Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DAVID W. STONE, IV GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ERIC P. BABBS

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ARTRECE D. PATTERSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 48A05-1112-CR-693

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Defendant. )

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Dennis D. Carroll, Judge

Cause No. 48D01-0910-FC-179

September 4, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
2

Case Summary

Artrece Patterson (“Patterson”) appeals the trial court’s finding of violation and 

revocation of his probation. 

We affirm.

Issues

Patterson raises two issues for our review, which we restate as:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support revocation of his 

probation; and

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 6, 2010, Patterson was convicted, following a jury trial, of Residential Entry 

as a Class D felony, Resisting Law Enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor, and Carrying a 

Handgun Without a License as a Class A misdemeanor. On June 1, 2010, the trial court 

imposed a sentence of forty-two months, eighteen months of which were suspended to 

probation. On November 26, 2010, Patterson was released from prison and began serving 

probation.

During a controlled drug buy on August 22, 2011, Detective Gaskill and Officer 

Williams of the Madison County Drug Task Force were out of uniform and conducting 

surveillance on a house from an unmarked car when they observed Patterson walk to the 

front of the house and sit on the front steps. They approached and identified themselves as 

police officers, at which point Patterson fled on foot. The officers ordered him to stop but he 

kept running, leading the police on a chase through the yards of several neighboring homes. 
3

He was apprehended after other officers and a K-9 unit joined the chase.

On October 26, 2011, the State filed a Notice of Violation of Probation alleging that, 

in connection with the events of August 22, 2011, Patterson committed Conspiracy to 

Commit Dealing in Cocaine as a Class B felony,1 Resisting Law Enforcement as a Class A 

misdemeanor,2 Residential Entry as a Class D felony,3and Criminal Mischief as a Class A 

misdemeanor.4 

On November 29, 2011, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether Patterson violated the terms of his probation, and if so, whether to revoke his 

probation. The trial court found that Patterson violated his probation by committing a new 

criminal offense, Resisting Law Enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor, and ordered him to 

serve the previously-suspended portion of his sentence. Patterson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Patterson contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he resisted 

law enforcement. More specifically, he argues that he could have reasonably disbelieved that 

Detective Gaskill and Officer Williams were police officers because they were wearing 

civilian clothes and driving an unmarked car. Patterson also argues that the trial court abused 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).

2

I.C. § 35-44-3-3(a)(3) (2011). Relevant subsection recodified at I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1, effective July 1, 

2012. We refer to the version of the statute in force at the time of the alleged crime.

3

I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5.

4

I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a)(2)(A)(i).
4

its discretion in revoking his probation.

Probation revocation is a two-step process. Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 955 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) trans. denied. The trial court first must make a factual determination 

that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. Id. If a violation is proven, the 

trial court then must determine if the violation warrants revocation of probation. Id. 

In reviewing an appeal from the revocation of probation, we consider only the 

evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, and we neither reweigh the evidence 

nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 954-55. Probation revocation proceedings 

are civil in nature, and the State needs to prove a violation of probation only by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Thornton v. State, 792 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 

(citing I.C. § 35-38-2-3(e))5. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the 

trial court’s decision that a defendant has violated any terms of probation, we will affirm the 

decision to revoke probation. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639-40 (Ind. 2008).

A condition of Patterson’s probation was to not violate Indiana law. (App. at 24.) 

Resisting law enforcement is a Class A misdemeanor, and occurs when a person “knowingly 

or intentionally[] . . . flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or 

audible means, . . . identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop.” I.C. § 35-

44-3-3(a)(3). While knowledge of a person’s status as a law enforcement officer is not 

required by statute, it has been required by case law when resistance occurs during an arrest. 

Battle v. State, 818 N.E.2d 56, 58-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (Robb, J., concurring with separate 

 

5 Relevant subsection recodified at I.C. § 35-38-2-3(f), effective July 1, 2012. We refer to the version of 

the statute in force at the time of the alleged crime.
5

opinion) (citing Sayles v. State, 513 N.E.2d 183, 187 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), trans. denied).

At Patterson’s probation revocation hearing, Officer Williams of the Madison County 

Drug Task Force testified that during a controlled drug buy on August 22, 2011, Patterson 

fled when Detective Gaskill and Officer Williams identified themselves as police officers. 

They ordered Patterson to stop, but he continued to flee. After Patterson’s arrest, he stated 

that “he took off running and that he had already began resisting arrest so he just continued to 

keep running[,]” that “he knowingly knew [sic] that Police Officers were in pursuit of him[,]”

and that “he ran between the houses attempting to flee from Officers.” (Tr. at 34-35.) 

Based upon the facts and circumstances, the trial court could reasonably find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that when Patterson fled, he knew Gaskill and Williams were 

police officers. Therefore, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that Patterson was in 

violation of his probation. Patterson’s argument that “[a]nyone can say he is an officer” is an 

invitation to reweigh evidence, which we cannot do. See Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 639. 

Sanction

Upon finding a probation violation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part 

of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-

3(g)(3) (2011).6 The decision to revoke probation is within the sole discretion of the trial 

court. Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 639. The trial court’s decision is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Sanders, 825 N.E.2d at 956. Given 

 

6 Relevant subsection recodified at I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3), effective July 1, 2012. We refer to the version 

of the statute in force at the time of the alleged crime.
6

Patterson’s criminal history and the fact that his conduct resulted in four new charges, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve all of his 

suspended sentence.

Conclusion

The State presented sufficient evidence to support revocation of Patterson’s probation. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Patterson’s probation and ordered 

that he serve the remainder of his suspended sentence.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.