h is c o n v ic ti o n f o r th e ma li c io u s s h o o ti n g o f Ri c h ar d Watson cannot standb e c au s e h e w a s n e v e r in d ic te d f

o r th is c r im e , a n d ma li c io u s s h o o ti n g is n o t a le s ser offe nse of the in d i ct ed off ense of assault with intent to commit m urder . I t is undisput ed that malicious shooting is not a lesser inclu d ed o ff

en s e o f assault with int ent to commit first deg ree murder. State v. Max , 714 S.W .2d 289, 294-95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). The Appellant’s a rg ument is ill -founde d, howeve r, as the r ecor d plainly shows that he wa s indicted in separ ate c ounts for assault with intent to commit f irst de g ree murder of Richard Watson and the ma licious shooting of Richard Watson.

Simi la rly , the Appellant a

rg ues that his conviction for the malicious shooting of Judy Watson is invali d b e c au s e h e w a s n e v e r in d ic te d f o r th is o f f e n s e , a n d ma li c io u s s h o o ti n g is n o t a lesser of fe ns e of the ind ic te d o ff

e ns e of a ssa ult wi th i nte nt t o com mi t fi rs t de g re e mur de r. Ag a in, thi s contention is without merit because the Appellant was indicted for both crimes of a ssault with intent t o co m m i tfi rs td egr ee m u rd eran d m al i ci o u s s h o o t i n g. Additionally , the Appellant arg ues that his dua l convictions for both the malicious shooting of Judy Wat so n a ndthe a ssa

ult wi th int e nt to co mmi t volu nta ry ma ns laug hte r of

Judy Wat so n v iol a te constitutional protections ag ainst double jeopar dy . Initially , we note that the Appellant ha s failed-7-

to cite any

authority in support of this arg ument as required by Tenn. R. App. P

. 27(a) (7) and Tenn. Ct. Cr im. Ap p. R. 1 0( b) . Furth erm ore, th e Ap pe llant h a s n ot r a ise d th e iss ue prior to this app e a l. Ty pic a lly under these circ umstances, our analy sis of an issue is waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b). Neve rtheless, re view of this issue is permitted if plain er ror e x is t s

. R u l e 5 2 (b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that " [a] n err or which ha s aff ecte d the s ubstantial rig hts of an
acc used may be noti ced at any time, even thoug h not raised in the motion for a new tria l or assig ned
as er ror on a ppeal, in the discretion of the appellate court wher e nece ssary to do substantial just ice.” Be cause a fundamental constitutional right of the Appellant is aff

ecte d, we elec t plain e rror revie w. See Sta te v . S

mi th , 24 S.W .3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000)

. To resolve a double jeopa rdy punishment iss u e, we must: (1) conduct a n analy sis of the offe n s es p u rs u an t to Blockburge r v. United States , 284 U.S. 299 (1932); (2) analy ze the evidenc e used to prove the offe nses ac cording to Duchac v . S tate , 505 S.W .2d 237 (Tenn. 1973) ; (3) conside r whether there wer e multiple victims or di scre te acts; and (4) compar e the purposes of the respe ctive statutes. State v. De nton , 938 S.W .2d 373, 381 (Tenn. 1996)

.
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-610 (1975) (r epea led 1982) provided that malicious sh oo tin g oc c ur s w he n one pe rs on “ un la wf ull y or ma lic iou sly

sh oo ts o r s ta

bs a no the r. ” On the date these c rimes wer e committed, the re was no codified c rime of a ssault with intent to commi t voluntary manslaug hter. None theless, the provisions of T en n es s ee Code Annotated sec tion 39-603 (1975) (re peale d 1982) provided:

