IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-31006

BONNIE GILES,

Plaintiff – Appellant

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant – Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:09-CV-00685

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and SOUTHWICK, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

For well over a decade, Plaintiff Bonnie Giles has been seeking disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Giles asserts she

became disabled on February 7, 1992, resulting from the onset of multiple

impairments including scoliosis, temporal lobe epilepsy, headaches, Graves

disease, depression, fibromyalgia, diabetes, and a later onset of cardiac disease. 

Giles first filed for disability benefits in 1996 and her claim has since been heard

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 18, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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by four administrative law judges (“ALJs”). All four denied benefits. The first

three decisions were remanded by the Social Security Appeals Council or by the

federal district court. The district court affirmed the most recent ALJ decision

and Giles timely appealed. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.

I. Factual Background

Giles was born in 1950 and has a high school education. She worked for

Mobil Oil in Dallas from 1977 until the alleged onset of her disability in

February 1992. During her time at Mobil, she was promoted several times,

eventually becoming a computer analyst, which she did for about a year until

she became sick. Giles claims she was terminated for missing too much work,

a problem caused by her illness. After being terminated, Giles moved to her

hometown in Louisiana to be closer to family.

Although Giles states her disability began in February 1992, the medical

records provide limited insight into the treatment she received before 1996,

showing only that she was seen by a psychiatrist for a few months and an

endocrinologist for a few years. The records also show that Giles has a 43 degree

lumbar curvature, but most doctors agreed that scoliosis is the lesser of her

problems. In October 1996, Giles started seeing Mairus McFarland for family

practice medicine, whose regular notes are throughout the record.

Giles’s medical history is complex, likely in part due to the challenges

inherent in treating Graves disease, an autoimmune disorder that causes

hyperthyroidism. Treatment of Graves disease may lead to hypothyroidism,

which can cause depression, mental and physical sluggishness, and weight

gain—conditions appearing in Giles’s medical history. Giles’s thyroid condition

had been treated successfully with medication in September 1995, but

physicians later altered her medications because of negative side effects. In

April 1996, the endocrinologist noted that Giles’s Graves disease was seemingly

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under control, but he expressed concerns that it may be over-controlled. In

February 1997, the record indicates Giles had normal thyroid function without

medication, but she still relied on medication intermittently during the next

several years. 

Throughout Giles’s illness, she has struggled with depression. Some

examining physicians also suggested she be assessed for bipolar disorder. 

Several doctors noted that Giles was crying during examinations. 

Much of Giles’s physical pain during 1996 and 1997 involved her temporal

lobe seizures which were likely causing severe migraine headaches. However,

medical records suggest that the prescription medication Tegretol was generally

effective in assisting Giles with her seizures, and Giles’s complaints about the

headaches were limited from 1999 to 2006.

In early 1997, Giles was admitted to the hospital and ultimately diagnosed

with diabetes. Her gallbladder was removed and she started insulin therapy. 

There is no indication that her diabetes was an impairment until late 2004,

when she was admitted to the hospital with chest pain and the emergency room

physician noted that her diabetes was poorly controlled.

Despite Giles’s numerous health problems, there are very few medical

records from 1998 through 2005, other than regular notes from her primary care

physician. In 2005, Giles’s cardiac issues arose, and she was diagnosed with

mitral valve prolapse and later received a pacemaker.

Giles has not been employed since 1992, and her insured status expired

on December 31, 1998. Accordingly, she must establish disability on or before

that date. 

II. Procedural Background

Four ALJs have denied Giles’s claim. In May 1998, ALJ Morton J. Gold

denied the claim, which was later remanded for failure to consider updated

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medical evidence. ALJ Thomas Bundy was the second to review the case in

November 2001, and his decision was remanded because of an insufficient

examination of the claimant’s mental impairment and credibility. ALJ Nancy

J. Griswold took the case on the next appeal in May 2004, and the district court

remanded her decision because of insufficient consideration of the claimant’s

severe headaches and whether an underlying medical impairment could have led

to Giles’s alleged symptoms. Finally, ALJ Charles R. Lindsay issued a decision

in August 2008, which serves as the basis for this appeal. All ALJs incorporated

the previous ALJ’s opinion in their decision.

ALJ Lindsay found that Giles had severe impairments of thyroid disease,

depression, cardiac disease, epilepsy, diabetes, and a history of migraine

headaches. He found that these conditions and others limited Giles’s residual

functional capacity (RFC) to the performance of light work except for no more 1

than frequent postural activities (and no climbing ladders); an inability to work

at unprotected heights or around dangerous moving machinery; no more than

frequent reaching, handling, and fingering; moderately reduced ability to

understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions; moderately reduced

ability to maintain attention and concentration, deal with the public, and set

goals independently; the need to sit and stand at will; and an inability to work

in high stress situations. ALJ Lindsay concluded that these limitations did not

preclude Giles from performing her past relevant work as a computer analyst

and that she could also perform three alternative jobs recommended by the

vocational expert: cashier II, telephone information clerk, and document

preparer.

Light work is defined as work involving “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with 1

frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted

may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing,

or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg

controls.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

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The Appeals Council rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that Giles could have

performed her prior job. Giles only worked as a computer analyst for one year,

and the vocational expert testified that two years of experience were required to

acquire skills at that level. Moreover, the Appeals Council found that “[i]n light

of the numerous, moderate mental limitations that are contained in the

established residual functional capacity,” Giles was unable to perform her past

work. The Council agreed that the vocational expert’s testimony provided

sufficient support to conclude that Giles could perform the alternate jobs ALJ

Lindsay listed, and the Council affirmed the denial of benefits. The district court

affirmed, and Giles timely appealed.

III. Applicable Laws

This court reviews the Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits

only to ascertain (1) whether the final decision is supported by substantial

evidence and (2) whether the Commissioner used the proper legal standards to

evaluate the evidence. Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind 2

might accept to support a conclusion. “It is more than a mere scintilla and less 3

than a preponderance.” When we apply the substantial evidence standard, “we 4

scrutinize the record to determine whether such evidence is present. We may

not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute our judgment” for

that of the Commissioner.5

Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000).

2

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 3

Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

4

Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted), cert. denied,

5

514 U.S. 1120 (1995); see Newton, 209 F.3d at 452.

5

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In order to be eligible for disability benefits, the claimant must prove that

she has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, or

combination of impairments, lasting at least twelve months that prevents her

from engaging in a substantial gainful activity. Substantial gainful activity is 6

defined as work involving significant physical or mental abilities that is usually

done for pay or profit. The ALJ engages in a five-step sequential evaluation 7

process for determining whether an individual is disabled: (1) whether the

claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the

claimant has a medically determinable severe impairment, as defined by

regulations; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of

impairments meets the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the

regulations; (4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing her

past relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from

doing any other work.8

Before considering the fourth and fifth steps, the Commissioner must

determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). The RFC is the 9

individual’s ability to do physical and mental tasks on a sustained basis despite

limitations from her impairments. In determining the RFC, the Commissioner

must consider all of a claimant’s impairments, including those that are not

severe.10

The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps and then the

burden shifts to the Commissioner for the fifth step. If the claimant shows she

 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 6

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a) and (b).

7

 Id. § 404.1520(a). 8

 Id. § 404.1520(e). 9

 Id. § 404.1545. 10

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is no longer capable of performing her previous jobs, the Commissioner must

show that the claimant is capable of engaging in some type of alternative work

that exists in the national economy. Giles does not challenge the 11

Commissioner’s conclusions in the first four steps. Rather, the sole basis for this

appeal involves the RFC limitations and Giles’s ability to perform alternative

work.

IV. Discussion

A. Consideration of the Combined Effects of Giles’s Multiple Impairments

Giles argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the combined effects

of her multiple impairments. This claim generally is without merit, as ALJ

Lindsay specifically incorporated “the combination” of Giles’s diabetes, cardiac

disease, and migraine headaches into his RFC. Additionally, he included

limitations resulting from Giles’s epilepsy and depression. However, Giles

contends that neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council considered the effects of

her scoliosis and fibromyalgia in combination with the other impairments listed. 

Neither of these two conditions was listed as a severe impairment or explicitly

included in the RFC. However, the RFC included a specification allowing Giles

to sit or stand at will to assist with back pain. 

In challenging ALJ Lindsay’s failure to list scoliosis as a severe

impairment, Giles points to several physician reports that label the scoliosis as

“severe.” However, a conclusion that the degree of curvature is medically

“severe” differs from a finding that the ailment was “severe” for purposes of

disability determination. A non-severe impairment under the Social Security

regulations is one that “does not significantly limit [the claimant’s] physical or

Chaparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987).

11

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mental ability to do basic work activities.” The plaintiff has the burden of 12

proving that her medical condition qualifies as severe. Giles points to no 13

documents in the record to support her assertion that scoliosis significantly

limited her physical work ability. 

Further, the medical history does not support including any specific

limitation in Giles’s RFC because of her fibromyalgia. Medical records from

1997 and 1998 indicate that Giles was experiencing joint pain, which may have

been related to fibromyalgia. However, after Giles received a Celestone injection

in December 1998, there are no records to suggest fibromyalgia caused Giles

difficulty. Giles herself did not raise this condition in her most recent ALJ

hearing. ALJ Lindsay did not err when failing to list fibromyalgia as severe nor

does the medical history support an additional RFC limitation to account for the

effects of fibromyalgia. 

B. Consideration of Treating and Examining Physicians’ Opinions

Disability cases typically involve three types of physicians: 1) a treating

physician who regularly provides care to the claimant; 2) an examining

physician who conducts a one-time physical exam of the claimant; and 3) a

reviewing or non-examining physician who has never examined the claimant,

but read the claimant’s files to provide guidance to an adjudicator. Because the 14

treating physician is most familiar with the claimant’s impairments, his opinion

should be accorded great weight in determining disability. If a treating 15

physician’s opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. 12

See Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005).

13

See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

14

Newton, 209 F.3d at 455.

15

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laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other

substantial evidence in [the] case record, [the Commissioner] will give it

controlling weight.” Likewise, when a treating physician has reasonable 16

knowledge of the impairment, his opinion is given more weight than an opinion

from a non-treating physician. By contrast, the Commissioner may give less 17

weight to a treating physician’s opinion about a condition outside his area of

expertise. Treating physicians’ opinions also receive greater weight “[w]hen 18

the treating source has seen [the claimant] a number of times and long enough

to have obtained a longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] impairment.” The 19

weight given to opinions from nonexamining physicians depends on “the degree

to which they provide supporting explanations for their opinions.”20

An ALJ is free to reject a physician’s opinion when good cause exists.21

“Good cause may permit an ALJ to discount the weight of a treating physician

relative to other experts where the treating physician’s evidence is conclusory,

is unsupported by medically acceptable clinical, laboratory, or diagnostic

techniques, or is otherwise unsupported by the evidence.” 

22

Social Security regulations provide that the Administration “will always

give good reasons in [the] notice of determination or decision for the weight [it]

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

16

Id. 17

Id. The regulation provides the example of an ophthalmologist who notes that the 18

patient complains of neck pain during an eye exam. The ophthalmologist’s assessment of the

neck pain would be given limited weight, even though he is a treating physician, because the

pain is outside his specialty.

Id. 19

Id. § 404.1527(d)(3).

20

Newton, 209 F.3d at 455.

21

Id. at 456.

22

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give[s the claimant’s] treating source’s opinion.” Further, Social Security 23

Ruling 96-2p instructs that an ALJ should not reject the treating physician’s

opinion simply because it is not well-supported by the record. In those 24

instances, the opinion is not given controlling weight, but the treating source

opinion is “still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors

provided in [the regulations].”25

Giles alleges thatthe Commissioner did not adequately weigh the opinions

of treating and examining physicians and over-relied on a reviewing physician’s

report. ALJ Lindsay’s decision included a description of interrogatory responses

by a reviewing physician, neurologist Dr. Woodrow W. Janese. As noted above,

this opinion may only be weighted according to the value of its supporting

explanations. If ALJ Lindsay had heavily relied on Dr. Janese’s testimony, such

reliance would have been in error because Dr. Janese’s responses to the

interrogatories were conclusory and without explanations. However, ALJ

Lindsay did not rely exclusively upon Dr. Janese—the medical record as a whole

supports ALJ Lindsay’s conclusions. Further, ALJ Lindsay’s decision

incorporated the preceding ALJ opinions, which together adequately address

why some physician reports were given greater or lesser consideration.

i. Disability Determinations Reserved for the Commissioner

Although some determinations, such as disability and RFC, are legally

reserved for the Commissioner, Social Security guidelines require adjudicators

making these determinations to consider the opinions of medical sources and

“apply the applicable factors” denoted in the regulations when weighing the

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

23

Social Security Ruling 96-2p, Titles II and XVI: Giving Controlling Weight to 24

Treating Source Medical Opinions, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,490 (July 2, 1996).

Id. at 34,491. 25

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opinions. These factors are: 1) the physician’s length of treatment of the 26

claimant; 2) the frequency of examination; 3) the nature and extent of the

treatment relationship; 4) the extent to which the physician’s opinion is

supported by the medical record; 5) the consistency of the opinion with the

record as a whole; and 6) the specialization of the treating physician. With 27

regards to a disability determination, the guidelines note that medical opinions

“must not be disregarded. However, even when offered by a treating source,

they can never be entitled to controlling weight or special significance.”28

Several physicians—Dr. McFarland, Dr. Rogers, and Dr. Russell—

indicated at various points in time that they considered Giles to be disabled. In

the second administrative review of this case, ALJ Bundy specifically addressed

these statements and found that they need not be attributed great weight based

on the above-listed factors. His conclusions are supported by the record as a

whole.

ii. Mental Health Conditions

The district court remanded ALJ Bundy’s decision back to the

administration for his failure to address the severity of Giles’s mental

impairment. Thus, ALJ Griswold, the third administrative reviewer, focused on

Giles’s mental health claims, and ALJ Lindsay incorporated Griswold’s findings

into his decision. Both ALJs noted that Giles’s mental health treatment had

been sporadic over the years. One mental health specialist opined that Giles

was mentally impaired to the point that she was not functional at work, but ALJ

Griswold adequately explained why this opinion was given limited weight. The

 Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96–5p, Titles II and XVI: Medical Source Opinions on 26

Issues Reserved to the Commissioner, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471, 34,473 (July 2, 1996).

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

27

 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,474. 28

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physician had only treated Giles for five months and a subsequent examining

physician’s report found fewer impairments. More importantly, there is no

evidence that Giles sought mental health treatment after November 1996.

Although Giles did not seek professional psychological help, she did follow

up with her family practice physician, Dr. McFarland, who continues to

prescribe anti-anxiety medication. Giles asserts that the Commissioner’s

decision did not properly weigh Dr. McFarland’s assessment of Giles’s mental

limitations. However, ALJ Griswold adequately explained why she gave limited

weight to Dr. McFarland’s assessment. For example, Dr. McFarland said that

Giles had a poor ability to maintain concentration, but his opinion was not

consistent with the record as a whole; several other physicians denoted that

Giles’s memory and concentration were intact. Moreover, Dr. McFarland is not

a mental health specialist, so his opinions regarding the claimant’s mental

impairments are entitled to lesser weight.29

To the degree Dr. McFarland’s opinion was consistent with the record, the

Commissioner’s decision adequately takes it into consideration. For example,

Dr. McFarland opined that Giles has a poor ability to deal with work stress, and

the vocational expert testified that the recommended alternate jobs were

appropriate for an employee who could not handle high stress job environments. 

Although ALJ Lindsay concluded that Giles’s mental health limitations

would not impair her from performing her prior work, the Appeals Council

reversed that portion of his decision. The Council’s conclusion that Giles could

perform the alternative jobs listed by ALJ Lindsay, even with her mental

limitations, is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The

Commissioner’s final decision adequately considered the testimony of treating

and examining physicians in determining Giles’s mental health limitations.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

29

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iii. Physical Limitations

Giles further claims that ALJ Lindsay’s RFC assessment failed to

acknowledge the full extent of her reduced physical capacity. Specifically, Giles

cites to Dr. McFarland’s finding that Giles could only occasionally lift up to 10

pounds. Dr. McFarland also found that Giles’s condition prohibited her from

sitting for more than an hour or standing for more than an hour during an eight

hour work day. ALJ Lindsay, however, concluded that Giles could sit or stand

for a full eight hours as long as she had the option to alternate between the two

postures at will. Giles contends that this RFC determination improperly ignored

Dr. McFarland’s expert opinion.