I f any pe rs on a ssa

ult a no the r, wi th int e nt to c omm it, or oth e rw ise a tte mpt

to c omm it,
an y fe l ony

or crime punishable by

imprisonment in the penitentiary , wher e the punishm en t i s not otherwise pr escribed, he sha ll, on conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five (5) y ear s, or, i n the discre tion of the jury , by imprisonment in the county workhouse or

jail not more than one ( 1) y ear , and by fine not excee ding f

ive hundre d dollars ($500).
Thus, any person who a ssaulted another with intent to c ommit voluntary manslaug hter wa s g uiltyof an attempt to commit a fe lony as provided by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-603. As sault wi th int e nt to c omm it vo lun tary ma ns laug hte r oc c ur re d (1 ) wh e n a n in div idu a l f e lon iou sly and willfully

assaulted a ny

pers o n , (2 ) with intent to commit vol untary manslaug hter, a nd (3) the specific felony

of voluntary

manslaug hter wa s not consummated. Malicious shooti ng , by definition,
re qu ir e d a

“ sh oo tin g ” wh e re a s a ssault w ithint e nt t o c omm it v olu nta ry ma ns laug hte r d id n ot. Mo re ov e r, a ssa

ult wi th i nte nt t o c omm it v olu nta ry ma ns laug hte r r e qu ir e d pro of of a n in te nt t o kill and malicious shoot i n g did not. Thus, there is not an identity of ele ments. See M

ax , 714 S.W .2d at 294-95.
Next, we consider the evidenc e utiliz ed to prove the offe nses under Duchac . The e vidence relied upon by the S tate to establish both crimes wa s the same, i.e. , a sing le g unshot to the victim’s l e g

. T h u s , t h e r e w a s o n e d i s c r e t e a c ta n d o n e v i c t i m

. F i n a l l y , t h e m a l i c i o u s s h o o t i n g a n d a s s au lt wi th int e nt to co mmi t fir st de g re e mur de r statut e s hav e the sa me pu rp os e

. Th e ir c omm on pu rp os eT he m i nim um p un i shm en t fo r assau l t wit h int en t t o co m m i t t he felo ny o f vo l un t ary m an sl au gh t er w as no t l ess 3

t hen one y ear nor m ore t han fi ve y ear s ; wher eas , t he mi ni mum p un i s hment for mal i ci ous s hoot i ng was not l es s t han t wo y ea r s n or mor e t h an t en y ea r s

. T en n

. Code An n

. §§ 39- 603, - 612.

T h e S ta te d isp u te s the a lleg a tio n th a t th e A p p e llan t le d a c rim e -f re e e x isten c e , fo c u sin g u p o n the A p p e llan t’s 4
f raudulent us e o f

i d ent i f i cat i o n s o urces, i ncl ud i ng t he use of hi s m i no r s o n’ s So ci al Sec uri t y num b er.

O n t he dat e t he offens es wer e c om mi t t ed, co nse cu t i ve s ent enc i ng was gove r ned s ol el y by t he gu i del i nes 5

est ab l i shed i n G r ay
. -8- is to deter assaultive conduct. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that double je opardy bars c onvictions for both assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaug hter a nd malicious shooting. We modify the judgme nts of conviction to ref lect m er g er of

the assault with intent to commit volunt ary manslaug hter into the convic tion f o r malicious shooting. See State v . Banes , 874 S.W .2d 73, 81 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (under the merg er conce pt, the lesser c onviction merg es with the g reater offe nse re sulting in one judg ment of convic tion). 3

V. Co nse c ut iveSe nt e nc ing

N e x t , t h e A p p e l l a n tc h a l l e n g e s t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s i m p o s i t i o n o f c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c e s

. In
o rd er i n g partial c onsecutive se ntence s, the trial court followed the dictates of State v. Gray , 538 S.W .2d 391 (Tenn. 1976) , finding the Appellant both a dang erous offe nder and a multiple offende r. At se nte nc ing , th e tr ia l c ou rt g ro up e d th e Ap pe llant’ s c on vic tio ns of un la wf ul a c ts i nto thr e e g ro up s: (1) r obbery

of the victims and a s s au l t s d u ri ng perpe tration of the r obberie s; (2) the a ssault of the Watsons, which occur

red a fter thero b b er i es we re complete; and (3) the assault of D eputy Gre en during flig ht. The Appe llant arg ues that during his twenty -two y ear s of fre edom, he c ommitt ed no crimes, whic h demonstrates “ absolute knowledg e that the public [was] not at risk.” This ar g ument is m i s p l ac ed