While Dr. McFarland’s conclusions are relevant, they are not controlling. 

The record does not reflect why Giles would be limited to the degree asserted by

Dr. McFarland. Moreover, even if Giles could only occasionally lift up to 10

pounds, as Dr. McFarland concluded, Giles would still be capable of performing

two of ALJ Lindsay’s alternative jobs—the telephone information clerk and the

document preparer—both of which are sedentary positions, requiring lifting of

no more than ten pounds. Likewise, Dr. McFarland limited Giles to only

occasional postural maneuvers, and while ALJ Lindsay did not incorporate that

into his RFC, the vocational expert testified that none of the three recommended

jobs would be affected if the claimant was limited in that manner. Therefore,

ALJ Lindsay adequately considered Dr. McFarland’s overall diagnosis, even if

the ALJ did not follow the precise guidance Dr. McFarland suggested with

respect to Giles’s RFC limitations.

C. Claimant’s Credibility

Giles’s third claim is that ALJ Lindsay’s credibility finding is not based

upon substantial evidence. She asserts that ALJ Griswold’s decision was

remanded in part to address the credibility issue and that ALJ Lindsay failed to

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follow the Appeals Council instructions. The Appeals Council had remanded so

the ALJ would “consider the following factors in evaluating the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of the alleged symptoms: objective medical

evidence; medical opinions; prior work record; daily activities; the location,

duration, frequency and intensity of pain or other symptoms; precipitating and

aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of

medication, including headaches and drowsiness; treatment other than

medication and other measures used to relieve symptoms.” 

ALJ Lindsay noted that he was evaluating the intensity and persistence

of Giles’s pain based on the medical record. He summarized her full medical

record and concluded that her statements were not entirely reliable. He did not

discuss each factor listed by the Appeals Council, but his decision need not do so. 

The Social Security Ruling on credibility determinations denotes the “kinds of

evidence,” including the above factors, that must be considered, but there is no

instruction that every factor must be discussed in detail in the determination.30

Of course the ALJ’s determination decision cannot simply make conclusory

statements regarding credibility and “must contain specific reasons for the

finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record,” but ALJ 31

Lindsay satisfied this burden by discussing the medical record and opinions.

While the record supports Giles’s assertions regarding her diagnoses, the

extent of the symptoms she described in the hearing exceed what the record

supports. For example, Giles testified she has severe migraine headaches two

to three times a week, while the record only supports that Giles experienced

Social Security Ruling 96-7p, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability

30

Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual’s Statements, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,483, 34,485

(July 2, 1996); see also Clary v. Barnhart, 214 Fed. App’x 479 (5th Cir. 2007) (“The ALJ is not

required to mechanically follow every guiding regulatory factor in articulating reasons for

denying claims or weighing credibility.”).

 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,486. 31

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intermittent headaches, which diminished in frequency with her seizure

medication. In short, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support ALJ

Lindsay’s determination to give the claimant limited credibility.

Finally, ALJ Lindsay did not ignore Giles’s testimony entirely. He found

that Giles “has established a lengthy history of complaints of headaches, and it

is reasonable to conclude that she did experience occasional headaches that,

alone or in combination with her seizure disorder, depression, and other

impairments, could have resulted in moderate limitations.” He included these

limitations in his RFC.

D. Burden of Proving the Availability of Alternative Work

At step five in the disability benefits determination, the Commissioner has

the burden of proof to show that there is other gainful employment the claimant

is capable of performing in spite of her limitations. Giles first argues that she

is not capable of performing the cashier II or telephone information clerk jobs

because she has a moderate limitation in dealing with the public. The

Dictionary of Occupational Titles does not explicitly state that persons with such

moderate limitations are incapable of performing these jobs. Although the 32

record suggests that Giles has some limitations in social contexts, there is an

adequate basis for the ALJ to conclude that Giles could sustain some social

See D.O.T. 211.462-010 Cashier II (“Receives cash from customers or employees in 32

payment for goods or services . . . .”); D.O.T. 237.367-046 Telephone Quotation Clerk (“Answers

telephone calls from customers requesting current stock quotations . . . .”). The Appellant

notes that the vocational expert’s citation to D.O.T. 237.367-046 was in error because the

formal name is Telephone Quotation Clerk, rather than Telephone Information Clerk as stated

by the vocational expert. Appellant suggests that the vocational expert intended to refer to

D.O.T. 237.367-022, the listing for information clerk. However, the D.O.T. number originally

cited by the vocational expert is the proper listing—the alternative name for Telephone

Quotation Clerk is listed as “Telephone-Information Clerk,” which is distinct from the regular

information clerk listing.

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interaction in a work environment. The vocational expert testified that Giles 33

could perform these tasks, even if she had a moderate limitation in her ability

to interact with the general public and a marked limitation in dealing with

detailed instructions. 

To overcome the vocational expert’s testimony, Giles argues that the

expert did not properly understand the term “moderate.” The ALJ defined

moderate to mean “that there are more than slight limitations but the person

can still perform the task satisfactorily.” The vocational expert testified that 34

a person with moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, carrying out

detailed instructions, and setting goals independently could perform Giles’s past

skilled work as well as the recommended unskilled alternate jobs. However, the

Appeals Council disagreed and found that Giles’s multiple moderate

impairments prohibited her from performing her prior skilled work. 

Giles asserts that the Appeals Council decision undermines the vocational

expert’s conclusion because, in order to reach opposing positions about Giles’s

capacity to perform her prior skilled work, the vocational expert must have

relied on a different interpretation of multiple “moderate” impairments than the

Appeals Council endorsed. Given the facts of this case, we do not find this

argument persuasive. First, the Appeals Council based part of its decision on

the fact that Giles had not performed her prior job as a computer analyst for long

enough to retain transferable skills. Second, the vocational expert also testified

See Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that the ALJ may rely 33

on the vocational expert’s testimony if the record reflects an adequate basis for doing so even

if the vocation expert’s testimony conflicts with the DOT). Further, Giles admits thatthe third

alternate job identified by the vocational expert, document preparer, does not require

significant interaction with the general public.

In an unpublished opinion, this court affirmed the use of a similar definition for 34

“moderate,” which is not defined by the regulations. Cantrell v. McMahon, 227 Fed. App’x 321,

322 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding the vocational expert understood the degree of limitation at issue

when the ALJ defined “moderate” to mean “there are some limitations, but the person can still

perform the task satisfactorily”).

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that a prohibition on high stress environments would prevent the claimant from

performing the computer analyst position. The ALJ’s RFC denoted that Giles

could not work in high-stress environments, yet he still included her past prior

work in his recommendation. The Appeals Council properly reversed this

portion of his decision. Yet this reversal does not mean that the remainder of

the vocational expert’s testimony was irrelevant or unpersuasive. The vocational

expert had a satisfactory understanding of the multiple moderate limitations in

Giles’s RFC, and both she and the Appeals Council found that Giles could

adequately perform the alternate unskilled jobs, even with her multiple

limitations. The Commissioner may rely upon the vocational expert’s testimony

to satisfy his burden of proof that the claimant is capable of performing alternate

jobs in the national economy.35

V. Conclusion

“Procedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not required. This

court will not vacate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a party have

been affected.” Giles has noted several occasions where the ALJ did not 36

thoroughly address each aspect of the record. Yet when dealing with such an

extensive and multi-faceted record, there will always be some evidence that is

not specifically discussed in the Commissioner’s decision. Our review is limited

to examining whether the decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial

evidence in the record, and it is here. Likewise, the Commissioner used the

proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence, and the ALJ adequately

resolved inconsistencies in the record. The decision below is AFFIRMED.

See, e.g., Carey, 230 F.3d at 145.

35

Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see Anderson v. 36

Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 634 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Mays).

17

Case: 10-31006 Document: 00511542858 Page: 17 Date Filed: 07/18/2011