. Whil e the Appe llant’s relative crime- fre e existence in society is relevant, it is not dispositi ve. 4

I n Gray , the supreme court he ld, “[a] defendant may be cla ssified as a dang erous of fende r if the crimes for whic h he is convicte d indicate that he has l ittle or no reg ard f or human life and no hesitation about committing a c rime in which the risk t o h u m an life is hig h.” 538 S.W.2d at 393 (e mph a sis a dd ed). The c e ntr a l pu rp os e of c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing of da ng e ro us of

fe nd e rs is t o pr ote c t s o c i e t y a g a i n s t t h o s e o f f e n d e r s w h o c o m m i t a g g r a v a t e d c r i m e s w h i c h p o s e a h i g h ri skto human life. It is clear f

rom the h o l ding of Gray that a finding that the def endant is a dang erous offe nder may

be, and of ten will be, determined sol ely from the circumstance s surrounding the crimes for whic h the defe ndant is being sentenc ed. “The decision to impose consec utive sentenc es whe n 5 crimes inher ently

dang erous a

re involved should be ba sed upon the pre sence of ag g ravating f actor s . . . .” Id

. The pres e n c e o f

a g g r a v a ti n g f

a c to r s inth is c a s e is o v e r w h e lm in g

. T h e A p p e ll a n t s tands convicted of

twelve crimes of violence. His conduct a nd that of his acc omplices direc tly impacted the lives of twelve i n n ocent victims. The pr oof established that the victims of the robberies-9-

re a so na bly be lie ve d th e y we re g oin g to die

. A d e pu ty sh e ri ff wa s f ir e d u po n d uring the e sc ape wi th the shotg un blast striking the deputy ’s patrol c ar. O llie Ba g ley was ne ver f

unctional af

ter his brutal beating . The Watsons were the victims of a s en s el es s assault. Richard Watson’s leg require d
a mpu ta tio n. Th e fa c ts o f this c a se dem on st rat e a dis re g ardfo r h uman li fea nda wi lli ng ne ss t o c omm it c ri me s in wh ic h the ri sk to hu ma n lif e is hig h. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s se nte nc ing de c isi on is f ir mly
su pp orte d b y

the la w andme rc if

ul u nd e r the fa c ts. The Appe llant also arg ues that th i s s t at e's procedure for the imposition of consec utive
se nte nc e s v iol a te s Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. C t. 2531 ( 2004). He asserts that the trial co urt eff

ectively incre ased the total leng th of his sentence bey ond the statutory minimum by imposing conse cutive sente nces without a jury determination. Our supreme court has held that the Tenne ssee Sentenc ing A ct does not violate the Six th Amendment. State v. Gomez and Londono , No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. A pril 15, 2005). Moreove r, our high court has specifica lly noted that Bl ake ly does not impact this state' s cons ec u t i ve sente ncing scheme

. State v. Robinson , 146 S.W .3d 469, 499 n.14 (Tenn. 2004)

. CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, w e mer g e the Appe llant’s conviction for assault with the intent to commit voluntary manslaug hter of J udy Watson into his conviction for malicious shooting and direc t entry

of a single judgment of conviction for malicious shooting. We re verse the Appellant’ s convictions for a ssault with the intent to commit robbery of Ollie Ba g ley and Goldie Crabtre e and
rema nd for e ntry

of judg ments of conviction for the lesser included crime of ag g ravated assault of Ollie Ba g ley

and Goldie Cra

btree . The minimum sentenc e of not le ss than two nor more tha n ten y ear s imprisonment is imposed for eac h conviction, provided the State indicates its consent. In the event the State doe s not consent, the case will be rema nded for a new trial upon the two cha rg es of
a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult a nda ny app lic able le sse rs . Impo sit ion of c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing is a ff ir me d w ith the g ro up ing of a ll c on vic tio ns to re ma in a s orig ina lly de te rm ine d b y the tria l c ou rt , w hic h, in e ff e c t, will result in no chang e in the Appe llant’s initiallyimposed ag g reg ate se ntence

.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE